Volume III - Annexes 50 - 110

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
v.
UGANDA
COUNTER-MEMORIAL OF UGANDA ON REPARATION
VOLUME III
6 FEBRUARY 2018

VOLUME III
REPORTS
Annex 50 International Rescue Committee, Mortality in Eastern DRC:
Results from Five Mortality Surveys by the IRC (May 2000)
Annex 51 Les Roberts, International Rescue Committee Health Unit,
Mortality in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo:
Results from 11 Surveys (2001)
Annex 52 Republic of Uganda, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into
Allegations into Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo 2001, Final Report (Nov. 2002)
Annex 53 U.K. All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region
and Genocide Prevention, Cursed by Riches: Who Benefits
from Resource Exploitation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo? (Nov. 2002)
Annex 54 International Rescue Committee, Mortality in the DRC:
Results from a Nationwide Survey (2003)
Annex 55 International Crisis Group, Ethiopia and Eritrea: War or
Peace?, ICG Africa Report No. 68 (24 Sept. 2003)
Annex 56 Burnet Institute, International Rescue Committee, Mortality
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Results from a
Nationwide Survey (2004)
Annex 57 Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold, Democratic
Republic of the Congo (2005)
Annex 58 B. Coghlan, R. Brennan, et al., “Mortality in the Democratic
Republic of Congo: a Nationwide Survey”, The Lancet, Vol. 367,
No. 9504 (7 Jan. 2006)
Annex 59 Democratic Republic of the Congo, Poverty Reduction and
Growth Strategy Paper (July 2006)
Annex 60 International Rescue Committee, Burnet Institute, Mortality in
the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Ongoing Crisis (2007)
Annex 61 L. Wyler, P. Sheikh, International Trade in Wildlife: Threats and
U.S. Policy, CRS Report for Congress, RL34395 (22 Aug. 2008)
Annex 62 A. Lambert, L. Lohlé-Tart, La surmortalité au Congo (RDC)
durant les troubles de 1998-2004: une estimation des décès en
surnombre, scientifiquement fondée à partir des méthodes de la
démographie (Oct. 2008)
Annex 63 Health and Nutrition Tracking Service (HNTS), Peer Review
Report: Re-examining mortality from the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, 1998-2006 (2009)
Annex 64 Human Security Report Project, “Part II, The Shrinking Costs
of War”, Human Security Report (2009-2010)
Annex 65 Ministère de la Justice et des Droits Humains, République
Démocratique du Congo, & PNUD, Monitoring judiciaire
2010-2011, Rapport sur les données relatives à la réponse
judiciaire aux cas de violences sexuelles à l’Est de la
République démocratique du Congo (2010-2011)
Annex 66 Marie Chêne, Transparency International, U4 Expert Answer:
Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) (8 Oct. 2010)
Annex 67 Martin Ekofo Inganya, Avocats sans frontières, La réparation
des crimes internationaux en droit congolais (2014)
Annex 68 Jacques B. Mbokani, Open Society Initiative for Southern
Africa (OSISA), La jurisprudence congolaise en matière de
crimes de droit international. Une analyse des décisions des
juridictions militaires congolaises en application du Statut de
Rome (2016)
ARTICLES & BOOKS
Annex 69 Henry M. Stanley, In Darkest Africa: Or the quest, rescue and
retreat of Emin, Governor of Equatoria, Vol. II (1890)
Annex 70 D. Rice, B. Cooper, “The Economic Value of Human Life”,
American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 57, No. 11 (Nov. 1967)
Annex 71 J. S. Landefeld, E. Seskin, “The Economic Value of Life: Linking
Theory to Practice”, American Journal of Public Health, Vol.
72, No. 6 (June 1982)
Annex 72 Auguste Maurel, Le Congo de la Colonisation Belge à
l’Indépendance (1992)
Annex 73 Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Washington Office on Africa,
“Appendix One: Historical Background, From Leopold to
Mobutu”, Zaire: A Nation Held Hostage (1992)
Annex 74 Koen Vlassenroot, “The Promise of Ethnic Conflict:
Militarisation and Enclave-Formation in South Kivu” in
Conflict and Ethnicity in Central Africa (D. Goyvaerts, ed.,
2000)
Annex 75 E. Pay & D. Goyvaerts, “Belgium, the Congo, Zaire, and
Congo: A Short History of a Very Shaky Relationship” in
Conflict and Ethnicity in Central Africa (D. Goyvaerts ed.,
2000)
Annex 76 G. Kiakwama & J. Chevallier, The World Bank, “Nonreformers:
Democratic Republic of the Congo”, Aid and Reform in Africa:
Lessons from Ten Case Studies, (S. Devarajan, D. Dollar, T.
Holmgren, eds., 2001)
Annex 77 F. Missier & O. Vallee, “Du Scandale Zaïrois au Congo
Gemmocratique” in Chasse au diamant au Congo/Zaire (L.
Monnier, B. Jewsiewicki, G. de Villers eds., 2001)
Annex 78 Adam Hochschild, “Congo’s Many Plunderers”, Economic &
Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (27 Jan.- 2 Feb. 2001)
Annex 79 K. Hillman Smith, “Status of Northern White Rhinos and
Elephants in Garamba National Park, Democratic Republic of
Congo, During the Wars”, Pachyderm No. 31 (July-Dec. 2001)
Annex 80 L. Mubalama, J. J. Mapilanga, “Less Elephant Slaughter in the
Okapi Faunal Reserve, Democratic Republic of Congo, with
Operation Tango”, Pachyderm, No. 31 (July-Dec. 2001)
Annex 81 Dennis Farrell, Associated Press, Billings Gazette, African
animal auction draws 2,000 (22 June 2002)
Annex 82 Thierry Vircoulon, “L’Ituri ou La Guerre Au Pluriel”, Afrique
Contemporaine, Vol. 2005/3, No. 215 (2005)
Annex 83 Johan Pottier, “Representations of Ethnicity in the Search for
Peace: Ituri, Democratic Republic of Congo”, African Affairs
Vol. 109, No. 434 (27 Nov. 2009)
Annex 84 E. Kisangani & F. Scott Bob, Historical Dictionary of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (2010)
Annex 85 Alex Veit, Intervention as Indirect Rule: Civil War and
Statebuilding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2010)
Annex 86 François Ngolet, Crisis in the Congo (2011)
Annex 87 Sarah C. P. Williams, “The Elephant in the Womb”, Science (19
June 2012)
Annex 88 Dan Fahey, Rift Valley Institute, “Ituri: Gold, Land, and
Ethnicity in North-eastern Congo”, Usalama Project:
Understanding Congolese Armed Groups (2013)
Annex 89 David Van Reybrouck, Congo: The Epic History of a People
(2015)
Annex 90 François Emizet Kisangani, Guerres Civiles dans la République
Démocratique du Congo 1960-2010 (2015)
Annex 91 Sebastian Gatimu, Institute for Security Studies, The true cost
of mineral smuggling in the DRC (11 Jan. 2016)
ONLINE SOURCES
Annex 92 IRIN, Special Report on the Ituri Clashes Part II: The
Ugandan position (3 Mar. 2000)
Annex 93 IRIN, 15,312 foreign forces withdrawn so far, says U.N. (2 Oct.
2002)
Annex 94 M. Mutuli, ed. V. Tan, U.N.H.C.R., Uganda counts close to
20,000 new Congolese refugees from Ituri region (19 May
2003)
Annex 95 M. Mutuli, ed. V. Tan, U.N.H.C.R., Congolese march to
Uganda: “Soldiers before us, death behind us” (21 May 2003)
Annex 96 World Health Organization, Verbal Autopsy Standards: 2012
WHO Verbal Autopsy Instrument (2012)
Annex 97 World Health Organization, Life expectancy, Data by country
(6 June 2016)
Annex 98 OECD Insights, Debate the Issues, Statistical Insights: What
does GDP per capita tell us about households’ material wellbeing?
(6 Oct. 2016)
Annex 99 Tim Callen, International Monetary Fund, Gross Domestic
product: An Economy’s All (29 July 2017)
Annex 100 Laurent Oussou, M.O.N.U.S.C.O., La Force de la MONUSCO
Invite les Communautés en Ituri à Dialoguer pour la Paix (11
Aug. 2017)
Annex 101 BBC, The Story of Africa, Independence, Case Study: Congo
Annex 102 Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Research,
Definitions: Battle Related Deaths
Annex 103 FocusEconomics, What is GDP per capita?
Annex 104 Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Research, About
UCDP
Annex 105 Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Research, Onesided
Violence
Annex 106 Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Research, FAQ,
How Are UCDP Data Collected?
Annex 107 World Wildlife Fund, African elephants
Annex 108 International Tropical Timber Organization, Biennial Review
Statistics
MISCELLANEOUS
Annex 109 Professor Sir Paul Collier and Dr Anke Hoeffler, Oxford
University, Assessment of the Impact of the Ugandan Military
Involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (20 Oct.
2017)
Annex 110 Calculated Number of Civilian Deaths between 7 August 1998
and 2 June 2003 (Source: U.N. Mapping Report)
Annex 50
International Rescue Committee, Mortality in Eastern DRC: Results from Five Mortality Surveys
by the IRC (May 2000)

International Rescue Committee Bukavu, DR Congo
1
Mortality in Eastern DRC
Results from Five Mortality Surveys
by
the International Rescue Committee
May 2000
Executive Summary
To guide health programs and quantify the levels of civilian death and violence in the eastern
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the International Rescue Committee (IRC) conducted a
series of five mortality surveys. These surveys took place between April 18 and May 27, 2000.
The areas surveyed included: the city of Kisangani (in collaboration with MSF Holland), the
Katana and Kabare Health Zones, the Kalonge Administrative Zone and approximately 1,000
square kilometers surrounding Moba. These sites represent three of the five eastern provinces
within DRC and have a collective population of 1.2 million.
The 1,011 households visited contained 7,339 living residents, who reported 606 deaths among
their household members since January 1, 1999. From the information provided the IRC reports
that:
• 1.7 million excess deaths or more have occurred over the past 22 months as a result
of the fighting in eastern DRC. This equates to 77,000 deaths per month and of that,
26,000 (34%) are children younger than five years of age.
• There are many children younger than two years old missing from the demographic
profile. Compared to the number of three and four year olds, there are 30% to 40% fewer
children under two years of age than would be expected. The data collected indicate that
the particular hardships endured by women may play a role in the shortage of young
children. Specifically within the interviewed families, 3% of full-term births resulted in
maternal death, and adult death from malnutrition was an almost exclusively female
phenomenon.
• Violent deaths and other “nonviolent” deaths are inseparable in eastern DRC. Those
places and times where infectious disease deaths were highest were the same as where
violent death rates were highest. Moreover, the displacements and economic hardships
induced by armed combatants play either a direct or an indirect role in all of the excess
deaths described.
• Violence against civilians appears to be inflicted by all sides. Among the 69 deaths
attributed to violence, family members reported that the deaths were committed by the
Interahamwe and the RCD at a similar frequency.
• Violence against civilians appears indiscriminate. Women and children constituted 47%
of the violent deaths reported.
• Eastern DRC is an unchecked incubation zone for disease. In the five surveys
conducted, both endemic and epidemic illnesses are rampant, with major (suspected to be
more than 500 deaths) outbreaks of cholera, shigella and meningitis reported by
households. Suspected polio was reported in two of the five areas.
• The overall mortality rate during the year 2000 is higher than it was in 1999. Thus,
none of the collected information indicates that the rates will decline in the foreseeable
future.
Annex 50
International Rescue Committee Bukavu, DR Congo
11
Kalonge 21% 14.1
Moba 47% 24.5
Zaire 1995, from UNICEF, State of the World’s Children 1997 3.1*
*UNICEF estimates <5 mortality as a function of births, i.e., via a different technique. Thus, the
calculated <5 CMRs presented are not exactly comparable to the UNICEF value.
The child mortality rates alone cannot explain the deficiency of young children in Kisangani and
Katana (although the Katana survey last year found an <5 CMR of 10/1,000/mo.). It is likely that
fertility and reproductive outcome issues are playing a part. Minor evidence of this includes: i)
while not asked about, five women reported having full-term stillborn children (which were not
included as deaths in this report), ii) an estimated 3% of full-term pregnancies in the sample
population resulted in a maternal death and iii) adult malnutrition appears to be a
disproportionately female phenomenon. (In the five surveys, of 15 deaths attributed to malnutrition
in people five years of age and older, 11 (73%) were women with a median age of 25, while only
four (27%) were males with a median age of nine years.) In the “attribution” of maternal
mortality, the two pregnant women who died of heart attacks during military attacks (one while
being shot at, one while running), and the woman who was too pregnant to run from attackers and
was strangled during/after being raped, were classified as deaths from violence. The woman in
Kisangani who died of an induced abortion had her death classified as “other non-infectious.”
The reason for mentioning these four deaths is to note that there are risks in the DRC associated
with being pregnant that are not captured by the epidemiological concept of maternal mortality.
Eastern DRC is an unchecked incubation zone for disease. Several major disease outbreaks were
detected during the course of these five surveys, which had not received a significant response (if
any) from the health community. Examples of this include: an estimated 870 suspected meningitis
deaths in Kisangani (95%, CI = 40 –1,800), family-reported death rates in Moba from cholera and
dysentery of approximately 1% of the sample population, reports of multiple measles deaths in
three of the five surveyed populations, suspected polio deaths reported in Kalonge (our diagnosis,
not the families) and seven polio cases last year reported by the Moba physical rehabilitation
center.
Violence and infectious disease deaths are inseparably linked. The rates of death from violence
versus the rates of death from all other causes are shown in Figure 15. There is an apparent
association between the areas with the most violence-related mortality and the most “other”
mortality. This was seen most dramatically in Kalonge, where when violent deaths increased
dramatically (5.5-fold) during the period after October 1999, the malaria-specific mortality rate
simultaneously went up 3.5-fold. Many of the Kalonge displaced and the Moba residents reported
that their family members died of malaria or diarrhea while hiding in the forest after their village
was attacked. Their statements included that they had no food in the forest, which may have
played a large role in their immunological susceptibility
Violence against civilians involves both sides and is somewhat indiscriminate. Over the course
of the five surveys, 69 deaths from violence were reported. Figure 16 shows the age and gender
profile of those killed. Of note is the fact that only 53% of those killed were males over 14 years
in age. The most common mechanism of murder in all of the age and gender groups was by
shooting except for girls five to 14 years old, whose four deaths were attributed to being burned in
their hut, a shooting, an abduction with the body found later and one poisoning. Figure 17 shows
those to whom the interviewees attributed the deaths. While the numbers of reported deaths from
violence are small, there seems to be a similar rate of participation in civilian murders by both
sides. In support of the idea that “all sides are complicit and indiscriminate” are the facts that i)
Annex 50
International Rescue Committee Bukavu, DR Congo
12
two of three households that had experienced multiple episodes of deaths from violence had the
RCD conduct the murders during one round and the Interahamwe conduct the murders during the
other round; thus, these families could not have been true “enemies” of either, and ii) of 12 RCDattributed
murders, three (25%) were females, while, similarly, of 18 Interahamwe attributed
murders, five (28%) were women.
Overall Mortality in Eastern DRC
There is a dearth of health and mortality data for eastern DRC. Articles in the media and
statements by political figures have implied that a quantitative documentation of the war death toll
has occurred, although these estimates seem to be largely speculative. While the 1.2 million
people within the sampling universe of the five IRC studies are not representative of the
approximately 20 million people in eastern DRC, these surveys probably represent the best
broad-based data available. Thus, the IRC feels an obligation to provide an estimate of the
number of people who have died due to this conflict. This attempt to extrapolate these findings to
eastern DRC is done somewhat reluctantly and will systematically attempt to extrapolate
conservatively (to give minimal excess mortality) to avoid these findings later being discredited
as exaggerated or hyperbolic.
Three approaches will be employed to estimate the mortality toll of this conflict. The third, or
“best judgment” approach will be assumed to be the best, but the other two approaches will
provide insight into the dependence of the outcome on the underlying assumptions. For all three
approaches, the following will be used as inputs:
a) Baseline mortality = 1.5 deaths/1,000 population/mo.
b) Place Population of Sample Universe Mortality 1/99 – 4/00 Other
Kisangani 613,000 2.6/1,000/mo.
Kabare 130,000 2.7/1,000/mo.
Katana 305,000 2.7/1,000/mo.
Kalonge 59,000 6.4/1,000/mo. 1-10/99 = 3.5
Moba 100,000 11.4/1,000/mo.
c) Province Population (1996*)
Orientale 5.691 million
N. Kivu 3.515 million
S. Kivu 3.028 million
Maniema 1.353 million
Katanga 6.319 million
Total = 19.906 million
* From Zaire Bureau of Statistics, Bukavu, 1996.
Approach 1: Straight Average
Assume that the five independent surveys conducted represent five measures of mortality,
which represent eastern DRC. Also assume that the rate over the past 22 months has been the
same as the rate over the survey recall periods of 15.7 to 16.8 months. Thus, the average
Annex 50
Figure 17: Perpetrators of Killing as
Reported by Families, N=69
Unknown
47%
Civilian
6%
RCD
17%
Inter.
26%
Bandits
3%
Bur. Hu.
1%
Annex 50
Annex 51
Les Roberts, International Rescue Committee Health Unit, Mortality in Eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo: Results from 11 Surveys (2001)

Annex 51
IRC
Mortality in eastern
Democratic Republic of Congo
Results from Eleven Mortality Surveys
Kalonge displaced, D.R. Congo . Photo : IRC
Final Draft 2001
Prepared by:
Les Roberts, IRC Health Unit
Charles Hale
Fethi Belyakdoumi
Laura Cobey
Roselidah Ondeko
Michael Despines
IRC DRC Bukavu/Kisangani
John Keys, IRC Regional Director for Africa
Annex 51
Table 3 estimates the mortality experienced in South Kivu Province. Table 4
estimates the overall number of deaths in the eastern DRC since August 1998.
It is estimated that approximately 2.5 million people have died as a result of this
war, above and beyond the million people who might have been expected to die
otherwise. Approximately 350,000 of these deaths are believed to have been from
violence.
6) The mortality rates are increasing.
lRC revisited three of the sites surveyed in the early months of 2000. Two of
these sites, Katana and Kabare, experienced a 50% or greater increase in the CMR
since the previous year. In a third location, Lusambo, mortality remained
unchanged. In the two new eastern areas surveyed this year, Kalemie and Kalima,
the mortality rate has increased over the recall period. Thus, it appears that over
the past 11 months, the mortality rate has not improved and probably has gotten
worse in eastern DRC.
VII. LIMITATIONS
There are several limitations to these surveys that should be considered by those who will
use these data. Some of these include:
• The areas visited may not have been typical of eastern DRC. In particular,
local officials and Congolese protested repeatedly that interviewers were
going to the safest areas and their findings would understate the severity of
the situation. Given that adequate security was one of the major criteria
for selecting sites to visit, this criticism is probably valid.
• There was no follow-up or confirmation of the information provided by
interviewees. This has two problematic aspects: People may have lied to
interviewers or may have been mistaken about the cause, month or age of
reported decedents. Interviewers and survey staff are convinced that
families were not inventing deaths, and that the overall CMR estimates are
probably accurate. The survey staff are equally convinced that some cause
of death data are suspect. For example, less than 10 AIDS-related deaths
were reported, even though Congo suffers from an AIDS epidemic and
two of the visited areas (Kalima and Lusambo) had households report that
TB was one of the two primary causes of death. Likewise, malaria, fever
and diarrhea deaths may not be distinguishablef rom malnutrition. It is
believed that violence-related deaths have not been over-diagnosed by the
households and, if anything, incentives existed to underreport violent
deaths.
International Rescue Committee
Mortality in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
Pagel5
Annex 51
Table 1: Summary of Mortality Surveys Conducted by IRC in Eastern DRC Since 1998.
Place & Date Live in CMR- <5 Methods
HHint Deaths/1,000/mo Mort.
Katana, 1/98 - 2/99 1051 3.8 (2.2 - 5.4) 10.1 Spatial grid, clusters spaced lKm. E. to W., 3.5 Km No. to So.
Katana, 1/99 - 4/00 1219 3.0 (2.2 - 3.9) 6.9 " " " 7 Km No. to So.
Katana, 1/00 - 3/01 1803 4.9 (3.8 - 6.0) 12.9 2 stage, syst., proportional to pop. assignment of clusters,
random grid to find starting pt.
Kabare, 1/99 - 4/00 1273 2.7 (2.0 - 3.8) 5.8 " " "
Kabare, 1/00 - 3/01 1778 4.4 (3.7 - 5.1) 5.6 " " "
Kisangani, 1/99 - 3/00 2305 2.9 (2.3 - 3.9) 4.8 " " "
Lubungu, 1/00- 3/01 2317 2.8 (2.1 - 3.6) 6.9 " " "
Moba, 1/99 - 5/00 1212 12.1 (10.5 - 13.8) 24.5 " " "
Kalonge 1/99 - 4/00* 1330 6.4 14.1 Spatial based convenient sampling, rural and urban via di£
Methods
Kalamie 1/00- 3/01 2204 10.8 (9.5 -12.1) 23.8 2 stage, syst., prop. to pop. Clusters, random grid to find pt.
Kalamie, 1/00- 3/01 150HH 4/122 HH dead 10 clusters in Kalamie survey ( on 2 axies) had additional survey
(3%), 4/122 most tacked on regarding fate of those who were neighbors at start of
dead (3%) war.
Kalima, 1/00 - 3/01 1958 7.5 (6.3 - 8.7) 17.1 2 stage, syst., prop. to pop. Clusters, random grid to find pt.
Lusambo 1/00- 2/01 ** 1288 3.0 (2.1 - 3.9) 10.0 " " "
* Because the Kalonge survey was not a probability survey, and was not sampled evenly with regard to space, this survey has the
greatest limitations in terms of validity.
** Not in eastern DRC, not to be included in extrapolations.
International Rescue Committee
Mortality in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
Page21
"
"
"
"
"
"
Annex 51
Table 2: Characteristics of Mortality Surveys Conducted by IRC in Eastern DRC Since 1998.
Place & Date Live in CMR- Basic Design Design Pop. of Area Pop. of accessible
1111 Deaths/1,000/mo Clusters X 1111/clust. Effect areas, actually
surveyed
Katana, 1/98 - 2/99 1051 3.8 (2.2- 5.4) 32 X 5 spatial 2.67 285,000* 285,000*
Katana, 1/99 - 4/00 1219 3.0 (2.2 - 3.9) 34 X 5 spatial 1.02 305,000* 305,000*
Katana, 1/00 - 3/01 1803 4.9 (3.8 - 6.0) 30 X 10 2 stage 1.75 347,000 347,000
Kabare, 1/99 - 4/00 1273 2.7 (2.0 - 3.8) 40X 5 2 stage 1.11 111,000 111,000
Kabare, 1/00 - 3/01 1778 4.4 (3.7 - 5.1) 30 X 10 2 stage 0.79 112,000 112,000
Kisangani, 1/99 - 3/00 2305 2.9 (2.3 - 3.9) 48X5 2 stage 1.35 402,000 402,000
Lubunga, 1/00- 3/01 2317 2.8 (2.1 - 3.6) 30 X 10 2 stage 1.93 157,000 157,000
Moba, 1/99 - 5/00 1212 12.1 (10.5 - 13.8) 40X5 2 stage 1.6 -100,000 -100,000
62,000 officially
Kalonge 1/99 - 4/00 1330 6.4 Spatial convenient NA 62,000 59,000 (95%)
Kalamie 1/00- 3/01 2204 10.8 (9.5 -12.1) 30X 10 1.66 -400,000 196,000 (-49%)
Kalima 1/00 - 3/01 1958 7.5 (6.3 - 8.7) 30X 10 1.62 154 OOO 91.000 (59%)
N = 18,450 Total= 1,576,000 Total= 1,268,000
*2001 # used for Katana, even though all of this growth is believed to be due to the arrival of displaced who probably had a higher
mortality than the residents.
International Rescue Committee
Mortality in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
Page 22
Annex 51
Figure 21: Perpetrators of violent deaths as reported
by interviewed HH, N=140
RCD*
29%
Interahamwe
13%
FDD
2%
Unknown
41%
Other
6%
Mayi-Mayi
9%

Annex 52
Republic of Uganda, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations into Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2001,
Final Report (Nov. 2002)

JUDICIAL COMMI SSION OF
INQUIRY
INTO
ALLEGAT I ONS I NTO I L L EGAL
EXPLOITATI O N O F N ATURAL
R E S O U R C E S A N D O T H E R FORMS O F
10 WE A LT H I N T H E D EMO C R AT I C
REPUBLIC O F CONGO 2 0 0 1
(May 2001– November, 2002)
Legal Notice No. 5/2001, as amended
FINAL R E P O R T
November, 2002
Annex 52
16
3 . ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES
Originally this Commission received no assistance from the reconstituted Panel. However
when the Commission was about to wind up, some documents were received from the
reconstituted Panel, which prompted this Commission to recall General Kazini for the third
time. After some difficulty in securing his attendance, the General attended, and after giving
evidence about the documents obtained from the new Panel, produced a number of radio
messages which affected this Commission’s understanding of what was going on in the the
Democratic Republic of Congo. so far as the UPDF was 10 concerned, and confirmed certain
suspicions which this Commission had entertained throughout. That evidence is considered
here first, as it affects the consideration of the subsequent Headings, taken from the original
Panel Report. The relevant allegations in the original Panel Report involve confiscation,
extraction, forced monopoly and price fixing. Some of the revelations made by General
Kazini in the radio messages which he produced go to confirm some of the allegations made
by the original Panel.
13. THE KAZINI REVELATIONS.
The radio messages concerned the undermentioned subjects:
13.1. UPDF Officers conducting business
20 In answer to the President's radio message (set out in a quotation of the message at
Paragraph 14.6 below), General Kazini wrote the following message (dated the 20th
December 1998) within hours: --
"It is true that some officers were getting excited about doing business in
Congo from the beginning but it was discouraged. What is happening is
that some Ugandans could be in business partnership with some
commanders but no officers or men are directly involved in trade in Congo.
There is a big influx of Congolese businessman into Entebbe using our
Aircraft on their return journeys they are still facing difficulties to take
items bought. We have been squeezing to assist them but we cannot handle
30 all their cargo. So I suggest that the Ministry of Commerce or a trade
delegation from UMA to meet the RCD leadership on your
recommendation to agree on modalities of doing business with their
Annex 52
17
counterparts in Congo. By a copy of this message 2 i/c 1 DIV should not
allow any officer to trade using our aircraft. Meanwhile 2DIV CO, 4DIV
CO to make sure boarders are thoroughly monitored."
The speed at which General Kazini replied shows that he was aware of all these
problems, would take no real action until the matter became public, and had not
previously himself made His Excellency the President aware of them.
From this message, General Kazini was admitting the following: --
1. That the allegation by the original Panel that some top officers in the UPDF
were planning from the beginning to do business in Congo was generally
true, although the specific examples given were 10 incorrect. On the first
occasion when General Kazini came before this Commission to give
evidence, he denied the allegations in paragraphs 27 and 28 of the original
Panel Report, and was extremely evasive while doing so. In view of his radio
message in reply to the President's radio message, he was clearly lying to this
Commission.
2. That Commanders in business partnership with Ugandans were trading in the
Congo, about which General Kazini took no action.
3. That Military aircraft were carrying Congolese businessman into Entebbe,
and carrying items which they had bought in Kampala back to the Congo, but
20 the military were unable to handle all the cargo. On the first occasion that
General Kazini gave evidence before this Commission, he said that it was not
allowed for Congolese businessman or Ugandan businessman to bring items
from the Congo on military airplanes. In this he has been revealed to have
lied to this Commission. The whole question of the use of military transport
is considered at Paragraph 14.6 below, and a graphic representation can be
found below.
As a result of the President's message, General Kazini took the following steps: --
 He directed that officers should not be allowed to trade using military aircraft
 He directed that passengers on military aircraft be thoroughly monitored.
30  He took no action in relation to Ugandans in partnership with UPDF officers or
Congolese
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The third paragraph of the President's radio message directed that Ugandan businessmen
should be given security assistance to do business in Congo in order to alleviate the acute
needs of the population and to establish links for the future. The radio message itself is clear,
and when this Commission interviewed His Excellency the President, he confirmed that he
had no intention to assist Congolese businessmen, save as to security, and pointed out that in
his message he had specifically mentioned Ugandan businessman.
However when General Kazini gave evidence to this Commission on the third occasion, he
said that he had given directions to assist Congolese businessman to travel back and forth
from Congo, and had even allowed them to carry goods from Uganda for sale in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. His counsel also interrupted 10 his evidence to argue that the
Presidential Radio message included assistance to Congolese businessmen, which it clearly
did not, save of course in relation to the provision of security.
This Commission’s researches in comparing the data from the Uganda Revenue Authority
which related to collection of customs duty on flights landing at the Military Air Base since
1999, data from Liaison Officers at the Military Air Base and from the Ministry of Defence
relating to flights for the UPDF, and data from the Civil Aviation Authority showing all
flights recorded by them to the Democratic Republic of Congo, both Civil and Military,
showed quite clearly that on many occasions, military flights paid for by Ministry of Defence,
or flown on Uganda Air Cargo (flying for Ministry of Defence) were carrying large quantities
20 of coffee in particular back from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Not only was this originally denied by General Kazini, but also by all of the liaison officers
who served at the Military Air Base. There was only one admission concerning coffee flown
in from the Democratic Republic of Congo for Mr. Bemba.
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Figure 1: Data from URA Customs at Old Airport Entebbe
However, as Figure 1 shows, the comparison between Military and Civilian dutiable flights
arriving at the Military Air Base shows, for flights during 1999 and 2000 which were
recorded by URA, military flights and civilian flights were almost equally disposed during
1999, with a wide difference during 2000. There was no data available before 1999 and after
December 2001, which is the reason for the dips at each end. General kazini, and the liaison
Officers at the Military Air Base have been lying to this Commission.
On the 11th of February 1999 in a radio message General Kazini said that reports had started
coming to him that officers in the Colonel Peter Kerim 10 sector, Bunia and based at Kisangani
airport were engaging in business contrary to the presidential radio message, and he pointed
out that the cover being used was "Uganda businessmen / Congolese".
This corroborates many of the Original Panel's allegations in respect of officers of the UPDF.
13.2.Gold Mining
On the 31st of December 1998 General Kazini messaged Major Kagezi, saying that
his soldiers and detach commanders were writing chits for gold mining and
smuggling and instructing him to stop this immediately. Major Kagezi replied that his
investigations revealed that Lieutenant Okumu had been giving chits, and
recommended changing his platoon because they had stayed for a long time, but he
20 had been unable to do so because the Commander had refused (an interesting
comment on co-operation and discipline within the UPDF). On the 1st of January
1999, General Kazini ordered that the platoons be changed and Lieutenant Okumu
arrested. This does not agree with the evidence of Lt Okumu who said that he had
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already been arrested from Durba on 27th December 1999. On the 11th of February
1999 General Kazini sent a message to say that he was sending intelligence officers
on a fact-finding mission on the gold trade involving UPDF officers and men. This
was the first time that this Commission had heard of this investigation, and is
surprised not to have heard about this from Colonel Mayombo, who said that he did
not conduct any investigations until after the original Panel Report.
As late as the 15th of February 2000 General Kazini was receiving reports from
Professor Wamba that UPDF soldiers in Watsa were in conflict with civilians in
relation to mining, and on 23rd February 2000, he sent a message in which he said
that he had seen three messages concerning 10 uncoordinated deployments. He pointed
out that no soldier of the UPDF was supposed to guard mines, although Major Kagezi
had deployed soldiers to Durba. He directed that all soldiers must be withdrawn to
Isiro. This message backs up some of the allegations in the original Panel Report
relating to mining. It is extremely difficult to reconcile with General Kazini's
evidence that he did not know that the soldiers at Durba had been detached to guard
the bridge there, and that Lt Okumu’s direct mission written instructions in
September 1999 were to guard the bridge and the airfield.
Further on the 3rd of October 1999, General Kazini was asking Lieutenant Colonel
Sula, Major Kagezi (who had already posted soldiers to Durba against orders) and
20 Captain Kyakabale to let him know if there was any UPDF deployed in either gold or
diamond mines, directing them to withdraw them immediately and send their names.
General Kazini's actions, radio messages, and evidence to this Commission have been
inconsistent throughout.
13.3. Intelligence/Security Funding
On the 21st of January 1999 General Kazini complained in a radio message that some
commanders were getting money from Congolese rebel leadership under the pretext
of intelligence gathering. This is an extremely interesting complaint, given that he
himself later, in July 2000, instructed Commanders in that area to refer any payment
of security funding to himself at TAC HQ, and is an example of what this
30 Commission is beginning to suspect, that General Kazini was writing all these radio
messages, and copying many of them to His Excellency the President, to cover
himself, without any intention that they should be followed.
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13.4. Looting
On the 29th of January 1999 General Kazini was complaining that soldiers of the 19th
Battalion were involved in looting civilians. He directed that soldiers should not man
roadblocks anywhere, and asked for an explanation and details of a specific
occurrence. This was another matter raised by the original panel, and denied by
General Kazini initially, but confirmed by these radio messages.
13.5. Smuggling
On the 5th of July 1999 General Kazini directed that an investigative team be
stationed in Arua and Nebbi at the customs stations to monitor goods in transit. He
explained that a dangerous habit was developing where 10 goods supposedly in transit to
Congo were returned to Ugandan markets tax-free. He said that the suspects were
army officers aided by “Kampala and Arua Boys”. He directed Captain Kyakabale to
take the appropriate measures. On 23rd August 1999 General Kazini accused the 19th
Battalion of being involved in smuggling in Bunia and Beni sector. On the 25th of
December 1999, General Kazini sent a message to, among others Lieutenant Colonel
Arocha, Lieutenant Colonel Mugenyi, Lieutenant Colonel Nyakaitana, and Lieutenant
Colonel Burundi. He accused of all of them of being suspected of indulging in
smuggling goods re-entering Uganda territory from the Democratic Republic of
Congo. On the same date he was asking for liaison with the Inspector General of
20 Government to send experts to monitor various customs those on the Uganda border.
He said that these were border points where goods were smuggled into the country
aided by the UPDF without paying taxes. This Commission was able to check this
information with the Inspector General of Government, who said that he had never
been approached by the UPDF for this purpose. These were the kind of events,
together with others referred to below, to which this Commission was referring when
asking Col, Mayombo why he had not investigated such matters. His reply after some
questioning, and after the witness indicated that he did not know of these matters,
although General Kazini clearly did, was:-
“Lt. Col. Mayombo: I am saying My Lord that: At that time I did not
30 investigate it. It was a failure in judgement, I accept.”
What General Kazini has done by producing these radio messages is to confirm that
his information in respect of many of the allegations of misconduct of the UPDF was
the same as that which reached the original Panel. There is no doubt that his purpose
in producing these messages was to try to show that he was taking action in respect of
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the Democratic Republic of Congo, but that he had gone to Kinshasa at the
invitation of Laurent Kabila, and there discussed trade possibilities, and in particular
air services. This was at a time when there was every reason to count on the cooperation
of Laurent Kabila, and this Commission sees no problem in such matters as
trade being discussed at that time.
14.3. Allegations against Kainerugaba Muhoozi
Apart from a later general allegation, this is the only time Lt Muhoozi’s name is
mentioned (in Paragraph 28) in the whole original Panel Report.
Before this Commission Lt Muhoozi said that he went, not to Eastern the Democratic
Republic of Congo but to Kinshasa on two occasions. The 10 first was in 1997, during
the regime of Laurent Kabila, when he went to look for a market for meat products on
behalf of his family ranch, which is well known for the keeping of cattle and the need
for a market. The second occasion was in early 1998 when he had started working for
Caleb International, Salim Saleh’s firm, for discussions with some potential partners
in the Democratic Republic of Congo with the possibility of developing some mining
interests there. This was early in the regime of Laurent Kabila, when friendly
relations were thought to exist between the Kinshasa Government and Uganda.
This Commission is fully satisfied that these were genuine visits during peacetime to
promote international trade, and this Commission cannot understand why they appear
20 as criticisms in the original Panel Report.
14.4. Allegations against top UPDF Officers
As to Point 4 above, see Paragraph 13.1 above: General Kazini’s radio message in
reply to that of His Excellency the President shows that, although there was no effect
on the policies of the Uganda Government, some officers were excited about the
possibility of self-enrichment in the Democratic Republic of Congo. To that extent
the allegations in the original Panel Report are true.
14.5. Allegations against General Kazini.
As to Point 5 above, this Commission has received some evidence in support of the
allegation against General Kazini in relation to his conduct at the inception of the
30 campaign in the Democratic Republic of Congo, From August to December of 1998,
he was clearly aware of a problem as his radio message shows, but took little action:
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he only appears to have acquainted His Excellency the President of the problem as
late as December 1998.
14.6.Transportation Networks
14.6.1. Military Air Base
The original Panel said that the Military Air Base was used during Operation Safe
Haven for transport of goods to and from the Democratic Republic of Congo. The
Commission therefore investigated the operations at the Military Air Base. What
the Commission found left a lot to be desired.
The first question to be asked was how a supposedly secure Military Air Base
came to be used for 10 transport of civilians and goods.
This Commission asked His Excellency the President about this because it had
been intimated to this Commission that this was on reliance on his radio message
dated 10/12/98. Set out below is part of the transcript of his evidence:
……………….when my army went into Congo, I had to give them terms of
reference on all major matters; there is no major matter which we did not
regulate by a document. For instance, on the 15th of December 1998, no, on
the 10th of December, 1998 at 1500hrs, I sent a message myself to all army
units in Congo, which I could read for their Lordships: “From President
for Chief of Staff, Inform Army Commander, Minister-of-State for
20 Defence, and All Stations.
(All stations means all units).
Ensure that there is no officer or man of our forces in Congo who engages
in business. Also report to me any other public servant, whether currently
based in Congo or not, who tries to engage in business in the Congo.
However, other Ugandan businessmen (who are not soldiers or public
servants, including all politicians or their families) ….”
This is in brackets: (businessmen who are not soldiers or public servants,
including all politicians or their families), end of brackets.
“ … should, given the fluid security situation in Congo, be assisted, if
30 necessary, to do business there in order to alleviate the acute needs of the
population ….”
(Of the population in Congo).
“… and also to establish links for the future. The purpose of this directive
is to erase the feeling that I ordered our forces into Congo because we
wanted to loot minerals from Congo, and not to defend our security
interests.”
Your Lordships, if they have not given you this copy of this message, then I
will give it to you. This is the ….
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If the allegation were true, there would have been a significant number of left hand
drive cars in the streets of Kampala. This Commission has evidence, and has
observed, that this is not the case and cannot confirm this allegation.
The evidence of Adele Lotsove also shows that cars in the Democratic Republic of
Congo are junk, as there are no good roads in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
therefore would not be worth stealing and transporting.
15.5. Theft from Banks
Paragraph 40 of the original Panel Report alleges that Jean Pierre Bemba had
instructed his soldiers to empty banks once a town was captured and that the soldiers
had taken the equivalent of $400,000 from Banque 10 Commerciale du Congo branch at
Bumba, $500,000 in Lisala and about $600,000 in Gemena. Jean Pierre Bemba
denied the allegation. As in the case of coffee referred to in paragraph 15.3 above, he
told the Commission that he heard of the allegation and wrote to the banks concerned
requesting them to confirm that money was taken from them by his men during the
liberation of their towns. The banks replied saying that they had never been looted by
his soldiers. He gave copies of the correspondence to the Commission (Exh.
JPB/7/116) and said that he had also given copies of those documents to the second
original Panel. He also pointed out that when a town was about to be captured, the
occupying troops would be ill advised to leave cash in the banks, knowing that it
20 would be lost to them, and converted to funding for the victorious rebels. This
allegation is unlikely to be true.
15.6. Murder of Civilians
In Paragraph 42 it is alleged that in Bunia Congolese civilians were injured or
murdered for resisting the attempted seizure of property by “RCD rebels and foreign
soldiers”. It is not clear whether this is an allegation against the UPDF, but the
allegation is not sufficiently detailed to investigate, or to rely upon. This Commission
does however have a record of a General Court Martial in which a soldier was
accused and convicted for murdering civilians who were in custody in Gemena. This
was much later in April 2001, but indicates that Uganda appears to have taken at least
30 one such allegation seriously.
15.7. Organised Looting
In Paragraph 43 and 44, the highest army commanders of Uganda are alleged to have
encouraged, organized and coordinated looting, and in particular General Kazini is
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said to have appointed loyal commanders and reliable civilian Congolese to secure
his network in areas rich in mineral resources. The appointment of Adele Lotsove was
quoted as an example, and is further dealt with in Paragraph 71. This Commission has
considered the matter at Paragraph 15.8 below of this report. In particular, it should
be born in mind that General Kazini was aware of looting, as his radio message of
29/1/99 shows, and was inappropriately involved in promoting Victoria Diamonds,
indicating actions consistent with the allegations of the original Panel, which cannot
be totally ruled out.
15.8.Allegations against Uganda
15.8.1. Appointment o 10 f Adele Lotsove
In paragraph 71 of original Panel Report it was stated that the illegal exploitation
of natural resources of Democratic Republic of Congo was facilitated by the
administrative structures established by both Uganda and Rwanda. The original
Panel cited as an example the appointment as Governor of Ituri Province of Adele
Lotsove on 18th June, 1999 by Major General Kazini.
This Commission has seen the letter of appointment among the exhibits. The
Commission has also heard evidence on oath from Madam Adele Lotsove and
General Kazini on the issue. Madam Adele Lotsove told the Commission that she
was a native of Ituri. She was once the 1st Deputy Governor of Kisangani in-
20 Charge of Upper Zaire Province or Haut Zaire. She said that Ituri Province was
one of the Provinces of Zaire in 1962, but was abolished by Mobutu. During a
National Conference in 1991 it was proposed that the whole of Zaire should be
divided into 28 Provinces. Ituri was supposed to be one of the Provinces, but the
proposal was never carried out. So when she was appointed the 1st Vice Governor
of Kisangani, she considered that as an opportunity to implement the 1991
proposal by proclaiming Ituri a Province as that was the aspiration of her people.
Her aim was to adopt the Ugandan model of administration and political system,
which she had seen during her stay in Nebbi in Uganda.
When she discussed with General Kazini her aspirations and ambition, she found
30 him very receptive. Since General Kazini was the one in charge of Security she
asked him to take charge of her security whilst she fought for the creation of Ituri
Province. The letter written by General Kazini dated 18/6/99 allegedly appointing
her a Provisional Governor in-Charge of the Districts of Ituri and HAUT–UELE
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recorded. In those circumstances this Commission is at a loss to work out what
information gathered by the original Panel could clearly indicate that such
payments were made, and this Commission therefore doubts this conclusion.
There is one additional consideration which does not seem to have been borne in
mind by the original Panel, which is that Adele Lotsove was only in office for
some 3 months before she was dismissed by Professor Wamba, and would
therefore have had little time to get involved in such matters.
15.8.2. Knowledge of Key Ugandan Officials
In Paragraph 45 it is alleged that key officials in the Government of Uganda were
aware of the situation on the ground: and further, in 10 the case of gold, that the
increased production would have alerted any government.
It has proved impossible to trace or investigate the allegation in Paragraph 45,
because the key officials and the sources of information upon which the original
Panel relies are not given. In evidence on oath before this Commission, this
allegation has been denied in toto. As to the allegation relating to the levels of
production of mineral resources, in particular gold, this Commission has dealt
with this at Paragraph 21.1 below
16. SYSTEMATIC AND SYSTEMIC EXPLOITATION
In Paragraphs 46-54 of the original Panel Report, the original Panel allege that a company
20 (Dara Forêt ) used illicit business practices and complicity with occupying forces and the
Government (presumably the Government of Uganda ) as well as its international connections
to exploit the natural resources of the Congo. The original Panel conducted a case study
which is alleged to support this proposition.
The allegations of impropriety concern Dara Forêt, Dara Great Lakes Industries and
associated companies, and the Uganda Government.
16.1.Timber : Dara Forêt and Dara Great Lakes International.
This Commission reproduces here the example according to the original Panel Report.
Evidence brought, and severely tested by this Commission, is interpolated together with this
Commission’s comments.
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Timber harvested in this region, which is occupied by the Ugandan army
and RCD-ML, has exclusively transited or remained in Uganda. Our own
investigation in Kampala has shown that mahogany originating in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is largely available in Kampala, at a
lower price than Ugandan mahogany. This difference in price is simply due
to the lower cost of acquisition of timber. Timber harvested in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo by Uganda pays very little tax or none at
all.
There is no evidence before this Commission that Uganda as a country or as a Government
harvests timber in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This 10 Commission doubts that the
allegation in the Report is correct. Timber does come across the border as an import, and there
is no doubt that timber is also smuggled through the porous borders. Congo timber is cheaper
in the market because it is usually cut by chain saws, which are not allowed in Uganda. Such
documentation as this Commission has seen indicates that timber cut in the Democratic
Republic of Congo is dutiable there on export, and that such duties are levied by the rebel
authorities and paid.
This Commission toured the Kampala Timber Market at the Ndeeba area. The Commission
found that timber from Congo is available in the market. The timber from Congo is mainly
hardwood.
20 The Commission found that timber from Congo is cheaper than those from Uganda. The
reason for the difference in price depends on the method of cutting the timber. In Uganda
timber is processed either by handsaw or pit saw or by sawmills or what is commonly known
as machine cut. Timber from Congo is processed by chain saw. Timber processed with
handsaws has a smooth surface while those cut with chain saw have rough or uneven surface.
Chain saws are illegal in Uganda.
Transit timber is always accompanied by Forest Products Movement Permit issued by the
District Forest Offices. One needs to get a concession from the Forestry Department to cut
timber from Forest Reserves. The application is made through the District Officer of the area
where the Forest Reserve is situated. It is then forwarded to the headquarters in Kampala
30 where it is processed and issued.
This Commission was informed that there is a ban on raw timber export. Only finished or
semi-finished wood products are permitted to be exported.
In addition, customs fees are generally not paid when soldiers escort those
trucks or when orders are received from some local commanders or
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General Kazini. Timber from the Democratic Republic of the Congo is
then exported to Kenya and Uganda, and to other continents. The Panel
gathered from the Kenyan port authorities that vast quantities of timber are
exported to Asia, Europe and North America.
The Panel also discovered during its investigation that individual Ugandan
loggers violated forestry legislation, recognized by their ally RCD-ML, by
logging (extracting) the timber directly. According to the Congolese
legislation on the permis de coupe, only individual Congolese nationals are
allowed to harvest timber and only in small quantities. Foreigners must
apply for the larger 10 concessions. Initially, Ugandans operated in
partnership with a Congolese permit holder. Soon, the Ugandans began to
pay the Congolese to sub-lease the permit and, subsequently, to obtain the
licence in direct violation of the law.
In so far as the above relates to Dara Forêt, Mr. Kotiram has told this Commission that he has
not yet cut a single tree within his concession. He has given good and sufficient reason for
that, and this Commission will recite it in due course.
During a visit to Mpondwe/ Kasindi and also at Arua/ Ariwari, this Commission spoke to the
Congolese Officers there, and they denied strongly that it would be possible for UPDF to
influence the passage of merchandise, or for their commanders to give orders in that regard. It
20 is true that large quantities of timber transit Uganda for export to Europe and America, in the
ordinary course of trade.
In so far as individual Ugandan loggers are concerned, this Commission has no way of
investigating this non-specific matter: This Commission has had evidence that there are
Ugandans who go over to the Congo and buy trees by negotiating with individual Congolese
permit holders or Chiefs, and import the timber once cut to Uganda, which helps to account
for the presence of Congolese hardwood in the Uganda market. This Commission was
informed that the low price of Congolese hardwood is due to the fact that Congolese timber is
harvested and cut with chain saws, while chain saws are not permitted in Uganda. The
efficiency of chain saws accounts for the increase in cross border trade. This cross border
30 trade has been carried on throughout living memory.
Timber extraction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its export
have been characterized by unlawfulness and illegality. Besides extracting
timber without authorization in a sovereign country and in violation of the
local legislation, DARA-Forest consistently exported its timber without any
certification procedure.
In this Paragraph the original Panel raise the whole question of de facto control of
administration which this Commission has dealt with under the heading of “Illegality” at
Paragraph 11 above.
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companies, either personally, or by his interest in yet another company, Royal Star
Holdings, which, while registered in Uganda, is a wholly Thai owned Company. Since the
shareholding in Nyota Wood is much the same, presumably it falls under the same umbrella.
This is the evidence of Mr. Kotiram, and probably in practice it is true: but probably also
these are not in law subsidiaries of Dara Group, (a company registered in the Virgin Islands)
since that company does not appear to hold any direct interest in any of the companies.
Then it can be shown that there was no collusion between Nyota Wood and the Ministry of
Water, Land and Forests of Uganda, because one application which was made to the Ministry,
which, if the original Panel is right, would have been essential to the alleged conspiracy, was
10 refused by the Ministry.
In May 2000, DGLI signed a contract for forest stewardship certification
with SmartWood and the Rogue Institute for Ecology and Economy in
Oregon, United States of America.
This is not true. Smartwood is the certifying Agency: the Rogue Institute for Ecology and
Economy was an agency whom Mr. Kotiram contracted to advise him on SmartWood’s
requirements for certification. Thereafter Dara contacted another Company, UNIQUE,
Wegerhäuser & Partner, who later gave a presentation to the reconstituted Panel. UNIQUE
were advising Dara on the way to go about certification of their concessions in Democratic
Republic of Congo and in Uganda.
20 On 21 March 2000, the Director of the DARA group, Prossy Balaba, sent a
letter to the Commissioner asking him to allow an official of SmartWood to
visit certain forests, such as Budongo and Bugoma; he was due to visit the
region in mid-April.
Prossy Balaba was not “the director of the Dara Group”. She was a director and minority
shareholder of the Ugandan Company referred to above as DGLI. In that regard it will be
noted that Mr. Kotiram set up his companies with himself in control, supported by the
participation of local directors and shareholders. This is quite normal, and indeed required in
some countries. In any event, for a Thai National whose grasp of French and English is not
that good, it is certainly advisable.
30 It is true that the request above was made : this Commission has a copy of the letter.
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Democratic Republic of the Congo of minerals such as cassiterite and
coltan in trucks. During the original Panel’s visit to Bunia it was reported
that other products were loaded in trucks which are supposed to carry
timber only; it is likely that coltan and cassiterite were these products.
Moreover, the fraud extends to the forging of documents and declarations
“originating” in Kinshasa.
The confusion between Dara Forêt and DGLI, on the basis of the evidence, exists only in the
mind of the original Panel. These appear to this Commission to be two separate Companies,
registered in two separate countries. Mr. Kotiram agrees that Dara Forêt has been exporting
coltan for which he has a licence, which he has produced to this 10 Commission. It does not
appear to be forged. The mineral has been sent in transit through Uganda. Mr. Kotiram has
produced before this Commission Customs documents which have been verified for this
Commission by URA. There is no evidence whatever that any of the Dara Companies have
been dealing with diamonds or gold.
The original Panel is not specific as to the forgery alleged: but this Commission suspect that
the problem may arise from the use by rebels of original forms left by the Kinshasa
Government before the rebellion. In any event, this Commission would be slow to accuse
parties of criminal offences such as fraud and forgery without being able to set out specific
details with particulars
20 The logging rate was alarming around Butembo, Beni, Boga and
Mambassa. The RCD-ML administration acknowledged its lack of control
over the rate of extraction, the collection of taxes on logging activities and
the customs fees at the exit points. On the basis of eyewitness accounts,
satellite images, key actors’ acknowledgements and the Panel’s own
investigation, there is sufficient evidence to prove that timber extraction is
directly related to the Ugandan presence in Orientale Province. This has
reached alarming proportions and Ugandans (civilians, soldiers and
companies) are extensively involved in these activities. In May 2000, RCDML
attributed a concession of 100, 000 hectares to DARA-Forest. Since
30 September 1998, overall DARA-Forest has been exporting approximately
48, 000 m3 of timber per year.
UPDF presence in Orientale Province provided the security and access to overseas markets
denied to the Congolese for so long. One would therefore expect to see increased activity in
the area, not only by Dara Forêt but by other companies as well.
So far as Dara Forêt is concerned, while Mr. Kotiram agrees the figures quoted, he tells this
Commission that in his concession he has not cut even a single tree, and he has given this
Commission good and sufficient reason for this. The source of his timber has been from
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individuals, in accordance with a long standing practice outlined to this Commission by
another witness.
This Commission is extremely concerned at the approach of the original Panel to this subject.
Nowhere in the whole of this passage is the reliability of sources quoted, but, considering the
emphasis put on these alleged events, the original Panel must have come to the conclusion
that it was safe to rely on its undisclosed and apparently un-evaluated sources. Yet the
perception of those sources, and that of the original Panel, was quite clearly wrong. A short
interview with Mr. Kotiram and his associates would have established the truth, but he was
never approached, according to his evidence. This problem casts doubt on the original Panel’s
collection and reliance upon information given to it, not only 10 in respect of Dara Forêt, but
throughout the Report, given the emphasis placed upon this so-called Case Study.
From the evidence, this Commission has come to the conclusion that the investigation by the
original Panel of Dara Forêt was fundamentally flawed and is unable to find support for any
single allegation made in this so-called Case Study.
16.1.1. Allegations against His Excellency the President and his family
The original Panel say :
Some unconfirmed information indicates that members of President
Museveni’s family are shareholders of DGLI, although more investigation
is needed.
20 As above, this Commission agrees that a great deal more investigation is needed
before such an allegation appears in a report to a United Nations body. This
Commission’s own investigations with the Companies Registry reveal nothing
whatever of that nature. All the relevant witnesses were called, and all the
Companies Registry files were obtained. The allegations are specifically denied by
Mr. Kotiram, Prossy Balaba, Salim Saleh, Jovial Akandwanaho, and, for himself,
by His Excellency the President
During a consideration of the link between exploitation of resources by the
Democratic Republic of Congo and the continuation of the conflict, the
reconstituted Panel point out that Dara Forêt registered as a Congolese registered
30 Company in Kinshasa in March 1998: it will be remembered that that was at a
time when relationships between Kinshasa and Kampala were good, and trade
opportunities were being investigated (see Paragraph 14.2 above). Then in June
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Lt. Col. Mayombo: I am aware that a Lt. Okumu, who was in charge of
a platoon, got involved with civilians by issuing chits that they could mine
and he was arrested by the overall operational commander and his case
was investigated by the Special Investigations Branch of the Military
Police.
He promised to let this Commission have details of the investigation, but has
never returned with that information. This would have assisted this Commission’s
investigations enormously.
General Kazini at first said that the officer was reprimanded for his offences: later
he said that there was a court martial which acquitted 10 him. The entry of reprimand
on this officer’s record has never been produced. Lt Okumu said that he was never
even investigated in respect of any offences relating to mines, but that he was
cleared of any charges in respect of selling fuel.
This has been a cover up: and it is in respect of the conduct of Lt Col Mugenyi, a
senior officer whom this Commission has caught out in lies and contradictions of
a serious nature, Maj. Sonko, who is not fit to fill the rank which he has attained,
and Lt Okumu, who also lied to this Commission, and whose misconduct has been
badly investigated. Particularly this Commission is unable to reject the allegation
by the original Panel (for this is the purpose of the cover-up) that UPDF soldiers
20 were posted at mines to take contributions of gold from miners to allow them to
mine.
The evidence of Major General Kazini, General Jeje Odong and Lt. Col. Noble
Mayombo clearly shows that the incident did happen and that the culprits were Lt.
David Okumu and the soldiers under his command. Lt. Col. Mugenyi claimed that
Lt. David Okumu was investigated and found innocent. This Commission has
found that no proper investigation was conducted because Lt. Col. Sonko who was
instructed by Lt. Col. Mugenyi to investigate the matter was also implicated in the
matter. His conclusion therefore did not come as a matter of surprise to the
Commission.
30 The evidence about the final investigation of this matter was extremely unclear.
General Kazini promised to let this Commission have a copy of it: he took no
action for many months, and on his last appearance stated that the matter had
come before a General Court Martial. He said that he had tried to get a copy of the
proceedings, and had been told that they could not be released to him for reasons
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however, Maj. Sonko referred to a quite different incident in which two
soldiers from Bunia were said to have connived with three FAC soldiers from
Watsa Barracks who harassed and robbed civilians. According to his report the
detach managed to get the stolen money back and to restore it to its rightful owner.
The whole matter was indecipherable, and amounts to just another example of the
frustrations one encounters when one tries to investigate what was going on within
the UPDF. However, in the Kazini Revelations at Paragraph 13.2 above, it is
obvious that there is confirmation of some of the original Panel’s allegations.
16.2.3. Trainees used as Convincible Labour to Mine
In Paragraph 58 the original Panel states that local 10 Congolese were used in what
the original Panel termed as “Convincible labour” to mine gold, diamonds or
coltan. The original Panel gives, as an example, Bondo locality in Equator
Province where young men from 12 to 18 years recruited by Jean- Pierre Bemba
were given one-hour morning physical training in the morning, and then sent to
gold mines to dig for gold on behalf of the Ugandans and Bemba. Jean Pierre
Bemba denied the allegation concerning the recruitment of young men from the
ages of 12 to 18 years. He stated that the minimum age of recruits was originally
17 years, but that it was later put at 18 years. Even when he was told that the
Commission had had evidence from a journalist who showed some video of some
20 young people being trained, Jean Pierre Bemba insisted on saying that the
minimum age was 17 years. He could not see the purpose of recruiting 12-year-old
young men.
The UPDF officers and men this Commission interviewed have admitted that
Jean-Pierre Bemba was an ally and that they trained the rebels under his
command, but denied that they trained young men recruited by him to mine gold
diamonds or coltan. Jean-Pierre Bemba has also denied the allegation. Since the
names of the alleged eyewitnesses who gave information to the original Panel
were not disclosed, this Commission is unable to investigate the matter further,
concludes that there it is unable to find evidence to support this allegation
30 16.2.4. Foreign Labour
The allegation in Paragraph 60 of the original Panel Report is that occupying
forces brought manpower from their home countries to mine in Congo. UPDF was
one of the occupying forces, but Uganda, unlike Rwanda, was not mentioned in
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connection with that pattern of organised extraction of minerals from Congo.
This Commission has not received evidence that tends to prove the allegation. The
probability is that the original Panel did not find that Uganda was involved and
that was the reason why Uganda was not specifically mentioned by the original
Panel. Accordingly this Commission rejects it as a mere allegation so far as
Uganda is concerned.
16.3.Wildlife.
16.3.1. Poaching in Garambwa National Park
Paragraph 61 of the original Panel Report states that between 1995 and 1999, 30%
of elephants were killed in Garambwa National 10 Park in areas controlled by
Ugandan troops and Sudanese rebels, and that there are similar problems in other
parks. There is no evidence available as to who was responsible for this. There is
however evidence that although there was a detach at Durba, near the Park, its
duties did not cover the Park. Congolese Security Reports produced complained of
poaching by SPLA in Garambwa Park and there were other reports of trouble
caused by the SPLA there. (Exh. FM/07/102). It should also be noted that the
original Panel’s allegation covers the period from 1995 to 1999. Ugandan troops
did not reach the area until late 1998, and therefore could only have been involved
in this allegation, if at all, for a very short time.
20 16.3.2. Tusks seized in Isiro
It is also said in Paragraph 61 of the original Panel Report that RCD-ML
temporarily seized about 3 tons of tusks in Isiro. After strong pressure, it is said,
from Uganda, the cargo was released and transferred to Kampala.
16.3.3. Tusks seized from Col Mugenyi near Garambwa National Park
Paragraph 62 of the original Panel Report alleges that Lt. Col. Mugenyi of the
UPDF and a crew of his soldiers were found with 800 kgs of elephant tusks in
their car near Garambwa Park. The Uganda Government is alleged to have
received notification of the incident.
The original Panel Report does not state the date on which he was found nor by
30 whom he was found, nor to which department or officer of the Uganda
Government Report was made. The Uganda Government denies in its response
that it received notification of this incident as alleged in the original Panel Report.
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has harmed Uganda, and allowed investigators to conclude that His Excellency the
President must have been involved in illegal exploitation of the natural resources of
the Congo. This Commission takes the matter very seriously indeed, and recommends
that the matter be further investigated by the relevant authorities for further action.
18.4. Take Air Ltd
In 1998 Take Air, in which General Salim Saleh was a shareholder and director,
submitted invoices to UPDF and was paid Shs. 111 million for flights to the Congo
that could not be identified. Lt. General . Saleh could not explain the reason for the
payment. He promised to check with his staff and report back to the Commission.
This was not done. Months later the General appeared before 10 the Commission again.
When asked about the documents he had promised including manifests, he said that
he had so far failed to get them. Take Air had closed in late 1998 and he (Saleh) had
difficulties in tracing its Managing Director who left Uganda in March 1999. To-date
the payment is still not accounted for. Further investigations are necessary and
recommended.
18.5. Other Private Companies
In Paragraph 79 of the UN Report it is alleged that a number of Companies were
created to facilitate the illegal activities in Democratic Republic of Congo. On the
Ugandan side, it is alleged that military officials created new companies and
20 businesses using prête-noms. It is said that most of the companies are owned by
private individuals or groups of individuals. Trinity and Victoria Group are
specifically named in Paragraph 80 as some of the said companies.
18.5.1. Victoria Group
Victoria Group is said to be chaired by one Mr. Khalil and has its headquarters in
Kampala and is owned jointly by Muhoozi Kainerugaba, son of President
Museveni, Jovial Akandwanaho and her husband. It is said the Group deals in
diamonds, gold and coffee. These products are purchased from Isiro, Bunia,
Bumba, Bondo, Buta and Kisangani. The Group is also suspected in the making of
counterfeit currency.
30 The evidence the Commission has on oath from Mrs. Ketra Tukuratiire, the Acting
Registrar – General, is that Victoria Group is not known in Uganda. It is neither
registered as local Company nor as a foreign Company. Apart from Khalil whom
this Commission has not been able to interview, as he is a non-resident in the
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Country, all the alleged owners of the Groups have denied any connection with
the Group.
Further evidence this Commission has received however, shows that there is a
Company known as La Societe Victoria which is owned by two people who have
not been mentioned throughout the evidence. The Company is registered in Goma
and deals in diamonds, gold and Coffee which it purchases from Isiro, Bunia,
Bumba, Bondo, Buta and Kisangani. The Company pays taxes to MLC to back up
what the Army Commander, Major General Kazini, terms’ “the effort in the armed
struggle”.
For that reason, General Kazini gave specific 10 instructions to UPDF Commanders
in Isiro, Bunia, Beni, Bumba, Bondo and Buta to allow the Company to do
business uninterrupted in the areas under their command.
Though General Kazini has denied on numerous occasions that he has any
connection with Khalil and that he only knew him casually, from the special
favours he gave to La Societe Victoria and the lies he told about his dealings with
the Company, one cannot resist the conclusion that he has some interest in the
Company, though this Commission has no conclusive evidence to prove it.
It is clear, however that the steps he took to facilitate the interests of the Company
were above and beyond the call of duty, and further, inappropriate to the UPDF’s
20 role of providing security.
As regards the alleged dealings of Mr. Khalil with Jovial Akandwanaho in
diamonds, this Commission originally had only the evidence of Jovial on the
issue. She admitted that she knew Khalil and that herself and Khalil at one time
established a Lebanese Restaurant known as Leban (U) Ltd on Bombo Road in
Kampala, in the middle of 1999. They are no longer operating the restaurant.
Jovial has denied that, apart from restaurant business, she had had any other
dealings with Khalil and in particular, diamonds. However under the heading “The
Diamond Link” at Paragraph 21.3 below, and particularly at Paragraph 21.3.5
below, this Commission has come to the conclusion that Jovial’s participation in
30 Khalil’s operations, and Victoria in particular, cannot be excluded.
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This Commission has asked the Inspector General of Government to provide
copies of the declaration of assets of Salim Saleh unfortunately he has not made one
for any of the past years, nor yet for 2002.
20.2. Jovial Akandanawaho
Jovial told the Commission that she has never been in any part of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Salim Saleh denied business dealings with any of the persons
mentioned. Jovial stated that she co-owned a restaurant with Khalil in Kampala for a
limited period in 1999, but denied having any other commercial dealings with him.
She further denied the allegation that she wanted control of Kisangani diamond
market. She and her husband refuted the allegation that 10 she was at the root of the
Kisangani wars. However, this Commission has evidence connecting Jovial with
Khalil and Victoria in Diamond smuggling, which is considered at Paragraph 21.3.5
below where this Commission has found that it is unable to rule out the participation
of Jovial Akandwanaho in the diamond smuggling operations of Victoria, revealing
that there is some truth in the allegations made against her by the original Panel.
20.3. General James Kazini
In Para 89, General James Kazini is said to be the third key actor. It is alleged that he is the
master in the field, the orchestrator, organizer and manager of most illegal activities related to
the UPDF presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He is said to rely on the
20 established military network and former comrades and collaborators such as Colonels
Tinkamanyire and Mugenyi and to be close to Messrs. Nyamwisi, Tibasiima, Lumbala, Jean-
Pierre Bemba all of whom have facilitated his illegal dealings in diamond, coltan, timber,
counterfeit currency and imports of goods and merchandise in Equator and Oriental
Provinces.
General Kazini is accused of many wrong doings in the original Panel Report, and this
Commission has tried to deal with the allegations in the same order as did the original Panel.
He was examined by the Commission at length, but he denied any involvement in business
activities. One of the witnesses, Ateenyi Tibasiima, confirmed what Kazini had said. He
stated in an affidavit that he had not helped or seen Kazini in business activities. However,
30 consideration of General Kazini’s involvement with Khalil and Victoria can be found at
Paragraph 21.3.4 below. Throughout this report, General Kazini’s name surfaces in respect of
many allegations which relate to the misbehaviour of senior officers of the UPDF in the DRC,
in respect of which he has taken little action: he has lied to this Commission on many
occasions. Whilst this Commission bears in mind that he was the man on the ground, and that
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many allegations have been freely made from the DRC which have not stood up to close
examination, nevertheless this Commission has found that many of those made against
General Kazini are supportable.
General Kazini’s alleged dealings with Jean-Pierre Bemba in respect of coffee beans is
covered by Paragraph 17.1 above. He and a number of other witnesses have stated that they
were never asked to meet with the original Panel. Aside from his meddling in local
administration when he appointed Mme Adele Lotsove a Provisional Governor and created a
new Ituri Province for which he was reprimanded (see Para 15.8), the Commission has not
found any evidence to implicate him as accused in the original Panel Report.
However, the Commission has received documentary evidence implicating 10 General Kazini in
other local administrative matters. In one case he instructed UPDF Commanders in Isiro,
Bunia, Beni, Bumba, Bondo and Buta to allow one company, La Societe Victoria, to do
business in coffee, diamonds, gold uninterrupted in areas under their control as it had been
cleared of taxation by the President of MLC, Jean Pierre Bemba. He concluded by saying
that: “Anything to do with payment to you in form of security funding, it will be done through
OSH-Tac HQS”, i.e. his office.
In another letter addressed to the Governor of Kisangani, the Major General attached a copy
of communication from the chairman of MLC and his own comments and stated that
VICTORIA had officially cleared taxes with MLC authorities and asked the Governor “to
20 leave VICTORIA do his business and he will continue to pay taxes to MLC to back up the
effort in the armed struggle”.
While General Kazini and other UPDF officer denied collecting or receiving any money from
Congolese for their services, the General’s first letter above leaves little doubt that some of
the UPDF Senior Officers expected money from Congolese for security purposes. His
evidence makes clear that he also expected it, and that the Commanders would keep the
money for themselves, rather than accounting to him for it.
20.3.1. General Kazini's Coltan.
Letter from General Kazini requesting one Thomas Mathe as minister of finance
of RCD-ML to allow his Coltan through customs.(Document 5)
30 On the face of it this appears to be a proper copy letter from General Kazini (who
then was a Brigadier). However it is apparent that there are a number of strange
things about it. In the first place Captain Balikudembe’s name is spelt wrong. He
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and the mining incidents referred to in Paragraphs 57 and 59 of the original Panel Report,
with which this Commission has dealt at Paragraph 16.2.1 above.
A serious consideration of those holding Senior Posts in the UPDF is called for, and
recommended by this Commission .
21. ECONOMIC DATA : CONFIRMATION OF THE ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION
OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
CONGO
In Paragraphs 94 to 108 economic data is set out in the report.
21.1.Gold
The conclusion of the original Panel Report in relation to 10 the economic data was that
the official data provided by Uganda authorities, contained substantial discrepancies.
The original Panel pointed out that the export figures for gold were consistently
greater than production values. The original Panel attributed the gap to the
exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo. They
point out that the Bank of Uganda has acknowledged to IMF officials that the volume
of Ugandan gold exports does not reflect Uganda's production levels, but rather that
some exports might be leaking over the borders from the Democratic Republic of
Congo. According to the Bank of Uganda exports in 1996 6.4 million dollars, and in
1995 $23 million, and in 1997 were $105 million.
20 This Commission has heard evidence from Bank of Uganda officials that their data is
collected from forms provided by the Bank of Uganda which express an intention to
export only. This Commission therefore looked at the URA figures for gold exports
and transit. It was not possible to separate the figures for exports originating from the
Congo, although it was possible to separate the transit figures, but only for 1999 and
2000.
This Commission thought to confirm figures from the UN COMTRADE database
said to have been provided by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, which revealed totally
different Ugandan export figures to those quoted by the UN panel, sourced from the
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. When comparing those figures with
30 the figures provided by Uganda's trading partners in terms of imports from Uganda an
even more disparate picture emerged.
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There are problems in comparing figures, since some are in millions of shillings
and others in thousands of dollars, and some others are in tones/tonnes. But a general
picture can be obtained of a steady rise until 1997, with a dip in 1998 and an increase
in 1999. In 2000 there is a small dip.
There is also one other thing which appears from the figures, and that is that the
figures from the COMTRADE database as provided by Uganda Bureau of Statistics
as to Uganda's export figures, and the figures provided by Uganda's partners as
imports differ wildly, and bear no relation at all to the figures provided by URA. It is
quite clear therefore that there is massive smuggling of gold, and that the figures from
any source cannot be relied upon. One wonders 10 how it can be suggested that Uganda
must have realised what was going on with respect to Gold, or how Uganda can be
blamed for anything but an inefficient Customs Service and a porous border. It is not
the only country in Africa with these problems. The Commission will have
recommendations to make on this subject in due course.
It is also clear that there is no mine in Uganda which is fully operative; the same is
also true for the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The only source of gold
available is artisanal mining in open areas and abandoned mines (such as Kilo Moto).
The original Panel themselves indicate that a great deal of artisanal mining is going
on: they quote a figure of 2000 people mining in Kilo Moto mines per day, paying
20 soldiers a total of 2 kg per day; no doubt the workers also take an appreciable amount
of gold out of the gate. The Addendum to the original Panel Report increases that
figure to 10,000 people per day, generating £10,000 a day, 6 days a week, or
$3,120,000 a year. Whether or not soldiers are involved, this is an appreciable amount
of gold. Maj. Ssonko put the figure at 20,000 artisanal miners. Dr Mido gave
evidence that Professor Wamba appointed a Commission of soldiers to charge
artisanal miners at Kilo Moto about $15 worth of gold to go into the mine, and that
the proceeds from that were about two to three hundred grams a month, which raises
the possibility that RCD soldiers were mistaken for UPDF soldiers.
According to the Uganda Government, the figures for production in Uganda do not
30 reflect true production, because artisanal miners do not declare production, whereas
exporters do. Nevertheless there is widespread artisanal production in Uganda, since
this would be the only source of gold production in Uganda, apart from the
production from one mine in development.
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What concerns this Commission is that the COMTRADE figures declared by
Uganda Bureau of Statistics are 16,35, and 43 million dollars for 1998,1999, and
2000 respectively. These figures are far too high to be matched by likely artisanal
production in the Democratic Republic of Congo even taken together with Uganda,
and they are not matched by COMTRADE Partner Import figures which are 2,4,and
14 million dollars only, (which are much more acceptable in relation to artisanal
production.
The original Panel has relied upon figures provided by the Ugandan Bureau of
Statistics. These figures do not match URA figures, or figures from Import partners
who, with respect, might be expected to be more reliable. 10 This Commission thinks
that perhaps if a little comparative research had been done, the original Panel would
have realised that the figures upon which they relied were, to say the least,
questionable, even though provided by Uganda, and that artisanal mining was the
only realistic source of gold production in this part of the world. The original Panel
might have been able to look with sympathy on the parlous state of the Uganda
Customs Service, and to make constructive recommendations in that regard. This
Commission cannot support their conclusion in Paragraph 45 that :
"The Panel has strong indications after talking to numerous witnesses (key
and others) that key officials in the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda
20 were aware of the situation on the ground, including the looting of stocks
from a number of factories. In some cases, the level of production of
mineral resources would have alerted any government, such as those of
gold for Uganda and coltan for Rwanda (from 99 tons in 1996 to 250 tons
in 1997)."
In passing this Commission would point out that in view of this Paragraph, and
similar comments in the Addendum, this Commission will not be considering coltan
under this heading, although there undoubtedly was coltan from the Congo transiting
through Uganda.
With relation to the acquisition of proper statistics, the problem appears to be the
30 recording of production. This Commission visited a gold exporter, and saw one
transaction through from the visit of the client with unprocessed gold dust to the
melting of the gold, and payment for it. The client was a businessman in Arua, and he
brought one large packet which was split up into many smaller packets, each of which
belonged to an artisanal miner. Each one was painstakingly labelled with the name of
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the artisan, and they were all melted and assessed individually, and the payment
for each man calculated.
In such circumstances it is impractical to expect the artisans to notify gold production
and source, even where the law requires it. It is only the exporter who is required to
fill in statistical forms for export. Production and, more importantly, source figures
ought also to be required of whoever is the first person in Uganda to melt the gold
down, because the gold dust brought contains many impurities. In that regard, it was
quite clear from the visit that URA has no hope of charging import duties, because the
individual packets were so small (smaller than a matchbox,though heavy, and quite
valuable) that they were easy to hide. For the same reason, it 10 might be impractical to
require source figures, because gold smuggled through the border would be unlikely
to be declared as sourced from outside Uganda, so that it was not dutiable. This
Commission was told that the sources were all within Uganda: but looking at some of
the names involved, and bearing in mind the fact that the client was from Arua, this
was unlikely.
This Commission’s observation of the practice and procedure of, at least, artisanal
gold production was that it would be very difficult, if not impossible to control gold
imports from across the border, or to produce production statistics of any kind.
Therefore, even if the Uganda Government ought to have noticed that production
20 figures did not match export figures, there was very little that could be done about it.
Practically speaking this Commission is unable to suggest an approach to solve the
problem, but would recommend further study of the problem.
Table 1: Comparative figures for Gold from various sources
GOLD
INFORMATION FROM 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
URA EXPORTS Mshs 24,296 22,233 18,972 12,988 22,497
URA TRANSIT from
Congo Value Mshs 0 0 0 0 13 53
BOU Mshs 2,539 6,409 8,059 1,860 3,836 3,184
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from Uganda coincide with the years of the wars in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, that is from 1997 onward."
So far as this Commission is concerned, the data from Ugandan Authorities is not
silent. It is quite clear from URA, BOU and Uganda Bureau of Statistics data to
COMTRADE that there is no record whatever of diamond production in Uganda.
There is a slight possibility of some artisanal surface diamond collection, but nothing
has been officially declared.
On the other side, the original Panel's information, which is said to have come from
WTO, the World Federation of Diamond Bourses and the Diamond High Council,
agrees quite closely with the COMTRADE Partner 10 Import figures on diamonds,
except for the figures for 2000. This Commission has checked the original Panel's
information with the Diamond High Council. It is revealed that, although much more
care is now exercised by the Belgian Authorities, at the time in question, the source of
diamonds was accepted upon the information of the importer, and Diamond High
Council statistics (which the original Panel quoted as their source) relate to import to
Belgium.
Therefore, although the original Panel treat as suspicious the fact that, according to
external statistics, Uganda was a diamond exporter, in fact that information was based
upon the most unreliable figures.
20 For example this Commission has traced a Police case in Uganda where one Khalil,
who is mentioned in the original Panel Report, admitted to obtaining diamonds in the
Democratic Republic of Congo in April 2000, flying them in to the Military Air Base,
and ultimately sending a packet of them through associates to the International
Airport, where the diamonds were exchanged (in the Gents toilet at the airport) for
$550,000 in cash with a courier from Belgium who caught the next flight back. This
was hardly an honest exchange, particularly as there is no record of import, export or
transit through Uganda.The reason the matter was reported to the Police in Uganda
was because on the way back to Kampala, the car was stopped by armed men and the
money stolen. The case is dealt with more particularly at Paragraph 21.3 below. The
30 point is that the source of information in Belgium that the diamonds originally came
from Uganda (which they did not) was the courier who had been involved in this
shady deal. Had the original Panel known all this, perhaps they would not have been
so hasty as to lay the blame at Uganda’s door: and to establish the source of the
information upon which they relied was only a telephone call away, for that is how
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this Commission established this information. There is no doubt that diamonds
are being smuggled, and falsely declared as sourced in Uganda. Bearing in mind that
a fortune can be carried in a pocket, it is difficult to see what Uganda as a State can
do about this. Partner Countries must be aware that Uganda is not a diamond
producing country, and yet are prepared to publish figures which deny that fact. The
original Panel acknowledge the difficulty, and make recommendations in respect of
it, which the Uganda Government, in its response, accepts.
Although the original Panel refers to diamond exports from Uganda as commencing
"with the occupation of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo" the figures
they produce clearly show considerable trading 10 in 1997, a year before the UPDF went
in. This however would coincide with the start of the Laurent Kabila regime, and the
coming of relative peace and security to the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,
followed by security provided by UPDF even in troubled times, both of which
enabled overseas trading. There is no surprise in this.
This Commission cannot therefore understand why the original Panel referred to
these figures as suspicious, or as supporting their conclusions from field trips.
Table 2: Comparative figures for Diamonds from various sources
DIAMONDS 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
URA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BOU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
COMTRADE UGANDAEXPORTS
($000) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
COMTRADE PARTNERSIMPORTS
($000) 0 0 203 1,364 1,232 13 0
PANEL ($000) 198 1,440 1,813 1,263
21.3. The Diamond Link
20 An opportunity presented itself to investigate the way in which diamonds were
exported to Europe from the Democratic Republic of Congo, arising from a document
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provided by the reconstituted Panel, combined with information that this
Commission had obtained about the smuggling of diamonds. The evidence and
conclusions to be drawn from it are set out below.
21.3.1. Victoria
Throughout this Commission’s investigations the name of Victoria Diamonds or
Victoria Group has surfaced on many occasions. The allegations in the original
Panel Report were that Salim Saleh was a key shareholder in the group, which was
said to have been involved in the making of counterfeit Congolese Francs
(Paragraph 67). Later in paragraph 80 the original Panel described Victoria Group
as being chaired by one Mr. Khalil with its headquarters 10 in Kampala. The original
Panel said that Mr. Khalil deals directly with Salim Saleh's wife on Diamond
issues, and had two collaborators in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Mohammed Gassan and Mr. Talal. The original Panel were also told that Victoria
Group belongs jointly to the son of President Museveni and Salim Saleh and his
wife, and was involved in trading diamonds, gold and coffee.
In Paragraph 88, when focusing on Salim Saleh and his wife, and accusing Salim
Saleh of controlling Mbusa Nyamwisi and Ateenyi Tibasima through General
Kazini, who were protecting his commercial and business interests, the original
Panel stated that Salim Saleh used the Victoria Group (and also Trinity) for the
20 purchase and commercialisation of diamonds, timber, coffee and gold. The
original Panel also reported that Salim Saleh's wife wanted to control the
Kisangani diamond markets on the recommendation of Mr. Khalil.
In the Addendum, Victoria comptoir in Kampala is mentioned in Paragraph 26 as
continuing to sell gold mined from Malaka, and in Paragraph 97 as still exploiting
diamonds, gold coffee and timber, enabling the UPDF to “pull out their troops,
while leaving behind structures that permit military officers and associates,
including rebel leaders, to continue profiting”. In Paragraph 99 of the Addendum,
Roger Lumbala is alleged to be a front for Victoria in respect of Bafwasende
diamonds.
30 This Commission’s original researches were centred on a Ugandan Company of
that name because of the insistence of the original Panel that the Company was
connected with Kampala, and it took very little time to establish that there was no
such company registered in Uganda, either local or foreign. All that was
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discovered relevant to the allegations in the original Panel report was that at
one time Jovial Akandwanaho and Khalil were associated in a Lebanese
restaurant. They were directors in a company named Leban (U) Ltd which was
registered on 5th August 1999, and opened a Lebanese Restaurant in Kampala
Road in mid-1999. Later, Jovial said, she had sold her shares to Khalil.
Later on in this Commission’s researches, a registration document of a company
called Victoria Diamonds, registered in Goma in February 1999 was obtained. The
Directors of that Company were Ahmed Ibrahim (a Lebanese living in Goma) and
Kay Nduhuukire (a Ugandan living in Goma), who were mentioned nowhere else
in the reports or evidence. This Commission therefore 10 thought that this Company
was not the Company referred to by the Original Panel, and reported as such.
However, an event in Uganda came to the attention of this Commission. On 14th
July 2000 a robbery took place on the Entebbe Road. The robbery was from a
vehicle which was travelling from Entebbe Airport to Kampala: and a sum of
$550,000 was reported to have been robbed from the occupants. The matter was
reported to the Police, and it turned out that the loser was the same Khalil, who
made a statement to the Police.
21.3.2. Khalil
In that statement Khalil identified himself as Khalil Nazem Ibrahim, of British
20 Nationality. He said that he came to Uganda in January 1999 and that he had a
Lebanese restaurant on Kampala Road and did business of buying diamonds from
the Congo especially in Kisangani, Buta and Bunia. He did not name the company
under which he worked. He said that he used to send money for buying diamonds
through one Hussein, and sometimes would go himself. He was receiving
diamonds through the Entebbe airport and also sending them to Europe especially
to Belgium, and received the money in dollars for buying the diamonds from one
Nasser Murtada at Entebbe Airport. His base was in Bugolobi in Kampala. Due to
problems in the Congo he said that he stopped the business and in June 2000
brought a man named Ismail from Buta to start buying diamonds from the Congo.
30 Khalil said that he then went back to Belgium to arrange finance after showing
Ismail what to do. The procedure was that Nasser Murtada delivered money in
dollars from Belgium at Entebbe airport and took the diamonds already purchased
back to Belgium.
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with Military Transport. It is the name Khalil which connects these operations
and the allegations in the original Panel Report. It seems to matter little whether
the Goma registered Company La Societé Victoria is the same Victoria Group or
Comptoir referred to in the original Panel Report or not. Khalil’s operations are
therefore referred to in this report simply as “Victoria”.
21.3.4. General Kazini
In considering these operations, this Commission wonders how they could have
been set up, obviously with UPDF assistance, so far at least as transport is
concerned. Those concerned in smuggling of diamonds from the Congo to the
Military Air Base in many cases were admittedly 10 Lebanese, who were plainly and
visibly neither Ugandan nor Congolese, and again it is fair to ask, in view of the
President’s radio message, how these Lebanese were allowed to travel to and from
the Military Airport. This Commission had no evidence as to how these operations
were set up, until the reconstituted Panel provided a set of documents which had to
be put to General Kazini.
The first document was a receipt for payment of ad valorem tax in advance to
MLC of $100,000 each from Siporia Diamonds and Victoria Diamonds. The payer
on behalf of Victoria Diamonds was Abbas Kazal, a connection which helps to
confirm this Commission’s above finding.
20 The receipt was attached to a note on MLC notepaper signed by Mr. Bemba
addressed to all civil and military authorities, dated 26th June 1999 which states
that La Societe Victoria was authorised to proceed with purchases of gold, coffee
and diamonds in Isiro Bunia Bondo Buta Kisangani and Beni, and that all the local
taxes would be paid to MLC.
The note was an interesting document in itself, confirming that Mr. Bemba
initially lied to this Commission, and confirming what appears to have been a
universal practice of pre-payment of taxes.
But also endorsed on the note were the comments of General Kazini addressed to
the Commanders in all of the mentioned towns, except Kisangani, also dated 26th
30 June 1999. From other writings of General Kazini this commission had no doubt
that it was in his handwriting: and there is quite a large sample in this case. It was
therefore astonishing to hear General Kazini deny flatly that he wrote it. It was not
until it was pointed out that in another document with which this Commission will
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deal below, the comments were referred to, and that it would be a simple
matter to call handwriting expert evidence that he admitted that he was indeed the
author. This was not a mistake: having watched General Kazini giving evidence,
this Commission is fully satisfied that it was a deliberate lie by Uganda’s Acting
Army Commander, displaying an arrogance and contempt of civil authority
similar to that which has been displayed by other witnesses in the UPDF.
General Kazini’s comments were actually instructions to his Commanders,
pointing out that La Societe Victoria had been granted permission to do business
in coffee, gold and diamonds in their areas, that taxes were to be paid to MLC, and
that the Commanders should “let Victoria 10 to do its business uninterrupted by
anybody”. This makes one wonder what the Commanders would have done if they
had not received this instruction.
In his last paragraph General Kazini instructed the commanders that anything to
do with payment to them in the form of security funding, it should be done
through OSH TAC HQS, that is, through himself. Throughout these proceedings,
every UPDF witness, including General Kazini, has denied that any such funding
was taking place, but it clearly was. Senior Officers have again been lying to this
Commission.
All of the above documents were copied in a letter from General Kazini on UPDF
20 notepaper addressed to the Governor Kisangani, datelined July 1999. The letter
referred to Mr. Bemba's letter and General Kazini’s comments endorsed on the
same document. He informed the Governor that Victoria had officially cleared
taxes with MLC authorities and MLC was a recognised organisation by all
Congolese and allies. He asked the Governor to "leave Victoria to his business and
he will continue to pay taxes to MLC to back up the effort in the armed struggle."
Pausing there for a minute, it is worth considering the position in Kisangani at the
time. Contrary to what this Commission understood at the start of this
investigation, the UPDF never took control of Kisangani town, but established
headquarters at La Forestiere some 17 km outside Kisangani. According to the
30 evidence of General Kazini and Adele Lotsove, Kisangani itself was under the
control of RCD Goma, and indeed the letter is copied to them. General Kazini was
questioned on his authority to give instructions to the Governor of Kisangani. His
explanations were confused and unconvincing.
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Whilst the Governor of Kisangani would also be responsible for territories
north of Kisangani, in areas which were under UPDF control, it has to be
remembered that Adele Lotsove had been talking to General Kazini for some time
with a view to establishing the province of Ituri so that she could take the
governorship of the province, and indeed it was on the 18th of June 1999 that
General Kazini wrote the letter of appointment, some 8 days before the date of the
correspondence under consideration: General Kazini therefore knew on the date
on which he wrote the letter to the Governor that the areas North of Kisangani,
which were destined to become Ituri Province, which were the same areas
controlled by the commanders listed in his com 10 ments, either were already, or soon
would come under the administration of Adele Lotsove, not of the Governor of
Kisangani.
Evidence shows that Kisangani, though not a diamond producing area in itself,
was the basis of collection and distribution. It was also Victoria’s base. Clearly
Victoria’s operations involving pre-payment of tax to MLC could not succeed
without some co-operation from the Rwanda supported Kisangani Administration
in the matter of tax.
Set in that light then, this Commission asked General Kazini why he, who had no
control in Kisangani Town, was giving instructions to the Governor of Kisangani
20 in administrative matters, and why, in his last paragraph he wrote what amounts to
a veiled threat. His replies were not satisfactory, particularly in view of the fact
that apart from the appointment of Adele Lotsove, he denied being involved in any
other administrative matters.
This Commission can only come to one conclusion, that General Kazini had more
interest in Victoria’s operations than he has been prepared to admit: and that
conclusion supports many allegations of the original Panel in respect of General
Kazini.
The Governor of Kisangani was not notified in advance of the intended
appointment of Adele Lotsove, or of the carving out from his Province of the new
30 Province of Ituri. General Kazini therefore was involved in secretly appointing, or
conspiring in the appointment of Adele Lotsove to take administrative control of
the mineral producing areas. This can only have been because she was a
sympathetic administrator. In appointing her, General Kazini was acting against
the existing Governor who clearly was not sympathetic, as is revealed by the
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phraseology of the last paragraph of General Kazini’s letter to him: “Let me
hope that I have been clearly understood”. In the circumstances this letter was
inflammatory, and calculated to upset the appointed administration, RCD Goma
and its ally, Rwanda.
It is also revealing that, amongst others, he copied his letter to Victoria, as though
reporting that he had obeyed his instructions, and done what he had been asked to
do by Victoria.
These conclusions put General Kazini at the beginning of a chain as an active
supporter in the Democratic Republic of Congo of Victoria, an organisation
engaged in smuggling diamonds through Uganda: and it is difficult 10 to believe that
he was not profiting for himself from the operation.
Perhaps also an answer to the question posed above, as to how Lebanese were
being allowed to fly on Military Aircraft to and from the Democratic Republic of
Congo, in breach of the President’s Instructions, is beginning to appear. General
Kazini according to the evidence, was one of those who gave clearance
instructions to the Liaison Officers at the Military Air base.
21.3.5. Jovial Akandwanaho
It is fairly clear how diamonds were smuggled into Uganda through the Military
Air Base, and smuggled out to Belgium. The question that arises is how the
20 courier was able on many occasions to get through Entebbe Airport Security
unscathed. He had to have had assistance at the airport.
Enquiries have revealed that a Civil Aviation Authority officer in the VIP lounge
was in fact assisting Nasser as he came into the country on Sabena. His evidence
had to be taken in camera on the basis that he feared for his life should he give
evidence in public. This fear was based upon an allegation that one of the
investigators into the robbery had been killed. What this officer told this
Commission on oath was that he had been introduced to Khalil by Jovial
Akandwanaho with a view to assisting him through Customs when he came from
Belgium, and returned to Belgium with the diamonds.
30 When he met Khalil, they came to an arrangement where the officer would assist
couriers from Belgium, and the officer was rung on several occasions by Jovial
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Akandwanaho, on occasions by Khalil, and also by others and asked to meet
the courier, which he did, and assisted him through Customs.
On one occasion he received a call from Jovial and was asked to go to the
departure lounge where the courier had been stopped because he was carrying
diamonds. When he got there, he rang Jovial who spoke on his phone to the
security officer, as a result of which the courier was allowed to continue onto his
flight. The officer said that this was how he came to know that diamonds were
involved. He showed Jovial’s mobile number on his phone: it was found to be
correct.
This Commission had the opportunity of seeing this 10 witness give evidence, and
was impressed by him as a truthful witness. He clearly thought that he was putting
himself in danger by giving evidence, but nevertheless volunteered information
which supported the allegations made by the original Panel. It might be thought
that this Commission might have further interviewed Jovial Akandwanaho, but it
had regard to her denial that she had anything to do with diamonds, and was only
associated with Khalil through a Lebanese restaurant: only a renewed denial was
to be expected where it was obvious that the identity of the witness would become
known, contrary to this Commission’s promise to the witness.
As a result, this Commission is unable to rule out the participation of Jovial
20 Akandwanaho in the smuggling operations of Victoria as alleged by the original
Panel : on the contrary there is every indication that there is a link between
General Kazini, Victoria, Khalil and Jovial Akandwanaho, and perhaps others in
the smuggling of diamonds through Uganda to Belgium.
It is clear to this Commission that the incident of the robbery opened many
channels of investigation, and the recommendation would be that further
investigations should be conducted on the basis of what has been revealed so far,
and appropriate action taken.
21.4. Niobium
The original Panel say that the pattern of Niobium Export appears to be the same : no
30 production prior to 1997, followed by an increase in exports. In respect of all these
minerals, due to the original Panel's recital of data source, this Commission
communicated with WTO, who said that they did not keep such statistics, and
referred this Commission to the UN COMTRADE Database. So there is some
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confusion there, as the figures are somewhat different. Uganda declares exports
as from 1995, whilst Partner Imports start in 1998. This makes a nonsense of the
original Panel's conclusion that Export started in 1997, to coincide with the start of
the war. The original Panel's figures are much higher than those from the
COMTRADE database, but the figures never exceed $782,000 in a year from
whatever source. This Commission does not think that the figures bear out the
original Panel's conclusion, or that Niobium bears any real relation to the alleged
illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Table 3: Comparative figures for Niobium from various sources
NIOBIUM 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
URA 7
BOU
COMTRADE UGANDA
EXPORTS ($000) 210 32 231 7
COMTRADE PARTNERS
IMPORTS ($000) 435 713 422
PANEL ($000) 0 0 13 580 782
21.5. 10 Mineral Transit figures
In Paragraph 102 of the Report, the original Panel say:
102. Third, the Ugandan authorities, in their response to the Panel's
questionnaire, stated that there was no record of transit of mineral
products. However, the Panel received information from one Ugandan
customs post at the border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Uganda. Records for 1998, 1999 and 2000 reveal that mineral products
as well as other commodities left the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
entered Uganda (presumably this would also prove true for the other dozen
or so points of entry). The following three examples show an increase in
20 the transboundary movement of natural resources between 1998 and 1999.
Coffee 1998: 144,911 bags
1999: 170,079 bags
2000: 208,000 bags
Timber 1998: 1,900 m3
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States and Actors. This was a subject which was of great interest to this
Commission, as the hope was that from such a consideration would come some
specific allegations which could be investigated. It did not appear that the members of
the reconstituted Panel who visited us were aware of, or perhaps had in mind, the
response by the Uganda Government.
It became clear that the reconstituted Panel had not addressed this subject in any
depth at all. The reason, with which this commission sympathises, is the lack of time.
It is true that a great deal of the time of the reconstituted Panel was taken up with
investigation of other countries which had not been looked at before in very great
detail. An example of the reconstituted Panel’s failure 10 can be found in Paragraph 31.5
below.
This has therefore raised problems, once again problems of perception.
In Paragraph 15 of the Addendum it is made clear that there was no emphasis placed
on such a review, since the reconstituted Panel say that their investigations focused on
evaluating whether changes in trends had occurred since the release of the report,
thereby apparently approaching their task by accepting the original Report, which has
been the subject of so much criticism, as a basis.
This was an important omission from the point of view of the accused countries, and
from Uganda’s point of view in particular. Uganda submitted detailed, item by item
20 responses. His Excellency the President also submitted a particularised response to
the allegations made against himself and his family. These responses appear in the
main to have been ignored by the reconstituted Panel. This Commission examined
those responses in tandem with the relevant paragraphs of the original Panel Report,
and, to take an example, in its Interim Report found no evidence whatever to back up
the criticisms by the original Panel against His Excellency the President. The
reconstituted Panel has done nothing to confirm or deny those allegations, which
remain in the air.
The second arises from the apparent complete acceptance of the original Panel Report
in the Press, the International Community and the proceedings of the United Nations
30 Security Council. One International Donor has already withdrawn substantial Aid
from Uganda on the ground of the allegations in the original Panel Report. This
demonstrates that the mandate to the reconstituted Panel recited in Paragraph 1 b)
above was not an unimportant issue to which the reconstituted Panel might merely
refer, but an issue at the basis of the whole perception of the situation by the
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International Community as regards the allegations against Uganda made in the
original Panel Report, which have caused Uganda a great deal of harm. On this
Commission’s evaluation, allegation by allegation, there is little evidence to support
most of the allegations, and none at all in respect of those against Uganda as a State,
and against His Excellency the President. The reconstituted Panel’s mandate was to
come up with a response, based as far as possible on corroborated evidence to the
comments and reactions of States and Actors cited in the report of the original Panel.
The reconstituted Panel so far has failed to do so.
31. EXPLOITATION OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES
10 31.1. “Illicit” and “Illegal”
As can be seen from the title of this section, the reconstituted Panel have abandoned
the use of the word “Illegal”, save in referring to their mandate. This is the case
throughout the Addendum, in which only the word “illicit” is used on nine occasions
instead, and only once in relation to Uganda.
It is important to understand the difference between these two words. “Illegal” is
defined as “not allowed by law”. “Illicit” as either “not allowed by laws or rules, or
strongly disapproved of by society”. (Longman – Dictionary of Contemporary
English).
In usage, “Illegal” appears to be the more uncompromising and restricted meaning of
20 “breach of the law”: the example given is “they were caught selling illegal drugs”
whereas “illicit” has a wider use and more often is used in the sense of moral
disapproval: the examples given are “an illicit love affair” (which would normally
involve no breach of the law, but more probably would attract society’s disapproval)
and “illicit diamond trading”, which expression arose from the days when there were
no controls, and now remains in the language.
Thus an illegal action will also be illicit: but an illicit action is not necessarily illegal.
One wonders then why the reconstituted Panel have moved to the word “illicit”, when
their mandate, as the mandate of this Commission uncompromisingly relates to
alleged “illegal” acts. In this Commission’s view, this constitutes a movement, not
30 only of the goalposts, but of the whole playing field, and this Commission is unable
to accept the view expressed by the Chairman of the reconstituted Panel in an
interview with this commission that, in view of differing interpretations, the word
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illicit may be used instead of the word “illegal” in respect of the allegations
against Uganda and Ugandans in the original Panel Report.
Indeed in a Press briefing by the President of the Security Council on 19th November
2001, the Chairman is reported in the following manner:
But during the second phase of the fact finding mission, the Panel
discovered that whether it was legal or illegal, most of the exploitation was
illicit. ‘There may be differences in style and forms of exploitation, but in
the end it was illegal’ he said.
If correctly reported, (and this was a specific quotation in a Press briefing by the
President of the Security Council), a finer example of 10 circular logic could not be
imagined.
Further in answer to a question specifically on the point of the definition of illegality,
the Chairman is reported to have said:
During the first phase of the Panel, the issue was whether the exploitation
was legal or illegal. In the second phase, the Panel found that the words
legal or illegal became irrelevant. In the end it discovered that those who
claimed to be operating legally were actually engaged in illicit activities
with regard to exploitation. Also between those activities classified as legal
and those classified as illegal there was a wide grey area
20 The grey area to which the Chairman refers is the area described by the word “illicit”,
in the sense of strong to mere disapproval by the International Community, by whom
the reconstituted Panel is mandated.
The report continued:
For example, those whom the Panel thought were illegal were not
denounced by the Democratic Republic of Congo Government – in fact the
Democratic Republic of Congo dealt with them to allow the continuation of
the activity
Just such a case was the operation of Dara Forêt as found by the reconstituted Panel.
In Paragraphs 72 to 73 of the Addendum, the reconstituted Panel found that Dara
30 Forêt had complied with all the regulations in effect and was recognised by the
Kinshasa Government. As an entity therefore, the reconstituted Panel was forced to
recognise that Dara Forêt had to be accepted as legal. Nevertheless, in interviews with
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27. The original Panel’s report sheds light on the gold mining activities
carried out by the Ugandan army, which assumed control of this gold-rich
area. The sharp rise in Ugandan gold exports, which also exceeded
national production, was given as further evidence that this gold is
transported by UPDF elements to Kampala, from where it is exported. The
Government of Uganda contested the findings of the original Panel in its
report, attributing the increase in its exports to 1993 policies liberalizing
gold sales and exports, where the revamped policies permitted artisanal
miners in Uganda to keep hard currency earned from sales. Officials
claimed that as a result of the 10 ease with which gold can be smuggled,
Uganda became the preferred destination for gold produced by artisanal
miners in the surrounding region.
28. The discrepancy between the gold export figures registered by the
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development and those recorded by the
Uganda Revenue Service was attributed to the fact that the Ministry’s
figures reflect the quotas set for the production of the Ugandan export
permit holders. These permit holders can buy from artisanal miners, the
total of which appears on the export permits. While small-scale smuggling
may in part explain the discrepancy in Uganda’s production and export
20 figures, the original Panel has evidence that artisanal gold mining activities
in the north-east by UPDF and RCD-ML, as well as the short-lived rebel
coalition FLC, have continued. In the Kilo-moto area for example,
operations at the Gorumbwa and Durba sites are under the control of
UPDF and RCD-ML. The Malaka site reportedly employs 10,000 diggers
and generates amounts of gold valued at $10,000 per day. Gold produced is
still being sold through the Victoria comptoir in Kampala.
The original Panel Report quotes a figure of only 2000 artisanal diggers operating at
Kilo Moto, producing sufficient gold to “pay off” up to 2 kg of gold a day. The
reconstituted Panel gives no account for this inflationary figure, which raises
30 suspicions of exaggeration by the original Panel’s informants. The reconstituted Panel
do not deal with this problem. There is another example of such exaggeration relating
to the “skimming” by Mbusa Nyamwisi of taxes, dealt with at Paragraph 32 below of
this report.
This Commission has dealt with Gold at Paragraph 21.1 above. As with diamonds,
there are no import figures of gold, which, if it is sourced in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, is clearly being smuggled. There is something in what the reconstituted
Panel say, with regard to gold being sold through Victoria, who were licenced in
respect of gold as well as diamonds, and this Commission is unable to exclude this
possibility.
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31.4. Copper and Cobalt
There are no allegations which involve Uganda in respect of these minerals. This
Commission has drawn attention to the situation of Kasese Cobalt Ltd in Paragraph
21.6 above. The company has now ceased to function.
31.5. Diamonds
The reconstituted Panel say:
Diamonds from artisanal mining in northern Kisangani area have provided
a source of revenue for the rebels, RPA and UPDF for the continuation of
the conflict. The high combined taxes imposed by the RCD-Goma rebel
group and RPA ultimately resulted in diamonds 10 mined in this area being
redirected to Kampala, where lower tax rates prevail.
The reconstituted Panel continue to quote the same figures from the Diamond High
Council as were used in the original Panel Report, and to draw the same conclusions
as the original Panel.
This Commission has dealt with the question of diamonds at Paragraph 21.2 above of
this Report. Its conclusions are undeniable: there are no import figures for diamonds,
nor transit figures. Diamonds are therefore quite clearly being smuggled through
Uganda, and declared as sourced in Uganda by the smugglers on arrival in Antwerp.
This Commission has evidence of one such transaction, privately conducted. That
20 being so, since no tax is paid in Uganda, it is difficult to understand the relevance of
lower tax rates in Kampala, how the Ugandan Treasury benefits, and how the UPDF
is able to use the proceeds for the continuation of the war, as the reconstituted Panel
claim. Tax paid in the Democratic Republic of Congo would be paid to rebel
authorities, who would be able to use the money for the continuation of the war. This,
however, would not be a matter to be laid at Uganda’s door, although it is true that
there is cause to believe that some top Commanders were secretly profiting for
themselves from “Security Funding”, a different matter.
This point is a specific example of the unfortunate failure of the reconstituted Panel to
carry out its mandate, as mentioned in Paragraph 1 b) above. The response of the
30 Uganda Government to the original Panel Report raises exactly this point, and the
investigations of this Commission have confirmed the likelihood that the response
was correct.
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31.6. Timber
The reconstituted Panel complain that although timber is exported through Kampala
to Mombasa, the Government of Uganda denies that timber is transited through
Uganda. In the meeting with the reconstituted Panel, it was made clear that in their
interviews, information such as this had mistakenly been given to the original Panel
by a senior Ugandan Government official, but this Commission has discovered such
information is quite wrong. URA has provided this Commission with transit
information for Timber, and also import figures both from the Democratic Republic
of Congo. It is difficult to understand how this misunderstanding has arisen, but a
misunderstanding it certainly is. If only referring to the data 10 from Dara Forêt, there is
clear evidence of transit of timber: and this information was no doubt provided to the
reconstituted Panel during their interview with Mr Kotiram. It certainly was provided
to this Commission from that source, and finally from URA. There was without
doubt, constant transit of timber through Mpondwe, and transit and import through
Arua.
32. ALLEGATIONS AGAINST UGANDA IN THE ADDENDUM
In Paragraph 95 of the Addendum, the reconstituted Panel acknowledge what Uganda
has said all along, that it had legitimate security interests which prompted its military
intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Addendum acknowledges
20 that there has been a significant withdrawal of UPDF troops, resulting in the
perception that exploitation activities have reduced.
In paragraph 97 of the Addendum it is stated that while the effect of the original
Panel’s report and the significant withdrawal of UPDF troops have given the
impression that the exploitation activities have been reduced, they are in fact
continuing. It alleges that commercial networks put in place by Ugandan Army
Commanders and their civilian counterparts that were described in the original
Panel’s report are still functioning in Orientale Province and Kampala. It cites, in
particular, Trinity and Victoria Companies as examples of Commercial networks that
are still actively exploiting diamonds, gold, coffee and timber from the Democratic
30 Republic of Congo.
The two named companies have no direct Ugandan connection. Trinity was set up by
the rebel leaders in control of the Oriental Province to generate funds to finance their
war efforts, although it is possible that much of the income ended upo in private rebel
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pockets. According to Professor Wamba and Col Otafiire, Uganda has made
strenuous diplomatic efforts at the time of the forming of FLC to bring it to an end.
Victoria Group is registered in Goma and operates in Isiro, Bunia, Bondo, Buta,
Kisangani, Beni and other places in the Democratic Republic of Congo and pays
taxes to MLC as evidenced by one of the documents made available to this
Commission by the re-constituted Panel of Experts. Neither of the companies has
Ugandans living in Uganda as shareholders. They are not registered in Uganda and
have no registered or Branch offices in Uganda. While it is true that this Commission
has found that there are Ugandans who have interests in Victoria, nevertheless those
individuals have done everything to keep their interests secret. 10 Uganda as a state is
not involved in their activities.
The ownership and nationality of the Companies could easily have been ascertained
from the Registrar of Companies’ offices in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of
Congo. That would have prevented the erroneous allegation that the two companies
are owned (rather than facilitated) by Ugandan Army Commanders and their civilian
counterparts. In the case of Victoria, however, this Commission is unable to exclude
that possibility. Trinity on the other hand appears to be a mainly Congolese affair, in
respect of which strenuous efforts have been made by Uganda to end it and therefore
this Commission doubts the reconstituted Panel’s conclusion.
20 Paragraph 98 of the Addendum states that while the Government of Uganda does not
participate directly in the exploitation activities, the culture in which its military
personnel function tolerates and condones their activities. It alleges that Commercial
activities of Senior UPDF officers are public knowledge but does not provide any
evidence of that. To prove the alleged involvement of Senior UPDF officers in
Commercial activities, it cites the alleged admission by General Salim Saleh that one
of his Companies had been engaged in exporting merchandise to the eastern part of
the Democratic Republic of Congo and the confiscation of the aircraft that was
transporting the merchandise by Major General Kazini. The paragraph also alleges
that General Kazini told the original Panel about his role in facilitating the transport
30 of Uganda merchandise to Kisangani and other areas in the Democratic Republic of
Congo.
This Commission interviewed both General Kazini and Lt. General Salim Saleh about
the allegation. It appears that the reconstituted Panel in the Addendum has mixed up
the role of Lt. General Salim Saleh as a businessman dealing in merchandise and as
an aircraft operator. As a businessman, Lt. General Salim Saleh has denied that any of
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In the Commission’s view the role General Kazini played, as indicated above,
supports to some extent the allegation in the Addendum that at least he established a
mechanism to promote business in the areas under the control of UPDF. We find the
allegation in Paragraph 98 sustainable, but are unable to lay blame at the door of the
State of Uganda.
In paragraph 99 of the Addendum it is alleged that UPDF officers usually conduct
their business through a Congolese affiliate, on whom they bestow power and
support. To prove their point the reconstituted Panel stated that they had learnt that
recently Mr. Lumbala had signed two Commercial agreements bearing the signatures
of UPDF Commander Kahinda Otafiire and Belgian and Austrian 10 parties. During a
working session with the reconstituted Panel in Kampala in March 2002, this
Commission asked the reconstituted Panel if they had in their possession copies of the
Commercial agreement alleged to bear the signatures of UPDF Commander Kahinda
Otafiire. The Chairman of the reconstituted Panel replied that they had only heard
about the allegation, as stated in the Addendum, and had no documentation to support
it.
This Commission finds it difficult to understand how a Panel of such stature could
make such a serious allegation against Colonel (not Commander) Kahinda Otafiire,
who is now a Minister of State in-Charge of Regional Co-operation, on hearsay
20 evidence of a single uncorroborated witness. The Commission’s immediate re-action
was to ignore the allegation. But in order to put matters beyond dispute, the
Commission summoned the Minister to come and tell the Commission what he
knows about the alleged Commercial agreements. He told the Commission that he
had not signed any commercial agreement with anybody and challenged the original
Panel to produce the signed Commercial Agreements to prove him wrong. He had not
been asked about them by the reconstituted Panel.
It is also alleged in paragraph 99 that Mbusa Nyamwisi “skims” up to USD 400,000
off the tax revenues collected from the Beni Customs post at the Uganda border and
shared the money with General Kazini and General Salim Saleh. This allegation has
30 been denied by Nyamwisi, General Kazini and General Salim Saleh and constitutes a
substantial advance on the original allegation. As the alleged credible, and apparently
very inflationary, source of the original Panel’s information was not disclosed, this
Commission has no alternative but to accept their denial, particularly as the source is
quoted by the reconstituted Panel as single, and is not corroborated
Annex 52
167
In view of the findings of this Commission regarding the allegations in
paragraphs 97, 98 and 99 above, this Commission thinks that the original Panel’s
conclusion in paragraph 100 that there is a link between the continuation of the
conflict and the exploitation of the natural resources and that Ugandan influential
Government Officials, military officers and businessmen continue to exploit the
security situation for their commercial interests, is tenuous with the possible
exception of the operations of Victoria. In particular the suggestion that Ugandan
influential Government Officials are involved has no basis in the text. While it is true
that businessmen continue to trade in the Democratic Republic of Congo, that does
not necessarily have the result of the c 10 ontinuation of the conflict.
33. THE LINK BETWEEN EXPLOITATION OF RESOURCES AND THE
CONTINUATION OF THE CONFLICT
33.1. Recent Developments
33.1.1. Uganda
In Paragraph 57 the original Panel say:
There are indications that clashes during the past seven months in the
Oriental and Kivu Regions between the Mayi Mayi, who appear to be better
equipped and coordinated than before, and UPDF and the MLC rebel
group have been directly related to control of coltan and gold
20 It is odd that, while the reconstituted Panel do not mention Uganda when
considering the exploitation of Coltan, nevertheless the Mayi Mayi clashes are
attributed to the UPDF’s desire for coltan. As to the desire for control of gold,
when talking of the clashes with the Mai-Mai, this allegation appears to be
geographically unrelated.
It is therefore probable that the reconstituted Panel ought perhaps to have gone
beyond relying on pure indications, and to have looked for evidence, as has this
Commission. This Commission has not found any such evidence, and would have
appreciated any assistance either of the Panels could have given in this regard.
33.1.2. Democratic Republic of Congo - Dara Forêt
30 During a consideration of the link between exploitation of resources by the
Democratic Republic of Congo and the continuation of the conflict, the
Annex 52
168
reconstituted Panel point out that Dara Forêt registered as a Congolese
registered Company in Kinshasa in March 1998: it will be remembered that that
was at a time when relationships between Kinshasa and Kampala were good, and
trade opportunities were being investigated (see Paragraphs 14.2 and 14.3 above).
Then in June 1998 Dara Forêt was granted a logging concession from North Kivu
Provincial Authority, and an exploitation licence. The reconstituted Panel found
that Dara Forêt had complied with all the regulations in effect, and pays taxes as
before. It is checked by local; authorities in North Kivu to see that it is complying
with the terms of its licence. It was also granted a certificate of registration by the
Ministry 10 of Justice in Kinshasa.
This is a completely different story from that of the original Panel, whose
criticisms of Dara Forêt were attributed by the Mayi Mayi for their formation, and
for the kidnapping of 24 Thai Nationals working there. There is no
acknowledgement of any mistake by the original Panel: this Commission has
examined the whole of the so-called Case Study of Dara Forêt and DGLI, and the
allegations against the Uganda Government, and His Excellency the President, and
found that far from there merely being no evidence of the original Panel’s
allegations, those allegations were completely wrong : and the reconstituted Panel
have independently agreed, on the basis of additional evidence.
20 This Commission was expecting to see a specific withdrawal of the false
allegations contained in the original Panel Report: it is absent.
34. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PANEL IN THE ADDENDUM
In paragraph 143 of the Addendum the reconstituted Panel alleges that the systematic exploitation of
natural resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo continues unabated.
It alleges that the exploitation activities are carried out by a large number of state and non-state actors
from the region and outside the region, some of whom are involved in the conflict, others not. It stated
that some individuals and institutions who have been enriched from the exploitation are
opportunistically making use of the current situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo to amass as
much wealth as possible. And in paragraph 144 it alleges that without resolution of the broader conflict
30 in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the region, it would be highly unrealistic to expect an end to
the exploitation of the natural resources and other forms of wealth in the country.
This Commission agrees that exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the
Democratic Republic of Congo is still continuing. The Government of Uganda has been acquitted of
any wrong doing by the reconstituted Panel and no state institution has been found by it to be involved
Annex 52
183
owned by a Uganda registered company Kullinan Finance Investment Company.
Kullinan Finance Investment Co. Ltd is owned by Mr. Anatoli Piskounov and an
offshore company called Term Invest Company INC, an international Business
Company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands on 11th September, 2000.
Kullinan Finance Investment Co Ltd owns 99% of the shares in La Conmet whilst 1%
of the Shares is owned by Ituri Gold Mining Co.
The Commission is in possession of the registration documents of both companies.
Lt. General Salim Saleh has no interest in any of the companies that own La Conmet.
Therefore he could not be the owner of La Conmet. Lt. General Salim Saleh has
testified on oath that he has no interest in La Conmet. His 10 evidence is corroborated by
Mr. and Mrs. Piskounov.
According to the evidence available, La Conmet exported only one consignment of
coltan from Democratic Republic of Congo to Ulba, Kazakhstan in October 2000.
The commission has in its possession receipts for taxes paid by the company to the
Congolese authorities in respect of that export. Therefore it is not correct that the
company was exempt from paying fiscal and customs duties.
It will be remembered that the original Panel ran into some trouble in its case study of
Dara Forêt: here is another example of a problematic case study, involving a report of
an interview which does not reflect the facts revealed by documentation. No doubt a
20 complete case study would have involved looking at the documentation available
from the Piskounovs, compared with the document in the panel’s possession.
Unfortunately the reconstituted Panel did not avail that document to this Commission,
which must proceed on available evidence.
Consequently this Commission has come to a conclusion that the allegations
contained in paragraphs 109 – 111 are not supported by credible evidence.
40.3. Diamonds - Victoria
In Paragraph 112 the reconstituted Panel set out briefly the information supplied to it
by this Commission in relation to Victoria’s diamond operations, and Khalil. This
Commission has no evidence to connect Lt. General Saleh with Victoria, nor is there
30 any evidence available upon which this Commission could act, that Victoria has been
purchasing gold from local comptoirs with counterfeit money: it may or may not be
so, but there is no evidence upon which this Commission can recommend any action
by the Government of Uganda.
Annex 52

Annex 53
U.K. All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region and Genocide Prevention,
Cursed by Riches: Who Benefits from Resource Exploitation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo? (Nov. 2002)

Annex 53
ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP ON THE GREAT LAKES
REGION AND GENOCIDE PREVENTION
Cursed by Riches:
Who Benefits from Resource Exploitation
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?
NOVEMBER 2002
“The international community could…, with our help, sort out the blight that is
the continuing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where three
million people have died through war or famine in the last decade.”
Prime Minister Tony Blair, to the Labour Party Conference, October 2001
Annex 53
18
positive signs, the DRC government needs to be encouraged to implement the policies and to
honour its commitments.
4.4 The Ugandan connection
It has been widely reported that certain members of the Ugandan army have been benefiting
from the resources in the northwestern area of the DRC. Individuals such as Commander
Major-General James Kazini and Salim Saleh are alleged to have exploited resources from the
Congo, and to have made considerable personal profits.51 A number of companies, both
Ugandan and Congolese, have been set up to facilitate this exploitation. Moreover, there are
reports of ongoing fighting between different rebel factions around the locations of natural
resources, such as the Bafwasende gold mine, where troops loyal to Pierre Bemba have made
recent advances. Roger Lumbala’s UPC (or RCD-National) is said to be fighting the RCDML
over resource-rich areas around Watsa, Dugu and Mahagi, as well as targeting customs
posts on the Congo-Uganda border, as these can provide a source of revenue to fund the war
effort. The intensification of the ethnic conflict between the Hema and Lendu in Ituri can be
linked to the interests of certain parties in gaining access to economic resources. 53
Reports have shown that Ugandan export figures of certain minerals, such as diamonds,
which are found in the area under Ugandan influence, have exceeded the country’s own
domestic production figures (see table 1).54 Some of these minerals are not even found
domestically in Uganda. The Ugandan government has argued that this is the result of
legitimate business activities which use Uganda as a transit country, and that the rebel forces
have de facto legitimacy to produce and trade.
Table 1
Ugandan Mineral Export and Domestic Production (1994 – 2000)
Year Gold Gold Coltan Coltan Niobium Diamond
exports production exports production exports exports
(tons) (tons) (tons) (tons) (US$) (US$)
1994 0.22 0.0016 - 0.435 - -
1995 3.09 0.0015 - 1.824 - -
1996 5.07 0.0030 - - - -
1997 6.82 0.0064 2.57 - $13,000 $198,302
1998 5.03 0.0082 18.57 - $580,000 $1,440,000
1999 11.45 0.0047 69.50 - $782,000 $1,813,500
2000 10.83 0.0044 - - - $1,263,385
2001 $2,539,000
Sources: Coltan and gold figures from Ugandan Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development; niobium figures from WTO
aggregated data; diamond figures from the Diamond High Council (all figures appeared in the UN Panel of Inquiry Report April
2001, except for 2001 diamond figures which appeared in Dietrich, Christian (2002)). It should be noted that there is no
production of niobium or diamonds in Uganda, therefore these are re-exports of minerals that are extracted elsewhere.
The Ugandan government set up its own Commission of Inquiry after the publication of the
accusations made in the first and second interim UN Panel reports. This commission, headed
by Justice David Porter, has gathered evidence to show that General Kazini has played a
major role in the transportation of Ugandan goods into the DRC without government
authority. It was also claimed by the UN Panel and other reports that General Kazini had
brokered deals for a company called Victoria Diamonds to carry out business in gold,
diamonds and coffee.55 Lebanese businessmen have facilitated diamond sales in Europe.
51 Final report of UN Panel of Experts report (S/2002/1146).
52 BBC World Service, February 2002.
53 According to local human rights organisations: reports obtained in October 2002.
54 The Ugandan government has disputed these figures, which were originally shown in the first report of the UN Panel of Experts.
55 IPIS report (2002), ‘Network War: An Introduction to Congo’s Privatised Conflict Economy’; final report of UN Panel of
Experts (S/2002/1146); The Monitor, Kampala, May 21 2002.
Annex 54
International Rescue Committee, Mortality in the DRC: Results from a Nationwide Survey
(2003)

Annex 54
Mortality in the
Democratic Republic of Congo:
Results from a Nationwide Survey
IRC
Conducted September - November 2002
Reported April 2003
Reported by
Les Roberts
Pascal Ngoy
Colleen Mone
Charles Lubula
Luc Mwezse
Mariana Zantop
Michael Despines
IRC New York, Health Unit
IRC Kinshasa , DRC
IRC Burundi
IRC Bukavu, DRC
IRC Bukavu, DRC
IRC New York , Health Unit
IRC New York
Annex 54
International Rescue Committee
If the 5 million inaccessible people in the east are left out of the equation, these results indicate
that the weighted average mortality in the DRC from January to October 2002 was 2.2/1000/mo.
If the 5 million inaccessible people are assumed to have the same mortality as those easterners
surveyed, the mortality rate was 2.4/1000/mo.
Cause of Death
Families attributed a cause to almost all reported deaths. Among children <5 years of age, the
majority of reported deaths were ascribed to febrile illnesses, diarrhea, neonatal mortality, acute
respiratory infections (ARI), measles and malnutrition. Among people >4 years of age, the
majority of deaths were ascribed to febrile illness, diarrhea, TB, ARI and malnutrition. It should
be emphasized that causes of death were not verified and that no formal verbal autopsy
procedure was employed. The reported causes of death for those <5 years and those >4 years are
presented in Figures 1-4 for both the eastern and western areas surveyed. [Due to logistic
constraints, western cause of death data is not included for South Lodja (this includes 10 deaths
among children <5 and 10 deaths among those >4).]
Of note is the apparent abundance of measles deaths in the east (21 in the east vs. 4 in the west),
as well as HIV-attributed deaths (10 in the east, 0 in the west).
Violence
War-related violence accounted for no deaths in the west and only 7 of 443 deaths (1.6%) reported in
the east. This compares to 69 violent deaths of 624 deaths (11.1 % ) recorded by the IRC in 2000, and
84 violent deaths of 894 (9.4%) in 2001.4 By chance, two areas (Kalima and Kalemie) were selected
for both the 2001 and 2002 surveys, and were evaluated both years using similar methods. Kalima and
Kalemie are important because they had the highest rates of mortality and violence of the six locations
surveyed in 2001. Kalima had a CMR of7.1 (95% CI: 6.3 - 8.7) between January 2000 and March
2001, which decreased to 3.0 (95% CI: 2.2 - 3.9) deaths/1000/mo. in 2002. Kalemie had a CMR of
10.8 (95% CI: 9.5 - 12.1) between January 2000 and March 2001, which decreased to 4.2 (95% CI:
2.8 - 5.6) deaths/1000/month during 2002.
Table 3: Mortality in Kalima and Kalemie, 2000 vs. 2002
Kalima Kalemie
Time Frame CMR Confidence lnt. CMR Confidence lnt.
~an '00-Mar '01 7.1 95% (6.3-8.7) 10.8 95% (9.5-12.1)
2002 3.0 95%(2.2-3.9) 4.2 95% (2.8-5.6)
Combining these two areas, the 69 violent deaths among 600 households over 16 months seen in
2000-2001 (1.04 violent deaths/1000/mo., 95% CI: 0.79 - 1.29) correspond to a violent death rate 26
times higher than the one violent death reported by 450 households over 9.1 months of 2002 (0.04
violent deaths/1000/mo.).
Kisangani Ville was the only place visited where multiple violent deaths were reported (5), and
all were shootings, allegedly by Rwandan soldiers. These violent events are further explored in
the Discussion section.
Page 6 of 15
Annex 54
International Rescue Committee
politically, most of these provinces remain out of the direct control of the Kinshasa-based government.
Thus, to facilitate comparisons with survey results from past years, a sample of 10 health zones was
taken in the areas of the five eastern provinces not controlled by the Kinshasa-based government, and
a separate sample of 10 health zones was taken in the six western provinces predominantly controlled
by the Kinshasa-based government. With one exception (South Lodja), the eastern sample can be
thought of as the rebel-held areas and the western sample as the Kinshasa-based governmentcontrolled
areas. This simplification ignores that fact that Aketi in the east and Gbadolite in the west
are controlled by a third political power. Because Aketi can be accessed only from the east and
transport to Gbadolite can be arranged only in Kinshasa, these two "Bemba" held health zones do not
detract from the general conclusions regarding differences between the east and the west.
By virtually all measures, the population's health appears worse in the east than in the west. The
crude mortality rate, birth rate and other factors that contrast the east and the west are shown in Table
4.
Table 4: Contrast in health events in the samples of the eastern vs. western health zones
Indicator East West
CMR: deaths/I 000/mo. 3.5 (95% CI = 2.2 - 4.9) 2.0 (95% CI = 1.5 - 2.6)
<5 MR: deaths/I 000/mo. 9.0 (95% CI = 4.0- 14.0) 4.4 (95% CI = 3.2 - 5.7)
% newborns dead by 12 mo. 21.0% 11.6%
Births/I 000/mo. 44 (95% CI = 38 - 50) 52 (95% Cl= 43 - 60)
% pregnancies lost 21.0% 7.0%
% population <5 16.3% 19.4%
Average HH growth rate 0.00% 1.58%
Measles-related deaths 21 of443 (4.7%) 4 of246 (1.6%)
HIV-reoorted deaths 10 of 443 (2.3%) 0of246 (0%)
Violence-related deaths 7 of 443 (1.6%) 0of246 (0%)
In specific health zones of the east, particularly dire circumstances were recorded. For example, in
Kalemie, 66% of children die before reaching 2 years of age. This fraction was 59% in Mweso, and
53% in Pweto. Thus, while conditions are generally poor in the east, clearly there are areas with acute
needs that are not being met.
The ongoing conflict in the east explains the relatively poor health condition of the population in
comparison with the west. Yet the health conditions in the west are relatively poor compared to
Africa generally. The crude mortality measured by this survey in the western DRC in 2002 is the
same as that reported for Sierra Leone in 2001, which had the highest mortality for any country in the
world that year, according to UNICEF. 10
Under stable conditions, rural African populations tend to experience far more births than deaths,
and thus are continually growing. During past surveys in the eastern DRC, the chief health zone
doctors (Medecin Chef de Zone, or MCZ) in Katana and Kisangani reported that in stable times,
including the early 1990s, the rate of population growth was 3%, while the local MCZ reported a
rate of 2% in Lusambo. Most health professionals in the DRC assume a 3% annual growth rate
while planning vaccination campaigns. The concept of average household growth rate, as
Page 11 of 15

Annex 55
International Crisis Group, Ethiopia and Eritrea: War or Peace?, ICG Africa Report No. 68
(24 Sept. 2003)

ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA:
WAR OR PEACE?
24 September 2003
ICG Africa Report N°68
Nairobi/Brussels
Annex 55
Ethiopia and Eritrea: War or Peace?
ICG Africa Report N°68, 24 September 2003 Page 8
the people will not”, said an Ethiopian community
activist. “The Tigrayans would instigate skirmishes,
and this could erupt into full scale war”.27
Eritrea’s position is that it is taking a principled stand
for international law, that justice delayed would be
justice denied, and that with respect to the Boundary
Commission’s decision, as one official said:
There is nothing to discuss. It is a closed
chapter. There is nothing ambiguous about
the process. We feel we are the one to have
complaints with the process, but we accepted
the decision in advance as final and binding.
Either we have a solution or we don’t. People
in Eritrea are fed up. Either pressure the
Ethiopian government to implement the
decision and we can all look forward to
peace, or the international community should
just leave us alone. The only way to have a
solution is to implement this agreement.28
The Eritrean government points out that it accepted
what it deemed to be an unfavourable decision four
years earlier in a territorial dispute with Yemen
over the Hanish Islands, and it expects the
Ethiopian government to do the same.29 It argues
that if Addis Ababa is recalcitrant, the Security
Council should bring pressure to bear to allow the
demarcation to proceed. “If the decision is
reopened, then we will reopen the Hanish Islands
decision”, warned one official.30 A diplomat added
that “The government won’t talk [about any other
issue] as long as it perceives that Ethiopia is
occupying its land”.
Early in 2003, Ethiopia appealed for UN help in
adjusting the boundary decision. The Secretariat
responded that the UN could not engage in
reinterpretation or revision of the decision on the
basis of the Algiers agreement, that the article cited
by Ethiopia anticipated humanitarian problems for
those caught on the “wrong” side of the border
27 ICG interview in Ethiopia, July 2003.
28 ICG interview in Eritrea, August 2003.
29 The Hanish-Zuquar Islands were awarded to Yemen
based on its relatively recent history of use and possession
of the islands. The full text of the International Court of
Justice’s 94-page decision on the Eritrea-Yemen dispute
can be downloaded from the International Boundaries
Research Unit at http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk.
30 ICG interview, August 2003.
once demarcation was final and was not intended to
vary the line of delimitation.31
C. RISING BORDER TENSIONS
Security along the border has become more brittle
as the demarcation is delayed. Troops from both
sides, but particularly Ethiopians, have made illegal
incursions into the TSZ.32 Eritrean troops
continually frustrate UNMEE’s freedom of
movement in adjacent Eritrean areas. Shootings
along the border are also increasing, by troops and
militias alike. Five Italian missionaries were shot
by Eritreans in June when they were mistaken for
fleeing Eritreans.33 On 18 May an Eritrean boy was
killed by Ethiopian troops after crossing the border
in search of his livestock.34 Ethiopian herdsmen –
often accompanied by armed men – have more
frequently entered the TSZ, heightening the risk of
armed clashes. Shootings were reported in the TSZ
in April between local militias,35 but whether this
was related to the border issue or competition over
resources remains unclear.
Mines remain the greatest danger to those who live
and work along the border. On 21 August 2003, six
persons were killed in Ethiopia when their tractor
struck a mine.36 Mine clearance by UNMEE, NGOs
and governmental agencies was going steadily until
that month, when Eritrea asked most of the teams
to leave, asserting that its demining authority
should do the job.37 Particularly worrisome is that
since early 2003, new mines have been laid on
31 The Ethiopian appeal cited Article 416 of the Algiers
agreement, which calls for UN assistance in dealing with
humanitarian problems arising from the Boundary
Commission’s decision. ICG interviews, July and August
2003.
32 In August 2003, the UN officially protested to Addis
Ababa the entrance of armed troops into the TSZ in order –
they said – to play football. IRIN, “UN Protests to Ethiopia
over border incursions”, 14 August 2003. Some diplomats
believe that the football match was a provocation. ICG
interviews, August 2003.
33 IRIN, “UN concerned about upsurge in border
shootings”, 4 July 2003.
34 “Progress Report of the Secretary-General”, op. cit.
35 Ibid.
36 IRIN, “Six Killed in Mine Blast”, 22 August 2003.
37 Eritrea had already told one of two international
demining groups to leave the country in June 2003. IRIN,
“Government has capacity to clear mines itself –
government ministry”, 13 June 2003.
Annex 55
Ethiopia and Eritrea: War or Peace?
ICG Africa Report N°68, 24 September 2003 Page 9
roads previously cleared, endangering UNMEE
patrols and local inhabitants alike. The Eritrean
Islamic Jihad Movement, a group opposed to the
government in Asmara, has claimed responsibility
for some of the mines38 but is probably not the only
group involved. Many mines have been laid in the
central sector, far from where it operates.
The demobilisation that was to have followed from
the Algiers agreement has not begun in earnest in
Eritrea where some 300,000 troops – a significant
proportion of able-bodied adults in a country of 3.5
million – are being held ready for action. 39
Sustaining such a military posture comes with
economic, social and internal political costs but
demobilisation will not go forward while the border
situation remains unresolved.40 Ethiopia has halved
its army to approximately 150,000 men but retains
its considerable advantage in material, notably air
power.41
38 IRIN, “Islamic Group Says it Planted Mines”, 21 March
2003.
39 The World Bank and European Union have set aside
U.S.$60 million for demobilisation activities, to be spent
once the Eritrean government takes certain initial steps.
40 ICG interview with Eritrean official, August 2003.
41 Africa Confidential, Vol. 44, No. 15, 25 July 2003, p. 1.
V. THE OCTOBER 2003 DECISION
POINT
On 7 July 2003 the Boundary Commission released a
“Decision Pursuant to Article 15B of the
Commission’s Demarcation Directions”, which
responded to an Ethiopian complaint raised about
procedures intended to facilitate the demarcation.
Both parties are required to appoint Field Liaison
Officers (FLOs) whose mission is to liaise with the
demarcation team and serve as a conduit for
communication between that team and the FLO’s
government. Ethiopia objected that Eritrea was using
this cover to send military officers to the border to
gather intelligence. The Boundary Commission
concluded that the already designated FLOs should be
replaced and new rules promulgated for the selection
of their successors, necessitating a further delay in
launching the demarcation itself, which had initially
been foreseen for April. However, it set a new date of
October 2003 for work to begin.42
Ethiopia thus faces a decision of great consequence
in the next few weeks. It can block the process
indefinitely simply by refusing the demarcation
team visas but the consequences would be much
harder to calculate or limit.
There is no appetite in either capital for starting
another war. “We will leave no stone unturned to
prevent a return to war”, said one Ethiopian official.
“We don’t need it. Our interests are not in more
war”.43 Another insisted, “The conflict was stupid,
and we won’t get into another one”.44 An Eritrean
official similarly said, “We don’t want to go to
another war. The populations in both Eritrea and
Ethiopia are suffering from drought and the effects of
42 The demarcation team will be composed of technicians
working under the authority of the Boundary Commission. It
is to begin by planting pillars in the ground along the eastern
sector of the border and conducting surveys in the central and
western sectors. In addition to complying with the new
requirements respecting FLOs, both parties will need to issue
travel documents for the demarcation team and give adequate
security guarantees. UNMEE claims it is not mandated to
provide security for the demarcation team. Under the terms of
the Algiers agreement, Ethiopia and Eritrea are not permitted
to have military units in the TSZ. Living quarters for the
demarcation team present another practical problem, and, of
course, the presence of mines, discussed above, represents a
further security threat.
43 ICG interview in Ethiopia, July 2003.
44 ICG interview in Ethiopia, July 2003.
Annex 55

Annex 56
Burnet Institute, International Rescue Committee, Mortality in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo: Results from a Nationwide Survey (2004)

Annex 56
Mortality in the
Democratic Republic of Congo:
Results from a Nationwide Survey
Conducted April - July 2004
Reported by
Dr. Ben Coghlan
Dr. Rick Brennan
Dr. Pascal Ngoy
Dr. David Dofara
Mr. Brad Otto
Dr. Tony Stewart
~ net Institute
\. O'UI , \1/grl,;Jnlge w.>nl>a heallh)'wo
Burnet Institute, Melbourne , Australia
International Rescue Committee, New York, USA
International Rescue Committee, Kinshasa, DR Congo
International Rescue Committee, Bukavu, DR Congo
Burnet Institute, Denpasar, Indonesia
Burnet Institute, Melbourne , Australia
IRC
International
Rescue
Committee
Annex 56
Table 5: Aggregated mortallty rates for a 16-month recall period (111/2003 to 4/30/2004)
Number of health zones Mortality rates and design effects
Stratum Subdivision of stratum
and type of selection CMR DE U5MR DE
EAST 11 random and 4 purpos ive 2.3 (2.1-2.5) 7.4 4.8 (4.4-5.3) 3.2
EAST 11 random 2.2 (2.0-2 .4) 6.2 4.7(4 .-5 .1) 2.7
EAST EAST 2002 7 random and 4 purposive 2. 7 (2.4-3.0) 8.2 5.8 (5.2-6.4) 3.6
EAST 2002 7 random 2. 7 (2.3-3.0) 6.2 5. 7 (5.0-6.3) 2.7
TRANSITIONAL EAST 4 random 1.4 (1.2-1.5) 1.9 3.0 (2.6-3.4) 1.4
WEST 2003-04 10 random 1.7 (1.5-1.8) 1.6 4.3 (3.8-4. 7) 1.4
WEST
WEST 2002 10 random + 4 transitional east 1.6 (1.5-1 .7) 2.2 4.0 (3.7-4.4) 1.9
All Rates expressed as deaths per 1000 per month (95% Confidence lntavals)
Table 6: Comparison of East health zones with and without violent deaths (1/112003 to 4/30/2004)
Mortality Rates· and Design effects
Subdivision of former East
Crude DE Under 5 years of age DE
Health zones reporting violence 1 2.8 (2.5-3 .1) f 8.9 6.3 (5.6-7.0) l 3.6
Health zones not reporting violence• 1.6 (1.4-1 .7) 2.5 3.0 (2.7-3.4) 1.5
Adi , Tshofa, Kalemla, Kalima. Katana, Moba, Olcha, Rwanguba and Shabunda Centre
• Mushenge, Bosomondanda, Lloala, Kloanganl -Vllle, loangl, lllule,
Mortality ratas are weighted by populallon and expraaoad ao daalho par 1000 par month (95% Confldanca Intervals)
Table 7: Proportionate mortality of violent deaths and relative risk of violent death in the East
Population Group
Children younger than 15
years
Women aged 15 years or over
Men aged 15 year or over
Proportion ate mortality for violent deaths Relative Risk
5 of 1707 (0.3%) Reference
9 of 681 (1.3%) 4.5 (1.5-13.3)
36 ofn4(4 .7%) 15.2 (6.0-38.6)
Recall Period • January 2003 to and of Aprll 2004
15
Annex 57
Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold, Democratic Republic of the Congo (2005)

The Curse of Gold
Democratic Republic of Congo
Human Rights Watch
Annex 57
109 TRADE IN TAINTED GOLD
that most of the gold they exported came from Congo. They estimated the trade to be
worth about $60 million per year.389 There are three main gold export businesses in
Kampala. The largest two, Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd and Machanga Ltd, control
an estimated 70 percent of the export trade from Uganda. Since profit margins on each
trade are relatively small, these traders make profits by trading in high volume and by
offering good quality gold, for which they need a reliable source of supply.
Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd. is the largest gold exporter in Uganda. In an interview
with Human Rights Watch researchers, its representatives said that nearly 90 percent of
their gold came from Ituri and they confirmed that Dr Kisoni Kambale from Butembo
was “one of their customers.”390 Company representatives explained they paid their
customers cash for the gold or transferred funds into the customer’s bank accounts held
either locally or abroad. Like Dr. Kisoni, they had their own refinery on the premises, to
process any gold that arrived as ore before exporting it to Switzerland and South Africa.
Representatives of the company stated they declared the gold upon export, ensuring that
a customs form and airway bill accompanied each shipment.391
Representatives of Machanga Ltd, the second largest gold exporter, also told Human
Rights Watch researchers that the gold they traded came from Congo and they
confirmed that one of their customers was Mr. Omar Oria.392 They further explained
they advanced cash for the purchase of gold, sometimes as much as 30 percent of the
anticipated purchase price, a system used also by Mr. Oria in Ariwara. Machanga
representatives stated they exported all their gold to Metalor Technologies SA, a gold
refining company in Switzerland.393 Other traders stated they also sold gold to
Switzerland as well as to other locations such as South Africa and Dubai.
Trading companies in Kampala do not operate illegally but rather benefit from the loose
regulation of the gold trade. Not required to request import documentation or to ask the
origin of the gold, they buy smuggled Congolese gold as if it had entered Uganda legally
and export it as a legal commodity. An essential bridge to the global economy, they
benefit from the risks taken by Congolese dealers like Dr. Kisoni and Mr. Oria and from
their relationships with local armed groups.
389 Human Rights Watch interviews with representatives from Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd, Machanga Ltd
and A. P. Bhimji Ltd, Kampala, July 7 and 8, 2004.
390 Human Rights Watch interview, Kanal Chune, Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd, Kampala, July 7, 2004.
391 Ibid.
392 Human Rights Watch interview, Jigendra Jitu, Machanga Ltd, Kampala, July 8, 2004.
393 Ibid.
Annex 57
THE CURSE OF GOLD 118
IX. International Initiatives to Address Resource Exploitation in the DRC
Continued fighting in eastern DRC throughout 2004 and early 2005 was a stark reminder
of the fragility of the peace process. During the first two years of the transitional
government, the international community focused on short-term crisis management and
failed to provide consistent diplomatic assistance to implement the peace process. While
timely intervention from the U.K., U.S.A. and South African governments twice pulled
Rwanda back from new military operations in Congo, such efforts were sporadic and in
the end Rwanda temporarily sent its troops back across the border in November 2004.
Key international actors paid little attention to tackling the underlying causes of the
conflict. While most international governments acknowledged that resource exploitation
played a central role in exacerbating and prolonging the conflict in the DRC as a result
of the U.N. panel of experts reports, few efforts were made to deal with the issue. The
DRC example of conflict and resources raised broader questions of corporate
accountability in the developing world, particularly in conflict zones where the
exploitation of natural resources could help fund military operations and fuel war.
U.N. Panel of Experts Reports on Illegal Resource Exploitation in the
DRC
The U. N. Security Council first expressed concern about the link between conflict and
natural resources in the DRC in June 2000 when it appointed an independent panel of
experts to research and analyze the matter.432 The U.N. panel of experts produced a
series of reports, the last in October 2003 that detailed how the exploitation of resources
had funded many of the different armed groups (local and foreign) fighting in eastern
DRC, enriching individual officers of the Rwandan, Ugandan and Zimbabwean armies
that intervened in the conflict, as well as elite Congolese actors.433
The U.N. panel of experts not only documented the link between resource exploitation
and conflict in the region, but also considered the connection between the exploitation
of resources and international business. The minerals and other resources from Congo
432 U.N Security Council Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2000/20), June 2, 2000. The mandate of the Panel
was (i) to follow up on reports and collect information on all activities of illegal exploitation of natural resources
and others forms of wealth in the DRC, including violation of the sovereignty of that country; (ii) to research and
analyse the links between the exploitation of the natural resources and others forms of wealth in the DRC and
the continuation of the conflict; and (iii) to revert to the council with recommendations.
433 See reports from the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, April 12, 2001 (S/2001/357), May 22, 2002 (S/2002/565), October
16, 2002 (S/2002/1146), October 23, 2003 (S/2003/1027) plus other addendums.
Annex 57

Annex 58
B. Coghlan, R. Brennan, et al., “Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: a Nationwide
Survey”, The Lancet, Vol. 367, No. 9504 (7 Jan. 2006)

Articles
44 www.thelancet.com Vol 367 January 7, 2006
Introduction
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) is
struggling to recover from a devastating 6-year conflict
that continues to destabilise Central Africa and cause
immense suffering to the country’s civilian population.
Known as “Africa’s first world war”1 because of the
involvement of at least six nations in the region, the war
began in August, 1998, and quickly engulfed the country
in a conflict characterised by extreme violence, mass
population displacements, widespread rape, and a
collapse of public health services. The outcome has been
a humanitarian disaster unmatched by any other in
recent decades, but one that has drawn little response
from the international community.
The broader health consequences of the war have been
similar in nature but much greater in scale compared
with those of other conflicts over the past two decades.
In a series of three mortality surveys, the International
Rescue Committee (IRC) documented that between
1998 and 2002, an estimated 3·3 million people died as a
consequence of the war.2–5 These data show that the
Congolese conflict has been the world’s most deadly
since the end of World War 26 and that the death toll far
exceeds those of other recent crises, including those in
Bosnia (estimated 250 000 dead),7 Rwanda (800 000),8
Kosovo (12 000),9 and Darfur in Sudan (70 000).10
Since 2002, however, there had been some
encouraging political and diplomatic developments
involving local, regional, and international participants. A
series of peace accords signed by the various factions, the
deployment of about 10 000 UN peace-keeping troops,
and the formation of an interim Government of National
Unity and Transition in July, 2003, had earlier held out
the hope for greater peace and stability in DR Congo.
Additionally, plans were drawn for nationwide
democratic elections in 2005 that would be open to all
major political parties.
Against this backdrop, the IRC decided to undertake
its fourth mortality survey in DR Congo from April to
July, 2004. This was the second nationwide survey in the
series, the first two surveys having concentrated only on
the eastern provinces. The specific objectives of the
survey were to determine both the rate and causes of
mortality throughout DR Congo, to identify trends in
mortality through comparisons with recent historical
data, to ascertain whether there were regional
differences in mortality rates, and to estimate the total
number of excess deaths since the previous survey.
However, the survey does not include mortality data for
the period since the beginning of June 2004, during
which there has been a resurgence of violence, including
a brief occupation of Bukavu by rebel forces, an
attempted coup in Kinshasa, the massacre of over
150 Congolese Tutsi refugees in neighbouring Burundi,
and major population displacements in Ituri Province.
The relevance of the findings has, therefore, increased in
the wider context of the deteriorating social, political,
and economic situation now confronting DR Congo.
Lancet 2006; 367: 44–51
See Comment page 7
Centre for International Health,
Burnet Institute, Melbourne,
Australia (B Coghlan MBBS,
T Stewart MBBS); National
Centre for Epidemiology and
Population Health, Australian
National University, Canberra,
Australia (M Clements PhD,
B Coghlan); International
Rescue Committee, New York,
NY 10168, USA
(R J Brennan MBBS);
International Rescue
Committee, Kinshasa,
Democratic Republic of Congo
(P Ngoy MD, D Dofara MD); and
Centre for International Health,
Burnet Institute, Bali, Indonesia
(B Otto BA)
Correspondence to
Dr Richard Brennan
[email protected]
Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: a nationwide
survey
Benjamin Coghlan, Richard J Brennan, Pascal Ngoy, David Dofara, Brad Otto, Mark Clements, Tony Stewart
Summary
Background Commencing in 1998, the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been a humanitarian disaster,
but has drawn little response from the international community. To document rates and trends in mortality and
provide recommendations for political and humanitarian interventions, we did a nationwide mortality survey during
April–July, 2004.
Methods We used a stratified three-stage, household-based cluster sampling technique. Of 511 health zones, 49 were
excluded because of insecurity, and four were purposely selected to allow historical comparisons. From the
remainder, probability of selection was proportional to population size. Geographical distribution and size of cluster
determined how households were selected: systematic random or classic proximity sampling. Heads of households
were asked about all deaths of household members during January, 2003, to April, 2004.
Findings 19 500 households were visited. The national crude mortality rate of 2·1 deaths per 1000 per month (95% CI
1·6–2·6) was 40% higher than the sub-Saharan regional level (1·5), corresponding to 600 000 more deaths than
would be expected during the recall period and 38 000 excess deaths per month. Total death toll from the conflict
(1998–2004) was estimated to be 3·9 million. Mortality rate was higher in unstable eastern provinces, showing the
effect of insecurity. Most deaths were from easily preventable and treatable illnesses rather than violence. Regression
analysis suggested that if the effects of violence were removed, all-cause mortality could fall to almost normal rates.
Interpretation The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo remains the world’s deadliest humanitarian crisis.
To save lives, improvements in security and increased humanitarian assistance are urgently needed.
Annex 58
Articles
50 www.thelancet.com Vol 367 January 7, 2006
declined by 77% and excess mortality has almost been
eliminated since fighting in the city stopped in 2002.
All these trends underscore the association between
violence and mortality due to all causes in DR Congo.
They also provide compelling evidence that
improvements in security represent perhaps the most
effective means to reduce excess mortality in DR Congo.
The most obvious inference to be drawn is that a larger,
more robust peacekeeping force than the current
MONUC (UN Mission in DR Congo) contingent of
16 700 is urgently needed to effectively address the
security concerns and associated humanitarian needs in
DR Congo. In fact, the African Union indicated in a
recent report that up to 45 000 troops might be needed to
stabilise the region and disarm the militias.16 But any
additional troops must be better trained, better
equipped, have better leadership, and be willing to
exercise their mandate to engage more forcefully than
MONUC personnel to date.17
Another key finding of the survey was that most deaths
were due to preventable causes such as malnutrition and
infectious diseases. Some epidemic diseases, like
measles, even seem to be on the increase. Moreover,
young children were disproportionately affected by these
illnesses. Improving food security and increasing access
to essential health services, such as immunisations,
clean water, insecticide-treated bednets, and case
management of common diseases, have the potential to
contribute greatly to reductions in excess mortality. The
international humanitarian response should emphasise
established, cost-effective strategies and interventions
related to infectious disease control, child survival, and
environmental health.
In interpreting the results, it is important to
recognise the limitations of the survey. First, five
million people were inaccessible because of security
issues and so were excluded from the sampling frame.
Second, during the survey, security concerns led to the
substitution of one health zone and two villages with
the nearest accessible unit of a similar population size.
Third, the sample does not capture households where
all occupants have died (survival bias). Fourth, underreporting
of infant deaths is a known issue in rural
Africa.18,19 All these factors serve to underestimate the
mortality rates.
On the other hand, the seasonal variations in mortality
seen in previous IRC studies—with peaks at the end of
the rainy season between November and January—
might have resulted in a slight overestimation of
mortality for the 16-month recall period. The regression
analysis for mortality attributed to violence assumes that
there was no confounding, so that any differences
between areas with and without violence would be
caused, indirectly or directly, by violence. If areas with
higher pre-war mortality rates were more likely to have
had violence, then we will have overstated mortality due
to violence.
Recall bias is likely to affect the results, although the
extent and direction of bias are difficult to measure. Long
recall periods can lead to an underestimate of less recent
deaths, while traumatic events may be remembered as
having occurred more recently than is actually the case.20
Households in which all family members were absent
were not sampled and could be interpreted as survivor
bias9 in the east. This assumption is less valid in the west
where there is no conflict and the direction of bias is
difficult to estimate. Inaccurate government census data
might have resulted in selection bias, and UNICEF and
World Bank mortality rates used for comparison are
subject to limitations of their own.13,14
Formal verbal autopsies were not done, although
information about the cause of death was sought.
Although responses were probably valid for traumatic
deaths and common diseases with obvious clinical
manifestations, such as measles, other cause-of-death
data must be interpreted with caution. Additionally, no
independent confirmation of cause of death from health
facilities or other sources was sought.
Lastly, the WHO/EPI method was not designed to
measure mortality. Mortality surveys that use this
method, including the 2002 IRC survey in DR Congo,4
often report higher design effects than the assumed
standard of two, particularly when examining violent
deaths. Mortality surveys may thus need to either assume
design effects of many times greater than two or greatly
increase the number of clusters surveyed, although these
decisions have to be balanced against the consequent
increases in costs, time, and logistical requirements, not
to mention security risks, when studying populations in
such contexts. Our choice of a design effect of four and
our decision to sample 30 clusters per health zone (and
not more) reflects such a balance, and was an increase
compared with the 2002 IRC survey of 15 clusters per
health zone. Furthermore, we believe that our use of
systematic sampling for almost a quarter of all clusters is
likely to have improved the precision of the study,
although we cannot quantify the level of improvement.
We believe that this survey of DR Congo is the largest
of its kind to be done in a country experiencing ongoing
conflict. Surveying was suspended for 3 weeks during
June because of major security concerns. During this
time, one of the main IRC offices was attacked and burnt,
and staff were threatened. Nonetheless, the survey was
representative of almost the entire national population
and a method similar to that of the 2002 IRC survey was
used to allow a discussion of the key trends in mortality
over this time.
Notwithstanding these constraints, we believe that
periodic surveys are an invaluable tool for mapping the
trends in mortality in a conflict situation where regular
sources of data are limited. Lack of security has been
clearly linked to increased mortality rates and,
consequently, DR Congo still has a rate among the
highest in the world. The limits of the current “peace”—
Annex 58
Annex 59
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (July 2006)

Democratic Republic of the Congo
PEACE – JUSTICE – WORK
July 2006
Annex 59
10
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
7. The Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (final PRGSP) was
prepared in a difficult but much more promising context, characterized by a
number of positive effects from implementation of the actions called for under the
interim version (I-PRSP). With the support of the international community, the country
is gradually emerging from the conflict, and reunification and peace are being
consolidated throughout the national territory. The political process began with the
organization of the constitutional referendum in December 2005 and the promulgation of
the constitution and the election law in February 2006. Inexorably, the path toward
organizing legislative and presidential elections has been mapped out. The efforts to
emerge from the political crisis were buttressed by courageous reforms: (i) fiscal and
monetary reforms; and (ii) reforms in key sectors of the national economy. Despite
several setbacks, which are hard to avoid in such circumstances, the reforms undertaken
by the Government brought about clear improvement in the macroeconomic
environment. Inflation has been relatively well controlled, the national currency has
stabilized, and the country has returned to positive growth rates. To consolidate these
gains and, in particular, to improve their positive spillover effects on the lives of the
people, the Government intends vigorously to continue to intensify these reforms. This
will enable it to rein in the effects of cyclical and structural shocks, whether domestic or
external in origin, so as to reach the completion point of the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries Initiative (HIPC Initiative) in 2007.
8. The process of preparing the final PRGSP was complicated and laborious,
but the Government insisted that it be carried out rigorously and systematically.
The objective pursued was to have a high quality PRGSP the contents of which were
assimilated, internalized, and legitimized by all stakeholders working in a responsible
partnership. From the methodological standpoint, the process combined qualitative and
quantitative methods in order to: (i) conduct a poverty diagnosis; (ii) define the longterm
vision of development; (iii) formulate the strategy; and (iv) develop the
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation framework and mechanisms for the actions
called for under the strategy. Participation took the following forms: (i) the organization
of sectoral and theme-based consultations and focused studies; (ii) the systematic
involvement of civil society organizations in the process, in particular in the organization
of participatory consultations with grassroots communities; (iii) the organization of
qualitative and quantitative surveys; (iv) the involvement of national experts and the
sectoral ministries; (v) the organization of capacity building workshops at the central and
provincial levels; and (vi) the participation of the development partners.
9. The qualitative and quantitative diagnosis clearly underscores the
multidimensional nature of poverty. Some of its dimensions are tangible and can be
quantified, while others are intangible and can only be perceived through proxies. The
results of the 1-2-3 survey show extremely high rates of monetary poverty (71.34 percent
of the poor) and inequality (Gini index of 40 percent) which vary sharply by area of
residence (61.49 percent of the urban poor have a Gini index of 40 percent, while 75.72
percent of the rural poor have a Gini index of 36 percent), by province (the poorest
provinces are in the eastern part of the country), by socioprofessional group (with greater
poverty in the informal sectors), and by demographic variable (greater poverty among
young couples and the elderly). The human development indicators (education, health,
access to socioeconomic goods and services) as well as indicators on the prevalence of
HIV/AIDS, living conditions, and social protection, not only confirm the foregoing
diagnosis, but also establish that poverty in the DRC is a generalized, chronic, mass
Annex 59
11
phenomenon. The diagnosis further establishes that the individual and collective factors
which explain poverty and the vulnerability of the people are, among others: (i) family
structure; (ii) education level (of the head of household or parents); (iii) employment
status; and (iv) the province of residence. In view of the above, the DRC would be hard
pressed to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015.
10. The long-term development vision (known as Vision 26/25) emerged from
the participatory process as the sole bulwark on which the PRGSP strategy should
be based. This vision contemplates building a Society of Hope based on: (i) national
unity and territorial integrity; (ii) security, justice, equality, and the rule of law; (iii)
work, wealth, prosperity, and sustainable development; and (iv) peace and national
solidarity. On the basis of these fundamental values, Congolese society will move by
2030 toward double digit growth rates with an equitable redistribution of wealth aimed at
achieving the MDGs. Four cardinal principles are set forth in this vision, namely: the
rule of law, a decentralized governance system, a pluralist democracy, and egalitarian
democracy built fundamentally on people shaped by culture and formed by a liberating
education. The last of these should produce free citizens capable of innovating, thinking
independently, and transforming their living conditions by taking the steps necessary for
their individual and collective development, citizens prepared to lead the country while
placing major emphasis on the well-being of all. The objective is to pull the DRC up to
the human development level of the intermediate countries and converge toward
the Millennium Development Goals.
11. The strategy adopted by the Government focuses on five groups of problems
identified by the people during participatory consultations in grassroots
communities and the diagnosis of monetary poverty, so as to align the PRGSP with
the prospect of achieving the MDGs. It is based on five major pillars: (i) promoting
good governance and consolidating peace through institution building; (ii) consolidating
macroeconomic stability and growth; (iii) improving access to social services and
reducing vulnerability; (iv) combating HIV/AIDS; and (v) supporting dynamism at the
community level. The strategies for reducing monetary and human poverty call for
strong and equitable economic growth and for Vision 26/25, to be fulfilled over the next
25-year generation. Such growth is particularly dependent on peaceful and secure
conditions and on good governance. Poverty reduction would entail the equitable
redistribution of this growth, determined by political, institutional, and sectoral reforms
designed to enhance transparency and decentralization on the one hand, and to improve
access to basic social services, reduce vulnerability, and combat HIV/AIDS on the other.
12. The implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the PRGSP require the
development and introduction of the proper institutional framework and
structures. Accordingly, in the short term, particular emphasis will be placed on
building the capacity of various stakeholders in the areas of poverty analysis and the
planning, financing, and implementation of priority poverty reduction programs and
projects. The strategy will be implemented using a participatory monitoring and
evaluation system organized as follows: (i) monitoring of strategy execution; (i)
monitoring of the poverty indicators; and (iii) assessment of the impact of the strategy’s
policies.
13. Implementation of the PRGSP is subject to both endogenous and exogenous
constraints. The factors which might inhibit successful implementation of the strategy
pertain to security, political, institutional, economic, and social considerations.
Annex 59
22
53. For each of these dimensions, households are subdivided into three categories depending
on the seriousness of the situation: (i) extremely poor; (ii) poor and fragile; and (iii) poor but
stable.
54. Tables 16 and 17 in the Annex show that the poverty profiles for urban and rural areas
are similar for the following dimensions: (i) basic needs; (ii) security and vulnerability; and (iii)
culture and family. They differ somewhat in the dimensions relating to productive activities and
basic services.
2.2.2. Profile of absolute poverty in the DRC5
2.2.2.1. Poverty threshold6
55. Estimates of the food poverty line based on data from the 1-2-3 survey place it at CGF
123,070 per person per year in urban areas and CGF 82,755 per person per year in rural areas.
These poverty lines were obtained by determining the value of the household basket of most
widely consumed goods representing approximately 90 percent of total household spending on
food.
56. The average nonfood expenditure of the households in this interval yields the nonfood
poverty line, namely CGF 30,195 per person per year in urban areas and CGF 14,900 per person
per year in rural areas.
57. The sums of the food and nonfood poverty lines come to CGF 153,265 per person per
year in urban areas and CGF 97,655 per person per year in rural areas.
2.2.2.2. Poverty indexes7 and characteristics
A. Overall incidence of poverty
58. For the country as a whole, the incidence of poverty (71.34 percent) is extremely
high by comparison with the other countries of central Africa. The same holds true as
regards the depth (32.23 percent) and severity (18.02 percent) of poverty.
B. Spatial disparities of poverty
59. Area of residence. The incidence of poverty is greater in rural areas (75.72
percent) than in urban areas (61.49 percent). The same phenomenon occurs in respect of
the depth and severity of poverty. People living in urban areas thus are better off than
those living in rural areas. The same pattern may be observed with regard to vulnerability
to poverty. This evidence tends to favor urban migration in the DRC.
60. Disparities between provinces. The disparities between urban and rural areas also exist
between the various provinces of the country. Three provinces have a poverty incidence of 85
percent or more, namely Equateur, Bandundu, and Sud Kivu. The city/province of Kinshasa (42
percent poor) is the least poor in the country, followed by Kasai Occidental and Maniema (where
5 The diagnosis is based on analyses conducted using data from Phase III of the 1-2-3 survey.
6 Starting from the food poverty line, the nonfood line is derived on the basis of the nonfood expenditures of
households for which total food spending falls in a selected interval around that food poverty line (± 10%).
7 The traditional instruments for measuring poverty (Foster-Greer-Thorbecke indices) make it possible to quantify
three poverty indexes: (1) the incidence of poverty (P0), reflecting the proportion of poor people in a given population
(in percent); (2) the depth of poverty (P1), which is an indicator of the intensity of poverty, the gap separating the poor
and the non-poor, and makes it possible to estimate the financing needed to eliminate poverty in a single blow in
conditions of perfect poverty targeting; and (3) the severity of poverty (P2), which assesses the degree of a society’s
aversion for poverty and measures inequality among the poor.
Annex 59
45
equipment, furniture, and means of transport) because there is no adequate policy for
covering the costs of care.
171. The lack of income forces girls and women into prostitution in order to survive;
they thus constitute one of the groups most vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. The monetary
poverty experienced by the affected households forces them to spend progressively less
on health and to devote 85 percent of their income to food. Consequently, 61 percent of
these households turn to traditional healers and sometimes to self-medication, thus
making it difficult to identify and monitor those affected.
172. The surveys show that, in large measure, the population is rather well informed about
STIs and HIV/AIDS (over 95 percent). However, knowledge about the various means of
HIV/AIDS prevention and transmission remains low among the people. In fact, while the
majority has heard about and knows the lethal consequences of the disease, genuine knowledge
about transmission mechanisms and prevention is uneven. Such knowledge is more widespread
among the more educated women (15.0 percent) than among those who have no education (7.0
percent). Women from urban areas (13.0 percent) are better informed, through information and
prevention campaigns, than are women from rural areas (9.0 percent). This low level of
education explains the persistence of unfavorable cultural practices and taboos which have an
influence on HIV/AIDS transmission, such as levirate marriage, sororate marriage, polygamy,
loss of inheritance, etc.
173. The insufficient sense of ownership of the fight against HIV/AIDS by specific high-risk
groups (sex workers, youths, men in uniform, truck drivers, airmen and artisanal miners of
precious substances, displaced persons, etc.) limits the measures to prevent HIV transmission.
174. HIV/AIDS now constitutes an extremely serious threat to economic development.
Indeed, it spares no age group, including nursing infants. It attacks men and especially women,
one of the major production factors in an economy largely driven by the primary sector. It thus
constitutes an impediment to national development. Up to the age of 39, the number of AIDS
cases is higher among women than among men. The low compensation level in conjunction with
the inefficiency of the social security system tends to increase considerably the expenses
associated with caring for Persons Living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHAs). With annual incomes just
shy of US$100 a year per capita, the annual cost of anti-retroviral (ARV) treatment of US$360
per person represents a burden, putting care out of the reach of the majority of affected
households and the family solidarity network.
175. The situation described above has had harmful effects on the levels of prevention of HIV
and STI transmission at the community level, on improving the quality of life of persons living
with HIV, on attenuating the socioeconomic impact of HIV, and on strengthening the
coordination and monitoring/evaluation capacity at all levels.
2.3.5. Community-level dynamics
176. The 40 years of conflict and poor governance, together with the glaring absence
of decentralized State structures, have created a void that grassroots organizations have
filled in order to promote income-generating activities, support the financing of
education, and create health associations and solidarity groups. However, the lack of
State support for this dynamic has resulted in: (i) the low level of participation of
community-level organizations in planning and decision-making; (ii) the absence of
promotion and legal recognition of community development organizations; (iii) the low
level of intervention capacity of community development organizations; and (iv) limited
capacity to support the initiatives of grassroots communities, particularly those of
women and youths.
Annex 59

Annex 60
International Rescue Committee, Burnet Institute, Mortality in the Democratic Republic of
Congo: An Ongoing Crisis (2007)

Annex 60
Annex 60
MORTALITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: AN ONGOING CRISIS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) has been
mired in conflict for over a decade, with devastating effects
on its civilian population. The most recent war of 1998-2002
was characterized by mass displacement collapse of health
systems and food shortages, all contributing to major
elevations of mortality. Although a formal peace accord was
signed in December 2002. the war has since given way to
several smaller conflicts in the five eastern provinces that
have continued to exact an enormous toll on the lives and
livelihoods of local populations.
Since 2000. the International Rescue Committee (IRC) has
documented the humanitanan impact of war and conflict in
DR Congo through a series of five mortality surveys. The first
four studies, conducted between 2000 and 2004, estimated
that 3.9 million people had died since 1998, arguably making
DR Congo the world's deadliest crisis since World War II. Less
than 10 percent of all deaths were due to violence, with most
attributed to easily preventable and treatable conditions such
as malaria, diarrhea, pneumonia and malnutrition.
Recent political developments together with improvements in
security and humanitarian funding have raised hope that DR
Congo could emerge from years of crisis. A number of international agencies have expressed optimism that
such progress would yield an early humanitarian dividend. But DR Congo faces many challenges on its road
to recovery and development.
This fifth and latest survey, covering the period from January 2006 to April 2007, aims to evaluate the current
humanitarian situation in DR Congo by providing an update on mortality. Investigators used a three-stage
cluster sampling technique to survey 14,000 households in 35 health zones across all 11 provinces, resulting
in wider geographic coverage than any of the previous IRC surveys.
The key findings and conclusions are:
1. Elevated mortality rates persist across DR Congo.
More than four years after the signing of a formal peace agreement the DR Congo's national crude
mortality rate (CMR) of 2.2 deaths per 1,000 per month is 57 percent higher than the average
rate for sub-Saharan Africa. This rate is unchanged since the previous IRC survey in 2004 . These
findings indicate that DR Congo remains in the midst of a major humanitarian crisis. As with previous
surveys, mortality rates are significantly higher in the volatile eastern provinces than in the west of
the country. In addition, mortality rates have risen significantly in the center of DR Congo (a region
referred to as Transition Eastin the attached survey). Based on the results of the five IRC studies. we
now estimate that 5.4 million excess deaths have occurred between August 1998 and April 2007. An
estimated 2.1 million of those deaths have occurred since the formal end of war in 2002.
ii
Annex 60
MORTALITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: AN ONGOING CRISIS
Table 5: CMRs and U5MRs for individual health zones, 2006-07
Stratum Province Zone CMR* 95%CI U5MR* 95%CI
Equateur Lolanga Mampoko 0.9 0.6 1.2 1.9 1.2 2.7
Katanga Mumbunda 1.0 0.6 1.3 2.1 1.1 3.1
Kasai Orientale Bonzola 1.0 0.7 1.3 2.2 1.3 3.1
Kinshasa Kasa-vubu 1.1 0.8 1.4 1.9 0.7 3.2
Kinshasa Masina 1 1.3 1.0 1.6 2.5 1.3 3.7
Bas Congo Matadi 1.5 1.1 1.8 3.1 2.2 4.0
Katanga Kambove 1.5 1.0 2.1 5.7 4.1 7.3
West Kasai Occidental Kalomba 1.6 0.8 2.4 3.8 2.1 5.5
Bandundu Koshibanda 1.7 1.4 2.0 3.9 2.5 5.3
Kasai Occidental Masuika 1.8 1.3 2.3 4.4 2.8 6.0
Bandundu ldiofa 2.8 2.1 3.5 6.7 3.4 10.0
Bandundu Vanga 3.0 2.5 3.6 7.1 5.4 8.7
Katanga Kilwa 3.1 2.3 3.9 6.8 4.3 9.2
Kasai Orientale Kasansa 3.4 2.7 4.1 7. 7 5.7 9.7
Kasai Orientale NgandanjikaA 3.6 2.8 4.5 8.1 5.8 10.5
I Equateur Bosomondanda 1.0 0.7 1.3 2.6 1.6 3.5
Equateur Tandala 1.8 1.3 2.2 4.4 2.9 5.8
Transition
Equat eur Kungu 2.0 1.5 2.6 3 .0 1.9 4.1
East
Kasai Orientale Vanga-kete 2.5 1.8 3.2 4.9 3.1 6.7
I Kasai Occidental Muetshi 2.9 1.9 4.0 5.9 3.4 8.4
Nord Kivu Lubero 0.8 0.5 1.2 1.8 0.5 3.1
Prov Orientale Makiso Kisangani 1.0 0.7 1.4 1.6 0.6 2.5
Sud Kivu Katana 1.5 0.9 2.0 4.5 2.1 6.9
Prov Ori entale Aru 1.6 1.1 2.0 4.2 2.7 5.7
Sud Kivu Kamituga 1.7 1.3 2.2 4.3 2.4 6.1
Prov Orientale Faradje 1.8 1.1 2.4 2.5 1.0 3.9
Nord Kivu ltebero 1.8 1.4 2.2 3.8 2.5 5.1
East2002 Maniema Kalima 2.1 1.5 2.7 5 .2 3.1 7.3
Nord Kivu Rwanguba 2.2 1.4 2.9 4.5 2.6 6.4
Prov Orientale Lubung a 2.2 1.5 2.9 4 .5 2.7 6.3
Sud Kivu Nyangezi 2.4 1.5 3.2 5 .5 3.0 8.0
Prov Orientale Rimba 2.8 2.0 3.6 5.9 3.2 8.6
Katanga KalemieA 3.6 2.9 4.2 8.9 6.9 10.9
Maniema KundaA 4.1 3.2 5.0 7.0 5.1 8.9
Katanga AnkoroA 7.1 6.0 8.2 16.6 13.1 20.2
* Mortality rates expressed as deaths per 1,000 per mon1h.
A Mortality rates statistically significantly above the emergency threshold of 2. 7 deaths per 1 ,OOO population per month.
12

Annex 61
L. Wyler, P. Sheikh, International Trade in Wildlife: Threats and U.S. Policy, CRS Report for
Congress, RL34395 (22 Aug. 2008)

Order Code RL34395
International Illegal Trade in Wildlife:
Threats and U.S. Policy
Updated August 22, 2008
Liana Sun Wyler
Analyst in International Crime and Narcotics
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Pervaze A. Sheikh
Specialist in Natural Resources Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Annex 61
International Illegal Trade in Wildlife:
Threats and U.S. Policy
Summary
Global trade in illegal wildlife is a growing illicit economy, estimated to be
worth at least $5 billion and potentially in excess of $20 billion annually. Some of
the most lucrative illicit wildlife commodities include tiger parts, caviar, elephant
ivory, rhino horn, and exotic birds and reptiles. Demand for illegally obtained
wildlife is ubiquitous, and some suspect that illicit demand may be growing.
International wildlife smuggling may be of interest to Congress as it presents
several potential environmental and national security threats to the United States.
Threats to the environment include the potential loss of biodiversity, introduction of
invasive species into U.S. ecosystems, and transmission of disease through illegal
wildlife trade, including through illegal bushmeat trade. National security threats
include links between wildlife trafficking and organized crime and drug trafficking.
Some terrorist groups may also be seeking to finance their activities through illegal
wildlife trade, according to experts. Wildlife source and transit countries may be
especially prone to exploitation if known to have weak state capacity, poor law
enforcement, corrupt governments, and porous borders.
The U.S. government addresses illegal wildlife trade through several national
and international venues. Congress has passed numerous laws that regulate and
restrict certain types of wildlife imports and exports, including the Endangered
Species Act of 1973, the Lacey Act and Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, and several
species-specific conservation laws. These laws and others establish authorities and
guidelines for wildlife trade inspection at ports of entry, and wildlife crime law
enforcement and prosecution. Internationally, the United States is party to several
wildlife conservation treaties, including the United Nations Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which
serves as the primary vehicle for regulating wildlife trade. Foreign training and
assistance programs to combat illegal wildlife trade are also conducted by some
federal agencies, including the U.S. Department of State, which leads an international
initiative against wildlife trafficking.
The role of Congress in evaluating U.S. policy to combat wildlife trafficking is
broad. Potential issues for Congress include (1) determining funding levels for U.S.
wildlife trade inspection and investigation; (2) evaluating the effectiveness of U.S.
foreign aid to combat wildlife trafficking; (3) developing ways to encourage privatesector
involvement in regulating the wildlife trade; (4) using trade sanctions to
penalize foreign countries with weak enforcement of wildlife laws; (5) incorporating
wildlife trade provisions into free trade agreements; and (6) addressing the domestic
and international demand for illegal wildlife through public awareness campaigns
and non-governmental organization partnerships. This report focuses on the
international trade in terrestrial fauna, largely excluding trade in illegal plants,
including timber, and fish.
Annex 61
Annex 62
A. Lambert, L. Lohlé-Tart, La surmortalité au Congo (RDC) durant les troubles de 1998-2004:
une estimation des décès en surnombre, scientifiquement fondée à partir des méthodes de la
démographie (Oct. 2008)

Annex 62
La surmortalité au Congo (RDC) durant les troubles de 1998-2004 : une
estimation des décès en surnombre, scientifiquement fondée à partir des
méthodes de la démographie
André Lambert et Louis Lohlé-Tart, démographes
[email protected], Octobre 2008
1 Introduction : des guerres, des électiôns et des morts
On parle souvent, à propos de la République Démocratique du Congo (ROC), de « quatre
millions de morts » - on cite même des chiffres encore beaucoup plus élevés - du fait des
troubles politiques de ces dernières années. Une ONG en particulier (International Rescue
Committee [IRC]) a contribué à diffuser cette information, reprise sans examen par de nombreuses
personnalités ou organisations, y compris politiques.
Les quatre millions de morts, produit supposé de la deuxième guerre du Congo, entre 1998 et
2004, représentent une évaluation du nombre de décès dus aux troubles et à leurs conséquences.
Depuis lors, ce nombre a, curieusement, subi une inflation dans l'horreur! En ce qui nous
concerne, nous n'étudions ici que la validité du nombre initialement proclamé et nous montrons
qu'il a été incroyablement exagéré.
Une première guerre a eu lieu en 1996 lorsque les troupes de l'Alliance des Forces Démocratiques
pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL), fortement épaulées par des militaires rwandais,
ont traversé le Congo <l'Est en Ouest, jusqu'à la fuite du président Mobutu et l'installation au
pouvoir du président Laurent-Désiré Kabila. De l'avis général, cette opération s'est apparentée
à une « promenade militaire » caractérisée par la fuite éperdue ( ou la reddition) des troupes
fidèles au Maréchal Mobutu devant les hommes se réclamant du futur président. Il y eut
certainement des morts suite à des escarmouches, ou dans le cadre d'exécutions ou d'autres
exactions mais un consensus est établi pour dire que cette première guerre a généré peu de
mortalité directe et un minimum de désorganisation supplémentaire. D'ailleurs, les « quatre
millions de morts » souvent cités ne se réfèrent pas à cette première guerre.
La deuxième guerre opposa de 1998 à 2004 les troupes du président Kabila, dorénavant appuyées
par des contingents étrangers (zimbabwéens, angolais, ... ) aux troupes rebelles de l'Est
de la ROC, soutenues par le Rwanda et l'Ouganda. Une des péripéties de cette guerre a été la
désunion puis l'opposition entre Rwandais et Ougandais, dont les troupes se sont battues entre
elles à Kisangani et dans la région.
Par ailleurs, un enregistrement électoral (« enrôlement ») de la population de nationalité
congolaise a eu lieu en ROC en 2005-2006 en vue de la constitution d'un fichier des électeurs.
Cette opération a permis de répartir les électeurs inscrits selon le sexe et l'âge, par circonscription
administrative.
A la demande de la Commission Européenne, trois experts, dont les deux auteurs de cet article,
ont effectué un contrôle des procédures d'enregistrement; celles-ci se sont avérées extrêmement
fiables d'un point de vue statistique.
Annex 62
teraient pour 22% de la population (22% =10% d'étrangers/ 45% de la population totale).
Sous cette hypothèse, le nombre maximal de décès s'élèverait alors - dans une
perspective maximaliste - à 182 592 * 1.22 soit un volume de 222 762 morts. Sachant
qu'on est parti de 1992 - et non pas de 1998 -, disons par facilité que le nombre
de morts dus aux troubles est d'environ DEUX CENT MILLE MORTS.
On peut certes accepter l'estimation préalable de quatre cent mille morts mais refuser de
considérer qu'ils sont répartis relativement uniformément sur le territoire et penser au
contraire qu'ils sont tous concentrés dans la partie« orientale » soumise aux troubles. Et donc
ne pas appliquer à ce nombre le pondérateur régional de 45%. C'est oublier que l'évolution de
l'espérance de vie est orientée à la baisse dans toutes les provinces et que cette évolution est
validée par la concordance « reconstitution - enregistrement électoral » au niveau de chaque
province.
On pourrait même dire a contrario que le déclin de l'espérance de vie dans les provinces en
paix plaide en faveur de l'idée selon laquelle les morts du Congo - même dans l'est du territoire
- sont plus la conséquence de la déliquescence du régime Mobutu que celle de la guerre
à l'Est et de ses conséquences. Il y aurait alors moins de deux cent mille morts! Mais nous ne
voudrions pas déforcer notre démonstration par des considérations difficilement quantifiables.
Ainsi donc, l'approche dynamique de l'évolution de la popuJation du Congo nous a permis
d'affirmer, par des méthodes uniquement quantitatives et adossées à des observations extrêmement
robustes de détruire complètement les affirmations délirantes et malheureusement
universellement reprises, selon lesquelles les troubles au Congo auraient entraîné quatre millions
(ou plus) de victimes.
Il existe certes un véritable drame humain en RDC; mais il n'est que très partiellement dû à la
guerre de 1998-2004 comme on vient de le montrer. En fait, les Congolais souffrent surtout
des conséquences de la gestion désastreuse du pays par le régime du maréchal Mobutu et on
pourrait se demander pourquoi dans le passé la Communauté Internationale n'a pas plus énergiquement
manifesté son écoeurement face à la déliquescence des conditions de vie de
l'immense majorité de la population congolaise. Peut-être fallait-il soutenir un« ami » dans le
contexte de guerre froide qui prévalait encore à cette époque?
On pourrait aussi se demander si l'affirmation « quatre millions de morts en RDC» résulte
d'une simple - mais grossière - erreur d'appréciation ou si elle sert les intérêts de pays,
d'organisations ou d'autres puissances occultes.
Enfin, nous soulignons fortement que notre travail n'a pas pour but de banaliser les conditions
de vie extrêmes dans lesquelles la population congolaise se débat. Cependant, il nous a paru
nécessaire, en présentant des estimations scientifiquement défendables, de lutter contre la
tendance à exagérer le nombre des victimes . Le présent travail ne nie pas l'inhumanité des
c·onditions de vie congolaises mais donne à penser que ce ne sont pas les interventions étrangères
- condamnables - qui sont la première cause de l'état marastique incontestable dans
lequel le Congo se trouve . De surcroît, on en arrive à penser que cette situation n'est malheureusement
pas exceptionnelle : il se pourrait même qu'il y ait plus de morts en Somalie ou au
Darfour, eu égard à la population « soumise au risque », et que la justice et la compassion les
plus élémentaires ne devraient pas oublier ces populations-là .
D/2008/4001 /4
17
Annex 63
Health and Nutrition Tracking Service (HNTS), Peer Review Report: Re-examining mortality
from the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1998-2006 (2009)

The Health and Nutrition Tracking Service (HNTS) is an independent interagency initiative hosted by WHO
Contact email: [email protected]
HEALTH AND NUTRITION TRACKING SERVICE (HNTS)
PEER REVIEW REPORT
Re-examining mortality from the conflict
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1998-2006
The Health and Nutrition Tracking Service (HNTS), an interagency initiative hosted by WHO, was created in response to a
request made by the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator as part of the Humanitarian Reform process. The HNTS was
established in late 2007 by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Health and Nutrition Clusters.
The Health and Nutrition Tracking Service (HNTS) aims to provide impartial, credible and timely information on mortality and
nutrition rates in populations affected by crises and emergencies, especially the least funded and publicized ones, using
standardized data collection and analysis methods wherever possible. The information gathered will help improve
humanitarian operations by (1) rapidly detecting excess mortality and malnutrition in crises using key indicators, (2) promoting
mutual accountability between the humanitarian community and beneficiaries, and (3) ensuring evidence-based information
on health and nutrition needs in crises is available to high-level decision-makers.
The HNTS has two main functions.
It offers operational support to humanitarian staff in the field by peer-reviewing guidelines and other documents, participating
in assessment missions, advising on the design of surveys, and providing technical advice to various agencies.
Its normative functions include developing standards for data collection and measurement through its Expert Reference Group,
collecting, analysing and disseminating data, and providing independent technical advice on various issues related to method
development and validation studies.
Annex 63
3
FIGURE 1: SEX RATIOS BY AGE AS REPORTED BY THE DIFFERENT SURVEYS
Source: Calculated from the age distributions of each survey
The sampling of the IRC surveys can be summarized as follows. The surveys
can be divided into three groups. The first two sets attempted probability
sampling within particular areas, but where extrapolation to death rates
for the whole of Eastern DRC was based on assumptions of the similarities
and differences between observed and non‐observed areas. The second
group is the two first nationwide surveys that both are characterized by a
three stage design with few initial selections. Then the third group has one
member, namely the last survey that have a similar design to the second
group, but with more first stage selections. The surveys were very similar
as far as household selection was concerned, except for the fact that the
first two sets of surveys used spatial sampling in some situations.
The overall design of the last survey is certainly the best, but it could still be
improved upon, ‐ a simple and cheap measure would be to introduce some
more stratification. More complex, and entering directly into the whole
debate on how mortality surveys should be carried out under difficult
conditions is the issue of procedures for selection of households. As
discussed above there are a number of issues that conceivably could lead
to biases.
Some of the imperfections in the sampling design will automatically be
reflected in the standard errors given the way they have been calculated,
while some are probably not. Bias due to household selection may be
present, but it is impossible to evaluate. Thus, the overall uncertainty
associated with the estimates is certainly larger than that presented in the
confidence intervals, but how much larger cannot be stated.
DEATH RATES IN THE IRC SURVEYS
Crude death rates are estimated from the households’ reports of deaths
during a reference period and the number of household members. In the
-
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
---
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
--
Age group
0.5
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.3
1.5
0.5
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.3
1.5
Sex ratio (males/females)
Source: DHS 2007 Source: IRC 2007
Source: MICS 1995 Source: MICS 2001
Annex 63
8
TABLE 5: HOUSEHOLD SIZES IN THE IRC SURVEYS
Household size East West
Survey set 1 7.3 Not surveyed
Survey set 2 7.3 Not surveyed
Survey 3 6.0 5.7
Survey 4 7.2 5.6
Survey 5 6.4 5.7
Source: The survey reports, for surveys 1 and 2 calculated from the reports
The IRC surveys are quite consistent as regards household size in the west
of DRC, but the estimates vary considerably in the east (Table 5).
The DHS from 2007 finds an average household size for the whole of DRC
of 5.4 (16 p. 13) , that is considerably lower than the IRC estimates. It is
unlikely that the different figures reflect real changes in household
composition, so some of the surveys must be wrong. In any case, the
implication would be that the fourth survey estimates a lower mortality
rate than what it would have been if the survey had similar average
household size as survey three and five. Conversely, if the surveys one, two
and four are right, then survey three and five would tend to estimate CDR
13‐20 percent too high in the East (all else being equal).
THE USE OF CDR TO ESTIMATE BASELINE DEATHS
In general terms there are at least three criticisms that can be leveled
against the use that IRC makes of the CDR to estimate baseline deaths. The
criticisms concern the comparison with a baseline in itself; the specific
choice of a baseline; and the assumption that mortality increased rapidly
from the baseline level because of the war.
The Crude Death Rate is not a good measure to compare mortality across
countries or across time, because the rate depends on the age distribution
of the population. With equal age specific rates, an old population will
normally have a much higher CDR than a population with a high proportion
of young. Thus, the CDR is influenced by the age distribution and by
extension by the fertility rate. Similarly, populations that have their age
distributions distorted, for example due to conflict or migration, may have
quite different CDRs than populations without such distortions, but with
the same underlying mortality. Therefore, comparing CDRs with a
“baseline” is in principle foolhardy without age standardizing so that the
baseline CDR can be expressed in terms of the age distribution of the actual
population. In the specific case of DRC, all sources indicate that the age
distributions are surprisingly even, so it is mainly the overall age effect that
is relevant. To some extent, as will be discussed later, this is an implied
major aspect of the Lambert and Lohlé‐Tart criticism of IRC.
Choosing the average Sub‐Saharan rate for comparison is also problematic
because it assumes that the demographic regime in DRC was an “average
African” before the war broke out. In fact, several different demographic
Annex 63
9
patterns may be identified in Africa, each with its own characteristics (17).
For example, countries with very high prevalence of HIV/AIDS have
different mortality patterns than those with low prevalence. DRC in 1998
was a country that had for many years undergone a profound crisis of
governance, which may well have affected mortality patterns. Moreover
sources indicate a quite high and stable fertility, in contrast to a more
general African tendency towards fertility decline in recent years.
Finally, the underlying assumption of IRC that mortality increased suddenly
in 1998 following the outbreak of the war is probably not warranted.
According to IRC the predominant direct cause of mortality is not violence,
but rather disease, and one would assume that much of the increase then
would be gradual, reflecting worsening conditions because of the war. Still,
one should not discount completely the possibility of at least localized
rapid increases due to disease, since such certainly have been documented
(e.g. outbreaks of cholera), as well as to sudden displacement as pointed
out by IRC.
IRC SUMMARY
To some extent the IRC study illustrates an observation made by Timæus in
a review of studies of adult mortality, namely that it is difficult to evaluate
studies based on reports on household deaths using internal evidence
alone (18 p. 557). There is no obvious smoking gun that would indicate
that there are fundamental errors in the IRC surveys that would lead them
to dramatically overestimate the death rates. Compared to many other
such surveys the IRC surveys – particularly the last two – appears well
designed and carried out.
As has been discussed, there is still smoke, i.e. a number of issues that can
be improved upon and that may have affected the estimates. Still, the
possible biases may go either way, and it is not easy to conclude if one
direction would dominate.
There are nevertheless concerns, principally relating to the use of three
stage sampling with few initial selections (especially in the two first
nationwide surveys), household selection, substitution, definition of
household and “death reporting group”, and for the first three surveys lack
of inclusion of the variance contribution from the implied weights. In sum,
these factors may lead to much higher mean square error than reflected in
the confidence intervals presented by IRC, or, put differently, considerably
higher uncertainty.
The low sex ratio as well as the variability in the average household sizes
suggest that the enumeration of household members in the IRC surveys
may have been imperfect, although the low sex ratio, when considered in
isolation, may indicate excess male mortality.
Finally, the use of the sub‐Saharan baseline CDR for estimating excess
deaths is problematic as is the implicit assumption of a very rapid increase
Annex 63
21
fourth IRC survey, the Lambert and Lohlé‐Tart CDR is well within the
confidence interval. For the 2007 survey it is outside of the confidence
interval, but given non sampling errors in the survey as discussed above,
the Lambert and Lohlé‐Tart estimate may well be within the real bounds of
uncertainty for the survey.
The main differences between the two are the treatment of excess deaths
and the IRC notion that mortality increased rapidly with the start of the
war. Lambert and Lohlé‐Tart assumes that the low life expectancy is the
way it is, and there are few “excess deaths” associated with it.
Thus the crucial difference from the IRC approach is not so much the
mortality level, but that Lambert and Lohlé‐Tart do not believe that the
very high mortality levels arrived with the war. This approach has the
benefit that it avoids the issue of a counterfactual that seem very difficult
to establish, and are perhaps more easy to argue for in terms of the overall
socio‐economic development of the DRC.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of how one looks on the data, the rapid radical increase in
mortality with the war that is implied by the IRC studies is difficult to
substantiate while there is little doubt that the mortality level in DRC is
very high.
Paradoxically Lambert and Lohlé‐Tart and IRC reinforce each other. If IRC’s
estimate of the current CDR is in fact correct, then that is consistent with
the Lambert and Lohlé‐Tart description of the demographic development
within the total sampling and non sampling errors that may be expected in
such a survey.
However, such a view has several implications:
• That the “excess mortality” from war in DRC is far smaller than
what has been presented by IRC, and that it cannot easily be
estimated given the current demographic models or surveys.
• That IRC statement about the war in the Congo as being the most
deadly war since World War II should be rephrased into something
like “the catastrophic governance failure during the Mobutu
regime and the subsequent war led to increasing mortality in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to alarming levels”.
• That the recent DHS survey must be wrong in its estimation of
child mortality, and that DRC thus has had a stable or decreasing
low life expectancy for several years.
• That the UN population division and U.S. Bureau of Census
estimates of a return to a pre conflict trajectory of increasing life
expectancy may be wrong.
• That it is very difficult, both philosophically and technically, to
disentangle the effects of overall decline in living conditions and
the war, particularly since the overwhelming number of deaths
Annex 63

Annex 64
Human Security Report Project, “Part II, The Shrinking Costs of War”, Human Security Report
(2009-2010)

1 H U M A N S E C U R I T Y B R I E F 2 0 0 7
H U M A N S E C U R I T Y R E P O R T P R O J E C T
S I M O N F R A S E R U N I V E R S I T Y , C A N A D A
H U M A N S E C U R I T Y R E P O R T 2 0 0 9
T H E S H R I N K I N G C O S T S O F W A R
Annex 64
H U M A N S E C U R I T y R E P o R T 2 0 0 9 / 2 0 1 0 125
April 2000 to December 2000—boosted the cumulative excess
death toll estimate for the two survey periods to 2.5 million, of
which 350,000 were violent deaths. As with the first survey, the
findings of the second survey were compromised because the
areas to be surveyed were not chosen in a way that ensured
that they were representative of the region as a whole.
The primary problem with the three nationwide surveys
that were conducted in 2002, 2004, and 2007 was the IRC’s
reliance on a baseline mortality rate that was too low.
In reaching its cumulative nationwide excess death
estimate of 5.4 million for the period covered by all five surveys,
the IRC added the excess death tolls from the first two surveys
to those of the subsequent three surveys.
Readers may wonder how the IRC could calculate nationwide
excess war death toll estimates for 1998 to 2001, given
the two surveys taken in this period only provided fatality data
for the war-affected eastern part of the country.
The short answer is the IRC assumed the violence was
concentrated in the east and there were no excess war deaths
in the west of the country over this period.83 From this it follows
that the excess war death toll for the east of the country
in this period will also be the nationwide excess death toll.
In the analysis that follows, we focus on the IRC’s own
estimates, as well as the methodology and assumptions that
underpin them.
In All the Surveys the Baseline Mortality Rate
Is Too Low
In determining the excess death toll, the baseline mortality
rate is critically important. If it is too low, the excess death toll
will be too high.
The IRC uses the sub-Saharan average of 1.5 deaths per
1,000 per month as its baseline mortality rate for all but the
very last survey when the sub-Saharan average drops to 1.4.84
Using the sub-Saharan African average mortality rate as a
comparator—to indicate how high death rates were in the east
of the DRC compared with the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, for
example—would have been both instructive and appropriate.
Using it as a measure of the pre-war mortality rate in the DRC
itself makes little sense.
The IRC argues that the sub-Saharan African average
mortality rate is a conservative choice for pre-war DRC—i.e.,
it is higher than previous estimates drawn from data from
the 1984 census and two UNICEF (United Nations Children’s
Fund) surveys that covered periods before the war started.
But, the IRC never explains why it believes that the sub-
Saharan African average is an appropriate measure of the
pre-war mortality rate for a country that is far from average
in sub-Saharan Africa.
The DRC languishes at the bottom of most development
indicators for sub-Saharan Africa. It suffered a devastating
20-year economic decline from the mid-1970s that reduced
its GDP (gross domestic product) per capita from more than
USD 300 to just a third of that figure by 1998. Foreign aid was
withdrawn almost completely in the early 1990s, and Mobutu
Sese Seko’s hopelessly inept and corrupt government had collapsed
in total disarray by 1997.
If the baseline mortality rate is too low,
the excess death toll will be too high.
The experts who reviewed the IRC’s DRC research for
the HNTS have all expressed skepticism about the choice of
the sub-Saharan African average as an appropriate baseline
mortality rate. Harvard University’s Kenneth Hill, for example,
notes, “the IRC counterfactual is not appropriate. [The] DRC
almost certainly has had above average mortality by SSA [sub-
Saharan African] standards for decades.”85
Later in this chapter we argue that 2.0 deaths per 1,000 per
month is a more plausible baseline mortality rate for the DRC
and show how using this rate sharply reduces the estimated
excess death toll attributable to the war throughout the entire
period, with the decreases being greatest for the three most
recent surveys.
The 2000 Survey: Survey Locations
Inappropriately Selected
The most serious problem with the IRC’s first survey is that
the survey locations were inappropriately selected for the
purpose of estimating excess mortality in the war-affected
eastern region of the country. (This was also the case with the
second survey.) In addition, too few areas were surveyed to
allow much confidence in the results even if the locations had
been selected appropriately.
The IRC’s May 2000 report on the first survey notes:
“While the 1.2 million people within the sampling universe of
the five IRC studies are not representative of the approximately 20
million people in eastern DRC, these surveys probably represent
the best broad-based data available.”86
While the latter part of the above statement is very
likely true, the fact remains that extrapolating from a small
convenience sample of five nonrandomly selected populations
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largest population of those in which the five surveys were
carried out, the impact of this single survey location on the
excess death rate for the entire region is very large.
In the second estimation method, Katanga accounts for
1.4 of the estimated 1.8 million deaths (or 77 percent) for
the region as a whole; in the third “conservative” estimate, it
accounts for 0.9 out of 1.7 million deaths (or 54 percent). In
other words, the death toll from the single Moba survey—which
we have no compelling reason to assume is representative of
Katanga as a whole—is driving most of the death toll estimate
for the entire eastern region.
The IRC provides no argument to support its assumption
that it is appropriate to extrapolate the Moba mortality rate to
Katanga as a whole. In fact, it is highly improbable that the
Moba rate—or indeed any other rate from a single survey in
Katanga—would be equal to the Katangan provincial average.
This is because, as subsequent surveys have demonstrated,
there is a high degree of intraprovincial variation in death rates
throughout the country, including the eastern provinces.
There are, in other words, no good reasons to accept the
excess mortality estimates that derive from the IRC’s second
and third estimation methods. But the biases generated by
the IRC’s procedures are then compounded by the decision
to sum the provincial totals in order to provide an excess
death estimate for the eastern region as a whole. The more
statistically appropriate way to provide a region-wide estimate
would have been to use all five surveys together—as was done
(though without the appropriate population-weighting) in
the first estimation method.
To reiterate, the methodological problems with the IRC’s
first survey are that:
 The five areas surveyed were not chosen randomly and
were in any case too few to obtain reliable projections.
 The excess mortality estimation methods:
i) failed to weight the mortality rates from the five
surveyed areas by population (in the first estimation
method); or
ii) inappropriately generalized from a single survey to a
province, and then—equally inappropriately—summed
the excess death tolls calculated for each province to
arrive at a regional total for the eastern part of the
country (in the second and third estimation methods).
All three estimation approaches applied an inappropriately
low baseline mortality rate. However, the error generated by
the use of the inappropriately low baseline had a much greater
impact on mortality estimates in the final three surveys than
in the first two.
The 2001 Survey: Survey Locations
Inappropriately Selected
The second survey, whose results were published in 2001,
surveyed five additional areas, but again without random
sampling and using the same inappropriately low baseline
mortality estimate. However, the significant bias generated by
the excessive reliance on the death toll in Moba in the first survey
was not an issue in the second survey. In the 2001 report,
the IRC used the results of all five surveys taken in 2000, plus
the five taken in 2001, as well as a single survey taken in 1999,
when estimating the cumulative death toll.94
Although the second survey is not as problematic as the
first, we believe the inappropriate selection of the areas to be
surveyed means the IRC’s excess death toll estimates for the
eastern region of the DRC, as derived from the second survey,
should also be rejected.
The Impact of the IRC’s Flawed Methodology
According to the IRC’s data, the nationwide U5MR in the DRC
increased at an unprecedented rate between the outbreak of
the war in August 1998 and 2001. The radical nature of the
IRC’s claim becomes evident when we compare the IRC’s
estimate with the under-five mortality trend data for the
DRC from 1970 to 2005 provided by the Inter-Agency Child
Mortality Estimation Group (IACMEG) dataset.95
Figure 7.1 Under-Five Mortality Rate (U5MR)
Estimates for the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), 1970–2004
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
U5MR (per 1,000 Live Births)
Year
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
IRC
DHS Indirect 2007
DHS Direct 2007
UNICEF 2001
UNICEF 1995
Census 1984
Data Sources: IACMEG; IRC.96
Census data and data from DHS and UNICEF surveys
show that child mortality rates in the DRC, while
very high, have been trending downwards for more
than 30 years. By contrast, the International Rescue
Committee’s estimate of the U5MR in the DRC for the
period 1998–2001 shows a very dramatic increase.
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The IRC’s data also suggest there were no excess deaths in
the west of the country for the period of the first two surveys.
We can infer this from the following:
 First, the IRC recorded zero excess deaths in the west for
the period of the first two surveys in the chart on page 13
of its final report.102
 Second, the IRC’s estimate of 5.4 million excess deaths
in the DRC between 1998 and 2007 is obtained by adding
the 2.5 million estimated excess deaths for the eastern
region during the first two surveys to the nationwide estimate
for the periods covered by the final three surveys.
Given that this nationwide excess death toll estimate does
not include an estimate for excess deaths in the west of
the country during the period of the first two surveys, we
conclude the IRC assumes there were no excess deaths in
the west during those periods.
We have no idea whether the IRC’s assumptions about
excess mortality in the west during the period of the first two
surveys are correct, but they are not implausible. They are
consistent with what we know about the patterns of violence
in the DRC and the lack of connectedness between the east
and the west of the country. From the start of the war in
August 1998, the violence was concentrated in the eastern
region. Much of the western region, which was controlled
by the government, is half a continent away from the warstricken
east. Communication between east and west is
minimal and livelihoods throughout the region are based
mostly on subsistence agriculture. As such, they are less likely
to be disrupted by distant armed violence—with the attendant
risk of increased mortality—than would have been the case in
a more economically interdependent country.
Given that, according to the IRC’s findings, there were
no excess deaths in the west during the periods of the first,
second, or third surveys, then, other things being equal, we
can infer that the average mortality rate for the region during
the period of the first two surveys should be the same as
that recorded in the third survey—i.e., 2.0 deaths per 1,000
per month.
Finally, other things again being equal, the mortality rate
for the whole of the DRC immediately prior to the war should
be the same as for the west of the country which was not
affected by conflict during the period of the first two surveys.
It follows that the 2.0 deaths per 1,000 per month is a plausible
pre-war mortality rate for the DRC.
Like all baseline mortality estimates for the DRC, this
figure is open to challenge, but HSRP is not alone in believing
the 2.0 deaths per 1,000 per month is appropriate. WHO’s
Francesco Checchi notes in his review of the IRC’s research
for the HNTS that his approach to the baseline issue would be
“to use the east to west CMR [crude mortality rate] rate ratio,
which in practice (though not in theory) means adopting the
CMR in the west as the baseline for the entire country.”103
We also note that in its sensitivity analysis for its report
on the third survey, the IRC uses the 2.0 deaths per 1,000
per month rate to demonstrate the effect of changing the
baseline mortality rate. From this we assume that, while the
IRC’s preferred baseline rate is 1.5, it believes the 2.0 rate is
not implausible.
Recalculating the Excess Death Estimate
When the IRC’s excess death figures for the period of May
2001 to April 2007 are recalculated using the revised baseline
rate, the result is startling. There is a massive reduction in the
excess death toll. As Table 7.1 illustrates, the best estimate of
the excess death toll shrinks to less than one-third of the IRC’s
original figure—from 2.83 million to 0.86 million.104
The point of this exercise was not to produce a “correct”
estimate—indeed, we do not believe the data are reliable
enough to permit this. Rather, it was to show how a modest,
but plausible, increase in a highly questionable baseline mortality
rate can lead to a radically lower excess death toll.
To make the point even clearer, we asked a hypothetical
question: What would the excess death toll be in 2017, under
several different, but equally plausible, conditions?
 First, assume the average mortality rate in the DRC for the
period 2007 to 2017 is the same as it was for the 2006 to
2007 period (i.e., 2.2 deaths per 1,000 per month). Using a
baseline mortality rate of 1.4 deaths per 1,000 per month—
which is the rate the IRC used in its final survey—there
would be an additional 6.6 million excess deaths by 2017.
 Second, assume the average mortality rate for the period
2007 to 2017 declined to 2.0 per 1,000 per month, which
is plausible given the mortality rate in the DRC had been
trending downwards since 2002.105 Assume also that the
baseline mortality rate remained at 1.4 per 1,000 per
month. There would now be an additional 5.0 million
excess war deaths by 2017.
 Third, assume an average mortality rate for the period
2007 to 2017 is 2.2 deaths per 1,000 per month, and the
baseline mortality rate is 2.0 per 1,000 per month—the
rate suggested by HSRP and Francesco Checchi. There
would be an additional 1.7 million excess deaths by 2017.
 Finally, assume the average mortality rate for the period
2007 to 2017 declined to 2.0 deaths per 1,000 per month.
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Can Retrospective Mortality
Surveys Be Used to Determine
Excess Death Tolls?
We now turn to a problem that has been ignored in the literature
on conflict epidemiology but challenges the very idea that
surveys are useful instruments for estimating excess death tolls.
We demonstrate why retrospective mortality surveys that
use point estimates of the pre-war mortality as a baseline, and
assume they do not change over time, will tend to produce
erroneous excess death estimates, except in the case of very
short wars. The longer the war lasts, the greater will be the
extent of the error.
We also argue that, since war deaths are not the only factor
that determine overall mortality, attributing increases (or
decreases) in mortality to wartime violence may sometimes be
highly inaccurate.
Finally, we point out that retrospective mortality surveys
are simply too crude an instrument to detect the impact of
most wars on nationwide mortality rates.
The discussion that follows is in no sense intended as a
critique of nationwide retrospective mortality surveys. On the
contrary, as we argue elsewhere in this chapter, such surveys are
critically important sources of data for war-affected countries
where there are rarely any reliable governmental statistics.
Nor do we question the utility of the local health surveys
that humanitarian organizations carry out in internally
displaced person and refugee camps that provide vital
needs-assessment information for humanitarian missions.
Our focus is rather on the use of retrospective mortality
surveys for the particular purpose of measuring nationwide
excess war death tolls.
The nationwide population health surveys undertaken by
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), UNICEF (United
Nations Children’s Fund), and WHO (World Health Organization)
107 are not used by these organizations to produce such
estimates—we believe with good reason.
We further argue that not only is it rarely possible to
calculate accurate estimates of excess war deaths but that such
estimates are of little practical utility for humanitarian policy
on the ground. Excess death estimates may well be useful for
advocacy purposes, and are of obvious interest to historians
and conflict researchers, but their utility even for these latter
purposes is very limited given their accuracy is so dubious.
The Elusive Quest for Baseline Mortality Data
In Chapter 5 we described how nationwide surveys can be
used to estimate the overall mortality rate for a war-affected
population. We noted that, provided the pre-war mortality
rate is known, researchers can easily determine the excess
mortality rate—the difference between the wartime rate and
the pre-war rate—and thence, the excess death toll.108
The first part of this process—using survey-derived data
to estimate the overall mortality rate—is subject to many
sources of uncertainty and possible error—such as sampling
error, reporting bias, response bias, recall bias, and survival
Martin Adler / Panos Pictures. SRI LANKA.
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In Figure 8.2 the assumption that the mortality rate
at the beginning of the war did not change results in an
underestimation of the excess death toll. In Figure 8.3,
however, the same assumption results in the excess death
toll being overestimated.
The extent of the overestimation is represented by the
dark-grey area. When the appropriate procedure of measuring
from the slope is followed, the light-grey area provides a
measure of the extent of excess mortality. As Figure 8.3 shows,
this declines over the period of the conflict.
Figure 8.3 Calculating Excess Mortality
with an Increasing Pre-War Mortality Rate
Crude Mortality Rate (CMR)
Pre-War Period War Period
Pre-War CMR Trend
Average Survey-Derived CMR
Assumed Baseline CMR
Source: HSRP.
If the mortality rate had been increasing in the
pre-war period, and could be assumed to have
continued to increase absent the onset of war,
the light-grey area will represent a measure of
the total number of excess deaths. If the mortality
rate immediately preceding the onset of the war is
assumed to remain constant, the measure of excess
deaths will be overestimated to the extent shown
by the dark-grey area.
Additional Methodological Challenges
In the highly schematic graphics in Figures 8.2 and 8.3, excess
mortality can be determined by measuring from a changing
baseline mortality rate. In the real world, things are not so
simple and this is rarely possible.
Getting an accurate point estimate for the baseline
mortality rate at the start of wars is, as we have already noted,
extremely challenging, particularly in poor countries engulfed
in, or emerging from, violent conflict. Getting accurate prewar
trend data on national mortality rates is even more
difficult. But there are additional problems that are equally if
not more challenging.
First, determining the cause of increased mortality during
periods of conflict is difficult, if not impossible. Mortality
rates can go up during peacetime. In our review of under-five
mortality rates (U5MRs) discussed in Chapter 7, we found that
25 percent of countries that were conflict-free between 1970
and 2008 experienced increases in the U5MR.115 So, clearly, as
mentioned previously, political violence is not the only cause
of changing mortality rates during periods of conflict.
Mortality surveys in conflict-afflicted countries measure
the effect not just of war but of all factors that impact mortality
rates. Some nonwar factors—a major drought taking place
during a period of fighting, for example—also push mortality
rates upwards; others may cause them to decline. The problem
is the mortality data cannot be disaggregated to determine the
impact of these different factors. In fact, there is no way of
determining the extent to which changes in wartime mortality
rates revealed by surveys are caused by war or other exogenous
factors.
Getting accurate pre-war trend
data on national mortality rates
is extremely difficult.
Second, survey-derived mortality rates often have quite
wide confidence intervals. For example, the IRC’s “best
estimate” of the nationwide mortality rate in the DRC for
the 2003 to 2004 period was 2.1 deaths per 1,000 per month.
But the IRC’s researchers could not be certain that this was
the correct figure. Their methodology indicated they were
95 percent confident the actual rate lay between 1.6 and 2.6
deaths per 1,000 per month.
Any measurement of baseline mortality is likely to have
a wider confidence interval than the survey-derived mortality
rate for the war period—in part because pre-war trend data are
often made up of widely divergent survey and census data.
What this means in practice is that excess death tolls from
low-intensity conflicts may well be undetectable. If the real
excess death toll is less than the uncertainties in wartime and
pre-war mortality trend data, then the impact of war deaths
may be hidden by the imprecision of the very instruments that
are being used to try and detect them.
The clear implication of this analysis is that retrospective
mortality surveys are rarely appropriate instruments for measuring
excess death tolls in wars in poor countries, except in
relatively rare circumstances—namely, very short wars.116
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Ministère de la Justice et des Droits Humains, République Démocratique du Congo, & PNUD,
Monitoring judiciaire 2010-2011, Rapport sur les données relatives à la réponse judiciaire aux
cas de violences sexuelles à l’Est de la République démocratique du Congo (2010-2011)

1
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 2
2. Contexte et justification .......................................................................................................... 8
Ministère de la Justice et des Droits Humains
République démocratique du Congo
Programme des Nations Unies
pour le développement
Monitoring judiciaire 2010-2011
Rapport sur les données relatives à la réponse judiciaire aux cas de violences sexuelles à l’Est de
la République démocratique du Congo
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55
dans les parties intimes » « d’attentat à la pudeur » au lieu de « viol » alors qu’il qualifie le fait
d’introduire le bras dans le sous-vêtement de « tentative de viol ».
6.4. Le droit à la réparation141
En droit congolais, l’article 258 du Code civil, livre II dispose que « tout fait quelconque de
l’homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le
réparer. ». En matière de violences sexuelles le législateur a expressément exigé des OMP et
juges de requérir « d’office un médecin et un psychologue, afin d’apprécier l’état de la victime des
violences sexuelles et de déterminer les soins appropriés ainsi que d’évaluer l’importance du
préjudice subi par celle-ci et son aggravation ultérieure»142.
Pour avoir droit à une indemnisation, il faut démontrer que le fait allégué a été commis, et que le
préjudice subi résulte directement du fait commis. Le principe est que l’indemnité doit pouvoir
réparer aussi intégralement que possible le préjudice constaté ; le juge a donc un rôle déterminant
dans l’évaluation de l’indemnité. Celle-ci doit être évaluée en se plaçant à la date du jugement
définitif et non à la date de la réalisation du dommage143.
En matière de responsabilité délictuelle, différents types de dommages doivent être pris en compte
dans le cadre de la réparation. Le dommage corporel – atteinte à l’intégrité physique –, le
dommage moral – atteinte à l’intérêt extrapatrimonial comme l’atteinte à l’honneur, aux sentiments,
au crédit – et le dommage matériel – atteinte au patrimoine.
En effet, les violences sexuelles subies par une personne ont des répercussions multiples sur sa
santé physique et mentale, son bien-être social, sa famille et sa communauté. Le mode de
réparation varie en fonction des circonstances de la cause. Le dommage peut être réparé en
nature ou par équivalent. De même, il peut être calculé en équité.
A titre d’exemple, en matière de réparation du dommage moral, sous le RP 2273, le TGI d’Uvira
octroie une réparation au père de la victime du fait que « son honneur a été souillé par le viol de sa
fille, le traumatisme subi après sa disparition».
De même, sous le RP 618/2011, le tribunal admet la partie civile aux dommages et intérêts en
raison de « la perte de la virginité…la perte de la chance pour elle de contracter un mariage ».
Inversement, certains jugements144 n’indiquent pas clairement la base d’estimation de la réparation
ou des dommages et intérêt accordés aux victimes. Sous le RP 2275145, le juge ne définit pas le
préjudice tout en l’invoquant en disant « attendu que s’agissant de l’action civile de la dame X…le
tribunal dira son action recevable…parce que celle-ci a subi des préjudices par le fait du prévenu
qui a abusé de sa fille par ruse en prétendant la soigner, mais dira le montant de 10 000 $ exagéré
et réduira ex aequo et bono à 2000 Fc ». Sous le RP 21152, le juge reçoit la constitution de la
partie civile et la dit fondée « étant donné que le comportement du prévenu a causé des préjudices
énormes à la victime X ». Le juge n’explique pas le type de préjudice moins encore son étendue
ou son importance.
D’autres jugements146 recourent à l’équité alors qu’il s’agit de dommages qui peuvent être évalués
de manière objective. Le TGI d’Uvira147 par exemple « statuant sur les intérêts civils de la
141 Art. 258 du CC, Art. 69 du CPP, Art. 7 et 226 du CMJ.
142 Art. 14 bis du CPPC.
143 L’assistance judiciaire des victimes de violences sexuelles, Vade-mecum, ASF.
144 RP 20.970, RP 21374, RP 21260, RP 20.970, RP 21714, RP 211521 (TGI-GOMA), RP 2280 (TGI-Uvira), RECEL 028 du TE de
Goma, RP 652/2011 du TMG-Bukavu.
145 Rendu par le TGI-Uvira.
146 RP2275 TGI-UVIRA ; 2273 TGI-UVIRA ; RECEL 396 (TE-Goma).
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victime…dit que celle-ci a subi des préjudices énormes certains par l’agression de sa fille, la
grossesse qui s’en est suivi de la perte de chance pour un avenir meilleur et lui accordera ex
aequo et bono des dommages et intérêts évalués à 2000 $». Dans sa décision148, le TGI de Goma
énonce que la victime « a été trouvée avec l’hymen déchiré…signe suffisant que le prévenu a
introduit son organe sexuel dans celui de la victime… », mais il condamne l’auteur du viol à payer
« …des dommages – intérêts d’office calculés ex aequo et bono…faute d’éléments objectifs
d’appréciation des préjudices… ».
Concernant le dommage corporel, le juge a la possibilité d’évaluer objectivement (et non ex aequo
et bono) les besoins de santé suite à l’agression ou les exigences pré et post natales de la victime
et de l’enfant à naître, comme par exemple le coût d’entretien d’une grossesse, d’un
accouchement, en recourant à une expertise médicale et psychologique comme l’exige la loi149.
Pour les dommages moraux, le juge pourrait alors recourir à une estimation « ex aequo et bono »
c'est-à-dire « selon ce qui est équitable et bon ». Il pourrait y ajouter des éléments objectifs
importants qui entourent la maternité comme la layette et d’autres besoins connus de tous les
parents responsables ou qui agissent en « bon père de famille » étant donné que le juge semble
reconnaître le prévenu comme l’auteur de la grossesse, (« malgré la dénégation du prévenu »)
due à un viol par ruse.
D’autres juges150 estiment tout simplement « le montant demandé » par la partie civile « exagéré »
et les fixent « ex aecquo et bono » sans motiver cette exagération et sans le comparer à l’étendue
du préjudice subi.
Le TMG de Bukavu151 siégeant en foraine à Kalehe en matière pénale concernant des crimes de
masse (crime contre l’humanité) et détention sans titre ni qualité d’une arme de guerre a accordé
un même montant « pour chacune des victimes » de viol152, de torture153, d’emprisonnement ou
autres formes de privation grave de liberté physique154, de meurtre155.
Le juge donne l’impression que toutes les victimes catégorisées suivant les infractions dont elles
ont été victimes ont subi un même préjudice, ce qui ne semble pourtant pas évident. On peut en
plus se poser la question de savoir le critère par lequel il a estimé que le préjudice issu d’un viol
est plus important qu’un préjudice causé par des actes de torture.
Dans les cas spécifiques des enfants en conflit avec la loi, le juge a parfois accordé des
dommages et intérêts pécuniaires aux victimes de ces mineurs156. Cependant, dans certains
jugements157, le juge condamne sans préciser qui est le débiteur des dommages et intérêts158, et il
se limite à dire qu’il « condamne le civilement responsable de l’enfant en conflit avec la loi. » Sous
le RECL 396 du TE de Goma, le juge condamne le civilement responsable sans que ce dernier ne
soit identifié, il énonce « que le conseil de la défense avait préféré la somme symbolique compte
tenu du lien de famille entre enfant en conflit avec la loi et la victime ».
147 RP 2292 DU 12 décembre 2011.
148 RP 21412.
149 Art. 14 bis du CP : « …l’officier du Ministère Public ou le juge requièrent d’office un médecin et un psychologue, afin d’apprécier l’état
de la victime des violences sexuelles et de déterminer les soins appropriés ainsi que d’évaluer l’importance du préjudice subi par celleci
et son aggravation ultérieure ».
150 RECL 028 du TE de Goma, RP 2275 du TGI-Uvira.
151 Sous le RP 275/09 et 521/10. Sous ce dossier, l’Etat congolais a été condamné seul à payer au tire de dédommagement pour
préjudices subis par les 400 victimes.
152 700 USD.
153 550 USD.
154 400 USD.
155 5800 USD.
156 RCEL 193, RECEL 028, RECEL 396, RECEL 055 du TE de Goma.
157 RECEL 028, RECL 193, RECL 396 du TE de Goma.
158 Rappelons que la condamnation au paiement pour des faits d’autrui est prévue par l’article 260 du code civil livre 3 (des obligations)
Annex 65

Annex 66
Marie Chêne, Transparency International, U4 Expert Answer: Overview of corruption and anticorruption
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (8 Oct. 2010)

www.transparency.org
www.cmi.no
Author(s): Marie Chêne , Transparency International, [email protected]
Reviewed by: Dieter Zinnbauer, Ph.D., Transparency International, [email protected]
Date: 08 October 2010 Number: 257
U4 Expert Answers provide targeted and timely anti-corruption expert advice to U4 partner agency staff www.U4.no
Query
What is the present corruption situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo? Please provide an overview of
recent evolution in national anti-corruption measures and structures.
Purpose
Our agency is currently reviewing its development
cooperation programme with the DRC.
Content
1. Overview of corruption in the DRC
2. Anti-corruption efforts in the DRC
3. References
Summary
As the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) emerges
from a long period of violence and instability, it
struggles with a legacy of entrenched corruption at all
levels of society, threatening social and political
institutions with failure. Repeated political crises, poor
infrastructure, an underdeveloped regulatory
environment, lack of institutional capacity and weak rule
of law fuel the country’s persistent governance crisis.
Petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as a
complex web of political patronage permeate all sectors
of the economy, undermining development prospects
and compromising the fragile post-conflict equilibrium.
Despite being endowed with considerable mineral
wealth, extraction of natural resources continues to be
combined with widespread corruption, including within
the armed forces, fuelling violence, insecurity and
public discontent. Corruption in tax and customs
administration, as well as in the management of staterun
companies, undermines the state’s capacity to
collect revenues and escape the trap of
mismanagement, conflict and poverty.
Against this backdrop, the country has limited capacity
to address the governance and corruption challenges it
faces. There is neither indication of firm political will to
address corruption, nor evidence of progress made in
anti-corruption in the post-conflict era. While a strong
legal framework to address corruption has recently
been established under the pressure of the international
community, it remains largely ineffective to curb
corruption. The judiciary is plagued by a lack of
resources and capacity, and faces major challenges of
independence, political interference and corruption.
Other governance institutions are weak or non-existent.
The media and civil society operate in a restrictive
environment, running a high risk of intimidation, arrest
and harassment when denouncing public sector
corruption.
Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
Annex 66
Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC)
www.U4.no 2
1. Overview of Corruption in
DRC
Background
The recent history of the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) has been marred by civil war and corruption.
After Laurent Kabila overthrew the corrupt regime of
Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997, the DRC endured five
years of conflict between government forces supported
by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, and rebels backed
by Rwanda and Uganda. Joseph Kabila assumed
power after his father was assassinated in 2001 and
won the first multiparty elections since independence in
2006, raising hopes that peace and stability would be
restored. The war had claimed an estimated three
million lives, and left the country in a fragile
humanitarian, economic and political state. This
situation further fuelled continuing violence, insecurity,
human right abuses, poor governance and corruption.
Most observers agree the war was driven by both
economic and political factors. The role of natural
resources in conflict in the country has been welldocumented,
with all sides taking advantage of the
fragile situation to gain control over and plunder the
country’s mineral wealth (Global Witness, 2004, 2009
and BBC, 2010). Some authors also attribute the
underlying causes of the conflict to decades of poor
governance that resulted in inequitable distribution of
resources, corruption and human rights violations under
successive authoritarian regimes, and bred public
discontent, violence and instability (Shekhawat, S.,
2009).
Far from addressing this governance crisis, the fragile
2003 peace agreement and the political transition
period that followed brought new governance and
corruption challenges to light. Political actors regularly
interfered in the administration, customs, army and
natural resource sectors for private gain, giving rise to a
predatory system of governance. Some reports
estimate that as much as 60 to 80 % of custom
revenues could have been embezzled, while close to a
quarter of the national budget was not properly
accounted for in the transition period (International
Crisis Group, 2006). Mining, state-run companies and
the military remain sectors that are particularly prone to
corruption.
Extent of Corruption
Corruption continues to undermine the economy and
administration in the post-conflict era. All available data
and country reports indicate persistent, widespread and
endemic forms of corruption in the DRC, permeating all
levels of society. As the country emerges from a long
period of violence and instability, there is little evidence
of progress in anti-corruption work. Repeated political
crises, poor infrastructure, an underdeveloped
regulatory environment, a lack of institutional capacity
and weak rule of law continue to hinder economic
development prospects and create fertile ground for
corruption.
This situation is reflected in the major worldwide
governance indicators. In 2009, the country ranked
162nd of 180 countries assessed by Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI),
scoring 1,9 on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly
clean). These findings are consistent with the World
Bank 2009 Worldwide Governance Indicators which
confirm the DRC’s extremely poor performance on all
six dimensions of governance assessed. While the
country has slightly improved its performance in terms
of voice and accountability (from 3,8 in 2004 to 8,5 in
2009 on a scale of 0 to 100), it scores below 5 in all
other areas of governance, including political stability,
regulatory quality and rule of law. The situation even
seems to be deteriorating in terms of government
effectiveness (from 4,9 in 2004 to 1,9 in 2009) and
control of corruption (3,9 in 2004 compared to 2,9 in
2009).
DRC does not perform better on the 2010 Heritage
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom. The
country ranks 44th out of the 46 countries in the Sub-
Saharan Africa region in terms of economic freedom,
scoring far below the regional average. In particular, the
country performed extremely poorly in terms of freedom
from corruption, with a score of 17 on a scale from 0 to
100. Against this background, the report points to
mismanagement and rampant corruption as major
obstacles to doing business in the country, which
contribute to driving much economic activity into the
informal sector.
Forms of Corruption
Both street-level and grand forms of corruption are
present in DRC, involving a wide range of state officials
from low ranking civil servants to the highest members
of government.
Inefficient government structures, weak administrative
capacity, and low salaries combined with an absence of
oversight, provide civil servants with both opportunities
and incentives for extorting money from the population
(Global Integrity, 2008). Reflecting this reality,
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Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Democratic
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bureaucratic and administrative forms of corruption
are widespread across all public services and
departments. For example, more than 80% of firms
interviewed in the 2006 World Bank Enterprise
Survey report expected to make informal payments to
get things done or secure a government contract. Close
to 70% expected to make gifts to get an operating
license.
The lack of transparency and oversight is especially
manifest in public financial management. Auditing
and expenditure tracking are rare and the DRC ranks at
the bottom of the 2008 Open Budget Index, with a
score of 0%. The government provides no information
to the public on the central government’s budget and
financial activity during the budget year, making it
impossible for citizens to hold government accountable
for its management of public funds. As a result, state
resources can be easily siphoned off for private or
political purposes. One of the few audits published in
2008 claimed that various state agencies and
parastatals had embezzled $1,8 billion (Bertelsmann
Foundation, 2010a).
At another level, the political legacy of previous regimes
in which public resources were siphoned off to sustain a
web of patronage networks continues to overshadow
the current political landscape. Various forms of
political patronage and clientelism are persisting
across the political system, as reflected by the
overrepresentation of cabinet members close to the
President. President Kabila also replaced the heads of
thirty seven state enterprises with his own connections,
tightening his grips on economic and political power
(Matti, S. A., 2010). Key positions in the administration
are also allocated on the basis of cronyism and
patronage politics rather than on merit. This is likely to
undermine democratic processes and the
establishment of transparent institutions, as rentseeking
and accessing power become the major
incentives for entering politics.
Sectors Most Affected by
Corruption in the DRC
Mining
The DRC is endowed with considerable mineral wealth,
including rich reserves of diamonds, copper, cobalt,
gold and uranium. But this vast natural wealth has
failed to bring economic dividends to ordinary citizens.
This is documented in UNDP’s 2009 Human
Development Report where DRC performs very poorly
on most indicators of human development (UNDP,
2009).
Many reports have documented the long tradition of
predatory management of natural resources. Global
Witness in particular have reported how the DRC’s
considerable natural wealth was originally exploited for
the commercial benefit of a small number of business
and political actors to the detriment of the population
(Global Witness, 2004). Global Witness reports also
denounced other problems in the natural resource
sector, including extensive corruption, a lack of
transparency and life-threatening labour conditions.
Global Witness’ most recent report on the DRC
documents the militarisation of mining in conflictaffected
eastern areas of the country. The report
describes how all warring parties have used the illicit
exploitation of natural resources to consolidate their
economic base and plunder the country’s mineral
wealth at the expense of the population (Global
Witness, 2009). According to a 2001 UN expert panel
report, warring factions sold minerals and signed
contracts with multinational corporations and other
mining companies to raise money for the war. This
involved a wide range of practices such as offering
monopolies in exchange for kickbacks, embezzling
money from state-run companies, creating joint
ventures in which politicians were shareholders, and
accepting unfavourable contract terms for the state in
exchange for kickbacks (International Crisis Group,
2006). In the process, the Congolese army and rebel
groups have resorted extensively to forced labour and
extortion, and have imposed illicit taxes on the civilian
population.
Following the 2002 peace agreement, a commission led
by an opposition parliamentarian, Christophe
Lutundula, produced an incriminating report of mining
sector management. In 2002, the World Bank helped
draft new mining and investment codes, and in 2007
the Minister of Mines announced the creation of a
governmental commission to review mining contracts
that led to the cancellation of 61 contracts and the
renegotiation of numerous deals (Freedom House,
2010a). On this occasion, Global Witness published a
report expressing concern over the lack of transparency
and clarity of the review process, over inadequate
safeguards to protect the independence of the review
commission, and over the limited involvement of civil
society (Global Witness, 2007).
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Smuggling of minerals also deprives the state of
valuable resources. The 2006 International Crisis
Group report estimated that close to $80 million in
diamonds were believed to be smuggled out of the
country each year. In the Eastern part of the country,
casserite from artisanal mines controlled by former
DRC rebels were transported to Rwanda via Goma for
refining. Gold smuggling has equally been an area of
concern and a source of insecurity on the Ugandan
border. According to the International Crisis Group,
Congolese armed groups, supported by Ugandan
officers and traders, have used gold mines as an
important funding source for their operations in the
north eastern Congo. Reportedly, the Congolese army
has also been involved in gold smuggling (International
Crisis Group, 2006).
Forestry
The Democratic Republic of Congo is part of the world’s
second largest tropical forest area after the Amazon
Basin: the Congo Basin (U4, 2010). Industrial logging
has great potential to generate state revenues but
challenges of illegal logging and smuggling prevent this
potential from being translated into economic growth.
According to a U4 policy brief, industrial logging
companies contribute less than 1% of GNP and there
are indications that actual timber exports could be as
much as seven times higher than official figures
(International Crisis Group, 2006).
There have been several attempts to reform forest
governance with support from the international
community. But success has been limited so far. In
2002, President Kabila declared a moratorium on new
forest concessions, cancelled 163 existing ones, and
promulgated a forestry code. However, subsequent
studies found that new concessions had been granted
and 2.4 million hectares reinstated. Seven companies
with concessions totalling over one million hectares
were operating under fictitious contact details
(International Crisis Group, 2006). Concerns have also
been expressed by local NGOs over the legal review
process of all logging contracts, especially with respect
to the limited involvement of civil society and local
community representatives. A review process finally
resulted in October 2008 with the announcement that
numerous deals would be cancelled, and that there
would be an ongoing moratorium on new concessions
(Freedom House, 2010a).
The U4 brief on forest governance in the DRC
concludes that: (U4, 2010).
• The 2002 forest code and accompanying
presidential decree have been largely unsuccessful
in improving industrial logging’s governance;
• The new legal framework requiring increased
public consultation has reinforced social
imbalances with limited voice for women and
indigenous people;
• The administrative, logistical and institutional
control mechanisms envisaged for forest
management are either weak or non-existent.
According to the brief, the limited impact of forest
governance reforms can mainly be attributed to a lack
of incentives for various stakeholders to reform a
system from which they benefit in its present form. In
addition, the general context of weak institutional and
governance structures create favourable conditions for
corruption, predation and illegal exploitation of
resources.
Tax and Customs Administration
Corruption in the tax and customs systems undermines
the government’s capacity to generate revenues.
According to the 2006 International Crisis Group report,
the DRC has one of Africa’s weakest collection
capacities. Customs administration generates the
largest share of fiscal income, but is also the greatest
source of revenue loss, with between 60 to 80% of
custom duties uncollected. This is seen as one of the
factors fuelling the conflict in the eastern part of the
country: armed groups finance their operations from the
taxes they collect at border crossings (International
Crisis Group, 2006).
More generally, customs administration is poorly
structured and suffers from a lack of resources,
infrastructure and equipment, but also from red tape,
the overstaffing of posts and widespread corruption. In
its 2008 report, Global Witness provides examples of a
wide range of malpractices, such as underestimating
the volume of goods, colluding with customs officers to
declare goods that are taxed at a lower rate than the
good was actually imported, or bribery to evade
customs fees (Global Witness, 2008).
Taxation is another dysfunctional area of the DRC’s
administration. According to Freedom House, citizens
are poorly informed of which fees are legal, and remain
largely unaware of their rights in this regard. Taxes are
mostly collected informally and illegally, undermining
development of a relationship of accountability between
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citizens and the state. At another level, mining
companies take advantage of the tax administration‘s
lack of resources and capacity to develop tax
avoidance schemes. When mining revenues reach the
state, opaque revenue distribution facilitates conflict
between the local and national levels, providing local
authorities with incentives to circumvent the revenue
administration system (Freedom House, 2010a).
State-Run Enterprises
The management of state-run companies remains an
area of concern. In the transition period, the
management of these companies was allocated to the
signatories of the peace agreement. Managers
appointed former warlords to run the companies, who
routinely abused their position for private gain, leading
to considerable losses to the budget. As a result of
corruption and mismanagement, the contribution of
state enterprises to the state budget dropped from 10%
in the late 1960s, to about 1% in the early 1990s, and
to almost nothing towards the end of the transition
period (Kodi, M., 2008).
Under pressure from the international community,
President Kabila requested the audit of about 20 stateowned
enterprises. This uncovered massive looting by
the management and governing boards appointed by
former warlords. The findings of the audit were debated
at the National Assembly in 2005. This debate indicated
that, of the 20 companies audited, only 12 had a board
of directors, and most had kept no accounts for a period
of between two to seven years, making a proper audit
impossible. Management teams routinely decided on
their own benefits or granted themselves “loans” that
were never paid back. None of the companies reviewed
had internal auditors (Kodi, M., 2008). Following the
publicity given to the report, the President suspended
six ministers who had allegedly participated in the
plundering of state enterprises.
The Helpdesk has found no recent account of the
situation in the post-transition era and little indication of
major progress made in the management of stateenterprises
since Kabila appointed his own people at
the head of many parastatals.
Army
There have been many concerns raised about
corruption in the armed forces, and it is noted that such
corruption often has a direct impact on the population.
Soldiers endure terrible living conditions, are very
poorly paid and live below the poverty line. Low wages
and poor internal control mechanisms facilitate the
development of lucrative embezzlement schemes within
the army. In particular, there have been widespread
examples of embezzlement of soldiers’ salaries,
possibly representing close to half of the funds
allocated to soldiers’ maintenance and salary costs.
There have also been concerns raised about bloating
the payroll with ghost soldiers (International Crisis
Group, 2006).
The International Crisis Group report documents how
corruption further erodes soldiers’ living condition, as
troops are irregularly paid, and, in some places, receive
less than half of what they are owed. Deprived of
decent salaries they have incentives to harass and
extort civilians, as well as loot villages for survival.
Soldiers thus become a major threat to local
populations. Embezzlement has decreased since 2006
due to introduction of a more independent payroll
mechanism and better surveillance by the Congolese
authorities. It is, however, unclear how successful these
efforts are, given that the armed forces continue to face
major challenges of lack of discipline in many parts of
the country (International Crisis Group, 2006). The
government is showing signs of addressing the
situation, as reflected in the 2010 national budget which
gives priority to the salaries of police, military, civil
servants and teachers (U4, 2010).
2. Anti-corruption Efforts in the
DRC
Addressing corruption and governance challenges is a
prerequisite to prevent the DRC from sliding back into
conflict. Yet the country has weak legal and institutional
mechanisms in place to ensure accountability, as well
as limited capacity to respond to its governance
challenges. High levels of patronage have undermined
the establishment of transparent, accountable
institutions, and rent-seeking elites generally lack the
incentives and political will to build strong institutions to
curb corruption (Matti, S. A., 2010).
Legal Framework
Anti-corruption interventions were initiated during the
transition period, mainly as a result of pressure from the
international community and with little ownership by the
Congolese government. An anti-corruption law enacted
in 2005 brought provisions of the UNCAC and African
Union Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption into the national context and is largely
perceived as providing an adequate legal framework to
fight corruption (Freedom House, 2010a). Global
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Integrity even rated the anti-corruption law as “very
strong” on the DRC’s 2006 scorecard. According to
most reports, however, there is little indication of strong
political will to effectively address corruption and
enforce legal anti-corruption provisions. The strong
legal framework has so far not resulted in effective
prosecutions of corruption, even in cases where there is
solid evidence of abuse (Kodi, M., 2007).
Other anti-corruption related legal provisions are
included in the 2006 Constitution and the Code of
Ethics of Public Officials, which require the head of
state, government officials and civil servants to submit
asset declarations to the constitutional court. However,
these provisions are poorly implemented. The lack of
public access to declarations hinders the effective
monitoring of public officials’ assets and limits the
impact of such measures.
There is neither a freedom of information law, nor
comprehensive laws regulating access to government
data. In addition, as information dissemination is poorly
developed, many citizens don’t know the laws and
regulations that affect their lives and remain largely
unaware of their rights and obligations (Freedom
House, 2010a).
In the area of public finance management, the country
has been working with the World Bank to adopt a new
procurement code (Freedom House 2010a).
In terms of its international commitments, the DRC has
signed 1
1 But not ratified as of 06.08.2010.
the African Union Convention on Preventing
and Combating Corruption. In September 2010, the
country also acceded to the UNCAC and is legally
bound by the terms of the convention. Additional
legislation includes the 2004 Money Laundering Act,
under which the DRC cooperates with African and
European crime-fighting organisations. In September
2007, the DRC also ratified the protocol agreement with
the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
on Fighting Corruption. Since 2008, the DRC is a
candidate within the Extractive Industry Transparency
Initiative (EITI), but must implement numerous steps to
promote transparency before becoming a compliant
EITI country (Freedom House 2010a).
Institutional Framework
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
The Commission de l’Ethique et de la Lutte contre la
Corruption (CELC) was created in 2003 as one of the
five “citizen” institutions mandated by the transitional
constitution. From its establishment, it faced major
resource and logistical problems that the international
community has sought to help tackle. As with other
transition bodies, its Board was composed of
representatives of all signatories to the Peace
Agreement, which resulted in bloated staffing, difficult
decision-making processes and the lack of a common
vision and coherent strategy (Kodi, M., 2007). The work
of the CELC was further hampered by weak leadership,
insufficient technical expertise and lack of
independence. Paralysed by these various challenges,
the CELC was finally not carried over into the new
constitution (Freedom House, 2010a).
Financial Intelligence Unit
In order to enforce anti-corruption laws among civil
servants and members of the government, President
Kabila launched a “zero-tolerance” campaign in
September 2009. Within this framework, he established
the DRC Financial Intelligence Unit in October 2009 to
combat money laundering and misappropriation of
public funds (US Department of State, 2010). The
effectiveness of this institution has yet to be
ascertained.
The State Auditor
The state auditor is responsible for reviewing public
expenditures and audit state-run companies. Freedom
House considers the DRC’s audit body to be largely
ineffective (Freedom House, 2010a).
The Judiciary
The judiciary faces many challenges that undermine its
ability to effectively prosecute corruption. The judiciary
has been subordinated to the executive since the
Mobutu era. The new administration is not believed to
have brought effective change and there has been very
little progress made in terms of judicial reform. The
judiciary lacks independence and suffers from
widespread political interference and generalised
corruption (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2010). A 2004
audit of the judicial system revealed that only 20% of
the population had access to justice services, especially
outside Kinshasa (Matti, S. A., 2010).
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The 2006 constitution transferred the power to appoint
judges and magistrates from the executive to the
Supreme Council of the Judiciary (CSM),
institutionalising the principle of judicial independence.
However, the CSM was only created in 2008 and
remained largely non-functioning as of mid-2009
(Freedom House, 2010a). In practice, judges remain
subject to undue influence from government officials. In
February 2008, President Kabila forced 89 judges into
retirement, including the President of the Supreme
Court and the Prosecutor General, and replaced them
with 28 new and largely unqualified magistrates. While
he justified his decision as a corruption purge, most
analysts considered it to constitute undue interference
with the judiciary (Freedom House, 2010a).
In addition to widespread political interference in the
administration of justice, the judiciary is poorly equipped
and under-financed. It has under-paid staff and poor
infrastructure, and lacks basic resources and capacity,
including legal texts. As a result, in spite of a strong
anti-corruption legal framework, very few office holders
have been prosecuted and convicted for corruptionrelated
offences fuelling a culture of impunity and
cynicism among the population (Kodi, M., 2007).
Other Institutions
The DRC lacks a national ombudsman and an effective
complaint mechanism to empower citizens to report
corruption cases (Freedom House 2010a).
Within the framework of a protocol cooperation
agreement on fighting corruption with South Africa and
UNODC signed in 2008, the DRC organised a Forum
National sur la Lutte Contre la Corruption (National
Forum on the Fight against Corruption) in December
2009. The Forum recommended creation of a number
of anti-corruption institutions, including a consultative
body, the National Council of Ethics, an Independent
Commission of Ethics and Fight against Corruption, a
government anti-corruption agency and an
Ombudsman (FONALC, 2009).
Other Stakeholders
Media
Freedom of speech and of the press is guaranteed by
the 2006 Constitution. However, in practice, the
effectiveness of the media as a watchdog is hampered
by considerable government control and restrictions.
Government has used a wide range of licensing
requirements, as well as security and criminal libel
laws, to restrict freedom of the press (Freedom House,
2009). Consistent with these findings, Reporters sans
Frontières ranked the DRC 146 out of 175 countries
assessed in its 2009 Freedom of the Press Index
(Reporters Sans Frontières, 2009).
Critical journalists and broadcasters are frequently
harassed, intimidated, arrested or imprisoned.
Broadcasting institutions can also be banned from
operating and the contents of their broadcasts
censored. In 2007, for example, the government
banned 40 TV and radio stations due to allegedly
improper licenses. More recently, in March 2009, the
mayor of Likasi ordered the closure of one local radio
and one TV channel for alleged defamation. In July of
the same year, the government banned transmission of
the French public radio, Radio France International or
RFI (Freedom House, 2010b). In spite of these
constraints and restrictions, however, the media
provides a space for lively debate on social and political
issues (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2010).
Civil Society
Governance challenges combined with the near
collapse of state institutions have served as a catalyst
for civil society, with a myriad of NGOs emerging to
provide basic services to fill gaps left by government.
However, freedom of assembly and association are
limited by public order-related provisions and groups
organising public events must inform local authorities in
advance (Freedom House, 2010b).
When they are politically active, civil society
organisations run a high risk of intimidation, arrest and
harassment. According to the Bertelsmann Foundation,
the government has intensified repressive measures
against opposition groups since the 2006 elections,
contributing to restrictions on the country’s political
space (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2010). In particular, a
2008 Human Rights Watch report also documented the
government’s increased use of violence and
intimidation to eliminate political opposition, with
President Kabila himself setting the tone and ordering
to "crush" or "neutralise" the "enemies of democracy,"
(Human Right Watch, 2008).
When tackling corruption issues, civil society faces
considerable pressure from the government and
powerful vested interests. A 2010 report by Freedom
House provides numerous examples of human rights
activists being arrested, harassed and imprisoned when
dealing with corruption. In 2009, for example, the
President of the human rights group ASADHO-Katanga
was sentenced to one year in prison after publishing a
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report alleging official kickbacks from illegal mining. In
the same year, a trade union leader was arrested after
writing a memorandum alleging the embezzlement of
public money by the Minister of National Economy and
trade (Freedom House, 2010a). In spite of these
various challenges, the Bertelsmann Foundation
reports that an increasing number of civil society
organisations engage in budget tracking issues and are
raising awareness of high level corruption in the
population (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2010).
The International Community
The DRC is a heavily indebted country, whose budget
is constrained by a debt load amounting to a quarter of
the country’s total annual expenditures (U4, 2010). As
a result and given DRC’s low revenue collection
capacity, the country is heavily dependent on aid, which
accounts for about half of the budget (U4, 2010).
International pressure has played an important role in
driving past and current governance reforms. However,
analysts also consider that international partners have
an important responsibility in the government’s failure to
deliver meaningful change. In the transition period,
some authors argue that the international community
turned a blind eye to increasing levels of corruption in
order not to undermine the fragile electoral process,
while both international partners and the government
paid lip service to the anti-corruption agenda (Kodi, M.,
2007). Beyond the transition process, the lack of
ownership is seen as a major obstacle to the success of
anti-corruption reforms (U4, 2010).
3. References
Global Witness, 2004, The same old story: a
background study on natural resources in the
Democratic Republic of Congo,
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/8a6
bac4cbe4f056785256eca00130ff8
BBC News, 2010, Democratic Republic of Congo
country profile,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/10763
99.stm
Shekhawat, S., 2009, Governance crisis and conflict in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Centre for African
Studies, University of Mumbai,
http://www.mu.ac.in/arts/social_science/african_studies/
seemawp6.pdf
International Crisis Group, 2006, Escaping the conflict
trap: promoting good governance in the Congo, Africa
Report Nr 114,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/centralafrica/
dr-congo/114-escaping-the-conflict-trappromoting-
good-governance-in-the-congo.aspx
Transparency International, 2009 Corruption
Perceptions Index,
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_i
ndices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table
World Bank Institute, World Wide Governance
Indicators,
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.as
p
Heritage Foundation, 2010, Index of Economic
Freedom,
http://www.heritage.org/index/country/DemocraticRepu
blicCongo
World Bank, 2006, Enterprise surveys,
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/
Global Integrity, 2008, Democratic Republic of Congo
country report,
Bertelsmann Foundation, 2010, BTI 2010 Democratic
Republic of Congo country report,
http://www.bertelsmann-transformationindex.
de/fileadmin/pdf/Gutachten_BTI2010/WCA/Cong
o__Republic_of_the.pdf
Open Budget Initiative, Open Budget Index 2008
Democratic Republic of Congo country report,
http://openbudgetindex.org/files/cs_democraticrepublico
fcongo.pdf
Matti, S. A., 2010, The Democratic Republic of Congo?
Corruption, patronage and competitive authoritarianism
in the DRC, Africa Today, Summer 2010, Vol. 56,
No. 4, Pages 42-61
UNDP, 2009, Human Development Report,
http://hdr.undp.org/en/
Global Witness, 2009, Faced with a gun, what can you
do? War and the militarisation of mining in Eastern
Congo,
http://www.globalwitness.org/fwag/
Annex 66
Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC)
www.U4.no 9
Freedom House, 2010a, Countries at crossroads - DRC
country report,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140
&edition=9&ccrpage=43&ccrcountry=181
Freedom House, 2010b, Freedom in the world,
Democratic Republic of Congo,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&y
ear=2010&country=7954
Global Witness, 2007, The Congolese sector in the
balance: lack of transparency risks undermining review
of mining contracts.
U4, Forest governance in Congo: corruption rules?, U4
Brief,
http://www.u4.no/document/publication.cfm?3776=fores
t-governance-in-congo-corruption-rules
Global Witness, 2008, Global Integrity report – Republic
Democratic of Congo,
http://report.globalintegrity.org/
Global Integrity, 2006 and 2008, DRC country report.
Kodi, M., 2007, Anti-corruption challenges in post
election Democratic Republic of Congo, Chatham
House,
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3388_drc0107.pd
f
Kodi, M., 2008, Corruption and Governance in the DRC
during the Transition Period (2003-2006), Chatham
House,
http://www.illegallogging.
info/uploads/MuzongKodiCorruptionGovernanc
einDRCSept08.pdf
US Department of State, 2010, Investment Climate
Statement - Democratic Republic of the Congo,
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ics/2010/138056.htm
Forum National sur La Lutte Contre la Corruption
(FONALC), 2009, Rapport synthèse du Forum National
sur La Lutte Contre la Corruption en RDC, FONALC/
Ministère de la Fonction Publique
Reporters Sans Frontières, 2009, Press Freedom
Index,
http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2009,1001.html
Human Rights Watch, 2008, We will crush you,
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/11/25/we-will-crushyou-
0
Annex 66

Annex 67
Martin Ekofo Inganya, Avocats sans frontières, La réparation des crimes internationaux en droit
congolais (2014)

Avocats
Sans Frontières
www.asf.be
La réparation des crimes
internationaux en droit congolais
Analyse des pratiques indemnitaires des juridictions militaires
au regard du Statut de Rome de la Cour pénale internationale
Martin Ekofo Inganya
Annex 67
76 2. Il se militaires suivantes 2.1. Le l’expertise de l’évaluation système l’incompétence est car dommages, Relevons de l’auteur 1 Les : CM Aff. Equateur, des contre Aud. Mil. 2 Y. LAMBERT-un préjudice certain
Le préjudice certain se définit comme un préjudice avéré, qui ne
peut être mis en doute. Le préjudice certain est certes dans la
plupart du temps un préjudice qui s’est déjà produit mais il peut
s’agir aussi d’un préjudice futur dès lors qu’il ne peut manquer
de se produire et qu’il est certain qu’il arrivera. En effet, s’il n’est
pas possible d’allouer des dommages et intérêts en réparation
d’un préjudice purement éventuel, il en est autrement lorsque
le préjudice, bien que futur, apparaît aux juges de fait comme
la prolongation certaine et directe d’un état de chose actuelle et
comme susceptible d’estimation immédiate.1
Il en est ainsi du rapport d’expert établissant qu’il y a eu viol sur
une adolescente, et que les symptômes tels que la dépression ou
les troubles sexuels provoqueront un choc émotionnel qui aura
des conséquences futures dans sa vie2. Dans cette hypothèse, le
juge est donc fondé, au regard de la certitude de la réalisation de
ce préjudice, d’intégrer ce préjudice futur dans le chiffrage des
indemnités à allouer à la victime.
un préjudice direct
Cette exigence parait concerner moins le préjudice que le lien
de causalité. En effet ce qu’on exige c’est que le préjudice soit la
conséquence directe du fait dommageable. Le préjudice à réparer
doit être une suite immédiate et directe de l’infraction permettant
ainsi d’écarter la réparation des préjudices indirects et lointains
qui, peut-être, n’auraient pu être provoqués par l’infraction.
Le préjudice doit consister dans la violation d’un intérêt
légitime
Il s’agit d’un intérêt digne d’être pris en considération par la loi ou
qui n’est pas contraire aux lois. Mais la tendance est d’exiger un
intérêt socialement protégé justifiant ainsi l’admission de l’action
en réparation de la concubine.
1 Civ 1 juin 1931 D 1932 .I.102.
2 TMG L’shi, 2007, RP n° 0315/2007, Aff. Aud Mil. Gson., L’shi et J TSHIABA contre Sgt. YOKA BIOn SO Petro.
Annex 67
La réparation des crimes internationaux en droit congoLais 77
2. COnSTATS TIRéS DES PRATIqUES
INDEMNITAIRES DES JURIDICTIONS
MILITAIRES EN MATI èRE DE CRIMES
INTERNATIONAU x
Il se dégage des jugements et arrêts rendus par les juridictions
militaires en matière des crimes internationaux1 les constatations
suivantes :
1. Une absence de recours à l’expertise pour l’évaluation des
dommages corporels ;
2. Absence de transparence dans l’indemnisation des victimes
de dommages corporels ;
3. Inégalité de traitement des victimes selon la juridiction
militaire saisie ;
4. Indemnisation financière comme unique forme de réparation ;
5. Non application des instruments juridiques internationaux
relatifs à la protection des victimes des crimes internationaux ;
6. Modicité des dommages-intérêts alloués aux victimes.
2.1. ABSENCE DES RAppoRtS D’ExpERtISE MéDICALE
Le préjudice corporel relevant d’une constatation médicale,
l’expertise médicale est bien évidemment l’élément déterminant
de l’évaluation du préjudice et constitue l’acte initial de tout
système de réparation d’un dommage corporel.2 En effet révélant
l’incompétence du juge à répondre à une question qui, par nature,
est essentielle pour l’issue du litige, l’expertise est importante
car elle a pour objet de déterminer les préjudices découlant des
dommages, la responsabilité étant d’ores et déjà établie.
Relevons qu’il y a lieu de distinguer l’établissement de la culpabilité
de l’auteur de l’infraction de l’évaluation pécuniaire du préjudice.
1 Les décisions judiciaires retenues dans le cadre de cette étude sont celles relatives aux affaires suivantes
: CM Equateur, 2006, RPA 014/2006,
Aff. Aud Mil. Sup. et parties civiles contre Lieutenant Eliwo et Consorts, dit « procès Songo Mboyo » ; CM
Equateur, 2006, RPA 015/2006, Aff. Aud. Mil. Sup. et parties civiles contre Bokila et Consorts, dit « procès
des pillages de Mbandaka » ; CM Province Orientale, 2007, RPA 003/2007, Aff. Aud. Mil. Sup. et consorts
contre Capitaine Mulesa et Consorts, dit « procès Mulesa » ; TMG Ituri, 2006, Aff. Aud. Mil. Gson. et parties
civiles contre KAHWA MAnDRO et RPA 030/06, dit « procès MBOnGI », CM Katanga, RPA 065, Aff.
Aud. Mil. Sup. et parties civiles contre KYUnGU MUTAnGA, dit « procès Gédéon » ; CM Sud Kivu, Aff. Aud.
Mil. Sup. et parties civiles contre Licol BALUMISA MANASSE et Consorts.
2 Y. LAMBERT-FAIVRE et S. PORCHY-SIMOn, op. cit., p. 89.
qui ne
dans la
peut
manquer
n’est
réparation
lorsque
comme
actuelle et
viol sur
dépression ou
aura
hypothèse, le
réalisation de
chiffrage des
le lien
soit la
réparer
permettant
lointains
intérêt
loi ou
d’exiger un
l’action
SO Petro.
Annex 67
78 S’agissant de la preuve de l’infraction, l’absence du rapport de
l’expert médical ne peut constituer un obstacle à la démonstration
de la culpabilité du prévenu ; l’administration de la preuve étant
régie par le principe de la liberté des preuves, le juge peut asseoir
sa conviction sur d’autres moyens de preuve pour conclure à la
culpabilité du prévenu à condition de respecter le principe de la
légalité dans l’administration de la preuve.
En ce qui concerne l’action civile tendant à la condamnation du
prévenu poursuivi pour crimes internationaux au paiement des
dommages-intérêts, il faut dissocier la preuve du préjudice subi
par la partie civile de l’évaluation pécuniaire des dommages et
intérêts faite par le juge.
Le préjudice ne se présumant pas, il appartient à la partie civile,
avant de postuler ses prétentions pécuniaires, de fournir la preuve
de son existence, puis de son caractère certain et direct. En matière
de préjudice corporel, la preuve d’un tel préjudice ne pourra être
administrée autrement qu’en recourant au rapport de l’expert
médical ou psychologique. Car il est doctrine constante1 que la
notion de dommage corporel est une notion de fait, donnant lieu à
une constatation par le biais de l’expertise médico-légale.
En tant qu’expert, le médecin constate, décrit et détermine
l’imputabilité des dommages à l’infraction. C’est la démonstration
d’un lien pathogénique direct, certain et exclusif : c’est le concept
juridique de causalité adéquate qui impose de démontrer la cause
et la certitude que, sans l’intervention de celle-ci, le dommage ne
serait jamais arrivé. L’effort de l’expert doit consister à affirmer
ou infirmer le caractère certain du préjudice ainsi que le caractère
certain et direct de la relation causale.
Le rapport de l’expert médical sert donc de document de base qui
conditionne la fixation du préjudice corporel de la victime et qui
permet à l’avocat de la partie civile d’établir sa réclamation, au
juge d’arbitrer2 par l’évaluation pécuniaire qu’il en fera.
Dans les jugements sous analyse, les tribunaux n’ont pas recouru à
un rapport de l’expert médical pour établir la certitude de l’existence
de préjudice et celle du lien avec les infractions mises à charge des
prévenus mais ont alloué des dommages-intérêts pour réparer les
préjudices subis en recourant à l’évaluation forfaitaire.
1 Y. LAMBERT-FAIVRE et S. PORCHY-SIMOn, op. cit., p. 89.
2 J.-G. MOORE, cité par B. A.H. DREYFUS, dans un article de la Gazette du Palais du 7 juillet 2001 p. 6.
2.2. Les manque corporels l’allocation confondus Certes analytique de transparence méthodologie. spécifiques victime sauraient Par domaine préjudices ne permet en des confondus différentes permet tribunaux En outre, critères le chiffrage Bokala à chaque fonde-exercée elles militaire chaque mêmes Annex 67
La réparation des crimes internationaux en droit congoLais 79
de
démonstration
étant
asseoir
la
la
du
des
subi
et
civile,
preuve
matière
être
l’expert
la
à
détermine
démonstration
concept
cause
ne
affirmer
caractère
qui
qui
au
à
l’existence
des
les
2.2. ABSENCE DES CRItèRES SpéCIAux DANS
L’INDEMNISAtIoN DES vICtIMES DE CRIMES
INtERNAtIoNAux Et LA gLoBALISAtIoN
SyStéMAtIquE DES pRéjuDICES
Les jugements sous analyse se caractérisent, d’une part, par le
manque de critères spécifiques dans l’évaluation des préjudices
corporels résultant des crimes internationaux et, d’autre part, par
l’allocation des dommages et intérêts pour « tous les préjudices
confondus ».
Certes aucun texte n’impose impérativement une indemnisation
analytique poste par poste des préjudices, mais le besoin de clarté
de transparence et de cohérence recommande le recours à cette
méthodologie. La particularité de chaque situation, les circonstances
spécifiques du dommage ou la situation personnelle de chaque
victime doivent nécessairement être prises en considération et ne
sauraient faire l’objet d’une quelconque systématisation.
Par ailleurs, la transparence implique que tout ce qui relève du
domaine de l’indemnisation soit connu de chacun. La réparation des
préjudices par confusion entraîne une certaine opacité dès lors qu’elle
ne permet pas à la victime de vérifier si tous les chefs de sa demande
en réparation ont été pris en compte par le juge dans la fixation
des dommages et intérêts. La réparation de « tous les préjudices
confondus » ne permet pas à chaque victime de comprendre les
différentes composantes de préjudices subis, pas plus qu’elle ne lui
permet de connaître les évaluations habituellement pratiquées par les
tribunaux dans des cas similaires.
En outre, l’analyse de ces jugements ne permet pas de dégager les
critères spécifiques que le juge militaire retient pour déterminer
le chiffrage des dommages-intérêts. Tel est le cas de l’affaire dite
Bokala où le TMG alloue indistinctement 15.000 dollars américains
à chaque ayant-droit de victime décédée. Cette juridiction se
fonde-t-elle sur l’âge de la victime, sa situation familiale, l’activité
exercée par la victime, et l’importance des douleurs endurées par
elles et par les ayants droits ? Dans cette même cause, la Cour
militaire de l’Equateur fait de même en accordant 5.000 dollars à
chaque victime de viol comme si toutes les victimes avaient subi les
mêmes préjudices tant dans leur nature que dans leur importance.
Annex 67
80 De la même manière, dans cette affaire, s’agissant des commerçants
victimes du pillage alors que la Cour pouvait examiner la situation
de chacun, elle alloue 10.000 dollars, ce qui pourrait conduire à se
demander si la Cour se trouvait face à des préjudices sériels, qui
affectent à l’identique de nombreux individus et dont la cause est
commune (affaires du sang contaminé, de l’amiante, du Distilbène®,
du vaccin contre l’hépatite B…)1.
Il semble donc découler de l’absence des critères particuliers
de préjudices corporels résultant des crimes internationaux une
inégalité de traitement des victimes.
2.3. INégALIté DE tRAItEMENt DES vICtIMES DES
pRéjuDICES CoRpoRELS RéSuLtANt DES
CRIMES INtERNAtIoNAux
L’inégalité de traitement des victimes se traduit par une dispersion
tant interne qu’externe dans l’appréciation jurisprudentielle de
préjudices corporels résultant des crimes internationaux.
Dispersion au sein d’une même Cour militaire
Ainsi par exemple, dans l’affaire MULESA , la Cour Militaire de la
Province Orientale a condamné la RD Congo in solidum au paiement
de 10.000 dollars américains à la partie civile Mateso pour meurtre
de sa tante SAMATO ADIDO . Cette même Cour, allouera à charge
de l’Etat congolais dans l’affaire BONGI 50.000 dollars américains
à la partie civile Androso KANYORO pour le meurtre de MBADHU.
Dispersion entre différentes cours militaires
En second lieu, il est frappant de constater qu’une victime est mieux
indemnisée à KISANGANI qu’à MBANDAKA. En effet dans l’affaire
SONGO MBOYO, la Cour Militaire de l’Equateur a condamné l’Etat
Congolais in solidum avec les prévenus BOKILA LOLEMI et Consorts
au paiement de 10.000 dollars américains à la partie civile pour le
viol de sa fille décédée tandis que, pour la même infraction, la Cour
Militaire de la Province Orientale accordera dans l’affaire MULESA
24.000 dollars américains au profit de la partie civile - le père de
1 J. KULLMAnn, « Remarques juridiques sur les sinistres sériels », in Risques, n°62, juin 2005, pp.107 et s.
la victime que telle indemnisée Au-delà individu juridictions en cause la justice.
Annex 67
La réparation des crimes internationaux en droit congoLais 81
commerçants
situation
se
qui
est
Distilbène®,
particuliers
une
DES
dispersion
de
la
paiement
meurtre
charge
américains
MBADHU.
mieux
l’affaire
l’Etat
Consorts
le
Cour
MULESA
de
et s.
la victime violée et tuée. Il est inadmissible que l’on puisse se dire
que telle victime, car elle a été violée à Mbandaka, sera moins
indemnisée que si elle l’avait été à Bunia ou Kisangani.
Au-delà des considérations propres au caractère unique de chaque
individu et de chaque situation, les inégalités constatées entre les
juridictions dans le cadre de l’indemnisation conduisent à remettre
en cause le principe même d’égalité ici devant le service public de
la justice.
Annex 67
82 2.4. MoDICIté DES DoMMAgES-INtéRêtS ALLouéS
Aux vICtIMES
Il se dégage de l’échantillon des décisions rendues en la matière et
repris dans le tableau suivant1 une modicité des montants en ce qui
concerne les indemnisations.
Au premier degré
juridictions
Affaires
jugées
Montant
des indemnités
allouées
Nombre
de victimes
Moyenne
des indemnités
par
victime
TMG Mbandaka
Affaire dite
SoNgo
MBoyo
RP
084/2005 du
12/04/2006
78.100 US $ 17, dont une victime
violée et décédée
(10.000 US $), et
16 victimes de viols
(5.000 US $) et/
ou pillages (500
US $).
4.500 US $ en
moyenne
par personne
TMG Mbandaka
Affaire dite
BoKALA
RP
101/006 du
20/06/2006
300.000 US $ 128 parties civiles
constituées (15.000
US $ pour une victime
décédée, 5000
US $ pour
chaque victime de
viol,…)
2.400 US $
par victime
TMG Bunia Affaire Bongi
RP 018/06 du
24/03/2006
300.000 US $ 3 parties civiles 100.000 US $
par victime
TMG Bunia Affaire
MuLESA
RP
101/2006 du
19/02/2007
315.000 US $ 19 parties civiles 16.000 US $
par victime
TMG Bunia Affaire KAhWA
panga
RP
039/2006 du
02/08/2006
500.500 US $ 13 parties civiles 38.500 US $
par victime
1 G. BALANDA MI KUIN LELIE L, « Quelques considérations quant à l’indemnisation des victimes par la
justice congolaise », in Les réparations Judiciaires au profit des victimes de violations massives de droit
de l’homme en République Démocratique du Congo, Kinshasa, 2011, p. 37.
Au degré juridictions
CM Equateur
CM Equateur
CM Pr
Orientale
CM Pr
Orientale
TMG Bien en RD condamnation étrangère, Annex 67
La réparation des crimes internationaux en droit congoLais 83
ALLouéS
et
qui
indemnités
en
personne
$
droit
Au degré d’appel
juridictions
Affaires
jugées
Montant
des indemnités
allouées
Nombre
de victimes
Moyenne
des indemnités
par
victime
CM Equateur
Affaire dite
SoNgo
MBoyo
RPA 014/2006
du 7/06/2006
170.317 US $ 17, dont une victime
violée et décédée
(10.000 US
$), et 16 victimes
de viols (5.000 US
$) et/ou pillages
(500 US $).
10.000 US $
en moyenne
par
personne
CM Equateur
Affaire dite
BoKALA
RPA
15/006 du
20/06/2006
126.000 US $ 25 parties civiles
constituées
(15.000 US $ pour
une victime décédée,
5000 US $
pour
chaque victime de
viol,…)
5.000 US $
par victime
CM Pr
Orientale
Affaire Bongi
RPA
030/06 du
24/03/2006
165.000 US $ 3 parties civiles 50.000 US $
par victime
CM Pr
Orientale
Affaire
MuLESA
RPA
003/2007 du
28/07/2007
171.000 US $ 19 parties civiles.
24.000US US $ par
victimes de viol,
19.000 US US $
par victime tuée ;
51.000U S $ pour
un père de 4 victimes
9.000 US $
par victime
TMG Bunia Affaire KAhWA
panga
RPA
023/2007 du
02/08/2006
Tout en annulant
le jugement
a quo,
la Cour Militaire
a déclaré
l’action des
parties civiles
recevable et
s’est réservée
de statuer
quant au fond
Bien que le franc congolais soit la seule monnaie ayant cours légal
en RD Congo, le tableau ci-dessus indique que les montants de
condamnation aux dommages-intérêts sont exprimés en monnaie
étrangère, le dollar américain, mais payable en franc congolais. En
Annex 67
84 effet s’il est admis que les préjudices sont évalués à la date où le
jugement est prononcé, son exécution intervient toujours après. Or
avec la dévaluation constante et chronique de la monnaie nationale «
franc congolais », le problème de la détermination de la monnaie de
condamnation aux dommages-intérêt en droit congolais a toujours
été posé. La jurisprudence admettait alors que le juge d’appel
puisse tenir compte de la dévaluation monétaire intervenue depuis
la date du prononcé du jugement, dont appel, pour augmenter les
dommages-intérêts alloués par le premier juge à l’appelant1. Cette
solution jurisprudentielle n’a résolu que partiellement le problème
car elle ne concernait que les décisions frappées d’appels.
Aussi, pour pallier cette carence, le recours à une monnaie
étrangère stable est apparu comme une panacée, comme monnaie
de refuge pour des condamnations aux dommages-intérêts en vue
de faire face à la dévaluation de la monnaie nationale entre le jour
du prononcé du jugement et de celui de son exécution.
2.5. LA NoN AppLICAtIoN DES INStRuMENtS
juRIDIquES INtERNAtIoNAux RELAtIfS
à LA RépARAtIoN DES vICtIMES DES CRIMES
INtERNAtIoNAux
L’une des contributions des juridictions militaires dans la répression
des crimes internationaux est l’application directe du Statut
de la Cour pénale internationale1. Cependant ces juridictions
n’appliquent pas les instruments juridiques internationaux relatifs
à la réparation des préjudices résultant de violations flagrantes du
droit international des droits de l’homme et des violations graves
du droit humanitaire.
1 CM Sud Kivu, Aff. Aud. Mil. Sup. et parties civiles contre Lt. Col. BALUMISA MANASSE et Consorts, Feuillet
21 ;TMG Mbandaka, 12 avril 2006, Aff. Aud. Mil. contre Lt. ELIWO NGO Y et Consorts, inédit.
3. Certaines être 3.1. Le juge forfaitaire que et bono n’existe de dommages-lors les gains juge raison En effet, par funéraires verser les pertes objectif une Cette incohérence des il existe compter 1 CSJ, 2 R. LUKOO sortira, 3 CSJ, Justice, Annex 67
La réparation des crimes internationaux en droit congoLais 85
où le
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depuis
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Cette
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3. TEnTATIVE D’ExPLICATIOn DE LA
PRATIqUE InDEMnITAIRE DES
JURIDICTIONS MILITAIRES
CONGOLAISES
Certaines causes justifiant les constats énoncés plus haut peuvent
être relevées.
3.1. uNE évALuAtIoN EN équIté « Ex AEquo Et
BoNo » DES INDEMNItéS pAR LE jugE MILItAIRE
Le juge militaire recourt systématiquement à une évaluation
forfaitaire des indemnités pour réparer les préjudices subis alors
que l’on juge1 et enseigne2 classiquement que l’évaluation ex aequo
et bono (c’est-à-dire en équité) n’est permise que dans le cas où il
n’existe pas d’éléments certains permettant de calculer le montant
de dommages-intérêts. Une évaluation en équité est exclue dès
lors qu’il est parfaitement possible de connaître les pertes subies et
les gains manqués à la suite d’un crime international. S’il arrive au
juge de recourir à l’évaluation ex aequo et bono, il doit donner la
raison pour laquelle l’évaluation ne peut être qu’ex aequo et bono.3
En effet, s’agissant des pertes subies, la preuve des frais exposés
par les victimes indirectes pour les soins médicaux et les frais
funéraires peut être administrée par des documents comptables à
verser au dossier. Tandis que pour les gains manqués, et notamment
les pertes de revenus, il faut les évaluer en recourant à un critère
objectif tel que le dernier salaire de la victime au cas où elle avait
une activité professionnelle.
Cette évaluation forfaitaire entraîne comme conséquence une
incohérence et une disparité ci-haut rappelée dans l’indemnisation
des dommages corporels. L’équité est une notion pour laquelle
il existe un risque constant d’imprévisibilité et d’insécurité, sans
compter l’arbitraire du juge. La spécificité première de l’équité est
1 CSJ, 28 juillet 1987, RP 994, inédit. ; CSJ, 04 juillet 1980, RPP 2, inédit.
2 R. LUKOO MUSU BAO , La jurisprudence congolaise en droit du travail et de la sécurité sociale, On s’en
sortira, Kinshasa, 2006, p. 89.
3 CSJ, 5 juillet 1997, « Kanyanga contre MP et Makosso », in Bulletin des Arrêts de la Cour Suprême de
Justice, p. 119.
Annex 67

Annex 68
Jacques B. Mbokani, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), La jurisprudence
congolaise en matière de crimes de droit international. Une analyse des décisions des
juridictions militaires congolaises en application du Statut de Rome (2016)

Jacques B MBOKANI
2 0 1 6
Une étude de
l’Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA)
Une analyse des décisions des juridictions militaires
congolaises en application du Statut de Rome
La jurisprudence congolaise
en matière de crimes
de droit international
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les FAPC dont i l était fondateur et c ommandant s uprême. Il a abusé de s on autorité et
de s on p ouvoir e n o rdonnant l ’exécution e t l e m eurtre d e L eti ; c e q ui f ut f ait p ar s es
subordonnés qui obéissaient de manière et quasi automatique à ses ordres. Le pouvoir,
l’autorité et le contrôle que [ l’accusé] exerçait dans les FAPC étaient tels que, même ses
plus proches collaborateurs ne pouvaient poser aucun acte important sans que leur chef
suprême n’ait ordonné ou autorisé et ils ne pouvaient lui désobéir sans subir un châtiment
sévère et parfois suprême »572.
Le second acte criminel imputé à l’accusé parce que, selon la Haute Cour, i l l’aurait
commis « par l’intermédiaire d’autres personnes » e st le soi-disant c rime de guerre par
tortures infligées à M. Combe Ngabu sur ordre de l’accusé. Ici encore, l’on constate que
la Haute Cour a appliqué l’article 25(3)(a) du Statut de Rome en soutenant que l’accusé
« est individuellement responsable pénalement du crime de guerre par tortures pour avoir,
par l’intermédiaire de ses subordonnés, infligé des tortures à Combe Ngabu ». La Haute
Cour n’est pas entrée dans beaucoup de développements par rapport à cette seconde
imputation. L’on suppose toutefois que les éléments invoqués dans le meurtre de M. Leti
Léopold s’appliquent ici aussi pour justifier le recours à la théorie de la commission par
l’intermédiaire d’une autre personne.
L’argumentation ainsi avancée tant sur la commission individuelle des crimes que
sur la commission par l’intermédiaire d’autres personnes ou d’une organisation est
globalement convaincante et n’appelle pas beaucoup de remarques. Il existe toutefois
deux points à relever. Le premier est que la référence à l’article 25(3), par la Haute Cour,
reste trop générale puisque cette disposition prévoit plusieurs hypothèses dans lesquelles
la responsabilité pénale individuelle peut être retenue et qu’il importait à la Haute Cour
militaire de spécifier laquelle de ces différentes hypothèses était applicable à l’accusé. La
Haute Cour semble toutefois avoir eu en tête l’article 25(3)(a) du Statut de Rome puisqu’elle
a retenu, à charge de l’accusé, une commission matérielle du crime de viol et, pour le
meurtre de Leti Léopold et les actes de tortures à l’endroit de Combe Ngabu et de Mawa
Assia, une commission par l’intermédiaire d’autres personnes. Le deuxième point est que
l’argumentation relative à la commission par l’intermédiaire d’autres personnes n’est pas
toujours soutenue par des faits concrets autres que les crimes dont il s’agit. Le degré de
contrôle que l’accusé exerçait sur son groupe armé et qui entraînait une exécution quasi
automatique de ses ordres aurait dû être étayé par d’autres faits que ceux qui sont à l’origine
de l’arrêt commenté.
11. Affaire colonel 106
L’affaire dite colonel 106 portait sur les exactions commises par un groupe armé des Maï-
Maï dirigé par le colonel Bedi Mobuli alias « colonel 106 ». Ce dernier était poursuivi pour
15 chefs d’accusation liés aux activités de son groupe armé dans la localité de Manga dans
572 Idem, p. 53.
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le Sud-Kivu. Les 5 premiers chefs d’accusation ont été qualifiés par la Cour militaire de
Bukavu de crimes contre l’humanité en vertu de l’article 7 du Statut de Rome.
Argumentation
Contrairement aux autres affaires, l’acte d’accusation dans cette affaire a spécifiquement
invoqué l’article 25 du Statut de Rome. L’affaire colonel 106 est ainsi l’une des rares
affaires dans lesquelles l’acte d’accusation fait explicitement référence au Statut de Rome.
Par r apport au r ôle joué par l’accusé dans l a perpétration des crimes573, la Cour a bien
commencé son a rgumentation en précisant que « l’article 25-3-a englobe les notions de
perpétration directe (commission d’un crime conjointement avec une autre personne) et de
perpétration indirecte (commission d’un crime par l’intermédiaire d’une autre personne)
que cette autre personne soit ou non responsable ». Ainsi, la Cour a bien clarifié la
distinction que renferme cet article sur les deux variantes de la coaction.
La Cour a par ailleurs abordé quatre points relatifs à la responsabilité de l’accusé. Dans
un premier temps, elle a examiné « la responsabilité individuelle du prévenu fondée sur
l’article 25(3)(a) du Statut de Rome ». Elle a soutenu à cet égard que « l’examen du dossier
et des éléments recueillis lors de l’instruction aux audiences successives renseignent que le
prévenu Bedi Mobuli a commis les crimes contre l’humanité tantôt comme auteur à titre
individuel, tantôt conjointement avec une autre personne, tantôt par l’intermédiaire d’une
autre personne sur pied de l’article 25 du Statut de Rome (…), tantôt en tant que supérieur
hiérarchique militaire ». Elle a ensuite reproduit les trois premiers paragraphes de l’article
25 du Statut de Rome, sans véritablement les confronter aux faits soumis à son examen.
Sur la question du viol, la Cour s’est limitée à constater que l’accusé a personnellement eu
des rapports sexuels avec deux femmes, et qu’il a même eu un enfant avec l’une d’elles, dans
un environnement coercitif et que pour cela, ces faits étaient constitutifs de viols en tant
que crimes contre l’humanité.
Dans un deuxième temps, la Cour a abordé la responsabilité de M. Bedi Mobuli au
regard d’une « attaque menée sous son commandement ». Elle a à cet égard cité quelque 17
cas où les actes criminels (pillage, incendie, enlèvements des personnes, mauvais traitements
et tortures, etc.) ont eu lieu suivant les ordres donnés par l’intéressé574. Elle n’a cependant
pas invoqué la base juridique pour asseoir la responsabilité de l’accusé. Toutefois, en faisant
référence aux actes perpétrés suivant les « ordres » de l’accusé, elle avait certainement en
tête l’article 25(3)(b) du Statut de Rome.
Dans un troisième temps, la Cour a analysé la responsabilité de M. Bedi sous l’angle de
la « commission du crime par coaction fondée sur le contrôle exercé conjointement sur le
crime ». À cet égard, se référant à certains extraits de la Décision Lubanga et de l’ouvrage
du professeur Nyabirungu, elle a déclaré que « la notion de coaction fondée sur le contrôle
exercé c onjointement s ur l e c rime a p our o rigine l e p rincipe d e l a d ivision des tâches
573 Arrêt colonel 106, p. 72 et suivantes.
574 Idem, p. 74.
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essentielles en vue de la commission d’un crime entre deux ou plusieurs personnes agissant
de manière concertée » ; et qu’ « ainsi bien qu’aucune de ces personnes ne détiennent le
contrôle d’ensemble de l’infraction parce qu’elles dépendent toutes les unes des autres pour
sa commission, elles partagent toutes le contrôle, car chacune d’elle pourrait compromettre
la commission du crime si elle n’exécutait pas sa tâche »575.
La C our a e nsuite soutenu q ue l a c oaction fondée sur l e contrôle du c rime suppose
d’abord l’existence d’un « accord ou plan commun entre deux ou plusieurs personnes ».
Dans l’affaire soumise à son examen, elle a estimé qu’il existait un « accord entre Bedi et ses
hommes » et que cet accord « portait sur l’idéologie, convaincre la population qu’ils étaient
des Américains venus les libérer »576. Elle a également soutenu que dans le cadre de cet
accord, les acteurs avaient convenu que « pour se ravitailler, il fallait prendre des contacts
avec les chefs coutumiers et la population ; concevoir et les convaincre sur le calendrier
de ravitaillement en ration, des vivres et autres, obtenir les transporteurs volontaires à
défaut piller les vivres, les médicaments pour la pharmacie et arrêter des gens en mesure de
transporter, les lier par une corde appelée saviem jusqu’à Manga » ; et qu’ « une fois arrivés,
les têtus [devaient être] gardés dans un trou appelé handaki ».
En plus de l’existence d’un accord, la coaction suppose également, et la Cour le dit à juste
titre, l’existence d’un apport de chaque membre, c’est-à-dire une contribution essentielle
et coordonnée aboutissant à la réalisation des éléments objectifs du crime. Se référant de
nouveau à certains extraits de la Décision Lubanga et à l’ouvrage du professeur Nyabirungu,
elle a rappelé que « lorsque les éléments objectifs d’une infraction sont réalisés par plusieurs
individus a gissant dans l e cadre d’un p lan c ommun, s euls c eux à q ui o nt été assignées
des tâches essentielles et qui sont donc en mesure de faire obstacle à la perpétration du
crime e n n ’accomplissant pas l eurs t âches p euvent ê tre considérés c omme e xerçant u n
contrôle conjoint sur le crime ». Par ces propos, elle avait certainement en tête l’idée de
l’interdépendance.
C’est sans doute pour tenter de démontrer l’importance de la contribution de M. Bedi
que la Cour a déclaré ce qui suit :
dans le cas sous examen, les crimes ne pouvaient pas être accomplis si les
éléments n’attaquaient pas la population civile ; il n’y aurait pas viol des femmes
si elles n’étaient pas amenées à Manga ; les butins des attaques n’arriveraient
pas à Manga s’il n’y avait pas une sélection des transporteurs liés pas une corde
appelée saviem et la distribution des femmes pour maintenir le moral de la troupe
serait laborieuse s’il n’y avait pas un chargé de dispatch en la personne de M. Bedi
Mobuli et la discipline serait compromise s’il n’y avait pas de handaki pour garder
et corriger les indisciplinés. À Manga, M. Bedi et son groupe savaient bien qu’il
est impossible que chaque villageois puisse ravitailler le mouvement de façon
575 Idem, p. 74.
576 Idem, p. 76.
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régulière et conséquente en vivres, médicaments, armes, munitions et femmes.
Les conditions précaires de vie étaient tellement en doute qu’il fallait s’attendre
à la résistance ou au refus. Mais ils ont délibérément accepté de procéder à ces
opérations. La Cour déclarer l’élément subjectif établi. Donc chacun avait un
rôle à jouer de sorte que si un maillon faillissait, il serait difficile de réaliser la
politique du mouvement. La Cour dira sa participation à tous ces crimes par le
contrôle exercé conjointement sur le crime établi dans le chef du prévenu577.
Dans un quatrième temps, la Cour militaire de Bukavu a abordé la responsabilité pénale de
l’accusé sous l’angle de la « commission par l’intermédiaire d’une personne » (perpétration
indirecte). À cet égard, elle a rappelé que cette forme de responsabilité consiste « en ce
que l’auteur principal, auteur intellectuel utilise l’exécutant (auteur direct) comme simple
outil ou instrument pour commettre le crime » et que c’est elle qui est également traduite,
selon elle, par « la théorie de l’auteur derrière l’auteur inscrite à l’article 25(3)(a) du Statut
de Rome »578. Ensuite, s’inspirant de la Décision Katanga et Ngudjolo, e lle a s outenu q ue
cette forme de responsabilité exige que soient satisfaites trois conditions à savoir (i) le
contrôle sur l’organisation, (ii) l’existence d’un appareil de pouvoir organisé et hiérarchisé,
et (iii) l’exécution des crimes assurée par une obéissance quasi automatique aux ordres.
Pour démontrer que ces trois conditions étaient réunies dans le chef de M. Bedi Mobuli,
la Cour a déclaré ce qui suit :
le prévenu Bedi Mobuli est le chef de l’organisation Maï-Maï dans sa branche
armée basée à Manga alias États-Unis (…), avec un pouvoir organisé et structuré
avec le colonel « cinq Birere », le capitaine « Shimita », [et] les crimes commis
obéissent à une exécution quasi automatique. C’est ainsi que l’attaque de la
première barrière du parc de Kahuzi Biega, ses hommes ont agi en son absence
et ont pillé les effets de F1, F55, ils ont détenu F1 et l’ont torturée, ils ont
enlevée, et violé F19, F37 comme s’ils étaient des robots obéissants à un même
modus operandi579.
La Cour a également mentionné deux incidents survenus dans la localité de Kalonge dans
lesquels les hommes fidèles à Bedi Mobuli ont demandé de l’argent à une victime (F14) et,
face au refus de celle-ci, ils l’ont pillée et lorsque sept de ces mêmes hommes ont violé une
victime après que celle-ci ait repoussé leurs avances. L’arrêt ne précise toutefois pas s’il
s’agit de la même victime (F14) ou d’une autre. La Cour a ainsi retenu la responsabilité
pénale de l’accusé Bedi Mobuli « pour avoir commis par l’intermédiaire de ses éléments,
l’infraction de crime contre l’humanité par pillage, enlèvement et par torture à Kahuzi
577 Idem.
578 Idem.
579 Idem.
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Biega sur la base des preuves par témoignages de F1, F55, F19, F89 (…) et l’attestation
médicale de F25, F47 et F305, etc. ».
Observations
Il existe au moins trois points positifs à signaler à propos de l’arrêt colonel 106 quant à
l’application de l’article 25 du Statut de Rome. En premier lieu, l’arrêt marque une rupture
nette avec l’approche erronée de la coaction contenue dans les précédentes décisions des
juridictions militaires de Bukavu depuis l’arrêt Kibibi et consorts, approche soi-disant tirée
de la jurisprudence de la CPI. Dans l’arrêt sous examen, la Cour militaire de Bukavu fait
application de la doctrine de la coaction fondée sur le contrôle exercé sur le crime pour les
mêmes raisons et dans les mêmes conditions que la CPI dans la Décision Lubanga et dans
la Décision Katanga et consort. Ainsi, la Cour précise que cette dernière approche exigeait de
démontrer l’existence (i) d’un accord ou d’un plan commun entre les coauteurs et (ii) d’un
apport essentiel et coordonné entre eux en vue de la réalisation du crime (interdépendance).
En deuxième lieu, l’arrêt distingue clairement les deux variantes de la coaction : directe
et indirecte. Troisièmement enfin, l’arrêt a le grand mérite d’avoir tenté de confronter le
cadre juridique tracé par lui aux faits soumis à son examen. Sur ce point, il marque une
certaine rupture avec cette tendance tant décriée des juridictions militaires congolaises de
se lancer dans des débats théoriques pour finalement omettre de les confronter aux faits
soumis à leurs examens.
L’arrêt colonel 106 comporte néanmoins quelques faiblesses à porter à son passif.
Premièrement, on l’a déjà dit, l’article 25(3)(a) du Statut de Rome prévoit trois hypothèses
de la commission d’un crime relevant de la compétence de la CPI. La première est celle
de la commission dite « individuelle » d ans laquelle u ne s eule p ersonne s ’engage d ans
la c ommission d’un c rime ( perpétration d irecte). L a deuxième hypothèse e st c elle de l a
commission physique et collective (avec d’autres personnes) d’un crime (commission
conjointe ou coaction directe). La troisième et dernière hypothèse est celle de la commission
du crime « par l’intermédiaire d’une autre personne ou groupe de personnes » ou encore la
perpétration indirecte du crime. Cette hypothèse concerne généralement le cas des individus
qui ne sont pas physiquement présents sur le lieu du crime, mais qui exercent un contrôle
étroit sur la volonté des individus qui commettent physiquement le crime.
Au regard de ces trois variantes, la question que soulève l’arrêt colonel 106 est alors celle de
savoir si pour un même comportement criminel, un individu peut être tenu pénalement responsable
sous toutes ces trois hypothèses ? A utrement d it, p eut-on c oncevoir u ne hypothèse de
cumul de responsabilité pénale pour un même fait dans le chef d’une personne ? L’arrêt
colonel 106 semble y avoir répondu par l’affirmative, sans le dire ouvertement. En effet, cet
arrêt ne dit pas clairement pour quelle catégorie précise des crimes, la première hypothèse
(perpétration physique) a été appliquée à l’accusé ni pour quelle autre hypothèse, la
perpétration indirecte lui a été appliquée. L’on se retrouve avec une déclaration globale
de la culpabilité sous toutes les trois variantes de l’article 25(3)(a) du Statut de Rome sans
beaucoup de spécifications. Certes, pour tel incident, l’on peut engager sa responsabilité
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comme auteur physique de l’acte ; pour tel autre, comme coauteur (avec d’autres) de l’acte ;
et pour tel autre encore, comme auteur ou coauteur indirect. Mais, pour un seul et même
incident, on ne peut pas réunir toutes ces trois hypothèses. Il était donc important que
l’arrêt soit plus précis sur cette question.
Deuxièmement, sur la question de l’existence d’un accord entre deux ou plusieurs
personnes, exigence nécessaire pour établir une coaction fondée sur le contrôle conjoint
du crime, l’arrêt colonel 106 semble s’être mépris sur cette condition. L’arrêt soutient que cet
accord portait sur l’idéologie, etc., mais ce qu’il a plutôt mis en avant ce sont les méthodes
du groupe armé auquel appartient l’accusé, alors qu’il n’a pas démontré l’existence d’un
accord au vrai sens du mot ni surtout qui étaient les parties à cet accord. On verra d’ailleurs
plus loin que l’arrêt soutient que les parties à cet accord étaient tantôt les membres de
l’équipe dirigeante de ce groupe armé, tantôt l’accusé et tous les membres dudit groupe
armé. Il aurait pourtant été plus simple que l’arrêt soutienne que cet accord portait plutôt
sur la création même du groupe armé auquel appartient l’accusé, sur la définition de ses
objectifs et même sur ses méthodes d’actions pour fonctionner et parvenir à ses objectifs.
Troisièmement, deux confusions latentes – celle entre la coaction directe et la perpétration
indirecte, d’une part, et celle entre la commission par ordre et la perpétration indirecte, d’autre
part – peuvent être dénichées dans l’argumentation de cet arrêt.
Confusion entre coaction directe et perpétration indirecte ? Il faut ici rappeler que dans la
« coaction directe », l’individu participe physiquement à la réalisation des éléments
objectifs (matériels) du crime conjointement avec d’autres, tandis que dans la perpétration
indirecte, il n’est pas présent sur le lieu du crime et n’a pas l’intention de se salir les mains ;
toutefois, c’est lui qui contrôle étroitement la volonté de ceux qui exécutent le crime à sa place580
à la manière d’un coach dans le football qui contrôle les mouvements de ses joueurs sur
terrain et qui peut les interchanger comme bon lui semble afin d’améliorer la performance
de l’équipe. L’exemple qui est généralement donné est celui des crimes imputés aux chefs
d’État – comme dans l’affaire Al-Bashir ou dans l’affaire Gbagbo581 – dans lesquelles l’idée de
base consistait à dire que ces deux individus ont commis les crimes par l’intermédiaire de
l’appareil d’État sur lequel ils ont exercé un contrôle étroit.
Dans l’affaire sous examen, il apparaît que d’une part, en abordant la question de la
« commission du crime par coaction fondée sur le contrôle exercé conjointement sur le crime » , la Cour
a s outenu l’existence d ’un accord e ntre l’accusé e t s es hommes. S elon c e r aisonnement,
il s’agit d’une coaction directe et les coauteurs directs sont, M. Bedi et ses hommes.
Cependant, lorsqu’elle a abordé un peu plus loin la responsabilité de l’accusé sous l’angle
de la « commission par l’intermédiaire d’une personne », la Cour militaire a affirmé que
l’accusé Bedi Mobuli est le chef de l’organisation Maï-Maï basée à Manga ; que cette
580 Thomas Weigend, « Perpetration through an Organization: The Unexpected Career of a German
Legal Concept », JICJ, vol. 9, 2011, pp. 91-111; Elies van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in
International Law, Oxford, OUP, 2012, p. 93 et suivantes.
581 CPI (Ch. Prél. I), Le Procureur c. Al-Bashir, « Décision relative à la requête de l’Accusation aux fins de
délivrance d’un mandat d’arrêt à l’encontre d’Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir », Doc. ICC-02/05-01/09-3-
tFRA, 4 mars 2009, § 214 ; Décision Gbagbo, § 230.
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organisation était structurée, mais surtout que la responsabilité pénale de M. Bedi Mobuli
était retenue pour avoir commis ces crimes « par l’intermédiaire de ses éléments ».
Ces propos font clairement penser à la perpétration indirecte fondée sur le contrôle
qu’un individu, en l’occurrence M. Bedi Mobuli, a exercé sur une organisation. Il se
pose alors la question de savoir s’il s’agit d’une coaction directe e ntre M . B edi M obuli
et ses hommes ou s’il s’agit d’une perpétration indirecte d ans l aquelle M . B edi M obuli
exerce un contrôle étroit sur la volonté de ses hommes dans la commission des crimes.
Autrement dit, l’arrêt est flou (et même contradictoire) sur la question de savoir (i) si les
hommes de l’accusé étaient utilisés comme de simples « instruments » par lesquels i l a
commis les crimes (perpétration indirecte); ou (ii) si ces hommes étaient des « coauteurs »
qui ont donné non seulement leur accord à un plan commun dont la réalisation comportait
tout au moins le risque de commission des crimes, mais aussi une contribution essentielle et
coordonnée dans la réalisation de ces crimes dans le cadre d’une interdépendance entre
eux (coauteurs directs).
La Cour militaire en est même arrivée à imputer à M. Bedi Mobuli les actes criminels
commis par ses hommes dans les circonstances où il apparaît que ces derniers ont agi de
manière incontrôlée et sans avoir reçu un ordre quelconque de l’accusé. Tel est le cas du
pillage et du viol de F14 (pour autant qu’il s’agisse de la même personne), commis par les
hommes de M. Bedi Mobuli à Kalonge. La Cour a conclu que M. Bedi Mobuli a commis
ces crimes par l’intermédiaire de ses hommes, alors même qu’elle n’avait pas démontré en
quoi la commission de ce crime obéissait à une exécution quasi automatique des ordres émis
par M. Bedi Mobuli. En laissant sous-entendre que les éléments de Bedi Mobuli étaient
en même temps (i) des coauteurs directs (avec Bedi Mobuli) et (ii) des éléments, dont la
volonté était étroitement contrôlée par Bedi Mobuli dans la commission des crimes, la
Cour militaire a, en réalité, entretenu une confusion sur la nature de la responsabilité
pénale retenue à charge de M. Bedi Mobuli.
Confusion entre la responsabilité fondée sur l’ordre et la perpétration indirecte ? La deuxième
confusion latente qui réside dans cet arrêt est la difficulté à distinguer la responsabilité
d’un individu qui a « ordonné » u n c rime e t s a r esponsabilité d ans l e c adre d ’une
« perpétration indirecte », lorsque cet individu agit par l’intermédiaire d’une personne ou
d’une organisation. Le donneur d’un ordre criminel est-il un auteur indirect des crimes ?
L’arrêt colonel 106 y a apparemment répondu par l’affirmative. Cette interprétation
particulière de l’article 25(3)(a) du Statut de Rome est parfaitement conforme au droit
congolais. Elle semble en effet avoir été influencée par l’article 21(3) du Code pénal
ordinaire congolais qui considère comme « auteurs » d’une infraction « ceux qui, par
offres, dons, promesses, menaces, abus d’autorité ou de pouvoir, machinations ou artifices
coupables, auront directement provoqué cette infraction », étant entendu que l’ordre
de commettre une infraction constitue une des variantes de la provocation (privée) à
commettre une infraction.
L’article 21 du Code pénal ordinaire ne contient donc pas la distinction entre le
donneur d’ordre et l’auteur indirect d’une infraction. L’article 25(3)(a) du Statut de
Annex 68
LA JURISPRUDENCE CONGOLAISE EN MATIÈRE DE CRIMES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
238
Rome, inséré à l’article 21 bis du Code pénal ordinaire, exprime une réalité un peu plus
nuancée que celle de l’article 21 du Code pénal ordinaire. En effet, il est incontestable
que dans les deux cas, il existe des ordres émanant d’un supérieur hiérarchique qui
abuse de son autorité ou de son pouvoir. Toutefois dans l’hypothèse de la commission
par l’intermédiaire d’une personne (perpétration indirecte), le rôle de l’auteur principal,
encore appelé « l’auteur derrière l’auteur », est plus important que dans celle de l’ordre
criminel donné. Dans le premier cas, les exécutants sont considérés comme de simples
instruments interchangeables mis à la disposition de l’auteur principal de sorte que leur refus
ne peut empêcher la commission du crime précisément parce qu’ils sont interchangeables.
Mais, dans le second cas, les exécutants ne jouent pas vraiment un rôle si effacé que cela
pourrait paraître. Le refus de leur part d’obéir aux ordres peut effectivement faire obstacle
à la commission du crime précisément parce qu’ils ne sont pas interchangeables. Ainsi,
pour conclure à l’existence d’une « perpétration indirecte », il est important d’établir
l’étroitesse du contrôle que l’auteur médiat du crime a exercé sur ceux qui ont physiquement
commis ledit crime, qu’il s’agisse d’un ou plusieurs individus ou d’une organisation ou
encore d’une structure.
Or, lorsqu’on lit attentivement l’arrêt colonel 106, on n’y trouve pas l’exercice d’un contrôle
étroit que M . B edi Mobuli aurait e xercé s ur les individus qui ont physiquement c ommis
les c rimes. E t m ême q uand l ’arrêt t ente d e d émontrer u ne c ertaine i nterdépendance
entre l es c oauteurs, i l n’est p as opéré u ne d istinction c laire e ntre l e c aractère substantiel
d’une aide à la commission des crimes et le caractère simplement utile de cette aide.
Certes, l’action des autres intervenants a effectivement apporté un soutien considérable
aux activités criminelles pour lesquelles M. Bedi Mobuli est poursuivi. Mais il restait à
démontrer l’existence d’une interdépendance totale entre eux dans la commission des crimes
pour conclure à une coaction directe.
C. La responsabilité du supérieur hiérarchique fondée sur
l’article 28 du statut de Rome
la responsabilité des supérieurs hiérarchiques a été appliquée dans au moins 11 affaires
traitées par les juridictions militaires congolaises en vertu de l’article 28 du Statut de Rome.
Il faut indiquer que le contenu de l’article 81 du Code judiciaire militaire présente certaines
ressemblances avec l’article 28 du Statut de Rome en ce qu’il prévoit la responsabilité
des supérieurs hiérarchiques. Cet article est ainsi formulé : « lorsqu’un subordonné est
poursuivi comme auteur principal de l’une des infractions prévues à l’article 80 et que ses
supérieurs hiérarchiques ne peuvent être poursuivis comme coauteurs, ils sont considérés
comme complices dans la mesure où ils ont organisé ou toléré les agissements criminels
de leur subordonné ». Toutefois, cette disposition, limitée aux seules infractions d’ordre
Annex 68

Annex 69
Henry M. Stanley, In Darkest Africa: Or the quest, rescue and retreat of Emin, Governor of
Equatoria, Vol. II (1890)

Annex 69
IN DA RICEST AFRICA
OR THE
QUEST, RESCUE, A:ND RETREAT OF EMIN
GOYERXOR OF EQUATORLl
BY
HENRY
V .
:\L STANLEY
WITH TWO STEEL ENGRAYIXGS, .ASD OXE HU:NDRED AND
FIFTY ILLUSTRATIONS AXD l\IAPS
IN TWO VOLU)IES
VoL. II
• .l will not cease to go forward until I come to the place where the two seas meet,
though I travel ninety years. "-KonAN, chap. xviii., Y. 6'.!.
NmY YORK
CHARLES SCRIB:NER'S SONS
1890
[ AU riglits reser ,oed]
Annex 69
COPYHIGHT, 1890, BY
CHARLES SCRIBN"ER'S so~s
Press of J. J. Little & Co.,
Astor Place, New York.
Annex 69
ll-18~ .
.July.
The
Wahuma
3o4 JN DARKEfi'l' .H. 'RICA.
CHAPTER XXXIII.
THE TRIRES OF THE GRASS-LAND.
· rrhe Wahnma : the exact opposite of the Dwarfs: their clmcendantsTrihes
nearly allied to the true 1wgro type-Tribes of the Nilotic
hasin-The Herdsmen-The trarlitions of Unyoro-1\ly experiences
of the \Valmma gained while at Kavalli-Yiew of the surrounding
country from Kavalli camp-Chiefs Kavalli, Katto, and Gavira
unbosom their wrongs to me-Old Ruguji's reminiscences-The
pastnre-land lying betwee~ Lake Alhert and the forest-The cattle
in the district round Kavalli: their milk-yield-Three cases referring
to cattle which I am called upon to adjudicate-Household duties
of the women-Dress among the Wahmna-Old Egyptian and
Ethiopian characteristics preserved among the tribes of the grassland-
Customs, habits, and religion of the tribes-Poor Gaddo
suspected of conspiracy against his chief, Kavalli: bis death-Diet
of the Wahmna-The climate of the region of the grass-land.
THE "\Vahuma arc the most interesting people, next to
the Pigmics in all Central Africa. Some philological
nidclerinfJS haYc classed them under the generic name
Bantu, and every traveller ambitious of being comprehended
among the scientific, adds his testimony and
influence to perpetuate this most unscientific term.
Bantu is an Inner African word of which the translation
is l\Ien. -\Yc are therefore asked seriously to accept it
as a solemn fact, upon scientific authority, that the
Wahuma, like the Pigmies, are men.
The ,Vahuma are the exact opposite of the dwarfs.
The latter are unclersizecl nomads, adapted lJy their
habits to forest life ; the former are tall, finelyformed
men, with almost European features, adapted
from immemorial custom and second nature to life in
pastoral lauds only. Reverse their localities, and they
pine and die. Take the Pigmies out of their arboreal
Annex 69
THE INDO -AFRJO.ANS .AND 7'JIJ,; f'J0 1l/JES . 38G
recesse8 and perpetual twilight, and from their vegetable
diet, and plant them on a grass-land open to the
winds and the sunshine, feed them on beef and grain
and milk as you may, and they shrink with the cold
and exposure, refuse their meat, and droop to death.
On the other hand, deport the "\Vahuma into the woods,
and supply them with the finest vegetables, and always
with plenty of food, and the result is, that they get
depressed, their fine brown-black colour changes into
ashen gray, the proud haughty carriage is lost, they
contract an aspect of misery, and die in despair and
· weariness. Yet these two opposites of humanity arc
called Bantu, or men, a term which is perfectly
meaningless, and yet as old as the story of the
Creation. In North America we see to-day Esquimaux,
English, Irish, German, French and Spanish.Americans,
and Indians, and, after the scientific manner, we should
call them Bantu. Interest in the various human families
is not roused by comprehending them under such
unphilosophical terms.
The "\Vahuma are true descendants of the Semitic
tribes, or communities, which emigrated from Asia
across the Red Sea and settled on the coast, and in the
uplands of Abyssinia, once known as Ethiopia. From
this great centre more than a third of the inhabitants
of Inner Africa have had their origin. As they pressed
southward and conquered the negro tribes, miscegenation
produced a mixture of races; the Semitic became
tainted with negro blood, the half-caste tribes intermarried
again with the primitive race, and became still
more degraded in foa ture and form, ancl in the course of
ages lost almost all traces of their extraction from
the Asiatic peoples. If a traveller only bears this fact
in mind, and commences his researches from the Cape of
Good Hope, he will be able easily, as he marches northward,
to separate the less adulterated tribes from those
who are so nearly allied to the true negro type as to
bear classification as negroid. The kinky, woolly hair
is common to all ; but even in this there are shades of
difference from that which is coarse almost as horse-
VOL. II.
1889.
July.
The
Wahuma.
Annex 69
1889.
July.
The
Wahuma.
386 IN D.ARKES'l' .AFRICA.
hair, to that whid1 rinds silken floss for finPncss. The
study of the hair may, however, be left; the great
and engrossing study being the Caucasian faces
under the ncgro hnir. From among the Kaflirs,
Zulus, l\fatabeles, Basutos, Bechuanas, or any other of
the fierce South African tribes, select an ordinary
specimen of those splendidly-formed tribes so ruthlessly
denominated as negroes, and plant him near a
,Y est African, or Congoesc, or Gaboncse type, and place
a Hindu between them, and having been 011cc started
on the right trail of discovery, you ·will at once perceive
that the features of the Kaffir are a subtle amalgamation
of the Hindu and ·west African types ; hut if we
take a J\ihuma of mature age, the relation to the Hindu
will still more readily appear. Advancing across the
Zambezi towards the watershed of the Congo and
Loangwa, we observe among the fribes a confusion of
types, which may be classed indifferently as being an
intermediate family between the ·west African and the
Kaffir; an improvement on the former, but not quite
up to the standard of the latter. If ,-ve extend our
travels cast or west we will rind this to be a
far-spreading type. It embraces the Babisa, Barna,
Balunda, and the tribes of the entire Congo basin ;
and to the eastward, "\Yachunga, "\Yafipa, "\Vakawendi,
"\Yakonongo, "\VanyarmYezi, and \Vasukmna. Among
them, every now and then, we will be struck with
the close resemblance of minor tribal communities to
the finest Zulus, and near the eastern littoral we
will sec negroicl "\Vest Africans reproduced in the
,Vaiau, "\Yasagara, ·w angindo, and the blacks of
Zanzibar. "\"Vhen we return from the East Coast to
the uplands bordering the Tanganika, and advam·c
north as far as Ujiji, we will sec the stature ancl
facial type much irnproncl. Through Ujiji we enter
Uruncli, and there is again a visible improvement. If'
we go east a few clays we enter Uhha, and we arc
in the presence of twin-brothers of Znluland-tall,
warlike creatures, with Caucasian heads and faces, hnt
dyed darkly with the saLle pigment. If we go east
Annex 69
THE INDO-.AFRTOANS. 387
a. little further, among those mixtures of pure negroeR,
with Kaflir type of ancient Ukalaganzn, now called
Usumhwa, we sec a ta1l, graceful-looking hcrdsmm1
,-rith European features, but ~lark in colour . .._ If we ask
him what he is, he will tell us his occupation is
herding cattle, and that he is a J\[tusi, of the -wat usi
tribe. "Is there any country, then, called Utusi ? "
and he ·will ans,Yer "No; bnt he came from the north." ,r c advance to the north, and ,rn find ourse1-ves travelling
along the spine of pastoral upland. -we are in
the Xilotic basin. Every streamlct trends easterly to a
great inland sea called now the Yictoria N yanza, or
westerly to the Albert Edward Nyanza._ This npland
embraces Ruanda, Karagwe, l\I pororo, Ankori, Ihangiro ,
Uhaiya, and Uzongora, and all these tribes inhabiting
those countries possess cattle ; but the people are
not all herdamen. ]\Jany among them arc de-voted to
agriculture. After journeying hither and thither , \Ye
are impressed with the far,t that all those occupied with
tending cattle are simj]ar to that graceful l\I tusi whom
we met in Usumbwa, and who vaguely pointed to the
north as his original home, and that all the agriculturists
are as negroid in feature as any thick-lipped \Vest Coast
African. By dwe1ling among them, we also learn
that the herdsmen regard those who till the soil with as
much contempt as a London banking clerk would view
the farm labourer. Still advancing to the north we
behold an immense snowy range. It is an impassable
harrier ; we deflect our mareh to the west, aud find this
:\I tusi type numerous, and stretching up to the foot of
the mountains, and to dense, impenetrable forests unfit
for the herding of cattle; and at once the Caucasian
type ceases, ancl the negroicl foatnres, either coppery,
lilack, or mixed complexion -t he flat nose, the sunken
ridge, and the projecting of the lmYcr part of the faceare
dumb witnesses that here the wave of superior
races was arrested. \Ye retrace our steps, ascend to
the upland and skirt the snowy range eastward, and
over a splendid grazing country ca1led Toro, Uhaiyana,
and Unyoro, \Ve see the fine-featured herdsmen again
1889.
July.
The
Wahuma.
Annex 69
1889.
July.
The
Wahuma .
388 JN DARKEST AFRICA.
in numhers attending their vast herds, nncl thr dark
flat-nosed negroicl tilling the land with hoe:::;, as we
Haw tl1em further south. After passing the snowy
range on its northern extremity, we proceed west.
across the flat grassy valley of the Semliki to other
grassy uplands parallel with Unyoro, but separate<l
from it hy the Albert N yanza ; and over this pastoral
region arc living together, lJnt each strictly adhering to
his own pursuit, the herdsmen and the tillers of the
soil. During our tnwels from Usumbwa the herdsmen
ha,,e changed their names from "\Vatusi to "\Vanyamhn,
"\Yalrnma, -\Yaima, "\Yawitu, and "\Vachwezi. That
is, they have accepted these titles in the main from the
agricultural class, but whether in Ankori, or among the
Balegga and Ba, ·ira, or dwelling with the "\Vaganda or
in Unyoro, they call themselves "\Yatusi, "\Vahuma,
or "\Vachwezi. In Karagwe, Ankori, or Usongora,
they are the dominating classes. Their descendants
sit in the seat of power in Ihangiro, Uhaiya,
Uganda, and Unyoro; but the people of these countries
arc an admixture of the Zulu and "\Vest African tribes,
and therefore they are more devoted to agriculture.
·when, as for instance, tribes · such as "\Yaganda, "\Vasoga,
and "\Vakuri have been left to grow up and increase in
power and prosperity, we have hut to look at the
sea-like expanse of the Victoria Nyanza, and we see
the reason of it. No further progress "·as possible, and
the wave of migration passed westward and eastward,
nnd overlapped these tribes, and in their progress
:;;nuthwarcl dropped a few members by the way, to
l,ecome absorbed by the members of the agricultural
dass, and to lose their distinctive characteristics.
As the traditions of Unyoro report that the "\Yachwezi
came from the eastern lmnk of the Yictoria ~ile, we
will cross that river, and we find that between us and
A byssiuia there are no grand physical features snch as
great lakes or continuous ranges to har the migration
to the south of barbarous multitudes; that the soil
is poor and the climate dry, and pasture unpromising,
and that all the tribes are devoted to the rearing of
Annex 69
CLIJIIATE OF THE GRASS-LAND. 403
ignorance in the art of cooking them leave8 them
nauseous.
The "mahva," or beer, is from fermented millet and
ripe bananas. It is in great demand, and a chief's
greatest business in life appears to be paying visits to
his friends round about, for the purpose of exhausting
their malwa pots. Fortunately, it is not very potent,
and is seareely strong enough to do more than inspire a
happy convivial feeling.
The climate of the region is agreeable. Five hours'
,rnrk per L1ay ean be performed, even ont-door, ·without
discomfort from excessive heat, arn1 three days out of
seven dnring the whole of daylight, bemuse of the
frequent clouded state of the sky. -\Yhen, however, the
sky is expose(1, the sun shines with a burning fervour
that makes men seek the shelter of their cool huts.
The higher portions of the grass-land ~ a~ at Kavalli's,
in the Balegga Hills, and on the summit of the Ankori
pastoral ranges-range from 4,500 to 6,500 feet above
the sea, and large extents of Toro and Southern
Unyoro as high as 10,000, and promise to he agreeable
lands for European settlers when means are provided to
~onvey them there. '\Yhen that time arrives they will
find amiable, quiet, and friendly neighhoms in that
fine-featured race, of which the hest type are the
\Vahuma, with whom ·we have never exchanged angry
words, and who bring up vividly to the mind the traits of
those blameless people with whom the gods deigned to
banquet once a year upon the heights of Ethiopia.
1889.
July.
The
Wahuma.
Annex 70
D. Rice, B. Cooper, “The Economic Value of Human Life”, American Journal of Public Health,
Vol. 57, No. 11 (Nov. 1967)

Annex 70
To establish the economic value of a human life, lifetime earnings
discounted at a 4 per cent rate are presented by age, sex, color, and
education. These estimates are intended for use by economists,
program planners, and others. Various specific findings
are reported.
THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE
Dorothy P. Rice, F.A.P .H.A., and Barbara S. Cooper
Introduction
THE value of human life expressed in
terms of lifetime earnings is a basic
tool of the economist, program planner,
government administrator, and others
who are interested in measuring the social
benefits associated with investments
in particular programs. For public programs,
such as the control and eradication
of disease, highway construction,
accident control, education, vocational
rehabilitation, welfare, housing, and
flood control, the valuation of human
lives is a basic requirement for the
proper calculation of the benefits to be
derived. The recent emphasis on costbenefit
analysis in all of these areas requires
that adequate tools be provided
for analysis, Like the carpenter, whose
work is generally facilitated and product
improved by the availability of good materials
and equipment, the economist
must be equipped with the tools of his
trade--in this case, basic data for valuation
of human life.
The aim of this report is to provide
improved, refined, comprehensive, and
up-to-date estimates of the present value
of lifetime earnings in considerable detail
according to age, sex, color, and
educational level. Presentation of the
data in this form will enable the econo-
1954
mist to choose the most appropriate series
of data for program evaluation. For
example, a health program to reduce
mortality in a specific age and color
group can be evaluated by use of the
lifetime earnings data developed for that
group. Likewise, basic data are provided
for measuring the benefits from investment
in various educational programs.
The data presented are limited to the
quantification of the value of human life
in terms of lifetime earnings. These are
by no means the only measures of the
value of human life. Schelling notes that
valuation may be in terms of the worth
of one's life to oneself or to whoever will
pay to prolong it, and the amount will
vary accordingly.1 However, in this report
the value of a person is defined in
terms of his economic worth as a productive
member of society and the
amount will vary according to age, sex,
color, and degree of educational attainment.
Historical Summary
Quantification of the human life
values in economic terms is not a new
concept. In their "Money Value of a
Man," Dublin and Lotka traced this
procedure from the valuation of slave
labor in ancient times through 'the vari-
VOL. 57, NO. 11, A.J.P.H.
Annex 70
ous estimates made by Sir William Petty
in the 17th century and Adam Smith a
century later, on up to the time of their
first edition, in 1930, and later, to 1946,
when their revised edition was published.
2 In the revised volume, these
authors defined the money value of man
as the present value of his net future
earnings, i.e., gross future earnings less
that part which he consumes or spends
on himself. Detailed data were presented
for ages 21 through 64 according to specified
annual levels of earnings in 1934,
employing a 2.5 per cent discount rate.
The human life value concept has also
been applied commercially in the field
of life and health insurance. In 1927,
Huebner, in his "Economics of Life lnsurance,"
3 stated his thesis that optimum
life insurance protection should equal
the capitalized monetary worth of the
individual's earning capacity. This idea
of employing potential lifetime earnings
as a measure of adequate life and health
insurance protection is now used extensively
in the field.
Lifetime Earnings in Health Studies
The cost-benefit studies in the health
field during the past few years include
various estimates of the value of human
life. Some are based on incomes; some
on earnings; some impute a value to
housewives; some account for consumption;
and various discount rates are employed.
Prest and Turvey point out in
their comprehensive survey of cost-benefit
analysis: "Some of the differences between
authors in the way they estimate
benefits stem from differences in the
availability of statistics rather than from
differences in what the authors would
like to measure if they could." 4
The following passages briefly examine
the different basic assumptions, technics,
and data employed by various
health researchers in their presentation
of earnings foregone.
In assessing the cost of mental illnt!ss
NOVEMBER, 1967
ECONOMIC VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE
in 1958, Fein presented estimates of the
present value of future expected income
for ten-year age groups at various discount
rates ranging from 2 to 5 per
cent. Median income in 1952 was used
for males and females, ignoring the economic
value of housewives. 5
Weisbrod, in "Economics of Public
Health," used fundamentally the same
formula as Dublin and Lotka for calculating
the present value of net future
earnings. However, there were some differences
in the meaning of consumption
and the earnings components of the
formulas. 6 Weisbrod developed the concept
of marginal consumption-the additional
consumption associated with an
additional person-and imputed a value
for nonmarket household services of fe.
males in terms of units of family responsibility.
Data were presented for
the present values of net future earnings
by single years of age and by sex,
using cross-sectional 1949 earnings and
two discount rates-4 and 10 per cent.
These data have been used recently by
several economists in the development of
costs of illnesses. 7
Klarman calculated the present value
of future earnings for syphilis cases and
for those who died of cardiovascular
diseases. For syphilis, the calculation
was based on 1961 average earnings by
sex and color, with no adjustments for
age and the value of household services.
Klarman used a net discount rate of approximately
2 per cent, having adjusted
for productivity increases. 8 In the later
work on cardiovascular diseases, the
present value of lifetime earnings was
calculated for ten-year age groups on
the basis of 1962 average earnings for
employed males and females, and separate
calculations were made for the value
of housewives' services for each age
class. In this case, a 4 per cent discount
rate was used. 9
In the recent study of one of the
authors, "Estimating the Cost of Illness,"
lifetime earnings were presented for
1955
Annex 70
assume that a person ten years from
now will earn the same amount as a
person of the same age, sex, color, and
educational level earns today. In order
to adjust for the gain in productivity,
an average annual gain can be projected
and applied to the annual earnings. This
rate of increase may be incorporated
into the discounting calculations to obtain
a net effective discount rate. For
example, assuming a rise in productivity
of 3 per cent a year, 20 a discount rate
of approximately 7 per cent will be reduced
to a rate of approximately 4 per
cent ( 1.07/ 1.03 = 1.039), the rate used
in this report.
Allowance for Consumption
There is a diversity of opm10n regarding
the treatment of consumption.
Insurance companies treat consumption
as a deduction from a person's contribution
to output. Dublin and Lotka and
Weisbrod deduct consumption from total
output in their calculations of the earning
losses. 21
Fein and Klarman, on the other hand,
make no such adjustment. Fein summarizes
his views as follows:
"Certainly the net figure ( gross value less
consumption) derived by Dublin and Lotka
to indicate the money value of a man to his
family is correct for their purposes. It is not
at all apparent, howewr. that the net concept
is the correct one when we deal with the
economic value of a man to society. It is
true that man consumes partly in order to
maintain himself, and in this sense some of
his consumption may be considered as a gross
investment to take care of depreciation; it
is also true, howernr, that consumption is an
end in itself and can be viewed as a final,
rather than an intermediate, step in the creation
of other products. The question involved
concerns the purposes for which an economy
exists." On an individual's income, "the individual
enjoys life, and it is for this purpose
that the social economy exists." 22
In accordance with the above Yiewpoint
and because we are measuring the economic
value of man to society and not
to his family, no allowance for consumption
is made.
NOVEMBER, 1967
ECONOMIC VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE
Findings
Data are presented on the present
value of lifetime earnings of males and
females by age, color, and years of
school completed, discounted at 1 per
cent. Table 1 presents the data hy sex
and color, and Table 2 presents the data
for males and females by color and years
of school completed. Data for three levels
of education are presented: completion
of 8 years_ 12 years, and 16 or more
vears of schooL (Data may he obtained
from the authors for th~ee additional
levels of education-completion of less
than 8 years, 9-11 years, and 13-15 years
of schooL)
The following highlights some of the
relationships and differentials found in
lifetime earnings by age, sex, color. and
educational leveL
Pattern of Lifetime Earnings
The value of lifetime earnings rnries
at different ages. For mf'n, dismunted
expected lifetime earnings increase
rapidly and sharply, peaking in the
young adult years-ages 25-29-and
then decreasing at an even faster rate
beginning in middle age. Without discounting,
the aggregate lifetime earnings
would be highest at the youngest age
groups, decreasing with age_ The discounting
procedure invoh-es the application
of increasingly higher rates to
each year's earnings. At the under-oneyear
age group, in which a person is not
considered productive until at least age
14, his first year's earnings are diminished
by the rate for the 13th year. The
13th year of discounting at the rate of
4 per cent yields a figure of 60 per cent,
reducing that first year's earnings by
t,,·o-fifths.
At the young adult ages, many years
of expected earnings are also discounted
heavily, but the earnings are counted
immediately and these earnings over a
long work span result in peak earnings
at these age groups- At age 20, when
many persons have already begun work-
1959

Annex 71
J. S. Landefeld, E. Seskin, “The Economic Value of Life: Linking Theory to Practice”, American
Journal of Public Health, Vol. 72, No. 6 (June 1982)

Annex 71
The Economic Value of Life: Linking Theory to Practice
J. STEVEN LANDEFELD, PHD, AND EUGENE P. SESKIN, PHO
Abstract: Human capital estimates of the economic
value of life have been routinely used in the past to
perform cost-benefit analyses of health programs. Recently,
however, serious questions have been raised
concerning the conceptual basis for valuing human life
by applying these estimates. Most economists writing
on these issues tend to agree that a more conceptually
correct method to value risks to human life in costbenefit
analyses would be based on individuals' "willingness
to pay" for small changes in their probability
of survival. Attempts to implement the willingness-topay
approach using survey responses or revealedpreference
estimates have produced a confusing array
of values fraught with statistical problems and measurement
difficulties. As a result, economists have
searched for a link between willingness to pay and
standard human capital estimates and have found that
Introduction
Among the most hotly debated areas of public policy are
those involving risks to human health and safety. For
example, in the occupational area, industry representatives
claim that exposure standards are so stringent they would
fail any reasonable cost-benefit analysis. At the same time,
public interest groups claim that cost-benefit analysis is a
biased tool used to further the ends of industry to the
detriment of workers' health and safety. 1
Central to this debate is the valuation of human life.
Although some claim the value of human life cannot be
expressed in monetary terms, the competing demands on
scarce public funds require that some value be placed on
programs that save lives. Refusal to place an explicit value
on life merely forces implicit valuations that are made as part
of decisions to fund or not to fund public projects as well as
decisions to take other regulatory actions.
Most economists writing on these issues agree that the
conceptually correct method to value risks to human life in
cost-benefit analyses should be based on individuals' willingness
to pay (or on individuals' willingness to accept compen-
Address reprint requests to J. Steven Landefeld, PhD, BE-52,
Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce,
Washington, DC 20230. Dr. Seskin is also with that agency. This
paper, submitted to the Journal September 24, 1981, was revised and
accepted for publication January 22, 1982.
Editor's Note: See also related editorial p 536 this issue.
AJPH June 1982, Vol. 72, No. 6
for most individuals a lower bound for valuing risks to
life can be based on their willingness to pay to avoid
the expected economic losses associated with death.
However, while these studies provide support for
using individual's private valuation of forgone income
in valuing risks to life, it is also clear that standard
human capital estimates cannot be used for this purpose
without reformulation. After reviewing the major
approaches to valuing risks to life, this paper concludes
that estimates based on the human capital
approach-reformulated using a willingness-to-pay
criterion-produce the only clear, consistent, and objective
values for use in cost-benefit analyses of policies
affecting risks to life. The paper presents the first
empirical estimates of such adjusted willingness-topay/
human capital values. (Am J Public Health 1982;
72:555-566.)
sation) for small changes in their probability of survival.*
Despite this agreement, however, controversy continues on
the appropriate technique for actually producing estimates
for valuing risks to life. This paper reviews the major issues
in this area and concludes that estimates based on the human
capital approach-reformulated, using a willingness-to-pay
criterion-produce the only clear, consistent, and objective
values for use in cost-benefit analyses of policies affecting
risks to life.
Methods Used to Value Life
Human Capital (HK)
The human capital (HK) approach to valuing life has a
long history dating back to the works of Petty' and Farr. 3
Later studies by Fein,• Mushkin and Collings,> Weisbrod,•
and Klarman' polished and improved the theoretical and
practical underpinnings of the approach. Finally, Rice• in
her pathbreaking article, "Estimating the Costs of Illness,"
effectively codified the empirical application of the technique.
*It should be recognized that the amount people are willing to
pay depends, in part, on their ability to pay. Hence, any estimate of
willingness to pay is dependent upon a given distribution of income.
Similarly, because of these wealth effects, the amount people are
willing to pay may differ from the amount they would be willing to
accept as compensation.
555
Annex 71
LANDEFELD AND SESKIN
In the standard HK approach, it is assumed that the
value to society of an individual's life is measured by future
production potential, usually calculated as the present discounted
value of expected tabor earnings.•• Some analysts,
like Weisbrod, have employed expected earnings net of
consumption, based on the notion that when an individual
dies not only is productive contribution lost, but also claims
on future consumption."Therefore, as would be the case for
physical capital, the net loss to society is the difference
between earnings and maintenance (consumption) expenditures.
Whether the gross HK approach or the net approach-
adjusting for consumption-is employed, each is
implicitly based upon the maximization of society's present
and future production.•••
Since standard HK estimates are constructed from
society's perspective, tabor earnings are evaluated before
taxes as representing the actual component of GNP, rather
than after-tax earnings which represent the relevant magnitude
to the individual. In addition, non-tabor income is
excluded since individual capital holdings (and associated
earnings) are not materially affected by an individual's
continued existence. Thus, standard HK estimates incorporate
a zero value for persons without tabor income such as
retired individuals with only investment or pension income.
By its emphasis on economic product, the HK approach
also ignores other dimensions of illness and death as well as
nonmarket activities that may be more important to an
individual than economic loss. These include pain and
suffering, aversion to risk, and loss of leisure which, itself,
has value for the individual and perhaps for others as well.
Furthermore, the only adjustment for nonmarket activities in
HK estimates is the imputation of a value for housekeeping
activities. These calculations are usually based on available
information from time-use studies combined with data on
wages of market substitutes for the relevant household
activities.
An important issue that must be resolved to implement
the HK approach involves the choice of an appropriate
"social" discount rate to convert future earnings into present
values. The problem amounts to determining what
**Rice• and Cooper and Rice• estimated the cost of illness in
the United States by using the HK approach to calculate indirect
costs in the form of forgone earnings due to sickness and death and
then adding the direct costs based on medical expenditures for
prevention, diagnosis, and treatment. Subsequently, Hartunian,
Smart, and Thompson 10 suggested that in assessing prevention
programs, incidence-based estimates of the costs of illness should
replace the prevalence-based estimates used by Rice. More recently,
it has been suggested that especially for fatal illnesses, an
adjustment should be made to account for the fact that while those
who die may suffer substantial costs before their deaths, society also
avoids significant health-related expenses because of their deaths;
on this point, see National Academy of Sciences.''
•••rt should be noted, however, that if society merely wanted
to maximize the gross national product (GNP)-a common measure
of welfare-a less expensive course of action than investments in
life saving might be to eliminate immigration barriers or discourage
birth control. Furthermore, health measures that reduce death rates
and add to GNP by increasing the labor force, could actually lower
per capita GNP, if the number of workers increases relative to the
amount of output they produce (see Mushkin and Landefeld").
556
TABLE 1-Present Value of Future Earnings of Males by Selected
Age Groups, 1977•
(1977 dollars)
Real DiscounRt ate
Age Group
(years) 2.5 Per Cent 6 Per Cent 10 Per Cent
1 to 4 405,802 109,364 31,918
20 to 24 515,741 285,165 170,707
40 to 44 333,533 242,600 180,352
65 to 69 25,331 21,801 18,825
•Dollarf iguresb ased on the present value of both expected lifetime
earningsa nd housekeepings ervices at 1977 price levels and an annual
increasei n laborp roductivitoyf 1 per cent.
Source: Dolan,H odgsona, nd Wun1.4
society forgoes when it invests in life-saving programs. The
choice is made difficult because of the effects of taxes and
risk aversion which cause the rate of return to society's
investments to diverge from the rates of return to private
investments. For example, taxation means that the beforetax
rate ofreturn to private investment (the marginal productivity
of capital) will exceed the after-tax rate of return to the
individual investor (the individual's rate of time preference).+
Risk aversion works in the same direction, resulting
in a risk premium that causes a divergence between the
marginal productivity of capital and the individual's rate of
time preference.
Although the problem of choosing a discount rate arises
in the evaluation of investments in most public programs, the
long life of "investments" in HK-with life expectancies on
the order of 70 years-greatly magnifies the difficulty. For
example, Table I shows a range of HK values when different
real discount rates are used to estimate the present value of
forgone earnings of males by selected age groups.:j::j: As can
be seen, the values are significantly larger for low discount
rates than for high ones, especially in the case of children
whose stream of earnings will be the longest. At a real rate of
10 per cent-the rate of discount recommended by the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB):j::j::j:-the value for males
aged I to 4 is less than one-tenth the value corresponding to a
real rate of 2.5 per cent. At the same time, choice of a
discount rate can affect the relative valuations placed on
persons in specific age groups. For example, according to
the Table, at a real rate of 6 per cent, males aged 20 to 24 are
valued higher than males aged 40 to 44; whereas, at a real
rate of I O per cent, the reverse is true. The usual response to
+A standard result of capital theory is that, given perfect capital
markets, rational individuals will adjust their savings and consumption
patterns so that their private rate of time preference will equal
their private rate of return on investments.
++Since estimates of future earnings are generally made in
constant or base-year dollars, whatever nominal discount rate is
chosen must be converted to a real rate by an adjustment for
inflation.
+++According to 0MB, "the prescribed rate of 10 per cent
represents an estimate of the average rate of return on private
investment before taxes and after inflation." 15
AJPH June 1982, Vol. 72, No. 6
Annex 72
Auguste Maurel, Le Congo de la Colonisation Belge à l’Indépendance (1992)

Annex 72
Auguste Maurel
LE CONGO
de la colonisation belge
à l'indépendance
REPUBLIQUCEE NTRAFRICAINE
ANGOLA
Préface de
Jean'"'PhilippeP eemans
PRO\'INCE
ORIENTALE
RHODESIE
ZAÏRE_HISTOIRE & SOCIETE -
L'HARMATTAN ~
Annex 72
AUGUSTE MAUREL,
(MICHEL MERLIER)
LE CONGO
de la colonisation belge
à l'indépendance
Préfacé par Jean-Philippe PEEMANS
L'Harmattan
5-7 me de l'Ecole-Polytechnique
75005 - Paris
Annex 72
L'auteur
De son vrai nom Auguste Maurel, il avait adopté Je pseudonyme
«Michel Merlier» parce que dans les armées 1950 - années
des décolonisations, africaines entre autres - il ne faisait pas
bon dire et surtout écrire des vérités sur les divers col onialismes
occidentaux, si on voulait parachever une carrière universitaire
sans encombre et/ ou accéder à des postes de responsabilité
dans le secteur public ou privé.
Auguste Maurel, géographe et agrégé de ]'université, a été sur
le terrain congolais bien avant les événements de 1959-60, et notamment
au Katanga.
Pour écrire cet ouvrage, il a compilé la plupart des informations,
journaux, articles, livres, disponibles à l'époque sur le
Congo belge.
Cet ouvrage est la reproduction
augmentée d'une préface
de l'ouvrage:
MICHEL MERLIER
Le Congo-.
de la colonisation belge
à l'indépendance
«Cahiers Libres» n°32-33
édités par François Maspero, 1962, Paris.
© L'Harmattan, 1992
ISBN: 2-7384-1260-2
Annex 72
Le premier syst~me colonial
« Nous avons connu qu'il y avait dans les villes des maisons
magnifiques pour les Blancs et des paillottes croulantes pour les
Noirs, qu'un Noir n'6tait admis ni dans Jes cinémas, ni dans les
restaurant~, ni dans les magasins dits européens : qu'un Noir
voyageait à même la coque des péniches, aux pieds du Blanc dans
sa cabine de luxe.
« Qui oubliera enfin les fusillades où périrent tant de nos frères,
les cachots où furent brutalement jetés ceux qui ne voulaient plus
se soumettre à un régime d'injustice, d'oppression et d'exploita'
tion1. >l
Sans contrainte, la constitution d'un groupe de sociétés capitalistes
ne suffisait pas à implanter le capitalisme au Congo. Les
achats des Congolais, épisodiques et modiques, ne pouvaient créer
la base d'un essor rapide de la cueillette : tous les explorateurs
regrettent que l'économie de subsistance convienne tant aux
<c indigènes » et déplorent l'insuffisance de leurs besoins. Aussi,
dès 1891-1892, Léopold II légalisa le travail forcé que les commis
des factorenes imposaient le long des fleuves.
Par la coercition de peuples plus faibles, l'économie marchande
devait pénétrer l'économie de subsistance des villages dans un
délai assez court, imposé par les conditions de rentabilité des ca~i·
taux investis. Ce conflit entre capitalisme et économie de subsistance
s'exprjme alors dans un conflit de races: organiser l'économie
coloniale revient à créer des détachements d'hommes armés, em~
bryon de l'Etat colonial, encadrés par des agents européens inté~
ressés à l'affaire et aux mains des compagnies.
Le système des sentinelles ou capitas et des gardes forestiers
devint le principe de l'économie coloniale. Achetés par l'Etat
{rs ooo. hommes à l'origine de la Force publique) ou mercenaires
des compagnies (ro ooo hommes au moins), des noirs, armés de
fusils à pistons et souvent de fusils à tir rapide « albini )), organi~
saient la cueillette sous la direction des chefs de postes intéressés
à la récolte par des primes. « J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre
connaissance que vous devez tâcher de livrer, dès le rer janvier
r899, 4 ooo kilos de caoutchouc. Pour cela vous avez carte blanche.
Essayez d'abord par la douceur, mais si les indigènes persistent
à refuser les taxes réclamées par l'Etat, employez la force des
annes », écrivait à l'un d'eux le capitaine Verstraeten•.
On recruta les premiers soldats sur la côte occidentale ou à
Zanzibar, hommes endettés qui s'engageaient pour accompagner
les caravanes et les expéditions dans l'intérieur du bassin 8• Ensuite
le recrutement sur place remplaça ce recrutement extérieur
sC1r mais coftteux. On incorporait dans la For ce Publique Jes esclaves,
les prisonniers de guerre « libérés », les fortes têtes livrées
1. Version de Congo lg6o, t. I, p. 323.
2. Cité dans Germinal, 1908, n° r5, p. 13.
3. Là Fores publique, de sa nais$ance à 1914, 19.5:2.
Annex 72
Le secret de la colonisation 29
ar les chefs des villages : souvent les officiers leur achetaient des
hommes. Un système de primes judicieux les intéressait à ce trafic de
chair humaine : quinze francs pour un enfant mâle mesurant
au moins I,20 mètre, soixante-cinq francs pour un jeune homme
Illesurant au moins 1,35 mètre et quatre-vingt-dix francs pour
un homme apte au service mesurant au moins 1,55 ipètre.
Réservé d'abord à certaines réglons comme l'Uele, !'Orientale,
le Lualaba-Kasai, le recrutement s'étendit à l'ensemble du Congo
occupé après les grandes mutineries de la Force Publique : en
1896, dans un but fiscal, on décida de recruter un soldat par vingtcinq
cases. A cette date, Je recrutement de la force armée nécessaire
à l'économie coloniale représente 58 % du budç-et financé
par l'exploitation des paysans. En 1905, la Force Pubhque absor bait
encore 17 % du budget. Ces levées de miliciens atteindront
66 ooo hommes de 1892 à 1914.
Sur le modèle de la colonisation hollandaise à Java, le travail
forcé - et non l'impôt en argent ou l'intéressement matériel des
Congolais- constitue le moteur de l'économie coloniale. Appliqué
depuis quelques années, il fut légalisé en 1892. Un système de
gratifications aux chefs de postes et aux commis les incitait à
généraliser le travail forcé dans leur zone ; des primes plus élevées
lorsque le prix d'achat des produits de cueillette ba.issait, puis,
devant l'indignation d'une partie de l'opinion sensible, des « frais
de perception>,, des points valant pour l'avancement et enfin des
allocations de retraite.
Le travail forcé comprenait d'abord des corvées de coupe de
bois, de pagayage, de portage, de réfection des pistes et d'entretien
des lignes téléphoniques. On imposa le portage, relativement
libre avant 1891. E. Picard a laissé une description hallucinante
du portage sur les pistes du Bas Congo :
<c L'âpre voie, battue à l'infini par les pieds nus des porteurs,
durcie comme une aire ... Incessamment, nous rencontrons ces
porteurs, isolés ou en file indienne, noirs, misérables, pour tout
vêtement ceinturés d'un pagne horriblement crasseux, tête crépue
et nue supportant la charge, caisse, balot, pointe d'ivoire, panier
bourré de caoutchouc, baril, la plupart chétifs, cédant sous le
faix multiplié par la lassitude et l'insuffisance de la nourriture,
faite d'une poignée de rii et d'infect poisson sec, pitoyables cariatides
ambulantes ... organisées en un système de transport humain,
réquisi tionnés par l'Etat armé de sa force publique irrésistible,
livrés par les chefs dont ils sont les esclaves et qui raflent leurs
salaires ; ... crevant au long de la route ou, la route finie, allant
crever de surmenage dans leur village 1• >1
Au Congo la confrontation du milieu naturel peu transformé,
sans réseau de transport cohérent, et des exigences du marché
I. E. Picard : En Congolie, 1909, p. 96-98.
Annex 72
30 Le pnmier système colonial
mondial obligèrent la colonisation à mettre sur pied une énorme
entreprise de transport vers la côte avec les moyens les plus primitifs.
Le portage permit de distribuer les premiers bénéfices.
avant de freiner le développement économique.
Après 1945, le portage existe encore dans les zones du coton
malgré l'ouverture des pistes : les limites imposées à cette culture
par des prix d'achats dérisoires laissaient assez de temps aux
paysans pour porter leur coton au poste d'achat, les frais des
compagnies diminuant d'autant.
Les villages doivent aussi fournir des vivres au titre de l'impôt
ou comme amende, ce qui permet d'abaisser leur prix 1• Pour les
travaux publics, l'Etat réquisitionne la main-d'oeuvre nécessaire:
sept mille hommes dès 1893. Ces « volontaires )), conduits au poste
de recrutement enchaînés, doive.nt. effectuer des périodes de trois
à sept ans pour trois à six francs par mois plus la nourriture .
Par la suite. grâce au décret du 3 juin r906, on affectera une partie
des miliciens de la Force Publique à ces travaux forcés aux mêmes
conditions.
Mais surtout le travail forcé le long des fleuves et des pistes
produisait les denrées d 'exportation. La production de l'ivoire
reposait. outre les expéditions de la Force Publique. sur l'imposition
en pointes des chefs de villages. On limita le droit de chasse,
toléré seulement contre l'abandon de la moitié du produit à l'Etat.
La production du caoutchouc progressa rapidement: trente tonnes
en 1887. six mille en 19or. ·
La capitation fut fixée entre six et vin,gt-quatre francs : vingtquatre
francs pour un paysan de l' ABIR représentait quatre
kilos de caoutchouc par mois. Il fallait délaisser l'agriculture pour
d'harassantes courses dans la forêt.« 2 500 cartouches représentent
25 ooo kilos de caoutchouc» plaisantait alors un fonctionnaire.
Bien entendu ce caoutchouc fut payé au truck system : un kilo
vaut cinquante centimes de pacotille au poste et huit à dix francs
à Anvers. Faut-il s'étonner que les rives du Congo et du
Kasai soient désertes et que le moindre déplacement d'un
fonctionnaire ou d'un agent des compagnies se transforme en
expédition ?
(< Dans la plupart des cas, il (le noir) doit, chaque quinzaine,
faire une ou deux journées de marche, et parfois davantage, pour
se rendre à l'endroit de la forêt où il peut trouver, en assez grande
abondance des lianes caoutchoutières. Là. le récolteur mène pendant
un certain nombre de jours, une existence misérable. Il
doit se construire un abri, improvisé ... exposé aux intempéries
de l'air et aux attaques de bêtes féroces. Sa récolte, il doit l'apporter
aux postes de l'Etatoudelacompagnie,etcen'est qu'après cela
1. E. Vandervelde : La Belgique et le Congo, 1911.
Annex 72
Le seC1'et de la colonisation 31
qu'il rentre au village où il ne peut guère séjourner que deux ou
trois jours, car la nouvelle échéance presse 1• »
Le jour du marché les l?aysans arrivent en colonne escortés par
des capitas armés d'albini et de coutelas de toutes tailles. Bientôt
plus d'un millier d'hommes sont rassemblés sur la place, é9ouvantés
et silencieux. On range les récolteurs par village, en ligne,
derrière des sentinelles l'arme au pied. Devant eux les employés
de la compagnie, une balance truquée, un billot et une table avec
les marchandises d'échange : assiettes en fer blanc, lambeaux
d'étoffe, miroirs, sonnettes, mitakos.
L'appel des villages commence : à chaque nom les villageois se
ruent en avant pour déverser leur récolte dans le plateau de la
balance. Un caporal tranche sur le billot quelques boules de caout chouc
prises dans chaque panier : à la moindre impureté, l'agent
de la compagnie crie pamba (pour rien) et tout le caoutchouc du
village est confisqué tandis q_ue les capitas jurent de se venger à
coups de chicotte. L'agent Jette aux paysans leur salaire, sans
leur demander ce qu'ils préfèrent. Alors les capitas les poussent
vers les séchoirs où ils déposent la récolte.
Ensuite commence la palabre de l'a?ent commercial et des
capitas. Si la quantité fournie a diminué, la sentinelle doit
s'expliquer : absence, nombre de .paysans tués dont on présente
les mains coupées, boucannées et enfilées sur des baguettes. Alors
commence la distribution des cartouches au prorata des mains
livrées. Si la sentinelle ne peut se justifier, elle subit immédiatement
le supplice de la chicotte.
La nuit ou au petit jour, des expéditions punitives ravagaient
les villages dont la cueillette restait malgré tout insuffisante :
cases incendiées, rapt des femmes comme otages, chefs brutalisés.
Au retour les capitas portaient au chef de poste quelgues mains
coupées pour prouver l'accomplissement de leur mission. lJ fallait
aussi fournir autant de mains que d'hommes absents pour le
re crutement ou le portage. Les noirs récalcitrants, désarmés au
préalable, étaient bâtonnés, enchaînés et conduits au poste pour
tr availler sur la piste ou porter des charges 1•
La chicotte, base de ce système d'avilissement des Noirs, était
infligée deux fois par jour à six heures et à quatorze heures, près
du poste. Selon le comte R. de Briey, <t le châtiment à la f01s le
plus humanitaire et le plus efficace pour le Noir, c'est le fouet ... les
missionnaires protecteurs naturels du Noir confirment cette matùère
de voir 8 • )) Les capitas distribuaient les peines toute la journée:
I. Rapport de la commission d'enquête, 1905, p. r91.
2. Voir S. Lefranc : Le régime c01,golais, 1908; ] . Marcel : Terre d'lpou vante,
1905 ; P. M:llle : ouvrage cité; E. D. l\:forel : Red Rubber. 1906, et
ses autres ouvrages; E. Vandervelde; 01.1vrage cité et u martyre des Congolais;
A . Verm.eersh : La question congolaise, 1906 .
3. R. de Briey : Le s,Phin~ noir, 1926, p. 163.
Annex 72
32 Le P,emief s}'stème colonial
« Toi tu iras à la chaîne ; toi tu au.ras ton matabiche » (ton pour~
boire, c'est-à-dire le fouet). Les victimes sont étendues sur le sol
maintenues par quatre soldats (« nos glorieux héros>)). Un milicien
vigoureux leur donne les coups convenus avec un nerf d'hippopotame
ou une lanière de cuir. A la fin, la victime est bourrée de
coups de pieds et doit encore remercier en faisant le salut militaire.
Le condamné à la chaîne était attaché plusieurs jours à un palmier,
La Commission d'enquête officielle envoyée au. Congo en 1905
confirma presque tous ces faits : « Il n'a guère été contesté que
dans les différents postes de l'ABIR que nous avons visités, l'emprisonnement
des femmes otages, l'assujettissement des chefs à des
travaux serviles, les humiliations qui leur ont été infligées-, la
chicotte donnée aux révoltést les brutalités des noirs préposés
au service des détenus fussent une règle habituellement suivie 1• »
Dans ce système, des jeunes Belges de vingt _à vingt-cinq ans,
ouvriers ou anciens caporaux venus au Congo pour y faire fortune,
reçoivent des pouvoirs de satrapes. A leur tête, des officiers
et des juges recrutés en Belgiquet en Scandinavie ou en Italie. Les
magistrats doivent fermer les yeux sur les engagements « volontaires
», la chicotte donnée même aux enfants : on leur répondait
d'ailleurs que si, d'après le règlement, la chicotte ne doit être
appliq_uée qu'aux hommes, cela veut dire tout simplement qu'elle
ne doit pas être donnée aux femmes l Les assassins à gages des
compagnies sont protégés par l'administration : il y a prescription
au bout de six mois. Après un crime particulièrement atroce et
connu d'un juge tatillon, ils"seront condamnés à une peine légère,
libérés et envoyés en Europe d '.où ils reviendront auréolés de
gloire et de légende. On donne leur nom à des rues ou à des bour·
gades.
Aux juges intègres, les administrateurs conseillent « le calme et
la réflexion gui doivent inspirer tous vos actes. » Leur intervention
détruirait la discipline, nuirait à l'intérêt de l'Etat dans des
« affaires politiques >> où la justice ne doit pas intervenir. S'ils ne
comprennent pas, on classe le dossier, on les déplace dans des
·contrées reculées, on les calomnie, on les persécute de mille manières
et en dernier recours on tente de les assassiner,
Alors commence le dépeuplement des rives du Congo que signalent
tous les explorateurs. Les paysans congolais fuient les
rivières, les _pistes et les postes, pour se réfugier au coeur de la fo.
rêt, sur les mterfluves. Là, ils échapperont longtemps aux expéditions
fiscales des Blancs.
Alors que le système colonial léopoldien régressait vers le tra~
vail forcé, forme dégénérée de l'esclavage imposée au nom de la
I. Cité dans S. Vandervelde : Le marty-r6 des Congolais.
Annex 72
34 Le premier système colonial
atteignait la région. Le conflit éclata surtout pour l'ivoire, lorsque
Léopold II commença à établir son monopole par le décret domanial
de 1891. Les compagnies cherchaient aussi à se débarrasser
de ces intermédiaires gênants. Le conflit se termina par leur expulsion
du bassin du Congo (1892-1894). La colonisation léopoldiennc
touchait alors à son apogée, avant les révoltes qui l'affaibliraient
pendant plus de dix ans.
De 1885 à 1894 l'Etat Indépendant imposa son autorité sur
de vastes régions . Mais les exactions inouïes du travail forcé entraînèrent
de formidables révoltes, mal connues, noyées dans le
sang, Après la guerre arabe et l'assassinat du chef Gongo Lutete,
les troupes du Kasaï recrutées parmi les Batétéla se mutinèrent.
D'autres mutineries désagrégèrent les colonn·es en marche vers
le Nil (1895-1900). En 1897 et 1898 les nombreux succès des rebelles
provoquèrent le soulèvement des populations de l'Uele, châtiées
à.la boîte à mitraille, contre les fonctionnaires du Domaine Privé,
et celui des Budjas contre l'Anversoise, vaincus après sept expéditions
(r898-1905). Ce soulèvement permit à. son tour la résistance
héroïque des Batétéla au Katanga: Bien organisés et annés du
matériel pris aux Belges qui les présentaient comme une horde de
bandits et de pillards esclavagistes à la solde de l'Anq"leterre, ils
résistèrent encore un an aux troupes du Comité Spécial du Katanga
renforcées par la Force Publique (1907-1908). La guérilla
continua longtemps sur les concessions des sociétés : ainsi le directeur
de l'ABIR remit à la Commission d'Enquête un tableau indiquant
qu'entre le 1er janvi er et le 1er août 1905, cent quarante
deux sentinelles de sa société avaient été tuées ou blessées par des
paysans.
Annex 72
lltn,
L'assemssement des paysans pa, les cultures obligatoif-es 85
d'un chef J?àt un explorà.teut, le décret du 6 octobre r891 prévoyait
qu'il fallait dresser nnmédiâtethet'lt un tableau avec le nom et la situation
du village, le nôrn des notables, le nombre de cases et de la
population, les prestations à fournir.
Louis Franck expliqua clairement le rôle relatif des chefferies
et des secteurs : « Le but final est d'arriver à crêér ou à investir
sous l'autorité de l'administration et de ses t1djoints, dans un territoire,
trois, quatre, ou cinq sètteuts où l'atltotité indigène sera
ct>t1fi~e à un chef de secteur d~gné par nous, sans pour cela supprimer
les chefs locaux ... Nous aitiverôtls ainsi à former graduellernettt
üne administration irtdlgène subordohnée qui empruntera
5 011 inftuënce à notre pouvoir et consolidera l'institution des chefferies1.
»
Les instructlons coticettumt les sucèessiotts conseillent aux administrateurs
de fa~orîset les éa.ttdidâts favotab1~s à la. colonisation, à
lâ faveur des cotttpétitiotts : « n est eerta!n que le choix à faire parnd
let thèf~ est fort délitat et gu•avant de se prononcer en faveur
de l'ùn où de l'aùtre d'entre eux, il serà . néc~ssaire de s'assurèr de
ses §entlrnents à. rtotre égàrd, Au préalable. les vues du gouvemerttetlt
hrl ~nt ekposées, c'est-à-dire qu'il sera II1is au courant
de ce qu'on attf~nd de lui, tant au point de vue des prestations à
fouinit par ses sujets; que des cultures de rapport à faire établir
par ses soins et, parmi celles-ci, spécialement celles du café et du
ca.cào. Les indigènes fte sont pas familiarisés à subir Ulie telle
soUfitl!!ISion, et c'est précl!ément poùr cette raison que les commissaires
de dfattict et res éomma.ndahts de tertit .oire doivent, par un
travail incessant et tenace, les y à.ttlenér graduellement. n {arrêté
du 18 novembtè 18941). . .
Cei,endant lès Mttditions de l'irtvéstiture d'un chef par le Blanc
l'am~neron.t à totninettre dans la plupart des cas d'énotmes bévues.
Pàtfois le chef réel des pa.ysans1 refusant de reconnaître la domination
coloniale, est déporté ou tusillé, puis remplacé par une créature
de radrfii.nistration, utt èhef « médaillé » sans autorité autre
que celle des fWlils de la Foree publique. Le plus souvent, les véritables
chefs dès cotnmùnàlités préfèrent la retraite et même la
clandestinité à l'humiliation. Retirés à l'intérieur des forêts, ils
conse!Veront du:cittt toute la période coJoniale, jusqu'à nos jours,
autt>nté ét prestige. Un adnûnisttateur décrivait un éhef Tumbwe
morl éh 1908 en ces termes : « Il vivàit près de la Niemba dans
une retraite oil nul :Eùt'opéen n'a pénétré. ~ua.nd il mourut, tous les
chefs du pays allèrent visiter les lieux et y pleurer. Son su~ces-seur
s'est installé un peu plus loin. Aucun Blanc ne l'a jama.is vu
et nul tte le vetta probablement jamais• n.
A K.isantu, le chef médaillé, anèien élève des Jésuites et corn-
1. Congo, 1911, t. I, p. r98.
2. Van der Kerken : ouvrage dt~, p. 224.
'i· Van der Ketkèn • ounàge dtê, p. 236.
Annex 72
86 La question ag1'aire
merçant avisé possède une belle maison de briques à étages. Le
chef réel des populations de Kisantu est « un vieillard, peut-être
un des moins intelligents que j'ai rencontré. C'est lui qu'on va
trouver au lieu de soumettre le litige au chef médaillé, homme intelligent
et capable de régler le différent en toute justice 1 • »
Pourtant le chef réel de la communauté tolère souvent l'existence
d'un chef de « fantaisie » chargé des relations avec les Blancs.
Souvent ces hommes de paille sont des intrigants, des hommes
de rien, des esclaves même ou bien d'anciens serviteurs des Blancs.
L'administration des populations se dédouble quoique l'administration
coloniale l'ignore assez souvent : l'administrateur territorial,
haï des Congolais, opprime les paysans pour l'exportation
et l'impôt ; l'autorité coutwnière réelle maintient la cohésion tribale
malgré la tourmente et anime la résistance de la tradition.
La domination coloniale s'accompagne d'une pulvérisation
croissante de la société. Dans son hostilité aux chefs véritables,
l'administration méconnait les liens complexes de vassalité et de
parenté qui unissent les individus dans la société congolaise. La
contradiction entre l'ancienne organisation à base tribale et la
nouvelle organisation territoriale, souvent dessinée arbitrairement
sur la carte, ajoute encore au désordre. Alors le chef perd ses fonctions
traditionnelles, en particulier l'arbitrage des conflits. Les
forces désagrégatrices l'emportent peu à peu.
Comme les principales études ethnologiques furent rédigées
après les grandes expropriations et déplacements de populations,
certaines tribus ont été fragmentées et d'autres réunies tout aussi
arbitrairement par la colonisation.
Les tribulations des Bayaka du Moyen Kwango sous la domination
belge illustreront ces considérations 9• Leur chef, le kiarnfu
Nsimba Nkumbi sera tué par l'occupant en r893 après une longue
et h6roique résistance. Les Belges remettront alors le couteau,
insigne du commandement, à son rival Luko Kisa et ensuite à ses
héritiers, malgré leur résistance: Luko Kisa s'enfuira en Angola;
arrêté, il mourra en prison en 1913. Ses fils se réfugieront dans les
forêts jusqu'en 1929. Alors le couteau revient aux héritiers de
Nsimba Nkumbi, puis de nouveau à leurs rivaux. Mais les deux
lignées rivales et leurs vassaux continuent leur résistance passive
aux Blancs. Les villages s'éloignent des pistes, les sociétés
secrètes se multiplient et les pratiques magiques renforcent l'emprise
de la coutume et la cohésion de la société paysanne face à
l'envahisseur.
Les groupes coutumiers institués en rgro furent réorganisés en
1931 et 19331 • Les Congolais, obligatoirernentenregistrésparl'adrnimstration,
ne peuvent se déplacer sans passeport si la durée du
r. R.P. de Pierpont : Les fermes-chapelles, r912, p. 26.
2. R.]:>. Planquaert : ouvrage cité.
3. J. Sourdillat : Les chefferies au Congo belge, 1940.

Annex 73
Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Washington Office on Africa, “Appendix One: Historical
Background, From Leopold to Mobutu”, Zaire: A Nation Held Hostage (1992)

Annex 73
-
a e:
A Nation Held Hostage
A Policy Paper by
The Washington Office on Africa
disLribuLed in collaboration w i1h lhe
Africa Office of the National Council of Churches
June 1992
Printed on. .Re.cy.cl .ed Paper
Annex 73
Z A I R E A NATION H E L D HOSTAGE
Appendix One:
Histori cal Background
By Dr. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja
From Leopo ld to Mobutu
Z aire is the third largest country in Africa and one of Lhe potentially
richestc ountries on 1.hcc ontinent. Its enom,ous wealth in natural re. .
sourc~-,a; nd Slrategic location in Lhec emer of Africa have made ii Lhe
envy of major world powers since the present territory was defined in the
Wesiem scramble for Afri<."1in 1885. In the ensuing one-hundred and seven
years-rega rdless of the name iL was called (Congo Free State, 1885-1908: Belgian
Congo. 1908-1960; Democr;1tic Republic of Lhe Congo, 1%0-1971; and
Zltire, since 1971 Ht has man:1ged to achieve world-wide noioricty.
The first in,tance of humaniL1rian cmpha~is on the country, nearly a century
ago, focus,;d on prote,t against the brutal regime of King Leopold fl of Belgium
m the Congo Free State. 111e leopoldian Era was characterized by mrociti<:.,.
The que,1 of red rubber and other resources by the Kjng's men led to
dcsnh for millions of Congolese men. women. and children and was immonali7.
ed in two outsl3nding literary work.,,, Joseph Conrad's 1/e(lrt of Darkness and
Mark Twain's King Leopold'$ SolllotJII_II'.n the real world, Mark Twain was
among the leading figures of an international campaign agairu;t IGng Leopold
in 1hc United States and in Britain (under Edmund Morel) . A major actor in this
campaign was William Henry Sheppard, an Afric:in-American from Virginia
who had arrived in 1890 a; one of the first two American Presbyterian missionaries
in the Congo. Having witnessed a1 fus1 hand the atrocities commi11ed by
the •gents of King Leopold and his rubber barons in the Kasai region.
Sheppard and hi, colleague William McCutchcon Morrison played a criti cal
role along with other ChrisLian groups in the fight 10 free the coumry from tl1e
L.eopoldian sy.iem.
When Belgium took over from King 1.. eopold in 1908. bringing reforms of the
wor>l abu,c:-, the adminbtmlion Mill buih on the lcgaq • of the Congo Free
Sime. In the Belgian Congo, more cle-Jrly than elsewhere in Africa. a •colonia l
trinity " of the ,1ate, large co rpor.11ions, and the Roman Catholic Church
worked hannoniously to promote Belgium's mi,s.t. i o11c ivi/i:i;a11iceT. he syMcm
was ba,;ed on economic exploi 1a1ion. political repression, and cultural oppres;,
ion. In the Belgian Congo, :,s in the Free Staie before it, the country was a
major source of capita I ac~,.1mula1icm for the colonial power. 111e Congo provided
revemie for l he cons1n1<.~nio in Belgium of public buildings, highways
and other public works . ILS K-Sources bailed Belgium out of financial difficul lies
during both \'vorld \vars. and il consistently proved a major source of invc,
tmcnt c:ipital and job opponunitics for the Belgian economy.
• 7 •
Annex 73
WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA: POLICY PAPER 1
An economic boom in the 1950!)a nd Lhe :1bscnceo f nationali:,;tu ph~:aval:d-tu r ..
ing much of the decade eamcd the Belgian Congo the l:tbel of "model colony·
from its colonial rivals. Afr ic:in elites known as evof,,es benefited . There were
:tlso some improvements for the masses, Including the opportunity to buy con·
sumer goo(b such as bicycles, gramophones, and radios. Bui the fundamental
roots of the system: economic injustice. political repression. and the daily humiliation
or colonial racism did noI change. A spirit of protest, however , grew.
£00/ruis demandt-d equality of opportunity with whites . Peasants resented the
forced cultivation of crops such as cotton , forced labor on private and govcm ·
menl proj~-cLsa nd heavy tax burdens. TI1e working dass demanded beuer Jiving
condition, and higher wages, while the urban unemployed and underemployed
sought protect ion from dcport:uion to the country, idc .,nd the right to
a decent Ii ving.
"111i,s1 agc of the struggle for frc~..:lomc ulminatc:d with a rebellion on January f ,
1959 in LeopoldviUe (Kinshasa), shocking the Belgian authorities into at-cepting
the dem,rnd for independence advanced b)' the anti-colonial alli:rnce of
ordinary people and the ei'Olttes. I lowever, the decolonization of the Belgian
Congo did not follow the classic pauem of a relatively long period of initiation
by the.: coloni:1I mlers of their ,ucccssors. prcfcr-.ibly a group of moder:uc nationalist~.
TI1e Belgi•ns. who shifted :ilmost overnight from opposiuon to independence
to :igr~-ement to the militant demand for "immedi•te independence ,"
gambled th•t they would he :ible 10 retain control even :1r1er independence.
They assumed that the Congole.sc, without technic:11 training. would be content
to hold the fom1al trappings of office , while Belgian technical assiswnct:
personnel cont inued to mn the country in practice.
In the May 1960 genera l election , the Mo11ve111c1N1t1fl io11a/ Co11g()ft1/is
/,1111111mba(MC/Nl.) and its coalition of radical natlonalbt parties won 71 of 137
se-Jts in the lower house of ParlianienL Patrice Lumumba, the MKC/L leader.
was seen by the Belgians as a maior stumbling-block 10 their strategy of neocoloni•
lism. llis election victory was a threat. In the ensuing crises Belgium
and it.s \Xie.stern 3llies aimed 10 eliminate Lumumha and to prop up le::1clcrs
withou t popular political support. hence vulnerable lo external manipulation .
One such leader was Joseph Desire Mobutu, now Moburu Sese Seko I le began
hb career as a sergeant in the Force P11bllq11e(1helle lgian colonial army),
became an informer for Lhc Belgian intelligence :-.t.'rv1ccs, and 1:uer :,ervcd :l:, !l
jun ior mini.:,teri n Prime Mjnbter Ltnnumha':, office when Lhe laucr n:11nc:hdi m
as chief of staff of the national am1y in July 1960. Tl1e appointment lollowed an
army muun1• Jess than one week :ifter independence on June jO. 1960. 1l1e
mutiny, general!)' acknow ledged to have been provoked by General F.mile
J:111.,ssenthse, Belgi:111C ommander-in-Chief of the Force P11/Jliq11erc. ,ultcd in
• 8 •
Annex 73
Z A I R E A NATION H E l D HOSTAGE
Ihc panic and flight of Europeans. Th is left both 1he economy and the state
deprived of most of tl1eir professional and technica l personnel . ft nlso marked
1.hc beginning of what became known as 1hc "Congo crisis."
Ha,•ing los1 control of the silua1ion, Belgium intervened militari ly on July I 0,
presumably 10 pro1ect European lives :incl property. On 1he following day, the
Ka1ang:1 (Shaba) province declared its secession. In the subscquem crisis, the
Congo's fate was shaped la rgcly by cx1emal intervent ion, with Belg.ium joined
hy 1he United SIa1c,.asn d by a Uni ted Nations mission dominated by Ihe West·
em powers. Although the: Unitc:d States justified imervemion by 1he Sovie1
1hrca1, as l.umumba cvenrually appealed for Soviet help, Soviet involvement
,,-:.1nse ver more 1hant oken. \ '(lhile Lumumba sought Unir<:dN ations assistance
in res1oring order, ending 1he secession of Katanga and securing the w ithdrawa
l of Belgian 1roops, Washington identirled Lumumba himself as a threat.
Pcrcci\'cd as a .. dangerous m;1n'' from the '\tandpoint of \Vestern imereslS,
Lumumba became a targe1 of a CIA assassina1ion plot ordered by U.S. Presidcni
Dwight Eisenhower on August 18, 1960. He was cventu:11ly killed on
January 17, 1961, as:, result of decisions made by his Congolese rivals. includ ing
his fom1cr aide Mobutu, but with tl1e help ;ind encoumgement or the CIA.
With Lumumba llr,a, and his followers af1erwards, eliminated from the poli tical
scene. tl1e swge was now set for a speedy resolution of the Kawnga secession.
The result wa, a unined Congo state, formed on tenns favorable to Belgian
and WcsIem in1erest,-, featuring a le-.1dcrship dependent primarily on externa l
backing r.11her tl,an politica l sup port within the country.
The newly established order rnp,dly disintegrated mto a new and more severe
cri~is. 111e .,spi.-..tions of ordinary p<.-oplc for more freedom and a better standard
of living , ignored br the political elite. led to 1he eruption of popular resbtance
beginning in early 196·1T. he call for a "second independence ," however,
was blocked h)' Wes1ern mili Iary intervention and 1he search for a new
"strongman " to 111ain1ain order . lronic:illy, MoYse Tshombe, the former
Katangan seccssionlst. presided over 1hc regime's suppression of the insurrections
for a 1ime. But in 1965, with Westen, support. :1rmy chief Mobu tu wok
power in hi> own name. In the word, of Eric Rouleau. wri ting in le Monde
Diploma//que , Mohu 111 fi1 1hc ideal prorlle of a dictator: inteUigent, cunn ing,
and ind ependenl of an)• group or popular consensus tl1at might preven1 him
from scrvmg hi!, cxtcm:11p aLron.o.sr his own personali ntcrc."t.s
Since 1965, Mobu1u has noled Zaire with .,upreme skill at politica l SUf\'ivaJ, but
with virtu:,lly toial disreboard for the interest.> of the Zairian peop le.
• 9 •
Annex 74
Koen Vlassenroot, “The Promise of Ethnic Conflict: Militarisation and Enclave-Formation in
South Kivu” in Conflict and Ethnicity in Central Africa (D. Goyvaerts, ed., 2000)

Annex 74
Conflict and Ethnicity
in Central Africa
Edited ~y
Didier Goyvaerts
Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of
Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies
2000
Annex 74
THE PROMISE OF ETHNIC CONFLICT :
MILITARISATION AND
ENCLAVE-FORMATION IN SOUTH KIVU
Koen Vlassenroot
Centre for Third World Studies
University of Ghent
The actual conflict 1 in Eastern Congo, as in the rest of the country,
can easily be interpreted as having been imported from neighbouring
countries - Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. It is a common complaint
often heard in both Kivu provinces that the Congolese would live in
peace and harmony if they were just left to themselves. Although it is
quite obvious that the current situation as well as large parts of the
local history are strongly influenced by political events in Burundi and
Rwanda, this view ignores the many different internal dynamics that
undermine stability in North and South Kivu. The new insurrection
that started on August 2nd, 1998 can indeed be understood as the
result of an intensified struggle for power between president Kabila
and his local allies on the one hand, and his former, strongly
disappointed allies on the other. Already by the end of 1997 there
were clear indications that the relationship between Kabila and
Uganda and Rwanda was seriously deteriorating. Kabila wanted to
reduce the influence of these countries in order to gain much needed
internal support. Uganda and Rwanda, however, complained about
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the international colloquium
Construzione Etnica e Violenza Politica, held under the auspices of the Fondazione
Giangiacomo Feltrinelli in Cortona on 2-3 July 1999. I am indebted to the
participants of this colloquium for their suggestions and comments. A shorter
version appears in Doom & Gorus (2000). The greater part of this article is based on
fieldwork carried out during several visits to the Great Lakes region between
December 1997 and May 1999. The financial support of the (Flemish) Fund for
Scientific Research is gratefully acknowledged. I am also very grateful to all those
in Eastern Congo, who shared their ideas and information with me, often under
difficult circumstances. For their protection, however, their names cannot be given.
Annex 74
power to allocate the land, to collect taxes etc. Land allocation was
regulated by the principle of kalinzi, which formed the structural
basis of the local moral economy. According to this principle, access
to land depended on the payment of tribute to the chief. Once this
tribute had been paid, the peasant obtained use rights over a part of
the customary land. Although there was only one initial payment, in
practice the peasant regularly had to pay tribute. These land rights,
however, were non-alienable for no subject could legitimately own
land through the customary land tenure system. Even if land rights
were hereditary, legitimate ownership could never be obtained since
land remained customary, which left farmers in a relatively insecure
position.
This system of kalinzi offered a peasant social integration and
protection in exchange for the acceptance of the position of the
customary authorities. As a result, subjects became clients in a
dependent and conditional relationship. This relationship was
determined by one's social identity. The economic relations
constituted an expression of respect for the existing social hierarchy
and allowed for ethnicity to be institutionalized since access to land
was conditioned by space and social identity. Access to land was
mainly determined by the social position one occupied in the existing
social order and by the relationship one had developed with one's
social superior. As a result, the society was a very hierarchically and
very tightly controlled power-structure with the mwami at the top
and the subjects, having to pay tribute without receiving anything in
return, at the bottom. Another consequence was that one's ethnic
identity, or ethnic belonging, had a clear material basis viz. the right
to use land as a source of livelihood. For those not belonging to the
ethnic community, it would be extremely difficult to have access to
land before being recognised as a 'client'.
This pre-colonial system of communal territorial ownership
practices formed the basis for the Belgian colonial administration's
version of indirect rule. The extremely fertile soil of the Kivu
highlands offered the potential for the development of plantation
agriculture. For this purpose, the colonial powers declared all vacant
land as property of the state and introduced a double system of land
control and ownership. In doing so, they introduced a dual system of
62
Annex 74
property rights. All vacant land became the property of the state to
be turned into plantations under control of the colons. On the other
hand, the legitimacy of the existing customary land tenure system
was recognised where land was already under control of the
traditional authorities. As a result of this colonial policy, the
traditional, ethnically-based rural political order was transformed
into units of a much larger modern administrative system. This led
to a complete restructuring of the existing social rural environment.
Another important and devastating consequence, was the further
institutionalisation of ethnicity. Ethnic citizenship, itself the result of
local ethnic community membership, was recognised as the sole
basis for the right to access land and thus continued to be the basis
for the existing economic relations. The practice of indirect rule,
however, did not create one single customary system but was based
on the colonial claims that every ethnic community had its own
traditional system. It created 'a different set of customary laws, one
for each ethnic group, and [ established] a separate Native Authority
to enforce each set of laws. The result was a Janus-faced power,
with two faces. The difference between them was that while civic
power was racialised, the Native Authority came to be ethnicised'.
(Mamdani 1997:4). Since the colonial period, parts of society have
found themselves in a marginal position as the customary system
denied access to all those not belonging to the particular ethnic group
or not respecting the authority of the mwami.
This system of land control and alienation continued to exist
during the first years after independence, including the reproduction
of a double form of citizenship viz. a civic Congolese one and an
ethnic one. In 1973, however, it was further complicated and
confused by a new legislation (the General Property Law, based on
the so-called Bakajika Law of 1966), which integrated the traditional
rural order into the urban-controlled modern political system. Again
the traditional, ethnically defined, territorial organisation formed the
basis for the new territorial structure, thus confirming the territorial
basis of ethnicity. More important, however, was that under this new
law the traditional, customary authorities lost their legitimate control
over the land distribution and were assigned the role of simple
administrators in the institutions of the new Zairean state. The 1973
63
Annex 74
law declared all land state property and from then on transactions of
land based on customary law became illegal. As a result of this new
legislation, the customary system was confronted with a deep
authority crisis while the existing social and economic order
drastically changed. The most important consequence of this new
legislation was that it provided a newly formed class of rural
Congolese capitalists with a new and powerful instrument. The
nationalised colonial plantations were redistributed to reward the
loyalty of a political elite, but also communal land became subject to
redistribution . The 1973 legislation not only drastically changed the
social structure of Kivu, it also was an expression of the changing
political economic conditions under the Mobutu regime. The policy
of nationalisation (see below) offered the material basis for the
formation of a new political elite. Loyalty was economically
rewarded.
Although this new legislation was meant to limit the power of the
traditional authorities, in reality the latter continued to play an
important role in the control over land. The modem legislation
abolished the customary land rights and only gave access to land on
the basis of individual property rights, therefore limiting the power
of the traditional authorities. Because the state was not capable of
successfully implementing this new law (it never succeeded in
describing the legal position of the traditiona1ly distributed land and
the administration was totally incapable), the existence of a double
system of land property rights (the traditional order based on ethnic
citizenship and the modern order based on individual property rights)
not only caused confusion but also opened up some new
opportunities. The traditional authorities became the privileged
intermediaries for the sale of land. According to Mamdani (1997:4)
'To the extent that they were able to combine their chiefly status with
important positions in the administration and the party hierarchy,
[some bami] could claim authority on both traditional and political
grounds, and make most of this situation to secure compliance with
[their] decisions'. Mugangu (1998:8) concludes that by their control
over the ethnic territory, 'non seulement, les authorites deviennent
partenaires incontournables au processus de territorialisation de
l'Etat, mais en plus elles peuvent reproduire, dans le contexte
64
Annex 74
for a more decentralised network of patronage, which became hard to
control for the political centre. As Reno (1997:4) states, 'Debureaucratised
patrimonialism instilled an individualistic, acquisitive
'capitalist lifestyle' of a Zairean sort.[ ... ] This became very explosive
in the Zairian context, since 'officially' sanctioned private
accumulation among strongmen is easily converted to autonomy by a
ruler and the freedom to make their own arrangements with
outsiders'. The activities of powerful generals such as Nzimbi or
Baramoto are prime examples of decentralised networks of patronage
aimed at controlling clandestine trade activities.
Mobutu's announcement of a democratisation process in April
1990 was yet another strategy to save his power. The privatisation of
the army was another strategy. Mobutu gave the army leeway to act
as private militia. The behaviour of the army during the looting of
1991 and 1993, as well as its reaction to the arrival of more than one
million Rwandan refugees in Eastern Congo in 1994 (when army
units entered into the service of whoever was willing to pay) are
evidence of this shift. It should be clear that disorder in the Zairian
context has nothing to do with anarchy but with deliberate strategies
designed to preoccupy, destroy or disorganise rivals. Ethnicity
proved to be the main instrument. The appearance of youth militia
acting to the defense of local strongmen only demonstrates how a
situation of impunity created the necessary conditions for a skilful
manipulation of disorder. In Katanga, the special youth group Juferi
played a crucial role in the campaign against the Baluba. As will be
explained later, also in Kivu youth militia were to become a crucial
pillar for defending the interests of local strongmen.
In the long run, the shrinking economy of the weak state (itself
the result of its own very nature) was to have some very serious
consequences for the power base of local strongmen. In South Kivu,
just as elsewhere on the continent, the decline of resources available
for patronage undermined the legitimacy of the local elite in two
ways. First, in their search for means to protect their positions, local
strongmen were forced to develop new strategies. Second, as they
became unable to satisfy the demands of their clients, their positions
were contested by a growing number of new actors (Chahal & Daloz
1998 :37). For the protection of their position, ethnicity was the best
71
Annex 75
E. Pay & D. Goyvaerts, “Belgium, the Congo, Zaire, and Congo: A Short History of a Very
Shaky Relationship” in Conflict and Ethnicity in Central Africa (D. Goyvaerts ed., 2000)

Annex 75
Conflict and Ethnicity
! 1
in Central Africa
Edited fry
Didier Goyvaerts
Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of
Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies
2000
Annex 75
BELGIUM, THE CONGO, ZAIRE AND
CONGO: A SHORT HISTORY OF A VERY
SHAKY RELATIONSHIP
Ellen Pay
University of Antwerp
Didier Goyvaerts
ILCAA, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies
The aim of the present papert is to provide a short historical
overview of the Belgian-Congolese/Zairian relations from the Belgian
exploration and subsequent colonization of the Congo basin in the
1870s up to the fall of Mobutu and the assumption of power by
Kabila in 1997. In doing so, it will become obvious that the history of
Congo/Zaire up to the 1990s cannot possibly be isolated from the
prevalent relations with Belgium - the mother country and, later, the
ex-colonizer. Hence, emphasis will be placed on those events in which
Belgium played a major part. Purely internal matters will only be
discussed briefly, so as not to interfere with the general gist of the
story.
King Leopold Il's hunger for colonies
Before Leopold II' s ascent to the throne, the interest of the great
European powers in the African continent had been rather moderate
and involved, essentially, a number of scattered regional commercial
dealings. In the beginning, these activities focused on the slave trade,
which relied heavily on the cooperation of both the local African
rulers themselves and the Arab merchants although, in all fairness, it
should be observed that in the West the role of the latter in this
t We wish to express· our sincere gratitude to Erik Kennes of the Africa Institute
(Tervuren) for having read and commented on a previous draft of this article.
Needless to say, the remaining shortcomings and infelicities are our own.
Annex 75
early 1990s now became particularly prominent. First, the country
was going through a severe economic crisis, which caused food
production to drop and imports to increase. Civil servants, doctors,
teachers and soldiers were not being paid. Moreover, the country was
burdened with an enormous international debt. A second factor was
the political instability. Not only had the state completely withdrawn
from the social sector -health care and education- but the army
(Forces Armees Zairoises, FAZ), Mobutu's last stronghold, was
under-armed and increasingly becoming demoralized. Last but not
least, Zaire had completely become isolated on the international
scene. For the United States, Mobutu ceased to be important after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. To the world economy, Zaire had
equally turned into a non-entity. Investments were non-existent and
even as a supplier of raw materials the country had lost its
significance due to the emergence of all sorts of surrogates. In point
of fact, Zaire had been dead internationally since the end of 1990. In
spite of this, and as a means to get out of the local impasse, the
European Union declared itself willing to give financial support to
the elections that were planned for mid-1997. As Belgium was still
hoping for a peaceful solution to the conflict, it not only offered to
help with the actual organization of the elections but kept putting the
Zaire question on the international agenda, lest the country be
completely forgotten by the west.
The Kahila factor
Still, it was not the disastrous economic situation that led to the
final showdown, but the tensions in the Kivu region of eastern Zaire
during 1996 and, especially, the subsequent revolt in 1997. This
revolt was intimately linked with the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda,
which had culminated in the 1994 genocide. Eventually, armed Tutsi,
entering Rwanda from Uganda managed to overthrow the Huturegime
in Kigali. Together with the Hutu death squads
(lnterahamwe) and the defeated government troops, over a million
Rwandans fled to the North-Kivu region of Zaire where, very
rapidly, military structures were set up comparable to those that had
30

Annex 76
G. Kiakwama & J. Chevallier, The World Bank, “Nonreformers: Democratic Republic of the
Congo”, Aid and Reform in Africa: Lessons from Ten Case Studies, (S. Devarajan, D. Dollar, T.
Holmgren, eds., 2001)

Annex 76
Aid and Reform in Africa
Lessons from Ten Case Studies
Edited by
Shantayanan Devarajan
The World Bank
David R. Dollar
The World Bank
Torgny Holmgren
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden
The World Bank
Washington, D.C.
Annex 76
Democratic Republic of Congo
Gilbert Kiakwama
Jerome Chevallier
Annex 76
DemocraticR epublico f Congo 637
For lack of expenditure control, inflation sprang up again and rapidly
turned into hyperinflation, with an annual rate jumping from 39 percent
in 1989 to over 4,000 percent in 1991. The economy went into a free fall.
In 1996, the year before the demise of the Mobutu regime, GDP per capita
was estimated at about US$150, less than 40 percent of the 1958 level.
The production of copper barely reached 40,000 tons, less than one-tenth
the level achieved in the mid-1980s.
Without maintenance, infrastructure has deteriorated to such an extent
that most regions are now completely isolated. Poverty has become
widespread, and social indicators, which used to compare favorably with
those in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, have steadily declined.
AID AND REFORM
The next section will discuss a series of issues at the core of the relationship
between aid and reform, including the role of financial flows in
reform, the adequacy of the reform agenda, the management of public
resources, and the political dimension of reform.
Financial Flows and Reform
During the 1967-97 period, Zaire made two genuine attempts at economic
reform. Both programs were formulated through close cooperation
between the IMF and the Central Bank. The first one, in 1967, enabled
the Congo to recover from the difficult post-independence years. The
international community strongly backed the reform program and provided
financial support through the IMF. At that time, the Central Bank
was in control of macroeconomic management with little interference
from the government. The 1967 reform reestablished private sector confidence,
and the economy quickly bounced back. The reform program
was supported by an IMF standby agreement, but the financial flows
involved were quite limited.
The second ambitious reform initiated by Zaire took place in 1983-
85. After a steep devaluation, the government liberalized the exchange
rate, interest rates, and most prices. Again, this reform was supported
by an IMF standby arrangement, but little additional support came from
the donor community. Improved fiscal management allowed Zaire to
pay its external debt as rescheduled, resulting in a net transfer of resources
in favor of its creditors. In 1984-85 the debt service actually paid
by Zaire increased by 88 percent over the previous two years. Whereas
in 1982 and 1983, Zaire was a net beneficiary of transfers from its creditors
for a total of US$42 million, it transferred the equivalent of US$369
million to its creditors in 1984-85, or about 2.6 percent of its GDP.

Annex 77
F. Missier & O. Vallee, “Du Scandale Zaïrois au Congo Gemmocratique” in Chasse au diamant
au Congo/Zaire (L. Monnier, B. Jewsiewicki, G. de Villers eds., 2001)

Annex 77
sous la direction de Laurent Monnier,
Bogumil Jewsiewicki et Gauthier de Villers
Chasse au diamant
au Congo/Zaïre
Institut africain-CEDAF
Afrika lnstituut-ASDOC
Tervuren
n° 45-46
série 2000
Éditions L'Harmattan
5-7, rue de l'École-Polytechnique
75005 Paris
Annex 77
DU SCANDALE ZAÏROIS
AU CONGO GEMMOCRATIQUE
par François Misser et Qlivier Vallée
LA TECTONIQUE DES MINERAIS
« Diamonds are a girl's best friends » chantait Marilyn Monroe. L'on
pourrait adapter la phrase aux chefs d'État ayant présidé aux destinées du
Congo-Zaïre depuis 1965. La permanence de leur implication dans
l'acquisition, le commerce, la production et le trafic de diamants a au demeurant
incité un chroniqueur du quotidien belge Le Soir à écrire qu'avec Joseph
Mobutu (Sese Seko) ou Laurent (Kabila), les diamants sont Désirés. La majuscule
vient en effet à point nommé rappeler que les deux hommes ont partagé,
outre un même second prénom, un appétit commun pour ces trésors du
sous-sol, ce qui fait de l'un et l'autre des archétypes de ce que l'on pourrait
appeler des « gemmocrates », autrement dit des acteurs politiques dont le
pouvoir est lié au contrôle de la richesse diamantifère.
Las, les dirigeants congolais gouvernementaux ou rebelles ne sont pas les
seuls à avoir contracté une véritable dépendance vis-à-vis du diamant, pour le
plus grand malheur du pays. Outre l'entourage du voisin de Brazzaville, Pascal
Lissouba, qui, jusqu'à sa chute en octobre 1997, se trouvait opportunément
sur la trajectoire de la contrebande, aujourd'hui les diamants congolais
constituent des ressources à la fois politiques et financières des présidents du
Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, de Namibie, Sam Nujoma et des prétoriens ougandais
et rwandais.
En marge des problèmes identitaires et sécuritaires, le nouveau conflit de
1998 au Congo démocratique comporte indéniablement une dimension stratégique
et économique. L'adhésion de la République démocratique du Congo
(RDC) à la Communauté pour le Développement Économique de l'Afrique
Australe a été mal perçue par Museveni. Celui-ci nourrissait le rêve d'une intégration
économique entre la RDC et l'Ouganda.
Le Rwanda avait goûté les délices de Capoue lorsque ses hommes dominaient
Kin, et le Zimbabwe n'ignorait pas les potentialités du Congo avec lequel,
d'ailleurs, il trafique le diamant depuis les années 1950.
Pourtant le diamant n'a pas toujours joué un rôle stratégique pour
l'économie de l'ex-Congo belge. N'eussent été l'engagement de l'Union
Minière du Haut-Katanga, qui apporta son soutien financier et militaire à la
sécession katangaise, et l'appartenance de la Forminière, qui exploitait les
diamants industriels au Kasaï Oriental et qui appartenait au même holding que
Annex 77 ,
28 François Misse, et Olivier Va/l{Je
l'UMHK, la Société Générale de Belgique, il n'est pas sûr que la sécession
sud-kasaYenne, appendice de la première aurait vu le jour. Dix ans après
l'indépendance d'ailleurs, le diamant ne représentait encore que 8 % de la valeur
des exportations congolaises, contre 76 % pour les produits de la Gécamincs
(cuivre et cobalt).
Il faudra la combinaison de la libéralisation de 1 'exploitation du diamant en
1982, autorisant l'activité artisanale en dehors des concessions octroyées par
l'État, et l'effondrement de la production de la Gécamines pour que cette ressource
finisse par peser d'un poids prépondérant dans l'économie. Les ventes
de diamant représentaient, avec 739 millions de dollars en 1996, quelque
47 ,9 % du total de la valeur des produits exportés par le Zaïre, tandis que les
minerais non précieux de la Gécamines se situaient en deçà de 20 % du total.
Ce retournement spectaculaire s'explique partiellement par une évolution
diamétralement opposée dans l'extraction des deux produits: en 1989, la Gécamines
avait produit 442 000 tonnes de cuivre, 9 300 tonnes de cobalt et
54 000 tonnes de zinc. Six ans plus tard, ces productions avaient respectivement
chuté à 33 900 tonnes, 4 500 tonnes et 3 900 tonnes . Parallèlement, la
production diamantifère s'était accrue de 17 ,5 à 21,9 millions de carats. A la
différence de la Gécamines, propriété intégrale de l'État, pour le compte de
qui elle entretenait les éléments de la Division Spéciale Présidentielle au Katanga,
la Minière de Bakwanga (Miba)-qui a succédé à la Forminière et dans
laquelle Sibeka, filiale de l'Union Minière détient toujours 20 % des parts-,
ne s'est pas laissée dépouiller de cette manière, du moins sous le régime Mobutu.
Aux deux facteurs mentionnés s'en ajoutent d'autres: les pillages de 1991
et de 1993, en contraignant quantité de sociétés à fermer leurs portes ou à réduire
leur activité, ont poussé nombre de leurs employés à se lancer dans
l'aventure de l'exploitation artisanale, comme ultime recours pour assurer leur
subsistance. La remarque vaut également pour les étudiants, les enseignants et
les fonctionnaires qui, soit pour payer leurs bourses et Jeurs frais de scolarité,
soit simplement pour subvenir à leur existence, ont été astreints à se livrer à ce
genre d'activités avec tous les risques que cela comportait, notamment le racket
systématique de la part des militaires de Mobutu. Les dévaluations en cascades
du zaîre monnaie et du franc congolais comme la dollarisation de
l'économie ont aussi induit une chasse urbaine au diamant. Il constitue une
des dernières voies d'accès aux devises fortes comme le dollar.
Qu'il s'agisse de l'activité formelle ou informelle, artisanale ou industrielle,
le diamant a en tout cas joué un rôle croissant dans l'économie de l'exZaïre,
et partant dans la stratégie des acteurs politiques, en tant que nerf de la
guerre ou en tant qu'enjeu de celle-ci.
D'où l'émergence d'une caste de « gemmocrates », dans laquelle figurent
aussi bien les opérateurs (Mukamba), que les bénéficiaires (le clan Mobutu et
les prétoriens) et les intermédiaires (libanais, sud-africains). Lapsus peut-être,
le diamant a d'ailleurs failli, à un moment donné, devenir le symbole du parti

Annex 78
Adam Hochschild, “Congo’s Many Plunderers”, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 4
(27 Jan.- 2 Feb. 2001)

Congo's Many Plunderers
Author(s): Adam Hochschild
Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 4, Money, Banking & Finance (Jan. 27 -
Feb. 2, 2001), pp. 287-288
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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Annex 78
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Annex 78
Congo's Many Plunderers
Some of the rebels in Congo who turned against Laurent Kabila
are principled people who did so because Kabila did not live up to
his democratic promises. But for many-rebels gold and diamonds
matter more and the civil war is less about ideology than about
who is going to continue the plundering. The country is in effect
split in several pieces and half a dozen neighbouring countries
are backing one faction or another.
ADAM HOCHSCHILD M any people today often seem surprised
that Africa is in such bad
shape. The old Soviet gulag is
no more; in eastern Europe they've opened
the secret police files; in Latin America
military dictators are almost all gone. Why
does Africa lag so far behind? Many of
its states haven't bothered to stage an
election, much less an honest one, in years.
Its economy is largely a wreck. And now,
ominously, Congo, the vast, mineral-rich
country that is one-thirteenth of the
continent's land mass, is embroiled in
what has been called "Africa's first world
war". The country is in effect split
in several pieces, and half a dozen
nearby nations are backing one faction or
another.
Given Africa's history, however, its
current troubles should be no surprise. For
the last four hundred years, to be an African
- and especially to be a Congolese - has
meant, above all, to be plundered. First
came the slave-traders, who shipped
millions of Africans across the North
Atlantic in chains to the New World. We
think of slaves as coming from west Africa,
as indeed was the case with most of those
brought to the American colonies. But
central Africa fell victim as .well: traders
captured millions more Africans from the
Congo River basin and surrounding territories
and took them on the shorter trip
across the South Atlantic to Brazil, to be
worked to death on coffee plantations.
And the slavers didn't just raid the central
African coast; they ranged hundreds of
miles into the interior.
Responsibility for this plundering was
not that ofEuropeans and Americans alone.
Pre-colonial Africa was no paradise of
democracy, and much of the continent had
indigenous slavery to begin with. This
meant that when a sea captain from
Liverpool or Lisbon or Charleston showed
up looking for slaves, African chiefs were
ready to sell them.
Then came colonialism. Thanks to the
steamship, the machine gun and the
repeating rifle, it swept over the continent
in an astoundingly short time. In 1870
roughly 80 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa
was living under indigenous rulers; by
1910 virtually all of it was European
colonies or white settler regimes. It was
the fastest land grab in history.
We tend to forget how deadly this system
was, because the colonial countries,
such as Britain, France, and Belgium, were
mostly themselves budding democracies
at home. But their relation to Africa was
one of theft. Take the Congo. For several
decades around the tum of the century,
misnamed the Congo Free State, it was the
personal, privately-owned colony of King
Leopold II of Belgium. During that time,
Leopold made a profit from the territory
equal to at least $ 1. 1 billion in today's
US dollars. Between 1880 and 1920,
demographers estimate, the Congo's population
was slashed in half, a loss of ten
million people.
Rubber Boom
The main spark for this holocaust was
the invention of the inflatable bicycle tire,
in 1887. Followed rapidly by the automobile,
this set off a worldwide rubber
boom. The central African rain forest was
rich in wild rubber vines, and Leopold
essentially set up a slave labour regime.
His soldiers would hold the women of
each village hostage, until the men had
gone into the forest - often for weeks at
a time -to gather a monthly quota of wild
rubber. This went on for nearly two decades.
With the women as prisoners and
the men as forced labourers, there were
few people left to plant and harvest food
or to hunt and fish. Famines raged, rebellions
flared and were brutally shot down,
and diseases that people would otherwise
Economic and Political Weekly January 27, 2001
have survived took a huge toll among the
traumatised, half-starving population.
In later decades, under Belgian colonial
rule, the plunder was less murderous and
more orderly - in part because colonial
officials realised that if they didn't change
the system, they'd soon have no labour
force left. "We run the risk of someday
seeing our.native population collapse and
disappear", declared the permanent committee
of the National Colonial Congress
of Belgium in 1924, "So that we will find
ourselves confronted with a kind of desert".
The Belgians then began to build schools,
hospitals, and the like. As in most African
colonies before second world war, some
forced labour remained, then was gradually
replaced by taxes that forced men to
leave their villages and find work in mines,
in factories and on plantations. And, despite
the schools and hospitals, the Congo was
still run for profit, which flowed increasingly
to multinational mining companies.
As the century went on, rail-roads and
machinery allowed the exploitation of the
territory's unbelievable wealth in gold,
diamonds, copper, cobalt and much more.
Most of the uranium for the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki bombs came from the Congo.
In the late 1950s, Africa was swept by
fervour for independence. The Congo, like
much of the rest of the continent, was
granted freedom. But the European countries
had in mind political independence
only. They wanted to keep the profits from
the mines and plantations flowing to
Europe. The Congo was one of the few
countries that challenged that hope. When
it received independence from Belgium in
1960, the Congo was headed by a coalition-
government prime minister, Patrice
Lumumba - chosen in the first, and last,
democratic national election the territory
has ever had. Lumumba believed that
Africa should be independent of Europe
economically as well as politically. To
western governments and business, the
idea was anathema. Two months after he
took power, a sub-committee of the US
National Security Council authorised his
assassination. The CIA and the Belgians
sent help to anti-Lumumba factions in the
government, and in early 1961 he was killed.
Africans learned to be sceptical when
American presidents talked about democracy.
Even before Lumumba's death,
Washington's man in the Congo was a
young army officer named Joseph Desire
Mobutu. President Kennedy received him
at the White House in 1963. With CIA
encouragement, he seized power in a coup
287
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Annex 78
two years later. Soon after, he renamed
himself Mobutu Sese Seko and his country
Zaire, and then proceeded to plunder it on
an even vaster scale than King Leopold II.
European and American mines and businesses
in the Congo gave Mobutu a share
of the take, and in 32 years of rule, he stashed
away a fortune estimated at $.4 billion in
Swiss banks and European real estate. The
US encouraged him at every step of the
way. President Reagan called him "a voice
of good sense and good will". President
George Bush called him "one of our most
valued friends". The US gave him more
than$ 1 billion in civilian and military aid.
After the cold war ended, Mobutu's
usefulness to the US as an anti-communist
came to an end. His kleptocratic reJ¾ime
was an increasing embarrassment; and
Washington began suggesting that he hold
elections. But after receiving so much US
money for so many years while stifling all
opposition, Mobutu didn't feel like changing
course. He was finally overthrown by
forces under Laurent Kabila in 1997 and
died of cancer in exile a few months later.
Kabila restored the name Congo (without
the 'the').
Mobutu' s decades of plundering had left
the country without a functioning government.
Uncollected garbage was piled in the
streets; public schools had largely ceased
to operate; and erratically-paid police and
soldiers supported themselves by looting
shops and holding foreign journalists for
cash ransoms. Few of the essential river
steamboats were still operating, and the
jungle had taken back most inter-city roads.
Most educated Congolese able to do so had
left for the US, Canada, and Europe. Even
ifKabilahad been an administrative genius
and a grass roots democrat - and he was
neither - it would have been a job of
decades to build a coherent society out of
the shambles he found. His death will not
change this. It's so long since a real census
has been taken that no one even knows
how many people li-.e in Congo today -
is it 50 million? 55 million?
Some of the rebels who turned against
Kabila in the last two or three years are
principled people who did so because
Kabila did not Ii ve up to his democratic
· promises .. This is particularly true of the
leadership of the faction of the Congolese
Rally for Democracy that is based in Bunia,
in the far north-east. But for many of
rebels, gold and diamonds matter more.
The rebel movement itself is now deeply
fractured. The current civil war is less
about ideology than about who is going
288
· to continue the plundering. We read mostly
about which AfFican governments are
backing which side in this struggle; what
journalists on the scene virtually never
examine is which multinationals are also
placing their bets on one faction or another,
oron several of them simultaneously.
Newspapers all over the world reported
that when Kabila arrived in the capital,
Kinshasa, to take power in 1997, he landed
in a corporate jet.· Hardly anyone asked
who had loaned it to him. (It was an
American minerals corporation, based in
ex-president Bill Clinton's home town of
Hope, Arkansas.)
There is no simple answer about what
should be done about the war. The proposal
to send some 5,000 UN troops to
police a ceasefire could be a very small
step in the right direction. But many times
that number of soldiers are having trouble
keeping order among a vastly smaller
number of people in Kosovo. And how
many officers does it take to police 50 or
55 million people living in an area as large
as the US east of the Mississippi, that has
not had a functioning police force in years?
· There is one more piece of historical
background to the current troubles of this
long-suffering country, and that is the
madness of the international arms trade.
Since 1990 alone, the US has supplied
$ 227 million worth of arms and training
to Africa; military forces in 34 of the
continent's 53 nations have received US
training. Just during the 1990s, the US
supplied more than$ 125 million in arms
and training to six of the seven states who
have had troops fighting- on several sides
- in Congo's civil war, It will not be easy
to help heal Africa's wounds, but one good
1 place to start would be to stop pouring
weaponry into a continent the West has
already done so much to ravage. mm
Perils of Putin's Russia
Russian president Vladimir Putinfaces the mind-boggling
imperative of having to integrate Russia's economy with that of the
world economy. At the same time, it involves a shedding of old
mindsets and long-held notions of the Soviet economy. Russia now
has to work towards a three-pronged approach - ensure its
territorial integrity; create favourable conditions for economic
recovery and growth and yet preserve the civil society and the
rights and freedoms that all Russians have come to enjoy.
p L DASH ffissia in post-Soviet years provides
ready case for a study in contrast.
ook at tiny Ja pan! It has no natural
resources; yet it is rich. For a contrast, look
at huge Russia! You name anything; Russia
has it; yet it is poor. Through the postSoviet
decade, it has passed through a
tumultuous journey from superpower status
to dilapidation. Even as many countries
of Europe unite together in the European
Union, forgetting their national barriers
and currencies, the Soviet successor states
are on the other hand trying to erect visa
and tariff barriers among themselves, build
up their national armies and have often
inched on the brink of mutual hostility on
the basis of ethno-national differences.
Such paradoxes as these jitter Pu tin's Russia
on the advent of the millennium when the
country is deeply engaged in the process
of an extraordinary transition. All mineral,
natural and human resources at her disposal
do not make Russia rich in any sense,
primarily because the country as a whole
lacks advanced technology and a sense of
proper management.
Bad economics combined with worse
politics remain the bane of post-Soviet
Russian development which· politicians,
Putin or no Putin, find tough to handle and
extricate ·their country from the present
morass. The second drawback is the lethal
combination of dictatorial tendencies of a
strong state with emerging liberal democratic
ethos of modem Russia. While better
management methods have begun penetrating
into the area of economic development,
the Russians, willy-nilly, avoid to
emulate the western style of management,
let alone capitalism. Instead, they continue
to vituperate it, and almost always find a
national analogy from their past history to
Economic and Political Weekly January 27, 2001

Annex 79
K. Hillman Smith, “Status of Northern White Rhinos and Elephants in Garamba National Park,
Democratic Republic of Congo, During the Wars”, Pachyderm No. 31 (July-Dec. 2001)

Pachyderm No. 31 July–December 2001 79
Since early 1997, Garamba National Park in the northeast
of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC—previously
Zaire) has been subjected to the effects of two
wars within the country. The park is home to the last
known wild population of northern white rhinos
(Ceratotherium simum cottoni) and the densest elephant
population in DRC. Figure 1 shows how poaching levels
have increased during the two recent wars, as indicated
by the number of contacts for patrol effort. The
poaching there in recent years has been primarily for
meat. Patrol monitoring indicates that 70–80% of the
poaching gangs’ members are Sudanese, usually ‘SPLA
deserters’, using weapons from the ongoing war in adjacent
southern Sudan. The others are local Congolese.
The increase in poaching during the active phases of
the two DRC wars, however, was not caused by influxes
of Congolese poachers or the occupying military.
The same poachers were there throughout, but the
anti-poaching effort of guards was temporarily stopped
or reduced and the general breakdown of law and order
was exploited.
Figure 1 shows how the poaching increase was
greatest during the first war in 1997. For several
months when the military forces arrived, guards were
disarmed and no efforts could be made to control
poaching. Without resistance, poachers were able to
move south through the park to areas where elephant,
rhino and hippo were concentrated. The second war
in 1999–2000 had an initial active phase that included
a two-month occupation of park headquarters by the
Ugandan-backed rebel forces when project personnel
and conservateurs were moved out. During this
phase, there was little reduction in anti-poaching effort,
because park guards continued their anti-poaching
efforts and monitoring. The Ugandan forces acted
positively towards conservation efforts and prevented
the sale of bushmeat; a small increase in poaching
was checked. The current phase of the second war
largely involves a jostling for power and resource exploitation
rather than open combat. Peace talks are
under way.
The effect of increased poaching and military actions
on wildlife was measured by systematic aerial
sample counts of large mammals. These counts were
carried out over the park after the first war in May–
June 1998 and after the main phase of the second war
in June 2000. Estimate count results for elephants from
systematic aerial surveys before, between and after the
active phases of the two wars in DRC are 11,175 in
1995 (standard error 3679), 5874 in 1998 (standard error
1339) and 6022 in 2000 (standard error 1046).
Half of the elephants were lost during the first war,
but there was no significant change during the initial
phase of the second war. These elephants have now
further gained in value by their genetic significance. It
has long been noted that they appear morphologically
and behaviourally as an intergrade between forest
(Loxodonta africana cyclotis) and savannah (L. a.
africana) types, and nowgenetic studies show that they
are intermediate and cannot be clearly classified as either
forest or savannah subspecies.
The rhinos are monitored by means of systematic
block counts using individual recognition, backed by
ongoing standard recording of rhino observations.
This means that the population present can be found
cumulatively where an individual missed in one survey
is seen in a subsequent survey. Table 1 summarizes
the cumulative results of surveys and reconnaissance
flights before, between and after the wars.
An intensive aerial rhino survey was carried out in
April 2000 using the stratified block count method, but
it was curtailed at the end when the plane developed an
engine problem. Twenty-four animals were found, including
seven new calves, one of which was probably
less than a week old. The other five, which were among
the minimum number seen in 1998, were subadult
Status of northern white rhinos and elephants in Garamba
National Park, Democratic Republic of Congo, during the wars
Kes Hillman Smith
Garamba National Park
PO Box 15024, Nairobi, Kenya
email: [email protected]
Annex 79
Pachyderm No. 31 July–December 2001 81
programme at each period of unrest had been designed
to ensure that substantial areas of long grass remain in
the most protected central southern area to afford maximum
protection for the rhinos while creating mosaics
with short grass patches so that they could alternate rapidly
between grazing and cover. These areas were found
each time to be favoured by the rhinos.
Factors that have been key in maintaining the rhino
population relatively stable despite the circumstances
have been that the guards have maintained their patrolling
and protection as much as possible during each
period of unrest and that the supporting partners with
the National Congolese Parks Institute have maintained
their ongoing commitment to protect the park. The International
Rhino Foundation is currently the main supporting
partner for Garamba, along with the US Fish
and Wildlife Service. A larger umbrella programme has
been developed by the main supporting partners with
the Congolese National Parks Institute and UNESCO
and UN Foundation to support the five World Heritage
Sites in DRC, one of which is Garamba, throughout
the armed conflict and in the future. Garamba personnel
were key in developing the programme in which
rhinos, elephants, gorillas and other key species of the
park were central to its World Heritage status.
The umbrella programme aims to provide financial
support and capacity building for field staff. The
economy of the country had declined well before the
wars started, which meant that the government could
not financially support the parastatal agency to which
the park belonged. The UN Foundation is the core funding
agency, operating through UNESCO with NGO
partners implementing the programme in the field.
These NGO partners are also committed to continuing
their own support. The UNESCO umbrella is key to
providing active diplomatic support, which will facilitate
the essentially neutral field operation of conservation
staff even within a somewhat insecure and politically
unstable region.
Table 1. Population dynamics of northern white rhinos between surveys over war periods (combined totals
of different individuals seen over a series of surveys during the preceding six months)
Surveys in 1996 War Surveys in 1998 War Surveys in 2000
Min (–max.) population est. 29 26 (–31) 30 (–36)
Births +4 +7
Known poached –2 –2
Previously known animals not
seen (missing or dead) 5 1
males, three of which would recently have left their
mothers on the birth of her new calf. At this stage they
are their most nervous and secretive, hiding in long grass
and very difficult to see. During the systematic sample
count of large mammals over the whole park and other
reconnaissance flights in June of the same year, another
individual not seen in April was observed, bringing the
total to 25. In August during reconnaissance flights, two
of the young males that had been missed in April were
found, and purely by chance two more of the younger
ones were found outside the park. This brought the total
seen in 2000 to 30. Of the new calves, all born between
the end of 1999 and April 2000, four were male,
one was female and the sex of the other two could not
be determined.
The age and sex structure of the population at the
end of 2000 was
Total confirmed individuals
Male adults 6
Female adults 6
Male subadults 5
Female subadults 4
Male juveniles 5
Female juvenile 1
Male infant 1
Unsexed infants 2
Total 30 confirmed August 2000
sex ratio 17 : 11 + 2 unknown
adult : subadult + juvenile ratio 12 : 18
It has not been possible to do a survey in 2001.
There are no reports of major poaching, but it has
been reported that guards found a rhino carcass in
April and a rhino horn was offered for sale to a consultant
across the border in Sudan in May.
Distribution was mapped on each of the surveys and
was each time associated with the central protected
areas and the long–short grass mosaics. The burning
Annex 79
Annex 80
L. Mubalama, J. J. Mapilanga, “Less Elephant Slaughter in the Okapi Faunal Reserve,
Democratic Republic of Congo, with Operation Tango”, Pachyderm, No. 31 (July-Dec. 2001)

36 Pachyderm No. 31 July–December 2001
Less elephant slaughter in the Okapi Faunal Reserve, Democratic
Republic of Congo, with Operation Tango
Leonard Mubalama1,2 and Jean Joseph Mapilanga2
ı Monitoring Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE/CITES)
2 Institut congolais pour la conservation de la nature
PO Box 852, Bukavu, Democratic Republic of Congo
tel: +250 853 6620; fax: 871 762 213 326
email: [email protected]
Abstract
The Okapi Faunal Reserve in the Democratic Republic of Congo is one of the most biologically rich of the
World Heritage Sites. Yet it is seriously threatened by the effects of war and armed conflict. Support from
conservation non-governmental organizations has proved critical given the urgency these crises have caused.
In addition, it has been proved through Operation Tango with impetus from these organizations that collaborative
action between the local authority for the management of protected areas and the Uganda People’s
Defence Forces and Congolese military was effective in reducing heavy elephant poaching and coltanore
exploitation within the reserve. Difficult choices must be made in attempts to balance the needs of still-fragile
wildlife populations with urgent demands of the rural poor. Still, the experience of the Okapi Faunal Reserve
gives hope to those working in neighbouring protected areas in Congo. Even as the forest has begun to
regenerate, so too the elephant population has survived recent poaching ordeals and has started to show
remarkable capability for recovery under today’s difficult constraints.
Résumé
La Réserve de faune à Okapi (RFO) figure parmi les plus riches sites de patrimoine mondial en danger en
République Démocratique du Congo. A ce jour, ce site est sérieusement menacé par les effets de la guerre et
de conflit armé. L’appui des ONGs de conservation a été critiques étant donné l’urgence de besoins de conservation
pendant la période de crise. Aussi, il a été démontré à travers l’Opération Tango et ce, avec l’impulsion
desdites ONGs que la collaboration entre l’institution nationale de conservation au niveau local et l’UPDF et
l’armée congolaise fut effective en réduisant le braconnage intense d’éléphants ainsi que l’exploitation du
coltan dans la Réserve. Le processus de rétablissement est au prise avec le choix tragique opéré visant à
balancer les besoins de la faune sauvage et ceux urgents de la population rurale démunie. Toujours est-il que
l’expérience de la RFO donne espoir aux autres aires protégées en RD Congo. A l’instar de la forêt, la population
d’éléphants a survécu l’épreuve du braconnage et a commencé à montrer une capacité remarquable de
rétablissement en dépit de contraintes difficiles en cours.
Introduction
Situated in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC), the Okapi Faunal Reserve (OFR) was
created in May 1992 and proclaimed a World Heritage
Site in December 1996 in recognition of its biological
significance and in response to the increasing threats to
its integrity. The reserve occupies about 20% of the Ituri
Forest (60,000 km2) (fig. 1), which in turn is a small
part of the vast Congo Basin forest. The reserve provides
a refuge for one of the largest populations of
elephants in the Congo. J.A. Hart (pers. comm. 1998)
estimated that OFR had 7375 elephants.
Like many African elephant range states, cannot
protect its elephant populations under the current political
and economic conditions. The high cost of protection
is the single most important factor in the fail-
Annex 80
Pachyderm No. 31 July–December 2001 39
serve. A concerted effort was made to enforce laws at
every level of the trade, and on the strength of intelligence
network records, patrol teams were deployed in
hot-spot hunting zones. The patrol teams were armed
and supplied with adequate ammunition to ensure that
they were on an equal footing with the heavily armed
poachers or were even more powerful.
By 18 October 2000, after several contacts between
a wildlife management team and RCD/ML authorities
in Bunia, it was possible to initiate the intensive
military–wildlife guard anti-poaching operation called
Tango (akin in sound to tembo, ‘elephant’ in Swahili)
in an attempt to wipe out elephant and bushmeat
poaching and illegal coltan mining. (Columbite/tantalite
is one of the ores from which tantalum powder
is made. It is used in the manufacture of tiny tantalum
capacitors, which withstand the heat of ever-faster
computers and ever-smaller mobile phones.) Baseline
data were provided by the findings of the MIKE monitoring
teams.
Large-scale poaching activities were evident, with
17 new or recent poaching camps reported. Twenty
poachers were caught red-handed and 111 kg of raw
ivory and 215 kg of elephant meat were recovered.
Three months before the launch of Operation Tango
the area under control of the wildlife management
authorities was less than 10% of the reserve (fig. 1).
Importantly, 17 weapons, most of them small machineguns,
along with 331 rounds of ammunition were
confiscated by a joint 34-man team of UPDF (Uganda
People’s Defence Forces) and APC (Armée Populaire
Congolaise) personnel.
Because of poor communication, it was decided
that all active law enforcement be vested in a closely
supervised rapid-deployment strike force based at
headquarters in Epulu. The strike force mounted regular
armed patrols on an unpredictable basis throughout
the reserve. Patrols also manned semi-permanent
observation posts at strategic vantage points. The
force responded rapidly on short notice to intelligence
reports or calls for assistance forwarded by the various
outposts.
After five months of Operation Tango, no new
signs of poaching were found, which correlates with
information gained from law-enforcement monitoring
of poaching levels during the latter part of 2000.
Results
Although we cannot say that the operation has led to
an absolute cessation of elephant poaching, the hope
has been that the protection levels gained would be
consolidated with the deployment in May 2001 of a
new group of 28 park guards trained by joint UPDF
and APC forces. Armed OFR personnel are recruited
among individuals in the local population who demonstrate
qualities of leadership and commitment; they
then receive regular hands-on training that empowers
them to take responsibility for managing their
natural resources—the formula proved to sustain
long-term conservation efforts under today’s difficult
conditions (Adams and McShane 1992). The idea of
investment in joint patrol forces with locally based
conservation institutions is not new. What is clear,
however, is that such site-based initiatives must be
tied to an international structure that endures through
cycles of civil strife (Hart and Hart 1997).
Results from Operation Tango are far better than
had been hoped, and the relative lull in poaching gives
time to build up other types of support for OFR. Elsewhere,
publicity on the plight of elephants has proved
effective in reducing the demand for elephant products;
therefore, production and dissemination of written
information materials in local languages should
be intensified. The lessons from these recent operations
indicate that a greater level of support, collaborative
effort with more partners, and innovative, sustainable
means of funding are necessary for the longterm
future of OFR. Unless the substantial levels of
funding that will be required to run this operation effectively
are regularly and reliably forthcoming, the
whole strategy will collapse.
We believe Operation Tango has been a success.
However, there is still much to do to consolidate these
results. Although the operation did not bring poaching
to a complete end, it is obvious that the joint military
and strike force’s basic patrol strategy brought increased
protection to the reserve, and international community
support helped to boost the morale of reserve staff.
Optimized law-enforcement operations have led to optimizing
the level of deterrence and hence reducing illegal
off-take to earlier levels (Jachmann 1998). Combined
with an improved regime of foot patrols carried
out from headquarters, and existing and planned outposts,
OFR will provide appropriate protection for the
elephant population and other wildlife. Nevertheless,
as formal armed forces are being withdrawn from the
region, exploitation is again a threat; conservation personnel
have been attacked and robbed, as have many
others. Much of this current increased instability seems
Annex 80
Annex 81
Dennis Farrell, Associated Press, Billings Gazette, African animal auction draws 2,000 (22 June
2002)

African animal auction draws 2,000 | World | billingsgazette.com 6/1/17, 12:37 AM
http://billingsgazette.com/news/world/african-animal-auction-draws/arti… Page 1 of 3
http://billingsgazette.com/news/world/african-animal-auction-draws/arti…
African animal auction draws 2,000
Jun 22, 2002
Associated Press
UMFOLOZI, South Africa (AP) - The hippos snorted, the rhinos dozed
and the giraffes darted about nervously as the hammer fell Saturday at
Africa's largest wild animal auction.
A crowd of nearly 2,000 private game reserve owners, tourists with
children and the odd Texas millionaire wandered among the huge
pens, inspecting the hundreds of animals up for fierce bid at the
annual auction held by the parks board of South Africa's KwaZulu-
Natal province.
A few minutes later in a nearby tent, auctioneer Mike Killassy stood in
front of a bank of television screens showing videos of the animals and
goaded potential buyers with his rolling patter.
"Elevenfive, elevenfive, there's a big bull there don't miss this one do I
hear 12? 12? I've got 12," he said before eventually selling a trio of
giraffes for $1,300 each.
DENIS FARRELL
Associated Press Potential buyers view a white rhino prior to the wildlife auctions at the Umfolozi Game Park, South Africa, Saturday
June 22, 2002. A crowd of nearly 2,000 private game reserve owners attended Africa's largest wild animal auction held by the parks
board of South Africa's KwaZulu-Natal province Saturday.
Annex 81
African animal auction draws 2,000 | World | billingsgazette.com 6/1/17, 12:37 AM
http://billingsgazette.com/news/world/african-animal-auction-draws/arti… Page 2 of 3
The one-day auction event started 14 years ago as an effort to get rid of
some of the surplus animals in the province's 110 protected areas.
Its importance has grown as more South Africans begin turning
former farms and cattle ranches into private game reserves, hoping to
make more money from tourism or game breeding.
The government used to kill the excess animals that it could not
donate to conservation programs elsewhere, said Jeff Gaisford, a
spokesman for the parks board.
Culled antelope, for example, would then be turned into biltong, a
snack of cured meat, and sold for maybe $3 each, he said. Live antelope
can easily sell for 10 times that amount.
Saturday's auction pulled in $1.1 million, all of which goes to the parks
board.
"It's certainly a lot more productive," Gaisford said.
Most of the 416 live animals at the auction were captured in the past
few months by rangers armed with tranquilizer guns. The animals
were taken to the Umfolozi park, 45 miles north of Durban, for
auction. About 1,600 animals not yet captured were bid on as well.
Hours before the bidding, groups of agitated giraffes cantered around
their 20-foot-high cages of tall logs. Shelves of grass were built into the
inside wall about halfway up so the long-necked animals could easily
reach them.
Nearby, wildebeest, nyala antelope and zebras milled about their cages
and enormous white rhinos rested on their sides in long pens.
But the showpiece was the group of five hippos. The hippo is one of the
most dangerous animals in Africa as well as one of the hardest to
capture. The animals, used to hiding in lakes, grunted and huddled
together in the shade at the back of their pen. This particular group
was marked for auction after one attacked and severely injured a man.
Hippos cannot be captured with tranquilizer guns, because they might
run into the water, fall asleep and drown. They have to be starved out
of their habitat, then lured into cages baited with food.
Behind the pens a fleet of shiny green trucks waited to transport the
animals to their new homes.
Anton Swardt, 35, kneeled before a young male rhino, taking notes
approvingly in his auction book. "They're beautiful creatures, eh?" he
said. "What's nice about this one is its ears are all clean." He was
referring to the absence of holes used by rangers to mark the beasts.


Annex 81
African animal auction draws 2,000 | World | billingsgazette.com 6/1/17, 12:37 AM
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Jamestown 4-Site Ticket
2 Museums + 2 National Parks. 7 Days of Unlimited
Admission
historyisfun.org
Swardt, who owned a farm near Warmbaths, was also impressed the
rhino was eating right in front of him, and he admired its large horn.
Most of the rhinos sold for between $20,000 and $30,000 each. The five
hippos sold for $4,100, a South African record. Previously the most
paid was $2,700.
Copyright 2002 Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material
may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
Annex 81

Annex 82
Thierry Vircoulon, “L’Ituri ou La Guerre Au Pluriel”, Afrique Contemporaine, Vol. 2005/3, No.
215 (2005)

L'ITURI OU LA GUERRE AU PLURIEL
Thierry Vircoulon
De Boeck Supérieur | « Afrique contemporaine »
2005/3 n° 215 | pages 129 à 146
ISSN 0002-0478
ISBN 2-8041-4929-3
Article disponible en ligne à l'adresse :
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pour citer cet article :
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thierry Vircoulon, « L'Ituri ou la guerre au pluriel », Afrique contemporaine 2005/3
(n° 215), p. 129-146.
DOI 10.3917/afco.215.0129
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Annex 82
129
Ll’aIt ugriu oue lrar geu earrue apu lpulurriieel l
Thierry VIRCOULON
1
De 1999 à 2004, le lointain district de l’Ituri, bordant les frontières
ougandaise et soudanaise, a connu ce que les Ituriens eux-mêmes appellent
une « guerre tribale » opposant Lendu et Hema, avec l’appui et l’interférence
de forces étrangères plus ou moins visibles. Ressemblant plus à un
« système de guerres » qu’à une guerre unique, le conflit iturien est un
« entrelacs » de luttes qui ont fait environ 50 000 morts de 1999 à 2003 et
environ dix fois plus de déplacés. Cet article n’a pas la prétention de démêler
cet « entrelacs » de luttes mais, plus modestement, son objectif vise à retracer
succinctement l’événementiel de la violence à l’oeuvre dans cette zone
congolaise depuis six ans et de mettre en évidence la sédimentation des conflictualités
locales qui rend illusoire toute paix imposée.
CHRONOLOGIE D’UN CONFLIT OUBLIÉ
Le district de l’Ituri
2
, qui compte entre 3,5 et 5,5 millions d’habitants, ne
s’est pas embrasé brutalement mais progressivement, presque méthodiquement
selon les témoignages des populations locales. Tout a débuté par un
conflit ultra-local, dans un des cinq territoires du district. Le territoire de
Djugu était, au plan agricole, le plus riche du district et, au plan ethnique,
le plus complexe. La géo-ethnie des Hema
3
et des Lendu
4
y était tellement
1. Auteur d’un ouvrage sur l’Afrique du Sud, Thierry Vircoulon a écrit plusieurs articles sur la transition congolaise et a
travaillé en RDC pour une organisation internationale.
2. Circonscription administrative de la province orientale, l’Ituri est divisée en cinq territoires qui sont également des circonscriptions
administratives (Djugu, Irumu, Mambasa, Aru et Mahagi), elles-mêmes subdivisées en collectivités.
3. Éleveurs, les Hema sont assimilés aux peuples nilotiques et se seraient installés de l’autre côté du lac Albert à partir
du XVIIIe siècle.
4. D’origine bantoue, les Lendu sont des agriculteurs qui vivaient dans un système de chefferies peu formalisé jusqu’au
début du XXe siècle.
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Annex 82
■ L’Ituri ou la guerre au pluriel ■
131
imbriquée qu’il était quasiment impossible de différencier leurs territoires :
des collectivités hema comportaient des populations lendu et vice-versa. À
l’époque coloniale, les Belges avaient créé, dans cette zone d’altitude et
donc bien arrosée, de nombreuses fermes ainsi que la plus grande des missions
catholiques du district, la mission de Fataki.
Lors de la « zaïrianisation» de l’économie, les propriétaires belges conservant
des intérêts dans l’ancien Congo devenu Zaïre ont confié leurs exploitations
agricoles à des gérants hema dans l’espoir d’en reprendre possession
une fois cette lubie mobutiste passée de mode. Or, la « zaïrianisation » a
duré et les Hema ont fait enregistrer ces propriétés – dont les ouvriers agricoles
étaient le plus souvent des Lendu – en leur nom. Les concessionnaires
hema ont mené une politique d’accaparement des terres en soudoyant les
autorités locales. En effet, selon la législation congolaise, un titre de propriété
non contestée pendant deux ans devient incontestable. Le service du
cadastre et le tribunal de grande instance de Bunia étant au service du plus
offrant, de nombreuses malversations foncières ont eu lieu dans les années
1990, permettant aux concessionnaires hema d’agrandir leurs propriétés
aux dépens des Lendu Pitsi du territoire de Djugu.
Cet accaparement était, du reste, facilité par le fait que la plupart des paysans
lendu étaient illettrés et n’avaient les moyens ni financiers ni intellectuels
de contester les titres fonciers qui leur étaient opposés. La police et le
reste de l’administration dominées par les Hema n’ont pas joué le rôle d’arbitre
impartial qui aurait dû être le leur et les quelques contestations foncières
parvenues devant le tribunal local ont tourné à l’avantage des
propriétaires. Structurelle en RDC, la corruption de l’administration et de la
justice locales a permis aux tensions entre ces deux tribus de « gonfler » au
point d’aboutir à un conflit ouvert (dans la mémoire locale, le premier « fait
de guerre » fut le massacre d’un groupe de Hema se rendant à un mariage).
Épicentre de la guerre tribale, le conflit foncier du territoire de Djugu
a vite révélé son potentiel de contagion en gagnant la zone d’Irumu où vivaient
des Hema et Lendu méridionaux. Dans ce territoire, les zones
hema et lendu sont plus homogènes que dans le Djugu, au point qu’il est
possible de distinguer de véritables « blocs géo-ethniques ». L’arrivée des
réfugiés lendu et de leurs récits de combats ont vite ravivé les anciennes
plaies et conduit les deux groupes à épouser les causes de leurs cousins du
nord.
Selon un processus dont l’histoire reste à faire, quatre milices ethniques
(voir tableau 1, page 132) se sont structurées en fonction des affiliations claniques
traditionnelles (l’UPC pour les Hema nord et le PUSIC pour les
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Annex 82
■ Afrique contemporaine ■
138
Les mémoires locales dépeignent une relation inégalitaire dès ses débuts
au XVIII
e
siècle entre les pasteurs hema et les agriculteurs lendu, mais cette
inégalité était tempérée par un système d’échanges mutuellement bénéfiques.
Si les Hema qui avaient des « rois » ont subsumé les Lendu sans chefferie
centralisée sous leur autorité, ils dépendaient d’eux pour une bonne
partie de leur approvisionnement et des traces d’acculturation dans les
deux groupes témoignent de l’intensité des échanges (Boga, dans le territoire
d’Irumu, est une localité de Hema méridionaux cultivateurs tandis
qu’on trouve des Lendu pasteurs). La coexistence des deux groupes aux territoires
étroitement imbriqués s’était traduite, dans le passé, par plusieurs
vagues d’affrontements en 1911, 1921, 1969, 1971, 1981 et 1992-1993.
Ces moments de tension avaient donné lieu à des tueries de part et d’autre,
tueries qui hantent encore la mémoire collective.
En général, ces affrontements ponctuels ne s’étaient arrêtés qu’avec l’intervention
militaire ou civile du pouvoir central. En 1911, quand les Lendus-
Bindi avaient tué le chef hema Bomere dans l’actuel territoire d’Irumu,
les autorités coloniales belges avaient séparé les belligérants en définissant
des territoires respectifs et en « libérant » ainsi les Lendu sud de la tutelle
des Hema. Dans l’histoire locale, ce meurtre d’un chef hema représente le
« crime primordial », celui d’où tout découle : c’est le moment de la rupture
de la coexistence pacifique et le début d’une séparation contestée des deux
groupes en collectivités administratives hema et lendu, au moins au sud de
l’Ituri.
Ensuite, l’histoire prend la forme de l’engrenage de la vengeance et les
heurts s’enchaînent. Près d’un siècle après le premier affrontement, en
1992-1993, le pouvoir mobutiste n’a pas hésité à envoyer ses « paracommandos
» donner la chasse aux Ngiti (Lendu sud) qui s’étaient emparés
du bétail des Hema. Ce fut le dernier incident avant le déclenchement de la
« guerre tribale » contemporaine qui prit la forme d’attaques et de razzia de
villages.
Selon des témoignages locaux, l’objectif de ces attaques était souvent de
s’emparer d’un terroir longtemps convoité, comme Bogoro qui connut plusieurs
attaques lendu ou Loga dans le territoire de Djugu. Dans le premier
cas, il s’agit d’un village à la frontière des territoires hemas et lendus qui permet
de contrôler l’axe commercial liant Bunia au lac Albert et qui fut attaqué
à trois reprises (janvier 2001, août 2002 et février 2003). Les Lendu
contestaient depuis longtemps l’appartenance de ce village aux Hema qui,
cartes coloniales à l’appui, prétendent l’avoir obtenu des autorités belges.
Dans le cas de Loga, les Hema ont chassé, en février 2002, les Lendu du
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Annex 82
Annex 83
Johan Pottier, “Representations of Ethnicity in the Search for Peace: Ituri, Democratic Republic
of Congo”, African Affairs Vol. 109, No. 434 (27 Nov. 2009)

REPRESENTATIONS OF ETHNICITY IN THE
SEARCH FOR PEACE: ITURI, DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO
JOHAN POTTIER*
ABSTRACT
This article scrutinizes writings on ethnicity with reference to Hema and
Lendu, the main protagonists in the Ituri conflict (1999–2007). First, it
reviews representations during the conflict: Hema leaders portray Lendu
as ‘wild and untameable’, ‘génocidaires’, and ‘incapable of governance’;
Lendu leaders portray Hema as driven by an innate desire for political
and economic control, a self-appointed elite whose legitimacy must be
questioned. Next, the article turns to the origins of these (mis)representations
by considering how Hema and Lendu have been viewed over the
course of the twentieth century – by anthropologists, colonial administrators,
missionaries, and explorers. This review challenges received wisdom
about pre-colonial and early colonial interactions between Hema and Lendu,
thus shedding light on a critical phase of history that remains
insufficiently understood, and supporting the argument that a re-crafting
of the dominant discourse on history is a challenge that is central to the
current peace process.
IN ITURI TODAY, THE ISSUES THAT IGNITED OR SUSTAINED the recent
conflict (1999–2007) have yet to be removed; fear of the ethnic other,
coupled with suspicion and rumour, runs as deep as ever. The UN Plan
of Action for Ituri (2008–10) identifies the issues that stand stubbornly in
the way of peace: ‘the illegal timber loggings in the forests of Mambassa,
the thorny problem of anti-personnel mines, the violence against women
and young girls, intra- and inter-community problems over land, and the
insecurity around the gold mines towards which former militias awaiting reintegration
continue to gravitate’.1 The Plan also highlights, especially for
Bunia, growing problems with youth unemployment, criminal activity, and
(a new phenomenon) street children. Worryingly, though not surprisingly,
the programme for DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegra-
*Johan Pottier ([email protected]) is Professor of Social Anthropology at the School of Oriental
and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. He thanks SOAS for funding a research
visit to the African Archives (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in Brussels.
1. PNUD, ‘Plan d’actions prioritaires visant la stabilisation et le relèvement communautaire de
l’Ituri’ (Plan of Action, United Nations Development Programme, Bunia, 2008), pp. 19–20.
23
African Affairs, 109/434, 23–50 doi: 10.1093/afraf/adp071
© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society. All rights reserved
Advance Access Publication 27 November 2009
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Annex 83
tion), launched nationwide in 2005, has done little to defuse struggles over
natural resources. The UNDP list of persistent concerns, especially the unregulated
control of agricultural land and gold mines, suggests that the
inter-ethnic tensions expressed during the conflict have yet to be dissolved.
Personal messages I have received from Ituri confirm this. In many parts of
the district, community leaders remain at a loss – or hold contradictory opinions
– as to how tensions expressed in terms of ethnicity should be tackled.
While this article does not propose solutions, it does throw light on two
distinct aspects of the concern about ethnicity. Through reviewing local
statements about ethnicity issued during the conflict, and by trawling the
colonial literature on the subject of ethnic (mis)representations of the
Hema and Lendu identities, the article aims to highlight the persistent
emotive power of racist discourses, and to trace their origin to the early decades
of Belgian colonial rule. Concretely, it is shown how the widespread
notion of a superior Hema and a yet-to-be-civilized Lendu population
springs from the way early colonial administrators perceived Ituri’s natural
and social environments. Responding to a need for making these complex
worlds ‘legible’, and hence fit for intervention,2 these pioneer representatives
of the state constructed a discourse of tribal/racial difference quite out
of sync with the intricate realities which surrounded them. Their ‘selective
viewing’, which gave rise to the social stereotypes still in force today, is exposed
in particular in reports from the 1920s and 1930s.
In addition, this article draws attention to how some early administrators
challenged the official/dominant discourse of difference. Their challenge included
an attack on the emerging consensus about Ituri’s then most recent
history – which spoke of the subjugation (slavery) of Lendu by Hema. Such
a view, they argued, could not be supported empirically. Their counternarrative
– which spoke of complex interactions and greater autonomy
for Lendu at the time the Belgian administration was set up – has lain dormant
in the archives for almost a century. It deserves scholarly attention not
only because of what it tells us about the development of policy discourses
under conditions of early colonialism, but also because Lendu community
leaders today claim that ‘their history’ is yet to be written.
My aim then is to map out contemporary essentialist portrayals and trace
their origins through an exploration of early colonial archives and some academic
publications. In doing so, I am guided by Mark Leopold’s perspective
that interpretations of the past are at the core of social reconstruction. I also
adopt his technique of reading history backwards, which enables us better to
2. James Scott, Seeing Like A State: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have
failed (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT and London, 1998).
24 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
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Annex 83
that the challenge to negative stereotyping becomes stronger the closer we
get to 1920. Remarkably, almost a century ago, Hackars demanded a radical
overhaul of history as handed down within the administration.
Following the completion of a major relocation programme, Hackars
turned the ‘legible’ world upside down:
. . . some Bahema . . . are finding it difficult to contemplate life without the Walendu, who,
contrary to general opinion, have never lived in a state of slavery. Rather the opposite holds:
before the European arrived, it was the [Mu]hema who was at the mercy of the [Mu]lendu,
who mockingly called him ‘his wife’ or even ‘his antelope’ – thus indicating the cattle keeper’s
cowardice and the price he would pay when refusing to adequately compensate
Walendu for services rendered or food items obtained. It is only since the arrival of the
European that the Bahema, always ambitious and deceitful, has tried to dominate the Walendu
in order to better exploit him. It is the [Belgian] administration which has furthered
the Bahema vision, which goes to say that every military operation [we mounted] against the
Walendu regrettably aimed to subjugate these toilers of the soil to the cattle keeper’s authority. That
is the reason why Walendu [who still live with Hema] are stubbornly resisting our presence,
and why they have so little confidence in our agents. . . . Before the Belgian conquest, the
Walendu had a tribal organization that we [Belgians] should have respected.83
Hackars’s perspective that colonial military operations had caused Lendu
to become dependent on Hema is extraordinary, as is his plea that the social
world-made-legible be undone and reversed.
One particularly catastrophic example of blatant disrespect toward Lendu
had been the appointment of South Hema chief Bomera, who was assassinated
in 1911 just months after the Belgian Chef de Zone had made him
‘king’ (roi). According to CDD Siffer, South Hema had recognized a single
chief/king until 1897. Following the death of the then incumbent, candidates
to the throne, Bomera among them, declared their own independent
chieftainships. Finding such political fragmentation unacceptable, the Chef
de Zone then intervened to re-create the single chieftaincy and to crown
Bomera king – but this happened against the advice of CDD Engh. The
result: ‘Bomera’s appointment was resented by most South Hema, while
Lendu refused to submit to his rule. A few months [later], refusing to meet
the tribute that Hema now demanded of them, Lendu killed Bomera along
with 200 Hema.’84 Persisting with the idea that South Hema needed a single
head, the Chef de Zone then appointed Bomera’s son, Ridjumba, and
sent an officer and 50 soldiers to Gety to ensure Lendu acceptance of
Hema domination. Protection notwithstanding, Ridjumba fled at the earliest
opportunity.
So, who needed liberating? In his 1920 reports, CDD Hackars clarifies
that Lendu who live independent of Hema maintain that they were never en-
83. Rapport sur la Situation Générale de l’Ituri, 1920, 2ème trimestre. AA, RA/AIMO 95,
emphasis added.
84. Rapport sur la Situation Générale de l’Ituri, 1914, 1er trimestre. AA, RA/AIMO 1759.
REPRESENTATIONS OF ETHNICITY IN ITURI 43
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saw Lendu as ‘a treacherous and also a warlike people, constantly fighting
amongst themselves and with their neighbours the Aluro [Alur]’.100
While it is doubtful that Major Bright ever had any direct contact with
Lendu (Bale), as indeed he could not find anyone who understood their
language, his second-hand portrayal of them is similar to that of Belgian
Lieutenant Demuenynck.101 Demuenynck too had learned about Lendu
from a distance – from their South Alur neighbours. Demuenynck complained
that Lendu had had a bad influence on certain South Alur
groupings, whom he described as ‘more unsociable and more pugnacious’
than other Alur. But he noted with interest that Alur were not cannibalistic,
which seemed remarkable to him given that they were ‘surrounded, to the
south and west, by cannibals: the Walendu and the Momvu’.102
Bright did not write about Hema chiefs, but he met royal Hima in Ankole
(Uganda) whom he described as handsome and superior to the Bantu race.
He wrote that were it not for their fascinating hair – which was ‘tightly
curled and growing in tufts’ – the Muhema might be mistaken for a dark
Egyptian, someone close to the European in evolutionary terms and a cut
above the ‘negroid and inferior’ Bantu race.103 By now, Europeans were
well familiar with the image of the handsome Hima/Hema, who had featured
so prominently in Stanley’s dispatches. For Stanley, ‘good looks’
and ‘intelligence’ were one. Of the Hema he met near Nyankunde in April
1888, Stanley wrote: ‘the purest of their kind resemble old ivory in colour,
and their skins have a beautifully soft feel, as of the finest satin’. Similarly,
he described Kavalli, chief of the Babiassi branch of South Hema, as ‘a
handsome young man, with regular features, tall, slender and wonderfully
composed in manner’.104
The appearance of Hema impressed. In Darkest Africa, Stanley wrote he
had become engrossed with ‘the Caucasian faces under the negro hair’.105
South Hema (Babiassi) chiefs were Stanley’s closest allies. His cordial encounters,
and the material support he received, destined the ‘superior’
Hema to become close to the European colonizer. It was to them that he
owed the success of his Emin Pasha expedition; it was through other Hema
100. Major R. G. T. Bright, ‘An exploration in Central Equatorial Africa’, African Affairs 9,
35 (1910), p. 231.
101. Bright, ‘Survey and exploration’, p. 141.
102. A. Demuenynck, ‘Au pays de Mahagi. Moeurs et coutumes des Alulus’, Bulletin société
royale belge de géographie 32, 1–2 (1908), pp. 51, 69.
103. Bright, ‘Survey and exploration’, p. 145.
104. Henry Morton Stanley, In Darkest Africa: Or the quest, rescue and retreat of Emin, Governor
of Equatoria, Volume 1 (Sampson, Marston, Searle and Rivington, London, 1890), pp.
362, 366. Thiry regards Babiassi Hema as a sub-group of the South Hema.
105. Henry Morton Stanley, In Darkest Africa: Or the quest, rescue and retreat of Emin, Governor
of Equatoria, Volume 2 (Sampson, Marston, Searle and Rivington, London, 1890), p. 355.
REPRESENTATIONS OF ETHNICITY IN ITURI 47
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Annex 83
Annex 84
E. Kisangani & F. Scott Bob, Historical Dictionary of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(2010)

The Scarecrow Press, Inc.
Lanham • Toronto • Plymouth, UK
2010
Historical Dictionary
of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo
Third Edition
Emizet François Kisangani and F. Scott Bobb
Historical Dictionaries of Africa, No. 112
Annex 84
Published by Scarecrow Press, Inc.
A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706
http://www.scarecrowpress.com
Estover Road, Plymouth PL6 7PY, United Kingdom
Copyright © 2010 by Emizet François Kisangani and F. Scott Bobb
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by
any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval
systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who
may quote passages in a review.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Kisangani, Emizet F.
Historical dictionary of the Democratic Republic of the Congo / by Emizet
François Kisangani and F. Scott Bobb. — 3rd ed.
p. cm. — (Historical dictionaries of Africa ; no. 112)
Previous ed. written by F. Scott Bobb.
ISBN 978-0-8108-5761-2 (hardcover) — ISBN 978-0-8108-6325-5 (ebook)
1. Congo (Democratic Republic)—History—Dictionaries. I. Bobb, F. Scott,
1950- II. Bobb, F. Scott, 1950- Historical dictionary of Democratic Republic of
Congo (Zaire) III. Title.
DT650.17.B63 2009
967.51003--dc22
2009016754
 ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of
American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper
for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.
Printed in the United States of America
Annex 84
during this period to quell civil disturbances, it also came to be
known for its excesses. For example, on 23 September 1991, forces
based at the aeronautics school at Ndjili Airport rampaged over late
pay and launched several days of intense “pillages” or looting in
which other soldiers and members of the general population eventually
joined. Officially, 30 people were killed. Most factories and
major businesses were stripped of their stock and equipment. Many
small businesses and private residences were also looted. French and
Belgian paratroopers landed and evacuated 10,000 expatriates. In
October, similar incidents occurred in Lubumbashi, Mbuji-Mayi,
and several other cities.
An antigovernment demonstration in Kinshasa on 16 February
1992 was attacked by the military and resulted in 46 deaths. Human
rights organizations frequently accused the military of preying on
the populace, in general, and targeting members of the opposition, in
particular, while being incapable of defending national borders.
On 23 January 1993, soldiers angry because merchants refused to
accept a new 5 million zaire note, which the opposition had called
on the populace to boycott, rampaged and killed several of these
merchants. The incident degenerated into another round of “pillages,”
this time focused in working-class neighborhoods in central
Kinshasa. It led to another evacuation of expatriates and seriously
damaged the country’s economic production. Some 80 percent of industrial
productive capacity was destroyed or crippled. Employment
and economic activity was reduced by 80 percent.
By the mid-1990s, the Congolese military was viewed by the populace
as the main cause of criminality and violence in the country.
Armed groups in uniform set up barricades and extorted money or
valuables from motorists. Businesses were obliged to “donate” goods
or money to soldiers, often at gunpoint. Many citizens sympathized
with the plight of the soldiers who, like themselves, were rarely
paid, and they tended to blame their behavior on the government
and the political paralysis caused by bickering within the Alliance
des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL),
which began in October 1996. As a result, casualties were light except
in a few early battles.
The leader of the AFDL, Kabila, was sworn in as president in late
May 1997. His first act was to disband the DSP. A number of its
352 • MILITARY
Annex 84
MINING. Congo is one of the richest countries in Africa in terms
of mineral resources. The most important minerals are copper,
diamonds, cobalt, and zinc. There are also deposits of gold, cassiterite,
manganese, cadmium, germanium, silver, wolframite, and
columbium-tantalum (coltan). Copper, cobalt, zinc, manganese,
and germanium are found in the southeastern Congo, mainly in
Haut-Katanga and Lualaba Provinces. Diamonds are located
mainly in the former Kasai Province, particularly around the towns
of Mbuji-Mayi and Tshikapa, although some mining activities are
conducted in Kwango and Tshopo Provinces. Gold is exploited in
Ituri, Nord-Kivu, and Sud-Kivu Provinces, while cassiterite, wolframite,
and coltan are mainly exploited in the two Kivu provinces.
Tales of distant kingdoms resplendent with copper, gold, and
diamonds motivated Afro–Arabs and later European explorers to
venture into Katanga in the 1800s. According to a number of historians,
Africans knew of copper ore deposits long before the arrival
of European explorers in Katanga in the 1890s. Reports reaching the
coast of great mineral wealth are credited with encouraging some of
the first explorations into the interior. The deposits found in Katanga
initially were judged to be too small for commercial exploitation until
the late 1880s, when Leopold II established the Comité Spécial du
Katanga in 1890, one of the first of several powerful “trusts” that
were given virtual monopolies over tracts of territory in exchange
for royalties.
Ore discoveries in 1901 led to the construction of a railway and,
in 1908, to the creation of the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga
(UMHK). The first smelting plant began operation in 1911, producing
1,000 tons of copper. Production reached 100,000 tons in 1928.
Diamond and gold mining began in the early 1920s. Earnings from
the Belgian Congo’s minerals supplemented the Belgian government’s
foreign exchange reserves during the colonial era, supported
the government during the two world wars, and provided the uranium
used to build the first atomic bomb.
Since the early 1900s, mining has been a source of a great deal of
Congo’s wealth. Historically, the mining sector contributed an average
of one-third of its gross domestic product (GDP), more than
three-fourths of its export revenues, and one-half of its government
MINING • 355
Annex 84
revenues. For example, during the first decades after independence,
mineral exports provided the Congolese government with two-thirds
of its foreign exchange. The Bakajika Law of June 1966 granted all
mineral rights to the state, and the large mining companies were nationalized,
beginning with the UMHK, which became the Générale
des Carrières et des Mines (GECAMINES). Private companies
were contracted to operate the companies in return for a portion of
revenues.
The rapid rise in mineral prices, particularly for copper and cobalt,
in the mid-1970s created an economic boom. This was followed by
a series of recessions, when prices fell in the late 1970s. The decline
of export revenues as the result of falling prices was compounded by
prohibitive transportation costs. Evacuation of Congolese minerals
has always been a problem: the National Way is a tortuous route
via rail and river to the port of Matadi, but it lies completely within
national territory. The most economical route, the Benguela Railway
that links Katanga to the Angolan port of Lobito, was closed in 1975
by the Angolan civil war. Other routes, to the Tanzanian port of Dar
es Salaam, the Mozambican port of Beira, and the South African
port of Durban, were disrupted by railway inefficiencies, port congestions,
and political issues.
In the late 1970s, the government entered into a number of joint
mining ventures with private foreign companies and also allowed
private traders to participate in the marketing of gold and diamonds.
Nevertheless, government participation in the mining sector remained
limited, and production was dominated by a few companies.
GECAMINES, the country’s largest company, dominated the mining
of copper, cobalt, and most minerals in Katanga Province, and
the Société Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), the country’s secondlargest
company, dominated the formal diamond mining industry.
In addition to its major mineral products such as copper, cobalt, diamonds,
uranium, tin, and gold, Congo has also produced petroleum,
lithium, monazite, and iron ore.
Congo contains deposits of coal estimated at 60 million metric
tons. However, many of the deposits are of relatively poor quality
and are located in isolated areas where transportation costs are
prohibitive. The country produced 126,000 tons of low-grade coal in
the late 1980s, primarily in Katanga. High-quality coke and coal used
356 • MINING
Annex 84
for mineral processing is imported from Zimbabwe. Imports averaged
130,000 tons per year in the 1980s, but declined significantly
in the 1990s with falling production by the large mining companies.
Following the completion of the Inga Hydroelectric Complex and
Inga–Shaba power line, electrical power has become the preferred
form of industrial power.
As the mining infrastructure deteriorated in the 1980s because of
poor maintenance and a lack of new investments, copper was supplanted
first by cobalt and subsequently by diamonds as the major
foreign exchange earner. With the economic crisis of the late 1980s
and early 1990s, production of all minerals except for diamonds
declined dramatically. The state-owned mining companies, beset by
falling production, decaying equipment, and a lack of new investment,
were considered insolvent by the mid-1990s. By 1995, agriculture
had become an equal contributor to GDP. Thus, the mining
industry had declined to such an extent that agriculture replaced
mining as the country’s top exporting sector for the first time since
independence.
Intense international pressure to privatize GECAMINES prompted
the government to reduce operating costs by merging the different
branches of the company in 1995. However, subsequent negotiations
regarding this privatization were abandoned. Following the fall of
Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997, the government of Laurent Kabila
negotiated a number of new joint ventures with foreign companies to
rebuild the mining industry. In early 1998, the government decided
to cancel more than 15 mining contracts, owing to the failure of foreign
enterprises to invest in these projects. Moreover, the civil war
against Kabila, which began in August 1998, acted as a deterrent to
most foreign investors as the northeastern mining sector came under
the control of rebel groups and their foreign allies, Rwanda and
Uganda, and the southern mining area (southern Katanga and Kasai)
was controlled by the government and its major ally, Zimbabwe.
Three United Nations reports published in 2001–2002 accused rebel
groups, as well as foreign countries fighting in Congo, of illegal exploitation
of mineral resources during the war.
Despite the promulgation of a new mining code to attract foreign
investors, the Congolese mining sector is being exploited erratically,
and artisanal mining remains quite predominant across the vast
MINING • 357
Annex 84
Congolese territory since the Second Congo War started in August
1998. In late 2006, the legislature recommended that no further partnership
agreements be signed between the GECAMINES and foreign
mining companies, on the grounds that the joint ventures resulted in a
reduction in profits for the loss-making GECAMINES. In short, good
governance in the mining sector increasingly remains a major concern
of foreign investors, aid donors, and the Congolese legislature.
See also ALUMINUM.
MINISTRIES. In early Congolese governments, the executive branch
was divided into ministries, but these were renamed “departments,”
headed by “state commissioners,” on 5 January 1973 as part of a
gradual process of introducing an authentic Congolese form of government.
Departments were renamed ministries again in 1997, after
the installation of the Laurent Kabila government.
MISSION DE L’ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU
CONGO (MONUC) [MISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
IN CONGO]. In January 2009, the MONUC had 19,815 military
personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police, and 1,050 personnel
of formed police units (representing 58 countries), with an annual
budget of $1.2 billion. The MONUC had its headquarters (HQ) in
Kinshasa (main HQ and Western Brigade), Kisangani (Eastern Division),
Bunia (Ituri Brigade), Bukavu (Kivu Brigade South), and
Goma (Kivu Brigade North). It also had a number of field offices
mostly located in eastern Congo.
The UN Security Council Resolution 1291 of 24 February 2000
established MONUC to facilitate the implementation of the Lusaka
Peace Accord, signed on 10 July 1999 to end the civil war
against Laurent Kabila, a conflict that many commentators called
“Africa’s First World War.” The civil war against Laurent Kabila
resulted in a process of severe militarization of Congolese society
with the increased presence of foreign armed groups, the massive
recruitment of children, and the creation of self-defense militias,
along with an increase in the illicit traffic of light weapons. The
UN Security Council, in collaboration with the African Union
(AU), was thus called upon by the peace accord to constitute,
facilitate, and deploy peacekeeping forces in Congo to ensure the
358 • MINISTRIES
Annex 84
discovery of a new field was expected to raise production by 5,900
barrels per day, leading the company to announce a $500 million
exploration program in 1995. Zaïrep, which operated onshore with
Belgian participation, announced an $80 million exploration program
for 1995.
A refinery, built with Italian participation in 1968 to process
imported oil, refines some domestic crude oil. Called the Société
Congo-Italienne de Raffinage (SOCIR), the plant has a refining capacity
of 17,000 barrels per day. However, because of the high sulfur
content of domestic petroleum, very little local crude can be refined
by SOCIR. As a result, locally produced crude is exported and lighter
crude, primarily from Nigeria, is imported for refining.
Two above-ground pipelines, the first built in the 1920s and the
second completed in the 1950s, carry oil from Matadi to Kinshasa.
A government agency, Petro-Zaïre, now Petro-Congo, distributed
refined petroleum products through private dealers until 1985, when
it lost its import monopoly. In the early 1990s, inflation and a collapsing
currency caused severe fuel shortages, leading the government
of then Prime Minister Étienne Tshisekedi to seize the assets
of oil companies. However, they were returned a few months later.
Since then, multinational petroleum corporations dominate the market
in Congo.
Meanwhile, production of crude oil has slightly increased over
the years from 25,347 barrels a day in 1994 to its highest level ever
of 29,334 barrels a day in 1996, according to U.S. Bureau of Mines
data. From 1997 to 1999, production averaged 25,690 barrels a day.
Production declined in the 2000s, from 23,288 barrels a day in 2000
to 23,014 barrels in 2002. The discovery of a number of wells had
slightly increased production from 25,025 barrels a day in 2003 to
almost 28,000 barrels a day in 2005, the last year for which data are
available.
“PILLAGES.” Literally translated, “lootings,” les pillages is the name
by which Congolese refer to the incidents of looting and violence that
occurred in major Congolese cities on several occasions, beginning
on 23–24 September 1991 in Kinshasa and spreading throughout
the country. Another massive pillage occurred on 28 January
1993, when 100 people died, including the French ambassador. The
“PILLAGES” • 425
Annex 84
incidents caused the evacuation of 10,000 expatriates and serious
damage to commercial and industrial installations throughout the
country. The pillages were a major factor in the 25 percent decline
in gross domestic product the following two years. The culture of
pillages has remained part of armed groups and the national army
since January 1993, especially during the civil wars against Mobutu
Sese Seko by the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la
Libération du Congo in 1996–97, and against Laurent Kabila in
1998–2003.
PINZI, ARTHUR. A Congolese politician prominent in the pro-independence
movement, Pinzi participated in the drafting of the
Conscience Africaine manifesto in 1956. He helped found the Mouvement
National Congolais (MNC) in 1958 but split away before
independence to form his own party. Elected mayor of Kalamu commune
in 1958, Pinzi joined the Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO)
and was elected to the parliament on its ticket in 1960. He served as
finance minister in the Cyrille Adoula government from 2 August
1961 to 10 July 1962.
PLANTATIONS. Large commercial plantations began in the 1800s
in Congo and were considered to be the primary source of its wealth
after the end of the slave trade and before the beginning of mining
operations in Katanga. During the colonial era, hundreds of plantations
were established, usually on land grants, for the cultivation of
rubber, timber, sugar cane, palm oil, coffee, tea, and cocoa and for
the raising of livestock. Following independence, many plantations
fell into disuse. Others slowly declined because of transportation
problems, lack of government incentives, and a shortage of foreign
exchange for inputs. Government statistics indicate that more than
1,500 single-crop plantations of 100 to 1,000 hectares were operating
in 1970. By 1980, the number of commercial operations had
declined by half. However, in 1983, new government policies and a
liberalization of domestic prices for agricultural products had encouraged
a modest upturn, particularly in western Congo and in the
former Shaba Region. The decline of the mining sector in the 1990s
had added further impetus to the sector, although poor infrastructure
426 • PINZI, ARTHUR
Annex 84

Annex 85
Alex Veit, Intervention as Indirect Rule: Civil War and Statebuilding in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (2010)

Annex 85
Alex Veit
Intervention
as Indirect Rule
Civil War and Statebuilding
in the Democratic Republic of Congo
Campus Verlag
Frankfurt/New York
Annex 85
Biblio g raphic Information published by the De utsch e Nationalbibl iothek.
Die Deutsche Na tionalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie .
Derail ed bibli ogra phic data are avail able in rhe Intern et at htrp://dnb.d-nb.c.le.
ISBN 978-3-593-39311-7
Zugl.: Dissertation, Hurnboldt-Universitat zu Berlin, Philosophische Fakultat lll, 2010.
All right s rese rv ed. No part of this book m ay be reprodu ced or transmirred in any form or by any
mean s, electronic or m echan ical, including photocopying, record1ng, or by any information srorage
and terrieva l system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Copyright© 2010 Campus Verlag GrnbH, hankfurt-on-Main
Cover illustrati on© Alex Veit, Town Center Bunia, lturi
Cov er design: Cam pus Verlag, Fr ankfu rt-on -Main
Printed on acid Free pap er.
Print ed in the United Srntes of Am erica
For further information:
www.campus.de
www.press.uchicago.edu
Annex 85
114 INTT(RVENTION ,\S INDIRECT RUI.E
It remains unclear which side actually initiated the assaults. One report
maintains that Lendu groups instigated conflict in May 1999, as attacks
"were preceded by written warnings sent out in May from chiefs from the
Pitsi locality that Hema should vacate the land and leave their livestock and
crops behind." (Irin 2000, part one) Another account holds that in the
same area in territoire Djugu, Hema landholders made efforts to exploit the
absence of credible state authority to expand their territories. "Hema landholders
allegedly presented land titles falsified with the help of local officials:
this, at least, was the perception of the local Lendu communities
involved." (HRW 2001; cf. UNSG 2004, 9-10) While such conflicts had in
earlier decades frequently led to localized fighting, the new circumstances
triggered violence of a previously unknown scale. By the year 2000, an
estimated 7,000 lives were lost and 150,000 people displaced (lrin 2000,
part one). The commodification of land was now supplemented with the
commercialization of violence. The Hema concessionaires enlisted Ugandan
army units to violently expel Lendu farmers. The latter, meanwhile,
defended their communal claims with communalized violence, targeting
not only Hema elites, but nearby Hema villagers as well.
The escalation of land conflicts coincided with Ugandan attempts to
strengthen control over local administration. In June 1999, the head of the
"Ugandan People's Defence Forces" (UPDF) in the Congo decreed the
formation of a new province of Kibali-lturi and appointed the former
teacher turned politician and businesswoman Adele Lotsove as governor. 47
Lotsove, ethnically a Hema-Gegere, had been employed in administrations
under Mobutu and Kabila and had also been a member of the AFDL, the
RCD, and the RCD-ML. Her appointment was widely seen as proof that
the UPDF favored Hema-Gegere elites. Her subsequent handling of land
conflicts was widely condemned as partial and inflammatory (Asadho 1999;
Irin 2000; HRW 2001; UNSG 2001, 14; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers
2004, 406-407; Vlasscnroot and Huggins 2005, 168-169).
Localization of Armed Groups
Faced with escalating violence, in December 1999 Ugandan president
Museveni invite~ representatives of the Hema, Lendu, and other Iturian
47 A province llf the some name, uniting the districts of lturi and Haut-Ucle, had already briefly
existed during the Congo Crisis in the 1 %0s ,
Annex 85
1\R ,\IED GIUlL'l'S IN l ll'Rl'S C IVI L \V,11{ 115
ethnic groups to Kampala. Some Ugandan army officers were replaced,
more UPDF troops were deployed, and Adele Lotsove was deposed. Her
successor was an ethnic Alur, a group considered as neutral. The violence
subsided temporarily. Yet, at the same time, Uganda supported the RCDML's
effort to build up its forces and trained hundreds of Congolese recruits
in Ugandan military schools. Thousands more trained in RCD-ML
camps in Nyal eke in North Kivu and in Rwampara, former premises of the
Zai'rian army a few kilometers outside of Bunia. Many small-caliber firearms
were imported into the region. Reportedly, recruits at Rwampara
were of predominately Hema origin, while in Nyaleke about 2,000 Lendu
from lturi trained (HRW 2001, 16- 17, 42-42 ; Irin 2000, part two). All the
necessary ingredients for a more intensified civil war were thus prepared,
while at the same time, cracks in the RCD-ML leadership appeared.
The nominal president of the group, Wamba dia Wamba, found himself
again embattled by men of le ss national prominence but with strong
links to local power figurations (Tull 2005, 115-117). Mbusa Nyamwisi, his
prime minister and member of an influential Nande family in North Kivu,
teamed up with RCD-ML's minister of finance, John Tibasima, an Iturian
Hema and former head of gold-parastatal Okimo. Both engaged in the
recruitment and training of new soldiers. Nyamwisi is thought to have
supervised the training in his home base, North Kivu, while Tibasima engaged
Hema recruits in Ituri. They tried to violently overthrow Wamba,
but were initially hindered by Ugandan intervention. The chaos allowed
Lendu recruits trained in North I<:.ivu to defect from the rebel movement
and return to their villages, now as trained soldiers. In November 2000, the
battle for the leadership culminated in a siege of Wamba's resid en ce in
Bunia. Nyamwisi proclaim ed himself the new RCD-ML president, with
Tibasima as his deputy (HRW 2001, 13-22; Balencie and de La Grange
2005, 235). The Ugandan government tried to bring the RCD-ML under
control by uniting it with the MLC beaded by Jean-Pierre Bemba. The
merger would be named 'Tront de Liberation du Congo" (f-1,C) and
headed by Bemba. Wamba was finally sidelined, and Nyamwisi and Tibasima
were assigned to high posts in the new group (HRW 2001, 26-30).
Bemba himself brought troops to I3unia in an attempt to arrange the
merger and mediate the loc al civil war.48 Lendu groups, however, again
48 In the northern region controlled b y the /v[LC thc, e were r ebtivcl y few natural rcsou1-ces in
cc>1npariso11 to the region occupied by the RCD- 1\IL and othn RCD factions, which held
Annex 85
116 INTr·:RVl·:NTION ,IS INDIRECT RULio
feared preferential treatment of their Hema enemies. At the beginning of
2001, they attacked Bunia for the first time, especially targeting UPDF
headquarters at the airport. Following was a new round of inter-communal
fighting, now closer to Bunia, on a more sophisticated level and involving
many more firearms than before. Bemba, meanwhile, failed to agree with
Nyamwisi and Tibasima on the share of income from resource trade and
taxes. The question of who should attend the imminent Inter-Congolese
Dialogue peace talks seemed even more important. National aspirations
regained importance, following several years during which the various rebel
groups had concentrated on their respective areas of control. After a series
of violent confrontations between RCD-ML and MLC, Bemba withdrew
from lturi in November 2001 (HRW 2001, 26-30; ICG 2003, 5; Balancie
and de La Grange 2005, 238-239). 49
The Nyamwisi-Tibasima triumph in lturi, however, remained temporary.
Again, double interdependencies with external allies and the local
basis of an armed group proved decisive for success and failure. During
the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in South Africa from February to April
2002, a power-sharing agreement between the Congo's main forces was
supposed to be negotiated. Yet, the RCD-ML unilaterally entered an alliance
with Congo's President Joseph Kabila, thereby cutting ties with its
erstwhile Ugandan allies.SUT he Ugandan government reacted by instigating
defections. The choice for a new Ugandan intermediary fell on Thomas
Lubanga, a nephew of former governor Adele Lotsove. The Hema-Gegere
Lubanga had served as the Minster of Defense in the RCD-ML. He assumed
the presidency of a new militia, the "Union des Patriotes Congolais"
(UPC), in June 2002, being able to attract mostly Hema troops to join
him.SI
gold, diamonds and other resources . Also the contrnl of border posts in lturi provided significant
income.
49 The i\TLC made a futile return to lturi, when it clashed with the RCD-ML from October 2002
to January 201U in lmiloir,• i\[ambasa, the western part of lturi not specifically covered in this
stud) (Minority Rights c; rnup lnte, national 2004, 12-16) .
50 Joseph Kabila took over his father I ,au rent's post after the latter's assassination in January
2001 (l3alencie and de La Grange 2005, 235) .
51 It is not entirely clear precisely when the UPC was founded. Some sources explained that the
UPC existed a~ a non-ethnical political pattv since the ear Iv 1990s (Civil servant 1, Human
rights activist 1, businessman 1, Catholic peace activist 1, Ndrele, 13 May 2006), the International
Criminal Court sets the date in 2000 (ICC 2006, 3). Other authors treat the founding
date as June or July 20112 (Vlassenroot and Racymaekers 2004, 3%; llalencie and de La
Grange 2005, 239).
Annex 85
1\1\,\llclJ (;ROUl'S IN ]'JTl\l'S CIVIi , \'(1,\1\ 117
After its secession, the UPC leadership demanded recognition in the
national dialogue. The other parties, as well as international mediators,
however, were unwilling to seat another faction at the overcrowded negotiation
table. Nyamwisi, faced with Hema opposition, turned to the Lendu
troops he had trained in his North J-.,:jvu base. To facilitate the RCD-ML's
turn to the Lendu, he appointed Jean-Pierre Mulondo Lopondo as the new
head of lturi's administration. Lopondo was perceived by many Hema as
intent on exterminating their group, very much as his predecessor Adele
Lotsove has been seen as anti-Lendu. The split of the RCD-ML thus
translated into local ethnico-political terms. While the UPC purported to
represent Hema interests, the RCD-ML defended Nande trading and
Lendu communal interests (cf. van Woudenberg 2003, 195-196). 52
The creation of the UPC signaled a new quality of the local civil war in
Ituri, and it also constituted a new type of non-state armed group in the
district. The UPC was the first lturian armed group with a distinguishable
name and leadership, and which straddled local interests with a national
outlook. To be recognized in internationally mediated national peace talks,
it was necessary to dispose of a recognizable leadership. A three- tier pattern
of action emerged. The UPC leadership, as well as other emerging
local militia, strived first for a stake in national politics of the Congo.
Hence, their new self-identifications arose as unitarist, patriotic, intcgrationist,
or nationalist forces. Such love for the Congolese nation, however,
would not, secondly, restrain fierce fights regarding local issues and, third,
the seeking of foreign support.
Proliferation of Local Formations
Initially, the UPC was successful, but its pursuit of an ethnic agenda contributed
to another escalation of violence. As massacres and killings of
civilians became frequent and claimed ever more victims, Lendu and Hema
forces began to accuse each other of committing genocide. With the help
of the UPDF, the UPC pushed the RCD-ML out of Bunia in August 2002
Offi cia lly th e UPC: was a political party comprising an armed wing called "F orces Patr'iotiqucs
pour la LibCration du .Congo". i\'lan~· other arn1ed groups in the Congo also used this sc.:par;-ition.
To minimizL the :-ilphabct soup, only pa1·ty names ;)l"C used fnr both the political and
military wing s of armed groups.
52 f'Nl ex-member l, llun ia, 4 Nov 2005; Ul'C members I and 2, llunia, 5 NCJv 2005; Pusic ex member
l, llunia, 2 i\lay 2006 ,
Annex 85
1 1 8 ]N ' l' l·:ll l' l·:N · 110N ,\S ] :-,.l )IH l : C:T Rl'I I:
ancl expanded further north along the main roads in territoirc Djugu. The
UPC also arranged \vith the RCD-ML commander in the tmitnirt·s Aru and
Mahagi, J erc,me J-.::akwavu, to defect to its side. In addi tion, the militia was
able to expand sout h war ds into the rural areas of territoirc 1 rumu. There, by
late 2001, land conflicts s imilar to those in ten-itoire Djugu had already contributed
to the formation of sclf-defcnse groups (UNSG 2004, 10, 17). At
the end of 2002, the UPC controlled much of lturi, except for Lendu seclC!
m and the important RCD-l'vIL controllec! road between Beni, Komanc!a,
and Kisangani (Al 2003, 17-18; UNSG 2004, 10-12; HRW 2003, 30- 35;
Johnson 2003, 22-23; Vlassenrooot and R acymaeke rs 2004, 397).
The initi al successes of the UPC, however, soo n foundered, as relations
between the militia and their allie s in Kampala soure d. During late 2002,
Lubanga began to accuse Ugandan forces of colonialist practices. 51 In
Januar y 2003, he signed a formal agreement wit h the Rwandan allied R CD
in Goma (North Kivu). J-.::ampala, unwilling to lose its influence in Itur i to
a Rwandan partner, again sowed the seed of defection. ln early 2003
Jcrbme Kakwavu, who as RCD-ML-cum-UPC commander controlled
lem/oins Mahagi and Aru, defected and formed the 'Torces Armccs du
Peuple Congolais" (FAPC). UPC defen se minister Chief Yves Kahwa
Mandro seceded to found the "Patti pour !'Unite et la Sauvegarde de
l'lntcgrit c du Congo" (Pusic), while UPC chief of staff Floribert I..::.isembo
staged a coup, which however failed. Kisembo then headed a small faction
known as UPC-1,isembo (UPC-I,) (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004,
397-8; John son 2003, 23-24; UNSG 2004, 13; ICG 2003, 5; 1--IRW 2003,
17).
On the Lendu side, two new groups emerged out of former, strongly
localized self -defense groups. While they never achieved acknowl edge ment,
the formalization of these groups can also be interpreted as an attempt
to ga in recognit ion at the Inter-Cong olese Dialogue. The "Forc es de
Resistance Patriotique en lturi" ([RPI) under Germain I,atanga and Cobra
Matata operated from lem'toire lrumu and was dominated by the Lendu
sub-clan Ngiti. The 'Tro nt des Nationalistes et Intcgrationnistes" (fNI)
under Floribert Njabu was based at the northern border of lem'toire Djugu,
and a faction of the rNI dominated by Mathieu Ngudjolo operated east of
Bunia. These Lendu groups enjoyed the support of the RCD-ML und er
Nyamwisi and, by extension, of the RCD-ML's new allies in the I,inshas a
53 1\t this point, erstwhile :1llics Rwanda and Uganda dcvclopt:d :1 SC\'Cl 'C mutual animo sity o,,cr
, a1 i()us issL1cs, with hoth sides tKGtsionally thrcMcni11g nutright wtirfarc.
Annex 85
i\ R ,111:1) G I\ CJ U I'S IN I 'I' l.' 1\1 'S C IV 11. \VA I\ l I'!
government. Existing ties to Ugandan army officers were also main1:1i1i.·d.
PRPI and FNI for some time professed unity but did not establis h I' ,i,11
hierarchies (UNSG 2004, 12; ICG 2003, 8-9). 54
Escalation of Militia Warfare
The intersecting logics of local military power as a ticket into national politics
and local conflicts about land further reinforced military clashes and
anti-civilian violence in 2002 and 2003. Still, the militarily most important
force in Ituri was the Ugandan army. Its soldiers were stationed at strategic
routes, international borders, and the towns of the district. While in these
areas, local armed groups could hardly compete. lturi's militias controlled
rural areas. Fighting took place throughout Irumu and Djugu. Some areas,
however, were conspicuous in their intensity of violence. Mongbwalu, the
center of gold exploitation, faced particularly intense fighting, mainly between
the UPC and FNI. After having changed hands several times, the
FNI there finally prevailed as the dominant force (HRW 2005, 23-57).
In late 2002 the governments in Kampala and Kinshasa were busy negotiating
the retreat of the UPDP as the last foreign occupation force. ln Sep tember
they reached an agreement which foresaw the Ugandan withdrawal
within three months and the installation of a "Pacification Commission"
for Ituri involving IZinshasa, Kampala, and local actors such as militias and
civil society groups. This agreement between IZinshasa and Kampala was
detrimental for the UPC, which was still the dominant local military formation
in Ituri and had no interest in a power-sharing agreement. With
help from Rwanda, it even successfully confronted its retreating former
Ugandan allies in 13unia (ICG 2003, 9-11; UNSG 2004, 12-13; 13alencie
and de La Grange 2005, 239).
The UPDP, on several occasions, ignored deadlines set for its complete
withdrawal. In March 2003, remaining forces at the airport set out to retake
Bunia from the UPC. Together with a makeshift coalition of F APC,
FNl, PRPI, and Pusic, it conquered the town . Jn due course, Ugandan
mediators facilitated an agreement between Ituri's militias, with the excep tion
of the UPC, which led to the opening of the lturi Pacification Com -
54 FN I ex-membe r I, llunia, 4 Nov 2005; Carbolic clergy 1, Catholic peace activist I, J\lahagi,
28 No\' 21105; civil servant l, human Right s r\cti\'ist I, businessman I, Catholic peace '1cti1 -
ist 1, Ndrdc , 13 i\lav 2006 .
Annex 85
122 IN "J'I\RVl'NTION ,\S I Nl)lll l'.C i' RL'Ui
ernment actually possessed the political strength to pursue a consistent
strategy can be plausibly doubted. Indeed, the Ugandan army and its superiors
in the government did not seem to form a centralized hierarchy. This
claim is made most apparent by the contradictory actions Ugandan officers
pursu ed in parallel. While the occupation has been extremely injurious to
Ituri's society, neither its actions appear to have been centrally planned,
nor its effect - the local civil war - anticipated (UNSG 2001, 2002; International
Court Of Justice 2005; Perrot 1999; Prunier 1999; Clark 2002;
Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004, 400-410).
As with any intervention force, the UPDF faced the challenge of the
local space. Its agenda may have been more limited than the Congolese
colonial and p ostcolo nial state, as Uganda had certainly no projet de societe, of
regulatin g the daily life of lturians. Por lturi's population, the Ugandan
forces were mostly distant inter ve ntioni s ts, except for occasional patrols
and roadblocks. A university teacher in Bunia ex plained lturian-U ga ndan
interactions as follows:
"The politicians as local competitors had nec essarily to rely on them, to attain
stability of power. For the population, in general they have handled relations with
the population very well. There have never been problems, say torture. lf you m et
them in th e evening, there have been some iso lated cases of extortion, but one can
say they have behaved in a disciplined manner." 57
In most rural areas, the UPDF did not stat ion troops, leaving ample political
space for the formation and regulation of public affairs by local militia
groups. 58
But des pite their governmental indifference, the Ugandan forces in
Ituri had to develop relationships with local actors, as otherwise neither
economic nor secur ity agendas could be fulfilled. There existed a need to
govern. Th e unwieldiness of the local setting forced Ugandan actors to
look for intermediaries able to extend their influence into Ituri's society.
Regarding the control of violence, rebel gro ups and militias were built up
to fulfil! the task. Yet, as detailed above, the armed groups, as a result of infighting,
regularl y dete riorated and turned towards Kampala's enemies in
57 "Pour lcs politicicns, comme c'Ctait lcs concurrcnts du milieu ii falbit nfcessnircmcnt
s'appu~t:r :-;ur CLIX, pour ,1ue vous aycz la stabilitC de vntre pouvoir. Avec la population, gCncralcment
ils <>qt tres bien gcrc lcs relations a,·cc la population, lls n "rrnt jamais de
problCmcs, dire torturer, ou le soir , Yous lcs rcncontrC, ils peuvcnt t'anc;onncr, des cas isolCs
cxistaicnt, mais di,·e que ils sc sont cnmportCs disciplinC.'' Academic in lturi 1, Bunia, 5 Nov
2005 .
58 !'NI ex-member 1, 13unia, 4 Nov 2005.

Annex 86
François Ngolet, Crisis in the Congo (2011)

C   C
The Rise and Fall of Laurent Kabila
François Ngolet
9781403975751_01_prexviii.indd iii 11/17/2010 5:11:42 PM
Annex 86
CRISIS IN THE CONGO
Copyright © François Ngolet, 2011.
All rights reserved.
First published in 2011 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®
in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.
Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world,
this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills,
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Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies
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Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,
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ISBN: 978–1–4039–7575–1
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Ngolet, François.
Crisis in the Congo : the rise and fall of Laurent Kabila /
François Ngolet.
p . cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978–1–4039–7575–1 (hbk.)
1. Congo (Democratic Republic)—History—1997– 2. Congo
(Democratic Republic)—Politics and government—1997–
3. Kabila, Joseph. 4. Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la
libération du Congo Kinshasa. 5. Political violence—Congo
(Democratic Republic)—History—20th century. 6. Ethnic conflict—
Congo (Democratic Republic)—History—20th century. I. Title.
DT658.26.N465 2010
967.5103′4—dc22 2010019024
A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.
Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.
First edition: January 2011
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America.
9781403975751_01_prexviii.indd iv 11/17/2010 5:11:42 PM
Annex 86
6 CRISIS IN THE CONGO
demand. But when the UN team led by Koffi Amega effectively began
its work on November 11, 1997, the Kabila regime found other ways
to stall. DRC officials refused to name a representative to the mission
to Mbandaka, thereby postponing it. International organizations
grew frustrated with the Kabila regime. On December 3, 1997, when
the Friends of the Congo Conference (Conférence des Amis du Congo)
sponsored by the World Bank (WB) opened in Brussels, Human Rights
Watch and the International Federation of Human Rights pressured
donors to link financial aid to the Congo with human rights progress.
The UN team finally departed for Mbandaka on December 10 but
encountered a group of protesters, most likely organized by the government.
The same situation occurred when the team reached the site of
Wendji, fifteen miles from Mbandaka. Local elders alleged that the site
was a secret religious shrine and prevented investigators from entering
it. The elders were later willing to allow the investigation to proceed
if money was given to them. Because of security concerns, the UN
was forced to evacuate its team from Mbandaka on the December 14.
Despite these difficulties, the team managed to conduct some interviews
in Mbandaka.10 Interviewees were later arrested and imprisoned
by the police. The work of the UN team was so deeply hampered that
Kofi Annan was forced to withdraw the mission team definitively on
April 17, 1998. The final report, which was presented to the UN secretary
general, stated that all the deliberately created harassments and
obstacles prevented the UN mission from pursuing its mandate. It is
fair to conclude that the DRC government never had any intention
of accepting the secretary general’s mission of investigation. It faked
acceptance to create the illusion of cooperation.11
The refugee problem had tarnished Kabila’s regime from the very
start. It was widely used by Kabila’s detractors to discredit his rule.12
This situation was aggravated by Kabila’s unwillingness to continue to
implement democratic reforms despite pressure from the international
community.13 On March 22, 1997, Kabila announced in Kisangani that
all political parties were forbidden until the end of the “war of liberation.”
He also declared that the Alliance would form a “transition government”
that would stay in power for one year. This government would
include only those people who never worked with Mobutu’s regime,
which automatically excluded Étienne Tshisekedi, the leader of the foremost
opposition party, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress
(UDPS).14 In taking control of the state, the ADFL would bring into
power only those individuals who had no ties to the old order.15 For
example, the Front Patriotique, a radical-left party untainted by association
with Mobutu and led by the lawyer Kinkela Vinkansi and former
director of the Kinshasa Hospital Dr. Jean-Baptiste Sondji, joined the
ADFL; Sondji became minister of health and Vinkansi became minister
9781403975751_02_ch01.indd 6 11/18/2010 9:16:02 PM
Annex 86
ORIGINS OF THE REBELLION AGAINST KABILA 7
of posts and telecommunications. Kabila utilized this distinction among
UDPS members vis-à-vis the new situation to great political advantage.
Longtime UDPS members who entered his government included Omer
N’Kamba, who became a provincial governor, and Justine M’poyo Kasa-
Vubu, appointed minister for the public service. Joseph Olenghankoy, a
leader of the Forces for Renovation for Union and Solidarity (FONUS),
a political formation close to the UDPS, also called for a dialogue with
the new authorities. As one of the most radical opponents to Mobutu, he
actively prepared the ADFL troops’ entry into Kinshasa. This co- optation
tactic was also pursued with the Parti Lumumbiste Unifié (PALU),
which, despite its radical stand, also maintained a degree of dialogue
with the new regime. François Lumumba, Patrice Lumumba’s son, eventually
attempted to transform the Alliance into a full-fledged Lumumbist
party, but he failed. Individual Lumumbists, such as Anicet Kashamura,
Mulopwe (Emperor) Kalondji, and Emmanuel Dungia, ended up joining
the ADFL. Kabila also reached out to businessmen such as Cyprien
Rwakabula Shinga, an important business and political leader of North
Kivu.16 Business magnate Jeannot Bemba Saolona—who helped finance
the ADFL war effort to protect his interests in North Kivu—called for
negotiations with the Alliance. In the southernmost province of Katanga,
political figures such as Nguz a Karl I Bond and the governor Kyangu
wa Kumwanza also succumbed to the ADFL appeals. The Catholic
Church was divided, because Msgr. Christophe Munzihirwa, archbishop
of Bukavu, was murdered for speaking up against the Rwando-Ugandan
invasion and in favor of Hutu refugees, but Msgr. Jérôme Gapangwa,
bishop of Uvira, was sympathetic to the Tutsi cause and the ADFL. It
seemed as if only journalists, NGO officials, human rights activists, and
those who remained in the UDPS resisted Kabila’s co-optation tactics.
Indeed, NGOs who were engaged in the democratic transition clashed
with the Alliance when Kabila decided to suspend the democratization
process. In response, Minister of Reconstruction Etienne Richard Mbaya
created a national commission to “coordinate actions of the NGOs” in
order to better control them.
Generally speaking, Kabila sought to undercut the credibility of the
internal opposition, accusing it of having accepted Mobutu as head of
state during the transition period. After achieving power, the suspension
of political activities of opposition parties was prolonged for two
years. Kabila’s government justified this act by stating that there could
be no opposition to the Alliance because the ADFL was not a party, but
a movement opened to all Congolese. According to Minister of Interior
Mwenze Kongolo, private and public demonstrations by opposition parties
were declared illegal. But the new regime announced that it would
respect the freedom of expression (liberté d’opinion), allowing newspapers
to openly criticize the authorities. Several newspapers did not hesitate
9781403975751_02_ch01.indd 7 11/18/2010 9:16:02 PM
Annex 86
Annex 87
Sarah C. P. Williams, “The Elephant in the Womb”, Science (19 June 2012)

The Elephant in the Womb | Science | AAAS
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The Elephant in the Womb
By Sarah C. P. Williams Jun. 19, 2012 , 7:01 PM
Nothing about elephants is small, and their pregnancies are no exception. Before giving birth to a 110-kilogram
calf, mothers carry the fetus for 22 months, the longest gestation period of any mammal. And whereas most
mammals have only one corpus luteum—a temporary gland that controls hormone levels during pregnancy—
elephants have as many as 11. Now, by giving 17 elephants blood tests and ultrasound scans throughout their
pregnancies, researchers have discovered a key to this remarkable form of motherhood.
"The study is exciting, surprising, and very pleasing," says veterinary researcher Twink Allen of the University of
Cambridge in the United Kingdom, who was not involved in the work. "It's a very unusual strategy the elephant
seems to have adopted, and it has puzzled people for 30 or 40 years."
In most mammals, one corpus luteum forms from a single egg follicle in the ovary during each menstrual cycle.
The temporary gland produces progesterone, which in turn promotes thickening of the endometrium and, if an
egg is fertilized, maintains the correct balance of hormones throughout a pregnancy to ensure that a female's
body remains geared toward supporting her growing baby. If fertilization doesn't occur, the corpus luteum dies,
only to reform during the next reproductive cycle. From dissected animals, scientists have known for more than
50 years that elephant ovaries contain multiple corpora lutea. But they didn't know how these structures formed
or what roles they played in elephant pregnancies. And they'd never studied the corpus lutea in real-time during
an elephant's life or pregnancy.
"There were all sorts of theories put forth," says Imke Lueders of the Leibniz Institute for Zoo and Wildlife
Research in Berlin. "Some people thought that elephants accumulated the corpora lutea over many cycles, for
example. Nobody could really prove any of the theories because elephants are so hard to study."
Hoping to change this, Lueders developed a method to follow elephant pregnancies using protocols originally
designed for horses. She collaborated with researchers and zoos around the world to study 15 female Asian
elephants and two female African elephants over a 5-year period. During normal menstrual cycles before
pregnancies, as well as throughout the entire course of each female's pregnancy, the scientists took blood
samples and performed ultrasounds. They used rectally inserted ultrasound probes on the elephants, which had
to be specially trained not to kick and rear up during the uncomfortable exams.
The researchers found that the animals formed, on average, five corpora lutea during each menstrual cycle. And
surprisingly, whereas one corpus luteum was derived from an egg-generating follicle, as happens in mammals
such as humans, the rest of the structures formed from separate follicles at a different point in the reproductive
cycle.
Over the course of each pregnancy, each gland slowly decreased its progesterone production. Having many


Annex 87

Annex 88
Dan Fahey, Rift Valley Institute, “Ituri: Gold, Land, and Ethnicity in North-eastern Congo”,
Usalama Project: Understanding Congolese Armed Groups (2013)

Rift Valley institute | usalama PRoject
undeRstanding congolese aRmed gRouPs
ituRi
gold, land, and ethnicity
in noRth-easteRn congo
Annex 88
RIFT VALLEY INSTITUTE | USALAMA PROJECT
Ituri
Gold, land, and ethnicity in
north-eastern Congo
DAN FAHEY
Annex 88
Published in 2013 by the Rift Valley Institute
1 St Luke’s Mews, London W11 1DF, United Kingdom
PO Box 30710 GPO, 0100 Nairobi, Kenya
THE USALAMA PROJECT
The Rift Valley Institute’s Usalama Project documents armed groups in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The project is supported by Humanity United and
Open Square, and undertaken in collaboration with the Catholic University of Bukavu.
THE RIFT VALLEY INSTITUTE (RVI)
The Rift Valley Institute (www.riftvalley.net) works in Eastern and Central Africa to
bring local knowledge to bear on social, political, and economic development.
THE AUTHOR
Dan Fahey is currently a contractor for the United Nations in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, and previously taught in the Political Science Department at Colorado
College.
RVI ExECUTIVE DIRECTOR: John Ryle
RVI PROgRAMME DIRECTOR: Christopher Kidner
RVI USALAMA PROJECT DIRECTOR: Jason Stearns
RVI gREAT LAkES PROgRAMME MANAgER: Michel Thill
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REPORT DESIgN: Lindsay Nash
MAPS: Jillian Luff, MAPgrafix
PRINTINg: Intype Libra Ltd., 3/4 Elm Grove Industrial Estate, London SW19 4HE
ISbN 978-1-907431-12-8
COVER: Mourners gather to bury the eight-month-old daughter of an artisanal gold
miner, Mongbwalu, Ituri (2004).
RIgHTS
Copyright © The Rift Valley Institute 2013
Cover image © Marcus Bleasdale/VII 2004
Text and maps published under Creative Commons license
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/nc-nd/3.0.
Available for free download at www.riftvalley.net
Printed copies available from Amazon
Annex 88
18 ITURI
attack Stanley’s expedition, Hema warriors helped to defend Stanley and
defeat the Ngiti.15
Such racialized views about the Hema and Ngiti have left an enduring
legacy in Ituri. Disseminated internationally through his best-selling
books, Stanley’s depictions of the two communities influenced the
opinions and policies of the Belgian colonists who arrived in Ituri during
the following decades. Indeed, today’s Lendu leaders identify Stanley
as the creator of an ideology of Hema superiority that was embraced
and institutionalized under Belgian rule, and which continues to affect
Hema-Lendu relations today.16
The Congo Free State, the private dominion owned by King Leopold
II, finally established a presence in Ituri around 1894. Leopold’s initial
interests in Ituri were to procure ivory and to extend his authority toward
the Nile River. Soldiers of the king’s private militia, the Force Publique
(‘Public Army’), were the first state agents to arrive in Ituri, their mission
being to ‘combat and disperse’ anyone engaged in the slave trade and to
establish new outposts of the state.17 The Free State established small
military outposts at Mahagi and in the village of the Banyali chief, Kr’lo,
which the Belgians dubbed ‘Kilo’.
In 1897, Batetela soldiers from Kasaï, to the far south-west of Ituri,
mutinied against their Belgian officers in the Force Publique, disrupting
the expansion of the colonial presence in Ituri.18 The Belgian military
commander in the area, Baron Francis Dhanis, evacuated the outpost at
Kilo before fighting and losing a decisive battle against the mutineers on
the Ituri River at the village of Ekwanga (present-day Salambongo). Less
15 Stanley, In Darkest Africa, vol. 2, p. 114.
16 Interviews with Lendu politicians and leaders, Ituri, June 2009 and February 2012.
17 Edmond Thiry, Elements de l’ethnohistoire des Nyali (Tervuren: Musée royal de L’Afrique
centrale, 2002), p. 88.
18 Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost, pp. 128-9, says the Batetela soldiers rebelled because
they were treated poorly and subjected to harsh conditions, while Meesen, who worked
for the Belgian government, said the Batetela were notorious for their indiscipline;
Meesen, Monographie de l’Ituri, p. 56.
Annex 88
PRECURSORS TO CONFLICT 19
than two years later, the Force Publique succeeded in re-establishing its
base at Kilo—but by 1901 the colonial presence was still limited to three
locations in Ituri: Irumu, Kilo, and Mahagi.
Over the next decade, however, the colonial authorities increased
their presence in Ituri and carved the region into administrative zones,
projecting in their maps an authority they did not possess on the ground.
Gold and the new Ituri
The colonial exploitation of gold marked the beginning of a new era in
Ituri. Royal decrees in 1888 and 1893 reserved all mineral resources for
the Congo Free State, thus establishing Leopold’s property rights over
mining areas.19 In 1903, geologists working for King Leopold confirmed
the existence of gold deposits in Ituri on the Agola River, near the colonial
outpost at Kilo; production began in 1905.
In 1911 — three years after Leopold was forced to hand Congo’s administration
over to the Belgian state—the colonial government also started
gold mining farther north in present-day Haut-Uele district, in the valley
of the Moto River. The entire gold mining area in north-east Congo consequently
became known as ‘Kilo-Moto’; companies created to exploit gold
reserves in this area have also borne the same name.
From 1905 until the 1930s, the colonial enterprise in Ituri was focused
on extracting gold. The primary obstacle to obtaining the gold was a
shortage of the labour needed to build transportation routes to the
mines, to carry and pull supplies along those routes, to work the mines,
and to produce food for both colonial agents and local mine workers.
These agents bribed or bullied local chiefs to provide this labour, but
such coercive measures led to social discontent and active resistance,
requiring an ever greater exercise of government control over the people
of Ituri.
19 Agayo Bakonzi, ‘The Gold Mines of Kilo-Moto in Northeastern Zaire: 1905–1960’ (PhD
thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1982), p. 111.
Annex 88
20 ITURI
The Kilo goldfields were located in a relatively remote and sparsely
populated area in what is now western Djugu territory. In the early
1900s, the easiest way to transport equipment and people to Ituri and
the Kilo mines was from the east, through the port of Mombasa in Kenya,
overland through Kenya and Uganda to Lake Albert, by boat to the port
at Kasindi in Ituri, and then overland to Kilo.
The Kasindi-Kilo section of the route cut through areas inhabited by
Ngiti and Hema. In 1911, to control the populations along this route, the
colonial chef de zone (‘district commissioner’) appointed a Hema chief
named Bomera as grand chef (‘paramount chief’) over all the populations
in present-day Irumu territory south of Bunia. Bomera’s nomination was
immediately controversial. After his arrival in around 1900 from western
Uganda, he had stolen cattle, seized land, and killed people—particularly
Ngiti—thereby creating enemies and increasing tensions in the area.
Indeed, less than a year before his appointment as grand chef, the Belgian
authorities had even arrested Bomera because of his abuses—so his
sudden elevation was a strange reversal of fortune prompted in part by
the personal recommendation of a Canadian missionary.20
Bomera was not popular among Hema clans in southern Ituri, who had
their own chiefs, but his selection was even more problematic for Ngiti.21
After his appointment, Bomera exacted revenge upon Ngiti villagers
with whom he had previously had disputes. Ngiti clans revolted and, on
4 December 1911, killed Bomera along with 200 Hema villagers. The
colonial authorities reacted swiftly and brutally, and with the help of a
chief from the Bira clan, confiscated cattle from the Ngiti and handed
them to Hema populations. In 1914, the Belgian authorities abandoned
the effort to establish paramount one chief, creating instead nine chieftaincies
based on pre-existing communities: six under Ngiti chiefs and
three under Hema chiefs.22
20 Thiry, Introduction à l’ethnohistoire des Hema, pp. 223–9.
21 Pottier, ‘Representations of Ethnicity’, p. 43.
22 Thiry, Introduction à l’ethnohistoire des Hema, pp. 230–7.
Annex 88
PRECURSORS TO CONFLICT 21
The appointment and death of Bomera illustrate the way that early
colonial policy, based on the extraction of Ituri’s gold, produced local
conflict, particularly between Hema and Ngiti. Some recent analyses
of the conflict in Ituri, indeed, have cited the death of Bomera as the
first instance of Lendu resistance to Hema dominance.23 Such narratives,
however, fall into the trap of blaming groups for the actions of
individuals, and show how today’s ethnic conflict is projected onto the
past.24 For it was not the actions of Ituri’s Hema populations but those of
colonial agents and Bomera himself that were responsible for fomenting
Lendu resistance.
The expansion of colonial authority during the second decade of the
twentieth century caused further social upheaval in Ituri. An account
from 1912-13 describes the Lendu as ‘unruly and bellicose’, fighting among
themselves and against the representatives of colonial authority.25 An
article from the same period by the British explorer and elephant hunter
Cuthbert Christy mentions an incident in which the ‘warlike’ Lendu,
‘who frequently try to assert their independence by raids on neighbouring
tribes and by defying the Government forces’, were threatening
further attacks on colonial outposts.26 The Hema, who were generally
favoured by colonial authorities over the Lendu, were also criticized, as
in this account from 1920: ‘It is only since the arrival of the European
that the Bahema, always ambitious and deceitful, has tried to dominate
the Walendu in order to better exploit him.’27
23 Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, ‘The Politics of Rebellion and
Intervention in Ituri: The Emergence of a New Political Context?’ African Affairs 103/412
(2004), p. 390; cf. ASADHO (Association Africaine de défense des droits de l’homme),
Rapport de l’ASADHO sur le conflit inter-ethnique Hema-Lendu en territoire de Djugu dans la
Province Orientale, Kinshasa, December 1999.
24 Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006), p. 391.
25 Thiry, Introduction à l’ethnohistoire des Hema, p. 30.
26 Cuthbert Christy, ‘The Ituri River, Forest and Pygmies’, The Geographical Journal 46/3
(1915) p. 207.
27 Pottier, ‘Representations of Ethnicity’, p. 43.
Annex 88
22 ITURI
To control the local populations better, and to expand gold mining
in the Kilo belt, the Belgian colonial authorities created new tribal and
administrative units in Ituri. During 1917–18, they started to organize
the Lendu into several autonomous chiefdoms, thereby separating them
from the Hema and Alur chiefs who previously ruled over them. As
a consequence of this colonial intervention, which continued into the
1930s, there were numerous power struggles among Lendu leaders and
increased tension between the Hema and Lendu, both of which the
authorities suppressed by deploying the Force Publique.28 By attempting
to separate the Hema and Lendu, and by favouring Hema in the areas
of education and administration—in short by suggesting that the two
communities were incapable of peaceful coexistence—Belgian colonial
agents established a new narrative that still has echoes in community
relations within Ituri today.
The colonial authorities’ response to food shortages at the mines
added to these tensions: they invited white settlers to set up farms and
businesses in Ituri. Between 1910 and 1930, a mélange of British (mainly
from Kenya), Afrikaaners, Belgians, and Greeks arrived in Ituri to raise
cattle, grow food crops, and plant coffee for export.29 The authorities
allocated additional lands to white settlers and companies for farming,
ranching, forestry, fishing, and mining, leading to the creation of many
substantial landholdings in Ituri during the 1930s and 1940s—a diversification
of the regional economy into the agricultural sector that required
still greater colonial control over both land and people.
Gold mining, however, remained at the core of the colonial enterprise.
In 1928, the government changed the district boundaries to bring the Kilo
and Moto goldmines together in a single district, called Kibali-Ituri. It
also created new economic zones throughout the Congo that restricted
population movements. In Ituri, this measure prevented migration and
28 Thiry, Introduction à l’ethnohistoire des Hema, pp. 30–32.
29 Bakonzi, ‘The Gold Mines of Kilo-Moto’, pp. 113, 138, and 178.
Annex 88
PRECURSORS TO CONFLICT 23
helped to ensure sufficient labour for the mines and farms run by white
settlers and companies.30
There are two enduring legacies of the colonial era that help explain
the origins and actions of the armed groups that have emerged in Ituri
since 1999. First, the colony gave preferential treatment to Hema over
Lendu in education, administration, and business, contributing to the
formation of a Hema elite. This class was well placed to take advantage
of the new opportunities afforded by the end of colonialism, establishing
themselves as important hubs in President Mobutu’s patronage networks
in what became north-eastern Zaire. Secondly, the colonial enterprise
exacerbated inequalities and latent tensions between Hema and Lendu
communities, and created myths about superiority, inferiority, and
incompatibility that persist in today’s discourse.
30 Bakonzi, ‘The Gold Mines of Kilo-Moto’, pp. 267–9.
Annex 88
24
3. Post-independence
The post-independence period in Ituri was characterized by economic
decline and transformation, as well as increasing social and political
tension. Industrial gold mining—which had been the core of Ituri’s
economy—went into a steady decline, even as artisanal mining steadily
increased. Agriculture remained important in Ituri but changes in
national land policy led to the redistribution of prime concessions
to politically connected elites. As a result, many Hema businessmen
acquired ranches and plantations in Lendu areas, which provoked resentment
among Lendu elites.
Gold mining and trade
After 1960, industrial gold mining in Ituri went into serious decline as
the European engineers who ran the Kilo mines left their jobs. Due to
colonial education policy, there were few Congolese staff with the qualifications
or ability to take over the operation. In 1966, Mobutu nationalized
the company controlling the gold mines in north-east Congo, creating
the Office des mines d’or de Kilo-Moto (OKIMO, Office of the Gold Mines
of Kilo-Moto).
When nationalization failed to halt the plunge in gold production,
Mobutu attempted to attract foreign investment, but this effort also
foundered. During the 1970s, the failure to maintain infrastructure such
as roads and bridges led the Kilo-Moto mines in Ituri to become isolated,
further discouraging foreign investment. As a result, the mine apparatus
and equipment deteriorated badly, diminishing yields. Exploitation of
so-called ‘reserve areas’ also declined, due to insufficient investment in
research and prospecting.31
31 Louis Bedidjo, ‘Situation Preoccupante a l’Office des Mines d’Or de Kilo-Moto’,
Centrale Congolaise du travail, Bunia, 5 January 2007, p. 1.
Annex 88
POST-INDEPENDENCE 25
As industrial mining declined, many miners in the Kilo belt turned
to artisanal mining. This activity was initially illegal but local mining
officials turned a blind eye, not least because they obtained money from
taxes and fees. In 1981, Mobutu restructured the mining sector, formally
legalizing—and taxing—artisanal mining in the Kilo belt and other goldproducing
regions. This made artisanal mining a viable livelihood at a
time when poverty was endemic and the Ituri economy, like that of Zaire
generally, was in rapid decline. During the 1980s and early 1990s, tens of
thousands of local people, joined by Congolese from across the nation,
became involved in artisanal mining in Ituri.
When the mining sector was liberalized in 1981, local businessmen
in the eastern DRC had an opportunity to enter the gold business. The
Kilo-Moto company had previously controlled all the gold coming out
of Ituri’s Kilo belt, but the growth of artisanal mining and the erosion
of government control in the mining areas made room for a pivotal new
entrepreneurial activity: that of the gold trader. Businessmen from Ituri
and North Kivu entered the trade, using gold as hard currency to purchase
consumer goods from neighbouring Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi.
By the early 1990s, two factors combined to make Kampala the primary
destination for Ituri’s gold. The first was civil war and political instability
in Burundi, Rwanda, and the Kivus. During the 1980s, Kambale Kisoni—
based in Butembo, North Kivu—emerged as one of the main traders in
Ituri’s gold. Kisoni sold most of his gold to the Belgian businessman
Antoine ‘Tony’ Goetz, who operated from the Burundian capital, Bujumbura.
During 1993–94, another round of violent conflict in the Kivus,
Rwanda, and Burundi made it difficult to transport gold to Bujumbura,
and Kisoni started to shift his gold business towards Uganda. In addition,
the Burundian government terminated Goetz’s free trade status in May
1995, giving Kisoni and other traders further reason to switch to Kampala.
Kisoni’s own story is a microcosm of the wider conflict in the eastern
DRC, involving the pursuit of natural resources, alliances of convenience
with armed groups, and the involvement of both neighbouring states
and the wider international community. To secure the acquisition of gold
from the Kilo area, he subsequently collaborated with two militias—the
Annex 88
26 ITURI
Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Mouvement de libération (RCD-ML,
Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement) and the FNI—at
times when both armed groups were allied to the Ugandan government.
32 Kisoni continued to trade his gold in Kampala, but in 2005 the
UN Security Council placed him on its sanctions list for violating the
Council’s arms embargo. In 2007, several men entered the DRC from
Uganda and killed Kisoni in his office in Butembo.33
The second factor related to changes in Ugandan government policy.
During the early 1990s, as Uganda started to recover from decades of
misrule and conflict, the government liberalized the economy in accordance
with prescriptions from the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. In 1993, the government of President Yoweri Museveni
embraced an initiative to promote regional trade, and started to pursue
export-driven economic growth.34 A year later, as part of its restructuring
programme, the government abolished the Bank of Uganda’s monopoly
on the purchase of gold, revoked the gold export tax, and relaxed administrative
burdens imposed on trading companies.35
These changes in Ugandan policy helped to redirect Ituri’s gold trade
towards Kampala. In the first quarter of 1995, Uganda exported only 1 kg
of gold; by the third quarter of 1996, exports had increased to 1,099 kg.36
Uganda’s own gold production was negligible during these two years—
2 kg and 3 kg respectively—and its vastly increased exports were simply
a re-export of Congolese gold, much of it from Ituri. By the eve of the
32 Stearns, North Kivu, pp. 32–3.
33 Dan Fahey, ‘Le Fleuve d’Or: The Production and Trade of Gold from Mongbwalu, DRC’,
in S. Marysse et al., L’Afrique des Grands Lacs, Annuaire 2007-2008 (Paris: L’Harmattan,
2008), pp. 373–5.
34 Paul Collier and Ritva Reinikka, ‘Reconstruction and Liberalization: An Overview,’ in
Ritva Reinikka and Paul Collier, Uganda’s Recovery: The Role of Farms, Firms, and Government
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2001), pp. 31–9.
35 P.M. Mobbs, The Mineral Industry of Uganda (Washington, DC: US Geological Survey,
1997), p. 221.
36 Bank of Uganda, Annual Report 1998/99 (Kampala: Bank of Uganda, 1999), p. 81.
Annex 88
POST-INDEPENDENCE 27
First Congo War in 1997, Kampala had already become a major transit
point for gold produced in Ituri.
By January 2013, Ituri’s political economy was poised for further
changes with the potential to have an impact on conflict dynamics. These
changes included the possible resumption—perhaps during 2013—of
industrial gold mining in Ituri by AngloGold Ashanti and the start of
oil exploration by Total near the Lake Albert shoreline, should security
conditions allow.
Land disputes
The concept of land in Ituri is complex and multi-dimensional. As in
the eastern DRC more generally, various aspects of land ownership—
economic, political, social, and even spiritual—continuously interact,
informing narratives about land rights.
In the post-independence era, land emerged as an important element
in power struggles among local political and economic elites. One source
of conflict was the redistribution of colonial-era concessions in Ituri,
which happened as a result of two changes in government policy. On
7 June 1966, President Mobutu approved the so-called Bakajika Law,
which annulled all land titles granted before independence and required
prior titleholders to reapply to the Zairean government.37 Then, on
30 November 1973, President Mobutu unveiled his ‘Zaireanization’
programme, which nationalized ‘farms, ranches, plantations, concessions,
commerce, and real estate agencies’.38
Even prior to Mobutu’s laws, some businessmen and customary
authorities acquired concessions from the government and from
expatriate owners, but the Zaireanization plan resulted in a large-scale
reallocation of concessions—indeed, whole industries—into the hands of
those with political connections. In Ituri, Hema businessmen benefited
37 Stearns, North Kivu, p. 24.
38 Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State (Madison:
The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 326.
Annex 88
28 ITURI
most from this process due to their political ties to the Mobutu regime.
One prominent Hema politician, D’zbo Kalogi, served as national Vice-
Minister of Agriculture from 1970–1974, Minister of Mines from 1974–77,
and Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development from 1986–87. It
remains unclear how many concessions were obtained by such leading
personalities, but various sources suggest they acquired a majority of the
concessions in Ituri’s Irumu and Djugu territories.39
In the mid-1970s, Lendu political leaders became more active in
expressing opposition to Hema dominance in Ituri, partly in response
to Hema acquisition of large tracts of land in predominantly Lendu
areas. In 1974, a Lendu leader, Soma Mastaki, created the Parti de libération
des Walendu (PLW, Walendu Liberation Party) to advance the political
demands of the Lendu community—but it soon degenerated into a
violent anti-Hema militia. Following several confrontations, the provincial
governor organized talks that led to a 1975 pact of reconciliation
between the Lendu and Hema communities.
During the political tumult that marked Mobutu’s decline and the
lead-up to multiparty democracy in the 1990s, latent tensions between
Lendu and Hema leaders re-emerged. One source of tension derived from
so-called ‘cultural associations’ created by Lendu and Hema leaders,
similar to the mutuelles in the Kivus. The Lendu had the Association
culturelle pour la libération des opprimés et rejetés de l’Ituri (ACL, Cultural
Association for the Liberation of Ituri’s Oppressed and Rejected—known
locally by the second part of the French acronym, LORI), while the Hema
created ENTE. These ostensibly cultural organizations, however, only
increased mutual suspicion, with Hema leaders accusing their Lendu
counterparts of promoting an active political and economic agenda, and
vice versa.
39 Dan Fahey, ‘Rethinking the Resource Curse: Natural Resources and Polywar in the
Ituri District, Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (PhD thesis, University of California,
Berkeley, 2011), p. 67.
Annex 88
POST-INDEPENDENCE 29
In Djugu territory, land conflicts were particularly intense in Walendu
Pitsi collectivité, where Lendu leaders claimed customary rights over
concessions acquired by Hema businessmen after independence. In 1995,
the LORI branch in Walendu Pitsi reportedly had a plan to ‘expropriate
the concessions and fields of non-Lendu, particularly of the Hema’.40
Around the same time, several Hema landowners in Walendu Pitsi
acquired—allegedly through political connections—rights to expand
their concessions, often by annexing land from neighbouring Lendu
villages.41
Simultaneously, a long-standing boundary dispute in Irumu territory
also reignited Hema-Lendu hostility. The dispute centred on whether
three villages (Nombe, Lakpa, and Lagabo) were part of Walendu Bindi
collectivité (ruled by Ngiti) or Bahema Sud collectivité (ruled by Hema).
The disagreement dated back to the 1910s, when colonial administrators
appointed the controversial Hema chief Bomera to rule this part of
Irumu. During the remainder of the colonial era, administrators changed
the Walendu Bindi–Bahema Sud boundary several times. By independence,
the three villages were officially part of Bahema Sud, although
Walendu Bindi authorities continued to claim authority.
In 1966, violence had erupted over rightful administration of the three
disputed villages. Walendu Bindi authorities organized Ngiti demonstrations
but they were crushed by Mobutu’s soldiers. There were additional
protests over the rightful administrative control of the enclave during the
1970s and 1980s, similarly suppressed by Mobutu’s security and political
apparatus. In addition, Walendu Bindi leaders sought to extend their
control to the southwest shore of Lake Albert, claiming that the colonial
authorities had wrongfully given Ngiti lakeshore lands to Hema chiefs.
40 Service national d’intelligence et de protection, République du Zaïre, ‘Note
d’Information au Commissaire S/Regional de L’Ituri a Bunia; Concerne: Cas de
l’association culturelle “LORI” dans la Collectivite des Walendu/Pitsi’ (No. 05/00/451/
SNIP/DI/462/95), 30 November 1995.
41 Dan Fahey, ‘This Land is My Land: Land Grabbing in Ituri,’ in Land Grabbing in the
Great Lakes Region of Africa (ed. An Ansoms) (forthcoming).
Annex 88

Annex 89
David Van Reybrouck, Congo: The Epic History of a People (2015)

Annex 89
CONGO
The Epic History of a People
DAVID VAN REYBROUCK
- Translated from the Dutch
by Sam Garrett
FOURTH ESTATE• London
Annex 89
Fourth Estate
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This Fourth Estate paperback edition published in 2015
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First published in Great Britain by Fourth Estate in 2014
?l rst published as Congo: Een Gescltiedenis by De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam, in 2010
Copyright 1\:D1 avid Van Reybrouck 2014
Translation copyright© Sam Garrett 2014
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Annex 89
CHAPTER 2
"DIABOLICAL FILTH"
Congo Under Leopold II
1885-1908
0 N JUNE l, 1885, KING LEOPOLD II AWOKE IN HIS PALACE AT
Laeken a different man: in addition to being king of Belgium,
from that day on he was also sovereign of a new state, the Congo Free State.
That latter entity would continue to exist for precisely twenty-three years,
five months, and fifteen days: on November 15, 1908, it was transformed into
a Belgian colony. Congo began, in other words, not as a colony, but as a state,
and one of the most peculiar ever seen in sub-Saharan Africa.
To start with, its head of state lived more than six thousand kilometers
(about 3,700 miles) to the north, a four-week journey by ship from his
empire - a journey that he himself, by the way, never undertook. From
his investiture in 1885 to his death in 1909, Leopold II never set foot in his
Congo. In view of the inherent risks to personal health engendered by such
a journey at the time, that is hardly surprising. The heads of state of other
European powers did not travel to their recently acquired holdings in Central
Africa either. The more curious fact is that the Belgian king, unlike his
colleagues, was the complete and absolute ruler over his overseas territory.
Kaiser William I, Queen Victoria, and Jules Grevy, president of France's
Third Republic, also ruled over vast stretches of Africa in 1885, but none of
them owned those areas personally. Their colonial policies were not a private
matter but a government affair, watched over by parliament (chamber
of deputies) and cabinet. But the Belgian king ruled over the new state in a
personal ca~acity.
Officially, the Kingdom of Belgium at that point still had nothing to
Annex 89
58 CONGO
do with Congo; it only happened to share a head of state with that remote
tropical backwater. In Belgium, Leopold was a constitutional monarch with
lL"Dited p nwers; in Congo he was an absolute ruler. This extremely personal-
1zt:ll r, gi m e made him more closely resemble a fifteenth-century king of the
K,.mg(·, Empire than a modern European monarch. And he acted as though
he t r:i1•: •.lid own this empire of his.
1,c:, ;-pold's acquisition of so much power, incidentally, took place almost
l,y ~1eight of hand. The European superpowers had not recognized him, but
his Association Internationale du Congo, as sovereign administrator over
the Congo basin. Yet when he abandoned that paper tiger for what it was
after the Berlin Conference and began behaving ostentatiously as ruler of
the Congo Free State, no one seemed to protest. People saw him as a great
philanthropist with a great many ideals and even more means at his disposal.
On the ground, however, things went quite differently. His ideals turned
out to be rather pecuniary, his means often extremely shaky. At first, the
Congo Free State existed only on paper. Even by the end of the nineteenth
century, Leopold had no more than fifty stations, each of which ruled - in
theory, at least-over a territory the size of the Netherlands. In actual practice,
large parts of the territory eluded his effective occupation . Katanga was
still largely in the hands of Msiri, Tippo Tip was still lord and master to the
east, and various native leaders refused to bow to his authority. Until the
very end of the Free State itself, the number of representatives of his government
remained limited. By 1906 there were only fifteen hundred European
state officials among a total of three thousand whites (the rest were missionaries
and traders) in the country.'
Indicative of the sketchy state of affairs was that no one knew exactly
where the borders of Leopold's empire lay. Least of all Leopold himself.
When it came to those borders, he had a tendency to change his mind.
Before the Berlin Conference that, of course, was understandable: nothing
had as yet been fixed. On August 7, 1884, he, along with Stanley, had
drawn up a preliminary sketch of the future territory at the royal villa in
Oostende. Stanley unfolded the very tenuous map he had made after his
African crossing, a large blank roll showing only the Congo River and its
hundreds of shoreline villages. It was to this sheet of paper that the king
and Stanley a?ded a few hastily penciled lines. It could almost not have
been more arbitrary. There was no natural entity, no historical inevitabilAnnex
89
"DIABOLICAL FILTH "
ity, no metaphysical fate that predestined the inhabitants of thi s ar ea to
become compatriots. There were only two white men, one with a mu s tache,
the other with a beard, meeting on a summer afternoon somewhere
along the North Sea coast to connect in red pencil a few lines on a big piece
of paper. Nevertheless, it was that map that Bismarck would approve a
few weeks later and that would set in motion the process of international
recognition.
On December 24, 1884, the king pulled out his pencil once again. He
was on the verge oflosing to the French the area to the north of the Congo's
mouth , a region for which he had entertained great hopes and that he would
surrender only with pain in his heart. As compensation, on that dark day
before Christmas, he set about annexing another area, Katanga. Quite literally,
annexation in this case meant poring over a map and thinking, like that
mythical first landowner of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's: "Ceci est a moi" (This
belongs to me). Not a single soldier was involved . It was a game of Risk, not
of Blitz. So Katanga it was, Katanga it would have to be. Leopold was not
particularly delighted. Katanga consisted of savanna , with less ivory to be
found than in the rain forest. Only decades later would it become clear that
the earth there abounded in ores and minerals . But Leopold simply doodled
it into the picture.
In 1885 France and England approved the new borders. Which is not
at all to say, however, that they would be incontestable from then on . During
the twenty years that followed, a great many territorial disputes would
arise : with France about Ubangi, with England about Katanga , and with
Portugal about Luanda, the area that bordered on Angola . And as though
that were not enough, during the first years of the Free State , Leopold tried
to press on to the headwaters of the Zambezi River, to Lake Malawi, Lake
Victoria, and the headwaters of the Nile, in fact to the whole area to the
east of his holdings . His lust for land was insatiable . Why all the hurry? His
African state was still extremely shaky. Wouldn't it have been better for him
to clean up his own internal backyard before thinking about moving on to
something else? After all, his means were considerable but they were not
inexhaustible, were they? All true enough , but Leopold realized that soon
there would no more opportunities for new acquisitions in Central Africa .
An understandable concern. As easily as he had swept together hundreds of
thousands o~ square kilometers before 1885, as ploddingly did that go afterward.
Until 1900 he kept alive the hope of further expansion, but none of
Annex 89
QQ CONGO
my p11,gnancd stuffed clay into my genitals . That was very painful."'" Cruelty
had , fu nction.
The village chiefrain lsekifusa was killed in his hut. Two of his wives
were murdered at the same time, II. child was cut in two . One of the
women was then discrnboweled . . .. Boeringa's people, who had come
along with the senrries, ate the bodies , Then they killed ten men who
had fled into the forest. When they left 13olima, they left a part ofLombutu's
behind, chopped into pieces and mixed with banana and manioc,
in plain sight, to frighten the villagers. The child's intestines were
hung up around the village huts . The child's body parts were impaled
on sticks ,°''
HAD THE SYSTEM OF PREMIUMS applied during the construction of the
railroad in Bas-Congo been introduced here as well, a very different set of
dynamics would have been set in motion , People would have been rewarded
for their efforts and motivated to continue producing. The Congolese, after
all, were anxious for such rewards, but the authorities ignored this: "When
we ask for mitakos [copper currency ingots], we get the chicolte [strop made of
hippopotamus hide ·] instead," someone said.' ;' The rubber had to flow freely
to the state, at no cost. This was about taxation, not remuneration: in fact,
what it boiled down to was pillaging .
The dirty work of collecting these revenues was left to subordinates
with rifles. Because their white bosses wanted to be sure that they did not
misuse their weapons to hunt for game, they had to account for every round
of ammunition. At various places, therefore, there arose the custom of cutting
off the right hand of those they had shot and taking it along as proof of
what the bullet had been used for. To keep the hands from rotting they were
smoked over an open fire, in the same way that food is preserved to this day.
The tax collector, after all, saw his boss only once every few weeks. During
the debriefing he was expected to present the hands as pieces justificaiives, as
"receipts" for expenses incurred.
Beginning in 1900 voices began to be raised in Europe against this Belgian
ruler who had his employees cut off people's hands. A few photographs
of Congolese with stumps for arms made their way around the world. This
resulted i~ the widespread misconception that living persons were having
Annex 89
"DIABOLICAL FILTH" 91
their hands cut off in Congo on a major scale. That did happen, but n1ucl1
less systematically than most people thought. The greatest ignominy of
Leopold's rubber policies was not that dead people's hands were cut off, bur
that the murdering took place so casually. The mutilation of corpses wa~ a
secondary effect . That does nothing, however, to detract from the fact that,
in a number of cases, the atrocities truly knew no bounds. "When I was
still a child," said Matuli, a fifteen-year-old female student at the Ikoko mission,
"the sentries shot at the people in my village because of the rubber. My
father was murdered: they tied him to a tree and shot and killed him, and
when the sentries untied him they gave him to their boys, who ate him. My
mother and I were taken prisoner. The sentri~s cut off my mother's hands
while she was still alive. Two days later, they cut off her head. There were
no white men present.''62
By severing the limbs of living victims, the sentries not only saved on
bullets, but were also able to steal the broad copper bracelets that women
often had forged around their wrists or ankles. Boali's story is quite telling
in that regard: "One day, when my husband was in the forest tapping rubber,
the sentry Ikelonda came to my hut and asked me to give myself to him.
I refused. Enraged, he shot me with his rifle; you can still see the wound. I
fell to the ground and Ikelonda thought I was dead. To get the copper ring
I wore around my ankle, he chopped off my right foot.''61 Had Boali shown
any sign oflife at that point, she would have been killed immediately.
But violence by Africans against other Africans was not the whole story:
it was not only at the base of the pyramid of power that blood flowed. Many
Belgians also took part in this. Physical violence was more widely tolerated in
those days-Belgian cafes were the scene of weekly brawls, free-for-alls were
a part of youth culture, corporal punishment was the standard at schoolsyet
some of the offences in Congo far exceeded the boundaries of custom.
Floggings with the chicotte were an official disciplinary measure. The Belgian
civil servant in charge established the number of lashes to be administered,
his black aide-de-camp dealt them out during the morning or evening roll call,
while the flag of the Free State waved over the proceedings. The strop had to
be flat, the number oflashes was not to exceed fifty (to be administered in two
series of twenty-five each), only the buttocks and lower back were to be lashed,
and the whipping was to cease at the first show of blood. Some white people,
however, did not abide so closely by the rules: they preferred a nonregulation
strop, which was twisted and angular and therefore much more painful. They
Annex 89
218 CONGO
good time, that was the motto. It was not until 1938 that a hesitant stare
, s i. :u~ with gen eral secondary schools, and not until 1954 (only six years
b,~. 0~e ;ndependence , but no one knew that yet) that the first university,
Lov:,n i,, , , , , w a s set up, an auxiliary branch of the Catholic University of Lou '-'"
,n , D L', i ng its first year, the new university had thirty-three students and
,;,·-.,,,.;,, pr, ,t . '.Ssors. You could study natural science s, social and administrative
scie ,ice~, ,~.Jucation, and agronomy. A law school was started only in 1958.' '
No big hurry, in other words. Was it then really necessary to recognize a
privileged caste?
In 1948 the Belgian administration found a provisional solution: the
evolue could apply for a "certificate of civil merit ." Anyone without a criminal
record and who had never been deported, who had sworn off polygamy and
sorcery, and who could read, write , and do arithmetic was eligible . Those
who held such a certificate could no longer be administered corpcral punishment
and would , in the case of a trial, be tried before a European judge.
They had access to separate wards in hospitals and were allowed to walk
through the white neighborhoods after 6 P.M. 74 This made a great impression
on the average Congolese. In Boma, Camille Mananga, a man who was
thirteen when the certificate of merit was introduced, told me: "That was
reserved for the truly prominent. They were allowed to go shopping and
drink along with the whites. That was a very great distinction. I was still
much too young . The sky was more within my reach than a certificate like
that!" " But for people who had been working their way up the ladder for
years, it represented fairly minimal privileges that stood in no proportion
to their efforts. Structural wage inequality still existed. As a former evolue,
Victor Masunda , another inhabitant ofBoma, could still get wound up about
that: "Of course I didn't apply for that card. It really didn't mean any higher
wages. A lot of people groveled, but I refused to lower myself. Applying for
the certificate of merit was degrading. Was I supposed to become their little
brother? No. I could get hold of my red wine and whisky on my own.""
It was for this reason that, in 1952, the carte d'immatriculation (registration
card ) was introduced. This new document gave the evolue the same
rights in public life and in the eyes of the law as the European population.
The most important advantage was that the evolue could now send his children
to European schools, an exceptional social promotion that also guaranteed
a decent education. But the skepticism among large parts of the colonial
elite was so great that extremely stringent requirements were posed for
Annex 89
SOON TO BE OURS 233
Their "countetmanifesto" appeared in August 1956. It was intended to surpass
the first text and preferably to pulverize it. The tone was much more
radical and the content unequivocally revolutionary. With regard, for example,
to the thirty-year plan advanced by Van Bilsen and Conscience Africaine?
"We, for our part, we do not wish to participate in carrying out this plan,
but only in doing away with it; its execution would lead to only more delays
for Congo. In essence, it is nothing but that same old lullaby. Our patience is
more than exhausted. The time is ripe, and therefore they must grant us that
emancipation this very day rather than postpone it for another thirty years.
History knows no belated emancipations, for when the hour has come the
people will no longer wait."8
That part about "the people" was, of cour~e. exaggerated. Kasavubu
did not have the Congolese people behind him, and even large sections of
"his" Bas-Congo had never heard of him. He spoke, at best, on behalf of the
Kikongo-speaking evolues of the capital. In colonial circles, however, this text
exploded like a bomb. It was the first time that a group of Congolese had so
openly called for more rapid emancipation. A federation of states obviously
did not appeal fo them at all. And the colony's unity did not seem particularly
sacred to them either: they seemed only to be standing up for Bas-Congo.
Many colonials went into a tizzy. They spoke of"madness," of"a race toward
suicide" and a "racism worse than that which they claim to be combating.''9
JefVan Bilsen became the whipping boy. It was he who had opened Pandora;s
box, they felt.
For the colonials this call for independence came like a shot out of the
blue, which says a great deal about the closed world they inhabited. Following
World War II, after all, a first wave of decolonization had already
swept Asia. Within the space of only three years, between 1946 and 1949,
the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia had become
independent. That same spark jumped the gap to North Africa, where Egypt
threw off the British yoke, and Morocco, Tunisia , and Algeria began agitating
for greater political autonomy. Figures such as Nehru, Sukarno, and
Nasser maintained close contact. In 1955 that relationship had culminated
in the seminal Bandung Conference on Java, an Afro-Asian summit where
new countries and countries longing for independence unanimously relegated
colonialism to the scrapheap of history . "Colonialism in a11 its forms is
an evil which should speedily be brought to an end," the closing statement
re·ad.10 No Congolese delegation was present at Bandung, but there was one
Annex 89
234 CONGO
from neighboring Sudan, which became independent a few months later.
In addition, after the conference, radio stations on Egyptian and Indian soil
i:, i in ,r-o adcasting the message of anti-imperialism. On the shortwave fre qu~
11ci~~. people in Congo could listen to La Voix de l'Afrique from Egypt
,tn.J Ail Tndia Radio, which even featured broadcasts in Swahili." The mess
c:gc: w.,~ spread by means of a technical innovation: the transistor radio. The
imr, ,.j, ,,·J:ion of this tiny, affordable piece of equipment had major consecp
,·1,,·t:s. From now on, people no longer needed to stand on market squares
and street corners to listen to the official bulletins from Radio Congo Beige,
but could remain in their living rooms, secretly enjoying banned foreign
broadcasts that kept repeating that Africa was for the Africans.
To DEAL WITH THE GROWING UNREST, Brussels decided at last to introduce
a nascent form of participation. For ten years politicians had been squabbling
over possible forms of native involvement in the cities, but in 1957 a law
to that effect was finally passed. The native boroughs of a few large cities were
to have their own mayors and city councils. On the lowest administrative
rung, therefore, actual power was being granted to the Congolese for the
first time. From experience the administrators had already seen that informal
neighborhood councils could be effective in solving local problems, particularly
when their members were chosen by the community .12 From now on
those members would be chosen in formal elections, although the borough
mayors continued to be answerable to a Belgian "first mayor." The first elections
in the history of the Belgian Congo were held in late 1957, but were
limited to Leopoldville, Elisabethville, andjadotville. Only adult males were
allowed to vote.
Congo, at that point, was one of the most urbanized, proletarianized,
and well-educated colonies in Africa. No less than 22 percent of the population
lived in the cities, 40 percent of the active male population worked for
an employer. and 60 percent of the children attended primary school." This
situation was both new and precarious. Wages had risen spectacularly during
the early 1950s, but from 1956 on, that growth had stagnated; there had
even been a major reversion. The fall of raw material prices on the international
market (due to, among other things, the end of the Korean War) put a
brake on the economy. Unemployment began to appear in the cities." Soon
there were some twenty thousand jobless people in Kinshasa." Those who
had lost their jobs moved in with family members who still had an income.
Annex 89
CONGO
r; the Con~;o in the 1870s, when Stanley and his men first sailed by in their
m lal ho.It The throb of the war drum, the thousands of enraged voices,
the dancing that grows wilder all the time, the eyes of the warrior. In the
catacombs of the stadium the players tighten their shoelaces and slide shin
guards into their socks. Elsewhere in the city, at the governor's residence,
the champagne bottles have been removed from the cooler and are lined
up, sweating in the sun.
It is still January 4, 1959, and on Avenue Prince Baudouin, close to the
YMCA, Kasavubu tells the drummed-up crowd that the meeting, unfortunately,
has been canceled. There are loud murmurs and protest, pushing and
shoving. As a pacifist and admirer of Gandhi, he urges his supporters to remain
calm. That seems to work, even without a microphone. He is the leader, he is
the chief, he is the mayor. Relieved and reassured, he returns home .
But it is January 4, 1959, the day that everything changes, although you
wouldn't say so yet. Congo is going along with the times, it seems. Leopoldville
is the second city in the world with a gyrobus, an electric bus with
antennae on the roof that charges its motor at the stops. The first city with
such futuristic public transport was in Switzerland, but now these buses
zoom around the cite too." A few thousand Abako supporters remain moping
around the spot where their meeting was to have been held. A white
gyrobus driver gets into an argument with one of them and raises his fist.
Futurism meets racism. Right away , the blows rain down on him. The genie
has left the bottle. There are fistfights, there is shoving. The police arrive,
black constables, white commissioners. It's because of New Year's, the police
think, the people are still drunk or already broke , one of the two. Two commissioners
deal out punches. That is not a good idea. "Dipenda!" the cry
goes up. "Attaquons Jes blancs! Let's get the white men!" Panic breaks out.
The police fire warning shots in the air. Farther along, one of their jeeps
is overturned and set on fire. At that moment the soccer stadium empties
out - commotion, ecstasy, frustration, sweat-and the supporters join
in with those who had been waiting to attend the Abako meeting. Soccer
is gunpowder. In 1830 Belgium became independent after an opera performance;
in 1959 Congo demands independence after a soccer match. A
scooter comes racing up, with two young men on it. They can't believe their
eyes. In the last few years, both of them have worked their way up by educating
themselves , but now they see the rage of the masses from whi_ch they
have withdrawn. They no longer look down on them, as evolues are wont to
Annex 89
SOON TO BE OURS 249
do, but feel a sense of solidarity. The elite and the masses have found each
other at last.
Leopoldville at that moment has four hundred thousand inhabitants,
twenty-five thousand of whom are Europeans. There is a bare-bones police
force of only 1,380 officers .•• There is no national guard. The ver,y next level
of law enforcement is the army. The city's barracks house some twentyfive
hundred troops, but they have been trained to wage war abroad, not to
repress uprisings among their own people. The police do their best to handle
things, but within, a few hours the entire cite is in an uproar. Cars belonging
to white people are covered by a downpour of stones. Windows shatter.
Fires break out everywhere. The police turn their guns on the demonstrators.
Puddles of dark blood gather on the asphalt, reflecting the flames.
Thousands and thousands of young people begin looting. All things Belgian
become their targets. Catholic churches and mission schools are vandalized;
neighborhood centers where sewing classes are held are stripped. Around
five o'clock, a few youth gangs descend on the shops belonging to the Greeks
and the Portuguese, places where the people otherwise do their shopping.
The looters strike ruthlessly and run off with meters of floral fabrics, bicycles,
radios, salt, and dried fish.
At the governor general's New Year's reception, the telephone rings.
"c;:a tourne ma! dans la cite. Things are getting ugly down in the cite."
Heavy rioting has broken out in a zone ten or twelve kilometers (about
6.2 to 7.5 miles) long. The city's European district has been locked down.
The army moves in, first with tear gas, then with guns. Demonstrators are
being mowed down. "That was like using a hammer to kill a mosquito,"
people realized afterward. 47 Some of the colonials, however, are so furious
that they take their hunting rifles down off the wall to go out and "help."
Years of piled-up contempt and fear, especially the latter, burst loose. At
around six, when darkness falls, relative calm descends on the city. The
fires smolder on. At the European hospital, dozens of white people show up
for treatment. Outside, before the door, their elegant cars are parked in the
darkness, dented, scratched, and ruined. At the villas, for the first time in
years, the women have to do their own cooking : the boy has disappeared
completely.
The next day, many of the Belgians feel more resigned than outraged.
"We completely lost face," they tell each other on Monday morning." Some
of them begin stocking up on canned sardines and vegetable oil, others
Annex 89
250 CONGO
book one-way tickets with Sabena for Brussels. The army takes three or
four days to get the city back under control. The final toll is unbearable:
forty-scvc a fatalities and 241 wounded on the Congolese side, according
lo th official figures at least. Eyewitnesses speak of two hundred, perhaps
even lhre e hundred people killed.
It wo.s January 4, 1959, and things would never be right again.
'A PEW D AYS LATER I flew to Brussels aboard a DC-6, " Jean Cordy told
me in the fall of2009 at his service flat in Louvain -la-Neuve. In 1959 he had
been the principal private secretary to Governor General Cornelis. "My
directives were clear: I was to convince the Belgian government to include
the word independence in their long-awaited policy paper. The governor
general had said this was an opportunity we should absolutely not miss.
I also visited the king and told him that Belgium had to refer to independence."
49
On January 13, 1959, more than a week after the riots, both the policy
paper and a royal statement were publicized. The ministerial text was fuzzy,
technical and incoherent, but Baudouin's speech was both apt and crystal
clear. A tape recording of his message was sent to Congo and immediately
broadcast on the radio. Fishermen on the beach at Moanda, farmers amid
the sugarcane, workers covered in the dust of the cement factory, seminarians
immersed in their books, nurses washing their hands, village chieftains
in the interior, helmsmen on the riverboats, nuns weeding their gardens, the
elderly, and the adolescent listened to their transistor radios and heard their
beloved king pronounce the historic words: "Our decision today is lead the
people of Congo in prosperity and peace, without harmful procrastination
but also without undue haste, toward independence." 50
People could hardly believe it . This was too good to be true! As they
drove through the villages of Bas-Congo, the truck drivers honked their
horns and sang loudly out the window:
Independence is coming.
Independence will soon be 011rs.
Mwana Kitoko [Baudouin] has said so himself.
The white chiefs have said so too.
Independence is coming.
Independence will soon be 01trs.51
Annex 89
CONGO
1ensions had risen too far. The first eleclions had been organized in 1957,
in Lhc hope , hat that would placate the men of Conscience Africainc and the
J\bako. But it had the opposite effect. After the January 1959 riots, the Belgians
promised independence, but not even that could smooth the feathers
that had been ruffled. The colonizer thought it was doing the right thing,
but struck out each time. That resulted in 1959 in the loss of a great deal
of valuable time and goodwill; assets that could have been used to prepare
well for independence. Rather than try to slap together an improvised, well intentioned
policy, perhaps the time had come to finally ask the Congolese
themselves what they wanted.
ON JANUARY 20, 1960, a group of some 150 men in winter coats gathered
at the Palais des Congres in Brussels-about sixty Belgians and some ninety
Congolese. The idea was to spend one month discussing, frankly and on
an equal basis, a number of touchy issues. Hence the name: it was to be a
"round table conference" (even though the tables were actually arranged in a
rectangle). The Belgian Socialist Party, part of the parliamentary opposition
at the time, was pleased with the initiative. The Belgians were represented
by six cabinet ministers, five members of parliament, and five senators,
accompanied by a few dozen advisers and observers. The politicians had
little on-the-ground knowledge of the colony; "dry-season pilgrims" was
how the Belgians in Congo itself referred to them mockingly. But many of
them were rather smitten with the United Nations' new-fangled ideology
of decolonization. The Congolese delegates came from the major political
parties (Kasavubu, Tshombe, Kamitatu among them) and included a dozen
tribal elders to represent the traditional authorities. Just before the conference
began, the Congolese delegates gathered to form a common front that
would bridge the interparty rivalries, ethnic tensions, and ideological fault
lines. They did not want this conference to turn into a messy game of PingPong;
they wanted to act as a single player. L'1111io11 fait la force--united we
stand, divided we fall: Belgium had at least taught them that much. This
sudden coalition came as a great surprise to the Belgian politicians, divided
as they were between Catholic, Liberal, and Socialist sociopolitical blocs,
between cabinet and parliament. Many of them were ill-prepared. There
was no agenda, no government standpoint . After all, this meeting was not
meant to de~ide anything, was it?
During the first five days of the round-table conference, however,
Annex 89
SOON TO BE OURS
stayed in bed; the memories were becoming washed out. "The round-table
ball was held at the Plaza, yeah .... The joy, the euphoria ... Kabaselc called
the politicians by their first names. They all loved him .... A man with class,
in his powder-blue tuxedo with black piping. Very chic ... He loved women
and he loved making jokes .... One time I even hid his pajamas!"6
' Besides all
the fooling around, at the Plaza the band made a start composing the song
that would soon become the biggest hit in Congolese music: "Independance
Cha-Cha." The lyrics, in Lingala and Kikongo, celebrated the newly won
autonomy, praised the cooperation between the various parties and sang of
the great names in the struggle for independence: "Independence, cha-cha,
we took it / Oh! Autonomy, cha-cha, we got it! / Oh! Round table, cha-cha,
we won it!" After 1960 Congo would adopt a number of national anthems,
under Kasavubu, under Mobutu, under Kabila: pompous compositions with
pathetic lyrics, but throughout the past half-century there has been only one
true Congolese anthem, one single tune that right up until today makes
all of Central Africa shake its hips: that playful, light-footed and moving
"Independance Cha-Cha."
JUNE 30 IT WAS. The round-table conference ended on February 20, 1960,
with only four months left in which to knock together a country. The to-do
list was impressive. A transitional government had to be formed, a constitution
written, a parliament and senate established, ministries expanded,
a diplomatic corps appointed, provincial and national elections organized,
a cabinet put together, a head of state chosen ... and that was only the
country's political institutions. A national currency also had to be created,
and a national bank, in addition to postage stamps, driver's licenses, license
plates, and a land registry office.
A great many Belgians in the colony were leery of this mad rush. They
were afraid that the colony, which had been worked on so carefully for
seventy-five years, would go down the tubes in a few months' time. Many
of them began sending their savings, their belongings, their families home.
Others migrated to Rhodesia or South Africa. During the first two weeks of
June, four times as many passengers left from the airport at Ndjili than in the
same period the year before. Sabena had to organize seventy extra flights,
the boats to Antwerp were brimming over.66
The run-of-the-mill Congolese, on the other hand, was enjoying it
immensely. He believed that a golden age was on its way, that Congo would
Annex 89
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE THRONE 283
mercenaries, and native rebels. Four of those names, however, dominated
the field: Joseph Kasavubu, Lumumba, Tshombe, and Mobutu. In terms of
complexity and intensity, the ensuing power struggle between them was
like one of Shakespeare's history plays. The history of the First Republic is
the story of a relentless knockout race between four men who were asked to
play the game of democracy for the first time. An impossible mission, all the
more so when one considers that each of them was hemmed in by foreign
players with interests to protect. Kasavubu and Mobutu were being courted
by the CIA, Tshombe at moments was the plaything of his Belgian advisers,
and Lumumba was under enormous pressure from the United States, the
Soviet Union, and the United Nations. The power struggle among the four
politicians was greatly amplified and complicated by the ideological tug of
war taking place within the international community. It is hard to serve
democracy when powerful players are constantly, and often frantically, pulling
on the strings from above.
What's more, none of these men had ever lived under a democracy in
their own country. The Belgian Congo had had no parliament, no culture o[
institutionalized opposition, of deliberation, of searching for consensus, of
learning to live with compromise. All decisions had come from Brussels. The
colonial regime itself was an executive administration. Differences of opinion
were kept hidden from the native population, for they could only undermine
the colonizer's prestige. In his seemingly unassailable omnipotence,
the highest authority, the governor general with his white helmet decked
out with vulture feathers, seemed more like the chieftain of a feudal African
kingdom than a top official within a democratic regime. Is it any wonder
then that this first generation of Congolese politicians had to struggle with
democratic principles? Is it strange that they acted more like pretenders to the
throne, constantly at each other's throats, than like elected officials? Among
the historical kingdoms of the savanna, succession to the throne had always
been marked by a grim power struggle. In 1960 things were no different.
And in fact, wasn't it all about who was going to take over from King
Baudouin? Kasavubu was the first and only president of the First Republic.
The dress uniform he had designed for himself was an exact copy of Baudouin's.
Leopoldville and Bas-Congo supported him en masse. Only rarely
was his position as head of state openly called into question, but in 1965,
Mobutu-whose own ceremonial uniform later proved to be a copy ofBaudouin's
as well-shoved him aside.
Annex 89
302 CONGO
gence personnel drove a wedge between them . Each and every one of them
chose Kasavubu's side and ·recommended that he drop Lumumba. In August
1960 Lumumba was a lon~ly man, supported only by the Soviets.
What's more, his wrath had only grown. On two occasions the U]\J
Security Council had _called upon Belgium to withdraw from Congo (on
July 22 that was to happen "quickly, " on August 8 even "immediately"), but
Belgium refused to budge as long as the blue helmets could not guarantee
its subjects' safety.38 It was not until late August, none too early, that all ten
thousand Belgian soldiers had left Congo . In Lumumba's eyes the United
Nations was toothless, at best. Perhaps even pro-Western.
On August 8, to top it all off, the southern part of Kasai province declared
independence as well. After Katanga, the diamond province was Congo's
most important mining area. Albert Kalonji had himself crowned king . A
former supporter ofLumumba, with whom he 'd had a falling-out before the
elections, he had missed out on a ministerial post in the new national gov.
ernment . His secession, however, was ethnically motivated as well. Kalonji
stood up for the Baluba, the inhabitants of Kasai who had gone to work in
the mines ofKatanga in great numbers and were hated there as immigrants
and fortune hunters. In Kasai itself, the Baluba faced off against the Lulua;
violent clashes had become commonplace. By proclaiming a new nation,
Kalonji hoped to create a homeland for the Baluba. Tshombe supported the
i n itial iv,.: ,1n d he and Kalonji even decided to establish a confederation.
"fogc 1 h, :r with Katanga, newly seceded South Kasai accounted for oneq
11, 1 nc r or Congo's territory, and the wealthiest quarter at that. For a uni-
1.;.1ri,!1, li k,: l,umumba, that was unacceptable . What's more, Jean Bolikango
w a:; ,d so L11in king about withdrawing Equateur from the republic. That was
1w cuin r:icknce: Tshombe, Kalonji, and Bolikango considered themselves
the ones duped most badly during the government's formation, because
they had not received a ministerial post. Lumumba wanted to act but could
not count on the UN emergency forces, seeing as they had done nothing
to stop Katangan independence. As defense minister, therefore, he sent the
renovated Congolese army to the rebellious diamond province. But the government
army was broke and led by officers who had been promoted two
months earlier without any preparation.
The results were horrific. Kasai in late August of that year was the
scene of senseless confrontations that led not to victories, but to massacres
that claimed thousands of civilian lives. During an attack on a Catholic
Annex 89
THB ELECTRIC YBARS 357
country's planned economy. "The peril is more white than yellow," he said
upon his return. "Politically we are a free people, culturally we are becoming
that, but in economic terms we are not at all the masters of our fate.""
Mobutu began a process of"Zai:rianization": those small- and medium-sized
businesses, plantations, and trading companies still in the hands of foreigners,
a few thousand enterprises in all, were expropriated and given to his
faithful followers!" From one day to the next, Portuguese restaurant owners,
Greek shopkeepers, Pakistani TV repairmen, or Belgian coffee growers
saw the work of a lifetime disappear. At the head of their company came a
Zai:rian from the president's circles who usually had no sense of how to run
a business. In the best of cases he allowed the original owner to work on as
manager and came by each month to collect the profits. In the worst cases,
he immediately emptied the till and sold all the stocks on hand.
The consequences were grotesque. An elegant lady who never left the
capital might suddenly be running a quinine plantation on the other side of
the country. Gentlemen who couldn't tell a cow from a bull became heads
of a cattle company. Generals were allowed to run fisheries, and diplomats
soft-drink factories. Minister of Information Sakombi became the owner of
a series of newsstands and movie theaters, but also of a few sawmills. Bisengimana
received the Prince de Ligne plantations on Idjwi, which comprised
one-third of the island itself.'° Our friendjamais Kolonga, a small fish in the
network around th(! president, became head of a lumberyard in his native
district. The party animal from the capital was now suddenly required to
manage a stock of tropical hardwood. Some made a mess of it, others rose
to the occasion. In one fell swoop, pop star Franco became the new owner
of Willy Pelgrim's recording empire, a sector with which he was indeed
familiar.6° Thanks to Zai:rianization, Jeannot Bemba became the country's
wealthiest businessman. He was made chairman of the employers' association
and even started his own airline, Scibe Zai:re. Finally, Mobutu treated
himself to fourteen plantations spread all over the country. He controlled
a quarter of the production of cacao and rubber, had twenty-five thousand
people on the payroll, and so became the nation's third biggest employer.
Thanks in part to the mining revenues, he was now estimated to be the
world's eighth richest_man.61
But Mobutu saw his country, and it was not good. In late 1974 he switched
to "radicaliz~tion." Ailing companies were now taken over by the state. That
way they could continue to yield revenue and with those yields he could
Annex 89
370 CONGO
describing the curve the rocket had made. 12 A parabola of soot. It looked like
a graphic representation of Mobutu's regime: after the steep rise of the first
years, his Zai:re toppled inexorably and plunged straight into the abyss.
AND THERE WERE MORE THINGS TO COME DOWN out of the blue in
those years. Between 1974 and 1980, two of the Zai:rian army's C-130 transport
planes, two Macchi fighters, three Alouette helicopters, and four Puma
helicopters went down." Not a single one of those crashes took place during
combat. The reason for so much bad luck? The soldiers were so badly paid
that they had started selling the spare parts for their aircraft. Pierre Yambuya,
a helicopter pilot in the national army, saw it all happen. His testimony
provides a unique glimpse of the state the armed forces were in at the time.
"Anyone with a private plane knew that Kinshasa was the world's cheapest
market for spare parts. The soldiers sold them for twenty times less than the
factory price."" Mobutu showed off with his prestigious projects, but began
neglecting the institution that had made his coup possible: the army. Air force
pilots supplemented their incomes by selling, wherever they landed, a part of
their kerosene to the local population, who used it as lantern fuel. It became
such a common custom that children would run with their yellow jerrycans
to the landing strip as soon as a government plane arrived. Yambuya knew
what he was talking about: "A sergeant-major earned 280 zai:res, a bag of rice
cost 1,200 zai:res back then. An adjutant got 430 zai:res. But a school uniform
cost 850 zai:res, and with the 5 zai:re allowance he received for each child, you
couldn't even buy a pencil." That suddenly makes corruption much more
understandable. The soldiers did not protest "up through the ranks," for that
could cost them their jobs or even their lives, but repeated at lower levels that
which went on over their heads. "To lead a reasonable life, for example, I sold
the fuel from my helicopter. My superior stuck the funding intended for my
mission in his own pocket and said: 'If you land somewhere, just sell some
1·1,d . /\ he r ,,11w, hat you do is your own business.' "15
Z ,;°Jl'(' became sick. The deeper cause was a shortage of revenues (due to
111c ,.up p,r ("risis, the oil crisis, failed Zai:rianization, and grotesque public
spe mJ.i, 1μ.), ,md the worst symptoms were the withdrawal of the state and
, f,,: r,prt: ,d ot" corruption. It was in the army that that first became visible.
Soldiers took military vehicles away from the base and used them to run their
own taxi services. Radios and record players disappeared from the mess halls,
bulldozers ~nd trucks from the garages. Officers even took their subordinates
Annex 89
TOUJOURS SERVIR 371
home with them and used them as servants. Absenteeism in the barracks was
high, sometimes more than 50 percent. The few soldiers who did show up
for roll call were not highly motivated. Discipline was something from long,
long ago. An internal document, the "Memorandum du Reflexion," did not
shrink from self-criticism when it came to a concise summary of the troops'
morale: "Everyone wants to command, but no one wants to obey."16
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Angolan border, Moi:se Tshombe's
troops-the veterans of the Katangan secession-were increasingly active.
Many of them belonged to the Lunda tribe, a people whose traditional territory
reached into Angola. Mobutu had driven them into exile many years ago,
after they had defeated the Simba rebels. But now, along with their sons and
new recruits, they were out for revenge. These notorious Katangan guardsmen
had followed a remarkable course. During the Katangan secession (1960-
63) they had fought for a rightist, European-run Katanga, but in Angola they
had taken sides since 1975 with the Marxist MPLA, the Movimento Popular de
Libertac;ao de Angola. The reason for the ideological turnaround was simple
enough: the MPLA, like them, held a grudge against Mobutu.
After the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, Angola started in 1975 a
violent struggle for decolonization. As in Congo the contest was one for
the throne, but in Angola the conflict was far bloodier. There were three
factions. Agostinho Neto's left-wing MPLA faced off against the FNLA of
Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi's UNIT A. The superpowers got involved.
Angola was the spot where the Cold War experienced its most heated African
episode. The MPLA received massive support from Russia and Cuba;
the two other militias had American backing. The U.S. support went by
way of South Africa and Zai:re: Pretoria backed Savimbi in the south; Kinshasa
supported Roberto in the north. Because Roberto also happened to
be Mobutu's brother-in-law, the former Katangan guardsmen chose to join
up with the MPLA. Their leader's name was Nathanael Mbumba, their new
nom de guerre the FLNC (Front pour la Liberation Nationale du Congo),
their nickname les Tigres Katangais (the Katangan Tigers).
The rebels invaded Zai:re on two occasions. In 1977 and again in 1978
they crossed the border and seized a large part of western Shaba (the so-called
Shaba I and Shaba II wars). In numbers and logistics they were far inferior to
the national army, but the local population received them joyfully; not only
were they fellow Lundas, but the people were also tiring of Mobutu. The
rebels won gr~und easily and in 1978 even took the important mining town
Annex 89
414 CONGO
well. Paul Kagame, the current president of Rwanda, became their military
leader. Starting in 1990, the RPF began crossing the Rwandan border and
initiated a civil war with the Hutu regime. An estimated twenty thousand
people were killed in that war between 1990 and 1994, and 1.5 million civilians
became displaced. The attacks created so much bad blood among the
Hutu population that the hatred toward anything Tutsi grew even further,
even toward those Tutsis who had remained in Rwanda and behaved as
good citizens. "Cockroaches" is what people called them.
On April 6, 1994, when Hutu president Juvenal Habyarimana's plane
was shot down, all hell broke loose. Kagame's RPF had to be behind the
attack, the Hutus reasoned, and they began murdering Tutsi citizens on a
massive scale. This was no battle fought by soldiers with firearms, but by
civilians with machetes. Civilian militias had been trained beforehand by
the Hutu regime and equipped with machetes. These militias often consisted
of teenage boys weaned on racial hatred, the infamous Interahamwe.
They set about the business of genocide, egged on by the broadcasts of
hate-radio Mille Collines, which kept repeating that the graves were not yet
full and that there were still cockroaches scuttling around. Within three
months, eight hundred thousand to one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus
had been slaughtered. Meanwhile, from the north, Kagame's RPF continued
to press on toward Kigali, the capital.
The international community was not on the ground. At the start of
the genocide, the Rwandan government army had murdered ten Belgian
blue helmets in order to chase the United Nations out of the country and
clear the way for ethnic cleansing. Reporters and foreign journalists fled the
country's violence. The eyes of the world in those weeks were turned much
more on South Africa, where Nelson Mandela was elected president. Few
people knew exactly what was going on and France's President Fran\,'.ois Mitterand
was no exception. He saw the Hutus as victims of the Tutsi invasion
and sent French troops to Rwanda to help them. The French support was
unconsciously prompted in part by the fact that the Hutus were Francophoi:
ie while the Tutsis in Uganda spoke English. What Mitterand did not
know was that he was in fact protecting the perpetrators of the genocide.
Under the name Operation Turqoise, the French troops established a safe
haven to which Hutus could flee in the southwest of the country, away from
Kagame's advancing RPF, away from the reprisals that were sure to follow.
The g~nocide was intended to make Rwanda Tutsi-free, but those same
Annex 89
THE DEATH THROES 415
Tutsis were now coming in to conquer it from the neighboring countries.
The RPF's military might had been sorely underestimated. The French
soldiers took in hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees and helped them
across the border . Here it was not only a people fleeing, but also a regime :
the government army, the country's ordnance, the administrative apparatus,
and even the state treasury left the country . Some 270,000 people fled
to Burundi and 570,000 to Tanzania, but the lion's share of the refugeesapproximately
1.5 million-ended up in eastern Zai:re.' 8 Mobutu had put
his airports at the disposal of the French offensive and granted permission
to lodge the refugees in his country. Most of them arrived in North Kivu,
in and around the city of Goma (850,000 refugees), and to a lesser extent at
Bukavu in South Kivu (650,000).
Along with Pierrot Bushala, the man who had lost his Tutsi girlfriend, I
drove in December 2008 to Mugunga, west of Goma, the biggest of the former
Hutu camps. It was still being used as a refugee center; since 1994, calm
has never returned to Kivu. In the 1990s, under the auspices of the UNHCR,
the United Nations' refugee organization, Bushala had been involved in trying
to maintain hygiene in the camps. "Can you picture it? This whole area
was full of refugees, and there was nothing at all," he said as his jeep bounced
through a sinister lunar landscape overrun with garish green vegetation.
The earth's surface in this place consisted of black lava from the imposing
Nyiragongo volcano a little farther along, and suddenly 850,000 people had
been dropped here. Bushala was responsible for the sanitary conditions in
one of the camps. "At first the people relieved themselves wherever they
could. But then the UNHCR and the Red Cross brought in tents, and quicklime
to sprinkle around. It was only later that toilets were built, over a hole
in the ground." As we walked around Mugunga itself, I realized how grim a
task it must have been to dig toilet holes in that volcanic rock. Pierrot looked
out over the desolate landscape of clotted lava covered with little huts and
tents. "We combated flies, mosquitoes, we walked around with spray guns,
we had teams to empty the toilets, we collected garbage." But it was to no
avail. Cholera and dysentery broke out in the camps . At least forty thousand
people died . Their bodies were piled along the road. The stench was unbearable.
The clouds of flies were so thick that drivers could barely see through
their windshields.
The mis~ry that came after the genocide restored Mobutu's international
respectability. The French were grateful to him for his assistance and
Annex 89
THE DEATH THROES
bridge over the Ruzizi. There weren't even any customs formalities,
no guards , no immigration service, nothing . We drove on until wf'
got to an airfield. Wait here, Deogratias said, and he left. We d id11't
know exactly where we were, we were just schoolboys. It was alffa dy
five thirty in the evening and it was getting dark . We were afraid the
headmaster at the boarding school would punish us, and we start ed
crying . At seven o'clock a big truck came by and we had [to] climb in
The drive took five hours. "What's the headmaster going to say?" we
asked each other . That was our biggest worry. Finally, we arrived at the
military training camp at Gabiro. We didn't get soccer shoes, but they
gave us rubber boots, not leather boots like the ones at home. There
were a lot of children at that camp, all of them kidnapped from Coma
and Uvira . There were also a few Bunyamulenge , but they were there
as volunteers. They cut off our hair right away. It was one o'clock in
the morning , and as a sort of hazing we had to crawl through the mud.
You have to rid yourselves of Mobutu, they screamed, you are the new
liberators of your country. 39
417
Young Ruffin 's testimony is very important, not only because it
describes the fate of what was then a relatively new phenomenon, the child
soldier under duress, but also because it shows how Rwanda was preparing
to invade Zai:re. The Tutsi regime that came to power in Kigali after the
genocide was extremely wary of those 1.5 million Hutu refugees in Zai:re.
Contrary to international directives, they were not a few dozen kilometers
from the border, but bunched up almost right against it. In those camps, the
recently routed Hutu regime was busy regrouping . They had money and
weapons and were determined to retake Rwanda . Just as the Tutsis in exile
had awaited their chance in Uganda from 1962 to 1994, the Hutus in eastern
Zai:re were now waiting their turn. Most of the refugees, some 85 to 90 per cent,
however, did not belong to the national army in exile, had not taken
part in the genocide , and had never belonged to Interahamwe. 40 They were
innocent civilians who simply wanted to go home again , but who feared for
a genocidal countercampaign .
An invasion was being planned in the refugee camps. The international
community was aware of the problem, but did not seem inclined to do
much. After the debacle in Somalia, America had no desire to once again see
the corpses of Gls dragged through the dust. Belgium did not feel like losing

Annex 90
François Emizet Kisangani, Guerres Civiles dans la République Démocratique du Congo 1960-
2010 (2015)

Annex 90
François EMIZET KISANGANI
GUERRES CIVILES DANS LA RÉPUBLIQUE
DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
1960-2010
Annex 90
La version anglaise a été originellement publiée par Lynne Rienner
Publishers en 2012 et la version française traduite par Mathieu
Mulenga avec la collaboration de Claire Dehon
© L'Harmattan, 2015
5-7, rue de l'Ecole-Polytechnique, 75005 Paris
http://www.harmattan.fr
[email protected]
[email protected]
ISBN : 978-2-343-02198-0
EAN: 9782343021980
Annex 90
Le territoire de Djugu, la zone la plus peuplée de l'Ituri et riche en
plantations de café, se trouve au centre du conflit entre les Hema et les Lendu.
D'autres sources de revenu comprennent l'élevage et la pêche dans le lac
Albert. On devrait ajouter l'or à cette richesse. Le centre principal
d'exploitation aurifère se trouve à Mongbwalu et à Kilo Moto contrôlé par
OKIMO avec son quartier général à Bambumines/Camp Y alala dans le
territoire de Djugu. Parce qu'il longe la frontière de l'Ouganda, l'Ituri a depuis
longtemps servi de centre commercial transfrontalier qui présente des
occasions lucratives pour le transport et la taxation des marchandises. En
outre, la découverte du coltan, de bois rares et de réserves de pétrole signifie
que les Hema et les Lendu occupent la zone la plus fertile et la plus riche dans
la région des Grands Lacs. Cette section commence par un bref contexte
historique pour évaluer les antécédents critiques du conflit entre les Hema et
les Lendu.
Bref contexte politique
Les communautés Hema et Lendu résident principalement dans les
territoires de Djugu et d'Irumu. La carte 6.2 montre les autres groupes
ethniques majeurs en Ituri : Alur, Bira, Lese, Logo, Kakwa, Lugbara et Nyari.
En dehors de ces autochtones, d'autres groupes avaient migré dans la région,
y compris les Naude du Nord-Kivu, qui vivent essentiellement à Bunia et à
Mongbwalu. En 2002, la population de l'Ituri s'approchait de 4,5 millions
(Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2002). Les Lendu constituent
presque 17 pour cent, alors que les Hema représentent 3,5 pour cent. Le
deuxième groupe le plus large en Ituri est celui des Alur avec 11 pour cent.
Les deux communautés antagonistes, les Lendu et les Hema, peuvent chacune
être subdivisées en deux groupes. Les Lendu comprennent un groupe du sud,
appelé Lendu-Bindi ou Ngiti, et un groupe du nord, constitué des clans Pitsi,
Djatsi et Tatsi. Les Lendu sont essentiellement agriculteurs et ils se déclarent
premiers occupants des terres dans le territoire de Djugu. Les Hema ont aussi
un groupe du sud, les Nyoro, et un autre du nord, les Gegere. Les Gegere se
marièrent aux Lendu et ils parlent le Kilendu. Dans ce sens, ils présentent des .
similarités avec les Tutsi vivant à Rutshuru et à Masisi qui parlent le hutu ou
le kinyarwanda. Les Hema du sud sont essentiellement pasteurs, mais, parmi
ceux du nord, il y a aussi bien des commerçants.
Historiquement, ni les Hema ni les Lendu ne sont originaires de
l'Ituri. Selon les contes historiques des migrations en Ituri, les pygmées mbuti
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furent les premiers occupants d'une zone allant de l'Ituri au Nord-Kivu
(Ndaywel, 1997). La première vague de migrations vers l'Ituri commença
peut-être entre le seizième et le dix-septième siècles avec des groupes lese et
nyari qui repoussèrent les pygmées mbuti. Au dix-huitième siècle, des
migrations lendu refoulèrent les Lese et les Nyari. Le dernier mouvement de
populations dans la région consista en de petites vagues de Hema vers la fin
du dix-huitième siècle et au début du dix-neuvième siècle, avec leur bétail,
partis à la recherche de pâturage (Thiry 2004). Ils se relocalisèrent le long de
la rive occidentale du lac Albert et ils s'associèrent aux Lendu. Ce mélange
entre les Hema et les Lendu ne créa aucun problème parce que les premiers
adoptèrent la langue lendu. Un autre groupe de Herna, les Nyoro, repoussèrent
les Lendu plus loin au nord, délimitant ainsi leur propre terre sans se mêler
aux Lendu. Ces mouvements de population ne s'arretèrent pas puisque même
vers la fin du dix-neuvième siècle, d'autres migrations de petits groupes
continuèrent.
Les agents du roi Léopold II pénétrèrent dans la zone pendant la
révolte de l'expédition de Dhanis, ou la mutinerie des Batetela, au cours des
années 1890 (Flamant et al, 1952; Moulaert, 1950). Le peuple d'Ituri fut de
la sorte parmi les premiers à l'est du Congo à tomber sous le règne de l'EIC.
En 1895, la zone d'Ituri faisait partie du district de Stanley Falls qui
comprenait aussi le Maniema actuel, le Nord-Kivu, le Sud-Kivu et le
Tanganyika. Ce n'est qu'après la réforme administrative du Congo belge en
1912 que l'lturi devint un district et, en 1926, fit partie de la province
Orientale. Quoique la situation fut politiquement satisfaisante en Ituri dans les
premières années du règne colonial, les Lendu restèrent difficiles à assujettir.
Par exemple, en 1911, les Lendu-Bindi d'Irnmu se révoltèrent et tuèrent un
chef Hema, Bornera, à cause d'un problème de terres (Johnson, 2003). Et, en
1919, selon les archives coloniales, les « autochtones de la zone de Kilo
refusèrent d'exercer n'importe quel type d'emploi; des mouvements séditieux
apparurent parmi les Lendu et les Lese » en 1919 (Belgique 1920, p. 12). Pour
rétablir l'ordre, l'autorité coloniale dut mener des opérations de police dans la
zone.
Le 8 novembre 1920, l'administration coloniale introduisit des
secteurs sur base ethnique, et le décret du 5 décembre 1933 créa de nouvelles
chefferies (Magotte 1934). Les deux lois institutionnalisèrent la gouvernance
indirecte et elles furent couramment appliquées dans les Kivu et dans l'Ituri
(Bucyalimwe 2005). Le décret de 1920 imposa un chef Hema sur les Lendu,
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créant une situation semblable à ce qui se passa à Masisi et à Rutshuru au
Nord-Kivu. Toutefois, les Lendu se révoltèrent et tuèrent une fois encore le
chef berna. Parce que le territoire de Djugu restait insoumis, le commissaire
de district de l'Ituri suggéra la mise de la zone sous occupation militaire pour
arrêter la révolte lendu. Il basa sa proposition sur le fait que l'occupation
n'aiderait pas seulement la compagnie minière aurifère de Kilo Moto à
recruter la main d'oeuvre parmi les Lendu, mais qu'elle pouvait aussi aider
l'administration coloniale à contrôler les Lendu (Moulaert 1950, p. 96 et pp.
225-257). Ainsi, l'administration coloniale exploita massivement les
territoires de Djugu et d'Irumu, surtout après la découverte des gisements d'or
de Kilo Moto.
Les Belges encouragèrent une économie basée sur des plantations
tenues par des colons européens. Cette exploitation conduisit à des
déplacements de populations ainsi qu'à l'aliénation des te1res et des droits de
pâturage, comme cela se passa dans .le Kivu. En 1923, l'administration
coloniale décida de séparer les Hema et les Lendu en limitant les collectivités
de Djugu au nord et d'Irumu au sud pour éviter une future confrontation
ethnique. Cependant, la politique de subjuguer les Lendu n'eut pas de succès.
En effet, six ans plus tard, l'administration coloniale envoya une autre
occupation militaire pour contrôler les Len du dans la zone de Geti parce qu'ils
refusaient de payer leurs impôts (Belgique 1930, p. 104). L'administration
introduisit aussi un droit privé sur la terre et un système d'enregistrement de
titres fonciers, les déclarant des terres vacantes et donc une propriété d'Etat;
ce qui aboutit à l'aliénation de milliers d'hectares de terre des communautés
locales lendu.
En outre, l'Etat colonial mit en place des politiques sociales qui
désavantagèrent les Lendu. Parce que les Hema coopéraient avec les colons
en Ituri, l'Etat ouvrit des écoles pour enfants berna. Cette politique se basa sur
un mythe colonial de supériorité selon lequel les « Hema avaient plus de
qualités de leadership et étaient plus intelligents que les Lendu » (Moulaert
1950, pp. 255-256). L'éducation des Hema leur permit plus tard d'occuper
plus de postes d'auxiliaires dans 1' administration coloniale, dans la compagnie
minière de Kilo Moto et dans les plantations. L'unique alternative laissée aux
Lendu fut de rester au village pour cultiver la terre ou devenir ouvrier manuel
dans l'industrie minière ou dans les plantations. Cette situation créa une
nouvelle stratification sociale qui associa l'ethnicité à la classe ; les Hema
devinrent la classe supérieure dans la communauté africaine. Bien que cette
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perception de l'inégalité accrût les chances de conflit entre les Hema et les
Lendu, l'administration coloniale réussit à subjuguer les Lendu grâce à des
opérations militaires ou de police dans le district de l'lturi, de la sorte évitant
toute sorte de révolte.
En 1960, quand le Congo devint indépendant, le district de 1 'Ituri vota
massivement pour le MNC/L. Des vingt sièges alloués à l'Ituri, dix-neuf
furent pris par le MNC/L (Gérard-Libois et Verhaegen 1961, p. 183).
L'idéologie nationaliste et unitariste du MNC/L donna à la population du
district de l'Ituri un forum pour exprimer leurs demandes dans le cadre du
programme national. Le 14 août 1962, Kibali-Ituri devint une province, avec
Jean Foster Manzikala comme président. Les forces centrifuges qui avaient
fissuré plusieurs provinces suivant des lignes ethniques ne dérangèrent pas les
relations ethniques entre les Hema et les Lendu à ce moment-là. Parce que la
province soutenait en majorité le MNC/L, la politique ethnique ne posa pas de
problème malgré le fait que la plupart des postes politico-administratifs en
Ituri restaient dans les mains des Hema, une conséquence du système colonial.
Ce n'est qu'après 1966 que les Lendu se révoltèrent et qu'ils refusèrent de
payer les impôts à ce qu'ils considéraient comme une administration berna.
L'autorité provinciale réprima le mouvement qui se solda par de lourdes pertes
en vies humaines (ICG, 2003).
En 1973, Mobutu promulgua la loi foncière qui donna aux Hema un
accès facile à la terre au détriment des Lendu. Cette loi fut suivie par la
politique de nationalisation en novembre 1973. Les deux lois bénéficièrent
plus aux Hema qu'à tout autre groupe ethnique en Ituri parce qu'ils dominaient
dans l'appareil politique d'Etat. Une année plus tard, un dirigeant Lendu,
Soma Mastaki, créa un pseudo-parti appelé le Parti de Libération des Walendu
(PL W) qui avait pour but de servir de fornm par lequel les Lendu pourraient
exprimer leurs demandes pour une meilleure représentation dans les
institutions d'Etat d'où ils avaient été marginalisés et exclus par les Berna, en
dépit du fait qu'ils représentent 17 pour cent de la population de l'Ituri (ICG,
2003). Malheureusement,' le mouvement tourna rapidement au terrorisme, à
tendre des embuscades et à tuer de civils berna. Des rapports des
administrateurs du district indiquèrent que le mouvement utilisait du poison
pour tuer des enfants berna en âge de scolarité. L'accusation se répandit à tel
point que les lettres PL W devinrent synonymes de poison en Ituri. La
conséquence de ces actes fut si dévastatrice pour les Hema qu'ils exigèrent
une trêve entre les deux communautés. En 1975, les dirigeants
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communautaires des deux groupes signèrent le pacte de réconciliation sous le
gouverneur Assumani Busanya Lukili. Le pacte rétablit la paix entre les deux
groupes pendant dix ans, de 1975 à 1984 (ICG, 2003). Quoiqu'il y eut de
nouveau des tensions en 1985, la situation resta calme sans aucun incident
majeur.
La relation entre les deux groupes changea après que le président
Mobutu annonça la libéralisation de son régime politique en 1990. Comme au
Nord-Kivu, les élites de l'Ituri créèrent des organisations pour promouvoir les
intérêts de leurs groupes. Les Hema furent les premiers lorsqu'ils fondèrent
l' ETE. Le mot signifie « bétail » dans la langue hema et il représente un
symbole de noblesse pour se distinguer des autres, bien que les Hema ne
fissent jamais partie de n'importe quel type de noblesse dans l'Ituri
précolonial. En tout cas, l'ETE avait pour but de renforcer la solidarité
ethnique et d'établir un objectif commun en renforçant l'unité du groupe
contre la menace des Lendu.
Les Lendu suivirent à leur tour et créèrent le LORI, mot qui signifie
« sous l'arbre à palabre ». Cependant, le LORI représentait réellement le
mouvement de Libération de la Race Opprimée en Ituri. L'organisation avait
pour but d'élever la conscience politique du groupe lendu et de combattre
contre le pouvoir dominant des Hema perçus comme une force d'occupation
qui s'était accaparée de la terre lendu. Comme partout ailleurs à l'est du
Congo, les groupes d'entraide, tels que le LORI et l'ETE, essayèrent de
mobiliser les circonscriptions ethniques au cas où les élections auraient lieu.
Ils fournissaient même un véhicule intellectuel pour mobiliser les jeunes et
pour justifier la violence.
Ce n'est qu'après 1993 que les Lendu-Ngiti et les Hema s'affrontèrent
à Irumu, faisant plus de 270 morts (ICG, 2003). Mobutu envoya un bataillon
de son armée en Ituri, mais le bataillon devint incontrôlable et il utilisa même
de l'artillerie lourde contre les Lendu, tuant délibérément plus de 300 civils.
Même la guerre contre Mobutu vers la fin de l'année 1996, qui se termina en
mai 1997 avec l'accession au pouvoir de Laurent Kabila comme président, ne
changea pas les relations ethniques en Ituri. En août 1997, cependant, les
Lendu-Pitsi dans la localité de Tsunde, à Djugu, commencèrent à protester
contre les activités d'un propriétaire de ranch hema, Magbo Mugenyi, qui
élargissait ses pâturages dans les champs des fermiers lendu. Un dirigeant
lendu, Ngbadhengo Gobba, intercéda avant que la protestation ne tourna en
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conflit armé (ICG, 2003). Gobba organisa une réunion avec le propriétaire de
ranch hema. La rencontre non seulement diffusa la tension, puisque le
propriétaire de ranch hema revint sur sa position, mais elle réunit aussi la
plupart des chefs traditionnels pour discuter ensemble les questions des terres.
Il en résulta une sorte de réconciliation vers le milieu de 1998 entre les chefs
traditionnels. La réunion prit fin avec la création du Conseil Consultatif des
Chefs Coutumiers de l'Ituri. Elle avait pour but de prévenir tout conflit armé
et de résoudre les problèmes en matière des terres sans recourir à la violence.
Le Conseil Consultatif apporta ainsi un semblant de paix jusqu'à ce que la
guerre anti-Kabila éclata le 2 août 1998 et que l'armée ougandaise occupa le
district de 1 'Ituri.
Au début de 1999, il y eut des échauffourées dans le territoire de
Djugu quand les forces ougandaises commencèrent à évacuer les fermiers
lendu de leur terre adjacente au ranch de l'homme d'affaires hema, Singa
Kodjo, en échange de paiements comptants (ICG, 2003). La plupart des
officiels lendu et des conseillers locaux qui intervinrent pour arrêter le
mouvement furent arrêtés et emprisonnés pour avoir troublé l'ordre public.
Ces mrestations envenimèrent un environnement déjà tendu en Jturi. Vers la
fin du mois de mai 1999, des menaces écrites des chefs lendu dans la
collectivité de Pitsi demandaient que les Hema, considérés comme des
« visiteurs vivant ici sur ces collines», évacuent les zones de Blukua, dans le
territoire de Djugu (ICG 2003, p. 4). Les Hema perçurent ceci comme un
avant-goût prémédité d'un« nettoyage ethnique». L'administrateur de Djugu
dut intervenir pour diffuser la situation et convoqua une réunion urgente de
tous les dirigeants communautaires le 19 juin 1999 dans le territoire de Djugu.
Cependant, la rencontre se termina en queue de poisson. Dans l'entretemps,
des groupes d'entraide dominés par des jeunes gens sans emploi
commencèrent à inciter l'animosité et à faire circuler des tracts haineux. Le
même jour à Djugu, il y eut des affrontements violents entre les Hema et les
Lendu qui se répandirent rapidement. Quelque 700 personnes furent tuées le
19 juin 1999 uniquement, le premier jour du conflit.
Le 18 octobre, seulement trois mois après l'éclatement du conflit,
quelque 5 000 à 7 000 personnes avaient été tuées et plus de 100 000 personnes
étaient déplacées (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 2000). A la mi-2000, le
conflit s'était répandu à d'autres territoires, entraînant d'autres groupes
ethniques. Par exemple, il atteignit Mongbwalu, le centre d'OKIMO, en 2002
et, en l'espace d'une année, les batailles pour le contrôle de la ville aboutirent
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à plus de 2 000 décès (Human Rights Watch 2005, p. 23). Malgré des
tentatives de paix, le conflit entre les Hema et les Lendu continua et, en juillet
2005, quand il prit fin officiellement, 80 000 à 100 000 personnes avaient été
tuées et une moyenne de 46 000 personnes étaient déplacées internes chaque
année de 1999 à 2005. Au moment du conflit, l'Ituri comptait au moins onze
groupes armés avec une moyenne estimée à 12 000 hommes chacun (ICG,
2008). Les plus importants étaient l'Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC),
créée en 2000 par Thomas Lubanga, et un groupe établi en 2002 par les Lendu
Bindi, les Forces de Résistance Patriotique des Lendu en Ituri, en tant que
groupe armé du Front National Intégrationniste (FNI).
Bien qu'il y eut des confrontations entre les Hema et les Lendu dans
le passé, les autorités étaient rapidement intervenues et elles avaient
rapidement arrêté la violence en ayant recours à des mécanismes traditionnels
d'arbitration et de médiation. L'impuissance des autorités traditionnelles en
juin 1999 fournit une perspective différente de la violence qui apparut au
milieu de la guerre contre Kabila et qui impliqua aussi les Forces de Défense
du Peuple Ougandais (FDPO). Des généraux ougandais soutinrent et
remplacèrent des dirigeants rebelles comme ils le désiraient. Wamba dia
Wamba, Mbusa Nyamwisi, John Tibassima, Jean-Pierre Bemba, Thomas
Lubanga, le chef Kahwa et beaucoup d'autres régnèrent dans l'Ituri en tant
que protégés des généraux ougandais.
Les causes du conflit Hema-Lendu
Au début de l'année 1998, quand les autorités traditionnelles créèrent
le Conseil Consultatif, la plupart des observateurs espéraient que l'Ituri se
trouverait sur le bon chemin et que sa richesse naturelle aiderait à reconstruire
le district. Toutefois, la présence de l'armée ougandaise changea la situation
en Ituri. Un point de jonction critique du conflit hema-lendu fut le rôle de
l'armée ougandaise opérant dans l'Ituri pour préserver la sphère d'influence
du président Museveni dans la guerre anti-Kabila. Avant juin 1999, les
officiers ougandais avaient donné une formation militaire à la fois aux Hema
et aux Lendu. Cette formation avait pour but d'augmenter la taille de l'aile
am1ée du RCD-Mouvement de Libération (ML), le groupe rebelle soutenu par
l'Ouganda qui théoriquement contrôlait le district de l'Ituri. Toutefois, une
grande partie des officiers ougandais favorisèrent les Hema en leur donnant
un traitement préférentiel et en les promouvant pour qu'ils puissent diriger des
groupes de milices, excluant ainsi les Lendu.
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Le conflit dans l'Ituri qui commença à Djugu le 19 juin 1999, ne fut
pas un acte spontané d'un groupe de jeunes gens sans emploi. Un mois avant
l'incident, certains chefs lendu demandèrent aux propriétaires hema de ranchs
de faire leurs bagages et de quitter les terres lendu ou sinon de faire face à des
conséquences désastreuses. Craignant une telle attaque, la plupart des
propriétaires hema de ranchs engagèrent des soldats ougandais pour protéger
leurs propriétés vers la fin du mois de mai 1999. Aux yeux des Lendu, les
troupes ougandaises devinrent des complices en prenant les terres lendu. Bien
que le rôle des troupes ougandaises fût critique, le sens d'exclusion des Lendu
n'était pas nouveau, mais il devint aigu vers la fin des années 1960. Depuis
lors, leurs élites essayaient de se positionner dans le processus politique de
l'Ituri. Ils finirent par découvrir que l'obstacle principal à leurs aspirations
politiques provenait de la domination hema à tous les niveaux de l'appareil
politico-administratif.
En plus de cette politique d'exclusion, un certain nombre
d'antécédents critiques aident aussi à expliquer le conflit dans l'Ituri. Le
premier antécédent critique est un élément de continuité. Le conflit en Ituri
commença lorsque le système colonial troubla les arrangements
institutionnels traditionnels en nommant des Hema à la tête des chefferies
lendu. En fait, les haines précoloniales entre les Lendu et les Hema ne sont
pas reprises dans les annales historiques (Ndaywel, 1997). Avant l'arrivée des
Européens, les deux groupes cohabitaient pacifiquement. Ainsi, la tension
entre les Hema essentiellement pasteurs et les Lendu essentiellement
agriculteurs commença au début des années 1910, tournant occasionnellement
à la violence suite à la politique coloniale. Le gouvernement belge accentua
les divisions et les inégalités sociales entre les deux communautés et les autres
groupes ethniques de la région. Les Hema avaient accès à l'éducation et aux
emplois dans l'administration coloniale parce qu'ils coopéraient avec le
système colonial. Des situations similaires apparurent à travers le Congo,
comme au Kasaï entre les Luba et les Lulua (voir le chapitre deuxième). Cette
politique coloniale de « diviser pour régner» causa un climat d'animosité et
de haine et la période p'ostcoloniale renforça l'inégalité croissante entre les
Hema et les Lendu. Une élite hema prit la relève et elle devint un grand groupe
propriétaire foncière, une classe d'hommes d'affaires et un noyau
administratif, avec un plus grand accès à la richesse, à l'éducation et au
pouvoir politique. Ce fait se reflète dans la proéminence des Hema à des postes
influents dans le gouvernement provincial et central. Malgré ces différences,
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les communautés hema et lendu coexistèrent généralement pacifiquement,
surtout dans les zones rurales et d'autant plus que l'endogamie était fréquente,
surtout entre les Lendu du nord et les Hema du nord.
Le deuxième antécédent critique, ou élément de changement, fut la
promulgation de la loi foncière de 1973. Comme mentionné précédemment,
la loi modifia les droits de propriété foncière et elle fit de toutes les terres une
propriété de l'Etat, abrogeant les contraintes du droit coutumier dans l'octroi
des droits d'usage des terres. Comme au Nord-Kivu, les bureaucrates chargés
de l'application de la loi foncière en lturi se transformèrent en distributeurs de
terres. En les allouant, ils firent complètement fi de la loi foncière de 1973 et
ainsi que du droit coutumier. Les propriétaires des ranchs hema purent
s'acheter des te1Tes dans tout l'Ituri beaucoup plus facilement que les Lendu
ne pouvaient le faire parce que les Hema dominaient l'appareil politicoadministratif
de l'Ituri et parce qu'ils facilitaient les transactions entre eux. En
outre, la loi sur la nationalisation de 1973 donna plus d'avantage aux Hema
qui devinrent propriétaires de la plus grande paitie des entreprises et des
plantations nationalisées.
Le conflit de l'Ituri tourna ainsi autour de l'utilisation sans scrupules
de la loi foncière de 1973 qui força beaucoup de familles lendu à quitter leurs
maisons parce que leurs terres pouvaient être et, effectivement, avaient été
achetées par quelqu'un d'autre, probablement par un propriétaire de ranch
hema. Essentiellement, la plupart des marchés des terres que les
administrateurs avaient conclus étaient illégaux. Néanmoins, les Hema
continuèrent à augmenter leurs terres et à déplacer les Lendu de leurs villages.
Tout cela ressemble au conflit au Nord-Kivu entre les Tutsi et les Hunde dans
le territoire de Masisi où le droit foncier coutumier fut ignoré par ceux qui
avaient le pouvoir. Comme indiqué par Vlassenroot et Raeymaekers (2003, p.
210), l'éclatement du conflit de l'Ituri doit se comprendre comme le résultat
de l'utilisation des acteurs locaux et régionaux dans un conflit politique local
profondément enraciné dans l'accès à la terre, à des ressources économiques
disponibles et au pouvoir politique.
Le troisième antécédent critique du conflit dans l'Ituri, comme au
Nord-Kivu, impliqua le mode de production agricole : l'agriculture contre
l'élevage ou le soc contre le bétail. L'unique différence entre le Nord-Kivu et
l'Ituri était que les pasteurs avaient migré dans l'lturi durant la période
précoloniale, alors que les Tutsi avaient introduit le bétail à Masisi dans les
295
Annex 90
années 1930. L'expansion des pâturages résultant de la loi foncière de 1973
sapa aussi l'autorité traditionnelle lendu. Inévitablement, les Lendu
répliquèrent.
Le dernier facteur est l'interaction entre l'ethnicité et le processus de
démocratisation. Le processus commença en avril 1990 et il déclencha
l'ethnicité comme une voie principale pour mobiliser les bases électorales.
Toutefois, l'ethnicité en elle-même ne cause pas de violence, mais « lorsque
l'ethnicité est liée avec l'incertitude sociale aiguë, une histoire du conflit et,
en fait, la crainte de ce que le future pourrait apporter, elle apparaît comme
l'une des failles majeures le long desquelles les sociétés se fracturent »
(Newland 1993, p. 16). Les élites berna et lendu recherchèrent le soutien de
leurs propres groupes ethniques parce qu'elles n'avaient pas de politique à
idéologie nationaliste et unitaire tel que le MNC/L au début des années 1960.
Le langage ethnique plutôt qu'un langage idéologique national devint l'appel
politique des élites. Elles créèrent des organisations d'entraide comme premier
pas vers un conflit. Grâce à des discours politiques incendiaires, les élites
mobilisèrent des jeunes sans emploi qui devinrent des instruments de terreur
et de mort.
· Quoique l'ethnicité fût critique lors de la mobilisation des jeunes
gens, des sentiments primordiaux expliquent à peine le conflit ethnique en
Ituri. Une perception d'exclusion à la modernité, créée pendant la période
coloniale, a été perpétuée dans l'ère postcoloniale. Cette perception fut le
premier facteur à susciter l'animosité. Des symboles ethniques devinrent
immensément puissants dans le conflit en Ituri parce qu'ils permettaient
habituellement aux politiciens de réinterpréter un conflit d'intérêt et la
politique d'exclusion comme une lutte pour la sécurité, la survie, le statut et
l'avenir de leur groupe. Se servir de ce symbole pour évoquer des émotions
telles que la peur et la haine, c'est la manière par laquelle les politiciens
motivent leurs partisans. Une pré-condition de guerre ethnique est l'occasion
politique qui consiste en deux éléments. Premierèment, il devrait d'abord y
avoir assez d'espace politique suite à la faiblesse del' Etat pour mobiliser sans
la possibilité de faire face à une répression possible ; l'accès aux institutions
d'Etat augmente évidement cette occasion. Deuxièmement, il faut une base
territoriale parce que les rebelles ne peuvent pas se mobiliser à moins qu'ils
ne se concentrent territorialement dans des régions spécifiques (Toft, 2003).
296
Annex 90
chargée de sécuriser l'aéroport et de protéger les personnes déplacées à
Bunia. Cette force, appelée Opération Artemis, comptait 1 800 soldats
français et un petit groupe des Forces Spéciales Suédoises de quatre-vingts
hommes. L'opération fut lancée le 12 juin alors que les soldats ougandais
avaient terminé leur retrait du Congo.
La mission française, sous le général Jean-Paul Thonier, resta à
Bunia jusqu'au 1er septembre 2003. Elle agit de manière décisive et avec
force contre les milices locales qui refusaient de se conformer à l 'Accord de
Luanda. Elle étendit aussi son influence au-delà de Bunia en interrompant le
flux d'armes aux groupes des milices. Le 28 juillet 2003, le Conseil de
Sécurité des NU vota la résolution 1493 qui définit les tâches des 10 800
soldats de la MONUC (UN, 2003). Appelées MONUC II sous le chapitre
VII, ces troupes avaient pour mission de protéger le personnel des NU, les
équipements et les installations ainsi qu'assurer la sécurité et la liberté de
mouvement de son personnel impliqué dans différentes missions au Congo.
En outre, elle avait le mandat de protéger les civils et les travailleurs
humanitaires sous menace de violence physique imminente et de contribuer
à l'amélioration de la sécurité pour l'assistance humanitaire.
Malgré un personnel militaire suffisant pour établir la sécurité, la
brigade des NU dans l'Ituri ne fit pas preuve d'initiative dans ses relations
avec les groupes des milices en Ituri qui se multipliaient toujours. Elle resta
plus faible que prévu à Bunia selon beaucoup d'observateurs (Nest, Grignon
et Kisangani, 2006 ; ICG, 2004). La brigade avait aussi beaucoup de
faiblesses qui sapèrent son rôle et retardèrent le processus de paix à Bunia.
Les soldats des NU furent incapables de reproduire le succès de l'opération
Artemis parce qu'ils n'avaient pas la capacité de contrôler les mouvements
des milices et leurs moyens de communication. Par exemple, le 25 février
2005, un certain nombre de milices tuèrent neuf soldats bangladais de
maintien de la paix des NU près de la ville de Kafe (ICG, 2008). En réplique,
les forces des NU attaquèrent une forteresse de l'une d'entre elles, tuant
cinquante personnes. En conséquence, d'autres conflits éclatèrent qui
conduisirent au kidnapping d'un certain nombre de casques bleus par des
groupes de milices.
Trois évènements changèrent la gestion du conflit dans l'Ituri et ils
préparèrent un chemin vers un semblant de paix. Premièrement, le CIA T
exigea que le gouvernement émette des mandats d'arrêts national et
301

Annex 91
Sebastian Gatimu, Institute for Security Studies, The true cost of mineral smuggling in the DRC
(11 Jan. 2016)

Annex 91
1/1812018 The true cost of mineral smuggling in the DRC - ISS Africa
The true cost of mineral smuggling in the DRC
I I legal mineral outflows rob the DRC of much-needed revenue that should go to its
development.
11JAN2016 / BYSEBASTIANGATIMU
There has been a soaring demand for commodities from Afr ica in recent years, wh ich created a unique
opportunity for the continent to plough this windfall into socio-economic development. However, a great portion
of the resources th at leave Afri ca's shores each year is not reflected in government revenue books.
Africa loses far more money thro ugh illicit financial flows every year than it receives in aid and for eign direct
investment. Global Financial Integrity (GFI) estimated that Afr ica loses a total of US$38.4 billion annually
through trade mispricing, and US$25 billion through other illicit flows.
According to a joint report by the African Development Bank and GFI, the illicit haemorrhaging of resources
from Africa is about four tim es that of Africa 's current externa l debt. Unethical commercial tra nsactions by
multin ati onal companies make up a massive 60% to 65% of the illicit outflow of the cont inent's wealt h.
Indeed, the scramble for Africa's resour ces has continued unabated, and is arguably worse than during the era of
colonialism. Emerging industrial powers in the East have join ed those of the West in exploiting Africa 's mineral
wealth 'at all costs'. In some cases, th ey collaborate with illicit netw orks and milit ias. The result is that many
prospects and oppo rtuni t ies for the development of the cont inent suff er a slow death .
Many prospect s for Africa's development suff er a slow death due to mineral smuggling
e aam
htlps:1/issafrica.org/iss-today/the-true-cost-of-mineral-smuggling-in-the-drc 113
Annex 91
1/1812018 The true cost of mineral smuggling in the DRC - ISS Africa
The resource-rich Democratic Republic of Congo (ORC) is a clear case in point. The Institute for Security Studies
(ISS) is currently researching illicit smuggling networks in eastern ORC to bette r understand and respond to this
challenge that continues to undermine the stability and development of the region.
Since the late 1800s, the Congolese people have suffered at the hands of foreign and local businessmen and
political leaders intent on exploiting resources such as rubber, ivory, diamonds , gold, copper, cobalt and
timber. The potential prosperity of the ORC is complicated by its history of viole nce and fragilit y. The country
gained independence in 1960, but a period of instability ensued after the assassination of Congole se
independence leader Patrice Lumumba in 1961. Belgium and the United States of America were implicated in
this crime.
In 1965, Joseph Mobutu was brought to power via a coup. The influx of refugees from Rwanda follo wing the
1994 genocide further weakened the state, leading to overt hrow of Mobutu in 1997. The rebel force installed
Laurent Kabila as president of the renamed ORC. Civil war continued, causing the deaths of millions of people
and leading to the president's assassination in 2001 .
Laurent' s son, Joseph Kabila, was officially elected the ORC president in 2006 , but the fight ing continued .
Throu ghout the countr y's frag ile history, external acto rs from the region and abroad have contribu ted to
destabilising the ORC.
As much as 98% of the gold produced in the DRC is smuggled out
maam
The roots of the country's mineral smuggling scourge can be traced back to 1981, when Mobutu legalised
artisanal mining, th ereby liberalising mineral trade in the country. The artisanal mining sector expanded as locals
st arted exploiting minerals and selling them wherever the y could find a market.
Neighbouring countries took advantage and provided free, unregulated cross-border trade t hat created an ideal
environm ent for mineral smuggling. This saw the formation of regional illi cit mineral tr ade networks.
The ISS research found that smuggling networks are well coordinated betw een and within states, dr iven by the
demands of international markets and comprised of a web of dangerous, intert wined groups that link the market
chain fr om the mine to jewellery stor es. These networks often operate in the fo rmal and open sector as well as
the illicit underwor ld; making th em both invisible and opaque.
Network s are made up of decentralised components that enjoy significant autonomy, but which ulti mate ly
answer to political elites and business moguls. The latter parties facilitate illicit t rade by compromising formal
state structures , state security measures and other trade regulations . For the networks, the control of flows and
routes - including cross-border channels - is more import ant than contro l of te rrito ries.
To what extent, however, does illicit mineral tr ade harm th e ORC? The Unit ed Nations Securit y Council Group of
Experts on the ORC estimated in a 2014 report th at a staggering 98% of the gold produced in t he countr y is
smuggled out. According to the United States Geologi cal Survey, artisanal mine rs produce an estimate d 10 OOO
kg of gold per year. However, between January and Octob er 2013, official export records show that only 180.7 6
kg had legally left the country.
htlps://issafric a.org/iss-today/the-true-cost-of-min eral-smuggling-in-th e-drc 213
Annex 91
1/1812018 The true cost of mineral smuggling in the DRC - ISS Africa
The main trading towns in eastern DRC for gold smuggling are Bukavu, Butembo , Bunia, Ariwara and Kisangani.
The vast majority of the gold traded in these towns leaves the country illegally . Most illicit minerals from eastern
DRC are exported through companies based in Europe, China, Russia, South Afr ica. the United Arab Emirates,
Lebanon and other Asian markets.
Terrorist organisations are also involved in mineral smuggling netw orks
e aam
Since 1997, Kampala has been a major tr ading location and trans it hub for Congo lese gold . Nearly all of the gold
traded in Uganda and Kenya is illegally exported from the DRC.
Burundi is also major transit country for gold originating in eastern DRC, as is Tanzania, itself a major gold
producer.
In addition to gold, the eastern DRC has large deposits of tin , tun gst en and tantal um (3Ts), mostly used in
manufacturing electroni cs like mobile phones and laptops. It has been alleged that Rwanda is a tran sit point for
the exportation of smuggled 3Ts from the DRC.
Terrorist organisations have also become involved in these networks, accordin g t o an interview with Remy
Kasindi, Director of Research at CRESA. a think tank based in Bukavu. Kasindi explained that groups such as alShabaab
and the Allied Democratic Forces-N atio nal Army for the Liberation of Uganda have joined hands in
smuggling minerals from North Kivu, and are financing their activiti es by using gold and other natural resources
stolen from eastern DRC.
Many local and international initiatives have aimed to curb t he menace of illegal mineral trade. These include the
Kimberly process, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiativ e, and the Internat ional Conference on Great
Lakes Region (ICGLR) initiati ve against the illegal exploitatio n of nat ural resources - but so far they have
attained limit ed success. The future developm ent of Africa requires a fundament al change. An effect ive solution
must start with member states in the Great Lakes Region, who must prioritise the implementation of the ICGLR
initiative.
Together with regional economic communities and under the umbrella of the African Union, cross-bo rder
trafficking in the region must be investi gat ed and addressed with practical measures. This must happen in a way
that reinforces tran sparency and account ability, and ensures inclu sivity in line with the African Mining Vision.
Given the eastern DRC's vast wealth of resources, it is incomprehensible that the area remains frau ght with
development issues. It is time for this to end.
SebastianG atimu, ResearcherG, overnance,C rime and JusticeD ivision, ISSN airobi
htlps://issafric a.org/iss-today/the-true-cost-of-mineral-smuggling-in-the-drc 313

Annex 92
IRIN, Special Report on the Ituri Clashes Part II: The Ugandan position (3 Mar. 2000)

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IRIN Special Report on the
Ituri clashes [Part Two]
News
NAIROBI, 3 March 2000
The Ugandan position
The Ugandan army (UPDF) has occupied the Ituri district of the Democratic Republic of
Congo since November 1998. Rwandan troops supported the occupation until May
1999, when units of Ugandan and Rwandan soldiers clashed in Kisangani and
precipitated a parting of the former allies.
The Ugandan government claims its only interests in the Congo are to protect
vulnerable borders used by the Ugandan armed opposition. However, it is accused of
economic and political exploitation and has come under increasing internal and
international pressure to account for actions in northeastern Congo.
The RCD-ML is a client movement, whose leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba justifies
the present occupation as a necessary security measure for a neighbouring country.
Wamba also said he welcomed the presence of the Ugandan army in its capacity to
train Congolese soldiers and political cadres. The UPDF exerts strict control over the
few active Congolese soldiers, including a directive that no guns should be carried.
Congolese soldiers guarding RCD members are restricted to compounds. There is
some disaffection with Ugandan hegemony, however, within the RCD-ML. Some
prominent RCD-ML representatives complain that Ugandan soldiers are pursuing their
own agenda, taking sides in the present conflict, “exporting” domestic military
corruption and “trying to undermine RCD”.
Initially the UPDF had no directive on the Ituri conflict, and, as a result, was accused of
acting as bystanders to massacres. Later, incidents of “mercenary behaviour” led to
accusations of it taking an active part in the clashes.
By November, Uganda took direct measures to control the conflict. In late December,
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni flew representatives of the local peace talks to
Kampala. The group comprised 18 delegates composed of Lendu, Hema, Alur, Ndo
Okebo and Mambisa representatives. According to a participant in the Kampala talks,
President Museveni told the communities that the conflict had to stop, and there was
abundant land in Congo to co-habit peacefully. Representatives say the talks resulted in
changes in the RCD-ML administration, including the immediate removal of the
controversial governor, Adele Lotsove. Representatives said they also told President
Museveni that he should take responsibility for the area he controlled as he was
effectively its “foreign president”.
Individual soldiers have been investigated for exploiting interests in timber, gold,
diamonds and coffee as well as being hired by some Hema to act as mercenaries in
the conflict. Recent allegations focus on a former colonel, Peter Karim, who was
dismissed from the UPDF in 1998 for misconduct, and now operates with the reserve
force. In Ituri, he is accused of taking coffee and timber for export, and supplying guns.
Complaints of mercenary behaviour and opportunism in the UPDF resulted in the
removal and investigation of Commander Kyakabale in November, and a new
leadership under Commander Arocha. Many of the troops were replaced by December,
and more deployed in January.
Redeployment of troops in January increased the profile of the UPDF in villages, but
still only consisted of very few soldiers. According to the present commander at Djugu,
it is difficult for the UPDF to keep track of groups of fighters in the vast, unfamiliar
terrain. The confusion and opportunism of the UPDF in Ituri is well illustrated by an
incident between two Ugandan units that took place in September. A southern unit, led
by Kyakabale, had been mobilised by a Hema group to attack Kpandrona, described
as the headquarters of the Lendu in Rethy. Aware of the advance, the Lendu alerted a
northern unit of Ugandans to come to protect the village. There was an exchange of fire
and casualties when the northern unit successfully ambushed the southern unit. This
was the catalyst for subsequent investigations.
Despite the Ugandan relationship with the Hema, UPDF soldiers have acted on an ad
hoc basis since the start of the conflict to protect other victims of mass attacks,
including Lendus, Ndo Okebo, and Alur. As a result, units of Ugandan soldiers are
generally accepted as viable security. Up to now, the UPDF has not suffered the sort of
resentment the Rwandan army has in other areas of Congo: there is more popular
distrust of Congolese soldiers.
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Annex 92
In February, a Ugandan commander arrived in Bunia to set up a training school for
Congolese recruits.
Crackdown on the Lendu
Although not the official line of the Ugandan government, UPDF soldiers in Ituri use
“insurgency” to describe the conflict. There are indications that a military operation has
been focused on the Rethy area, northeast of Bunia, purportedly the headquarters of
extremist Lendu groups. Representatives of the UPDF say security “cannot be
guaranteed” in this area. Since the start of the conflict, Ugandan soldiers have been
killed and, according to UPDF members, disarmed by large groups Lendu fighters. A
source in the RCD-ML claimed heavy weapons were being used by Ugandan soldiers
to “dislodge” the Lendu.
Since January, security operations against Lendu communities have increased. In the
second week of February, all 55 detainees in Bunia prison were Lendu, and one died of
wounds. Based at Bunia airfield, the UPDF also uses a container next to the airstrip to
hold prisoners who are taken out periodically and beaten. The six cases of bullet
wounds in Bunia hospital, all Lendu, date from January. An unknown number of villagers
have been killed in security sweeps described by survivors in hospital:
“There were soldiers who arrived at the village with Hema. We were running towards
the mountains, they were shooting and killing. I was separated from my daughter. The
next day people brought me her child. My daughter had been killed, shot in the back.”
[Adeline Kpakay, a grandmother of bullet-wounded two year-old, interviewed Bunia
hospital.]
Displaced people attest to the fact that Ugandan soldiers co-opt Hema civilians in
attacks against the Lendu, including handing over suspects. In February, three young
Lendu boys aged 12, 15 and 21 were released to the hospital after two weeks’
detention in Bunia prison. Caught by soldiers, they had been handed over to Hema
civilians in Ega Barriel for “interrogation”. One had a deep wound on the buttocks where
he had been put in a fire, the smallest had been stabbed with arrows in his back and cut
on the scalp, and the eldest had rope wounds where his wrists and elbows had been
tied behind his back. Asked to comment on the case, Ugandan Minister of State for
Defence Stephen Kavuma told IRIN that because of “consistent reports [of abuses] ...
we are investigating the whole thing, and if there is such a case, it will be part of that
investigation”.
Peace talks
Ad hoc talks between the warring communities began in September under District
Governor Adele Lotsove, who was removed from her post by President Museveni in
December. She was roundly criticised for having an “inflammatory influence”, and
accused of favouring her own Hema people. A Peace Commission was established by
the RCD-ML under the leadership of Jacques Depelchin, its minister of internal affairs.
Depelchin told IRIN a reduced Commission now continued the work on a permanent
basis, but that he was extending contacts to other groups - religious, youth, women and
intellectuals. He said he had travelled to affected areas in Djugu during November and
December and addressed both Lendu and Hema communities. Killings, however,
escalated in December and January.
Peace talks have failed to reach a settlement. RCD-ML leader Ernest Wamba dia
Wamba said in February his administration had tried to get both sides to see there was
no benefit in fighting “but with not much success”. He appealed for help in resolving the
conflict.
Displaced communities and the humanitarian agencies
An estimated 150,000 people have been displaced by the conflict. Humanitarian
assistance is minimal, with a little basic medicine and food channelled through local
church organisations and women’s organisations. Christian Blind Mission (CBM) and
Medair provide some assistance in rural areas, otherwise international organisations
say extremist sentiments in both communities block humanitarian access. ICRC is
carrying out hospital and prison visits in Bunia and some towns, and has established a
house for some 15 conflict-affected children. MSF Holland worked out of Bunia,
providing medicine in rural areas, until it was forced to leave in January. Its car was
stoned and workers accused of being “pro-Lendu”. Oxfam has successfully maintained
water development projects in Bambumines, but agrees the conflict has affected
humanitarian access and the working environment.
Local representatives of the Red Cross have remained active in affected villages, but,
they say, without any logistical support. In Blukwa, Njango Lombu, who has worked for
the Red Cross since 1978, said he had helped organise mass burials, and
transportation and collection of bodies. Drodro hospital is being run by two doctors and
15 nurses. Dr Tshulo Ngandju told IRIN the hospital was desperate for orthopaedic
specialists, x-ray materials and transport to cope with the number of traumatic machete
amputations in the surrounding area. His team - without salary other than community
contributions - has managed to save people with injuries so severe they were initially
believed dead.
A meeting of some 200 local and international delegates met in Bunia on 11 February
to discuss the crisis and humanitarian access. The need for cooperation from all
affected communities was stressed, and Lendu and Hema leaders were asked to
commit to a written agreement for humanitarian access. United Nations agencies and
international NGOs have sent exploratory missions to the area since the meeting.
The displaced are concentrated in isolated bush areas, major trading centres, around
Annex 92
hospitals and in Bunia town.
Bunia’s population has significantly increased with villagers seeking refuge with
relatives and friends. Every Friday, about 400 people are given two kg of food rations
donated by MedAir, through a local women’s organisation, Association des Mamans
Antibwaki, in Bunia hospital grounds. Numbers increased in February, with over 100
new cases. The organisation estimates some 75 percent come from displaced villages
to collect the rations, and about 25 percent live in Bunia with relatives. Workers say
resources are “very limited” and many people have to be sent away. One recipient said
she moved near Bunia at the beginning of January when “Lendu fighters” attacked
Ngongo village. After reuniting her scattered family, she came to stay with a relative in a
one-roomed house that now tries to support 21 adults and children.
In Djugu, the displaced have congregated around the trading centre from different
affected communities - Lendu, Hema and Ndo Okebo. Many of the women interviewed
said they had to resort to “stealing” from the fields, and were brewing alcohol for
soldiers to earn a small amount of cash. Although the Ugandan soldiers and the local
administration have directed people to return to their villages, many houses and
possessions were completely destroyed, including seeds and tools. Seasonal planting
has been affected, which has long-term implications for food supplies and reserves.
Some returnees have been attacked as they attempt to repossess their villages and
fields, which makes the majority reluctant to leave Djugu. Attacks have also frozen
trading between villages, and movement to markets.
In Drodro, a large group of displaced people occupies two church buildings and a
secondary school. Some have been there since the early months of the conflict, and are
in pitiful condition - infected skin diseases, marasmic and malnourished children,
chronic diarrhoeal diseases, vitamin deficiencies, as well as hepatitis and cholera
cases. The displaced say there are deaths “every day”. A seven month-old baby was
found dead, tinged yellow and suffering from chronic diarrhoea the morning IRIN visited
the group. Survival of these long-term displaced people has depended on finding
piecemeal work. One Hema man said he cleaned houses for “about 250 Congolese
francs, which will buy a cup of tea”. Work in the field and carrying cassava loads pays
about 200 Congo francs. Displaced Lendu people said it was getting harder for Lendu
to find work because of “resentment” - fields and farms are owned by the Hema in the
Drodro area.
To date, many displaced Lendu and Hema co-exist successfully together in towns and
trading centres. But there are rural areas where the conflict has caused extreme
polarisation, especially around the Rethy area, and in previously mixed villages.
Polarisation and hostilities are likely to increase if attacks continue and no settlement is
reached, escalating an already acute humanitarian crisis and further complicating
humanitarian access.
[Exclusive maps and photos available on IRIN website. For previous IRIN reporting on
the Ituri conflict, click here: http://umva.ocha.unon.org/]
Annex 92

Annex 93
IRIN, 15,312 foreign forces withdrawn so far, says U.N. (2 Oct. 2002)

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15,312 foreign forces withdrawn
so far, says UN
Actualités
KINSHASA, 2 octobre 2002
So far, 15,312 foreign troops have withdrawn from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Maj-Gen
Mountaga Diallo, force commander of the UN Mission in the
DRC, said on Wednesday.
He told reporters at a news conference in the Congolese capital, Kinshasa, that the
departed troops numbered 10,233 Rwandans, 2,287 Ugandans, 2,092 Zimbabweans
and 700 Burundians.
The UN mission, known as MONUC, reported that there had been about 23,400
Rwandan troops in DRC. Zimbabwe had the second-largest contingent of forces in the
DRC, with some 12,000, followed by Angola with about 8,000.
Meanwhile, as MONUC was announcing that the withdrawal of foreign troops from the
DRC was nearing its conclusion, the Association Africaine de Defense des Droits de
l'Homme (ASADHO), a national human rights NGO, reported the redeployment of
Rwandan troops in South Kivu Province of eastern DRC. In a communiqué issued on
Wednesday, ASADHO cited witnesses who reported that between 16 and 20
September, some 250 well-armed Rwandan soldiers re-entered the DRC via the city of
Bukavu, and headed inland toward Walungu and Kalehe in South Kivu.
"We saw new units cross the border at Rizizi 2 [a river] to enter South Kivu via Bukavu,"
ASADHO quoted one witness as saying.
MONUC did not confirm this information, but instead noted its satisfaction with the
ongoing withdrawal of all foreign forces. "Our observers are everywhere and have
verified the withdrawal. In any event, we will revisit all locations occupied by various
forces to verify the status of pull-outs," Diallo said in response to the ASADHO account.
For his part, the MONUC head and Special Representative of UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan, Amos Namanga Ngongi, said he had confidence in all parties to the
withdrawal process. "Now is not the time to make accusations against any party, as the
process is progressing and the parties are respecting and honouring their
commitments," Ngongi said.
He added that the Rwandan withdrawal could be completed before the end of next
week, ahead of the agreed deadline. Rwanda has announced that the final stage of its
withdrawal from the DRC was under way, from South Kivu Province. Zimbabwe made a
similar declaration, announcing that the final withdrawal of its troops would begin on
Friday, from the southeastern DRC city of Lubumbashi.
War in the DRC erupted more than four years ago when Rwanda and Uganda sent
forces into the DRC to back Congolese rebels seeking to topple the government of
President Laurent-Desire Kabila - who received the backing of forces from Angola,
Namibia and Zimbabwe to halt the offensive.
After Kabila's assassination in January 2001, his son Joseph became president and
entered into negotiations with Rwanda and Uganda. The withdrawal of their forces has
come in the wake of recent bilateral agreements Kabila reached with the two countries.
Partager
http://www.irinnews.org/fr/node/203505
Annex 93

Annex 94
M. Mutuli, ed. V. Tan, U.N.H.C.R., Uganda counts close to 20,000 new Congolese refugees from
Ituri region (19 May 2003)

UNHCR - Uganda counts close to 20,000 new Congolese refugees from Ituri region
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2003/5/3ec7977f4/uganda-counts-c… 5:12:08 PM]
Uganda counts close to 20,000 new
Congolese refugees from Ituri region
Assessment teams have found another 10,000 Congolese refugees in
areas north of Lake Albert, bringing to nearly 20,000 the total number
of people fleeing the Democratic Republic of the Congo's volatile Ituri
region. Many are living with relatives and may not want to move to
government-allocated camps.
By Millicent Mutuli, ed. Vivian Tan | 19 May 2003
search
Annex 94
UNHCR - Uganda counts close to 20,000 new Congolese refugees from Ituri region
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2003/5/3ec7977f4/uganda-counts-c… 5:12:08 PM]
Congolese refugees collecting water in Rwebisengu village, south-western Uganda,
where they are living outdoors despite torrential rains. © UNHCR/M.Mutuli
KAMPALA, Uganda, May 19 (UNHCR) - An additional 10,000 Congolese refugees
have been found encamped near Lake Albert, bringing to nearly 20,000 the total
number of people who have arrived in Uganda after fleeing recent fighting in the Ituri
region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). There are fears that more
refugees could follow.
Over the weekend, two assessment teams comprising Ugandan government officials
and staff from the UN refugee agency and the World Food Programme (WFP)
visited six sub-counties in western Uganda's Nebbi district, which is close to Ituri
district. More than 10,000 refugees have been registered by local authorities in
these areas north of Lake Albert, which separates western Uganda from northeastern
DRC.
There are growing fears that more refugees could be on their way to Uganda behind
the last group of Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF), who are withdrawing
from Ituri. Some of these troops reportedly arrived in Nebbi district on Monday,
followed by hundreds of new refugees.
Many of the recent arrivals in Nebbi district are ethnic Hema and Alur. Local
authorities said many of them have come from Mahagi, Bunia and Beni, less than
300 km across the border in north-eastern DRC. Significant numbers are living with
friends and relatives and are unwilling to consider relocation to refugee settlements.
The Ugandan government, however, would like all refugees arriving in Nebbi district
to be assisted in the nearby Imvepi settlement, some 65 km from Arua in northwestern
Uganda. Imvepi is already hosting 15,000 Sudanese refugees.
In some of the sub-counties visited over the weekend, the refugees had mingled with
the local community and were difficult to trace. Local authorities were unable to
locate them to speak with the assessment team.
In Jang Okoro, the local councillor said many of the 3,000 Congolese refugees in his
sub-county were women, children and elderly men. He recounted reports that
younger men were being prevented from leaving Ituri. In one incident, he said,
Congolese rebels of the Union Patriotique du Congo (UPC) had forcefully
conscripted young men from a market in the DRC.
To survive, many of the refugees in Jang Okoro are working on farms, making
2,000-3,000 Ugandan shillings (just over $1) for a day's work. Other refugees have
rented small parcels of the agriculturally-rich farmland and are living off the land.
The Ugandan Red Cross has made a one-time distribution of domestic supplies
Annex 94
UNHCR - Uganda counts close to 20,000 new Congolese refugees from Ituri region
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2003/5/3ec7977f4/uganda-counts-c… 5:12:08 PM]
including tarpaulins for shelter, kitchen sets and blankets to particularly vulnerable
refugee families in Nebbi district.
Local authorities said that while there continued to be local goodwill towards the
refugees, rapidly-dwindling resources could raise tensions within the community.
They called for the transfer of refugees to settlements and advised local officials to
resume the registration of those willing to relocate, although there is little optimism
that many will come forward.
Last week, a 10-person team consisting of government officials, WFP and UNHCR
staff visited four other locations - mainly fishing villages - on the southern shores of
Lake Albert and confirmed the presence of nearly 9,000 Congolese refugees.
Registration of those willing to be relocated to the existing Kyaka II camp in
Kyenjojo district, west of Kampala, is expected to begin soon.
The assessment team found many of the refugees living in very difficult conditions.
In Ntoroko, the mainly Hema refugees were living outdoors. Many were sleeping on
the bare floor of shop verandas and restaurants in a small trading centre. Local
authorities have identified some land for the temporary settlement of the nearly
5,000 refugees registered there, but refugees said they lacked shelter material and
implements to construct the shelters. Many said they fished for food.
UNHCR officials remain extremely worried about the sanitation conditions,
particularly as one refugee in Ntoroko has died of cholera while two others have
been hospitalised.
Meanwhile, large parts of Kamuga and Ruhangara villages remain submerged after
torrential rains, cutting off the road from Ntoroko and forcing the assessment team
to travel by boat. There, they found both the local community and refugees living in
squalid conditions. Scores of refugees were sleeping in two churches in Kamuga,
while children were wading through the stagnant, greenish water.
In Rwebisengu village, some 30 recently-arrived families were cooking and sleeping
under trees close to the local administrative office. Local officials raised concerns
over the large number of cows brought in by the cattle-keeping Hema community,
fearing the spread of animal diseases and pressure on pastures.
Annex 94

Annex 95
M. Mutuli, ed. V. Tan, U.N.H.C.R., Congolese march to Uganda: “Soldiers before us, death
behind us” (21 May 2003)

UNHCR - Congolese march to Uganda: "Soldiers before us, death behind us"
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2003/5/3ecb770f9/congolese-march… 4:19:17 PM]
Congolese march to Uganda: “Soldiers
before us, death behind us”
More than 20,000 refugees have fled recent ethnic clashes in northeastern
Congo. Some of them marched behind retreating Ugandan
troops and arrived along Uganda’s Lake Albert, where many are
sleeping rough in hope of returning home as soon as the situation
stabilises.
By Millicent Mutuli, ed. Vivian Tan | 21 May 2003
search
Annex 95
UNHCR - Congolese march to Uganda: "Soldiers before us, death behind us"
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2003/5/3ecb770f9/congolese-march… 4:19:17 PM]
Congolese refugee Sylvain Yusuf (in green) and family building a shelter in Ntoroko,
Uganda. © UNHCR/M. Mutuli
NTOROKO, Uganda, May 21 (UNHCR) - As the last of the Uganda People’s
Defence Forces left the Congolese town of Bunia, Sylvain Yusuf and his family
joined the human tide of frightened Congolese who fled the besieged town as fear
and panic gripped the town’s residents. They formed a long column behind the
withdrawing troops who slowly made their way towards Kasenyi, a Congolese
fishing village on the south-western shore of Lake Albert.
Many of the fleeing Congolese were afraid to face the aftermath of Uganda’s troop
withdrawal from the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
after nearly six years. Others were shaken by the gruesome massacres in the
recurrent conflict that has pitted the minority cattle-keeping Hema community
against the majority Lendu cultivators.
“People were being killed by the Lendu. They killed anyone they met, they did not
choose,” says Yusuf, a 17-year-old Hema schoolboy. “We could not stay in Bunia.”
His cousin, Kodjo Bahati, 20, says he saw people killed before his own eyes. “They
used machetes, spears and arrows. It was bad,” says the Congolese youth who was
set to finish his secondary school education next year. It was then that Bahati
decided to leave Nyakunde, a village some 45 km from Bunia.
As they walked from Bunia to Kasenyi, 88 km away, Yusuf’s family and many more
like them stayed close behind the soldiers they had grown used to. When darkness
fell during their three-day journey from Bunia, they camped with the soldiers on the
outskirts of the troops’ tented camp.
“Sometimes they gave us some of their food because they knew us and we knew
them,” recalls Yusuf. “It was not a difficult journey because we had the courage. The
soldiers were in front of us and we knew there was death behind us.”
Since the beginning of May, more than 20,000 refugees, mainly Hema and Alur,
have been registered by authorities in villages in two western Uganda districts -
Nebbi and Bundibugyo. In Nebbi - north of Lake Albert, which divides western
Uganda and north-eastern DRC - many have joined relatives and friends as they
wait for the situation at home to improve. In Bundibugyo, south of the lake, many of
those arriving have remained in lakeside villages, too accustomed to life by the
water to relocate to inland camps.
More are expected to arrive behind the last troops entering Uganda through Nebbi in
the coming days.
Yusuf and his family arrived in Uganda in mid-May. They are now in Ntoroko, a
Annex 95
UNHCR - Congolese march to Uganda: "Soldiers before us, death behind us"
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2003/5/3ecb770f9/congolese-march… 4:19:17 PM]
bustling lakeside trading centre. Before the refugee influx, Ntoroko had a population
of some 2,500 people. The new refugee influx has swelled the numbers nearly
three-fold to 7,400, straining scarce resources in the small port. Local authorities
say deteriorating sanitary conditions have caused one refugee to die from cholera
and two others to be hospitalised.
Yusuf’s parents have moved on to Karugutu, a Ugandan village several kilometres
inland from Ntoroko. But the teenager prefers to remain close to the lake, where he
and his cousins have been fishing for food and sleeping on the bare floor of shop
verandas. Days have blended into nights and back into day, he says, digging holes
for a shelter where he hopes to spend the night.
Local officials have set aside some parcels of land for refugees to construct
temporary shelters. But Yusuf and his cousins complain that there are no shelter
materials or tools to work with. They have asked for help but say that they do not
want to leave the crowded village of Ntoroko for Kyaka II, an existing refugee
settlement in south-western Kyenjojo district proposed by the government.
“When I stand here, I look to that side and I see Congo,” says Yusuf, pointing
towards the hills overlooking Lake Albert. “I will remain here until we can go back
home.”
STORIES
Central African refugees, exiled
across the river, long for home
VIDEOS
Central African refugees, exiled
across the river, long for home
Annex 95

Annex 96
World Health Organization, Verbal Autopsy Standards: 2012 WHO Verbal Autopsy Instrument
(2012)

Annex 96
Verbal autopsy standards:
The 2012 WHO verbal autopsy instrument
Release Candidate 1
(@~) World Health
~~ii Organization ----- .t.\1HMN ,"oEPr..,.
INDEPTH · ·
Network~. • J
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Annex 96
WHO Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
Verbal Autopsy Standards: 2012 WHO Verbal Autopsy Instrument
Contents: v. 1. Manual
l .Autopsy- methods. 2.Cause of death. 3.Questionnaires - standards. 4.lnterviews - standards. S.Data
collection - methods. I.World Health Organization. II.Health Metric Network.11I.INDEPTHN etwork
ISBN 978 92 4 154847 2 (NLM classification: QZ 35)
© World Health Organization 2012
All rights reserved. Publications of the World Health Organization are available on the WHO web site
(www.who.int) or can be purchased from WHO Press, World Health Organization, 20 Avenue Appia, 1211
Geneva 27, Switzerland (tel.: +41 22 791 3264; fax: +41 22 791 4857; e-mail: [email protected]).
Requests for permission to reproduce or translate WHO publications - whether for sale or for noncommercial
distribution - should be addressed to WHO Press through the WHO web site
(http://www.who.int/about/licensing/copyright_form/en/index.html).
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the
expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal
status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers
or boundaries. Dotted lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full
agreement.
The mention of specific companies or of certain manufacturers' products does not imply that they are
endorsed or recommended by the World Health Organization in preference to others of a similar nature that
are not mentioned. Errors and omissions excepted, the names of proprietary products are distinguished by
initial capital letters.
All reasonable precautions have been taken by the World Health Organization to verify the information
contained in this publication. However, the published material is being distributed without warranty of any
kind, either expressed or implied. The responsibility for the interpretation and use of the material lies with
the reader. In no event shall the World Health Organization be liable for damages arising from its use. .
Annex 96
2012 WHO verbal autopsy instrument Release candidate 1
2 Introduction to verbal autopsy
Reliable data on the levels and causes of mortality are cornerstones for building a solid
evidence base for health policy, planning, monitoring and evaluation. In settings where the
majority of deaths occur at home and where civil registration systems do not function, there is
little chance that deaths occurring away from health facilities will be recorded and certified as
to the cause or causes of death. As a partial solution to this problem, VA has become a
primary source of information about causes of death in populations lacking vital registration
and medical certification. VA has become an essential public health tool for obtaining a
reasonable direct estimation of the cause structure of mortality at a community or population
level, although it may not be an accurate method for attributing causes of death at the
individual level.
Verbal autopsy is a method used to ascertain the cause of a death based on an interview with
next of kin or other caregivers. This is done using a standardized questionnaire that elicits
information on signs, symptoms, medical history and circumstances preceding death. The
cause of death, or the sequence of causes that led to death, are assigned based on the data
collected by a questionnaire and any other available information. Rules and guidelines,
algorithms or computer programs, may assist in evaluating the information to determine the
cause of death 11• The main objective of VA is to describe the causes of death at the
community level or population level where civil registration and death certification systems
are weak and where most people die at home without having had contact with the health
system.
A standard VA instrument comprises a VA questionnaire, a list of causes of death or
mortality classification system, and sets of diagnostic criteria (either expert or data derived
algorithms) for assigning causes of death. The VA process consists of several steps, and many
factors can influence the cause specific mortality fractions estimated through this process.5
2.1 Historical background
In Europe, before the 19th century when modern systems of death registration were
implemented, designated death searchers visited the households of deceased people to assess
the nature of deaths. The need for lay reporting of causes of death remained in developing
countries where there was a lack of medical capacity to produce death certificates for the
population. As an alternative, in the 1950s and 60s in Asia and Africa, systematic interviews
by physicians were used to determine causes of death. Workers at the Narangwal project in
India labelled this new technique "verbal autopsy"6·7•
The interest of WHO in VA (formerly "lay reporting") of health data was first demonstrated
in a publication by Dr. Yves Biraud in 1956. During the 1970s, WHO encouraged the use of
lay reporting of health information by people with no medical information, leading to
development in 1975 of lay reporting forms. Since the late 1970s and early 80s when the
3

Annex 97
World Health Organization, Life expectancy, Data by country (6 June 2016)

Annex 97
(~) World Health ,ffl, Organization
Englis h Fram;ais PyccKMM Espanol
~ 0 0 0 9 ®
~ Health topics Data Media centre Pubhcat1ons Countries Programmes Governance About WHO -
Data ana lysis
By theme
By category
By indicator
By country
Metadata
About the Observatory
Search
Global Health Observatory data repository
By category > World Health Statistics
Life expectancy
Data by country
Also available:
- Data by WHO region
filter table I reset table
Last updated 2016-06-06
Country
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Yeou
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
2015
2014
2013
2012
Download filtered data as CSV table I XML (simple) I JSON (simple)
Download complete data set as· CSV table I Excel I CSV list I more
Life expecta ncy at birth Life expec tancy at .1ge 60
{y ears); (yea rs);
Both sexes Male Fema le Both sexes Ma le Fem3le
583 56 7 599 166 160 171
57 9 56 4 59 5 16 5 159 170
574 559 590 16 4 159 169
56 7 55 2 58 3 16 3 15 7 168
563 54 7 579 16 2 156 16 7
55 7 541 573 161 15 5 166
55 0 53 4 566 160 15 4 16 5
54 3 527 559 158 15 2 16 3
535 520 551 15 7 151 16 2
52 8 511 54 4 156 15 0 161
52 1 50 4 538 15 5 14 9 160
518 50 4 53 3 15 4 14 9 159
513 498 527 15 4 14 8 158
806 786 82 5 23 3 218 246
804 78 4 82 3 231 216 24 5
801 781 82 2 230 21 4 24 4
800 779 820 228 21 2 24 2 T

Annex 98
OECD Insights, Debate the Issues, Statistical Insights: What does GDP per capita tell us about
households’ material well-being? (6 Oct. 2016)

Annex 98
OECD INSIGHTS
Debate the issues
Statistical Insights: What does GDP per capita tell us
about households' material well-being?
6 OCTOBER2 016
by Guest author
OECD Statistics Directorate
Although GDP per capita is often used as a broad measure of average living
standards, high levels of GDP per capita do not necessarily mean high levels of
household disposable income, a key measure of average material well-being of
people. For example, in 2014 Norway had the highest GDP per capita in the OECD
(162% of the OECD average[1] ), but only 115% of the OECD average for household
disposable income [2]. And in Ireland, GDP per capita was 24% above the OECD
average, while household disposable income per capita was 22% bclIDYth:e OECD
average. Conversely, in the United States GDP per capita was 34% above the OECD average while
household disposable income was 46% above the OECD average. These differences between GDP per
capita and household disposable income per capita reflect two important factors. First, not all
income generated by production (GDP) necessarily remains in the country; some of it may be
appropriated by non-residents, for example by foreign-owned firms repatriating profits to their
parents. Secondly, some parts may be retained by corporations and government and not accrue to
households.
International rankings of household disposable income per capita and GDP per capita can differ
significantly
GDP per capita, by design an indicator of the total income generated by economic activity in a
country, is often used as a measure of people's material well-being. However, not all of this income
necessarily ends up in the purse of households. Some may be appropriated by government to build
up sovereign wealth funds or to pay off debts, some may be appropriated by firms to build up
balance sheets, and yet some may be appropriated by parent companies abroad repatriating profits
from their affiliates. At the same time, households can also receive income from abroad for example
from dividends and interest receipts through investments abroad .
As such, a preferred measure of people's material well-being is household disposable income per
capita, which represents the maximum amount a household can consume without having to reduce
its assets or to increase its liabilities.
The above-mentioned factors can create significant differences between measures of household
disposable income per capita and GDP per capita . The United States for example see its position
relative to the OECD average jump by more than 10 percentage points (46% above the OECDAnnex
99
Tim Callen, International Monetary Fund, Gross Domestic product: An Economy’s All (29 July
2017)

Annex 99
1/26/2018 Gross Domestic Product (GDP): An Economy's All - Back to Basics: GDP Definition
=m rnternational
\\; j Moneta ry Fund
Gross Domestic Product: An Economy's All
FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT
Tim Callen
When it is growing, especially if inflation is not a problem, workers and businesses are generally
better off than when it is not
Many professions commonly use abbreviations. To doctors,
accountants, and baseball players, the letters MRI
(magnetic resonance imaging), GAAP (generally accepted
accounting principles), and ERA (earned run average),
respectively, need no explanation. To someone unfamiliar
with these fields, however, without an explanation these
initialisms are a stumbling block to a better understanding
of the subject at hand.
Economics is no different. Economists use many
abbreviations. One of the most common is GDP, which
stands for gross domestic product. It is often cited in
Stack them up (photo: Monty
Rakusen/Corbis)
newspapers, on the television news, and In reports by governments, central banks, and the
business community. It has become widely used as a reference point for the health of national
and global economies. When GDP is growing, especially if inflation is not a problem, workers and
businesses are generally better off than when it is not.
Measuring GDP
GDP measures the monetary value of final goods and services-that is, those that are bought by
the final user-produced in a country in a given period of time (say a quarter or a year ). It counts
all of the output generated within the borders of a country. GDP is composed of goods and
services produced for sale In the market and also Includes some non market production , such as
defense or education services provided by the government. An alternative concept, gross national
product, or GNP, counts all the output of the residents of a country. So If a German-owned
company has a factory in the United States, the output of this factory would be includ ed in U.S.
GDP, but in German GNP.
Not all productive activity is included in GDP. For example, unpaid work (such as that performed
in the home or by volunteers) and black-market activities are not included because they are
difficult to measure and value accurately. That means, for example, that a baker who produces a
loaf of bread for a customer would contribute to GDP, but would not contribute to GDP if he baked
the same loaf for his family (although the ingredients he purchased would be counted).
Moreover, "gross" domestic product takes no account of the "wear and tear" on the machinery,
buildings, and so on (the so-called capital stock) that are used In producing the output . If this
depletion of the capital stock, called depreciation, is subtracted from GDP we get net domestic
product.
Theoreti cally, GDP can be viewed in three diff erent ways:
• The production approach sums the "value -added" at each stage of production, where value added
is defined as total sales less the value of intermediate inputs into the production process.
For example, flour would be an intermediate input and bread the final product; or an architect's
services would be an intermediate input and the building the final product.
• The expenditure approach adds up the value of purchases made by final users-for example,
the consumption of food, televisions, and medical services by households; the investm ents in
machinery by companies; and the purchases of goods and services by the government and
foreigners.
• The income approach sums the incomes generated by production - for example, the
compensation employees receive and the operating surplus of companies (roughly sales less
costs).
GDP in a country is usually calculated by the national statistical agency, which compiles the
information from a large number of sources. In making the calculations, however, most countries
follow established international standards. The international standard for measuring GDP is
contained In the System of National Accounts, 1993, comp iled by the International Monetary
Fund, the European Commission, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
the United Nations, and the World Bank.
Real GDP
One thing people want to know about an economy is whether its total output of goods and
services is growing or shrinking . But because GDP is collected at current, or nominal, pr ices, one
cannot compare two periods without making adjustments for inflation . To determine "rea l" GDP,
its nomlnal value must be adjusted to take Into account price changes to allow us to see whether
the value of output has gone up because more is being produced or simply because prices have
increased. A statistical tool called the price deflater is used to adjust GDP from nominal to
constant prices.
GDP is important because it gives information about the size of th e economy and how an
economy is performing. The growth rate of real GDP is often used as an indicator of the general
health of the economy. In broad terms, an increase in rea l GDP is interpreted as a sign that the
http://www.imf.o rg/external/pubs/fl/f andd/basics/gdp.htm 1/2
Annex 99
1/26/2018 Gross Domestic Product (GDP): An Economy's All - Back to Basics: GDP Definition
economy is doing well. When real GDP is growing strongly, employment is likely to be increasing
as companies hire more workers for their factories and people have more money in their pockets.
When GDP is shrinking, as it did in many countries during the recent global economic cris is,
employment often declines. In some cases, GDP may be growing, but not fast enough to create a
sufficient number of jobs for those seeking them. But real GDP growth does move in cycles over
time. Economies are sometimes in periods of boom, and sometimes in periods of slow growth or
even recession (with the latter often defined as two consecutive quarters during which output
declines). In the United States, for example, there were six recessions of varying length and
severity between 1950 and 2011. The National Bureau of Economic Research makes the call on
the dates of U.S. business cycles.
Comparing GDPs of two countries
GDP is measured in the currency of the country in question. That requires adjustment when
trying to compare the value of output in two countries using different currencies. The usual
method is to convert the value of GDP of each country into U.S. dollars and then compa re them.
Conversion to dollars can be done either using market exchange rates-those that prevail in the
foreign exchange market-or purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. The PPP exchange
rate is the rate at which the currency of one country would have to be converted into that of
another to purchase the same amount of goods and services in each country. There is a large gap
between market and PPP-based exchange rates in emerging market and developing countries.
For most emerging market and developing countries, the ratio of the market and PPP U.S. dollar
exchange rates is between 2 and 4. This is because nontraded goods and services tend to be
cheaper in low-income than in high-income countries-for example, a haircut in New York is more
expensive than in Bishkek-even when the cost of making tradable goods, such as machinery,
across two countries is the same. For advanced economies, market and PPP exchange rates tend
to be much closer. These differences mean that emerging market and developing count ries have
a higher estimated dollar GDP when the PPP exchange rate is used.
The IMF publishes an array of GDP data on its website (www.imf.org ). International inst itutions
such as the IMF also calculate global and regional real GDP growth. These give an idea of how
quickly or slowly the world economy or the economies in a particular region of the world are
growing. The aggregates are constructed as weighted averages of the GDP in individua l
countries, with weights reflecting each country's share of GDP in the group (with PPP exchange
rates used to determine the appropriate weights).
What GDP does not reveal
It is also Important to understand what GDP cannot tell us. GDP is not a measure of the overall
standard of living or well-being of a country. Although changes in the output of goods and
services per person (GDP per capita) are often used as a measure of whether the average citizen
in a country is better or worse off, it does not capture things that may be deemed important to
general well-being. So, for example, increased output may come at the cost of environmental
damage or other external costs such as noise. Or it might involve the reduction of leisure time or
the depletion of non renewable natural resources. The quality of life may also depend on the
distribution of GDP among the residents of a country, not just the overall level. To try to account
for such factors, the United Nations computes a Human Development Index, which ranks
countries not only based on GDP per capita, but on other factors, such as life expectancy ,
literacy, and school enrollment. Other attempts have been made to account far some of the
shortcomings of GDP, such as the Genuine Progress Indicator and the Gross National Happiness
Index, but these too have their critics.
Tim Callen is an Assistant Director in the IM F's Externa l Relations Department.
Updated : July 29, 2017
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/fl/fandd/basics/gdp.htm 2/2
Annex 100
Laurent Oussou, M.O.N.U.S.C.O., La Force de la MONUSCO Invite les Communautés en Ituri
à Dialoguer pour la Paix (11 Aug. 2017)

Published on MONUSCO (https://monusco.unmissions.org)
Accueil > La Force de la Monusco invite les communautés en Ituri à dialoguer pour la paix
La Force de la Monusco invite les communautés en Ituri
à dialoguer pour la paix [1]
11 aoû 2017
La Force de la Monusco invite les
communautés en Ituri à dialoguer pour la
paix
Bunia, le 11 août 2017 – Le commandant adjoint de la Force de la Monusco, le général
Major Bernard Commins, invite les communautés de la province de l’Ituri à dialoguer pour
la paix.
«Il faut que le dialogue existe et qu’il ne s’arrête jamais. Il faut que les uns et les autres
aient le courage, parfois la volonté de pouvoir se parler, de pouvoir prendre le temps de
s’écouter, de vouloir prendre le temps d’écouter quelles sont les différences, quelles sont
les difficultés que les uns et les autres perçoivent. Que les uns et les autres aient la
volonté d’identifier ensemble quels sont les voies et les moyens à utiliser pour arriver à
résoudre ensemble les difficultés», a affirmé le numéro 2 de la force onusienne, en visite
de travail du 8 au 10 août 2017 dans cette province de l’est de la RDC.
La mission de Bernard Commins en Ituri consistait à dire aux acteurs locaux ce que la
Force de la Monusco fait et continuera à faire dans cette province.
«Notamment, aider les populations, les protéger et aussi essayer de voir comment nous
pouvons mieux développer ces mécanismes qui existent déjà, à savoir, les mécanismes
d’alerte rapide, de dialogue qui vont aider à créer plus de stabilité et aussi de voir avec
les acteurs sur le terrain comment nous pouvons aider, mais surtout déterminer le niveau
d’implication de ses acteurs», a-t-il souligné.
Ainsi, Commins a rencontré tour à tour le Gouverneur de la province, le commandement
des FARDC, ses collègues de la Monusco, les chefs des congrégations religieuses et les
délégués de la société civile.
La question majeure soulevée au cours de ces rencontres est l’insécurité causée par le
groupe armé Force de résistance patriotique de l’Ituri (FRPI) dans le sud du territoire
d’Irumu et la recrudescence des groupes armés en général.
La Force de la Monusco invite les communautés en Ituri à dialoguer pour la paix Page 1 of 2
https://monusco.unmissions.org/print/la-force-de-la-monusco-invite-les-…... 1/22/2018
Annex 100
Face aux différentes interrogations sur la stratégie de la Monusco en soutien aux FARDC
pour mettre fin à ces phénomènes récurrents, le générale major Commins a rappelé le
mandat de protection des civils de la Monusco dans le contexte de la revue stratégique de
cette mission qui fait qu’elle intervient selon les moyens que lui accorde le conseil de
sécurité de l’ONU.
Sur la question de la FRPI Commins soutient «qu’il n’y a pas d’avenir dans la violence.
Ce n’est pas avec la violence qu’on construit un pays et qu’on aide une communauté à se
développer. Ce n’est pas à travers la violence que des jeunes filles et des jeunes garçons
iront à l’école pour s’éduquer et s’instruire pour construire ce pays, leur communauté, leur
ville, leur village, leur province. C’est plutôt en apportant chacun un peu de paix.»
Laurent Sam Oussou
Source URL: https://monusco.unmissions.org/la-force-de-la-monusco-invite-les-commun…-%
C3%A0-dialoguer-pour-la-paix
Liens
[1] https://monusco.unmissions.org/la-force-de-la-monusco-invite-les-commun…%
A0-dialoguer-pour-la-paix
[2] https://monusco.unmissions.org/la-une
[3] https://monusco.unmissions.org/le-bcnudh-beni-sensibilise-la-soci%C3%A9…-
sexuelles-surtout-en-temps-de-conflit
[4] https://monusco.unmissions.org/la-monusco-exp%C3%A9rimente-un-nouveau-d…-
kivu-apr%C3%A8s-la-fermeture-de-ses-bases
La Force de la Monusco invite les communautés en Ituri à dialoguer pour la paix Page 2 of 2
https://monusco.unmissions.org/print/la-force-de-la-monusco-invite-les-…... 1/22/2018
Annex 100
Annex 101
BBC, The Story of Africa, Independence, Case Study: Congo

Annex 101
1/18/2018 The Story of Africa I BBC World Service
[1)11]1!1H OMEPA GE I BBC NEWS I BBC SPORT
B I it I Cl 'i'-tl;lr-1 I"' ; =l!:~'11:'.P
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HOME
LIVING HISTORY
EARLY HISTORY
NILE VALLEY
WEST AFRICAN
KINGDOMS
THE SWAHILI
TRADITIONAL
RELIGIONS
!SLAM
CHRISTIANITY
SLAVERY
CENTRAL AFRICAN
KINGDOMS
AFRICA & EUROPE
(1800-1914)
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(1914-1945)
INDEPENDENCE
PROGRAMMES
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FORUM/
FEEDBACK
Case Study: Congo
DR CONGO
(FORMERLY ZAIRE, BEFORE THAT,
BELGIAN CONGO)
Independence for Congo followed a strange
course of events unlike anything else in the rest
of Africa. The Belgian Congo was huge and
underdeveloped. After the war, new cultural
organisations like ABAKO, Association des
Bakongo and the Lulua-Freres, emerged in the
1950'5.
But it was the attitude of the Belgians which bred a new
political consciousness in the 1950's. In the first place, the
Belgians like the Portuguese, were resolutely untouched by the
drive towards indep endence in th e early 1950's. Decolonisat
ion was first discussed in 1956 , but seen as
something that would happen thirty years into the future.
On the eve of independence, the Congo, a territory larger than
Western Europe, bordering on nine other African
colonies/states, was seriously underdeveloped. There were no
African army officers, only three African managers in the
entire civil service , and only 30 university graduates . Yet
Western investments in Congo's mineral resources (copper,
gold, tin, cobalt, diamond s, mangan ese, zinc) were colossal.
And these investments meant that the West was determined to
keep control over the country beyond independence.
HANDOVER
Following widespread rioting in 1959, the Belgians to the
surprise of all the nationalist leaders said elections for
independence could go ahead in May 1960. This in itself
caused confusion and a rush to form parties. In the event 120
different parties took part, most of them regionally based.
Only one, Mouvement National Congolais or the MNC, led by
Pat rice Lumumba , favoured a centralised governmen t and had
support in four of six provinces.
The actual independence day was a mixture of huge
excitement and bad temper on the part of the former colonial
power. King Baudouin of Belgian made a patronising speech;
and Patrice Lumumba's speech was spirit ed.
'4• ll Listen to Patrice Lumumba's announcing Belgian Congo's
independence follow ed by an Ind ependence cha-cha- cha
Within days things fell apart. The army mutinied against
Belgian officers . The main mining area, Katanga, declared
itself a separate state under Moise Tshombe, but with strategic
support and encouragement from Belgian mining interests.
Belgian troops then intervened unasked ; Lumumba invited UN
peacekeeping forces to help but they steered clear of fighting
Tshombe's Katanga regime.
http://www.bcb.co.u k/worldservcie/africa/features/storyofafrci a/14chapter7. shtml
Towards
Independence
French &
British
Colonial
Styles
From Gold
Coast To
Ghana
The Nation
State
Case Study:
Guinea
Conakry
Case Study:
Algeria
Case Study:
Congo
Case Study:
Kenya
Education
Post
Independence
One Party
States
Forces For
Change
Tlmellne
Further
Reading
Useful Links
1/2
Annex 101
1/18/2018
©111111
The Story of Africa! BBC World Service
DEATH OF LUMUMBA
Americans followed events closely. Lumumba's great
speechmaking skills and his contacts with the Soviet Union all
conspired to turn the Americans against him. He was described
by Alan Dulles, chief of American Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), as a "mad dog" and President Dwight Eisenhower
authorised his assassination. This was carried out through
Lumumba's opponents in the Congo. In November 1960 he
was kidnapped and taken to Katanga. In January 1961 he was
shot in Elizabethville; his body was then dumped by a CIA
agent. Tshombe eventually became Prime Minister, but not for
long.
In 1965 Joseph Mobutu seized power with American backing in
a bloodless coup. He had waited in the shadows for his
opportunity since the late 1950's, all the while cultivating his
pro-West image for the Americans. Once in power he began a
32-year reign of greed and corruption, indulged by America
and the West in return for a solidly anti-Soviet pro-western
stance.
http://www.bbc.cou. k/worldservice/africa/features/storyofafrica/14chapte.srh7t ml 2/2
Annex 102
Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Research, Definitions: Battle Related Deaths

Definitions - Department of Peace and Conflict Research - Uppsala University, Sweden
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/[1/24/2018 3:39:33 PM]
Arms
(state-based, non-state, one-sided)
Any material means, e.g. manufactured weapons but also sticks, stones, fire, water, etc.
Comment
‘Arms’ includes anything material, i.e. other than corporal strength and/or psychological
power. Nuclear weapons, biological weapons as well as chemical weapons are included
as bombs or other explosives regardless of how they have been constructed. The use of
airplanes on 11 September also qualifies as use of armed force.
Battle-related deaths
(state-based, non-state)
Counted as battle-related deaths is the use of armed force between warring parties in a
conflict dyad, be it state-based or non-state, resulting in deaths.
Comment
Typically, battle-related deaths occur in what can be described as "normal" warfare
involving the armed forces of the warring parties. This includes traditional battlefield
fighting, guerrilla activities (e.g. hit-and-run attacks / ambushes) and all kinds of
bombardments of military units, cities and villages etc. The targets are usually the
military itself and its installations, or state institutions and state representatives, but
there is often substantial collateral damage in the form of civilians killed in crossfire,
indiscriminate bombings etc. All deaths - military as well as civilian - incurred in such
situations, are counted as battle-related deaths.
The general rule for counting battle-related deaths is moderation. All battle-related
deaths are based on each coder's analysis of the particular conflict. Each battle-related
death has to be verified in one way or another. All figures are disaggregated as much as
possible. All figures that are not trustworthy are disregarded as much as possible in the
coding process. Sometimes there are situations when there is lack of information on
disaggregated battle-related deaths. When this occurs, the coder may rely on sources
that provide already calculated figures either for some particular incidents, or for total
number of deaths in the conflict. The UCDP incorporates such death figures for
Annex 102
Definitions - Department of Peace and Conflict Research - Uppsala University, Sweden
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/[1/24/2018 3:39:33 PM]
particular incidents and for an entire armed conflict if they are coherent with the
definition. If they are not, or if there is no independent verification of the figure, it cannot
be accepted.
Best estimate, of deaths
(state-based, non-state, one-sided, actors, dyads)
The best estimate consists of the aggregated most reliable number of deaths.
Comment
If different reports provide different estimates, an examination is made as to what source
is most reliable.
Ceasefire agreements
(state-based)
A ceasefire agreement is an agreement that regulates the conflict behaviour of warring
parties in a state-based conflict, but which does not address the incompatibility.
Comment
A so-called ceasefire agreement that de facto addresses the incompatibility is
considered to be a peace agreement in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (UCDP
database).
Conflict, armed
(state-based)
An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.
Comment
“Armed conflict” is also referred to as “state-based conflict”, as opposed to “non-state
Annex 102
Annex 103
FocusEconomics, What is GDP per capita?

What is GDP per capita?
https://www.focus-economics.com/economic-indicator/gdp-per-capita[1/24/… 7:06:49 PM]
Home > Indicators > What is GDP per capita?
What is GDP per capita?
GDP per capita stands for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (per
person). It is derived from a straightforward division of total GDP (see
definition of GDP) by the population. Per capita GDP is typically expressed in
local current currency, local constant currency or a standard unit of currency in
international markets, such as the U.S. dollar (USD).
GDP per capita is an important indicator of economic performance and a useful
unit to make cross-county comparisons of average living standards and
economic wellbeing. However, GDP per capita is not a measure of personal
income and using it for cross-country comparisons also has some known
weaknesses. In particular, GDP per capita does not take into account income
distribution in a country. In addition, cross-country comparisons based on the
U.S. dollar can be distorted by exchange rate fluctuations and often don’t
reflect the purchasing power in the countries being compared.
The table below shows the GDP per capita in current U.S. dollars (USD) by
country for the last five years.
GDP per capita
Economic News
Philippines: Growth remains
buoyant in Q4
January 24, 2018
The economy recorded another period
of robust, albeit moderating, growth in
the last quarter of 2017, supported by
strong private and government
consumption, as well as strengthening
external demand.
Read more
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all cylinders in Q4
January 18, 2018
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Annex 103

Annex 104
Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Research, About UCDP

Annex 104
UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET
About UCDP
Program Direct.or
Kristine Eck, Senior lecturer
Phone: +46 18 471 2350
Kristine.Ec [email protected]
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is the world 's main provid er of data on organized violence and the oldest ongoing data
collection project for civil war, with a history of almost 40 years. Its definiti on of armed conflict has become the global standard of how
conflicts are system atically defined and studi ed. UCDP produces high-qu ality data, which are systematical ly collected, have global
coverage 1 are comparable across cases and countries, and have long time series which are updated annually. Furthermore, the program is
a unique source of information for practitioners and policymakers .
UCDP also operates and continu ously update s its online database (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedi a) on armed conructs and organised
vio lence, in which information on seve ral aspects of armed conflict such as conflict dynamics and conflict resolution is available. This
interactive database offers a web -based system for visualizing, handling and downloading data, includin g ready-made datasets on
organized violence and peacemaking, all free of charge.
Data on armed conflicts have been published yearly in the Journal of Peace Research since 1993, in th e Human Security Reports since
2005, in the SIPRI Yearbook since 1988, and in the report series States in Armed Conflict (1987-2012) . In addition, UCDP research ers
regularly publish research on organized violen ce, its causes, escalation, spre ad, prevention and resolution , in top scientific journals and
books.
For questio ns regarding UCD P and our data please contact us by e-mail: [email protected] .se
Upp sala University uses cookies to make your website expe rience as good as possible. Read more about cookies. OK
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Annex 105
Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Research, One-sided Violence

Definitions - Department of Peace and Conflict Research - Uppsala University, Sweden
http://pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/[1/26/2018 5:34:27 PM]
The use of armed force between two organised armed groups, neither of which is the
government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year.
One-sided violence
(one-sided)
The use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group
against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.
Comment
Extrajudicial killings in government facilities are excluded.
Opposition organisation
(state-based)
Any non-governmental formally organised group of people having announced a name for
their group and using armed force to influence the outcome of the stated
incompatibility.
Comment
The UCDP only deals with organised opposition. The focus is on armed conflict
involving consciously conducted and planned political campaigns rather than
spontaneous violence. Organisations of this kind are, in a sense, state-like entities and
usually pose a very different threat to those in power than unorganised opposition. In the
case of several levels of organisation, such as that of individual organisations that also
operate in alliance as part of an umbrella organisation, the simple rule is to look for
which organisation “calls the shots”. If the umbrella organisation is only an organisation
in the nominal sense, and the individual organisations take their own political decisions
and conduct military action on their own, the individual organisations are treated as the
warring parties. If the umbrella organisation commands the individual organisations,
then it is the relevant unit.
Other, concerning termination of the use of armed force
Annex 105

Annex 106
Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Research, FAQ, How Are UCDP Data Collected?

FAQ - Department of Peace and Conflict Research - Uppsala University, Sweden
http://pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/faq/[1/26/2018 12:36:37 PM]
Cameroon (government)
Cameroon (territory: Islamic State)
Congo (government)
Eritrea – Ethiopia (territory)
Ethiopia (territory: Ogaden)
Ethiopia (territory: Oromiya)
Kenya (Northeastern Province and Coast)
Libya (territory: Islamic State)
Mali (government)
Mozambique (government)
Niger (territory: Islamic State)
Nigeria (government)
Nigeria (territory: Islamic State)
Rwanda (government)
Somalia (government)
South Sudan (government)
Sudan (government)
Uganda (government)
Americas
Colombia (government)
USA (government)
See the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (UCDP database) for more information on all of
these conflicts.
How are UCDP data collected?
UCDP datasets on organized violence are updated and published on the website at least
once a year, usually in June or July. If you wish to receive an e-mail that informs you of
one updates are released, please join our mailing list.
Data collection is carried out in four stages:
1. The first stage of data collection is carried out by keying in a specific string of search
words related to organized violence into the online Factiva Global News Database.
Factiva carries over 30 000 different newswires, newspapers and other sources and has
global coverage. For each country around the globe a specified set of sources is
Annex 106
FAQ - Department of Peace and Conflict Research - Uppsala University, Sweden
http://pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/faq/[1/26/2018 12:36:37 PM]
selected to provide the best coverage of news events possible. These sources always
include at least one of the major newswires (Reuters, AFP, Xinhua, EFE) and BBC
Monitoring; the latter source picking up local newspapers, and television and radio
broadcasts. This exercise produces a number of news articles (commonly between 50
000 and 80 000) that are then downloaded by human coders and manually sorted. The
information gathered is then coded according to the UCDP’s criteria for the different
types of organized violence, taking heed to possible biases in reporting and any other
aspects that may affect the reliability of the sources.
2. In the second stage the coders turn to other types of material available. This stage
includes reading through newly published books and case studies, journals such as the
Africa Research Bulletin and Africa Confidential, NGO publications (Human Rights
Watch, Amnesty etc.) as well as available online databases within the sphere of
organized violence. This information is then manually coded in the same way as in
stage one, with for example estimates of deaths and considerations regarding
incompatibilities being updated according to the new input.
3. If something still remains unclear in regard to which actors are fighting, the number of
deaths, or if any other unclear factors are present, the UCDP makes use of its extensive
network of regional experts. These are contacted with queries regarding any unclear
matters and asked to weigh in with their expertise regarding specific groups, countries,
regions, or any other aspect.
4. Lastly, the data that has been collected is scrutinized and checked by the UCDP’s
project managers and the program’s directors, who have the final say in what data will
enter the database and the datasets.
How does terrorism fit into the UCDP’s categories of organized
violence?
The UCDP does not make use of the term ‘terrorism’ to classify any type of violence.
Each act of organized violence (meaning that it is carried out by a group that is
organized according to certain criteria) is instead viewed through the lens of targets; are
the targets other states, representatives of other organized groups or civilians?
In terms of the targeting of civilians the UCDP’s category of ‘one-sided violence’ often
overlaps with definitions of terrorism with a lethal outcome. Any actor directly targeting
and killing civilians are perpetrating one-sided violence. This also includes governments
Annex 106
Annex 107
World Wildlife Fund, African elephants

African elephants | WWF
http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/endangered_species/elephants/african_el… 10:44:21 AM]
What We Do
Priority Species
Elephants
Asian elephants
African elephants
Elephants continue to roam across much of Africa, but
these magnificent animals remain under severe threat
from poaching, habitat loss, and human-wildlife conflict.
SUBSCRIBE TO WWF
Physical description
African elephants are the world's largest land animals. The biggest can be
up to 7.5m long, 3.3m high at the shoulder, and 6 tonnes in weight.
The trunk is an extension of the upper lip and nose and is used for
communication and handling objects, including food. African elephants
have two opposing extensions at the end of their trunks, in contrast to
the Asian elephant, which only has one.
Tusks, which are large modified incisors that grow throughout an
CONTENTS
Two subspecies
Social structure
Population & distribution
Threats
What WWF is doing
What you can do
Threats
Our solutions
Donate to African elephants
African elephants
Annex 107
African elephants | WWF
http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/endangered_species/elephants/african_el… 10:44:21 AM]
elephant's lifetime, occur in both males and females and are used in fights
and for marking, feeding, and digging.
The other notable feature of African elephants is their very large ears,
which allow them to radiate excess heat.
Two subspecies, two homes
There are two subspecies – the larger savannah elephant (Loxodonta
africana africana), which roams grassy plains and woodlands, and the
smaller forest elephant (Loxodonta africana cyclotis), which lives in the
equatorial forests of central and western Africa.
Savannah elephants are larger than forest elephants, and their tusks
curve outwards. In addition to being smaller, forest elephants are darker
and their tusks are straighter and downward pointing.
Social structure
The complex social structure of elephants is organized around a system
of herds composed of related females and their calves. Males usually live
alone but sometimes form small groups with other males.
In the savannah subspecies, each family unit usually contains about 10
individuals, although several family units may join together to form a 'clan'
consisting of up to 70 members led by a female. Forest elephants live in
smaller family units.
Life cycle
Usually, a single calf is born after a gestation period of 22 months. Young
elephants wean after 6 to 18 months, although they may continue nursing
for over 6 years.
Male elephants leave their natal group at puberty and tend to form much
more fluid alliances with other males.
Elephants live up to around 70 years, with females mostly fertile between
25 and 45. Males need to reach 20 years of age in order to successfully
compete for mating.
African elephants mainly eat leaves and branches of bushes and trees,
engine oil to help people and
elephants in Africa!
DID YOU KNOW?
African elephants care for
wounded individuals and are
unique in that they identify and
look after elephant bones.
African elephants are the world's
largest terrestrial animals.
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Annex 107
Annex 108
International Tropical Timber Organization, Biennial Review Statistics

1/29/2018 The Annual Review statistical database | The International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO)
http://www.itto.int/annual_review_output/?mode=searchdata 1/1
Countries Groupings Products Flows
Exports Quantity
Imports Quantity
Production Quantity
Exports Value
Imports Value
Imports Unit Value
Export Unit Value
Years
Biennial Review Statistics
(Updated 2017/06/01)
ITTO reports the production and the trade of primary wood products. Historical data can found from 1990. Our data is
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the UNECE Timber Section. The data is also published and analyzed along with coverage of trade flows, species trade,
price trends, secondary processed wood products (SPWP) and other trends in the tropical timber sector in the Biennial
Review and Assessment of the World Timber Situation.
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Please select Products (C = coniferous, NC = non-coniferou s, NC.T. = non-coniferous tropical), Flows and Years.
Please click the button "show superscripts" to display the definition of the superscript.
Country Product Flow Unit Year Value superscript
Congo, Dem.
Rep.
Sawnwood
(NC.T.)
Export Unit
Value $/m3 2002 367.00
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Veneer (C)
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Annex 108
Annex 109
Professor Sir Paul Collier and Dr Anke Hoeffler, Oxford University, Assessment of the Impact of
the Ugandan Military Involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (20 Oct. 2017)

Annex 109
Assessment of the Impact of the Ugandan Military Involvement
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Professor Sir Paul Collier and Dr Anke Hoeffler
Oxford University
20th October, 2017
1
Annex 109
1. Introduction
In this document we provide a response to the "Assessment of Macroeconomic
Damages" by Lebun and Lubu (2016). Citing our work as the foundation for their
approach, they conclude that the Ugandan army's aggression caused
macroeconomic damages to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) of
$12.7bn.
We find that their study is a misguided use of our approach, that the concept on
which the authors base their estimation is flawed, and that their technical analysis
is incorrect. Consequently, in our view their results and conclusions should be
disregarded.
This document is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a periodization of the
economy of the DRC, meaning a description of the period DRC history relevant for
an economic analysis. In Section 3 we provide a discussion of the concept of war
losses and whether counterfactual analysis can be used to assess these losses. In
Section 4 we consider the statistical analysis in Lebun and Lubu (2016) and show
that their analysis falls short of the standards of the literature. Section 5 provides
a brief conclusion and assessment of what the court can reliably conclude about
these tragic events.
2. Periodization of Economic History of DRC
The Economy under President Mobutu
The economy of the DRC has always been heavily dependent upon natural
resource extraction. This makes it highly exposed to two influences: global
commodity prices, and the quality of governance. The growth and decline of the
economy over the post-1965 period is a complex interaction of these two
variables. Commodity prices - and associated discoveries - changed considerably,
and the quality of governance changed more modestly.
In 1965 Joseph Mobutu, supported by Belgium and the USA, staged a coup d'etat
and came to power in the DRC. This marked the beginning of deterioration in the
quality of governance of catastrophic proportions. Throughout his governance,
corruption was endemic and Mobutu and his associates embezzled vast sums of
government funds. In 1965, national income per capita was $972 ( aggregate GDP
of per capita income times population being $16.9 bn). By the time he was ousted
in 1997, it had shrunk by nearly two-thirds to only $333 (aggregate GDP being
$14.8 bn)1. The extent of economic mismanagement was so enormous that the
1 Source: World Development Indicators. All figures in 2010 constant USD.
2
Annex 109
DRC became onei!o' f the poorest societies: in 1997, it was the eighth poorest
country in the world. However, throughout Mobutu's autocratic leadership, any
opposition was brutally suppressed and the country was relatively stable.
Mobutu's time in office was not only marked by catastrophic economic decline,
but also by gross human rights violations.
The Overthrow of President Mobutu and the Descent into Violent Conflict
In 1997, a coalition of Zairians, Ugandans and Rwandans (the Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL)) swept from the East to the
West of the country. While it could not have been predicted, there was relatively
little resistance from the DRC army and there were few battle fatalities; the capital
Kinshasa fell without a fight. The AFDL leader, Laurent-Desire Kabila, declared
himself president after marching into Kinshasa and Mobutu fled. In August 1998,
President Kabila asked the foreign forces to withdraw, but they allied themselves
with local non-state groups in the East of the country and continued to fight the
DRC army. Angolan, Zimbabwean and Namibian militaries entered the hostilities
on the side of the new government. The Ugandan government agreed to withdraw
its forces in 2001, the process being completed by 2003.
This new wave of armed conflict caused human suffering on a large scale.
Meanwhile, the economy continued to decline. By 2001, per capita income had
fallen to only $257 (aggregate GDP being only $12.7bn).
In 2001, the political situation further deteriorated: Laurent-Desire Kabila was
assassinated by a member of his own entourage and hastily replaced by his young
son, Joseph Kabila.
The Recovery: 2001-2015
In response to the political deterioration, UN peacekeepers were deployed.
Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC rebels agreed to a UN pull-out plan; Uganda and
Rwanda began pulling troops back from the frontline. In May 2003, the last
Ugandan troops left the eastern DRC.2 While peace was gradually restored, albeit
with significant interruptions around disputed elections and postponed elections,
the quality of economic governance remained poor. For example, in the 2017
Resource Governance Index, DRC is ranked 75th out of 89 countries.
Coincident with the gradual withdrawal of external forces, the global commodity
prices on which DRC has long been heavily dependent began to rise and continued
to do so until 2013 in a historically unprecedented boom that became known as
2 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13286306, accessed 25 June 2017
3
Annex 109
the 'super-cycle'. This switch from declining ,prices to strongly rising prices will
have shaped the course of GDP to a substantial extent.
From 2001, the economy began to recover from its nadir of $257 per capita. By
2015 (the end point for our data), per capita income had risen to $385, (aggregate
GDP being $29.7bn), surpassing its level at the end of the Mobutu regime of $333.
3. Assessment Derived from a Counterfactual
Quantifying the costs of complex actions like interventions in civil wars are very
difficult. The most reliable recent expert on this process is Smith (2014), who
considers the methodological issues in the quantification of the costs of armed
conflict. He states:
"The cost of a war reflects the difference between the observed wartime outcomes
and a hypothetical no-war counter/actual. Thus the cost estimate is very dependent
on the specification of the counter/actual. While the construction of a counter/actual
is essential, some care should be put into justifying its plausibility."
We agree with Smith (2014) that in any assessment of military action the most
critical step is the correct specification of the counter/actual.
A counterfactual can be constructed in a number of different ways. Popular
methods include the use of large-n data ( e.g. Collier 1999; Collier and Hoeffler
2004) where data from across countries and across time are used in regression
analysis to establish an average growth path. The economies at war contract
during wartime while the peace economies continue along the average growth
trajectory. The cost of the war is measured by the distance between the income
stream in the war economy vis-a-vis the average. This average does not exist in
reality and is thus a constructed economy that serves as a counterfactual.
Another popular method is the use of time-series data for one country. This is the
method used by Lebun and Lubu (2016). When using this method, one needs to
establish pre-conflict trends or relationships to provide a credible counterfactual.
While the actual course of the economy can be observed from descriptive statistics
(subject to measurement error), the counterfactual traces a hypothetical
evolution of the economy had the intervention being evaluated not occurred.
By their nature, counterfactuals are not observed events, but conjectures that can
only be judged by their inherent plausibility. The assessment .of the economic
consequences of an earlier date for the withdrawal of the Ugandan military
4
Annex 109
presen C'c is hence the difference between the actual course of events, as observed,
and this conjecture as to how that course would have unfolded had this
unobservable counterfactual occurred.
To postulate a plausible counterfactual course of events, it is essential to be able
to estimate the contribution of each different component of the growth process,
so that the consequences of the hypothesized change in one feature (the date of
Ugandan military withdrawal) can be correctly measured. This is a difficult
undertaking which unfortunately Lebun and Lubu (2016) have not succeeded in
doing.
Lebun and Lubu (2016) use time series regression analysis to try to establish by
how much the armed conflict during the period 1998-2003 reduced GDP in the
DRC. The regression analysis generates a counterfactual, i.e. what would economic
growth and output have been in the absence of armed conflict. They then take the
difference between this hypothetical constructed path of the economy and what
actually happened and sum the differences.
Their analysis is deeply flawed. We detail some of the technical flaws in the
following section, but the overall flaw is more fundamental. Specifically, they
calculate the losses by using a counterfactual of positive GDP growth from 1998
onwards (Le bun and Lubu, Graph 2, p 20) . Given thatthe economy of DRC had been
in almost continual decline for the 30 years prior to 1998, no times series
methodology could plausibly generate such a counterfactual. Indeed, the most
plausible path based on any such time series would have been a forecast of further
decline, which is indeed what actually happened for the following three years.
Beginning in 2001, the economy started to recover. Lebun and Lubu (2016:18)
acknowledge this turnaround but leave it unexplained. The most plausible
explanation for this turnaround is the onset of the global commodity boom, or
commodity super cycle, which Lebun and Lubu fail to take properly into account.
For example, the initial upturn in GDP in 2001 is most plausibly explained by the
short, sharp, coltan boom of 2000/2001 which pumped income into the DRC
economy. More importantly, there was an unprecedented rise in global non-fuel
commodity prices from their trough in mid-2001 to their peak in 2011. To indicate
the scale of this change, the IMF index of non-fuel primary commodity prices
tripled between mid-2001 and 2011.
In order to illustrate the implications of both the 30+ year prior decline in the
economy, and the post-2001 commodity super-cycle, consider Figure 1. Here, we
postulate a simple counterfactual in which, in the absence of the unauthorised
Ugandan military presence 1998-2001, this decline would have continued at its
5
Annex 109
previous long term rate, until the , onset of the global commodity super-cycle in
2001 began to lift the economy upwards. This straightforward counterfactual path
of the economy is shown by the downward sloping dashed line. Using this
counter/actual, there are no identifiable economic costs associated with the military
intervention. Actual GDP always exceeds the counterfactual GDP.
Figure 1
30
25
'μ'
V)
i:::
~ 20
Cl
VJ
~ 15
..0
.s
10
DRC-GDP
~OrlNM~~~~OO~OrlNM~~~~OO~OrlNM~~
OO~~~~~~~~~~OOOOOOOOOOrlrlrlrlrlrl
~~~~~~~~~~~0000000000000000
rlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
This is not meant to imply that the overstay of Ugandan forces was in fact costless.
It is plausible that it incurred some costs. Rather, it has two implications. First, the
estimate by Le bun and Lubu (2016) is highly implausible, and liable to exaggerate
the true costs by a very large factor. Second, given the very large effects of the
continued decline prior to 1998, and the massive global boom post-2001; and
recognizing the terrible state of observable economic data on DRC; the attempt to
quantify the impact of three unauthorised years of Ugandan military presence
1998-2001 is entirely infeasible.
4. Model and Estimation Problems with Lebun and Lubu
The starting point of the analysis in Lebun and Lubu (2016) is a presentation of
the data and a theoretical model. As it is common in the literature, they then test
this model using statistical analysis.
One of the major problems with their implementation of this research method is
that they do not actually test the model they specify. Furthermore, they use
1.estimation methods/or large-n samples but only use da.tafrom one country, the DRC.
Given that African data are generally of poor quality (Jerven 2013) and that many
6
Annex 109
r of the data points are estimates themselves, the quality of the data should receive
some discussion. However, the data quality receives no debate. Lastly, some of the
text describing the methods used make it very difficult for the reader to follow
what the authors have done and they do not cite other research correctly. We now
discuss some of these methodological issues in more detail.
The authors start with a standard Solow growth model which has been used in
large-n studies to examine African countries' growth experience (Hoeffler 2002).
However, they then augment the model in a non-standard way without discussing
this extension of the model (p.8). They then proceed to estimate this extended
model using data from the DRC. They start off with an Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) estimation which is not a suitable method for estimating these time series
models, primarily because the error terms are serially correlated, and not taking
this correlation into account will produce biased estimates. They do not explain
this problem with the OLS method, but do present estimations based on the use of
a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. They justify the use of this
method because "it makes it possible to evaluate the model's coefficient in the
form of elasticities". This is factually incorrect. The logarithmic transformation of
the model makes it possible to interpret the coefficients as elasticities. The GMM
estimation technique is used in growth regressions in order to account for
unobserved country effects and to address endogeneity issues. GMM is also not a
time-series method and it is completely unclear how the authors implemented this
panel data estimation method using data from only one country. The authors then
continue with parametric and non -parametric validation (p.10). This part is very
confusing and given that the previous GMM estimation cannot have produced
sensible results, we do not further comment on these validation attempts. The
coefficients from this unconvincing analysis are then used to calculate the damages
on p.18. Given that the previous estimations are not convincing, we do not trust
these further calculations.
We are aware that African researchers often have restricted access to recent
publications, but the work cited by them is well established and available through
open access sources by now. They quote old working papers rather than the
published versions in scientific journals, suggesting that they did not check on
whether the research is published in a peer reviewed journal.
5. Conclusion
In principle, the costs of conflict can be quantified. However, whether such
estimates can be made to a degree of plausibility necessary for a, court of law
depends upon the situation being investigated. This particular conflict in the DRC
7
Annex 109
is characterised by circumstances that make any quantification implausible. There
were simply too many other factors that powerfully influenced the economy
during the relevant period, and the data on the DRC are exceptionally weak. Any
application of quantitative techniques to this particular problem would therefore
be liable to produce estimates that wou_ld be subject to powerful challenges as to
credibility. In the event, the estimate by Lebun and Lubu (2016) are so seriously
methodologically flawed that they cannot be taken seriously and should be
disregarded.
All that can reasonably be concluded about these tragic events is that the
unauthorised Ugandan overstay may have incurred some costs but they cannot be
quantified.
6. Expert Declaration
We confirm that the conclusions and opinions expressed herein are true and our
own.
Dated this 20th day of October, 2017
Professor Sir Paul Collier and Dr Anke Hoeffler
Oxford University
8
Annex 109
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9
Annex 109
Paul Collier
British, born 23/4/1949
Address: 3, Northmoor Rd., Oxford, OX2 6UW
Employment
2012- Professor of Economics and Public Policy, Blavatnik School of Government,
Oxford University.
1993-2012 Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Oxford University,
and Director, CSAE, (Centre for the Study of African Economies),
2008-, Co-Director, International Growth Centre (LSE/Oxford)
1998-2003, Director of Research Department, World Bank
1992-96 Professor, (offer of Named Chair), Kennedy School of Government, Harvard.
1989-93, Reader in Economics, Oxford University
1986- Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford (tenured)
1976-86 Fellow, Keble College Oxford, (tenured)
1985-89, University Lecturer in Economics, Oxford University (tenured)
1973-85, Research Officer, Institute of Economics and Statistics, Oxford University
1972-75, Lecturer, Oriel College, Oxford
Education
1975, D.Phil.,Oxford University
1970-72, Nuffield College, Oxford.
1970, BA(MA), PPE, Oxford
1967-70, Trinity College, Oxford .
1960-66, King Edward VII Grammar School, Sheffield.
Honours
Honorary Doctorates : Universite d 'Auvergne (2007)
University of Sheffield (2008)
University of Antwerp (2014)
CBE, June 2008 ('for services to scholarship and development').
Thompson 'Current Classic' Award, 2010 for the most cited aiticle.
Atthur Ross Prize, 2008.
Lionel Gelber Prize, 2008.
Corine Prize, 2008.
Estoril Prize, 2009.
A.SK Prize in Social Science, 2013
Knighthood, 2014
President's Medal, British Academy, 2014
Richardson Lifetime Achievement Award, 2016
Public Lectures
Royal Economic Society, Annual Public Lecture, 2006.
Arrow Lecture, Stanford University, 2009.
IADB 50th Anniversary Keynote, 2009.
Jackson Hole Central Bank Symposium, Keynote, 2011
August 2016
Annex 109
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Foreign Ministry of France, Annual Keynote to Diplomats, 2012
Annual Pan-Government Retreat, Rwanda, keynote (in presence of President Kagame)
Central Bartle of Uganda Annual Public Lecture, 2012
University of Botswana Annual Public Lecture, 2013
First Pan-African Parliamentary Assembly, Abuja, 2013
Foreign Ministry of Mexico, Annual Keynote to Diplomats, 2014
European Public Choice Society, Keynote, 2014
Foreign Ministry of Germany, Presentation to ambassadors, 2014
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2009
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(eds) Oxford Handbook of International Political Theo,y .
Resource Revenue Management: Three Policy Clocks, in R. Caputo and R. Chang (eds.)
Commodity Prices and Macroeconomic Policy, Central Bank of Chile.
(with J. Aker and P. Vicente), Is Information Power? Using Mobile Phones and Free
Newspapers during an Election in Mozambique, Review of Economics and Statistics(with
T. Venables) Urban Infrastructure for Development, Oxford Revie,v of Economic Policy
(with P. Jones), Transforming Dares Salaam into a city that works, in Adam et al., (eds.)
Tanzania: Policies/or Prosperity, Oxford University Press.
The Bottom Billion, in G. Ritzer (ed), Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology.
The Moral and Fiscal Implications of Anti-Retroviral Therapies for HIV in Africa (under
review)
Shared-Use Mining Infrastructure: Why it Matters, and How to Achieve it (with Glenn
Ireland and Richard Manning). Development Policy Review.
Betts, A. and Collier, P. (2017) Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refi1gee System.
Harmondsworth: Penguin.
August 2016
Annex 109
Curriculum Vitae
Dr Anke Elisabeth Hoeffler, Diplom Volkswirtin, MSc Econ, DPhil Econ
Summary
Stemming from my doctorate I have been conducting frontier research for the past 17 years. This is
evidenced by:
I am ranked among the top three per cent of European economists; h-index: 37
30 peer reviewed published articles and 13 book chapters
including "Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars" (co-authored with Paul Collier) which was the
most cited economics paper in 01 2010
Due to my academic publications, media discussions and meetings with policy makers my
work has had an impact on the current thinking on development issues, in particular civil war
and violence
I have continuously funded my research position for the past 17 years, attracting funding from
the EC, ESRC, DFID, World Bank, OECD, BMZ, OSI, Norwegian Research Council
My work has been widely featured in the media for example on Reuters, The Wall Street
Journal, the Economist, the Huffington Post, the Guardian, India Today and on CNN News
I have been invited to present my research to international policy shapers, for example The
World Bank, the UN, the OECD, the EC, DFID and BMZ
Contact Details
work:
private:
web:
Education
09.94 - 10.98
09.92 - 06.93
03.87 - 11.91
Employment
10.99 - present
10.96 - 07.99
10.93 - 09.94
01.92 - 07.92
Economics Department , Manor Road, Oxford OX1 3UQ, UK
Tel: +44 1865 271959, [email protected] .uk
Lower Green Farm, Horton cum Studley, OX33 1AP, UK
Tel: +44 1865 351 229, mobile +44 7584 660140
http://users.ox.ac. uk/-ball0 144/
https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ZBYsHdsAAAAJ&hl=en
D.Phil. in Economics: "Econometric Studies of Growth, Convergence and
Conflicts", University of Oxford, Balliol College
MSc in Economics, University of London, Birkbeck College,
Diplom in Volkswirtschaftlehre (degree in economics) , University of Wurzburg
Research Officer, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford
Part-time Lecturer in Economics, Balliol College, Oxford
, Consultant , TechnEcon ltd, Economic&Transport Consultants, London
Research Assistant for Prof. Peter Bofinger, University of Wurzburg
anke.hoeffler@economics .ox.ac.uk http://users .ox.ac.uk/-ba110144
Annex 109
Ongoing and Recent Research
09.15 - present
09.16 - 11.17
10.16 - present
10.17 - present
Research Grants
10.17 - 06.19
01.12-09 .17
09.14 - 08.15
11.14-03 .15
09.09-12 .10
01.08 - 12.10
07.05 - 06.07
10.03 - 09.04
10.00 - 03.03
09.99 - 09.00
Teaching
2001 - present
2006 - 2015
May 13&14&15
Oct - Dec 2014
Dec 2013
2005 - 2007
1996 -1999
"The Global Cost of Violence" book contract with Princeton University Press,
co-author: James Fearon
"Violence Against Children: A Critical Issue for Development" editor special
issue, European Journal for Development Research
"Growth in Fragile and Conflict Affected States", editor special issue Review
for Development Economics
"An Investigation of the Security Situation of Syrian Refugees"
"An Investigation of the Security Situation of Syrian Refugees in Jordan",
World Bank: $200,000
"Enhancing Knowledge for Renewed Policies against Poverty", Work
Package Leader 'States and political Systems', EC GORDIS ?'h Framework
Programme: total budget€ Sm, Oxford funding £275,000
"An Analysis of Post-conflict Stabilization", co-PI Richard Caplan, DFID and
the Folke Bernadotte Academy: £46,300
"Violence Against Children", Fell Fund: £4,890
"Democracy and income: A time series analysis with special reference to
Africa", International Growth Centre: £10,150
"Illegitimate regime change and managing macroeconomic policy, joint with
Benedict Goderis, Open Society Institute: £109,366
"Reducing the security risk in low-income countries" , joint with Paul Collier,
ESRC: £143,226
"Civil wars and global security challenges: a quantitative economic
perspective", joint with Paul Collier, ESRC: £40,206
"Aid, policy and conflict", Research Council of Norway: £123,148
"Economics of conflict", World Bank: $45,000
Supervision : 17 MSc&MPhil students , six DPhil students (four completed, two
current students) in Economics, Politics&IR, Development Studies, Area
Studies
Biannual MSc lectures , Security Sector Management, Cranfield University,
UK Defence Academy
Lecture series on 'New Wars' , convenors: Royal Danish Defence College and
the Centre for Africa Studies, Copenhagen
Visiting scholar in Germany, seminars in the economics and politics
departments at the University of Heidelberg and the University of Mannheim
Two day doctoral seminar on quantitative methods, German Institute of
Global and Area Studies
Data project, lectures&computer lab sessions, PPE students Oxford
PPE undergraduate tutorials, Balliol College Oxford
anke. hoeffler@econom ics .ox.ac. u k http://users.o x.ac.uk/-ball0144
Annex 109
Commissioned Work
04.16 -06 .17
12.16-05.17
01.14-06.14
11.11 -11.12
11.09 - 04.10
05.07 - 09.07
05.98 - 09.07
04 .03 - 11.03
"Growth in Fragile States in Africa", Project Coordinator for the African
Economic Research Consortium, output: edited volume
"An Evaluation of Interventions Designed to Prevent Intimate Partner
Violence in Haiti", Copenhagen Consensus Center
"Cost of Violence " (with James Fearon), Copenhagen Consensus Center
"Global Factors that increase the Risk of Conflict and Fragility", for
OECD/INCAF, three research papers
"Post-conflict Recovery and Peace Building" (with Sarah van Billerbeck and
Syeda ShahBano ljaz), background paper for the World Bank's World
Development Report 2011
"Dealing with the Consequences of Violent Conflicts in Africa", Background
Paper for the African Development Bank Report 2008
"Challenges of Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in WarAffected
Economies ", Background Paper for the African Development Bank
Report 1998
"Conflicts" (with Paul Collier), Copenhagen Consensus Center
Wider Academic Participation
2015 - present
2014 - present
2003 - present
2014 - present
2014 - present
2005-2012
2014 - present
Publications
Journal Articles
Co-editor for the Review of Development Economics
External Examiner, SOAS
Resource Person (Reviewer) for the African Economic Research Consortium,
biannual meetings, aim: capacity building for young African scholars
Steering Committee for 'Point Sud', an African research initiative by the German
Research Foundation, DFG, to fund interdisciplinary research on Africa
Advisory Board for the charity 'Giving What We Can'
Policy Advisory Board for the German Institute for Global and Area Studies
elected member of the German Economic Association (Verein fur Socialpolitik)
Migration, Diasporas and Culture: an Empirical Investigation (with Paul Collier) 2018, Kyklos .
Accepted.
Violence against Children: A Critical Issue for Development. 2017, European Journal of Development
Research 29 :945-963 .
What are the Costs of Violence? 2017 , Politics , Philosophy & Economics 16(4) : 422 - 445.
The Ethics of Security Research . An Ethics Framework for Contemporary Security Studies (with
Stephane Baele, Nils-Christian Bormann, David Lewis, Thibault Slingeneyer and Olivier Sterck) 2017 ,
International Studies Perspectives . http s://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekx003
Why Peace Endures: An Analysis of Post-Conflict Stabilization (with Richard Caplan) 2017 , European
Journal of International Security 2(2) : 133- 152. ·
[email protected] .uk http ://users.ox.ac.uk/-ballO 144
Annex 109
Free and Fair Elections -A new database (with Sylvia Bishop) 2016 , Journal of Pe;_ace Research 53:
608-616.
Do elections matter for economic performance? (with Paul Collier) 2015, Oxford Bulletin of Economics
and Statistics 77: 1-21.
Can International Interventions Secure the Peace? 2014, International Area Studies Review 17: 75-
94.
The New Institutionalism and Africa (with Robert Bates, Stephen Block and Ghada Fayad) 2013,
Journal of African Economies 22(4) : 499-522 .
The State of Democracy in Africa (with Robert Bates and Ghada Fayad) 2012, International Area
Studies Review 15: 323-338.
Need, Merit or Self-Interest - What Determines the Allocation of Aid? (with Verity Outram) 2011,
Review of Development Economics 15(2): 237-250 .
'Greed' versus 'Grievance': A Useful Conceptual Distinction in the Study of Civil War? 2011, Studies
in Ethnicity and Nationalism 11 (2): 27 4-285.
Paradise Lost: The Cost of State Failure in the Pacific (with Lisa Chauvet and Paul Collier) 2010,
Journal of Development Studies 46(5) : 961-980.
Testing the Neocon Agenda: Democracy in Resource-Rich Societies (with Paul Collier) 2009,
European Economic Review 53(3):293-308 .
Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War (with Paul Collier and Dominic Rohner) 2009,
Oxford Economic Papers 61: 1-27.
Post-Conflict Risks (with Paul Collier and Mans Soderbom) 2008, Journal of Peace Research 45(4):
461-478 .
Unintended Consequences: Does Aid Promote Arms Races? (with Paul Collier) 2007, Oxford Bulletin
of Economics and Statistics 69: 1-28.
Military Expenditure in Post-Conflict Societies (with Paul Collier) 2006, Economics of Governance
7(1 ): 89-107 .
Institutions, Governance and Economic Development in Africa: An Overview (with Augustin Fosu and
Robert H Bates) 2006, Journal of African Economies 15: 1-9.
Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict (with Paul Collier) 2005, Journal of Conflict Resolution 49:
625-633.
Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars (with Paul Collier) , 2004 , Oxford Economic Papers 56: 563-595.
Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Countries (with Paul Collier) 2004, The European Economic
Review 48 : 1125-1145 .
On the Duration of Civil War (with Paul Collier and Mans Soderbom) 2004, Journal of Peace
Research 41 (3): 253-273.
Africa's Exodus: Capital Flight and the Brain Drain as Portfolio Decisions (with Paul Collier and
Catherine Pattillo) 2004, Journal of African Economies 13: ii15 - ii 54.
On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa (with Paul Collier) 2002, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46:13-
28.
Aid, Policy and Peace (with Paul Collier) 2002, Defence and Peace Economics 13(6):435-450.
[email protected] x.ac.uk http://users.ox.ac .uk/-ball0144
Annex 109
Violence against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting or Terror? (with Jean-Paul Azam) 2002, Journal of
Peace Research 39: 461-485.
Flight Capital as a Portfolio Choice (with Paul Collier and Catherine Pattillo) 2001, The World Bank
Economic Review 15: 55-80 .
The Augmented Solow Model and the Afri can Growth Debate , 2002 , Oxford Bulletin of Economics &
Statistics 64(2) : 135-158.
Openness , Investment and Grow th, 2001 , Journal of African Economies 10 (4): 470-497 .
On Economic Causes of Civil War (with Paul Collier) 1998, Oxford Economic Papers 50: 563-573.
Book Chapters
Beyond civil war: the costs of interpersonal violence (with James Fearon) 2017 in: Prioritizing
Development: A cost benefit analysis of the United Nations Global Goals (Bjorn Lomborg ed) .
Cambridge University Press .
Development and the Risk of Mass Atrocities . 2016. in: Economic Aspects of Genocide, Mass Killing,
and Their Prevention. (Charles Anderton and Jurgen Brauer, eds) Oxford University Press , 230-250.
The Economics of Violent Conflict and War in Africa. 2014. Chapter 38 in The Oxford Handbook of
Africa and Economics: Context and Concepts (Celestin Monga and Justin Yifu Lin, eds) . Oxford
University Press.
Armed Conflict, Perspective Paper for the Copenhagen Consensus Project 2012. Chapter in 'Global
Problems - Smart Solutions' Bj0rn Lomborg (ed) pp 54-61. Cambridge University Press .
On the Causes of Civil War, 2012, Chapter 9 in The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and
Conflict (Michelle Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, eds). Oxford University Press.
High-Value Natural Resources , Development and Conflict: Channels of Causation (with Paul Collier)
2011, in: Strengthening Post-conf lict Peacebuilding through Natural Resource Management, volume
1, ELI and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
The Cost of State Failure and the Limits to Sovereignty (with Lisa Chauvet and Paul Collier) 2011, in:
Fragile States : Causes, Costs, and Responses. (Willem A Naude, Amelia U Santos -Paulino and Mark
McGillivray, eds) . Oxford University Press.
Fragile States and Conflict Recurrence, 2010, Chapter 7 in: Peace and Conflict 2010, J.Joseph
Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfield and Ted Robert Gurr, eds) : 65-78.
Civil War (with Paul Collier), 2007 , Chapter 23 in Handbook of Defense Economics T. Sandler and K.
Hartley (eds) , Volume 2, Elsevier.
Economic Causes and Consequences of Civil War: A Discussion of the Possible Policy Interventions
(with Paul Collier) 2006 , in Michael Dauderstadt and Arne Schildberg (eds) Dead Ends of Transition:
Rentier Economies and Protectorates , 151-158. Campus.
The Political Economy of Secession (with Paul Collier) 2006, in Hurst Hannum and Eileen F Babbitt:
Negotiating Self-Determination , 37-59. Lexington Books .
The Economic Cost of Corruption in Infrastructure (with Paul Collier) 2005 in: Transparency
International. 'Global Corruption Report' , London: Pluto Press .
Conflicts (with Paul Collier) 2004 in: Global Crises, Global Solutions (Bjorn Lomborg, ed) , 129-156 .
Cambridge University Press.
anke.hoeffler@economics .ox.ac .uk http://users .ox.ac.uk/-ba110144
Annex 109
Ober die Okonomischen Ursachen van Burgerkriegen (with Paul Collier) 2003 in: Kriminalitat ,
Okonomie und Europaischer Sozialstaat (Hans-Jorg Albrecht and Horst Entorf, eds), Physica Verlag.
Books
Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, 2003 (with Paul Collier, Lance Elliot,
Havard Hegre, Marta Reynal-Querol and Nicholas Sambanis) World Bank Policy Research Report.
Oxford University Press.
Other
Domestic Violence in Haiti (with Jean-Guy Honore and Anastasia Gage) 2017. Copenhagen
Consensus Center.
Benefits and Costs of the Conflict and Violence Targets for the Post-2015 Development Agenda (with
James Fearon) 2014 . Copenhagen Consensus Center.
Income and Democracy: Lipset's Law Revisited (with Ghada Fayad and Robert H. Bates) 2012. IMF
Working Paper 12/295.
Three thematic papers supporting the OECD DAG INCAF project 'Global Factors Influencing the Risk
of Conflict and Fragility':
Growth, aid and policies in countries recovering from war. 2012.
Out of the Frying Pan into the Fire? Migration from fragile states to fragile states. 2012.
Exporting from fragile states: Challenges and opportunities . 2012.
Post-conflict Recovery and Peace Building (with Syeda ShahBano ljaz and Sarah van Billerbeck)
2011, Background Paper for the World Development Report 2011.
Dealing with the Consequences of Violent Conflicts in Africa, Background Paper for the African
Development Bank Report 2008.
Panel Data Estimators and Cross-Country Growth Regressions (with Stephen Bond and Jonathan
Temple), 2001, CEPR Working Paper No 3048.
Challenges of Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in War-Affected Economies, 1998,
CSAE Discussion Paper 98/26.
Econometric Studies of Growth, Convergence and Conflicts, 1998, D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford.
Work in Progress
The Global Cost of Violence. Book Draft (with James Fearon) . Princeton University Press.
Finance for Development: Are Sovereign Bond Issues in Sub-Saharan Africa Supporting Sustainable
Development? (with James Gichuki). 2017. Mimeo.
Post-Conflict Stabilization in Africa. 2016. Mimeo.
Democracy's Achilles Heel: Structural Causes of Flawed Elections and their Consequences for
Citizen Trust (with Maddalena Agnoli, Lisa Chauvet , Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Sultan Mehmood)
2016. Mimeo.
[email protected] x.ac.uk http://users .ox.ac.uk/-ball0144
Annex 109
Dr Anke Hoef,f.ler is a Research Officer at the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) at the
University of Oxford. She holds a Diplom in Volkswirschaftslehre from the University of Wurzburg
and an MSc in economics from Birkbeck College, University of London . She received her DPhil in
economics from the University of Oxford in 1999. Anke's research interests are wide ranging and
often interdisciplinary. Broadly she is interested in the macroeconomics of developing countries and
political economy issues, but has a specific interest in the economics of violence . Most recent
publications include work on elections in the Journal of Peace Research and the Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics. Anke has also contributed to the Oxford Handbook of Africa and
Economics: Context and Concepts as well as to Economic Aspects of Genocide, Mass Killing, and Their
Prevention, both published by Oxford University Press. She is currently working on a book
manuscript entitled "The Global Costs of Violence" (with James Fearon).
Dr Anke Hoeffler is an economist and works as a Research Officer at the Centre for the Study of
African Economies (CSAE) at the University of Oxford. Her research focuses on the economics of
violence.

Annex 110
Calculated Number of Civilian Deaths between 7 August 1998 and 2 June 2003 (Source: U.N.
Mapping Report)

1
CALCULATED NUMBER OF CIVILIAN DEATHS BETWEEN 7 AUGUST 1998 AND 2 JUNE 2003
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993–2003
Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003
August 2010
Paragraph Number Date Reported Number of
Deaths
Number of Deaths
(as derived by
Uganda)
Beni and Lubero Regions (Grand-Nord)
¶346 25 and 26 August
2000
17 civilians and 7
Mayi-Mayi prisoners
24
¶347 1 November 2000 Between 7 and 11
people
9
¶348 9 November 2000 36 people 36
¶349 March 2000 4 civilians 4
¶443 2001 Unknown number of
people
25
Orientale Province
¶361 (Kisangani) 14 to 17 August
1999
Over 30 civilians 40
¶362 (Kisangani) 5 May 2000 Over 24 civilians 30
¶363 (Kisangani) 5 to 10 June 2000 Between 244 and 760
civilians
502
¶402 Between January
2001 and January
2003
Unknown number of
civilians
100
Annex 110
2
Ituri
¶366 20 June 1999 At least 25 people 25
¶369 1 December 1999 Over 200 members of
the civilian population
250
¶370 26 April 2000 Around 10 deaths 10
¶405 Between January
and February 2001
Around 100 people 100
¶405 Between January
and February 2001
Unknown number 25
¶405 3 February 2001 105 people 105
¶407 19 January 2001 Between 200 and 250
civilians
225
¶408 26 April 2001 6 members of the
ICRC
6
¶408 January 2002 35 Lendu civilians 35
¶408 Between February
and April 2002
Several hundred
Lendu civilians
400
¶409 Early June 2002 At least 27 27
¶411 Between 9 and 11
August 2002
80 Lendu, Nande and
Bira civilians
80
¶412 Months following
August 2002
Numerous civilians 50
¶417 20 November
2002
At least 50 Lendu
civilians
50
¶421 6 March 2003 Between 17 and 52
civilians
35
Annex 110
3
Équateur
¶381 22 December 1998 7 civilians 7
¶381 25 December 1998 At least 27 civilians 27
¶383 Between 24 and
26 February 1999
At least 15 civilians 15
¶385 28 May 1999 1 ALiR member 1
¶392 9 August 2000 Several dozen soldiers 48
Total: 2,291
Annex 110