INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
v.
UGANDA
COUNTER-MEMORIAL OF UGANDA ON REPARATION
VOLUME II
6 FEBRUARY 2018
VOLUME II
UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS
Annex 1 U.N. Security Council, 2981st meeting, Resolution 687 (1991),
U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991) (8 Apr. 1991)
Annex 2 U.N. Security Council, 3004th meeting, Resolution 705 (1991)
(15 Aug. 1991)
Annex 3 U.N. Security Council, Decision taken by the Governing
Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission
during the resumed Fourth Session, at the 23rd meeting, held
on 6th March 1992, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/9 (6 Mar. 1992)
Annex 4 U.N. Security Council, Compensation for Business Losses
Resulting from Iraq’s Unlawful Invasion and Occupation of
Kuwait where the Trade Embargo and Related Measures Were
also a Cause, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/15 (4 Jan. 1993)
Annex 5 U.N. Compensation Commission, Report and
Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners
Concerning the First Instalment of Individual Claims for
Damages up to $100,000 (Category “C” Claims), U.N. Doc. S/
AC.26/1994/3 (21 Dec. 1994)
Annex 6 U.N. Security Council, 3519th meeting, Resolution 986 (1995),
U.N. Doc. S/RES/986 (14 Apr. 1995)
Annex 7 U.N. Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner,
Statement by Mrs. Mary Robinson, U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights (19 Sept. 1997)
Annex 8 U.N. Security Council, Report and Recommendations Made by
the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Seventh Instalment
of Individual Claims for Damages up to $100,000 (Category
“C” Claims), U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1999/11 (24 June 1999)
Annex 9 U.N. Security Council, Report and Recommendations Made by
the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Second Instalment
of “E1” Claims, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1999/10 (24 June 1999)
Annex 10 U.N. Security Council, 4241st meeting, Resolution 1330
(2000), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1330 (2000) (5 Dec. 2000)
Annex 11 U.N. Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms
of Wealth of Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc.
S/2001/357 (12 Apr. 2001)
Annex 12 Claude Kabemba, U.N.H.C.R., Centre for Documentation
and Research, The Democratic Republic of Congo: From
Independence to Africa’s First World War, WRITENET Paper
No. 16/2000 (June 2001)
Annex 13 U.N. Security Council, Addendum to the report of the Panel
of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1072 (13 Nov. 2001)
Annex 14 U.N. General Assembly, Responsibility of States for
internationally wrongful acts, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (28 Jan.
2002)
Annex 15 U.N. Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts on
the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms
of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc.
S/2002/1146 (16 Oct. 2002)
Annex 16 U.N. Security Council, 4691st Meeting, Resolution 1457
(2003), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1457 (2003) (24 Jan. 2003)
Annex 17 U.N.H.C.R., U.N.H.C.R. Global Appeal 2004, Uganda (31 Dec.
2003)
Annex 18 U.N. Security Council, 4761th meeting, Resolution 1483
(2003), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003)
Annex 19 U.N. Security Council, Letter dated 15 Oct. 2003 from the
Chairman of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation
of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1027 (23 Oct. 2003)
Annex 20 U.N. Security Council, 4987th meeting, Resolution 1546
(2004), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (8 June 2004)
Annex 21 U.N. General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/60/147 (21 Mar. 2006)
Annex 22 U.N. Economic and Social Council, Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Combined second, third, fourth and fifth periodic
reports submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of
the Covenant, Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/COD/5 (14 Aug. 2007)
Annex 23 U.N. Security Council, 6058th meeting, Statement by the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/48 (22
Dec. 2008)
Annex 24 D. Nthengwe, ed. L. Dobbs, U.N.H.C.R., 30,000 Congolese flee
to escape fresh conflict in Ituri district (7 Apr. 2009)
Annex 25 U.N. Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the
Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law committed
within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
between March 1993 and June 2003 (Aug. 2010)
Annex 26 U.N. News Centre, DR Congo: U.N. envoy welcomes end of
M23 rebellion, commitment to peace talks (5 Nov. 2013)
Annex 27 U.N. Security Council, Statement by the President of the
Security Council 7058th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2013/17
(14 Nov. 2013)
Annex 28 U.N. Security Council, 7150th meeting, The extension of
the Mandate U.N. Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (M.O.N.U.S.C.O.), U.N. Doc. S/
RES/2147 (2014) (28 Mar. 2014)
Annex 29 Charles Yaxley, U.N.H.C.R., Uganda hosts record 500,000
refugees and asylum-seekers (18 Dec. 2015)
Annex 30 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, DR
Congo: Weekly Humanitarian Update (19-23 June 2017) (23
June 2017)
Annex 31 U.N. Secretary General, The Secretary-General’s opening
remarks to the Uganda Solidarity Summit on Refugees (23 June
2017)
Annex 32 U.N. Security Council, 7998th Meeting, Security Council
Members Stress Need for Democratic Republic of Congo to
Hold Fair, Free, Inclusive Elections without Further Delay,
U.N. Doc. SC/12907 (11 July 2017)
Annex 33 Catherine Wachiaya, U.N.H.C.R., Eager refugees cram
crowded classrooms in Ugandan school (11 Sept. 2017)
Annex 34 U.N.H.C.R., U.N.H.C.R. warns of worsening displacement in
Democratic Republic of Congo (24 Oct. 2017)
UGANDA GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
Annex 35 Uganda, Act 12, the Uganda Bureau of Statistics Act, published
in The Uganda Gazette, No. 36, Vol. XCI, Acts Supplement No.
7 (11 June 1998)
Annex 36 Letter from Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary General to Yoweri
Kaguta Museveni, President and Minister of Defence, Republic
of Uganda (4 May 2001)
Annex 37 U.N. Security Council, The Response by the Government of
the Republic of Uganda to The Addendum Report of the Panel
of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC), U.N. Doc. S/2001/1163 (4 Dec. 2001)
Annex 38 Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts (2002, 2004,
2005)
Annex 39 Letter from Imelda Atai Musana, Executive Director, Uganda
Bureau of Statistics to the Solicitor General, Ministry of Justice
and Constitutional Affairs, UBOS/30/30 (26 Oct. 2017)
Annex 40 Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Exports and Imports (1981-2016)
DRC GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
Annex 41 République du Zaire, Ministère du Plan et Reconstruction
Nationale, Enquête Nationale sur la Situation des Enfants et
des Femmes au Zaire en 1995, Rapport Final (Feb. 1996)
Annex 42 République Démocratique du Congo, Document de la Stratégie
de Croissance et de Réduction de la Pauvreté, Deuxième
Génération, 2011-2015, Vol. I (Oct. 2011)
DRC CASE LAW
Annex 43 Songo Mboyo (MP et PC c. Bokila et consorts), RP 084/2005
(Tribunal Militaire de Garnison de Mbandaka, 12 Apr. 2006)
Annex 44 Waka-Lifumba (MP et PC. c. Botuli), RP 134/2007 (Tribunal
Militaire de Garnison de Mbandaka, 18 Feb. 2007)
Annex 45 Basele et consorts (MP et PC c. Basele Lutula alias Colonel
Thom’s et consorts), RP 167/09 and RMP 944/MBM/09
(Tribunal Militaire de Garnison de Kisangani, 3 June 2009)
Annex 46 Kakado (MP et PC c. Kakado Barnaba), RP 071/09, 009/010
and RP 074/010 (Tribunal Militaire de Garnison de Bunia, 9
July 2010)
Annex 47 Maniraguha et Sibomana (MP et PC (400) c. Jean Bosco
Maniraguha alias Kazungu et consorts), RP 275/09, 521/10
RMP 581/07 and 1573/KMC/10 (Tribunal Militaire de
Garnison de Bukavu, 16 Aug. 2011)
Annex 48 Kimbanguistes (MP et PC Kumba et consorts- MP et PC c.
Mputu Muteba et consorts, RP 11.154/11.155/ 11.156 (Tribunal
de Grande Instance de Kinshasa/ Kalamu, 17 Dec. 2011)
Annex 49 Mupoke, also known as Kabala et consorts (MP et 107 PC
c. Kabala Mandumba et consorts; MP et PC c. Kabala
Mandumba), RP 708/12 (Tribunal Militaire de Garnison de
Bukavu, 15 Oct. 2012)
Annex 1
U.N. Security Council, 2981st meeting, Resolution 687 (1991), U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991)
(8 Apr. 1991)
Annex 1
UNITED
NATIONS
Security Council
s
Distr.
GENERAL
S/RES/687 (1991)*
8 April 1991
RESOLUTION 687 (1991)
Adopted by the Security council at its 2981st meeting,
on 3 April 199.l
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of
6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990,
665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of
16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990) of
25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990, 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990,
678 (1990) of 29 November 1990 and 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991,
Welcoming the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and
territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate Government,
Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq, and noting the intention
expressed by the Member States cooperating with Kuwait under paragraph 2 of
resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as
possible consistent with paragraph 8 of resolution 686 (1991),
Reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light
of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait,
Taking note of the letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq on
27 February 1991 l/ and those sent pursuant to resolution 686 (1991), 11
* Reissued for technical reasons.
l/ S/22275, annex.
11 S/22273, S/22276, S/22320, S/22321 and S/22330.
91-11221 3315Z (E) 'I. •.
,
Annex 1
S/RES/687 (1991)
Page 7
16. Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of
Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal
mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage,
including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources; or injury to
foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful
invasion and occupation of Kuwait;
17. Decides that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990 repudiating
its foreign debt are null and void, and demands that Iraq adhere scrupulously to
all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt;
18. Decides also to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that fall
within paragraph 16 above and to establish a Commission that will administer the
fund;
19. Directs the Secretary-General to develop and present to the Security
Council for decision, no later than thirty days following the adoption of the
present resolution, recommendations for the fund to meet the requirement for the
payment of claims established in accordance with paragraph 18 above and for a
programme to implement the decisions in paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 above, including:
administration of the fund; mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of
Iraq's contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the value of the exports
of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed a figure to be
suggested to the Council by the Secretary-General, taking into account the
requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity as assessed in
conjunction with the international financial instit~tions taking into consideration
external debt service, and the needs of the Iraqi economy;· arrangements for
ensuring that payments are made to the fund; the process by which funds will be
allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, listing
claims and verifying their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect of
Iraq's liability as specified in paragraph 16 above; and the composition of the
Commission designated above;
.E
20. Decides. effective immediately, that the prohibitions against the sale or
supply to Iraq of commodities or products, other than medicine and health supplies,
and prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in
resolution 661 (1990) shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to the Security
Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation
between Iraq and Kuwait or, with the approval of that Committee, under the
simplified and accelerated "no-objection" procedure, to materials and supplies for
essential civilian needs as identified in the report of the Secretary-General dated
20 March 1991, !J..I and in any further findings of humanitarian need by the Committee;
!J..I S/22366.
I • ••
,
Annex 2
U.N. Security Council, 3004th meeting, Resolution 705 (1991) (15 Aug. 1991)
Annex 2
Resolution 705 (1991)
of 15 AIJl!Usl 1991
The Security Council,
Having considered the note of 30 May 1991 which the
Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 of his
report of2 May 199182 and which was also annexed to his letter
of 30 May 1991 addressed to the President of the Security
Council 89
,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations,
1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for
his note of 30 May 1991;
2. Decides that, in accordance with the suggestion made
by the Secretary-General in paragraph 7 of his note, compensa··
tion to be paid by Iraq. as arising from section E of resolution
687 (1991) of3 April 1991, shall not exceed 30 per cent of the
annual value of its exports of petroleum and petroleum
products;
3. Decides also, in accordance with paragraph 8 of the
Secretary-General's note, to review the figure established in
paragraph 2 above from time to time in light of data and
assumptions contained in the Secretary-General's letter of 30
May 199189 and other relevant developments.
Adopt,d wianimously at the 3004th
meeting
Resolution 706 (1991)
of 15 August 1991
The Security Council,
Recalling its previous relevant resolutions and in particular
resolutions 661 (1990) of6 August 1990, 686 (1991) of2 March
1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991,
692 (1991) of20 May 1991, 699 (1991) of 17 June 1991 and 705
(1991) of 15 August 1991,
Taking note of the report dated 15 July 1991 of the interagency
mission headed by the &ecutive Delegate of the
Secretary-General for the United Nations Inter-Agency
Humanitarian Programme for Iraq, Kuwait and the Iraq{furkey
and Iraq/Iran border areas, 90
Concerned by the serious nutritional and health situation
of the Iraqi civilian population as described in the report and
by the risk of a further deterioration of this situation,
Concerned also that the repatriation or return of all
Kuwaitis and third- State nationals or their remains present in
Iraq on or after 2 August 1990, pursuant to paragraph 2 (c) of
21
resolution 686 (1991) arid paragraphs 30 and 31 of resolution
687 (1991), has not yet been fully carried out,
Taking note of the conclusions of the above-mentioned
report, and in particular of the proposal for oil sales by Iraq to
finance the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines and materials and
supplies for essential civililil needs for the purpose of providing
humanitarian relief,
Taking note also of the letters dated 14 April, 31 May. 6
June, 9 July and 22 July 1991 from the Minister for Foreign
Affairs oflraq and the Permanent Representative oflraq to the
United Nations to the Chairman of the Security Council
Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the
situation between Iraq and Kuwait, in regard to the export by
Iraq of petroleum and petroleum products,
Convinced of the need to ensure equitable distribution of
humanitarian relief assistance to all segments of the Iraqi
civilian population through effective monitoring and transparency
of the process.
Recalling and reaffirming in this regard its resolution 688
(1991), and in particular the importance which the Council
attaches to Iraq's allowing unhindered access by international
humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in
all parts of Iraq and making available all necessary facilities for
their operation, and in this connection stressing the continuing
importance of the Memorandum of Understanding between the
United Nations and the Government oflraq signed on !8 April
1991,91
Recalling that, pursuant to resolutions 687 (1991), 692
(1991) and 699 (1991), Iraq is required to pay the full costs of
the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy
Agency in carrying out the tasks authorized by section C of
resolution 687 (1991), and that the Secretary-General, in the
report of 15 July 1991 that he submitted to the Council
pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 699 (1Q91),92 expressed
the view that the most obvious way of obtaining financial
resources from Iraq to meet those costs would be to authorize
the sale of some Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products;
recalling also that Iraq is required to pay its contributions to
the United Nations Compensation Fund and half the costs of
the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commi~ion; and
recalling further that, in its resolutions 686 ( 1991) and 687
(1991), the Council demanded that Iraq return in the shortest
possible time all Kuwaiti property seized by it and requested
the Secretary-General to take steps to facilitate this demand,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations,
1. Authorizes all States, sub_iect to the decision to be
taken by the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 5 and
notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3 (a). 3 (b) and 4
of resolution 661 (1990), to permit, for the purposes specified
in the present resolution, the import, during a period of six
months from the date of adoption of the resolution lJU:rsuant to
paragraph 5, of a quantity of petroleum and petroleum prcdAnnex
3
U.N. Security Council, Decision taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations
Compensation Commission during the resumed Fourth Session, at the 23rd meeting, held on 6th
March 1992, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/9 (6 Mar. 1992)
UNITED
NATIONS S
Security Council
Distr.
GENERAL
S/AC.26/1992/9
6 March 1992
Original: ENGLISH
UNITED NATIONS
COMPENSATION COMMISSION
GOVERNING COUNCIL
Resumed Fourth Session
Geneva, 6 March 1992
Decision taken by the Governing Council of the
United Nations Compensation Commission
during the resumed Fourth Session, at the 23rd meeting,
held on 6th March 1992
Propositions and Conclusions on
Compensation for Business Losses:
Types of Damages and Their Valuation
1. The propositions and conclusions contained in this Decision shall apply to compensation for the
loss of earnings or profits and other business losses covered by Security Council resolution 687 (1991).
2. The basic premise underlying all of the findings concerning business losses is that, pursuant to
paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), Iraq "is liable under international law for any
direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to
foreign Governments, nationals and corporations as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation
of Kuwait".
3. This Decision does not attempt to describe all of the conceivable factual and legal situations
resulting from Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 687
(1991), other types of losses may have been suffered, and they are eligible for compensation if they result
from Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Ultimately, it will be up to the Commissioners to identify
the applicable principles and apply them to the circumstances of particular cases.
/.....
GE.92-70136
Annex 3
S/AC.26/1992/9
page 2
4. The propositions and conclusions contained in this Decision are not intended to be a
comprehensive statement of relevant principles. The Governing Council will review the matter and
will provide further guidance concerning business losses as required in the future. In particular, the
Governing Council will request the Secretariat to consider the question of steps which might be
taken to protect against multiple recovery of compensation by claimants, or to confirm that
claimants have attempted to avail themselves of particular possible sources of recovery, as a
prerequisite to relief from the Commission.
5. When reference is made herein to corporations and other legal entities, it is understood that
such corporations or other legal entities may be either publicly or privately owned enterprises.
6. The trade embargo and related measures , and the economic situation c * aused thereby, will
not be accepted as the basis for compensation. Compensation will be provided to the extent that
Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait constituted a cause of direct loss, damage or
injury which is separate and distinct from the trade embargo and related measures. (Where, for
example, the full extent of the loss, damage or injury arose as a direct result of Iraq's unlawful
invasion and occupation of Kuwait, it should be compensated notwithstanding the fact that it may
also be attributable to the trade embargo and related measures). The total amount of compensable
losses will be reduced to the extent that those losses could reasonably have been avoided.
Further guidance on the matters dealt with in this paragraph will be provided by the
Governing Council for the use of the Commissioners when assessing claims.
* The trade embargo and related measures refers to the prohibitions in United Nations
Security Council Resolution 661 (1990) and relevant subsequent resolutions and the
measures taken by states pursuant thereto.
Annex 3
Annex 4
U.N. Security Council, Compensation for Business Losses Resulting from Iraq’s Unlawful
Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait where the Trade Embargo and Related Measures Were also
a Cause, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/15 (4 Jan. 1993)
UNITED
NATIONS S
Security Council
Distr.
GENERAL
S/AC.26/1992/15_*/
4 January 1993
Original: ENGLISH
UNITED NATIONS
COMPENSATION COMMISSION
GOVERNING COUNCIL
Eighth session
Geneva, 14-18 December 1992
Compensation for Business Losses Resulting from Iraq's
Unlawful Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait where
the Trade Embargo and Related Measures
Were also a Cause
Decision taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations
Compensation Commission at its 31st meeting, held in
Geneva on 18 December 1992
1. Paragraph 16 of United Nations Security Council resolution
687 reaffirms "that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and
obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will
be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under
international law for any direct loss, damage, including
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or
injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a
result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait."
2. In paragraph 6 of its Decision S/AC.26/1992/9 on
Propositions and Conclusions on Compensation for Business Losses,
hereinafter referred to as Decision 9, the Governing Council set
out guidelines for awarding compensation for business losses
caused by Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait where
the trade embargo and related measures were also a cause, and
undertook to provide further guidance on the matter.
___
_*/ Re-issued for technical reasons.
GE.93-60009
Annex 4
S/AC.26/1992/15
Page 2
3. The two essential elements of admissible losses are (a) that
such losses must be the result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and
occupation of Kuwait and (b) that the causal link must be direct.
Although the UN trade embargo was imposed in response to Iraq's
invasion and occupation of Kuwait, losses suffered solely as a
result of that embargo are not considered eligible for
compensation because the causal link between the invasion and the
loss is not sufficiently direct.
4. The terms of contracts, and transactions that have been part
of a business practice or course of dealing, as well as the
relevant circumstances will need to be examined by Commissioners
to determine whether related claims fall within the scope of the
Compensation Commission.
5. In all cases, Commissioners will require evidence that
claims fall within the criteria of direct loss as set out in
paragraph 16 of resolution 687 in order for them to be eligible
for compensation by the Compensation Fund. It will not be enough
for claimants to argue that losses were due to the chaotic
economic situation following Iraq's unlawful invasion and
occupation of Kuwait. There will be a need for detailed factual
descriptions of the circumstances of the claimed loss, damage or
injury.
6. In its Decisions No. 1 (S/AC.26/1991/1) and No. 7
(S/AC.26/1991/7/Rev.1), the Governing Council decided that
compensation payments are available with respect to any direct
loss suffered as a result of:
(a) Military operations or threat of military action by either
side during the period 2 August 1990 to 2 March 1991;
(b) Departure from or inability to leave Iraq or Kuwait (or a
decision not to return) during that period;
(c) Actions by officials, employees or agents of the Government
of Iraq or its controlled entities during that period in
connection with the invasion or occupation;
(d) The breakdown of civil order in Kuwait or Iraq during that
period; or
(e) Hostage-taking or other illegal detention.
These guidelines are not intended to be exhaustive. There will
be other situations where evidence can be produced showing claims
are for direct loss, damage or injury as a result of Iraq's
unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
7. Commissioners will wish to apply relevant valuation methods
to different categories of loss. Paragraph 15 of Decision 9
shows various valuation methods for tangible assets depending on
the type of asset and the circumstances of the case. Paragraph
18 of Decision 9 shows various valuation methods for losses
relating to income producing properties. When compensation for
Annex 4
Annex 5
U.N. Compensation Commission, Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of
Commissioners Concerning the First Instalment of Individual Claims for Damages up to
$100,000 (Category “C” Claims), U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1994/3 (21 Dec. 1994)
Distr.
GENERAL
S/AC.26/1994/3
21 December 1994
Original: ENGLISH
UNITED NATIONS
COMPENSATION COMMISSION
GOVERNING COUNCIL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
MADE BY THE PANEL OF COMMISSIONERS
CONCERNING THE FIRST INSTALMENT OF INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS
FOR DAMAGES UP TO US$100,000
(CATEGORY "C" CLAIMS)
/...
GE.94-65334
Annex 5
15
For a discussion of the "B" Panel's conclusions in regard to this issue, see "B" Recommendations,
at pp. 14-15.
Decision 12, para. 1(b).
Id. Decision 12, paragraph 2 provides:
When the Executive Secretary determines that the processing of all remaining
claims before the panels of Commissioners is likely to take no more than one year to
complete, he should so notify the Governing Council. The Governing Council should
thereupon establish the final time limit for the submission of claims covered by paras.
1(a) and 1(b) of this decision. The Governing Council should establish the final time limit
at its next meeting after receiving such notification and should allow at least three
additional months from the date of its decision for the filing of the claims.
Id.
operations against Iraq.41
c. Claims Submitted for Persons Either Detained or Missing
The First Instalment includes category "C" claims filed on behalf of individuals who are
asserted to be either still missing or in detention in Iraq. All of these claims were submitted on
behalf of Kuwaiti nationals for MPA resulting from hostage-taking or other illegal detention (i.e.,
on page "C1" of the claim form). The issue presented is whether a claim can be submitted on
behalf of an individual who is presumed to be still missing or detained, for the MPA allegedly
suffered by that person.
In Decision 12, the Governing Council established special procedures for the submission
of claims of individuals "who have been detained in Iraq until after or within one year prior to the
expiration of the established filing deadlines." The Decision provides 42 that claims "for losses and
personal injuries" resulting from such detentions "should be submitted to the Commission within
one year of the detainee's release . . . but not later than the time limit to be established pursuant
to paragraph 2 of this decision."43 The Governing Council also foresaw the possibility that these
persons may in fact be deceased, in which case, according to the same Decision, the claims "should
be submitted to the Commission within one year . . . of the death of the detainee, as legally
determined by the detainee's Government, but no later than the time limit to be established
pursuant to paragraph 2 of this decision."44
In accordance with Decision 12, the Panel concludes that claims submitted by third parties
for MPA suffered by individuals alleged to be held in detention by the Government of Iraq may
not be considered for compensation at this stage. Claims for the MPA suffered by such detainees
-- to be considered "losses" within the meaning of Decision 12 -- should be filed by the detainees
Annex 5
16
Decision 1, para. 14.
Report submitted by the Executive Secretary to the Governing Council in Accordance with Article
16 of the Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure (Report No. 4) (S/AC.26/1993/R.16) ("Article 16 Report").
within one year of their release. Alternatively, once a detainee's Government has determined that
the detainee is deceased, a claim may be submitted at that time together with the appropriate
documentation by the decedent's family for his or her death (e.g., on page "C3" of the "C" claim
form).
Regarding claims submitted by third parties on behalf of "missing" persons, the Panel also
concludes that they may not be considered for compensation at this time. The Panel recommends
that a claim be submitted, in accordance with the procedures of Decision 12, once such missing
person is determined to be a detainee who was subsequently released or determined by the
detainee's Government to be deceased. Finally, in instances where it is determined that a missing
person was not a detainee but has died as a direct result of Iraq's invasion and occupation of
Kuwait, a claim may be submitted by his or her family for his or her death.
d. Family Members Eligible to Submit Death and MPA Claims
Decision 1 provides the basis for a category "C" claimant to claim for the death of a family
member. Page "C3" of the claim form, in particular, allows a 45 claim to be filed by a claimant for
the death of his or her "spouse, child or parent." Pursuant to Decision 3, a claimant may also
submit a claim on the "C2" or "C3" pages of the claim form for MPA for witnessing the intentional
infliction of events leading to the serious personal injury or death of a "spouse, child or parent."
Additionally, Decision 8 imposes monetary ceilings with respect to the amount of compensation
payable for MPA per "family unit."
In reviewing category "C" claims for death and different types of MPA, the Panel noted,
similar to the "B" Panel's observation, that claimants and their respective Governments have
interpreted differently the definition of "family."
The issue as a whole was raised in the following manner in Article 16 Report Number 446:
In circumstances where compensation is claimed for death or mental pain and anguish
relating to a family member, there is an issue as to whether included in the terms parent,
child or spouse are, e.g., adopted children, foster parents, wards, guardians and other
legally cognizable family relationships under the laws of various countries. A related issue
is whether the age of children, marital status or other factors should affect the eligibility
for compensation and/or the ceilings in respect of claims for death or mental pain and
Annex 5
Annex 6
U.N. Security Council, 3519th meeting, Resolution 986 (1995), U.N. Doc. S/RES/986
(14 Apr. 1995)
UNITED S NATIONS
Security Council Distr.
GENERAL
S/RES/986 (1995)
14 April 1995
RESOLUTION 986 (1995)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3519th meeting,
on 14 April 1995
The Security Council,
Recalling its previous relevant resolutions,
Concerned by the serious nutritional and health situation of the Iraqi
population, and by the risk of a further deterioration in this situation,
Convinced of the need as a temporary measure to provide for the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people until the fulfilment by Iraq of the
relevant Security Council resolutions, including notably resolution 687 (1991)
of 3 April 1991, allows the Council to take further action with regard to the
prohibitions referred to in resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, in
accordance with the provisions of those resolutions,
Convinced also of the need for equitable distribution of humanitarian
relief to all segments of the Iraqi population throughout the country,
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Iraq,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Authorizes States, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3 (a),
3 (b) and 4 of resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions, to
permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq,
including financial and other essential transactions directly relating thereto,
sufficient to produce a sum not exceeding a total of one billion United States
dollars every 90 days for the purposes set out in this resolution and subject to
the following conditions:
(a) Approval by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), in
order to ensure the transparency of each transaction and its conformity with the
other provisions of this resolution, after submission of an application by the
95-10988 (E) /...
Annex 6
S/RES/986 (1995)
Page 2
State concerned, endorsed by the Government of Iraq, for each proposed purchase
of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products, including details of the purchase
price at fair market value, the export route, the opening of a letter of credit
payable to the escrow account to be established by the Secretary-General for the
purposes of this resolution, and of any other directly related financial or
other essential transaction;
(b) Payment of the full amount of each purchase of Iraqi petroleum and
petroleum products directly by the purchaser in the State concerned into the
escrow account to be established by the Secretary-General for the purposes of
this resolution;
2. Authorizes Turkey, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3 (a),
3 (b) and 4 of resolution 661 (1990) and the provisions of paragraph 1 above, to
permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq
sufficient, after the deduction of the percentage referred to in paragraph 8 (c)
below for the Compensation Fund, to meet the pipeline tariff charges, verified
as reasonable by the independent inspection agents referred to in paragraph 6
below, for the transport of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products through the
Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline in Turkey authorized by paragraph 1 above;
3. Decides that paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution shall come into
force at 00.01 Eastern Standard Time on the day after the President of the
Council has informed the members of the Council that he has received the report
from the Secretary-General requested in paragraph 13 below, and shall remain in
force for an initial period of 180 days unless the Council takes other relevant
action with regard to the provisions of resolution 661 (1990);
4. Further decides to conduct a thorough review of all aspects of the
implementation of this resolution 90 days after the entry into force of
paragraph 1 above and again prior to the end of the initial 180 day period, on
receipt of the reports referred to in paragraphs 11 and 12 below, and expresses
its intention, prior to the end of the 180 day period, to consider favourably
renewal of the provisions of this resolution, provided that the reports referred
to in paragraphs 11 and 12 below indicate that those provisions are being
satisfactorily implemented;
5. Further decides that the remaining paragraphs of this resolution shall
come into force forthwith;
6. Directs the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to monitor
the sale of petroleum and petroleum products to be exported by Iraq via the
Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline from Iraq to Turkey and from the Mina al-Bakr oil
terminal, with the assistance of independent inspection agents appointed by the
Secretary-General, who will keep the Committee informed of the amount of
petroleum and petroleum products exported from Iraq after the date of entry into
force of paragraph 1 of this resolution, and will verify that the purchase price
of the petroleum and petroleum products is reasonable in the light of prevailing
market conditions, and that, for the purposes of the arrangements set out in
this resolution, the larger share of the petroleum and petroleum products is
shipped via the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline and the remainder is exported from
the Mina al-Bakr oil terminal;
/...
Annex 6
S/RES/986 (1995)
Page 3
7. Requests the Secretary-General to establish an escrow account for the
purposes of this resolution, to appoint independent and certified public
accountants to audit it, and to keep the Government of Iraq fully informed;
8. Decides that the funds in the escrow account shall be used to meet the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population and for the following other purposes,
and requests the Secretary-General to use the funds deposited in the escrow
account:
(a) To finance the export to Iraq, in accordance with the procedures of
the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), of medicine, health
supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs,
as referred to in paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991) provided that:
(i) Each export of goods is at the request of the Government of Iraq;
(ii) Iraq effectively guarantees their equitable distribution, on the basis
of a plan submitted to and approved by the Secretary-General,
including a description of the goods to be purchased;
(iii) The Secretary-General receives authenticated confirmation that the
exported goods concerned have arrived in Iraq;
(b) To complement, in view of the exceptional circumstances prevailing in
the three Governorates mentioned below, the distribution by the Government of
Iraq of goods imported under this resolution, in order to ensure an equitable
distribution of humanitarian relief to all segments of the Iraqi population
throughout the country, by providing between 130 million and 150 million United
States dollars every 90 days to the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian
Programme operating within the sovereign territory of Iraq in the three northern
Governorates of Dihouk, Arbil and Suleimaniyeh, except that if less than
one billion United States dollars worth of petroleum or petroleum products is
sold during any 90 day period, the Secretary-General may provide a
proportionately smaller amount for this purpose;
(c) To transfer to the Compensation Fund the same percentage of the funds
deposited in the escrow account as that decided by the Council in paragraph 2 of
resolution 705 (1991) of 15 August 1991;
(d) To meet the costs to the United Nations of the independent inspection
agents and the certified public accountants and the activities associated with
implementation of this resolution;
(e) To meet the current operating costs of the Special Commission, pending
subsequent payment in full of the costs of carrying out the tasks authorized by
section C of resolution 687 (1991);
(f) To meet any reasonable expenses, other than expenses payable in Iraq,
which are determined by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to be
directly related to the export by Iraq of petroleum and petroleum products
permitted under paragraph 1 above or to the export to Iraq, and activities
/...
Annex 6
S/RES/986 (1995)
Page 4
directly necessary therefor, of the parts and equipment permitted under
paragraph 9 below;
(g) To make available up to 10 million United States dollars every 90 days
from the funds deposited in the escrow account for the payments envisaged under
paragraph 6 of resolution 778 (1992) of 2 October 1992;
9. Authorizes States to permit, notwithstanding the provisions of
paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 661 (1990):
(a) The export to Iraq of the parts and equipment which are essential for
the safe operation of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline system in Iraq, subject to
the prior approval by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) of each
export contract;
(b) Activities directly necessary for the exports authorized under
subparagraph (a) above, including financial transactions related thereto;
10. Decides that, since the costs of the exports and activities authorized
under paragraph 9 above are precluded by paragraph 4 of resolution 661 (1990)
and by paragraph 11 of resolution 778 (1991) from being met from funds frozen in
accordance with those provisions, the cost of such exports and activities may,
until funds begin to be paid into the escrow account established for the
purposes of this resolution, and following approval in each case by the
Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), exceptionally be financed by
letters of credit, drawn against future oil sales the proceeds of which are to
be deposited in the escrow account;
11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council 90 days after
the date of entry into force of paragraph 1 above, and again prior to the end of
the initial 180 day period, on the basis of observation by United Nations
personnel in Iraq, and on the basis of consultations with the Government of
Iraq, on whether Iraq has ensured the equitable distribution of medicine, health
supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs,
financed in accordance with paragraph 8 (a) above, including in his reports any
observations he may have on the adequacy of the revenues to meet Iraq’s
humanitarian needs, and on Iraq’s capacity to export sufficient quantities of
petroleum and petroleum products to produce the sum referred to in paragraph 1
above;
12. Requests the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), in close
coordination with the Secretary-General, to develop expedited procedures as
necessary to implement the arrangements in paragraphs 1, 2, 6, 8, 9 and 10 of
this resolution and to report to the Council 90 days after the date of entry
into force of paragraph 1 above and again prior to the end of the initial
180 day period on the implementation of those arrangements;
13. Requests the Secretary-General to take the actions necessary to ensure
the effective implementation of this resolution, authorizes him to enter into
any necessary arrangements or agreements, and requests him to report to the
Council when he has done so;
/...
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S/RES/986 (1995)
Page 5
14. Decides that petroleum and petroleum products subject to this
resolution shall while under Iraqi title be immune from legal proceedings and
not be subject to any form of attachment, garnishment or execution, and that all
States shall take any steps that may be necessary under their respective
domestic legal systems to assure this protection, and to ensure that the
proceeds of the sale are not diverted from the purposes laid down in this
resolution;
15. Affirms that the escrow account established for the purposes of this
resolution enjoys the privileges and immunities of the United Nations;
16. Affirms that all persons appointed by the Secretary-General for the
purpose of implementing this resolution enjoy privileges and immunities as
experts on mission for the United Nations in accordance with the Convention on
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and requires the Government
of Iraq to allow them full freedom of movement and all necessary facilities for
the discharge of their duties in the implementation of this resolution;
17. Affirms that nothing in this resolution affects Iraq’s duty
scrupulously to adhere to all of its obligations concerning servicing and
repayment of its foreign debt, in accordance with the appropriate international
mechanisms;
18. Also affirms that nothing in this resolution should be construed as
infringing the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Iraq;
19. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
-----
Annex 6
Annex 7
U.N. Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, Statement by Mrs. Mary Robinson, U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights (19 Sept. 1997)
Annex 7
1/18/2018 Statement by Mrs. Mary Robinson United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Statement by Mrs. Mary Robinson United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights
Geneva, 19 September 1997
"I have said that I would be a moral voice for victims of human rights violations, and so I feel
compelled to refer to the current political crisis regarding the investigation of alleged massacres
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This investigation has at its core the fundamental
human rights imperative to combat impunity - to dispel the idea that atrocities can be committed
without fear of the consequences.
We are attempting to inject accountability into a region which has been wracked for decades by
cycles of inter-ethnic violence, massacres and forced displacement. This pattern was behind the
sheer horror of the 1994 Rwanda genocide and the displacement of more than a million
Rwandese into neighbouring countries.
I was dismayed at the rejection by the authorities in Kinshasa of the Joint Investigative Mission
and now the obstacles which are preventing the deployment of the Secretary-General's
investigative team.
It is essential that there be a thorough investigation which goes at least some way to ascertaining
the facts and responsibility for the deaths of a large number of refugees and others over the past
year. If there is no day of reckoning then we will send the wrong message and invite further
suffering in the Great Lakes region and elsewhere.
In the past the United Nations has turned away when its investigations have been blocked. Here,
Secretary-General Kofi Annan took the hard option in keeping the issue in front of the Security
Council and maintaining strong international support for an investigation under his own authority.
This is a powerful precedent -- aimed directly at those who would abuse human rights believing
they can deflect international outrage."
http://newsarchive.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?Newsl… 1/1
Annex 8
U.N. Security Council, Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners
Concerning the Seventh Instalment of Individual Claims for Damages up to $100,000 (Category
“C” Claims), U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1999/11 (24 June 1999)
UNITED
NATIONS S
Security Council Distr.
GENERAL
S/AC.26/1999/11
24 June 1999
Original: ENGLISH
UNITED NATIONS
COMPENSATION COMMISSION
GOVERNING COUNCIL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE PANEL OF COMMISSIONERS
CONCERNING THE SEVENTH INSTALMENT OF INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS FOR
DAMAGES UP TO US$100,000 (CATEGORY “C” CLAIMS)
GE.99-63093
Annex 8
S/AC.26/1999/11
Page 17
compensable because the causal link between the invasion and the loss is
not sufficiently direct.
29. In its First Report the Panel also considered relevant rules and
principles of international law, noting that the terms “direct” and
“indirect” are used synonymously with “proximate” and “remote” and that the
most commonly used test in damage claims was whether the act of a State was
the “proximate cause” of the loss suffered. 27/
30. Throughout its review of category “C” claims, the Panel has found
that the difficulty lies in making this determination of “direct”
causation. At the same time, the Panel noted in the First Report that
considerations of logic, fairness and equity must enter into this
determination, bearing in mind the general mandate from the Governing
Council in respect of urgent claims in that expedited procedures be
adopted. 28/ Thus, the Panel’s development of a mass claims processing
system for category “C” claims, in accordance with its mandate, has
influenced the Panel to make certain general presumptions regarding Iraqi
causation, where deemed appropriate, given the legal and factual
circumstances of the particular loss type, as discussed more fully in
section IV infra.
F. Evidentiary standard for category “C” claims
31. In accordance with decision 1 and article 35(c) of the Rules,
evidence must be provided regarding the circumstances surrounding the
claimant’s loss to demonstrate that the loss was a direct consequence of
Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. However, this evidence need only
be the “reasonable minimum” that is “appropriate under the particular
circumstances of the case” and a lesser quantum of evidence is required for
claims for smaller amounts. Thus, in its First Report, the Panel took into
account a number of factors including the different types of evidence
submitted by claimants and background information concerning the
availability, relevance and validity of such evidence in the context of the
circumstances surrounding the invasion and occupation of Kuwait. 29/
32. In the First Report, the Panel determined that the completed claim
form itself constitutes an essential statement by the claimant, that
identification documents submitted as proof of identity not only establish
identity reliably but also serve to establish the fact of the claimant’s
presence in Iraq or Kuwait prior to or during the invasion, or an eligible
family relationship. The Panel found further that personal statements may
in some instances be the best available evidence to indicate the
circumstances of the loss, but that the evidentiary weight to be given to
such statements should vary in relation to the particular loss for which
the statement is submitted. The Panel noted that while witness statements
may often be the only corroborative evidence that a claimant may produce,
such statements may be analysed in the light of the relationship between
Annex 8
Annex 9
U.N. Security Council, Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners
Concerning the Second Instalment of “E1” Claims, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1999/10 (24 June 1999)
UNITED
NATIONS S
Security Council Distr.
GENERAL
S/AC.26/1999/10
24 June 1999
Original: ENGLISH
UNITED NATIONS
COMPENSATION COMMISSION
GOVERNING COUNCIL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE PANEL OF COMMISSIONERS
CONCERNING THE SECOND INSTALMENT OF “E1” CLAIMS
GE.99-62968
Annex 9
S/AC.26/1999/10
Page 16
able to demonstrate a long standing practice, dating back prior to 1980, of
granting Iraqi buyers and contract parties long or deferred payment terms.
D. Evidentiary requirements
30. Article 35(1) of the Rules provides general guidance on the
submission of evidence by a claimant:
“Each claimant is responsible for submitting documents and other
evidence which demonstrate satisfactorily that a particular claim or group
of claims is eligible for compensation pursuant to Security Council
resolution 687 (1991). Each panel will determine the admissibility,
relevance, materiality and weight of any documents and other evidence
submitted.”
31. Pursuant to article 35(3) of the Rules, corporate claims must be
supported by documentary and other appropriate evidence sufficient to
demonstrate the circumstances and amount of the claimed loss. The
Governing Council has made it clear that with respect to business losses
there “will be a need for detailed factual descriptions of the
circumstances of the claimed loss, damage or injury” in order for
compensation to be awarded. 6
32. All corporations filing category “E” claims were required to submit
with their claim forms “a separate statement explaining its claim
(‘Statement of Claim’), supported by documentary and other appropriate
evidence sufficient to demonstrate the circumstances and the amount of the
claimed loss”. 7 In addition, claimants were instructed to include in the
Statement of Claim the following particulars:
“(a) The date, type and basis of the Commission’s jurisdiction for
each element of loss ...;
(b) The facts supporting the claim;
(c) The legal basis for each element of the claim;
(d) The amount of compensation sought, and an explanation of how
this amount was arrived at.” 8
Annex 9
Annex 10
U.N. Security Council, 4241st meeting, Resolution 1330 (2000), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1330 (2000)
(5 Dec. 2000)
Annex 10
United Nations S/RES/1330 (2000)
(~) Security Council
~ ~
Distr.: General
5 December 2000
00-78289 (E)
Resolution 1330 (2000)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4241st meeting, on
5 December 2000
The Security Council,
Recalling its previous relevant resolutions and in particular its resolutions 986
(1995) of 14 April 1995, 1111 (1997) of4 June 1997, 1129 (1997) of 12 September
1997, 1143 (1997) of 4 December 1997, 1153 (1998) of 20 February 1998, 1175
(1998) of 19 June 1998, 1210 (1998) of24 November 1998, 1242 (1999) of21 May
1999, 1266 (1999) of 4 October 1999, 1275 (1999) of 19 November 1999, 1280
(1999) of3 December 1999, 1281 (1999) of 10 December 1999, 1284 (1999) of 17
December 1999, 1293 (2000) of31 March 2000 and 1302 (2000) of8 June 2000,
Convinced of the need as a temporary measure to continue to provide for the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people until the fulfilment by the Government of
Iraq of the relevant resolutions, including notably resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April
1991, allows the Council to take further action with regard to the prohibitions
referred to in resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, in accordance with the
provisions of those resolutions,
Convinced also of the need for equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies
to all segments of the Iraqi population throughout the country,
Determined to improve the humanitarian situation in Iraq,
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Iraq,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
I. Decides that the provisions of resolution 986 (1995), except those
contained in paragraphs 4, 11 and 12 and subject to paragraph 15 of resolution 1284
(1999), shall remain in force for a new period of 180 days beginning at 00.01 hours,
Eastern Standard Time, on 6 December 2000;
2. Further decides that from the sum produced from the import by States of
petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, including financial and other
essential transactions related thereto, in the 180-day period referred to in
paragraph 1 above, the amounts recommended by the Secretary-General in his report
of I February 1998 (S/1998/90) for the food/nutrition and health sectors should
continue to be allocated on a priority basis in the context of the activities of the
Annex 10
S/RES/1330 (2000)
2
Secretariat, of which 13 per cent of the sum produced in the period referred to above
shall be used for the purposes referred to in paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 986
(1995);
3. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take the actions necessary
to ensure the effective and efficient implementation of this resolution, and to
continue to enhance as necessary the United Nations observation process in Iraq
including, within 90 days of the adoption of this resolution, to complete the
recruitment and placement in Iraq of a sufficient number of observers, in particular
the recruitment of the number of observers agreed between the Secretary-General
and the Government of Iraq, in such a way as to provide the required assurance to
the Council that the goods produced in accordance with this resolution are
distributed equitably and that all supplies authorized for procurement, including dual
usage items and spare parts, are utilized for the purpose for which they have been
authorized, including in the housing sector and related infrastructure development;
4. Decides to conduct a thorough review of all aspects of the
implementation of this resolution 90 days after the entry into force of paragraph 1
above and again prior to the end of the 180-day period, and expresses its intention,
prior to the end of the 180-day period, to consider favourably renewal of the
provisions of this resolution as appropriate, provided that the reports referred to in
paragraphs 5 and 6 below indicate that those provisions are being satisfactorily
implemented;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to provide a comprehensive report to the
Council 90 days after the date of entry into force of this resolution on its
implementation and again at least one week prior to the end of the 180-day period,
on the basis of observations of United Nations personnel in Iraq, and of
consultations with the Government of Iraq, on whether Iraq has ensured the
equitable distribution of medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and
supplies for essential civilian needs, financed in accordance with paragraph 8 (a) of
resolution 986 (1995), including in his reports any observations which he may have
on the adequacy of the revenues to meet Iraq's humanitarian needs;
6. Requests the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), in close
consultation with the Secretary-General, to report to the Council 90 days after the
entry into force of paragraph 1 above and prior to the end of the 180-day period on
the implementation of the arrangements in paragraphs 1, 2, 6, 8, 9 and 10 of
resolution 986 (1995);
7. Decides that from the funds produced pursuant to this resolution in the
escrow account established by paragraph 7 of resolution 986 (1995), up to a total of
600 million United States dollars may be used to meet any reasonable expenses,
other than expenses payable in Iraq, which follow directly from the contracts
approved in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 1175 (1998) and paragraph
18 of resolution 1284 (1999), and expresses its intention to consider favourably the
renewal of this measure;
8. Expresses its readiness to consider, in the light of the cooperation of the
Government of Iraq in implementing all the resolutions of the Council, allowing a
sum of 15 million United States dollars drawn from the escrow account to be used
for the payment of the arrears in Iraq's contribution to the budget of the United
Annex 10
S/RES/1330 (2000)
Nations, and considers that this sum should be transferred from the account created
pursuant to paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 986 (1995);
9. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to transfer the
excess funds drawn from the account created pursuant to paragraph 8 (d) of
resolution 986 (1995) for the purposes set out in paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 986
(1995) in order to increase the funds available for humanitarian purchases, including
as appropriate the purposes referred to in paragraph 24 of resolution 1284 (1999);
I 0. Directs the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to approve,
on the basis of proposals from the Secretary-General, lists of basic electricity and
housing supplies consistent with the priority given to the most vulnerable groups in
Iraq, decides, notwithstanding paragraph 3 of resolution 661 (1990) and paragraph
20 of resolution 687 (1991 ), that supplies of these items will not be submitted for
approval of that Committee, except for items subject to the provisions of resolution
1051 ( 1996), and will be notified to the Secretary-General and financed in
accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 986
(1995), requests the Secretary-General to inform the Committee in a timely manner
of all such notifications received and actions taken, and expresses its readiness to
consider such action with regard to lists of further supplies, in particular in the
transport and telecommunications sectors;
11. Requests the Secretary-General to expand and update, within 30 days of
the adoption of this resolution, the lists of humanitarian items submitted in
accordance with paragraph 17 of resolution 1284 (1999) and paragraph 8 of
resolution 1302 (2000), directs the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990)
to approve expeditiously the expanded lists, decides that supplies of these items will
not be submitted for approval of the Committee established by resolution 661
(1990), except for items subject to the provisions of resolution 1051 (1996), and will
be notified to the Secretary-General and financed in accordance with the provisions
of paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 986 (1995), and requests the SecretaryGeneral
to inform the Committee in a timely manner of all such notifications
received and actions taken;
12. Decides that the effective deduction rate of the funds deposited in the
escrow account established by resolution 986 (1995) to be transferred to the
Compensation Fund in the 180-day period shall be 25 per cent, further decides that
the additional funds resulting from this decision will be deposited into the account
established under paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 986 (1995) to be used for strictly
humanitarian projects to address the needs of the most vulnerable groups in Iraq as
referred to in paragraph 126 of the report of the Secretary-General of 29 November
2000 (S/2000/1132), requests the Secretary-General to report on the use of these
funds in his reports referred to in paragraph 5 above, and expresses its intention to
establish a mechanism to review, before the end of the 180-day period, the effective
deduction rate of the funds deposited in the escrow account to be transferred to the
Compensation Fund in future phases, taking into account the key elements of the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people;
13. Urges the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to review
applications in an expeditious manner, to decrease the level of applications on hold
and to continue to improve the approval process of applications, and in this regard
stresses the importance of the full implementation of paragraph 3 above;
3
Annex 10
S/RES/1330 (2000)
4
14. Urges all States submitting applications, all financial institutions,
including the Central Bank of Iraq, and the Secretariat, to take steps to minimize the
problems identified in the report of the Secretary-General of 29 November 2000
pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1302 (2000);
15. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements,
subject to the approval of the Council, to allow funds deposited in the escrow
account established by resolution 986 (1995) to be used for the purchase of locally
produced goods and to meet the local cost for essential civilian needs which have
been funded in accordance with the provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related
resolutions, including, where appropriate, the cost of installation and training
services, and further requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary
arrangements, subject to the approval of the Council, to allow funds up to 600
million euros deposited in the escrow account established by resolution 986 (1995)
to be used for the cost of installation and maintenance, including training services,
of the equipment and spare parts for the oil industry which have been funded in
accordance with the provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions, and
calls upon the Government of Iraq to cooperate in the implementation of all such
arrangements;
16. Urges all States, and in particular the Government of Iraq, to provide
their full cooperation in the effective implementation of this resolution;
17. Calls upon the Government of Iraq to take the remaining steps necessary
to implement paragraph 27 of resolution 1284 (1999), and further requests the
Secretary-General to include in his reports under paragraph 5 above a review of the
progress made by the Government oflraq in the implementation of these measures;
18. Requests also the Secretary-General to prepare a report as expeditiously
as possible but no later than 31 March 2001 for the Committee established by
resolution 661 ( 1990) containing proposals for the use of additional export routes
for petroleum and petroleum products, under appropriate conditions otherwise
consistent with the purpose and provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related
resolutions, and particularly addressing the possible pipelines that might be utilized
as additional export routes;
19. Reiterates its request in paragraph 8 of resolution 1284 (1999) to the
Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission and to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency
to complete by the end of this period the revision and updating of the lists of items
and technology to which the import/export mechanism approved by resolution 1051
(1996) applies;
20. Stresses the need to continue to ensure respect for the security and safety
of all persons directly involved in the implementation of this resolution in Iraq, and
calls upon the Government of Iraq to complete its investigation into the death of
employees of the Food and Agriculture Organization and to forward it to the
Council;
21. Appeals to all States to continue to cooperate in the timely submission of
applications and the expeditious issue of export licences, facilitating the transit of
humanitarian supplies authorized by the Committee established by resolution 661
(1990), and to take all other appropriate measures within their competence in order
Annex 10
S/RES/1330 (2000)
to ensure that urgently needed humanitarian supplies reach the Iraqi people as
rapidly as possible;
22. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
5
Annex 11
U.N. Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc.
S/2001/357 (12 Apr. 2001)
Annex 11
United Nations
• Security Council Distr.: General
12 April 2001
Original: English
Letter dated 12 April 2001 from the Secretary-General
to the President of the Security Council
I wish to refer to the presidential statement dated 2 June 2000
(S/PRST/2000/20) in which the Security Council requested me to establish a Panel
of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a period of six months. The
Council also requested that the expert panel, once established, submit to the
Council, through me, its final report at the end of the mandate.
Further to my letter dated 2 April 2001, I have the honour to transmit to you
the report of the Panel, submitted to me by the Chairperson of the Panel. I should be
grateful if you would bring the report to the attention of the members of the Security
Council. ·
(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
01-32354 (E) 130401
111I1II 1ll III llI I IllI II llI I 111111111111111111
S1200113s1
Annex 11
S/2001/357
exploitation evolved to an active extraction phase: Both
Congolese (civilians and soldiers) and foreigners
(civilians and soldiers) became involved in the
extraction of natural resources. This section highlights
one particular case study rather than offering a number
of shorter illustrative examples. The study will in effect
demonstrate how a company used illicit business
practices and complicity with occupying forces ~d the
Government as well as its international connections to
exploit the natural resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
47. DARA-Forest case study. A Ugandan-Thai
forest company called DARA-Forest moved to the Ituri
area late in 1998. In March 1998, DARA-Forest
applied for a licence to carry out logging activities_ in
the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo, but was denied
a forest concession by the Kinshasa authorities. In
1999 the company began to buy production by hiring
indiv\duals to harvest timber and then sell it to the
company. Initially, these individuals were Congolese
operating in partnership with Ugandans. The same
year, DARA engaged in industrial production wi!h the
construction of a sawmill in Mangina. By 2000, 1t had
obtained its own concession from RCD-ML. Analysis
of satellite images over a period of time reveals the
extent to which deforestation occurred in Orientale
Province between 1998 and 2000. The most harvested
forests in the areas were around Djugu, Mambassa,
Beni, Komanda, Luna, Mont Moyo and Aboro. This
logging activity was carried out without conside~ation
of any of the minimum acceptable rules of timber
harvesting for sustainable forest management or even
sustainable logging.
48. Timber harvested in this region, which is
occupied by the Ugandan army and RCD-ML, has
exclusively transited or remained in Uganda. Our own
investigation in Kampala has shown that mahogany
originating in the Democratic Republic of the <?ongo is
largely available in Kampala, at a lower pnce than
Ugandan mahogany. This difference in price is simply
due to the lower cost of acquisition of timber. Timber
harvested in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by
Uganda pays very little tax or none at all. In addition,
customs fees are generally not paid when soldiers
escort those trucks or when orders are received from
some local commanders or General Kazini. Timber
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo is then
exported to Kenya and Uganda, and to other continents.
The Panel gathered from the Kenyan port authorities
10
that vast quantities of timber are exported to Asia,
Europe and North America.
49. The Panel also discovered during its investigation
that individual Ugandan loggers violated forestry
legislation, recognized by their ally RCD-M~, by
logging (extracting) the timber directly. Accordmg to
the Congolese legislation on the permis de coupe, only
individual Congolese nationals are allowed to harvest
timber and only in small quantities. Foreigners must
apply for the larger concessions. Initially, Ugandans
operated in partnership with a Congolese permit holder.
Soon, the Ugandans began to pay the Congolese to
sub-lease the permit and, subsequently, to obtain the
licence in direct violation of the law.
50. Timber extraction in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and its export have been characterized by
unlawfulness and illegality. Besides extracting timber
without authorization in a sovereign country and in
violation of the local legislation, DARA-Forest
consistently exported its timber without any
certification procedure. It tried to approach some
certification bodies licensed by the Forest Stewardship
Council. These bodies requested documentation and
elements that the company failed to provide. Yet
DARA-Forest exported timber in violation of a normal
procedure generally required and accepted by the
international forest community and gradually
considered to be international "soft law". Companies
importing this uncertified timber from DARA-Forest
were essentially in major industrialized countries,
including Belgium, China, Denmark, Japan, Kenya,
Switzerland and the United States of America.
51. The Panel also realized that DARA Great Lakes
Industries (DGLI), of which DARA-Forest is a
subsidiary, along with a sister company in Uganda,
Nyota Wood Industries, is in collusion with the
Ministry of Water, Land and Forests of Uganda in
establishing a scheme to facilitate the certification of
timber coming from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. In May 2000, DOLi signed a contract for forest
stewardship certification with SmartWood and the
Rogue Institute for Ecology and Economy in Oregon,
United States of America. On 21 March 2000, the
Director of the DARA group, Prossy Balaba, sent a
letter to the Commissioner asking him to allow an
official of SmartWood to visit certain forests, such as
Budongo and Bugoma; he was due to vis_it the region.in
mid-April. The visit was meant to deceive the offi~1al
by presenting those forests as the ones for which
Annex 11
certification was sought and to convince SmartWood to
work for the certification of their timber. Indeed, when
the visit took place, from 14 to 16 April, the DARA
group had not even applied for the concession of the
Budongo forest (Uganda). It was only on 5 July 2000
that John Kotiram of the DARA group wrote to the
Commissioner to request the concession on the
Budongo forest.
52. The idea behind this is to use Budongo forest as a
model of forests from which timber is harvested and
which comply with the international requirements for
certification, in order to certify timber coming from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo for which basic
elements of certification do not exist. Future plans for
beating the international system are already in place.
According to internal documents of DGLI, DARAForest
will import timber from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo into Uganda, which will be
processed for different types of products in the new
plant in Namanve for the sawmilling of hardwood, both
imported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and harvested in Uganda. DGLI partners in this new
scheme include DARA Europe GmbH Germany,
Shanton President Wood Supply Co. Ltd China,
President Wood Supply Co. Ltd Thailand, DARA
Tropical Hardwood, Portland, Oregon, United States of
America. The distribution of sales of the company is
thought to remain the same, about 30 per cent to the
Far East, China, Japan and Singapore, 40 per cent to
Europe and 25 per cent to North America. DARA Great
Lakes Industries shareholding and management is
between Thai and Ugandan nationals, among them
John Supit Kotiran and Pranee Chanyuttasart of
Thailand and Prossy Balaba of Uganda. Some
unconfirmed information indicates that members of
President Museveni's family are shareholders of DGLI,
although more investigation is needed.
53. The DARA group also established another
scheme to carry out fraudulent activities in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The objects of
DGLI range from logging to financial and industrial
activities. Because of the confusion created between
DARA-Forest, which received a concession from RCD,
and DGLI, DARA-Forest has also been dealing in
diamonds, gold and coltan. The Panel has received
reports from the custom posts of Mpondwe, Kasindi
and Bundbujyo of the export from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo of minerals such as cassiterite
and coltan in trucks. During the Panel's visit to Bunia it
S/2001/357
was reported that other products were loaded in trucks
which are supposed to carry timber only; it is likely
that coltan and cassiterite were these products.
Moreover, the fraud extends to the forging of
documents and declarations "originating" in Kinshasa.
54. The logging rate was alarming around Butembo,
Beni, Boga and Mambassa. The RCD-ML
administration acknowledged its lack of control over
the rate of extraction, the collection of taxes on logging
activities and the customs fees at the exit points. On the
basis of eyewitness accounts, satellite images, key
actors' acknowledgements and the Panel's own
investigation, there is sufficient evidence to prove that
timber extraction is directly related to the Ugandan
presence in Orientale Province. This has reached
alarming proportions and Ugandans (civilians, soldiers
and companies) are extensively involved in these
activities. In May 2000, RCD-ML attributed a
concession of 100,000 hectares to DARA-Forest. Since
September 1998, overall DARA-Forest has been
exporting approximately 48,000 m 3 of timber per year.
55. Other extraction schemes. Burundians and
Rwandans have also extracted timber or have been
associated with Congolese loggers. Roads to evacuate
timber from places deeper in the forest are in a very
bad state. Yet Congo timber, as it is referred to in
Bujumbura, is readily available in Burundi and
Rwanda. Some Burundians, however, are also involved
in the harvesting of bark from prunus Africana. This
tree is known and used in medicine for prostate
treatment. Statistics gathered from the Tanzanian Port
Authority clearly indicate that Burundi exported those
barks in 1998 and 1999. Prunus Africana is not found
in Burundi, however, but rather in the forests of South
Kivu.
56. Mining sector. In the mining sector, direct
extraction was carried out in three ways, namely (a) by
individual soldiers for their own benefit; {b) by locals
organized by Rwandan and Ugandan commanders; and
(c) by foreign nationals for the army or commanders'
benefit.
57. The Panel came across a number of cases in
which soldiers were directly involved in mining in
Watsa. In September 1999, the UPDF local commander
demanded the extraction of gold on the pillars of the
Gorumbwa mine galleries in which dynamite was used.
On 9 September, the galleries collapsed, leading to the
death of a number of Congolese miners. Some months
11
Annex 11
contacted her aides, but she never arranged a meeting
with the Panel.
93. She was recently appointed by RCD-Goma as
General Manager of SOMIGL, a conglomerate of four
partners, which obtained the monopoly for the
commercialization and export of coltan. This monopoly
has strengthened her position as a major player in the
trade in coltan in the region. RCD-Goma, in an attempt
to explain this partnership, said that she is a very useful
person and would bring $1 million to RCD monthly.
Some sources have told the Panel members that her
network of contacts is impressive and that she controls
almost every official in RCD-Goma. According to
some sources, she is also involved with her daughter
Djamila in counterfeiting currency. Mrs. Gulamali is
famous for forging customs declarations, especially for
the products she exports. Confronted recently with a
false customs declaration w~ere coltan was declared as
cassiterite, she replied, "in this business everybody
does that". Her declaration alerted the Panel to the
extent to which fraud is prevalent among the
companies that export coltan.
F. Economic data: confirmation of the
illegal exploitation of the natural
resources of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo
94. All the empirical evidence provided above is
complemented by the economic analysis of data
provided by different sources.
Uganda
95. At the request of the Panel, the Ugandan
authorities provided extensive data, including
production and export values for agricultural products
such as coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco. In terms of
minerals, the data also cover gold and coltan
production and export figures.
96. The official data contain substantial
discrepancies. First, export figures for gold are
consistently greater than production values, as shown
in table l and figure l.
97. The gap between production and export could
originate from the exploitation of the natural resources
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Central
Bank of Uganda has reportedly acknowledged to IMF
S/2001/357
officials that the volume of Ugandan gold exports does
not reflect this country's production levels but rather
that some exports might be "leaking over the borders"
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The
central bank reported that, by September 1997, Uganda
had exported gold valued at $105 million, compared
with $60 million in 1996 and $23 million in 1995.
98. Second, the data from the Ugandan authorities are
silent with regard to diamond production and export.
Several third party sources (WTO, World Federation of
Diamond Bourses, Diamond High Council) indicate
diamond exports from Uganda during the last three
years. These diamond exports are suspicious for many
reasons:
(a) Uganda has no known diamond production;
(b) Diamond exports from Uganda are observed
only in the last few years, coinciding surprisingly with
the occupation of the eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo as shown in table 2 and figure 2;
(c) Finally, these facts corroborate the Panel's
findings from field investigation, discussions and
external observers on the need to control the rich
diamond zone near Kisangani and Banalia.
99. These figures are understated and there are
indications that Uganda exported more diamonds.
However, this is not well captured in the statistics
because of the loose regulations governing the free
zone areas. These regulations permit diamonds
originating in any country to be repackaged, and then
to be sold from any country as diamonds from a
country of origin that is not necessarily the one
mentioned in the statistics.
19
Annex 11
S/2001/357
20
Table l
Uganda: mineral exports and production, 1994-2000
Year Gold Tin Co/tan Cobalt
A. Mineral exports (tons)
1994 0.22
1995 3.09
1996 5.07 3.55
1997 6.82 4.43 2.57
1998 5.03 18.57
1999 11.45 69.5 67.48
2000 10.83 275.98
B. Mineral production (tons)
1994 0.0016 3.704 0.435
1995 0.0015 4.289 1.824
1996 0.003 0.38
1997 0.0064 1.81
1998 0.0082 1.102
1999 0.0047 76.74
2000 0.0044 287.51
Source: Uganda, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. 2000 data are from January to
October.
11194
Figure 1. Uganda: gold production and exports, 1994-2000
1995 1996 11197
Year
1998 11199 2000
Annex 11
Table 2
Uganda: rough diamond exports, 1997-
October 2000
Volume Value
Year (carats) (United States dollars)
1997 l 511.34 198 302
1998 11 303.86 1 440 OOO
1999 11 024.46 1813500
2000 9 387.51 l 263 385
Source: Diamond High Council.
I 00. Data collected from any third party consistently
show that Uganda has become a diamond exporting
country; they also show that diamond exports from
Uganda coincide with the years of the wars in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, that is from 1997
onward.
101. As far as niobium is concerned, the pattern
appears to be the same: no production prior to 1997
followed by a series of increases in exports as shown in
table 3 and figure 3.
Table 3
Uganda: niobium exports, 1995-1999
(thousands of United States dollars)
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Source: World Trade Organization (aggregated data).
Niobium
0
0
13
580
782
102. Third, the Ugandan authorities, in their response
to the Panel's questionnaire, stated that there was no
record of transit of mineral products. However, the
Panel received information from one Ugandan customs
post at the border between the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and Uganda. Records for 1998, 1999 and
2000 reveal that mineral products as well as other
commodities left the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and entered Uganda (presumably this would
also prove true for the other dozen or so points of
entry). The following three examples show an increase
S/2001I357
in the transboundary movement of natural resources
between 1998 and 1999.
Coffee
Timber
1998: 144,911 bags
1999: 170,079 bags
2000: 208,000 bags
1998: l,900m3
1999: 3,782 m3 and 46,299 pcs
2000: 3,272 m3 and 3,722 pcs
Cassiterite* 1998: None
1999: 30 kgs
2000: 151 drums
• The sudden increase in the import of cassiterite may
also mean an increase in the import of coltan. The Panel
discovered that cassiterite is often listed in lieu of
coltan, as coltan possesses a higher value, which
implies high import taxes in Uganda.
Rwanda
103. In response to the request for statistics by the
Panel, the Rwandan authorities provided the following
data:
Table 4
Rwanda: mineral production, 1995-2000
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Gold
(kg)
10
17
10
10
Cassiterite
(tons)
247
330
327
330
309
437
Source: Rwanda Official Statistics (No. 227/01/10/MIN).
Co/tan
(tons)
54
97
224
224
122
83
21
Annex 12
Claude Kabemba, U.N.H.C.R., Centre for Documentation and Research, The Democratic
Republic of Congo: From Independence to Africa’s First World War, WRITENET Paper No.
16/2000 (June 2001)
UNHCR
Centre for Documentation and Research
WRITENET Paper No. 16/2000
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO:
FROMINDEPENDENCE TO AFRICA’S FIRSTWORLDWAR
By Claude Kabemba
Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
June 2001
WriteNet is a Network of Researchers and Writers on
Human Rights, Forced Migration, Ethnic and Political Conflict
WriteNet is a Subsidiary of Practical Management (UK)
E-mail: [email protected]
THIS PAPER WAS PREPARED MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION,
ANALYSIS AND COMMENT. ALL SOURCES ARE CITED. THE PAPER IS NOT, AND DOES NOT PURPORT
TO BE, EITHER EXHAUSTIVE WITH REGARD TO CONDITIONS IN THE COUNTRY SURVEYED, OR
CONCLUSIVE AS TO THE MERITS OF ANY PARTICULAR CLAIM TO REFUGEE STATUS OR ASYLUM. THE
VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THE PAPER ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AND ARE NOT NECESSARILY THOSE
OF WRITENET OR UNHCR.
Annex 12
3
The process of exploitation of the resources of the vast Congo territory pushed Belgium to look to
the wider region for the supply of labour, especially for the Katanga mining industry. It naturally
turned to the vast population of Kivu, Rwanda and Burundi, Zambia and Kasai province.7 But the
population of Rwanda constituted the main reliable source. However, these immigrants from
Rwanda, because of the colonial system which organized people according to their origin and tribe,
did not become integrated with the indigenous Congolese despite the fact they have lived together
for many decades peacefully. Indeed, Belgian policy did not favour integration of different ethnic
groups.
Additionally, colonial legislation was not clear on the issue of the status of the population of Rwandan
origin in Congo, and at independence, legislation dealt only with election-related problems and failed
to address the citizenship question of what had become an extremely diverse population. One must
bear in mind that the citizenship of this population is one of the causes of the current conflict in the
DRC. In 1960, Congo hastily gained its independence while major issues remained unresolved,
issues that would sooner or later generate serious conflicts among the populations of the Great Lakes
region.8 The Belgian colonizer succeeded in establishing the three countries, Congo, Rwanda and
Burundi, without a clear vision of a nation. The more than two hundred Congolese ethnic groups and
the three ethnic groups that are found in both Rwanda and Burundi progressed separately without
real integration. The unique common denominator between them was their servitude to the same
administration. Colonial prescriptions gave rise to the distinction between settlers and natives among
those living in the colony. This prescription continues in post-independence Congo.
2. Governance of the DRC During the Mobutu Era
After five years of political instability, Colonel Joseph Désiré Mobutu took power on 24 November
1965. He quickly asserted control over the state. Like the Belgians before him, Mobutu reverted to
a form of strong centralized and oppressive administration. By hanging in public four former ministers
from the first Republic in an affair known as the Pentecost Plot, Mobutu clearly sent a message to
the Congolese people that opposition to his programme would not be tolerated.9 He took advantage
of the political chaos of multiparty democracy that had prevailed during the first five years of
independence, to progressively dismantle the institutions of the first Republic and to abolish the
constitution. He totally ignored the fundamental law, the first Congolese constitution based on
multiparty democracy. The 1964 Luluaburg constitution suppressed the parliamentary regime and
gave exclusive ownership of the soil and subsoil to the Congolese State. In 1967, he modified the
Luluaburg constitution, introducing a two party democracy system. In 1970 he further consolidated
his power by introducing the one party system which fused together the Mouvement Populaire de la
Révolution - his political party, and the State.
7 Baleme, N.K.A., Bantu Ethnic and Traditional Realities in Focus of Central Africa, Libreville: CICIBA,
1999, pp. 28 and 101
8 Ibid.
9 Leslie, W.J., Zaire: Continuity and Political Change in an Oppressive State, Boulder CO: Westview Press,
1993, p. 32
Annex 12
Annex 13
U.N. Security Council, Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1072 (13 Nov. 2001)
United Nations S/2001/1072
Security Council Distr.: General
13 November 2001
Original: English
01-63001 (E) 151101
*0163001*
Letter dated 10 November 2001 from the Secretary-General to the
President of the Security Council
I wish to refer to the presidential statement dated 3 May 2001
(S/PRST/2001/13), in which the Security Council extended the mandate of the Panel
of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a final period of three months. I
also wish to refer to the President’s letter, by which the Panel’s mandate was
extended until 30 November 2001 (S/2001/951), and the Panel was requested to
submit, through me, an addendum to its final report.
I have the honour to transmit to you the addendum to the report of the Panel,
submitted to me by the Chairperson of the Panel. I should be grateful if you would
bring the report to the attention of the members of the Security Council.
(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
Annex 13
15
S/2001/1072
66. Documentary evidence gathered shows that, in
1999, over 30 per cent of the first semester earnings of
MIBA were transferred to Government accounts. Those
transfers were vaguely labelled “payments to fiscal
accounts” (paiements accomptes fiscaux). It is not clear
who within the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo controls these accounts, or what
the funds transferred to them are used for. Another 11
per cent of the earnings from that period were
funnelled directly to the Congolese armed forces. Other
transfers from MIBA sales are described in official
documents as “deductions for the war effort”,
amounting to tens of millions of dollars. Testimony
from very credible sources corroborates what these
documents suggest: a pattern over the past three years
of diverting a hefty percentage of MIBA earnings to
high-level government officials for their personal
benefit, as well as to cover war or military-related
expenses.
67. In some cases, it appears that deals were
concluded because they were linked, directly or
indirectly, to arms and military support. In 1997, the
Kabila Government ended the exclusive contract it had
with De Beers to buy all of the industrial diamond
output of MIBA. Following a period in which
Congolese diamonds were sold on the international
auction market to the highest bidder, President Kabila
reached an agreement with the Israeli-owned
International Diamond Industries in August 2000 for a
monopoly on diamond sales. According to the terms of
the agreement, IDI agreed to pay $20 million in return
for a monopoly on sales valued at $600 million
annually. The Panel was informed by very credible
sources that this deal included unpublished clauses, in
which IDI agreed to arrange, through its connections
with high-ranking Israeli military officers the delivery
of undisclosed quantities of arms as well as training for
the Congolese armed forces.
68. IDI ultimately paid only $3 million from the
agreed sum of $20 million. President Joseph Kabila
decided in April 2001 to end the contract, citing failure
to pay as the reason. In his statement, the owner of IDI,
Dan Gertler, claimed that IDI had complied with its
obligations and alleged that the Government’s decision
was motivated by the fact that information about the
agreement was included in the Panel’s final report. The
statement also insisted that the Panel did not consult
with IDI and demanded that the Panel rectify its report.
The Panel requested to meet with IDI representatives in
Kinshasa in September 2001. IDI declined this request.
IDI is reportedly trying to negotiate some form of
compensation for breach of contract with the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
69. It is important to look at this failed Kabila-Gertler
deal as a number of key aspects are significant. On the
Congolese side, it comes within a pattern of
miscalculated decisions taken by the cash-strapped
Laurent-Désiré Kabila, whose main interest was the
immediate cash flow. Although there was some
discontent within Kabila’s entourage at the
outrageousness of the deal, it was, nonetheless, not
revoked until seven months after it was signed. The
Panel has credible information indicating that there is a
growing involvement of Israeli businessmen in the
region. Taking advantage of the withdrawal of De
Beers from conflict diamond regions, a whole network
of Israelis was established, including Mr. Gertler in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lev Leviev in
Angola and Shmuel Shnitzer in Sierra Leone. In all
three cases, the pattern is the same. Conflict diamonds
are exchanged for money, weapons and military
training. These diamonds are then transported to Tel
Aviv by former Israeli Air Force pilots, whose numbers
have significantly increased both in UNITA-held
territory in Angola and in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. In Israel, these diamonds are then cut and
sold at the Ramat Gan Diamond Centre.
70. During their meetings with the Panel, members of
the Congolese Commission indicated that, as the
country moves towards greater political openness, the
Kinshasa Government will have to take action on the
issue of Zimbabwe’s activities in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The Commission also
expressed their view that the question should figure on
the agenda of the inter-Congolese dialogue, and that a
protocol d’accord must be established between the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe to
rectify the irregularities, including agreements secretly
signed under pressure of the military situation at the
time.
71. Further evidence of this collapse of a functional
State, and its inability to make decisions in its national
interest, is reflected in the stance currently adopted by
the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo towards the activities being carried out in the
rebel-held areas. The Panel has learned, from
commercial companies and individual business people
who have operated under both the Kinshasa
Annex 13
16
S/2001/1072
Government and rebel authorities, that the regulations
and procedures have not, for the most part, changed
under rebel administrations. In fact, civil servants
appointed by the Government are still performing such
duties as customs control and tax collection in rebelheld
areas. However, the taxes are not received by the
Government in Kinshasa but are diverted for the use of
the rebels and Uganda and Rwanda. This is
acknowledged by the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, which, offered in September
2001 to pay the 37-month arrears and salaries of those
civil servants. Furthermore, the Government in
Kinshasa appears to have recognized the activities of
the commercial entities in the rebel-held areas. One of
the many examples is the German-owned company
Somikivu, which operates in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo, but continues to pay taxes to
the rebels and maintains an office in Kinshasa. When
asked about the legal status of the commercial entities
operating in the rebel-held and occupied territories, the
Congolese Minister of Justice informed the Panel
during a meeting in September 2001 that none of the
concessions had been revoked thus far, and that an
evaluation on a case-by-case basis would be conducted
when the Government regained control of the areas in
which they are operating.
72. To further demonstrate this, the Panel has taken a
closer look at the legal status of DARA Forest, a Thaiowned
company operating in North Kivu Province.
DARA Forest is a Congolese-registered logging
company owned by five shareholders. Royal Star
Holdings is the main shareholder, and is partly owned
by the managing director of DARA Forest, John
Kotiram. Besides Mr. Kotiram, there are three
Congolese shareholders. In March 1998, DARA Forest
registered as a Congolese company in Kinshasa, after
which work was begun on building a sawmill in
Mangina in North Kivu Province. In June 1998, DARA
Forest was granted a 35,000-hectare logging
concession from the North Kivu Provincial Authority,
which grants these concessions following registration
with the central Government. DARA Forest also
acquired an exploitation licence from the same
authority to buy and export from local loggers. Its
exports, which were to the United States and China,
started early in 1999, months after the beginning of the
war.
73. DARA Forest, which the Panel has found to have
complied with all the regulations in effect, currently
pays its taxes at the same bank as it did before the area
came under rebel control. It also deals with the same
customs officials as it did before the rebels took control
of the area when it exports its products and imports
production equipment. The Panel has also learned that
a bimonthly check is conducted by the local Congolese
authorities in North Kivu to ensure that DARA Forest
is complying with the terms of licences granted to it.
Furthermore, DARA Forest was granted on 12
September 2001 a certificate of registration from the
Ministry of Justice in Kinshasa. This would appear to
be a clear sign of recognition of the company and
acceptance of its work in the rebel-held areas by the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
74. The case of Arslanian Frères also demonstrates
the ambiguity of the Government’s approach. The
diamond company Arslanian Frères, based in Belgium,
has an agreement to buy all the stock of the Belco
Diamants comptoir in Kisangani and to “help them
financially when needed” and has been travelling to
Kisangani to openly purchase diamonds mined in the
rebel-held areas surrounding the town. Nevertheless,
one of the owners of the company, Raffi Arslanian, was
approached in writing in 2001 by the Government’s
Minister of Mines to invest in a multi-million-dollar
project aimed at reorganizing the State-owned
diamond-producing enterprise MIBA.
75. There are many indications that President Joseph
Kabila is genuinely interested in bringing about
positive changes in his country. The Panel has noted
that, not withstanding the political considerations
involved in the granting of favourable concessions to
his allies, there are serious attempts to attract foreign
investment to restructure, modernize and liberalize the
remaining State assets in the mining business. In this
respect, the country’s new mining code is expected to
bring about some fundamental and positive changes to
the mining industry in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
Zimbabwe
76. According to information available to the Panel,
there are five main factors at play, which helped to
shape the Zimbabwean objectives in its involvement in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. One
determining factor is Zimbabwe’s desire to assert its
role within SADC. Supporting the Democratic
Republic of the Congo militarily presented such an
opportunity. A second factor lies in Zimbabwe’s ailing
Annex 13
17
S/2001/1072
economy and political system. The results of the gross
mismanagement of the economy, unchecked public
expenditure, corruption and one-party rule are apparent
and are reflected in falling standards of living. Like the
land appropriation policy, a military campaign was
seen as a means to rally public support for the State’s
leaders. The third factor is that Zimbabwe had
supported President Kabila’s AFDL in 1996, pledging
$5 million to help finance the efforts to overthrow the
Mobutu regime. The fourth, and most notable, factor
was the lesson learned from Zimbabwe’s military
involvement in the civil war in Mozambique. As a
revolutionary and freedom fighter, President Mugabe
had pledged military forces to that country, only to find
that South African businessmen moved in to
monopolize the market after the Zimbabwean
withdrawal. Government leaders were determined not
to make the same mistake in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. There is yet a fifth factor, which the
Panel has heard from a number of analysts. The
declining exchange rate, the failing Zimbabwean
mining industry, and the critical energy shortage in
Zimbabwe have left few sources for personal
enrichment by Government officials. These officials
started looking to the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
77. Zimbabwean commercial activities in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo began when
Zimbabwean Defence Industries, a company owned by
the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, secured the sale of
foodstuffs and ordnance to Kabila’s troops as they
advanced towards Kinshasa. Following the outbreak of
the war in 1998, Zimbabwe’s new status in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo was reflected in the
appointment of Billy Rautenbach to head Gécamines,
as well as the deal secured for Congo-Duka, a joint
venture between ZDI and a Congolese company,
General Strategic Reserves, to supply foodstuffs and
other consumer goods to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. That company failed, however, because of
its unsound financial policy, discouraging the very
investors ZDI was hoping to attract.
78. The key figure in Zimbabwe’s commercial
involvement is Emmerson Mnangagwa. Viewed as a
loyal member of ZANU-PF by President Mugabe,
Mr. Mnangagwa first became involved in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo when President
Mugabe sent him in 1998 to investigate the state of the
Zimbabwean forces there. Mr. Mnangagwa, the
architect of the commercial activities of ZANU-PF,
used his leverage on President Kabila, and drew up the
first plans for Zimbabwe’s commercial designs in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. It was during that
phase, in 1999, that Operation Sovereign Legitimacy
(OSLEG) was conceived, following the summit held in
Windhoek in 1999, at which the allies had demanded
compensation for their involvement in the conflict.
79. OSLEG represents the commercial side of the
Zimbabwe Defence Forces in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. Its directors are predominantly top
military officials. Its principal platform for business
ventures has been COSLEG, a joint venture agreement
with COMIEX, a company then controlled by the late
President Laurent-Désiré Kabila and ranking AFDL
officials. The role of OSLEG was defined as that of the
partner with “the resources to protect and defend,
support logistically, and assist generally in the
development of commercial ventures to explore,
research, exploit and market the mineral, timber, and
other resources held by the State of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo”. While President Kabila
provided the concessions, the Zimbabweans supplied
the muscle to secure the commercial activities. Thirdparty
investors have been brought in to furnish needed
capital and expertise. Attracting the third party has not
been a difficult task, since Zimbabwe’s added leverage
on the Democratic Republic of the Congo has allowed
it to obtain very favourable terms for its deals. The
prevailing business environment is another incentive.
The constraints of governmental controls and
regulations and a functioning legal system to enforce
them are often absent. As a result, the Zimbabwean
army has been successful in enticing investors, often
with off-shore companies, to bankroll and make
operational its joint ventures. This pattern now
characterizes all of the Zimbabwean exploitation
activities, whether with MIBA, Gécamines, SOCEBO
or the relatively recent SCEM.
80. It is important to note that the Government of
Zimbabwe views these exploitation activities as
legitimate commercial ties with a neighbouring
sovereign State, to whose aid it had come under the
SADC Treaty’s collective security provision. The
Government of Zimbabwe in fact went to great lengths
initially to promote these commercial ventures to its
citizens, at times exaggerating their profitability in
order to justify the continued Zimbabwean presence in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo after the
Annex 13
Annex 14
U.N. General Assembly, Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/56/83 (28 Jan. 2002)
United Nations A/RES/56/83
General Assembly Distr.: General
28 January 2002
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 162
01 47797
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly
[on the report of the Sixth Committee (A/56/589 and Corr.1)]
56/83. Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts
The General Assembly,
Having considered chapter IV of the report of the International Law
Commission on the work of its fifty-third session,1 which contains the draft articles
on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts,
Noting that the International Law Commission decided to recommend to the
General Assembly that it should take note of the draft articles on responsibility of
States for internationally wrongful acts in a resolution and annex the draft articles to
that resolution, and that it should consider at a later stage, in the light of the
importance of the topic, the possibility of convening an international conference of
plenipotentiaries to examine the draft articles with a view to concluding a
convention on the topic,2
Emphasizing the continuing importance of the codification and progressive
development of international law, as referred to in Article 13, paragraph 1 (a), of the
Charter of the United Nations,
Noting that the subject of responsibility of States for internationally wrongful
acts is of major importance in the relations of States,
1. Welcomes the conclusion of the work of the International Law
Commission on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts and its
adoption of the draft articles and a detailed commentary on the subject;
2. Expresses its appreciation to the International Law Commission for its
continuing contribution to the codification and progressive development of
international law;
1 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 and corrigendum
(A/56/10 and Corr.1).
2 Ibid., paras. 72 and 73.
Annex 14
A/RES/56/83
8
Article 31
Reparation
1. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the
injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.
2. Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the
internationally wrongful act of a State.
Article 32
Irrelevance of internal law
The responsible State may not rely on the provisions of its internal law as
justification for failure to comply with its obligations under this part.
Article 33
Scope of international obligations set out in this part
1. The obligations of the responsible State set out in this part may be owed to
another State, to several States, or to the international community as a whole,
depending in particular on the character and content of the international obligation
and on the circumstances of the breach.
2. This part is without prejudice to any right, arising from the international
responsibility of a State, which may accrue directly to any person or entity other
than a State.
Chapter II
Reparation for injury
Article 34
Forms of reparation
Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall
take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in
combination, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
Article 35
Restitution
A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation
to make restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation which existed before the
wrongful act was committed, provided and to the extent that restitution:
(a) Is not materially impossible;
(b) Does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving
from restitution instead of compensation.
Article 36
Compensation
1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation
to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made
good by restitution.
2. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage including
loss of profits insofar as it is established.
Annex 14
Annex 15
U.N. Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc.
S/2002/1146 (16 Oct. 2002)
United Nations S/2002/1146
Security Council Distr.: General
16 October 2002
English
Original: French
02-62179 (E) 171002 181002
*0262179*
Letter dated 15 October 2002 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council
I have the honour to refer to the statement by the President of the Security
Council dated 19 December 2001 (S/PRST/2001/39), whereby the Security Council
renewed for a period of six months the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Council requested the Panel to submit to it
an interim report after three months, followed by a final report at the end of its
mandate. I refer also to the letter dated 12 July 2002 from the President
(S/2002/763), by which the Security Council extended the mandate of the Panel
until 31 October 2002.
I have the honour to transmit to you the final report of the Panel, which was
submitted to me by its Chairman, Mr. Mahmoud Kassem. This independent report
comprises an evaluation of the situation on the ground and the Panel’s observations
on the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. I should be grateful if you would bring the report to the attention of the
members of the Security Council.
(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
Annex 15
21
S/2002/1146
network to further control access to operating capital
for commercial operators in the area. Economically
speaking, this region has become a captive region, where
the types of commercial ventures are manipulated and
the viability of local businesses is controlled.
Furthermore, the flow of money is regulated by the
network through currency trading and the widespread
introduction of counterfeit Congolese francs.
107. As in the past, the network continues to involve
the transnational criminal group of Victor Bout. Mr.
Bout recently purchased the Uganda-based nonoperational
airline company Okapi Air. The purchase
of the company allowed Victor Bout to use Okapi’s
licences. The company was subsequently renamed
Odessa. The Panel is in possession of a list of outbound
flights from 1998 to the beginning of 2002 from
Entebbe International Airport, which confirms the
operational activities of Mr. Bout’s aircraft from
Ugandan territory. Currently, Mr. Bout’s aircraft share
the flight times and destinations (slots) with Planet Air,
which is owned by the wife of Lt. General Salim Saleh
and which facilitates the activities of Mr. Bout by filing
flight plans for his aircraft.
Strategies and sources of revenue
Coltan
108. Coltan has been exploited extensively in
Orientale Province by various armed groups under the
protection of UPDF. A number of coltan operations,
especially under the supervision of UPDF Colonels
Muzora and Burundi, have been coordinated under the
front company Trinity Investment, where UPDF Major
General Kazini is the principal figure. Armed groups
frequently identified with militias under the command
of UPDF officers manage sites in remote locations
where diggers pay a daily fee to exploit an area.
Case study of a commercial chain
involving coltan
109. During March 2002, Panel members met with
Valentina Piskunova who, together with her husband
Anatoly Piskunov, represents and operates the company
LA CONMET from its base in Kampala. During
discussions with the Panel, Ms. Piskunova explained
that, because of the collapsed international coltan
market, prices for the mineral in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo had dropped
dramatically. However, Ms. Piskunova told the Panel
that the continuing international interest in coltan from
the Democratic Republic of the Congo is due to the
“very low” labour costs for extracting the mineral.
Therefore, the company continued to buy coltan from
its office at Butembo in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. She said that their purchase price for coltan
with a 30 per cent tantalum content was $10 per
kilogram. The same coltan was then sold for $17 per
kilogram.
110. Ms. Piskunova went on to tell the Panel that the
company’s coltan was transported by road across the
border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Uganda at Kasindi to Entebbe International
Airport, where it was then transported by Boeing 707,
via Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, at a cost of
$140,000 per flight, to Ulba, Kazakhstan, for
processing.
111. In addition to the profit made on the sales of
coltan, LA CONMET also experienced savings by
being granted “full exoneration” for “all activities
involving exploitation for the territory of Beni-Lubero”
(Democratic Republic of the Congo), including
freedom from paying fiscal and customs duties. The
document granting the exonerations is in the possession
of the Panel. It was signed at Kampala by Mbusa
Myamwisi, then Commissioner General for RCDKisangani,
on 5 January 2000, identifying Salim Saleh
as the owner of LA CONMET and designating his
representatives as “the Russian group LA CONMET”.
Diamonds
112. The network coordinates all elements of the
diamond trade, local buying houses, Lebanese
exporters, army protection from UPDF and individual
militias, tax exonerations from the public sector, and
Lebanese connections in Antwerp, under the aegis of
the front company, the Victoria Group. Considerable
evidence available to the Panel has named the
Lebanese-born, Khalil Nazeem Ibrahim, and another
known as Mr. Abbas, as the present focal points in
Kampala for Victoria’s diamond operations. The Panel
has credible evidence that Khalil Nazeem Ibrahim used
the capital and marketing services of Hemang Nananal
Shah, proprietor of Nami Gems in Antwerp. Lt.
General Saleh is recognized by the Panel’s sources in
Bunia, Kisangani and Kampala as the founder and
director of the Victoria Group and as the mastermind of
its operations.
Annex 15
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S/2002/1146
political agenda, all are pursuing illegal economic
activities as a matter of survival. It is hoped that
progress in the peace process, together with an
effective and responsive programme of disarmament,
demobilization, rehabilitation, reintegration and
resettlement, would provide better alternatives to the
armed groups. This would require the necessary
funding for reintegration programmes and security
assurances for those who are not wanted for war crimes
or acts of genocide. The international community must,
therefore, provide the assistance to these programmes,
invest in publicizing them and encourage the armed
groups to participate.
154. The Panel is hoping that this report will
contribute to a shift in policies — in the light of the
recent encouraging political and military developments
on the ground — that will bring the exploitation of
resources back to a legally acceptable level.
IX. Conclusions
155. An embargo or a moratorium banning the export
of raw materials originating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo does not seem to be a viable
means of helping to improve the situation of the
country’s Government, citizens or natural environment.
Massive technical and financial assistance for the
population would be required to offset the
humanitarian impact of such restrictive measures. At
the same time, if the Panel in its report does not
recommend any punitive measures to curb the illegal
exploitation and trade originating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, this will only encourage a
continuation of the exploitation by different criminal
organizations. This could easily lead to an increase in
these activities. There must be sustained efforts to deter
illicit and illegal exploitation.
156. Restrictive measures nevertheless need to be
taken vis-à-vis the role of companies and individuals
involved in arms supply and resource plundering. The
international and multinational dimension of these
illegal activities is very important. Ethical and
transparent business practices are needed to combat
these illegal activities.
157. The establishment of a transitional government in
Kinshasa should be accompanied by four elements,
namely, the disarmament of all rebel groups in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo; phased withdrawal
of foreign troops; measures to drastically curb the
illegal exploitation and encourage legal exploitation;
and the application of serious leverage through
multilateral pressures and incentives. To these elements
must be added a dynamic monitoring process. All must
be phased, interlinked and ongoing. This dynamic
package would not only advance the peace process in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but would also
lead to a peaceful and final settlement of the
exploitation issue, ensuring that legal modes of
resource exploitation prevail. The first two elements
seem to be finding their way to an interlinked and
phased implementation as a result of the recent
agreements signed in Pretoria and Luanda. The third
element is intrinsically linked with the fourth, namely
applying leverage through incentives and disincentives.
158. In order to readjust the present process of illegal
exploitation and encourage legal exploitation, which
could contribute to the economic stability of all parties,
there is a need to apply forceful disincentives and
incentives. These should be monitored through a
proactive monitoring body. Until now, all the parties
involved in the illegal exploitation have had no strong
incentive to alter the economic status quo. It is
necessary, therefore, to find measures that address their
fears of losing revenues. Such measures will however
be effective only if a political process is undertaken
simultaneously.
159. Reconstructing and reorienting the region’s
economies are essential to peacemaking and peacebuilding.
The Panel believes that a peace dividend in
the form of economic incentives should be emphasized
by the international community in order to promote the
parties’ adherence to the peace agreements and
encourage confidence-building. The Panel also
proposes in its recommendations that a set of
disincentives be enacted to apply pressure in the case
of non-compliance with the agreements.
160. Many of the Panel’s conclusions about the
economic roots and consequences of the conflict have
been echoed in ideas associated with the proposals for
an international conference on peace, security,
democracy and sustainable development in the Great
Lakes region. Recently signed agreements may signal
that the time for organizing this conference is
approaching. Such a conference would be an ideal
forum to address the need to reorient the regional
trading system to post-conflict imperatives and for
negotiating the framework of a multilateral agreement
Annex 15
Annex 16
U.N. Security Council, 4691st Meeting, Resolution 1457 (2003), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1457 (2003)
(24 Jan. 2003)
United Nations S/RES/1457 (2003)
Security Council Distr.: General
24 January 2003
03-22255 (E)
*0322255*
Resolution 1457 (2003)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4691st meeting, on
24 January 2003
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 1291 (2000) of 24 February 2000, 1304 (2000) of
16 June 2000, 1323 (2000) of 13 October 2000, 1332 (2000) of 14 December 2000,
1341 (2001) of 22 February 2001, 1355 (2001) of 15 June 2001, 1376 (2001) of
9 November 2001, 1417 (2002) of 14 June 2002 and 1445 (2002) of 4 December
2002, and the statements of its President of 26 January 2000 (S/PRST/2000/2),
2 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/20), 7 September 2000 (S/PRST/2000/28), 3 May 2001
(S/PRST/2001/13) and 19 December 2001 (S/PRST/2001/39),
Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of all other States in the region,
Reaffirming also the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
over its natural resources,
Recalling the letters from the Secretary-General of 12 April 2001
(S/2001/357), 13 November 2001 (S/2001/1072), and 22 May 2002 (S/2002/565),
Reiterating its commitment to take appropriate action to help put an end to the
plundering of the resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in support of
the peace process,
Determining that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
continues to constitute a threat to international peace and stability in the Great Lakes
region,
1. Takes note of the report of the Panel of Experts (hereinafter “the Panel”)
on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, transmitted by the Secretary-General in his
letter dated 15 October 2002 (S/2002/1146);
2. Strongly condemns the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo;
3. Notes with concern that the plundering of the natural resources and other
forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues and is one of
the main elements fuelling the conflict in the region, and in this regard, demands
Annex 16
2
S/RES/1457 (2003)
that all States concerned take immediate steps to end these illegal activities, which
are perpetuating the conflict, impeding the economic development of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and exacerbating the suffering of its people;
4. Reiterates that the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo should be exploited transparently, legally and on a fair commercial basis, to
benefit the country and its people;
5. Stresses that the completion of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from
the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as the early
establishment of an all-inclusive transitional government in the country, which will
ensure that central government control is reinstated and that viable administrations
are empowered to protect and regulate the exploitation activities, are important steps
towards ending the plundering of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo;
6. Stresses also that the possible convening of an international conference
on peace, security, democracy and development in the Great Lakes region at the
appropriate time could help the States of the region in promoting a sound regional
economic integration, to the benefit of all the States in the region;
7. Takes note of the importance of the natural resources and extractive
sectors for the future of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, encourages States,
international financial institutions, and other organizations to assist Governments in
the region in efforts to create appropriate national structures and institutions to
control resource exploitation, encourages also the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo to work closely with the International Financial Institutions
and the donor community to establish Congolese institutional capacity to ensure that
these sectors are controlled and operated in a transparent and legitimate way, so that
the riches of the Democratic Republic of the Congo can benefit the Congolese
people;
8. Stresses the importance of following up the independent findings of the
Panel regarding the link between the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the continuation of the conflict, stresses
the importance of exerting the necessary pressure to put an end to such exploitation,
notes that the reports of the Panel to date have made a useful contribution to the
peace process in this regard, and therefore requests the Secretary-General to give a
new mandate to the Panel for a period of six months at the end of which the Panel
should provide a report to the Council;
9. Stresses that the new mandate of the Panel should include:
– Further review of relevant data and analysis of information previously
gathered by the Panel, as well as any new information, including specifically
material provided by individuals and entities named in the previous reports of
the Panel, in order to verify, reinforce and, where necessary, update the Panel’s
findings, and/or clear parties named in the Panel’s previous reports, with a
view to adjusting accordingly the lists attached to these reports;
– Information on actions taken by Governments in response to the Panel’s
previous recommendations, including information on how capacity-building
and reforms in the region are affecting exploitation activities;
Annex 16
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S/RES/1457 (2003)
– An assessment of the actions taken by all those named in the reports in respect
of paragraphs 12 and 15 below;
– Recommendations on measures a transitional Government in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and other Governments in the region could take to
develop and enhance their policies, legal framework and administrative
capacity to ensure the resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are
exploited legally and on a fair commercial basis to benefit the Congolese
people;
10. Requests the chairman of the Panel to brief the Council on any progress
towards the cessation of the plundering of the natural resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo three months after the resumption of the Panel’s work;
11. Invites, in the interests of transparency, individuals, companies and
States, which have been named in the Panel’s last report to send their reactions, with
due regard to commercial confidentiality, to the Secretariat, no later than 31 March
2003, and requests the Secretary-General to arrange for the publication of these
reactions, upon request by individuals, companies and States named in the report of
15 October 2002, as an attachment to this report, no later than 15 April 2003;
12. Stresses the importance of dialogue between the Panel, individuals,
companies and States and requests in this regard that the Panel provide to the
individuals, companies and States named, upon request, all information and
documentation connecting them to the illegal exploitation of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo’s natural resources, and requests the Panel to establish a
procedure to provide to Member States, upon request, information previously
collected by the Panel to help them take the necessary investigative action, subject
to the Panel’s duty to preserve the safety of its sources, and in accordance with
United Nations established practice in consultation with the United Nations Office
of Legal Affairs;
13. Emphasizes the duty of the individuals, companies and States named in
the report to respect the confidentiality of the material to be given to them by the
Panel so as to ensure that the safety of the Panel’s sources is preserved;
14. Requests the Panel to provide information to the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Committee on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises and to the National Contact Points for the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in the States where business
enterprises listed in annex 3 of the last report as being allegedly in contravention of
the OECD guidelines are registered, in accordance with United Nations established
practice;
15. Urges all States, especially those in the region to conduct their own
investigations, including as appropriate through judicial means, in order to clarify
credibly the findings of the Panel, taking into account the fact that the Panel, which
is not a judicial body, does not have the resources to carry out an investigation
whereby these findings can be considered as established facts;
16. In this regard, notes with satisfaction the decision of the Attorney
General of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to start a judicial procedure,
commends the decision of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
to suspend momentarily the officials named in the reports pending further
Annex 16
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S/RES/1457 (2003)
clarification, and requests the Panel to cooperate fully with the Office of the
Attorney General and to provide to this Office information it may need to conduct
its investigations, subject to the Panel’s duty to preserve the safety of its sources,
and in accordance with United Nations established practice in consultation with the
United Nations Office of Legal Affairs;
17. Further notes with satisfaction the actions taken by other States,
including the decision by the Government of Uganda to establish a Judicial
Commission of Inquiry, urges all States concerned and in particular the
Governments of Zimbabwe and Rwanda to cooperate fully with the Panel and
investigate further the accusations made through due judicial process and stresses
the importance of collaboration between the Panel and all investigative bodies;
18. Encourages all organizations concerned to consider, as appropriate, the
relevant recommendations contained in the reports of the Panel, and in particular
encourages the specialized industries’ organizations to monitor trade in commodities
from conflict areas, in particular the territory of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and to collect data in this regard, with a view to helping put an end to the
plundering of the natural resources in these areas;
19. Encourages the implementation of the decisions taken within the
framework of the Inter-Congolese dialogue, especially its recommendation to
establish a special commission to examine the validity of economic and financial
agreements in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
20. Expresses its full support to the Panel and reiterates that all parties and
relevant States must extend their full cooperation to the Panel, while ensuring
necessary security for the experts;
21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Annex 16
Annex 17
U.N.H.C.R., U.N.H.C.R. Global Appeal 2004, Uganda (31 Dec. 2003)
112 UNHCR Global Appeal 2004
Planning figures
Population Jan. 2004 Dec. 2004
Sudan (refugees) 160,700 140,300
DRC (refugees) 32,000 47,000
Rwanda (refugees) 12,000 800
Other refugees 1,500 1,800
Asylum-seekers 590 690
Total 206,790 190,590
Total requirements: USD 15,053,601
Uganda
Arrangements have been made for those willing to
relocate to settlements and for those who may change
their minds, given the worsening situation in Bundibujyo.
In order to ensure the availability of funds to tackle
these situations, an emergency appeal was issued in
July 2003.
After almost one year in transit, more than 16,000 ex-
Acholpii refugees were relocated, in September 2003, to
new locations proposed by the Government. However,
the relocation of these refugees is an operational and
a funding challenge. The sites would require basic
infrastructure, for which there are funding constraints.
Furthermore, at the time of publication, there had been a
disappointing response to the Special Appeal launched
in July 2003.
Main objectives
• Provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and
pursue durable solutions, such as voluntary repatriation,
local integration and resettlement for them.
• Continue to promote a self-reliance strategy (SRS)
for Sudanese, Congolese and Rwandan refugees,
through food production and the integration of
services into existing national structures (i.e. health,
education, environment, agriculture and community
services).
• Promote counselling for urban refugees in Kampala.
• Play a catalytic role in encouraging development
agencies and NGOs to incorporate the SRS into their
programmes to benefi t Ugandan nationals as well as
refugees.
Working environment
Recent developments
The President of Uganda announced “Strategic
Challenges and Peace” as the slogan for 2003 and urged
the rebels to engage in peace talks with the Government.
In spite of this, the security situation in northern Uganda
remained a cause for concern, particularly in Adjumani,
where a large number of refugee settlements are located.
Often the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels attacked
the refugee settlements and villages on the outskirts
of Adjumani town, looting food and taking personal
belongings, killing or abducting people, including children,
for forced conscription.
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), ethnic
confl ict between the Hema and Lendu tribes forced some
13,000 Congolese asylum-seekers over the border into
Nebbi district in Uganda. These asylum-seekers have
been reluctant to settle in the
designated settlements proposed
by the Government and have opted
to stay in Nebbi and in areas close
to the DRC border, without any
humanitarian assistance from the
Government or UNHCR. Similarly,
the majority of the 11,000 asylumseekers
from DRC in Bundibujyo
district are unwilling to relocate
to designated refugee settlements
in Kyaka II, Kenjojo district.
Annex 17
UNHCR Global Appeal 2004 113
In February 2003, the Government moved to offer Universal
Primary Education (UPE) to all children (previously available
only to a maximum of four children per family). This was in
line with its commitment to the Millennium Development
Goal of achieving education for all children by 2015.
Constraints
It is very diffi cult to predict if, and, to what extent
unfavourable conditions will hamper crop production.
This applies particularly to economic activities in northern
Uganda, which are limited to subsistence farming and
small-scale trading. A combination of climatic conditions
and rebel activities can easily frustrate plans for selfsuffi
ciency. It is nonetheless important to note that some
60 per cent of the refugees in the settlements have
attained 100 per cent self-reliance in food.
The security situation in northern Uganda, particularly in
Adjumani, where a large number of refugee settlements
are located has seriously constrained the delivery of basic
services (education, health, water) to refugees.
Early and forced marriages of young girls still take place,
despite continued sensitisation efforts. However, these
efforts are succeeding in gradually changing attitudes
towards girls and women within the refugee community.
Strategy
Protection and solutions
The Government, through its Ministry for Disaster
Preparedness and Refugees has maintained a liberal
refugee policy. Sudanese and Congolese refugees
continue to be recognised as refugees on a prima
facie basis while other nationals go through individual
refugee status determination under the Refugee Eligibility
Committee (REC). In 2004, the Government and UNHCR
will continue to work closely with the REC, intensifying
collaboration on providing international protection,
and organising training and seminars for the relevant
government and law enforcement offi cials. Resettlement
will be facilitated for a limited number of refugees with
specifi c protection problems.
UNHCR will also continue to monitor developments in the
refugees’ countries of origin to explore any opportunities
for voluntary repatriation. The contingency plans that are
in place will be updated for 2004.
Sudanese refugees
The presence of Sudanese refugees in Uganda dates back
to 1989 (Adjumani and Moyo camps) and 1993 (Arua) when
the majority of the refugees arrived from southern Sudan.
Currently, there are 172,300 Sudanese refugees in Uganda
(52 per cent male, 48 per cent female, with 57 per cent
under the age of 18). Most of these refugees come from
Nimule, Pageri, Magwi, Agoro, Kit, Ikotos, Torit, Kajokeji,
Kaya, Yei, Yambio, Wau, Upper Nile and Bar-el-Ghazel
areas in Sudan. Despite reports of stability in southern
Sudan, over 4,000 new arrivals were registered in 2003.
In view of the possibility of a viable Machakos (Kenya)
peace agreement between the Government of Sudan and
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), a contingency
plan for the voluntary repatriation of the Sudanese
refugees has been prepared. The plan is built around
basic data on the place of return/origin, the profi le of the
refugees and estimates of return to different locations. It
is estimated that 35,000 Sudanese refugees will opt to
repatriate with UNHCR assistance in 2004.
Rwandan refugees
As at October 2003, there were some 18,500 Rwandan
refugees in the country (65 per cent under the age of 18).
A Tripartite Agreement on the voluntary repatriation of
Rwandan refugees was signed in July 2003 between the
Governments of Uganda and Rwanda and UNHCR. This
augured well, and UNHCR then undertook to put in place
a repatriation plan. The sensitisation and preparation for
possible repatriation was scheduled to start during
the third quarter of 2003, with some 12,000 refugees
expected to repatriate by the end of 2003. However, to
safeguard refugees (in case the situation changes again)
humanitarian assistance for the Rwandan refugees will
be continued in 2004.
Congolese refugees
The majority of Congolese refugees came to Uganda
fl eeing the civil confl ict in the east of the DRC. In
Uganda, as at October 2003, there were 8,500 registered
Congolese refugees (60 per cent of them under the age
of 18). There are indications of possible durable solutions
for the Congolese refugees, despite the continued confl ict
around the Ituri region, which has been the main source
of instability and the cause of the refugee infl ux into
Uganda. The French-led EU Peace Keeping operation in
Bunia succeeded in preventing the spread of violence to
other areas. The United Nations peacekeeping force took
over from the French peacekeepers with an expanded
operational mandate to cover the Ituri region. With peace
restored, there will be greater prospects for Congolese
refugees voluntarily repatriating to DRC in 2004.
Other refugees
There are small groups of refugees from Burundi,
Ethiopia, and Somalia in Uganda. Some 123 Kenyan
refugees living in Nakivale refugee settlement (in Mbrara
Uganda
Annex 17
114 UNHCR Global Appeal 2004
district) were recently repatriated with UNHCR support.
International protection is provided to all refugees, and
material assistance to most of them (but urban refugees
receive material assistance for a limited period only).
Assistance
UNHCR’s main focus in 2004 will be to ensure basic
humanitarian assistance for refugees and continue the
integration of basic services (education, health, water) into
national structures in line with the Self-Reliance Strategy
(SRS). The SRS will prepare the refugees for their eventual
return and successful reintegration back home.
The overall aim of the refugee programme is to enable
refugees to become self-reliant. In this respect, an
integrated multi-sectoral community development
approach will be implemented. The approach involves
several sectors in the common objective of improved
programme implementation (more effective use of limited
resources). In 2004, the priority sectors will be education
and community services, health, environment and crop
production, as well as income generation. UNHCR will
continue to mainstream reproductive health and HIV/AIDSrelated
activities. UNHCR will also undertake education
on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).
UNHCR will contribute to local infrastructural
improvements in refugee hosting areas through Quick
Impact Projects (QIPs). These projects will ensure better
services for refugees, and also promote and maintain
good relations with the local populations.
Desired impact
Through the SRS, the Government of Uganda will provide
refugees with adequate arable land to achieve substantial
levels of self-suffi ciency in food. The nutritional status
Refugees load and enter convoy truck in Kiryandongo. UNHCR / J. Hesemann
Uganda
Annex 17
UNHCR Global Appeal 2004 115
of the refugees in all settlements will be maintained at
an acceptable level. Refugees will be in a position to
pay for their health services, education, to look after the
vulnerable members of their family, and to participate in
social and economic activities in the same manner as
Ugandan citizens.
Through the continued promotion of gender awareness,
women will participate fully in economic and social
activities and refugee committees. Their involvement in
decision making will be actively encouraged. Refugee
children will continue to have access to education. The
high dropout rate among girls in the higher classes of
primary schools will be addressed by means of a specifi c
education campaign.
The involvement of development-oriented organisations
and donors in SRS should help to enhance its contribution
to the well-being of refugees.
Organisation and implementation
Management structure
UNHCR’s operations in Uganda will be co-ordinated by
the country offi ce in Kampala, supported by sub-offi ces
in Arua and Adjumani, a fi eld offi ce in Mbarara, and a
satellite offi ce in Hoima. The Uganda programme will be
managed by a total of 93 staff members.
Co-ordination
UNHCR is a member of the United Nations Country Team
under the leadership of the UN Resident Co-ordinator.
The Offi ce takes part in the preparation of CCA, the CAP
and the UNDAF processes. UNHCR also maintains a
close working relationship with government authorities,
United Nations agencies (particularly WFP and UNICEF),
and other national and international NGOs. Participation
of Government, United Nations agencies and donors in
the SRS Task Force will continue in 2004.
Regional policy guidelines were adopted at the strategy
meeting in Addis Ababa in February 2003. Within this
policy framework, the branch offi ce in Kampala will
continue to liaise with the Regional Technical Support
Services (RTSS) in Nairobi and other UNHCR offi ces to
ensure a co-ordinated approach to voluntary repatriation
of Sudanese refugees in the event of a peace agreement.
Uganda
Offices
Kampala
Arua
Hoima
Mbarara
Pakelle/Adjumani
Partners
Government agencies
District Community Department (Arua)
District Directorate of Health Services
(Adjumani, Arua and Moyo districts)
District Education Offi ce (Adjumani, Arua and Moyo districts)
District Forestry Offi ce (Adjumani, Arua and Moyo districts)
Offi ce of the Prime Minister
NGOs
African Development and Emergency Organisation
African Humanitarian Action
Aktion Afrika Hilfe
Danish Assistance to the Self-Reliance Strategy
Finnish Refugee Council
German Development Services
Hugh Pilkington Charitable Trust
Integrated Rural Development Initiatives
International Rescue Committee
Jesuit Refugee Services
Lutheran World Federation
Ockenden International
Transcultural Psycho-social Organisation
Uganda Micro-fi nance Union
Budget (USD)
Activities and services Annual Programme
Protection, monitoring and co-ordination 2,219,869
Community services 350,677
Crop production 303,123
Domestic needs 336,959
Education 2,007,965
Fisheries 4,558
Forestry 453,581
Health 1,439,618
Income generation 70,852
Legal assistance 337,470
Livestock 46,981
Operational support (to agencies) 1,832,497
Sanitation 88,345
Shelter / other infrastructure 649,328
Transport / logistics 2,552,076
Water 223,870
Total Operations 12,917,769
Programme support 2,135,832
Total 15,053,601
Annex 17
Annex 18
U.N. Security Council, 4761th meeting, Resolution 1483 (2003), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (22
May 2003)
United Nations S/RES/1483 (2003)
Security Council Distr.: General
22 May 2003
03-36853 (E)
*0336853*
Resolution 1483 (2003)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4761st meeting, on
22 May 2003
The Security Council,
Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions,
Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq,
Reaffirming also the importance of the disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction and of eventual confirmation of the disarmament of Iraq,
Stressing the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political
future and control their own natural resources, welcoming the commitment of all
parties concerned to support the creation of an environment in which they may do so
as soon as possible, and expressing resolve that the day when Iraqis govern
themselves must come quickly,
Encouraging efforts by the people of Iraq to form a representative government
based on the rule of law that affords equal rights and justice to all Iraqi citizens
without regard to ethnicity, religion, or gender, and, in this connection, recalls
resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000,
Welcoming the first steps of the Iraqi people in this regard, and noting in this
connection the 15 April 2003 Nasiriyah statement and the 28 April 2003 Baghdad
statement,
Resolved that the United Nations should play a vital role in humanitarian
relief, the reconstruction of Iraq, and the restoration and establishment of national
and local institutions for representative governance,
Noting the statement of 12 April 2003 by the Ministers of Finance and Central
Bank Governors of the Group of Seven Industrialized Nations in which the members
recognized the need for a multilateral effort to help rebuild and develop Iraq and for
the need for assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in
these efforts,
Welcoming also the resumption of humanitarian assistance and the continuing
efforts of the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies to provide food and
medicine to the people of Iraq,
Welcoming the appointment by the Secretary-General of his Special Adviser on
Iraq,
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Affirming the need for accountability for crimes and atrocities committed by
the previous Iraqi regime,
Stressing the need for respect for the archaeological, historical, cultural, and
religious heritage of Iraq, and for the continued protection of archaeological,
historical, cultural, and religious sites, museums, libraries, and monuments,
Noting the letter of 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the
United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/538) and recognizing the
specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international
law of these states as occupying powers under unified command (the “Authority”),
Noting further that other States that are not occupying powers are working now
or in the future may work under the Authority,
Welcoming further the willingness of Member States to contribute to stability
and security in Iraq by contributing personnel, equipment, and other resources under
the Authority,
Concerned that many Kuwaitis and Third-State Nationals still are not
accounted for since 2 August 1990,
Determining that the situation in Iraq, although improved, continues to
constitute a threat to international peace and security,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Appeals to Member States and concerned organizations to assist the
people of Iraq in their efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their country,
and to contribute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq in accordance with
this resolution;
2. Calls upon all Member States in a position to do so to respond
immediately to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other
international organizations for Iraq and to help meet the humanitarian and other
needs of the Iraqi people by providing food, medical supplies, and resources
necessary for reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq’s economic infrastructure;
3. Appeals to Member States to deny safe haven to those members of the
previous Iraqi regime who are alleged to be responsible for crimes and atrocities and
to support actions to bring them to justice;
4. Calls upon the Authority, consistent with the Charter of the United
Nations and other relevant international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi
people through the effective administration of the territory, including in particular
working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the
creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own
political future;
5. Calls upon all concerned to comply fully with their obligations under
international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the
Hague Regulations of 1907;
6. Calls upon the Authority and relevant organizations and individuals to
continue efforts to locate, identify, and repatriate all Kuwaiti and Third-State
Nationals or the remains of those present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990, as well
as the Kuwaiti archives, that the previous Iraqi regime failed to undertake, and, in
this regard, directs the High-Level Coordinator, in consultation with the
Annex 18
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S/RES/1483 (2003)
International Committee of the Red Cross and the Tripartite Commission and with
the appropriate support of the people of Iraq and in coordination with the Authority,
to take steps to fulfil his mandate with respect to the fate of Kuwaiti and Third-State
National missing persons and property;
7. Decides that all Member States shall take appropriate steps to facilitate
the safe return to Iraqi institutions of Iraqi cultural property and other items of
archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and religious importance illegally
removed from the Iraq National Museum, the National Library, and other locations
in Iraq since the adoption of resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, including by
establishing a prohibition on trade in or transfer of such items and items with respect
to which reasonable suspicion exists that they have been illegally removed, and
calls upon the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization,
Interpol, and other international organizations, as appropriate, to assist in the
implementation of this paragraph;
8. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for
Iraq whose independent responsibilities shall involve reporting regularly to the
Council on his activities under this resolution, coordinating activities of the United
Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq, coordinating among United Nations and
international agencies engaged in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction
activities in Iraq, and, in coordination with the Authority, assisting the people of
Iraq through:
(a) coordinating humanitarian and reconstruction assistance by United
Nations agencies and between United Nations agencies and non-governmental
organizations;
(b) promoting the safe, orderly, and voluntary return of refugees and
displaced persons;
(c) working intensively with the Authority, the people of Iraq, and others
concerned to advance efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions
for representative governance, including by working together to facilitate a process
leading to an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq;
(d) facilitating the reconstruction of key infrastructure, in cooperation with
other international organizations;
(e) promoting economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable
development, including through coordination with national and regional
organizations, as appropriate, civil society, donors, and the international financial
institutions;
(f) encouraging international efforts to contribute to basic civilian
administration functions;
(g) promoting the protection of human rights;
(h) encouraging international efforts to rebuild the capacity of the Iraqi
civilian police force; and
(i) encouraging international efforts to promote legal and judicial reform;
9. Supports the formation, by the people of Iraq with the help of the
Authority and working with the Special Representative, of an Iraqi interim
administration as a transitional administration run by Iraqis, until an internationally
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S/RES/1483 (2003)
recognized, representative government is established by the people of Iraq and
assumes the responsibilities of the Authority;
10. Decides that, with the exception of prohibitions related to the sale or
supply to Iraq of arms and related materiel other than those arms and related
materiel required by the Authority to serve the purposes of this and other related
resolutions, all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq and the provision of financial
or economic resources to Iraq established by resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent
relevant resolutions, including resolution 778 (1992) of 2 October 1992, shall no
longer apply;
11. Reaffirms that Iraq must meet its disarmament obligations, encourages
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of
America to keep the Council informed of their activities in this regard, and
underlines the intention of the Council to revisit the mandates of the United Nations
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic
Energy Agency as set forth in resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 1284 (1999)
of 17 December 1999, and 1441 (2002) of 8 November 2002;
12. Notes the establishment of a Development Fund for Iraq to be held by the
Central Bank of Iraq and to be audited by independent public accountants approved
by the International Advisory and Monitoring Board of the Development Fund for
Iraq and looks forward to the early meeting of that International Advisory and
Monitoring Board, whose members shall include duly qualified representatives of
the Secretary-General, of the Managing Director of the International Monetary
Fund, of the Director-General of the Arab Fund for Social and Economic
Development, and of the President of the World Bank;
13. Notes further that the funds in the Development Fund for Iraq shall be
disbursed at the direction of the Authority, in consultation with the Iraqi interim
administration, for the purposes set out in paragraph 14 below;
14. Underlines that the Development Fund for Iraq shall be used in a
transparent manner to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the
economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, for the continued
disarmament of Iraq, and for the costs of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other
purposes benefiting the people of Iraq;
15. Calls upon the international financial institutions to assist the people of
Iraq in the reconstruction and development of their economy and to facilitate
assistance by the broader donor community, and welcomes the readiness of creditors,
including those of the Paris Club, to seek a solution to Iraq’s sovereign debt
problems;
16. Requests also that the Secretary-General, in coordination with the
Authority, continue the exercise of his responsibilities under Security Council
resolution 1472 (2003) of 28 March 2003 and 1476 (2003) of 24 April 2003, for a
period of six months following the adoption of this resolution, and terminate within
this time period, in the most cost effective manner, the ongoing operations of the
“Oil-for-Food” Programme (the “Programme”), both at headquarters level and in the
field, transferring responsibility for the administration of any remaining activity
under the Programme to the Authority, including by taking the following necessary
measures:
(a) to facilitate as soon as possible the shipment and authenticated delivery
of priority civilian goods as identified by the Secretary-General and representatives
Annex 18
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S/RES/1483 (2003)
designated by him, in coordination with the Authority and the Iraqi interim
administration, under approved and funded contracts previously concluded by the
previous Government of Iraq, for the humanitarian relief of the people of Iraq,
including, as necessary, negotiating adjustments in the terms or conditions of these
contracts and respective letters of credit as set forth in paragraph 4 (d) of resolution
1472 (2003);
(b) to review, in light of changed circumstances, in coordination with the
Authority and the Iraqi interim administration, the relative utility of each approved
and funded contract with a view to determining whether such contracts contain
items required to meet the needs of the people of Iraq both now and during
reconstruction, and to postpone action on those contracts determined to be of
questionable utility and the respective letters of credit until an internationally
recognized, representative government of Iraq is in a position to make its own
determination as to whether such contracts shall be fulfilled;
(c) to provide the Security Council within 21 days following the adoption of
this resolution, for the Security Council’s review and consideration, an estimated
operating budget based on funds already set aside in the account established
pursuant to paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, identifying:
(i) all known and projected costs to the United Nations required to ensure
the continued functioning of the activities associated with implementation of
the present resolution, including operating and administrative expenses
associated with the relevant United Nations agencies and programmes
responsible for the implementation of the Programme both at Headquarters and
in the field;
(ii) all known and projected costs associated with termination of the
Programme;
(iii) all known and projected costs associated with restoring Government of
Iraq funds that were provided by Member States to the Secretary-General as
requested in paragraph 1 of resolution 778 (1992); and
(iv) all known and projected costs associated with the Special Representative
and the qualified representative of the Secretary-General identified to serve on
the International Advisory and Monitoring Board, for the six month time
period defined above, following which these costs shall be borne by the United
Nations;
(d) to consolidate into a single fund the accounts established pursuant to
paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 986 (1995);
(e) to fulfil all remaining obligations related to the termination of the
Programme, including negotiating, in the most cost effective manner, any necessary
settlement payments, which shall be made from the escrow accounts established
pursuant to paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 986 (1995), with those parties
that previously have entered into contractual obligations with the Secretary-General
under the Programme, and to determine, in coordination with the Authority and the
Iraqi interim administration, the future status of contracts undertaken by the United
Nations and related United Nations agencies under the accounts established pursuant
to paragraphs 8 (b) and 8 (d) of resolution 986 (1995);
(f) to provide the Security Council, 30 days prior to the termination of the
Programme, with a comprehensive strategy developed in close coordination with the
Authority and the Iraqi interim administration that would lead to the delivery of all
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relevant documentation and the transfer of all operational responsibility of the
Programme to the Authority;
17. Requests further that the Secretary-General transfer as soon as possible to
the Development Fund for Iraq 1 billion United States dollars from unencumbered
funds in the accounts established pursuant to paragraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution
986 (1995), restore Government of Iraq funds that were provided by Member States
to the Secretary-General as requested in paragraph 1 of resolution 778 (1992), and
decides that, after deducting all relevant United Nations expenses associated with
the shipment of authorized contracts and costs to the Programme outlined in
paragraph 16 (c) above, including residual obligations, all surplus funds in the
escrow accounts established pursuant to paragraphs 8 (a), 8 (b), 8 (d), and 8 (f) of
resolution 986 (1995) shall be transferred at the earliest possible time to the
Development Fund for Iraq;
18. Decides to terminate effective on the adoption of this resolution the
functions related to the observation and monitoring activities undertaken by the
Secretary-General under the Programme, including the monitoring of the export of
petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq;
19. Decides to terminate the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 6
of resolution 661 (1990) at the conclusion of the six month period called for in
paragraph 16 above and further decides that the Committee shall identify individuals
and entities referred to in paragraph 23 below;
20. Decides that all export sales of petroleum, petroleum products, and
natural gas from Iraq following the date of the adoption of this resolution shall be
made consistent with prevailing international market best practices, to be audited by
independent public accountants reporting to the International Advisory and
Monitoring Board referred to in paragraph 12 above in order to ensure transparency,
and decides further that, except as provided in paragraph 21 below, all proceeds
from such sales shall be deposited into the Development Fund for Iraq until such
time as an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq is properly
constituted;
21. Decides further that 5 per cent of the proceeds referred to in paragraph
20 above shall be deposited into the Compensation Fund established in accordance
with resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent relevant resolutions and that, unless an
internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq and the Governing
Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission, in the exercise of its
authority over methods of ensuring that payments are made into the Compensation
Fund, decide otherwise, this requirement shall be binding on a properly constituted,
internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq and any successor
thereto;
22. Noting the relevance of the establishment of an internationally
recognized, representative government of Iraq and the desirability of prompt
completion of the restructuring of Iraq’s debt as referred to in paragraph 15 above,
further decides that, until December 31, 2007, unless the Council decides otherwise,
petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas originating in Iraq shall be immune,
until title passes to the initial purchaser from legal proceedings against them and not
be subject to any form of attachment, garnishment, or execution, and that all States
shall take any steps that may be necessary under their respective domestic legal
systems to assure this protection, and that proceeds and obligations arising from
sales thereof, as well as the Development Fund for Iraq, shall enjoy privileges and
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immunities equivalent to those enjoyed by the United Nations except that the abovementioned
privileges and immunities will not apply with respect to any legal
proceeding in which recourse to such proceeds or obligations is necessary to satisfy
liability for damages assessed in connection with an ecological accident, including
an oil spill, that occurs after the date of adoption of this resolution;
23. Decides that all Member States in which there are:
(a) funds or other financial assets or economic resources of the previous
Government of Iraq or its state bodies, corporations, or agencies, located outside
Iraq as of the date of this resolution, or
(b) funds or other financial assets or economic resources that have been
removed from Iraq, or acquired, by Saddam Hussein or other senior officials of the
former Iraqi regime and their immediate family members, including entities owned
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or
at their direction,
shall freeze without delay those funds or other financial assets or economic
resources and, unless these funds or other financial assets or economic resources are
themselves the subject of a prior judicial, administrative, or arbitral lien or
judgement, immediately shall cause their transfer to the Development Fund for Iraq,
it being understood that, unless otherwise addressed, claims made by private
individuals or non-government entities on those transferred funds or other financial
assets may be presented to the internationally recognized, representative government
of Iraq; and decides further that all such funds or other financial assets or economic
resources shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities, and protections as provided
under paragraph 22;
24. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular
intervals on the work of the Special Representative with respect to the
implementation of this resolution and on the work of the International Advisory and
Monitoring Board and encourages the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the United States of America to inform the Council at regular
intervals of their efforts under this resolution;
25. Decides to review the implementation of this resolution within twelve
months of adoption and to consider further steps that might be necessary;
26. Calls upon Member States and international and regional organizations to
contribute to the implementation of this resolution;
27. Decides to remain seized of this matter.
Annex 18
Annex 19
U.N. Security Council, Letter dated 15 Oct. 2003 from the Chairman of the Panel of Experts
on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1027 (23 Oct.
2003)
Annex 19
United Nations It -i~ Secu rity Council
~ 11
Distr.: General
23 October 2003
~ Original: English
Letter dated 23 October 2003 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council
I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1457 (2003) of
24 January 2003, by which the Council renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts
on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo for a period of six months. The Council
requested the Panel to submit to it a final report at the end of its mandate. I also
refer to resolution 1499 (2003) of 13 August 2003, by which the Council further
extended the mandate of the panel until 31 October 2003.
I have the honour to transmit to you the final report of the Panel, which was
submitted to me by its Chairman, Mahmoud Kassem. I should be grateful if you
would bring the report to the attention of the members of the Security Council.
(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
03-56736 (E) 241003
1111111111 11111111111111111111111111111111111
S1200311021
Annex 19
Democratic Republic of the Congo, signed on 17 December 2002, and other
subsequent and intervening peace agreements have also informed the Panel's work.
7. The Panel was composed as follows:
• Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem (Egypt), Chairman
• Mr. Andrew Danino (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
• Mr. Alf Giirsjii (Sweden)
• Mr. Mel Holt (United States of America)
• Mr. Bruno Schiemsky (Belgium)
• Mr. Ismaila Seek (Senegal).
8. Two part-time technical advisers, Mr. Christian Dietrich (United States of
America) and Mr. Patrick Smith (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland), also served with the Panel. In addition, three political officers, an
administrator, an archivist, a secretary and a security officer assisted the Panel.
II. Reactions to the Panel's last report
9. As Council members are aware, the publication of the annexes in the Panel's
last report (S/2002/1146) created strong reactions by entities named therein. The
annexes brought together two groups of companies and individuals. First, annexes I
and II comprised individuals and companies that were involved in natural resource
exploitation in a way which could be linked directly with funding the conflict and
the resulting humanitarian and economic disaster in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Many of the parties were either members of one of the elite networks
described in the Panel's last report or enjoyed close business relations with them.
Even where business activities involved the payment of taxes to rebel
administrations and therefore might seem to be legitimate, none of those funds were
used to benefit the communities in which mineral exploitation was occurring.
Instead the taxes went to fund the elite network's military activities. Secondly, there
were those parties that, while having only indirect commercial ties to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, still bore a responsibility to ensure that those
links did not, albeit inadvertently, contribute to funding and perpetuating the
conflict. They comprise annex III of that report.
10. A specific example is that of the export of the mineral columbo tantalite
( coltan), from which the metal tantalum is extracted. Tantalum is used, inter alia, in
the production of electronic components. In 1999 and 2000 a sharp increase in the
world prices of tantalum occurred, leading to a large increase in coltan production in
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Part of that new production involved
rebel groups and unscrupulous business people forcing farmers and their families to
leave their agricultural land, or chasing people off land where coltan was found and
forcing them to work in artisanal mines. As a result, the widespread destruction of
agriculture and devastating social effects occurred, which in a number of instances
were akin to slavery. While the processors of coltan and other Congolese minerals in
Asia, Furope and North America may not have heen aware of what was happening
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Panel's investigations uncovered such
serious concerns that it was decided to raise the awareness of the international
S/2003/1027
5
Annex 20
U.N. Security Council, 4987th meeting, Resolution 1546 (2004), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (8 June
2004)
United Nations S/RES/1546 (2004)
Security Council Distr.: General
8 June 2004
04-38116 (E)
*0438116*
Resolution 1546 (2004)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4987th meeting, on
8 June 2004
The Security Council,
Welcoming the beginning of a new phase in Iraq’s transition to a
democratically elected government, and looking forward to the end of the
occupation and the assumption of full responsibility and authority by a fully
sovereign and independent Interim Government of Iraq by 30 June 2004,
Recalling all of its previous relevant resolutions on Iraq,
Reaffirming the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of
Iraq,
Reaffirming also the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own
political future and control their own natural resources,
Recognizing the importance of international support, particularly that of
countries in the region, Iraq’s neighbours, and regional organizations, for the people
of Iraq in their efforts to achieve security and prosperity, and noting that the
successful implementation of this resolution will contribute to regional stability,
Welcoming the efforts of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General to assist
the people of Iraq in achieving the formation of the Interim Government of Iraq, as
set out in the letter of the Secretary-General of 7 June 2004 (S/2004/461),
Taking note of the dissolution of the Governing Council of Iraq, and
welcoming the progress made in implementing the arrangements for Iraq’s political
transition referred to in resolution 1511 (2003) of 16 October 2003,
Welcoming the commitment of the Interim Government of Iraq to work
towards a federal, democratic, pluralist, and unified Iraq, in which there is full
respect for political and human rights,
Stressing the need for all parties to respect and protect Iraq’s archaeological,
historical, cultural, and religious heritage,
Affirming the importance of the rule of law, national reconciliation, respect for
human rights including the rights of women, fundamental freedoms, and democracy
including free and fair elections,
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Recalling the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
(UNAMI) on 14 August 2003, and affirming that the United Nations should play a
leading role in assisting the Iraqi people and government in the formation of
institutions for representative government,
Recognizing that international support for restoration of stability and security
is essential to the well-being of the people of Iraq as well as to the ability of all
concerned to carry out their work on behalf of the people of Iraq, and welcoming
Member State contributions in this regard under resolution 1483 (2003) of 22 May
2003 and resolution 1511 (2003),
Recalling the report provided by the United States to the Security Council on
16 April 2004 on the efforts and progress made by the multinational force,
Recognizing the request conveyed in the letter of 5 June 2004 from the Prime
Minister of the Interim Government of Iraq to the President of the Council, which is
annexed to this resolution, to retain the presence of the multinational force,
Recognizing also the importance of the consent of the sovereign Government
of Iraq for the presence of the multinational force and of close coordination between
the multinational force and that government,
Welcoming the willingness of the multinational force to continue efforts to
contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in support of the
political transition, especially for upcoming elections, and to provide security for the
United Nations presence in Iraq, as described in the letter of 5 June 2004 from the
United States Secretary of State to the President of the Council, which is annexed to
this resolution,
Noting the commitment of all forces promoting the maintenance of security
and stability in Iraq to act in accordance with international law, including
obligations under international humanitarian law, and to cooperate with relevant
international organizations,
Affirming the importance of international assistance in reconstruction and
development of the Iraqi economy,
Recognizing the benefits to Iraq of the immunities and privileges enjoyed by
Iraqi oil revenues and by the Development Fund for Iraq, and noting the importance
of providing for continued disbursements of this fund by the Interim Government of
Iraq and its successors upon dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority,
Determining that the situation in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to
international peace and security,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Endorses the formation of a sovereign Interim Government of Iraq, as
presented on 1 June 2004, which will assume full responsibility and authority by
30 June 2004 for governing Iraq while refraining from taking any actions affecting
Iraq’s destiny beyond the limited interim period until an elected Transitional
Government of Iraq assumes office as envisaged in paragraph four below;
2. Welcomes that, also by 30 June 2004, the occupation will end and the
Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to exist, and that Iraq will reassert its full
sovereignty;
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3. Reaffirms the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own
political future and to exercise full authority and control over their financial and
natural resources;
4. Endorses the proposed timetable for Iraq’s political transition to
democratic government including:
(a) formation of the sovereign Interim Government of Iraq that will assume
governing responsibility and authority by 30 June 2004;
(b) convening of a national conference reflecting the diversity of Iraqi
society; and
(c) holding of direct democratic elections by 31 December 2004 if possible,
and in no case later than 31 January 2005, to a Transitional National Assembly,
which will, inter alia, have responsibility for forming a Transitional Government of
Iraq and drafting a permanent constitution for Iraq leading to a constitutionally
elected government by 31 December 2005;
5. Invites the Government of Iraq to consider how the convening of an
international meeting could support the above process, and notes that it would
welcome such a meeting to support the Iraqi political transition and Iraqi recovery,
to the benefit of the Iraqi people and in the interest of stability in the region;
6. Calls on all Iraqis to implement these arrangements peaceably and in full,
and on all States and relevant organizations to support such implementation;
7. Decides that in implementing, as circumstances permit, their mandate to
assist the Iraqi people and government, the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), as requested
by the Government of Iraq, shall:
(a) play a leading role to:
(i) assist in the convening, during the month of July 2004, of a national
conference to select a Consultative Council;
(ii) advise and support the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, as
well as the Interim Government of Iraq and the Transitional National
Assembly, on the process for holding elections;
(iii) promote national dialogue and consensus-building on the drafting of a
national constitution by the people of Iraq;
(b) and also:
(i) advise the Government of Iraq in the development of effective civil and
social services;
(ii) contribute to the coordination and delivery of reconstruction,
development, and humanitarian assistance;
(iii) promote the protection of human rights, national reconciliation, and
judicial and legal reform in order to strengthen the rule of law in Iraq; and
(iv) advise and assist the Government of Iraq on initial planning for the
eventual conduct of a comprehensive census;
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8. Welcomes ongoing efforts by the incoming Interim Government of Iraq to
develop Iraqi security forces including the Iraqi armed forces (hereinafter referred to
as “Iraqi security forces”), operating under the authority of the Interim Government
of Iraq and its successors, which will progressively play a greater role and
ultimately assume full responsibility for the maintenance of security and stability in
Iraq;
9. Notes that the presence of the multinational force in Iraq is at the request
of the incoming Interim Government of Iraq and therefore reaffirms the
authorization for the multinational force under unified command established under
resolution 1511 (2003), having regard to the letters annexed to this resolution;
10. Decides that the multinational force shall have the authority to take all
necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq
in accordance with the letters annexed to this resolution expressing, inter alia, the
Iraqi request for the continued presence of the multinational force and setting out its
tasks, including by preventing and deterring terrorism, so that, inter alia, the United
Nations can fulfil its role in assisting the Iraqi people as outlined in paragraph seven
above and the Iraqi people can implement freely and without intimidation the
timetable and programme for the political process and benefit from reconstruction
and rehabilitation activities;
11. Welcomes, in this regard, the letters annexed to this resolution stating,
inter alia, that arrangements are being put in place to establish a security partnership
between the sovereign Government of Iraq and the multinational force and to ensure
coordination between the two, and notes also in this regard that Iraqi security forces
are responsible to appropriate Iraqi ministers, that the Government of Iraq has
authority to commit Iraqi security forces to the multinational force to engage in
operations with it, and that the security structures described in the letters will serve
as the fora for the Government of Iraq and the multinational force to reach
agreement on the full range of fundamental security and policy issues, including
policy on sensitive offensive operations, and will ensure full partnership between
Iraqi security forces and the multinational force, through close coordination and
consultation;
12. Decides further that the mandate for the multinational force shall be
reviewed at the request of the Government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of
this resolution, and that this mandate shall expire upon the completion of the
political process set out in paragraph four above, and declares that it will terminate
this mandate earlier if requested by the Government of Iraq;
13. Notes the intention, set out in the annexed letter from the United States
Secretary of State, to create a distinct entity under unified command of the
multinational force with a dedicated mission to provide security for the United
Nations presence in Iraq, recognizes that the implementation of measures to provide
security for staff members of the United Nations system working in Iraq would
require significant resources, and calls upon Member States and relevant
organizations to provide such resources, including contributions to that entity;
14. Recognizes that the multinational force will also assist in building the
capability of the Iraqi security forces and institutions, through a programme of
recruitment, training, equipping, mentoring, and monitoring;
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15. Requests Member States and international and regional organizations to
contribute assistance to the multinational force, including military forces, as agreed
with the Government of Iraq, to help meet the needs of the Iraqi people for security
and stability, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and to support the efforts
of UNAMI;
16. Emphasizes the importance of developing effective Iraqi police, border
enforcement, and the Facilities Protection Service, under the control of the Interior
Ministry of Iraq, and, in the case of the Facilities Protection Service, other Iraqi
ministries, for the maintenance of law, order, and security, including combating
terrorism, and requests Member States and international organizations to assist the
Government of Iraq in building the capability of these Iraqi institutions;
17. Condemns all acts of terrorism in Iraq, reaffirms the obligations of
Member States under resolutions 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, 1267 (1999) of
15 October 1999, 1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000, 1390 (2002) of 16 January
2002, 1455 (2003) of 17 January 2003, and 1526 (2004) of 30 January 2004, and
other relevant international obligations with respect, inter alia, to terrorist activities
in and from Iraq or against its citizens, and specifically reiterates its call upon
Member States to prevent the transit of terrorists to and from Iraq, arms for
terrorists, and financing that would support terrorists, and re-emphasizes the
importance of strengthening the cooperation of the countries of the region,
particularly neighbours of Iraq, in this regard;
18. Recognizes that the Interim Government of Iraq will assume the primary
role in coordinating international assistance to Iraq;
19. Welcomes efforts by Member States and international organizations to
respond in support of requests by the Interim Government of Iraq to provide
technical and expert assistance while Iraq is rebuilding administrative capacity;
20. Reiterates its request that Member States, international financial
institutions and other organizations strengthen their efforts to assist the people of
Iraq in the reconstruction and development of the Iraqi economy, including by
providing international experts and necessary resources through a coordinated
programme of donor assistance;
21. Decides that the prohibitions related to the sale or supply to Iraq of arms
and related materiel under previous resolutions shall not apply to arms or related
materiel required by the Government of Iraq or the multinational force to serve the
purposes of this resolution, stresses the importance for all States to abide strictly by
them, and notes the significance of Iraq’s neighbours in this regard, and calls upon
the Government of Iraq and the multinational force each to ensure that appropriate
implementation procedures are in place;
22. Notes that nothing in the preceding paragraph affects the prohibitions on
or obligations of States related to items specified in paragraphs 8 and 12 of
resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 or activities described in paragraph 3 (f) of
resolution 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, and reaffirms its intention to revisit the
mandates of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection
Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency;
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23. Calls on Member States and international organizations to respond to
Iraqi requests to assist Iraqi efforts to integrate Iraqi veterans and former militia
members into Iraqi society;
24. Notes that, upon dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the
funds in the Development Fund for Iraq shall be disbursed solely at the direction of
the Government of Iraq, and decides that the Development Fund for Iraq shall be
utilized in a transparent and equitable manner and through the Iraqi budget including
to satisfy outstanding obligations against the Development Fund for Iraq, that the
arrangements for the depositing of proceeds from export sales of petroleum,
petroleum products, and natural gas established in paragraph 20 of resolution 1483
(2003) shall continue to apply, that the International Advisory and Monitoring Board
shall continue its activities in monitoring the Development Fund for Iraq and shall
include as an additional full voting member a duly qualified individual designated
by the Government of Iraq and that appropriate arrangements shall be made for the
continuation of deposits of the proceeds referred to in paragraph 21 of resolution
1483 (2003);
25. Decides further that the provisions in the above paragraph for the deposit
of proceeds into the Development Fund for Iraq and for the role of the IAMB shall
be reviewed at the request of the Transitional Government of Iraq or twelve months
from the date of this resolution, and shall expire upon the completion of the political
process set out in paragraph four above;
26. Decides that, in connection with the dissolution of the Coalition
Provisional Authority, the Interim Government of Iraq and its successors shall
assume the rights, responsibilities and obligations relating to the Oil-for-Food
Programme that were transferred to the Authority, including all operational
responsibility for the Programme and any obligations undertaken by the Authority in
connection with such responsibility, and responsibility for ensuring independently
authenticated confirmation that goods have been delivered, and further decides that,
following a 120-day transition period from the date of adoption of this resolution,
the Interim Government of Iraq and its successors shall assume responsibility for
certifying delivery of goods under previously prioritized contracts, and that such
certification shall be deemed to constitute the independent authentication required
for the release of funds associated with such contracts, consulting as appropriate to
ensure the smooth implementation of these arrangements;
27. Further decides that the provisions of paragraph 22 of resolution 1483
(2003) shall continue to apply, except that the privileges and immunities provided in
that paragraph shall not apply with respect to any final judgement arising out of a
contractual obligation entered into by Iraq after 30 June 2004;
28. Welcomes the commitments of many creditors, including those of the
Paris Club, to identify ways to reduce substantially Iraq’s sovereign debt, calls on
Member States, as well as internationa1 and regional organizations, to support the
Iraq reconstruction effort, urges the international financial institutions and bilateral
donors to take the immediate steps necessary to provide their full range of loans and
other financial assistance and arrangements to Iraq, recognizes that the Interim
Government of Iraq will have the authority to conclude and implement such
agreements and other arrangements as may be necessary in this regard, and requests
creditors, institutions and donors to work as a priority on these matters with the
Interim Government of Iraq and its successors;
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29. Recalls the continuing obligations of Member States to freeze and
transfer certain funds, assets, and economic resources to the Development Fund for
Iraq in accordance with paragraphs 19 and 23 of resolution 1483 (2003) and with
resolution 1518 (2003) of 24 November 2003;
30. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within three
months from the date of this resolution on UNAMI operations in Iraq, and on a
quarterly basis thereafter on the progress made towards national elections and
fulfilment of all UNAMI’s responsibilities;
31. Requests that the United States, on behalf of the multinational force,
report to the Council within three months from the date of this resolution on the
efforts and progress of this force, and on a quarterly basis thereafter;
32. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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Annex
Text of letters from the Prime Minister of the Interim
Government of Iraq Dr. Ayad Allawi and United States
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the President of
the Council
5 June 2004
Republic of Iraq
Prime Minister Office
Excellency:
On my appointment as Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Iraq, I am
writing to express the commitment of the people of Iraq to complete the political
transition process to establish a free, and democratic Iraq and to be a partner in
preventing and combating terrorism. As we enter a critical new stage, regain full
sovereignty and move towards elections, we will need the assistance of the
international community.
The Interim Government of Iraq will make every effort to ensure that these
elections are fully democratic, free and fair. Security and stability continue to be
essential to our political transition. There continue, however, to be forces in Iraq,
including foreign elements, that are opposed to our transition to peace, democracy,
and security. The Government is determined to overcome these forces, and to
develop security forces capable of providing adequate security for the Iraqi people.
Until we are able to provide security for ourselves, including the defence of Iraq’s
land, sea and air space, we ask for the support of the Security Council and the
international community in this endeavour. We seek a new resolution on the
Multinational Force (MNF) mandate to contribute to maintaining security in Iraq,
including through the tasks and arrangements set out in the letter from Secretary of
State Colin Powell to the President of the United Nations Security Council. The
Government requests that the Security Council review the mandate of the MNF at
the request of the Transitional Government of Iraq, or twelve months from the date
on which such a resolution is adopted.
In order to discharge the Iraqi Government’s responsibility for security, I
intend to establish appropriate security structures that will allow my Government
and Iraqi security forces to progressively take on that responsibility. One such
structure is the Ministerial Committee for National Security, consisting of myself as
the Chair, the Deputy Prime Minister, and the Minister of Defense, Interior, Foreign
Affairs, Justice, and Finance. The National Security Advisor, and Director of the
Iraqi National Intelligence Service will serve as permanent advisory members of the
committee. This forum will set the broad framework for Iraqi security policy. I
intend to invite, as appropriate, the MNF commander, his Deputy, or the MNF
His Excellency
Mr. Lauro L. Baja, Jr.
President of the Security Council
United Nations
New York, New York
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Commander’s designative representative, and other appropriate individuals, to
attend and participate as well, and will stand ready to discuss mechanisms of
coordination and cooperation with the MNF. Iraqi armed forces will be responsible
to the Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense. Other security forces (the Iraqi police,
border guards and Facilities Protection Service) will be responsible to the Minister
of the Interior or other government ministers.
In addition, the relevant ministers and I will develop further mechanisms for
coordination with the MNF. Intend to create with the MNF coordination bodies at
national, regional, and local levels, that will include Iraqi security forces
commanders and civilian leadership, to ensure that Iraqi security forces will
coordinate with the MNF on all security policy and operations issues in order to
achieve unity of command of military operations in which Iraqi forces are engaged
with MNF. In addition, the MNF and Iraqi government leaders will keep each other
informed of their activities, consult regularly to ensure effective allocation and use
of personnel, resources and facilities, will share intelligence, and will refer issues up
the respective chains of command where necessary, Iraqi security forces will take on
progressively greater responsibility as Iraqi capabilities improve.
The structures I have described in this letter will serve as the fora for the MNF
and the Iraqi government to reach agreement on the full range of fundamental
security and policy issues, including policy on sensitive offensive operations, and
will ensure full partnership between Iraqi forces and the MNF, through close
coordination and consultation. Since these are sensitive issues for a number of
sovereign governments, including Iraq and the United States, they need to be
resolved in the framework of a mutual understanding on our strategic partnership.
We will be working closely with the MNF leadership in the coming weeks to ensure
that we have such an agreed strategic framework.
We are ready to take sovereign responsibility for governing Iraq by June 30.
We are well aware of the difficulties facing us, and of our responsibilities to the
Iraqi people. The stakes are great, and we need the support of the international
community to succeed. We ask the Security Council to help us by acting now to
adopt a Security Council resolution giving us necessary support.
I understand that the Co-sponsors intend to annex this letter to the resolution
on Iraq under consideration. In the meantime, I request that you provide copies of
this letter to members of the Council as quickly as possible.
(Signed) Dr. Ayad Allawi
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The Secretary of State
Washington
5 June 2004
Excellency:
Recognizing the request of the government of Iraq for the continued presence
of the Multi-National Force (MNF) in Iraq, and following consultations with Prime
Minister Ayad Allawi of the Iraqi Interim Government, I am writing to confirm that
the MNF under unified command is prepared to continue to contribute to the
maintenance of security in Iraq, including by preventing and deterring terrorism and
protecting the territory of Iraq. The goal of the MNF will be to help the Iraqi people
to complete the political transition and will permit the United Nations and the
international community to work to facilitate Iraq’s reconstruction.
The ability of the Iraqi people to achieve their goals will be heavily influenced
by the security situation in Iraq. As recent events have demonstrated, continuing
attacks by insurgents, including former regime elements, foreign fighters, and illegal
militias challenge all those who are working for a better Iraq.
Development of an effective and cooperative security partnership between the
MNF and the sovereign Government of Iraq is critical to the stability of Iraq. The
commander of the MNF will work in partnership with the sovereign Government of
Iraq in helping to provide security while recognizing and respecting its sovereignty.
To that end, the MNF stands ready to participate in discussions of the Ministerial
Committee for National Security on the broad framework of security policy, as
referred to in the letter from Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Iraq
Allawi dated June 5, 2004. On the implementation of this policy, recognizing that
Iraqi security forces are responsible to the appropriate Iraqi ministers, the MNF will
coordinate with Iraqi security forces at all levels — national, regional, and local —
in order to achieve unity of command of military operations in which Iraqi forces
are engaged with the MNF. In addition, the MNF and the Iraqi government leaders
will keep each other informed of their activities, consult regularly to ensure effective
allocation and use of personnel, resources, and facilities, will share intelligence, and
will refer issues up the respective chains of command where necessary. We will
work in the fora described by Prime Minister Allawi in his
June 5 letter to reach agreement on the full range of fundamental security and policy
issues, including policy on sensitive offensive operations, and will ensure full
partnership between MNF and Iraqi forces, through close coordination and
consultation.
His Excellency
Mr. Lauro L. Baja, Jr.
President of the Security Council
United Nations
New York, New York
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Under the agreed arrangement, the MNF stands ready to continue to undertake
a broad range of tasks to contribute to the maintenance of security and to ensure
force protection. These include activities necessary to counter ongoing security
threats posed by forces seeking to influence Iraq’s political future through violence.
This will include combat operations against members of these groups, internment
where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security, and the continued search
for and securing of weapons that threaten Iraq’s security. A further objective will be
to train and equip Iraqi security forces that will increasingly take responsibility for
maintaining Iraq’s security. The MNF also stands ready as needed to participate in
the provision of humanitarian assistance, civil affairs support, and relief and
reconstruction assistance requested by the Iraqi Interim Government and in line with
previous Security Council Resolutions.
In addition, the MNF is prepared to establish or support a force within the
MNF to provide for the security of personnel and facilities of the United Nations.
We have consulted closely with UN officials regarding the United Nations’ security
requirements and believe that a brigade-size force will be needed to support the
United Nations’ security effort. This force will be under the command and control of
the MNF commander, and its missions will include static and perimeter security at
UN facilities, and convoy escort duties for the UN mission’s travel requirements.
In order to continue to contribute to security, the MNF must continue to
function under a framework that affords the force and its personnel the status that
they need to accomplish their mission, and in which the contributing states have
responsibility for exercising jurisdiction over their personnel and which will ensure
arrangements for, and use of assets by, the MNF. The existing framework governing
these matters is sufficient for these purposes. In addition, the forces that make up the
MNF are and will remain committed at all times to act consistently with their
obligations under the law of armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions.
The MNF is prepared to continue to pursue its current efforts to assist in
providing a secure environment in which the broader international community is
able to fulfil its important role in facilitating Iraq’s reconstruction. In meeting these
responsibilities in the period ahead, we will act in full recognition of and respect for
Iraqi sovereignty. We look to other member states and international and regional
organizations to assist the people of Iraq and the sovereign Iraqi government in
overcoming the challenges that lie ahead to build a democratic, secure and
prosperous country.
The co-sponsors intend to annex this letter to the resolution on Iraq under
consideration. In the meantime, I request that you provide copies of this letter to
members of the Council as quickly as possible.
Sincerely,
(Signed) Colin L. Powell
Annex 20
Annex 21
U.N. General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (21 Mar. 2006)
United Nations A/RES/60/147
General Assembly Distr.: General
21 March 2006
Sixtieth session
Agenda item 71 (a)
05-49642
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 2005
[on the report of the Third Committee (A/60/509/Add.1)]
60/147. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law
The General Assembly,
Guided by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 1 the International Covenants on Human Rights, 2 other relevant
human rights instruments and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,3
Affirming the importance of addressing the question of remedies and reparation
for victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious
violations of international humanitarian law in a systematic and thorough way at the
national and international levels,
Recognizing that, in honouring the victims’ right to benefit from remedies and
reparation, the international community keeps faith with the plight of victims,
survivors and future human generations and reaffirms international law in the field,
Recalling the adoption of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law by the
Commission on Human Rights in its resolution 2005/35 of 19 April 20054 and by
the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 2005/30 of 25 July 2005, in which
the Council recommended to the General Assembly that it adopt the Basic Principles
and Guidelines,
1. Adopts the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law annexed to the present
resolution;
_______________
1 Resolution 217 A (III).
2 Resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
3 A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), chap. III.
4 See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 2005, Supplement No. 3 and corrigendum
(E/2005/23 and Corr.1), chap. II, sect. A.
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2
2. Recommends that States take the Basic Principles and Guidelines into
account, promote respect thereof and bring them to the attention of members of the
executive bodies of government, in particular law enforcement officials and military
and security forces, legislative bodies, the judiciary, victims and their
representatives, human rights defenders and lawyers, the media and the public in
general;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to take steps to ensure the widest
possible dissemination of the Basic Principles and Guidelines in all the official
languages of the United Nations, including by transmitting them to Governments
and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and by including the
Basic Principles and Guidelines in the United Nations publication entitled Human
Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments.
64th plenary meeting
16 December 2005
Annex
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law
Preamble
The General Assembly,
Recalling the provisions providing a right to a remedy for victims of violations
of international human rights law found in numerous international instruments, in
particular article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,1 article 2 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,2 article 6 of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,5 article 14 of
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment,6 and article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,7 and of
international humanitarian law as found in article 3 of the Hague Convention
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907
(Convention IV),8 article 91 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977,9 and articles 68 and 75 of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court,10
_______________
5 Resolution 2106 A (XX), annex.
6 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, No. 24841.
7 Ibid., vol. 1577, No. 27531.
8 See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and
1907 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1915).
9 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1125, No. 17512.
10 Official Records of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June–17 July 1998, vol. I: Final documents (United Nations
publication, Sales No. E.02.I.5), sect. A.
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3
Recalling the provisions providing a right to a remedy for victims of violations
of international human rights found in regional conventions, in particular article 7 of
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 11 article 25 of the American
Convention on Human Rights,12 and article 13 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,13
Recalling the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime
and Abuse of Power emanating from the deliberations of the Seventh United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders and General
Assembly resolution 40/34 of 29 November 1985 by which the Assembly adopted
the text recommended by the Congress,
Reaffirming the principles enunciated in the Declaration of Basic Principles of
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, including that victims should be
treated with compassion and respect for their dignity, have their right to access to
justice and redress mechanisms fully respected, and that the establishment,
strengthening and expansion of national funds for compensation to victims should
be encouraged, together with the expeditious development of appropriate rights and
remedies for victims,
Noting that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court requires the
establishment of “principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims,
including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation”, requires the Assembly of
States Parties to establish a trust fund for the benefit of victims of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court, and of the families of such victims, and mandates the
Court “to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and
privacy of victims” and to permit the participation of victims at all “stages of the
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court”,
Affirming that the Basic Principles and Guidelines contained herein are
directed at gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations
of international humanitarian law which, by their very grave nature, constitute an
affront to human dignity,
Emphasizing that the Basic Principles and Guidelines contained herein do not
entail new international or domestic legal obligations but identify mechanisms,
modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation of existing legal
obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law
which are complementary though different as to their norms,
Recalling that international law contains the obligation to prosecute
perpetrators of certain international crimes in accordance with international
obligations of States and the requirements of national law or as provided for in the
applicable statutes of international judicial organs, and that the duty to prosecute
reinforces the international legal obligations to be carried out in accordance with
national legal requirements and procedures and supports the concept of
complementarity,
_______________
11 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1520, No. 26363.
12 Ibid., vol. 1144, No. 17955.
13 Ibid., vol. 213, No. 2889.
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4
Noting that contemporary forms of victimization, while essentially directed
against persons, may nevertheless also be directed against groups of persons who
are targeted collectively,
Recognizing that, in honouring the victims’ right to benefit from remedies and
reparation, the international community keeps faith with the plight of victims,
survivors and future human generations and reaffirms the international legal
principles of accountability, justice and the rule of law,
Convinced that, in adopting a victim-oriented perspective, the international
community affirms its human solidarity with victims of violations of international
law, including violations of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law, as well as with humanity at large, in accordance with the
following Basic Principles and Guidelines,
Adopts the following Basic Principles and Guidelines:
I. Obligation to respect, ensure respect for and implement international
human rights law and international humanitarian law
1. The obligation to respect, ensure respect for and implement international
human rights law and international humanitarian law as provided for under the
respective bodies of law emanates from:
(a) Treaties to which a State is a party;
(b) Customary international law;
(c) The domestic law of each State.
2. If they have not already done so, States shall, as required under international
law, ensure that their domestic law is consistent with their international legal
obligations by:
(a) Incorporating norms of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law into their domestic law, or otherwise implementing them in their
domestic legal system;
(b) Adopting appropriate and effective legislative and administrative
procedures and other appropriate measures that provide fair, effective and prompt
access to justice;
(c) Making available adequate, effective, prompt and appropriate remedies,
including reparation, as defined below;
(d) Ensuring that their domestic law provides at least the same level of
protection for victims as that required by their international obligations.
II. Scope of the obligation
3. The obligation to respect, ensure respect for and implement international
human rights law and international humanitarian law as provided for under the
respective bodies of law, includes, inter alia, the duty to:
(a) Take appropriate legislative and administrative and other appropriate
measures to prevent violations;
(b) Investigate violations effectively, promptly, thoroughly and impartially
and, where appropriate, take action against those allegedly responsible in
accordance with domestic and international law;
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A/RES/60/147
5
(c) Provide those who claim to be victims of a human rights or humanitarian
law violation with equal and effective access to justice, as described below,
irrespective of who may ultimately be the bearer of responsibility for the violation;
and
(d) Provide effective remedies to victims, including reparation, as described
below.
III. Gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations
of international humanitarian law that constitute crimes
under international law
4. In cases of gross violations of international human rights law and serious
violations of international humanitarian law constituting crimes under international
law, States have the duty to investigate and, if there is sufficient evidence, the duty
to submit to prosecution the person allegedly responsible for the violations and, if
found guilty, the duty to punish her or him. Moreover, in these cases, States should,
in accordance with international law, cooperate with one another and assist
international judicial organs competent in the investigation and prosecution of these
violations.
5. To that end, where so provided in an applicable treaty or under other
international law obligations, States shall incorporate or otherwise implement within
their domestic law appropriate provisions for universal jurisdiction. Moreover,
where it is so provided for in an applicable treaty or other international legal
obligations, States should facilitate extradition or surrender offenders to other States
and to appropriate international judicial bodies and provide judicial assistance and
other forms of cooperation in the pursuit of international justice, including
assistance to, and protection of, victims and witnesses, consistent with international
human rights legal standards and subject to international legal requirements such as
those relating to the prohibition of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.
IV. Statutes of limitations
6. Where so provided for in an applicable treaty or contained in other
international legal obligations, statutes of limitations shall not apply to gross
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international
humanitarian law which constitute crimes under international law.
7. Domestic statutes of limitations for other types of violations that do not
constitute crimes under international law, including those time limitations applicable
to civil claims and other procedures, should not be unduly restrictive.
V. Victims of gross violations of international human rights law
and serious violations of international humanitarian law
8. For purposes of the present document, victims are persons who individually or
collectively suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering,
economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or
omissions that constitute gross violations of international human rights law, or
serious violations of international humanitarian law. Where appropriate, and in
accordance with domestic law, the term “victim” also includes the immediate family
or dependants of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in
intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimization.
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6
9. A person shall be considered a victim regardless of whether the perpetrator of
the violation is identified, apprehended, prosecuted, or convicted and regardless of
the familial relationship between the perpetrator and the victim.
VI. Treatment of victims
10. Victims should be treated with humanity and respect for their dignity and
human rights, and appropriate measures should be taken to ensure their safety,
physical and psychological well-being and privacy, as well as those of their
families. The State should ensure that its domestic laws, to the extent possible,
provide that a victim who has suffered violence or trauma should benefit from
special consideration and care to avoid his or her re-traumatization in the course of
legal and administrative procedures designed to provide justice and reparation.
VII. Victims’ right to remedies
11. Remedies for gross violations of international human rights law and serious
violations of international humanitarian law include the victim’s right to the
following as provided for under international law:
(a) Equal and effective access to justice;
(b) Adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered;
(c) Access to relevant information concerning violations and reparation
mechanisms.
VIII. Access to justice
12. A victim of a gross violation of international human rights law or of a serious
violation of international humanitarian law shall have equal access to an effective
judicial remedy as provided for under international law. Other remedies available to
the victim include access to administrative and other bodies, as well as mechanisms,
modalities and proceedings conducted in accordance with domestic law. Obligations
arising under international law to secure the right to access justice and fair and
impartial proceedings shall be reflected in domestic laws. To that end, States should:
(a) Disseminate, through public and private mechanisms, information about
all available remedies for gross violations of international human rights law and
serious violations of international humanitarian law;
(b) Take measures to minimize the inconvenience to victims and their
representatives, protect against unlawful interference with their privacy as
appropriate and ensure their safety from intimidation and retaliation, as well as that
of their families and witnesses, before, during and after judicial, administrative, or
other proceedings that affect the interests of victims;
(c) Provide proper assistance to victims seeking access to justice;
(d) Make available all appropriate legal, diplomatic and consular means to
ensure that victims can exercise their rights to remedy for gross violations of
international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian
law.
13. In addition to individual access to justice, States should endeavour to develop
procedures to allow groups of victims to present claims for reparation and to receive
reparation, as appropriate.
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A/RES/60/147
7
14. An adequate, effective and prompt remedy for gross violations of international
human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law should
include all available and appropriate international processes in which a person may
have legal standing and should be without prejudice to any other domestic remedies.
IX. Reparation for harm suffered
15. Adequate, effective and prompt reparation is intended to promote justice by
redressing gross violations of international human rights law or serious violations of
international humanitarian law. Reparation should be proportional to the gravity of
the violations and the harm suffered. In accordance with its domestic laws and
international legal obligations, a State shall provide reparation to victims for acts or
omissions which can be attributed to the State and constitute gross violations of
international human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian
law. In cases where a person, a legal person, or other entity is found liable for
reparation to a victim, such party should provide reparation to the victim or
compensate the State if the State has already provided reparation to the victim.
16. States should endeavour to establish national programmes for reparation and
other assistance to victims in the event that the parties liable for the harm suffered
are unable or unwilling to meet their obligations.
17. States shall, with respect to claims by victims, enforce domestic judgements
for reparation against individuals or entities liable for the harm suffered and
endeavour to enforce valid foreign legal judgements for reparation in accordance
with domestic law and international legal obligations. To that end, States should
provide under their domestic laws effective mechanisms for the enforcement of
reparation judgements.
18. In accordance with domestic law and international law, and taking account of
individual circumstances, victims of gross violations of international human rights
law and serious violations of international humanitarian law should, as appropriate
and proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case,
be provided with full and effective reparation, as laid out in principles 19 to 23,
which include the following forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation,
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.
19. Restitution should, whenever possible, restore the victim to the original
situation before the gross violations of international human rights law or serious
violations of international humanitarian law occurred. Restitution includes, as
appropriate: restoration of liberty, enjoyment of human rights, identity, family life
and citizenship, return to one’s place of residence, restoration of employment and
return of property.
20. Compensation should be provided for any economically assessable damage, as
appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances of
each case, resulting from gross violations of international human rights law and
serious violations of international humanitarian law, such as:
(a) Physical or mental harm;
(b) Lost opportunities, including employment, education and social benefits;
(c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning
potential;
(d) Moral damage;
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8
(e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and medical
services, and psychological and social services.
21. Rehabilitation should include medical and psychological care as well as legal
and social services.
22. Satisfaction should include, where applicable, any or all of the following:
(a) Effective measures aimed at the cessation of continuing violations;
(b) Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth to the
extent that such disclosure does not cause further harm or threaten the safety and
interests of the victim, the victim’s relatives, witnesses, or persons who have
intervened to assist the victim or prevent the occurrence of further violations;
(c) The search for the whereabouts of the disappeared, for the identities of
the children abducted, and for the bodies of those killed, and assistance in the
recovery, identification and reburial of the bodies in accordance with the expressed
or presumed wish of the victims, or the cultural practices of the families and
communities;
(d) An official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the
reputation and the rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with the
victim;
(e) Public apology, including acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance
of responsibility;
(f) Judicial and administrative sanctions against persons liable for the
violations;
(g) Commemorations and tributes to the victims;
(h) Inclusion of an accurate account of the violations that occurred in
international human rights law and international humanitarian law training and in
educational material at all levels.
23. Guarantees of non-repetition should include, where applicable, any or all of
the following measures, which will also contribute to prevention:
(a) Ensuring effective civilian control of military and security forces;
(b) Ensuring that all civilian and military proceedings abide by international
standards of due process, fairness and impartiality;
(c) Strengthening the independence of the judiciary;
(d) Protecting persons in the legal, medical and health-care professions, the
media and other related professions, and human rights defenders;
(e) Providing, on a priority and continued basis, human rights and
international humanitarian law education to all sectors of society and training for
law enforcement officials as well as military and security forces;
(f) Promoting the observance of codes of conduct and ethical norms, in
particular international standards, by public servants, including law enforcement,
correctional, media, medical, psychological, social service and military personnel,
as well as by economic enterprises;
(g) Promoting mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social conflicts
and their resolution;
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9
(h) Reviewing and reforming laws contributing to or allowing gross
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international
humanitarian law.
X. Access to relevant information concerning violations and reparation
mechanisms
24. States should develop means of informing the general public and, in particular,
victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations
of international humanitarian law of the rights and remedies addressed by these
Basic Principles and Guidelines and of all available legal, medical, psychological,
social, administrative and all other services to which victims may have a right of
access. Moreover, victims and their representatives should be entitled to seek and
obtain information on the causes leading to their victimization and on the causes and
conditions pertaining to the gross violations of international human rights law and
serious violations of international humanitarian law and to learn the truth in regard
to these violations.
XI. Non-discrimination
25. The application and interpretation of these Basic Principles and Guidelines
must be consistent with international human rights law and international
humanitarian law and be without any discrimination of any kind or on any ground,
without exception.
XII. Non-derogation
26. Nothing in these Basic Principles and Guidelines shall be construed as
restricting or derogating from any rights or obligations arising under domestic and
international law. In particular, it is understood that the present Basic Principles and
Guidelines are without prejudice to the right to a remedy and reparation for victims
of all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian
law. It is further understood that these Basic Principles and Guidelines are without
prejudice to special rules of international law.
XIII. Rights of others
27. Nothing in this document is to be construed as derogating from internationally
or nationally protected rights of others, in particular the right of an accused person
to benefit from applicable standards of due process.
Annex 21
Annex 22
U.N. Economic and Social Council, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: Combined second, third, fourth and fifth periodic reports submitted
by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/COD/5 (14 Aug. 2007)
United Nations E/C.12/COD/5
Economic and Social Council Distr.: General
21 January 2009
English
Original: French
09-32585 (E) 210109 210509
GE.09-40363
Substantive session of 2009
Implementation of the International Covenational Archives
of the Congo Cultural Rights
Combined second, third, fourth and fifth periodic reports
submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the
Covenant
Democratic Republic of the Congo*
[14 August 2007]
* In accordance with the information transmitted to States parties regarding the processing of their
reports, the present document was not edited before being sent to the United Nations translation
services.
Annex 22
09-32585 15
E/C.12/COD/5
Article 6
57. The problem of labour and employment in the DRC has been acute since the
time of economic crisis and armed conflicts. According to the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (Ministry of Planning, PRSP, February 2004, page 38), it is
employment that has been the most seriously affected by the difficulties facing the
State, made worse by poor management of public enterprises and the lack of a
partnership policy to encourage investment.
58. In 2000, 2% of the total population (4% of the workforce and 8% of the male
workforce) was employed, compared to 8%, 18% and 35% respectively in 1958. The
social and political crisis of the 1990s, combined with armed conflicts, merely
precipitated this negative trend, which has had a lasting impact on employment and
on vocational training. The crisis is one of the main causes of the extremely difficult
social situation, as a result of which urban unemployment has been exacerbated and
an informal sector has emerged.
59. The employment situation in the DRC can be appreciated from the
occupational status of the working age population (15 to 64 years). Fifty-seven
percent of these people are engaged in an economic activity, i.e. they devote the
greatest portion of their time to it even if they exercise other activities: employees,
self-employed workers, and agricultural workers (MICS2/2001, pp. 41 and 42).
60. Most workers are engaged in the agriculture sector (41%): farming, fishing,
livestock, hunting, for agriculture constitutes the primary employment sector in the
country. The proportion is 56% in rural areas versus 10% in the cities.
61. Employed workers represent 7%: this low proportion indicates the collapse of
modern employment in the DRC. The employee portion of the workforce was 8% in
1958, falling to 2% in 1997, as a result of:
(a) lack of measures to encourage domestic or foreign investors to create
jobs;
(b) the constraints imposed by structural adjustment programmes, as a result
of which thousands of workers became unemployed or actually left the workforce;
(c) the looting episodes of 1991 and 1993, which led to the elimination of
many jobs, and the war, which destroyed the little infrastructure remaining in the
affected areas, reducing employment opportunities.
62. Self-employed persons (those not working for wages or salary) account for
9%, reflecting the predominance of the informal sector which has sprung up in
urban areas and which now accounts for millions of people, including young school
graduates who are unable to find formal employment, those who pursue informal
activities to supplement their wages, and those who pursue such activities for
enrichment (MICS2/2001, p. 42).
63. With respect to female employment, it must be noted that male employees
outnumber female employees by 4 to 1 (12% versus 3%). The gap is lower in the
case of self-employed workers, where the male/female ratio is 2 to 1. Women are
engaged primarily in agriculture and in the informal sector.
64. In agriculture, women are more numerous (53.8%) than in wage-earning jobs
(2.8%), for agriculture constitutes the primary employment sector in the country and
Annex 22
E/C.12/COD/5*
22 GE.11-40296
110. The following table illustrates the trend in the average wage and the
minimum wage in relation to the cost of living between 1990 and 1997:
ITEMS 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Average market price
indices (IRES) 100 1 916 86 244,3 1 757 917,3 419 491 562,2 1 972 868 817,0 16 826 898 140 16 759 291 747,4
PRIVATE SECTOR
Nominal wage index 100 235,7 48 653,9 104 940,3 145 836,8 8 480 559,4 8 480 559,4 133,4
Real wage index 100 17,0 56,4 6,0 0,0 0,4 0,1 0,0
PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
Nominal wage index 100 4 925,3 33 434,6 435 716,8 83 982 249,4 157 358 790,9 157 350 970,9 25 477 712 102,0
Real wage index 100 257,0 38,8 24,8 20,0 8,0 1,0 5 871,0
LEGAL MINIMUM
SALARY
Nominal wage index 100 2 224,8 18 471,3 2 254 777,1 43 949 44,6 80 254 777 80 254 777,1 0 254 777,1
Real wage index 100 116,1 21,4 14,5 10,4 4,1 0,5 0,5
Source: Études de la Banque centrale du Congo, 1997 Conjoncture économique, p. 4.12, point 4.2.2.
111. The level of income per capita per day, which was US$1.31 in 1973, fell to
US$0.91 in 1974 and to US$0.30 in 1998. In 2004, it was estimated at less than
US$0.20 per person per day, or $73 per year (Ministry of Planning, Poverty
Reduction Strategy Document, February 2004, p. 11, point 2.2, § 23 and p.5 §3),
but UNICEF, in its 2007 programme document for the DRC, estimates annual per
capita income at US$120.
112. Observance of the SMIG is not effectively enforced by the responsible
labour inspection offices, because of the shortage of inspectors. Efforts are now
underway to strengthen the material and human resources of these offices.
113. The principle of equal pay is governed in the DRC by article 86 of the
Labour Code, which provides that where working conditions, vocational
qualifications and performance are equal, the salary shall be equal for all workers,
regardless of their origin, sex or age.
114. On this point, we may note that in the DRC there is no discrimination
between the sexes, for wages are paid according to occupational category and not
according to performance. The classification of jobs, which ranges from labourer
to supervisor, contains a wage scale of 1 to 10.
115. Breaches of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" are punishable by a
fine of 20,000 constant francs for each worker concerned, but the fine may not
exceed 50 times the maximum rates set in article 328 of the Labour Code.
116. Minimum health and hygiene standards in the workplace are set by articles
160, 163, 167 and 170 of the Labour Code, Title VII of which is devoted to
workplace health and safety. These provisions cover all fields of work and are
mandatory. They are supplemented by ministerial decrees. The labour inspection
office is responsible for enforcing them.
117. With respect to equal opportunities for promotion, the Constitution (article
36.3) declares that no one may be prejudiced in his or her work by reason of
origin, sex, opinions or beliefs, or socioeconomic conditions. Thus there is no
group of workers not enjoying equal promotion opportunities, whether they are
Annex 22
Annex 23
U.N. Security Council, 6058th meeting, Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/PRST/48 (22 Dec. 2008)
United Nations S/PRST/2008/48
Security Council Distr.: General
22 December 2008
Original: English and French
08-66492 (E) 221208
*0866492*
Statement by the President of the Security Council
At the 6058th meeting of the Security Council, held on 22 December 2008, in
connection with the Council’s consideration of the item entitled “The situation in
the Great Lakes region”, the President of the Security Council made the following
statement on behalf of the Council:
“The Security Council is grateful for the efforts undertaken by His
Excellency Mr. Joaquim Chissano, former President of Mozambique, as the
Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)-
affected areas. The Council expresses its appreciation for his briefing of
17 December 2008, and agrees with his recommendation that the peace efforts
should continue. The Council welcomes President Chissano’s readiness to
continue in his role for a further period.
“The Security Council reiterates its welcome for the Final Peace
Agreement (FPA), negotiated between the Government of Uganda and the
LRA, and reached through the Juba Peace Process. The Council commends the
Government of Uganda for its continued commitment to the FPA and its
investment in the peace process.
“The Security Council condemns the repeated failure of Joseph Kony to
sign the FPA. It calls upon the LRA to sign and honour the FPA immediately
and to begin the process of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration to
ensure a peaceful, political solution.
“The Security Council strongly condemns the recent attacks by the LRA
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Southern Sudan, which pose a
continuing threat to regional security. It demands that the LRA cease its
recruitment and use of children and that it release immediately all women,
children and other non-combatants, in accordance with Security Council
resolution 1612 (2005). The Council reiterates its deep concern at the longrunning
and brutal insurgency by the LRA which has caused the death,
abduction and displacement of thousands of innocent civilians in Uganda, the
Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
“The Security Council recalls the International Criminal Court arrest
warrants for certain LRA leaders on charges of, among other things, war
crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, rape and the enlistment
of children through abduction. The Council recalls its statement of June 2006
(PRST/2006/28), and reaffirms that it attaches vital importance to promoting
Annex 23
S/PRST/2008/48
2 08-66492
justice and the rule of law, including respect for human rights, as an
indispensable element for lasting peace. The Council reaffirms that ending
impunity is essential for a society recovering from conflict to come to terms
with past abuses committed against civilians and to prevent their recurrence.
“The Security Council commends the States in the region for their
increased cooperation, and welcomes the joint efforts they have made to
address the security threat posed by the LRA. The Council calls upon these
States to ensure that all actions are carried out in accordance with international
humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and to take appropriate measures
to protect civilians. The Council encourages these States to keep the United
Nations missions in the region informed about their actions.
“The Security Council welcomes the re-establishment of peace and
security in northern Uganda. It encourages the Government of Uganda, with
the support of international partners, to honour its commitment to accelerate
reconciliation, recovery and development in that region through rapid
implementation of its Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) and
relevant Agenda items in the FPA and to disburse anticipated financing for the
PRDP without delay.
“The Security Council will continue to monitor the situation closely.”
Annex 23
Annex 24
D. Nthengwe, ed. L. Dobbs, U.N.H.C.R., 30,000 Congolese flee to escape fresh conflict in Ituri
district (7 Apr. 2009)
Home News and Stories News
30,000 Congolese flee to escape fresh conflict
in Ituri district
Renewed fighting between two rival militia groups in the Ituri district of north-east Congo
drives more than 30,000 Congolese civilians from their homes.
By David Nthengwe, ed. Leo Dobbs | 07 April 2009 | F rançais
Displaced people north of Dungu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Orientale province. © UNHCR/S.Schulman
BUNIA, Democratic Republic of the Congo, April 7 (UNHCR) - The UN refugee agency said Tuesday that renewed
fighting between rival militia groups in the north-eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has driven more
than 30,000 Congolese from their homes.
On March 31, the Popular Front for Justice in the Congo (FPJC) attacked Tcheyi, Bavi and Songolo villages in the
Irumu area of Ituri district, which is located in DRC’s Orientale province. Two days later, the self-styled
Revolutionary Front for Peace in the Ituri (FPRI) launched a counter attack to retake Bavi.
The FPJC splintered from the FPRI last September and carried out a number of attacks, which led to displacement
and human suffering in the area. The FPRI has refused to participate in the peace process in the DRC and has
been blamed for major human rights violations in Ituri district.
The displaced have fled to Nyakunde and Marabo and are also located along the road leading to Kagaba,
Chikede, Geti and Aveba, some 50-70 kilometres south of the Ituri capital of Bunia. Many of the newly displaced
include people who were uprooted in raids mounted by the FRPI in 2006 in Ituri district and who were assisted to
return to their homes by UNHCR in late 2006.
The latest flare-up threatens to reverse the considerable progress made in the repatriation and resettlement of
thousands of Congolese affected by previous conflicts in the area.
Meanwhile, UNHCR on Tuesday urged donors to help provide aid to internally displaced people, host families and
returnees in Haut-Uele, another troubled district of Orientale. Thousands fled their homes in the district, which lies
immediately to the north of Ituri, to escape attacks since last September by Uganda’s rebel Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA).
But some people have been returning home while UNHCR teams have since the end of last month managed to
access villages north of the district capital of Dungu which the LRA had previously attacked, including Kiliwa, Limai,
Taduru and Duru. They found destitute people in need of urgent assistance.
“Assistance should target everybody - the returning, displaced and host families - since they are all in the same
state of need,” said Karl Steinacker, who is the coordinator of UNHCR operations in eastern DRC.
In Duru, UNHCR staff members found 1,400 displaced people sharing their meagre resources with some 1,200
locals. About 1,100 people have returned to their villages around Duru, but are in poor health and in urgent need of
relief assistance.
People in need were also found last week in the town of Faradje and the village of Kiliwa, where people had
almost nothing. On Monday, a UNHCR team visited Taduru, 20 kilometres north-west of Dungu, and found seminaked
men, women and children sleeping under loose palm leaves. Many were ill and in need of medicine.
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Annex 24
A displaced octogenarian woman writhes in pain in the town of Taduru, Haut-Uele district. She needs medicine. © UNHCR/D.Nthengwe
But UNHCR also found that many people were returning home: about 12,000 people had gone back to Faradje, or
about 70 percent of the population, while some had returned to Kiliwa, 45 km north of Dungu. But they were
returning to scenes of devastation, with houses burned down, fields left idle for months and water sources tainted.
UNHCR and other agencies have provided some help, including shelter materials and food, but much more needs
to be done - and soon - because the rainy season is approaching.
But the overall situation in Haut-Uele remains tense and most of the estimated 180,000 internally displaced
people are not ready to return home. Fighting continues in the Duru area and one man was killed there on March
29. Some people continue to flee their homes - about 200 people fled to Faradje last week to escape LRA
attacks.
“It’s a province that has never known real peace,” said a Catholic priest in Dungu, lamenting the violence that has
long plagued Orientale.
By David Nthengwe in Bunia, Democratic Republic of the Congo
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Annex 24
Annex 25
U.N. Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003 (Aug. 2010)
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, 1993–2003
Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003
August 2010
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
1
Foreword
This report is the result of interviews with several hundred interlocutors, both Congolese
and foreign, who witnessed atrocities in the country: it substantiates their accounts and
reflects their aspirations for justice. No report however, can adequately describe the
horrors experienced by the civilian population in Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC), where almost every single individual has an experience to narrate of
suffering and loss. In some cases, victims became perpetrators, while perpetrators were
themselves sometimes subjected to serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law, in a cycle of violence that has not yet abated. The report is intended to
be representative of the grave acts of violence that affected – directly or indirectly – a
vast number of people living in the DRC. While it neither aims to establish individual
responsibility, nor lay blame, the report – in full candour – reproduces the often shocking
accounts by victims and witnesses of the tragedies they experienced. The report is
intended as a first step towards the sometimes painful but nonetheless essential process of
truth-telling after violent conflict.
This report makes an assessment of the justice system in the DRC, based on
insights from various stakeholders in the justice sector, including those who were victims
of its shortcomings. It presents a number of options to be considered by both Congolese
and international actors in the difficult task of reforming the justice system, which faces
multiple challenges. It calls for renewed Government commitment to ensure that justice
becomes one of the fundamental pillars of Congolese democracy. Lastly, it looks to the
future by identifying a number of paths that could be pursued by Congolese society to
come to terms with its past, to fight impunity, and to face its contemporary challenges in
a manner that prevents the re-occurrence of such atrocities.
Through their testimonies in this report, the Congolese people have demonstrated
their commitment to truth and to justice. The ultimate impact of this project will depend
on follow-up actions by the Government and the people of the DRC. While the primary
responsibility to define and implement an approach to transitional justice lies with the
Government and the people of the DRC, they deserve the support of the international
community in this endeavour. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights will remain a committed partner of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
in the important quest for truly sustainable peace.
Navanethem Pillay
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
3
• Conduct a mapping exercise of the most serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the DRC
between March 1993 and June 2003.
• Assess the existing capacities within the national justice system to deal
appropriately with such human rights violations that may be uncovered.
• Formulate a series of options aimed at assisting the Government of the DRC in
identifying appropriate transitional justice mechanisms to deal with the legacy of
these violations, in terms of truth, justice, reparation and reform, taking into
account ongoing efforts by the DRC authorities, as well as the support of the
international community.6
3. The Mapping Exercise was presented to President Joseph Kabila during the visit
of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to the DRC in May 2007, and was well
received. In its Resolution 1794 (2007) of December 2007, the UN Security Council
requested the full support of the Congolese authorities for the OHCHR-initiated Mapping
Exercise. On 30 June 2008, a letter was sent by High Commissioner Louise Arbour to
President Kabila announcing the imminent arrival of the Mapping Team. The Mapping
Exercise began officially on 17 July 2008 with the arrival of the Chief of the Mapping
Team in Kinshasa. More than twenty human rights officers were deployed across the
DRC between October 2008 and May 2009 to gather documents and information from
witnesses to meet the three objectives defined in the ToR. The Congolese Government
has expressed its support for the Mapping Exercise on a number of occasions, notably in
the statement delivered by the Minister for Human Rights at the Special session of the
Human Rights Council on the human rights situation in the East of the DRC in November
2008 and in various meetings between the Chief of the Mapping Exercise and the Justice
and Human Rights Ministers.
Mapping Exercise
4. Mapping is based on a number of methodological premises.7 A mapping exercise
itself should be concerned not only with the violations themselves but also with the
context(s) in which they were committed, either in a given region or across an entire
country, as is the case here. Such an exercise requires various activities to be carried out,
including the collection, analysis and assessment of information contained in multiple
reports and documents from different sources, meetings and witness interviews, as well
as consultation with field experts and consultants. However, a mapping exercise is not an
end in itself. It remains a preliminary exercise leading to the formulation of transitional
_______________
6 Article 1, ToR.
7 The French translations of “mapping” – cartographie, inventaire or état des lieux (inventory) – fail to
reflect accurately the scope of the mapping exercise's mandate, and it was decided by the team to retain the
generic English term to designate this exercise in French.
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
4
justice mechanisms, be they judicial or not. It represents a fundamental step in enabling
the identification of challenges, the assessment of needs and better targeting of
interventions.
5. The ToR for this Mapping Exercise required the Team8 to “start and complete this
exercise as soon as possible […] to assist the new government with the tools to manage
post-conflict processes”.9 The six-month deployment timeframe set by the Secretary-
General for the Mapping Team, with the mandate of compiling an inventory of the most
serious violations committed within the territory of the DRC over a ten-year period,
imposed certain constraints in terms of the methodology to be used. It did not provide for
in-depth investigations or gathering of evidence admissible in court, but rather “the basis
for the formulation of initial hypotheses of investigation by giving a sense of the scale of
violations, detecting patterns and identifying potential leads or sources of evidence”.10
Consequently, with regard to violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law, the Mapping Exercise provides a description of the violation(s) and their location in
time and space, the nature of the violation(s), the victims and their approximate number
and the – often armed – group(s) to which the alleged perpetrators belong(ed). The
exercise was carried out “chronologically and province by province”.11
6. Given the scale of the violations committed in the ten years of conflict in the
DRC, it was necessary to select from the most serious of these crimes. A gravity
threshold12 with a set of criteria enabling the Team to identify incidents of sufficient
severity to be included in the final report was used for incident selection. These criteria
fell into four categories: 1) nature of the crimes and violations linked to a given incident,
2) scale (number) of crimes and violations linked to an incident, and number of victims,
3) how the crimes and violations were committed and 4) impact of crimes and violations
on communities, regions or the course of events.
7. Since the primary objective of the Mapping Exercise was to “gather basic
information on incidents uncovered”, the level of evidence required was naturally lesser
than would be expected from a case brought before a criminal court. The question was
therefore not one of being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a violation was
committed, but rather of reasonably suspecting that the incident did occur. Reasonable
suspicion is defined as “necessitating a reliable body of material consistent with other
_______________
8 “Team” is used to designate the body of human rights specialists who led the Mapping Exercise
investigations across the DRC. These specialists may also be designated “Mapping Exercise Teams” or
“Mapping Teams”.
9 Article 2.3, ToR.
10 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Rule-of-Law tools for
post-conflict states: Prosecution initiatives, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2008, p.6.
11 Article 4.2, ToR: “It should be carried out province by province, and in chronological order of events. It
should gather basic information and not replace in-depth investigations into the incidents uncovered.”
12 The gravity threshold was developed by the International Criminal Court to identify “the most serious
crimes for investigation”. See, for example, Article 17(d)(1): Issues of admissibility under the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court.
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
5
verified circumstances tending to show that an incident or event did happen.13 Assessing
the reliability of the information obtained was a two-stage process involving evaluation
of the reliability and credibility of the source,14 and then the validity and veracity of the
information itself.15
8. Unlike some commissions of inquiry with a specific mandate to identify the
perpetrators of violations and make them accountable for their actions, the objective of
the Mapping Exercise was not to establish or to try to establish individual criminal
responsibility of given actors, but rather to expose in a transparent way the seriousness of
the violations committed, with the aim of encouraging an approach aimed at breaking the
cycle of impunity and contributing to this. This decision is further explained by the fact
that, in light of the methodology adopted and the level of evidence used in this Exercise,
it would have been imprudent, and unjust, to seek to ascribe personal criminal
responsibility to any given individual, which is first and foremost a matter for legal
proceedings based on the appropriate level of evidence. The report does, however,
identify the armed group(s) to which the alleged perpetrator(s) belong(ed), since it was
essential to identify the groups allegedly involved in order to suggest proper legal
characterizations for the conduct in question. Consequently, information on the identity
of the alleged perpetrators of some of the crimes listed does not appear in this report but
is held in the confidential project database submitted to the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights.16 However, the identities of alleged perpetrators under warrant of arrest
and those already sentenced for crimes listed in the report have been disclosed. It should
also be noted that where political officials have assumed public positions encouraging or
provoking the violations listed, their names have been cited in the sections relating to the
political context.
9. Conducting a mapping exercise of the most serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law committed in the DRC during the period under
examination presented a number of challenges. In spite of the scale of extreme violence
that characterises the violations in some of the country’s regions, it was also necessary to
take into consideration less serious violations in seemingly less affected regions in order
to provide an overview of the entire country. With this in mind, the gravity threshold was
adapted to each region. Investigating violations that occurred over ten years earlier was
sometimes difficult due to the displacement of witnesses and victims and the passing of
_______________
13 Another formulation would be reliable and consistent indications tending to show that the incident did
happen.
14 Reliability of the source was determined using several factors, including the nature, objectivity and
professional standing of the source providing the information, the methodology used and the quality of
prior information obtained from that source.
15 The validity and authenticity of the information were evaluated through comparison with other data on
the same incidents to ensure cohesion with other verified elements and circumstances.
16 Article 4.3, ToR: “Sensitive information gathered during the mapping exercise should be stored and
utilised according to the strictest standards of confidentiality. The team should develop a database for the
purposes of the mapping exercise, access to which should be determined by the High Commissioner for
Human Rights.”
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
6
time. In some cases, violations that initially appeared to be isolated crimes turned out to
be an integral part of waves of violence occurring in a given geographical location or
within a given timeframe. It cannot be denied that vis-à-vis the frightening number of
violations committed between 1993 and 2003, the sheer size of the country and
difficulties accessing a number of sites, the Mapping Exercise remains necessarily
incomplete and can in no case reconstruct the complexity of each situation or obtain
justice for the victims. We state this with utmost regret.
10. The Mapping Exercise report contains descriptions of over 600 violent incidents
having occurred within the territory of the DRC between March 1993 and June 2003.
Each of these incidents points to the possible commission of gross violations of human
rights and/or international humanitarian law. Each of the incidents listed is backed up by
at least two independent sources identified in the report. As serious as they may be,
uncorroborated incidents claimed by one single source are not included in this report.
Over 1,500 documents relating to human rights violations committed during this period
were gathered and analysed with a view to establishing an initial chronology by region of
the main violent incidents reported. Only incidents meeting the gravity threshold in
accordance with the methodology set out were considered. The in-field Mapping Teams
then met with over 1,280 witnesses to corroborate or invalidate the violations listed in the
chronology. During these interviews, information was also collected on previously
undocumented crimes.
Implementation of the Mapping Exercise
11. Throughout the implementation of the Mapping Exercise, contacts were
established with Congolese non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in order to obtain
information, documents and reports on serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law that occurred in the DRC during the period covered by the
ToR. To this end, meetings were held with over 200 NGO representatives to present the
Mapping Exercise and request their collaboration. Thanks to this collaboration, the
Mapping Team had access to critical information, witnesses and reports pertaining to the
violations committed between 1993 and 2003. Without the courageous and outstanding
work of the Congolese NGOs during these ten years, documenting the many violations
committed would have been incredibly difficult.
12. Meetings were also held with the Congolese authorities, in particular with the
civilian and military judicial authorities across the country, government representatives,
in particular the Ministers for Justice and Human Rights, and the government agencies
responsible for judicial system reform.
13. Consultations were also held with the main partners of the Mapping Exercise
[MONUC, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)], diplomatic missions as
well as actors involved in human rights and the fight against impunity in the DRC
(notably UN organisations, international NGOs, religious groups and trade unions) to
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
7
explain the exercise and seek their collaboration. The project was warmly received by all
and the collaboration fruitful.
14. The Mapping Exercise was rolled out in three successive phases:
• Phase one began with the arrival of the Chief of the Mapping Team in July 2008,
and was dedicated to the recruitment of teams and to the collection, analysis and
use of documents, both confidential and in the public domain, from existing
information sources on the violations committed during the period under
examination. Over 1,500 documents on this subject, some of them confidential,
were obtained from many sources, including the United Nations, the Congolese
Government, Congolese human rights organisations, major international human
rights organisations, the national and international media and various NGOs
(notably unions, religious groups, aid agencies and victims’ associations). In
addition, different national and international experts were consulted in order to
open up new avenues of research, corroborate some of the information obtained
and streamline the overall analysis of the situation.
• Phase two began on 17 October 2008 with the deployment of the field Teams to
carry out the mandate in all provinces of the DRC from five field offices,17
including all investigations, consultations and analyses necessary both to prepare
the inventory of the most serious violations and also to assess the existing
capacities of the Congolese judicial system to deal with this and formulate options
for transitional justice mechanisms that could contribute to the fight against
impunity. During this phase previously obtained information was verified in order
to corroborate or invalidate that information with the aid of independent sources,
while also obtaining new information on previously undocumented violations.
• Phase three began with the closure of the field offices on 15 May 2009 and was
aimed at compiling all the information gathered and drafting the final report.
During this period, regional consultations regarding transitional justice were held
with civil society representatives in Bunia, Bukavu, Goma and Kinshasa. The
final report was submitted to OHCHR on 15 June 2009 for review, comments and
finalisation.
_______________
17 The five field offices were at Bukavu (South Kivu), Goma (North Kivu), Kisangani (Orientale), Kalemie
(Katanga) and Kinshasa. The Kisangani team moved to Bunia to cover the Ituri region. The Kalemie-based
team covered the provinces of Maniema, Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental. The Kinshasa-based team
covered the provinces of Kinshasa, Bas-Congo, Bandundu and Équateur.
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
9
the war, which led to the overthrow of the Mobutu regime.18 At the start of the period,
serious violations were committed against Tutsi and Banyamulenge civilians,19
principally in South Kivu. This period was then characterised by the apparently relentless
pursuit and mass killing (104 reported incidents) of Hutu refugees, members of the
former Armed Forces of Rwanda (later “ex-FAR”) and militias implicated in the
genocide of 1994 (Interahamwe), allegedly by the Alliance des forces démocratiques
pour la libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL). A proportion of the AFDL’s troops, arms
and logistics were apparently supplied by the Armée patriotique rwandaise (APR), the
Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) and by the Forces armées burundaises (FAB)
throughout the Congolese territory. Hutu refugees, who it appears were often rounded up
and used by the ex-FAR/Interahamwe as human shields during their flight, began a long
trek across the country from east to west towards Angola, the Central African Republic or
the Republic of the Congo. This period was also marked by serious attacks on other
civilian populations in all provinces without exception, in particular allegedly by the
Forces armées zaïroises (FAZ) retreating towards Kinshasa, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe
driven back by the AFDL/APR and the Mayi-Mayi.20
C. August 1998–January 2000: Second Congo War
19. The third period concerns the inventory of violations committed between the start
of the Second Congo War in August 1998, and the death of President Laurent-Désiré
Kabila. This period includes 200 incidents and is characterised by the intervention on the
territory of the DRC of the government armed forces of several countries, fighting
alongside the Forces armées congolaises (FAC) (Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia) or
_______________
18 In an interview with Washington Post on 9 July 1997, Rwandan president Paul Kagame (then Defence
Minister) recognised that Rwandan troops had played a key role in the ADFL campaign. According to
President Kagame, the campaign strategy comprised three elements: a destroy the refugee camps, b destroy
ex-FAR and Interahamwe structures based in and around the camps and c overthrow the Mobutu regime.
According to the article, Rwanda had planned the rebellion and had participated in it by supplying arms,
munitions and training facilities for Congolese rebel forces. According to Kagame, operations – in
particular key operations – were directed by Rwandan mid-level commanders. “Rwandans Led Revolt in
Congo”, Washington Post, 9 July 1997. See also the interview with General James Kabarebe, the Rwandan
chief military strategist of the ADFL, in the Observatoire de l’Afrique Centrale: “Kigali, Rwanda. Plus
jamais le Congo”, Vol. 6, No. 10, 3–9 March 2003. See also the televised interviews with the Ugandan and
Rwandan presidents and General James Kabarebe explaining in detail their respective roles in the First
Congo War, in “L’Afrique en morceaux”, a documentary by Jihan El Tahri, Peter Chappell and Herve
Chabalier, 100 minutes, produced by Canal Horizon, 2000.
19 The term “Banyamulenge” came into popular use in the late 1960s to distinguish ethnic Tutsis
historically based in South Kivu, the Banyamulenge, from those arriving from the 1960s onwards as
refugees or economic migrants. Banyamulenge means “people of Malenge” and takes its name from a city
in the Uvira territory with a very large Tutsi population. Over time, however, the use of the term
Banyamulenge has become increasingly more generalised and has been used to designate all Zairian,
Congolese and occasionally Rwandan Tutsis.
20 In the DRC, the term Mayi-Mayi is used to designate groups of armed combatants resorting to specific
magic rituals such as water ablutions (“Mayi” in Swahili) and carrying amulets prepared by witchdoctors,
believed to make them invulnerable and protect them from ill fate. Present mainly in South Kivu and North
Kivu, but also in other provinces, the various Mayi-Mayi groups included armed forces led by warlords,
traditional tribal elders, village heads and local political leaders. The Mayi-Mayi lacked cohesion and the
different groups allied themselves with various government groups and armed forces at different times.
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
10
against them, and also the involvement of multiple militia groups and the creation of a
coalition under the banner of a new political and military movement, the Rassemblement
congolais pour la démocratie (RCD), which would later split on several occasions.
During this period the DRC was racked by numerous armed conflicts: “Some […]
international, others internal and […] national conflicts that became internationalised.
Participants in these conflicts include at least eight national armies and 21 irregular
armed groups”.21 In spite of the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement on 10 July
199922 by all the parties,23 which called for the respect of international humanitarian law
by all parties and the definitive withdrawal of all foreign forces from the national territory
of the DRC, the fighting continued, as did the serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law allegedly by all parties to the conflict. On 16 June 2000,
the UN Security Council, in its Resolution 1304 (2000), called for all parties to cease
hostilities and demanded that Rwanda and Uganda withdraw from the territory of the
DRC. It was not until the signing of two new agreements with Rwanda (Pretoria
Agreement) and Uganda (Luanda Agreement) in 2002, that these foreign forces began to
withdraw from the country.24
20. This period was marked by attacks on civilians believed to be Tutsi, in particular
in Kinshasa, Katanga, Orientale Province, East and Kasai Occidental, Maniema and
North Kivu. Within the context of the war and the conflicts across the whole of the
territory, civilian populations were broadly speaking the victims of serious violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law allegedly by all parties in the conflicts
and throughout the territory, but especially in North Kivu and South Kivu, Orientale
Province (in particular in Ituri), Katanga, Équateur and also Bas-Congo.
D. January 2001–June 2003: Towards transition
21. Lastly, the final period lists 139 incidents describing the violations committed in
spite of the gradual establishment of a ceasefire along the front line and the speeding up
of peace negotiations in preparation for the start of the transition period on 30 June 2003.
During this period, fighting that had shaken the province of Ituri, in particular the ethnic
conflicts between the Lendu and the Hema, reached an unprecedented peak. The period
was marked by clashes between the Forces armées congolaises (FAC) and the Mayi-Mayi
forces in Katanga province. As in previous periods, the main victims of the parties
involved in the conflict were civilian populations throughout the territory, particularly in
Orientale Province, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema and Kasai Oriental provinces.
_______________
21 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DRC (A/55/403), para. 15.
22 S/1999/815, Annex.
23 The following were party to the Agreement: Angola, Namibia, Uganda, Rwanda, the DRC and
Zimbabwe. The Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RDC) and the Mouvement de libération du
Congo (MLC) rebel groups signed at a later date.
24 Pretoria Agreement of 31 July 2002 between the DRC and Rwanda, Article 8, para. 3 (S/2002/914,
Annex); Luanda Agreement of 6 September 2002 between the DRC and Uganda, Article 1 (available at
www.droitcongolais.info/files/0426_accord of_6_September_2002_rdc-ouganda_r.pdf).
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36. This chapter emphasises the fact that the scale and gravity of sexual violence were
primarily the result of the victims’ lack of access to justice and the impunity that has
reigned in recent decades, which has made women even more vulnerable than they
already were. The phenomenon of sexual violence continues today as a result of this
near-total impunity, even in areas where the fighting has ended; it has increased in those
areas where fighting is still ongoing.
B. Inventory of acts of violence committed against children
37. This chapter shows that children did not escape the successive waves of violence
that swept over the DRC, quite to the contrary: they were often its first victims. In fact,
children are always affected when crimes under international law are committed against
civilians, partly because they are particularly fragile and partly because violence takes
away their first line of defence, namely their parents. Even when children are not direct
victims themselves, the fact of seeing their parents killed or raped, their property pillaged
and their homes set on fire leaves them deeply traumatised. Being displaced makes them
more vulnerable to malnutrition and diseases. Their young age makes them the target of
contemptible beliefs and superstitions, which claim, for example, that sexual
relationships with children can treat certain diseases or make rapists invincible. Lastly,
war generally deprives them of their right to education and thus often compromises their
long-term future.35
38. The decade 1993-2003 was also marked by the widespread use by all those
involved in the conflicts36 of children associated with armed groups and forces ( “child
soldiers”), making the DRC one of the countries in the world where this phenomenon is
most common. In the military camps, these children suffered indescribable violence,
including murder, rape, torture, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and were
deprived of all their rights. The report highlights the fact that child soldiers were
sometimes also forced to commit very serious violations themselves but that in terms of
justice, it is essential first to pursue the political and military leaders responsible for the
crimes committed by the child soldiers placed under their command, based on the
principle of hierarchical superiority and the person with most responsibility, as well as
investigating to establish to what extent the children were forced to act or influenced by
their adult superiors.
_______________
35 According to the World Bank, in 2003 the DRC was one of the five countries in the world with the largest
number of children not in school. Figure cited in: Watch List, The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children in
the DRC, 2003. See also the Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 50th session, final
observations: DRC (CRC/C/COD/CO/2).
36 See in particular the Report of the Secretary General on children and armed conflict (A/58/546–
S/2003/1053 and Corr.1 and 2), which cites 12 parties to the conflict: the Forces armées congolaises (FAC),
the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie–Goma (RCD-G), the Mouvement national de libération
du Congo (MLC), the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie/Kisangani–Mouvement de libération
(RCD-K/ML), the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie–National (RCD-N), the Hema militia
[Union des patriotes congolais (UPC) and Parti pour l’unité et la sauvegarde du Congo (PUSIC)], the
Lendu/Ngiti militia [Front nationaliste and intégrationniste (FNI) and Forces de résistance patriotique en
Ituri (FPRI)], the Forces armées populaires congolaises (FAPC), the Mayi-Mayi, the Mudundu-40, the
Forces de Masunzu and the ex-Forces armées rwandaises and Interahamwe (ex-FAR /Interahamwe).
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18
impunity. To do this, an analysis was carried out of the domestic and international law
applicable in this area, as well as the courts with jurisdiction to prosecute and try the
alleged perpetrators of the serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committed in the DRC. A study of Congolese case law on crimes under
international law was also carried out to examine domestic judicial practice in relation to
war crimes and crimes against humanity. This study helped to gain a better understanding
of the legal, logistical, structural and political challenges and obstacles that characterise
criminal proceedings in relation to crimes under international law in the DRC.
44. Around 200 actors in the judicial system, academics and national experts in
criminal and international law were interviewed by the Mapping Team.39 Hundreds of
documents from different sources were obtained and analysed, in particular laws, judicial
decisions and various reports dealing with the justice system.
45. The analysis of the legal framework applicable in the DRC to deal with the most
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed between
March 1993 and June 2003 shows that there is a significant body of legal norms and
provisions both in international law and domestic law, which is sufficient to begin to
tackle impunity in respect of the crimes documented in this report. The DRC is bound by
the major conventions in respect of human rights and international humanitarian law and
has been party to the majority of them since well before the conflicts of the 1990s.40
Whilst the lack of jurisdiction of the civilian courts for crimes under international law
may be regrettable, it should be noted that the military courts have jurisdiction to try
anyone responsible for crimes under international law committed within the DRC
between 1993 and 2003. Finally, the Constitution of February 2006 contains strong
provisions that protect human rights and fundamental judicial guarantees, and
incorporates the main international standards in this area.
46. Whilst the legal framework appears adequate, the review of Congolese case law
identified only about a dozen cases since 2003 where the Congolese courts had dealt with
incidents classified as war crimes or crimes against humanity. Furthermore, only two of
these cases concerned incidents covered by this report, namely the Ankoro case,41 a
_______________
39 Primarily meetings with the civilian and military judicial authorities in various public prosecutor’s
offices, Government representatives and national bodies tasked with the reform of the judicial system.
40 With the exception of Additional Protocol II (1977) to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, ratified in 2002,
the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ratified
in 1996 (Resolution 39/46 of the General Assembly, appendix), and of course the Rome Statute of the ICC,
signed in 2000 and ratified in 2002.
41 In the Ankoro case, the investigations carried out by MONUC revealed that violent confrontations
between the FAC and the Mayi-Mayi, in November 2002, had caused the deaths of at least 70 people.
Thousands of homes were set on fire and destroyed, and hundreds of public and private buildings including
hospitals, schools and churches were pillaged. In December 2002, 28 FAC soldiers were arrested and
handed over to the military judicial authorities. Seven of them were charged with crimes against humanity.
The trial was delayed for many months to enable the creation of a commission of enquiry of officers able to
judge a lieutenant-colonel; in the end, the court acquitted six of the defendants and sentenced the seventh to
20 months’ imprisonment for murder. The Public Prosecutor’s Office, having been satisfied by the arrest,
did not lodge an appeal (RMP 004/03/MMV/NMB–RP 01/2003, RMP 0046/04/NMB–RP 02/2004).
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judgment of 20 December 2004 on the incidents that took place in Katanga in 2002, and
the Milobs case,42 a judgment of 19 February 2007 on the incidents that occurred in Ituri
in May 2003.
47. It is undeniable that some Judges of the Congolese military justice system,
inspired by the DRC’s ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC in 2002 and supported
by the international community, rendered a small number of courageous decisions in
relation to crimes under international law.43 Although they braved physical and
psychological barriers as well as apparent political pressure to do so, all the cases studied
nonetheless illustrate the significant operational limitations of the military justice system.
Botched and dubious investigations, poorly drafted or inadequately substantiated court
documents, irrational decisions, violations of due process and various instances of
interference by the civilian and military authorities in the judicial process, are apparent
defects that characterised some of these cases, particularly those pertaining to Ankoro,
Kahwa Mandro, Kilwa and Katamisi.
48. The lack of political will to prosecute serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the DRC is also confirmed by the fact that the vast
majority of decisions handed down came about as the result of constant pressure from
MONUC and NGOs.
49. This apparent lack of dynamism in the Congolese justice system in handling war
crimes and crimes against humanity, particularly in respect of those primarily responsible
for them, can only encourage the commission of new serious violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law, which continue to this day.
Inability of the Congolese justice system to deal adequately with crimes under
international law committed on its territory
50. The problem in the DRC is less one of inadequate provisions in the criminal law
than a failure to apply them. Although, as the Report on the current state of the justice
sector in the DRC confirms, the Congolese judicial system enjoys “a solid legal tradition
inherited from colonisation, as still evidenced by the quality of certain senior judges”,44 it
_______________
42 In the Milobs case, in May 2003, members of the Front nationaliste et intégrationniste (FNI), a militia
that was running wild in Ituri, tortured and killed two soldiers on a peace monitoring mission for MONUC.
Seven members of the militia were charged with war crimes over three years after the incidents. On 19
February 2007, the court at the military garrison in Bunia sentenced six of the defendants to life
imprisonment for war crimes under the Congolese Military Penal Code and article 8 of the Rome Statute of
the ICC (RP 103/2006).
43 This applied in the Songo Mboyo (2006), Milobs (2007), Gety and Bavi (2007), Lifumba Waka (2008),
Gédéon Kyungu (2009) and Walikale (2009) cases.
44 The mission tasked with analysing the judicial system was the result of an initiative of the European
Commission acting jointly with Belgium, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, MONUC, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). See Status report, Organisational audit of the Justice System in the
DRC, May 2004, p. 7.
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has been widely noted that the Congolese judicial system faces acute and overwhelming
problems.45 Having been significantly weakened under the Mobutu regime, it suffered
severely as a result of the various conflicts that ravaged the DRC for over ten years.
51. The research and analyses carried out by the Mapping Team, and the working
sessions and consultation with key figures in the Congolese judicial system, both at an
institutional level and within civil society, confirmed that there are significant structural
and chronic shortcomings in all parts of the Congolese justice system. Even successful
criminal prosecutions are inadequate if the State does not take the necessary steps to
ensure that prisoners do not escape.46 The fact that the military courts and tribunals have
exclusive jurisdiction over crimes under international law also poses a problem with
regard to the punishment of serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law.47 Their lack of capacity and lack of independence are illustrated by the
extremely low number of cases they have tried and the way they have handled such cases.
52. The allegedly high level of involvement of foreign nationals in serious violations
of international humanitarian law committed in the DRC also causes a problem for the
Congolese courts. Although they have jurisdiction in respect of any person, whether or
not they are Congolese, they have limited means of ensuring that suspects residing
outside the country appear in court. Cooperation on extradition from certain States
remains unlikely, given the limited ability of Congolese military courts to guarantee fair
and impartial trials and respect the fundamental rights of defendants, in particular since
the death penalty is still in effect in Congolese law.
53. To sum up, the following elements lead to the conclusion that the capacity of the
Congolese justice system to bring an end to impunity for crimes under international law
are severely limited: (i) the limited engagement of the Congolese authorities in
strengthening the justice sector, (ii) the very limited resources allocated to the judicial
system for tackling impunity, (iii) the acceptance and tolerance of multiple incidents of
interference by the political and military authorities in court cases that confirm the
system’s lack of independence, (iv) the inadequacy of the military justice system, which
has sole jurisdiction for dealing with the numerous crimes under international law often
_______________
45 See in particular the Report from the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers,
Leandro Despouy, addendum, Mission in the DRC, (A/HRC/8/4/Add.2) (hereinafter referred to as the
“Despouy report”).
46 ”The disastrous state of the prison system, perhaps the weakest link in the judicial chain, means that it is
easy for suspects and convicted prisoners to escape; this includes some very influential figures, who
“sometimes “escape” with the connivance of the authorities.” Combined report of seven thematic special
procedures on Technical Assistance to the Government of the DRC and urgent examination of the situation
in the east of the country (A/HRC/10/59), par. 63. According to figures from MONUC, during the second
half of 2006 only, at least 429 prisoners, including some who had been convicted for serious violations of
human rights, escaped from prisons throughout the DRC. See Despouy report (A/HRC/8/4/Add.2), par. 55.
47 Military justice should “be restricted solely to specifically military offences committed by military
personnel, to the exclusion of human rights violations, which shall come under the jurisdiction of the
ordinary domestic courts or, where appropriate, in the case of serious crimes under international law, of an
international or internationalised criminal court”. Commission on Human Rights
(E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1), Principle 29.
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21
committed by the security forces, (v) inadequate judicial practice and jurisprudence in
this area, (vi) and non-compliance with international principles in relation to minors and
the inadequacy of the judicial system for cases of rape. Given the multitude of possible
crimes under international law committed, the effectiveness and independence of the
judicial system is crucial in light of the large number of senior figures in the armed
groups involved in various alleged violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law.
IV. Formulation of options in the field of transitional justice mechanisms that
could help to combat impunity in the DRC.
54. The transitional justice mandate with which the Mapping Team has been
entrusted consists of providing various options in order to help the Government of the
DRC to deal with the many serious human rights and international humanitarian law
violations committed on its territory, with a view to achieving "truth, justice, reparation
and reform".48 This mandate also echoes the demands that Congolese society has made of
its leaders, initially at the Inter-Congolese Dialogue which resulted in the global and
inclusive Agreement concerning transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
Sun City (South Africa) in 200249 and, subsequently, at the Conference on Peace,
Security and Development which was held in January 2008 in North Kivu and South
Kivu. This mandate has also received firm support from the Security Council, which has
asked MONUC "to help [the Government] to create and apply a transitional justice
strategy".50
55. In order to carry out this mission, the Mapping Team has examined recent
experience in DRC in terms of transitional justice and has identified existing issues in this
area, particularly in the light of the conclusions of the evaluation of the judicial system
that are presented in this report. The experience of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) that operated in the DRC during the transition, and current reforms of
the justice and security sectors have also been reviewed. In addition, there were
consultations with Congolese experts, particularly judicial authorities and representatives
from the Ministries of Justice and Human Rights, international experts in this field, local
and international human rights and criminal law specialists and victims' associations. As
there was a convincing need for national approval of transitional justice measures if these
were to be effective, several round-table meetings were also organised, in order to gather
views and opinions from civil society on this subject.51
_______________
48 Article 1.3 of the ToR.
49 Available at the following address:
http://home.hccnet.nl/docu.congo/Frans/OudSysteem/accordglobal.html [in French]
50 Mandate repeated by the Security Council in several of its resolutions, in particular Resolution 1794
(2000) dated 21 December, para. 16, and Resolution 1856 (2008) dated 22 December 2008, para. 4.
51 Round-table meetings concerning the combat against impunity and transitional justice were organised by
the Mapping Exercise in Bunia, Goma, Bukavu and Kinshasa in May 2009.
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50
CHAPTER I. MARCH 1993 – JUNE 1996: FAILURE OF THE
DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS AND REGIONAL CRISIS
130. In the early 1990s, under pressure from the people and donors, President Mobutu
was compelled to re-establish a multiparty system and convene a national conference. As
the months went by, however, Mobutu managed to off-balance his opponents and remain
in power through the use of violence and corruption, and by using tribal and regional
antagonisms to his advantage. This strategy had particularly serious consequences for
Zaire, including the destruction of key infrastructures, economic meltdown, the forced
deportation of civilians in Katanga, ethnic violence in North Kivu and increased
tribalism. Violations of human rights also became commonplace across the entire
country.
131. In 1994, after months of institutional paralysis, supporters and opponents of
President Mobutu eventually came to an agreement on the appointment by consensus of a
prime minister and the establishment of a transition parliament. However, the agreement
did not succeed in solving the political crisis, curbing the criminalisation of security
forces or setting the country on the road towards elections. From July 1994 onwards, the
influx of 1.2 million Rwandan Hutu refugees following the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda
further destabilised the province of North Kivu and made the situation in South Kivu still
more delicate. Due to the presence among the refugees of members of the former Forces
armées rwandaises (later “ex-FAR”), as well as militias responsible for the genocide (the
Interahamwe), and given the alliance that had existed for some years between the former
Rwandan regime and President Mobutu, this humanitarian crisis quickly degenerated into
a diplomatic and security crisis between Zaire and the new Rwandan authorities.
132. Faced with the use by the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe of refugee camps as a
base from which to lead their incursions into Rwanda, in 1995 the new Rwandan
authorities opted for a military solution to the crisis. With the aid of Uganda and Tutsis
from North and South Kivu who had been denied Zairian citizenship by the transition
parliament in Kinshasa, they organised a rebellion to counter the ex-FAR and
Interahamwe and bring about a change of regime in Kinshasa.
133. During this period, the most serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law were concentrated for the most part in Katanga, North Kivu and in the
city-province of Kinshasa.
A. Shaba (Katanga)
134. For over a century, a sizeable community from the Kasai provinces had settled in
Katanga87 to construct the railway at the request of the Belgian colonial authorities and
_______________
87 The province of Katanga was called Shaba from 1971 to 1997.
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77
Banyamulenge community who were consulted claimed not to have accurate information
on these events.
2. Kinshasa
189. After war broke out in North and South Kivu, the people of Kinshasa became
increasingly hostile towards Rwandans and peoples of Rwandan origin, in particular the
Tutsis, whom they systematically accused of being in collusion with the AFDL/APR.
• In late October 1996, during public demonstrations staged by students in protest
of the presence of “Rwandans” in Kinshasa, men, women and children of
Rwandan nationality or origin, particularly those of Tutsi derivation, were
publicly humiliated and beaten. Instead of protecting these people, the security
forces reportedly conducted arbitrarily arrests of a number of Rwandans, most of
them Tutsis. With the cooperation of the people, they also looted and seized many
of their homes. The victims were arrested and detained at various detention sites,
including the Service d’action et de renseignements militaires (SARM) building
in the Ngaliema commune, the Service national d’intelligence et de protection
(SNIP) building opposite the Primature in the Gombe commune and the Tshatshi
camp. The detention conditions themselves led to large numbers of deaths, as
detainees received no food or medical care. Many victims were tortured and
subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. An unknown number of
people were allegedly executed by the security forces, particularly in the Tshatshi
camp. Still more were reportedly deported to Rwanda and Burundi by the Zairian
authorities. Others were forced to flee quickly into other countries.175
3. Orientale Province
190. After the start of the First Congo War, and as the AFDL/APR troops advanced
across Orientale Province, the Zairian security services and the people of Kisangani
adopted an increasingly hostile attitude towards the Rwandans and peoples of Rwandan
origin, especially Tutsis, who they systematically accused of being in collusion with
AFDL/APR.
• From October 1996, the Zairian security services and civilians arbitrarily arrested
several dozen civilians of Rwandan nationality or origin, as well as people
resembling them, in the town of Kisangani and the surrounding area. They
reportedly killed an unknown number of these people; at least one person was
_______________
175 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April and May 2009; Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6); AI, “Zaire/Rwanda: Disappearances/Fear for
Safety”, 1996; AI, “Zaïre-Violentes persécutions perpétrées par l’État et les groupes armés”, 1996.
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71
180. From December 1996, the Kinshasa Government attempted to launch a counteroffensive
from Kisangani and Kindu with the aid of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. However,
it proved impossible to reorganise the ailing Zairian army in such a short space of time.
The AFDL/APR/UPDF troops, who were reinforced from February 1997 by anti-Mobutu
Katangese soldiers who had served in the Angolan Government army (the ex-Tigers)
since the 1970s, and by children involved with armed forces and armed groups
(CAAFAG),153 commonly known as the Kadogo (“small ones” in Swahili) and recruited
during the conquests, took control of Kisangani on 15 March 1997 and Mbuji Mayi and
Lubumbashi in early April. After the fall of Kenge in Bandundu province, the
AFDL/APR troops and their allies reached the gates of the capital and President Mobutu
had to resign himself to stepping down. On 17 May 1997, AFDL/APR troops entered
Kinshasa, and on 25 May, the AFDL president, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, declared himself
President of the Republic and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC). Within a few months, however, President Kabila’s authoritarian measures,
his reneging on contracts signed with a number of foreign companies and his refusal to
cooperate with the special Team sent by the UN Secretary-General to investigate the
massacre of refugees in the East of the DRC lost the new regime its main international
allies.
A. Attacks against Tutsi and Banyamulenge civilians
1. South Kivu
181. Since the 1980s, the issue of the nationality of Tutsis living in South Kivu, like
that of the Banyarwanda in North Kivu, had been a matter of controversy. Most Tutsis in
South Kivu declared themselves to be Zairian Banyamulenge,154 the descendants of
Tutsis from Rwanda and Burundi who had settled on the Hauts Plateaux in the Uvira and
Fizi territories before the colonial partitioning of 1885. The other communities, on the
other hand, were of the opinion that most Tutsis living in South Kivu were political
refugees and, as economic migrants who had arrived in the country in the twentieth
century, they could not, therefore, claim Zairian nationality. The decision taken in 1981
by President Mobutu to repeal the law of 1972, by which Zairian nationality had been
granted collectively to peoples of Rwandan and Burundian origin present in the Zairian
territory before 1 January 1950, strengthened the position of the so-called “indigenous”
communities. Since then, there had been widespread suspicion over the true nationality of
_______________
153 Children associated with armed groups and armed forces (CAAFAG) designates children who were
enlisted in regular or irregular armed forces or armed groups either of their own free will or by force,
regardless of their role.
154 Gisaro Muhoza, of Tutsi origin, a deputy for the Congolese parliament in the territory of Uvira,
popularised this term in the late 1960s to distinguish ethnic Tutsis historically based in South Kivu, the
Banyamulenge, from those arriving from the 1960s onwards as refugees or economic migrants.
Banyamulenge means “people of Mulenge”, and takes its name from a city in the Uvira territory with a
very large Tutsi population. It should be noted, however, that most of Mulenge’s inhabitants are not Tutsis
but Vira. Over time, the term Banyamulenge has become increasingly used to designate all
Zairian/Congolese Tutsis.
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• In the CETA (airborne forces’ training centre) and Tshatshi military camps,
FAC/APR units raped a large number of wives and daughters (sometimes minors)
of ex-FAZ soldiers who had left for Kitona. They forced some victims to live with
them as sex slaves and carry out domestic chores for them.450
• At the Kokolo camp, FAC/APR units raped a large number of wives and
daughters of ex-FAZ soldiers who had left for Kitona, as well as women arrested
at random in the town. Many gang rapes took place in the area of the camp known
as “Camp Américain”. One girl was raped by several soldiers and then tortured.
The soldiers poured hot wax over her genital area and the rest of her body.451
• Over the course of the period in question, many sources report that across
Kinshasa the AFDL/APR soldiers also raped and beat a large number of women,
including many prostitutes.452
301. At the end of September 1997, several of Kinshasa’s districts were hit by shells
fired from Brazzaville by the armed groups fighting for the control of the presidency in
the Republic of the Congo. The FAC/APR reacted by firing on Brazzaville for two days
with rocket launchers.
• From 29 September to 1 October 1997, shots from heavy weapons fired
indiscriminately from Brazzaville reportedly caused the deaths of at least 21
people in different districts of Kinshasa.453
302. Following President Kabila’s decision to ban political party activity, the new
regime’s security forces targeted the leaders and activists of the main opposition parties.
During the crackdown, female members of the immediate family of arrested opponents
were frequently the victims of rape. In this context, the Mapping Team documented the
following alleged incidents:
• Between 1997 and 1998, FAC/APR soldiers frequently arbitrarily arrested and
tortured PALU (Parti lumumbiste unifié – Unified Lumumbist Party) activists. On
25 July 1997, during a crackdown operation on a PALU demonstration, they
killed between one and four activists and injured at least four. Several dozen
_______________
450 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa and Matadi, March and April 2009; Colonel Kisukula
Abeli Meitho, La désintégration de l’armée congolaise de Mobutu à Kabila, L’Harmattan, 2001.
451 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009; Report of the Special Rapporteur (A/52/496).
452 Report of the Special Rapporteur (A/52/496); ASADHO (Association africaine de défense des droits de
l’homme), “Appel urgent. SOS au Congo-Zaïre: les espaces démocratiques menaces”, 1997; ACPC,
“30 jours de violations des droits de l’homme sous le pouvoir de l’AFDL”, 1997; UDPS/Belgium (Union
for Democracy and Social Progress), “l’UDPS/Belgique accuse M. Kabila pour crimes contre l’humanité”,
November 1998. Available at the following address: www.congoline.com/Forum1/Forum02/Kashala03.htm
453 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March 2009; IRIN, “Emergency Update No. 260 on the
Great Lakes”, 1 October 1997; Reuters, “Kabila to send troops to Brazzaville”, 1 October 1997.
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PALU activists were arbitrarily arrested and tortured on this occasion. On the
same day, the soldiers searched and looted the residence of the party’s president,
Antoine Gizenga, in the Limete commune. During the operation, they killed a
PALU activist and seriously injured six more by beating them with whips, iron
bars and rifle butts.454
• Between 1997 and 1998, FAC/APR soldiers frequently arrested UDPS activists
and tortured them for several months at various detention sites.455
• On 10 December 1997, FAC/APR soldiers beat and gang-raped two sisters of the
President of the FSDC (Front pour la survie de la démocratie au Congo – Front
for the Survival of Democracy in Congo). The FSDC President, a former
dignitary under Mobutu, was finally arrested in February 1998. During his
detention at the central prison and then at the Mikonga military training centre, he
was frequently tortured.456
10. Bas-Congo
303. Under President Mobutu’s regime and until its fall, in May 1997, the various
Zairian security services, in particular the Civil Guard, committed many acts of violence,
especially rape, and tortured many civilians with complete impunity. An illustrative case
has been heard in the Rotterdam District Court (Netherlands).
• In October 1996, at Matadi, the Civil Guard commander Colonel Sébastien
Nzapali, nicknamed “King of the Beasts” on account of his notorious brutality,
had a customs officer working at the Matadi port tortured. On 7 April 2004,
Colonel Nzapali was sentenced to two and a half years in prison by the Rotterdam
District Court (Netherlands) for these crimes. Nzapali had been living in the
Netherlands since 1998 but his application for political asylum was denied.457
304. From the start of 1997, the Angolan government made contact with the Rwandan
and Ugandan authorities and lent its support to the AFDL/APR/UPDF operation aimed at
removing President Mobutu from power. The FAA (Forces armées angolaises) soldiers
took advantage of their presence in Kinshasa alongside AFDL/APR/UPDF troops to step
up their crackdown on Cabindan populations who had taken refuge in the province of
Bas-Congo.
_______________
454 HRW, “Uncertain Course: Transition and Human Rights Violations in the Congo”, 1997; Info-
Congo/Kinshasa, 11 August 1997; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997.
455 HRW, “Uncertain Course: Transition and Human Rights Violations in the Congo”, 1997; AI, “Deadly
alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997; AI, DRC: A Year of Dashed Hopes, 1998.
456 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, May 2009; AI, DRC: A Year of Dashed Hopes, 1998.
457 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009; Verdict of the Rotterdam District Court
(Netherlands), 7 April 2004.
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CHAPTER III. AUGUST 1998–JANUARY 2001: THE SECOND WAR
308. From late 1997 onwards, the relationship between President Kabila, Rwanda and
the Tutsi soldiers present in the Forces armées congolaises (FAC) had deteriorated
significantly, primarily because the Rwandan authorities and certain Congolese Tutsi
soldiers had accused the Congolese president of favouring his Katanga clan, failing to
respect his commitments in relation to recognising the right of the Banyamulenge to
Congolese nationality and being too conciliatory towards the ex-Forces armées
rwandaises/Interahamwe [ex-FAR/Interahamwe] and Mayi-Mayi militias, which were
hostile to the presence of the Armée patriotique rwandaise (APR) in the Congo. In July
1998, fearing a coup d'état, President Kabila dismissed the Rwandan general James
Kabarebe from his position as Chief of Staff of the FAC and ordered the APR soldiers to
leave Congolese territory. In response, on 2 August 1998, some Tutsi soldiers mutinied
and, with the help of the APR, the Ugandan army [Ugandan People’s Defence Force
(UPDF)], the Burundi army [Forces armées burundaises (FAB)] and some soldiers from
the ex-Forces armées zaïroises (ex-FAZ), launched a rebellion intended to overthrow
President Kabila.
309. Within a few weeks, this coalition, under the banner of a new political and
military movement, the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD),464 took
control of the main towns in North and South Kivu, Orientale Province and North
Katanga and broke through into the province of Équateur. Its offensive into the province
of Bas-Congo and Kinshasa failed, however, due to the military intervention of Angola
and Zimbabwe alongside President Kabila. During the following months, the DRC
therefore found itself divided into two zones, one led by Laurent Kabila with the support
of the armed forces of Zimbabwe [Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF)], Angola (Forças
Armadas Angolanas – Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)), Namibia [Namibia Defence Force
(NDF)], Chad [Armée nationale tchadienne (ANT)] and Sudan, and the other controlled
by the armed wing of the RCD, the Armée nationale congolaise (ANC), the Rwandan
army (APR), the Ugandan army (UDPF) and the Burundian army (FAB).
310. Over the months, the military situation became more complex. To limit the
ANC’s and APR’s grip on North and South Kivu, Laurent Kabila formed alliances with
the Mayi-Mayi armed groups, the Burundian Hutu armed group, the Forces pour la
défense de la démocratie (FDD)465 and with ex-FAR/Interahamwe and “Hutu armed
elements”, now reorganised within the Armée de libération du Rwanda (ALiR). Uganda,
meanwhile, whose army was in control of a large part of Orientale Province, created and
supported a second political and military movement, the Mouvement pour la libération
du Congo (MLC), led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, to manage the areas it had conquered in the
province of Équateur. In March 1999, against a background of growing disagreement
_______________
464 The RCD was officially created on 16 August 1998. Led by a Congolese, Wamba Dia Wamba, the
movement’s stated aim was to end the presidency of Laurent-Désiré Kabila.
465 The FDD was the armed wing of the Burundi Hutu movement of the Centre national pour la défense de
la démocratie (CNDD).
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between Rwanda and Uganda as to which strategy to pursue against President Kabila, the
RCD split into a pro-Rwandan wing (RCD-Goma) and a pro-Ugandan wing [RCDMouvement
de libération (ML)]. In spite of these divisions, the RCD-Goma army (the
ANC) and the APR continued to extend their area of influence into North Katanga, the
Kasais and Équateur.
311. On 10 July 1999, under intense diplomatic pressure, an agreement was signed in
Lusaka between the principal belligerents.466 In addition to a ceasefire, the agreement
called for the disarmament of all armed groups, starting with the ex-FAR/Interahamwe,
the departure of foreign troops and for inter-Congolese political discussions to be held.
This highly ambitious agreement had no effect on the ground, as the belligerents
continued to seek a military solution to the crisis and the conflict became more
entrenched, against a background of the pillaging of the country’s natural resources and
an exacerbation of violence directed at civilians, especially women, in particular in North
and South Kivu, North Katanga and Orientale Province.
A. Attacks directed at Tutsi civilians
312. Following the outbreak of the second war, on 2 August 1998, radio and television
stations based in Kinshasa broadcast official communiqués calling for a general
mobilisation of the population and collectively accusing the Tutsis of being in collusion
with APR rebels and soldiers. In the days that followed, President Kabila’s security
services and those people who were hostile to the rebellion embarked on a campaign of
hunting down Tutsis, Banyamulenge and people of Rwandan origin in general. Numerous
civilians deemed to have a “Tutsi” or “Rwandan” appearance were also targeted. In total,
several thousand people were arrested and had their property confiscated or destroyed.
Several hundred of them disappeared, the majority of them allegedly victims of summary
executions. In the area controlled by the Kabila Government, around 1,500 people were
arbitrarily held in detention camps, officially in order to guarantee their safety. From July
1999 onwards, having then lived for over a year in deplorable conditions, these people
were gradually able to leave the country as the result of an agreement between the
Congolese Government, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and several host countries.
1. Kinshasa
313. In early August 1998, clashes broke out between the FAC, which had remained
loyal to President Kabila, and Tutsi soldiers in the Kokolo and Tshatshi camps.467 At the
_______________
466 For the text of the Agreement, see S/1999/815, appendix.
467 On 4 August 1998, hundreds of Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers placed under the orders of James
Kabarebe arrived by plane at the base in Kitona, in Moanda (Bas-Congo), from Goma. A number of
soldiers from the ex-FAZ staioned at the base for months rallied to support them. During the days that
followed, this Rwandan-Ugandan-Congolese military coalition advanced rapidly along the road between
Moanda, Boma and Matadi, heading for Kinshasa.
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same time, President Kabila’s security forces embarked on a series of searches
throughout the capital, looking for rebels and their possible accomplices. Almost a
thousand civilians responded to the call from the Congolese authorities and signed up to
“popular defence” groups. The Congolese Government apparently equipped them with
edged weapons and used them alongside the regular security forces. People of Tutsi or
Rwandan origin or who bore a physical resemblance to them were the prime targets.
Several senior figures in the regime, including the head of President Kabila’s cabinet, Mr
Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, stirred up hatred against the Tutsis, comparing them to a
“virus, a mosquito and filth that must be crushed with determination and resolve”.468 In
this context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
• From August 1998 onwards, elements of the Police d’intervention rapide (PIR)
[Police Rapid Intervention Force] arrested several high-ranking figures suspected
of supporting the RCD as well as numerous Tutsi or Rwandan civilians. Unknown
numbers of women were also arrested and raped by police officers in the prisons
of the PIR and the Inspection de la police provinciale de Kinshasa (Ipkin)
[Kinshasa Provincial Police Inspectorate]. On 14 September 1998, 111 people,
including numerous Tutsis, were detained in the Centre pénitentiaire et de
rééducation de Kinshasa [Kinshasa Penitentiary and Re-education Centre]
(CPRK, the former Makala prison).469
• Also from August 1998 onwards, FAC soldiers arrested, took out of combat and
shot some 20 Rwandan soldiers, Congolese Tutsis and a number of ex-FAZ
members suspected of having supported the rebels. The bodies of the victims
were buried on the road to Matadi, at a location between the Mbenseke cemetery
and the Gombe-Lutendele neighbourhood in the municipality of Mont-Ngafula.
Other groups of Rwandan/Banyamulenge soldiers were subsequently executed in
similar circumstances.470
• Again from August 1998 onwards, an unknown number of people held at the
Palais de Marbre, the GLM (Litho Moboti Group) and the Palais de la Nation,
including numerous Tutsis, were shot dead and buried where they had been
detained or tied up in sacks weighted down with stones and thrown into the
river.471
_______________
468 International arrest warrant dated 11 April 2000 from the Examining Magistrate Vandermeersch
(Belgium) for Mr. Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi; ASADHO, “A round-table discussion on peace and
national reconciliation is essential”: press release no. 11/986, September 1998.
469 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009; IRIN, “Update No. 483”, citing an article
from Libération, 19 August 1998; IRIN, “Update No. 473 for Central and Eastern Africa”, 4 August 1998;
The Times, “Embattled Congo plans “nightmare” for Tutsi rebels”, 12 August 1998; The Times, “Kabila
régime calls for slaughter of the Tutsis”, 14 August 1998; ICRC, press release, 17 September 1998; HRW,
Casualties of War, February 1999.
470 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March 2009.
471 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March and April 2009; HRW, Casualties of War,
February 1999.
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156
• From August 1998 onwards and over the course of the following months, FAC
soldiers executed or tortured and subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment an unknown number of civilians, including numerous Tutsis and
Rwandans and people who resembled Tutsis in the Kokolo camp. The victims
were often tortured in the prison of the 50th Brigade and in the offices of the land
forces information officer, which had been converted into ad hoc prison cells. On
19 August, over 160 Tutsi prisoners were counted by the ICRC in the Kokolo
camp. Most of the prisoners were held in conditions likely to result in a
significant loss of human life. Women detainees were raped on a regular basis,
particularly when they went to take a shower. According to several witnesses, the
bodies of people who had been killed or had died were burnt or buried in mass
graves dug inside the camp itself.472
• Again, from August 1998 onwards and over the course of the following months,
FAC soldiers detained, tortured and executed an unknown number of people,
including numerous Tutsis, in underground prison cells at the Tshatshi camp in
Kinshasa. According to one witness, a soldier from the camp’s 501st battalion
explained that “the people who are here are to be slaughtered”. The bodies of the
victims were thrown directly into the river.473
314. When the ANC/APR/UPDF troops entered the suburbs of Kinshasa around 26
August 1998, the members of the popular defence groups and to a lesser extent, the FAC
began to hunt down the infiltrators and their supposed accomplices. An unknown number
of Tutsis, people of Rwandan origin and others who resembled them were killed during
this period. On 27 August, in the municipality of Kasavabu, a civilian declared on Radio
France Internationale (RFI) that it was the population and not the soldiers who were at
the front of the queue to “burn the Tutsis”.474 People with traces of red mud on their
shoes, such as is found in the Bas-Congo, people wearing sports clothes, certain members
of the attacking forces moving around as civilians and several people with learning
disabilities who did not comply with the ceasefire were attacked.475 In total, at least 80
people were killed, some of them burned alive by necklacing, others impaled or mutilated
to death and others shot. The bodies of the victims were most often left in the streets or
thrown into the River Ndjili or the River Congo.476 During these events, several hundreds
_______________
472 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March and April 2009; ICRC, press release, 28 August
1998; IRIN, 28 August 1998; HRW, Casualties of War, February 1999.
473 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March and April 2009.
474 ”It was the people. It was not the soldiers. It was us, we were the ones who burnt the Tutsis. We, when
we see a Tutsi - myself, when I see one, I burn him.” BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation], Summary of
World Broadcasts, 29 August 1998.
475 HRW, Casualties of War, February 1999; AI, DRC: War against unarmed civilians, 1998.
476 Report on the situation of human rights in the DRC (E/CN.4/1999/31), appendix III; ASADHO, “RDC:
Le pouvoir à tout prix. Répression systématique et impunité”, Annual report 1998, p.16; Libération, “La vie
reprend à Kinshasa”, 1 September 1998.
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• On 18 August 1998, around the town of Kalima, in the Pangi region, members of
the FAC who had remained loyal to President Kabila allegedly killed at least 133
civilians of Rwandan origin, the majority of whom were Tutsis. Most of the
victims were shot dead at the Rushurukuru power station and in the town of
Kakula.501
7. Kasaï Oriental
• From August 1998 onwards, in Mbuji Mayi, the security services reportedly
arbitrarily arrested and killed an unknown number of Tutsis, people of Rwandan
origin and those resembling them: In November 1999, they arrested at least ten
Tutsis, whom they then transferred first to Makala prison in Kinshasa and then to
the refugee camp in the municipality of Mont-Ngafula, where they remained until
2001. Tutsis and people of Rwandan origin were also transported to Kananga by
lorry. On 10 October 1999, the ANR arrested a human rights activist involved in
protecting the Tutsi and Rwandan community in Mbuji Mayi. The activist was
then transferred to the headquarters of the ANR in Kinshasa, where he was
arbitrarily detained for several months in cruel, inhuman or degrading conditions.
Under pressure from human rights NGOs, the Special Rapporteur on the situation
of human rights in the DRC and the media, however, he was released on 6
January 2000.502
B. Attacks on other civilian populations
1. Bas-Congo
329. On 4 August 1998, hundreds of Rwandan troops and a small number of Ugandan
troops placed under the orders of James Kabarebe arrived by plane at the military base in
Kitona, in Moanda, having travelled from Goma. Some ex-FAZ soldiers stationed at the
Kitona base for several months rallied to join them. During the days that followed, the
Rwandan-Ugandan-Congolese military coalition was reinforced by several thousand men
and embarked on its conquest of the Bas-Congo via the road between Moanda, Boma and
Matadi. Some elements in the FAC, which included numerous children associated with
armed groups and forces (“child soldiers”) (known as “Kadogo” in Swahili) tried to
resist, particularly in Boma and Mbanza Ngungu, but were swiftly overwhelmed; many
died during the fighting.
_______________
501 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009.
502 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kasai Oriental, March-April 2009.
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165
330. Throughout their advance on Kinshasa, the Rwandan-Ugandan-Congolese
coalition, referred to in the remainder of the report using the acronym ANC/APR/UPDF,
killed numerous civilians and committed a large number of rapes and acts of pillaging. In
this context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
• On 7 August 1998, fighting between elements of the ANC/APR/UPDF and FAC
for the control of Boma caused the death of an unknown number of civilians,
most often victims of stray bullets. The coalition forces killed at least 22 civilians
close to the central bank and municipal gardens. The victims included gardeners,
workers at the abattoir, two people with learning disabilities and people waiting
for a vehicle to take them to Moanda.503
• Between 7 and 10 August 1998, in Boma, elements from the ANC/APR/UPDF
confined and raped several women, often collectively, in the Premier Bassin hotel,
which they had requisitioned. They also caused a significant amount of damage to
the hotel.504
• From 4 August to 4 September 1998, ANC/APR/UPDF soldiers systematically
pillaged the bank vaults in Moanda, Matadi and Mbanza Ngungu.505
• On 13 August 1998, ANC/APR/UPDF soldiers stopped the turbines on the Inga
dam, depriving Kinshasa and a large area of the province of Bas-Congo of their
main source of electricity for almost three weeks. By making property essential to
the survival of the civilian population unusable, they caused the death of an
unknown number of civilians, particularly children and hospital patients.506
331. On 17 August 1998, however, during the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) summit, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia announced they were
sending troops to the DRC to support the army that had remained loyal to President
Kabila. During the days that followed, elements of the ZDF were deployed to Kinshasa,
whilst the FAA launched a land and air offensive in the Bas-Congo. On 23 August, the
FAA took back control of the Kitona base from the ANC/APR/UPDF troops.
332. During their advance along the Moanda-Boma-Matadi-Kisantu road, the FAA
killed civilians, committed rape and pillaged hospitals and homes. When they entered an
area, the FAA would carry out a systematic search operation and execute all those it
suspected of collusion with their enemies. The FAA took advantage of these operations to
rape women and pillage homes. The property pillaged was then sent to Angola by river,
_______________
503 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009.
504 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009.
505 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009.
506 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009; Report on the situation of human rights in the
DRC (E/CN.4/1999/31); ICRC, press releases, 19, 28 August and 9 September 1998.
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166
road and even by helicopter. The FAA killed any civilians, including women and
children, who tried to oppose the atrocities. The scale of the pillaging gave both the
victims and witnesses the impression that this was a planned operation. It is clear that the
Angolan military hierarchy and the authorities in Kinshasa at least tolerated the
commission of these various violations. In this context, the Mapping Team documented
the following alleged incidents.
• On 23 August 1998, on their arrival in Moanda, elements of the FAA raped at
least 30 women and girls, most of them in the Bwamanu neighbourhood. In some
cases, the soldiers obliged the members of the victims’ families to applaud during
the rapes, on penalty of execution.507
• From 26 August 1998, elements of the FAA summarily executed an unknown
number of civilians in the centre of Boma. They also raped an unknown number
of women and girls. They pillaged civilian property, primarily in the city’s
suburban neighbourhoods.508
• From 27 August 1998, elements of the FAA raped six women shopkeepers and at
least three girls in the village of Manterne, 19 kilometres from Boma, on the road
to Matadi.509
• Around 27 August 1998, in the village of Kinzau Mvwete, halfway between
Boma and Matadi, elements of the FAA killed 45 civilians, including women and
children.510
• From 4 September, elements of the FAA raped an unknown number of women
and girls, in particular during search operations in the Mvuadu and Kinkanda
neighbourhoods in the town of Matadi. The troops also pillaged tens of private
homes.511
• Around 6 September, in Kimpese, elements of the FAA committed rapes and acts
of pillaging on a large scale.512
333. In mid-September 1998, the FAA, ZDF and FAC regained control of the province
of Bas-Congo. The ANC/APR/UPDF troops withdrew to Angola, to an area under the
control of UNITA, before leaving for Rwanda between November and December. During
this period, the humanitarian situation remained very worrying because of the scale of the
_______________
507 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009; HRW, Casualties of War, February 1999.
508 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009.
509 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009.
510 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009
511 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009.
512 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009
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167
pillaging, carried out primarily in hospitals, the destruction of major infrastructure and
restrictions imposed on the freedom of movement of humanitarian workers in the
province by the Government in Kinshasa.
2. Kinshasa
334. At the end of August 1998, soldiers from the ANC/APR/UPDF and FAC/ZDF
fought each other for control of Kinshasa. In this context, the Mapping Team
documented the following alleged incidents.
• At the end of August 1998, the ZDF used heavy weapons to bombard the
municipalities of Kimbanseke, Masina and Ndjili and the village of Kingatoko, on
the border with the province of Bas-Congo, and killed around 50 civilians. During
the night of 27 to 28 August, 282 wounded civilians were taken into the capital’s
main hospitals and medical centres. The bombardments prompted thousands of
people to move to other municipalities. Elements of the ZDF fired with heavy
weapons, making no distinction between civilian and military targets. These
therefore included healthcare institutions and places of worship. The military
authorities often exposed civilians to indiscriminate fire, ordering them to remain
in their homes so that ANC/APR/UPDF soldiers were unable to hide in
abandoned houses.513
• Between 28 August and 1 September 1998, the fighting between
ANC/APR/UPDF and FAC/ZDF troops caused several civilian deaths, primarily
in the municipality of Mont-Ngafula.514
• On 28 August 1998, the FAC killed at least two Red Cross volunteers, one of
them by smashing his skull, whilst they were trying to rescue victims from the
bombardments in the Mitendi and Mbenseke neighbourhoods of the municipality
of Mont-Ngafula. During the same incident, they also seriously wounded an
unknown number of Red Cross volunteers.515
335. On 13 August 1998, ANC/APR/UPDF troops took control of the Inga
hydroelectric power station in the Bas-Congo and stopped the turbines on the dam.
• By stopping the turbines on the Inga dam for three weeks during August and
September 1998, the ANC/APR/UPDF troops deprived part of the province of
Bas-Congo and several neighbourhoods in Kinshasa of power and water supplies.
_______________
513 Interviews with the Mapping Team, April 2009; Report on the situation of human rights in the DRC
(E/CN.4/1999/31); ASADHO, press release, 6 September 1998; AI, DRC: War against unarmed civilians,
1998; Reuters, “Shelling in Kinshasa suburb, Civilians Flee”, 23 August 1998; IRIN, “Weekly Round-Up”,
4 September 1998.
514 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa April 2009.
515 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa March 2009.
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172
Beni and Lubero regions (Grand-Nord)
344. On 7 August 1998, the UPDF took unopposed control of the town of Beni and the
surrounding region. During the following months, however, numerous local young
people joined the Mayi-Mayi groups operating in the Beni and Lubero regions. With
financial support and weapons provided by the Government in Kinshasa, these Mayi-
Mayi groups increased in strength and stepped up the number of attacks against the
UPDF military convoys travelling between Beni and Butembo and in an area to the northwest
of the two towns. On 14 November 1999, Mayi-Mayi combatants attacked Ugandan
troops in Beni, killing several soldiers and a UPDF colonel.
345. The Mayi-Mayi groups in Grand-Nord quickly began to fight due to rivalry for
the control of the region’s agro-pastoral and mining resources and local control over
peace negotiations. Violent confrontations broke out between the Vurondo Mayi-Mayi of
Chief Lolwako Poko Poko and those of Chief Mudohu.
346. In 2000, the attempts made by the RCD-ML to regain control of the Vurondo
Mayi-Mayi and incorporate them in the Armée patriotique congolaise (APC), the armed
wing of the RCD-ML, failed and led to further incidents. In August, the Vurondo Mayi-
Mayi, who had been brought to Lubero by the APR for a military training course run by
UPDF troops, rebelled.
• On 25 and 26 August 2000, confrontations between the Vurondo Mayi-Mayi and
APC/UPDF troops in the village of Lubero reportedly resulted in tens of deaths
among the Mayi-Mayi and an unknown number of civilian victims. Some sources
suggest that 17 civilians were killed and seven Mayi-Mayi prisoners summarily
executed.531
347. Following these incidents, the Mayi-Mayi restarted and intensified their attacks
on UPDF convoys between Beni and Butembo. In retaliation, the UPDF forces led
operations against villages suspected of sheltering Mayi-Mayi groups. UPDF soldiers
often made disproportionate use of force during these attacks, killing combatants and
civilians indiscriminately.
• On 1 November 2000, UPDF soldiers allegedly killed between seven and eleven
people during an attack on the population of the villages of Maboya and Loya, 16
kilometres north of the town of Butembo. A few hours before the attack, four
UPDF soldiers had been killed by Vurondo Mayi-Mayi during an ambush close to
the village of Maboya. During the afternoon, UPDF soldiers apparently launched
_______________
531 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009; HRW, “Uganda in Eastern DRC:
Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife”, March 2001, p. 41.
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an indiscriminate attack on the inhabitants of both villages and set 43 houses on
fire. Some victims were shot and killed, whilst others were burned alive.532
348. On 8 November 2000, close to the village of Butuhe, 10 kilometres north of
Butembo, Vurondo Mayi-Mayi attacked a UPDF convoy that was escorting lorries
transporting minerals.
• On 9 November 2000, UPDF soldiers are alleged to have killed indiscriminately
36 people in the village of Kikere, close to Butuhe, north of Butembo. The
soldiers fired blindly on civilians using rifles and rocket-launchers. Some civilians
died as a result of being burned alive in their homes. The soldiers also
systematically killed domestic animals and destroyed civilian property.533
349. In the town of Beni, UPDF soldiers instituted a reign of terror for several years
with complete impunity. They carried out summary executions of civilians, arbitrarily
detained large numbers of people and subjected them to torture and various other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatments. They also introduced a particularly cruel form of
detention, putting the detainees in holes dug two or three metres deep into the ground,
where they were forced to live exposed to bad weather, with no sanitation and on muddy
ground.
• In March 2000, UPDF soldiers allegedly killed four civilians and wounded
several others in the town of Beni during an operation to quell a demonstration.
The victims had been protesting against the murder of a woman, the arbitrary
arrest of her husband and the pillaging of their house, committed a few days
earlier by UPDF soldiers.534
350. During the period under consideration, UPDF soldiers carried out several
operations against an armed group of Ugandan origin, the ADF-NALU (Allied
Democratic Forces–National Army for the Liberation of Uganda535) based in the
Ruwenzori massif in the Beni region. For their part, ADF-NALU carried out attacks on
villages in the Ruwenzori region, kidnapping numerous civilians and pillaging their
property. In this context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
_______________
532 United Nations, press release, Commission on Human Rights, 2 April 2001; ASADHO, “L’Ouganda
sacrifie la population civile congolaise”, February 2001; HRW, “Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political
and Ethnic Strife”, p. 42; De l'Afrique vers le monde, “Butembo, en territoire occupé: message de paix pour
le Nouvel An 2001 par l’évêque catholique et par le représentant des baptistes”, 5 January 2001. available
on the Internet at: http://web.peacelink.it/dia/report/jan_05_2001.txt.
533 ASADHO, “L’Ouganda sacrifie la population civile congolaise”, February 2001; Didier Kamundu
Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p. 123; HRW, “Uganda in Eastern
DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife”, p. 42.
534 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009.
535 Formed from an amalgamation of former rebel groups, the ADF-NALU [Allied Democratic Forces-
National Army for the Liberation of Uganda] appeared in the second half of the 1980s after the arrival in
power of the Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni. During the 1990s, the ADF-NALU were supported by
President Mobutu and used North Kivu as a sanctuary.
Annex 25
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359. After the withdrawal of the FAC from Orientale Province, numerous civilians
joined the Mayi-Mayi armed groups and attacked ANC/APR soldiers at several places in
the region. In retaliation, ANC/APR soldiers led punitive expeditions against civilian
populations suspected of collaborating with the Mayi-Mayi. In this context, the Mapping
Team documented the following alleged incidents.
• On 24 October 1998, elements of the ANC/APR executed 28 civilians, including
several minors, in the village of Makoka, on the border with Maniema province,
in the Lubutu region. The soldiers also raped at least seven women. Before they
left, they pillaged and set fire to the village. According to the villagers, there were
no Mayi-Mayi in Makoka at this time.592
• At the end of 1999, in the Opala region, soldiers from the ANC/APR killed two
boys between the villages of Yatolema and Yalikoko and raped an unknown
number of women. At the end of 1999, soldiers raped at least one young girl in
the town of Opala.593
• In October 2000, at the 63-kilometre marker on the road between Kisangani and
Lubutu, elements of the ANC/APR summarily executed four young boys accused
of being Mayi-Mayi. The soldiers then arrested seven members of the victims’
family and tortured them for three consecutive days before releasing them. The
day before the incident, a group of Mayi-Mayi had killed several ANC/APR
soldiers during an ambush, forcing them to withdraw to their base in Wanie
Rukula, in the Ubundu region.594
360. During the period under consideration, FAC planes bombarded ANC/APR/UPDF
positions in Orientale Province on several occasions.
• On 10 January 1999, a FAC plane apparently indiscriminately bombarded the
town of Kisangani, killing 12 civilians and wounding 27. On 22 February, FAC
bombardments of the town of Opala caused five civilian deaths. The number of
casualties caused by the bombardments could have been much higher if military
sources in Kinshasa had not warned civilians in time, allowing them to leave the
towns that had been targeted.595
_______________
592 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January 2009; Document submitted to the
Mapping Team by the President of civil society in Wanie Rukula, Orientale Province, 2009; Congolese
Foundation for the Promotion of Human Rights and Peace (FOCDP), “Memorandum to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations”, 2001; Justice and Liberation group, 1999 report.
593 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January 2009.
594 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, February 2009.
595 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January and February 2009; Horeb Group,
Annual Report, 1999; Justice and Liberation group, “La guerre des alliés and le droit international
humanitaire”, May 1999; Lotus Group, Report on the bombardments of 1999, 2000.
Annex 25
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189
361. In August 1999, whilst international pressure on the leaders of the RCD-Goma to
sign the Lusaka Agreement596 was intensifying, the simmering crisis between Rwanda
and Uganda for the control of the RCD degenerated into open conflict in Kisangani. On
the morning of 7 August, APR and UDPF soldiers fought with heavy weapons for several
hours without any civilians being wounded. The situation calmed down again over the
course of the following days. Tension continued to build, nonetheless, and both sides
strengthened their positions and brought large numbers of weapons into the town. On the
evening of 14 August, fighting again broke out between the two armies at the airport and
extended along the main roads and into the town centre.
• From 14 to 17 August 1999, APR and UPDF soldiers are said to have used heavy
weapons in areas with a dense civilian population as they fought to gain control of
the town of Kisangani. The fighting allegedly caused the deaths of over 30
civilians and wounded over 100 of them. The APR fired on both military targets
and private homes belonging to civilians suspected of supporting the Ugandans.
Once the hostilities were over, Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers pillaged several
places in Kisangani.597
362. After three days of fighting, Uganda and Rwanda signed a ceasefire agreement
that provided for Kisangani to be demilitarised and the headquarters of the pro-Ugandan
branch of the RCD, the RCD-Kisangani-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-K-ML) led by
Wamba dia Wamba, to be relocated to Bunia on 1 October 1999. During the months that
followed, Orientale Province found itself divided into a “Rwandan zone” under the
control of the RCD-G and a “Ugandan zone” dominated by the various movements
supported by Kampala. In May 2000, however, tension between the Ugandan and
Rwandan armies again moved up a notch in Kisangani. The UPDF strengthened its
military positions to the north-east of the town and the APR reacted by bringing in
additional weapons.
• On 5 May 2000, the APR and UPDF are said to have used heavy weapons in
densely populated areas, causing the deaths of over 24 civilians and wounding an
unknown number of them. Before the start of the hostilities, the Ugandan army
_______________
596 For the text of the agreement, see S/1999/815, appendix.
597 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008; Judicial Commission of
Inquiry - Republic of Uganda, Final Report on Allegations into Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC, 2001, November 2002; Horeb Group, “Les affrontements de
Kisangani: crimes contre les droits humains and le processus de paix durable”, August 1999; Justice and
Liberation group, “La guerre des alliés en RDC and le droit à l’autodétermination du peuple congolais”,
August 1999; Lotus Group, “Les conséquences de la contradiction des alliances and factions rebelles au
nord-est de la RDC: La guerre de Kisangani”, September 1999.
Annex 25
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had warned the population of the imminent bombardments and had asked for the
evacuation of several areas located close to their targets.598
363. On 12 May 2000, a team of United Nations military observers was sent to the
area. Under international mediation, the two parties adopted a demilitarisation plan for
the town, which they began to implement on 29 May. Fighting broke out again on 5 June,
however, resulting in the so-called “Six-Day War”.
• The APR and UPDF fought each other in Kisangani from 5 to 10 June 2000. Both
sides reportedly embarked on indiscriminate attacks with heavy weapons, killing
between 244 and 760 civilians according to some sources, wounding over 1,000
and causing thousands of people to be displaced. The two armies also destroyed
over 400 private homes and caused serious damage to public and commercial
properties, places of worship, including the Catholic Cathedral of Notre-Dame,
educational institutions and healthcare facilities, including hospitals. The UPDF
had taken steps to avoid civilian losses by ordering the evacuation of combat
zones before the start of hostilities and prohibiting access to three areas that were
declared off-limits to non-combatants. This restriction was, however, also
extended to humanitarian workers, in particular the ICRC, which was not able to
get help to the wounded for several days.599
7. Ituri
364. In mid-August 1998, UPDF soldiers arrived in Ituri and quickly took control of
the district without encountering any real resistance. Like the rest of Orientale Province,
Ituri was placed under RCD administration. Following the movement’s split, in March
1999, into a pro-Rwandan branch (RCD-Goma) and a pro-Ugandan branch (RCD-ML),
Ituri was integrated into the RCD-ML zone and administered from Kisangani. The key
man on the ground in Ituri, however, was the UPDF Chief of Staff, General Kazini. He
applied a policy that supported autonomy for the region in relation to the rest of Orientale
Province and openly favoured the interests of the Hema community, thus reviving former
conflicts over land.
_______________
598 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, November 2008; Judicial Commission of
Inquiry - Republic of Uganda, Final Report on Allegations into Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC 2001, November 2002; Justice and Liberation group, “La guerre
des alliés à Kisangani (5 mai-10 juin 2000)”, 2000; Lotus group, “Les rivalités ougando-rwandaises à
Kisangani: La prise en otage de la population civile”, May 2000.
599 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, November 2008 and February 2009; Report of
the inter-agency assessment mission to Kisangani (S/2000/1153), appendix; IRIN, Weekly reports, May
2000 to June 2000; Judicial Commission of Inquiry - Republic of Uganda, Final Report on Allegations into
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC 2001, November 2002;
Justice and Liberation group, “La guerre des alliés à Kisangani (5 mai-10 juin 2000), 2000; Lotus group,
Report on the war in Kisangani, 2000; Lotus Group, “Kisangani, Le visage de la fatalité”, January 2001.
Annex 25
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191
365. The Hema-Gegere farmers600 who, a few years previously, had acquired new
concessions from the land registry in the Djugu region, took advantage of the new
political situation to enforce their rights. As the Lendu from the Walendu Pitsi601
community, who held the customary rights to the land concerned, disputed the value of
their title deeds, the Hema-Gegere farmers appealed to the courts and had the Walendu
Pitsi expelled from the concessions they wanted. The latter refused to leave, however,
and clashes broke out with the police officers who had come to remove them. Several
senior Lendu, including the leaders of the Walendu Pitsi and Walendu Djatsi
communities, were arrested for vandalism. In April 1999, the Hema-Gegere concessionholders
paid UPDF and APC soldiers to attack the Lendu villages located in the disputed
concessions.602
366. In this climate, the appointment in June 1999 of Adèle Lotsove, a Hema woman
from the Djugu region,603 as Governor of the new province of Kibali-Ituri,604 was seen by
the Djugu Lendu as a provocation. Her arrival in Ituri was accompanied by a deployment
of Ugandan soldiers to the disputed concessions and the withdrawal of the police forces
from the majority of the Djugu region. The Walendu Pitsi organised themselves into selfdefence
forces and confronted the UPDF soldiers and Hema self-defence forces created
by the concession-holders in the Walendu Pitsi, Walendu Djatsi, Walendu Tatsi and Ndo
Okelo communities. The Lendu and Hema self-defence forces quickly transformed
themselves into community militias and people living in the Djugu region were subjected
to a first campaign of ethnic cleansing, which resulted in hundreds of deaths. In this
context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
• Between June and December 1999, UPDF and APC soldiers killed an unknown
number of Lendu civilians in villages in the Djugu region close to the concessions
claimed by the Hema-Gegere farmers. Villages in the Dz’na Buba, Linga, Jiba,
Dhendo, Blukwa Mbi, Laudjo, Laudedjo Gokpa, Nyalibati and Gbakulu
groupements were particularly badly affected. Most of the victims were Lendu but
Hema were also killed during the attacks. Numerous victims died when their
village was set on fire or following heavy arms fire directed at their homes. Some
victims were shot dead at point-blank range.605
_______________
600 The term Hema-Gegere or Hema-Nord refers to the Hema in the northern part of the district and
speaking the same language as the Lendu. Until 2002, they were allied to Hemas living in the southern part
of the district (sometimes called Hema-Sud) although the latter did not speak the same language as them.
601 In the remainder of the text, Lendu from the Walendu Pitsi community will be referred to by the term
Walendu Pitsi.
602 The chiefs of the Pitsi and Djatsi community were released in September 1999.
603 Adèle Lotsove is a Hema woman from the Bahema-Badjere chiefdom in the Djugu region. She
previously occupied the post of Vice-Governor of Orientale Province.
604 The new province combined the districts of Ituri and Haut-Uélé.
605 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Report of the Ituri Peacekeeping Committee,
Bunia, August 1999; Document submitted to the Mapping Team on statistics for the Djugu region, March
2009.
Annex 25
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192
• Between June and December 1999, members of the Lendu militia killed several
tens of Hema-Gegere in the village of Libi from the Walendu Pitsi community
and in the village of Fataki from the Walendu Djatsi community. These attacks
led to the displacement of almost all the Hema-Gegere living in the Walendu Pitsi
community.606
• From June 1999 onwards, the Lendu self-defence groups recruited large numbers
of children to their ranks and used them during their attacks on Hema locations.
They most often helped them to carry pillaged property.607
• On 20 June 1999, members of the Hema militias and UPDF soldiers killed at least
25 people, including several civilians, during an attack on the village of Dhendro,
in the Walendu Pitsi community, on the border with the Dhendro groupement.608
• On 14 September 1999, members of the Lendu militias from the Walendu Pitsi
community used edged weapons to kill several hundred Hema-Gegere, including
a majority of civilians, during widespread attacks on locations in the Dhendro
groupement in the Bahema-Nord community. Members of the militias also
pillaged and set fire to tens of villages. The victims were buried in mass graves.
According to several sources, the massacre took place in retaliation for an attack
committed on 20 June by members of the Hema militias in the village of
Dhendro.609
• On 14 September 1999, during a night-time offensive on the village of Fataki, in
the Walendu Djatsi community, members of the Hema militias and Hema soldiers
from the APC killed several tens of civilians with edged weapons, including at
least 15 minors and several women. The assailants then buried the bodies
themselves. Following the attack, all the Lendu left the village and Fataki became
a Hema bastion in the Walendu Djatsi community.610
367. During the months that followed, members of the Lendu militias tried to regain
control of Fataki on several occasions. For its part, the UPDF concentrated its troops on
Fataki and Linga and led several offensives against Lendu militia bases in Kpandroma
and Rethy, in the Walendu Djatsi community.
_______________
606 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March and May 2009.
607 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March to April 2009.
608 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Documents submitted to the Mapping Team in
February and March 1999; Special report on the events in Ituri (January 2002-December 2003)
[S/2004/573], MONUC; Report of the Ituri Peacekeeping Committee, Bunia, August 1999.
609 Ibid.
610 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Confidential document submitted to the Mapping
Team in February 2009; Document submitted to the Mapping Team on the victims of the conflict, Ituri,
March 2009.
Annex 25
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193
368. During the period under consideration, the Lendu militias also attacked villages in
the Djugu region on the shores of Lake Albert, the majority of which were populated by
Hema.611
• In July 1999, members of the Lendu militias from the Buba group in the Walendu
Pitsi community allegedly killed over 100 Hema civilians in the fishing village of
Musekere in the Bahema-Nord community. Having encircled the village at dawn
and forced six APC soldiers there to flee, they massacred the population using
machetes and other edged weapons. From the start of the conflict, the Lendu
leaders of the Buba groupement had threatened to attack the inhabitants of
Musekere on several occasions.612
369. In October 1999, the RCD-ML set up a Peacekeeping and Monitoring
Committee613 and organised several inter-community meetings, which resulted in peace
agreements being signed by the leaders of the different communities. Whilst the
Peacekeeping Committee deployed in the north of the Djugu region succeeded in
restoring calm to the region, however, confrontations broke out between Hema and
Lendu militias in the south of the region in the Walendu Djatsi, Banyari Kilo, Mabendi,
Mambisa and Ndo Okebo communities.
• On 1 December 1999, members of the Lendu militias confronted elements of the
UPDF and members of the Hema militias over control of the mining town of
Bambou, in the Walendu Djatsi community in the Djugu region. The fighting
allegedly led to the deaths of over 200 members of the civilian population.
Numerous victims were mutilated and the town looted. Most of the victims’
bodies were thrown into the River Chari.614
370. At the end of 1999, Ugandan soldiers and senior members of the RCD-ML615
tried to ease the conflict in the Djugu region. In November, the Ugandan President,
Yoweri Museveni, met representatives of the Ituri communities. On 16 December, Adèle
Lotsove handed over her post as Governor to Ernest Uringi Padolo, a member of the Alur
community, which was seen as neutral in the Hema/Lendu conflict.616 The sector
_______________
611 Ibid.
612 Interviews with the Mapping Team, May 2009, ACIAR [Australian Centre for International
Agricultural Research]-Justice Plus, “Tentative de paix, action humanitaire and bilan des affrontements
sanglants entre Lendu (Bbale) et Hema (Gegere) en territoire de Djugu”, August 1999–March 2000.
613 The Committee was led by the academic Jacques Depelchin, a friend of the President of the RCD-ML,
Wamba dia Wamba and the Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni.
614 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; Confidential documents submitted to the Mapping
Team in February 2009.
615 In October 1999, the RCD-ML relocated its headquarters from Kisangani to Bunia.
616 In numerical terms the Alur are the largest community in Ituri. In 1999, members of the Lendu militias
had attacked members of the Alur community which were then supported by the Hema militias. In
September 1999, however, following the peace agreement concluded in Rethy with the Lendu, the Alur
distanced themselves from the Hema.
Annex 25
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194
commander who had made UPDF soldiers available to the Hema-Gegere concessionholders
to attack the Walendu Pitsi was replaced. These initiatives helped to restore calm
to the district over the course of 2000, but did not put an end to the serious violations of
human rights in the Djugu region. In this context, the Mapping Team documented the
following alleged incidents.
• In January 2000, members of the Lendu militias from the Walendu Pitsi and
Bahema-Nord communities attacked people living in the Blukwa groupement,
killing several hundreds of Hema with edged weapons. The groupement had been
the site of violent inter-ethnic confrontations since September 1999. The attack in
January took place after the departure of APC troops, fleeing from the increasing
violence.617
• On 26 April 2000, members of the Hema militias and UPDF troops attacked the
Buba groupement, in the Walendu Pitsi community, causing around 10 deaths, the
majority of whom were Lendu civilians.618
• Between 27 August and 12 September 2000, members of the Hema militias from
Mangala, Ghele, Gele and Liko, sometimes acting with the support of the Hema
APC soldiers, pillaged and set fire to several villages in the Walendu Djatsi
community including Mbau (27 August), Glakpa and Gobi (28 August), Logai
(29 August), the villages in the Dz’na groupement (31 August) and Mayalibo (6-
12 September).619
8. Kasaï Occidental
371. Between March and July 1999, ANC/APR soldiers launched a vast offensive to
take control of the provinces of Eastern and Kasai Occidental. In April, they captured the
areas of Lodja and Lubefu, and the FAC fled towards Kananga, committing numerous
atrocities and looting as they went. Between May and June, FAC and ZDF soldiers
entered into violent confrontations with ANC/APR troops for the control of the Demba
and Dimbelenge regions, north of Kanaga. People on both sides of the front line were
subjected to numerous atrocities. Given the land-locked nature of the region and the lack
of time, the Mapping Team was only able to document a limited number of incidents,
which are reported below as representative of the violations committed during this
period.
_______________
617 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; ACIAR-Justice Plus, “Tentative de paix, action
humanitaire and bilan des affrontements sanglants entre Lendu (Bbale) and Hema (Gegere) en territoire de
Djugu”, August 1999-March 2000; ASADHO, press release, “Affrontements sanglants entre Lendu and
Hema”, 7 February 2000; ASADHO, “Rapport sur le conflit interethnique Hema-Lendu en territoire de
Djugu, dans la province Orientale”, 7 December 1999.
618 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; Documents submitted to the Mapping Team in
March 2009.
619 Interviews with the Mapping Team Ituri, March and April 2009; Documents submitted to the Mapping
Team in March 2009.
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
206
Mayi and were systematically killed. The bodies of some of the victims were
thrown into wells.667
• On 24 November 2000, elements of the FAC summarily executed nine people,
including one of the founders of the AFDL, Commander Anselme Masasu.
Arrested in Kinshasa at the end of October, the victims were held for over two
weeks in the GLM building in Kinshasa in cruel, inhuman or degrading
conditions. On 21 November, accompanied by around 40 other people accused of
preparing a coup d’état against President Kabila, they were transferred to ANR
prisons in Lubumbashi. On 22 November, the victims and other accused were
taken to the village of Cantonnier, about 20 kilometres from the town. Having
been condemned to death at the end of a summary trial by the Military Court
sitting in Cantonnier specifically for this purpose, the victims were shot.
Following the publication of a press release about the case by the ASADHO on 2
December, several human rights activists were arrested in early 2001. The
ASADHO’s senior official in Katanga was arbitrarily detained and tortured for
several months in the GLM building.668
10. Équateur
381. In November 1998, a new rebellion, the Mouvement pour la libération du Congo
(MLC) began with support from Uganda. Led by Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, in the early
days the MLC had just one battalion consisting mainly of ex-FAZ soldiers supported by
elements of the UPDF. In a few months, however, the MLC army, the Armée de
libération du Congo (ALC) added numerous ex-FAZ to its ranks and took control of
several urban areas in the north of Équateur province. The town of Bumba fell on 17
November, the town of Lisala on 10 December, the village of Businga, on the crossroads
to the towns of Gemena and Gbadolite on 20 December, the town of Gemena on 24
December and the village of Libenge, in the far west of the province, on the border with
the Central African Republic, on 4 January 1999. The FAC conducted very intense air
bombardments in December 1998 to block the advance of the ALC/UPDF. In this
context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
• On 22 December 1998, an FAC Antonov dropped 11 home-made bombs on the
village of Businga, killing five civilians. On 24 December, an FAC Antonov
plane bombed the village a second time, killing two civilians.669
_______________
667 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, December 2008; Confidential document submitted to the
Mapping Team in 2008.
668 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga/Kinshasa, February 2009; Report of the Special
Rapporteur (A/56/327), par. 32; Actualités en RDC, “Commandant Anselme Masasu Nindaga: La VSV
exige la copie du jugement de l'exécution”, 21 March 2001. Available at:
http://web.peacelink.it/dia/sommar/mar_21_2001.txt; AI, “From assassination to state murder?”, 12
December 2002.
669 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, February 2009.
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
207
• On 25 December 1998, an FAC plane Antonov bombed the town of Gemena,
lightly wounding two civilians. On 28 December, an FAC Antonov plane
indiscriminately dropped several home-made bombs on Gemena, killing at least
27 civilians.670
382. At the same time, the FAC, elements of the Armée nationale tchadienne (ANT)
and others from the ALiR launched a land-based counter-offensive. During the operation,
FAC/ANT/ALiR soldiers committed serious violations directed at civilians whom they
considered to be hostile to the regime of President Kabila and accomplices of the ALC. In
this context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
• On 28 December 1998, elements of the FAC killed at least four civilians in the
forest surrounding the village of Businga. An eye witness reported that one of the
victims, an injured woman, was shot and killed by an FAC soldier. The previous
day, the FAC/ANT/ALiR had chased the ALC/UPDF from the village, causing
the civilians to flee into the forest.671
• On 9 January 1999, elements of the ANT set fire to 55 houses and 18 civilians
were burned alive in Boyasegbakole I in the Gemena area. The massacre took
place on the fringes of the confrontations between the ANT and ALC/UPDF for
the control of Gemena.672
• Around 10 January 1999, elements of the FAC and units of President Kabila’s
Presidential Guard known as the PPU673 killed 25 people, including six women, in
the village of Nduma, around 100 kilometres from Zongo. The bodies of the
victims were thrown into wells. Around the same date, elements of the FAC/PPU
killed 15 inhabitants of the village of Mase, two kilometres from Nduma. Some
victims were burned alive, whilst others were shot dead.674
• On 29 March 1999, in the Businga region, elements of the FAC/ANT/ALiR
looted the IME Loko development centre, the hospital between Businga and
Gbadolite and property belonging to the Evangelical Community of Ubangi-
Mongola (CEUM).675
_______________
670 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
671 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, February 2009.
672 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009; Confidential document submitted to the
Mapping Team, March 2009.
673 The “Presidential Protection Unit” later became the Groupe spécial de sécurité présidentielle (GSSP)
[Presidential Special Security Group].
674 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa and Équateur, February, March and April 2009; AFP
[Agence France-Presse], DRC troops massacre 300 civilians, 13 January 1999; AI, Killing human decency,
2000, p. 10.
675 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
208
383. After the ALC/UPDF troops had withdrawn to Lisala, the FAC/ANT/ALiR
soldiers continued their offensive and arrived in Umangi during the night of 23 to 24
February 1999. On 24 February, the FAC attacked the town of Lisala. In this context, the
Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
• On 24 February 1999, elements of the FAC/ALiR shot and killed three civilians in
the village of Umangi and a fourth in the village of Edjeke, less than 20
kilometres from Lisala.676
• Between 24 and 26 February 1999, the FAC/ANT/ALiR and ALC/UPDF shelled
the town of Lisala, killing at least 15 civilians.677
384. On 26 February 1999, ALC/UPDF troops regained control of Lisala, forcing the
FAC/ANT/ALiR to withdraw to Umangi.
• On 26 February 1999, elements of the FAC/ANT/ALiR killed three civilians as
they withdrew to Umangi in the village of Bopuo, seven kilometres from
Lisala.678
• On 28 February 1999, elements of the FAC/ANT/ALiR killed seven civilians in
the village of Ngonzi-Rive, nine kilometres from Lisala. The victims, who had
been taken hostage the day before, were executed in front of the school complex
building in Ngonzi-Rive. One of the victims was killed for having claimed the
bicycle the soldiers had taken from him.679
385. During the following months, violent fighting broke out between elements of the
FAC/ANT/ALiR and the ALC/UPDF around Businga and Kateke, two villages in the
district of Nord-Oubangui. The fighting resulted in heavy losses on both sides. In this
context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
• On 28 May 1999, 12 kilometres from Businga, elements of the ALC/UPDF
executed an ALiR member who was no longer able to fight. Numerous witness
statements indicate that the ALC soldiers cut off the lips of Chadian prisoners.
Cases of prisoners being summarily executed and mutilated were very frequent.680
_______________
676 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
677 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
678 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
679 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
680 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, February-March-April 2009.
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
209
• In May 1999, whilst they were withdrawing from Congolese territory, elements of
the ANT pillaged large amounts of civilian property and several tonnes of coffee
in the town of Zongo in the district of Sud-Oubangui.681
386. Taking advantage of the withdrawal of ANT troops and the arrival of
reinforcements from the recruitment and training camps, ALC/UPDF soldiers launched a
second major offensive in May 1999. In three months, ALC/UPDF troops regained
control of the towns of Kateke (27 April 1999), Businga (14 May 1999) and Gbadolite (3
July 1999). As they retreated, elements of the FAC/ALiR carried out deliberate attacks on
civilians, either because they were accused of collaborating with ALC/UPDF soldiers or
in order to provide an opportunity to loot their property. In this context, the Mapping
Team documented the following alleged incidents.
• On 10 May 1999, elements of the FAC/ALiR killed three minors between
Businga and Loko. An unknown number of civilians were also killed in the
villages of Bokosa, Bogbudu, Bobusu and Bobale.682
• In June 1999, elements of the FAC/ALiR killed at least eight civilians in Inke, a
village 50 kilometres from Gbadolite.683
• Towards the end of July 1999, elements of the FAC killed between 32 and 45
civilians in the village of Bogwaka, south of Gemena. The victims, who belonged
to a group of young choir members from the village of Bogon, were heading for
Akula to enlist in the ALC. When they arrived in Bogwaka, in the Gemena
region, the victims were intercepted by the FAC. Assuming the FAC were ALC
soldiers, the victims told them they wanted to enlist in the army of the MLC. The
civilians were led to the house of the FAC commander and executed one by one.
The bodies were buried in Bogwaka in a mass grave behind the house used by the
FAC commander at the time.684
387. In June 1999, the ALC/UPDF troops took control of Bongandanga, a town south
of Lisala. Elements of the FAC, belonging to a battalion nicknamed “Robot” because of
the uniforms and equipment used by the soldiers, beat a retreat towards Djolu. In this
context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
• Before leaving Bongandanga, elements of the FAC Robot battalion killed two
civilians behind the Bongandanga Institute. The victims had been accused of
belonging to the ALC.685
_______________
681 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
682 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March/April 2009; Action humanitaire du Congo,
“Situation des graves violations des droits humains dans le Nord-Équateur”, 4 April 2009.
683 Ibid.
684 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
685 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March-April 2009.
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392. On 9 August 2000, a UPDF tank is said to have fired on a boat transporting FAC
soldiers and at least several dozen soldiers drowned near the Protestant Mission in Kala, a
village 30 kilometres from Libenge:
• Between 20 July and 10 September 2000, elements of the 10th Brigade of the
FAC executed tens of civilians in the village of Dongo. On 21 July, the soldiers
first arrested and executed the civilians who were still in the village when they
arrived. During the days that followed, they arrested and executed the civilians
who had fled into the bush and who had finally agreed to return. The killings
ceased on 10 September when the ALC/UPDF regained control of Dongo. The
bodies of the victims were placed in a number of mass graves opposite the area
office on avenue Mbenga, close to the market, on the road between Dongo and
Ikwangala. On 14 September, the MLC brought several international journalists to
the area so that international public opinion would become aware of the
massacres.697
_______________
697 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa and Équateur, April 2009; Ian Fisher, “Congo’s War
Triumphs over Peace Accord”, New York Times, 18 September 2000; Voice of America, “Congo Rebels”,
14 September 2000.
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CHAPTER IV. JANUARY 2001–JUNE 2003: TOWARDS TRANSITION
393. Following the assassination of Laurent-Désiré Kabila on 16 January 2001 and his
replacement by his son Joseph Kabila, a new phase of the conflict began. The belligerents
agreed to implement a plan to withdraw their forces and start preparing for the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue (ICD). From March 2001 onwards, MONUC’s military observers
were able to be deployed along the front line and consolidate the ceasefire.
394. In the provinces of North and South Kivu, however, the war continued between
Kabila’s Government (the Mayi-Mayi groups, FDD and ALiR) and the soldiers of the
ANC, (the armed wing of the RCD-Goma), and the Rwandan soldiers of the APR.
395. In Orientale Province, the efforts made by Uganda to unite its two allies, the
RCD-ML and the MLC, failed. After the RCD-ML rallied to the Government in
Kinshasa, the ALC (the army of the MLC) and the ANC stepped up their attacks on the
army of the RCD-ML, the APC. The attacks were designed to prevent the government
army of the FAC from regaining a foothold in North Kivu and Orientale Province
through its new ally, the RCD-ML.
396. In spite of reluctance on both sides, the Inter-Congolese dialogue began on 25
February 2002 in Sun City (South Africa). On 19 April, President Joseph Kabila and the
head of the MLC, Jean-Pierre Bemba, announced the conclusion of a framework powersharing
agreement for which they gained the support of most of those involved in the
Dialogue, except the RCD-Goma and several parties from the unarmed political
opposition, including the UDPS.
397. On 30 July 2002, the Congolese and Rwandan Presidents signed a peace
agreement in Pretoria, providing for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese
territory in return for the dismantling of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and Hutu armed groups
within the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR698).699 At the same
time, the Government in Kinshasa concluded a peace agreement with Uganda in Luanda
on 6 September, providing for the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the Congo and the
re-establishment of peace in the Ituri district.700 Starting in September 2002,
Zimbabwean, Angolan, Namibian, Rwandan and Ugandan troops began to withdraw
from Congolese territory. Under intense international pressure, the various elements and
entities involved in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue finally signed the Global and All-
Inclusive Agreement in Pretoria on 17 December 2002.701 In spite of the continued
fighting in North and South Kivu, the deterioration in the security situation in North
_______________
698 The ALiR was dissolved as part of the FDLR at the end of 2000.
699 For the text of the Agreement, see S/2002/914, appendix.
700 Available at the following address: www.droitcongolais.info/files/0426_accord_du_6_septembre_2002_
rdc-ouganda_r.pdf.
701 Available at the following address: http://democratie.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/VII.1.pdf.
Annex 25
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Katanga and the intensification of the war between the different militias in Ituri, the
participants in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue ratified the Global and All-Inclusive
Agreement in Sun City (South Africa) on 1 April 2003 along with an additional
memorandum on the integration of the various armed groups into a single national army.
The transition institutions were officially put in place on 30 June
2003.
Government and Rebel Zones, June 2002
Annex 25
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400. In April 2002, Joseph Kabila and Jean-Pierre Bemba signed a power-sharing
agreement. As the agreement was rejected by the RCD-Goma and the main opposition
party, the UDPS, the negotiations taking place as part of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue
stalled. On 14 May 2002, in Kisangani, a group of soldiers and police officers with no
identifiable leader called on the RCD-Goma security forces to rebel. They also incited the
local population to kill any Rwandans in the town.
• On 14 May 2002, several unidentified civilians, responding to the call of the
ANC’s rebels, are said to have killed at least six people. The victims were
Rwandans, people of Rwandan origin and those who resembled them.706
401. Over the course of the day, soldiers from the ANC/APR were sent reinforcements
from Goma and regained control of the town.
• Between 14 and 22 May 2002, elements of the ANC/APR allegedly killed at least
276 civilians and wounded hundreds in Kisangani, particularly in neighbourhoods
in the municipality of Mangobo, at Camp Ketele, at Bangoka airport and on the
Tshopo bridge. The soldiers also committed an unknown number of rapes and
looted civilian property during their search operations. Numerous bodies were
thrown into the River Tshopo, some of which had been mutilated and
disembowelled.707
402. During the period under consideration, the Bas-Uélé district remained under the
control of ALC/UPDF soldiers. The latter allegedly committed serious violations against
all those who dared to dispute their authority or criticised their involvement in pillaging
the natural resources of the region. The case below is mentioned for illustrative purposes.
• From 2001 to January 2003, elements of the ALC/UPDF apparently tortured and
killed an unknown number of civilians in the town of Buta. Most of the victims
were held in muddy holes in conditions likely to cause death through disease or
exhaustion. After a human rights activist had been tortured and held in one of the
_______________
706 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008; Eleventh report of the
Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2002/6); Report of the Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/2003/3/Add.3); DRC
Ministry of Human Rights, “Livre blanc spécial sur les récurrentes violations des droits de l’homme and du
droit international humanitaire dans la ville de Kisangani”, June 2002; Groupe Justice et Libération, “Vraie
ou fausse mutinerie de Kisangani and le massacre des populations civiles”, June 2002; ANMDH,
“Kisangani – Les événements du 14 May 2002 – Rapport sur le massacre de la population and le pillage
des biens des paisibles citoyens”, 30 May 2002, Lotus Group, “Comprendre les événements du 14 mai
2002 et agir pour le respect des droits humains and une paix juste”, July 2002; Synergie pour la paix
(SYPA), Rapport d’enquête sur le massacre de Kisangani du 14 au 16 mai 2002, June 2002; AI, “RDC: Il
faut que justice soit rendue maintenant aux victimes des massacres de Kisangani”, press release, 12 June
2002; AI, DRC, Our brothers who help kill us: economic exploitation and human rights abuses in the east,
2003; HRW, “Crimes de guerre à Kisangani: Identification des officiers impliqués”, 20 August 2002.
707 Ibid.
Annex 25
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217
muddy holes by the soldiers, MONUC and United Nations organisations sent out
an investigative mission and had these prisons shut down.708
403. Between 2001 and 2003, troops from the ALC, the army of the MLC, and the few
soldiers in Roger Lumbala’s RCD-National709 confronted elements of the APC, the
armed wing of the RCD-ML, for control of the district of Haut-Uélé on several occasions.
During the period under consideration, the town of Isiro passed back and forth into the
hands of both sides several times. In October 2002, faced with the advance of the APC,
the ALC sent reinforcements from Équateur to Isiro as part of the “Clean the blackboard”
operation (Operation effacer le tableau). This operation was designed to destroy the APC
once and for all, so as to deprive the Government in Kinshasa of its ally, the RCD-ML, in
the eastern Congo and to get hold of the natural resources still under the control of the
RCD-ML before the transition period began. The UPC, which was also trying to crush
the APC, joined in with the operation. Elements from the “Clean the blackboard”
operation mounted an ambush against the APC in the village of Madesi. In this context,
the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
• On 30 or 31 July 2002, elements of the APC gang-raped six women in the area
around the village of Madesi.710
• During and after the fighting, between 31 July and 2 August 2002, elements of the
ALC taking part in the “Clean the blackboard” operation tortured, mutilated and
killed at least 16 APC combatants as well as an unknown number of civilians,
including women and children. ALC soldiers used the organs of some of their
victims (genitals and ears) as war trophies and showed them to the population of
Isiro. The Mapping Team was not in a position to confirm the allegations that
elements of the “Clean the blackboard” operation indulged in acts of cannibalism
after the fighting.711
• In early March 2003, ALC soldiers tortured to death six palm-oil sellers in Ganga
in the Haut-Uélé district. The day after the killing, they massacred a woman by
beating her with a hammer on the grounds that she was wearing an item of
clothing with the APC logo on.712
_______________
708 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January 2009.
709 The RCD-National is a small political and military movement that appeared in 2001 and had a military
presence in the regions of Isiro and Watsa. Led by Roger Lubumla, who had long been President of the
UDPS opposition party in France, the movement allied itself to Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC on the ground
and had few of its own troops.
710 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January and February 2009; Voix des opprimés,
“Rapport sur les événements du Haut-Zaïre entre 1993 et 2003”, 2008.
711 Ibid.
712 Ibid.
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• In late 2002 and early 2003, elements from the Forces armées du peuple congolais
(FAPC), an armed group active in the Aru and Mahagi regions of the Ituri district
raped and killed an unknown number of civilians in the area around the Kilomoto
gold mine, in the Watsa region of the Haut-Uélé district.713
B. Ituri
404. During the second half of 2000, the underlying conflict between the President of
the RCD-ML, Wamba dia Wamba and his two principal lieutenants, the Nande Mbusa
Nyamwisi714 and the Hema John Tibasima715 broke out in public. Wamba dia Wamba
had long criticised Nyamwisi and Tibasima for trying to orchestrate the conflict between
the Hema and Lendu communities716 in order to establish a power base in the district and
control the region’s natural resources. In August, Wamba dia Wamba tried to regain
control of the movement by dismissing Nyamwisi and Tibasima from their posts, but they
resisted and the number of incidents on the ground between the different factions of the
APC increased. After several unsuccessful attempts at mediation by Uganda and a series
of confrontations in the centre of Bunia, Wamba dia Wamba was exiled to Kampala in
December, leaving the leadership of the RCD-ML to Nyamwisi and Tibasima.
405. In January 2001, Ituri saw a resurgence of violence in the Djugu area. Between
January and February, members of the Hema militias from Bogoro, generally
accompanied by Hema soldiers from the APC and UPDF soldiers, led indiscriminate
attacks in the Walendu Tatsi community, next to the Bahema-Nord community, killing an
unknown number of civilians. In this context, the Mapping Team documented the
following alleged incidents.
• On 4 January 2001, during a failed attack on Kpandroma, members of the Hema
militias based in Fataki killed at least 35 Lendu civilians in the Zabu groupement
in the Walendu Pitsi community, particularly in Aruda and Mola and the
surrounding area.717
• In early 2001, members of the Hema militias killed at least 16 people and
kidnapped two minors who have been since recorded as having disappeared in the
_______________
713 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January and February 2009.
714 Originally from North Kivu, Mbusa Nyamwisi was then Prime Minister of the RCD-ML.
715 A former director of the Okimo mining company, which sold gold from Ituri, John Tibasima was the
Movement’s Defence Minister.
716 Since 2000, Mbusa Nyamwisi and the UPDF had organised military training for Lendu militiamen at the
Nyaleke camp, close to the town of Béni, in North Kivu. John Tibasima supervised the training in Uganda
and in the Rwampara camp, close to Bunia, of thousands of Hema militiamen in order to integrate them
into the APC.
717 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009.
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219
Salimboko, Poli-Masumbuku and Penyi groupements in the Walendu Tatsi
community.718
• Also in early 2001, members of the Lendu militias killed an unknown number of
civilians, including a majority of Hema and Alur in the villages alongside Lake
Albert in the Bahema Banywagi and Bahema-Nord communities.719
• Between January and February 2001, UPDF soldiers attacked around 20 villages
in the Walendu Tatsi community, killing around 100 people, including various
Lendu civilians. During the attacks, the soldiers also committed rape, looted and
caused an unknown number of people to disappear. Most of the victims were
killed in villages located near the Zumbe power station, in the Bedu Ezekere
groupement, where they had gathered under the protection of members of the
Lendu militias.720
• On 3 February 2001, members of the Hema militias and UPDF troops killed 105
people, including numerous Lendu civilians, in the villages in the Bulo
groupement in the Ndo Okebo community in the Djugu region. The victims often
came from the Walendu Pitsi community. They had taken refuge in the Bulo
groupement following recent attacks on their village.721
406. At the end of 2000, the conflict between the Hema and Lendu finally reached the
Irumu region. The UPDF soldiers lent their support to the local Hema communities and
violent incidents broke out on the ground.
• Between 9 and 18 January 2001, members of the Hema militias allegedly killed
around 60 people, including numerous Lendu and Ngiti civilians,722 in the village
of Kotoni, in the Irumu region and the surrounding area.723
407. Following the bombardment of the Walendu Bindi community by a UPDF
helicopter, Ngiti militiamen, originally in conjunction with the Djugu Lendu from the
Walendu Bindi community, launched an attack on 19 January 2001 against UPDF
_______________
718 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, February 2009; Documents produced by members of the
Lendu communities and submitted to the Mapping Team in March 2009.
719 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March and April 2009; Documents submitted to the Mapping
Team in March 2009.
720 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri (January
2002-December 2003) [S/2004/573], MONUC; Documents submitted to the Mapping Team in April 2009;
Transcription of the phone message of the chief of the Walendu Tatsi community to the press, 11 February
2001, list of events that occurred in the community.
721 Interview with the Mapping Team, Ituri. May 2009; Report of the Bbale community submitted to the
Mapping Team in March 2009.
722 The Ngiti are Lendu from the Irumu region.
723 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, February 2009; Documents produced by members of the
Lendu communities and submitted to the Mapping Team in March 2009.
Annex 25
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220
positions at the airport in Bunia. During the attack, Ngiti militiamen tried to destroy the
helicopter the UPDF had used to bomb their villages. The UPDF finally repelled the
attack but at the cost of a significant loss of human life.
• On 19 January 2001, Hema militiamen and civilians allegedly killed between 200
and 250 civilians from the Lendu, Ngiti, Nande and Bira ethnic groups in the
Mudzipela neighbourhood in the town of Bunia. The victims, who included a
large number of women and children, were killed with machetes, spears or
studded batons. Most of them were subjected to mutilation. Some were
decapitated and their heads carried through the town as trophies. The Hema
militiamen and civilians also systematically looted the victims’ property and set
fire to several houses. Shortly before the massacre, UPDF officers and senior
members of the Hema community in Bunia had held a meeting and called on
Hema civilians to attack the Lendu population.724
408. In order to restore calm to Ituri and avoid new splinter groups developing within
the RCD-ML, Uganda forced the RCD-ML and MLC to join forces within a new
movement, the Front de libération du Congo (FLC), led by Jean-Pierre Bemba.725 On 6
February 2001, the FLC organised consultations with the traditional chiefs in Ituri and on
17 February, the latter signed a memorandum of agreement, providing in particular for an
immediate cessation of hostilities, the disarmament of the militiamen and the dismantling
of the training camps.726 During the months that followed, the number of violations
decreased significantly. Inter-community tension on the ground nonetheless remained
high and the militias continued to arm themselves. In this context, the Mapping Team
documented the following alleged incidents.
• On 26 April 2001, armed men killed six members of the ICRC during an attack on
a humanitarian convoy in the area around Fataki in the Walendu Djatsi
community, in the Djugu region. Local sources indicate that the attack is thought
to have been perpetrated by Ugandan soldiers and Hema militiamen. The attack
was supposedly aimed at ending the presence of humanitarian personnel in areas
where the displaced Lendu had taken refuge. During the period under
consideration, numerous sources indicate that Hema militias and armed groups
severely hampered the work of humanitarian organisations in areas populated
principally by Lendu.727
_______________
724 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Documents submitted to the Mapping Teamà in
Bunia in March 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573), MONUC; New York Times,
“Congo's War Turns a Land Spat Into a Blood Bath”, 29 January 2001.
725 The army of the MLC, the ALC, already controlled the districts of Haut-Uélé and Bas-Uélé.
726 The memorandum of agreement also included various provisions on the reform of the local land and
judicial system and on combating impunity.
727 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March and May 2009, HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood.
Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern DRC, July 2003.
Annex 25
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221
• In 2001, Hema soldiers from the APC killed 40 Lendu, a majority of them
civilians, including women, children and elderly and disabled people, in the
village of Gobu in the Bahema-Nord community. The victims were taken to a
ditch and shot. Their bodies were then thrown into the ditch.728
• In January 2002, UPDF troops and Hema militiamen opened fire on the
population of the village of Kobu in the Walendu Djatsi community in the Djugu
region, killing 35 Lendu civilians. As they entered the village, Ugandan soldiers
killed four civilians in the marketplace, including one disabled person. Almost all
of the population fled and hid in the forest for nearly two months. On their return
to the village, the villagers found 35 decomposed bodies, which they buried in
various places. Those responsible for the massacre were trying to remove Lendu
populations from the Kobu area, close to the Kilomoto gold mines. Following the
killing, the population of Kobu sent a petition to Governor Lopondo, who visited
the area shortly afterwards accompanied by senior figures in the UPDF.
Following the visit, UPDF soldiers left the area.729
• On 26 January 2002, members of the Hema militias killed around 100 Lendu in a
forest a few kilometres from Datule, in the Bahema-Sud community in the Irumu
region. The victims had been chased from the village of Datule the previous day
by a UPC commander. They were killed with machetes, spears and studded
batons. A young girl of 13 was the only person to survive the attack.730
• On 28 January 2002, Hema militiamen killed and mutilated around 50 Lendu
civilians in Kasenyi in the Irumu region. Having been informed of the massacre
that had taken place on 26 January, the victims had fled the village of Datule on
27 January in the hope of reaching the Lendu villages in the Walendu Bindi
community. They were hiding behind a police station when they were surprised
and killed.731
• Between January and May 2002, Hema militiamen in the region forcibly recruited
all the men from the Alur ethnic group living in the village of Gobu in the
Bahema-Nord community in the Djugu region.732
• Between February and April 2002, elements of the UPDF and Hema militiamen
killed several hundred Lendu civilians in the Walendu Bindi community in the
Irumu region. They also tortured and raped an unknown number of people. The
_______________
728 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009.
729 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; ASADHO, Annual Report 2002, March 2003, p.
28.
730 Ibid.
731 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April-May 2009; ASADHO, Annual Report 2002, March
2003, p. 28.
732 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March and April 2009.
Annex 25
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222
villages of Aveba, Bukiringi, Nombe, Kaswara, Djino, Kagaba, Biro, Kapalayi,
Gety étang, Tsubina, Kinyamubaya, Karach, Bolomo, Bachange, Tsede, Molangi,
Tamara, Irura, Modiro, Mukiro and Anyange were all pillaged.733
409. In February 2002, against a background of growing economic rivalry between
Hema and Nande businessmen and disagreements on the new strategic directions taken
by the Mouvement,734 the Defence Minister of the RCD-ML, Thomas Lubanga, and the
Hema soldiers of the APC broke away from the RCD-ML to form a political and military
Hema group, the Union des patriotes congolais (UPC). In response, Mbusa Nyamwisi
and Nande officers in the APC, supported by certain members of the UPDF, reduced
Hema influence in the district,735 intensified their cooperation with the FAC736 and
encouraged members of the Lendu and Ngiti militias to join forces in political military
groups, namely the Front National Intégrationiste (FNI)737 and the Forces de résistance
patriotique en Ituri (FRPI)738. During the course of 2002, these various armed groups
received significant supplies of weapons from Uganda and the Government in Kinshasa.
In this context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
• Starting on 21 May 2002 and during the course of the next six months, elements
of the UPC killed at least 46 civilians, most of them from the Bira ethnic group, in
Walu in the Ngombe-Nyama groupement, in the Irumu region. The militiamen
also raped an unknown number of women, looted and destroyed educational
institutions and hospitals. These attacks were supposedly intended as retaliation
for the help given to the Lendu by the Bira during the previous attacks against the
Hema in the region.739
• In May 2002, Lendu militiamen accompanied by civilians killed at least 80
people, mainly Hema and Alur, in the village of Gobu in the Bahema-Nord
community. The victims were civilians or soldiers who were no longer able to
fight. Most were summarily executed with edged weapons. According to several
witness statements, the Hema militiamen in the area had fled before members of
the Lendu militias arrived in the village.740
_______________
733 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March-April 2009; Confidential documents on the events in
Ituri submitted to the Mapping Team, March 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC.
734 In 2001, Mbusa Nyamwisi broke away from the FLC and the MLC to enter into an alliance with the
Government in Kinshasa.
735 Governor Uringi was replaced by a Kasaian, Jean-Pierre Molondo, the bishop of Bunia, a Hema accused
of having taken part in the ethnic conflict, who was in turn replaced by a Nande.
736 From 2002, the FAC set up an integrated operational headquarters (EMOI) in Nyaleke with the APC
from Nyamwisi.
737 The FNI united the Lendu militias from the Djugu region.
738 The FRPI brought together the Ngiti militias from the Irumu region. The Ngiti are related to the Lendu
but nonetheless distinct from them.
739 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, May 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC.
740 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009.
Annex 25
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223
• In early June 2002, elements of the UPDF and Hema militiamen indiscriminately
killed members of the Lendu militias and an unknown number of civilians in the
Lendu villages in the Walendu Pitsi community. By way of example, in June
2002, Hema militiamen and elements of the UPDF killed at least 27 people in
Buba.741
410. In June 2002, faced with the advance of Lendu militiamen into the Banyali-Kilo
community in the Djugu region, the local Security Council for the town of Mongwalu
decided to chase away or eliminate any Lendu living in the town. In this context, the
Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
• On 10 June 2002, elements of the UPC supported by local youths, systematically
attacked the houses of Lendu living in Mongwalu, killing around 20 civilians. The
victims, who were long-term residents of Mongwalu, were either shot dead or
killed with studded batons.742
• On 11 June 2002, in retaliation for a massacre carried out the day before, several
hundred Lendu from the villages of Kobu, Bambou and Kpandroma killed tens of
civilians with edged weapons, most of them from the Hema ethnic group, in the
town of Mongwalu. The Hema left Mongwalu following the massacre.743
411. In early August 2002, elements of the UPC, with support from UPDF troops, are
reported to have chased elements of the APC out of the town of Bunia. In this context,
the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
• Between 7 and 10 August 2002, in Bunia, at least 300 civilians were killed on the
basis of their ethnic origin, most of them by UPC militiamen. Between 7 and 8
August, elements of the UPC killed an unknown number of Bira, Lendu and
Nande civilians during raids on the neighbourhoods of Mudzipela, Bigo and Saio.
Lendu and Ngiti militiamen responded by killing an unknown number of Hema
civilians in the districts of Mudzipela, Saio, Rwambuzi and Simbiliabo. At the
same time, Lendu and Ngiti militiamen killed 32 Hema civilians and wounded
and mutilated an unknown number of them at a farm in the village of Lengabo, a
few kilometres from Bunia. Between 9 and 11 August, elements of the UPDF and
the UPC killed at least 80 Lendu, Nande and Bira civilians at the Governor’s
_______________
741 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; Documents submitted to the Mapping Team, Ituri,
March 2009.
742 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April and May 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern DRC,
July 2003.
743 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April and May 2009; Document submitted to the Mapping
Team, “Rapport d’enquête-massacre à Mongwalu”, undated; Special report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern DRC,
July 2003.
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
224
residence, at the hospital in Bigo and at Bunia central prison. The bodies of the
victims were then placed in mass graves.744
412. Over the course of the following months, violent fighting broke out on several
fronts, between elements of the UPC and UPDF on the one hand, and those of the APC
and FNI-FRPI on the other. Both coalitions targeted civilian populations on the basis of
their ethnic origins. Numerous civilians from non-belligerent tribes were also massacred
on the basis of their actual or supposed support for one or other camp. Many of them
were also victims of forced recruitment to the various armed groups. The mining regions
north of Bunia, control of which was seen as strategic by the various groups involved,
were the theatre for some particularly violent fighting.
413. On 9 August 2002, having had to leave Bunia quickly, Governor Lopondo, the
APC troops and Lendu and Ngiti militiamen745 established a base in Komanda for the
purpose of preparing the counter-offensive. The UPC, meanwhile, consolidated its
positions south of Bunia in order to prevent the counter-attack from elements of the APC
and FNI-FRPI and to gain control of the area’s mining resources. In this context, the
Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
• On 9 August 2002, elements of the APC and Lendu and Ngiti militiamen killed
tens of civilians, mostly Hema, in the town of Komanda and the surrounding
villages in the Basili-Basumu community, in the Irumu region. Guided by the
Ngiti militiamen who had infiltrated the village and by local youths, elements of
the APC and members of the militias moved from house to house, killing Hema
civilians purely on the basis of their ethnic origin. Most of the victims were killed
with edged weapons. Some were tied up and then killed with spears.746
• From 14 to 19 August 2002, elements of the UPC killed over 50 civilians from
different ethnic groups during an attack on the village of Komanda. Most of the
victims were shot or killed with edged weapons when they fled Komanda for
Beni. Many of the victims had left Bunia a few days previously following the
takeover of the town by the UPC and had taken refuge in Komanda. The aim of
the UPC attack was to avenge the massacre committed in Komanda on 9
August.747
_______________
744 Interview with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern DRC, July 2003.
745 The latter did not come from Bunia but had been recruited on the way, during their flight to Beni, in the
village of Medu, halfway between Bunia and Komanda.
746 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January 2009 and Ituri, April 2009; Document
submitted to the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern DRC, July 2003.
747 Ibid.
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
225
• On 28 August 2002, Hema-Gegere militiamen associated with the UPC killed
several tens of “non-native” inhabitants748 in the gold-producing town of
Mabanga in the Mambisa community, in the Djugu region. The victims were
killed either with machetes or with studded batons. Sixteen of them were clubbed
to death with planks of wood. The Hema-Gegere militiamen associated the “nonnatives”
with Governor Lopondo and APC soldiers. Whilst the Lendu militiamen
were trying to take control of the region’s mines, the Hema-Gegere militiamen
feared that the “non-natives” were helping them. During previous fighting in
Mabanga, the Lendu militiamen had systematically killed Hema civilians but had
spared the “non-native” populations. After the massacre, UPDF troops intervened
to provide cover for the flight of the non-natives to Bunia.749
• On 31 August 2002, elements of the UPC supported by Bira militiamen killed at
least 14 civilians, including women and children, in several villages in Songolo in
the Walendu Bindi community, in the Irumu region. They also carried out acts of
pillaging and widespread destruction, setting fire to over 1,000 houses. Several
victims were mutilated and killed in an extremely cruel fashion. At least three
women were impaled. Songolo was considered to be one of the FRPI fiefdoms.750
• Between 5 and 15 September 2002, elements of the FRPI and APC systematically
massacred over 1,000 Hema-Gegere and Bira civilians, including large numbers
of children, in Nyakunde and the surrounding villages in the Andisoma
community, in the Irumu region. They also carried out numerous acts of pillaging.
The victims were killed purely on the basis of their ethnic origin, mostly using
arrows or edged weapons. Elements of the APC and FRPI had set up road blocks
so that no-one from the Hema or Bira ethnic groups was able to escape from
Nyakunde. FRPI militiamen sorted civilians and the soldiers there who were no
longer able to fight based on their ethnic origin in the Evangelical Medical Centre.
They systematically killed Hema and Bira and spared the members of other ethnic
groups. Numerous victims were detained in cruel, inhuman or degrading
conditions for several days before they were finally executed. Most of the
massacres took place once the fighting with the UPC militiamen present in
Nyakunde had been over for several days.751
_______________
748 The term “non-natives” here refers to inhabitants of Ituri who originated from other parts of the
DRC. The term used locally is “Jajambo”.
749 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern DRC,
July 2003.
750 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March and April 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern DRC,
July 2003.
751 Interview with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern DRC, July 2003; AI,
“DRC: On the precipice: the deepening human rights and humanitarian crisis in Ituri”, 2003.
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
226
• On 13 September 2002, elements of the FRPI from Gety killed around 150
people, including numerous civilians, most of them Hema, in the lakeside
groupement of Bandikado in the Bahema–Sud community, in the Irumu region.
They killed and mutilated an unknown number of people in Nyamavi, for
example. They also looted the villages before leaving the groupement. These
attacks also caused several thousand people to be displaced for several years.752
• On 11 October 2002, in the Djugu region, elements of the FNI from the Walendu
Djatsi community killed an unknown number of Alur, Hema, Bira and Nyali
civilians in the mining town of Nizi in the Mambisa community. They also killed
28 people and kidnapped 23 women in the mining area of Kilomoto. During these
attacks, the militiamen mutilated numerous victims, carried out large-scale
pillaging and set fire to numerous buildings, including the community offices,
schools and a hospital. The victims’ bodies were buried in nine mass graves.
According to witnesses, the FNI militiamen accused inhabitants of the town from
all ethnic groups of supporting the UPC.753
414. Between October and December 2002, confrontations between elements of the
FNI-FPRI and UPC had spread throughout the Irumu region. The UPC troops led major
military operations in the same region directed at the FRPI bases in the Walendu Bindi
community and Lendu enclaves in the Bahema-Sud community. The Bira farmers living
in Pinga, in Songo in the Irumu region were also attacked, with the UPC suspecting them
of funding the FNI and FRPI. In this context, the Mapping Team documented the
following alleged incidents.
• Between 15 and 16 October 2002, UPC militiamen killed at least 180 people,
including civilians, in Zumbe in the Walendu Tatsi community. The militiamen
also raped at least 50 women. Most of the victims were killed with machetes or
spears. Some were shot dead. Some survived but were badly mutilated. Having
looted large amounts of property and stolen 1,500 head of cattle, the UPC troops
set fire to the village, destroying more than 500 buildings, including health centres
and schools. Zumbe was an FRPI fiefdom.754
• On 20 October 2002, elements of the UPC from Bunia and Bogoro killed at least
10 Lendu civilians during attacks on several villages, including Nombe, Medhu,
Pinga, Kagaba, Singo and Songolo in the Walendu Bindi community, in the
Irumu region. A Bira woman married to a Lendu civilian was also killed. The
_______________
752 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; Document submitted to the Mapping Team:
Report on the violation of human rights committed during the organised attacks on the Bahema-Sud
community from 2001 to 2003, undated.
753 Interview with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern DRC, July 2003.
754 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC.
Annex 25
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228
• Between 12 and 29 October 2002, elements of the ALC and RCD-N taking part in
the “Clean the blackbaord” operation allegedly killed at least 173 Nande and
Pygmy civilians in Mambasa and in the villages along the main road between
Mambasa and Beni, particularly in Teturi, Mwemba and Byakato, in the Mambasa
region. The soldiers also carried out acts of cannibalism, mutilated an unknown
number of civilians, raped a large number of women and children and committed
widespread pillaging. The victims were killed purely on the basis of their ethnic
origin, with Nande and Pygmies accused of supporting the RCD-ML.758
417. Following their victory over the APC in Mambasa, elements of the ALC/RCDN/
UPC, with the help of UPDF soldiers, launched a major military operation in order to
take control of the mining town of Mongwalu.
• On 20 November 2002, during their attack on Mongwalu, elements of the
ALC/RCD-N/UPC are alleged to have killed at least 50 Lendu, including civilians
and Lendu militiamen who were no longer able to fight. Most of the victims were
shot dead or killed with edged weapons. Some were killed whilst they were hiding
in a church. Some survived but were badly mutilated and tortured.759
418. On 30 November 2002, APC, FNI and FRPI troops regained control of the towns
of Irumu and Komanda. Following the scandal caused by the publicity organised about
acts of cannibalism committed by troops taking part in the “Clean the blackboard”
operation, the international community put pressure on the leaders of the MLC, the RCDML
and the RCD-N to sign a ceasefire agreement in Gbadolite on 30 December 2002.760
The UPC, however, which in December 2002 had successfully taken control of the
strategic town of Mwanga and blocked access north of Bunia for the FNI militiamen
based in the Kilomoto region, rejected the agreement. Faced with the closer relationship
between the Government in Kinshasa and Uganda and the ALC’s withdrawal from Ituri,
the UPC entered into an alliance with Rwanda, which brought weapons and military
advisers into the area immediately. In response to the arrival of Rwandan soldiers into the
area, Uganda ended its collaboration with the UPC and offered its support to the Lendu
militia and the APC. During the first half of 2003, fighting between the UPC and
elements of the FNI, FRPI, APC and UPDF intensified and spread throughout the district.
_______________
758 Minority Rights Group International, Erasing the Board. Report of the international research mission
into crimes under international law committed against the Bambuti Pygmies in the eastern DRC, 2004;
Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573), MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically
Targeted Violence in Northern DRC, July 2003.
759 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April and May 2009, Special report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood, July 2003.
760 Following the “Erasing the board” operation, the Kabila Government wrote to the President of the
Security Council to ask him to set up an International Criminal Court for the DRC. The proposal was
supported by Jean-Pierre Bemba, who asked in return that the court should be competent to judge all the
crimes committed in the country since 1996.
Annex 25
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229
419. On 23 January 2003, the UPC officially asked the UPDF troops to evacuate Ituri.
In February, the Peacekeeping Commission in Ituri began its work but the UPC rejected
the creation of the interim institutions provided for in the agreement of September 2002.
The hardening of the UPC’s positions and the open conflict with the UPDF caused
several internal splits. The Hema-Sud militiamen led by Chief Kawa Mandro left the
UPC to create a new armed group, the Parti pour l’unité et la sauvegarde de l’intégrité du
Congo (PUSIC), with the support of Uganda. In the Mahagi and Aru regions, Jérôme
Kakwavu also left the UPC and created the Forces armées du peuple congolais (FAPC)
with the support of Ugandan soldiers who wanted an ally in areas with substantial forest
resources.
• On 2 January 2003, elements of the FAPC from Mahagi allegedly killed around
ten Alur civilians in the village of Djalusene, in the Djukoth community, in the
Mahagi region. They also raped several women and set fire to numerous
houses.761
420. Between January and March 2003, the UPC carried out several military offensives
in order to take control of the mining areas around Mongwalu and Kobu.762 In this
context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
• On 13 January 2003, elements of the UPC from Mongwalu killed at least ten Alur
civilians in Nyangaraye. The victims were killed with machetes, most of them in
the Catholic church where they had been assembled. The bodies were then burned
when the church was set on fire.763
• Between 18 and 20 February 2003, elements of the UPC from Mwanga and
Kunda raped and killed an unknown number of civilians during attacks on the
villages of Ngongo Kobu, Lipri, Nyangaraye and Bambou. During the attacks, the
militiamen also destroyed infrastructure owned by the Kilomoto mining company,
including schools and hospitals.764
• On 24 February 2003, elements of the FNI and FRPI, under the command of
Mathieu Ngudjolo and Germain Katanga respectively, indiscriminately killed
between 200 and 350 people, including a majority of Hema civilians, in the
village of Bogoro in the Bahema-Sud community. They also raped numerous
women and girls and reduced some of them to sexual slavery. They also took part
in widespread pillaging of the village and destroyed numerous homes. Elements
of the FNI and FRPI included numerous children under the age of 15 amongst
_______________
761 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009.
762 Interviews with the Mapping Team; Ituri, April 2009; Confidential documents submitted to the Mapping
Team, April 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573), MONUC.
763 Ibid.
764 Ibid.
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
230
their combatants. Ngudjolo and Katanga are currently being tried in the
International Criminal Court for the crimes committed during this attack.765
• On 25 February 2003, elements of the UPC took hostage, tied up and killed
around 50 Lendu delegates in the village of Sangi in the Walendu Djatsi
community, who had come to negotiate with UPC officers. Four days previously,
having carried out an attack on the village of Buli and suffered significant losses,
UPC officers had invited senior Lendu figures in the area to take part in peace
talks in the village of Sangi. The victims, who included numerous women, were
killed with machetes, knives and batons. Some were tied up and then killed in the
village church. Others were taken to Kobu and killed there. Only two people
survived the massacre. The victims’ bodies were buried in several mass graves.766
• For several days, starting on 25 February 2003, elements of the UPC raped and
killed an unknown number of people in the villages of Jitchu, Buli, Ngabuli, Pili,
Athe, Bakpa, Lambi and Widde in the Walendu Djatsi community. On 25
February, for example, heavy weapons fire directed at the village of Buli caused
numerous civilian casualties. The militiamen also arrested tens of civilians,
including numerous women and children who were hiding in the Jitchu forest in
the area around Buli. Having brought them back to the village of Kobu and held
them there, they executed them with edged weapons. The 40 or so bodies found in
Kobu were then buried in the village by the local people.767
• On 4 March 2003, FNI militiamen from Zumbe and elements of the APC killed at
least 47 civilians during an attack on the village of Mandro. The place was a
former UPC training centre which had been a bastion of the PUSIC since
February 2003. The victims, most of them Hema-Sud, were indiscriminately
killed with edged weapons, or shot. Elements of the FNI also kidnapped an
unknown number of women, who were reduced to slavery. Before leaving
Mandro, the FNI troops systematically pillaged and stole civilian property, in
particular bringing several thousand head of cattle back to Zumbe.768
421. On 6 March 2003, after the UPC had attacked the UPDF base in Ndele, a few
kilometres from Bunia, UPDF soldiers and elements of the FNI and FRPI set up a joint
military operation and regained control of the town of Bunia.
_______________
765 Document submitted to the Mapping Team: Report on the violation of human rights committed during
the attacks organised against the Bahema-Sud community from 2001 to 2003, March 2009; Special report
on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573), MONUC; Second special report of the Secretary-General on MONUC
(S/2003/566); Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC, 2 July 2007, Arrest warrant for Germain Katanga, ICC-
01/04-01/07, Pre-Trial chamber I of the ICC, Amended Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to
Article 61(3)(a) of the Statute, 26 June 2008.
766 Ibid.
767 Ibid.
768 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009, Special report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC.
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
231
• On 6 March 2003, elements of the UPC and UPDF/FNI/FRPI fought each other
with heavy weapons in Bunia, reportedly killing between 17 and 52 civilians.
After the withdrawal of UPC troops from the town, elements of the FNI killed an
unknown number of Hema civilians on the basis of their ethnic origins. Elements
of the UPDF/FNI/FRPI also looted and destroyed numerous buildings, private
homes and premises used by local and international NGOs. UPDF soldiers
sometimes intervened to ask elements of the FNI/FRPI to stop the atrocities and
leave the town.769
422. After taking control of Bunia, elements of the FNI launched a major offensive
against the UPC bastions located north of the town. In this context, the Mapping Team
documented the following alleged incidents.
• Between 9 and 13 March 2003, elements of the FNI killed at least 113 civilians in
the villages of the Kilo-Banyari community, in the Djugu region, and in the
villages in the Sindoni-Akeso groupement and along the road to Mongwalu,
including Itende, Kabakaba and Kilo-Missio. The victims were of various ethnic
origins but included a large number of Nyali. During the attacks, FNI militiamen
mutilated civilians, pillaged property and set fire to villages. On 10 March, for
example, elements of the FNI opened fire on the population of Kilo,
indiscriminately killing 20 civilians. The UPDF soldiers there tried, without any
great success, to stop the FNI atrocities directed at civilians.770
• On 3 April 2003, elements of the FNI killed and mutilated several hundred
people, including a majority of Hema civilians, in the Largude groupement in the
Bahema-Nord community. Some victims, including children, were killed by
heavy weapons fire, others by being shot or with edged weapons. The militiamen
also attacked the hospital in Drodro, where they killed at least 27 people.
Numerous women were kidnapped by the militiamen and reduced to sexual
slavery. At the end of the hostilities some of the women were released, but others
are still recorded as having disappeared.771
• On 13 May 2003 in Mongwalu, elements of the FNI killed two MONUC military
observers. The militiamen mutilated the victims’ bodies and stole both their
personal property and MONUC property. The militiamen suspected the observers
of supporting the UPC troops who were threatening to attack Mongwalu.
Hundreds of civilians from various ethnic groups had taken refuge in the house
where the military observers were living. Both victims were arrested on the road
_______________
769 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March and April 2009, Special report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; AI, DRC-Ituri - a need for protection, a thirst for justice, 2003.
770 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009, HRW, Le fléau de l’or, June 2005.
771 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC.
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
232
to the airport and then publicly executed. On 19 February 2007, the military
tribunal at the Bunia garrison sentenced seven FNI militiamen who were involved
in the murders to life imprisonment for war crimes.772
423. After the departure of the UPDF troops from the Ituri district, under considerable
international pressure, in early May 2003, the UPC and FNI troops fought to take control
of the strategic locations left vacant by the Ugandan soldiers. Anticipating new
massacres, thousands of Bunia’s inhabitants opted to leave the town. Some followed the
UPDF troops to Uganda. Others fled to Beni, in North Kivu. On 6 May, serious clashes
broke out in Bunia between elements of the FNI under the orders of Mathieu Ngudjolo
and elements of the UPC under the command of Bosco Ntaganda.
• On 6 May 2003, FNI militiamen and, to a lesser extent, members of the UPC
militias allegedly indiscriminately killed several hundred civilians, committed
rape and carried out widespread pillaging in Bunia during fighting for control of
the town. They also mutilated numerous civilians. Elements of the FNI
particularly targeted neighbourhoods inhabited primarily by Hema, such as
Mudzipela and Nyagasenza. They killed religious representatives, set fire to
numerous houses and looted the offices of several international NGOs including
Medair, Agro-Action Allemande (AAA) and COOPI [Cooperazione
Internazionale].773
424. The UPC swiftly led a counter-offensive and finally took control of Bunia.
• Having gained control of the town on 12 March 2003, UPC militiamen are
reported to have killed several hundred civilians, mostly Ngiti Lendu and Jajambo
from other districts, primarily Nande.774
425. In response to this series of massacres and the attacks carried out against
MONUC facilities, the Secretary-General of the United Nations asked Member States on
15 May 2003 to form a coalition in order to end the humanitarian disaster and allow
MONUC to complete its deployment in Bunia.775 On 16 May, Tanzania organised a
summit, during which President Kabila met delegations from the Administration
intérimaire de l’Ituri [Interim Administrative Authority for Ituri] and the leaders of the
main armed groups. In light of the continued fighting, on 30 May the Security Council
_______________
772 Interviews with the Mapping Team, April and May 2009; Judgment of the military court at the Bunia
garrison on 19 February 2007, RP no. 103/2006; HRW, Ituri: Couvert de sang, Violence ciblée sur
certaines ethnies dans le nord-est de la RDC, July 2003.
773 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March and April 2009, Special report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; AI, DRC-Ituri - How many more have to die? 2003; AI, DRC-Ituri - a need for
protection, a thirst for justice, 2003; MSF, “Ituri: promesses non tenues ? Un semblant de protection and
une aide inadéquate“, 25 July 2003.
774 Ibid.
775 Letter sent to the President of the Security Council by the Secretary-General (S/2003/574).
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
233
adopted Resolution 1484 (2003), authorising the deployment to Bunia of an interim
emergency multinational force under European command.
426. On 31 May 2003, the FNI and Lendu from Datule launched a major offensive
against the village of Tchomia, which at the time was under the control of PUSIC troops.
The attack was intended as revenge for the attack carried out by the PUSIC on Datule on
26 January 2002. In just a few hours, elements of the FNI chased out the PUSIC troops
and destroyed their military camps.
• On 31 May 2003, elements of the FNI, often accompanied by members of their
families, including women and children, are alleged to have killed almost 300
people in the village of Tchomia in the Bahema-Sud community, systematically
massacring the Hema-Sud victims on the basis of their ethnic origin. The
militiamen moved from house to house, killing civilians. They reportedly also
killed 40 people at the hospital in Tchomia. During the killings, elements of the
FNI had blocked all access roads into Tchomia in order to prevent anyone
escaping from the village. The militiamen and their families embarked on
widespread pillaging of the area. Before they left, they set fire to schools,
churches and the hospital. They also kidnapped ten women, whom they used to
carry the property they had pillaged and as sex slaves.776
427. The interim emergency multinational force began its deployment in Bunia on 6
June 2003. After a few weeks, it managed to restore order in the town and put an end to
ethnic killing. Outside Bunia, however, the acts of violence continued. Elements of the
FNI, FRPI and FAPC launched a series of attacks against UPC and PUSIC positions in
the Djugu and Irumu regions. These violent clashes resulted in numerous massacres of
civilians, most of them from the Hema ethnic group. In this context, the Mapping Team
documented the following alleged incidents.
• On 7 and 20 June 2003, elements of the FNI killed an unknown number of Hema
civilians, estimated at 137 according to some sources, in the village of Katoto in
the Bahema–Nord community, in the Djugu region. The victims were shot dead or
killed with edged weapons. The bodies were buried in approximately 30 mass
graves. The militiamen also mutilated several people, pillaged the village and set
fire to houses. Katoto was chosen as a target because of the presence of UPC and
PUSIC positions in the village.777
• In June 2003, elements of the FPAC and FNI killed 33 civilians in the mining
town of Nizi in the Mambisa community, in the Djugu region. The attack was
_______________
776Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC; AI, DRC-Ituri - How many more have to die, 2003.
777 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern DRC,
July 2003; documents submitted to the Mapping Team, April 2009.
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
234
intended to destroy the UPC camp and chase away the Hema who controlled the
Kilomoto mining company.778
• On 11 June 2003, elements of the FNI, FRPI and APC killed an unknown number
of civilians, estimated at over 160 according to some sources, in the Bagungu and
Beiziha groupements, close to Kasenyi, in the Irumu region. The victims, mostly
Hema displaced by the war, were either shot dead or killed with edged weapons.
Around 30 victims were killed when they were trying to flee by boat across Lake
Albert. The militiamen also kidnapped over 20 people, including women, and
executed any who did not have the strength to carry the property that had been
pillaged. They also set fire to over 200 homes.779
• On 10 June 2003, FNI militiamen from Djugu slaughtered around 40 civilians,
mostly Alur, in Nioka in the Mahagi region. Until then the area had been occupied
by UPC militiamen. Most of the victims, who included several children, were
either shot dead or killed with edged weapons. Elements of the FNI had criticised
the inhabitants of Nioka for having given shelter to Hema who had been displaced
by the war.780
428. Following the withdrawal of the UPDF soldiers from the mining region of
Mongwalu, in March 2003, FNI troops took control of the area. On 10 June, UPC troops
regained control of the town of Mongwalu but, after 48 hours, FNI troops launched a
counter-attack with the support of elements of the UPDF.
• On 11 June 2003, FNI militiamen allegedly killed several hundred people,
including numerous civilians, in Mongwalu. They also raped tens of women and
carried out acts of systematic pillaging in the town and its surrounding area.
Following the attack, hundreds of bodies were found in the area and burned on the
orders of FNI militiamen.781
429. During the period under consideration, all the armed groups in Ituri (UPC, FNI,
FRPI, FAPC and PUSIC) are alleged to have recruited thousands of children along ethnic
lines.
• Between 2001 and 2003, thousands of Hema children recruited by the UPC had
undergone military training in the Mandro, Katoto and Bule camps. During the
_______________
778 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern DRC, July 2003.
779 Interviews with the Mapping Team, April 2009; Documents submitted to the Mapping Team, April
2009; Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573), MONUC.
780 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; Justice Plus, “Massacre des civils à Nyoka (Mahagi)”, press release, 23 June 2003.
781 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April and May 2009, Special report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern DRC,
July 2003.
Annex 25
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235
training, they were often tortured, subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading acts
and raped. In 2000, at least 163 of these children were sent to Uganda to undergo
military training at a UPDF camp in Kyankwanzi before finally being repatriated
to Ituri by UNICEF in February 2001. Between 2002 and 2003, some children
associated with the UPC were kidnapped and taken to Rwanda to undergo
military training in the APR camps. An unknown number of Lendu children were
taken to military training camps in North Kivu. Other communities were affected
by the same phenomenon, primarily the Alur, largely in the Mahagi region.782
C. Katanga
430. Throughout 2000, the Mayi-Mayi led by Chief Makabe based in Musao, in the
Badia area, fought alongside the FAC and ZDF in order to prevent the ANC/APR from
taking control of the Malemba Nkulu region. As the front stabilised and the number of
atrocities by the FAC directed at the civilian population increased, however, the
relationship between the FAC and the Mayi-Mayi deteriorated significantly. In January
2001, the accidental killing of two Mayi-Mayi in the Makabe group by FAC soldiers
during a joint operation degenerated into open conflict.
• In January and March 2001, elements of the FAC reportedly set fire to around 20
villages in the areas of Badia (Ayamba, Lufuy, Kikose, Lubinda, Kyungu,
Kimbalama, Kalembe, Kishiko, Katota, Lwamba Numbi, Lwamba Kamalenge,
Kakongolo, Kajima, Kalwenye, Munengwelela and Musao) and Mwanza Seya
(Nshimbi, Kimiba, Lubembey, Bunda and Mputu 1) in the Malemba Nkulu
region. These attacks are said to have resulted in over ten civilian deaths and
caused thousands of others to be displaced. The soldiers had accused the
inhabitants of the villages of supporting the Mayi-Mayi.783
431. In 2001, following the introduction of the ceasefire between the principal
belligerents and the cessation of most military operations in Katanga, the Government in
Kinshasa dissolved the FAP but did not implement an appropriate demobilisation and
reintegration plan. Feeling they had been abandoned by those in power, the Mayi-Mayi
led by Chief Makabe and his lieutenant Kabale became more and more aggressive
_______________
782 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April and May 2009; Confidential documents submitted to the
Mapping Team, May 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573), MONUC; Reports of the
Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (S/2002/1299, A/58/546-S/2003/1053 and Corr. 1 and 2
and A/59/695-S/2005/72); BBC News, “UN finds Congo child soldiers”, 21 February 2001; BBC News,
“DRC awash with child soldiers”, 17 February 2003.
783Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, December 2008; Confidential document of the working
group on international crimes committed in the DRC submitted to the Mapping Team; CVDHO
[Commission de vulgarisation des droits de l’homme and de développement], “Alerte sur la situation
d’insécurité générale et de violation massive des droits de l’homme and du droit humanitaire dans le
territoire de Malemba Nkulu, fevrier-mars 2001”, April 2001; ASADHO, CDH [Centre démocrate
humaniste], CVDHO, “Nord- Katanga: attaques délibérées contre la population civile”, October 2003, p.
23; Kalenge Yamukena Yantumbi, Le Nord-Katanga à feu and à sang, Kyamy Network Editions,
Lubumbashi, 2004, p. 113 to 116.
Annex 25
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243
2. Beni and Lubero regions (Grand-Nord)
442. In the Beni and Lubero regions controlled by the RCD-ML, fighting continued
between the troops from the APC (the armed wing of the RCD-ML) and the UPDF on the
one hand and the various Mayi-Mayi groups on the other.
• In 2001, elements of the APC allegedly killed at least five civilians and set fire to
houses in the village of Kiantsaba, 15 kilometres from Beni. APC soldiers and the
Vurondo Mayi-Mayi had long been in dispute over control of the village.808
443. From 2001, Mayi-Mayi groups and UPDF soldiers, sometimes supported by
elements of the APC, engaged in fierce fighting to gain control of the village of Irango,
around 20 kilometres from Beni.
• In 2001, elements of the UPDF allegedly killed an unknown number of people in
the village of Irango. The victims had been accused of supporting the Mayi-Mayi.
The soldiers also raped numerous girls. During the attack, they set fire to and
looted several houses.809
444. In the town of Beni, UPDF soldiers instituted a reign of terror for several years
with complete impunity. They summarily executed civilians, tortured and arbitrarily
detained an unknown number of people, several of them in muddy holes two or three
metres deep.
• Throughout 2001, elements of the FDLR are alleged to have terrorised and killed
tens of civilians in the region north of Kanyabayonga. Civilian killings were
reported, particularly in the villages of Kayna, Mayene, Nyamindo, Kisandja and
Kiteka.810
E. South Kivu
445. During the period under consideration, the RCD-Goma tried to secure a popular
base in South Kivu and increase the isolation of the FDLR by organising an inter-Kivu
dialogue in September 2001 and offering local Mayi-Mayi groups the opportunity to sign
a separate peace agreement. With the exception of the Mudundu 40 group, Mayi-Mayi
groups in the province, although encouraged by the Government in Kinshasa, refused to
negotiate with the RCD-Goma. The inter-Kivu dialogue was boycotted by most local
civil society organisations.
_______________
808 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009.
809 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009.
810 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February and April 2009.
Annex 25
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SECTION II. INVENTORY OF SPECIFIC ACTS OF VIOLENCE COMMITTED
DURING THE CONFLICTS IN THE DRC
525. The aim of this section of the report is to produce an inventory of the specific acts
of violence that were committed during the conflicts in the DRC, namely acts of violence
committed against women (Chap. I), acts of violence committed against children (Chap.
II) and acts of violence related to the illegal exploitation of natural resources (Chap. III).
Given that the methodology used in Section I of the report would not enable full justice to
be done to the numerous victims of these specific acts of violence, and would not
appropriately reflect the scale of the violence practised by all armed groups involved in
the different conflicts in the DRC, it was decided from the outset to devote an entire
section of the report to these issues and to spend time seeking out information and
documents that would support the multiple aspects of these acts of violence rather than
confirming individual acts perpetrated against countless victims. This approach has
highlighted the widespread and systematic nature of these violations and enabled a brief
analysis to be produced.
526. It is important to stress that women and children were the main victims of the
most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed
primarily against the civilian population of the DRC between 1993 and 2003 and listed in
Section I of this report. Women and children were therefore the main victims of
violations of the right to life, to physical integrity and to safety. They were also
particularly affected by forced deportations, slavery, looting and the destruction of goods
and property. This over-exposure can be explained by their specific vulnerability and also
by their demographic weight within the DRC’s population.958
527. Finally, it would have been unthinkable to produce an inventory of the most
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within
the DRC between March 1993 and June 2003 without considering, however briefly, the
role played by natural resource exploitation in the perpetration of these crimes. In a
significant number of cases, the struggle between different armed groups for access to,
and control over, the DRC’s resources served as a backdrop to the violations perpetrated
against the civilian population.
528. The first two chapters will therefore analyse the fate of women and children in the
DRC between 1993 and 2003 and focus particularly on the specific acts of violence to
which they were subjected. The third chapter will be devoted to the link between the
perpetration of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and natural
resource exploitation in the DRC.
_______________
958 According to the National Institute of Statistics (INS) of the DRC’s Ministry of Planning (figures from
December 2006), young people under the age of 18 account for 48.5% and women 51% of the population.
Annex 25
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339
Forces armées congolaises (FAC)
693. Not only did the Government apparently incorporate most of the Kadogo who had
fought in the AFDL/APR into the new government army but also, with the start of the
second war, began to actively recruit children once more. An official announcement
broadcast on the national radio on 7 August 1998 invited children and youths between the
ages of 12 and 20 to enlist in the armed forces following the commencement of the
second war. In addition to Kinshasa, recruitments took place at the Mbuji-Mayi airport in
Kasai Occidental and in Katanga.1267 Despite a presidential decree of June 2000 on the
demobilisation of children and announcements made by Joseph Kabila in June 2001,
child recruitment continued unabated. By 2003, the UN estimated that 10% of the FAC
was made up of CAAFAG and the Minister of Human Rights admitted that there were
3,000 CAAFAG waiting to be demobilised within the FAC.1268
Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie and local defence forces linked to the
RCD
694. The army of the RCD (and later that of the RCD-G), the ANC, with the support of
the APR, were among those groups with the most CAAFAG in their ranks. The ANC
used a wide range of methods to recruit children, some focusing on voluntary recruitment
and others on forced. Numerous children were abducted both day and night, from their
homes, from schools or at the market.1269
695. After the second war broke out in August 1998, ANC/APR soldiers reportedly
recruited large numbers of children into their ranks in South Kivu, along with a hundred
or so minors who had previously been demobilised by UNICEF. To begin with, child
recruitment into the ANC took place on a voluntary basis in the context of an awareness
raising campaign aimed at parents. When this failed, the ANC soldiers proceeded to
conduct systematic forced recruitments. Many children were abducted as they left their
schools or while at the market. The recruits were forced to undergo military training in
the DRC or Rwanda, under the command of APR soldiers. In 2002, there were still more
than a thousand children in the ranks of the ANC/APR. Despite official denials, the
forced recruitment of children continued until at least June 2003.1270
696. In addition to its main forces, the RCD-Goma had a paramilitary force under its
control known as the Forces de défense locale (FDL), which claimed to have 10,000
members, and which operated along the same lines as forces that had existed in Rwanda
_______________
1267 HRW, Casualties of War, February 1999.
1268 AI, Children at War, 2003.
1269 Additional report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for children and armed
conflict (E/CN.4/2000/71); Fifth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2000/1156); HRW,
“Reluctant recruits: children and adults forcibly recruited for military service in North Kivu”, May 2001.
1270 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February, March 2009; HRW, Casualties of War, 1999;
Child Soldiers, CRC Country Briefs, 2004; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers
Global Report 2001 – DRC, 2001.
Annex 25
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715. It must be noted that these principles were not respected by the Congolese
military courts, which have sole competence to hear crimes under international law.1300 In
fact, a number of CAAFAG were detained,1301 prosecuted and sometimes sentenced to
death by the Military Order Court (Cours d’ordre militaire),1302 which has been criticised
for its injustices, in violation of all principles of international law with regard to fair trials
for children under the age of 18, in particular the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Seven children were tried separately in Kinshasa, Mbandaka and Matadi between 1999
and 2002 and sentenced to death. They were convicted of "conspiracy", "first-degree
murder", "squandering of weapons" and "murder in times of war". In six of these cases,
the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by presidential decree but one child was
executed in Kinshasa on 15 January 2002, only 30 minutes after his sentence had been
passed.1303
5. Demobilisation and reintegration
716. The first demobilisation efforts date back to 1998, and all peace accords and
ceasefire agreements since the 1999 Lusaka Accord have constantly highlighted the
obligation on armed groups to demobilise CAAFAG and bring their recruitment and use
to an end.
717. In the face of national and international pressure to end the recruitment and use of
CAAFAG, most of the armed groups’ leaders have stated their opposition to this practice
and given commitments to bring child recruitment to an end. Yet the demobilisation of
CAAFAG has often been more a symbolic, public relations-oriented exercise than a
sincere commitment. A large proportion of demobilised CAAFAG were, in fact, later rerecruited.
1304
718. In 2000, in his report on children and armed conflict, the Secretary-General
estimated that there were between 10,000 and 20,000 children under 15 years of age in
the various fighting forces in the DRC.1305 That same year, President Kabila signed a
decree banning the recruitment of children under 18 years of age into the armed forces
and the deployment of child soldiers in combat zones. During the same period, the RCD-
_______________
1300 Since the 2002 reform, military courts have not had the authority to hear cases involving children (Art.
114 of the Military Judicial Code). Previously, as soon as they were enrolled in a military school or were
serving under the flag, they could be tried before the military courts (Art. 129 of the Military Justice Code).
1301 Child soldiers arrested in Bas-Congo in 1998 reportedly remained in detention for more than five years
without appearing before a judge. See CODHO, Des arrestations et détentions arbitraires à Kinshasa,
2003.
1302 On 1 May and 20 August 2001 and 22 May 2003, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions, in association with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DRC
sent urgent appeals to the Government of the DRC in relation to the death sentences passed on five minors
by the Military Order Court (E/CN.4/2002/74/Add.2 and E/CN.4/2004/7/Add.1), Tenth report of the
Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2002/169); AI, Children at War, 2003.
1303 MONUC, Child Protection Section, September 2002.
1304 For concrete cases of “false demobilisations” and “re-recruitment”, see AI, Children at War, 2003.
1305 Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/55/163-S/2000/712).
Annex 25
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Goma issued an instruction creating a committee for the demobilisation and reintegration
of child soldiers in the territory under its control.1306 And yet the results were not
forthcoming on either side. In May 2001, the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for children and armed conflict, Mr Olara Otunnu, visited the DRC and met with
President Joseph Kabila, with the leaders of the RCD and with the leaders of the Front
pour la libération du Congo (FLC), led by Jean-Pierre Bemba.1307 Following this visit,
both the Government and the RCD produced action plans for the demobilisation of
CAAFAG. At the start of 2001, the Government agreed to demobilise a total of 4,000
CAAFAG; however, a year later, only around 300 had actually been released.1308 At the
same time, the RCD estimated that there were 2,600 CAAFAG within its forces.1309
Transit and orientation camps were established in Kisangani, Goma and Bukavu. Yet
again, despite these claims, the armed groups continued to enlist children. The
ANC/APR, for example, incorporated CAAFAG who had been serving in the local
defence forces (FDL) into its army.1310 Only around 650 CAAFAG were demobilised by
the RCD-Goma between December 2001 and November 2003.1311
719. Rwandan children were also recruited and used by various groups, above all the
ex-FAR/Interahamwe/ALiR/FDLR, different Mayi-Mayi groups and, in part, the RCD.
Between May 2001 and July 2004, more than 550 of them were demobilised. Many of
them had left Rwanda with their families during or immediately after the 1994 genocide.
They were recruited or abducted from refugee camps or from the villages in which they
were living.1312
720. CAAFAG were also abandoned or released by different armed groups in an adhoc
manner.1313 At the start of 2003, the RCD-ML gave NGOs access to some camps and
dozens of CAAFAG were released and entrusted to a local NGO with a view to
reintegrating them into their communities.1314 This scant progress was continually
thwarted by persistent parallel recruitments, however, including the abduction of girls for
sexual purposes - in particular in Maniema, Katanga, in North and South Kivu and
Ituri1315 - and the continuing and widespread use of CAAFAG.1316 The intensification of
_______________
1306 Fourth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2000/888 and Corr.1).
1307 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for children and armed conflict
(A/56/453).
1308 Tenth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2002/169); Beth Verhey, Going Home.
Demobilising and Reintegrating Child Soldiers in the DRC, Save the Children, 2003, which indicates that
the number of children associated with the government forces in 2001 was 280.
1309 Beth Verhey, Going Home. Demobilising and Reintegrating Child Soldiers in the DRC, Save the
Children, 2003.
1310 Eleventh report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2002/621).
1311 Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/58/546–S/2003/1053 and
Corr.1 and 2).
1312 Save the Children, Crossing the Border, July 2004.
1313 Fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2003/1098).
1314 AI, Children at War, 2003.
1315 Fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2003/1098).
Annex 25
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340
and Uganda for several years. The FDL was made up of numerous CAAFAG who
received only rudimentary military training and who were rarely paid.1271
Mouvement national de libération du Congo (MLC)
697. The MLC’s army, the ALC, with the backing of the Ugandan Army, the UPDF,
allegedly also recruited children, primarily in Mbandaka, Équateur Province. In 2001, the
MLC admitted to having 1,800 CAAFAG within its ranks.1272 The child soldiers were
involved in ALC offensives during which serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law were committed. This was particularly the case in the
attacks carried out within the context of the "Erasing the Board" operation.1273
Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie–Kisangani/Mouvement de libération
(RCD-K/ML)
698. According to MONUC, a considerable number of children were recruited, both
voluntarily and forcibly, by the APC, the military wing of the RCD-K/ML. Abducted
children are reported to have sometimes been taken to Uganda to undergo military
training.1274
Mayi-Mayi Groups
699. In 2002, a number of organisations estimated that one-half of all Mayi-Mayi forces
were children, including some scarcely eight years of age.1275 The different Mayi-Mayi
groups did allegedly abduct and recruit children, particularly in North and South Kivu, in
Ituri, Maniema and Katanga.1276 Between 2001 and 2003, groups operating in Malemba
Nkulu territory, Katanga, abducted and recruited several dozen CAAFAG. Most of these
were used to carry looted goods and munitions, to do the cooking and to act as sex slaves.
Some of them received guns and served as guards while others participated in the
hostilities against the ANC/APR and then later against the FAC.1277 Other Mayi-Mayi
_______________
1271 AI, Children at War, 2003.
1272 Ibid.
1273 Minority Rights Group International, Erasing the Board: Report of the international research mission
into crimes under international law committed against the Bambuti Pygmies in the eastern DRC, 2004.
1274 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January–February 2000. At the end of 2000,
some 165 Congolese children were abducted from Bunia, Beni and Butembo and deported to Uganda. Fifth
report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2000/1156); Report of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for children and armed conflict (A/56/453).
1275 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2004 – DRC, 2004; Watch
List, The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children in the DRC, 2003.
1276 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, South Kivu, Katanga, Maniema, 2008 and 2009; AI,
Children at War, 2003.
1277Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, December 2008.
Annex 25
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510
ANNEX II
LIST OF DOCOUMENTS ON THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE
CONGO CONSULTED BY THE MAPPING TEAM
The Mapping Team reviewed numerous reports, from both public and confidential
sources, in relation to the most serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committed within the territory of the DRC between March 1993 and
June 2003. The following is a non-exhaustive list of the public reports consulted by the
mapping team. The titles of the non-public reports are not listed for confidentiality
purposes.
United Nations
Secretary-General
- Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in Zaire
(E/CN.4/1994/49), 23 December 1993
- Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team charged with investigating
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the DRC
(S/1998/581, annex), 22 January 1998
- Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team on the events in Mambasa, 31
December 2002-10 January 2003 (S/2003/674, Annex 1), 2 July 2003
- MONUC Special report on the events in Ituri (January 2002-December 2003)
(S/2004/573) 16 July 2004
Reports of the Secretary-General on MONUC
- Reports of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2000/30), 17 January 2000
- Second report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2000/330 and Corr.1), 18 April
and 23 April 2000
- Third report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2000/566 and Corr.1), 12 and 29
June 2000
- Fourth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2000/888 and Corr.1), 21
September and 4 December 2000
- Fifth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2000/1156), 6 December 2000
- Sixth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2001/128 and Corr.1), 12 and 14
February 2001
- Seventh report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2001/373), 17 April 2001
- Eighth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2001/572), 8 June 2001
- Ninth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2001/970 and Corr.1), 16 and 23
October 2001
- Tenth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2002/169), 21 February 2002
- Eleventh report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2002/621), 5 June 2002
- Twelfth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2002/1180), 18 October 2002
Annex 25
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511
- Thirteenth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2002/1180), 21 February
2003
- Fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2003/1098), 17 November
2003
- Fifteenth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2004/251), 25 March 2004
- Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2004/1034), 31 December
2004
- Seventeenth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2005/167), 15 March 2005
- Eighteenth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2005/506), 2 August 2005
- Nineteenth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2005/603), 26 September
2005
- Twentieth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2005/832), 28 December
2005
- Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2006/390), 13 June 2006
- Twenty-second report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2006/759), 21September
2006
- Twenty-third report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2007/156 and Corr.1), 20
March 2007
- Twenty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2007/671), 14 November
2007
- Twenty-fifth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2008/218), 2 April 2008
- Twenty-sixth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2008/433), 3 July 2008
- Twenty-seventh report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2009/160), 27 March
2009
- Second Special report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2003/566), 27 April
2003
-Third Special report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2004/650), 16 August
2004
- Fourth Special report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2008/728),
21 November 2008
Reports of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict presented to the
Security Council
- Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (S/2000/712), 19 July
2000
- Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (S/2001/852),
7 September 2001
- Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (S/2002/1299),
26 November 2002
- Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (S/2003/1053 and
Corr.1 and 2), 10 November 2003 and 20 February and 17 April 2004
- Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (S/2005/72), 9
February 2005
- Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (S/2006/826),
26 October 2006
Annex 25
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512
- Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (S/2007/757),
21 December 2007
- Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (S/2008/693),
10 November 2008
- Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (S/2009/158 and
Corr.1), 26 March and 13 August 2009
Security Council
- Resolution 1234 (1999) of 9 April 1999
- Resolution 1258 (1999) of 6 August 1999
- Resolution 1273 (1999) of 5 November 1999
- Resolution 1279 (1999) of 30 November 1999
- Resolution 1291 (2000) of 24 February 2000
- Resolution 1304 (2000) of 16 June 2000
- Resolution 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000
- Resolution 1316 (2000) of 23 August 2000
- Resolution 1323 (2000) of 13 October 2000
- Resolution 1332 (2000) of 14 December 2000
- Resolution 1341 (2001) of 22 February 2001
- Resolution 1365 (2001) of 31 July 2001
- Resolution 1376 (2001) of 9 September 2001
- Resolution 1379 (2001) of 20 November 2001
- Resolution 1399 (2002) of 19 March 2002
- Resolution 1417 (2002) of 14 June 2002
- Resolution 1445 (2002) of 4 December 2002
- Resolution 1457 (2003) of 24 January 2003
- Resolution 1468 (2003) of 20 March 2003
- Resolution 1484 (2003) of 30 April 2003
- Resolution 1489 (2003) of 26 June 2003
- Resolution 1493 (2003) of 28 July 2003
- Resolution 1499 (2003) of 13 August 2003
- Resolution 1501 (2003) of 26 August 2003
- Security Council mission visit to the DRC, 4-8 April 2000 (S/2000/416)
- Report of the Security Council mission visit to the Great Lakes regions, 27 April-7 April
2002 (S/2002/537/Add.1)
- Security Council demands that rebel group in DRC bring perpetrators of Kisangani
massacres to justice. In presidential statement, members call for immediate
demilitarization of Kisangani by RCD-Goma (SC/7462), 23 July 2002
- Security Council condemns continuing exploitation of natural resources in the DRC
(SC/7925), 19 November 2003
Annex 25
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513
MONUC’s Office of Human Rights and the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights
- Report on the human rights situation in the DRC presented to the Security Council by
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (S/2003/216), 24 February 2003
- The human rights situation in the DRC, 2007
Special Reports
- The human rights situation in Zaire (E/DEC/1994/270), 25 July 1994
- The human rights situation in Zaire (E/CN.4/RES/1994/87), 9 March 1994
- The human rights situation in Zaire E/CN.4/RES/1995/69), 6 March 1995
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Zaire
(E/CN.4/1995/67 and Corr.1), 19 December 1994 and 17 February 1995
- The human rights situation in Zaire (E/DEC/1995/280), 25 July 1995
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other punishments or cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment (E/CN.4/1996/35), 9 September 1996
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers
(E/CN.4/1996/37), 1st March 1996
- Decisions adopted by the working group on arbitrary detention
(E/CN.4/1996/40/Add.1), 31 October 1995
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Zaire
(E/CN.4/1996/66 and Corr.2 and 3), 29 January and 28 March and 15 April 1996
- The human rights situation in Zaire (E/CN.4/RES/1996/77), 23 April 1996
- The human rights situation in Zaire (E/DEC/1996/282), 24 July 1996
- Report of the joint mission charged with investigating allegations of massacres and
other attacks on human rights that took place in East Zaire from September 1996
(A/51/942), 2 July 1997
- The human rights situation in Zaire (E/CN.4/RES/1997/58), 15 April 1997
- The human rights situation in the DRC (E/DEC/1997/267), 22 July 1997
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Zaire: mission to the
Kivu septentrional (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.1), 16 September 1996
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Zaire: mission to
rebel-occupied zones in Eastern Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2), 2 April 1997
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions:
country situations (E/CN.4/1997/60/Add.1), 23 December 1996
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Zaire
(E/CN.4/1997/6), 28 January 1997
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Zaire (A/52/496), 17
October 1997
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the DRC (A/53/365),
10 September 1998
- The human rights situation in the DRC (A/Res/53/160), 9 December 1998
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of the use of mercenaries
(E/CN.4/1998/31), 27 January 1998
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
514
- Report of the Special Rapporteurs on the allegations of massacres in the DRC
(E/CN.4/1998/64), 23 January 1998
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the DRC
(E/CN.4/1998/65 and Corr.1), 30 January and 30 April 1998
- The human rights situation in the DRC (E/CN.4/RES/1998/61), 21 April 1998
- The human rights situation in the DRC (E/DEC/1998/260), 30 July 1998
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the DRC (A/54/361),
17 September 1999
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the DRC
(E/CN.4/1999/31), 8 February 1999
- The human rights situation in the DRC (E/CN.4/RES/1999/56), 27 April 1999
- The human rights situation in the DRC (A/55/318) – Note by the Secretariat, 23 August
2000
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the DRC (A/55/403),
20 September 2000
- The human rights situation in the DRC (A/Res/55/117), 12 March 2001
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the DRC
(E/CN.4/2000/42), 18 January 2000
- The human rights situation in the DRC – (E/CN.4/2000/43) – Note by the Secretariat,
10 December 1999
- Report of the Working Group on enforced or involuntary disappearances
(E/CN.4/2000/64 and Corr.1 and 2), 21 December 1999 and 11 and 20 April 2000
- The human rights situation in the DRC (E/CN.4/RES/2000/15), 18 April 2000
- The human rights situation in the DRC (E/DEC/2000/248), 28 July 2000
- Report of the mission of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the
DRC, report of the Special Rapporteuse on extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary
executions, and of a member of the Working Group on enforced or involuntary
disappearances (A/56/220) – Note by the Secretary-General, 26 July 2001
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the DRC (A/56/327),
31 August 2001
- Report of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (A/56/36 and Corr.1), 28
September 2001
- The human rights situation in the DRC (A/Res/56/173), 27 February 2002
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the DRC
(E/CN.4/2001/40), 1 February 2001
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the DRC
(E/CN.4/2001/40/Add.1), 27 March 2001
- The human rights situation in the DRC (E/CN.4/RES/2001/19), 20 April 2001
- The human rights situation in the DRC (E/DEC/2001/254), 24 July 2001
- Report of the mission of the Special Rapporteuse on the human rights situation in the
DRC, report of the Special Rapporteuse on extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary
executions, and of a member of the Working Group on enforced or involuntary
disappearances (A/57/349), 23 August 2002
- Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the DRC
(A/57/437), 26 September 2002
Annex 25
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515
- Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights
defenders (E/CN.4/2002/106), 27 February 2002
- The human rights situation in the DRC (E/CN.4/2002/47) – Note by the Secretariat,
16 January 2002
- The human rights situation in the DRC (E/CN.4/2002/48) – Note by the Secretariat,
8 January 2002
- Report of the Special Rapporteuse on violence against women: its causes and
consequences (E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.1), 28 January 2002
- The human rights situation in the DRC (E/CN.4/RES/2002/14), 19 April 2002
- The human rights situation in the DRC (E/DEC/2002/248), 25 July 2002
- Report of the mission of the Special Representative on the human rights situation in the
DRC, of the Special Representative on extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
and of a member of the Working Group on enforced or involuntary disappearances
(A/58/127), 9 July 2003
- Interim report of the Special Rapporteuse on the human rights situation in the DRC
(A/58/534), 24 October 2003
- Report of the Special Rapporteuse on extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions –
mission to the DRC (E/CN.4/2003/3/Add.3), 4 January 2002
- Report of the Special Rapporteuse on the human rights situation in the DRC
(E/CN.4/2003/43), 15 April 2003
- Report of the mission of the Special Rapporteuse on the human rights situation in the
DRC, of the Special Rapporteuse on extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions, and
of a member of the Working Group on enforced or involuntary disappearances
(E/CN.4/2003/44), 31 December 2002
- The human rights situation in the DRC (E/CN.4/RES/2003/15), 17 April 2003
- Report of the Special Rapporteuse on the human rights situation in the DRC
(E/CN.4/2004/34), 10 March 2004
- Report of the Special Rapporteuse on violence against women: its causes and
consequences (A/HRC/7/6/Add.4), 27 February 2008
- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers
(A/HRC/8/4/Add.2), 11 April 2008
- Combined report of seven thematic special procedures on technical assistance to
the Government of the DRC and urgent examination of the situation in the east of the
country (A/HRC/10/59), 5 March 2009
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for children and armed conflict
- Impact of armed conflict on children (A/51/306/Add.1) – Note by the Secretary-
General, 6 September 1996
- Impact of armed conflict on children (A/51/306), 26 August 1996
- Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict (A/53/482), 12 October 1998
- Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict (A/54/430), 1 October 1999
- Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict (A/55/442), 3 October 2000
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
516
- Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict (A/56/453), 9 October 2001
- Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict (A/57/402), 24 September 2002
- Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict (A/58/328 and Corr.1), 29 August 2003 and 16 January 2004
- Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict (A/59/426), 8 October 2004
- Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict (A/60/335 and Corr.1), 7 September and 23 November 2005
- Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict (A/61/275 and Corr.1), 17 August and 10 October 2006
- Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict (A/62/228), 13 August 2007
- Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict (A/63/227), 6 August 2008
Group of experts
- Report of the United Nations Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2001/49), 16 January 2001
- Report of the United Nations Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2001/357), 12 April 2001
- Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2001/1072), 13 November 2001
- Interim report of the United Nations Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2002/565), 22 April 2002
- Final report of the United Nations Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2002/1146), 16 October 2002
IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Networks)
- Number 23: “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes region”, 19-25
August 1996
- Number 24: “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes region”, 26 August-
1 September 1996
- Number 25: “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes region”, 2-8
September 1996
- Number 26: “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes region”, 9-15
September 1996
- Number 27: “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes region”, 16-
22 September 1996
- Number 28: “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes region”, 23-
29 September 1996
- Number 29: “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes region”, 30
September- 6 October 1996
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
517
- Number 30: “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes region”, 7-13
October 1996
Number 31: “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes region”, 14-21
October 1996
- Number 32: “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes region”, 22-27
October 1996
- Number 34: “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes region”, 3-10
November 1996
- Number 35: “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes region”, 11-17
November 1996
- Number 36: “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes region”, 18-24
November 1996
Number 37: “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes region”, 25
November- 1 December 1996
- Number 38: “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes region”, 2-8
December 1996
- “Updates Great Lakes”, First semester 1997
- “Great Lakes”, 1 July-14 October 1997
- “Weekly reports - Year 1998”
- “Weekly reports - Year 1999”
- “Weekly reports - Year 2000”
- “Weekly reports - Year 2001”
- “Weekly reports - Year 2002”
- “Weekly reports - Year 2003”
Special Reports
-“IRIN Update on Masisi, Rutshuru and Lubero zones, North Kivu” – 23 August 1996
- “IRIN Update on South Kivu” – 26 October 1996
- “IRIN Briefing on the conflict in South Kivu” – 10 July 1996
- “IRIN Briefing on the conflict in South Kivu” – 7 October 1996
- “IRIN Special report on Ituri clashes” – 3 March 2000
- “IRIN Special report on Ituri district”– 2002
- “IRIN Youth in Crisis” – 2007
WFP (World Food Programme)
- WFP Emergency Report No. 22, 7 June 1996
UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund)
- “UNICEF Ambassador Jessica Lange shocked and deeply moved by systematic rape of
women and children in eastern DRC,” 11 August 2003
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
518
OCHA [Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs]
- Shabunda mission report, June 2001
ICJ (International Court of Justice)
- Application instituting proceedings filed in the registry of the court on 23 June 1999.
Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (DRC v. Rwanda)
- Application instituting proceedings filed in the registry of the court on 17 October 2000.
Arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v. Belgium)
- Case concerning the Arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v. Belgium)
[Request for the indication of provisional], Order of 8 December 2000
- Arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v. Belgium) (content), Judgement of 14 February
2002
- Case concerning armed activities on the territory of the Congo (new application: 2002)
(DRC v. Rwanda) (provisional measures), Order of 10 July 2002
- Case concerning armed activities on the territory of the Congo (new application: 2002)
(DRC v. Uganda), 19 December 2005
- Case concerning armed activities on the territory of the Congo (new application: 2002)
(DRC v. Rwanda) Jurisdiction of the Court and admissibility of the application. Summary
of the judgement 3 February 2006
ICC (International Criminal Court)
- Arrest warrant issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber 1 in the case The Prosecutor v.
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo – ICC-01/04-01/06
- Arrest warrant issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber 1 in the case The Prosecutor v.
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui – ICC-01/04-01/07
- Arrest warrant issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber 1 in the case The Prosecutor v. Bosco
Ntaganda – ICC-01/04-02/06
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
519
Intergovernmental reports
All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes and Genocide Prevention
- Cursed by riches: Who benefits from resource exploitation in the DRC?, 2003
Government reports
Government of the DRC- Ministry of Human Rights
- "Livre Blanc: Les pays agresseurs et leurs complices congolais à l'est", 30 June 1999
- "Livre Blanc: La guerre d’agression en RDC: Trois ans de massacres et de génocide à
huis clos", October 2001
- "Livre Blanc: Sur la persistance des violations massives et flagrantes des droits de
l’homme par les troupes d’agression rwandaise, ougandaise et burundaises ainsi que leurs
complices congolais", February 2002
- "Livre Blanc: Sur les récurrentes violations des droits de l’homme et du droit
international humanitaire dans la ville de Kisangani", 30 June 2002
- "Livre Blanc: Kisangani – Massacre des 14 et 15 Avril 2002", 30 June 2002
Republic of Uganda
- Judicial Commission of Inquiry – Republic of Uganda, Final Report on Allegations into
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC 2001,
November 2002
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
- "DRC, Situation of certain groups", April 1998
- "DRC, The August 1998 rebellion and groups affected", December 1998
- "DRC, Situation of children", March 2004
Commission des recours des réfugiés de la République francaise
- "RDC: les zones de rébellion", October 2002
- "RDC: les différentes forces en armes depuis 1997", January 2006
U.S. Department of State
- U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices in the DRC 1998
- U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices in the DRC 1999
- U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices in the DRC 2000
- U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices in the DRC 2001
- U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices in the DRC 2002
- U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices in the DRC 2003
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
520
U.S. Institute of Peace
- Zaire - Predicament and Prospects, Minority Rights 1997
- Zaire Crises on War and Governance 1997
- DRC - Reconstructing Peace in the Congo 1999
U.S. Committee on Refugees
- “Ethnic Cleansing and Displacement in eastern Zaire”, 6 July 1996
NGO Reports
APREDECI (Action paysanne pour la reconstruction et le développement
communautaire intégral)
- Rapport circonstanciel – Novembre 1996 et ses événements, 1996
- L’apocalypse au Nord-Kivu, in collaboration with the Groupe des volontaires pour la
paix (GVP) and the Centre de recherche et d’encadrement populaire (CRE), 1997
- Rapport sur le massacre de Mudja, April 1997
- Mission d'enquête sur la situation des droits de l’homme dans la province du Nord-
Kivu, 1997
AZADHO/ASADHO (Association zaïroise de défense des droits de
l’homme/Association africaine de défense des droits de l’homme)
- "Périodique des droits de l’homme", March-April 1993
- "État des libertés - Spécial 1993", 1 March 1993
- "Périodique des droits de l’homme", July 1993
- "Périodique des droits de l’homme", no. 9, January 1994
- "Périodique des droits de l’homme", no. 12, September 1994
- "L'armée tue, July-August", 1994
- Nord et Sud-Kivu : La violence au quotidien, 1994
- État des libertés et droits de l’homme au Zaïre, 1994
- "Périodique des droits de l’homme", no. 14, February 1995
- "Périodique des droits de l’homme", no. 18, July-October 1995
- "Périodique des droits de l’homme", no. 19, January 1996
- Massacre à Kitshanga au Nord-Kivu, 1996
- "Nord-Kivu, État d’urgence", April 1996
- "Périodique des droits de l’homme", no. 20, January 1997
- "Nord-Kivu : Conflits armés", 4 September 1997
- "Des espoirs déçus à une vague d’inquiétude, les occasions manquées", 1 February
1998
- "Une année d’administration AFDL : Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose",
1 November 1997
- "Existence de fosses communes au Nord-Kivu", March 1997
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
521
- "Nord-Kivu, report of 13 June 1998"
- "Périodique des droits de l’homme", no. 21, February 1998
- Communiqué de presse, 6 September 1998
- "Massacre à Goma", 15 February 1998
- Rapport annuel 1998
- "Carnage à Butembo – Plus de 300 morts !", 4 March 1998
- Report of the International NGO Commision on the massive human rights violations in
the DRC, prepared in collaboration with the International Centre for Human Rights and
Democratic Development (Montreal, Canada) (ICHRDD) June 1998
- "Situation des droits de l'homme dans le territoire de Beni sous administration RCD
(août 1998-juillet 1999)", September 1999
- "Le conflit interethnique Hema-Lendu en territoire de Djugu", 12 July 1999
- Massacre à Katogota, 2000
- Rapport annuel 2000
- "Affrontements sanglants entre Lendu et Hema", 7 February 2000
- L'Ouganda sacrifie la population civile congolaise, 2001
- Rapport annuel 2002
- "Rapport semestriel sur la RDC: L’état des libertés fondamentales et des droits de
l’homme après Sun City – pire qu’avant", 1 June 2002
CADDHOM (Collectif d’actions pour le développement des droits de l’homme)
- "Rapport semestriel – July à December 1997", 1998
- "Atrocités commises en province du Kivu de 1996 à 1998", July 1998
- "Massacres de Kasika au Sud-Kivu", 1998
- "Enquête sur les massacres des réfugiés", 1998
- "Rapport semestriel – 2 août au 2 février 1999", 1999
- "Victimes des tortures en chefferies des Wamuzimu", December 2003
- "Appel urgent – Des arrestations et détentions arbitraires à Kinshasa", April 2003
COJESKI (Collectif des organisations des jeunes solidaires du Congo)
- "Vue synoptique sur les violations massives des droits de l’homme pendant les trois
premiers mois d’agression du Sud-Kivu/RDC", 20 November 1998
- "Cinq mois d’invasion de la RDC: Les droits de l’homme en péril dans les provinces
occupées de l’est du Congo", 1999
- "Les violations caractérisées des droits de l’homme dans le Kivu – Rapport narratif des
forfaits pour la période allant du 1er octobre 1999 au 29 février 2000", March 2000
CDJP (Commission diocésaine justice et paix)
- "Morts et blessés au Katanga – février à juillet", 1995
- "S.O.S. lancé par les associations des droits de l’homme du Sud-Maniema", 31 January
2002
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
522
- "Graves violations des droits de l'homme consécutives aux affrontements Mayi-Mayi et
militaires du RCD (de juin à août 2002) : Cas des territoires de Kabambare, Kasongo,
Pangi (Province du Maniema) et Shabunda (Sud-Kivu)", 26 August 2002
- "Documents aux Onusiens", 20 November 2002
- Rapport annuel, 2002
- "Plaidoyer pour les déplacés des conflits insensés au Sud-Maniema", 1 September 2003
- "Besoins humanitaires prioritaires de la province du Maniema". Plaidoyer", 2003
- "Au nom de toutes les miennes. S.O.S. pour les femmes victimes des crimes sexuels et
autres violences à Kalima", 2 November 2003
- "Contact de Kaparangao entre RCD et miliciens Mayi-Mayi", February 2003
- "La province du Maniema durant sept ans de guerre et de conflits sanglants (1998-
2004)", 2004
Congo-Afrique
- "Cour d'ordre militaire : nature, organisation et compétence" – no. 319, 1 November
1997
- "Carnets de guerre d'un Kinois", November 1998
- "Administration de la justice et bonne gouvernance en Afrique", November 1998
- "Le droit est mort. Vive le droit" – no. 331, 1 January 1999
- "Quel avenir pour le droit pénal en République démocratique du Congo ?" – no. 350,
1 December 2000
- "Diamants sanglants et économie des guerres civiles en Afrique" – no. 360, 1 December
2001
- "La justice militaire dans le système judiciaire congolais" – no. 352, 1 February 2001
- "Justice militaire en RDC : La réforme du 18 novembre 2002" – nos. 367 to 370, 1
November 2002
- "Répression des crimes internationaux (569 à 587)" - nos. 369 et 370, 1 November 2002
- "Armes, minerais et ethnies : Au coeur de la guerre en RDC" – no. 378, 1 October 2003
- "Lutte contre l'impunité pour un état de droit en RDC" – no. 399, 1 November 2005
CVDHO (Commission de vulgarisation des droits de l’homme et du développement)
- "Situation d'insécurité générale dans le territoire de Malemba Nkulu", 5 April 2001
- "Rapport sur le drame d’Ankoro", 29 September 2002
- "Cannibalisme dans le territoire de Malemba Nkulu", 10 March 2003
- "Nord-Katanga : attaques délibérées contre la population civile", October 2003
GAPS (Gender Action for Peace and Security)
- "Human rights situation – Kasai Occidental", March 2000
- "Human rights situation – Kasai Occidental", January to March 2001, April 2001
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
523
Groupe justice et libération
- "La guerre du Congo à Kisangani et les violations des droits de l’homme du 2 août au
17 septembre 1998", September 1998
- "Initiatives de paix et violations du droit international humanitaire", 1 May 1999
- "La guerre des alliés à Kisangani (du 5 mai au 10 juin 2000) et le droit à la paix", 30
June 2000
- "Massacre des populations civiles dans les villages de Masimango, Kababali et Abali",
15 July 2001
- "Avant comme après la guerre, le calvaire de la population d’Isangi continue", 30
November 2003
Groupe Jérémie
- "Massacres de Birava, Sud-Kivu", 13 April 1995
- "La violation des droits de l’homme dans le territoire contrôlé par l’AFDL", 1 January
1997
- "Donner la parole à la base: Vue d'ensemble des déclarations, réflexions et autres
documents d’analyse des organisations de la société civile nationale sur la guerre actuelle
en RDC", 1999
- "Violations au Sud-Kivu, janvier à juin 2001", 2001
Groupe Lotus
- "Les premières retombées de la guerre des Kivu", November 1996
- "RDC – D’un régime autoritaire à une rébellion", October 1998
- "FAC torture in Bondo", January 1998
- "Les conséquences de la contraction des alliances et factions rebelles au nord-est de la
RDC", September 1999
- "Le conflit de leadership dans la rébellion-agression congolaise et les violations des
droits de l’homme", April 1999
- "Rapport sur le bombardement de la ville de Kisangani dans la nuit du 10 au 11 janvier
1999", January 1999
- "Les rivalités ougando-rwandaises à Kisangani : La prise en otage de la population
civile", May 2000
- "Rapport de la guerre de six jours à Kisangani", July 2000
- "Les affrontements de Juin 2000 entre les troupes rwandaises et ougandaises à
Kisangani", July 2000
- "Le calvaire des populations rurales", October 2001
- "Des foyers d’insécurité et de violation des droits de l’homme à Kisangani", December
2001
- Communiqué de presse – Opala, January 2003
- "La population et les acteurs de la paix civile paient le prix de la confusion et du chaos
créés par la rébellion de l’armée du RCD/Goma", May 2002
- "Le visage de la fatalité – Guerre de six jours", July 2002
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
524
- "Comprendre les événements du 14 mai et agir pour un respect des droits de l’homme et
une paix juste", July 2002
- "Mémorandum adressé à la délégation dépêchée à Kisangani par le Secrétaire général
de l’ONU pour enquêter sur les fosses communes", December 2002
- "Ituri et Kisangani - Situation sécuritaire extrêmement inquiétante", March 2003
Haki Za Binadamu
- "Monitoring : Cas types des violations des droits de l’homme au Maniema", 1995
- "Massacres de réfugiés hutu au Maniema", 1996
- "Assassinat de onze religieux hutu rwandais", 1997
- "Maniema S.O.S. : les femmes en proie aux instincts sexuels des soudards, 1997
- Violence sexuelle au Maniema", 1997
- "Situation des droits de l’homme au Maniema, RDC, Monitoring d’octobre 1998 à juin
2000", 2000
- "Droits de l’homme – Maniema, juin à juillet 2002", August 2002
- "Rapport trimestriel d'observation des droits de l’homme – January to March 2003",
April 2003
Halte Africa
- Rapport sur la situation à Fizi, 2002
Héritiers de la justice
- "Situation des droits de l’homme en RDC – Sud-Kivu", 31 December 1998
- "Actualités de ce mercredi 18 août1999", 1999
- "Le Gouverneur du Sud-Kivu n'a pas convaincu", February 2000
- "Une population désespérée, délaissée et prise en otage", 2001
Groupe Horeb
- "Les affrontements de Kisangani, crimes contre les droits humains et processus de paix
durable", January 1999
- "Évaluation – La perte de vitesse du RCD aggrave les violations systématiques et
flagrantes des droits de l’homme à Kisangani", June 1999
Info-Congo/Kinshasa
- "Info-Congo/Kinshasa", August 1997
- "Info-Congo/Kinshasa", January 1999
- "Même fragile, un cessez-le-feu bienvenu", no. 160, 1 April 2000
- "Des combats presque partout", no. 161, 1 May 2000
La Grande vision pour la défense des droits de l’homme
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
525
- "Rapport du 1er novembre 1996 sur les événements sanglants survenus à Goma et ses
alentours", November 1996
- "Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme dans la zone agropastorale de
Masisi", 1997
ANMDH (Friends of Nelson Mandela for the Defense of Human Rights)
- "Rapport intérimaire de la guerre du Nord et Sud-Kivu et les violations des droits de
l’homme", 28 November 1996
- "Rapport succinct", 1997
- "La précarité de la situation des droits de l’homme avant la chute de la ville de
Kisangani", 1997
- "La destruction de la ville de Kisangani et la situation des droits de l’homme dans la
province Orientale", 2000
- "Quelles sont les chances de la cohabitation Hema-Lendu ?", February 2000
- "Guerre à Kisangani", June 2000
- "Rapport sur la violation des droits de l’homme à l'est de la RDC", January 2001
- "La guerre interethnique en Ituri et l'implication de l’armée ougandaise", February 2001
- "Rapport de synthèse sur la guerre interethnique", February 2001
- "Les événements des 14 et 15 mai 2002 à Kisangani", May 2002
- "Un aperçu sur la situation des droits de l’homme en RDC", November 2002
LINELIT (Ligue nationale pour les élections libres et transparentes)
- "Nouvelles révélations sur le massacre des réfugiés hutu rwandais dans la province de
l’Équateur", 1997
- "Massacre de quinze civils par l’AFDL à Kinshasa - Jungle ou état de droit ?", July
1997
Groupe Lufalanga pour la justice et la paix
- "Rapport trimestriel d’activités - avril à juin 2002", 15 July 2002
- "Agents de la RTNC/Kisangani (Radio télévision nationale congolaise) menacés par les
autorités du RCD/Goma", 2003
Mahano
- "Numéro 22, Spécial Nord-Kivu, avril-mai-juin 1993", 1993
- "Numéro 24, octobre-novembre-décembre 1993", 1993
Peacelink/OSPITI
- La violation des droits de l’homme dans le territoire contrôlé par l’AFDL, 1996
- "Eyewitness Report – November 1996", January 1997
- Les morts de la libération, 1997
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
526
- Rapport sur la situation qui prévaut actuellement dans les provinces du Nord et du Sud-
Kivu, 1997
SCEPDHO (Structure de culture, d’éducation populaire et des droits de l’homme)
- "Rapport annuel – Bas-Congo" – 1998, January 1999
- "Rapport des droits de l’homme sur les événements survenus au cours de la marche
pacifique organisée par la secte religieuse Bundu dia Kongo dans les districts de Boma et
du Bas-Fleuve", 24 August 2002
SOPROP (Solidarité pour la promotion sociale et la paix)
- "Situation des droits de l’homme à Goma et ses environs jusqu’au 21 septembre 1998",
October 1998
- "Situation des droits de l’homme au Nord-Kivu", November 1998
- "Situation des droits de l’homme dans la ville de Goma et ses environs depuis
l’éclatement de la rébellion", October 1998
- "Génocide en coulisse", 31 December 1999
- "Alerte dans les territoires de Masisi et Walikale, province du Nord-Kivu/RDC", 2002
- "Rapport d'investigation, Nord-Kivu, avril-août 2001", August 2001
- "Abus et violations au Nord-Kivu, juillet-septembre 2002", September 2002
- "Nord-Kivu, janvier-mars 2002", March 2002
- "Nord-Kivu, janvier-mars 2003", March 2003
UVG-Kis (Union des victimes des guerres de Kisangani)
- "Les victimes de la guerre de six jours à Kisangani", 2000
- "Événements des 14 et 15 mai 2002 : massacre des populations civiles et des policiers",
2002
- "Situation des différentes guerres de 1996–2000", undated
VSV (Voix des sans-voix pour les droits de l’homme)
- "Bref aperçu sur la situation des droits de l’homme à Kinshasa sous l’AFDL", 22 May
1997
- "L’insécurité atteint le sommet de l’État, January" 2001
- "Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme à Isiro, Novembre 2001", December
2001
- "Rapport annuel 2002", March 2003
- "Situation des droits de l’homme dans le district du Haut-Uélé en général et dans la ville
d’Isiro en particulier", May 2002
- "Victimes des tortures corporelles et traitements dégradants", 2003
- "Exactions commises par les rebelles de John Garang du Sud-Soudan dans le district du
Haut-Uélé en RDC de 1999 à Juillet 2003", September 2003
- "Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme au Haut-Uélé 1993-2003", September
2006
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
527
- "Violations massives des droits de l’homme commises dans le district du Haut-Uélé,
période de 1994 à 2003", 2008
Other national documents
- "Mémorandum des communautés hutu et tutsi du Nord-Kivu à la Commission
d’enquête sur les massacres de Walikale, Masisi et Bwito en mars et avril 1993, Les
communautés zaïroises hutu et tutsi du Nord-Kivu", April 1993
- "Recensement des victimes hunde des massacres et affrontements interethniques de
1993 à nos jours, Les communautés zaïroises hutu et tutsi du Nord-Kivu", April 1993
- "Insécurité de la communauté tutsi et diverses tracasseries, Communauté tutsi de
Jomba", 2 February 1995
- "Rapport sur l'arrivée et le séjour des rebelles à Idjwi, Collectivité de Rubenga,
30 January 1997
- "Rapport final des activités de ramassage et inhumation de corps des victimes de la
guerre de libération du Congo-Zaïre, Équipe d'urgence de la biodiversité (EUB),
7 February 1997
- "Rapport d'enquête sur les violations des droits de l'homme à l’est du Congo, Église
luthérienne du Congo", May 1997
- "Témoignage des femmes rescapées de Tingi-Tingi", May 1997
- "Les morts de la libération, Comité Palermo Bukavu", June 1997
- "Rapport circonstancié sur les cas de violation des droits de l’homme au Zaïre", Prison
Fellowship, 1997
- "Trente jours de violations des droits de l'homme sous le pouvoir de l’AFDL,
Association des cadres pénitentiaires du Congo (ACPC)", 1997
- "Bulletin droits de l’homme Hebdo, fusillade au CPRK (Centre pénitentiaire et de
rééducation de Kinshasa)", Congosol, September 1998
- "Qui gagne dans le bain de sang au Sud-Kivu ? : Cri du coeur des mamans, Les femmes
du Sud-Kivu", 28 February 2000
- "Rapport sur l'état des droits de l’homme en Ituri, Justice Plus", July 2002
- "Femmes dans la tourmente des guerres en RDC, Dignité des sans-voix (DSV)", 2002
- "Le corps des femmes comme champ de bataille durant la guerre de la RDC", Réseau
des femmes pour le développement associatif (RFDA), Réseau des femmes pour la
défense des droits et la paix (RFDP) and International Alert (IA), 2004
- "Akele and Sita (Professeurs), Crimes humanitaires en droit congolais", January 1999
- "Justin Balegamire, Attaques invasives de l'est zaïrois par le peuple tutsi (1994 à
1996)", January 1997
- "M. Dibinga Wa Said, Massacre de Nyalukungu, Sud-Kivu", July 1999
- Didier Kamundu Butundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006
- Kankonde Luteke, "L’épuration ethnique des Kasaïens au Shaba", 4 September 1995
- Charles Mfwamba, Rapport sur la situation des droits de l’homme dans la société
minière de Bakwanga, August 1999
- Faustin Ngabu, "Massacres à Walikale et Masisi", 8 May 1993
- Faustin Ngabu, "Situation qui prévaut dans le diocèse autour des massacres dans les
zones de Walikale et Masisi", 11 May 1993
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
528
- Germain Sylaï Gotto and Mamadou Bineta, "Le calvaire des déplacés katangais",
September 1999
- François Zoka, Pierre Kibaka and Jean-Pierre Badidike, "La guerre des alliés à
Kisangani et le droit de la paix", 2000
NGO reports
ACCORD
- DRC Country Report, 2002
AI (Amnesty International)
- Report on Zaire, 1992
- Extrajudicial execution – At least 15 civilians in Kinshasa, 25 February 1993
- Recent arrests in Kinshasa, 25 May 1993
- Violence against democracy, 16 September 1993
- Zaire collapsing under crisis, 2 February 1994
- Zaire – Nine demonstrators killed, 8 March 1995
- Zairian human rights activists under threat, 1st September 1995
- Zaire fears for safety, 11 January 1996
- Zaire action needed, 14 June 1996
- Appeal for the protection of human rights in the crisis in eastern Zaire, 11 August 1996
- Zaire Tutsi ethnic group and other civilians, 22 October 1996
- Zaire crisis facing Rwandese cannot be solved, 31 October 1996
- Zaire fear of mass human rights violations, 10 November 1996
- Zaire arm flows, 11 November 1996
- Amnesty International condemns massacre of around 500 refugees in eastern Zaire,
26 November 1996
- Killings, torture and arbitrary arrests persist, 29 November 1996
- Violent persecution by State and armed groups, 29 November 1996
- Lawlessness and insecurity in North and South-Kivu, 30 November 1996
- Hidden from scrutiny – Human Rights abuses in eastern Zaire, 19 December 1996
- Still in need of protection – Repatriation, refoulement and the safety of refugees and the
internally displaced, 24 January 1997
- Appeal for a Commission to investigate reports of atrocities in eastern Zaire, 24 March
1997
- Mineral wealth should not overshadow shameful human rights records, 2 June 1997
- Amnesty International condemns AFDL abuses against Rwandese refugees in eastern
Zaire, 23 April 1997
- United Nations investigation on massacres must not be based on concessions with the
Government, 16 July 1997
- DRC Rwandese refugees, 21 July 1997
- Truth about massacres, 2 October 1997
- Rapes, killings and other human rights violations by the security forces, 1997
- Deadly alliances in Congolese forests, 1997
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
529
- A long-standing crisis spinning out of control, 1998
- Civil liberties denied, 2 February 1998
- One year on – No more excuses President Kabila, 15 May 1998
- Legacy of killings must end, 30 June 1998
- Security Council shamefully abandons victims in the DRC, 15 July 1998
- Government cracks down on human rights organizations, 4 August 1998
- Urgent appeal to safeguard human rights, 7 August 1998
- Fuelling ethnic hatred escalates human rights crisis, 13 August 1998
- A long-standing crisis spinning out of control, 3 September 1998
- War against unarmed civilians, 23 November 1998
- A year of dashed hopes, 1998
- Thousands of civilians victims of atrocities in the DRC, 1998
- Government terrorises critics, 2000
- Killing human decency, 31 April 2000
- Torture/Fear of disappearance, 23 October 2000
- Torture – A weapon of war against unarmed civilians, 2001
- Rwandese-controlled east – Devastating human toll, 2001
- Take a step to stamp out the torture by Rwandese forces and their allies, 2001
- Deadly conspiracies, 2001
- Making a killing – The diamond trade from assassination to State murder, 2002
- Fear of detention, 2002
- DRC Alarming increase in arbitrary arrests and detentions, 8 January 2002
- Stop diamond company guards killings, 27 February 2002
- DRC Inter-Congolese dialogue, 12 March 2002
- DRC Death penalty/unfair trial, 18 March 2002
- Kisangani killings – victims need justice now, 12 June 2002
- Prisoners of conscience, 17 July 2002
- The United Nations must take urgent steps to stop escalation of ethnic killings,
17 October 2002
- Government must investigate human rights violations in Mbuji Mayi diamond fields,
22 October 2002
- The expansion of MONUC must be used to protect human rights where they are more
seriously at risk, 5 December 2002
- One hundred and fifteen people face imminent execution, 12 December 2002
- DRC public statement – A neglected human rights tragedy in Ituri, 20 March 2003
- End the use of child soldiers, 31 March 2003
- Time to stop the carnage and economic exploitation, 28 April 2003
- The United Nations should deploy a rapid reaction force in Ituri, 20 May 2003
- Extrajudicial executions, torture and ill-treatment, 29 May 2003
- Amnesty International media briefing – DRC Mission findings, 1 August 2003
- Stop the cycle of economic violence, 30 October 2003
- Children at war, 9 September 2003
- Child soldiers tell their story, 9 November 2003
- Stop the use of child soldiers, 10 November 2003
- Addressing the present and building a future, 2003
- On the precipice: The deepening human rights and humanitarian crisis in Ituri, 2003
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
530
- Ituri – How many more have to die?, 2003
- Ituri – A need for protection, a thirst for justice, 2003
- Irene Khan Amnesty International high-level mission Great Lakes region, 2003
- DRC: Our brothers who help kill us – Economic exploitation and human rights abuses
in the East, 2003
- Mass rape – Time for remedies, 2004
- Surviving rape – Voices from the East, 2004
CARITAS
- Tableau synthétique relevant les cas des massacres et tueries par l'AFDL, 17 September
1997
ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross)
- DRC Activity report 1993
- DRC Activity report 1994
- DRC Activity report 1995
- DRC Activity report 1996
- DRC Activity report 1997
- DRC Activity report 1999
- DRC Activity report 2000
- DRC Activity report 2001
- DRC Activity report 2002
- Mission to East Congo, July to September 2002
- Mission to East Congo, October to December 2002
- Activity Report DRC 2003
- Updated press releases 2001 - 2003
Concertation chrétienne pour l'Afrique centrale
- Ituri - Éviter l'explosion, 24 April 2003
Conflict Research Group
- Dynamics of conflicts in Ituri, 1 October 2003
Rights and Democracy
- Rapport de la Commission internationale non gouvernementale sur les violations
massives des droits humains en RDC. Prepared by the Centre international des droits de
la personne et du développement démocratique (Montreal, Canada) [CIDPDD] and the
Association africaine pour la défense des droits de l’homme en République démocratique
du Congo (Kinshasa) [ASADHO], June 1998
- The Situation in the DRC, 2003
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
531
FIDH (International Federation for Human Rights)
- Spécial Congo, Zaïre et Congo-Brazzaville, 3 July 1997
- État des libertés et droits de l’homme à l’aube de la transition en RDC, 30 November
2003
The Swedish Foundation for Human Rights
- Justice, impunity and sexual violence in Eastern DRC, 2008
Gandi International
- Rapport succinct, 29 November 1997
- Rapport d’activité avec additif sur les violations des droits de l’homme et le dossier de
massacre des refugiés, 1997
Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
- Coherence in Crisis, February 2003
Human Rights First
- DRC, ravaged by conflict, human rights atrocities and impunity, 2003
HRW (Human Rights Watch)
- Inciting hatred against Kasaiens in Shaba, 30 June 1993
- Human Rights Developments – report, 1993
- Human Rights Developments – report, 1994
- Human Rights Developments – report, 1995
- Rearming with impunity, 31 May 1995
- Forced to flee - violence against the Tutsi in Zaire, 31 July 1996
- Attacked by all sides – Civilians and the war in eastern Zaire, 30 March 1997
- What Kabila is hiding, civilian killings and impunity in Congo, 15 October 1997
- Uncertain course: transition and human rights in the Congo, 31 December 1997
- Zaire transition, war and human rights, 1997
- Human Rights Developments – report, 1997
- HRW welcomes UN report on Congo massacres, 3 June 1998
- HRW condemns Security Council inaction, 14 July 1998
- Written statement submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights, 17 March 1998
- Human Rights Developments – report, 1998
- Casualties of war, 28 February 1999
- Human Rights Developments – report, 1999
- Eastern Congo – Activists severely beaten, 2000
- Eastern Congo ravaged, 31 April 2000
- Imprisoned activists disappear, 1 August 2000
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
532
- DRC Visit of Mary Robinson, 29 September 2000
- Human Rights Developments – report, 2000
- Uganda in eastern DRC, 31 March 2001
- Reluctant Recruits: children and adults forcibly recruited for military service in North
Kivu, May 2001
- Congo – Resource exploitation exacerbates civilian suffering, 2001
- Attacks on civilians in Ugandan occupied areas in North-eastern DRC, 13 February
2002
- DRC – Scores killed in new ethnic fighting, 13 February 2002
- DRC – Civilians in Ituri need urgent protection, 18 March 2002
- La guerre dans la guerre : violence sexuelle contre les femmes et les filles dans l’est du
Congo, 1 June 2002
- War Crimes in Kisangani, 31 August 2002
- DRC – World report, 2002
- Briefing to the UN Commission on Human Rights, 27 February 2003
- Covered with blood – Ethnically targeted violence in North-eastern DRC, 31 July 2003
- DRC – Essential background of human rights issues, 2003
- UN Congo – Burundi mission should prioritize civilian protection, 2003
- The curse of gold, 26 April 2005
- En quête de justice – Poursuivre les auteurs de violences sexuelles commises pendant la
guerre au Congo, 2005
ICTJ (International Center for Transitional Justice)
- A long road to a just peace in the DRC, 30 October 2004
- Living with fear, 31 August 2008
ICG (International Crisis Group)
- North Kivu, 13 August 1998
- Congo at war, 17 November 1998
- Africa’s seven nation war, 21 March 1999
- How Kabila lost his way, 21 May 1999
- Disarmament in Congo, investing in conflict prevention, 13 June 2001
- Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an ugly war, 20 December 2000
- The Inter-Congolese dialogue, 16 November 2001
- From Kabila to Kabila, prospects for peace in the Congo, 16 March 2001
- Disarmament in Congo, jump-starting DDRRR, 14 December 2001
- Storm clouds over the Sun City, the urgent need to recast the Congolese peace process,
14 May 2002
- The Kivus, the forgotten crucible of the Congo conflict, 24 January 2003
- Katanga-DRC's forgotten conflict, 1 September 2006
MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières)
- Populations en danger au Zaïre, rapport MSF, 1995
- Ethnic cleansing rears its head in Zaire, 1 November 1996
- Traque et massacre des Rwandais au Zaïre-Congo, 1996-1997
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
533
- Forced flight – A brutal strategy of elimination in eastern Zaire, 30 April 1997
- Histoire des réfugiés rwandais ayant fui les camps du Kivu, Zaïre, de September 1996 à
June 1997, September 1997
- International Activity Report, 2001
- Special Report – Confronting catastrophe in the DRC, 30 November 2001
- La guerre me suivait, 2002
- Giving voice to untold human suffering, 2002
- Quiet, we are dying, 2002
- Report on the DRC 1992-2002, 2002
- I have no joy, no peace of mind; Medical, psychosocial and socio-economic
consequences of sexual violences in eastern DRC, 2004
- International activity report: DRC, I took my children and fled, 2003
- Ituri – Unkept promises, 2003
Minority Rights Group International
- 'Erasing the Board': Report of the international research mission into crimes under
international law committed against the Bambuti Pygmies in the eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo, 2004
Norwegian Refugee Council
- Profile on internal displacement – DRC, 8 August 2002
Open Society Justice Initiative
- Justice reform in Africa, 2005
OIJ (Organisation interafricaine des juristes)
- Recueil de témoignages sur les crimes commis dans l'ex-Zaïre depuis octobre 1996,
September 1997
Peacewomen
- Thousands of women assaulted, 4 November 2003
- Sexual violence a widespread weapon in DRC conflict, 13 November 2003
- Mass rape, looting widespread in DRC, 12 September 2003
- Congo – A hell on earth for women, 11 September 2003
- A war on women, 25 November 2003
Pole Institute
- Inter-congolese dialogue, 30 April 2000
- The coltan phenomenon, 1 January 2002
Annex 25
Unofficial translation from French original
534
- Exposé – Survie identitaire et pression démographique, point de vue d'un Muhunde à
Masisi, 27 June 2004
RAID (Rights and Accountability in Development)
- Unanswered Questions: Companies, conflict and the DRC, 1 March 2004
Refugees International
- Eastern Congo – Beyond the volcano, a slow motion holocaust, 28 January 2002
Save the Children
- Going home – Demobilizing and reintegrating child soldiers in the DRC, 2003
Protecting women and children in war and conflict, 2003
University of Massachusetts
- The economics of civil war – The case of the DRC, 7 January 2003
Watchlist
- Country report – The impact of armed conflict on children in the DRC, 1 June 2003
World Policy Institute
- Deadly legacy, US arms to Africa and the Congo war, 2 March 2000
Other international documents
- L'autre visage du conflit dans la crise des Grands Lacs, Jesuit School of Theology,
Grand Lakes Network, 2000
- Situation actuelle au Nord-Kivu, L'observatoire de l'Afrique centrale, 6 July 2001
- Politique africaine, Le Maniema, de la guerre de l'AFDL à la guerre du RCD, no. 84,
December 2001
- Justice, impunité et violences sexuelles à l’est de la RDC, Rapport de la Mission
internationale d’experts parlementaires, November 2008
- Colonel Kisukula Abeli Meitho, La désintégration de l’armée congolaise de Mobutu à
Kabila, L’Harmattan, 2001
- Abbot Ntihabose Jean Berchmans Neuf mois de tragédie à l'est du Zaïre – Mon journal,
14 October 1997
- Stanislas Bucyalimwe Mararo, Le Nord-Kivu, coeur de la crise congolaise, 2001-2002
- Ambroise Bulambo, Mourir au Kivu, du génocide tutsi aux massacres dans l’est du
Congo RCD, L’Harmattan, 2001
Annex 26
U.N. News Centre, DR Congo: U.N. envoy welcomes end of M23 rebellion, commitment to
peace talks (5 Nov. 2013)
DR Congo: UN envoy welcomes end of M23 rebellion, commitment to peace
talks
5 November 2013 – The United Nations special envoy for Africa’s Great Lakes region today joined other
senior diplomatic officials in welcoming the announcement by the M23 rebel group that it is ending its bloody
insurgency against the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which for nearly two
years has exacerbated humanitarian strife in the country’s restive east.
Welcoming the announcement in a statement issued from the Congolese capital, Kinshasa, Mary Robinson,
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to the Great Lakes Region, and Martin Kobler, Special
Representative and head of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, were joined by a host of other
diplomats, including Boubacar Diarra, African Union Special Representative for the Great Lakes, Russell
Feingold, United States Special Envoy for the region and the DRC, and Koen Vervaeke, European Union
Senior Coordinator to the region.
The envoys also welcomed the commitment of the Congolese Government to end combat and complete
steps agreed to as part of the Kampala Dialogue. The envoys commended Ugandan President Yoweri
Museveni and his Defense Minister, Crispus Kiyonga, for their “patient and determined leadership” in
facilitating the Dialogue.
“The Envoys urge both parties to conclude the political process by signing a principled agreement that
ensures the timely disarmament and demobilization of the M23 and accountability for perpetrators of war
crimes and crimes against humanity,” the statement said, adding that the officials also welcomed the
reestablishment of State authority by the Congolese Government in areas previously held by the M23.
While the envoys noted that the end of the M23 rebellion represents an important step in ensuring sustainable
peace in eastern DRC and the Great Lakes region, they stressed that “this is only one step towards
addressing the persistent conflict and instability, and to ensure an end to all illegitimate armed actors in the
DRC, including the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda).”
The envoys went on to urge all signatories of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Great
Lakes and the DRC to recommit to ensuring the implementation of the accord, including by advancing a
political dialogue between key countries in the region.
Today’s announcement comes in the wake of fresh clashes between Government troops (FARDC) and M23
fighters in and around flashpoint towns in the eastern DRC. The UN mission (MONUSCO), which has been
supporting the Government’s operations, has been on “high alert” since the violence began to escalate; its
helicopters were fired upon twice during the past two weeks and, since late September, three peacekeepers
have been killed in the line of duty. The Kampala talks stalled as the fighting intensified.
The M23 – composed of soldiers who mutinied from the DRC national army in April – along with other armed
groups, has clashed repeatedly with the FARDC. In the past year, the fighting has displaced more than
100,000 people, exacerbating an ongoing humanitarian crisis in the region which includes 2.6 million
internally displaced persons and 6.4 million in need of food and emergency aid. Earlier today, the UN refugee
agency reported some 10,000 people had been forced to flee to Uganda after fresh fighting in the region.
At various times, UN officials have also deplored the activities of other armed groups in the region, including
Mayi Mayi, the FDLR, the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) and the Allied Democratic
Forces (ADF).
UN News Centre Page 1 of 1
http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=46423 1/22/2018
Annex 26
Annex 27
U.N. Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council 7058th Meeting, U.N.
Doc. S/PRST/2013/17 (14 Nov. 2013)
United Nations S/PRST/2013/17
Security Council Distr.: General
14 November 2013
Original: English
13-56466 (E) 141113
*1356466*
Statement by the President of the Security Council
At the 7058th meeting of the Security Council, held on 14 November 2013, in
connection with the Council’s consideration of the item entitled “The situation
concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, the President of the Security
Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:
“After 19 months of a rebellion which has exacerbated the humanitarian
strife in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Security
Council welcomes the announcement by the M23 to put an end to its rebellion,
the Government of DRC’s acceptance of this announcement and the cessation
of hostilities between the DRC and the M23. The Security Council condemns
the violence caused by this rebellion, which has resulted in a significant loss of
civilian life, as well as of MONUSCO peacekeepers’ lives, and the
displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians.
“The Security Council calls for the swift conclusion and implementation
of a final, comprehensive and agreed outcome, in line with the Kampala talks,
that provides for the disarmament and demobilization of the M23 and
accountability for human rights abusers. The Council commends the efforts of
President Museveni and Defence Minister Kiyonga in facilitating the
conclusion of these talks. The Security Council calls for the immediate and
permanent disarmament and demobilization of the M23 combatants, with the
assistance of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), in accordance with
resolution 2098 (2013).
“The Security Council reaffirms its strongest support to the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and MONUSCO in the
implementation of resolution 2098 (2013) and urges the continuation of their
efforts. The Security Council welcomes the measures taken by the Special
Envoy of the Secretary-General, the SRSG and MONUSCO in support of a
political solution, in line with a comprehensive strategy for durable peace and
security, and commends the active steps taken by MONUSCO to implement
fully its mandate, in particular the protection of civilians. The Security Council
welcomes the initial steps taken by MONUSCO in its support and lead
coordination role of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the DRC and urges the
continuation of these efforts. The Security Council acknowledges the
commitment of all troop-contributing countries to MONUSCO to
implementing the full range of the mission’s responsibilities in line with
resolution 2098 (2013).
Annex 27
S/PRST/2013/17
2/4 13-56466
“The Security Council recognizes the significant sacrifices made by
MONUSCO and the troop-contributing countries and expresses appreciation
for their efforts to improve peace and stability in eastern DRC. The Security
Council expresses condolences to the families of the peacekeepers killed in
action while protecting the people of eastern DRC. The Security Council
emphasizes that any effort to undermine MONUSCO’s ability to implement its
mandate will not be tolerated and that those responsible for threats or attacks
against peacekeepers must be held accountable.
“The Security Council expresses deep concern regarding the sustained
regional threat posed by the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda
(FDLR), a group under UN sanctions whose leaders and members include
perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and have continued to promote
and commit ethnically based and other killings in Rwanda and the DRC, and
stresses the importance of permanently addressing this threat. The Security
Council stresses the importance of neutralizing the FDLR and all armed
groups, including the ADF, the LRA and various Mayi Mayi groups, in line
with resolution 2098 (2013).
“The Security Council reiterates its strong commitment to the
sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the DRC as well as
of all countries of the region. The Security Council stresses that the
Government of DRC bears primary responsibility for security, protection of
civilians, national reconciliation, peacebuilding and development in the
country. It underlines that the recent achievements of the FARDC in defeating
M23 on the ground must encourage the Government of DRC to sustain efforts
to neutralize FDLR and other armed groups. In that regard, the Security
Council further welcomes DRC President Joseph Kabila’s public reaffirmation
on 30 October that his Government intends to neutralize the FDLR and
stresses the importance of rapid follow through.
“The Security Council further welcomes the 4 November statement by
SRSG Kobler noting MONUSCO’s intention not to allow FDLR and other
armed groups, to take advantage of the changing security dynamics on the
ground and its commitment to act decisively on all attempts to exploit the
situation.
“The Security Council strongly condemns the continuing violence and
abuses of human rights by all armed groups, including summary executions,
sexual and gender-based violence and large-scale recruitment and use of
children, demands that all armed groups cease immediately all forms of
violence and destabilizing activities and that their members immediately and
permanently disband, lay down their arms and demobilize children from their
ranks, and reiterates that those responsible for human rights abuses and
violations of international humanitarian law will be held accountable and
should not be eligible for integration into the FARDC or other elements of
state security forces.
“The Security Council calls upon the Government of DRC to remain
fully committed to establishing a professional, accountable and sustainable
national army, including a Rapid Reaction Force, in accordance with its
commitment to deepen SSR. The Security Council takes note of the statement
of the President of the DRC, Joseph Kabila, of 23 October 2013 in which he
Annex 27
S/PRST/2013/17
13-56466 3/4
indicated that army reform will constitute his top priority, and announced the
pursuit of the electoral process, and his commitment to ensure that the DRC
judicial system will effectively address the cycle of impunity. The Security
Council urges the Government of the DRC to finalize the development of a
comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and
Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) plan.
The Security Council calls on the Government of DRC to consolidate state
authority, make progress on decentralization, rule of law, and further the
agenda of reconciliation, tolerance, and democratization, in line with the PSC
framework and resolution 2098 (2013).
“The Security Council recalls that there should be no impunity for any of
those responsible for human rights abuses and violations of international
humanitarian law in the DRC and the region, and, in this regard, urges the
DRC, all countries of the region and other concerned UN Member States to
bring perpetrators to justice.
“The Security Council recalls its resolutions on women, peace and
security, and reiterates that all actors must strengthen their efforts to combat
impunity for conflict-related sexual violence, to provide all necessary services
to survivors, and to ensure the equal and full inclusion of women at all stages
of conflict resolution, reconstruction and the promotion of peace including
through taking account of the call of the 11 July 2013 Bujumbura Declaration
for ensuring that benchmarks, indicators and follow-up measures of the plan of
implementation for the PSC Framework are gender-sensitive. The Security
Council urges the Government of DRC to expedite the investigation of the
November 2012 mass rapes committed by elements of the FARDC in Minova
and bring the perpetrators to justice.
“The Security Council recalls its resolutions and presidential statements
on children and armed conflict and reiterates that all parties in the DRC must
halt and prevent the recruitment and use of children, protect and consider as
victims those children who have been released or otherwise separated from
armed forces and armed groups, and pay particular attention to the protection,
release and reintegration of all children associated with armed forces and
groups. The Security Council urges the Government of the DRC to continue
implementing the action plan to prevent and end the recruitment and use of
children and sexual violence against children signed on 4 October 2012.
“The Security Council expresses grave concern about the ongoing
humanitarian crisis, including the 2.7 million internally displaced people and
the 6.4 million people in need of food assistance and emergency agricultural
aid, and calls upon all parties to allow safe and unhindered access for the
timely and full delivery of humanitarian aid to all civilians in urgent need of
assistance, in accordance with relevant provisions on international law,
including international humanitarian law and the United Nations guiding
principles of humanitarian assistance. The Security Council further expresses
concern with the over 450,000 refugees who have fled from the DRC and calls
upon the DRC and all States in the region to work towards the peaceful
environment conducive to the eventual voluntary return and reintegration of
refugees to the DRC, with the support, as appropriate, of the UNHCR. The
Security Council commends in this regard the support provided by
Annex 27
S/PRST/2013/17
4/4 13-56466
neighbouring countries to refugees from the DRC. The Security Council
encourages the Rwandan Government, United Nations and international
organizations to work together to urgently address the situation of former M23
combatants interned in Eastern Rwanda since March 2013.
“The Security Council notes with concern the regional security
implications of the conflict in eastern DRC and supports in this regard regional
confidence-building measures, including the Expanded Joint Verification
Mechanism (EJVM), and further calls for the completion of its investigations
on cross-border incidents. The Security Council welcomes the decision of the
ICGLR to grant permanent representation of MONUSCO in the EJVM. The
Security Council expresses concern at shells landing in Rwanda, which
resulted in civilian loss of life, urges the swift conclusion of the EJVM
investigations into this cross-border shelling, commends the restraint shown so
far by Rwanda and urges its continuation. The Security Council further urges
restraint by all other parties.
“The Security Council stresses the need to address sustainably the root
causes of the conflict in eastern DRC and reiterates its support for the
implementation of the commitments under the Peace, Security and
Cooperation (PSC) Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the
region, which is essential to achieving lasting peace and security in the Great
Lakes region. The Security Council calls upon all signatories to fulfil
promptly, fully and in good faith their respective commitments under the PSC
Framework. The Security Council welcomes the 4 November joint Summit of
the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the
Southern-African Development Community (SADC) in Pretoria. The Security
Council commends the engagement of Special Envoy Mary Robinson and
encourages her, in coordination with and with appropriate support from the
SRSG for the DRC, to continue to lead, coordinate and assess the
implementation of national and regional commitments under the PSC
Framework.
“The Security Council encourages the United Nations, the African Union,
the ICGLR, SADC and other relevant international and regional organizations
to continue to work together, with the sustained engagement and support of the
international community, towards the implementation of the PSC Framework,
and the establishment of a broader dialogue among key parties that addresses
the deeper drivers of conflict in eastern Congo.”
Annex 27
Annex 28
U.N. Security Council, 7150th meeting, The extension of the Mandate U.N. Stabilization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (M.O.N.U.S.C.O.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/2147
(2014) (28 Mar. 2014)
United Nations S/RES/2147 (2014)
Security Council
Distr.: General
28 March 2014
14-28213 (E)
*1428213*
Resolution 2147 (2014)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 7150th meeting, on
28 March 2014
The Security Council,
Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President
concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), especially its resolutions
2136 (2014), 2098 (2013), 2078 (2012), 2076 (2012) and 2053 (2012),
Recalling its resolution 2086 (2013) and reaffirming the basic principles of
peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force,
except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and recognizing that the mandate
of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country
concerned,
Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and
territorial integrity of the DRC as well as all States in the region and emphasizing
the need to respect fully the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness
and regional cooperation,
Stressing the primary responsibility of the government of DRC for ensuring
security in its territory and protecting its civilians with respect to the rule of law,
human rights and international humanitarian law,
Noting that eastern DRC has continued to suffer from recurring cycles of
conflict and persistent violence by armed groups, both Congolese and foreign, and
emphasizing the need to address the root causes of conflict to put an end to these
recurring cycles of violence,
Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the Southern African
Development Community (SADC), and the African Union (AU) to restore peace and
security in eastern DRC, and encouraging the government of the DRC to continue to
ensure close cooperation with these and other international parties,
Recalling the signing in Addis Ababa on 24 February 2013 of the Peace,
Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
the region (“the PSC Framework”), under the auspices of its guarantors, namely the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Chairperson of the AU Commission,
the Chairperson of the SADC and Chairperson of the ICGLR, and calling on all
Annex 28
S/RES/2147 (2014)
2/14 14-28213
parties to continue to implement promptly, fully and in good faith their respective
commitments,
Welcoming the Regional Oversight Mechanism’s calling for a broader political
dialogue in its January 2014 communique, and the initial dialogue between key
signatories states initiated by Angola in its role as Chair of the ICGLR, encouraging
the continuation of such dialogue under the auspices of the PSC Framework to
resolve the root causes of conflict in the DRC and the Great Lakes region, and
welcoming the continued engagement of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
for the Great Lakes region,
Reaffirming its strongest support to the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General (SRSG) and the United Nations Organization Stabilization
Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in the implementation of their mandate, and
strongly encouraging the continuation of their efforts,
Reiterating its deep concern regarding the security and humanitarian crisis in
eastern DRC due to ongoing destabilizing activities of foreign and domestic armed
groups, and stressing the importance of neutralizing all armed groups, including the
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic
Forces (ADF), the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Bakata-Katanga and various
Mayi Mayi groups,
Welcoming the end of the rebellion by the 23 March Movement (M23) and the
signing in Nairobi by the M23, the Government of DRC, the SADC and the ICGLR
of the documents concluding the Kampala Dialogue facilitated by Uganda as chair
of the ICGLR, stressing the importance of ensuring that all provisions of the signed
documents are implemented swiftly and in good faith and, in this regard, that the
M23 does not regroup and resume military activities, in line with the Nairobi
declarations and relevant Security Council resolutions,
Expressing deep concern regarding the sustained regional threat posed by the
FDLR, a group under UN sanctions whose leaders and members include perpetrators
of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, during which Hutu and others
who opposed the genocide were also killed, and have continued to promote and
commit ethnically-based and other killings in Rwanda and the DRC, and stressing
the importance of permanently addressing this threat,
Expressing concern that the FDLR, as well as other armed groups, continue to
have freedom of movement in the DRC, noting with deep concern reports indicating
FARDC collaboration with the FDLR at a local level and welcoming in this regard
the plans by the FARDC, supported by MONUSCO, to neutralize the FDLR, and
stressing the need to put such plans into sustained action,
Recalling the Security Council’s Presidential Statements on the Central
African Region and the LRA, including S/PRST/2013/18 and S/PRST/2013/6,
commending the important ongoing efforts being undertaken by MONUSCO in the
fight against the LRA, encouraging further efforts of the AU-Regional task force,
and urging greater cooperation and information-sharing between relevant UN
bodies, the AU-Regional Task Force regional forces and non-governmental
organisations in tackling the threat of the LRA,
Expressing deep concern regarding the increasing number of internally
displaced persons in the DRC, now reaching more than 2.9 million, and the over
Annex 28
Annex 29
Charles Yaxley, U.N.H.C.R., Uganda hosts record 500,000 refugees and asylum-seekers
(18 Dec. 2015)
Home News and Stories News
Uganda hosts record 500,000 refugees and
asylum-seekers
Numbers reach 510,973, making Uganda the third-largest refugee-hosting country in
Africa after Ethiopia and Kenya.
By Charlie Yaxley; ed. Tim Gaynor | 18 December 2015 F|r a nçais | عرب ي
Burundian refugee Larson talks with a customer at his pharmacy in Nakivale refugee settlement in Uganda. © UNHCR/F. Noy
KAMPALA, Uganda, Dec 18 (UNHCR) - More than half a million people fleeing violence and human rights abuses,
mostly from South Sudan, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo, have now found protection and safety in
Uganda.
By early December, Uganda had become home to almost 511,000 refugees and asylum-seekers, the highest
number ever in the country’s history. More than 100,000 have so far arrived in 2015, making Uganda the thirdlargest
refugee-hosting country in Africa, after Ethiopia (736,000) and Kenya (594,000).
Uganda is widely recognized as having progressive and forward-thinking refugee and asylum policies. Upon
receiving refugee status, refugees are provided with small areas of land in villages integrated within the local host
community; a pioneering approach that enhances social cohesion and allows both refugees and host communities
to live together peacefully.
Refugees have access to the same services as Ugandan nationals, have the right to work and to establish their
own businesses. They enjoy freedom of movement and are given land for agricultural use, reducing dependency
on humanitarian aid.
The government has also included refugee management and protection within its own domestic planning in the
National Development Plan (NDP II), through the [refugee] Settlement Transformative Agenda. This approach
means Uganda has created a fertile environment for including long-term development planning into the
humanitarian response for refugees and their host communities.
More than 17,000 Burundians refugees have arrived in Uganda this year, among them Larson, aged 29. He
recently set up a pharmacy at the Nakivale refugee settlement and is currently trying to rebuild a life for his wife
and two children.
“People always used to say that Uganda takes good care of its refugees,” said Larson. “It’s true. I like it here. It is
peaceful. Maybe with time I could one day go back to Burundi but for now I’m focused on rebuilding things here.”
UNHCR Representative to Uganda Neimah Warsame praised Uganda for its ‘outstanding generosity and
hospitality’ shown towards refugees and asylum-seekers, and called on all partners involved in the refugee
response to work together to develop an innovative approach to refugee protection that goes beyond
emergency assistance towards providing long-term development.
By Charlie Yaxley in Kampala, Uganda
Related news and stories
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Annex 29
Annex 30
U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, DR Congo: Weekly Humanitarian
Update (19-23 June 2017) (23 June 2017)
Date of creation: 23 June 2017 | Sources: OCHA and Partners | Feedback: [email protected] | www.unocha.org/drc | www.reliefweb.int | https://rdc.humanitarianresponse.info/fr | Twitter: @UNOCHA_DRC
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
NIGERIA
BURUNDI
RWANDA
UGANDA
TANZANIA
CHAD
REPUBLIC
OF
GABON CONGO
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
CAMEROON
REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH SUDAN
ANGOLA
ZAMBIA
Nord-Ubangi Bas-Uele
Sud-Ubangi
Nord-Kivu
Kasaï Central
Sankuru
Kinshasa
Maï-Ndombe
Maniema
Kasaï-
Oriental
Ituri
Sud-Kivu
Tanganyika
Tshopo
Tshuapa
Kasaï
Lomami
Lualaba
Kwilu
Kwango
Kongo Central
Equateur
Mongala
Haut-Katanga
Haut-Lomami
Haut-Uele
SOUTH KIVU: NEW US-AID 5-YEAR PROJECT TARGETS
180,000 PEOPLE
On 22 June, the United States International Development Agency
(USAID) officially launched a new 5-year food security programme
targeting some180,000 people in Kabare and Kalehe territories,
near the border with North Kivu. Awarded to a consortium led by
Mercy Corps that includes World Vision and Harvest Plus and two
Congolese NGOs, the project aims to improve food security,
nutrition and economic well-being. The project, which de facto
started in October 2016, runs until September 2021.
TANGANYIKA: ASSISTANCE FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE
12,000 displaced people, who have found refuge in Katanika after
fleeing violence in Kalemie Territory in December 2016 and
January 2017, on June 19 started receiving essential household
items and shelter through a USAID-funded fair organized by the
NGO Catholic Relief Service. This assistance complements aid
received earlier that included food from WFP, and health, hygiene
and sanitation assistance from international NGOs as Oxfam.
ITURI: AVIAN, MALNUTRITION AND SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
On 16 June, The UN's Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)
experts provincial health authorities recorded the deaths of over
22,000 ducks, 2,000 chickens and 300 pigeons due to the avian
flu. Since the disease appeared in the province in April, 16
outbreaks have been recorded in three of the five territories of Ituri
(Djugu, Irumu and Mahagi). To combat the spread of the disease,
poultry is being slaughtered in the affected areas. FAO and
provincial authorities estimate that some $1.5 million is needed.
The prospect of the disease affecting neighboring provinces is very
high, the experts have said.
More than 400,000 children under five suffer from chronic
malnutrition in Ituri Province, according to a report of DRC’s
National Nutrition Program (PRONANUT) published on June 16
that cited poverty, population displacement and poor dietary
habits as contributing factors. The humanitarian community
estimates that malnutrition has become, by its scale, a major
public health issue, contributing to nearly half of the mortality of
children under five years. Humanitarian actors estimate that some
3.5 million children are affected across the country, of which 1.9
million suffer from severe acute malnutrition. Read here our story
on malnutrition in Haut-Lomami Province.
39 cases of rape were registered in May 2017 in Irumu Territory,
Ituri Province, according to sexual violence experts. 29 of the cases
were committed in Bunia while the remaining ten cases were
committed in locations where militiamen launched attacks on
civilians in the south of Irumu Territory. 66 percent of survivors
were minors under 18; 20 percent of suspected perpetrators were
also minors. UNICEF, international NGO Trocaire and a Congolese
organization teamed up to provide the necessary assistance. In
2016, 85% of the cases of sexual gender-based violence reported
in Ituri. While there is a clear improvement in the medical and
psychosocial assistance, legal and judicial assistance and
KASAI CRISIS: FUNDING TRICKLING IN, ACTORS
RAMPING UP PRESENCE
Over 500 girls and boys have been enrolled as child soldiers
within the armed groups fighting in the Kasai region and some
600 cases of sexual violence have been recorded since the
beginning of the crisis in August 2016, protection experts have
reported. While these statistics are grim, the reality, particularly on
sexual violence, is likely more troubling as many cases go
unreported. Across the three Kasai provinces, protection of civilians
remains the foremost challenge. Two months after the humanitarian
community launched a USD $64.5-million appeal for the crisis,
funding has been slowly trickling in. On 22 June, Humanitarian
Coordinator Mamadou Diallo disbursed $3 million from the
Humanitarian Fund, raising to $7.5 million the Fund’s
contributions to the response. While waiting for funding, UN
agencies, international and national NGOs are ramping up their
presence in the region. Our latest report is available here.
DR Congo: Weekly Humanitarian Update 19 - 23 June 2017
Annex 30
Annex 31
U.N. Secretary General, The Secretary-General’s opening remarks to the Uganda Solidarity
Summit on Refugees (23 June 2017)
Annex 31
1/18/2018 The Secretary-General's opening remarks to the Uganda Solidarity Summit on Refugees I United Nations Secretary-General
New York
23 June 2017
United Nations
Secretary-General
TheS ecretary-Generoapl'esn inrge marktso theU gandSa olidaritSyu mmiot nR efugees
Your Excellency President Museveni,
Excellencies,
All protocol observed,
Kampala, 22 June 2017
Twelve years ago I became on the 15th of June High Commissioner for Refugees. On the 18th of June caught a plane to fly to Uganda to visit South Sudanese refugees to celebrate
with them World Refugee Day.
This was a moment during in which the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was being established and peace between north and south was finally being achieved.
There was enormous hope in the refugees I met. There was singing and dancing with the perspect ive of going back home. And, indeed, in the following years UNHRC helped about half
a million South Sudanese return home, full of hope in the future of their country.
Now, seven years after the independence, yesterday I returned to the same place in the northern part of Uganda, I witnessed what has been the biggest exodus of refugees in Africa
since the Rwandan genocide.
This is what we are facing today: the biggest refugee exodus in African since the Rwandan genocide.
You can't imagine what it means for me, after also having been in South Sudan, as High Commissioner for Refugees, two or three years ago and meeting people who came to see me to
say: "we saw you in northern Ugandaa nd now we are displaced againHa nd yesterday feeling the same despair.
The first conclusion is obvious: everything must be done to end the war in South Sudan.
I want to express my deep appreciation for the efforts that you, Mr. President [Yoweri Museveni of Uganda], are making in order to create the conditions for those who in the past were
united In the liberation movement of the country [South Sudan] to come back again Into unity and to be able to establish peace In the country.
At the same time, it Important to underline that Uganda that, in the past, received these South Sudanese refugees and I had the opportunity when visiting the same area that I visited
yesterday, to see that they were not in camps but in so-called settlements that are in reality villages, like villages of the Ugandese people. This allows them to farm the land, allows them
to go to the same schools, the same health centers, to have jobs, to allow them to have normal lives, to live in dignity.
It is necessary for the international community to recognize that Uganda has had an exemplary refugee policy in the past and, even today faced with the largest refugee in-flow of the
past year, Uganda remains a symbol of the integrity of the refugee protection regime that unfonunately is not being respected everywhere in the world.
I have seen Uganda's borders open, I have seen the doors of Uganda's people open, I have seen the hearts of the Ugandan people open.
But not all doors are open in the world. Not all refugees are accepted, some are rejected, and sometimes In countries much richer than Uganda. So it's also necessary to look Into this
example and to say clearly that the international community must come together and re-establish the integrity of the refugee protection regime everywhere in the world.
And, at the same time, the international community needs to step up and needs to give to the Ugandan people and to the refugees hosted by the Ugandan people the kind of support
that is absolutely needed because the circumstances in which these sacrifices are being made are extremely extremely challenging.
I have seen a situation in which 160 students only have one teacher, health centres where people sleep on the ground because there are not enough beds.
The World Food Programme ls struggllng to be able to feed the refugee population and, unfortunately, Is not able to provide the quantity that is necessary for a healthy development.
namely for children.
At the same time, we see the impact on the environment of the local communities. We see how difficult it is to for many of the members of these communities to find a job when the
labour market is overwhelmed by such a dramatic presence of refugees.
On the other hand, climate change is also impacting on Uganda. Drought is being severe. Uganda is facing its own problem is relation to drought and in relation food security in several
areas.
International solidarity with Uganda is not a matter of generosity, it's a matter of justice. International solidarity is absolutely crucial at the present moment.
https://www.un.org/sg/en/contenl/sg/statemenl/2017 -06-23/secretary-generals-opening-remarks-uganda-solidartty-summit-refugees 1/2
Annex 31
1/18/2018 The Secretary-General's opening remarks to the Uganda Solidarity Summit on Refugees I United Nations Secretary-General
An appeal for all those present here to step up to our common responsibility to support refugees and to our common responsibility to recognize the enormous sacrifice the Ugandan
people are making and to support this country in this very challenging moment.
I must say that the cooperation between the Uganda government and the Uganda [UN] country team is exemplary.
New instruments, namely innovative financial instruments are being created to allow for a perfect articulation of these efforts.
I do believe that we have in Uganda an example that, from the point of view of UN reform can be extremely helpful to give us clear indication on how we can work together with other
governments, in other parts of the world, in order to make sure that the Sustainable Development Goals are met and no one is left behind.
In this moment, it is absolutely essential to recognize this enormous effort and not to let Ugandan people down.
Your solidarity today is a must because without that solidarity this effort is not sustainable and, if this effort is not sustainable, the impact on the stability of the region will be absolutely
dramatic.
It's time for us all to assume our responsibilities and I count on your commitment and your solidarity.
Thank you very much.
https://www.un.org/sg/en/contenl/sg/statemenl/2017 -06-23/secretary-generals-opening-remarks-uganda-solidarity-summit-refugees 2/2
Annex 32
U.N. Security Council, 7998th Meeting, Security Council Members Stress Need for Democratic
Republic of Congo to Hold Fair, Free, Inclusive Elections without Further Delay, U.N. Doc.
SC/12907 (11 July 2017)
Annex 32
1/18/2018 Security Council Members Stress Need for Democratic Republic of Congo to Hold Fair, Free, Inclusive Elections without Further Delay I Meetin ...
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Several Security Council members insisted today that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo hold free,
fair, and inclusive elections by the end of the year and without further delay, as the head of United Nations peacekeeping
briefed them on the situation in that country.
Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, painted a grim picture of the situation on the
ground, saying that overcoming the current political impasse, rising insecurity and worsening humanitarian conditio ns
would require the concerted effort of the Government in Kinshasa as well as regional and international actors.
He was presenting the Secretary-General's reports on implementation of the political agreement of 31 December 2016 in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (document 5/2017/435 lhttp://undocs ori,:/S/2016/1130ll. and on the United Nations
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (document S/2017/565
(http://undocs.org/S/2016/1130ll. He expressed concern that imp lementation of the 31 December political agreement -
which sets out a blueprint for the country's peaceful transition of power through democratic elections by the end of 2017 -
had stalled, and that critical institutions, essential to holding elections, had still not been established . Fighting and violence
continued at disturbing levels and the number of displaced people, now well into the millions, continued to rise.
Human rights violations remained widespread, some even perpetrated by Government forces, he continued, emphasizing
the vital role of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).
Through a combination of human rights monitoring and political outreach, the Mission was helping to restore a measure of
stability wherever it could. While encouraged by President Joseph Kabila's assurances of his determination to ensure that
crimes would not go unpunished, he emphasized that such statements must be followed by action . The level of cooperation
that Kinshasa would provide to the team of international investigators appointed by the Human Rights Council would be a
test of its commitment to accountability.
In the ensuing discussion, the repr esentative of the United States said the Congolese people deserved to have their voices
heard. The United States would take action to sanction anybody who stood in the way of the transition to democracy, she
warned, emphasizing: ''The election must not be delayed." Those responsible for undermining peace and security in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo must be held accountable, she added, underlining the international community's narrow
window of opportunity to exert pressure on the Congolese Government to stand by its commitments.
Several Council members also stre ssed the need to move forward with election preparations, with France's representative
calling upon the authorities to publish an electoral schedule, as stipulated in the 31 December political agreement . The
United Kingdom's representa tive pointed out that political uncertainty in Kinshasa was fuelling violent instability across the
country and threatenin g the wid er region .
The recent spate of violence in the Kasai" provinces was particularly worrisom e, Council members stressed, with Bolivia's
speaker noting with concern the 1,400 human rights violations that had occurred between March and May. Armed groups
had recruited more than 500 children, and 600 cases of sexual violence had been recorded since August 2016. ''This type of
violence should not go unpunished," he emphasized. Japan's representative, noting that the Catholic Church had reported
3,300 killings in Kasai" since last October , urged the Council to monitor whether MONUSCO's current posture was sufficient to
ensure dynamic prote ction of civilians.
Council members also voiced support for the inte rnatio nal investigation mandated by the Human Rights Council, urging the
Congolese Government to offer its full cooperation. No stone should be left unturned in efforts to deliver justice in the
murd er of United Nation s experts Zaida Catalan and Michael Sharp, Sweden's repres entative stressed.
Responding, the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo said the investigation into the killing of the United
Nations experts was under way, and the Government would conduct it in a transparent manner. He added that 11 suspects
had been arr ested, eight of whom had been identified as having played a direct role in the two murders. He also expressed
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surprise at the virulence of the Council's criticism of his country's law-enforcement agencies, insisting they had not
committed abuses. The Government condemned abuse and had adopted measures to punish perpetrators, he emphasized.
Turning to the elections, he said efforts were under way to update the voter register and 13 of the country's 26 provinces
had been covered. However, operations had not yet begun in Kasa"i and Kasa"i-central due to insecurity created by the
Kamwina Nsapu militia. However, the Electoral Commission had registered 33 million of an expected 45 million voters, he
added, stressing that the polls required the participation of all provinces. "We cannot envisage the conduct of such critical
presidential elections while excluding the Kasa"i provinces," he said, stressing that the results must be credible. 'We need to
avoid unrest."
As for security, he said some 1,700 militia members had laid down their arms and received reintegration kits from the
Government. In response to MONUSCO's claim of having discovered seven mass graves, he said only one body had been
discovered in one alleged grave, while a 12-calibre weapon had been found in the second.
Also speaking today were representatives of Uruguay, Kazakhstan and Italy.
The meeting began at 10:06 a.m. and ended at 11 :20 a.m.
Briefing
JEAN-PIERRELA CROIX,U nder-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, said the number of people displaced by
violence in Kasa"i had now reached 1.3 million, also expressing concern that critical institutions had still not been established
six months before elections were due to take place at the end of 2017, and that implementation of the political agreement of
31 December 2016 had stalled. The Government also required strong Council support to address challenges amid
persistent instability, particularly in the east and west of the country.
He went on to state that in North Kivu Province, in particular, Mayi-Mayi groups, among others, had recently conducted raids
against FARDC positions. Clashes between ethically-based militias in North Kivu continued, while armed groups in South
Kivu Province had been increasingly involved in conflicts related to customary succession, and others concerning
intercommunal and transhumance-related disputes. Additionally, the conflicts in neighbouring Burundi and South Sudan
had been spilling over into the Democratic Republic of the Congo's eastern lturi and South Kivu provinces, he noted.
The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), he said,
continued to support the FARDC in operations against the Front for Patriotic Resistance in lturi (FRPI) in lturi, and against the
Lord's Resistance Party (LRA) in Haut-Uele. The Mission was also supporting local and community dialogue efforts in North
and South Kivu, as well as in Maniema and Tanganyika provinces. That approach was grounded in the conviction that
although military efforts might sometimes be necessary, only a political solution could effectively address the root causes of
the various conflicts.
Yet, the violence in western Democratic Republic of the Congo had reached disturbing levels, he emphasized, noting that the
Kamuina Nsapu militia had targeted and killed dozens of people and attacked voter-registration centres, schools and
religious institutions. Through a combination of human rights monitoring and political outreach, he continued, MONUSCO
was helping to restore a measure of stability wherever it could, but despite its efforts, disturbing daily reports of human
rights abuses and violations continued. Dozens of mass graves had been reported, but, so far, national investigation efforts
had been slow.
He went on to emphasize the determination of the United Nations to ensure that those responsible for the killing of Michael
Sharp and Zaida Catalan were brought to justice. While encouraged by President Joseph Kabila's assurances about his
determination to ensure that crimes committed in the Kasa"i provinces would not go unpunished, he underlined that such
statements must be followed by action. The level of cooperation and support that the Government would provide to the
team of international investigators appointed by the Human Rights Council would be a test of its commitment to
accountability, he stressed. The current political impasse, rising insecurity, and the worsening human rights and
humanitarian situation in the country required a concerted response from its regional and international partners that must
help to create the conditions for a successful transition and for free, fair and inclusive elections.
Statements
FRANt;OIS DELATIRE (France) emphasized that elections must be held in fewer than six months, and pressed the
Government to reaffirm its commitment to uphold the 31 December agreement. The organization of elections,
establishment of the national follow-up council and implementation of confidence-building measures were critical. Noting
that there had been registration delays in Kasa"i and Kinshasa, he called on the authorities to publish an electoral schedule,
as stipulated in the 31 December political agreement. Increasing violence in the west required attention, especially in Kasa"i,
where fighting had reached an unbearable level, he said, adding that he was equally troubled by instability elsewhere that
had inflamed intercommunal tensions. Urging belligerents to lay down their weapons, he said the authorities must
investigate violations and hold perpetrators accountable before the judiciary. He also urged the Government to cooperate
with the international mission of experts deployed by the Human Rights Council, stressing that MONUSCO must focus on
protecting civilians and providing support for the 31 December agreement.
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STEPHEN HICKEY (United Kingdom} said people in Kasa"i were facing "the darkest moments of their lives" amid mass killings,
beheadings, mass graves, displacement and reports that Government security forces were responsible. When faced with
hell, people should be able look to the Government with hope, which could not be said for those in Kasa"i, he said, noting
that militias were also responsible for rapes, killings and recruiting children. The international investigation mandated by
the Human Rights Council must start as soon as possible and be conducted with transparency, he emphasized, urging the
Government to offer its full cooperation. Meanwhile political uncertainty in Kinshasa was fuelling violent instability across
the country, threatening the wider region, he said, pressing the Government to stop the violence, ensure accountability for
abuses and implement the 31 December political agreement. The Electoral Commission must release a timetable for the
polls and agree a budget so that international funds could be released, he said.
ELBIO ROSSELL(IU ruguayl said that, as a contributor of personnel to MONUSCO, his country's Government was concerned
about the slow implementation of the 31 December 2016 political agreement and the adverse trends in various parts of the
country. The political agreement remained the only viable solution to the ongoing violence and its implementation should
be the Government's main focus, he emphasized. Expressing concern about negative trends, primarily in the areas of
security and human rights, he said there was increasing violence among ethnic communities and in urban areas, noting that
a staggering number of civilians had been forced to flee their homes. Expressing concern about human rights violations,
particularly against women and children, he said it was disconcerting to hear that half of the violence was committed by
State officers. It was the Government's responsibility to respect, and ensure respect, for human rights, he said, underlining
that the national authorities must begin investigations to ensure that the crimes did not go unpunished.
KAI RAT UMAROV (Kazakhstan) said the implementation of the 31 December political agreement must be supported by
regional and international actors. He condemned attacks against civilians, including gender-based violence, emphasizing:
"All armed groups must drop their weapons and cease all forms of violence." Calling upon the Government to neutralize all
armed groups, he said the scale of human rights violations against children had reached its highest peaks in recent years.
The Government had a responsibility to bring criminals to account, he stressed, noting also that the economic situation
continued to undermine humanitarian efforts.
OLOF SKOOG (Sweden) said all signatories must implement the 31 December political agreement, thereby paving the way
for free, peaceful and credible elections - the only way out of the humanitarian, economic and security crisis. He also
encouraged strong, continuous engagement by regional actors, stressing that MONUSCO's mandate, with its focus on
supporting the political process, compelled the United Nations to act strategically. There was a need for consultations with
the Secretariat to ensure the Mission's ability to fulfil its tasks, he added. Concerning the killing of United Nations experts
Zaida Catalan and Michael Sharp, he emphasized that no stone should be left unturned in efforts to deliver justice in that
case. Sweden, in cooperation with the Secretary-General, would continue to explore how the United Nations could support
ongoing national investigations to establish the truth and bring the perpetrators to justice, he said, suggesting an additional
investigative mechanism as one option.
RENE ERNESTO FERNANDEZ REVOLLO (Bolivia) said violence by armed groups affected civilians and had led to clashes
between communities, adding that the worsening humanitarian situation included 1,400 human rights violations between
March and May. In Kasa"fa, rmed groups had recruited more than 500 children and 600 cases of sexual violence had been
recorded since August 2016, alongside reports of human trafficking. Condemning and calling for the investigation of any
sexual exploitation or abuse, he said: ''This type of violence should not go unpunished." There were 1.3 million displaced
people in Kasa"i,a nd 3.8 million throughout the country, he said, noting that some 400,000 children under the age of five
years suffered from malnutrition, while attacks by armed groups on hospitals and medical centres fuelled the humanitarian
crisis. MONUSCO must step up efforts to neutralize armed groups and protect civilians, including by improving earlywarning
systems, he said. Moreover, the 31 December political agreement was the road map for organizing elections, he
noted, expressing concern that no oversight mechanisms had been established. There was also a need for inclusive
dialogue that would consider the views of all stakeholders, he said.
MICHELEJ. SISON (United States} said the United Nations and the wider international community had worked tirelessly for
years to bring peace to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Commending the efforts of the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), she said the United States would remain
committed to ensuring that it fulfilled its mandate. In the same vein, the Congolese people must be empowered to have
their voices heard through the upcoming elections, she said, emphasizing: ''The election must not be delayed." Warning that
the United States would take action to sanction anybody who stood in the way of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's
first transition to democracy, she underlined that those responsible for undermining peace and security in the country must
be held accountable. The return to horrific violence must be disturbing for the Council, she said, noting that hundreds, if not
thousands, of children had been forced to join armed groups. Noting that such occurrences reflected an absence of State
authority, she emphasized that the bottom line was clear: the United States supported holding elections on time, and with a
narrow window of opportunity to pressure the Government to stand by its commitment; "we cannot let history to repeat
itself'.
ANDREA BIAGINI (]1gjy) said the spill-over effect of violence from the Democratic Republic of the Congo into neighbouring
countries must not be taken lightly. All perpetrators of violence must be held accountable for their actions. The focus of all
parties must now be on leading the country towards democratic and transparent elections, he said, welcoming efforts to
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speed up election preparations. Italy would continue to support MONUSCO, he pledged, noting that the Mission played a
vital role in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
KORO BESSH O (@Qiill)e xpressed deep concern over the situation, and regret that little progress had been made in
implementation of the 31 December political agreement. With prospects for the timely holding of elections uncertain , Japan
was concerned that the Electoral Commission would be unable to hold the polls by the end of the end of 2017. The Council
must send a clear message that the political agreement must be implemented swiftly, he emphasized. He expressed
support for MONUSCO, noting that it had relocated personnel to the country's western and southern regions so as to better
respond to challenges. Noting that the Catholic Church had reported 3,300 killings in Kasa"i since last October, he said the
Council should monitor whether the Mission's current posture was sufficient to ensure dynamic protection of civilians.
IGNACE GATA MAVITA WA LU FUT A (Democratic Republic of the Congol said that , due to the lack of flexibility and concessions
on the part of the Rassemblement des forces politique s et sociales, the nomination of Government member s had been
delayed. The same attitude had prevailed during the signing of ar rangements, which had delayed the creation of t he council
tasked with monitoring the follow-up to implementation of the 31 December political agreement (National Follow-up
Council). A preparatory meeting of that Council on 3July had included members of the presidential majority, opposit ion
signatories to the 18 October accord, elements of the Rassemblement, and those affiliated with the late opposition leader
Felix Tshisekedi, he said. A second meeting involving the same individuals would focus on validating the mandates of
members and drawing up internal rules of procedures.
Turning to the elections, he said work was under way to update the voter register and 13 of the country's 26 provinces had
been covered. However, operation s were yet to start in Kasa·i and Kasa"-iCentral due to insecurity created by the Kamwina
Nsapu militia. The Electoral Commission's offices had been set ablaze, and where the situation had cooled down, new
materials were being distributed. Registration was set to begin on 20 July in the two provinces, he said, emphasizing the
importance for those who had fled to return home and participate in order to demonstrate greater civic mindedness.
Furthermore, political stakeholders and the international commun ity should avoid rhetor ic that could rekindle tensions.
Noting that the Electoral Commission had registered 33 million of an expected 45 million voters, he emphasized t hat all
provinces must participate in the polls. 'We cannot envisage the conduct of such critical presidential elections while
excluding the Kasa"i provinces," he said, stressing that the results must be credible. 'We need to avoid unrest."
On the security front, he said the Government was aware of the t roubling situation in the two Kasa"i provinces and the army
was working to restore order and eradicate armed groups. Some 1,700 militia members had laid down their arms and
received reintegration kits from the Government, while 138 children had left the ranks of those armed groups and been
handed over to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and MONUSCO. Regarding the alleged involvement of
Government troops in violations, he said "marginal elements" in the army had committed atrocities against civilians in
Muanza Lomba and had been condemned by a military tribunal.
Proceedings also were also under way to investigate the murde rs of the two United Nations experts, he added, emphasizing
that the Government would conduct the investigation in a transparent manner, and welcomed the request the United States
that it participate in the investigation through the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Congolese authorities were also ready to
work with Sweden if so requested, he added, noting that 11 suspects had been arrested, eight of whom had been identified
as having played a direct role in the murders.
He went on to express surprise at the virulence of Council membe rs' attacks on the country's law enforcement forces, saying
they had not perpetrated abuses. The Government condemned abuse and had adopted measures to punish perpet rators,
he emphasized. Responding to comments about violence in the Kasa"i provinces, he explained that when militias attacked
law-enforcement officers, the latter were then accused of taking part in beheadings. "How would your law-enforcement
officers react?" he asked. 'We need to avoid double standards here ." He reassured the Council that justice would be
delivered for the two United Nations experts, the four Congolese who had accompanied them and all compatriots victimized
by the Kamwina Nsapu militia.
In response to MONUSCO's claims of having discovered seven mass graves, he said only one body had been found in one
alleged grave, adding that a 12-calibre weapon had been discovered in the second. It was important that the authorities
establish their existence, although they had been announced "with great fanfare". Most ref ugees in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo were from neighbouring countries, he said, pointing out the existence of numerous foreign armed groups. A
regional approach to the situation was critical. MONUSCO had yet to see the reduction of 3,600 "Blue Helmets", he said,
adding that the same had been true of making the Force Intervention Brigade operational, which had only happened after
current troops had been replaced with more seasoned units better equipped to tackle the asymmetric war.
0 Fori nformatiomn edia.N ota n officiarl ecord.
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Annex 33
Catherine Wachiaya, U.N.H.C.R., Eager refugees cram crowded classrooms in Ugandan school
(11 Sept. 2017)
Annex 33
UNHCR - Eager refugees cram crowded classrooms in Ugandan school
http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/stories/2017/9/59b686104/eager-refugees-c… 5:22:15 PM]
By Catherine Wachiaya in Bidibidi refugee settlement, Uganda | 11 September
2017 | Français | عربي
At first light, teacher Patrick Abale leaves his tent,
pitched among others on the edge of Yangani
Primary School in the Bidibidi settlement in
northern Uganda.
He strides towards the administration block, drops off his books in the office he
shares with the school principal and turns to look at the first few pupils arriving.
“When I joined here there were more than 6,000 pupils in this school,” he says, as
the sound of stamping and shuffling feet gradually fills the chill morning air.
The trickle of arrivals turns into a torrent. By now students are pouring in from all
directions.
Eager refugees cram crowded
classrooms in Ugandan school
Yangani Primary School in the Bidibidi refugee settlement in northern Uganda
has 5,000 students and a staff of just 38.
search
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Uganda: Yangani Primary School has 5,000 pupils
When it first opened several months ago, there was a rush to enrol, and the school
was forced to turn some children away because of the lack of space, reducing the
number to about 5,000 today, which, Patrick notes, is “a very big number”.
Patrick, a Ugandan, is a deputy principal in charge of academic studies and
administration at Yangani. It is a Ugandan state school and, although the children
are mostly refugees, there are some local pupils here, too.
Despite the pupil numbers, the school has a staff of only 38. In 10 years of teaching,
Patrick has worked in some difficult environments but Yangani is on a different
scale.
Spread over roughly two acres, the school is a patchwork of tattered plastic tents,
many with holes, flapping in the wind. A sloping valley separates the administration
area and upper primary classes on one side from the lower primary classes on the
other. Inside the classrooms the temperature soon rises and children squirm in
discomfort.
“Things are really tough here because there just isn’t enough space for all the
students,” Patrick says, gesturing into one of the classrooms.
A glance inside reveals a crowded scene: children occupy every available space,
with as many as five sharing a desk. Some sit on the floor, others stand at the back
“There just isn’t enough space for all the students.”
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and in the aisles, clutching their books to their chests.
“Sometimes, because of the congestion, they stand next to the teacher at the front of
the class,” Patrick says.
Yangani school opened in February this year to cater to the rapidly growing numbers
of South Sudanese refugees. Uganda has been among the most generous
countries in its response to the influx, welcoming refugees, giving them plots of land
and making public services, including education, available.
Now host to nearly 2 million people who have fled South Sudan, 60 per cent of them
children, Uganda is struggling to keep up.
According to the education ministry, the standard teacher-to-student ratio should be
one to 45. There should be three children to a desk, and 14 to every lavatory.
Yangani breaches these rules by a wide margin. As an administrator, Patrick tries to
ensure that learning materials are shared equally across the classes. “We now have
279 textbooks for all students, so you can imagine how tough it is to share,” he
says. That is one textbook to every 18 children.
UNHCR, the Ugandan education ministry and partner organizations are looking for
ways to increase capacity, setting up more schools and working with national and
local officials to identify existing ones that can expand.
In this way, they hope to bring more refugee children into the national education
system and raise standards for refugees and local communities. Uganda cannot do
this on its own. “The government is already doing its level best, so we are calling for
more donor support to fill the gaps,” says Julius Okello, a UNHCR field officer in
Bidibidi.
I am introduced to 17-year-old Bashir, who fled his home in South Sudan last
November. Now he lives in Bidibidi as an unaccompanied minor. His parents stayed
behind but he has no idea what has happened to them.
There were no other schools nearby so he had to wait for months before Yangani
opened and he could enrol. Bashir is in his last year of primary school and he says
he is doing his best to study diligently, but admits it can be hard.
“We don’t have enough books,” he says. “If you get a little money, you can buy
“Schools like Yangani are filling a crucial
gap.”
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some, but most students can’t afford them. Some of us who don’t have parents here
struggle.”
The brimful classrooms are evidence that there is plenty of demand for education.
Most refugees are settled in areas a long way from existing state-run schools.
Setting up new ones not only gets refugee children into the national education
system, but also raises capacity and standards for local communities. “Schools like
Yangani are filling a crucial gap,” Okello says.
However, it is difficult for children to learn under such constrained circumstances.
“There are no boundaries to separate the classes. Two different classes take place
next to each other, so whatever is being taught in one class is heard in the next
one.”
Patrick surveys the ranks of children before heading off to teach another class.
“Imagine only 38 teachers for all these students,” he says. “You can get
overwhelmed.”
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Annex 34
U.N.H.C.R., U.N.H.C.R. warns of worsening displacement in Democratic Republic of Congo (24
Oct. 2017)
Annex 34
UNHCR - UNHCR warns of worsening displacement in Democratic Republic of the Congo
http://www.unhcr.org/...ws/briefing/2017/10/59eefe3e4/unhcr-warns-worse… 4:23:05 PM]
UNHCR warns of worsening
displacement in Democratic Republic
of the Congo
This is a summary of what was said by UNHCR spokesperson Adrian
Edwards – to whom quoted text may be attributed – at today's press
briefing at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.
24 October 2017 | Français | عربي
A family flee violence in Kamonia, Kasai province. © UNHCR/John Wessels
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UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, is increasingly concerned by escalating
displacement we are seeing in several key regions of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. Since 2015 the number of people displaced internally has more than
doubled and now stands at 3.9 million people – some 428,000 of these having been
displaced in the past three months alone. Over the past year, some 100,000
Congolese have fled to neighbouring countries as refugees. With widespread militia
activities, and unrest and violence fueled by ethnic and political conflict affecting
many areas, the risk of further displacement is high. The challenges of getting aid to
people in need are growing fast.
See also: Civilians in DRC struggle for survival amid growing violence
at home
Tanganyika province
In the eastern province of Tanganyika, where some 584,000 people are internally
displaced, intercommunal conflict between the Twa and Luba groups spilled into
neighboring Haut-Katanga province earlier this year. Clashes with the army
continue and there is wide prevalence of armed militia. Scores of civilians have
been forced to flee, and there have been reports of murders, looting and extortion,
and torture or other inhumane treatment. With people finding it difficult to sustain
their livelihoods, more are becoming dependent on aid.
Refugees crossing from DRC into neighbouring Zambia are hosted temporarily at
the Kenani transit center, close to the border. Over 5,400 people are currently
staying at the center, receiving assistance from the authorities, UNHCR and
partners. As the rainy season has started, it is becoming urgently important to beef
up public health, sanitation and water supplies to prevent diseases. Psychosocial
support, as well as care for people with specific needs – some 27 per cent of the
refugee population – is also urgently required.
North and South Kivu provinces
Further north in the east of DRC, violence involving mostly local armed groups is
also plaguing North and South Kivu provinces. In North Kivu alone, over one million
people are displaced. In South Kivu, where 545,000 people are internally displaced,
the security situation further deteriorated in September as conflicts escalated
between militias and the armed forces in the territories of Fizi and Uvira. Fear is
widespread, including among the 30,000 Burundian refugees hosted at Lusenda
camp in Fizi.
Congolese from North Kivu have mainly been fleeing to Uganda, and those from
South Kivu to Tanzania – usually transiting through Burundi to escape attacks in
their villages. Currently, Uganda hosts the largest number of DRC refugees, over
236,500 people, mostly in the south-west. In Tanzania, there were 76,890 DRC
Annex 34
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http://www.unhcr.org/...ws/briefing/2017/10/59eefe3e4/unhcr-warns-worse… 4:23:05 PM]
refugees as of the end of September.
The Kasai region
Meanwhile, in the Kasai region in central-southern DRC, displaced people and
refugees who fled the violence that started over a year ago have begun to return. As
of 23 October, over 710,000 people had gone back. Many are finding their property
in ruins and family members killed. At present the situation in the Kasai region is far
from stable and humanitarian access has only just become possible in many areas.
In total, over 762,000 people are displaced in the Kasai region. In Angola’s Lunda
Norte province an additional 27,555 Congolese who have fled the Kasai conflict are
being assisted by UNHCR and partners.
UNHCR is coordinating protection activities for the displaced from the Kasai conflict,
returnees and other vulnerable civilians. We have also distributed basic relief items
and are preparing additional support, particularly for the communities where returns
take place.
In light of the situations in these three regions, UNHCR and partners have recently
upgraded the situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo to level 3 – the highest
level of emergency. UNHCR, as part of this response, will be fulfilling its
responsibilities focusing on protection and assistance of the displaced populations,
including through leadership of the Protection cluster.
Refugees
In all, there are today some 621,711 refugees from the DRC in more than 11 African
countries. And funding is urgently needed. Of some US$236.2 million required for
the needs of refugees, IDPs and other people of concern in the DRC, only US$49.7
million has been received so far – a fifth of the amount required.
At the same time, the number of refugees from neighboring countries seeking refuge
inside Democratic Republic of the Congo has grown by a third since early 2016 and
now stands at 526,000 people. We continue to see new arrivals from Burundi, the
Central African Republic and South Sudan.
For more information on this topic, please contact:
In Kinshasa, Andreas Kirchhof, [email protected], +243 817 009 484
In Geneva, Aikaterini Kitidi, [email protected], +41 79 580 83 34
Annex 35
Uganda, Act 12, the Uganda Bureau of Statistics Act, published in The Uganda Gazette, No. 36,
Vol. XCI, Acts Supplement No. 7 (11 June 1998)
Act 12 THE UGANDA BUREAU OF STATISTICS ACT 1998
ACTS SUPPLMENT NO.7
11TH June, 1998
ACTS SUPPLEMENT
to The Uganda Gazette No.36 Volume XCI dated 11th June, 1998.
Printed by UPPC, Entebbe, by order of the Government
Act 12 THE UGANDA BUREAU OF STATISTICS ACT 1998
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS
Part 1 – PRELIMINARY
Section
1. Short title
2. Interpretation
Part II – ESTABLISHMENT, OBJECTS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
BUREAU
3. Establishment of Bureau, application of seal and executors of
contracts.
4. Objects and functions of the Bureau
Part III - BOARD OF THE BUREAU
5. Establishment of the Board, members, qualifications, tenure
and meetings
6. Validity of proceedings of Board
7. Functions of the Board
8. The Executive Director
9. Secretary to the Board
10. Other staff
11. Authorized officers
12. Protection of members and staff from personal liability or
negligence
1
Annex 35
Act 12 THE UGANDA BUREAU OF STATISTICS ACT 1998
(a) an instrument issued by the Bureau and sealed with
the common seal of the Bureau, authenticated in
the manner prescribed in this section; or
(b) a contract or instrument entered into or executed
under subsection (7) of this section,
shall be received in evidence without further proof
as such an instrument duly issued or a contract or
instrument entered into or executed as the case
may be unless the contrary is proved.
4. (1) The Bureau shall Objects and be the principal data collecting and
functions of
the Bureau disseminating agency responsible for coordinating,
monitoring and supervising the National Statistical
System to cover matters specified in the Fourth
Schedule to this Act.
(2) The Bureau in carrying out its objects under
subsection (1) will-
(a) be responsible for-
(i) providing high quality central statistics
information services;
(ii) promoting standardization in the collection,
analysis and publication of statistics to ensure
uniformity in quality, adequacy of coverage
and reliability of statistics information;
(iii) providing guidance, training and other
assistance as may be required to other users
and providers of statistics;
(iv) Promoting cooperation, coordination and
rationalization among users and providers of
statistics at national and local levels so as to
6
Annex 35
Act 12 THE UGANDA BUREAU OF STATISTICS ACT 1998
avoid duplication of effort and ensure optimal
utilization of scarce resources;
(v) Promoting and being the focal point of
cooperation with statistics users and
providers at regional and international levels.
(b) be a source of official statistical information.
(3) Without prejudice to the general effect of
subsections (1) and (2) of this section, the Bureau may,
under this section perform the following functions-
(a) review all initiatives to collect data at the
national and local government levels and approve
instruments developed for data collection
including census frames, registers, sample
designs and questionnaires;
(b) collect, compile, analyze and publish social,
environmental, economic and national accounts
statistics;
(c) conduct censuses and surveys as the need
arises;
(d) collect routine administrative statistics;
(e) organise and maintain a central depository of
statistical reports, publications, documents and
data from both within and outside Uganda;
(f) guide and coordinate local government
statistical services;
(g) do all things necessary or incidental or
conducive to the objects of the Bureau under
this Act.
Part III – BOARD OF THE BUREAU
7
Annex 35
Act 12 THE UGANDA BUREAU OF STATISTICS ACT 1998
released to any other person without the written
consent of the Executive Director;
(c) he or she obtains from the recipient a written
undertaking to make available a copy of the
research findings to the Bureau; or
(d) he or she is satisfied that the unit records cannot
be identified as relating to any particular person or
business enterprise.
20. The Executive Director shall ensure that any statistical data
collected, after appropriate processing and ascertaining its
quality for accuracy, and also after ensuring confidentiality
with respect to any individual who provided any statistical
information to which section 19 relates is released for
general dissemination.
Dissemination
of statistical
data
21.
(1) The Bureau shall, in promoting and facilitating
development of an integrated National Statistical System
or in the exercise of any other function under this Act,
consult and cooperate with other lead agencies having
duties related to, or having aims or objectives related to
those of the Bureau.
(2) The Bureau may, on such terms and conditions considered
necessary, delegate any of the Executive Director’s
functions under this Part to any person.
Relationship
with other
lead agencies
Funds of the
Bureau and
investment
of surplus
funds
(3) It shall be the duty of all lead agencies to cooperate with
the Bureau in the carrying out of its functions under this
Act.
Part VI – FINANCE
22.
17
Annex 35
Annex 36
Letter from Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary General to Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President and
Minister of Defence, Republic of Uganda (4 May 2001)
Annex 36
Annex 37
U.N. Security Council, The Response by the Government of the Republic of Uganda to The
Addendum Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), U.N. Doc. S/2001/1163
(4 Dec. 2001)
Annex 37
United Nations
• Security Council Distr.: General
10 December 2001
Original: English
Letter dated 10 December 2001 from the Permanent
Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed
to the President of the Security Council
On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to attach herewith the
response of the Government of the Republic of Uganda to the addendum to the
report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex*).
I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex
circulated as a document of the Security Council.
(Signed) Prof. Semakula Kiwanuka, Ph.D
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative
* The annex is being circulated in the language of submission only.
01-68908 (E) 121201
11111111 1111II1I l1lI 1II l1lI 1II l1l I1II 1ll I I III
S1200111163
Annex 37
Annex to the letter dated 10 December 2001 from the Permanent
Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council
THE RESPONSE
BY TIIE GOVERNMENT OF TIIE
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
TO
THE ADDENDUM REPORT OF THE PANEL OF EXPERTS ON THE
ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION OF NATIJRAL RESOURCES AND
OTHER FORMS OF WEAL TH OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO (DRC)
MINISTRV OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
KAMP ALA. UGANDA
4th December, 2001
S/2001/1163
Annex 37
S/2001/1163
(b) The im_portancoef the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement in addressing the crisis and
the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC and bringing stability in
the Great Lakes Region.
(c) Uganda's commitment to the implementation of the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement
as demonstrated by the withdrawal of most of her troops :from the DRC.
8. The Government of Uganda still notes with very grave concern, however,
that:
(a) Serious allegations and accusations are made against high-ranking UPDF
officers and their civilian counterparts in the continued exploitation of
natural resources of the DRC without any corroborative evidence.
(b) The misconceived allegation persists that the continuation of the conflict
in the DRC is linked to illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC
in the case of Uganda.
(c) The UN Panel continues to refuse to share the sources of evidence on
allegations contained in the report with the Independent Judicial
Commission established on the recommendation of the UN Security
Council.
9. In spite of these concerns, however, the Government of Uganda will continue to
co-operate with the UN Security CoWlCil, the UN Secretary-General and the
Reconstituted UN Panel in order to establish the truth regarding the allegations against
Uganda and the high ranking officers of the UPDF mentioned in the addendum to the UN
Panel Report. Uganda encourages the UN Panel to work with the Independent Judicial
Commission (the Porter Commission) in order to establish corroborated evidence against
the high ranking officers of the UPDF or any Ugandans accused of illegal exploitation of
the natural resources of the DRC. The Government of Uganda is committed to
implementation of the recommendations of the Porter Commission.
Key elements of the Response to the Addendutmo t he Report of the UN Panel
10. The response of the Government of the Republic of Uganda to the addendum as
contained in this document covers the following points:
- Background to the addendum to the report of the UN Panel.
- Improvements and positive aspects of the addendum and its flaws.
- Response to the specific allegations against Uganda but outside the mandate
of the Justice Porter Commission.
Exploitation of natural resources and the continuation of the conflict.
- Uganda Goverrnnent comments on the Conclusions and recommendations of
the UN Panel.
- Recommendations by Uganda on the way forward.
s
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S/2001/1163
DRC. It also appreciates that Uganda has complied with the statement of the President of
the Security Council (S/PRST/2001/13) by establishing a Judicial Commission oflnquiry
into the illegal exploitation of natural resources of the DRC.
17. Seventh, the addendum remedies the earlier anomaly of focusing on Uganda,
Rwanda, Burundi and the rebel groups; and gives coverage of all the parties involved in
the DRC as well as the transit and destination countries of the natural resources of the
DRC.
m: FLAWS IN THE ADDENDUM TO THE REPORT OF THE UN PANEL
Definition of Illegality
18. The issue of 'illegality' in exploitation of natural resources of the DRC was not
tackled in the addendum yet it was a contentious issue and was raised in the response by
the Government of the Republic of Uganda to the initial UN report. Although the
addendum is silent on the definitional aspects of 'illegality', it contains elements that
clearly demonstrate agreement with Uganda's submission that, in the context of the
conflict in the DRC -:-where there is total collapse of the state institutions and structures -
exploitation of resources for survival of the people such as cross-border trade is
legitimate. Some aspects of trade carried out by the rebel groups who are in the de-facto
control of the territory cannot be classified as illegal.
Methodology
19. The methodology used in data collection and analysis in the addendum is not
stipulated. Uganda has argued that the UN Panel, for some unexplained reasons, fu.iled to
properly analyse most of the solid data provided by the technical officials in Kampala and
that no rigorous econometric and statistical analysis was contained in the Panel's report
to prove causality. Uganda has demonstrated, for example, that its high GDP growth
figures, which started in early 1990s had nothing to do with the start of the conflict in the
DRC in 1998. Rather, the economic performance has been due to sound macro-economic
policies and increased foreign investment since 1990/91. The new UN Panel, therefore,
fell short of its mandate by not directly responding to Uganda's concerns in this respect.
Hence the erroneous linkage of Uganda's economic performance to the illegal
exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC.
Corrobontion of Evidence
20. Uganda's response in May 2001 pointed out that the Panel's serious allegations
against the Uganda Government and H.E. President Y. Museveni were based on hearsay,
falsehoods and distortion of data. The mandate for the UN Panel from the UN Security
Council on the need for corroborated evidence to back up allegations is very clear.
However, the problem of uncorroborated or ignored evidence persists in the addendum
on a number ot:allegations against Uganda.
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Annex 37
S/2001/1163
21. While acknowledging that UPDF have withdrawn from the DRC, the Panel makes
a very serious allegation - without any corroborated evidence - that there are continuing
commercial networks and structures put in place by Ugandan commanders and their
civilian counterparts in Oriental Province and Kampala. Examples given are Trinity and
Victoria companies, which are not Ugandan-owned. Unnamed 'reliable sources' are
quoted without supporting docwnents on a scheme between Mr. Mbusa Nyamwisi and
senior UPDF officers to 'skim' US$400,000= off tax revenues at Beni customs post at the
Uganda border. The period is not specified of when and how the money is shared.
22. While acknowledging that Uganda is committed to the implementation of the
Lusaka Agreement and the relevant UN Secwity Council resolutions, and bas
substantially withdrawn her troops from the DRC, the UN Panel - without any logical
evidence - concludes that a link between the continuation of the conflict and exploitation
of the natural resolll'CCS of the DRC exists 'in the case of Uganda'. The Panel should
have a corroborated case study to demonstrate the linkage.
23. The UN Panel alleges that Uganda denied that timber from the DRC does not
transit through Uganda. This is false. Uganda has always stated that transit cargo to and
from the DRC has taken place since time immemorial. Detailed facts and data regarding
transit cargo from the DRC were given to the UN Panel in November and August 2001.
24. The Uganda Government is concerned that the addendum is silent on allegations
based on hearsay and falsehoods raised in the initial report which they have not
corroborated. The reconstituted UN Panel refuses to acknowledge the mistakes where
the image and integrity of people or institutions have been unjustifiably damaged.
Examples of the mistakes that should have been acknowledged in the addendum include:
8
(a) DARA-Forest Cue-study against the Government of Uganda: The
Addendum clearly shows that the DARA-Forest case study, which was
central to the old UN Panel's demonstration of Uganda's systemic and
systematic illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC, was
not consistent with the evidence. It establishes that DARA-Forest is not a
Uganda-Thai company, H.E. President Museveni and his family are not
shareholders in the company and that the Department of Forestry, the
Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment in Kampala was never
involved in the false certification of timber from the DRC as of Ugandan
origin.
(b) Allegations against H.E. President Museveni and his family: The
addendum is silent regarding the fictitious shareholding by H.E. the
President's family in the private companies involved in the illegal
exploitation of natural resources of the DRC, e.g., Victoria, DARA-Forest,
Great Lakes Industries and Trinity Company.
Annex 37
S/2001/1163
(c) Information on Coltan is found on page 24 of Bulletin 4 (1961). 4 The production
of Coltan declined due to depressed prices in the late l 950s. The production was
bound to pick up with improved prices as is the case today.
(d) Information on gold is on page 15 of the same Bulletin 4. Today gold has been
found almost in all districts of Uganda. Most of the gold mined is alluvial (except
Busia gold field which is reef) and is mined by artisanal/small-scale miners, many of
whom are unlicensed.
(e) It is estimated that over 500,000 Ugandan artisans are engaged in gold production in
Uganda during any single month.
(f) Mineral production figures (especially of gold) have always been lower than export
figlll'es since the trade in gold was hberali7.ed and royalty removed in 1992/93 (CF Para
96 of the report of the first UN Panel of Experts, April 2001). Before hberalization,
the gap between the gold production on export figures was not significant.
(g) The main reasons for the increased gap between production and export figures for
gold include:
• Bebe ll>eralization, the few licensed artiscl'lal miners 'M>Uld indicate tew grams of production
to hang on their licenses and the buyers would file low figures to avoid payment of royalties.
• After liberalization in 1992193, buyers felt confidento export their gold through official
channels thus indicating increased exports. Most of the artisanal miners are not licensed a,d
invariably do not file their production returns which in tum come from a few licensed miners.
Thus, while the production figures have remained fairly stable, the export figures have
steadily gone up.
• The gold export figures in table 1 of the UN Report (para 96) are those on the Export Pemits
issued by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development In most cases they differ from
those of actual expor1s. Actual export figures cl'0 those captured by the Customs Department.
One needs an Export Permit before processing other export documents.
(h) Although Uganda has no production figures for diamond, it is possible that some
diamonds are being produced as a result of winning gold. During the Diamond
Prospecting Programme in Uganda (1965-1974) by Mineral Prospecting (U) LTD a
number of diamonds totaling over 0.4m CTS were recovered and three (3)
Kimberlites were discovered. Kimberlites are rocks which are major hosts for
diamond.
(i) Since Uganda does not have official figures of diamond exports or production the
4 I bid
34
Annex 37
S/2001/1163
Ministry cannot comment on the figme in table 2 of the UN Report of April 2001, the
source being the Diamond High Council. If we are given export papers, we could
know whether the purported exports were from Uganda or not. The possibility of
fraudsters using forged docwnents must not be ruled out.
G) Niobium (Coltan) production was halted in Uganda due to low prices. Increased
demand and higher prices have led to more production and hence exports, the
coincidence with the Congo conflict notwithstanding (cfpara 33 of the UN Report).
It is stated that "seven years" worth of Columbo-Tantalite (Colten) was found in
stock. Is it possible that the material could not have been sold due to low prices!
Besides we do not measure minerals worthiness in years!
(k) Following the conclusion of UNDP assisted Mineral Investment Prograrmne in
1992, the number of investors interested in the mineral sector increased. This
number dropped with revision of the surface rent in 2000.
SUMMARY REPORT OF THE MEETING WITH HON. PROF. E RUGUMAYO THE MINISTER OF
TOURISM, TRADE AND INDUSTRY 23 AUGUST 2001
53. The meeting between Hon. Prof. E Rugumayo and the Reconstituted UN Panel of Experts was
attended by: Ambassador Mugume, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Ssemanda. P., Ministry of Foreign
Affairs; Mr. J. Muhwezi, Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry; and Mr .. J. Tindigarukayo, Ministry of
Tourism, Trade and Industry.
54. The chainnan of the UN Panel explained why the Panel was reconstituted for an extra period of 3
months. He pointed out that this time, the reconstituted Panel was to cover more countries including
Burundi, Uganda, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia, Rwanda, Angola, aid a number of countries outside
Africa.
55. Ambassador Kassem and his team asked the following questions:
(a) Is there an arrangement in which trade is carried out in the rebel controlled areas
In Eastern DRC since the Kinshasa Government is not in control of the area?
(b) Would the Minister be able to show that the trade in timber, minerals and other
items in the Eastern DRC is legal since the Kinshasa authorities have no control
over the areas.
( c) What would be the effect of conflict among members of the same trade
agreement such as COMESA?
( d) How does the 1'1inistry of Trade, Tourism an,( Industry define the import, export,
re-export and goods in transit?
( e) What are the conditions in which Uganda government gives a certificate of origin?
35
Annex 38
Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts (2002, 2004, 2005)
UGANDA BUREAU OF STATISTICS
2002
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
Uganda Bureau of Statistics
P.O. Box 13
Entebbe
Tel: 041 320741, 322099, 322100, 077 705127
Fax: 041 320147
Email: [email protected]
Website: www.ubos.org November, 2002
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
Annex 38
UGANDA BUREAU OF STATISTICS
2002
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
Annex 38
FOREWORD
The Uganda Bureau of Statistics hereby presents the Statistical Abstract, 2002.
Censuses and Surveys conducted by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) and other partner agencies
yield a wide range of economic, social and demographic statistics. Reports from these censuses and surveys
are the main mode of dissemination of these statistics and can be bought from the Uganda Bureau of
Statistics Head Office in Entebbe, the CPI Unit located in the Treasury Building, Ministry of Finance Kampala
and main Bookshops in the country.
Major exercises undertaken by UBOS in recent past to generate statistics include;
1989 Household Budget Survey (HBS),
1989 Census of Business Establishments (COBE),
1991 Population and Housing Census,
1992 Integrated Household Survey (IHS),
Monitoring Surveys (1993/94, 1994/95 and 1995/96)
1997, 1999/2000 National Household Surveys
2002 Population and Housing Census
Regular collection of data on industrial production, consumer prices and external trade.
Contents of the statistical abstract are extracts from the above surveys and related activities by key
stakeholders such as the Central Bank, departments/units in other government ministries and parastatal
organizations.
The Statistical Abstract is designed to serve as a convenient tool for statistical reference and a guide to other
statistical publications and sources. Note however that, the contents being taken from the Bureau of
Statistics and many other organizations are subject to errors arising from a number of factors including:-
Sampling variability (for sample studies);
Reporting error in data for individual units;
Incomplete coverage;
Non-responses, imputation and processing errors.
Where applicable these have been indicated in the text.
With the exception of population projection tables, the data series in this Statistical Abstract have been
restricted to a maximum of five years. Longer series are available at the Bureau and can be availed on
request.
We continue to be grateful for any valuable comments about this publication so as to improve future
publications.
Mr. J.B Male-Mukasa
Executive Director November 2002
Annex 38
181
4.2 External Trade
Table 4.2. A: Exports by quantity, 1997-2001
Commodity Unit 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Traditional Export Crops
Coffee Tonne 210,123 197,143 230,466 150,891 183,277
Cotton Tonne 18,975 4,915 14,482 21,290 12,479
Tea Tonne 18,260 22,893 22,102 26,388 30,447
Tobacco Tonne 4,809 8,109 4,714 14,128 14,589
Non-Traditional Exports
Maize Tonne 52,835 33,164 23,163 8,741 61,603
Beans and other Legumes Tonne 27,760 5,875 15,829 25,013 6,756
Fish and Fish products Tonne 11,819 14,688 9,628 14,894 28,119
Cattle hides Tonne 6,619 6,487 4,666 12,246 20,386
Sesame seeds Tonne 1,485 43 2,325 1,438 1,854
Soya beans Tonne 418 76 n.a 42 960
Soap Tonne 3,655 3,482 3,193 3,777 5,656
Electric Current ‘000 Kwh 169,508 158,998 174,331 250,993 142,507
Cocoa beans Tonne 1,341 1,137 1,542 1,662 2,466
Cobalt Tonne - - - 416 636
Hoes and hand tools '000 223 171 180 105 108
Pepper Tonne 56 50 987 144 517
Vanilla Tonne 96 18 n.a 10 49
Live animals '000 7 5 19 27 130
Fruits Tonne 429 46 138 1,637 92
Groundnuts Tonne 112 87 167 15 40
Bananas Tonne 78 765 763 1,622 1,336
Roses and Cut flowers Tonne 537 1,522 1,563 2,207 3,687
Ginger Tonne 35 11 n.a 75 16
Gold and gold compounds Kg. 1,381 665 4,231 5,927 6,161
Note: (1) Includes some re-exports, and therefore overstates the true level.
(2) Figures for 2000 and 2001 are provisional.
Source: URA, UCDA, B.A.T, Mastermind Tobacco Co, CDO , Uganda Tea Association, Bank of Uganda and UBOS.
Annex 38
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Annex 39
Letter from Imelda Atai Musana, Executive Director, Uganda Bureau of Statistics to the Solicitor
General, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, UBOS/30/30 (26 Oct. 2017)
Annex 39
UGANDA BUREAU OF STATISTICS
In_ any c_orrespondence on · UBOS
this subJect ple ase quote No: ....... ................ . 130130
October 26, 2017
The Solicitor General
Plot 9, Colville Street
P.O. Box 7186
Kampala , UGANDA
Ministry of Justice and Constitutiona
P.O Box 7183
KAMPALA-UGANDA
Attn: Mr J B R Suuza
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
Tel: +(256) 41 4706000
Fax: +(256) 41 4237553
Email: ubos@u bos.org
Website: www.ubos.org
THE CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF CONGO VS UGANDA)
Reference is made to your letter of reference ADM/7 / 171/01 dated October
24, 2017 seeking information as to whether the Bureau has received
responses from United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) and COMESA
Secretariat on the recalled data for reconciliation.
This is to inform you the Bureau has not received any responses from UNSD
or COMESA Secretariat on the recalled data for reconciliation to date. As
requested, attached herewith is the import and export statistics of minerals
for the years 1995 to 2016 including the Country of origin and destination.
2 7 OCT~-> --17.-, .
' :, ........~. .
. :,, ,
. l, r:,, :'
, 1, J,~ , •• r /I•,
I
Annex 39
EXPORTSO F SELECTEDM INERALS BY QUANTITY ANO VALUE IN USO, 199S • 2016
EXPORTS 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
COUNTRY/ITEM QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR
OIAMONO , OtAMONO OUST AND OIAMONO POW! 4,141
BELGIUM
HONGKONG
RWANDA
SOUTH AFRICA
EXPORTS
COUNTRY/ITEM
GOLD ANO GOLD COMPOUNDS
AUSTRALIA
BAHRAIN
BELGIUM
CANADA
CONGO BR
D.R.CONGO
DENMARK
HONGKONG
KOREA.REPUBLIC OF
NETHERLANDS
SAUDI ARABIA
SOUTH AFRICA
SWITZERLAND
TANZANIA
THAILAND
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES
UNKNOWN
VIETNAM
COUNTRY/ ITEM
BELGIUM
CHINA
ESTONIA
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
KENYA
NETHERLANDS
SOUTH AFRICA
SWITZERLAND
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UNITED KINGDOM
EXPORTS
COUNTRY/ITf M
TANTALUM
SWITZERLAND
UN!TEDKINGOOM
4,141
199S 1996 1997 1998 1999
QUANTITY US OOUAR QUANTIT'I' US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR
2,860 29,846,469 4,801 51,S4S,S79 2,03S 77,283,610 2,247 21,017,559 4,231 33,485,139
3,303,043
2,007 20,087,602 1,314 13,357,294
"'
,06
170,000
126,097
82,500 497 5,415,757
1.828,457 2,616 28,696,719
7,467,455 772,767
84,358
"" QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR
135,600
69,750
46,300
19,SSO
207,372 20,859 32,450
101,9 19
70,117 20,8S9 32,450
35,336
764 15,104,655
3,620
185 1,624,309 2,275 19,958 ,150
814,719
497 39,527,752 1,546 14,786,858 ., 728,297
300,03 0
1,8 76,590
656 19,659, 864
1997
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
24,706
4,606,392 1,863 12,770,366
1999
QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR
11,060
9<)()
1,485
20
8,655
231,265 802 6,632
1,460
121
181,277
48,407
6,632
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR
5,767
,,ooo
1,767
289,253
275,341
13,912
IM PORTSO F SELECTEDM INERALS BY QUANTITY ANO VALUE IN USO, 1995 2016
COUNTRY/ IUM QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR
DIAMOND , DIAMOND OUST ANO DIAMOND POW 389 S,89S 1,130 1,167 22,04S 3,922 26,187 11,454 2,742 20,207
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
CHINA
FRANCE
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
HONGKONG
HUNGARY
JAPAN
KENYA
KOREA,REPUBLICOF
LIECHTENSTEIN
MALAYSIA
POLAND
SOUTH AFRICA
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
TURKEY
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES
COUNTRY/ITEM
GOLD ANO GOLD COMPOUNDS
BELGIUM
CHINA
CONGO BR
0 .R.CONGO
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
INDIA
ISREAL
TTALY
KENYA
KOREA,REPUBUCOF
SOUTH AFRICA
TANZANIA
THAILAND
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UN!TED KINGOOM
UNITED STATES
IMPORTS
COUNTRY/ITEM
CHINA
O.R.CONGO
SOUTH AFRICA
THAILAND
l~~~~~/ITEM
300 1,130 1,167
S,S9S
1995
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
120 1,265
•1995
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
QUANTIT'I' i ~~S DOLLAR
"
QUANTilY USOOUAR
" 12
QUANTITY ""
1,716
701
US DOLLAR
QUANTIT'l' l
1~! 6
ooLLAR
22,045 1,68.S
2,B4
,,.,
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
1997
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
QUANTITY l
1:S7
DOLLAR
" 735
lS,000
10,2S0
1,936
4.428
78
l,68i.
2,749
1998
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
1998
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
70 '"
30 900
"
QUANTIT'l' i
1:S8
ooLLAR
1,591
"'
,,,.
8,673
5,679
3,533
2,2S2
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
0 2,112
2,112 ,,,.
QUANTITY USDOUAR
QUANTITY 1
1
~ DOLLAR
10
,11~;.NOA 6l!KEAU OF STATISTICS
P O aox 7186 KAMPALA
rEL 041 706000
Email : [email protected]
Annex 39
EXPORTS OF SELECTED MINERALS BY QUANTITY Al
EXPORTS 2000 2001
COUNTRY/I TEM QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR
DIAMOND, DIAMOND OUST AN O DIAMOND POW 0 201
BELGIUM
HONGKONG 0 201
INDIA
RWANDA
SOUTH AFRICA
TANZANIA
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UNITED STATES
EXPORTS 2000 2001
COUNTRY/I TEM QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR
GOLD AND GOLD COMPOUNDS 5,926 43,285,000 6,158 49,263,318
AUSTRALIA
BAHRAIN
BELGIUM 27 826,449
CANADA
CONGO BR
D.R.CONGO 125 196,059
DENMARK
HONGKONG
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF
NETHERlANDS 237 1,557,053
SAUDI ARABIA
SOUTH AFRICA ' 3,279 23,950,644 2,651 18,953,808
SUDAN
SWAZllAND 4 32,936
SWEDEN
SWITZERlAND - 2,332 17,033,517 1,242 9,952,168
TANZANIA
THAILAND
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 123 898,423 9 68,222
UNITED KINGDOM 192 1,402,416 519 6,9ll,S74
UNITED STATES 5 37,048
UNKNOWN 1,341 10,728,000
VIETNAM
EXPORTS 2000 2001
COUNTRY/ITEM QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR
NIOBIUM 4,038 19,398
BELGIUM 4,038 19,398
CHINA
ESTONIA
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
INDIA
KENYA
NETHERLANDS
RWANDA
SOUTH AFRICA
SWITZERLAND
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UNITED KINGDOM
EXPORTS 2000 2001
COUNTRY/ITEM QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR
TANTALUM
SWITZERLAND
UNITED KINGDOM
IMPOR TS OF SELECTED MINERALS BY QUANTITY Al
IMPORTS 2000 2001
COUNTRY/ITEM QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR
DIAMOND, DIAMOND DUST AND DIAMOND POW! 3,306 6,171 234 3,768
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
CHINA 0 201
FRANCE
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 1 103
HONGKONG
HUNGARY
!NOIA
ITALY
JAPAN
KENYA 16 59
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF
LIECHTENSTEIN
MALAYSIA
POLAND
SOUTH AFRICA 0 467
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND 3,270 5,832
THAILAND
TURKEY
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 133 900
UNITED KINGDOM 20 280 100 2,098
UNITED STATES
IMPORTS 2000 2001
COUNTRY/ITEM QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR
GOLD AND GOLD COMPOUNDS 80 6,012 5 159
BELGIUM
CHINA
CONGO BR
D.R.CONGO
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 0 17
HONGKONG
INDIA 0 142
ISREAL
ITALY
KENYA 5
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA
TANZANIA
THAILAND
TURKEY
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 80 6,012
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES
IMPORTS
QUANTITY•f ~ DOLLAR
2001
COUNTRY/ITEM QUANTITY I US DOLLAR
NIOBIUM
I
304 I 463
CHINA
D.R.CONGO 304 463
2002
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
2002
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
7,086 60,092,234
46 456,633
41 3SS,OOO
4,347 36,418,447
2,565 22,160,14S
77 610,203
11 91,806
I
2002
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
2002
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
2002
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
860 4,213
24 322
367 644
22 379
380 1,602
67 1,265
2002
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
0 3,125
0 3,125
2002
QUANTITY I us DOLLAR
I
2003
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
2003
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
3,275 36,425,762
1,964 18,571,497
911 11,494,384
358 3,284,913
11 85,468
31 289,499
0 2,700,000
2003
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
2003
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
2003
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
8,130 25,172
3,875 14,450
51 359
1,000 843
0 371
'\, ,
2,916 8,736
288 413
2003
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
0 1,S26
0 1,511
0 15
2003
QUANTITY I us DOLLAR
20 I 8
2004
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
0 52
0 52
2004
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
5,277 59,364,7 81
3,550 38,649,927
1,728 20,714,854
2004
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
2004
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
2004
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
10,563 47,082
4,0SS 23,200
3,879 9,021
120 6,385
1,846 4,292
10 329
620 3,325
33 530
2004
QUANTITY US DOLLAR
2004
QUANTITY I US DOLLAR
-~
auREAU C
UGANDA ao~ 7186 1 ~e0t4 1 roeo1 o
e.maU: ubos@U
Annex 39
EXPORTSO F SELECTEDM INERALS BY QUANTITY Al
EXPORTS 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
COUNTRY/ITEM QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR
DIAMOND, DIAMOND OUST ANO DIAMOND POWI 5,361 52,110 1S2,846
BELGIUM S,361
SOUTH AFRICA
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UNITED STATES
EXPORTS
COUNTRY/ITEM
GOLD ANO GOLD COMPOUNDS
AUSTRALIA
BAHRAIN
BELGIUM
CANADA
CONGO BR
D.R.CONGO
DENMARK
HONGKONG
KOREA,REPUBLICOF
NETHERLANDS
SAUDI ARABIA
SOUTH AFRICA
SWAZILAND
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
TANZANIA
THAILAND
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES
UNKNOWN
EXPORTS
COUNTRY/rrEM
NIOBIUM
BELGIUM
CHINA
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
INDIA
KENYA
NETHERLANDS
RWANDA
SOUTHAfRICA
SWITZERLAND
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UNITED KINGDOM
EXPORTS
COUNTRY/ITEM
TANTALUM
SWITZERLAND
UNITED KINGDOM
IMPORTS OF SELECTED MINERALS BY QUANTITY Al
IMPORTS
COUNTRY/ITEM
DIAMOND, DIAMOND DUST AND DIAMOND POW
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
CHINA
FRANCE
GERMANY,fEDERALREPUSLICOf
HONGKONG
HUNGARY
INDIA
ITALY
JAPAN
KENYA
KOREA,REPUSLICOF
LIECHTENSTEIN
MALAYSIA
POLAND
SOUTH AFRICA
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
THAILAND
TURKEY
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES
IMPORTS
COUNTRY/ITEM
GOLD AND GOlO COMPOUNDS
BELGIUM
CHINA
CONGO BR
D.R.CONGO
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
HONGKONG
INOIA
ISREAL
ITALY
KENYA
KOREA,REPUBLICOF
SOUTH AFRICA
TANZANIA
THAtlAND
TURKEY
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES
IMPORTS
COUNTRY/ITEM
NIOBIUM
CHINA
D.R.CONGO
INOIA
KENYA
SOUTH AFRICA
THAILAND
IMPORTS
COUNTRY/ITEM
TANTALUM
INOIA
KENYA
200S
52,008
,02
2009
150,000
2,846
QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR
4,242 73,072,240 6,936 122,S79,211 3,542 6S,783,16S 2,050 S0,661,325 23,096,688
188,109 235,000
325,000
749 13,219,037
3,S21
37,890
2,643,487
2,738,962 794,046
3,429 59,295,181 6,894 122,019,211 3,S41 65,779,644 1,845 45,240,986 899 22,302,642
369,912
200S 2006 2008 2009
QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR
12,000 62,382 3,114 8,505
12,000 62,382 3,000 6,399
2,106
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR
200S 2006 2007 2008 2009
QUANTITY USOOlLAR QUANTITY USDOUAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY USOOllAR
1,794 19,586 3,194 11,429 1,221 4,294 2,572 11,969 33,469 80,423
"'
100 9' 11S 1,142 28,003 64,793
1,859
'" "' SOO 391 209 1,200 ''° 12,261 806 5,670 " 2,526
"' 195
,oo 1,086
60 258 670 695 2,559
572 2,734 3,107
25 ,65 100 2,045
2,399
1,020 S,435 2,285 7,906 sso 1,811 2,102 1,162 1,117 "' 1,742 so 1,433
200S 2006 2007 2008 2009
QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY USDOUAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR
2,4!H 0 1,407 8,158
7,700
'"
2,493
·2005 2006
QUANTITY l
2
~
7
00LLAR QUANTITY l
2
~
8
oQlLAR QUANTITY l
2
QUANTITY I US DOLLAR QUANTlTY I US DOLLAR ~ DOLLAR
36000 9338
4565,49
QUANTITY l
2
~
5
00LLAR
2006
QUANTITY i2:
7
DOLLAR
2008 2009
QUANTITY I US DOLLAR QUANTITY I US DOLLAR QUANTITY I US DOLLAR
-~
J<iANOAII UREAUO F STATISTISC
' p O aox !186 l(AMPAIA
TEL 041 TOOOOO
1mM11lu b01CDubos.ortJ
Annex 39
EXPORTS OF SELECTED MINERALS BY QUANTITY Al
EXPORTS 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
COUNTRY/ITEM QUANTITY USOOUAR QUANTITY US OOllAR QUANTITY USOOllAR QUANTITY US OOllAR QUANTITY US OOllAR QUANTITY US OOllAR QUANTITY US OOllAR
DIAMOND, DIAMOND OUST AND DIAMOND POW ,,. ..
BELGIUM
HONGKONG
RWANDA
SOUTH AFRICA ,0
TANZANIA
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 1,420
UNITED STATES
EXPORTS 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
COUNTRY/ITEM QUANTITY US DOUAR QUANTITY US OOUAR QUANTITY US OOUAR QUAITTITY US DOllAR QUANTITY US OOUAR QUANTITY US DOUAR QUANTITY US DOUAR
GOLD AND GOLD COMPOUNDS 918 30,072,070 163 6,794,892 199 9,165,987 3,131,736 179,6Sl 1,088 35,643,17S 8,612 339,S28,956
AUSTRALIA 1 300
BAHRAIN
BELGIUM 1,732 7,516,262
CANADA
CONGO BR
D.R.CONGO
DENMARK 7,998
HONGKONG 38,SOO
KOREA,REPUBLICOF
NETHERLANDS
SAUDI ARABIA 7,031
SOUTH AFRICA 50,546
SUDAN
SWAZILAND
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND 200,000
TANZANIA
THAILAND 37,S19
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 918 30,065,040 6,786,894 8,965,98 7 3,127,712 129,10S 1,086 35,594,876 8,436 331,936,675
UNITED KINGDOM 2,292
UNITED STATES
UNKNOWN
VIETNAM 48,000
EXPORTS 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
COUNTRY/ITEM QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLL.AR QUANTITY US OOUAR QUANTITY US OOUAR QUANTITY US DOUAR QUANTITY US DOUAR
NIOBIUM 7,500 22,000 10,636 4S0,483 51,765 S-17,379
BELGIUM
CHINA 4,700 202,100 19,100 221,028
ESTONIA
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
INOIA 20,26S 220,707
KENYA
NETHERLANDS SOO 15,000
RWANDA 7,000 49.482
SOUTH AFRICA
SWITZERLAND
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 7,000 7,000
UNITED KINGDOM 5,936 248,383 S,400 56,162
O:PORTS 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
COUNTRY/ITEM QUANTITY US DOUAR QUANTITY US DOUAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOUAR QUANTITY US DOUAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR
TAITTALUM
SWITZERLAND
UN!TED KINGDOM
IMPORTS OJ SELECTED MINERALS BY QUANTITY Al
2010 2014 2015 2016
COUNTRY/ITEM QUANTITY US OOUAR QUANT ITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY US DOUAR QUANTITY US DOUAR QUANTITY US DOUAR QUANTITY US DOUAR
DIAMOND, DIAMOND DUST ANO DIAMOND POW 29,937 67,099 3,346 38,474 14,298 50,602 1,152 14,506 2,981 14,251 S,727 31,930 21,098 36,528
AUSTRALIA 9 112
AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
CHINA 15,930 35,300 2,680 34,850 10,816 34,366 2,647 1,370 1,288 3,939 6,091 19,840 21,187
FRANCE
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 196 1,638 810 13,659 6S 5,722
HONGKONG
HUNGARY l,02S
INOIA 7,570 12,530 201 65 88 1,728 49S 2,306
ITALY 80 1,317 494 0 68
JAPAN
KENYA 170 S3
KOREA,REPUBLICOF 1,860 2,267 300 2,431 1SO 1,118 37S S01
LIECHTENSTEIN 2,847
MALAYSIA 2,579
POlAND 157 1,123
SOUTH AFRICA 10 361 86 907
SWEDEN 2,020 3,291 100 10,039 2,164 2,524
SWITZERLAND 900 4,S97 1,211 1,005
THAllANO 2,640 7,012
TURKEY 3-0
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 3,195 9,236 43 4,437 543 1,943 S60 3,955 139 2,111
UNITEOKINGOOM Sl 164 403 151 2,209 S7
UNITED STATES 3-0 183 131 11 so 1,642
IMPORTS 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
COUNTRY/ITEM QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTITY USOOUA R QUANTITY USOOUAR QUANTITY US DOLLAR QUANTrTV USDOUAR QUAITTITY USOOUAR QUANTITY USOOUAR
GOLD ANO GOLD COMPOUNDS 187,566 0 1&3 1 6,39S 0.403 7648.98 104.046 41298.89 0.027 250
BELGIUM
CHINA 130 110
CONGO BR
O.R.CONGO 187,566
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
HONGKONG
INO!A
ISREAL 100 140
ITALY
KENYA
KQREA,REPUBLICOf
SOUTH AFRICA 1,551
THAILAND 41,050
TURKEY 5,791
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 539 6,395
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES
IMPORTS
QUANTrrv. 1
2
~~000LL.AR QUANTITY 1°i: DOLLAR
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
COUITTRY ITEM QUANTITY I US DOLLAR QUANTITY I US DOLLAR QUANTITY I US OOUAR QUANTITY I US DOUAR QUANTITY ! USDOUAR
NIOBIUM
CHINA
D.R.CONGO 7000 7000.01 7000 7000
14S 633.03
KENYA 1051.39
SOUTH AFRICA
THAILAND 14400 87696
IMPORTS
QUANTITY l
2
~~0DOUAR QUANTITYl
0i: DOUAR QUANTITY lo ~: DOUAR QUANTITY1°i: DOLLAR
2014 2015 2016
COUNTRY/ITEM QUANTITY i us DOLLAR QUANTITY I US DOUAR QUANTITY I US DOLLAR
KENYA 2372 • UGANDA BURE.AU OF STATISTICS
p Q. aox 7186 KAMPALA
TEL 041 706000
email: [email protected]
Annex 40
Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Exports and Imports (1981-2016)
UGANDA BUREAU OF STATISTICS
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 1981-2016 (EXCERPTS)
Available at http://www.ubos.org/statistics/macro-economic/trade-2/
Formal commodity Exports value (US$ Million) 1990 - 2016
COMMODITY 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
TRADITIONAL EXPORT CROPS
01 Coffee 140.4 117.6 95.4 106.8 343.3 382.9 410.4 309.4 295.7 288.0 125.3 97.7 96.6 100.2 124.2 172.9 189.8 265.9 403.2 280.2 283.9 466.7 372.2 425.4 410.1 402.6 371.7
02 Cotton 5.8 11.7 8.2 5.5 3.5 9.7 17.0 29.6 7.6 18.4 22.1 13.5 9.5 17.7 38.9 28.8 20.5 19.6 13.2 22.7 19.9 86.0 74.9 31.7 21.9 20.8 31.6
03 Tea 3.6 6.8 7.7 11.1 11.8 8.7 17.8 33.1 28.2 25.4 37.0 30.0 31.3 38.3 37.3 34.3 50.9 47.6 47.2 59.8 68.3 72.1 73.9 85.6 84.7 70.3 71.5
04 Tobacco 2.9 4.5 4.2 7.0 8.3 9.6 4.7 12.7 22.3 19.9 27.1 32.4 45.3 43.2 41.1 31.7 27.7 67.2 69.1 62.4 68.7 54.0 69.7 120.2 66.0 72.9 64.1
COMM NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORTS
05 Live Animals 0.1 - - 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.7 2.1 4.2 4.0 1.7 1.7 2.8 2.0 2.0 1.3
06 Fish and Fish Products 1.4 5.3 6.5 8.9 10.4 32.7 47.2 30.3 42.0 24.9 30.8 78.2 87.9 88.3 103.3 142.7 146.8 125.5 128.7 111.2 127.7 136.2 128.3 126.7 134.8 117.6 121.5
07 Flowers - - - 0.2 0.5 2.7 2.8 3.5 6.7 7.3 9.9 14.8 17.8 24.4 26.4 24.1 21.0 22.8 28.8 26.3 22.5 21.5 26.8 28.7 28.7 23.2 24.6
08 Beans and Other Legumes 4.2 4.3 2.8 12.6 12.9 16.2 16.0 12.0 6.3 8.9 4.5 2.4 3.3 5.2 8.2 8.9 8.2 10.3 18.0 14.7 10.2 20.4 14.2 20.6 26.2 63.2 50.5
09 Bananas - 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.9 1.0
10 Fruits - - - 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.9 1.2 1.2 2.0 5.3 0.9 0.7 1.4 1.2 1.5 2.1 3.2 4.5
11 Pepper - 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.5 1.2 2.1 1.7 0.6 0.9 3.6
12 Maize 3.3 4.2 3.9 23.3 28.7 23.1 17.9 15.1 12.2 5.3 1.5 18.2 10.4 13.5 17.4 21.3 24.1 23.8 18.2 29.1 38.2 26.8 56.9 42.3 43.6 91.1 70.3
13 Ground-nuts - 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 2.5 1.7 0.8 5.2 1.5
14 Sesame Seeds 5.2 10.5 6.5 2.8 1.5 6.0 9.6 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.8 0.8 0.5 2.2 2.8 4.8 4.6 5.5 15.9 13.4 12.9 17.3 11.7 28.5 55.2 50.7 14.6
15 Cocoa Beans 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.5 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.9 2.0 7.0 6.8 9.6 10.0 15.9 22.8 27.8 35.1 44.5 38.4 54.8 59.4 56.7 75.0
16 Electric Current 1.2 0.9 1.5 0.7 2.2 2.4 4.2 - - 13.2 18.6 10.6 15.6 13.8 12.1 4.9 4.9 8.7 10.9 13.2 12.5 16.3 16.4 17.2 34.2 17.0 21.3
17 Soap - - - 1.3 1.7 3.0 2.3 2.3 1.7 2.0 2.3 3.2 4.0 10.2 14.5 7.3 6.4 16.7 20.9 17.1 18.8 26.2 33.3 32.6 32.1 26.6 25.2
18 Hides and Skins 6.1 4.3 4.0 5.8 10.9 10.2 7.8 10.5 6.0 4.5 14.1 25.5 9.8 4.9 5.4 7.1 8.0 18.1 12.5 6.0 17.1 33.1 41.6 64.4 73.8 63.0 51.4
19 Gold and Gold Compounds - 9.6 0.0 0.1 0.2 29.8 51.5 77.3 21.0 33.5 43.3 49.3 61.0 36.4 61.2 73.1 122.6 65.8 50.7 23.1 30.1 6.8 9.2 3.1 0.2 35.6 339.5
20 Hoes and Hand Tools 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 1.0 2.0 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.2 0.5 1.1 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.3 2.3 0.4 1.3 0.4 0.3
21 Cobalt - - - - - - - - - - 11.0 12.7 7.0 - 11.5 15.9 18.1 17.3 21.7 24.1 18.1 17.6 14.2 10.1 - - -
22 Petroleum Products - - - - - 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.1 9.7 12.3 10.8 28.1 28.1 32.0 36.4 38.6 48.2 99.3 72.4 104.4 136.7 131.9 144.9 125.4 114.1
23 Other Precious Metals - - - - - 0.6 0.1 1.7 16.5 2.9 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.0
24 Vanilla - 0.2 - 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.8 - 1.3 0.1 1.0 2.4 6.9 11.2 6.1 6.1 4.8 6.3 3.0 4.9 4.4 3.0 2.4 2.7 2.7 3.4 3.2
25 Soya beans - 0.5 - 2.1 0.8 1.8 2.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 1.3 1.5 1.1 0.3 0.9 1.2 0.9 0.9 2.4 7.1
26 Sorghum - - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 4.0 1.8 1.4 0.3 3.8 25.6 35.2 36.2 55.3
27 Plastic Products - - - - - 1.2 1.6 3.8 1.3 0.8 2.6 1.9 1.6 1.7 4.9 3.9 5.5 9.7 13.1 10.2 10.1 18.5 26.7 35.0 38.0 35.0 22.2
28 Animal/Veg Fats & Oils - - - - - 0.7 1.2 3.4 1.6 1.5 3.7 3.3 2.8 4.7 6.8 10.0 17.1 62.8 46.1 49.5 55.2 101.1 110.4 100.1 102.3 79.0 62.1
29 Sugar & Sugar Conftionary - - - - - 0.4 0.2 0.9 25.4 1.6 0.8 1.7 0.6 0.6 1.8 6.8 11.8 33.5 39.6 45.2 60.2 81.9 122.7 85.3 68.9 65.7 100.3
30 Iron and Steel - - - - - 2.7 14.2 3.2 0.6 0.9 1.3 2.2 3.0 7.3 13.5 24.7 22.5 40.5 64.4 55.8 52.7 75.5 83.2 94.3 93.1 86.6 70.8
31 Cement - - - - - 0.0 6.1 0.6 3.8 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.8 1.8 3.0 5.8 19.1 77.5 82.8 71.4 94.0 106.9 102.9 89.1 80.0 60.9
32 Beer - - - - - 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.7 1.7 2.0 1.9 1.9 5.8 8.8 23.0 40.0 30.2 20.9 23.3 25.3 23.7 13.3 10.0 11.0
33 Telephones for Cellular - - - - - - - - - 0.0 - 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 8.4 0.0 40.7 69.2 58.8 78.7 126.1 143.6 43.9 3.6 15.1 1.9
34 Rice - - - - - 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.5 2.0 3.7 4.3 6.9 10.4 16.7 16.5 18.4 38.9 37.0 28.7 24.2 20.3
35 Mineral Water - - - - - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6 1.7 6.1 8.9 7.5 7.4 5.5 22.9 26.3 20.0 13.5 8.1
36 Vegetables - - - - - 0.4 10.3 1.3 2.9 0.0 0.5 0.4 1.6 2.0 1.9 1.2 3.3 3.2 4.4 5.1 4.3 3.5 8.3 11.7 14.7 14.1 16.8
37 Other products 2.8 2.4 4.8 10.3 19.1 26.8 60.5 39.4 30.3 23.1 32.0 33.2 37.4 78.3 97.4 115.3 173.9 308.5 402.5 360.2 372.7 451.8 531.9 585.9 528.0 552.3 583.5
Re-Exports 12.4 11.7 24.6 21.3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Traditional export crops 152.7 140.7 115.5 130.4 366.8 410.9 449.9 384.7 353.7 351.6 211.6 173.6 182.7 199.5 241.5 267.8 288.8 400.3 532.7 425.1 440.7 678.8 590.7 662.9 582.7 566.6 538.8
Non-traditional exports 37.4 55.3 55.8 92.1 93.1 165.6 260.8 209.9 183.0 137.2 194.1 282.1 289.5 346.4 439.8 545.1 673.4 936.4 1,191.6 1,142.5 1,177.9 1,480.3 1,766.8 1,744.9 1,679.2 1,700.4 1,943.5
TOTAL 190.1 196.0 171.4 222.6 459.9 576.6 710.8 594.6 536.7 488.8 405.7 455.7 472.2 545.9 681.3 812.9 962.2 1,336.7 1,724.3 1,567.6 1,618.6 2,159.1 2,357.5 2,407.7 2,262.0 2,267.0 2,482.3
Annex 40
Annex 41
République du Zaire, Ministère du Plan et Reconstruction Nationale, Enquête Nationale sur la
Situation des Enfants et des Femmes au Zaire en 1995, Rapport Final (Feb. 1996)
Annex 41
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Annex 41
i O'
AVANT-PROPOS
Nous sommes très heureux de présenter le rapport final de l'Enquête sur la Situation des
Enfants et des Femmes au Zaïre en 1995 (ENSEF-ZAIRE/1995). Ce type d'enquête est le premier
d'envergure nationale que ce pays ait organisé depuis l'indépendance. L'enquête aura servi à évaluer
les progrès réalisés à mi-parcours par rapport aux objectifs visés dans le cadre de la Décennie du
couple Mère-Enfant prévue entre 1990 et l'An 2000. En effet, pour atteindre ces objectifs, un Plan
National d'Action avait .été élaborè en 1992 entre le Zaïre et ses partenaires .
Les principales contributions pour la réalisation de l'enquête sont venues :
- du ZAIRE qui a fourni l'essentiel des personnes-ressources;
- de l'UNICEF qui a apporté un appui technique significatif et l'essentiel des ressources financières ;
- du PNUD et de l'OMS dont les contributions respectives ont été substantielles .
Cette enquête a ,été réalisée dans des conditions sociales, budgétaires et logistiques difficiles.
Malgré les difficultés, les résultats obtenus sont très satisfaisants. C'est pourquoi, nous remercions
tous les membres du Comité Technique, les Enquêteurs, les Agents de saisie, bref tout le personnel
qui a oeuvré à la réalisation de cette enquête . Leur travail est d'une grande contribution au
développement de ce pays qui leur en saura gré.
Au-delà des résultats qu'elle fournit, cette enquête est d'abord une preuve manifeste qu'en
dépit des difficultés conjoncturelles , la coopération entre le Zaïre et ses partenaires extérieurs peut
être fructueuse si l'on fait montre d'une volonté suffisante de part et d'autre et si l'on conçoit des
mécanismes conséquents.
Ensuite, cette enquête permet de donner une situation quantifiée de l'impact de la crise socioéconomique
du Zaïre sur le bien-être du couple Mère-Enfant. Grâce à cette opération, le Zaïre et ses
différents partenaires viennent d'obtenir des données qu'ils peuvent dès lors utiliser pour concevoir
et programmer des actions en faveur des enfants et des femmes. Il est recommandé que ces
données, collectées avec tant d'efforts , soient exploitées et analysées en profondeur et que les
résultats soient suffisamment vulgarisés et disséminés .·
Puisse ce rapport contribuer de manière effective à une planification conséquente des
secteurs sociaux pour le développement harmonieux du Zaïre.
Pour le Gouvernement de
la République du Zaïre
Ministre u Plan t Rec~!ion Nationale
Mr Gilîrt Kiakw~ k~a Kiziki
~~ ::::::=---
Annex 41
C. Environnement socio-économjgue
Situation générale 1
Le Zaïre connaît depuis 1990 une situation socio-économique très préoccupante.
Son produit intérieur brut (PIB) marque un net recul en enregistrant une croissance
moyenne négative tournant autour de -10% alors que sa population s'accroît de 3, 1 % l'an.
En plus, le pouvoir d'achat de la population s'est fortement dégradé à cause d'yne
hyperinflation qui a atteint 8828 % en 1993. La monnaie nationale, le zaïre-monnaié, a
connu une forte dépréciation car son taux de change pour 1 $ US est passé de 3 NZ en
1993 à 15.000 NZ en décembre 1995.
Par ailleurs, le budget de l'Etat pendant les quatre derniers exercices atteint à peine
500 millions de $ US annuellement. Il s'exécute difficilement parce que d'une part les
recettes escomptées ne se réalisent pas et, d'autre part, l'Etat fait face au service de la
dette dont le poids est élevé. S'agissant de la dette, il convient de rappeler que son montant
s'évaluerait à 10 milliards de$ US, alors que le P.I.B. n'est estimé qu'à 5,5 milliards de $US.
En outre, le revenu réel par habitant a périclité, passant de près de 350 $ US en
1959, à 240 $ US en 1981 et à 100 $ US en 1995. La répartition du revenu indique de
fortes disparités sociales et régionales. Ainsi 5% de la population détiendraient 50% du
revenu national 2
• Par ailleurs, deux régions, à savoir Kinshasa et le Shaba, représentant
ensemble 25 % de la population du Zaïre, concentrent à elles seules (du moins jusqu'en
1990) 52% du revenu national.
Cette situation économique défavorable a négativement influé sur les différentes
infrastructures tant économiques que sociales. Ainsi depuis 1992, les crédits prévus à
chaque exercice au titre du budget d'investissement en faveur des secteurs sociaux (santé,
éducation, etc.) sont rarement débloqués. Et quand ils le sont, ces crédits sont libérés si
tardivement qu'ils ne représentent presque plus rien du fait de l'hyperinflation. En définitive,
l'environnement socio-économique du Zaïre actuel se caractérise par une quasi absence
d'investissements et par d'énormes difficultés d'accès aux soins de santé, à l'éducation, à
l'eau potable, à l'assainissement., etc.
Face à ces difficultés, les populations ont développé des stratégies de survie qui ont
entrainé des mutations sociales. Parmi celles-ci, on peut épingler d'une part l'éclosion du
secteur informel, certes dynamique, mais qui a le défaut d'échapper au fisc et au circuit
Les principaux indicateurs macro-économiques présentés
ici proviennent des publications de la Banque du Zaïre
ci-après :- Rapport Annuel ,1993
- Condensé Statistique, janvier 1996.
Ministère du Plan, 1995, Rapport National sur le
Développement Social, Document présenté au Sommet
Mondial sur le Développement Social à Copenhague, mars
1995.
6
Annex 41
bancaire et, d'autre part l'accroissement de la violence et de la délinquance juvénile,
l'effritement de la solidarité familiale, etc.
Les facteurs explicatifs de la crise socio-économique du Zaïre
Les facteurs expliquant la dégradation socio-économique actuelle du Zaïre sont
anciens et nombreux. Ils datent des lendemains de l'indépendance du pays en 1960 et ont
évolué pernicieusement, se consolidant à cause d'une gestion économique peu efficace.
A partir de 1990, ces facteurs sont entrés en synérgie avec les problèmes liés à
l'ajustement politique.
D'une façon globale, les facteurs qui ont influé sur la situation socio-économique du
Zaïre sont à la fois endogènes et exogènes. Parmi les facteurs endogènes, on doit épingler
comme premier facteur la transformation défavorable des structures de production qui, à
partir de 1960, ont privilégié le secteur tertiaire au détriment du secteur secondaire.
Ensuite, la production réelle était focalisée sur le cuivre qui absorbait l'essentiel des
investissements à tel point que ce seul produit apportait au pays 80% des recettes en
devises et ce jusqu'en 1990, liant ainsi la viabilité de toute une économie à l'évolution des
cours internationaux de ce métal 1
.
Un deuxième facteur endogène est le déclin du secteur agricole qui a exacerbé la
dépendance extérieure non seulement en ce qui concerne les produits finis industriels mais
aussi pour les produits agricoles qui, pourtant pouvaient être largement fournis sur place.
En conséquence, l'économie a fini par manifester un besoin énorme et permanent des
devises étrangèges, seules capables de financer les importations et les achats locaux
importants, la monnaie nationale étant non convertible et se dépréciant régulièrement.
Un autre facteur endogène de la crise socio-économique actuelle est la gestion économique
peu rigoureuse. Celle-ci se caractérise par:
- une quasi absence de planification devant permettre de prévoir et contourner les effets
pervers de la crise économique 2
;
- une insuffisance de crédits budgétaires en faveur des secteurs productifs et sociaux;
- un désordre monétaire et financier se traduisant par la présence dans le pays de
plusieurs "zones monétaires" (zone "ancien zaïre" dans les deux Kasaï, zone "devises"
dans les localités frontalières, zone "nouveau zaïre" dans le reste du pays) 3
• La Banque
Centrale ne contrôle pas !es zones "ancien zaïre" et "devises". Même dans la zone
"nouveau zaïre" que la Banque Centrale gère et contrôle, on a observé des aberrations
monétaires telle que l'injection frauduleuse des billets de banque.
J . Vanderlinden , op . cit.
Ministère du Pi an , Premier plan quinquennal 1986-1990 .
MANDIANGU NDOMBASI, 198 9 , Eléments de base de planification,
Ministère du Pl a ~.
MASALA LOKA, 19 92, Expérience zaïroise en matière de
planification,BEP , Ministère du Plan.
La réform e monétaire du 22 octobre 1993 a conduit au
rempla c ement du za ï re (ancien zaïre) par le nouveau Zaïre (NZ)
selon la parité suivan~e: 1 SUS= 3 NZ = 9.000.000 zaïres.
7
,.
Annex 41
Ainsi, par exemple, la mortalité infantile se situe autour de 148 °/00 au Zaïre. En milieu
:1in, elle est de 101 °/00 tandis qu'elle est de 161 °loo en milieu rural. La différence est importante
énote de la disparité entre les deux milieux en matière d'accès au système et à l'information
~ itaires et en matière d'infrastructures sanitaires notamment. Il en est de même de la mortalité
enfants de moins de 5 ans (mortalité infanto-juvénile). Elle est de 146 °/00 en milieu urbain
tre 241 °/00 en milieu rural, alors que la moyenne nationale est de 220 °/00. L'espérance de vie
naissance est de 45,4 ans pour l'ensemble du Zaïre, 53,8 en milieu urbain et 43,2 ans en
eu rural. Comme indiqué plus haut, ces résultats constituent des ordres de grandeur et
timation de ces indicateurs par sexe n'a pas fourni des résultats satisfaisants.
3. Evolution des indicateurs de mortalité
Une comparaison utile peut être faite avec les données du Recensement démographique
isé au Zaïre en 1984, étant donné que les mêmes méthodes ont été utilisées.
T.4.18.: Indicateurs de mortalité (en pour mille) en 1984 et 1995
INDICATEUR 1984 1995
Mortalité infantile (1q0) 137 148
Mortalité infanto-juvénile (5q0) 213 220
Espérance de vie à la naissance ( e0 ) 47,0 45,4
Le rapprochement des indicateurs disponibles aux deux périodes montre que globalement
1ortalité générale et la mortalité des enfants semblent avoir augmenté entre 1984 et 1995, au
nent où la situation socio-économique de la population du Zaïre dans l'ensemble et surtout
3 des populations rurales continue à se détériorer.
nclusion
L'Enquête Nationale sur la Situation des Enfants et des Femmes au Zaïre en 1995 (ENSEF-
1E/1995) a, au-delà des objectifs définis pour la mi-décennie en matière démographique, fourni
indications sur la structure de la population selon le sexe, l'âge de la population et l'état
rimonial, et estimé les principaux indicateurs de nuptialité, de fécondité et de mortalité.
Il ressort de l'analyse des données recueillies les principaux résultats suivants:
oncernant la structure par sexe et par âge
Il y a plus de femmes (51,5 %) que d'hommes (48,5 %) au Zaïre, soit un rapport de
masculinité de 94 hommes pour 100 femmes;
La population du Zaïre est très jeune : 19 % ont moins de 5 ans et 58,9 % ont moins de 20
ans. La jeunesse de la population est plus marquée en milieu rural où 59,2 % ont moins de
20 ans contre 58,3% en milieu urbain. Par contre, la population potentiellement active (15-
59 ans) est moins importante en milieu rural (47 %) qu'en milieu urbain (50 %).
L'analyse de l'évolution de la structure par sexe et par âge montre non seulement un
rajeunissement de la population, mais aussi une prépondérance de plus en plus grande de
la population féminine en milieu urbain, en particulier à Kinshasa.
59
r
Annex 41
f
2. Concernant l'état matrimonial
Il y a une forte proportion de femmes en âge de procréation (15-49 ans) vivant en uni
conjugale (63,8 %).
La proportion des célibataires hommes (38, 1 %) est plus élevée que celle des célibatai1
femmes (23,7 %), tandis que celles des femmes désunies (14,4 %) est plus importante Cf
celle des hommes de cet état (3,4 %).
Les âges moyens au premier mariage qui sont respectivement de 26,4 ans chez i
hommes et 21,5 ans chez les femmes, accusent une tendance à la hausse.
3. Concernant le fécondité
Le nombre moyen d'enfants par femme est élevé et se situe autour de 7 enfants.
Il n'y a pas de différence sensible entre le milieu urbain et le milieu rural.
L'âge moyen à la procréation, qui est de 28,2 ans pour l'ensemble du pays (29,3 ans i
milieu urbain et 27,5 ans en milieu rural), a tendance à augmenter.
On observe un recul de l'âge au mariage des femmes et une augmentation de l'âge à
procréation, mais la fécondité ne baisse pas; elle a tendance à stagner sinon à augment
4. Concernant la mortalité
Près de 148 enfants sur 1000 meurent avant d'atteindre 1 an; 101 en milieu urbain et 1
en milieu rural.
Environ 220 enfants sur 1000 meurent avant d'atteindre 5 ans; 146 en milieu urbain e! 2
en milieu rural.
L'espérance de vie à la naissance est faible: 45,4 ans pour l'ensemble du pays, 53,8 a
en milieu urbain et 43,2 ans en milieu rural.
La mortalité infantile semble avoir augmenté entre 1984 et 1995, passant de 137 à 148 °/,
Les résultats qui viennent d'être présentés démontrent, si besoin en était, que la situatt
démographique du Zaïre relative à la structure par sexe et par âge, la fécondité et la mortalité ret
préoccupante. Des mesures énergiques devraient être prises pour son amélioration.
60
Annex 42
République Démocratique du Congo, Document de la Stratégie de Croissance et de Réduction
de la Pauvreté, Deuxième Génération, 2011-2015, Vol. I (Oct. 2011)
Annex 42
Annex 42
Document de Stratégie de Croissance et de Réduction de la Pauvreté – DSCRP 2 15
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
Annex 42
Document de Stratégie de Croissance et de Réduction de la Pauvreté – DSCRP 2 72
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
Annex 43
Songo Mboyo (MP et PC c. Bokila et consorts), RP 084/2005 (Tribunal Militaire de Garnison de
Mbandaka, 12 Apr. 2006)
JUGEMENT ET NOTES D’OBSERVATION
JUGEMENT
REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO RMP154/PEN/SHOF/05
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
RP 084/2005
JUSTICE MILITAIRE
TRIBUNAL MILITAIRE DE GARNISON
MBANDAKA
PRO-JUSTICIA
JUGEMENT
Au Nom du Peuple Congolais
(Art.149 de la Constitution de la République Démocratique du Congo)
Le Tribunal Militaire de Garnison de Mbandaka, statuant au premier degré en matière répressive a rendu et
prononcé en son audience publique de ce mercredi 12 avril 2006 à SONGO MBOYO dans le Territoire de
BONGANDANGA, le jugement dont la teneur suit :
En Cause : Auditeur Militaire, Ministère Public et les Parties Civiles :
Contre : Les prévenus
1. Lieutenant ELIWO NGOY ;
2. Lieutenant BOKILA LOLEMI ;
3. Sous Lieutenant VONGA WA VONGA ;
4. Sous Lieutenant MAHOMBO MAGBUTU ;
5. Sous Lieutenant KALEMA SEKWALO ;
6. Adjudant YANGBANDA DUMBA ;
7. Adjudant MAMBE SOYO
8. 1 Sergent BWAZU MUSAMBI ;
9. 1 Sergent MOTUTA ALONDO ;
10. Sergent BOTONGA ILUNGA ;
11. Sergent MOMBANYA NKOY ;
12. Soldat KOMBE MOMBELE ;
Vu la procédure suivie à charge des prévenus sus-identifiés;
Vu les décisions de renvoi de l’Auditeur Militaire de Garnison datées du 12 septembre 2005 et notifiées auxdits
prévenus, renvoyant ceux-ci devant la Juridiction de jugement ;
Vu la fixation e la cause à l’audience publique du 08 octobre 2005 par l’ordonnance du Président de tribunal
Militaire de Garnison datant du 04 octobre 2005 ;
Vu les citations à comparaître à l’audience publique du 08 octobre 2005 établies par le greffier, Sous Lieutenant
BANZA KASONGO et notifiées par exploit d’huissier aux prévenus mieux identifiés ci-haut ;
Vu le procès-verbal de tirage au sort des membres assesseurs de la composition du Siège du tribunal Militaire,
désignée pour une période de trois mois renouvelables à compter de la date du 08 octobre 2005 ;
Vu la prestation de serment des membres assesseurs de la composition du Siège du Tribunal Militaire :
Vu l’appel de la cause à cette audience à laquelle comparaissent :
Annex 43
FAISANT DROIT
Le Ministère Public entendu
Le tribunal Militaire de Garnison statuant contradictoirement pour les prévenus ;
- Déclare les prévenus ELIWO NGOY, KALEMBA SEKWALO, BWANZU MASAMBI, BOTONGA
ILUNGA et MAMBE S OYO n on coupables des faits m is à leur charge dans les préventions. Prononce leur
acquittement ; ordonne leur libération immédiate et met les frais à charge du trésor public ;
- Déclare tous les prévenus non coupables du complot militaire, prononce leur acquittement quant à ce ;
- Déclare l e p révenus M OTUTA A LONDO e t M AHOMBO M ANGBUTU non coupables de
détournement d’armes et dissipation des munition de guerre et les acquitte quant à ce ;
- Déclare le prévenu BOKILA LOMEMI Fabien non coupable d’usurpation du commandement. Prononce
son acquittement quant ce ;
- Déclare le prévenu BOKILA LOMEMI Fabien coupable de l’outrage à son supérieur et d’inclination des
Militaires à s’armer contre la population civile et le condamne comme suit ;
S’agissant de l’outrage à son supérieur, à 5 ans d’emprisonnement ;
S’agissant d’incitation à s’armer contre la population civile ; à 20 ans d’emprisonnement ;
- Déclare les prévenus BOKILA LOMEMI , VONGA WA VONGA, KOMBE MOMBELE et YANGBANDA
DUMBA coupables de détournement d’armes de guerre et dissipation des munitions de guerre ; les
condamné comme suit :
S’agissant du détournement d’armes de guerre à 10 ans d’emprisonnement ;
S’agissant de la dissipation des munitions à 10 ans d’emprisonnement ;
- Déclare les prévenus BOKILA LOMEMI, VONGA WA VONGA, YANGBANDA DUMBA, KOMBE
MOMBELE et MAHOMBO MANGBUTU coupables de pillage et les condamne à 20 ans d’emprisonnement ;
- Déclare l es p révenus B OKILA L OMEMI, V ONGA W A V ONGA, YANGBANDA DUMBA, KOMBE
MOMBELE, MAHOMBO MANGBUTU, MOMBANYA NKOY et MOTUTA ALONDO coupables de crime
contre l’humanité et les condamne à l’emprisonnement à perpétuité ;
Faisant application de l’article 7 CPP, prononce l’unique peine, celle la plus forte ;
Ainsi : BOKILA LOMEMI, VONGA WA VONGA, YANGBANDA DUMBA, KOMBE MOMBELE ,
MAHOMBO M ANGBUTU, M OMBANYA N KOY e t M OTUTA A LONDO ; à l’emprisonnement à
perpétuité ;
- Au paiement de 20.000 FC d’amende, chacun en ce qui le concerne ;
- A titre subsidiaire à la destitution de FARDC quant à BOKILA LOMEMI, VONGA WA VONGA et
MAHOMBO MANGBUTU. A la dégradation quant à YANGBANDA DUMBA, KOMBE MOMBELE,
MOTUTA ALONDO et MOMBANYA NKOY ;
- Laisse les frais d’instance fixés 10.000 FC à leur charge, payables dans 8 jours sous peines d’une contrainte par
corps dont le délai ne pouvant excéder 6 mois ;
Quant à l’action mue par les parties civiles précisées ;
Déclare pour certaines leur constitution régulière en forme et fondées quant à leur motifs ; et par conséquent
statuant ex acquo et bono, condamne l’Etat congolais en sa qualité de commettant, à payer à chaque partie civile
le montant de dommages et intérêts selon la classification suivante :
- 10.000 $ US pour victime de viol décédée ;
- 5.000 $ US pour victime de viol survivante ;
- 500 $ US pour marchandises pillées ;
Annex 43
- 200 $ US pour autres effets pillés ;
Ainsi :
1. Mme Marie BOYELA aura droit à 10.000 $ US payable en Francs Congolais pour viol ayant occasionné le
décès de sa fille Eugénie BONYOLE ;
2. Mme BOKONO BANGANGU aura droit à 5.000 $ US, payables en Francs Congolais pour préjudice a
lui subit par le fait du viol et 200 $ US pour pillage de ses effets personnels, payables en Francs Congolais ;
3. BONDEKE LOKULI aura droit à 5.000 $ US payables en Francs Congolais pour préjudice à lui subit par le
fait du viol
4. BONGELE LOKULI aura droit à 5.000 $ US payables en Francs Congolais pour préjudice à lui subit par le
fait du viol
5. IFOLE LOONDO aura droit à 5.000 $ U S payables en Francs Congolais pour préjudice à lui subit par le
fait du viol et 200 $ US, payables en Francs Congolais pour pillage des effets personnels ;
6. BOLUMBU MOSAMBE aura droit à 5000 $ US, payables en Francs Congolais pour préjudices à lui subit
par le viol et 200 $US, payables en Francs Congolais pour pillage de ses effets personnels ;
7. BAASA BONKOSO aura droit à 5000 $ US payables en Francs Congolais pour préjudices à lui subit par le
viol et 200 $US, payables en Francs Congolais pour pillage de ses effets personnels ;
8. N’SOMBO BOFUWA aura droit à 5000 $ US payables en Francs Congolais pour préjudices à lui subit par
le viol ;
9. BONGOLE ILONGA aura droit à 5000 $ US payables en Francs Congolais pour préjudices à lui subit par
le viol et 200 $US, payables en Francs Congolais pour pillage de ses effets personnels ;
10. BOALE NKANGA aura droit à 5000 $ US payables en Francs Congolais pour préjudices à lui subit par le
viol et 200 $US, payables en Francs Congolais pour pillage de ses effets personnels ;
11. YOLO B OTEYA aura d roit à 5000 $ US payables en Francs Congolais pour préjudices à lui subit par le
viol et 200 $US, payables en Francs Congolais pour pillage de ses effets personnels ;
12. BAYUMA MBOYO aura droit à 5000 $ US payables en Francs Congolais pour préjudices à lui subit par le
viol ;
13. BOOMBI BOKETSHU aura droit à 5000 $ US payables en Francs Congolais pour préjudices à lui subit par
le viol et 200 $US, payables en Francs Congolais pour pillage de ses effets personnels ;
14. IFOLE LOONDO aura droit à 5000 $ US payables en Francs Congolais pour préjudices à lui subit par le
viol ;
15. Mr T IMOTHE N ZAMBA B OTAKA a ura d roit à 5 00 $ U S, payables en Francs Congolais pour ses
marchandises pillées ;
16. Mr MOBIA ENGINZI aura droit à 500 $ US, payables en Francs Congolais pour ses marchandises pillées ;
17. Mr LOKOLE NKOY aura droit à 500 $ US, payables en Francs Congolais pour ses marchandises
pillées ;
Que les prétentions des parties civiles suivantes ont été déclarées recevables en la forme, mais non fondées
quant à leur motif ;
1. LUNATO LOKOTA ;
2. ILANGA EFILE ;
3. IMOLO BAINDATE ;
4. LOFOTA BAKAMBO ;
5. BALILO BOKUSA ;
6. EFILE KOMBE ;
7. ELIMA LOKULI ;
8. LOKULI LOKULI ;
9. BOKOTSI BOLEKO ;
10. BOSANGA ILANGA
Annex 43
11. BOLUMBU ENTOKO;
12. LOFELI BAENDE ;
13. LIKANGA Georges;
14. BOTONGA;
15. LUMAYI OKOTO ;
16. MBOYO ILEKOLA ;
17. BONGOLE ILONGA ;
18. DJEMI Antoine.
Ainsi rendu et prononcé à l’audience publique du 12 avril 2006 à laquelle siégeaient :
- Le capitaine KILENSELE MUKE, Président ;
- Le Com ppl Jean Michel MBOLELI, Membre ;
- Le Com ppl IDUMA BOSSA, Membre ;
- EDV BUJIRWA MWANAUME, Membre
Avec le concours aux débats du capitaine WAWIMA BANSOMI et Lieutenant MUHEMEDI RAMAZANI
respectivement Auditeur et Substitut de l’Auditeur Militaire de Garnison, représentant du Ministère public et
l’assistance du sous lieutenant BANZA KASONGO, Greffier du siège.
Greffier P résident
Annex 43
Annex 44
Waka-Lifumba (MP et PC. c. Botuli), RP 134/2007 (Tribunal Militaire de Garnison de
Mbandaka, 18 Feb. 2007)
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux 33
Vu les citations à comparaître à l'audience publique du 10 septembre 2007 établies par
le Slt Romain BIAMBA greffier assumé et notifiées par exploit d' huissier aux prévenus
mieux identifiés ci haut ;
Vu le procès-verbal du tirage au sort des membres assesseurs de 3a composition du
Siège du Tribunal désignés pour une période de trois mois renouvelable à compter de la
date du 04 août 2007.
Vu la prestation de serment des membres assesseurs de la composition du Siège du
Tribunal Militaire ;
Vu l’appel de la cause à cette audience, à laquelle comparaissent tous les prévenus
assistés de leur conseil Maître HANDY KALONJI, Avocat au barreau d'appel de
MBANDAKA et les parties civiles représentées conjointement par le Collectif des
Avocats dont font partie Maîtres HUGO, DONATIEN BEYA, MAITRE GAUDET
BGKOUANGO, MAITRE FRANÇOIS TSHITEYA ET MAITRE LAMBERT LISIKA, tous Avocats
au barreau Près la Cour d'Appel de Mbandaka ;
Vu l'instruction faite à cette audience ;
Vu la remise ordonnée en date du 18 septembre 2007 par le Tribunal sur requête
introduite séance tenante par le Collectif des Avocats des parties civiles sollicitant la
comparution de la RDC en qualité du civilement responsable ;
Vu l'appel de la cause à cette audience à laquelle toutes les parties comparaissent
exception faite par la RDC bien que citée régulièrement par le greffier du Tribunal, et le
défaut a été retenu à sa charge ;
Vu la requête introduite par le collectif des Avocats des parties civiles séance tenante,
sollicitant du tribunal l’audience foraine à WAKA LUFUMBA au motif de confronter les
victimes à leurs bourreaux ;
Ouï le Ministère Public dans ses réquisitions et l’avis favorable des prévenus et leurs
conseils, sur quoi le Tribunal de Céans adopta d'organiser l'audience foraine à Waka
Lifumba ;
Vu l'ordonnance prise en date du 20 septembre 2007 par le Président de cette
juridiction, fixant en date du 17 octobre 2007 l'audience foraine de WAKA LIFUMBA ;
Vu les Citations faites aux prévenus de comparaître à cette audience ;
Vu l’appel de la cause à cette audience à laquelle toutes les parties, comparaissent ;
la RDC entendu représentée par Maître Philippe BOSEMBE Avocat au Barreau Près la
Cour d'Appel de Mbandaka, en même temps Avocat des prévenus en remplacement du
Maître HANDY KALONJI empêché ;
Vu l'instruction de la cause à cette audience et les différentes remises contradictoires
ordonnées respectivement en date du 17, 18, 19,20 octobre 2007;
Vu la requête introduite par le collectif des AVOCATS des parties civiles en cette dernière
date, sollicitant au tribunal d'organiser l'audience foraine à BASANKUSU au motif de
confronter les prévenus aux renseignant et médecins ayant examiné les victimes ;
Ouï le ministère public dans ses réquisitions et l'avis favorable des prévenus et leurs
conseils sur quoi le tribunal se décida d'organiser l'audience foraine à BASANKUSU ;
Vu l'ordonnance prise en date du 20 octobre 2007, par le président de cette juridiction
fixant en date du 23 octobre l'audience foraine de BASANKUSU ;
Vu l'appel de la cause à cette audience à laquelle comparaissent toutes les parties
assistées de leurs conseils respectifs, et la comparution de l'expert médecin appelé à la
diligence des parties au procès ;
Vu l'instruction de la cause à cette audience ;
Annex 44
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux 52
PAR CES MOTIFS
Statuant contradictoirement et publiquement à l’égard de toutes les parties au procès :
- Vu le statut de la Cour Pénale Internationale tel que ratifié par la RDC, en ses
articles 7, 9, 21, 25, 30, 31, 32, et 71 ;
- Vu le Code pénal ordinaire livre deuxième en ses articles 46, 47, 67 et 84 ;
- Vu la loi N°023/2002 du 18 novembre 2002 portant code pénal militaire en son
article 63 ;
- Vu le décret-loi N°0013/2002 du 30 mars 2002 portant autorisation du Statut de
la Cour Pénale Internationale ;
- Vu le code civil congolais LIII, en ses articles 258 et 260 ;
- Vu l e d écret l oi 0 4/079 d u 2 1 a oût 2004 portant nomination des magistrats du
Siège
FAISANT DROIT
Le Tribunal dit le prévenu BOTULI IKOFO coupable de l’infraction des coups et blessures
volontaires simples et le condamne à 06 mois de SPP
- Déclare le prévenu BAENDE LONGILIMA coupable des infractions : d’arrestation
arbitraire, extorsion, pillage et crime contre l’humanité et le condamne comme
suit :
A 5 ans SPP pour l’infraction d’arrestation arbitraire et détention illégale ;
A 5 ans SPP pour l’infraction d’extorsion ;
A 10 ans SPP pour l’infraction de pillage ;
A 20 ans SPP pour l’infraction de crime contre l’humanité.
Faisant application de l’article 7 du CPM, prononce l’unique peine, celle la plus forte soit
VINGT ANS SPP.
Le condamne en outre au payement de 20.000FC d’amende quant au prévenu
BOTULI IKOFO
A titre subsidiaire, prononce la dégradation de la PNC du policier BAENDE
LONGILIMA
Laisse les frais d’instance fixés à 20.000FC par chacun en ce qui le concerne ;
payables dans les 08 jours sous peines d’une contrainte par corps dont la durée
ne pouvant excéder 03 mois.
Quant à l’action mue par les parties civiles
- Déclare pour certaines leurs constitutions régulières en la forme et fondées quant
à leur motif, par conséquent, condamne l’Etat Congolais en sa qualité de
commettant à payer à chaque partie civile le montant de dommages et intérêts
selon la classification suivante :
200 USD pour la victime des coups et blessures simples,
500 USD pour les victimes d’extorsion,
600 USD pour les victimes de pillage
2.000 USD pour les victimes d’arrestation arbitraire, détention illégale et
tortures,
5.000 USD pour les victimes de viol,
30.000 USD pour la victime de viol décédée. […]
Déclare pour d’autres leurs constitutions régulière en la forme non fondées, par
Annex 44
Annex 45
Basele et consorts (MP et PC c. Basele Lutula alias Colonel Thom’s et consorts), RP 167/09 and
RMP 944/MBM/09 (Tribunal Militaire de Garnison de Kisangani, 3 June 2009)
192
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux AFFAIRE COLONEL THOM’S ET CONSORTS CONTRE MINISTERE PUBLIC
ET PARTIES CIVILES
Tribunal Militaire de Kisangani
RP 167/08
Lors d’un siège de plus de 10 jours dans près de 13 villages du
Secteur Yawende Loolo, à 365 km de Kisangani en juin et juillet
2007, des éléments Maï-Maï de Basele Lutula alias Colonel Thom’s
ont commis des viols sur plus ou moins 135 femmes (dont 8
mineures).
Le déroulement du procès :
• Début du procès le 02 avril 2009
• Prononcé de la décision le 03 juin 2009
• 08 audiences (dont 7 en foraine à Lieke Lesole)
Les acteurs au procès :
• 5 prévenus dont un par défaut (en fuite)
• 39 victimes constituées et reconnues par le tribunal
comme Parties civiles
Les infractions mises à la charge des prévenus: crimes de
guerre, crimes contre l'humanité, mouvement insurrectionnel et
terrorisme.
Décision de la juridiction :
• Sur 5 accusés, quatre ont été condamnés à une peine de
prison à perpétuité pour crime contre l’humanité. Le
cinquième a été condamné avec circonstances
atténuantes à 30 ans de servitude pénale pour crime
contre l’humanité ;
• Toutes les victimes de crimes contre l’humanité se sont
vus allouer 10.000$ chacune et 2.500$ pour coups et
blessures ;
• La RDC a été condamnée au paiement des dommages et
intérêts in solidum avec les prévenus en tant que
civilement responsable.
Suites :
• Appel sur le banc de tous les condamnés
• Tous les condamnés se sont évadés de la prison d’Osio le
25 octobre 2010.
Annex 45
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux
193
REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO RP.N° 167/09
JUSTICE MILITAIRE RMP.N°944/MBM/09
TRIBUNAL MILITAIRE DE GARNISON
DE KISANGANI
PRO-JUSTITIA
JUGEMENT
Au nom du peuple congolais.
LE TRIBUNAL MILITAIRE DE GARNISON DE KISANGANI,
Statuant au premier degré et en matière répressive ce mercredi 03 juin 2009 en foraine
à LIEKE LESOLE, Territoire d’OPALA, District de la TSHOPO en Province Orientale rend le
jugement dont la teneur suit :
EN CAUSE : l’Auditeur Militaire de Garnison de Kisangani, Ministère Public et Parties
civiles;
Contre : les prévenus :
1. BASELE LUTULA alias colonel Thom’s : né à LUKANDU en 1972, fils de LUTULA (en vie)
et de BOKOTO (décédée), originaire de la localité de Yalingo, secteur de Balingalidja,
Territoire d’Opala, Province Orientale, Unité : DIPO T1, 9ème Région Militaire, grade 2ème
Classe, Matricule : S.M, état-civil : marié à NISAFU SELUWA, père de 13 enfants,
résident à Opala, C.I : pas de C.I (c’est un MAI-MAI), études faites : 6 ans primaire.
2. OSUMAKA LOLEKA André alias EFFACER LE TABLEAU : Fils de ILONGA OSUMAKA (en
vie), né à LELENDE en 1982 et de ASO IKOLIAKA (décédée), originaire de la localité de
LELENDE, Secteur YAWENDE, Territoire d’OPALA, District de la TSHOPO, Province
Orientale, état-civil, célibataire, fonction, Indépendant, études faites : 3 ans primaire,
résident à LELENDE.
3. KIPELEKA NYEMBO BUMBA alias KATA MOTO: Fils de ASAMBI(en vie) et de LOHIYE (en
vie), né dans la forêt TUTU, originaire de LITOKO, Secteur de BALINGALIDJA, Territoire
d’Opala, District de la TSHOPO, Province Orientale, profession cultivateur, marié à
YVONNE Annie, études faites : néant, résident à LITOKO.
4. OKANGA LIKUNDE alias MUSIQUE : Fils de EKILI LIKUNDE (décédé) et de ESINYA
MOLI (en vie), né en 1981 à LOHUMONOKO, originaire de la localité de LUHOMONOKO,
secteur de LOHUMONOKO, Territoire d’Opala, District de la TSHOPO, Province Orientale,
état-civil marié à Madame ELOKE LISAKA, père de 2 enfants, résident à LOHUMONOKO,
profession cultivateur, études faites 2 ans primaire.
5. KOTI OKOKE alias KOY LIKOLO YA NGOMBA : non autrement identifié.
PREVENUS DE :
I. Pour le prévenu BASELE LUTULA alias Colonel Thom’s seul ;
1. Etre, étant supérieur hiérarchique, pénalement responsable du crime international
commis par ses subordonnés placés sous son autorité et son contrôle effectif pour n’avoir
pas exercé le contrôle qui convenait sur ceux-ci en ne prenant pas les mesures
nécessaires et responsables qui étaient en son pouvoir pour empêcher ou réprimer
l’exécution de ce crime ou pour en référer aux autorités compétentes aux fins d’enquêter
et de poursuivre.
Annex 45
210
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux Il ressort de ce qui précède que la qualité du demandeur en réparation ne tient pas à son
statut civil, mais à la réalité du préjudice qu’il a subi.
De ce qui précède, il se dégage trois critères de la réparation du dommage, à savoir
l’existence d’un fait générateur de responsabilité, l’existence d’un dommage et le
rattachement du dommage au fait générateur de responsabilité après un lien de cause à
effet.
Le tribunal relève dans la présente cause que :
1) premièrement : les parties civiles K.L, L.A, M.L, O.L, A.A, L.L, A.L, E.O, A.I, K.L, O.L,
L.Y, L.Y, A.AL, E.E, S.K, I.I, L.J, Y.I, O.O, E.M, E.L, ont été violées par KIPELEKA-NYEMBO
BUMBA alias KATOMOTO. Les parties civiles T.O, A.ALU, A.I, L.E, V.L, K.L, N.L, A.I, S.K,
A.N, I.O, J.L, L.L, et E.L. ont été violées pour KOTI OKOKE alias KOY LIKOLO YA
NGOMBA. Les parties civiles A.L, A.A et A.N. ont été violées par OSUMAKA LOLEKA alias
Effacer le Tableau. Les trente-huit susnommées ont toutes consigné les frais.
Le crime contre l’humanité par viol constitue le fait principal générateur de
responsabilité.
Les dommages moral et matériel évoqués par les parties civiles concernées sont :
- Certaines victimes ont été infectées par les maladies sexuellement transmissibles.
- D’autres ont perdu leur mariage.
- Les mineures ont perdu leurs virginités.
- Pour les célibataires, la chance de leur mariage est réduite
- Toutes les victimes ont souffert dans leurs chaires, mais également soufrent
moralement jusqu’à ce jour pour avoir été humiliées.
2) Deuxièmement, les parties civiles E.E., E.T, Y.A, O., B.B ont tous consignés les frais.
Les coups et blessures simples constitue le fait principal générateur de responsabilité.
Bien que le dommage n’ait pas été clairement définit par le concluant, les dépenses
effectuées pour se faire soigner ainsi que l’humiliation publique paraissent être les
préjudices par eux subis.
3) De ce qui précède, les liens de causalité résultent du fait que ces dommages
n’auraient pas existé si :
a) KIPELEKA NYEMBO, OSUMAKA LOLEKA et KOTI OKOKE n’avaient pas violés les
trente-une femmes dont huit mineures.
b) BASELE LUTULA, KIPELEKA NYEMBO, OSUMAKA LOLEKA et KOTI OKOKE n’avaient
pas administré des coups à EFIKA EFANGA, Esaü TOLENGA, YENGA AITEKELE,
OBOMOLEMA et BAMBALE BOTOYI.
Si la responsabilité civile des auteurs des incriminations ayant porté préjudice aux parties
civiles se fonde sur l’article 258 du Code Civil Livre III aux termes duquel « Tout fait
quelconque de l’homme qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel
il est arrivé à le réparer ». Il se pose dans le cas d’espèce la responsabilité de la
République Démocratique du Congo en sa qualité de civilement responsable.
La responsabilité civile de la République Démocratique du Congo trouve son fondement
dans les dispositions des l’article 263 alinéa 3 du CCL III qui stipule : « On est
responsable non seulement du dommage que l’on cause par son propre fait, mais encore
de celui qui est causé par le fait de personnes dont on doit répondre ou des choses que
l’on a sous sa garde ; les pères du dommage causé par leurs enfants habitants avec eux,
les Maîtres et les commettant du dommage causé par leurs domestiques et
préposés,….. »
Il résulte de cette disposition que quatre conditions sont requises pour que la RDC soit
civilement responsable, à savoir :
Annex 45
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux
211
- Un lien de commettant à préposé ;
- Le dommage doit être causé par le préposé à un tiers ;
- Le dommage doit être par la faute du préposé ;
- La faute doit être commise dans l’exercice de ses fonctions.
En l’espèce, le lien de commettant est établi par le simple fait que BASELE LUTULA alias
Colonel Thom’s touche sa solde comme Soldat de 2ème Classe jusqu’à ce jour ; Le
prévenu BASELE LUTULA, en commettant les infractions des coups et blessures simples,
viol, détention illégale d’armes, …, a causé des dommages à des personnes autres que
l’Etat Congolais ; S’il n’avait pas commis ces infractions, les dommages ne seraient pas
causés aux tiers, c’est par sa faute que ces tiers ont subi des dommages.
En vertu de la Théorie de la Responsabilité de l’Administration Publique pour risque et sur
le fondement de sa mission d’assurer la sécurité des personnes et de leurs biens, laquelle
assure mieux la protection des administrés contre les actes dommageables , imputables
aux agents de l’Etat, qu’ils soient préposés ou organes et que les faits générateurs du
dommage résultent des fautes personnelles ou des fautes de service, en plus de sa
responsabilité tirées de l’exigence de la bonne organisation et du bon fonctionnement de
ses services et ceux créés par son fait, la sécurité des individus « est la raison même de
la vie juridique des peuples et de l’organisation des sociétés ».
Pour toutes ces considérations, l’Etat Congolais doit répondre civilement des
conséquences des actes du prévenu BASELE LUTULA alias Colonel Thom’s surtout lorsque
ce dernier a commis ses forfaits au moyens d’armes de guerre ; il en est de même des
actes des autres prévenus, à savoir : KIPELEKA NYEMBO, OSUMAKA LOLEKA, KOTI
OKOKE et OKANGA LIKUNDE.
PAR CES MOTIFS
Le Tribunal Militaire de Garnison de Kisangani,
Statuant sur l’action publique,
Contradictoirement, en audience publique, et à la majorité des voies de ses membres ;
Vu la Constitution de la RDC en ses articles 146 et suivants ;
Vu la Loi n° 023/2002 portant Code Judiciaire Militaire ;
Vu la Loi n° 024/2002 portant Code Pénal Militaire spécialement en ses articles 5, 6 et
203 ;
Vu le décret d’Organisation Judiciaire n° 04/079 du 21 août 2004 portant nomination des
Magistrats Militaires du Siège ;
Vu le Code Pénal Ordinaire Livre I et II, spécialement en ses articles 21, 22, 23, 43 – 46
et 113 ;
Vu le Code Pénal Ordinaire tel que modifié à ce jour, spécialement dans son article 170 ;
Vu le Traité de Rome portant Statut de la Cour Pénale Internationale, spécialement en
ses articles 7 paragraphe 1er pt g) - 1, 28 paragraphe a pt i (ii), paragraphe b, article 9
paragraphe 1er ;
Vu le Règlement de Procédure et de Preuve, spécialement dans sa règle 63 paragraphe
4 ;
Annex 45
212
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux Vu telle que modifiée et complétée à ce jour l’Ordonnance-loi n° 82-020 du 31 mars
1982 portant Code de l’organisation et de la Compétence Judiciaire ;
Vu les articles 258 et 260 alinéa 3 du CCL III ;
Ouï le Ministère Public dans son réquisitoire ;
La défense des prévenus, les conseils des parties civiles et du civilement responsable
entendus dans leurs plaidoiries ;
Ouï chacun des prévenus dans leurs ultimes déclarations avant la clôture des débats ;
Le Tribunal Militaire de Kisangani, ayant pris l’affaire en délibéré en son audience du lundi
1er juin 2009 et ayant contradictoirement renvoyé la cause pour le prononcé de son
jugement à la date du mercredi 03 juin 2009.
DISANT DROIT
1. Pour le prévenu BASELE LUTULA alias Colonel Thom’s
A la question de savoir si le prévenu BASELE LUTULA est coupable des infractions mises à
sa charge, le Tribunal Militaire de Garnison de Kisangani, à la majorité des voix des
membres de sa composition, répond : Oui pour crime contre l’humanité par viol, viol
avec violence, corps et blessures simples, destruction et dégradation sans intention
méchante, détention illégale d’aime et munitions de guerres.
A la question de savoir s’il y a lieu de retenir en faveur du prévenu des circonstances
atténuantes, des causes de justifications objectives ou subjectives des causes
absolutoires ou le sursis, le Tribunal Militaire de Garnison, à la majorité des voix de
membres de sa composition, répond : NON pour chacune des préventions pour les
quelles il est coupable.
A la question de savoir s’il y a lieu de lui appliquer une sanction pénale et une peine
complémentaire, le Tribunal Militaire de Garnison, à la majorité des voix des membres de
sa composition, répond : Oui.
En conséquence, le condamne :
- à la servitude pénale à perpétuité pour crime contre l’humanité par viol ;
- à 7 jours de servitude pénale principale (S.P.P) pour destruction et dégradation
sans intention méchante et 10.000 Francs Congolais d’amende ou à 1 mois de
servitude pénale subsidiaire (S.P.S) à défaut de paiement dans 15 jours ;
- à 6 mois de S.P.P. pour corps et blessures simples et à 10.000 Francs Congolais
d’amende ou 1 mois S.P.S à défaut de paiement dans 15 jours ;
- à 20 ans de S.P.P. pour détention illégale d’armes et munitions de guerre ;
- à 20 ans de S.P.P. pour viol avec violence et à 100.000 Francs Congolais
d’amende ou à 1 mois S.P.P. à défaut de non paiement dans 15 jours.
Faisant application de l’article 7 du C.P.M le condamne à une seule peine, la plus élevée,
soit la Peine à Perpétuité ;
- à 10.000 FC de Frais d’instance (F.I) à défaut de paiement dans 15 jours à 1 mois
de Contrainte par Corps (CPC) ;
- prononce sa dégradation et son renvoi des FARDC ;
- Ordonne la restitution des sommes de 15.000 Francs Congolais, 11.000 Francs
Congolais et un colis de diamant estimé à 12.000 $ respectivement au profit des
sieurs ILANGI ILAY Pierre et BAMBALE BOTOYI.
Annex 45
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux
213
2. Pour le prévenu KIPELEKA NYEMBO alias KATAMOTO.
A la question de savoir si le prévenu KIPELEKA est coupable des infractions mises à sa
charge, le Tribunal militaire de Garnison de Kisangani, à la majorité des voix de ses
membres, répond : Oui pour crime contre l’humanité par viol, détention illégale d’armes
et munitions de guerre, coups et blessures simples, destruction et dégradation sans
intention méchante ;
A la question de savoir s’il y a lieu de retenir en faveur du prévenu des circonstances
atténuantes, des causes de justifications objectives ou subjectives des causes
absolutoires ou le sursis, le Tribunal Militaire de Garnison, à la majorité des voix de
membres de sa composition, répond : NON pour chacune des préventions pour les
quelles il est coupable.
A la question de savoir s’il y a lieu de lui appliquer une sanction pénale et une peine
complémentaire le Tribunal militaire de Garnison, à la majorité des voix de ses membres,
répond : Oui pour une sanction pénale, NON pour une peine complémentaire.
En conséquence, le condamne :
- à la servitude pénale à perpétuité pour crime contre l’humanité par viol ;
- à 20 ans de S.P.P pour détention pour illégale d’armes et munitions de guerre ;
- à 6 mois de S.P.P pour coups et blessures simples et à 10.000 FC d’amende ou à
1 mois de S.P.S à défaut de paiement dans 15 jours ;
- à 7 jours de S.P.P pour destruction et dégradation sans intention méchante et à
20.000 FC d’amende ou à 1 mois de S.P.S à défaut de paiement dans 15 jours.
Faisant application de l’article 7 du C.P.M, le condamne à une peine unique, la plus forte,
la Servitude Pénale à Perpétuité ;
- à 10.000 FC de Frais d’Instance (F.I) ou à 1 mois de C.P.C à défaut de paiement
dans 15 jours.
3. Pour le prévenu OSUMAKA LOLEKA alias Effacer le Tableau.
A la question de savoir si le prévenu KIPELEKA est coupable des infractions mises à sa
charge, le Tribunal militaire de Garnison de Kisangani, à la majorité des voix de ses
membres, répond : Oui pour crime contre l’humanité par viol, détention illégale d’armes
et munitions de guerre, coups et blessures simples, destruction et dégradation sans
intention méchante ;
A la question de savoir s’il y a lieu de retenir en faveur du prévenu des circonstances
atténuantes, des causes de justifications objectives ou subjectives des causes
absolutoires ou le sursis, le Tribunal Militaire de Garnison, à la majorité des voix de
membres de sa composition, répond : NON pour chacune des préventions pour les
quelles il est coupable.
A la question de savoir s’il y a lieu de lui appliquer une sanction pénale et une peine
complémentaire le Tribunal Militaire de Garnison, à la majorité des voix de ses membres,
répond : Oui pour une sanction pénale, NON pour une peine complémentaire.
En conséquence, le condamne :
- à la Servitude Pénale à Perpétuité pour crime contre l’humanité par viol ;
- à 7 jours de S.P.P pour destruction et dégradation sans intention méchante et à
10.000 FC d’amende ou à 1 mois de S.P.S à défaut de paiement dans 15jours ;
- à 6 mois de S.P.P pour coups et blessures volontaires simples et à 10.000 FC
d’amende ou à 1 mois de SPS à défaut de paiement dans 15 jours ;
- à 20 ans de SPP pour détention illégale d’armes et munitions de guerre.
Annex 45
214
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux Faisant application de l’article 7 du CPM prononce une seule peine la plus forte soit la
Peine à perpétuité.
- à 10.000 FC de F.I ou à 1 mois de CPC à défaut de paiement dans 15 jours.
4. Pour le prévenu OKANGA LIKUNDE alias Musique.
A la question de savoir si le prévenu OKANGA est coupable des incriminations mises à sa
charge, le Tribunal Militaire de Garnison de Kisangani, à la majorité des voix des
membres de sa composition répond : Oui pour crime contre l’humanité par viol,
destruction et dégradation sans intention méchante, corps et blessures simples et
détention illégale d’armes et munitions de guerre ;
A la question de savoir s’il y a lieu de retenir en sa faveur des circonstance atténuantes
des causes de justifications objectives ou subjectives, des causes absolutoires ou sursis,
le Tribunal, à la majorité des voix des membres de sa composition, répond : Oui pour des
circonstances atténuantes dues au fait qu’il est délinquant primaire et à cause de son
jeune âge pour chacune des préventions pour lesquelles il est coupable.
A la question de savoir s’il y a lieu de lui appliquer une sanction pénale et une peine
complémentaire, le Tribunal militaire, à la majorité de la voix de ses membres, répond :
Oui pour une sanction pénale, NON pour une peine complémentaire
En conséquence, le condamne :
- à 30 ans de Servitude Pénale pour Crime contre l’humanité par viol ;
- à 10.000 FC d’amende ou à 1 mois de SPS à défaut de paiement dans 15 jours
pour destruction et dégradation sans intention méchante ;
- à 10.000 FC d’amende pour corps et blessure volontaires simples à défaut de
paiement dans 15 jours à 1 mois de CPC ;
- à 5 ans de SPP pour détention illégale d’armes et munitions de guerre.
Faisant application de l’article 7 du C.PM prononce qu’une seule peine, la plus forte soit
30 ans de S.P.P
- à 10.000 FC Frais d’Instance (F.I) ou à 1 mois de CPC à défaut de paiement dans
15 jours.
5. Pour le prévenu KOTI OKOKE alias NKOY LIKOLO YA NGOMBA
A la question de savoir si le prévenu KOTI OKOKE est coupable des infractions mises à sa
charge, le Tribunal militaire de Garnison de Kisangani, à la majorité des voix de ses
membres, répond : Oui pour crime contre l’humanité par viol, destruction et dégradation
sans intention méchante, corps et blessures volontaires, simples et détention illégale
d’armes et minutions de guerre.
A la question de savoir s’il y a lieu de retenu en sa faveur des circonstances atténuantes
des causes de justifications objectives au subjectives, des causes absolutoires ou le
sursis, le Tribunal militaire de Garnison de Kisangani, à la majorité des voix des membres
de sa composition, répond : NON pour chacune des préventions pour lesquelles il est
coupable ;
A la question de savoir s’il y a lieu de lui appliquer une sanction pénale et une peine
complémentaire, le Tribunal militaire, à la majorité de la voix de ses membres, répond :
Oui pour une sanction pénale, NON pour une peine complémentaire
En conséquence, le condamne :
- à la Servitude Pénale à Perpétuité pour crime contre l’humanité par viol ;
Annex 45
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux
215
- à 7 jours de Servitude Pénale Principale et 10.000 FC d’amende ou à 1 mois de
SPS à défaut de paiement dans 15 jours pour dégradation sans intention
méchante ;
- à 6 mois de SPP et à 10.000 FC d’amende ou à 1 mois de SPS à défaut de
paiement dans 15 jours pour coups et blessures volontaires simples ;
- à 20 ans de Servitude Pénale Principale pour détention illégale d’armes et
munitions de guerre.
Faisant application de l’article 7 du CPM le condamne à la Servitude Pénale à
Perpétuité (SPPP), unique peine la plus forte ;
- à 10.000 FC de Frais d’Instance ou à 1 mois de Contrainte par Corps (CPC) à
défaut de paiement dans 15 jours.
STATUANT SUR L’ACTION CIVILE
Contradictoirement en audience publique, et à la majorité des voix de ses membres ;
Déclare recevable et fondée l’action en réparation du préjudice introduite par KOYALE
LIKONDO (mineur d’âge), Lucie AKONGA (mineur d’âge), MATESO LIKONDO (mineur
d’âge), OSO LIKAKA, AYAKA ALUMA (âgé de 58 ans), LIKAKA LIENGO, ASONGO LOKWA ,
EFIKA OSUMAKA, ASELE ISINGA, KOLONGO LIKAKA, OTAMA LIKONDO, LEKA YENI,
AKAKA ALIFE, EFIKA EPANGA, SAKUNGA KEMANDE, ISEKUA TOKONEKA LOHOMBE
Joséphine (fille enceinte), AFANIO NDOMBO (tentative de viol), YENGA ILTENYAKA,
OKOLIYA OSUMAKA, EKANGA MATESO, ETENYA LOKONDO, AYITENYAKA AKILI, LIHOMBE
EFIKA, VOTE LIKAKA, KOLONGO LIKAKA, NYOMBO AKONGA, AKONGA IKENGO, AFANIO
NDOMBO, IKWA OSUMAKA, Jacquie LIKONDO, LIKAKA LIKONDO, ADO LIKAKA, AYAKA
ALUME, EFIKA EFANGA, Esaü TOLENGA, YENGA AYITEKELE, OBO MOLEMA et BAMBALE
BOTOYI.
En conséquence,
S’agissant des parties civiles, KOYALE LIKONDO, Lucie AKONGA, MATESO LIKONDO, OSO
LIKAKA, AYAKA ALUMA, LIKAKA LIENGO, ASONGO LOKWA, EFIKA OSUMAKA, ASELE
ISINGA, KOLONGO LIKAKA, OTAMA LIKONDO, LEKA YENI, AKAKA ALIFE, EFIKA EPANGA,
SAKUNGA KEMANDE, ISEKUA TOKONEKA, YENGA ITENYAKA, OKOLIYA OSUMAKA,
EKANGA MATESO, ETENYA LOKONDO, AYITENYAKA AKILI, ASELE ISINGA, LIHOMBE
EFIKA, VOTE LIKAKA, KOLONGO LIKAKA, NYOMBO AKONGA, AKONGA IKENGO, AFANIO
NDOMBO, IKWA OSUMAKA, Jacquie LIKONDO, LIKAKA LIKONDO, ETENYA LIKAKA et ADO
LIKAKA, le tribunal condamne les prévenus BASELE LUTULA, OSUMAKA LOLEKA,
OKANGA LIKUNDE KIPELEKA NYEMBO NDUBA et KOTI OKOKE tous, solidairement avec la
République Démocratique du Congo, à payer à chacune d’elles à titre de
dédommagement pour préjudice subi l’équivalent en Francs Congolais de 10.000$ US
(dix milles dollars américain );
Quant aux victimes des corps et blessures volontaires simples à savoir, EFIKA EFANGA,
Esaü TOLENGA, YENGA AYITEKELE, OBOMOLEMA et BAMBALE BOTOY, le Tribunal
militaire de Garnison de Kisangani, condamne les prévenus ci-haut cités in solidum avec
la RDC à payait à chacune elles l’équivalent en francs congolais la somme de 2.500$ US
(deux milles cinq cents dollars américain) à titre des dommages et intérêts.
Ainsi jugé et prononcé en audience publique de ce mercredi 03 juin 2009.
A laquelle ont siégé :
Le Capitaine Magistrat CLAUDE DISIMO YATIKEKE, Président
Le Lieutenant Magistrat WILLY MUSANS KATUNG, Membre
Annex 45
216
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux Le Commissaire Principal KITENGE MWAMBA, Juge Assesseur
Le Commissaire Principal MOFONZA YOMBO, Juge Assesseur
Le Commissaire Principal MAKASA KALOB, Juge Assesseur
Avec le concours du Lieutenant Magistrat Guillaume NGEMBO NGWAMA et du Sous-
Lieutenant Magistrat NGANAMA, tous Substituts de l’Auditeur Militaire de Garnison de
Kisangani, Officier du Ministère public et l’assistance Sous-Lieutenant Variavas
BONDJALA, Greffier du siège.
Le Greffier, Le Président,
Annex 45
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux
217
RMP 944/MBM/08
RP 167/08
Note de plaidorie de Maitre Koyakosi Mbawa dans l’affaire Lieke Sole
Monsieur le Président,
Monsieur les Juges,
Monsieur l’Auditeur Militaire de Garnison, Ministère public,
Les victimes trouvent par l’organisation de ce procès et au lieu de la commission du
crime un début de satisfaction. Car leur satisfaction sera grande au moment où votre
tribunal allouera d’importantes indemnités et enfin elle le sera davantage au moment de
l’exécution du jugement.
Monsieur le Président,
Après les conflits armés qui ont endeuillé la République démocratique du Congo, la voie
de la paix fut ouverte à tous les combattants : ce fut donc le brassage. Mais certains ont
refusé cette solution en choisissant la voie de la barbarie, de la terreur, de viol
systématique de pauvres et paisibles mamans. Il en est ainsi du prévenu BASELE Alias
Col. Thom’s et de ses hommes qui, ayant fait parti du groupe Maï-Maï ; ont semé la
terreur à tout leur passage.
A l’aide d’armes de guerre, ces hors-la-loi ont pillé, extorqué, torturé, violé. Les
déclarations des victimes, notamment sur les P.V (cotes : 68, 70, 71,72) sont
éloquentes. Ils ne respectaient personne et personne ne leur résistait.
N’ont-ils pas injurié des policiers et tabassé des militaires ? (cotes 94 et 95)
C’est ainsi qu’à leur arrivée, les hommes fuyaient laissant leurs épouses et leurs filles à
leur merci (côte 87 et 88). Ils violaient de jour comme de nuit, et partout où ils
rencontraient leur proie. Ils violaient tout le monde, mineurs, femmes enceintes, femmes
mariées et vieillards. Ainsi huit mineurs furent violés, madame IKUMA OSUMAKA avec
une grossesse de 9 mois fut aussi violée et enfin madame AFAYO NDOMBO née en 1939
a failli être violée (côte 152).Certaines femmes violées ont perdu leur mariage, d’autres
furent rendu grosses et presque toutes sont infectées, car aucune de ces relations
sexuelles imposées n’étaient protégées.
Il convient de souligner que le nombre des victimes est plus important que ce qui est
connu, car certaines victimes ont préféré le silence de peur de perdre leur mariage ou
leur chance de mariage (lire côte 93).
Il faut par ailleurs noter que les biens de ces villageois furent considérés comme des
biens sans maîtres, qu’ils pouvaient prendre à leur aise. L’imposition du travail collectif
n’était qu’un prétexte pour semer la terreur et l’horreur. BASELE alias COL THOM’S n’a-til
pas fait savoir que lui ne jugeait pas mais qu’il bastonnait (côte 69) ?
La terreur et l’horreur étaient si fortes que leur simple présence provoquait la panique et
la fuite dans la forêt. Cela fut pareil partout où ils passaient, à Liekele-Sole à Yawende,….
C’est donc dans ces conditions de terreur et d’horreur que la plupart des victimes ne
résistaient presque plus.
«Mille jours de crimes, un jour d’attrapage» dit-on. Les prévenus sont poursuivis
aujourd’hui notamment pour des crimes contre l’humanité au sens de l’art.7 du Statut de
Rome, crimes qui ont causé aux victimes d’énormes préjudices dont elles vont solliciter ;
dans les lignes qui suivent réparation ; par la condamnation des prévenus à leur payer
chacune le montant de 50.000$ payable en Franc congolais.
Annex 45
Annex 46
Kakado (MP et PC c. Kakado Barnaba), RP 071/09, 009/010 and RP 074/010 (Tribunal Militaire
de Garnison de Bunia, 9 July 2010)
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux 135
AFFAIRE KAKADO BARNABA
TRIBUNAL MILITAIRE DE GARNISON DE BUNIA- RP 071/09, 009/010 et RP
074/010
Qualification : Crimes de guerre
I. JUGEMENT DU 09 JUILLET 2010
1. EXPOSE DES FAITS et RETROACTES :
Le prévenu Sieur KAKADO BARNABA YONGA TSHOPENA, de nationalité congolaise,
né à KAGABA, le14 Decembre1923; fils de INDUZO (décédé) et de ALI (décédée),
originaire du village TSHOBENA, secteur de WALENDU BINDI, Territoire d’IRUMU,
District de L’ITURI province Orientale ; état civile: marie à Madame SHAI MUZUNGUI et
père de 15 enfants de religion protestante; études faites:école biblique EMMAUS de
NYAKUNDE,école de pêche et de culture de Cotton, domicilie entre BULANZABO et
KILIMALI dans le groupement WALESE/BIRA; plaidant par ses conseils savoir Maîtres
jean Destiné ESSANOTO, Modeste MAGENE et Nestor KPAMBE, respectivement Avocats
au Barreau près la Cour de Kisangani, ainsi que Maître Célestin NTAWARA, Défenseur
judiciaire près le Tribunal de Grande Instance de Bunia.
Poursuivi, d’une part, pour avoir participé à un mouvement insurrectionnel par le fait de
l’organiser;
En l’occurrence, avoir, à IRUMU, Territoire de ce nom, district de l’ituri, dans la Province
Orientale en République Démocratique du Congo, plus précisément dans les localités de
BAHITI, TSHELETSHELE et TSHEYI, sans préjudice de date certaine, mais au courant des
années 2006 et 2007, période non encore couverte par le délai de prescription légale,
organisé une milice armée regroupant les combattants NGITI en vue de porter atteinte à
l’intégrité du Territoire National ;
Faits prévus et punis par les articles 136 et 139 du Code Pénal Militaire;
Et ,d’autre part, avoir ,au courant d’une période non encore couverte par le délai de
prescription légale, comme responsable pénale individuel, chef militaire ou autres
supérieurs hiérarchiques du responsable pénal individuel, selon l’un des modes de
responsabilité pénale prévue aux articles 25 et 28 du Traite de ROME du 17 Juillet 1998,
ratifié par la RDC le 30 Mars 2002et entré en vigueur le 01 Juillet 2002, dans le cadre
des conflits armes opposant de manière prolongée sur le Territoire d’un Etat ,les
autorités du gouvernement de cet Etat et des groupes armes organisés ou ces groupes
entre-eux, dirigé intentionnellement des attaques contre les personnes civiles qui ne
participant pas directement aux hostilités;
En l’occurrence, avoir dans le Territoire d’ IRUMU, district de l’ituri, dans la Province
Orientale en République Démocratique du Congo, sans préjudice de date certaine, mais
au courant du mois de Septembre 2002,comme autre responsable hiérarchiques en sa
qualité de l’autorité morale des combattants NGITI, groupe armé organisé autrement
identifié sous le label du FRPI, dans le cadre du conflit arme opposant de l’an 2002 à l’an
Annex 46
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux 174
- Déclare, par contre, recevables en la forme el fondées partiellement quanta leurs
motifs les actions en réparation introduites par les 12 victimes régulièrement constituées
citées au premier feuille;
En conséquence, le Tribunal condamne, ex aequo et bono, seul, le
prévenu KAKADO BARNABA YONGA TSHOPENA à payer au titre du dédommagement
pour tout préjudice subi comme suit :
- à Mr (…) : l'équivalant en Francs Consolais de 50.i
- à Mr (…) : l'équivalant en Francs Congolais de 50.000$ ;
- à Mr (…) : l'équivalant en Francs Congolais de 50.OOOS :
- à Mr (…) : l’équivalant en Francs Congolais de 50.000$;
- à Mr (…) : l'équivalant en Francs Congolais de 50.000$ ;
- à Mr (…) : l'équivalant en Francs Congolais de 50.000$ ;
- à Mme (…) : l’équivalant en Francs Congolais de 50.000$ ;
- à Mr (…) : l’équivalant en Francs Congolais de 50.000$ ;
- à Mr (…) : l'équivalant en Francs Congolais de 50,000$ ;
- à Mr (…) : l'équivalant en Francs Congolais de 50.000$ ;
- à Mme (…) : l’équivalant en Francs Congolais de 750.000$ ;
- à Mme (…) : l'équivalant en Francs Congolais de 750.000$ ;
- Le Tribunal averti en fin le condamné que la loi lui accorde un délai de cinq jours
compter de ce prononcé pour former un recours éventuel.
Ainsi jugé et prononcé en audience publique de ce lundi 09 Juillet 2010 … ».
Annex 46
Annex 47
Maniraguha et Sibomana (MP et PC (400) c. Jean Bosco Maniraguha alias Kazungu et
consorts), RP 275/09, 521/10 RMP 581/07 and 1573/KMC/10 (Tribunal Militaire de Garnison de
Bukavu, 16 Aug. 2011)
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux 100
AFFAIRE MANIRAGUHA Jean Bosco alias KAZUNGU et crt
TRIBUNAL MILITAIRE DE GARNISON DE BUKAVU- RP 275/09 et 521/10 / RMP
581/07 et 1573/KMC/10
QUALIFICATION : Crimes contre l’humanité
I. JUGEMENT DU 16 AOUT 2011
« …Le Tribunal Militaire de Garnison de Bukavu, siégeant en matière répressive en
foraine au premier degré, dans la salle d’audience du Tribunal de Paix de KALEHE, dans
le quartier KALEHE centre au Sud-Kivu, a rendu et prononcé, en audience publique de ce
mardi seizième jour du mois d’août de l’an deux mille onze, le jugement dont voici les
dispositif et motif :
EN CAUSE :
L’Auditeur Militaire de Garnison de Bukavu, Ministère Public et les Parties Civiles (quatre
cents personnes)
CONTRE:
1. Le soldat MANIRAGUHA Jean Bosco alias KAZUNGU, élément FDLR et sujet Rwandais,
né à GITAMARA, âgé de plus ou moins vingt-huit ans, originaire du village de
GITAMARA, Secteur de NYAMABWIRE, Territoire et/ou Province de GITAMARA en
République du Rwanda, Niveau d’étude : Néant, état-civile célibataire sans enfant.
2. le soldat SIBOMANA KABANDA alias TUZARGWANA, élément FDLR et sujet Rwandais,
né à CIBUNGU âgé de 32 ans, fils de HABIMANA et de NZIRORERA, originaire de
GITARAMA République du Rwanda, Niveau d’étude : Néant, état-civile célibataire
sans enfant.
PREVENUS DE:
Pour le prévenu MANIRAGUHA Jean bosco alias Kazungu
1. S’être, comme auteur, coauteur ou complice, selon l’un des modes de participation
criminelle prévus par les articles 5 et 6 du code pénal militaire, rendu coupable de
crimes contre l’humanité par meurtre;
En l’occurrence, avoir à HUNGU, RWAMIKUNDU, et KAFUNDA, villages de ces noms,
territoire de KALEHE, province du Sud-Kivu, en République Démocratique du Congo,
au courant de la période allant de juin/juillet 2006 au janvier 2007, à l’occasion
d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique, à l’aide des armes de guerre, par
exécutions des infractions, occasionné la mort de sieur MBIMBI (à HUNGU), incendié
56 cases dans le village de RWAMIKUNDU et occasionné la mort de 52 personnes
dont Marie NABINTU, et ses sept enfants, tué plusieurs personnes dont notamment :
dame Francisca et sieur KATCHWENGE BUNYAKIRI à HUNGU et le pasteur
BISURUMBA à KAFUNDA ;
Faits prévus et réprimés par les articles 165 à 167 du code pénal militaire et 7, 28,
77 du Statut de Rome de la CPI.
Annex 47
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux 124
- NON pour crime contre l’humanité par viol et par meurtre ; en conséquence, les en
acquitte et le renvoi à toute fin de poursuites sans frais quant à ce ;
Par contre, répond :
- OUI pour crime contre l’humanité par torture;
- OUI pour crime contre l’humanité par emprisonnement ou autres formes de privation
grave de liberté physique ;
Quant à celle de savoir s’il y a lieu de lui bénéficier des larges circonstances atténuantes
comme suffisamment motivées ci-haut, le Tribunal à la majorité des voix des membres
de sa composition et par scrutins secrets, distincts et successifs répond : OUI pour
toutes les deux préventions;
Quant à celle de savoir s’il ya lieu de lui déclarer coupable et lui appliquer une sanction
pénale, le Tribunal à la majorité des voix des membres de sa composition et par scrutins
secrets, distincts et successifs, répond : OUI ;
En conséquence, le condamne :
- à la peine d’emprisonnement de trente ans pour crime contre l’humanité par meurtre;
- à la peine d’emprisonnement de trente ans pour crime contre l’humanité par
emprisonnement ou autres formes de privation grave de liberté physique ;
Faisant application de l’article 78-3- du statut de Rome, prononce une peine unique, la
plus forte, la peine d’emprisonnement de trente ans.
Le Tribunal ordonne aux condamnés de restituer tous les biens des victimes par eux
emportés.
Le Tribunal statuant sur l’action civile contradictoirement, en audience
publique, et à la majorité des voix de ses membres;
Dit irrecevable et non fondée la demande de construction de deux écoles ; l’une à
KALONGE et l’autre à BUNYAKIRI ;
Dit recevable mais non fondée l’exception soulevée par la RDC ;
Dit recevable mais non fondée l’action de V27 ;
En conséquence, les déboute.
Déclare recevables et fondées les actions en indemnisation des préjudices mues par
toutes les autres parties, telles que libellées dans leurs procurations spéciales ;
En conséquence :
Le Tribunal de céans condamne l’Etat congolais seul à payer au titre du
dédommagement pour préjudices subis, de sommes équivalentes en francs congolais :
- à 700 $ US (sept cent dollars américains) pour chacune des victimes de viol ;
- à 550 $ US (cinq cent cinquante dollars américains) pour chacune des victimes de
tortures ;
-à 400 $ US (quatre cents dollars américains) pour chacune des
Annex 47
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux 125
victimes d’emprisonnement ou autres formes de privation grave de liberté physique ;
- à 5800 $ US (cinq mille huit cents dollars américains) pour chacune des victimes de
meurtre.
Met les frais de la présente instance à charge du Trésor Public.… ».
II.COMMENTAIRES
I. FAITS ET RETROACTES
Au courant de l’année 2006, sieur MANIRAGUHA Jean Bosco alias KAZUNGU ou
Petit Bal, sujet hutu rwandais dirige une milice dénommée FDLR RASTA, composée entre
autres des nommés KASOLE, RASTA, FREDDIS, VATICAN, GITAMISI, MONUC,
NJEGITERA, MANUC, ENJECTERE. Cette milice va assiéger les villages formant la localité
de KALONGE.
Le 02 juillet 2006, sieur MANIRAGUHA et dix-huit de ses cent trente hommes, en
patrouille de reconnaissance dans certains villages, arrêtent sept personnes au village
FENDULA dont deux hommes tués par le prévenu lui-même, après avoir fait déverser des
braises ardentes sur une femme (…). Quelques instants après, la bande va abattre trois
hommes au village RWAMIKUNDU pour se livrer ensuite aux pillages du bétail et des
volailles. Plusieurs femmes emportées dans le campement des FDLR RASTA sont
réparties entre les membres de la bande par le chef MANIRAGUHA au titre d’esclaves
sexuels.
Le 09 juillet 2006, au village FENDULA, ils vont incendier cinquante-six
habitations. Certains des habitants vont se réfugier dans la forêt et d’autres, estimés au
nombre de cinquante-deux, seront brûlés vifs. Le bétail, les volailles et tant d’autres
biens de valeur seront emportés par les assaillants grâce aux victimes astreintes à cet
exercice déshumanisant. Certaines femmes sont violées au village, d’autres soumises à
l’esclavage sexuel en forêt.
Suite à l’intervention des éléments des FARDC, la bande sera mise en déroute, car
certains de ses membres seront tués. Mais le prévenu MANIRAGUHA et quelques
rescapés vont installer leur Quartier Général au village BUSH BWAMBOMBO, d’où ils vont,
à tour de rôle, organiser des attaques, dans la période allant d’août 2006 à janvier 2007,
dans plusieurs villages du secteur de BUNYAKIRI, où viols des femmes et filles, tueries
des hommes, pillages des biens sont constamment perpétrés.
L’éventail des actes au passif de la bande à MANIRAGUHA s’avère effrayant, les
dégâts matériels sont incalculables : tueries et viols, ruptures forcées des mariages,
enfants orphelins, sans abri, etc.
II. PRINCIPES ENONCES
1. SUR LA COMPETENCE DU TRIBUNAL A L’EGARD DES PREVENUS ETRANGERS
« Le Tribunal de céans observe que les prévenus MANIRAGUHA Jean Bosco alias
KAZUNGU et consorts sont, bien que militaires, des sujets Rwandais, étrangers à
Annex 47
Annex 48
Kimbanguistes (MP et PC Kumba et consorts- MP et PC c. Mputu Muteba et consorts, RP
11.154/11.155/ 11.156 (Tribunal de Grande Instance de Kinshasa/ Kalamu, 17 Dec. 2011)
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux 10
AFFAIRE MPUTU MUTEBA ET CONSORTS DITE AFFAIRE DES
KIMBANGUISTES
TRIBUNAL DE GRANDE INSTANCE DE KINSHASA/ KALAMU- RP 11.154/
11.155/ 11.156.
QUALIFICATION : GENOCIDE
I. JUGEMENT DU 17 DECEMBRE 2011
« Par sa lettre n° 4665/RMP FL 134/PR.022/GTM du 16/12/2011, le Procureur de la
République près le tribunal de céans a attrait, en procédure de flagrante sous R.P.
11.154 les prévenus MPUTU MUTEBA Israël, LUZAYISU NZUZI alias Nodo, SOLWA Pierre,
LUZOLO MVUMBI, MBAKI PUNGA Constant, KUMBA ADO alias Shakazulu, ASANGA
KATENDE Trésor, BINGONDA MAWETE, BENGANI Pascal, KIZAYAKO Biaise, KABASELE
MUKONGA et LUSANGA NGUMBI Junior, par devant le tribunal de céans pour meurtre,
association des malfaiteurs, pillage et incendie volontaire, faits prévus et punis par le
code pénal en ses articles 21 et 23 du livre premier, en ses articles 44-45, 156 et 158,
200 et 103 du livre deuxième.
Par une autre lettre n°4671/RMP FL 135/PR.022/ASD de la même date, le même
Ministère public a déféré également en procédure de flagrance devant le tribunal de
céans sous R.P. 11.156, les nommés NSIMBA KATUZAYAKO alias Jeantilie, MWADl
KAPELA Fabrice alias Mille Esprits, BUNGU KINIAKA alias Eniawu, LUFUNDU NZOLAMESO
Miguel, NSEKA MERDI alias Pululu Cibor, Gauthier MAKELE ZONO, MAYUKULA Vincent,
KALANGANGU NDOMIMSI Trésor et KUMBA Ado alias Shakazulu tous poursuivis des
chefs des infractions de meurtre pillage et génocide, faits prévus et punis par le code
pénal en ses articles 21 et 23 du livre premier et en ses articles 44-45 et 200 du livre
deuxième et par le Statut de Rome du 17/07/1998, en ses articles 1, 5, 6 et 77.
Enfin, par une autre lettre de fixation d'audience en procédure de flagrance n°
4670/RM/RL 136/PR.022/1OS/SEC/2011 de la même date, le même Ministère public
poursuit cette fois, sous R.P. 11155, les prévenus ITEMBELA-LESSA et Jonathan
KUMONA pour les infractions de pillage, destruction méchante, meurtre et génocide,
faits prévus et punis par les articles 21 et 23 du code pénal livre premier, et 44-45, 110,
120 et 200 du code pénal, livre deuxième, ainsi que par les articles 1.5.6 et 77 du statut
de Rome.
Ces trois causes enrôlées sous R.P. 11154, 11.155 et 11.156 ont été jointes à la
demande des parties pour cause de connexité de faits.
A l'appel de ces causes à l'audience publique du 17/12/2011, à laquelle les parties
civiles, l'église KIMBANGUlSTE, dame (…), sieur (…) et sieur (…) ont comparu
représentées par leurs conseils Maîtres DIANGENDA et MONTANA, Avocats, et les
prévenus ont comparu tous assistés de leurs conseils, Maîtres BARUTI et DJETA, Avocats
d'une part et d'autre part Maître OKITO, Défenseur judiciaire du ressort ; la présente
cause a été plaidée et prise en délibéré.
La procédure suivie à cet effet est régulière et contradictoire.
Annex 48
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux 21
Pour le tribunal, c'est ce mécontentement qui a entraîné la rancune et l’animosité dans
le chef des jeunes du quartier parmi lesquels le prévenu ci-haut identifié, de provoquer
par des coups de pierre de nature à entraîner la mort, la suppression des membres de la
religion Kimbanguiste de leur quartier ou mieux de la commune de Selembao.
C’est ainsi que le tribunal dira établie à sa charge le crime de génocide par meurtre et le
condamnera pour le génocide à la peine d'emprisonnement à perpétuité.
Le tribunal dira pour droit que ces deux Infractions de destruction méchante et de
génocide retenues à charge du prévenu prénommé sont en concours matériel et par
conséquent, le condamnera au cumul des peines portée à la peine de servitude pénale à
perpétuité.
S'agissant des postulations civiles.
Concernant la dame (…), le tribunal note que ses prétentions n'ont pas été étayées en
l’espèce par des preuves soit-elle physique ou médicale de plaie lui causée par les
prévenus et ce surtout qu'elle n'a pas comparu en personne. Le tribunal recevra son
action civile et la dira non fondée ; et par conséquent, l'en déboutera.
Quant à l'action civile du sieur (…), le tribunal, par le fait que la m ort de son fils n'est
pas intervenue, à la paroisse où les prévenus ci-dessus reconnus coupables ont eu à
opérer, mais par contre par arme à feu après pillage du sous commissariat NKULU dans
la commune de Selembao, la dira aussi recevable et non fondée ; et par conséquent l'en
déboutera.
Par contre, l'action civile de l'église Kimbanguiste sera reçue et déclarée fondée. Ses
biens tant mobiliers qu'immobiliers ayant subi la destruction et le pillage de la part des
prévenus coupables. Ainsi, il lui sera alloué la somme de huit mille dollars américains,
fixés ex aequo et bono, à titre de dommages et intérêts, à lui payer in solidum par les
prévenus retenus coupables ci-dessus identifiés.
L'action civile de (…) sera aussi dite recevable et fondée, le décès de son jeune frère par
lapidation étant reconnu par quelques uns des prévenus, et condamnera, en
conséquence, les prévenus reconnus coupables, ci-dessus identifiés, de lui payer, in
solidum la somme de quinze mille dollars américains fixés ex aequo et bono, à titre des
dommages et intérêts.
Les frais d'instance seront mis, à raison de la moitié, à charge de tous les prévenus ciavant
prénommés, retenus coupables en l'espèce, qui payeront chacun le seizième
(1/16). à défaut de payer, ils subiront chacun dix jours de contrainte par corps.
PAR CES MOTIFS:
Le tribunal statuant publiquement et contradictoirement à l'endroit de toutes les parties
en procédure de flagrance ;
Le Ministère public entendu dans ses réquisitions ;
Vu le Statut de Rome du 17/07/1998, spécialement à ses; articles 1er, 5, 6 et 77 :
Vu la Constitution de la République, spécialement en ses articles 153, alinéa 4ième et
215;
Vu le code de l'organisation et de la compétence judiciaires :
Vu le code de procédure pénale ;
Vu le code pénal, livre 1er, spécialement à ses articles 2l et 23 ;
Vu le code pénal, livre 2ème spécialement à ses articles 43-45, 103 ; 110-112 , 156-158
et 200 ;
Vu le code civil congolais livre III, spécialement à son article 258 ;
Annex 48
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux 22
-En ce qui concerne le R. P. 11.154.
Dit non établies les infractions de meurtre, d'association des malfaiteurs, de pillage et
d'incendie volontaire mise à charge des prévenus MPUTU MUTEBA Israël, LUZAYISU
NZUZI alias Nodo, SOLWA Pierre, LUZOLO MVUMBI, MBAKIFUNGA Constant, ASANGA
KATENDE Trésor, BINGONDA MAWETE, BENGANI Pascal, KIZAYAKO Blaise, KABASELE
MUKONGA et LUSANGA NGUMBI Junior;
Par conséquent, les acquitte et les renvoie de toute fin des poursuites judiciaires ;
-En ce qui concerne le R.P, 11.156,
Dit non établies les infractions de meurtre, de pillage et de génocide mises à change des
prévenus MAYUKULU Vincent et KALANGANGU Trésor ;
Par conséquent, les acquitte et les renvoie de toute fin des poursuites judiciaires :
Par contre, dit établies le crime de génocide par meurtre et le pillage mise à charge des
prévenus KUMBA Ado alias Shakazulu, NSIMBA, KATUZAYAKO alias Jaentilie, MWADl
KAPELE alias Mille esprits, BUNGU KINYAKA alias Eniawu, LUFUNDU NZOLAMESO Miguel,
MAKELE ZONO Gauthier et NSEKA Merdi alias Pululu Cibor ;
Par conséquent, les condamne chacun pour le génocide à la peine de servitude pénale à
perpétuité et pour le pillage, avec admission de larges circonstances atténuantes, à la
servitude pénale à perpétuité ;
Dit pour droit que ces deux infractions sont en concours matériel par conséquent, les
condamne chacun au cumul des peines portées à la seule peine de servitude pénale à
perpétuité ;
En ce qui concerne le R.P. 11.155,
Dit non établies les infractions de pillage, de destruction méchante, de génocide par
meurtre mises à charge du prévenu Jonathan KUMONA ;
Par conséquent, l'en acquitte et le renvoie de toute fin des poursuites judiciaires ;
Dit aussi non établie l'infraction de pillage à charge du prévenu ITEMBILA-LESSA.
Par conséquent, l'en acquitte et le renvoie de toute fin des poursuites judiciaires ;
Par contre, dit établis le génocide par meurtre et la destruction méchante mis à charge
du prévenu ITEMBILA LESSA;
Par conséquent, le condamne pour le génocide par meurtre à la peine d'emprisonnement
à perpétuité et pour la destruction méchante à cinq ans de servitude pénale principale
Dit pour droit que ces deux infractions sont en concours matériel ;
Par conséquent, le condamne au cumul des peines portée à la peine de servitude pénale
à perpétuité ;
Statuant sur les intérêts civils :
Reçoit les actions de la dame (…) et du sieur (…) mais les déclare non fondées, par
conséquent, les en déboute :
Par contre, reçoit l'action civile de l'église Kimbanguiste et la déclare fondée, par
conséquent, condamne les prévenus NSIMBA KATUZAYAKO alias Jeantilie, MWADI
KAPELE Fabrice, KUMBA Ado alias Shakazulu, BUNGU KINYAKA alias Eniawu, LUFUNDU
NZOLAMESO Miguel, MAKELE ZONO Gauthier, NSEKA Merdi, ITEMBILA LESSA à lui payer
in solidum la somme équivalent en franc congolais à huit mille dollars américains fixés
ex aequo et bono à titre de dommages intérêts ;
Annex 48
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux 23
Reçoit également l'action civile de […] et la déclare fondée, par conséquent, condamne
les mêmes prévenus ci-avant nommés à lui payer in solidum la somme de quinze mille
dollars américains ou l'équivalant en franc congolais fixés ex aequo et bono à titre des
dommages et intérêts.
Statuant sur les frais :
Condamne les huit-prévenus ci-haut cités à payer la moitié des frais de la présente
instance en raison d'un seizième chacun, à défaut de payer dans le délai légal, chacun
subira dix jours de contrainte par corps ;
Ordonne l'arrestation immédiate de ces huit prévenus condamnés ;
Le Tribunal de grande instance de Kinshasa/Kalamu siégeant en matière répressive au
premier degré a ainsi jugé et prononcé à son audience publique du 17/12/2011, à
laquelle ont siégé les magistrats Aimé ZANGISI MOPELE, Président, Marc OMARI
MUTOMBO et Bernard DZOGOLO PANDA MOYA, Juges, avec le concours du magistrat
ABEDI SIKOFO Deo Gratias, Officier du ministère public et l'assistance de Mr LIKONGO
LIYOKO, Greffier du siège.
Annex 48
Annex 49
Mupoke, also known as Kabala et consorts (MP et 107 PC c. Kabala Mandumba et consorts;
MP et PC c. Kabala Mandumba), RP 708/12 (Tribunal Militaire de Garnison de Bukavu, 15 Oct.
2012)
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux 197
AFFAIRE MUPOKE
TRIBUNAL MILITAIRE DE GARNISON DE BUKAVU- R.P. 708/12 / RMP
1868/TBK/KMC/1012
Qualification : Crime de guerre
I. JUGEMENT DU 15 OCTOBRE 2012
« … Le Tribunal Militaire de Garnison de Bukavu, siégeant en matière répressive en
foraine au premier degré, dans la salle d’audience du Tribunal de Paix de WALUNGU,
précisément à WALUNGU centre au Sud-Kivu, a rendu et prononcé, en audience
publique de ce Lundi quinzième jour du mois d’octobre de l’an deux mille douze, le
jugement dont voici les dispositif et motif :
I. LES FAITS
Le dimanche 17 janvier 2010, dimanche jour d’activités intenses et de marchés dans la
plupart de villages du Sud-Kivu ; ce dimanche, les marchands et marchandes de
MUPOKE ainsi que leur clients se séparent en débandade.
En effet le village de MUPOKE est une zone agricole située dans la collectivité de NINDJA
au recoin du territoire de WALUNGU et SHABUNDA où la puissance publique est quasiinexistante.
Les paysans de cette partie de la République sont abandonnés à eux-mêmes d’où la
présence des rebelles Hutu-Rwandais, communément appelés « interamwe », organisés
sous l’appellation de force démocratique pour la libération du Rwanda, FDLR en sigle.
Les villageois de MUPOKE et ceux des villages environnants n’avaient de choix que de
vivre avec ces rebelles Rwandais et de partager bon gré mal gré leurs produits agricoles
avec eux.
La collecte de vivres pour les HUTU Rwandais en brousse se faisait soit par le service du
chef de village soit par les éléments FDLR eux- mêmes et ce, tout le dimanche, jour du
marché. C’était devenu une espèce de taxe, qui ruinait la petite économie des paysans.
Mais ces derniers se trouvant sous domination des interamwe ne pouvaient s’y opposer.
La domination était manifeste et devenue presque excessive à tel paroxysme que
certains marchands et/ou paysans ne la toléraient plus et s’obligèrent de la dénoncer.
Ainsi, un certain KILONGO, d’heureuse mémoire, qui fréquentait le marché de MUPOKE,
partit de là pour NYALUBEMBA dans le territoire de SHABUNDA aux fins de mettre les
FARDC au parfum de cette occupation ou domination qui le tourmentait de manière
indescriptible.
Arrivé, à NYALUBEMBA où était, dans le cadre des opérations AMANI LEO, basé le 5122
Bn relevant du 51e secteur opérationnel ; les autorités seront saisies et informées que
chaque dimanche à MUPOKE, les FDLR estimés à dix combattants viennent au marché
pour rançonner les pauvres paysans vendeurs.
Annex 49
Recueil en matière de crimes internationaux 222
auprès de celles-là de produits vivriers et autres articles (savons, habits notamment)
voire de l’or. Elles se sont toutes régulièrement constituées parties civiles.
Cependant, le Tribunal de céans était dans l’impasse d’examiner au cas par cas des
biens par elle perdus ou pillés par les prévenus, tel que cela a été démontré ci-haut lors
de l’examen des éléments de crime de guerre par pillage. Ainsi, leurs conseils s’étant,
sans en démontrer les dommages subis par chacune d’elles, limités à solliciter
l’allocation des dommages-intérêts in globo soit 5.000$ US à chacune.
Le Tribunal en déduit qu’ils ont postulé de manière ex aequo et bono.
Ainsi, faute d’élément objectif certain pouvant permettre aux juges, dans ce cas précis,
d’évaluer l’importance du préjudice subi par les parties civiles, le Tribunal, comme leurs
conseils, estimera leurs dommages-intérêts ex aequo et bono, hormis les cas ci-après :
Ainsi les pertes par les victimes :
- F9 de 90.000Fc plus 150$ US ;
- F3 de 120$ US plus 5000Fc ;
- F7 de 200$ US ;
- M1 de 85 $ US ;
- M2 de 20.000Fc ;
- M5 de 150$ US ;
- M7 de 800$ US.
Toutes ces pertes en argent ont causé des préjudices certains et considérables aux
parties civiles qu’elles sont car elles ont perdu tous leurs capitaux.
Ces pertes dues au pillage constituent le fait générateur de responsabilité, la cause
efficiente des dommages subis par les victimes ci-avant citées et appellent la réparation
par tous les prévenus de la présente cause.
Par ailleurs, la perte par la victime F3 de 3000$ US, somme que son mari avait
empruntée et qui a occasionné sa fuite dans la nature jusqu’aux jours d’aujourd’hui.
Cette perte en monnaie a causé un préjudice certain et énorme à la partie civile,
F3,abandonnée par son mari, obligée désormais d’élever seule sa progéniture, privée du
soutien matériel de son époux. Cette perte qui est la conséquence de l’acte commis par
les prévenus appelle une réparation. Il y adonc un fait (le pillage), un préjudice et un
lien de causalité entre les deux. Ce sont là les conditions exigées pour l’engagement de
la responsabilité civile des prévenus.
Le Tribunal rappelle que F15 et M3 ne sont pas des marchands mais ils étaient au
marché aux fins de se procurer quelques vivres. Cependant, la perte par F15 de 5$ US
ainsi que M3 constitue un dommage minime qui appelle réparation.
VICTIME PAR ATTAQUE DES BIENS PROTEGES
Le Tribunal rappelle encore ici qu’il n’y a qu’une seule victime, l’église locale de MUPOKE
de la 5e CELPA qui s’est constituée partie civile sur le banc par l’entremise de son conseil
Maître NZOZO SAFARI, porteur de pièce.
L’offrande en nature perdue, les objets sacrés de la sainte cène et certains ouvrages y
compris le nouveau testament emportés et/ou déchirés ainsi que les tôles endommagées
par l’attaque des prévenus constitue un préjudice énorme à la fois matériel et moral à la
partie civile sus indiquée.
Cette attaque constitue le fait générateur de responsabilité, la cause efficiente des
dommages subis par la victime et appelle la réparation par le prévenu KABALA et
Annex 49
Volume II - Annexes 1 - 49