Declaration of President Yusuf

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172-20210204-JUD-01-01-EN
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172-20210204-JUD-01-00-EN
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111 44 DECLARATION OF PRESIDENT YUSUF Majority frames subject-matter of dispute in manner totally disconnected from Applicant’s written and oral pleadings — This leads to mischaracterization of subject-matter of dispute — Subject-matter of dispute concerns alleged measures of racial discrimination on basis of “national origin”, not current nationality — Majority should have applied long-standing jurisprudence in identifying subject-matter of dispute — No need for factual assessment of measures complained of by Qatar — Issues of fact are a matter for the merits — Whether “Qataris” form distinct national origin and effects of impugned measures may only be addressed at the merits stage — At this stage Court must only satisfy itself that such measures are “capable of having an adverse effect” on enjoyment of rights protected under Convention — They appear to have that effect in the present circumstances. I. Introduction 1. I disagree with the conclusions of the Court and the reasoning of the majority on two interrelated issues dealt with in the Judgment: (a) the determination of the subject‑matter of the dispute; and (b) the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the Court with regard to what is referred to as “indirect discrimination”. 2. On the first issue, the entire reasoning of the Judgment turns on the concept of “nationality”, without taking adequately into consideration Qatar’s claims regarding racial discrimination on the basis of “national origin”. By focusing almost exclusively on the question of nationality, the formulation of the object of the claim chosen by the Applicant is ignored, leading to the mischaracterization of the subject‑matter of the dispute. As discussed below, this approach is inconsistent with the jurisprudence of the Court on the determination of the subject‑matter of the dispute. 3. Secondly, apart from the fact that the above mischaracterization results in an erroneous conclusion on the jurisdiction of the Court, the majority also finds that some of the measures complained of by Qatar, which are referred to as “indirect discrimination” in the Judgment, do not fall within the provisions of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (hereinafter “CERD” or the “Convention”), even if they have the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the rights and freedoms of persons of Qatari national origin. There is, however, no meaningful analysis in the Judgment to support such a statement. 112 application of the cerd (decl. yusuf) 45 II. The Subject‑Matter of the Dispute 4. Qatar has consistently claimed that the measures adopted on 5 June 2017 by the United Arab Emirates (hereinafter the “UAE”) against Qataris amount to a “distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on . . . national . . . origin” both in purpose and in effect within the meaning of Article 1, paragraph 1, of CERD. In its Application (AQ), Qatar argued that “[t]he UAE has enacted and implemented a series of discriminatory measures directed at Qataris based expressly on their national origin” (AQ, para. 3; see also paras. 34, 44, 54, 58, 62‑63, 65 (a) and 66 (a)); that the “blanket expulsion of Qataris from the UAE and the ban on entry by Qataris into the UAE discriminate against Qataris on the basis of national origin” (ibid., para. 59); that “[t]he UAE has also enacted various measures interfering with rights to property based on Qatari national origin” (ibid., para. 44; see also para. 63); and that “[t]he UAE has . . . unlawfully targeted Qataris on the basis of their national origin” (ibid., para. 54). 5. Similar statements are made by the Applicant in its Memorial (MQ) and in its Written Statement (WSQ), clarifying that its claims were predicated on “national origin” both in purpose and in effect (MQ, paras. 1.2, 1.8, 1.11‑1.13, 1.15, 1.23, 1.25, 3.5, 3.21, 3.24 and 3.86 to 3.113), and alleging that the measures adopted by the UAE were “discriminatory in both purpose and effect, by intentionally targeting and having a disproportionately negative impact on persons of Qatari ‘national origin’ in the historical‑cultural sense, irrespective of their present nationality” (WSQ, para. 1.18). Moreover, during the oral proceedings, Qatar explained that it “has from the beginning framed its case as one of discrimination ‘based on’ national origin, including in the sense of intentional targeting and of disparate impact” (CR 2020/7, p. 45, para. 40 (Amirfar)). 6. Instead of paying particular attention to the above formulation of the dispute by the Applicant, as the Court has always done in determining the subject‑matter of the dispute, the majority frames the subjectmatter of the dispute in a manner totally disconnected from the Applicant’s written and oral pleadings. For example, after quoting paragraph 2.6 of Qatar’s Written Statement, which refers to acts and omissions of the UAE that “discriminate against Qataris on the basis of national origin” (paragraph 44 of the Judgment), the Judgment surprisingly states that “[a]s can be seen from Qatar’s characterization of the subject-matter of the dispute (see paragraph 44 above), Qatar makes three claims of racial discrimination” (paragraph 56 of the Judgment). The Judgment then proceeds to make an artificial classification of Qatar’s claims, the first category of which is purportedly a “claim arising out of the ‘travel bans’ and ‘expulsion order’, which make express reference to Qatari nationals” (ibid.). However, the text of Qatar’s Written Statement, quoted in para- 113 application of the cerd (decl. yusuf) 46 graph 44 of the Judgment, and to which reference is made in paragraph 56, does not mention even once the word “nationality”, while it clearly explains that the alleged acts and omissions of the UAE discriminate against Qataris “on the basis of national origin”. Nor does this text provide a basis for the classification of Qatar’s claims into the three categories indicated in the Judgment. 7. It is true that Qatar argued in its pleadings that the concept of “national origin” in Article 1, paragraph 1, of CERD encompasses discrimination based on nationality. Qatar based such interpretation on General Recommendation XXX of the CERD Committee, which reads as follows: “Under the Convention, differential treatment based on citizenship or immigration status will constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim.” (CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXX on Discrimination against Non‑Citizens, UN doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2005), para. 4.) 8. In General Recommendation XXX, the CERD Committee seems to suggest that a measure that seeks to differentiate between individuals on the basis of their current nationality might, deliberately or inadvertently, have a disproportionately adverse impact on a group of people having a common “national or ethnic origin”, taking into account the objective underlying that measure and the criteria chosen for differentiation, or may not be applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, in which case it would constitute discrimination under CERD. 9. The Court may endorse such interpretation or may decide, as the majority appears to favour in the present Judgment, that the term “national origin” cannot encompass measures predicated on current nationality. In either case, it cannot be held, on the basis of the written and oral pleadings of the Applicant, that the claims of Qatar mostly relate to racial discrimination on grounds of current nationality, and that consequently they fall outside the scope of the Convention as such. The content of those pleadings clearly indicates otherwise. 10. The insistence of the majority on characterizing the subject‑matter of the dispute in a manner which does not take into consideration the actual formulation put forward by the Applicant in its written and oral pleadings departs from a long‑standing jurisprudence of the Court referred to in paragraph 42 of the Judgment itself. According to this jurisprudence, it is for the Court to determine on an objective basis the subject‑matter of the dispute between the Parties, “while giving particular attention to the formulation of the dispute chosen by the applicant” (Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015 (II), p. 602, para. 26; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 114 application of the cerd (decl. yusuf) 47 2007 (II), p. 848, para. 38; Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 448, para. 30). 11. Had the majority applied this jurisprudence to the present case, it would have come to the conclusion that the subject‑matter of the dispute relates to “the interpretation or application” of CERD, and that Qatar’s claims fall squarely within the scope of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention, since those claims concern alleged measures of racial discrimination on grounds of “national origin”. III. The Jurisdiction of the Court with regard to “Indirect Discrimination” 12. According to the artificial classification of Qatar’s claims mentioned above (para. 6), the only claim that is described as relating to discrimination on grounds of national origin is the so‑called claim of “indirect discrimination”, as opposed to “direct” discrimination on the basis of nationality; a distinction which has no basis in the text of the Convention. However, even in the case of this claim, the majority concludes that, “In the present case, while the measures based on current Qatari nationality may have collateral or secondary effects on persons born in Qatar or of Qatari parents, or on family members of Qatari citizens residing in the UAE, this does not constitute racial discrimination within the meaning of the Convention. In the Court’s view, the various measures of which Qatar complains do not, either by their purpose or by their effect, give rise to racial discrimination against Qataris as a distinct social group on the basis of their national origin. The Court further observes that declarations criticizing a State or its policies cannot be characterized as racial discrimination within the meaning of CERD. Thus, the Court concludes that, even if the measures of which Qatar complains in support of its ‘indirect discrimination’ claim were to be proven on the facts, they are not capable of constituting racial discrimination within the meaning of the Convention.” (Paragraph 112 of the Judgment.) The reasons of my disagreement with this sweeping statement are set out below. 13. First, it is rather odd to find in a judgment on preliminary objections an attempt at a factual assessment of whether the measures complained of actually constitute racial discrimination under CERD. In a very recent judgment of the Court dealing also with jurisdiction ratione materiae under CERD, it was clearly stated as follows: “In order to determine whether it has jurisdiction ratione materiae under CERD, the Court does not need to satisfy itself that the meas- 115 application of the cerd (decl. yusuf) 48 ures of which Ukraine complains actually constitute ‘racial discrimination’ within the meaning of Article 1, paragraph 1, of CERD. Nor does the Court need to establish whether, and, if so, to what extent, certain acts may be covered by Article 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, of CERD. Both determinations concern issues of fact, largely depending on evidence regarding the purpose or effect of the measures alleged by Ukraine, and are thus properly a matter for the merits, should the case proceed to that stage.” (Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (II), p. 595, para. 94.) In the present case, however, issues of fact, which are normally a matter for the merits, appear to be summarily dismissed in a single paragraph at the jurisdictional stage of the proceedings. 14. Secondly, the majority offers no meaningful analysis to support the above‑mentioned statement. The question whether or not the term “Qatari” is to be understood solely as synonymous to “current nationality” or as indicating “national origin”, or both, and whether as a consequence measures targeting “Qataris” come within the ambit of Article 1 of CERD, is a question of fact that should be addressed at the merits stage. In this connection, it is to be noted that the majority does not even acknowledge — let alone examine — the Expert Report adduced by the Applicant to establish that “Qataris” form, apart from a legal nationality, a socio‑cultural national group distinct from the Emiratis (cf. MQ, paras. 3.94‑3.112; MQ, Vol. VI, Ann. 162, Expert Report of Dr. J. E. Peterson dated 9 April 2019, paras. 28‑30; WSQ, para. 2.121). 15. Thirdly, the “Court’s view” cannot simply be asserted. It needs to be based on legal and factual analysis. This is not the case here. The fact that Article 1, paragraph 1, of CERD distinguishes between “purpose” and “effect” suggests that, under CERD, discrimination may also derive from the collateral effects of the measure on a particular group, without having to establish a discriminatory purpose or intent. As the CERD Committee observed in its General Recommendation XIV, “particular actions may have varied purposes. In seeking to determine whether an action has an effect contrary to the Convention, [the Committee] will look to see whether that action has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon a group distinguished by race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.” (CERD Committee, General Recommendation XIV on Article 1, Paragraph 1, of the Convention, UN doc. A/48/18 (1993), p. 115, para. 2.) 116 application of the cerd (decl. yusuf) 49 16. Thus, a measure may amount to de facto racial discrimination when it has a disproportionate effect on a group of people having a common “national or ethnic origin”, regardless of whether that measure was intended to target a particular “nationality”. This is essentially a question of fact and may only be established after having heard both Parties in the merits phase. It cannot be used at this stage of the proceedings to justify a finding that the measures complained of by Qatar fall outside of the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court, particularly when they are alleged to have the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the rights and freedoms of persons of Qatari national origin. 17. The determination of the jurisdiction of the Court ratione materiae does not require the Court to satisfy itself at this preliminary stage that the measures complained of by the Applicant constitute racial discrimination within the meaning of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention. What matters is whether the measures complained of by Qatar “are capable of having an adverse effect on the enjoyment of certain rights protected under CERD” (Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (II), p. 595, para. 96; see also Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 820, para. 51). 18. It is my view that the measures complained of by Qatar were capable of having such an adverse effect on persons of Qatari national origin, and that the Court should have left the examination of the actual effect of these measures for the merits stage. (Signed) Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf.

Bilingual Content

111 44 DECLARATION OF PRESIDENT YUSUF Majority frames subject-matter of dispute in manner totally disconnected from Applicant’s written and oral pleadings — This leads to mischaracterization of subject-matter of dispute — Subject-matter of dispute concerns alleged measures of racial discrimination on basis of “national origin”, not current nationality — Majority should have applied long-standing jurisprudence in identifying subject-matter of dispute — No need for factual assessment of measures complained of by Qatar — Issues of fact are a matter for the merits — Whether “Qataris” form distinct national origin and effects of impugned measures may only be addressed at the merits stage — At this stage Court must only satisfy itself that such measures are “capable of having an adverse effect” on enjoyment of rights protected under Convention — They appear to have that effect in the present circumstances. I. Introduction 1. I disagree with the conclusions of the Court and the reasoning of the majority on two interrelated issues dealt with in the Judgment: (a) the determination of the subject‑matter of the dispute; and (b) the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the Court with regard to what is referred to as “indirect discrimination”. 2. On the first issue, the entire reasoning of the Judgment turns on the concept of “nationality”, without taking adequately into consideration Qatar’s claims regarding racial discrimination on the basis of “national origin”. By focusing almost exclusively on the question of nationality, the formulation of the object of the claim chosen by the Applicant is ignored, leading to the mischaracterization of the subject‑matter of the dispute. As discussed below, this approach is inconsistent with the jurisprudence of the Court on the determination of the subject‑matter of the dispute. 3. Secondly, apart from the fact that the above mischaracterization results in an erroneous conclusion on the jurisdiction of the Court, the majority also finds that some of the measures complained of by Qatar, which are referred to as “indirect discrimination” in the Judgment, do not fall within the provisions of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (hereinafter “CERD” or the “Convention”), even if they have the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the rights and freedoms of persons of Qatari national origin. There is, however, no meaningful analysis in the Judgment to support such a statement. 111 44 DÉCLARATION DE M. LE JUGE YUSUF, PRÉSIDENT [Traduction] Objet du différend, tel que formulé par la majorité, dépourvu de tout lien avec les exposés écrits et oraux du demandeur, et donc interprété erronément — Objet portant en réalité sur des mesures alléguées de discrimination raciale fondées sur l’« origine nationale », et non sur la nationalité actuelle — Regret que la majorité n’ait pas suivi la jurisprudence bien établie de la Cour pour déterminer l’objet du différend — Nul besoin d’analyser les faits relatifs aux mesures contestées par le Qatar — Questions de fait relevant du fond — Question de savoir si les « Qatariens » forment un groupe ayant une origine nationale distincte ne pouvant être examinée qu’au stade du fond, de même que les effets des mesures contestées — Au présent stade, mission de la Cour consistant simplement à vérifier si les mesures en cause étaient « susceptibles de porter atteinte » à la jouissance de droits protégés par la convention — Pareil effet vraisemblable dans les circonstances de l’espèce. I. Introduction 1. Je désapprouve les conclusions de la Cour et le raisonnement tenu par la majorité au sujet de deux questions connexes traitées dans l’arrêt, à savoir a) la détermination de l’objet du différend et b) la compétence ratione materiae de la Cour quant à ce qui est qualifié de « discrimination indirecte ». 2. S’agissant de la première question, le raisonnement tenu dans l’arrêt repose entièrement sur la notion de « nationalité », sans tenir dûment compte des allégations du Qatar faisant état d’une discrimination raciale fondée sur l’« origine nationale ». En se concentrant presque exclusivement sur la question de la nationalité, la majorité a fait abstraction de la manière dont le demandeur avait choisi de formuler l’objet du différend, dont elle a ainsi fait une interprétation erronée. Comme je vais l’exposer ci- dessous, cette démarche n’est pas conforme à la jurisprudence de la Cour concernant la détermination de l’objet du différend. 3. Ensuite, outre le fait que cette interprétation erronée la conduit à décliner à tort la compétence de la Cour, la majorité déclare que certaines des mesures contestées par le Qatar, qui sont qualifiées de « discrimination indirecte » dans l’arrêt, ne tombent pas sous le coup de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (ci- après la « CIEDR » ou la « convention »), même si elles ont pour but ou pour effet de détruire ou de compromettre les droits et les libertés de personnes d’origine nationale qatarienne. La majorité ne présente toutefois pas de véritable analyse dans l’arrêt à l’appui de cette déclaration. 112 application of the cerd (decl. yusuf) 45 II. The Subject‑Matter of the Dispute 4. Qatar has consistently claimed that the measures adopted on 5 June 2017 by the United Arab Emirates (hereinafter the “UAE”) against Qataris amount to a “distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on . . . national . . . origin” both in purpose and in effect within the meaning of Article 1, paragraph 1, of CERD. In its Application (AQ), Qatar argued that “[t]he UAE has enacted and implemented a series of discriminatory measures directed at Qataris based expressly on their national origin” (AQ, para. 3; see also paras. 34, 44, 54, 58, 62‑63, 65 (a) and 66 (a)); that the “blanket expulsion of Qataris from the UAE and the ban on entry by Qataris into the UAE discriminate against Qataris on the basis of national origin” (ibid., para. 59); that “[t]he UAE has also enacted various measures interfering with rights to property based on Qatari national origin” (ibid., para. 44; see also para. 63); and that “[t]he UAE has . . . unlawfully targeted Qataris on the basis of their national origin” (ibid., para. 54). 5. Similar statements are made by the Applicant in its Memorial (MQ) and in its Written Statement (WSQ), clarifying that its claims were predicated on “national origin” both in purpose and in effect (MQ, paras. 1.2, 1.8, 1.11‑1.13, 1.15, 1.23, 1.25, 3.5, 3.21, 3.24 and 3.86 to 3.113), and alleging that the measures adopted by the UAE were “discriminatory in both purpose and effect, by intentionally targeting and having a disproportionately negative impact on persons of Qatari ‘national origin’ in the historical‑cultural sense, irrespective of their present nationality” (WSQ, para. 1.18). Moreover, during the oral proceedings, Qatar explained that it “has from the beginning framed its case as one of discrimination ‘based on’ national origin, including in the sense of intentional targeting and of disparate impact” (CR 2020/7, p. 45, para. 40 (Amirfar)). 6. Instead of paying particular attention to the above formulation of the dispute by the Applicant, as the Court has always done in determining the subject‑matter of the dispute, the majority frames the subjectmatter of the dispute in a manner totally disconnected from the Applicant’s written and oral pleadings. For example, after quoting paragraph 2.6 of Qatar’s Written Statement, which refers to acts and omissions of the UAE that “discriminate against Qataris on the basis of national origin” (paragraph 44 of the Judgment), the Judgment surprisingly states that “[a]s can be seen from Qatar’s characterization of the subject-matter of the dispute (see paragraph 44 above), Qatar makes three claims of racial discrimination” (paragraph 56 of the Judgment). The Judgment then proceeds to make an artificial classification of Qatar’s claims, the first category of which is purportedly a “claim arising out of the ‘travel bans’ and ‘expulsion order’, which make express reference to Qatari nationals” (ibid.). However, the text of Qatar’s Written Statement, quoted in para- application de la ciedr (décl. yusuf) 112 45 II. L’objet du différend 4. Le Qatar a toujours soutenu que les mesures anti-qatariennes adoptées le 5 juin 2017 par les Emirats arabes unis traduisaient, tant par leur but que par leur effet, une « distinction, exclusion, restriction ou préférence fondée sur … l’origine nationale » au sens du paragraphe 1 de l’article premier de la CIEDR. Dans sa requête (RQ), il plaidait que « [l]es Emirats arabes unis [avaient] adopté et appliqué un ensemble de mesures discriminatoires … qui cibl[ai]ent les Qatariens au motif exprès de leur origine nationale » (RQ, par. 3 ; voir également par. 34, 44, 54, 58, 62-63, 65 a) et 66 a)) ; que « l’interdiction faite à tous les Qatariens d’entrer sur le territoire des Emirats arabes unis et l’expulsion générale de tous ceux qui s’y trouvaient [était] discriminatoire, dès lors que le motif en [était] leur origine nationale » (ibid., par. 59) ; que « [l]es Emirats arabes unis [avaient] également adopté diverses mesures entravant l’exercice du droit à la propriété des Qatariens au motif de leur origine nationale » (ibid., par. 44 ; voir également par. 63) ; et qu’« ils [avaient] pris illicitement pour cible les Qatariens au motif de leur origine nationale » (ibid., par. 54). 5. Le Qatar a fait des déclarations similaires dans son mémoire (MQ) et dans son exposé écrit (EEQ), où il a précisé que l’« origine nationale » était au coeur de sa thèse s’agissant à la fois du but et de l’effet des mesures émiriennes (MQ, par. 1.2, 1.8, 1.11-1.13, 1.15, 1.23, 1.25, 3.5, 3.21, 3.24 et 3.86 à 3.113), et où il a allégué que lesdites mesures étaient « discriminatoires du point de vue de leur but autant que de leur effet, en ce qu’elles vis[ai]ent délibérément et frapp[ai]ent de manière disproportionnée les personnes d’« origine nationale » qatarienne — au sens historico-culturel de ce terme —, indépendamment de leur nationalité actuelle » (EEQ, par. 1.18). Il a également précisé à l’audience qu’il avait « axé d’emblée sa thèse sur une discrimination « fondée sur » l’origine nationale, y compris au sens d’une prise pour cible intentionnelle et de conséquences disparates » (CR 2020/7, p. 45, par. 40 (Amirfar)). 6. Au lieu d’accorder une attention particulière à cette formulation du différend adoptée par le demandeur, comme la Cour l’a toujours fait lorsqu’il s’agissait de déterminer l’objet d’un litige, la majorité reformule l’objet du différend d’une manière qui n’a absolument aucun lien avec les exposés écrits et oraux du demandeur. Ainsi, après avoir cité le paragraphe 2.6 de l’exposé écrit du Qatar, où il est fait référence à des actes et à des omissions des Emirats arabes unis qui « font subir aux Qatariens des discriminations fondées sur l’origine nationale » (arrêt, par. 44), la majorité ajoute de manière étonnante dans l’arrêt que, « [d]e la manière dont il [a] défini[] l’objet du différend (voir le paragraphe 44 ci-dessus), il appert que le Qatar avance trois chefs de discrimination raciale » (ibid., par. 56). Est ensuite opérée une classification artificielle des prétentions du Qatar, le premier chef de discrimination supposé « se rapport[ant] à la « décision d’expulsion » et aux « interdictions d’entrée », qui visent expressément les nationaux qatariens » (ibid.). Pourtant, le passage de l’exposé écrit du 113 application of the cerd (decl. yusuf) 46 graph 44 of the Judgment, and to which reference is made in paragraph 56, does not mention even once the word “nationality”, while it clearly explains that the alleged acts and omissions of the UAE discriminate against Qataris “on the basis of national origin”. Nor does this text provide a basis for the classification of Qatar’s claims into the three categories indicated in the Judgment. 7. It is true that Qatar argued in its pleadings that the concept of “national origin” in Article 1, paragraph 1, of CERD encompasses discrimination based on nationality. Qatar based such interpretation on General Recommendation XXX of the CERD Committee, which reads as follows: “Under the Convention, differential treatment based on citizenship or immigration status will constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim.” (CERD Committee, General Recommendation XXX on Discrimination against Non‑Citizens, UN doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2005), para. 4.) 8. In General Recommendation XXX, the CERD Committee seems to suggest that a measure that seeks to differentiate between individuals on the basis of their current nationality might, deliberately or inadvertently, have a disproportionately adverse impact on a group of people having a common “national or ethnic origin”, taking into account the objective underlying that measure and the criteria chosen for differentiation, or may not be applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, in which case it would constitute discrimination under CERD. 9. The Court may endorse such interpretation or may decide, as the majority appears to favour in the present Judgment, that the term “national origin” cannot encompass measures predicated on current nationality. In either case, it cannot be held, on the basis of the written and oral pleadings of the Applicant, that the claims of Qatar mostly relate to racial discrimination on grounds of current nationality, and that consequently they fall outside the scope of the Convention as such. The content of those pleadings clearly indicates otherwise. 10. The insistence of the majority on characterizing the subject‑matter of the dispute in a manner which does not take into consideration the actual formulation put forward by the Applicant in its written and oral pleadings departs from a long‑standing jurisprudence of the Court referred to in paragraph 42 of the Judgment itself. According to this jurisprudence, it is for the Court to determine on an objective basis the subject‑matter of the dispute between the Parties, “while giving particular attention to the formulation of the dispute chosen by the applicant” (Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015 (II), p. 602, para. 26; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports application de la ciedr (décl. yusuf) 113 46 Qatar qui est cité au paragraphe 44 de l’arrêt et auquel renvoie le paragraphe 56 ne mentionne pas une seule fois la « nationalité », mais indique clairement que les actes et omissions allégués des Emirats arabes unis font subir aux Qatariens des discriminations « fondées sur l’origine nationale ». Ce passage ne justifie pas davantage de classer les prétentions du Qatar selon les trois chefs dénombrés dans l’arrêt. 7. Il est vrai que, au cours de la procédure, le Qatar a plaidé que la notion d’« origine nationale » figurant au paragraphe 1 de l’article premier de la CIEDR pouvait s’appliquer à une discrimination opérée sur la base de la nationalité. Il a fondé cette interprétation sur la recommandation générale XXX du Comité de la CIEDR, qui se lit comme suit : « Aux termes de la Convention, l’application d’un traitement différent fondé sur le statut quant à la citoyenneté ou à l’immigration constitue une discrimination si les critères de différenciation, jugés à la lumière des objectifs et des buts de la Convention, ne visent pas un but légitime et ne sont pas proportionnés à l’atteinte de ce but. » (Comité de la CIEDR, recommandation générale XXX concernant la discrimination contre les non-ressortissants, Nations Unies, doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2005), par. 4.) 8. Dans sa recommandation générale XXX, le Comité de la CIEDR semble laisser entendre qu’une mesure visant à différencier des personnes au motif de leur nationalité actuelle peut, de manière délibérée ou non, léser de manière disproportionnée un groupe de personnes ayant la même « origine nationale ou ethnique », selon l’objectif sous-jacent et les critères de différenciation, ou peut ne pas viser un but légitime, constituant de ce fait une discrimination proscrite par la CIEDR. 9. La Cour est libre d’approuver cette interprétation ou de décider, comme la majorité semble avoir préféré le faire dans le présent arrêt, que l’expression « origine nationale » ne peut englober la nationalité actuelle. Mais quoi qu’elle décide, elle ne peut déclarer, sur la base des exposés écrits et oraux du demandeur, que les griefs de celui- ci portent pour l’essentiel sur une discrimination raciale fondée sur la nationalité actuelle et débordent donc, en tant que tels, le cadre de la convention. Le contenu des exposés du demandeur indique clairement le contraire. 10. L’obstination de la majorité à présenter l’objet du différend d’une manière qui ne tient aucun compte de la formulation réellement adoptée par le demandeur lors des procédures écrite et orale marque une rupture avec la jurisprudence bien établie de la Cour qui est invoquée dans l’arrêt lui- même au paragraphe 42. Selon cette jurisprudence, il appartient à la Cour de définir, sur une base objective, l’objet du différend qui oppose les parties, « tout en consacrant une attention particulière à la formulation du différend utilisée par le demandeur » (Obligation de négocier un accès à l’océan Pacifique (Bolivie c. Chili), exception préliminaire, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2015 (II), p. 602, par. 26 ; Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), 114 application of the cerd (decl. yusuf) 47 2007 (II), p. 848, para. 38; Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 448, para. 30). 11. Had the majority applied this jurisprudence to the present case, it would have come to the conclusion that the subject‑matter of the dispute relates to “the interpretation or application” of CERD, and that Qatar’s claims fall squarely within the scope of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention, since those claims concern alleged measures of racial discrimination on grounds of “national origin”. III. The Jurisdiction of the Court with regard to “Indirect Discrimination” 12. According to the artificial classification of Qatar’s claims mentioned above (para. 6), the only claim that is described as relating to discrimination on grounds of national origin is the so‑called claim of “indirect discrimination”, as opposed to “direct” discrimination on the basis of nationality; a distinction which has no basis in the text of the Convention. However, even in the case of this claim, the majority concludes that, “In the present case, while the measures based on current Qatari nationality may have collateral or secondary effects on persons born in Qatar or of Qatari parents, or on family members of Qatari citizens residing in the UAE, this does not constitute racial discrimination within the meaning of the Convention. In the Court’s view, the various measures of which Qatar complains do not, either by their purpose or by their effect, give rise to racial discrimination against Qataris as a distinct social group on the basis of their national origin. The Court further observes that declarations criticizing a State or its policies cannot be characterized as racial discrimination within the meaning of CERD. Thus, the Court concludes that, even if the measures of which Qatar complains in support of its ‘indirect discrimination’ claim were to be proven on the facts, they are not capable of constituting racial discrimination within the meaning of the Convention.” (Paragraph 112 of the Judgment.) The reasons of my disagreement with this sweeping statement are set out below. 13. First, it is rather odd to find in a judgment on preliminary objections an attempt at a factual assessment of whether the measures complained of actually constitute racial discrimination under CERD. In a very recent judgment of the Court dealing also with jurisdiction ratione materiae under CERD, it was clearly stated as follows: “In order to determine whether it has jurisdiction ratione materiae under CERD, the Court does not need to satisfy itself that the meas- application de la ciedr (décl. yusuf) 114 47 p. 848, par. 38 ; Compétence en matière de pêcheries (Espagne c. Canada), compétence de la Cour, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 448, par. 30). 11. Si elle avait suivi cette jurisprudence en la présente affaire, la majorité serait parvenue à la conclusion que l’objet du différend concernait « l’interprétation ou l’application » de la CIEDR, et que les griefs du Qatar relevaient pleinement du paragraphe 1 de l’article premier de la convention puisqu’ils se rapportaient à des mesures alléguées de discrimination raciale fondées sur l’« origine nationale ». III. La compétence de la Cour à l’égard de la « discrimination indirecte » 12. Suivant la classification artificielle des prétentions du Qatar qui a été mentionnée plus haut (au paragraphe 6), la seule allégation qui ferait intervenir une discrimination fondée sur l’origine nationale est celle qualifiée de « discrimination indirecte », par opposition à la discrimination « directe » fondée sur la nationalité ; or une telle distinction ne trouve aucune justification dans le texte de la convention. Toujours est-il que, même dans le cas de cette allégation, la majorité conclut ce qui suit : « En la présente espèce, bien que les mesures fondées sur la nationalité actuelle des ressortissants qatariens puissent produire des effets collatéraux ou secondaires sur des personnes nées au Qatar ou de parents qatariens, ou sur des proches de ressortissants qatariens résidant aux Emirats arabes unis, il ne s’agit pas là d’une discrimination raciale au sens de la convention. Selon la Cour, les mesures dont le Qatar tire grief n’entraînent pas, par leur but ou par leur effet, une discrimination raciale à l’égard des Qatariens en tant que groupe social distinct au motif de leur origine nationale. La Cour observe en outre que les déclarations critiquant un Etat ou sa politique ne sauraient être assimilées à une discrimination raciale au sens de la CIEDR. En conséquence, la Cour conclut que, quand bien même les mesures dont le Qatar tire grief dans le cadre de son allégation de « discrimination indirecte » seraient avérées, elles ne peuvent être constitutives de discrimination raciale au sens de la convention. » (Paragraphe 112 de l’arrêt.) Les raisons de mon désaccord avec cette conclusion par trop générale sont les suivantes. 13. Tout d’abord, il est quelque peu étrange que, dans un arrêt sur des exceptions préliminaires, la Cour entreprenne une analyse factuelle dans le but de savoir si les mesures incriminées constituent effectivement une discrimination raciale prohibée par la CIEDR. Dans une très récente décision concernant également sa compétence ratione materiae au titre de la CIEDR, la Cour a clairement dit ceci : « Aux fins de déterminer si elle a compétence ratione materiae au titre de la CIEDR, la Cour n’a pas besoin de s’assurer que les mesures 115 application of the cerd (decl. yusuf) 48 ures of which Ukraine complains actually constitute ‘racial discrimination’ within the meaning of Article 1, paragraph 1, of CERD. Nor does the Court need to establish whether, and, if so, to what extent, certain acts may be covered by Article 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, of CERD. Both determinations concern issues of fact, largely depending on evidence regarding the purpose or effect of the measures alleged by Ukraine, and are thus properly a matter for the merits, should the case proceed to that stage.” (Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (II), p. 595, para. 94.) In the present case, however, issues of fact, which are normally a matter for the merits, appear to be summarily dismissed in a single paragraph at the jurisdictional stage of the proceedings. 14. Secondly, the majority offers no meaningful analysis to support the above‑mentioned statement. The question whether or not the term “Qatari” is to be understood solely as synonymous to “current nationality” or as indicating “national origin”, or both, and whether as a consequence measures targeting “Qataris” come within the ambit of Article 1 of CERD, is a question of fact that should be addressed at the merits stage. In this connection, it is to be noted that the majority does not even acknowledge — let alone examine — the Expert Report adduced by the Applicant to establish that “Qataris” form, apart from a legal nationality, a socio‑cultural national group distinct from the Emiratis (cf. MQ, paras. 3.94‑3.112; MQ, Vol. VI, Ann. 162, Expert Report of Dr. J. E. Peterson dated 9 April 2019, paras. 28‑30; WSQ, para. 2.121). 15. Thirdly, the “Court’s view” cannot simply be asserted. It needs to be based on legal and factual analysis. This is not the case here. The fact that Article 1, paragraph 1, of CERD distinguishes between “purpose” and “effect” suggests that, under CERD, discrimination may also derive from the collateral effects of the measure on a particular group, without having to establish a discriminatory purpose or intent. As the CERD Committee observed in its General Recommendation XIV, “particular actions may have varied purposes. In seeking to determine whether an action has an effect contrary to the Convention, [the Committee] will look to see whether that action has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon a group distinguished by race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.” (CERD Committee, General Recommendation XIV on Article 1, Paragraph 1, of the Convention, UN doc. A/48/18 (1993), p. 115, para. 2.) application de la ciedr (décl. yusuf) 115 48 dont l’Ukraine tire grief constituent effectivement une « discrimination raciale » au sens du paragraphe 1 de l’article premier de la CIEDR. Elle n’a pas non plus à établir si, et, dans l’affirmative, dans quelle mesure, certains actes pourraient être couverts par les paragraphes 2 et 3 de l’article premier de la convention. Ces deux questions portent sur des points de fait, largement tributaires des éléments de preuve relatifs au but ou à l’effet des mesures alléguées par l’Ukraine, et relèvent donc de l’examen au fond si l’affaire devait se poursuivre jusqu’à ce stade. » (Application de la convention internationale pour la répression du financement du terrorisme et de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Ukraine c. Fédération de Russie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2019 (II), p. 595, par. 94.) Or, dans la présente affaire, des allégations de fait qui relèvent normalement du fond semblent avoir été écartées de manière sommaire dans un seul paragraphe, au stade de la procédure concernant la compétence. 14. Ensuite, la majorité ne présente pas de véritable analyse à l’appui de sa déclaration précitée. La question de savoir si le terme « Qatarien » doit être réputé renvoyer uniquement à la « nationalité actuelle » ou à l’« origine nationale », ou encore aux deux, et si les mesures visant les « Qatariens » tombent par conséquent sous le coup de l’article premier de la CIEDR est une question de fait qui devait être examinée au stade du fond. A ce propos, il convient de noter que la majorité ne prend même pas acte (et donne encore moins d’analyse) du rapport d’expert produit par le demandeur à l’effet d’établir que, outre la nationalité au sens juridique, les « Qatariens » forment un groupe socioculturel distinct de celui des Emiriens (cf. MQ, par. 3.94-3.112 ; MQ, vol. VI, annexe 162, rapport d’expert de M. J. E. Peterson en date du 9 avril 2019, par. 28-30 ; EEQ, par. 2.121). 15. Troisièmement, la conclusion à tirer « selon la Cour » ne peut être formulée sans autre explication. Elle doit être fondée sur une analyse du droit et des faits. Il n’y en a aucune ici. Le fait que le paragraphe 1 de l’article premier de la CIEDR fasse une distinction entre le « but » et l’« effet » donne à penser que, d’après la convention, la discrimination peut également découler des effets collatéraux de la mesure prise à l’égard d’un groupe particulier, sans qu’il soit nécessaire d’établir l’existence d’un but ou d’une intention discriminatoire. Comme le Comité de la CIEDR l’a fait observer dans sa recommandation générale XIV : « certaines mesures peuvent avoir plusieurs objectifs. Pour savoir si une mesure a un effet contraire à la Convention, [le Comité] se demandera si elle a une conséquence distincte abusive sur un groupe différent par la race, la couleur, l’ascendance ou l’origine nationale ou ethnique. » (Comité de la CIEDR, Recommandation générale XIV concernant le paragraphe 1 de l’article premier de la Convention, Nations Unies, doc. A/48/18 (1993), p. 135, par. 2.) 116 application of the cerd (decl. yusuf) 49 16. Thus, a measure may amount to de facto racial discrimination when it has a disproportionate effect on a group of people having a common “national or ethnic origin”, regardless of whether that measure was intended to target a particular “nationality”. This is essentially a question of fact and may only be established after having heard both Parties in the merits phase. It cannot be used at this stage of the proceedings to justify a finding that the measures complained of by Qatar fall outside of the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court, particularly when they are alleged to have the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the rights and freedoms of persons of Qatari national origin. 17. The determination of the jurisdiction of the Court ratione materiae does not require the Court to satisfy itself at this preliminary stage that the measures complained of by the Applicant constitute racial discrimination within the meaning of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention. What matters is whether the measures complained of by Qatar “are capable of having an adverse effect on the enjoyment of certain rights protected under CERD” (Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (II), p. 595, para. 96; see also Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 820, para. 51). 18. It is my view that the measures complained of by Qatar were capable of having such an adverse effect on persons of Qatari national origin, and that the Court should have left the examination of the actual effect of these measures for the merits stage. (Signed) Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf. application de la ciedr (décl. yusuf) 116 49 16. Partant, une mesure peut constituer une discrimination raciale de facto lorsqu’elle a un effet disproportionné sur un groupe de personnes ayant une même « origine nationale ou ethnique », indépendamment du point de savoir si cette mesure était conçue pour cibler une « nationalité » particulière. Il s’agit là essentiellement d’une question de fait qui ne pouvait être tranchée qu’après examen des thèses des deux Parties au fond. Elle ne pouvait être utilisée au stade de la compétence comme justification pour conclure que les mesures contestées par le Qatar échappaient à la compétence de la Cour, a fortiori lorsque lesdites mesures sont supposées avoir pour but ou pour effet de détruire ou de compromettre les droits et les libertés de personnes d’origine nationale qatarienne. 17. Pour déterminer si elle avait compétence ratione materiae, la Cour n’avait pas à rechercher à ce stade préliminaire si les mesures dont le demandeur tirait grief constituaient une discrimination raciale au sens du paragraphe 1 de l’article premier de la convention. L’important était de savoir si ces mesures étaient « susceptibles de porter atteinte à la jouissance de certains droits protégés par la CIEDR » (Application de la convention internationale pour la répression du financement du terrorisme et de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Ukraine c. Fédération de Russie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2019 (II), p. 595, par. 96 ; voir également Plates‑formes pétrolières (République islamique d’Iran c. Etats‑Unis d’Amérique), exception préliminaire, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 820, par. 51). 18. Je suis d’avis que les mesures mises en cause par le Qatar étaient effectivement susceptibles de porter atteinte aux droits de personnes d’origine nationale qatarienne et que la Cour aurait dû réserver au stade du fond l’examen de l’effet concret de ces mesures. (Signé) Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf.

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