Memorandum of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on the
Application filed before the International Court of Justice by the
Cooperative of Guyana on March 29
, 2018
th
ANNEX
Table of Contents
I. Venezuela’s territorial claim and process of decolonization of the
British Guyana, 1961-1965 ................................................................... 3
II. London Conference, December 9
, 1965………………………15
III. Geneva Conference, February 16
th
th
-10
, 1966………………………20
IV. Intervention of Minister Iribarren Borges on the Geneva Agreement at
the National Congress, March 17
th
th
-17
, 1966……………………………25
V. The recognition of Guyana by Venezuela, May 1966 ........................ 37
VI. Mixed Commission, 1966-1970 .......................................................... 41
VII. The Protocol of Port of Spain, 1970-1982 .......................................... 49
VIII. Reactivation of the Geneva Agreement: election of means of
settlement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1982-198371
IX. The choice of Good Offices, 1983-1989 ............................................. 83
X. The process of Good Offices, 1989-2014 ........................................... 87
XI. Work Plan Proposal: Process of good offices in the border dispute
between Guyana and Venezuela, 2013 ............................................. 116
XII. Events leading to the communiqué of the UN Secretary-General of
January 30th, 2018 (2014-2018) ....................................................... 118
th
2
I.
Venezuela’s territorial claim and
Process of decolonization of the British Guyana, 1961-1965
The memorandum elaborated by Severo Mallet-Prèvost on February 8
,
1944 was submitted to Judge Otto Schoenrich by the author, authorizing
him to proceed, after his death (which occurred on December 10
th
, 1948), to
publish it. This is what Judge Schoenrich exactly did, with a preliminary
note, in the American Journal of International Law (vol. 43, mumber 3, July
1949). It is interesting to mention that one hundred days after having issued
the memorandum, Mallet-Prèvost, in a letter addressed to John Foster Dulles
on May 18
th
th
,
1899:
, 1944, noted, regarding the arbitration ruling of October 3
rd
“In that case I know that the two American Arbitrators, who wished to
apply what they considered as law, were nevertheless compelled
against their will and in order to avoid a threatened great injustice, to
concur in a decision which was wholly indifferent to the legal
principles which they considered as applicable”
Venezuela has always invoked that it was the discovery of the Mallet-
Prèvost memorandum - which allowed it to know what Foreign Minister
Falcon Briceño called, on November 12
th
, 1962 in his speech before the
Special Political Committee of the UN General Assembly, the “intimate
history” of the award - which had risen at the official and diplomatic level a
claim that existed decades ago in the collective soul of Venezuelans:
3
“we did not know the intimacy of the award, we did not know how
things had really happened. In fact, we did know, that we had been
stripped from it, but the Venezuela of 1899 and the one that follows it
for a few years later, is a Venezuela that is in a situation of poverty,
struck down by a recent civil war”
An official testimony immediately prior to the public knowledge of the
memorandum was provided by the speech of the head of the Venezuelan
delegation at the 9th Inter-American Conference (Bogotá, March 30
to
May 2
th
nd
, 1948), Romulo Betancourt, in which he stated “not to renounce to
territorial aspirations over zones today under colonial rule”. Even earlier, on
June 30
th
, 1944, MP Dr. José A. Marturet demanded in the National
Assembly “the review of its borders (those of Venezuela) with those of the
English Guiana” and the President of Congress, Dr. Manuel Egaña,
collected and confirmed, in the closing session, on July 17
, 1944, this
“yearning to review the ruling by which the English imperialism stripped us
of a large part of our Guayana.”
The publication of the Mallet-Prèvost memorandum coincided with the
opening of the British and private North American archives and the
Venezuelan Foreign Ministry moved a team of historians to do research
between 1950 and 1955.
During the dictatorial regime of Marcos Pérez Jiménez the claim was
materialized in declarations within the framework of the OAS (the 4th
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Relations, Washington DC
March 26
th
th
, 1951, statement of the Foreign Minister Dr. Luis
Emilio Gómez Ruiz; the 10th Inter-American Conference, Caracas, March
1-28, 1954, statement by the Legal Counsel of the Ministry of Foreign
Relations, Dr. Ramón Carmona) reserving the intention to “enforce” the fair
th
to April 7
4
aspirations of Venezuela to be redressed according to an “equitable
rectification” taking into account the damages suffered by the Nation as a
result of a historical injustice.
In February 1956, following the establishment of the British Caribbean
Federation, even though it did not include British Guiana, the Venezuelan
Foreign Minister, Dr. José Loreto Arismendi, reiterated that the Venezuelan
position on the boundaries of this colony would not be affected by any
change of status that occurred in it.
In March 1960, with Venezuela under a democratic regime, Dr. Rigoberto
Henríquez Vera presented to a parliamentary delegation of the United
Kingdom the criteria of the Venezuelan National Assembly:
“A change of status in the English Guiana cannot invalidate the fair
aspirations of our people to be redressed in an equitable manner and
by amicable understanding, the great damages that the nation suffered
under the unjust ruling of 1899”.
**********
The beginning of the process of decolonization of British Guiana within the
framework of the United Nations prompted the Venezuelan Government to
formalize a claim in this regard, to prevent he independence of the British
colony, supported by Venezuela, from becoming an settling obstacle for its
claim, based on a historical justice backed by the many causes of nullity of
the aforementioned award. An award that deprived the former General
Captaincy of Venezuela of thousands of kilometers inherited from the
Crown of Spain when coming to pass to its own independence in 1810, as
part of the Gran Colombia.
5
The Prime Minister of British Guiana had made a statement before the 4th
Committee of the General Assembly on December 18
, 1961 (Doc.
A/C.4/515) and a letter from the Permanent Representative of the United
Kingdom had been circulated, dated January 15
th
, 1962 (Doc. A /C.4/520)
concerning the independence of Guyana. For his part, the Permanent
Representative of Venezuela, Carlos Sosa Rodríguez, addressed a letter to
Secretary General on February 9
th
, 1962, in which he expressed his reserve
concerning the decolonization process announced:
th
“because there is a disagreement between my country and the United
Kingdom over the demarcation of the border between Venezuela and
British Guiana.”
The letter was accompanied by an explanatory memorandum of the
situation; it called for the fair demands of Venezuela to be taken into
account, that “the injustice committed be rectified in an equitable manner”
and resolved “through negotiations between the interested Parties, the old
issue between Venezuela and the United Kingdom regarding the limits of
British Guiana.”
Days later, on February 22
, 1962, Ambassador Carlos Sosa Rodríguez
made a statement at the 1302 session of the 4
nd
Committee of the General
Assembly, hoping that the issue could be resolved through “friendly
negotiations” between Venezuela and the United Kingdom (Doc.
A/C.4/540):
th
“On this occasion, when the issue of the independence of British
Guiana had been raised before the United Nations and the legitimate
aspiration of its population to reach, through peaceful negotiations
6
with the United Kingdom, the full exercise of its sovereignty, the
Government of Venezuela, by warmly supporting such fair
aspirations, is at the same time obliged in defense of the rights of its
own people, to request that its fair claim be taken into account and that
the injustice committed be rectified in an equitable manner. My
country hopes to be able to do it through friendly negotiations
between the interested Parties, taking into account, not only their
legitimate aspirations, but also the prevailing current circumstances
and the legitimate interests of the people of British Guiana” (emphasis
added).
On April 4
, 1962, the National Assembly approved a declaration in
Caracas:
th
“Supporting Venezuela’s policy on the border dispute between the
English possession and our country regarding the territory from which
we were stripped by colonialism; and, on the other hand, to support
without reserve the total independence of English Guiana and its
incorporation into the democratic system of life”.
This position was reiterated in the agreement of the National Assembly of
th
October 13
, 1965 and has been traditionally supported by Venezuela in the
process of decolonization of this territory.
Given the negative attitude of the British government, Venezuela requested
(on August 18
, 1962) the inclusion of the “issue of boundaries between
Venezuela and British Guiana” (Doc. A/5168) in the agenda of the
Seventeenth session of the General Assembly.
The Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Relations, Marcos Falcón Briceño, in
addition to his speech before the General Assembly on October 1
th
st
, made a
7
comprehensive statement at the 348 session of the Special Political
Committee on November 12, 1962 (Doc. A/SPC/71), suggesting a friendly
solution to the dispute.
The next day (at the 349 session), the representative of the United Kingdom,
C.T. Crowe (Doc. A/SPC/72), replied that the case was closed and rejected
that there was a pending border issue between Venezuela and the United
Kingdom in British Guiana. However, the British representative added that
his government, with the consent of Guyana, was willing to discuss with
Venezuela through diplomatic channels the arrangements for a tripartite
examination of the lengthy documentary material regarding the issue, to
“clear any doubt that the Government may continue to have regarding the
validity of the award… It is better to proceed in this way, instead of
continuing our discussions here at the United Nations”.
On November 16th, the Committee agreed, taking into account “the
possibility of direct discussions between the interested Parties”, not to
continue the discussion of the issue (350 session, Doc. A/SPC/73).
**********
Venezuelan experts were in London in February 1963 for the first stage of
document review. It was the Jesuits Hermann González Oropeza and Pablo
Ojer, who were later joined by Dr. Rafael Armando Rojas, Ambassador of
Venezuela in Nicaragua.
On November 5th, 1963, the ministers, Marcos Falcón Briceño and R. A.
Butler, met in London to review the results of the experts’ research. The
Venezuelan gave the British an aide-memoire summarizing the position of
8
Venezuela. In light of the evidence that was discovered and compiled,
Venezuela claimed to have conclusive evidence of the moral and legal
damage it suffered, as it was deceived and deprived of its legitimate territory
by the 1899 award. The truth and historical justice demand that Venezuela
claim the total return of the territory from which it has been dispossessed. In
other words, it was about finding out the historical truth of what happened
around the limits and, based on it, the reparation of the injustice committed
with Venezuela.
The meeting of November 5
was informal, but the talks next day were
conducted in a formal manner with all the members of the respective
delegations. Since the work of the experts had not been completed, the
ministers limited themselves to exchanging their preliminary opinions and
confirming the ongoing procedure.
On November 7
th
, 1963, the Venezuelan and United Kingdom ministers
signed a joint communiqué. The ministers agreed that, as a next stage, a
British expert (Sir Geoffrey Meade), also acting on behalf of British Guiana,
would travel to Caracas to examine the documentary material of the
Venezuelan archives, which he did on December 3
th
, 1963.
Subsequently, experts from both sides would meet to discuss the results of
their investigation and would report to their respective governments. These
reports would be the basis for further discussions between them.
The experts from both sides met during fifteen sessions between February
and May 1964. The Report of the Venezuelan Experts (Hermann González
Oropeza S.J. and Pablo Ojer Celigueta, S.J.) submitted to the National
Government was dated March 18
rd
th
to 11
, 1965.
th
9
In a note dated June 21
, 1965, Venezuela’s Foreign Minister, Iribarren
Borges, transcribed to the United Kingdom ambassador in Caracas, Anthony
H. Lincoln, the text of the Venezuelan communiqué signed on May 24th
and made public on the 25
st
of the same year on oil exploration concessions
in the Guayana Esequiba:
th
“The Minister of Foreign Relations learned, through press reports
from London, that the Government of British Guiana has granted three
oil exploration concessions to three companies.
Given the possibility that any of these concessions affected the
territory claimed by Venezuela, the Ministry of Foreign Relations
managed and obtained reliable information accompanied by the
corresponding map on these concessions.
As two of the concessions affect the territory claimed by Venezuela
and which by law belongs to it and the corresponding continental
shelf, the Foreign Ministry:
1) Notes with surprise that, since there is a process of amicable
diplomatic negotiations, regarding the border dispute between
Venezuela and Great Britain, some concessions have been granted that
affect the territory in dispute,
2) It declares to the interested Parties that Venezuela does not
recognize the concessions granted on the territory and continental
shelf claimed by it, and therefore it formulates the due reserve for the
effects that may take place...
The efforts of the Venezuelan Government to keep the greatest
discretion in the current negotiations - even at the cost of manifest
sacrifices - have hardly had adequate response in such unilaterally
granted oil concessions on the territory claimed by the Republic.
On the other hand, the Venezuelan Government reserves further
comments on the issues related to the continental shelf and the
territorial sea involved in those concessions”.
10
The reports of the Experts were exchanged by the Governments on August
rd
3
, 1965. In the note (Nº 1140) on that date, written by the Venezuelan
ambassador to London, Hector Santaella expressed the satisfaction of the
Venezuelan Government “for the happy termination of this stage of the
negotiations, according to the text of the Joint Communiqué signed in
London on November 7
, 1963.”
That satisfaction is reiterated in the note of September 7
th
, 1965, a reply to
that of August 3
th
, 1965 of the Foreign Office Secretary, Michael Stewart.
The note of September 7
rd
shows Venezuela’s disagreement with the
interpretation arising from the last paragraph of the British note, which
states that the attitude assumed by the Honorable Government of His
Majesty does not imply a desire to enter into talks that affect the substance
of the matter of the limits between Venezuela and British Guiana. The
Venezuelan note adds:
th
“The absolute conviction of the Venezuelan Nation about the injustice
committed in the matter of the limits between Venezuela and British
Guiana and its attitude towards the Arbitration Award of 1899, which
for Venezuela lacks validity, are not, of course, elements of recent
knowledge of the Government of His Excellency; nor does the current
position of my Government differ in anything from that adopted in the
initial stages of these talks. What other basis could exist on the part of
Venezuela in this matter, or what different motivation can serve as a
basis for everything that has been done, other than the legitimate
aspiration to redress the injustice that deprived my country of a
significant part of its territory?
I certify, on behalf of the Venezuelan government and people, once
again, our unswerving determination to seek the recovery of the
11
territory that we consider as an integral part of our national heritage.
For this purpose, with this clear objective, Venezuela requested the
initiation of the current process. It has not, therefore, been pursuing a
simple interest in historical research or satisfying academic concerns.
The Venezuelan position regarding the problem is clearly established.
It has declared not to recognize the Arbitration Award of 1899 as the
final settlement of the dispute with the United Kingdom and raised to
the Honorable Government of His Majesty the desire to consider, with
an unsuspecting spirit, the rectification of the injustice of which
Venezuela was a victim, in an unfortunate hour that our people cannot
forget, and a solution is reached that takes into account the legitimate
interests of our country and those of the population of British Guiana.”
**********
In an address on a national radio and TV broadcast on September 16
, 1965,
Venezuelan Minister Iribarren Borges stated the following:
th
“British Guiana shares with Venezuela, although in a different sense,
the same colonialist heritage, only that our country inherited the
plunder, and the neighbor the fruit. If British Guiana carefully
examines the family tree that one day will inherit from the Metropolis,
it will find that it has sought to incorporate into its heritage a jewel -
the territorio Esequibo - that was ripped out of the Venezuelan jewel
chest in a long night of imperial dreams. British Guiana must wake up
at the clear morning of independence, with its clean heritage, without
being partly attributable to dark origins …
… The warning issued by the National Government in the sense that it
does not recognize the alleged oil exploration concessions granted by
the Government of British Guiana over territory claimed by
12
Venezuela has the same application to any other concessions of the
same origin that have as its target said territory…
... it should be highlighted once again that whatever the change in
status in the current Colony of British Guiana, it will not affect the
Venezuelan claim on the territory that legally belongs to it ... This
would be the same as admitting, that due to the fact that the
decolonization process comes to an end on the right bank of the
Essequibo River, it must remain on the left bank, thus consecrating
forever the atrocious injustice of Colonialism”.
In his address before the 20
General Assembly of the United Nations, on
October 6
th
th
, 1965, Minister Iribarren Borges warns that:
“There are still territories that, split from an independent State, with
no more justification than the law of the strongest, remain under the
dominion of a colonial power”.
The Minister distinguish, following the resolutions adopted by the inter-
American conferences, between colonies and occupied territories. If
colonies must achieve independence by implementing the principle of selfdetermination,
the occupied territories cannot have any other form of
decolonization than reintegration into the State from which they have been
split, a principle safeguarded in the sixth paragraph of resolution 1514
(XV):
“Precisely the issue of the Guayana Esequiba, a Venezuelan territory
occupied by a colonial power and incorporated into a colony, is
among the cases foreseen by that sixth paragraph.”
13
The Minister reiterates “the unwavering position” of the Venezuelan
Government and points out:
“If my country maintains its claim even when there is a change of
status in the current colony of British Guiana, it does not mean in any
way that we put obstacles to the independence of that colony.
Whatever the status of British Guiana, Venezuelan rights will be the
same…”
The Minister recalls the supreme principles of “international equity and
morals”, invoked by President Raúl Leoni in his First Address to the
National Congress.
These concepts were reproduced in the note by the Venezuelan ambassador
to London, Hector Santaella, addressed on November 2
, 1965 to the
Secretary of the Foreign Office, Michel Stewart, on the occasion of the
Conference on the Independence of British Guiana. After stressing that
Venezuela strongly desires the independence of British Guiana, it reiterates
the claim about its “legitimate border” and the will to “achieve an amicable
solution to the issue.” It concludes:
nd
“expressing the unanimous will of the authorities and the people of
Venezuela to reaffirm in a more formal and categorical way, the
position of my Government in the sense that no change of status that
could occur regarding British Guiana, arising from a declaration of
independence or of any other cause will in no way affect the
unwavering and imprescriptible territorial rights that Venezuela is
legitimately entitled to the Guayana Esequiba.”
14
On November 3
, Minister Iribarren Borges addressed his British
counterpart, Michel Stewart, in a note, stating that:
rd
“My Government wishes to record that I would consider an unfriendly
act on the part of His Majesty’s Government if a transfer was agreed
unreservedly of sovereignty over the territory claimed by Venezuela, a
transfer that could not generate more rights than those legitimately
owned by the Government granting them”.
II.
London Conference, December 9
th
th
-10
, 1965
The “Agenda for the continuation at the ministerial level of the government
talks regarding the dispute between Venezuela and the United Kingdom on
the border with British Guiana, according to the joint communiqué of
November 7
th
, 1963,” agreed by the Parties on December 1
st
, 1965, was as
follows:
1. Exchanging of views on the reports of the experts on the
examination of the documents and discussion of the consequences
thereof. Need to resolve the dispute.
2. Seeking satisfactory solutions to the practical settlement of the
dispute that has arisen as a result of the Venezuelan contention that the
Award of 1899 is void and null.
3. Summarizing plans for collaboration in the development of British
Guiana.
15
4. Determination of the deadlines for compliance with the agreements
that may be reached on items 1, 2 and 3.
5. Joint statement on the talks.
This Agenda reveals, as paragraph 2 shows, that the Parties were willing to
“seek satisfactory formulas for the practical settlement of the dispute”
regardless of the conclusion they could reach on the validity or nullity of the
1899 award after considering the reports of the experts on either side.
**********
In the session of December 9
, 1965, the Parties quickly warned that
continuing to discuss item 1 of the Agenda would not bring them closer to
an agreement, so they moved on to item 2, as it was about “seeking
satisfactory solutions for the practical arrangement of the issue.”
When questioned in this regard, Minister Iribarren Borges proposed as a
satisfactory solution the return of the territory in claim, adding his
willingness to thoroughly discuss any other proposal.
The Foreign Office Secretary, Michael Stewart, invited Venezuela to
th
abandon its territorial claim or, at least, to postpone it while Guyana
consolidated itself as a State and, with this purpose, focus on the
consideration of the specific plans of development for British Guiana.
Iribarren Borges declined this invitation: they had met in London precisely
to solve the political problem. The Venezuelan Minister submitted a second
proposal: 1) recognition of the sovereignty of Venezuela over the claimed
territory and a joint administration for a period to be agreed - for example,
ten years, with obligations of both countries - in greater proportion for
16
Venezuela - in order to promote its development; and, 2) Venezuela’s
collaboration in the development of British Guiana.
This second proposal was rejected by the other party, considering it a
variant of the first one, Iribarren Borges made a third proposal, namely the
appointment of a Commission “to resolve the dispute between Venezuela
and the United Kingdom on the territorial issue between Venezuela and
British Guiana”. It consisted of three representatives from each Party, whose
work was to begin no later than January 20
, 1966. The mandate of the
Commission would include: 1. Resolving the territorial dispute. 2.
Formulating collaboration plans for the development of Guayana Esequiba
and British Guiana. 3. Executing development plans according to studies. If
by May 15
th
th
, 1966 the Commission had not reached a full agreement or any
agreement, the Parties would choose a Mediator or Mediators in a term not
exceeding three months that should present, in a reasonable time,
conciliation solutions on the issue or issues pending solution. If the threemonth
period should expire, and the Parties had not agreed on the
appointment of the Mediator or Mediators, or if they had not been able to
propose conciliatory solutions within a reasonable period of time, then an
international arbitration would be used to decide on the issue or issues
pending solution. In that case, a treaty establishing the basis, conditions and
rules for arbitration should be concluded within 18 months following
January 1
st
, 1967).
This proposal included 1) a Joint Commission; 2) Mediation; and 3)
arbitration, whose basis, conditions and rules should be negotiated.
The next day, December 10
, 1966 (that is, July 1
st
, Iribarren Borges refers to this arbitration as “a
final decision, which is submitted to a totally neutral entity with the power
th
17
to decide” and to Venezuelan desire to cooperate in the development of the
neighboring country. Iribarren’s statement shows clearly that the issue to be
submitted to arbitration is not the validity or nullity of the award, but the
territorial issue or dispute.
Iribarren Borges warns that Venezuela has attended the Conference to
discuss and try to find a solution to the existing territorial problem on the
border with British Guiana. That is clearly expressed in the title of the
Agenda. Then, in the final sentence of item 1, the existence of the dispute
and the need to resolve it are recognized. Item 2 provides that a satisfactory
solution must be found for the practical settlement of the dispute that has
arisen as a result of the Venezuelan claim. The Minister considers it absurd
to expect that Venezuela has come to this conference to ratify the
antagonistic positions of the Parties on the validity or nullity of the 1899
award. Here we have come, he says, to seek a solution to the existing
territorial problem. Iribarren Borges rejects the desirability of returning to
the United Nations. We come from that Organization. Our conversations
arose in that instance. The United Nations will not solve the problem; it will
exhort us to talk again, which is what we are doing so far and we must
continue doing until we find a solution. Before elaborating on his latest
proposal, the Minister warns that there are two separate problems that have
been united in a solution: one is the political problem between Venezuela
and the United Kingdom for the occupation of its territory; another is the
problem of the development of British Guiana, whose responsibility lies
with the United Kingdom as a colonial power.
**********
18
At the end of their talks, on December 10
, 1965, the Parties signed a joint
statement where it was noted:
1. In accordance with the terms agreed in the joint communiqué of
November 7
th
, 1963, conversations have been held in London ... on the
basis of the following Agenda...
2. In addition to considering the reports of the Experts on the
documentary material relating to the Arbitration Award of 1899, the
Ministers discussed ways and procedures to end the dispute that
threatens to break the traditionally amicable relations between
Venezuela, on the one hand, and the Kingdom United and British
Guiana, on the other.
3. Ideas and proposals were exchanged for a practical settlement of the
dispute. It was agreed that some of them should be submitted for
further consideration and that Ministers should continue the present
discussions during the week beginning February 13
th
, 1966, in
Geneva, in order to consider such proposals, as well as others that
could be suggested in agreement with the aforementioned Agenda.
Since neither Party has been able to accept the conclusions of the
experts designated by the other, item 1 will not be considered...
**********
th
19
III.
, 1966
On February 4
Geneva Conference, February 16th-17
th
, 1966, the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry sent an aidememoire
to the British Embassy in Caracas expressing its concern and
asking for explanations for the statements made by Foreign Office officials
according to which it was foreseen that at the Geneva Conference “the
Venezuelan claim” on Guayana Esequiba would not be discussed. This
contradicted the commitment made in accordance with the Agenda signed in
London on December 1
th
, 1965 and with the joint communiqué of December
10
st
th
of the same month and year. Those explanations were given in aidememoire
of
the
British
Embassy
of
February
8
, 1966 and in a personal visit
of Ambassador Sir Anthony Lincoln, to Minister Iribarren Borges of the
same date, and were included in a press release of the Foreign Ministry: The
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Relations had been
misinterpreted. Neither Lord Watson nor any other Representative of
H.M.’s Government had made the statement attributed to him. The British
Government ratified the Agenda as agreed on December 10
th
, 1965.
The Geneva Conference did not devote a word to the discussion on the
validity or nullity of the 1899 Award. This debate was excluded from the
negotiation, focused on reaching definitively a practical and satisfactory
settlement. To that end, agreements on concrete plans for collaboration in
the development of Guyana could play an important role.
**********
th
20
At the opening of the first session of the Conference on February 16
, 1966,
Minister Iribarren Borges raised Venezuela’s claim to Guayana Esequiba, a
territory usurped by Great Britain and annexed to British Guiana, in terms of
justice. Venezuela honestly and enthusiastically supported the prompt
independence of that colony, however, it could not admit that the territorial
limits of the new State was established at the expense of Venezuelan soil as
a result of a decision that constituted a mockery of the arbitration procedure
and a disdain for the principles of International Law. The Minister
underlines Venezuela’s receptiveness towards solution formulas and recalls
that in London, in December 1965, he already submitted to Great Britain
“ways and procedures to put an end to the controversy”. Iribarren Borges
invites the Secretary of the Foreign Office, Stewart, to adopt a position on
such proposals or to present a concrete and structured proposal applicable to
the case. The Minister recalls that in London the Secretary of the Foreign
Office limited himself to outlining the lines, on which the Antarctic Treaty
was based, a case with substantial differences with that presented by the
Venezuelan claim on Guayana Esequiba.
The Secretary of the Foreign Office, Michael Stewart, made a proposal
limited to the examination of the joint economic development of British
Guiana, avoiding the political problem (the Venezuelan claim on the
Essequibo territory) that justified the presence of the Venezuelan delegation
in Geneva. The Conference had been convened to seek practical solutions to
the territorial controversy and, consequently, the British proposal was
considered unacceptable.
A recess was agreed to reach, through informal talks between ministers,
some agreement. Before attending this meeting, Minister Iribarren Borges
explained to the Venezuelan delegation the two items he considered
th
21
fundamental: 1) that the dispute should have a form of "final solution" after
an agreed period of time; and 2) a special regime for the development of
Guayana Esequiba. A commission would come to clarify the details, which
would be submitted to a further high-level meeting.
Following the informal meeting with the Secretary of the Foreign Office,
the Venezuelan Minister told the members of his delegation that the “final
solution” that he proposed to the British was arbitration and that they replied
that they could not accept it “because it would be to agree that the arbitral
award does not exist”.
The travaux préparatoires of the Geneva Agreement shows that Venezuela
wanted to settle the territorial dispute as soon as possible by resorting to
arbitration if a practical settlement was not reached within a mixed
commission or other means of political third party settlement, such as
mediation, the duration of which was to be limited in order to avoid its
lasting indefinitely. These points were incorporated in the Venezuelan
counter-proposals, always encountering British (and Guyanese) opposition.
The object of the arbitration that Iribarren Borges proposed as a final
solution becomes even more evident when he observed: “there can be
another solution other than arbitration: they could agree to make a division
of the territory”.
Iribarren Borges proposed a working paper that, after being debated within
the Venezuelan delegation, ended up becoming the first Venezuelan
counter-proposal. A commission would be appointed for:
1) Seeking solutions for the practical settlement of the Venezuelan
claim, including a frozen period;
22
2) Considering a form of special regime of the territory in order to
develop it jointly;
3) Collaborative schemes with British Guiana;
4) Dictate the basis for arbitration in the case that the search for
solutions referred to in point 1 is not achieved; and,
5) Set a deadline for the Commission to report to governments.
To continue the talks, Iribarren Borges said in an internal debate of his
delegation, the least Venezuela can get out of the negotiation is a
commitment to go to arbitration, even if its basis cannot be established. If it
is possible to appoint a commission to study them, that’s already accepting
arbitration. The idea is to agree to arbitration, but that the commission can
seek other types of solutions. It is the same proposal made in London. For
the Minister, arbitration is “something substantial” that can be taken out of
the talks and without this it would be “unseemly” for the country to continue
them. Our objective, he concluded, is to reach arbitration. The Minister
insisted over and over again on it “or something similar to arbitration” (he
went so far as to mention mediation or conciliation). One of the members of
the delegation, Diaz Gonzalez, added: “arbitration is fundamental because it
excludes the arbitral award”. Other member of the delegation anticipated
that the British will not accept arbitration; the Minister agreed, but they will
accept, said the Minister, “keep on seeking for solutions” through a
commission.
Minister Iribarren Borges went with this working paper to talk privately
with Secretary of State Michael Stewart and British Guiana Prime Minister
Forbes Burnham. After half an hour he returned to the offices of the
Venezuelan delegation, reporting that the British (and in particular
Burnham) did not accept items 2, 3 and 4, but included in item 1 the
23
examination of peaceful means of settling disputes in accordance with
international law. On item 5, the Venezuelan Minister had proposed a period
of six months for the Commission’s Report, while the British (and
Burnham) considered that it should be thought of “in terms of years”.
Iribarren Borges was of the view that the issue should not be given the
impression of being postponed indefinitely, suggesting a first report and
then a final report.
In short, the British-Guyanese counterproposal was the following:
Appointing a commission whose purpose was to seek satisfactory solutions
for the practical settlement of the controversy arising from the Venezuelan
contention that the 1899 arbitral award is null and void, including
consideration of its peaceful settlement in accordance with international law,
and to set a deadline for it to report back to Governments at a high-level
ministerial meeting.
Although this counterproposal seemed to assume a dilatory policy, it was
also an advance on the initial British-Guyanese position allowing to break
out of the deadlock. Now there were talks about of a mixed commission to
examine the territorial controversy, including the arbitration solution in a
generic formulation.
The joint communiqué dated February 17
, 1966 reports:
th
“There was an exchange of ideas and proposals for the practical
settlement of outstanding problems..., as a result of the deliberations,
an agreement was reached, the provisions of which will enable a
definitive solution to be found to these problems....The agreement was
welcomed by the Ministers of the three Governments in that it
24
provides the means to resolve a dispute that threatened to damage
relations between two neighbors and contains the basis of goodwill for
the future cooperation of Venezuela and Guyana”.
**********
IV.
Intervention of Minister Iribarren Borges
on the Geneva Agreement at the National Congress, March 17
th
, 1966
Although the Geneva Agreement entered into force on the date of its signing
(February 17
th
, 1966), it was submitted for parliamentary debate in
Venezuela. Minister Iribarren Borges defended the Agreement at the session
of March 17
th
, 1966.
Before, on March 11
th
, 1966, President Raul Leoni, in his II Address to the
National Congress, affirmed that:
“By signing the Geneva Agreement, the National Government has not
only defended the intangibility of our territory by placing our claim in
the same situation as the border dispute was when it was submitted to
arbitration in 1897, but has been consistent with Venezuela’s
traditional international position inspired by the principles enshrined
in the Preamble of the Constitution, which order cooperation with
other nations, in the aims of the international community, on the basis
of reciprocal respect for sovereignty, self-determination of peoples
and repudiation of war and conquest as instruments of international
policy”.
25
**********
The intervention of Dr. Iribarren Borges on the Geneva Agreement at the
National Congress at the session held on March 17
, 1966 was divided into
two parts. In the First part it refers to the “Prior managements to the Geneva
Agreement” and in the Second part to the Agreement itself.
In relation to First Part, the Minister begins with a brief reference to the
1899 arbitral award. He mentions “the painful political, economic and
military circumstances that our Homeland went through at that time” that
“prevented the National Government from carrying to its last consequences
the categorical rejection of that ruling”. But “with the decline of the colonial
era, the hope was reborn that one day the injustice of which we had been
victims would be repaired. For many years this hope impregnated the
increasingly clear and categorical declarations of the Venezuelan State in
the face of that arbitrary award. However, no matter how solid and
convincing the Venezuelan argument was, the United Kingdom refused to
enter into discussions aimed at revising an arbitral award that it considered
intangible” (emphasis added).
The Minister considers the beginnings of the bilateral negotiation, referring
th
in particular to the agreement contained in the statement of the Chairman of
the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly, of November
16
th
, 1962, to carry out a tripartite examination of the documentation
relating to the territorial issue: “The transcendental value of this agreement
is undeniable since it represents the starting point of a long bilateral process
that will inevitably lead to the revision of the so-called 1899 arbitral award”.
The Minister recalled that the agreement of November 16
, 1962:
th
“had as its object the examination of the documents, without Great
Britain accepting in any way to enter into the substance of the
26
problem: the revision of the 1899 Tribunal’s judgment... It was,
therefore, the Venezuelan Government’s intention to conduct the
negotiation at the highest governmental level and to take it up to the
revision of the Tribunal’s judgment. In order to meet these objectives,
it was necessary to break the obvious resistance of the British
Government. As early as March 1963, Great Britain attempted to
reduce the talks to the level of an academic discussion among experts,
but Venezuela clearly expressed its view that it would in no way enter
into those talks as long the United Kingdom commits itself beforehand
to discussing the issue at the ministerial level... Venezuela continued
to press until it obtained Britain’s acceptance that the discussions
would be held in two phases: first at the expert level, and second at the
high ministerial level”.
The Minister then refers to the first conference in London, in November
1963. Iribarren Borges understands that in this conference, an advance in
favor of Venezuela was observed, if we stick to the joint communiqué,
because after referring to the reports that the experts have to present to their
Governments, it says that “these reports will serve as a basis for further
discussions between the Governments”. The Minister considers that:
“Therefore, by not qualifying these discussions, it allowed us to
maintain that the conversations at the government level were going to
have as their object the discussion of the substantive issue”.
In the months leading up to the ministerial meeting of December 1965, the
Venezuelan Foreign Ministry “went through repeated statements by the
British Guiana Prime Ministers, Mr. Jagan and Mr. Burnham, to the effect
that they were unwilling to discuss the line of the arbitral award, since they
did not recognize the border conflict because they considered it resolved in
1899”.
27
After recalling the notes exchanged in August and September 1965,
following the exchange of experts’ reports on August 3
, 1965, Iribarren
Borges points out:
rd
“It was evident that Great Britain was reluctant to enter into
substantive discussions on such a serious matter. Apparently, it still
qualified the Venezuelan claim as unfounded, and was only open to a
purely academic discussion that could not lead to any settlement of the
old problem”.
Hence his allocution on the radio and TV channel of September 16
, 1965,
with “express instructions” from President Raul Leoni:
th
“Our Government would be rightly accused of not being very serious
if, in such a serious matter...it were to admit to entertaining itself in
sterile free debates, in semantic interpretations of old texts”.
And now he concludes on this point:
“Our position was therefore clear that we were not going to go to a
ministerial conference to engage in discussions that did not address
the substance of the problem: the revision of the so-called 1899
arbitral award”.
The Minister then deals with British Guiana’s independence:
“...our traditional claim was to receive increasing momentum as that
date approached, given that it was appropriate to make it very clear
that our controversy with the United Kingdom, the cause of the border
problem, was not to end with British Guiana’s independence, except
for a satisfactory solution for Venezuela...The principle that any
28
change of status in the colony...will not affect the Venezuelan
territorial claim has been repeatedly reaffirmed”.
The Minister also refers to the Washington Act and paragraph 6 of General
Assembly resolution 1514(XV), which he himself invoked in his discourse
on October 6
, 1965 address to the General Assembly. Also, to his note of
November 3
th
on the occasion of the Independence Conference of British
Guiana.
In referring to the second London conference, the Minister commends the
agreed Agenda “after long negotiations carried out by our Ambassador in
London, in the months of October to December 1965”. The Agenda “meant
a considerable advance in favor of our views.” Already in the title, observes
the Minister,
rd
“which defines the nature of the talks, it states that the talks are aimed
at “the controversy between Venezuela and the United Kingdom.”
This admission that there is a “border dispute with British Guiana" is
reaffirmed by the admission at the first item of the “need to resolve
the dispute.” Moreover, in order to dispel any doubt about the nature
of the talks… it was stipulated in the second item of the agenda that it
would “seek satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the
controversy that has arisen as a result of the Venezuelan contention
that the Award of 1899 is null and void.” Reinforcing this
interpretation, the “determination of deadlines” for the solutions to be
reached is contemplated in the fourth item. To no one can escape the
fact that the British position at the beginning of this process in 1962
had already changed significantly. What was agreed on the agenda
was far from that first offer made by his representative, Mr. Crowe, in
the sense that they were only willing to examine the documents
relating to the 1899 Award”.
29
The Minister makes a succinct explanation of his presentation and
successive proposals made to try to find a satisfactory solution to the
dispute. He adds:
“This offer came to clash against the intransigence of Great Britain,
as well as British Guiana, which, determined to maintain the validity
of the Award of 1899, rejected the existence of a territorial dispute
between Venezuela and the United Kingdom over the border with
British Guiana.”
The Minister then presented the British counterproposal, which
“was reduced to formulating some ideas, traced in Article IV of the
Antarctic Treaty, which applied to our problem would lead to an
economic development solution on both sides of the Award line, while
the two neighboring countries would be forced not to press their
respective claims for 30 years. At the same time it was insisted that
there was no alternative but to return the matter to the United Nations
informing of the outcome of the examination of the documents”.
Iribarren Borges explains the motives that led to the rejection of this
counterproposal, warning that
“he could not accept that an attempt was made to avoid the legalpolitical
problem of the border issue, to reduce it only to trying to
solve the economic problem of the underdevelopment of Guayana
Esequiba, for which the United Kingdom was precisely responsible…
Having rejected a British proposal to continue the discussions with
Lord Walston, when he visited Caracas in January 1966, we agreed to
hold a new meeting of the same Ministerial Conference, in the city of
30
Geneva... When the examination of the documents was removed from
the agenda, the discussion focused fully in the search of “satisfactory
solutions to the practical settlement of the dispute.”
The last point of this First Part of the speech of the Minister focuses on the
Geneva Conference, mentioning the exchange of notes on February 4
and
8
th
th
and the visits of the British ambassador to the Minister on those dates, to
dispel any misunderstanding about some statements attributed to Lord
Walston, that called into question whether the Venezuelan claim would be
discussed in Geneva and not only the economic aid to British Guiana. “It
was evident”, notes the Foreign Minister, “that the firmness shown by the
Foreign Minister was working well”.
At the Conference, the United Kingdom reformulated its proposal inspired
by the Antarctic Treaty, unacceptable for Venezuela, “for the reason of not
contemplating the issues that, Venezuela believes, are fundamental to the
practical resolution of the conflict, which is the purpose of the Conference”,
by completely avoiding the territorial problem through a joint development
plan to both sides of the Award line and freezing the Venezuelan claim for
thirty years.
Iribarren Borges continues:
“After several informal contacts, our Delegation decided to leave on
the table a formula similar to the third Venezuelan proposal that had
been rejected in London, with the addition of the appeal to the
International Court of Justice. The Delegations of Great Britain and
British Guiana, after careful consideration of that proposal, although
they were eventually receptive, objected to the specific mention of the
recourse to arbitration and to the International Court of Justice.
31
Having overcome this objection replacing that specific mention with
the reference to Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, which
includes those procedures of arbitration and recourse to the
International Court of Justice, it was found that there was a possibility
of reaching an agreement. It was, therefore, on the basis of the
Venezuelan proposal, how the Geneva Agreement was achieved... a
Venezuelan proposal that was strictly rejected in London has been
accepted in Geneva”.
The Minister adds:
“Evidently the Geneva Agreement is not the ideal solution to the
problem, which is none other than the return of the territory to
Venezuela. We did not go to the city of Lake Leman to dictate the
conditions of surrender of the adversary by putting the sword of a war
victory on the scale of the dispute. We went to find a satisfactory
solution to the difficult territorial issue. As a result of the diplomatic
dialogue, and not of the monologue of the victors, the Geneva
Agreement brings to a new situation the extreme positions of those
who demand the return of usurped territory by virtue of a null award,
and that of those who claimed that having no doubt about their
sovereignty over that territory, were not willing to take the case to
court. As a substantially Venezuelan solution, the Geneva Agreement
received the unanimous support of the Delegation…”
The Second Part of the speech by the Minister Iribarren Borges is devoted
to the presentation of the preamble and eight articles of the Geneva
Agreement, warning that
32
“for its proper understanding it must be considered as a whole, since,
while it contains substantive and adjective provisions, each of them is
part of the general idea behind the instrument”.
The Minister maintains that Venezuela has been in favor of the participation
of British Guiana, “as the opposite would be to admit that Britain as a
colonial power can resolve serious matters in its colony without the
participation of the latter.” Their exclusion “would have been a mistake with
serious consequences for Venezuela.”
Iribarren Borges refers to the last part of the Preamble in which he sees
“an express recognition of the existence of the dispute between
Venezuela and Britain over the border with British Guiana,
recognition that is ratified in Article 1 of the Agreement”.
Article I, the Minister says,
“contains two points of great importance, namely: 1. To channel the
talks through a Mixed Commission, that is, an ad-hoc body that
allows for permanent and agile communication between the two
Governments in order to reach a solution to the dispute. 2. Express
recognition of the controversy that arose from the challenge of
Venezuela to the so-called Arbitral Award of 1899. It should be noted
that the continuation of the talks is of paramount importance and that a
solution that allows a satisfactory end to the dispute, without resorting
to the procedures provided for in Article 4 of the same Agreement,
might emerge from them. Furthermore, the operation of the
Commission allows direct and permanent contact with British Guiana
to deal with any other matters related to the dispute”.
33
Regarding Article 3,
“naturally, the representatives will maintain contact and receive
continuous instructions from their respective Governments; however,
it would not hurt to establish the semiannual report, since it must be
prepared by the full Commission, that is, by the four representatives,
and will thus be a document of the Commission itself”.
In relation to the four years agreed for the Mixed Commission,
“if we agreed to a 4 years deadline, it was after arduous discussions
with the British, who initially demanded 30 years.”
On the procedure, in the event that the Secretary General of the United
Nations must act,
“Article 4 of the Geneva Agreement clearly states the following: a)
The only function entrusted to the Secretary General of the United
Nations is to indicate to the Parties, for their use, the means of
peaceful resolution of the disputes established in the aforementioned
provision of the Charter (article 33); b) These means are as follows:
negotiation, investigation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement and recourse to organizations or regional agreements.
These are, strictly speaking, the procedures that must be used until the
dispute is resolved or until they have been exhausted”.
The Minister notes that in the last stages of discussion the British proposed
that the choice of means of solution be entrusted to the UN General
Assembly, proposal dismissed by Venezuela: 1) because it was not
appropriate to place this specific function under an eminently political and
deliberative organ, which could lead to excessive delays “because strange
34
political elements would easily be introduced to the simple function of
choosing the means of settlement”; and 2) because the Assembly only meets
in ordinary sessions once a year for a period of about three months, to
discuss matters previously mentioned in the Agenda and in extraordinary
sessions at the request of the Security Council or the majority of the
members of the United Nations.
Venezuela therefore proposed, the Minister continues, that this function to
choose the means of solution be entrusted to the International Court of
Justice, as a permanent body free from the aforementioned inconveniences.
As this proposal was not accepted by the British, Venezuela proposed to
entrust the function to the Secretary General. “In conclusion ... there is an
unequivocal interpretation that the selection of the means of settlement will
be made only by the Secretary General of the United Nations.”
And the exposition of article 4 ends: “Finally, in accordance with the terms
of article 4, the so-called Award of 1899, in the case of not reaching a
satisfactory solution for Venezuela, must be reviewed through arbitration or
the judicial appeal” (emphasis added).
With regard to Article 5 of the Agreement, the Minister understands that
thanks to it “Venezuelan reservations, on all types of concessions granted or
that may be granted in the claimed territory, are thus recognized.”
**********
The law approving the Agreement was adopted on April 13
, 1966.
President Leoni, endorsed by Minister Iribarren Borges, signed its execution
on the 15
th
th
, 1966 in the United
Nations. Although Article 7 of the Agreement establishes its entry into force
. The Agreement was registered on May 5
th
35
on the date of its signature, Minister Iribarren Borges, in his speech of
March 17
th
, 1966, held before the National Congress that “it is evident that
when the law approving the Agreement is submitted to this Sovereign
Congress, this Agreement will enter into force upon the ratification of that
Law”.
In a letter dated April 4
, 1966, the Secretary General of the United Nations,
U Thant, accepted the functions attributed to him by Article IV.2 of the
Geneva Agreement, considering that “those functions are of such nature that
they can be properly performed by the Secretary General of the United
Nations”.
th
36
V.
The recognition of Guyana by Venezuela, May 1966
Through Note No. GG-00474 of May 18
, 1966, addressed to the
Ambassador of the United Kingdom, Sir Anthony Lincoln, the Minister of
Foreign Relations, Iribarren Borges, accepted the invitation for Venezuela to
be represented in the acts of celebrating the independence of Guyana,
warning that:
th
“... the presence of the Venezuelan Delegation ... does not imply
recognition or in any way waiver or decrease of the territorial rights
claimed by Venezuela and in no way affects the sovereignty rights
that come from the claim arising from the Venezuelan contention that
the so-called Paris Arbitration Award of 1899 about the border of
Venezuela and British Guiana is null and void. Testimony of the same
nature was made in the Geneva Agreement of February 17
of the
current year. Therefore, my country in due course will recognize the
new State of Guyana, with the express and indicated territorial
reservation”.
th
On May 25
th
, 1966, the British Ambassador responded to the previous note,
by instructions of the Secretary of the Foreign Office, in the following
manner:
“Since Article V (2) of the Geneva Agreement stipulates that no act or
activity that is carried out while the agreement is in force will
constitute a basis to enforce, support or deny a claim of territorial
sovereignty in the territories of Venezuela or British Guiana, the
37
reservations that the Government of Venezuela intends to make when
granting its recognition to Guyana, seems that do not add anything to
the legal position of Venezuela. It is, therefore, with regret that the
Government of His Majesty notes that the Venezuelan Government
has thought it necessary to express such reservations. However, since
the Government of Venezuela has proceeded in this way, in the
aforementioned Note of Your Excellency, the Government of His
Majesty, for its part, feels obliged to reserve in this matter its rights
and those of the Government of British Guiana.”
The note of recognition of Guyana by Venezuela was sent on the same day
of its independence, May 26
, 1966. In the note, the Government of
Venezuela expresses itself “eager to establish relations with the State of
Guyana on a basis of common interest and mutual respect, and is willing to
exchange diplomatic representatives… when both countries deem it
convenient.”
After other complimentary and festive considerations, the note recalls that
under Article 8 of the Geneva Agreement, Guyana becomes part of this
Agreement from this date. And adds:
th
“Consequently, and in accordance with the provisions of article 5 of
the same Convention, the recognition that Venezuela makes of the
new State of Guyana does not imply on the part of our country the
waiver or decrease of the claimed territorial rights, nor in any way
affects the sovereignty rights that come from the claim arising from
the Venezuelan contention that the so-called Paris Arbitration Award
of 1899 on the border between Venezuela and British Guiana, is null
and void. Therefore, Venezuela recognizes as territory of the new
State that which is located east of the right bank of the Essequibo
River, and reiterates before the new country, and before the
38
international community, that it expressly reserves its rights of
territorial sovereignty over the entire zone to the left margin of the
aforementioned river; consequently, the territory of the Guyana
Esequiba on which Venezuela expressly reserves its sovereign rights,
limits the East with the new State of Guyana, through the Essequibo
river line, taken from its source to its mouth in the Atlantic Ocean”.
On June 21
1966, speaking at the Security Council, Venezuelan
representative, Mr. Zuloaga, reiterated:
st
“Venezuela formally reports that, neither its support for Guyana’s
application of membership of the United Nations, nor the membership
itself, when produced, could imply the renounce or reduction of
Venezuela’s severing rights on the territory located on the left border
of the Essequibo River, nor the recognition in any form of Laudo
Arbitral’s call of Paris 1899 on the border between Venezuela and
British Guiana, about which it has made a fact the appropriate
reservation in recognizing the new State”.
This declaration was renewed ed in the UN General Assembly of September
th
20
1966, on the occasion of the accession of Guyana as a member of the
Organization.
The Guyana Government replied to the Venezuelan note of May 26
months after, August 19
th
1966. The note stated:
th
“My Government takes note of the pleasure with which the
Venezuelan Government has given its recognition to Guyana, but
observes, with regret, that the Venezuelan Government has described
the middle line of the Essequibo River as the occidental border of the
39
Guyana State, in contradiction with the 1905 Agreement resulting
from the works of the Border Demarcation Commission…”
The note expressly notes that Article I (2) of Guyana’s Constitution, which
defines the territory of the State, which includes all the area on the date of
independence, was comprised in the British Guiana Colony. At the same
time, referring to the Geneva Agreement, the Prime Minister and Minister
for Foreign Relations, L.F.S. Burnham, affirms:
“I wish to give securities to the Government of Your Excellency that
the Government of Guyana has the purpose, in accordance with the
well-established international practice, to comply with all the
obligations of such Agreement”.
On the establishment of diplomatic relations, the note observed that the
limitations of the new State regarding trained personnel and resources
prevent him to establish a mission in Venezuela, but the Government of
Guyana would accept any decision of the Venezuelan Government of
elevating its current General Consulate to the status of Embassy and
naming, when appropriate, the Ambassador who represents it.
**********
40
VI.
Mixed Commission, 1966-1970
The Geneva Agreement provided that the Parties designate their
representatives in the Mixed Commission on the following months after the
entry into force of the Agreement (February 16
, 1966). Guyana designated
its commissioners, Mr. Donald Jackson and Mohamed Shahabuddeen, on
April 14, 1966. Venezuela named its own, Dr. Luis Loreto and Mr. Gonzalo
Garcia Bustillos, two days after. There were no changes in the four years in
which the Commission operated. The Commission celebrated sixteen
meetings.
According to the provisions of Article III of the Geneva Agreement, the
Mixed Commission had to present partial reports every six months starting
from the date of its first meeting. On the other hand, Article IV.1 stated that:
th
“If within a period of four years from the date of this Agreement, the
Mixed Commission should not have arrived at a full agreement for the
solution of the controversy, it shall, in its final report, refer to the
Government of Guyana and the Government of Venezuela any
outstanding questions…”.
**********
A short synthesis of the Mixed Commission activity can be found in the
brochure The claim of the Guyana Esequiba (El reclamo de la Guyana
41
Esequiba) (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, People’s Power Ministry for
Foreign Relations, General Directorate of Borders, Caracas, 1982, pp. 1012).
In
this
publication
it is
said
that:
“… from the beginnings of its functioning, a radical disparity of
criteria took place within the Mixed Commission between Venezuela
and Guyana on the interpretation of Article I of the Geneva
Agreement.
According to Venezuela, the High Contracting Parties had entrusted to
the Mixed Commission the task of searching for practical solutions to
the territorial controversy. This interpretation was based on:
a) The background information of the diplomatic negotiations leading
to the Geneva Agreement, since the first item on the Agenda of the
Ministers Conference of London (1965),was excluded from the
Geneva Conference. Item 1 referred to the examination of the
documents on the nullity of the ‘arbitral award’;
b) The Geneva Agreement text stipulating the search of satisfactory
solutions for the practical arrangement of the controversy;
c) The parity and diplomatic basis of the Commission.
According to Guyana’s Representatives, the Mixed Commission
should focus first on clarifying the objective of the controversy
between the two countries. In other words, the Venezuelan contention
that the 1899 arbitral award was null and void, and therefore had to
start with the examination of documents which, according to
Venezuela, supported its position.
The Venezuelan Delegation successfully resisted entering a legal
discussion since, in addition to the reasons that supported its
interpretation of the Geneva Agreement, it considered that a
discussion of legal nature within a joint and diplomatic commission
would not led to any solution, since at the end both delegations will
maintain their respective positions on the ‘arbitral award’”.
42
And it continues:
“In an attempt to take the Mixed Commission out of the sterile
discussion on the correct interpretation of Article I of the Geneva
Agreement, Venezuela brought a broad proposal about the joint
development of the Guyana Esequiba in the IV Meeting (Georgetown,
March 1967). The promised answer of Guyana came to happen in the
VI Meeting (October-November 1967), after the Venezuelan
Delegation requested by Guyana broadened the proposal following
Guayana’s request in a Joint Development Project meticulously
crafted. Endless discussions resulted in the creation of the
Subcommittee of experts to study plans of joint development, which
came to hold two meetings, both in Georgetown, in February and June
1968.”
And it adds:
“That said, since May 1967 to July 1968, both in the Mixed
Commission and in the Subcommittee of experts, it could be seen that
Guyana did not have any serious disposition to explore the joint
development as a way that could lead to the solution of the
controversy.
In the course of Mixed Commission discussions, and in governmentto-government
contacts
…it
has
come
clear
that
Guyana
is
unwilling
to
accept any plan of joint development of the Guyana Esequiba, if
there is no prior recognition by Venezuela of the sovereignty of
Guyana in that territory.
43
Moreover, even though the Venezuelan project of Mixed
Development is not confined exclusively to Guyana Esequiba but sees
it as a primary object, the counter-proposals of Guyana intentionally
excluded that territory, intending that Venezuela provided financial
sources at very low interest rates, payable in 50 years and with ten
years dead free of interests, for three Guyana projects located in Canje
river close to Corentin river border with Surinam, Georgetown and the
middle area of Demerara District.
Ultimately, Guyana:
1) Did not accept that the Joint Development Plan included the
Guyana Esequiba.
2) Did not accept that Venezuela participate in the Administration of
the Plan, nor of the concrete projects.
3) Used the discussions on the matter to exhaust the time allotted to
the Mixed Commission and to neutralize at international level the
impact of the statement by Venezuela on non-recognition of
concessions to be granted by Guyana on the Guyana Esequiba”.
**********
March 30
th
1968, at the beginning of the first session of the Commission’s
eight meeting, Dr. Luis Loreto read a statement that summarized the
Venezuelan commissioners’ perception on the progress of their works. Two
years of the four years agreed upon in the Geneva Agreement have passed
for the Mixed Commission to execute the mandate of Article I; the
Venezuelan commissioners invited those from Guyana to seriously meditate
on the deadlock of the negotiations.
The Venezuelan Commissioner made a devastating analysis on the work
done in previous meetings of the Commission, which showed the
44
obstructive and dilatory policy pursued by the Guyana’s commissioners and,
in due course, by the Guyana experts in the subcommittee, referred to
above:
“In the first meeting of the Commission (July 1966) the inflexible
opposition of the Guyana commissioners on purely formal aspects,
prevented the approval of its entire regulation rules of procedure.
In the second meeting (September 1966) a lot of time was wasted on
procedural issues and, later, after having proposed the Venezuelan
representatives the restitution of the territory to the west of Essequibo,
the Guyanese commissioners tried hard to alter the mandate of the
commission according to the Geneva Agreement, seeking to
deliberate on the validity or nullity of the 1899 Award, a deliberation
of legal nature: a) sterile, given the indisputably diplomatic and
negotiating nature of the Commission; and b) irrelevant, given the
mandate given to them by Article I of the Geneva Agreement.
In the third meeting (December 1966) the Guyana’s commissioners
opposed to the negotiations progress due to the fact that the serious
territorial controversy was deteriorated by actions such as the attack to
the flag and the Venezuelan consulate in Georgetown; consequently,
only the first report could be approved.
In the fourth meeting (March 1967), the Venezuelan commissioners
tried to seek new paths for understanding through the proposal of a
joint development plan. The Guyanese commissioners promised an
answer for the fifth meeting (July 1967), but instead of providing it,
they requested a new extension of the proposal, an extension that
Venezuela took to the sixth meeting (October/December 1967), which
ended up splitting in two meetings. The Guyana’s commissioners,
45
after trying to lead the discussion to marginal and insignificant points
of the plan, they wanted to return the negotiations back where they
were on the second meeting (September 1966), fourteen months
before. Acting like this, the commissioners from Guyana, far from
showing a serious and sincere will to comply with the expressed
mandate of the Geneva Agreement, evidenced the intention of
disregarding it. That is why the Venezuelan commissioners chose to
return to their country, leaving the meeting, to which they came back
after being informed by their colleagues from Guyana that were ready
to get to the bottom of the matter. It happened, however, that after an
endless debate, even of a semantic nature, the only thing that could be
agreed upon was the establishment of a subcommittee of experts. As
the Guyanese commissioners did not allow these aspects to be
discussed, the deadlines for its creation and functioning had to be left
for the seventh meeting (December 1967).
Following the establishment of the subcommittee, Dr. Loreto
continues, the Guyanese hindered its work by not allowing the
presence of the advisors accompanying the experts to the formal
sessions, rejecting as a working paper the Joint Development Plan
presented by Venezuela (discussed in its general lines in the sixth
meeting of the Commission (October-December 1967). Instead, the
experts from Guyana declared that they expected from Venezuela the
concession of a loan to face the debt of the country and refused to
move forward under the pretext that the meaning of the expression
“economic development”, used in the terms of reference of the
Subcommittee, should be clarified, and asking the Commission to
decide whether it included “social development”. This allowed the
Guyanese experts to gain time for their dilatory and obstructive policy
while the Commission lose it. The report of the Subcommittee was
reduced to asking the Commission if the Subcommittee should carry
46
out studies on possible cooperation areas between Venezuela and
Guyana for the financing and execution of development and
economic, social and cultural exchange between the countries.
Therefore, a complete negative outcome.
The severe territorial controversy between the States, Dr. Loreto
concluded, far from taking an understanding path, it is being
aggravated due to the obstructionist attitude that Guyana has shown in
the Subcommittee and in the Mixed Commission. This is not the
proper manner to handle this matter. To Venezuela the practical
solution is that the territory from which it was stripped be restored to
it. However, we have adopted a sympathetic attitude and as an answer
you close all paths for us to understand each other. You have not
offered a practical solution. We would like to know which one is the
practical solution offered”.
**********
In the 11
th
December 1968, the Venezuelan commissioners issued an extensive
statement in which it is highlighted:
meeting of the Commission, held in Caracas on 28
th
th
and 29
“if the representatives from Guyana where willing to search in good
faith satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the
controversy, Venezuela would be willing to give reasonable time so
that the Mixed Commission accomplished the mission and thus, will
consent to extend the existence of that body for such periods as it
deems appropriate for that purpose. Here is a proposal of practical
content which we formally presented. If Guyana does not modify its
behavior and continues to be intransigently locked up in its
speculative position, it will corroborate with such attitude its reiterated
47
determination to disregard the Geneva Agreement, and particularly,
Article I”.
**********
In the 12
th
April
1969, the Venezuelan commissioners insisted on the joint development of
projects west of Essequibo as, although it was not the substantive solution to
the dispute, it allowed to get close to it, while avoiding that, because of the
main issue, development stagnated. The lines of the proposal were: 1) all
Guyana territory would be eligible for development projects, but will not
give priority to the territory west of Essequibo; 2) the projects would be
planned and executed with a joint administration formula agreed by the
Parties; 3) the projects would be undertaken under national, joint and
international funding sources. This proposal was rejected.
**********
The commissioners met in two occasions to prepare the Final Report
(Caracas, May 13-16, 1970; and Port of Spain, June 15
meeting held in Bridgetown, Barbados, from 8
th
th
to 10
), date
in which it was signed. The scarce three pages of the Final Report expressed
in its emptiness the Parties failure. The Final Report incorporated separate
memoranda as annexes, focusing on highlighting that the signing of the
Report did not constitute acceptance nor recognition of their positions with
respect to each other’s memoranda. The partial reports that were presented
every six months while the Commission was active were considred an
integral part of the Final Report. “The non-compliance of the Geneva
Agreement” can be read in the Venezuela’s memorandum:
th
th
, 16
th
and 18
48
“it is not that a satisfactory solution has not been found for the
practical settlement of the controversy but, that despite the
Venezuelan efforts, the search for a solution was not even
attempted.”
VII.
The Protocol of Port of Spain, 1970-1982
The Protocol of Port of Spain was signed on June 18
1970; Rafael Caldera
was the President of Venezuela (1968-1974), who intended to initiate a
“Caribbean” policy.
The Protocol consists of the preamble and six articles. In the preamble the
Parties show their conviction that
th,
“the promotion of mutual confidence and positive and friendly
intercourse between Guyana and Venezuela will lead to an
improvement in their relations”.
Article I states that while the Protocol is in force, both Governments
“shall explore all possibilities of better understanding between them
and between their peoples and in particular shall undertake periodical
reviews, through normal diplomatic channels, of their relations with a
view to promoting their improvement and with the aim of producing a
constructive advancement of the same.”
According to Article II.1:
49
“So long as this Protocol remains in force no claim whatever arising
out of the contention referred to in Article I of the Geneva Agreement
shall be asserted by Guyana to territorial sovereignty in the territories
of Venezuela or by Venezuela to territorial sovereignty in the
territories of Guyana”.
According to Article III, once the Protocol enters in force,
“the operation of Article IV of the Geneva Agreement shall be
suspended. On the date when this Protocol ceases to be in force the
functioning of that Article shall be resumed at the point at which it has
been suspended, that is to say, as if the Final Report of the Mixed
Commission had been submitted on that date, unless the Government
of Guyana and the Government of Venezuela have first jointly
declared in writing that they have reached full agreement for the
solution of the controversy referred to in the Geneva Agreement or
that they have agreed upon one of the means of peaceful settlement
provided for in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations”.
Article IV of the Protocol sets forth that Article V of the Geneva Agreement
remains operative during this period.
Article V of the Protocol regulates its duration (twelve years renewable for
identical terms –or by written agreement for shorter terms, but longer than
five years - unless six months before the end of each term either
Government notifies the other in writing of its termination.
Article VI provides that the Protocol shall be known as “Protocol of Port of
Spain” and shall enter into force on the date of its signature. Both texts in
Spanish and English have equal value.
50
**********
In the explanatory memorandum of the Venezuelan draft law approving the
Protocol, of June 22
1970, it is said that when the Venezuelan Government
saw the possibility of losing control of,
nd
“an issue of such vital importance for Venezuela, as the determination
of the settlement means of the controversy… carefully examined the
situation in which the relations between the countries were, as well as
the general state of international politics, in what this could affect our
aspirations, and concluded that it was not the proper time to enter into
this new phase of the procedure”.
It continues:
“In effect…, given the lack of any process in the Mixed Commission
and given the unfortunate but undeniable fact, of the deterioration of
the relations between Venezuela and Guyana, it was difficult, if not
impossible, to expect that the mechanism of the Geneva Agreement
could fulfill its function of providing a satisfactory solution for the
practical settlement of the controversy, since the achievement of such
a solution necessarily presupposes in the exercise of the means of
solution envisaged, a willingness of understanding by both sides”.
It goes on to explain that the Government undertook a wide range of
consultations with politicians and experts, including “opinions of reputable
foreign experts”, carefully weighing all alternatives and
“it was concluded that the most appropriate, even though in view of
the environment that existed at the time seemed to be the most
arduous, was the search for a negotiated route with
51
Guyana...Notwithstanding
the wide
initial divergence of
positions...there was evidence of an effective willingness on the part
of Guyana to negotiate. This desire for understanding on the part of
both Parties eventually made it possible to arrive at the text of the
Protocol which...opens the way for creating the necessary conditions
to make possible a peaceful, honorable and equitable settlement of the
dispute”.
Furthermore,
“When the negotiations began, the Government of Guyana proposed a
suspension term too long in the opinion of the Government of
Venezuela, based on the criterium that a new generation should
complete the full examination of the issue. Venezuela, on the other
hand, proposed a term that the Government of Guyana considered too
short. So, the term of twelve years… represents a formula of
commitment… but closer to the initial proposal of Venezuela that the
one from Guyana”.
The advantages of the Protocol are listed below: a) maintains in force the
Venezuelan claim on the territory seized by the 1899 Award; b) avoids the
litigation from leaving the ambit of direct negotiations and passing into the
hands of third parties in the short term; c) opens a long enough term for the
Governments to explore all possibilities of improving their understanding
and that of their peoples and, particularly, undertake through normal
diplomatic channels regular reviews of their relations to promote their
improvement and produce a constructive advance of them; d) contemplates
the eventuality that, by the end of this period, more appropriate
circumstances could exist so that, in the terms of the Geneva Agreement and
according to the international situation prevailing in that moment, they can
be translated into a solution of the dispute or in the determination of a
52
means to solve it; e) through intelligent and well-organized cultural,
economic and all-embracing collaboration, Venezuela could not only
decrease current tensions but considerably improve its image; and, f) makes
possible to create a favorable environment that allows, after the twelve
years, continue the procedure established in Article IV of the Geneva
Agreement.
It is underlined that the term “freezing”, used by some interpreters of the
Protocol, do not correspond to its true meaning nor its intention, since the
twelve-year term will not be a period of inactivity; on the contrary, as
provided by Article I, the Parties undertake to make effective efforts within
that period to create a climate of real understanding that opens the path to
address the solution of the controversy, as stated in Article III of the
Protocol. Everything that the Geneva Agreement may contain that is
positive for Venezuelan interests remains untouched. On the date on which
the Protocol ceases to be in force, the mechanism of Article IV of the
Geneva Agreement will resume at the point of suspension, i.e. as if the Final
Report of the Mixed Commission had been submitted at that time. Through
Article IV of the Protocol, Article V of the Geneva Agreement continues to
operate, removing only anachronistic references.
According to the Government, the Protocol opened new positive
perspectives:
“Represents a success of the willingness of understanding and a new
phase in the search of the settlement of the controversy, not only
because it avoids inconvenient or inopportune steps, but especially
because emphasizes the constructive work of creating new ties of
collaboration and trust between Venezuela and Guyana”.
53
The termination of the Protocol of Port of Spain
th
On April 4
, 1981, on the occasion of the official visit to Caracas by the
President of Guyana, Forbes Burnham, a Communiqué from the Ministry of
Foreign Relations of Venezuela informed that President Herrera Campins
firmly reaffirmed the validity of the claim on the Essequibo and reiterated
his refusal “to any commitment incompatible” with said claim, as well as
“the national aspiration to obtain reparation for the grave injustice
committed against our country by the voracity of the colonial empires”. In
this sense, “he confirmed Venezuela’s rejection of the Alto Mazaruni
hydroelectric project”, also recalled that Venezuela and Guyana “have
committed themselves to seek satisfactory solutions for the practical
settlement of the pending controversy” and recalled “the Venezuelan
determination to continue exploring the most appropriate means to achieve
this end”. As a result, "he stated that at this moment there is no provision on
our part to extend the Protocol of Port of Spain”, which expired on June
18
th
, 1982.
The latter information was supplemented by a statement by the Venezuelan
Minister of Foreign Relations, Dr. José Alberto Zambrano Velasco, of
April, 10
th
, 1981:
“The Government considers that new ways should be explored to
materialize our claim, and considers that it interprets, with its
decision, national sentiment... The immediate consequence of the
extinction of the Port of Spain Protocol is the full reactivation of the
procedures indicated by the Geneva Agreement of 1966...We must
assess whether Guyana and Great Britain have complied in good faith
with the obligations derived from it. We should break down the means
established in that treaty in order to choose the one that, within the
54
objectives assigned by the Parties, better suit the interests of the
country. The unity of the Venezuelans is decisive for...the ethical and
legal basis of our claim to be respected to obtain reparation for the
violation of which we were victims by the action of the colonial
empires. And that the commitment made by Venezuela, Guyana and
United Kingdom in 1966 to find satisfactory solutions for a practical
settlement of the dispute should also be respected... This unity will
also be necessary to make Guyana and the International Community
understand that for Venezuela it is unacceptable, pending a
satisfactory solution to the dispute, that by unilateral decision there
should be acts of disposition over the territory claimed, which could
seriously affect it and which would seek to disregard our rights. In the
specific case of the Alto Mazaruni dam, it must be clear at the
international level that its construction under the current conditions is
inadmissible for Venezuela and that consequently, we are not willing
to recognize any right that might be invoked on the basis of the
hypothetical execution of said project”.
This declaration was followed by another, from the National Government,
dated May 2
, 1981. In this declaration it is stated that
nd
“Venezuela has striven to observe rigorously” the precepts of the
Geneva Agreement and, without ignoring the value of some of the
criticisms addressed to it, it is “convinced that if the two Parties intend
to comply with it in good faith, its purpose will surely be obtained,
that is, to find a satisfactory solution for the practical settlement of the
controversy. Therefore, ... the Government insists on asserting for its
provisions in order to find a solution to our claim”.
The statement continues:
55
“Obviously, in the event that the means of settlement provided for in
the Geneva Agreement are exhausted, without the dispute having been
resolved, or that it continues to be evident that the other Party has no
intention of complying with its provisions, refusing to negotiate
satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the territorial
dispute, it may be necessary to rethink the orientation of the efforts to
obtain reparation due to Venezuela. Consequently, if, according to
recent declarations by the Government of Guyana, the territorial
problem between our countries is restricted to the Treaty of 1897 and
the Award of 1899, it is obvious that the intention is to dispense with
the Geneva Agreement. To refuse to negotiate in accordance with
what has been agreed is not only to ignore the injustice committed
against Venezuela but also to refuse to comply with the international
commitments undertaken”.
The declaration adds:
“The Geneva Agreement imposes on the Parties the duty to seek
satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the dispute. That
is why, from the outset, Venezuela has been prepared to consider all
the problems involved in this matter, whether political, maritime,
cultural, economic or social problems, and not to limit itself to merely
examining the nullity of the non-existent 1899 Award, as Guyana
seems to claim. Venezuela considers that a practical arrangement is
not possible without addressing this issue as a whole and that any
different conduct constitutes a violation of the obligation to negotiate
a satisfactory solution, as agreed in the Geneva Agreement”.
The declaration recalls the terms of Guyana’s recognition by Venezuela,
with express reservation over the entire Essequibo territory, until a practical
settlement of the dispute is obtained.
56
It concludes:
“Venezuela is willing to find, within the provisions of Article IV of
the Geneva Agreement, a suitable means of finding a satisfactory
solution to the practical settlement of the dispute. This attitude is a
necessary condition for recourse to the means of peaceful settlement
provided for by international law. Hence, Venezuela is concerned to
see certain attitudes of the Guyanese government or sustained under
its protection, which seems contradictory with the purpose of finding a
means of a peaceful solution to our controversy”.
**********
Aware of Venezuela’s intention to resume the application of Article Iv of
the Geneva Agreement, Mr. Burnham initiated an international campaign
against Venezuela. According to Venezuelan Minister Zambrano Velasco in
his speech to the Convention of Governors held in Ciudad Bolivar on July
8
th
, 1982,
“Mr. Burnham intended to return to his country with a Venezuelan
decision in support of the extension of the Protocol of Port of Spain,
and with the national contribution for the construction of the Mazaruni
dam, which had become the dream or panacea that would solve the
economic problems affecting the brotherly people of Guyana”.
President Herrera Campins openly rejected both objectives and, the
Minister continues, “the Guyanese reaction became strident and
aggressive. He multiplied in all international fora, political or
technical, a planned and belligerent accusation against Venezuela,
presenting it as a rich, large and powerful country that aspires to two
57
thirds of a small newborn state to independent life, to which it made
economic war and pursued a policy of aggression.
This strategy, according to Guyanese intentions, would have finished
days before the date set for the cessation of application of the Protocol
of Port of Spain, with a condemnation of Venezuela, describing it as
an aggressor country, according to the statement made by the Foreign
Minister of Guyana at the meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the
Group of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Havana last June.
This eventual condemnation would have been proposed by Guyana for
ratification by the CARICOM Heads of State (in December) who
would have been called for a meeting in Georgetown, which was later
cancelled for not having found an echo among the eventual
participants who realized the Guyanese maneuver. ...In those same
days another accusation of aggression on the part of Venezuela
circulated in the United Nations Security Council, promoted by
Guyana...”.
Between April and December, 1981, a series of Guyanese initiatives
took place in multilateral venues, which had to be replicated one by
one by the representatives of Venezuela. In April 1981, it took place at
the 68
International Labor Conference, in Geneva, where the
representative of Venezuela objects to “the use of this Forum to
address an issue that must be resolved bilaterally and by the peaceful
means chosen by the Parties to the Geneva Agreement”. In May 1981,
the same happened at the 34
th
meeting of the Caribbean Economic Development Group held in
Washington. In August, at the United Nations on New and Renewable
Energy Conference in Nairobi. In October, at the British Community
Heads of Government Meeting in Melbourne. In this case, a press
release from the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Relations, issued on
th
Health Assembly. In June, at the 4
th
58
October 7
, stressed that the statement by the Heads of Government
meeting in Melbourne was taking place at a time when the Conference
Secretariat belonged to Mr. S.S. Ramphal, the Guyanese Minister who
signed the New Protocol of Spain.
This issue received its own treatment within the World Bank as a
result of the financing of the hydroelectric project submitted by
Guyana for execution in the Alto Mazaruni. On June 17
th
, 1981, the
Embassy of Venezuela in the United States, following instructions
from the Ministry of Foreign Relations, issued a communiqué
informing the President of the World Bank of the delivery of a letter
dated 8
th
June, signed by Foreign Minister Zambrano Velasco, in
which Venezuela’s position on the project was reaffirmed: “The
projected Alto Mazaruni dam is located in the Essequibo territory, the
object of territorial controversy, and is the result of a unilateral
initiative by the Government of Guyana, which does not comply with
its international obligations... The construction of the dam... involves
considerable work that would profoundly and irreversibly alter the
region and the physical environment. Venezuela reaffirms its firm
opposition to the fulfillment of such a unilateral act of disposition over
a territory whose sovereignty corresponds to it”.
This evidences “a lack of serious will to comply with its international
obligations, arising from the Geneva Agreement, which imposes on
the Parties the duty to seek a satisfactory solution for the practical
settlement of the dispute. It is obvious that this kind of unilateral acts
deviates from the conduct owed by States obliged to negotiate in good
faith, in view of a peaceful and practical settlement of a pending
dispute and adds unnecessary elements of tension in international
relations. Venezuela’s opposition is even stronger as the political
purpose pursued by Guyana with the project becomes evident...
th
59
The Venezuelan Government...confirms that it does not recognize any
right or legal situation that could be invoked in the future, whether by
third States, international organizations or entities, or by private
corporations, based on a hypothetical unilateral act of disposition
performed by Guyana over the Essequibo territory... The same
considerations would be valid for the credits that could be granted for
the financing of the work...Venezuela believes that it would be
unusual for the World Bank... to proceed to finance a unilateral act
over a territory in controversy, whose political purpose on the part of
Guyana is evident”.
On September 24
, 1981, Foreign Minister Zambrano Velasco replicated
the tendentious intervention of the Prime Minister of Guyana at the 36
th
session of the United Nations General Assembly, who had presented
Venezuela as an expansionist, intervening country that tries to abuse the
weakest:
th
“This is the central point of the matter -Dr. Zambrano Velasco said-
Guyana and Venezuela freely, without pressure or threats, assumed
the obligation to seek satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement
of the territorial controversy existing between them. Unfortunately,
the current Government of Guyana has been inclined to show
solidarity with the iniquities of the past. Venezuela’s attempts at
dialogue have come up against a wall of absolute intransigence, and
the announced policy of the Government of Guyana is to transform at
any cost the de facto conditions of the territories subject to claim in
such a way as to make any settlement difficult or impossible”.
The Venezuelan Minister continues:
60
“The incredible horror of the Jonestown massacre brought to the
world’s attention the disastrous results of that policy. Venezuelans are
aware of the serious and growing economic and social difficulties
suffered by the young Guyanese nation... We believe, however, that
the temptation to divert public attention from real immediate problems
to non-existent external threats must be resisted.... I clearly denounce
the actions and statements of the Government of Guyana, such as
seeking international support, publicizing alleged or non-existent
support, or achieving an animosity against Venezuela. I denounce
such activities as initiatives destined for Venezuela to fall into the trap
of an explosive reaction... The arrogant, dismissive, defiant and even
insulting activities of persons of the current Government of Guyana
against Venezuela are only understandable as excuses not to comply
with the obligation contracted to negotiate between the Parties
satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the controversy... I
emphatically deny that Venezuela harbors intentions of military
aggression against Guyana”.
The Minister concludes with a friendly exhortation to the Government of
Guyana to “sincerely and in good faith perform the duties which it freely
assumed under the Geneva Agreement of 1966”.
This skirmish did not stop there. The Government of Guyana issued a
memorandum (A/C.1/36/9), linking it with the item on the agenda of the UN
General Assembly concerning the Declaration on the Strengthening of
International Security. Venezuela considered this memorandum “an
unsustainable propaganda move whose fantastic aspiration is to present
Venezuela as a country that threatens to attack another”.
Venezuela replied with another memorandum, dated 20 November 1981
(A/C.1/36/12), denouncing the Guyanese Government
61
“misrepresentations and interested and slanderous interpretations...
which once again manifest the Guyanese intention to deviate from the
fulfillment of its international commitments and duties... Guyana has
systematically violated the Geneva Agreement of 1966, by refusing to
seek “a satisfactory method for the practical settlement of the dispute”
(art.1), so that the dispute could be “amicably settled in a manner
acceptable to both Parties” (preamble). Guyana has persistently
refused to negotiate with Venezuela a solution of the kind described
by that treaty... The only case in which Venezuela has not even been
able to begin a real negotiation has been precisely with Guyana, as a
consequence of the obstinate determination of the only government
that this country has had in its fifteen years of Independence, to refuse
to comply with its obligations under the Geneva Agreement”.
Referring to the Agreement, the Memorandum states that
“it constitutes the legal status of the Venezuelan territorial claim, and
is the product of the will freely expressed by Venezuela and
Guyana..., a formal agreement by which the three parties involved
committed themselves to a political search for peaceful solutions to a
controversy inherited from colonialism.... However, the fact that
Guyana insists on raising the issue within a multilateral field may
reveal, beyond a propaganda drive on its part, a purpose to move away
from the bilateral instrument called, by our common will, to be the
means to resolve the dispute. Venezuela wonders “how can
international security be affected if a treaty is complied with in good
faith, Article IV of which expressly refers to the means of peaceful
settlement of disputes provided for in Article 33 of the UN Charter?...
It is also a matter of concern that, as part of its publicity stunt, Guyana
is attempting to present Venezuela as a conflictive country, to the
62
point of daring to assert that the Caribbean region has faced a constant
threat to its peace and security as a result of the Venezuelan claim”.
In his Third Address to the Congress of the Republic, on March 11
, 1982,
President Herrera Campins regrets that
th
“in almost all the international fora held after President Burnham’s
visit to Venezuela, we have constantly been victims of attacks by the
Guyanese delegation, which we have responded to and rejected in
form and substance on each of those occasions”.
These lamentations are reiterated in the IV Address Message, to the
Congress, March 10
, 1983.
**********
In accordance with Article V of the Protocol, on December 11
th
, 1981,
Venezuela formally notified (Note No GM-515) its termination at the end
(June 18
th
th
, 1982) of the twelve years of the initial period. In the same note,
Venezuela transmitted to Guyana
“the firm willingness of the Government of the Republic of Venezuela
to find, through the fulfillment in good faith of the provisions of the
Geneva Agreement, a satisfactory solution for the practical settlement
of the outstanding territorial dispute, so that it may be amicably and
peacefully settled in a manner acceptable to both Parties”.
Identical note No. GM-516) was addressed to the Foreign Office and both
notes were communicated (note No. GM.517) to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim.
63
On the same date, the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Venezuela issued a
communiqué informing of this decision. It states, inter alia, that:
“During the four years of activity of the Mixed Commission, Guyana
maintained an inflexible position, aimed at evading negotiation
through which a satisfactory solution could have been found for the
practical settlement of the dispute. As a result of the intransigent
Guyanese non-compliance, the Mixed Commission was unable to
fulfill its mandate under the Geneva Agreement... In the light of the
international situation at the time, the immediate background within
the Mixed Commission, and the supreme interests of the country, the
national Government at the time concluded that the time was not ripe
for the immediate implementation of Article IV of the Geneva
Agreement. By virtue of this, the Protocol of Port of Spain was
negotiated and signed..., although this did not preclude the possibility
of taking steps, by other means, to seek a solution to the controversy
raised... The Venezuelan Government’s decision not to extend the
Protocol of Port of Spain carries with it a firm determination to
comply with and enforce compliance with the Geneva Agreement,
which establishes an obligation to negotiate a satisfactory solution for
the practical settlement of the dispute, so that it is resolved in a
manner acceptable to both Parties. We have repeatedly denounced
Guyana’s failure to comply with this obligation to negotiate in good
faith. At this moment, when the matter takes a new turn, Venezuela
renews the hope that Guyana will rectify this conduct and that genuine
negotiations will be undertaken... We must proceed, through that
international treaty, to seek a solution that, without losing sight of all
the historical, geographical, political, social and legal factors present
in the matter, proposes the achievement of the fundamental objective
for Venezuela, which is the achievement of a practical arrangement
64
that rectifies the injustice committed with the abusive dispossession of
which we were victims in the Guayana Esequiba...”.
Both the Senate (on December 14
) and the Chamber of Deputies (on
December 15
th
) adopted resolutions supporting the Government’s decision
not to extend the application of the Protocol of Port of Spain, as well as its
determination “to comply with and enforce compliance with the Geneva
Agreement, in search of a satisfactory solution for the practical settlement of
the territorial dispute raised”.
On May 11
th
, 1982, Guyana expressed unfounded accusations of alleged
aggressions and imminent invasions by the Venezuelan Armed Forces in a
letter to the President of the Security Council, forcing Venezuela to deny it
in a letter dated June 1
th
, 1982, distributed as a document of the Security
Council (S/15208).
This document recalls that these accusations are not new and respond to
Guyana’s intention to use the Security Council and the United Nations as an
instrument of propaganda against Venezuela. Once again it is pointed out,
referring to the activities of the Mixed Commission:
st
“The obstinacy with which Guyana maintained a point of view far
removed from reality and from the fulfillment of the obligation to
negotiate in good faith, raising as a question prior to any subsequent
conversation, the useless intellectual exercise of examining the
validity or nullity of the 1899 Award, rendered the activities of the
Mixed Commission inoperative, frustrating the purpose of the Geneva
Agreement, which is, according to its Article 1, the search for
practical solutions, that is, of a political nature and, therefore, opposed
to a speculative, theoretical and exclusively legal solution, such as that
65
relating to the validity or nullity of an arbitral award... The
Government of Guyana has been engaged in a publicity effort,
repeating over and over again that it is the victim of a Venezuelan
aggression...as if by repeating this slogan alone, Guyana aspires to
justify its 16-year sustained breach of the specific obligation to
negotiate in good faith in order to achieve a satisfactory solution to the
practical settlement of the dispute.
This strategy became even more evident since April 1981, when the
President of Guyana Forbes Burnham visited Venezuela and President
Luis Herrera Campins participated eight months before the date
foreseen in the Protocol of Port of Spain that Venezuela would not
continue to apply that Protocol... This is the opportunity to reiterate
that the Geneva Agreement imposes on the Parties the duty to search a
practical solution to the problem; to reaffirm that Venezuela has been
willing, from the outset, to consider all the aspects involved in the
matter, because a practical solution such as the one that has been
agreed upon requires that the entire issue be addressed as a whole.
Limiting the discussions to a merely theoretical-legal aspect implies a
violation of the obligation contracted in good faith by both countries
when adopting the Geneva Agreement... In view of this reality, the
Government of Guyana seems to be desperate for a dossier, a formula,
a mechanism to avoid its obligation to negotiate…The failure to
comply with the obligation to negotiate in good faith in a repeated and
systematic manner constitutes an offence to the law, a contempt for
the other party, a veiled form of violence and an expeditious method
of breaking faith in peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms”.
**********
On June 17
th
, 1982, on the eve of the effective termination of the application
of the Protocol of Port of Spain, the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign
66
Relations, Zambrano Velasco, delivered an extensive speech at the Congress
of the Republic: “The history of dispossession is the history of a
maneuvering between hegemonies that, believing themselves eternal, tried
to turn the law of the empire into a false ‘rule of law’” he says, and then
extended broadly into the historical process of the “judicial farce” that led to
the 1899 Award, at a time when Venezuela’s weakness was critical. And he
goes on:
“After the Second World War, when new facts previously unknown in
all their significance proved the justification for Venezuela’s rejection
of the 1899 Award, our claim was strengthened. These facts revealed
the precise circumstances surrounding the work of the so-called
Tribunal of Paris and made it possible to perceive with greater clarity
the dimension of the outrage committed. At that time, under the
auspices of the UN, the process of decolonization began, which gave
hope to the peoples who were victims of colonialism to re-establish
the territorial integrity violated by the expansionism of the empires.
Since 1948, before the OAS, the Venezuelan denunciation against the
arbitrary farce and colonialist usurpation, as well as the consequent
territorial claim, has been formulated repeatedly”.
The Minister refers to the Geneva Agreement “from the outset interpreted as
the statute of our territorial claim”, and to its application, as well as to the
independence of Guyana, which Venezuela recognized “clearly reserving
the country’s rights over the usurped territory”.
The Geneva Agreement, Foreign Minister Zambrano Velasco says,
"starts from the recognition of the existence of a controversy and
establishes the procedures to find a solution by peaceful means. It
expressly provides that the matter must be resolved in a manner
67
acceptable to both Parties. Article I of the Agreement obliges the
Parties to negotiate “a satisfactory solution for the practical settlement
of the dispute”. This leads to taking into account not only the legal
elements involved in the issue, but also all historical, moral, political,
geographical and any other considerations that may lead to a balanced,
practical, acceptable and, ultimately, equitable result. The treaty also
binds the Parties to approach the negotiation of the matter in good
faith, so that it makes sense and is not reduced to a mere exercise of
intolerance”.
In relation to the work of the Mixed Commission:
“Venezuela made an effort to fully comply with this obligation to
negotiate in good faith, in the terms defined by International Law. Our
representation did everything in its power, took all possible initiatives,
so that the negotiations made sense and could offer some progress. On
the other hand, the Guyanese representation, instead of addressing the
issue of territorial claim in the manner in which it was legally obliged
to do so, stubbornly refused to consider any possibility of a practical
and satisfactory solution to the matter. It merely argued that the 1899
Award was a fait accompli and that, until Venezuela obtained its
annulment, there was nothing more to discuss. The action of the
Guyanese delegation frustrated the mechanisms of the treaty. Indeed,
the intention to subject the possibility of negotiation to the previous
annulment of the award, or to limit the application of the means of
solution to the legal aspects involved, constitutes a clear violation of
the letter and spirit of the Geneva Agreement.
The “controversy”, according to the aforementioned Agreement, is not
purely a legal dispute but a broader one, which includes aspects of
natural justice and morality. The approach of the Guyana delegation is
incompatible with the content of the Geneva Agreement...To ensure
68
the objective of a mutually acceptable solution, it gives a fundamental
role to negotiation. The latter, in turn, is conceivable only as a
reciprocal movement of rapprochement of the positions of the Parties,
so that thanks to this concerted exercise of flexibility, sufficient points
of contact can be established between the aspirations of both Parties
and a balanced, mutually acceptable result is obtained. It is clear that
the validity or nullity of an award cannot be negotiated, because it is
inconceivable to achieve a balanced and mutually acceptable result on
this matter. Indeed, the Geneva Agreement sets aside the fraudulent
1899 Award. Its own text points out that there is a dispute and that the
Parties must negotiate their solution. At all times Venezuela has faced
this attempt by the Government of Guyana to evade its obligation to
negotiate in good faith. Not only because it is morally unacceptable
that Guyana seeks to impose as the argument based on the 1899
Award, the existence of judicial fraud itself, but because, above all,
we cannot admit the denaturalization of the Geneva Agreement, which
is an international commitment freely agreed and which constitutes
the statute of our territorial claim”. With this precedent, says the
Minister, it is not surprising that the Mixed Commission could not
fulfill the mandate entrusted to it”.
The Minister alludes to the difficult circumstances in which the Protocol of
Port of Spain was signed at a time of stagnation. The Minister understands
that, analyzed with the greatest objectivity, the Protocol has justified its
existence:
“Before the Guyanese people it has been clearly demonstrated that
their permanent economic and social crisis does not derive, as his
Government wanted it to believe, from an alleged Venezuelan
harassment… The patient and serene action of Venezuela has
counteracted the attempts to portray an image of aggressor and a
69
sustained diplomatic action has made known to the countries of the
world the fundamentals of elementary justice of the Venezuelan claim
and the permanent willingness of our country to reach reasonable
solutions by peaceful means. The degree of detente allowed renewing
dialogue during the past constitutional period. There were new
negotiating initiatives, which express the continuity of our claim.
Although they were implemented at the highest level, the attitude of
the Government of Guyana did not contribute to design of a draft
solution. Today, Venezuela, strengthened in all aspects and with a
solid and respected international trajectory, can approach the new
negotiation process under more favorable conditions”.
The Minister explains the road map from June 18
, 1982, when the
procedure set forth in Article IV.1 of the Geneva Agreement is opened, and
concludes by referring to the strategy of “internationalization of the
problem” deployed, with no results, by the Government of Guyana,
presenting the controversy in an accusatory tone in the most diverse
international fora, in search of condemnations for Venezuela, invoking an
alleged aggression: “The absence of results in the deployment of this
strategy allows us to think that there will be a change in Guyana’s attitude,
which will facilitate the beginning of constructive conversations”.
The text of this speech was annexed to the notes addressed the following
day, on June 18
th
, 1982, to the Foreign Minister of Guyana, Rashleigh
Jackson (Note No. GM-135) and to the Secretary of State of the Foreign
Office, Francis Pym (Note No. GM-136), formally ratifying the decision not
to extend the application of the Protocol of Port of Spain, repeating the
contents of the notes transferred the previous December 11
th
.
**********
th
70
VIII.
Reactivation of the Geneva Agreement: election of means of
settlement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1982-1983
On July 1
st
, 1982, implementing the Article IV.2 of the Geneva Agreement,
Venezuela proposed to Guyana the adoption of direct negotiation by the
Parties, “the first mode of dispute settlement provided for in (Article 33 (of
the Charter)”. This information was transmitted to the Secretary General of
the United Nations (Note No. DG-401, dated 2
August) and to the
Secretary of State of the Foreign Office (Note No. DG-406, dated 4th
August).
The reasons for this proposal had been anticipated by Minister Zambrano
Velasco in his speech to the National Congress on June 17
nd
:
th
“The means of solution to be chosen must be adapted to the nature of
the controversy and respect the terms that the Parties have defined to
resolve it, since the fundamental idea that underlying the Geneva
Agreement also governs this phase. In order to satisfy this
requirement, it is necessary, that the stage of direct negotiations,
which has not yet taken place, be fully implemented....
It is clear that the negotiation, which has never really been undertaken,
is far from having exhausted its possibilities to bring a satisfactory
result to our territorial controversy... The National Government is
fully aware of the difficulties that, given the antecedents, this process
71
will present. However, it has considered it appropriate to insist on
negotiation. Firstly, because, it is the method that best fulfills the aims
of the Geneva Agreement, to which we will adhere strictly. Secondly,
because we must not lose hope that the twelve years since 1970... have
served to bring the Government of Guyana to the negotiating table in a
different spirit ...”
Although Article IV.1 of the Geneva Agreement provided that the Parties,
once the task entrusted to the Mixed Commission had been completed
without agreement, should choose “without delay” one of the means of
peaceful settlement provided for in Article 33 of the Charter, Guyana took
its time, and its ambassador in Caracas confused with speculative statements
about Venezuela’s alleged aggressive intentions (see press release of the
Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Relations, August 4
).
Guyana rejected the Venezuelan proposal for direct negotiation and
proposed a judicial settlement by the International Court of Justice in a note
dated 20
th
th
August 1982. In its communiqué the following day, the
Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Relations warned that
“it is incomprehensible that an invitation as open as the one
formulated by Venezuela to negotiate should be responded with a
proposal to resort to judicial means... The attitude assumed by the
Government of Guyana does not correspond objectively with the letter
and spirit of the Geneva Agreement. We cannot forget that the
solution to the dispute, as conceived by the Geneva Agreement, must
meet two requirements: first, it must be of a practical nature; second,
it must be acceptable to both Parties; the two requirements call for
negotiation in good faith”(emphasis in the original). .
72
In a note dated 30
August, 1982 (No. GM-185), Foreign Minister
Zambrano Velasco addressed his Guyanese counterpart in these terms:
th
“It is surprising for the Government of Venezuela that a friendly
invitation to negotiate is answered, once again, in terms that do not
even show any willingness to discuss or, at least, to listen. Therefore,
Venezuela considers it necessary to remember that it is not possible to
fully comply with the Geneva Agreement by refusing to consider
negotiation as a means of solving the underlying problem and
considers that the counterproposal of the government of Guyana
departs from the purpose of that treaty”.
He further explained:
“The Geneva Agreement, in effect, expressly provides that its basis is
to address the existing controversy over the border between Venezuela
and Guyana (then British Guiana), so that it is “amicably resolved in a
manner acceptable to both Parties” (Preamble). It also defines, in
Article I, the purpose that the signatories of this international
instrument set out to achieve, as well as its very nature, by stipulating,
as an obligation of the Parties, the search for “satisfactory solutions
for the practical settlement of the controversy”. In this perspective,
and with the purpose of faithfully fulfilling its obligations, Venezuela
has maintained since the Mixed Commission began its work that the
solution of the dispute, under the terms of the Geneva Agreement,
must meet two requirements: the first, to be practical, not theoretical,
speculative or exclusively legal; the second, to be acceptable to both
Parties.
The settlement of the dispute, as conceived in the Geneva Agreement,
is essentially placed at the level of equity, natural justice and ethics. It
has therefore been Venezuela’s invariable position to be willing to
73
consider any means capable of ensuring a practical solution acceptable
to both Parties in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva
Agreement. In this regard, it is permanently willing to examine not
only those aspects strictly related to the territorial dispute itself, but
also all those that, within the framework of our bilateral relations, can
contribute to a solution of the aforementioned characteristics.
Even before the Geneva Agreement and all the more so after its
conclusion, we have insistently proposed negotiation as a means of
settling the current dispute, because only through diplomatic means
can a balanced and practical settlement be achieved that will mean a
satisfactory and acceptable outcome for both Parties. From the
foregoing, it must be concluded that the means proposed by the
Government of Guyana is inadequate for the objectives and purposes
of the Geneva Agreement. As a consequence, I would like to reiterate,
on behalf of the Government of Venezuela, the invitation to negotiate
on the broadest basis in search of a satisfactory solution to the
practical settlement of the dispute”.
This note was also brought to the attention of the Secretary of State of the
Foreign Office (Note No. GM-187 on the same date, August 30
, 1982).
Guyana’s reply is dated 9
th
September 1982. Guyana reiterates its proposal.
Two days earlier, on the 7
th
September, Venezuelan Foreign Minister
Zambrano Velasco had met in New York with UN Secretary-General Javier
Perez de Cuellar. The press release reporting this meeting anticipated that, if
by September 18
th
Venezuela and Guyana had not agreed on a means of
peaceful settlement, the Secretary-General would indicate one at the request
of either party. While Venezuela was still waiting for a response to its latest
communication, “the official spokespersons of the Government of Guyana
th
74
have again insisted on trying to present Venezuela as an aggressive and
threatening country”.
**********
After the three months provided for in Article IV.2 of the Geneva
Agreement expired without the Parties having been able to agree on one of
the means laid down in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, the
Government of Venezuela notified the Government of Guyana (note No.
GM-210, dated 19
September 1982) that it was convinced that
th
“the most appropriate international body to indicate a means of
settlement is the Secretary-General of the United Nations”.
Accordingly, the note added,
“the Government of Venezuela intends to bring the matter to the
attention of the Secretary-General and would welcome a similar
approach on the part of the Government of Guyana”.
A copy of this note was forwarded to the Secretary of State of the Foreign
Office (Note No. GM-212) and to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations (Note No. GM-214) on the same day (September 19, 1982).
Two days earlier, on September 17
, the representative of Guyana
addressed the President of the Security Council (S/15398) with further
accusations against Venezuela, along the lines he had already followed on
11
th
th
May 1982. As at that time, the Representative of Venezuela replied by
letter dated on September 30
:
th
75
“It is curious that signs of this nature take place on dates linked to the
process of selecting the means of resolving the territorial controversy
over the border between Venezuela and British Guiana, today the
Cooperative Republic of Guyana, which could be interpreted as an
additional sign of the intention to neglect the primary interest in
settling the dispute between our countries, in view of the imminent
obligation to leave in the hands of an appropriate international body,
or of the Secretary-General of the United Nations as expressly agreed
in the text of the Geneva Agreement itself, the choice of the means of
peaceful settlement of the territorial controversy”.
On 27
th
September 1982, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Zambrano Velasco
addressed the UN General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session period. On
this occasion, the Foreign Minister recalled that:
“Venezuela has never, in its one hundred and seventy-two years of
independent life, had not a single war, nor a single armed encounter
with any of its neighbors... For years, Guyanese spokespersons have
been carrying out a systematic campaign to promote feelings of
sympathy on the basis of presenting their country as a small and poor
nation whose territory is the object of the greed of a rich and powerful
neighbor, and to try to create an image of Venezuela as an aggressor
country indifferent to the law, justice and solidarity that must exist
between countries fighting for their development... For almost two
decades, Guyanese statements about an imminent aggression have
been heard in international fora, yet it is an obvious fact that no
aggression has taken place”.
The Foreign Minister informs that
76
“after repeated rejections of our formal invitations to the Guyanese
government to begin negotiations that will allow a satisfactory and
practical solution, Venezuela will elevate to the Secretary General of
the United Nations the decision to indicate a means of resolving the
controversy, thus conforming our conduct to the letter and spirit of the
international treaty signed between the Parties, which is known as the
Geneva Agreement...”.
Venezuela formally referred the matter to the Secretary General by Note No.
GM-233 of 6
, Guyana
responded to the Venezuelan note of September 19
th
October 1982. Only two days later, on October 8
th
. His note, signed by M.
Shahabuddeen, as Acting Minister of Foreign Relations, had a clear dilatory
intention:
th
“It is observed”, says the note, “that the current provisions of Article
IV (2) of the Geneva Agreement provide that the Government of the
Cooperative Republic of Guyana and the Government of the Republic
of Venezuela “shall refer the decision on the means of agreement to an
appropriate international body on which both Parties agree, or in the
absence of an agreement on this point, to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations. The Government of the Cooperative Republic of
Guyana has the highest respect for the distinguished SecretaryGeneral
of the United Nations and, should it be necessary, will be
pleased that he assumes the role established for him in the Geneva
Agreement. However, the Government of the Cooperative Republic of
Guyana would be concerned to invite him to assume it at the
appropriate time with a view to ensuring that he has no shadow of
doubt about his competence to act under the Geneva Agreement,
except in the residual role expressly and specifically reserved for him,
in the second alternative of the provision referred to, i.e. under the
circumstances in which the two Governments have not reached
77
agreement on the appropriate international body under the first
alternative, an event which has not yet occurred. Moreover, and in any
case it is observed that the terms of the proposal of the Government of
the Republic of Venezuela have actually been formulated under the
second alternative of the provision in question, despite the fact that as
stated above, the stipulated precedent condition of recourse to that
alternative has not yet been satisfied, in view of the fact that the two
Governments have not yet taken any steps to reach agreements on an
international body as contemplated by the first alternative. For these
reasons, the Government of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana is of
the opinion that the proposal of the Republic of Venezuela is
premature and inadmissible at this stage. However, in accordance with
its commitments under the Geneva Agreement, the Government of the
Cooperative Republic of Guyana is prepared to attempt to reach an
agreement with the Government of the Republic of Venezuela on an
international body under the first alternative of that provision”.
It was on October 11
, 1982, when the Minister for Foreign Relations of
Guyana, Rashleigh Jackson, during his intervention at the 37th General
Assembly of the United Nations - and not through diplomatic channels -
made a counter-proposal: that the General Assembly, the Security Council
or the International Court of Justice should be the body responsible for
designating the applicable means of settlement. His intervention was
marked by a rhetoric of denunciations of false aggressions and intentions on
Venezuela’s part.
On October 15
th
, 1982, the representative of Venezuela was forced to make
a new reply to the intervention of the Foreign Minister of Guyana. For 16
years, the Government of Guyana
th
78
“has systematically eluded compliance (with the Geneva Agreement)
and has limited itself to defaming and slandering Venezuela with
descriptions of aggressor, which have been denied by the facts...” On
the other hand, the Guyanese Minister, without respecting the
diplomatic channel, “has formulated a counterproposal within the
context of a speech pronounced in an unacceptable tone. The
Government of Venezuela, notwithstanding the serious reservations it
has about the fact that such proposals have been formulated in such
circumstances, has submitted them to careful study. However..., he
will not answer them on this occasion, but rather, within the firm
purpose that encourages him to resolve the controversy through the
Geneva Agreement, he will again resort to the ordinary diplomatic
channel, unilaterally abandoned by the Government of Guyana”.
The same date, October 15
th
, 1982, Venezuela delivered its answer through
diplomatic note (No. GM-251):
“After these alternatives have been carefully analyzed, the government
of Venezuela reiterates its conviction that the most practical and
appropriate thing to do is to entrust the UN Secretary-General with the
choice of the means. And it added: “As it is evident that there is no
agreement between the Parties for the choice of an international organ
to fulfill the function set forth in Article IV.2, it is obvious that it is
entrusted to the UN Secretary-General”.
A copy of this note (No. GM-258) was sent on 28
th
October 1982 to the
Secretary of State of the Foreign Office and to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations (No. 260).
79
Guyana delayed its response. Four months later, on 21
February 1983, its
Foreign Minister Jackson announced that the Government would not delay
it any further but, the days passed.
On March 10
st
, 1983, President Herrera Campins, in his Fourth Address to
the National Congress, reported:
th
“We invited the Government of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana
to agree on a means of peaceful solution and proposed direct
negotiation between the two Republics to find an amicable and
acceptable solution. That demonstration of good will did not find the
welcome we had hoped for in the Guyanese Government, which
insisted on developing a campaign of attacks, offenses and false
accusations against Venezuela in all the international fora it attended”.
On the same date, Foreign Minister Zambrano Velasco presented the Yellow
Book to the National Congress. In his introduction, it is noted that the
Guyanese government, instead of maintaining the controversy within the
bilateral framework of the Geneva Agreement:
“has sought at all times its internationalization, in order to make it
appear as a generalized conflict and to avoid the mechanisms of the
Geneva Agreement. Responding to this purpose, the issue of the claim
has been presented in various international fora, in order to obtain a
resolution or declaration adverse to Venezuela and to distort the
justice of our claim. In the UN and in several of its specialized
organizations, such as FAO, UNESCO, WHO and ILO, the Guyanese
representation has
launched aggressive and manifestly
disproportionate accusations against Venezuela. These accusations
have also occurred in other instances of which our country is not a
part, as has happened with meetings of countries of the British
80
Commonwealth of Nations, CARICOM and the Movement of NonAligned
Countries...”
The Yellow Book refers to the notes exchanged by the Parties to comply
with the provisions of Article IV of the Geneva Agreement and points out
that, at the same time, in a constant search for the internationalization of the
controversy, the Minister of Foreign Relations of Guyana used the platform
of the UN General Assembly to formulate the Guyanese position, a
procedure that Venezuela objected to by diplomatic note.
**********
It was on March 28
th
, 1983 that Guyana responded to Venezuela’s proposal
of October 15
th
, 1982, which it had no choice but to accept.
On May 23
th
, 1983 (Note No. GM-95) Foreign Minister Zambrano Velasco
acknowledged receipt of the Guyanese note of March 28
th
. It states:
“Although I cannot share and I am obliged to reject many of the views
contained in your communication and despite the late response, I must
acknowledge the satisfaction of the Government of Venezuela at the
acceptance by the Government of Guyana of our proposal to go to the
Secretary General of the United Nations as the most appropriate
international organ to carry out the function provided for in Article
IV.2 of the Geneva Agreement”.
He concluded:
“On this occasion, at a time when the pending territorial controversy is
entering a new stage, I am pleased to reiterate to you the unalterable
readiness of the Government of Venezuela to faithfully comply with
81
and require compliance with the Geneva Agreement, in the conviction
that a satisfactory solution to the practical settlement of the dispute
can be reached by that route, so that the dispute is amicably resolved,
in a manner acceptable to both Parties, as we have agreed by that
Treaty”.
On May 31
, 1983, the UN Secretary-General, based on the notes of
October 15
st
th
, 1983, of which he had received copies
sent by the Parties,
, 1982 and March 28
th
“now having the assurance that it is the desire of both the government
of Guyana and the government of Venezuela that I assume the
responsibility conferred on me by Article IV (2) of the Geneva
Agreement, I will communicate to His Excellency and the government
of Guyana, after careful consideration, the conclusion to which I will
arrives in the exercise of said responsibility”.
**********
82
IX.
The choice of Good Offices, 1983-1989
UN Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, sent Diego Cordovez to
Caracas and Georgetown on an exploratory mission in August 1983. It
should be noted that on the occasion of the inauguration of President
Lusinchi on the 2
February 1984, attended by a high-level Guyanese
delegation, Guyana’s desire to restore a climate of cordiality with Venezuela
was observed.
This allowed the initiation of an informal procedure parallel to the one that
Cordovez was running, led by Shridat Ramphall, then Secretary General of
the Commonwealth and former Attorney General and Minister of Foreign
Relations, and Emilio Figueredo, personal representative of President
Lusinchi and closely related to Foreign Minister Morales Paúl. In September
1984, the Foreign Ministers of Venezuela and Guyana had met with the UN
Secretary-General in New York. Starting in November 1984, Figueredo and
Ramphall held several meetings.
The purpose of the informal procedure, through those who were designed as
“facilitators”, was to assess the possible scope of a hypothesis that would
allow the “practical arrangement” and determine its meaning for Guyana, as
well as to verify its actual willingness to negotiate. This level of
communication complemented the other two agreed by the Ministers,
namely the communication with the UN Secretary-General, represented by
Mr. Diego Cordovez, and the official communication between Ministers.
nd
83
Mr. Emilio Figueredo summed it up like this: first, an attempt was made to
obtain the opening of informal and official channels of communication
between the Parties, with a view to establishing a propitious ground for the
proposal of a practical arrangement; second, an objective evaluation was
made of the role of the UN in the implementation of the Geneva Agreement;
third, a consultation process was carried out to identify the positive and
negative aspects of the proposal made by Diego Cordovez; fourth, tactical
schemes were developed on how to carry out an assessment of public
opinion on the substance of the problem, in an attempt to determine the
country’s real interest in this dispute; finally, the foundation was laid for a
systematic analysis of the issue under its different perspectives.
These informal contacts, aimed at assessing hypotheses that might allow a
practical settlement of the dispute, resulted in some proposals. By insisting
on the fact that a symbolic solution should not present Guyana with a major
sacrifice of its territory, Mr. Ramphall presented a concrete proposal in the
maritime area which he believed would constitute an equitable solution.
Between February 6
th
th
and 9
, 1985, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Morales
Paúl officially traveled to Georgetown, with Emilio Figueredo recently
appointed Ambassador in special mission accredited to the United Nations
for the implementation of the Geneva Agreement.
On February 16
, 1985, the Foreign Ministries of Venezuela and Guyana
sent notes to the UN Secretary-General requesting an early visit to both
countries by his Representative, Diego Cordovez. He traveled to Caracas
and Georgetown in March 1985 with a first proposal: a five-member
conciliation commission whose final report for the Secretary-General’s
consideration would include a solution proposal.
th
84
In July 1985, while Figueredo-Ramphall contacts were resumed, Venezuela
officially informed Cordovez of its reservations to the proposed conciliation
as a means of settlement. Conciliation was the most legal of the political
means of settlement; it was a rigid means, without control by the Parties,
prone to resemble an arbitral or judicial decision, but without its binding
force; to accept it directly was to burn beforehand the possibilities of other
less invasive means of settlement, such as good offices or mediation, and it
granted too much discretion to the Secretary-General.
In September 1985, in response to these objections, Cordovez produced a
second and then a third text, in which the Commission became a contact
group, with no competence to present proposals for solutions. However,
Venezuela continued to encourage a formula of good offices.
The disagreement with the Cordovez proposal, the leaks to the press tending
to create unease in public opinion, as well as the death of Guyana’s
President Forbes Burnham (August 6
, 1985) imposed a pause in the
process.
It was in March 1987 when the process was re-launched, on the occasion of
the visit to Caracas, between 24
th
, of the new President of Guyana,
Desmond Hoyte. The Parties agreed to invite the Secretary-General to
choose good offices as a means of settlement.
This invitation was formulated at the meeting of the Permanent
Representatives of Venezuela (Reinaldo Pabón) and Guyana (Samuel
Insanally) at the United Nations with the Secretary-General on April 6
th
th
and 28
,
1987. It was agreed that the name of the person designated as good officer
th
85
would be submitted to the consideration of both governments for approval
prior to designation.
The agreement on Alister McIntyre as the good officer was reached on
August 5
th
, 1989 at a meeting between Presidents Carlos Andrés Pérez and
Desmond Hoyte in Tobago and was announced on November 8
at a new
presidential meeting in Puerto Ordaz. It was only later that the SecretaryGeneral
appointed him. His task was to “define, in the most flexible and
informal way possible, the hypotheses of a practical solution” to be
communicated to the Parties.
In a meeting held at United Nations headquarters in New York by the
Foreign Ministers (Reinaldo Figueredo and Rasleigh Jackson) with Alister
McIntyre on 28
th
April 1990, three levels of communication were agreed,
similar to those already used in previous years: a) the good officer with the
governments; b) the good officer with the facilitators and with each other,
and c) between the foreign ministers.
**********
th
86
X.
The process of Good Offices, 1989-2014
Alister McIntyre (1989-1999)
The facilitators (Emilio Figueredo, for Venezuela, and Barton Scotland, for
Guyana) held four meetings (New York, 13
August 1990; New York, 29
October 1990; London, 26
th
April 1991) at
which the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Alister
McIntyre, was present as a “friendly witness”, foreseeing that “as the talks
progress, he may assume a more active role, helping to dispel doubts about
the aspirations and purposes of the Parties”. On April 5
th
January 1991; New York, 5
th
, 1991, the Foreign
Minister also met with the Secretary General.
According to the report presented to the Venezuelan Government by Emilio
Figueredo, at the first meeting (August 13
th
, 1990) Venezuela pointed out
the convenience of breaking the problem down into three large areas:
1. A coastal area that involves territorial cessions to be defined in favor of
Venezuela, above all to achieve a greater Atlantic projection;
2. A central area or zone of the Mazaruni, linked to energy cooperation, and
with possible territorial implications; and,
3. An area considering an ecological reserve solution (which could be
binational) could be visualized.
th
87
The Guyanese facilitator found this approach to areas interesting, and it was
possible to complement it with cooperation formulas.
It was agreed to maintain informal and low profile status, without public
statements.
It seemed to Emilio Figueredo that the Guyana facilitator did not want to
accelerate the pace until elections were held in Guyana.
At the second meeting (29
October 1990), the intention was expressed to
focus on the various geographical, development and cooperation aspects of
the problem, without making precise territorial observations, but rather
insisting on general assessments of parameters of common interest and
points of convergence.
The Guyanese facilitator was interested in what the Venezuelan understood
by a hypothesis that contemplated, among others, a solution in the area of
the possible Mazaruni dam and ruled out the possibility of establishing an
ecological reserve zone arguing that Guyana had recently decreed a large
area of this nature.
The Guyanese facilitator underlined the difficulties, including constitutional
ones, of any territorial arrangement, indicating that he was aware that the
greatest contribution Guyana could make to overcome the dispute was in the
maritime area. He agreed on a corridor towards the Atlantic, possibly
accompanied by a small stretch of coastline. There was a strong resistance,
therefore, to solutions that significantly modify the land map and to share
control of natural resources.
th
88
The facilitator from Guyana, however, was open to dealing without
prejudice with all issues and geographical areas and to abandon a purely
legal view of the dispute.
At the third meeting (January, 26
1991), the Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General, Alister McIntyre, stated that, although the talks should
be open, the objective of the process should also be borne in mind: to reach
an agreement to resolve the territorial dispute by tying it to a scheme of
economic cooperation.
The Guyanese facilitator argued that it was necessary to break with
traditional schemes and seek new formulas, suggesting as a sign of goodwill
and progress the development of a modus vivendi in fisheries.
At the fourth meeting (5
th
April 1991) the Venezuelan facilitator raised the
inconvenience of Guyana carrying out unilateral acts, without prior
consultation or knowledge of Venezuela, in areas under dispute. Granting
mining concessions (i.e. gold, oil) or an environmental protection zone of
900,000 acres, or the decree establishing an exclusive economic zone (even
more so when there was no delimitation and the coastal zone was important
for negotiations) were at least “unfriendly acts”.
It was agreed to come to the substance, trying to define in general terms the
areas of interest in territorial terms, as well as to define the parameters of
convergence and common interests to translate them into concrete ideas that
help the design of hypotheses for the solution of the controversy.
Emilio Figueredo examined the Secretary-General’s powers to choose the
means of solution and, after consulting the views of all the international
th
89
legal advisers to which the Government could have recourse, reached the
following conclusions:
1. There must be consent of the Parties to accept the means indicated by the
Secretary-General.
2. The task of the Secretary-General is limited to the choice of means, with
the consent of the Parties.
3. There is an obligation to negotiate between the Parties.
**********
Between April 5
, 1993 there was no further contact
between the facilitators. However, several meetings were held between
Foreign Ministers and Heads of State in which it was agreed to suspend the
process until the completion of the Guyana elections leading to the election
of Mr. Cheddi Jagan in October 1992.
In February 1993 President Cheddi Jagan visited Caracas, improving
relations by increasing cooperation in non-conflict areas, both Presidents
expressing their support for Alister McIntyre’s good offices.
On August 10
th
,1991 and September 1
st
, 1993, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Fernando Ochoa Antich
addressed a note to his Guyana counterpart, Clement Rohee, regarding the
granting of oil concessions to Mobil offshore the Zone in Reclamation.
On September 1
th
, 1993, the Ministers met in New York with the SecretaryGeneral,
Boutros Boutros Ghali, and his Personal Representative, Alister
McIntyre, and it was agreed to resume talks at the point they had reached on
April 5
st
th
, 1991, with both Parties reaffirming their willingness to seek a
90
practical settlement of the dispute in accordance with the provisions of the
Geneva Agreement.
For this meeting, a note from facilitator Emilio Figueredo to Minister
Ochoa Antich highlighted:
1. The convenience of ratifying the three-tier mechanism.
2. Alister McIntyre’s role as "receiver of the official position of
governments, as well as transmitter of the hypotheses that emerge from the
facilitators’ conversations, and ultimately, to try to get the Parties to reach a
practical settlement of the dispute”.
3. Foreign Ministers “should in the first instance give a procedural impetus
to the facilitators’ mechanism. In a second stage, and provided that progress
has been made in the other instances...they will intervene in the substantive
part of achieving acceptance of the agreement and its respective ratification.
It is very important to remember that it is not convenient to advance at the
official level in the negotiation process since it could run the risk of
blocking the negotiations”.
4. Facilitators “should be able to act as flexibly as possible, in order to
multiply, without any restriction, the options that could lead to a practical
settlement of the dispute”.
In another note by Emilio Figueredo on the September 1
, 1993 meeting
with the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, it is noted that the
Secretary-General
st
“emphasized the need to remove the legal dimension in the treatment
of the problem”
and also
91
“the strengthening of the role of the UN in the search for a negotiated
solution, as well as that this should be a continuous negotiation”.
On 24
th
September 1993, Foreign Ministers Ochoa Antich and Clement
Rohee met again with the Secretary-General and his Personal
Representative in New York.
In October 1993 Alister McIntyre visited Caracas and Georgetown.
On November, 24
1993, a meeting was held in New York with First Lady
Janet Jagan, as head of the Guyana delegation, at which the good offices
was ratified. The rest of the conversation revolved around the profile that
the new “facilitator” of Guyana should have (since the previous day Dr
Barton Scotland had been dismissed).
On March 23
th
, 1994, Alister MacIntyre met in New York with the
facilitators (the Guyanese facilitator was already Harl N. Ramkarran): a
recount of the previous conversations was made, and a timetable was
agreed. The Guyanese policy was to gain time and to delay the procedure, in
order to strengthen its position in the dispute, prepare public opinion and
improve the economic and political stability of the country.
In May 1994, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Burelli Rivas met with Alister
McIntyre in Caracas. He expressed his concern concerning the press reports
on the apparent ecological damage caused by the alleged indiscriminate
exploitation of Guayana Esequiba timber resources by foreign companies
with concessions from the Guyanese government. In the same vein,
instructions were issued to the Venezuelan Ambassador in Georgetown to
express his concern and willingness to provide the necessary assistance for a
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92
rational exploitation compatible with a sustainable development of the
resources of Guayana Esequiba.
A further meeting of the facilitators with Alister McIntyre was held on 10
June 1994, advancing the discussion of an approach to work on various
negotiating scenarios from which an appropriate formula for a practical
settlement of the dispute under the Geneva Agreement could emerge.
The activity report of the Venezuelan facilitator, Emilio Figueredo,
concludes:
th
“More than ten years after the UN Secretary-General chose the ‘good
offices’ mechanism in 1983, not much progress has been made in the
substantive part of the process negotiated between Venezuela and
Guyana... Several factors have influenced the process, highlighting the
changes of government in one country or another and, more recently,
the institutional crisis that affected the neighboring country…
However, significant progress has been made in defining the
procedural aspects... It could be said that the ‘good offices’
mechanism has proved its usefulness and both Parties have reiterated
their confidence in it”.
In the second half of 1994 the Guyanese authorities raised the need for a
Meeting of Heads of State to discuss "Border Cooperation", urged by the
measures adopted under the presidency of Rafael Caldera to prevent the
illicit trafficking of commodities, especially fuel, with which Guyanese
miners operating in the vicinity of the de facto boundary were supplied.
Those measures had led to some local incidents.
In November 1994, the Ministry of Foreign Relations considered it
convenient to apply greater pressure in the regions close to the Reclamation
93
Zone, given the levels of dependence of Venezuela existing in the Guayana
Esequiba, as well as the postponement of the Meeting of Presidents in order
to propose to the Guyanese Government to negotiate both, a hypothesis of a
satisfactory solution to the territorial question and a project of cooperation
and border integration, in parallel and with a criterion of globality.
At the beginning of March 1995, Foreign Minister Burelli Rivas visited his
counterpart, Clement J. Rohee, in Georgetown, where he presented a
proposal that responded to this scheme of globality. A press release from the
Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Relations, dated March 3
, stated that the
Ministers reviewed the pending items on the bilateral agenda with the
intention of evaluating the situation and “advancing practical solutions to
common problems, including the good offices procedure...for the search for
a definitive solution to the territorial dispute”.
Alister McIntyre visited Caracas on July 10
rd
, 1995.
**********
On November 1
th
th
and 11
, 1995, Mr. Carlos M. Ayala Corao replaced Mr. Emilio
Figueredo as facilitator from Venezuela. According to Mr. Ayala Corao’s
report on his activity between this date and 24
st
November 1998, on 23th
November 1995, Foreign Minister Burelli Rivas informed him of the state
of the matter: there was a proposal for maritime delimitation and the
possibility of recovering part of the disputed territory, the other part being
subject to a “leasing” regime to be defined. Four days later, on the 27
th
, Mr.
Ayala met with President Rafael Caldera, who considered positive the
progress of the talks and Guyana’s readiness to seek for the first time a
solution to the dispute.
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94
On December 14
, 1995, the first meeting was held in New York
between the Good Officer, Alister McIntyre, and the facilitators (Ayala
Corao and Harry Ramkarran). Its purpose was to clarify the procedural and
methodological aspects of the conversations and review the content of the
issues discussed in the past. In this regard, general parameters on maritime
delimitations favorable to Venezuela were discussed, as well as the
possibility of “returning” to Venezuela with full jurisdiction of a territory in
the North of the Reclamation Zone and a “leasing” in favor of Guyana of
another portion of the Venezuelan territory. But Ramkarran said that the
political conditions in Guyana had changed, so he did not consider it viable
in the short term to advance talks on those parameters.
On April 26
th
th
and 15
, 1996, a second meeting took place in New York to
assess the status of the dispute and its progress. They also addressed the
possibility that the Good Officer would propose to the Parties to discuss on
a possible demarcation of submarine and marine areas henceforth of the 200
nautical miles, without prejudice of continuing the conversations about the
territorial dispute (continental).
On June 21
th
th
and 27
th
, 1996, a new round of conversations was held in New
York. The Guyanese facilitator informed that his government was not ready
in that moment to initiate a process of maritime delimitation due to lack of
knowledge on the matter and issues of domestic politics. Nevertheless, he
expressed his full and determined support to the McIntyre Process. Ayala
Corao declared his confusion on the impossibility expressed by Ramkarran
and requested to the Good Officer a direct intervention before both
governments.
th
and 23
95
On August 26
, 1996, the Good Officer, Alister McIntyre, met with
President Caldera in Caracas, Foreign Minister Burelli and facilitator Ayala
Corao. Before meeting with the President, McIntyre stated that “there are
not negotiations, but rather discussions. The important thing is that both
governments currently have a good relationship and they are prepared to
discuss their differences in the UN”.
McIntyre then visited (on September 2
th
th
and 27
) Georgetown. In Guyana,
the Good Officer affirmed that both Parties were cooperating, and they
seemed to be satisfied about the way in which the process was developing.
Guyana had adopted a Law of Environmental Protection that led to the
creation of an Agency of protection of the Environment. The Guyanese
Foreign Minister reiterated his desire to collaborate on the fishing sector,
particularly to eliminate the incidents. A dialogue existed whose purpose
was to clarify the concept of Globality as a base of cooperation between
both countries.
In a letter dated on September 13
nd
rd
and 3
, 1996, addressed to Foreign Minister
Burelli Rivas by his counterpart Clement J. Rohee, he informs him of the
success of the visit of the Good Officer, refers to his next meeting in New
York and considers it important that both seize the opportunity to reaffirm
its commitment and support to the McIntyre process.
On October 4
th
, 1996, a meeting took place in New York between the
Assistant for Political Issues of the Secretary-General (Álvaro de Soto), the
Good Officer, the Foreign Ministers and Facilitators of the Parties. In a very
cordial atmosphere, Mr. Álvaro de Soto invited the Parties to start the
debates on the maritime delimitation. Guyana stated that to do so, it was
necessary a previous political agreement and, in addition, Guyana lacked the
th
96
expertise and experience in the field. The Foreign Minister Burelli explained
that the maritime delimitation per se is a normal act of the relations of the
coastal States and reminded the political consensus refer to concrete
hypothesis and not to abstract ones. Mr. de Soto insisted the Guyanese
representation on the need to indicate its will to initiate conversations about
the issue, providing the Parties with the experts on the law of the sea of the
United Nations. At the end, the Guyanese representation accepted to
proceed, via non-official conversations with the facilitators, with an
exploration of the issue. As a consequence, in the same date, McIntyre met
with the facilitators to agree the methodology in order to initiate the
consideration of the parameters of a future maritime delimitation.
On December 14
, 1996, the Good Officer met in New York with
the facilitators. Mr. Ayala Corao briefly explained the maritime delimitation
treaties signed by Venezuela, specially the one held with Trinidad and
Tobago. Mr. Ramkarran informed that, even though Guyana did not have
maritime delimitation treaties, he would inform in the next meeting about a
national law on the matter.
On April 19
th
th
and 15
, 1997, the Good Officer again met in New York with the
facilitators. The Guyana’s facilitator presented the Maritime Boundary Act
of the Republic and some presidential orders attached. It was suggested that
in the next meeting, they would insist in the possibility to initiate a maritime
delimitation from the 350 nautical miles. Venezuela reiterated its concern
regarding the irrational exploitation of natural resources of the Guayana
Esequiba. He suggested that Guyana would keep informing the Venezuelan
authorities on the exploitation of natural resources and its environmental
impact. Venezuela offered a cooperation agreement.
th
97
th
On May 24
, 1997, a new meeting was held in New York between the Good
Officer and the facilitators. The Guyana’s facilitator expressed the
acceptance for his country to negotiate an agreement on environmental
matters under the procedure of the good offices of McIntyre. Mr Alister
McIntyre expressed his intention to formalize this initiative in his next visit
to Caracas and Georgetown, which was agreed in the mid July.
On July 14
th
, 1997, Alister McIntyre met in Caracas with President Caldera
and Foreign Minister Burelli Rivas, who expressed his interest to move
forward in the environmental and maritime delimitation agreements.
McIntyre went to visit Georgetown from July 20
, 1997. The
Venezuelan ambassador, Hector Azócar, informed of this visit via fax on
July 23
th
th
to 23
rd
. He stated that McIntyre expressed that he had found a very
positive atmosphere in Caracas as well as in Georgetown. The proposal of a
greater environmental cooperation had been favorably welcomed by the
President, Sam Hinds, and even more by the Foreign Minister, Clement J.
Rohee, both being more suspicious about the maritime delimitation because
“we must first define the framework of what was sought with this”.
Closing this series of meetings, on July 26
, 1997, the Secretary-General
and his Personal Representative met in New York with the Foreign
Ministers, Permanent Representatives and facilitators. Similarly, McIntyre
held a meeting apart, on the same date, with the facilitators.
**********
In the following months, and until March 1998, the meetings were
suspended due to the elections in Guyana. On 20
th
of that month,
the Good Officer met again in New York with the facilitators. The
Guyana’s facilitator pointed out the difficult political situation of his
th
st
and 21
98
country and reiterated the decision of the new government of President Janet
Jagan to accept the proposal to conclude an environmental agreement within
the framework of the McIntyre Process.
On July, 1998, President Janet Jagan held an official visit in Caracas. A
joint communiqué was issued:
“the Presidents assessed the progress of the process for a mutually
satisfactory solution of the existing territorial dispute between
Venezuela and Guyana, and they reiterated their firm commitment to
resolve it peacefully. In this regard, they expressed their satisfaction
because of the efforts made by Sir Alister McIntyre… and they
confirmed their decision to continue supporting the McIntyre Process
in order to reach a final settlement as established by the Geneva 1966
Agreement” (emphasis in the original).
In this meeting of Presidents, they agreed to give a comprehensive and
global approach to the treatment of the common agenda, with a High Level
Bi-national Committee, led by the Foreign Ministers, and a series of
Subcommittees on Politics, Environment, Cultural Exchange, Economic and
Consular Integration, Culture, Health, Agriculture, Farming and Agroindustry,
and
Transport.
On
October 24
1998, the Good Officer met in New York with the
facilitators. The Guyanese facilitator informed that the interpretation of the
news about the agreement of environmental cooperation contained in the
joint communiqué of Presidents Caldera and Janet Jagan had caused a
radical reaction against by the media and Guyanese opposition, which
forced to postpone any subsequent development. The agreement, even
though within the McIntyre Process, should be developed within the
th
99
framework of the multilateral agreements. The Venezuelan facilitator
insisted that its framework should be the Geneva Agreement, as an initial
step in order to establish the foundations leading to a solution of the dispute.
**********
Venezuela entered into an electoral period, and meetings were called off.
However, on December 30
, 1998, Guyana’s Foreign Minister, Clement J.
Rohee, said at a press conference that politically it would be foolish to
abandon the McIntyre Process and that the Guyanese Government was not
interested in conducting direct negotiations with Venezuela.
On February 2
th
, 1999, Hugo Chávez Frías took office as President of
Venezuela, an occasion to meet with the President of Guyana, Janet Jagan,
invited to the event. As a result, on March 30
nd
, a committee chaired by
Foreign Minister José Vicente Rangel officially visited Georgetown, signing
the terms of reference of the High Level Bi-national Committee.
Fifteen days earlier, on March 15
th
, 1999, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister
had met with the Good Officer, Alister McIntyre, in Caracas. The Minister
informed on the meeting in April of the facilitators to establish a work
agenda on very specific points, including the environment and maritime
delimitation. Relations with Guyana, said José Vicente Rangel, are excellent
at this time, aiming at to its cultural, economic and cooperative projection.
For the Minister, the solution of the dispute should be “reasonable, fair, and
equitable”.
On June 15
th
th
, 1999, Mr. Ayala Corao expressed to the Foreign Minister his
willingness to continue acting as a facilitator for Venezuela, recalling in his
letter the basis for carrying out his mission:
100
1. Personal and informal agent of the Foreign Minister (and of the
President). 2. Always depending on the express instructions of the Foreign
Minister.
3. Reserved nature of its management.
In one of the Annexes -Annex A- attached to the letter of Mr. Ayala Corao,
he made some considerations on the Process of Good Offices within the
framework of the Geneva Agreement. Ayala understood that the SecretaryGeneral
chose the Good Offices and executed them by himself through a
Personal Representative. This one was the closest formula to Venezuela’s
proposal and the farthest one to Guyana’s.
Ayala Corao ended up noting, in a footnote, that
“the position taken by the Government of Venezuela is that the
Secretary General only has jurisdiction for the general indication of
the means of solution and the Parties must agree the aspects
concerning the organization and functioning of this means”.
On September 9
, 1999, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, José Vicente
Rangel, wrote to the Good Officer, Alister McIntyre, regarding the granting
of off shore oil concessions by Guyana to Century GY and Exxon
companies (object of a previous note addressed by the Minister to his
Guyanese counterpart, Clement J. Rohee, dated on July 13
th
).
In that letter, the Minister observed that
th
“all issues of delimitation of maritime and submarine areas have
considerable importance in the pursuit of a solution of the dispute
outstanding between Guyana and Venezuela”, remembering that it
should be, in accordance with the Geneva Agreement, “amicably
101
solved in a way that is acceptable to both Parties” and “satisfactory
solutions for the practical settlement of the dispute should be sought”.
In that same letter, the Minister pointed out that
“a fundamental and vital element for Venezuela regarding the
delimitation… in the Atlantic, is its right, independent of the
outstanding dispute, and its solution, to extend its sovereignty or
jurisdiction over the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and
the continental shelf… corresponding to the projection of Delta
Amacuro coast between Punta Araguapiche and Punta Playa”.
The Minister clarified that It was precisely those areas that were delimitated
between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago, “and not those corresponding
to the projection of the coast of the Zone in Reclamation, which were
delimited between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago”.
And the Minister continued:
“Ignoring the most essential obligations imposed by the Geneva
Agreement and international law, the Government of Guyana has
unilaterally granted to CENTURY GY and EXXON companies
hydrocarbon exploration concessions that, far from being limited to
underwater areas corresponding to the Zone in Reclamation... cover
areas ... that constitute the maritime projection of Delta Amacuro
coast between Punta Araguapiche and Punta Playa ...”, with the
“aggravating circumstance that the Government of Guyana ignored
the protest that Venezuela had formulated in August 1993, in the
similar case of offshore hydrocarbon concessions to MOBIL. The
Guyanese Government also ignored the repeated statements made in
102
this regard by the previous Venezuelan Government in the framework
of the Good Offices.”
And the Minister concluded:
“It is surprising that an act of this nature was committed at a time
when bilateral relations were strengthening… in particular through the
establishment and installation, on March 30
, 1999, on the occasion of
the official visit of the Minister of Foreign Relations of Venezuela to
Georgetown, of a High Level Bilateral Commission. Moreover, the
signing by the then President of Guyana of the document by which
EXXON was granted the said concession came a few days before the
date that both Governments had agreed for the meeting of a Technical
Group on Marine Resources, whose establishment responded precisely
to the need to prevent and resolve the fishing incidents that have
arisen”.
th
On September 20
, 1999, Alister McIntyre renounced as Personal
Representative of the Secretary General.
Oliver Jackman (1999-2007)
Oliver Jackman was appointed Personal Representative of the Secretary
General on November 1
th
, 1999. The new Good Officer visited Caracas and
Georgetown in the early days of March 2000.
President Hugo Chavez confirmed his support for the Good Offices,
expressing at the same time his energetic opposition to the installation of an
aerospace base in the Essequibo. However, on May 19
st
, 2000, Guyana
signed an agreement with the United States Company, Beal Aerospace
Technologies for the construction of a commercial satellite launch base in
th
103
the north-west of the Essequibo. Venezuela raised the corresponding protest
to Guyana. On July 3
, President Chavez declared:
rd
“Venezuela will not allow it to be installed in that territory, which is
Venezuelan, a rocket launch base ...”
President Chavez warns of a change in the attitude of Guyana, which is
aggressive. He considers statements by Foreign Minister Clement J. Rohee
out of tune in mid-August 2000.
“Venezuela wants that the issue can be treated under the Geneva
Agreement. If we do not recognize that there is a problem, where are
we going to get the will to solve it?” says Chavez on August 17
,
2000. “If it were true that the borders are already set, as Foreign
Minister of Guyana argues, there would not even be a Geneva
Agreement, nor any Mr. Jackman traveling”.
th
The Good Offices process was paralyzed for three years until April 30
,
2003, when the facilitators of Venezuela (Dr. Luis Herrera Marcano since
February 25
th
, 2002) and Guyana (Ralph Ramkarran) met in Georgetown to
prepare their meeting with the Good Officer, Oliver Jackman, in Barbados
on May 23
th
th
. Jackman indicated that his role was limited to “facilitating
negotiation between Governments”, a clarification that, as stated by the
Guyanese facilitator, Ramkarran, to Herrera, was due to an initiative of the
Foreign Minister of Guyana before the UN Secretary-General.
According to what was previously agreed, Ramkarran affirmed –and
Herrera confirmed- that:
1. both Venezuela and Guyana had had, in recent times, very difficult
domestic situations that had drawn the attention of their Governments.
104
2. That situation had led to a virtual stoppage of the process of good offices
since 2000, which did not mean a lack of interest of the Parties.
3. Both countries had provided a new impulse to their bilateral relations.
4. Both countries agreed on assigning a high priority to the prompt
reactivation of the good offices process.
5. Initially, it was desirable that the process was focused on the cooperation
measures in order to consolidate an atmosphere of trust.
6. Both Governments considered very important to continue having this
procedure that offers the opportunity to keep in a constructive dialogue
under the auspices of the Geneva Agreement and without formalities and
limitations of diplomatic contacts.
7. Both Governments were full confident with Ambassador Oliver Jackman
as Good Officer.
Regarding the following steps, they agree:
1. A meeting of Good Officer Jackman with Foreign Ministers in Santiago
de Chile on the occasion of OAS General Assembly (June 7
, 2003).
2. Visits of Jackman to Caracas and Georgetown in July 2003.
3. A meeting of Foreign Ministers with the UN Secretary-General, with
Jackman and the facilitators present (September 2003, on the occasion of
UN General Assembly).
This meeting implied the reactivation of the Good Offices mechanism,
without entering on the substantive discussions.
On June 8
th
th
-8
th
, 2003, as scheduled, the Foreign Minister of Venezuela, Roy
Chaderton, met in Santiago de Chile with Good Officer Jackman.
Unfortunately, he could not do it with the Foreign Minister of Guyana,
Samuel Insanally, who could not travel to Santiago for health reasons. The
105
Venezuelan Foreign Minister referred to his recent official visit to
Georgetown and the positive results of his conversations with the President
and the Foreign Minister of Guyana.
The Good Officer, Oliver Jackman, taking up an initiative of the last
meeting in 2000, requested to the facilitators the presentation of a paper
containing their views on the way how the good offices process should be
conducted. They agreed that the facilitators tried to jointly prepare a halfpage
text. In the resulting document, written by Mr. Ramkarran and
accepted by Mr. Herrera with minor amendments on July 11
, 2013, they
stated:
th
“…2. The good offices process is led by the same Parties that, at the
same time, recognize the mandate of the good officer in assisting them
to resolve problems, differences, disputes and controversies. 3. Both
Parties have expressed their continued support and confidence in the
process and continue believing that it is playing an important role in
facilitating an approach to - and facilitating - discussions. 4. The Good
Officer facilitates meetings of the Parties represented by their
facilitators in places and with the regularity that they determine and
agree to the Good Officer. The agenda of these meetings is agreed by
the Parties. However, the Good Officer can offer guidance,
suggestions and recommendations in this regard. 5. The Good Officer
chairs the meetings in which he participates. He is expected to provide
clarity and focus of the discussions. The Good Officer addresses
issues that arise that require a contribution from him or the Secretary
General. He summarizes the discussions and conclusions and the tasks
to be carried out, if necessary, before the next meeting. 6. The Good
Officer maintains regular contact with the Governments to officially
inform them of the course of the discussions. 7. The Good Officer will
determine its relationship, level of commitment and nature of the
106
report, if applicable, with the Secretary General. 8. The Good Officer
is seen as a symbol of the desire of both Parties to resolve the dispute
in a peaceful and friendly manner. 9. The Good Officer tries to keep
alive the possibility of annual meetings between the Ministers of
Foreign Relations and the Secretary General, in which he may
consider being present. In these meetings, the progress achieved will
be reviewed and the commitment to the process will be renewed. 10.
To this end, the Good Officer may consider visiting Caracas and
Georgetown once a year before the beginning of the session of the
General Assembly, especially if a meeting is scheduled in New York
between the Foreign Ministers and the Secretary General.”
On September 27
, 2003, the Foreign Ministers of Venezuela, Roy
Chaderton, and Guyana, Samuel Insanally, met with Secretary General, Kofi
Annan, and with the Good Officer, Oliver Jackman, and the facilitators,
Luis Herrera Marcano and Ralph Ramkarran. Since 1999, a high-level
meeting did not take place. The objective was to relaunch the good offices
process, benefitting of increased cooperation between both countries on
health, trade and fishing areas, which contributed to create an atmosphere of
confidence. In statements to the press, the Good Officer, Oliver Jackman,
explained that the process depended on the governments and not on the UN.
In December 2003, the Government appointed Hector Azócar, who
previously served as Ambassador of Venezuela in Guyana (1997-2000), as
facilitator.
On February 19
th
, 2004, President Hugo Chávez officially visited
Guyana, with Bharrat Jagdeo as President of the Cooperative Republic.
President Hugo Chávez proposed to favor the mechanisms of integration
and exchange on territorial differences, always within the framework of the
th
th
and 20
107
Geneva Agreement. The new Venezuelan facilitator, Hector Azócar, took
this opportunity to contact with the Guyanese facilitator, Ralph Ramkarran.
The joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit highlighted the spirit of
cordiality that had permeated the approach to dialogue between the Parties
and reiterated its commitment to the good offices process, praising Mr.
Oliver Jackman’s work in the pursuit of a peaceful and practical solution to
the controversy, in accordance with the Geneva Agreement of 1966. As a
gesture of solidarity, President Chávez agreed to cancel Guyana’s debt with
Venezuela. Later, on September 6
, 2005, Guyana joined the Petrocaribe
Energy Agreement.
On May 21
th
, 2004, the Venezuelan and Guyanese facilitators met in
Barbados with the Good Officer, Oliver Jackman. Ramkarran reiterated his
country’s commitment to the good offices process and highlighted President
Chavez’s visit to Guyana. For Ramkarran, it was necessary to hold more
frequent meetings with the Good Officer and a greater participation of the
United Nations. Previous meetings of the facilitators would clarify or define
those issues requiring the intervention of the Good Officer.
st
Oliver Jackman expressed that the Secretary-General was participating in
the process based on the Geneva Agreement, and that his role as Good
Officer was to advise and facilitate what governments put forward and that
“the vision that countries have about the Agreement (of Geneva)
would be very useful, in particular with respect to Article IV”.
According to the Good Officer, the Secretary-General was not in a position
to conduct the process; it is the governments that have to give the guidelines
108
and suggest the way forward. The meetings could not be limited to
exchanging courtesies and cordialities.
In this meeting, the facilitator of Venezuela gave a broad presentation on
the events that the Government had had to face since December 2001;
however, his commitment to further consolidate relations with Guyana had
not stopped. The statements made by President Chavez in Guyana reflected
his opinion that both governments should consult each other when dealing
with sensitive projects, without Venezuela ever separating itself from the
spirit and content of the Geneva Agreement, which provided that no act
carried out in the territory under dispute meant resignation or decrease of the
rights that each party claimed. The President’s statements had to be seen in
the context of deepening Latin American integration.
According to Venezuelan facilitator, Hector Azócar:
“The Good Officer was perceived with an interest in inducing
governments to enter into substantive issues and to seek an answer to
the Secretary General’s proposal to establish a road map. His
insistence on knowing the effect of the statements of President Hugo
Chávez on future steps was revealed even before the meeting of the
Facilitators themselves”.
Ban Ki-moon took office as UN Secretary-General on January 1
, 2007,
replacing Kofi Annan. On January 24
st
, 2007 the Good Officer Oliver
Jackman, passed away.
th
109
Norman Girvan (2009-2014)
In February 2007, in a note addressed to the Secretary-General, Venezuela
expressed interest in continuing the Good Offices process, requesting the
consideration to appoint a new Good Officer
In those months, despite the excellent relations between Venezuela and
Guyana under the presidencies of Chavez and Jagdeo, the incidents were not
missing, involving the detention of fishing vessels and the arrest of crew
members by the Guyanese authorities, or Venezuela acting at the boundary
de facto to fight oil smuggling, illegal mining and protecting rivers and the
environment. These incidents resulted in the exchange of diplomatic notes,
written with care not to disturb the recipient. In this context, a Venezuelan
note of December 10
, 2007 suggested a high-level meeting to prepare a
meeting with the UN Secretary-General and promote the process of good
offices, useful not only to identify satisfactory solutions to the practical
arrangement of territorial controversy, but also to establish fast and timely
communication channels to avoid incidents likely to tarnish excellent
relations.
th
It took almost three years before Norman Girvan could be appointed as a
Good Officer on October 9
, 2009. These were the best moments of the
cooperation, solidarity and integration policy sponsored by President
Chávez who, on July 20
th
, 2010, received in Caracas, on an official
visit, the President of Guyana, Bharrat Jagdeo. It was not desired that the
territorial dispute clouded such an environment.
However, Guyana initiatives such as the request for recognition of its claim
of a continental shelf beyond two hundred miles before the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf on September 6
th
st
-21
th
, 2011, as well as the oil
110
exploration licenses granted by Guyana in the projection, not only on the
Essequibo coast, but even in the mouth of the Orinoco, caused incidents that
affected the process of good offices.
Thus, meeting in Port of Spain on September 30
, 2011, the Foreign
Ministers of Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro, and Guyana, Carolyn RodriguesBirkett,
signed
a
joint
statement
in
which:
1)
The right of Venezuela to make its views on Guyana's request known
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is
confirmed, as well as the agreement that the “facilitators” of both
States discuss said request and inform their Governments;
2) It is recognized that the delimitation of maritime boundaries remains
an outstanding issue that will require negotiations;
3) It is recognized that “the controversy regarding the 1899 Arbitral
Award about the frontier between Guyana and Venezuela still
exists” and is “a legacy of colonialism (which) must be resolved,
reaffirming the Ministers in “their commitment to the Geneva
Agreement and the Good Offices Process”;
4) It is noted that the Ministers informed the Personal Representative of
the UN Secretary-General on their discussions; and,
5) They welcomed the excellent relations that have developed between
the two States, and reiterated their commitment to maintain them at
that level.
In a communication to the UN Secretary-General on 9
th
March 2012, signed
by Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela objected to Guyana’s
submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The
continental shelf intended by Guyana constituted the projection of a
th
111
coastline forming part of Venezuela’s Zone in Reclamation, a shelf to which
Venezuela was entitled on the basis of customary international law.
Venezuela, however, considered the fruits that could be derived from a
constructive dialogue within the framework of the Good Offices process in
the search for a practical solution to the territorial dispute. On the same date,
Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro wrote to his Guyanese counterpart in
similar terms.
On March 14
, 2012, Guyana replied the communication from the
Venezuelan Foreign Ministry. Guyana says:
th
“My Government is of the view that the scope of the Geneva
agreement of February 17
, 1966 is clear and proscribed. Maritime
issues were not among the repertoire of issues that were addressed in
the Agreement; it was not in the remit of the Mixed Commission; and
cannot therefore be under the mandate of the Good Offices Process…”
th
Guyana denied the territorial nature of the dispute and insists that the
purpose of the Geneva Agreement is to resolve on the validity or nullity of
the 1899 Award. According to Guyana, maritime delimitation had to be
negotiated by the Parties, but not within the framework of the Good Offices
process.
Guyanese Foreign Minister, Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett, also addressed a
long letter to the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, on April 4
, 2012
(with a copy to the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry). In this letter Guyana
requested to ignore the Venezuelan objection to the consideration of the
Guyanese claim, denying the existence of a territorial dispute and limiting
the purpose of the Geneva Agreement to the dispute on the validity or
nullity of the 1899 Award.
th
112
In this strained environment, Mr. Girvan devised a new approach to the
performance of his task as a good officer through the so-called technical
workshops. It was not a question of focusing on the subject of the border
dispute and waiting for the Parties to take a position, but of clarifying
concepts and issues involved in the resolution of multidimensional disputes,
which could be related to future conversations about said controversy. With
the workshops the authorities and teams of the Parties would begin to know
each other and build trust, applying the so-called Chatham House Rule.
The first of these workshops was held in New York on May 15
, 2012. Half
a dozen people participated in each of the Parties. The delegations were
headed by facilitators Chaderton and Ramkarram.
A second workshop was held on May 17
th
, 2013, in Port of Spain. Under the
coordination of the Good Officer and the participation of facilitators
Chaderton and Ramkarran, delegations from both countries met (10
members for each party) in a very positive atmosphere. “We have made
progress and will continue to make progress” said Guyanese facilitator
Ramkarran. “It is important that we keep this process going, taking steps
instead of gigantic leaps”, concluded the Good Officer, Girvan.
Following the death of President Chavez on March 5
th
, Nicolas Maduro
made his first official visit to Guyana as President of the Bolivarian
Republic on August 30
th
, 2013. On that occasion, the 5th Bilateral High
Level Council (COBAN) was held and the steps were taken to launch the
Committee of Prevention, Investigation and Peaceful Solution of Fishing
Incidents. This committee had been created through a Memorandum of
Understanding signed by the Foreign Ministers on July 21
th
st
-31
st
, 2010, on the
113
occasion of the official visit of the President of Guyana, Jagdeo, to Caracas.
In the joint declaration signed by the Presidents, Nicolas Maduro and
Donald Ramotar, on August 31
, 2013, it was pointed out that a new
impetus had been given to the process of good offices, and the reassignment
of the good officer Norman Girvan was requested for a new period.
On October 10
st
, 2013, a naval unit of Venezuela (Yekuana) arrested the
Panamanian-flagged Teknik Perdana ship, hired by the American company
Anadarko to carry out oil exploration under a Guyana license on the
continental shelf of the Essequibo coast. This arrest originated the protest of
Guyana, in note of October 11
th
, open to accept an explanation based on the
Venezuelan Navy’s mistake in placing the ship in Venezuelan waters. Then,
noticing through the Venezuelan note of October 15
th
that this had not been
a mistake, Guyana qualified Venezuelan arrest as an aggression and
regretted that the incident occurred when bilateral relations were better than
ever (note DG: 7/10/2013).
The Foreign Ministers, Elías Jaua and Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett, met in
Port of Spain on October 17
th
, 2013. In a joint statement they recognized the
importance of urgently addressing the delimitation of maritime spaces to
avoid incidents and agreed to explore mechanisms to his end in the
framework of international law.
Norman Girvan met with the Venezuela´s Foreign Minister, Elias Jaua, in
Port of Spain, on the same date. As a result, he sent him a letter on October
29
th
th
, accompanied by a detailed work plan proposal. Girvan informed the
Minister that in the summer of 2014 the Secretary-General intended to carry
out a review of the progress achieved, a review that could consider other
114
alternative means of resolving the dispute. “However”, Girvan says in his
letter,
“I am convinced that the current process of good offices allows more
empowerment of the two States than any other alternative and that it is
possible to achieve significant progress towards the settlement of the
border dispute.”
And he concluded:
“The United Nations remains committed to supporting the Parties in
the search for a mutually satisfactory resolution of the border dispute.”
**********
115
XI.
Work plan Proposal
Process of good offices in the
border dispute between Guyana and Venezuela
2013
The work plan is proposed in order to facilitate discussion between the
Parties based on the following:
• Both Parties are ready to discuss concrete options for the resolution
of the border dispute.
• Any discussion or suggestion will be carried out without prejudice to
the legal position of the two states.
• Nothing is understood as agreed until it is included in a signed and
formalized agreement.
Work plan
• Mid-November to mid-December: A work meeting of two days in
Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, with the participation of
delegations of both states. In the meeting will be studied and
discussed, in a non-binding manner the following: 1) options for the
economic development and cooperation; 2) mechanism for maritime
delimitation; 3) options for a binational dialogue (as a
complementary process to promote exchange between the civil
societies of both countries); 4) other possible means of resolution.
• January: Visits by the Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-
General to both capitals to present the Foreign Ministers a report
116
about the work meeting. The report could include suggestions for
specific follow-up actions. These could consist on: Proposals of
additional work meetings to develop a series of particular scenarios
for resolving the border dispute; proposals for the organization of a
binational dialogue.
• February: Follow-up on the proposals in order to obtain the views of
both Parties and agree on an agenda for the elaboration and
implementation of any suggestions that have been agreed upon. This
agenda could also include a series of high-level work meetings to
delve deeper into the options.
• Mid 2014: The Personal Representative, in close contact with both
Parties and the UN Secretary-General would carry out a review of
the status of the Good Offices process in order to provide
recommendations on the way to follow, including the continuation
of the Good Offices or the consideration of other means of resolution
of the dispute, as established in the Geneva agreement of 1966.
The Personal Representative will keep in regular contact with the
Facilitators to implement the work plan and discuss its progress.
**********
117
XII.
Events leading to the communiqué of the
UN Secretary-General of January 30
, 2018 (2014-2018)
The last Good Officer agreed by the Parties, Norman Girvan, passed away
on April 9
th
th
, 2014. In addition, the relationship between Venezuela and
Guyana became increasingly strained in 2014.
On April 8
th
, 2014, the Venezuela’s Foreign Ministry addressed a note to the
Ministry of Foreign Relations of Guyana regarding information from the
Guyanese Government Information Agency on the partnership between
Guyana and Brazil to develop a hydroelectric complex in the Mazaruni, and
the statements attributed to the Minister, Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett, in the
sense that she did not expect a negative reaction from Venezuela “in view of
the fact that that area is no longer in dispute.” The Venezuelan note stated
that, on the contrary, the Venezuelan claim remained in full force, recalled
the traditional position of Venezuela and believed that “it was necessary to
make clear that no bilateral negotiations, arrangements or agreements have
been concluded whereby both States have decided to put an end to the
dispute.” The note highlighted that the statements of the head of Foreign
Relations of Guyana, were not “in harmony with the Good Offices Process
... and do not conform to the spirit of understanding and cooperation
established in the Geneva Agreement”, which governs the dispute.
Venezuela invoked Article V.2 of the Geneva Agreement to call into
question the Brazilian-Guyanese project in the Mazaruni.
Guyana replied through note on April 14
, 2014. It clarified that the
quotation attributed to the Minister of Foreign Relations was not accurate.
She did not state that “that area is no longer in dispute”; she said: “I cannot
th
118
predict the future, but I do not foresee any issues developing with our
neighbor and even so, Guyana’s position is that it does not have a territorial
dispute with Venezuela”. The Minister considered that the Venezuelan note
was in contradiction with the expectations generated in Guyana by the broad
vision of President Hugo Chavez when he described the border issue as a
machination of imperialism to prevent unity in Latin America. Article V.2
of the Geneva Agreement did not limit the activities of Guyana in the
Essequibo. According to the note, the position of the Venezuelan
government on investments in Guyana was a regressive step that could
negatively affect its economic and social development. Guyana’s activities
in the Essequibo did not fall under the mandate of the Good Offices Process.
The note recalled, once again, the desirability of assembling a technical
group to discuss a mechanism for the negotiation of a maritime delimitation
agreement, a commitment assumed by both Governments at the level of
Ministers of Foreign Relations.
A month later, the note of the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry of May 14
,
2014, referred to the death of Mr. Norman Girvan, it noted that this
unfortunate fact “has temporarily paralyzed Good Offices Mechanism
agreed by both Parties” and invited Guyana to formally request, with
Venezuela, to the UN Secretary-General the appointment of a Good Officer,
and thus, “resuming the Good Offices mechanism currently in force for both
Parties.” The Ministry of Foreign Relations reiterated the position of
reaching with Guyana “a practical arrangement that successfully settle the
territorial dispute existing between both States, derived from the nullity and
consequent invalidity of the Award of October 3, 1899, issue that was
recognized and accepted peacefully by all Parties of the Geneva Agreement
of 1966”.
th
119
Guyana’s response was formalized in a note dated June 16
, 2014. It
reaffirmed its disagreement with Venezuela’s contention on the invalidity of
the 1899 Award. According to the note, the Geneva Agreement provided a
way for the Venezuelan Government to prove its assertion. There was no
reference in that Agreement to the existence of a border dispute between the
Parties. The appointment of a Good Officer to replace Norman Girvan “is
currently under consideration by the Government of Guyana.”
Four days later, on June 20
th
, 2014, the First Technical Meeting of the teams
of Venezuela and Guyana was held in Port of Spain, scheduled by the joint
declaration of October 17
th
, 2013. Venezuela contended that the delimitation
of maritime spaces was as important to avoid incidents - in what coincided
with Guyana - as it was inevitably linked to the previous settlement of the
pending territorial dispute, which Guyana insisted on denying. At that
meeting it could be seen that Guyana had no interest in the appointment of a
new Good Officer.
The exploration activities licensed by Guyana on the continental shelf of the
Essequibo coast led to further incidents and exchanges of diplomatic notes
in the first months of 2015.
The Ministry of Foreign Relations of Venezuela issued a note on February
26
th
th
, 2015 protesting the concessions for oil exploration and drilling in
Stabroek Block, located on the maritime facade of the Essequibo, an area
under reclamation, and partially on the continental shelf of the Orinoco
Delta, a Venezuelan undisputed area. Venezuela has not received
information about the establishment of the Deep Water Champion oil
platform. Any act, the note stressed, lacked any effects. The note called for a
peaceful and constructive dialogue and the reactivation of the Good Offices
120
process through the appointment of the Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General (pending due to the rejection of Guyana). At the same
time, a letter was sent to the Country Manager of Esso Exploration.
A note from Guyana dated February 28
, required Venezuela to desist from
such actions that are detrimental to the development of Guyana and
contrary, it said, to international law. The note rejected the claims of
Venezuela.
Venezuela ratified its position in a statement dated March 3
th
and in a note
dated March 4
th
, 2015. The first one highlights its contribution to the
development of Guyana, and mentioned the interference of foreign factors.
The second accused Guyana of “confusing and erratic behavior” and
expressed its surprise at a behavior that contradicted the formal request
made by the Government of Guyana through its Minister of Foreign
Relations, Mrs. Carolyn Rodriguez Birkett, on July 20
th
, 2014, in Port of
Spain, who raised the need to delimit maritime and submarine areas. The
note recalled a similar event in 2000 involving Esso and the same block and
that “in light of the clear evidence of a border dispute, the aforementioned
company formalized its withdrawal, recognizing that it should be resolved
in advance between the States concerned.” Finally, the note called again for
the restoration as soon as possible of the mechanism of Good Offices,
without the interference of foreign factors.
In relation to this incident, on March 13
th
, 2015, Venezuela published in a
Guyanese media - the Kaieteur News - a communique replied the same day
by Guyana (and published the following day, March 14
th
). In Guyana’s
reply, it rejected the link between the issues of the continental shelf and the
exclusive economic zone with the territorial claim of Venezuela under the
th
121
Geneva Agreement. Guyana even considered a “subtle threat” the fact that
in its statement Venezuela states that “it reserves the right to carry out all
actions in the diplomatic field and in accordance with the international law
that are necessary to defend and safeguard sovereignty and independence
over the Essequibo.”
**********
David Granger won the elections on May 11
, 2015 and assumed the
Presidency of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana. Four days earlier, May
7
th
th
, Guyana announced that Exxon Mobil had found oil in the Stabroek
block.
On May 26
th
, 2015, Venezuela enacted Decree No. 1,787, published in the
Official Gazette of the following day, establishing the Operational Zones for
Integral Maritime and Insular Defense (ZODIMAIN).
In a note dated June 8
, 2015, Guyana described Decree No. 1,787 as
th
“a serious act of provocation and a clear threat to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Guyana… also a threat to regional peace and
security… to exacerbate tensions… another dangerous precedent in
the adventurism of Venezuela’s unilateral and unfounded claim to
Guyana’s territory.”
In this note, Guyana totally ignores the Geneva Agreement and claims that
Venezuela respect “the International Treaty to which Venezuela was a
signatory party and out of which was handed down the Arbitral Award of
1899”.
122
On the same date, June 8
, 2015, Venezuela reissued Decree No. 1,787
correcting errors, showing that the Decree was not intended to unilaterally
delimit maritime spaces, but to make operational areas of defense and
protection against multiform threats, including natural disasters, which have,
unfortunately, multiplied in number, intensity and unpredictability as a
result of climate change. A paragraph in the preamble states that:
th
“The Venezuelan State recognizes the existence of maritime areas that
are to be delimited in accordance with international agreements and
treaties signed by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and that need
to be addressed by the Venezuelan State until a definitive delimitation
is achieved in an amicable way.”
With regard to the so-called “ATLANTIC ZODIMAIN”, it is expressly
provided that:
“There is a maritime area, defined by T-U-V points, to be delimited
which will be determined once the pending dispute between the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Cooperative Republic of
Guyana has been settled under the 1966 Geneva Agreement”.
In addition, Venezuela replied to Guyana’s note in a communiqué dated
th
June 9
, 2015. The communiqué emphasized the
need to continue with good offices and expressed that the only and
surprising aggression is that the Government of Guyana had allowed a
transnational company as powerful as the Exxon Mobil, with no intention to
solve Guyana’s right to development, to enter into territory in dispute. The
new Government of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, it is noted,
exhibits a dangerous policy of provocation against Venezuela, supported by
the imperial power of a US transnational corporation, the Exxon Mobil.
and a note dated June 10
th
123
Venezuela regrets that a Decree aimed at organizing, through the assistance
of new information technologies, daily monitoring and maritime protection
activities which in no way affect the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, is
used to artificially create a crisis, using highly offensive language.
Venezuela has done a lot for the development of Guyana and for the benefit
of the Guyanese people, such as Petrocaribe. Venezuela ratifies the
invitation to the Foreign Minister of Guyana to a prompt meeting to
continue, through political dialogue, the path of cooperation and
overcoming the historical dispute, which had its genesis in fraudulent
actions of former colonial powers against Venezuela.
In the note of June 10
, 2015, Venezuela rejected the tone and the
disconcerting, serious and false accusations of the Guyanese note, which do
not correspond to the Bolivarian peace diplomacy of Venezuela. The note
insisted on the objectives of Decree No. 1,787 and regretted the
misperception of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana as it constituted a
severe failure at the principle of good faith, from the perspective of
international law, to endorse baseless accusations of alleged Venezuelan
actions to “usurp a territory of Guyana.” It is strange and alarming, the note
continued, that the Guyanese note did not mention the Geneva Agreement,
which is the regulatory framework to be observed in order to resolve the
territorial dispute and then proceed to the delimitation of maritime spaces. It
was Guyana who opened the door of those spaces to the imperial formulas
embodied in one of the greediest transnational company in the world. The
note, finally, reiterated Venezuela willingness to dialogue and hopes for an
early meeting with the Foreign Minister of Guyana.
Despite this conciliatory attitude, on June 10
th
, 2015, the Vice President and
Foreign Minister of Guyana, Carl Greenidge, addressed the National
th
124
Assembly of Guyana again calling the Decree No. 1,787 “unfounded and
shameless attempt to usurp the territory of Guyana”, contrary to any rule
and principle of international law and evoking the “illegal” occupation of
Anakoko, the incursions into the territory of Guyana, the obstruction of its
development projects in the region, such as the Upper Mazaruni
hydroelectric project or more recent projects with Brazil, and the pressures
to deter foreign investment, all of which qualify as acts of aggression,
military, paramilitary and economic. He also referred to the “use of force” in
the case of Teknik Perdana, shortly after the visit of President Nicolas
Maduro to Georgetown. The logical and reasonable point, Mr. Greenidge
said, is that Venezuela and Guyana had sat down to discuss the maritime
delimitation, an issue that both Parties had considered important and that
should be resolved through negotiations, as expressed in the joint statement
of September 30
, 2011, but the efforts of Guyana in this regard had been
futile. For 49 years, Mr. Greenidge concluded, Guyana has lived in the
shadow of the “illegal” claim of Venezuela. The Decree is a warning that
Venezuela intends to continue to press Guyana and has come only to widen
the gap between the two countries. The sword of Damocles still hangs over
our heads and it is time to finish this cycle and seek a definitive solution
within the framework of the Geneva Agreement, once the Good Offices
have failed.
In order to put an end to misinterpretations, which Guyana had taken care of
feeding among CARICOM members, Venezuela chose to derogate Decree
No. 1,787 by Decree No. 1859, dated July 6
th
, 2015, published in the
Official Gazette of the same date.
**********
th
125
th
On July 6
, 2015, President Nicolás Maduro delivered an important speech
in a special session of the National Assembly. He announces that he will
communicate with the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, to activate the
appointment of a new Good Officer. The National Assembly unanimously
adopted a resolution supporting the policy announced by the President.
Three days later, on July 9
, 2015, the President of Venezuela addressed a
letter to the Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, requesting the initiation of the
procedure of designation of the Good Officer,
th
“given that the method of good offices has not been exhausted”,
including “the possibilities of historical research as a means of
contributing to the best performance of good offices and assistance in
the proper negotiation that must lead to a peaceful and acceptable
arrangement for both Parties, which is the object and purpose of the
Geneva Agreement”.
The letter recalls that the Parties recognized that the territorial dispute
should be settled amicably in an acceptable manner to both Parties
(preamble). Likewise, it is denounced that
“the new government of Guyana has ignored, if not disregarded, the
validity of the Geneva Agreement of 1966, showing a recalcitrant and
ambivalent attitude and inflicted serious offenses on my country and
my people”.
It draws attention to the unilateral behavior of Guyana, operating without
notification, not to mention agreement, in vast extensions of the disputed
territory. It identifies the attributes that the Good Officer must meet. It
reiterates the terms of the recognition of Guyana as an independent State.
126
A day later, July 10
, 2015, Foreign Minister Delcy Rodríguez turned to the
Secretary- General, on behalf of President Nicolás Maduro, to appoint a new
Good Officer.
However, on July 13
th
, 2015, the Foreign Minister of Guyana, Carl
Greenidge, told the Secretary-General - and publicly - that he was not
interested in the continuation of the Good Offices, a process manipulated by
Venezuela “to keep unsettled the border dispute”, accusing it of feeding a
dilatory policy. For Guyana the only option was the International Court of
Justice.
On July 28
th
th
, President Maduro denounced the provocations of Guyana and
called for the reactivation of the Good Offices mechanism.
Guyana published its maritime coordinates dated July 22
, 2015, in the
Official Gazette of the 29
th
September, 2015 addressed
to the UN Secretary-General, Venezuela objected to the straight line of
closure of the mouth of the Essequibo.
On September 27
th
. By note dated 22
th
, 2015, Ban Ki-moon met with Presidents Nicolás
Maduro and David Granger in New York. As a result of the meeting, on
October 3
th
rd
, 2015, it were announced the return to Georgetown of the
Venezuelan ambassador, who had been called to consultations in Caracas,
and the placet to the new Guyana’s Ambassador in Caracas. One delegation
(a technical team headed by the Chief of Staff of the Secretary General)
visited Caracas and Georgetown on October 13
, 2015. Days later, the
technical team of the General Secretariat formulated a working paper: “A
way forward”.
**********
th
th
-14
127
In a letter from the Foreign Minister, Delcy Rodríguez, to the Secretary-
General, Ban Ki-moon, of March 15
, 2016, concerns are expressed "at
erroneous legal interpretations in the proposal submitted by the technical
team sent by you ...” The working paper “A way forward” reflected the
spirit of the proposals of the Government of the Cooperative Republic of
Guyana, which had distanced itself from the due respect to the Geneva
Agreement, a position contrary to the search for a “practical, satisfactory
and acceptable settlement to both Parties to the dispute ”, as central
commitment of this legal instrument.
The letter highlights the lack of political will, reluctance and unusual
aggressiveness of the current government of the Cooperative Republic of
Guyana to move towards a friendly settlement, carrying out a series of
unilateral actions for the disposition of the disputed territory and the
maritime spaces. Overall, with the arrival of the new government (of David
Granger), the relations had suffered an unexpected deterioration that had
affected the hard-built trust. Hence the skepticism about the good faith of
the Guyanese side in moving forward against a lapse of time that conditions
the outcome. “The haste derived from the aggressiveness imposed by one of
the Parties cannot determine the most appropriate means of resolving the
dispute.”
On July 5
th
th
, 2016, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister wrote again to the
Secretary-General, insisting, in accordance with the spirit, purpose and
reason of the Geneva Agreement, on a friendly negotiated solution (a
practical, satisfactory and mutually acceptable settlement) of the territorial
dispute with the good offices of the Secretary-General through the
appointment of a new Personal Representative or Good Officer to conduct
128
intensive contacts with both Parties. To that end, the Foreign Minister
suggested the option of a set of candidates with a particular profile.
On July 28th, 2016, Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon proposes through a
letter to Foreign Minister, Delcy Rodríguez, candidates to conduct the
process of Good Offices.
On August 18
, 2016, the Foreign Minister pointed out to the SecretaryGeneral
the “no complacency” of Venezuela regarding the proposed
candidates and suggested the name of another person
th
“whom we would like to invite Venezuela, as soon as possible, to
convene a meeting with the President of the Republic, Nicolás
Maduro Moros, in order to adopt a definitive answer regarding his
suitability”.
On October 31
, 2016, the Secretary-General addressed the Venezuelan
Foreign Minister (with whom he had met on the 13
st
), to remind her that the
person proposed by Venezuela was unavailable. Considering that the other
candidates had not been accepted by the Venezuelan government, he added:
th
“I regret to inform you that I will not be able to appoint a Personal
Representative for the Good Offices process. As I have indicated in
my previous communications, my intention is to proceed to make an
assessment in November of the progress made in resolving the
dispute, with a view to taking a decision before the end of my mandate
on how to proceed. Allow me to reiterate that I attach the highest
priority to the search for a solution to the border dispute, and it is my
intention to use the remaining time until the end of the year in the
most productive manner.”
129
On November 4
, 2016, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister replied to the
Secretary- General, expressing concern about his position. The selection of
the Personal Representative, as confirmed by experience, is a difficult and
complex process. Not having arranged a suitable candidate in so few
months, could not result in the elimination of the mechanism. This was the
time to redouble efforts.
The Foreign Minister added:
th
“We are concerned that an exit to this controversy might be
contemplated with the back turned to the international legality and
closing the doors to peaceful negotiation, which would allow for a
negotiated solution, in an atmosphere of trust between the Parties.
This scenario glimpses an uncertain and conflictive landscape in a
region that has been declared by CELAC as a territory of peace.”
The Foreign Minister continued:
“the government of Guyana has exacerbated the violation and
disregard of this valid and binding legal instrument for the Parties (the
Geneva Agreement), seeking to resort to the International Court of
Justice, excluding its normative sense, which contemplates the
successive exhaustion of the political negotiation mechanisms
contemplated therein. Attempting to resort to the judicial means
blatantly violates the legal instrument in force and valid for this
dispute, which in its spirit, nature and reason expressly excludes it ...
defined by the achievement of the practical and satisfactory settlement
for both Parties. Being even more strict, it is imperative to remember
that any way to reach a settlement must have the mutual consent of the
Parties, as it has always been in compliance with the Geneva
Agreement ... Such recommendation (to resort to the Court) would be
130
so burdensome for the national interest of Venezuela and for regional
stability, that it would be impossible for us to accept.”
The Foreign Minister concluded:
“We know that because of the short time remaining for your
outstanding mandate, it is not possible to address this delicate issue
with all the legal, political and diplomatic considerations that are
required. We therefore reiterate the respectful request presented to you
by President Nicolás Maduro in his recent conversations, to bring this
dispute to the immediate attention of the designated Secretary-
General, Antonio Guterres.”
Ten days later, on November 14
, 2016, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister
sent two letters to the Secretary-General. In one of them, the Foreign
Minister reported that on November 12
th
the Government-Opposition
Dialogue Table had agreed on a unanimous position in defense of the
legitimate and inalienable rights of Venezuela over Guyana Esequiba and in
defense of the Geneva Agreement.
In the second letter denounced the reckless actions of the government of
th
Guyana in detriment of the legality, responsibility and good faith due to the
effective fulfillment of the Geneva Agreement. During 2015 and 2016, the
government of Guyana had magnified the abusive practice of granting
concessions to transnational corporations for exploration and exploitation of
natural resources in the territory, which had resulted in a “dramatic
environmental deterioration… of the planetary lung of the Amazon… a
clear depredation of the environment…”. The same had been done in the
maritime spaces that make up the projection of the Essequibo, which
seemed incompatible with the principles applicable in the framework of
131
dispute settlement set out in resolutions 37/10, article 8, and 53/101, article
2,e , of the UN General Assembly. If the behavior of the government of
Guyana allowed a manifest intention of non-compliance with the Geneva
Agreement to be suspected, that of Venezuela had been prudent and
adjusted to law in the face of provocation, avoiding an escalation of tension.
On December 15
, 2016, Ban Ki-moon addressed a letter to President
Nicolas Maduro in which he proposed to incorporate an element of
mediation into good offices, a mandate for which he set a mandatory
deadline to end “at the end of 2017”. The Secretary-General added that if by
this date he concluded that significant progress had not been achieved in
reaching a solution to the dispute, he will choose the International Court of
Justice as the next means of settlement, unless both Parties jointly request
the contrary.
Ban Ki-moon pointed out that he had shared these conclusions with the
Secretary-General designated to succeed him, Antonio Guterres, and that he
would appoint at his discretion a Personal Representative, who would be
able to make proposals on any aspect of the bilateral relationship that could
facilitate a complete agreement for the solution of the dispute. As a first
step, he will discuss with the Parties possible measures aimed at building
trust in order to create an environment conducive to dialogue.
President Nicolas Maduro replied to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on
December 17
th
, 2016. In his letter he stated that Venezuela was firmly
committed to reach a negotiated solution within the strict framework of the
Geneva Agreement. To this end,
th
132
“he hopes that, as happened with the appointment of the Personal
Representatives all the preceding Secretaries-General, the Parties will
be consulted before the new Secretary General, Mr. Antonio Guterres,
proceeds to their designation.”
The President insisted on
“our objection to the intention ... to recommend to the Parties that they
resort to the Court...”
and added that this recommendation
“is not in accordance with the letter or the purpose of the [Geneva]
Agreement.”
In addition,
“the mere announcement… is an incentive for the Party that insists on
it to have no interest in a negotiated solution and simply to let time go
by… The government of Guyana has exacerbated the violation and
disregard of the Geneva Agreement..., excluding its normative sense,
which contemplates the successive exhaustion of the political
negotiation mechanisms contemplated therein. That means of last ratio
deviates from the object, purpose and reason of the Geneva
Agreement - as well as its terms ... - conducive to a friendly, practical
and satisfactory settlement acceptable to both Parties...”
Effectively, the government of Guyana welcomed the communication of
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon of December 15
, 2016. In this connection,
President Granger said on December 22
th
, 2016 before the Guyanese Armed
Forces that 51 years had been too long to continue with the Venezuelan
claim, and therefore, they expected to submit the matter to the International
nd
133
Court of Justice. Foreign Minister Greenidge had said the same thing before
the National Assembly of that country on December 20
, 2016. Further,
President Granger sent a communication to President Maduro on December
21
th
st
in the same keynote of reluctance to negotiations and with an evident
intention to recourse to the International Court of Justice. Such actions
become especially significant because they unveil Guyana’s true purpose, as
it actually happened, of not betting at all to the political means for
settlement of controversies and delegitimize, in this manner, the good
offices that had just being announced.
**********
On February 23
, 2017, the new Secretary General, Antonio Guterres,
addressed President Nicolas Maduro informing him of the election of Mr.
Dag Nylander as his Personal Representative and attaching the “terms of
reference” of his mission.
This letter was replied on February 25
rd
, 2017 by the Foreign Minister,
Delcy Rodríguez. With respect to this letter it is worth emphasizing the
following:
1. The precision that the designation of the Good Officers has always been
done with the approval of the Parties after consultation. To this end, in order
to respect the procedure that has historically been complied with, a visit by
the candidate to Caracas would be appreciated, as soon as possible, to meet
with President Maduro and the Venezuelan team.
2. Venezuela’s willingness to collaborate closely and in good faith with the
Personal Representative of the Secretary General, once the Parties have
th
134
given their approval, with special attention to the reduced timeframe in
which the intended means will be applied, which condemns in advance its
effective possibilities of action and favors the disinterest of Guyana, since
the immobility would automatically lead to the Court.
3. A recommendation of the Secretary-General in this regard would
otherwise be absolutely inadmissible, considering the fundamentals of the
Geneva Agreement, which provides for a full and successive use of political
means to solve the dispute. This recommendation could not be accepted by
Venezuela. There is also no principle of jurisdiction that allows it.
On March 27
, 2017, the Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, wrote to
President Nicolás Maduro, informing him that the President of Guyana,
David Granger, had welcomed Mr. Dag Nylander’s election and confirmed
Guyana’s full cooperation in all the aspects of the process. The Secretary
General added that:
th
“Mr. Nylander, whom I have designated according to the parameters
that former Secretary General Ban Ki-moon defined in the letters of
December 15
, 2016…, is willing to visit your country and Guyana as
soon as possible”.
th
Mr. Dag Nylander made his first exploratory visit to Caracas on April 11
,
2017. The second was on May 3
th
. His greatest interest was to
identify short-term confidence-building measures, such as the reactivation
of the High Level Binational Commission, the establishment of a
mechanism for rapid and direct communication between the Parties in the
event of maritime or border incidents, or restoration of the exchange of rice
for oil within the framework of Petrocaribe.
rd
th
and 4
135
The letter of the Foreign Minister, Delcy Rodriguez, to the SecretaryGeneral,
Antonio
Guterres,
on
May
7
, 2017 reiterated some points of her
letter of February 25
th
. The minister observed that the Good Officer has
always been designated with the approval of the Parties through a round of
consultations,
th
“which is why it got our attention that this good practice has not been
observed”.
And she added:
“However, the candidate nominated by you has the profile and
willingness to recreate an environment of mutual trust ... that can
benefit the good development of the good offices mechanism.”
The Foreign Minister recalled that in the visits made by Mr. Dag Nylander it
was reiterated
“our indeclinable position on the impertinence and inadmissibility of a
possible recommendation to resort to the International Court of
Justice, which contradicts and excludes the purpose and reason of the
Geneva Agreement”.
And she continued:
“In the same way, we express the unfeasibility of considering limiting
the good offices to a few months ..., since the teaching of our and
other’s experience is that territorial disputes take their time ... It is of
the utmost interest of Venezuela to reach, sooner or later, friendly ...
practical and satisfactory settlement for both Parties that, based on the
rich experience and learning achieved during these years through good
136
offices, have motivated and allowed us to responsibly take a great
additional step within the succession of the political means
contemplated by the Geneva Agreement, by accepting that good
offices transcend with mediation elements ... It is essential to reflect
on the very short time frame that is intended to be imposed, which
would curtail the function and expectation of solution resulting from
the adoption of a new political and successive method with the
quality, complexity and exigency of the good offices assisted by
mediation”.
It should be noted that in the “basic observations to the terms of reference”,
attached to the letter of the Foreign Minister, it was indicated that the
experimentation of good offices with mediation elements
“requires more than the year foreseen by the Secretary General,
especially when it has already consumed more than a third of it ... It is
impossible to meet the objective of the Geneva Agreement in such a
peremptory term ... Limiting good offices would encourage poor
availability by the new government of Guyana to advance negotiations
through this political means”.
This aspect was stressed when evaluating the action plan of the Personal
Representative:
“not even to date (May 3
, 2017) there are proposals for a detailed
action plan with substantive elements, goals, objective and indicators
to diagnose the effective and accurate compliance within the
framework of good faith that informs and obliges both Parties…
rd
Considering also that only this week, from May 3
rd
to 6
th
, 2017, the
candidate for Good Officer has made exploration visits”.
137
The letter continued:
“Venezuela reiterates that under no circumstances will accept the part
that says that the Secretary-General will choose the International
Court of Justice as the next means of solution, in the event that no
significant progress has been made in solving the dispute, if this is
recommended by your Personal Representative and the Parties do not
request otherwise by mutual agreement. This provision, together with
the very short deadline to evacuate good offices / mediation, only
guarantees its failure, especially when one of the Parties (Guyana)
fervently longs to resort to the Court under erroneous and false
considerations”.
Then it is added:
“Venezuela also reiterates that there is no basis for jurisdiction
established between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the
Cooperative Republic of Guyana that allows a possible
recommendation of the Secretary-General to prosper without the
consent of both Parties. If that had been the intention of the Parties to
the Geneva Agreement, that would have been agreed. The opposite
was precisely agreed, as can be seen from the dispositions of the
Agreement and the logic that encourages it that such means are a last
resort that can be adopted by agreement, that is, through a special
agreement, including the regulation of its multiple aspects, after
having exhausted all successive political means”.
And the letter concluded:
“Venezuela will not accept a recommendation of the Secretary
General in this regard, not only for reasons of opportunity, but simply
for respect of the Geneva Agreement, which marks an object that is
138
none other than reaching amicably a practical and satisfactory
settlement for both Parties and, to that end, it establishes the limits of
the powers conferred on the UN Secretary-General”.
On May 9
th
, 2017, the Personal Representative of the Secretary General, Mr.
Dag Nylander, wrote to the Foreign Minister, Delcy Rodríguez, informing
her that he wanted to “continue exploring measures to build trust that could
be implemented in the short term in order to promote positive environment
for the Good Offices Process ”, mentioning several areas that had been
alluded to in the meetings of May 3
in Caracas in which it would
be possible (environment, fisheries, commercial exchanges, reinforced
communication protocols and bilateral cooperation of security). Mr.
Nylander invited the Venezuelan Government to suggest in writing, before
May 20
rd
th
and 4
th
, concrete ideas in this regard, preferably in the form of a nonpaper.
On
May
21
st
, the Foreign Minister responded to Mr. Nylander's request. The
working paper Beneficial measures in the framework of Good Offices to
strengthen compliance with the Geneva Agreement aimed at reaching a
practical and satisfactory settlement for both parties in the territorial
dispute over the Essequibo included five transversal proposals to be
developed in the five targeted work areas: environment, fisheries and
maritime spaces, agriculture, energy, security and defense.
The Personal Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Dag Nylander,
visited Caracas for the third time on June 5
, 2017. On this occasion
it was reiterated that Venezuela considered it impossible to continue the
Good Offices with mediation elements if he insisted on proposing that this
laborious and complex task be accomplished within a peremptory period of
a few months, a condition impossible to fulfill that, in advance, condemn it
th
th
and 8
139
to failure. There were no precedents that allowed to state the contrary and
anyone could realize that this process required a longer investment of time.
Mr. Nylander was reminded that the Geneva Agreement did not set
deadlines for any of the means. In the same vein, it was reiterated the
determination not to accept an eventual recommendation of the Secretary
General to refer the case to the Court, exceeding the implicit limits of the
Geneva Agreement in the performance of his powers.
Mr. Dag Nylander sent a communication to the Foreign Minister on June
22
nd
, 2017, which included a document entitled Guidelines for the
Negotiation Process. The eight-page document was essentially procedural in
nature. It raised the how, where and when of a mediation for the solution by
the Parties of the “central issue”, which he defined as “border dispute”
(main table), completed with measures he called “confidence building”
(secondary technical table).
It should be noted the omission of any consideration of the observations
made and repeated by Venezuela on the “terms of reference” marked by the
Secretary-General to his mission, despite the express warning that they
represented for Venezuela “red lines”. These had to do, essentially, with the
very short duration of the Good Offices / Mediation process, together with
the warning that the Secretary General would recommend to resort to the
International Court of Justice if the process had not advanced properly in the
opinion of his Personal Representative and unless both Parties requested its
continuation. Guyana’s most fervent yearning was to reduce the controversy
to the point of validity or nullity of the 1899 Award and transfer its
resolution to the Court, so that the “terms of reference” of the Secretary
General endorsed avant la lettre the points of view and goals of Guyana.
The paper made no mention of the object of mediation under the Geneva
140
Agreement of 1966, which could not be any other but to achieve a “practical
arrangement” satisfactory to both Parties.
The paper referred to a step-by-step process to reach an arrangement “as
soon as possible”; it talked about “moving fast”, working “intensely”. But it
was not necessary to be very thoughtful to know that mediation on a
complex and secular territorial issue is not settled in a few months. On the
contrary, if given due time, which should not be closed beforehand,
mediation, can lead to satisfactory solutions. As for the “confidencebuilding”
measures, their introduction in the mediation framework was
meaningless unless they were linked to the satisfaction of their central
purpose, namely the "practical arrangement" satisfactory for both Parties of
the controversy. It was necessary not conflate measures serving the practical
settlement of the dispute with the isolation of the controversy to jeopardize
other areas of the bilateral relationship.
Despite the conviction that, first, a fixed and peremptory term mediation
would not allow significant progress in achieving the practical and
satisfactory settlement of the dispute, second, it was manifestly imprudent to
anticipate, as the Secretary General did, a decision - the recommendation to
resort to the Court - incompatible with the provisions of the Geneva
Agreement and, third, the insistence on maintaining the “terms of reference”
that implied a certain agreement between the interests of Guyana and certain
influential media in the United Nations, Venezuela, while reiterating its
warnings, agreed to cooperate in good faith in the procedure.
In order to continue the exchange “on the elaboration of an agenda towards
the resolution of the controversy, including concrete elements for discussion
in relation to the central issue, as well as confidence-building measures”, the
141
Personal Representative visited again Caracas between June 26
,
2017.
In his meeting with the delegation of Venezuela, Mr. Dag Nylander insisted
on his two-table methodology, the main one, on the central issue, the border
controversy, and the secondary, technical one, on trust measures. Two
separate tables did not seem to go, in Venezuela’s opinion, in the desirable
direction that the measures serve to reinforce the Good Offices and
contribute the objective of the Geneva Agreement.
As reported by the Personal Representative on April 11
th
th
and 28
, since the first
meeting Guyana had warned that it would not accept that the measures
would revolve around the resolution of the dispute. Given this, Venezuela
informed him that there was no point in insisting on such measures, despite
that the Personal Representative had requested proposals in this regard (in
his letter of May 9
th
.
Mr. Nylander delayed his response to Venezuela’s proposals on June 27
th
) and Venezuela complied with this petition on May 21
st
,
and gave it orally. He again omitted to refer to the observations made by
Venezuela to the “terms of reference”.
th
The possibility of embarking the Parties on an environmental conservation
project over a circumscribed area of the Essequibo, a pilot plan as a first
step for a practical and satisfactory arrangement, was suggested.
The Personal Representative was presented with the possibility to define an
indicator of what significant progress would mean, in order to move the
deadline of November 30
th
, 2017. Mr. Nylander replied that it was difficult.
**********
142
th
On July 7
, 2017, Mr. Dag Nylander met in New York with the Foreign
Minister of Venezuela, Samuel Moncada, and proposed the following
agenda for the first meeting of the Parties:
1. The Venezuelan contention that the Paris Arbitration Award of 1899
on the Essequibo is null and void.
2. Options for the solution.
A. Maritime issue
B. Environmental issue
C. Dimensions of bilateral cooperation
D. Other matters
3. Implementation and verification of agreements.
The idea was to meet in Port of Spain (Trinidad) as soon as possible and on
successive occasions, with duration of three days per meeting. The different
items of the agenda could be alternated, without the need to exhaust one to
move on to another. Technical teams, such as the Division of Ocean Affairs
and Law of the Sea, could be invited,. The work of the experts would help
to reduce the tension in the discussion. Everything would be confidential. It
would be the Personal Representative who would report on the progress of
the meetings, notwithstanding that the Parties, prior agreement between
them, could issue pronouncements.
The Personal Representative, who made these proposals orally, required the
Venezuelan Minister’s views no later than July 11
, 2017. However, already
at the meeting the Minister made some observations, which he developped
at his meeting on July 21
th
.
Finally, the meetings of the Parties with the Personal Representative of the
Secretary General, Mr. Dag Nylander, were held in Greentree (New York).
st
143
On November 20
, 2017, Venezuela proposed to apply a modus vivendi
while the direct negotiations were resumed. According to this proposal,
during the negotiations, Venezuela would not interfere in the activities of
Guyana in the Essequibo territory provided that Guyana offered timely
information on its investment and development plans that could affect the
natural environment and bearing in mind that, as provided in the article V.2
of the Geneva Agreement, none of these activities would constitute a basis
for enforcing or creating sovereignty rights.
As regards the maritime spaces, projection of the Essequibo coast,
Venezuela proposed its division into three segments or corridors was
proposed: The eastern corridor or segment under Guyanese administration,
the western one, under Venezuelan administration and the central one as a
reserve area where the Parties would act in concert. Venezuela undertook to
respect the exploration and exploitation activities of non-living resources of
the continental shelf based on licenses granted by the Cooperative Republic
of Guyana until the date of adoption of the modus vivendi. The granting of
new licenses would correspond to each administration in its corridor, prior
information and consultation with the other Party. Only those licenses
having being mutually agreed would be granted in the reserve area.
The Venezuelan proposal anticipated that the Parties would accommodate
their education plans in order to prevent the territorial dispute from being
taught in terms of confrontation, and promote empathy and cooperation with
a view to solving the dispute through a practical and satisfactory
arrangement for both Parties.
Finally, according to the Venezuelan proposal, if, by December 31
th
, 2019,
the Parties had not reached a full agreement, Article IV.2 of the Geneva
st
144
Agreement, suspended while negotiations were taking place, would be
reactivated at the point where it was suspended, unless the Parties agree to
continue negotiations or agree to another means of settlement.
Unfortunately, the response of Guyana, on November 25
, was
characterized by the misrepresentation of the Venezuelan proposals, the
confusion of the Guyanese own claims with consolidated and undisputed
rights, the deliberate disregard of the position of the “other”, the conception
of the negotiation as an imposition of its own points of view, ignoring that
the commitment that results from any negotiation in good faith requires that
the Parties abandon their maximalist positions to reach an agreement; all
this while using a categorical language that sought to delegitimize the
adversary dogmatically. In short, for the Cooperative Republic of Guyana,
the only possible agreement was the one that implied the unconditional
acceptance of all its claims by Venezuela.
Between November 28
th
, 2017, a third and final meeting was held
in Greentree Foundation (New York) between the delegations of the Parties,
headed by the respective Foreign Ministers, and convened by the Personal
Representative of the Secretary General. At the end of this meeting, it was
clear that Guyana had sat down just to wait, refusing to negotiate and did
not make any additional proposal other than insisting on its maximalism.
President Granger’s speech at the Christmas luncheon with his armed forces
on December 22
th
th
and 30
, 2016, has become a reality: “Well we have already
decided that we have already waited 51 years too long. It is our territory
and we will go to court to prove that it is our territory.”
nd
It was the case of the draft Memorandum of Understanding that, one held
these three meetings, Guyana decided to send on its own. This draft
145
proposed to Venezuela an unconditional surrender and a renunciation of all
its rights. Seeking to hide with this document its intransigence, Guyana was
only providing the clearest proof of it. The memorandum was configured as
a pre-agreement that would become a formal treaty within three months and,
if it is was not the case, it entailed Venezuela’s consent to submit to the
International Court of Justice the object of the dispute as Guyana conceived
it, namely, the validity or nullity of the 1899 Award.
On December 11
, 2017, the Personal Representative of the SecretaryGeneral,
Dag
Nylander,
made
an
informative
visit
to
Caracas.
On
December
18
th
, 2017, President Nicolas Maduro wrote to the SecretaryGeneral,
Antonio Guterres. In his letter, the President of Venezuela
contrasted the behavior of Venezuela at the end of 2017 with Guyana’s.
While Venezuela had demonstrated its total commitment to negotiation,
Guyana simply let time pass to take advantage of the promise made by the
previous Secretary-General in its communication of December 15
th
, 2016.
The mere announcement of the Secretary-General had been an incentive for
Guyana’s lack of interest in reaching a negotiated solution. Venezuela
signed the Geneva Agreement to commit to reach a practical and mutually
acceptable arrangement, and not to go to an unconsented international
jurisdiction that it has never accepted and that was contrary to the object,
purpose and reason of the Geneva Agreement, as well as its letter. In any
case, the agreement of the Parties was essential to support the jurisdiction.
The letter concluded asking the Secretary General to continue the
facilitation of negotiations through good offices and mediation, even
reinforced, of his Personal Representative, for a period of at least two years.
“Venezuela, the letter assured, is firmly determined to try to reach a
negotiated solution.”
th
146
**********
On January 30
, 2018, the Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, informed
President Nicolas Maduro that
th
“within the framework established by my predecessor, and since no
significant progress has been achieved in reaching a negotiated
solution to the dispute, I have chosen the International Court of Justice
as the means that must now be used for its solution”.
In his letter, the Secretary-General noted that Article IV.2 of the Geneva
Agreement
“confers on the Secretary General of the United Nations the power
and responsibility to choose, among the means of peaceful settlement
referred to in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, the
means to be used for the resolution of the dispute”; and, "if the means
so chosen does not lead to a solution... the responsibility of choosing
another means ...”
Antonio Guterres recalled the communication of his predecessor of
December 15
, 2016, and referred to “the high-level intensive efforts”
carried out by his Personal Representative, Dag Nylander, in 2017, which he
had “carefully analyzed”, arriving to the conclusion mentioned above.
The Secretary-General offered
th
“continuity in good offices ... through a complementary process
established by virtue of the powers granted to me by the Charter”, a
147
process that: “Firstly ... could contribute to the use of the means of
peaceful solution chosen.”
In an official communiqué issued by the Ministry of Foreign Relations the
following day, January 31
, 2018, it is stated that:
st
“Venezuela duly recorded its strong opposition to the letter dated
December 15
, 2016… warning that the steps announced exceeded
the powers granted to him by the Geneva Agreement, contravening to
its spirit, purpose and reason, as well as the principle of fairness
agreed between the Parties”.
th
And it added:
“The communication of the Secretary-General ignores the successive
order of the means of peaceful settlement established by the Geneva
Agreement as the agreed methodology to reach an acceptable,
practical and satisfactory solution to the dispute.”
And it concluded:
“It is worth asking the reasons to recommend the International Court
of Justice to two States that do not accept its jurisdiction ... The
Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela ... reiterates its
firm willingness to ... maintain political negotiation based on the
Geneva Agreement of Geneva 1966 as the only path to reach a
peaceful, practical and satisfactory solution for both Parties”.
President Nicolás Maduro addressed the Secretary-General, Antonio
Guterres, on February 25
, 2018, stating that he had received
th
148
“with concern, surprise, and at the same time regrets, the content of
his letter, as it exceeds, as does the letter signed on December 15
,
2016 by his predecessor, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, the powers granted to him
by the Geneva Agreement, and contravenes its spirit, purpose and
reason.”
th
The letter continued:
“The judicial settlement contravenes the Geneva Agreement because
it violates its preamble, which stipulates that the dispute must be
“amicably resolved in a manner that is acceptable to both Parties. It
also violates its article I, since it does not lead to satisfactory solutions
to the practical settlement of the dispute”.
The letter added:
“In addition,… Venezuela does not recognize the jurisdiction of the
Court… and in this sense it has been consistent with its historical
position…”
so that the proposal of the Secretary-General
“would be sterile, unacceptable and contrary to the interests of
Venezuela and its People”.
Venezuela
“considers important to continue to have the Good Offices method ...
in the terms in which it was initially accepted by the Parties under the
Geneva Agreement.”
149
On March 28
, 2018, the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Venezuela sent a
diplomatic note to Guyana with its position regarding the communication of
the UN Secretary General of January 30
th
. For this purpose, the note
included the essential lines of President Maduro’s letter to the SecretaryGeneral
of February 25
th
, 2018. The note reiterated to the Guyanese
government that resorting to the judicial settlement was
th
“unacceptable, sterile and unenforceable, proposing the restart of the
diplomatic contacts that allow to reach a peaceful and satisfactory
solution to the territorial controversy, as well as the joint evaluation of
the advisability of continuing with the figure of the Good Offices
under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General”.
On March 29
, 2018, Venezuela learned that Guyana had filed an
Application by a public communiqué from the Ministry of Foreign
Relations of Guyana, before having received the official communication of
the Greffier of the Court. A statement from the Venezuelan Foreign
Ministry made on 30
th
insists on retaking the path of negotiation and
political means to solve the dispute.
Guyana’s response to the Venezuelan note of March 28
th
, 2018
was replied by the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry on May 4
th
rd
, on April 3
, 2018.
th
**********
Venezuela has been protesting every time Guyana has proceeded to grant
licenses for exploration and / or exploitation of oil resources in maritime
areas that are the projection of the Essequibo coast. It has sent warning
letters to the concessionary companies and carried out an information
activity in situ to ships conducting exploratory operations in these areas
150
within the disputed territory. The disregard for this territory on one occasion
end up with the arrest of one of these ships (Teknik Perdana, October 10
,
2013).
In 2017, concessions and exploration activities skyrocketed. But, in order
not to disturb the process of good offices that was just beginning, Venezuela
postponed the diplomatic protest. However, in 2018 these activities were the
object a series of successive verbal notes (DVMAL No. 000307 to 000321,
transferred between on January 25
th
, 2018; and DVMAL nº000322
to 000335, dated February 28
th
th
and 30
and sent jointly by note DVMAL, nº 000338,
of March 1
th
st
). Guyana replied (notes nº 366 / 2018 to 369/2018, transferred
on March 21
,
2018). Some of these notes also referred to mining activities in the land
territory.
At the end of 2018, one of the most dangerous scenarios was confirmed
when ships hired by Exxon Mobil conducted exploration activities in sectors
of the Stabroek block partially located in the maritime projection of the
Delta Amacuro. The delimitation of these areas falls outside the framework
of the Geneva Agreement, but depends on the solution of the territorial
dispute to be achieved within that framework.
On December 22
st
; and No. 301/2018 to 304/2018, transferred on March 27
th
, 2018, a ship hired by Exxon Mobil - the Ramform Thetis
- was intercepted by a Venezuelan naval unit. Guyana’s protest note of the
same date was replied by Venezuela on December 27
nd
(Venezuela had
already sent diplomatic notes on 20
th
,
reiterating the terms of the note of the 24
th
th
and 24
). The note of December 27
th
, stated
th
“the misconception and Manicheism that underlies Guyana’s approach
to the situation and leads to unilateral initiatives that, beyond their
151
illegality, cause situations susceptible of producing undesirable
incidents. The People’s Power Ministry for Foreign Relations of the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is reluctant to believe that this is
precisely the objective pursued by Guyana in the current
circumstances”.
The note continued reminding that:
“existing a territorial dispute between the two countries west of the
middle of the Essequibo River, neither party can refer to maritime
spaces which are the projection of its coast as areas under their
sovereignty and jurisdiction, as long as that dispute is not resolved,
and even then a problem of delimitation of the respective spaces will
remain pending”.
The note pointed out that in this case:
“the exploration of hydrocarbon resources licensed to transnational
companies by the Government of Guyana extends through an area of
the natural projection of the Delta Amacuro on the sea and invades the
Atlantic front of the undoubtedly Venezuelan coast. This implies a
flagrant violation of the sovereignty of Venezuela, as a result of
unilateral claims and actions of Guyana that Venezuela will not
allow”.
After denouncing the misrepresentation made by the Ministry of Foreign
Relations of Guyana qualifying as a hostile and illegal act occurred within
the Exclusive Economic Zone of Guyana the prudent and proportionate
action of the Venezuelan Navy, the note continued addressing the false
accusation of threats and terrorism, both aspects aimed at preventing
152
Venezuela from exercising its sovereign rights. To this effect had deferred
this situation to the UN Secretary-General.
In the note, the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Venezuela reiterated its
concern over the series of unilateral and arbitrary actions in disputed or not
delimited maritime spaces, with which Guyana intends to consolidate
irreversible situations or precedents favorable to its interests. Venezuela has
so far refrained from following that intrinsically destabilizing course of
conduct, and requires Guyana to do the same. In the note Venezuela insisted
on the need to refrain from forcing the situation with exploration activities
in such territories, if they are not by mutual agreement, until the dispute is
resolved and subsequently the maritime spaces corresponding to each on are
delimited.
The note observed that:
“The peaceful settlement of the territorial dispute and the delimitation
of maritime spaces will only be possible through the negotiation of the
Parties, eventually assisted by political means, such as good offices,
used in the past, or mediation, capable to lead to practical, satisfactory
and acceptable settlement for Venezuela and Guyana, contemplated by
the 1966 Geneva Agreement”.
“Contrary to what Guyana maintains in its note No. 1863/2018”, the
note clarified, “Venezuela asserts that the International Court of
Justice lacks jurisdiction over the unilaterally application of Guyana,
invoking as sole basis a choice made by the UN Secretary-General
that does not correspond to his powers in accordance with Article IV.2
of the Geneva Agreement and which, in any case, is in itself
insufficient to substantiate unilateral action. Hence its refusal to
participate in the proceedings initiated before the Court, politically
153
condemned to failure even in the most favorable scenario for the
plaintiff”.
Venezuela, the note went on:
“does not exclude in absolute terms the search for a judicial solution
of the territorial dispute, after exhaustion of the political means that
assist the negotiation of the Parties, verified by both by mutual
agreement, through a special agreement that attaches relevance to the
historical dimension of justice and concludes with an equitable
decision. It is only from there that the negotiation of the delimitation
of maritime spaces could proceed”.
And it concluded:
“Considering all the above, the Government of Venezuela proposes to
the Government of Guyana, the resumption of direct negotiations, on
the date and place to be fixed by mutual agreement for the coming
year, and counting with the assistance of the UN Secretary-General.
The Venezuelan Government considers that, encouraged by the
principle of good faith, which implies taking into account the views
and interests of the other party and the willingness to give up
maximalist approaches for the benefit of reciprocal assignments, an
agreement may be reached”.
Guyana responded to Venezuela’s note of December 27
, 2018, on January
8
th
th
, 2019. On that note, as in a previous note, dated December 28
th,
2018,
Guyana warned that it planned to continue with its development program in
areas over which it had sovereign rights (implying that Guyana had them
where the events subject to the diplomatic exchange had occurred).
154
The Minister of Foreign Relations of Guyana, Carl Greenidge, made a
extensive statement on these facts before the National Assembly of Guyana
on January 3
, 2019. He referred, once again, to the “aggressive actions”
from Venezuela. Guyana insists time and again to present as “violations of
the territorial integrity of Guyana” any Venezuelan initiative aimed at
preventing Guyana’s unilateral exercise of jurisdiction in controversial
maritime spaces and is determined to move forward with the application of
unilateral policies in such spaces, with the inevitable increase in tensions
that can lead to incidents that could be manipulated diplomatically and by
the media.
**********
rd
155
Annex