INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
APPEAL RELATING TO THE JURISDICTION OF
THE ICAO COUNCIL UNDER ARTICLE 84 OF
THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
(BAHRAIN, EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA AND UNITED ARAB EMIRATES v. QATAR)
REPLY OF THE KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN,
THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT,
THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA,
AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Volume II of II
Annexes 1 – 55
27 MAY 2019
LIST OF ANNEXES
VOLUME II
International Treaties and Legislation
Annex 1 United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Civil Air Transport Agreement, signed at Washington
on 4 November 1966, (1967) 6 International Legal
Materials 82
1
Annex 2 Amendment to United States-Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics Civil Air Transport Agreement, signed at
Moscow on 6 May 1968, (1968) 7 International Legal
Materials 571
13
Annex 3 United States-Polish People’s Republic Air Transport
Agreement, signed at Warsaw on 19 July 1972, (1972)
23 United States Treaties 4269
17
Annex 4 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, (1987)
26 International Legal Materials 77
55
Annex 5 Department of Transportation Termination of Air Carrier
Operations between the United States and South Africa,
31 October 1986, (1987) 26 International Legal
Materials 104
95
ICAO Correspondence and Documents
Annex 6 ICAO Council – 74th Session, Minutes of the Second
Meeting, ICAO document 8956-C/1001, 27 July 1971
103
Annex 7 Settlement of Differences: United States and
15 European States (2000), Note on Procedure:
Preliminary Objections (Working Paper Presented
by the President of the Council), ICAO document
C-WP/11380, 9 November 2000
139
i
Annex 8 Bahrain and UAE comments on draft Minutes
C-MIN 214.8 Closed circulated by the Secretariat,
2 August 2018
145
United Nations and European Union documents
Annex 9 United Nations, Resolution 569 (1985) adopted by the
Security Council at its 2602nd meeting on 26 July 1985
175
Annex 10 Common Position of 29 June 1998 defined by the
Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on
European Union concerning a ban on flights by Yugoslav
carriers between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the European Community (98/426/CFSP) [1998]
OJ L190/3
179
Annex 11 Council Regulation (EC) No 1901/98 of 7 September
1998 concerning a ban on flights of Yugoslav carriers
between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
European Community [1998] OJ L248/1
181
Annex 12 United Nations, Resolution 1718 (2006) adopted by the
Security Council at its 5551st meeting on 14 October
2006
185
Annex 13 European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 of
27 May 2016 concerning restrictive measures against the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and repealing
Decision 2013/183/CFSP [2016] OJ L141/79
191
Annex 14 European Union, Council Regulation (EU)
2017/1509 of 30 August 2017 concerning restrictive
measures against the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea and repealing Regulation (EC)
No 329/2007 [2017] OJ L224/1
211
ii
Press Articles and Television Clips
Annex 15 A. Barnett, “Suicide bombs are a duty, says Islamic
scholar”, The Guardian, 28 August 2005
237
Annex 16 Video Excerpt of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, Al-Jazeera
Television, 9 January 2009
241
Annex 17 Video Excerpt of Muhammad Salim Al-Awa, Al-Jazeera
Television, 16 September 2010
247
Annex 18 “Hamas political leaders leave Syria for Egypt and
Qatar”, BBC News, 28 February 2012
251
Annex 19 D. Sabbagh, “Al-Jazeera’s political independence
questioned amid Qatar intervention”, The Guardian,
30 September 2012
255
Annex 20 Video Excerpt of Asim Abdul Majid, Al-Jazeera
Television, 25 June 2013
259
Annex 21 M. Mazzetti, C. J. Chivers and E. Schmitt, “Taking
Outsize Role in Syria, Qatar Funnels Arms to Rebels”,
The New York Times, 29 June 2013
261
Annex 22 “By the Millions, Egyptians Seek Morsi’s Ouster”,
The New York Times, 30 June 2013
265
Annex 23 “Al Jazeera staff resign after ‘biased’ Egypt coverage”,
Gulf News, 8 July 2013
271
Annex 24 J. Schanzer, “Confronting Qatar’s Hamas Ties”,
Politico, 10 July 2013
273
Annex 25 Video Excerpt of Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi, Al-Jazeera
Television, 27 July 2013
277
Annex 26 Video Excerpt of Gamal Nassar, Al-Jazeera Television,
17 August 2013
281
Annex 27 Video Excerpt of Mohamed El-Beltagy, Al-Jazeera
Television, 16 August 2014
285
iii
Annex 28 “German minister accuses Qatar of funding Islamic
State fighters”, Reuters, 20 August 2014
287
Annex 29 T. Ross, R. Mendick and A. Gilligan, “Charity
Commission: British charities investigated for terror
risks”, The Telegraph, 1 November 2014
291
Annex 30 “Islamic Council for Da’wa and Relief cancels
Qaradawi’s Membership”, Egypt Independent,
9 December 2014
297
Annex 31 A. Gennarelli, “Egypt’s Request for Qatar’s Extradition
of Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi”, Center for Security
Policy, 27 May 2015
299
Annex 32 “Voting”, Al Jazeera, 28 May 2015 301
Annex 33 “How Qatar Used and Abused Its Al Jazeera Journalists”,
The New York Times, 2 June 2015
305
Annex 34 M. Fahmy, “The Price of Aljazeera’s Politics”, The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 26 June 2015
309
Annex 35 “Abadi: Iraqi government is ‘holding’ Qatari ransom
money”, Al Araby, 25 April 2017
313
Annex 36 E. Solomon, “The $1bn hostage deal that enraged
Qatar’s Gulf rivals”, The Financial Times, 5 June 2017
317
Annex 37 J. S. Block, “Qatar is a financier of terrorism. Why does
the U.S. tolerate it?”, Los Angeles Times, 9 June 2017
323
Annex 38 “Al-Nosra, the Qatari Terrorist Arm in Syria”, Sky News
Arabia, 17 June 2017
327
Annex 39 E. Lake, “Al-Jazeera and the Muslim Brotherhood”,
Asharq Al-Awsat, 25 June 2017
331
Annex 40 “Egypt: Qatar is the main funder of terrorism in Libya”,
Asharq Al-Awsat, 28 June 2017
335
Annex 41 “Egypt: Qaradawi’s Daughter, Son-in-Law Jailed for
Financing ‘Brotherhood’”, Asharq Al-Awsat, 4 July
2017
341
iv
Annex 42 “New human rights report accuses Qatar of sponsoring
terrorism in Libya”, Asharq Al-Awsat, 24 August 2017
345
Annex 43 “Qatar accused of financing Muslim Brotherhood
activities in Europe”, The Arab Weekly, 29 October 2017
349
Annex 44 “Egypt attack: IS flags carried by gunmen, say officials”,
BBC, 25 November 2017
353
Annex 45 “‘Wanted Terrorist’ finished second in Qatar triathlon”,
The Week, 28 March 2018
357
Annex 46 C. Coughlin, “White House calls on Qatar to stop
funding pro-Iranian militias”, The Telegraph, 12 May
2018
359
Annex 47 Video Excerpt “Zero Distance”, Al-Jazeera Television,
29 July 2018 and 5 August 2018
363
Annex 48 “Egypt remands dissident cleric’s daughter for 45 days”,
BBC Monitoring, 18 March 2019
367
Annex 49 “How Qatar funds Muslim Brotherhood expansion in
Europe”, Gulf News,17 April 2019
371
Annex 50 E. Chorin, “Libya’s Perpetual Chaos”, Foreign Affairs,
19 April 2019
375
Writings of Publicists
Annex 51 C. Rousseau, “Mesures prises par les Puissances
occidentales à l’égard de la Pologne et de l’U.R.S.S. à
la suite de l’établissement de l’état de guerre en Pologne
le 13 décembre 1981”, (1982) 86 Revue Générale de
Droit International Public 603
383
Annex 52 E. Malamut, “Aviation Suspension of Landing Rights
of Polish Airlines in the United States”, (1983)
24 Harvard International Law Journal 190
395
v
Other documents
Annex 53 “Findings of Fact-finding Report Issued by the
Independent National Commission on Events
Concurrent with June 30th, 2013”, 11 March 2014
405
Annex 54 Interpol Red Notice for Yousf Al Qaradawi,
20 November 2014 (Redacted)
597
Annex 55 Public Prosecution, Office of the Attorney General of
Egypt, “Request to Reconsider The Decision of the
Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files
(CCF) issued on the 17th of October 2018, in Session
No. 106, according to provisions of Article 42 of the
statute of the Commission regarding the Egyptian
sentenced: Yusuf Al-Qaradawi under extradition No. 22
of 2014 (International Cooperation Bureau)”, 9 March
2019
601
vi
Annex 1
United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Civil Air Transport
Agreement, signed at Washington on 4 November 1966
(1967) 6 International Legal Materials 82
1
2
Annex 1
3
Annex 1
4
Annex 1
5
Annex 1
6
Annex 1
7
Annex 1
8
Annex 1
9
Annex 1
10
Annex 1
11
Annex 1
12
Annex 2
Amendment to United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Civil Air Transport Agreement, signed at Moscow on 6 May 1968
(1968) 7 International Legal Materials 571
13
14
Annex 2
15
Annex 2
16
Annex 2
Annex 3
United States-Polish People’s Republic Air Transport Agreement,
signed at Warsaw on 19 July 1972
(1972) 23 United States Treaties 4269
17
18
Annex 3
19
Annex 3
20
Annex 3
21
Annex 3
22
Annex 3
23
Annex 3
24
Annex 3
25
Annex 3
26
Annex 3
27
Annex 3
28
Annex 3
29
Annex 3
30
Annex 3
31
Annex 3
32
Annex 3
33
Annex 3
34
Annex 3
35
Annex 3
36
Annex 3
37
Annex 3
38
Annex 3
39
Annex 3
40
Annex 3
41
Annex 3
42
Annex 3
43
Annex 3
44
Annex 3
45
Annex 3
46
Annex 3
47
Annex 3
48
Annex 3
49
Annex 3
50
Annex 3
51
Annex 3
52
Annex 3
53
Annex 3
54
Annex 4
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986
(1987) 26 International Legal Materials 77
55
56
Annex 4
57
Annex 4
58
Annex 4
59
Annex 4
60
Annex 4
61
Annex 4
62
Annex 4
63
Annex 4
64
Annex 4
65
Annex 4
66
Annex 4
67
Annex 4
68
Annex 4
69
Annex 4
70
Annex 4
71
Annex 4
72
Annex 4
73
Annex 4
74
Annex 4
75
Annex 4
76
Annex 4
77
Annex 4
78
Annex 4
79
Annex 4
80
Annex 4
81
Annex 4
82
Annex 4
83
Annex 4
84
Annex 4
85
Annex 4
86
Annex 4
87
Annex 4
88
Annex 4
89
Annex 4
90
Annex 4
91
Annex 4
92
Annex 4
93
Annex 4
94
Annex 4
Annex 5
Department of Transportation Termination of Air Carrier Operations
between the United States and South Africa,
31 October 1986
(1987) 26 International Legal Materials 104
95
96
Annex 5
97
Annex 5
98
Annex 5
99
Annex 5
100
Annex 5
101
Annex 5
102
Annex 5
Annex 6
ICAO Council – 74th Session, Minutes of the Second Meeting,
ICAO document 8956-C/1001, 27 July 1971
103
104
Annex 6
105
Annex 6
106
Annex 6
107
Annex 6
108
Annex 6
109
Annex 6
110
Annex 6
111
Annex 6
112
Annex 6
113
Annex 6
114
Annex 6
115
Annex 6
116
Annex 6
117
Annex 6
118
Annex 6
119
Annex 6
120
Annex 6
121
Annex 6
122
Annex 6
123
Annex 6
124
Annex 6
125
Annex 6
126
Annex 6
127
Annex 6
128
Annex 6
129
Annex 6
130
Annex 6
131
Annex 6
132
Annex 6
133
Annex 6
134
Annex 6
135
Annex 6
136
Annex 6
137
Annex 6
138
Annex 6
Annex 7
Settlement of Differences: United States and 15 European States
(2000), Note on Procedure: Preliminary Objections
(Working Paper Presented by the President of the Council),
ICAO document C-WP/11380, 9 November 2000
139
C-WP/11380
9/11/00
COUNCIL 161ST SESSION
Subject No. 26: Settlement of Disputes between Contracting States
Subject No. 16: Legal Work of the Organization
SETTLEMENT OF DIFFERENCES:
UNITED STATES AND 15 EUROPEAN STATES (2000)
NOTE ON PROCEDURE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
(Presented by the President of the Council)
SUMMARY
This paper provides an overview of the procedure applicable to the
above case during the preliminary objections stage.
Action by the Council: see paragraph 7.1
REFERENCES
Doc 7300/7 — Convention on International Civil Aviation
Doc 7782/2 — Rules for the Settlement of Differences
SG 1658/00
SG 1670/00
SG 1674/00
State letter Ref. LE 6/5-00/38
Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1972, p. 46 ff.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 On 14 March 2000, the United States of America submitted an application and memorial to
the Council for settlement of a difference with Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, under
Article 84 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and Article 2 of the Rules for the Settlement of
Differences (hereinafter “the Rules”).
(4 pages)
140
Annex 7
C-WP/11380 - 2 -
2. APPLICATION AND MEMORIAL
2.1 The application and memorial asserted that a disagreement exists regarding European Council
Regulation (EC) No. 925/1999 (“Hushkits”) and its compatibility with the Convention on International Civil
Aviation, in particular in Articles 11, 15, 38 and 82, as well as Annex 16. According to the wording of the
application and memorial, the Applicant requested that the Council:
(1) determine that the Respondents are in violation of the Convention and Annex 16;
(2) order Respondents to comply with all provisions of the Convention; and
(3) order Respondents to take immediate steps to procure their release from their obligations
under the EC Regulation; and (4) grant such other and further relief as the Council deems
proper and just.
2.2 In accordance with Article 3, paragraph (1)(b), of the Rules, all Contracting States were
notified that the application and memorial had been received (State letter Ref. LE 6/5-00/38 o f
31 March 2000). Copies of the application and memorial were distributed to Representatives on the Council
by memorandum SG 1658/00, LE 6/5 dated 3 April 2000.
3. PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
3.1 Acting under Articles 3, paragraph (1)(c), and 28, paragraph (3) of the Rules, the
President of the Council determined 26 June 2000 as the date by which the counter-memorial specified in
Articles 3, paragraph (1)(c), and 4 of the Rules should be filed by the Respondents. This time-limit was
extended until 21 July 2000, and further until 4 August 2000.
3.2 On 19 July 2000, the Respondents submitted a Statement of Preliminary Objections, in
accordance with Article 5 of the Rules.
3.3 Copies of the Statement of Preliminary Objections were sent to the Applicant by letter dated
4 August 2000 and to Representatives on the Council by memorandum SG 1670/00, LE 6/5 dated
17 August 2000.
3.4 According to the Statement of Preliminary Objections, the Respondents raised the following
objections as a preliminary matter:
(1) The Council lacks jurisdiction due to the inadmissibility of the United States’ claims for
failure to resolve the dispute by negotiation;
(2) The Council lacks jurisdiction due to the inadmissibility of the United States’ claims for
failure to exhaust local remedies; and
(3) The Council lacks jurisdiction due to the inadmissibility of points 2 to 4 of the relief
requested by the United States, as these requests go beyond the powers given to the
Council under the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
141
Annex 7
- 3 - C-WP/11380
The Respondents therefore requested that all the Applicants’ claims, and points 2 to 4 of the requested relief,
be dismissed as inadmissible.
3.5 The Respondents also underlined their commitment to seeking a solution of the differences
underlying this dispute and reiterated their willingness to enter into negotiations with the United States for the
purpose of resolving the dispute.
4. RESPONSE TO THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
4.1 Acting under Articles 3, paragraph (1)(c), and 28, paragraph 3, of the Rules, the
President of the Council determined 15 September 2000 as the date by which the Response of the Applicant
to the Preliminary Objections specified in Articles 5, paragraph (4), and 3, paragraph 1(c), of the Rules should
be filed.
4.2 On 15 September 2000, the United States filed a Statement of Response to the
Preliminary Objections.
4.3 Copies of the Statement of Response were sent to the Respondents by letter dated
18 September 2000 and to Representatives on the Council by memorandum SG 1674/00, LE 6/5 dated
27 September 2000 (English only); other language versions were circulated on 13 October 2000.
4.4. According to the wording of the Statement of Response, the United States requested that the
Council:
(1) reject the propositions of the Preliminary Objections and reaffirm the Council’s
competence to consider the application and memorial of the United States;
(2) order that the time-period for the filing of counter-memorials shall begin to run again
immediately following the Council’s denial of the preliminary objections; and
(3) deny any further requests of the Respondents for additional time to file their
counter-memorials.
5. WORK PROGRAMME OF THE COUNCIL
5.1 At the 14th meeting of its 160th Session, the Council decided to include the item
“Settlement of Differences: United States and 15 European States (2000)” in the work programme of its current
161st Session.
6. FURTHER PROCEDURE UNDER THE RULES
6.1 The procedure applicable in the case of preliminary objections being filed is essentially set out
in Article 5 of the Rules. Paragraph (4) of Article 5 reads as follows:
142
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C-WP/11380 - 4 -
“(4) If a preliminary objection has been filed, the Council, after hearing the
parties, shall decide the question as a preliminary issue before any further steps
are taken under these Rules.”
6.2 Therefore, a decision of the Council shall be taken as a formal decision which may be subject
to appeal to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the case India vs. Pakistan (Appeal Relating to the
Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, Judgement of 18 August 1972, ICJ Reports 1972, p. 46), the International
Court of Justice decided that decisions of the ICAO Council regarding its jurisdiction to entertain a dispute
under Article 84 of the Convention should from a procedural viewpoint be treated similar to decisions on the
merits of the case, and are therefore appealable to the ICJ. Furthermore, the Court also indicated that Article 15
of the Rules applies to such a decision, including the requirement to give reasons for the Council’s decision in
writing (ICJ Reports, 1972, p. 13-14).
6.3 Under Article 15 of the Rules, the following requirements apply:
– The Council shall render its decision after hearing the arguments of the Parties;
– The decision of the Council shall be in writing and shall contain all the particulars of
Article 15, paragraph (2);
– Any Member of the Council who voted against the majority opinion may, if he/she so
wishes, have his/her views recorded in the form of a dissenting opinion to be attached to
the decision of the Council; and
– No Member of the Council who is a party to the dispute shall participate in the vote.
7. ACTION BY THE COUNCIL
7.1 The Council is invited to :
a) proceed to hearing the arguments of the Parties relating to the preliminary objections;
b) discuss the matter; and
c) take a decision on the matter in line with the procedure set out in paragraph 6 above.
— END —
143
Annex 7
144
Annex 8
Bahrain and UAE comments on draft Minutes C-MIN 214.8 Closed
circulated by the Secretariat, 2 August 2018
145
1
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: "Larcos, Andrew" <[email protected]>
To: "Delegation, UAE" <[email protected]>
Cc: "Weber, Ludwig J." <[email protected]>, Mohamed Salem <[email protected]>, Aysha
Mohammed Al Hamili <[email protected]>
Bcc:
Date: Thu, 2 Aug 2018 19:02:53 +0000
Subject: RE: comment on C-MIN 214/8 (Closed)
This message has been archived. View the original item
Dear Mohammed,
This is to acknowledge receipt of your e-mail message. We will be in contact should we encounter any
difficulties with the proposed amendments.
Kind regards,
Andrew Larcos
C/ACS
From: Delegation, UAE
Sent: 2-Aug-18 2:53 PM
To: Larcos, Andrew
Cc: Weber, Ludwig J.; Mohamed Salem; Aysha Mohammed Al Hamili
Subject: comment on C-MIN 214/8 (Closed)
Dear Andrew,
please find UAE comments & Bahrain comments attached
if any more clarification is needed please contact me.
Annex 8
146
2
Best Regards
Eng. Mohammad Salem | .
UAE Alt Representative to ICAO Council
Tel: +1 514 954 5739
Fax: +1 514 954 5826
999 University Street Suite 14.20
Montreal, Quebec
Canada H3C 5J9
Email: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
Annex 8
147
Comments on Draft Minutes C-Min 214/8 (Closed) 23/7/18
We respectfully suggest the changes noted below to the draft Minutes. Requested changes
are noted in red text for ease of reference.
We request that paragraph 23 should be revised as follows:
H.E. Al Mansoori affirmed that the Applicant had made no attempt to negotiate the real
dispute with the Respondents, and had not even attempted to fulfil the said Article
2(g) requirement when filing its Application (A). He noted that, in fact, the Applicant
conceded on page 7 of its Memorial (A) that it had not attempted to enter into
negotiations in relation to the matters it now raised before the Council, taking the
position instead that the severance of diplomatic relations had made negotiations
“futile.”
We request that paragraph 111 should be revised as follows:
In seeking clarification regarding the voting majority required (19), H.E. Al Mansoori
(United Arab Emirates) noted that, pursuant to Article 84 of the Chicago Convention,
33 Council Members were eligible to vote on the Respondents’ preliminary objection
relating to Application (A). In his view, that meant that 17 positive votes constituted a
majority. In further noting that in accordance with Article 66 b) of the Chicago
Convention 25 Council Members were eligible to vote on the Respondents’
preliminary objection relating to Application (B), he indicated that in his opinion 13
positive votes constituted a majority.
Annex 8
148
COUNCIL — 214TH SESSION
SUMMARY MINUTES OF THE EIGHTH MEETING
(THE COUNCIL CHAMBER, TUESDAY, 26 JUNE 2018, AT 1430 HOURS)
CLOSED MEETING
President of the Council: Dr. Olumuyiwa Benard Aliu
Secretary: Dr. Fang Liu, Secretary General
PRESENT:
Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Brazil
Cabo Verde
Canada
China
Colombia
Congo
Cuba
Ecuador
Egypt
France
Germany
India
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Kenya
Malaysia
— Mr. A.D. Mesroua
— Mr. G.E. Ainchil
— Mr. S. Lucas
— Mr. O. Vieira (Alt.)
— Mr. C. Monteiro
— Mr. M. Pagé
— Mr. Shengjun Yang
— Mr. A. Muñoz Gómez
— Mr. R.M. Ondzotto
— Mrs. M. Crespo Frasquieri
— Mr. I. Arellano
— H.E. H. EL-Adawy,
President, CAA
— Mr. P. Bertoux
— Mr. U. Schwierczinski
— Mr. A. Shekhar
— Ms. N. O’Brien
— Mr. M.R. Rusconi
— Mr. S. Matsui
— Ms. M.B. Awori
— Mr. K.A. Ismail
Mexico
Nigeria
Panama
Republic of Korea
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Turkey
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United Republic of Tanzania
United States
Uruguay
— Mr. D. Méndez Mayora
— Mr. M.S. Nuhu
— Mr. G.S. Oller
— Mr. Y.J. Lee
— Mr. S. Gudkov
— H.E. Dr. N.B.M. Al-Amudi,
Minister of Transport and
Chairman, GACA
— Mr. T.C. Ng
— Mr. M.D.T. Peege
— Mr. V.M. Aguado
— Ms. H. Jansson Saxe
— Mr. A.R. Çolak
— H.E. S.B.S. Al Mansoori,
Minister of Economy and
Chairman, GCAA
— Mr. D.T. Lloyd
— Mr. R.W. Bokango
— Mr. T.L. Carter
— Mr. M. Vidal
ALSO PRESENT: SECRETARIAT:
Mrs. M.F. Loguzzo (Alt.)
Mr. C. Fernández (Alt.)
H.E. K.B.A. Mohammed,
Minister of Transportation
and Telecommunications (Obs.)
Mr. M.T. Al Kaabi (Obs.)
Mr. S.M. Hassan (Obs.)
Mr. D. Krishan (Adv.)
Mr. G. Petrochilos (Adv.)
Ms. A. Keene (Adv.)
Mr. R.F. Pecoraro (Alt.)
Mr. D. Tavares Taufner (Alt.)
Mr. H. Gonzales (Alt.)
Mr. Chunyu Ding (Alt.)
H.E. A. Salama (Alt.)
Mr. A. Khedr (Rep.)
Mrs. S. El Mowafi (Alt.)
Mrs. Y.H.M. Elbedewy (Alt.)
Mr. M. Millefert (Alt.)
Mr. N. Naoumi (Alt.)
Mr. M. Usami (Alt.)
Mrs. D. Valle Álvarez (Alt.)
Bahrain
Mrs. J. Yan
Ms. I. Sosina
Mr. J. Huang
Mr. Y. Nyampong
Mrs. D. Brookes
Mr. M. Vaugeois
Mr. A. Larcos
Miss S. Black
— C/OSG
-writer
International Civil Aviation Organization
DRAFT MINUTES
DRAFT
C-MIN 214/8 (Closed)
23/7/18
Mr. Hassan was not
part of the Bahrain
delegation.
Annex 8
149
C-MIN 214/8 (Closed) -2-
ALSO PRESENT (CONTINUED):
H.E. J.B.S. AlSulaiti,
Minister of Transport and
Communications (Obs.)
H.E. A.N. AlSubaey (Obs.)
H.E. F.M. Kafood (Obs.)
H.E. Y.S. Laram (Obs.)
Mr. E.A. Al-Malki (Obs.)
Mr. M.A. AlHajri (Obs.)
Mr. T.A. Almalki (Obs.)
Mr. E.A. Mindney (Obs.)
Mr. A. Altamimi (Obs.)
Mr. J. Augustin (Adv.)
Mr. K. Lee (Alt.)
Mr. D.S. Ha (Alt.)
Mr. D. Subbotin (Alt.)
H.E. A.M. Altamimi (Alt.)
H.E.H.E. W.M.A. Alidrissi (Adv.)
Mr. S.A.R. Hashem (Rep.)
Mr. M.S. Habib (Alt.)
Mr. N.B.B. Alsudairy (Obs.)
Mr. D.L.Q. Ming (Adv.)
Mr. L.C. Yong (Adv.)
Mr. S. Vuokila (Alt.)
H.E. S.M. Al Suwaidi (Alt.)
H.E. M.S.H. Al Shehhi (Alt.)
H.E. F. Al Raqbani (Alt.)
Miss A. Alhameli (Rep.)
Mr. M. Salem (Alt.)
Mr. M. Al Shamsi (Alt.)
Dr. L. Weber (Alt.)
Mrs. L. Coquard-Patry (Alt.)
Mrs. S. Aminian (Alt.)
Mrs. S. Kirwin (Alt.)
Mrs. K.L. Riensema (Alt.)
Mr. S. Kotis (Alt.)
Mr. J.M. Padilla (Alt.)
Mrs. M.A. González (Alt.)
Mr. F. de Medina (Alt.)
Rep. of Qatar to ICAO
Qatar
Singapore
Arab Emirates
Representatives to ICAO
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Chile
Cyprus
Ethiopia
Greece
Honduras
Indonesia
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Lebanon
Paraguay
Peru
Qatar
Senegal
Sudan
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Subject No. 16: Legal work of the Organization
Subject No. 26: Settlement of disputes between Contracting States
Settlement of Differences: The State of Qatar and the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of
Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (2017) – Application (A)
(relating to the interpretation and application of the Chicago Convention and its Annexes):
Preliminary Objection Stage
Settlement of Differences: The State of Qatar and the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of
Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (2017) – Application (B) (relating to the interpretation and
application of the International Air Services Transit Agreement): Preliminary Objection Stage
1. On behalf of the Council, the President extended a warm welcome to the following
high-level Government Officials who were duly accredited to represent their respective Member States as
their Authorized Agents: H.E. Kamal Bin Ahmed Mohammed, Minister of Transportation and
Telecommunications of Bahrain, H.E. Hany EL-Adawy, President of the Civil Aviation Authority of Egypt,
H.E. Jassem Bin Saif AlSulaiti, Minister of Transport and Communications of Qatar, H.E. Dr. Nabeel bin
Mohamed Al-Amudi, Minister of Transport and Chairman of the Board of the General Authority of Civil
Aviation of Saudi Arabia, and H.E. Sultan Bin Saeed Al Mansoori, Minister of Economy and Chairman of
the Board of the General Civil Aviation Authority of the United Arab Emirates. In addition, he welcomed
all other officials from the said five Member States who were also in attendance. The Secretary General
joined in this welcome.
2. The Parties and the Council agreed to the proposal by the President for the concurrent
presentation and consideration of the two above-mentioned items, on the understanding that the Council
would take separate decisions thereon given that Application (A) and Application (B) related to two
different international air law instruments, namely, the Chicago Convention and the International Air
Services Transit Agreement (Transit Agreement), and that there were different Respondents thereto. The
items were considered on the basis of two working papers presented by the Secretary General, C-WP/14778
Restricted (with Addendum No. 1) and C-WP/14779 Restricted (with Addendum No. 1), respectively, and
the following memoranda issued by the Secretary General to Council Representatives:
memorandum SG 2411/18 (with Blue rider) dated 23 March 2018, which transmitted the Respondents’
Statements of preliminary objections with respect to Application (A) and Application (B);
memorandum SG 2416/18 (with Blue rider) dated 8 May 2018, which transmitted the Applicant’s
Response to the said Statements of preliminary objections; and
memorandum SG 2420/18 dated 13 June 2018, which transmitted the Respondents’ Rejoinders to the
Applicant’s Responses to their Statements of preliminary objections.
Introduction of C-WP/14778 Restricted (with Addendum No. 1) – Application (A)
3. The Secretary General introduced C-WP/14778 Restricted (with Addendum No. 1), which
provided an overview of the procedure applicable to Application (A) – the disagreement between Qatar, as
Applicant, on the one hand and Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as
Respondents, on the other hand, during the preliminary objection stage.
4. In the executive summary of C-WP/14778 Restricted, the Council was invited to hear the
arguments of the Parties relating to the preliminary objection and to take a decision on the matter in line
with the procedure set forth in Article 5 of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2),
paragraph (4) of which specified that “If a preliminary objection has been filed, the Council, after hearing
the Parties, shall decide the question as a preliminary issue before any further steps are taken under these
Rules.”.
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Introduction of C-WP/14779 Restricted (with Addendum No. 1) – Application (B)
5. The Secretary General then introduced C-WP/14779 Restricted (with Addendum No. 1),
which provided an overview of the procedure applicable to Application (B) – the disagreement between
Qatar, as Applicant, on the one hand and Bahrain, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, as Respondents, on
the other hand, during the preliminary objection stage. The action by the Council proposed in the executive
summary of C-WP/14779 Restricted was identical to that proposed in the executive summary of
C-WP/14778 Restricted.
6. The President of the Council recalled that, for the two cases before it, the Council was
sitting as a judicial body under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, taking its decisions on the basis of the
submission of written documents by the Parties, as well as on the basis of oral arguments. The Council’s
consideration was limited to the Respondents’ two Statements of preliminary objections with respect to
Application (A) and Application (B), the Applicant’s respective Responses thereto, and the Respondents’
respective Rejoinders, and would not address the merits of the cases. The Rules for the Settlement of
Differences (Doc 7782/2) and the Rules of Procedure for the Council (Doc 7559/10) would be used.
Presentation by the Respondents’ Authorized Agents of their oral arguments
with respect to Application (A) and Application (B)
7. At the invitation of the President of the Council, and on behalf of Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, H.E. Dr. Nabeel bin Mohamed Al-Amudi (Saudi Arabia) presented
the preliminary objection filed by the Respondents in response to Qatar’s Application (A) under Article 84
of the Chicago Convention. Before he began, H.E. Al-Amudi reiterated the Respondents’ utmost respect for
ICAO, the Council, and the international rules and principles governing civil aviation. He emphasized that
safety had been, and continued to be, the Respondents’ top priority. In noting that the Respondents, the
Secretariat, and the ICAO Middle East Regional Office (MID) (Cairo), among others, had worked
diligently to ensure that contingency arrangements were in place in the Gulf region, and that such
arrangements ensured the safe operation of civil aircraft, H.E. Al-Amudi indicated that that task had been
accomplished.
8. H.E. Al-Amudi underscored that, as one of the Council Members had astutely recognized
and stated during the Extraordinary Session of the Council convened on 31 July 2017 pursuant to the
request made by Qatar under Article 54n) of the Chicago Convention, the aviation component of the
situation in the Gulf region was but one part of a complex environment. ICAO’s role, within that
environment, was to administer an international aviation system that delivered safe, secure and efficient air
navigation for all Member States. He observed that that role had been fulfilled.
9. In emphasizing that the Respondents had not chosen to bring this dispute before the
Council today, H.E. Al-Amudi stressed that, as previously notified to the President of the Council and the
Secretary General, the procedures set for the present hearing were contrary to the Respondents’ requests,
the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2), and the fundamental rules of due process. He cited
two notable examples, as follows: firstly, the Respondents’ preliminary objections needed 19 positive votes
to carry the day, but the Rules only required a simple majority of the Council Members entitled to vote; and
secondly, the Respondents had not been provided with sufficient or equal time to adequately present their
case. Their right to be heard had thus been compromised.
10. H.E. Al-Amudi highlighted that during the present meeting it fell on the Council to
recognize that the real issue of this dispute did not concern international civil aviation but rather the
Applicant’s breaches of its international obligations, which had left the Respondents with no effective
option other than to exercise their sovereign right to implement measures to protect their national security
interests.
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11. Underscoring the importance of the dispute’s context, H.E. Al-Amudi recalled the 2013
and 2014 timeframe, when the Gulf Cooperation Council States, including Qatar, had agreed to a series of
collective obligations known as the Riyadh Agreements. He noted that although Egypt was not a signatory
thereto, under their terms, and in particular, as expressly stated in Article 4 of the November 2014
Agreement, Egypt was a beneficiary of those Agreements. H.E. Al-Amudi further noted that, under the
signature of its Emir, Qatar had committed to stop funding, harboring, and supporting persons and
organizations engaging in terrorist or extremist activities, and to desist from interfering in the internal
affairs of neighbouring States. He emphasized that the Riyadh Agreements reinforced the Applicant’s
international law obligations, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations (UN), the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, relevant binding United Nations Security
Council Resolutions, and the customary international law principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of other States.
12. Recalling that the Respondents had asked the Applicant, time and again, to halt these
practices, in line with its commitments, H.E. Al-Amudi underscored that, time and again, the Applicant had
failed to do so. He indicated that in June 2017, after assessing that all other options had been exhausted, the
Respondents had determined that the only way to address these grave threats to their national security was
to terminate diplomatic and consular relations with the Applicant, and to institute a basket of lawful
counter-measures, including the said airspace restrictions. He stressed that unless and until the Applicant
fulfilled its obligations under the Riyadh Agreements, the Respondents would consider it a grave national
security threat, and would continue the basket of counter-measures necessary to counter that threat.
13. In affirming that the Respondents did not implement such counter-measures to punish the
Applicant, H.E. Al-Amudi underscored that their purpose was rather to induce the Applicant to bring its
actions into compliance with its fundamental obligations. He emphasized that when the Applicant fully
complied with its international obligations, as reinforced in the Riyadh Agreements, then the said
counter-measures would be lifted, and that as long as the Applicant continued to breach its obligations, the
counter-measures would remain.
14. Noting that some Council Representatives might be asking themselves why the
Respondents were talking about terrorism in an Organization established to deal with international civil
aviation, H.E. Kamal Bin Ahmed Mohammed (Bahrain) emphasized that that was exactly the point of first
ground of their preliminary objection with respect to Qatar’s Application (A), which rested on the fact
that the present dispute between Qatar, as Applicant, and the Respondents would require the Council to
determine issues that fell outside the latter’s jurisdiction. Noting that the Applicant had all but conceded
that point, he recalled that it had promised to present a “robust defence” against the allegations of its
funding and support of terrorism and to show why the Respondents’ counter-measures were unlawful were
the case to get to the merits. The Council would then have to determine those issues. H.E. Mohammed
underscored, however, that the Council’s jurisdiction under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention was
limited to “any disagreement … relating to the interpretation or application” of the Chicago Convention. In
emphasizing that that provision clearly limited the types of matters that the Contracting States to the
Convention intended the Council to hear, he underscored that the exercise of jurisdiction over matters
unrelated to civil aviation was outside the latter’s mandate. H.E. Mohammed stressed that by asking the
Council to ignore that principle, the Applicant was in fact asking the Council to act far beyond the scope of
its authority, which was not appropriate.
15. Noting that the Parties apparently agreed on the content and applicability of the customary
international law principle on counter-measures in this case, H.E. Mohammed emphasized that the
obligations in the Chicago Convention could not be viewed in isolation of those rules. The Respondents
maintained that the Applicant’s breaches of its international law obligations created a situation where they
had no choice but to impose lawful counter-measures to induce the Applicant to change its behaviour.
the First
Preliminary
Objection
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16. H.E. Mohammed recalled that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had held in the
Hungary/Slovakia case that an injured State could take counter-measures against a State which had
breached its obligations. Under international law, five conditions had to be met for the counter-measures to
be considered lawful, the first of which was that the counter-measure must be adopted in reaction to a
previous internationally wrongful act and directed against the wrong-doing State. He affirmed that such was
the case here.
17. H.E. Mohammed underscored that the Respondents maintained that their said airspace
restrictions were lawful counter-measures, and were permitted under international law. He indicated that
Council Members would know from their own experience that States had, in the past, been compelled to
restrict their airspace in the face of illegal conduct by other States. They had done so bilaterally or
collectively, and on various legal grounds, including by way of counter-measures. H.E. Mohammed cited,
as examples, a European Union (EU) flight ban at the time of the Kosovo crisis; the flight bans on Libyan
outbound flights in 2015; similar bans on North Korean flights; and bans on South African flights as a
reaction to the continuation of apartheid policies in the 1980’s. He noted that although the list of examples
was much longer, the salient point was clear, and it had never been suggested by the States involved, and
rightly so, that any of those broader disputes could be characterized as an aviation matter and resolved by
the Council.
18. H.E. Mohammed emphasized that despite the Applicant’s allegations, the Respondents
were not asking the Council to decide those issues now; rather, at this stage, the Council had only to decide
whether it could properly exercise jurisdiction over the merits, as it related to the real issue in the case.
However, the Respondents did ask the Council to make a decision on its jurisdiction at this phase of the case.
They submitted that their preliminary objection had an exclusively preliminary character. Deciding on the
objection now would not require the Council to rule on the merits of the real issue in dispute, but simply
require it to decide whether it had jurisdiction at all. H.E. Mohammed underscored that in keeping with
ICAO’s Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2), as well as the practice of the ICJ, the
objection should be resolved at the preliminary stage, if at all possible.
19. H.E. Mohammed noted that in order to rule on the legality of the Respondents’ said
airspace measures at large, the Council would first have to determine if the Applicant had in fact violated
the Riyadh Agreements, the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combatting
International Terrorism, the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, numerous United Nations Security Council
Resolutions, and the customary international law principle of non-interference. To state the obvious, such
matters were outside the mandate of the Council. Recalling that the Council had not once ruled on an
Article 84 case in its history, H.E. Mohammed underscored that to do so on a matter involving national
security and counter-terrorism would be unprecedented.
20. H.E. Mohammed stressed that it was impossible to rule on the legality of the Respondents’
said airspace measures without dealing with the larger dispute at hand, a dispute in which the real issue was
the Applicant’s illegal actions. In indicating that for that reason the Council should rule in favour of the
Respondents’ preliminary objection, he reiterated that the real and principal issue in this dispute was not
civil aviation. Recalling that the Council itself had reviewed and confirmed that the contingency
arrangements in the Gulf region agreed in 2017 ensured the safe operation of civil aircraft,
H.E. Mohammed maintained that the larger dispute at issue that the Applicant sought to bring before the
Council did not belong in ICAO.
21. H.E. Sultan Bin Saeed Al Mansoori (United Arab Emirates) then presented the second
ground of the Respondents’ preliminary objection with respect to Qatar’s Application (A). Recalling
that Article 84 of the Chicago Convention provided that only disagreements which “cannot be settled by
negotiation” may be submitted to the Council, he indicated that that meant that an Applicant, in the present
First
Preliminary
Objection
First
Preliminary
Objection
"not"
please
italicise
Respondents'
Second
Preliminary
Objection
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case, Qatar, must show that it had attempted negotiations about the dispute before submitting a case to the
Council. The text of Article 84 was quite clear.
22. H.E. Al Mansoori also brought to the Council Members’ attention Article 2(g) of the Rules
for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2), which provided that the Applicant’s Memorial must contain
“A statement that negotiations to settle the disagreement had taken place between the parties but were not
successful.”. He noted that the Respondents’ submissions cited numerous precedents where the ICJ had
dealt with that issue, including the 2011 case Application of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation) (cf. Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 70, paragraph 160). H.E. Al Mansoori underscored that where
a treaty, such as the Chicago Convention, explicitly called for negotiations before a dispute may be brought,
that requirement operated as a precondition that the Applicant must satisfy before filing an Application with
the Council. Towards that end, it was notable that many of the exhibits the Applicant had provided to
support its attempt at negotiations had come after it had filed its Application (A) and Memorial.
23. H.E. Al Mansoori affirmed that the Applicant had made no attempt to negotiate the real
dispute with the Respondents, and had not even attempted to fulfil the said Article 2(g) requirement when
filing its Application (A). He noted that, in fact, the Applicant conceded on page 9 of its Memorial (A) that
it had not attempted to enter into negotiations in relation to the matters it now raised before the Council,
taking the position instead that the severance of diplomatic relations had made negotiations “futile.”
24. Indicating that the Applicant appeared to have realized, belatedly, that that argument did
not satisfy the precondition to negotiate, H.E. Al Mansoori highlighted that in its Response, the Applicant
had fundamentally changed its position, and now asserted that it had in fact attempted negotiations. It was
notable, however, that despite exhibiting dozens of media reports containing the Applicant’s supposed
official statements, the Applicant had only illustrated that it had made vague public statements to third party
States about its willingness to negotiate. However, the Applicant had not proved that it had demonstrated
that willingness to the Respondents and the Applicant had never made a formal request to initiate
negotiations. H.E. Al Mansoori maintained that the issuance of empty statements regarding the Applicant’s
“willingness” to negotiate was insufficient.
25. H.E. Al Mansoori emphasized that, as the Party asserting jurisdiction, the burden fell on
the Applicant to demonstrate that it had satisfied the requirement of negotiations by making an attempt to
negotiate, consistent with the ICJ Judgment in the said case Application of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation). The Applicant had
failed to do so, however.
26. This led H.E. Al Mansoori to bring to the Council’s attention to another clear contradiction
in the Applicant’s submission. He noted that the first ground of the Respondents’ preliminary objection
with respect to Qatar’s Application (A) rested on the fact that the real issue of this dispute fell outside of
international civil aviation. The Applicant disagreed with them in that regard. However, at the same time,
the Applicant’s response in relation to the question of whether it had fulfilled the precondition of
negotiations was to point to vague statements relating to the larger dispute at hand. H.E. Al Mansoori
reiterated that, indeed, none of the exhibits that the Applicant had pointed to as evidence of its attempts at
negotiations touched on the Respondents’ airspace restrictions.
27. H.E. Al Mansoori queried why, if the real issue of the dispute was the Respondents’
airspace restrictions, did the evidence that the Applicant relied upon as supposedly demonstrating its
attempts at negotiation of those airspace restrictions contain statements only as to the larger dispute. He
underscored that if the real issue of the dispute was indeed the said airspace restrictions, as the Applicant
would have the Council believe, then the Applicant had failed to fulfil the requirement of negotiations
under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention.
[a]
Respondents'
First
Preliminary
Objection
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28. H.E. Al Mansoori observed that the Applicant had further attempted to confuse the issue
by referring to discussions held in entirely unrelated fora, for example, to proceedings before the World
Trade Organization (WTO), which related to a different dispute. He underscored that, consistent with the
views expressed by the ICJ in the said case Application of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), such discussions did not satisfy the
requirement of prior negotiations because they did not relate to what the Applicant claimed was the subject
of its Application (A) before ICAO.
29. H.E. Al Mansoori noted that the Applicant had also asserted that the proceedings of the the
Extraordinary Session of the Council on 31 July 2017, held pursuant to Article 54 n) of the Chicago
Convention, were evidence that there had been negotiations between the Parties within the framework of
ICAO. He emphasized that, as the Council Members well knew, those Article 54 n) proceedings had been
rightfully confined to discussions regarding the safety of civil aviation in the context of the contingency
arrangements in the Gulf region. H.E. Al Mansoori affirmed that such discussions could not, under any
characterization, constitute an attempt by the Applicant to negotiate for purposes of satisfying the
requirement of prior negotiations under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention. He noted that while the
Applicant had also pointed to letters that it had submitted to the President of the ICAO Council and the
ICAO Secretary General, arguing that it had indeed attempted negotiations, none of the letters it had
referred to included any request to the Respondents to negotiate on the said airspace restrictions. Indeed,
those letters had not even been addressed to the Respondents.
30. H.E. Al Mansoori indicated that, in these circumstances, the Respondents respectfully
submitted that the Council should conclude that the Applicant had failed to fulfil the precondition of
negotiations required by Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and, further, that it had failed to comply with
Article 2(g) of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2). As a consequence, the Respondents
respectfully submitted that the Council should decline to proceed with this matter further.
31. H.E. Al Mansoori underscored that even if the Applicant were to affirm today its
willingness to undertake negotiations with the Respondents, it would be too late for the present case.
Maintaining that any such request for negotiations had to occur before the Application was filed with ICAO,
he reiterated that the law on that question was crystal-clear.
32. H.E. Al Mansoori indicated that, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Respondents
respectfully requested that the Council accept and uphold their preliminary objection with respect to
Qatar’s Application (A) and therefore decide: i) that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims raised by
Qatar’s Application (A); or ii) in the alternative, that Qatar’s claims were inadmissible.
33. On behalf of Bahrain, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, H.E. Hany EL-Adawy (Egypt)
addressed the preliminary objection filed by them, as Respondents, in response to Qatar’s Application (B)
under Article II, Section 2 of the Transit Agreement. He prefaced his remarks with an affirmation of the
Respondents’ utmost respect for ICAO, the Council, and the international rules and principles governing
civil aviation and their commitment to cooperating with all parties, including Qatar, under the auspices of
ICAO, to ensure the safe and secure operation of civil aviation.
34. H.E. EL-Adawy underscored that the grounds for the preliminary objection explained
earlier in respect of the Chicago Convention applied with equal force to the Transit Agreement. He
reiterated that the first ground of the preliminary objection rested on the fact that the real issue of this
dispute, the Applicant’s illegal actions, fell outside the scope of ICAO’s mandate, and that the second
ground of the preliminary objection rested on the fact that the Applicant had not satisfied the precondition
to make a genuine attempt at negotiations.
35. H.E. EL-Adawy took this opportunity to re-emphasize that the central issue in the current
crisis was the Applicant’s ongoing support for extremism and terrorism and its continued interference in the
objections
objections
First
Preliminary
Objection
Second
Preliminary
Objection
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internal affairs of other States. He reiterated that the Applicant’s policies represented a threat not only to the
security and stability of Arab States, but also to many other countries.
36. In noting that at this stage the Council was only called upon to decide whether it could
properly exercise jurisdiction over the merits of the case, as they pertained to the real issue, H.E. EL-Adawy
reiterated that if the Council were to accept jurisdiction and proceed to the merits of the case, then it would
be acting inconsistently with international law and contrary to the expectations of States, because it would
be required to pass judgment on issues outside its jurisdiction.
37. H.E. EL-Adawy underscored that the Applicant had overstated the breadth of the Council’s
jurisdiction when it claimed in its Response that “the Council has never refused jurisdiction in any case
brought before it.”. He emphasized that the Council had only rejected preliminary objections challenging its
ability to hear a disagreement on three occasions, and that it had never issued a final decision on the merits.
H.E. EL-Adawy noted, by contrast, that since the founding of ICAO, the Council had never asserted
jurisdiction over a counter-measures defence. He indicated that the Respondents respectfully submitted that
ICAO should not be involved in setting this dangerous precedent today and accordingly respectfully
requested the Council to uphold their preliminary objection with respect to Qatar’s Application (B) on the
grounds that: i) the Council lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims raised by Qatar’s Application (B);
or ii) in the alternative, that Qatar’s claims were inadmissible.
Presentation by the Applicant’s Authorized Agent of its oral arguments in response
to the Respondents’ oral arguments
38. H.E. Jassem Bin Saif AlSulaiti (Qatar) prefaced his presentation with an expression of
Qatar’s gratitude to ICAO for its efforts and service to ensure the safety and security of international civil
aviation, and for assuming its responsibilities by convening the present Council meeting to consider Qatar’s
requests regarding the aviation restrictions imposed on it by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
Bahrain and Egypt on 5 June 2017.
39. H.E. AlSulaiti underscored that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Respondents’
preliminary objections and not the merits of the claims made by Qatar in its Application (A) and
Application (B) and their corresponding Memorials filed with ICAO on 30 October 2017. He emphasized
that the current hearing was simply to discuss the jurisdiction of the Council, which was set out in Article 84
of the Chicago Convention and Article II, Section 2 of the Transit Agreement. Under those agreements, the
jurisdictional clause was simple: the Council had jurisdiction to decide the case if there was any
disagreement relating to the interpretation or application of the Chicago Convention or the Transit
Agreement which could not be settled by negotiation. There was nothing under those agreements or in the
Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2) which set any other limits on, or otherwise
circumscribed, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Council. The Council was simply being asked to
undertake a function with which it had been constitutionally mandated.
40. H.E. AlSulaiti recalled that, on 5 June 2017, without any previous warning and without any
effort to negotiate with Qatar, the said four States, acting in concert and in coordination, had taken what
Qatar considered to be a series of brutal and unprecedented measures against it, which included the
prevention of Qatari-registered civil aircraft from transiting their airspace and from landing for non-traffic
purposes. He asserted that those actions explicitly violated a number of provisions of the Chicago
Convention and the Transit Agreement as set out in Qatar’s Application (A) and Application (B) and their
corresponding Memorials, which had been filed with ICAO on 30 October 2017.
41. H.E. AlSulaiti noted that by letter dated 19 March 2018, the Respondents had presented to
ICAO their Statements of preliminary objections to Qatar’s Application (A) and Application (B). Qatar had
responded on 30 April 2018. The Respondents subsequently had filed so-called “Rejoinders” on 12 June
2018. Before proceeding further, H.E. AlSulaiti wished to place on record that Qatar believed that it had
two
objections
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been procedurally and substantively prejudiced by virtue of the fact that the Respondents had been
permitted to file the so-called “Rejoinders” under Article 7(1) of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences
(Doc 7782/2). As stated in Qatar’s e-mail of 25 May 2018 to Council Delegations, Qatar was equivalent to
the defendant for the purposes of consideration of the Respondents’ Statements of preliminary objections,
yet the said Rules had been interpreted to allow the Respondents to file Rejoinders, which were the last
written pleadings permitted following the filing of the Counter-memorials. The Respondents’
Counter-memorials had not yet been submitted, however.
42. H.E. AlSulaiti noted that since the Parties were making a single presentation for both of
the said Applications for convenience and to save time, references in his current presentation to certain
excerpts or texts were to Qatar’s Application (A), the Respondents’ Statement of preliminary objections (A),
Qatar’s Response (A) and the Respondents’ so-called “Rejoinder” (A). He indicated that they were to be
taken as cross-read with the comparable provisions in the pleadings for Application (B).
43. H.E. AlSulaiti emphasized that essentially, the crux of the Respondents’ arguments was
that the Council did not have jurisdiction, or alternatively, that Qatar’s claims were inadmissible. He
indicated that, at times, the Respondents confused the two concepts in their Statement of preliminary
objections. They claimed that their actions constituted lawful counter-measures, and that that would require
the Council to determine issues forming part of a wider dispute between the Parties. The Respondents stated
that there was a body of law outside of the Chicago Convention which afforded them a dispositive defence
to the claims of Qatar. The basis of the alleged lack of jurisdiction essentially boiled down to an allegation
that “While the Council has considerable expertise in the technical aspects of aviation enshrined in the
Chicago Convention, it is not well-suited or well-equipped to handle disputes of a wider nature …”(cf.
Statement of preliminary objections, executive summary, paragraph 4). Additionally, the Respondents
claimed that Qatar had failed to meet the condition of negotiation.
44. H.E. AlSulaiti underscored that although the Respondents claimed that, in determining the
issues raised by Qatar under the Chicago Convention or the Transit Agreement, the Council was prevented
or circumscribed from considering any issues falling outside of the Convention or Agreement, they did not
explain or explain satisfactorily why that should be so. He highlighted that most legal disputes arose in a
wider context and that their determination could also take into account other issues relevant to the
determination of the legal question placed before the tribunal. In adjudicating issues, tribunals, even those
with subject matter jurisdictional clauses like the Council, were not placed in blinkers.
45. H.E. AlSulaiti affirmed that, as Qatar had pointed out in its Response to the said Statement
of preliminary objections, the Council had jurisdiction as long as the question for decision related to the
interpretation or application of the Chicago Convention or the Transit Agreement and could not be settled
by negotiations.
46. H.E. AlSulaiti underscored that, as Qatar has shown in its said Responses, the Rules for
the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2) did not permit the Council to consider issues of admissibility at
the preliminary objection stage. Article 5(1) of the Rules, adopted by the Council to govern its
consideration of disputes under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article II, Section 2 of the Transit
Agreement, quite clearly only allowed a preliminary objection to be filed as to jurisdiction.
47. H.E. AlSulaiti averred that the reference made in paragraph 15 of the Respondents’
“Rejoinder” to Article 36(6) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was intended to divert
the Council’s attention from the central issue. The Article simply stated that in the event of a dispute as to
whether the Court had jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court itself. It had
nothing to do with admissibility.
48. H.E. AlSulaiti noted that it was quite remarkable how the Respondents attempted to
explain away the recent decision of the Council in the case Settlement of Differences: Brazil and United
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States (2016). He emphasized that if Brazil had not wished to make the point that the Council should not
address issues of admissibility at the preliminary objection stage, then that had been Brazil’s prerogative.
Qatar now raised the matter. H.E. AlSulaiti underscored that contrary to what had been alleged by the
Respondents, there was no confirmation by the Council that it could have ruled on admissibility at that stage.
In fact, for the Council, the matter to be decided at the preliminary objection stage was only jurisdiction,
which was why the Council had not even discussed the arguments on extinctive prescription in the said case.
He maintained that it was the Respondents who were wrong in law on that point.
49. H.E. AlSulaiti recalled that in paragraph 24 of the “Rejoinder”, the Respondents stated
that Qatar presumably intended to invite the Council to join the Respondents’ preliminary objections to the
merits in both Applications. Underscoring that the Respondents’ presumption was wrong, he highlighted
that in paragraph 214 of its Response, Qatar invited the Council to declare that it had no competence at the
preliminary objection stage to consider the claims, arguments and submissions of the Respondents on
admissibility.
50. H.E. AlSulaiti observed that the statement made by the Respondents in paragraph 26 of
their Rejoinder that Article 5(4) of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2) did not give the
Council the option of joining preliminary objections to the merits was correct. He emphasized, however,
that under Article 5(1) of the Rules, preliminary objections were to be on issues of jurisdiction, not issues of
admissibility.
51. H.E. AlSulaiti averred that, given Qatar’s arguments, it was disingenuous and trickery for
the Respondents to claim, as they did in paragraph 14 of their Rejoinder, that Qatar did not dispute a
Respondent’s right to file an objection on grounds of admissibility under ICAO’s Rules. Qatar’s response
was that although such an objection should be presented, the Council could not consider it at this stage.
52. H.E. AlSulaiti indicated that, as had been pointed out in paragraph 17 of Qatar’s Response,
although the ICJ could rule on admissibility at the preliminary objection stage, the ICJ had indicated in its
Judgment in the case Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) that under its Rules, where the Court found that an objection did not possess
an exclusively preliminary character, it would be dealt with at the merits stage (cf. Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2008)
53. H.E. AlSulaiti underscored that the Respondents’ claim that the real issue before the
Council was something different from their actions which were not in conformity with the Chicago
Convention and the Transit Agreement was wrong and misleading. He averred that the Respondents had not
understood or had ignored the case law. H.E. AlSulaiti stressed that the object of Qatar’s claim, or the real
issue for the Council to determine, was whether or not the Respondents had violated the Chicago
Convention and the Transit Agreement, and to declare that accordingly. He emphasized that, as Qatar had
pointed out in paragraph 34 of its Response, the fact that a legal dispute had wider underlying elements did
not mean that such a dispute fell outside the jurisdiction of the Council or was inadmissible. H.E. AlSulaiti
recalled that many of the cases under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention or the Transit Agreement
previously referred to the Council had had wider underlying political issues or other non-aviation problems,
and that in no case had the Council since its inception declined jurisdiction over it.
54. H.E. AlSulaiti highlighted that, as stated by the ICJ in its Judgment in the United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case, no provision of its Statute or Rules contemplated that the
Court should decline to take cognizance of one aspect of a dispute merely because that dispute had other
aspects, however important (cf. ICJ Reports 1980).
55. H.E. AlSulaiti emphasized that, although the Respondents would like the Council to
believe otherwise, there was no provision in the Chicago Convention or the Transit Agreement which
stipulated that the Council should decline jurisdiction over a disagreement on their interpretation or
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application merely because there were other aspects to the dispute before the Council, or that the decision
could or must take into account elements which did not fall completely within the parameters of civil
aviation. He underscored that the violation of the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement was not a
marginal or incidental matter before the Council.
56. H.E. AlSulaiti averred that the reference made by the Respondents in their Statement of
preliminary objections and paragraph 42 of their Rejoinder to the Chagos Islands arbitration case did not
help them. They had helpfully pointed out that the Tribunal had stated that where a dispute concerned the
interpretation or application of the Convention, the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal extended to making
such findings of fact or ancillary determinations of law as were necessary to resolve the dispute presented to
it. H.E. AlSulaiti emphasized that that was exactly what Qatar was requesting the Council to do.
57. H.E. AlSulaiti underscored that the assertion made by the Respondents in paragraph 44 of
their Rejoinder that bodies such as the Council may not encroach upon the jurisdiction which other bodies
may have over the real dispute, which was related to the so-called “principle of specialty”, was wrong in
law and unsubstantiated. He indicated that as Qatar had addressed that issue in paragraphs 49 to 65 of its
Response to show that that principle espoused by the Respondents could not apply to prevent the Council
from assuming jurisdiction, he would not repeat the arguments here in the Council. H.E. AlSulaiti indicated
that it would mean that no other Specialized Agency or other body would have jurisdiction to consider a
matter as long as there was some connection, incidental or otherwise, with the functions of another
organization. The net result would be a complete denial everywhere of the justiciability of Qatar’s
grievances. It would also render invalid the constitutional mandate under the Chicago Convention and the
Transit Agreement to settle differences or disagreements relating to their interpretation and application.
58. H.E. AlSulaiti averred that the point which the Respondents tried to make about the use of
the words “political issues” was, in the main, one of pure semantics. Noting that the words “wider issues”,
“wider disputes”, “political issues”, “broader issues”, “wider underlying elements”, “broader questions”,
“other aspects” and so on were all used, he underscored that, fundamentally, whatever terminology was
used, the law was still the same.
59. H.E. AlSulaiti observed that all of the Respondents’ arguments as to why the Council
could not answer the legal question put to it boiled down to one thing. In the Statement of preliminary
objections, executive summary, paragraph 3, the Respondents claimed that resolution of Qatar’s claims
would require the Council to determine issues forming part of the wider dispute between the Parties. They
stated that the Council would have to determine, amongst other things, whether Qatar had breached its
relevant counter-terrorism obligations under international law. In paragraph 4, they alleged that the Council
did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate issues as to whether Qatar had breached its other obligations under
international law. In particular, the Respondents stated in paragraph 58 of their Rejoinder: “Such a factual
and legal assessment requires considerable expertise on technical and legal matters. The Council has
considerable specialist expertise in the technical aspects of aviation enshrined in the Chicago Convention.
But it is not well-suited or equipped to handle disputes about violation of sovereignty, breach of the
principle of non-intervention, subversion and terrorism”. More or less the same statement was repeated in
the Respondents’ Statement of preliminary objections, executive summary, paragraph 4, and paragraph 69;
and in their Rejoinder, executive summary, paragraph 5.
60. H.E. AlSulaiti stressed that while it was clear that most of the Respondents’ arguments
boiled down to the rationale that the Council was not well-suited or well-equipped to answer the legal
question put to it or to assume its legal mandate, that was not a valid argument in law or in fact. Yet that was
what the Respondents were, in effect, having as the conclusion of their reasoning and arguments.
61. In emphasizing that Qatar had the utmost respect for the Council, H.E. AlSulaiti indicated
that although it might or might not agree with every decision of the Council, it had confidence in the ability
of the Council and the Representatives to answer the legal questions put to them. He recalled that the Group
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of Experts established to draft Rules for the Settlement of Differences in the 1950’s had been of the view
that: “If Council decides to hear a case arising under Article 84 [of the Chicago Convention] which presents
problems of legal complexity or requires special knowledge of economic or air transport matters on the part
of the Council, it is open for each State member of the Council to designate, temporarily, a legal, economic
or other expert as Representative of that State on Council during the period or on the occasions where the
contemplated case under Article 84 is being dealt with.”.
62. Further, as to the supposed difficulty the Council Representatives would face if the
Respondents would put forward a defence that they had instituted lawful counter-measures, Qatar believed
that, based on the documents which the Respondents had unfortunately produced as exhibits and the
statements they had made in their Statements of preliminary objections and Rejoinders, the matter would be
one of the easiest for the Council to decide at that session when it would examine the merits of the two
cases.
63. H.E. AlSulaiti underscored that, whether or not Council Representatives believed that
statement, the fact was that the assessment could only be made after the Respondents’ Counter-memorial
was presented, which may or may not contain a claim from the Respondents that their actions were lawful
counter-measures, and after Qatar replied to whatever defence was put forward by the Respondents. In
emphasizing that the Council could not make that assessment now, he noted that that was what the ICJ had
been guarding against in its 1972 Judgment regarding the Appeal relating to the jurisdiction of the ICAO
Council (India v. Pakistan).
64. H.E. AlSulaiti recalled that in that ICJ case India had alleged then that flights of Pakistani
aircraft over India was governed by a Special Regime in force between the two States, which was
completely outside of the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement, and also that India had become
entitled under international law or international treaty law outside of those two agreements, to terminate or
suspend them. In its Judgment, the ICJ had decided that as long as there was “a dispute of such a character
as to amount to a ‘disagreement … relating to the interpretation or application’ of the Chicago Convention
or of the related Transit Agreement … then prima facie the Council is competent. Nor could the Council be
deprived of jurisdiction merely because considerations that are claimed to lie outside the Treaties may be
involved, if, irrespective of this, issues concerning the interpretation or application of these instruments are
nevertheless in question.” (cf. ICJ Reports 1972, p. 61, paragraph 27). The Court had gone on to state that
“The fact that a defence on the merits is cast in a particular form, cannot affect the competence of the
tribunal or other organ concerned, – otherwise parties would be in a position themselves to control that
competence, which would be inadmissible.” (cf. ICJ Reports 1972, p. 61, paragraph 27). Thus the
competence or jurisdiction of the Council must depend on the character of the dispute submitted to it and on
the issues raised, not on those defences on the merits or other considerations, which would become relevant
only after the jurisdictional issues had been settled.
65. H.E. AlSulaiti emphasized that although the Respondents had tried to explain away the
importance of that ICJ Judgment, they could not hide from the plain, clear wording of the Court. They could
not claim that the Council had no jurisdiction because they intended to raise a defence of counter-measures
at the stage of the merits. They could not bring forward a defence, any defence, on the merits so as to deny
jurisdiction. The Council had not seen the Respondents’ Counter-memorial and Qatar’s reply, and it could
not assume that it had no jurisdiction because of issues which might be in there.
66. Further, all those arguments of the Respondents went to admissibility, not jurisdiction, and
should be dismissed at this stage.
67. The Respondents kept claiming that the actions they had taken were lawful
counter-measures. They were not.
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68. On the issue of the negotiations, Qatar had made it clear that the threshold to establish
jurisdiction was quite low.
69. H.E. AlSulaiti underscored that compromissory clauses such as, or similar to, Article 84 of
the Chicago Convention or Article II, Section 2 of the Transit Agreement were not uncommon. Qatar
believed, and reiterated, that the question as to the date when the condition of negotiation must be fulfilled
was not definitively settled in law, as prior to the Racial Discrimination case, there had been a long string of
cases, going back to 1924 right through to 2008, to the effect that any initially unmet condition, including
for jurisdiction, may be fulfilled at the time the Court rules, as otherwise the Applicant would be entitled to
initiate fresh proceedings, which would not be in the interests of sound administration of justice. The one
case that went against the grain was the Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation) case, which had a strong dissenting
opinion by five judges (cf. Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 70, paragraph 160).
70. Recalling that Qatar had mentioned in its said Response that none of its efforts to negotiate
with the Respondents had been fruitful, H.E. AlSulaiti indicated that the core issue before the Council was
Qatar’s request that it determine whether the Respondents had violated the provisions of the Chicago
Convention and the Transit Agreement. In so doing, the Council was free, as the Respondents had pointed
out in paragraph 42 of their Rejoinder, to make such findings of fact or ancillary determination of law as
were necessary to resolve the dispute presented to it. For example, if the Respondents would keep their
promise to defend their actions by saying that their counter-measures were valid, then the Council was not
prevented from considering elements which would go to a determination of the question. Nor was it an
argument in law or in fact to say that the Council was ill-suited or ill-equipped to do so.
71. H.E. AlSulaiti underscored that the issue of negotiations in the two cases now under
consideration must be considered in the context that the Respondents had broken off diplomatic relations
with Qatar at the same time as they had instituted the said measures. They had acted then, and had continued
to act, in concert and in coordination with each other. The Respondents had refused to negotiate with Qatar,
instead presenting non-negotiable demands and principles, which if accepted, would render Qatar no longer
a sovereign nation. H.E. AlSulaiti averred that it was therefore self-serving for the Respondents to claim
that Qatar did not negotiate the aviation aspects with them, when in fact all the other coercive measures had
been taken jointly as one package.
72. H.E. AlSulaiti emphasized that Qatar had nevertheless presented evidence that it had
negotiated or attempted to negotiate with the Respondents, through the mechanism of ICAO, the very
subject matter of the violations of the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement. Qatar was seeking to
work with the Respondents through ICAO to find a solution to the measures which they had taken. He
recalled that when Qatar had taken the matter to the Council under Article 54 n) of the Chicago Convention,
the Respondents had asked the Council to recognize that the Parties were cooperating and to encourage
them to cooperate further. H.E. AlSulaiti noted that the United Arab Emirates had indicated that the ICAO
MID Regional Office had coordinated multiple meetings to review the contingency measures in the Gulf
region and to discuss additional proposals. Numerous Representatives had spoken of the need for the
Parties to “continue” to cooperate, or negotiate, or dialogue, or discuss. The Council had encouraged all
Parties to continue their collaboration. Contrary to the Respondents’ assertion, in carrying out those
negotiations through the mechanism of ICAO, Qatar did not have to indicate that they were under Article 84
of the Chicago Convention. Discussions and negotiations on the Respondents’ aviation restrictions had
taken place in ICAO. If the other Parties had not responded then in a manner to negotiate in good faith and
to resolve the aviation measures taken against Qatar, Qatar could not be faulted for that.
73. H.E. AlSulaiti noted that the multiple ICAO meetings held in the Gulf region had also been
to seek solutions to mitigate the effects of the coercive measures taken by the Respondents by preventing
Qatari-registered aircraft from overflying their airspaces.
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74. With regard to the WTO, H.E. AlSulaiti recalled that although Qatar had written to three of
the Respondents in Application (A) and to two of the Respondents in Application (B) requesting
consultations on the prohibition of Qatari-registered aircraft from accessing their airspaces and landing at
their airports, the answer from the three States had been a flat “no”. So within another multilateral
framework Qatar had sought unsuccessfully to engage the Respondents on the subject matter of the specific
dispute before the Council today.
75. H.E. AlSulaiti recalled that under international jurisprudence, it was not necessary for
Qatar to have referred specifically to the Chicago Convention or the Transit Agreement, as long as the
negotiations related to the subject matter of those Agreements.
76. With respect to the use of good offices of the Emir of Kuwait and certain other States,
H.E. AlSulaiti noted that despite the expressions of willingness by Qatar to negotiate a solution, the only
reaction on the part of the four Respondents had been to issue non-negotiable demands, some of which
would be an affront to the sovereignty of any State.
77. H.E. AlSulaiti highlighted that among the demands which the Respondents stated were
non-negotiable were to: immediately shut down the Turkish military base; shut down Al Jazeera and its
affiliate stations; align Qatar’s military, political, social and economic policies with the Gulf and Arab
countries; shut down all news outlets funded directly and indirectly by Qatar; respond within 10 days of the
list being submitted to Qatar, or the list would become invalid; and consent to monthly compliance audits in
the first year, quarterly audits in the second year and annual audits in the following 10 years.
78. H.E. AlSulaiti emphasized that Qatar had made clear that it was open to negotiations and
had attempted negotiations, that it would not negotiate on items which would derogate from its sovereignty,
but was open to discuss all other issues in accordance with international law.
79. H.E. AlSulaiti indicated that Qatar had noted with particular interest the statement in
paragraph 137 of the Respondents “Rejoinder” that Qatar had not made any genuine attempt to negotiate
through other channels, such as via Kuwait and the United States. He considered that that was quite an
astonishing assertion, which utterly ignored the evidence produced by Qatar in its various exhibits attached
to its Response. H.E. AlSulaiti recalled that the then US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson had said on
19 October 2017 that “It is up to the leadership of the quartet when they want to engage with Qatar because
Qatar has been very clear – they’re ready to engage.”.
80. H.E. AlSulaiti stressed that under these circumstances, it was clear that negotiations were
futile and the Parties were deadlocked.
81. H.E. AlSulaiti underscored that Qatar clearly had met the requirement for negotiations
under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article II, Section 2 of the Transit Agreement. He
reiterated that Qatar had been subjected to a brutal campaign from the four States, targeting its civil aviation
and aiming to cause direct and premeditated damage to Qatar and its airlines. The campaign was still going
on for a year. The Respondents refused to allow Qatari-registered aircraft to fly over or land in their
territories, in violation of numerous provisions of the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement. They
acted with complete impunity.
82. H.E. AlSulaiti recalled that the drafters of the Chicago Convention had given the Council a
noble and sacred function to decide upon disagreements between States relating to the interpretation or
application of those two instruments. That duty became even more important to protect Member States
from aggressive and arbitrary actions by other Member States. The Council was elected by all of the
Member States of ICAO to work for the global good of civil aviation. That was the vision of the creators of
this Organization.
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83. H.E. AlSulaiti recalled Article 4 of the Chicago Convention, which indicated that each
Contracting State agreed not to use civil aviation for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of the
Convention. He underscored that ICAO contracting States looked to the Council Members to preserve the
integrity of the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement, and to set an example to the other
Contracting States, not to violate themselves those treaties.
84. In concluding, H.E. AlSulaiti indicated that Qatar respectfully requested the Council to
accept its submissions at paragraphs 214 and 215 of its Response, including to reject the preliminary
objection of the Respondents in both Application (A) and Application (B).
85. After a brief recess to enable consultations, the Respondents and the Applicant presented
the following rebuttals to each other’s oral arguments, all of which were duly noted and recorded for the
minutes of the meeting.
Respondents’ rebuttal
86. Speaking on behalf of the four Respondents on this very important matter which raised
novel issues for the Council, Mr. Georgios Petrochilos (Legal Advisor, Bahrain Delegation) noted that the
latter had heard arguments from the Applicant on a number of points. Rather than reiterating the
Respondents’ procedural concerns at this stage, he focused only on three of the Applicant’s points. He
started with its argument, or perhaps lack of argument, on what was the real issue in dispute. As the Council
would have seen, in the pleadings, the term “real issue in dispute” was a legal term of art. Mr. Petrochilos
noted that there were three main propositions, the first of which was that it was within the power of the
Council to address and assess objectively the object of the dispute. Affirming that that was indeed a
responsibility of the Council, he underscored that it was a responsibility that went hand-in-hand with the
power of the Council to determine the existence and the scope of its jurisdiction. The second proposition –
and it followed from the first one like the night follows the day – was that in so doing the Council was not
bound by the characterizations made by the Parties, and in particular, by the characterizations that were
made by one Party, in the present case, the Applicant. The third proposition was that the object of the
dispute consisted of the issues that arose objectively from the pleadings of both sides.
87. In now applying that test to the facts of the cases, Mr. Petrochilos indicated that when one
looked at Qatar’s Applications one saw an attempt – and Council had heard it today– to frame the dispute as
one under ICAO international treaties. Even so, it was hard to keep up that pretense in the pleadings, and so
the Applicant had had to admit, as in fact it did, that the Respondents had adopted a set of measures which
included the severance of diplomatic and consular relations with the Applicant and various other
restrictions placed on the latter. Mr. Petrochilos recalled that the Applicant called those measures “actions”,
in the plural, and that it admitted that they had several “aspects”. He noted that the position was then made
clearer in the Respondents’ pleadings, which described the main measures, although very briefly. The
pleadings also referred to the stated position of the Respondents from the outset of the measures that the
latter were being adopted as lawful counter-measures. Those had been taken, as the Council had heard, in
the face of the Applicant’s multiple grave and persistent breaches of international obligations essential to
the security of the Respondents and the region. Mr. Petrochilos underscored that the Applicant did not
dispute that counter-measures were what the Respondents intended to take, nor that the Respondents were
entitled to bring that defence and have it determined before any court or tribunal that had proper jurisdiction
to adjudicate the real dispute. Indeed, the Applicant conceded in its Response, and had stated the same thing
during the present meeting, that in order for the Council to decide on the merits of the case the Council
would need to determine “on the facts and in law whether the Respondents have met the conditions for
lawful counter-measures”. Mr. Petrochilos underscored that that would require the Council to conduct a
forensic factual enquiry, in proper judicial fashion, into the Applicant’s illegal activities. He respectfully
submitted that that left the Council in a place clearly outside the Chicago Convention and the Transit
Agreement
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88. In elaborating thereon, Mr. Petrochilos indicated that, on the merits of the case the Council
would first have to determine whether the Applicant had breached or had not breached a number of
international obligations that, as it admitted, had, in the main, nothing whatever to do with civil aviation.
He queried how the Council was to assess the long list of the Applicant’s grave misdeeds which the
Respondents said were not related to civil aviation, the Chicago Convention, or to the Transit Agreement,
and what legal standard the Council would apply. Mr. Petrochilos noted that, while the Council would then
have to determine whether the four Respondent States were entitled to react to the Applicant’s breaches by
taking a set of counter-measures to induce it to come back to the fold of legality, the Chicago Convention
and the Transit Agreement could not help the Council answer that question. He underscored that it was
crucial to understand that this forensic and legal examination would come before the Applicant’s
complaints under the Chicago Convention and Transit Agreement. Why was that? because – and this was
uncontroversial between the Parties – counter-measures precluded any question of unlawfulness at the
threshold. Mr. Petrochilos emphasized that the Council would not get anywhere near the Chicago
Convention or the Transit Agreement, which were the texts that granted it jurisdiction, until it had fully
considered and decided a host of other issues on which the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement
had nothing whatever to say. He averred that one was unable to see how the Council might uphold its
jurisdiction in those circumstances. Mr. Petrochilos reiterated that this was not a civil aviation dispute but
rather a dispute about fundamentally different and broader duties of international law. He underscored that
those duties were neither ancillary, as the Applicant had said, nor incidental issues on any possible view, but
rather “the core of the dispute”, to quote the Chagos Islands ICJ decision.
89. Turning to the second point, the Applicant’s argument about the preliminary nature of the
Respondents’ objections, or otherwise, Mr. Petrochilos recalled that the Rules for the Settlement of
Differences (Doc 7782/2), at Article 5(1), characterized a preliminary objection as a question as to
“the jurisdiction of the Council to handle the matter presented by the Applicant.”. Thus a preliminary
objection might concern either, firstly, whether the Council had jurisdiction at all to consider the
Application, or secondly, whether the Council should, in the circumstances of the case, exercise a
jurisdiction that it had. Mr. Petrochilos noted that the first type of objection was one of jurisdiction, while
the other type of objection could perhaps, in legal theory, be called one of admissibility. He averred that
those distinctions did not matter for the Council’s purposes as both of those types of objection were covered
by the wording of Article 5(1). They were points as to the jurisdiction of the Council to handle the dispute,
whether it had jurisdiction or whether it should exercise it. Mr. Petrochilos indicated that, in any event,
there was not much daylight between the two types of objection because both, if successful, precluded the
consideration of the substance of the dispute. They operated at the threshold.
90. Mr. Petrochilos highlighted that Article 5(4) of the said Rules provided that where
preliminary objections had been lodged, as in the present case, the Council shall decide the question as a
preliminary matter. Recalling that the ICJ had held “that in principle a Party raising preliminary objections
is entitled to have them resolved preliminarily”, he underscored that all the said Rules were doing was
expressing a general procedural principle. Mr. Petrochilos underscored that the Council had always
resolved preliminary objections that it had characterized as going to its jurisdiction in a preliminary
decision and had never joined them to the merits of the dispute for consideration later. The only
circumstances in which the Council had joined preliminary objections to the merits was where the objection
did not possess “an exclusively preliminary character”, which might mean either that the Council did not
have enough information to properly evaluate the objection at that stage or that it was impossible to rule on
the preliminary objection separately on its own without prejudging the merits. Mr. Petrochilos stressed that
at present the Council was not in either one of these territories. The Respondents were not asking the
Council to validate the lawfulness of the measures they had taken, nor were they asking the Council to
condemn the Applicant for its severely unlawful conduct. They were simply asking the Council to
recognize the real object of the dispute between the Parties and to recognize and declare on that basis that it
did not possess jurisdiction to consider the substance of this dispute.
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91. The last point that Mr. Petrochilos wished to make on this issue of the Respondents’
primary position was that both of their preliminary objections went to the Council’s jurisdiction i.e. to the
issue of whether the Contracting States, including the four Respondent States, had or had not consented to
have this dispute adjudicated by the Council. In the interest of time, he picked that point up only by
reference to Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, in which the Contracting States had consented to the
Council’s jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes which firstly related to “the interpretation or application of this
Convention”. It was thus necessary for Council Members to satisfy themselves that the real dispute that was
objectively before them was about the interpretation or application of the Chicago Convention. Secondly, it
was necessary for them to satisfy themselves that this was a dispute that could not be settled by negotiation.
Those were jurisdictional requirements enshrined in Article 84 of the Convention.
92. Turning to the requirement of exhaustion of negotiations before an Applicant may
commence proceedings, Mr. Petrochilos re-emphasized that Qatar had not fulfilled that precondition. He
noted that Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article II of Section 2 of the Transit Agreement were
formal: they required that the dispute must be one that could not be settled by negotiations. At the risk of
stating the obvious, Mr. Petrochilos underscored that that was not an option at the Applicant’s discretion,
nor was it a mere formality. He recalled that the ICJ, which was the appeal body in respect of the Council’s
decisions, required an Applicant to make at least “a genuine attempt to resolve the disagreement through
negotiations and that attempt and these negotiations must take place prior to the filing of an Application”.
Mr. Petrochilos underscored that an Applicant which commenced legal proceedings first and only
thereafter sought to start negotiations fell afoul of that jurisdictional requirement. He noted that there were
good policy reasons why the Respondents asked the Council to enforce that precondition, as follows: firstly,
that unless the Parties had tried to negotiate and had clearly stated their positions in a formal and appropriate
way, the contours of the dispute were not known and it was not possible to see the pathology that had
developed in this case. The Council was able to assess the nature and the scope of the dispute only through
the exchange of pleadings between the Parties, which the Respondents considered was neither appropriate
nor helpful. The second policy reason was that if the Council were to accept jurisdiction on the basis that
one can start proceedings first and only then pick up the phone perhaps or send a formal diplomatic
correspondence, more importantly and more appropriately, then there would be no motivation for Applicant
States to do that which was required of them by the Chicago Convention, and that was not a policy to be
encouraged. Thirdly, it was necessary to always bear in mind that judicial resolution was the mechanism of
last resort, and that negotiation was the primary method of resolution in international relations.
Mr. Petrochilos recalled that the Applicant represented to the Council in its Application (A) and
Application (B) that it had not sought to negotiate. It stated in section (g) thereof that “The Respondents did
not permit any opportunity to negotiate the aviation aspects … ”. Then the Applicant had had to prove that
assertion. He noted that that kind of assertion, which was one that went to futility, was a very demanding
one which required one, at the very least, to try to commence negotiations. Mr. Petrochilos underscored that
when the Respondents had put the Applicant to that point in their pleadings, the latter had changed tact,
assumedly because it had not been able to sustain its allegation anymore. The Applicant had therefore stated
that it had invited negotiations after all.
93. In making two points on that allegation, Mr. Petrochilos averred that as 11 of the
statements relied upon by the Applicant during the present meeting post-dated its said Applications, the
Council could ignore them. He highlighted that all of the remaining statements were addressed to third
parties, for political consumption in the view of the Respondents: they had not been made in the formal
fashion of formal correspondence on specific issues. Mr. Petrochilos further emphasized that, in fact, not
even in that irregular fashion adopted by the Applicant had the latter even once formulated a specific
invitation to negotiate specific complaints that it now claimed to have under the Chicago Convention and
the Transit Agreement, and yet the Applicant had admitted in its own Applications that the negotiations
would have to concern civil aviation specifically. He underscored that an invitation to negotiations would
have been a very straightforward thing to do for any State that resorted to the Council with a genuine
complaint within the ICAO system. Any State would know how to do it. That the Applicant had instead
tack
presumably
Annex 8
166
-19- C-MIN 214/8 (Closed)
expended its energies on vague political statements addressed to third parties showed that it had no
intention to have a genuine negotiation on specific legal rights and obligations.
94. Before closing, Mr. Petrochilos noted that he was authorized to represent to the Council
one important factual point: the four Respondent States had heard today for the first time, if they had
understood correctly, that the Applicant had invited all of them to negotiate. So far as ICAO-related
complaints were concerned, he was authorized to place on record on behalf of the said Respondents that that
was incorrect. It had never happened. Unless he could be of further help to the Council under the control of
the Respondents’ Authorized Agents, that concluded Mr. Petrochilos’ intervention.
95. Returning to the point raised regarding the safety of civil aviation, H.E. Al Mansoori
(United Arab Emirates) recalled that the Council, at its said Extraordinary Session on 31 July 2017, had
successfully addressed the issue of contingency arrangements in the Gulf region. In emphasizing that the
Applicant’s airports and airspace remained open, he noted that: Qatar Airways alone currently had over 100
aircraft in operation flying to more than 150 destinations worldwide; Qatari-registered aircraft continued to
fly in and out of Doha every day; contingency routes had been established through the Respondents’ FIRs;
and, in addition, landing and overflight options remained available for safety or emergency purposes.
H.E. Al Mansoori indicated that it was very regrettable that the Applicant was exploiting ICAO, a very
important technical organization, for its political and media campaign purposes.
Applicant’s surrebuttal
96. H.E. AlSulaiti (Qatar) reiterated that Qatar’s sole intention in submitting its Application (A)
and Application (B) and their corresponding Memorials to ICAO had been to raise purely technical issues
relating to the interpretation and application of the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement and not
any political issues. He then gave the floor to his Legal Advisor, Mr. John Augustin.
97. Enquiring whether the Respondents’ Legal Advisor had given an additional presentation or
a rebuttal, Mr. Augustin noted that whereas his rebuttal was supposed to have addressed issues raised by the
Applicant in its oral arguments, his comments had gone well beyond that into a fresh presentation. He
underscored that the Applicant had neither been afforded such an opportunity to give an additional
presentation nor been prepared to give one, although the Respondents had apparently been prepared to do
so.
98. In then commencing his surrebuttal, Mr. Augustin highlighted that approximately
one-third of the Respondents’ comments had had to do with issues which absolutely went to the merits of
the two cases and whether the Applicant supported terrorism or terrorism financing. He pointed out that
whereas in the past when the Council has considered similar matters it had drawn a curtain on discussions
which touched on the merits of the case, some ten minutes had been spent by the Respondents in
commenting on the Applicant’s alleged support for terrorism or terrorism financing, which had nothing to
do with the matter currently before the Council.
99. In emphasizing that the Applicant had a completely different view from the Respondents
on the issue of admissibility of its claims and the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2),
Mr. Augustin indicated that it was completely unable to understand the logic of the Respondents’ reasoning
with regard to Article 5(1) of the Rules, which clearly stated “If the Respondent questions the jurisdiction of
the Council to handle the matter presented by the Applicant, he shall file a preliminary objection setting out
the basis of the objection.” The Respondents accepted that there was a difference between jurisdiction and
admissibility. However, Article 5(1) referred to the jurisdiction of the Council and not to the admissibility
of a case. Mr. Augustin emphasized that ICAO’s Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2) were
different from the ICJ’s Rules in that regard.
Annex 8
167
C-MIN 214/8 (Closed) -20-
100. Mr. Augustin highlighted that a completely new philosophy had been presented by the
Respondents, namely, that of the “real issue” in the case. He noted that although Qatar’s Application (A)
and Application (B) and their corresponding Memorials related purely to the interpretation and application
of the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement, for some reason the Respondents considered that the
Council lacked the jurisdiction to hear and resolve the claims raised therein. Mr. Augustin further indicated
that the Respondents had avoided the substantive issue of the Appeal relating to the jurisdiction of the
ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan) on which the ICJ had rendered its Judgment on 18 August 1972, referred
to earlier by H.E. AlSulaiti (cf. paragraphs 69 and 70 above). In that Appeal India had claimed that there
were issues outside the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement which prevented the Council from
examining the merits of the case, the same argument being used by the Respondents in the present two cases.
He repeated the ICJ’s decision that as long as there was “a dispute of such a character as to amount to a
‘disagreement … relating to the interpretation or application’ of the Chicago Convention or of the related
Transit Agreement … then prima facie the Council is competent. Nor could the Council be deprived of
jurisdiction merely because considerations that are claimed to lie outside the Treaties may be involved, if,
irrespective of this, issues concerning the interpretation or application of these instruments are nevertheless
in question.” (cf. ICJ Reports 1972, p. 61, paragraph 27).
101. Recalling that the Respondents had indicated that they might have a defence on the merits,
Mr. Augustin enquired whether that was a promise that they would bring forward the issue of their
counter-measures. Noting that neither the Respondents’ defence on the merits nor the Applicant’s reply had
been seen by the Council, he underscored that as a consequence the latter could not make a determination
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear and resolve the claims raised in Qatar’s Application (A) and Application
(B). Mr. Augustin quoted, in this regard, the ICJ’s Judgment in the said Appeal relating to the jurisdiction of
the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan) “The fact that a defence on the merits is cast in a particular form,
cannot affect the competence of the tribunal or other organ concerned, – otherwise parties would be in a
position themselves to control that competence, which would be inadmissible.” (cf. ICJ Reports 1972, p. 61,
paragraph 27). Averring that that was the very core of the Respondents’ arguments, he asserted that they
wanted, at this stage, to control the competence of the Council for a defence on the merits which no one had
seen and to which the Applicant had not replied.
102. Mr. Augustin reiterated that if the Respondents were to put forward a defence that they had
instituted lawful counter-measures, then the Applicant considered, on the basis of the evidence referred to
earlier, that the matter would be one of the easiest for the Council to decide at that session when it would
examine the merits of the two cases. The Respondents, on the other hand, had indicated that it would be
extremely difficult as the Council’s hands were tied and it was incapable of handling the matter. The point
was that the Council could not make a determination that it had no jurisdiction until it had seen the
Respondents’ defence on the merits and the Applicant’s response, which was exactly what the said Appeal
relating to the jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan) had been trying to avoid.
103. Mr. Augustin then referred to the Respondents’ argument, presented in their Statement of
preliminary objections, executive summary, paragraph 4, that “While the Council has considerable
expertise in the technical aspects of aviation enshrined in the Chicago Convention, it is not well-suited or
well-equipped to handle disputes of a wider nature … including issues regarding terrorism and other
matters related thereto.”. He recalled that that argument was repeated in paragraph 69 of the said Statement
(“The Council, comprised of aviation specialists, has considerable expertise in the technical aspects of
aviation enshrined in the Chicago Convention, but is not well-suited or well-equipped to handle disputes
about interference, violation of sovereignty, subversion and terrorism.”), as well as in the Respondents’
Rejoinder, executive summary, paragraph 5 (“The Council is not well-suited or equipped to handle disputes
of this nature, nor is it competent to do so.”) and paragraph 58 (“Such a factual and legal assessment
requires considerable expertise on technical and legal matters. The Council has considerable specialist
expertise in the technical aspects of aviation enshrined in the Chicago Convention. But is not well-suited or
equipped to handle disputes about violation of sovereignty, breach of the principle of non-intervention,
subversion and terrorism.”).
Annex 8
168
-21- C-MIN 214/8 (Closed)
104. Mr. Augustin indicated that he would very much like to see the Respondents go before a
proper tribunal or court of law such as the ICJ and claim that it was not well-suited or well-equipped to
discuss issues which went to the merits of a case, whatever the type of issue. He averred that it was a novel
legal argument and that it had no basis in fact or in law. Recalling the oral arguments presented earlier by
H.E. AlSulaiti (cf. paragraph 67 above), Mr. Augustin reiterated that the Group of Experts established to
draft Rules for the Settlement of Differences in the 1950’s had been of the view that: “If Council decides to
hear a case arising under Article 84 [of the Chicago Convention] which presents problems of legal
complexity or requires special knowledge of economic or air transport matters on the part of the Council, it
is open for each State member of the Council to designate, temporarily, a legal, economic or other expert as
Representative of that State on Council during the period or on the occasions where the contemplated case
under Article 84 is being dealt with.”. Affirming that each Council Member State was free to designate
temporarily whomever it wished to listen to a particular case, Mr. Augustin stressed that it could not be said
that the Council was ill-equipped or ill-suited and that the case should therefore be dismissed upfront at the
preliminary objection stage.
105. All of the preceding oral arguments were duly noted and recorded for the minutes of the
meeting. In the absence of any direct questions to the Authorized Agents or Legal Advisors of the Applicant
and the Respondents by Council Members non-Parties to the disagreements, the Council proceeded to its
deliberations on the items.
Deliberations
106. Taking into account the Council’s recent experience with the Settlement of Differences:
Brazil and United States (2016) (cf. C-DECs 211/9 and 211/10), and the views of the many Council
Representatives who had been consulted prior to the present meeting, the Representative of Mexico, in his
capacity as Dean of the Council, proposed that the Council proceed directly to a vote by secret ballot in
order to take a decision on each of the Respondents’ preliminary objections with respect to Application (A)
and Application (B), pursuant to Article 50 of the Rules of Procedure for the Council (Doc 7559/10).
107. This proposal was seconded by the Representative of Singapore, in his capacity as First
Vice-President of the Council, as constituting the most efficient way forward.
108. The Council agreed to the said proposal. Under Article 52 of the Chicago Convention,
decisions by the Council required approval by a majority of its Members. In line with the consistent practice
of the Council in applying that provision in previous cases, since the Council comprised 36 Members,
acceptance of the Respondents’ preliminary objections in both Application (A) and Application (B)
required 19 positive votes.
109. It was highlighted: that Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were not
entitled to vote under Application (A) and that Egypt and the United Arab Emirates were not entitled to vote
under Application (B) in accordance with Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article 15 (5) of the
Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2), which specified that “No Member of the Council
shall vote in the consideration by the Council of any dispute to which it is a Party”; that pursuant to
Article 66 b) of the Chicago Convention only those Council Member States parties to the Transit
Agreement were eligible to vote under Application (B)1; and that following the completion of each secret
ballot, a staff member from LEB would assist in the tallying of all of the votes cast for the purpose of
ensuring its accuracy.
1 List of Council Member States parties to the Transit Agreement:
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, China (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Macao Special
Administrative Region), Congo, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Republic of Korea, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom and the United States.
constituted
The President
then said that
he understood
this as a
matter of
procedure, but
he wished to
understand
whether there
should be
deliberations.
He noted that
in the case
between the
United States
v. Brazil, there
were
deliberations,
whereby
Representativ
es spoke and
expressed
their views.
He wished to
be sure on
whether there
ought to be
deliberations.
There were no
comments
from the
Council.
Annex 8
went to the merits of a case, whatever the type of issue. He averred that it was a novel
it had no basis in fact or in law. Recalling the oral arguments presented earlier by
paragraph 67 above), Mr. Augustin reiterated that the Group of Experts established to
Settlement of Differences in the 1950’s had been of the view that: “If Council decides to
under Article 84 [of the Chicago Convention] which presents problems of legal
special knowledge of economic or air transport matters on the part of the Council, it
member of the Council to designate, temporarily, a legal, economic or other expert as
State on Council during the period or on the occasions where the contemplated case
being dealt with.”. Affirming that each Council Member State was free to designate
wished to listen to a particular case, Mr. Augustin stressed that it could not be said
equipped or ill-suited and that the case should therefore be dismissed upfront at the
stage.
the preceding oral arguments were duly noted and recorded for the minutes of the
of any direct questions to the Authorized Agents or Legal Advisors of the Applicant
Council Members non-Parties to the disagreements, the Council proceeded to its
items.
into account the Council’s recent experience with the Settlement of Differences:
States (2016) (cf. C-DECs 211/9 and 211/10), and the views of the many Council
been consulted prior to the present meeting, the Representative of Mexico, in his
Council, proposed that the Council proceed directly to a vote by secret ballot in
on each of the Respondents’ preliminary objections with respect to Application (A)
pursuant to Article 50 of the Rules of Procedure for the Council (Doc 7559/10).
proposal was seconded by the Representative of Singapore, in his capacity as First
Council, as constituting the most efficient way forward.
Council agreed to the said proposal. Under Article 52 of the Chicago Convention,
required approval by a majority of its Members. In line with the consistent practice
applying that provision in previous cases, since the Council comprised 36 Members,
Respondents’ preliminary objections in both Application (A) and Application (B)
votes.
highlighted: that Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were not
Application (A) and that Egypt and the United Arab Emirates were not entitled to vote
accordance with Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article 15 (5) of the
of Differences (Doc 7782/2), which specified that “No Member of the Council
consideration by the Council of any dispute to which it is a Party”; that pursuant to
Chicago Convention only those Council Member States parties to the Transit
to vote under Application (B)1; and that following the completion of each secret
from LEB would assist in the tallying of all of the votes cast for the purpose of
Member States parties to the Transit Agreement:
Australia, China (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Macao Special
Region), Congo, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia,
constituted
The President
then said that
he understood
this as a
matter of
procedure, but
he wished to
understand
whether there
should be
deliberations.
He noted that
in the case
between the
United States
v. Brazil, there
were
deliberations,
whereby
Representativ
es spoke and
expressed
their views.
He wished to
be sure on
whether there
ought to be
deliberations.
There were no
comments
from the
Council.
169
C-MIN 214/8 (Closed) -22-
110. A request made by H.E. Al-Amudi (Saudi Arabia) on behalf of the Respondents for an
open ballot for the sake of transparency in the process given that the Council was currently acting as an
adjudicator was declined by the Council on the basis of Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure for the Council
(Doc 7559/10), which stipulated that “Unless opposed by a majority of the Members of the Council, the
vote shall be taken by secret ballot if a request to that effect is supported, if made by a Member of the
Council, by one other Member, and, if made by the President, by two Members”.
111. In seeking clarification regarding the voting majority required (19), H.E. Al Mansoori
(United Arab Emirates) noted that, pursuant to Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, 33 Council Members
were eligible to vote on the Respondents’ preliminary objection relating to Application (A). In his view,
that meant that 17 positive votes constituted a majority. In further noting that in accordance with
Article 66 b) of the Chicago Convention 25 Council Members were eligible to vote on the Respondents’
preliminary objection relating to Application (B), he indicated that in his opinion 13 positive votes
constituted a majority.
112. Reiterating that Article 52 of the Chicago Convention stipulated that “Decisions by the
Council shall require approval by a majority of its Members.”, the Director, Legal Affairs and External
Relations Bureau (D/LEB) noted that his Bureau had examined the historical records of previous ICAO
proceedings under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention relating to the settlement of disputes and that it
had been the consistent and unanimous practice of the Council to require approval of its decisions by a
majority of its Members, which currently stood at 19..
113. H.E. Al-Amudi (Saudi Arabia) wished to place on record his objection to the statement
that 19 votes would constitute the voting majority required under Article 52 of the Chicago Convention.
Indicating that it was the Respondents’ understanding that a review of the Rules for the Settlement of
Differences (Doc 7782/2) would be undertaken in September 2018, he underscored that they considered
that it was contrary to due process to conduct such a review of the rules whereby the Council adjudicated
the settlement of differences while such momentous and critical decisions by the Council on Qatar’s
Application (A) and Application (B) were pending.
114. In clarifying that when the Council was sitting as a court, as at present, it was not the role of
LEB to provide its interpretation of relevant rules, D/LEB underscored that earlier he had merely read the
text of Article 52 of the Chicago Convention and recited to the Council the factual historical records of
previous Council decisions, no more, no less.
115. In providing factual information in response to a query by the President of the Council,
D/LEB recalled that at the Tenth Meeting of its 211th Session on 23 June 2017 the Council had requested
the Secretariat to review the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2) with the aim of
determining whether they needed to be revised and updated taking into account relevant developments that
had occurred since the publication of that document (cf. C-DEC 211/10, paragraph 45). The Secretariat had
subsequently reported that it was necessary to consult the Legal Committee thereon during its upcoming
37th Session (Montréal, 4-7 September 2018). D/LEB further clarified that while Article 33 of the said
Rules stipulated that the latter “may, at any time, be amended by the Council”, it also stipulated that
“No amendment shall apply to a pending case except with the agreement of the parties”.
116. H.E. Al Mansoori (United Arab Emirates) also wished to place on record his objection to
the voting majority required (19) for the Council’s acceptance of the Respondents’ preliminary objections
with respect to Qatar’s Application (A) and Application (B). In protesting against the voting majority
required (19), he noted that Article 52 of the Chicago Convention did not provide for a qualified majority
and instead provided that decisions by the Council “shall require approval by a majority of its Members”.
H.E. Al Mansoori further noted that Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article 15(5) of the Rules of
Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2) both provided that “No Member of the Council shall vote in the
consideration by the Council of any dispute to which it is a party.”. He affirmed that Article 52 of the
on the advice of the Director of the Legal
Bureau,
The President the Council then asked for
clarification as to whether deliberations
were required. He concluded that the
decision would be taken by secret ballot.
The President
then asked
whether it
would be
appropriate to
take a 5 minute
pause to
enable
discussion
before voting.
He received no
support from
the Council. It
was agreed to
proceed with
the voting.
Annex 8
C-MIN 214/8 (Closed) -22-
110. A request made by H.E. Al-Amudi (Saudi Arabia) on behalf of the Respondents open ballot for the sake of transparency in the process given that the Council was currently acting adjudicator was declined by the Council on the basis of Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure for the (Doc 7559/10), which stipulated that “Unless opposed by a majority of the Members of the Council, vote shall be taken by secret ballot if a request to that effect is supported, if made by a Member Council, by one other Member, and, if made by the President, by two Members”.
111. In seeking clarification regarding the voting majority required (19), H.E. Al Mansoori
(United Arab Emirates) noted that, pursuant to Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, 33 Council Members
were eligible to vote on the Respondents’ preliminary objection relating to Application (A). In that meant that 17 positive votes constituted a majority. In further noting that in accordance Article 66 b) of the Chicago Convention 25 Council Members were eligible to vote on the Respondents’
preliminary objection relating to Application (B), he indicated that in his opinion 13 positive constituted a majority.
112. Reiterating that Article 52 of the Chicago Convention stipulated that “Decisions Council shall require approval by a majority of its Members.”, the Director, Legal Affairs and Relations Bureau (D/LEB) noted that his Bureau had examined the historical records of previous proceedings under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention relating to the settlement of disputes and had been the consistent and unanimous practice of the Council to require approval of its decisions majority of its Members, which currently stood at 19..
113. H.E. Al-Amudi (Saudi Arabia) wished to place on record his objection to the statement
that 19 votes would constitute the voting majority required under Article 52 of the Chicago Convention.
Indicating that it was the Respondents’ understanding that a review of the Rules for the Settlement Differences (Doc 7782/2) would be undertaken in September 2018, he underscored that they considered
that it was contrary to due process to conduct such a review of the rules whereby the Council adjudicated
the settlement of differences while such momentous and critical decisions by the Council on Application (A) and Application (B) were pending.
114. In clarifying that when the Council was sitting as a court, as at present, it was not the LEB to provide its interpretation of relevant rules, D/LEB underscored that earlier he had merely text of Article 52 of the Chicago Convention and recited to the Council the factual historical records previous Council decisions, no more, no less.
115. In providing factual information in response to a query by the President of the LEB recalled that at the Tenth Meeting of its 211th Session on 23 June 2017 the Council had requested
the Secretariat to review the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2) with the determining whether they needed to be revised and updated taking into account relevant developments had occurred since the publication of that document (cf. C-DEC 211/10, paragraph 45). The Secretariat subsequently reported that it was necessary to consult the Legal Committee thereon during its upcoming
37th Session (Montréal, 4-7 September 2018). D/LEB further clarified that while Article 33 of Rules stipulated that the latter “may, at any time, be amended by the Council”, it also stipulated “No amendment shall apply to a pending case except with the agreement of the parties”.
116. H.E. Al Mansoori (United Arab Emirates) also wished to place on record his objection the voting majority required (19) for the Council’s acceptance of the Respondents’ preliminary objections
with respect to Qatar’s Application (A) and Application (B). In protesting against the voting required (19), he noted that Article 52 of the Chicago Convention did not provide for a qualified and instead provided that decisions by the Council “shall require approval by a majority of its Members”.
H.E. Al Mansoori further noted that Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article 15(5) of the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2) both provided that “No Member of the Council shall vote consideration by the Council of any dispute to which it is a party.”. He affirmed that Article 52 Bureau,
The President
then asked
whether it
would be
appropriate to
take a 5 minute
pause to
enable
discussion
before voting.
He received no
support from
the Council. It
was agreed to
proceed with
the voting.
170
-23- C-MIN 214/8 (Closed)
Chicago Convention, read together with Article 84 thereof, should be interpreted as meaning that the
majority required was of all Council Members entitled to vote. Accordingly, as there were 33 Council
Members entitled to vote on the preliminary objection with respect to Application (A), 17 positive votes
would constitute a majority. Furthermore, as there were 25 Council Members entitled to vote on the
preliminary objection with respect to Application (B), 13 votes would constitute a majority.
H.E. Al Mansoori averred that any other reading of the rules would defeat their purpose and also defy the
principle of treaty interpretation, fairness and equal treatment of the Parties. He therefore felt compelled to
clearly express his disagreement with the voting majority required (19).
117. In supporting the above intervention by H.E. Al Mansoori, H.E. EL-Adawy (Egypt)
requested that his objection to the said voting majority required be also placed on record. He enquired how
that requirement would be applied in the case of a dispute regarding the interpretation or application of a
Convention to which there were fewer than 19 parties and thus fewer than 19 States, in particular, Council
Member States, eligible to vote
118. A request then made by H.E. Al Mansoori (United Arab Emirates) that the Council
reconsider the above-mentioned majority of 19 positive votes in the current Council for the approval of its
decisions on the Respondents’ preliminary objections with respect to both Application (A) and
Application (B) was declined in the absence of any desire on the part of the Council to determine what
constituted the voting majority other than the relevant provisions of the Chicago Convention read by
D/LEB.
119. The above-mentioned requests and statements were noted for the record.
120. The Council then proceeded to the holding of a secret ballot on the Respondents’
preliminary objection with respect to Application (A) and on their preliminary objection with respect to
Application (B). In response to questions by the Representatives of the United States and South Africa,
D/LEB clarified that: a “Yes” vote was a vote in favour and meant acceptance of the Respondents’
preliminary objection; a “No” vote was a vote against and meant disagreement with the said preliminary
objection; and “Abstain” meant that there was no vote, neither for nor against the preliminary objection.
121. H.E. Mohammed (Bahrain) recalled that the Respondents had two preliminary objections
each to Qatar’s Application (A) and Application (B). As explained by Mr. Petrochilos (Legal Advisor,
Bahrain Delegation), the first preliminary objection was that the real issue in dispute was not an issue of the
interpretation or application of the Chicago Convention or the Transit Agreement. The second preliminary
objection was that the dispute was not one which cannot be settled by negotiation as was required by the
jurisdictional clauses of those two treaties. As accepting either one of those preliminary objections had the
effect of disposing of the case here and now, Mr. Petrochilos suggested that the appropriate wording of the
question for the secret ballot for each Application would be “Do you accept either one of the two
preliminary objections formulated by the Respondents in respect of each of the Applications?”.
122. The President of the Council observed that both of the Respondents’ said preliminary
objections related to the jurisdiction of the Council. At his request, D/LEB read the text of Article 5(1) of
the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2), which stipulated that “If the Respondent questions
the jurisdiction of the Council to handle the matter presented by the Applicant, he shall file a preliminary
objection setting out the basis of the objection.”.
123. The President of the Council noted that in essence for each of Qatar’s Application (A) and
Application (B) the Respondents had a preliminary objection for which they provided two justifications. He
took the point made by Mr. Petrochilos that the voting on each preliminary objection applied to both of the
justifications provided therefor. Before proceedings to vote, the Representative from South Africa again requested clarity
and stressed the need for everyone to be on board. What does a no vote mean and what
does a yes vote mean? The President explains that a Yes means you accept the
Preliminary Objection and a No means you reject it, and you disagree with the Preliminary
Objection of the Respondents. An abstain vote means you take no view.
Annex 8
majority required was of all Council Members entitled to vote. Accordingly, as there were 33 Council
Members entitled to vote on the preliminary objection with respect to Application (A), 17 positive votes
would constitute a majority. Furthermore, as there were 25 Council Members entitled to vote on the
preliminary objection with respect to Application (B), 13 votes would constitute a majority.
H.E. Al Mansoori averred that any other reading of the rules would defeat their purpose and also defy the
principle of treaty interpretation, fairness and equal treatment of the Parties. He therefore felt compelled to
clearly express his disagreement with the voting majority required (19).
117. In supporting the above intervention by H.E. Al Mansoori, H.E. EL-Adawy (Egypt)
requested that his objection to the said voting majority required be also placed on record. He enquired how
that requirement would be applied in the case of a dispute regarding the interpretation or application of a
Convention to which there were fewer than 19 parties and thus fewer than 19 States, in particular, Council
Member States, eligible to vote
118. A request then made by H.E. Al Mansoori (United Arab Emirates) that the Council
reconsider the above-mentioned majority of 19 positive votes in the current Council for the approval of its
decisions on the Respondents’ preliminary objections with respect to both Application (A) and
Application (B) was declined in the absence of any desire on the part of the Council to determine what
constituted the voting majority other than the relevant provisions of the Chicago Convention read by
D/LEB.
119. The above-mentioned requests and statements were noted for the record.
120. The Council then proceeded to the holding of a secret ballot on the Respondents’
preliminary objection with respect to Application (A) and on their preliminary objection with respect to
Application (B). In response to questions by the Representatives of the United States and South Africa,
D/LEB clarified that: a “Yes” vote was a vote in favour and meant acceptance of the Respondents’
preliminary objection; a “No” vote was a vote against and meant disagreement with the said preliminary
objection; and “Abstain” meant that there was no vote, neither for nor against the preliminary objection.
121. H.E. Mohammed (Bahrain) recalled that the Respondents had two preliminary objections
each to Qatar’s Application (A) and Application (B). As explained by Mr. Petrochilos (Legal Advisor,
Bahrain Delegation), the first preliminary objection was that the real issue in dispute was not an issue of the
interpretation or application of the Chicago Convention or the Transit Agreement. The second preliminary
objection was that the dispute was not one which cannot be settled by negotiation as was required by the
jurisdictional clauses of those two treaties. As accepting either one of those preliminary objections had the
effect of disposing of the case here and now, Mr. Petrochilos suggested that the appropriate wording of the
question for the secret ballot for each Application would be “Do you accept either one of the two
preliminary objections formulated by the Respondents in respect of each of the Applications?”.
122. The President of the Council observed that both of the Respondents’ said preliminary
objections related to the jurisdiction of the Council. At his request, D/LEB read the text of Article 5(1) of
the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2), which stipulated that “If the Respondent questions
the jurisdiction of the Council to handle the matter presented by the Applicant, he shall file a preliminary
objection setting out the basis of the objection.”.
123. The President of the Council noted that in essence for each of Qatar’s Application (A) and
Application (B) the Respondents had a preliminary objection for which they provided two justifications. He
took the point made by Mr. Petrochilos that the voting on each preliminary objection applied to both of the
justifications provided therefor. Before proceedings to vote, the Representative from South Africa again requested clarity
and stressed the need for everyone to be on board. What does a no vote mean and what
does a yes vote mean? The President explains that a Yes means you accept the
Preliminary Objection and a No means you reject it, and you disagree with the Preliminary
Objection of the Respondents. An abstain vote means you take no view.
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Secret ballot on the Respondents’ Preliminary Objection – Application (A)
(relating to the interpretation and application of the Chicago Convention and its Annexes)
124. The result of the secret ballot on the question “Do you accept the preliminary objection?”,
in which 33 votes were cast by the Council Members eligible to vote, was as follows:
In favour 4 votes
Against 23 votes
Abstentions 6 votes
There were no invalid ballots or blank votes.
125. Based on this result, the President declared that the preliminary objection filed by the
Respondents with respect to Application (A) was not accepted by the Council.
Secret ballot on the Respondents’ Preliminary Objection – Application (B)
(relating to the interpretation and application of the Transit Agreement)
126. The result of the secret ballot on the question “Do you accept the preliminary objection?”,
in which 25 votes were cast by the Council Members eligible to vote, was as follows:
In favour 2 votes
Against 18 votes
Abstentions 5 votes
There were no invalid ballots or blank votes.
127. Based on the above result, the President declared that the preliminary objection filed by the
Respondents with respect to Application (B) was not accepted by the Council.
Closing statements
128. H.E. AlSulaiti (Qatar), as Applicant, expressed appreciation to the Council for having been
afforded the opportunity to participate in the present meeting and to present its views regarding the
Respondents’ preliminary objections with respect to Qatar’s Application (A) and Application (B).
129. Speaking on behalf of the Respondents, H.E. Al-Amudi (Saudi Arabia) reiterated their
utmost respect for ICAO and the Council and reaffirmed their unwavering commitment to the rules and
principles of the Chicago Convention and the Strategic Objectives and principles of ICAO. He
re-emphasized that the cases brought before the Council during the present meeting involved: the
Applicant’s multiple and persistent breaches of international law, obligations that did not relate to civil
aviation; and the sovereign right of the Respondents under international law to take lawful
counter-measures to induce the Applicant to comply with its international obligations and to protect against
a national security threat. Underscoring that the Respondents regretted that the Council had decided that
ICAO had jurisdiction to hear the Applicant’s complaints, H.E. Al-Amudi reiterated that they believed that
the rules applied today were contrary to the fundamental rules of due process. In particular, they considered
that the super majority voting requirement was not in line with the plain meaning of the Chicago
Convention.
130. Repeating that the Respondents had not chosen to bring this dispute before the Council,
H.E. Al-Amudi indicated that they respectfully submitted that ICAO’s role did not extend to consideration
of a dispute where the real issue involved national security and international instruments outside of civil
aviation. He underscored that while the Respondents had the utmost respect for the Council, they were
compelled to exercise their right under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention to appeal the Council’s
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decisions to the ICJ and would file their applications with the Court in this regard immediately following
the receipt of the Council’s approved decisions. The Respondents continued to take the view that the
dispute that the Applicant had brought before the Council fell outside the scope of matters that the ICAO
Council could adjudicate upon under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article II, Section 2, of the
Transit Agreement. By cause of the Respondents’ impending appeal, the dispute was now moving to the
ICJ. H.E. Al-Amudi emphasized, however, that as the Respondents had expressed before and as they now
again expressed, their four States were committed to continuing to work with all Parties, including Qatar,
under the auspices of ICAO to ensure the safe operation of air traffic. He stressed that the safety of civil
aviation had been, and remained, the Respondents’ top priority. In concluding, H.E. Al-Amudi thanked the
President and the Council for their efforts in this matter and their commitment to the Strategic Objectives of
this esteemed Organization.
131. The above statements were noted and recorded for the summary minutes of the meeting.
132. On behalf of the Council, the President expressed appreciation to the high-level
Government officials from Bahrain, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and the
members of their Delegations for having participated in the present meeting. He stressed that, regardless of
the Council’s decisions regarding the Respondents’ preliminary objections with respect to Application (A)
and Application (B), it was important that as Member States of the same Organization, ICAO, they continue
to communicate, consult and collaborate for the further development of international civil aviation. The
President expressed the hope that all ICAO Member States would continue to move forward in that spirit.
133. It was noted that, on the basis of the above proceedings, the Secretariat would prepare and
circulate the draft text of the Council’s decisions at the preliminary objection stage of the Settlement of
Differences: The State of Qatar and the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (2017) – Application (A), and the Settlement of Differences:
The State of Qatar and the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates
(2017) – Application (B), which would be tabled for the Council’s consideration and approval at its
Eleventh Meeting (214/11) on Friday, 29 June 2018.
134. It was further noted that the time-balance of seven calendar days remaining for the
Respondents to file their Counter-memorial with ICAO shall begin to run from the date of receipt by the
Respondents of the Council’s approved decisions regarding their preliminary objections with respect to
Application (A) and Application (B). However, the Respondents had indicated their intention to exercise
their right under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and to immediately thereafter file appeals of the
Council’s said decisions with the ICJ, in which case, pursuant to Article 86 thereof, the said decisions of the
Council would be suspended until the appeals were decided by the ICJ.
135. The meeting adjourned at 1810 hours.
— END —
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174
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United Nations, Resolution 569 (1985) adopted by the Security
Council at its 2602nd meeting on 26 July 1985
United Nations document S/RES/569(1985)
175
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178
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Common Position of 29 June 1998 defined by the Council on the
basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union concerning a ban
on flights by Yugoslav carriers between the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the European Community
(98/426/CFSP) [1998] OJ L190/3
Available at http://data.europa.eu/eli/compos/1998/426/oj
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4. 7. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 190/3
COMMON POSITION
of 29 June 1998
defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European
Union concerning a ban on flights by Yugoslav carriers between the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the European Community
(98/426/CFSP)
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and, in
particular, Article J.2 thereof,
Whereas, on 19 March 1998 the Council adopted
Common Position 98/240/CFSP (1) on restrictive measures
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
Whereas further measures were contemplated in
Common Position 98/240/CFSP should the conditions
set out therein not be met and repression continue in
Kosovo;
Whereas neither the said conditions nor those called for
by the European Council at its meeting in Cardiff on 15
June 1998 have been met and therefore a further reduction
of economic relations with the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia should be foreseen;
Whereas the restrictive measures set out in Article 1
hereto will be reconsidered immediately if the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbian Governments move
to adopt and implement a framework for dialogue and a
stabilisation package,
HAS DEFINED THIS COMMON POSITION:
Article 1
Flights by Yugoslav carriers between the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and the European Community will be
banned.
Article 2
This Common Position shall take effect from the date of
its adoption.
Article 3
This Common Position shall be published in the Official
Journal.
Done at Luxembourg, 29 June 1998.
For the Council
The President
R. COOK
(1) OJ L 95, 27. 3. 1998, p. 1.
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Council Regulation (EC) No 1901/98 of 7 September 1998
concerning a ban on flights of Yugoslav carriers between the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the European Community
[1998] OJ L248/1
Available at http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1998/1901/oj
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I
(Acts whose publication is obligatory)
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1901/98
of 7 September 1998
concerning a ban on flights of Yugoslav carriers between the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the European Community
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community, and in particular Article 228A thereof,
Having regard to Common Position 98/426/CFSP of 29
June 1998 defined by the Council on the basis of Article
J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning a ban
on flights by Yugoslav carriers between the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the European Community (1),
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Whereas the developments regarding Kosovo have
already led the Security Council of the United Nations to
impose an arms embargo against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations, and to the consideration of additional
measures in case of failure to make constructive progress
towards the peaceful resolution of the situation in Kosovo;
Whereas the European Union has already decided on
additional measures as envisaged by Common Positions
98/240/CFSP (2), 98/326/CFSP (3) and 98/374/CFSP (4)
and the ensuing Council Regulations (EC) Nos 926/98 (5),
1295/98 (6) and 1607/98 (7);
Whereas the Government of the FRY has not stopped the
use of indiscriminate violence and brutal repression
against its own citizens, which constitute serious violations
of human rights and international humanitarian law,
and has not taken effective steps to find a political solution
to the issue of Kosovo through a process of peaceful
dialogue with the Kosovar Albanian Community in order
to maintain the regional peace and security;
Whereas, therefore, Common Position 98/426/CFSP foresees
a ban on flights by Yugoslav carriers between the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the European
Community as a further measure to obtain from the
Government of the FRY the fulfilment of the requirements
of UNSC Resolution 1160 (1998) and of the said
Common Positions;
Whereas this further measure falls under the scope of the
Treaty establishing the European Community;
Whereas, therefore, and notably with a view to avoiding
distortion of competition, Community legislation is
necessary for the implementation of these measures, as far
as the territory of the Community is concerned; whereas
such territory is deemed to encompass, for the purposes
of this Regulation, the territories of the Member States to
which the Treaty establishing the European Community
is applicable, under the conditions laid down in that
Treaty;
Whereas there is a need to provide for certain specific
exemptions;
Whereas there is a need for the Commission and Member
States to inform each other of the measures taken under
this Regulation and of other relevant information at their
disposal in connection with this Regulation,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article 1
1. Aircraft operated directly or indirectly by a Yugoslav
carrier, that is a carrier having its principal place of business
or its registered office in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, shall be prohibited from flying between the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the European
Community.
2. All operating authorisations granted to Yugoslav
carriers are hereby revoked.
(1) OJ L 190, 4. 7. 1998, p. 3.
(2) OJ L 95, 27. 3. 1998, p. 1.
(3) OJ L 143, 14. 5. 1998, p. 1.
(4) OJ L 165, 10. 6. 1998, p. 1.
(5) OJ L 130, 1. 5. 1998, p. 1.
(6) OJ L 178, 23. 6. 1998, p. 33.
(7) OJ L 209, 25. 7. 1998, p. 16.
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Article 2
No new operating authorisations shall be granted or
existing ones renewed enabling aircraft registered in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to fly to or from airports
in the Community.
Article 3
1. Articles 1 and 2 shall not apply to
(a) emergency landings on the territory of the
Community and ensuing take-offs;
(b) authorisations for charter series flights between
Leipzig and Tivat by Montenegro Airlines.
2. Nothing in this Regulation shall be construed as
limiting any existing rights of Yugoslav carriers and
aircraft registered in the FRY other than rights to land in
or to take off from the territory of the Community.
Article 4
The participation, knowingly and intentionally, in related
activities, the object or effect of which is, directly or
indirectly, to circumvent the provisions of Articles 1 and
2 shall be prohibited.
Article 5
Each Member State shall determine the sanctions to be
imposed where the provisions of this Regulation are
infringed. Such sanctions must be effective, proportionate
and dissuasive.
Article 6
The Commission and the Member States shall inform
each other of the measures taken under this Regulation
and supply each other with any other relevant information
at their disposal in connection with this Regulation,
such as breaches and enforcement problems, judgments
handed down by national courts or decisions of relevant
international fora.
Article 7
This Regulation shall apply:
within the territory of the Community including its
airspace,
on board any aircraft or any vessel under the jurisdiction
of a Member State,
to any person elsewhere who is a national of a
Member State,
to any body which is incorporated or constituted
under the law of a Member State.
Article 8
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its
publication in the Official Journal of the European
Communities.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member
States.
Done at Brussels, 7 September 1998.
For the Council
The President
W. SCHÜSSEL
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United Nations, Resolution 1718 (2006) adopted by the Security
Council at its 5551st meeting on 14 October 2006
United Nations document S/Res/1718(2006); Available at website of
the United Nations available at https://undocs.org/S/RES/1718(2006)
185
United Nations S/RES/1718 (2006)
Security Council Distr.: General
14 October 2006
06-57207 (E)
*0657207*
Resolution 1718 (2006)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5551st meeting, on
14 October 2006
The Security Council,
Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993),
resolution 1540 (2004) and, in particular, resolution 1695 (2006), as well as the
statement of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41),
Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as
well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and
security,
Expressing the gravest concern at the claim by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) that it has conducted a test of a nuclear weapon on
9 October 2006, and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to international efforts aimed at
strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the
danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,
Expressing its firm conviction that the international regime on the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be maintained and recalling that the
DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Deploring the DPRK’s announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its pursuit of nuclear weapons,
Deploring further that the DPRK has refused to return to the Six-Party talks
without precondition,
Endorsing the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 by China, the
DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States,
Underlining the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and
humanitarian concerns of the international community,
Expressing profound concern that the test claimed by the DPRK has generated
increased tension in the region and beyond, and determining therefore that there is a
clear threat to international peace and security,
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Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking
measures under its Article 41,
1. Condemns the nuclear test proclaimed by the DPRK on 9 October 2006
in flagrant disregard of its relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 1695 (2006),
as well as of the statement of its President of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41),
including that such a test would bring universal condemnation of the international
community and would represent a clear threat to international peace and security;
2. Demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of
a ballistic missile;
3. Demands that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of
withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
4. Demands further that the DPRK return to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards, and underlines the need for all States Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to continue to comply with their Treaty
obligations;
5. Decides that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic
missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a
moratorium on missile launching;
6. Decides that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing
nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, shall act
strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the terms and conditions of its
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement (IAEA
INFCIRC/403) and shall provide the IAEA transparency measures extending beyond
these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation,
equipments and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the IAEA;
7. Decides also that the DPRK shall abandon all other existing weapons of
mass destruction and ballistic missile programme in a complete, verifiable and
irreversible manner;
8. Decides that:
(a) All Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or
transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their
flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of:
(i) Any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery
systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile
systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on
Conventional Arms, or related materiel including spare parts, or items as
determined by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph
12 below (the Committee);
(ii) All items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in the
lists in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815, unless within 14 days of
adoption of this resolution the Committee has amended or completed their
provisions also taking into account the list in document S/2006/816, as well as
other items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined by the
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Security Council or the Committee, which could contribute to DPRK’s
nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destructionrelated
programmes;
(iii) Luxury goods;
(b) The DPRK shall cease the export of all items covered in subparagraphs
(a) (i) and (a) (ii) above and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of
such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or
aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK;
(c) All Member States shall prevent any transfers to the DPRK by their
nationals or from their territories, or from the DPRK by its nationals or from its
territory, of technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision,
manufacture, maintenance or use of the items in subparagraphs (a) (i) and (a) (ii)
above;
(d) All Member States shall, in accordance with their respective legal
processes, freeze immediately the funds, other financial assets and economic
resources which are on their territories at the date of the adoption of this resolution
or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the
persons or entities designated by the Committee or by the Security Council as being
engaged in or providing support for, including through other illicit means, DPRK’s
nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic missilerelated
programmes, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their
direction, and ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are
prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities
within their territories, to or for the benefit of such persons or entities;
(e) All Member States shall take the necessary steps to prevent the entry into
or transit through their territories of the persons designated by the Committee or by
the Security Council as being responsible for, including through supporting or
promoting, DPRK policies in relation to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic
missile-related and other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, together
with their family members, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a
state to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;
(f) In order to ensure compliance with the requirements of this paragraph,
and thereby preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons,
their means of delivery and related materials, all Member States are called upon to
take, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent
with international law, cooperative action including through inspection of cargo to
and from the DPRK, as necessary;
9. Decides that the provisions of paragraph 8 (d) above do not apply to
financial or other assets or resources that have been determined by relevant States:
(a) To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs,
rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and
public utility charges, or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees
and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal
services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine
holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic
resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention
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4 06-57207
to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets and
economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee
within five working days of such notification;
(b) To be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such
determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and has
been approved by the Committee; or
(c) To be subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in
which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to
satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered prior
to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person referred to in
paragraph 8 (d) above or an individual or entity identified by the Security Council
or the Committee, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;
10. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 8 (e) above shall not
apply where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is
justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or
where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the
objectives of the present resolution;
11. Calls upon all Member States to report to the Security Council within
thirty days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a
view to implementing effectively the provisions of paragraph 8 above;
12. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of
procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the
Council, to undertake the following tasks:
(a) To seek from all States, in particular those producing or possessing the
items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in paragraph 8 (a)
above, information regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the
measures imposed by paragraph 8 above of this resolution and whatever further
information it may consider useful in this regard;
(b) To examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged
violations of measures imposed by paragraph 8 of this resolution;
(c) To consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in
paragraphs 9 and 10 above;
(d) To determine additional items, materials, equipment, goods and
technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraphs 8 (a) (i) and 8 (a) (ii)
above;
(e) To designate additional individuals and entities subject to the measures
imposed by paragraphs 8 (d) and 8 (e) above;
(f) To promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the
implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution;
(g) To report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work, with
its observations and recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the
effectiveness of the measures imposed by paragraph 8 above;
13. Welcomes and encourages further the efforts by all States concerned to
intensify their diplomatic efforts, to refrain from any actions that might aggravate
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06-57207 5
tension and to facilitate the early resumption of the Six-Party Talks, with a view to
the expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005
by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the
United States, to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
and to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia;
14. Calls upon the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks
without precondition and to work towards the expeditious implementation of the
Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 by China, the DPRK, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States;
15. Affirms that it shall keep DPRK’s actions under continuous review and
that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in
paragraph 8 above, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting
of the measures, as may be needed at that time in light of the DPRK’s compliance
with the provisions of the resolution;
16. Underlines that further decisions will be required, should additional
measures be necessary;
17. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 of 27 May 2016
concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea and repealing Decision 2013/183/CFSP
[2016] OJ L141/79
Available at http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2016/849/oj
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European Union, Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1509 of 30 August
2017 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea and repealing Regulation (EC) No 329/2007
[2017] OJ L224/1
Available at http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1509/oj
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Annex 14
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Annex 14
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Annex 14
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Annex 14
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Annex 14
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Annex 14
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Annex 14
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Annex 14
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Annex 14
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Annex 14
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236
Annex 15
A. Barnett, “Suicide bombs are a duty, says Islamic scholar”,
The Guardian, 28 August 2005
Available at
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/aug/28/uk.terrorism
237
Suicide bombs are a duty, says Islamic scholar | Politics | The Guardian
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/aug/28/uk.terrorism 1/2
Suicide bombs are a duty, says Islamic scholar
Antony Barnett
Sun 28 Aug 2005 00.42 BST
A controversial Islamic scholar who is backed by London Mayor Ken Livingstone has said it is a
duty of Muslims in Iraq to become suicide bombers.
Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, speaking at a conference of Islamic scholars in Egypt last Monday,
criticised a fellow scholar who said the Koran categorically forbids suicide but an individual
has the right to take such action.
Al-Qaradawi said: 'I think that saying it is a legitimate right in Palestine and Iraq is not enough
because a right is something that can be relinquished. It is a duty...
'The truth is we should refrain from raising this issue because doubting it is like joining the
Zionists and Americans in condemning our brothers in Hamas, the Jihad, the Islamic factions
and the resistance factions in Iraq.'
Although Al-Qaradawi goes on to condemn the terrorist attacks in London, he also said: 'We
cannot say we pat these misguided boys on the back but we do want to listen to them. They
have gone astray so we want to treat them in a way that will set them straight... we want to
treat them the way clerics treat their students, the way fathers treat their sons.'
His comments will be certain to stir up controversy. Last week Livingstone said he would take
the government to court if they tried to ban Al-Qaradawi from coming to Britain under its new
anti-terrorist laws. Al-Qaradawi has supported suicide attacks on civilians in Israel but this
appears to be the first time he has openly supports such terrorist attacks in Iraq.
The latest statements from Al-Qaradawi come as a Saudi Islamic activist in London has
decided to shut down his controversial website. Mohammed al-Massari, the Saudi dissident
whose site featured videos of suicide bombings in Israel and Iraq, and anti-Western and pro-al-
Qaeda propaganda, posted an internet 'obituary' announcing his site had been a victim of the
'murder of freedom of opinion and expression by the oppressive regime lead by Tony Blair, the
liar and well-known war criminal.'
Al-Massari, 58, who took refuge in London more than 10 years ago, said his website had been
'open to anyone who wanted to post a message,' suggesting he did not necessarily endorse
them all.
He said he had temporarily shut the site while awaiting clarification on his status in Britain.
'Unfortunately, we had to suspend big parts of our electronic site until this inquisition blows
over or until I move to a country that allows an acceptable degree of free speech,' Al-Massari
said.
Last Wednesday, the government said it was prepared to act within days against 'a number of
names' to either deport or bar them from the country under new anti-terrorism measures.
Annex 15
238
Suicide bombs are a duty, says Islamic scholar | Politics | The Guardian
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/aug/28/uk.terrorism 2/2
The identities of those facing this action was not revealed, but among them was expected to be
Palestinian cleric Abu Qatada, who has been called Osama bin Laden's spiritual ambassador in
Europe, and Saad al-Faqih, a Saudi accused of supporting Bin Laden's terror network.
Annex 15
239
240
Annex 16
Video Excerpt of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, Al-Jazeera Television,
9 January 2009
(Video recording on CD-rom located at the end of this Volume)
(Transcript of English subtitles and of Arabic original)
Website of the Middle East Media Research Institute available at
https://www.memri.org/tv/hamas-psychological-warfare-al-aqsa-tvcalls-
israelis-return-where-you-came-and-promises-big
241
Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi on Al-Jazeera Incites Against Jews, Arab Regimes, and ... Page 1 of 3
https://www.memri.org/reports/sheikh-yousef-al-qaradhawi-al-jazeera-inc…-...
Annex 16
242
Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi on Al-Jazeera Incites Against Jews, Arab Regimes, and ... Page 2 of 3
https://www.memri.org/reports/sheikh-yousef-al-qaradhawi-al-jazeera-inc…-...
Annex 16
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Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi on Al-Jazeera Incites Against Jews, Arab Regimes, and ... Page 3 of 3
https://www.memri.org/reports/sheikh-yousef-al-qaradhawi-al-jazeera-inc…-...
Annex 16
244
Transcript of Arabic:
"الرسالة الاولى أوجهها الى اليهود المعتدين الغاصبين المستكبرين، المتجبرين في أرض لله على عباد لله"
[...]
"لقد جرب اليهود في تاريخهم أنهم أفسدوا في أرضهم مرتين، فعاقبهم لله تعالى على كل افساده بأن سلط عليهم من أدبهم و أذلهم و
طئطئ رؤوسهم، هكذا فعلو في التاريخ، و من المعروف أن لله سلط عليهم ملك بابل، بختنصر، هذا الذي سباهم، داس في الارض،
داس خلال الديار، و أحرق معابدهم و توراتهم، و أخذهم أسرى إلى بابل سبعين سنة. و فعلو بعد ذلك، فسلط عليهم الرومان."
[...]
"لقد عاش اليهود زمن طويلا و هم أهل ذمة في ديارنا، فما نقض أحد لهم عهدا، بل كانوا أحرارا، وكانوا من أغنياء الامة، حتى
حسدهم المسلمون، وكانوا قريبين من السلاطين و الملوك و الرؤساء في ذلك الحين، و مع هذا لم يرعوا هذا، طردوا من اوربا، لم
يجدو صدرا حنونا و لم يجدو كهفا يؤويهم الا ديار الاسلام."
"الدولة العثمانية و دولة المماليك و الدول الاسلامية و البلاد الاسلامية، هي التي فتحت لهم صدورها و آوتهم و آمنتهم من خوف، فلما
تمكنوا قلبوا لها ظهر المجن، و أصبحنا نحن ضحاياهم، و هذا من عجائب الزمن. الأمة التي ضربت عليها الذلة و المسكنة و باءوا
بغضب من لله، هم أحرص الناس على حياة، أصبحنا ضحايا لهم."
"تجرأ علينا الجبناء و استقوى علينا الضعفاء و تعزز علينا الاذلاء. البغاث أصبح في أرضنا يستنسر. اصبح هؤلاء النعاج، أصبحوا
ذئابا يفترسوننا، ماذا جرى لأمتنا. ولكن لله تعالى بالمرصاد لهم، لن يتخلى عن هذه الأمة، ولن يدع هؤلاء يزيدون إفسادا في الارض.
إننا ننتظر نقمة من لله سبحانه و تعالى تنزل بهم، و ستكون على أيدينا ان شاء لله. ’قاتلوهم، يعذبهم لله بأيديكم و يخزهم و ينصركم
عليهم، و يشفي صدور قوم مؤمنين و يذهب غيظ قلوبهم.‘"
"هذه رسالتي إلى اليهود الغادرين، الذين لم يفوا بحق، و لم يفوا بعهد، الذين عاهدت منهم و ينقضون عهدهم في كل مرة، و هم لا
يتقون."
"ورسالتي الثانية إلى الغرب، الممالئ للصهيونية، المتواطئ معها. وخصوص اً أمريكا. أمريكا المتألهة في الارض، لا تسأل عما تفعل
ولا تحاسب عن ما تقول. لأنها إلاه في هذا الكون. أمريكا هي التي تساند اسرائيل في الحق و في الباطل، في العدل و في الظلم."
[...]
"نقول للغرب عامة ولأمريكا خاصة، ان لله سبحانه و تعالى لن يدعكم تناصرون الباطل، لن يدعكم تناصرون الظلم على العدل."
[...]
"وقد سقط الاتحاد السوفييتي امام اعينهم، و هو يملك ما يملك من القوة العسكرية و من الترسانة النووية و غير ذلك. ولكنه سقط، و هم
جدير ان يسقطوا حسب سنن لله، اذا لم يتداركوا انفسهم و يقفوا مع العدل."
"ورسالتي الى حكام المسلمين عامة و إلى حكام العرب خاصة، أن يتقوا لله في أمتهم. الشعوب قالت كلمتها و لكن الحكام أصموا
آذانهم كأنهم لا يسمعون، و غشوا على أعينهم كأنهم لا يبصرون."
[...]
"إن هذه الامة، أمة كبيرة، ولكن مشكلتها في حكامها، في زعمائها، فهم في وادي، و الأمة في وادي آخر. وإذا استمر هذا، فلا يمكن
ان يستمر هؤلاء الحكام، لأنهم إنما يستمدون شرعيتهم من شعوبهم، من جماهير هذه الشعوب، فإذا تخلت عنهم الشعوب، وإذا تركتهم
الجماهير، فقدو الشرعية."
"إن هؤلاء الحكام، يائسون، عاجزون، لا يستطيعون أن يفعلوا شيئا، حتى مجرد ان يجتمعوا، أن يجتمعوا في القمة، أهذا أمر عسير؟"
"يا أيها الحكام، عار عليكم، لا أريد أن اقول حرام عليكم، لأن كثيرا منكم لا يهمه الحلال ولا الحرام، ولكن اقول عار عليكم، أن ترو
إخوانكم أمامكم، يُدمَ رون، و يُذ بحون، و تفعل بهم الأفاعيل، و أنتم متفرجون، هذا شيء في غاية الغرابة."
Annex 16
245
[...]
"فهل هؤلاء أحفاد ابي عبيدة، و خالد ابن الوليد، و طارق ابن زياد، والفاتحين من أمتنا طوال التاريخ. هذه رسالتي الى حكامنا، أن
ينظروا إلى شعوبهم و أن يتخذوا قرارهم، وإلا فإن التاريخ سيكنسهم بمكنسته،"
[...]
"غزة، ليس لديها باب إلا مصر، ولكن اسرائيل، تحيط بها عدة دول عربية، هناك لبنان و سوريا، و هنالك الاردن و السعودية، كلهم
جيران لإسرائيل، و يستطيع من يريد أن يذهب، أن يذهب من هذه المنافذ لو فتحت لهم الأبواب، لو فتحت أمامهم المنافذ، ولكن كأننا
أصبحنا حماة لإسرائيل."
[...]
"هنا في قطر، مركز مارك اند سبنسر هذا، الذي يجعل ارباح يوم السبت لإسرائيل دائما. هناك ستاربكس الذي يقدم القهوة، هذا أعلن،
كان يعلن قديما على أبواب محلاته، ’إننا نفيد همَّ شركائنا و هُ م إسرائيل، و نساهم في تعليم طلاب إسرائيل، ونساهم في إقامة الترسانة
الدفاعية لإسرائيل،‘ ونساهم في كذا و كذا. و الناس يذهبون و يشربون القهوة الغالية الثمن، بدلا من أن يشرب قهوة بريالين، يشرب
قهوة بعشرين ﷼. ستاربكس هذا، و هو صهيوني. فلماذا هذا، لماذا لا نعلم الأمة أن تستغني ببضائعها ما أمكن و لو كان أقل في
تصنيعها. إنما لا يمكن أن ترتقي الأمة إلا بهذا. المقاطعة أيها الإخوة، فعلو المقاطعة مع أعداء الأمة. إن الريال الذي تدفعه لهذه،
يتحول إلى رصاصة في صدر إخوانك في غزة و في البلاد الإسلامية الأخرى."
[...]
"اللهم عليك بأعدائك اعداء الاسلام، اللهم عليك باليهود المعتدين الغادرين، اللهم عليك بهذه الطغمة الفاجرة الماكرة المستكبرة، اللهم
إنهم طغوا في البلاد فأكثروا فيها الفساد، فصب عليهم يا ربنا سوط عذاب، و كن لهم بالمرصاد."
"اللهم يا من اهلكت ثمود اً بالطاغية، و اهلكت عادا بريح صرصر عاتية، اللهم يا من اهلكت ثمود اً بالطاغية، و اهلكت عادا بريح
صرصرٍ عاتية، و اخذت فرعون و جنوده اخذة رابية، اللهم خذ هذه الطغمة الباغية الطاغية، اللهم عليك فهذه الطغمة اليهودية
الصهيونية الباغية، اللهم لا تبقي لهم من باقية، اللهم أحصهم عددا، و اقتلهم بددا، ولا تبقي منهم احدا."
Annex 16
246
Annex 17
Video Excerpt of Muhammad Salim Al-Awa, Al-Jazeera Television,
16 September 2010
(Video recording on CD-rom located at the end of this Volume)
(Transcript of English subtitles and of Arabic original)
Website of the Middle East Media Research Institute available at
https://www.memri.org/tv/muhammad-salim-al-awa-secretarygeneral-
international-union-muslim-scholars-copts-amass-weapons
247
Transcript of Arabic:
المذيع: "و أن الكنيسة حسب المتعقدات الدينية لا تتدخل في السياسة، و ليس لديها شأن بالسياسة، و أن انتخاب الرئيس مبارك او نجله، او
أي شخص، هو شأن سياسي، وليس شأن كنسي. هذه الاجتماعات و هذه القرارات، وهذه الإعلانات، و هذه التصريحات، والدور
السياسي للكنيسة الآن في مصر."
محمد سليم العوا: "هذا عمل سياسي واضح ليس فيه كلام، مخالف لما يقولونه انه العقيدة الكنسية. العقيدة الكنسية، ’اعط ما لقيصر،
لقيصر، و ما ﻟﻠﻪ ﻟﻠﻪ.‘ و لكن لما يقول الكلام ده الأب بيشوي، ’هذه بلدنا، انتو مش عايزينا نتكلم بالسياسة ببلدنا، و المسلمين ضيوف
عندنا.‘ هذا تصريح سيكون له ما بعده، و هو تصريح خطير، خطير، خطير، منشور اليوم فقط، ولكن النيران التي ستشتعل بسببه لا
يعلمها إلا لله. و أنا ادعو الأب بيشوي الى أن يكذب هذا التصريح، أو يسحبه، ..."
[...]
المذيع: "الحوار مسجل"
محمد سليم العوا: "مسجل، لينكره أو ينفيه. ياما حوارات مسجلة نفاها رجال دين و سياسيين، و زعماء. إنما هذا التصريح إذا بقي كذلك
سيشعل النار هي البلد كلها."
المذيع: "يبدو أن الامور أكبر من ذلك بكثير. في السادس عشر من اغسطس الماضي، قبل شهر بالضبط من اليوم، نشرت صحيفة
الشروق المصرية خبرا يقول ضبطت أجهزة الامن المصرية سفينة قادمة من اسرائيل، تحمل مواد متفجرة، مخبأة في الحاويات لإدخالها
الى البلاد. و القت مباحث امن الدولة القبض على مالك السفينة و يدعى جوزيف بطرس الجبلاوي، نجل وكيل مطرانية بورسعيد،
وقررت النيابة حبسه اربعة ايام على ذمة التحقيقات في القضية ...."
[...]
المذيع: " وهناك تعليقات كثيرة على الخبر أن الأديرة مليئة بالسلاح، وأن الاديرة خارج نطاق ..., الدولة لا تستطيع أن تدخل إلى هذه
الأديرة في الوقت الذي يتم فيه كل يوم بالقبض على مسلمين بتهم التطرف و السلاح."
[...]
محمد سليم العوا: "السلاح الذي يأتي به القبطي لكي يخزنه في الكنيسة، لا معنى له الا أنه استعداد لاستعماله ضد المسلم. و التصريح
الذي صدر اليوم عن الأب بيشوي، أننا سنصل الى حد الاستشهاد، الاستشهاد ده لا يكون إلا في حرب. قال ’اذا تكلمتم عن الكنائس،
سنصل الى حد الاستشهاد،‘ الاستشهاد لا يكون إلا في حرب. فالكنيسة و بعض رجالها يعدون لحرب ضد المسلمين."
[...]
محمد سليم العوا: "مسعى، مستمر، منظم، غير عشوائي، للتمهيد لهذا اليوم، الذي يمكن المطالبة فيه بانقسام مصر الى دولتين، دولة الى
الأقباط و دولة الى المسلمين، و ربما الى عدة دول. ربما الى دولة للنوبة كما كانوا يدعون من شوية من سنين ..."
Annex 17
248
International Union of Muslim Scholars Secretary-General Muhammad Salim Al-Awa... Page 1 of 2
https://www.memri.org/reports/international-union-muslim-scholars-secre… -general...
Annex 17
249
International Union of Muslim Scholars Secretary-General Muhammad Salim Al-Awa... Page 2 of 2
Annex 17
250
Annex 18
“Hamas political leaders leave Syria for Egypt and Qatar”,
BBC News, 28 February 2012
Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
17192278
251
Hamas political leaders leave Syria for Egypt and Qatar - BBC News
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17192278 1/3
28 February 2012
Hamas political leaders leave Syria for Egypt and Qatar
The political leadership of the Palestinian Islamist group, Hamas, has moved from
Syria to Egypt and Qatar.
Deputy political leader Moussa Abu Marzouk, now based in Cairo, said Hamas could not
operate effectively due to the unrest in its long-time ally.
The political leader, Khaled Meshaal, and his aides have moved to Doha.
On Friday, the head of the Hamas government in Gaza, Ismail Haniya, declared his support
for Syrian people against President Bashar al-Assad.
"I salute all people of the Arab Spring, or Islamic winter, and I salute the heroic people of Syria
who are striving for freedom, democracy and reform," Ismail Haniya told worshippers at a
mosque in Cairo.
REUTERS
Home News Sport Weather iPlayer Sounds CBBC M
Annex 18
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17192278 1/3
28 February 2012
Hamas political leaders leave Syria for Egypt and Qatar
The political leadership of the Palestinian Islamist group, Hamas, has moved from
Syria to Egypt and Qatar.
Deputy political leader Moussa Abu Marzouk, now based in Cairo, said Hamas could not
operate effectively due to the unrest in its long-time ally.
The political leader, Khaled Meshaal, and his aides have moved to Doha.
On Friday, the head of the Hamas government in Gaza, Ismail Haniya, declared his support
for Syrian people against President Bashar al-Assad.
"I salute all people of the Arab Spring, or Islamic winter, and I salute the heroic people of Syria
who are striving for freedom, democracy and reform," Ismail Haniya told worshippers at a
mosque in Cairo.
REUTERS
Home News Sport Weather iPlayer Sounds CBBC M
Hamas political leaders leave Syria for Egypt and Qatar - BBC News
worshippers shouted back: "God is great" and "Syria! Syria!"
The remarks reflected the deepening split between Hamas and Mr Assad.
Iranians 'not happy'
The political bureau of Hamas - which is designated a terrorist organisation by Israel, the US
and EU - moved to Syria in 1999 after the Jordanian authorities accused the group of using
the country as a base for illegal activities and briefly detained Mr Meshaal and a key aide.
The Syrian government welcomed the group, providing its leaders with a safe haven, and
helping to supply it with weapons and money for the armed struggle against Israel, with which
Syria is still technically at war.
Relations appeared to be good until anti-government protests erupted throughout Syria in
March 2011, triggering a violent crackdown by security forces which activists say has left
more than 7,000 people dead.
Hamas initially neither publicly endorsed the Syrian regime's handling of the uprising -
252
Annex 18
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17192278 2/3
The Syrian government welcomed the group, providing its leaders with a safe haven, and
helping to supply it with weapons and money for the armed struggle against Israel, with which
Syria is still technically at war.
Relations appeared to be good until anti-government protests erupted throughout Syria in
March 2011, triggering a violent crackdown by security forces which activists say has left
more than 7,000 people dead.
Hamas initially neither publicly endorsed the Syrian regime's handling of the uprising -
reportedly much to Mr Assad's anger - nor repudiated it.
Analysts said the Sunni Islamist group was torn between risking the support of its main
financial backers - Syria and its ally, Iran - and supporting Syria's majority Sunni community,
which has borne the brunt of the crackdown by the Alawite-dominated security forces.
Mr Abu Marzouk told the Associated Press on Sunday that Hamas still had offices in Syria,
but acknowledged that "practically, we are no longer in Syria because we could not practice
our duties there".
"Our position on Syria is that we are not with the regime in its security solution, and we
respect the will of the people," he added.
He said Hamas wanted to keep its ties with Iran, but stood up to the government in Tehran in
refusing to publicly support President Assad.
REUTERS
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17192278 2/3
"Our position on Syria is that we are not with the regime in its security solution, and we
respect the will of the people," he added.
He said Hamas wanted to keep its ties with Iran, but stood up to the government in Tehran in
refusing to publicly support President Assad.
REUTERS
Hamas political leaders leave Syria for Egypt and Qatar - BBC News
"The Iranians are not happy with our position on Syria, and when they are not happy, they
don't deal with you in the same old way."
A member of the Hamas political bureau recently said Iran had been the main financial
supporter of the Hamas government in Gaza, and that without Iranian money it would not be
able to pay its 45,000 employees.
Mr Abu Marzouk also said that last year's agreement between Hamas and the rival Fatah
movement to form a Palestinian government of national unity ahead of parliamentary
elections still faced steep obstacles.
A series of recent meetings between Mr Meshaal and Palestinian Authority President
Mahmoud Abbas did not lead to any breakthrough.
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253
254
Annex 19
D. Sabbagh, “Al-Jazeera’s political independence questioned amid
Qatar intervention”, The Guardian, 30 September 2012
Available at https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/sep/30/aljazeera-
independence-questioned-qatar
255
AI-Jazeera's political independence questioned amid Qatar intervention I Media I The Guardian
G The
il
. oar tan
This article is more than 6 years old
Al-Jazeera's political independence questioned amid
Qatar intervention
Al-Jazeera English journalists protest after being ordered to re-edit UN report to focus on
Qatar emir's comments on Syria
DanSabbagh
Sun 30 Sep 201212.57 BST
Al-Jazeera's editorial independence has been called into question after its director of news
stepped in to ensure a speech made by Qatar's emir to the UN led its English channel's
coverage of the debate on Syrian intervention.
Journalists had produced a package of the UN debate, topped with excerpts of President
Obama's speech, last Tuesday when a last-minute instruction came from Salah Negm, the
Qatar-based news director, who ordered the video to be re-edited to lead with the comments
from Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani.
Despite protests from staff that the emir's comments -a repetition of previous calls for Arab
intervention in Syria -were not the most important aspect of the UN debate, the two-minute
video was re-edited and Obama's speech was relegated to the end of the package.
There are hints at staff dissatisfaction within the film, available for viewing on al-Jazeera's
website and YouTube, which notes that the emir "represents one of the smallest countries in
https:/lwww.theguardian.com/media/2012/sep/30/al-jazeera-independence-questione… 1/2
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AI-Jazeera's political independence questioned amid Qatar intervention I Media I The Guardian
the Arab world ... but Qatar has been one of the loudest voices condemning Syria".
The episode left a bitter taste among staff amid complaints that this was the most heavyhanded
editorial intervention at the global broadcaster, which has long described itself as
operating independent of its Qatari ownership.
An al-Jazeera spokesman said the emir's speech was "a significant development" that day and
the broadcaster "consequently gave it prominence".
Obama's speech had been carried live, the spokesman added, and the emir's comments were
balanced with disagreement from the Egyptian president, Mohammed Morsi.
However, insiders said Morsi's contribution had to be taken from an interview with another
broadcaster, because none of the world leaders speaking at the UN had, or was, intending to
take notice of the emir's comments.
Al-Jazeera English was set up in 2006 by the Arabic broadcaster of the same name and both are
owned by the Qatari state. The network, founded in 1996, gained credibility with audiences in
the region for its seemingly independent coverage in the post 9/11 period. Its English channel
was launched to offer an alternative, non-western-centric worldview.
However, in recent years, Qatar has taken steps to consolidate its control over the channel as
the country seeks greater political influence in the Gulf.
In September 2011, Wadah Khanfar, a Palestinian widely seen as independent, suddenly left as
director-general after eight years in the post and was replaced by a member of the royal family,
Sheikh Ahmed bin Jassim al-Thani, a man with no background in journalism.
In his resignation letter, Khanfar said, after noting that the channel had been criticised by
Donald Rumsfeld and hailed by Hillary Clinton, that "al-Jazeera is still independent and its
integral coverage has not changed".
He added: "When we launched in 1996, media independence was a contradiction in terms", but
al-Jazeera had managed "to pleasantly surprise" its critics by "exceeding all expectations".
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258
Annex 20
Video Excerpt of Asim Abdul Majid, Al-Jazeera Television,
25 June 2013
(Video recording on CD-rom located at the end of this Volume)
(Transcript of English subtitles and of Arabic original)
Archives of the State Information Service
of the Arab Republic of Egypt
259
Coverage of Speech of Muslim Brotherhood Leader Asim Abdul Majid, Al Jazeera
Mubashir Masr, 25 June 2013
Transcript of Arabic
"بدأ وقت العمل, كلنا كنا نطالب الدكتور مرسي أن يغضب و الآن نقول إن الصعيد الذي نصب الدكتور
مرسي هو الذي سيغضب, أقول لدعاة الفتنة سواء من الماركسيين أو من متطرفي الأقباط أو من مجرمي
الفلول الذين لم يتوبوا إلى الآن, إن الصعيد قادم وهو غاضب, سنأتيكم.. سنأتيكم بمئة ألف رجل الرجل
منهم بمئة ألف رجل من صعيد مصر, هم يظنون أننا سننزل يوم ثلاثين باستراتيجية دفاعية...خسئتم!
نحن سنأتي باستراتيجية هجومية, بثورة اسلامية, من اقترب بهذا الكرسي بغير حق سيحرقه الصعيد
حرقا. إن لحظة الحقيقية قد حانت فمن سالمنا فليعلن من الآن ومن حاربنا فلا يلوماً إلا نفسه.. فلا يلوماً إلا
نفسه .
{هتاف}
إسلامية.. إسلامية... رغم أنف البلطجية ... إسلامية... إسلامية... رغم أنف العلمانية خيبر.. خيبر.. يا
يهود .. جيش محمد هل سيعود؟ جزاكم لله خيراً يا إخوان."
Transcript of English subtitles
“The working time has began. we were all asking Dr. Morsi to get angry and now we say that
the people who designated Dr. Morsi are the one who will get angry, I say to the advocates of
sedition, whether from the Marxists or the extremists of the Copts, the criminals of fuloul
who haven’t repented until now that Upper Egypt is coming angry, we will bring you a
hundred thousand men, including 100 thousand men from Upper Egypt, they think we will
come down on the 30th day with defense strategy. You lost; we will come down with an
offensive strategy of an Islamic revolution, which approached this chair without right will
burn by Upper Egypt. The moment of truth has come, peace is upon us from now, and
whoever fought should blame himself only, so that no one blame himself only.
.. Islamic.. Islamic Despite bullying… Islamic… Islamic.. despite the secularism..
Kheyber .. Kheyber, Jews .. army of Muhammad will come back. May god reward you, good
brothers?”
{chants}
Annex 20
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Annex 21
M. Mazzetti, C. J. Chivers and E. Schmitt, “Taking Outsize Role in
Syria, Qatar Funnels Arms to Rebels”, The New York Times,
29 June 2013
Available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/world/middleeast/sendingmissiles-
to-syrian-rebels-qatar-muscles-in.html
261
Taking Outsize Role in Syria, Qatar Funnels Arms to Rebels - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/world/middleeast/sending-missiles-to… 1/3
By Mark Mazzetti, C. J. Chivers and Eric Schmitt
June 29, 2013
WASHINGTON — As an intermittent supply of arms to the Syrian opposition gathered
momentum last year, the Obama administration repeatedly implored its Arab allies to keep
one type of powerful weapon out of the rebels’ hands: heat-seeking shoulder-fired missiles.
The missiles, American officials warned, could one day be used by terrorist groups, some of
them affiliated with Al Qaeda, to shoot down civilian aircraft.
But one country ignored this admonition: Qatar, the tiny, oil- and gas-rich emirate that has
made itself the indispensable nation to rebel forces battling calcified Arab governments and
that has been shipping arms to the Syrian rebels fighting the government of President Bashar
al-Assad since 2011.
Since the beginning of the year, according to four American and Middle Eastern officials with
knowledge of intelligence reports on the weapons, Qatar has used a shadowy arms network to
move at least two shipments of shoulder-fired missiles, one of them a batch of Chinese-made
FN-6s, to Syrian rebels who have used them against Mr. Assad’s air force. Deployment of the
missiles comes at a time when American officials expect that President Obama’s decision to
begin a limited effort to arm the Syrian rebels might be interpreted by Qatar, along with other
Arab countries supporting the rebels, as a green light to drastically expand arms shipments.
Qatar’s aggressive effort to bolster the embattled Syrian opposition is the latest brash move by
a country that has been using its wealth to elbow its way to the forefront of Middle Eastern
statecraft, confounding both its allies in the region and in the West. The strategy is expected to
continue even though Qatar’s longtime leader, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, stepped
down last week, allowing his 33-year-old son to succeed him.
“They punch immensely above their weight,” one senior Western diplomat said of the Qataris.
“They keep everyone off balance by not being in anyone’s pocket.”
Taking Outsize
Role in Syria,
Qatar Funnels
Arms to Rebels
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Taking Outsize Role in Syria, Qatar Funnels Arms to Rebels - The New York Times
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“Their influence comes partly from being unpredictable,” the diplomat added.
Mr. Obama, during a private meeting in Washington in April, warned Sheik Hamad about the
dangers of arming Islamic radicals in Syria, though American officials for the most part have
been wary of applying too much pressure on the Qatari government. “Syria is their backyard,
and they have their own interests they are pursing,” said one administration official.
Qatari officials did not respond to requests for comment.
The United States has little leverage over Qatar on the Syria issue because it needs the
Qataris’ help on other fronts. Qatar is poised to host peace talks between American and
Afghan officials and the Taliban, who have set up a political office in Doha, the Qatari capital.
The United States Central Command’s forward base in Qatar gives the American military a
command post in the heart of a strategically vital but volatile region.
Qatar’s covert efforts to back the Syrian rebels began at the same time that it was increasing
its support for opposition fighters in Libya trying to overthrow the government of Col.
Muammar el-Qaddafi. Its ability to be an active player in a global gray market for arms was
enhanced by the C-17 military transport planes it bought from Boeing in 2008, when it became
the first nation in the Middle East to have the durable, long-range aircraft.
The Obama administration quietly blessed the shipments to Libya of machine guns, automatic
rifles, mortars and ammunition, but American officials later grew concerned as evidence grew
that Qatar was giving the weapons to Islamic militants there.
American and Arab officials have expressed worry about something similar happening in
Syria, where Islamists in the north have turned into the most capable section of the opposition,
in part because of the weapons from Qatar. Saudi Arabia recently has tried to wrest control
from Qatar and take a greater role in managing the weapons shipments to Syrian rebels, but
officials and outside experts said the Qatari shipments continue. The greatest worry is over
the shoulder-fired missiles — called man-portable air-defense systems — that Qatar has sent
to Syria since the beginning of the year. Videos posted online show rebels in Syria with the
weapons, including the Chinese FN-6 models provided by Qatar, and occasionally using them
in battle.
The first videos surfaced in February and showed rebels wielding the Chinese missiles, which
had not been seen in the conflict previously and were not known to be in Syrian government
possession.
Western officials and rebels alike say these missiles were provided by Qatar, which bought
them from an unknown seller and brought them to Turkey. The shipment was at least the
second antiaircraft transfer under the Qataris’ hand, they said. A previous shipment of
Eastern bloc missiles had come from former Qaddafi stockpiles.
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Taking Outsize Role in Syria, Qatar Funnels Arms to Rebels - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/world/middleeast/sending-missiles-to… 3/3
The shipments were small, the Western officials and rebels said, amounting to no more than a
few dozen missiles. And rebels said the Chinese shipments have been plagued with technical
problems, and sometimes fail to fire. The first FN-6s were seen in the custody of groups under
the Free Syrian Army banner, suggesting that they were being distributed, at least initially, to
fighters backed by the United States and not directly to extremists or groups with ties to Al
Qaeda.
American and Arab officials said that Qatar’s strategy was a mixture of ideology — the ruling
family’s belief in a prominent role for Islam in political life — and more hard-nosed
calculations.
“They like to back winners,” one Middle Eastern official said.
In meetings with Mr. Obama, the leaders of Jordan and the United Arab Emirates have
expressed a host of grievances about the Qatari shipments and have complained that Qatar is
pursuing a reckless strategy.
In Mr. Obama’s meeting with Sheik Hamad at the White House on April 23, American officials
said, he had warned that the weapons were making their way to radical groups like Jabhet al-
Nusra, also known as the Nusra Front, a Qaeda-affiliated group that the United States has
designated as a terrorist organization.
“It was very important for the Qataris to understand that Nusra is not only an organization
that destabilizes the situation in Syria,” said one senior Obama administration official. “It’s a
national security interest of ours that they not have weapons.”
But Charles Lister, an analyst with the IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center in London
who follows the Syria opposition groups, said that there was evidence in recent weeks that
Qatar had increased its backing of hard-line Islamic militant groups active in northern Syria.
Mr. Lister said there was no hard evidence that Qatar was arming the Nusra Front, but he said
that because of existing militant dynamics, the transfer of Qatari-provided arms to certain
targeted groups would result in the same practical effect.
“It’s inevitable that any weapons supplied by a regional state like Qatar,” he said via e-mail,
“will be used at least in joint operations with Jabhet al-Nusra — if not shared with the group.”
At least some extremists have already acquired heat-seeking missiles and have posted videos
of them, although the sources for these arms are not apparent from videos alone. And they
appear to have been made principally in the Eastern Bloc, not in China.
Erin Banco and Mark Landler contributed reporting from Washington, and Karam Shoumali from Antakya, Turkey.
A version of this article appears in print on June 30, 2013, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Sending Missiles To Syrian
Rebels, Qatar Muscles In
Annex 21
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Annex 22
“By the Millions, Egyptians Seek Morsi’s Ouster”,
The New York Times, 30 June 2013
Available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/world/middleeast/egypt.html
265
By the Millions, Egyptians Seek Morsi’s Ouster - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/world/middleeast/egypt.html 1/5
By David D. Kirkpatrick, Kareem Fahim and Ben Hubbard
June 30, 2013
CAIRO — Millions of Egyptians streamed into the streets of cities across the country on
Sunday to demand the ouster of their first elected head of state, President Mohamed Morsi, in
an outpouring of anger at the political dominance of his Islamist backers in the Muslim
Brotherhood.
The scale of the demonstrations, coming just one year after crowds in Tahrir Square cheered
Mr. Morsi’s inauguration, appeared to exceed even the massive street protests in the heady
final days of the uprising that overthrew President Hosni Mubarak in 2011. At a moment when
Mr. Morsi is still struggling to control the bureaucracy and just beginning to build public
support for painful economic reforms, the protests have raised new hurdles to his ability to
lead the country as well as new questions about Egypt’s path to stability.
Clashes between Mr. Morsi’s opponents and supporters broke out in several cities around the
country, killing at least seven people — one in the southern town of Beni Suef, four in the
southern town of Assiut and two in Cairo — and injuring hundreds. Protesters ransacked
Brotherhood offices around the country. In Cairo, a mob of hundreds set fire to the almostempty
Brotherhood headquarters, pelting it with stones, Molotov cocktails and fireworks for
hours. A few members hiding inside the darkened building fired bursts of birdshot at the
attackers, wounding several, but the police and security forces did nothing to stop the assault
or the arson.
Demonstrators said they were angry about the near total absence of public security, the
desperate state of the Egyptian economy and an increase in sectarian tensions. But the
common denominator across the country was the conviction that Mr. Morsi had failed to
transcend his roots in the Brotherhood, an insular Islamist group officially outlawed under Mr.
Mubarak that is now considered Egypt’s most formidable political force. The scale of the
protests across the country delivered a sharp rebuke to the group’s claim that its victories in
Egypt’s newly open parliamentary and presidential elections gave it a mandate to speak for
most Egyptians.
“Enough is enough,” said Alaa al‑Aswany, a prominent Egyptian writer who was among the
many at the protests who had supported the president just a year ago. “It has been decided for
Mr. Morsi. Now, we are waiting for him to understand.”
By the Millions, Egyptians Seek
Morsi’s Ouster
Annex 22
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By the Millions, Egyptians Seek Morsi’s Ouster - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/world/middleeast/egypt.html 2/5
Shadi Hamid, a researcher at the Brookings Doha Center in Qatar who studies the Muslim
Brotherhood closely, said: “The Brotherhood underestimated its opposition.” He added: “This
is going to be a real moment of truth for the Brotherhood.”
Mr. Morsi and Brotherhood leaders have often ascribed much of the opposition in the streets to
a conspiracy led by Mubarak‑era political and financial elites determined to bring them down,
and they have resisted concessions in the belief that the opposition’s only real motive is the
Brotherhood’s defeat. But no conspiracy can brings millions to the streets, and by Sunday night
some analysts said the protests would send a message to other Islamist groups around the
region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.
“It is a cautionary note: don’t be too eager for power, and try to think how you do it,” Mr.
Hamid said, faulting the Egyptian Brotherhood for seeking to take most of the power for itself
all at once. “I hear concern from Islamists around the region about how the Brotherhood is
tainting Islamism.”
Mr. Morsi’s administration appeared caught by surprise. “There are protests; this is a reality,”
Omar Amer, a spokesman for the president, said at a midnight news conference. “We don’t
underestimate the scale of the protests, and we don’t underestimate the scale of the demands.”
He said the administration was open to discussing any demands consistent with the
Constitution, but he also seemed exasperated, sputtering questions back at the journalists. “Do
you have a better idea? Do you have an initiative?” he asked. “Suggest a solution and we’re
willing to consider it seriously.”
Protests against President Mohamed Morsi on Sunday in Cairo. Clashes broke out in
several cities around the country. Tara Todras‑Whitehill for The New York Times
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18/03/2019 By the Millions, Egyptians Seek Morsi’s Ouster - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/world/middleeast/egypt.html 3/5
Many vowed to stay in the streets until Mr. Morsi resigned. Some joked that it should be
comparatively easy: just two years ago, Egyptian protesters toppled a more powerful
president, even though he controlled a fearsome police state. But there is no legal mechanism
to remove Mr. Morsi until the election of a new Parliament, expected later this year, and even
some critics acknowledge that forcing the first democratically elected president from power
would set a precedent for future instability.
Some of the protesters called for another intervention by the military, which seized power from
Mr. Mubarak and held onto it for more than a year. Chants were directed to the defense
minister, Gen. Abdul‑Fattah el‑Sisi: “Come on Sisi, make a decision!”
General Sisi, for his part, has stayed carefully neutral, feeding the protesters’ hopes. In a
statement last week urging the president and his opponents to compromise, the general said
the military would “intervene to keep Egypt from sliding into a dark tunnel of conflict, internal
fighting, criminality, accusations of treason, sectarian discord and the collapse of state
institutions.”
Many in the opposition saw the statement as an indication that if Sunday’s protests were
disruptive enough, the military would take over once again. The military sent four helicopters
flying low over a demonstration in Tahrir Square in Cairo on Sunday to reinforce its power and
control, and many below cheered.
Members of the Muslim Brotherhood. At least seven people died in clashes throughout
Egypt. Yusuf Sayman for The New York Times
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By the Millions, Egyptians Seek Morsi’s Ouster - The New York Times
The Web site of the flagship state newspaper, Al Ahram, reported Sunday that soldiers had
been ordered only to “protect the will of the people without bias to any side at the expense of
the other, especially as the political forces have not reached any formula of consensus.”
The extrication of the military from power was the biggest achievement of Mr. Morsi’s first
year in office. Last August, months after his election, the generals finally went back to their
barracks and allowed him to take full power as president, although the military retains
considerable autonomy under Egypt’s new Constitution.
But Mr. Morsi continued to battle institutions within his own government left over from Mr.
Mubarak, most notably the judiciary, and some of those fights contributed to the protests that
peaked Sunday. The protests began in November, when he tried to declare himself above the
courts until the passage of a new Constitution, a move that reinforced the fears of his
opponents and perhaps the general public that he threatened to become a new autocrat.
“He was of the revolution,” said Magdi Morsi, an airline flight planner demonstrating in front of
the presidential palace who is not related to the president. He said he had voted for
Brotherhood candidates for Parliament as well as for Mr. Morsi but had turned against them
for failing to deliver on their promises. “I decided he was a big liar,” he said. “He must leave.
The public is against him now.”
The police, another institution left intact from the Mubarak government, are in open revolt
against Mr. Morsi. In anticipation of Sunday’s protests, the interior minister had already
announced that the police would not protect the offices of the Muslim Brotherhood from attack.
And when the protests began, police officers were almost nowhere to be found.
Several officers in uniform joined the protesters in Tahrir Square calling for Mr. Morsi’s ouster
and asking the military to intervene. Two officers were seen in the vicinity of the attack on the
Brotherhood’s headquarters talking on hand‑held radios, but they did nothing to intervene.
Two armored vehicles from the interior security forces later arrived but also did nothing to
stop the attack. The officers listened for a while as the attackers appealed to them to arrest the
few Brotherhood members trying to defend their headquarters with birdshot, and then they
left.
The attackers used green pen lasers to search for figures at the windows of the Brotherhood
offices, then hurled Molotov cocktails. They vowed to show no mercy on the members inside.
“Their leaders have left them like sheeps for the slaughter,” one said. Two people were killed in
the violence at the headquarters, medics there said.
Thousands of Mr. Morsi’s supporters in the Muslim Brotherhood had gathered at a rally near
the presidential palace to prepare to defend it if the protesters tried to attack. Many brought
batons, pipes, bats, hard hats or motorcycle helmets, even woks or scraps of metal to use as
shields. They stood at attention with clubs raised and marched together. “We will sacrifice our
lives for our religion,” some chanted. “Morsi’s men are everywhere.”
Correction: June 30, 2013
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https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/world/middleeast/egypt.html 5/5
By the Millions, Egyptians Seek Morsi’s Ouster - The New York Times
An earlier version of this article misstated the location of Beni Suef. It is in northern Egypt, but
not as far north as the Nile Delta.
Mayy El Sheikh contributed reporting.
A version of this article appears in print on July 1, 2013, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: By the Millions, Egyptians Seek
Morsi’s Ouster
READ 137 COMMENTS
Annex 22
270
Annex 23
“Al Jazeera staff resign after ‘biased’ Egypt coverage”,
Gulf News, 8 July 2013
Available at https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/al-jazeera-staff-resignafter-
biased-egypt-coverage-1.1206924
271
Al Jazeera staff resign after ‘biased' Egypt coverage
Gulf Mena Europe Africa Americas Asia Oceania
WORLD
Anchor accuses management in Doha of provoking Egyptians
Published: July 08, 2013 22:14
By Ayman Sharaf, Special to Gulf News
Annex 23
272
Annex 24
J. Schanzer, “Confronting Qatar’s Hamas Ties”,
Politico, 10 July 2013
Available at https://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/congress-qatarstop-
funding-hamas-093965
273
Confronting Qatar's Hamas ties - POLITICO
Qatar’s ambassador to Washington, Mohammed Bin Abdullah al-Rumaihi, is about to
receive a letter that will put his diplomatic skills to the test.
Congressmen Peter Roskam (R-IL) and John Barrow (D-GA) are circulating a “Dear
Colleague” letter on Capitol Hill this week, collecting signatures to challenge the uberwealthy
Persian Gulf emirate over its financial ties to the Palestinian terrorist group
Hamas.
The draft letter, addressed directly to Rumaihi, acknowledges that “longstanding,
strategic bilateral relations between the United States and Qatar, including a strong
defense pact, are of critical importance to both countries.”
Annex 24
274
Confronting Qatar's Hamas ties - POLITICO
“However,” it continues, “we believe that Qatar’s relationship with Hamas empowers,
legitimizes, and bolsters an organization committed to violence and hatred.”
Qatar is a valuable ally for Washington. The sprawling al-Udeid Airbase near Doha is a
crucial asset for CENTCOM, particularly in the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
More recently, Qatar has played a key role in organizing, financing, and arming the
opposition to Bashar al- Assad’s regime in Syria at a time when the U.S. government has
failed to reach consensus.
However, Roskam, Barrow, and a growing group of other legislators don’t believe that
should absolve the Qataris of their support for a terrorist group best known for suicide
bombings and firing rockets into civilian areas. Of particular concern is Qatar’s reported
pledge of $400 million in financial aid to Hamas last year, and the fact that Hamas’s
leader, Khaled Meshal, now hangs his hat in Doha. Meshal recently delivered a sermon
at Qatar’s Grand Mosque in which he affirmed Hamas’s commitment “to liberate
Jerusalem” – a euphemism for the destruction of Israel.
The congressional letter also notes that Qatar’s recently-retired emir, Sheikh Hamad bin
Khalifa al-Thani, made “the first visit by a foreign leader to Gaza since Hamas took
power in 2007,” and further expresses alarm that the emir chartered a private plane in
April for Hamas militants to visit Doha.
Of course, the emir recently abdicated the throne to make way for his son, Tamim. And
it’s possible that Tamim will eschew his father’s Hamas policy. Rumors in the Arabiclanguage
press even suggested that Tamim gave Meshal 48 hours to vacate Qatar after
the toppling of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt last week.
It is clear now that these were only rumors. Qatar’s policy has not wavered. But what if
congressional pressure could force Tamim to change course?
The timing of this letter is critical. It coincides with the fall of Egypt’s Muslim
Brotherhood, which was one of Hamas’s most important patrons. One senior Israeli
security official told me that he viewed Egypt as the “back office” for Hamas. Cairo, for
example, hosted the group’s internal elections earlier this year, and allowed one of its
more senior leaders, Mousa Abu Marzouk, to be based there. More importantly,
underground tunnels connecting Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula to the Hamas-controlled Gaza
Strip serve as a crucial lifeline for the smuggling of weapons, goods, and cash.
With Egypt’s Brotherhood down for the count, the Egyptian junta is now shutting down
the Hamas tunnels. With few allies left in the region, Hamas is now clinging to Qatar for
financial and political assistance. If Congress can successfully challenge that
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Confronting Qatar's Hamas ties - POLITICO
relationship, the Israeli security official believes that it “can weaken or even destroy” the
movement.
Roskam and Barrow’s letter to al-Rumaihi is expected to drop sometime this month. It
will fall far short of labeling Qatar a “state sponsor of terror,” but it will undoubtedly
encounter stiff resistance from the State Department, which jealously protects its
alliance with this tiny but influential state.
Roskam and Barrow are apparently prepared for this battle, particularly if Secretary of
State John Kerry weighs in. As they note in their letter, in 2009, then-Senator Kerry
warned: “Qatar can’t continue to be an American ally on Monday that sends money to
Hamas on Tuesday.” We’re about to find out if that’s true.
Jonathan Schanzer, a former terrorism finance analyst at the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, is vice president for research at Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Annex 24
276
Annex 25
Video Excerpt of Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi, Al-Jazeera Television,
27 July 2013
(Video recording on CD-rom located at the end of this Volume)
(Transcript of English subtitles and of Arabic original)
Website of the Middle East Media Research Institute available at
https://www.memri.org/tv/leading-sunni-scholar-al-qaradhawi-urgesegypti…-
defy-al-sisi-says-christians-participated (video by request)
277
" و ظن أن الشعب أعطاه حق القتل, قطع رؤوس المصريين, عبد الفتاح السيسي و أعوانه جاءوا بجنودهم و
بقضهم و بقضيضهم منهم الجنود الرسميون و منهم الجنود الذين يلبسون الملابس مدنية و منهم البلطجية و
منهم أناس من النصارى ومن غيرهم جندوهم ليقتلوا المسلمين العزل, كلهم مسؤولون أمام لله لا يقول أحد ’أنا
مأمور‘ لا, ليس هناك أحد مأمور أن يقتل إنسان مسالم. من أمرك أن تقتل إنسان مسالم فارفض رأيه و إن
حاكمك و إن قال فيك ما قال و لكنك ستكون بريئاً عند لله و عند الناس. نداء آخر أوجهه إلى شيخ الأزهر.
شيخ الأزهر الذي حضر من أول يوم حين ما نداه عبد الفتاح السيسي و قال له " أنت مضر لهذا .. لأن الإنسان
لازم يختار أخف الضررين و اعتبر إن أخف الضررين إن الحاكم يقتل الشعب. من قال هذا يا شيخ الأزهر؟!
و هل استفتيت هيئة كبار العلماء و من مع البحوث الإسلامية و هيئة الفتوى في الأزهر .. و استفتيت علماء
المسلمين ؟! هذا أمر خطير جداً.. لم تستفتي فيه أحدا, و لا يجوز لك أن تعمل برأيك وحدك, و لا ندري ماذا
يبيّت هذا الوحش البشري, عبد الفتاح السيسي, ما لا يبيّت هذه الليلة لمقيمين المنتظمين.. هذا لم يُخف الذين
يقيمون باستمرار.. صرلهم شهر .. النهاردة ثلاثين يوم .. الذين يبيتون في رابعة العدوية صار لهم شهر.. هم
رجال و لله في عزائم الأسود, لن يتو اروا أبداً و لن يعني و لن يهمهم أن يموتوا. الذين ماتوا ليسوا خسارة لم
نخسرهم بالعكس. أدعوا حكام العرب .. حكام البلاد الإسلامية .. أدعوا خادم الحرميين الشريفين أدعوا الملك
عبد لله.. أدعوا الملك عبد لله و أدعوا رجاله أن يقفوا مع الحق. أنتم أعطيتموهم اثنا عشر مليار. هل أعددتم
المليارات ليقتلوا بها المصريين؟ "
Transcript of Arabic:
Annex 25
278
Leading Sunni Scholar Al-Qaradhawi Urges Egyptians to Defy Al-Sisi, Says Christian... Page 1 of 2
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280
Annex 26
Video Excerpt of Gamal Nassar, Al-Jazeera Television,
17 August 2013
(Video recording on CD-rom located at the end of this Volume)
(Transcript of English subtitles and of Arabic original)
Website of the Middle East Media Research Institute available at
https://www.memri.org/tv/al-jazeera-commentator-former-mbofficial-
gamal-nassar-al-sisi-jewish-implementing-protocols
281
أ"ن ا الحقيقة بحثت بشكل أو بآخر عن أصول السيسي , أردت أن أتعرف عليه فإذا بي أجد عندنا جريدة الوطن الجزائرية تقول أن
السيسي من أصول يهودية , أمه مليكه تيتاني و خاله عضو في منظمة الدفاع اليهودية, إّذا أمامنا مشهد أنو هذا الرجل بكل المقاييس
ينفذ خطة صهيونية لتقسيم مصر. هذا الرجل الذي هو على رأس القوات المسلحة الآن يقوم بجرم مكتمل المعالم الذي حدث هو
مجازر متعددة و أنا في ظني إن لم يحدث هناك وقوف وقفة حاسمة في هذا الإطار ستتكرر المجازر هذا الرجل أتى ليقضي على
الأخضر و اليابس. هو من ضمن مخططه يريد أن يكون هناك حرب أهلية ليظهر أمام العالم أنه حاول أن يدافع عن مؤسسات
الدولة وهو الذي يحرقها. حاول أن يحافظ على الأمن الوطني و الأمن القومي و هو الذي أهدره بشكل أو بآخر هذا يريد باختصار
حرق الدولة المصرية هذا المخطط الصهيوني أقول لك و أتحمل هذا الكلام ومن يراجع بروتكولات حكماء صهيون و من يراجع
كل الأدبيات الموجودة لدى كتّابهم و أيضاً مِن مَن كانوا يكتبون في الوليات المتحدة الأمريكية سيجد إن هذا معد المخطط هو سلفاً."
Transcript of Arabic:
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Annex 27
Video Excerpt of Mohamed El-Beltagy, Al-Jazeera Television,
16 August 2014
(Video recording on CD-rom located at the end of this Volume)
(Transcript of English subtitles and of Arabic original)
Archives of the State Information Service
of the Arab Republic of Egypt
285
Transcription of Audio from “Coverage of Mohamed El-Beltagy, Senior Figure in the
Muslim Brotherhood”, Al Jazeera Mubashir Masr
16 August 2014
[Reporter asks in English] “There has been a state of emergency declared in Sinai. Can you
control your supporters to prevent violence?”
محمد البلتاجي] " نحن لسنا المتحكمين في الأرض لكن هذا الذي يحدث في سيناء رداً على هذا الإنقلاب
العسكري يتوقف في الثانية التي يعلن فيها عبد الفتاح السيسي أنه تراجع عن هذا الإنقلاب و أنه صحح الوضع
و رده إلى أهله و أن الرئيس يعود إلى سلطاته."
]
English Translation
[Reporter asks in English] “There has been a state of emergency declared in Sinai. Can you
control your supporters to prevent violence?”
[Mohamed El Beltagy] “We are not in control of what is happening on the ground. But what is
happening in Sinai is in response to this military coup; it would stop the second that Abdel Fatah Al
Sisi declares that he has renounced the coup, that he has rectified the situation, that the power has
been returned to the rightful people, and that President [Morsi] will be restored to power”
,
Arabic Original
Annex 27
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Annex 28
“German minister accuses Qatar of funding Islamic State fighters”,
Reuters, 20 August 2014
Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-securitygermany-
qatar/german-minister-accuses-qatar-of-funding-islamicstate-
fighters-idUSKBN0GK1I720140820
287
German minister accuses Qatar of funding Islamic State fighters - Reuters
WORLD NEWS
AUGUST 20, 2014 / 3,24 PM / 5 YEARS AGO
German minister accuses Qatar of funding Islamic State
fighters
Q
f
BERLIN (Reuters) - German Development Minister Gerd Mueller accused Qatar on
Wednesday of financing Islamic State militants who have seized wide areas of northern Iraq
and have posted a video of a captive American journalist being beheaded.
"This kind of conflict, this kind of a crisis always has a history ... The ISIS troops, the
weapons - these are lost sons, with some of them from Iraq," Mueller told German public
broadcaster ZDF.
"You have to ask who is arming, who is financing ISIS troops. The keyword there is Qatar -
and how do we deal with these people and states politically?" said Mueller, a member of the
Christian Social Union (CSU), the center-right Bavarian sister party of Angela Merkel's
Christian Democrats.
Mueller did not elaborate and presented no evidence of a Qatari link to Islamic State. A
German government spokesman said he was checking whether Mueller's remarks reflected
the official view of Berlin.
Officials at the Foreign Ministry of Qatar, a wealthy Gulf Arab state, did not immediately
respond to requests for comment on his accusation.
ADVERTISEMENT
Qatar has denied that it supports Islamist insurgents in Syria and Iraq. Diplomats and
opposition sources say that while Qatar supports relatively moderate rebels also backed by
BERLIN (Reuters) - German Development Minister Gerd Mueller accused Qatar on
Wednesday of financing Islamic State militants who have seized wide areas of northern Iraq
and have posted a video of a captive American journalist being beheaded.
"This kind of conflict, this kind of a crisis always has a history ... The ISIS troops, the
weapons - these are lost sons, with some of them from Iraq," Mueller told German public
broadcaster ZDF.
"You have to ask who is arming, who is financing ISIS troops. The keyword there is Qatar -
and how do we deal with these people and states politically?" said Mueller, a member of the
Christian Social Union (CSU), the center-right Bavarian sister party of Angela Merkel's
Christian Democrats.
Mueller did not elaborate and presented no evidence of a Qatari link to Islamic State. A
German government spokesman said he was checking whether Mueller's remarks reflected
the official view of Berlin.
Officials at the Foreign Ministry of Qatar, a wealthy Gulf Arab state, did not immediately
respond to requests for comment on his accusation.
ADVERTISEMENT
Qatar has denied that it supports Islamist insurgents in Syria and Iraq. Diplomats and
opposition sources say that while Qatar supports relatively moderate rebels also backed by
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-germany-qatar/german-m… nd ing-islamic-state-fig hters-id USKBN0GK German minister accuses Qatar of funding Islamic State fighters - Reuters
Saudi Arabia and the West, it also has backed more hardline factions seeking to set up a
strict Islamic state.
In March, David Cohen, the U.S. Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence, cited reports of Qatari backing for Islamist fighters in Syria and described this
as a "permissive jurisdiction" for donors funding militants.
Qatar has also strongly backed Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, outlawed since the Egyptian
military overthrew an elected Islamist president in 2013, and has given refuge to many
foreign Islamists including from Hamas and the Taliban.
Proclaiming a "caliphate" straddling parts of Iraq and Syria, Islamic State has overrun broad
swathes of Sunni Muslim-populated northern and western Iraq with little resistance. They
have pushed back Kurdish regional forces allied with the Baghdad central government and
driven tens of thousands of minority communities including Christians and Yazidis from
their homes.
Annex 28
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Annex 28
In March, David Cohen, the U.S. Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence, cited reports of Qatari backing for Islamist fighters in Syria and described this
as a "permissive jurisdiction" for donors funding militants.
Qatar has also strongly backed Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, outlawed since the Egyptian
military overthrew an elected Islamist president in 2013, and has given refuge to many
foreign Islamists including from Hamas and the Taliban.
Proclaiming a "caliphate" straddling parts of Iraq and Syria, Islamic State has overrun broad
swathes of Sunni Muslim-populated northern and western Iraq with little resistance. They
have pushed back Kurdish regional forces allied with the Baghdad central government and
driven tens of thousands of minority communities including Christians and Yazidis from
their homes.
ADVERTISEMENT
Islamic State circulated a video on Tuesday that purported to show the beheading of
American journalist James Foley in revenge for U.S. air strikes against the insurgents in
Iraq.
Germany's foreign and defense ministers said on Wednesday that Germany was prepared to
send arms to Kurdish security forces in northern Iraq fighting Islamic State and would
immediately deliver military equipment such as helmets and security vests.
Reporting by Michelle Martin, Amena Bakr and Angus McDowall; Editing by Mark Heinrich
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust PrinciP-les.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-germany-qatar/german-m… nd ing-islamic-state-fig hters-id driven tens of thousands of minority communities including Christians and Yazidis from
their homes.
ADVERTISEMENT
Islamic State circulated a video on Tuesday that purported to show the beheading of
American journalist James Foley in revenge for U.S. air strikes against the insurgents in
Iraq.
Germany's foreign and defense ministers said on Wednesday that Germany was prepared to
send arms to Kurdish security forces in northern Iraq fighting Islamic State and would
immediately deliver military equipment such as helmets and security vests.
Reporting by Michelle Martin, Amena Bakr and Angus McDowall; Editing by Mark Heinrich
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust PrinciP-les.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-germany-qatar/german-m… nd ing-islamic-state-fig hters-id 289
290
Annex 29
T. Ross, R. Mendick and A. Gilligan, “Charity Commission: British
charities investigated for terror risks”, The Telegraph,
1 November 2014
Available at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamicstate/
11203569/Charity-Commission-British-charities-investigatedfor-
terror-links.html
291
Charity Commission: British charities investigated for terror risks
William Shawcross, the chair of the Charity Commission, warns that money donated
by the British public may already have been sent to Islamic State fighters, as the
watchdog opens cases on 86 aid groups at risk from extremists
The Charity Commission has warned that Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is a threat to charities raising money
in Britain Photo: ZEIN AL-RIFAI/AFP
By Tim Ross, Robert Mendick, and Andrew Gilligan
10:00PM GMT 01 Nov 2014
The government’s charity watchdog has launched a series of formal investigations into
British aid organisations, amid concerns that they are at risk of being hijacked by terrorists in
Syria and Iraq.
The head of the Charity Commission told The Telegraph he fears that groups distributing
money and supplies donated by the public in Britain could be exploited by Islamists to
smuggle cash, equipment and fighters to terrorists on the front line.
The regulator has begun scrutinising 86 British charities which it believes could be at risk
from extremism, including 37 working to help victims of the Syria crisis, according to new
figures released today.
It has launched full-scale investigations into four charities operating in the region, including
the group that employed the murdered hostage Alan Henning when he was kidnapped, and
another organisation allegedly infiltrated by a suicide bomber.
The number of terrorism-related cases that the regulator is examining has almost doubled
since February, amid growing concerns that charities working in the region are potential
targets for the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isil, also known as Islamic
State, and Isis).
William Shawcross, the chair of the Commission, said there was “a risk” that money donated
by the British public had already been sent to Isil fighters, who have beheaded two British
hostages, among many other victims, and are holding a third.
"It is absolutely terrifying to see these young British men going out to be trained in Syria and
coming back here,” Mr Shawcross said.
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“Most of them are not going out under the auspices of charities but, when that happens, it is
absolutely our duty to come down on it.
"Even if extremist and terrorist abuse is rare, which it is, when it happens it does huge
damage to public trust in charities. That’s why I take it very seriously.”
The warning comes at a critical time for global efforts to stem the flow of money to terrorists
in Iraq and Syria.
The Telegraph’s Stop the Funding of Terror campaign, which has won wide support in
Parliament, the military and overseas, is calling for action to cut off terrorist finance.
The Commission, which regulates charities in England and Wales, has worked with the
government of Qatar as well as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, among others, to strengthen their
systems for regulating charitable groups.
However, despite these efforts, funded by British taxpayers, America warned earlier this
month that Qatar and Kuwait remain “permissive” regimes in which terrorist financiers are
able to operate.
Analysts fear that millions of dollars in so-called charitable donations raised inside Qatar and
Kuwait have been used to buy weapons and supplies for jihadists in Iraq and Syria. In other
developments this weekend:
:: The brother of David Haines, the British hostage executed by his captors, has made an
impassioned plea to Gulf States to strangle the funding to terror groups operating in Syria
and Iraq. Michael Haines told The Telegraph: “We have to attack their finances. We need to
fight them on every front that we can find. We have to destroy them.”
:: It has emerged that the cousin of Qatar’s foreign minister has been convicted of funding
international terrorism. Abdulaziz bin Khalifa al-Attiyah was found guilty in absentia by a
Lebanese court for channelling financial support to al-Qaeda.
:: Lord Lamont, the former chancellor, praised the Telegraph in Parliament for “highlighting
the movement of funds to terrorist groups in the Middle East” as he pressed ministers to raise
the issue with Gulf rulers.
:: Foreign Office Minister Baroness Anelay promised that Britain was having “robust” talks
with Qatar and other Gulf states as she called for “much greater progress” to stop terror
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financing. The minister revealed that Isil gets most of its money from selling oil, extortion,
and hostage ransoms, as well as from foreign donations.
:: The government is facing new questions over the “extraordinary” inconsistencies in British
action against terrorist financiers, after it emerged that terrorists whose assets have been
frozen under Treasury sanctions may not be banned from travelling to the UK. Stephen
Barclay, a Conservative MP, called on his own party leadership to “spell out” why Britain
has a different sanctions regime against Qatari terror financiers from America, the UK’s
closest intelligence ally.
Last Wednesday, David Cameron raised concerns that the wealthy Gulf state of Qatar had
failed to act against rich Qatar-based fundraisers and “charities” that have sent millions of
dollars to jihadists fighting in Iraq and Syria.
During a private, one-to-one discussion with Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the Emir
of Qatar, the Prime Minister urged the Gulf ruler to accelerate efforts to tackle terrorist
financiers operating within the country.
Sources said the issue was also raised during a formal lunch in Number 10, which was also
attended by Mr Cameron’s chief of staff, Ed Llewellyn, his national security adviser Sir Kim
Darroch, and the Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond.
In Britain, the Charity Commission had already taken action against charities linked to
extremists, with the most serious cases going to court as part of terrorism prosecutions.
Speaking to The Telegraph, Mr Shawcross said the regulator was stepping up its assault on
the abuse of charitable funds by terrorists, as well as other kinds of malpractice including
fraud, mismanagement, and mistreatment of vulnerable adults and children.
An extra £8 million has been given to the watchdog, along with planned new powers, to
enhance its ability to tackle abuse of charities by Islamists and others, he said.
However, he warned that it was “often very difficult” to ensure that aid and money sent to
war zones to help the victims of violence does not end up in the wrong hands.
“Of course there is a risk [that funds raised here in Britain have been transported to Isil
jihadists in Iraq and Syria].
"If we find any evidence of it happening through charities we will pursue it robustly in
conjunction with the police and other law enforcement agencies.”
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He said he was particularly concerned about the large number of small, new charities that
have been set up to raise money to help victims of the Syrian crisis, while “aid convoys”
delivering supplies to the region were especially vulnerable.
“I think there are 500 British charities that say they operate in Syria in one form or another
and 200 of them have been registered since the conflict there began. Some of them are
inexperienced and obviously more vulnerable to exploitation than bigger more established
charities, the household names."
Mr Shawcross said the regulator was concerned that “there may not be adequate controls as
to where the goods and supplies were being delivered” from the aid convoys. He insisted that
“most Muslim charities are run by good people”, many of whom are “more horrified than
anybody else by abuse of charities by Islamists”.
Mr Shawcross insisted that “most Muslim charities are run by good people”, many of whom
are “more horrified than anybody else by abuse of charities by Islamists”.
“Charities can be abused, people working along the Syrian border can be abused, for Islamist
or extremist purposes, there is no question about that – sometimes knowingly, sometimes
unknowingly,” he said.
New figures from the Commission show there are 86 case files currently open in which
officials are reviewing the operations of charities, at least in part because there are fears that
they operate in countries – or for particular causes – which could be targeted by extremists or
terrorists.
The regulator’s figures showed that 37 of these 86 charities under scrutiny were working in
Syria, by raising money in Britain, sending humanitarian supplies, or participating directly in
aid convoys to the worst hit areas.
This workload has increased significantly since February, when the Commission was
working on 48 extremism-related cases, about 10 of which involved charities that focused on
Syria.
Full “statutory inquiries“ – the Commission’s most serious kind of formal investigation -
have begun into four British charities operating in Syria, including the Al-Fatiha Global
organisation, which the beheaded hostage Alan Henning was working with when he was
kidnapped.
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The others are Children in Deen, Aid Convoy and Syria Aid. All four investigations are still
“live”, while dozens of other charities are being monitored or scrutinised by the Commission
because they are operating in Syria or raising funds for the region in Britain.
Mr Henning was driving an ambulance on behalf of Rochdale Aid 4 Syria, which raised
money on behalf of Al-Fatiha Global. He was part of a convoy of 20 vehicles making the
4,000-mile journey to Idlib in north-west Syria when he was kidnapped on Boxing Day last
year.
The Charity Commission launched its investigation after one of Al-Fatiha’s leaders was
photographed with his arms around two hooded fighters carrying machine guns. A trustee of
the charity has challenged the commission’s decision to launch the inquiry.
The investigation into Children in Deen began in April after it emerged that a participant in
the Birmingham charity’s aid convoy last year, Abdul Waheed Majeed, had allegedly
become Britain’s first suicide bomber in Syria.
Majeed, 41, killed dozens of civilians when he drove a truck full of explosives into the wall
of Aleppo prison, enabling hundreds of prisoners to escape.
Last year, the Commission began formal inquiries into Aid Convoy, and Syria Aid, over
concerns about the way their funds were being used once inside Syria.
The watchdog issued a formal warning against aid convoys to Syria and urged members of
the public to donate to the larger aid agencies and major international charities to minimise
the risk that their money will be stolen by extremists.
Masood Ajaib, a trustee of Children in Deen, condemned the actions of Majeed and
completely dissociated himself and the charity from any links to violence. He said the
commission's investigation had already hit fundraising and made its operations more
difficult.
"We had nothing to do with this and do not support violence," he said. "All we want to do is
help the women and children affected by the biggest humanitarian disaster we have seen for
generations."
© Copyright of Telegraph Media Group Limited 2019
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Annex 30
“Islamic Council for Da’wa and Relief cancels Qaradawi’s
Membership”, Egypt Independent, 9 December 2014
Available at https://ww.egyptindependent.com/islamic-council-dawa-
and-relief-cancels-qaradawi-s-membership/
297
Islamic Council for Da’wa and
Relief cancels Qaradawi’s
membership
The International Islamic Council for Da'wah and Relief decided in its Tuesday
meeting, headed by Al-Azhar Grand Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayyeb, to cancel the
membership of the Islamic Relief UK, and the International Union of Muslim Scholars,
headed by ardent Qatar-based supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood Yusuf al-
Qaradawi.
The International Islamic Council for Da'wah and Relief said its decision came after
evidence showed that the Islamic Relief UK has funded Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in in
2013, and because the International Union of Muslim Scholars chaired by Qaradawi
mixed religion with politics.
Qaradawi is being tried in absentia in Egypt over charges of plotting to storm prisons
and free prisoners during the 25 January 2011 uprising. He has been placed as well
on arrival watchlists.
Islamic Council for Da'wa and Relief cancels Qaradawi's membership - Egypt Indepe... Page 1 of 1
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Annex 31
A. Gennarelli, “Egypt’s Request for Qatar’s Extradition of Sheikh
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi”, Center for Security Policy, 27 May 2015
Available at
https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/05/27/egypts-requestfor-
qatars-extradition-of-sheikh-yusuf-al-qaradawi/
299
Egypt's Request for Qatar's Extradition of Sheikh Yusuf Al- Qaradawi - Center for Security Policy
-
, CENTER FOR SECURITY POLIC
Egypt's Request for Qatar's Extradition of
Sheikh Yusuf Al- Qaradawi
@ May 27, 2015 :. Alessandra Gennarelli
Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, the Muslim Brotherhood chief jurist, has resided in Qatar for decades. However on
May 26, 2015 Egyptian authorities requested Qatar extradite Qaradawi back to Egypt. Yusuf Qaradawi, followed
by as many as 41 other Muslim Brotherhood officials, such as the former President of Egypt Mohammad Morsi,
are awaiting the death penalty in Egypt. Following the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood government, Qaradawi
issued a call for jihad in Egypt. Their convictions include, but are not limited to, murder, violence, inciting
violence, theft, insulting the judiciary and escaping from jail. The Egyptian court will have their final decision on
the matter June 2, 2015.
Yusuf Al- Qaradawi's background is far from clean, as his membership to the Muslim Brotherhood has led to
multiple arrests. The Muslim Brotherhood has been the cause of many Egyptian crackdowns, such as the ones in
1949, 1954 and 1981. In Qaradawi's autobiograp]!y, each arrest and imprisonment experience is discussed with a
sense of dignity and positivity, even comparing himself to the Quaranic story of Joseph. A similar sense of
comfortableness is seen in Qaradawi's comments on the current charges he is facing, saying they are "worthless
and undeserving of attention."
Yusuf Al- Qaradawi along with the other 41 Muslim Brotherhood Organization members facing charges can all
be found on the Interpol, or the International Criminal Police Organization, wanted list. The addition of all these
men to the wanted list is a good sign for Egypt. Leaders like the Chief of the Egyptian Police Interpol, Gamal
Abdel Bary, commented saying this is "an important change in the international communities' view to the
banned groups members."
Qatar is a member of Interpol, and therefore should comply with the request of Qaradawi' s extradition.
However, since Egypt's request was made Qatar has not been inclined to comply. The Assistant to the Minister
of Justice Adel Fahmy tells a local EgJ.P.tian newspfil)..fil. "Qatar did not previously accept the Interpol calls to
arrest the defendants although both countries, Egypt and Qatar, are signatories to an agreement of exchange of
prisoners." Egypt contacted Qatar earlier this year regarding Qaradawi, requesting Qatar to freeze all assets of
his on the basis that they go to fund terrorism. Qaradawi is the head of the Union of the Good a network of
Muslim Brotherhood-linked charities which finances Hamas.
Egypt and Qatar's have a long history of a rocky relationship. And to make matters worse, recently the Egyptian
delegate to the Arab League, Tariq Adel, accused Qatar of supQorting terrorism earlier this year. Qatar
responded by recalling its ambassador to Egypt, and their relationship has yet to improve. Qatar's financing of
terrorism has also been a source of tension between Qatar and several states, including the U.S., Germany., Iraq
and Israel.
Since Egypt's declaration of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, steps have been made to detain
Brotherhood members. This move by Egyptian authorities to indict Qaradawi for his role in calling for violence is
a painful but necessary step to expose the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood, and their anti-democratic ways.
https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/05/27 /egypts-request-for-qatars-extradition-of-sheikh-yusuf-al-qaradawi/
Reconciliation between Egypt and Qatar seems unlikely, and Qaradawi's return to Egypt is not imminent.
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Annex 32
“Voting”, Al Jazeera, 28 May 2015
Available at http://www.aljazeera.net/votes/pages?voteid=5270
301
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[TRANSLATION]
[Al‐Jazeera Logo] Live broadcast
Voting
Do you consider that the expansion of the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria is in
the interest of the region?
Voting results:
Voting period: from 22/5/2015 to 28/5/2015
Yes
81% / 46060
No
19% / 10821
Total number of voters: 56881
The voting results do not represent the opinion of Al‐Jazeera – it rather represents
the opinion of participating voters.
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304
Annex 33
“How Qatar Used and Abused Its Al Jazeera Journalists”,
The New York Times, 2 June 2015
Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/opinion/mohamedfahy-
how-qatar-used-and-abused-its-al-jazeera-journalists.html
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Opinion | How Qatar Used and Abused Its Al Jazeera Journalists - The New York Times
1/3
OP‑ED CONTRIBUTOR
By Mohamed Fahmy
June 2, 2015
CAIRO — This week, I am back in court in an effort to prove my innocence at a retrial on
charges that I was a member of the banned Muslim Brotherhood, designated a terrorist
organization in Egypt since December 2013, and that I sought to harm the country’s reputation
and security. I already spent 412 days in detention before my conviction in the first trial was
overturned on appeal earlier this year.
The terrorism charges against me and my colleague Baher Mohamed are unfounded and have
been widely discredited. The other charges relate to our employment by the Al Jazeera media
network, which is owned by the state of Qatar.
Following the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood‑backed president, Mohamed Morsi, in 2013,
Egypt moved to ban Al Jazeera’s Arabic service in the country, known as Mubasher Misr,
because it was perceived as a Qatari‑sponsored propaganda mouthpiece for the Brotherhood. I
was the bureau chief of the Al Jazeera English service, a separate operation that adhered to
higher journalistic standards, which, we assumed, would inoculate us against accusations of
bias. We were mistaken.
Now, Baher and I find ourselves once again in the soundproof defendants’ cage, fighting to
avoid long prison terms. Our friend and fellow Jazeera journalist, Peter Greste, will not be with
us. Thanks to his government’s work to win his release, Peter is home in Australia.
At the retrial, we will argue that we continued to work despite the broadcast ban because we
believed the English service was exempt and Al Jazeera failed to obtain legal clarification from
the Egyptian authorities. If, as a result, there were violations of licensing laws, which in any
case would be merely misdemeanors, it is the network’s executives from Qatar who should pay,
not us. A final ruling from the Egyptian court could come later this month.
My 18‑month ordeal may be close to an end, yet I find myself increasingly angry at how my life
and the lives of my family and loved ones have been turned upside down. My anger, however, is
not directed primarily at the prosecutor, the judiciary or the government of President Abdel
Fattah el‑Sisi. It is aimed at my employer, Al Jazeera.
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/opinion/mohamed-fahy-how-qatar-used-…
How Qatar Used and Abused Its Al
Jazeera Journalists
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Opinion | How Qatar Used and Abused Its Al Jazeera Journalists - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/opinion/mohamed-fahy-how-qatar-used-… 2/3
SUBSCRIBE TO THE TIMES
The network knowingly antagonized the Egyptian authorities by defying a court‑ordered ban
on its Arabic‑language service. Behind that, I believe, was the desire of the Qatari royal family
to meddle in Egypt’s internal affairs. While Al Jazeera’s Doha executives used the Cairo bureau
of Al Jazeera English to give their scheme a veneer of international respectability, they made
us unwitting pawns in Qatar’s geopolitical game.
Midway through our first trial, last year, Al Jazeera undermined our defense when it sued
Egypt for $150 million in compensation for business losses in Egypt. The network’s own lawyer
in our case criticized the lawsuit and quit the case. “Al Jazeera is using my clients,” he told the
court, according to Agence France‑Presse. “I have emails from (the channel) telling me they
don’t care about the defendants and care about insulting Egypt.”
This is why in May I filed a lawsuit in Canada, where I hold citizenship as well as in Egypt,
against Al Jazeera. I intend to hold the network accountable for its negligent conduct, and I am
seeking $83 million in compensation for my ordeal.
When Al Jazeera was started in 1996, Qatar was widely praised for its enlightened thinking.
The network’s 24‑hour rolling news coverage was a breath of fresh air in the Middle East’s
torpid media scene. The international services, like Al Jazeera English, recruited some of the
best names in journalism.
Like many young Arabs, I was impressed. Al Jazeera seemed a model of courageous
broadcasting in a region not known for upholding freedom of speech. That was still my view
when I became Cairo bureau chief in September 2013.
I have since realized how deeply I, like the viewing public, was duped. I came to see how Qatar
used Al Jazeera as a pernicious, if effective, tool of its foreign policy.
A court order shut down Mubasher Misr the same month I joined Al Jazeera English, but the
channel continued to broadcast by satellite and Internet from studios in Doha. I soon had
concerns that Qatar was compromising our journalism. Against my objections, the Arabic
Mohamed Fahmy at his retrial on Monday.
Amr Nabil/Associated Press
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https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/opinion/mohamed-fahy-how-qatar-used-… 3/3
Opinion | How Qatar Used and Abused Its Al Jazeera Journalists - The New York Times
station redubbed our English‑language news packages with inflammatory commentary.
I frequently complained to the Doha bosses that broadcasting our reports on the banned
Mubasher Misr, which was officially classified as “a national security threat,” put our lives at
risk. They told me to get on with the job, but the practice continued — even after Egypt
declared the Brotherhood a terrorist group, days before our arrest. When we came to trial, the
network’s actions made it much harder to disprove the testimony of the prosecution’s lead
national security witness that I had worked for Mubasher Misr, inaccurate though it was.
The Doha management also neglected to tell me that it was providing Brotherhood activists in
Egypt with video cameras and paying them for footage, which it then broadcast, without
explaining its political provenance, on the banned Arabic channel. During my detention, I met
a number of prisoners who told me how this worked, and I have seen court documents
confirming it.
Al Jazeera’s managers crossed an ethical red line. By attempting to manipulate Egypt’s
domestic politics, they were endangering their employees.
Qatar and Al Jazeera will continue to talk about Doha’s progressive values and support for
freedom of speech in the region. Just days ago, Qatar’s ambassador to the United Nations
piously told the Security Council that her country supported efforts to enhance the safety of
journalists and voted for a resolution calling for “a safe and enabling environment for
journalists, media professionals and associated personnel to perform their work independently
and without undue interference.”
I wonder how the Qatari poet Mohammed al‑Ajami feels as he languishes in Doha’s central
prison, serving a life sentence for “criticizing the emir” in a poem. You won’t find his plight
highlighted on Al Jazeera’s outlets anytime soon.
I have come to understand that Al Jazeera’s noble‑sounding claims are nothing but a glossy
whitewash.
Mohamed Fahmy, an Egyptian‑Canadian journalist who was the Cairo bureau chief for Al Jazeera English, is the author of
“Baghdad Bound: An Interpreter’s Chronicles of the Iraq War.”
Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook and Twitter, and sign up for the Opinion Today newsletter.
A version of this article appears in print on June 3, 2015 in The International New York Times
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Annex 34
M. Fahmy, “The Price of Aljazeera’s Politics”, The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, 26 June 2015
Available at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/
view/the-price-of-aljazeeras-politics
309
Copyright 2019 The Washington Institute - printed with permission
Articles & Op-Eds
The Price of Aljazeera's Politics
Mohamed Fahmy
Fikra Forum
June 26, 2015
The network's leadership has manipulated the truth and revealed itself as a mouthpiece for extremism, rather
than providing a much-needed forum for the region's many independent voices.
As a journalist, it has always been my preference to remain behind the headlines rather than make them.
However, the past eighteen months have seen a reversal of roles as we three Aljazeera journalists -- Baher
Mohamed, Peter Greste, and I -- face high-profile charges in Egypt. We stand accused of belonging to the Muslim
Brotherhood, a banned terrorist organization in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
The three of us have endured two separate trials sandwiched around an appeals court ruling, which overturned an
initial seven-year sentence. And as I await another verdict, I'm confident that on the basis of the evidence -- or
lack thereof -- we should be acquitted. I hope that soon my long ordeal will be over and I can get on with my life.
But I am also aware that this trial is influenced by factors other than personal evidence against us. So I am deeply
worried that my colleagues and I will take the fall for violations committed by Aljazeera. We may pay a heavy
price for Qatar, the network's owner, meddling in Egypt's domestic affairs.
As the most organized and politically cunning opposition in Egypt during the Arab Spring, the Muslim Brotherhood
was able to hijack the Egyptian people's aspirations at a time of great upheaval. Now, Egyptian president Abdul
Fattah al-Sisi faces a turbulent road to restore an effective and representative Egyptian government, but the pro-
Brotherhood aspects of Aljazeera have little interest in supporting Sisi.
From my research during my incarceration -- where I spent more than four hundred days -- interviewing
incarcerated activists, I have come to understand better the murky Masonic-style modus operandi of the Muslim
Brotherhood.
This research began to provide me with some understanding of how I arrived in court. And while I strongly oppose
the Egyptian state's increasing limits on reporters and freedom of speech, I now understand how Egyptian
authorities could conceivably link Aljazeera with the Muslim Brotherhood.
In a recent interview with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) on my predicament, Aljazeera America's
new CEO, Al Anstey, spoke repeatedly about how Aljazeera's different channels reach "different demographics."
He also discussed how Aljazeera shares content between the different stations, which he described as "normal
practice." Those different demographics, I have come to learn, go to the heart of the chameleon that is Aljazeera.
When I agreed to become its Cairo bureau chief in September 2013, I relied on Aljazeera English's strong
reputation for journalistic independence and integrity to make my decision. The network repeatedly assured me
that our legitimate journalism wouldn't be undermined or tainted by Aljazeera's other channels. I expected the
network to honor that commitment. It didn't.
I had not realized the depths to which other Aljazeera stations would stoop to reach those demographics so
different from Aljazeera English. I soon learned that branches of Aljazeera employed spectacularly different
approaches for gathering and making editorial decisions on the news. Aljazeera English provided true news while
other channels operated as broadcast networks dedicated to the Muslim Brotherhood. As one former Aljazeera
journalist admitted, "In Egypt, we have become the palace broadcaster" for the Brotherhood.
Aljazeera's Mubasher Misr channel is emblematic of this issue. Although Egyptian authorities banned this channel,
Mubasher Misr continued broadcasting antigovernment programming into Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood's
political messaging. This channel had a strong political slant without an impartial editorial line. I was horrified to
see our English-language packages, dubbed into Arabic and altered with an aggressive pro-Muslim Brotherhood
slant, rebroadcast time and again on the banned channel.
I repeatedly asked my bosses in Doha to stop, knowing that this practice put us, the journalists, at great risk. Each
time, the network told me not to worry and that it would not happen again. But the network did not honor those
promises. Because Aljazeera continued to repurpose our English-language content for illegal broadcasts, I ended
up in jail.
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In court, these broken promises allowed the prosecution's lead national security witness to testify that I had
"worked for the banned Aljazeera Mubasher," even though this testimony was inaccurate.
A steely faced Anstey denied to the CBC that our packages had been aired in full by Mubasher Misr. When
pressed, he claimed he would have to see "the package to answer that in detail." But Aljazeera's own press office
contradicted Anstey by acknowledging that the sharing of our English-language packages "may have happened on
a very small number of occasions."
Anstey, who was managing director of Aljazeera English at the time of my arrest, was ultimately responsible for
ensuring that proper operational licenses were in place to meet Egyptian legal requirements. However, the
network's own lawyer warned executives that the network was not properly licensed for us to operate legally, a
warning these executives ignored. While sitting in the courtroom prisoners' cage, we learned that the prosecutor
was alleging that Aljazeera's broadcast licenses were not in place despite documented management assurances
to me that all the legalities were in order.
Surely, if Aljazeera executives like Al Anstey broke the law, they should face the penalties in the Egyptian courts --
one to three years in jail and/or fines -- not Aljazeera's journalists.
The transgressions by Aljazeera also dictated that our legal strategy for the retrial meant distancing ourselves
from the negligent actions of the network. The intent was to show that we journalists in the dock were just doing
our jobs. The Aljazeera lawyer representing Baher Mohamed in the retrial weeks back highlighted that during
interrogations, Baher stated that he correctly translated a televised speech by President Sisi. Then, the network
presented cuts of Baher's translation out of context in order to depict Sisi calling for civil strife between the
Egyptian people and the Brotherhood. Baher's testimony was cited in the charge sheet, the prosecutor's case, and
in the judgment giving reasons for the seven-year sentence handed down to us three journalists during our first
trial in June of 2013.
My bosses also neglected to tell me that they had commissioned Muslim Brotherhood members to cover the
Brotherhood's own antigovernment protests and sell the footage to the banned Arabic arms of the Aljazeera
network. While in prison, I interviewed some of these activists who were caught and jailed. They openly
acknowledged receiving cameras and broadcast equipment from Aljazeera. Some of those activists also informed
me that they used the money they received in return for their work to print posters for their rallies and provide
food for protestors. Upon my release on bail, I reviewed their official interrogation records and confirmed this.
Their families also shared with me their fury at Aljazeera for using their sons without explaining to them that their
actions would break the law. This is not citizen journalism. We three journalists and our colleagues Sue Turton,
Dominic Kane, and Mohamed Fawzy, who were sentenced to ten years in absentia, would have not accepted this
nonsense. My team was kept in the dark by a network that has opted to become part of the struggle -- an agent
of change rather than a recorder and interpreter of events.
As I wait in these final days before the judge hands down a verdict, I am struck by how Anstey can coolly talk
about "different demographics" as if Aljazeera presents the same so-called media integrity across all its outlets. It
clearly doesn't.
It has become clear to me now how much emphasis Aljazeera places on framing and distributing a potentially
dangerous and biased point of view, created by Aljazeera's owners and backers in Qatar.
Recently, Qatar's role internationally has been subject to increased scrutiny. Qatar flatters Western governments
and invests in eye-catching global projects in Paris, London, and New York. At the same time, it gives voice to
terrorist organizations such as Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria and other extreme Islamist groups across the Middle East.
Doha's appetite for keeping dubious company runs deep, and Aljazeera plays a central role.
In 2003, senior Aljazeera journalist Taysir Allouni was sentenced to prison in Spain for helping al-Qaeda transfer
money to key operatives in Spain as he reported on their activities. Allouni is famous for interviewing Osama bin
Laden in October 2001, shor tly after the September 11 attacks. Upon his release from prison, Allouni returned to
Qatar, where he was welcomed back by then Aljazeera director-general Ahmed bin Jassim al-Thani.
Last month, Aljazeera aired an extended interview with Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the emir of Jabhat al-Nusra. It
was the leader's second interview on Aljazeera since 2013, when the militant Islamist group split from what is now
known as ISIS. Senior Aljazeera Arabic presenter Ahmed Mansour conducted the hour-long interview from an
undisclosed location with Julani, who did not show his face as he sat on an ornate armchair. "Our options are open
when it comes to targeting the Americans if they will continue their attacks against us in Syria. Everyone has the
right to defend themselves," Julani warned. The program was so deferential to the terrorist leader that it has been
described as Qatar's "infomercial" for al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate. The network labeled him as the head of a "rebel"
group.
Three weeks after the interview, German authorities detained, then released Ahmed Mansour, who holds dual
Egyptian and British citizenship, as the Cairo Criminal Court had convicted the veteran in absentia with a fifteenyear
sentence. This sentence emerged from charges that he participated in the torture and questioning of lawyer
Osama Kamal in Tahrir Square during the uprising against President Hosni Mubarak in 2011. Aljazeera has even
covered the hotel bills for exiled Muslim Brotherhood leaders staying in Doha.
It is clear that Qatar uses Aljazeera as a tool of influence to advance the cause of the Muslim Brotherhood. Senior
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Qatari leaders including former prime minister Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani have even suggested to foreign officials
that Aljazeera's coverage can be altered in exchange for actions that complement Qatar's state interests.
Current and former Aljazeera employees have repeatedly argued that the broadcasting network lacks impartiality
and promotes a pro-Islamist narrative. The former Aljazeera director-general from 2006 to 2011, Wadah Khanfar,
who recently signed on with Arianna Huffington for her new HuffPost Arabi, was described on the Muslim
Brotherhood's own website in 2007 as having been "one of the most prominent leaders in the Hamas Office in
Sudan."
The same year, Aljazeera Arabic's Washington bureau chief, Hafez al-Mirazi, resigned in protest over the station's
"Islamic drift," stating that "fr om the first day of the Wadah Khanfar era, there was a dramatic change especially
because of him selecting assistants who are hardline Islamists."
In 2012, Aktham Suliman, Aljazeera Arabic's Berlin bureau chief for ten years, resigned in protest over Qatar's
influence over the channel. He explained that "it's not a good feeling when you have the impression that you're no
longer a journalist, you're basically just a guard dog responding to your owner's whistle when he tells you to go
after this state or that government...with the Qatari ruler always the one calling the tune."
I started with the best of intentions at Aljazeera English -- objectively reporting on the Arab Spring, one of the
biggest stories of our time, with an Arab voice to the Arab world and beyond. However, Aljazeera has used my
work to support the extremist and inflammatory narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood.
It was a lost opportunity. The network's slogan, "The opinion and the other opinion," represents a mirage, as the
coverage fails to give voice to Qatar's opposition, which calls for the right to protest and form political parties and
labor unions. More than ever, the region needs independent voices and reporting to make sense of the forces of
change and the possibilities for a better, more peaceful future. Aljazeera had that potential. Sadly, its leadership
has instead manipulated the truth and has revealed itself as a mouthpiece for extremism.
Mohamed Fahmy, an award-winning journalist and author, is the former Aljazeera English Egypt bureau chief.
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Annex 35
“Abadi: Iraqi government is ‘holding’ Qatari ransom money”,
Al Araby, 25 April 2017
Available at
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2017/4/25/abadi-iraqigovernment-
is-holding-qatari-ransom-money
313
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Annex 35
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316
Annex 36
E. Solomon, “The $1bn hostage deal that enraged Qatar’s Gulf
rivals”, The Financial Times, 5 June 2017
Available at https://www.ft.com/content/dd033082-49e9-11e7-a3f4-
c742b9791d43?mhq5j=e2
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The $1bn hostage deal that enraged Qatar’s Gulf rivals | Financial Times
https://www.ft.com/content/dd033082-49e9-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43?mhq5j=e2 1/4
News review: exclusives of the year
Members of Iran-backed militia Kata’eb Hizbollah, which kidnapped the Qataris in 2015, on parade in Baghdad © Reuters
Erika Solomon in Beirut JUNE 5, 2017
Qatar paid up to $1bn to release members of its royal family who were kidnapped in Iraq while
on a hunting trip, according to people involved in the hostage deal — one of the triggers behind
Arab states’ dramatic decision to cut ties with the government in Doha.
Commanders of militant groups and government officials in the region told the Financial Times
that Doha spent the money in a transaction that secured the release of 26 members of a Qatari
falconry party in southern Iraq and about 50 militants captured by jihadis in Syria. By their
telling, Qatar paid off two of the most frequently blacklisted forces of the Middle East in one fell
swoop: an al-Qaeda affiliate fighting in Syria and Iranian security officials.
The deal, which was concluded in April, heightened concerns among Qatar’s neighbours about
the small gas-rich state’s role in a region plagued by conflict and bitter rivalries. And on
Monday, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain took the extraordinary
step of cutting off diplomatic ties and transport links to Qatar, alleging the country fuels
extremism and terrorism.
“The ransom payments are the straw that broke the camel’s back,” said one Gulf observer.
Doha denies it backs terrorist groups and dismissed the blockade by its neighbours as “founded
on allegations that have no basis in fact”. It said it could not immediately respond to a request
for comment on the hostage deal. But a person close to the Qatari government acknowledged
that “payments” were made. The person was unaware of the amounts or where the money went.
Qatar
The $1bn hostage deal that enraged Qatar’s Gulf rivals
Doha reportedly paid al-Qaeda affiliate and Iran to win release of royal hunting party
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The $1bn hostage deal that enraged Qatar’s Gulf rivals | Financial Times
https://www.ft.com/content/dd033082-49e9-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43?mhq5j=e2 2/4
Qatar, a US ally that hosts an American military base, has long drawn the ire of its neighbours,
who consider Doha an irritating regional maverick. The world’s top exporter of liquefied natural
gas, it has used its immense wealth to court relations from London to Washington and Tokyo.
But critics accuse it of seeking to punch above its weight diplomatically, meddling in regional
affairs and using the Arabic channel of Al Jazeera, the satellite television network it set up, as a
propaganda tool.
Doha has a history of reaching out to all kinds of controversial groups, from rebels in Sudan’s
Darfur region to the Taliban in Afghanistan and Hamas in Gaza. Qatar touts itself as a neutral
player that can act as an intermediary in regional conflicts. But its critics, notably Saudi Arabia
and the UAE, allege it also uses such interventions to play both sides and fund radical Islamist
groups, most recently in Libya and Syria. And to Doha’s critics, the hostage deal was further
evidence of that role.
“If you want to know how Qatar funds jihadis, look no further than the hostage deal,” said a
Syrian opposition figure who has worked with an al-Qaeda mediator on hostage swaps in Syria.
“And this isn’t the first — it is one of a series since the beginning of the war.”
The Financial Times spoke to people involved on both sides of the hostage swap deal, including
two government officials in the region, three Iraqi Shia militia leaders and two Syrian
opposition figures.
Around $700m was paid both to Iranian figures and the regional Shia militias they support,
according to regional government officials. They added that $200m to $300m went to Islamist
groups in Syria, most of that to Tahrir al-Sham, a group with links to al-Qaeda.
Those who spoke to the FT said the deal highlighted how Qatar has allegedly used
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The $1bn hostage deal that enraged Qatar’s Gulf rivals | Financial Times
https://www.ft.com/content/dd033082-49e9-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43?mhq5j=e2 3/4
hostage payments to bankroll jihadis in Syria. But to its Gulf neighbours, the biggest issue is
likely to be the fact that Doha could have paid off their main regional rival, Iran, which they
accuse of fuelling conflicts in the Arab world.
This particular saga began when an Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militia, known as Kata’eb
Hizbollah, kidnapped the Qataris in December 2015. Three Iraqi militia leaders say the hostages
were held in Iran.
Kata’eb Hizbollah is an Iraqi group but it is seen as having links with Iran’s main regional proxy,
Hizbollah, the Lebanese militant group. The latter is helping Iran back Bashar al-Assad, the
Syrian president, in his country’s six-year conflict.
Two regional diplomats said they believed one of the Iraqi group’s motives for the kidnapping
was to give Hizbollah and Iran leverage to negotiate the release of Shia fighters kidnapped by
the radical Sunni group Tahrir al-Sham in Syria.
Tahrir al-Sham, in previous iterations, was an al-Qaeda branch. It claims it has broken the
connection, but the international community still views it as an affiliate.
The hostage transaction was also linked to a separate agreement to facilitate the evacuation of
four towns in Syria, two surrounded by jihadi forces and two besieged by Shia militias, say
Syrian rebels and diplomats.
One western diplomat said the arrangement provided Qatar the “cover” to finance the hostage
deal. “Iran and Qatar had long been looking for a cover to do this [hostage] deal, and they finally
found it,” he said.
According to two opposition figures with close contact with the groups paid, Qatar used the
evacuation arrangement to pay $120m-$140m to Tahrir al-Sham. Another $80m, they said,
went to the Islamist group Ahrar al-Sham.
“The Qataris pay anyone and everyone, to what end? They have only brought about our ruin,”
said a Syrian rebel commander, who gave details of the payments but asked not to be identified.
A regional Arab official said the total paid to jihadi groups was closer to $300m.
“So, if you add that up to the other $700m they paid to Iran and its proxies, that means Qatar
actually spent about a billion dollars on this crazy deal,” he said.
The Iraqi Shia militia commanders in Iraq, all from hardline Iranian-backed groups, said that,
to their knowledge, Iran had obtained around $400m after giving them a payment they would
not disclose. They agreed to share some details because they were unhappy about their share of
the payment.
Related article
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The $1bn hostage deal that enraged Qatar’s Gulf rivals | Financial Times
https://www.ft.com/content/dd033082-49e9-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43?mhq5j=e2 4/4
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2019. All rights reserved.
“They [the Iranians] took the lion’s share,” said a member of one of the Iranian-backed Shia
“The hostage deal was perhaps a miscalculation,” said Gerd Nonneman, professor of
international relations at Georgetown University in Qatar. “This would have been done in good
faith in order to return hostages — there would have been no intention to funnel money to Iran.”
Another confusing chapter of the deal is that Haidar al-Abadi, the Iraqi prime minister, said in
April his government had seized hundreds of millions of dollars, which Iraqi officials said
arrived on Qatari planes “illegally”. It is not clear if this is money is part of the sums mentioned
above or an additional amount.
“The money all came in suitcases. Can you imagine this?” said one senior official.
Additional reporting by Simeon Kerr in Dubai and Mouataz Majid in Baghdad
militias in Iraq. “That’s caused some of us to be frustrated, because that was not the deal.”
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322
Annex 37
J. S. Block, “Qatar is a financier of terrorism. Why does the U.S.
tolerate it?”, Los Angeles Times, 9 June 2017
Available at https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-blockqatar-
terrorism-syria-20170609-story.html
323
Qatar is a financier of terrorism. Why does the U.S. tolerate it? - Los Angeles Times
◄
TOPICS
OP-ED OP-ED OPINION
Qatar is a financier of terrorism. Why
does the U.S. tolerate it?
By JOSHUA S. BLOCK
JUN 09, 2017 I 4:00 AM
President Donald Trump holds a bilateral meeting with Qatar's Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad AI-Thani, in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on May 21. (Evan Vucci / Associated Press)
Five Arab countries cut ties to Qatar on Monday, deepening a rift among
Persian Gulf nations over that country's support for radical Islamist groups. The
United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Yemen all announced
they would withdraw their diplomatic staff from Qatar and cut air and sea
traffic to the country.
►
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-block-qatar-terrorism-syria… 1/3
Annex 37
◄
OP-ED OP-ED OPINION
Qatar is a financier of terrorism. Why
does the U.S. tolerate it?
By JOSHUA S. BLOCK
JUN 09, 2017 I 4:00 AM
President Donald Trump holds a bilateral meeting with Qatar's Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad AI-Thani, in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on May 21. (Evan Vucci / Associated Press)
Five Arab countries cut ties to Qatar on Monday, deepening a rift among
Persian Gulf nations over that country's support for radical Islamist groups. The
United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Yemen all announced
they would withdraw their diplomatic staff from Qatar and cut air and sea
traffic to the country.
►
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-block-qatar-terrorism-syria… 1/3
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Qatar is a financier of terrorism. Why does the U.S. tolerate it? - Los Angeles Times
As part of what former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice termed the
"New Middle East," Qatar has emerged as one of the region's most
consequential players and one of the richest countries in the world. It has also
positioned itself as one of the strongest supporters of the Arab Spring,
preaching democracy abroad. But behind the polished fa<;ade of skyscrapers and
luxury shopping malls lies a dark reality. Ruled by the Al-Thani clan, the
onetime British protectorate has become a financier of terrorism.
One week after welcoming U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis in April, Qatar
hosted a conference by Hamas. The Al-Thani family is a major backer of the
terrorist organization, pouring millions every year into the Gaza Strip to cement
Hamas' grip on power. Last year alone, Qatar transferred .$.31 million to Hamas,
and the country is expected to pledge an additional $.100 million to Gaza.
Western leaders have largely turned a blind eye to
Qatar's abysmal human rights record at home and
malevolent behavior abroad.
Share quote & link
Also on the list of Qatar's beneficiaries is the radical Muslim Brotherhood, the
parent organization of Hamas. The Qatari government has bankrolled the
Muslim Brotherhood and affiliated groups with billions of dollars across the
Middle East. Qatar was a key supporter of the Mohamed Morsi-led regime in
Egypt, and members of the Egyptian Brotherhood have lived in Doha for
decades. Brotherhood figures are frequently featured on the Qatari-owned Al
Jazeera network, spreading their anti-Western world view to more than 60
million people.
Qatar has emerged as a key financier of the Syrian opposition, including Salafi
jihadist groups as well as Sunni Islamist organizations. Diplomatic sources
estimate that Qatar has invested at least $1 billion in anti-Bashar Assad forces,
with people close to the Qatari government putting the number as high as $3
billion. Qatar has channeled weanons and money: to Islamist rebels, notably to
the notorious organization Ahrar al-Sham, which has known ties to Al Qaeda.
Far from being a force of moderation, Ahrar al-Sham has fought alongside
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-block-qatar-terrorism-syria… 2/3
Annex 37
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Qatar is a financier of terrorism. Why does the U.S. tolerate it? - Los Angeles Times
Jabhat al-Nusra, also known as Al Qaeda in Syria. Qatar's ruling emir, Sheikh
Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, has been tfY.ing to get Jabhat al-Nusra off
America's terror list by championing a cosmetic separation between the group
and the umbrella Al Qaeda branch. It now operates under the banner of Fateh
al-Sham.
In a smart PR move, the government in Doha has financed Western research
institutions and think thanks with hundreds of millions of dollars to push the
myth of moderate Islamist groups in Syria. Qatar cites Ahrar al-Sham and
Jabhat al-Nusra as examples, claiming that their sole purpose is to remove
Assad. Too many Western leaders accept this rhetoric. One exception is
Germany, which has gone so far as to implicate Qatar as a .SP-Onsor of Islamic
State.
Qatar's close cooperation with Iran puts the country at odds with Gulf powers
that are firmly aligned against the theocratic regime in Tehran. "Iran represents
a regional and Islamic power that cannot be ignored and it is unwise to face up
against it," Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani reportedly said at a military:
ceremony: in May:. "It is a big power in the stabilization of the region." He also
reportedly described Hamas and Hezbollah as a resistance movement, calling
Hamas "the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." (The Qatari
government later claimed that the Qatar News Agency's website was hacked.)
Western leaders have largely turned a blind eye to Qatar's abysmal human
rights record at home and malevolent behavior abroad. This is partly due to the
significance of the al-Udeid air base, from which nearly all coalition airstrikes
against Islamic State are being conducted. But there may be more costs to our
ongoing partnership with Qatar than benefits. Now that our allies are publicly
breaking with the Gulf state, Washington should put pressure on the
government in Doha to pick a side. Qatar has gotten away with its opportunistic,
two-faced foreign policy for too long.
Joshua S. Block is president and CEO of the Israel Project.
Follow the Opinion section on Twitter _@latimesoP-inion or Facebook
LATEST NEWS
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-block-qatar-terrorism-syria… 3/3
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326
Annex 38
“Al-Nosra, the Qatari Terrorist Arm in Syria”, Sky News Arabia,
17 June 2017
(Video recording on CD-rom located at the end of this Volume)
(Transcript of English subtitles and of Arabic original)
Available at https://www.skynewsarabia.com/video/957485
327
Arabic Transcription of Titles and Audio from Al-Nosra, the Qatari Terrorist
Arm in Syria”, Sky News Arabia, available at:
https://www.skynewsarabia.com/video/957485
النصرة.. ذراع قطر المتطرف في سوريا
تمويل، تسليح، دعم اعلامي
تمويل
2015- 64.2 مليار دولار من التمويل للجماعات الارهابية بين 2010
30 مليون دولار فدية الصحفي الامريكي
16 مليون دولار دفعة على الهواء من الدوحة فدية لراهبات "معلولا"
تسليح
[يقول شخص مسلح]: تم بحمد لله شراء هذا المدفع مضاد الطيران بفضل لله ثم بمساعدة اخواتنا الخيرين
في حملة مدد اهل الشام من قطر
[يقول شخص مسلح]: تم بعون لله تعالى شراء عدد من الاسلحة و كمية من الذخائر لإعداد الاخوة في
المعسكر...عن طريق حملة مدد اهل قطر لأهلنا في الشام
دعم اعلامي
لم تتأخر قطر عن دعمهم اعلاميا
يظهر "اميرهم الجولاني" في وسائل اعلامها [قناة الجزيرة]
[الجولاني للجزيرة: لا نطمح للانفراد بصياغة مستقبل سوريا]
[مقابلة مع ابو محمد الجولاني، امير جبهة النصرة]
قطر.. نصرة الجبهة
Annex 38
328
ENGLISH TRANSLATION
(FROM ARABIC)
Al-Nusra, The Extremist Arm of Qatar in Syria
Financing…Arming .... Providing Media Support
Financing
64.2 Billion Dollars as funding to the terrorist groups between 2010-2015
30 Million Dollars as a ransom for the American journalist
16 Million Dollars as a payment on live T.V. from Doha, as a ransom for the nuns “of
Maaloula [an ancient city in Syria]”
Arming
[An armed man speaking]: Thanks to Allah [God], we bought this anti-aircraft gun
with the help of Allah [God] and then with the help of our good brothers from the
‘Maded Ahel al Sham’ campaign for the support of the Levant [Syrian] people from
Qatar.
[An armed man speaking]: With the help of Allah, we bought a number of weapons
and a quantity of ammunition to prepare the brothers in the camp ... through the
Maded campaign of the Qatari people to support our people in the Levant [Syria].
Providing Media Support
Qatar did not hold back by supporting them through media
“Their Prince Al-Jolani”, was shown in their media [Al-Jazeera Channel]
[Al-Jolani to Aljazeera: “We do not intend to be alone in shaping the future of Syria”]
[Clip of an interview with Abo Muhammad Al-Jolani, the prince of Jabhat Al-Nusra]
Qatar.. Supports the Jabhat [Al-Nusra]
Annex 38
329
330
Annex 39
E. Lake, “Al-Jazeera and the Musli Brotherhood”, Asharq Al-Awsat,
25 June 2017
m
Available at https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/eli-lake/opinion/aljazeera-
muslim-brotherhood
331
Al-Jazeera and the Muslim Brotherhood - ASHARQ AL-AWSAT English Archive
Al-Jazeera and the Muslim
Brotherhood
by Eli Lake | Jun 25, 2017 | Opinion |
In 2014, Mohamed Fahmy, the former Cairo bureau chief for the Qatar-funded
television network began a 438-day sentence in an Egyptian prison on
terrorism charges and practicing unlicensed journalism.
Today Fahmy is preparing a lawsuit against his former employers. And while he
is still highly critical of the regime that imprisoned him, he also says the
Egyptian government is correct when it says al-Jazeera is really a propaganda
channel for Islamists and an arm of Qatari foreign policy.
“The more the network coordinates and takes directions from the government,
the more it becomes a mouthpiece for Qatari intelligence,” he told me in an
interview Thursday. “There are many channels who are biased, but this is past
bias. Now al-Jazeera is a voice for terrorists.”
Fahmy’s testimony is particularly important now. Al-Jazeera is at the center of a
crisis ripping apart the Arab Gulf states. Earlier this month Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain imposed a political and diplomatic
blockade on Qatar. As part of that blockade, al-Jazeera has been kicked out of
those countries.
Al-Jazeera’s Arabic broadcasts have not met professional standards in recent
years. To start, the network still airs a weekly talk show from Muslim
Brotherhood theologian Yusuf al-Qaradawi. He has used his platform to argue
that Islamic law justifies terrorist attacks against Israelis and US soldiers. US
military leaders, such as retired Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez, who commanded
forces in the initial campaign to stabilize Iraq, have said publicly that al-Jazeera
reporters appeared to have advance knowledge of terrorist attacks. Fahmy told
me that in his research he has learned that instructions were given to
journalists not to refer to al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, al-Nusra, as a terrorist
organization.
https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/eli-lake/opinion/al-jazeera-muslim-broth…
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332
He said Qatar’s neighbors were justified in banning al-Jazeera. “Al-Jazeera has
breached the true meaning of press freedom that I advocate and respect by
sponsoring these voices of terror like Yusuf al Qaradawi,” he said. “If al-Jazeera
continues to do that, they are directly responsible for many of these lone
wolves, many of these youth that are brain washed.”
Fahmy didn’t always have this opinion of his former employer. He began to
change his views while serving time. It started in the “scorpion block” of Egypt’s
notorious Tora prison. During his stay, he came to know some of Egypt’s most
notorious Islamists.
“When I started meeting and interviewing members of the Muslim Brotherhood
and their sympathizers, they specifically told me they had been filming protests
and selling it to al-Jazeera and dealing fluidly with the network and production
companies in Egypt associated with the network,” he said.
One example of al-Jazeera’s coordination with the Muslim Brotherhood
revolves around Muslim Brotherhood sit-ins in the summer of 2013, following
the military coup that unseated Mohammed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhoodaffiliated
president. As part of Fahmy’s case against al-Jazeera, he took
testimony from a former security guard for the network and the head of the
board of trustees for Egyptian state television. Both testified that members of
the Muslim Brotherhood seized the broadcast truck al-Jazeera used to air the
sit-ins that summer. In other words, al-Jazeera allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to
broadcast its own protests.
Al-Jazeera and the Muslim Brotherhood - ASHARQ AL-AWSAT English Archive
(Bloomberg)
Eli Lake
https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/eli-lake/opinion/al-jazeera-muslim-broth…
Annex 39
333
334
Annex 40
“Egypt: Qatar is the main funder of terrorism in Libya”,
Asharq Al-Awsat, 28 June 2017
Available at https://aawsat.com/print/962246
335
Egypt: Qatar is the main funder of Terrorism in Libya
[Translation]
Asharq Al‐Awsat [Newspaper LOGO]
Egypt: Qatar is the main funder of terrorism in Libya
During a meeting attended by all UN Members
Wednesday – 3 Shawal 1438 – 28 June 2017
[Photo – members of Daesh in Libya (Reuters)
New York: “Asharq Al‐Awsat Online”]
Ambassador Tariq Al‐Kouni, Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab Affairs, said that Qatar is the main financier to terrorist
groups and organizations in Libya, and in other States in the region which he did not name.
During a meeting that was held yesterday (Tuesday) in New York, in furtherance of an Egyptian initiative and with the
participation of all UN Member States, Al‐Kouni outlined the forms of support that Qatar granted to terrorism in Libya,
and pointed out the impact of terrorism on the situation in Libya which has become a safe haven for terrorism.
The Egyptian report affirmed that there are ties between terrorist groups and organizations in Libya, and that they all
work under the umbrella of the Muslim Brotherhood and get their ideas from its extremist ideologies.
Al‐Kouni added that Egypt faced terrorist operations originating from Libya, including those [operations] that targeted
a number of Coptic Christians in Upper Egypt in May 2017. He further referred to the announcement made by the
Armed Forces’ Spokesman regarding the destruction by the Armed Forces, yesterday morning, of 12 vehicles loaded
with arms, which sneaked into Egypt through the western borders with Libya.
According to the Asharq Al‐Awsat News Agency, Al‐Kouni affirmed that Egypt stresses the necessity of taking a
number of measures with regard to the situation in Libya; the first of which is to reach a political settlement in the
country; second, that the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) intensifies its efforts in supervising and implementing
the political agreement; third, that the Security Council and its relevant committees make a documentation of the
repeated violations committed by certain States, and in particular Qatar, with regard to the sanctions imposed on
Libya, especially by funding and arming terrorist groups and organizations in Libya, and take the necessary measures
against the violations committed by the said States; fourth, the need to promote cooperation and coordination
between the committee of sanctions of Libya and the committee of sanctions of “Daesh” and “Al‐Qaeda”; and finally,
the necessity of lifting the arms embargo imposed on the Libyan national army, which restricts the ability of the Libyan
army in its fight against terrorism.
For his part, Ambassador Amr Abou Al‐Atta, the Egyptian delegate to the UN and President of the Counter‐terrorism
Committee at the Security Council, who presided the meeting, pointed out that terrorism constitutes one of the most
important challenges that have an impact on the stability in Libya, and that such an impact in Libya is extending to the
neighboring States and to the entire region. He added that the danger of terrorism is increasing in Libya, especially
after that “Abu Bakr Al‐Baghdadi”, the leader of the extremist Daesh organization, invited the terrorist fighters, who
wish to join “Daesh”, to move to Libya instead of Syria and Iraq.
For its part, the Libyan delegation affirmed in its report that the state of instability in Libya provides an incubator
environment for terrorist groups, and that the international community must undertake a number of measures;
including supporting the Libyan organs and fulfilling their need for arms which would allow them to fight terrorism in
furtherance of the UN Resolution No. 2214; providing them with equipment to control the borders and outlets and
track the foreign terrorist fighters; implementing the UN Resolution No. 2178 in order to prevent foreign terrorist
fighters from reaching Libya and to prevent arms from reaching the terrorist groups; and increasing the coordination
between Libya and the other States, and in particular, its neighboring States, in order to monitor the arms trade and
Annex 40
336
Egypt: Qatar is the main funder of Terrorism in Libya
prepare reports regarding the country of origin, the serial number and the destination thereof. Additionally, States
must put in place a strict supervision of media channels that promote a culture of violence, hatred and terrorism, and
must close these channels and pursue those who fund and facilitate their operation. The States from which the said
channels are broadcasted must take stringent measures in this regard.
For his part, the representative of Qatar said that his country is worried of the threat of terrorism and that it is keen to
participate in the efforts to eradicate terrorism, alleging that the reports of the different experts teams do not refer to
the involvement of Qatar in any violation of UN Resolutions or in any activity that would undermine the stability of
Libya. He further pointed out that what he mentioned is enough to respond to what he called “the allegations” made
by Egypt which come in the “context of media propaganda that attacks Qatar, and which is based on militias that
operate without any legitimacy…”.
Further to the intervention of the Qatari delegation – which was largely expected, the Egyptian delegation distributed
on the meeting attendees a list that shows the various violations committed by Qatar in Libya, in light of what was
officially transmitted in the reports prepared by the UN teams of experts.
The [Egyptian] delegation affirmed that Egypt did not refer to Qatar in this discussion and that, conversely, Qatar was
the one that involved itself by its activities and because it is the main funder of terrorism in Libya. It further explained
that the role played by Egypt contributes to the stability in Libya – something that everyone knows – while pointing
out that the intervention of the Egyptian delegation silenced the Qatari delegation who did not reply.
The participation of the Ambassador, Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab Affairs, in the meeting proves that Egypt is
highly concerned by this subject and that it considers the situation in Libya and the achievement of stability as a top
priority.
Annex 40
337
مصر: قطر المموِل الرئیسي للإرھاب في لیبیا
https://aawsat.com/print/962246 1/2
Annex 40
338
مصر: قطر المموِل الرئیسي للإرھاب في لیبیا
https://aawsat.com/print/962246 2/2
Annex 40
339
340
Annex 41
“Egypt: Qaradawi’s Daughter, Son-in-Law Jailed for Financing
‘Brotherhood’”, Asharq Al-Awsat, 4 July 2017
Available at https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/waleed-abdulrahman/
news-middle-east/egypt-qaradawis-daughter-son-law-jailedfinancing-
brotherhood
341
Egypt: Qaradawi’s Daughter, Son-In-Law Jailed for Financing “Brotherhood” - ASHARQ AL-AWSAT English Archive
https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/waleed-abdul-rahman/news-middle-east/egy… 1/2
Egypt: Qaradawi’s Daughter, Son-In-
Law Jailed for Financing
“Brotherhood”
by Waleed Abdul Rahman | Jul 4, 2017 | Middle East |
Cairo- Egyptian authorities accused on Monday Ola el-Qaradawi, daughter of the
spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, and her husband Hossam Khalaf, a
leading member of the Islamist Wasat Party, of providing the Brotherhood with
operations in Egypt.
Egyptian police detained Ola and her husband for 15 days on Sunday pending
investigations on charges of planning terrorist attacks that target security forces.
The Muslim Brotherhood was designated by Egypt as a terrorist group in 2013.
On June 5, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain and the UAE cut ties with Qatar and
accused it of supporting terrorism. The four countries also said 59 individuals
and 12 entities linked to Qatar have been added to their updated respective lists
of designated terrorist organizations and individuals.
a
Annex 41
342
https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/waleed-abdul-rahman/news-middle-east/egy… 2/2
The list included Yusuf Qaradawi, chairman of the International Union of Muslim
Scholars, who lives in exile in Qatar and is accused by Egypt for his role in
instigating people against some Arab and Gulf countries.
Egyptian judicial sources said on Monday that Qaradawi’s daughter holds the
Qatari nationality, in addition to the Egyptian passport. She also works at the
Qatari embassy in Cairo since several years.
Qaradawi has four daughters and three sons. Ola studied at the University of
Texas in the city of Austin in the US.
According to the judicial sources, Ola and her husband are accused of being
“members of an illegal organization,” in reference to the Muslim Brotherhood,
which is banned in Egypt and for “planning terrorist acts against the security of
public institutions.”
The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt considers the Army as the main obstacle facing
its chances to return to power and control the country, which explains the
continuous attacks launched by members of the Brotherhood against Egypt’s
military institutions.
Waleed Abdul Rahman
Annex 41
343
344
Annex 42
“New human rights report accuses Qatar of sponsoring terrorism in
Libya”, Asharq Al-Awsat, 24 August 2017
Available at https://aawsat.com/print/1006966
345
رعایة الإرھاب في لیبیا » تقریر حقوقي جدید یتھم قطر ب »
https://aawsat.com/print/1006966
Annex 42
346
[Translation]
Middle East [Newspaper LOGO]
New human rights report accuses Qatar of sponsoring terrorism in Libya
Thursday – 1 Thu Al‐Hegga 1438 – 24 August 2017, issue [14149]
Cairo: Abdel Sattar Heteita
A recent Libyan human rights report accused the State of Qatar of sponsoring terrorism. The report, which was
prepared by the Libyan institution “Justice First”, headquartered in Cairo, affirmed that it provides the relevant
counter‐terrorism authorities with reports and information it obtains with regard to Libyan entities and individuals
who appear on the two lists of the Arab States. The institution invited the world to cooperate with the “Arab quartet”
which issued two lists regarding the terrorist persons and entities who were linked to Qatar during the last two
months, including seven Libyan persons, and seven Libyan organizations. Hassan Tatanaki, President of the institution
that issued the report, affirmed to the “Middle East”: “we urge all the countries of the world to join the four Arab
countries in their categorization of entities and individuals who are involved in and linked to an activity of terrorism,
or to the funding or encouragement thereof”. At the beginning of last June, the Arab quartet (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the
United Arab Emirates and Qatar) announced that they added 59 individuals and 12 entities to the list of terrorism,
including five Libyans, Ali Al‐Salabi, Abdel Hakim Belhag, Al‐Mahdi Al‐Harati, Ismail Al‐Salabi, Al‐Sadek Al‐Gharyani, in
addition to the “Benghazi Defense Brigades” group.
The four States issued a second list by the end of last month, to which they added nine individuals and entities which
are reported to be terrorists, and which included two Libyan individuals, Ibrahim Boukhozaim and Ahmed Al‐
Hassanawi, along with six Libyan entities, “Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries”, “Al‐Saraya Media Centre”,
“Boshra News Agency”, “Raffalah Al‐Sahati Brigade”, “Al‐Naba’a Channel” and “Tanasuh Institution for Preaching
Culture and Media”.
For his part, Tatanaki said that the war on terrorism “is not only a military or a security [war], but it is a legal,
intelligence, economic and intellectual war”. With regard to the “Naba’a Channel” which appeared on the second list
of terrorist entities, the report said that the channel appeared four years ago “in a form that is almost identical to the
Qatari Al‐Jazeera, especially in its editorial policy”. “Any follower of this channel would easily discover that it
promotes the ideology of the fighter Libyan (group) and its extremist ideas”, and that “it defends those groups that
are classified as terrorist groups, such as the Benghazi Defense Brigades, the Shura Council of Benghazi
Revolutionaries, and Ansar Al‐Shari’a”.
The report examined the advisory opinions [“Fatwas”] that were issued by one of the persons who appeared on the
terrorism list, and affirmed that these opinions are being disseminated through the Tanasuh satellite channel and that
they “incite violence, fighting and blood”. The report stated that this channel belongs to the “Tanasuh Institution for
Preaching Culture and Media (which appears on the second terrorism list)”. The report added that the said institution
“receives direct support from the State of Qatar”, and that it is practically managed by a member of the Fatwa
Institution who is known by his preaching activity that instigates terrorism.
As to the “Bushra News Agency”, the report stated that it represents the media arm of the terrorist “Benghazi Defense
Brigades”, and that its role significantly emerged after the merger between a number of terrorist groups and
organizations in Benghazi, to later become their media vehicle. [The report] added that “various pieces of evidence
show that Bushra Agency receives financial and logistical support from Qatar, and that this theory is supported by the
fact that its logo was linked to the Qatari Al‐Jazeera logo during the coverage of certain operations carried out by the
Brigades”.
With regard to organizations that operate under the flagship of the “Benghazi Defense Brigades”, the report of the
“Justice First” institution clarified that these brigades were “composed of a mixture between groups affiliated to Al‐
Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood, and that they were mainly constituted of the Shura Council of Benghazi
Revolutionaries, Igdabia, the Council of Mujahideen in Derna, and the Ansar Al‐Shari’a organization which is classified
by the Security Council as a terrorist organization”, in addition to another militia that used the name of the Petroleum
Facilities Guard in west Benghazi, as well as the use of some mercenaries from Africa. The report stated that the
“Benghazi Defense Brigades” is responsible for several terrorist attacks and operations against the Libyan Armed
Forces in the region of petroleum fields and ports, as well as an operation in the Barak Al‐Shati air base in the south of
Libya. With regard to “Al‐Saraya Media Centre”, the report stated that it is “a media institution with an exculpatory
background connected to the agendas of the Qatari project for the support of terrorism in Libya and in the region, and
it is considered to be one of the most important wings of the terrorist Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries”.
With regard to the “Raffalah Al‐Sahati Brigade”, the report stated that it is accused of slaughtering hundreds of
soldiers and officers, the shooting of peaceful protestors, and the establishment of a secret prison for the torture of
citizens.
Annex 42
347
348
Annex 43
“Qatar accused of financing Muslim Brotherhood activities in
Europe”, The Arab Weekly, 29 October 2017
Available at https://thearabweekly.com/qatar-accused-financingmuslim-
brotherhood-activities-europe
349
Annex 43
350
Annex 43
351
Annex 43
352
Annex 44
“Egypt attack: IS flags carried by gunmen, say officials”, BBC,
25 November 2017
Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
42122809
353
25 November 2017
Egypt mosque attack
Egypt attack: IS flags carried by gunmen, say officials
Egyptian officials investigating the massacre of worshippers at a mosque in Sinai say
the attackers were carrying the flag of the Islamic State group.
At least 305 people died in the assault, which was launched during Friday prayers and has not
yet been claimed by any group.
Egypt's public prosecutor said there were up to 30 attackers at the scene.
Home UK World Business Politics Tech Science Health
World Africa Asia Australia Europe Latin America Middle East
The Egyptian military released footage of air strikes on "terrorist targets"
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-42122809
Annex 44
President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi has vowed to respond with "the utmost force".
The Egyptian military says it has already conducted air strikes on "terrorist" targets.
Egyptian security forces have for years been fighting an Islamist insurgency in the Sinai
peninsula, and militants affiliated with so-called Islamic State (IS) have been behind scores of
deadly attacks in the desert region.
Friday's attack in the town of Bir al-Abed is the country's deadliest in recent memory.
◾ The IS affiliate in Sinai
◾ Horror of attack will work against extremists
◾ Egypt's militant groups explained
◾ Sisi the strongman
Al-Rawda mosque was bombed and then dozens of gunmen, waiting outside, opened fire on
those trying to escape. Some attackers wore masks and military-style uniforms.
Egypt attack: IS flags carried by gunmen, say officials - BBC News Page 2 of 4
354
peninsula, and militants affiliated with so-called Islamic State (IS) have been behind scores of
deadly attacks in the desert region.
Friday's attack in the town of Bir al-Abed is the country's deadliest in recent memory.
◾ The IS affiliate in Sinai
◾ Horror of attack will work against extremists
◾ Egypt's militant groups explained
◾ Sisi the strongman
Al-Rawda mosque was bombed and then dozens of gunmen, waiting outside, opened fire on
those trying to escape. Some attackers wore masks and military-style uniforms.
The assailants reportedly set parked vehicles on fire in the vicinity to block off access to the
building, and fired on ambulances trying to help victims.
Thirty children are among the dead and more than 100 people have been wounded.
"What is happening is an attempt to stop us from our efforts in the fight against terrorism," Mr
Sisi said in a televised address hours after the attack.
"The armed forces and the police will avenge our martyrs and restore security and stability with
the utmost force."
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-42122809
Annex 44
Defying local dynamics
By Dr HA Hellyer, regional expert
What is particular about this attack is that this is not only the first on such a scale, but it was
also carried out with such a lack of interest in local dynamics.
Until now, radical groups have been trying to recruit in Egypt, from among local Egyptians.
It is very difficult to see how that will be remotely possible following this attack - irrespective of
local grievances vis-à-vis the state. If anything, this will only intensify local opposition to any
group that claims the slightest bit of sympathy for attacks of this nature.
Egypt attack: IS flags carried by gunmen, say officials - BBC News Page 3 of 4
Defying local dynamics
By Dr HA Hellyer, regional expert
What is particular about this attack is that this is not only the first on such a scale, but it was
also carried out with such a lack of interest in local dynamics.
Until now, radical groups have been trying to recruit in Egypt, from among local Egyptians.
It is very difficult to see how that will be remotely possible following this attack - irrespective of
local grievances vis-à-vis the state. If anything, this will only intensify local opposition to any
group that claims the slightest bit of sympathy for attacks of this nature.
Which militants operate in the area?
Militant Islamists stepped up attacks in Sinai after Egypt's military overthrew Islamist President
Mohammed Morsi following mass anti-government protests in July 2013.
Hundreds of police, soldiers and civilians have been killed since then, mostly in attacks carried
out by the Sinai Province group, which is affiliated to IS.
◾ Fake attack photos circulate on social media
◾ Egypt vows forceful response after massacre
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-42122809
355
Sinai Province has also carried out deadly attacks against Egypt's Coptic Christian minority
elsewhere in the country, and said it was behind the bombing of a Russian plane carrying
tourists in Sinai in 2015, killing 224 people on board.
It has been operating mainly in North Sinai, which has been under a state of emergency since
October 2014, when 33 security personnel were killed in an attack claimed by the group.
Sinai Province is thought to want to take control of the Sinai peninsula in order to turn it into an
Islamist province run by IS.
Egypt attack: IS flags carried by gunmen, say officials - BBC News Page 4 of 4
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-42122809
Annex 44
356
Annex 45
“‘Wanted Terrorist’ finished second in Qatar triathlon”, The Week,
28 March 2018
Available at https://www.theweek.co.uk/odd-news/92582/wantedterrorist-
finishes-second-in-qatar-triathlon
357
https://www.theweek.co.uk/odd-news/92582/wanted-terrorist-finishes-seco…
ODD NEWS
Mar 28, 2018
And other stories from the stranger side of life
Source: Twitter/@DohaTriathlon
Qatari officials have come under fire after a man named on a list of wanted terrorists finished second in a governmentsponsored
triathlon. Mubarak al-Ajji was photographed on the podium receiving a silver medal and prize money just a week
after Qatari officials promised the US they would crack down on terrorists.
‘Wanted terrorist’ finishes second in Qatar triathlon
News Sport Business Technology Cars Money Portfolio Podcast Subscriptions Offers
Annex 45
358
Annex 46
C. Coughlin, “White House calls on Qatar to stop funding pro-Iranian
militias”, The Telegraph, 12 May 2018
Available at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/05/12/whitehouse-
calls-qatar-stop-funding-pro-iranian-militias
359
(https://www.telegraph.co.uk/)
ALL SECTIONS
› News
News More
White House calls on Qatar to stop funding pro-Iranian militias
By Con Coughlin, DEFENCE EDITOR
12 MAY 2018 • 4:32PM
Emails said to be from senior officials in the Qatari government were sent to leading members of groups such as Hizbollah CREDIT:
REUTERS/AZIZ TAHER
Follow
White House calls on Qatar to stop funding pro-Iranian militias Page 1 of 3
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/05/12/white-house-calls-qatar-sto…...
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The Trump administration has called on Qatar to stop funding pro-Iranian militias
following revelations about the Gulf state’s dealings with terror groups in the Middle East.
US security officials have expressed concern about Qatar’s links to a number of Iraniansponsored
militias, many of them regarded as terrorist organisations by Washington.
It follows the disclosure of a number of emails said to be from senior officials in the Qatari
government to leading members of groups such as Hizbollah, the Iranian-backed Shia militia
that operates in southern Lebanon, as well as senior commanders in Iran’s Revolutionary
Guard (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/05/10/russia-israel-iran-trapped-…).
The emails, transcripts of which have been seen by the Sunday Telegraph, show that senior
members of the Qatari government are on friendly terms with key figures in Iran’s
Revolutionary Guard such as Qasem Soleimani, the influential head of of the Iranian Quds
Force, and Hassan Nasrallah, the head of Hizbollah.
Details of these previously undisclosed conversations between Qatari officials and the heads of
several Iranian-backed terror groups show that Doha paid hundreds of millions of dollars - one
report puts the figure as high as $1 billion - as part of ransom payments to secure the release of
hostages held by Shia militias in southern Iraq.
Such payments are in direct contravention to Washington’s long-standing policy of not paying
ransom demands to terrorist organisations.
Following US President Donald Trump’s decision last week to pull out the nuclear deal with
Iran, the administration is now calling on Qatar to review its relations with Iran, as well as its
ties with Iranian-sponsored terrorist groups.
“What these emails show is that a number of senior Qatari government officials have
developed cordial relations with senior figures in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, as well as a
number of Iranian-sponsored terrorist organisations,” said a senior US security official.
“At a time when the US government is trying to persuade Iran to end its support for terror
groups in the Middle East, we do not believe it is helpful that Qatar continues to have ties with
such organisations.”
Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizbollah, reportedly has ties to Qatar
White House calls on Qatar to stop funding pro-Iranian militias Page 2 of 3
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/05/12/white-house-calls-qatar-sto…...
Annex 46
361
Washington regards Qatar as an important ally in the war against Islamist-inspired terrorism,
and the US based its command headquarters for the recent military campaign to defeat Islamic
State (Isil) at Qatar’s Al Udaid air base.
The Qataris say they opened communications with Iran and a number of the terror
organisations Tehran supports to secure the release of members of the Qatari royal family who
were kidnapped while on a hunting expedition in southern Iraq.
In one of the emails, that are believed to have been intercepted by foreign governments, a
senior Qatari official reports that £50 million was paid to Mr Soleimani in April 2017, while
another £25 million was paid to an Iraqi Shia terror organisation that is accused of killing
scores of American troops in southern Iraq.
White House calls on Qatar to stop funding pro-Iranian militias Page 3 of 3
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/05/12/white-house-calls-qatar-sto…...
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Annex 47
Video Excerpt “Zero Distance”, Al-Jazeera Television, 29 July 2018
and 5 August 2018
(Video recording on CD-rom located at the end of this Volume)
(Transcript of English subtitles and of Arabic original)
Archives of the State Information Service of
the Arab Republic of Egypt
363
Transcript of Arabic original:
" أثناء الاشتباكات الدائرة في بعض المواقع الحدودية, كانت عدساتنا ترصد من حين لآخر مروحيات قوات حفظ السلام الدولية
على علو منخفض في عمليات تنشيط و مراقبة, بينما غابت المروحيات المصرية بسبب استهداف تنظيم الدولة لها أكثر من
مرة. تتخذ القوات من منطقة الجورا جنوب الشيخ زويد قاعدة عسكرية لها وفقاً لاتفاقية السلام بين مصر و إسرائيل, كما رصد
فريقنا الميداني طائرات أخرى صغيرة نسبياً لكنها لا تبدو من فئة المسّيرة, وثقنا أيضاً وجود نوعين مختلفين من طائرات دون
طيار تحلق في مناطق العمليات و فوق الأحياء السكنية و على فترات زمنية متباينة. تقارير إسرائيلية أشارت إلى أن إسرائيل
تشارك بالطائرات المسّيرة في العمليات العسكرية في سيناء بالتنسيق مع مصر و إنها نفذت بالفعل ضربات ضد مسلحين منذ
.2013
لم تعلق مصر رسمياً على التقارير الإسرائيلية لكنها في وقت لاحق بثت عبر وزارة دفاعها لقطات لطائرات بدون طيار صينية
الصنع من نوع وينغ لونغ قالت أنها انضمت حديثاً إلى أسطول الطائرات القوات الجوية لكن هذا النوع من الطائرات المسّيرة
لن يكن مطابقاً للطائرات التي رصدناها في سيناء, أثار ذلك فضولنا حول هوية هذه الطائرات خاصة بعد تزايد حالات
استهداف المدنيين هناك. في مسار البحث عن حقيقة هويات الطائرات المسّيرة في سيناء ومن يقف وراء ضربات الخاطئة
للمدنيين, رصد رفيقنا الميداني نوعاً ثالثاً من تلك الطائرات يختلف عن النوعين السابقين. كما حصلنا على صور عبر الأقمار
الصناعية لمقار عسكرية في سيناء بحثاً عن طائرات مسيرة تربض فيها. أبرز هذه المقار الكتيبة 101 التي تدار منها العمليات
العسكرية في شمال سيناء بالإضافة إلى مطار العريش و قاعدة جفجافة الجوية التي تقع في مركز الحسنة بوسط سيناء. عثر
فريق تحليل الصور الأقمار الصناعية على اثنتين من الطائرات المسّيرة في قاعدة جفجافة الجوية. إحدى طائرتين كانت في
وضع الهبوط عند التقاط الصورة في تمام الساعة ثماني و أربعين دقيقة صباحاً فيما يبدو أنها بعد العودة من مهمة, أما الطائرة
الأخرى فكانت رابضة في المربع المخصص للطائرات دون طيار وهو من طراز وينغ لونغ الصينية الهجومية التي عرضها
الجيش في إحدى بياناته.
اكتشفنا أيضاً في نفس القاعدة طائرات أخرى من نوع و هي طائرات أمريكية الصنع لكنها تعود لدولة الإمارات التي سلمتها
إلى مصر في عام 2016 استناداً إلى مصدر عسكري مصري رفض الكشف عن هويته و اتضح لنا أيضاً أنها ذات الطائرات
التي رصدناها أثناء قيامها بعمليات في سيناء. يستخدم هذا النوع من الطائرات لمكافحة مجموعات التمرد لقدرتها على رصد
التحركات والقيام بأعمال استخبارية كما يمكنها حمل أكثر من 3600 كيلو غرام من المتفجرات. أما الطائرات الدون طيار التي
رصدناها في سيناء فبعد البحث في قاعدة البيانات الطائرات المسّيرة العسكرية حول العالم وبعد مقارنة ما لدينا من طائرات
و هي AT- بالتعاون مع مركز دراسات الطائرات المسّيرة العسكرية والمدنية بواشنطن, تبين أن هذه الطائرة من نوع 802
طائرات أمريكية الصنع لكنها تعود لدولة الإمارات التي سلمتها إلى مصر في عام 2016 استناداً إلى مصدر عسكري مصري
رفض الكشف عن هويته و اتضح لنا أيضاً أنها ذات الطائرات التي رصدناها أثناء قيامها بعمليات في سيناء. يستخدم هذا النوع
من الطائرات لمكافحة مجموعات التمرد لقدرتها على رصد التحركات والقيام بأعمال استخبارية كما يمكنها حمل أكثر من
3600 كيلو غرام من المتفجرات. أما الطائرات الدون طيار التي رصدناها في سيناء فبعد البحث في قاعدة البيانات الطائرات
المسّيرة العسكرية حول العالم وبعد مقارنة ما لدينا من طائرات بالتعاون مع مركز دراسات الطائرات المسّيرة العسكرية و
أما هذه فيعتقد إلى حد كبير أنها IAI Heron و هذه من طراز Hermes المدنية بواشنطن, تبين أن هذه الطائرة من نوع 450
وجميعها طائرات قتال و استطلاع تتبع القوات الجوية الإسرائيلية. " Hermes من نوع 900
Annex 47
364
Transcription of Arabic original and English subtitles, “Zero Distance”, Al Jazeera
television, 29 July 2018 and 5 August 2018
Transcript of English subtitles:
“During the ongoing clashes in some border locations lenses of our cameras were occasionally
monitoring from time to time helicopters of the international peacekeeping forces at low altitude,
while Egyptian helicopters were absent because of targeting them by ISIS more than once. The
international forces from the Joura area south of Sheik Zuwaid have a military base for them
according to Egypt-Israel treaty. Also, our field team observed other relatively small aircrafts but
they don’t appear to be of drone category. We also documented existence of two different types
of drones, flying over the operations and inhabitants areas at different periods. Israeli reports
argued that it participates by drones with Egypt and it actually carried out strikes against
militants since 2013.
Egypt didn’t officially elaborate on the Israeli reports but late on through its ministry of defense
aired footage of Chinese-made drones the Egyptian Air Forces fleet of aircraft but this type of
drones was not typically identical to the drones we observed in Sinai. This matter raised our
curiosity about the identity of these aircrafts, especially after increasing in cases of targeting of
civilians there. In the course of search for the truth about the identity of the drones in Sinai and
who are behind the wrong strikes on civilians our field team observed a third type of aircrafts,
which is different from the two previous types. Moreover, we got satellite images of military
headquarters in Sinai searching for landing drones. the most prominent headquarters are the
Battalion 101 where the military operations in North Sinai run from. In addition, to Alarish
Airport and the Jafjaf air base in the Al Hasana center at the middle of Sinai. The analysis team
of satellite images found two drones at Jafjaf airbase, one of the two planes was in a landing
position when the image was taken at 8:40 am apparently after returning from a mission, the
other plane was asleep in the square specified for the drones, they were of Chinese Long- Wing
drones type presented by one of the Egyptian army’s statements.
We also discovered in the same base other US- made aircrafts type AT-802, which belong to the
UAE and were delivered to Egypt in 2016 according to any Egyptian military source who
declined to be identify. Also, it became clear to us that the drones are the same like we observed
while carrying on operations in Sinai. This kind of aircrafts is used to combat insurgent groups
for their ability to observe movements and running out intelligence works as it can carry more
than 3600 K.g. of explosives. But the drones we observed in Sinai after searching at the military
aircraft database around the world and comparing the aircrafts we have in cooperation with the
Center for Studies of Military and Civil drones in Washington, it was found that types of these
three planes are “Hermes 450” “IAI Heron” and the third is largely believed to be “Hermes 900”.
All are fighter aircrafts and surveillance related to Israeli Air Force”.
Annex 47
365
366
Annex 48
“Egypt remands dissident cleric’s daughter for 45 days”,
BBC Monitoring, 18 March 2019
Available at https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/
367
1 of 1 DOCUMENT
BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political
Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring
March 18, 2019 Monday
Egypt remands dissident cleric's daughter for 45 days
LENGTH: 204 words
By BBC Monitoring
An Egyptian court has remanded in custody Ola al-Qaradawi, daughter of exiled Islamist cleric Yusuf
al-Qaradawi, for 45 days pending investigations into charges of "financing terrorism".
The Giza Criminal Court remanded Ola al-Qaradawi and her husband Hossam Ali, as well as others, the
state-run news agency MENA reported on 18 March.
Ola al-Qaradawi and her husband have been held in pre-trial detention since their arrest in July 2017.
They face charges including "joining the terrorist Muslim Brotherhood group which incites changing the
regime, attacking state institutions, targeting public facilities and endangering society", MENA reported.
The charges also include receiving funding from abroad to finance terrorist attacks.
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who resides in Qatar, received a life sentence in Egypt in January 2018 over charges of
involvement in the assassination of an interior ministry officer.
Qatar rejected a request to extradite the cleric back to Egypt in September 2017, amid a diplomatic crisis
involving the two countries, as well as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain, since June of that year. See:
https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c1dmc7x4
Source: MENA news agency in English 1357 gmt 18 Mar 19
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
PUBLICATION-TYPE: Transcript
SUBJECT: NEGATIVE PERSONAL NEWS (90%); MUSLIMS & ISLAM (90%); TERRORISM (90%);
INVESTIGATIONS (90%); ARRESTS (90%); LITIGATION (90%); EXTRADITION (90%); MUSLIM
Page 1
Annex 48
368
BROTHERHOOD (78%); PRELIMINARY COURT PROCEEDINGS (78%); TERRORIST ATTACKS (77%);
SENTENCING (73%); INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (66%)
COUNTRY: EGYPT (95%); QATAR (92%); SAUDI ARABIA (79%)
LOAD-DATE: March 18, 2019
Copyright 2019 British Broadcasting Corporation
All Rights Reserved
Page 2
Egypt remands dissident cleric's daughter for 45 days BBC Monitoring Middle East - PoliticalSupplied by
BBC Worldwide Monitoring March 18, 2019 Monday
Annex 48
369
370
Annex 49
“How Qatar funds Muslim Brotherhood expansion in Europe”,
Gulf News, 17 April 2019
Available at https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/qatar/how-qatar-fundsmuslim-
brotherhood-expansion-in-europe-1.63386835
371
How Qatar funds Muslim Brotherhood expansion in Europe
https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/qatar/how‐qatar‐funds‐muslim‐brotherhood‐expansion‐in‐europe‐1.63386835 1/3
EXCLUSIVE
How Qatar funds Muslim Brotherhood
expansion in Europe
Gulf News interviews French author George Malbrunot on his recent book Qatar
Papers
Published: April 17, 2019 11:53
Sami Moubayed, Correspondent
Image Credit:
Beirut: Ninety per cent of Qatari funds to the EU were channeled to Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated
projects, two French authors have confirmed, supporting claims made since the summer of 2017 by
Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
One of the authors—prominent investigative journalist George Malbrunot—spoke to Gulf News
about his new book Qatar Papers: How the State Finances Islam in France and Europe.
It has been co-authored with his colleague Christian Chesnot, a ranking expert on the Arab World.
“This is not fantasy,” Malbrunot said in an exclusive interview.
“The evidence we published was based on bank transfers, cheques, and official letters. It is evidence
that they simply cannot contest.”
A total of 140 projects spread in Europe—mainly mosques and Islamic centers—were
directly funded by Qatar over the past eight years.
- George Malbrunot, journalist
Annex 49
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How Qatar funds Muslim Brotherhood expansion in Europe
https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/qatar/how‐qatar‐funds‐muslim‐brotherhood‐expansion‐in‐europe‐1.63386835 2/3
The two journalists started working on their 295-page book in late 2016, after receiving an
information-packed USB from a whistleblower, filled with documents from database of the Qatar
Foundation, headed by Shaikha Moza Bint Nasser Al Misned, and Qatar Charity, headed by a
relative of her son, the Emir, Sheikh Hamad Bin Nasser Al Thani.
Much of the funding came from Qatar Charity, an NGO that was set up in 1992 originally to help
orphans from the Afghan War, then expanded horizontally and vertically across the globe, with the
lion’s share of its activities focused on Europe.
“A total of 140 projects spread in Europe—mainly mosques and Islamic centers—were directly
funded by Qatar over the past eight years,” he said.
Their activities spread across territory from north of Norway to the coast of Normandy, France,
totaling 90 million Euros.
“Ninety per cent of that activity was linked to Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organisations through
a system that is very efficient, sophisticated — and legal,” he added.
“Much of the funding came from three sources: the Diwani Al Amiri, office of the former emir,
Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, and the Qatar Charity.”
“Qatar wants to buy influence in Europe,” explained Malbrunot, making use of its excessive wealth,
which transformed it from a “country of fishermen” into a world influencer.
Ultimately, Doha would like to control and influence Islamic societies across the European
continent, “a task previously handled by Morocco, Algeria, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia.”
Stunning revelations
An ever-present thread in the book’s revelations are links to the Brotherhood—outlawed
throughout most of the world for its links to global jihad and terrorism.
“One document shows that the Qatar Foundation pays Tarek Ramadan (grandson of the
Brotherhood’s founder Hasan Al Banna) a monthly salary of 35,000 euros (Dh145,521).”
The amount was allocated to help Ramadan ward off accusations of rape and sexual misconduct,
levied against him in November 2017.
They prompted him to leave his academic job as professor at the University of Oxford, relocating to
Doha where he now teaches at the Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani University and chairs the Research
Center of Islamic Legislation in Qatar.
Before his trial, Ramadan withdrew 590,000 euros from Qatari banks, allegedly for his defense
team.
Research for the book took Mablrunot and Chesnot to Switzerland, the UK, Germany, Kosovo,
France — and Qatar of course.
In the island of Jersey in the English canal, Qatar set up a mosque, “although there are no more
than 400 people living there”.
In northern France, they donated hefty sums to the Ibn Rushd School in the city of Lille, and also
to another private school in the southern city of Bordeaux.
Annex 49
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How Qatar funds Muslim Brotherhood expansion in Europe
https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/qatar/how‐qatar‐funds‐muslim‐brotherhood‐expansion‐in‐europe‐1.63386835 3/3
They also financed 50 similar projects in Italy, and channeled 3.6 million euros to Switzerland
between the years 2011-2014.
“They were used to fund the Muslim Cultural Complex of Lausanne, the Museum of Islamic
Civilisation in La Chaux-de-Fonds in the canton of Neuchâtel, and the Saladine Mosque in Bienne
(canton of Bern).
“The Muslim Brotherhood philosophy is to encompass people’s lives from birth to death. All of the
Qatar-financed projects tried to do just that, surrounding mosques with schools, swimming pools,
restaurants, and even morgues.”
“When we spoke with people administering these centers, they would say: ‘We are not members of
the Brotherhood. All of our funding is 100 per cent legal.”
“Yet, when we entered the libraries of these mosques and schools, we found the books of Shaikh
Yousuf Al Qaradawi (the Doha-based Egyptian mentor of the Brotherhood). His books were
everywhere, and so were those of Sayyid Qutob (one of the historic leaders of the Egyptian
Brotherhood).”
International pressure on Doha
“After years of (presidents) Sarkozy and Holland, Emanuel Macron said that he has had enough.
When Emir Tamim called him to congratulate him on his election, the French President said: ‘I will
keep the partnership with Qatar, but I don’t want financing of any future project without my
knowledge.”
Qatar, he notes, came under immense pressure to change its behaviour after its standoff with GCC
countries in mid-2017.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt severed ties with the country on June 5, accusing it of
backing the Muslim Brotherhood and promoting extremist ideology.
“In some cases, it complied, but in others, it tried to play a double game, like closing the London
headquarters of Qatar Charity, then re-opened with a rebrand, being Nectar Trust. It just dropped
the word ‘Qatar’ from its name.”
Mabrlunot and Chesnot rose to global fame in 2004, when they were held captive for five months
in Iraq by the Islamic Army. It is their third book on Qatar after Les secrets du coffre-fort (Secrets
of the Safe, 2013) and Nos tres chers emirs (Our Very Dear Emirs, 2016). Next September, they will
be releasing a documentary about their new book, providing a visual aid to Qatar Papers. It will be
aired on Russia Today.
Annex 49
374
Annex 50
E. Chorin, “Libya’s Perpetual Chaos”, Foreign Affairs, 19 April 2019
Available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2019-04-
19/libyas-perpetual-chaos
375
Why Haftar's Tripoli Offensive Could Break the Country's Deadlock
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2019-04-19/libyas-perpetu…
SNAPSHOT April 19, 2019
Libya’s Perpetual Chaos
Why Haftar’s Tripoli Offensive Could Break the Country’s Deadlock
By Ethan Chorin
Earlier this month, as the United Nations prepared for yet another conference to
end Libya’s nearly eight-year-long conflict, General Khalifa Haftar, the leader of
the eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA), ordered an assault on the capital,
Tripoli. Whether Haftar’s forces will succeed in taking the city is still unclear. But a
decisive victory for the general would likely bring relative order to Libya, at least
for the time being.
The international community has sporadically condemned the LNA’s offensive,
asking on “all parties” to adhere to the UN process and support Haftar’s rival, the
Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). Last week, U.S. Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo joined the chorus, calling on Haftar to “halt” his advance.
Despite these condemnations, it is clear that some countries, including France and
the United Arab Emirates, are saying one thing publicly while privately hoping
that Haftar’s actions will jolt Libya out of its deep political malaise.
For four years, many in the Western media have cast Haftar as an aspiring dictator
undermining the UN’s patient efforts to bring the country’s warring factions
together. Yet many Libyans have lost patience with the GNA and support the
LNA’s efforts—not out of any great sympathy with Haftar but because they feel
that he is the only actor in the country actively addressing Libya’s massive security
needs.
Many Libyans have lost patience with the GNA.
Annex 50
376
Why Haftar's Tripoli Offensive Could Break the Country's Deadlock
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2019-04-19/libyas-perpetu…
DEMOCRACY DERAILED
Few informed observers expected that the fall of Libyan dictator Muammar al-
Qaddafi in 2011 would quickly or easily lead to democracy. Yet the early
achievements of the Libyan revolutionaries were quite remarkable: within two years
of Qaddafi’s ouster, Libya held largely free and fair national elections, saw a
peaceful transfer of power from an unelected transitional body to an elected
government (the General National Congress), and witnessed the rapid growth of
civil society and a free press. But as former President Barack Obama lamented in
2014, the United States had failed to prepare for what came after Qaddafi’s fall.
Another U.S. misstep has gone largely unnoticed: as part of its “war on terror,” the
administration of former President George W. Bush had “rendered” some of
Qaddafi’s most feared Islamist foes back to Libya for torture and interrogation—
both a reprehensible and counterproductive move. When the revolution broke out
in 2011, Qatar and Turkey financed and armed these Islamists and their allies, many
of whom went on to fight moderate rebels in Libya and Syria. Some have been
linked to the September 11, 2012 attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi, which
resulted in the death of U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens and the end of the
Obama administration’s appetite for American action in Libya.
After the United Nations Security Council unfroze some of the former Qaddafi
regime’s foreign assets in late 2011, billions of dollars flowed into Libya’s Central
Bank and were paid out indiscriminately to all those claiming “revolutionary”
status. This turned Tripoli into a feeding ground for rebels, radicals, and criminals
seeking to get onto the government dole while undermining the fledgling
government. The chaos became worse after the attack on the U.S. mission in
Benghazi, which drove Western powers out of Libya and facilitated the placement
of radicals in key positions in, for example, the Ministry of Defense. There, they
facilitated the transfer of arms and patronage to their allies—mainly Islamists and
militias from the powerful coastal city of Misrata. Within months, Benghazi fell to
al Qaeda–allied militant groups.
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French President Emmanuel Macron with Haftar (R) and GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj in La . . .
Shortly thereafter, in June 2014, Libya held its second national elections, in which
Islamist parties once again did poorly. The Islamists, supported heavily by Qatar
and Turkey, rejected the results and, along with their militia allies from the coastal
city of Misrata, launched an attack on the Tripoli airport, which caused fighting to
spill over into residential areas, including the diplomatic quarter. The United States
pulled out its remaining diplomats, and the House of Representatives relocated to
the eastern city of Tobruk, where its leadership formally appointed Haftar—a
Qaddafi-era general who had returned from his U.S. exile in 2011—as commander
of the LNA. In Tripoli, members of the Islamist-Misrata alliance refused to
recognize the elected government and brought other, non-elected members into a
rump General National Congress (GNC). The General National Congress (GNC)
limped along from the fall of 2012 until August 2014, when it was formally
replaced by the House of Representatives.
LOOKING FOR A QUICK FIX
In the summer of 2014, the UN hosted a reconciliation dialogue in Morocco. The
talks produced a document titled the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which
was signed by representatives of both the Tripoli and the Tobruk governments in
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December 2015. The LPA was meant to bridge the differences between the House
of Representatives and the rump GNC by creating a hybrid of the two—the
Government of National Accord. The result was an unqualified mess.
In December 2015, executive power was vested in a nine-person Presidency
Council made up of a president, five vice presidents, and three ministers. A
consultative body, the State Council, was drawn from representatives of the both
governments. But there was a legal catch: by the terms of the LPA, the GNA had to
be ratified by a vote of the House of Representatives, which would then be
subsumed into the GNA as its legislature. A major sticking point to the House of
Representatives’ ratification was an article in the LPA engineered to sideline Haftar,
whom the Islamist-Misrata coalition saw as the biggest threat.
Initially both the House of Representatives and the GNC refused to participate in
the LPA. The GNA convened in Tunisia for the first time in January, 2016 and was
then transferred to an enclave in Tripoli, while the House continued its claim to
govern Libya from the east. And as the GNA sat deadlocked and isolated in
Tripoli, Haftar racked up battlefield victories. By 2017, he had succeeded in
expelling al Qaeda, the Isalmic State (ISIS), and other extremists from Benghazi,
boosting his popularity across the country. One 2018 study published by the
Netherlands Institute of Foreign Relations, for instance, found that the Libyan
public had significantly in the “protective greater confidence capacity” of Haftar’s
LNA than in that of the GNA.
Although the United States and its European allies had enthusiastically helped
topple Qaddafi, following the 2012 Benghazi attack, the West had once again lost
interest in Libya. This began to change only in 2016 when the consequences of
Libya’s political dysfunction arrived on European shores: African immigration
toward Europe via Libya surged, even as ISIS expanded rapidly in Libya and
North Africa. European leaders feared that terrorists would enter their countries
disguised as refugees and asylum seekers. Indeed, Tripoli’s hinterlands became a
training ground for suicide bombers in Europe and Tunisia—including one who
killed 22 at a concert in Manchester, England in 2017.
Faced with this crisis, the international community chose expediency over longterm
stability. In early 2016, the West had suddenly shifted its recognition from the
House of Representatives to the not-yet-ratified GNA. With GNA permission,
the United States began bombing ISIS at its hub in Sirte, while Italy struck deals
with the Tripoli militias to keep African asylum seekers languishing in Libya. This
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not only infuriated Libyans but subjected the world-be-emigrants to atrocities at
the hands of their traffickers. By the end of 2016, however, Haftar had become too
strong to ignore, and the distance between him and the GNA became harder to
bridge. Finding little public support in the West, Haftar alternately courted Russia,
Egypt, and several Gulf states, while arguing that he and the LNA answered to the
House of Representatives, not the GNA, which according to the LPA process still
did not exist.
With the LPA stuck in the mud once again, in June 2017 the UN appointed its
fourth Libya envoy, Ghassan Salame, who tried to resuscitate the LPA by engaging
the State Council and the House of Representatives to simplify the GNA’s
leadership structure. Stymied, Salame announced last winter that he would move
straight to a comprehensive national conference that would cover all outstanding
issues at once. The conference, planned for earlier this month, was put on hold after
Haftar began his offensive.
At a pro-LNA rally in Benghazi, April 2019
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AN END TO THE FIGHTING?
Most Libyans today simply want order and an end to the country’s fighting. As the
international community is not willing to accept the responsibilities and costs of
intervention itself, Haftar’s current moves may be the chance to shift the status
quo, just as a sudden rebel push in 2011 broke the de facto partition of the country
between the rebels and the Qaddafi regime.
Haftar’s offensive is a dangerous gamble: a swift and radical change on the ground
could potentially lead to a cease-fire that would break the militias’ hold over the
capital and, by extension, the GNA. It could also be the precursor to an attempt by
Haftar to establish authoritarian rule over the country. And if there is a long
stalemate, the country could see the dramatic escalation of a proxy war, with Qatar
and the Muslim Brotherhood supporting the GNA and Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and
the United Arab Emirates supporting Haftar. Over the last few days, Haftar’s siege
has revealed splits within GNA-linked militias, themselves divided on the role of
ISIS and al Qaeda-linked jihadists in the current fight. It has also split the
international community: the European Union is calling on Haftar to halt his
advance, but the UN Security Council failed to pass a draft resolution condemning
the offensive.
Assuming that the LNA does manage to take Tripoli—and that the international
community accepts this outcome—how can a Libyan government secure political
legitimacy? First, the UN should introduce a peacekeeping force that would
monitor the LNA, help disband and disarm the country’s remaining militias, and
assist with post-conflict stabilization.
The Libyan legal expert Azza Maghur has convincingly argued that any legal
resolution to Libya’s crisis will have to come from the House of Representatives,
which is the last legally elected body in the country. In this scenario, the House of
Representatives would serve simply as a ratifying body for a new electoral law and
a streamlined, technocratic interim government that could guide the country until
it is ready for national elections. Such an approach would be close to what the first
post-Qaddafi government, the National Transitional Council, had envisioned before
the Islamists and the United States pressured it to rush to elections. After elections,
the process of completing the draft constitution would begin again.
If Haftar believes the international community will neither prop up the GNA nor
allow a military dictatorship, he can probably be convinced to continue in his role
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as the head of the LNA, reporting to a legitimate government. Alternately, he might
participate in the political process as one of many candidates for civilian office.
The United States doesn’t have to do much to help. The Trump administration can
avoid falling into the same trap as its predecessor by not joining the hysteria over
Haftar and the LNA, but also by making it painfully clear to Haftar that he should
limit himself to securing the country, not persecuting rivals and consolidating
power.
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C. Rousseau, “Mesures prises par les Puissances occidentales à
l’égard de la Pologne et de l’U.R.S.S. à la suite de l’établissement de
l’état de guerre en Pologne le 13 décembre 1981”,
(1982) 86 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 603
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E. Malamut, “Aviation Suspension of Landing Rights of Polish
Airlines in the United States”,
(1983) 24 Harvard International Law Journal 190
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“Findings of Fact-finding Report Issued by the Independent National
Commission on Events Concurrent with June 30th, 2013”,
11 March 2014
Archives of the State Information Service
of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Also available at
http://egyptevidence.com/downloads/NCHR_Report_EN.pdf
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Interpol Red Notice for Yousf Al Qaradawi, 20 November 2014
(Redacted)
Archives of the State Information Service
of the Arab Republic of Egypt
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Public Prosecution, Office of the Attorney General of Egypt,
“Request to Reconsider The Decision of the Commission for the
Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF) issued on the 17th of October
2018, in Session No. 106, according to provisions of Article 42 of the
statute of the Commission regarding the Egyptian sentenced: Yusuf
Al-Qaradawi under extradition No. 22 of 2014 (International
Cooperation Bureau)”, 9 March 2019
Archives of the State Information Service
of the Arab Republic of Egypt
601
Request to Reconsider
The Decision of the Commission for the Control of
INTERPOL's Files (CCF) issued on the 17th of October 2018,
in Session No. 106, according to provisions of Article 42 of the
statute of the Commission regarding the Egyptian sentenced:
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi under extradition No. 22 of 2014
(International Cooperation Bureau)
- Preamble
1- The General Prosecution of the Arab Republic of Egypt issued, on
the 1st of Feb. 2014, an arrest warrant for the Egyptian accused
Yusuf Abdulla Al-Qaradawi, among 130 others, based on the
referral order issued on the 12th of Dec. 2013 by the investigating
judge in case No. 56460 of 2013 Nasser City felonies whereas the
abovementioned, among 130 others, have agreed among each other,
in the period from 1/1/2010 to 10/2/2011, by means of international
calls, to create chaos in the country, bring down the state with its
associations, train armed elements to carry out hostile acts in the
country, attack and assault police stations and prisons and free
prisoners.
2- On the 20th of Nov. 2014, the INTERPOL issued Red Notice No.
A-9237/11-2014 to arrest the abovementioned accused for the
charges of case No. 56460 of 2013 Nasser City felonies.
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3- It has been proven, by means of reviewing the registers of the
Egyptian Passports, Emigration and Nationality Administration,
that the accused departed to Qatar on 17/7/2013.
4- In its session held on 16/6/2015, the competent criminal court ruled,
in absentia and by consensus, to sentence the accused Yusuf
Abdulla Al-Qaradawi to death penalty on basis of the
abovementioned charges and according to the provisions of the
Egyptian Penal Code.
5- On 11/9/2017, the legal affairs department of the INTERPOL
reported that a closed session has been held in the INTERPOL'S
Headquarters (Lyon, France) to discuss the situation of sentenced
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi in light of the statements of the Egyptian media
regarding the annulment of the Red Notice of arresting him. The
session concluded the validity of the Red Notice issued on request
of Cairo's INTERPOL, and not to comply with the complaints the
sentenced filed to the human rights committee to annul the Red
Notice.
6- On 30/4/2018, the General Prosecution received a communication
from the INTERPOL stating that the CCF has received a request
from the mentioned sentenced objecting on the data recorded in the
files of the INTERPOL pleading that the criminal procedures taken
against him were of political nature and not in conformity with
human rights or his right of fair trial in accordance with Articles 2
and 3 of the INTERPORL's Constitution.
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7- On 30/4/2018, the CCF received further information to determine
whether the subject of challenge was in conformity with the
ITERPOL's regulations. The information was about all criminal
procedures taken by Egyptian courts against the sentenced, copies
of judgments issued in his regard and other elements expressing the
possibility of his physical and actual participation in the incidents
relating to the charges filed against him, particularly those in
relation to provocation to assault prisons, freeing prisoners and
financing armed elements to commit such crimes.
8- On 9/6/2018 the Egyptian General Prosecution informed the CCF
of the information available. The mentioned sentenced was made
aware of the information recorded against him on the request of
Cairo's INTERPOL according to the provisions of Article 35 of the
CCF's regulations.
9- On 17/10/2018 the CCF issued its decision No. CCF/R892.17
stipulating that the request of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi was not in
conformity with the regulations of the INTERPOL on processing
personal data with the necessity of deleting it from the INTERPOL's
files.
10- The decision of the CCF of deleting the mentioned data and the
annulment of the Red Notice was established on basis of the
following:
a) The inaccuracy of the data provided by the Egyptian National
Office (Cairo's INTERPOL) regarding the maximum penalty for
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the charges filed against the abovementioned (provisions 25:28
of the Commission's decision);
b) The political nature of the case, whereas the Qatari National
Office (Doha's INTERPOL) indicated in Feb. 2015 to the CCF
regarding the red notice issued against the abovementioned
(Provision 37 of the CCF's decision) and the CCF's conclusion
that the case is of a political nature (Provisions 41:76 of the
CCF's decision) in noncompliance with the provisions of Article
3 of the INTERPOL's constitution and Article 34 of Data
Processing Rules;
c) Lack of respect to human rights of the above mentioned in
noncompliance with Article 2 of the INTERPOL's Constitution
(provisions 87:94 of the CCF); and
d) Lack of evidence of committing the crimes the above mentioned
has been charged with.
11- On 5/12/2018 the Egyptian General Prosecution received the
response regarding the mechanism of reconsidering the CCF's
decision on annulling the previously issued Red Notice for the
sentenced Yusuf Abdulla Al-Qaradawi and deleting his data from
the INTERPOL's files according to Article 42 of the Statute of the
CCF which required the necessity of providing new incidents or
evidences that should change the viewpoint, besides enabling the
abovementioned to be educated on what has been provided and to
respond thereto according to Article 1/35 of the CCF's Code.
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- The new incidents and evidences upon which the Egyptian General
Prosecution establishes its request of reconsidering the CCF's
decision:
12- The General Prosecution refers to the provisions of Article 42 of the
CCF's Code on the mechanism of reconsidering request applied in
the INTERPOL, and represents the following issues, incidents,
pleas and evidences for the reconsideration of the CCF's decision.
13- The General Prosecution allows the accused or his attorney to
access such information and respond thereto in compliance with
Article 54 of the Egyptian Constitution, provisions of Article 2 of
the INTERPOL and Article 1/35 of the CCF. The General
Prosecution requests that it be informed of the accused responses or
what he may provide of papers and emphasizes its right to respond
verbally or in writing in a reasonable period.
14- Firstly, the decision of the CCF that the case is of political nature
was based on the incidents of the case, the situation of other
international organizations, the nature of the charges, the situation
of the sentenced, the impartial results of the INTERPOL according
to the criteria provided in Article 3/34 of the procedural rules of
the CCF which the prosecution has applied and found that there has
been a major incident that the CCF hasn’t been aware of and which
shall nullify the political nature of the case. The General
Prosecution has indicated in paragraph 3 above that it has been
proven, through the questionnaire of the Egyptian Passports,
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Emigration and Nationality Administration, that that Mr. Yusuf Al-
Qaradawi departed from the Arab Republic of Egypt to Qatar on
17/8/2013, namely after the 30th of June 2013 (the date on which
the Egyptian people ousted Muhammad Mursi). This means that:
the abovementioned was not banned from traveling even though he
was a member of the MB, his opposition to the regime in that time,
the procedures taken against him were absolutely legal
notwithstanding any political affiliation, and that the arrest warrant
issued for him was by the investigation judge on 12/12/2013 after
he had committed punishable criminal offenses according to the
Egyptian law stipulating freedom depriving punishments. This
emphasizes the absence of any political nature to the case referred
to.
15- There have been several judgments issued to insert the MB in the
list of terrorist groups, an incident that the FCC hasn’t been aware
of. Therefore, the MB is a terrorist group according to the Egyptian
judiciary and the enforceable legislations (Law No. 8 of 2015).
There is a number of criteria stipulated in the Egyptian law to list
any entity, group or organization in the list of terrorist groups. This
law resembles Egypt's commitment to countering terrorist and its
financing, pursuing terrorists and terrorist groups; this is in light of
the conclusions of the Security Council's decisions of countering
terrorism and terrorists. In the same regard, the Egyptian law
identifies terrorist groups as any associations, groups,
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organizations, gatherings, cells or others of whatsoever legal or
actual personality who practice, in any way, in or outside the
country, harming people, terrorizing them or endangering their
lives, freedom, rights or security, or endangering the environment,
natural resources, monuments, means of communication,
transportation, money, facilities, public or private properties or
taking over them, or hindering authorities, judiciary, government
services, municipals, warship venues, hospitals, education
facilities, other public facilities, diplomatic or counselor missions,
regional or international organizations in Egypt, hindering public or
private means of transportation, inciting disturbing public order,
endangering safety of the society, its interests and security,
obstructing constitution enforcement, works of state authorities, or
invading personal freedom and public rights guaranteed by the
constitution, or threatening national integrity or social or national
peace.
16- The General Prosecution refers to the erroneous grounds of the
judgment that the MB is a political party opposing the regime and
the state is targeting its leaders. The CCF has confused the Egyptian
judiciary with the investigation authorities and the political system
of the state. In the same regard, the General Prosecution indicates
that dissolved national party that preceded the MB has neither been
listed as a terrorist group nor its leaders has been accused with
terrorist crimes. This means that the end result is based on the
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criteria of the Egyptian law, and it has been proven that the MB and
its members have committed acts of violence, homicide and
sabotage which are crimes punishable by the regulations of the
Egyptian law.
17- In regard to the nature of the person himself, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi,
the General Prosecution refers to his history as one of the respected
popular influential Islamic scientists in the Egyptian community.
He has also been honored by many Arab states for his
accomplishments and contributions. He is the president of the
International Union of Muslim Scholars and generally influential in
Arab communities. He exploited that to achieve personal objectives
using Islamic rhetoric to provoke the public, who was actually
provoked, to carry out his ideologies which resulted in punishable
criminal offenses according to the enforceable Egyptian
legislations.
18- As evidence on the mentioned in paragraph 17, the Prosecution
indicates that search and arrest warrant No. 4030/1304 was issued
against Yusuf Al-Qaradawi on 25/12/2014 on request of the Iraqi
Judiciary because the abovementioned has expressively provoked
the public, through Aljazeera Channel – Al-Shari'a Walhya
Program, to kill Mr. Nouri Al-Malki, the Iraqi Prime Minister, on
3/3/2013, claiming that he is a murder of his people, the elderly,
children and women. (Annex 1, a copy of the search and arrest
warrant)
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19- The Prosecution indicates the existence of footage of Al-Qaradawi
provoking the Libyans to kill the late Libyan president, Muammar
Al-qaddafi, for the same reasons (on YouTube)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQXuoZe5fCQ&feature=youtu.be
The Prosecution also refers to the footage of the death of the late
Libyan president, Muammar Al-qaddafi, by one of the Libyan
opponents.
20- the General Prosecution refers to open sources where Yusuf Al-
Qaradawi said it is allowed to explode oneself to target a corrupt
system even if civilians died as long as this is done according to
group's planning.
https://youtube.com/watch?v=DxtFLSCFO-M&feature=youtu.be
21- The General Prosecution also refers to a speech of Dr. Yusuf Al-
Qaradawi publicized on Aljazeera, directed to the Egyptians,
provoking them to create violent chaos and riots against the regime
in noncompliance with international norms.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2y2t6iE3nz0&feature=youtu.be
22- The General Prosecution also attaches footage in which Al-
Qaradawi appears after the judgment, in absentia, of sentencing him
to death penalty, in which he was calling for revolution and chaos,
and admitting that he called for revolutions in all countries to
achieve justice.
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Office of the Attorney-General
10
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LKzkPU&feature=youtu.be
https://youtu.be/Lkz8oC3zkPU
23- Regarding passing a judgment in absentia by the Egyptian judiciary
to punish the abovementioned, the CCF was not aware of the
procedural system in Egypt. The judgment was only a threatening
one to the sentenced and it automatically expires in case of the
attendance of the sentenced, by arresting him, or by making an
appeal before the proper criminal court according to Article 395 of
the Egyptian Penal Code. In this case, the person shall be re-trialed
with all legal and judicial guarantees referred to by the Prosecution
in its memorandum dated 9/6/2018 (appendix2).
24- Even though Yusuf Al-Qaradawi was aware of the judgment
rendered in his regard, he neither attended in person nor assigned
an attorney to attend on his behalf, before the competent court.
Instead, he escaped justice and didn’t follow the national legal
equity procedures, which is still possible. Such procedures have
been taken by several others and resulted in the innocence of some
and the guilt of others according to the evidences available.
25- In reference to the same judgment issued on 16/6/2015, the
Egyptian Cassation Court cancelled it for some other accused and
trialed them again before other criminal courts. If the case were of
a political nature, as the CCF indicated, the Egyptian Cassation
Court wouldn’t have accepted challenging the judgment. The
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Office of the Attorney-General
11
Egyptian judiciary is independent, impartial and doesn’t interfere
with politics.
26- The acts committed by the sentenced are absolute criminal charges
that don’t relate to any political orientation, and his affiliation to a
certain group doesn’t resemble immunity against law.
27- Criminalizing terrorist acts in the frame of the national law has been
in compliance with all international regulations and conventions of
the UN and particularly the Security Council on countering
terrorism, its financing and drying up its resources. In no
circumstances shall terrorist acts that result into death, sabotage and
killing the innocent be considered oppositional acts nor shall their
committer be considered a political opponent.
28- The Prosecution refers to the report published on open sources by
Arab World Magazine in its publication on 20/4/2018 regarding the
statements of the former Russian ambassador in Qatar, Vladimir
Titorenko, in an interview in Rehla Felzakera Program on the
Russian RT Channel where he talked about Yusuf Al-Qaradawi's
role, AKA President of the International Union of Muslim Scholars,
and how he instructed the Qatari Emiri Divan to finance the
opposition in Egypt to support the revolution. Mr. Vladimir
Titorenko emphasized that he attended several meetings with Al-
Qaradawi, who was old enough to forget that the ambassador was
present and used to say "finance the opposition and the revolution
will be fiercer." (16th min of the footage)
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12
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QcHI712il6k&feature=youtu.be
29- International Community has distinguished hatred rhetoric from
freedom of speech, considering the religious rhetoric that incites
violence is an act that allows states to punish, counter and eliminate
those who commit it. In this context, peaceful freedom of speech
should not be confused with inciting violence, hatred, sabotage,
facilities assault, disturbing security and public safety. Article 2 of
the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights stipulates
the necessity of prohibiting any incitement of national, racist or
religious hatred, and the Egyptian Law was in conformity with this
frame when criminalized incitement of violence, terrorism, chaos
and panic.
30- INTERPOL has issued a Red Notice for the abovementioned
sentenced in the same case and the same grounds, convinced that
the case is absolutely a criminal one with no political motives or
backgrounds. In spite of the validity of the arrest warrant and the
Red Notice of the INTERPOL, Doha's INTERPOL and the Qatari
authorities have neither identified the wanted person's location nor
arrested him or cooperate with the Egyptian INTERPOL breaching
Article 87 of the INTERPOL'S Data Processing Statute which
identifies the procedures to be taken upon identifying the wanted
person's location, namely informing the national office of the
requesting country of the location of the wanted person and taking
all legal procedures to arrest him. On the contrary to that, Doha's
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Office of the Attorney-General
13
INTERPOL totally ignored the Red Notice in breach of the
INTERPOL's codes and provided a safe haven to criminal
offenders.
31- After the General Prosecution assessed the appeals presented to the
CCF, it noticed that only the escapees to Qatar filed appeals against
being in the Red Notices. Such appeals were made in a systematic
endeavor of Doha INTERPOL and the State of Qatar to misuse the
INTERPOL and its mechanisms. The INTERPOL mainly aims to
counter criminal and terrorist crimes in particular, in addition to
arresting criminals. Qatar did that to provide safe haven to such
criminals and let them escape the judicial authorities of different
countries.
32- The General Prosecution refers to the unawareness of the CCF that
the investigating judge supervised the investigations of this case.
This investigating judge is a member of the Egyptian Judiciary and
not an affiliate to any political faction, and he is independent,
cannot be dismissed, and is subject to no other authority but the law.
The Egyptian judge referred Youssef Al-Qaradawi to the competent
criminal court, which is a normal judicial entity. Such judge did not
take any exceptional procedures as the court that pronounced the
sentence was the competent criminal court in accordance with
previously determined national jurisdictions applied to all courts.
The Prosecution also refers to its memorandum dated 12 June 2018
(Appendix 2) on the independence of the Egyptian Judiciary,
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Office of the Attorney-General
14
General Prosecution, and Egyptian Courts, along with the litigation
rights of the accused in criminal lawsuits.
33- Regarding lack of evidence, the General Prosecution indicates
several facts proved by investigations carried out regarding the
case. Such investigations proved that the said person is one of the
terrorist MB leaders, and he chaired the International Union of the
Muslim Scholars and exploited his position to incite the public to
execute the plot of the terrorist MB of inciting chaos all over the
country and bring it down along with its institutions. Al-Qaradwi
travelled with others to many countries, including Turkey, to meet
some members of the International Organization of Muslim
Brothers and coordinate with them concerning the execution of
such plot. The same happened in the meeting with leaders from
Hamas Movement, Lebanon Hizbullah, and some extremists in
Northern Sinai. Some armed affiliates of such groups crossed the
Egyptian eastern borders in January 2011 to execute such plot. They
intended to assault and destroy Egyptian prisons and free the
inmates. Some of such inmates were members of extremist groups
and terrorist organizations, and they created chaos within the
country to bring it down. In this context, we refer to what foreign
mass media broadcasted when Al-Qaradawi expressively urged
funding the activities done in Egypt by the aforementioned terrorist
group.
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15
34- The role of the CCF is limited to its main law regarding reviewing
compliance of Red Notices to the INTERPOL's Constitution and
Rules, and CCF does not investigate and collect evidence of a
crime. Therefore, talking about evidence assessment and their
sufficiency is considered interference from the CCF with the
jurisdiction of the competent court before which the case is filed.
The available evidence is sufficient for the trial Mr. Yusuf Al-
Qaradawi by the Egyptian Judiciary and to determine whether he
was innocent or guilty. The judgment in absentia shall be nullified
in case of the attendance of the sentenced, or if his attorney took the
procedures necessary for his retrial, but neither the sentenced nor
his attorney attended to present their defense against the evidence
of the investigating authority, represented in the inculpatory
evidence of the witnesses, the investigation of the national
authorities represented in national security sector and general
intelligence service, besides a recording of a phone call made
between the former president, Muhammad Mursi and the so called
Ahmad Muhammad Abdulmo'ty which proved that they agreed, in
details, to carry out the plot and to transfer funds for Yusuf Al-
Qaradawi to support such plot by exploiting his title, president of
the International Union of Muslim Scholars, giving religious
rhetoric supporting the plot. Mr. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi did not present
his defense in this regard.
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16
35- In reference to the relation the CCF made between the charges filed
against Mrs. Ola Al-Qaradawi and the Red Notice issued in his
regard, the CCF took such charges as a reason to delete the data of
the aforementioned and cancel nullify the Red Notice. The
Prosecution would like to indicate that Mrs. Ola Al-Qaradawi and
her husband, MR. Hosam Khalafalla, are charged in case No. 316
of 2017 filed by the Higher State Security. The General Prosecution
is carrying out the criminal investigations for this case, whereas
Mrs. Ola is charged with punishable criminal offenses under
national legislations. The General Prosecution indicates that
detaining the abovementioned is based on its decision made under
its jurisdiction under the Egyptian Law stipulating its right of pretrial
detention. The prosecution also indicates that the detention of
the accused has been in prisons where all accused are detained, it
also indicates the existence of physical evidence (classified
information of criminal investigations). The abovementioned have
committed crimes that are considered financing and supporting
terrorist acts under Article 3 of countering terrorism law No. 94 of
2015. The Prosecution also refers to its decision of arresting the
accused for pre-trial detention starting from 2/7/2017, i.e. after
more than two and half years from issuing the arrest warrant against
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. The accused were present in Egypt before
issuing the pre-trial decision and the authorities did not take any
legal actions against them.
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17
36- The Prosecution indicates that the inaccuracy of the information of
the arrest warrant, subject of the Red Notice, regarding the
maximum penalty allowed against the accused Yusuf Al-Qaradawi
is up to the court before which the case is filed, and the legal
adaptation of the incident is a right of the competent court under the
law.
37- The General Prosecution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, based on
the incidents, the evidences and the information in the request,
requests that the CCF reconsider its decision of deleting the data of
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi and the cancelation of the Red Notice, and
requests relisting the data in the INTERPOL's files and the
revalidation of the Red Notice. The Prosecution also urges the CCF
not to be influenced by the pressures practiced by Qatar and its
media.
Made on 9/3/2019
International Cooperation Office
Attorney General Office
9/3/2019
Attorney General
Arab Republic of Egypt
Counselor/ Nabil Ahmad
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Annex 56
ICAO Council -214th Session, Summary Minutes of the Eighth Meeting
of 26 June 2018, ICAO document C-MIN 214/8, 23 July 2018 (Final)
PRESENT:
Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Brazil
Caba Verde
Canada
China
Colombia
Congo
Cuba
Ecuador
Egypt
France
Germany
India
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Kenya
Malaysia
ALSO PRESENT:
Mrs. M.F. Loguzzo (Alt.)
Mr. C. Femandez(Alt.)
H.E. KB.A. Mohammed,
Minister of Transportation
International Civil Aviation Organization
COUNCIL- 214TH SESSION
SUMM ARY MINUTES OF THE EIGHTH MEETING
(THE COUNCIL CH AMBER, TUESDAY, 26 JUNE 2018, AT 1430 HOURS)
CLOSED MEETING
President of the Council: Dr. Olumuyiwa Benard Aliu
Secretary: Dr. Fang Liu, Secretary General
- Mr. A.D. Mesroua
- Mr. G.E. Ainchil
- Mr. S. Lucas
- Mr. 0. Vieira(Alt.)
- Mr. C. Monteiro
- Mr. M. Page
Mr. Shengjun Yang
Mr. A. Munoz Gomez
- Mr. R.M. Ondzotto
- Mrs. M. Crespo Frasquieri
- Mr. I. Arellano
- H.E. H. EL-Adawy,
President, CAA
- Mr. P. Bertoux
- Mr. U. Schwierczinsk:i
- Mr. A. Shekhar
- Ms. N. O'Brien
- Mr. M.R. Rusconi
- Mr. S. Matsui
- Ms. M.B. Awori
- Mr. KA. Ismail
-Argentina
-Argentina
-Bahrain
Mexico
Nigeria
Panama
Republic of Korea
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Turkey
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United Republic of Tanzania
United States
Uruguay
SECRETARIAT:
Mrs. J. Yan
Ms. I. Sosina
Mr. J. Huang
and Telecommunications (Obs.)
Mr. M.T. Al Kaabi (Obs.) -Balirain
Mr. Y. Nyampong
Mrs. D. Brookes
Mr. M. Vaugeois
Mr. A. Larcos
Miss S. Black
Mr. S.M. Hassan (Obs.)
Mr. D. Krishan (Adv.)
Mr. G. Petrochilos (Adv.)
Ms. A. Keene (Adv.)
Mr. R.F. Pecoraro (Alt.)
Mr. D. Tavares Taufuer (Alt.)
Mr. H. Gonzales (Alt.)
Mr. Chunyu Ding (Alt.)
H.E. A. Salama (Alt.)
Mr. A. Khedr (Rep.)
Mrs. S. El Mowafi (Alt.)
Mrs. Y.H.M. Elbedewy (Alt.)
Mr. M. Millefert (Alt.)
Mr. N. Naoumi (Alt.)
Mr. M. Usami (Alt.)
Mrs. D. Valle Alvarez (Alt.)
-Bahrain
-Bahrain
-Bahrain
-Bahrain
-Brazil
-Brazil
-Brazil
-China
-Ei,,ypt
-Egypt
-Egypt
-Egypt
-France
-Gemmny
-Japan
-Mexico
Annex 56
C-MIN 214/8 (Closed)
23/7/18
- Mr. D. Mendez Mayora
- Mr. M.S. Nuhu
- Mr. G.S. Oller
- Mr. Y.J. Lee
- Mr. S. Gudkov
- H.E. Dr. N.B.M. Al-Amudi,
Minister of Transport and
Chairman, GACA
- Mr.TC.Ng
- Mr. M.D.T. Peege
- Mr. V.M. Aguado
- Ms. H. Jansson Saxe
- Mr. A.R. t;;olak
- H.E. S.B.S. Al Mansoori,
Minister of Economy and
Chairman, GCAA
- Mr. D.T. Lloyd
- Mr. R.W. Bokango
Mr. T.L. Carter
-Mr. M. Vidal
- C/OSG
- SA/PRES
-D/LEB
- LEB
-LEB
- LEB
- C/ACS
- Precis-writer
Annex 56
C-MIN 214/8 (Closed)
ALSO PRESENT(CONTINUED):
H.E. J.B.S. A!Sulaiti,
Minister of Transport and
Communications (Obs.)
H.E A.N. AISubaey(Obs.)
H.E. F.M. Kafood (Obs.)
H.E. Y.S. Laram (Obs.)
Mr. E.A. Al-Malki (Obs.)
Mr. M.A. A!Hajri (Obs.)
Mr. T.A. Almalki (Obs.)
Mr. E.A. Mindney (Obs.)
Mr. A. Altamimi (Obs.)
Mr. J. Augustin (Obs.)
Mr. K. Lee (Alt.)
Mr. D.S. Ha (Alt.)
Mr. D. Subbotin (Alt.)
H.E. A.M. Altamimi (Alt.)
H.E.H.E. W.M.A. Alidrissi (Adv.)
Mr. S.A.R. Hashem (Rep.)
Mr. M.S. Habib (Alt.)
Mr. N.B.B. Alsudairy (Obs.)
Mr. D.L.Q. Ming (Adv.)
Mr. L.C. Yong (Adv.)
Mr. S. Vuokila (Alt.)
Mr.◊. Dogrukol (Alt.)
H.E. S.M. Al Suwaidi (Alt.)
H.E. M.S.H. Al Shehhi (Alt.)
H.E. F. Al Raqbani (Alt.)
Miss A. Alhameli (Rep.)
Mr. M. Salem (Alt.)
Mr. M. Al Shamsi (Alt.)
Dr. L. Weber(Alt.)
Mrs. L. Coquard-Patry (Alt.)
Mrs. S. Aminian (Alt.)
Mrs. S. Kirwin (Alt.)
Mrs. K.L. Riensema (Alt.)
Mr. S. Kolis (Alt.)
Mr. J.M. Padilla (Alt.)
Mrs. M.A. Gonzalez (Alt.)
Mr. F. de Medina (Alt.)
Representatives to ICAO
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Chile
Cyprus
Ethiopia
Greece
Honduras
Indonesia
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Lebanon
Paraguay
Peru
Qatar
Senegal
Sudan
-2-
-Qatar
-Qatar
-Qatar
-Qatar
-Rep. of Qatar to !CAO
-Qatar
-Qatar
-Qatar
-Qatar
-Qatar
-Republic of Korea
-Republic of Korea
-Russian Federation
-Saudi Arabia
-Saudi Arabia
-Saudi Arabia
-Saudi Arabia
-Saudi Arabia
-Singapore
-Singapore
-Sweden
-Turkey
-United Arab Emirates
-United Arab Emirates
-United Arab Emirates
-United Arab Emirates
-United Arab Emirates
-United Arab Emirates
-United Arab Emirates
-United Arab Emirates
-United Arab Emirates
-United Arab Emirates
-United Kingdom
-United States
-United States
-Uruguay
-Uruguay
Annex 56
C-MIN 214/8 (Closed)
Subject No. 16: Legal work of the Organization
Subject No. 26: Settlement of disputes between Contracting States
Settlement of Differences: The State of Qatar and the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of
Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (2017) - Application (A)
(relating to the interpretation and application of the Chicago Convention and its Annexes):
Preliminary Objection Stage
Settlement of Differences: The State of Qatar and the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of
Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (2017)- Application (B) (relating to the interpretation and
application of the International Air Services Transit Agreement): Preliminary Objection Stage
1. On behalf of the Council, the President extended a warm welcome to the following
high-level Government Officials who were duly accredited to represent their respective Member States as
their Authorized Agents: H.E. Kamal Bin Ahmed Mohammed, Minister of Transportation and
Telecommunications of Bahrain, H.E. Hany EL-Adawy, President of the Civil Aviation Authority of Egypt,
H.E. Jassem Bin Saif AlSulaiti, Minister of Transport and Communications of Qatar, H.E. Dr. Nabeel bin
Mohamed Al-Amudi, Minister of Transport and Chairman of the Board of the General Authority of Civil
Aviation of Saudi Arabia, and H.E. Sultan Bin Saeed Al Mansoori, Minister of Economy and Chairman of
the Board of the General Civil Aviation Authority of the United Arab Emirates. In addition, he welcomed
all other officials from the said five Member States who were also in attendance. The Secretary General
joined in this welcome.
2. The Parties and the Council agreed to the proposal by the President for the concurrent
presentation and consideration of the two above-mentioned items, on the understanding that the Council
would take separate decisions thereon given that Application (A) and Application (B) related to two
different international air law instruments, namely, the Chicago Convention and the International Air
Services Transit Agreement (Transit Agreement), and that there were different Respondents thereto. The
items were considered on the basis of two working papers presented by the Secretary General, C-WP/14778
Restricted (with Addendum No. 1) and C-WP/14779 Restricted (with Addendum No. 1), respectively, and
the following memoranda issued by the Secretary General to Council Representatives:
• memorandum SG 2411/18 (with Blue rider) dated 23 March 2018, which transmitted the Respondents'
Statements of preliminary objections with respect to Application (A) and Application (B);
• memorandum SG 2416/18 (with Blue rider) dated 8 May 2018, which transmitted the Applicant's
Responses to the said Statements of preliminary objections; and
• memorandum SG 2420/18 dated 13 June 2018, which transmitted the Respondents' Rejoinders to the
Applicant's Responses to their Statements of preliminary objections.
Introduction of C-WPII 4778 Restricted (with Addendum No. 1) -Application (A)
3. The Secretary General introduced C-WP/14778 Restricted (with Addendum No. 1), which
provided an overview of the procedure applicable to Application (A)- the disagreement between Qatar, as
Applicant, on the one hand and Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as
Respondents, on the other hand, during the preliminary objection stage.
4. In the executive summary of C-WP/14778 Restricted, the Council was invited to hear the
arguments of the Parties relating to the preliminary objection and to take a decision on the matter in line
with the procedure set forth in Article 5 of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2),
paragraph (4) of which specified that "If a preliminary objection has been filed, the Council, after hearing
the Parties, shall decide the question as a preliminary issue before any further steps are taken under these
Rules.".
Annex 56
C-MIN 214/8 (Closed) -4-
Introduction of C-WP/14779 Restricted (with Addendum No. 1) -Application (BJ
5. The Secretary General then introduced C-WP/14779 Restricted (with Addendum No. 1),
which provided an overview of the procedure applicable to Application (B) - the disagreement between
Qatar, as Applicant, on the one hand and Bahrain, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, as Respondents, on
the other hand, during the preliminary objection stage. The action by the Council proposed in the executive
summary of C-WP/14779 Restricted was identical to that proposed in the executive summary of
C-WP/14778 Restricted.
6. The President of the Council recalled that, for the two cases before it, the Council was
sitting as a judicial body under Atticle 84 of the Chicago Convention, taking its decisions on the basis of the
submission of written documents by the Parties, as well as on the basis of oral arguments. The Council's
consideration was limited to the Respondents' two Statements of preliminary objections with respect to
Application (A) and Application (B), the Applicant's respective Responses thereto, and the Respondents'
respective Rejoinders, and would not address the merits of the cases. The Rules for the Settlement of
Differences (Doc 7782/2) and the Rules of Procedure for the Council (Doc 7559/10) would be used.
Presentation by the Respondents' Authorized Agents of their oral arguments
with respect to Application (A) and Application (B)
7. At the invitation of the President of the Council, and on behalf of Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, H.E. Dr. Nabeel bin Mohamed AI-Amudi (Saudi Arabia) presented
the preliminary objection filed by the Respondents in response to Qatar's Application (A) under Article 84
of the Chicago Convention. Before he began, H.E. Al-Amudi reiterated the Respondents' utmost respect for
ICAO, the Council, and the international rules and principles governing civil aviation. He emphasized that
safety had been, and continued to be, the Respondents' top priority. In noting that the Respondents, the
Secretariat, and the ICAO Middle East Regional Office (MID) (Cairo), among others, had worked
diligently to ensure that contingency arrangements were in place in the Gulf region, and that such
arrangements ensured the safe operation of civil aircraft, H.E. Al-Amudi indicated that that task had been
accomplished.
8. H.E. Al-Amudi underscored that, as one of the Council Members had astutely recognized
and stated during the Extraordinary Session of the Council convened on 31 July 2017 pursuant to the
request made by Qatar under Article 54n) of the Chicago Convention, the aviation component of the
situation in the Gulf region was but one part of a complex environment. ICAO's role, within that
environment, was to administer an international aviation system that delivered safe, secure and efficient air
navigation for all Member States. He observed that that role had been fulfilled.
9. In emphasizing that the Respondents had not chosen to bring this dispute before the
Council today, H.E. Al-Amudi stressed that, as previously notified to the President of the Council and the
Secretary General, the procedures set for the present hearing were contrary to the Respondents' requests,
the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2), and the fundamental rules of due process. He cited
two notable examples, as follows: firstly, the Respondents' preliminary objections needed 19 positive votes
to carry the day, but the Rules only required a simple majority of the Council Members entitled to vote; and
secondly, the Respondents had not been provided with sufficient or equal time to adequately present their
case. Their right to be heard had thus been compromised.
10. H.E. Al-Amudi highlighted that during the present meeting it fell on the Council to
recognize that the real issue of this dispute did not concern international civil aviation but rather the
Applicant's breaches of its international obligations, which had left the Respondents with no effective
option other than to exercise their sovereign right to implement measures to protect their national security
interests.
Annex 56
-5- C-MIN 214/8 (Closed)
11. Underscoring the impo1tance of the dispute's context, H.E. AI-Amudi recalled the 2013
and 2014 timeframe, when the Gulf Cooperation Council States, including Qatar, had agreed to a series of
collective obligations known as the Riyadh Agreements. He noted that although Egypt was not a signatory
thereto, under their terms, and in particular, as expressly stated in Article 4 of the November 2014
Agreement, Egypt was a beneficiary of those Agreements. H.E. Al-Amudi further noted that, under the
signature of its Emir, Qatar had committed to stop funding, harboring, and supporting persons and
organizations engaging in terrorist or extremist activities, and to desist from interfering in the internal
affairs of neighbouring States. He emphasized that the Riyadh Agreements reinforced the Applicant's
international law obligations, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations (UN), the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, relevant binding United Nations Security
Council Resolutions, and the customary international law principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of other States.
12. Recalling that the Respondents had asked the Applicant, time and again, to halt these
practices, in line with its commitments, H.E. Al-Amudi underscored that, time and again, the Applicant had
failed to do so. He indicated that in June 2017, after assessing that all other options had been exhausted, the
Respondents had determined that the only way to address these grave threats to their national security was
to terminate diplomatic and consular relations with the Applicant, and to institute a basket of lawful
counter-measures, including the said airspace restrictions. He stressed that unless and until the Applicant
fulfilled its obligations under the Riyadh Agreements, the Respondents would consider it a grave national
security threat, and would continue the basket of counter-measures necessary to counter that threat.
13. In affirming that the Respondents did not implement such counter-measures to punish the
Applicant, H.E. Al-Amudi underscored that their purpose was rather to induce the Applicant to bring its
actions into compliance with its fundamental obligations. He emphasized that when the Applicant fully
complied with its international obligations, as reinforced in the Riyadh Agreements, then the said
counter-measures would be lifted, and that as long as the Applicant continued to breach its obligations, the
counter-measures would remain.
14. Noting that some Council Representatives might be asking themselves why the
Respondents were talking about terrorism in an Organization established to deal with international civil
aviation, H.E. Kamal Bin Ahmed Mohammed (Bahrain) emphasized that that was exactly the point of first
ground of their preliminary objection with respect to Qatar's Application (A), which rested on the fact
that the present dispute between Qatar, as Applicant, and the Respondents would require the Council to
determine issues that fell outside the latter's jurisdiction. Noting that the Applicant had all but conceded
that point, he recalled that it had promised to present a "robust defence" against the allegations of its
funding and support of terrorism and to show why the Respondents' counter-measures were unlawful were
the case to get to the merits. The Council would then have to determine those issues. H.E. Mohammed
underscored, however, that the Council's jurisdiction under Alticle 84 of the Chicago Convention was
limited to "any disagreement ... relating to the interpretation or application" of the Chicago Convention. In
emphasizing that that provision clearly limited the types of matters that the Contracting States to the
Convention intended the Council to hear, he underscored that the exercise of jurisdiction over matters
unrelated to civil aviation was outside the latter's mandate. H.E. Mohammed stressed that by asking the
Council to ignore that principle, the Applicant was in fact asking the Council to act far beyond the scope of
its authority, which was not appropriate.
15. Noting that the Paities apparently agreed on the content and applicability of the customary
international law principle on counter-measures in this case, H.E. Mohammed emphasized that the
obligations in the Chicago Convention could not be viewed in isolation of those rules. The Respondents
maintained that the Applicant's breaches of its international law obligations created a situation where they
had no choice but to impose lawful counter-measures to induce the Applicant to change its behaviour.
Annex 56
C-MIN 214/8 (Closed) -6-
16. H.E. Mohammed recalled that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had held in the
Hungary/Slovakia case that an injured State could take counter-measures against a State which had
breached its obligations. Under international law, five conditions had to be met for the counter-measures to
be considered lawful, the first of which was that the counter-measure must be adopted in reaction to a
previous internationally wrongful act and directed against the wrong-doing State. He affirmed that such was
the case here.
17. H.E. Mohammed underscored that the Respondents maintained that their said airspace
restrictions were lawful counter-measures, and were permitted under international law. He indicated that
Council Members would know from their own experience that States had, in the past, been compelled to
restrict their airspace in the face of illegal conduct by other States. They had done so bilaterally or
collectively, and on various legal grounds, including by way of counter-measures. H.E. Mohammed cited,
as examples, a European Union (EU) flight ban at the time of the Kosovo crisis; the flight bans on Libyan
outbound flights in 2015; similar bans on North Korean flights; and bans on South African flights as a
reaction to the continuation of apartheid policies in the 1980' s. He noted that although the list of examples
was much longer, the salient point was clear, and it had never been suggested by the States involved, and
rightly so, that any of those broader disputes could be characterized as an aviation matter and resolved by
the Council.
18. H.E. Mohammed emphasized that despite the Applicant's allegations, the Respondents
were not asking the Council to decide those issues now; rather, at this stage, the Council had only to decide
whether it could properly exercise jurisdiction over the merits, as it related to the real issue in the case.
However, the Respondents did ask the Council to make a decision on its jurisdiction at this phase of the case.
They submitted that their preliminary objection had an exclusively preliminary character. Deciding on the
objection now would not require the Council to rule on the merits of the real issue in dispute, but simply
require it to decide whether it had jurisdiction at all. H.E. Mohammed underscored that in keeping with
ICAO's Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2), as well as the practice of the ICJ, the
objection should be resolved at the preliminary stage, if at all possible.
19. H.E. Mohammed noted that in order to rule on the legality of the Respondents' said
airspace measures at large, the Council would first have to determine if the Applicant had in fact violated
the Riyadh Agreements, the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Coriference on Combatting
International Terrorism, the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, numerous United Nations Security Council
Resolutions, and the customary international law principle of non-interference. To state the obvious, such
matters were outside the mandate of the Council. Recalling that the Council had not once ruled on an
Article 84 case in its history, H.E. Mohammed underscored that to do so on a matter involving national
security and counter-terrorism would be unprecedented.
20. H.E. Mohammed stressed that it was impossible to rule on the legality of the Respondents'
said airspace measures without dealing with the larger dispute at hand, a dispute in which the real issue was
the Applicant's illegal actions. In indicating that for that reason the Council should rule in favour of the
Respondents' preliminary objection, he reiterated that the real and principal issue in this dispute was not
civil aviation. Recalling that the Council itself had reviewed and confirmed that the contingency
arrangements in the Gulf region agreed in 2017 ensured the safe operation of civil aircraft,
H.E. Mohammed maintained that the larger dispute at issue that the Applicant sought to bring before the
Council did not belong in ICAO.
21. H.E. Sultan Bin Saeed Al Mansoori (United Arab Emirates) then presented the second
ground of the Respondents' preliminary objection with respect to Qatar's Application (A). Recalling
that Article 84 of the Chicago Convention provided that only disagreements which "cannot be settled by
negotiation" may be submitted to the Council, he indicated that that meant that an Applicant, in the present
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case, Qatar, must show that it had attempted negotiations about the dispute before submitting a case to the
Council. The text of Article 84 was quite clear.
22. H.E. Al Mansoori also brought to the Council Members' attention Article 2(g) of the Rules
for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2), which provided that the Applicant's Memorial must contain
"A statement that negotiations to settle the disagreement had taken place between the parties but were not
successful.". He noted that the Respondents' submissions cited numerous precedents where the JCJ had
dealt with that issue, including the 2011 case Application of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation) (cf. Preliminary
Objections, J udgment, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 70, paragraph 160). H.E. Al Mansoori underscored that where
a treaty, such as the Chicago Convention, explicitly called for negotiations before a dispute may be brought,
that requirement operated as a precondition that the Applicant must satisfy before filing an Application with
the Council. Towards that end, it was notable that many of the exhibits the Applicant had provided to
support its attempt at negotiations had come after it had filed its Application (A) and Memorial.
23. H.E. Al Mansoori affirmed that the Applicant had made no attempt to negotiate the real
dispute with the Respondents, and had not even attempted to fulfil the said Article 2(g) requirement when
filing its Application (A). He noted that, in fact, the Applicant conceded on page 7 of its Memorial (A) that
it had not attempted to enter into negotiations in relation to the matters it now raised before the Council,
taking the position instead that the severance of diplomatic relations had made negotiations "futile."
24. Indicating that the Applicant appeared to have realized, belatedly, that that argument did
not satisfy the precondition to negotiate, H.E. Al Mansoori highlighted that in its Response, the Applicant
had fundamentally changed its position, and now asserted that it had in fact attempted negotiations. It was
notable, however, that despite exhibiting dozens of media reports containing the Applicant's supposed
official statements, the Applicant had only illustrated that it had made vague public statements to third party
States about its willingness to negotiate. However, the Applicant had not proved that it had demonstrated
that willingness to the Respondents and the Applicant had never made a formal request to initiate
negotiations. H.E. Al Mansoori maintained that the issuance of empty statements regarding the Applicant's
"willingness" to negotiate was insufficient.
25. H.E. Al Mansoori emphasized that, as the Party asse1ting jurisdiction, the burden fell on
the Applicant to demonstrate that it had satisfied the requirement of negotiations by making an attempt to
negotiate, consistent with the ICJ Judgment in the said case Application of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation). The Applicant had
failed to do so, however.
26. This led H.E. Al Mansoori to bring to the Council's attention to another clear contradiction
in the Applicant's submission. He noted that the first ground of the Respondents' preliminary objection
with respect to Qatar's Application (A) rested on the fact that the real issue of this dispute fell outside of
international civil aviation. The Applicant disagreed with them in that regard. However, at the same time,
the Applicant's response in relation to the question of whether it had fulfilled the precondition of
negotiations was to point to vague statements relating to the larger dispute at hand. H.E. Al Mansoori
reiterated that, indeed, none of the exhibits that the Applicant had pointed to as evidence of its attempts at
negotiations touched on the Respondents' airspace restrictions.
27. H.E. Al Mansoori queried why, if the real issue of the dispute was the Respondents'
airspace restrictions, did the evidence that the Applicant relied upon as supposedly demonstrating its
attempts at negotiation of those airspace restrictions contain statements only as to the larger dispute. He
underscored that if the real issue of the dispute was indeed the said airspace restrictions, as the Applicant
would have the Council believe, then the Applicant had failed to fulfil the requirement of negotiations
under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention.
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28. H.E. Al Mansoori observed that the Applicant had further attempted to confuse the issue
by referring to discussions held in entirely unrelated fora, for example, to proceedings before the World
Trade Organization (WTO), which related to a different dispute. He underscored that, consistent with the
views expressed by the ICJ in the said case Application of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), such discussions did not satisfy the
requirement of prior negotiations because they did not relate to what the Applicant claimed was the subject
of its Application (A) before ICAO.
29. H.E. Al Mansoori noted that the Applicant had also asserted that the proceedings of the the
Extraordinary Session of the Council on 31 July 2017, held pursuant to Article 54 n) of the Chicago
Convention, were evidence that there had been negotiations between the Parties within the framework of
ICAO. He emphasized that, as the Council Members well knew, those Article 54 n) proceedings had been
rightfully confined to discussions regarding the safety of civil aviation in the context of the contingency
arrangements in the Gulf region. H.E. Al Mansoori affirmed that such discussions could not, under any
characterization, constitute an attempt by the Applicant to negotiate for purposes of satisfying the
requirement of prior negotiations under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention. He noted that while the
Applicant had also pointed to letters that it had submitted to the President of the ICAO Council and the
ICAO Secretary General, arguing that it had indeed attempted negotiations, none of the letters it had
referred to included any request to the Respondents to negotiate on the said airspace restrictions. Indeed,
those letters had not even been addressed to the Respondents.
30. H.E. Al Mansoori indicated that, in these circumstances, the Respondents respectfully
submitted that the Council should conclude that the Applicant had failed to fulfil the precondition of
negotiations required by A1ticle 84 of the Chicago Convention and, further, that it had failed to comply with
Article 2(g) of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2). As a consequence, the Respondents
respectfully submitted that the Council should decline to proceed with this matter further.
31. H.E. Al Mansoori underscored that even if the Applicant were to affirm today its
willingness to undertake negotiations with the Respondents, it would be too late for the present case.
Maintaining that any such request for negotiations had to occur before the Application was filed with ICAO,
he reiterated that the law on that question was crystal-clear.
32. H.E. Al Mansoori indicated that, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Respondents
respectfully requested that the Council accept and uphold their preliminary objection with respect to
Qatar's Application (A) and therefore decide: i) that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims raised by
Qatar's Application (A); or ii) in the alternative, that Qatar's claims were inadmissible.
33. On behalf of Bahrain, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, H.E. Hany EL-Adawy (Egypt)
addressed the preliminary objection filed by them, as Respondents, in response to Qatar's Application (B)
under Article II, Section 2 of the Transit Agreement. He prefaced his remarks with an affirmation of the
Respondents' utmost respect for ICAO, the Council, and the international rules and principles governing
civil aviation and their commitment to cooperating with all parties, including Qatar, under the auspices of
ICAO, to ensure the safe and secure operation of civil aviation.
34. H.E. EL-Adawy underscored that the grounds for the preliminary objection explained
earlier in respect of the Chicago Convention applied with equal force to the Transit Agreement. He
reiterated that the first ground of the preliminary objection rested on the fact that the real issue of this
dispute, the Applicant's illegal actions, fell outside the scope of ICAO's mandate, and that the second
ground of the preliminary objection rested on the fact that the Applicant had not satisfied the precondition
to make a genuine attempt at negotiations.
35. H.E. EL-Adawy took this opportunity to re-emphasize that the central issue in the current
crisis was the Applicant's ongoing support for extremism and terrorism and its continued interference in the
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internal affairs of other States. He reiterated that the Applicant's policies represented a threat not only to the
security and stability of Arab States, but also to many other countries.
36. In noting that at this stage the Council was only called upon to decide whether it could
properly exercise jurisdiction over the merits of the case, as they pertained to the real issue, H.E. EL-Adawy
reiterated that if the Council were to accept jurisdiction and proceed to the merits of the case, then it would
be acting inconsistently with international law and contrary to the expectations of States, because it would
be required to pass judgment on issues outside its jurisdiction.
37. H.E. EL-Adawy underscored that the Applicant had overstated the breadth of the Council's
jurisdiction when it claimed in its Response that "the Council has never refused jurisdiction in any case
brought before it.". He emphasized that the Council had only rejected preliminary objections challenging its
ability to hear a disagreement on three occasions, and that it had never issued a final decision on the merits.
H.E. EL-Adawy noted, by contrast, that since the founding of ICAO, the Council had never asserted
jurisdiction over a counter-measures defence. He indicated that the Respondents respectfully submitted that
ICAO should not be involved in setting this dangerous precedent today and accordingly respectfully
requested the Council to uphold their preliminary objection with respect to Qatar's Application (B) on the
grounds that: i) the Council lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims raised by Qatar's Application (B);
or ii) in the alternative, that Qatar's claims were inadmissible.
Presentation by the Applicant's Authorized Agent of its oral arguments in response
to the Respondents' oral arguments
38. H.E. Jassem Bin Saif AlSulaiti (Qatar) prefaced his presentation with an expression of
Qatar's gratitude to ICAO for its efforts and service to ensure the safety and security of international civil
aviation, and for assuming its responsibilities by convening the present Council meeting to consider Qatar's
requests regarding the aviation restrictions imposed on it by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
Bahrain and Egypt on 5 June 2017.
39. H.E. AlSulaiti underscored that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Respondents'
preliminary objections and not the merits of the claims made by Qatar in its Application (A) and
Application (B) and their corresponding Memorials filed with ICAO on 30 October 2017. He emphasized
that the current hearing was simply to discuss the jurisdiction of the Council, which was set out in Article 84
of the Chicago Convention and Article II, Section 2 of the Transit Agreement. Under those agreements, the
jurisdictional clause was simple: the Council had jurisdiction to decide the case if there was any
disagreement relating to the interpretation or application of the Chicago Convention or the Transit
Agreement which could not be settled by negotiation. There was nothing under those agreements or in the
Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2) which set any other limits on, or otherwise
circumscribed, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Council. The Council was simply being asked to
undertake a function with which it had been constitutionally mandated.
40. H.E. AISulaiti recalled that, on 5 June 2017, without any previous warning and without any
effort to negotiate with Qatar, the said four States, acting in concert and in coordination, had taken what
Qatar considered to be a series of brutal and unprecedented measures against it, which included the
prevention ofQatari-registered civil aircraft from transiting their airspace and from landing for non-traffic
purposes. He asserted that those actions explicitly violated a number of provisions of the Chicago
Convention and the Transit Agreement as set out in Qatar's Application (A) and Application (B) and their
corresponding Memorials, which had been filed with ICAO on 30 October 2017.
41. H.E. AlSulaiti noted that by letter dated 19 March 2018, the Respondents had presented to
ICAO their Statements of preliminary objections to Qatar's Application (A) and Application (B).Qatar had
responded on 30 April 2018. The Respondents subsequently had filed so-called "Rejoinders" on 12 June
2018. Before proceeding further, H.E. AlSulaiti wished to place on record that Qatar believed that it had
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been procedurally and substantively prejudiced by virtue of the fact that the Respondents had been
permitted to file the so-called "Rejoinders" under Article 7(1) of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences
(Doc 7782/2). As stated in Qatar's e-mail of25 May 2018 to Council Delegations, Qatar was equivalent to
the defendant for the purposes of consideration of the Respondents' Statements of preliminary objections,
yet the said Rules had been interpreted to allow the Respondents to file Rejoinders, which were the last
written pleadings permitted following the filing of the Counter-memorials. The Respondents'
Counter-memorials had not yet been submitted, however.
42. H.E. AlSulaiti noted that since the Parties were making a single presentation for both of
the said Applications for convenience and to save time, references in his current presentation to certain
excerpts or texts were to Qatar's Application (A), the Respondents' Statement of preliminary objections (A),
Qatar's Response (A) and the Respondents' so-called "Rejoinder" (A). He indicated that they were to be
taken as cross-read with the comparable provisions in the pleadings for Application (B).
43. H.E. AlSulaiti emphasized that essentially, the crux of the Respondents' arguments was
that the Council did not have jurisdiction, or alternatively, that Qatar's claims were inadmissible. He
indicated that, at times, the Respondents confused the two concepts in their Statement of preliminary
objections. They claimed that their actions constituted lawful counter-measures, and that that would require
the Council to determine issues fonning part of a wider dispute between the Parties. The Respondents stated
that there was a body oflaw outside of the Chicago Convention which afforded them a dispositive defence
to the claims of Qatar. The basis of the alleged lack of jurisdiction essentially boiled down to an allegation
that "While the Council has considerable expertise in the technical aspects of aviation enshrined in the
Chicago Convention, it is not well-suited or well-equipped to handle disputes of a wider nature ... "(cf.
Statement of preliminary objections, executive summary, paragraph 4). Additionally, the Respondents
claimed that Qatar had failed to meet the condition of negotiation.
44. H.E. AlSulaiti underscored that although the Respondents claimed that, in determining the
issues raised by Qatar under the Chicago Convention or the Transit Agreement, the Council was prevented
or circumscribed from considering any issues falling outside of the Convention or Agreement, they did not
explain or explain satisfactorily why that should be so. He highlighted that most legal disputes arose in a
wider context and that their determination could also take into account other issues relevant to the
determination of the legal question placed before the tribunal. In adjudicating issues, tribunals, even those
with subject matter jurisdictional clauses like the Council, were not placed in blinkers.
45. H.E. AlSulaiti affirmed that, as Qatar had pointed out in its Response to the said Statement
of preliminary objections, the Council had jurisdiction as long as the question for decision related to the
interpretation or application of the Chicago Convention or the Transit Agreement and could not be settled
by negotiations.
46. H.E. AlSulaiti underscored that, as Qatar has shown in its said Responses, the Rules for
the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2) did not permit the Council to consider issues of admissibility at
the preliminary objection stage. Article 5(1) of the Rules, adopted by the Council to govern its
consideration of disputes under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article II, Section 2 of the Transit
Agreement, quite clearly only allowed a preliminary objection to be filed as to jurisdiction.
47. H.E. AlSulaiti averred that the reference made in paragraph 15 of the Respondents'
"Rejoinder" to Article 36(6) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was intended to divert
the Council's attention from the central issue. The Article simply stated that in the event ofa dispute as to
whether the Court had jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court itself. It had
nothing to do with admissibility.
48. H.E. AlSulaiti noted that it was quite remarkable how the Respondents attempted to
explain away the recent decision of the Council in the case Settlement of Differences: Brazil and United
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States (2016). He emphasized that if Brazil had not wished to make the point that the Council should not
address issues of admissibility at the preliminary objection stage, then that had been Brazil's prerogative.
Qatar now raised the matter. H.E. AISulaiti underscored that contrary to what had been alleged by the
Respondents, there was no confirmation by the Council that it could have ruled on admissibility at that stage.
In fact, for the Council, the matter to be decided at the preliminary objection stage was only jurisdiction,
which was why the Council had not even discussed the arguments on extinctive prescription in the said case.
He maintained that it was the Respondents who were wrong in law on that point.
49. H.E. AlSulaiti recalled that in paragraph 24 of the "Rejoinder", the Respondents stated
that Qatar presumably intended to invite the Council to join the Respondents' preliminary objections to the
merits in both Applications. Underscoring that the Respondents' presumption was wrong, he highlighted
that in paragraph 214 of its Response, Qatar invited the Council to declare that it had no competence at the
preliminary objection stage to consider the claims, arguments and submissions of the Respondents on
admissibility.
50. H.E. AlSulaiti observed that the statement made by the Respondents in paragraph 26 of
their Rejoinder that Article 5( 4) of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2) did not give the
Council the option of joining preliminary objections to the merits was correct. He emphasized, however,
that under Article 5(1) of the Rules, preliminary objections were to be on issues of jurisdiction, not issues of
admissibility.
51. H.E. AlSulaiti averred that, given Qatar's arguments, it was disingenuous and trickery for
the Respondents to claim, as they did in paragraph 14 of their Rejoinder, that Qatar did not dispute a
Respondent's right to file an objection on grounds of admissibility under ICAO's Rules. Qatar's response
was that although such an objection could be presented, the Council could not consider it at this stage.
52. H.E. AlSulaiti indicated that, as had been pointed out in paragraph 17 of Qatar's Response,
although the ICJ could rule on admissibility at the preliminary objection stage, the ICJ had indicated in its
Judgment in the case Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) that under its Rules, where the Court found that an objection did not possess
an exclusively preliminary character, it would be dealt with at the merits stage (cf. Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2008)
53. H.E. AlSulaiti underscored that the Respondents' claim that the real issue before the
Council was something different from their actions which were not in conformity with the Chicago
Convention and the Transit Agreement was wrong and misleading. He averred that the Respondents had not
understood or had ignored the case law. H.E. A!Sulaiti stressed that the object of Qatar's claim, or the real
issue for the Council to determine, was whether or not the Respondents had violated the Chicago
Convention and the Transit Agreement, and to declare that accordingly. He emphasized that, as Qatar had
pointed out in paragraph 34 of its Response, the fact that a legal dispute had wider underlying elements did
not mean that such a dispute fell outside the jurisdiction of the Council or was inadmissible. H.E. AlSulaiti
recalled that many of the cases under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention or the Transit Agreement
previously referred to the Council had had wider underlying political issues or other non-aviation problems,
and that in no case had the Council since its inception declined jurisdiction over it.
54. H.E. AlSulaiti highlighted that, as stated by the ICJ in its Judgment in the United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case, no provision of its Statute or Rules contemplated that the
Court should decline to take cognizance of one aspect of a dispute merely because that dispute had other
aspects, however important (cf. ICJ Reports 1980).
55. H.E. AlSulaiti emphasized that, although the Respondents would like the Council to
believe otherwise, there was no provision in the Chicago Convention or the Transit Agreement which
stipulated that the Council should decline jurisdiction over a disagreement on their interpretation or
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application merely because there were other aspects to the dispute before the Council, or that the decision
could or must take into account elements which did not fall completely within the parameters of civil
aviation. He underscored that the violation of the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement was not a
marginal or incidental matter before the Council.
56. H.E. AlSulaiti averred that the reference made by the Respondents in their Statement of
preliminary objections and paragraph 42 of their Rejoinder to the Chagos Islands arbitration case did not
help them. They had helpfully pointed out that the Tribunal had stated that where a dispute concerned the
interpretation or application of the Convention, the jurisdiction of a comt or tribunal extended to making
such findings of fact or ancillary determinations oflaw as were necessary to resolve the dispute presented to
it. H.E. AlSulaiti emphasized that that was exactly what Qatar was requesting the Council to do.
57. H.E. AlSulaiti underscored that the assertion made by the Respondents in paragraph 44 of
their Rejoinder that bodies such as the Council may not encroach upon the jurisdiction which other bodies
may have over the real dispute, which was related to the so-called "principle of specialty", was wrong in
law and unsubstantiated. He indicated that as Qatar had addressed that issue in paragraphs 49 to 65 of its
Response to show that that principle espoused by the Respondents could not apply to prevent the Council
from assuming jurisdiction, he would not repeat the arguments here in the Council. H.E. AlSulaiti indicated
that it would mean that no other Specialized Agency or other body would have jurisdiction to consider a
matter as long as there was some connection, incidental or otherwise, with the functions of another
organization. The net result would be a complete denial everywhere of the justiciability of Qatar's
grievances. It would also render invalid the constitutional mandate under the Chicago Convention and the
Transit Agreement to settle differences or disagreements relating to their interpretation and application.
58. H.E. AlSulaiti averred that the point which the Respondents tried to make about the use of
the words "political issues" was, in the main, one of pure semantics. Noting that the words "wider issues",
"wider disputes", "political issues", "broader issues", "wider underlying elements", "broader questions",
"other aspects" and so on were all used, he underscored that, fundamentally, whatever terminology was
used, the law was still the same.
59. H.E. AlSulaiti observed that all of the Respondents' arguments as to why the Council
could not answer the legal question put to it boiled down to one thing. In the Statement of preliminary
objections, executive summary, paragraph 3, the Respondents claimed that resolution of Qatar's claims
would require the Council to determine issues forming part of the wider dispute between the Parties. They
stated that the Council would have to determine, amongst other things, whether Qatar had breached its
relevant counter-terrorism obligations under international law. In paragraph 4, they alleged that the Council
did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate issues as to whether Qatar had breached its other obligations under
international law. In particular, the Respondents stated in paragraph 58 of their Rejoinder: "Such a factual
and legal assessment requires considerable expertise on technical and legal matters. The Council has
considerable specialist expertise in the technical aspects of aviation enshrined in the Chicago Convention.
But it is not well-suited or equipped to handle disputes about violation of sovereignty, breach of the
principle of non-intervention, subversion and terrorism". More or less the same statement was repeated in
the Respondents' Statement of preliminary objections, executive summary, paragraph 4, and paragraph 69;
and in their Rejoinder, executive summary, paragraph 5.
60. H.E. AlSulaiti stressed that while it was clear that most of the Respondents' arguments
boiled down to the rationale that the Council was not well-suited or well-equipped to answer the legal
question put to it or to assume its legal mandate, that was not a valid argument in law or in fact. Yet that was
what the Respondents were, in effect, having as the conclusion of their reasoning and arguments.
61. In emphasizing that Qatar had the utmost respect for the Council, H.E. AlSulaiti indicated
that although it might or might not agree with every decision of the Council, it had confidence in the ability
of the Council and the Representatives to answer the legal questions put to them. He recalled that the Group
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of Experts established to draft Rules for the Settlement of Differences in the 1950's had been of the view
that: "If Council decides to hear a case arising under Article 84 [of the Chicago Convention] which presents
problems of legal complexity or requires special knowledge of economic or air transport matters on the part
of the Council, it is open for each State member of the Council to designate, temporarily, a legal, economic
or other expert as Representative of that State on Council during the period or on the occasions where the
contemplated case under Article 84 is being dealt with.".
62. Further, as to the supposed difficulty the Council Representatives would face if the
Respondents would put forward a defence that they had instituted lawful counter-measures, Qatar believed
that, based on the documents which the Respondents had unfortunately produced as exhibits and the
statements they had made in their Statements of preliminary objections and Rejoinders, the matter would be
one of the easiest for the Council to decide at that session when it would examine the merits of the two
cases.
63. H.E. AlSulaiti underscored that, whether or not Council Representatives believed that
statement, the fact was that the assessment could only be made after the Respondents' Counter-memorial
was presented, which may or may not contain a claim from the Respondents that their actions were lawful
counter-measures, and after Qatar replied to whatever defence was put forward by the Respondents. In
emphasizing that the Council could not make that assessment now, he noted that that was what the ICJ had
been guarding against in its 1972 Judgment regarding the Appeal relating to the jurisdiction of the !CAO
Council (India v. Pakistan).
64. H.E. AlSulaiti recalled that in that ICJ case India had alleged then that flights of Pakistani
aircraft over India was governed by a Special Regime in force between the two States, which was
completely outside of the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement, and also that India had become
entitled under international law or international treaty law outside of those two agreements, to terminate or
suspend them. In its Judgment, the ICJ had decided that as long as there was "a dispute of such a character
as to amount to a 'disagreement ... relating to the interpretation or application' of the Chicago Convention
or of the related Transit Agreement ... thenprima facie the Council is competent. Nor could the Council be
deprived of jurisdiction merely because considerations that are claimed to lie outside the Treaties may be
involved, if, irrespective of this, issues concerning the interpretation or application of these instruments are
nevertheless in question." (cf ICJ Reports 1972, p. 61, paragraph 27). The Court had gone on to state that
"The fact that a defence on the merits is cast in a particular form, cannot affect the competence of the
tribunal or other organ concerned, - otherwise parties would be in a position themselves to control that
competence, which would be inadmissible." (cf ICJ Reports 1972, p. 61, paragraph 27). Thus the
competence or jurisdiction of the Council must depend on the character of the dispute submitted to it and on
the issues raised, not on those defences on the merits or other considerations, which would become relevant
only after the jurisdictional issues had been settled.
65. H.E. AlSulaiti emphasized that although the Respondents had tried to explain away the
importance of that ICJ Judgment, they could not hide from the plain, clear wording of the Court. They could
not claim that the Council had no jurisdiction because they intended to raise a defence of counter-measures
at the stage of the merits. They could not bring forward a defence, any defence, on the merits so as to deny
jurisdiction. The Council had not seen the Respondents' Counter-memorial and Qatar's reply, and it could
not assume that it had no jurisdiction because of issues which might be in there.
66. Further, all those arguments of the Respondents went to admissibility, not jurisdiction, and
should be dismissed at this stage.
67. The Respondents kept claiming that the actions they had taken were lawful
counter-measures. They were not.
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68. On the issue of the negotiations, Qatar had made it clear that the threshold to establish
jurisdiction was quite low.
69. H.E. AlSulaiti underscored that compromissory clauses such as, or similar to, Article 84 of
the Chicago Convention or Article II, Section 2 of the Transit Agreement were not uncommon. Qatar
believed, and reiterated, that the question as to the date when the condition of negotiation must be fulfilled
was not definitively settled in law, as prior to the Racial Discrimination case, there had been a long string of
cases, going back to 1924 right through to 2008, to the effect that any initially unmet condition, including
for jurisdiction, may be fulfilled at the time the Court rules, as otherwise the Applicant would be entitled to
initiate fresh proceedings, which would not be in the interests of sound administration of justice. The one
case that went against the grain was the Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation) case, which had a strong dissenting
opinion by five judges (cf. Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 70, paragraph 160).
70. Recalling that Qatar had mentioned in its said Response that none of its efforts to negotiate
with the Respondents had been fruitful, H.E. AlSulaiti indicated that the core issue before the Council was
Qatar's request that it determine whether the Respondents had violated the provisions of the Chicago
Convention and the Transit Agreement. In so doing, the Council was free, as the Respondents had pointed
out in paragraph 42 of their Rejoinder, to make such findings of fact or ancillary determination of law as
were necessary to resolve the dispute presented to it. For example, if the Respondents would keep their
promise to defend their actions by saying that their counter-measures were valid, then the Council was not
prevented from considering elements which would go to a determination of the question. Nor was it an
argument in law or in fact to say that the Council was ill-suited or ill-equipped to do so.
71. H.E. AISulaiti underscored that the issue of negotiations in the two cases now under
consideration must be considered in the context that the Respondents had broken off diplomatic relations
with Qatar at the same time as they had instituted the said measures. They had acted then, and had continued
to act, in concert and in coordination with each other. The Respondents had refused to negotiate with Qatar,
instead presenting non-negotiable demands and principles, which if accepted, would render Qatar no longer
a sovereign nation. H.E. AlSulaiti averred that it was therefore self-serving for the Respondents to claim
that Qatar did not negotiate the aviation aspects with them, when in fact all the other coercive measures had
been taken jointly as one package.
72. H.E. AlSulaiti emphasized that Qatar had nevertheless presented evidence that it had
negotiated or attempted to negotiate with the Respondents, through the mechanism of ICAO, the very
subject matter of the violations of the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement. Qatar was seeking to
work with the Respondents through ICAO to find a solution to the measures which they had taken. He
recalled that when Qatar had taken the matter to the Council under Article 54 n) of the Chicago Convention,
the Respondents had asked the Council to recognize that the Parties were cooperating and to encourage
them to cooperate further. H.E. AlSulaiti noted that the United Arab Emirates had indicated that the ICAO
MID Regional Office had coordinated multiple meetings to review the contingency measures in the Gulf
region and to discuss additional proposals. Numerous Representatives had spoken of the need for the
Parties to "continue" to cooperate, or negotiate, or dialogue, or discuss. The Council had encouraged all
Parties to continue their collaboration. Contrary to the Respondents' assertion, in carrying out those
negotiations through the mechanism ofICAO, Qatar did not have to indicate that they were under Article 84
of the Chicago Convention. Discussions and negotiations on the Respondents' aviation restrictions had
taken place in ICAO. If the other Parties had not responded then in a manner to negotiate in good faith and
to resolve the aviation measures taken against Qatar, Qatar could not be faulted for that.
73. H.E. AlSulaiti noted that the multiple ICAO meetings held in the Gulfregion had also been
to seek solutions to mitigate the effects of the coercive measures taken by the Respondents by preventing
Qatari-registered aircraft from overflying their airspaces.
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74. With regard to the WTO, H.E. AlSulaiti recalled that although Qatar had written to three of
the Respondents in Application (A) and to two of the Respondents in Application (B) requesting
consultations on the prohibition of Qatari-registered aircraft from accessing their airspaces and landing at
their airports, the answer from the three States had been a flat "no". So within another multilateral
framework Qatar had sought unsuccessfully to engage the Respondents on the subject matter of the specific
dispute before the Council today.
75. H.E. AlSulaiti recalled that under international jurisprudence, it was not necessary for
Qatar to have referred specifically to the Chicago Convention or the Transit Agreement, as long as the
negotiations related to the subject matter of those Agreements.
76. With respect to the use of good offices of the Emir of Kuwait and certain other States,
H.E. AlSulaiti noted that despite the expressions of willingness by Qatar to negotiate a solution, the only
reaction on the part of the four Respondents had been to issue non-negotiable demands, some of which
would be an affront to the sovereignty of any State.
77. H.E. AlSulaiti highlighted that among the demands which the Respondents stated were
non-negotiable were to: immediately shut down the Turkish military base; shut down Al Jazeera and its
affiliate stations; align Qatar's military, political, social and economic policies with the Gulf and Arab
countries; shut down all news outlets funded directly and indirectly by Qatar; respond within 10 days of the
list being submitted to Qatar, or the list would become invalid; and consent to monthly compliance audits in
the first year, quarterly audits in the second year and annual audits in the following 10 years.
78. H.E. AlSulaiti emphasized that Qatar had made clear that it was open to negotiations and
had attempted negotiations, that it would not negotiate on items which would derogate from its sovereignty,
but was open to discuss all other issues in accordance with international law.
79. H.E. AlSulaiti indicated that Qatar had noted with particular interest the statement in
paragraph 137 of the Respondents "Rejoinder" that Qatar had not made any genuine attempt to negotiate
through other channels, such as via Kuwait and the United States. He considered that that was quite an
astonishing assertion, which utterly ignored the evidence produced by Qatar in its various exhibits attached
to its Response. H.E. AlSulaiti recalled that the then US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson had said on
19 October 2017 that "It is up to the leadership of the quartet when they want to engage with Qatar because
Qatar has been very clear - they're ready to engage.".
80. H.E. AlSulaiti stressed that under these circumstances, it was clear that negotiations were
futile and the Parties were deadlocked.
81. H.E. AlSulaiti underscored that Qatar clearly had met the requirement for negotiations
under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article II, Section 2 of the Transit Agreement. He
reiterated that Qatar had been subjected to a brutal campaign from the four States, targeting its civil aviation
and aiming to cause direct and premeditated damage to Qatar and its airlines. The campaign was still going
on for a year. The Respondents refused to allow Qatari-registered aircraft to fly over or land in their
territories, in violation of numerous provisions of the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement. They
acted with complete impunity.
82. H.E. AlSulaiti recalled that the drafters of the Chicago Convention had given the Council a
noble and sacred function to decide upon disagreements between States relating to the interpretation or
application of those two instruments. That duty became even more important to protect Member States
from aggressive and arbitrary actions by other Member States. The Council was elected by all of the
Member States ofICAO to work for the global good of civil aviation. That was the vision of the creators of
this Organization.
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83. H.E. AlSulaiti recalled Article 4 of the Chicago Convention, which indicated that each
Contracting State agreed not to use civil aviation for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of the
Convention. He underscored that ICAO contracting States looked to the Council Members to preserve the
integrity of the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement, and to set an example to the other
Contracting States, not to violate themselves those treaties.
84. In concluding, H.E. AlSulaiti indicated that Qatar respectfully requested the Council to
accept its submissions at paragraphs 214 and 215 of its Response, including to reject the preliminary
objection of the Respondents in both Application (A) and Application (B).
85. After a brief recess to enable consultations, the Respondents and the Applicant presented
the following rebuttals to each other's oral arguments, all of which were duly noted and recorded for the
minutes of the meeting.
Respondents' rebuttal
86. Speaking on behalf of the four Respondents on this very important matter which raised
novel issues for the Council, Mr. Georgios Petrochilos (Legal Advisor, Bahrain Delegation) noted that the
latter had heard arguments from the Applicant on a number of points. Rather than reiterating the
Respondents' procedural concerns at this stage, he focused only on three of the Applicant's points. He
started with its argument, or perhaps lack of argument, on what was the real issue in dispute. As the Council
would have seen, in the pleadings, the term "real issue in dispute" was a legal term of art. Mr. Petrochilos
noted that there were three main propositions, the first of which was that it was within the power of the
Council to address and assess objectively the object of the dispute. Affirming that that was indeed a
responsibility of the Council, he underscored that it was a responsibility that went hand-in-hand with the
power of the Council to detern1ine the existence and the scope of its jurisdiction. The second propositionand
it followed from the first one like the night follows the day -was that in so doing the Council was not
bound by the characterizations made by the Parties, and in particular, by the characterizations that were
made by one Party, in the present case, the Applicant. The third proposition was that the object of the
dispute consisted of the issues that arose objectively from the pleadings of both sides.
87. In now applying that test to the facts of the cases, Mr. Petrochilos indicated that when one
looked at Qatar's Applications one saw an attempt- and Council had heard it today-to frame the dispute as
one under ICAO international treaties. Even so, it was hard to keep up that pretense in the pleadings, and so
the Applicant had had to admit, as in fact it did, that the Respondents had adopted a set of measures which
included the severance of diplomatic and consular relations with the Applicant and various other
restrictions placed on the latter. Mr. Petrochilos recalled that the Applicant called those measures "actions",
in the plural, and that it admitted that they had several "aspects". He noted that the position was then made
clearer in the Respondents' pleadings, which described the main measures, although very briefly. The
pleadings also referred to the stated position of the Respondents from the outset of the measures that the
latter were being adopted as lawful counter-measures. Those had been taken, as the Council had heard, in
the face of the Applicant's multiple grave and persistent breaches of international obligations essential to
the security of the Respondents and the region. Mr. Petrochilos underscored that the Applicant did not
dispute that counter-measures were what the Respondents intended to take, nor that the Respondents were
entitled to bring that defence and have it dete1mined before any court or tribunal that had proper jurisdiction
to adjudicate the real dispute. Indeed, the Applicant conceded in its Response, and had stated the same thing
during the present meeting, that in order for the Council to decide on the merits of the case the Council
would need to determine "on the facts and in law whether the Respondents have met the conditions for
lawful counter-measures". Mr. Petrochilos underscored that that would require the Council to conduct a
forensic factual enquiry, in proper judicial fashion, into the Applicant's illegal activities. He respectfully
submitted that that left the Council in a place clearly outside the Chicago Convention and the Transit
Agreement.
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88. In elaborating thereon, Mr. Petrochilos indicated that, on the merits of the case the Council
would first have to determine whether the Applicant had breached or had not breached a number of
international obligations that, as it admitted, had, in the main, nothing whatever to do with civil aviation.
He queried how the Council was to assess the long list of the Applicant's grave misdeeds which the
Respondents said were not related to civil aviation, the Chicago Convention, or to the Transit Agreement,
and what legal standard the Council would apply. Mr. Petrochilos noted that, while the Council would then
have to determine whether the four Respondent States were entitled to react to the Applicant's breaches by
taking a set of counter-measures to induce it to come back to the fold of legality, the Chicago Convention
and the Transit Agreement could not help the Council answer that question. He underscored that it was
crucial to understand that this forensic and legal examination would come before the Applicant's
complaints under the Chicago Convention and Transit Agreement. Why was that? because - and this was
uncontroversial between the Parties - counter-measures precluded any question of unlawfulness at the
threshold. Mr. Petrochilos emphasized that the Council would not get anywhere near the Chicago
Convention or the Transit Agreement, which were the texts that granted it jmisdiction, until it had fully
considered and decided a host of other issues on which the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement
had nothing whatever to say. He averred that one was unable to see how the Council might uphold its
jurisdiction in those circumstances. Mr. Petrochilos reiterated that this was not a civil aviation dispute but
rather a dispute about fundamentally different and broader duties of international law. He underscored that
those duties were neither ancillary, as the Applicant had said, nor incidental issues on any possible view, but
rather "the core of the dispute", to quote the Chagos Islands ICJ decision.
89. Turning to the second point, the Applicant's argument about the preliminary nature of the
Respondents' objections, or otherwise, Mr. Petrochilos recalled that the Rules for the Settlement of
Differences (Doc 7782/2), at Article 5(1), characterized a preliminary objection as a question as to
"the jurisdiction of the Council to handle the matter presented by the Applicant.". Thus a preliminary
objection might concern either, firstly, whether the Council had jurisdiction at all to consider the
Application, or secondly, whether the Council should, in the circumstances of the case, exercise a
jurisdiction that it had. Mr. Petrochilos noted that the first type of objection was one of jurisdiction, while
the other type of objection could perhaps, in legal theory, be called one of admissibility. He averred that
those distinctions did not matter for the Council's purposes as both of those types of objection were covered
by the wording of Article 5(1). They were points as to the jurisdiction of the Council to handle the dispute,
whether it had jurisdiction or whether it should exercise it. Mr. Petrochilos indicated that, in any event,
there was not much daylight between the two types of objection because both, if successful, precluded the
consideration of the substance of the dispute. They operated at the threshold.
90. Mr. Petrochilos highlighted that Article 5(4) of the said Rules provided that where
preliminary objections had been lodged, as in the present case, the Council shall decide the question as a
preliminary matter. Recalling that the ICJ had held "that in principle a Party raising preliminary objections
is entitled to have them resolved preliminarily", he underscored that all the said Rules were doing was
expressing a general procedural principle. Mr. Petrochilos underscored that the Council had always
resolved preliminary objections that it had characterized as going to its jurisdiction in a preliminary
decision and had never joined them to the merits of the dispute for consideration later. The only
circumstances in which the Council had joined preliminary objections to the merits was where the objection
did not possess "an exclusively preliminary character", which might mean either that the Council did not
have enough information to properly evaluate the objection at that stage or that it was impossible to rule on
the preliminary objection separately on its own without prejudging the merits. Mr. Petrochilos stressed that
at present the Council was not in either one of these territories. The Respondents were not asking the
Council to validate the lawfulness of the measures they had taken, nor were they asking the Council to
condemn the Applicant for its severely unlawful conduct. They were simply asking the Council to
recognize the real object of the dispute between the Parties and to recognize and declare on that basis that it
did not possess jurisdiction to consider the substance of this dispute.
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91. The last point that Mr. Petrochilos wished to make on this issue of the Respondents'
primary position was that both of their preliminary objections went to the Council's jurisdiction i.e. to the
issue of whether the Contracting States, including the four Respondent States, had or had not consented to
have this dispute adjudicated by the Council. In the interest of time, he picked that point up only by
reference to Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, in which the Contracting States had consented to the
Council's jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes which firstly related to "the interpretation or application of this
Convention". It was thus necessary for Council Members to satisfy themselves that the real dispute that was
objectively before them was about the interpretation or application of the Chicago Convention. Secondly, it
was necessary for them to satisfy themselves that this was a dispute that could not be settled by negotiation.
Those were jurisdictional requirements enshrined in Article 84 of the Convention.
92. Turning to the requirement of exhaustion of negotiations before an Applicant may
commence proceedings, Mr. Petrochilos re-emphasized that Qatar had not fulfilled that precondition. He
noted that Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article II of Section 2 of the Transit Agreement were
formal: they required that the dispute must be one that could not be settled by negotiations. At the risk of
stating the obvious, Mr. Petrochilos underscored that that was not an option at the Applicant's discretion,
nor was it a mere formality. He recalled that the ICJ, which was the appeal body in respect of the Council's
decisions, required an Applicant to make at least "a genuine attempt to resolve the disagreement through
negotiations and that attempt and these negotiations must take place prior to the filing of an Application".
Mr. Petrochilos underscored that an Applicant which commenced legal proceedings first and only
thereafter sought to start negotiations fell afoul of that jurisdictional requirement. He noted that there were
good policy reasons why the Respondents asked the Council to enforce that precondition, as follows: firstly,
that unless the Parties had tried to negotiate and had clearly stated their positions in a formal and appropriate
way, the contours of the dispute were not known and it was not possible to see the pathology that had
developed in this case. The Council was able to assess the nature and the scope of the dispute only through
the exchange of pleadings between the Parties, which the Respondents considered was neither appropriate
nor helpful. The second policy reason was that if the Council were to accept jurisdiction on the basis that
one can start proceedings first and only then pick up the phone perhaps or send a formal diplomatic
correspondence, more importantly and more appropriately, then there would be no motivation for Applicant
States to do that which was required of them by the Chicago Convention, and that was not a policy to be
encouraged. Thirdly, it was necessary to always bear in mind that judicial resolution was the mechanism of
last resort, and that negotiation was the primary method of resolution in international relations.
Mr. Petrochilos recalled that the Applicant represented to the Council in its Application (A) and
Application (B) that it had not sought to negotiate. It stated in section (g) thereof that "The Respondents did
not permit any opportunity to negotiate the aviation aspects ... ". Then the Applicant had had to prove that
assertion. He noted that that kind of assertion, which was one that went to futility, was a very demanding
one which required one, at the very least, to try to commence negotiations. Mr. Petrochilos underscored that
when the Respondents had put the Applicant to that point in their pleadings, the latter had changed tack,
presumably because it had not been able to sustain its allegation anymore. The Applicant had therefore
stated that it had invited negotiations after all.
93. In making two points on that allegation, Mr. Petrochilos averred that as 11 of the
statements relied upon by the Applicant during the present meeting post-dated its said Applications, the
Council could ignore them. He highlighted that all of the remaining statements were addressed to third
parties, for political consumption in the view of the Respondents: they had not been made in the formal
fashion of formal correspondence on specific issues. Mr. Petrochilos further emphasized that, in fact, not
even in that irregular fashion adopted by the Applicant had the latter even once formulated a specific
invitation to negotiate specific complaints that it now claimed to have under the Chicago Convention and
the Transit Agreement, and yet the Applicant had admitted in its own Applications that the negotiations
would have to concern civil aviation specifically. He underscored that an invitation to negotiations would
have been a very straightforward thing to do for any State that resorted to the Council with a genuine
complaint within the ICAO system. Any State would know how to do it. That the Applicant had instead
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expended its energies on vague political statements addressed to third parties showed that it had no
intention to have a genuine negotiation on specific legal rights and obligations.
94. Before closing, Mr. Petrochilos noted that he was authorized to represent to the Council
one important factual point: the four Respondent States had heard today for the first time, if they had
understood correctly, that the Applicant had invited all of them to negotiate. So far as ICAO-related
complaints were concerned, he was authorized to place on record on behalf of the said Respondents that that
was incorrect. It had never happened. Unless he could be of further help to the Council under the control of
the Respondents' Authorized Agents, that concluded Mr. Petrochilos' intervention.
95. Returning to the point raised regarding the safety of civil aviation, H.E. Al Mansoori
(United Arab Emirates) recalled that the Council, at its said Extraordinary Session on 31 July 2017, had
successfully addressed the issue of contingency arrangements in the Gulf region. In emphasizing that the
Applicant's airports and airspace remained open, he noted that: Qatar Airways alone currently had over 100
aircraft in operation flying to more than 150 destinations worldwide; Qatari-registered aircraft continued to
fly in and out of Doha every day; contingency routes had been established through the Respondents' FIRs;
and, in addition, landing and overflight options remained available for safety or emergency purposes.
H.E. Al Mansoori indicated that it was very regrettable that the Applicant was exploiting ICAO, a very
important technical organization, for its political and media campaign purposes.
Applicant's surrebuttal
96. H.E. AlSulaiti (Qatar) reiterated that Qatar's sole intention in submitting its Application (A)
and Application (B) and their corresponding Memorials to ICAO had been to raise purely technical issues
relating to the interpretation and application of the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement and not
any political issues. He then gave the floor to Mr. John Augustin (Observer, Qatar Delegation).
97. Enquiring whether the Respondents' Legal Advisor had given an additional presentation or
a rebuttal, Mr. Augustin noted that whereas his rebuttal was supposed to have addressed issues raised by the
Applicant in its oral arguments, his comments had gone well beyond that into a fresh presentation. He
underscored that the Applicant had neither been afforded such an opportunity to give an additional
presentation nor been prepared to give one, although the Respondents had apparently been prepared to do
so.
98. In then commencing his surrebuttal, Mr. Augustin highlighted that approximately
one-third of the Respondents' comments had had to do with issues which absolutely went to the merits of
the two cases and whether the Applicant supported terrorism or terrorism financing. He pointed out that
whereas in the past when the Council has considered similar matters it had drawn a curtain on discussions
which touched on the merits of the case, some ten minutes had been spent by the Respondents in
commenting on the Applicant's alleged support for terrorism or terrorism financing, which had nothing to
do with the matter currently before the Council.
99. In emphasizing that the Applicant had a completely different view from the Respondents
on the issue of admissibility of its claims and the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2),
Mr. Augustin indicated that it was completely unable to understand the logic of the Respondents' reasoning
with regard to Article 5(1) of the Rules, which clearly stated "If the Respondent questions the jurisdiction of
the Council to handle the matter presented by the Applicant, he shall file a preliminary objection setting out
the basis of the objection." The Respondents accepted that there was a difference between jurisdiction and
admissibility. However, Article 5(1) referred to the jurisdiction of the Council and not to the admissibility
ofa case. Mr. Augustin emphasized that ICAO's Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2) were
different from the ICJ' s Rules in that regard.
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100. Mr. Augustin highlighted that a completely new philosophy had been presented by the
Respondents, namely, that of the "real issue" in the case. He noted that although Qatar's Application (A)
and Application (B) and their corresponding Memorials related purely to the interpretation and application
of the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement, for some reason the Respondents considered that the
Council lacked the jurisdiction to hear and resolve the claims raised therein. Mr. Augustin further indicated
that the Respondents had avoided the substantive issue of the Appeal relating to the jurisdiction of the
!CAO Council (India v. Pakistan) on which the ICJ had rendered its Judgment on 18 August 1972, referred
to earlier by H.E. AlSulaiti (cf paragraphs 69 and 70 above). In that Appeal India had claimed that there
were issues outside the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement which prevented the Council from
examining the merits of the case, the same argument being used by the Respondents in the present two cases.
He repeated the ICJ's decision that as long as there was "a dispute of such a character as to amount to a
'disagreement ... relating to the interpretation or application' of the Chicago Convention or of the related
Transit Agreement ... then prima facie the Council is competent. Nor could the Council be deprived of
jurisdiction merely because considerations that are claimed to lie outside the Treaties may be involved, if,
irrespective of this, issues concerning the interpretation or application of these instruments are nevertheless
in question." (cf. ICJ Reports 1972, p. 61, paragraph 27).
I O 1. Recalling that the Respondents had indicated that they might have a defence on the merits,
Mr. Augustin enquired whether that was a promise that they would bring forward the issue of their
counter-measures. Noting that neither the Respondents' defence on the merits nor the Applicant's reply had
been seen by the Council, he underscored that as a consequence the latter could not make a determination
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear and resolve the claims raised in Qatar's Application (A) and Application
(B).Mr. Augustin quoted, in this regard, the ICJ's Judgment in the said Appeal relating to the jurisdiction of
the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan) "The fact that a defence on the merits is cast in a particular form,
cannot affect the competence of the tribunal or other organ concerned, - otherwise parties would be in a
position themselves to control that competence, which would be inadmissible." (cf ICJ Reports 1972, p. 61,
paragraph 27). Averring that that was the very core of the Respondents' arguments, he asserted that they
wanted, at this stage, to control the competence of the Council for a defence on the merits which no one had
seen and to which the Applicant had not replied.
I 02. Mr. Augustin reiterated that if the Respondents were to put forward a defence that they had
instituted lawful counter-measures, then the Applicant considered, on the basis of the evidence referred to
earlier, that the matter would be one of the easiest for the Council to decide at that session when it would
examine the merits of the two cases. The Respondents, on the other hand, had indicated that it would be
extremely difficult as the Council's hands were tied and it was incapable of handling the matter. The point
was that the Council could not make a determination that it had no jurisdiction until it had seen the
Respondents' defence on the merits and the Applicant's response, which was exactly what the said Appeal
relating to the jurisdiction of the !CAO Council (India v. Pakistan) had been trying to avoid.
103. Mr. Augustin then referred to the Respondents' argument, presented in their Statement of
preliminary objections, executive summary, paragraph 4, that "While the Council has considerable
expertise in the technical aspects of aviation enshrined in the Chicago Convention, it is not well-suited or
well-equipped to handle disputes of a wider nature ... including issues regarding terrorism and other
matters related thereto.". He recalled that that argument was repeated in paragraph 69 of the said Statement
("The Council, comprised of aviation specialists, has considerable expertise in the technical aspects of
aviation enshrined in the Chicago Convention, but is not well-suited or well-equipped to handle disputes
about interference, violation of sovereignty, subversion and terrorism."), as well as in the Respondents'
Rejoinder, executive summary, paragraph 5 ("The Council is not well-suited or equipped to handle disputes
of this nature, nor is it competent to do so.") and paragraph 58 ("Such a factual and legal assessment
requires considerable expertise on technical and legal matters. The Council has considerable specialist
expertise in the technical aspects of aviation enshrined in the Chicago Convention. But is not well-suited or
equipped to handle disputes about violation of sovereignty, breach of the principle of non-intervention,
subversion and terrorism.").
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104. Mr. Augustin indicated that he would very much like to see the Respondents go before a
proper tribunal or court of law such as the ICJ and claim that it was not well-suited or well-equipped to
discuss issues which went to the merits of a case, whatever the type of issue. He averred that it was a novel
legal argument and that it had no basis in fact or in law. Recalling the oral arguments presented earlier by
H.E. AlSulaiti ( cf. paragraph 67 above), Mr. Augustin reiterated that the Group of Experts established to
draft Rules for the Settlement of Differences in the 1950's had been of the view that: "If Council decides to
hear a case arising under Article 84 [of the Chicago Convention] which presents problems of legal
complexity or requires special knowledge of economic or air transport matters on the part of the Council, it
is open for each State member of the Council to designate, temporarily, a legal, economic or other expert as
Representative of that State on Council during the period or on the occasions where the contemplated case
under Article 84 is being dealt with.". Affirming that each Council Member State was free to designate
temporarily whomever it wished to listen to a particular case, Mr. Augustin stressed that it could not be said
that the Council was ill-equipped or ill-suited and that the case should therefore be dismissed upfront at the
preliminary objection stage.
105. All of the preceding oral arguments were duly noted and recorded for the minutes of the
meeting. In the absence of any direct questions to the Authorized Agents or Legal Advisors of the Applicant
and the Respondents by Council Members non-Parties to the disagreements, the Council proceeded to its
deliberations on the items.
Deliberations
106. Taking into account the Council's recent experience with the Settlement of Differences:
Brazil and United States (2016) (cf. C-DECs 211/9 and 211/10), and the views of the many Council
Representatives who had been consulted prior to the present meeting, the Representative of Mexico, in his
capacity as Dean of the Council, proposed that the Council proceed directly to a vote by secret ballot in
order to take a decision on each of the Respondents' preliminary objections with respect to Application (A)
and Application (B), pursuant to Article 50 of the Rules of Procedure for the Council (Doc 7559/10).
I 07. This proposal was seconded by the Representative of Singapore, in his capacity as First
Vice-President of the Council, as constituting the most efficient way forward.
I 08. The Council agreed to the said proposal. Under Article 52 of the Chicago Convention,
decisions by the Council required approval by a majority of its Members. In line with the consistent practice
of the Council in applying that provision in previous cases, since the Council comprised 36 Members,
acceptance of the Respondents' preliminary objections in both Application (A) and Application (B)
required 19 positive votes.
109. It was highlighted: that Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were not
entitled to vote under Application (A) and that Egypt and the United Arab Emirates were not entitled to vote
under Application (B) in accordance with Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article 15 (5) of the
Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2), which specified that "No Member of the Council
shall vote in the consideration by the Council of any dispute to which it is a Party"; that pursuant to
Article 66 b) of the Chicago Convention only those Council Member States parties to the Transit
Agreement were eligible to vote under Application (B) 1
; and that following the completion of each secret
ballot, a staff member from LEB would assist in the tallying of all of the votes cast for the purpose of
ensuring its accuracy.
1 List of Council Member States parties to the Transit Agreement:
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, China (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Macao Special
Administrative Region), Congo, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Republic of Korea, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom and the United States.
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110. A request made by H.E. AI-Amudi (Saudi Arabia) on behalf of the Respondents for an
open ballot for the sake of transparency in the process given that the Council was currently acting as an
adjudicator was declined by the Council on the basis of Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure for the Council
(Doc 7559/l 0), which stipulated that "Unless opposed by a majority of the Members of the Council, the
vote shall be taken by secret ballot if a request to that effect is supported, if made by a Member of the
Council, by one other Member, and, if made by the President, by two Members".
111. In seeking clarification regarding the voting majority required, H.E. Al Mansoori (United
Arab Emirates) noted that, pursuant to Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, 33 Council Members were
eligible to vote on the Respondents' preliminary objection relating to Application (A). In his view, that
meant that 17 positive votes constituted a majority. In further noting that in accordance with Article 66 b) of
the Chicago Convention 25 Council Members were eligible to vote on the Respondents' preliminary
objection relating to Application (B), he indicated that in his opinion 13 positive votes constituted a
majority.
112. Reiterating that Article 52 of the Chicago Convention stipulated that "Decisions by the
Council shall require approval by a majority of its Members.", the Director, Legal Affairs and External
Relations Bureau (D/LEB) noted that his Bureau had examined the historical records of previous ICAO
proceedings under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention relating to the settlement of disputes and that it
had been the consistent and unanimous practice of the Council to require approval of its decisions by a
majority of its Members, which currently stood at 19.
113. H.E. Al-Amudi {Saudi Arabia) wished to place on record his objection to the statement
that 19 votes would constitute the voting majority required under Article 52 of the Chicago Convention.
Indicating that it was the Respondents' understanding that a review of the Rules for the Settlement of
Differences (Doc 7782/2) would be undertaken in September 2018, he underscored that they considered
that it was contrary to due process to conduct such a review of the rules whereby the Council adjudicated
the settlement of differences while such momentous and critical decisions by the Council on Qatar's
Application (A) and Application (B) were pending.
114. In clarifying that when the Council was sitting as a court, as at present, it was not the role of
LEB to provide its interpretation of relevant rules, D/LEB underscored that earlier he had merely read the
text of Article 52 of the Chicago Convention and recited to the Council the factual historical records of
previous Council decisions, no more, no less.
115. In providing factual information in response to a query by the President of the Council,
D/LEB recalled that at the Tenth Meeting of its 211 th Session on 23 June 2017 the Council had requested
the Secretariat to review the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2) with the aim of
determining whether they needed to be revised and updated taking into account relevant developments that
had occurred since the publication of that document (cf. C-DEC 211/10, paragraph 45). The Secretariat had
subsequently reported that it was necessary to consult the Legal Committee thereon during its upcoming
37th Session (Montreal, 4-7 September 2018). D/LEB further clarified that while Article 33 of the said
Rules stipulated that the latter "may, at any time, be amended by the Council", it also stipulated that
"No amendment shall apply to a pending case except with the agreement of the parties".
116. H.E. Al Mansoori (United Arab Emirates) also wished to place on record his objection to
the voting majority required (19) for the Council's acceptance of the Respondents' preliminary objections
with respect to Qatar's Application (A) and Application (B). In protesting against the voting majority
required (19), he noted that Article 52 of the Chicago Convention did not provide for a qualified majority
and instead provided that decisions by the Council "shall require approval by a majority of its Members".
H.E. Al Mansoori further noted that Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article 15( 5) of the Rules of
Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2) both provided that "No Member of the Council shall vote in the
consideration by the Council of any dispute to which it is a party.". He affirmed that Article 52 of the
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Chicago Convention, read together with Article 84 thereof, should be interpreted as meaning that the
majority required was of all Council Members entitled to vote. Accordingly, as there were 33 Council
Members entitled to vote on the preliminary objection with respect to Application (A), 17 positive votes
would constitute a majority. Furthermore, as there were 25 Council Members entitled to vote on the
preliminary objection with respect to Application (8), 13 votes would constitute a majority.
H.E. Al Mansoori averred that any other reading of the rules would defeat their purpose and also defy the
principle of treaty interpretation, fairness and equal treatment of the Parties. He therefore felt compelled to
clearly express his disagreement with the voting majority required (19).
117. In supporting the above intervention by H.E. Al Mansoori, H.E. EL-Adawy (Egypt)
requested that his objection to the said voting majority required be also placed on record. He enquired how
that requirement would be applied in the case of a dispute regarding the interpretation or application of a
Convention to which there were fewer than 19 parties and thus fewer than 19 States, in particular, Council
Member States, eligible to vote
118. A request then made by H.E. Al Mansoori (United Arab Emirates) that the Council
reconsider the above-mentioned majority of 19 positive votes in the current Council for the approval of its
decisions on the Respondents' preliminary objections with respect to both Application (A) and
Application (B) was declined in the absence of any desire on the pmt of the Council to determine what
constituted the voting majority other than the relevant provisions of the Chicago Convention read by
D/LEB.
119. The above-mentioned requests and statements were noted for the record.
120. The Council then proceeded to the holding of a secret ballot on the Respondents'
preliminary objection with respect to Application (A) and on their preliminary objection with respect to
Application (B). In response to questions by the Representatives of the United States and South Africa,
D/LEB clarified that: a "Yes" vote was a vote in favour and meant acceptance of the Respondents'
preliminary objection; a "No" vote was a vote against and meant disagreement with the said preliminary
objection; and "Abstain" meant that there was no vote, neither for nor against the preliminary objection.
121. H.E. Mohammed (Bahrain) recalled that the Respondents had two preliminary objections
each to Qatar's Application (A) and Application (B). As explained by Mr. Petrochilos (Legal Advisor,
Bahrain Delegation). the first preliminary objection was that the real issue in dispute was not an issue of the
interpretation or application of the Chicago Convention or the Transit Agreement. The second preliminary
objection was that the dispute was not one which cannot be settled by negotiation as was required by the
jurisdictional clauses of those two treaties. As accepting either one of those preliminary objections had the
effect of disposing of the case here and now, Mr. Petrochilos suggested that the appropriate wording of the
question for the secret ballot for each Application would be "Do you accept either one of the two
preliminary objections formulated by the Respondents in respect of each of the Applications?".
122. The President of the Council observed that both of the Respondents' said preliminary
objections related to the jurisdiction of the Council. At his request, D/LEB read the text of Article 5(1) of
the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2), which stipulated that "If the Respondent questions
the jurisdiction of the Council to handle the matter presented by the Applicant, he shall file a preliminary
objection setting out the basis of the objection.".
123. The President of the Council noted that in essence for each of Qatar's Application (A) and
Application (B) the Respondents had a preliminary objection for which they provided two justifications. He
took the point made by Mr. Petrochilos that the voting on each preliminary objection applied to both of the
justifications provided therefor.
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Secret ballot on the Respondents' Preliminary Objection - Application (A)
(relating to the interpretation and application of the Chicago Convention and its Annexes)
124. The result of the secret ballot on the question "Do you accept the preliminary objection?",
in which 33 votes were cast by the Council Members eligible to vote, was as follows:
In favour
Against
Abstentions
4 votes
23 votes
6 votes
There were no invalid ballots or blank votes.
125. Based on this result, the President declared that the preliminary objection filed by the
Respondents with respect to Application (A) was not accepted by the Council.
Secret ballot on the Respondents' Preliminary Objection -Application (B)
(relating to the interpretation and application of the Transit Agreement)
126. The result of the secret ballot on the question "Do you accept the preliminary objection?",
in which 25 votes were cast by the Council Members eligible to vote, was as follows:
In favour
Against
Abstentions
2 votes
18 votes
5 votes
There were no invalid ballots or blank votes.
127. Based on the above result, the President declared that the preliminary objection filed by the
Respondents with respect to Application (B) was not accepted by the Council.
Closing statements
128. H.E. AISulaiti (Qatar), as Applicant, expressed appreciation to the Council for having been
afforded the opportunity to participate in the present meeting and to present its views regarding the
Respondents' preliminary objections with respect to Qatar's Application (A) and Application (B).
129. Speaking on behalf of the Respondents, H.E. Al-Amudi (Saudi Arabia) reiterated their
utmost respect for ICAO and the Council and reaffirmed their unwavering commitment to the rules and
principles of the Chicago Convention and the Strategic Objectives and principles of ICAO. He
re-emphasized that the cases brought before the Council during the present meeting involved: the
Applicant's multiple and persistent breaches of international law, obligations that did not relate to civil
aviation; and the sovereign right of the Respondents under international law to take lawful
counter-measures to induce the Applicant to comply with its international obligations and to protect against
a national security threat. Underscoring that the Respondents regretted that the Council had decided that
ICAO had jurisdiction to hear the Applicant's complaints, H.E. Al-Amudi reiterated that they believed that
the rules applied today were contrary to the fundamental rules of due process. In particular, they considered
that the super majority voting requirement was not in line with the plain meaning of the Chicago
Convention.
130. Repeating that the Respondents had not chosen to bring this dispute before the Council,
H.E. Al-Amudi indicated that they respectfully submitted that ICAO's role did not extend to consideration
of a dispute where the real issue involved national security and international instruments outside of civil
aviation. He underscored that while the Respondents had the utmost respect for the Council, they were
compelled to exercise their right under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention to appeal the Council's
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decisions to the ICJ and would file their applications with the Court in this regard immediately following
the receipt of the Council's approved decisions. The Respondents continued to take the view that the
dispute that the Applicant had brought before the Council fell outside the scope of matters that the ICAO
Council could adjudicate upon under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article II, Section 2, of the
Transit Agreement. By cause ofthe Respondents' impending appeal, the dispute was now moving to the
ICJ. H.E. Al-Amudi emphasized, however, that as the Respondents had expressed before and as they now
again expressed, their four States were committed to continuing to work with all Parties, including Qatar,
under the auspices of ICAO to ensure the safe operation of air traffic. He stressed that the safety of civil
aviation had been, and remained, the Respondents' top priority. In concluding, H.E. Al-Amudi thanked the
President and the Council for their efforts in this matter and their commitment to the Strategic Objectives of
this esteemed Organization.
131. The above statements were noted and recorded for the summary minutes of the meeting.
132. On behalf of the Council, the President expressed appreciation to the high-level
Government officials from Bahrain, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and the
members of their Delegations for having participated in the present meeting. He stressed that, regardless of
the Council's decisions regarding the Respondents' preliminary objections with respect to Application (A)
and Application (B), it was important that as Member States of the same Organization, ICAO, they continue
to communicate, consult and collaborate for the further development of international civil aviation. The
President expressed the hope that all ICAO Member States would continue to move forward in that spirit.
133. It was noted that, on the basis of the above proceedings, the Secretariat would prepare and
circulate the draft text of the Council's decisions at the preliminary objection stage of the Settlement of
Differences: The State of Qatar and the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (2017) -Application (A), and the Settlement of Differences:
The State of Qatar and the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates
(2017) - Application (B), which would be tabled for the Council's consideration and approval at its
Eleventh Meeting (214/11) on Friday, 29 June 2018.
134. It was further noted that the time-balance of seven calendar days remaining for the
Respondents to file their Counter-memorial with ICAO shall begin to run from the date of receipt by the
Respondents of the Council's approved decisions regarding their preliminary objections with respect to
Application (A) and Application (B). However, the Respondents had indicated their intention to exercise
their right under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and to immediately thereafter file appeals of the
Council's said decisions with the ICJ, in which case, pursuant to Article 86 thereof, the said decisions of the
Council would be suspended until the appeals were decided by the ICJ.
135. The meeting adjourned at 1810 hours.
- END
Volume II (Annexes 1-55)