Volume 3

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE ACCESS TO THE
PACIFIC OCEAN
(BOLIVIA v. CHILE)
REJOINDER OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CHILE
Volume 3 of 3
(Annexes 416 - 454)
15 SEPTEMBER 2017

i
INDEX TO VOLUME 3 OF 3
ANNEXES 416 - 454
ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE
NO
Annex 416 A. Crespo Gutiérrez, The
Treaties Signed with Chile in
1895 (1975), pp 43-47, 53, 58-
62, 67-68, 71-73 (extracts)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
391
Annex 417 “Banzer claims Landlocked
Situation, Not A Basic
Condition”, El Mercurio
(Chile), 5 February 1975
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
El Mercurio (Chile) 425
Annex 418 Telegram from the US
Secretary of State to the US
Embassy in Bolivia,
15 February 1975
(Original in English)
US National Archives and
Records Administration,
<https://aad.archives.gov/a
ad/createpdf?rid=90952&d
t=2476&dl=1345>
431
Annex 419 “Memorandum of
Conversation”, Bolivia,
7 June 1976
(Original in English)
Foreign Relations of the
US, 1969–1976, Volume
E–11, Part 2, Documents
on South America,
1973-1976, Office of the
Historian,
<https://history.state.gov/hi
storicaldocuments/frus196
9-76ve11p2/d79>
437
ii
ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE NO Annex 420 Report from Gregorio Amunátegui Prá to the President of Chile, October 1976 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Personal records of Gregorio Amunátegui Prá 447 Annex 421 “The National Maritime Council Speaks Out: The exchange of territories is the only realistic solution for Bolivia”, La Tercera (Chile), 1 November 1976 (Original in Spanish, English translation) La Tercera (Chile) 475 Annex 422 Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 7 April 1977 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 314 to its Reply 479 Annex 423 Memorandum by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile entitled “Course of the negotiation with Bolivia”, 1978 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 489
iii
ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE
NO
Annex 424 First draft of the resolution on
the maritime problem of
Bolivia circulated by Bolivia at
the 11th General Assembly of
the OAS, 1979
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
U. Figueroa Pla, The
Bolivian Claim Before
International Fora (2007),
pp 485-486
515
Annex 425 Minutes of the Extraordinary
Meeting of the Permanent
Council of the OAS,
14 February 1979 (extracts)
(English translation)
Organization of American
States, OEA/Ser.G
CP/ACTA 368/79,
14 February 1979, pp 6-57,
68, 71, 73
521
Annex 426 Report on the Maritime
Problem of Bolivia,
26 October 1979
(Original in English)
Organization of American
States, General Assembly,
Ninth Regular Session,
OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.
1145/79, 26 October 1979
567
Annex 427 Minutes of the 6th Meeting of
the General Committee of the
OAS General Assembly,
19 November 1982 (extracts)
(English translation)
Organization of American
States, General Assembly,
Twelfth Regular Session,
OEA/Ser.P/XII.O.2,
29 July 1983, Vol. II, Part
I, pp 662, 696-705, 710-
715, 717-720
579
Annex 428 Letter from the President of
Colombia to the President of
Chile, 18 November 1983
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Chile
601
iv
ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE NO Annex 429 Official Message from the Embassy of Chile in Peru to the General Directorate for Foreign Policy of Chile, 21 December 1983 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 605 Annex 430 Official Message from the Consulate General of Chile in Bolivia to the Directorate of Bilateral Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 26 June 1984 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 609 Annex 431 Minutes of the 2nd Plenary Meeting of the OAS General Assembly, 12 November 1984 (extract) (English translation) Organization of American States, General Assembly, Fourteenth Regular Session, OEA/Ser.P AG/Actas 200/84, 12 November 1984, pp 1-9 613 Annex 432 Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the General Committee of the OAS General Assembly, 15 November 1984 (extracts) (English translation) Organization of American States, General Assembly, Fourteenth Regular Session, OEA/Ser.P/XIV.O.2, 17 September 1985, Vol. II, Part I, pp 350, 368-372, 375-376, 380-382 623
v
ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE
NO
Annex 433 H. Muñoz, The Foreign
Relations of the Chilean
Military Government (1986),
pp 142-144 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
633
Annex 434 Draft Chilean-Bolivian Joint
Communiqué, 1986
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Chile
639
Annex 435 Speech of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia,
21 April 1987
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Chile, Memoria of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
for 1987, pp 25-28
643
Annex 436 Minutes of the 4th Meeting of
the General Committee of the
OAS General Assembly,
12 November 1987 (extracts)
(English translation)
Organization of American
States, General Assembly,
Seventeenth Regular
Session,
OEA/Ser.P/XVII.O.2,
14 November 1987,
Vol. II, Part I, pp 341, 351-
364
653
Annex 437 Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of
the General Committee of the
OAS General Assembly,
19 May 1992 (extracts)
(English translation)
Organization of American
States, General Committee,
Twenty-Second Regular
Session,
OEA/Ser.P/XXII.O.2,
1 April 1993, Vol. II,
Part I, pp 295, 299-309
667
vi
ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE NO Annex 438 Minutes of the 4th Plenary Meeting of the OAS General Assembly, 4 June 1996 (extracts) (English translation) Organization of American States, General Assembly, Twenty-Sixth Regular Session, OEA/Ser.P/XXVI-O.2, 30 April 1997, Vol. II, Part I, pp 79-83 681 Annex 439 Minutes of the 4th Plenary Meeting of the OAS General Assembly, 3 June 1997 (extracts) (English translation) Organization of American States, General Assembly, Twenty-Seventh Regular Session, OEA/Ser.P/XXVII-O.2, 5 June 1998, Vol. II, Part I, pp 155-156, 183-187 689 Annex 440 A. Ostria Gutiérrez, Notes on Port Negotiations with Chile (1998), pp 41-47 (extracts) (Original in Spanish, English translation) 697 Annex 441 Minutes of the 4th Plenary Meeting of the OAS General Assembly, 5 June 2001 (extracts) (English translation) Organization of American States, General Assembly, Thirty-First Regular Session, OEA/Ser.P/XXXI-O.2, 31 October 2001, Vol. II, pp 133-134, 140-144 713
vii
ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE
NO
Annex 442 Minutes of the 4th Plenary
Meeting of the OAS General
Assembly, 10 June 2003
(extracts)
(English translation)
Organization of American
States, General Assembly,
Thirty-Third Regular
Session,
OEA/Ser.P/XXXIII-O.2,
5 September 2003, Vol. II,
pp 127, 138-141
723
Annex 443 Note from the President of
Chile to the President of
Bolivia, December 2005
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Original submitted by
Bolivia as Annex 81 to its
Memorial
731
Annex 444 “Chilean Foreign Affairs
Minister does not exclude a
sovereign outlet to the sea for
Bolivia”, El Universal
(Venezuela), 16 April 2006
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Original submitted by
Bolivia as Annex 132 to its
Memorial
735
Annex 445 “Chile accepts to include outlet
to the sea for Bolivia in the
agenda”, Diario Libre
(Dominican Republic),
18 July 2006
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Original submitted by
Bolivia as Annex 135 to its
Memorial
739
viii
ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE NO Annex 446 “The surveys show that a high percentage of the Chilean population does not agree with the proposal ‘sea for Bolivia’”, El Mercurio (Chile), 24 June 2007 (Original in Spanish, English translation) El Mercurio (Chile) 745 Annex 447 Political Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 7 February 2009 (extract) (Original in Spanish, English translation) Bolivia, InfoLeyes, <http://bolivia.infoleyes.com/shownorm.php?id=469&gt; 751 Annex 448 “The Bolivian enclave that Piñera stopped” and “The formula that is most suitable for the President”, La Tercera (Chile), 5 December 2010 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 363 to its Reply 759 Annex 449 “Moreno and the enclave: ‘Alternatives that divide the country are not beneficial’”, La Tercera (Chile), 6 December 2010 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 364 to its Reply 787
ix
ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE
NO
Annex 450 “Bachelet offered 28 km to
Bolivia”, El Deber (Bolivia),
6 February 2011
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Original submitted by
Bolivia as Annex 143 to its
Memorial
793
Annex 451 Letter from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Chile to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, 8 November 2011
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Original submitted by
Bolivia as Annex 82 to its
Memorial
803
Annex 452 E. Silva Cimma, The Last
Patience (2012), pp 33-36
(extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
<http://www.xn--
pequeodios-x9a.cl/wpcontent/
uploads/2015/10/SIL
VA-CIMMA.pdf>
809
Annex 453 Statement by the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Chile, 67th
Session of the UN General
Assembly, A/67/PV.15,
28 September 2012, pp 37-41
(extract)
(Original in English)
United Nations,
<https://documents-ddsny.
un.org/doc/UNDOC/GE
N/N12/523/96/PDF/N1252
396.pdf?OpenElement>
819
Annex 454 Clarifications on History of the
XIXth Century Between Chile
and Bolivia
(Original in English)
Prepared by the
Government of Chile in
response to
BR Annex 373
825

Annex 416
A. Crespo Gutiérrez, The Treaties Signed with Chile in 1895 (1975), pp 43-47, 53, 58-62, 67-68, 71-73 (extracts)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
391
392
Annex 416
Annex 416
393
…
The report endorsed by a minority of the Commission members considers that the provision prohibiting the exploitation of the saltpeter deposits that might be found in the transferred zone “is outrageous;” it refers to “the degrading imposition that Bolivia should accept the Treaties without any modifications…”; it also states that the Treaties constitute “a cunning scheme whereby Chile intends to play its two rivals (Peru and Bolivia) off against each other.” The report suggests postponing any commitment until after the plebiscite agreed under the Ancón Treaty has taken place.
“If this (the plebiscite), says the document, is unfavorable to it, (Chile) undertakes to grant us the Vitor Cove from the Camarones Ravine, which it does not and will not own in such case, for the plebiscite comprises the former and the latter, that is, the entire territory of the provinces of Tacna and Arica; and it is in this case, and in case direct arrangements fail, that the Chilean nation agrees to provide us with an ANALOGOUS COVE… That Cove analogous to the Vitor Cove, as provided under the Treaty and which is enforceable against Chile only, is unknown, as are its dimensions, to the extent that the Treaty relegates this issue to a special protocol to be subsequently agreed.”
This report makes a number of considerations on the “spiteful and unreasonable interference by our Nation in certain affairs that are to be resolved exclusively between such Republic
43
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Annex 416
395
and the Republic of Peru,” without acknowledging the fact that the Bolivian Government based its stipulations on the outcome of a plebiscite organized by its neighbors.
In utter absence of any historical perspective, the report wonders: “Will it be beneficial to Bolivia to form a common cause with Chile, a nation hated by all our neighbors?” And, surely thinking of warlike alliances, the report states: “Chile will indeed advance along the path to progress. But Argentina and Peru will advance too…”
Rumors circulated that if no approval was given to the Treaties, Chile would invade the Bolivian territory. Childishly, the report asserts that “Chilean capitalists will not allow a new war that will close the Bolivian market.”
As a conclusion, the report endorsed by a Congressional minority in 1895 suggests postponing the approval of the Treaties.
“… in 1894, as argued by the minority members of the Commission, it was believed that the bases of the Treaty were the only ones that Bolivia could secure from its implacable victor: 1891, such short-sighted prediction was denied, for it was stated that such bases were likely to be improved in furtherance of the rights and aspirations of the Bolivian people. When the Iquique Pact was presented, it was believed also that the bases contained in it had been secured thanks only to the exceptional situation of the Republic of Chile, and, with the utmost good faith, it was ensured that the Iquique Revolutionary Government had consented to the broadest concessions in gratitude for the Bolivian Government’s executive order acknowledging the hostilities. In 1895, it was demonstrated too that the prediction of 1891 had been inaccurate, for under the May Treaties, without any domestic conflict taking place, a number of extra advantages in furtherance of the Bolivian interests have been secured.”
44
396
Annex 416
Annex 416
397
The report continues with its erroneous digressions, which are contrary to the opinions of our representative in Santiago, with the following arguments:
“Right now we can appreciate the progress made from the advantages obtained, which are attributed to the prelude to the rupture between the Republics of Argentina and Chile, is it not right to expect that during an effective, fierce international fight between these two nations appropriate opportunities will come along that will offer Bolivia a more promising future, or even full recognition of its rights?”
And the report adds this poetic phrase: “As regards this topic, it is more appropriate to trust in the triumph of Justice than in long-lasting violence and force.”
The report ends with this confused, not to say inane, paragraph:
“It is our obligation” -it says- “to consolidate the May Treaties amid the public opinion, because, if not a criterion, it is a force that underpins and defends international faith, to such an extent that, absent such faith, public authorities will find themselves in a vacuum, not to say the most disastrous antagonism. Let us put our best interest in finding a favorable advancement of the stipulations contained in the Treaties submitted to your sovereign decision, in order to secure Bolivia’s future, relying on domestic and international public order.”
There is a very typical attitude in our political circle, known as “covering your back.” The report endorsed by the Congressional minority in ’95 is likely to be motivated by such attitude. It does not want the May Treaties to be approved, but it does not categorically reject them either. It suggests consolidating the Treaties amid the public opinion, and “advancing” the stipulations of such treaties “in order to secure the future
45
398
Annex 416
Annex 416
399
of Bolivia.” Such phraseology is unbefitting of those who should have acted as statesmen, measuring the importance of such historical moment. How right Mr. Daniel Salamanca was as he said that such Congress, in discussing these Treaties, “showed a shameful lack of understanding of world reality.”Opposition lawmakers argued against the provisions of the Treaties, referring mainly to the fact that Bolivia was to cede its littoral in perpetuity, and would only receive by way of compensation a promise that Tacna and Arica would be handed over to it, provided the plebiscite agreed under the Ancón Treaty between Peru and Chile was favorable to the latter. In a leaflet published by Mr. Antonio Quijarro in 1897 under the title “Current Political Situation. The Cession of Tacna and Arica. The Treaties with Chile and Mr. Pando and Mr. Quijarro,” we find the following reasoning concerning the 1895 Treaties, that were the ones that he adduced during his speech in Congress: “The transfer of Tacna and Arica would not be made plainly and simply because, where appropriate, Bolivia would be obliged to pay, by way of compensation for the transfer, the sum of five million silver pesos in coins with a fine gold content of 25 grams and 9 tenths of fino, and specifically allocate 40% of the gross return earned by the Arica Customs Service to such payment.” Quijarro argues also that the cession of the littoral and the relevant territorial compensation “should have been set out in a single agreement and instrument, the one being an essential condition for the other and vice versa.” Underestimating the territorial cession offered, Quijarro says: “The importance of the Port of Arica has diminished considerably with the irresistible competition from Antofagasta. In order for Bolivia to be able to reap some benefit from those territories, it would be necessary for it to embark on the arduous venture of building a railway to La Paz, covering a distance of nearly 80 leagues. What would be the rent allocated to repaying the capital invested in such construction project? The return earned by the Arica Customs Service is trifling; and, in addition, it would be burdened from the start with 40% of the gross income demanded by Chile for making such transfer.” Quijarro even went as far as to say that there was “a sentiment of
46
400
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Annex 416
401
indifference (on the part of the negotiators) as regards legal and moral principles, by consecrating an adjustment between Bolivia and Chile over properties that are owned exclusively by Peru.”
The most serious comments made on the 1895 Treaties were based on the random compensation offered by Chile in exchange for the transfer made by Bolivia of its littoral. The delivery of Tacna and Arica depended on Chile’s success in the plebiscite. If adverse, it was compelled to deliver to us only the Vitor Cove or an analogous one. We should recall that the Ancón Treaty provided for the organization of a plebiscite on the territory bordering the Camarones Ravine and Camarones River to the south, i.e. it comprised the Vitor Cove. It is true that there were negotiations to reduce the area subject to the plebiscite, but there were no final agreements. The Tarata region, to the north of Arica, was only returned to Peru in compliance with the arbitration protocol executed in Washington by representatives of Chile and Peru, which led to the 4 March 1925 ruling by U.S President Calvin Coolidge. There, it was decided that the area that was to be the subject matter of the plebiscite was to border the Sama River to the north.
The possibility still remaining that Bolivia might only receive the Vitor Cove or an analogous cove, it was alleged in Congress that such compensation was insufficient and that it was necessary to determine with more precision what Bolivia was to receive as compensation for the handover of its littoral.
The other objections to the treaties referred to commercial aspects and financial readjustments, Chile wished to secure certain commercial advantages that kept the Bolivian market open to Chilean exports. Minister Gutiérrez proposed and obtained limitations on such privileges to a term of ten years.
…
402
Annex 416
Annex 416
403
IX
President Baptista, in his Address to the Congress delivered on 6 August 1896 when handing over power to the new President, Mr. Severo Fernández Alonso, discussed the treatment of the 1895 Treaties by the Congress. We selected some paragraphs from this Address:
…
404
Annex 416
Annex 416
405
Following the Government completion of its task by signing this last protocol, the Congress was in charge of approving or rejecting it, whether in full or in part, even if it was incorrect but accepted to a certain degree by Law, such as by means of a deferral.
However, a risk dismayed the Congress’ decency and patriotism; the possibility that, prior to reaching a solution, the Congress’ sessions were impolitely adjourned.
At such urgent times, the Honorable Plenipotentiary of Chile provided us with one more proof of the open and raised spirit of the negotiations for the service of his country and Bolivia, suggesting me to evoke, before the Council, the preparation of a protocol reproducing, establishing and sealing the statements included in the previous documents that were dispersed in the several formulas or untrusted minutes. And so it was done. I met in advance almost every non-formally-summoned Congressman with the purpose of stating my conviction as far as my frail health and almost vanished voice allowed me.
In this protocol, dated 9 December, the only possible action was to reproduce the terms that have been stated so many times or, at least, declare what was axiomatically in point implied from the international treaties.
406
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Annex 416
407
With reference to the protocol dated 30 April 1896, explanatory of the one of 9 December 1895, the Address states:
“The Government of Chile approved the protocol, but it then agreed to bring it to be discussed by the Congress. The national Government plainly informed you of the contents of this explanatory clause and presented to you, for a deliberation thereupon, the protocol of 18 May (1895), establishing the basis for the settlement of acknowledged credits”.
The last document was not sent for the consideration of the Congress together with the Treaties by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Cano “on his name and own behalf”, according to the Bolivian deputy in Santiago”. (9).
Minister of Foreign Affairs Cano was very active to convince the Chilean Government to accept the Protocol of 9 December. On 11 December, he sent a communication to Minister Gutierrez stating that:
“The severity of the situation to be created, together with the repeated instances, sustained for a long time, convinced Mr. Matta to sign the Protocol, a copy of which is attached hereto, and which, through your efforts, should be duly approved by such Government”. He further explained that “the Protocol does not contain modifications... It only includes a clarification of the different issues deemed as obscure or that were implicitly included in the treaties. If the Chilean Government is motivated by the true purpose of achieving peace in a frank and cordial manner, I believe it will find no reason of objection. I hope that you can crown your patriotic task, exercising efforts to get the aforementioned protocol immediately approved”.
The pressure exerted by the Bolivian deputy in Santiago to obtain Chile’s acceptance of the Protocol of 9
59
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409
December was only enough to make the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Barros Borgoño, accept this document with the exception of section 4, which, in his concept, “has a wide, vague and general meaning”. “Mr. Barros Borgoño, as informed by Minister Gutiérrez, has found no inconvenience in considering this clause; but he believes it is critical to specify its contents to meet the requirements of the Chilean Congress, which had to be informed, in his concept, of the aforementioned Protocol”.
It must not be forgotten that during the discussion of the Treaties by the Congress of Bolivia, Minister Gutiérrez warned, on several occasions, that the government of Chile would not accept modifications to the signed documents. This opinion was officially communicated by the Chilean deputy in Sucre, Mr. Matta. On 7 December, two days before the approval of the Treaties, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Cano, sent a telegram to the Bolivian deputy in Santiago stating as follows: “At 5 p.m., Minister Matta sent me an official letter with a transcription of the telegram of his government declaring any modification to the treaties as unacceptable. I replied with an almost exact copy of the communication sent to you by the Vice-President, adding “that the Government estimates that there are no modifications to the agreed bases nor an amendment with a resolutory condition; since it was Chile who declared the indivisibility of treaties and the second part regarding the definite cession follows from the aforementioned”. I state, in a note to Mr. Matta (continues the telegram): “If, at the moment of executing the treaties, any part thereof is left unfilled, the full agreement would be null, being this statement, and no other, the one repeated in the approval formula, declaration that follows from the unity of the treaties and it is intended to bring a happy conclusion to a precarious situation, by means of the settlement of a final peace sealing the aspirations of both nations”. The telegram ends instructing Minister Gutiérrez: “Seek authorization from the Government so Mr. Matta may accept the resolution formula of the Congress. Urgent response required. The Chambers
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411
shall vote on the issue on Monday 9th”. The mentioned resolution formula said: “the definite cession of the Bolivian littoral must be effective upon Chile’s delivery to Bolivia of the port referred to in the treaty and the protocol (of 18 and 28 May respectively)”.
At the last minute
, this resolution formula of the Chambers was replaced by the protocol of 9 December.
When Minister Gutierrez
informed President Baptista of his efforts to achieve Chile’s approval of this last treaty, Minister Gutiérrez, on a letter dated 14 January 1896, he states:
“My dear
colleague:
“With utter disillusionment I receive news on the grim incidents that followed the preliminary discussions on the peace Treaties, or rather their approval by our Congress, according to the information obtained from your letter dated the 26th day of the preceding month.
It is impossible to understand that Quijarro and Revollo managed to organize an opposing group by Mr. Quijarro and Mr. Revollo, with no other basis than sophism, with the intention of dissolving it as a soap bubble. It is hard to believe that someone aware of the facts has taken so seriously the contents of the protocol dated 9 December, which, apart from the sections repeating the Treaty, establishes a peremptory deadline of two years for Chile the delivery to us a port. I consider that such stipulation is doubtfully convenient. The vagueness in section 4° has raised some questions for Barros Borgoño, but he found that the reasons therefor fell within the spirit of the Treaty.
It was positive for the Treaties that fortunately Barros became the Minister of Foreign Affairs, because if Minister Matte (sic) had held office at that time, the Government would have relentlessly insisted in the absolute formula of “approval or rejection”. It is true that Barros agreed with his predecessor in considering that the different signals constantly and successively received from Bolivia were redundant
61
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413
and somewhat useless at the same time, and that they did not affect the May Treaties. Meanwhile, leaning in favor of his own work, he would not yield to his failure, accepting statements satisfactory to our anarchic Congress, with the condition, however, that the treaties remain unmodified.
“It calls the attention the effect that it caused in the Chilean public opinion the knowledge of them. Mr. Carlos Walker Martínez... told me: “I cannot understand how Bolivia has not received on its knees those Treaties”. Mr. Vicente Reyes, another enthusiastic contributor to this work, but moderate and quiet, said with astonishment: “the concessions offered to Bolivia are exorbitant”.
I am making reference to our enthusiastic friends: there are no reasons to invoke the opinions of adversary parties such as Senator Balmaceda, who stated that the May Treaties “were the worst treaties ever signed by Chile”.
Nonetheless, in the end, the treaties which were poor turned to be good as a consequence of the protocol, CONCEIVED OR SUGGESTED by the LIBERAL PARTY, i.e. by Quijarro...
I see you are very disappointed and I can see why”.
…
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415
XIII
As can be noted, this entanglement arose from the signing of the Protocol of 9 December. Here, it is worth wondering: Was Mr. Matta authorized by the government to sign this agreement? We may assume that he was since he continued leading the diplomatic representation of his country in Bolivia. If there was this authorization, was it given in good faith by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Barros Borgoño, or was it a trick to later circumvent the compliance with the three Treaties signed on 18 May? Another possibility involves a vague instruction sent from Santiago, with Matta exceeding the execution thereof. The fact that Minister Barros Borgoño challenged section 4º of the Protocol of 9 December from the beginning supports this thesis. In any case, if this was a trick, the Bolivian government easily fell for it.
Regardless of the explanation, accepting this imposition from the Congress was a serious mistake on the part of the Bolivia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If the government was confident of the benevolence of the agreements signed in May, it should have exerted all its influence to get them approved. Instead, Cano faltered and sought a way to please a Congress that furnished no solid arguments opposing the Treaties.
Mr. Daniel Salamanca, in his analysis of this historical fact, said some harsh words to those congressmen. “From my point of view —in the words of this illustrious figure—, the treaties obtained by Baptista in 1895 were the result of the ventures carried out in 1891 (the acknowledgment of the belligerence of the revolutionary parties during Chile’s civil war). These treaties, compared to that signed in 1904 may be considered as an extraordinary fortune. Yet, the Congress of Bolivia, raising a strong opposition, showed a pathetic lack of sense regarding the world’s reality. It was arrogant and demanded something that, to my sound judgment,
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417
could not seriously be offered. If the demands of the Bolivian Congress were not the cause of the failure of these treaties, they were at least a pretext to leave them in oblivion. Thus, that foolish recklessness from the government of Mr. Aniceto Arce was completely futile”. (10)
It is worth recalling that during the Chambers discussion of the Treaties, in November 1895, Minister Gutiérrez issued several communications to the government reflecting the criteria of Chile’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the approval of these agreements. He stated on a note: “The Minister of Foreign Affairs just told me, as final word from his Government, does not accept any modification to the text of the May treaties, and that any such modification shall be considered as an act of disapproval. These concepts were confirmed by the previous declaration on this issue, communicated by me in my letter No. 70 sent on the 1st day of last month. Furthermore, he insisted that any modification would lead to further ones by Chile’s Congress”.
Similarly, the Minister of Chile in Bolivia received a telegram from the Government of Chile, dated 18 November , with a copy delivered to Minister Gutiérrez with the purpose of being forwarded to his government. The letter read as follows:
“Even if that Government has given moral assurance that the treaties will be approved by the Congress, with a date close to the resolution, it is advisable that Your Excellency informs such Government of the possible consequences of a rejection, whether frank or dissimulated. While Chile will maintain every right acquired under the Truce Treaty in an immutable manner, as reinforced by the May Treaties, Bolivia will forever abandon the acquisition of an outlet to the Pacific Ocean, and also the political and economic support of Chile”.
…
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419
It is clear that the failure of the efforts for the simple and straightforward approval of the 1895 Treaties resulted from the pressure of liberal congressmen opposing the government, as well as from the weakness of the actions of the official-party majority, and the indecisiveness of the Minister of Foreign Affairs who, scared by the criticism to the agreements, signed the Protocol of 9 December, which actually shattered all negotiations.
Mr. Luis Barros Borgoño, in his book El Problema del Pacifico y las Nuevas Políticas de Bolivia (The Pacific Problem and the New Policies of Bolivia), stated as follows:
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“The preamble of the Treaty on Transfer of Territories of 18 May 1895 is clear and explicit. It says: The Republics of Chile and Bolivia, for the purpose of strengthening more and more the bonds of friendship which unite both countries and aware that a higher need —the future development and the commercial prosperity of Bolivia— require its free and natural access to the sea, have decided to conclude a special Treaty on the transfer of territory...”. (11)
The same book by Barros Borgoño read as follows: “On 31 December 1895, the Congress passed a law approving the three Treaties of 18 May 18 along with other two protocols of 28 May. From that moment onwards, the Chilean Government was willing to exchange ratifications, as well as to finalize the treaties executed within an environment of international reconciliation and friendship. The Bolivian Congress, however, failed to approve the Treaties as expected and it added a protocol modifying the agreement, incorporating an element of mistrust to negotiations”. Barros Borgoño adds that the Chilean Congress, when approving the Treaties on 31 December, was not aware of the protocol signed on 9 December in Sucre. Mario Barros, in his book Historia Diplomática de Chile (Chilean Diplomatic History), provides his own version of this episode: “When the Chilean Congress, during a secret session held on 12 January 1896, discussed the peace treaty with Bolivia, along with the 1895 additional protocol, the rage of the members of the Congress cannot be described”.
The Protocol of 30 April 1896 intended to save the treaties by explaining the document signed between Mr. Matta and Mr. Cano on 9 December, but failed to succeed. The Bolivian Congress approved this protocol, within the same environment of mistrust accurately described by Mr. Claudio Pinilla in his letter to Mr. José Vicente Ochoa. The same Government submitted to the Congress a proposal, which contained a suggestion to include, in the law approving the protocol of 30 April ,
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a subsection stating that “in the case provided for under section 4° of the Protocol dated 9 December, it shall be the responsibility of the Bolivian Congress to declare whether the port offered by Chile in substitution of Arica meets the conditions set by the protocol dated 30 April”. Vain stipulation. The Chilean Congress never considered neither the protocol of 9 December nor that of 30 April 1896.
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“Banzer claims Landlocked Situation, Not A Basic Condition”,
El Mercurio (Chile), 5 February 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
El Mercurio (Chile)
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Banzer Claims
Landlocked Situation, Not A Basic Condition

On Saturday he will meet the Chilean President
LA PAZ, 4 (AFP) The landlocked problem of Bolivia is not a condition to resume diplomatic relations with Chile, stated Bolivian President Hugo Banzer earlier today.
72 hours before meeting his Chilean colleague, Augusto Pinochet, General Banzer built a “silver bridge” for an exchange between the Ambassadors of both countries.
Banzer declared verbatim: “The maritime reintegration is not a basic condition for resuming relations.”
Bolivia and Chile interrupted their diplomatic relations not as a consequence of the landlocked problem of the country but rather for a dispute over the use of the River Lauca, shared by both countries.
In previous years, Bolivia had raised the landlocked situation as a prior condition for reestablishing diplomatic relations with Chile.
“GOOD WILL”
LA PAZ, 4 (UPI). Earlier today, President Hugo Banzer described the initiative by Chilean President Augusto Pinochet for both presidents to meet next Saturday at the Charaña border crossing, on Bolivian territory, as a “good will gesture”.
In a brief contact that the President had with the press, he expressed that the upcoming meeting with Pinochet would be informal, and last only a couple of hours.
He clarified that the invitation for both Presidents to meet was transmitted by President Pinochet to his Bolivian colleague, through the Bolivian Consulate in Santiago.
Banzer added that, in his invitation, the Chilean President referred to a desire to discuss a previous agenda.
The Bolivian President said he had accepted the invitation because he was convinced that international policy is better implemented through personal contacts.
In the official press there are no indications of who will accompany Banzer to his meeting with Pinochet. However, Minister of Foreign Affairs Alberto Guzmán and three Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, Generals
(Continued on page 8)
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Oscar Ariazola and Carlos Alcoreza, and Vice Admiral Javier Pinto Tellería will most surely be there.
CAUTION IN LA PAZ
LA PAZ, 4 (UPI). Today, the press cautiously commented on the official statement that the Presidents of Bolivia and Chile, Generals Hugo Banzer and Augusto Pinochet, will meet next Saturday.
The meeting was announced last night by the Press Secretary of the Office of the President, Mr. Javier Arce Villalba.
The morning press cautiously stated that the meeting could serve to establish an agenda for future discussions between the two countries, either through another presidential meeting or through high level special missions. He added that, in any case, they will search to resolve the existing problems between the two countries.
Morning newspapers highlighted the presidential meeting on their front pages and in big headlines, the second [meeting] between both Presidents in less than a year, even though the two countries have not had diplomatic relations for 12 years.
In response to the questions raised by journalists, Arce Villalba stated that the meeting would take place on the initiative of President Pinochet, who had sent an invitation to his Bolivian colleague.
Local newspapers speculate about the possibility that the meeting might serve/result/procure? the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between La Paz and Santiago, which were ruptured in 1962, as a result of a dispute between them over the use of the international waters of the River Lauca.
The Press Secretary of the Bolivian Government pointed out that the absence of diplomatic relations between the two nations was no obstacle for a presidential meeting, since Article 74 of the Treaty of Vienna provides for this possibility.
Banzer and Pinochet held a first encounter, which both sides described as informal, in Brasilia on 15 and 16 March 1974 when both Presidents attended the inauguration of President Ernesto Geisel.
Before that, two other meetings between the Presidents of Bolivia and Chile took place. They were held in 1955 between the late General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (from Chile) and former President Víctor Paz Estenssoro (from Bolivia), currently exiled in Lima.
IN ARICA
ARICA (Peter Woodbridge, correspondent). The trip by President General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte to this city has really worked up public opinion after being linked to two possibilities: the reinstatement of a free port and a significant meeting with the President of Bolivia, General Hugo Banzer.
As for the presidential meeting, let us recall the first announcement made by General Pinochet in that regard, when he visited the city shortly after 11 September 1973. After having being denied by some authorities, this matter was enquired yesterday by “El Mercurio” in La Paz. Consul General Rigoberto Díaz explained over the phone that:
“The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued yesterday (Monday) an official communication whereby it announced a meeting between Presidents Banzer and Pinochet to be held on 8 February in Charaña, a town next to the Chilean border which is home to the first Bolivian station of the Arica-La Paz railway.”
The Chilean President will arrive at the Chacalluta airport tomorrow morning at 10 a.m.
coming from Iquique, and he will be greeted by military and civil authorities as well as chiefs of service from that province. Upon his arrival, he will be formally welcomed by the honor department of the Rancagua Regiment.
A source shared some details of the trip with El Mercurio: “There is no knowledge of a possible return to the modalities of a free port. As part of its policy to maintain a market economy, the Government is trying as far as possible not to create monopolies nor privileges; but it is willing to drive regional programs to foster production, set development plans in motion, and grant the facilities that are necessary to consolidate a difficult economy. Within these margins, President Pinochet will surely bring good news to the people of Arica.”
The source also noted that “Arica is a very interesting location for the General, because deep down he knows it needs a strong incentive to stay productive and he has been very concerned with this issue.”
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Telegram from the US Secretary of State to the
US Embassy in Bolivia, 15 February 1975
(Original in English)
US National Archives and Records Administration,
<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=90952&dt=2476&dl=1345&gt;
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Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006 Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006 Message TextCONFIDENTIALPAGE 01 STATE 03526964ORIGIN ARA-10INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01 INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 AID-05 EB-07 OMB-01 TRSE-00 /061 RDRAFTED BY ARA/BC/B:MWCOTTER:BJDAPPROVED BY ARA:WDROGERSARA-LA/BC:JEKARKASHIAN --------------------- 045922O 150112Z FEB 75FM SECSTATE WASHDCTO AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATEC O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 035269E.O. 11652: GDSTAGS: PFOR, BLSUBJECT: BOLIVIAN AMBASSADOR CAPRILES' CALL ON-- ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS, FEBRUARY 14, 1975SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR ROBERTO CAPRILES CALLED AT HIS REQUESTTO DISCUSS MATTERS OF GENERAL BILATERAL INTEREST. HETHANKED MR. ROGERS FOR THE U.S. STATEMENT ON THE CHARANAMEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENTS OF BOLIVIA AND CHILE.CAPRILES THEN OUTLINED HIS VIEW OF BOLIVIA'S GEOPOLITICALPOSITION IN THE HEMISPHERE AND SPOKE OF THE NEED FORINTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN ACHIEVING HIS COUNTRY'S ECON-OMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT GOALS. HE ALSO ASKED FOR U.S.SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING IN BOLIVIA'S QUEST FOR A SOLUTIONTO ITS LANDLOCKED STATUS AND RAISED THE SECRETARY'S PLANSTO TRAVEL TO L.A. END SUMMARY.1. CAPRILES BEGAN BY THANKING ROGERS FOR HIS FEBRUARY 13STATEMENT TO THE PRESS ON THE CHARANA MEETING, NOTING THATIT WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED IN LA PAZ. CAPRILES SAID HEAPPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY TO SUMMARIZE FOR ROGERS HISVIEWS ON BOLIVIA'S ROLE IN THE HEMISPHERE. HE SAIDCONFIDENTIALCONFIDENTIALPAGE 02 STATE 035269BOLIVIA'S PHYSICAL SETTING BORDERING ON FIVE OTHER
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Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006 Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006 COUNTRIES GIVES IT A UNIQUE GEOPOLITICAL POSITION, THE FULLSIGNIFICANCE OF WHICH IS LIMITED AT PRESENT BY ITS ECONOMICAND SOCIAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT. HE SAID THAT THE RESOURCEBASE NECESSARY FOR DEVELOPMENT EXISTS IN BOLIVIA AND THATTHE GOB HAS THE WILL TO MOVE FORWARD BUT WILL REQUIRE THETHE ASSISTANCE AND SYMPATHETIC ATTITUDE OF THE USG ANDOTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. HE ALSO REFERRED WITH CON-SIDERABLE FRANKNESS TO THE NEED TO MODERNIZE BOLIVIA'SINSTITUTIONAL BUREAUCRACY.2. CAPRILES THEN REFERRED TO BOLIVIA'S SINGLE MOST IMPOR-TANT CONCERN: ITS LANDLOCKED STATUS. HE SAID THAT THISCONCERN IS A PRACTICAL RATHER THAN EMOTIONAL ONE ANDREFLECTS THE FACT THAT THE COUNTRY IS COMPLETELY DEPENDENTON ITS NEIGHBORS FOR THE TRANSIT OF ALL IMPORTS ANDEXPORTS. A REALISTIC SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM PROBABLYWILL NOT INVOLVE TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS BY ITS NEIGHBORS,SAID CAPRILES, ALTHOUGH MANY BOLIVIANS STILL SPEAK INTHOSE TERMS, BUT WILL INVOLVE PRACTICAL ECONOMIC ANDCOMMERCIAL FACTORS OF IMPORTANCE TO ALL THE COUNTRIES INTHE AREA. ANY SOLUTION WILL BE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE, HENOTED, AND WILL BE MANY YEARS IN THE MAKING. HE ACKNOW-LEDGED THAT ANY SOLUTION MUST BE WORKED OUT BY THECOUNTRIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED, BUT AGAIN, CITED THENEED FOR SYMPATHETIC ASSISTANCE FROM OR A "CATALYTIC"INPUT BY OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE U.S.3. ROGERS ASSURED CAPRILES THAT THE U.S. RECOGNIZESBOLIVIA'S IMPORTANCE IN THE HEMISPHERE, AS EVIDENCED BYOUR LONG, AND TRADITIONALLY CLOSE, RELATIONSHIP ANDTHE FORTHCOMING NATURE OF U.S. POLICIES TOWARD BOLIVIA.HE ASSURED CAPRILES THAT THE USG FULLY UNDERSTANDSBOLIVIA'S ASPIRATIONS AND IS PREPARED TO PLAY A POSITIVEAND SUPPORTIVE ROLE AT THE RIGHT MOMENT. WHILE NOTINGTHAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TAKE A LEADERSHIP ROLE,ROGERS PROMISED THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE AS IMAGINATIVE ANDHELPFUL AS POSSIBLE. HE EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO MAINTAINA CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH CAPRILES ON THIS AND ON OTHERSUBJECTS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. POSSIBLE RESORT TO THEWORLD BANK AND CIAP AS INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR FOCUS-CONFIDENTIALCONFIDENTIALPAGE 03 STATE 035269ING ATTENTION ON BOLIVIA'S PROBLEM WERE DISCUSSED.CAPRILES EXPRESSED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN PURSUING THEPROSPECTS OF UTILIZING CIAP.5. CAPRILES REFERRED TO THE SECRETARY'S PLANNED TRIP TOLATIN AMERICA AND ASKED WHETHER A STOPOVER IN LA PAZWOULD BE POSSIBLE. ROGERS NOTED THAT THE SECRETARY ONLYPLANNED TO VISIT THOSE COUNTRIES TO WHOSE FOREIGN MINIS-
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Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006 Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006 TERS HE HAD ALREADY MADE A PERSONAL COMMITMENT. HE ADDED,HOWEVER, THAT SINCE IT WAS LIKELY THAT CHILE AND PERUWOULD BE VISITED, THE SECRETARY WOULD BE FULLY BRIEFED ONALL PROBLEMS IN THE SUBREGION, INCLUDING BOLIVIA'S LAND-LOCKED STATUS. ROGERS SAID THAT WHILE A STOPOVER IN LAPAZ WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE ON THIS TRIP, HE HOPED THESECRETARY WOULD VISIT LATIN AMERICA AGAIN IN THE FUTURE.6. IN CLOSING, ROGERS REPEATED HIS DESIRE TO MAINTAIN AFRANK DIALOGUE WITH CAPRILES. HE RECALLED HIS LONGRELATIONSHIP WITH JULIO SANJINES, FORMER AMBASSADOR OFBOLIVIA TO THE U.S., AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT HIS RE-LATIONSHIP WITH CAPRILES WOULD BE AS CLOSE. INGERSOLLCONFIDENTIALNNN
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Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006 Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006 Message AttributesAutomatic Decaptioning: XCapture Date: 01 JAN 1994Channel Indicators: n/aCurrent Classification: UNCLASSIFIEDConcepts:FOREIGN RELATIONS, AMBASSADORS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, POLITICAL SITUATIONControl Number: n/aCopy:SINGLEDraft Date: 15 FEB 1975Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960Decaption Note: Disposition Action: RELEASEDDisposition Approved on Date: Disposition Authority: GolinoFRDisposition Case Number: n/aDisposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEWDisposition Date: 28 MAY 2004Disposition Event: Disposition History: n/aDisposition Reason: Disposition Remarks: Document Number: 1975STATE035269Document Source: COREDocument Unique ID: 00Drafter:MWCOTTER:BJDEnclosure:n/aExecutive Order: GSErrors:N/AFilm Number: D750055-0326From:STATEHandling Restrictions: n/aImage Path: ISecure:1Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750238/aaaabike.telLine Count: 128Locator:TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILMOffice:ORIGIN ARAOriginal Classification: CONFIDENTIALOriginal Handling Restrictions: n/aOriginal Previous Classification: n/aOriginal Previous Handling Restrictions: n/aPage Count: 3Previous Channel Indicators: n/aPrevious Classification: CONFIDENTIALPrevious Handling Restrictions: n/aReference:n/aReview Action: RELEASED, APPROVEDReview Authority: GolinoFRReview Comment: n/aReview Content Flags: Review Date: 03 SEP 2003Review Event: Review Exemptions: n/aReview History: RELEASED <03 SEP 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <15 DEC 2003 by GolinoFR>Review Markings: Margaret P. GrafeldDeclassified/ReleasedUS Department of StateEO Systematic Review05 JUL 2006Review Media Identifier: Review Referrals: n/aReview Release Date: n/aReview Release Event: n/aReview Transfer Date: Review Withdrawn Fields: n/aSecure:OPENStatus:NATIVESubject:BOLIVIAN AMBASSADOR CAPRILES' CALL ON -- ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS, FEBRUARY 14, 1975TAGS:PFOR, BL, US, (CAPRILES, ROBERTO), (ROGERS, WILLIAM D)To:LA PAZType:TEMarkings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006
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“Memorandum of Conversation”, Bolivia, 7 June 1976
(Original in English)
Foreign Relations of the US, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2,
Documents on South America, 1973 1976, Office of the Historian,
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d79&gt;
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28/2/2017Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976 Office of the Historianhttps://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976ve11p2/d791/9FO… RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–11, PART 2, DOCUMENTS ON SOUTH AMERICA, 1973–1976[Page 217]79. Memorandum of Conversation1Santa Cruz, Bolivia, June 7, 1976, 8:30–10:30 a.m.PARTICIPANTSThe United StatesThe SecretaryUnder [Assistant] Secretary RogersUnder Secretary MawAmbassador StedmanLuigi R. Einaudi, S/P—NotetakerAnthony Hervas—InterpreterBoliviaPresident Hugo Bánzer SuárezForeign Minister AdriazolaAmbassador CrespoInterior Minister Pereda2 othersBánzer: My English is Colonel’s English, not President’s English. I am sorry.The climate today is not normal. This is a hot land, but you have been greeted by a cold south wind.The Secretary: In the United States, a southwind means a warm wind.Banzer: Yes. Here it is the opposite.The Secretary: I have been very impressed by the foliage. It is very luxuriant.You have been in the United States?Banzer: Yes. I once spent 2½ years as Military Attaché in Washington. I also spent some time at Fort Knox.The Secretary: I am very pleased to be here in Bolivia.We think our relations are now quite satisfactory.Banzer: Yes. Your Ambassador here is in constant touch with our Ministers. He knows our sentiments well.The Secretary: I appreciate very much the opportunity to be here with you now and to underscore our interest.Rogers: I met President Banzer in Lima in December 1974, at the meeting of Ayacucho where the Andean countries signed an agreement on arms limitation.Banzer: Yes, some advance has been made on this point. But signatures on documents are not enough. We need to take more e1ective steps.The Secretary: What do you have in mind?Banzer: The solution of the landlocked status of Bolivia.The Secretary: Am I right that Peru has announced that it is ready to discuss the outlet issue?Banzer: A meeting has just taken place between Chile and Peru in Lima. They will meet again in Santiago at the end of the month. We hope that, once theyreconcile their approaches, it will be possible to reach a solution.The Secretary: We support Bolivia in its search for access to the sea. In Venezuela I spoke to President Perez about it. He agrees.Banzer: We know this is a di2cult matter. But we believe it is not an impossible one.
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28/2/2017Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976 Office of the Historianhttps://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976ve11p2/d792/9[P… 218][Page 219]It is of vital importance to Bolivia.It is vital because Bolivia’s geographic isolation makes Bolivia a very dependent country. This dependency in turn makes Bolivia underdeveloped, not onlyeconomically but emotionally as well.The Secretary: What I have seen of Bolivia so far does not suggest that you are emotionally underdeveloped. And I take it that although we are closer here tothe Atlantic, you are speaking of an outlet to the Paci4c.Banzer: Yes. Access to the sea from the Altiplano is very important to us, for many reasons.The Secretary: If you get access, you will have to build the necessary infrastructure.Banzer: There is already a road and rail communication from Bolivia to the Paci4c. And there is a port as well. It is not, however, in the area we wouldreceive under the Chilean proposal.The Secretary: Arica would stay Chilean?Banzer: Yes. We will have to build a separate port of our own, reach a trilateral agreement with Peru on the port, or conceivably even internationalize partof the city or the province itself.The Secretary: Would Chile agree to that?Banzer: We have not discussed that yet. But it would be convenient for Chile. If Bolivia were to build a separate port, Arica would su1er andperhaps even die. Ninety-4ve percent of the trade handled by Arica is Bolivian. As a practical matter, therefore, it would be advantageous for the Chileans toreach an agreement with us.The Secretary: Have you decided what territory you would give Chile in exchange?Banzer: No, not exactly. We are studying our frontiers now.The Secretary: Is there much population in the territory you would get from Chile?Banzer: No, very little. The lands are mountainous and desolate. They are empty and underdeveloped.The Secretary: In sum, you would say the current negotiations depend now on Peru?Banzer: It depends very much on their relations with Chile. But we believe that there is a very positive disposition in Peru to maintain good relations.We must realize that only a few years ago Bolivia’s return to the Paci4c was a dream. Now that our country knows it has great potential, to get to the Paci4chas become a precondition for our development.Let me give you a small example of the meaning of access. If a small farmer here in Santa Cruz needs an incubator, he will have to import it from theUnited States or Europe. It will be shipped to Arica. Then if a problem occurs at the pier or in storage, the Chilean Government has no interest in resolvingit. It is not Chilean cargo. There is a delay. Then the rail line is in bad condition. Suppose there are di2culties. Again, the same thing happens. Chile has noinherent interest in speeding up the shipment.The Secretary: But don’t you pay?Banzer: Yes, but trains normally have problems. One day can become weeks. Our poultry man will encounter losses and delays; his delays delay ourdevelopment day by day. People become discouraged by so many obstacles.Adriazola: The losses in storage have sometimes run to $650,000 to $700,000 daily.Banzer: But that is an economic issue. We believe access will have much greater impact by reducing tensions and even avoiding war. Because this has been afestering issue for nearly a century. In Peru generations have been dedicated to the idea of revenge. And the same happens in Chile, where the idea is todefend what they conquered in the War of the Paci4c.The Secretary: If Bolivia were between them, then war would be less likely.Banzer: Exactly. The existence of a corridor would force the invaded country to align itself with the other. That fact would a1ect any planningfor war and help to deter it.Our basic objective is to contribute to peace and to develop the area in an integrated manner with Peru and Chile.The Secretary: Would you get the railway?Banzer: Yes. And we would immediately seek the resources to improve it and the road, and to construct an airport as well.Also, our oil pipeline goes through the proposed corridor.There is no other solution. Any other solution would force Chile to divide its territory.The Secretary: But will Peru agree to the Chilean proposal?
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28/2/2017Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976 Office of the Historianhttps://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976ve11p2/d793/9[P… 220][Page 221]Banzer: It is possible that they will say yes, but it is likely to be conditioned.The Secretary: Such as—perhaps—water rights? Because I presume that Peru needs water for the desert areas on its coast.Banzer: A solution would bring bene4ts to all three countries.We are also concerned that without a practical, peaceful solution there could be other kinds of trouble. We are concerned, for example, that the Angolanexperience might be repeated here.The Secretary: Not a second time. We will not tolerate it. Cuba is permitted one military expedition a century.I know there are problems. Nonetheless, I think that your discussions are useful. I spoke to de la Flor the last time I was in Lima. He said that they wouldstudy the issue with care. But I didn’t get the impression that he felt an urgent need to bring the negotiations to a rapid conclusion. Am I wrong?Banzer: No, you are right. Chile’s attitude is better. Chile needs a solution to improve its image.The Secretary: I, too, think that Chile wants a solution. In February, I did not believe that Peru had made up its mind.Do you mind if I discuss this with de la Flor when I see him?Banzer: No, not at all. But we are concerned that Peru might misinterpret your interest and react adversely. De la Flor is touchy. I don’t know how the twoof you get along. I would not want him to take it as US pressure.The Secretary: No, de la Flor is a friend. I will not pressure him. I will ask what his intentions are.By accident, he was the 4rst Foreign Minister that I met after becoming Secretary of State. It was at the United Nations. He followed me in speaking at theGeneral Assembly. After hearing his speech, which was interminable, I met him and we talked. His rhetoric is worse than his performance.Banzer: Obtaining an outlet to the sea is one of the essentials of our policy. We have not, as in the past, made it a partisan issue in domestic policy. It issimply a question of vital national interest.The Secretary: You are clearly preparing for success by taking an active LOS role. Our delegates complain constantly at the activities of yours.Maw: No, as a matter of fact, the Bolivians have always taken very positive and constructive positions.The Secretary: Maw is our expert. He says your speeches are ferocious.Banzer: I think one way to cooperate on this outlet question would be to strengthen cooperation aimed at increasing the general development of the region.Both McNamara and Ortiz Mena have discussed these issues with us and know them well. The World Bank and the IDB could play an essential role incooperation for development of the region.This is a strong argument for Peru also. The area Chile o1ers us, which borders Peru, is very poor. But so is the Peruvian territory contiguous to it. A pole ofdevelopment would aid Peru as well.A good policy for you would be to support the development of this area. I think that this is something that the United States could do without raisingsusceptibilities.The Secretary: That we can do. It is relatively easy. I will speak to McNamara about it when I return to Washington. He is an old friend.Banzer: He knows the problem well. He has visited our countries recently.Even if we do not solve this problem, and obtain an outlet to the sea, we are sure the stability of Bolivia will not be e1ected.But if we fail, our people would then know that our country would continue to be an underdeveloped country. They would be very let down. There would beprofound internal resentment and some would seek revenge against those who refused to satisfy our needs.We do not want arms. We want the development of our country. We want peace.The Secretary: Do you think Peru will make a rapid decision?Banzer: No. I repeat, there are generations in Peru raised with the idea of revenge. We have a similar problem here. Many Bolivians were educated with theidea of reconquest. But, facing the problem with realism, we can see that we are in no condition to think in terms of revenge. There are still some who do,however. We can convince them. We have the moral authority to do so. They know we are not doing this just to try to stay in power.The Secretary: We sympathize. Many others in the hemisphere do as well.Banzer: We have reactivated support not only here but elsewhere. It is a useful weapon. I have spoken to many Presidents. They are committed to oursupport.The Secretary: What is Brazil’s position?Banzer: Full support. Brazil put me and Pinochet in contact for the 4rst time in Brasilia.
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28/2/2017Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976 Office of the Historianhttps://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976ve11p2/d794/9[P… 222]The Secretary: What do you think of Pinochet?Banzer: He is a man of decision. He has problems. But he agrees with us on the outlet. As soldiers, we have committed ourselves and our honor to asolution. The problem is Peru. They have their reasons. Let us not forget that in 1879 Chile invaded Peru, occupied Lima for two years, and committed manymoral outrages.The Secretary: Yes, I know. But Peru has no quarrel with Bolivia. They cannot object to a corridor for Bolivia on the grounds that it would stop theirpossibilities of reconquest from Chile.Banzer: If we could add a small port or international role for Peru to the corridor proposed by Chile, it would be a great monument to the will for peace.We believe that in Peru’s emotions, the future can outweigh the past.The Secretary: It should be tried. We will give you support in a delicate way, without arousing resentment.Banzer: The outcome would favor all three countries. But no one dares to admit it publicly. Chile wants to defend its territory. Peru wants more but knows itcannot get it. Bolivia cannot make the announcement because we do not want to upset either one. But it is a good solution.The Secretary: I will talk to Silveira tonight. What do you think?Banzer: Brazil is interested. Through us, Brazil thinks that it can gain access to the Paci4c. We see this very clearly.I have some other points as well.The Secretary: What do you think of Peru’s military buildup?Banzer: Yes, they have constantly increased their military preparedness. They are preparing revenge. They have obtained much Soviet equipment.The Secretary: Are they stronger than Chile?Banzer: In equipment. But Chile has better soldiers.The Secretary: Bolivia also.Banzer: Yes. But we do not want to be involved. If there is a war, we would be involved because there is only 120 kilometers width of coastwithout entering our territory. One division may be able to operate there, but not an army corps. One country or the other would have to use our territory incase of a con5ict. We would enter the war against the 4rst that had violated our territory for then we would then not only be landlocked but violated as well.The Secretary: You think war is possible?Banzer: Yes, if the problem is not solved as we suggest. We have begun three-way peace talks between the armies. But we do not believe in documents. Weneed acts.I think this is all we can say on this issue. The dynamics of our conversation have not enabled me to welcome you properly. Of course, I know the ForeignMinister did so already. I know he did so because I told him to. And I know he did so because I was there too last night—but as an ordinary citizen minglingin the crowd.The Secretary: I am touched. I did not know you were there.Banzer: Power is temporary, citizenship is permanent. As a Bolivian citizen, I did not want to miss the 4rst arrival of an American Secretary of State onBolivian soil. So, last night, I was there in the crowd, with my wife and children, to help receive you.I would like you to have a clear understanding of who we are. This is a government of the Armed Forces. We call it such because the Armed Forces have thefundamental responsibility of government. But we have the support of civilians as well. There are only 40 o2cers in the government compared tothousands of civilians. This is not a pre-eminently military government.We have clear goals. We seek national unity. Our geography conspires against unity. We have varied cultural origins. In the highlands, Quechua and Aymara,here in the lowlands, Guarani.We seek the physical, cultural and spiritual integration of our country. And we have done much. Here in Santa Cruz, before, it was di2cult for a man of thehighlands to survive. Now they are doing much, they are the promoters of growth.The Secretary: People from the highlands?Banzer: Yes, the majority of the new settlers here are from there.We want development because we have great potential. We now have 5½ million people in this country. We could support 50 million. We are rich inminerals. All forms of energy and raw materials abound.This wealth has long been dormant, awaiting better opportunities. Now is the time to take advantage of it.
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28/2/2017Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976 Office of the Historianhttps://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976ve11p2/d795/9[P… 224][Page 223]This development e1ort should be directed to help the human base, the peasantry. Then we will be a nation, not a collection of villages. And then we mustreturn to the sea.These are the objectives of the Bolivian people.The Secretary: We followed your coming to o2ce and your policies since with great interest. We want to help you as best we can.Banzer: Thank you. We do recognize the cooperation we have been receiving from the United States, but we are bothered by delays. Too often, opportunitiesare lost because of delays.There is a program worthy of mention in this connection. It is help for the Bolivian Government Agency for Community Development. It is directedprimarily to and by the peasantry. We have succeeded in changing attitudes.The US Government has helped, but we could use more help. We need permanent support in this regard.The peasant must also work for his own development. Before, the peasant always asked for everything from the government: he wanted schools, water,everything to be provided to him by the government, without his contributing anything. Now, through this community development organization, thepeasant contributes 1/2. The other the government provides, partly through its own funds, sometimes through external credits. This e1ort needspermanent support. There are similar programs, such as civic action of the Armed Forces, that work only with domestic resources.Programs seeking these objectives are giving good results. The e1ort our government is investing in the future is to change permanently the attitudes ofthe peasants by o1ering them the means of improving their own lot through low-interest, long-term credits. These are now 50–50. In the future, we wantthem to take the major responsibility themselves.The Secretary: What exactly can be done to help from the outside?Banzer: Bolivia needs roads, dams, schools, hospitals. Technical cooperation is essential to improve crop yields. The United States Government, through itsEmbassy, has been in constant contact with our o2cials and our e1orts. The Embassy works, but the results are slow.Ambassador Stedman: We have two development loans to Bolivia now, from AID.The Secretary: How long did they take to negotiate?Stedman: The 4rst loan took 18 months. The second . . .The Secretary [To Banzer]: Our AID bureaucracy is composed of junior professors who could not reform the United States, so they are dedicated toreforming the rest of the world. And their conditions are endless.Banzer: We believe that our development policies, with the support of private enterprise and others, can help us develop a great deal withoutsocial and political costs. The results go beyond what has been given.We can see the results in the stability and peace here in Bolivia. We are something of an island of peace within South America. There are no kidnappingshere. No crimes. Strikes last hours, not weeks.The Secretary: So that is why you are called underdeveloped! In these days no country can be self-respecting without kidnappings and populardemonstrations.Banzer: It could be that, in the past, our people were a bit intimidated. But we value politics. We have studied it. We will be developing a new politicalsystem by 1980. It will not be a traditional one. That gave bad results. We must 4nd a new political formula that will not repeat the errors of the past. Thenwe will have ful4lled the responsibility of the Armed Forces. We will then be able to continue to help our country, but without assuming directresponsibility for the nation’s course.This phenomenon is rather generalized. In our countries, the military are frequently obliged to assume power to rebuild the political situation.The Secretary: I know that in Chile the military had never interfered before. When they did, it was because they thought they faced an extreme situation. Weunderstand your problem.Do you get political science lectures from our representatives?Banzer: No.Stedman: There are no junior professors here.The Secretary: I remember what conditions were like in Bolivia when I 4rst came to Washington. Things have improved.I believe, sociologically, that the Armed Forces career is the one that is most open to talent. Is that so?Banzer: Yes, that is very true. But there are some other characteristics of government that must also be kept in mind. We know we must respect humandignity and freedom of the press. Sometimes freedom becomes libertinage, but we know freedom must be respected.
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28/2/2017Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976 Office of the Historianhttps://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976ve11p2/d796/9[P… 225][Page 226]The Secretary: If you lived in a city where the only morning newspaper was the Washington Post, I am not sure that you would be so favorable to freedom ofthe press.Banzer: I know, I lived there.The Secretary: They only write well about Rogers because he is a Democrat.Banzer: I also wanted to explain that we seek to link economic to social development. As the standard of living improves, the chances of peace also improve.In foreign a1airs, we believe that the international community must resolve its di1erences. Rich and poor countries cannot coexist at peace forever. The naked di1erences that exist now increase the danger of communism. We believe the industrialized countries should recognize the importance ofbetter prices for raw materials. Current patterns create permanent tensions.The Secretary: I agree with you. We have made a major e1ort in this regard. We have philosophical disagreements internally. Many of our people areinstinctive ideological advocates of the free market. Yet we cannot reject internationally what every government accepts domestically. We favor stabilizationof prices, but it is a slow process.If I may make a point, not aimed particularly at Bolivia, because many were involved. The confrontation at Nairobi helped our internal enemies. It lead to astupid two-vote margin which helped the enemies of cooperation for development. Bolivia abstained. Our friends must understand that we need help. Wecannot allow an unholy alliance between radical LDCs and US conservatives to kill development.Banzer: I would like to comment on the strategic tin stockpile. We believe it is adequate and that it should be maintained. But we do not believe it should beused as a strategic instrument to control prices. For us, it is hard to mine our mineral riches. Yet Bolivia is the only free world major tin producer. Anyvariation in price a1ects us greatly. And our ores are expensive to extract. Mining is the base of our economy.I repeat, I have no objection to strategic stockpiles as such. But I do not believe they should be used to regulate prices.The Secretary: We have no policy to regulate prices by manipulating strategic stockpiles. Nixon wanted to reduce the stockpiles. This was not aimed againstBolivia, of which he was an admirer. We have signed the Tin Agreement. I have made clear we do not want 5uctuations, particularly downward. [Turns toStedman] Is something being planned now?Stedman: There is no authority . . .Banzer: I hope you will not get new authority from Congress.The Secretary: Has any been requested?Stedman: Yes, but . . .The Secretary: Who is the Chairman?Stedman: Bennett.Banzer: This would have a major impact on Bolivia.The Secretary: They won’t have time. Fortunately, Congress has only 70 days left in this session, of which 40 will be spent studying the sexual exploits oftheir colleagues.Banzer: That is why democracy sometimes doesn’t work.In your UN speech you said technology should be part of the patrimony of humanity. We agree. Bolivia has a great need for technology. And yet wecontribute scienti4c know-how to the rest of the world. For example, there are more than 1,000 Bolivian doctors in the US. In Chicago alone, there is acolony. We train them at $30,000 a head. We get no compensation when they leave. We hope more could be done on this front.The Secretary: We agree. I discussed this very issue in Nairobi.Banzer: On another point, in Nairobi, it was agreed that development assistance should go to the neediest. But the lowest level do not give returns.Bangladesh continues, does not resolve its problems. Money will not solve their problems.I believe assistance should go to countries with high development potential. Bolivia has great food potential. That is the best help to give internationally.Assistance based on pro4tability. It is better to invest in productive areas and then to grant food so produced to those who cannot help themselves. We inBolivia will be wheat exporters soon.The Secretary: On the question of technical personnel and the brain drain, I have referred to this many times. I really don’t know how to solve it. We wouldbe interested in your ideas. Do you have some proposals?Your other point is interesting. Our attitude on foreign assistance is to give preference to countries in this hemisphere. Between Bolivia and Bangladesh, wewould prefer to give more to Bolivia.
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28/2/2017Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976 Office of the Historianhttps://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976ve11p2/d797/9[P… 227][Page 228]Banzer: I also have a point on the question of transnational corporations. Sometimes they disturb the morals of the people. They are not directly tied togovernments, but their attitudes a1ect the relations of host countries with the countries where the transnationals are headquartered. Here in Bolivia, forexample, Gulf is the United States. Popular opinion does not distinguish between Gulf and the US Government.The Secretary: We do not object to measures to control transnationals. Your major problem is to decide at what point controls become so burdensome thatthe parent company no longer feels it is worthwhile to compete. In the United States we believe there is some legal obligation not to have expropriationswithout compensation. But we also believe the company should meet international standards, and we are prepared to consider formalizing them onquestions of illegal conduct.Banzer: Could be. But the companies should behave better.The Secretary: We do not say that there should be no regulation, only that it should not discriminate against the companies.Banzer: Let us now turn to the drug issue.The Secretary: Yes, I was going to raise it.Banzer: We know Bolivia produces coca leaf that is in turn used to produce cocaine. We would honestly like to cooperate to neutralize the damage so caused.We have a narcotics control law. We are implementing the law. But we have few resources.To be e1ective, we have drawn up a plan. We must 4rst attack production (and here we have a substitution program, but coca is very pro4table, and wemust 4nd alternative incentives). Second, we must control the elaboration (but this is something that requires substantial means, such as helicopters, etc.)Cocaine can be manufactured anywhere. It is easy to make.The Secretary: You will not 4nd it with helicopters, if it is being produced in a private home.Banzer [Nods]: Then, thirdly, we must control sales and marketing. For this we need specialized and well-paid personnel.The Secretary: What do you need speci4cally to implement your program?Stedman: They have presented us a $50 million program over 4ve years.The Secretary [To Banzer]: Our bureaucracy is torn by con5icting emotions. They want to do something, but they don’t want me to do it.[Turns to Rogers] This has been going on long enough. I want to know from Vance exactly what he did in Colombia. I want a full report on the situation inBolivia, Colombia and Mexico. And I want to know, not what our people think they can get, nor what they think they can negotiate. I want to know what ourpeople think they need, not what they can get from OMB.[To Banzer] We will get in touch with you in a month.Banzer: We believe that $290 million worth of cocaine goes annually to the United States, causing death and other problems. We should be in a position todo something.Rogers: It would certainly help our balance of payments.Banzer: We want to help you. We do not have the resources to do all we want.The Secretary [To Rogers]: I want an answer by opening of business on Monday. Have Vance send the answer to me through Eagleburger.[Turns to Banzer] We will be in touch within a month with our preliminary ideas.Banzer: I would like to send my greetings through you also to President Ford and to the American people and my special congratulations on yourbicentennial.The Secretary: I would like to thank you also, in the name of President Ford. This has been a very useful conversation. We will do our utmost torespond positively.Banzer: I agree. I think it is possible that we have saved tons of paper and years of negotiations.The Secretary: I believe anything can be solved in two hours. The problem is to terrorize the bureaucracy so that it will 4nd the two hours.1. Summary: Assistant Secretary Rogers, Ambassador Stedman, Secretary Kissinger, and President Banzer held a wide-ranging discussion of U.S.-Bolivian relations.Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820118–1270. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Einaudi on January 18, 1977, and approved in Son March 7, 1977. Brackets in the discussion are in the original. The meeting was held in President Banzer’s home. Kissinger visited Latin Americafrom June 6 to June 13. In a May 26 memorandum, Rogers briefed Kissinger for his meeting with Banzer. (Ibid., ARA/AND Files, Records Relating toBolivia, 1976–1978: Lot 78D46, POL 7, Kissinger Visit) In telegram 4516 from La Paz, June 9, the Embassy sent a summary of Banzer’s narcotics
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Report from Gregorio Amunátegui Prá to the President of Chile, October 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Personal records of Gregorio Amunátegui Prá
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REPORT
To : His Excellency the President of the
Republic of Chile.
From : Gregorio Amunátegui Prá.
Subject : Commission in Bolivia.
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1.
Meeting with President Banzer
The audience I had been granted by the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Monday, 27 September had to be postponed until the following day in the afternoon, as the President has been visiting the Garrisons located in the interior of the country for a week.
The meeting in question was thus held on Tuesday 28 September at 8:00 PM –two hours after his arrival in La Paz– at his office in the Quemado Palace.
I attended the meeting accompanied by our Ambassador Rigoberto Díaz. The President received me alone and with great cordiality.
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After having been introduced by the Ambassador, I immediately addressed the matter and stated:
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That I was the bearer of an affectionate greeting from the Chilean President who sent him “a hug from soldier to soldier”;
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That my visit was on account of your wish to maintain direct contact with him, through Special Envoys, where the circumstances made it advisable; without prejudice to the permanent activity of our Ambassador to La Paz;
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That within this framework and following special instructions, I wished to convey him your concern over the current status of the Chilean-Bolivian negotiations aimed at giving Bolivia a sovereign outlet to the sea. That such concern was centered on three basic points:
1)
Bolivia’s lack of explicit acceptance of the territorial strip offered by Chile;
2)
The failure to determine the territory Bolivia would offer Chile in compensation; and
3)
The fact that the Bolivian petition for an “Enclave” still subsisted, despite Chile’s express rejection of that petition at the time it was made, rejection that was subsequently reiterated on several occasions.
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Continuing, I explained to the President that the lack of definition in the aspects above-mentioned placed our Government in a difficult position in the bilateral conversations maintained with Peru, for the third round of which it was necessary to arrive with concrete proposals, both for reasons of form and substance. This lack of specificity would only undermine our negotiating position, because it would demonstrate a basic weakness in the negotiation itself with Bolivia, which would without a doubt encourage the Peruvian sector opposing the Agreement to delay its resolution and/or to make suggestions which Chile would find completely unacceptable. The subsistence of the “Enclave”, in the terms of the negotiation, could even lead to the failure of the entire negotiation, as Peruvians would obviously be inclined for this alternative, which is absolutely and completely unacceptable for our Government, since it would break the continuity of the territory, as was expressed from the beginning.
Additionally, I argued that the existing lack of definition in these conversations was, in your judgement, even more regrettable if one looks at the present international scene, which combines a perfectly planned communist Soviet offensive against our Governments, tending to destabilize them, with complacency and passivity, and lack of leadership, of most large countries in the western world. In view of this specific circumstance, our mission was to solve the circumstantial problems which tended to divide military Governments with a common philosophy and to advance, jointly and decidedly, towards formulas that would allow us to fight subversion and favour the social and economic development of our peoples.
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- Having attentively listened to my exposition, President Banzer stated that he would address, in order, each of the points which preoccupied his friend the President of Chile:
a) Strip of territory to be ceded by Chile.-
Bolivia’s delay in replying with regard to the territorial strip offered by Chile in the North of Arica, in the terms of the Note of 19 December 1975, has followed from – according to the President –“not an essential disagreement, but [because of] the studies which the National Maritime Council (CONAMAR) had to conduct on the matter. Said studies (approximately 147 in total) have already been finished”.
The President added that, in general terms, Bolivia is interested in a strip with the widest beachhead possible. In this respect, he mentioned that the beachhead on the strip offered is small; and that, on the contrary, in some places of its interior it would not be necessary to count on its entire extension. He even mentioned that perhaps in the future he could conduct efforts to obtain an additional adjacent strip on the Peruvian coast with the Government of Peru.
But he reiterated that, in any case, the lack of express communication on this matter had been exclusively due to the fact that his Government had wanted to have a comprehensive study on it.
In relation to these observations by the Bolivian President, I allowed myself to point out to him that the coastal area of the strip offered had a length of approximately 8,200 meters, which could be favorably compared to that of the Port of Arica, with an extension of only 1,575 meters. That the installations of this Port —entire and efficient— were only currently being used in one third of its installed capacity, so that Bolivia had at its disposal a very large capacity for its additional needs.
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That, to a greater extent, modern technology made it possible to load and unload certain products — oil, for example — while the vessel was far from the port, which made things even easier. And that, in any case, Bolivia would have a strip with a coastal extension over five times greater than that of the Port of Arica, where it could place the port installations it deems necessary. All this, together with the extensive existing facilities in the ports of Iquique and Antofagasta.
To this, the President replied that Bolivia’s problem was not so much the construction of a port but, rather having “the possibility of a wider access to the ocean.” That the matter had emotional roots. “I know” — he said — “that you hold that the urban limits of the city of Arica are in the proximity, but I believe there is still a stretch of land between the current boundary line of the strip and the city, which would make it possible to widen the area and present the exchange issue in a more favourable light for my country’s public opinion.”
But he added - “I reiterate that there is no disagreement as to the essentials and that, our studies having been concluded, we may discuss other aspects shortly and move forward.”
b) Exchange. –
President Banzer pointed out that this was one of the most delicate issues in the negotiation, which is why he had ordered very advanced studies to locate and define the exchangeable territories, both from the CONAMAR and a group of experts from the private sector known as PEGASO, that was constituted for that precise purpose.
The studies are concluded and the Government has already adopted a criterion regarding the possibilities of exchange. They basically agree on compensating Chile for the territory that it cedes. They understand that it is within the exclusive power of Bolivia to indicate this territory.
To the above, I replied that in the same way Chile had indicated the strip, we believed that it was for Bolivia to indicate the one for exchange. I added that what we had requested was that that territory
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was on the border, unpopulated and with water resources, and could be constituted by a continuous strip or of different portions. And that its surface should be, in any case, equivalent to that ceded by Chile in terms of land and sea.
To this, the President answered that he understood Chile was only claiming compensation for the territorial sea and not for the patrimonial one.
I replied that this was accurate. That, in the beginning, we had requested to be compensated for what was effectively ceded in continental territory, territorial sea, economic zone, and the corresponding continental shelves. That, by a special act of deference to his Government, we had excluded the maritime economic zone and agreed on the territorial sea —and its continental shelf— subject to the dimensions internationally in force at the time of signing the Agreement.
I then added a series of relevant background in order to underscore the importance of the cession made by Chile in this regard.
The President replied that he was aware of that and that he had made it public during his tour to the interior of the country.
With regard to that [tour], he explained that its main objective had been to inform the Armed Forces of the Nation about this aspect of the negotiation.
And that, through the conversations maintained, he had found two basic positions: i) the majority, constituted of the officers who understood that Chile would not cede a territory “in exchange for nothing”; and ii) of those – a minority – who argued that Bolivia should not cede any part of its territory.
The above, he added, reveals that it is absolutely necessary to start a campaign intended to illustrate to public opinion — and reinforce the criterion of the officers from the Armed Forces — about the convenience of and need for the exchange. He added that this campaign would be undertaken by the CONAMAR shortly and that, once concluded, he would convene “a meeting of notables” in Cochabamba to make a final statement about this matter.
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“These are the people who gave me the mandate to obtain a sovereign outlet to the sea for Bolivia. I have obtained it under conditions I deem fair in times of peace. If they accept the terms that I convene with Chile, perfect; if not, the historical responsibility of their rejection and the failure of the negotiation will lie with them, as the President of the Republic would have presented them with the only feasible solution through peaceful means…”
c) Enclave. –
The President immediately proceeded to refer to our observation about the inadmissibility of the reiteration of Bolivia’s request for the cession of a sovereign territory of 50 kilometers of extension along the coast and 15 kilometers deep, in appropriate areas to be determined, alternatively, in the proximity of Iquique, Antofagasta, or Pisagua.
In this regard, he pointed out that this request had not initially been made as an alternative to the strip located to the north of Arica but “as a whole, given the limited size of the coast of the strip near Arica.”
To this, I reiterated my previous remarks about said coastal extension.
Then the President — without any further analysis on this matter — added that the idea of this “enclave” had emerged, at the same time, “as an emergency solution in the event Peru did not consent to Chile’s cession of the territory to the North of Arica.”
This observation led me to reiterate that I considered such strategy very dangerous as the enclave was absolutely and completely unacceptable for Chile.
I added that some sectors in Peru would obviously realize that and would be encouraged to promote it, in order to make the negotiation fail.
Then, I asked him in your name not to continue insisting on it, as such petition would put you in an impossible situation.
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The President answered that the Chilean Government’s position on the matter “carried, in his view, weight,” and that he would reflect on it and would give the corresponding instructions to Minister Adriázola for his forthcoming meeting with Minister Carvajal in New York.
d) Peru.-
He then expressed that he was afraid that “Peru — whose armed forces had been educated with revenge for generations — would pass the ball back again to Chile manifesting, for example, that it would agree to the cession of the territory offered by Chile, but as long as [Chile] did not request compensation from Bolivia.”
I answered that everything was, of course, possible; but that a position like the one described would be “ultra petita”, lacking any legal basis, and clearly demagogic, which would in no manner favour Peru’s international image.
The President agreed with me, but added that he was worried that Peru would be precisely in a demagogic disposition, adding that he was concerned over the growing Peruvian arms build-up. “For a country that is in a difficult economic situation, to allocate large amounts of money to the acquisition of weapons reveals plans for war”. In this regard, he recalled having told you in Charaña that President Velasco Alvarado had once told him that “Peru would welcome any agreement Bolivia might reach with Chile in order to find a solution to its landlocked status provided such solution would be reach in territories that had not been Peruvian because these would be reconquered”. He added that President Morales seemed to be different but that he did not trust him yet. That he was wary “of the Peruvian hypocrisy…”
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e) Demilitarization of the strip. –
Afterwards, and always with respect to the military aspect, he pointed out that his country had positively welcomed the Chilean suggestion according to which the demilitarization issue would be solved through a Declaration, whereby Bolivia undertakes to maintain in the strip only the forces necessary to express its sovereign presence and guarantee security, all to avoid sensitizing Peru.
I replied that, among other things, the suitability of having this issue as the subject of an unilateral declaration by Bolivia had been considered, which would be the most convenient thing for his Government and would give it a greater international boost.
Expounding on the same aspect, I expressed that perhaps that Declaration would be the precise historic opportunity not only to announce a minimal military presence on the strip, but to formulate a call for Peace in all the American Continent. That his Government had, in our opinion, clean title thereto. That the important thing would be — should we agree on an initiative of this nature — to maintain confidentiality until the Declaration and the continental call are made public. That is until the moment when the relevant Agreement with Chile is signed.
I added that this would be a strong and pragmatic answer to his concern over Peru’s arms race and possible war plans. And that, in that event, they would end up in a very delicate position — “virtually trapped in its own net” — as the Peruvian President himself, General Morales, had stated Peru’s profound peaceful vocation before the entire foreign diplomatic service accredited in Lima at the reception the latter offered to the President at the Country Club of Lima on 24 September.
President Banzer heard these observations with special attention, and a bit of surprise, as if he had seemingly never entertained a possibility such as the one raised; then, he told me that he found this suggestion very interesting, that he was thankful for it, and that he would give it careful consideration.
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f) River Lauca. –
Then, the Bolivian President – to conclude the issue of the “differences”– proceeded to address the issue of the use of the waters of the Lauca.
He said this was a very delicate matter for his country “because such waters led to the rupture of relations with Chile.”
He added that his Foreign Minister had an interesting idea regarding the issue which he requested me to discuss with him the following day.
g) Conclusions. –
Continuing, to sum up what was discussed, the President requested that I let you know that he had taken due note of your concern — which he considered both justified and worthy of consideration — and that he would proceed to study, together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the CONAMAR, a way to accelerate the negotiation as much as possible. And that, in view of the fact that the third round of conversations between Chile and Peru would be held next November, he believed it convenient “to establish a calendar — a schedule — of the Chilean-Bolivian deliberations in order to achieve concrete, significant progress with regards to the matters of concern to President Pinochet, before the round in question.”
He told me that he was very satisfied with the meeting as he had realized that between the two countries “there were no substantial differences but rather issues of form, by definition capable of settlement through ad hoc conversations.”
h) South Cone. –
When it seemed that the meeting was going to end, President Banzer mentioned that an idea, which he had entertained for a while, was emerging as a result of my preliminary affirmations as to the identity of goals of the military regimes that emerged as a consequence of the crisis of traditional liberal democracy.
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In this regard, he pointed out that he was quite concerned over the matter and that he had thought that, in order to define objectives and analyze common problems — with respect to both subversion and a possible political model to be developed in lieu of the traditional democratic form — perhaps “it would be convenient to convene a meeting of Presidents with similar ideas. Among which I include — in addition to Bolivia and Chile — Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay. I think Ecuador might be interested in a meeting of this nature… and perhaps even Peru.”
For my part, I replied that perhaps including Peru might be inconvenient or, in any case, premature, in view of the considerations he had earlier expressed. But that in any case, I personally believed you would be very receptive to this idea.
The President asked me to let you know about his concern and to request you I communicate to him your reaction to it. That he would make this same suggestion to Argentine President Videla during his next visit to La Paz.
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He then gave me two copies of his speeches for “his friend General Pinochet,” he thanked me for my visit, reiterating how pleased he was with the common ground found by both Governments, and asked me to send you his regards and his best wishes for the success of your Government.
When we left the Quemado Palace, it was 9:50 PM. The meeting with President Banzer had lasted, very uncharacteristically — according to Ambassador Rigoberto Díaz — 110 minutes.
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2.- Meeting with Foreign Minister Adriázola. –
The following day — Wednesday, 29 September — I had a two-hour meeting with Bolivian Foreign Minister Oscar Adriázola at his place of residence, in company of Ambassador Díaz.
The Foreign Minister stated that the President had been very pleased with the meeting held the day before and had convened a Committee of Ministers to analyze what was addressed and to speed up the negotiation. He added that he saw with optimism its development and his future conversation with his colleague Foreign Minister Carvajal, as he entirely agreed with the President in the sense that the differences between both countries are only ones of form.
Then he specifically referred to the waters of the Lauca and told me that the Bolivian technicians advocated a scheme of joint use. He did not give me any details about the particular issue, agreeing both that this scheme would be one of the topics of the next talks between the Foreign Ministries.
For my part, I reaffirmed Chile’s position. That is that our Government was only interested in making full use of the waters generated on Chilean territory, which, in practical terms, would entail improving the intake to a level of approximately 2 cubic meters per second. This would in no manner affect the existing level for Bolivia, estimated at 8 to 16 cubic meters per second.
Afterwards we proceeded to discuss our suggestion as to the possibility of Bolivia making a call for peace in the hemisphere, with regard to which the Foreign Minister showed great interest.
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Finally, he expressed he was glad he would meet Foreign Minister Carvajal in New York, where he expressed he was confident he would be able to set a calendar or schedule to make substantial progress in the negotiations. In this regard, I stressed that it was our belief we should hold the third round of Chile-Peru conversations with a concrete position on the matters which were points of concern for the President of Chile. The Foreign Minister expressed that he personally agreed with this.
[Signature.]
Gregorio Amunátegui Prá
Santiago, October 1976. –
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“The National Maritime Council Speaks Out: The exchange
of territories is the only realistic solution for Bolivia”,
La Tercera (Chile), 1 November 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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Today, the National Maritime Council (CONAMAR) urged Bolivians to accept the exchange of territories with Chile as the only realistic solution to the landlocked status of this country, and revealed that great progress has been made in binational negotiations.
In the first document that CONAMAR published since its creation at the beginning of this year, it expressed that the negotiations with Chile are being conducted “within a framework of respect for national dignity.”
“The current conditions to reach a port solution will not arise again in a long time,” expressed CONAMAR, an entity formed by international diplomacy experts.
“The dilemma for Bolivia is blunt: to
continue to be a landlocked country for an indefinite period of time, which cannot be prolonged any longer, or to firmly move towards a definition that is for now the most real and practicable, despite the pessimistic voices, which are always out there,” the document affirmed.
“Missing this opportunity, we will have to resign ourselves to indefinite dependence and let this free transit servitude keep us in a harmful
situation,” it said.
“There is no mutilation, but an exchange instead. We will hand over a particular extension and will receive another one of the same extension, gaining access to the sea,” the document added.
“If we think of the exchange it is because there is no other alternative at the moment. Another solution could be war; however, it would be convenient to ask ourselves calmly and dispassionately if we are in a position to
trigger a conflict when neither human nor material resources are available to us,” CONAMAR stated.
It further said that “our negotiators have managed to modify some Chilean proposals. Now, we are not speaking about 200 miles but three (nautical) miles.
“There is no pressure either on the demilitarization of the strip of land, since it will be under our sovereignty.”
La Tercera
1 November 1976
THE NATIONAL MARITIME COUNCIL POINTS OUT
Exchange of territories is the only realistic solution for Bolivia
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Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile to the Minister
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481 Santiago, 7 April 1977
Mr. Minister,
Building on my encrypted telex Nº 91, I am hereby expanding on the terms of the meeting I held last 1 April with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Vice-Admiral Patricio Carvajal.
The meeting started at 5:00 p.m. I was accompanied by this Mission’s Minister Counsellor, Augustin Saavedra Weise and by Press Advisor, Alfredo Valdes Loma, responsible for taking notes. For his part, the Foreign Minister welcomed me accompanied by the Director General, Commander Jaime Lavin and a stenographer.
I began the conversation by stating that during my recent trip to La Paz, I received instructions to request from the Chilean Government a clear position in the face of the situation created between this country and Peru, after the former rejected the Torre Tagle proposal; and to ask the Government of Chile how this circumstance would mark the future of the maritime negotiation and how Chile plans to carry forward its conversations with Peru.
I also stated that the recent visits to Santiago by senior officials from Peru were certainly proper to address issues as important as the ones mentioned. I added also that the growing delay that affects the port negotiation is creating an atmosphere of concern in our country, inasmuch as stagnation discourages the public opinion.
The Foreign Minister replied saying that the recent visit paid by the Peruvian War Minister, General Arbulu, was consideration for the visit paid last year by the Chilean Defense Minister, General Brady and that “nothing” had been discussed in regard to Bolivia, for the conversations were restricted to strictly military issues.
Despite the fact that it is difficult to believe that two senior representatives of military governments did not address such a transcendental matter for the South Pacific, as is the case of Bolivia’s landlocked condition, I accepted Admiral Carvajal’s explanation and continued, noting that since Chile had subjected the outcome of the negotiation to the fulfilment of letter “n”, of number 4 of its response of December 1975, Bolivia insisted in its desire of knowing what steps
Chile proposed should be followed in the immediate future.
…
To His Excellency
Oscar Adriazola Valda
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship
La Paz, Bolivia
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The Foreign Minister commented that –in his view– the situation “has been complicated” by President Banzer’s rejection of the condition for an exchange of territories, uttered in his message of December 1976. He added that “the position of the Bolivian President has caused the negotiation to be more sensitive than the Peruvian response itself”. He then reminded me that the negotiation has been progressing “word by word” and “painstakingly”. He then added that each aspect of what has been agreed to bears “a lot of significance” and that Chile is concerned over Bolivia’s public request that the condition for exchange of territories be eliminated, given that the latter is an essential negotiation requirement inasmuch as Chile cannot accept the idea that its territory could be reduced in size as a result of the agreement reached. He reminded me also that the condition for exchange of territories was established from the very beginning of the conversations with former Ambassador Gutierrez Vea Murguia.
Building on his explanation, the Minister said that there is “misinformation” in certain Bolivian circles, because the idea is not to “mutilate” anyone, but to achieve a solution to the problem without territorial loss for any of the parties. He mentioned again the exchange of 1907, made to amend the border and said that “at that moment, no one spoke of dismemberment”. Finally, he reiterated, “the negotiation must come to a conclusion with Bolivia and Chile keeping the same territorial proportions with which they commenced processing the agreement”. Attention must be paid to the fact that in this statement, Chile is implicitly accepting that the eventual exchange of territories be made only in relation to territory, without contemplating marine waters, as this Embassy informed Your Excellency in due course.
After Foreign Minister Carvajal’s lengthy explanation, I responded emphasizing that his mention of General Banzer’s message was fitting, for it allowed me to clarify its scope. I explained to him that this was an imaginative formula intended to overcome the “impasse” created by the exchange of Chilean-Peruvian memorandums. I reminded him also that what had been stated created a new scheme and that, in this context, Bolivia defined its position, precisely with the purpose of presenting a formula that balances the interests of the Parties. Likewise, when President Banzer proposed that Chile eliminates its condition for the exchange of territories and that Peru amends its thesis on shared sovereignty, he sought to create the proper conditions for the Chilean-Peruvian talks to be resumed, a requisite which –as has been evidenced– is essential for the negotiations to be successful.
In the internal sphere –I continued– President Banzer has had to bring together the state of mind of the Bolivian people, in the face of the prolonged port negotiation and its current critical state, which had resulted precisely from the absence of a “prior agreement” between Peru and Chile, so the latter may dispose freely of the territory offered to our country. Initially, the national public opinion considered that the solution to Bolivia’s landlocked condition would be processed rapidly. For reasons that are even of public knowledge, that did not happen and the growing skepticism of some spheres of the public opinion in regard to the final outcome of the negotiations had to naturally result in a rejection to the exchange, due to the uncertainty surrounding Chile’s competence to cede the territory subject to the exchange.
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Thus, the path proposed by President Banzer cannot be regarded as an expression of “Bolivian inconsistency”. It is the reflection of a situation that has been created and that is alien to our will. I reiterated that Bolivia, by replacing the conditions that limit the negotiation, has proposed a contemporary and expedited proposal that is filled with concrete possibilities to create a prosperous joint development pole in an area which is at present characterized by its state of inactivity.
Foreign Minister Carvajal interrupted my explanation stating that, “Bolivians must understand that Chile cannot sell territory”. I replied that it was not a matter of “selling” but of obtaining a just solution for the Bolivian problem. Thereafter, I said that in the current state of affairs, there are two alternatives: either Chile obtains the agreement with Peru to continue negotiating the proposed territory or, solutions will have to be sought in a perimeter exogenous to the one delimited by the Treaty of 1929. In the first case, the negotiation must be Chilean-Peruvian, since Bolivia was not a Party in 1929; in the second one, it would be a matter of an arrangement between Chile and our country.
Minister, I did not mention a third possibility, a tripartite meeting, because it had not been included into the instructions, but obviously this is a perspective that could be explored.
The Foreign Minister asked whether our country had considered other formulas. Among them, he mentioned the possibility that Bolivia gives Peru Tacora Volcano, along with other resources that could be subject to a negotiation with Torre Tagle. He added that since Bolivia has great reserves of sulfur and since Peru is in need of this mineral, these alternatives could serve to discuss with Lima the enlargement of the maritime front of the corridor proposed initially.
In the face of Minister Carvajal’s insinuation of the possibility of a joint Chilean-Bolivian presentation of a new formula to Peru, I stated clearly that we could not continue presenting formulas that lead us to new frustrations. In any case, the presentation ought to be made by Chile, in pursuit of its “prior agreement” with Peru. After certain hesitation, the Minister stated that Chile “could” make the presentation unilaterally, provided that there is a prior understanding with Bolivia. The preceding statement and the subsequent digressions of the Chilean Minister were both similar to those expressed earlier and in regard to which I informed your Office in Note 14/11/77 of past 7 January. The difference was the concrete possibility that Chile consults Peru directly.
In view of my insistence in regard to the proposal put forward by President Banzer, the Foreign Minister said he did not believe it convenient to issue a public response to the message delivered by His Excellency so as to not create irritating elements, for the
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Chilean position stipulating the exchange of territories as a sine qua non requirement has been sufficiently explained to the Bolivian Plenipotentiary by both General Pinochet as by himself.
Resuming his explanation, Admiral Carvajal noted that it would be possible to start with the drafting of a document recording the progress made until the receipt of the Peruvian response, and that simultaneously to the drafting of said document, a formula acceptable for Peru and its interests could be sought. He commented that he “understood the Peruvians”, all the more after the intense campaign carried out by former President Velasco in relation to Peru’s rejection to any formula to resolve Bolivia’s landlocked condition that might overlap territories that were Peruvian. The new Head of State, General Morales Bermudez –he continued– has “inherited” a complex situation and that is why problems have arisen. He commented that –according to information he has had access to– the Bustamante Commission agreed with the formula that he was proposing to me and that the “manu-militari” Government had evicted the commission and presented the infamous Memorandum of November.
He then said that what had to be done now was to try to seek solutions that allow President Morales to offer his country appealing justifications to use them at the level of Peru’s national public opinion and, particularly, with the residents of Tacna, a town which is affected by socio-economic underdevelopment.
Finally, he stated that at the international level, if an agreement as the one that is being prepared preliminarily were to be reached, it would be difficult for Peru to persist in its refusal, because it would be perceived as an “opposition” to the solution to Bolivia’s landlocked condition.
When requesting the Foreign Minister to be more precise in regard to the ideas he put forward, he said we would meet again in the “coming days” and that, meanwhile, his Ministry would prepare ideas to be sure of having a more coherent and clearer presentation.
In summary: the Foreign Minister reiterated the aspects put forward in our preceding meeting, with the difference that on this occasion he did not refer to the fact that his “country had information that would allow it to infer” that Peru could amend its proposal. He introduced the new element –subject to our prior acceptance– of presenting the new formula to Peru unilaterally and proposed to continue with the meetings so as to make a more precise explanation. Finally, the position concerning the exchange of territories is inflexible and La Moneda would rather not –unless there is pressure to the contrary– respond to President Banzer’s message and preserve the fluency of the dialogue undertaken.
Awaiting for the Foreign Minister to call me to a new meeting to broaden the ideas outlined, the meeting concluded at 6:00 p.m. I am hereby informing Your Excellency of this for the resulting purposes.
Taking advantage of this occasion, I reiterate Mr. Minister the assurances of my loftiest and most distinguished consideration.
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[Signature]Adalberto Violand AlcazarAmbassador
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Memorandum by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
entitled “Course of the negotiation with Bolivia”, 1978
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATION WITH BOLIVIA
I.
Exchange of communications
8-2-1975
Meeting of the President of Chile and the President of Bolivia in Charaña, in which the resumption of diplomatic relations between both countries was agreed upon, after being interrupted for 13 years. It was also agreed to accredit Ambassador.
26-8-1975
Bolivia presents the Chilean Government with an Aide Memoire defining the guidelines for a negotiation that would allow them “to reach a mutually convenient and adequate solution to the landlocked situation”.
12-12-1975
Meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile with the Bolivian Ambassador. On this occasion, the Chilean Minister replied verbally to Bolivia’s petition.
16-12-1975
The Bolivian Ambassador gave the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile the note 681/108/75 in which “Bolivia accepts the general terms of the answer of the Government of Chile regarding the proposal submitted by means of the above-mentioned Aide Memoire”. Moreover, the Bolivian Ambassador requested that a written answer be given in the same terms to the one formally formulated.
19-12-1975
By note 686, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile gave the Bolivian Ambassador a written answer regarding the Chilean proposals in relation to the Bolivian Aide Memoire. In that same Note, it was stated that, in accordance with art. 1 of the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of Lima of 1929, Chile would proceed to consult the Government of Peru as to whether it agreed with the cession requested by Bolivia.
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19-12-1975
Note 685 is delivered to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru making the above-mentioned consultation.
31-12-1975
By means of note 6-Y/120, the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs answered the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and stated that “the Government of Peru has made public its understanding position regarding the aspirations of the Bolivian nation to reach a legal solution to the problem” and adds that the Government of Peru, to decide on the matter, considers it indispensable to know in an official and complete form the texts of the documents exchanged between Chile and Bolivia.
7-1-1976
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile sends note 293 to the Peruvian Minister and states that he had instructed the Chilean Ambassador in Lima to make the texts available to him.
29-1-1976
By note 6-Y/1, the Peruvian Minister acknowledges receipt of the texts and states that “it is necessary for Peru and Chile to carry out a prior analysis of the matter considering its legal aspects and the interests that correspond to our two countries.” Finally, the Peruvian Minister formally proposed to conduct bilateral Chilean-Peruvian conversations in order to deal with this matter.
17-2-1976
By note 88, the Chilean Government stated that in “its desire to maintain the closest and most cordial relations with Peru, the Chilean Government will be most pleased to hold talks with Your Excellency’s Government aimed at establishing the most effective manner of protecting and ensuring the exercise of such rights.”
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3-3-1976
By note 6-Y/2, the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs offered the city of Lima as venue for these conversations.
18-3-1976
By note 4378, the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs communicated the appointment of ad hoc Chilean representatives Mr. Julio Phillipi I. and Mr. Enrique Bernstein C, the latter as the alternate. Furthermore, he acknowledged the appointment of Peruvian representative Mr. Luis Marchand, which appointment was communicated to him by the Peruvian Ambassador in Santiago. Finally, he accepted the meeting at Lima and offered the city of Santiago for any further meeting, if necessary.
19-4-1976
The First Round of Conversations is held in Lima.
5-7-1976
The Second Round of Conversations is held in Santiago.
18-11-1976
The ad hoc representative of the Peruvian Government, Ambassador Luis Marchand, had a meeting with the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs and informed him that the Government of his country had unilaterally decided to conclude its representatives’ participation in the conversations with Chile, and to communicate a new proposal to solve Bolivia’s landlocked status.
26-11-1976
The Chilean Government submitted a memorandum on Ambassador Marchand’s proposal, saying that “the Chilean Government believes that such proposal impacts on matters reserved to its exclusive national sovereignty and bears no relationship to the general terms of the negotiation between Chile and Bolivia that were approved by the two countries.”
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24-12-1976
The Bolivian President, Army General Hugo Banzer Suárez, addressed the Bolivian people in his Christmas speech and said, among other things: “I propose that the Government of Chile modify its proposal to eliminate the condition regarding an exchange of territory. I further propose that the Peruvian Government modify its proposal regarding the establishment of a territorial area under shared sovereignty.”
8-2-1977
On the occasion of the second anniversary of the Charaña Embrace, the President of the Republic of Chile sent a note to the Bolivian Head of State, reiterating once again his Government’s willingness to continue the negotiation on Bolivia landlocked status. Such message was replied to on the same date by President Banzer.
FROM THE FOREGOING IT FOLLOWS THAT:
1.
The Chilean Government has clearly presented the basic guidelines for the negotiation with Bolivia. Such conditions were accepted by Bolivia in general terms, without it making any observation to the “territorial exchange”.
2.
The Chilean note of 19 December 1975 has not yet been replied by the Bolivian Government.
3.
The Chilean Government has at all times abided by its international commitments, and that is why it proceeded with the consultation with Peru.
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4.
The Peruvian proposal bears no relation with the consultation made to the Government of Peru and concerns matters within Chile’s exclusive sovereignty, hence why it was dismissed, and therefore Peru’s answer is still pending.
5.
At all times Chile has shown its spirit to move forward with this negotiation.
II.- Meetings and conversations with Bolivian and Peruvian authorities
In parallel to the exchange of communications between the Government of Chile and the Governments of Bolivia and Peru, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile held personal meetings with the Embassies of Bolivia and Peru. It is worth mentioning that the meetings with the Ambassador of Bolivia were always held at the initiative of the Minister of Chile.12-12-1975
The Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs met the Bolivian Ambassador. On this occasion, the Chilean Minister presented the basis for the Chilean proposal towards the negotiation. Among other things, he stated that “the answer (to the Aide-Memoire) was given within the framework provided to the conversations by President Banzer himself; this refers to a current reality, without acknowledging any historical or legal antecedents.”
The Chilean Minister also pointed out that the entire negotiation would be carried out on the basis of an exchange of territory, which was at no time objected to by the Bolivian representative or his Government.
23-1-1976
A new meeting was held between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Ambassador of Bolivia. The Bolivian Representative said he was pleased and expressed thanks for the hospitality received during his visit to Arica.
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[Handwritten:] See last page.
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He added that he deemed it convenient to study the clarification of some concepts of the negotiations he described as “aristas”, such as the “demilitarization”, the River Lauca. Regarding the demilitarization, he insisted on a clarification, for he deemed it necessary for the Bolivian public opinion not to consider it as a limitation to its sovereignty. He also said that he would submit an Aide Memoire.
17-2-1976
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile met the Ambassador of Bolivia. The Ambassador said that the demilitarization issue has raised concern among the Armed Forces and the Bolivian public opinion, as it is seen as a limitation to its sovereignty. The Minister replied that international agreements always entail restrictions, to illustrate, he referred to the Hill of Arica (“Morro of Arica”) and the Straits of Magellan, which cannot be armed with artillery.
2-4-1976
Meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile and the Ambassador of Bolivia. The Minister insisted that Chile was at a disadvantage vis-à-vis Bolivia in the negotiations, given that the territory to be given as compensation was still undetermined. As to the demilitarization, the Chilean Minister said that Bolivia should clarify that no air bases, military officers or troop deployments that cause suspicion were present at the area other than those necessary to provide essential services. The Minister reiterated once again the need to know as soon as possible the territories that Bolivia would surrender as compensation.
31-4-1976
Meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile and the Ambassador of Bolivia, Adalberto Violand. At this meeting, Ambassador Violand proposed the creation of special commissions, one of them devoted to mark the boundaries of the
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territory to be exchanged. The Chilean Minister agreed.
2-6-1976
Meeting between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile and Bolivia. Both Ministers agreed on the need to move forward in these negotiations. With regard to a question of the Chilean Minister, the Bolivian Minister pointed out that it is his nation’s desire that Chile expands the offered maritime front, so that, at the moment of the exchange, the Bolivian Government may show to its public opinion this argument of the extension of the maritime littoral. The Chilean Minister indicated that it is impossible to extend it more to the South. Bolivia could continue using the port of Arica, the same way it had been doing it up to that moment. The Bolivian Minister pointed out the incentive for development. Creation of a development area. The situation of the differences [“aristas”] is analyzed. In connection with the demilitarization, Minister Adriázola, after the Chilean Minister’s explanation, expressed the following statements: “we are interested in keeping the necessary people for our sovereignty”. “No other criterion encourages us than contributing to permanent peace”. “Concerning the Lauca, we then would leave things the way they are.”
Minister Carvajal noted that to achieve that (the Lauca) a work of engineering could be considered and this matter could be the subject of a conversation.
In relation to the compensation, Minister Adriázola holds the view that it would be convenient to establish a commission that evaluates potential territories for exchange. The Chilean Minister found this idea interesting and recalled the territorial exchange in 1907.
This resulted from the railway layout, from Antofagasta to Oruro. The Commission could be the same Boundary Commission. For the agreed points to move forward, the Bolivian Minister insisted on the need to establish this Commission immediately. This could
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be done before 29 June. Minister Carvajal agrees with this proposition and proposes to establish the following commissions: a Boundary Commission, to propose territories for exchange; an Economic and Finance Affairs Commission, to evaluate public works (railway, airports, etc.) and (Violand requests) a Free Transit Improvement Commission. Minister Adriázola agrees. It was also agreed that these agreements would be stated in a diplomatic note.
9-6-1976
Both Ministers met at the headquarters of the Assembly of the OAS (Diego Portales Building). Minister Adriázola points out that he had received a draft diplomatic note. He considers that the deadlines are short. Minister Carvajal emphasized the fact that it is only a draft. He would take it to the Government to be discussed. Besides, he said that there had been some reaction in Bolivia in relation to the exchange of territory, but he added that this reaction “will not change the decision of the Government of the [Armed Forces]”. “This movement comes from the extreme left-wing.” “But the Government of Banzer wishes to continue with the negotiations”.
21-7-1976
Meeting between Director General and Ambassador Violand. Bolivia was informed about the lack of response to the note 4086 which authorized both parties to the Chilean-Bolivian Boundary Commission to study the frontier zone. The Ambassador stated that Bolivia was mainly interested in the instalment and repair of markers and, afterwards, the issues relating the exchange would be analyzed. The need to know the territories that would be given in exchange was insisted to the Ambassador.
The Ambassador committed himself to give a response, with his Government, regarding the territory exchange matter.
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10-10-1976
Conversations held by Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Chile and Bolivia in New York. In this meeting, the Bolivian Minister insisted on the need to extend the maritime littoral. Minister Carvajal reminded him his conversation with Violand on the fact that Bolivia could negotiate with Peru an extension of the maritime strip. Minister Carvajal insisted on the need to know, as soon as possible, which territories will be exchanged, in order to deal with Peru’s suspicion that such territories could be located on the border between Bolivia and Peru. Mr. Tejada (member of the delegation that accompanied the Bolivian Minister) stated “the studies are advanced”. “The problem is to raise awareness of the Bolivian people”. Afterwards, in response to a question raised by Minister Adriázola, Mr. Tejada explained that all climatological and meteorological studies had been carried out and that there was already a clear idea of the problem, the specific territories had been studied, feasibility studies to build a port had been performed and, despite the fact that it is not completed, it is seen to be feasible; after the awareness phase the territories for exchange could be mentioned. Now they could not be mentioned.
He also raised the need to separate the problem of the Lauca, to which the Minister responded that it was part of the context of the negotiation.
15-11-1976
Ambassador Violand informed Minister Carvajal that the Peruvian Minister proposed to the Bolivian Ambassador in Lima that the third round of conversations involves all three parties, which the Ambassador refused.
15-11-1976
Ambassador Mariátigui visits the Chilean Minister and asked him if it was true that an agreement had been reached with Bolivia with
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regard to the differences [“aristas”]. Minister Carvajal confirmed that it had. The Ambassador further added that Bolivia had communicated that the territory that Bolivia would cede to Chile would be located in the region of Lípez.
16-11-1976
Ambassador Mariátigui specified to the Minister Carvajal that the territory ceded by Bolivia would be located in the region of South-Lípez and asked if this was acceptable for Chile. Minister Carvajal answered that, in principle it was. In that same opportunity, Ambassador Mariátigui informed Minister Carvajal that Luis Marchand would be travelling to Santiago on 18 November with the purpose of delivering a document with Peru’s presentation.
4-1-1977
The Director of Foreign Policy of Bolivia, Manfredo Kempff, is received by Acting Viceminister Colonel Jaime Lavín. In this meeting, Ambassador Violand was given the text of the Address of President Pinochet to President Banzer, in connection with the anniversary of Charaña. Mr. Kempff expressed his wish to establish the Mixed Commission with two working groups. It was agreed that the Mixed Commission would meet in La Paz between April 4 and April 6, 1977. This meeting is still pending.
20-4-1977
Meeting between the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Bolivian Ambassador. Minister Carvajal pointed out that the starting point of the negotiation still was the note of 19 December 1975, to which could be added a clarification or interpretation of those matters so called “aristas”. Minister Carvajal reaffirmed that the condition to the cession of the corridor was the territorial compensation.
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CONSIDERING THE ABOVEMENTIONED CONVERSATIONS, THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS CAN BE MADE:
1-
Once again, it is shown on the part of Chile the basic guidelines on which the Chilean proposition is based.
2-
Likewise, it is clear that Bolivia accepted the principle of territorial exchange as a basic element of the negotiation on the part of Chile.
3-
From the meeting held by both Ministers in New York, it is evident that the issues regarding the “differences” [aristas] were settled and, in relation to the territorial exchange, Bolivia has carried out all proper studies that would already be completed.
4-
So far, Bolivia has not officially denied the fact that it has informed Peru which territories would offer in exchange to Chile.
5-
The Bolivian Government has not yet explained why President Banzer in his Christmas Address only requested that Peru withdraws its proposal with respect to the shared sovereignty in the territory and made no reference to the other part of the Peruvian presentation about the tripartite administration of the port of Arica.
6-
It is unknown any new fact that may have influenced the Bolivian Government at such extent that President Banzer has announced rejection of the territorial exchange in his Address on 24 December 1976.
7-
Bolivia has not set the new date yet for the meeting of the Mixed Commission with Chile, after it was Bolivia who cancelled the meeting scheduled for early last April.
8-
Considering the conversations held, it may be concluded that the Minister has clearly explained the Bolivian Ambassador and Minister every point of the Chilean note of 1975, duly addressing all questions and doubts raised by Bolivia.
11.-
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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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Minister Carvajal met the Bolivian Ambassador. The Bolivian Ambassador states that his Government accepted the Chilean proposal in a global manner, without prejudice to the remaining aspects pointed out in the Aide-Memoire of 26 August. The Chilean Minister reminded him that, as he had expressly stated, he could not accept revisiting those territories referred to in the alternative rejected by the Government of Chile. In said meeting the Ambassador delivered the note accepting in a global manner the Chilean proposal.
The Ambassador expressed how difficult it was to accept compensation for the maritime surface. He added that they were already in a position to consult with the Government of Peru. Bolivia accepted the easements created in favor of Peru under the 1929 Treaty. With regard to the River Lauca, the Ambassador stated that his Government agreed to the consolidation of the use currently made of its waters by Chile. The Minister pointed out that what was being proposed was the full use of the waters of said river. The Ambassador then referred to the “demilitarization,” pointing out that Bolivia will need means that would guarantee effective maritime police in the area in order to protect its sovereignty and to guarantee both criminal and civil order.
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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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First draft of the resolution on the maritime problem of Bolivia circulated by Bolivia at the 11th General Assembly of the OAS, 1979
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
U. Figueroa Pla, The Bolivian Claim Before International Fora (2007),
pp 485 - 486
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First Draf t Resolution Unoff icially Circulated at the IX General Assembly of the OAS on the Maritime Problem of Bolivia
The General Assembly,
Considering:
That the problem of the landlocked status of Bolivia is a disruptive factor threatening hemispheric peace and security, which runs counter to one of the purposes of the Charter of the Organization of American States;
That, according to the Charter, it is in the interest of the American States to prevent and remove possible causes of dispute and difficulties among its members;
That the sovereignty of the United States of America over the Panama Canal Zone and Bolivia’s confinement, both stemming from perpetual treaties signed under different circumstances, were the main causes of dispute in the continent;
That, the former having disappeared, Bolivia’s confinement remains as a permanent cause of difficulties and differences between neighboring and brotherly countries;
That the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, held in Atlanta on April 30, 1974, provides that it is the duty of the American nations to address situations, such as Bolivia’s lack of its own access to the sea, that are inconsistent with international standards of justice and create difficulties to their development;
That the Declaration of the Permanent Council of the OAS dated August 5, 1975 notes that the landlocked situation affecting Bolivia is a matter of continental concern and calls on all American States to cooperate in finding solutions, in accordance with the principles of International Law and, especially, those contained in the OAS Charter;
That in several negotiations conducted among the States
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interested in resolving Bolivia’s landlocked situation, some common ground has been found that can be validated by the Inter-American System and that serves as the basis for recommendations towards the settlement of this dispute, which is of interest to the whole Continent;
That the OAS General Assembly considers that it is its duty, in accordance with Chapter V of the Charter, to seek frameworks for understanding among the countries, within the established procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes;
Resolves:
1. To affirm that, as provided by the OAS Charter, any situation that endangers the peace of the hemisphere or alters the peaceful coexistence of member states is a matter of collective concern for the countries of the Inter-American System, such as Bolivia’s confinement.
2. To urge, in furtherance of the purposes and principles of the OAS Charter, the Governments of Bolivia, Chile and Peru to open negotiations for the purpose of providing Bolivia with sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.
3. To recommend to the aforementioned Governments that, among the items to be discussed in their direct negotiations, they take into account the following:
a) Cession to Bolivia of a territory connecting the country to the Pacific Ocean, without interrupting the geographical continuity of the Chilean territory;
b) Cession to Bolivia of a coast which includes full sovereignty over maritime resources;
c) Establishment of an integrated development zone among the three countries, which would include a port in current Chilean territory, offering efficiency or immediate operability;
d) Guarantee to Peru of a form of access to the integrated development zone mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
e) Solutions agreed upon should not include territorial compensation.
4. To instruct the Permanent Council to ask the Governments of Bolivia, Chile and Peru if they are interested in developing cooperation with the agencies of the Inter-American System for the success of their negotiations and for the better implementation of this Resolution.
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Minutes of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Permanent Council of the OAS, 14 February 1979 (extracts)
(English translation)
Organization of American States, OEA/Ser.G CP/ACTA 368/79,
14 February 1979, pp 6-57, 68, 71, 73
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PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES MINUTES OF THE EXTRAORDINARY MEETING HELD ON 14 FEBRUARY 1979 … [p 6] … SPEECH BY AMBASSADOR GONZALO ROMERO A.G., REPRESENTATIVE OF BOLIVIA, ON THE OCCASION OF THE CENTENARY OF THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC The PRESIDENT: I would ask the Secretary to please read the note sent by the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Bolivia, by which he requests that this meeting be called [OEA/Ser.G/CP/INF.1427/79]. The SECRETARY: [Reads. See the ANNEX.] The PRESIDENT: Thank you. The Representative of Bolivia has the floor. The REPRESENTATIVE OF BOLIVIA: Mr. President, I thank you for the reading that has been done by the Secretary, and to follow I will make a speech, for which I ask for indulgence. Today Bolivia commemorates the most tragic date in its history. The 14th of February marks the centenary of the outbreak of an unjust war that ended up severing the country’s maritime coast and made the country dependent on the aggressor, a circumstance that must be remedied. My country is peaceful and respectful of its neighbors’ borders. None of them can claim territories that have been wrested away by force. Respectful of rights, it can only be counted as a loyal defender of its own and by means of revering the rights of others.
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[p 7]
The purpose of my Mission then is to present some historic facts that show the
arbitrary situation from which the Bolivian nation suffers through to its forced
confinement, due to force, contrary to Inter-American proclamations and the OAS
Charter, one of the principles of which reads: “The American States condemn
wars of aggression: victory does not give rights.”
Bolivia became a republic with real and effective dominion over more than an
indigenous population in the entire Atacama desert. That territory, which
stretched from the coast inland, counted four ports: Antofagasta, Mejillones,
Cobija and Tocopilla, and seven coves: Gatico, Guanillos, Michilla, Tames,
Gualaguala, Cobre and Paquica. It covered 158,000 square kilometers. In
Atacama, from the time it was a jurisdiction of the Royal Court of Charcas, and
for the 54 years of the Republic before the war of 1879, Bolivia exercised
governmental actions undisturbed by the colonial jurisdictions of its time, and
later by Chile, until well into the 19th century. It was only when riches of copper,
borax, guano, and nitrate were discovered and entrepreneurs realized how easy it
was to gain access both by sea and land that Chile became interested, then turning
that interest into a grim reality through a military takeover of that rich land. The
Bolivians were not as greedy as Chile in the discovery of these natural resources
since, as the Chilean diplomat Sotomayor Valdez noted succinctly in his books,
Bolivia was left so down-hearted due to Melgarejo’s government that few
[p 8]
of its citizens “had any interest in these discoveries, which sparked a real fever of
speculation among us.”
Nonetheless, starting with José Amunátegui and later with Eyzaguirre, Ríos
Gallardo, and others, the fantasy that Bolivia attacked Chile and that that country
merely defended itself was created. So it turns out that the aggressor was the
victim, and the attacker innocent. A story was deliberately fabricated as a “cover524
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up” and an attempt to conceal the crime and somehow palliate the contempt for morality and rectitude. Things providing clear evidence of a guilt complex. It is a sufficient illustration of the facts to note the arguments used by Chilean Minister Plenipotentiary Abraham König when, with Bismarckian insolence, he said these shameful sentences, before the entire Americas, on the Bolivian Littoral such as: Our rights are born of victory, the supreme law of all nations. We already knew that the Littoral was valuable and worth millions. We are keeping it because it is valuable; if it were not, there would be no interest in keeping it. Note written to the Government of Bolivia on 13 August 1900. Bolivia is formed geographically and historically by two elements: one, social and territorial; the other, related to the times when it was integrated, as a geopolitical unit. In pre-Colombian times, it formed part of the Collasuyo, which was an expression of the Aymara-Uruchipayas kingdoms, with a nucleus organized around Lake Titicaca and also on the Pacific coasts that extended from present-day Tarapacá and Atacama to the Mapocho Valley. Later, during Inca [p 9] rule, Collasuyo was incorporated into the Quechua Empire until the Spaniards arrived. It is during the Iberian conquest and later in the Colonial era that it would again become part of another entity through the Royal Court of Charcas, bringing together in that jurisdiction territories that had been conquered by Spain. The Court of Charcas formed a vast jurisdiction that belonged first to the Viceroyalty of Peru and later to the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata. From this Court and through Viceroyal provisions they financed expeditions from the Royal Coffers of Potosí, such as that by Valdivia to Chile, to conquer and organize it into a Captaincy, and those of Diego de Rojas, Heredia, and Gutiérrez to the regions of Tucumán, and those of Núñez del Prado and Garay to Chaco.
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The Royal Court was active not only in the resolution of problems of law and
justice, but in political and administrative questions. There were no res nullius
territories in colonial times or when independence arose. Thus they were
unpopulated districts, belonging to specific jurisdictions, clearly established by
Spain’s impressive imperial organization.
Chile’s desire to expand at the cost of territories with clearly established
borders makes it imperative to refer to some background with respect to Bolivia’s
rights over its maritime coastline on the Pacific Ocean. Paramount titles date from
colonial times. When Pedro de la Gasca drew the borders of the Captaincy of
Chile, and then by means of letters sent by Captain Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor
Charles V,
[p 10]
accepting the provisions of “peacemaker” (letters from 25 June and from 15
October 1550), those communications establish that the north of Chile was
located in the Copiapó Valley.
After the colonial era and in the Republic of Bolivia’s first years during the era
of independence, consultations were held between Liberators Bolívar and Sucre
on whether Alto Peru should become a vast confederation stretching from
Venezuela to the border with the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, or
whether those who freely chose to separate from Buenos Aires, by their
children’s own decision, would form a new State. Eventually, the matter was
decided in accordance with the opinion of the Marshall of Ayacucho and
acknowledgment by Bolívar, who agreed that the new sovereign nation would
bear his name, causing him to declare it “his beloved child.”
Bolivia was born with an extensive coastal territory. It inherited it from the
partition of Charcas. While it was part of the Viceroyalty of Peru, it obviously
bordered Chile under that name. When the Court of Charcas became part of the
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Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, it maintained its maritime jurisdiction despite a reference by the Viceroy of Peru, which still considered the coasts of the new Viceregal jurisdiction to be part of Peru. Since the 16th century, the conquerors assigned the port of San Marcos de Arica to the Intendancy of Potosí. In 1680, Viceroy Francisco de Toledo confirmed that incorporation, which remained directly subject to Charcas for more than two centuries. It was also a coastal site defended by Spanish troops and residents against pirates. [p 11] After the War of Independence, Bolívar continued to oversee the Bolivian right to the sea. Sucre ordered the cove named La Mar, later known as Cobija, be enabled as a major port. In those times, Arica and other regions of Peru requested its annexation into Bolivia, as on record in the request sent by Tacna to Bolivia, published on 2 March 1826. The incorporation of Arica and Moquegua is described in J.M. Valdivia’s book Tacna and Arica. As for Bolivian rights, we have already seen that prior to the founding of the Republic, Charcas had many title deeds and rights over the coasts of Atacama. The adoption of uti possidetis in 1810 provided the basis for countries to retain the borders they had in Spanish colonial jurisdictions. Bolivia, to become a sovereign entity, kept all of the territory of the Royal Court of Charcas, which entailed an extensive coastline that included all of Atacama, from the Loa River with its ports and coves to the Paposo, while Chile comprised the area included between the Salado River and Cabo de Hornos, which corresponded to the Captaincy of the same name. Let us take a brief look at the Bolivian right. For Garcilaso de la Vega, he considered the Inca chief Yupanqui the conqueror of part of what is currently Chile. Vestiges of those conquests are found in the ruins of the two roadways stretching from Pasto to Copayapu (or Copiapó), a distance of 600 leagues. As an
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excuse for entering the territories he coveted, he established nothing more than a
town in Atacama “to give
[p 12]
a more immediate feel to the conquest, because from that point onward a vast
empty space must be crossed before Chile is reached.”
When passing through Charcas on his march toward Chile, Almagro met with
envoys of the vassal peoples of Chile who were carrying tributes of gold and
other riches to the Incas. He stole the booty and distributed it among his men. The
chronicler Gómara recorded the event:
In Charcas, Saavedra (Almagro’s second-in-command) stumbled
upon some Chileans who, unaware of the current circumstances, were
carrying to Cuzco their tribute in fine gold, worth one hundred fifty
thousand pesos. It was a good start to the journey, particularly if that
was the purpose…(sic)
We can also cite chronicles from the conquest of Chile, such as that of Pedro
de Lobera Mariño, who says in his “Chronicle of the Kingdom of Chile”:
They continued traveling until they reached a province called Jupisa
(Tupiza), where they found a new reason, shall we say, for their
attempt. An Indian leader named Huayllullo, who came from Chile with
the usual present offered by that kingdom to the King of Peru, who had
imposed two governors of that kingdom in Chile, one in the Mapiche
(Mapocho) Valley and the other in the Coquimbo Valley, who were
represented by Huayllullo as an ambassador; at that time the Indians
held their King in great reverence, of which this gift was a token. (sic)
Likewise, Alonso de Góngora Marmolejo in his History of Chile reiterated the
same information:
Having acquired all that is necessary and having learned that to get
from Atacama to Copiapó it was necessary to pass through eight
uninhabited leagues, with no grass or water, except for small wells
known as jaqueyes, of briny water harmful to the horses—which were
very valuable in those days, he left that road and took the one the Incas
used through Diaguita land, where upon arrival in the provinces of
Tupiza…he continued on his way until the end in Copiapó…(sic).
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[p 13] Chroniclers like Cieza de León and Agustín de Zárate also confirmed the preceding narratives. Cosmographer and chronicler Juan López de Velasco, in his work A General Geography and Description of the Indies (1571-1574), provides all the details on the limits of the countries he describes, and draws exact borders for Chilean territory, separating it from Charcas. That work was recently discovered in Spain in 1874, the year in which it was published in a modern edition. In it, the Peruvian coasts, including those of Charcas, from the ports of Areco, Ilo, Arica, Tarapacá, Tacna, Mejillones, Punta de Farallones (or Morro Moreno), and Bahía de Santa Clara are named. He notes: “Río de Copiapó and Bahía de Copiapó, where the area of the province of Charcas ends and the boundaries of the province of Chile begin.” It is notable that all the geography texts and chronicles of the 16th to 19th centuries show the Chilean boundary in the Copiapó Valley and at the border with Charcas. This is set forth in ninth provision of the Compilation of the Laws of the Indies, which sets the limits of the Court of La Plata, “In the north with the Royal Court of Lima and undiscovered provinces, in the south with the Court of Chile, and in the west with the Southern Sea.” It can be added that the Royal Charter of 29 August 1563 also noted the definitive borders of the Court, stating in one section that: …and all the land from said city of La Plata to that of Cuzco, including the boundaries, and said city of Cuzco with its boundaries, plus the borders that our Viceroy and Commissars communicated to said Court are subject to it and not to the Royal Court of the Kings nor to the governor of said province of Chile… (sic) [p 14] In a document by Pedro Sánchez de Hoz waiving the provision for the conquest of Nueva Extremadura (Chile), dated in 1740, there is a reference to the territory of Charcas: “In the town of Atacama, which is on the coast of a Peruvian province.”
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Valdivia, in his letters to Charles V, says that Copiapó “is the beginning of this
land (Chile), passing through the great uninhabited area of Atacama,” and in
another letter to the same recipient, dated 1548, he observes that the territory he
governed “starts at 27 degrees latitude south.”
There are documents in the archives of the province of Tarapacá that confirm
that in 1763 Viceroy Amat y Junient demanded the establishment of the limits
between Lima and Charcas on the Pacific coasts to coincide with the Loa River.
This analysis was done by Felipe Paz Soldán, a Peruvian scholar and author on
this subject. Another of the innumerable pieces of evidence is found in the
recounting of Viceroy Guirior to his successor in 1780, in which he says that
Atacama was, and is, subject to the Court of La Plata.
A report by the Governor of the Intendancy of Potosí, Juan del Pino Manrique,
from December 1781, refers to the parishes of Atacama and some mining
settlements, saying:
The district of Atacama, located at the edge of the province, borders
that of Lípez and that of Chile in the north, the province of Tucumán in
the east, and the coast of the Southern Sea in the west…
Then he says:
…the aforementioned district extends one hundred leagues from north
to south, sixty-five from east to west, and has a circumference of three
hundred twenty leagues, being the most thinly populated of the
Intendancy’s districts… (sic)
[p 15]
When the Intendancies of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata were
established, a Royal Ordinance (section No. 8) set forth the following:
…whose district (La Plata) will be the Archbishopric of Charcas, except
for the town of Potosí, with all the territory of the province of Porco, in
which it is located, and those of Chayanta, Atacama, Lípez, Chichas
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and Tarija, since these five provinces comprise the particular district of the remaining Intendancy, which will be located in the aforementioned town and the superintendency of that Royal Mint, its mines and mita [forced labor], and its Banco de Rescates will form an entity with the relevant remaining portions. Also found among the many proofs is one produced by official cosmographer Cosme Bueno, who referred to the Bishopric of Santiago of Chile and its northern limits by saying: …that borders on the province of Atacama, belonging to the Archbishopric of La Plata, on the coast of which is found the port of Cobija, Mejillones Bay…, the port of Betas… and the Juncal… Lastly, he assigns Atacama to the Court of Charcas. With respect to maps, eminent professors from Bolivia, such as Manuel Frontaura Argondoña, reviewed and made an exhibit (see the Presencia newspaper of 7 October 1973) showing maps and books from colonial times, many of them of Chilean origin. In these maps, Atacama is always incorporated into Charcas, starting from the Paposo. Finally, there are archives in Spain, the Americas, and some private hands, in which the Royal Court of Charcas appears as the possessor of those coasts. Among other provisions in defense of the jurisdiction of Bolivian borders and territories, Liberator Simón Bolívar decided on 5 [p 16] December 1825, just months after the founding of the Republic, that Marshall Sucre would enable the port of Atacama (Cobija) and establish a tax of 8 percent on the value of merchandise entering through it. The Marshall of Ayacucho, on 10 September 1827, dictated measures of aid, as an illustration of dominion, over the entire province of Atacama, which extended from the Paposo River to the Loa, within the limits of Alto Peru. In June
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of 1829, President Andrés Santa Cruz organized a government for the Atacama
coast, detaching it from the province of Potosí. Administrative actions and
production contracts for guano deposits in Mejillones and other sites followed
between 1831 and 1842, a period which saw the first Chilean intervention that
declares part of that territory to be its property and loosely incorporating the
Atacama desert into its territory. Bolivia energetically protested this action.
The political constitutions of Chile also support Bolivian rights, since those
from 1822 and 1823 until that of 1828, set the Atacama desert as the northern
limit of Chile.
The discovery of mineral resources in Atacama induced Chile’s governing
class to investigate such news further. It is true that the Government of Bolivia
did not exercise sufficient control, which encouraged Chilean President Manuel
Bulnes, in 1842, to submit a draft law to the Congress of Mapocho, which was
unanimously approved and applied to place
[p 17]
the guano deposits of Coquimbo, Atacama, and adjacent islands, under the
sovereignty of that country.
By virtue of the preceding law, the frigate “Chile” appeared off the Atacama
coast, released Chileans held in the guano deposits, and built a fort at Punta
Angamos (Mejillones), raising the Chilean flag there. The Bolivian schooner
“Sucre” destroyed the fort and lowered the flag. Chile desisted and opened
negotiations.
This was the start of a long dispute with Bolivia. The system of producing
decrees, government acts and laws to the detriment of its neighbors has become a
permanent norm in Chile. When rights, legal title, or legitimate ownership do not
exist, attempts are made to create them through laws promulgated by its various
governments. This fact, repeated with other adjoining countries, results in
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instruments that lead to claims, disputes or conflicts. This was the start of the system of faits accomplis and of the search by lawyers to subsequently justify them. This procedure forced Bolivia to protest, through diplomatic envoy, the abrogation of this law. The envoy was Casimiro Olañeta, who was told “the matter would be studied” to modify that measure if the title deeds could not be found. Subsequently, an attempt was made to back up this arbitrary law with falsified title deeds to confirm that first annexation. This behavior went even further: in 1843, Chile created the “province of Atacama.” Bolivia, to prevent greater problems with the clandestine production of guano and nitrate, accredited other missions, those of Joaquín Aguirre in 1846, Macedonio Salinas in 1858, José María [p 18] Santiváñez in 1860 and Tomás Frías in 1863. None of these friendly missions achieved any success. This was followed by the negotiation phase of Chile with the government of the Bolivian dictator General Mariano Melgarejo, “who turned this grotesque petty tyrant into his personal ally, praised his passions, encouraged his madness, with the Treaty of Limits of 1866,” as recorded by Mapocho writer, Francisco Valdéz Vergara. In those years, the Spanish fleet made a threatening incursion into the port of Valparaíso, which immediately attracted unity among the South American countries and, obviously, Melgarejo’s government in Bolivia, thereby improving relations between both countries and allowing diplomats in Santiago to achieve drawing the border at the 24th parallel, the joint production of minerals, nitrate, and other resources between the 25th and 23rd parallels (the 25th parallel did not have mineral deposits, while the 23rd did), and Chile’s power to designate employees to inspect and oversee Bolivian customs accounting in Mejillones. By then, the abuse owing to the presence of a cruel and bloody despot allowed Chile to dominate the region economically. This treaty prompted the same Chilean
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historian to say the following: “Upon learning this, who could be surprised that
the Bolivian people felt attacked by the Government of Chile and would wish to
amend the Treaty of 1866?” This quote is from Aquiles Vergara Vicuña in his
book The Sea: Nexus of Peace between Bolivia and Chile, page 152.
This treaty was challenged from the beginning, and after arduous negotiations
a new one was agreed upon, on 6 August 1874. While it did ameliorate many
things, it was at least not as unfavorable as
[p 19]
that of 1866. According to historian Basadre, from Peru, this latter treaty and its
complement of 1875 cooled Bolivian enthusiasm for forming a defensive alliance
“while English shipyards finished building armored vessels for Chile.”
During this time, Chile tried to get Bolivia to hand over its Atacama
territories, and to help it conquer the Peruvian Tarapacá by way of compensation,
a proposition that was rejected by Bolivia. The intention to annex both territories
was evident. The warnings of the illustrious Bolivian diplomat Rafael Bustillo
were being fulfilled; but Bolivia, aside from seeking guarantees in a defense
treaty to which it did not pay great attention, did nothing to arm itself, unlike its
neighbor. The interests of the English companies undoubtedly intensified the
drama. With the pretext of a minimum tax of 10 cents per hundredweight of
Bolivian nitrate for export, Chile found a reason to start the war, occupying
Antofagasta on 14 February 1879. In the midst of the conflict, it reiterated,
through two illustrious Bolivian citizens, a proposal to give the entire Atacama to
Chile in exchange for conquering Peruvian territory to “restore its own
(Bolivia’s) and to provide the easy access to the Pacific it currently lacks (Chile
had already occupied the Bolivian coasts), without having to deal with obstacles
always imposed by the Peruvian government…” (note of 29 May 1879, signed by
Chilean President Domingo Santa María). These bases were rejected by Bolivia
and shown to the Peruvian Government.
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[p 20] The war was unfortunate for Bolivia and Peru. The number of troops and better supplies, mobilization by sea, and defense by vessels built and financed by England, permitted military success and the imposition of conditions. The drama ended with heroic blood spilled in defense of the national territories of Bolivia and Peru. Previous pacts and treaties turned out to be worthless, and it was clear that they had only been pretexts in a plan conceived at La Moneda to seize Atacama and Tarapacá. The Bolivian nation pulled back to their inland mountains and plains. Their transport through the Cuenca del Plata or Brasil basins were notoriously insufficient and difficult. The country did not have a road or railway infrastructure, making its commerce through its Pacific ports subject to the whims of the victor. Given this situation of growing insecurity, Bolivia sought agreements that would ensure peace and freedom. Negotiations were undertaken beginning in 1882 and 1883 until, on 4 April 1884, the Truce Pact was signed, in Valparaíso, by Bolivian delegates Belisario Salinas and Belisario Boeto and Chilean delegate Aniceto Vergara. Article 2 of this pact assigned the status of guarantee or judicial pledge to the Bolivian Littoral, which was already completely occupied by Chilean military forces. War reparations were set by commissioners. Additionally, a “free transit” system was established through Antofagasta, and the entry of merchandise for Bolivia was taxed to the benefit of Chile. [p 21] Against the rules of a truce, which maintain the legal status quo of occupied territories, the Chilean Senate, in 1887, drafted a law that created the province of Antofagasta, with the departments of Tocopilla and Antofagasta. Despite Bolivian protests about the nullity of that arbitrary expropriation of territory, said law was approved by the Congress in 1888. When the Chilean Government
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promulgated the law, Bolivia submitted a formal protest, rejecting the measure
and stating that the Truce Pact had not recognized any change in the borders
established in 1874. In addition, it protested against the appointment of Chilean
parliamentary representatives for those Bolivian districts, and, lastly, it refused to
recognize the mining concessions granted in Bolivian territory. The policy of faits
accomplis again sprouted. It was a short step from there to the Treaty of 1904,
which imposed this statement. It is not so much the treaty itself as the
expropriation arising from the law that demonstrates the aggression exercised.
Subsequent to these events, President Balmaceda, of Chile, proposed to
President Aniceto Arce, of Bolivia, a peaceful conclusion to the necessary
acceptance of the loss of the Littoral (already usurped by our southern neighbor,
as we have seen), the free import of Chilean products to Bolivia, and the
construction of a railway from Arica-Oruro to La Paz for the defeated nation to
use for international trade. This proposal was rejected by Bolivia, and Chile
threatened to renew hostilities. Only the outbreak of a civil war, lost by
Balmaceda’s party, made possible new peaceful negotiations.
[p 22]
This resulted in the treaty of 18 May 1895, by which "Chile would continue to
exercise absolute and perpetual dominion over, and possession of, the territory it
has governed to date, in accordance with the provisions of the Truce Accord."
Chile also undertook to pay Bolivian obligations for the 1867 loan and credits
for mining entrepreneurs Pedro López Gama, Enrique N. Meiggs, and Juan
Garday. Likewise, by means of another Treaty on Transfer of Territory, of the
same date, was established arising from the Treaty of Ancón, signed with Peru,
and if following a plebiscite Chile was given Tacna and Arica, it “undertook to
transfer them to the Republic of Bolivia,” and should it not obtain those
territories, it undertook to hand over the Vitor cove, along with the sum of
5,000,000 of 25.9 grams of silver pesos. A prohibition on Bolivia producing and
exporting nitrate from those territories until the fields under Chilean control were
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exhausted was also agreed upon. A protocol signed on 9 December of the same year set forth that the two treaties were part of an indivisible whole. By that time, Argentinean-Chilean relations had deteriorated nearly to the point of war. In 1899, however, the problem was solved through a meeting of Presidents Roca and Errázuri. This new situation caused Chile to resume its harsh attitude toward nations of the Pacific. Abraham König was sent to Bolivia as Minister Plenipotentiary to impose a treaty, particularly since certain aspects had already been decided with Peru through the Billinghurst-Latorre Protocol, of 9 April 1898, which established the plebiscite on Tacna and Arica. [p 23] All Chilean offers to Bolivia were annihilated by the actions of König, who said: …to speak with the clarity that sometimes demanded by international negotiations, we must state that Bolivia should not expect the transfer of the territories of Tacna and Arica, even if the plebiscite favors Chile… This person seemed to be trying to imitate the Iron Chancellor of Germany. We see his argument in the note he sent to Minister of Affairs Villazón, of Bolivia, dated 13 August 1900: It is a very common mistake, and one that recurs daily in the press and on the street, to believe that Bolivia has the right to demand a port in compensation for its Littoral. No such thing. Chile has occupied the Littoral and took it under the same title that Germany used to annex the Empire of Alsace and Lorraine, with the same title that the United States of America took Puerto Rico. Our rights are born of victory, the supreme law of all nations. We already knew that the Littoral was valuable and worth millions. We keep it precisely because it is valuable; if it were not, there would be no interest in keeping it. Once the war ends, the winning nation imposes its conditions and demands payment for its costs involved. Bolivia was defeated, it could not pay and handed over the Littoral…
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The tone of the note, some parts of which are already well-known, suffices to
make the point on the form and ways the the Treaty of 1904 was imposed on
American land. This note was answered by the Bolivian Minister of Foreign
Affairs in a calm and energetic tone. It was not returned to avoid excuses for fresh
new military attacks, since at that same time and under the circumstances
Argentina declining to intervene in Pacific problems, Chile proposed to Peru by
means of La Moneda diplomat Angel Custodio Vicuña, as denounced by then
Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs Pedro de Osma, the portioning out of
Bolivia, after ceding Arica to Chile, in the following terms:
…in exchange for the alliance of the States (Chile-Peru) to declare war
on Bolivia, whose territory would offer ample compensation for the
costs and efforts of the enterprise…
[p 24]
Amid efforts to finalize the Treaty of 1904 and inducements extended to Peru,
miners encouraged by the Chilean Government invaded Bolivian borax deposits
in Ascotán, Chilcaya, and Pacopocani, overstepping the borders established by
the Truce Pact, which were later incorporated into the victor’s greed of 1879 in
the aforementioned treaty.
The treaty imposed in 1904 found Bolivia with many international problems.
With Brazil, it needed to resolve the problem and the cession of Acre; with
Argentina, adjustment of the borders arising from the Vaca Guzmán-Quirno
Costa Treaty; with Paraguay, the latent Chaco conflict; and with Peru, for the
rights over Tambópata. Furthermore, Chile rejected the claims over the borax
deposits of Chilcaya and Ascotán. Thus, the moment to sign the Treaty of 1904
arrived, which only freed Bolivia from Chilean customs control and provided a
statement of “free transit,” which was regulated in 1912 and 1937.
This treaty, which so emphatically proclaims Chile as the definitive owner of
the Bolivian Littoral, has not been complied with many times. The rights of
Bolivian investors that were dispossessed of the nitrate deposits of Taco without
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indemnification were never recognized or compensated, despite the obligation set forth in Article 2 of that instrument. Nor has the spirit of “free transit” been respected, as it is constantly hindered by the unilateral increase in handling and freight fees in the ports of Arica and Antofagasta. In addition, those ports suffer from serious defects [p 25] such as excessive theft of merchandise entering or exiting Bolivia, which increases insurance costs and causes serious delays; a lack of equipment such as cranes and additional material and cargo-handling equipment; the current obsolete equipment and has been in use for more than 70 years; insufficiency in the current obsolete equipment that has been in use for more than 70 years; lack of minerals cargo for export; lack of storage facilities for minerals; delays in administrative procedures for shipping; scarcity of docks and sheds; lack of workers for loading and unloading; extra charges for porters, who double or triple their fees. In sum, a noose of arbitrary dependence and daily problems, which raises costs and damages the Bolivian economy. With the Treaty of 1904, Chile attempted to destroy any possibility of progress and growth for Bolivia, it wrested more than 400 kilometers of its coasts from it. In addition to the moral damage, this represents a true disgrace and doom for the hard-working, peaceful people I represent. Throughout a century of injustice and despoliation, it has impeded the development of its maritime transport, limited the procurement of financial resources, immigration and settlement, and tourism, limited its acquisitions of capital assets, hindered its sovereign, independent control of imports and exports, and worst of all, it has traumatized the nation. That treaty hangs over us like a sword and as an inconceivable limitation in today’s world. Although Bolivia fulfills its commitments in keeping with pacta sunt servanda, it considers [p 26] that there are situations that merit demanding a review due to Chilean non-
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and that international pacts with no fixed end date can be subject to
the principle of ribus sic stantibus, i.e., that treaties may lapse if there has been a
fundamental change in the circumstances under which the document was signed.
Daniel Sánchez Bustamante, Bolivia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a
memorandum on 22 April 1910 to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Chile and
Peru, that stated that both countries should allow the establishment of an
intermediate Bolivian zone between their Pacific coast borders, and added “that
someday the facts and high expectations will impose the only possible solution to
this serious South American problem: the definitive incorporation of all or part of
Tacna and Arica to Alto Peru.” Chile rejected the proposal. Peru was more
accommodating. The time was still not right for the treaty, or its corresponding
protocol, of 1929.
Bolivia submitted a request to the League of Nations in 1920 and 1921 to
amend the Treaty of 1904, which [was not] accepted so it was withdrawn, but it
did obtain a statement from the President of the Chilean delegation, Agustín
Edwards, who said that his country would listen to a direct proposal in those
terms. Indeed, direct negotiations also failed.
In 1923, Bolivia once again, by route of direct negotiations, through Ricardo
James Freyre, suggested amending the Treaty of 1904. Chile responded that it
would be willing to “listen” to Bolivian proposals without modifying the treaty
and “without destroying the continuity of Chilean territory,” which ended this
latest intent.
[p 27]
On 30 November 1926, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, seeking to
resolve the grave injustice perpetrated against Bolivia for the loss of its maritime
coasts on the Pacific, sent a memorandum to the Governments of Chile and Peru,
proposing the cession of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia. Chile responded that in
principle it was willing to agree to the proposal, but that it would remain pending
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until the disagreement with Peru was resolved; the latter rejected it, alleging rights over those areas. All this ended in the 1929 Treaty of Lima, between Chile and Peru, whose secret protocol in Article 1 says that those countries “will not, without prior agreement between them, cede to a third power all or part of the territories that, in accordance with the Treaty, are subject to their respective sovereignties.” Bolivia, by means of a circular dated 1 August 1929, expressed its reservations about this agreement. Bolivia, during the Chaco War, confronted the limitations of “free transit” established by the Treaty of 1904, since it could not import weapons through the ports of the Pacific under Chilean control. Two years after the end of the war, this situation was later extended in 1937. In 1943, the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under Luis Fernando Guachella, delivered to Secretary of State Cordell Hull a memorandum in which he reiterated Bolivia’s longing for a sovereign outlet to the sea, and to that end encouraged a direct and peaceful agreement with Chile that took into consideration the interests of both countries. If there was a moment during these long Bolivian attempts of a just agreement when the possibilities were bettered, it would have been in 1950, when [p 28] Chile was willing to address the requests of the Government of La Paz, as noted by President González Videla to President Harry S. Truman on a visit he made to the United States, when he spoke about the volumes of water from the high plains basin intended for agricultural and industrial development in the regions north of Atacama and Tarapacá. President Truman was enthusiastic about this proposal. The notes exchanged by Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs Walker Martínez Larraín and Bolivian Ambassador Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez on 1-2 June 1950 were formalized. The Chilean note read: My government will agree with this position, and motivated by a spirit of fraternal friendship toward Bolivia, is willing to formally enter into direct negotiations intended to seek a way to make it possible to give
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Bolivia its own sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to
obtain non-territorial compensation and that effectively serves its
interests…
This very auspicious dialogue was unfortunately interrupted.
Later, a new act of aggression would further harm Chilean-Bolivian relations:
the unilateral alteration of the course of the Lauca, an international river whose
waters run toward the Bolivian high plains. That behavior was yet another
example of the Chilean fondness for the policy of faits accomplis.
Subsequent governments in Bolivia stated that it made sense to establish
relations with Chile only if the end result was an outlet to the maritime coasts of
the Pacific, within the framework of equality and sovereignty, as a fair historic
and economic reparation to Bolivia for the despoliation it suffered as a result of
the war of 1879.
[p 29]
Various attempts to deal with Chile culminated in the “Charaña embrace” in
1975, where strings were pulled to induce Bolivia to renew relations by using the
lure of talks to address its outlet to the sea. The demand for territorial
compensation that appears in the negotiations, nullified from the time it was
proposed by the unanimous rejection of the Bolivian people, once again spoiled
any possibility of agreement.
In Charaña, Chile’s exclusively bilateral desire once again appeared. At the
time, emphasis was placed on the necessity for commercial pragmatism, on not
looking to the past, on ignoring history, on keeping Bolivia in a state of amnesia,
on not remembering previous Chilean offers and on ignoring Peru, as if it were
not one of the actors involved.
The entire country, without discrimination, demanded the government in
power review the ahistorical methods and the cryptic demands that emerged from
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the dialogue. The sterility of this type of proposal, where one of the parties seeks advantages rather than fairness, was once again underlined by failure. With respect to the support for Bolivia’s cause, we should remember that Bolivia has received evidence of heartfelt support, some of which, recognizing its hemispheric and global significance, seeks to resolve its enclosure status and its legitimate desire for a useful outlet to the coasts of the Pacific. Among these, we can mention without limitation: Colombia in 1919; Brazil in 1938; Paraguay in 1943; Venezuela in 1962, in the so-called “Maracay Declaration,” and in 1974 and 1975; the United States [p 30] in 1963 and 1978; Mexico in 1963; Costa Rica in 1964; Ecuador in 1972; Peru in 1973; Argentina, among others, in 1977; and the OAS in Atlanta in 1974. In addition to the Ayacucho Declaration, in 1975, President Carlos Andrés Pérez, of Venezuela, showed his concern on the occasion of Bolivia’s 150th anniversary: I appeal to the Latin America conscience. The agreement of our countries should be on the just decision to give Bolivia the ocean in honor of its 150 years of history. Unity and solidarity of our America. Joint effort. This involves, and is of interest to, all Latin Americans. The integrationist destiny of our regional homeland has been paralyzed by various historical circumstances that have prevented the consolidation of its grandeur… Likewise, President Jimmy Carter expressed his concern in 1978 by saying: Next year will mark a century from the War of the Pacific. We must see such an occasion as an opportunity to reaffirm our intention to achieve harmony in this hemisphere. The difficult decisions in their region can be made only by Bolivia, Peru, and Chile. But we are willing, along with other countries, the OAS, and the United Nations, to find a solution to the question of Bolivia’s lack of access to the sea, a solution that is acceptable to all parties, and that contributes to a lasting peace and development in the region. In this way, we can say that the willingness of nations gives new impetus to
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the hope that old and noble principles of hemispheric solidarity will prevail. The
peoples have also expressed their opinions in the OAS, on the occasion of
Bolivia’s 150th anniversary, when it is time to assume the historic commitment
of…unity and solidarity…and the fullest understanding of the landlocked status
that affects Bolivia.
[p 31]
I solemnly swear, Mr. President, that Bolivia believes in dialogue, but not as a
dilatory tactic by means of which a peaceful solution can be indefinitely
postponed, but as a measure intended to provide a sovereign and useful outlet to
the sea, with its own port, to my country, without territorial compensation, and
that serves to improve coexistence in the framework of the American community.
With respect to matters of justice, we can note that authorized figures of the
Chilean Government and the newspapers of Santiago, such as El Mercurio, affirm
that Bolivia has no problems with Chile, there are no pending