Volume 2

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE ACCESS TO THE
PACIFIC OCEAN
(BOLIVIA v. CHILE)
REJOINDER OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CHILE
Volume 2 of 3
(Annexes 374 - 415)
15 SEPTEMBER 2017

i
INDEX TO VOLUME 2 of 3 ANNEXES 374 - 415 ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE NO Annex 374 Preliminary Peace Protocol between Bolivia and Chile, 19 May 1891 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 1 Annex 375 Circular of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia to the Legations of Bolivia Abroad, 25 January 1901 (extracts) (Original in Spanish, English translation) The Alfredo Montalvo Bolivian Digital Pamphlets Collection, <https://digital.library.cornell.edu/catalog/bol:0454&gt; 11 Annex 376 Letter from the Legation of Bolivia in Chile to the President of Bolivia, 10 April 1902 (Spanish transcription, English translation, original in Spanish) National Archive of Bolivia (Sucre) 37 Annex 377 Treaty on Demarcation of Frontiers between Peru and Bolivia, 23 September 1902 (English translation) 1909 3(4) American Journal of International Law, Supplement: Official Documents, pp 381-383 53 Annex 378 Protocol to the 1904 Treaty of Peace and Amity between Bolivia and Chile, 20 October 1904 (Original in Spanish, English translation) National Archive of Chile 57
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ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE NO Annex 379 Treaty on Rectification of Borders between Peru and Bolivia, 17 September 1909 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru, <https://apps.rree.gob.pe/portal/webtratados.nsf/Tratados_Bilateral.xsp?…; 63 Annex 380 Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia to the Minister Plenipotentiary of Chile in Bolivia, 29 April 1910 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 69 Annex 381 Letter from the Minister Plenipotentiary of Chile in Bolivia to the Government of Bolivia, 14 August 1910 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 73 Annex 382 Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia to the Minister Plenipotentiary of Chile in Bolivia, 29 August 1910 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 79
iii
ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE
NO
Annex 383 E.B. Codesido, Annotations to
the History of Diplomatic
Negotiations with Peru and
Bolivia 1900-1904 (1919),
pp 188-192 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
83
Annex 384 Note from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia to
the Extraordinary Envoy and
Minister Plenipotentiary of
Bolivia in Chile,
21 November 1919
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Original submitted by
Bolivia as Annex 43 to its
Memorial
95
Annex 385 Note from the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Chile to the
Minister Plenipotentiary of
Bolivia in Chile,
21 December 1921
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Original submitted by
Bolivia as Annex 237 to its
Reply
113
Annex 386 Letter from the Legation of
Chile in Bolivia to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia,
5 December 1926
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Chile
121
iv
ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE NO Annex 387 Circular of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia to the Legations of Bolivia Abroad, 21 January 1927 (Original in Spanish, English translation) A. Vergara Vicuña, The Sea, Link of Peace between Bolivia and Chile (1936), pp 314-322 137 Annex 388 Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Chilean Ambassador to Bolivia, 16 November 1944 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 157 Annex 389 Letter from the Embassy of Chile in Bolivia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 18 October 1945 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 161 Annex 390 Letter from the Embassy of Chile in Bolivia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 31 October 1945 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 171 Annex 391 Minutes of a conversation between the President of Chile and the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, 17 June 1948 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 185
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ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE
NO
Annex 392 Telegram from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Chile to the
Embassy of Chile in Bolivia,
19 June 1948
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Chile
191
Annex 393 Minutes of a conversation
between the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Chile and
the Bolivian Ambassador to
Chile, 25 June 1948
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Chile
195
Annex 394 Note from the Bolivian
Ambassador to Chile to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, 28 June 1948
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Original submitted by
Bolivia as Annex 257 to its
Reply
203
Annex 395 Note from the Bolivian
Ambassador to Chile to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, 14 March 1950
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Original submitted by
Bolivia as Annex 65 to its
Memorial
221
Annex 396 Remarks of Welcome to the
President of Chile at the
Washington National Airport,
12 April 1950
(Original in English)
Public Papers, Harry S.
Truman, 1945-1953,
<https://www.trumanlibrar
y.org/publicpapers/index.p
hp?pid=708&st=chile&st1
=>
229
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ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE NO Annex 397 Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 25 May 1950 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 260 to its Reply 231 Annex 398 Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 1 June 1950 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 109A to its Memorial 241 Annex 399 Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, 20 June 1950 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 109B to its Memorial 249 Annex 400 Letter from the Embassy of Chile in Bolivia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 7 July 1950 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 255 Annex 401 Confidential Circular from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Heads of Diplomatic Missions of Chile, 28 July 1950 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 261
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ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE
NO
Annex 402 Letter from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Chile to the
President of the Foreign
Relations Committee of the
Chamber of Deputies,
30 August 1950
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Chamber of Deputies of
the Republic of Chile
267
Annex 403 Minutes of the 26th Ordinary
Session of the Chilean Senate,
6 September 1950, pp 24-27
(extract)
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Senate of the Republic of
Chile
271
Annex 404 Address by the President of the
US opening the meeting of the
Foreign Ministers of the
American Republics,
26 March 1951
(Original in English)
Public Papers, Harry S.
Truman, 1945-1953,
<https://www.trumanlibrar
y.org/publicpapers/index.p
hp?pid=269&st=&st1=>
285
Annex 405 Telegram from the Embassy of
the US in Peru to the US
Secretary of State,
31 March 1951
(Original in English)
US National Archives and
Records Administration
291
viii
ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE NO Annex 406 A. Ostria Gutiérrez, A Work and a Destiny, Bolivia’s International Policy After the Chaco War (1953), pp 75-81 (extract) (Original in Spanish, English translation) 293 Annex 407 Exchange of notes establishing a Mixed Bolivian-Peruvian Commission, 20 April 1955 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru, <https://apps.rree.gob.pe/portal/webtratados.nsf/Tratados_Bilateral.xsp?…; 309 Annex 408 Preliminary Convention between Bolivia and Peru concerning the joint utilization of the waters of Lake Titicaca, 30 July 1955 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru, <https://apps.rree.gob.pe/portal/webtratados.nsf/Tratados_Bilateral.xsp?…; 323 Annex 409 Agreement between Bolivia and Peru concerning a preliminary economic study of the joint utilization of the waters of Lake Titicaca, 19 February 1957 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru, <https://apps.rree.gob.pe/portal/webtratados.nsf/Tratados_Bilateral.xsp?…; 333
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ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE
NO
Annex 410 Memorandum Concerning the
Question of Free Access to the
Sea of Land-Locked Countries
by the Secretariat of the UN
Conference on the Law of the
Sea, A/Conf.13/29,
14 January 1958, pp 22-39
(extract)
(Original in English)
United Nations,
<http://www.un.org/ga/sea
rch/view_doc.asp?symbol=
A%2FConf.13%2F29&Su
bmit=Search&Lang=E>
341
Annex 411 UN Conference on the Law of
the Sea, Official Records
Volume VII: 5th Committee
(Question of Free Access to the
Sea of Land-locked Countries),
Summary Records of Meetings
and Annexes, A/Conf.13/43,
24 February – 27 April 1958,
pp 18-19 (extract)
(Original in English)
United Nations,
<http://legal.un.org/docs/?
path=../diplomaticconferen
ces/1958_los/docs/english/
vol_7.pdf&lang=E>
361
Annex 412 Confidential Aide Mémoire
from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Chile for the
personal information of
Ambassador Ríos Gallardo,
6 August 1963
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Chile
365
Annex 413 Memorandum from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Chile to Ambassador Ríos
Gallardo, 8 August 1963
(Original in Spanish, English
translation)
Archives of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Chile
371
x
ANNEX NO TITLE SOURCE PAGE NO Annex 414 Telex from the Consulate General of Chile in Bolivia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 26 April 1971 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 375 Annex 415 Memorandum by the Consulate General of Chile in Bolivia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 3 October 1973 (Original in Spanish, English translation) Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 379
Annex 374
Preliminary Peace Protocol between Bolivia and Chile,
19 May 1891
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
1
2
Annex 374
Annex 374
3
Protocol
Gathered on this date at the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of the branch, 2nd Vice-President of the Republic of Bolivia, Dr. Serapio Reyes Ortiz, and Mr. Juan Gonzalo Matta, Confidential Agent for the Governing Junta established on behalf of the Congress of the Republic of Chile, have held various conversations on the need to establish close relations between both countries, both political and commercial, in order to reach definitive treaties of peace and commerce serving the mutual interests of both nations. During such conversations, Your Excellency Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia expressed and insisted that the fundamental basis for any final agreement between both countries should be the return to Bolivia of its Littoral Department; having Your Honor, the Confidential Agent for Your Excellency the Governing Junta stated that such basis was totally unacceptable, as Chile could not consent to the breaking of the continuity of its territory situated south of the 23rd parallel with the territory that the Republic of Peru has transferred to it, north of the Loa River.
Therefore, both parties, always motivated by
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Annex 374
5
a sincere desire to reach a final agreement inspired by the cordiality that must reign between both countries and that, as far as possible, is based on equity, have agreed to lay the bases for the definitive treaties, which are to take place as soon as peace has been restored in Chile.
Those bases, duly discussed and which ought to be a necessary part of the definitive treaties of peace and commerce, are the following:
1st
The Republic of Chile shall remain in possession of, and with full and perpetual control of the territory extending from the 23rd parallel to the mouth of the Loa River on the Pacific Ocean, with the eastern boundaries specified in Article 2 of the Truce Treaty.
2nd
The Government of Chile agrees and undertakes to pay the obligations recognized by Bolivia in favor of the mining companies in Huanchaca, Corocoro, and Oruro, deducting the amounts in accordance with the Truce Pact as well as of the credits on the Littoral Department’s income under such Treaty, which are those of Banco Garantizador de Valores de Chile, the bonds issued for the construction of the Mejillones railway, the credit recognized in favor of López Gama, represented by Casa Alsop y Compañía
6
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7
Valparaíso, and the forty thousand bolivianos in favor of the Garday family. Therefore, all income earned by the Arica and Antofagasta Customs Services from imports into Bolivia shall be free from any encumbrances.
3rd
The amounts of the credits referred to in the above base, taken from the books of the Bolivian National Treasury are as follows:
Compañía Huanchaca
1.280,000
Compañía Corocoro
1.634,000
Compañía Oruro
252,000
Banco Garantizador de Valores
718,000
Mejillones Railway
219,000
Credit López Gama
835,000
Id. Garday
40,000
[Subtotal]
4.978,000
Deposited funds
535,000
Total
4.443,000
These approximate amounts are considered without interest, and with them, according to the calculations performed, the total amount is six million, six hundred [illegible] thousand pesos.
This statement is entered as the interest expense has been observed by the Government of Bolivia. It is further declared that the agreements concluded and the calculations, plus interest, performed
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Annex 374
9
by Mr. Heriberto Gutiérrez, providing for a [illegible] of twenty-five percent have been rendered ineffective, as the government loan to which they were subordinated has not been fulfilled.
4th
The natural products from Chile and the products manufactured with raw materials from this Republic, when imported into the Republic of Bolivia, may not be taxed except with the same right imposed formerly on similar products from this country and vice versa.
5th
Chilean alcoholic beverages are not included in the above provision, but in no event may a levy be imposed on them which is higher than the tax imposed on foreign alcoholic beverages, the term “alcoholic beverage” shall be understood to mean spirits whose content of alcohol exceeds 25 % vol.
The Chilean ports which are in communication with Bolivia for transit of imports and exports of goods shall be free.
This agreement is executed by Your Honor Confidential Agent Mr. Juan Gonzalo Matta on an ad referendum basis for it to be ratified by the Governing Junta established in Iquique as they have agreed.
In witness whereof, this agreement is executed in duplicate by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Confidential Agent for the
10
Annex 374
Governing Junta established to represent the Chilean Congress, in the city of La Paz, on 19 May 1891.
[Signature] [Signature]
Annex 375
Circular of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia to the Legations of Bolivia Abroad, 25 January 1901 (extracts)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
The Alfredo Montalvo Bolivian Digital Pamphlets Collection,
<https://digital.library.cornell.edu/catalog/bol:0454&gt;
11
12
Annex 375
Annex 375
13
CIRCULAR TO THE LEGATIONS OF BOLIVIA
ABROAD
La Paz, 25 January 1901.
When I took office of the Foreign Ministry and among the first duties of my position, I found the painful, it is true, but inevitable task of rectifying diverse considerations and assertions contained in the Circular that was addressed by the Chilean Foreign Ministry to its Diplomatic Corps abroad on 30 September.
The severe statements made therein, in the way of a simple explanation of the true scope of the Note sent to our Government by Plenipotentiary König, reveal, unfortunately, not only the natural and legitimate purpose of justifying the conduct followed by the Government of Chile in its relations with Peru and Bolivia, but also an
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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Annex 375
15
absolute ignorance of the rights that belong to the latter in the territories now occupied by Chile; and what is even stranger, this has occurred in a state of negotiations intended to bring together both countries and conclude a definitive peace agreement between them, in which it is possible to perceive the marked tendency to attribute to the Bolivian policies a certain odious vainness in the fulfillment of its commitments, and an undue and tenacious aspiration to possess what in no way corresponds to it.
…
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Annex 375
17
…
The different accusations that I have addressed here refer to facts that relate to an epoch preceding the war of 1879, but since there are others that are intimately and significantly related to our current policy, I must take them into account.
Bolivia and Peru are credited with obstructing the noble intention of the Government of Chile to reconcile and give full satisfaction to the aspirations and interests of both peoples, in order to ensure the achievement of a definitive peace among the three nations, and with this intention, the following accusation is formulated:
“When, owing to our long years of efforts and very harsh sacrifices, we thought we had reached the outcome, we saw a new unforeseen obstacle arise, and we were placed in a no-win situation. Peru refused to discuss the
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19
plebiscitary protocol until we concluded with Bolivia a peace treaty from which all adventitious rights to the possession of Tacna and Arica would be eliminated; and Bolivia, in turn, postponed the discussion of the Peace Treaty until after we came to an agreement on the plebiscitary protocol with Peru and carried it out.”
It is not understandable that Bolivia ought to be attributed, in the aforementioned and still pending peace negotiations, a role that is so different from that which it was really able to play and that is so opposed to the aims it has pursued with self-sacrifice and determination.
If, on many occasions, it becomes difficult to discover the truth of past events, which are hidden in the darkness of times, then there is nothing easier than to clarify the current facts, all the more if they have just developed in our own sight.
In the present case, in order to be able to discover with full clarity who is to be held responsible for the fact that it has not yet been possible to reach a definitive peace agreement at present, it is enough to recall both countries’ diplomatic actions, which are recorded in the different pacts agreed upon in the last period and in the efforts to put them into force.
The truce pact was signed with a series of burdensome conditions imposed upon Bolivia. It was only natural that the latter should seek to free itself from it, replacing it with a definitive peace, even if it had to resign itself to accepting painful sacrifices.
On the other hand, it was also natural for Chile to aspire to the consolidation of the property rights
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21
it desired to possess over the territories which it had occupied provisionally.
After an unsuccessful attempt at settlement and in the aftermath of the civil war that broke out in Chile, the declaration of belligerence, sharply requested by its advocates, was produced and with it, came about the approximation of relations between the Bolivian Government and the triumphant Government Junta of Chile.
The stipulation of a pact favorable to Bolivia was then only to be expected, but this was far from being so.
The Protocol of 19 May 1891 was formulated with the Minister of Chile, Juan Gonzalo Matta. In spite of its very heavy and inconvenient conditions and that it completely ruled out the idea of a port for Bolivia, this protocol was, after serious resistance in the Bolivian Congress, approved by it, and then the Government was recommended to take steps to improve it as much as possible.
When the pact was taken to Chile, it was paralyzed there.
Shortly afterwards, the Government of Chile itself initiated again the conclusion of a definitive peace treaty, which would harmonize the interests of both countries as much as possible.
Bolivia decidedly supported this purpose and instructed its Plenipotentiary in Santiago to proceed to adjust it.
After serious and successive meetings, two treaties were concluded, both on 18 May 1895: one on peace and friendship and another one on territory transfer.
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23
In the former, the possession of the territory which Chile governed according to the Pact of Truce became an absolute and perpetual dominion; and in the second one, Chile undertook to transfer to Bolivia the territories of Tacna and Arica, if, as a result of the plebiscite or by direct arrangements, it acquired them. In order to do this, Chile committed to make all efforts.
However, if Chile could not obtain the territories of Tacna and Arica, it committed itself to transfer Vitor inlet or an analogous one, as well as the sum of 5,000,000 pesos to Bolivia.
With these treaties, both Governments recognized that what is now regarded in the Circular as a tenacious and unjustified obsession to obtain a port was only Bolivia’s natural and just aspiration to be given at least a strip of territory that allows its connection with the sea, in exchange for the whole of the coastal territory it abandoned; Bolivia demanded only a port in return for the transfer of the four ports and seven coves which its coastal territory contained.
Two additional protocols were concluded thereafter; one on Credit Settlement, concluded in Santiago on 28 May that year; and an explanatory protocol on the obligations assumed in the Treaties of 18 May in Sucre, signed on 9 December that year.
This latter was entered into in order to record that the two Treaties of Peace and Transfer were an indivisible whole and of reciprocal stipulations; and that the port that Chile was bound to give to Bolivia in case it did not obtain Tacna and Arica, should broadly satisfy the present and future needs of Bolivia’s commerce and industry.
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Since the scopes of the above condition still seemed vague and indeterminate to the Government of Chile, both countries agreed to clarify it, and a last explanatory protocol was concluded and signed in Santiago on 30 April 1896.
All these pacts were approved by the Bolivian Congress, without exception. Chile, on the other hand, only approved the two main ones, leaving the legislative approval of the Protocols of 9 December 1895 and 30 April 1896 pending, and thus hindered the definitive conclusion of the arrangements; all this in spite of the fact that these Protocols had been widely discussed and already approved by the Council of State of that Republic.
The text of the legislative approval given by the Bolivian Congress is transcribed below:
“Mariano Baptista
Constitutional President of the Republic of Bolivia.
“Whereas the National Congress has sanctioned the following Law:
“The National Congress
“Decrees:
“Sole Article - The two treaties of Peace and Territory Transfer, adjusted in the city of Santiago on 18 May this year and the Complementary Protocols –the first dated the 28th of the same month and the second dated today– the former three by the respective Plenipotentiaries, Mr. Heriberto Gutierrez and Mr. Luis Barros Borgoño, and the latter signed in that Capital by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia Mr. Emeterio Cano and the Minister Plenipotentiary of Chile Mr. Juan Gonzalo Matta are hereby approved as a whole and as reciprocal and integral stipulations from one another.
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“Inform the Executive Branch for the constitutional measures [that are to be taken to this end].
“Session Room – Sucre, 9 December 1895 – Severo Fernandez Alonso – Federico Zuazo – Gil Antonio Peña, Senator Secretary – Fanor G. Romero, Deputy Secretary – Adolfo Trigo Acha, Deputy Secretary.
“Therefore, I promulgate that it be regarded and complied with as a Law of the Republic.
“House of Government of Sucre, 10 December 1895 - M. Baptista - Emeterio Cano.”
This transcript evidences that Bolivia complied with its duty to sanction the stipulations agreed upon and that it was the Government of Chile which, in the midst of constant hesitation, delayed their definitive sanction, leaving to the present the approval of the aforementioned explanatory Protocols pending by its Congress.
Bolivia, however, persisted in its intention to uphold the stipulated arrangements and instructed its Legation in Chile to continue taking the steps leading to the approval of the aforementioned Protocols.
Nevertheless, despite every effort, by telegram received on the 22nd, this Chancellery was informed that the Chilean Senate, at the request of the Executive, agreed at its last session to hand back to Bolivia the Protocols it had pending with it, so that it may seek the solution it desires, on bases that are different from those proposed and approved earlier.
And it will still be said that it was Bolivia that postponed the definitive peace arrangements with Chile!
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29
Moreover, since I am discussing the solution both Governments are still trying to find, I should, even if briefly, mention that salient features of the latest efforts undertaken in La Paz, which may have led to recent statements by Chile’s Government before the Chilean Congress.
Mr. Abraham König, having been accredited to this Government this past 7 March, initiated his efforts formulating proposals that are already known, the main bases of which were the consolidation of Chile’s property rights and the payment to Bolivia of 6,000.000 Chilean pesos, additionally to other payments, amounting to about Bs. 5,000.000.
The new proposal, which completely suppressed the granting of a port, which had been offered to Bolivia by Chile in already approved treaties, came, as was to be expected, as an extraordinary surprise to the Bolivian Government, much more so because the proposal was accompanied by the Chilean Government’s firm and preconceived determination, expressed through its Plenipotentiary, not to reach any solution that considered the granting of the aforementioned port on the Pacific.
Actually, the sudden change in Chilean policy could not have been more unexpected -Since the clarifying Protocols were pending approval by the Chilean Congress, it was only natural and appropriate to wait for the decision of Congress, either approving them, or stating the founded reasons for their rejection.
That was the natural thing to do; and underscores
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31
that it should be the only basis for all diplomatic efforts between both Governments.
Therefore, the proposals put forward by Mr. König in his letter dated August 13 were, naturally, rejected on the merits by a letter of reply dated 15 October.
All in all, despite the bad impression created by the new initiative, such were the good will and perseverance of the Bolivian Government to ultimately secure a permanent peace that might enable it to more freely and effectively attend to the development of its trade and sources of wealth, that it again took the new proposal into consideration, in an attempt to analyze whether under such proposal it was possible to find both a better solution and methods of compensation more convenient for, and fairer to, the interests of both countries, while being acceptable to Bolivia without tainting its reputation.
With such purpose in mind, a candid, friendly exchange of ideas took place between the President of the Republic and Mr. König in search for a possible solution.
It was noted to the Chilean Plenipotentiary that the amount set by him, in addition to being small when considered as a rate, for it barely accounted for one year’s production of the coastal area, which belongs to Bolivia and is nowadays occupied by Chile, was a trifling sum of money that bore no relationship to any actual purpose or real interest to Bolivia; and that it was necessary to come up with an actual base amount intended to provide fair compensation and satisfy
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33
a pressing need felt by the Bolivian people.
Therefore, it was said: if Bolivia were to renounce its port, necessary as an indispensable condition for its progress and commercial development, it was required that Bolivia be provided with other means capable of making up the absence of a port, and be compensated, as far as possible, for the absence of a port, which Chile stated it could not grant to Bolivia.
It was then thought that said means, perhaps the only means possible, could be the construction of railways and roads connecting Bolivia not only with the Pacific Ocean but also with isolated regions in the west and northwest, which actually is one of Bolivia’s most pressing needs.
The minimum amount required to satisfy such need was set at two million pounds sterling.
Such amount was designated not as a sum of money to be received in payment for the territories ceded, but as a means to replace the lack of a port by building much-needed communication routes; and as compensation for an element of progress that was being eliminated by another that could be provided.
Following a thorough discussion, Mr. König agreed to such amount, suggesting that it be paid in five annual installments, and offering to consult with his Government. In turn, Mr. Villazón informed Congress of this event.
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35
As Congress refused to give an opinion on the matter at hand, Mr. König decided to return to Chile.
As this Circular is concluded, and by fulfilling the unavoidable duty to withdraw the charges that were unlawfully intended to be brought against Bolivia, I would like to bring to your attention, Mr. Minister, that in an attempt to attain such ends, our Government will persist in its unwavering efforts to secure an amicable, equitable arrangement, which both nations have been pursuing for so long. There is no doubt in my mind that such task will require the willingness of learned, sensible men from both countries, so that peace may be secured, which, as Mr. Errázuriz Urmeneta himself has pointed out, constitutes the ultimate interest of Nations.
Federico Diez de Medina
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Letter from the Legation of Bolivia in Chile to the President
of Bolivia, 10 April 1902
(Spanish transcription, English translation, original in Spanish)
National Archive of Bolivia (Sucre)
37
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Santiago, 10 de Abril de 1902
Señor General [B.] Jose M. Pando,
Presidente Constitucional de Bolivia
La Paz
Mi respetado General:
Tuve la fortuna de encontrarme en Antofagasta con el Señor F. Avelino Aramayo y hacer juntos el viaje desde este puerto hasta Santiago.
La presencia del Sr. Aramayo aquí ha sido de todo punto importante para el desarrollo de los asuntos internacionales con Chile y para concretar y discutir las bases esenciales sobre las que tendrán que apoyarse las futuras estipulaciones.
Hemos encontrado preparado el terreno y una buena y uniforme disposición – así en la opinión pública, como en las esferas oficiales ––para el arreglo con Bolivia; de tal suerte, que el Señor Aramayo, con una que le honran, dio forma al pensamiento y lo sometió al Gobierno de Chile para su estudio; así lo verá Ud. por las comunicaciones que hoy le dirige el Sr. Aramayo.
En la Conferencia solemne que hemos celebrado con el Exmo Sr. Riesco y su Gabinete, hemos llegado a recoger el pensamiento de este Gobierno y ciertas declaraciones concretas, que han de darnos mucha luz para las soluciones futuras. Así, ya podemos dar por efectivas las siguientes bases para el Tratado de Paz: reconocimiento de nuestras deudas, conforme á lo que ya se estudió en los Tratados de Mayo de 1895 y en las proposiciones de la misión König; libertad aduanera, y, por consecuencia, reconquista de nuestra soberanía comercial, indemnización decorosa por la cesión del Litoral y suficiente para cubrir nuestras necesidades de viabilidad, como desea el Gobierno del país. Estas ideas primordiales condensadas y encarnadas en las bases del tratado que, confidencialmente, sometió el Honorable Sr. Aramayo al Gobierno de Chile, no merecieron seria oposición ni fundamentales reparos, habiendo quedado en estudio en la Cancillería, para dar franca idea sobre ellas. Yo creo que no sufrirán trascendentales modificaciones ni hallarán insuperables resistencias; creo, al contrario, que este Gobierno aprovechará de la situación y oportunidad que lo ofrecemos para llegar á esta solución que persiguen con interés.
El Señor Riesco ha ofrecido la aprobación del Congreso al tratado y dice que asegurará los elementos que han de apoyarlo, y, según su opinión, y la nuestra , este negocio se debe concluir rápidamente para evitar su fracaso, dando á la discusión pública, siempre apasionada, tiempo para destruirlo y descomponerlo.
Hoy quizá de su opinión el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y así podremos comunicarlos á U. algo solido y concreto.
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Santiago, 10 April 1902
To General B. José M. Pando
Constitutional President of Bolivia
La Paz
To my most respected General,
I had the good fortune to meet Mr. F. Avelino Aramayo in Antofagasta and to share with him the trip from this port to Santiago.
Mr. Aramayo’s presence here has been of utmost importance to developing foreign affairs with Chile and to discussing and establishing the essential bases over which the future provisions shall be founded.
We have found that there was a way paved and a good and consistent willingness (both in terms of public opinion and in the attitude of the official authorities) to make an arrangement with Bolivia in such a way that Mr. Aramayo grasped the spirit of these thoughts and put them to the consideration of the Government of Chile. You will be able to notice this from today’s communications from Mr. Aramayo.
In the solemn Conference held with Mr. Riesco and his Cabinet, we managed to capture the thoughts of this Government and certain specific declarations that should shed plenty of light for future solutions. Thus, we can already assume the following bases as effective for the Peace Treaty: recognition of our debts, in conformity with what has already been studied in the May 1895 Treaties and in the proposals of the König mission; customs freedom and, consequently, regaining our trade sovereignty, decent compensation for the cession of the Littoral, sufficient to cover our sustainability needs, as desired by the country. These crucial ideas, summarized and embodied in the bases of the treaty which, confidentially, Mr. Aramayo submitted to the Government of Chile, did not receive any opposition or fundamental objections; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is currently analyzing them to express their frank opinion. I believe that they will not undergo any transcendental modifications and will not meet any fierce opposition. On the contrary, I believe that the Government will appreciate the situation and opportunity we are offering to reach the solution they are so eager to find.
Mr. Riesco has offered Congress approval of the treaty and claims he can guarantee the elements that will support him; and, in his opinion, and ours, the business should be concluded quickly to avoid failure, to prevent it from failing if public discussions, which are always passionate, are given enough time to destroy and dismantle it.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs may express his opinion today, allowing us to provide you with solid and concrete information.
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La presencia del Señor Canciller en Santiago es precisa, y con el Señor Aramayo hemos hablado y convenido en hacer que venga aquí y cambie ideas con el Sr. Riesco y los hombres de su Gobierno. Este paso servirá para orientar al Señor Canciller en la política internacional que ha de seguir y, si se llega á convenir en el arreglo, para dejar ya sentadas las bases y convenido el plan que debe seguirse para llevar a término el negocio. El Señor Canciller encontrará preparada la opinión de Chile y tendrá una atmosfera simpática y agradable que hará fácil cuanto se proponga hacer en beneficio del país.
Desde luego, lo principal esta asegurado: podemos ya decir que nuestro progreso depende solo de nosotros y de nuestra cordura y que tendremos, desde luego, seguridad de tener, por lo pronto, dos ferrocarriles que muevan nuestras industrias y pongan en juego los capitales extranjeros.
Sobre el monto de la compensación creo que no hemos de tener mayor dificultad y podremos contar con los dos millones de libras, que es como tuve ocasión de expresarla alguna vez. También el punto esencial de nuestra independencia aduanera, lo conseguiremos, aunque con dificultad, pues Chile quiere conservar su preponderancia en nuestro mercado y tener en Bolivia un centro asegurado para su exportación. Así nos lo dieron a comprender el Sr. Riesco y su Sr. Canciller, insistiendo este último en la idea de proteger (decía) el comercio americano. Chile no ha perdido de vista este punto y aspira á mantener, ya no por supuesto con carácter de vencedor, las ventajas que le proporcionó el Pacto de Tregua.
También se habló de Chilcaya, y habiendo preguntado el Señor Presidente que si teníamos seguridad de que todo Chilcaya era muestro, el Señor Aramayo le contestó que sí, que nuestros títulos nos daban ese derecho y que los estudios científicos, últimamente practicados, nos aseguraban la soberanía indiscutible.
El punto de arbitraje para las cuestiones que emergiesen del tratado, fue recibido con aplauso por el Señor Riesco y dijo que aún se le podía dar mayor amplitud, si fuese preciso.
Luego se pasó á tratar del establecimiento de agencias aduaneras en los puertos chilenos, en la misma forma de la que existe en Antofagasta. Entonces dijo el Sr. Riesco que las dificultades últimamente surgidas en este puerto (Antofagasta) habían hecho comprender al Gobierno la necesidad de levantar el permiso de establecer agencias extranjeras; que con este sistema se protegía el contrabando y se desmoralizaba la administración; que el Gobierno de Chile dará al de Bolivia toda clase de facilidades para el establecimiento de las aduanas en la frontera. Manifestada la conveniencia de dejar la agencia en Antofagasta, tal como ahora se encuentran, se convino en estudiar este punto.
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The presence of the Minister in Santiago is required, and with Mr. Aramayo we have discussed and agreed to have him come here to exchange ideas with Mr. Riesco and the men of his Government. This step will provide the Minister with the guidance in international policy he must follow and, should an arrangement be reached, this will set the bases and devise the plan that must be followed to conclude this business. The Minister will find that Chile’s opinion is set, and he will meet a pleasant and hospitable atmosphere that will facilitate what he intends to do for the benefit of the country.
Of course, the essential elements have been secured: we can already state that our progress depends only on us and on our behavior, and we will thus have the certainty of having, in the meantime, two railroads to move our industries and to bring foreign capital into action.
With regard to the amount of the compensation, I believe that we will not meet major difficulties and we will be able to count on the two million pounds, as I expressed previously. Additionally, we will attain the essential goal of our customs independence, albeit with certain difficulty, since Chile intends to maintain its prevalence over our market and to have, in Bolivia, a sure destination for its exports. This is what Mr. Riesco and his Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed, and the latter insisted on the idea of protecting (as he called it) the American trade. Chile has not forgotten about this item and aspires to maintain, of course not as a victor, the advantages it enjoyed under the Truce Pact.
Chilcaya was also discussed, and when the President asked if we had any certainty that the entire Chilcaya was ours, Mr. Aramayo replied in the affirmative, that our title granted us that right and that the latest scientific studies guaranteed indisputable sovereignty General J.M.P.
The issue of the arbitration for issues arising from the treaty was welcomed by Mr. Riesco and he said that it could be given greater scope, if necessary.
Next, the creation of customs agencies in Chilean ports in the same manner as the one located in Antofagasta was discussed. Mr. Riesco took the floor and said that due to the recent difficulties arising in connection with this port (Antofagasta), in the opinion of the Government, the permit to set foreign customs agencies should be revoked given that this encouraged smuggling and undermined the administration powers; and the Government of Chile will give to the Government of Bolivia all sorts of facilities to the establishment of customs agencies at the border. Following the arguments as to the convenience of leaving the agency in Antofagasta as is, the attendees agreed to study this question.
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El Señor Riesco manifiesta más interés en la construcción del ferrocarril de Iquique; el Señor Aramayo le probó, sobre el mapa, que ese ferrocarril era dañoso a Chile, pues haría fuerte competencia al de Antofagasta y, por consiguiente, al mismo comercio de Chile. Insistimos en demostrar la necesidad de la construcción de los ferrocarriles á la región de nuestros ríos, desvaneciendo la idea del alejamiento de las industrias chilenas y del desviamiento de la corriente comercial del Pacifico, que es lo que aquí se tramó.
El Señor Riesco fue el primero en hablar des anualidades de £200,000 para cubrir los gastos de ferrocarriles: habiéndomelo expresado primero á mi en la visita de cortesía que le hice y después al Sr. Aramayo en la conferencia del 8. Habiendo preguntado el termino de estas anualidades, que dejamos en blanco el proyecto de las bases, expresó el Señor Aramayo que serían por 20 años.
Estos son los puntos principales que ocuparon la hora y media de conferencia con el Presidente Riesco y su Gabinete.
En este momento recibo esquela verbal del Ministro de R.E. invitándonos a las G.V.M. á su despacho para hablar de estos asuntos.
Con todo respeto me suscribo su atento amigo
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Mr. Riesco expressed greater interest in the construction of the Iquique railway; Mr. Aramayo proved to him, using the map, that this railway was harmful to Chile, since it would create great competition for the Antofagasta railway and, consequently, to Chilean trade itself. We insisted on proving the need to build railways to reach the region of our rivers, erasing the idea of a departure from the Chilean industries and the deviation of the Pacific trade flow, which was concocted here.
Mr. Riesco was the first one to mention annuities of £200,000 to cover the expenses of the railways: he had expressed it to me in the courtesy visit I paid to him and later to Mr. Aramayo in the conference held on the 8th. With regard to the term of these annuities, which we left incomplete in the proposed bases, Mr. Aramayo stated that the duration would be 20 years.
These are the main issues that were discussed during the hour-and-a-half conference with President Riesco and his Cabinet.
I have received a verbal invitation from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, inviting us to his office to discuss these matters.
Respectfully,
[Signed]
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Treaty on Demarcation of Frontiers between Peru and Bolivia, 23 September 1902
(English translation)
1909 3(4) American Journal of International Law, Supplement: Official Documents,
pp 381-383
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Annex 378
Protocol to the 1904 Treaty of Peace and Amity between Bolivia and Chile, 20 October 1904
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
National Archive of Chile
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“Copy for the Illustrious
Minister Plenipotentiary
of Bolivia Mr. Alberto
Gutiérrez”
“In Santiago, on the 20th day of the month of October of 1904, gathered at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile the Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia in Chile, Alberto Gutiérrez, and the Minister of this branch, Emilio Bello Codecido, with a view to signing the Treaty of Peace and Amity entered into on this same date between the Governments of the two countries, the Bolivian representative stated:
That, in accordance with the spirit that has guided the Governments of Bolivia and Chile when entering into the said Pact, and interpreting the purposes of cordiality and harmony manifested by your Government in the course of the negotiations that they have just completed, Bolivia will make every effort, whether jointly
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with or separately from Chile, so that the territories of Tacna and Arica are definitively incorporated into Chilean territory.
For his part, the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that in accordance with his Government considered that the common interests of Chile and Bolivia established between the two Republics the commitment to unite their actions and efforts in order to make definitive Chile’s dominion over the territories of Tacna and Arica.
He also added that in reciprocity Chile would provide diplomatic support to Bolivia in favor of Bolivia’s rights over the territory it currently occupies, should it be disputed by another neighboring nation, with Chile offering mediation, good offices or other amicable recourse.
In witness whereof, they agreed to record this session, signing and sealing this document in two counterparts.
[signed] H. Gutiérrez
[signed] Emilio Bello C.”
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Treaty on Rectification of Borders between Peru and Bolivia, 17 September 1909
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru,
<https://apps.rree.gob.pe/portal/webtratados.nsf/Tratados_Bilateral.xsp?
action=openDocument&documentId=605E>
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At a meeting in the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the seventeenth
day of September 1909, the undersigned Mr. Solón Polo, Extraordinary
Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary of Peru, and Dr. Daniel S. Bustamante,
Responsible Minister, for the purpose of reaching an agreement further to the
arbitral award issued by His Excellency the President of the Argentine Republic
this past 9 July, pursuant to the special arbitration agreement of 30 December
1902 between the Governments of Peru and Bolivia, agreed as follows:
I
In order that the boundaries fixed by the Arbitrator correspond, to the
extent possible, to the natural features of the land, and best harmonize with the
reciprocal agreements of the interested countries, the Governments of Peru and
of Bolivia have resolved, by means of this agreement, to effectuate the swaps
and concessions of land that, by common agreement, they consider necessary
for their stated purpose that the borders of the two countries be arranged such
that their security is taken into account and all subsequent confusion is avoided.
II
Consequently, the line of demarcation between the territories of Peru
and of Bolivia will originate at the place where the current borders coincide
with the Suches River; it will cross the lake of the same name and will follow
the Palomani-Tranca, Palomani-Kunca, Palomani Peak and Yaguayagua Range
mountains. From there it will follow the Huajra, Lurini and Ichocorpa ranges,
along the watershed between the Lanza and Tambopata rivers to 14° south
latitude; thence it will proceed until it meets the Mosoj-Huaico or Lanza River
on the same parallel and will continue along this river until it meets the Tambopata.
From the confluence of the Tambopata River and the Lanza River, the
border will continue to the western source of the Heath River and will follow it
downstream to the Amarumayu or Madre de Dios River. From the confluence
of the Heath River with the Madre de Dios, a geodetic line will be drawn from
the mouth of the Heath in a westerly direction from the barraca Illampu, over
the Manuripi River; and leaving this property, on the Bolivian side, the border
line will continue to the confluence of the Yaverija Creek with the Acre River,
with all territories located to the east of said lines belonging permanently and
perpetually to Bolivia and the territories located to the west of said lines belonging
permanently and perpetually to Peru.
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III
The High Contracting Parties undertake to exchange ratifications of this
Agree-ment within 30 days from the date hereof; and within six months the
Mixed Demarcation Commissions charged with placing markers along the
boundary line will be established in accordance with the foregoing provisions.
The personnel of these Commissions, as well as the instructions to
which they will be subject, shall be determined by special agreement of the
Governments of Peru and Bolivia, giving due consideration to the speed with
which the work can be accomplished and its precision and accuracy.
Signed in duplicate in La Paz on the seventeenth day of September 1909.
Lima, 27 September 1909. Send to Congress
for exercise of authority referred to in Article 59,
Section 16 of the Constitution of the Republic.
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Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia to the Minister Plenipotentiary of Chile in Bolivia, 29 April 1910
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
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No. 272
MINISTER:
I have read with particular interest your letter no. 4 dated yesterday, in which Your Excellency asked me to confirm certain statements that I made in the course of our Conference on the 25th of this month.
I am most pleased to assure Your Excellency that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of which I am in charge, when formulating its vehement aspirations to the possession of a port on the Pacific, will listen with absolute deference to the advice and opinion of Chile, and that if the Chilean government deems it more appropriate to postpone the study of this matter because it is not the proper time to do so, my Government will proceed at all times with the purpose of not altering, in the least, the cordial relationship that fortunately exists between our two countries.
With sentiments of high consideration, I repeat to Your Excellency the expressions of my distinguished appreciation.
[Signed Daniel S. Bustamante]
TO HIS EXCELLENCY MR. GUILLERMO PINTO AGÜERO, EXTRAORDINARY ENVOY AND MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE.
La Paz, 29 April 1910.
Ministry of Foreign Affairsand Worship
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Letter from the Minister Plenipotentiary of Chile in Bolivia
to the Government of Bolivia, 14 August 1910
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
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…
No. 87. La Paz, 14 August 1910
A few days after I was appointed as Head of this Legation, Your Excellency agreed to hold a meeting with the undersigned concerning the wishes of Your Excellency’s Government that mine take into account Bolivia’s aspirations to extend its borders to the Pacific Ocean.
Your Excellency asked me to assess the Chilean Government’s state of mind concerning the cession of the Port of Arica to Bolivia, which in the opinion of Your Excellency’s Government would suit, more than anything else, the commercial needs of Bolivia.
Unfortunately, the exceptional circumstances concerning the dominion of the provinces of Tacna and Arica, since the Treaty of Ancón, prevent my Government from dealing with the matter with countries other than Peru.
The provinces used to form part of the Peruvian territory; however, by virtue of the Treaty mentioned, they came under the sovereignty of Chile until, after a period of ten years, a plebiscite resolves to which of the two countries, Chile or Peru, they were they to be definitively annexed.
After laborious efforts, which lasted for a long time, last March, my Government proposed to the Government of Peru to carry out the plebiscite and proposed equitable and reasonable bases to do so.
Peru has not yet responded to our proposal.
Thus at the moment the only pending matter is the need to implement the Treaty of Ancón so as to determine which of the two countries will have dominion over the abovementioned
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provinces.
Chile wishes to comply with the Treaty and carry out the plebiscite. To that end, it has proposed a fair and equitable formula for its implementation.
We are still waiting for Peru’s response.
Since it is not possible to deal with the cession of Arica with Bolivia, we talked with Your Excellency about other means to serve the commercial interests of your country and we found as a desirable formula the grant by Chile of ample advantages, in its ports, to Bolivia’s commerce.
In agreement with Your Excellency, I made this proposal to my Government, which embraced the idea with noted goodwill. I have just been instructed to request that Your Excellency issue minutes setting forth Your Excellency’s Government’s aspirations in this regard in a clear and detailed manner.
In compliance with the referred instructions, I would like to kindly request that Your Excellency specify in writing, in a detailed manner, the advantages the Bolivian commerce needs in the Chilean ports to meet its aspirations fully.
Once in possession of such minutes, I shall promptly submit them to the consideration of my Government, which wishes to use its best efforts quickly to reach an agreement to satisfy the fair interests of both countries and promote and protect the Bolivian commerce on our coasts.
Trusting that we will bring our efforts to a successful conclusion very soon for the honor and benefit of both Republics, I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.
(Signed) Guillermo Pinto Agüero
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Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia to the Minister Plenipotentiary of Chile in Bolivia, 29 August 1910
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
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No. 64
Subject
MR. MINISTER: -
I am pleased to inform you that I am aware of the declarations made by Your Excellency in note No. 87 of the 14th of this month, regarding the good will that the Government of Chile has to provide all kind of facilities in its ports for the Bolivian commerce.
In response, I am honored to express to Your Excellency that, in due time, I will be pleased to send you a Memorandum containing the wishes of my Government on this matter, in order to be able to reach an agreement, as Your Excellency expresses, that is righteous and beneficial for both Republics.
I reaffirm, on this occasion, that I have the highest and greatest regard for Your Excellency.
To Honorable Mr. GUILLERMO PINTO AGUERO, Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Chile.
-SANTIAGO.-
La Paz, 29 August 191[0]
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND WORSHIP
OFFICE OF DIPLOMATIC AFFAIRS
[Signature]
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E.B. Codesido, Annotations to the History of Diplomatic Negotiations with Peru and Bolivia 1900-1904 (1919),
pp 188-192 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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…
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…
The supplementary protocols that served to specify the obligations undertaken by Chile in order to satisfy the transfer of territory that Bolivia demanded, in the various alternatives contemplated in the respective Treaty, made it clear that there was no agreement on the fundamental basis of the concluded treaties, and the lack of approval by the respective Congresses made these treaties wholly unenforceable, as expressly established by both governments in explanatory notes exchanged to that effect.
Here, we can say that the first stage of the negotiations with Bolivia based on providing this country with its own outlet to the Pacific ended.
After this active period, the diplomatic negotiations ceased to prepare new and more viable solutions.
Actually, on the action of the Governments, inspired by
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a true purpose of harmony and peace, certain factors had been imposed that were part of a different international conflict, that of Tacna and Arica, whose difficulties did not allow the anticipation of resolutions on the cession of territory that would always be met with the unknown and the uncertain.
This state of affairs lasted several years. In the meantime, new bases for a peace treaty with Bolivia arose, and the idea of offering this country an area with access to the sea was disregarded because it was impracticable, although it was a logical and legitimate aspiration, given its condition as a landlocked country. This was not for Chile to grant. The 1895 negotiations had demonstrated this point.
In 1900, Chile confirmed the bases for the signing of a definitive peace treaty with Bolivia, pursuant to the new face that the problem was showing to both Ministries of Foreign Affairs after the hindrances that had come up in relation to the prior solutions.
These Bases, proposed by our Government, were the following:
“The Chilean Government is willing to assume and undertake to pay the obligations incurred by the Government of Bolivia to the mining companies in Huanchaca, Corocoro and Oruro, and the outstanding balance of the Bolivian loan taken out in Chile in 1867, after deducting any amounts paid to such account, as per article 6 of the Truce Pact.
The Government of Chile may also honor the following debts of the Bolivian littoral: the debt pertaining to the bonds issued for the construction of the Mejillones to Caracoles railway; the debt owed to Mr. Pedro López Gama, who is currently represented by Alsop y Ca; the debt to Mr. Enrique Meiggs, represented by Mr. Eduardo Squire, derived from the contract entered into by the former with the Bolivian Government on 20 March 1876, for the lease of the Toco nitrate deposits; and the debt acknowledged in favor of the family of Mr. Juan Garday.
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Such debts will be subject to particular payment and to a specification detailed in a supplementary Protocol.
The Government of Chile will also pay a sum of money that will be fixed by mutual agreement between both governments, and that must be invested in the construction of a railway connecting some port of Chile with the Bolivian interior, or continuing the existing Oruro railway.
The amount, as well as the starting and ending points, will be fixed by mutual agreement; but it may be anticipated that the Government of Chile is willing to pay up to six million Pesos.
The point selected as the start of the railway will be declared duty free for all products and goods entering thereby in transit to Bolivia, and for all Bolivian products and goods exported thereby.
In exchange for such concessions, the Bolivian Government will be willing to enter into the Peace Treaty, ensuring the definitive cession of the Bolivian littoral, occupied by Chile, pursuant to the Truce Pact.”
The 1902 memoir explained in the following terms the results of the confidential mission of Bolivia’s distinguished public figure, Félix Avelino Aramayo, in charge of analyzing the bases for the agreement with our country:
“Although I regret not having yet reached an amicable and equitable solution of the pending matters with Peru, I am satisfied to be able to leave testimony of the good understanding that we have been reaching with Bolivia.
The discrete and accurate endeavor that, pursuant to the instructions of the Department, Chile’s representative has had in that country has been most welcomed by the current Bolivian Government, and translated into concrete facts with the arrival in Chile of Félix Avelino Aramayo, Bolivia’s Minister in Great Britain.
Mr. Aramayo, without having a special mission,
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brought bases accepted by the Government of Bolivia and made sure they were analyzed to reach an agreement that could be formalized immediately by diplomatic means.
After the effectiveness of this fact was verified, the bases for a Treaty were discussed, with the assistance of that country’s Chargé d’Affaires, Julio César Valdés.
In the meetings held on this matter, the following items received particular treatment:
1.
Bolivia’s abandonment of any aspiration to a port on the Pacific;
2.
This country’s trade independence, granting Chile most favored nation status;
3.
Payment by Chile of a sum of money, in annuities, destined for the construction of railroads that will provide an easy outlet to the Pacific for Bolivia’s products.
An almost complete agreement was reached with regard to these items, and the negotiation progressed enough for it to be completed once the diplomatic representations of each country were established, through the appointment of the Ministers Plenipotentiary.”
The Memoir submitted to the Congress of Bolivia in August 1903 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eliodoro Villazón, referring to the status of the negotiations with Chile and its new direction, read:
“There was no change last year in the amicable relations we have been cultivating with this Republic. The current President, filled with elevated feelings and with the desire to end the situation created by the Truce Pact, expressed, from when he took office, the most benevolent willingness to continue the negotiations that could lead to a definitive peace treaty. With this laudable purpose, he established a new Legation, appointing Mr. Beltrán Mathieu as its head. We also appointed a new diplomatic Representative, sent as Minister Plenipotentiary, Alberto
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Gutiérrez. This regularized diplomatic relations, and the negotiations were resumed. During the negotiations, solutions were sought for the various matters of interest for one country and the other, such as: cession of territory and the ensuing compensations–new delimitation of frontiers–trade and customs relations– and, finally, payment of the war indemnities and other obligations undertaken at different times, under contracts guaranteed with income from the littoral.
Agreements were reached in connection with material issues, and the liquidation of debts, form of payment and fixing of the frontier, especially from the Ascotán lake to the Chugara lake, remained pending.”
…
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Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia to
the Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary
of Bolivia in Chile, 21 November 1919
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 43 to its Memorial
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Worship
La Paz, 21 November 1919.
Archive Section
Note Nº 31
Mister Minister,
On 11 November last I addressed to you an encrypted cablegram the translation of which states:
Translation. “Andes.- Santiago.- With regard to the Chilean proposal explained in letter of 13 September this Foreign Ministry believes a counter proposal must be formulated in the sense that Bolivia, Chile, and Peru start a tripartite demarche requesting the mediation of the United States for a solution to the Tacna – Arica problem. In the event that this proposal is accepted, Chile will certainly ask Bolivia to go together before the United States to deal with the plebiscite and its success and to cede the strip to the north of Arica to us. Since neither country nor Government will accept the exclusion of Arica, we will insist on the fact that the Chilean proposal should include said port. If that is the idea, the path shall be opened. Please inform the Foreign Ministry that it would be difficult for the Bolivian public opinion to accept a compromise which excludes Arica from its expected sovereignty and that in any event, the Government of Bolivia considers the Chilean proposal as an act of friendliness towards us. (Signed) Carlos Gutiérrez”.
That Legation knows that the Chilean proposal consists in the cession, by that country, to Bolivia, of an area of territory located to the north of the port of Arica, provided that Chile wins in the plebiscite against Peru, for which our country shall unite its diplomatic action to that of Chile for it to consolidate its sovereignty over the provinces of Tacna and Arica.
In view of this initiative and the insisting efforts of Minister Mr. Bello Codesido so that
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To H. E. Mr. Claudio Pinilla,
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister of Bolivia.
Santiago.
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the Foreign Ministry provides a categorical reply, the undersigned has held many meetings with that diplomat.
One of them took place at the Government Palace, which was attended by the President of the Republic, at the request of the Minister of Chile, Mr. Bello Codesido, and in this one he broadened his country’s proposal, in the sense that, in the event that Bolivia accepted it, the port of Arica would be neutralized, hence, there would not be Chilean customs transactions, nor shall fortifications be built and no army forces shall be kept there.
The Representative of La Moneda also expressed that for the purpose of avoiding that the Chilean-Bolivian proposal for an agreement be seen as a maneuver tending to discredit Bolivia vis-à-vis Peru, Chile proposed Bolivia to concur together and in accordance to strictly comply with the Treaty of Ancón concluded between his country and Peru.
Both the President and the undersigned Minister for Foreign Affairs, told him that Bolivia considered the Chilean proposal as a friendly act towards our country, for it acknowledged our country’s right to an access to the sea. But the Government needed to be inspired by the opinions of the country and for that he thought of inviting the most capable men to a meeting to consult with them on the matter in question, given that the Bolivian attitude, of accepting the Chilean proposal as it was formulated, could seed our future war with Peru.
In a meeting held by the undersigned and the Members of the honorable Commission of Diplomatic Affairs of the Honorable Chamber of Deputies, the idea that the Government of Santiago’s proposal aspired to separate us from Peru, which was not convenient, was generalized.
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Worship
It was after that meeting and conferences held with the President of the Republic and the members of the Cabinet, that the undersigned Foreign Minister reached the conclusion that the proposal of Bello Codesido, in the terms in which it was formulated, should not be accepted, but rather, a counter proposal should be submitted in the sense of taking part with Chile and Peru to request for the mediation of the United States for the solution of the problem of Tacna and Arica.
The advantages that this solution would bring to us will not be hidden from your illustrious and expert criteria, being able to reach the same result proposed by Chile; of attending together and in agreement, when timely, given that Peru is pigeonholed in the most absolute intransigence; and also because the Arica-la Paz railway has bound our interests with those of Chile, along with the fact that our representation, arguable up until now, would be established with the consent of the two Parties to the controversy.
On 14 November, Mr. Bello Codesido was at the Foreign Ministry, where he informed the undersigned about the susceptibility that the spirit of the response of the Bolivian Government to the cablegram had caused; in Peru, people wondered if it was true that Bolivia had “concluded or was about to conclude” a pact with Chile on the future fortune of the Provinces of Tacna and Arica.
The undersigned expressed that the affirmative reply of Bolivia in no way affected the negotiations that could be followed with Chile, since it was nothing but the enunciation ////
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of a current truth.
The Minister then expressed that since the Representative of the Government of La Moneda was there, he believed that it was convenient to inform him that there have been favorable views to seek a tripartite arrangement between Bolivia, Chile and Peru in the reserved sessions of the National Congress when they addressed the Chilean proposal.
This declaration aiming at exploring the spirit of Chile caused a bad impression in Minister Bello, because, as said by the representative of La Moneda, this new attitude implied an unexpected reaction in the sense of a tripartite demarche proposed against the aforementioned.
As there was no such reaction, as expressed to him by the Foreign Minister, and that concept was confirmed by the President of the Republic in a meeting held subsequently in company of the undersigned, and, as the previous one, at the request of the Minister of Chile.
Mr. Bello Codesido conceptualized that Chile’s promise to cede Arica to Bolivia would be as important as ceding to Peru the territories subject to the plebiscite, for there would be no motivation for the Chilean voters.
Chile’s susceptibility with regard to the declaration made before Peru that Bolivia had not concluded, nor is it about to conclude, any pact with Chile on the provinces of Tacna and Arica, has been confirmed in the note whose copy is attached to this letter, along with the reply of the Foreign Ministry under my charge.
You are now informed of the recent events.
On this occasion I renew to you the assurances of my distinguished consideration.
[Signed Carlos Gutiérrez]
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COPY
CHILEAN LEGATION
La Paz, 19 November 1919.
Mister Minister,
On the occasion of the press publications of the telegrams recently exchanged between the Foreign Ministries of La Paz and Lima, Your Excellency accepted my request, verbally expressed on 14 November, of informing me about the text of the telegraphic reply which Your Excellency addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru last 8 November.
Aware of the declaration embodied in the telegraphic note addressed by Your Excellency in which Your Excellency evidences that the “Government of Bolivia has not concluded, nor is it about to conclude, a pact with the Government of Chile on the future fortune of the provinces of Tacna and Arica”, my Government has instructed me to express to Your Excellency the surprise that such a declaration has caused, conceived in such absolute terms, which indeed seem to exclude, in an unusual form, the continuation of the essentially friendly dealings begun by this Legation last September and aimed at producing an agreement between our countries which would signify a new tie in their future relations, as well as a manifestation of Chile’s sincere longing to cooperate on its part to the fulfilment of Bolivia’s aspiration to secure a sovereign access to the Pacific.
This unexpected attitude of the Government of Your Excellency, when the undersigned was awaiting to know the views of this Government on the concrete grounds for an arrangement which synthesizes the ideas exposed by the honorable former colleague of Your Excellency within the
To H.E. Mr. Carlos Gutierrez
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
LA PAZ.
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cordial and friendly spirit to which the mission of the representative of Chile obeys to, and which in this concept had been appreciated, moves my Government to inquire about the scope that the certainty given to Peru in the sense that the Government of Bolivia is not about to conclude a pact with Chile on the future fortune of the provinces of Tacna and Arica could have.
By requesting to Your Excellency for a necessary clarification in this regard I believe it is my duty to anticipate that my Government cannot suppose that it was the intention of Your Excellency to abruptly end the friendly dealings pending through a declaration made before an alien country, whose policy is characterized by a permanent hostility towards Chile, and which, on the contrary, is certain to find the highest motives that inspire the Foreign Ministry of Bolivia’s actions in its relations with friendly countries, the explanation of this diplomatic incident, which notwithstanding the ungrateful comments and views it received, shall not have disturbing effects for the harmony and cordiality in which the mutual efforts of our Governments have been developing in favor of a closer and lasting approach between the two countries
On this occasion I reiterate to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest and distinguished consideration.
(Signed) Emilio Bello Codesido.
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COPY
DIPLOMATIC SECTION
La Paz, 21 November 1919.
NOTE Nº 30
Mister Minister,
I have the honor to receive the kind note addressed by Your Excellency on 19 November last, in which under the express instruction of your Government, Your Excellency expresses the surprise caused by the content of the telegraphic note of this Foreign Ministry in reply to the one addressed by that of Peru, because Your Excellency considers that the terms in which it is conceived are too absolute and seem to exclude the continuation of the dealings carried out by Your Excellency last September.
Your Excellency adds that the attitude of my Government, in the precise moment in which the Legation under your charge believed that the views of the Bolivian Foreign Ministry on the friendly arrangement between both entities, leads you to inquire as to the scope that the certainty given to Peru could have in the sense that the Government of Bolivia is not about to conclude any pact with that of Chile on the future fortune of the provinces of Tacna and Arica.
Fulfilling the desire of Your Excellency of clarifying the criteria with which the Bolivian Foreign Ministry replied to that of Peru, I must express that this reply, far from obeying the purpose of ending the friendly dealings entered into by Your Excellency has no other scope but that of the enunciation of the current truth, for, indeed, my country has not concluded a pact with Chile on the future fortune of the provinces of Tacna and Arica and it is not about to conclude one either because, currently,
To Mr. Emilio Bello Codesido,
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister of Chile in Bolivia
Hand delivered.
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whereas a Chilean proposal is pending in this Foreign Ministry, there still are not grounds for a reciprocal agreement which authorize the imminence of a pact aimed at defining the fortune of those districts, in dispute nowadays between Chile and Peru, signatories of the Treaty of Ancón, and Bolivia believes that it is a party to that controversy because it longs to fulfil its fundamental aspiration of accessing the Pacific by means of the incorporation of Arica or another port into its sovereignty.
Hence, the Government is free to conclude, with the illustrious representative of La Moneda and with any powers that could cooperate in the realization of its legitimate longing to access the sea, agreements that are aimed at facilitating that aspiration and the no-less accentuated one of strengthening, if possible, the relations of cordial friendship that my country and that of Your Excellency inalterably maintain.
On this occasion I renew to you the assurances of my highest and distinguished consideration.
(Signed) Carlos Gutiérrez.
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Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile to
the Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia in Chile,
21 December 1921
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 237 to its Reply
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Received on ________________
Answered on 22 December 1921
Santiago, 21 December 1921.
[Coat of Arms of Chile]
REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Diplomatic Section.
No. 1725.-
Mr. Minister,
His Excellency Mr. Alberto Gutierrez, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, has sent the undersigned an attentive and direct telegraphic communication, a reply to which I believe should not exclude Your Excellency, since you are the highest representative of your homeland in our country in your capacity as Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary.
This communication states the desire, in relation to the diplomatic controversy in which Chile and Peru currently find themselves, to consider Bolivia’s rights and interests regarding the problem of the Pacific, with respect
TO YOUR EXCELLENCY MR. MACARIO PINILLA,
EXTRAORDINARY ENVOY AND MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY OF BOLIVIA IN CHILE.- Santiago.
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to such a solution the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia suggested the dispositions that he believes would be adequate and appropriate.
In response, it is my duty to express to Your Excellency that the pending negotiation between the Government of Chile and the Government of Peru arises from an international Treaty signed between those two countries, in which Bolivia has not had any direct or indirect involvement in the past nor at the moment.
Every act on the part of Bolivia aimed at becoming involved in this disagreement entails an interference contrary to diplomatic practices and the good relations between our two countries.
The dealings before the Government of Peru had the purpose of complying with what is still pending in clause 3 of the Treaty of 1883. With Bolivia, the situation is completely different: The 1884 Truce Pact turned into the 1904 Treaty of Peace and Amity, which was signed by His Excellency Alberto Gutierrez, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of Bolivia. The Treaty set forth conditions of justice and equity convenient for both countries and broadened Bolivia’s then existing means of communication with the coast; Chile took charge of the costs of building the railway
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from Arica to La Paz, half of which would pass to Bolivia in the near future at no charge to that country. In this way Bolivia was linked to the sea by means of three railways: the ones in Arica and Antofagasta, in Chile, and the one in Mollendo, in Peru.
It should be noted that the Treaty referred to has been applied and complied with without any controversy regarding its enforcement or interpretation ever arising from it.
For all this, Your Excellency’s Government has been publicly and formally invited, first in Geneva and later in La Paz and Santiago, to directly explain to Chile its points of view regarding the aspirations to have a port in the Pacific.
However, through a Note dated 16 November, Your Excellency informed me that you had received “instructions to declare that Your Excellency’s Mission did not involve any proposal or initiative regarding Bolivia’s aspirations to obtain a port in the Pacific, for the time being.”
The antecedents presented lead me to declare to Your Excellency that my Government believes it is excused from considering the proposals contained in the telegraph note to which I reply; I request that Your Excellency deliver
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this answer to your Illustrious Government, I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest and distinguished consideration.
[Signature]
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Letter from the Legation of Chile in Bolivia to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 5 December 1926
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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123No. 116
La Paz, 5 December 1926
Minister,
In compliance with the instructions from my Government, I am honoured to submit to Your Excellency, for the information of your Hon. Government, the attached Memorandum wherein the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile answered the proposal from His Excellency, the United States Secretary of State, related to the Tacna and Arica problem.
My Ministry has also instructed me to furnish the press in this city with copies of said Memorandum, so that it can be published tomorrow in order to avoid inaccurate versions.
For this purpose, I am pleased to renew my highest appreciation for Your Excellency in this greeting.
[Signature]
Mr. Alberto Gutierres
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Hand delivered.-
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MEMORANDUM
The Government of Chile has taken a keen interest in the “Memorandum” in which His Excellency, the United States Secretary of State, put forward for its consideration the general guidelines for a plan to reach a final solution to the controversy regarding Tacna and Arica.
The considerations made by the Secretary of State in describing the antecedents which led him to promote such formulation, cause the Government of Chile to account, even if briefly, for the main historical and diplomatic stages of the matter.
The Secretary of State is aware that we may show, with dignity, our centennial tradition in foreign policy, permanently marked by a spirit of cordial friendship toward all American peoples. We never omitted any sacrifice, no matter how big it was, whenever the principle of Pan-American solidarity so required in order to safeguard the political independence of a Nation in this continent.
We do not intend to recall the historical reasons that caused the rupture, which, in our opinion, the Treaties with Peru in 1883 and with Bolivia in 1904 brought to an end and loyally re-established the cordiality and peace under which we have lived for more than fifty years with these nations.
One single matter remained outstanding at the conclusion of the War of the Pacific: the definitive nationality of the territory of Tacna and Arica, which would be determined by the inhabitants ten years after the date of the Treaty.
For forty years, in spite of our reiterated initiatives to produce an agreement to set forth the bases on which the plebiscite should be grounded, it was not possible for us to reach a satisfactory result.
In the tranquil possession of the territory, and confident
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that time would be our best ally to consolidate the situation achieved in those provinces, to whose moral and material progress we have devoted our best energies, we spontaneously renounced that privileged situation and went to Washington in order to seek a final solution to this old issue, inspired by our lofty understanding of international brotherhood.
The Washington Protocol entrusted to your Excellency, the President of the United States, the determination of the bases for such solution, and his decision fully enshrined the Chilean thesis defending the principle of self-determination of the territories through the free will of the inhabitants.
The plebiscitary proceedings evidenced the huge electoral majority existing there in favour of Chile, thus upholding our right to the final annexation of Tacna and Arica to the Chilean territory.
Had this verdict been contrary to Chile, our Government and our country would have hastily complied with its terms.
In spite of this legitimate expectation, the Government of Chile has not hesitated to receive the suggestions from the State Department to divide the territory, a sacrifice accepted only as a generous effort in pursuit of peace. The Secretary of State, who in justice calls upon the national sentiment as a fundamental element in considering this matter, will understand the full extent of this sacrifice, provided that it values the cultural work carried out in such territories by the men who offered the best years of their lives to facilitate the enjoyment of all the benefits of civilization. Teachers, soldiers, missionaries, industrialists, they have all been restless workers in this crusade.
The Republic of Bolivia, which spontaneously waived all maritime littoral twenty years after the end of the war, demanding, as being more convenient to its interest,
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financial compensations and communication ways, has expressed its longing to be included in the negotiations being held to resolve the issue regarding the nationality of these territories.
Neither at law nor in equity can a justification be found to this demand, which is currently asserted as a right. However, the Government of Chile has not disregarded this interest raised by the Government of Bolivia and has subordinated its discussion, as was logical, to the outcome of the pending controversy with the Government of Peru.
Even more so, during the negotiations followed over this year before the Department of State, and within the formula of territorial division, the Government of Chile has not rejected the idea of granting a strip of land and a port to the Bolivian Nation. These highly inspired proposals that the Government of Chile has accepted in this regard have not been given the consideration they deserved on the part of the Peruvian Government, and the matter has remained outstanding to the present date.
Our Government remains under the stipulations of the Ancon Treaty, thus following our long-standing, uninterrupted tradition of respect for the word pledged, and loyal and exact compliance with international commitments.
In the same line of thought, the award of President Coolidge has been accepted, and it is believed that the best solution to the problem is the application of the method established under Article Three of the Ancon Treaty, which was confirmed by the Arbitrator’s decision.
Once the final possession of the territories between Chile and Peru has been defined pursuant to these provisions, the Government of Chile would honour its declarations with regard to the Bolivian aspirations.
The proposal from the Department of State goes far beyond the generous concessions which the Government of Chile has been able to grant. It involves the final cession, to the Republic of Bolivia, of the disputed territory and,
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as the Secretary of State says, although this solution does not hurt the dignity of any of the countries in dispute and is in harmony with the repeated wish of the Chilean Government to help satisfy Bolivian aspirations, it is equally true that such cession entails a sacrifice of our own rights and a cession of territory which has been incorporated to the Republic forty years ago pursuant to a solemn Treaty, a situation that cannot be legally altered except by a plebiscite, the results of which raise no doubt in the feelings of the Chilean people.
At no time has the Government of Chile abandoned this solid legal situation, brought about by the Ancon Treaty and the arbitral award, and it will not abandon it now, either.
Nevertheless, to honour the higher cause of American brotherhood, and led by its longing to favour the conciliation between the countries involved in the War of the Pacific, Chile has always been willing to hear every proposal of arrangement that may contribute to such lofty purposes, while including offers of proportional compensation for the sacrifice of that part of its legitimate rights that such propositions entails.
But it wishes to leave testimony, once again, that when discussing such proposals it has not abandoned such rights, but has merely considered the possibility of freely and voluntarily sacrificing them for the sake of a higher national or American interest.
In this regard, the Government of Chile thus agrees to consider, in principle, giving a new and eloquent demonstration of its purposes of peace and cordiality.
In justice, the Secretary of State affords special relevance to the commercial bonds between the interested countries.
We understand and share such lofty purposes,
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not only in order to solve the pending issue but also to re-establish the friendship between the peoples separated by the 1879 conflict.
In this understanding, we give prevalence to the prior execution of commercial treaties between the three countries, together with agreements on customs and port regimes, and on other related matters that may serve as a strong link, established in the present to ensure harmony in the future and set the foundations for an economic union between Bolivia, Peru and Chile, as the basis for a broader understanding between all Latin American peoples, to facilitate trade and boost the progress of the Continent to the benefit of mankind.
Consequently, we deem it convenient that the commercial treaties and customs agreements which the Secretary of State suggests should be executed with the Government of Peru should be extended to the Government of Bolivia, in accordance with our constant desire to approach this Nation. For Chile, this would entail the consolidation of intense commercial flows currently existing between Chile and Bolivia on solid foundations, whose intensification suits the interests of both peoples.
The Government of Chile attributes the utmost importance to the criterion set forth by the Secretary of State in his “Memorandum”, related to the perpetual neutrality in which these territories ought to be maintained. Thus, we agree with him in that the term “demilitarization” in the region should be understood in its broadest sense, absolutely eliminating any possibility for maintaining naval, air or land bases or forces there or in territorial waters.
In this respect, we are to frankly and clearly express our thoughts to the Secretary of State. If we do hand over a communication way to the Pacific in order for Bolivia to develop an economic life, we have the right to ensure that the sacrifice we make in favour of a lofty ideal will not imply a future risk to our external security.
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As a natural corollary to this concept, it would be indispensable to establish that the territory whose cession is being proposed could not be further transferred, either as a whole or in part, to any of the contracting State parties, or to other powers.
Otherwise, such an acceptance would be tantamount to distorting the noble purposes which the Secretary of State has determined in formulating his proposal.
In the course of the negotiations which this proposition gave rise to, we shall submit our final considerations as previously formulated, put forward any others that contemplate our interests, and attentively hear those that other interested parties could also suggest. The proposals by the Secretary of State and the suggestions by the parties shall be regarded as an indivisible entirety, aimed at the lofty goal pursued by the Government of the United States, as widely shared by the Government of Chile, of definitively solving the issue and reaffirming the peace and brotherhood between all American countries.
Santiago, 4 December 1926.
(Signed). Jorge Matte, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile.
True copy of the original wire cable. - La Paz, 5 December 1926.
[Signature]
[Seal:] Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary of Chile
CHILEAN LEGATION
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Circular of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia to
the Legations of Bolivia Abroad, 21 January 1927
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
A. Vergara Vicuña, The Sea, Link of Peace between Bolivia and Chile (1936),
pp 314-322
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Circular to Bolivia’s Legations
Abroad
La Paz, 21 January 1927
Sir
,
Following up on the information and comments I first conveyed to you via my circular of 29 December, concerning the international state of affairs, I will now address the Government of Peru’s response, issued this month on the 12th, to the Memorandum of the Secretary of State of the United States, dated this past 30 November, categorically rejecting his proposals for a three-country agreement regarding the Tacna and Arica litigation.
In my aforementioned circular, I pointed out that no objection had thus far been raised by Peru to Mr. Kellogg’s formula, which was indicative of such Government’s tacit assent to his proposals. Perhaps it has been supervening circumstances that caused it to change
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship
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its political course and guided the drafting of the Note of 12 January.
The substantive portion of Peru’s Note starts by expressing verbatim, as follows:
“The proposed arbitration had no parties other than Peru and Chile. Neither the treaty nor the supplementary act even made provision for a third power to be involved. The subsequent acceptance of good offices without abandoning the arbitration has not changed the parties’ exclusive standing. How can it then be explained that, the arbitration agreements reached between Peru and Chile that do not contemplate the intervention of a third power in the resolution of the dispute, may then end with the participation of Bolivia, which, according to the Memorandum’s proposal, would take ownership of the Tacna and Arica territories?”
It is obvious to respond that Secretary Kellogg proposed this solution not as an arbitrator but, rather, as a mediator, pursuant to the second part of the Washington protocols. If the arbitrator’s powers are limited, for the same reason that they are final, those of the mediator have by their very nature all the flexibility of true terms of agreement. On the other hand, Mr. Kellogg has not sought out Bolivia since it withdrew its neutrality
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in the plebiscitary proceeding to arbitrarily raise it as a term of the agreement. Bolivia’s participation has been imposed not just because of the public demonstration of its need and rights but also because Chile and Peru have suggested and imposed its international standing. Proof of this are the public and well-known documents produced by Chile from May 1879 onwards and, restricting ourselves to the case of Peru, the declarations of President Leguía recorded in multiple documents and even in the note of this 12 January. Said country was offering to transfer to Bolivia the entire disputed territory, and the latter offered a portion of it. It is thus not Mr. Kellogg who suggested Bolivia’s participation in the dispute but rather, in addition to its geographic and economic situation relative to Tacna and Arica, its rights have been recognized, in whole or in part, by Chile and Peru. The mediator could not, and should not, ignore such circumstances and, relying on this Government’s willingness, has tried to propose a permanent, final plan to achieve peace.
It is not true either that, as Peru’s Memorandum seems to suggest, Bolivia receives with this offer a free gift, with no legal basis. Bolivia has agreed to involvement that was required of it by all the historical antecedents of this dispute and all the principles
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of law it has raised. Everyone has acknowledged the selflessness with which it has accepted the burden of a continental peacemaker, for the sake of the principle it has adopted from the celebrated conclusions of President Wilson, that nations have a fundamental right to be directly connected to the Ocean’s great ways to thus acquire the attributes of sovereignty. It is in honor of that principle and in the service of needs that are becoming more pressing in nature day by day that Bolivia has been willing to make any and all efforts and sacrifices its economic capacity will allow it in order to secure those elements of commercial and political independence.
The Peruvian Note raises the precedent that the chief of the plebiscitary commission, General Lassiter, expressed his opinion that holding the Tacna and Arica plebiscite under honorable, proper conditions was unachievable in such circumstances (15 June 1926). It deduces from this antecedent that such declaration meant that the disputed territory was to automatically revert to Peruvian sovereignty. General Lassiter’s opinion did not, and could not, have any other scope than to suggest to the arbitrator that he should declare the plebiscite unachievable, and proceed under the second part of the Washington protocol, i.e. that he invite the parties to consider the new situation or that he take on the good offices that are being extended. Any attempt to treat
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General Lassiter’s opinion as an arbitral final award really means disregarding all international pacts and precepts. Furthermore, even if General Lassiter’s opinion could have the character of an arbitral award, he only said that the plebiscite, at that time, could not be carried out under the proper conditions. To attribute greater scope to such a declaration would mean contravening the precepts of law and putting in the mouth of an official who is not vested with any arbitral authority words that he never uttered, either expressly or implicitly, or that are understood from his opinions. Had the arbitrator, the true arbitrator, the President of the United States, wished to hold Peru as the successful party in the dispute and granted it the possession of and title to Tacna and Arica, he would have done so on an ULTRA PETITA basis, and he would have infringed the limitations of his mandate, which was reduced to determining whether or not the plebiscite could proceed. To suggest that the opinion of General Lassiter has more weight than the authority of the arbitrator himself is to completely distort the factors of the dispute and subvert the terms of the arbitration agreement.
The Government of Bolivia’s affirmation that it will not be ceding even a single particle of its national soil, either gratuitously or for consideration, was in reference to the territory whereupon it exercises, or will be able to exercise, its full sovereignty, not, as is the case of Peru, incomplete rights and mere expectations that it has not actually exercised in over
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forty years, as the ones over the territories of Tacna and Arica.
The Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has exhibited a marked revulsion to the idea of submitting the transfer of territories and fragments of sovereignty to a monetary assessment, as if they were vulgar goods in ordinary trade, rather than, as they actually are, pieces of the national soul, the heart of Peru, as stated verbatim in reference to Tacna and Arica. Unfortunately, it is Peru that has established this precedent and priced those territories through the Ancón Treaty, the necessary antecedent of any agreement, given the terms of the Washington protocol. In agreeing to the alternative form provided for in Article 3 of that Treaty, a compensation of 10 million pesos for the benefit of the losing country in the prescribed plebiscite proceeding is stipulated. It could be objected that the Treaty of Ancón was signed under forceful pressure but, given the circumstances of said historical moment, that compensation was agreed upon either on Peru’s initiative or with a view to satisfying its interests. The Secretary of State of the United States has therefore not suggested a new idea, but faithfully adhered to the dispute’s antecedents instead.
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The Peruvian Note claims that accepting the Kellogg formula would equal abandoning its nationals in Tacna and Arica to the servitude and dishonor in which they currently live in. Precisely, the formula in question seeks to remove Peruvian nationals out of that opprobrious regime to place them under a government regime that is the one that had traditionally existed in that territory; a regime of friendly cooperation between Bolivians and Peruvians aimed at working for the area’s prosperity and returning to it the blooming development it enjoyed when Peru was in charge of its political governance and Bolivia contributed the energy of its commercial and economic activity. Those interests never clashed nor conflicted, and there is no reason at all to assume that, as the years went by, the Bolivian regime would have become oppressive or tyrannical. On the other hand, the Peruvian residents in that region had no aspirations other than their trade freedom and those conditions of stability and confidence that only well-defined political situations can afford.
The sacrifice the American Memorandum has asked of both Chile and Peru, that they surrender their respective disputed rights for the sake of peace, means for Peru nothing but a renunciation of a remote expectation, while, to Chile, it means surrendering an actual possession.
At the end of the Peruvian Note the following concepts are established.
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“This rejection does not, however, mean an intention to obstruct any other solutions. Far from it, Peru has accepted the partial or full internationalization of the provinces and has accepted their separation, gratuitously giving Bolivia a passageway (sic) until the beach and, there, a small bay that can be turned into a large, convenient and safe port. Lastly, Peru is willing to listen to any suggestion, on condition, however, that it be returned the towns of Tacna and Arica, the latter along with its port and Morro.”
Such assertions need no commentary. Peru should be recognized for its right to the integrity of this dispute, and it will see if it can make some concessions. The note I find myself commenting on here in such detail affirms that Peru holds absolute rights over Tacna and Arica that it will never give up, that it will not cede on any account; however, it is willing to make a definitive cession to some unknown entity, which would be the internationalization. Probably, such cession would be based on neutralized territories being subjected to the authority of a Peruvian government.
It is deplorable for Bolivia’s Government to have to refute the viewpoints of the Government of a friendly country we are tied to by memories of past glories and common sacrifices; it is, however,
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a matter of decorum for this Foreign Ministry to explain the reasons why Bolivia has accepted the legal situation it was offered via the Memorandum of the Secretary of State of the United States. Nothing in this country’s behavior is out of line with its irreproachable loyalty to its neighboring countries. The Republic has a right to seek, within the strictest norms of international propriety, means to repair the landlocked status it has been reduced to by sad events that can and should receive ample reparation in law and justice.
The Peruvian response, which reveals a temporary clouding of the judgment of the men who are leading that country, is but an incident in this great process of historical reparation that all these peoples should pursue in order to consolidate their full development.
I beg that you pass these considerations on to the Government you have been accredited to for its information and consideration.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurance of my distinguished appreciation in considering myself your faithful servant.
A. Gutiérrez.
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Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile to
the Chilean Ambassador to Bolivia, 16 November 1944
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF DIPLOMATIC AFFAIRS
orm
Declarations of the new Bolivian ambassador in Peru
Copy by air mail.
Original by ordinary means.
Santiago, 16 November 1944.
CONFIDENTIAL OFFICIAL LETTER No. 53
Our Embassy in Peru, through Official Letter No. 590/267 of 26 October, has informed this Ministry of the arrival in Lima of the new Bolivian Ambassador in Peru, Mr. Rafael Ballivián, who upon being interviewed by journalists about the matters still “pending” for Bolivia with regard to its foreign affairs, stated that “fortunately, all of my country’s international issues have been satisfactorily and very fairly resolved. In the future, any matters referring to topics of this nature which Bolivia should solve will be strictly about trade agreements, the strengthening of relations with its neighboring countries, cultural exchanges, and anything entailing forging deeper bonds.”
This Office is positively interested in being informed, as soon as practicable, of the reaction this declaration may have caused in Bolivia.
May God be with you.
BY MINISTER
[Signature.]
TO
THE AMBASSADOR OF CHILE IN BOLIVIA.
LA PAZ .
[Illegible handwritten note.]
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Letter from the Embassy of Chile in Bolivia to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 18 October 1945
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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CV/RGA
First Interview held with the Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Port Issue.
LA PAZ, 18 October 1945
CONFIDENTIAL. No. 837/50.-
Minister,
Consistently with common practice, after arriving in this capital city, I requested a preliminary audience with the Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gustavo Chacón.
Said audience was held today, and I attended the meeting with the Counselor of this Mission, Mr. Joaquín Larraín S.
Following formal introductions, the Minister explained that the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, which had taken on the duty to address and resolve, to the extent possible, the complex and diverse problems faced by the country, had – among other things – the advantage of not being responsible for the political agenda and international policy errors committed by previous administrations and, consequently, party members were exempt from the need to account for past actions or exploit popular feelings to enhance the personality of certain politicians, he wished, through His Excellency the President of the Republic to find a solution to the port aspirations present in the Bolivian people, within a direct understanding with the Chilean Government. To that end, the interest of both countries would be taken into consideration, on the basis of reciprocal compensations to guarantee full comprehension and harmony between both peoples in the future.
The Minister personally
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and notwithstanding any personal situation which might be politically commendatory to him, thought and had the purpose to circumscribe the problem to specific terms which could make it possible or viable to find a solution that contemplated, in part, the Bolivian longings and that at the same time was acceptable to Chile, since for the time being it was not possible, in his opinion, to seek unilateral solutions which were outdated or ill-timed.
That he understood that any suggestion or solution of the kind he imagined could not be carried out during his term as member of the Cabinet or even during the term in office of their Excellencies, Mr. Juan Antonio Ríos and Mr. Gualberto Villarroel, because an environment of cordiality and cooperation had to be created which did not exist to the present, he recognized.
That for the time being – given that this was my first visit – he only deemed it convenient to enunciate the purposes of the Government, which had already transpired into certain actions that were actually aimed at creating such cordial climate toward Chile. For instance, the agreement for the current Chilean Ambassador was granted immediately, as compared to the ordinary proceeding, which usually takes more than a week, and he personally intervened before the Directors of Government-friendly journals to cooperate with the President’s and the Cabinet’s cordial purpose.
That I could already count, with the best disposition of the Government and with his personal friendship, and that the suggestions he made were precisely inspired on such feelings.
On my part, I stated that I was commissioned by His Excellency, President Juan Antonio Ríos, the Vice President, His Excellency Mr. Alfredo Duhalde, and His Excellency, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Joaquín Fernández, to
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present the Government of Bolivia with most amiable salutations and to assure that the Mission entrusted to me is, as it has always been, inspired by cordial and harmonious wishes as the basis for our Government with regard to all American Republics.
I added that, in order for the performance of my mission not to cause any misunderstanding which might undermine the amiable purposes related to my work, I wanted – in my turn – to express with all the frankness and honesty the way in which the Chilean Government values its political relations with the Republic of Bolivia and, to that end, I expressed that Chile considers that there is no pending problem or issue, either legal or juridical, with this sister Republic. The Chilean public opinion has no antipathy feelings toward the Bolivian people and, quite the opposite, it is visibly pleased to receive any action aimed at removing from the Bolivian spirit any hate against Chile, what our people expect with anticipation, the abandonment of old policies based on hatred on the part of Bolivians, while Chile disregarded this brotherly people in the harmonic play between American nations, in whose maintenance we were all interested.
I told him I agreed with him in that, in compliance with the Treaty in force, which is not defective and which Chile has loyally fulfilled, and provided that an environment of moral disarmament of the politics in Bolivia had been created, and consequently in Chile, the Government could hear the suggestions announced to the Minister, which should be informal in nature and be explained in a way not to be exploited as background of domestic policy by any of the countries and – before putting them forward for consideration of the Governments – they should be known by the respective diplomatic representatives so as
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to be polished and cleansed from any unacceptable or inconvenient parts for the respective sovereignty rights. This is intended to prevent the efforts from becoming an immediate failure, which would unquestionably worsen relations between Chile and Bolivia.
I also expressed to him that any suggestions by the Bolivian government regarding the indicated aspirations, should be grounded on the fact that any allegations in this sense had always been considered contrary to national sovereignty and, since our country was essentially democratic, it could not be expected that the solution to international matters would be imposed either by the Government or by the Ambassadors – on the contrary – they should account with a consensus of public opinion, and this situation could also be expected to apply in the case of Bolivia. The preparation or inception of new aspects in the neighborly relation between Chile and Bolivia should, thus, be carefully designed and fully deprived of publicity until such time as the terms to be proposed to us were deemed feasible or not.
After listening to the foregoing explanation, Minister Chacón expressed his agreement with the exchanged points of view and eventually affirmed that, were he to continue in office as Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a future meeting he would specify the special aspects of the suggestion he had formulated in general terms and which was intended to relieve Bolivia’s landlocked situation.
Even though I found it premature to address this issue during a visit which was exclusively introductory and of a courtesy nature, I was forced to specifically establish the ideas described above, given that the Minister took the initiative to act in this respect and to appear, naturally, with a precise opinion on our part about the assertion
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that was about the Bolivian aspirations .
For the same reasons, I did not find it necessary to urge the Minister to further specify his points of view, at least not until the conversations which he announced President Villarroel wished to have with me.
It is my belief that I have in this manner faithfully interpreted the instructions given to me in Santiago by his Excellency the President, and by you.
May God keep you.
[Signature]
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Letter from the Embassy of Chile in Bolivia to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 31 October 1945
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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OFFICE OF DIPLOMATIC AFFAIRS.
Interview held with the President of the Republic, Lt. Col. Gualberto Villarroel.- Port Issue.
CONFIDENTIAL
No. 881/54.-
LA PAZ, 31 October 1945.
Minister,
I was invited by His Excellency, the President of the Republic, and I went yesterday to the Government House, where I held a conversation with Mr. Gualberto Villarroel for an hour and a half.
The President started by giving an account of his domestic duties as head of government, and highlighted the most prominent aspects of his administrative and political work.
In the administrative sphere, he informed me, in particular, about the measures intended to boost production, which would cater for the financial reconstruction of Bolivia by replacing the country’s economy, dependent on a single commodity, with a regime that facilitates independence in the field of livelihoods and self-supply.
The President, who speaks with assertiveness and confidence, believes that his policy, intended not to destroy but to make capital serve the needs of the country and improve the living conditions of the working classes, shall bring about cohesion among various political sectors.
Furthermore, he wishes to build a Government that is endorsed by organized political parties
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and he understands such endorsement should be sought in the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement which, situated between capitalism and communism, expects to represent the middle and working classes of the country.
After describing his work in the domestic arena, he expressed his wish to share his thoughts about international relations. In that regard, he told me that the Chaco War, in which he had served, had shown Bolivians and Paraguayans alike that international conflicts are beneficial to no one.
The calm study of the Chaco controversy had convinced him that, with good faith, Bolivians and Paraguayans were defending what they understood were their rights, on the grounds of the tittles derived from the constitution of their respective colonial governorships and, had they chosen to contrast their realities rather than engaging in stubborn claims, a harmonious solution would have been reached and the blood of young people, from populations which did not hate each other, would not have been shed.
This experience had led him to think, as head of government, that it is convenient to prevent misunderstandings, in the future of Bolivia and Chile.
He could not conceal the fact that the desire to obtain its own access to the sea is being strengthened and grows day by day in Bolivian public opinion, in spite of the facilities available to the country for the conveyance of its products to the Pacific. He further stated that such aspiration would imply further pressure in this direction in the future, if the economic plan of his Government, as explained earlier, proved successful, once Bolivia achieved diversified exports. Therefore, he believed it was not only in the interest of Bolivia, but also of Chile, that a solution to this aspiration was not indefinitely delayed so that, against reciprocal compensations, it was also commercially useful for Chile.
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Next, he went on to state that he perfectly understood that no Government in Chile could at present raise, without facing a risk of removal, before public opinion the cession of a port to Bolivia. Thus, it was a duty of this Government to provide for the Chileans the means that could satisfy Bolivian aspirations. To that end, he was willing to create, from his Government, a new climate of cordiality and reciprocity of interests to enable the minorities in Chile desiring a definitive and amicable agreement to succeed with their view of the vital interests of this neighboring Republic.
He further informed that, in his opinion, the legal theory supporting a revision of the 1904 Treaty could not prosper before the United Nations.
Based on the foregoing, and notwithstanding his position as member of the military, he would lead international policy in order to pursue an understanding with Chile, a country which he valued and whose cooperation he wished to count on for the progress of Bolivia.
At this point of the conversation, I dared ask the President whether, in this line with his ideas, he had drawn, or devised, a concrete plan or proposal considered feasible in the future, and he replied that he had no such concrete proposal to make, but he only aspired that the initiative of efforts for an agreement would come from his Government.
In turn, I expressed that, as he also recognized, the difficulty for any Chilean administration to make a port concession to Bolivia fundamentally rested on the conviction that the 1904 Treaty was not only valid, but it also entailed compensation which had been agreed upon and complied with, and nothing else was due to Bolivia.
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Such belief in the public opinion became increasingly uncompromising as the Bolivian revisionist claim was renewed before foreign countries; however, there was no antipathy in Chile against Bolivia and, even more so, there is among all social classes a strong rapprochement desire, which should be strengthened by means of commercial relations and through the comprehension and understanding between the men of both countries, as His Excellency perfectly knows.
Just like many in Bolivia believe, with no basis, that there are hostile purposes on the part of Chile, on account of diverse publications and legal opinions, many in our country believe that, in the event a formula or an agreement were to be reached with Bolivia after having accepted any sacrifice, Bolivian public opinion would revive the revisionist theory.
As His Excellency recognized, in his honorable spirit of understanding, the difficulties an immediate agreement would imply for the Government of Chile, in a similarly loyal manner I ought to state that any solution to be sponsored by him should involve a considerable reduction of the claims from exacerbated spirits, which would blow up on the President, as a means of political opposition, at a time when political harmony was not entirely achieved in Bolivia.
As a member of the military, such arrangement, far from being beneficial, would be detrimental to his career, as there is a belief that only heroic actions are becoming of the military, and present generations do not have sufficient knowledge against which to appreciate the moral value of civilian actions performed by the military in office.
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The immediate solution might be useful, but it would not be appreciated; however, the initiator of a new policy should always be remembered, to the extent such policy eventually proves beneficial and is contrary to that undertaken by his predecessors, who failed.
Additionally, I expressed that the paths to an understanding proposed by His Excellency cannot be objected as not being beneficial to Bolivia because, besides enabling competition to the advantage of consumers, it will always be good for the Bolivian market to count on supplementary economies from its neighboring countries.
Finally, I stated that we might conclude from the conversation that the actions from his Government and our actions should be limited, for the time being, and without implying any delays on the part of the Chilean Government, to the creation of an amiable climate through the approval of all relevant exchange arrangements and other agreements intended to morally defuse both peoples, and in order to prepare, in the near future, a convention to relieve Bolivia’s landlocked position.
The lack of concrete propositions to be made is due to the purpose of leaving reality to take the opportunity and point to the most adequate and attainable path for Chile to satisfy Bolivia, so that both His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Bolivia, and the Chilean Ambassador should, according to this, focus on the preparation of an amiable environment in which to enable those who are to succeed us to find an equation that finally seals the friendly ties between both countries.
The President told me that, among these purposes, he would call upon me and instruct his Minister of Foreign Affairs to shape the agreements to that end, in regard to various matters he specified, some of which are still pending, and he expressly allowed me to inform you in this respect.
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Thus, I hereby duly submit to you the report contained in my Telegram No. 307 dated yesterday, and I will very much appreciate your authoritative opinion on the matters this letter addresses.
I further reiterate to you the impression conveyed in such telegram, in the sense that I was personally quite satisfied at the statements of President Villarroel, who, by making them, showed a broadly conciliatory approach and a clear intention to reestablish cordiality with our country, which had been lost in the past months.
Moreover, his statements reflect the composure and realistic approach of the Bolivian head of state on the matter of port aspiration.
However, it should be borne in mind that, as you are well aware, this country is typically prone to an excessive sensitivity among men and exacerbated jingoist elements may, interested in creating difficulties for the Government, distort at any time the sound intentions of President Villarroel with peevish attitudes like those which, on other occasions, have disrupted the harmony between both countries.
May God keep you.
[Signature]
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Minutes of a conversation between the President of Chile
and the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, 17 June 1948
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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Strictly Confidential
Conversation with His Excellency and Ambassador of Bolivia, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez.-
On Thursday, 17 June at 12.30 p.m., Ambassador Ostria Gutiérrez met with His Excellency the President of the Republic and explained that he had instructions to propose a draft that would serve as a basis for discussion to officially open the negotiations regarding Bolivia’s landlocked status problem.
His Excellency said he was willing to listen.
Ambassador Ostria stated that Bolivian aspirations consisted of an outlet to the sea, including the port and the city of Arica.
The President of the Republic, in response to this proposal, said that he had been quite clear before when he refused to begin any efforts on the basis of the cession of Arica.
As a result, Ambassador Ostria said that, since one of Chile’s main reasons to refuse to cede Arica was the historical value of the city, a division could be arranged, leaving major historical monuments to Chile and the rest for Bolivia.
The President immediately replied that Arica was not a divisible city and could not accept the commencement of negotiations on the basis of its division.
Ambassador Ostria then referred to the possibility that Chile ceded a part of the bay of Arica to Bolivia, making reference to its large extension. President González Videla said once again that his refusal to open negotiations over Arica referred to both the port and the city.
Ambassador Ostria stated that, in view of this, Bolivia’s aspirations would be met if a strip of land north of Arica was ceded and asked the President if he would accept to open negotiations on this basis. H.E. told Ambassador Ostria that for this he needed
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to have Bolivia’s proposal in writing regarding the strip of land to which the Ambassador had made reference. He asked the Ambassador to write his proposal in a document as a Note addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressly stating that Bolivian petitions with regard to Arica had been strictly rejected by the Government of Chile.
Only when the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been informed of this concrete proposal made by Bolivia on the cession of a strip of land north of Arica, could negotiations be declared to be open. The President further stated that Chile would then have the opportunity to officially inform Peru that negotiations had begun on said basis.
Ambassador Ostria asked the President not to make such communication, and the President said he would talk about it with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vergara Donoso.
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Telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
to the Embassy of Chile in Bolivia, 19 June 1948
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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EMBACHILE
LA PAZ
No. 1.- Strictly Confidential.- 19 June 1948.- summary of cable No. 47.- 1.- At noon on the 17th of this month, Ambassador Ostria held his second meeting with His Excellency the President of the Republic to discuss the matter of Bolivia’s port aspirations.- 2.- The Ambassador expressed that Bolivia’s aspirations included an outlet to the sea, including the port and city of Arica.- When this was categorically refused by His Excellency, Ostria mentioned the possibility that Chile would cede to Bolivia part of the city of Arica, or, ultimately, part of the bay.- Given the refusal by His Excellency to open negotiations on that basis, Ambassador Ostria stated that the port aspiration would be limited to the cession of a strip of land to the north of that port.- 3.- His Excellency the President of the Republic requested the Bolivian Government to formulate proposals in writing, and that only then would it be possible to declare open the negotiations.- 4.- The information that the undersigned told Ambassador Ostria that it would be a good idea to accelerate the negotiations is not true.- VERGARA
#3815
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25 June 1948
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On Friday, 25 June, at noon, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Germán Vergara, met with the Ambassador of Bolivia, Mr. Ostria Gutierrez, who consulted him on the delivery of the draft note attached to this memorandum.
Minister Germán Vergara told Ambassador Ostria that he would not mind answering this note expressing that the Government of Chile would declare its disposition to listen to any concrete proposal on this matter by the Bolivian Government, but making an express reservation that official negotiations could only be declared open once Chile knows said proposals and considers them acceptable as a basis for discussions.
It was understood that the Chilean drafted response would be delivered to the Ambassador to Bolivia, who would only then submit the note detailing his concrete proposals to Minister Vergara for his consideration.
18 hs. Meeting held by Minister Germán Vergara and the Ambassador of Bolivia, Mr. Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez.
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Draft Note
Minister:
The Government of Chile, on different occasions and specifically in the Treaty of 18 May 1895 and the Minutes of 10 January 1920, entered into with Bolivia, although not ratified by the respective Legislative Powers, accepted the cession to my country of its own outlet to the Pacific Ocean.
Subsequently, on the occasion of the claim presented by Bolivia on 1 November 1920, at the First Assembly of the League of Nations, the Delegate of Chile, His Excellency Agustín Edwards, stated as follows:
“Bolivia can find satisfaction in direct and freely consented negotiations. Chile has never closed this door to Bolivia, and I am able to declare that nothing would please us more than to discuss directly with Bolivia the best means to help its development. What Chile wants is its friendship; our burning desire is for it to be happy and prosperous. It is also in our own interest, since it is our neighbour and its prosperity will reflect on ours.”
Later on, His Excellency the President of Chile, Mr Arturo Alessandri, in a Message addressed to the Chilean Congress of 1922, declared as follows:
“In Bolivia the conviction should grow stronger that, in an environment of fraternity and harmony, they will only find in our country a warm desire to look for proposals that, taking into account our legitimate rights, can satisfy as far as possible their aspirations.”
In turn, on 6 February 1923, His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Mr Luis Izquierdo, stated in a note addressed to the Minister of Bolivia, Mr Ricardo Jaimes Freyre, that the Government of Chile “keeps the purpose of hearing with the highest spirit of conciliation and equity, the proposals that the Government of Bolivia might submit to it to conclude a new Pact that considers the situation of Bolivia, without modifying the Treaty of Peace and without interrupting the continuity of Chilean territory.”
To Mr. Germán Vergara Donoso
The Minister Of Foreign Affairs,
Hand delivered
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On the other hand, concerning the proposal of the Secretary of State of the United States, His Excellency Mr Frank B. Kellogg, for Chile and Peru to cede to Bolivia “any right, title and interest which either may have in the provinces of Tacna and Arica”, His Excellency Mr Jorge Matte, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, stated that “the Government of Chile has not rejected the idea of granting a strip of territory and a port to the Bolivian Nation” and that it accepts “to consider, in principle, the proposal.”
At the start of his Government, His Excellency the President of the Republic, Mr Gabriel González Videla, demonstrated a similar disposition during his conversations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, His Excellency Mr Aniceto Solares, who attended the presidential inauguration, in November 1946, as well as during the numerous meetings held with the undersigned Ambassador of Bolivia in Chile.
With such an important antecedents that reveals a clear orientation in the international policy followed by the Chilean Republic, I have the honor of proposing to Your Excellency that the governments of Bolivia and Chile formally enter into a direct negotiation to satisfy the fundamental need of Bolivia to obtain its own sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, thus solving the problem of the landlocked situation of Bolivia on bases that take into account the mutual benefits and genuine interests of both peoples.
Certain of being able to rely upon the acceptance of the Government of Your Excellency, thus beginning a work of great future possibilities for Bolivia as well as for Chile, I reiterate the assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration.
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Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 28 June 1948
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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EMBASSY OF BOLIVIA
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
N° 515/375
Subject: Negotiations
with Chile.
Santiago, 28 June 1948.
Mr. Minister:
Following the dispatch of my note N° 455/325, dated 2 June, in which I informed you of the conversations I held with the President of Chile, Mr. Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, and with the Minister of Foreign affairs, Mr. German Vergara Donoso, I received new instructions enclosed in the letter dated 4 June, sent by H.E. the President of the Republic, Dr. Enrique Hertzog, and by you, as a result of the information I transmitted in my encrypted cablegram N° 115, of the first of this month.
Immediately thereafter, I met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had requested me to provide him with information on the main points which, in accordance with the instructions I would receive, I was to communicate to the President of the Republic. I informed Mr. Vergara Donoso about the content of the Bolivian counterproposal in frank terms.
The Chilean Foreign Minister heard me silently and then made the following observation:
-Has the President of the Republic not told you about the impossibility of transferring Arica?
-Yes, he did, I replied, but he also invited me, after making the respective consultation with the Foreign Ministry of La Paz, to communicate to you, in clear and faithful terms, the view of the Government of Bolivia. And that is what I am determined to do.
Mr. Vergara Donoso said nothing in response to this assertion and, with the extreme caution that characterizes him, only agreed on the advisability of moving forward with the negotiations, and also promised to schedule a meeting with the President of the Republic.
On Thursday 17 of this month, at 12:30 p.m., I was granted that meeting and President Gonzalez Videla received me with much cordiality, as always. Then, consistently with his very invitation and just as I had told the Foreign Minister, I faithfully informed him of the view of the Government of Bolivia, proposing “the cession of the port of Arica and of the coastal strip to the north, up to the Peruvian border” –following the instructions issued by H.E. the President of the Republic and you, on 4 June (letter a). I also proposed the transfer of the “Chilean section of the Arica-La Paz railway, including its dependencies, warehouses, etc.”, (letter b) and I explained
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EMBASSY OF BOLIVIA
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note No 515/375.
to him that the respective compensations, both for the cession as for the transfer, would be subject to a subsequent agreement to be entered into within a term of fifteen days (letter c). Finally, I suggested that the Government of Chile should inform the government of Peru –as prescribed under the additional protocol concluded between both countries in 1929– of the agreements reached with Bolivia, because our country “did not want the solution to its port issue to cause disturbances in its friendship with the sister Republic of Peru”, (letter d).
When I made that proposal, I also explained to President Gonzalez Videla the geographic and financial aspects that made advisable the cession of Arica to Bolivia –a port which in reality was nothing but an “onerous port” for Chile, according to the categorical statements of an eminent Chilean intellectual and politician.
After hearing me with great attention, President Gonzalez Videla addressed the arguments that he had put forward in the meeting we held on 1 June and about which I informed you in my Noteº 455/325, dated 2 June. After that, he added firmly that ceding Arica was impossible, regardless of the conditions proposed, and he insisted that that city was a real sanctuary of the warlike glories of Chile and that, hence, the Army would not accept its cession.
–You will tell me that I ought to not request consent from the Army –he added– That is true. But as the Head of the State it is my duty to give an ear to their opinion, and I know the Army is opposed to that idea.
I then proposed, in accordance with the instructions imparted on 4 June, (letter e) that, since what mattered to Bolivia was the port of Arica, the Morro of Arica, where the “warlike glories of Chile” were actually located, should be excluded from the transfer by means of a modus vivendi.
However, I could not make any progress with our purpose, because President Gonzalez Videla remained inflexible in his view opposing to the cession of Arica.
–Even if I accepted this transfer –he said– the Congress would reject it unanimously. To be honest there would not be a single vote in favor of it. Why head towards a forced failure then? Were I not acting in good faith, it would be easy to accept the Bolivian proposal and limit myself to expect the Congress to reject it. But that is not and cannot be my intention. On the contrary, I want to take things to a realistic field so that Chile and Bolivia come to an understanding. Furthermore, I understand the need that Bolivia has for an access to the Pacific Ocean. I was born in La Serena, I am a seaman and I realize what not having an access to the ocean means for a country, all the more when this country did have, as in the case of Bolivia, one. If I were Bolivian, I would keep the same ideal you do.
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Then, insisting on his rejection to our counterproposal, he declared that he could accept the transfer of a strip of territory, “but not of a town”. On the other hand, he noted that Peru’s reluctance would be unavoidable in case Arica were transferred to Bolivia, which would not happen, according to him, if such transfer merely concerned a semi deserted territory to the north of that city. “Without doubt” –he finally said– “the first transfer mentioned [that of Arica] would cause enmity in Peru not only against Chile but also against Bolivia...”
He then continued insisting on taking the matter to a realistic ground and he noted, once more, the viability of transferring a strip of territory north of Arica.
In light of that situation, with the impossibility of securing his consent with regard to transferring Arica, and proceeding in accordance with what was expressed by H.E the President of the Republic, Doctor Enrique Hertzog, in a note addressed to you on 17 April 1948 (letter a) and with the express authorization contained in cablegram N° 77 addressed by you on 10 June, (“if this were not possible, you may move on with the negotiations as expressed in the last paragraph of your note N° 325”), I proposed that the transfer of a strip of territory to the north of Arica should have the following fundamental bases: 1st, the inclusion, in the zone transferred up to the Peruvian border, of the Arica–La Paz railway; 2nd, the possibility of building a true port that satisfies Bolivia’s trade needs in the said strip.
I also reiterated what I had already told President Gonzalez Videla in the meeting we had held on 1 June; namely, that the compensation that Bolivia was to give in return for said transfer could never be territorial in nature, because the Bolivian Nation had reached the maximum of sacrifices by transferring to Chile, as a result of defeat, its large and wealthy coastal territory on the Pacific Ocean, and that, in consequence, only financial compensations could be considered.
President Gonzalez accepted, with no reluctance, the two fundamental bases to which I referred and, with regard to the compensation, he agreed with me on the fact that they would only be financial or commercial in nature. “The railway could easily be subjected to an appraisal”, he highlighted when expressing his view.
Thus, after having accepted that basic aspect and referring to Peru’s consent, the President of Chile told me that, in due course, he would call the Ambassador of Peru to formalize the negotiation, in keeping with the restriction imposed under the Chilean–Peruvian Protocol of 1929.
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With regard to the way to put into effect what has been agreed upon verbally, President Gonzalez Videla told me that, in order to exchange the respective notes, I was to approach the Foreign Minister, to whom he was going to give new instructions to that end.
At the end of our meeting, President Gonzalez Videla expressed his legitimate desire to link his name to a historical solution, not only as viewed by our two countries but also on account of its great American transcendence, which rightfully I praised.
Thereafter, I met the Foreign Minister with the main purpose of agreeing on the wording of the notes we were to exchange.
Mr. Vergara Donoso asked me to inform him about the most recent conversation I had held with the President of the Republic, so as to define our ideas. I did so, although I noted that he was already aware of that conversation, because he had held a lengthy meeting with President Gonzalez Videla on that very day.
Chancellor Vergara Donoso agreed with me with regards to the advisability of specifying, by means of notes, the results of the negotiation carried out with the President of the Republic. However, when analyzing the possible content of the notes, he suggested that the transfer of Arica ought to appear as proposed by Bolivia as well as the transfer of the strip of territory in replacement for the latter, an aspect to which I was firmly opposed, first, because it was not consistent with the historical reality and, second, because of the adverse meaning that a proposal like that one, presented as though Bolivia had put it forward, would receive in the national public opinion.
Upon that request, Chancellor Vergara Donoso suggested that I prepared a draft note; which I suggested to divide in two stages; one to agree upon, in principle, the transfer to Bolivia of an own access to the sea, and another one to specify the territorial aspect.
On that same occasion, the Foreign Minister expressed his fear that the planned agreement with Bolivia would stumble upon the opposition of the extreme right wing in Chile and, as to neutralize it, he suggested that, when repatriating the remains of Marshal Santa Cruz, the grandson of the victor of Yungay, Mr. Manuel Bulnes Sanfuentes, who was a close friend of President Gonzalez Videla, ought to attend the respective ceremony on behalf of Chile. To that end, he asked me to ask the Bolivian Government for its opinion, which I am hereby submitting for your consideration.
Pursuant to what was agreed upon with the Foreign Minister, I carefully prepared, on basis of
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the precedents of the instructions imparted on 19 April (Note Nº G.S.6), the draft for a first note, which I submitted to Mr. Vergara Donoso in a new meeting and which reads as follows:
“Draft note”
“Mr. Minister:
The Government of Chile, on different occasions and specifically in the Treaty of 18 May 1895 and in the Minutes of 10 January 1920 entered into with Bolivia, although not ratified by the respective Legislative Powers, accepted the cession to my country of its own access to the Pacific Ocean.
Subsequently, on the occasion of the claim presented by Bolivia on 1 November 1920, at the First Assembly of the League of Nations, the Delegate of Chile, His Excellency Agustín Edwards, stated as follows: “Bolivia can seek satisfaction through the medium of direct negotiations of our own arranging. Chile has never closed that door to Bolivia, and I am in a position to state that nothing would please us better than to sit down with her and discuss the best means of facilitating her development. It is her friendship we desire. Our earnest wish is that she may be happy and prosperous. Lest it be thought otherwise, I may add that it is to our interest that she should be so, since she is our neighbour, and her prosperity cannot but be conducive to our own.”
Later on, His Excellency the President of Chile, Mr. Arturo Alessandri, in a Message addressed to the Chilean Congress of 1922, also declared the following: “It is necessary that the conviction takes hold in Bolivia that, in an environment of brotherhood and harmony, a cordial desire will only be found in our country to seek solutions, that, with reference to our legitimate rights, satisfy its aspirations in as much as possible.”
In turn, on 6 February 1923, His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Mr. Luis Izquierdo, stated in a note addressed to the Minister of Bolivia, Mr. Ricardo Jaimes Freyre, that the Government of Chile “maintains its purpose to listen, with the utmost spirit of conciliation and equity, to the proposals that Your Excellency’s Government wishes to submit in order to celebrate a new Pact regarding Bolivia’s situation, but without modifying the Peace Treaty and without interrupting the continuity of the Chilean territory.”
On the other hand, concerning the proposal of the Secretary of State of the United States, His Excellency Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, for Chile and Peru to cede to Bolivia “all right, title and interest which either may have in the Provinces of Tacna and Arica”, His Excellency Mr. Jorge Matte, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, stated that “the Government of Chile has not rejected the idea of granting a strip of territory and a port to the Bolivian nation” and that it accepts “to consider, in principle, the proposal”.
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Upon taking office, His Excellency the President of the Republic, Mr. Gabriel González Videla, demonstrated the same willingness in his conversations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, His Excellency Mr. Aniceto Solares –who attended his presidential inauguration, in November 1946, as well as in the numerous meetings granted to the undersigned Ambassador of Bolivia to Chile.
With such important antecedents, which reveal a clear orientation of the international policy followed by the Chilean Republic concerning this issue, I have the honor of proposing to Your Excellency that the Governments of Bolivia and Chile formally enter into a direct negotiation to satisfy the fundamental need of Bolivia to obtain its own and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, thus solving the problem of the landlocked condition of Bolivia on bases that take into account the mutual benefits and true interests of both peoples.
Confident that the Government of Your Excellency will express its acceptance, and thus begin a work of great future projections for Bolivia as well as for Chile, I reiterate the assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration.
To His Excellency Mr. Germán Vergara Donoso Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Hand delivered.”
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After reading this draft note with careful attention, the Minister of Foreign Affairs asked me if I would be willing to make modifications to some details, to which I agreed, but added that those modifications should not change the fundamental bases contained in the Bolivian proposal.
Chancellor Vergara Donoso then declared that he agreed “in principle” with the terms of my note, but that in order to reply in the affirmative he needed to examine that project with the President of the Republic and with his advisors from the Chancellery.
I thought his reply was just and, moving on to address the territorial aspect, I limited myself to telling him that, in accordance with our most recent conversation, I would prepare a draft Protocol in order to submit it for his consideration.
With that purpose in mind, Mr. Vergara Donoso pointed to the fact that any Protocol required the approval of the Congress and added that, in his view, it would be convenient to give the agreement the form of an exchange of notes.
Yet, the Chilean Minister continued
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insisting on his view that the proposal for the cession of a strip of territory should be made by the Government of Bolivia and he even proposed the exchange of two additional notes asides from the draft submitted; I, however, told him anew that I disagreed with that and agreed only with the idea that a second note should be exchanged, seeking a proper way to show that neither Bolivia nor Chile proposed that solution.
Another point that the Foreign Minister proposed was that, in the draft submitted, the Government of Bolivia should specify its view either with regard to Arica or to the strip of territory to the north, but I pointed to Mr. Vergara Donoso that, in strict logic, the general Bolivian proposal ought to come first, followed by the Chilean acceptance to whichever of the options specified, such as the ones he had suggested, which could only be the result of the main agreement.
It was categorically agreed, with respect to the draft note submitted, that Mr. Vergara Donoso would make the corresponding consultations and that he would respond to me as soon as possible, although he reiterated that his reply would be favorable “in principle” and that it would also entail a draft that would be subject to our consideration.
Thereafter, the political situation gave rise to a ministerial crisis which is still in place and Mr. Vergara Donoso rushed to tell me that, in these conditions and so long as his continued position in the Ministry was uncertain, it would be impossible for him to assume any responsibility and that, as a result, the response he was to prepare would have to be delayed.
I emphasized to the Minister the antecedents of the conversations that I held with the President of the Republic, which gave a permanent nature to what had been agreed, despite any possible changes in the Ministry, and I asked him to ask the President anyway; but the trip to