INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE ACCESS TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN
(BOLIVIA v. CHILE)
REPLY OF THE PLURINATIONAL
STATE OF BOLIVIA
21 March 2017
Volume 4 of 5
(Annexes 314 - 344)
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Annex 314
Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Adalberto Violand, to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Bolivia, Oscar Adriazola, N°
281/140/77, 7 April 1977
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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EMBASSY OF BOLIVIA RESERVED
281/140/77
Santiago, 7 April 1977
Mr. Minister,
Building on my encrypted telex Nº 91, I am hereby amplifying the
terms of the meeting I held past 1 April with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Chile, Vice-Admiral Patricio Carvajal.
The meeting started at 5:00 p.m. I was accompanied by this Mission’s
Minister Counsellor, Augustin Saavedra Weise and by Press Advisor, Alfredo
Valdes Loma, responsible for taking notes. For his part, the Foreign Minister
welcomed me accompanied by the Director General, Commander Jaime Lavin
and a stenographer.
I began the conversation by stating that during my recent trip to La Paz,
I received instructions to request the Chilean Government for a clear position in
the face of the situation created between this country and Peru, after the former
rejected the Torre Tagle proposal; and to ask the Government of Chile how this
circumstance would mark the future of the maritime negotiation and how Chile
plans to carry forward its conversations with Peru.
I also stated that the recent visits to Santiago by senior personalities from
Peru were certainly proper to address issues as important as the ones mentioned.
I added also that the growing delay that affects the port negotiation is creating an
atmosphere of concern in our country, inasmuch as stagnation discourages the
public opinion.
The Foreign Minister replied saying that the recent visit paid by the
Peruvian War Minister, General Arbulu, was a retribution for the visit paid last
year by the Chilean Defense Minister, General Brady and that “nothing” had been
discussed in regard to Bolivia, for the conversations were restricted to strictly
military issues.
Despite the fact that it is difficult to believe that two senior representatives
of military governments did not address such a transcendental matter for the
South Pacific, as is the case of Bolivia’s landlocked condition, I accepted Admiral
Carvajal’s explanation and continued, noting that since Chile had subjected the
outcome of the negotiation to the fulfilment of letter “n”, of number 4 of its
response of December 1975, Bolivia insisted in its desire of knowing what steps
Chile proposed should be followed in the immediate future.
To His Excellency
Oscar Adriazola Valda
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship
La Paz, Bolivia
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The Foreign Minister commented that –in his view– the situation “has been
complicated” by President Banzer’s rejection of the condition for an exchange of
territories, uttered in his message of December 1976. He added that “the position of the
Bolivian President has caused the negotiation to be more sensitive than the Peruvian
response itself”. He then reminded me that the negotiation has been progressing “word
by word” and “painstakingly”. He then added that each aspect of what has been agreed to
bears “a lot of significance” and that Chile is concerned over Bolivia’s public request that
the condition for exchange of territories be eliminated, given that the latter is an essential
negotiation requirement inasmuch as Chile cannot accept the idea that its territory could
be reduced in size as a result of the agreement reached. He reminded me also that the
condition for exchange of territories was established from the very beginning of the
conversations with former Ambassador Gutierrez Vea Murguia.
Building on his explanation, the Minister said that there is “misinformation” in
certain Bolivian circles, because the idea is not to “mutilate” anyone, but to achieve
a solution to the exchange of 1907, made to amend the border and said that “at that
moment, no one spoke of dismemberment”. Finally, he reiterated, “the negotiation must
come to a conclusion with Bolivia and Chile keeping the same territorial proportions
with which they commenced processing the agreement”. Attention must be paid to the
fact that in this statement, Chile is implicitly accepting that the eventual exchange of
territories be made only in relation to territory, without contemplating marine waters, as
this Embassy informed Your Excellency in due course.
After Foreign Minister Carvajal’s lengthy explanation, I responded emphasizing
that his mention to General Banzer’s message was fitting, for it allowed me to clarify its
scope. I explained to him that this was an imaginative formula intended to overcome the
“impasse” created by the exchange of Chilean-Peruvian memorandums. I reminded him
also that what had been stated created a new scheme and that, in this context, Bolivia
defined its position, precisely with the purpose of presenting a formula that balances the
interests of the Parties. Likewise, when President Banzer proposed that Chile eliminates
its condition for the exchange of territories and that Peru amends its thesis on shared
sovereignty, he sought to create the proper conditions for the Chilean-Peruvian talks to
be resumed, a requisite which –as has been evidenced– is essential for the negotiations to
be successful.
In the internal sphere –I continued– President Banzer has had to bring together
the state of mind of the Bolivian people, in the face of the prolonged port negotiation
and its current critical state, which had resulted precisely from the absence of a “prior
agreement” between Peru and Chile, so the latter may dispose freely of the territory
offered to our country. Initially, the national public opinion considered that the solution
to Bolivia’s landlocked condition would be processed rapidly. For reasons that are even
of public knowledge, that did not happen and the growing skepticism of some spheres of
the public opinion in regard to the final outcome of the negotiations had to naturally result
in a rejection to the exchange, due to the uncertainty surrounding Chile’s competence to
cede the territory subject to the exchange.
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Thus, the path proposed by President Banzer cannot be regarded as an expression
of “Bolivian inconsistency”. It is the reflection of a situation that has been created
and that is alien to our will. I reiterated that Bolivia, by replacing the conditions
that limit the negotiation, has proposed a contemporary and expedited proposal
that is filled with concrete possibilities to create a prosperous joint development
pole in an area which is at present characterized by its state of inactivity.
Foreign Minister Carvajal interrupted my explanation stating that,
“Bolivians must understand that Chile cannot sell territory”. I replied that it was
not a matter of “selling” but of obtaining a just solution for the Bolivian problem.
Thereafter, I said that in the current state of affairs, there are two alternatives:
either Chile obtains the agreement with Peru to continue negotiating the proposed
territory or, solutions will have to be sought in a perimeter exogenous to the one
delimited by the Treaty of 1929. In the first case, the negotiation must be Chilean-
Peruvian, since Bolivia was not a Party in 1929; in the second one, it would be a
matter of an agreement between Chile and our country.
Minister, I did not mention a third possibility, a tripartite meeting, because
it had not been included into the instructions, but obviously this is a perspective
that could be explored.
The Foreign Minister asked whether our country had considered other
formulas. Among them, he mentioned the possibility that Bolivia gives Peru
Tacora Volcano, along with other resources that could be subject to a negotiation
with Torre Tagle. He added that since Bolivia has great reserves of sulfur and
since Peru is in need of this mineral, these alternatives could serve to discuss with
Lima the enlargement of the maritime front of the corridor proposed initially.
In the face of Minister Carvajal’s insinuation of the possibility of a joint
Chilean-Bolivian presentation of a new formula to Peru, I stated clearly that we
could not continue presenting formulas that lead us to new frustrations. In any
case, the presentation ought to be made by Chile, in pursuit of its “prior agreement”
with Peru. After certain hesitation, the Minister stated that Chile “could” make the
presentation unilaterally, provided that there is a prior understanding with Bolivia.
The preceding statement and the subsequent digressions of the Chilean Minister
were both similar to those expressed earlier and in regard to which I informed
your Office in Note 14/11/77 of past 7 January. The difference was the concrete
possibility that Chile consults Peru directly.
In view of my insistence in regard to the proposal put forward by President
Banzer, the Foreign Minister said he did not believe it convenient to issue a public
response to the message delivered by His Excellency so as to not create irritating
elements, for the
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Chilean position stipulating the exchange of territories as a sine qua non requirement has been
sufficiently explained to the Bolivian Plenipotentiary by both General Pinochet as by himself.
Resuming his explanation, Admiral Carvajal noted that it would be possible to start
with the drafting of a document recording the progress made to the present, in case a Peruvian
response is received, and that simultaneously to the drafting of said document, a formula
acceptable for Peru and its interests could be sought. He commented that he “understood the
Peruvians”, all the more after the intense campaign carried out by former President Velasco in
relation to Peru’s rejection to any formula to resolve Bolivia’s landlocked condition that might
overlap territories that were Peruvian. The new Head of State, General Morales Bermudez
–he continued– has “inherited” a complex situation and that is why problems have arisen. He
commented that –according to information he has had access to– the Bustamante Commission
agreed with the formula that he was proposing me and that the “manu-militari” Government
had evicted the commission and presented the infamous Memorandum of November.
He then said that what had to be done now was to try to seek solutions that
allow President Morales to offer his country appealing justifications to use them
at the level of Peru’s national public opinion and, particularly, with the residents
of Tacna, a town which is affected by a socio-economic underdevelopment.
Finally, he stated that at the international level, if an agreement as the one that is being
preepared preliminarily were to be reached, it would be difficult for Peru to persist in its refusal,
because it would be perceived as an “opposing” to the solution to Bolivia’s landlocked condition.
When requesting the Foreign Minister to be more precise in regard to the ideas he
put forward, he said we would meet again in the “coming days” and that, meanwhile, his
Ministry would prepare ideas to be sure of having a more coherent and clearer presentation.
In summary: the Foreign Minister reiterated the aspects put forward in our
preceding meeting, with the difference that on this occasion he did not refer to the fact
that his “country had information that would allow it to infer” that Peru could amend its
proposal. He introduced the new element –subject to our prior acceptance– of presenting
the new formula to Peru unilaterally and proposed to continue with the meetings so as to
make a more precise explanation. Finally, the position concerning the exchange of territories
is inflexible and La Moneda would rather not –unless there is pressure to the contrary–
respond to President Banzer’s message and preserve the fluency of the dialogue undertaken.
Awaiting for the Foreign Minister to call me to a new meeting
to broaden the ideas outlined, the meeting concluded at 6:00 p.m. I am
hereby informing Your Excellency of this for the resulting purposes.
Taking advantage of this occasion, I reiterate Mr. Minister
the assurances of my loftiest and most distinguished consideration.
[Signature]
Adalberto Violand Alcazar
Ambassador
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Annex 315
Joint Declaration by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and Peru,
7 June 1977 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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JOINT DECLARATION BY THE MINISTERS
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF BOLIVIA AND PERU
At the invitation of the Government of Peru, the Honorable
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Major General Oscar Adriazola
Valda, visited the city of Lima from 6 to 8 June 1977.
During his visit, he was received in a special meeting by His
Excellency the President of the Republic of Peru, Major General Francisco
Morales Bermudez Cerruti.
The Honorable Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and Peru,
held talks in order to increase the ties that
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