Volume III

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE ACCESS TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN
(BOLIVIA v. CHILE)
REPLY OF THE PLURINATIONAL
STATE OF BOLIVIA
21 March 2017
Volume 3 of 5
(Annexes 278 - 313)
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411
Annex 278
Statement by the President of Chile, H. E. Mr. Gabriel
Gonzalez Videla, regarding the port negotiations,
29 March 1951
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Newsletter of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, N° 22 (January-June 1951),
pp. 18 - 24
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[…]
ADDRESS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF CHILE, HIS EXCELLENCY,
GABRIEL GONZALEZ VIDELA WITH REGARD TO THE PORT
NEGOTIATIONS
The President of the United States of America, when inaugurating the
Ministerial meeting of Washington, which is of such transcendental importance for
our continent, has wished to recall the conversation I held with him last year, in my
official visit to that country, to address the utilization of falling waters of the High
Plateau to promote the transformation and financial and agricultural development
of the provinces of the north of Chile, the south of Peru and an important sector of
the Bolivian territory, in return for which Bolivia could obtain its outlet to the sea.
President Truman pointed in his address to the possibilities and perspectives of inter-
American solidarity, recalling the remarkable opportunities that the republics of our
continent have for their financial development. He added that, “these possibilities
will only become realities by working and planning ahead together for a long time”.
The President alluded to the possibilities of developing vast and uneducated regions
of the eastern hillsides of the Andes, turning them into farming lands, and recalled
how Brazil, Chile and other American countries have managed to establish heavy
industry and the construction of factories and hydrological works with the help they
received from the United States.
In direct relation with these projects and purposes, President Truman referred
to our conversation and highlighted my suggestion as one of the examples that
can clearly and objectively exemplify the benefits that can be expected from the
cooperation of the peoples of America. Referring to my statement, he stated verbatim
that he liked to “recall our conversation, which contemplated the utilization of those
high lakes found between Bolivia and Peru to turn the eastern coast of South America
into a farmland for Chile and Peru and, in return, give Bolivia a maritime port
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on the Pacific”. It was only natural that in my trip to the United States, when analyzing
different aspects of the relations among American peopleswith President Truman, I
would allude to the fundamental cooperation issues that exist among them, to the
vital need for enhancing the economic development of the regions of this part of
the world and, particularly and prominently, to the precise means to introduce new
production and wealth elements in our northern provinces. It was also to be expected
that the spirit of the American Head of State would be impressed by the perspectives
of a project that could transform the provinces of the north of Chile, the south of Peru
and the east of Bolivia, which are desert areas at present, into a vast farming region,
giving a formidable and unexpected impetus to the economic development of the
three countries. I salute, fellow compatriots, the fact that before an auditorium as the
Consultation Meeting, this great American statesman placed on record our enduring
desire to find effective formulas for financial development, which are capable of
benefiting not Chile only but also other nations of America; and that at the same
time, he highlighted our willingness to give an ear to the longing of a brother and
democratic country, underscoring with a two-fold example our broad and enthusiastic
support to anything that may contribute to bringing relations between the peoples of
these hemisphere closer.
Even though it is clear that the words uttered by President Truman do not and
cannot imply interference of any kind in the direct Chilean-Bolivian exchanges, I
believe it is necessary to reiterate once more, albeit succinctly, the precedents of this
negotiation, which has been accepted by us with the fraternal purpose of studying
whether, within our possibilities, we are in a position to satisfy the aspirations of that
brother country and bring closer the ties that unite us to them.
It is common-ground that on numerous occasions the Government of Bolivia
has expressed its desire to obtain an own outlet to the Pacific Ocean.
In regard to this purpose, the policy of the Chilean Government has unvaryingly
been a single one: to express its willingness to give an ear to any Bolivian proposal
aimed at solving its landlocked condition, provided that it is put forward directly
to us and that it does not imply renouncing our traditional doctrine of respect for
international treaties, which we deem essential for a peaceful coexistence between
Nations.
As early as in 1920, when Bolivia lodged a request with the First League of
Nations Assembly, the Head of the Chilean Delegation, Mr. Agustin Edwards, stated
verbatim:
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“Bolivia can seek satisfaction in direct and freely consented negotiations. Chile has
never closed that door to Bolivia and I am in position to state that nothing would be
more pleasant than to directly contemplate with it the best means to contribute to
its development”. Thereafter, in 1922, former President Arturo Alessandri, during
his mandate as President of the Nation, said in an Address to the National Congress
that, “the conviction takes hold in Bolivia that, in an atmosphere of brotherhood and
harmony, it will find in our country only a cordial desire to seek formulas that, taking
our rights into account, satisfy in as much as possible its aspirations”. A year later, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Mr. Luis Izquierdo, officially told the Bolivian
Plenipotentiary that our Government “maintains the purpose of hearing, with the
most elevated spirit of conciliation and equity, the propositions that the Bolivian
Government might like to submit to conclude a new pact that takes into account
Bolivia’s situation, without modifying the Treaty of Peace and without interrupting
the continuity of Chilean territory”. Some years later, another distinguished Chilean
statesman, Mr. Jorge Matte Gormaz, serving back then as Minister of Foreign Affairs,
told the Government of the United States that the Government of Chile had not
rejected “the idea of ceding a strip of territory and a port to the Bolivian Nation”.
Consistent with that policy that has been followed for more than thirty years,
I welcomed with a broad and comprehensive spirit, inspired in the most sincere
Americanist feelings, the demarches carried out before my Government, from the
very moment in which they were commenced, first by former Foreign Minister
AnicetoSolares, who presided his country’s Delegation during the Presidential
Inauguration of November 1946; followed by Ambassador Ostria Gutierrez and,
thereafter, by the former President of Bolivia, Dr. Enrique Hertzog. The studies and
exchanges of viewpoints developed from the outset on the, clearly established by
myself, basis that Chile’s decision to exclude Arica port from any solution on the
matter was irrevocable. These exchanges resulted in the exchange of Notes between
the Bolivian Ambassador and the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs carried out
on June last year, the text of which had been brought to the notice of the press in
due course and which is widely known in the whole Republic. Emphasizing the
Americanist feelings that inspire us, as well as the deep affection we have towards the
Bolivian people and the loyalty we owe to its democratic Government, we placed on
record in our response that Chile was willing to enter into a direct negotiation aimed
at seeking a formula that may make it possible to give Bolivia an
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own outlet to the Pacific Ocean. As can be easily apprehended, this is a
first step in a field that must meticulously be studied before being able
to safely walk on it. This is the only concrete thing about this matter.
Every time Bolivia has updated its desire for an outlet to the sea, consideration
was naturally given to what that country might offer us as compensation in the event
that an agreement is reached on this particular matter with Chile and Peru, with the
latter of which, in accordance with the terms of the 1929 Treaty, it would be necessary to
hold talks in due course. Among the ideas and suggestions that have been made in that
regard, mention has been made to the utilization of the falling waters of the High Plateau
to produce a great amount of hydroelectric power for industrial uses and to raise to the
surface the ground waters that are found in currently sterile regions, as Tamarugal prairie
and others. It can be affirmed that, since the outset of the Century, the idea of using, for
farming and industrial purposes, the flow of Titicaca, Poopo and Coipasa Lakes, and of
Desaguadero River has fascinated distinguished technicians from different countries.
For instance, prestigious engineer, Mr. Luis Lagarrigue, carried out studies
on this matter in Bolivia, Mauricio Hochschild firm has three complete reports that
have been prepared by the corresponding authorities in this regard, and, as early
as before the last war, the world renowned German company Siemmens-Schukert
prepared a complete study for the installation of an enormous hydroelectric plant
to provide hydroelectric power utilizing the natural falling waters to create artificial
irrigation and increase the industrial use of electricity in Bolivia and the north
of Chile, supplying Tarapaca province with a remarkable amount of electricity.
I personally know our Northern provinces; I have seen up-close the rough
life that must be endured by the Pampa workers, I admire their heroic and laborious
spirit and I have always dreamed that one day it will be possible to completely change
their lives, introducing new factors that make it less harsh, more comfortable, more
humane. Knowing the progress that technology has made in creating hydroelectric
plants in Chile and the United States I hold the certainty that it will be possible to bring
electric energy for our country at a low cost and thus utilize all the groundwater of the
Northern provinces, which could sometime be transformed in a modern California.
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I know that the waters of the High Plateau are only waiting for the impetus
that may make them fertile and allow transforming what at present is merely a sterile
desert into wealth and abundance. A new age of prosperity is opening before not only
Chile, but also Bolivia and Peru. To Chile, utilization of hydroelectric power from
the lakes of the High Plateau not only gives us the possibility to irrigate the arid lands
of the rough north to provide abundant energy for copper and saltpeter exploitation,
reducing production costs, but it is also an essential basis to create heavy chemical
industry which is waiting for low-cost and abundant energy to develop the technical
process of transformation of saltpeter parcels and sub-products.
It is not risky to state that if the financial cooperation of the United States
allows us to carry out an enterprise of this magnitude, the historians of the future
will refer to this as one of the loftiest initiatives in our national life and as proof
of the existence of a real and dynamic spirit of solidarity in the people and in the
Government of Chile. However, a project of such great scopes that would completely
revolutionize industrial and agricultural productionof Chile, Bolivia and Peru must
still be assessed in regard to the essential aspect of its founding.
It is no mystery that none of these three countries has enough capital. Only the
financial power of the United States, together with its enormous industrial potential
and with the willingness,clearly expressed on several occasions, to help Latin
American nations to achieve a better utilization of their natural resources, will allow
carrying out an enterprise of such a great scale. That is why I am thankful to President
Truman for, when referring to the works carried out by virtue of the cooperation
between the United States and other American States and examining those that could
be included within the ratio of its vast Economic Solidarity plan, he made express
mention to our project, which is in that way entering, owing to his words, a path in
which it will be possible to overcome the only serious obstacle that had prevented
it from becoming a reality. Finally, I wish to tell my compatriots, with complete
frankness, that I believe it is absurd to consider President Truman’s statement as an
interference in our international policy.
From an assessment of the facts I have just narrated and from a reading of the
text of the address made by the American Head of State, it follows with great clarity
that he enthusiastically evoked a suggestion of the Chilean President, presenting it as
an example of inter-American cooperation and including it, spontaneously, into the
possibilities which, in his words, will “become
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realities, working and planning ahead together for a long time” and in regard to which,
andin spite of the restrictions that its defense program might impose upon it, the United
States is willing to do everything it can to achieve this purpose.On the other hand, the
fact that President Truman had chosenthe Ministerial Conference to express a noble
and generous longing of his spirit to give a perfect example of what Inter-American
cooperation can achieve and of the benefits that can be expected from it, does not
mean in any way that the problem of Bolivia’s landlocked condition could have been
addressed on that occasion. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Continent have
met exclusively to consider the matters included in the agenda agreed to earlier, the
interest of which, common to all the countries of the hemisphere, derives from the
state of emergence to which the free western democracies are devoted. The possibility
of satisfying Bolivia’s longing for an outlet to the Pacific is a matter that can only be
addressed in Chile’s direct discussions with Bolivia and with Peru, by virtue of the
1929 Treaty. This has been the invariable doctrine of the Chilean Chancellery and
that is the position of the current Government and of the President of the Republic.
I believe it is perfectly natural that in a matter of such importance there is
ample room to exercise the right ofcriticism.I respect that civic right, particularly in
the political opposition parties of my Government. But I must warn that the scope
of my constitutional attributions clearly points to a limitation on that right, because
that is what is convenient for the national interest. In fact, the Political Constitution
of the State, by setting the rules for the faculties and attributions of the President of
the Republic in regard to the conduction of our foreign affairs, states verbatim, “to
develop political relations with foreign powers, hold negotiations, make preliminary
stipulations, conclude and sign all peace, alliance, truce, neutrality, commerce, treaties,
concordats and other conventions are the special attributions of the President of the
Republic. Before their ratification, treaties must be subject to Congress approval.
Discussions and deliberations on these questions shall remain secret if the President
required it”.
I have quoted the wording of the Political Constitution that is applicable to
the case being dealt with for the sole purpose of correcting a severe mistake which,
unfortunately, has a tendency to be generalized. Such mistake consists in believing
that the President of the Republic has the duty to consult the National Congress to
adopt initiatives of this nature, or while they are carried out. As can be seen, the
constitutional text prescribes,
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precisely, the complete opposite. However, I do not demand, request, or suggest that
silence or secrecy be kept with regard to the fundamental guidelines of this question.
All that I request is that the impulses of passion or circumstantial political advantages
be separated from it. To do so I invoke the notorious fact that, whenever the general
and permanent interests of the nation are concerned, I have never stepped back in
the face of any difficulty, regardless of how severe it was, neither have I hesitated in
the face of any sacrifice. It was a natural decision to abide by these rules of conduct
whenever preserving our rights over the Antarctic region was concerned. The attitude
I followed then and the one I am following now are marked with the same firm and
reflexive decision that is inspired in the desire to strengthen Chile’s international
position, to the effect of guaranteeing the full exercise of its rights and obtain the
respect and consideration of all nations. I request the trust of my compatriots, because
that is what is advantageous for the nation.
I am entirely responsible, legally and constitutionally, for the demarche the
precedents of which I have just explained. I have the deep conviction that it will lead
us to highly advantageous results. What yesterday was a survey on an idea that was
absolutely far from our economic and financial possibilities, has just turned into a
hope. That is the essential virtue of the spontaneous statement made by the President
of the United States. Chile’s sincere Americanism, its fraternal spirit, the clearness
of its international conduct, radiate once more. I believe I have enough reasons to
take pride in these first outcomesof my initiative. And I am absolutely certain that
whatever the final results, Chile’s prestige will stand high. And there will be no
detriment whatsoever to any of its inalienable rights. I am responding to my country
with the reliability of my word as a ruler, of this categorical statement.
I have spoken
Santiago, 29 March 1951”.
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[...]
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Annex 279
Communique of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia,
regarding the statement made by the President of Chile,
30 March 1951
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Newsletter of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, N° 22 (January-June 1951),
pp. 24 - 25
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[...]
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COMMUNIQUE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WITH
REGARD TO THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF CHILE
“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with regard to the statements made on
the radio by the President of Chile, His Excellency, Mr. Gabriel Gonzalez Videla,
whereby he commented on the port issue alluded to in the speech of the President
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of the United States, His Excellency, Harry Truman, hereby states:
1. That it praises the cordial attitude of the Chilean Head of State and his
decision to address the Bolivian port problem, the need and solution of which he once
more recognizes.
2. That it places on record that the initiative concerning the utilization of
Bolivian lakes, put forward to the President of the United States by the President of
Chile, has yet not been officially proposed to the Bolivian Government which, as a
result, has not had the opportunity to reply favorably or negatively to it.
3. That, concerning the idea of ceding an area to the north of Arica, the
Foreign Ministry hereby states that nothing concrete has been agreed to yet, much
less an agreement, and
4. That the only thing that has been agreed to so far between Bolivia
and Chile is contained in the Notes exchanged in Santiago between the Bolivian
Ambassador, Mr. Alberto Ostria Gutierrez and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Chile, Mr. Horacio Walker Larrain, on 1 and 20 June 1950, which were published
past 31 August and in which our country proposes that the Governments of Bolivia
and Chile formally enter into a direct negotiation to satisfy the fundamental need of
Bolivia to obtain its own and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, thus solving the
problem of the landlocked condition of Bolivia” and Chile accepts “to formally enter
into a direct negotiation aimed at searching for a formula that could make it possible
to give Bolivia its own and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to
obtain compensation of a non-territorial character that effectively takes into account
its interests.
La Paz, 30 March 1951”.
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[...]
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Annex 280
Report by the Chilean President, H. E. Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, to the
National Congress inaugurating the regular period of sessions,
21 May 1951, p. 56 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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[…]
Relations with Bolivia. – For many years and whenever it saw a favorable
opportunity to do so, Bolivia has expressed its aspiration to obtain an outlet to the
Pacific and, invariably, Chile has responded that, without modifying our unbreakable
doctrine of respect for treaties, it was willing to give an ear to any concrete proposal
by that country, provided that it is made in a direct manner.
My Government, consistent with that policy and inspired in an effective Pan-
Americanist spirit, responded, in the Note of 20 July 1950, to the communication that,
on 1st of that month, was made on behalf of his country by the Bolivian Ambassador
in Chile, His Excellency Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, stating that “is willing to formally
enter into a direct negotiation aimed at searching for a formula that could make it
possible to give Bolivia its own and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and for
Chile to obtain compensation of a non-territorial character that effectively takes into
account its interests”.
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Annex 281
A. Ostria Gutierrez, A Work and a Destiny, Bolivia’s International Policy
after the Chaco War (1953), pp. 65 - 67 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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65
[…]
This is how it was understood by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Bolivia, and on the eve of the Regional Conference of the Countries of La
Plata –January 1941– he invited the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile
to visit La Paz and exchange ideas about the international situation.
This frank and cordial attitude found the best acceptance in the Chilean
Government and this was how, for the first time in the history of the
relations of both peoples, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile made
an official visit to Bolivia, carrying out a mission of true goodwill and
genuine rapprochement.
On that occasion, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and
Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez and Manuel Bianchi, signed –at the same
time as two agreements for the exchange of Bolivian and Chilean teachers
and students, and for the constitution of a joint commission “to submit
to the consideration of both Governments new draft agreements aimed
at regularizing their economic relations”– important Reversal Notes on
non-aggression and non-recognition of territorial annexations by force.
These Notes were drafted as follows:
“La Paz, 16 January 1941
Mr. Minister:
In order to further consolidate the cordial relations between our two
countries and to give the agreements in force their full effectiveness,
I am honored to leave testimony of the complete
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agreement reached with Your Excellency regarding the following
statements.
1) The Governments of Bolivia and Chile solemnly
reiterate that they condemn wars of aggression in their reciprocal
relations and in their relations with all other States, and that all
disagreements or conflicts that may arise between them must
be resolved only through peaceful procedures established in the
international agreements, of which both are contracting Parties.
2) They also reaffirm their complete agreement with the
principle of non-recognition of territorial annexation by force,
enshrined in the American Declaration of 3 August 1932; in the Anti-
War Pact of Rio de Janeiro of 10 October 1933, and in Resolution
XXVI of the Eighth International Conference of American
States, within the terms in which such agreements were signed.
3) They also ratify their adherence to the provisions of Article
8 of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, signed in
Montevideo on 26 December 1933, which provides that no State has
the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of others.”
With the agreement on non-aggression, the security
demanded by the Bolivian people on the border with Chile was
achieved, in the same way that had been followed with Peru.
The work of linking Bolivia and Chile was supposedly completed that
way; but the truth is that there remained and still remains a fundamental
problem to be solved: that of the maritime reintegration of Bolivia.
On that occasion, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia,
complying with an elementary patriotic duty, during his conversations
with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile was expected to propose
a solution to that problem. And he did so in a clear and frank way.
With a sympathetic spirit, the Chilean Foreign Minister did not
reject the Bolivian proposal to open direct negotiations between the
two countries; but noted that a suitable atmosphere had to be created in
advance so as to reach an understanding that counts on the full acceptance
of the two peoples.25
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How could it be possible to reach an arrangement that fulfills
Bolivia’s aspiration –he said– if this aspiration is raised in a field of
aggression, with certain Bolivian press representatives that take it to the
worst of extremes?
In his turn, although admitting the truth behind that assertion,
the Bolivian Foreign Minister insisted in his viewpoint and pointed to
the solution to Bolivia’s port problem as the essential basis to reach a
comprehensive and definite agreement with Chile.
Legally speaking, Bolivia’s landlocked condition had been sealed
with the signing of the Peace Treaty of 1904 –which legalized the seizing
of Bolivia’s littoral as a result of the latter’s defeat in the War of the
Pacific (1879). But there remained an ideal in the Bolivian people who
could not and would not resign themselves to living lacking a direct
maritime communication with the world. This ideal stood above the
territory surrendered under the 1904 Treaty and would disappear neither
with this nor with any other treaty.
[…]
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Annex 282
Report entitled “Declaration regarding the port issue,” from the Special
Envoy of Bolivia to Chile, Jorge Escobari Cusicanqui, to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Walter Guevara Arze, 31 December 1953
(Original in Spanish, Spanish transcription, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
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DECLARATION REGARDING THE PORT ISSUE
Mr. Minister:
I hereby confirm the information that I have been able to transmit
verbally to the Honorable President of the Republic, to you Mr. Minister,
to the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Federico Fortun, to the
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Dr. German Quiroga Galgo, to the
Ambassador of Bolivia in Chile, Dr. Fernando Iturralde Chinel, and
to the Acting Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Alvaro Perez
del Castillo, about the mission entrusted to me in Santiago regarding
the interest of our Government to inquire into the possibility that, on
occasion of the projected meeting of the Presidents of Bolivia and Chile
in that capital, a Declaration could be signed recording, in addition
to mentioning matters related to the economic link between both
countries, a paragraph referring to the Bolivian port issue be included.
Upon my arrival to Santiago, (last November 8th) and since our
Embassy had requested a meeting with the President of the Republic,
General Carlos Ibañez del Campo, and with the Foreign Affairs
Minister, Mr. Oscar Fenner Marin, on Tuesday, November 10th, the
Chancellor received me in his private residence. I attended the meeting
accompanied by the Acting Chargé d’Affaires, Mr. Luis Alberto
To Mr. Walter Guevara Arze;
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship
Hand delivered.
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Alipaz.
I informed the Chancellor of Chile that, as announced by the Foreign
Ministry of Bolivia to the Chilean Ambassador, Mr. Luis Rau Bravo on
November 5th, my visit was for the purpose of giving him personally a
draft Declaration that would be signed in the aforementioned Presidential
meeting. While putting the aforementioned document in the hands of Mr.
Fenner, I stated that, since the Government of Bolivia had been informed
of President Ibañez’s desire to sign an act or declaration with President
Paz Estenssoro, he anticipated his satisfaction to the Ambassador of
Chile in La Paz in a Note dated November 5th. I added that the project
entrusted to me was intended to transmit that desire and the spirit of
cordial friendship that encouraged both Presidents to strengthen the
fraternal relations that our countries happily maintain.
I told the Chilean Foreign Minister that the aforementioned draft
Declaration included matters for which the two Governments would
defer attention to the Bolivian-Chilean friendship. I referred to the
scope of an Agreement of economic linkage and trade exchanges which,
according to said document, would be previously studied by the Joint
Commission responsible for laying the basis for the conclusion of the
aforementioned international instrument. I emphasized the desirability
of entrusting this Commission with the study of the following aspects:
an adequate customs regime for both countries; facilities for the payment
of merchandise and products; control provisions of border police for the
repression of smuggling; railway
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affairs (tariff regime, administration and operation of the Arica-La Paz
railroad); problems of roads and air navigation; and various possibilities
for the exchange of products, among which we could mention the supply of
oil and the supply of Bolivian meat to the labor centers of northern Chile.
I further stated that the aforementioned draft Declaration, in
addition to the aforementioned section on economic linkage and trade
between the two countries, contained a paragraph in which Bolivia
and Chile reiterated their intention to settle through direct negotiations
and on bases that take into account the interests of the two Republics,
the Bolivian issue of obtaining a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean.
I told Foreign Minister Fenner that the inclusion of this paragraph
in the Declaration was in harmony with the general statement contained
therein, concerning the interest of the Governments to grant deferential
attention to matters of transcendental importance for the cordial friendship
existing between the two Republics. I added that, according to the wording
of that section, there would be no obligation to solve the Bolivian port
issue immediately, but it only would reiterate a commitment made between
Bolivia and Chile in the Notes exchanged in Santiago on 1 June 1950 and 20
June 1950, by means of which the two countries agreed in that year to enter
into a direct negotiation aimed at searching the formula that could make it
possible to grant Bolivia its own and sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean.
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I emphasized that the Chilean Government, by signing this
Declaration, would concretely ratify the policy defined by that country in
December 1944 with regard to the maritime aspiration of Bolivia; year
in which the President of Chile spontaneously expressed to the Embassy
of Bolivia in Santiago the “willingness of his Government to consider
any direct negotiation aimed at solving the port issue.” This policy
that had an eloquent expression on 4 December 1926 –when Chile, in
response to the Kellogg formula, stated its purpose of “helping to satisfy
the Bolivian aspirations”– was formalized in November 1946 on the
occasion of the visit of the Bolivian Chancellor to Santiago; in April and
July 1947 when the Chilean Head of State expressed his firm intention
to “gradually facilitate the access of Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean”; in the
Notes exchanged between the Embassy of Bolivia in Santiago and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, on 1 and 20 June 1950, respectively;
and in the speech given by the President of Chile on 29 March 1951.
I said that the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement committed
as it is to consolidate the achievements and purposes of the National
Revolution, such as the Nationalization of Mines, Agrarian Reform
and Educational Reform, and currently dedicated to the study and
execution of important internal programs of economic diversification
and structuring of the political and social regime of the Republic, did not
propose itself to settle immediatelly the Bolivian port issue. However,
in view of the projected meeting of the Presidents of Bolivia and
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Chile, internal and international reasons, determined by
the historical and diplomatic tradition of Bolivia, made it
unavoidable that the two countries sign a Declaration regarding
the Bolivian maritime aspiration on the said opportunity.
I added that the failure to do so could cause in Bolivia an adverse
reaction against Chile and against the meeting of the Presidents of both
nations, since the port issue is traditionally a unanimous sentiment
of the Bolivian people. I pointed out that this unfavorable reaction
would be to the detriment of the cordial relations which the two
Governments endeavor to strengthen, and consequently could provoke,
lamentably, animadversions to the policy of rapprochement with Chile.
I informed the Chilean Foreign Minister that in a Note dated
November 5th, addressed to Ambassador Rau Bravo, the Acting
Foreign Minister of Bolivia, Mr. Fortun, confirmed the conversation
he had that day with the aforementioned diplomatic, representative
of said matters, leaving on record in that opportunity the spirit of
understanding and justice with which the Head of the Chilean Mission
recognized the matters referred to. I added that in that Note the Acting
Minister for Foreign Affairs stressed that the concepts which he had
expressed on that occasion were closely in tune and were a faithful
reflection of those expressed to the Ambassador of Chile in La Paz,
by the President of the Republic and Chancellor Dr. Guevara Arze.
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Finally, I said that Chile has shown an eloquent reception and
understanding of the achievements and purposes of the Bolivian National
Revolution and that the Bolivian Government is certain that the Chilean
Government will properly appreciate the justified reasons for suggesting
the inclusion of the section relating to the port in the aforementioned
draft Declaration, and that it is thus waiting for a response that ratifies
that spirit of loyal and firm friendship.
The Chancellor of Chile, Mr. Oscar Fenner, listened with great
interest to the development of my presentation. In response, he told
me that he had been very pleased to note the sincere desire of the
Government of Bolivia to achieve a positive outcome with the Chilean
Government; wish that was fully reciprocated, with the same purposes
of cordial friendship towards our country. He added that, following this
policy of auspicious Chilean-Bolivian rapprochement, the Government
of General Ibañez would defer attention to the study of the issues whose
solution could be reached immediately and effectively, such as matters
relating to economic and trade relations between both Republics. In that
sense –he added– the Foreign Ministry of Chile will devote its greatest
interest to the draft Declaration that I placed in his hands, especially to
the issues that could be entrusted to the Joint Commission that would lay
the foundations for that economic exchange.
“Concerning the possibility that during the Presidential meeting
the issue of the
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maritime aspiration of Bolivia should be mentioned –he said– I must
inform you that I have spoken with President Ibañez, to whom I have
given my opinion that it would be untimely to refer to that issue during
that event.” He added that General Ibañez had the same criterion, and
that this was based on adverse conditions to the allusion of the Bolivian
issue that had presented at that time in the atmosphere of Chile’s internal
politics. The mention of this issue could give rise to strong criticism
to the Government by the opposition sectors that are determined to
create difficulties for the Ibanez regime. He stated that during the
direct negotiations between Foreign Minister Horacio Walker and the
Ambassador of Bolivia, Mr. Ostria Gutierrez, there had already been
an unfavorable reaction in Chile with regard to the abovementioned
understandings, since they had been inopportunely disclosed. He added
that his Government was sincerely willing to assist in the solution of the
Bolivian issue, but that in order to reconcile the concurrent interest of
both countries in their purpose of studying the basis for an arrangement,
strictly confidential negotiations could be initiated, which –he stressed–
should in no way be disclosed until the two Governments consider it
convenient and suitable. Previously –he added– it would be necessary to
find harmony in the internal environments of Chile and Bolivia; referring
specifically to the Chilean public opinion, he said “it must be prepared
in advance, so that it spontaneously provides a climate conducive to a
satisfactory solution.” ...He finally stated that he would consult with
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President Ibañez regarding the definitive response he would
give me, offering to let me know about it as soon as possible.
On the same day, Tuesday, November 10th, through the Embassy
in Santiago, I directed to our Chancellery the following confidential
cablegram:
“236. – Mine. – 235. – Protocol fixed a hearing for today Tuesday at
7:30 pm. Escobari conveys the following points. Accompanied by the
Chargé d’Affaires I attended the meeting in the private residence of the
Chancellor of Chile, to whom I explained the arguments that Ministry
had instructed me to put forwards and submitted the draft Declaration.
The opinion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile is contrary to the
inclussion of the maritime aspiration of Bolivia in the declaration. He
said that President Ibañez has the same criterion and considers it untimely
that during the Presidents’ meeting the port issue should be mentioned
due to possible criticism from opposition sectors to his Government.
He said that an equally unfavorable reaction occurred in Chile due to
the direct negotiations between Chancellor Horacio Walker and Alberto
Ostria Gutierrez. He added that in order to reconcile the interest of
both Governments with regard to the assessment of the solution of the
problem, strictly confidential negotiations could be initiated, which in
no way should be divulged. Specifically referring to the Chilean public
opinion, he said “it is necessary to prepare it in a way that spontaneously
provides an environment conducive to a satisfactory solution.” He
said that he will consult with President Ibañez regarding the definitive
answer, which he offered to communicate to me as soon as possible. The
Embassy requested my meeting with President Ibañez. Escobari. Alipaz.”
After three days, on Friday, November 13th, I was summoned to
the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile. I went in the
company of the Acting Chargé d’Affaires, Mr. Luis Alberto Alipaz.
In this second meeting, Foreign Minister Oscar Fenner Marin
told me that, having spoken with President General Ibañez, by express
instrcution of the Chilean President, he had to reiterate the opinion he
expressed to me earlier, that his Government considered it untimely that
during the meeting of the Presidents of both countries, any statement be
made regarding the
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maritime aspiration of Bolivia. He then handed over to me a draft
Declaration based on our own, in which, with certain changes in the
wording of the Bolivian document, only matters relating to economic
and commercial ties between the two Republics were mentioned. The
Chancellor stated that his Government has the broad purpose of assisting
in the solution of the port issue of Bolivia, but that, due to certain temporary
difficulties arising from the Chilean-Peruvian relations and from the
significant opposition that exists in Congress against the regime of General
Ibañez, this matter could not be raised, without the risk of originating
suspicions in Peru and without the danger of increasing the criticisms of
the Chilean internal politics against his Government. He added that, in any
case, he did not want Bolivia to interpret his response as a demonstration
of indifference towards the Bolivian maritime aspiration, or as a “step
back” from the Chilean Government in the negotiations regarding the
port, but that he had the confidence that once that adverse environment
dissipated, Bolivia and Chile could resume these negotiations in order
to satisfy the Bolivian claim. For the said opportunity –he added– it will
require the concurrence of Peru, in order to achieve a tripartite settlement.
Immediately, the Chilean Chancellor, having expressed
our desire to obtain a hearing with President General Carlos
Ibañez del Campo, instructed the Protocol Department to grant
us this meeting. A few minutes later, the Chilean President
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welcomed us in Palacio de la Moneda.
After conveying to General Ibañez the greetings of President Victor
Paz Estenssoro, I explained to him the reasons for my trip to Santiago, and
reiterated the presentation that I was able to make to the Foreign Minister,
Mr. Fenner. I added that Bolivia was sincerely affectionate for the eloquent
demonstrations of friendship he had with my country, especially on account
of the measures taken by his Government when the nationalized mining
companies tried to hinder the free transit of Bolivian minerals through Chile.
President Ibañez vehemently expressed his appreciation for President
Paz Estenssoro and his admiration and sympathy for the achievements
and purposes of the Bolivian National Revolution, which –he said–
enjoys in the Government and people of Chile the most comprehensive
understanding and reception. He then broadly endorsed the statements
of Chancellor Fenner regarding the inconvenience of mentioning the
port issue of Bolivia during the planned Presidential meeting. “This is
a question –he said– that is also of concern to the Government of Chile,
which is willing to consider it with due attention in due course.” He
added that in order to solve this problem, the cooperation of international
entities such as the United Nations and the Organization of American
States should be taken into account, and that specially the countries
bordering Bolivia could also participate in an Americanist settlement.
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I should like to point out that the suggestions made by the Chilean
President in order to bring the Bolivian port issue to the attention of
international organizations and other States depart from the policy pursued
by Chile that called for a direct understanding between the Governments
of both countries. General Ibañez, when he referred to the abovementioned
solutions, did so with obvious lack of insight into his ideas and incurring
in evident mental deficiencies, such as not remembering the names of
the international institutions to which he wished to refer, and mentioning
them after marked efforts and after citing them with the denominations
that they had before the last World War. In this regard, I was informed in
Santiago that one of the reasons for the discredit of the Ibañez regime was
that the Chilean Head of State had repeatedly incurred in innumerable
mistakes attributed to his advanced age, such as calling to his office,
in their capacities of Ministers, people who no longer were in office.
About the second meeting with the Chancellor of Chile
and about the one granted to me by President Ibañez, I was able
to address to our Chancellery, on the same day, November 13th,
through the Embassy, the following confidential cablegram:
“236. – Mine. – 236. – Today, we were granted a second meeting with the
Chancellor who received us after President Ibañez. Escobari conveyed
the following points. The Chancellor said that having talked with the
President, he reiterated the Chilean Government’s view that a statement on
the port issue during the Presidents’ meeting would be untimely. He handed
over to me the draft Declaration based on our own which only mentions
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issues of commercial and economic ties. The Chancellor said that Chile has
the broad purpose of collaborating with the solution of the Bolivian issue
but that due to a considerable opposition that exists in Congress against
the Chilean Government, this issue cannot be raised, as it would serve
as a pretext to increase the criticism towards General Ibañez. He added
that he does not want his response to be interpreted as a demonstration of
Chile’s indifference towards the Bolivian aspiration or as a “step back”
in the negotiations regarding a port, but considered that once the adverse
environment dissipated, Bolivia and Chile could resume the negotiations
to satisfy the Bolivian claim, and Peru should participate in a tripartite
settlement. At our request, the Chancellor immediately requested a
meeting with the President of the Republic that was granted to us a few
moments later. General Ibañez, after thanking the greeting of President
Paz Estenssoro and the concepts regarding the purpose of increasing
the friendship of both countries and after listening to my presentation
on the issues with Chile, referred to the port issue, ratifying in general
terms the expressions made by Chancellor Fenner. Escobari. Alipaz.”
During the week that I stayed in Santiago I was able to see
the intense campaign of criticism against the Government of Ibañez
that was encouraged by opposition sectors. The press adverse to the
regime holds that the Chilean electorate was disappointed in taking the
General to the Presidency, they say that he was “not the same person
that governed Chile from 1927 to 1931”; that its Administration until
the present has concretized inconsequential and dangerous measures for
the internal order of the country. It is said that to a large extent these
errors can be attributed to the extraordinary powers that were recognized
by law to the Executive Power. The reaction against the Ibañez regime
is mainly fomented by conservative circles and, especially by the socalled
“economic right-wing” sector, which has a large majority in
the Senate and has powerful means of propaganda in the press and
radio. In those days, the Chilean Government was devoted to solve
a serious problem caused by the significant increase in the cost of
living; the teachers decreed a general strike because their demands
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for salary increases had not been met; the National Association of Fiscal
Employees and the National Association of Semi-fiscal Employees
joined the strike of the National Federation of Educators of Chile. The
Government organized a lawsuit against those responsible for the teachers’
strike and declared the school year over. The Federation of Students of
Chile decreed a strike of 48 hours. On the other hand, the right-wing
sectors of Congress presented an accusation against the former Minister
of Economy of General Ibañez, Mr. Tarud, formulating the following
charges: steel sales, abolition of the Gold Law and acquisition of buses.
Left-wing forces united to defend, not actually the Administration
of Ibañez, but the social benefits achieved in such Administration.
The indictment failed by a few votes after an intense debate.
Regarding the Chilean-Peruvian relations, it is worth noting
the following events that occurred on that occasion: The Government
of Peru rejected the agreement requested by Chile for former Foreign
Minister Arturo Olavarria, to serve as Ambassador in Lima, in view of
the demonstrated sympathy by the latter towards the Governments of
Bolivia and Ecuador. On the other hand, the official and diplomatic circles
informed of the protest of the Chilean athletes that concurred to the race
organized by the Peruvian Automobile Club, in which the motorists of
Chile declared to have been sabotaged in Peru. The Government of Chile
called its Ambassador in Lima, Mr. Enrique Gallardo Nieto, for having
exaggerated
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his protest to the Peruvian Government concerning the incidents of the
car race.
The reasons given by the Chancellor and the President of Chile
regarding the country’s internal politics and the Chilean-Peruvian relations
were thus evident in order to justify their opinions about the untimeliness
that the port issue was mentioned during the planned Presidential meeting.
But it is also evident that the results of the inquiries that the Supreme
Government instructed me to carry out in Santiago de Chile confirm the
assessments I had to make in a report of 4 October 1953, which, after
recording a detailed list of the International policies observed by Bolivia,
Chile and Peru with reference to our maritime aspiration, I indicated the
projections of the Chilean Decree-Law of 25 July 1953, by which Arica
was granted a status similar to that of a “free port”; Decree that will
cause damages to the commerce and national economy; reaffirms the
sovereignty of Chile over Arica and distances the possibilities of our port
claim.
In view of the aforementioned antecedents, it corresponds that
the Government of the National Revolution, without prejudice to the
attention that must be given to the important internal problems of the
country, gives deferential interest to the study of the diplomatic action
that would be put into practice in due time.
La Paz, 31 December 1953
Jorge Escobari Cusicanqui
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Annex 283
UN DOC A/CONF.13/29/Add.1, 3 March 1958 (extract)
(Original in English)
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records,
Volume I, Preparatory Documents, 24 February – 27 April 1958,
pp. 328 - 330
http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/lawofthesea-1958/vol/english/
PrepDocs_vol_1_e.pdf
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Annex 284
Memorandum from the Chilean Embassy in La Paz to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 10 July 1961
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
(Submitted by Bolivia as Annex 24 to its Memorial)
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CHILEAN EMBASSY
MEMORANDUM
1.- Chile has been willing, together with safeguarding the legal
situation established in the Treaty of Peace of 1904, to study, through direct
efforts with Bolivia, the possibility of satisfying the aspirations of the latter
and the interests of Chile. Chile will always reject the resort, by Bolivia, to
organizations which are not competent to resolve a matter which is settled by
Treaty and which could only be modified by direct agreement of the parties.
2.- Note Nº 9 of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated in Santiago
on 20 June 1950, is a clear testimony of those purposes. Through it, Chile
states that it is “willing to formally enter into a direct negotiation aimed at
searching for a formula that could make it possible to give Bolivia its own and
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to obtain compensation
of a non-territorial character that effectively takes into account its interests.”
3.- Given that President Paz Estenssoro manifested his
willingness to visit President Alessandri, in response to the invitation
made by the President of Chile, it would seem particularly untimely
and inconvenient to unsettle public opinion in both countries
with the announcement of resorting to international organizations
to deal with a problem that the Government of Bolivia has not
concretized in its direct relations with the Government of Chile.
La Paz, 10 July 1961
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Annex 285
Memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia to the
Chilean Embassy in La Paz, N° G.M. 9-62/127, 9 February 1962
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
(Submitted by Bolivia as Annex 25 to its Memorial)
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REPUBLIC OF BOLIVIA
_______
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND WORSHIP
_______
MEMORANDUM
N°. G.M. 9-62/127
1. The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Worship has carefully considered the Memorandum sent by the
Honorable Embassy of Chile on 10 July 1961, referring to the Chilean
Government’s willingness to seek a solution to the Bolivian port issue.
2. It has also acknowledged the reiteration of Note Nº 9, dated in Santiago
on 20 June 1950, by which Chile stated to be “willing to formally enter into a direct
negotiation aimed at searching for a formula that could make it possible to give Bolivia
its own and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to obtain compensation
of a non-territorial character that effectively takes into account its interests.”
3. Finally, I have taken note of the Chilean viewpoint
regarding the inconvenience of resorting, in this matter, to international
organizations that are not competent, if there is concurrence of criteria to
overcome the current situation by direct agreement between the Parties.
4. With the purpose of reaching an agreement that strengthens
the friendship between Bolivia and Chile, by eliminating any grounds for
estrangement, the Bolivian Government expresses its full agreement to initiate,
as soon as possible, direct negotiations aimed at satisfying the fundamental
need of the Nation for its own and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, on
the basis of compensation that, without having territorial character, takes into
account the reciprocal conveniences and effective interests of both countries.
La Paz, 9 February 1962.
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Annex 286
Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Jose Fellman
Velarde, to the President of the OAS Permanent Council, Gonzalo Facio,
17 February 1963
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
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La Paz, 17 February 1963
Mr. President:
Addressing, with great satisfaction, your verbal request and
given the Bolivian Government’s keen desire to facilitate, in all that is
possible, the success of the negotiations that you have been carrying out,
as President of the Council of the Organization of American States, in
order to seek the resumption of diplomatic relations between Bolivia
and Chile, I have the honor to inform you of the points of view of my
Government regarding a possible solution to the problem which, for
Bolivia, means the lack of an own and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.
1.- Bolivia, in the current circumstances, does not seek
to modify the legal situation created by the Treaty of Peace signed with
Chile in 1904. Neither does it seek that the referred own and sovereign
access be located in territories that Chile cannot dispose of freely
according to its agreements with the Republic of Peru. Nor does it wish,
lastly, that a solution to the problem of its lack of access to the Pacific
Ocean be obtained by interrupting the continuity of Chilean territory.
2.- Rather, it thinks that a feasible solution
may be the granting by Chile of a port enclave, with the
attributes of sovereignty recognized by International Law,
connected or easy to connect to the Antofagasta-La Paz railroad.
3.- In return, it would be prepared to facilitate
to Chile, to the extent that this does not mean serious
prejudice, the use of the waters of those international courses
____________ ____________
To His Excellency
Mr. Gonzalo J. Facio
President of the OAS Council
Hand delivered.
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that are of common dominion to both countries.
It seems unnecessary to establish that Bolivia will not consider itself
obliged to the above-mentioned points of view, outside the framework of the efforts
made by the Organization of American States, or the direct negotiations resulting
from these efforts.
On this occasion, Mr. President, I reiterate to Your Excellency the
assurances of my highest consideration.
Jose Fellmann Velarde
Minister of Foreign Affairs
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Annex 287
Speech of the Foreign Minister of Bolivia, Jose Fellman Velarde, in
response to the statements made by the Foreign Minister of Chile, Carlos
Martinez Sotomayor, 3 April 1963
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Press Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Towards the
Sea – Transcendental Documents (1963),
pp. 45 - 76
(Submitted by Chile as Annex 165 to its Counter-Memorial)
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RESPONSE BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF BOLIVIA
JOSE FELLMAN VELARDE
Men and women of Bolivia:
Men and women of the Continent:
Last Thursday, with the assistance of his country’s media, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Chile presented to his people an incomplete version of the Bolivian-
Chilean relations. He made a statement regarding the port issue of Bolivia, which,
if confirmed, would entail the renouncement of existing commitments between both
countries and announced a new policy regarding Bolivia, which places the Bolivian
Government in the need to formulate, in turn, a new policy with respect to Chile.
These facts compel the Bolivian Government to respond, through its Minister
of Foreign Affairs, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile. It is not my intention at
all to enter into controversy, since any controversy runs the risk of dragging its actors
into the restraints of their own feelings, which tends to result in irritation, limiting the
possibilities to reach an understanding, which should never be lost in the relations
between two neighboring countries.
I will therefore limit myself to completing the version of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Chile regarding
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Bolivian-Chilean relations, to inform the Chilean people particularly, to demand
that the Chilean Government, in the light of existing commitments between both
countries, define its thoughts regarding Bolivia’s port issue, and finally to inform the
Bolivian people, as has always been done, of the line of conduct that the Government
has adopted in its relations with Chile.
CLARIFICATION
Before addressing this matter, I deem it appropriate to make an important
clarification, which arises from the need to put an end to the continued efforts being
made by the Chilean Government to involve its people in Bolivian-Chilean problems.
The Bolivian Government and people, have never admitted the possibility that the
Chilean people are compromised in these problems, have never tried to compromise
them and have always, at every time and opportunity, distinguished between what the
Chilean Government says and does from what the people of Chile feel and think.
The Bolivian Government and people have invariably acted in this way
because they understand the enormous responsibility of giving place to grievances
between two peoples and putting obstacles in the way of their understandings,
especially considering that these two peoples are called to live together in the same
corner of the planet.
These statements are not based on superficial or circumstantial reasons, but
are supported by concrete facts. While the Chilean Government is removing Bolivians
from the Chilean public administration
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and giving an example to industry and trade [sectors] to do the same, the
Bolivian Government has not removed any of the Chileans who work in
the Bolivian public administration, including in law enforcement. While
the political police in Chile are expelling many Bolivians living in its
territory, there is not a single Chilean, in all the large colony living in
Bolivia that has been disturbed in his work or disturbed by word or deed.
Moreover, on April 14th of last year, the Chilean Government
proceeded to divert waters from the Lauca River, which originates in Chile
and discharges in Bolivia, without Bolivia’s consent. The next day, with
the same arguments and the same right, the Bolivian Government could
have proceeded to divert waters from Silalaz, which, unlike Lauca River,
originates in Bolivia and discharges in Chile. Bolivia did not do so, even
though it was able to do so, suppressing in that way its justified irritation,
because the waters of that river are useful to the town of Antofagasta and
its diversion would have harmed said town.
These facts, to which many others could be added, show that, for
the Bolivian Government and people, the problems that are pending with
the Government of Chile are not problems that are pending with the
people of Chile.
This carefully preserved distinction obeys to an existing distinction
between the Chilean Government and the Chilean people. Let’s talk
about the war of 1879 and the 150,000 square kilometers of Bolivian
territory, on the Pacific coast, which passed to the possession of Chile.
That territory is rich in saltpeter and guano, and that is why the war took
place, an imperialist war, which saw no mitigation, and this territory is
still rich in copper
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and other minerals. It is good to ponder over whether all that wealth, that vast wealth,
has benefited Chilean workers, peasants, or the middle class, or whether it has served
only to develop four or five fabulously powerful and fabulously rich companies.
Let’s talk about Lauca River. The Chilean people certainly do not know the
list of owners of the Azapa Valley, which is currently irrigated with Bolivian waters.
If it knew it, the Chilean people would see that it is reduced to a privileged few; that
in not a single peasant owns the land he works with his hands in that list.
For these reasons we, the Bolivian people and Government, do not consider
dishonorable to explain to the people, I repeat, to the Chilean people for what could
have been perceived hurtful in our acts or words, because we never meant to hurt
them.
The permanent distinction that the Bolivian people and Government have
made between the people of Chile and its Government, as opposed to the ongoing
efforts of the Chilean Government to involve its people in the problems between the
two countries, moves the Bolivians to ask ourselves why the Chilean Government
seems so determinedly committed to involve the Chilean people in these problems,
without concern for the consequences of separating two peoples that are linked by
geography, tradition and history.
INTERNAL CRISIS
The Foreign Minister of Chile, in his presentation last Thursday, has openly
accused
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the Bolivian Government of artificially promoting the issue of the Bolivian Landlocked
condition for internal politics purposes. There is no fact that supports this accusation
and, rather, there are many who demonstrate the opposite; that it is the Government
of Chile which tries to involve the Chilean people in the problems between both
countries, for internal politics purposes.
That seems to be the answer. A month before the waters of the Lauca River
were diverted towards Arica, Arica, which had a profitable status as a free port, was
deprived of that status and its inhabitants had reacted to the point that it was necessary
to use violence to reestablish order. The diversion of the waters of the Lauca River,
consummated with the argument that it would make Arica a proper agricultural
region, appears in the light of this unobjectionable circumstance as a measure of
internal politics aimed at silencing the protests of the Arica people at the expense of
the rights of another country.
Last year, the Chilean Government promoted a Law restricting freedom
of expression and failed to accelerate the adoption of said Law in Congress. The
problems with Bolivia and the criticism of its conduct in relation to those problems,
have served the Chilean Government to revive the efforts and lobby for the adoption
of that Law again.
Finally, it is not possible to ignore the fact that the Chilean Government is
only a few days away from important elections and has acted as if it believed that the
appearance of a policy of harshness towards Bolivia could offer it additional votes.
The Bolivian Government, on the other hand, has no reason to stir up Bolivian-
Chilean problems for
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internal politics purposes. And this is so true, that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Chile, in launching his reckless accusation, has not been able to support it with any
concrete evidence, as is the responsible duty of anyone who accuses anyone.
The Government of Bolivia is not, as the Government of Chile, facing a
growing popular discontent caused by economic difficulties, monetary instability or
lack of popular support. The Chilean Foreign Affairs Minister would not have made
such an accusation against the Government of Bolivia if he had paused to compare
the essential character of his Government with ours, if he had paused to compare
which of the two countries has greater economic difficulties, to compare where the
currency is stable and where it is not, and lastly, if it had recalled that the Bolivian
Government had been established with more than 75 percent of the popular vote, and
the Government of Chile with less than 35 percent of the popular vote.
To be clear. In Bolivia nobody stirred anything artificially, because we are
a country of people who know how to think for themselves. The resentment for the
diversion of the Lauca River and, above all, the inflexible will to return to the sea,
are in every Bolivian without distinction, whatever his political position, creed or
condition.
The resentment for the diversion of Lauca River emerges from the unilateral,
arbitrary and despotic way in which it was carried out, and the will to return to the sea
obeys to a necessity that is vital for the whole country. It is said that there are other
landlocked nations in the world and that is true; however, these other landlocked
nations, for the most part, have, unlike Bolivia, their
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great centers of consumption connected to the sea by easy river routes, in whose
course no one can interfere.
CAPTIVE NATION
Bolivia’s landlocked condition, sealed by the force of arms, has turned it into
a prisoner and that situation obstructs its spiritual contacts with the rest of the world,
deforms its political psychology and postpones its economic development. I said it
and I repeat it. “No people, throughout history, has paid a higher price for defeat.”
It is said that Bolivians should be satisfied with the so-called free transit; but
that is the same as saying to a person unjustly imprisoned, to be satisfied with the
window of his cell; because, in fact, the so-called free transit, which, in the wording
of the Treaties, is supposedly unrestricted, has never really been unrestricted or truly
free.
These Treaties were signed in 1904. However, in 1932, when Bolivia was
engaged in an international war, the Chilean Government at that time decided to forbid
the transit of arms to Bolivia through its ports. In 1952, when Bolivia nationalized
the large mining companies, the Chilean justice ordered the embargo of machinery
and food destined for those mines and for the workers of those mines. In 1956, when
Bolivia was able to export oil, it had to negotiate a special agreement to be able to
do so. In 1962, the Chilean Customs Administration ordered that exports of Bolivian
minerals should be subject to provisions that were expressly prohibited by valid
agreements
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between the two countries. And, less than two months ago, in order not to go further,
the flour imported to feed the Bolivian miners, was placed in Antofagasta on top of
a tar cargo and it was thus totally rendered useless. Furthermore, according to those
Treaties, the Bolivian people and goods, must pass through Chilean customs. That
is to say that Bolivia has to give account to Chile of everything that it imports, of
everything that it exports, of everything that it does.
Moreover, whenever a problem arises between the two countries, the Chilean
authorities give themselves ways and means to hinder, delay and disrupt transit
through its ports in order to force Bolivia to bow to its dictates. That means that the
fate of Bolivia is subject to the will of the Government of Chile. In one word, Bolivia
is not really free.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, in his presentation last Thursday,
offers us greater facilities in the so-called free transit. This demonstrates, as a
confession of guilt, that the transit through Chile is neither free nor unrestricted,
because, if it were, it would not require improvements. And, as an offering, it does
not dazzle us at all. From the bitter experience of the past, for what happened with
our arms in time of war, with our machinery and food when we were at peace, for the
flour to make our bread, for the oblique political pressure to which we were subjected
innumerable times, we know that everything that can be agreed upon on paper, will
be of no use if the Government of Chile does not want that to work. Bolivia, in order
to be free, needs a port of its own, needs to open the doors that imprison it and not to
decorate the windows of its confinement.
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LAUCA RIVER
Let’s talk about the Lauca River. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile
said last Thursday that the Lauca River dies in a salt flat, that its deviation is not
detrimental to Bolivia and, consequently, that that question does not really concern
the Bolivian Government.
A glance at the map, which the Foreign Minister of Chile should have done,
is enough to refute those claims. The Lauca River does not die in a salt flat, it flows
into Lake Coipasa and, along with two other freshwater streams, prevents the lake,
which is surrounded by the salt flat of the same name in almost two thirds of its total
perimeter, from salinizing and degrading, as a result, the habitability of the Bolivian
High Plateau, which is possible only thanks to its existence and that of the lakes
Titicaca and Poopo.
Lauca River does not die, therefore, in a salt flat and its deviation causes a
clear damage for Bolivia, due to the possible salinization of Lake Coipasa.
In order to measure the magnitude of this damage, we must also consider
the situation of the three thousand peasant families whose lands are irrigated by the
Lauca River. Since the deviation was consummated, the Bolivian Government has
had to relocate more than a hundred of these families to Caranavi and Chapare and it
is necessary to continue those relocations, because there is no other remedy.
Harm is, therefore, caused, even if the Government of Chile denies it or if it
is irrelevant for it. How can it be irrelevant for the Government of Chile? According
to a verbatim version of the Uruguayan press, Chilean deputy Sergio Diaz, an official
envoy
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of the Chilean Government, held in Montevideo on 3 May of last year, that “in the
Lauca River issue, if 150,000 people benefit and only 6,000 indigenous people are
adversely affected, these latter would have to be exterminated with an atomic bomb.”
The Bolivian Government, on the other hand, defends its joint-ownership
rights, not only for the damage suffered, but also for the principle involved in this:
no country can use waters of an international river, without the consent of the other
country or without taking into account joint-ownership rights. The Montevideo
Declaration of 1937 is explicit in this regard. The utilization by the Government of
Chile of waters of the Lauca River, without Bolivian consent, is a severe precedent
that has put in danger the whole American legal order on this matter.
The Foreign Ministry of Chile issued a statement last Thursday, in which it
indicates that the diversion of the Lauca River does not entail any harm to Bolivia;
but that Chancellery is well aware that this is not true. In the informal conversations
held last October in Bolivia by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and Chile,
I proposed that our two Governments agree to request any international organization
for a technical commission to verify, on-site, whether or not the diversion of the
Lauca River is detrimental to Bolivia. Moreover, I added that if that commission
decided that such harm does not exist, Bolivia would no longer insist on the issue.
That proposal was ratified by a Memorandum of 19 December of last year, delivered
by the Ambassador of Bolivia to the OAS to his colleague, the Ambassador of Chile
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Why, I ask, if the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile is so certain, as he states
in his address last Thursday, that the diversion of Lauca River waters does not entail
any harm to Bolivia, did he not accept that proposal? Why does the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Chile hide to the Chilean people the existence of this Bolivian proposal?
Why does he no mention the existence of these proposals in the Libro Blanco (White
Book) published by his Chancellery, or in the address he made last Thursday? Do the
Chilean people know that the Bolivian Memorandum of 19 December has not even
been answered by their Government?
Another aspect of this issue. Bolivia has interests and rights over the Lauca
River, because it runs 250 kilometers through its territory, because it is a regulating
factor of the high plateau’s climate, and because its waters sustain the agriculture of
an appreciable area of its territory. Despite this, the Government of Bolivia reiterated
in Official Notes and public statements of its representatives that it was not indifferent
to the needs of water for food production in the north of Chile, provided that those
interests were borne in mind and those rights respected. Does the Chilean people
know about this? Do they know, in that sense, that the Lauca River issue would never
have acquired such magnitude if their Government, instead of choosing the path of
despotic gestures on 14 April of last year, had continued to discuss the requirement
for consent, the harm caused and the compensations due with Bolivia?
The Government of Chile argues that it was the Government of Bolivia that
broke these talks. That is not true. On 15 April of last year, the Ambassador
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of Chile in La Paz presented a Note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
stating: “It was against this requirement... that the Government of Chile decided
to suspend negotiations and His Excellency the President of the Republic issued
the instructions for the utilization of part of the Lauca River’s waters.” What was
Bolivia’s requirement? That the matter be subject to the procedure established by
the Declaration of Montevideo on Utilization and Exploitation of Waters. That is, to
continue discussing the requirement of consent, the subject of harm and the issue of
compensation.
It was therefore the Government of Chile, as evidenced by that Note, who
resolved to suspend negotiations with Bolivia regarding the Lauca River issue. Do
the Chilean people know about this? Do the Chilean people know that every question
could have been avoided if their Government had agreed to continue the talks that
were underway?
REVISION, NO
Let us turn to the problem of an outlet to the sea for Bolivia. The Foreign
Minister of Chile, in his presentation last Thursday, stated that the Government of
Bolivia, in this regard, demanded a revision of the Treaty of 1904. I can understand,
but not justify, why he made that statement. The revision of the Treaty of 1904 would
entail calling into question the right of Chile over the 150,000 square kilometers of
which Chile became an owner after the War of the Pacific, and all Chileans would
naturally resent that possibility. It would also entail a precedent
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for the revision of many of the Treaties in which the borders between many
countries of the hemisphere have been agreed upon, and this naturally
has to resent those countries that are beneficiaries of such Treaties.
Consequently, this statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile
was aimed at arousing the Chileans’ support for their Government and
depriving Bolivia of the sympathy of several American countries.
I repeat that I can, thus, understand the statement of the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Chile, but that I cannot justify it. And I cannot
justify it, because it is not true. Never, in any document or statement,
did the Bolivian Government or any of its representatives requested
or even insinuated, the revision of the Treaty of 1904. Moreover, in a
Note dated last 17 February and submitted to the President of the OAS
Council, as a result of the mediation efforts that he has been carrying
out, the Government of Chile through its Minister of Foreign Affairs was
informed that “Bolivia, in the present circumstances, does not seek to
modify the legal situation created by the Treaty of Peace signed with
Chile in 1904.”
That is to say, that the Foreign Minister of Chile knew, without a
doubt, forty days before his presentation of last Thursday, that Bolivia’s
objective in the problem of its outlet to the sea was not the revision of the
1904 Treaty. I ask. Why, then, has he stated otherwise? Why did he not
inform the people of Chile about the Bolivian Note of 17 February 1963?
Why did he hide that Note?
The Foreign Affairs Minister of Chile, in his statement of last
Thursday, said that the Government
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of Bolivia had artificially brought up the problem of its outlet to the sea, in order to
obstruct the possibility of resuming diplomatic relations with Chile. This is also not
true and the Foreign Minister of Chile also knows that is not true.
The issue of an outlet to the sea for Bolivia has appeared in the negotiations
for an eventual resumption of diplomatic relations between Bolivia and Chile, first,
because the Government of Chile has made this happen when it deviated, with a
despotic gesture, –and ending the talks that were being held between the two countries–
the waters of Lauca River; second, because there are formal commitments between
Bolivia and Chile to seek a solution to that problem, and third, because the problem
of an outlet to the sea for Bolivia was a pending issue between the two countries.
The Government of Chile was under the obligation, to its own people, to foresee
that, by diverting the Lauca River, unilaterally and arbitrarily, without exhausting
efforts, and with contempt for what Bolivia might feel, would naturally awaken a
memory, always latent and never healed, in a unilateral and arbitrary manner, without
taking into account or caring for the sentiments of the Bolivian people, with which,
in 1904, Bolivia was confined to its high mountains.
The diversion of Lauca River waters was carried out on 14 April last year. The
following day, a demonstration, composed mainly of students and workers, launched
itself on the streets of La Paz to protest, with a fair title, the dispossession of 1962 and
the dispossession of 1879.
The Government of Chile could not have expected that the people of Bolivia,
when they were wounded for the second time,
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would forget that they had already been wounded before. Chile had no reason to hope
that the issue of Bolivia’s landlocked condition, which is its main problem, would
not emerge on the surface and that it is always latent in the soul of each and every
Bolivian.
Thus, it is the Government of Chile that has made the problem of an outlet
to the sea for Bolivia appear among the existing issues between the two countries.
The Bolivian Government has done nothing more than to bringing together and
interpreting the feelings of its people, and it has done so, keeping in mind, that there
are formal commitments between Bolivia and Chile to provide a solution to that
problem. The Government of Bolivia has done nothing else than abiding by those
commitments. Did the Government of Chile expect that the Government of Bolivia,
just because another issue –Lauca River– had emerged, would forget that there were
such commitments?
On 1 June 1950, the Ambassador of Bolivia in Santiago addressed a Note to
the Government of Chile, the pertinent part of which reads: “With such important
precedents, which reveal a clear orientation of the international policy followed by
the Chilean Republic concerning this issue, I have the honor of proposing to Your
Excellency that the Governments of Bolivia and Chile formally enter into a direct
negotiation to satisfy the fundamental need of Bolivia to obtain its own and sovereign
access to the Pacific Ocean, thus solving the problem of the landlocked condition of
Bolivia on bases that take into account the mutual benefits and true interests of both
peoples.”
That Note was answered on the 20th of the same month by the Chilean
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Horacio Walker Larrain, with another Note, the essential
paragraph of which reads: “At
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the present opportunity, I have the honor of expressing to Your Excellency that my
Government will be consistent with that position and that, motivated by a fraternal
spirit of friendship towards Bolivia, is willing to formally enter into a direct negotiation
aimed at searching for a formula that could make it possible to give Bolivia its own
and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to obtain compensation of a
non-territorial character that effectively takes into account its interests.”
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, in his presentation, mentioned these
Notes, but did not read its text. Why did he not do it? Why is the text of these Notes
hidden from the Chilean people?
The exchange of Notes of 1 and 20 June 1950, according to the norms of
International Law, constitutes a formal commitment between Bolivia and Chile in
order to give Bolivia an own and sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean and to give
Chile, in return, an appropriate compensation that is not territorial in nature. This
commitment is inseparable from the legal regime governing the relations between
Bolivia and Chile and is guaranteed, as any other exchange of Notes, by the faith of
both States and their national honor.
NOTHING IS ARTIFICIAL
What the Bolivian Government is doing now therefore is not artificially
bringing up the issue of its landlocked condition, but calling on the Chilean
Government to comply with these commitments. It vitally needs to obtain its own
and sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, and it is willing, in return, to give Chile
appropriate non-territorial compensations.
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What the Bolivian Government wants, in accordance with the solemn
commitment that the Notes of June 1950 signifies, is to sit down with Chile’s
representatives at the negotiating table and negotiate an agreement taking into account
their mutual interests, an agreement that will be of benefit to Bolivia and of benefit to
Chile.
There is nothing artificial about this desire, nothing out of the ordinary, and I
am fully certain, as shown by numerous pieces of evidence, that the Chilean peoples
do not oppose to these negotiations, to reach a just agreement in which both countries
give away something that they have, without sacrificing anything essential, in order
to obtain what they need.
Why is the Chilean Government now refusing to listen to Bolivia? Why is it
avoiding holding direct talks between the two countries having committed to do so?
Why does it not inform the Chilean people of the text of those Notes? Why does the
Chilean Government not comply with its commitments?
One statement. If the Chilean Government, which on countless occasions has
reiterated its respect for its international commitments, and which requires Bolivia
to comply with the commitments in force between the two countries, denies the
commitment that it assumed in 1950, the Bolivian Government will in turn consider
that is free to do the same. Because neither the Chilean Government nor any other
Government has the right to choose, from among the legal rules that it has freely
agreed to and that govern its relations with other countries, which ones it will comply
with and which ones it will not.
The issue of an outlet to the sea for Bolivia is a pending question between
Bolivia and Chile. First, because a commitment was assumed through the exchange
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of Notes of June 1950, and second, because before relations between the two countries
were broken off, negotiations had been initiated to this effect, not at Bolivia’s
initiative, but at Chile’s initiative.
On 10 July 1961, the Bolivian Government received from the Chilean
Ambassador in La Paz, what the Chilean Foreign Minister called in the speech made
last Thursday “a paper that is entitled Memorandum, but is not a Memorandum.”
That Memorandum consists of three points, the first of which says: “Chile has
been willing, together with safeguarding the legal situation established in the Treaty
of Peace of 1904, to study, through direct efforts with Bolivia, the possibility of
satisfying the aspirations of the latter and the interests of Chile,” and reiterates in the
second paragraph: “Note Nº 9 of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated in Santiago
on 20 June 1950, is a clear testimony of those purposes. Through it, Chile states
that it is ‘willing to formally enter into a direct negotiation aimed at searching for a
formula that could make it possible to give Bolivia its own and sovereign access to
the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to obtain compensation of a non-territorial character
that effectively takes into account its interests.’”
As the Chilean Foreign Minister said in his speech, it is obvious that a
Memorandum is a document delivered to a Foreign Ministry or to a diplomatic
representation as a record of and to verify what a Foreign Minister or diplomatic
representative says in a meeting. It is nothing more, but it is nothing less.
It is thus established that regardless of the character of the “paper entitled
Memorandum but that
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is not a Memorandum,” the Chilean Ambassador, during his meeting on 10 July 1961
told the Bolivian Foreign Minister that the Chilean Government was willing to enter
into direct negotiations with Bolivia regarding the issue of an outlet to the sea and
that it would maintain the commitment assumed in 1950.
On 9 February 1962, at a meeting granted to the Chilean Ambassador, the
Bolivian Foreign Minister expressed the Bolivian Government’s agreement to the
initiation of those talks, within the spirit of the commitment in force since 1950. As a
record of and to verify this agreement, he gave another Memorandum to the Chilean
Ambassador.
It is clear, therefore, in this light, that the negotiations regarding the Bolivian
port issue had been opened at the initiative of the Chilean Government, and
consequently this issue is pending between Bolivia and Chile.
Are the Chilean people aware of the Memorandum of 10 July 1961? Are they
aware of the answer? Why are these Memorandums being hidden from them? Why is
the publication of said Memorandums prohibited?
The Chilean Foreign Minister, in his presentation of last Thursday, gave
an explanation of why, how and when regarding what he calls “a paper that is
entitled Memorandum but is not a Memorandum.” According to his explanation,
the Memorandum of 10 July 1961 was given to the Bolivian Foreign Minister
under circumstances in which the Bolivian Parliament was planning to amend the
Constitution in order to add the port issue as a constitutional provision.
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This explanation is revealing. It shows that the Chilean Ambassador, at his
meeting on 10 July 1961, with the Bolivian Foreign Minister, upon informing him
that the Chilean Government would honor the commitments assumed in 1950, and
that “was willing to formally enter into a direct negotiation aimed at searching for
a formula that could make it possible to give Bolivia its own and sovereign access
to the Pacific Ocean,” was actually attempting to keep the port issue from being
included as a provision in the Bolivian Constitution.
I am afraid that in giving this explanation, the Chilean Foreign Minister did
not weigh the significance of what he was saying, in all its magnitude, because that
would mean that the Chilean representative, duly authorized by his Government, was
ratifying a commitment, not with any intention of complying with it, but purely and
simply as a manoeuver. Moreover, this means that the Chilean Government, acting
with a malicious intent, was making promises that it never intended to honor, and was
using trickery and deceit in its relations with other countries.
I wonder, are the Chilean people aware that their Government is not acting
in good faith? Are they aware that, with the explanation of intentions, their Foreign
Minister has called into doubt the value that his word deserves? That in the future, not
only Bolivia but every other country has acquired the right to doubt what the Chilean
Government says?
It is therefore definitively clear that the Bolivian port issue arose in the
negotiations for a possible resumption of diplomatic relations between Bolivia and
Chile, because the Chilean Government caused this to happen by diverting the waters
of the
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Lauca River, because there are formal commitments to seek a solution and because it
is a pending issue between the two countries.
The diplomatic relations between countries is not an end in itself; it is a means
whereby those countries can strengthen their relations by resolving their differences
or avoiding them. The Bolivian Government desires to maintain good relations with
Chile and has stated so on countless occasions, but it is the Chilean Government
that is putting an obstacle in the way of this purpose by insisting that the relations
between the two countries if they are resumed, must not be used to resolve or avoid
the disputes that exist between them, to comply with the commitments assumed by
both of them, to find a solution to the issues that the two Parties have recognized as
pending.
In his presentation of last Thursday, the Chilean Foreign Minister made his
best efforts to present his Government’s policy as being marked by complete calm,
in contrast with the policy of the Bolivian Government which makes “outrageous
statements,” full of “unfounded accusations,” intended to “stir up the most violent
passions against Chile.”
It is very easy to respond to those efforts by saying that although the jailer can
enjoy the luxury of remaining calm, the person who is being unjustly imprisoned has
no other recourse than to protest for his imprisonment.
The waters of Lauca River, over which Bolivia has joint-ownership rights,
are flowing towards Chile and irrigating Chilean soil. Given this fact, what would the
Chilean Government have to protest about? The Bolivian Government, on the other
hand, does indeed have a right to protest, as it is faced with the risk that the
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inhabitability of the high plateau could deteriorate even more, and this is where the
great majority of Bolivians live. As a result, the farmers who live in the areas irrigated
by that river would have to be relocated to other regions. Owing to that matter, Bolivia
has the duty to protest and to continue protesting until the situation is justly resolved.
On the other hand, Chile possesses a long coastline and is not aware of
the tragedy of having to live far from the great routes of global trade. Its ruling
classes own, exploit and enjoy the benefit of 150,000 km of territory that used to be
Bolivia’s. Consequently, what would Chile protest about? Bolivia, on the other hand,
landlocked inside its high mountains by the force of arms, does indeed have the right
to protest, as it is faced with the task of accelerating its economic development, in
order to raise the standard of living of its people, with the bitter feeling every day that
this task is incalculably more difficult for people who are deprived of the blessing
of the sea. This is an unfair disadvantage with respect to other people who can reach
the ocean by navigable rivers or have their own ports. Moreover, given the formal
commitments pending with the Chilean Government to resolve the situation, it has
the duty to protest and continue protesting until these commitments are fulfilled.
In light of this, the deliberation and moderation that have characterized the
conduct of the Bolivian people and their Government are noteworthy.
With regard to the issue of Lauca River, instead of opting for a policy of “river
for river,” which would have been justified by 23 years of frustration, we have abided
by the procedures established by Law, and have waited for a possible solution, with
internationally
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recognized goodwill. With regard to the issue of the sea, we have done nothing more
than demanding compliance with formal commitments, subjecting ourselves to the
conditions that the Chilean Government had set when it assumed those commitments.
We did even more than that, in order to facilitate the initiation of direct negotiations,
by means of a cable from the Bolivian President to the President of the Council of the
Uruguayan Government, we offered to contribute, with our best will, to the creation
of a climate that would be favorable to finding amicable solutions.
Without making any “outrageous statements”, we have endured the Chilean
Government’s arrogating to itself the right to censor our official correspondence, its
expelling numerous Bolivian citizens from Chilean territory by its political police,
and its obstructions to the transit of raw materials, machinery and food through
Chilean ports.
This is it in the realm of the facts. In the realm of words, we acted with
deliberation and moderation that are even greater. Can the Chilean Foreign Minister
point to even a single official document from Bolivia that is full of half-truths, veiled
threats, false accusations and insulting arguments as his own presentation of last
Thursday?
MARCH OF THE SEA
Regarding the “March of the Sea”, which took place on 23 March in honor
of Eduardo Abaroa, and which seems to have been the determining motive for the
presentation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile last Thursday, the Chilean
people have not been informed that this is a commemoration carried out not only this
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year, but that has been going on for many decades. Have they not been informed
that, every 23 March, the Bolivian flag is hoisted in its diplomatic and consular
representations all over the world, for at least twenty years? Have they not been
informed –to corroborate all this– that on 23 March 1961, the Charge d’Affaires
of Chile in Bolivia, as part of that commemoration, deposited a wreath before the
monument of Eduardo Abaroa?
Why, then, is there an attitude of surprise and indignation, for the “March of
the Sea,” carried out in 1963?
It is true that this year, this March has been carried out with a much greater
vigor and depth of spirit than in the past. It is true that all the Bolivians, men,
women, and children in the four latitudes of the homeland came, as they had done so
seldom. And it is also true that, this year, the “March of the Sea”, in addition to its
commemorative reason, had a high sense of protest.
How could we not protest if the Lauca waters, after a despotic gesture, continue
to flow towards Chile; if the Chilean Government refuses to honor its commitments
to enter into direct negotiations regarding our port problem; if there are people in
Chile with such audacity that they dare to maintain that the Bolivian sea was never
Bolivian; if it is to please us with an unrestricted free transit that is not unrestricted
nor free; if at last, to all this is added the memory of the threat that involves the
presence of Chilean Army troops on our border in April, May and June last year?
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, in his presentation, complains of the
insults of which, according to him, Chile
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would have been subject in the radio and in the press of Bolivia. I could respond that
the radio and the press in Bolivia are free to express what they want without fearing
that they will be brought to justice, accused and put in prison for the opinions they
issue. But I will not do it.
I am not going to do it because I do not believe that the Bolivian Government
owes explanations to the Government of Chile for what the Bolivian radio and press
says or writes. And Bolivia does not owe those explanations, because it has not asked
for explanations for what some Chilean organs of oral or written press say.
As far as the radio is concerned and because words are taken by the wind,
I will simply recall that a Chilean station owned by the heirs of the booty of 1879
and that, therefore, has good reasons for it, called Bolivia “A country of indigenous
people possessed by schizophrenia.”
THE INSULTS
As for the Chilean press, to some press I repeat, the evidence of the insults to
which Bolivia is subjected to –I will not say that they are worthy of complaint–are
pathetic in some cases and, in others, revealing.
“La Tercera” newspaper of Santiago called the Bolivians “ill-informed and
illiterate masses” on 22 December of last year. “Clarin” newspaper, on 27 March,
describes the population of Bolivia “divided in three very different sectors: the
indigenous people who are the majority, the aristocracy of the whites that only
fills a narrow two percent and the mestizo, with the sordidness of their hard racial
resentment, almost indigenous, almost white, almost nothing.” In “Golpe” newspaper
on 4 March, there is a letter to the President of
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Bolivia and the Vice-President, which begins by saying: “Mr. Victor Paz and Mr. Juan
Lechin, stop being fools and cynics.” “Noticias Gráficas” newspaper, on 5 March,
calls the Bolivians “quena (Indian flute) players, coca leaf chewers and chicha (purple
corn liquor) drinkers.” “Noticias Gráficas” newspaper on 21 March, in an editorial,
says that “being a Bolivian, is the same as being dumb, with a mix of huemul deer.”
“Golpe” newspaper, on 23 February, calls the Government of Bolivia a “coward.”
“Clarin” newspaper, on 5 March, argues that “50 percent of all Bolivians have some
type of venereal disease.”
Why continue? Suffice it to say that “La Tercera” newspaper, in the headline
of the death of a Bolivian aviator on 23 March, stated, “Bolivian pilot ridiculously
crashes” as if that death made it happy or was a reason for mockery.
The Chilean Foreign Minister, who complains so loudly for what our press
writes, can perhaps, to justify this claim, display similar insults against the Chilean
people in Bolivian newspapers?
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile maintains that “the insults Chile has
been subjected by Bolivia, the rupture of diplomatic relations, the accusation before
the OAS, the attempt to have the Organization intervene in its problem with Chile,
the declarations of Bolivian Representatives at the United Nations and the organized
exacerbation of anti-Chilean factions accentuated at the Week of the Sea, have so
greatly aggravated Bolivian-Chilean relations that the good willingness of Chile,
demonstrated in 1961 as in past times, to hear Bolivia, does not exist now.
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Those are not legitimate arguments. First, it is not about a good or bad
willingness of the Government of Chile to “hear Bolivia”, but a formal commitment
between the two countries. Secondly, all this would have been avoided if the
Government of Chile had conferred on itself, by itself only, the faculty to utilize
water, over which Bolivia has joint-ownership rights. What did the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Chile want? That, in exchange for the alms of his attention, we let
his Government take away, today the Lauca [River], and tomorrow any other river?
With the same argument, I could say that the unilateral and arbitrary diversion
of Lauca River waters, the attacks on Bolivia by the Chilean press, the refusal of the
Government of Chile to abide by the Resolutions of the OAS Council, the attack on
our Official correspondence, the unmotivated expulsion of Bolivian citizens from
Chilean territory, the disproportionate style of its official documents, the permanent
obstacles that oppose to the so-called free transit, and the Chilean Government’s claim
to exacerbate anti-Bolivian passions have worsened the Bolivian-Chilean relations to
such an extent, that the Government of Bolivia has decided to give up hope for to
evict the Treaty of 1904.
Another part of the best efforts made by the Foreign Minister of Chile in
his presentation of last Thursday was devoted to demonstrating that the Bolivian
Government had tried in vain to isolate Chile from the world.
There is none of that. The Bolivian Government does not see the need to
isolate Chile, nor has it attempted to do so. What it has done and will continue to do,
is to increasingly seek greater support from the Chilean public opinion and
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the continent, for a just solution to its problems. If the Government of Chile receives
visits or carries them out, it is its problem. If there are representatives of Chile in
these or other international organizations, we do not think it is wrong, because there
are also Bolivians. If the Government of Chile has received the sympathy of one or
another ruler, although I do not know if such a thing had happened, it is only fair
that it should celebrate it. The Bolivian Government will not fall into the nonsense
of protesting for it, respecting as it respects, the right that all American Governments
have to form their own criterion as regards an issue that is of continental concern.
The Government of Bolivia does not act with narrow-mindedness. If Chile
has any problem and we rightly corroborate, that Chile is right, we will support it.
If Chile presents applicants for posts in international organizations and we find that
they are suitable candidates, within the rotation that is traditional among the Latin
American nations, we will vote for those candidates.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia does not need to exaggerate the
attitudes he performs, or hide the facts of foreign policy. The people of Bolivia know
perfectly well that all international activities have their alternatives and have acquired
the right to be constantly and completely informed of what the Government that they
have chosen does or does not do.
NEW LINE
In that spirit, and in order to conclude this address, it is my duty to give an
account to the Bolivian people
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579
of the line of conduct that the Government has set in relation to relations with Chile.
Regarding the Lauca River issue, I must reiterate that Bolivia will never
recognize the alleged right of the Government of Chile to utilize the waters of that
river, in whole or in part, without the Bolivian consent. Bolivia will furthermore not
consider, in the future, any proposal for arrangement, until the Chapiquiña floodgates
are closed, that is to say, as long as the water keeps flowing towards Chile, water over
which Bolivia has joint-ownership rights.
With regard to the port issue, the course of action we have established is
equally clear. The Foreign Minister of Chile, in his presentation of last Thursday, said
that his Government “is not willing to enter into talks that may affect their national
sovereignty or that would entail territorial cessions of any kind.”
These expressions seem to contradict the commitments that his Government,
freely, willingly and spontaneously, assumed by means of the exchange of Notes
of June of 1950, which is of extraordinary importance. I would like to say that the
Government of Chile, first, does not live up to its commitments and, secondly, that it
has disregarded an inseparable part of the legal regime that governs Bolivian-Chilean
relations.
That phrase, as expressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, is part
of a Note addressed to the President of the OAS Council. Since we have not been
informed of that Note, we have asked the President of the OAS Council to have it
transcribedg in its entirety for us.
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580
581
When that transcript is in our power, officially, we will request the Government
of Chile, through the same channel, a clarification that will leave no room for doubts.
The Government of Bolivia will act according to that clarification. Any attitude
taken beforehand could lead to new misunderstandings, to more serious frictions, and
to further estrangement. It is not advisable to rush, forgetting the need to be patient
and often postponing the dictates of self-love hurt by the advice of sound reason.
The possibility of resuming diplomatic relations with Chile in an unreserved
and mutually trusting environment or, alternatively, the possibility that Bolivia is free
to revise other aspects of the legal regime governing the relations between the two
countries will both depend on that clarification.
We Bolivians –people and Government– share the absolute certainty that the
port issue of Bolivia, will be solved unfailingly. We are ready to renounce many
things in order for the solution to be reached, although we are also ready for greater
efforts and for sacrifice if necessary.
That is why the clarification of the Chilean Government, although important
to act accordingly, is not decisive and will not shake the uncompromising willingness
that encourages us to return to the sea. We have the right to demand that the
Government of Chile honor the commitments it has assumed with Bolivia in 1950,
because we have never failed to honor the commitments we entered into with Chile;
but, at the same time, we know that Chile can renege those commitments and even
claim, as in the case of the Memorandum of 10 July 1961,
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583
that those commitments are not truly commitments.
The latter, if it were to occur, would not mean that the possibilities to find
a prompt solution to our landlocked condition issue by means of negotiations with
the current Government of Chile have been postponed; it would mean that those
probabilities never existed. In other words, in one case, that the Government of Chile
of 1963 never intended to honor the commitments assumed by the Government of
Chile of 1950 or, in the other case, that the Government of Chile of 1950 did not
assume those commitments with the honest intention of complying with them; and
that the commitments, as was established by the confusion of the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Chile last Thursday, in the case of the Memorandum of 10 July 1961, were
assumed only as an intention of maneuver and with malicious intent.
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLES
This corroboration will come in handy. If it is true, we will confirm something
that we all already knew, or intuited at least –that the problem of our landlocked
condition will be solved, not because the Government of Chile wants or stops wanting
it, but because of the will of the peoples. First and foremost, by the will of the people
of Bolivia and then by the will of the Chilean people and all the peoples of the
continent.
This fact gives being Bolivia an additional raison d’etre and deepens that
intense and warm national feeling that we are just rediscovering and that unites us as
nothing ever before had united us.
It also imposes on us the need to contribute, each in his own sphere, to the
common goal. It imposes
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585
on the Government the duty to keep up with those who are called to represent that
national feeling and to strive for that common goal. It imposes on the Chancellery
the permanent task of extending and deepening Chile and America’s support for a
just and mutually convenient solution; it imposes on the workers and peasants the
obligation to contribute with constructive work to strengthen the nation; it imposes
upon every Bolivian, wherever he may be, the need to assert, without rest or faint, the
sacred creed of our return to the sea.
We must develop to the extent of these claims, because the fate of our
imprisoned country depends on it, and we are going to do it, undoubtedly, because all
Bolivians, absolutely all of us, want to leave a free Bolivia for our children.
In this task tackled with an honest method, cleanliness of conduct and
persevering purpose, we are assisted by law and reason, and we are accompanied by
the sympathy and support of the Americas.
That is why, just as when the conflict with Chile began, I said: “Bolivia, is not
alone” and this has proven to be true, now I will say more, and I’m sure that time will
corroborate my words, that: Bolivia is called to greatness and nothing and nobody
can stop it.
_______________
76-
586
587
Annex 288
Press Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Towards the
Sea – Transcendental Documents (1963), pp. 7 - 8 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
588
589
On Wednesday, March 27th, Chile’s Foreign Minister, Carlos
Martinez Sotomayor, establishing what appeared to be a new position
of his Government, delivered a speech that was, in a way, a response
to the “Week of the Sea”, celebrated in our country on the occasion of
the anniversary of the death of Eduardo Abaroa, hero of the War of the
Pacific.
A week later, on Wednesday, April 3rd, Bolivia’s Foreign Minister,
Jose Fellman Velarde, gave his answer and, for an hour and a half, he
thoroughly analyzed the concepts of the Chilean Minister of Foreign
Relations, explaining Bolivia’s position in these circumstances.
All this seems absolutely normal in matters of international
relations, but the truth is that the speeches of both Chancellors, in less
than seven days, demonstrated what had not been considered clearly
enough in 84 years: that Chile had not maintained a sincere position
towards Bolivia; and that Bolivia, in the course of time, had defined an
evolved attitude towards the problem of its landlocked condition, to such
an extent that it is already such a solid matter that it does not accept any
theory against it. Thus, many of the traditional arguments of the Chilean
diplomacy, such as the irreversibility
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590
591
of treaties, are now arguments that favor the Bolivian position. One
example: Bolivia does not request a revision of the 1904 Treaties, which
sealed the traditionally imperialist usurpation of 1879. Instead, following
the same legal line, it calls for the fulfillment of commitments. And the
Note of the Chilean Chancellery of 20 June 1950 and the Memorandum
of 10 July 1961 are commitments.
Whatever the course the relations between the two countries
follow in the future, the documents that now have a decisive value are the
speeches of March 27th and April 3rd, the Chilean Note of 1950 and the
Memorandum of the Chancellery of that country of 10 July 1961. That
is why we publish them, all together, for the first time. In international
politics, documents bear witness of the word pledged, although these are
often overlooked.
The order of the publications in this booklet is chronological. First
the documents, then the address by Chancellor Martinez Sotomayor,
dening its validity and, lastly, the reply of Chancellor Fellman Velarde.
Considering everything, it sheds more light over a great truth:
Bolivia claims its right of access to the sea.
Press Office
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
La Paz, 4 April 1963.
8-
592
593
Annex 289
“Bolivia firmly maintains its decision not to resume relations with Chile”,
El Diario (Bolivia), 15 June 1963
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
El Diario Newspaper (Bolivia)
594
El Diario 15 de Junio de 1963
595
The following Communiqué
was issued yesterday:
With reference to the
Communiqué of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Chile, regarding
Bolivian-Chilean relations, the
Bolivian Foreign Ministry deems it
necessary to establish:
1.-That it is evident that
the Bolivian Government firmly
maintained its decision not to
resume diplomatic relations with
the Government of Chile until it
complies with the commitments
made to Bolivia through the
exchange of Notes of June 1950,
in the sense of being willing to
discuss “the formula that can grant
Bolivia an own and sovereign
access to the Pacific Ocean and for
Chile to obtain compensations of
non-territorial character.”
That position of the Government
of Bolivia, continues and will
continue unwavering.
2.-The Bolivian Government
did not, under any circumstances,
consider the efforts of Mr. Facio, ,
President of the OAS Council, as
being carried out on a “personal
basis,” but as emerging from
the Resolution approved by that
Organization on 24 May 1962,
offering Bolivia his good offices
to mediate in the conflict with
Chile. This assertion is supported
by of several facts, the most
demonstrative of which consists
of statements made by Mr. Facio
himself, first, to the Associated
Press in Lima on February 19th,
in which he states: “The path for
a direct settlement with Chile is
open, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE RESOLUTION OF THE
OAS COUNCIL” and, second,
to “Presencia” newspaper of La
Paz, where he affirmed, referring
to his exchange of ideas with the
representatives of the Supreme
Government: “The talks that we
had regarding OAS-RELATED
PROBLEMS were very
satisfactory.”
“El Diario” Newspaper 15 June 1963
BOLIVIA FIRMLY MAINTAINS ITS DECISION NOT TO RESUME
RELATIONS WITH CHILE
Until that country complies with the commitments that it has assumed.
596
597
Annex 290
Message from the President of the Republic of Bolivia, Dr. Victor Paz
Estenssoro, to the Honorable National Congress,
6 August 1963, p. 101 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
National Information Office of the Presidency of Bolivia
598
599
[...]
It is necessary to point out, once again, that our country, in
regard to the matter of its reintegration with the sea, demands the
fulfillment of the promises made by the Government of Chile in June
1950 and July 1961, and, with regard to the Lauca issue, demands
that the Chilean Government must comply with the requirement of
consent to which it is bound by the Montevideo Declaration of 1937.
Neither the Bolivian people nor their Government have any
interest or desire in maintaining the current state of affairs with Chile.
On this occasion, I reiterate that when the Government of that
country expresses its willingness to comply with the commitments
assumed in June 1950, Bolivia will not refuse to resume diplomatic
relations between the two countries, with a view to seeking a friendly and
fair solution to the Lauca River issue, and to contribute to the creation
of a climate conducive to an understanding of mutual coexistence in the
port issue.
For as long as Bolivia does not obtain an own and sovereign
outlet to the Pacific Ocean, its foreign commerce will be subjected to
a situation of dependence and its economic and cultural development
will continue being impaired. It has, on the other hand, much to offer
Chile without the need to resort to territorial compensation. It is truly
hard to find, in the new continental atmosphere of interrelation and
solidarity, reasons to oppose to that agreement of mutual coexistence.
[...]
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600
601
Annex 291
Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Jose Fellman
Velarde, to former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile,
Conrado Rios Gallardo, 25 September 1963
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
C. Rios Gallardo, An Informal Chilean-Bolivian Contact (1966),
pp. 46 - 48
602
603
46
__________________________________________________________________
[...]
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND WORSHIP OF
BOLIVIA
La Paz, 25 September 1963
To Mr. Conrado Rios Gallardo
Santiago – Chile
Distinguished Mr. Rios,
I received your kind letter yesterday, 16 September, due to mail complications.
I understand –as I told you in the conversation we held in Paraguay– that
it is pointless to turn our eyes to the past if we have the willingness to look ahead.
However, and without any intention to call your memory into question, I would like
to emphasize that, in that conversation, I spoke with you, first, of my desire to reach a
mutually advantageous solution for the problems that divide our two countries and to
overcome the obstructions that hindered this purpose owing to the growing sentiment
of vindication of the Bolivian public opinion, and then referred to the difficulties
Bolivia endures as a result of its lack of access to the Pacific Ocean, in regard to free
transit,
604
605
47
___________________________________________________________________
as in regard to its individual order. The “Facio Note” was disclosed after I informed
you that, in the current circumstances, the Government of Bolivia did not intend
to recover Litoral [Department], divide the Chilean territory or access the Ocean
through territories subject to the Chilean-Peruvian Agreements of 1929.
I insist in what I said then. In my view, that Note does not entail a revision
of the 1904 Peace Treaty. If you read the Notes exchanged in June 1950 and the
Memorandums of 1961, you will see that the Chilean Government is willing,
safeguarding the legal situation created by the 1904 Treaty, to enter into formal and
direct negotiations with Bolivia to give it an own and sovereign access to the Pacific
Ocean and for Chile to receive the compensations that are not territorial in nature –
this
____________
606
607
48
__________________________________________________________________
is almost a verbatim description of these notes. The Government of Bolivia still
agrees with that view.
I believe, also, although this is a personal view, that sovereignty should be
addressed, as all other abstract issues, not in itself, but in relation to its content. And,
as a result, I would have appreciated to know with the most detail possible, what the
Government of Chile is able to offer to try to seek a solution to the problems which,
to Bolivia, entail not owning docks where Bolivian cargo can be handled by Bolivians
paid in Bolivian currency, with storage and customs houses, and offices supervised by
the appropriate Bolivian authorities, beaches where Bolivians can travel to without
the need for passports or permits, and not having effective and sufficient guarantees
for the free and unrestricted transit regime –agreed to under the 1904 Treaty– not to
be hindered.
I am writing these lines with the same sincerity with which you do –sincerity
that I appreciate. No Bolivian Government would ever renounce, in the substance
more than in the formal aspects, the commitments made by Chile in 1950 and in 1961,
independently of the circumstances in which these were assumed.
We could have made progress in the substantial aspects. Unfortunately,
however, I regrettably agree with you on the fact that our positions, for the time being,
seem to be absolutely opposed to one another.
It is really sad that this should be the situation. It has not been easy for me to
push forward the creation of a proper atmosphere and not find any echo, not even Mr.
Fuentes’ “exequatur”. In spite of this, this process was not restricted to any constructive
proposal. Believe me when I say that in the midst of these difficulties, it is pleasant to
find people who have the same willingness that I believe I have and which deserves
the respect due to anyone who defends, in positive terms, his Motherland.
I reiterate the assurances of my consideration,
Jose Fellman Velarde
608
609
Annex 292
Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Jose Fellman
Velarde, to former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Conrado Rios
Gallardo, 13 January 1964
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
C. Rios Gallardo, An Informal Chilean-Bolivian Contact (1966),
pp. 66 - 72
610
611
66
[…]
La Paz, 13 January 1964.
Mr. Conrado Rios Gallardo
Santiago – Chile.
Dear Mr. Rios:
I had been expecting with optimism your letter of the 9th of this month. I just
received it and I must tell you, honestly, that reality has not justified that expectation.
612
613
67
I think, as you also do, that for the matter at hand, the present is decisive.
International relations are almost always a matter of controversy in electoral processes
and it is never clear whether a change of government, even if it is only of people,
entails a return to the starting point in a negotiation regarding pending issues between
two countries.
Considering this circumstance, I think it is my duty to comment your letter
with the utmost frankness.
I understand that the Government of Chile does not want to renounce the
rights provided to it by the 1904 Treaty and I trust that you will understand that the
Bolivian Government does not want to renounce the expectations raised by the June
1950 Note. This without considering the circumstances, of one order or another, in
which both instruments were subscribed.
I believe, however, that between one and the other point of view, there is a
sort of no-man’s land, and if there were a real desire to find solutions, we should have
moved forward in that no man’s land until we met, if possible, halfway.
As far as free transit is concerned, the terms of your letter do not signal to
that progress. They belong to what Bolivia is already entitled to, under existing
agreements, or to what it has already rejected, in more favorable circumstances,
when, in 1961, the Ministers of Public Works of both countries were to meet. And I
honestly cannot agree with them. Perhaps you don’t know that, at that time, even the
territories that Bolivia was supposed to receive in Arica for warehouses and agencies
were mentioned.
You say that no nation has granted rights and privileges similar to those that
Chile grants Bolivia in its territory. Allow me to differ with those terms. To be fair, we
must remember that it is not a concession but a compensation, as is clearly established
in the 1904 Treaty. On the other hand, even outside that framework, I don’t believe
that Bolivia is the landlocked nation with the greatest transit facilities, as far as Chile
is concerned.
614
615
68
You remind me, as backup documents, of the terms of the 1937 Convention
and of the 1953 Declaration, yet you do not recognize that all rights or privileges
accorded in such instruments for Bolivia are born –as is stated in paragraph 1, page
3 of your letter– only from the moment in which the Chilean authorities hand over
Bolivian goods to Bolivian authorities. That is to say, between the Nation that sends
something to Bolivia or that receives something from Bolivia, the Chilean authority is
in between.
We cannot forget that there are landlocked nations that can trade with other
nations, without the presence or intervention of a third Party. It is this fact that causes
friction and resentment. There are losses of goods, apathy
616
617
69
in the handling, delays... Although not strictly true in all cases, all this happens,
according to our importers and exporters, on account of that third Party.
Why couldn’t we think of eliminating that motive of friction and resentment
for the good of all? I don’t think that Chile would have lost anything by allowing
direct dealings between Bolivia and the importer and exporter countries. Moreover,
within an adequate interpretation, this was stipulated within the terms of freedom
and non-restriction of the 1904 Treaty.
My idea of a satisfactory adjustment of the transit issue was a free zone,
under the jurisdiction and competence of Bolivian authorities, where there are docks
or
618
619
70
where these can be built, or that are or can be easily connected to one of the railways
that connect Bolivia with the Pacific, and that cover enough land to build customs
agencies, warehouses, housing for employees, a commissariat for provisions, a small
hotel and an airstrip. In short, a few square kilometers, which, as regards transit,
constitute a station, free from the presence of third Parties, between Bolivia and the
world, and to which, without difficulty to leave, the Bolivians can arrive, without any
requirement.
Free zones of this type, with different denominations, are owned by Switzerland
in France and Germany, for example. We are negotiating something similar with the
Argentine Republic in Barranqueras. Why couldn’t Chile agree on such a thing?
When I talked to you about Mejillones, where a free zone could be created,
no matter what denomination is given to it, I had in mind the fact that there is a small
dock from which we already export some tin, which is connected to the Antofagasta
railway, which has few inhabitants and, above all, due to the difficulties of creating
a free zone in a port such as Arica and Antofagasta, where problems may arise with
port workers, or there may be no space, and where entrenched interests may exist that
could oppose to the creation of the free zone.
The economic advantages of Arica and Antofagasta above such a free zone
are unquestionable, and this would have led Bolivia to continue using those ports for
many years. Better yet if it has the same facilities that you detail in your letter. But
the important thing for Bolivians, are the moral advantages, the independence of their
communications.
Within this framework, it seems necessary to point out that, we did not intend
to force Chile to build docks that don’t exist or an airport. In time, we would have done
it ourselves. Neither remove the total load currently handled in Arica or Antofagasta,
which, as it stands out by the naked eye, is physically impossible, economically
inconvenient and can be subject to an agreement.
I think that my idea of a free zone, as I have explained, even if it is in that noman’s
land that is between the Treaty of 1904 and the Note of 1950 –although that is
not my view–did not imply for Chile the cession of rights to which it considers itself
620
621
71
entitled. I didn’t see, as I wrote, the need to discuss the spiky term of sovereignty, and
not even that of extraterritoriality, had the practical details of the status of that free
zone, or whatever it might be called, been agreed upon.
I dare to say to you that, personally, I could have supported an agreement as
this one, before my Government and, what is even more important, before the public
opinion of my country. Moreover, I do not think that it would have been inconvenient
if, at the same time as the agreement of the principle, relations between our two
countries had been restored, in order to enter into details.
The terms of your letter, I’m sad to say, offer no basis for negotiation. In such
circumstances, I believe that it is a burdensome responsibility for me, personally, to
continue keeping my Government in a state of expectation. Within my own Party,
there are those who maintain, with increasing insistence, that the current policy of the
Foreign Ministry is detrimental to the country and places the official candidates at a
disadvantage compared to the opponents, who have no obstacles in their approaches.
We are satisfied that we have made an honest effort. I immensely regret that it
did not prosper, not even to the point of finding points of agreement and I think you
feel
622
623
72
as much regret as I do. Anyhow, our meeting and our cordial and frank correspondence,
give me the satisfaction of having acquired a friend.
With nothing else to add, please receive the warm greeting of
Jose Fellman Velarde
[...]
624
625
Annex 293
C. Rios Gallardo, An Informal Chilean-Bolivian Contact (1966),
pp. 35 - 39 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
626
627
An Informal Chilean-Bolivian Contact
Completely retired from diplomatic functions, I was surprised, in
the first days of August 1963, by an urgent appeal from Foreign Minister,
Mr. Carlos Martinez Sotomayor, who, on behalf of the President of the
Republic, Mr. Jorge Alessandri, asked me to preside over the Special
Diplomatic Mission that our country would send to Paraguay, on occasion
of General Alfredo Stroessner’s presidential inauguration, a distinction
that I accepted because of the friendship I profess to the virile Guarani
people and the marked deference the Government made for me.
The mission was integrated by the following members: Carlos
Montane C., Guillermo Rivera B., and Edmundo Eluchans M.; the
commanders-in-chief of the army, the navy and the air force, Major
General Oscar Izurieta M., Vice Admiral Hernan Cubillos L., and Air
General Eduardo Jensen F., respectively; the secretary of the mission Mr.
Jorge Valdobinos and the respective command assistants. As is usual in
these cases, the diplomatic representation of the country in Paraguay,
headed by the efficient Ambassador Mr. Jaime Egaña Barahona, became
part of the special mission.
628
629
36
On August 12th, in a direct flight from Santiago to Asuncion, in only two
hours, we landed in its airport. In 1939, I had arrived from Buenos Aires by river, in
a four-day journey, presiding over the special mission of our country for presidential
inauguration of General Felix Estigarribia, the skilful leader and winner of the Chaco
War.
Almost a quarter of a century had passed. In such a brief space, the majestic
capital of Paraguay, a source of irradiation in the colonial era, had transformed –
without their inhabitants losing their elegant simplicity and its streets the charm of its
perfumed orange trees– into a modern metropolis. From the old city only what was
worthy of being preserved remained, and the new one rose between wide avenues
and tall buildings rising up to the sky. The people who loved their land lived with joy
and enjoyed the goods of progress. There was a sense of well-being and a lofty youth,
of both genders, which was the guarantee of the great future of the nation.
Two days before the end of the official sessions, in the afternoon of August
16th, the secretary of the special mission of Bolivia called the secretary of ours by
telephone, requesting a meeting between the head of the Chilean mission and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of his country, Mr. Jose Fellman Velarde, with whom
I had exchanged only discreet greetings in the course of the various ceremonies.
Even though diplomatic ties had been broken since April 1962, a duty of undisputed
courtesy knocked on our door and the one knocking was precisely the one who had
broken relations.
The meeting was agreed for 9:30 p.m. on the same day and at the scheduled
time, the diplomatic representative of Palacio Quemado was knocking at the door of
room 513, of the magnificent and modern Guarani Hotel, where we had been staying.
In a room of 5 x 3, we were face to face and for the first time in life and we hand
shook each other cordially. We had not met each other before. I had heard about him
and he possibly heard about me too. We looked at each other and measured ourselves
as a spontaneous reaction. Similar statures, he was in the full force of life and I was
far beyond the middle of it. The meeting was unique; our personalities were both
characterized, with or without reason, as anti-Chilean and anti-Bolivian respectively.
Yet our
630
631
37
meeting was cordial, and he always kept his chivalry safe.
The talk began without hesitation and he immediately made a brief
analysis of the development of the relations of the two countries after
the Treaty of 1904, to concentrate immediately on the various episodes
experienced in the last four years, ending with the dramatic opening of
Lauca River floodgates and assuring that this provocation had forced his
Government to break diplomatic relations with Chile. He pointed out that
after this fact, a strong current of opinion in favor of the maritime claim
had emerged again in his country and that even some frenzied people had
come to proclaim war as a decision. These elements, he added, stoned the
Chancellery and covered me with insults.
He assured that he did not share these extreme opinions, which
are inconsistent with the reality. He even thought that it was not possible
to aspire to a territory in the Pacific, but such a statement could result
in his being hanged back in my country. He added that Arica was the
natural port of the Department of La Paz, but that given its extraordinary
development, its large Chilean population, its expanding industrial power,
and the substantial State investments made in it, there was no reasonable
pretension over that territory.
At this point I interrupted him by expressing that it was extremely
detrimental to the practical understanding to create illusions in the
multitude about the possibility of Chile giving up an inch of territory and
I frankly stated that the Treaty of Peace of 1904 had definitely established
our borders.
However –he replied– Chancellor Walker’s Note and Ambassador
Trucco’s Memorandum opened the door for a port negotiation and,
regarding the importance of both documents, I have requested a statement
and I have never obtained it. I reminded him that he had indirectly obtained
one in Foreign Minister Martinez Sotomayor’s response to Ambassador
Facio, to the effect that Chile is not willing to enter into talks that affect
the integrity of its national sovereignty.
Putting that matter aside, he then discussed the free transit regime
prescribed under the Pact of 1904, and declared that said regime was not
enough
632
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38
for Bolivia’s development, that difficulties were always experienced
in the transit of goods, that the free transit regime had been ousted by
the will of Chilean maritime unions and that these latter had recently
threatened with making a strike if their demand for a train driver who
had ran over and killed a man who had been crossing the rail-line was
not complied with.
I replied that no port on earth was safe from labor strikes, from
New York to Mollendo, from Liberpool to Arica, but added that strikes
are sporadic and free transit is eternal.
Foreign Minister Fellman Velarde, whose look is both intelligent
and perceptive, then addressed the Lauca question again. He put forward
different proposals for solution formulas and placed more emphasis in the
appointment of neutral engineers, of professional reputation, to inform
both countries of whether Chile’s utilization of the waters causes any
harm to Bolivia. This step would be faster than appealing to The Hague
Court. He assured me that works are still being carried out in the river,
twelve kilometers from the border, and said that pictures evidencing
these works had been shown to the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin
America and the U.S. Ambassador to La Paz. With a conciliatory tone,
he added that Chile could increase the flow rate of Lauca River, taking
advantage of Challaviento lagoon. He insisted, once more, in seeking a
solution to this problem and assured they are ready for that.
He immediately thereafter referred to a proposal handed to the
President of the OAS Council, Ambassador Facio, consisting of greater
facilities –which would not affect Chile’s sovereignty– in Mejillones
port. He justified this project saying a port could be built in that bay to
thus avoid the obstacles experienced in Arica and Antofagasta, owing
to the fact that these two see an intense commercial movement, while
Mejillones could be a more expeditious port for Bolivia and Bolivian
inhabitants could reach it without transportation complications to swim
and sunbathe there.
In reply, I told him that I was not aware of that proposal, and he
responded that he would send it to me through a safe channel. These
exchanges resulted in our exchange of correspondence and the latter was
encouraged by a mutual aspiration to overcome the difficulties that
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separate our two nations. This was a noble aim that was unfortunately not
crowned with success.
The meeting then ended with Foreign Minister Fellman Velarde
first saying that President Paz Estenssoro –always seeking to overcome
difficulties– had thought it fitting to take advantage of the trip made
by former Foreign Minister Rios Gallardo and meet him –asides from
official contacts– to hold a frank exchange of ideas for the purpose of
seeking the means to resume relations, inasmuch as positive results could
only be achieved in direct dealings and, while these are not reestablished,
the two countries would continue growing distant and the task would
become more difficult to complete.
I replied telling him that I shared these purposes and that I would
comply with the duty of informing President Alessandri and Foreign
Minister Martinez Sotomayor of the ideas and thoughts that have been
expressed here in such clear terms.
The meeting lasted two hours, what has been written here is but a
brief summary of the fundamental aspects, which have been recorded in
the most faithful way possible. Should there be any error in this account,
I beg Mr. Jose Fellman Velarde –whose fate at these uncertain moments
experienced in his country I ignore– to forgive me. I would have liked
to have his authorization to submit these letters to the public, even
though this correspondence belongs to neither him nor myself, but to our
respective public opinions who shall take notice of and judge them.
C.R.G.
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Annex 294
A. Alessandri Palma, Memoirs of my Government, Volume I (1967),
pp. 76 - 77 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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76
[...]
On 4 November 1921, the first Council of Ministers of the
Tocornal-Barros Jarpa cabinet took place, where the ministerial program
was agreed upon, which was sober and dignified, offering work, respect
for the law and permanence in office until a political combination
capable of supporting an efficient and hardworking Ministry was formed.
The Ministry was well received in the Senate and in the Chamber of
Deputies. I recommended to Minister Jaramillo to especially continue the
construction of the trans-Andean by Uspallata, of the railways of Salta
and Antofagasta, from Lonquimay to Bahia Blanca and from Valparaiso
by Casablanca, to give work to the unemployed. On
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the same day, I received the new Minister of Bolivia, Mr. Macario Pinilla,
and, even though it was a little against the protocol, I told him that if he
came to ask me for a revision of the Treaty of 1904, it was preferable
that he not waste his time and not make me waste mine, because I, on
behalf of Chile, would never accept the revision of the Treaty, without
prejudice to hearing in a new negotiation something about the aspirations
of Bolivia, based on compensations: “We consider –I said– our situation
with Bolivia completely settled, we do not owe Bolivia anything, even if
we do not refuse to talk about new bases or propositions of an arrangement
with no relation to the Treaty.”
[...]
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Annex 295
E. J. Holland, A Historical Study of Bolivia`s Foreign Relations
1935-1946 (1967), pp. 228 - 232 (extract)
(Original in English)
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647
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Annex 296
Report from the Consul General of Bolivia in Chile, Franz Rück Uriburu,
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Emilio Molina Pizarro,
19 November 1970
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
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651
Republic of Bolivia RESERVED
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship
La Paz, 19 November 1970
Subject: Confidential mission in Santiago, Chile
Mr. Minister,
This morning, the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Fernando Laredo, gave me instructions to submit to you a report on the
conclusions reached in Santiago, Chile, as a result of the confidential
mission I had been entrusted by the Government of Bolivia before that of
Chile’s, while I simultaneously discharge functions as Consul General in
the Chilean capital.
Such demarches –quite complex, due to both the issues discussed
and the Chilean diplomats and politicians who took part in them–
were carried out due to the instructions that, authorized by the Foreign
Ministry, were imparted to me by the then President of the Republic,
General Alfredo Ovando and resulted in a lengthy report which will give
you, Distinguished Foreign Minister, detailed information of everything
that has happened in regard to them.
Meanwhile, and complying with your instructions, Distinguished
Foreign Minister, I shall succinctly inform you of the conditions that
both countries have agreed -so far- for a possible reestablishment of
diplomatic relations, which have been broken off for eight years owing
to the controversy arising from Chile’s undue appropriation of the waters
of Lauca River.
The spirit of these demarches –on which the instructions I
received from my Government were inspired and with which Chile
agrees completely– is to take advantage, within a fresh state of mind, of
the complementation
General
Emilio Molina Pizarro
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship
Hand Delivered.
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Republic of Bolivia 2.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship
offered by the economies of Bolivia and Chile to act in better conditions
within the Andean Group, always bearing in mind not only the unwavering
framework of national dignity, which is obvious, but also the crucial
objective of entering into the path that lead us towards attaining the
own and sovereign outlet Bolivia must have on the Pacific. And it is
held that this is the “road” to the sea and not merely of “obtaining” a
port, because, since diplomacy is the “science of the possible”, we must
adapt –sometimes to our regret– our actions to the possibilities that are
offered to us and not to the reality which, by virtue of justice, we ought
to demand for.
In this way, after ten months of confidential dealings –carried
out seven months in Santiago and three in La Paz and, of course, adreferendum
given that the undersigned officially discharges functions as
Consul– concrete conclusions that have been approved in their entirety by
the Government of Unidad Popular were arrived to with the Democratic-
Christian Government of President Frei, as I had the honor to inform you,
distinguished Foreign Minister in the cables that record my talks with
President Allende.
The conditions agreed to for a possible resumption of relations are
the following:
1. A simultaneous statement would be made by the two
Governments to the effect that they are thereby resuming their diplomatic
relations encouraged by the purpose of seeking formulas to resolve the
issues that are of common interest and for the purpose of contributing
more effectively to sub-regional integration and Latin-American unity”.
2. Similarly, the two Governments would make the statements
they regard appropriate on the resumption of relations.
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Republic of Bolivia 3.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship
(Complementary clarification: in my view, the President of Bolivia
shall utter his statement –which shall be made simultaneously with the
holding of an act of relations resumption– to the effect that Bolivia is
taking this decision of historical transcendence with three objectives in
mind: 1) to negotiate with Chile a sovereign and own outlet to the Pacific
Ocean, in the terms clearly established in the Notes exchanged by the
two Governments on 1 and 20 June 1950, by the Bolivian Ambassador,
Mr. Alberto Ostria Gutierrez and Chilean Foreign Minister Mr. Horacio
Walker Larrain; 2) to solve the Lauca River dispute; 3) to push forward
the implementation of Covenants and Agreements of vital importance for
the development of infrastructure and trade between Bolivia and Chile,
which entail positive progress in the harmonious application of the great
integration prospect carried out by the countries of the Andean Group).
3.- An announcement will be made for the holding of a meeting
of the Joint Technical Commission to study the utilization of Lauca River
and propose solutions that contemplate both countries’ legitimate and
reciprocal interests.
4.- An announcement will be made for the holding of meeting
of the Joint Commission (Economic Complementation Treaty) to resolve
the following issues.
A.- More transit facilities for people and goods;
I.- Elimination of passports and visas, with Chile keeping only
health and police control over vehicles and people.
II.- Bolivian foreign trade to La Paz, other cities and vice-versa,
will be carried out in a direct manner and not with Arica tax ID number,
CIF (for instance, Hamburg-CIF La Paz .- La Paz-CIF Hamburg, etc.).
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Republic of Bolivia 4.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship
III.- Creation of a Bolivian maritime terminal in Arica in charge
of a Bolivian Customs Agency; cession to Bolivia of a dock of its own;
cession to Bolivia of an area in Arica to build a land terminal (construction
of a hotel, service station for trucks coming from Bolivia, etc.).
B.- Arica-La Paz road (conclusion) and Iquique-Oruro
(construction).
C.- Widening of pipelines and deposits for the oil-pipeline and
extension of hoses to tanker vessels at the sea.
D.- Assessment of the laying of gas pipelines which, crossing
the main Bolivian mining centers, reaches the coast on the Pacific.
E.- Commercial exchange: gas and oil bought by Chile from
Bolivia.
F.- Assessment of the petro-chemical industry, taking advantage
of the agreements of the Andean Sub-Region.
G.- Assessment of projects with steelmaking mixed societies.
H.- Intensification of intellectual exchange and perspectives for
technical assistance.
STRICTLY RESERVED AND VERBAL NEGOTIATION TO
ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF A SOVEREIGN PORT FOR BOLIVIA
ON THE PACIFIC OCEAN
Once relations are reestablished, the Bolivian diplomatic agent to
Santiago will send a note to the Foreign Minister of Chile, requesting: a)
a meeting or b) a written response “to continue the negotiations specified
in the Notes exchanged by the two Governments on 1 and 20 June 1950,
signed by the Bolivian Ambassador, Mr. Alberto Ostria Gutierrez and
Chilean Foreign Minister, Mr. Horacio Walker Larrain, to secure a
sovereign port for Bolivia on the Pacific Ocean”.
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Republic of Bolivia 5.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship
In the recent negotiations held with the current Chilean Government,
we agreed, making progress in what had been agreed to with the preceding
Government, that the exchange of these Notes would take place fifteen
days after the date on which relations are resumed.
(We agreed on this term bearing in mind that after such event,
it would be necessary to request for the agreement for the Bolivian
Ambassador or the exchange of Ambassadors –in the case of the latter,
it would take more time for the Senate to give its approval for the
appointment of the Chilean Ambassador– and then the Bolivian diplomat
would have to make essential visits, for instance, to the President of the
Congress, of the Supreme Court, the Interior Minister, who in Chile
replaces the President in the event he is unable to discharge functions).
Let me repeat, Mr. Foreign Minister, that these conditions agreed
for the possibility of a reestablishment of relations with Chile, will have
to be analyzed together with the fluctuations that were experienced in the
course of the negotiations and which are recorded in a general report I
will submit for your consideration.
Meanwhile, Honorable Minister, I am waiting for your instructions
to verbally submit lengthy information to you and the President of the
Republic when he deems it appropriate.
I believe these negotiations evidence the advantage of having
compiled into a single body all the demarches carried out earlier by the
representatives of Bolivia and Chile with regard to this question, which
record also the progress made in regard to petrochemical and gas related
matters, greater transit facilities (elimination of visas and controls)
and, mainly, Chile’s willingness to restore the effectiveness of the
Governmental Notes of 1950, which recognize Bolivia’s right to conduct
negotiations leading effectiveness to its maritime reintegration.
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Republic of Bolivia 6.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship
The Revolutionary Government shall now determine the advantage
of modifying, extending, pursuing or suspending the negotiations in
course. The undersigned, in his capacity as Foreign Service Officer at
the service of Bolivia, can only wait for official instructions and comply
with them, as he has done in the course of the demarches of which I am
informing in this document.
Finally, I must note the excellent willingness that President Allende,
and afterwards his Chancellor, Mr. Almeyda, have showed me in
recent days in order to come to an agreement with Bolivia that puts an
end to the rupture of relations between both countries.
I reiterate to you Honorable Foreign Minister the assurances of the
most elevated and distinguished consideration.
[Signature]
Franz Rück Uriburu
Consul General of Bolivia in Chile
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Annex 297
Meeting held between the Foreign Ministers of Bolivia and Chile in San
Jose, Costa Rica, drafted by Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
Fernando Laredo, 14 April 1971
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
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COPY
RESERVED
MEETING HELD BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF
BOLIVIA AND CHILE IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA
On 14 April 1971, at the express invitation of the Distinguished
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Mr. Clodomiro Almeyda, the
Foreign Ministers of Bolivia and Chile, accompanied by Undersecretary
Fernando Laredo, Ambassador Carlos Casap and Ambassadors Luis
Herrera, Armando Vargas Carreño and Mario Valenzuela, met for an
intimate dinner and held a lengthy meeting.
In the talks they held, they addressed different political issues
related to the internal situations in both countries, the situation of Cuba
vis-à-vis the OAS, and issues related to the latter –to the Regular Sessions
of which both Delegations would attend.
The main discussion t