INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE ACCESS TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN
(BOLIVIA v. CHILE)
REPLY OF THE PLURINATIONAL
STATE OF BOLIVIA
21 March 2017
Volume 2 of 5
(Annexes 234 - 277)
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Annex 234
Circular of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, to the Legations of
Bolivia Abroad, 25 January 1901
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Report from the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia to the Regular Congress of 1901 (1902), pp. 97 - 101
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CHILE
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Circular to the Legations of Bolivia Abroad
La Paz, 25 January 1901
When I took office of the Foreign Ministry and among
the first duties of my position, I found the painful, it is true, but
inevitable task of rectifying diverse considerations and assertions
contained in the Circular that was addressed by the Chilean
Foreign Ministry to its Diplomatic Corps abroad on 30 September.
The severe statements made therein, in the way of a simple
explanation of the true scope of the Note sent to our Government by
Plenipotentiary König, reveal, unfortunately, not only the natural and
legitimate purpose of justifying the conduct followed by the Government
of Chile in its relations with Peru and Bolivia, but also an absolute
ignorance of the rights that belong to them in the territories now
occupied by Chile; and what is even stranger, this has occurred in a state
of negotiations intended to bring together both countries and conclude
a definitive peace agreement between them, in which it is possible to
perceive the marked tendency to attribute to the Bolivian policies a certain
odious vainness in the fulfillment of its commitments, and an undue
and tenacious aspiration to possess what in no way corresponds to it.
[...]
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[...]
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The different accusations that I have addressed here refer to facts
that relate to an epoch preceding the war of 1879, but since there are
others that are intimately and significantly related to our current policy,
I must take them into account.
Bolivia and Peru are credited with obstructing the noble intention
of the Government of Chile to reconcile and give full satisfaction to
the aspirations and interests of both peoples, in order to ensure the
achievement of a definitive peace among the three nations, and with
this intention, the following accusation is formulated:
“When, owing to our long years of efforts and very harsh
sacrifices, we thought we had reached the outcome, we saw
a new unforeseen obstacle arise, and we were placed in a nowin
situation. Peru refused to discuss the plebiscitary protocol
until we concluded with Bolivia a peace treaty from which all
adventitious rights to the possession of Tacna and Arica would
be eliminated; and Bolivia, in turn, postponed the discussion
of the Peace Treaty until after we came to an agreement on the
plebiscitary protocol with Peru and carried it out.”
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It is not understandable that Bolivia ought to be attributed, in the
aforementioned and still pending peace negotiations, a role that is so
different from that which it was really able to play and that is so opposed
to the aims it has pursued with self-sacrifice and determination.If, on
many occasions, it becomes difficult to discover the truth of past events,
which are hidden in the darkness of times, then there is nothing easier
than to clarify the current facts, all the more if they have just developed
in our own sight.
In the present case, in order to be able to discover with full clarity
who is to be held responsible for the fact that it has not yet been possible
to reach a definitive peace agreement to present, it is enough to recall
both countries’ diplomatic actions, which are recorded in the different
pacts agreed upon in the last period and in the efforts to put them into
force.
The truce pact was signed with a series of burdensome conditions
imposed upon Bolivia. It was only natural that the latter should seek to
free itself from it, replacing it with a definitive peace, even if it had to
resign itself to accepting painful sacrifices.
On the other hand, it was also natural for Chile to aspire to the
consolidation of the property rights it desired to possess over the territories
which it had occupied provisionally.
After an unsuccessful attempt at settlement and in the aftermath
of the civil war that broke out in Chile, the declaration of belligerence,
sharply requested by its advocates, was produced and with it, came about
the approximation of relations between the Bolivian Government and the
triumphant Government Junta of Chile.
The stipulation of a pact favorable to Bolivia was then only to be
expected, but this was far from being so.
The Protocol of 19 May 1891 was formulated by the Minister of
Chile, Juan Gonzalo Matta. In spite of its very heavy and inconvenient
conditions and that it completely ruled out the idea of a port for Bolivia,
this protocol was, after serious resistance in the Bolivian Congress,
approved by it, and then the Government was recommended to take steps
to improve it as much as possible.
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When the pact was taken to Chile, it was paralyzed there.
Shortly afterwards, the Government of Chile itself initiated again
the conclusion of a definitive peace treaty, which would harmonize the
interests of both countries as much as possible.
Bolivia decidedly supported this purpose and instructed its Plenipotentiary
in Santiago to proceed to adjust it.
After serious and successive meetings, two treaties were concluded,
both on 18 May 1895: one on peace and friendship and another one on
territory transfer.
In the former, the possession of the territory which Chile governed
according to the Pact of Truce became an absolute and perpetual
dominion; and in the second one, Chile undertook to transfer to Bolivia
the territories of Tacna and Arica, if, as a result of the plebiscite or by
direct arrangements, it acquired them. In order to do this, Chile committed
to make all efforts.
However, if Chile could not obtain the territories of Tacna and
Arica, it committed itself to transfer Vitor inlet or an analogous one, as
well as the sum of 5,000,000 pesos to Bolivia.
With these treaties, both Governments recognized that what is now
regarded in the Circular as a tenacious and unjustified obsession to obtain
a port was only Bolivia’s natural and just aspiration to be given at least a
strip of territory that allows its connection with the sea, in exchange for
the whole of the coastal territory it abandoned; Bolivia demanded only a
port in return for the transfer of the four ports and seven coves which its
coastal territory contained.
Two additional protocols were concluded thereafter; one on
Credit Settlement, concluded in Santiago on 28 May that year; and an
explanatory protocol on the obligations assumed in the Treaties of 18
May in Sucre, signed on 9 December that year.
This latter was entered into in order to record that the two Treaties
of Peace and Transfer were an indivisible whole and of reciprocal
stipulations; and that the port that Chile was bound to give to Bolivia in
case it did not obtain Tacna and Arica, should broadly satisfy
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the present and future needs of Bolivia’s commerce and industry.
Since the scopes of the above condition still seemed vague and
indeterminate to the Government of Chile, both countries agreed to
clarify it, and a last explanatory protocol was concluded and signed in
Santiago on 30 April 1896.
All these pacts were approved by the Bolivian Congress, without
exception. Chile, on the other hand, only approved the two main ones,
leaving the legislative approval of the Protocols of 9 December 1895 and
30 April 1896 pending, and thus hindered the definitive conclusion of the
arrangements; all this in spite of the fact that these Protocols had been
widely discussed and already approved by the Council of State of that
Republic.
The text of the legislative approval given by the Bolivian Congress
is transcribed below:
“Mariano Baptista
Constitutional President of the Republic of Bolivia.
Whereas the National Congress has sanctioned the following
Law:
The National Congress
Decrees:
Sole Article - The two treaties of Peace and Territory Transfer,
adjusted in the city of Santiago on 18 May this year and the
Complementary Protocols –the first dated the 28th of the same
month and the second dated today– the former three by the
respective Plenipotentiaries, Mr. Heriberto Gutierrez and Mr.
Luis Barros Borgoño, and the latter signed in that Capital by
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia Mr. Emeterio Cano
and the Minister Plenipotentiary of Chile Mr. Juan Gonzalo
Matta are hereby approved as a whole and as reciprocal and
integral stipulations from one another.
Inform the Executive Branch for the constitutional measures
[that are to be taken to this end].
Session Room – Sucre, 9 December 1895 – Severo Fernandez
Alonso – Federico Zuazo – Gil Antonio Peña, Senator Secretary
– Fanor G. Romero, Deputy Secretary – Adolfo Trigo Acha,
Deputy Secretary.
Therefore, I promulgate that it be regarded and complied with
as a Law of the Republic.
House of Government of Sucre, 10 December 1895 - M.
Baptista - Emeterio Cano”.
This transcript evidences that Bolivia complied with its
duty to sanction the stipulations agreed upon and that it was the
Government of Chile which, in the midst of constant hesitation,
delayed their definitive sanction, leaving to the present the approval
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of the aforementioned explanatory Protocols pending by its Congress.
Bolivia, however, persisted in its intention to uphold the stipulated
arrangements and instructed its Legation in Chile to continue taking the
steps leading to the approval of the aforementioned Protocols.
Nevertheless, despite every effort, by telegram received on the
22nd, this Chancellery was informed that the Chilean Senate, at the
request of the Executive, agreed at its last session to hand back to Bolivia
the Protocols it had pending with it, so that it may seek the solution it
desires, on bases that are different from those proposed and approved
earlier.
And it will still be said that it was Bolivia that postponed the
definitive peace arrangements with Chile!
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[…]
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Annex 235
Telegram 723.2515/503 from the Charge d’Affaires of the United States
in Bolivia Goold to the Secretary of State,
6 October 1919
(Original in English)
Department of State of the United States, Papers relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States (1919), Volume I, p. 160
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Annex 236
Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Alberto Gutierrez,
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Ernesto Barros Jarpa,
20 December 1921
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Information Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Chile and the
Aspiration of Bolivia for a Port in the Pacific (1922), pp. 135 - 138
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BOLIVIA AND THE BARROS JARPA-SOLOMON
NEGOTIATION
LA PAZ, 20-21 DECEMBER 1921
Your Excellency, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Santiago.
MR. MINISTER:
On the 13th day of this year his current Servant the Chargé d'Affaires of Chile
was pleased to communicate to this Ministry the tenor of the proposal transmitted by
his Government to the Government of Peru, to resolve by means of a plebiscite that
would be carried out on the bases that in 1912 had been proposed or discussed between
the two Governments regarding the definitive nationality of the Provinces of Tacna
and Arica. On the 16th he asked the undersigned what the ideas of this Government
would be on the aforementioned proposal. The undersigned did not hesitate to express
to the representative of Chile that, although he was pleased to see the possibility of
a settlement of the issues that distanced the good relations between his country and
Peru, he did not believe that the procedure indicated by the Government of Chile
would give the desired results. However, the undersigned added, perhaps this would
be
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an opportunity for more effective initiatives to contribute to solving the Pacific
issue under broad and just conditions that would definitively settle the peace on the
continent.
Yesterday his Servant the Chargé d'Affaires of Peru directed a Note to this
Ministry transmitting the text of the cable response that his Government had given to
the one of Chile. In it the Government of Peru expressed its excuse for accepting the
plebiscitary procedure to which it was invited and proposed to submit the issue of the
South Pacific in all its integrity to an arbitration which would be initiated or
agreed under the auspices of the Government of the United States.
My Government has carefully examined both communications with the interest of
the continental situation of Bolivia in the Pacific issue, whose possible resolution
imposes a definite attitude on it and gives it an undisputed right to intervene in it.
The question concerning the nationality of Tacna and Arica is not the only
one that persists as a result of the War of the Pacific and the Treaties which resulted
as a consequence of it. The problem is multiple and its different aspects present close
connections that do not make possible the solution for ones without causing the
aggravation on the others.
The conflict of 1879 was concluded with pacts that only translated the warlike
state of that time, but left in the spirit and interests of the vanquished peoples a germ
of disturbance that could not but to be the cause of constant international uneasiness.
The peace of the South American continent imposes the desirability of
cementing the relations of these peoples in the principles of justice and reparation,
which will be the sole basis for peaceful and lasting agreements.
Bolivia does not ignore the duties imposed by the faith of the Public Treaties;
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however, it would not only be a question of examining whether they had been fully
complied with by the Contracting Parties but also whether they might continue to be
maintained when they entailed the annulment of the essential elements of international
life and of the attributes peculiar to the national sovereignty of one of them.
Bolivia convinced that is assisted by the right to claim the unjust deprivation
suffered of these gifts with which nature had endowed it and with which it had been
born to independent life, it resorted to the justification of all civilized nations to
submit to them the study of its international mutilation.
Article 19 of the Treaty of Versailles, inspired by such needs and doctrines,
explicitly recognized that this kind of situations could occur and occur, consequently
pointing to appropriate procedures to remedy them. In this regard, the Bolivian claim
before the Assembly of Nations of last September had this purpose.
The Government of Peru, in its response to the invitation of the Chancellery
of Santiago, has stated, based on reasons proper to it and whose examination does not
correspond to that of Bolivia, its refusal to accept the plebiscite, instead proposing
an appeal to arbitration which, presided by the US Government, would resolve in its
entirety the issue of the Pacific.
Considering the Pacific port dispute, my Government cannot remain silent
and, with full independence in its actions, declares that it would gladly accept that the
question of the Pacific, in which solution the rights and interests of Bolivia should be
considered, be decided by means of a purely legal procedure such as that of arbitration
that would surely bring an era of peace and well-being for nations that would submit
their differences to this civilized way of resolving international conflicts.
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Moreover, as it is convenient to foresee the case that the Governments of Peru
and Chile cannot agree to this end, mine proposes to hold an international conference
composed of representatives of nations directly concerned on this serious issue of the
Pacific and those other neighboring or friendly nations of the continent.
The Government of Bolivia recognizes that the Governments of Chile and Peru
have given in considering the possibility of a solution by legal means, a proof of love
of peace and a spirit of conciliation and wishes to take advantage of this opportunity
to record their points of view and its rights in solving the Pacific issue.
This is an occasion, Your Excellency, Mr. Minister, which gives me the pleasure
to offer you the sentiments of my highest consideration – A. Gutierrez, Minister for
Foreign Affairs.
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Annex 237
Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Ernesto
Barros Jarpa, to the Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia to
Chile, Macario Pinilla, N° 1.725, 21 December 1921
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
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The Republic of Chile
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Santiago, 21 December 1921
Diplomatic Section
Nº 1.725
Mr. Minister:
The Honorable Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Mr. Alberto
Gutierrez, has sent to the undersigned an attentive direct telegraphic
communication, for whose reply I believe I should not exclude Your
Excellency, who has in our country the high representation of his country
in the form of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.
This communication expresses the wish that, given the diplomatic
controversy in which Chile and Peru are currently engaged, the rights
and interests of Bolivia should be considered in relation to the Pacific
issue, regarding
TO HIS EXCELLENCY, MR. MACARIO PINILLA,
ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY
OF BOLIVIA IN CHILE – Santiago.
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which solution is suggested by His Excellency Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia, temperaments that in his opinion would be adequate
and appropriate.
In response, I would like to express to Your Excellency that the
pending negotiation between the Governments of Chile and Peru arises
from an International Treaty signed between those two countries and in
which Bolivia had neither direct nor indirect intervention.
Every act of Bolivia aimed at getting involved in this discrepancy,
entails an intrusion outside diplomatic uses and contrary to good relations
between our countries.
The negotiation initiated before the Government of Peru obeys the
purpose of complying with clause 3 of the Treaty of 1883, in what is still
pending. With Bolivia, the situation is completely different: The truce of
1884 was transformed into the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1904
signed on behalf of Bolivia by His Excellency Alberto Gutierrez, the
current Minister of Foreign Affairs. That Treaty established the conditions
of justice and equity convenient to both countries, and in it the current
means of communication between Bolivia and the coast were extended,
assuming Chile at its expense the construction of the Railroad
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of Arica to La Paz whose half-part will pass to Bolivia in the near future,
at no charge to that country. This way Bolivia was linked to the sea
through three railroads: those of Arica and Antofagasta in Chile and that
of Mollendo in Peru.
It is appropriate to point out that the Treaty in question has been
applied and complied with without any controversy ever being raised in
its implementation or interpretation.
The Government of Your Excellency, however, has been publicly
and solemnly invited in Geneva, and later in La Paz and in Santiago, to
express directly to Chile their views on their aspirations for a port in the
Pacific.
But by Note dated 16 November, Your Excellency informed me the
fact that he had received “instructions to declare that Your Excellency’s
Mission did not include, for now, any proposal or initiative on the
aspirations that Bolivia maintains for obtaining a port in the Pacific
Ocean.”
The antecedents which I have set forth lead me to declare to Your
Excellency that my Government is deemed excused to consider the
proposals contained in the Telegraph Note which I reply; and in begging
Your Excellency to convey this reply to Your
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Illustrated Government, I am especially grateful to renew to Your
Excellency the sentiments of my highest and most distinguished
consideration.
[Signature]
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Annex 238
Information Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Chile
and the Aspiration of Bolivia for a Port in the Pacific (1922),
pp. 155 - 157 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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MEMORANDUM FROM THE URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT
The Government of Uruguay, in response to a request from Bolivia,
instructed its Ministers in Santiago and Lima to exchange ideas with
the Foreign Ministries of both countries on the possibility of removing
from the American environment the uncertainty that the persistence of
this issue would mean in the future for the peace and tranquility of these
nations.
The Minister of Uruguay, Mr. Martinez Thedy, following the instructions
of the Foreign Ministry of his country, conferred with the
Minister of Foreign Affairs on this matter, in order to inform him of a
Memorandum that the Foreign Ministry of Uruguay had just sent to the
Government of La Paz, referring to the issues that this country has raised
before various South American Governments in relation to its maritime
aspirations.
This Memorandum, which is the result of conversations held between
Mr. Martinez Thedy and Mr. Barros Jarpa, says as follows:
“According to what was promised, the Foreign Ministry of Uruguay
sent a friendly word to the Chancellery of Chile, in the sense that it
would be beneficial for the American harmony to leave no
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reasons for future disagreements, which would result in failure to seek
within a broad spirit of cordiality and reciprocal interest, a solution to
the issue that Bolivia insistently raises.
We are qualified to affirm that in Chile, the issue is appreciated in the
same way, dominating the opinion that Bolivia should not raise the
matter before corporations that are foreign to the sovereignty of Chile.
Chile believes that it is not appropriate to discuss this issue jointly
with Peru at the Washington meeting because of the legal nature of
the issue to be addressed there; but reiterates that it is willing, in this
case, to consider solutions directly with Bolivia. Chile points out that
it has always considered this issue with interest and a friendly spirit.
Our impression is that Bolivia will not lose anything by attempting
to address this issue directly with Chile, rather it would have an
opportunity to use the goodwill that the Government of Chile
repeatedly expresses towards Bolivia.
From the antecedents of this matter, it appears that the presentation of
the Bolivian claim before different nations and jurisdictions, produces
in Chile displeasure, and may perhaps frustrate attempts to settle this
issue through direct negotiations.
Perhaps it is not appropriate to invoke, in order to reach success, reasons
of strictly legal nature, but of solidarity and continental harmony.”
_____________
When the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Barros Jarpa, was
interviewed, he made the following statements to the press regarding the
Memorandum transcribed above:
“As soon as I returned from my trip to Tacna, I received the visit
of the Minister of Uruguay, who informed me of all the proceedings that
had been carried out by his Government in order to take an active part
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in favor of the wishes of Bolivia, in order to participate in the Chilean-
Peruvian conferences of Washington.
I told Mr. Martinez Thedy that the Government of Chile was not in
favor of accepting requests or insinuations about its external problems;
but that, on the other hand, was keenly pleased to exchange ideas about
them and to make its points of view known.
Posed with the acceptance of Mr. Martinez Thedy on this subject,
the Uruguayan diplomat heard an extensive and frank exposition that I
made about the position of our country regarding the Bolivian aspirations.
I also expressed to the distinguished Uruguayan diplomat the idea
that it would be very interesting for the American countries to try to
persuade Bolivia that the path that it had adopted would bring no favorable
resolution for its interests; and that, on the other hand, the good disposition
of Chile gave Bolivia high hopes of success in its aspirations, as long as
it seeks the satisfaction of these aspirations within an environment of
cordiality, friendly bonding and reciprocal concessions.
That is the origin of the Memorandum passed by the Uruguayan
Government to that of Bolivia, a Memorandum with which the first of
these countries commits once again the gratitude of our people, lending
itself to be an authorized and eloquent spokesman of our thesis, and adding
on its part recommendations that, inspired by a high spirit of continental
harmony and a full understanding of the problem, make a real historical
justification for our country.”
_____________________
[...]
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Annex 239
Note from the Chargé d’Affaires of the Bolivian Legation to Chile, Juan
Salinas Lozada, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Alberto
Gutierrez, N° 117, 27 January 1922
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
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LEGATION OF BOLIVIA
Santiago, 27 January 1922
Nº 117
Subject: Invitation of the U.S.
Tacna and Arica
Distinguished Minister,
In my Note Nº 111 of the 20th of this month, I had the pleasure of
informing Your Excellency of the views I had gathered from official and
diplomatic circles in regard to the invitation made by the United States of
America, of which you are aware already. The considerations that I had
formulated, and that were contained in the said Note, have been confirmed by
the new orientation followed by the Chilean press and the recent statements
made by Foreign Minister Barros Jarpa.
The Chilean press statements no longer insists in attributing
to the invitation made by Mr. Harding the points of agreement which
it uniformly had believed to have found in relation to the Chilean
thesis of compliance with the Ancon Treaty from the beginning.
“La Nacion” newspaper, in one of its latests editorials, held inter alia:
“The invitation made by the U.S. can be perfectly understood in two ways:
it regards the Chilean intention to exclusively resolve the question related
to the plebiscite, as well as Peru’s desire to submit all pending questions
to the arbitration. Either of the two parties can interpret it to its favor”.
The Government of Chile, which in first instance,
______________ ____________________
To His Excellency, Dr. Mr. Ricardo Jaimes Freyre, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Worship La Paz .-
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had also shared the views of the press in regard to this matter, understood,
after a detailed assessment, that the wording of the invitation made by
the U.S. President was not completely favorable to it –view that gained
impetus in light of the Peruvian response-note. In this circumstance, it
thought it would be fitting to request clarifications to the State Department
of Washington, which had in its turn approached the Foreign Ministry of
Lima –without any response up to the present.
In this Foreign Ministry, absolute reserve is kept in regard to this
particular aspect, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs has limited himself
to stating that “the Chilean–Peruvian talks in Washington –which
President Harding had been kind enough to foster– will not be carried
out until the United States informs Chile officially that Peru has accepted
the invitation sent to that end”.
What is actually being expected are the clarifications requested by
Chile. I however understand that these, whichever they might be, do not
affect at all the course of the negotiations, for I am becoming increasingly
convinced of the fact that Chile will take the solution to the longstanding
conflict of the Pacific to an end.
In regard to this final aspect, Foreign Minister Barros Jarpa made
a recent statement to a journalist of “El Mercurio” from Valparaiso:
“Telegram communications have been cut, he said, because Peru
decided to use a tenor that has resulted in its international discredit, the
Government had the purpose of pushing Peru to the point of dragging it
to the solution the latter is not seeking”. And after asking him how the
invitation made by the U.S. was put forward, he replied verbatim: “I am
in position to declare
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that it was not surprising to us. We accepted it without hesitation”.
This statement by Mr. Barros Jarpa allows us to perceive in clear terms
that it had actually been Chile which gave place to the invitation made by Mr.
Harding, through the procedures Your Excellency was informed of in the note
I had sent you.
In this circumstance, I received past Saturday, a lengthy cable form
Your Excellency by which I was instructed to inform this Government of the
wording of the communication sent by Your Excellency to His Excellency,
the President of the United States, Mr. Harding, through our Legation in
Washington. Since I was not in the capital on that day and in light of my
desire not to delay its transcription, I used a telegraph to transmit its
complete wording to Mr. Barros Jarpa, who was also absent in Viña del Mar.
For that reason, I sent to Your Excellency the following telegraph from
the Cartagena resort:
“Cartagena, 22 January 1922 – Relations – La Paz– Since neither the Honorable
Minister of Foreign Affairs nor the undersigned are in Santiago, I hastened to send
from here a cable to Mr. Barros Jarpa, informing him of the cable Your Excellency
sent to our Legation in Washington; thereafter, I was informed that my telegram
had been handed the night before at 9 p.m. in Viña del Mar–I will confirm this
via a note tomorrow – Salinas–Lozada – Bolivian Charge d’Affaires of Bolivia”.
The telegram I sent to Mr. Barros Jarpa was worded in the following
terms:
“Cartagena, 21 January 1922 – Minister of Foreign Affairs – Santiago –
To His Excellency, Mr. Minister: I hastened to inform Your Excellency
of the wording of the telegram that my Government instructed me to
bring to the notice of His Excellency and that has just been transmitted
to this beach I am in for the moment (transcript of the cable sent by
Your Excellency) –Salinas–Lozada– Charge d’Affaires of Bolivia”.
On Monday, I returned to this city and
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I sent the following note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs:
“Santiago, 23 January 1922 – Mr. Minister: Last Saturday, I received
instructions from my Government to inform Your Excellency of the wording of
the communication that by means of its Legation in Washington had been sent to
His Excellency, the Secretary of State of the United States. Since I was not in the
capital city on that day, I informed Your Excellency, in a telegram, of the wording
of that communication, which I am honored to reiterate today in the present note. It
reads as follows: “The Honorable Government of the United States has invited the
Honorable Governments of Chile and Peru to appoint Plenipotentiaries to examine
and agree on the way to put an end to the existing differences between them, which
result from the Ancon Treaty. When the recent demarches were commenced by these
two republics, the Government of Bolivia thought it necessary to state that it could
not be separated from the diplomatic controversies in which questions concerning
the South Pacific were discussed, for the solution of the questions resulting from
the war of 1879 will always affect, whatever form it takes, its most transcendental
interests, which are closely related to modifications of the statu quo that the force
of circumstances has created in the Pacific. The noble interest demonstrated by the
Honorable Government of the United States to facilitate a solution to this problem
that causes disturbance in the good relations of these peoples must also include
Bolivia, who is condemned, owing to the consequences of a war that it did not
provoke nor caused, to an absolutely unsustainable situation in the continent, which
will give place, in the future, to nothing but uneasiness and unrest. The problem
of the Pacific is tripartite and so must its solution. Otherwise, one of the obstacles
that obstruct definite peace and cordiality among all the nations of this part of the
Americas will not be overcome. By virtue of that, my Government has instructed
me to request the Government of Your Excellency to transmit to the Government of
Bolivia, in due course, that invitation to the Plenipotentiary meeting that would be
held in Washington, under the auspices of your great nation, because the concrete
aspects related to that treaty concluded by the two countries will certainly not be
the only ones that will be discussed therein, but might also include the discussion of
the situation that the final agreement will create in the Content –(Signed by) Jaimes
Freyre– Minister of Foreign Affairs.” That is the wording of the communication
that my Government has instructed me to transmit to Your Excellency, and I
am glad to reiterate to Your Excellency, the feelings of my most attentive and
distinguished consideration. – (Signed by) J. Z. Salinas-Lozada – to His Excellency,
Mr. Barros Jarpa - Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship. Hand delivered.”
In the days that followed, I continued sending numerous informative
cables which I believe ought not to be confirmed in this communication.
In turn, I received the following cable from Your Excellency:
TRANSLATION: “La Paz, 24 January 1922 – Bolivian Legation – Santiago –
We have learned that the Government of the U.S. will ask Chile and Peru whether
they consent to the participation of Bolivia in the Washington Conference.
You are hereby instructed to make the necessary efforts to secure a favorable
response from the Government. Jaimes Freyre”.
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I, thereafter, immediately, replied to the above cable in the following
terms:
TRANSLATION: “Santiago, 25 January 1922 – Relations – La Paz – Because
the Foreign Minister was unwell, it was not possible to see him today. I will do
so tomorrow – Salinas-Lozada”.
Meanwhile, I thought it fitting to find out at the U.S. Embassy
whether instructions had been received to formalize consultations to this
Government in regard to the request for Bolivia’s participation.
The outcomes of this inquiry to the U.S. Embassy were transmitted
to the Ministry in the following encrypted cable:
TRANSLATION: - “Santiago, 26 January 1922 – Relations – La Paz – The U.S.
Embassy has not yet received instructions to ask Chile whether it consents to
Bolivia’s participation in conferences to be held by Peru and Chile. We guess
they are waiting for a reply from Peru to the preceding clarifications previously
requested by Chile through Washington in relation to the terms of its acceptance
note. Meanwhile, Chile will not address the appointment of plenipotentiaries.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is preparing a book entitled Chile and the
Bolivian aspiration for a port on the Pacific. Said book will contain the debate
held within the League, opinions that are favorable to Chile, and the notes sent
recently by Barros Jarpa and Pinilla. I will hold a meeting with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs today. Salinas-Lozada”.
The day after, I was received by Mr. Barros Jarpa and held a
lengthy and cordial meeting which I am trying to put into words, in the
most faithful way possible, shaping it as a conversation:
– [The Minister of Bolivia]: It is said ttthat the Government of
Your Excellency has requested Peru, through the Department of State of
Washington, certain clarifications on the wording of the note in which
Mr. Harding’s invitation will be accepted.
– [The Minister of Chile]: That is not evident by itself. We are
simply awaiting a communication from Washington and we have
instructed our Minister to request it from the Department of State. That
communication must contain a statement to the effect that everything
has been defined and that we are able to proceed to the appointment of
Ministers Plenipotentiary.
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– What do you think is the reason why the Department of State is
taking so long in continuing these demarches?
– Minister, apparently Peru’s response was not found clear enough
and it is thus expecting the corresponding clarifications.
– Could you please tell me which those clarifications are?
– Minister, they refer, with no doubt, to the distorted interpretation
Peru has sought to give to the wording of that invitation, for while Chile
comprehends that it has been invited to study the way to give friendly
compliance to the third clause of the Ancon Treaty –which relates to the
way in which the plebiscite is to be carried out– Peru has responded
that an arbitration settled by the United States will decide at last the
differences resulting from Ancon Treaty.
– And will Chile not accept arbitration if that were necessary?
– Minister, it is not possible to anticipate what might happen. That
will depend on the direction the talks take.
– It is said in public spheres recently that there is a formula that
might come about in the course of discussions as the only one capable of
saving the situation. It is said that Tacna will be given to Peru and Arica
to Chile.
– Minister, this formula labeled as the division formula is very old
and it is true that it has many supporters, but it is useless to think of it
before the legal aspects of the dispute are resolved, which is what we are
to uphold.
– Fine Mr. Minister, but in the event that discussions are directed
toward studying the political aspects of that conflict, do you think that
solution will be possible?
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– Minister, the solution might be either that one or any other, but I
insist we will not cease requesting that the Treaty be complied with, giving
Peru the concessions it might demand within this process. Besides, I am
in position to inform you that my Government is sure of this solution, as
it was sure of the decision the League of Nations would take in regard
to your claim, so much so that we have already drafted the message we
will send to the Congress to request the necessary authorization to raise
an internal patriotic loan to gather the amount of the indemnification.
– Thus, you are of the idea that…
– Minister, that Tacna and Arica will be definitely transferred to
Chile.
Given that the conversation drifted from the object the Foreign
Ministry had instructed to discuss, I tried to change its course by uttering
the following:
– In my country, the attitude followed by Chile to launch
conversations with Peru to solve the longstanding dispute of the Pacific
has been perceived in positive terms. While it is true that at the beginning
it was perceived as a mere strategy, opinion shifted thereafter in the face of
numerous expressions of rapprochement by Chile, in the course of these
demarches and within that generous and Americanist spirit, Bolivia also
hoped that its request for participation in the Washington Conferences
would also be favorably welcomed.
– Minister, we have evidently been informed that Bolivia is
currently expecting a favorable change of opinion in Chile, even within
the republican elements that had always shown an unfavorable
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position to rapprochement between our countries. We understand that
this change has occurred by virtue of the rejections experienced by you
in Geneva and recently in the Foreign Ministries of Argentina, Uruguay
and Brazil, as well as those that will be experienced in Washington in
the coming days. This has been reaffirmed by the fact that the same
plenipotentiary who had sounded out from up close the public opinions
of the countries I have just mentioned is now leading the Foreign Ministry
of your country.
– Perhaps that is actually not the reason, Mr. Minister, because I
completely ignore the rejection you are referring to and I believe that if
any change is actually being experienced it is owing to the fact that my
country is convinced to the objectives followed by Chile to solve the
complex conflict of the Pacific at once.
– Minister, that is partially true, but the press in your country hinders
everything. It is way too violent against us. It is worse than Peru’s.
– I will do as much as I am able to Mr. Minister to try to modulate
the views expressed by that press campaign, in the hope that you will also
try recommend some moderation in Chile.
– Minister, I believe that our campaign is, contrary to your
view, more astute. If you check the articles signed by, for instance, Mr.
Santelices, you will be able to find that, by that very circumstance, they
lack substance for Santelices himself is a discredited man.
– Returning to the beginning of our conversation, is my country
able to count on Chile’s acceptance to Bolivia’s participation in the
Washington Conferences?
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– Minister, the current Chilean Government has always been willing
to help Bolivia in pursuing its aspiration, within the limits imposed by
dignity and respect for treaties in force. We have given much proof of
this (It would have been too lengthy to insert here the list of concessions
that the Minister assured Chile had made in favor of Bolivia, but since he
concluded that explanation referring to the proposals made by Mr. Bello
Codesido, I observed the following):
– But Mr. Minister, the proposals made by Mr. Bello Codesido did
not satisfy the needs of my country. Too little was offered and too much
was demanded in return.
– Minister, those proposals were made in the beginning, they can
now be deepened to satisfy Bolivia.
– To see whether that is possible, we would have to wait for the
outcome of the conversations to be held in Washington, to which my
country would not renounce.
– Minister, it would not be necessary to wait. Chile is confident
that the outcome will be favorable to it. As a result, any negotiation we
seal today would be strictly observed.
Given that we had deviated from the main purpose of the talks
once more, after a brief pause I asked,
– Has the Minister received a consultation from the Department
of State of Washington in relation to my country’s request to take part in
these Conferences?
– Minister, we have not received anything.
– We have learned that you might receive it sooner rather than
later.
– Minister, we been told something different. I know that the
Foreign Ministry is awaiting for President Saavedra’s second note to
President Harding, which everyone is aware of due
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67
to the publications that have been made but which you might not have
received officially, because it has not been transmitted to us. We have
been informed that this note has still not reached the White House and
that it is being expected so it is replied to together with the one sent by
your Minister in Washington to the Department of State. Thus, I do not
believe that consultation will be made by the United States. The Foreign
Ministry of Washington will tell you to make it directly to Peru and Chile.
– And, in the event that this happens, what would Chile’s attitude
be?
– Minister, that would depend on Peru’s attitude, the reply of which
we would be expecting in order to utter an opinion.
– But could Chile not put forward guidelines vis-à-vis Peru
beforehand?
– No, in any case we are expecting Peru to put them forward.
– And, in the event that Peru’s response is favorable to Bolivia,
what would Chile respond to Washington?
Minister, provided that the talks tackle the political aspects of
the dispute, we would welcome Bolivia’s participation with certain
reservations, owing to the steps Bolivia took to reach this end, but I must
warn you that we will always uphold the legal aspect of the dispute,
namely compliance with the Ancon Treaty, and in such a case Bolivia
would be virtually ruled out inasmuch as it is not a party to that treaty.
At that exact moment, an officer of the Presidency rushed into the
room with an urgent call from Mr. Alessandri, and our conversation had
to be paused.
My personal view, of which I informed Your
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69
Excellency in the cable that has been confirmed by the above dialogue,
is quite optimistic. We might be able to work fruitfully but, as an initial
step, it is necessary to calm down the press campaign, which has deep
repercussions here and affects the already reduced number of friends we
have in Chile.
I take this occasion to reiterate to you the assurances of my highest
and most distinguished consideration.
[Signature]
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71
Annex 240
Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Alberto Gutierrez,
to the Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia to Chile, Eduardo Diez de
Medina, N° 200, 31 March 1926
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
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Ministry of Foreign
Reserved
Affairs and Worship
La Paz, 31 March 1926
Nº 200
Mr. Minister:
So as to keep you informed of the development of negotiations
that you yourself commenced with the Memorandum of 27 May last year,
I am hereby sending you copies of those documents and those that were
thereafter exchanged between the Chilean Legation in Bolivia and this
Ministry. You ought to be kept informed in case Mr. Mathieu initiated a
conversation to that effect.
To this end, the Minister of Bolivia in Washington has
informed us that, when Mr. Mathieu discharged functions as Chile’s
Ambassador, he stated in a meeting held with several people that he
knew of a secret alliance treaty between Peru and Bolivia, which had
been concluded by Presidents Saavedra and Leguia, on occasion of the
Centenial Anniversary
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
To His Excellency, Mr. Eduardo Diez de Medina
Special Envoy and Minister
Plenipotentiary of Bolivia in Chile
Santiago
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75
Ministry of Foreign --2--
Affairs and Worship
of Ayacucho. He assures that he refuted that account.
Jaimes referred to this incident to attribute to the
negotiations launched by Chile the desire to inquire into the
existence of this secret pact or to cause a tense situation with Peru.
I am sending you this information for the consideration of
your Administration and declare myself your kind servant.
[Signature]
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77
Copy
Reserved
The Government of Bolivia has the purpose of maintaining
absolute neutrality in the advent of the arbitral Award to be issued by
the President of the United States in regard to the Tacna-Arica dispute,
however, in view of the repeated insinuations made by the President of
Chile and the Chancellery of La Moneda to the Bolivian diplomatic Agent
in Santiago to obtain Bolivia’s support in the conduction of the coming
plebiscite, assuring Bolivia that, once the said plebiscite is carried out,
Bolivia’s legitimate longing for a port of its own on the Pacific will be
satisfied with a port that broadly meets the needs of this sovereign nation,
the Government of Bolivia hereby responds: that it would be willing
to collaborate in [Chile’s] success in the plebiscite provided that the
Government of Chile undertakes, in a formal protocol and abandoning
with the offers that are ineffective, to transfer to Bolivia, without any
territorial compensation, either of the following ports: Mejillones,
Pisagua or Arica, once the latter is transferred to Chile’s dominion as a
result of the plebiscite to be carried out, in order for Bolivia’s rights and
full sovereignty to be thus reintegrated.
La Paz, 27 May 1925.
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79
Copy
CHILEAN LEGATION
MEMORANDUM
In reference to the confidential memorandum sent by the Bolivian
Minister of Foreign Affairs on 27 May 1925, the Envoy Special and
Plenipotentiary Minister of Chile, duly authorized by its Government,
hereby states that Chile accepts in principle the idea of transferring
to Bolivia a port on the Pacific, in accordance to a plan that does not
contemplate territorial compensations and that could be studied in the
future.
To move forward with this negotiation, the Government of
Chile would like the Government of Bolivia to detail its request of
27 May by indicating concretely which the geographical lines that
it would aspire to obtain in each of the solutions it has proposed are.
La Paz, 8 March 1926
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81
MEMORANDUM
The Minister of Foreign Affairs is pleased to have been informed,
by the Memorandum sent by His Excellency the Special Envoy and
Minister Plenipotentiary of Chile on the 8th of the current month, that
the Government of Chile accepts in principle the idea of transferring a
port on the Pacific to Bolivia, be Mejillones, Pisagua or Arica, by means
of compensations that do not affect the integrity of the Bolivian territory.
Responding to the question formulated in the Memorandum
referred to above, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, duly authorized,
hereby states that, in the event of the transfer of any of the ports cited
and those to which the confidential Memorandum of 27 May 1924
refers, he would also propose the cession of an area of territory of an
extension of no less than five kilometers of width connecting, through
the closest route, one of those ports with Bolivian territory. In the
specific cases of Mejillones and Pisagua, said area would have to be
established by expert geographers; and in the case of Arica, it would
include the political circumscription denominated Arica Department.
Given that any initiative related to Bolivia’s participation
or cooperation in the plebiscite concerning Tacna and Arica,
alluded to in the Memorandum of 17 May, is untimely, this
Government would give Chile’s, in return for the transfer of ports
and territories, financial compensations that are in harmony with
the financial resources of the Republic or commercial and customs
franchises that do not affect the permanent interests of the country.
La Paz, 29 March 1926.
82
83
Annex 241
C. Rios Gallardo, After the Peace… The Chilean-Bolivian Relations (1926),
pp. 132 - 133, 214 - 215 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
84
85
-132-
[…]
Whenever Bolivia has made any demonstration in favor of its
aspiration over Tacna and Arica, it has found from Peru the most
definitive negative; rejection that, as the one of March 1920, almost took
both countries to war.
This attitude has always contrasted with the deferential, friendly
attitude of Chile, which has never refused to listen to the aspiration of
Bolivia, and, on the contrary, has promised to satisfy it in the field of
mutual compensations.
Unfortunately, the Bolivians have not taken advantage of these
facts, their international policy is always oscillating between Chile and
Peru, in circumstances that have long been due to take a defined and
definitive course.
In 1919, following the communication sent by the Minister of
Bolivia in Paris, Mr. Ismael Montes, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of France, Mr. Stephan Pichon, regarding the Bolivian aspiration to
[obtain] Tacna and Arica; the Peruvian Chancellery, as we have seen,
considered in this case to send a circular to all its Legations, stating that
the Government of Peru would never consent to cede its rights over
Tacna and Arica and that it would not accept any kind of compensation
for those territories from Bolivia.
The Chilean Government remained silent. In 1917,
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87
-133-
its Ambassador, Mr. Echenique Gandarillas, had already spoken in the
transmission of Government and he stated: “...my Government hopes
that, when the opportunity arrives, it will find the means to satisfy the
most valuable aspirations of the Bolivian people and the Chilean people.”
Its Ambassador’s statement was consistent with the unalterable
conduct followed by Chile, with the attitude it had followed in 1883,
1895, 1900, 1904, 1910 and with the conduct it had followed in 1920 and
1922 as well as with its recent actions before the Washington Conferences.
[…]
88
89
-214-
[…]
In order to get an idea of the unfaithful and friendly way in which
Bolivia acted in regard to Chile in 1920 and 1921, it is necessary to recall
some facts that should not remain in the shadows. The Bello Codesido
mission arrived in La Paz, after Pichon closed the doors of the Quai
d’Orsay to the Minister in Paris, Mr. Ismael Montes, and days after this
new failure, he was dealing with Lansing and Colby. Chile knew about
the adventures in Paris and the wanderings in Washington, and yet Mr.
Bello Codesido reached the Government of Mr. Gutierrez Guerra in a
sincere mission of friendship, and even prepared to clear the horizon for
Bolivia to reach the sea. Ambassador Echenique Gandarillas stated in
1917, “...my Government hopes to find, when the opportunity comes, the
means to satisfy the most valuable aspirations of the Bolivian people and
the Chilean people.” Consistent with this invariable policy of our country,
cemented in the field of mutual compensations, Mr. Bello Codesido, in
presenting his
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91
-215-
credentials, recorded that the moment was approaching and that it was
near.
When was it? When Chile settled its difficulties with Peru, when
the third clause of the Treaty of Ancon was fulfilled in order to define
the nationality of Tacna and Arica. This is indeed the only moment that
Chile expected to satisfy in the realm of reality, not of fantasy, the port
aspirations of Bolivia. Mr. Bello Codesido had the mission to say that
this time was coming, that Bolivia had to rely on Chile’s word and that it
should wait for the events to come.
[…]
92
93
Annex 242
Telegram 723.2515/1952 from the Ambassador of the United States in
Chile, W. Miller Collier, to the U.S. Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg,
20 February 1926
(Original in English)
Department of State of the United States, Papers relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States (1926), Volume I, pp. 306 - 308
94
95
96
97
Annex 243
Telegram 723.2515/2118 from the U.S. Secretary of State, Frank B.
Kellogg, to the Ambassador of the United States in Chile, W. Miller
Collier, 10 April 1926
(Original in English)
Department of State of the United States, Papers relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United States (1926), Volume I, pp. 374 - 375
98
99
100
101
Annex 244
Telegram 723.2515/2124 from the U.S. Ambassador in Chile, W. Miller
Collier, to the U.S. Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, 11 April 1926
(Original in English)
Department of State of the United States, Papers relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States (1926), Volume I, pp. 376 - 377
102
103
104
105
Annex 245
Telegram 723.2515/2143a from the U.S. Secretary of State, Frank B.
Kellogg, to the U.S. Consul at Arica, Von Tresckow, 15 April 1926
(Original in English)
Department of State of the United States, Papers relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States (1926), Volume I, pp. 384 - 385
106
107
108
109
Annex 246
Letter from the President of Bolivia, Hernando Siles, to the President of
the United States, Calvin Coolidge, 19 April 1926
(Original in English)
Department of State of the United States, Papers relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States (1926), Volume I, p. 396
110
111
112
113
Annex 247
Minutes of the Meeting of the Plenipotentiaries of Peru and Chile, Under
the Extension of Good Offices of the U.S. Secretary of State, Frank B.
Kellogg, 4 June 1926
(Original in English)
Department of State of the United States, Papers relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States (1926), Volume I, pp. 462 - 465
114
115
117
118
119
Annex 248
Telegram 723.2515/2415 from the U.S. Secretary of State, Frank B.
Kellogg, to the Ambassador of the United States in Chile, W. Miller
Collier, 9 June 1926
(Original in English)
Department of State of the United States, Papers relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States (1926), Volume I, pp. 475 - 476
120
121
122
123
Annex 249
Note from the Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia in Peru, Alberto
Ostria Gutierrez, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Enrique
Baldivieso, N° 169, 11 June 1936
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
124
125
LEGATION OF BOLIVIA
Lima, 11 June 1936
Nº 169 CLASSIFIED
Subject: Classified instructions
dated 25 April
Mr. Minister,
With regard to my Note Nº 152, dated the 26th of the past month,
and my cablegram Nº 96, of the 4th of this month, I hereby comply
with the duty of informing you that, following a lengthy oral address, I
submitted to the Minister, Mr. Alberto Ulloa, the bases or topics –a copy
of which I am appending– for a rapprochement plan between Bolivian
and Peru, in accordance with the instructions I received from that Foreign
Ministry (Note Nº 67, dated 25 April, and confirmed by cable Nº 1028, of
25 May 1936).
The Minister of Foreign Affairs welcomed said plan with keen
interest and promised to study it and, after exchanging views with the
President of the Republic, submit a draft –which will have been agreed
to already– containing all the topics proposed and giving them the form
of a Covenant.
From the begging, however, Mr. Ulloa put forward observations to
paragraph 1), which relates to Peru’s consent, prescribed as a condition
under Article 1 of the Complementary Protocol of 3 June 1929.
The Peruvian Foreign Minister said, on that occasion and in
a subsequent conversation held, that the declaration planned would
entail, in the substance, a moral coercion against Chile, and that it could
create, for both Peru and Bolivia, a tense diplomatic situation with that
country. He added that, for that reason, Peru could not, be publically or
confidentially, anticipate anything in relation to the matter. He finally
said that, in his view, the fact that any Peruvian Government could refuse
its consent to the cession of Arica when Chile and Bolivia come to an
understanding was inconceivable.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
To Mr. Enrique Baldivieso
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
LA PAZ.
126
127
---2---
The response given by Mr. Ulloa is thus summarized as follows:
Peru cannot, for the time being, anticipate its consent, prescribed under
Article 1 of the Complementary Protocol of 3 June 1929. It thus must
express that consent once the Bolivian-Chilean agreement is reached.
The observations I made on that regard were fruitless, although
I first explained that any consent by Peru would be subject to a prior,
friendly and loyal understanding with Chile.
In the substance, there can be no doubt that Peru, in light of the
understanding –mainly commercial– it has reached with Chile, does not
wish the latter to find any grounds for distrust, independently of whether
it is unfounded, in relation to the attitude it follows in the face of Bolivia’s
port longing and also wishes to, at the same time, preserve its –though
nominal to the present– quality as third party to take part in a future
agreement between Bolivia and Chile.
As far as other matters are concerned –and particularly free
transit– Mr. Ulloa expressed to me his determined willingness, which
he ultimately set forth in the following terms: “I would regard myself an
unsuccessful Foreign Minister if I failed to conclude an agreement with
you, as complete as possible, to secure a better and definite rapprochement
between Peru and Bolivia”.
As soon as Mr. Ulloa submits the draft he promissed, I will
immediatelly submit it for your consideration, so you may impart the
corresponding instructions.
I take this opportunity to reiterate to you the assurances of my
highest and most distinguished consideration.
[Signature]
128
129
1) STATEMENT
Bolivia hereby declares that it does not have, and does not intend
to have, any right over the territory found to the south of Peru, which has
been recognized and delimited already under Treaties in force between
both countries.
As a result, Bolivia hereby places on record that its national longing
to obtain an own access to the Pacific Ocean does not seek and will not
seek satisfaction through any of the portions of Peru’s southern coastline,
the territorial proprietorship of which it shall always categorically respect.
Peru hereby declares for its part that it does not have nor intends
to have any right over the territory of Bolivia, which has been recognized
and delimited already under Treaties in force between both countries.
At the same time, Peru hereby declares, with regard to Article 1 of
the Complementary Protocol to the Lima Treaty of 3 June 1929, entered
into between Peru and Chile, that it does not oppose to the satisfaction
of Bolivia’s port longing, nor, consequently, to the cession of the entirety
or part of the territory falling under Chilean sovereignty pursuant to
the Treaty of 3 June 1929 which, resulting from a friendly, loyal and
reciprocal understanding, Chile might make in the future in benefit of
Bolivia.
[…]
130
131
Annex 250
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Boundaries between Bolivia and Paraguay,
signed at Buenos Aires on 21 July 1938 (Ratifications exchanged on
29 August 1938)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
www.latinamericanstudies.org/paraguay/chaco-treaty.pdf
132
133
134
135
Annex 251
Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez,
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce,
N° 280, 7 May 1943
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE ACCESS TO THE
PACIFIC OCEAN
(BOLIVIA v. CHILE)
REPLY BY THE PLURINATIONAL STATE
OF BOLIVIA
21 March 2017
137
Nº 280 – RESERVED Santiago, 7 May 1943
Subject: Statement by the Chilean Foreign Minister. ANNEX
Attachments: Several newspaper clippings. 16 Pages
RESERVED
Mr. Minister:
Yesterday the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile presented the
following statement to the press, which, because of its importance, was
transmitted to you by cable:
“With reference to certain statements that appeared in the South
American press and attributed to the Bolivian Foreign Minister, Dr.
Tomas Elio, concerning the aspirations of the neighboring country to
obtain what has been called its territorial and maritime reintegration,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile believes it appropriate to
state that the Government of the Republic considers that there are no
pending territorial issues between Chile and Bolivia, which were
definitively settled in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1904.
Every campaign that tries to revive an issue that has been totally
resolved for nearly forty years by the free and spontaneous will of both
Governments, will find our country’s strong repudiation and will only
serve to divide two neighboring and friendly nations and will weaken the
efforts that the United States and other American States are making in
favor of the continental defense and the cause of democracy in the world.”
The statements made by Foreign Minister Elio, referred to in this
official communiqué that was published in Santiago, were in the sense
that Bolivia longed for the revision of its boundary lines and that, to that
end, it relied on the support of the peoples of the Americas.
Taking advantage of yesterday’s weekly audience, I discussed the
matter with the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
----------------------------- -------------------------------
To Mr. Pedro Zilveti Arce,
Acting Minister of Foreign Relations – La Paz
138
139
-2-
Mr. Fernandez, to whom I did not hide my annoyance and my surprise
at the violent communiqué he had published, stating above all that the
logical and the elemental course of action would have been to utter a
statement on the official thinking of the Chancellery of Bolivia and not
on “statements that appeared in the South American press and attributed
to Dr. Elio,” as the communiqué itself stated.
For that reason, Mr. Fernandez told me that the attitude
of Chancellor Elio had provoked a serious setback in the Chilean
Government, especially since it involved “a hostile propaganda” against
this country in the rest of America and precisely on the eve of President
Rios’ trip to the United States.
Mr. Fernandez added that every Chilean-Bolivian affair had to be
settled directly between the two nations, and that his country would never
accept foreign impositions.
- Why don’t you speak directly to us, frankly and with loyalty,
about your ideal and your aspirations? –he said.
And then he expressed himself more or less in these terms:
- There is no question that cannot be settled in a field of reciprocal
conveniences, but the first thing to do is to create an environment
conducive to understanding and affection, instead of provoking mistrust
and resentment.
The conversation then drifted to the general issue of the link
between Bolivia and Chile, more necessary now than ever in this critical
hour for the world and for America.
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He made reference of his affection for Bolivia, “even for having
a daughter with Bolivian blood,” and suggested the desirability of
ceasing Chancellor Elio’s statements, which he described as detrimental
to a good understanding and cordiality between the two nations.
For my part, I once again insisted on what I had said at the outset
of our conversation and emphasized, as always, that Bolivia’s port ideal
was a national ideal that could only disappear with the nation itself.
Finally, referring to the press campaign against Bolivia, which has
become more pronounced in recent days, Mr. Fernandez has spontaneously
promised to bring journalists together and appeal to them to make them stop.
In relation to both this campaign and the attitude of the Chilean
Government, I have had a calm and prudent attitude, while always
dignified, encouraged by the conviction that a confrontational attitude
in newspapers or a violent and disruptive conduct could provoke serious
situations for the country, which in my opinion should be avoided at all costs.
In requesting that this information be brought to the Government’s
persuasion, because although the expressions of the Chilean Chancellor
differ from his own public declarations, they should not be flatly dismissed,
even by the substance of reason that they contain in regard to the proposal
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143
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for a direct negotiation, I send to you several press clippings related to
this matter and I take the opportunity to reiterate the assurances of my
highest consideration.
[Signature]
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145
Annex 252
Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez,
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce,
N° 369, 11 June 1943
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
146
147
EMBASSY OF BOLIVIA
Nº 369 – RESERVED Santiago, 11 June 1943
Subject: Meeting with the
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Minister:
I am pleased to refer to your Note P. y D. 423, dated the 1st of this
month, which was delivered to me personally by the Undersecretary of
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Humberto Palza.
In accordance with the instructions contained in the abovementioned
Note, I spoke yesterday with the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Joaquin Fernandez, explaining the willingness of the Bolivian
Government to initiate direct negotiations with the Chilean Government
“independently of the Treaty of 1904,” as he himself proposed to me in
two successive meetings. In response, the Chilean Chancellor merely told
me that he was pleased to see that attitude in the Bolivian Government
and that he would hurry to inform the President of the Republic.
That, for the moment, is what I have to inform you about such an
important matter.
I reiterate to you the assurances of my highest consideration.
[Signature]
To Mister
Pedro Zilveti Arce,
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs,
LA PAZ148
149
Annex 253
Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez,
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce,
N° 386, 18 June 1943
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
150
151
EMBASSY OF BOLIVIA Annex
2 pages
Nº 386 – RESERVED Santiago, 18 June 1943
Subject: New meeting with the Chilean Foreign Minister.
Mr. Minister:
With reference to your Note P. y D. 423, of the 1st of the current
month, and mine of the 11th of the same month, as well as the cablegram
N° 212 that we sent yesterday jointly with the Undersecretary of Foreign
Relations, Mr. Humberto Palza, I have the pleasure of informing you
that, having visited the Chancellor of Chile to introduce that high official
of the Chancellery of Bolivia, Mr. Fernandez expressed to both of us the
following:
1).- That he ratified his invitation to begin direct
negotiations with the Government of Bolivia regarding the port
ideal of our country, but “independently of the Treaty of 1904.”
2).- That, in declaring that, he also interpreted the
thinking of the President of the Republic, Mr. Rios.
3).- That he was very much pleased that the
Bolivian Government was on the path of direct talks,
stopping to seek solutions in Geneva, Washington or
elsewhere in the world, which in his view only provoked
an adverse reaction in the Chilean public opinion.
4).- That in his opinion the talks could
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To Mr. Pedro Zilveti Arce,
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, La Paz152
153
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begin “when President Peñaranda finishes his tour of America and,
consequently, when his statements to the press of the different countries
of the continent conclude.”
As you can see, what the Chilean Foreign Minister expressed to
the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Palza, and to me, absolutely
confirms what I previously informed you by cable and by mail.
In this situation, and in accordance with your instructions,
verbally transmitted to me by Mr. Palza, I will propose to the Chilean
Foreign Minister to formalize through a note the beginning of that
initial negotiation, which has not yet materialized, but aimed at a direct
understanding between the two countries.
I reiterate to you the assurances of my highest consideration.
[Signature]
154
155
ANNEX TO NOTE Nº 386
“LOS RECORTES”
Agustinas 1038 – Phone 80172
______________
EL DIARIO ILUSTRADO NEWSPAPER
Moneda 1158
Santiago
17 JUNE 1943
The Ambassador of Bolivia in the Foreign Ministry
________
The Ambassador of Bolivia, His Excellency, Mr. Alberto Ostria
Gutierrez, visited yesterday the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Fernandez, to whom he introduced to the Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs of Bolivia, Mr. Humberto Palza, who is visiting Santiago, to
address personal matters.
His Excellency Ostria Gutierrez and Mr. Palza also visited the
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gajardo, to whom they presented
their greetings.
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Annex 254
Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutierrez,
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Pedro Zilveti Arce,
N° 403, 25 June 1943
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
158
159
EMBASSY OF BOLIVIA
Nº 403 – RESERVED Santiago, 25 June 1943
Subject: Proposal to the Chilean Chancellor
Mr. Minister:
In accordance with the thinking of that Foreign Ministry, the
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Humberto Palza, inforned me in
a general manner, verbally, and which I have seen confirmed in Circular
Note N° P. y D. 491 –from which I just learned the written text of
special instructions, although only in part, but maintaining my ignorance
of the rest of them– I proposed to the Chilean Foreign Minister, Mr.
Joaquin Fernandez, to formalize through notes the proposal he made
in several conversations and thereafter in the presence of Mr. Palza –as
recorded in our cable Nº 212, dated 17 June 1943– to initiate direct talks
independently of the Treaty of 1904, regarding the port issue of Bolivia.
In reply, Chancellor Fernandez told me that he would consult the
issue with the President of the Republic, Mr. Rios, and that he would
communicate the corresponding result.
In due course, if my proposal is accepted, I will submit for the
approval of that Ministry the draft of the
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To Mr.
Pedro Zilveti Arce,
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs . LA PAZ.-
160
161
EMBASSY OF BOLIVIA
-2-
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respective note.
I reiterate to you the assurances of my highest consideration.
[Signature]
162
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Annex 255
Memorandum of the Bolivian Ambassador to the United States, Luis
Fernando Guachalla, submitted to the U.S. Secretary of State, Cordell
Hull, 15 September 1943
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
164
165
Embassy of Bolivia
Washington, D. C. CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM
The Government of the United States has been informed
by H. E. the President of Bolivia, and his Minister of Foreign
Affairs, on occasion of the talks held at the White House this past
5 May, of his Government’s criterion with regard to Bolivia’s
landlocked condition. Such criterion can be summarized as follows:
1. Bolivia, faithful to its tradition of respect
for international pacts, does not disown the legality of the
territorial dominion Chile exercises over the Pacific coast
in accordance with the public treaties it has entered into.
2. However, Bolivia maintains its legitimate
aspirations for a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean
through territory owned by Chile and it supports them due to
political, financial and international justice related reasons.
3. Bolivia fosters a direct understanding with Chile
on basis that take into account both countries’ advantages
and high interests and does not wish to disturb continental
harmony in its pursuit for a sovereign outlet to the sea.
Washington, D. C.
15 September 1943.
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Annex 256
Note from the Bolivian Ambassad
Volume II