Volume 3

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE ACCESS TO THE
PACIFIC OCEAN
(BOLIVIA v. CHILE)
COUNTER-MEMORIAL OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CHILE
Volume 3 of 6
(Annexes 154 – 214)
13 JULY 2016

i
Index to Volume 3 of 6
Annexes 154 – 214
Annex
No
Title
S
ource
Page No
Annex 154
Agreement Modifying Article Two of the Protocol on the Exploitation of the Bolivian Section of the Arica-La Paz Railway of 29 August 1928, agreed by exchange of notes on 10 November 1955
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Treaties, Conventions and International Arrangements of Chile 1810-1976, Vol. II (1977), pp 228-229
613
Annex 155
Agreement on the Sica Sica – Arica Oil Pipeline of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos, Transiting through Chilean Territory between Bolivia and Chile, signed at Santiago on
24 April 1957
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Treaties, Conventions and International Arrangements of Chile 1810-1976, Vol. II (1977), pp 240-245
619
Annex 156
Agreement Extending the 1937 Convention on Passports between Bolivia and Chile, agreed by exchange of notes on 7 August 1958
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Treaties, Conventions and International Arrangements of Chile 1810-1976, Vol. II (1977), pp 246-247
633
Annex 157
Chilean Ministry of National Defence, Secretary of the Navy, Decree No 180, 8 February 1961 (notarized in Maritime Concession, Merchant Navy and Coastal Area Office – Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos, 9 March 1961)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
639
Annex 158
Memorandum of the Chilean Embassy in Bolivia, 10 July 1961
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 24 to its Memorial
645
ii
Annex
No
Title
S
ource
Page No
Annex 159
Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, No G.M. 9-62/127,
9 February 1962
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 25 to its Memorial
649
Annex 160
Note from the Chilean Ambassador to Bolivia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 15 February 1962 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
653
Annex 161
Cable from the Embassy of Chile in Bolivia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 133, 15 April 1962
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
699
Annex 162
Minutes of Secret Session 68 of the Chilean Senate, 18 April 1962 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
715
Annex 163
Letter from the Acting Ambassador of Chile to the Organization of American States to the Ambassador of Costa Rica to the Organization of American States, 4 March 1963
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
735
Annex 164
Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 27 March 1963
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Towards the Sea, Important Documents (1963), pp 17-41
743
Annex 165
Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 3 April 1963
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Towards the Sea, Important Documents (1963), pp 45-76
787
iii
Annex
No
Title
S
ource
Page No
Annex 166
Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, to Conrado Ríos Gallardo former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 4 November 1963
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
C. Ríos Gallardo, An Unofficial Talk Between Chile and Bolivia (1966), pp 51-53
829
Annex 167
Letter from Conrado Ríos Gallardo, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 17 November 1963
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
C. Ríos Gallardo, An Unofficial Talk Between Chile and Bolivia (1966), pp 53-55
837
Annex 168
Letter from Conrado Ríos Gallardo, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 6 February 1964
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
C. Ríos Gallardo, An Unofficial Talk Between Chile and Bolivia (1966), pp 72-75
845
Annex 169
Memorandum by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 20 March 1964
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
855
Annex 170
Note from the President of Bolivia to the President of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay entitled “Why is Bolivia not present in Punta del Este?”, 8 April 1967
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
869
Annex 171
Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile to all Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Latin America,
29 May 1967
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
883
Annex 172
Bolivian Supreme Decree No 8866, 28 July 1969
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Official Gazette of the Plurinational State of Bolivia
923
iv
Annex
No
Title
S
ource
Page No
Annex 173
Declaration of Ayacucho, signed at Lima on 9 December 1974
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 110 to its Memorial
933
Annex 174
Joint Declaration of Charaña between Chile and Bolivia, 8 February 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 111 to its Memorial
945
Annex 175
Organization of American States, General Assembly, resolution
CP/RES. 157 (169/75), 6 August 1975
(Original in English)
Archives of the Library of the Organization of American States
951
Annex 176
Statement of the Chilean Delegate to the Organization of American States, 6 August 1975 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
J. Gumucio Granier, Bolivia’s maritime confinement in the world’s fora (1993),
pp 155-159
955
Annex 177
Aide Mémoire from the Bolivian Embassy in Chile to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 26 August 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 174 to its Memorial
963
Annex 178
Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 681/108/75, 16 December 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
969
Annex 179
Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, No 685, 19 December 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 72 to its Memorial
973
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No
Title
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Page No
Annex 180
Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, No 686, 19 December 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 73 to its Memorial
977
Annex 181
Message of President Banzer announcing that Chile’s Reply
(19 December 1975) constitutes a globally acceptable basis for negotiations, 21 December 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
L.F. Guachalla, Bolivia-Chile: The Maritime Negotiation, 1975-1978 (1982), pp 85-86
989
Annex 182
Telex from the Embassy of Chile in Bolivia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 416, 21 December 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
995
Annex 183
“Government ‘globally’ accepts Chilean response”, Los Tiempos (Bolivia), 22 December 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Los Tiempos (Bolivia)
1009
Annex 184
“Negotiations will be held with Chile on the basis of territorial compensation”, Presencia (Bolivia), 29 December 1975 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Presencia (Bolivia)
1015
Annex 185
“Banzer: It will be the people who decide on the agreement with Chile”, Presencia (Bolivia), 30 December 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Presencia (Bolivia)
1033
vi
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No
Title
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Page No
Annex 186
Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 6-Y/120, 31 December 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of Chile
1041
Annex 187
“Foreign Minister Guzmán Soriano: We will give compensation that does not compromise our development”, Presencia (Bolivia), 1 January 1976 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Presencia (Bolivia)
1045
Annex 188
Bolivian Supreme Decree No 13301, 7 January 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Official Gazette of the Plurinational State of Bolivia
1057
Annex 189
Instructions from the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, published in Presencia (Bolivia), 16 January 1976 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, History of the Chilean-Bolivian Negotiations, 1975-1978 (1978), pp 12-13
1061
Annex 190
Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 6-Y/1, 29 January 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
1067
Annex 191
Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, No 88, 17 February 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
1075
vii
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No
Title
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Page No
Annex 192
Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 6-Y/2, 3 March 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
1081
Annex 193
Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, No 4086, 11 March 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
1085
Annex 194
Telex from the Embassy of Chile in Bolivia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 11 March 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
1091
Annex 195
“Bolivia has not assumed definitive commitments with the Chilean Government”, El Diario (Bolivia),
11 March 1976 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
El Diario (Bolivia)
1095
Annex 196
“Chile’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs: There is no deterioration in the negotiations over Bolivia’s outlet to the sea”, Presencia (Bolivia), 13 March 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Presencia (Bolivia)
1099
Annex 197
Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, No 4378, 18 March 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
1103
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No
Title
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Annex 198
Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 6-Y/3, 31 March 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
1109
Annex 199
Aerogram from the Chilean Embassy in Bolivia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 35, 5 April 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
1113
Annex 200
Joint Peruvian-Chilean Press Release, 23 April 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, History of the Chilean-Bolivian Negotiations, 1975-1978 (1978), p 48
1117
Annex 201
Joint Peruvian-Chilean Press Release, 9 July 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, History of the Chilean-Bolivian Negotiations, 1975-1978 (1978), p 49
1121
Annex 202
Agreement establishing a Permanent Mixed Commission, agreed by exchange of Notes No 12683 of 28 July 1976 and No 669/72/76 of 11 August 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Treaties, Conventions and International Arrangements of Chile 1810-1976, Vol. II (1977), pp 260-261
1125
Annex 203
Memorandum of Meeting between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile and the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, 16 August 1976, attached to a Note from the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Chilean Ambassador to Bolivia, No 59, 19 August 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
1129
ix
Annex
No
Title
S
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Page No
Annex 204
Telex from the Chilean Embassy in Bolivia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 500, 20 September 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
1145
Annex 205
“Bolivia will offer Chile a strip of land in the Department of La Paz”,
El Mercurio (Chile), 26 September 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
El Mercurio (Chile)
1151
Annex 206
“Declaration of the National Maritime Council (Official Agency Created by Supreme Decree of 7 February 1976) expressing its full support for the plans for a corridor north of Arica and an exchange of equivalent territory”, Presencia (Bolivia), 31 October 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Presencia (Bolivia)
1155
Annex 207
Official Communiqué of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru, No 30-76, 18 November 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 155 to its Memorial
1159
Annex 208
Final Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting of the Bolivian-Chilean Permanent Mixed Commission, 19 November 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
1167
Annex 209
Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile on the meetings held by G. Amunategui, Special Envoy of the President of the Republic of Chile, and President Banzer of Bolivia, 22 November 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
1175
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Annex
No
Title
S
ource
Page No
Annex 210
Report of Enrique Bernstein Carabantes and Julio Philippi Izquierdo, Representatives of Chile, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 24 November 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Memoria of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 1976, pp 170-173
1179
Annex 211
“Response by the Peruvian Foreign Ministry to information provided to the Ambassador of Peru by the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of Chile”, El Diario (Bolivia), 26 November 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
L.F. Guachalla, Bolivia-Chile: The Maritime Negotiation, 1975-1978 (1982), pp 111-112
1189
Annex 212
Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 26 November 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, History of the Chilean-Bolivian Negotiations, 1975-1978 (1978), p 45
1193
Annex 213
“Complete version of the Explanations by the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs José de la Puente”, El Mercurio (Chile), 26 November 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
El Mercurio (Chile)
1197
Annex 214
Message from the President of Bolivia, 24 December 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 173 to its Memorial
1215
Annex 154
Agreement Modifying Article Two of the Protocol on the Exploitation of the Bolivian Section of the Arica-La Paz Railway of 29 August 1928, agreed by exchange of notes on
10 November 1955
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Treaties, Conventions and International Arrangements of Chile 1810-1976, Vol. II (1977), pp 228-229
613
614
Annex 154
Annex 154
615
AGREEMENT MODIFYING ARTICLE TWO OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE EXPLOITATION OF THE BOLIVIAN SECTION OF THE ARICA-LA PAZ RAILWAY OF 29 AUGUST 1928
Executed in Santiago, Chile, by Exchange of Notes on 10 November 1955.
POLITICAL DIVISION
Department of Treaties and Boundaries
No. 10579
Santiago, 10 November 1955.
Mr. Ambassador,
I have the honor to inform you that, in accordance with one of the recommendations of the Chile-Bolivia Mixed Commission on Economic Complementation, and in consideration of the reciprocal interests of both countries in relation to international trade, my Government agrees to modify the procedure set forth in Article Two of the Protocol on the Exploitation of the Bolivian Section (Iturralde-Blanco Viel), signed on 29 August 1928, as follows:
1)
If the annual tonnage exported from Bolivia does not exceed 40,000 tons, the current 60%-40% proportion per ton-kilometer shall be maintained for the purposes of the distribution of the gross product from international trade between the Chilean and Bolivian Sections.
2)
If the annual tonnage exported from Bolivia exceeds 40,000 tons, the Bolivian Railway Section shall receive 60% and the Chilean Railway Section 40% of such excess tonnage.
3)
The excess income received by the Bolivian Section for the reasons specified in number 2) above must also be applied toward the acquisition of equipment and materials for the improvement of its exploitation.
This Note and that of Your Excellency, conceived in similar terms, shall be deemed by the Governments of Chile and Bolivia as a sufficient agreement intended to modify Article Two of the Protocol of 29 August 1928.
I avail myself of this opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.
(Signed): Kaare Olsen Nielsen.
To His Excellency Fernando Iturralde Chinel, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Bolivia.–Hand Delivered.
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617
EMBASSY OF BOLIVIA
No. 48/55
Santiago, 10 November 1955.
Dear Minister,
I have the honor to inform you that, in accordance with one of the recommendations of the Chile-Bolivia Mixed Commission on Economic Complementation, and in consideration of the reciprocal interests of both countries in relation to international trade, my Government agrees to modify the procedure set forth in Article Two of the Protocol on the Exploitation of the Bolivian Section (Iturralde-Blanco Viel), signed on 29 August 1928, as follows:
1)
If the annual tonnage exported from Bolivia does not exceed 40,000 tons, the current 60%-40% proportion per ton-kilometer shall be maintained for the purposes of the distribution of the gross product from international trade between the Chilean and Bolivian Sections.
2)
If the annual tonnage exported from Bolivia exceeds 40,000 tons, the Bolivian Railway Section shall receive 60% and the Chilean Railway Section 40% of such excess tonnage.
3)
The excess income received by the Bolivian Section for the reasons specified in number 2) above must also be applied toward the acquisition of equipment and materials for the improvement of its exploitation.
This Note and that of Your Excellency, conceived in similar terms, shall be deemed by the Governments of Chile and Bolivia as a sufficient agreement intended to modify Article Two of the Protocol of 29 August 1928.
I avail myself of this opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.
(Signed): Fernando Iturralde Chinel.
To His Excellency Rear Admiral Kaare Olsen Nielsen, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile.–Hand Delivered
618
Annex 155
Agreement on the Sica Sica – Arica Oil Pipeline of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos, Transiting through Chilean Territory between Bolivia and Chile, signed at Santiago on
24 April 1957
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Treaties, Conventions and International Arrangements of Chile 1810-1976, Vol. II (1977), pp 240-245
619
620
Annex 155
Annex 155
621
AGREEMENT ON THE SICA SICA – ARICA OIL PIPELINE OF YACIMIENTOS PETROLIFEROS FISCALES BOLIVIANOS, TRANSITING THROUGH CHILEAN TERRITORY
Exchange of Notes signed at Santiago, Chile, on 24 April 1957.
Message No. 644 of 10 May 1957.
Legislative approval: 22 July 1957.
Ratification: 25 July 1957.
Promulgation: Decree No. 363, of 25 July 1957.
Publication: Diario Oficial No. 23.834, of 30 August 1957.
Republic of Chile
Ministry of
F
oreign Affairs
No. 3276.—Santiago, 24 April 1957.
Dear Ambassador:
The Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of Economic Complementation of 14 October 1955, subsection g), paragraph 2, establishes that details relating to the study, construction, operation and maintenance, in Chilean territory, of oil pipelines leaving Bolivian territory and arriving at the port of Arica or any other Chilean port, shall be established by both Governments, in each case, by means of exchanges of notes which shall include different matters such as: the layout and conditions of any easements that it may be necessary to establish; the regime governing the temporary import into Chile of machinery, motor vehicles and equipment required for study and construction purposes; the conditions available for foreign personnel employed at such works; the free admission of elements necessary for the permanent operation and maintenance of the oil pipelines and, in general, any and all details as may be pertinent for such purposes.
Based on those agreements, I am pleased to inform the Illustrious Government of Your Excellency, through its dignified intermediary, that my Government finds itself in agreement with the following details related to the YPFB oil pipeline that will be constructed from Sica Sica to Arica, in the portion located in Chilean territory, in accordance with the related background:
A.—General Information
The pipe for the oil pipeline, from the border until it enters approximately 85 km into Chilean territory, will be 10¾" in external diameter. From there it will continue to Arica, approximately 71 km, with a pipe with an external diameter that is 8⅝", which would be equipped with 5 pressure reducing stations, in order to attain the safety conditions on the line due to the strong pressure that will develop along its entire course because of the uneven topography in the region. A terminal station shall be installed at the port of Arica. That station shall have containers available for the storage of an appropriate volume of fuel, in addition to
622
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appropriate facilities for the loading of tankers and appropriate constructions for administration and dwelling purposes. The entire length of the pipeline will be protected against corrosion. If it is necessary for the pipeline to pass through land where crops are grown, it will do so underground, as in the cases where it passes through railway crossings, roads and populated areas, in order to ensure the maximum safety.
B.—Location of the line
Although generally following the same route as the railway from Arica to La Paz, the line will deviate from that route considerably, in accordance with the following details: from Charaña to the SW it will deviate somewhat from the Railway line, crossing it near the Villa Industrial Station, and from there, seeking the shortest distances, it will touch the Alzérreca Station, where it will cross the railway twice. From that point, it will continue closer to the rail line until it touches the Puquios Station, then go to the Pampa Ossa Station, Pampa Colorada, San Martín Station, Rosario Station and finally Arica. In this final section, it will deviate considerably from the railway.
This path may be modified by mutual agreement between the parties, without deviating significantly from the line that was defined, to avoid costly expropriations or easements that could be prejudicial to private individuals, principally when crossing the urban limits of Arica, a city in which it is sought to avoid damage to existing establishments and harm to municipal projects.
C.—Personnel, construction materials, operation and maintenance, etc.
The construction, operation, and maintenance of the above-mentioned oil pipeline shall be the responsibility of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos, an entity vested, by means of this exchange of notes, with the aforementioned facilities set out in the Treaty of Economic Complementation, of 31 January 1955, as amended by the Supplementary Protocol of 14 October of the same year, relating to this line.
The material and equipment to be imported into Chile for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the YPFB pipeline shall be free of any duty, lien or tax of any kind, but it cannot be used for any purposes other those for which it is imported. The material referred to here may be freely moved between Bolivia and Chile for purposes of the pipeline, whenever the needs of the YPFB services require it.
The personnel that provide services in the construction, operation, and maintenance of the pipeline shall not be subject to the provisions in force which specify a certain percentage of Chilean personnel in companies doing business in Chilean territory.
The approximate details of personnel, materials, etc., required during the construction phases, for a limited time, and those for operation and maintenance, for an indefinite time, are the following:
1.—Construction Phase
a) Personnel: 35 North American citizens, 70 Bolivians, and 100 Chileans.
b) Equipment: 10 tractors, 2 cranes, 18 trucks, 8 power wagons, 5 pick-up trucks, 10 jeeps, 1 airplane, 18 pieces of welding equipment, various equipment of lesser importance, 4 mobile camps for the personnel.
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625
2.—Operation and maintenance of the pipeline
a) Personnel: 4 line walkers, 4 watchmen, 1 foreman, and 30 laborers (mobile crew) with portable radio equipment.
b) Equipment: 1 tractor, 1 dump truck, 1 power wagon, 1 jeep, 1 light airplane, 1 railcar, 2 pieces of welding equipment.
c) Pipe: 71 km of 8⅝" OD weighing approximately 2,400 tons and 85 km of 10¾" OD weighing approximately 4,000 tons.
d) 5 pressure reducers that include valves and connections and 5 dwellings for watchmen and line inspectors.
3.—Terminal in Arica
a) Personnel: 25 people.
b) Equipment: 1 pick-up truck, 1 jeep, one motorboat.
c) 6 tanks, each of approximately 50,000 barrels capacity. Pumping equipment and tanker loading system, 2 power generators. Radio equipment. 8 buildings for operation and housing for personnel.
D.—Other Matters
The works shall be constructed, to the extent possible, on Chilean public land to be granted at no cost to Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos for use under a concession for the duration of the exploitation of the pipeline. If it is necessary to expropriate or establish easements on public or private property, the Government of Chile will make such expropriations and establish such easements and will grant to Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos a concession to use the expropriated land, and Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos must pay the compensation agreed to for the easements created on private property. Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos must also pay for any damage caused to private individuals during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline.
The Government of Chile may authorize Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos to purchase the land and property in the Department of Arica that it needs in order to build the terminal Station with its permanent offices, tanks, and facilities and lodging for the personnel for pipeline maintenance and operation.
The Government of Chile may request Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos to install outlet starters at certain points along its travel. Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos shall either install or authorize these starters on behalf of the interested parties.
It is understood that the provisions guaranteeing the fullest free transit of Bolivian persons and cargo through Chilean territory shall apply to Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos.
As an annex to this note, I have sent Your Excellency a map showing graphically the projected layout of the pipeline, from Charaña to Arica, and ten additional maps specifying in detail the route and the profiles of the pipeline.
By means of this note, in response to Your Excellency’s note, all requirements and formalities set forth in subsection g), paragraph 2 of the Supplementary Protocol signed at La Paz on 14 October 1955 are hereby fulfilled.
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I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration. — (Signed.). — Eduardo Urzúa Merino.
To His Excellency, Mr Renán Castrillo, Ambassador of Bolivia.
____________
BOLIVIAN EMBASSY
No 13-57.—Santiago, 24 April 1957.
Dear Minister:
The Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of Economic Complementation of 14 October 1955, subsection g), paragraph 2, establishes that details relating to the study, construction, operation and maintenance, in Chilean territory, of oil pipelines leaving Bolivian territory and arriving at the port of Arica or any other Chilean port, shall be established by both Governments, in each case, by means of exchanges of notes which shall include different matters such as: the layout and conditions of any easements that it may be necessary to establish; the regime governing the temporary import into Chile of machinery, motor vehicles and equipment required for study and construction purposes; the conditions available for foreign personnel employed at such works; the free admission of elements necessary for the permanent operation and maintenance of the oil pipelines and, in general, any and all details as may be pertinent for such purposes.
Based on those agreements, I am pleased to inform the Illustrious Government of Your Excellency, through its dignified intermediary, that my Government finds itself in agreement with the following details related to the YPFB oil pipeline that will be constructed from Sica Sica to Arica, in the portion located in Chilean territory, in accordance with the related background:
A.—General Information
The pipe for the oil pipeline, from the border until it enters approximately 85 km into Chilean territory, will be 10 ¾" in external diameter. From there it will continue to Arica, approximately 71 km, with pipe with an external diameter that is 8 ⅝", which would be equipped with 5 pressure reducing stations, in order to attain the safety conditions on the line due to the strong pressure that will develop along its entire course because of the uneven topography in the region. A terminal station shall be installed at the port of Arica. That station shall have containers available for the storage of an appropriate volume of fuel, in addition to appropriate facilities for the loading of tankers and appropriate constructions for administration and dwelling purposes. The entire length of the pipeline will be protected against corrosion. If it is necessary for the pipeline to pass through land where crops are grown, it will do so underground, as in the cases where it passes through railway crossings, roads and populated areas, in order to ensure the maximum safety.
B.—Location of the line
Although generally following the same route as the railway from Arica to La Paz, the line will deviate from that route considerably, in accordance with the following details: from Charaña to the SW it will deviate somewhat
628
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from the Railway line, crossing it near the Villa Industrial Station, and from there, seeking the shortest distances, it will touch the Alzérreca Station, where it will cross the railway twice. From that point, it will continue closer to the rail line until it touches the Puquios Station, then go to the Pampa Ossa Station, Pampa Colorada, San Martín Station, Rosario Station and finally Arica. In this final section, it will deviate considerably from the railway.
This path may be modified by mutual agreement between the parties, without deviating significantly from the line that was defined, to avoid costly expropriations or easements that could be prejudicial to private individuals, principally when crossing the urban limits of Arica, a city in which it is sought to avoid damage to existing establishments and harm to municipal projects.
C.—Personnel, construction materials, operation and maintenance, etc.
The construction, operation, and maintenance of the above-mentioned oil pipeline shall be the responsibility of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos, an entity vested, by means of this exchange of notes, with the aforementioned facilities set out in the Treaty of Economic Complementation, of 31 January 1955, as amended by the Supplementary Protocol of 14 October of the same year, relating to this line.
The material and equipment to be imported into Chile for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the YPFB pipeline shall be free of any duty, lien or tax of any kind, but it cannot be used for any purposes other those for which it is imported. The material referred to here may be freely moved between Bolivia and Chile for purposes of the pipeline, whenever the needs of the YPFB services require it.
The personnel that provide services in the construction, operation, and maintenance of the pipeline shall not be subject to the provisions in force which specify a certain percentage of Chilean personnel in companies doing business in Chilean territory.
The approximate details of personnel, materials, etc., required during the construction phases, for a limited time, and those for operation and maintenance, for an indefinite time, are the following:
1.—Construction Phase
a) Personnel: 35 North American citizens, 70 Bolivians, and 100 Chileans.
b) Equipment: 10 tractors, 2 cranes, 18 trucks, 8 power wagons, 5 pick-up trucks, 10 jeeps, 1 airplane, 18 pieces of welding equipment, various equipment of lesser importance, 4 mobile camps for the personnel.
2.—Operation and maintenance of the pipeline
a) Personnel: 4 line walkers, 4 watchmen, 1 foreman, and 30 laborers (mobile crew) with portable radio equipment.
b) Equipment: 1 tractor, 1 dump truck, 1 power wagon, 1 jeep, 1 light airplane, 1 railcar, 2 pieces of welding equipment.
c) Pipe: 71 km of 8 ⅝" OD weighing approximately 2,400 tons and 85 km of 10 ¾" OD weighing approximately 4,000 tons.
d) 5 pressure reducers that include valves and connections and 5 dwellings for watchmen and line inspectors.
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3.—Terminal in Arica
a) Personnel: 25 people.
b) Equipment: 1 pick-up truck, 1 jeep, one motorboat.
c) 6 tanks, each of approximately 50,000 barrels capacity. Pumping equipment and tanker loading system, 2 power generators. Radio equipment. 8 buildings for operation and housing for personnel.
D.—Other Matters
The works shall be constructed, to the extent possible, on Chilean public land to be granted at no cost to Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos for use under a concession for the duration of the exploitation of the pipeline. If it is necessary to expropriate or establish easements on public or private property, the Government of Chile will make such expropriations and establish such easements and will grant to Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos a concession to use the expropriated land, and Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos must pay the compensation agreed to for the easements created on private property. Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos must also pay for any damage caused to private individuals during the construction and maintenance of the pipeline.
The Government of Chile may authorize Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos to purchase the land and property in the Department of Arica that it needs in order to build the terminal Station with its permanent offices, tanks, and facilities and lodging for the personnel for pipeline maintenance and operation.
The Government of Chile may request Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos to install outlet starters at certain points along its route. Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos shall either install or authorize these starters on behalf of the interested parties.
It is understood that the provisions guaranteeing the fullest free transit of Bolivian persons and cargo through Chilean territory shall apply to Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos.
As an annex to this note, I have sent Your Excellency a map showing graphically the projected layout of the pipeline, from Charaña to Arica, and ten additional maps specifying in detail the route and the profiles of the pipeline.
By means of this note, in response to Your Excellency’s note, all requirements and formalities set forth in subsection g), paragraph 2 of the Supplementary Protocol signed at La Paz on 14 October 1955 are hereby fulfilled.
I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency the expression of my highest and most distinguished consideration. — (Signed.). — Renán Castrillo. — Ambassador of Bolivia”.
To His Excellency, Mr Eduardo Urzúa Merino, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile.
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Agreement Extending the 1937 Convention on Passports between Bolivia and Chile, agreed by exchange of notes on
7 August 1958
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Treaties, Conventions and International Arrangements of Chile 1810-1976, Vol. II (1977), pp 246-247
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AGREEMENT EXTENDING THE 1937 CONVENTION ON PASSPORTS
AGREED UPON THROUGH THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES IN SANTIAGO, CHILE, 7 AUGUST 1958.
m
inistry of foreign
a
ffairs
______ No. 12359.—Santiago, 7 August 1958
Dear Ambassador:
I am pleased to write to Your Excellency in order to inform you that my Government resolved to broaden, with the aim of further strengthening relations with Bolivia with regard to the flow of tourists and the facilities to enter the country granted to travelers between our two countries, the Convention on Passports of 18 September 1937, and the Diplomatic Notes of 30 November of that same year and 20 March 1940.
The essential purpose of this Agreement is to promote and facilitate the flow of passengers travelling between the cities of Iquique and Oruro, for which the regime of safe conduct procedure currently in force for passengers travelling between the Department of Arica and the Republic of Bolivia is extended to individuals travelling between Bolivia and the entire Tarapacá Province. The conditions and regulations governing the issue and validity of safe conducts and other provisions shall remain unchanged, as regulated in the Convention on Passports of 18 September 1937, and the Diplomatic Notes of 30 November 1937 and 20 March 1940.
Safe conducts for passengers travelling between the province of Tarapacá (except for the Department of Arica) and the Republic of Bolivia shall be issued in Iquique by the Head of the Identification Office, with the approval of the Mayor of the province, and they shall be signed off at no cost by the Bolivian Consul and by the relevant local authority in Oruro, and similarly signed off at no cost by the Chilean Consul.
The regime for passengers travelling between Arica and Bolivia shall continue as is, with the intervention of the authorities currently acting.
This Agreement shall be effective until a general convention is established to regulate all aspects in connection with the passage of individuals between both countries.
If the Government of Your Excellency should be willing to accept the foregoing provisions, this Note and the counterpart by Your Excellency on similar terms shall constitute an agreement on the subject matter established herein.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.
(Signed.). — Alberto Sepúlveda Contreras, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
To His Excellency,
Mr. Renán Castrillo Justiniano
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Bolivia
SANTIAGO.
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EMBASSY OF BOLIVIA
Santiago, 7 August 1958
Dear Minister,
I am pleased to write to Your Excellency in order to inform you that my Government resolved to broaden, with the aim of further strengthening relations with Bolivia with regard to the flow of tourists and the facilities to enter the country granted to travelers between our two countries, the Convention on Passports of 18 September 1937, and the Diplomatic Notes of 30 November of that same year and 20 March 1940.
The essential purpose of this Agreement is to promote and facilitate the flow of passengers travelling between the cities of Iquique and Oruro, for which the regime of safe conduct procedure currently in force for passengers travelling between the Department of Arica and the Republic of Bolivia is extended to individuals travelling between Bolivia and the entire Tarapacá Province. The conditions and regulations governing the issue and validity of safe conducts and other provisions shall remain unchanged, as regulated in the Convention on Passports of 18 September 1937, and the Diplomatic Notes of 30 November 1937 and 20 March 1940.
Safe conducts for passengers travelling between the province of Tarapacá (except for the Department of Arica) and the Republic of Bolivia shall be issued in Iquique by the Head of the Identification Office, with the approval of the Mayor of the province, and they shall be signed off at no cost by the Bolivian Consul and by the relevant local authority in Oruro, and similarly signed off at no cost by the Chilean Consul.
The regime for passengers travelling between Arica and Bolivia shall continue as is, with the intervention of the authorities currently acting.
This Agreement shall be effective until a general convention is established to regulate all aspects in connection with the passage of individuals between both countries.
If the Government of Your Excellency should be willing to accept the foregoing provisions, this Note and the counterpart by Your Excellency on similar terms shall constitute an agreement on the subject matter established herein.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.
(Signed.). — Renán Castrillo Justiniano, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Bolivia
To His Excellency,
Mr. Alberto Sepúlveda,
Minister of Foreign Affairs
HAND DELIVERED.
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Chilean Ministry of National Defence, Secretary of the Navy, Decree No 180, 8 February 1961 (notarized in Maritime Concession, Merchant Navy and Coastal Area Office – Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos, 9 March 1961)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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ANNEX 9
Page 292. No. 155. Year 1961.
MARITIME CONCESSION COASTAL AREA OFFICE AND MERCHANT NAVY
- O -
YACIMIENTOS PETROLÍFEROS FISCALES BOLIVIANOS.
In Arica, Republic of Chile, on 9 March 1961, before me, Dora Lerner Sinenberg, Attorney-at-law, Notary Public and of Finance, Business and Mines Registrar of the Department, Acting Registrar serving as a substitute for Enrique Alvarez Véliz, as evidenced by the judicial appointment entered on page forty-one overleaf of this notarial record book, and the witnesses whose names are stated at the end hereof, there appear: DOMITILO TOLEDO RODRIGUEZ, Chilean, widower, residing in this city at Sotomayor 220, holder of identity card 291.715 of Valparaíso, Arica Community Treasurer, and in such capacity acting on behalf of the Chilean Treasury, as it will be stated at the end hereof; and EDGAR ESTENSORO ARAOZ, Bolivian, married, with address at Chinchorro without number, holder of identity card 73.373 of Arica, on behalf of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos, as it will be stated at the end hereof; both of age and known to me, I attest, state as follows: That they come to have the following Decree recorded as a notarial instrument: Ministry of National Defense. Secretary of the Navy.- Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos be granted the Concession of Beachfront Lands, Beach, Sea Beds and Water Portions.- Number 180.- Santiago, 8 February 1961.- It was ordered as follows: In view of the attached records, the statements made by the Navy Commander in Chief (Coastal Area Office and Merchant Navy) in Ordinary official letter No. 12.210-7845, of 12 January of this year, and D.F.L. (Law Ranking Decree) No. 340 of 5 April 1960, it is decided that: One.- Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos, with address in Arica, El Chinchorro industrial neighborhood, shall be granted the Concession of an Area of Beachfront Lands, which are registered with a larger area in favor of the Treasury with Arica’s Real Estate Registry on page 25 overleaf, No. 60 of the Real Estate Record Book of 1935; beach and Sea Beds, located at the place named El Chinchorro
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of Arica port, District and department with the same name, province of Tarapacá, and identified at the abovementioned location in Plan No. 30-60, approved by the Maritime authority of Arica, as well as Water Portions that shall be used to keep anchored at the port of Arica bay: two (2) buoys for ships with a volume capacity of more than 10,000 gross register tonnage and three (3) permanent signaling buoy lines.- Two.- The area of beachfront lands, which are 20 m wide and 35 m high, have a surface area of 700 m2.- The Beach, which is 20 m wide and 60 m high, has a surface area of 1,400 m2; and the Sea Beds, which are 20 m wide and 1,320 m high, have a surface area of 26,580 m2.- Boundaries and measurements: on the North, and South, they adjoin beachfront lands, beach and sea beds, for 35-70, and 1,329 m, respectively, on each boundary; on the East, they border beachfront lands, for 20 m, and on the West, they border sea beds, for 20 m.- Three.- The purpose is to protect the underground and undersea pipeline belonging to the Sica Sica – Arica Oil Pipeline terminal, oil pipeline signaling items and docking items for ships while subject to any task.- Four.- The concession term shall be twenty (20) years, commencing on 1 January 1960, and ending on 31 December 1979. Five.- This concession is granted for no valuable consideration, pursuant to the provisions of letter “D” of the agreement on Sica Sica – Arica Oil Pipeline of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos that was subscribed on 24 April 1957.- Six.- This concession shall be governed by D.F.L No. 340 dated 5 April 1960, Marine Police General Regulation, and any laws or regulations amending or superseding them in the future.- Seven.- The Concessionaire shall have this decree recorded as a notarial instrument, and the Arica Community Treasurer shall be empowered to sign it in behalf of the Treasury.- The expenses necessary for such recording shall be borne by the Concessionaire.- Be this decree submitted to legal review, communicated and registered with the Department of National Assets of the Ministry of Lands and Colonization.- J. Alessandri R.- C. Vial I.- This is transcribed for your information.- This copy is consistent with its original, and consists of one sheet of paper which I have had before me and returned to the interested party.- The legal capacities of Domitilo Toledo Rodríguez and Edgar Estensoro Araoz are not indicated as they are known to the parties and the attesting Notary Public.- Having been
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read with witnesses Manuel Díaz Rodríguez and Lily Espejo Alvarez, they are given and signed by the appearing parties.- A copy is furnished, and the fiscal tax shield of five cents and the legal notarial tax are paid in this act.- I attest.- E. Estensoro, Taxpayer Identification No. 10560 Arica.- D. Toledo R.- M. Díaz R.- L. Espejo A.- Dora Lerner.- Notary Public and Acting Registrar.-
THIS SECOND COPY IS CONSISTENT WITH ITS ORIGINAL. Arica, 5 April 1961.
Signed by: Dora Lerner
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Memorandum of the Chilean Embassy in Bolivia, 10 July 1961
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 24 to its Memorial
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CHILEAN EMBASSY
MEMORANDUM
1. Chile has always been open, together with safeguarding the de jure situation established in the Treaty of Peace of 1904, to study, in direct dealings with Bolivia, the possibility of satisfying its aspirations and the interests of Chile. Chile will always reject the resort, by Bolivia, to organizations which are not competent to resolve a matter which is already settled by Treaty and could only be modified by direct agreement of the parties.
2. Note number 9 of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated in Santiago on 20 June 1950, is a clear testimony of those purposes. Through it, Chile states that it is “open formally to enter into a direct negotiation aimed at searching for a formula that would make it possible to give Bolivia its own sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to obtain compensation of a non-territorial character which effectively takes into account its interests.”
3. Given that President Paz Estenssoro manifested his willingness to visit President Alessandri, in response to the invitation made by the President of Chile, it would seem particularly untimely and inconvenient to unsettle public opinion in both countries with the announcement of resorting to international organisations to deal with a problem that the Government of Bolivia has not specified in its direct relations with the Government of Chile.
La Paz, 10 July 1961
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Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, No G.M. 9-62/127, 9 February 1962
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 25 to its Memorial
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REPUBLIC OF BOLIVIA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND WORSHIP
MEMORANDUM
No. G.M. 9-62/127
1. The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship has carefully considered the Memorandum sent by the Honorable Embassy of Chile on 10 July 1961, referring to the Chilean Government’s willingness to seek a solution to the Bolivian port problem.
2. It has also acknowledged the reiteration of note no. 9, dated in Santiago on 20 June 1950, by which Chile stated to be “open formally to enter into a direct negotiation aimed at searching for a formula that would make it possible to give Bolivia its own sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to obtain compensation of a non-territorial character which effectively takes into account its interests.”
3. Finally, I have taken note of the Chilean view point regarding the inconvenience of resorting, in this matter, to international organisations that are not competent, if there is concurrence of criteria to overcome the current situation by direct agreement between the parties.
4. With the purpose of reaching an agreement that strengthens the friendship between Bolivia and Chile, by eliminating any grounds for distance, the Bolivian Government expresses its full agreement to initiate, as soon as possible, direct negotiations aimed at satisfying the fundamental need of the nation for its own and sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, on the basis of compensation that, without having territorial character, takes into account the reciprocal conveniences and effective interests of both countries.
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Note from the Chilean Ambassador to Bolivia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 15 February 1962
(extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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EMBASSY OF CHILE
MT-MT/aba
[Seal:] 00507
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FILE. No. 27.
LA PAZ, 15 February 1962.
DEAR MINISTER,
Memorandum No. G.M. 9-62/127 and Note No. G.M. 10/128, which were delivered to me by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, José Fellman Velarde, on Friday, 9 February, prompt me to make some observations to you which I deem relevant and with respect to which I request your kind consideration.
1.
It seems proper to me to state first that Memorandum No. G.M. 9-62/127 of the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs contains two statements made with malicious intent that run counter to the factual background of the issue.
The first malicious statement consists in attributing to the Chilean Government “the willingness to seek a solution to Bolivia’s port problem.”
Anybody can tell the fundamental difference between the “willingness to listen” and the “willingness to seek a solution.”
The “willingness to listen” is the simple act of gladly receiving proposals made by another party in order to study and analyze them based on their merits. It is, in other words, a passive but cordial action.
The “willingness to seek a solution”, implies
TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
SANTIAGO DE CHILE.
OFFICE OF THE MINISTER
OFFICE OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS
Ref: Bolivia’s Notes and Memorandum.
Observations on the goals pursued
by the Bolivian Government
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an active posture, a manifest interest in resolving a given problem, by also suppling its own precedent and suggestions.
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It follows from documents of the archives of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs that I have recently reviewed that the administration of President Ibáñez, which began in 1952, upheld Chile’s traditional foreign affairs policy consisting in “repudiating Bolivia’s requests before international organizations or third powers to bring up its maritime issue,” and instructed the Chilean Ambassadors in La Paz, Mr. Luis Rau and Mr. Alejandro Hales, not to abandon “the willingness to listen to Bolivia” in the event it should make any direct proposals. Such instructions establish –if I remember them literally– that “not even the constant instability of the Bolivian administrations makes it advisable to close this door to Bolivia.”
Over a period of some years, after the Revolution of April 1952, which caused the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario [Revolutionary Nationalist Movement] to come to power, the Bolivian Government silenced its claim for a port on the Pacific Ocean. The new Bolivian administration had more urgent tasks ahead: the destruction of the economic and political power of the “rosca”; the nationalization of the mining industry; the agrarian reform; the creation of a permanent political organization through universal suffrage and illiterate vote; the inclusion of rural workers in the consumer culture; the alarming economic crisis caused by the increase in the mining industry’s production costs and the decrease in the
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international price of tin.
However, upon passing an “acid test” consisting in having a president stay in power for the entire term of office – the only case in the history of the country – Bolivia resumed its port ambition during President Hernán Siles’s administration and when the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States was discussing the proposal to hold a Special Conference on the Limitation and Balance of Armaments submitted by the President of Chile, His Excellency, Mr. Jorge Alessandri.
On the day before the OAS’s Council meeting, the undersigning Ambassador was called to the office of Bolivia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carlos Morales Guillén, who, under President Siles’ express instructions, stated as follows: “Bolivia will enthusiastically support President Alessandri’s initiative but will request that the Organization of American States analyze how to best solve Bolivia’s long-standing and unyielding port aspirations, which constitute a problem adjacent to the arms build-up issue. Bolivia does not expect the Special Conference on the Limitation and Balance of Armaments to finally solve the problem, but to review the matter in order to settle it in the near future. President Siles is informing this to the Chilean Ambassador to demonstrate the honest and friendly willingness of the Government of Bolivia, which does not intend to disrupt its excellent amicable relationship with the Government of Chile.”
I replied that “Chile has traditionally
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maintained a policy consisting in respectfully listening to the proposals and suggestions directly made by Bolivia, but that it has always firmly rejected any attempts to submit to international organizations a matter which, legally speaking, had already been settled.” (Telegram No. 73 from the Embassy of Chile in La Paz to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, dated 12 April 1960).
In response, through telegram No. 48 of 13 April, the acting Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Enrique Ortúzar, informed this Special Mission that “he fully agreed with the statement” made by the Chilean Ambassador to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Mr. Morales Guillén. He instructed the Ambassador to hold a meeting with President Siles or the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and further sustained that he was “deeply upset and surprised” by Bolivia’s approach. He added that “any action against the observance of treaties is also against the principles embraced by the Organization of the American States.” He also deemed it inappropriate to deal with this matter at the Special Conference on the Limitation and Balance of Armaments.
During the meeting held between the Chilean Ambassador and President Siles on 18 April in compliance with the instructions contained in the abovementioned telegram, the Bolivian President insisted on the “moral and political obligation of his administration to submit Bolivia’s port aspiration issues to the Organization of American States.”
You are well aware of with the fate of that proposal. It was finally dismissed by the Council of the OAS, which made no decision on the matter. However, this
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shows that the Government of Bolivia is still willing to revive through every possible mechanism its longing of maritime vindication and that the Government of Chile rejects resort to international organizations but insists, instead, that it is willing to listen to Bolivia’s direct claims.
From that date, however, Bolivia has stepped up its demagogic use of the so-called “vital aspiration of Bolivia” at a domestic level.
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In the days leading up to my meeting with Mr. Arze Quiroga, we had exchanged our views on the projects–so cherished by me–to definitively solve the problem of the transit of Bolivian goods through Arica and Antofagasta. In a lengthy informal conversation with President Paz Estenssoro during a private meal at his home, which was only attended by Raúl Diez de Medina, his wife, my wife and I, in addition to the President and his wife, we discussed the possibility of signing agreements in that regard and we also had a frank and amicable talk about how the Armed Forces appeared to have become a growing menace to the stability of his administration. The President looked worried and was open to the signing of agreements with Chile to improve the service provided in Arica.
Then, I met with Minister Arze Quiroga. In anticipation of the course that our conversation might take, I took with me a copy of the items that had been approved by Minister of Foreign Affairs Vergara Donoso in his Strictly Confidential Telegram No. 1 dated 11 April 1961.
These were the events that took place on 10 July of that year.
During our conversation, we discussed the
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activities of the Maritime Action Center; the official schedule of the Anniversary celebration of the city of La Paz; the project to amend the Constitution; the Bolivian initiative of April 1960 for the Council of the OAS to address the maritime vindication issue, and the activities of some military groups, among other matters.
I insisted that this type of initiative would greatly impair the friendship between Chile and Bolivia and that, in the absence of such friendship, the Government of Bolivia would be a much easier prey of the forces that were seeking to destroy it.
As for the “port issues”, Minister Arze Quiroga clearly explained the position of President Paz Estenssoro: “This Government and the MNR are against the demagogic use of this matter. We believe that this problem can only be solved by the mutual understanding of the parties –among which I include Peru and Chile– in a three-party operation. Since this is not a current problem, we think that we should not bring it up without serious deliberation directly with you.”
He asked me what we thought about it and I replied that we had always refused to resort to third parties and that we had always shown our willingness to listen to Bolivia directly. To that end, I read the items on the copy that I had carried in my pocket, which contained the express instructions I had received from the Office. As requested by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I did not mention the lack of response to the Chilean Note of June 1950.
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Minister Arze Quiroga took note of my statement.
I was very clear about the nature of our statements. We rejected Bolivia’s intention to resort to third parties to deal with a matter which we had never overlooked. That was no special initiative on our part. We were simply repeating what we had always maintained. I did not formally deliver a memorandum as the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed several months later (after the Lauca incident had taken place). I will later discuss this again.
To be honest, I must say that I never doubted Minister Arze Quiroga’s chivalry, a white man who was not just another ordinary and dishonest mestizo from the Bolivian Plateau. I have always been friends with him and with President Paz Estenssoro and our friendship went beyond our official relationship. They were both exceptional people in the complex mess that was Bolivian politics.
The above account explains the origin of the so-called “Memorandum” allegedly delivered by the Embassy of Chile on 10 July 1961. The document was not inside an envelope, it was not numbered and it had not been signed nor initialized. As I have explained, it was nothing more than a set of notes for my personal use, and I had been very cautious not to exceed the authorization that the Office had granted me.
[…]
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Cable from the Embassy of Chile in Bolivia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 133, 15 April 1962
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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CHILEAN EMBASSY
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SANTIAGO, CHILE
LA PAZ, 15 April 1962
CABLE
NO. 133
1. Today, Sunday, at 7 p.m., the Minister of Foreign Affairs handed over to the press the following press release:
“Yesterday, 14 April at 4 p.m., the President of Chile, Mr. Jorge Alessandri, ordered the use of Lauca River waters, making the river’s detour a reality.
The water level of Lauca River coming into Bolivia is part of its territorial heritage. Such decision by the Government of Chile therefore constitutes an act of aggression.
The Government of Chile, before using the waters of Lauca River – an international river of successive course – was obligated, under the requirements of International Law, to report any scheduled works and request Bolivia’s consent. In the 23 years that this matter has endured, the Government of Chile has never reported the works and the Government of Bolivia, for its part, has never given its consent.
Until 24 hours earlier, the Governments of Bolivia and Chile were exchanging ideas in order to begin direct negotiations in a meeting between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Surprisingly, the Government of Chile rejected that exchange of ideas and placed in the hands of the President of the Republic the duty to determine the date when Lauca River’s detour would take place. Faced with this, the Government of Bolivia reported the imminence of the aggression to the Organization of American States.
The aggression has materialized; the Government of Bolivia states that it will never recognize the Government of Chile’s alleged right to use, by itself and for itself, the waters of Lauca River.
Furthermore, it will denounce Chile for such aggression before the Organization of American States for it to take action as it is bound to do under the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.
Third, a formal protest shall be submitted to the Government of Chile.
Finally, Bolivia hereby informs that it has ordered the immediate return of the personnel of the Bolivian Embassy currently located in Santiago.
By disclosing the matter to the public, without concealing its difficulties, Bolivia reiterates the need and duty of all Bolivian citizens to remain calm and to
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preserve, in the face of foreign aggression, national unity above all. Signed by José Fellman Velarde, Minister of Foreign Affairs. La Paz, 15 April 1962."
2. The Minister of Foreign Affairs called me to attend a meeting at 7:30 p.m. Instead, I was received by the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the General Advisor to the Ministry, who handed me a Diplomatic Note that read as follows:
“No. GM 32. La Paz, 15 April 1962. Mr. Ambassador, The Government of Bolivia has learnt that the President of Chile, Mr. Jorge Alessandri, ordered yesterday at 4 p.m. that the Lauca River be used, making the river’s detour a reality.
The Government of Bolivia had warned in a Diplomatic Note dated 21 March that any such order would be considered an act of aggression. In its discretion, the decision made by the President of Chile has crystallized such aggression.
The Government of Bolivia complies with its duty to send a vehement protest to the Government of Chile for such act.
It is paramount to state that the aggression against the Bolivian territorial heritage took place 24 hours after the Government of Chile had rejected the possibility of initiating direct negotiations with the Government of Bolivia, through a meeting of both Ministers of Foreign Affairs, on the pretext that the proposal to submit the matter to the procedure under the Montevideo Declaration on the Use and Development of Water so the matter could reach the public was unacceptable, when this had actually been the suggestion of the Chilean Ambassador himself in La Paz.
I hereby avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.”
Signed by José Fellman Velarde.
3. Immediately after reading it, I told Undersecretary Escobari and the General Advisor, Mr. Alipaz, that I could not accept it nor receive it because it contained a very serious error and was false about the facts. I explained to them that I had never suggested to Foreign Minister Fellman to “submit the matter to the procedure provided for in the Montevideo Declaration“ and summarised my actual conversations with Fellman. Furthermore, I pointed out that the Note insisted on charging the Government of Chile with the rejection of negotiations and failed to state that Foreign Minister Fellman had unconditionally accepted to
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travel to Chile and, later, only 24 hours before the date scheduled for his departure, imposed a prior condition that had been previously repeatedly rejected. I asked them to request that Foreign Minister Fellman correct the Diplomatic Note because the error of interpretation contained therein made it unacceptable. They replied that the Minister was not there. Faced with this evasion, I told them I would receive the Note but requested an audience to address the matter immediately. I thought it was my duty to do so without previously asking You because events were unfolding at a fast pace and, faced with the removal of the Bolivian Embassy staff at Santiago, You might as well have taken similar action, since the opportunity to clarify the facts and bring down such falsehood – as flagrant as many others before – would have been lost. Therefore, on Monday I am personally going to deliver the following Note to the Foreign Minister, if he would receive me (otherwise, I will leave it with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.)
(TEXT OF THE NOTE TRANSCRIBED IN THIS CABLE ATTACHED.)
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4. "No. 65
LA PAZ, 15 April 1962
MINISTER,
I refer to Your Excellency’s Diplomatic Note dated 15 April 1962, delivered to me by the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs.
In that Note, Your Excellency states that ”[t]he Government of Bolivia hereby complies with its duty to send a vehement protest to the Government of Chile“ for the use of Lauca River waters and that ”[i]t is paramount to state that the aggression against the Bolivian territorial heritage took place 24 hours after the Government of Chile had rejected the possibility of initiating direct negotiations with the Government of Bolivia, through a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, on the pretext that the proposal to submit the matter to the procedure under the Montevideo Declaration on the Use and Development of Water so the matter could reach the public was unacceptable”.
Your Excellency further states that “this had actually been the suggestion of the Chilean Ambassador himself in La Paz”.
In this regard, I am compelled to make some comments on Your Excellency’s Diplomatic Note which clearly suffers from errors of interpretation.
In the numerous conversations Your Excellency and I have held from 24 March with a view to securing a meeting between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs
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of Bolivia and Chile, all aspects of the problem concerning the water capture works my Government would perform in a section of that River, which runs on Chilean national territory, which have been carefully analyzed, in a friendly atmosphere.
On 28 March, in one of the two conversations held with Your Excellency, Your Excellency referred to “some procedure that would address the problem under the Montevideo Declaration”. When analyzing this matter, we discussed the possibility of finding a formula that would clarify the fundamental issue at dispute, i.e., Chile’s claim that it reported the works to be performed on 5 August 1949, and Bolivia’s claim that such report was never submitted to it.
Subsequently, in several of our meetings, we addressed this subject. Your Excellency asked me, on two occasions, if I had consulted with my Government on any procedure that would settle the issue and I replied, twice, that the Government of Chile had not shared with me any decision or opinion on the matter.
I am confident Your Excellency will recall my insistence on holding the meeting between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Chile and Bolivia with no prior requirements or conditions, and only with a view to making such meeting the starting point of direct negotiations, as agreed by both Governments.
Thus, on Thursday, 12 April
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[sic] negotiations, it would unnecessarily delay the initiation of them, resulting in detriment to the relations of the two countries”.
At that point, Your Excellency said you were willing to travel to Santiago, via Lima, on 15 April and made no request other than that shared by the Chilean Ambassador with the press that “following the date of delivery of the last Chilean diplomatic notes, on 2 and 3 April, conversations between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and the Chilean Ambassador had moved on to constructive ground and progress has been made to initiate direct negotiations.“ Furthermore, Your Excellency and I agreed that such statement would account for the fact that “while the trip of the Bolivian Minister of Affairs to Santiago was imminent, and during his stay there, the Government of Chile, for reasons of elemental consideration, would not order the detour of Lauca River waters.”
Based on this statement, Your Excellency believed a way had been paved for your visit to Santiago. Your Excellency said to me that the President of Bolivia shared that view and had six air tickets booked with Panagra airlines, via Lima, departing from La Paz on 14 April and flying from Lima to Santiago on 16 April.
After asking Your Excellency if this information could be shared with the Government of Chile, Your Excellency answered in the affirmative.
On 13 Friday
, on the eve of the date scheduled for the trip, Your Excellency
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provided for in the Montevideo Declaration on the use and development of water.”
It was faced with this demand, made after having reached an agreement for Your Excellency’s visit to Santiago – which would take place “with no prior requirements or conditions that would unnecessarily defer the commencement of negotiations,” – that the Government of Chile resolved to suspend the negotiations and His Excellency the President of Chile ordered that part of the Lauca River waters be used.
The purpose of this account of the facts is to make it perfectly clear that there has been no formal suggestion or proposal on the part of the Government of Chile, or the Chilean Ambassador in La Paz, to “submit the matter to the procedure provided for in the Montevideo Declaration on the Use and Development of Water.”
Conversely, there was indeed an agreement, reached on 12 April to initiate direct negotiations four days later with no prior requirements or conditions for them.
Upon receiving Your Excellency’s Diplomatic Note, to which I replied, I immediately made the comments hereby described, to the Deputy Secretary, Mr. Escobar and the General Advisor, Mr. Alipaz.
I hereby avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.
Manuel Trucco
Ambassador of Chile.”
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5. I request instructions from You concerning the decision of the Government of Bolivia, contained in the telegram that was delivered today by Foreign Minister Fellman, to order ”the immediate return to Bolivia of the personnel of the Bolivian Embassy in Santiago.” I presume that, from today onwards, violent statements are going to be made and that this will severely worsen the undersigned’s personal situation and the Mission’s.– TRUCCO.
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Minutes of Secret Session 68 of the Chilean Senate,
18 April 1962 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
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EXTRAORDINARY LEGISLATURE
Session 68, 18 April 1962
SPECIAL
SECRET
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Mr MARTINEZ SOTOMAYOR (Minister of Foreign Affairs).
[…]
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I am going to read the text of the statement made by Foreign Minister Fellman to the press on
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Sunday, 15 April 1962. It says:
“Yesterday, 14 April, at 4:00 p.m., the President of Chile, Mr. Jorge Alessandri, gave an order to use the waters of the River Lauca, thereby diverting it. The basin of the River Lauca that enters Bolivia is part of its territorial heritage. That decision by the Chilean Government therefore constitutes an act of aggression. Before using the waters of the River Lauca, which is an international river of successive course, the Chilean Government was required by international law to report the works that it was planning and to obtain Bolivia’s consent. In the 23 years that this issue has lasted, the Chilean Government has never made a report and the Bolivian Government has never given its consent. Until 24 hours ago, the Governments of Bolivia and Chile were exchanging ideas with a view to commencing direct conversations at a meeting of Foreign Ministers. The Chilean Government unexpectedly rejected those exchanges of ideas and gave the President of the Republic the responsibility for determining the date on which the River Lauca would be diverted.
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Faced with this event, the Bolivian Government gave notice to the OAS that this aggression was imminent. Once the dispossession was consummated, the Bolivian Government declared that it would never recognize the alleged right of the Chilean Government to use the waters of the River Lauca by itself. Furthermore, it will report the Chilean aggression to the OAS in the next few hours, so that the this organization can take the actions it is required to take by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed in Rio de Janeiro. Thirdly, it will submit a formal protest to the Government of Chile. And finally, it has announced that it has ordered its diplomatic personnel in Santiago to return to Bolivia immediately. By making the public opinion aware of this case, without hiding any difficulties, it reiterates the need and duty of each and every Bolivian to keep a calm attitude at the present time and to preserve national unity above all things in the face of foreign aggression." Thus ended the Bolivian communiqué.
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Letter from the Acting Ambassador of Chile to the Organization of American States to the Ambassador of Costa Rica to the Organization of American States, 4 March 1963
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
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Washington DC, 4 March 1963
No 54
Dear Ambassador:
I have the honor of referring to the negotiations Your Excellency has been engaged in, on a personal and informal basis, with the goal of resuming diplomatic relations between Chile and Bolivia.
My Government has instructed me to express its appreciation and gratitude for the efforts Your Excellency has made to achieve such a lofty goal.
My Government learned of the draft Act for resumption of diplomatic relations that Your Excellency delivered to the Chilean Ambassador to the Organization of American States and of the addition that the Bolivian Government would like to make to that document.
In this regard, I have been instructed to tell Your Excellency the following:
FIRST: In general, the Chilean Government agrees with the original draft Act delivered by Your Excellency, and as I will explain below, it would only like to note the precise meaning of two items contained in that document.
SECOND: The Chilean Government has learned of the Bolivian Government's desire to add a new paragraph to the draft Act, with the goal of including the initiation of
To His Excellency
D. Gonzalo Facio
Ambassador of Costa Rica to
the Council of the Organization of American States
Washington, DC
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negotiations between the two countries regarding the so called “Bolivia’s port problem” as part of the purposes of resuming diplomatic relations.
THIRD: This proposal confirms the statements by senior officials of the Bolivian Government to the effect that the resumption of diplomatic relations with Chile, which were cut off by that Government solely on the basis of the issue of the Lauca River, would now be conditioned upon a commitment on Chile's part to open negotiations on what Bolivia calls its “port problem.”
FOURTH: Since the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Chile and Bolivia is very important and has been recommended by the Council of the Organization of American States, my Government believes that said act should materialize in a perfectly clear manner that leaves no doubts as to the true scope thereof. In making this argument, Chile is certain that it is doing a service to the Regional Organization, to the Continental opinion, and in particular, to Your Excellency, who has been cooperating so effectively in the matter.
FIFTH: For this reason, my Government states clearly and categorically that once diplomatic relations with Bolivia have been resumed, it is not willing to enter into talks that could affect national sovereignty or involve a cession of territory of any kind. As far as my country is concerned, the borders with Bolivia were established by freely consented international treaties, which are in full force and effect, and are definitive.
SIXTH: Chile wishes to make this statement on very clear terms because the statements by senior officials in the Bolivian government in the past few weeks, whether publicly or in private, have made the government of Chile fear
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that the diplomatic relations that are now being resumed could again be broken in the future at Bolivia's initiative, using as a pretext not the problem of the River Lauca, but Chile's refusal to enter into discussions about what Bolivia calls its “port problem.”
Your Excellency, who has had direct personal contact with the Bolivian Government, is in a better position than anyone to judge whether it is appropriate to reestablish diplomatic relations with a permanent character, in keeping with the rest of the relations between the States in the Americas.
SEVENTH: If Your Excellency believes that, with the foregoing clarifications, reestablishing relations could be useful for the American community and the good relations that ought to exist between the countries that are members of the OAS, my Government is willing to accept the draft Act delivered by Your Excellency on 8 February, with the following scope for points 1 and 2 in the document:
A) It is understood that when paragraph 1 refers to the commitment by Chile and Bolivia to seek a cordial agreement with the goal of "achieving a solution to mutual problems, by means of direct negotiations," this commitment refers solely to the problems specifically contemplated in the draft Act. Therefore, the so-called Bolivian port problem is excluded.
It is appropriate to point out that that is how the Government in La Paz itself understood it when it asked Your Excellency to include a special point about the matter.
B) With regard to paragraph 2, it is understood
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that if it cannot be reached, though direct negotiations, “an amicable solution to the issue of the Lauca River in an effort to have the solution include works to promote the economic development of the regions on the border between Chile and Bolivia to the extent technically and economically possible”, the dispute should be resolved by one of the peaceful means provided for in the inter-American system, from among which Chile has already selected arbitration based on the law or recourse to the International Court of Justice.
I take this opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest and most distinguished consideration.
Enrique Gajardo Villarroel
Acting Ambassador of Chile
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Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile,
27 March 1963
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Towards the Sea,
Important Documents (1963), pp 17-41
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SPEECH BY THE CHILEAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
CARLOS MARTÍNEZ SOTOMAYOR
“In talking to you tonight, I take great pleasure in fulfilling an assignment given to me by the President of the Republic.
It is unusual for the Minister of Foreign Affairs to address his fellow citizens to inform them about current international problems. This is due to the discretion and sound judgment with which the matters concerning a country's foreign affairs must be treated, and particularly to the confidential nature of such matters. On more than one occasion, indiscretion and premature information have been detrimental to important ongoing negotiations.
This sparing disclosure of information – which is practised by almost all foreign ministers around the world – obviously has nothing to do with methods of ‘secret diplomacy’, which have totally been done away with today.
However, under certain circumstances, when it is in the national interest to do so, it is appropriate to provide citizens with trustworthy information about certain aspects of foreign policy. The Government of President Alessandri wants
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this policy to express the will of the vast majority of Chileans.
The President has found that it was the right time to inform the public of certain facts and negotiations related to Chilean foreign policy vis-à-vis Bolivia. For weeks and months, we have kept silent so as not to disrupt important discussions that I will refer to in a moment, and also to avoid creating an atmosphere that could be detrimental to our future relations with that country.
We prefer the prudent and serene path of diplomatic action as opposed to the outlandish claims of the Bolivian foreign office and its unfounded accusations. When it was necessary to respond we responded; when it was necessary to correct, we did so; when it was necessary to report, we used the safest methods, even though they were not the most spectacular.
In any event, the country can be certain that the interests of our nation were always safeguarded in a due and proper manner. Although there has been prudence, there has never been leniency.
“Week of the Sea”
Nevertheless, in recent days, events inspired by the Bolivian government have occurred that require us to explain, in a public manner, many past events, and to report them not only to the Chilean public, but also to the public of this Continent.
During the eight-day period known as the “Week of the Sea,”
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the Bolivian authorities, including their highest representatives, stirred up the most violent passions against Chile. The Bolivian government organized demonstrations of all types, not to pay homage to a national hero, which was the pretext, but to attack our country, by distorting historical truths and provoking the broadest revanchist propaganda. This attitude was not limited to Bolivia, but in several Latin American countries, the Bolivian representatives have sought to create an atmosphere favorable to their port aspirations, using distorted information to accuse Chile of having caused an unjust war and having used force to impose a peace treaty on Bolivia.
Even in our own country, Bolivian consular agents attempted to organize demonstrations contrary to our sovereignty, as is public knowledge.
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III. Discussions between the Foreign Ministers of Chile and Bolivia, and a Chilean draft Act
The Minister that speaks now traveled to the United States at the end of September of last year to attend the general debate of the United Nations General Assembly in New York and then to attend the Informal Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in the Americas, held in Washington.
On both occasions, I had the opportunity to speak with the Bolivian Foreign Minister. The favorable climate under which those contacts had been initiated was harmed by the allusions that the Bolivian Foreign Minister made in his speech to the General Assembly, regarding his country’s “problem of its landlocked situation.” I had to correct some of those allusions
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at the same meeting, by discussing all of the free transit facilities that Chile grants to Bolivians and Bolivian commerce, in accordance with the Treaty of 1904 and supplementary agreements.
Later, in Washington, we held new discussions in which we agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations, and by means of direct negotiations, seek a solution to the Lauca dispute. We agreed that within a month our governments would exchange draft acts for that purpose.
And so it was that the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a document that we delivered to Bolivia's representative to the United Nations on 3 November 1962.
Our draft act was accompanied by a memorandum that referred to the discussions between the Foreign Ministers of Chile and Bolivia, and to the desire of both governments to reestablish diplomatic relations, with the objective of finding a solution to the Lauca dispute.
According to our draft, the governments of Chile and Bolivia would declare their common interest in drawing up and enforcing a joint program of economic development and communications in the areas of the border between Chile and Bolivia, for which purpose they would seek, not only their own resources, but also, by mutual agreement, the technical and financial assistance of the Inter-American Development Bank and other appropriate international entities.
Chilean Draft
The draft also provided for both governments to study a treaty that would establish the principles that
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would govern in the future, to resolve any new problem regarding the use of the international rivers between the two countries.
The draft of the Chilean Act also established that within two months, the Ministers of Public Works of the two countries would meet in order to study various technical problems and take action related to reciprocal trade, public works of mutual interest, greater facilities for Bolivian traffic, and various other matters that were to have been considered by the Ministers of Public Works of Bolivia and Chile in 1961.
The Chilean draft also provided for the meeting of a mixed commission, formed by technicians who would study the issues of an economic, social and cultural nature that could contribute to better development and progress of both peoples.
At the end of this process of technical negotiations, which was not to last for more than six months, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two countries were to meet in Santiago to analyze the conclusions that had been reached.
As you can appreciate, we were striving to focus on the question of the River Lauca, within a modern and progressive framework, by seeking the most effective use of the international rivers between Chile and Bolivia, for the benefit of the people of both countries. In making this use, we were also attempting to initiate an ambitious program of economic and social development in that area, that would be funded not only by the resources of both countries, but also with the help of international financial institutions, such as the Inter-American Development Bank.
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All the initiatives and projects of an economic and technical nature that were going to be considered at the meeting of the Ministers of Public Works in 1961, which was never held, were also to be addressed.
Within an action of this scope, the issue of the River Lauca would gain its true importance and become another factor in a vast joint undertaking which, instead of tearing the countries apart, would bring them closer together, thus beginning an era of mutual collaboration and understanding.
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IV. The Facio Negotiations
At the time when Chile was going to provide a categorical answer to Bolivia’s port pretensions, negotiations on a compromise took place, of which the public opinion is generally aware. The President of the OAS Council and representative of Costa Rica, Gonzalo Facio, initiated negotiations on a personal and informal basis aimed at reestablishing diplomatic relations between Chile and Bolivia, including the commitment to solve the dispute over the river Lauca through direct negotiations.
In yet another sign of its conciliatory spirit, the Government of Chile accepted to collaborate with Ambassador Facio’s efforts, who prepared a draft Act for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations which in general
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terms was inspired by the Chilean draft of November of last year, as I stated before.
Notwithstanding the trip of Ambassador Facio to La Paz, where he met with the President and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, the Government of that country insisted in that the Act for the eventual reestablishment of diplomatic relations included a commitment to engage in talks over the so called port problem.
“Port Problem”
When we were informed by Mr. Facio of this Bolivian condition, we stated the following in a note dated March 4:
“For this reason, my Government states clearly and categorically that once diplomatic relations with Bolivia have been resumed, it is not willing to enter into discussions that could affect national sovereignty or involve a cession of territory of any kind. As far as my country is concerned, the borders with Bolivia were established by freely consented international treaties, which are in full force and effect, and are definitive.
Chile wishes to make this statement on very clear terms because the statements by senior officials in the Bolivian government in the past few weeks, whether publicly or in private, have made the government of Chile fear that the diplomatic relations that are now being resumed could again be broken in the future at Bolivia's initiative, using as a pretext not the problem of the River Lauca, but Chile's refusal to enter into discussions about what Bolivia calls its “port problem”.
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We also mentioned to Ambassador Facio that we appreciated the constructive efforts that he has been making and that we would accept his draft Act, provided that the Chilean proposal of not entering into negotiations about Bolivia’s port problem is clear.
V. Chile’s compliance with treaties in force
In our opinion one fact is obvious: Bolivia is not interested in the problem of the River Lauca. Chile's collection of part of its water does not cause Bolivia any harm. If this were not so, it would have accepted a judicial ruling.
What Bolivia is interested in is taking advantage of this dispute with Chile to bring up its port problem. This purpose was clearly revealed in the claims that Bolivia made at the OAS Council meeting. And later it became obvious—particularly from the way Facio handled things.
While on the one hand, Bolivia apparently wants to negotiate directly with Chile, on the other hand it adopts a revisionist view of the treaties. It says that the Treaty of 1904 is unjust and that it was imposed by force.
I must emphatically state that the Peace Treaty of 1904, freely negotiated by the parties, signed 24 years after the hostilities with Bolivia had ceased, freely ratified by Bolivia and in effect for almost 60 years, is inviolable.
I must also declare, with equal emphasis, that Chile is not willing to cede any part of its national territory. On the other hand, it will always be willing to consider with Bolivia incidental means to facilitate even more its systems
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of communication across Chile, not in violation of the Treaty of 1904, but pursuant to that treaty, and all the subsequent agreements that Bolivia has signed with our country.
The thesis that the boundary treaties should be revised would be fatal not only for Chile, but for all of America. It would bring about total anarchy on our continent, because the great majority of current boundaries, in North, Central and South America, were set by international treaties, the validity of which cannot be called into doubt without provoking serious conflicts.
VI. Trucco Memorandum
Now I am going to discuss a matter that the government of Bolivia has made much of, and that has been the subject of comments in the press and on the radio in our country. It is a memorandum that the Chilean government would have delivered to the Bolivian government on 10 July 1961. Some people refer to it as the Trucco Memorandum, based on the surname of our former ambassador in La Paz.
To understand this matter, we must go back to the time when the event occurred, and not look at in the light of subsequent events.
It all started in 1961. Our relations with the Bolivian government were normal. Every so often there arose certain initiatives in Bolivia making claims because of its landlocked situation, but they did not have any great consequences. The problem of the Lauca went through a period of tranquility, and since the meeting of the Mixed Commission in 1960, we had not heard Bolivia mention the issue again.
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Surprisingly, our government was informed that Bolivia intended to ask the Inter-American Conference, which was to be held in the month of May of that year, in Quito, to take care of the problem of its landlocked situation. For that reason, a meeting of prominent people was convened in the office of the President in La Paz.
Our ambassador in Bolivia transmitted this information to the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and proposed that we state, on that occasion, the points of view that Chile had sustained on several prior occasions when faced with similar initiatives by Bolivia. Specifically, he suggested that he be instructed to tell the Bolivian government that:
1)
Along with safeguarding the situation of law derived from the Treaty of 1904, Chile was open to study, in direct negotiations with Bolivia, the possibilities of satisfying Bolivia's aspirations and Chile's interests. The Chilean note of 20 June 1950, in response to a Bolivian note of 1 June of the same year, is clear testimony of these purposes.
2)
Since the President of Bolivia had accepted an invitation from the president of Chile to visit our country, it seemed untimely and counterproductive for Bolivia to raise its so-called "port problem" at an international conference such as the one in Quito.
Prejudicial Campaign
This proposal by Ambassador Trucco was backed by several precedents. 1950 was not the first time that Chile had expressed its willingness to hear Bolivia's aspirations,
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provided that it do so directly and without making recourse to international organizations, as Bolivia is so fond of doing. It is important to point out that, prior to the aforementioned note, such prominent individuals as Agustín Edwards, Luis Izquierdo and Jorge Matte Gormaz had stated a similar opinion at various times.
Since our relations with Bolivia were normal, it was not surprising that Chile's Minister of Foreign Affairs, when he received the report from Ambassador Trucco, authorized him pursuant to a cable of 11 April 1961 to make the arguments proposed by the Ambassador, if any official statement was made by Bolivia.
However, there was no need at that time to comply with these instructions, because the Quito conference was postponed indefinitely.
Unfortunately, a short time thereafter, a campaign in favor of maritime reintegration began among the Bolivian public opinion.
It was announced that the new Political Constitution of the neighboring country, which was being studied by Parliament, would incorporate it as a constitutional rule. The press started a campaign against the validity of the Peace Treaty of 1904, and a memorial was presented, along these lines, to Ambassador Stevenson, who was traveling as a personal representative of the President of the United States in various countries in Latin America.
The Chilean ambassador then asked for an audience, on 10 July 1961, with the Bolivian Foreign Minister, Mr. Arze Quiroga, and told him how inappropriate this campaign was for relations between the two countries. The Bolivian minister agreed with our Ambassador
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that campaigns like this did not lead to anything useful, and stated that he was in favor of talking directly with Chile. During the course of the meeting, he asked our Ambassador what exactly was Chile's position with respect to Bolivia's aspirations. The Chilean Ambassador answered in accordance with the authorization that he had received three months before, and the Bolivian Foreign Minister took note of this. In order to fully comply with his duties, the Ambassador had taken along a paper, entitled Memorandum, which remained in Mr. Arze Quiroga’s possession after he read it.
This is the document that has become known as the “Trucco Memorandum.” It is not an official note, it is not signed, and it only contains a statement of Chile's points of view, at that time.
“Aide Memoire”
Memoranda are documents frequently used by Foreign Ministries to remember something. Thus, in diplomatic language, they are known as “Aide Memoires.” I repeat, they are never signed, and in this case the memorandum was not signed. It is nothing more than a simple statement of points of view at a certain time.
Bolivia did not attach any other significance to it at that time, because the document was archived. Foreign Minister Arze Quiroga did not refer to it again. If it had been an offer by Chile, as some have claimed thereafter, it would have been logical for Bolivia to accept it quickly and initiate direct conversations with Chile. This is not what happened, however.
The new Bolivian Foreign Minister dug up the Memorandum many
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months thereafter, exactly 7 months later, to try to mix a negotiation about the so-called "port problem" with discussions that were being held about the River Lauca, in an obvious intent to make those discussions fail.
It was up to me to state a flat refusal of Bolivia's claims.
Bolivia's ongoing verbal attacks on Chile; the breakdown in diplomatic relations; the accusation of aggression before the OAS; the attempt to have the OAS intervene in its problems with Chile; the statements by Bolivia’s representatives at the United Nations General Assembly; and the organized exacerbation of anti-Chilean passions among the Bolivian people accentuated during the Week of the Sea have caused the relations between Chile and Bolivia to deteriorate so much that the favorable disposition that our country showed in 1961, as in previous times, to listen to Bolivia, no longer exists. That is what we stated emphatically. The only party responsible for this is the government of Bolivia itself, which has sought to put international pressure on Chile, although it has not obtained it, as well as a climate for making us agree to enter into negotiations over what it calls its “port problem”. This time, as on so many other prior occasions, the Bolivian government has demonstrated that it does not know Chile well.
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VIII. Contrast between the attitudes of Chile and Bolivia
The national public opinion has been able to observe how our country has dealt with this problem. Bolivia, in a clear contrast with our attitude, has been
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very far from maintaining negotiations on the same plane as Chile. The Bolivian government has forgotten to remain calm and to respect basic norms of international coexistence.
Chile's attitude has been devoid of any overblown gesture, any attempt at demagoguery, and any pressure to transfer to the rest of the continent a matter that the American consciousness requires to be handled with wisdom, and which, due to its real significance, should not have gone beyond the bilateral level of two Ministries of Foreign Affairs.
The neighboring country has not only accused us of aggression and endangered peace in the Americas, but has also used all mechanisms to extend to various locations in this hemisphere and the rest of the world its persistent campaign of unfounded accusations. Nor has it hesitated to confuse the media in the Continent by providing them with distorted background information and other elements regarding a problem that, in its real proportions, is far from having the characteristics that Bolivia has claimed.
We have always maintained a different attitude, which, as I have repeated numerous times, is not based on weakness, but on a full awareness of our undeniable rights. I hope that Bolivia will really keep this in mind.
In this speech it is been shown that our objective in a possible solution to the Lauca problem is to obtain an agreement which will promote the development of and benefit our common border areas, with a profound sense of American unity.
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Joint and Fraternal Action
Thus, we proposed a plan to exploit natural resources, for the benefit of both our peoples, and we have indicated to Bolivia our interest in improving all the means of transport between the two countries, which Bolivia uses at a considerable loss to the Chilean Treasury. In short, we have proposed a joint and fraternal action of economic development. Since 1961 we have invited Bolivia to study, jointly, the following measures:
1.
Installation of Bolivian customs warehouses and a customs agency in Arica.
2.
Construction of the roads from Iquique to Oruro and from Arica to Oruro.
3.
Eliminate intermediaries in the dispatch of goods originating in or destined to Bolivia.
4.
Establishment of a port tariff that is broadly favourable to Bolivian goods.
5.
Facilities for the operation of air navigation companies from both countries.
In other words, Chile's proposal is fully aimed at progress and benefit, which is vital for both of our peoples. We are puzzled that Bolivia is not interested in this great historic possibility proposed by Chile, and does not understand that instead of taking a strident attitude, which will not benefit it in terms of internal policy, it should consider the greater interests of the peoples and its responsibility at a time of cooperation that destiny has signaled for our continent.
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Is it not fair for people in the Bolivian highlands and the inhabitants of northern Chile to have access to electricity, sufficient water for their crops, and the establishment of industries that can make their lives more progressive and worthy?
Wouldn't it be more logical to direct the people of our continent towards a reality that the old continent of Europe has already understood, notwithstanding its age-old disputes, and which is based on the mutual cooperation of all peoples?
It is not fitting for civilized countries and peoples to keep confusing their citizens with sterile inspiration and incentives as negative as rancor and hatred.
The attitude of the Chilean government, on the contrary, is in harmony with the spirit and the objectives of the Punta del Este Charter.
Bolivia must forget the old revisionist schemes which have already been superseded by history and progress and should comply with the imperative demand of the peoples to take action so that we can use the natural resources in our border areas, through a plan of social and economic development. In so doing we would be the first example on our continent, of how neighboring countries can overcome age-old quarrels and can march together, united in progress.
The government of Chile is willing, at any time or place, to have the Foreign Ministers of both countries meet to take the first steps towards meeting these goals. Chilean technicians are also ready to forge, with their Bolivian colleagues, the accelerated scheduling for this important initiative.
But, make no mistake about it, even though we are willing to forget the insults and are offering
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again to cooperate in an enterprise in our mutual interest, we are not willing to initiate negotiations that could harm Chile's sovereignty.
The Bolivian public must be certain that the campaign of hatred and provocations that its government has launched against us will never defeat the iron will of the government of Chile and of all Chileans to defend the territorial integrity of our fatherland.
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Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia,
3 April 1963
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Towards the Sea,
Important Documents (1963), pp 45-76
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[…]
NOTHING IS ARTIFICIAL
What the Bolivian government is doing now therefore is not artificially bringing up the issue of its landlocked situation, but calling the Chilean government to comply with these commitments. It vitally needs to obtain its own and sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, and it is willing, in exchange, to give Chile appropriate compensation that is not of a territorial nature.
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What the Bolivian government wants, in accordance with the solemn commitment that the notes of June 1950 signifies, is to sit down with Chile’s representatives at the bargaining table and negotiate an agreement in their mutual interests, an agreement that will be of benefit to Bolivia and of benefit to Chile.
There is nothing artificial about this desire, nothing out of the ordinary, and I am fully certain, as shown by numerous pieces of evidence, that the Chilean people are not opposed to these negotiations, to reach a fair agreement to which both countries give away something that they have, without sacrificing anything essential, to obtain what they need.
Why is the Chilean government now refusing to listen to Bolivia? Why is it avoiding holding direct discussions between the two countries having committed to do so? Why does it not inform the Chilean people of the text of those Notes? Why does the Chilean government not comply with its commitments?
One statement. If the Chilean government, which on countless occasions has reiterated its respect for its international commitments, and which requires Bolivia to comply with the commitments in force between the two countries, denies the commitment that it made in 1950, the Bolivian government will in turn consider that is free to do the same. Because neither the Chilean government nor any other government has the right to choose, from among the legal rules that it has freely agreed to and that govern its relationship with other countries, which ones it will comply with and which ones it will not.
The problem of an outlet to the sea for Bolivia is a pending question between Bolivia and Chile. First, because a commitment was made through the exchange
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of Notes in June 1950, and second, because before relations between the two countries were broken off, negotiations had been open to this effect, not at Bolivia’s initiative, but at Chile's initiative.
On 10 July 1961, the Bolivian government received from the Chilean ambassador in La Paz, what the Chilean Foreign Minister called in his speech last Thursday “a paper that is entitled Memorandum, but is not a Memorandum.”
That Memorandum consists of three points, the first of which says: “Chile has always been open, together with safeguarding the de jure situation established in the Treaty of Peace of 1904, to study, in direct negotiations with Bolivia, the possibility of satisfying its aspirations and the interests of Chile”, and reiterates in the second paragraph: “Note number 9 of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated in Santiago on 20 June 1950, is clear testimony of these purposes. Through it, I quote: Chile states that it is open formally to enter into a direct negotiation aimed at searching for a formula that would make it possible to give Bolivia its own sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to obtain compensations of a non-territorial character which effectively takes into account its interests, end quote.”
As the Chilean Foreign Minister said in his speech, it is obvious that a Memorandum is a document delivered to a Foreign Ministry or a diplomatic representation as a record of what a Foreign Minister or diplomatic representative says in an interview. It is nothing more, but it is not anything less.
It is thus established that regardless of the character of the “paper entitled Memorandum but that
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is not a Memorandum,” the Chilean Ambassador, during his interview on 10 July 1961 told the Bolivian Foreign Minister that the Chilean government was willing to enter into direct negotiations with Bolivia regarding the problem of an outlet to the sea and that it would maintain the commitment made in 1950.
On 9 February 1962, at an audience granted to the Chilean Ambassador, the Bolivian Foreign Minister gave the Bolivian government’s agreement to the initiation of those conversations, and within the spirit of the commitment in force since 1950. As a record of and to verify this agreement, he gave another Memorandum to the Chilean ambassador.
It is clear, therefore, in this light, that the negotiations on the Bolivian port problem had been opened at the initiative of the Chilean government, and consequently that this problem is pending between Bolivia and Chile.
Are the Chilean people aware of the Memorandum of 10 July 1961? Are they aware of the answer? Why are these memoranda being hidden from them? Why are they not allowed to be published?
The Chilean Foreign Minister, in his speech last Thursday, gave an explanation of why, how and when what he calls “a paper that is entitled Memorandum but is not a Memorandum.” According to this explanation, the Memorandum of 10 July 1961 was given to the Bolivian Foreign Minister under circumstances in which the Bolivian parliament was planning to amend the Constitution to add the port question as a constitutional rule.
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This explanation is revealing. It shows that the Chilean Ambassador, at his interview on 10 July 1961, with the Bolivian Foreign Minister, upon informing him the Chilean government would honor the commitments made in 1950, and that “it was open to enter into a direct negotiation aimed at seeking the formula that could make it possible to give Bolivia its own and sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean,” was really an attempt to keep the port question from being included as a provision in the Bolivian constitution.
I am afraid that in giving this explanation, the Chilean Foreign Minister did not weigh up the significance of what he was saying, in all its great magnitude, because that would mean that the Chilean representative, duly authorized by his government, was ratifying a commitment, not with any intention of complying with it, but purely and simply as a manoeuver. Moreover, this means that the Chilean government, acting with evil intent, was making promises that it never intended to honor, and was using trickery and deceit in its relations with other countries.
I ask you, are the Chilean people aware that their government is not acting in good faith? Are they aware that with the explanation of intentions, its Foreign Minister has called into doubt the credit that his word deserves? That in the future, not only Bolivia but every other country has acquired the right to doubt what the Chilean government says?
It is therefore definitively clear that the Bolivian port question arose in the negotiations for a possible resumption of diplomatic relations between Bolivia and Chile, because the Chilean government caused this to happen by diverting the waters in the
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River Lauca, because there are formal commitments to seek a solution and because it is a pending issue between the two countries.
Diplomatic relations between the countries are not an end in themselves; they are a means whereby those countries can strengthen their relations by resolving their differences or avoiding them. The Bolivian government desires to maintain a good relationship with Chile and has said so on countless occasions, but it is the Chilean government that is putting an obstacle in the way of this purpose by insisting that the relations between the two countries if they are resumed, must not be used to resolve or avoid the disputes that exist between them, to comply with the commitments made by both of them, to find a solution to the issues that the two parties have recognized as pending.
In his speech last Thursday, the Chilean Foreign Minister used his best efforts to present his government’s policy as being marked by complete calm, in contrast with the policy of the Bolivian government which makes “outrageous statements,” full of “unfounded accusations,” intended to “stir up the most violent passions against Chile.”
It is very easy to respond to those efforts by saying that although the jailer can enjoy the luxury of remaining calm, the person who is been unjustly imprisoned has no other recourse than to protest his imprisonment.
The waters of the River Lauca, to which Bolivia has co-ownership rights, are running towards Chile and irrigating Chilean soil. Given this fact, what would the Chilean government have to protest? The Bolivian government, on the other hand, does indeed have a right to protest, as it is faced with the risk that the
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inhabitability of the high plateau could deteriorate even more, and this is where the great majority of Bolivians live. As a result, the farmers who live in the areas irrigated by that river would have to be moved to other regions. Moreover, it has the duty to protest and to continue protesting until the situation is justly resolved.
Furthermore, Chile has a long coastline and is not aware of the tragedy of having to live far from the great routes of global trade. Its ruling classes own, exploit and enjoy the benefit of 150,000 km of territory that used to be Bolivia's. Of what would it protest? Bolivia, on the other hand, enclosed inside its high mountains by the force of arms, does indeed have the right to protest, as it is faced with the task of accelerating its economic development, in order to raise the standard of living of its people, with the bitter feeling every day that this task is incalculably more difficult for people who are deprived of the blessing of the sea. This is an unfair disadvantage with respect to other people who can reach the ocean by navigable rivers or have their own ports. Moreover, given the formal commitments pending with the Chilean government to resolve the situation, it has the duty to protest and to continue protesting until these commitments are honored.
In light of this, the deliberation and moderation that have characterized the conduct of the Bolivian people and their government are noteworthy.
With regard to the issue of the river Lauca, instead of opting for a policy of “river for river,” which would have been justified by 23 years of frustration, we have abided by the procedures established by law, and have waited for a possible solution, with internationally
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recognized goodwill. With regard to the issue of the sea, we have done nothing more than demand compliance with formal commitments, subjecting ourselves to the conditions that the Chilean government had set when it made those commitments. We did even more than that, in order to facilitate the holding of direct negotiations, by means of a cable from the Bolivian president to the President of the Council of Uruguayan Government, we offered to contribute, with our best will, to the creation of a climate that would be favorable to finding amicable solutions.
Without making any “outrageous statements” we have suffered from the Chilean government’s arrogating to itself the right to censor our official correspondence, and from seeing numerous Bolivian citizens expelled from Chilean territory by Chile’s political police, and seeing the transit of raw materials, machinery and food through Chilean ports obstructed.
This was in the realm of the facts. In the realm of words, we acted with deliberation and moderation that are even greater. Can the Chilean Foreign Minister point to even a single official document from Bolivia that is as full of half-truths, veiled threats, false accusations and insulting arguments as his own speech of last Thursday?
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Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia,
to Conrado Ríos Gallardo former Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Chile, 4 November 1963
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
C. Ríos Gallardo, An Unofficial Talk Between Chile and Bolivia (1966), pp 51-53
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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND WORSHIP
BOLIVIA
La Paz, 4 November 1963
Mr. Conrado Ríos Gallardo
Santiago, Chile
Dear Mr. Ríos Gallardo:
I received your letter of 19th October shortly before leaving for the United States and Mexico. I was so busy with preparing for the trip that I have not been able to answer it until today. I also wanted to study it carefully, for it seems to me that we have reached a difficult stage.
My state of mind, as always, is favorably disposed. I cannot, however, prejudice the legitimate interests of my country. That is why, with the same candor with which we have always dealt, I must let you know that it is difficult if not impossible to renounce what was offered to us in the note of June 1950 (7) and reiterated by the Memorandum of July 1961 (8).
(7) Mr. Fellman Velarde is the only Minister of Foreign Affairs of his country that has magnified the importance of such documents and attempted to give them the exaggerated rank of diplomatic commitments. His predecessors archived them without comments. Let me explain the first case. On 1 June 1950, the Bolivian Ambassador in Chile, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, invited our country to enter into “a direct negotiation to satisfy Bolivia’s fundamental need to obtain its own and sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, thus resolving the problem of the landlocked situation of Bolivia on bases that take into account the mutual benefit and genuine interest of both nations.” Twenty days later, the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Horacio Walker Larraín, responded: “motivated by a fraternal spirit of friendship towards Bolivia, is open formally to enter into a direct negotiation aimed at searching for a formula that would make it possible to give Bolivia its own sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to obtain compensation of a non-territorial character which effectively takes into account its interests.” The answer sets forth a simple promise and this promise is conditioned upon advantageous equivalencies. What could they be? Ambassador
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You have asked me to formulate a fair proposal to settle the difficulties of the river Lauca. In fact, I don’t think I should do so without insisting, as the same time, on an answer to our Memorandum responding to the Memorandum of July 1961 and indicating our same willingness “to enter into a direct negotiation aimed at searching for a formula that would make it possible to give Bolivia its own sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to obtain compensations of a non-territorial character which effectively takes into account its interests.”
As you will see, it is not a question of repudiating the pacts signed in the past, which are still in force in our two countries, in spite of the fact that, in our opinion, the Chilean Government is not complying with the
Ostria Gutiérrez himself suggested it in his book “Una Obra y un Destino” [A Work and a Destiny]: “the irrigation of the desert in Northern Chile with the waters of Lake Titicaca” (p 61). This volume was published in 1946, and he carried out his negotiations in 1950. The talented diplomat did forget that Lake Titicaca is jointly owned by Bolivia and Peru, just as Tacna and Arica could be jointly owned by Chile and Peru, since neither of the two countries may dispose of them without first consulting the other. (Art. 3 of the Supplementary Protocol of 1929). The extraordinary thing about this case is that this simple exchange of notes was later elevated to a sort of commitment of governments in circumstances where Ambassador Ostria Gutiérrez himself declared to his country’s press that everything that had happened “had not gone beyond the preliminary diplomatic stage”. (Diarios de La Paz, 31 August 1950).
(8) This is a reference to the Memorandum that the Chilean Ambassador in Bolivia, Manuel Trucco Gaete, delivered on 10 July 1961 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduardo Arze Quiroga. What did this document say? It said: “Chile has always been willing, together with safeguarding the de jure situation established in the Treaty of Peace of 1904, to study, in direct negotiations with Bolivia, the possibility of satisfying its aspirations and the interests of Chile. Chile will always reject resort, by Bolivia, to organizations which are not competent to resolve a matter which is already settled by Treaty and could only be modified by direct agreement of the parties.” The part transcribed is the core and the rest insists on the inadvisability of attempting to “resort to international organisations to deal with a problem that the Government of Bolivia has not specified in its direct relations with Chile.” This statement confirms that the exchange of notes between Ostria Gutiérrez – Walker Larraín were of no importance because nothing was specified as a solution. Foreign Minister Guevara Arze judged the Memorandum to be just another document, quite frequent in diplomatic relations, and ordered it achieved along with other documents. His successor rescued it from the silence to which it had been condemned seven months later, and in his hands he transformed it into a banner for political agitation and deception of the people.
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most important one: the Treaty of 1904. I fear that we have again reached a deadlock. Perhaps if we went back to what we discussed in Asunción and you were willing to let me know, concretely, how Bolivia’s difficulties with the transit of goods and people and with the jurisdiction over customs duties and cargo in the Pacific port can be solved, we could get out of this deadlock. As I have already written to you regarding the issue of sovereignty, we are more interested in substance than in formalities. I understand that the latter is more or less consistent with the terms of the first paragraph on the second page of your letter.
As additional evidence of our willingness, I would like to point out that we did not insist on our differences with the Chilean Government while there were still problems between Chile and Argentina. Not until today have we made a claim about the treatment owed to Bolivians in Chilean territory.
Looking forward to hearing from you, I remain sincerely yours,
José Fellman Velarde
Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Worship
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Letter from Conrado Ríos Gallardo, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, 17 November 1963
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
C. Ríos Gallardo, An Unofficial Talk Between Chile and Bolivia (1966), pp 53-55
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Santiago, 17 November 1963.
Mr. José Fellman Verde
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia
La Paz.
Dear Minister of Foreign Affairs:
I received your undated, unsigned first letter answering my letter of 19 October and preferred to wait for the duplicate in
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proper form before I answered it. Thank you—many thanks for your cablegram explaining how this oversight happened—it reached me on a timely basis.
Contrary to your opinion, I do not think that in our exchange of letters we have "reached a difficult stage"; on the contrary, I think that we have reached the moment for decisions, even if you insist on placing as an obstacle the note of June 1950 and the memorandum of July 1961, in circumstances where I explained to you in Asunción the low value of both documents, which you attempt to elevate to the rank of a diplomatic commitment, meanwhile forgetting that former Foreign Minister Martínez Sotomayor, on 28 March of this year, stated: "... Chile is not willing to cede any part of its national territory. On the other hand, it will always be willing to consider with Bolivia incidental means to facilitate even more its systems of communication across Chile, not in violation of the Treaty of 1904, but pursuant to that treaty, and all the subsequent agreements that Bolivia has signed with our country.".
After that official declaration, I do not see what positive advantage could be reached through documents that lack the force of a pact and that have also been emphatically rejected. To appeal to them, in my opinion, is to avoid reason.
There is a statement in your letter, Mr. Foreign Minister, that I do find important—extraordinarily important—not only because you have signed it, but also because it has been broadcast by your emissaries abroad, and that is your claim that Chile is not complying with the Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1904.
In the hope that we can reach practical agreements, within the realm of actual possibility, getting away from the field of illusions, I invite you to specify precisely the stipulations with which my country is not complying, and in making this friendly suggestion to you, I reiterate the proposal of a formula to solve the problem of the River Lauca.
You have asked me to tell you specifically how the difficulties that Bolivia is facing in its transit of persons and goods through our ports on the Pacific can be resolved. You must understand that it is very difficult,
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if not impossible, for me to state any opinion on this matter when I do not know what these difficulties involve, and therefore it would be logical for you to be indicate them to me candidly. Well, I believe that there is plenty of good will to correct these mistakes and improve the existing situation.
Finally, you say that because of our brief misunderstandings with Argentina, your Government refrained from insisting on its problems with Chile, but this statement is not backed by the facts, since the statements made by President Paz Estenssoro in New York and in Mexico, as well as other statements by you and your diplomatic representatives abroad, are very far from creating the climate that is indispensable for overcoming the existing differences and reaching agreements that are consistent with the world of cooperation in which we must live.
This is my answer to your letter of the 4th of this month, and I look forward to your response. Very best regards.
Conrado Ríos Gallardo
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Letter from Conrado Ríos Gallardo, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia,
6 February 1964
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
C. Ríos Gallardo, An Unofficial Talk Between Chile and Bolivia (1966), pp 72-75
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Santiago, 6 February 1964.
Mr. José Fellman Velarde
La Paz, Bolivia.
Dear Mr. Fellman Velarde:
We have distanced ourselves from a fair agreement, and now it appears that there is no remedy. The points indicated in your letter of 22 November, which I described in my letter of 6 December as “realistic, constructive formulas,” have no relation whatsoever with your new insistence on having “a free zone, under the jurisdiction and competence of Bolivian authorities” on our coastline. Don’t you already have this situation in your customs warehouses on Chilean territory?
A free zone is a proposal that no Chilean Government will be able to accept, and I believe that I am not mistaken in making such a categorical statement. Furthermore, we would not obtain anything if we tried to hide this from you, particularly when the ruling class in my country, regardless of their political beliefs, are certain that Bolivia is reaching the Pacific through Chilean ports with sovereignty and with privileges that our own trade does not enjoy.
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Moreover, it is very distressing that you continue to deem the simple note of Foreign Ministry that explored the possibility of an eventual negotiation, as the one of June 1950 , to be an international pact, especially given the fact that the Bolivian Ministers of Foreign Affairs from 1950 to 1961 never attempted to do so. Don’t you realize that treaties and agreements were signed for economic complementation between Bolivia and Chile in 1955 and 1956? Wasn’t there an exchange of visits between Presidents Paz Estenssoro and Ibáñez in 1955? Did anyone recall the existence of that note and rely on it to claim that he or she was entitled to negotiate a port?
The relations during that period were kept on a level of open collaboration, which was never disrupted by the longing for a port. At that time there were no transit problems, as shown by the Maritime Conference in Geneva held in 1958. What we are debating today is solely the result of the river Lauca, not an effective need. It is taking maximum advantage of an argument, and is not based on inoperability of the agreements granting Bolivia its access to the sea.
Have you read the book by Colonel Ramón C. Bejarano: “Ways and means of connection of Paraguay (1811-1961)”? If you read that book, you will see that that landlocked country—which does not suffer any major complex as a result of its geographical position—does not enjoy Bolivia’s liberty and rights to reach the ocean. Its navigable rivers are almost foreign to them...
I am not aware that Switzerland has free zones—you claim that they are in France and Germany. What I do not know is whether there are bilateral agreements that guarantee free transit for Switzerland. It is indeed entitled to navigate on the River Rhine pursuant to the Mannheim Convention of October 1868, which declares that river to be free for all countries, not just for the ones that border it. There is also a bilateral convention concluded in Barcelona in April 1921, which was acceded to by a large number of countries, including Bolivia and Chile. The preamble declares “the right of free transit” as a basis for “the cooperation between the States”, but “without prejudice to their right of sovereignty or authority over the roads open to transit”.
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And, in more recent times, we have the Cairo Declaration, approved in July 1962, in which it was agreed to help landlocked countries, of which there are more than 20, by recommending “appropriate facilities, use of ports, means of transport and other transit facilities granted to them in the ports of countries with a coastline”.
We can thus see the world’s recognition of the existence of landlocked nations, in favor of which there has been international cooperation to resolve their problems, so that they can reach maritime routes with the greatest facilities possible, and in this regard Chile has complied with its commitment to Bolivia, without any limitations whatsoever.
It is worth listing the countries without a coastline that are able to trade without a third party, all the more so because the existing regime is worth adopting, as it could result in a change of ideas and plans, even though I do believe that it is too late for that. I will explain my reason below.
In my opinion, it is quite excessive for there to be prejudice against a friendly country when its authority receives merchandise in transit on board, transfers the merchandise immediately to the Bolivian representative as soon as it arrives, and then the cargo is under Bolivian jurisdiction. It is strange that such a simple fact causes “frictions and resentments,” as you put it. Doesn’t the same thing happen with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Peru? Moreover, the Transit Convention was signed in 1937, and more than 37 years have passed without incident, and only now, after the Lauca, are Bolivia’s feelings being hurt.
To claim that for this reason, merchandise has been lost and mishandled and there have been delays is an unfair charge that is easy to disprove. A few days, on the 29th to be exact, “El Mercurio” published information from Arica, which stated that since 1962 there have been 16,000 loads of merchandise in that port, consisting of 2,500 drums of fuel, sewing machines, yarn, chemicals, tools, etc., in transit to Bolivia, but since 1956 there have been valuable spare parts in Bolivian warehouses ordered by the Mayor
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of Cochabamba. The representatives of your country are the ones responsible for managing these factors, not the representatives of our country.
It is possible that your intransigent position, which makes resumption of relations dependent on the cession of a free zone, derives from the belief that you will be able to obtain from future Chilean governments what you were not able to obtain from the current one. That is wrong. In international policy our country has always maintained a united policy that will not be broken by changes in La Moneda. The future will confirm my opinion.
Furthermore, at the end of an administration, it is not possible to enter into negotiations with a greater scope than the ones indicated in my letter dated 9 January, and for that very reason, it is very distressing for me not to be successful, so it seems, in negotiations in which I have made my best efforts for understanding and a spirit of unity in the Americas.
Those who read our correspondence will agree that we are making a noble effort to return to the good relations of the past, and in this way we will be able to confront the critics of the future without any fear; particularly when the ideas set forth in our exchange of letters can serve as reference points for a definitive understanding. That is my sincere desire.
Even if you hadn’t sent me the cablegram of the 24th of last month, I would have answered your letter, because I will always believe José Fellman Velarde is no longer who he was, since he has resigned from his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs, once and for all.
You should consider me a friend, and believe that I will always be willing to serve the cause of greater understanding between Chile and Bolivia, all the more so because it is inexcusable for us to remain separated and not united in the fateful era in which we live.
Finally, I think that I could not find a better intermediary than you to present my cordial regards to the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fernando Iturralde, whom I had the occasion to meet during the course of his diplomatic mission to Chile.
Please accept my best regards,
Conrado Ríos Gallardo
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Memorandum by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile,
20 March 1964
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
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REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF FOREIGN POLICY
Department of American Affairs
South America Section
INFORMATION ABOUT BOLIVIA REQUESTED BY ADVISOR RAÚL BAZAN.
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4. Report on the domestic political situation in Bolivia when the sluicegates were raised to divert part of the water of the River Lauca. Is it true that the dissensions in the Government party caused an equal number of divisions at that time in the Popular Militias directed by provincial leaders, and that there were rumors of a possible intervention by the Army? Was it under these circumstances that the claim for the port vindication was renewed? Was this an attempt to produce unity among the Militias?
a) Bolivian domestic politics at the time when the Lauca sluicegates were opened:
In the months following the breakdown in relations between Chile and Bolivia, the political situation in Bolivia deteriorated noticeably, as a result of the violence that occurred on the eve of the elections for part
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of the Legislature, which were to be held on 3 June 1962. The fight between the various sectors of the Government party became increasingly evident. The opposition leaders publicly denounced the Army’s interference in the electoral fight, the arbitrary detention of members of the opposition by Government militias, etc. In addition to these events, there was also a climate of tension and violence within the country as a result of the repeated conflicts between armed peasants, which forced the Government to send armed forces to contain them, and to serve as a military police.
b) Circumstances in which the port vindication was renewed.
Bolivia’s port problem was not raised during the first administration of Víctor Paz Estenssoro or during the administration of President Siles.
During Paz’s first administration, the port claim was basically kept quiet. The Bolivian Presidents had other, more urgent tasks: the destruction of the economic and political power of the “rosca” (Bolivian right wing), the nationalisation of the mining industry, the agrarian reform, the establishment of an entire political machine in the service of the new regime, the incorporation of Indians into the life of the nation through universal suffrage, the decline of tin on the international market and the profound economic crisis that it had to face.
The situation was such that the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Arturo Olavarría, upon his return from a meeting in Arica with the Bolivian Foreign Minister, in late January 1953, stated “that Bolivia had tacitly abandoned its pretensions over a Bolivian port on the coast of Chile”.
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Moreover, during the meeting between Paz Estenssoro and Ibáñez in Arica, in 1955, not even the slightest mention was made of the Bolivian port problem. On top of that, Paz Estenssoro’s private secretary told the Chilean press that he had no interest in bringing up the issue of the sea. (All these statements appear in the Santiago newspapers from that time.) Furthermore, the Minister of the Interior in President Ibáñez’s administration stated: “The Bolivian Government has no interest in obtaining a Chilean port, and this is what President Paz Estenssoro himself told me in Arica, adding that Bolivia was solely interested in good relations with Chile” (“La Tercera de la Hora”, 19 August 1955).
During the entire subsequent administration of the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, presided over by Hernán Siles Zuazo, the port problem was hardly raised at all. There was only one reference to it, and it came a few months before the end of President Siles’s term of office, four months from the transfer of power on 6 August 1960.
When President Alessandri’s proposal to call a special conference on Arms Limitation and Balance in Latin America was discussed in the OAS Council, the Bolivian Government, through its Foreign Minister, Dr. Carlos Morales Guillén, declared that “Bolivia would enthusiastically support President Alessandri’s initiative, but would ask the OAS to study the best way to resolve Bolivia’s age-old, non-renounceable port aspiration, which was a problem related to the issue of armaments. It is not Bolivia’s intent that the special conference on Arms Limitation and Balance finally resolve the problem, but that it should study the problem with the goal of resolving it in the near future. President Siles informed the Chilean Ambassador of this intent so that his government’s frank and friendly disposition would be clear, as he did not want to create any reason for a cooling of the excellent
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relations that he has with the Chilean Government”.
The Chilean Ambassador, at a special meeting held with President Siles in accordance with instructions by the Government sent to him via cable, expressed Chile’s surprise at and profound displeasure with the Bolivian initiative.
President Siles insisted that “his Government had a moral and political obligation to present the problem of the port aspiration to the Organization of American States”.
As of that date, 18 April 1960, the so-called “Bolivia’s port aspiration” began to be used again for demagogic purposes. This is closely related to the clear symptoms of political disintegration, irreconcilable differences with the Government party, personal statements by local and regional leaders, the prevailing labor union anarchy, and the rise of “lechinismo”. In the fierce fight between the various political groups and even the Armed Forces, the flag of the port vindication was extremely important. So there was a real competition to see who could be most successful in raising it.
Then came the issue of Lauca. For a while Bolivia stopped raising the issue of its outlet to the sea and put the entire emphasis on the Lauca problem. After its failure in the OAS, recourse to the port vindication was used again. The Bolivian Foreign Minister himself, Fellman Velarde, acknowledged on 30 December 1962, in statements to the press in his country, that the question of the river Lauca had been the vehicle that allowed Bolivia to make its people aware of the problem of its landlocked situation. Officially Bolivia raised its port problem when it presented the issue of “Bolivia’s port problem” before the OAS Council so that it could be discussed at the 11th Inter-American Conference to be held on a future date.
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Santiago, 20 March 1964.
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Note from the President of Bolivia to the President of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay entitled “Why is Bolivia not present in Punta del Este?”, 8 April 1967
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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Why is Bolivia not present in Punta del Este?
Note of His Excellency General René Barrientos Ortuño, president of the Republic of Bolivia, to His Excellency General Oscar Gestido, president of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay.
La Paz, April 8, 1967
Dear Mr President,
I have the honor to address Your Excellency to inform you and, through you, the heads of the American nations meeting in Punta del Este and the opinion of the continent of the reasons why Bolivia is not present at the Summit of Heads of State.
Upon being awakened to life as an independent nation, Bolivia had a large coast on the Pacific Ocean. This coast enabled my country to participate, on an equal footing with the rest of the countries of America, in foreign trade, migration flows and cultural exchange.
Since the year 1879, and as a result of a conquest war, Bolivia has been encroached upon. Its coast was taken over by another country and such event became a factor hindering its progress. The Chilean economy has benefited from large nitrate and rich copper deposits, such as those in Chuquicamata, located in the territories occupied
To His Excellency
General Oscar Gestido, President of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay,
Montevideo.
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and constituting, so far, important sources of wealth.
Such divestiture was formalized upon signing of the Treaty of 20 October 1904, whereby Bolivia was forced to cede its Littoral Department.
The belief that the mutilation suffered has prevented Bolivia from keeping the pace of development of the sister nations of the continent has been a permanent source of concern for those who have ruled the country, for the Bolivians, and for some distinguished minds as well. This concern, which becomes more serious day after day, has led Bolivia to search for a solution entailing a return to the sea through its own sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.
The situation created and the legitimacy of the Bolivian claim have resulted in a series of statements and commitments.
Under the Treaty of 18 May 1895 and the Minutes of 10 January 1920 —which instruments were not ratified—Chile agreed to cede to Bolivia its own outlet to the Pacific Ocean.
The public opinion in America is aware that Agustín Edwards, Chilean Delegate before the First Assembly of the League of Nations, Chilean Presidents Arturo Alessandri and Gabriel Gonzáles Videla and other statesmen of that country, stated that Bolivia could have its longing and need for a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean satisfied. Even Franck B. Kellog, Secretary of State of the United States of America proposed the handing over of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia in 1926. On such occasion, Jorge Matte, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, expressed that his government had not rejected the idea of returning a strip of territory and a port to Bolivia.
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Finally, in the year 1950, in direct negotiations and through an exchange of notes, Bolivia and Chile sealed an express commitment to “searching for a formula that would make it possible to give Bolivia its own sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and for Chile to obtain compensation of a non-territorial character which effectively takes into account its interests.” In 1961, the Embassy of Chile in La Paz, through a memorandum addressed to the government of Bolivia, reiterated the 1950 commitment.
The unshakeable belief that the existing commitments must be fulfilled assign meaning to the attitude adopted by Bolivia as to its claim that the obstacles to its full development be overcome, thus seeking to ensure the peace and progress of this part of the continent.
Upon attending the second period of sessions of the Eleventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Buenos Aires, Bolivia was fully aware of the general topics to be proposed to the Meeting of Heads of State of the American countries.
From the preparatory stages of such meeting, it was easy to perceive the concern of the governments of the hemisphere over the urgency to speed up social and economic development in order to improve the standard of living of their peoples. Accordingly, the reaffirmation of the commitments assumed under the Letter of Punta del Este of 1961 and the generation of sufficient support to strengthen the existing economic integration systems of Latin America until the Latin American Common Market is established should be the subject of continental political decisions of the highest level.
Within the framework of joint action, cooperative effort, mutual assistance and peaceful coexistence,
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the Bolivian delegation drew the attention of the continent to the problems arising from the landlocked condition of the country, related to economic development planning and to its participation in the integration process. The Bolivian argument was based on the premise that, in many cases, the hemispheric harmony required to undertake joint work with multinational implications, […] the amassing of the sub-regional harmonies.
In such virtue and during the deliberations of the General Committee of the Meeting in Buenos Aires, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia submitted a specific proposal to be included on the agenda of the Summit of Heads of State and entitled as follows: “Assessment of the factors arising from Bolivia’s landlocked condition and hindering its development planning and participation in the integration process.” It was thus established that Bolivia, as a landlocked country, faces problems which limit the exercise of its sovereignty. It is obvious to insist on the fact that the study and execution of certain projects intended to enlarge and improve its access to sea routes will encounter virtually insurmountable difficulties if for realization thereof authorization must be granted, at all times, by the States whose territories are involved. In another respect, this situation undeniably restricts my country’s exercise of its sovereignty if such exercise is also understood to involve the power inherent to all States to plan and execute specific economic development projects, which constitute an inseparable part of the integral organization of their economies.
As an emergency resort, Bolivia has negotiated and entered into different international agreements which govern its free transit. However, no such regime will prevent difficulties
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or conflict situations. For instance, when in the year 1932 my country became involved in an unfortunate war, the Bolivian army had to submit to cumbersome port proceedings and to slow and inaccurate interpretations of the wording of agreements and commitments. Other similar cases confirm the existing restrictions.
The government of Bolivia understands that the Summit of Heads of State, adopting a wide economic and political approach, should examine the problems which impede effective American cooperation. The subsistence of any problems hindering harmony in a region of the hemisphere will not make it easy to undertake joint work. It was not intended, Your Excellency, to submit to such a high-level meeting a question outside of its scope but an issue of inescapable continental interest. On such an occasion, Bolivia did not believe it was necessary to reiterate the legitimate and unquestionable legal and moral arguments which support its claim and thus limited its action to the items included on the agenda of the Summit.
Bolivia’s need for a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean could not be excluded from the Summit of Heads of State, which is under a duty to express its concern over such a serious matter, to analyse its impact on the integration process and to provide high-level guidance which may be put into practice through direct understanding taking into account mutual interests.
An integration-oriented policy must not enshrine existing deficiencies and injustices. There must not be a weak link in the chain of continental confraternity. And integration would not be effective if the legitimacy of each party’s aspiration to obtain the means required to ensure its progress,
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including the free access to global trade routes, were not recognized.
Such was the criterion which inspired the request to include expressly the problem of Bolivia’s landlocked situation on the agenda or in another official document of the Summit of Heads of State and which led to my decision not to attend it if Bolivia’s proposal was not accepted.
The absence of Bolivia from the Punta del Este Summit proves the fact that there is a pending problem in the hemisphere; it goes without saying that its consequences will be permanently felt. Bolivia’s position is not an obstinate one; the question is one of principle related to the equality of opportunities which each country requires to participate to the full extent of its sovereign powers in the structural transformations taking place in the young American republics.
My country is fully aware of its contribution to the progress of the American community and of the rights which should be recognized in its favor. Bolivia’s position with regard to its current landlocked situations is one of serenity, but also one of firmness.
To conclude, I again request Your Excellency that this communication be made known to Their Excellencies the Heads of State of America meeting in your noble country.
I avail myself of this opportunity to publicly express my desire that the outcome of the Summit of Heads of State is as positive as that claimed by the urgency of the present situation and to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my personal consideration.
Signed by General René Barrientos Ortuño,
Constitutional President of the Republic
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Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile to all Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Latin America, 29 May 1967
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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Chile’s
Response
to the Bolivian
President
1967
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Response
to the Bolivian
President
Letter from the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gabriel Valdés, to Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Americas, explaining Chile’s stance towards the statements of the Bolivian President, Mr. René Barrientos, in his letter to the Uruguayan President, His Excellency Oscar Daniel Gestido, on the occasion of the Meeting of Presidents in Punta del Este.
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Santiago, 29 May 1967
Dear Minister,
The President of the Bolivian Republic, Mr. René Barrientos, submitted a letter to the Uruguayan President on the occasion of the Meeting of Presidents of the Americas held in Punta del Este, giving the reasons for Bolivia’s absence at the meeting and explaining its stance towards “the problem of its landlocked situation.” Although that letter was not included in the Heads of State meeting’s agenda, later on, it was widely disseminated.
I am forced by an essential sense of historical responsibility and honesty to answer this letter. Not only does it contain unfair judgments over my country, but also absolutely false statements. I am doing so in compliance with the instructions of the President of the Republic, His Excellency Eduardo Frei.
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President Barrientos states in his letter: “Upon being awakened to life as an independent nation, Bolivia had a large coast on the Pacific Ocean. This coast enabled my country to participate, on an equal footing with the rest of the countries of America, in foreign trade, migration flows and cultural exchange.” Such a statement lacks historical grounds. Book 2, Title 15 of the “Collection of laws of the Kingdoms of the Indies”, established that Peru’s territory extended from the city of Lima throughout the coast “up to, but not including, the Chilean Kingdom;” and Charcas territory (currently Bolivia) was allowed to use Arica as a transit port, although it remained Peru’s property. This landlocked situation has been recognized by many Bolivian authors, such as the historian Alcides Arguedas in his book “A Sick People”, among others.
The Bolivian President also states that:
“Since the year 1879, and as a result of a conquest war, Bolivia has been encroached upon. Its coast was taken over by another country and such event became a factor hindering its progress. The Chilean economy has benefited from large nitrate and rich copper deposits, such as those in Chuquicamata, located in the territories occupied and constituting, so far, important sources of wealth.”
The Bolivian President successfully avoids explaining his statements. It is important to remember that
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since 1866, the boundary between Chile and Bolivia has been set at parallel 24, creating a zone of “free exploitation of guano” between parallels 23 and 25. In 1874, Chile relinquished its rights over the north of parallel 24 as long as Bolivia did not levy additional taxes on “Chilean people, industries or capitals,” in that area. It was a precise condition agreed upon in the Treaty.
Bolivia violated the Treaty in 1878 and levied a new tax of 10 cents per quintal on all nitrate exported by the Antofagasta Nitrate and Railway Company, which comprised Chilean capitals and workers. Chile complained about the violation and offered to submit the dispute to arbitration. Since, neither diplomatic negotiations nor the proposed conciliation succeeded, Chile declared the 1874 Treaty void and proceeded to lay claim to the territory that it had freely handed over, on a condition that Bolivia had not fulfilled. Then, Bolivia declared war on Chile one month and a half before Chile made that decision. The Bolivian writer, Enrique Finot, in his book “The New History of Bolivia” (La Paz, 1954) states that: “[T]his tax clearly violated the clause established by the 1874 Treaty… It is true that Bolivia, were it ideally prudent, could have been able to find other means to avert this dangerous situation, but it did not.”
Hence, there was not such a conquest war as the Bolivian President affirms.
The President’s reference
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to the copper deposits in Chuquicamata, which exploitation started in 1915, that is, 36 years after the war and 11 years after the Treaty of Peace and Amity between Chile and Bolivia, shows a complete lack of seriousness.
President Barrientos states that: “Such divestiture was formalized upon signing of the Treaty of 20 October 1904, whereby Bolivia was forced to cede its Littoral Department.”
The Treaty of Peace of 1904 was signed 24 years after hostilities had finished. There was no Chilean soldier left in the Bolivian territory. Bolivia was enjoying the most ample free transit through the Chilean territory by the same means of transportation used before 1879. When announcing the Treaty to the Congress of his country, the Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Claudio Pinilla, honestly stated that the final text had been fully supported by him and that it was him who had submitted the document to the Chilean plenipotentiaries. Bolivia’s popular election of General Ismael Montes, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time the Treaty was signed, as President of the Republic ratified this deed with 38,000 votes. This was one of the greatest election majorities in the political history of the Altiplano. In 1909, when submitting his Diplomatic Correspondence to the Chilean President, Bolivian diplomat, Mr. Alberto Gutiérrez, stated that signing the
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1904 Treaty as Plenipotentiary of his nation had been an honor.
Can we then honestly say that Bolivia “was forced to cede its Littoral Department?”
President Barrientos adds: “[T]he mutilation suffered has prevented Bolivia from keeping the pace of development of the sister nations of the continent.” The Bolivian Head of State explains that this situation has led the country to look for “its own sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.”
True history proves exactly the contrary. Bolivia did not make any use of the littoral to improve its economic situation; it did not build ports; it did not make any efforts to set up a merchant navy (they never owned a ship) nor to establish a minimum commercial connection with the civilized world. The littoral was open to exploitation by foreign capital and immigration; even the number of Bolivian citizens inhabiting the so-called Littoral Department in 1879 was – according to statements of the Bolivian Minister Mr. Mariano Baptista- “of more than 7%.” In fact, it was of 2%.
Bolivia’s current economic situation is significantly better. It has two railways, built by Chile, and which give it broad access to the Pacific Ocean. They have two major ports available – Arica and Antofagasta – and, as provided by the 1904 Treaty, it is allowed to use freely any
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of the 12 Chilean ports. This provides Bolivia with a maritime system which it has never imagined throughout history. In addition, the country has access to five railways and international highways which connect Bolivia to every border country and which provide a 7-door connection with Latin America, thus placing Bolivia in a much better position than most of its sister nations in the continent.
Pursuant to the 1904 Treaty, Chile granted Bolivia, in perpetuity, the fullest and most unrestricted right of commercial transit through its territory and the use of every Chilean port on the Pacific Ocean, freely limiting our sovereignty in favor of Bolivia.
In compliance with one of the provisions of the said treaty agreed upon by Chile, this country built, at its own cost, a railway from the Chilean port of Arica to the Bolivian city of La Paz. What is more, Chile ceded, freely and in perpetuity, the Bolivian railway section to Bolivia’s Government. This railway was exclusively destined to serve Bolivia’s need to access the sea.
To that same effect, Bolivia can make use of the railway that goes from the Chilean port of Antofagasta to that country’s territory. Chile finished the new Arica port in 1966 through which Bolivia is allowed to ship its products without restrictions.
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Any of these Chilean ports used by Bolivia, either Arica or Antofagasta, are individually enough to meet Bolivian import and export needs.
On 16 August 1937, representatives of both nations signed a Convention on transit. Article I of the said Convention establishes that: “The Government of Chile, pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1904, recognizes and guarantees the broadest and freest transit through its territory and major ports for people and cargo crossing its territory from or to Bolivia. Among the Chilean-Bolivian provisions in force, free transit encompasses all kinds of cargo, at any time, with no exceptions whatsoever.”
This Convention also establishes that Bolivia will have the right to appoint its own Customs Agents and Warehouses in Chilean ports and that those Customs Agents will have in Chile the same protections and prerogatives of national customs employees. The task assigned to the Bolivian Agents under the 1937 Convention is to ensure that the transit of goods across Chile and to Bolivia complies with all the legal requirements and safety measures which may be deemed appropriate.
On 31 January 1955, both countries signed a Treaty on Economic Complementation. The purpose of that Treaty was to develop
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a coordinate action to achieve economic complementation of both countries. Article 2, paragraph (f) establishes, as a fundamental rule for that economic integration, “[t]he agreement on a system that expands and facilitates the current free transit regime of goods originating in one of the two countries through the territory of the other, for their export to third countries. Such system shall also include the necessary arrangements to allow the import by one of the two countries through the territory of the other, of goods originating in third countries.”
And, paragraph (g) of the same Article provides for “[t]he expansion and improvement of current means of communication and transport between the two countries.”
On 24 April 1957, an agreement was reached on the creation of the oil pipeline of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos to transport Bolivian oil from Sica-Sica to the Chilean port of Arica. This agreement established new facilities for Bolivia in exchange of which Chile did not receive any kind of compensation.
Not only did Chile fulfill its contractual obligations, but it also proposed to Bolivia, on several occasions, new procedures for the direct benefit of that country, as it has been demonstrated by the agenda prepared for the negotiations to be conducted on November
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1961 between the Ministers of Public Works of both countries. This meeting, exclusively promoted by Chile, was unilaterally suspended by the Bolivian Government. The agenda of the meeting provided for the signing of agreements which may have allowed Bolivia to have new routes of access to the Pacific Ocean and territory of its own to build warehouses in Arica.
It seems illogical that currently our two countries are not united through other ways other than the railway tracks. On several occasions, Chile has proposed to the Government of Bolivia to build highways connecting its territories to the Chilean ports of Arica, Iquique and Antofagasta. However, Bolivia has never accepted the said proposals, stating that those highways were only meant to facilitate the Chilean troops’ invasion of its territory.
Is that the reaction of a country that considers itself landlocked and wants to change this situation?
It is worth mentioning that, so far, arguments against the Bolivian alleged landlocked situation were centered in the transit facilities offered to Bolivia across the Chilean territory. It should also be mentioned that Bolivia is connected to Brazil and Argentina through railways and to the Peruvian ports of Mollendo and Matanari as a way of access to the Pacific Ocean. Chile is not the only neighboring country providing Bolivia with communication and transit facilities. Other
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countries voluntarily do it as well, even though they are not bound by any treaty as we are.
For those who are skeptical, all they have to do is read the Integral Study on Transportation for Bolivia being conducted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
From that study, the Americas will conclude, as we did, that Bolivia enjoys more freedoms than those guaranteed under the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on Transit Trade of Landlocked Countries in Geneva, 1965. If all landlocked nations in the world, which are more than twenty, knew these benefits granted to Bolivia, they would undoubtedly consider Bolivia not as a landlocked nation but as a privileged country among landlocked countries, and they would try to obtain the same benefits from the States across which they access the sea.
Consequently, it would be worth wondering, is Bolivia a landlocked country, isolated from the world, without communication or access to the Pacific Ocean, to the Atlantic Ocean or to the rest of the planet?
Any person objectively studying the subject would answer negatively and recognize
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that such a statement is, in the words of the Bolivian President, “not only childish, but also tendentious.”
The current President of Bolivia said that: “Under the Treaty of 18 May 1895 and the Minutes of 10 January 1920 —which instruments were not ratified— Chile agreed to cede to Bolivia its own outlet to the Pacific Ocean.”
The 1895 Treaty never entered into force, and the 1920 Minutes did not go beyond the simple diplomatic discussion field. In 1895, Chile offered to cede the port of Arica to Bolivia, in the event that the said city - in dispute with Peru at that time -, came into Chile’s power. On 7 November 1896, Bolivia replied that it reserved the right to classify the port Chile would grant to it. The Chilean Government did not accept this predicament and negotiations were terminated. In 1920, Chile proposed another peaceful solution to Bolivia. Then, Bolivia asked the port of Arica and Chile did not accept. Can these processes be called “commitments” as General Barrientos did? No internationalist, even Bolivian ones, would give it such a definition.
President Barrientos states: “The public opinion in America is aware that Agustín Edwards, Chilean Delegate before the First Assembly of the League of Nations, Chilean Presidents Arturo Alessandri and Gabriel Gonzáles Videla and other statesmen of that country, stated that Bolivia could have its longing and need for
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a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean satisfied. Even Franck B. Kellogg, Secretary of State of the United States of America proposed the handing over of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia in 1926.
On such occasion, Jorge Matte, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, expressed that his government had not rejected the idea of returning a strip of territory and a port to Bolivia”.
We do not understand the grounds on which the Bolivian President cites those examples. Chilean public officials have always dealt with international problems by applying a honorable, honest, and most importantly, constant policy throughout one and a half century of independence; a fact that makes Chilean people proud.
Agustín Edwards statements on September 1921 could be endorsed by any Chilean diplomat today. He stated: “Bolivia can seek satisfaction through the medium of direct negotiations of our own arranging. Chile has never closed that door to Bolivia, and I am in a position to state that nothing would please us better than to sit down with her and discuss the best means of facilitating her development.” The only commitment arising from this phrase is, and we do not deny it, to listen and dialogue.
In 1923, during the first administration of President Arturo Alessandri, Chile communicated Bolivia that it “was willing
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to celebrate a new Pact which responds to Bolivia’s situation, without modifying the Treaty of Peace and without interrupting the continuity of the Chilean territory.” The Bolivian Government was requested to submit a concrete proposal on the subject and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in La Paz never presented it.
In 1926, before the Treaty of Lima, which put an end to the Chilean-Peruvian dispute over Tacna and Arica, was signed, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, submitted a proposal to Chile and Peru by which the provinces of Tacna and Arica would be left to Bolivia, in order to settle the bordering dispute. The Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Matte Gormaz, accepted the proposal, in principle, but Peru rejected it. What kind of “commitment” could be implied from this diplomatic proposal that did not succeed for reasons beyond our control?
President Barrientos states that in 1950, Chile and Bolivia sealed “the express commitment” to seek a formula that would allow Bolivia its own sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, in exchange of which Chile would receive compensation of non-territorial character. President Barrientos also states that this 1950 negotiation was ratified in 1961 by Chile’s Embassy in La Paz in a Memorandum submitted to the Government of Bolivia.
Without doubt, the Bolivian President refers to an exchange of notes between the Bolivian Ambassador in Santiago, Alberto Ostria Gutiérrez, and the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Horacio Walker, in which they agreed, in principle, to enter into
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direct talks to study the possibility of granting Bolivia its own sovereign outlet to the sea. On that occasion, Chile warned that this policy would be subjected to the approval of Peru pursuant to the agreements that we have with that nation.
Negotiations did not even start. Bolivian and Chilean public opinion reacted so violently that Ambassador Ostria and Minister Walker were forced to explain that there had been no commitment and that negotiations had never been opened. This is what President Barrientos calls Chile’s “commitment.”
As regards the 1961 memorandum, it is a document by which Chile reaffirmed once more that it was open to listen to Bolivia in direct talks and rejected the intervention of international organizations in the dispute. The memorandum did not entail any commitment and even if it did, it should be voided, since the first attitude of Bolivia in 1962, after breaking off diplomatic relations with Chile, was resorting to the Organizations of American States.
Chile maintained then, and maintains now, that no international oraganisation, no matter how respectable it may be, is competent to review a freely agreed upon bilateral treaty; that it does not refuse to bilaterally talk with Bolivia to improve the benefits currently granted to that country, but that it doesn’t accept, and will not accept, that Bolivia raise the issue at an international level,
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at other people’s courts and through advertising campaigns in a legally groundless fit of rage, which is inconsistent with the relation two civilized nations should have.
Prior and current Bolivian campaigns have shown Chile that Bolivia is not really wishing to discuss the issue of its alleged landlocked situation. In fact, it seems that Bolivia is not seriously concerned about those issues and that its only interest is to keep the problem itself alive. There are some people who want to hide serious internal issues by instilling a feeling of hate against our country.
Chile is unwilling to follow Bolivia in this field. We want the Americas to be aware of the facts of our dispute and to judge it for itself.
Bolivia speaks about a “outlet to the sea”, the “giving back of its coast,” a “port of its own in the Pacific Ocean.” Bolivia gives sentimental reasons to found its claim, which not only lack historical force, but also, and most important, legal force and economic reality.
Deep down, Bolivia is pursuing the revision of a freely agreed upon Treaty.
Since Bolivia enjoys appealing to the conscience of the Americas, it should know that if that conscience existed in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and peoples of this continent, it would be that treaties cannot be
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revised without the agreement of the parties. The entire legal system of the Americas, the safety of our borders, the peace of mind of our people, our efforts and our future, and especially, the necessary economic integration of the Continent, are based on that principle.
Most countries around the world have had, at least once, border issues. All of these conflicts were solved by means of intangible international agreements. Could we then imagine the possibility of revising, amending or ratifying everything that was agreed upon, again? Since 1810, hundreds of treaties have shaped the geographical and political structure of the American Continent. This rules out any possibility for revision which is not bilaterally intended.
Let us be honest with ourselves. There is no international talk or treaty without a firm legal basis. Bolivia and Chile have the following basis: the 1904 Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce, which both ratified with their signatures.
In addition, we would also like to remind Bolivia that it was that country’s decision to interrupt dialogue; it was Bolivia who broke off diplomatic relations with Chile in 1962. Then, it is Bolivia’s duty to restore them. President Frei, in his recent message to the National Congress, stated that:
“Since our first Message, we placed on record that it was not Chile’s will to break off relations with Bolivia.
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This situation has been worsened due to a sustained and unfair campaign. Chile has constantly demonstrated its wishes to loyally and practically cooperate with Bolivia in urgent tasks relating to its economic and social development. Last year, I mentioned the Government’s main steps in this sense, which I now repeat, although we could seem excessively patient. I would like to clearly state that the Government will firmly maintain its stance towards restoring diplomatic relations without accepting or imposing any conditions. However, blaming Chile for Bolivia’s underdevelopment goes absolutely against reality. We are, indeed, willing to cooperate in the research of concrete solutions within the framework of economic integration, without detriment to our rights, and to improve the services provided to Bolivia.”
Bolivia should then abandon all its claims on Chile’s territory, based on unrealistic vindications, challenging the validity of the 1904 Treaty, making up “historical compensations” nobody owes it, appealing to what it calls “the conscience of the Americas.” This is not a serious approach, and it is Chile’s intention that any form of bilateral contact with a sister nation be conducted in an environment of responsibility and mutual respect.
In the agenda of the Meeting of Presidents in Punta del Este, Chile accepted
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the preferential treatment given to the activation of international resources to improve the infrastructure of landlocked countries in order to accelerate their economic development. That is the effective way of raising the issue positively. Stating that the lack of development is substantially due to the landlocked situation of the country is false. This is denied by the situation of many landlocked countries with a high economic level and by international research studies on the Bolivian economy which found other causes to be the reasons for its problems.
With this note addressed to Your Excellency, I hereby comply with the duty imposed on the Government of Chile to inform the Governments of our sister nations in the Continent Chile’s opinion as regards an issue which had already been definitively settled 63 years ago, but which the current Government of Bolivia wants to deceitfully revive. In the light of the abovementioned aspects, Your Excellency’s Government will be able to appreciate the magnitude of the mistakes and historical distortion deliberately incurred by the Bolivian Head of State in his letter to the Uruguayan President.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.
GABRIEL VALDES S.
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile.
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Bolivian Supreme Decree No 8866, 28 July 1969
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Official Gazette of the Plurinational State of Bolivia
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GACETAOFICIALDELESTADOPLURINACIONALDEBOLIVIADECRETOSUPREMONº08866LUISADOLFOSILESSALINASPRESIDENTECONSTITUCIONALDELAREPÚBLICACONSIDERANDO:Que,elpaístienesuscritosconlasRepúblicaslimítrofes,conveniossobrelibreeirrestrictotránsitodemercaderíasdeyparaBolivia;Que,enejecucióndedichosconvenios,elpaísmantieneenpuertosylugaresdetránsitodemercaderíasdeyparaBolivia,AgenciasAduaneras,quedesempeñansimultáneamentelasfuncionesdeConsulados;Que,enlapráctica,acausadelosobjetivosdiferentesemergentesdeladoblefunciónatribuídaalascitadasAgencias,nohansatisfecholospropósitosdeunoportuno,económicoyeficientedespachoymovilizacióndelacargabolivianadeimportaciónyexportación,resultandoportantoconvenienteeldesdoblamientofuncionalquepermitalaespecializacióndelosrespectivosserviciosconsularesyaduaneros,conlosconsiguientesbeneficiosparaelEstadoyelpúblicousuario;Que,lafaltadepersonalespecializadoenlaspredichasAgenciasAduaneras,suinsuficienciafinanciera,lacarenciadeequipodetrabajoyotrosfactoresdeordenadministrativo,obliganaempresasestatalesyparaestatalesamantenerenpuertosylugaresdeoperacióndetránsitodemercaderías,oficinasaduaneraspropiasacostoselevadosqueafectansusrespectivospresupuestos;Que,enconsecuencia,esconvenientereorganizarlasAgenciasConsularesyAduanerasprecitadas,dotándolasdeunanuevaestructuraadministrativa,equipodetrabajoadecuadoysuficientesrecursosfinancierosypersonaltécnicoquerespondanplenamentealasexigenciasdelcomerciointernacioaldelpaís;Que,porlosantecedentesacumuladossobrelamateria,seestablecequelosaludidosConveniosinternacionalesylosderechosquederivandeellossonejercitadosporBoliviaenformalimitada,sometiendosucomerciointernacionalainadecuadas,gravosasydilatoriasprácticasportuariasymétodosdetrabajorutinarios;Que,deotraparte,lasAgenciasAduanerasPrivadas,cuyasfuncionesseconcretanalreembarquedelasmercaderíasenlospuertosylugaresdetránsitodecargabolivianadeimportación,hanelevadoexageradamentelastarifasporlaprestacióndesusservicios,determinandorecargosinjustificadosenelcostodedichosbienes;Que,conformealderechodelibretránsitoqueleacuerdanlosConveniosinternacionalesquetienesuscritoselpaísconlasRepúblicasvecinas,correspondealSupremoGobiernotomarlasprovidenciasadecuadasconlafinalidaddeprotegerla
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SUPREME DECREE No 08866
LUIS ADOLFO SILES SALINAS
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
WHEREAS:
That the country has executed with adjoining Republics agreements on free and unrestricted transit of goods from and to Bolivia;
That, in connection with the performance of such agreements, the country maintains customs agencies at ports and locations where goods are in transit from and to Bolivia, which serve as consular offices at the same time;
That, in practice, as a result of different objectives arising from the dual function exercised by the above-mentioned agencies, the purposes of timely, economical and efficient clearance and movement of Bolivian cargo for import and export purposes have not been fulfilled, and it is thus convenient to divide the functions so that the agencies may specialize in the respective consular and customs services, with consequent benefits for the Government and users;
That the lack of personnel specialized in the above-mentioned customs agencies, insufficient financial resources, lack of work teams and other matters of an administrative nature, make it necessary for government-owned and private companies to maintain customs offices of their own at ports and locations where goods are in transit, at very high costs, which affect their respective budgets;
That, as a consequence of the foregoing, it is deemed convenient to reorganize the above-mentioned consular and customs agencies, vesting them with a new administrative structure, appropriate work teams and sufficient financial resources, as well as technical personnel capable of satisfying in full the country’s needs relating to international trade;
That, by reason of prior experience acquired in this regard, it is established that the above-mentioned international agreements and rights derived therefrom are exercised by Bolivia in a limited manner, resulting in the application of inappropriate, prejudicial and delayed port practices and routine work methods, affecting Bolivia’s international trade;
That, on the other hand, private customs agencies, the functions of which relate to the re-shipment of goods at ports and locations where Bolivian cargo is in transit to Bolivia, have increased excessively their fees for the rendering of services, thus resulting in unjustified higher charges in the costs for such goods;
That, pursuant to the free transit right established under the international agreements executed by and between the country and neighboring Republics, the Supreme Government is responsible for taking any and all appropriate action for the purposes of protecting
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mercaderíadestinadaaBoliviadedaños,pérdidas,demora,gravámenesinjustificadosyotrasincidenciasquevienenafectándola,conrepercusióndesfavorablesobrelasinversionesdedivisasquesuponeelcomerciointernacional.CONSIDERANDO:Que,porDecretoLeyNº.7230de30dejuniode1965sehacreadolaAdministraciónAutónomadeAlmacenesAduaneros,entidadindependienteyespecializadaconlasfuncionesderecibir,almacenar,clasificar,custodiar,proteger,entregar,cuidardesutransporte,embarcaryreembarcartodalamercaderíadeimportaciónyexportacióndelpaís.Que,dichaentidadporsuestructurajurídica,sussistemasoperativos,equipodetrabajo,personaltécnicoespecializadoyautarquíaeconómica,eselinstrumentoadecuadodequedisponeelEstadoBolivianoparaimplantarunnuevosistematécnico,económicoyadministrativoenlasoperacionesdedespachodemercaderíadeyparaBolivia,sinafectarlasestipulacionesdeconveniosinternacionalessuscritossobreestamateria.ENCONSEJODEMINISTROS,DECRETA:ARTÍCULO1.-LasfuncionesdelasAgenciasAduanerasoficialesqueactualmenteoperanenlospuertosylugaresdetránsitodemercaderíasdeyparaBolivia,pasanaserresponsabilidaddelaAdministraciónAutónomadeAlmacenesAduaneros,quedandoexcluídatodaotraentidadestataloparaestataldeejerceridénticasosimilaresfunciones,salvolodispuestoenelartículo10°delpresenteDecreto.ARTÍCULO2.-LaAdministraciónAutónomadeAlmacenesAduaneros,serálaentidadencargadaderecibirlacargadeimportaciónconsignadaaBolivia,seadesdelospuertosolugaresdeembarquesilasnecesidadesasílorequieren,odesdelosbarcosuotrosmediosdetransportellegadosalospuertosolugaresdeingresoalpaís.Seencargarátambiéndealmacenardichacarga,decustodiarlaenlosalmacenesdetránsitoydeembarcarlaporferrocarril,carretera,barcoovíaaérea,siendoresponsabledelaseguridaddesuconducciónhastasudestinofinalenterritorioboliviano.Tratándosedecargadeexportaciónodetránsito,tendráanálogasfuncioneshastalallegadadeellaalospuertosolugaresdeembarqueoreembarque,pudiendoconcertarconveniosparalaconduccióndecargabolivianahastaeldestinofinaldelamisma.Dichasoperacionesseránefectuadas,porlaAdministraciónAutónomadeAlmacenesAduanerosconcarácterexclusivoyobligatorio,cuandosetratedecargadeimportaciónoexportacióndestinadaoperteneciente,a/ydeentidadesestatales,paraestatales,autónomas,semiautónomas,autárquicas,semiautárquicasydeserviciospúblicosdescentralizadosdelEstadoBoliviano,quedandolamencionadaAdministraciónfacultadatambiénparaprestarigualesserviciosaentidadesopersonasparticulares.
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goods intended to arrive in Bolivia from damage, loss, delays, unjustified charges and other matters that may affect them and that may have detrimental effects for foreign currency investments involved in international trade.
WHEREAS:
That the Autonomous Administration of Customs Warehouses, an independent entity specializing in the receipt, storage, classification, custody, protection, delivery, care of transport, shipment and re-shipment of all goods for import to and export from the country was created by virtue of Decree Law No 7230 dated 30 June 1965.
That, by reason of the legal structure, operating systems, work teams, specialized technical personnel and economic autarchy of that entity, the above-mentioned Administration constitutes the appropriate instrument available for the Bolivian Government to implement a new technical, economic and administrative system in connection with the clearance of goods from and to Bolivia, without affecting the provisions set forth under the international agreements executed on this subject.
NOW THEREFORE, THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS,
DECREES AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE 1.- The functions currently exercised by the official customs agencies regarding operations at ports and locations where goods are in transit from and to Bolivia shall become the responsibility of the Autonomous Administration of Customs Warehouses, and any other state or parastatal entity shall be excluded from exercising identical or similar functions, except as provided for by Article 10 of this Decree.
ARTICLE 2.- The Autonomous Administration of Customs Warehouses shall be the entity in charge of receiving the import cargo dispatched to Bolivia either from seaports or shipment locations if so required, or from ships or other means of transport which arrive to Bolivian seaports or ports of entry. Such entity shall also store the cargo, guard it at transit warehouses, and dispatch it by rail, road, sea or air, and shall be responsible for cargo security until its final destination within the Bolivian territory. In the case of export or transit cargo, the entity shall have similar responsibilities until the cargo reaches ports or shipment or re-shipment locations, and may sign agreements to transport Bolivian cargo to its final destination. Such operations shall be exclusively and mandatorily conducted by the Autonomous Administration of Customs Warehouses in the case of import or export cargo owned by or sent to state, parastatal, autonomous, semi-autonomous, autarchic, semi-autarchic entities and decentralized public utilities of the Bolivian State. The Administration shall also be entitled to provide similar services to private entities or individuals.
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ARTÍCULO3.-Lasoficinasquevienendesempeñándosehastaelpresenteconladoblefuncióndeconsuladosyagenciasaduaneras,continuaránensusrespectivosasientosdeacuerdoanecesidadesdelservicio,comooficinasexclusivamenteconsularesbajolajurisdiccióndelMinisteriodeRelacionesExteriores,conlasatribucionesprevistasporlasdisposicioneslegalespertinentes.ARTÍCULO4.-LasAgenciasAduanerasestablecidasenloslugaresdeingresodemercaderíasaBolivia,seguiránbajolajurisdiccióndelMinisteriodeHaciendaysusfuncionesseránexclusivasencuantoserefierealodispuestoenelArtículo1ºdelpresenteDecreto.ARTÍCULO5.-QuedansuprimidaslasagenciasdespachadorasdeAduanasquelasentidadesestatalesyparaestatalesdelpaísmantienenenlospuertosylugaresdetrnsitodemercaderíasdeyparaBolivia,cuyasfuncionessetransfierenalaAdministraciónAutónomadeAlmacenesAduaneros,conformesetieneprevistoenelartículoprimero.ARTÍCULO6.-AlosefectosdequelaAdministraciónAutónomadeAlmacenesAduanerospuedacumplirconeficiencialasfuncionesqueleconfiereelpresenteDecretoupremo,elMinisteriodeHaciendadictaráunreglamentoespecífico,otorgándolelasfacultadessuficientesparanegociarconlasentidadesyautoridadesportuarias,aduanerasodeotraclase,seanellasnacionalesoextranjeras,lospermisosnecesariosparaconstruir,alquilaryoperaralmacenesaduanerosyfacilidadesoserviciosconexosycomplementarios.Quedatambiénfacultadaparacontratarconlasempresasdeseguro,formasexpeditivasdeproteccióndemercaderiasenpuertoyentránsitoyconvenirconlasempresastransportadoras,tarifasyfletes,consujeciónalosordenamientoslegalesrespectivos.EndichoreglamentoseestableceráelrigurosocontroldepartedelasautoridadesdelMinisteriodeHaciendaydelaContraloríaGeneral,encumplimientoalasleyesvigentessobrelamateria.ARTÍCULO7.-LaAdministraciónAutónomadeAlmacenesAduanerospodrámantenerymanejaralmacenesafianzadosenlospuertosextranjerosyotroslugaresdetránstodemercadería,asícomooperarsuspropiossistemasdetransporte,-alquilardepósitos,cobrartarifas,fletarserviciosdetransportey-ensuma,ejercertodasaquellasfuncionesqueresultennecesariasalmejorlogrodelosfinesprevistosenelpresenteDecreto.ARTÍCULO8.-Paraefectivacoordinacióndelaboresrelativasalarecepciónydespachodecargaytodoslosproblemasdeinfraestructuratantoenlotécnicocomoenofinanciero,elMinisteriodeObrasPúblicas,ComunicacionesyTransportes,tendráunrepresentanteenelDirectoriodelaAdministraciónAutónomadeAlmacenesAduanerosconderechoavozyvoto.ARTÍCULO9.-LaDirecciónGeneraldeAduanas,laAdministración
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ARTICLE 3.- The offices which have until now operated both as consulates and customs agencies shall continue to perform their duties exclusively as consular offices based on service requirements and under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the powers set forth in the applicable legal rules.
ARTICLE 4.- The Customs Agencies established at the Bolivian ports of entry for goods shall continue to operate under the authority of the Ministry of Finance and shall have exclusive duties in accordance with Article 1 of this Decree.
ARTICLE 5.- The customs clearance agencies operated by state and parastatal entities at ports and transit locations for goods from and into Bolivia are hereby eliminated. The duties of such agencies shall be reassigned to the Autonomous Administration of Customs Warehouses in accordance with Article 1 hereof.
ARTICLE 6.- In order for the Autonomous Administration of Customs Warehouses to efficiently perform the duties set out in this Supreme Decree, the Ministry of Finance shall issue specific regulations whereby it shall grant to the referred Administration sufficient powers to apply to domestic or foreign, port, customs or other authorities and entities, for the necessary permits to build, lease and operate customs warehouses and supplementary and related facilities or services. It shall also be empowered to sign agreements with insurance companies to implement prompt protection measures for goods at ports and goods in transit, and agree on fees and freightage with transportation companies in accordance with all applicable legal provisions.
Such regulations shall provide for strict control by the authorities of the Ministry of Finance and the Office of the Comptroller General pursuant to the applicable laws in force.
ARTICLE 7.- The Autonomous Administration of Customs Warehouses may maintain and administer warehouses established at foreign ports and other locations for goods in transit, as well as operate their own transportation systems, rent warehouses, charge tariffs, charter transportation services and, in general, perform all activities necessary in furtherance of the purposes of this Decree.
ARTICLE 8.- To effectively coordinate the activities related to the reception and dispatch of cargo and to address all technical and financial issues arising in connection with infrastructure, the Ministry of Public Works, Communications and Transport shall have a representative entitled to speak and cast a vote in the Board of Directors of the Autonomous Administration of Customs Warehouses.
ARTICLE 9.- The General Customs Office, the Autonomous Administration
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AutónomadeAlmacenesAduanerosylaSubsecretaríadeTransportesformularánunestatutodetránsitodemercaderíasquecontemple,conelmáximodetalle,losprocedimientosdeoperaciónconformealosconveniosinternacionales,incluyendosucorrespondienteplantarifarioparasuaprobaciónporelSupremoGobierno.ARTÍCULO10.-QuedaenvigencialaautorizaciónconcedidaalaCorporaciónMineradeBolivia,medianteDecretoLeyN°07337,de23deseptiembrede1965,referentealrégimenestablecidopordichaInstitución.ARTÍCULO11.-QuedanderogadastodaslasdisposicionescontrariasalpresenteDecreto.LosseñoresMinistrosdeEstadoenlosDespachosdeHacienda,RelacionesExteriores,ObrasPúblicas,ComunicacionesyTransportesydeEconomíaNacional,quedanencargadosdelaejecuciónycumplimientodelpresenteDecreto.EsdadoenelPalaciodeGobiernodelaciudaddeLaPaz,alosveintiochodíasdelmesdeJuliodemilnovecientossesentaynueveaños.FDO.DR.LUISADOLFOSILESSALINAS,Dr.GustavoMedeirosQuerejazu,Cnl.EufronioPadilla,Gral.EnriqueGallardo,RenéCandia,Sr.LuisD’AvisS.,Ing.GustavoMéndezTorrico,Dr.WalterMontenegro,Dr.MarioQuintelaVacaDiez,Dra.AlciraEspinoza,Sr.FélixGómez,Dr.AlvaroTorrico,RodolfoLuzioLazarte.TEXTODECONSULTAGacetaOficialdelEstadoPlurinacionaldeBoliviaDerechosReservados©2012www.gacetaoficialdebolivia.gob.bo
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of Customs Warehouses and the Office of the Undersecretary of Transport shall issue a set of regulations for goods in transit which shall thoroughly establish operating procedures in accordance with international agreements, including a tariff scheme to be approved by the Supreme Government.
ARTICLE 10.- The authorization granted to Corporación Minera de Bolivia under Decree-Law No. 07337 of 23 September 1965 with respect to the regime established by such entity hereby comes into effect.
ARTICLE 11.- Any and all provisions which are contrary to this Decree are hereby repealed.
The Ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Public Works, Communications and Transport and Economy of the State of Bolivia shall enforce and comply with this Decree.
Given at the Government House, La Paz, on 28 July 1969.
SIGNED BY LUIS ADOLFO SILES SALINAS, Gustavo Medeiros Querejazu, Eufronio Padilla, Enrique Gallardo, René Candia, Luis D’Avis S., Gustavo Méndez Torrico, Walter Montenegro, Mario Quintela Vaca Diez, Alcira Espinoza, Félix Gómez, Alvaro Torrico, and Rodolfo Luzio Lazarte.
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Declaration of Ayacucho, signed at Lima on 9 December 1974
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 110 to its Memorial
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DECLARATION OF AYACUCHO
Meeting in the city of Lima at the invitation of the Peruvian Head of State, Major-General Juan Velasco Alvarado, to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Ayacucho, the Heads of State and Government of Bolivia, Panama, Peru and Venezuela and representatives of the Heads of State of Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Ecuador, recognize the great historical significance of that definitive armed conflict in the emancipation endeavour of America, which concluded a fundamental phase in the process of forging the freedom of our peoples.
We pay tribute to the memory of the illustrious heroes who gave us a homeland and freedom and an eloquent lesson in authentic creative solidarity, and we submit before America the example of those heroes as an incentive for the fulfilment of the duties that the present and the future signal to us.
Ayacucho is the culmination of a vast historical process of raising awareness about sovereignty and represents the bravery of our peoples and their willingness to make sacrifices. Victory was made possible thanks to the joint action of all those from the different corners of America who conceived and materialized, after a lengthy and sustained effort, the ideal of emancipation.
We proclaim, therefore, that the Battle of Ayacucho constitutes the symbol of the unity of Latin American peoples in their struggle for liberation and the celebration of its 150th anniversary is a suitable occasion to declare that the union of Latin America demands the permanent
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and continuous effort to fully realize the ideals of freedom, justice, sovereignty, equality and solidarity.
Consistently with the spirit that encouraged the insurgence of that vast popular, unifying and emancipating movement:
WE DECLARE THAT:
Our countries achieved their political independence, but their incorporation into the world’s economy then elicited different forms of dependence, which explain the obstacles to our economic, social and cultural development.
It is urgent to complete the task of emancipation by promoting the construction of our own destiny in the socio-economic field, which requires the development of models that ensure a fair participation in economic and cultural life for our peoples and facilitate the full realization of the American people.
The historical and fundamental commitment of the Latin America continent is to unite for economic and social liberation and scientific and technological improvement of the countries that comprise it, thus accelerating their integration. This unity demands a common willingness to achieve objectives of shared interest for their peoples, based on solidarity and the recognition of a pluralist reality.
Consistent with the purposes that inspired the Meeting of the Congress of Panama, we reiterate that only if united will the countries of Latin American fully fulfil the mission that is incumbent upon them within the international community, thus contributing to peace and security in the world.
Latin American nationalism constitutes raising awareness of our people about their deep reality and true character,
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which is the fruit of the mixing of blood, fusion of cultures and common historical, social and economic experiences.
Given the current international circumstances, its strengthening requires raising the problems of the region and their solutions without any interference, concluding new forms of joint action that promote the authentic values of our nations and preventing alien policies, actions or measures in Latin America that seek to undermine the character of our people and the sovereignty of our States.
We reiterate our adherence to the principles of legal equality of States, their territorial integrity, self-determination of the peoples, ideological pluralism, respect for human rights, non-intervention and international cooperation, good faith in the fulfilment of obligations undertaken, the peaceful solution of international disputes and the prohibition on resorting to threat, use of force and armed, economic or financial aggression in relations between States.
We condemn and reject the colonial situations that still persist in Latin America and which must be eradicated promptly because they constitute a potential threat to peace in the region. We hereby commit our efforts to this objective.
We undertake to promote and support the establishment of a permanent order of peace and international cooperation and to create the conditions to enable effective limitation on armaments and put an end to their procurement for offensive military purposes, [in order to] to devote all possible resources to economic and social development of each of the countries of Latin America.
We condemn the use of nuclear energy for other than peaceful ends and the progress and welfare of our peoples.
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The creation of a society with full national decision-making capability requires an end to economic dependence by determining and achieving development objectives suited to the real needs of each of our peoples.
The right fully to exercise sovereignty over their own natural resources, to defend the prices of raw materials, to regulate foreign investment and to control the activities of transnational companies are inalienable rights of our countries.
The concerted efforts of all our nations are essential to promote the formation and strengthening of associations of export-producing countries of raw materials; to achieve the most favourable terms of access for our products to international markets; to obtain the best conditions in the transfer, creation and exchange of technologies suitable to our particular realities; to ensure better regional supply of essential commodities, particularly food; to establish Latin American multinational companies and to cooperate on monetary affairs, transport and communications, external financing and Latin American financial institutions.
Integration is the most effective instrument for development and a guarantee for economic independence, as it combines national efforts with the complementarity of our economies.
The deep world economic crisis makes evident the need to take forward structural change decisively and to establish a system of collective economic security that makes possible a comprehensive development of peoples for their welfare, in a climate of stability, free of threats and acts of coercion that obstruct it, in order to achieve a new international economic order that shall be based on fairness, equality, sovereignty, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all States.
In reaffirming the historic commitment to increasingly strengthen the unity and solidarity between our peoples, we express the
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broadest understanding to the landlocked situation affecting Bolivia, a situation that must demand the most attentive consideration toward constructive understandings.
We declare that the union of our peoples as sister nations supports peace, justice, welfare and the rule of law as supreme objectives of their international relations. Consistently with these fundamental principles, we solemnly undertake to act immediately and jointly through our Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the face of any situation that may affect the peaceful coexistence between our countries.
We will fraternally and decidedly cooperate so that the peoples of Latin America, today a community of 300 million human beings, unite in their efforts in the light of the present imperative to chart their own, free and independent course, to achieve the goals of economic development and social justice that will make possible the full self-realization and dignity of the Latin America people, the sole heirs of the historic legacy of the emancipating process that culminated in Ayacucho.
Signed at the Government House in Lima, on the ninth day of the month of December 1974.
(signed)
Major-General Juan Velasco Alvarado, President of Peru;
General Hugo Banzer Suarez, President of Bolivia;
General Omar Torrijos Herrera, Head of Government of Panama;
Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela;
Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, Representative of the President of Colombia;
Alberto J. Vignes, Representative of the President of Argentina;
Carlos Anibal Jaramillo, Representative of the President of Ecuador,
and Vice-Admiral Patricio Carvajal Prado, Representative of the Head of State of Chile.
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Joint Declaration of Charaña between Chile and Bolivia,
8 February 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 111 to its Memorial
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JOINT DECLARATION
1. At the initiative of His Excellency the President of the Republic of Chile, General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, he met at the Chile-Bolivia frontier with His Excellency the President of the Republic of Bolivia, General Hugo Banzer Suárez, with the purpose of exchanging point of views on matters of interest to both countries and on the continental and worldwide situation.
2. The meeting, carried out in an atmosphere of cordiality and fraternity, permitted the identification of important common ground which reflects the state of the ties that unite Bolivia and Chile and permit the continuation of the joint task to reach global understandings for the benefit of both nations.
3. In this respect, the Presidents reaffirmed their full adhesion to the Declaration of Ayacucho, which faithfully reflects a spirit of solidarity and openness to understanding in this part of America.
4. Both heads of state, in that spirit of mutual understanding and constructive motivation, have resolved to continue the dialogue at various levels, to seek formulas for solving the vital matters that both countries face, such as the landlocked situation that affects Bolivia, taking into account their reciprocal interests and addressing the aspirations of the Bolivian and Chilean peoples.
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5. The two Presidents have resolved to continue developing a policy in favour of harmony and understanding so that, in a climate of cooperation, a formula for peace and progress is jointly found in our Continent.
6. The Presidents, in order to materialize the purposes outlined in the present Joint Declaration, have resolved to normalize the diplomatic relations between their respective countries, at the Ambassadorial level.
Charaña, 8 February 1975
[Signed] [Signed]
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Organization of American States, General Assembly,
resolution CP/RES. 157 (169/75), 6 August 1975
(Original in English)
Archives of the Library of the Organization of American States
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Annex 175
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Statement of the Chilean Delegate to the Organization of American States, 6 August 1975 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
J. Gumucio Granier, Bolivia’s maritime confinement in the world’s fora (1993),
pp 155-159
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Annex 176
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Annex 176
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The celebration of the 150th anniversary of Bolivia’s Declaration of Independence gave Bolivian diplomacy an opportunity to seek solidarity in the hemisphere, not only with the country in general, but primarily to point out its maritime confinement as a cause for its underdevelopment, which should be overcome with the cooperation of the States in the region. For this reason, the Permanent Representative of Bolivia, with the joint sponsorship of the majority of the countries in the regional organization, called a meeting of the Permanent Council of the OAS to be held on 6 August 1975 to commemorate the anniversary, having approved by consensus the following declaration:
“The Permanent Council of the Organization of American States makes the following: DECLARATION ON THE OCCASION OF THE 150TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF BOLIVIA
“The landlocked situation that affects Bolivia is reason for concern throughout the hemisphere, and all the American States offer to cooperate
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in seeking solutions which, in accordance with the principles of International Law and, particularly, with the contents of the Charter of the Organization of American States, may help Bolivia to remove the difficulties faced in its economic and social development as a result of its landlocked situation, by conciliating reciprocal interests and promoting constructive understandings.” [Footnote omitted.]
It is worth pointing out that in that session, the Chilean delegate stated:
“The Chilean delegation joins in the 150th anniversary of the independence of the Republic of Bolivia with a feeling of brotherhood, expressing its best wishes for the progress and welfare of the Bolivian people. We join with them in rejoicing over this historic date, which is also for America, on which the political independence of the countries in South America culminated definitively... The Chilean delegation concurs with the approval of the Declaration made by the Permanent Council on the occasion of this Bolivian anniversary, and in doing so, it reiterates the spirit of the Joint Declaration of Charaña, once again stating its spirit of solidarity”. [Footnote omitted.]
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Annex 177
Aide Mémoire from the Bolivian Embassy in Chile to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 26 August 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 174 to its Memorial
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A) BOLIVIAN PROPOSAL
In order properly to frame the major problem of returning to the sea in its true dimension and significance, the Government of the Armed Forces organized the Cochabamba Consultation, through which the thinking and will of the Bolivian people regarding the great national goal was unified. Such concurrence, without precedence in History, resulted in the creation of the Maritime Commission, which took on the task of identifying alternative solutions to Bolivia’s landlocked situation.
The work of such Commission provided general guidance to the Government, based on which the latter was able to delineate a viable formula that would satisfy Bolivia’s need to count on its own and sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean.
Once the preliminary phase of identification of basic criteria and the assessment task performed by our Mission in Santiago were completed, the Republic’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed Bolivia’s Ambassador accredited to the Chilean Government to submit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of our neighbouring country a concrete proposal, establishing the fundamental guidelines to continue a negotiation, intended to resolve Bolivia’s landlocked situation. Such proposal is contained in a document dated 25 August 1975, which reads as follows:
1.
The Bolivian Government, in order to specify the guidelines for a negotiation permitting to reach mutually convenient and adequate solutions to the landlocked situation that affects Bolivia, has deemed appropriate to present to the Government of Chile the concrete criteria that, in its opinion, must serve as a basis for an agreement on this problem.
2.
Cession to Bolivia of a sovereign maritime coast between the Concordia Line and the limit of the urban radius of the city of Arica. That coast must be continued with a strip of sovereign territory from said coast to the Bolivian-Chilean frontier, including the transfer of the Arica-La Paz railway.
3.
Adoption of a regime that signifies autonomy for Bolivia in the operations linked to the realization of its international commerce through the port of Arica, according to the proposal formulated by the Government of Chile.
4.
Cession to Bolivia of a sovereign territory of 50 kilometres in extension along the coast and 15 kilometres of depth, in appropriate zones to be determined, alternatively, in the proximity of Iquique, Antofagasta or Pisagua.
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5.
The coastal strip mentioned in the previous item will be connected with the current Bolivian territory in accordance with the following features:
a.
Bolivia’s faculty to project, construct, operate and maintain all the infrastructure works necessary for the purpose of an effective connexion (railways, highways, pipelines, etc.).
b.
The aforementioned works will have an international character, with the faculty of unrestricted use, at all times and circumstances, by Bolivia and Chile.
c.
The roads, railways, pipelines and other complementary infrastructure will be the property of the Bolivian State.
6.
The interconnection between that coastal territory and that of Bolivia has as its only objective the creation of an efficient transport infrastructure for the development of the Bolivian economy. The legal regime to which said works will be subjected to will be similar to the one established for the Sica Sica-Arica oil pipeline.
7.
The Government of Bolivia will be willing to consider, as a fundamental matter of the negotiation, the contributions that may correspond, as an integral part of an understanding that takes into account reciprocal interests.
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Note from the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 681/108/75, 16 December 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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EMBASSY OF BOLIVIA
681/108/75
Santiago, 16 December 1975
Dear Minister:
I have the honour of addressing Your Excellency to inform you that my Government accepts the general terms of the Chilean Government’s response to the proposal presented by means of the Aide Memoire of 26 August of this year, regarding the framework for the negotiation that enables reaching an adequate solution to Bolivia’s landlocked situation.
Moreover, at the instruction of His Excellency the President, General Hugo Banzer Suárez, and the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I would reiterate our request for a written response, on the same terms as the one stated orally by Your Excellency at the meeting on Friday the 12th of this month, and that constitutes the basis for the agreement that our two countries are negotiating.
I would also like to thank Your Distinguished Government, on behalf of the Bolivian Government, for the decision expressed by His Excellency the President of the Republic, General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, via the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to grant to Bolivia a sovereign maritime coastline, linked to Bolivian territory by an equally sovereign strip of territory.
The Bolivian Government understands that the other proposals set forth in the Aide Memoire of 26 August, and those expressed by Your Excellency, will be subject to negotiations that contemplate the satisfaction of mutual interests.
I would like to take this opportunity to assure Your Excellency of my highest and most distinguished consideration.
(Signed)
His Excellency Vice Admiral
Patricio Carvajal
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Hand Delivery
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Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, No 685, 19 December 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 72 to its Memorial
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NOTES SENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU REGARDING THE PROBLEM OF BOLIVIA’S LANDLOCKED SITUATION
Santiago, 19 December 1976 [sic]
Your Excellency:
The Government of Bolivia, in order to define the guidelines for a negotiation that enables reaching a solution to Bolivia’s landlocked situation, has proposed to my Government the cession to Bolivia of a sovereign maritime coast between the Concordia Line and the northern boundary of the city of Arica.
That coast must be connected with a territorial strip from said coast to the Chilean-Bolivian frontier, including the transfer of the Arica-La Paz Railway.
The Government of Chile would be willing to negotiate with the [Government] of Bolivia regarding the referred proposal, but previously it wishes to know whether the Government of Peru agrees with the cession requested by Bolivia, considering that it affects the provisions of the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of Lima of June 1929, Article 1 of which reads as follows:
“The Governments of Chile and Peru shall not, without previous agreement between them, cede to any third Power the whole or part of the territories which, in conformity with the Treaty of this date, come under their respective sovereignty, nor shall they, in the absence of such an agreement, construct through those territories any new international railway lines.”
In addition, I inform Your Excellency that my Government has made known to the Government of Bolivia that the solution to be reached must respect the provisions of the Treaty of Lima, and in particular, the easements established in favor of Peru in Articles 2 and 7 thereof.
Likewise, my Government reiterates its will to comply faithfully with the provisions of the Supplementary Protocol to that Treaty.
I renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration.
Patricio Carvajal Prado
Minister of Foreign Affairs
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Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, No 686, 19 December 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 73 to its Memorial
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Republic of Chile
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
N° 686
Santiago, 19 December 1975
Mr. Ambassador:
I am pleased to acknowledge receipt of the Note N° 681/108/75 dated 16 December this year, through which Your Excellency notifies me that the Enlightened Government of Bolivia accepts the general terms of the response of the Government of Chile to the proposal presented through the Aide Memoire of 26 August last, relating to the negotiation framework that would enable the reaching of an adequate, total, and definitive solution to Bolivia’s landlocked situation.
2.
In addition, through your Government’s instructions, it requests a written response in equal terms to the one which the undersigned formulated verbally to Your Excellency at the meeting of the 12th of this month, and which would constitute the basis of agreement for a negotiation between both our countries.
3.
Furthermore, Your Excellency expressed the gratitude of your Government for the intentions expressed by the President of Chile to negotiate with Bolivia a sovereign maritime coast linked to the Bolivian territory through an equally sovereign strip of land.
4.
As Your Excellency has requested, I reiterate in the present note the terms on which my Government desires to respond to the guidelines for a negotiation aimed at reaching a mutually convenient solution, subject to the following:
To H.E. Mr.
Guillermo Gutiérrez Vea Murguia
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Bolivia
Hand delivered
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a)
This response expresses what His Excellency President Banzer stated in order to consider the current reality without reviving historical antecedents.
b)
On this basis, the Chilean response is based on a mutually convenient arrangement that would take into account the interests of both countries and that would not contain any innovation to the provisions of the Treaty of Peace, Amity, and Commerce signed between Chile and Bolivia on 20 October 1904.
c)
As His Excellency President Banzer stated, the cession to Bolivia of a sovereign maritime coastline, linked to Bolivian territory through an equally sovereign territorial strip, would be considered.
d)
Chile would be willing to negotiate with Bolivia the cession of a strip of territory north of Arica up to the Concordia Line based on the following delimitations:
- North Boundary: Chile’s current boundary with Peru.
- South Boundary: Gallinazos ravine and the upper edge of the ravine north of the River Lluta, (so that the A-15 highway from Arica to Tambo Quemado would in its entirety be part of Chilean territory) up until a point to the South of Puquios Station, and then an approximately straight line passing through contour 5370 of Cerro Nasahuento and extending to the current international boundary between Chile and Bolivia.
- Area: the cession would include the land territory described above and the maritime territory comprised between the parallels of the end points of the coast that would be ceded (territorial sea, economical zone, and submarine shelf).
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e)
The Government of Chile rejects, for being unacceptable, the cession of territory to the south of the indicated limit, that could affect in any way the territorial continuity of the country.
f)
The cession to Bolivia described in section d) would be subject to a simultaneous exchange of territories, that is to say, Chile would at the same time receive in exchange for what it hands over a compensatory area at least equal to the area of land and sea ceded to Bolivia.
The territory that Chile would receive from Bolivia could be continuous or composed of different portions of border territory.
In order to determine the new political-international limits between Chile and Bolivia, the Mixed Boundaries Commission would be re-established, granting it authority to study the border zone and to make proposals regarding the fixing of the limits to both Governments, trying to avoid that the territories to be ceded comprise populated areas.
g)
The public facilities or constructions existing in the territories to
be ceded must be acquired by the State that receives the territory, at a replacement cost determined by common agreement. (Chacalluta Airport, Railway from Arica to Visviri, etc.)
h)
Both Governments of Bolivia and Chile will respect private rights, legally acquired in the territories that end up under their respective sovereignties as a consequence of the arrangement to be reached.
i)
The Government of Bolivia would authorize Chile to use all of the waters in the River Lauca.
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j)
The territory ceded by Chile would be declared a Demilitarized Zone and, in accordance with previous conversations, the Bolivian Government would undertake to obtain the express guarantee of the Organization of American States with respect to the inviolability of the ceded land strip.
k)
Both Governments would commit not to cede the exchanged
territories to a third power.
l)
Once the final agreement has been reached, a solemn testimony will be made mentioning that the territorial cession that permits the sovereign access to the sea represents the full and definite solution to the landlocked situation of Bolivia.
m)
Bolivia shall commit to respect the easements in favor of Peru established in the Chilean-Peruvian Treaty of 3 June 1929.
n)
The force of this agreement shall be conditioned upon Peru’s prior agreement in accordance with Article 1° of the Supplementary Protocol to the aforementioned Treaty.
5.
Since in Note 681/108/75 of 16 December 1975, the Enlightened Government of Bolivia has accepted the general terms of the Chilean Government’s response, as of this date my Government is proceeding to formulate to Peru the consultation referred to in letter n) of the preceding paragraph.
6.
Finally, I refer to the last paragraph of the note to which I respond, in which Your Excellency states the following:
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”The Bolivian Government understands that the other proposals set forth in the Aide Memoire of 26 August, and those expressed by Your Excellency, will be subject to negotiations that contemplate the satisfaction of mutual interests.”
As stated in letter e) of paragraph 4 of this Note, the proposals contained in sections 4, 5, and 6 of the Aide Memoire presented by the Bolivian Embassy on 26 August 1975, are rejected for not being acceptable by the Government of Chile.
As for the matters of a commercial nature, such as those offered by Your Excellency relating to the laying of a pipeline to supply fuel to the mining industry at the North of Chile and the petrochemical and refinery industries to be installed in Chilean ports, the Government of Chile would be willing to negotiate on the basis established by a mutual agreement.
Along with expressing to Your Excellency my highest and most distinguished consideration, I reiterate my hope of perfecting an agreement that contributes decisively to the friendship and the development of our nations.
[Signed]
PATRICIO CARVAJAL PRADO
Minister of Foreign Affairs
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Message of President Banzer announcing that Chile’s Reply (19 December 1975) constitutes a globally acceptable basis for negotiations, 21 December 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
L.F. Guachalla, Bolivia-Chile: The Maritime Negotiation, 1975-1978 (1982),
pp 85-86
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22 December 1975
MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT BANZER (21 December 1975) ANNOUNCING THAT CHILE’S REPLY (19 DECEMBER 1975) CONSTITUTES A GLOBALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS
(from EL DIARIO)
People of Bolivia,
Following the consistent behaviour that was adopted from the very first moment when I took office, I comply with my duty to inform my people of matters that are substantially relevant to the life of the Republic. At this time, which must be considered a decisive stage in this nation-building process, in defining our future and consolidating our lifestyle, I inform you once again about the actions taken by my administration on a very serious issue.
The return to the sea.
One of the main issues of concern for the Government of the Armed Forces that I preside over is to find a solution to the confinement of our nation, which has been addressed eagerly, with a realistic approach and with profound patriotism.
In this context, a consistent policy, oriented both to unify the thoughts of the Bolivian people and to follow a deliberate, truthful and constructive line of action, was outlined. Therefore, our international actions were translated into an initiative to realize Bolivia’s need to return to the waters of the Pacific Ocean.
In this path, as the people are well aware, we have made fundamental achievements in opening new perspectives to enable an acceptable solution for the Bolivian desires. The national mind-set was unified through the historical consultation that took place in Cochabamba: a continental understanding was obtained and, thus, the Charaña meeting was prepared as a practical way to foster dialogue and direct negotiation towards finding formulae to solve Bolivia’s confinement.
Upon the restoration of diplomatic relations between Bolivia and Chile, my Government devoted all efforts to reach with that country a formula that will make it possible for our Nation to count on its own and sovereign maritime coastline, connected to our territory, also on a sovereign basis. We knew that negotiations were not going to be easy. The complexity of this issue required imaginative efforts, foresight and unwavering determination to arrive at constructive solutions. Therefore, our mission was hard-working, tenacious and responsibly carried out.
Once the necessary and adequate conditions were provided, the Government of Bolivia, through its Ambassador accredited to the Chilean Government, submitted a formal proposal for a practical solution to our confinement, which we are sure that the interests and expectations of both countries were contemplated. This proposal of 26 August of this year marked the beginning of a definition phase, in which a path opened towards a satisfactory solution.
Yesterday, the Bolivian Ambassador in Santiago handed me with Chile’s reply to the Bolivian requirement of a maritime coastline with territorial continuity and full sovereignty.
In that reply, the Government of Chile accepted to grant Bolivia a maritime coastline to the north of Arica with a connecting territory, with a transfer of sovereignty. Such acceptance, which addresses a vital issue raised in the Bolivian proposal, has been agreed to by the National Government.
Furthermore, it is my duty to inform the people of Bolivia that Chile’s reply, as expected, involves the exchange of equivalent territories that do not alter the territorial extension of both countries, nor their wealth or safety.
In this regard, the National Government is responsibly considering this proposal, and procuring that whichever the outcome, it does not limit the development of our country, its prospects for improving the standard of living of the people and, last but not least, the preservation of the national wealth provided by its natural resources.
In other words, we cannot intend to shift from being a confined country to a mortgaged one.
Other issues contained in Chile’s reply are yet to be carefully weighed by the National Government. In view of that, a study has already been initiated to continue immediately with the negotiations on those [issues].
In light of this background that I am now sharing with our people, the Government considers that the reply of the Chilean Government to the Bolivian proposal constitutes an acceptable global basis for negotiations. Moreover, we are aware that such negotiation must be carried out with the utmost care and safeguarding the interests of the Bolivian nation, as we have done so far. Also, the Government is aware that the ongoing negotiations with the Chilean Government shall be subject to the rules of international law. In this sense, I have taken notice of the
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consultation that the Chilean Government has made to the Government of Peru, in compliance with the international agreements concluded by both countries. We trust that the understanding that would be reached will effectively enshrine the interests of all stakeholders, in a matter which is crucial for our nation.
The information that I am sharing with the people constitutes a fundamental achievement and the triumph of the understanding between two countries that were called to agree on common goals that are vital for the wellbeing of their people. Also, this is the culmination of the first stage of a laborious and tough task that I was entrusted with at the Consultation Meeting on Returning to the Sea, held in Cochabamba. In my capacity as President of the Republic, I have tried to interpret the nation’s feelings and to preserve the Bolivian interests in this matter, as in no other. I truly believe that this stage, successfully concluded now, opens a path that will safely lead us to satisfy our national need to return to the sea.
Fellow nationals:
With true love for my people I have undertaken the responsibility for fighting for a noble cause that has been deep rooted in the hearts of all Bolivians for 96 years and that, until yesterday, was frustrated. So, the relations with Chile were restored, trusting that this sister nation, led by the honourable President, General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, will honour its commitment to do justice to the cause of a nation located in the centre of the continent and that, without respite, marches towards the sea.
We are now witnessing the peace brought by Christmas time. I am pleased to bring such good news to the homes of all Bolivians. I am at peace knowing that the efforts, the tenacity and the responsibility were fruitful not only for Bolivia, but also in terms of creating new hopes for peace, understanding and a decision to move towards the future with the confidence of peoples that have faith in their greatness.
I am joyful to celebrate Christmas listening to the Christian message of rebirth together with a hopeful and vigorous people.
Finally, I express my fervent admiration for my people that supported the efforts of the National Government at all times. To the workers, farmers, intellectuals, students and soldiers, men and women from the very heart of South America that encourage this national crusade to return to the sea, my sincere gratitude. I reaffirm the commitment of the Government of the Armed Forces of the Nation to meet your expectations. We are at a turning point in our history in which we reiterate, truly advocating for peace and greatness, our decision to be triumphant.
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Telex from the Embassy of Chile in Bolivia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 416, 21 December 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
FORMAT FOR MESSAGES
(Telex and Cables)
CLASSIFICATION
NUMBER
TIME GROUP
MONTH
YEAR
OPEN
416
212230+1
DECEMBER
1975
FROM: EMBACHILE LA PAZ
TO: DIRELAS
TEXT
1. TODAY, AT 9 P.M. ON THE NATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION CHANNEL, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, GENERAL HUGO BANZER SUAREZ, ADDRESSED THE NATION, IN ORDER TO REPORT, AS HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED, HIS GOVERNMENT’S OPINION ON CHILE’S RESPONSE TO THE BOLIVIAN PROPOSAL.
2. BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT IT IS OF INTEREST, I TRANSMIT TO YOU THE ENTIRE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT’S SPEECH BELOW:
“PEOPLE OF BOLIVIA, FOLLOWING THE CONSISTENT BEHAVIOUR THAT WAS ADOPTED FROM THE VERY FIRST MOMENT WHEN I TOOK OFFICE, I COMPLY WITH MY DUTY TO INFORM MY PEOPLE OF MATTERS THAT ARE SUBSTANTIALLY RELEVANT TO THE LIFE OF THE REPUBLIC. AT THIS TIME, WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED A DECISIVE STAGE IN THIS NATION-BUILDING PROCESS, IN DEFINING OUR FUTURE AND CONSOLIDATING OUR LIFESTYLE, I INFORM YOU ONCE AGAIN ABOUT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY MY ADMINISTRATION ON A VERY SERIOUS ISSUE: THE RETURN TO THE SEA.
ONE OF THE MAIN ISSUES OF CONCERN FOR THE GOVERNMENT THAT I PRESIDE OVER IS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE CONFINEMENT OF OUR NATION, WHICH HAS BEEN ADDRESSED EAGERLY, WITH A REALISTIC APPROACH AND WITH PROFOUND PATRIOTISM. IN THIS CONTEXT, A CONSISTENT POLICY, ORIENTED BOTH TO UNIFY THE THOUGHTS OF THE BOLIVIAN PEOPLE AND TO FOLLOW A DELIBERATE, TRUTHFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE LINE OF ACTION, WAS DEFINED. THEREFORE, OUR INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS WERE TRANSLATED INTO AN INITIATIVE TO REALIZE BOLIVIA’S NEED TO RETURN TO THE WATERS OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN. IN THIS PATH, AS THE PEOPLE ARE WELL AWARE, WE HAVE MADE FUNDAMENTAL ACHIEVEMENTS IN OPENING NEW
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PERSPECTIVES TO ENABLE AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION FOR THE BOLIVIAN DESIRES.
THE NATIONAL MIND-SET WAS UNIFIED THROUGH THE HISTORICAL CONSULTATION THAT TOOK PLACE IN COCHABAMBA: A CONTINENTAL UNDERSTANDING WAS OBTAINED AND, THUS, THE CHARAÑA MEETING WAS PREPARED AS A PRACTICAL WAY TO FOSTER DIALOGUE AND DIRECT NEGOTIATION TOWARDS FINDING FORMULAE TO SOLVE BOLIVIA’S CONFINEMENT.
UPON THE RESTORATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN BOLIVIA AND CHILE, MY GOVERNMENT DEVOTED ALL EFFORTS TO COMPLETE WITH THAT COUNTRY A FORMULA THAT WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR OUR NATION TO COUNT ON ITS OWN AND SOVEREIGN MARITIME COASTLINE, CONNECTED TO OUR TERRITORY, ALSO ON A SOVEREIGN BASIS.
WE KNEW THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOT GOING TO BE EASY. THE COMPLEXITY OF THIS ISSUE REQUIRED IMAGINATIVE EFFORTS, FORESIGHT AND UNWAVERING DETERMINATION TO ARRIVE AT CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTIONS. THEREFORE, OUR MISSION WAS HARD-WORKING, TENACIOUS AND RESPONSIBLY CARRIED OUT.
ONCE THE NECESSARY AND ADEQUATE CONDITIONS WERE PROVIDED, THE GOVERNMENT OF BOLIVIA, THROUGH ITS AMBASSADOR ACCREDITED TO THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT, SUBMITTED A FORMAL PROPOSAL FOR A PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO OUR CONFINEMENT, WHICH WE ARE SURE THAT THE INTERESTS AND EXPECTATIONS OF BOTH COUNTRIES WERE CONTEMPLATED.
THIS PROPOSAL OF 26 AUGUST OF THIS YEAR MARKED
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THE BEGINNING OF A DEFINITION PHASE, IN WHICH A PATH OPENED TOWARDS A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION .
YESTERDAY, THE BOLIVIAN AMBASSADOR IN SANTIAGO HANDED ME WITH CHILE’S REPLY TO THE BOLIVIAN REQUIREMENT OF A MARITIME COASTLINE WITH TERRITORIAL CONTINUITY AND FULL SOVEREIGNTY.
IN THAT REPLY, THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED TO GRANT BOLIVIA A MARITIME COASTLINE TO THE NORTH OF ARICA WITH A CONNECTING TERRITORY, WITH A TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY. SUCH ACCEPTANCE, WHICH ADDRESSES A VITAL ISSUE RAISED IN THE BOLIVIAN PROPOSAL, HAS BEEN AGREED TO BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.
FURTHERMORE, IT IS MY DUTY TO INFORM THE PEOPLE OF BOLIVIA THAT CHILE’S REPLY, AS EXPECTED, INVOLVES THE EXCHANGE OF EQUIVALENT TERRITORIES THAT DO NOT ALTER THE TERRITORIAL EXTENSION OF BOTH COUNTRIES, NOR THEIR WEALTH OR SAFETY. IN THIS REGARD, THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IS RESPONSIBLY CONSIDERING THIS PROPOSAL, AND PROCURING THAT WHICHEVER THE OUTCOME, IT DOES NOT LIMIT THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR COUNTRY, ITS PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVING THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE PEOPLE AND, LAST BUT NOT LEAST, THE PRESERVATION OF THE NATIONAL WEALTH PROVIDED BY ITS NATURAL RESOURCES. IN OTHER WORDS, WE CANNOT INTEND TO SHIFT FROM BEING A CONFINED COUNTRY TO A MORTGAGED ONE.
OTHER ISSUES CONTAINED IN CHILE’S REPLY ARE YET TO BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. IN VIEW OF THAT, A STUDY HAS ALREADY BEEN INITIATED TO CONTINUE IMMEDIATELY WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THOSE [ISSUES]. IN LIGHT OF THIS BACKGROUND
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THAT I AM NOW SHARING WITH OUR PEOPLE, THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT THE REPLY OF THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT TO THE BOLIVIAN PROPOSAL CONSTITUTES AN ACCEPTABLE GLOBAL BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. MOREOVER, WE ARE AWARE THAT SUCH NEGOTIATION MUST BE CARRIED OUT WITH THE UTMOST CARE AND SAFEGUARDING THE INTERESTS OF THE BOLIVIAN NATION, AS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES GOVERNMENT HAS DONE SO FAR. ALSO, THE GOVERNMENT IS AWARE THAT THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT SHALL BE SUBJECT TO THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. IN THIS SENSE, I HAVE TAKEN NOTICE OF THE CONSULTATION THAT THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT HAS MADE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU, IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY BOTH COUNTRIES.
WE TRUST THAT THE UNDERSTANDING THAT WOULD BE REACHED WILL EFFECTIVELY ENSHRINE THE INTERESTS OF ALL STAKEHOLDERS, IN A MATTER WHICH IS CRUCIAL FOR OUR NATION.
THE INFORMATION THAT I AM SHARING WITH THE PEOPLE CONSTITUTES A FUNDAMENTAL ACHIEVEMENT AND THE TRIUMPH OF THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES THAT WERE CALLED TO AGREE ON COMMON GOALS THAT ARE VITAL FOR THE WELLBEING OF THEIR PEOPLE. ALSO, THIS IS THE CULMINATION OF THE FIRST STAGE OF A LABORIOUS AND TOUGH TASK THAT I WAS ENTRUSTED WITH AT THE CONSULTATION MEETING ON RETURNING TO THE SEA, HELD IN COCHABAMBA. IN MY CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, I HAVE TRIED TO INTERPRET THE NATION’S FEELINGS AND TO PRESERVE THE BOLIVIAN INTERESTS IN THIS MATTER, AS IN NO OTHER.
I TRULY BELIEVE THAT THIS STAGE, SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED NOW,
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OPENS A PATH THAT WILL SAFELY LEAD US TO SATISFY OUR NATIONAL NEED TO RETURN TO THE SEA.
FELLOW NATIONALS: WITH TRUE LOVE FOR MY PEOPLE I HAVE UNDERTAKEN THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FIGHTING FOR A NOBLE CAUSE THAT HAS BEEN DEEP ROOTED IN THE HEARTS OF ALL BOLIVIANS FOR 96 YEARS AND THAT, UNTIL YESTERDAY, WAS FRUSTRATED. SO, THE RELATIONS WITH CHILE WERE RESTORED, TRUSTING THAT THIS SISTER NATION, LED BY THE HONOURABLE PRESIDENT, GENERAL AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE, WILL DO JUSTICE TO THE CAUSE OF A NATION THAT IS LOCATED IN THE CENTRE OF THE CONTINENT, WITHOUT RESPITE, MARCHES TOWARDS THE SEA.
WE ARE NOW WITNESSING THE PEACE BROUGHT BY CHRISTMAS TIME. I AM PLEASED TO BRING SUCH GOOD NEWS TO THE HOMES OF ALL BOLIVIANS. I AM AT PEACE KNOWING THAT THE EFFORTS, THE TENACITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY WERE FRUITFUL NOT ONLY FOR BOLIVIA, BUT ALSO IN TERMS OF CREATING NEW HOPES FOR PEACE, UNDERSTANDING AND A DECISION TO MOVE TOWARDS THE FUTURE WITH THE CONFIDENCE OF PEOPLES THAT HAVE FAITH IN THEIR GREATNESS.
I AM JOYFUL TO CELEBRATE CHRISTMAS LISTENING TO THE CHRISTIAN MESSAGE OF REBIRTH TOGETHER WITH A HOPEFUL AND VIGOROUS PEOPLE.
FINALLY, I EXPRESS MY FERVENT ADMIRATION FOR MY PEOPLE THAT SUPPORTED THE EFFORTS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
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AT ALL TIMES. TO THE WORKERS, FARMERS, INTELLECTUALS, STUDENTS AND SOLDIERS, MEN AND WOMEN FROM THE VERY HEART OF SOUTH AMERICA THAT ENCOURAGE THIS NATIONAL CRUSADE TO RETURN TO THE SEA, MY SINCERE GRATITUDE.
I REAFFIRM THE COMMITMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATION TO MEET YOUR EXPECTATIONS. WE ARE AT A TURNING POINT IN OUR HISTORY IN WHICH WE REITERATE, TRULY ADVOCATING FOR PEACE AND GREATNESS, OUR DECISION TO BE TRIUMPHANT. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. (APPLAUSE BY THE ENTIRE CABINET).”
CABRERA.
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“Government ‘globally’ accepts Chilean response”,
Los Tiempos (Bolivia), 22 December 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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Cochabamba, Monday, 22 December 1975
Government “globally” accepts Chilean response
La Paz, 21 (LOS TIEMPOS).- President Hugo Banzer declared that his government has “globally” accepted Chile’s counterproposal for the resolution of Bolivia’s landlocked situation.
“We don’t want to go from being a confined country to being a mortgaged country,” he said in reference to the possible exchange of territory with Chile. He assured that the solution “must not limit national development” and “must preserve Bolivian wealth.”
President Banzer directed a message to the nation tonight through the national radio and television network officially to announce Chile’s response, and he had words of gratitude and friendship regarding the junta headed by General Augusto Pinochet.
He said that a commission had been formed to analyse the Chilean response, which he categorized as an historic success through the dialogue and the understanding of the peoples.
The text of the presidential message was as follows:
“People of Bolivia,
Following the consistent behaviour that was adopted from the very first moment when I took office, I comply with my duty to inform my people of matters
that are substantially relevant to the life of the Republic.
At this time, which must be considered a decisive stage in this nation-building process, in defining our future and consolidating our lifestyle, I inform you once again about the actions taken by my administration on a very serious issue: the return to the sea.
One of the main issues of concern for the Government of the Armed Forces that I preside over is to find a solution to the confinement of our nation, which has been addressed eagerly, with a realistic approach and with profound patriotism. In this context, a consistent policy, oriented both to unify the thoughts of the Bolivian people and to follow a deliberate, truthful and constructive line of action, was outlined. Therefore, our international actions were translated into an initiative to realize Bolivia’s need to return to the waters of the Pacific Ocean.
In this path, as the people are well aware, we have made fundamental achievements in opening new perspectives to enable an acceptable solution for the Bolivian desires.
The national mind-set was unified through the historical
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consultation that took place in Cochabamba: a continental understanding was obtained and, thus, the Charaña meeting was prepared as a practical way to foster dialogue and direct negotiation towards finding formulae to solve Bolivia’s confinement.
Upon the restoration of diplomatic relations between Bolivia and Chile, my Government devoted all efforts to reach with that country a formula that will make it possible for our Nation to count on its own and sovereign maritime coastline, connected to our territory, also on a sovereign basis. We knew that negotiations were not going to be easy. The complexity of this issue required imaginative efforts, foresight and unwavering determination to arrive at constructive solutions. Therefore, our mission was hard-working, tenacious and responsibly carried out.
Once the necessary and adequate conditions were provided, the Government of Bolivia, through its Ambassador accredited to the Chilean Government, submitted a formal proposal for a practical solution to our confinement, which we are sure that the interests and expectations of both countries were contemplated.
This proposal of 26 August of this year marked the beginning of a definition phase, in which a path opened towards a satisfactory solution.
Yesterday, the Bolivian Ambassador in Santiago handed me with Chile’s reply to the Bolivian requirement of a maritime coastline with territorial continuity and full sovereignty.
In that reply, the Government of Chile accepted to grant Bolivia a maritime coastline to the north of Arica with a connecting territory, with a transfer of sovereignty.
Such acceptance, which addresses a vital issue raised in the Bolivian proposal, has been agreed to by the National Government.
Furthermore, it is my duty to inform the people of Bolivia that Chile’s reply, as expected, involves the exchange of equivalent territories that do not alter the territorial extension of both countries, nor their wealth or safety.
In this regard, the National Government is responsibly considering this proposal, and procuring that whichever the outcome, it does not limit the development of our country, its prospects for improving the standard of living of the people and, last but not least, the preservation of the national wealth provided by its national resources. In other words, we cannot intend to shift from being a confined country to a mortgaged one.
Other issues contained in Chile’s reply are yet to be carefully weighed by the national government. In view of that, a study has already been initiated to continue immediately with the negotiations on those [issues].
In light of this background that I am now sharing with our people, the Government considers that the reply of the Chilean Government to the Bolivian proposal constitutes an acceptable global basis for negotiations.
Moreover, we are aware that such negotiation must be carried out with the utmost care and safeguarding the interests of the Bolivian nation, as the government
of the Armed Forces has done so far.
Also, the Government is aware that the ongoing negotiations with the Chilean Government shall be subject to the rules of international law. In this sense, I have taken notice of the consultation that the Chilean Government has made to the Government of Peru, in compliance with the international agreements concluded by both countries. We trust that the understanding that would be reached will effectively enshrine the interests of all stakeholders, in a matter which is crucial for our nation.
The information that I am sharing with the people constitutes a fundamental achievement and the triumph of the understanding between two countries that were called to agree on common goals that are vital for the wellbeing of their people. Also, this is the culmination of the first stage of a laborious and tough task that I was entrusted with at the Consultation Meeting on Returning to the Sea, held in Cochabamba. In my capacity as President of the Republic, I have tried to interpret the nation’s feelings and to preserve the Bolivian interests in this matter, as in no other.
I truly believe that this stage, successfully concluded now, opens a path that will safely lead us to satisfy our national need to return to the sea.
Fellow nationals, with true love for my people I have undertaken the responsibility for fighting for a noble cause that has been deep rooted in the hearts of all Bolivians for 96 years and that, until yesterday, was frustrated.
So, the relations with Chile were restored, trusting that this sister nation, led by the honourable President, General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, will honour its commitment to do justice to the cause of a nation located in the centre of the continent and that, without respite, marches towards the sea.
We are now witnessing the peace brought by Christmas time. I am pleased to bring such good news to the homes of all Bolivians. I am at peace knowing that the efforts, the tenacity and the responsibility were fruitful not only for Bolivia, but also in terms of creating new hopes for peace, understanding and a decision to move towards the future with the confidence of peoples that have faith in their greatness.
I am joyful to celebrate Christmas listening to the Christian message of rebirth together with a hopeful and vigorous people.
Finally, I express my fervent admiration for my people that supported the efforts of the National Government at all times. To the workers, farmers, intellectuals, students and soldiers, men and women from the very heart of South America that encourage this national crusade to return to the sea, my sincere gratitude.
I reaffirm the commitment of the Government of the Armed Forces of the Nation to meet your expectations. We are at a turning point in our history in which we reiterate, truly advocating for peace and greatness, our decision to be triumphant.
Thank you very much.”
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“Negotiations will be held with Chile on the basis of territorial compensation”, Presencia (Bolivia), 29 December 1975 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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Negotiations will be held with Chile on the basis of territorial compensation
Technical and economic possibilities for building a good port north of Arica - Optimism about Peru's response - Exchange of territories: a commercial transaction - Official documents will be made public once Peru's response is known - […]
.Note from editorial staff.- Last night, Bolivian Television and the National radio broadcaster aired President Banzer’s Roundtable with newspaper publishers and directors of radio stations in La Paz. The meeting was held without a fixed agenda, which permitted several matters to be discussed. Naturally, because of the occasion, matters regarding the maritime issue took up most of the time; but economic and political problems were also considered. Because of the importance of the statements, and their ramifications, we offer our readers a full-length version of what occurred during this roundtable, since not everybody could follow it on the television or the radio.
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Ricardo Ocampo: Good evening, dear friends of Bolivian Television. Today we begin the final program of the 1975 Testimony series. Tonight, we have the honour of having the President of the Republic, Gen. Hugo Banzer Suárez, as our guest. To interview him, we have invited the Publisher of Presencia, Mr. Huáscar Cajías, the Publisher of Última Hora, Mariano Baptista; the Director of Radio Nueva America, Raúl Salmón; the Director of La Voz del Pueblo, Roberto Zapata; the publisher of Hoy, Jaime Humérez; and the Director of Radio Fides, Father José Gramunt.
Tonight’s topic is open. Naturally, the highly distinguished journalists that have joined us would not have gone along with pre-established questions or agreements. On the other hand, we have absolute trust in that the President will enlighten us about several aspects of our country’s affairs that he will be asked about.
Without any further ado, I will give the floor to Huáscar Cajías.
TERRITORIAL COMPENSATION FOR CHILE
Huáscar Cajías: Thank you very much. Mr. President, the unavoidable topic of conversation these days is the settlement that could be reached with the Republic of Chile so that we can get our own port on the Pacific Ocean. I have the unfortunate advantage of being the one to start with questions. This might mean setting the tone for what will come later. But as newspaper publishers, we are a bit overwhelmed with mail that we are currently receiving, with opinion letters; which, of course, are not unanimous, but which are always related to two or three of the aspects of the settlement that could be reached with Chile.
In this regard, my first question is about a topic of great concern to our people in general. It is the topic of territorial compensation, whereby the cession of a corridor in part of Chile would be obtained. This is my question, Mr. President: At this time, can the cession of territory be considered a definitively accepted, solidly established condition, or is it a starting point that is still open to discussion?
Gen. Hugo Banzer: Undoubtedly, we could say that this question constitutes the basis for the negotiation. That is obvious, as I said during an address a few days ago on Bolivian Television. I said that they demanded of us, they asked us for, let’s not say territorial compensation; I think that the more exact term is exchange of territories. The Government of the Armed Forces
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has analyzed this point at length, and although we have accepted the Chilean proposal, globally considered as a basis for negotiations, we also consider that an exchange of territories is part of that fundamental basis. And why have we globally accepted, considering that an exchange is a global basis; it’s part of the global basis? Because we really don’t believe that any Chilean government can sell territories. No government can accept something other than territories, because there is no historical justification for doing so. I sincerely believe that no Chilean government could accept gas, oil or even money, because there is no historical justification for going forward with such a negotiation. We believe that any government will request an exchange of territories, now or in the future. And although in the past, negotiations were started on the basis of non-territorial compensation, honestly I think that they were not going to culminate in a settlement with Chile. This is because if I put myself in the Chilean government’s position, I can only emphasize that no government would accept as a basis, that is, would agree to negotiate on the basis of being paid with goods or with money. The same would be true in Bolivia. Under no circumstances could this administration or future ones sell territories, dispose of them; so we believe that an exchange is the only way in which the Chilean government can grant us the corridor, including, of course, the outlet to the sea.
Mariano Baptista: Mr. President, part of Bolivian public opinion maintains that the possibility of this accord may be a step backwards compared to what our representative in Santiago achieved in 1950. In that exchange of notes, the Chilean government spoke of the possibility of Bolivia having a sovereign port without territorial compensation. Nothing was specified in the note, but at that time, it was assumed that this accord would allow Chile to use the waters of Lake Titicaca. In a prior interview, I mentioned the 1950 accord to Ambassador Gutiérrez, and I referred to a famous article by Franz Tamayo. In this article, Tamayo said: “God protect Bolivia and God protect Bolivia and Peru,” referring to this possibility and saying that neither Peru nor Bolivia could allow even one drop of Lago Titicaca’s water to be wasted.
Bolivian public opinion is divided on this most recent arrangement, which is
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why I said that this would represent a step backwards. But there are people, many people, who believe that it has been beneficial, because it does not mention the waters of Lake Titicaca or even the possibility of getting those waters, which is something we couldn’t allow because Peru would oppose it. But, additionally, here is something of interest: Última Hora has conducted research among some of our friends in Chile and they told us that President González Videla’s exchange of notes was not done with the acquiescence or knowledge of Chile’s Armed Forces or the Chilean Congress, and that in no event would it ever have happened. What do you think about these two issues?
Gen. Hugo Banzer: First of all, I would like to say that I am convinced, as I said when I answered Dr. Cajías’s question, that I don’t believe that any Chilean administration could cede its territory and accept water, or raw materials, or resources, or money as compensation. I think that the most logical thing is that it requests an exchange of territories. And I completely agree; how could I not agree with Franz Tamayo, when he said what you mentioned: water from Lake Titicaca, water from the Altiplano cannot be taken, because the Altiplano is a semi-arid area. If we are going to cede or give to Chile water, be it from the Titicaca or the water used to irrigate the Altiplano, we would turn our Altiplano, which is semi-arid anyway, into a desert for sure; so we have to conserve that water because it’s the only factor that allows peasants to have some production.
POSSIBILITY OF BUILDING A PORT
Raúl Salmón: Mr. President, I’m going to formulate my question by going back to some historical events regarding the negotiations that have been going on for nearly a century with respect to our conflict with Chile. It just seems to me that we are locked into one of the four alternatives that have always been proposed. The vindication thesis does not work, because it would cut off the continuity of Chilean territory. The enclave was also rejected. Moscoso’s quixotic proposal, which had no foundation in the development of the three countries’ highland region: Bolivia, Peru and Chile. And finally, the practical thesis, related to the corridor.
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Just this Christmas I was reading a book that is foundational in Chile, by Benjamín Subercaseaux: Chile, A Crazy Geography. This book, 15 editions of which have been published, with the most recent one in 1973, states the following: “From the beginning - he says - the height of these coasts is astounding (referring to the Arica area), over several days it turns into an earthy wall 400 to 800 m high. Those cliffs are the abrupt edge of the plateau which makes up the area, because the whole area is a vast plateau at an altitude of one thousand meters, which, further south, reaches over two thousand meters above sea level in the inland Paposo area.”
That would suggest to us, Mr. President, that the corridor offered to us in Chile’s response would mean that Bolivia would have to build a port across from cliffs, the cost of which would be exorbitant and beyond Bolivia's means, even assuming that we had access to the most advanced technology. In that sense, I think that the country’s hopes for the corridor and return to the sea are to have the purpose of development, not a coast just so that we can go swimming as tourists.
In that regard, what are your administration’s estimates for the cost of building a port there?
Gen. Hugo Banzer: I think that is a very interesting question. In reality, the corridor that starts at the Concordia Line and becomes wider towards the south, shall we say, down to the Arica metropolitan area, is an area that is obviously not one hundred percent suited for the development of a port. But this is not because of the cliffs there; on the contrary, it is because the water is too shallow. We have done some research. In Charaña, the Chilean Foreign Minister himself shared with me the difficulties involved in building a port, from his point of view as a seaman. Despite the fact that significant progress has been made in technical knowledge and port-building technology, this is a concern for us.
Not long ago, the Chilean Foreign Minister himself let us know, through our Ambassador Gutiérrez, that the Chilean government’s most recent data
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shows that a port can be built. They have built one in a very similar area to the south, to handle the demand for transportation that exists because of certain natural resources that they have in that area, and the conditions are very favourable. Even though, say, 50 years ago, port-building technology had not been developed, now it has. In fact, the Chilean government has informed us that if we wanted the baseline studies that they used for the construction of the port that they have developed further south, Bolivia could make use of that information.
Then, there is a foreign company conducting a study of the expansion of our Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos facilities in Arica. According to our talks with Chile, these facilities will be expanded. It has also conducted studies to the north and south of Arica concerning the expansion of these Yacimientos facilities. This company also believes that it will be a bit more costly, but not impossible; so we believe that it is possible to build a port. But additionally, we should keep in mind that in estimating the time that it will take to build a port, if we reach an agreement to exchange territory, undoubtedly, we will have to research and obtain financing. For that reason, the Bolivian proposal considers aspects of autonomous management for part of the Arica port. That is, management by Bolivian personnel at all levels, who have access to the facilities and have independence, but who do not have sovereignty. Without a doubt, this would allow us to manage this part of the port while we build the Bolivian port itself. In short, here is my answer: technically it is not impossible to build a port on this part of the corridor’s coastline, or where the corridor starts. There is no question that it is more difficult to build it there than at a different location on the coast of Chile or Peru; but from what we have been told by people who are knowledgeable on this topic, it can be done.
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Raúl Salmón: Didn't that company that you mentioned give you an approximate figure on the cost of building that port?
Gen. Hugo Banzer: No, I still do not have a global or approximate figure. We believe that we need to be owners of our own sovereign port and that the Bolivian people have to make the necessary effort to build their own port, regardless of the administration in power.
PERU’S POSITION
Roberto Zapata: Mr. President, the bilateral talks we had with Chile, as a result of the 1929 treaty coming into existence, dictated that at the present time, the success or failure of the negotiations depends on Peru’s position. As a matter of fact, during our discussion with Ambassador Guillermo Gutiérrez, he stated that ultimately Peru is the one that has the say. How do you think Peru views the cession at the government level: favourably or unfavourably? Are you optimistic about the Peruvian response or, for example, could it happen that Peru might also suggest that Chile consider compensation, by virtue of the 1929 treaty?
Gen. Hugo Banzer: I must say that I am optimistic and that I have the duty to be so, because optimism and trust are what have brought us to this point in the negotiations. If we had not been optimistic, if we had not had faith in what we were doing, then we probably would have gotten stuck halfway. I am optimistic that Peru's response to Chile’s consultation will be positive. I don't think that Peru, as a sister nation, can oppose this, for it is a country linked to Bolivia, just as Bolivia is linked to Peru, not just through historical ties but through geography as well. Besides, on several occasions, Peruvian administrations have expressed their support for Bolivia’s maritime cause,
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for the cause of returning to the sea. For example, President Velasco Alvarado signed a joint declaration with me when I returned from Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador. In that joint declaration, Peru categorically expressed its support for Bolivia’s return to the sea. In the Ayacucho Act, Peru’s support is more concrete. You will recall that the only bilateral issue included in the Ayacucho Act is the one between Bolivia and Chile. There are so many other things that they would have liked to cover in the Ayacucho Act, for example, Panama and the Panama Canal problem; Argentina’s problem with the Falkland Islands; ultimately, every country has its own problem on this continent. However, the only topic that was covered was Bolivia, the topic of returning to the sea and there, in the Ayacucho Act, Peru and the signatory countries to that Act are categorical: they consider that Bolivia must return to the sea, and not just to foster its natural development, but because through the Ayacucho Act, we have made a commitment to maintain peace on the continent. We have also made a commitment definitively to remove any doubts that may exist, along with the remarks which sometimes appear in the press, to provoke an armed conflict in this part of the South American continent. So the Ayacucho Act is solid ground for us to stand on as far as Peru’s response is concerned. Finally, and when I returned from the United Nations, I met with the current president of Peru, General Morales Bermúdez; we exchanged ideas on the topic and issued a joint press release. Then Peru’s Foreign Minister, De La Flor, came to La Paz not long ago. As you have endeavoured to let the Bolivian people know, his viewpoint on the resolution of Bolivia's landlocked situation is positive. These events make me optimistic, because you can't say “yes, we agree" one day and then “no, we don't agree” the next day. I have great respect for and think highly of Peruvian leaders, whom I consider to be friends; not just friends of the President of Bolivia, but friends of the Bolivian people as well. That is where my optimism comes from.
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NEGOTIATING AN EXCHANGE
Jaime Humérez: Shortly before Chile's response was made known, their Foreign Minister, Vice Admiral Patricio Carvajal, said in official statements to the press that the Act of Charaña and the negotiations underway with Bolivia did not constitute a commitment by Chile to grant sea access to Bolivia or to resolve Bolivia's landlocked situation. Now that we know the response, we see that Chile has proposed a series of conditions on the bases of which Bolivia could be granted a corridor along the Concordia Line, with sovereign access to the sea. From what we know about those conditions, it is clear that the Chilean Foreign Minister's words have been fulfilled almost to the letter, because there is no spirit of generosity among the conditions, nor is there any sense of making reparations, but simply a desire to obtain a benefit based on Chile’s national interests, with the idea that Bolivia is surely obtaining benefits for its development, to satisfy that traditional longing. Based on this, I see what is being done with Chile, in reality, as a high-level commercial transaction in which we are getting the sea - will get it if everything concludes successfully - but at the same time we will pay a price for that sea which, if the negotiations are successful, might be fair or might even be high; but, in any case, we are giving something of ours in exchange for something that we will receive. If we act according to the same point of view, with the same train of thought as the Chilean Foreign Minister, this would naturally mean that in no way should we feel a debt of gratitude or acknowledgment. We would not be thinking that there has been generosity or redress, but that
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we are making an effort, which will certainly be a notable effort, for the country first to cede a territory in exchange for the territory that they will give us, which is a form of bartering, the most primitive commercial transaction known to mankind and, then, compensation or payment for the assets - the railroad, the airport in that territory - in such a way that, by no means should we, the Bolivian people, feel obligated to be eternally grateful. What I want to ask you is whether you feel that this interpretation is correct, or whether the people should view or interpret this transaction with Chile in a different way.
Gen. Hugo Banzer: Undoubtedly, I think that your interpretation is correct. But from the point of view of governments or people, I would like to take this opportunity, I would like to express my gratitude to President Pinochet, my personal gratitude, because he is making good on his word. My first encounter with General Pinochet was in Brazil, and there, at one point during the protocol proceedings that we were invited to, I spoke to him about Bolivia's maritime problem, and he told me: “General, believe me, I will do everything, everything possible so that we can arrive at a solution, an agreement between the two countries.” Then, in Charaña; the Act of Charaña does not include a categorical commitment by Chile to resolve Bolivia’s landlocked situation, but once again, Gen. Pinochet told me that he had a strong personal interest in finding a solution to this problem because he could see that the Chilean people and the Bolivian people could very well develop brotherly relations from the time they complemented each other economically and geographically. So personally, I am grateful to President Pinochet because he has kept his word. Now that the negotiation indeed has a, shall we say, commercial focus, exchanging one thing for another of the same character, this clearly does not oblige us to show our gratitude to anybody. But, I repeat that from my personal point of view, I am thankful to Gen. Pinochet. This is not to say, though, that the Bolivian people ought to be grateful to the Chilean people.
If Chile had given us that territory as a gift, that would be one thing; but, as you have said, this is nothing other than a commercial transaction. So I agree with your point of view.
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THE CORRIDOR’S ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES
José Gramunt: Mr. President, regarding this quasi-commercial transaction that you have just mentioned, the economic and technical terms that have just been mentioned are very important. Therefore, to begin with, is that corridor wide enough to be economically and technically viable for beneficial use in the form of roads, an oil pipeline, and a multipurpose pipeline? Secondly, as you have very clearly stated, it is technically possible to build a new port on the coast or on the beach to the north of Arica. But, is it economically viable, considering that there will soon be two competing ports? This would minimize the economic possibilities for developing that part of the coast, increasing the cost of handling goods, instead of building one great port on that part of the Pacific Coast to decrease the cost of all commercial activity for Bolivia as well as Chile, and, who knows, maybe even for Peru. Is it economically viable to have two ports in Arica, and is the width of the corridor also economically viable? And if I am not mistaken, one end of this corridor is 8 km wide, later reaching a width of about 25 km, but I do not know if the topography at that widest point allows economic use of this corridor.
Gen. Hugo Banzer: We know that there is a railway and an oil pipeline in the corridor. If we reach an agreement with Chile,
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the first thing we would need to be willing to do is overhaul the railway. The Arica-Charaña stretch is in very poor condition, such that at present, the railway does not completely meet Bolivian transportation needs. For example, there is a section in which the train is moved by a cog railway. According to what engineers and specialists on the subject have told me, I believe that now there are technical means of replacing that cog railway with more suitable equipment to allow the trains to move quickly. So Bolivia's first objective must be to get that railway in optimal working condition, which would allow for more efficient movement of our cargo that accumulates in Arica, i.e., naturally the cargo coming from overseas. The same would apply for materials or elements to be transported out of Bolivia. I have proof that with the overhaul of Bolivian railways, the La Paz-Charaña stretch is in very good condition. That is not the case for the Charaña-Arica stretch, but it is logical for it to be in that condition, because in reality, one hundred per cent of the cargo transported by that railway is Bolivian. So, what could be Chile's fundamental interest in putting that railway in optimal condition, if, to begin with, I believe that it is operating at a loss, and on top of that, its cargo is not involved? It is not Chilean cargo; it is Bolivian cargo … [illegible text]. What we would have to do is get that Arica-Charaña stretch of railroad into good condition.
As for the oil pipeline, there are no problems with it because it is working properly. To be sure, if the corridor were under our sovereign control, we could expand the oil pipeline or build another one, if that were in the country’s best interests.
As for building a highway, we do not have a detailed study. But let’s not forget that we are currently studying the Patacamaya-Tambo Quemado highway project, with the intention of building it. The Chilean government has practically finished laying down the asphalt on the Tambo Quemado-Arica stretch. The Tambo Quemado-Arica stretch is not part of the corridor, but it runs very close to its boundary, or it would run very close to the southern boundary of the corridor that is being given preliminary consideration or being negotiated, in such a way that it would not be difficult to link the Tambo
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Quemado-Arica stretch with our future corridor. Or this could be linked to future infrastructure with a very short stretch of highway, just 20 or 30 km. I mean using the Patacamaya-Tambo Quemado-Arica highway after concluding negotiations with Chile, so that that highway can be re-routed in a certain location. That would be much more economical for Bolivia. That is, at this time we do not need to consider a highway to link our country’s production centers or production areas with the future Bolivian port.
José Gramunt: Pardon me. I'm wondering if you would allow me to go back to the topic of competition between the two ports. Has a study already been done, or has that not yet been proposed?
Gen. Hugo Banzer: That has not been proposed, but I see that matter as follows. Undoubtedly, we will continue to utilize the Port of Arica, just as we will continue to utilize other Chilean ports. Let us not forget that 52% of the minerals that Bolivia exports via the Pacific go through Antofagasta, so it will be quite some time until changes are made to our ground transportation infrastructure and all of our minerals are routed to our own port. So additionally, we will continue to utilize the Port of Arica, particularly if the agreement we are negotiating considers management of part of the Port of Arica.
Regarding the construction of another port which would compete with Arica, obviously this could end up being somewhat detrimental for each port. But I think that it would be more detrimental for Arica than for the Bolivian port, from the time that all of the cargo is Bolivian cargo – or in reality almost all of it; I think that 95% of the cargo that comes into the Port of Arica and that will come into our port in the future will be Bolivian. There must be a low percentage of cargo that is not headed for Bolivia, because in any event, Chile mainly imports and exports
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through Iquíque, Antofagasta and other ports. Next to nothing must be coming into the Port of Arica for Chile, and I believe that very little comes in there for Peru, particularly for the Tacna area, but the largest percentage of port activity in Arica concerns incoming and outgoing Bolivian cargo.
Ricardo Ocampo: I'm going to allow myself to make a suggestion to the distinguished journalists that have joined us. Because of the seniority and variety of duties that the President has been performing for such a long time, he is the expert on several matters. I think that we can close the topic of the sea. I think that with the detailed explanation that Ambassador Gutiérrez Vea Murguía has recently given us and the President's timely insight on this topic, we are not getting the opportunity to listen to the President’s viewpoint on other very important aspects of our country's affairs. And with this simple suggestion I would like to give this discussion a fresh start, giving the floor to Huáscar Cajías.
PUBLICITY OF THE PROPOSALS
Huáscar Cajías: Mr. President, in response to the program director's friendly request, I am not going to ask you a question. I'm going to make a request and ask you a question.
Our job as journalists is to inform. Everybody wants to express an opinion on this topic of the sea, but upon a stable foundation. The only more or less certain foundation that we have at this time, which may be 80% certain, is the information provided by the Chilean press, information whose indisputable source is the voluntary indiscretion of a Chilean government official. Couldn't we have another voluntary indiscretion from a Bolivian official, to find out the text of the Bolivian proposal and the Chilean counter-proposal, so that we can express an opinion based on something concrete? So I won't pose this as a question: As a journalist I would ask that this be done as soon as possible, so that we can avoid arguing about points that may already be indisputable, which would be a waste of time and effort for everybody, not just journalists and could possibly result in some completely fruitless run-ins. I would then implore you … [illegible text] agreement that all the rest of the journalists here agree that this pair of documents be made public. I think that Chile
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has fulfilled its duty to its people to make public what is in its best interest, and that the Bolivian government can do the same, if necessary, as I say, through a voluntary indiscretion.
So I will shift the questions to a different field. How do you, or how does the government view next year’s economic situation, particularly considering the drop in the prices of some of our main minerals?
Gen. Hugo Banzer: Regarding the request you have made, I would like to tell you that the Bolivian people have the right, the absolute right, to know Chile’s response. This response is currently being analyzed and evaluated by the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While we could simply just make it known, in a way we are also respecting a commitment to keep this negotiation— I would not say secret, but confidential. Let us not forget that Peru has not yet answered; it has not given its answer, and we must be respectful of the Peruvian stance. Therefore, Bolivia is taking this negotiation seriously. We don't want to answer impulsively, nor do we want anyone to answer impulsively, because these are the things that sometimes make a negotiation fail; I think that in 1950 it made the negotiations fail, or it was the excuse for making the negotiations fail, even though, according to some people, they could have borne fruit. From my point of view, I don't think that was the case, because, once again - I don't think that under any circumstance Chile would accept non-territorial compensation. So as soon as Peru's response is known, and as soon as we can make a careful evaluation of the Chilean response, then the Bolivian people will know the Chilean response in its entirety, as they are entitled to do. Therefore, Dr. Cajías, you can be certain that this is how we will conduct ourselves: very seriously. This is because we believe that this effort is very important for the country and that it must be handled very seriously.
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“Banzer: It will be the people who decide on the agreement with Chile”, Presencia (Bolivia), 30 December 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Presencia (Bolivia)
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PRESENCIA, La Paz, 30 December 1975
Banzer: It will be the people who
decide on the agreement with Chile
It is requested that the maritime problem be analysed “realistically”
SUPPORT FROM RAILWAY WORKERS.- Yesterday, the President of the Republic received representatives of the National Confederation of Railway Workers, who expressed their support for the foreign policy of the Government and for the negotiations with Chile to solve the maritime problem.
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The President of the Republic assured yesterday that it would not be him or his cabinet who decide on Chile’s response to the proposal for an exchange of territory as a solution to Bolivia’s geographical confinement. He went on to say that the decision would come from the people, who will be consulted through their representatives, among which he included labour coordinators.
The President spoke yesterday afternoon to leaders of the National Federation of Railway Workers, who had come to the Palace to express to him this sector’s solidarity with the negotiations that the Bolivian government was conducting with Chile to find a solution to the national maritime aspiration.
Gen. Banzer dismissed the possibility of sounding out the people’s position on negotiations with Chile through a referendum or plebiscite, in view of the cost and time that this would require, which he calculated would be at least US$5 million and eight months. “Are we in a position to waste time and squander money, when the people have their natural representatives?” he asked, adding that although there was no congress or parliament, the labour coordinators were representatives, because “they have not been hand-selected; instead some were selected through elections, when they are held, and others were selected via consensus, because those who could represent their constituencies were appointed. Because of that, there is social peace, and because of that, there is tranquillity.”
He asked the railway coordinators to make contacts and sound out the opinion of their constituencies “because there will be a time when we will have to meet with the representatives of the people,” he said.
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CONFUSION
He went on to say that it is understandable that for many, or for everyone, there was confusion about the Chilean response, which would involve an exchange of territory. He added that this is due to the fact that “we have been brought up to believe that they should give us back part of what they took from us; we’ve always been taught that in school, others have been inculcated with the idea that any solution with Chile should be with non-territorial compensation, but nobody has considered what that non-territorial compensation would mean.”
He went on to state that the problem had been analysed and it was considered that economic compensation, which is what non-territorial compensation would mean, would not be appropriate. He added that the country could not go from being a confined country to being a mortgaged country, that we could not mortgage the future of coming generations, and even this generation, nor could we stop development. He explained that the Bolivian request presented to Chile did not mention any of territorial, non-territorial or economic compensation, and that it was the response that added the component of exchange of territory.
“It’s true”, said Banzer, “that the concept of territorial compensation runs counter to my upbringing, because I was taught the same thing you were. And that’s what has happened with the Bolivian people: they have felt, as they say, shocked by an impression of dissatisfaction. However, little by little, as Bolivians have been digesting the information that we’re giving them, which is impartial, as we begin to compare the two items (territorial and economic compensation), we begin to understand.”
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VICTORY CREATES RIGHTS
Continuing with his reflections, the President stated: “Do you all believe that Chile is going to give us back part of the territory that it conquered as a result of war, just ‘because’? .... Very difficult. In some countries, some people just believe that victory creates rights. The internationalists, the pacifists say that, in international events, victory does not establish rights, but the reality is, - and we have to be realistic - that victory does establish rights. That’s what many Bolivians can’t accept, because they’ve become utopian, idealists, and then they depart from the land of reality, they’re not touching earth, they’re not in contact with the ground, they believe that being in the clouds, thinking in utopias, can continue to keep them going, or with little flags to wave. I believe that it’s best to walk on the path of reality, of facts.”
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The President also repeated the idea that “a country or government cannot sell territory because it does not have historical justification.” He added that, “in addition, thinking about that and then looking at the other party’s position, you have to be realistic and understand.”
He mentioned the fact that someone had suggested to him to offer Chile electric power from the “El Bala” complex, when we have not even studied that project properly, he said. “To build ‘El Bala’ he added, we will need approximately US$500 million, we don’t even have the exact number, and construction will take close to ten years.” And he asked: “Are we going to wait another ten years being confined? Will Chile accept electric power from us in exchange for territory? Could you justify that position to your people? In short,” he concluded, “we’ve looked at all of the circumstances, we want to be realists.”
He also stated that those outside of the country do not understand that what was once an aspiration has now become a vital necessity, and that any country that wants to develop urgently needs an outlet to the sea.
GRATITUDE
The President of the Republic, who met the railway workers accompanied by the Minister of the Interior, Col. Juan Pereda, thanked them for the support that they had offered him and stated that the social peace that existed among the workers was the fruit of understanding and dialogue. He asked them to keep working the same or harder than in 1975, to achieve the national objectives. He reiterated, once again, that he would be glad to receive suggestions or alternatives for a realistic solution of the maritime problem, and censured others as only wanting to criticize.
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Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 6-Y/120,
31 December 1975
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of Chile
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DOCUMENTS:
Notes Exchanged Between Peru and Chile
•
19 and 31 December 1975
Below we have transcribed the text of the notes exchanged between Chile and Peru on 19 and 31 December 1975 with regard to Bolivia’s aspirations to have sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.
In the first one, dated 19 December, Chile communicates to Peru the nature of its conversations with Bolivia and asks for its opinion on the same, in view of the provisions of the 1929 Treaty between the two countries.
In its note from late December of last year, Peru requests a copy of the texts exchanged between Chile and Bolivia prior to issuing an opinion on this matter.
NOTE TO PERU
(19 December)
Republic of Chile – Ministry of Foreign Affairs – No. 685.
Santiago, 19 December 1975.
TO THE HONORABLE MR.
MIGUEL ANGEL DE LA FLOR VALLE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF PERU, LIMA
Your Excellency:
The Government of Bolivia, in order to define the guidelines for a negotiation that enables reaching a solution to Bolivia’s landlocked situation, has proposed to my Government the cession to Bolivia of a sovereign maritime coast between the Concordia Line and the northern boundary of the city of Arica.
That coast must be connected with a territorial strip from said coast to the Chilean-Bolivian frontier, including the transfer of the Arica-La Paz Railway.
The Government of Chile would be willing to negotiate with the [Government] of Bolivia regarding the referred proposal, but previously it wishes to know whether the Government of Peru agrees with the cession requested by Bolivia, considering that it affects the provisions of the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of Lima of June 1929, Article 1 of which reads as follows:
“The Governments of Chile and Peru shall not, without previous agreement between them, cede to any third Power the whole or part of the territories which, in conformity with the Treaty of this date, come under their respective sovereignty, nor shall they, in the absence of such an agreement, construct through those territories any new international railway lines.”
In addition, I inform Your Excellency that my Government has made known to the Government of Bolivia that the solution to be reached must respect the provisions of the Treaty of Lima, and in particular, the easements established in favor of Peru in Articles 2 and 7 thereof.
Likewise, my Government reiterates its will to comply faithfully with the provisions of the Supplementary Protocol to that Treaty.
I renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration.
Patricio Carvajal Prado
Minister of Foreign Affairs
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PERUVIAN RESPONSE
(31 December)
Note No. 6-Y/120
Lima, 31 December 1975.
To the Honorable Vice Admiral Patricio Carvajal
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile
Santiago.
Your Excellency:
With regard to the landlocked situation that affects Bolivia, the Peruvian Government has made public its position of understanding of the aspirations of the Bolivian nation to reach a legal solution to the problem. That position is set forth in the Joint Statement of Presidents Banzer and Velasco, and in the Joint Press Release of Presidents Banzer and Morales Bermudez, as well as in the Declaration of Ayacucho, among other official statements. At this time, the Government of Peru reiterates that position through me.
I have received Note No. 685 dated the 19th of this month regarding the matter, in which Your Excellency informs the Peruvian Government about the Bolivian Government’s proposal to the Government of Chile, which contains a formula to address the problem of Bolivia’s landlocked situation by ceding to this country a strip of territory in the province of Arica. In your note, Your Excellency asks for Peru’s opinion on Bolivia’s proposal, taking into account the provisions of the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of Lima dated 3 June 1929. The Government of Peru also takes note of the statement contained in the note to which I am responding, that Chile will respect and comply with the provisions in the Treaty of Lima dated 3 June 1929, and its Supplementary Protocol of the same date.
In this regard, as it is public knowledge that there is a Chilean counter-proposal to the Bolivian proposal, the Government of Peru considers it indispensable, in order to be able to issue an opinion on the matter, to have a complete and official knowledge of the text of the documents exchanged between Chile and Bolivia. The Government of Peru finds that to reach a constructive understanding in this matter, it is important for the parties to have access to the most open and most extensive information.
In the case of my country, the need to have that information arises from the special ties that link it to the province of Arica because of the historical background, the close geo-economic and social relationship that exists between the territories of Tacna and Arica, and the provisions of the 1929 Treaty of Lima and its Supplementary Protocol.
Please accept the assurances of my highest and distinguished consideration.
(Signed) MIGUEL A. DE LA FLOR VALLE, Division General, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
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“Foreign Minister Guzmán Soriano: We will give compensation that does not compromise our development”, Presencia (Bolivia), 1 January 1976 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Presencia (Bolivia)
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Foreign Minister Guzmán Soriano:
We will give compensation that does not compromise our development
-
The current negotiation is better than the one in 1950
-
There is already a precedent of a territorial exchange with Chile
-
Bolivia will identify what territory will be given in exchange
BY
ANA MARIA R. DE CAMPERO
-INTERVIEW.- Minister of Foreign Affairs Alberto Guzmán Soriano informed PRESENCIA that the compensation it will give Chile will not compromise our development. He also maintained that it would be our country that indicates the territories to be exchanged for the corridor proposed by the Chilean government.
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[…]
–Was there any point at which you felt pessimistic about the progress of the negotiations? [the reporter Ana Maria R. de Campero] asked Guzman Soriano.
–There were times when we were concerned, but not pessimistic. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we have remained optimistic because we knew all along that there would be a
positive response. I think there was a greater fluctuation in the opinion of the public, he stated.
At the time of the meeting in Charaña, there were people who said that it was an easy victory for Chilean diplomacy. From the point of view of Bolivian diplomacy, what is your point of view on this?
–Taking the long view, we can see that the interview was positive. What Bolivia has been seeking is not a unilateral diplomatic triumph; the initial agreement we have reached with Chile is a triumph of understanding. Nobody has triumphed over the other. Because only understanding will lend permanence to this arrangement and allay fears and suspicion in these negotiations.
After relations between the two countries were normalized, it took Bolivia almost six months to draw up a specific proposal. What was the reason for that delay?
–We were studying what was most suitable. You know that the Maritime Commission was organized after the meeting in Cochabamba. The Commission studied the different possible formulas for resolving our landlocked situation. The delay was unavoidable because we had to choose the most viable formula to propose to Chile.
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Furthermore, our ambassador in Santiago, Guillermo Gutiérrez, had to carry on intense efforts to open diplomatic channels before we set forth our proposal. Actually, I think he accomplished this opening in record time.
–What know from the Chilean press that our proposal includes a corridor and an enclave.
–The proposal we have delivered to Chile consists of a package: a series of measures and a series of proposals that make it possible for us to achieve our objective. That is the political framework on which the negotiations are based.
–What objectives have guided the government in requesting a corridor without a port? Surely, even if we had this corridor tomorrow, it would be insufficient for all the cargo shipped into and out of Bolivia.
–That’s right. As you said, we will keep on using other ports. As our president said on television recently, Antofagasta is indispensable, since a large percentage of our
minerals are exported through that port, and that will continue to be an export route, not just temporarily, but indefinitely.
The fact that we have proposed and accepted, in principle, a strip is based on that this is the formula that will allow us to solve our vital problem, the return to the Pacific Ocean, with full sovereignty. This is not a matter of a mere commercial operation or an arrangement to assuage the feelings of the Bolivian people. Instead, it is a matter of achieving access to the SEA, with all its immense riches, such as the riches found in the seabed,
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for example, and thus become a country with its own coast, making its own direct use of those resources.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs paused briefly and then continued:
Based on its geographic situation, Bolivia is a country with multiple gravitation, given its participation in three of the continent’s hydrographic systems: the Amazon, the River Plate and the Pacific basin, which allow it to reach its markets overseas. That is why we will continue to need free transit and free port facilities such as those provided to us by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Peru and Chile, because our import and export cargo must come via the easiest, most direct route. But in the future, having a port will enable us to address certain situations with political tools and the sovereign capacity to plan our infrastructure. For example, we will be able to craft immediate solutions to critical problems such as port congestion and other problems that are now beyond our control, such as stevedore strikes and freight rate fixing.
In the proposal submitted to Chile, have we proposed compensation of any kind?
–Absolutely nothing; we did not specify compensation of any kind. In the instructions given to our ambassador, we merely left open the possibility of conversations about compensation subject to later negotiations.
–Many public figures, among them former State dignitaries, maintain that we should have conducted negotiations based on the 1950 Notes, that is, non-territorial compensation. What is your opinion on this?
–The people making these criticisms are the very ones who had the opportunity to act
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in accordance with their ideas rather than waiting for a military government to arrive and take the initiative. The only outcome of 1950 was these Notes, which did achieve anything in particular, precisely because people were opposed to the idea. That negotiation failed because people were opposed … That should give pause to all those who are now criticizing without providing solutions.
We must conduct and judge negotiations dispassionately.
Does that mean that you believe this round of negotiations has more potential than the 1950 round?
–Yes. In the current negotiation, as compared to 1950, there is progress in several respects.
–Could you state those aspects?
–Of course. First, today’s negotiations are based on a highly specific position that even includes a tentative delimitation for what would be a territorial strip ceded to Bolivia. In 1950, negotiations had not reached that point, and now they have. That is, right now, there is a territory over which negotiations are taking place and over which there is a global commitment in principle between Bolivia and Chile.
Second, we have consulted Peru in these negotiations, which was not done in 1950.
Third, at that time, talking about non-territorial compensation meant that it would have been impossible to know what that compensation would be. We had not yet conducted the studies (that now exist) on what Bolivia could give without compromising its future.
That’s why talking
(Continue on page 2)
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(Comes from page 1)
about non-territorial compensation is risky. Imposing more long-term sacrifice on our country would not be prudent. President Banzer gave us a guideline on this matter when he said that we should not go from being a landlocked country to being a mortgaged country.
What we give Chile must be at the lowest cost with the least disruptive effect on our development. Because, at the end of the day, making progress will mean the future welfare of our people, and that is just as important as our access to the sea.
At this point, General Guzmán Soriano made a call to the Director of Borders at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and when he arrived bearing two maps he showed us that in 1907, there was a precedent for a territorial exchange between Bolivia and Chile.
This was an agreement that arose from the Treaty of 1904, signed by the foreign ministers Sabino Pinilla and Ricardo Salas, by which around 350 kilometers were exchanged, to allow the Chilean section of the railway that connected Antofagasta with Bolivia to be completely within the territory of this country.
After looking at the maps, we went on with the interview.
–After the explanation of the 1950 Notes, we understood that the possibility of territorial compensation to Chile had already been considered at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Does that mean that said hypothesis had been deemed acceptable before Chile responded?
–It was deemed one of the most likely possibilities.
–Before hearing Chile’s proposal?
–After doing studies to consider possible financial compensation. For some months we have been aware of the reality of this aspect, and we have seen the suitability of territorial compensation.
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–Nevertheless, over the course of the year, both the President of the Republic and you, and even Ambassador Gutiérrez have stated that in exchange for a solution of its problem, Bolivia could give natural resources, financial compensation, encourage trade …
–It is in our Bolivian nature and upbringing to reject territorial compensation. But given the actual situation, and given our maritime objective, we have to be pragmatic and take an objective view of our options. That is why I reiterate that one of the conclusions of the study on this matter was the impossibility of dealing with compensation of other kinds. I am sure you will understand that we could not publicize any of these details before receiving a response from Chile; for diplomatic reasons, we could not jump the gun.
–In this matter of compensation, has Chile proposed some specific area?
By no means. It has not even hinted where the area to be exchanged would be located. We were all surprised by the version published in a Chilean daily newspaper that we would be offering territory in an area parallel to Pisagua and Iquique. When the time comes, based on studies by technical committees that are already underway, we will propose the area we deem most suitable.
Here, it is worth pointing out one aspect that is a matter of concern to us. I believe public opinion has narrowed the maritime problem down into a single fact: a territorial swap or exchange. That focus can cause us to lose perspective. Our number one objective in our international policies is to obtain our own and sovereign outlet to the sea. That is, to obtain our own coast, naturally continuous with our territory and with a strip of land that is also sovereign.
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Achieving this objective requires us to call the attention of public opinion. The rest, though it is still important, is incidental, procedural. It is true that it touches the fibre of Bolivians, because we are talking about something we have to give up, but it is tied to the fundamental objective of our nation, returning to the sea.
On the other hand, there are people who are already stepping up to criticize the quality of the land. We have not requested that strip to promote agroindustry. There are those who say that we are going to exchange rich areas for useless ones, areas that don’t even have trees! If they were saying that we would be unable to build suitable infrastructure in that area, that would give us pause. But once we can see that this strip offers us the benefit of having a railway and an airport, we find it even more suitable.
–By the way, what is the amount of the compensation Bolivia would be giving for these two works?
–This would not be a matter of “compensation”; we would be paying for the two works that are already there. But there is nothing defined. This possibility, although not compulsory, is within Chile’s counterproposal. Of course we should be buying both because they would be in our territory, but it has yet to be negotiated how we would purchase them and under what conditions.
The Bolivian proposal, itself having many points, has been responded by Chile in great detail, but it must be said that both countries are relying on the assumption that none of these items
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predetermine any solution of our vital problem. These are subject to negotiation, and I repeat, they are not required conditions in order for obtaining our outlet to the sea.
There has been a lot of talk in the Chilean press, lately, about the matter of demilitarization. In any matter of this nature, these would be proposals to be negotiated. What is essential here is that Chile has already made the commitment to cede territory.
Bolivia has accepted everything that is consistent with its proposal but has left the rest to negotiations. Evidently, there is no expectation that everything has been so coordinated and so closely meshed that the Chilean response will match our proposal.
–What is the size of the territorial strip in kilometers?
–I can’t say precisely, because that is subject to negotiations. But the area on the coast would be approximately 8.9 kilometers, and the entire area could be about 2,500 kilometers. We will know that later, when we receive the report from our technical committee, which is already working on it.
–When will the basic documents on which these negotiations rest be made public? The public are really clamouring to see those documents.
–We will release them shortly. There is a basic diplomatic courtesy that requires that we maintain confidentiality, particularly when the matter is under consultation by the government of our sister country, Peru.
When do you expect Peru to respond?
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–Soon, I think. The Bolivian people are already becoming aware of how suitable this arrangement will be; that is why we don’t think delay would be appropriate. That response will have to be consistent with the expressions of support for our cause at different times on the part of Peruvian leaders.
There is no question but that this maritime issue will be front-page news for quite a while. It is significant that our return to the sea is a priority objective for Bolivians and a common denominator that unites us regardless of any differences we may have.
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Bolivian Supreme Decree No 13301, 7 January 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Official Gazette of the Plurinational State of Bolivia
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DECRETO SUPREMO Nº 13301 GRAL. HUGO BANZER SUAREZ PRESIDENTE DE LA REPÚBLICA C O N S I D E R A N D O : Que, las negociaciones inciadas por el Gobierno de las FF. AA. para obtener una salida propia, soberana y con continuidad geográfica al Océano Pacífico, han concluído en su primera etapa con la contrapropuesta concreta del Gobierno de Chile que ha ofrecido conceder a Bolivia un corredor soberano, con costa marítima al norte de Arica; Que, es necesario someter a inmediato estudio de personas de reconocida capacidad, los términos de la indicada respuesta, en lo fundamental de la misma y en todos sus demás aspectos, a fin de contar con elementos de juicio idóneos en las posteriores negociaciones con Chile; Que, a tal efecto, debe constituirse, al nivel máximo, bajo la Presidencia del Primer Mandatario de la República, el Consejo Nacional Marítimo que deberá ser asesorado por Grupos de Trabajo Especializados que se organizarán de inmediato con la participación de ciudadanos de prestigio y honestidad reconocidos, los que convocados bajo el régimen del Servicio Civil Obligatorio trabajarán conforme a las normas establecidas en el presente Decreto. EN CONSEJO DE MINISTROS, D E C R E T A : ARTÍCULO 1.- Se constituye el Consejo Nacional Marítimo (CONAMAR), presidido por el Primer Mandatario de la Nación e integrado por los señores Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, Defensa Nacional, Planeamiento y Coordinación, del Interior y Justicia, Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas madas, Secretario General y Secretario de Prensa e Informaciones de la Presidencia de la República y otros ciudadanos que podrían ser designados por la Presidencia de la República. ARTÍCULO 2.- Un Coordinador General, servirá de elemento de enlace entre el Consejo Nacional y la Comisión de Asesoría que se menciona en el artículo siguiente. Será designada por el Presidente de la República. ARTÍCULO 3.- Se crea la Comisión de Asesoría Marítima que estará compuesta por Grupos de Trabajo especializados que asesorarán al Consejo Nacional, y realizarán los estudios y análisis cuidadosos de todos los asuntos y aspecto relacionados con el problema del enclaustramiento de Bolivia. ARTÍCULO 4.- Los ciudadanos que deben integrar dichos Grupos y Comisiones de Estudio, serán convocados bajo el régimen del Servicio Civil Obligatorio y trabajarán a tiempo completo, con una remuneración que será fijada en el Presupuesto respectivo para quienes no trabajan en reparticiones del Estado o del sector privado. En el caso específico del presente Decreto, los funcionarios tanto del sector público corno del privado, serán declarados en comisión desde el día de su nombramiento hasta cuando el Gobierno considere necesarios sus servicios, con goce del 100% de sus remuneraciones en la Administración Nacional, departamental, municipal; en las empresas o entidades públicas y en las empresas del sector privado, manteniendo su antigüedad de servicios en la que se tomará en cuenta el tiempo que dure su declaratoria en comisión, así como todos sus derechas y beneficios sociales. ARTÍCULO 5.- El trabajo de los miembros de la Comisión de Asesoría y de los Grupos a que se refiere el artículo primero, es declarado como el más absoluto secreto. Cualquier revelación será sancionada conforme al Código Penal Militar. ARTÍCULO 6.- Todas las reparticiones públicas, están obligadas a proporcionar, en el día, la información, datos y documentos que sean requeridos por el Coordinador General o su alterno. ARTÍCULO 7.- El Ministerio de Finanzas incorporará en el Presupuesto Nacional de 1976, la suma de $b. 15.000.000.- para cubrir las erogaciones por concepto de remuneraciones a los miembros y personal de los Grupos y Comisiones anteriormente referidos y los gastos que demande su funcionamiento. Los señores Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, de Planeamiento y Coordinación, Defensa Nacional y Finanzas quedan encargados de la ejecución y cumplimiento del presente Decreto. Es dado en el Palacio de Gobierno de la ciudad de La Paz, a los siete días del mes de enero de mil novecientos setenta y seis años. FDO. GRAL. HUGO BANZER SUAREZ, Alberto Guzmán Soriano, Juan Pereda Asbún, René Bernal Escalante, Juan Lechín Suárez, Víctor Castillo Suárez, Waldo Bernal Pereira, Julio Trigo Ramírez, Víctor Gonzales Fuentes, Mario Vargas Salinas, José Antonio Zelaya Salinas, Alberto Natusch Busch, Jorge Torres Navarro, Guilermo Jiménez Gallo, Wálter Núñez Rivero.
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SUPREME DECREE NO. 13301
GENERAL HUGO BANZER SUAREZ
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
WHEREAS:
The first phase of the negotiations initiated by the Government of the Armed Forces to obtain its own, sovereign and with geographical continuity outlet to the Pacific Ocean has concluded with the concrete counter-proposal submitted by the Government of Chile, which has offered to grant Bolivia a sovereign corridor, with a maritime coastline to the north of Arica;
It is necessary to submit the terms of the above-mentioned response to the immediate study of well-known competent people, having regard to its fundamental aspects and to all other aspects, in order to count on a suitable baseline opinion in subsequent negotiations with Chile;
For this purpose, the National Maritime Council must be created at the highest level, which shall be presided over by the President of the Republic and advised by Specialized Working Groups that will be organized immediately with the participation of prestigious and honest citizens, who, called under the regime of Mandatory Civil Service, will work pursuant to the rules set forth in this Decree.
TOGETHER WITH THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS,
DECREES:
ARTICLE 1.- The Maritime National Council (CONAMAR) is hereby created and is presided over by the President of the Republic and composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, National Defense, Planning and Coordination, Domestic Affairs and Justice, Joint Commander of the Armed Forces, the Secretary General and the Secretary of the Press and Information of the Office of the President of the Republic and other citizens that may be appointed by the President of the Republic.
ARTICLE 2.- A General Coordinator shall serve as a liaison between the National Council and the Advisory Committee referred to in the following article. He shall be appointed by the President of the Republic.
ARTICLE 3.- The Maritime Advisory Committee is hereby created, which shall consist of specialized Working Groups and shall advise the National Council and conduct careful studies and analyses on all matters and aspects related to the problem of Bolivia’s landlocked situation.
ARTICLE 4.- Citizens joining these Groups and Study Committees shall be appointed under the regime of Mandatory Civil Service and shall work full time, with compensation to be fixed in the respective Budget for those who do not work in State agencies or the private sector. In the specific case of this Decree, officials of both the public and private sectors shall be declared on secondment from the date of their appointment until the moment the Government requires their services, being paid 100% of their remuneration in the National, departmental or municipal Administration, in public companies or entities and private sector companies, maintaining their seniority, which shall take into account the duration of the secondment and all their rights and social benefits.
ARTICLE 5.- The work of the members of the Advisory Committee and that of the Groups referred to in Article 1 is regarded as top secret.
Any disclosure shall be punished pursuant to the Military Penal Code.
ARTICLE 6.- All government agencies are under an obligation to provide, on the day they are requested, the information, data and documents required by the General Coordinator or his deputy.
ARTICLE 7.- The Ministry of Finance shall incorporate in the National Budget of 1976 BOP 15,000.000 to cover the expenses for salaries of members and staff of the Groups and Committees referred to above and the expenses required for their operation.
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Planning and Coordination, National Defence and Finance are responsible for the implementation and enforcement of this Decree.
Executed in the Government House, in the city of La Paz, on 7 January 1976.
SIGNED BY GENERAL HUGO BANZER SUAREZ, Alberto Guzmán Soriano, Juan Pereda Asbún, René Bernal Escalante, Juan Lechín Suárez, Víctor Castillo Suárez, Waldo Bernal Pereira, Julio Trigo Ramírez, Víctor Gonzales Fuentes, Mario Vargas Salinas, José Antonio Zelaya Salinas, Alberto Natusch Busch, Jorge Torres Navarro, Guilermo Jiménez Gallo, Wálter Núñez Rivero.
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SUSCRIPCION OBLIGATORIA DECRETO SUPREMO Nº 690 03 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 2010 .- Dispone la suscripción obligatoria, sin excepción alguna, de todas las entidades del sector público que conforman la estructura organizativa del Organo Ejecutivo, así como de entidades y empresas públicas que se encuentran bajo su dependencia o tuición, a la Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia, dependiente del Ministerio de la Presidencia, para la obtención física de Leyes, Decretos y Resoluciones Supremas. TEXTO DE CONSULTA Gaceta Oficial del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia Derechos Reservados © 2014 www.gacetaoficialdebolivia.gob.bo
SUPREME DECREE NO. 690
3 NOVEMBER 2010.- The President of the Republic orders the compulsory subscription, without exception, by all public sector entities that make up the organizational structure of the Executive Branch, as well as by all public entities and companies that are under its control or custody, to the Official Gazette of Bolivia, under the Ministry of the Office of the President, in order to obtain physical copies of Laws, Decrees and Supreme Resolutions.
Annex 189
Instructions from the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, published in Presencia (Bolivia), 16 January 1976 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, History of the Chilean-Bolivian Negotiations, 1975-1978 (1978), pp 12-13
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3. ACCEPTANCE OF EXCHANGE BY BOLIVIA
It has previously been stated that territorial exchange was an essential element of the negotiations held with Bolivia. This condition was unequivocally accepted by this country.
It should be noted that there is a precedent concerning territorial exchange between Chile and Bolivia. On 1 May 1907, both governments signed a Protocol in this regard: “In order to consider the change of certain sections of the boundary line established in the Treaty of 20 October 1904, as they agree it better serve the interests of both countries …”
In addition to accepting the general conditions set forth by Chile, the Government of Bolivia repeatedly and specifically showed itself willing to accept the proposed principle of exchange.
a)
On 20 December 1975, President Banzer, in a message addressed to the country, reiterated Bolivia’s global acceptance of the proposal made by Chile. The Chilean response to our proposal of 26 August -said Banzer- satisfies us, in principle, and added: “A Committee will analyze the Chilean response, which may be described as an historical success, by means of a dialogue and understanding between peoples.”
b)
The daily newspaper “Presencia” in La Paz published on 16 January 1976, instructions that the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had sent to its Ambassador in Santiago for the continuation of the negotiations.
The following positions about the Chilean position were adopted in those instructions:
“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic has sent specific instructions to the Bolivian Ambassador in Santiago with respect to the Chilean proposal. In said instructions, the formula set forth in the response is globally accepted, in the parts that agree with the Bolivian proposal, and other aspects are left pending for a future stage of negotiation. In the same way, the principle of territorial exchange is accepted as a contribution by both countries that will make possible a cordial understanding.”
“The instructions set forth the National Government’s opinion of the points contained in the Chilean response, which are as follows:
1. The Bolivian government agrees that for a pragmatic negotiation that allows our country to obtain its own and sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, the current reality must be considered.
2. The National Government agrees to the cession to Bolivia of a sovereign maritime coast, linked to Bolivian territory by a sovereign strip of land, whose northern boundary is the border between Chile and Peru. As for the southern boundary, in principle, the points of reference proposed by the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Office are considered admissible, but the proper adjustments must be studied afterwards.
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3. The acceptance of a simultaneous exchange of territories is subject to a clarification of the maritime area, in view of the fact that the extension of internal waters, territorial sea and patrimonial sea has not yet been defined by the International Community.
4. The National Government has stated that the territories that are likely to be exchanged should be determined through an evaluation by the proper organizations in Bolivia and Chile. Therefore, Bolivia reserves the right to negotiate the areas that might potentially be exchanged.”
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Annex 190
Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 6-Y/1,
29 January 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
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Annex 190
Annex 190
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REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
NOTE N 6-Y/1 LIMA, 29 JANUARY 1976
YOUR EXCELLENCY:
I have had the honor of receiving the Note from Your Excellency dated 7 of this month in which, in responding to the [Note] I had conveyed to you on behalf of the Peruvian Government on 31 December last, you refer to the delivery by the Ambassador of Chile in Lima of the communications exchanged between the representatives of the Governments of Bolivia and Chile, which were intended to specify the guidelines for a negotiation on the problem of the first of these countries being landlocked , by means of the cession of a strip of territory in the province of Arica in exchange for territorial compensation yet to be determined and other conditions.
As stated by Your Excellency, the Ambassador of Chile in Lima delivered to me copies of the texts of the “Aide Memoire” dated 26 August 1975, which contains the Bolivian proposal; the Note of 16 December of the same year, from the Ambassador of Bolivia in Santiago to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile; and the communication from the Government of Chile, through its Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 19 December, by which it responds to the Bolivian proposal.
My government has examined with due attention the official documents that Your Excellency conveyed to me. This examination shows that in this problem, as it had been addressed until now, a number of substantial elements exist between which there is an obvious relation; the reciprocal proposals formulated by Chile and Bolivia; the Treaty of Lima of 1929 and its Supplementary Protocol;
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and the repercussions which would arise from the fundamental alteration of the legal status, the territorial distribution, and the socioeconomic structure of an entire region.
From the analysis of the Treaty and, specifically, of Articles 2, 5, 7 and 10, clearly follows that when the negotiating parties enacted the political separation of the two ancient Peruvian provinces of Tacna and Arica, resulting in the dislocation of the traditional geographical, social and administrative cohesion, they established a supplementary system of coordinated interplay of the two aforementioned territories; in other words, they created for them a new legal status of harmonious coexistence, mutual economic cooperation and clear regional neighbouring integration. Consistently with this spirit, the Treaty provided for a Peruvian presence in Arica by way of a set of specific rights.
Due to the vital significance and projection into the future of that status, the Treaty signatories deemed it appropriate to include in the text a special provision in case of a change of dominion in the area. This was precisely the purpose of Article 1 of the Supplementary Protocol of 1929.
Consequently, the Bolivian proposal to the Government of Chile about an outlet to the sea through Arica having been produced, my Government believes that it is necessary for Peru and Chile to conduct a prior analysis of the problem, both in terms of legal aspects and of the interests of our two countries. This analysis must be based on the full compliance with the Treaty of Lima of 1929 and its integrated Protocol, and it should consider and evaluate the measures aimed at addressing all the situations arising from a possible change of the Peruvian-Chilean status in the region as well as the impact such change would have on the economic and social life of the people living in that area upon the interruption
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of the current territorial continuity between Tacna and Arica.
According to Peru, the analysis of the problem must be fundamentally oriented at seeking any solution that, by the just consideration of the Rights and interests involved, constitute in itself guarantee of permanent peace.
Consistently with all of the foregoing, my Government formally proposes to hold talks with that of Your Excellency on this important issue. In so doing, it is confident that these talks will contribute to improving the effective foundations of a lasting friendship and cooperation among Peru, Chile and Bolivia.
“I take this opportunity to extend to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration”.
MIGUEL ANGEL DE LA FLOR VALLE
DIVISION GENERAL
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TO HIS EXCELLENCY VICE-ADMIRAL
PATRICIO CARVAJAL PRADO
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF CHILE
SANTIAGO
ERRAZURIZ
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Annex 191
Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, No 88, 17 February 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
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Annex 191
Annex 191
1077
REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
No. 88
Santiago, 17 February 1976.
Your Excellency:
I
have the pleasure to acknowledge receipt of Note No. 6-Y/l, dated 29 January 1976, in which Your Excellency refers to my note of the 7th of the same month, in which I informed you that I had instructed the Ambassador of Chile in Lima to officially hand over to your Government the complete texts of the documents exchanged between Chile and Bolivia, related to the negotiations aimed at finding a solution to the landlocked situation of that country.
I have already
had the honour of informing Your Excellency, in my Notes of 19 December 1975 and 7 January 1976, that the arrangement between Chile and Bolivia to give Bolivia a sovereign outlet to the sea, through a strip of territory to the North of Arica, will be subject to Peru’s prior agreement, pursuant to Article I of the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of Lima of 1929. The proposed solution also
TO HIS EXCELLENCY, DIVISION GENERAL MIGUEL ÁNGEL DE LA FLOR VALLE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF PERU
LIMA.
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REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
must contemplate full respect for the rights established by that Treaty and its Supplementary Protocol in favour of Peru that might be affected by the cession to Bolivia of the strip of territory referred to. Indeed, the Treaty of 1929 established Chile’s sovereignty over Arica and Peru’s sovereignty over Tacna, with certain rights being granted in favour of both nations at the same time. I take this opportunity to reaffirm to Your Excellency that respect for the specific rights granted to Peru is a condition for the arrangement between Chile and Bolivia. This same willingness is clearly stated in my Note of 19 December sent to His Excellency the Bolivian Ambassador in Santiago.
Without prejudice to the foregoing, and guided by the spirit of friendship and cooperation that motivates its talks with Bolivia and its desire to maintain the closest and most cordial relations with Peru, the Chilean Government will be most pleased to hold talks with Your Excellency’s Government aimed at establishing the most effective manner of protecting and ensuring the exercise of such rights.
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In order to start these talks as soon as possible, my Government will appoint an ad-hoc representative to meet with the person designated by Your Excellency.
I take this opportunity
to reiterate to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest and most distinguished consideration.
[Signed]
PATRICIO CARVAJAL PRADO
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile
Annex 192
Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 6-Y/2, 3 March 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
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Annex 192
Annex 192
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REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
NOTE 6-Y/2
LIMA,
3 MARCH 1976.
YOUR EXCELLENCY:
I am pleased to acknowledge to Your Excellency receipt of Note No. 88, of the 17th of last month, in which the Illustrious Government of Chile accepts to hold the talks to which it was invited by the Government of Peru in its Note no. 6-Y/1, of 29 January last. I am convinced that these talks will allow a thorough analysis of a matter of such vital interest to our countries.
In this regard, I am pleased to offer to Your Excellency, on behalf of my Government, the city of Lima as the venue for these talks.
I am also pleased to inform you that I have instructed the Ambassador of Peru in Chile to inform Your Excellency of the name of the representative of my Government who will meet with the representative appointed by the Illustrious Government of Chile, along with the advisors deemed appropriate, on the date set by mutual agreement for the commencement of the talks.
I take this opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency my highest and most distinguished consideration.
MIGUEL A. DE LA FLOR VALLE
DIVISION GENERAL
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TO HIS EXCELLENCY VICE ADMIRAL
PATRICIO CARVAJAL PRADO
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Annex 193
Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile, No 4086, 11 March 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
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Annex 193
Annex 193
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N.° 4086
SANTIAGO, 11 March 1976.
AMBASSADOR,
I have the honour of referring to my Note N.° 686, dated 19 December 1975, by which I informed Your Excellency of the Chilean Government’s position on the Bolivian proposal contained in the 26 August 1975 Aide Memoire regarding the negotiation framework that would allow to reach an adequate, complete and final solution to Bolivia’s landlocked situation.
In particular, I would like to refer to paragraph 4.°, letter f), section 3.° of said Note, in which my Government proposed that:
“In order to determine the new political-international limits between Chile and Bolivia, the Mixed Boundaries Commission would be re-established, granting it authority to examine the border zone and to make proposals regarding the fixing of the limits to both Governments, trying to avoid that the territories to be ceded comprise populated areas.”
As Your Excellency knows, the Chile-Bolivia Mixed Boundaries Commission was established in accordance with article 1.°, section 1.° of the “Protocol on Replacement and Conservation of Boundary Markers” signed between our governments on 10 August 1942, at the city of La Paz. In that same occasion an Additional Act to said Protocol was also signed with the purpose of determining the manner in which the Mixed Boundaries Commission was to act.
Taking into account that in its Note N.° 681/108/75 dated 16 December 1975 the Government of Bolivia accepted the general terms of my Government’s response, the Government of Chile formally proposes to the Government of Bolivia that to determine the new political-international limits between Chile and Bolivia that would be a product of the simultaneous exchange of territories between the two countries, the Mixed Boundaries Commission be granted powers to study the border area and make the relevant proposals to both Governments.
Said powers would complement the competences the Mixed Boundaries Commission was granted by the 1942 Protocol and by our Government’s exchange of notes at La Paz on 28 July 1959.
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Finally, Your Excellency, I propose that this Note and Bolivia’s affirmative reply constitute an agreement between both Governments to give the new aforementioned competences to the Mixed Boundaries Commission.
Your Excellency, I take this opportunity to reiterate the highest assurances of my most distinguished consideration.
PATRICIO CARVAJAL PRADO
Minister of Foreign Affaires
To His Excellency
Guillermo Gutiérrez Vea Murguia
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Bolivia
Hand delivered
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Annex 194
Telex from the Embassy of Chile in Bolivia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 11 March 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
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Annex 194
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REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE FORM
(Telex and Cables)
CLASSIFICATION
NUMBER
TIME GROUP
MONTH
YEAR
OPEN
121
110935
MARCH
1976
FROM: EMBACHILE LA PAZ
TO: DIRELAS INFO DIPLAN
TEXT
LAST NIGHT THE MINSTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AT THE END OF A PROLONGED MEETING OF THE NATIONAL MARITIME COUNCIL:
“IN ORDER FOR PUBLIC OPINION TO BE PROPERLY INFORMED ABOUT CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL CRITERIA CONTEMPLATED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BOLIVIA AND CHILE, WHICH ARE AIMED AT SOLVING BOLIVIA’S GEOGRAPHICAL CONFINEMENT THROUGH A FREE AND SOVEREIGN OUTLET ON THE PACIFIC OCEAN, IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT, AS ALREADY STATED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT HAS NOT ASSUMED DEFINITIVE COMMITMENTS.”
“WE HAVE CATEGORICALLY DECLARED THAT WE ACCEPT GLOBAL BASES OF NEGOTIATION THAT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE RECIPROCAL INTERESTS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THOSE MATTERS ON WHICH THERE IS COMMON GROUND BETWEEN US. ALL OTHER MATTERS CONTAINED IN THE DOCUMENTS FORMING THE BACKGROUND TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, I.E. BOLIVIA'S PROPOSAL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE'S RESPONSE, WOULD BE ADDRESSED AT A LATER STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.”
“CONSEQUENTLY, WE WANT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR GOVERNMENT HAS NOT ACCEPTED THE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE AREA TO BE HANDED OVER TO BOLIVIA, INASMUCH AS IT WOULD LEAD TO A LIMITATION OF SOVEREIGNTY, THE USE OF THE WATERS OF THE LAUCA RIVER AS A WHOLE, OR A TERRITORIAL EXCHANGE THAT WOULD EXTEND OVER MARITIME AREAS.”
“LA PAZ, 10 MARCH 1976.”
SPACE FOR INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION
Approval by ORIGINATING AUTHORITY
Approval by CODE DEPARTMENT
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“Bolivia has not assumed definitive commitments with the Chilean Government”, El Diario (Bolivia), 11 March 1976 (extract)
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
El Diario (Bolivia)
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Annex 195
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Bolivia has not assumed definitive commitments with the Chilean Government
[...]
The text of the written Declaration issued yesterday night by Foreign Minister Alberto Guzmán is as follows:
In order for public opinion to be properly informed about certain fundamental criteria contemplated in the negotiations between Bolivia and Chile, which are aimed at solving Bolivia’s geographical confinement through a free and sovereign outlet on the Pacific Ocean, it should be recalled that, as already stated on several occasions, the National Government has not assumed definitive commitments.
We have categorically declared that we accept global bases of negotiation that take into account the reciprocal interests of our two countries, particularly as regards those matters on which there is common ground between us. All other matters contained in the documents forming the background to the negotiations, i.e. Bolivia's proposal and the Government of Chile's response, would be addressed at a later stage of the negotiations.
Consequently, we want to make clear that our Government has not accepted the demilitarization of the area to be handed over to Bolivia, inasmuch as it would lead to a limitation of sovereignty, the use of the waters of the Lauca River as a whole, or a territorial exchange that would extend over maritime areas.”
Once the meeting was over, those present declined to make statements, merely saying that they had held an ordinary session of the National Maritime Council where several matters concerning Bolivia’s landlocked situation were discussed, analyzing and assessing the state of the negotiations with Chile.
Unofficially it was known that during yesterday’s meeting a detailed explanation was made of the territories that would be subject to exchange as compensation for the corridor offered by Chile north of the city of Arica. This is evident from the participation of the Director of the Military Geography Institute, Oscar Wilde, and the head of the [Earth Resources Technology Satellite] ERTS Program in Bolivia.
EL DIARIO
[...]
La Paz, Thursday, 11 March 1976
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“Chile’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs: There is no deterioration in the negotiations over Bolivia’s outlet to the sea”, Presencia (Bolivia), 13 March 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Presencia (Bolivia)
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PRESENCIA
Newspaper founded on 28 March 1952
Year 24 - No 6,384 - La Paz, Bolivia, Saturday, 13 March 1976 - 14 Pages - $b. 2.00
Chile's Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
There is no deterioration in the negotiations over Bolivia’s outlet to the sea
S
a
ntiago de Chile, 12 (AP) - The statements by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of BOLIVIA do not mean a deterioration in the talks between Chile and Bolivia over an outlet to the sea for the andean plateau country, said an important source at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile.
The comment refers to a declaration issued on Wednesday in La Paz by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Alberto Guzmán Soriano, who stated that his government had not accepted certain points in Chile’s proposal to overcome Bolivia’s landlocked situation.
The statements by Bolivia’s Foreign Affairs Minister reflect a posture in the negotiation, but in no way do they signify a deterioration in the talks currently being held between Chile and BOLIVIA, the source stated.
Guzmán Soriano said the Government in La Paz has not assumed definitive commitments with Chile, and that it has not accepted the demilitarization of the area to be handed over to Bolivia, inasmuch as it would lead to a limitation of sovereignty, the use of the waters of the Lauca River as a whole, or a territorial exchange that would comprise maritime areas.
The source at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that those statements clearly reflect a posture in the negotiation. The differences between the postures of the two countries must be overcome over the course of the talks.
The Embassy of BOLIVIA yesterday qualified as completely unfounded the interpretations concerning the suspension or rupture of the negotiations with Chile, after Guzmán Soriano's statements were made known.
The Bolivian mission answered all questions posed by the local press and disclosed the text containing the statements by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Embassy pointed out that the statements are testimony of a legitimate stance and sentiment of the people and the government of BOLIVIA.
Therefore, all interpretations and comments concerning a suspension or rupture in those negotiations are absolutely groundless, the embassy stated.
The proposal that Chile put forward to Bolivia includes the cession of a corridor north of Arica, which would be demilitarized; territorial compensation; and the use by Chile of the entire waters of the Lauca River, which runs on the frontier between the two countries.
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Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, No 4378, 18 March 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
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Annex 197
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REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
No. 4378
Santiago, 18 March 1976
Your Excellency:
I have the honour to reply to Note No. 6-Y/2 dated March 3 of this year, by which Your Excellency accepts the proposal included in my Note No. 88 of 27 February of this year, to appoint ad-hoc representatives to carry out talks between our governments, with the purposes outlined in the proposal.
As expressed by Your Excellency, the Peruvian Ambassador in Santiago has informed me that the Peruvian representative will be Mr. Luis Marchand Stens, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru.
In turn, I am pleased to inform Your Excellency that the Government of Chile has appointed, as its representative for these purposes, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Julio Philippi Izquierdo, and as alternate representative, the Political Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Enrique Bernstein Caravantes, in addition to such other advisors as may be deemed appropriate.
TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF PERU
DIVISION GENERAL MIGUEL ANGEL DE LA FLOR VALLE
LIMA
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In response to the kind invitation of the Government of Peru to hold the talks in Lima, my government gladly accepts that they begin in that capital and, if a subsequent meeting is needed, my government offers to hold it in Santiago.
If the Government of Peru agrees to it, said talks could commence on the following 19 April.
I take this opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest and distinguished consideration.
PATRICIO CARAVAJAL PRADO
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile
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Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 6-Y/3, 31 March 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
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Annex 198
1111
NOTE N 6-Y/3
LIMA, 31 MARCH 1976
Your Excellency,
I have the honour to address Your Excellency in response to your Note No. 4378, dated 18 March of this month, in which you exparess your acceptance to hold in the city of Lima the talks proposed by the Government of Peru in my Note No. 6-Y/1, dated 29 January 1976. Your Excellency has also kindly informed me of the appointment of former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Julio Philippi Izquierdo, as Ad Hoc Representative of the Government of Chile, and Ambassador Henry Bernstein Carabantes as Alternate Representative.
I further confirm to Your Excellency the information provided by the Ambassador of Peru in Santiago in the sense that Ambassador Luis Marchand Stens, Secretary General of Foreign Affairs, has indeed been appointed by the Government of Peru as its Representative for the abovementioned talks. In turn, Ambassador Antonio Belaúnde Moreyra, Minister Luis Solari Tudela and First Secretary Hernán Couturier Mariátegui have been appointed as Advisors.
In relation to the kind offer of the Government of Chile to continue talks, if necessary, in Santiago, the Government of Peru accepts to hold them alternately in the two capital cities.
To: His Excellency Vice-Admiral
Patricio Carvajal Prado
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile
Santiago
[Signature]
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Finally, I communicate to Your Excellency that the Government of Peru agrees to open the talks on the following 19 April.
I take this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest and distinguished consideration.
[Signature]
MIGUEL A. DE LA FLOR VALLE
DIVISION GENERAL
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Annex 199
Aerogram from the Chilean Embassy in Bolivia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 35, 5 April 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EMBASSY OF CHILE
LA PAZ, BOLIVIA
REG/PWP
MINRELACIONES
SANTIAGO, CHILE
AEROGRAM (DIRECOMEX) RES. NO. 35
LA PAZ, 5 April 1976.
Resugram RES. 16 – Remioficio RES. 83/22 (point 8)
1. In early February the Director of the Bolivian Geological Service (GEOBOL), Mr. Álvaro Fernández, reported that within what could be considered as “negotiable” territory in the Western Mountain Range, an inventory of natural resources would be created with the exploratory work to be done by that entity. He went on to say that the Government, through the National Maritime Council (CONAMAR), had earmarked special funds for this investigation by GEOBOL personnel in cooperation with the University, in the belief that non-metallic resources were the most important potential source.
2. Mr. Álvarez said that the work would be done via satellite and that they had made contacts in the United States for work of this nature.
3. According to information, the Bolivian Government has advanced USD 100,000 to carry out the program.
4. An analysis of the background information causes us to think that the real reason for this action is to protect the Government from the criticism that it would incur if it exchanged territories
CONFIDENTIAL
E. LA PAZ (DIRECOMEX)
AEROGRAM R.
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with great potential value. Opponents have insisted in the campaign that “enormous” resources are contained in the border regions.
5. It seems obvious that extensive prospecting in the border region will require participation by specialized international companies and investments of large sums of money.
[Signed]
DÍAZ
DISTRIBUTION:
1. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DIRECOMEX)
2. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Filing Office)
3. EMBASSY LA PAZ, file
Annex 200
Joint Peruvian-Chilean Press Release, 23 April 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, History of the Chilean-Bolivian Negotiations, 1975-1978 (1978), p 48
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JOINT PERUVIAN-CHILEAN PRESS RELEASE
The Ad-hoc Representative of Chile, Dr. Julio Philippi Izquierdo, and the Alternate Representative, Ambassador Enrique Bernstein Carabantes, met with the Representative of Peru, Ambassador Luis Marchand Stens, accompanied by their respective Advisors, from 20 April to 23 April in the city of Lima, in order to hold the talks provided for in the Notes exchanged between the Governments of Peru and Chile, related to the discussions between Chile and Bolivia regarding the potential cession of a strip of territory north of Arica.
Dr. Julio Philippi Izquierdo and Ambassador Enrique Bernstein Carabantes were received in a special audience by the President of Peru, Francisco Morales Bermúdez Cerrutti, Division General of the Peruvian Army, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Ángel de la Flor Valle, Division General of the Peruvian Army.
The talks held between the Representatives of Peru and Chile took place in an atmosphere of great cordiality and openness. Both Representatives addressed the various and complex aspects of this important matter.
The Representatives of Peru and Chile agreed to continue the talks in Santiago, Chile, at the end of June.
Both Representatives expressed the certainty that the contacts made in Lima will strengthen a fruitful dialogue between Peru and Chile and therefore will strengthen the relations between their respective Governments.
Lima, 23 April 1976
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Joint Peruvian-Chilean Press Release, 9 July 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, History of the Chilean-Bolivian Negotiations, 1975-1978 (1978), p 49
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JOINT PRESS RELEASE
The Representative of Peru, Ambassador Luis Marchand Stens, met with the Representative of Chile, Professor Julio Philippi Izquierdo, and the Alternate Representative, Ambassador Enrique Bernstein Carabantes, accompanied by their respective Advisors, from 5 to 9 July, in the city of Santiago, to hold the second round of talks planned by the two Governments with regard to the potential cession to Bolivia of a strip of territory to the north of Arica.
Ambassador Luis Marchand Stens was received in special audiences by His Excellency the President of Chile, Army General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, and by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vice Admiral Patricio Carvajal Prado. On both occasions, it was clear that Chile and Peru were interested in strengthening the ties of friendship that fortunately bind them.
In this course of this second round of talks, they continued examining the various aspects affecting the border relations between Peru and Chile, deriving from the Treaty of Lima of 1929 and its Supplementary Protocol, as well as from numerous Subsequent Conventions. Through this analysis they arrived at significant and positive elucidations in this complex matter.
The talks continued in the same atmosphere of cordiality, openness and lofty perspective that characterized the meeting in Lima last April.
The representatives of Peru and Chile agreed to continue with the talks in the city of Lima on an upcoming date to be set by both delegations, taking into account the need to complete, in certain aspects, the analysis of matters that were already discussed at the meetings in Lima and Santiago.
The Representatives confirmed with great satisfaction that the process of talks under way has constructively strengthened the bilateral dialogue between their respective Governments.
SANTIAGO, 9 July 1976
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Agreement establishing a Permanent Mixed Commission, agreed by exchange of Notes No 12683 of 28 July 1976 and
No 669/72/76 of 11 August 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Treaties, Conventions and International Arrangements of Chile 1810-1976, Vol. II (1977), pp 260-261
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AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING A PERMANENT
MIXED COMMISSION
Agreed by the exchange of Notes, in Santiago, Chile, on 28 July 1976
REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
No. 12683
Santiago. 28 July 1976.
AMBASSADOR:
I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Government of Chile has agreed to create a Permanent Mixed Commission aimed at strengthening its relations with the Government of Bolivia.
This Commission’s fundamental objective will be to discuss any issues of common interest to both countries, especially those relating to economic and technical cooperation, physical integration and the development of trade.
Within this broad framework, the Commission will establish its own regulations and work schedule, on the understanding that its meetings will be held alternately in Chile and Bolivia.
Should Your Excellency agree with the foregoing, this note and your positive reply will constitute a formal agreement between our governments.
I take this opportunity to extend to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.
Patricio Carvajal Prado
Minister of Foreign Affairs
To His Excellency
Adalberto Violand Alcázar
Ambassador of Bolivia
Hand delivered
EMBASSY OF BOLIVIA
669/72/76
Santiago. 11 August 1976.
MINISTER:
I have the honor to answer Note No. 12683, sent by Your Excellency to me on 28 July, which reads as follows:
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“Ambassador:
I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Government of Chile has agreed to create a Permanent Mixed Commission aimed at strengthening its relations with the Government of Bolivia.
This Commission’s fundamental objective will be to discuss any issues of common interest to both countries, especially those relating to economic and technical cooperation, physical integration and the development of trade.
Within this broad framework, the Commission will establish its own regulations and work schedule, on the understanding that its meetings will be held alternately in Chile and Bolivia.
Should Your Excellency agree with the foregoing, this note and your positive reply will constitute a formal agreement between our governments.
I take this opportunity to extend to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.
(Signed) Patricio Carvajal Prado. Minister of Foreign Affairs.”
In informing
Your Excellency that my government agrees with the terms of the note quoted above, I reiterate the assurance of my highest consideration.
Adalberto Violand
To His Excellency Vice Admiral
Patricio Carvajal Prado
Minister of Foreign Affairs
HAND DELIVERED
Annex 203
Memorandum of Meeting between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile and the Bolivian Ambassador to Chile,
16 August 1976, attached to a Note from the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Chilean Ambassador to Bolivia,
No 59, 19 August 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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CONFIDENTIAL
REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DIRELAS) RES. No. 59
RE: Sending the indicated
documentation
REF: Ordinary Circular No. 389
SANTIAGO, 19 August 1976
FROM: MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TO: AMBASSADOR OF CHILE IN LA PAZ
I. Further to my Ordinary Circular No. 389, I am sending you a photocopy of the Notes exchanged between this Ministry and the Embassy of Bolivia in Santiago, by which the Permanent Mixed Chile-Bolivia Commission was established.1
II. I also enclose a copy of the Memorandum on the meeting held by the Bolivian Ambassador with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 16 August. At the meeting they discussed issues of which you should be aware.
Sincerely
yours,
BY
ORDER OF THE UNDERSECRETARY
[signature]
P
ABLO VALDES PHILLIPS
Minister
Counselor
Director of International Relations
HSB/ft
DISTRIBUTION:
1. EMBACHILE LA PAZ
2. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (FILING DESK), file
3. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DIRELAS), file
1 [The original document does not attach these Notes, which were exchanged on 28 July 1976 and 11 August 1976 and which are reproduced as Annex 202.]
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CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM
FROM: OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
TO: MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
I. On 16 August of this year, at 5:00 p.m., the Minister of Foreign Affairs received Bolivian Ambassador Adalberto Violand in an audience. The meeting was attended by the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, the Director General and the Director of Planning of this Foreign Ministry and the Minister Counselor and the Counselor of the Bolivian mission in Santiago.
II. After the customary greetings, the Ambassador told the Minister that he was the bearer of good news, because he brought with him the Diplomatic Notes to establish the Mixed Chilean-Bolivian Commission for economic, scientific and technical cooperation and physical integration, which would meet in the future alternately in Chile and Bolivia.
III. The Minister read aloud the Notes that were exchanged, and thanked Bolivia for their answer, so that they would now be able to form the indicated Mixed Commission.
IV. The Ambassador proposed that the Commission could be established
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1135
officially and simultaneously in Santiago and La Paz, which would have to be done, therefore, next Thursday the 19th of this month, at noon.
V. Then, the Bolivian diplomat said that the Chilean Foreign Minister was aware of President Banzer’s positive disposition with respect to the discussions being held by the two countries to give Bolivia an outlet to the Pacific Ocean. He also mentioned the possibility of a meeting between the Chilean Foreign Minister and Minister Adriazola of Bolivia, in order to make progress on the matter.
VI. The Bolivian Ambassador then said that the territory that Bolivia would hand over in exchange for the territory that it would receive from our country would be free of any easements. Therefore, he asked that Chile withdraw its conditions of limitation of sovereignty. He said that his country is prepared for kilometre-for-kilometre exchange, but without the compensation of water. He added that it would be desirable for the extension of the coastline offered by Chile to be extended, to allow Bolivia to construct a coastal city because otherwise, the Chacalluta Airport would be inefficient.
VII. The Bolivian Ambassador went on to say that currently, a solution could not be reached because his country has not been given any trump card.
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VIII. With respect to the Lauca, Ambassador Violand said that this is the irritating point in the discussions, and has given the Bolivian people a bad impression of the course of the discussions. Therefore, he asked that the issue of the Lauca be removed from the talks, so that a Preliminary Agreement could be reached on the matter.
IX. The Minister then referred to the additional elements, stating that there were three points of disagreement with Bolivia about the Chilean proposal: the extension of the territory, the demilitarization of that territory, and the issue of the Lauca, and therefore, he did not agree to the greater extension of the coast signalled by the Ambassador.
He said that the three points mentioned would have to be discussed in greater detail and that an interpretation could be made. When the Minister alluded to the demilitarization of the territory offered by Chile to Bolivia, he indicated that this would mean that Bolivia would only maintain there forces necessary for its domestic security.
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X. The Bolivian Ambassador commented on the Minister’s remarks, stating that this interpretation would have to be consistent with absolute sovereignty. With regard to the demilitarization of the territory, he said that large military contingents could not be concentrated there, which is just another example of Bolivia’s pacifism. Finally, he said that the primary problem is convincing the Bolivian public.
XI. The Minister then discussed the need to maintain the bases already agreed to in the course of the discussions, to avoid disagreement with Peru on this matter.
W
ith regard to the issue of the Lauca, the Chilean Foreign Minister said that allowing Chile to use all of the Lauca would be unfair, but that the Chilean petition related only to a small amount of water on the borderline of this river, the use of which would be of great benefit for the desert region of Chile in that area.
XII. The Ambassador insisted that the issue of the Lauca will cause problems with Bolivian public opinion, which we have tried to avoid in both Bolivia and in Chile.
XIII. The Minister said that both Bolivia’s outlet to the sea and the use of the Lauca by our country are matters of reciprocal convenience.
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XIV. The Bolivian Ambassador said that he was simply presenting the motion, with the understanding that it would not be resolved at this meeting, and that he trusted that at the meeting with Minster Carvajal of Chile and Minister Adriazola of Bolivia, a Draft Agreement could be reached.
XV. The Minister then mentioned that it would be appropriate for Bolivia to plan, in the port it would build in the territory ceded by Chile, for the facilities that are lacking in Arica, consistently with the concept of economic integration.
XVI. The Minister Counselor of Bolivia then took the floor, explaining that the “trump card” referred to by the Bolivian Ambassador earlier was related to the reaction by the public opinion in his country.
XVII. The Minister immediately added that the additional elements are clearly determined and that there must be three trump cards, one for each additional element.
XVIII. Ambassador Violand then mentioned the meeting of the Chilean and Bolivian Foreign Ministers, requesting that the Minister set a date for it, and the Minister said that he could not set one right now, but only when they were further along in the discussions.
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XIX. Ambassador Violand requested additional information on the discussions that have been held between Chile and Peru. The Minister answered that they have been informal, without any minutes taken, and that they have basically been to clearly ratify the points set forth in the Treaty of 1929, and how the benefits indicated therein have operated; what they are and how they currently work. The Minister stated that he could say all of this without violating the confidentiality of the discussions.
XX. The Ambassador said that Bolivia was afraid of being a confined country with a beach, but the Minister addressed that, saying that Bolivia would be a country with a port and the concomitant advantages thereof for Bolivia.
XXI. Finally, it was agreed that it was necessary to establish the constitution and regulation of the Chilean-Bolivian Boundary Commission, at its first meeting.
XXII. The meeting ended at 6:15 p.m.
XXIII. The meeting was attended by the Officer from the South America Department, Mr. Alvaro Castellón Covarrubias.
SANTIAGO, 17 August 1976
signed off by:
PABLO VALDES PHILLIPS
DIRECTOR
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Telex from the Chilean Embassy in Bolivia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, No 500, 20 September 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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Annex 204
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REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
CLASIFICATION
NUMBER
TIME GROUP
MONTH
YEAR
OPEN
500
201700
SEPTEMBER
1976
FROM: EMBACHILE LA PAZ
TO: DIRELAS INFO DIPLAN
REMITELEX 496.
1. ON SUNDAY THE 19TH “EL DIARIO” PUBLISHED FIRST PAGE HEADLINES STATEMENTS MADE BY FOREIGN MINISTER ADRIAZOLA [TO] THAT NEWSPAPER. I TRANSCRIBE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT PARAGRAPHS:
“BOLIVIA WOULD BE WILLING IF THE ARRANGEMENT IS SATISFACTORY TO TRANSFER CERTAIN AREAS TO RECEIVE OTHER EQUIVALENT ONES THAT ALLOW OUR COUNTRY TO RETURN WITH SOVEREIGNTY TO THE SEA, THEREBY PUTTING AN END TO THE ASPHYXIATION IMPOSED ON US BY OUR ALMOST 100 YEARS OF CONFINEMENT.”
“FINALLY WE ASKED HIM THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: IN ADDITION TO THE TERRITORIAL COMPENSATION, DO YOU THINK THAT THERE WILL BE OTHER DEMANDS BY CHILE AND PERU TO GIVE BOLIVIA ITS DESIRED OUTLET TO THE SEA?
FOREIGN MINISTER ÓSCAR ADRIAZOLA ANSWERED: “FIRST OF ALL, I BELIEVE THAT IT IS MORE CONSISTENT WITH REALITY TO TALK ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SIMULTANEOUS EXCHANGE OF TERRITORY IN EQUIVALENT AREAS. THE ARMED FORCES GOVERNMENT OF THE NATION FEELS THAT IT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, TO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION. WITH RESPECT TO THE REST, I THINK THAT MAKING ASSUMPTIONS IS NOT A RESPONSIBLE THING TO DO.”
2. SATURDAY 18, IN COMMENT ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF OUR COUNTRY “EL DIARIO” WRITES: “OF COURSE, IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO TERM SUCH AS “SWAP,” “EQUIVALENT EXTENSION” OR “EXCHANGE OF TERRITORIES,” WHICH ARE SO FOREIGN TO THE
REFERENCES:
STATEMENTS MADE BY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE BOLIVIAN AIR FORCE
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FRATERNAL SOLUTION WE ARE SEEKING.”
“THESE ARE NOT THE TERMS OR CONDITIONS FOR AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN TWO NATIONS, AND AS OF NOW WE WARN YOU THAT IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO CONSTRUCT A PERMANENT GUARANTEE OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE.”
3. TODAY “HOY” PRINTED AN EDITORIAL ENTITLED “STUDIES FOR EXCHANGE WITH CHILE.” I COPY THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS:
“WE ONCE SAID THAT IT SEEMED A BIT PREMATURE TO US TO NEGOTIATE AREAS TO EXCHANGE WHEN THE BASIC AGREEMENT ON TERRITORIAL EXCHANGE HAS NOT BEEN FULLY DEFINED, AT FIRST DUE TO OBJECTIONS OF SUBSTANCE RAISED BY BOLIVIA REGARDING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH CHILE WOULD BE WILLING TO GRANT THE CORRIDOR, AND THEN BECAUSE PERU’S ACQUIESCENCE TO CARRY OUT THE EXCHANGE OF TERRITORY BETWEEN BOLIVIA AND CHILE STILL SEEMS REMOTE.”
“WHEN THE FIRST PHASE OF THE DIALOGUE WITH CHILE WAS COMPLETE, A FEW MONTHS AGO, THE PRESIDENT OFFERED IN A SPEECH TO GIVE THE SECOND PHASE AN OPEN CHARACTER WITH EXTENSIVE INFORMATION FOR THE PUBLIC. AT THAT TIME WE COMMENDED THAT OFFICIAL POSITION WITHOUT ANY RESERVATIONS. NOW, CONSISTENT WITH THAT CRITERION, WE ARE ENCOURAGING THEM TO COMPLY WITH THAT OFFER.”
4. I WILL SEND MORE INFORMATION BY AIRMAIL.
DÍAZ
REFERENCES:
STATEMENTS MADE BY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE BOLIVIAN AIR FORCE
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Bolivia will offer Chile a strip of land in the Department of La Paz”, El Mercurio (Chile), 26 September 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
El Mercurio (Chile)
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EL MERCURIO – Sunday, 26 September 1976
Annex 205
1153
In exchange for the maritime corridor,
Bolivia will offer Chile a strip of land in the Department of La Paz.
• According to the AFP the Government has virtually agreed to exchange this territory.
• However, the final decision will not depend on Bolivia alone, but also Peru and Chile, by virtue of the Treaty of 1929.
La Paz, 25 (AFP). Bolivia will offer Chile a strip of territory in the Department of La Paz in exchange for the maritime corridor to the north of Arica, it emerged today.
The territorial exchange requested by Chile in exchange for the 2000 km² offered to the north of Arica to resolve the landlocked situation of the nation, through a corridor to the Pacific Ocean, has been virtually accepted by the Government, as AFP has learned.
The commander in chief of the Bolivian Air Force, General Luis García, said last week in Cochabamba, 450 km to the southwest of here, that the government was studying the territory capable of being exchanged for the maritime corridor to the north of Arica offered by Chile.
Shortly after receiving the Chilean proposal last December, President Hugo Banzer had said that the Chilean proposal “was a globally acceptable offer.”
The National Maritime Council (CONAMAR) was tasked with making a complete evaluation of the economic, demographic and military conditions in the corridor. CONAMAR in turn asked the Geological Institute of Bolivia (GEOBOL) to evaluate the potential energy resources in the border regions with Chile to keep from transferring significant mining or energy deposits to its neighbour.
Critics of the government, who were emphatically rejected by the authorities, claimed that the government intended to transfer mineral resources to the neighbouring country as part of the territorial exchange.
Well informed sources said that Chile has submitted two requests about the territory that it will receive in exchange for the maritime corridor.
The first request was that this area be completely unpopulated and the second was the region be rich in water resources.
Neither of these requests has been officially answered by Bolivia.
The northern part of Chile, which borders Bolivia, is largely
made up of the Atacama Desert, one of the driest places in the world.
GEOBOL engineers still have not delivered their report to the Government on the analyses that they performed, which are apparently almost finished.
AFP managed to find out some points of the report on the potential energy resources on Bolivia’s current border area with Chile.
The Department of Potosí, the southernmost of the departments that border Chile, is rich in geothermal terms, especially the provinces of Nor Lipez and Sur Lipez.
The Department of Oruro, immediately to the south of La Paz, has very significant salt mines, such as the Coipasa salt mine, which the Armed Forces Development Corporation (COFADEANA) is analyzing in order to use it.
Although the Department of La Paz is also rich in minerals, it does not have them to the same extent as the other two. Copper is its primary resource.
Ultimately, the territory to be offered to Chile in exchange is still being evaluated by the Bolivian government and no official decision has yet been made.
The final decision does not depend only on the national Government, because the corridor to the north of Arica is covered by the Treaty of 1929 between Chile and Peru. Any transfer of territory in the Arica-Tacna area to Bolivia must be approved by Chile and Peru.
Representatives of both governments will meet in Lima next month to continue their dialogue about the Treaty of 1929 between the two nations.
The leading national newspaper, “El Diario”, initiated a broad poll in recent days about the exchange of territory. The poll was published for only two days, without any explanation as to why it was cancelled.
Most of the people polled were against the exchange of territory with Chile, and the official press showed their dislike of the poll.
On the other hand, the local newspaper “Presencia” today included a long article on its editorial page, stating the opinion that this exchange “would violate Bolivia’s integrity and sovereignty and would ultimately aggravate the disruption in the Southern Pacific region of Latin America.
“El Diario” asked for a nationwide plebiscite to decide on the matter, or at least a broad consultation in qualified media in the country.
The official press did not comment on the issue, although they indicated that the negotiations with Chile on the maritime solution will continue in a constructive climate of mutual understanding.
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“Declaration of the National Maritime Council (Official Agency Created by Supreme Decree of 7 February 1976) expressing its full support for the plans for a corridor north of Arica and an exchange of equivalent territory”,
Presencia (Bolivia), 31 October 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Presencia (Bolivia)
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1157
31 October 1976
DECLARATION OF THE NATIONAL MARITIME COUNCIL (official agency created by Supreme Decree of 7 February 1976) EXPRESSING ITS FULL SUPPORT FOR THE PLANS FOR A CORRIDOR NORTH OF ARICA AND AN EXCHANGE OF EQUIVALENT TERRITORY.
(from PRESENCIA)
La Paz
In view of certain statements made by respected national institutions, and in order to avoid greater confusion due to lack of knowledge of the current diplomatic process to reach our return to the sea, the NATIONAL MARITIME COUNCIL (CONAMAR) considers it necessary to inform the public opinion of this country of the following:
1. All Bolivians agree on a single ideal: to put an end to our confinement, which has prevented us from further developing and has kept us in a state of prolonged dependence for almost 100 years.
2. A prompt, appropriate solution is being sought, because it is not possible to wait another century arguing that a century or two of waiting has no importance in the lives of a people. The current situation, to reach a solution to the port issue, will not occur again for a long time. There is no impatience, but neither can we give in to delays. To be successful, diplomatic negotiations must occur at the right time.
3. As everyone knows, the negotiations with Chile are being conducted in a “framework of respect for national dignity.” The public opinion can be sure that at no time has any pressure been accepted that would undermine the respect owed to a sovereign country. Bolivia is not in the situation of 1904 and therefore, it is free to decide its international policy. It is not, therefore, in a situation that can be compared with the one 72 years ago, when the Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce was signed, the result of which the total waiver of our rights over the Littoral.
4. All possible solutions have been carefully and fully analyzed, and this means that we did not unconditionally accept Chile’s first proposal. The different points were duly studied by more than 300 Bolivian experts, whose efforts were concentrated on 260 very significant documents. Nothing was left to chance or improvisation, because we are convinced that mistakes in the discussion of big international problems have fatal consequences. All we have to do is look at the past to realize that this is true.
5. The members of the CONAMAR study groups are fully aware of their responsibility in the light of history. That is why they have exhaustively studied everything that has been proposed and must be answered. Nothing has been done precipitously or without prior knowledge of the background. Therefore, the Government of the Armed Forces is fully confident that the Bolivian people have the good sense and sound understanding to be aware of the progress of the diplomatic negotiations, which although they are confidential, as is necessary, will be fully made known through the media.
6. Bolivia’s dilemma is categorical: either continue for an indefinite period in a confinement that cannot be prolonged any longer, or progress, once and for all, towards a definition that for now is the most real and practicable, despite the pessimistic voices that are always present. Nothing can be reached with hopes and dreams, for humanity today lives in constant motion and cannot be content to merely wait, indefinitely, for a solution to the great problems of nations, like Bolivia, that are in one of the greatest stages of their lives. If this opportunity fails, we will have to resign ourselves indefinitely to dependence and allow the servitude of free transit to keep us in this prejudicial situation.
7. There is no mutilation involved, but rather an exchange, for a cession of territory is not the same thing as a territorial exchange. Therefore we must insist on clarifying the situation. We will give a certain area of land, and will receive another area of the same size with access to the sea. In diplomatic negotiations in any part of the world, people do not always reach the desired solutions. World history is full of examples of this. The reason we are considering an exchange is that there are no other solutions for the moment. Another solution could be war, but we must ask ourselves calmly and dispassionately if we are in a position to precipitate a conflict when we lack both human and physical resources. Let’s look back at our most recent past, the Chaco War and the painful lessons learned there.
8. If we are not in a position to spend copious amounts of money, thereby mortgaging the country; if we cannot offer compensation in terms of minerals, energy, agriculture, cattle or industrial resources, what can we use to negotiate? Quite simply we can exchange, and we repeat, this is not a mutilation nor a dismemberment.
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9. Our negotiators have managed to change some of Chile’s proposals: they are no longer discussing 200 miles, but 3 miles. Nor is there any insistence on demilitarization of the strip of territory because it will be subject to our sovereignty. Furthermore, the waters of the River Lauca will no longer be exclusively for Chilean use. Bolivia will study how to carry out a joint action that benefits everyone, without any prejudicial exclusivity. Through proper negotiations, all the points will be clarified once and for all, and always in a framework of mutual respect and consideration. Bolivia of 1976 is not the Bolivia of 1904.
10. Both the Armed Forces and the most humble Bolivian citizens have the duty to ensure the national integrity. They do not need to be reminded of this, for it is inherent and ever present, because behind everything is the immortal shadow of those who sacrificed to give us a free and sovereign country.
11. The War of the Pacific was tripartite. The bilateral negotiations between Peru and Chile could be tripartite whenever the situation so requires. In this way we would ensure a satisfactory solution to the negotiations currently underway.
12. Finally, CONAMAR asks all Bolivians to study, without passion or fits of emotion, all the aspects of the problem and to think about the most appropriate, prompt and beneficial solution for the national interest. Without dangerous haste or prejudicial delays, without sentiments that cannot be qualified as subordinate and animated by a genuine civic spirit, they should study, first, the background of the negotiations, and then, with the greatest composure possible, reach conclusions that will not result in decades of delay. That is why we insist that at the present time, the Bolivian people must decide whether they prefer to remain in their confinement, while waiting for better times to come, in the distant future, or to take advantage of a situation that may not ever present itself again.
The sea is waiting for us, with all the benefits that it provides to humanity. Let us not reject it.
La Paz, 30 October 1976
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Official Communiqué of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru, No 30-76, 18 November 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 155 to its Memorial
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The Official Communiqué read as follows:
Official Communiqué No. 30-76 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1. As the public opinion knows, the Chilean Government, by means of Note No. 685, of 19 December 1975, informed the Peruvian Government that that the Bolivian Government had made a proposal to the Chilean Government to find a solution to Bolivia's landlocked situation. The Peruvian Government was informed of this proposal because Article l of the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of Lima of 1929 provides that any cession of the territory of Arica, in whole or in part, to a third party requires a prior agreement between Peru and Chile.
2. The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces issued Supreme Resolution No. 0720 of 26 December 1975, appointing an Advisory Committee composed of outstanding figures to study this complex matter.
3. Furthermore, at Peru’s initiative, discussions of this difficult and delicate matter were held between the two countries, at the level of Special Representatives.
4. After analysing these valuable reports issued by the aforementioned Committee and evaluating the result of said talks, the Government
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of Peru has taken the decision to formulate to the Government of Chile a proposal that has been conveyed to the Foreign Minister of said country, through the Secretary General of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Luis Marchand Stens, who, as the Special Representative of the Government of Peru, travelled to Santiago, Chile for that purpose. That proposal is aimed at preserving the high interests of the Nation, ensuring the specific rights Peru has over Arica by virtue of international conventions and strengthening the uninterrupted socio-economic relation between Tacna and Arica.
5. Said proposal, consistent with Peru’s deep commitment to integration and to Latin America, also takes into account the spirit of understanding that has motivated our country in relation to Bolivia’s landlocked situation, as expressed both in the Declaration of Ayacucho, adopted on 9 December 1974, and in reiterated official declarations.
6. In the framework of this background, the Peruvian Government has formulated the following proposal to the Chilean Government because it believes that this proposal takes into account the interests of Peru, Bolivia and Chile:
a) Possible sovereign cession by Chile to Bolivia of a corridor to the North of the province of Arica, parallel to the Concordia Line, beginning at the Bolivia-Chile frontier and ends when it reaches the Pan-American Highway in that province, which links the port of Arica to the city of Tacna. Such possible cession is subject to the following condition:
b) Establishment in the province of Arica, after the corridor, of an area of territory under the shared sovereignty of the three countries, Peru, Bolivia and Chile, located to the south of the Peru-Chile frontier, between the Concordia Line, the Pan-American Highway, the northern limit of the city of Arica and the coast of the Pacific Ocean (see attached sketch).
7. The condition precedent mentioned in point 6 b), which constitutes the fundamental basis of Peru’s proposal, is supplemented with the following conditions:
a) Establishment of a tri-national port administration in the port of Arica
b) Concession to Bolivia of the right to build a port under its exclusive sovereignty, in accordance with Peru’s interest in achieving a definitive, real and effective solution to Bolivia’s landlocked situation, to which end it is indispensable for Bolivia to have a port of its own.
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c) Exclusive Bolivian sovereignty over the sea adjacent to the coast of the territory under shared sovereignty
d) Establishment by the three countries of an economic development hub in the territory under shared sovereignty, to which multinational financing organizations could cooperate financially.
8. Consequently, the proposal that the Peruvian Government formulates to the Chilean Government shall serve as a basis for arriving, at the appropriate time, to the prior agreement, set forth in Article 1 of the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of 1929 and [the proposal] has been presented with the firm intention of finding a definitive solution to Bolivia’s landlocked situation.
9. The Peruvian proposal entails full implementation of the pending clauses of Treaty of Lima of 1929 and the Supplementary Protocol, and the guarantee of compliance with the easements established by that Treaty in favour of Peru.
10. The Bolivian Government has been officially informed of all of the foregoing, including certain proposals related to the bilateral relations between the two countries, with the confidence that the effort made by Peru in favour of Bolivia's maritime aspiration will help to definitively resolve this problem and will strengthen the peace, friendship and cooperation between the peoples and Governments of Peru, Bolivia and Chile. Moreover, it is worth noting that this effort is inspired by the lofty goal of promoting solidarity that will encourage the development of the region in question, which will also contribute to the progress and welfare of their respective peoples.
11. So that the public opinion is fully aware of the Peruvian proposal, a sketch is published specifying the corridor that Chile would cede to Bolivia to the north of Arica. Likewise, this sketch specifies the location of the area under the shared sovereignty of Peru, Bolivia and Chile, which is also situated in the referred province of Arica (1).
In summary, the Peruvian initiative was inspired by the purpose of providing a solution based on a stable peace and a realistic setting, and not on a mere legal concept that does not take into account all the geopolitical, security and economic elements that ensure its viability.
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Final Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting of the Bolivian-Chilean Permanent Mixed Commission, 19 November 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile
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REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
FINAL MINUTES
The Inaugural Meeting of the Bolivian-Chilean Permanent Mixed Commission, set up through the exchange of Notes of
19 August 1976, was held in Santiago, Chile, on 18 and 19 November 1976.
The Delegation from the Republic of Bolivia was composed of the following:
PRESIDENT: Mr. Javier Murillo de la Rocha, Acting Undersecretary General for Foreign Affairs.
DELEGATES: Mr. Adalberto Violand, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Bolivia in Chile.
Mr. Willy Vargas Vacaflor, Secretary General of Integration.
Mr. Manfredo Kempff Suárez, Director General for Foreign Politics of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship.
Mr. Armando Loayza, Director General for Economic Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship.
SECRETARY: Mr. Ramiro Prudencio, Secretary of the Bolivian Embassy in Chile.
The Delegation from the Republic of Chile was composed of the following:
PRESIDENT: Army Colonel Enrique Valdés Puga, Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs.
DELEGATES: Mr. Rigoberto Díaz Gronow, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Chile in Bolivia.
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Mr. Pablo Valdés Phillips, Director of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Juan Manuel Casanueva Préndez, Economic Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Adelio Pipino Cravero, Executive Secretary for LAFTA and Andean Pact Affairs.
SECRETARY: Mr. Roberto Ibarra García, Secretary of the Office of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Bolivian Delegation was received at an audience by the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vice Admiral Patricio Carvajal Prado. On that occasion, the high level that had been reached by the relations between the countries was very clear.
The solemn inaugural ceremony of the Bolivian-Chilean Permanent Mixed Commission took place in the Andrés Bello Room of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Chairman of the Delegation of Chile welcomed the Delegation of Bolivia and expressed how pleased the Government of Chile and its people were to receive the Bolivian representatives. The Chairman of the Delegation of Bolivia expressed gratitude for the warm words of the Chairman of the Delegation of Chile. Both agreed on how important it was to implement this Mixed Commission as an effective instrument to address many issues of mutual interest.
At the proposal of the President of the Bolivian Delegation, the Chilean Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs,
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Army Colonel Enrique Valdés Puga, was elected Chairman of the meeting to install the Permanent Mixed Commission.
Upon beginning its work, the Commission approved the “Rules for the Bolivia-Chile Permanent Mixed Commission,” which are attached to these minutes.
The delegations analyzed the different areas of interest to both countries, which will be considered at the First Regular Meeting of the Permanent Mixed Commission. As a result of this extensive exchange of ideas and information, the following draft agenda was approved for such meeting:
1. Bases for an economic, scientific and technological cooperation agreement.
2. Analysis of trade and perspectives.
3. Rail, air, road transport and telecommunications.
4. Tourism and passenger traffic.
5. Bases for a labour agreement.
6. Cultural, educational and administrative cooperation.
The First Regular Meeting of the Permanent Mixed Commission was scheduled to take place in the city of La Paz, in March 1977.
When the discussions were over, both Presidents expressed their satisfaction with the work accomplished and the shared points of view, which reveal significant prospects for cooperation and exchange between the two countries.
These minutes have been drawn up in two counterparts, in Santiago, Chile, on this nineteenth day of November, 1976.
JAVIER MURILLO DE LA ROCHA
Acting Undersecretary General for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bolivia
ENRIQUE VALDES PUGA
Army Colonel
Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Chile
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Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile on the meetings held by G. Amunategui, Special Envoy of the President of the Republic of Chile, and President Banzer of Bolivia, 22 November 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
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REPUBLIC OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MEETINGS HELD BY GREGORIO AMUNATEGUI, SPECIAL ENVOY
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE, AND
PRESIDENT BANZER
On 22 November 1976, Mr Gregorio Amunátegui held a meeting with President Banzer to analyze the situation arising from the Peruvian proposal.
President Banzer thanked and recognized Chilean efforts to lead these negotiations to a successful ending. He pointed out that he rejected the Peruvian proposal and understood perfectly Chile’s position against the Peruvian proposal. He further stated that he had not communicated any information to Peru in connection with areas for exchange. President Banzer pointed out that if negotiations failed, he would publicly acknowledge Chile’s positive attitude. In this case, he would start discussing alternative options with Chile with a realistic approach.
He further pointed out that Chile should not condition its response to Peru on the friendly relationship between the Presidents and people of Chile and Bolivia.
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Report of Enrique Bernstein Carabantes and Julio Philippi Izquierdo, Representatives of Chile, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 24 November 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Memoria of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
for 1976, pp 170-173
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The representatives of the Chilean Government in the talks with the Peruvian Government, Enrique Bernstein Carabantes and Julio Philippi Izquierdo, were consulted by the Government and issued the following report in an official letter dated 24 November:
REPORT
Santiago, 24 November 1976.
Vice Admiral Patricio Carvajal Prado
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile.
Hand delivery.
Dear Minister:
You have asked us, in our capacity as representatives of the Chilean Government in the talks with the Peruvian Government regarding the possible cession of Chilean territory to Bolivia, for our opinion on the content of a Peruvian memorandum dated 19 November. That memorandum contains a summary of the proposal that was made to you on that date by the Peruvian Secretary General of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Luis Marchand Stens.
In addition to giving you our opinion on the basic points contained in that memorandum, we believe that we should remind you of the background.
1. The Treaty of Lima of 1929 definitively resolved the old dispute over the territories of Tacna and Arica. It established Chile’s sovereignty over Arica and Peru’s sovereignty over Tacna, and granted certain specific rights to each of these nations.
2. Article 1 of the Supplementary Protocol to that Treaty provides that “the Governments of Chile and Peru shall not, without previous agreement between them, cede to any third Power the whole or part of the territories which, in conformity with the Treaty of this date, come under their respective sovereignty.”
3. Because Bolivia asked Chile to enter into negotiations to obtain an outlet to the sea, on the same day that Chile specified the terms of those negotiations, it consulted Peru, in accordance with the provision of the 1929 Protocol cited above, to see whether Peru would agree to the potential cession to Bolivia of a sovereign maritime coast that would extend as a strip of territory from that coast to the border between Chile and Bolivia, along the Concordia Line, including the transfer of the railway from Arica to La Paz. The proposed cession forms part of the basic guidelines agreed by the Governments of Chile and Bolivia that guide the entire negotiations between the two countries, the entire content of which was reported to Peru, including the clear specification and delimitation of territory that would be ceded to Bolivia in exchange.
These guidelines expressly provide that the potential cession would be subject to
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Peru’s prior agreement, in accordance with the first article of the Supplementary Protocol quoted above. At the same time, they indicated that Bolivia would agree to respect the easements in favor of Peru established in the Pacts of 1929.
4. In response to a proposal by Peru, Chile agreed to initiate talks with this country by appointing ad hoc representatives, and these talks were held in two stages: in April and July of this year. At the talks, the Chilean representatives provided the additional information that was requested. The legal and technical aspects of the cession of land to Bolivia were carefully analyzed by both parties, and in the Chilean delegation’s opinion, they reached the conclusion that there were no problems in that area that could not be adequately resolved to the satisfaction of the three countries in question.
5. At the same time, Chile and Bolivia have continued their negotiations within the established guidelines, aimed at satisfying Bolivia’s aspirations to a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, joined to its territory, without interruption on the basis of an exchange of territory.
6. At this point, the Peruvian suggestion was presented. Although it agrees to the cession of Chilean territory to Bolivia along the Concordia Line, it says that it must stop when it reaches the highway that joins Arica to Tacna, a few kilometres from the sea. Without any explanation that would allow the reader to understand the scope of what it then proposes, the proposal says that between the corridor and the sea, there should be “an area under the shared sovereignty of the three countries, Bolivia, Chile and Peru”, that it would include not only the rest of the strip that Chile is willing to cede to Bolivia as part of the pending negotiations, but would also extend it such that the southwest end of it would reach the “northern part of the city of Arica”. The size of this territory subject to “the shared sovereignty of the three countries” would be 66 square kilometers, according to the Peruvian proposal.
Nothing is said about the system that would govern this strange “shared sovereignty” or how it would be established; in any case, it is obvious that the concept would be fundamentally close to national sovereignty.
7. The foregoing shows that the Peruvian proposal is not consistent with Chile’s specific consultation nor with the provisions of the Treaty of 1929.
It does not answer Chile’s consultation, and suggests that our country should give up sovereignty over territories beyond the land offered freely and sovereignly in exchange to Bolivia.
Moreover, the idea of an “area under shared sovereignty of the three countries Bolivia, Chile and Peru”, is unacceptable in our opinion, because it is highly inadvisable. It would not only deprive Bolivia of a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, but would also be the source of all sorts of difficulties, as history has shown in similar cases.
8. According to the Peruvian proposal, a “Concession to Bolivia of the right to build a port under its exclusive sovereignty” would be granted on the coastline of the “territory under shared sovereignty”. The sea adjacent to the “territory under shared sovereignty” would not be part of that territory, but would be “under the exclusive sovereignty of Bolivia”. In other words, this would result in a strange legal situation where the “territory under shared
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sovereignty” would not have any sea, and Bolivia would have a port and a sea, but no coastline.
9. It is obvious that in the Peruvian proposal, the grant to Bolivia of a mere port concession in someone else’s territory that is joined to its territory—undoubtedly through unspecified complex easements—is completely different from the solution being negotiated between Chile and Bolivia within the guidelines that have already been set. These guidelines give full sovereignty to Chile, through continuous territory, and also contemplate respect for the easements established by the Accords of 1929 in favor of Peru.
10. The Peruvian proposal adds that the “establishment of a tri-national port administration in the port of Arica” and the “establishment by the three countries of an economic development hub in the territory under shared sovereignty, to which multinational financing organizations could cooperate financially .”
The scope of a “tri-national port administration in the port of Arica” is not clear. The rights that Treaties in force confer on both Bolivia and Peru to use that important Chilean port for free transit of persons, goods and armaments to and from Bolivian and Peruvian territory, respectively, are smoothly exercised under the administration and direction of Chilean officers. They ensure appropriate movement of cargo, which is high volume with respect to Bolivia and extremely low volume with respect to Peru. Therefore, there is no reason whatsoever to propose changes to the current system that are completely unacceptable to Chile, which currently exercises national sovereignty in a port that belongs to it.
As for the concept of joint development of the region, the Chilean Government is in full agreement with it; it has proved this in many ways and an ongoing basis. Ultimately, it is obvious that there is no advantage to limiting the possibilities of this development to a certain territory, much less under a supposed “shared sovereignty” that would be the source of difficulties of all kinds, which could not attract capital and business activities. The ties that bind our countries in terms of economic development, transit of persons and goods, and especially the agreements on multinational companies, make it clearly advisable to leave room for interested government or private capital to set up companies in the region where the objective conditions make it advisable to do so.
11. Finally, by proposing potential joint ownership of territories that were established as Chilean under the Treaty of 1929 and proposing a “tri-national port administration in the port of Arica”, Peru is suggesting that significant changes be made to that solemn Pact, which reflected a long and laborious effort to put an end to the dispute over Tacna and Arica. We believe that the entire Treaty must remain in full force and effect if we are to ensure “friendship and understanding” between Chile and Peru, as the preamble to the Treaty states.
12. For the reasons set forth above, along with others that could be added in a more detailed analysis that we were not able to perform for lack of time, we advise you to reject the Peruvian proposal and maintain the guidelines established by Chile and Bolivia
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for the negotiations underway, which are, in our opinion, the only viable and capable way of giving a sovereign outlet to the sea to Bolivia, at least through Chile’s exclusive territory.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) Julio Philippi
(Signed) Enrique Bernstein
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“Response by the Peruvian Foreign Ministry to information provided to the Ambassador of Peru by the Undersecretary
of Foreign Affairs of Chile”, El Diario (Bolivia),
26 November 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
L.F. Guachalla, Bolivia-Chile: The Maritime Negotiation, 1975-1978 (1982),
pp 111-112
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26 November 1976
Lima, (L)
RESPONSE BY THE PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY TO INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE AMBASSADOR OF PERU BY THE UNDERSECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF CHILE
(from EL DIARIO)
1.
The Government of Chile, through its Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, in a short interview granted to the Ambassador of Peru in Santiago, delivered a memorandum to him related to the Peruvian proposal announced to the Peruvian public opinion on the 19th of this month by official communication number 30-76.
2.
That memorandum states that the Chilean Government believes that the proposal by the Peruvian government impacts on matters reserved to its exclusive national sovereignty and bears no relationship to the general terms of the negotiation between Chile and Bolivia that were approved by the two countries.
3.
In view of the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of 1929 between Peru and Chile, and the fact that a consultation was made to obtain the bases for the prior agreement referred to in article one of the Supplementary Protocol, which gave the broadest powers to the Government of Peru, including for exercising a Right of Veto, it is hard for the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Peru to understand and accept that Chile does not accept to consider, without prior dialogue at the level of Foreign Ministers, Peru’s response consisting of a proposal that protects the high interests of the Peruvian nation.
It entails a real and definitive
solution to Bolivia’s landlocked situation, guarantees peace and promotes the development of the region concerned.
4.
Therefore, it is not Peru’s intention to modify the clauses of the Treaty of 1929, because our country respects international treaties, according to an unchanging legal tradition which we have maintained since the birth of the Republic.
5.
The Peruvian Government’s proposal of tripartite joint ownership is not the result of any intent to object to, modify, amend or replace the Treaty of 1929. Far from it, Peru has always sought to ensure the preservation and effectiveness of this Treaty’s provisions, which grant Peru certain rights, such as the case of the easements, a Peruvian free port in Arica, etc.
The formula to establish an area in Arica under shared sovereignty among Peru, Bolivia and Chile arose from an event that occurred long after this treaty, the Bolivian-Chilean formula for the corridor, established in December 1975, which has caused Peru to propose to its two neighbours that, precisely because of the new circumstances to be created in the Arica district, a trapezoidal area be selected from the coast south of Arica as the seat of a tripartite development hub that would benefit the three countries in their future industrial and commercial expansion.
The reality is that the Bolivian-Chilean formula for the corridor submitted in the consultation to Peru entails a substantial alteration of the political geography established by the Treaty of 1929, since it introduces a new sovereign, Bolivia, in that area bordering Peru. In view of such possible changes, which would modify the border regime of our country that has existed for close to fifty years under the provisions of the Treaty of 1929, the least that might be expected would be that Peru would, in turn, make its own proposal within the emerging new circumstances, in order to protect its legitimate interests.
6.
This leads us to observe that as a result of the Chilean-Bolivian discussions, the legal scope of the Protocol should be redrawn in a new legal and economic figure, determined, on the one hand, by Chile’s proposal for an exchange, and, on the other, by the proposal that Peru is making, which is aimed at making this new situation compatible with the highest interests and rights of the Peruvian nation set out in the Treaty of 1929, and Bolivia’s aspiration to reach the sea. In addition, the sovereign right which, when all is said and done, Chile is entitled to exercise,
to cede part of its territory in Arica, subject to Peru’s acceptance, would represent a gesture showing a high level of understanding in favour of the definitive solution of this problem. Added to this is Peru’s will to constructively perform the faculty granted to it by article one of the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of 1929, not to veto the possible cession but to agree to the cession of the corridor through the establishment of an area under shared sovereignty among Peru, Bolivia and Chile, over an area of 66 square kilometers. Under these circumstances, Peru would accept the insertion of Bolivia by a long corridor, in the interest of harmony, peace and the development of the region.
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7.
Consequently, I would like to state that the Government of Peru (Foreign Minister José de la Puente), by its proposal transmitted to the Honourable Foreign Minister of Chile through a special representative on the 19th of this month, has responded to the consultation submitted to it by the Government of Chile, pursuant to article one of the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of 1929, by Note 685 of 19 December 1975.
8.
Finally, the Government of Peru would like to state that it will continue to make all necessary efforts to assist in achieving the aspiration of its sister Republic of Bolivia to access the Pacific Ocean.
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Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile,
26 November 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, History of the Chilean-Bolivian Negotiations, 1975-1978 (1978), p 45
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MEMORANDUM
On 18 November 1976, the Government of Peru through its Secretary General for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Luis Marchand Stens, has formulated a proposal related to the ongoing negotiations between the Governments of Chile and that of Bolivia.
In the opinion of the Government of Chile, such proposal affects matters within its exclusive national sovereignty, and bears no relationship to the general terms of the negotiation between Chile and Bolivia that were approved by both countries.
This proposal also entails a clear and manifest modification of the clauses of the 1929 Treaty which definitively established Chilean sovereignty over Arica.
For these fundamental reasons, the Government, faithful to the Chilean tradition of respecting Treaties and safeguarding national sovereignty, declines to consider the referred proposal.
In order to reach a successful conclusion in the ongoing negotiation with Bolivia, which satisfies the aspiration of that country to have a sovereign maritime coast linked to the Bolivian territory through a strip of equally sovereign territory, the Government of Chile is awaiting the response to its consultation made on 19 December 1975 by Note 685, pursuant to article 1 of the Supplementary Protocol to the 1929 Treaty.
Santiago, 26 November 1976
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“Complete version of the Explanations by the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs José de la Puente”,
El Mercurio (Chile), 26 November 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
El Mercurio (Chile)
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EL MERCURIO — Friday 26 November 1976
Complete version of the Explanations by the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs José de la Puente
As published in “La Prensa” in Lima
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Tape-recorded version of the statements by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador José de la Puente Radbill.
Everyone knows that these have been difficult months, months of much study, and of great concern by the Government and by the Foreign Ministry, which is its executive agency. We have spent a lot of time studying, and not just the options in the report by the Advisory Committee presided over so intelligently by former President Dr. José Luis Bustamante y Rivero.
We have analyzed all the topics discussed in the two rounds of talks, in which Ambassador Marchand of Peru and Dr. Phillippi of Chile both participated. We have also reviewed the international and historical documents of Peru and have exhausted everything that could be useful for our country to formulate its proposal in response to the consultation from the Chilean Government, in accordance with Article 1 of the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of Lima of 1929, so that if this proposal is accepted by the Chilean Government, it could constitute that prior agreement which is necessary and indispensable for the Chilean Government to conclude its negotiations with Bolivia.
In all this work, we have received enormous support, understanding and decisiveness from the President of the Republic and the members of the revolutionary junta, to whom on several occasions I presented all the items they would need to reach this decision, and as we said in Official Communiqué N-30.76 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, what we are seeking in this proposal is to provide a solution that is aimed at the peace that our countries so desire, but that is a long-lasting peace, based on an genuine proposal, not a mere legal formula that fails to take into account all the geopolitical, security, and the economic elements that would be involved in an appropriate answer.
Peru, like any nation, must first and foremost take its own high interests into account, and it has done so. This is the important aspect of the Peruvian formula: it takes into account the sacred interests of the nation along with those of its sister Republic of Bolivia, so that Bolivia can achieve its long-cherished ambition of reaching the sea.
We had to find a formula that would include those elements, because the lack of a single one of them would make the entire proposal unrealistic. They are so closely interrelated that if we make a proposal that only includes the legal aspects and fails to include the elements of peace, which must underlie the entire proposal, the proposal would be incomplete. The only way to work is within an atmosphere of peace and security. The rest becomes secondary if we do it in an atmosphere of hostility or tension. We therefore believe that the tension in this area of the Americas will decrease forever, and even though this area of shared sovereignty is obviously small, it has all the necessary elements to create a development hub, where a large petrochemical industry, for example, could be set up for all three countries.
This industry could be fuelled by a pipeline from that part of the Bolivian corridor that empties into the trapezoid contemplated in the Peruvian formula. Thus, when this proposal was ready, and I brought it before the President and the Junta Government, their first reaction was exactly what I am relating to you; it is a complete formula in which there is peace, security and economic development, and over and above these advantages, that we give to our sister nation the Republic of Bolivia the possibility to access the sea.
Suspicious people sometimes say that this proposal is just a disguised way of saying "no." You all know that my language is very frank and direct; it has been that way ever since I became the Foreign Minister. We are willing to demonstrate legally, economically and from the point of view of international relations that it is a frank and honest proposal that will withstand any analysis, such analysis will only show the truth: that Peru's intention is to assist with this solution, and we consider that the formula is consistent with that intention.
That said, and fully aware that the formula is consistent with the reality of Latin America, and the goal of integration that we talk about so much, we also believe that it is strong evidence that we have put integration first and that we believe in it.
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DIALOGUE WITH THE JOURNALISTS
JOURNALIST:
(Juan Carlos Muñoz, EFE). Was the proposed formula drawn up by the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee, which ceased working almost simultaneously with the announcement of the Peruvian proposal? That is the impression that these events have given.
MINISTER:
You are exactly right; that is the impression, but it is not correct. The formula did not come from the Ad Hoc Committee. It is a formula drawn up by the Foreign Ministry on the basis of all the studies, including very important proposals by the Committee, which like any committee has had some inclinations in one direction and some inclinations in the other. What we did (and this is the obligation of a Foreign Ministry) was to conduct a thorough analysis of all the documentation that we had, an analysis of our own diplomatic history, and in general, an analysis of our own history so that we could draft a proposal, which we submitted to the Chilean Government. Your question is well taken, because it clarifies a concern that I had myself, i.e., that we could say that this was the formula of the Ad Hoc Committee. The Ad Hoc Committee has issued various opinions, multiple opinions.
JOURNALIST:
Now that the Committee has stopped working, will it be consulted in the future? On the other hand, is Peru’s proposal negotiable?
MINISTER:
First I'll answer your question about the Committee. By way of a Supreme Resolution, the Government thanked the Committee and terminated its mission before we made the proposal. Therefore, the Committee has completed its important services, and has been thanked by the Government through the Supreme Resolution, which was issued and signed by the President of the Republic and countersigned by me. With respect to the second part of your question, I repeat, perhaps because it is useful, and as you said, because it is quite a complex topic: what the Chilean Government is doing is asking the Peruvian Government for its consent, in accordance with Article 1 of the Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of 1929. It is asking our Government for the “prior consent” that it must obtain for any cession of the territory of Arica. There has to be a prior agreement between Chile and Peru. Peru is telling it: we could give you this consent provided that you comply with these conditions, and we are offering positive elements so that these conditions could be complied with. Accordingly, it is no longer a negotiation. We are answering a consultation that was made to us, and, having been consulted, we are giving our opinion and making the proposal, because you will always have to take into account that there has been a proposal by Bolivia to Chile, a proposal by Chile to Bolivia, which it answered, and then Chile make a proposal to the Peruvian Government. Our country, therefore, also has to make its proposal, otherwise there would only be two proposals, without one from Peru.
That is what is so important to clarify.
JOURNALIST:
(Hubert Cam, UPI). Will the proposals be the subject of a discussion or negotiation?
MINISTER:
You know that there must always be a dialogue in face of a Peruvian proposal. The difference is that
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the rounds of discussions are already complete. If dialogue occurs, it will take place at the level of the Foreign Ministers, and we Foreign Ministers can discuss it. This is the basis for the agreement with Chile that I mentioned a few minutes ago. In other words, by giving our answer, we have provided the basis for reaching that prior agreement, which we must have for Chile to be able to negotiate with Bolivia.
JOURNALIST:
(Juan Carlos Muñoz, EFE). If there were a new round of discussions, would they have to be between the Foreign Ministries?
MINISTER:
No, between the Foreign Ministers, because they have always been between the Foreign Ministries.
JOURNALIST:
(Hildebrando Paz, AFP). Has our Foreign Ministry already received any reaction from the Chilean and Bolivian Governments, even a preliminary one?
MINISTER:
No. The formula has been sent and you see that reports are being published in the press, both in Santiago and in La Paz. These are the reactions of journalists. I think that it is such a fundamental issue that the other governments will have to study the Peruvian proposal very carefully and then they will give us their opinion. So I think that this will take at least a few days. A proposal of this character which involves a historic event, perhaps the most important event in the relations among the three countries in the past 50 years, must be studied very carefully.
JOURNALIST:
(Mr. Vargas, from the newspaper "Correo"). One of the most influential papers in Chile, “El Mercurio”, has said that the Peruvian proposal is a covert proposal.
MINISTER:
That reaction could be expected, because the Peruvian proposal not only involves an analysis of the problem of Bolivia’s outlet to the sea, but also involves Peru's position on this matter, and how we see that we can participate in this agreement, recognizing certain rights of our own, then many may think, as we have already read, that it is a clever formula used to disguise a “no”, but we do reject that, because it is not a tricky formula. It is a very serious formula, which has a legal basis and economic basis, founded on a desire for peace and integration. But who can stop a newspaper? Since you have asked me the question, I must tell you that I do not agree with that opinion.
JOURNALIST:
(Telecentro). Won't there be a third round of discussions?
MINISTER:
There will, because the discussions thus far have been at the level of the special representatives. What could happen is a dialogue between Foreign Ministers.
JOURNALIST:
(Hildebrando Paz, AFP). General Banzer’s proposal of a territorial exchange has not been well received in Bolivia. Couldn’t the opinion of the civilian population frustrate these negotiations?
MINISTER:
That is actually a very delicate question, because it is problem of Bolivia’s internal politics. And in my capacity as Foreign Ministry of Peru I must not get involved in that. That is a sacred principle for us, just as we would not want the Bolivian Foreign Ministry to intervene in Peru’s sovereign affairs. Thus, you will understand why I am not going to answer your question. That’s the Bolivians’ business and they are the ones who will find a solution to the problem.
JOURNALIST:
(ESI) Do you have an estimate of the area of the trapezoid with shared sovereignty?
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MINISTER:
The trapezoid with shared sovereignty would have an area of 66 square kilometres, which means only 16 square kilometres more than the corridor would have had. The fundamental feature of that zone is that it is subject to shared sovereignty, in which the efforts of all three countries will not only focus on development, but will also safeguard the right of the three countries, whose presence in the region is indispensable to guarantee peace, to avoid any resentment, any doubts, and any possibilities (no matter how slight) of an element of conflict. We believe that this solution will create a zone of concord amongst the three of us forever, at least as far as the word “forever” can apply to human beings.
JOURNALIST
(“El Comercio”). What would happen to Arica under the Peruvian position?
MINISTER:
We would have to look at that on a map. This is the territory (he said, pointing to a sketch of the zone) where the current border is. Parallel to this line would be the Bolivian corridor, which under the original proposal was going to empty into the adjacent sea, which, as you know, is a beach that extends for several kilometres under water, which means that there is no way to construct a port (or if it could be built, it would be exorbitantly expensive).
The Peruvian formula provides that Bolivia would reach the port below this area with shared sovereignty, because on the other side there would be a worthless beach, and once the corridor is complete, Bolivia would have had to go through the province of Arica, without sovereignty, to reach the port of Arica. Therefore, under the original corridor they would reach the sea without sovereignty.
Under our proposal, this trapezoid adjoins the city of Arica and reaches all the way to the port. Accordingly, we are helping Bolivia’s access with sovereignty to this zone, which ends at the northern part of Arica. Later it would be organized in the port, what we call a tri-national authority, as exists in other parts of the world, because what we are proposing exists elsewhere with an authority over the docks and port facilities for loading and unloading. Moreover, you must not forget that the railway that ends up in the port of Arica originates in Tacna, Peru. This means that the formula makes it much easier to use the port. The zone from the boundary to the base of the trapezoid in the outskirts of Arica is only 16 kilometres more.
If we analyse it from the territorial point of view, it is not very significant, because as you can see, it is a trapezoid of only 66 square kilometres.
In a trapezoid of this nature, in which three countries collaborate, the international credit agencies, the Inter-American Development Bank, the CAF, the Andean Group (two of the countries are part of them, since Chile has withdrawn) will have to contribute a series of factors to develop this region. We have all the elements that will assist in the economic development of that region, and for that reason we believe in that formula. We believe that is a formula that responds to the integrational aspirations of Peru and that collaborates in the solution of the problem of the landlocked situation of Bolivia.
But as we have very clearly indicated, the sine qua non condition for meeting all the other requirements is this area of shared sovereignty.
JOURNALIST:
(“El Comercio”). Another of the requirements indicated in the communiqué is total compliance with the Treaty of 1929 and the construction of a dock for Peru by the Chilean Government. Have there been discussions about that?
MINISTER:
We have never had any doubts about compliance with the Treaty of
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1929, even before Chile made its proposal. We have been in ongoing dialogue so that Chile can comply with the provisions of that Treaty from year 29. Accordingly, they are completing the Peruvian dock in the port of Arica, without any problems. It is a bilateral issue between Peru and Chile which preceded the consultation by Chile. Thus Chile is constructing the pier where Peruvian ships are to dock. They are performing the work not only on the dock, but also on the warehouse and the facilities required for the railway crossing.
So what I can tell you about this aspect is that we have not had any problems, there have always been the natural delays in carrying out the protocol, but there have not been any problems whatsoever. And naturally, this entire process includes compliance with all points of the Treaty of 29, and as we have also indicated, it includes compliance by Bolivia with a series of agreements in force between the two countries. You know that there is a Treaty on condominium of Lake Titicaca, which we signed with Bolivia and is pending ratification. Ultimately, there are a series of complementary legal measures that are indispensable, such as recognition of the easement for the Ichusuma and Maule canals, for irrigation of the Peruvian land on the Tacna side, etc. Accordingly, this constitutes a set of obligations over which there are no disputes, but which must be complied with.
JOURNALIST:
(Hubert Cam, Agency UPI). Would the zone under shared sovereignty also be a demilitarized zone?
MINISTER:
We have not discussed that point, but we have clearly indicated that we have defined the zone under shared sovereignty, aimed at economic development, and naturally, as a result of the subsequent discussions that take place if Chile accepts this proposal, we will have to hold a series of legal and technical discussions to flesh out the concept of shared sovereignty.
JOURNALIST:
(Agency AP). Were the points included in the Peruvian proposal discussed in prior talks?
MINISTER:
In the two rounds of talks we have conducted a complete analysis, a complete discussion of all issues related to the problem. We have conducted a historical study, an economic study, a socioeconomic study, a study of existing relations and of the easements involved in the zone. This has been a task of profound, careful and extensive analysis that greatly helped provide us with a large part of the information we had, so that we could ultimately formulate our proposal.
JOURNALIST:
(H. Ackerman, Agency AP). Did the possibility of this international zone you are now proposing come up in the round of talks?
MINISTER:
No. No formula was discussed during the talks. The formula was conceived later.
JOURNALIST:
How could a zone with shared sovereignty work? Are there other cases in the world where there are two or three nations with actual sovereignty?
MINISTER:
A trinational administration is contemplated in international law. It is not an original concept. For example, one of the points we considered—naturally subject to discussions with Chile—would be to have an administrator from the United Nations for the zone.
To be honest, I don't think that it's worth discussing until we hear the Chilean Government’s opinion.
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JOURNALIST:
Would the Pan-American Highway be within the zone of shared sovereignty or outside it?
MINISTER:
(Pointing to the map). This is the Pan-American Highway, which is inside, or rather, borders it. The end of the trapezoid is almost parallel to it. Inside [the zone] are the highway and the railway. All of this is inside the zone of shared sovereignty.
JOURNALIST:
What would the population of this trapezoid be, and what nationality would they have?
MINISTER:
That’s another problem that we'll have to study. You see that the way is quite complex, so we will have to make adjustments. What is interesting is that it is not impossible. This is an area that is almost completely deserted now, but not totally deserted, and a significant industrial population could be built up there.
JOURNALIST:
Where would the airport be?
MINISTER:
In Chacalluta. A large part of it is a deserted area, and on the other hand, here with the corridor, it is very possible that a pipeline could run from Bolivian territory. That pipeline could provide fuel to a significant petrochemical industry in this region, which is really an ideal area for Chile, Peru and Bolivia to develop a petrochemical industry.
Moreover, Peru offers the advantage that the entire Tacna area is a significant agricultural zone, which would provide sufficient water from the irrigation ditches to increase production in this area. It could be the bread basket to supply the industrial zone, which cannot be developed agriculturally but only industrially. From here, we would provide all the food necessary to make this development zone a reality.
JOURNALIST:
(“CORREO”). In that sense, have Tacna and Arica complemented each other from a technical standpoint?
MINISTER:
That’s right. And we won't break that tie. What you are saying is exactly right. We won't break the socioeconomic tie that exists between Tacna and Arica. If we hadn’t offered this zone, hadn’t proposed this zone with shared sovereignty, we would be breaking this socioeconomic tie that has allowed Arica to live and allowed some residents of Tacna to work as “peddlers”, which is important even though it does not have great economic value for the region.
JOURNALIST:
(Agency EFE). What character would the notification to, or the act of informing, Bolivia have?
MINISTER:
As we have indicated, Bolivia is the country that is most interested in a solution to this problem. What is Peru doing? With its proposal, Peru is contributing to resolving Bolivia’s problem. From there everything originates. If Bolivia hadn’t aspired to reach the sea, and hadn’t made the proposal that it made to Chile, we would not be here discussing this issue today. So, what is our logical obligation, within the very frank and honest policy that we are pursuing? When I sent Ambassador Marchand to inform the Chilean Foreign Minister
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about Peru’s answer—not my answer, but Peru’s answer—my obligation was to tell the Bolivian Foreign Minister of Peru's proposal. And Ambassador Marchand explained to the Chilean Foreign Minister very clearly that we were informing the Bolivian Foreign Minister. Because we want to make it perfectly clear that our diplomacy is not the diplomacy from other centuries that existed in Europe, or any other part of the world, even on our Continent. It is a diplomacy that must be based on frankness... (transmission failure)... if there is no frankness and it actually gives rise to a conflict. Because conflict, both among nations and human beings, comes from distrust and the concealment of the truth. We have reached that conclusion, and I think that it is Peru's international policy. It is the approach that I have wanted to take ever since I became Foreign Minister, and you know me very well; I do not use the language, sometimes esoteric, of most diplomats, even though I am a professional diplomat. I think that it is important to call a spade a spade, because problems arise when we talk in euphemisms and there is sometimes a hidden insult underneath: we must not do that.
JOURNALIST:
(Agency EFE). Does this mean that in the future, this topic will be discussed by the three countries simultaneously?
MINISTER:
Everything suggests that that will be the case. In any event, Peru will never be opposed to dialogue. We have desired to maintain dialogue at all times, and I think that dialogue is the greatest expression of the human being. Any other questions?
JOURNALIST:
(“La Prensa”). Yes, a question about the nationality that the people living in the trapezoid would have.
MINISTER:
I can only give you a very preliminary answer, because as I said before, we have to establish a regime governing coexistence in the zone with shared sovereignty. But everything suggests that everyone will retain their own nationality in this territory, not on the basis of being in the territory but the nationality that they already hold. In other words, a Peruvian who enters the territory will continue being Peruvian, a Chilean will remain a Chilean and a Bolivian will stay a Bolivian.
JOURNALIST:
Their children as well?
MINISTER:
That’s right.
JOURNALIST:
Is Peru not involved in any other exchange that Chile might make with Bolivia?
MINISTER:
Peru has very clearly indicated and expressed to the two governments that an indispensable condition was that the exchange must be in areas that do not affect Peru’s rights or its security. Therefore, the location of their territories is very important. We are all aware of the location, as it seems: these zones would be located to the South, in the southern part of their borders, in the Department of Potosí, in the part that practically borders Argentina, very close to Argentina.
JOURNALIST:
(“El Comercio”). If Chile and Bolivia reject these offers, what would happen?
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MINISTER:
We would be right back where we started from. We have been consulted. We have made a proposal that we believe can be acceptable and would bring to the solution to the problem. If this proposal were unfortunately not accepted, we will have complied with our sacred duty to a sister Republic, consistent with Peru’s desire for integration, and there would be nothing more we could do.
JOURNALIST:
(Agency AP). If Chile now comes to Peru and asks for a clarification of your proposal, would you immediately provide a clarification?
MINISTER:
First of all I would like to know what you mean by clarification. That we clarify the meaning of our proposal?
JOURNALIST: Exactly.
MINISTER:
That’s right, of course. It’ a dialogue.
JOURNALIST:
Mr. Minister, doesn’t the Peruvian solution involve any type of compensation for Peru from Bolivia?
MINISTER:
No. For Peru it is not a matter of territorial compensation.
Annex 214
Message from the President of Bolivia, 24 December 1976
(Original in Spanish, English translation)
Original submitted by Bolivia as Annex 173 to its Memorial
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People of Bolivia:
For us Christians and for all men of good will, this is the date on which Christ is born again, as a permanent renewal of humanity in love, justice and peace.
From the historical perspective of the message that the Son of God brought us, man and his temporal destiny constitute the first instance in the process of absolute realization.
It is here, on Earth, where we must reach the highest degrees of perfection, and thus the highest degrees of happiness. This is the world in which we have to transform the causes of inequality and suffering,
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using the skills that we have as a result of our divine origin.
Perfection and happiness, as well as peace and justice, are essentially social concepts. In no way can they be fully achieved in the isolated, exclusive, petty and selfish sphere of the individual. Humanity is thus united by its origin and also by the purpose assigned to it; it is a homogeneous and uniform whole. Unfortunately this unity has been broken by greed, based on the belief in individual salvation, which has made history a dramatic and painful chain of events.
This is not exactly the era of the greatest non-observance of Christian principles. The characteristics of the past that determine the conditions in which we now live show that the breakdown began in past eras on the watch of the most advanced nations and certain groups of humans that must now be transformed, and at the same time, must cooperate
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so that the rest of humanity can reach levels of progress and wellbeing that are compatible with their dignity and their nature.
The backwardness of three quarters of humanity is the result of an international order in which industrialized nations, in total opposition to the universal solidarity preached by Christ, dominate countries that produce raw materials.
Instead of mocking the dramatic nature of our development, those nations must now sincerely contribute to the establishment of a new world order that allows underdeveloped countries to overcome the poverty that restricts their freedom.
It must be understood that the tensions and social conflicts in the depressed areas of the world are largely the result of external influence. This influence manifests itself in the economic crises caused by the great powers or in the ideological intervention
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of external centers that use violence to impose their own ideas and forms of social organization.
The efforts made by developing countries to improve the lives of their respective communities are not sufficient if these efforts are not accompanied by a profound transformation in international relations.
The social sense of development represents the essence of the stage at which we find ourselves. To the extent that social transformations do not weaken the country, systematically and permanently, we are making the economy a means of allowing all Bolivians to achieve wellbeing, distributed throughout all the requirements of life.
No social policy will be acceptable to the Government of the Armed Forces unless its principal goal is to improve the fate of our native peoples. Bolivia is basically a nation of Quechua and Aymara Indians. If this immense, admirable contingent of humanity is not allowed to actually participate
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in the decision making and in the operational process of development, we will remain in the molds of colonialism, keeping our native peoples suppressed in their own country, as they have been for hundreds of years.
With respect to workers in the cities and the mines, I repeat that in the new society that we are becoming, they too will have preference in the most general terms. Community in its entirety will have the benefits of development, on the basis of the capacity and needs of each of its members.
Having been alerted to the true meaning of the condition described above, and in order to overcome the external obstacles if they are perpetuated, the government over which I preside along with all the people began a process of transformations and development in August 1971, to achieve justice, peace and solidarity in our society.
At this great time of year, which opens hearts and raises the spirit as we celebrate Christmas, we again say
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that our ultimate objective is to organize a community of brotherhood, without differences or ominous privileges.
Stability, economic growth, the use of natural resources, and ultimately all the efforts we are making, are so that Bolivians can overcome the obstacles that restrict their existence and can reach the level of dignity consistent with their intrinsic nature.
Among the options for overcoming the causes of poverty, development is the best alternative. Therefore, since 1971 we have been transforming structures, accelerating growth and redistributing wealth. We have made very significant progress to date. However, we still have a long way to go. But today, people have become aware of their true abilities and I know that they have made up their minds to conquer their greatest problems.
In 1976, for example, in the course of continuing growth of its GDP, Bolivia reached
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a rate of 6.7%. Annual inflation was only 12%. Savings in the banking system increased by 66%, which shows the Bolivian people's confidence in their destiny. Monetary reserves amount to 165 million dollars. This is the basis upon which we will achieve the social justice that we are seeking.
Nevertheless, our development, today more than ever, is suffering from the consequences of our landlocked situation, since that restriction is getting worse, thus limiting our growth possibilities by wrongfully increasing the cost of our progress.
Bolivians:
This is the right time to point out the fundamental guidelines of the maritime negotiations that have attracted people's attention, in the context of the continent's and the world's expectations.
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Ever since the Armed Forces took responsibility for the government, they have interpreted our people's most fundamental aspirations and deemed it their absolute duty to promote a coherent, realistic and intensely dynamic policy in order to achieve the great objective of returning to the sea.
Aware that the fundamental definitions in such an important issue in the life of the Republic will require basic national convergence—a conviction and practice from which the government has never departed— we convened the historic Cochabamba meeting in April 1974.
There, we proposed to the country that Bolivians should unite around the Armed Forces of the Nation to achieve the objective of returning to the Pacific Ocean.
On that occasion I pointed out that there have never been miracles in history or in international relations, and I said that if we do not face the specific realities—which are often harsh—
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with the discipline and energy that are implicit in great accomplishments, we run the risk of maintaining the frustration that would painfully weigh on our consciences.
I also stated that a return to the sea with sovereignty would require the firm and deliberate unity of all Bolivians.
That message, expressed with great civic fervor, resonated in the hearts ofBolivians, who are willing to serve their homeland with love and sincere devotion.
From the convergence resulting from the historic meeting we obtained solid national support for taking action to find the fairest, most realistic and most viable solutions for overcoming our century-old geographic confinement.
The mandate that the government received for returning with sovereignty to the Pacific Ocean is based on that lofty consensus.
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True to our proven desire for peace, with a generous attitude and setting aside any animosity in order to achieve harmony in the region, we resolved to use frank and direct dialogue with the goal of seeking a comprehensive understanding to put an end to our nation's landlocked situation.
Based on the legitimacy of the Cochabamba mandate, we proposed a formula of peace, development and integration that will allow Bolivia to return to the Pacific Ocean with sovereignty.
Without any selfishness, Bolivia has desired to contribute to the task of achieving the understandings required by the growing fraternal cooperation between peoples in this part of the Americas, who are entitled to have their leaders offer them a future of hope, forged in security and progress.
The Bolivian formula is based on the permanent moral values of the international community and
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above all on the postulates of justice, peaceful coexistence, integration and stable peace on the continent that will sustain solidarity in the hemisphere.
Once again I emphatically declare that the Bolivian proposal did not mention compensation of any sort, and I reaffirm that nothing specific has been agreed to, other than the indeclinable will to continue seeking fair, realistic and practical solutions to the confinement that is asphyxiating our homeland.
Today more than ever, I must insist that Bolivia's fundamental problem must prevail over any demagoguery or superficial analysis.
The factors introduced in the process of negotiation by the documents exchanged between Chile and Peru constitute a new framework, the scope of which is in the public domain.
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For our government, the negotiations underway were carried out in accordance with clearly defined instances.
The Chilean Government gave its timely answer to the Bolivian proposal of 26 August 1975. Both documents were put on the negotiating table, thus establishing a global basis, within which, I repeat, Bolivia has not specifically committed to anything.
The Peruvian Government has also expressed its points of view.
Therefore, it is now up to the Bolivian Government to define its position, which is based on the following principles.
1.
We ratify our original proposal for peace, development and integration, which will provide a solution to Bolivia's geographic confinement, through a free and fully sovereign outlet from Bolivian territory to the Pacific Ocean.
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2.
With the goal of a solution that does honor to international justice, brotherly cooperation and the broadest solidarity, I propose that the Government of Chile modify its proposal to eliminate the condition regarding an exchange of territory. I further propose that the Peruvian Government modify its proposal regarding the establishment of a territorial area under shared sovereignty.
3.
In exchange, the Bolivian Government offers such contributions as may be necessary, on equitable terms, to the establishment of a great tripartite development hub in the coastal zone that would be transferred to Bolivian sovereignty, which would result in mutual benefits for Bolivia, Chile and Peru.
The foregoing proposals have been officially communicated to the Governments of Chile and Peru.
Both countries have agreed until now that they should not interrupt the dialogue that could make it possible to reach
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the most constructive solutions. We believe that the high-mindedness that this major Bolivian problem deserves should prevail.
Moreover, I want to point out, with special emphasis, that during the current process of diplomatic negotiations, we have had unprecedented success. In a gesture that honors both nations, Chile and Peru have acknowledged before the conscience of the world the right Bolivia has to reintegrate itself to the Pacific Ocean with sovereignty. To move away from this conduct would constitute a rejection of Latin American unity.
And that is not all. The two governments have expressed their agreement on the need to resolve Bolivia's current confinement without delay.
It is feasible, therefore, to enter a new stage in which the nations involved in the solution to Bolivia's confinement are called upon to enter with a mind set on eliminating inflexibility, because they have in their hands the future happiness
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of three nations who desire to cultivate their affinities and overcome any differences.
Bolivia’s cause is legitimate and this legitimacy is recognized by our sister nations and the visionary leaders of the Americas and the world, who have provided us with words of encouragement.
Our demand is indissolubly linked to the noblest of American ideals. Therefore we have received specific expressions of support.
I want to make special reference to the historic commitment contained in the Declaration of Ayacucho, which stated categorically that the solutions to Bolivia’s landlocked situation are linked to the great undertaking of reaffirming the postulates of liberty, justice, equality and solidarity.
As long as Bolivia remains landlocked, justice cannot be proclaimed in the inter-American sphere.
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How could we talk of liberty if we are facing greater dependence on other countries? How could we reaffirm full sovereignty when there is a nation whose exercise of that precious attribute is limited, and how could we solidify equality if there are nations that do not have the same opportunities as other nations to develop and contribute to integration?
Overcoming the asphyxiating situation that has affected our homeland for almost more than century is basically a vital necessity if Bolivia is to develop socioeconomically.
For all these reasons, I appeal to the concept that our sister nations have of history and urge their illustrious leaders to work towards the supreme ideal of peace and cooperation.
The road ahead will not be smooth. Many obstacles will have to be sorted out. Fortunately, our people will not surrender; their spirit has been forged in difficult
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circumstances, they grow stronger day by day because they have faith in a destiny of greatness.
In times of such responsibility and importance for the future of the nation, I appeal to the nobility of my people and to their dignity; I ask them to act fairly. I urge them to abandon their personal positions and interests.
We are living at a time at which we must think deeply.
I make an urgent call to everyone who has the lofty mission of forming public opinion to act with the greatest serenity and objectivity possible.
Ultimately, I call for the unity of Bolivians under the sacred image of the fatherland, reiterating that any decision regarding our return to the sea will only come from the will of the people.
We are aware of the difficult battle we will have to fight in order to return to the sea. The difficulties involved
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in this process do not intimidate us, nor will they diminish the ability of the Bolivian people to conquer this right. Sooner or later, Bolivians, we will return to the sea with sovereignty!
BOLIVIAN BROTHERS AND SISTERS:
As the holy time approaches when we remember the birth of Jesus, the son who was sent to Earth by the Supreme Creator to redeem humanity, our hearts are lifted by the light of Bethlehem, which, throughout the ages, has illuminated the world and shown the pathway towards its perfection.
At the summit of the thoughts inspired by the beautiful image of our Savior, we find the true meaning of our existence in the practice of solidarity and justice and the transcendental values that make man the most perfect creature in nature.
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From that level that is unique to mankind, let us act such that the qualities that were granted to us individually are joined together in a broad, generous, fair and unlimited social instance.
1977 is a new day on the road of our history. We have already laid the fundamental bases for the Bolivia that we desire.
Convinced by the greatness, the creativeness and the heroism of our people, I am certain that our conduct will be the faithful practice of the Christian principles that we proclaim, so that when it comes time to confront reality with theory, no one will be ashamed of having failed to do his duty.
Let peace and love for justice be the principles that motivate all our acts and at the same time constitute the essential features of the new Bolivia that we are building.
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With our love for the Son of God, whose message represents the joyful promise of a new dawn, let us renew our faith in the permanent happiness of the Bolivian people.
Peace and happiness for Bolivian homes.
THANK YOU.