Volume IV

Document Number
19082
Parent Document Number
19072
Document File
Document

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

CASE CONCERNING
MARITIME DELIMITATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

SOMALIA
v.
KENYA

MEMORIALOF SOMALIA

VOLUME IV

13 JULY 2015 VOLUME IV

EXHIBITS

UNITED NATIONS & U.N. COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF

THE CONTINENTALSHELF DOCUMENTS

Annex 70 Federal Republic of Somalia, Continental Shelf Submission of the Federal
Republic of Somalia: Executive Summary (21 July 2014)

Annex 71 United Nations, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Progress
of work in the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Statem▯ent
by the Chair, U.N. Doc. CLCS/85 (24 Sept. 2014)

Annex 72 United Nations, Office of LegalAffairs, Division for OceanAffairs and the
Law of the Sea, Table recapitulating the status of the Convention and of the
related Agreements (10 Oct. 2014), available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/
reference_files/status2010.pdf

Annex 73 United Nations, Statistics Division, NationalAccounts MainAggregates
Database, “Per Capita GDP in US Dollars” (Dec. 2014), available at http://
unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnllist.asp (last accessed 26 June 2015)

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SOMALIAAND PETROLEUM
COMPANIES

Annex 74 Letter from Dr. Abdirahman D. Beileh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs &
Investment Promotion of the Federal Republic of Somalia, to Mr. Paolo

Scaroni, Chief Executive Officer of Eni S.p.A., No. MOFA/MO/1043/2014
(24 Apr. 2014)

Annex 75 Letter from Mr. Massimo Mantovani, Senior Executive Vice President,
General Counsel LegalAffairs Department, Eni S.p.A., to H.E.Abdirahman
D. Beileh, Minister of ForeignAffairs of the Federal Republic of Somalia,
No. Prot. Dialeg 10 (9 June 2014)

Annex 76 Letter from H.E.AhmedAli Dahir,Attorney-General of the Federal Republic
of Somalia, to Mr. Claudio Descalzi, Chief Executive Officer of Eni S.p.A.,
No. 01/115/XIG/2014 (16 Sept. 2014)Annex 77 Letter from H.E.AhmedAli Dahir,Attorney-General of the Federal Republic
of Somalia, to Mr. Peter Worthington, Chief Executive Officer of Midway
Resources International, No. 02/124/XIG/2014 (20 Sept. 2014)

Annex 78 Letter from H.E.AhmedAli Dahir,Attorney-General of the Federal Republic
of Somalia, to Mr. Christophe de Margerie, Chief Executive Officer of Total
S.A., No. 03/125/XIG/2014 (20 Sept. 2014)

Annex 79 Letter from Mr. Claudio Descalzi, Chief Executive Officer of Eni S.p.A.,

to H.E.Abdirahman D. Beileh, Minister of ForeignAffairs of the Federal
Republic of Somalia, and H.E.AhmedAli Dahir,Attorney-General of the
Federal Republic of Somalia, No. 85 (3 Oct. 2014)

EXPERT REPORT

Annex 80 Lindsay Parson, Expert Review Paper, Geology and Geomorphology of the

East Africa Continental Margin, Indian Ocean (6 July 2015)

ACADEMICARTICLES & REPORTS

Annex 81 L.N. King, “The Work of the Jubaland Boundary Commission”, The
Geographical Journal, Vol. 72, No. 5 (Nov. 1928)

Annex 82 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, International

Boundary Study No. 134: Kenya-Somalia Boundary (14 May 1973)

Annex 83 United States, Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Limits in the Seas, No. 92, Maritime Boundary: Kenya-Tanzania (23 June
1981)

Annex 84 E.M. Mathu and T.C. Davies, “Geology and the environment in Kenya”,
Journal of African Earth Sciences, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Nov. 1996)

Annex 85 M.G. Hassan and M.H. Tako, “Current status of marine fisheries in Somalia”,

inA ssessment& m onitoring ofm Arinesystem (S. Lokman et al. eds., 1999)

Annex 86 F. Carbone et al., “The Modern Coral Colonization of the Bajuni Barrie▯r
Island (Southern Somalia):AFacies Model for Carbonate-Quartzose
Sedimentation”, Geologica Romana, Vol. 35 (1999)Annex 87 Mohamad D. Abdullahi,C ulture AndC ustoms ofs omAliA (2001)

Annex 88 U.N. Environment Programme, The State of the Environment in Somalia: A
Desk Study (Dec. 2005)

Annex 89 Godfrey Mwakikagile, K enyA: dentity of n Ation(2007)

Annex 90 E. Milano and I. Papanicolopulu, “State Responsibility in DisputedAreas
on Land and at Sea”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und

Völkerrecht (ZaöRV), Vol. 71 (2011)

Annex 91 Brownlie s PrinCiPles oPuBliC nternAtionAl lAw (James Crawford ed., 8th
ed. 2012)

Annex 92 A. C. Beier and E. Stephansson, Environmental and Climate Change Policy
Brief: Somalia (28 Oct. 2012)

Annex 93 Jeff R. Vogel, Fishing for Answers to Piracy in Somalia

Annex 94 L. Persson et al., “Failed State: Reconstruction of Domestic Fisherie▯s Catches

in Somalia 1950-2010”, University of British Columbia Working Papers
Series, Working Paper No. 2014-10 (2014)

Annex 95 Luke Patey, Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition, Oxford Institute for

Energy Studies Paper Series No. WPM 53 (Oct. 2014)

Annex 96 U.S. Central IntelligenceAgency, The World Factbook: Somalia, available
at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html

(last accessed 3Apr. 2015)

Annex 97 U.S. Central IntelligenceAgency, The World Factbook: Kenya, available
at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print/

country/countrypdf_ke.pdf (last accessed 3Apr. 2015)

NEWSPAPER & PETROLEUM INDUSTRY REPORTS

Annex 98 African Energy, “SOMALIA- TotalFinaElf to explore offshore”, Financial
Times: Energy Newsletters (26 Feb. 2001)

Annex 99 Dana Petroleum plc, Annual Report & Accounts 2002 (2003)Annex 100 Thomas Pearmain, “Woodside Spuds Offshore Well; Kenya’s Oil Future to Be
Determined in 2007”, Global Insight (5 Dec. 2006)

Annex 101 Thomas Pearmain, “Woodside Well in Kenya a Duster”, Global Insight (23
Jan. 2007)

Annex 102 Total S.A., Press Release: Total Enters Exploration in Kenya by Acquiring a
40% Stake in Five Offshore Blocks in the Lamu Basin (21 Sept. 2011)

Annex 103 Barry Morgan, “Kenyan block still attractive”, Biyokulule Online (13 Apr.

2012)

Annex 104 Kelly Gilblom, “Kenya, Somalia border row threatens oil exploration”▯,
Reuters (20Apr. 2012)

Annex 105 Total S.A., Press Release: Total Steps Up Exploration Activities in Kenya with
the Award of the Offshore L22 License in the Lamu Basin (27 June 2012)

Annex 106 Eni S.p.A., Press Release: Eni enters Kenya with the acquisition of three
exploration blocks (2 July 2012)

Annex 107 Kelly Gilblom, “Somalia challenges Kenya over oil blocks”, Reuters (6 July
2012)

Annex 108 Kennedy Senelwa, “Kenya ministry signs contracts for oil drilling”, The East
African (7 July 2012)

Annex 109 Rawlings Otini, “Kenya expels oil giant Statoil from exploration plan”,
Business Daily Africa (5 Nov. 2012)

Annex 110 Tullow Oil plc, Tullow in Kenya 2013

Annex 111 Total S.A., Factbook 2013 (2013)

Annex 112 Kelly Gilblom, “Middle Eastern oil explorer gives up licence in Kenya”,
Reuters (28 Jan. 2013)

Annex 113 Nina Rach, “Kenya forges ahead”, oedigital.com (1 July 2013)

Annex 114 Midway Resources International, Media Release: Midway Resources
International (“MRI”) completes gravity-magnetic seismic data ac▯quisition

programs on Blocks L13 and L4, Kenya (19 July 2013)Annex 115 Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, Second-Quarter 2013 Operations Report
(29 July 2013)

Annex 116 Deloitte, “Kenya”, ihetdeloitteg uide tooil Andg As ie AstA friC:
uniquelys truCtured(2014)

Annex 117 Total S.A., Factbook 2014 (2014)

Annex 118 Chris Lo, “Offshore Kenya: keeping up the neighbors”, Offshore Technology
Market & Customer Insight (13 Jan. 2014)

Annex 119 Eduard Gismatullin, “Tullow Finds More Kenyan Oil to Boost EastAfrica
Exports”, Bloomberg Business (15 Jan. 2014)

Annex 120 Nina Rach, “Kenyan explorers look deeper offshore”, oedigital.com (1 July

2014)

Annex 121 World Bank, Press Release: Kenya: New World Bank project will support
country efforts to better manage oil and gas developments and revenues to

invest in lasting growth and development (24 July 2014)

Annex 122 John Gachiri, “National Oil,American firm finish survey of Lamu oil blocks”,
Business Daily (2 Dec. 2014)

Annex 123 IHS Inc., EDIN Database, Kenya: Contracts Block L24 (2015)

Annex 124 IHS Inc., EDIN Database, Kenya: Contracts Block L26 (2015)

Annex 125 Elayne Wangalwa, “World Bank approves US$50 million for Kenya’s oil and
gas sector”, CNBC Africa (12 Feb. 2015)

Annex 126 “Anadarko to Drill Play-Opening Deepwater Well in Kenya”, Oil & News
Kenya (3 Mar. 2015)

Annex 127 Tullow Oil plc, Kenya exploration and appraisal update (11 Mar. 2015)

Annex 128 African Development Bank, Information Centre for the Extractives Sector
(ICES), “Oil & Gas”, available at http://ices.or.ke/sectors/oil-gas/ (last
accessed 22 May 2015)Annex 129 Petroleum Geo-Services, “Kenya-Lamu Basin PGS MultiClient2D”, available
at http://www.pgs.com/pageFolders/241891/kenya_lamu_mc2d_a3ds_0412_
std.pdf (last accessed 8 June 2015)

Annex 130 Schlumberger, “Multiclient Latest Projects: Kenya Deepwater 2D 2013

Multiclient Seismic Survey”, available at http://www.multiclient.slb.com/en/
latest-projects/africa/kenya_2d.aspx (last accessed 9 June 2015)

Annex 131 Schlumberger, “Kenya Multiclient Seismic Surveys: 2D offshore data”,
available at http://www.multiclient.slb.com/africa/east-africa/kenya.aspx (last

accessed 9 June 2015)

Annex 132 Schlumberger, “Kenya Multiclient Seismic Surveys Map”, available at http://
www.multiclient.slb.com/africa/east-africa/kenya.aspx (last accessed 9 June
2015)

Annex 133 IHS Inc., EDIN Database, Kenya: Contracts Block L-05/Block L05 (2015)

Annex 134 IHS Inc., EDIN Database, Kenya: Contracts Block L-13 (2015)

Annex 135 IHS Inc., EDIN Database, Kenya: Contracts Block L21 (2015)

Annex 136 IHS Inc., EDIN Database, Kenya: Contracts Block L23 (2015) Annex 70

Federal Republic of Somalia, Continental Shelf Submission of the Federal Republic of Somalia:
Executive Summary (21 July 2014)Annex 70Annex 70

Table of contents

1. INTRODUCTION ….......................................................2.......................................................................

2. MARITIME AREAS, MAPS AND COORDINATES …...............................3..........................................

3. ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE RECEIVED DURING THE PREPARATION OF THIS SUBMISSION
…....................................................................4.......................................................................................

4. THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF OF SOMALIA – BASELINES …...4..............

5. PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 76 INVOKED IN SUPPORT OF THIS SUBMISSION ….....5...................

6. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE CONTINENTAL MARGIN OF SOMALIA …...........5.................

7. MARITIME DELIMITATIONS AND OTHER ISSUES..............................5..........................................

7.1. Maritime areas between Somalia and Kenya........................6.........................................................

7.2. Maritime areas between Somalia and Yemen …......................9......................................................

7.3. Maritime delimitation between Somalia and Tanzania …............9..................................................

8. THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE SOMALI CONTINENTAL SHELF …...................10............................

APPENDIX 1 …............................................................12............................................................................

CONTINENTAL SHELF SUBMISSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMExecutive Sum m ary Annex 70

1. INTRODUCTION the C onvention m ay be satisfied by subm itting
prelim inary inform ation indicative of the
Som alia ratified the U nited N ations C onvention
lim ts of the continental shef beyond 200
on the Law of the Sea, nautical m ilesefromethetobaselines from
“he Convenion, on 24 Juthe breadth of the territorial sea is m easured,
C onvention entered into force for Som alia on 16
together w ith a descriptive report on
Novem ber 1994. of preparation and intended date of the
subm isson (docum ent SPLOS/183, paragraph 1
Artice 4 of Annex II to(a)).Convention
stipulates that w here a coastal State intends to

establish, in accordance Dueh torailack6of financal and techncal
outer lim its of itscontresources and relevant capacity and expertise,
nautical m iles from the Som aliaew asoam ongithe developing States
the breadth of the terrfacedalparticular eachallenges in fulfilling

should subm it particularequirem ents of articleh4 of Annex II
C om m issionon the Lim iConvention. M oreover, Som aliacontinues
Shelf, hereinafter referexperencesa “number of other constrants

Com m ission”, along withrelatinginto theepolitical and security
and technical data as sthe country,blesubstantially hindering
any case w ithinten yeafulfilm ent of these requirem ents.
force of the C onvention for that State.
O n this basis, in Octciarl 2008, the

In 2001 the Eleventh M eetingntof States Partiescretory-G eneral of the
the Convention decided that inNathescase of ala (SRSG, M .
State Party for which themConventionAbenterediiaed the
preparaton of prelminary informaton, as
into force before 13 M ay 1999, it is understood
that the ten-year tim e periodereferredetouinr lim itsof the
article 4 of A nnex II toonthenC onvention Sshall beyond 200 nauti
taken to have com m encedonle13fM ay 1999baselines from w hich
of the territorial sea is m easured, w ith
(document SPLOS/72, paragraph (a)). Ths
decision applied to Som alia. Consequently, in Secretary-General in
the case of Som alia theaten-yearetim ehperioddecision set out
SPLO S/183. In order to prepare this m aterial,
referred to in article 4 of Annex II of the
C onvention expired on t13 M ay 2009.pted an offer of assistance
the G overnm ent of N orw ay. O n 14 April 2009
The Eleventh M eeting oftheaTransitiGonalrFedenta(TFG ) of
C onvention also decidedthehRepublicgofeSomaliausubmited such

of the ability of Statesprelim inarylyinform ation to the Secretary-
States, to fulfil the reG eneral of thearU nited4N ations.
Annex II to the Convention be kept under
review (docum ent SPLOS/72, paragraph (b)).t the request of the
Norwegian Governm ent agreed to proceed with
D ue to lack of financial and technical resources,
relevant capacity and expertise, or othernce sim ilars the preparation
constraints, m anydevelopingucountries were. T he w ork has been
facing particular challengeslyiny m eetingl thesegian M inistry

requirem ents. Foreign A ffairs, the N orw egian M apping
A uthority, the N orw egian Petroleum
In June 2008 the Eighteand GRID-Arenda.f States
Parties to the C onvention therefore decided that
it is undersood that theThisyesubm ission fulfils the obligations

condition referred to ihas under article nn76 andtarticle 4 of A nnex

2 Executive Sum m aryAnnex 70

the Convention and suppTheensubmisson is intended to serve
prelim inary inform ationsafeguardtedtheypresent and future interests

on 14 April 2009 in accoSom ali statethand its people.
decisions contained in docum ents SPLOS/72
and SPLO S/183, requiring the subm ission of
2. MARITIME AREAS, MAPS
inform ation on the outer lim its of its continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical m lesCfromINtheS
baselnes rom which he breadth of the

territorial sea is m easured, intarespect of areasoncontained
offshore Som aia. The M anuBodyonof thisended to enabe he
subm ission contains a detailedmdescription oofr imits of t

the scientific and technical data, m aps, technicala w here
procedures and scientifiextendobeyondes200atnautical m ilesfrom
w ere applied in the establishm ent of the outer
baselines in the high seas in the
lim its of the continentaIndian Ocean.m alia w here
those lim its extend beyond 200 nautical m iles.

FigurO1.rviewof the Africanlandm asand m aritimaeas of thenorth-western
W hitelines – 200nautical m illim its, yellow /rlines– land and
equidistance line. The m ap figure is m ade for illustrative purposes only.

3
CONTINENTAL SHELF SUBMISSION OF THE FEDExecutiveBLSum m aryALIA Annex 70

In accordance w iththe Sparagraph a1d(a), andalthe Som ali prelim inary
Guidelines of the Com m isinform aton subm tted on 14 April 2009.
sum m aryincludes a m apshowing the outer
 N orway takes no position on, nor does
lim its of the continental shelf (Figure 6) and a list
of the coordinates of the afixed pointsesuseditolity for, any legal or
define the outer lim its of the icontinental shelf to the preparation
the subm ission, including issues pertaining
beyond 200 nautical m es, toe baselinesior m aritim edelim itation. The
nautical m iles betw een adjacent points, and the
provision of article 76 onsawhichppeach point isrds the assistance
based (A ppendix 1). podd y he UNP hf
Program m e/G RID -A rendal.

3. ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE  A ssistance and advice provided by N orw ay

RECEIVED DURING THE should be based on open and accessible
PREPARATION OF THIS sources, and in particular should include
technical analyses and preparation
SUBMISSION M ain Body docum ent based on m odern

The Government of Norway hasogprovdedl Inform aton System (GIS)
assistance and advice to tthenoFederal G overnm ente UNEP Shelf
Program m e/G RID -A rendal.
of Som alia (FGS) in the preparation of the
present subm ission, and tA m ajor aimrof the Norwegian assistance has
M inistry of Foreign A ffairs, the N orw egian
been to ensure that Som alia m eets
Petroleum Directorate and periodNocondition referred to in article
M apping Authority have beA nnexvoIIeto thetC onvention, the decisions
work.
contained in SPLO S/72 and SPLO S/183, and
Based on open and accessbleosourcesuandem ents the Som ali prelim inary
m odern G eographical Inform ationtoSystem t(G IS) 14 April 2009.

technogy, the UNEP Shef Progamme,
represented by G RID -Arendal, hasEcarriedS outTHE
the technical analyses and prepared the m aterial
CONTINENTAL SHELF OF
contained in the M ain BodSOMALIA – BASELINEShe
annexes to this subm ission.
The pesentsubmision deas with the
The FG S w ere also assisted in the preparation of
the present subm ission ebyaM r. H araldtBrekke, aimis of the
continental shelf of Som alia, w ithout prejudice
form er m em ber of the Canymoissues of bilateral m aritim e delim itation
N o advice w as providedneighbouringherStates. Suchf issues w ill be
theCmmison.
to under item 7 below .
All expenses related to the preparation of the
Som alia is of the view that the norm al baseline
present subm ission have fromn w hichdthey breadth of the territorial sea
Governm ent of Norway. m easured is defined at the low -w ater

The Norwegian assistancetwas based uonesthepecifically stipulated otherwise.
following prem ises: In accordance with the pertnent provsions of
the Conventon, and with the assistance
 A ssistance should incsateltehimager, theiNorwegian Mappng

a submision to the CommAuthority has identified a total of 608
accordance w ith artipoints alonge the coast of Som alia from
and article 4 of A nnw ith D jibouti in the north to the starting point of

as w ell as the deciK enya-Som aliaed m aritim e boundary,
SPLO S/72, paragraph (hereinafter “S608/K 1” as depicted in

4 Executive Sum m aryAnnex 70

W ith a few exceptions, south-west and csouth-trending seafloor
norm al baseline in accoincluding the C hain R idge (Figure 2).

provisions set out in tTheC C hainiRidge extends northw ards
of the Som ali coastline, as com puted from the
sum of the distances betw eenetheset608n baseline the Carlsberg
w hence it m erges w ith the southern
points from the D jibouthetoO w enFracture, Zone, w hich
km . The baselines points are established w ithan
accuracy of one secondC of arcrg(30im ).to the Sheba R idge

The Carsberg Ridge consttues the northern
5. PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE extension of the C entral Indian
active spreading ridge of the Indian
76 INVOKED IN SUPPORT
OF THIS SUBMISSION Sheba Ridge continues westwards
Fracture Zone, extending north
Som alia invokes the provisionslfof paragraphs t1, 3 ed Sea.

and 4 of article 76 inTheppdetailstof theabopeningntof the
of the outer lim its of the continental shelf beyond
200 nautical m iles, basedion stheeconsiderations research, but it is clear that the
m argin of Som alia is part of a passive
outlined in Section 6. Bm argin. Theedm arginnw as form ed
“G ardiner” form ulae lines have been used in this
subm ission. The outer lim itsof thecocontinentalreak-up between the African
continent and the continental block
shelf have been delineatM adagascar and India.
connected by straight lines not exceeding 60
In the Jurasic, as partof the Gondwana
nautical m ilesin length, as set out in the
provisions of article 76, paragraph S7m(see wFigureaposed
6). M adagascar in the south (south of the
Som ali Spur), and w ith northern

6. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF
The initial rifting of this region
THE CONTINENTAL in the M iddle Jurassic, prior to
MARGIN OF SOMALIA Som ali Basin. M agnetic anom alies

The Som ali continental m arginnisncharacterised ali Basins indicate the
presence of old oceanic crust.The
by a narrow continental anomalesiin heroW eern Somali Basn
slightly to the north. Ainterpreteddtosrepresent both lim bs of an
spur (the Central Som ali Spur) is observed
spreading segm ent. The crust beneath
extending to the east mN ortherntwSom ali Basin also exhibits
in the south and the tam plitude m agnetic anom alies indicative of oceanic
the north. South of the C entral Som ali Spur, the
crust.
continental slope exhibits a sm ooth gradient, in
contrast to the m ore com plexam orphologyaltos thegest that
north. T he slope extends todithecodeepenabyssal plainte Jurassic (the age of
the oldest M 22 anom aly), and ceased
of the Som ali B asin at a depth of about 5000 m .
tim e in the Early Cretaceous. A
The Som ali Basin is subspreadingistartedrin sthe Late Cretaceous
basins. The Central Som Indiaputo m igratesnorthw ards along

N orthern Som ali Basin partseof theh thenmsingle Som ali Basin, w hich
W estern Som ali Basin isubsequently. split byethe form ation
Som ali Basin is located todgtheweast, separated a result of this

from the two aforem entionedsub-basinseby process.

CONTINENTAL SHELF SUBMISSION OF THE FEDExecutiveBLSum m aryALIA Annex 70

Figu.eom orphologicalstructuralsetting em thes nsttAfrcanesContinental
fracture zones Sof the Central Som ali Spur: These zones are nam ed after the three principal types of vessels encountered
sailingin these w atersthe D how is an A rabm erchant shipsV LC Cstands
Auxiliary Rescue and Salvage.

7. MARITIME DELIMITATIONS

AND OTHER ISSUES by reference to Rule 46 and A nnex I of the
of Procedure of the C om m ission.
All inform ation and m aps contained in this
Som alia’s approach regarding m aritim e
subm ission are without prejudice to issues of
m aritim e delim itation. delim itation w ith neighbouring States is based
the international law of the sea and

There rem ain unresolvedwihisheesetld rjuiprudne toftthe
bilateral delim itation Internatonal Court of Jlustcethon maritime
the Federal Republic of Som alia’s neighbouring
delim itation, the first stage in the
states Kenya and Yem entoanthe delim itation of the continental shelf m ay
Tanzania. T hese issues be to hestablish beacprovisional equidistance

6 Executive Sum m aryAnnex 70

7.1 Maritime areas between resolvnedthe basis of the jurisprudence
and Kenya the International C ourt of Justice on

The delimitation of the continental shelfSom alia’s continental shelf claim
between the Federal Republic of Som alia andh at least up to a
the Republ c of Kenya haseqnot yet beenrawn from S608/K1 (Figure 3).

Figue p. figureshow ing the equidistance line of Som alia, representing
details), and the 200 M lim it lineand 350 M m xheum constraint
blue m aritim e areas indicate possible overlap with Kenyan claim s. The m ap figure is m ade for illustrative purposes only.

The coastlines of both TSom aliasandincK enyaiare by the
generally rather straight andllowfeatureless, with

the exception of a protuberaLatitude ongtude Estint
O ver a distance of about 200 km in aNum berrly
De. i.ecDe.in.ec.
direction from the point-1 39 4341 33 332 (base point S608)
coast exhibits a general azim uth of 38 degrees
off north. For a distance2 1of about 200.4 km south
-2 46 2142 48 29.4 3
of the point S608/K1, the ge-3 19 3943 26 00.4 4
the K enyan coast is 225 degrees off north.
-3 52 5544 03 33.9 5
-4 26 0944 41 10.4 6
O n the basis of these da-4 59 2245 18 50.3im7s a

continental shelf area, base-5 32 3245 56 33.9 8
equidi staenceng from point S608/K145 57 22.7 9
(see Figure 4) w ith an -azim uth5 (2251.1+138)/2 =

131.5 degrees off north. (G eodetic datum : W G S84)

Latitude SouLongtude East
Thqeuidistnntceslcte Deg.M in.Sec. Deg. M in.Sec.

the 12 nautical m ile territea l8m 1.t 41 43 07.0
the 24 nautical m ile contig1on5at 13.741 52 06.1
the 200 nautical m ile EEZ at 53 18.344 04 00.0

the 350 nautical m ile lim -5at 32 47.445 56 51.1

CONTINENTAL SHELF SUBMISSION OF THE FEDERAExecutiveC Sum m aryA Annex 70

FiguTeh. starting point for theThSeofali claimt isf thneclai08/s1s.how n Figure

m ap figure is m ade for illustrative purposes only.

FiguLem.it lines and geodetic constructions illustrating the relationships
and its neighboBuringlines:tKies.a’s claim . Yellow line: 350 nautical m iles
line: 350 nautical m iles from Pem ba (Tanzania). Pink line: Illustrating
and m ain plaTheu mfp Siguheeles.m ade for illustrative purposes only.

8 Executive Sum m aryAnnex 70

The unresolved issue ofcoastal Statesnoconstitute for the
continental shelf between“the areas under spue”.f
Som alia and the Republic of Kenya is to be
Som alia is ready to enter into consultations w ith
regarded as a “m aritimthediR epublic of Yem enrpw itha view
of rule 5 (a) of A nnex I of the Rules of Procedure
of the C om m ission. The purportedorclaimebytatheng w hich
Republic of Kenya includeshm artmesiareas conider and make
recom m endations on subm issions by
claim edby the Federal Rtwoblcoastal States,in the areas under
thereby resulting in an overlapping area w hich,
for the sam e purposes, constitutes “theiareato the final delim itation
under dspute. continental shelf to be concluded
the areas under dispute by the
Pending such an agreem ent or understanding,
The present subm ission by the Federal Republic
of Som alia includes the areaslunder disputehe C om m ission
betw een the tw o coastal States. Som alia pis ready any future
delim itation in the m aritim earea
to enter into consultations w ith the Republic of
K enya w ith a view to reaching an agreem ent or
understanding w hich w ill allowithe C om m issionetween
to consider and m akerecom m endaons on Tanzania

subm issions by each of the tw o coastal States inson and
the areas under spute wthout preudice o theished on the
final delim itation of the econtinental shelf to beecutive Sum m ary
concuded subsequenty in themareas underdeby the Federal Republic
Som alia, there is a potential overlap
dispute by the tw o coastal States. Pending such an
agreem ent or understanding, Som aliatrequestsnian claim s
the C om m issionnot to atake anythsteps that w ouldhelf beyond
prejudice any future bilateral delim itation in the

m aritim e area concernedUnresolved delim itationissues between
coastal States, as w ell asany overlap
7.2 Maritime areas between Somalia
and Yemen areas of the continental shelf beyond
m iles claim ed by them , should be
reference to rule 46 of A nnex I of the Rules
The delim itation of the Procedureal of thebeC om m ission. For the purpose
the Federal R epublic of Som alia and the R epublic
of Yem en has not yet beenticresolved. Basedex on othehese
current subm ission androcthereinform ationolved delim itation
should be regarded as a “m aritim e
published on the C om coveredn’byw overlappingdiclaim s m ade
the Executive Sum m arycoastal Statesssconstitute for the
by the R epublic of Yem en, it is evident that there
is an overlap betw een Som ali and uYem eni claim s

as regards the areas of Som aliaiis readyheto enter into consultations w ith
beyond 200 nautical m ithe. U nitedRepublic of Tanzania
reaching an agreem ent or understanding
Unresolved delim itationw ill allowethe C om m ission to consider and
coastal States, as w ell asany overlap betw een the
recom m endations on subm issions by
areas of the continentatwohecoastal States0in thetareas under
m iles claim ed by them ,w ithout prejudicedetodthey final delim itation
reference to rule 46 ancontinental shelf toulebe concluded
Procedure of the C om m ission. For the purpose of
the areas under dispute by the
article 5 (a) of Annex IPending suchleanoagreem ent or understanding,
Procedure, such unresolveSom alia requests the C om m ission
should be regarded as stepsathat wouldspprejudiceeaany future
covered by overlapping delim itationebin the tm aritim earea

CONTINENTAL SHELF SUBMISSION OF THE FEDExecutiveBLSum m aryALIA Annex 70

Figureeo.ter lim its of the continental shelf of Som alia.

8. THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE  8 poins deined by he sedment
thickness form ula set out in article
SOMALI CONTINENTAL
SHELF paragraph 4(a)(i);

The outer lim itsof the Som ali continental shelfby arcs constructed
nautical m es from the foot of the
beyond 200 nautical m iles is defined by 532 fixed
points established in accordance w ith sarticlen 76cofrdance
the C onvention. T hese are aas follow s:aragraph 4(a)(ii); and

10 Executive Sum m aryAnnex 70

 318 points defined icontnental slope pont subm tted by Som al
the constraint criter(Figure 36). nautical
m iles distance from the baseline,

provided for in artThee southernm ost fixed point of the
of the Som ali continental shelf is
The 532 fixed points artheoinerseciony of heig350 nauical mi
lines not exceeding 60 nautical m iles in length, as
constraint line and the calculated
provided for in articleline between Som alia and Kenya.
points and connecting lines are show n in Figure
6. A colour code has been used to indicate under
For both the northern- and southernm ost fixed
which article 76 criteripoints descbed above, reerence s made t
established. (Further detailscan be found in
Appendix 1). list of coordinates of fixed points
Appendix 1. The final delim itation
For the purpose of ths submisson, the Yem en in the north

northernm ost fixed point of then outer lim it of theve to
Som ali continental shelf iseestablishedhonuthe bilateral
(referenceis m ade to Secton 7 above), i
Yem eni 200 nautical m iles line at a distance of 60
nautical m iles from theacnorthernm ost foot of theal law.

CONTINENTAL SHELF SUBMISSION OF THE FEDExecutiveBLSum m aryALIA Annex 70

APPENDIX 1

List of coordinates

ECS Longitude Long ELong ELong L Eat Lat Lat
Point East LatitudeDeg. M in. Sec. Deg. M in. Sec. A rticle 76 provision invoked

OL1 45,9475-5,5465045 56 51,10 -5 32 47,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL2 45,9747-5,5152745 58 28,99 -5 30 55,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL3 46,0041-5,4811146 0 15,00 -5 28 52,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL4 46,0333-5,4466646 2 0,01 -5 26 48,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL5 46,0625-5,4119446 3 45,00 -5 24 42,99 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL6 46,0911-5,3769446 5 28,00 -5 22 37,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL7 46,1241-5,3361146 7 26,99 -5 20 10,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL8 46,1522-5,3008346 9 8,00 -5 18 3,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL9 46,1799-5,2652746 10 48,00 -5 15 55,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL10 46,2077-5,2294446 12 28,01 -5 13 46,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL11 46,2349-5,1936146 14 5,99 -5 11 37,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL12 46,2888-5,1208346 17 20,00 -5 7 15,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL13 46,3152-5,0844446 18 55,00 -5 5 4,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL14 46,9218-4,2948046 55 18,81 -4 17 41,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL15 46,9277-4,2879446 55 40,01 -4 17 16,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL16 46,9394-4,2741946 56 22,10 -4 16 27,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL17 46,9453-4,2673046 56 43,10 -4 16 2,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL18 46,9511-4,2603846 57 4,10 -4 15 37,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL19 46,9569-4,2535046 57 25,00 -4 15 12,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL20 46,9627-4,2465846 57 45,90 -4 14 47,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL21 46,9685-4,2396646 58 6,79 -4 14 22,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL22 46,9743-4,2327246 58 27,60 -4 13 57,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL23 46,9801-4,2257746 58 48,40 -4 13 32,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL24 46,9916-4,2118846 59 29,91 -4 12 42,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL25 47,0031-4,1979447 0 11,20 -4 11 52,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL26 47,0145-4,1839447 0 52,31 -4 11 2,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL27 47,0202-4,1769447 1 12,81 -4 10 37,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL28 47,0259-4,1699447 1 33,30 -4 10 11,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL29 47,0315-4,1629147 1 53,70 -4 9 46,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL30 47,0372-4,1558847 2 14,09 -4 9 21,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL31 47,0429-4,1488347 2 34,50 -4 8 55,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL32 47,0485-4,1418047 2 54,79 -4 8 30,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL33 47,0541-4,1347547 3 15,10 -4 8 5,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL34 47,7512-3,4157247 45 4,51 -3 24 56,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL35 48,1991-3,0842548 11 56,90 -3 5 3,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL36 48,2021-3,0825748 12 7,78 -3 4 57,25 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL37 48,2890-2,9308148 17 20,58 -2 55 50,94 A rt. 76(4)(a)(i): 1% Sedim ent Thickness

OL38 48,7505-2,3472548 45 2,05 -2 20 50,13 A rt. 76(4)(a)(i): 1% Sedim ent Thickness

OL39 49,4347-2,0132449 26 5,10 -2 0 47,69 A rt. 76(4)(a)(i): 1% Sedim ent Thickness
OL40 49,9824-1,5391749 58 56,73 -1 32 21,03 A rt. 76(4)(a)(i): 1% Sedim ent Thickness

OL41 49,7002-1,0730349 42 0,96 -1 4 22,92 A rt. 76(4)(a)(i): 1% Sedim ent Thickness

OL42 50,4309-0,4265050 25 51,45 0 -25 35,43 A rt. 76(4)(a)(i): 1% Sedim ent Thickness

OL43 50,5439-0,2787550 32 38,27 0 -16 43,51 A rt. 76(4)(a)(i): 1% Sedim ent Thickness

12
Executive Sum m aryAnnex 70

ECS LongitudLatitudeng ELong ELong L Eat Lat Lat A rticle 76 provision invoked
Point East Deg. M in. Sec. Deg. M in. Sec.

OL44 50,71605,70500450 42 57,94 0 42 18,01 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL45 51,21941,29325651 13 9,92 1 17 35,72 A rt. 76(4)(a)(i): 1% Sedim ent Thickness

OL46 52,07416,80694652 4 27,11 1 48 25,01 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL47 52,08230,80841552 4 56,60 1 48 30,30 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL48 52,09059,80995252 5 26,05 1 48 35,83 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL49 52,09870,81155952 5 55,46 1 48 41,61 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL98 52,47154,97069652 28 17,70 1 58 14,50 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL99 52,47845,97548852 28 42,26 1 58 31,76 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL10052,48515,98033952 29 6,70 1 58 49,22 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL10152,49190,98524552 29 30,98 1 59 6,88 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL10252,49866,99021052 29 55,12 1 59 24,75 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL10352,50536,99522852 30 19,10 1 59 42,82 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M
OL10452,51199,00030452 30 42,94 2 0 1,09 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL10552,51859,00543452 31 6,63 2 0 19,56 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL10652,52504,01062052 31 30,16 2 0 38,23 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL10752,53152,01585952 31 53,52 2 0 57,09 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL10852,53793,02115452 32 16,74 2 1 16,15 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL10952,54432,02650252 32 39,81 2 1 35,41 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL11052,55071,03190452 33 2,70 2 1 54,85 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL11152,55708,03735852 33 25,44 2 2 14,49 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL11252,56339,04286452 33 48,02 2 2 34,31 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL11352,56955,04842352 34 10,43 2 2 54,32 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL11452,57571,05403552 34 32,67 2 3 14,53 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL11552,58181,05969852 34 54,74 2 3 34,91 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M
OL11652,58796,06541352 35 16,64 2 3 55,49 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL11752,59394,07117752 35 38,38 2 4 16,24 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL11852,59993,07699352 35 59,94 2 4 37,18 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL11952,60593,08285852 36 21,32 2 4 58,29 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL12052,61186,08877352 36 42,54 2 5 19,58 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL12152,61761,09473752 37 3,58 2 5 41,05 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL12252,62341,10075052 37 24,42 2 6 2,70 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL12352,62916,10681352 37 45,11 2 6 24,53 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL12452,63482,11292152 38 5,61 2 6 46,51 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL12552,64053,11907752 38 25,92 2 7 8,68 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL12652,64616,12528152 38 46,05 2 7 31,01 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL12752,65165,13153152 39 5,99 2 7 53,51 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL12852,65714,13782852 39 25,75 2 8 16,18 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M
OL12952,66250,14417152 39 45,32 2 8 39,02 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL13053,36762,84514653 22 3,52 2 50 42,52 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL13153,37402,85048253 22 26,62 2 51 1,74 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL13253,38046,85587353 22 49,57 2 51 21,14 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL13353,38671,86131653 23 12,34 2 51 40,74 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL13453,39304,86681353 23 34,96 2 52 0,53 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL13553,39924,87236353 23 57,42 2 52 20,51 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL13653,40546,87796453 24 19,71 2 52 40,67 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL13753,41161,88361753 24 41,84 2 53 1,02 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL13853,41777,88932253 25 3,78 2 53 21,56 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL13953,42371,89507853 25 25,58 2 53 42,28 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL14053,42971,90088353 25 47,18 2 54 3,18 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

13
CONTINENTAL SHELF SUBMISSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMExecutive Sum m ary Annex 70

ECS LongituLatitudeong ELong ELong LEat Lat Lat A rticle 76 provision invoked
Point East Deg. M in. Sec. Deg. M in. Sec.

OL14153,435726,90673953 26 8,61 2 54 24,26 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL14253,441635,91264553 26 29,89 2 54 45,52 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL14353,447491,91860053 26 50,97 2 55 6,96 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL14453,453301,92460453 27 11,88 2 55 28,57 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL14553,459053,93065653 27 32,59 2 55 50,36 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL14653,464760,93675453 27 53,14 2 56 12,32 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL14753,470417,94290353 28 13,50 2 56 34,45 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL14853,476021,94909753 28 33,67 2 56 56,75 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL14953,481579,95533853 28 53,68 2 57 19,22 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL15053,487076,96162553 29 13,47 2 57 41,85 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL15153,492527,96795953 29 33,10 2 58 4,65 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL15253,497921,97433753 29 52,52 2 58 27,61 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M
OL15353,503269,98076153 30 11,77 2 58 50,74 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL15453,508560,98722853 30 30,82 2 59 14,02 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL15553,513794,99373953 30 49,66 2 59 37,46 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL15653,518974,00029653 31 8,31 3 0 1,06 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL15753,524105,00689653 31 26,78 3 0 24,82 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL15853,529179,01353853 31 45,04 3 0 48,74 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL15953,534195,02022253 32 3,10 3 1 12,80 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL16053,539158,02694753 32 20,97 3 1 37,01 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL16153,544064,03371353 32 38,63 3 2 1,37 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL16253,548920,04052253 32 56,11 3 2 25,88 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL16353,553711,04736953 33 13,36 3 2 50,53 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL16453,558445,05425753 33 30,40 3 3 15,33 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M
OL16553,563129,06118653 33 47,27 3 3 40,27 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL16653,567753,06815353 34 3,91 3 4 5,35 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL16753,572315,07515953 34 20,33 3 4 30,57 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL16853,576828,08220253 34 36,58 3 4 55,93 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL16953,581272,08928353 34 52,58 3 5 21,42 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL17053,585663,09640053 35 8,39 3 5 47,04 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL17153,589993,10355453 35 23,97 3 6 12,79 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL17253,594261,11074353 35 39,34 3 6 38,67 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL17353,598476,11796953 35 54,52 3 7 4,69 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL17454,145798,95013354 8 44,87 3 57 0,48 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL17554,433037,22728754 25 58,93 4 13 38,23 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL17654,439011,23312754 26 20,44 4 13 59,26 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL17754,444939,23901654 26 41,78 4 14 20,46 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M
OL17854,450821,24495554 27 2,96 4 14 41,84 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL17954,45664,25094254 27 23,94 4 15 3,39 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL18054,462429,25697854 27 44,74 4 15 25,12 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL18154,468163,26306254 28 5,39 4 15 47,02 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL18254,473843,26919554 28 25,83 4 16 9,10 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL18354,479473,27537454 28 46,10 4 16 31,34 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL18454,485050,28159954 29 6,18 4 16 53,76 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL18554,490574,28787354 29 26,07 4 17 16,34 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL18654,496048,29419254 29 45,77 4 17 39,09 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL18754,501473,30055654 30 5,30 4 18 2,00 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL18854,506840,30696554 30 24,62 4 18 25,07 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL18954,512157,31341954 30 43,77 4 18 48,31 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

14
Executive Sum m aryAnnex 70

ECS LongitudLatitudeng ELong ELong L Eat Lat Lat A rticle 76 provision invoked
Point East Deg. M in. Sec. Deg. M in. Sec.

OL19054,51748,31991954 31 2,70 4 19 11,71 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL19154,52265,32646154 31 21,45 4 19 35,26 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL19254,52779,33304654 31 40,00 4 19 58,97 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL19354,53285,33967554 31 58,35 4 20 22,83 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL19454,53792,34634554 32 16,52 4 20 46,84 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL19554,54292,35305754 32 34,48 4 21 11,01 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL19654,54784,35981254 32 52,24 4 21 35,32 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL19754,55275,36660854 33 9,78 4 21 59,79 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL19854,55753,37344354 33 27,12 4 22 24,39 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL19954,56232,38031954 33 44,29 4 22 49,15 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL20054,56701,38723554 34 1,20 4 23 14,05 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL20154,57162,39418954 34 17,95 4 23 39,08 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M
OL20254,57621,40118254 34 34,47 4 24 4,25 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL20354,58072,40821154 34 50,78 4 24 29,56 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL20454,58527,41527954 35 6,89 4 24 55,00 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL20554,58965,42238554 35 22,79 4 25 20,59 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL20654,59407,42952654 35 38,46 4 25 46,29 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL20754,59832,43670554 35 53,92 4 26 12,14 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL20854,60251,44392054 36 9,18 4 26 38,11 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL20954,60678,45116854 36 24,22 4 27 4,21 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL21054,61084,45845254 36 39,04 4 27 30,43 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL21154,61493,46576954 36 53,65 4 27 56,77 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL21254,61883,47312154 37 8,01 4 28 23,23 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL21354,62289,48050654 37 22,19 4 28 49,82 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M
OL21454,62671,48792354 37 36,12 4 29 16,52 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL21554,63052,49537254 37 49,84 4 29 43,34 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL21654,97059,16520154 58 13,94 5 9 54,72 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL21754,97434,17267754 58 27,50 5 10 21,64 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL21854,97801,18018354 58 40,80 5 10 48,66 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL21954,98164,18772254 58 53,92 5 11 15,80 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL22054,98528,19529054 59 6,78 5 11 43,04 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL22154,98871,20288754 59 19,43 5 12 10,39 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL22254,99210,21051554 59 31,85 5 12 37,85 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL22354,99557,21816954 59 44,04 5 13 5,41 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL22454,998886,22585254 59 55,99 5 13 33,07 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL22555,002148,23356255 0 7,73 5 14 0,82 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL22655,005341,24130055 0 19,23 5 14 28,68 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M
OL22755,008472,24906455 0 30,50 5 14 56,63 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL22855,011535,25685255 0 41,53 5 15 24,67 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL22955,01454,26466855 0 52,32 5 15 52,80 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL23055,01741,27250855 1 2,90 5 16 21,03 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL23155,02034,28037155 1 13,24 5 16 49,34 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL23255,02311,28825855 1 23,35 5 17 17,73 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL23355,02580,29616955 1 33,21 5 17 46,21 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL23455,02851,30410255 1 42,82 5 18 14,77 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL23555,03116,31205755 1 52,20 5 18 43,41 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL23655,03371,32003455 2 1,36 5 19 12,12 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL23755,03612,32803155 2 10,26 5 19 40,91 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

OL23855,03857,33604955 2 18,95 5 20 9,78 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S+ 60M

15
CONTINENTAL SHELF SUBMISSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMExecutive Sum m ary Annex 70

ECS LongituLatitudeong ELong ELong LEat Lat Lat A rticle 76 provision invoked
Point East Deg. M in. Sec. Deg. M in. Sec.

OL23955,040936,34408855 2 27,37 5 20 38,72 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL24055,043213,35214555 2 35,57 5 21 7,72 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL24155,045418,36022055 2 43,50 5 21 36,79 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL24255,047562,36831555 2 51,22 5 22 5,93 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL24355,049637,37642655 2 58,69 5 22 35,13 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL24455,051640,38455555 3 5,90 5 23 4,40 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL24555,053581,39270055 3 12,89 5 23 33,72 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL24655,055454,40086155 3 19,64 5 24 3,10 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL24755,057255,40903755 3 26,12 5 24 32,53 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL24855,058987,41722855 3 32,35 5 25 2,02 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL24955,728966,16401955 43 44,28 6 9 50,47 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M

OL25055,736954,16650655 44 13,03 6 9 59,42 A rt. 76(4)(a)(ii): FO S + 60M
OL25155,740046,16749355 44 24,16 6 10 2,97 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL25255,750556,18555755 45 2,00 6 11 8,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL25355,932501,50777855 55 57,00 6 30 28,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL25456,439806,36574956 26 23,30 7 21 56,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL25556,444473,37347256 26 40,10 7 22 24,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL25656,449140,38122256 26 56,90 7 22 52,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL25756,453807,38900156 27 13,71 7 23 20,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL25856,458447,39675156 27 30,41 7 23 48,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL25956,467694,41230656 28 3,70 7 24 44,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL26056,472307,42008456 28 20,31 7 25 12,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL26156,481470,43566756 28 53,29 7 26 8,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL26256,486057,44347356 29 9,80 7 26 36,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL26356,490610,45130656 29 26,20 7 27 4,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL26456,499692,46694556 29 58,89 7 28 1,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL26556,504220,47477956 30 15,19 7 28 29,21 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL26656,508721,48261156 30 31,39 7 28 57,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL26756,517721,49830556 31 3,80 7 29 53,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL26856,538999,53547256 32 20,40 7 32 7,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL26956,543499,54333356 32 36,60 7 32 36,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL27056,547973,55119456 32 52,70 7 33 4,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL27156,552447,55905656 33 8,81 7 33 32,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL27256,561389,57477856 33 41,00 7 34 29,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL27356,570251,59055656 34 12,90 7 35 26,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL27456,574666,59844556 34 28,80 7 35 54,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL27556,583474,61427856 35 0,51 7 36 51,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL27656,592197,63011156 35 31,91 7 37 48,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL27756,59657,63802856 35 47,59 7 38 16,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL27856,600915,64597156 36 3,29 7 38 45,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL27956,605249,65391656 36 18,89 7 39 14,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL28056,609556,66186256 36 34,40 7 39 42,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL28156,613859,66980756 36 49,89 7 40 11,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL28256,618167,67777756 37 5,40 7 40 40,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL28356,626723,69372256 37 36,20 7 41 37,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL28456,630972,70169556 37 51,50 7 42 6,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL28556,635222,70969556 38 6,80 7 42 34,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL28656,639470,71769556 38 22,09 7 43 3,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL28756,643692,72569556 38 37,29 7 43 32,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

16
Executive Sum m aryAnnex 70

ECS LongitudLatitudeong Long ELong L Eat Lat Lat A rticle 76 provision invoked
Point East Deg. M in. Sec. Deg. M in. Sec.

OL28856,652109,74169556 39 7,59 7 44 30,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL28956,660473,75775056 39 37,70 7 45 27,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL29056,668778,77383456 40 7,60 7 46 25,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL29156,672915,78186256 40 22,49 7 46 54,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL29256,677029,78991656 40 37,30 7 47 23,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL29356,681139,79797356 40 52,10 7 47 52,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL29456,685249,80602856 41 6,89 7 48 21,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL29556,693419,82219556 41 36,31 7 49 19,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL29656,705582,84644456 42 20,09 7 50 47,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL29756,709611,85455656 42 34,60 7 51 16,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL29856,713613,86266756 42 49,01 7 51 45,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL29956,721612,87888956 43 17,80 7 52 44,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL30056,729553,89513956 43 46,39 7 53 42,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL30156,733502,90327856 44 0,61 7 54 11,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL30256,737445,91144556 44 14,80 7 54 41,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL30356,741362,91958356 44 28,90 7 55 10,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL30456,749195,93588856 44 57,10 7 56 9,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL30556,753084,94405656 45 11,10 7 56 38,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL30656,756970,95225156 45 25,09 7 57 8,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL30756,760833,96041756 45 39,00 7 57 37,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL30856,764695,96861156 45 52,90 7 58 7,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL30956,772363,98500056 46 20,51 7 59 6,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL31056,776167,99319556 46 34,20 7 59 35,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL31156,779971,00141656 46 47,90 8 0 5,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL31256,783749,00961156 47 1,50 8 0 34,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL31356,791304,02605556 47 28,69 8 1 33,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL31456,798804,04252856 47 55,70 8 2 33,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL31556,802529,05077856 48 9,10 8 3 2,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL31656,806252,05902756 48 22,51 8 3 32,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL31756,813640,07552756 48 49,10 8 4 31,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL31856,824640,10036256 49 28,71 8 6 1,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL31956,828279,10863856 49 41,80 8 6 31,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL32056,831916,11691756 49 54,90 8 7 0,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL32156,835528,12522156 50 7,90 8 7 30,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL32256,842723,14180656 50 33,80 8 8 30,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL32356,849860,15844556 50 59,50 8 9 30,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL32456,853418,16675156 51 12,30 8 10 0,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL32556,860474,18341756 51 37,71 8 11 0,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL32656,86398,19175056 51 50,30 8 11 30,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL32756,867472,20008456 52 2,90 8 12 0,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL32856,870971,20844456 52 15,50 8 12 30,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL32956,874442,21680556 52 27,99 8 13 0,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL33056,877915,22516656 52 40,49 8 13 30,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL33156,881359,23352756 52 52,89 8 14 0,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL33256,884805,24188956 53 5,30 8 14 30,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL33356,888223,25025156 53 17,60 8 15 0,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL33456,891641,25863856 53 29,91 8 15 31,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL33556,902390,28522256 54 8,60 8 17 6,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL33656,909113,30200156 54 32,81 8 18 7,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

17
CONTINENTAL SHELF SUBMISSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMExecutive Sum m ary Annex 70

ECS LongituLatitudeong ELong ELong LEat Lat Lat A rticle 76 provision invoked
Point East Deg. M in. Sec. Deg. M in. Sec.

OL33756,912473,31041756 54 44,90 8 18 37,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL33856,915806,31880756 54 56,90 8 19 7,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL33956,922445,33563956 55 20,80 8 20 8,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL34056,929002,35250056 55 44,41 8 21 9,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL34156,932276,36094556 55 56,19 8 21 39,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL34256,935528,36938956 56 7,90 8 22 9,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL34356,942027,38627856 56 31,30 8 23 10,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL34456,945248,39472256 56 42,89 8 23 41,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL34556,951639,41163956 57 5,90 8 24 41,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL34656,957973,42858356 57 28,70 8 25 42,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL34756,961139,43705656 57 40,10 8 26 13,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL34856,967418,45402756 58 2,70 8 27 14,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL34956,981221,49175056 58 52,40 8 29 30,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL35056,984307,50027956 59 3,50 8 30 1,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL35156,987361,50877856 59 14,50 8 30 31,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL35256,990415,51727756 59 25,49 8 31 2,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL35356,993474,52580756 59 36,51 8 31 32,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL35456,996501,53433256 59 47,40 8 32 3,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL35556,999529,54286156 59 58,30 8 32 34,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL35657,002529,55139057 0 9,11 8 33 5,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL35757,005530,55991757 0 19,91 8 33 35,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL35857,011472,57702757 0 41,30 8 34 37,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL35957,014418,58555557 0 51,90 8 35 8,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL36057,017360,59411257 1 2,50 8 35 38,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL36157,026110,61980657 1 34,00 8 37 11,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL36257,031859,63697357 1 54,69 8 38 13,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL36357,034721,64555657 2 4,99 8 38 44,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL36457,037582,65414057 2 15,29 8 39 14,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL36557,040415,66272357 2 25,49 8 39 45,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL36657,043223,67130557 2 35,60 8 40 16,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL36757,046030,67991657 2 45,71 8 40 47,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL36857,048833,68852857 2 55,80 8 41 18,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL36957,051613,69711157 3 5,81 8 41 49,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL37057,054389,70572357 3 15,80 8 42 20,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL37157,059891,72297357 3 35,61 8 43 22,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL37257,062613,73158457 3 45,41 8 43 53,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL37357,065335,74022257 3 55,20 8 44 24,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL37457,068030,74886157 4 4,91 8 44 55,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL37557,07348,76614057 4 24,29 8 45 58,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL37657,078724,78341657 4 43,41 8 47 0,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL37757,081361,79208457 4 52,90 8 47 31,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL37857,083970,80072357 5 2,29 8 48 2,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL37957,086584,80938857 5 11,70 8 48 33,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL38057,089194,81805657 5 21,10 8 49 5,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL38157,091777,82672357 5 30,40 8 49 36,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL38257,094332,83538957 5 39,59 8 50 7,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL38357,099444,85275057 5 58,00 8 51 9,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL38457,104501,87011257 6 16,20 8 52 12,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL38557,109500,88750057 6 34,20 8 53 15,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

18
Executive Sum m aryAnnex 70

ECS LongitudLatitudeng ELong ELong L Eat Lat Lat A rticle 76 provision invoked
Point East Deg. M in. Sec. Deg. M in. Sec.

OL38657,11446,90491757 6 52,01 8 54 17,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL38757,11689,91361257 7 0,80 8 54 49,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL38857,11933,92233457 7 9,60 8 55 20,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL38957,12416,93975057 7 27,00 8 56 23,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL39057,12655,94847257 7 35,60 8 56 54,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL39157,12895,95719457 7 44,20 8 57 25,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL39257,13365,97466657 8 1,19 8 58 28,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL39357,13608,98341757 8 9,70 8 59 0,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL39457,14067,00088957 8 26,40 9 0 3,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL39557,14291,00963957 8 34,70 9 0 34,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL39657,14988,03588957 8 59,31 9 2 9,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL39757,15204,04466657 9 7,39 9 2 40,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL39857,15427,05341657 9 15,40 9 3 12,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL39957,15874,07094457 9 31,41 9 4 15,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL40057,16312,08850057 9 47,20 9 5 18,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL40157,16527,09727757 9 55,00 9 5 50,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL40257,16954,11486257 10 10,50 9 6 53,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL40357,17165,12363957 10 18,10 9 7 25,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL40457,17386,13244457 10 25,70 9 7 56,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL40557,17598,14125157 10 33,30 9 8 28,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL40657,17802,15002857 10 40,81 9 9 0,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL40757,18005,15883457 10 48,31 9 9 31,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL40857,18416,17644457 11 3,10 9 10 35,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL40957,18822,19408357 11 17,71 9 11 38,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL41057,19020,20289057 11 24,90 9 12 10,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL41157,19229,21172257 11 32,09 9 12 42,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL41257,19612,22936257 11 46,29 9 13 45,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL41357,20002,24702857 12 0,30 9 14 49,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL41457,20207,25586157 12 7,30 9 15 21,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL41557,20581,27355657 12 20,99 9 16 24,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL41657,20772,28238957 12 27,80 9 16 56,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL41757,21146,30011157 12 41,21 9 18 0,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL41857,21328,30894557 12 47,80 9 18 32,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL41957,21511,31780457 12 54,40 9 19 4,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL42057,21693,32666757 13 0,99 9 19 36,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL42157,21879,33552857 13 7,50 9 20 7,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL42257,22236,35325057 13 20,30 9 21 11,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL42357,22405,36214057 13 26,71 9 21 43,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL42457,22759,37988957 13 39,21 9 22 47,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL42557,22927,38874957 13 45,40 9 23 19,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL42657,23268,40652957 13 57,61 9 24 23,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL42757,23432,41541857 14 3,70 9 24 55,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL42857,23608,42430557 14 9,70 9 25 27,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL42957,23765,43319557 14 15,70 9 25 59,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL43057,23934,44208357 14 21,60 9 26 31,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL43157,24096,45097257 14 27,41 9 27 3,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL43257,24417,46877857 14 39,00 9 28 7,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL43357,24578,47766657 14 44,69 9 28 39,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL43457,24736,48658457 14 50,30 9 29 11,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

19
CONTINENTAL SHELF SUBMISSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMExecutive Sum m ary Annex 70

ECS LongitudLatitudeng ELong ELong L Eat Lat Lat A rticle 76 provision invoked
Point East Deg. M in. Sec. Deg. M in. Sec.

OL43557,248861,49550057 14 55,90 9 29 43,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL43657,250415,50441757 15 1,49 9 30 15,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL43757,251947,51330657 15 7,01 9 30 47,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL43857,253473,52222257 15 12,50 9 31 20,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL43957,254974,53113957 15 17,90 9 31 52,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL44057,257942,54900057 15 28,59 9 32 56,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL44157,259389,55791757 15 33,80 9 33 28,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL44257,260835,56683457 15 39,01 9 34 0,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL44357,262277,57577857 15 44,20 9 34 32,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL44457,263696,58469457 15 49,31 9 35 4,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL44557,265111,59363957 15 54,40 9 35 37,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL44657,266499,60255557 15 59,40 9 36 9,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL44757,269248,62044457 16 9,29 9 37 13,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL44857,270581,62939057 16 14,09 9 37 45,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL44957,271916,63833457 16 18,90 9 38 18,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL45057,273250,64727857 16 23,70 9 38 50,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL45157,274557,65622257 16 28,41 9 39 22,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL45257,275859,66516657 16 33,09 9 39 54,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL45357,277140,67411157 16 37,70 9 40 26,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL45457,278415,68308457 16 42,29 9 40 59,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL45557,279668,69202757 16 46,80 9 41 31,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL45657,280917,70097357 16 51,30 9 42 3,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL45757,282139,70994457 16 55,70 9 42 35,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL45857,284555,72786257 17 4,40 9 43 40,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL45957,286918,74580657 17 12,90 9 44 44,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL46057,289195,76372257 17 21,10 9 45 49,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL46157,290331,77269457 17 25,19 9 46 21,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL46257,291445,78166757 17 29,20 9 46 54,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL46357,292555,79063957 17 33,20 9 47 26,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL46457,294724,80861157 17 41,01 9 48 31,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL46557,295779,81758357 17 44,81 9 49 3,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL46657,296835,82655557 17 48,61 9 49 35,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL46757,298887,84452857 17 55,99 9 50 40,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL46857,300891,86250057 18 3,21 9 51 45,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL46957,302831,88047257 18 10,19 9 52 49,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL47057,303779,88947257 18 13,60 9 53 22,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL47157,304722,89847257 18 17,00 9 53 54,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL47257,305639,90747357 18 20,30 9 54 26,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL47357,307449,92544457 18 26,80 9 55 31,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL47457,309196,94344557 18 33,10 9 56 36,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL47557,310889,96144557 18 39,20 9 57 41,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL47657,312502,97947257 18 45,01 9 58 46,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL47757,313306,98847257 18 47,90 9 59 18,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL47857,314082,99747357 18 50,70 9 59 50,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL47957,314810,0065057 18 53,49 10 0 23,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL48057,315610,0155057 18 56,20 10 0 55,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL48157,316310,0245057 18 58,89 10 1 28,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL48257,317810,0425257 19 4,10 10 2 33,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL48357,319110,0605557 19 9,10 10 3 38,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

20
Executive Sum m aryAnnex 70

ECS LongitudLatitudeong ELong ELong L Eat Lat Lat A rticle 76 provision invoked
Point East Deg. M in. Sec. Deg. M in. Sec.

OL48457,319810,0695857 19 11,51 10 4 10,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL48557,320510,0786157 19 13,90 10 4 43,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL48657,321110,0876157 19 16,20 10 5 15,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL48757,322410,1056657 19 20,69 10 6 20,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL48857,322910,1146657 19 22,79 10 6 52,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL48957,323510,1236957 19 24,90 10 7 25,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL49057,324110,1327257 19 27,00 10 7 57,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL49157,324710,1417457 19 29,00 10 8 30,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL49257,325210,1507757 19 30,99 10 9 2,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL49357,325810,1598057 19 32,90 10 9 35,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL49457,326310,1688357 19 34,79 10 10 7,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL49557,326810,1778657 19 36,60 10 10 40,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL49657,327310,1868857 19 38,40 10 11 12,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL49757,327810,1959157 19 40,10 10 11 45,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL49857,328210,2049457 19 41,70 10 12 17,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL49957,328610,2139757 19 43,30 10 12 50,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL50057,329110,2230057 19 44,90 10 13 22,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL50157,329910,2410557 19 47,91 10 14 27,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL50257,330710,2591157 19 50,70 10 15 32,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL50357,331110,2681657 19 52,00 10 16 5,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL50457,331710,2862257 19 54,41 10 17 10,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL50557,332110,2952557 19 55,60 10 17 42,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL50657,332710,3133357 19 57,80 10 18 48,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL50757,333010,3223657 19 58,80 10 19 20,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL50857,333510,3404457 20 0,70 10 20 25,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL50957,333710,3494757 20 1,50 10 20 58,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL51057,334110,3675557 20 3,11 10 22 3,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL51157,334310,3765857 20 3,80 10 22 35,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL51257,334710,3946657 20 5,00 10 23 40,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL51357,334810,4037257 20 5,60 10 24 13,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL51457,335110,4217757 20 6,60 10 25 18,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL51557,335210,4308357 20 7,00 10 25 51,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL51657,335510,4579457 20 7,91 10 27 28,61 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL51757,335510,4670057 20 8,10 10 28 1,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL51857,335610,4760257 20 8,20 10 28 33,70 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL51957,335610,4941157 20 8,39 10 29 38,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL52057,335610,5031657 20 8,39 10 30 11,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line
OL52157,335510,5302757 20 8,10 10 31 49,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL52257,335510,5393057 20 7,91 10 32 21,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL52357,335410,5483657 20 7,60 10 32 54,10 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL52457,335310,5573857 20 7,30 10 33 26,60 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL52557,335210,5664457 20 6,91 10 33 59,20 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL52657,335010,5845257 20 6,10 10 35 4,30 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL52757,334810,5935557 20 5,60 10 35 36,80 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL52857,334510,6116457 20 4,40 10 36 41,90 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL52957,334310,6206657 20 3,70 10 37 14,40 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL53057,333910,6387457 20 2,30 10 38 19,50 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL53157,333710,6477757 20 1,50 10 38 52,00 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

OL53257,333210,6656857 19 59,77 10 39 56,45 A rt. 76(5): 350 M line

21
CONTINENTAL SHELF SUBMISSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMAExecutive Sum m ary Annex 70

22 Executive Sum m ary Annex 71

United Nations, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Progress of work in the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Statement by the Chai▯r, U.N. Doc. CLCS/85
(24 Sept. 2014) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea CLCS /85

Commission on the Limits of the
Distr.: General
Continental Shelf 24 September 2014

Original: English

Thirty-fifth session
New York, 21 July -5 September 2014

Progress of work in the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf

Statement by the Chair

Summary

The present statement provides information on the work carried out by the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and its subcommissions during
its thirty -fifth session. In particular, it contains an overview of the progress made in
the examination of the submissions made by the following: Uruguay; Cook Islands,
in respect of the Manihiki Plateau; Argentina; Ghana; Iceland, in respect of the Ægir

Basin area and the western and southern parts of Reykjanes Ridge; Pakistan;
Norway, in respect of Bouvetøya and Dronning Maud Land; South Africa, in respect
of the mainland of th e territory of the Republic of South Africa; Federated States of
Micronesia, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, concerning the Ontong Java
Plateau; France and South Africa, in the area of the Crozet Archipelago and the
Prince Edward Islands; and Mauritus, in the region of Rodrigues Island. The
statement also contains information about a presentation made by Kenya to the
Commission. In addition, the statement addresses the following issues: conditions of
service and attendance of the members of the ssion; and future sessions of the
Commission.

14-61600 (E) 021014
*1461600* Annex 71

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea CLCS /85

Commission on the Limits of the
Distr.: General
Continental Shelf 24 September 2014

Original: English

Thirty-fifth session
New York, 21 July -5 September 2014

Progress of work in the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf

Statement by the Chair

Summary

The present statement provides information on the work carried out by the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and its subcommissions during
its thirty -fifth session. In particular, it contains an overview of the progress made in
the examination of the submissions made by the following: Uruguay; Cook Islands,
in respect of the Manihiki Plateau; Argentina; Ghana; Iceland, in respect of the Ægir

Basin area and the western and southern parts of Reykjanes Ridge; Pakistan;
Norway, in respect of Bouvetøya and Dronning Maud Land; South Africa, in respect
of the mainland of th e territory of the Republic of South Africa; Federated States of
Micronesia, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, concerning the Ontong Java
Plateau; France and South Africa, in the area of the Crozet Archipelago and the
Prince Edward Islands; and Mauritus, in the region of Rodrigues Island. The
statement also contains information about a presentation made by Kenya to the
Commission. In addition, the statement addresses the following issues: conditions of
service and attendance of the members of the ssion; and future sessions of the
Commission.

14-61600 (E) 021014
*1461600*Annex 71

CLCS/85

held two meetings with the delegation on 22 and 24 July, during which the
delegation had made a presentation on key elements of its submission, and the

subcommission had made a presentation of its preliminary views, which had been
transmitted to the delegation in written format following the meeting.

53. The subcommission had also concluded that it was not necessary to
recommend seeking the advice of specialists, in accordance with rule 57 of the rules
of procedure, or cooperation with relevant international organizations, in accordance

with rule 56. The subcommission had also concluded that further time would be
required to examine all the data and prepare recommendations for t ransmittal to the
Commission.

54. The subcommission had decided that its members would continue to work on
the submission individually during the intersessional period and at the thirty -sixth

session, particularly its consideration under annex III to the r ules of procedure, with
the aim of making a detailed presentation of its preliminary analysis to the
delegation at the next session.

55. The Commission subsequently decided that the meetings of the
subcommission during the thirty -sixth session would be he ld from 3 to
14 November 2014. The subcommission had invited the delegation to meet during

the second of those two weeks.

Item 17
Presentation of the submission made by Kenya 9

56. In a note verbale dated 7 July 2014, the Government of Kenya request ed the
opportunity to make another presentation of its submission of 6 May 2009 to the
Commission in view of the partial change in the latter’s membership that had

occurred since the twenty -fourth session of the Commission held in August and
September 2009 , at which Kenya had originally presented its submission (see
CLCS/64, paras. 93 -97).

57. The presentation of the submission of Kenya was made on 3 September 2014,
by the Head of the delegation, Githu Muigai, Atto rney General, and by Michael

Gikuhi, Geophysicist and member of the task force on delineation of Kenya’s outer
continental shelf. The delegation of Kenya also included the Permanent
Representative of Kenya to the United Nations, Macharia Kamau, and the Dep uty
Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations, Koki Muli Grignon, as

well as a number of scientific, legal and technical advisers.

58. In addition to elaborating on substantive points of the submission, Mr. Muigai
noted that one member of the Commission, Mr. Njuguna, had provided Kenya with
advice and assistance concerning the submission.

59. In reference to paragraph 2 (a) of annex I to the rules of procedure, Mr. Muigai
indicated that Kenya had entered into a maritime boundary agreement wit h the
United Republic of Tanzania on 23 June 2009, which applied to the territorial sea,

exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, including the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles upon the finalization of its delineation.
__________________

9 Submission made on 6 May 2009; see www.un.org/depts/ los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
submission_ken_35_2009.htm .

14-61600 11/19 CLCS/85

held two meetings with the delegation on 22 and 24 July, during which the
delegation had made a presentation on key elements of its submission, and the

subcommission had made a presentation of its preliminary views, which had been
transmitted to the delegation in written format following the meeting.

53. The subcommission had also concluded that it was not necessary to
recommend seeking the advice of specialists, in accordance with rule 57 of the rules
of procedure, or cooperation with relevant international organizations, in accordance

with rule 56. The subcommission had also concluded that further time would be
required to examine all the data and prepare recommendations for t ransmittal to the
Commission.

54. The subcommission had decided that its members would continue to work on
the submission individually during the intersessional period and at the thirty -sixth

session, particularly its consideration under annex III to the r ules of procedure, with
the aim of making a detailed presentation of its preliminary analysis to the
delegation at the next session.

55. The Commission subsequently decided that the meetings of the
subcommission during the thirty -sixth session would be he ld from 3 to
14 November 2014. The subcommission had invited the delegation to meet during

the second of those two weeks.

Item 17
Presentation of the submission made by Kenya 9

56. In a note verbale dated 7 July 2014, the Government of Kenya request ed the
opportunity to make another presentation of its submission of 6 May 2009 to the
Commission in view of the partial change in the latter’s membership that had

occurred since the twenty -fourth session of the Commission held in August and
September 2009 , at which Kenya had originally presented its submission (see
CLCS/64, paras. 93 -97).

57. The presentation of the submission of Kenya was made on 3 September 2014,
by the Head of the delegation, Githu Muigai, Atto rney General, and by Michael

Gikuhi, Geophysicist and member of the task force on delineation of Kenya’s outer
continental shelf. The delegation of Kenya also included the Permanent
Representative of Kenya to the United Nations, Macharia Kamau, and the Dep uty
Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations, Koki Muli Grignon, as

well as a number of scientific, legal and technical advisers.

58. In addition to elaborating on substantive points of the submission, Mr. Muigai
noted that one member of the Commission, Mr. Njuguna, had provided Kenya with
advice and assistance concerning the submission.

59. In reference to paragraph 2 (a) of annex I to the rules of procedure, Mr. Muigai
indicated that Kenya had entered into a maritime boundary agreement wit h the
United Republic of Tanzania on 23 June 2009, which applied to the territorial sea,

exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, including the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles upon the finalization of its delineation.
__________________

9 Submission made on 6 May 2009; see www.un.org/depts/ los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
submission_ken_35_2009.htm .

14-61600 11/19Annex 71

CLCS/85

65. Following that decision, the Commission received a note verbale dated
2 September 2014 from Somalia. The Commission took note of it and determined
that no chang e in the aforementioned decision would be required.

Item 18

Report of the Chair of the Commission on the twenty -fourth
Meeting of States Parties to the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea

66. The Chair of the Commission provided an ov erview of the proceedings of the
twenty -fourth Meeting of States Parties to the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea held in June 2014, which were deemed of relevance to the

Commission (see SPLOS/270 and SPLOS/277, sect. VII). In particular, he drew the
attention of the members to the decision of the Meeting of States Parties regarding
the conditions of service of the members of the Commission (see SPLOS/276 ).

67. The Commission took note of the information reported by the Chair and, in
particular, of the decision of the twenty -fourth Meeting of States Parties (see also
paras. 9-12 above).

Item 19

Report of the Chair of the Committee on Confidentiality

Referral of a matter to the Committee

68. On 4 August 2014, the Commission was informed by its Chair of a potential
breach of confidentiality that had allegedly taken place during the international
workshop on the new developments on the Law of the Sea, which was held at the

University of Xiamen, China, from 24 to 25 April 2014. The allegations concerned
the potential disclosure of internal procedures of the Commission and the disclosure
of information contained in a note verbale from a State, which was not in the public
domain.

69. In accordance with the rules of procedure of the Commission ( CLCS/40/Rev.1 )
related to an alleged breach of confidentiality by a member of the Commission, and

considering the nature of the allegation, the Commission decided to refer the matter
to the Committee on Confidentiality in order to establish the facts. The Committee
constituted an investigating body comprising all five of its members (Messrs. Park
(Chair), Heinesen, Kalngui, Marques and Uścinowicz).

Report by the Chairman of the Committee
70. The Chair of the Committee on Confidentiality, Mr. Park, reported that the

Committee and its investigating body had held meeti ngs to consider the case
referred to the Committee and to investigate the allegations. He presented to the
Commission a report providing information on the work carried out by the
Investigating Body to ascertain whether any behaviour contrary to annex II t o the
rules of procedure had occurred during the international workshop. The Chair

informed the Commission that, after a thorough examination of the report of the
investigating body, the Committee had endorsed it by consensus, on 2 September
2014, and had subsequently reached the conclusions set out below.

14-61600
13/19 Annex 72

United Nations, Office of LegalAffairs, Division for OceanAffairs and the Law of the Sea,
Table recapitulating the status of the Convention and of the related Agreements (10 Oct. 2014),
available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf Declaration
or 

ion;

time thereafter,

Ratification/ 23/12/99/16/01/97(a)09/00(a)
e Convention

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d Nations; shaded rows indicate
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(in force as from 28/07/1996) 11/02/97(2p0�/08/a)/(0p7)/03(a)   27/1/5(p)

29/07/94 14/10/942/907/95/(p/)95(sp)729/07/94 02/06/02909794/91/901/95056s6)

Declratin        


accession;7/06/83
Ratificati14/10/94(a)0491/9706886/93/96/109309685/95/863021/06/9621/03/27/11/95(2a4)/02/03(a)

UNCLOS

                  

(in force as from 16/11/1994)     

Sidd/mm/yy 10/12/82/1282/8310282/82/8210/12/8282/82/82 10/12/8210/12/82/8310/12/82
10/12/8204/10/84 10/12/822/8207/12/84

State or entity

Germhanaerceadteneiaey-ntisyoHeereIrdiadInes(rlIrbasdIfyamJaicadaaKaehyiantiib Declratin     4

09/09

Ratification/12/0312/03 28/
16/09/05(a) 16/05/08(a) 13/15/09/05(a)

UN(FifsretockfrAg1e/12/20t01) 19/08/03(a)17/04/98(a)

Sidd/mm/y28/08/9606/96 04/12/95 04/12/9512/914/02/97/1204/12915/96/0307/08/06

dd/mm/yy

Ratification/
05/02/02(a) 29/07/94(ds)p)
accession;

Agreement on Padd/mm/yy
(in force as from 28/07/1996) 11/02/97(2p�907828/07/03(a)   27/11/5(p)

29/07/9414/11/94 28/07/95(sp)5(29/07/94 28/07/95(sp)0929/07974/28/20/06(s6)

Declratin        


accession;7/06/83
Ratificati14/10/94(a)95/919708/869730515021/06/85/95863021/06/9621/0327/11/95(2a4)/02/03(a)

UNCLOS

                  

(in force as from 16/11/1994)     

Sidd/mm/yy 10/12/82/12/828312/828221010210/12/82/8282 10/12/8210/12822/830/12/82
10/12/8204/10/84 10/12/822/827/12/84

State or entity

GeGhGanaecenadainaleHyBtisHoHduIcelanda Ira(slabliicc JamJacardan KiribatianAnnex 72

Declaration     6

Ratification/ 14/05/08(a)
26/03/08(a)(a)

 19/12/03

UN(iFifrcetocfrsAg1e/122n0t010/12/08(a)01/97(a) 02/11/09(a) 14/03/06(a) 16/07/07(a)

Sidd/mm/yy 19/04/9628/06/96498 041/109/095 1310/0//162/950/004/06/96/11/962/0301/02/08

dd/mm/yy

Ratification/ 10/07/95 29/01/96
13/03/97/a)(a)11/9803/05/0011/10066p)30/09/96(p)/p)(p) 09/12/02(1p7)/12/96(a)
accession;

 
Agreement on Pardd/mm/yy
(in force as from 28/07/1996)3/01/96(p)         

29/07/94 22/90/79(4p)1/09/49628/07/95(sp)/07/9429/07/94 13/11/98(p)97

Declaration            

accession;
Ratification/3/97/9683/9609696/9614/08/860669630/09/96(a)/970813/11/98/9706/02/07(a)

UNCLOS

                     

(in force as from 16/11/1994)   

Sidd/mm/10/12/82/8210/12/8282/10/12/828282482/128021210/12/8210/12/82/82/03/83
09/12/84 01/07/83 10/12/8227/11/8410/12/82

State or entity

MoMzayaaNqiNruNaeherindrlageiieorwaaaPiaaunPaPaareguhiioinrtutarRuelcmlfofaeoldova Declaration     6

Ratification/ 14/05/08(a)
2616/12/08(a)

 19/12/03

UN(FifsretockfrAg1re12/20t0110/12/010/01/97(a) 02/11/09(a) 14/03/06(a) 16/07/07(a)

Sidd/mm/yy 19/04/9628/06/96/958 04/04/1215/02/9604/12/9530/004/06/26/11/969//101/02/08

dd/mm/yy

Ratification/ 10/07/95 29/01/96
1321/05/9602/11/9803/07/0811/2426/26/3001/14/01/97(p) 09/120617/12/96(a)
accession;

 
Agreement on Padd/mm/yy
(in force as from 28/07/1996)3/01/96          

29/07/9429/07/94/925/10/94 2810/08/94p)29/07/9419194/9207/11/948/p)

Declaration            

accession;
Ratification/1/18/04/8328/06/960714/11/2417/26/30/09/96(a)7/86/0584/1129/06/02/07(a)

UNCLOS

                     

(in force as from 16/11/1994)   

Sidd/mm/y1010/10/12/8210/12/821010/05/10/1210/1280210/1282/8210/10/1214/03/83
09/12/84 01/07/83 10/12/8227/11/810/12/82

State or entity

MoMyaNamibNiaNetherlandsNiNiuNoOmaPakisanaPaPuaPeruhilippineRepReRomaniaof MoldovaAnnex 72

Declaration   8


1

Ratification/ 1019/12/03

UN(iFifretockfrAg1e/122n0t01) 13/09/06(a)02/02/09(a)

Sidd/mm/yy 27/06/96 19/12/03 04/12/95 31/07/960/96904/12/95004/12/95 21/08/96

dd/mm/yy

Ratification/ 24/09/12(p)0915/05/108/28/0795/(p/)95(sp)28/07/95(sp)

accession;

  
Agreement on Padd/mm/yy
(in force as from 28/07/1996)0p7)p)8(       

29/07/9410/94/10/94/06/96 03/0894/10/94/95 09/08/94929/07/94 25/07/9706/98

Declaration
       

Ratification/3/09/07/9806/96/015/05/11 16/0485/04/86/8509/12/027/99 30/09/85
19/08/01/13/(0a8)/95(a) 25/07/97(a)
UNCLOS

             

(in force as from 16/11/1994)15(a)       

Sidd/mm/yy 10/12/8210/12/82/840/12/82 10/1282/12/82/82101010/12/822/82 10/12/82

State or entity

StaudSfrnlmwlaniyrinidrtaedTruel-oefrnlcTsikiTkmenigtaainUdnUdniiUnrteielacefs of Declaration   8


1

Ratification/ 1019/12/03

UN(FifsretocfrsAg1e12/20t01) 13/09/06(a)02/02/09(a)

Sidd/mm/yy 27/06/96 19/12/03 04/12/95 31/010/10/96/04/12/9502/032/95 21/08/96

dd/mm/yy

Ratification/ 24/09/12(p)0915/5/110828/0728/07/95(sp)928/07/95(sp)

accession;

  
Agreement on Padd/mm/yy
(in force as from 28/07/1996)/98p)         

29/071229/07/94 25/06/96 03/0810/15/05/95 09/08/94/29/07/94 25/07/9706/98

Declaration
       

Ratification/309/2425/06/96/0915/05/11 16/0425/24/04/850909/11/90/99 30/09/85
19/008/0102/08/95(a) 25/07/97(a)
UNCLOS

            

(in force as from 16/11/1994)5(a        

Sidd/mm/yy 10/12/8210/12/828410/12/82 10/1210/10/12/821010/10/12/82/8210/12/82

State or entity

StaSuSurSwSwedentzerlandab RTpTogToTgrTunTukerTuUgaUkrainenited Kingdomesrtes of Annex 73

United Nations, Statistics Division, NationalAccounts MainAggregates Database, “Per Capita
GDP in US Dollars” (Dec. 2014), available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnllist.asp (last
accessed 26 June 2015) Annex 73

Per Capita GDP at current prices in US Dollars (all countries)

Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Afghanistan 266 293 394 398 454 566 659 715 708
Albania 2,532 2,806 3,353 4,081 3,822 3,786 4,087 3,904 4,066

Algeria 3,039 3,391 3,846 4,787 3,771 4,350 5,274 5,401 5,325

Andorra 39,990 43,192 49,338 50,036 46,401 42,953 44,015 40,150 41,015
Angola 1,983 2,441 3,413 4,596 3,989 4,221 5,159 5,540 5,668

Anguilla 18,121 21,970 27,028 26,541 20,824 19,478 21,027 20,163 19,886
Antigua and Barbuda 12,080 13,600 15,276 15,786 13,979 13,017 12,786 13,405 13,790

Argentina 5,768 6,790 8,438 10,292 9,506 11,508 13,759 14,725 14,760
Armenia 1,625 2,126 3,079 3,917 2,914 3,125 3,422 3,354 3,504

Aruba 23,303 24,015 25,921 27,549 24,640 23,529 25,014 24,805 25,156
Australia 37,152 39,249 46,432 48,776 45,878 57,593 67,407 68,459 65,600

Austria 38,191 40,386 46,495 51,261 47,490 46,377 50,884 48,154 50,420
Azerbaijan 1,547 2,421 3,768 5,503 4,929 5,817 7,167 7,485 7,814

Bahamas 23,417 23,734 24,321 23,674 22,061 21,941 21,651 22,096 22,313
Bahrain 18,156 19,459 21,049 23,038 19,251 20,546 22,467 23,339 24,695

Bangladesh 463 479 538 618 685 758 809 833 980

Barbados 14,225 15,692 16,336 16,358 16,461 15,812 15,503 14,917 14,854
Belarus 3,126 3,842 4,723 6,358 5,166 5,818 6,321 6,764 7,664

Belgium 36,824 38,788 44,229 48,281 44,723 44,273 47,993 45,104 47,261
Belize 4,098 4,364 4,509 4,662 4,441 4,527 4,702 4,857 4,894

Benin 533 557 633 739 713 690 745 751 805
Bermuda 75,902 84,155 91,379 94,483 89,588 88,442 85,284 84,911 85,302

Bhutan 1,259 1,349 1,761 1,818 1,795 2,211 2,495 2,458 2,363
Bolivia 1,021 1,203 1,356 1,696 1,735 1,935 2,320 2,579 2,868

Bosnia and Herzegovina 2,810 3,239 3,991 4,846 4,480 4,380 4,771 4,410 4,662
Botswana 5,294 5,341 5,712 5,747 5,178 6,980 7,697 7,191 7,312

Brazil 4,739 5,790 7,194 8,623 8,373 10,978 12,576 11,320 11,199
British Virgin Islands 37,550 39,345 40,741 38,575 33,004 32,840 33,033 32,375 32,307

Brunei Darussalam 25,914 30,613 32,108 37,095 27,213 30,882 41,060 41,127 38,563

Bulgaria 3,813 4,414 5,770 7,105 6,737 6,587 7,605 7,226 7,543
Burkina Faso 407 421 475 570 553 579 672 682 741

Burundi 144 158 163 187 199 220 237 246 251
Cabo Verde 2,309 2,614 3,130 3,692 3,524 3,413 3,801 3,552 3,731

Cambodia 471 537 628 743 735 783 878 945 1,008
Cameroon 915 965 1,070 1,190 1,163 1,145 1,257 1,220 1,329

Canada 36,095 40,195 44,197 46,226 40,614 47,297 51,866 52,607 52,270
Cayman Islands 62,558 64,107 68,309 67,049 61,485 58,857 59,047 59,246 59,448

Central African Republi 357 381 427 486 476 468 511 494 343
Chad 586 608 655 757 657 736 813 820 816

Chile 7,532 9,371 10,383 10,672 10,120 12,685 14,502 15,254 15,723
China 1,735 2,106 2,626 3,387 3,778 4,375 5,345 5,976 6,626

China: Hong Kong SAR 26,327 28,005 30,513 31,470 30,548 32,433 35,020 36,739 38,039

China: Macao SAR 25,190 30,364 36,607 40,847 40,860 53,046 67,062 77,196 91,377
Colombia 3,394 3,709 4,661 5,403 5,105 6,180 7,125 7,763 7,826

Comoros 644 654 735 810 791 781 842 800 846Annex 73

Per Capita GDP at current prices in US Dollars (all countries)

Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Congo 1,718 2,120 1,978 2,625 2,338 2,987 3,502 3,149 3,153
Cook Islands 9,411 9,557 11,478 11,663 10,726 12,653 14,193 14,978 16,002

Costa Rica 4,621 5,128 5,898 6,583 6,386 7,773 8,704 9,443 10,185

Côte d'Ivoire 982 978 1,097 1,275 1,239 1,208 1,242 1,244 1,407
Croatia 10,348 11,519 13,751 16,158 14,399 13,754 14,394 13,114 13,490

Cuba 3,776 4,667 5,185 5,383 5,499 5,702 6,165 6,498 6,985
Curaçao 18,120 18,659 19,207 20,371 20,010 20,001 20,054 20,163 19,830

Cyprus 24,444 26,199 30,306 34,667 31,991 31,410 31,837 28,987 27,662
Czech Republic 13,292 15,106 18,265 22,590 19,619 19,616 21,422 19,395 19,510

Czechoslovakia (Former)
D.P.R. of Korea 548 575 597 551 494 570 638 643 621

D.R. of the Congo 221 257 286 327 302 347 404 446 484
Denmark 48,832 52,006 58,436 64,153 57,882 57,614 61,231 57,469 59,921

Djibouti 912 976 1,062 1,213 1,277 1,353 1,464 1,575 1,668
Dominica 5,049 5,408 5,829 6,379 6,795 6,676 6,881 6,919 6,915

Dominican Republic 3,578 3,775 4,259 4,636 4,703 5,089 5,463 5,731 5,826

Ecuador 3,013 3,337 3,575 4,256 4,237 4,637 5,200 5,656 6,003
Egypt 1,316 1,476 1,780 2,184 2,448 2,749 2,911 3,223 3,110

El Salvador 2,815 3,043 3,284 3,484 3,341 3,444 3,699 3,782 3,826
Equatorial Guinea 11,937 13,737 16,928 24,884 16,433 19,237 25,129 26,622 24,480

Eritrea 226 241 253 256 334 369 440 504 543
Estonia 10,566 12,865 16,925 18,471 15,081 15,010 17,616 17,556 19,328

Ethiopia 160 191 236 310 332 302 335 455 489
Ethiopia (Former)

Fiji 3,655 3,747 4,076 4,175 3,367 3,649 4,201 4,401 4,578
Finland 38,966 41,106 48,254 53,354 47,060 46,165 50,783 47,292 49,265

France 34,825 36,497 41,553 45,363 41,567 40,617 43,680 40,763 42,339
French Polynesia 22,374 22,786 25,435 27,039 24,709 23,583 24,699 22,731 23,162

Gabon 6,944 7,303 8,594 10,459 7,942 8,278 10,652 9,781 10,151

Gambia 434 442 522 612 553 566 521 510 488
Georgia 1,433 1,742 2,298 2,900 2,446 2,652 3,300 3,636 3,715

Germany 34,085 35,807 41,105 44,940 41,027 41,100 45,265 42,672 45,091
Ghana 804 930 1,099 1,234 1,097 1,326 1,579 1,646 1,846

Greece 22,430 24,724 28,795 31,997 29,720 26,967 25,975 22,430 21,768
Greenland 28,977 31,818 35,904 40,614 40,919 40,447 44,216 41,370 42,437

Grenada 6,754 6,766 7,324 7,947 7,395 7,366 7,411 7,598 7,843
Guatemala 2,146 2,326 2,561 2,867 2,697 2,882 3,240 3,341 3,478

Guinea 306 311 466 515 501 481 502 541 615
Guinea-Bissau 413 407 469 570 533 533 600 546 608

Guyana 1,729 1,906 2,259 2,478 2,593 2,874 3,258 3,585 3,739
Haiti 411 476 575 609 610 621 683 704 745

Honduras 1,414 1,551 1,722 1,896 1,953 2,078 2,277 2,339 2,293

Hungary 11,083 11,337 13,774 15,586 12,896 12,939 13,949 12,713 13,403
Iceland 56,609 56,872 70,327 56,883 40,866 41,696 45,539 43,523 46,520

India 743 829 1,041 1,102 1,124 1,414 1,581 1,530 1,548 Annex 73

Per Capita GDP at current prices in US Dollars (all countries)

Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Indonesia 1,273 1,601 1,871 2,178 2,272 2,947 3,470 3,551 3,475
Iran (Islamic Republic o 2,931 3,433 4,347 4,997 4,978 5,663 7,629 7,285 6,363

Iraq 1,325 1,944 2,606 3,495 3,635 3,783 4,949 5,619 5,790

Ireland 50,591 54,547 62,762 62,903 52,952 48,893 52,571 48,508 50,155
Israel 21,061 22,339 25,248 29,989 28,292 31,222 34,234 33,703 37,704

Italy 31,590 32,896 37,051 39,950 36,302 35,146 37,515 34,356 35,243
Jamaica 4,190 4,424 4,725 5,042 4,442 4,827 5,245 5,354 5,126

Japan 36,005 34,268 34,235 38,087 39,537 43,151 46,384 46,663 38,528
Jordan 2,403 2,773 3,025 3,717 3,854 4,094 4,285 4,414 4,618

Kazakhstan 3,792 5,320 6,810 8,571 7,324 9,299 11,682 12,508 13,650
Kenya 601 702 846 911 930 970 972 1,149 1,227

Kiribati 1,240 1,180 1,400 1,480 1,350 1,567 1,762 1,794 1,705
Kosovo 1,484 1,580 1,940 2,394 2,338 2,413 2,857 2,734 2,972

Kuwait 35,186 42,011 44,869 54,540 37,180 38,579 49,296 53,544 52,198
Kyrgyzstan 488 558 741 989 891 899 1,147 1,207 1,303

Lao People's DR 469 601 701 861 891 1,054 1,236 1,414 1,589

Latvia 7,673 9,839 14,280 16,682 12,383 11,417 13,658 13,857 15,064
Lebanon 5,390 5,404 6,008 6,982 8,354 8,850 8,949 9,490 9,793

Lesotho 711 736 817 827 859 1,083 1,226 1,135 1,075
Liberia 186 207 232 250 268 271 378 414 453

Libya 8,124 9,686 10,838 16,221 11,542 13,400 6,650 15,566 12,029
Liechtenstein 105,307 114,197 130,323 142,810 125,642 140,707 157,736 149,710 152,933

Lithuania 7,953 9,327 12,455 15,237 12,070 12,089 14,286 14,143 15,381
Luxembourg 80,865 89,614 103,314 112,791 100,662 102,668 114,179 107,481 113,373

Madagascar 275 293 379 472 417 415 458 447 463
Malawi 283 300 323 376 425 464 463 349 315

Malaysia 5,554 6,180 7,218 8,454 7,278 8,754 10,050 10,422 10,514
Maldives 3,666 4,860 5,769 6,774 6,786 7,169 7,168 7,700 8,220

Mali 459 497 561 665 661 672 739 696 715

Malta 15,414 16,282 18,943 21,335 20,166 20,579 22,479 21,563 23,243
Marshall Islands 2,677 2,791 2,994 3,178 3,151 3,379 3,537 3,566 3,586

Mauritania 694 939 1,008 1,178 1,042 1,202 1,384 1,276 1,418
Mauritius 5,350 5,533 6,387 7,881 7,201 7,897 9,112 9,231 9,593

Mexico 7,810 8,610 9,188 9,579 7,674 8,906 9,797 9,802 10,293
Micronesia (FS of) 2,354 2,396 2,433 2,503 2,668 2,841 2,996 3,155 3,216

Monaco 124,319 133,339 167,598 181,493 150,146 145,541 163,193 153,249 173,377
Mongolia 999 1,334 1,632 2,136 1,715 2,286 3,181 3,691 4,056

Montenegro 3,665 4,370 5,938 7,306 6,686 6,630 7,244 6,514 7,109
Montserrat 10,382 10,798 11,166 11,828 12,248 11,651 12,454 12,252 11,565

Morocco 1,976 2,160 2,453 2,871 2,907 2,869 3,095 2,949 3,146
Mozambique 361 378 415 484 459 424 539 593 605

Myanmar 238 274 359 505 639 799 1,107 1,166 1,183

Namibia 3,582 3,886 4,247 4,024 4,070 5,113 5,615 5,931 5,462
Nauru 2,599 2,513 2,292 4,131 5,404 6,234 8,567 12,022 15,211

Nepal 327 351 422 445 480 607 680 656 654Annex 73

Per Capita GDP at current prices in US Dollars (all countries)

Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Netherlands 41,243 43,929 50,669 56,430 51,810 50,339 53,627 49,248 50,930
Netherlands Antilles (fo 18,086 18,556 19,112 20,127 19,920 18,090

New Caledonia 27,266 30,015 37,341 37,719 35,688 36,789 39,195 36,415 37,862

New Zealand 27,833 26,629 32,314 30,838 27,867 33,260 37,640 39,191 41,952
Nicaragua 1,159 1,228 1,333 1,498 1,459 1,535 1,676 1,777 1,851

Niger 256 267 302 367 353 360 388 390 415
Nigeria 1,293 1,632 1,819 2,213 1,754 2,311 2,508 2,730 2,966

Norway 66,760 73,982 84,914 96,683 79,903 87,611 100,765 102,066 103,586
Oman 12,323 14,566 16,377 23,484 18,169 20,923 22,984 23,385 21,929

Pakistan 745 847 928 905 950 1,008 1,202 1,201 1,238
Palau 9,446 10,117 10,414 10,480 10,387 10,028 10,254 10,888 11,480

Panama 4,594 4,998 5,670 6,473 6,683 7,355 8,374 9,452 10,472
Papua New Guinea 798 885 991 1,221 1,209 1,415 1,841 2,152 2,106

Paraguay 1,479 1,770 2,252 2,967 2,510 3,103 3,819 3,678 4,294
Peru 2,744 3,163 3,608 4,213 4,164 5,026 5,783 6,429 6,593

Philippines 1,201 1,399 1,681 1,928 1,832 2,136 2,358 2,588 2,765

Poland 7,968 8,987 11,227 13,883 11,428 12,479 13,725 12,986 13,760
Portugal 18,771 19,793 22,751 24,789 23,035 22,503 23,108 20,559 21,429

Puerto Rico 23,205 23,875 25,045 25,851 26,455 27,051 27,309 27,918 28,509
Qatar 54,229 62,920 69,167 84,813 62,528 71,510 88,861 92,633 93,352

Republic of Korea 19,096 21,395 23,599 20,937 18,726 22,588 24,675 24,954 26,482
Republic of Moldova 793 917 1,198 1,665 1,509 1,627 1,980 2,073 2,285

Romania 4,509 5,599 7,792 9,478 7,640 7,685 8,499 7,908 8,853
Russian Federation 5,308 6,888 9,048 11,560 8,509 10,618 13,280 14,091 14,680

Rwanda 274 322 380 469 504 526 575 637 645
Saint Kitts and Nevis 11,109 12,831 13,578 14,469 13,793 13,695 14,185 14,267 13,710

Saint Lucia 5,662 6,290 6,733 6,854 6,735 7,060 7,230 7,289 7,328
Samoa 2,414 2,488 3,009 2,955 2,827 3,211 3,572 3,637 3,632

San Marino 68,092 71,868 81,889 90,079 76,967 69,322 66,153 57,625 57,293

Sao Tome and Principe 807 869 924 1,192 1,253 1,216 1,423 1,474 1,770
Saudi Arabia 13,303 14,855 16,051 19,714 16,013 19,327 24,116 25,946 25,962

Senegal 773 808 948 1,094 1,015 998 1,078 1,023 1,072
Serbia 3,528 4,130 5,458 6,702 5,821 5,412 6,386 5,626 6,313

Seychelles 10,553 11,523 11,597 10,759 9,356 10,635 11,706 12,224 15,565
Sierra Leone 322 357 399 453 435 448 500 633 809

Singapore 27,901 31,644 37,670 39,252 38,306 45,933 52,447 53,608 54,649
Sint Maarten (Dutch par 18,843 19,543 20,246 20,921 20,558 20,986 21,442 22,170 22,572

Slovakia 9,079 10,554 14,185 17,749 16,337 16,381 17,928 17,031 17,928
Slovenia 18,169 19,704 23,816 27,352 24,577 23,352 24,856 22,374 23,161

Solomon Islands 915 980 1,195 1,265 1,240 1,367 1,618 1,776 1,912
Somalia 273 275 279 284 214 111 108 128 133

South Africa 5,344 5,553 6,036 5,705 5,815 7,295 8,019 7,586 6,936

South Sudan 1,706 1,289 1,581 1,717 957 1,045
Spain 26,672 28,713 33,120 36,139 32,762 30,999 32,132 28,997 29,685

Sri Lanka 1,223 1,404 1,593 1,991 2,042 2,388 2,828 2,816 3,159 Annex 73

Per Capita GDP at current prices in US Dollars (all countries)

Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

St. Vincent and the Gren 5,064 5,608 6,273 6,371 6,177 6,234 6,185 6,339 6,484
State of Palestine 1,357 1,349 1,478 1,748 1,857 2,221 2,544 2,674 2,908

Sudan 1,422 1,385 1,513 1,519 1,393 1,438

Sudan (Former) 888 1,110 1,417 1,482 1,365 1,528
Suriname 4,390 5,199 5,753 6,855 7,450 8,321 8,349 9,378 9,826

Swaziland 2,339 2,636 2,679 2,607 2,698 3,262 3,374 3,055 2,819
Sweden 43,083 46,209 53,260 55,657 46,148 52,053 59,595 57,182 60,566

Switzerland 55,009 57,360 63,112 72,069 69,679 74,223 87,967 83,290 84,854
Syrian Arab Republic 1,563 1,761 2,059 2,583 2,573 2,808 2,462 1,896 1,606

Tajikistan 340 407 523 709 669 740 835 953 1,036
TFYR of Macedonia 2,994 3,277 3,976 4,722 4,476 4,475 4,988 4,628 5,110

Thailand 2,881 3,355 3,966 4,384 4,224 5,102 5,512 5,887 6,270
Timor-Leste 1,821 2,774 2,862 4,226 3,099 3,905 5,224 5,008 4,362

Togo 381 390 434 529 515 503 570 587 610
Tonga 2,613 2,887 2,991 3,318 3,152 3,593 4,287 4,437 4,173

Trinidad and Tobago 12,323 14,092 15,957 19,726 15,964 15,495 17,660 17,365 18,240

Tunisia 3,211 3,383 3,787 4,317 4,134 4,143 4,266 4,150 4,263
Turkey 7,130 7,736 9,312 10,379 8,627 10,135 10,605 10,661 10,972

Turkmenistan 2,989 3,380 3,807 4,398 4,060 4,393 5,725 6,798 7,987
Turks and Caicos Island 21,877 26,116 27,009 29,262 23,248 22,159 22,971 22,112 21,338

Tuvalu 2,259 2,353 2,768 3,095 2,763 3,238 3,994 4,044 3,882
U.R. of Tanzania: Mainl 479 472 538 662 673 686 720 817 933

Uganda 428 454 540 631 614 636 670 702 704
Ukraine 1,893 2,387 3,188 4,049 2,627 3,066 3,697 4,010 4,163

United Arab Emirates 43,534 45,556 44,489 46,403 32,850 33,886 38,930 40,444 43,049
United Kingdom 40,008 42,606 48,602 45,519 37,421 38,796 41,518 41,650 42,423

United States 43,914 46,042 47,657 47,997 46,588 47,925 49,277 50,907 52,392
Uruguay 5,222 5,879 7,013 9,068 9,065 11,531 13,961 14,727 16,351

USSR (Former)

Uzbekistan 553 660 838 1,097 1,236 1,423 1,618 1,801 1,977
Vanuatu 1,886 2,047 2,393 2,697 2,643 2,966 3,276 3,155 3,165

Venezuela 5,445 6,748 8,330 11,223 11,525 13,559 10,728 12,729 12,213
Viet Nam 623 710 820 1,043 1,102 1,302 1,507 1,716 1,868

Yemen 945 1,104 1,210 1,401 1,280 1,358 1,334 1,345 1,422
Yemen Arab Republic (Former)

Yemen Democratic (Former)
Yugoslavia (Former)

Zambia 626 908 953 1,175 998 1,225 1,408 1,463 1,540
Zanzibar 407 444 517 604 585 593 658 758 848

Zimbabwe 490 480 473 430 633 721 820 903 953 Annex 74

Letter from Dr.Abdirahman D. Beileh, Ministry of ForeignAffairs & Investment Promotion of
the Federal Republic of Somalia, to Mr. Paolo Scaroni, Chief Executive Officer of Eni S.p.A.,
No. MOFA/MO/1043/2014 (24Apr. 2014) Annex 74

JAMHUURIY ADDA FEDERAALKA SOOMAALIYA 41_).l,!ill Jl-4.~1..)~
WASAARADDA ARRIMAHA DIBADDA IYO ~.Jl6i .J.llo)J.J
DHIIRAGALINTA MAALGASHIGA ~I.JL4 ~!.J:i...."il

FEDERAL REPUBLI COF SOMALIA
Ministry ofF oreign Affairs & Investment Promotion

REF: MOFA/M0 / 1043/2014 Date: 24/04/2014

Paolo Scaroni

ChiefExecutive Officer
Eni, Sp.A
Piazzale Mattei, 100144

Roma, Italy

Dear Mr. Scaroni,

Reference is made to the press release issued by Eni Sp.A. ("Eni"),
dated February 2, 2012, in connection with Eni's acquisition of three product

sharing contracts, awarded by the Government of the Republic of Kenya, for
the acquisition of exploration blocks (L-21, L-23 and L-24) (the "Specified
Area").

The Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia (the "Somali
Government") hereby informs you that the Specified Area lies within the

maritime zones of Somalia. The Somali Government strongly condemns
Eni's illegal activities in the Specified Area as a grave violation
sovereignty with severe repercussions, including permanent damages to its
environmental and economic well-being. The Somali Government,

therefore, urges Eni to immediately cease and desist from such illegal
activities.

Senior officials of the Somali Government h"hve,in the past: strongly
urged Eni to cease and desist from such activities. thatEnitdiq_

Address: Afgoye Road-KM5-Mogadishu, Federal Republicof Somalia.
Website: http://www .mofa .gov.soAnnex 74

not heed the Somali Government's request then, as such we strongly urge it
to do so now. Furthermore, the Somali Government requests Eni to
promptly provide it with all documents relating to its activities in the

Specified Area, including an inventory of all fees and fmancial
compensation provided to the Government of the Republic of Kenya and/or
any other public or private entity. Mona Al-Sharmani, Senior Legal Advisor
to the Somali Government will contact the office of your Chief Legal
Officer to set up a meeting to further discuss this matter.

We look forward to a speedy resolution of this matter.

Dr. Abdirahman D. Beileh

...

Address: Afgoye Road-KM5-Mogadishu, Federal Republic of Somalia.
Website: http://www. mofa.gov.so Annex 75

Letter from Mr. Massimo Mantovani, Senior Executive Vice President, General Counsel Legal
Affairs Department, Eni S.p.A., to H.E.Abdirahman D. Beileh, Minister of ForeignAffairs of
the Federal Republic of Somalia, No. Prot. Dialeg 10 (9 June 2014) Annex 75

General Counsel Legal Affairs DPiazzaleattei, 1oma,
Senior Executive Vice President00144 Roma
Tel. centralino8 .21
www.eni.it

H.E.Minister o{Foreiqn Affairs DrAbdirahman D. Beileh

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Afgoye Road
KMS
Mogadishu
Federal Republicmalia

Rome June, 9 2014
Ref.No. Prot. Dialeg10

'V Exd2 ( e !O~}/
(ou_,__ I/

We make reference to your letter of 24 April 2014, Ref: MOFA/M0/1043/2014 ,
addressed to PaoloScaroni, former Chief ExecutiveOfficer of eni spa.

Firstly, I would like to inform you that on 9 May 2014 the Board of Directors of eni
spa has appointed Mr. Claudio Descalzi as the new Chief Executive Officer of our company

and he has requested mey to your letter referenced above.

I would like alsoorm you that I had the opportunity to meet at our offices in
Rome with Ms. Mona AI-Sharmani, Senior Legal Advisor to the Somali Government, with
whom I have discussissues of the maritime border dispute between Somalia and
Kenya and of the offshore activities of our affiliate eni Kenya BV.

On the merit, we note the contents of your letter and your claim that the Specified
Area lies within the maritime zones You will be aware that the Government of

the Republic of Kenyawould dispute your claim.

./.

Capltale socialei.v.o 4.005.358.876,00
Reglstro Imprese di Roma, Codice Fiscale 00 484960588
Sedl secondarie:11006, R.E.A. Roma n.756453
Via Emilia, 1 - Piazza Ezfo Vanonl, 1
20097 San Donato f·111anese (f·H)Annex 75

~

Eni's position is that it was lawfully awarded the three production sharing contracts
by the Governmentf the Republic of Kenya and that these licences are consistent with

Kenya's maritime zone, and thereforeactivities in the Specified Area are not "illegal"
asdescribed in your letter.

In those circumstances, we respectfully ask you to understand that eni is not

prepared to and cannot cease and desist from continuing its activities pursuant to the three
production sharing contracts entered into with the Governmentblic of Kenya.

We note your request for "all documents relating to its [eni's] activities in the

Specified Area, including an inventory of allfees and financial compensation provided to the
Government of the Republic of Kenya and/or any other public or private entity".

Unfortunately, eni is not in a position to provide this inform ation and documentation aswe
are bound by confidentiality obligations towards the Governmentblic of Kenya.

Yours faithfully. Annex 76

Letter from H.E.AhmedAli Dahir,Attorney-General of the Federal Republic of Somalia, to Mr.
Claudio Descalzi, Chief Executive Officer of Eni S.p.A., No. 01/115/XIG/2014 (16 Sept. 2014) Annex 76

~.

a

JAMHUURIYADDA FEDERALKASOOMAALIYA
XAFII SKA XEERILAALIYAHA GUUD EE QARANKA

THEATTORNEYGENERALOFFICE rWI~WI~

SUM:01/115/XIG/2014 TR:16/09/2014

Claudio Descalzi
Chief Executive Officer
Eni, Sp.A

PiazzaleMattei, 1-00144
Rom~aly

Dear Mr. Descalzi,

Reference is made to that certain letter from EniSp.A. ("Eni"), dated 9 June 2014 (Ref.
No. Prot. Dialeg 10), in responseto a letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal
RepublicSomalia (the "Ministry of Foreign Affairs"), dated 24 April 2014 (Ref

MOFA/M0/1043/2in connection with Eni'sacquisition of three product sharing contracts,
awarded by Government of the Republic of Kenya (the "Government of Kenya"), for the
acquisition of exploration blocks (L-21, L-23 and L-24) (the "Specified Area").

The Federal Government of Somalia (the "Somali Government") indicated, as reflected
in a letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated July 26, 2014 with

Ref:MOFA/SFR/OM/950/2014, that the Specified Area lies within the ExclusiveEconomic Zone
of Somalia. The outer-limits of Somalia's ExclusiveEconomic Zone are reflected in the
Proclamation of the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia dated 30 June 2014 (posted
onthe website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Lawof the Sea,Office of Legal Affairs of

the United Nations, at: www.un.org/Depts/ los).

/ J/} ,,)

Fu; rm~:drdaAyg 2.!ittSomali Government filed an Application instituting
legal proc;eedingsagainst the.a before the International Court of Justice in
connection with the maritime dispute between Somalia and Kenya.

Tell:0025? 617002521690000557 Email: [email protected],[email protected] 76

Therefore, given Eni's continued gross violations of Somalia'.ssovereignty and territorial

integrity and of applicable Somali laws, including Somali Maritime Law of 1988.

The officethe Attorney-General of Somalia hereby imposes on Enia penalty fine of

thirty Euros per square kilometer per day. The ("fine"), which is equivalent to €1,005,660
(Euro) per day, payable immediately, for each day that fails to cease and desist from all illegal

activities inSomali maritime zones. Such Fine shall accrue and be payable asof 1st July

2014, the day following the Somali Government's proclamation of its ExclusiveEconomic Zone.

All outstanding Fines due and payable shall accrue interest at a rate of London Interbank

Offeredate plus 2% per annum. Furthermore, the Fine shall continue to accrue and be
payable in fulll such date that the Somali Government and Eni enter into an amicable

agreement and in accordance with the terms of such agreement.

Failure to pay such fine may result in legal proceedings with a competent court.

We look forward to a speedy resolution of this matter.

Sincerely,r

~

Claudio Descalzi

Chief Executive Officer

Eni, Sp.A

cc: Ms. Federica Mogherini, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Italy

cc: H.D..Jf h1-aBeirhMinister for Foreign Affairs and Investment Promotion
~ f·,~~~=.·~

•,1'.· ·'

T~ll:0025261 02121900205- Email: [email protected],[email protected]
:!,:,·:· Annex 77

Letter from H.E.AhmedAli Dahir,Attorney-General of the Federal Republic of Somalia, to Mr.
Peter Worthington, Chief Executive Officer of Midway Resources International, No. 02/124/
XIG/2014 (20 Sept. 2014) Annex 77

.
.
.

JAMHUURIYADDA FEDERALKA SOOMAALIYA
XAFIISKA XEERILAALIYAHA GUUD EE QARANKA

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE LWI ~ IJI~

SUM :)2 l!j_!XlG/2014

Peter Worthingron
Chief Executive Officer
Midway Resources International

IS HalfMoon Street
London, WIJ 7DZ

Dear Mr. Worthington,

Reference is madtothe information posted on Midway Resources International
("MRI") websitein connection with a production sharing contract it has entered with the
Government of the Repubhc of Kenya (the "Kenyan Government") for Block LI3 (the

"Specified Area"), which MRI operates through its subsidiary &aGas Limited.

A portionof the Specified Area hes within the ExclusiveEconomic Zone of Samaha.
The outer-hmits of Samaha's ExclusiveEconomic Zone are reflected in the Proclamation
of the President of the Federal Repubhc of Samaha, dated 30 June 2014, posted on the

website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs of
the United Nations (www.un.org/Depts/los).

Furthermore, on 28 August 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Investment

Promotion (the "Somah Government") filed an apphcation instituting legal proceedings
against the Kenyan Government before the Internationalt of Justice in connection
with the maritime dispute between Samaha and Kenya.

Tell: 002526171661200252690000557 Email:[email protected], [email protected] 77

Therefore, given MRI's continued gross violations of Somalia's sovereignty and
territorial integrity and of applicable Somali laws, including the Somali Maritime Law of

1988, the office of the Attorney-General of Somalia hereby imposes on MRI a fine equal to

thirty(30) Euros per square kilometer (whichisequal ro a total amount o€OSOIO )per
day. The fine shall be payable immediately for each day that MRI fails to cease and desist

from all illegal activities in the Somali maritime zones. Such fine shall accrue and be
payable as of I July 2014, the day following the Somali Government's proclamation of its

Exclusive Economic Zone. All outstanding fines due and payable shall accrue interest at a

rateof the London Interbank Offered Rate plus two percent per annum. Furthermore, the
fine shall continue to accrue and be payable in full until such date that the Somali

Government and MRl enter into an amicable agreement and in accordance with the terms

of such agreement.

We look forward to a speedy resolution of this matter.

Sincerely,

HE . Ahmed Ah Dahir

Cc: H.EDr. Abdirahman Beileh, Minister of ForeAffair· ~~fa=!~~
Federal Republic of Somalia

Tell: 00252617166121, 00252690000557 Email:[email protected] ,[email protected] Annex 78

Letter from H.E.AhmedAli Dahir,Attorney-General of the Federal Republic of Somalia, to Mr.
Christophe de Margerie, Chief Executive Officer of Total S.A., No. 03/125/XIG/2014 (20 Sept.
2014) Annex 78

JAMHUURIYADDA FEDERALKA SOOMAALIYA

xAFIISKA XEERILAALIYAHA GUUD EE QARANKA

THEATTORNEYGENERAL'S OFFICE rWI ~ 81 ~

SUM:l2.3_/i..Z2014I/G TR:la__/~2014

Christophe de Margerie

ChiefExe cutive Officer ·
TOTALS.A.

Tour Coupole

2rplace Jean Millier
Arche Nord - Coupole/Regnault

92078 Paris La Defense Cedex

France

Dear Mr . de Margerie,

Reference is made to the letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Investment

Promotion of the Federal Republic of Somalia (the "Somali Government"), dared 6

September 2014 (Ref# MOFA/SFR/PS/2351/2014), to TotalS.A, ("Totaf') in
connection with Toral'sexecution of a production sharing ctheGovetnment of

the Republic of Kenya (the "Kenyan Government") for Block L22 (the "Specified Area''),
which Toral operates wiIOO% interesL

In said letter the Somali Government indicated that the Specified .Arealies within

.thexclusive EconomiZone of Somalia. Touter~h ofiomsalia'sExclusive
Economic Zone are reflected in the Proclamation of the President of theFederal Republic

of Somalia, dated 30 June 2014, posted on the website of the Division for Ocean Affairs

and the Lawof theSea, Office of LegalAffairs of the United Nations
(www.un.org/Depts/los).

Tell: 00252617166100252690000557Email:[email protected], [email protected] 78

Furthermore, on 28 August 2014, the Somali Government filed an application

instituting legal proceedings against the Kenyan Government beforeternational Court
of Justice in connection with the maritime dispute between Somalia and Kenya. ·

Therefore, givenotal's continued gross violations of Samaha's sovereignty and
territorial integrity and of applicable Somali laws, including the Somali Maritime Law of

1988, the office of the Attorney-General of Somalia hereby imposes on Total a fine equal

tothirty(30)Euros per square kilometer (which is equal to a total amo€109230)
per day. The fine shall be payable linmediately for each day that T oral fails to cease and

desist from all illegal activities in the Somalizoneitsuch fine shall accrue and be
payable asf IJuly2014, the day following the Somali Government's proclamation of its

Exclusive Economic Zone.All outstanding fines due and payable shall accrue interest at a
rateoftheLondon -Interbank Offered Rate plus two percent per annum. Furthermore, the

fme shall continue to accrue and be payabfUlluntisuch date that the Somali
Government and Total enter into an amicable agreement and in accordance with the terms

of such agreement.

We look forward to a speedy resolution of this matter.

Sincerely,

~--::'-
H.E. Ahmed AliDahir

cc: H.E. Laurent Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affa~~~~~~al

the Republic of France

cc: H.E Dr. Abdirahman Beileh, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Investment P~omotion

of the Federal Republic of Samaha

Tell: 00252617166121,00252690000557Email:[email protected], [email protected] Annex 79

Letter from Mr. Claudio Descalzi, Chief Executive Officer of Eni S.p.A., to H.E.Abdirahman
D. Beileh, Minister of ForeignAffairs of the Federal Republic of Somalia, and H.E.AhmedAli
Dahir,Attorney-General of the Federal Republic of Somalia, No. 85 (3 Oct. 2014) Annex 79

eni spa
Claudio Descalzi
Chief Executive Off icer Piazzale Enrico Mattei, 1
00144Rome- Italy
Ph. +39 065982332 Fax +39 0659822492
Piazza Eziononi, 1

20097 San Donato Milanese (Milan) -
Ph. + 39 02520610031001
Fax +39 0252041990
[email protected]

San Donato Milanese, October 3rd,2014
Ref. g5

H.E. Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr

Abdirahman D. Beileh
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Afgoye Road
KM5

Mogadishu
Federal Republic of Somalia

-and-

H.E. Attorney-General Ahmed Ali Dahir

Attorney-General's OfficeKM5
Mogadishu
Federal Republic of Somalia

I make reference to the letters of 26 July 2014 (received on 5 August 2014), Ref:

MOFA/SFR/OM/1950/2014 and 16 September 2014 (received on 17 September 2014), Ref.

(SUM: 01/115/XIG/2014) addressed to our Chief Executive Officer and copied to Ms. Federica

Mogherini, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Italy.

I would like to emphasize that the maritime border dispute between the Federal Republic of

Somalia ("Somalia") and the Republic of Kenya ("Kenya") is a matter that can only be resolved

between the two sovereign States. Indeed, Somalia has recently instituted proceedings against

Kenya before the International Court of Justice.Annex 79


~fi n l1

In this respect, we would like to clarify that three production sharing contracts have been

awarded by Kenia to our affiliate eni Kenia B.V. and we cannot cease and desist from our
activities given our existing contractual obligations towards Kenya. Nonetheleeni Kenya B.V.

has formally informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kenya of your position and of your

request that all the activities are suspendeeni Kenya B.V. has also provided copy of the letter

from the Attorney-General of Somalia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Attorney­

General's office of Kenya.
I would also like to respectfully underline that the activities carried out so far and those

scheduled in the near term have not and will not cause any damage to Somalia's environmental

and economic well-being.

Considering the situation, we consider not applicable the 'penalty fine' purported by the letter of

16 September 2014 sent to us by the Attorney-General.
I hope that the two States will be able to find a mutually acceptable solution to their dispute for

their benefit and for that of the companies investing in the area.

I am available for discussing the matter further in a meeting. In this respect I understand that

H.E Mr. Daud Mohamed Omar, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources of Somalia, will be in

Rome on October 14th for the MinisteriaConference "Italy-Africa, working together for a
sustainable energy future" and I could meet him at that time.

Yours faithfully, Annex 80

Lindsay Parson, Expert Review Paper, Geology and Geomorphology of the East Africa
Continental Margin, Indian Ocean (6 July 2015)Geology and geomorphology of the East Africa continental margin

in the Indian Ocean

Expert Report
prepared by

Dr Lindsay Parson,

Maritime Zone Solutions Ltd.

July 2015 Annex 80

Geology and geomorphology of the East Africa continental margin

in the Indian Ocean

Expert Report
prepared by

Dr Lindsay Parson,

Maritime Zone Solutions Ltd.

July 2015Annex 80

Geology and geomorphology of the East Africa continental margin

1 Introduction

I am the Managing Director of a technical maritime consultancy (Maritime
Zone Solutions Ltd.) based in Romsey, Hampshire, UK. I started the company

in May 2010 when I left the UK National Oceanography Centre (NOC),

Southampton, where I had worked for the previous 15 years as Head of the

Law of the Sea Group in the Marine Geology and Geophysics Department.

Among other areas, the Group was responsible for UK maritime delineation
with respect to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. Prior to my

position at NOC, I was Principal Scientific Officer at the Institute of

Oceanographic Sciences (IOS), Wormley in Surrey, where I carried out two

parallel marine research programmes; one investigating geological processes
at continental margins and active plate boundaries, and the other the

technical implementation of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS) provisions. From 1980 onwards, when I joined IOS, I was involved

in providing advice to the Department of Energy and the UK Foreign and

Commonwealth Office. I have authored more than 100 peer-reviewed articles
in scientific literature and more recently a number of commentaries on the

technical-legal interface and implementation of UNCLOS.

In 2003 I was asked by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office to assist

with the preparation of the four UK submissions to the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf in accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS.

These were completed and submitted by 2009 and two have been defended

in front of the Commission. I remain the Lead Technical Advisor to the Legal

Advisors Office on delimitation issues on the continental shelf. Over my 35-
year career, both the Law of the Sea Group and Maritime Zone Solutions Ltd.

have been commissioned by many non-UK coastal states to assist them with

their submissions. I developed a training programme for international experts

to learn about UNCLOS Article 76, which ran between 2000 and 2006, and

since then I have managed and lectured at the graduate and post-graduate
level on the Law of the Sea modules offered in the ʻMarine Science Policy and

Lawʼ Masters degree programme at the University of Southampton. I have

supervised seven PhD students and acted as a national and international

1Geology and geomorphology of the East Africa continental margin

1 Introduction

I am the Managing Director of a technical maritime consultancy (Maritime
Zone Solutions Ltd.) based in Romsey, Hampshire, UK. I started the company

in May 2010 when I left the UK National Oceanography Centre (NOC),

Southampton, where I had worked for the previous 15 years as Head of the

Law of the Sea Group in the Marine Geology and Geophysics Department.

Among other areas, the Group was responsible for UK maritime delineation
with respect to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. Prior to my

position at NOC, I was Principal Scientific Officer at the Institute of

Oceanographic Sciences (IOS), Wormley in Surrey, where I carried out two

parallel marine research programmes; one investigating geological processes
at continental margins and active plate boundaries, and the other the

technical implementation of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS) provisions. From 1980 onwards, when I joined IOS, I was involved

in providing advice to the Department of Energy and the UK Foreign and

Commonwealth Office. I have authored more than 100 peer-reviewed articles
in scientific literature and more recently a number of commentaries on the

technical-legal interface and implementation of UNCLOS.

In 2003 I was asked by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office to assist

with the preparation of the four UK submissions to the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf in accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS.

These were completed and submitted by 2009 and two have been defended

in front of the Commission. I remain the Lead Technical Advisor to the Legal

Advisors Office on delimitation issues on the continental shelf. Over my 35-
year career, both the Law of the Sea Group and Maritime Zone Solutions Ltd.

have been commissioned by many non-UK coastal states to assist them with

their submissions. I developed a training programme for international experts

to learn about UNCLOS Article 76, which ran between 2000 and 2006, and

since then I have managed and lectured at the graduate and post-graduate
level on the Law of the Sea modules offered in the ʻMarine Science Policy and

Lawʼ Masters degree programme at the University of Southampton. I have

supervised seven PhD students and acted as a national and international

1Annex 80

Geology and geomorphology of the East Africa continental margin

This report will be organised into five sections, each refering to either a

specific part of the margin, or physical processes that have characterised its
development. These will be followed by a concluding summary section.

Section 2 describes the configuration of the coastline, and the relief and form

of the adjacent land and marine areas. Section 3 discusses the evolution of
the landforms and the offshore ocean basins as they have resulted from plate

tectonic movements. Section 4 addresses the geology and geomorphology of

the margin, and Section 5 provides a detailed overview of the offshore

seafloor geology adjacent to the coast. Section 6 contains a number of

summary observations derived from the review of the margin in the context of
implementation of Article 76 of the 1982 Convention.

2 Coastline geometry, relief and morphology

The coastal margin of Somalia and Kenya separates the terrestrial cratonic

continental block of Africa, which is the stable portion of Africaʼs continental

crust, from the oceanic basins and sub-basins of the western Indian Ocean

(see Figure 1).

3Geology and geomorphology of the East Africa continental margin

This report will be organised into five sections, each refering to either a

specific part of the margin, or physical processes that have characterised its
development. These will be followed by a concluding summary section.

Section 2 describes the configuration of the coastline, and the relief and form

of the adjacent land and marine areas. Section 3 discusses the evolution of
the landforms and the offshore ocean basins as they have resulted from plate

tectonic movements. Section 4 addresses the geology and geomorphology of

the margin, and Section 5 provides a detailed overview of the offshore

seafloor geology adjacent to the coast. Section 6 contains a number of

summary observations derived from the review of the margin in the context of
implementation of Article 76 of the 1982 Convention.

2 Coastline geometry, relief and morphology

The coastal margin of Somalia and Kenya separates the terrestrial cratonic

continental block of Africa, which is the stable portion of Africaʼs continental

crust, from the oceanic basins and sub-basins of the western Indian Ocean

(see Figure 1).

3Annex 80

Geology and geomorphology of the East Africa continental margin

approximately latitude 2ºS, the coastal area is sandy and backed immediately

by dunes and further inland by low relief scrub. South of approximately 2°S,

Kenyaʼs shoreline is slightly more mixed, comprising a mixture of rocky

headlands and smaller, discrete sandy bays.

3 Plate-tectonic evolution

The evolution of the Indian Ocean began with the separation of west and east

Gondwanaland during the Mesozoic era, approximately 160 Ma . The 2

continental margins of eastern Africa are marked by a series of basins formed

by the separation of the India-Madagascar-Antarctica land masses from

Africa-Arabia land mass that occurred as part of the Gondwanaland
3
separation. This separation ceased about 120 Ma .

Magnetic anomalies show that the crust in the Western Somali Basin was

formed by seafloor spreading and the generation of new oceanic crust as

Madagascar moved south with respect to Africa (Eagles & König, 2008). This

movement led to the creation of the Davie Fracture Zone and a sheared

margin along the edge of the continent from southernmost Kenya down to

Mozambique. This corresponds to the section of the East African coastline

that trends roughly north-south. To the north, however, the northeast-

southwest trending coastline off Kenya and southern Somalia corresponds to

a 'rifted' margin, i.e., one which has resulted from the stretching, fracturing

and rupture of continental crust. This formed during the same period of
seafloor spreading as the Davie Fracture Zone. These margin segments have

both been largely tectonically inactive since their formation, albeit subject to

occasional vertical movements in the south.

2“Ma” signifies “million years ago”.
3
See Cochran, J. R. 1988. Somali Basin, Chain Ridge, and origin of the Northern Somali
Basin gravity and geoid low Journal of Geophysical Research: Solid Earth, 1988.
4Geophysical surveys commonly identify parallel magnetic striping patterns, normally referred
to as ʻmagnetic anomaliesʼ, in ocean basins, which can be used to accurately record the date

the seafloor was created.
5ʻShearedʼ or ʻtransformʼ margins are common features generated where continental blocks
slide past one another along faults in the earthʼs crust.

5Geology and geomorphology of the East Africa continental margin

approximately latitude 2ºS, the coastal area is sandy and backed immediately

by dunes and further inland by low relief scrub. South of approximately 2°S,

Kenyaʼs shoreline is slightly more mixed, comprising a mixture of rocky

headlands and smaller, discrete sandy bays.

3 Plate-tectonic evolution

The evolution of the Indian Ocean began with the separation of west and east

Gondwanaland during the Mesozoic era, approximately 160 Ma 2. The

continental margins of eastern Africa are marked by a series of basins formed

by the separation of the India-Madagascar-Antarctica land masses from

Africa-Arabia land mass that occurred as part of the Gondwanaland
3
separation. This separation ceased about 120 Ma .

Magnetic anomalies show that the crust in the Western Somali Basin was

formed by seafloor spreading and the generation of new oceanic crust as

Madagascar moved south with respect to Africa (Eagles & König, 2008). This

movement led to the creation of the Davie Fracture Zone and a sheared

margin along the edge of the continent from southernmost Kenya down to

Mozambique. This corresponds to the section of the East African coastline

that trends roughly north-south. To the north, however, the northeast-

southwest trending coastline off Kenya and southern Somalia corresponds to

a 'rifted' margin, i.e., one which has resulted from the stretching, fracturing

and rupture of continental crust. This formed during the same period of
seafloor spreading as the Davie Fracture Zone. These margin segments have

both been largely tectonically inactive since their formation, albeit subject to

occasional vertical movements in the south.

2“Ma” signifies “million years ago”.
3
See Cochran, J. R. 1988. Somali Basin, Chain Ridge, and origin of the Northern Somali
Basin gravity and geoid low Journal of Geophysical Research: Solid Earth, 1988.
4Geophysical surveys commonly identify parallel magnetic striping patterns, normally referred
to as ʻmagnetic anomaliesʼ, in ocean basins, which can be used to accurately record the date

the seafloor was created.
5ʻShearedʼ or ʻtransformʼ margins are common features generated where continental blocks
slide past one another along faults in the earthʼs crust.

5Annex 80

Geology and geomorphology of the East Africa continental margin

Figure 2: Principal geomorphological features of the continental margin of Somalia, including:
the Somali Basin and its constituent sub-basins (Northern, Eastern and Western Somali

Basins); key bathymetric relief features (Dhow, VLCC and ARS fracture zone complex), as

dashed lines; Central Somali Spur; and land boundaries. Deep Sea Drilling Project (DSDP)
sites are located as numbered red dots .

At the southern limit of the Northern Somali Basin, a major submarine feature

referred to informally as the Central Somali Spur marks a large prolongation

that extends as a single block more than 300 km from the coast. (See Figure
2.) South of this feature, the continent-ocean transition continues as an

oblique section of rifted margin, which originated approximately 160 Ma.

7Simpson, E.W. & Schlich, R., et al., 1974, Initial Reports of the Deep Sea Drilling Project,
Volume 25. Washington (U.S. Government Printing Office) pp. 679-684.

7Geology and geomorphology of the East Africa continental margin

Figure 2: Principal geomorphological features of the continental margin of Somalia, including:
the Somali Basin and its constituent sub-basins (Northern, Eastern and Western Somali

Basins); key bathymetric relief features (Dhow, VLCC and ARS fracture zone complex), as

dashed lines; Central Somali Spur; and land boundaries. Deep Sea Drilling Project (DSDP)
sites are located as numbered red dots .

At the southern limit of the Northern Somali Basin, a major submarine feature

referred to informally as the Central Somali Spur marks a large prolongation

that extends as a single block more than 300 km from the coast. (See Figure
2.) South of this feature, the continent-ocean transition continues as an

oblique section of rifted margin, which originated approximately 160 Ma.

7Simpson, E.W. & Schlich, R., et al., 1974, Initial Reports of the Deep Sea Drilling Project,
Volume 25. Washington (U.S. Government Printing Office) pp. 679-684.

7Annex 80

Geology and geomorphology of the East Africa continental margin

including those associated with a southeasterly branch of the continental East
8
Africa Rift system . Present day records of earthquake activity also confirm

that, unlike the Somali margin to the north, the Kenyan margin is not entirely

tectonically passive. This localised combination of fault systems has led to the
formation of islands, the weakening of coastal rock formations, and enhanced

erosion along the Kenya and Tanzania coastline.

5 Offshore geology

The Somali Basin dominates the northwestern Indian Ocean adjacent to the

East African coast. It comprises a roughly bean-shaped area covering more

than two million square miles (5 million square kilometres). It is bounded by

the African coasts of Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania on the west, Socotra

Island in the north, the broad flanks of the Carlsberg Ridge to the east, and a
rough line linking the Coco-de-Mer Seamounts, Amirante Ridge-trench

complex, and the Aldabra and Comoros Islands to the east and south (see

Figure 1).

South of the Central Somali Spur in the Western Somali Basin, the shallow

water platform is consistently very straight and narrow with an average width

to the 200 m isobath of much less than 20 nautical miles (37 km). However,

the seafloor descends at a modest gradient as it moves offshore, reaching the

deepest parts of the basin at between 4500 and 4800 m in water depth. At

this depth, the seafloor is largely flat and uninterrupted by significant features.

Recent bathymetric models are helpful for identifying the sedimentation

patterns in this area . These data show a large amount of sediment discharge

from the upper parts of the slope into the basin. This sediment moves along

sediment fan channels, submarine canyons, and smaller scale gullying

systems out into the basin. (See Figure 4.)

8Chorowitz, J. 2005. The East African Rift System. Journal of African Earth Sciences, 43, pp
379-410.

9See http://topex.ucsd.edu/marine_topo/ and Smith, W. H. F., and D. T. Sandwell, Global
seafloor topography from satellite altimetry and ship depth soundings, Science, v. 277, pp.
1957-1962, 26 Sept., 1997.

9Geology and geomorphology of the East Africa continental margin

including those associated with a southeasterly branch of the continental East
8
Africa Rift system . Present day records of earthquake activity also confirm

that, unlike the Somali margin to the north, the Kenyan margin is not entirely

tectonically passive. This localised combination of fault systems has led to the
formation of islands, the weakening of coastal rock formations, and enhanced

erosion along the Kenya and Tanzania coastline.

5 Offshore geology

The Somali Basin dominates the northwestern Indian Ocean adjacent to the

East African coast. It comprises a roughly bean-shaped area covering more

than two million square miles (5 million square kilometres). It is bounded by

the African coasts of Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania on the west, Socotra

Island in the north, the broad flanks of the Carlsberg Ridge to the east, and a
rough line linking the Coco-de-Mer Seamounts, Amirante Ridge-trench

complex, and the Aldabra and Comoros Islands to the east and south (see

Figure 1).

South of the Central Somali Spur in the Western Somali Basin, the shallow

water platform is consistently very straight and narrow with an average width

to the 200 m isobath of much less than 20 nautical miles (37 km). However,

the seafloor descends at a modest gradient as it moves offshore, reaching the

deepest parts of the basin at between 4500 and 4800 m in water depth. At

this depth, the seafloor is largely flat and uninterrupted by significant features.

Recent bathymetric models are helpful for identifying the sedimentation

patterns in this area . These data show a large amount of sediment discharge

from the upper parts of the slope into the basin. This sediment moves along

sediment fan channels, submarine canyons, and smaller scale gullying

systems out into the basin. (See Figure 4.)

8Chorowitz, J. 2005. The East African Rift System. Journal of African Earth Sciences, 43, pp
379-410.

9See http://topex.ucsd.edu/marine_topo/ and Smith, W. H. F., and D. T. Sandwell, Global
seafloor topography from satellite altimetry and ship depth soundings, Science, v. 277, pp.
1957-1962, 26 Sept., 1997.

9Annex 80

Geology and geomorphology of the East Africa continental margin

rocks 11and sands in deep water (see Sites 234, 235, 240 and 241 - DSDP

Leg 25; Simpson and Schlich 1974). It is likely that discharge from Somali,

Kenyan and Tanzanian river systems delivered sediments to the Somalia

Basin.

The sands recovered from the Somali Basin are of particular interest for

studying the region, as they have been transported considerable distances on

very low gradients from the continental source, probably in deep-water

channels. Turbidite flows recorded at DSDP Site 241 demonstrate a common

sedimentary process of passive continental margins. Sediments deposited by
such flows on the open slope are typically found on low angle slopes of 0.1-

0.7 degrees. Turbidity currents will continue to flow, however, until they

completely run out of slope . They then deposit their remaining bedload by

settling in flat-floored basins, an abyssal plain or sometimes slope basins.

Data show this has occurred off Somalia. Regional studies indicate

contemporaneous accumulation of massive sand along the African margin,

including in the Somali sub-basins. Although it is not possible to establish the

exact source area for the massive sand, detailed mineralogy clearly indicates

that it is derived from the crustal rocks of Africa and Madagascar (Girdley et al

1974). In the Somali Basin, sediments such as those found at DSDP Site 241
(see Figure 2), are of the same age as the massive sand recovered at DSDP

Site 240, and are graded beds interlayered with pelagic deposits. These

graded beds have similar compositions as the sands from DSDP Site 240 and

apparently represent overbank, or flood, deposits from channelized density

flows that bypassed the graded bed area.

The sedimentary section in the Western Somali Basin sampled at the DSDP

deep drill sites can be extrapolated southwards to offshore Kenya using

geophysical data (for example, Coffin et al 1986). Along the

11Pelagic rocks include fine grained sediments, deposited slowly and derived from
continental run-off and settling of material from the water column.
12
Jeff Peakall, Ian A. Kane, Doug G. Masson, Gareth Keevil, William McCaffrey, and
Ransome Corney. 2012. Global (latitudinal) variation in submarine channel sinuosity.
Geology, v. 40.1, pp 11-14.

11Geology and geomorphology of the East Africa continental margin

rocks 11and sands in deep water (see Sites 234, 235, 240 and 241 - DSDP

Leg 25; Simpson and Schlich 1974). It is likely that discharge from Somali,

Kenyan and Tanzanian river systems delivered sediments to the Somalia

Basin.

The sands recovered from the Somali Basin are of particular interest for

studying the region, as they have been transported considerable distances on

very low gradients from the continental source, probably in deep-water

channels. Turbidite flows recorded at DSDP Site 241 demonstrate a common

sedimentary process of passive continental margins. Sediments deposited by
such flows on the open slope are typically found on low angle slopes of 0.1-

0.7 degrees. Turbidity currents will continue to flow, however, until they

completely run out of slope 12. They then deposit their remaining bedload by

settling in flat-floored basins, an abyssal plain or sometimes slope basins.

Data show this has occurred off Somalia. Regional studies indicate

contemporaneous accumulation of massive sand along the African margin,

including in the Somali sub-basins. Although it is not possible to establish the

exact source area for the massive sand, detailed mineralogy clearly indicates

that it is derived from the crustal rocks of Africa and Madagascar (Girdley et al

1974). In the Somali Basin, sediments such as those found at DSDP Site 241
(see Figure 2), are of the same age as the massive sand recovered at DSDP

Site 240, and are graded beds interlayered with pelagic deposits. These

graded beds have similar compositions as the sands from DSDP Site 240 and

apparently represent overbank, or flood, deposits from channelized density

flows that bypassed the graded bed area.

The sedimentary section in the Western Somali Basin sampled at the DSDP

deep drill sites can be extrapolated southwards to offshore Kenya using

geophysical data (for example, Coffin et al 1986). Along the

11Pelagic rocks include fine grained sediments, deposited slowly and derived from
continental run-off and settling of material from the water column.
12
Jeff Peakall, Ian A. Kane, Doug G. Masson, Gareth Keevil, William McCaffrey, and
Ransome Corney. 2012. Global (latitudinal) variation in submarine channel sinuosity.
Geology, v. 40.1, pp 11-14.

11Annex 80

Geology and geomorphology of the East Africa continental margin

Western Basin. This process continues to this day.

As in most ancient passive margins, the continuous delivery of sediment over

the eons to the marginal basin off the East African coast has resulted in

enormously thick sediments layers. Such an accumulation provides the
opportunity for the establishment of continental-shelf outer limits beyond

200 M to both Somalia and Kenya in an implementation of UNCLOS Article

76, paragraph 4(a)(i) . Notwithstanding this, Kenya has chosen to use the

Statement of Understanding/Annex ll of the Final Act of the Conference to

define its outer limit of its continental shelf, but there seems little doubt that a
construction along their margin in accordance with Article 76, paragraph

4(a)(i) would have resulted in a broadly similar location.

Signed:

Dr Lindsay Parson

Maritime Zone Solutions Ltd

6 July 2015

* * *

13
UNCLOS, Art. 76 4.(a) reads, in relevant part:
“For the purposes of this Convention, the coastal State shall establish the outer edge of the
continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by either:

(i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to the outermost
fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent
of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the continental slope…”.

13Geology and geomorphology of the East Africa continental margin

Western Basin. This process continues to this day.

As in most ancient passive margins, the continuous delivery of sediment over

the eons to the marginal basin off the East African coast has resulted in

enormously thick sediments layers. Such an accumulation provides the
opportunity for the establishment of continental-shelf outer limits beyond

200 M to both Somalia and Kenya in an implementation of UNCLOS Article

76, paragraph 4(a)(i) 1. Notwithstanding this, Kenya has chosen to use the

Statement of Understanding/Annex ll of the Final Act of the Conference to

define its outer limit of its continental shelf, but there seems little doubt that a
construction along their margin in accordance with Article 76, paragraph

4(a)(i) would have resulted in a broadly similar location.

Signed:

Dr Lindsay Parson

Maritime Zone Solutions Ltd

6 July 2015

* * *

13
UNCLOS, Art. 76 4.(a) reads, in relevant part:
“For the purposes of this Convention, the coastal State shall establish the outer edge of the
continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by either:

(i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to the outermost
fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent
of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the continental slope…”.

13Annex 80

Geology and geomorphology of the East Africa continental margin

Technology Conference, no.14, Vol. 2. pp. 421-430.

Eagles and Konig 2008 A model of plate kinematics in Gondwana breakup.

Geophys. J. Int. 173, pp. 703-717.

Simpson, E.W. & Schlich, R., et al., 1974, Initial Reports of the Deep Sea

Drilling Project, Vol 25. Washington (U.S. Government Printing Office) pp.

679-684.

15 Annex 81

L.N. King, “The Work of the Jubaland Boundary Commission”, The Geographical Journal, Vol.
72, No. 5 (Nov. 1928) Annex 81

THE WORK OF THE JUBALAND BOUNDARY COMMIS­
SION: A paper read at the Meeting of the Society on 7 May I928, by

Capt. E. H. M. Clifford, M.G., R.E., Assistant Commissioner,in the
absenceof the author, the Senior British Commissioner

LIEUT.-COL.L. N. KING, R.E.
HE Pact of London of 1915 heralded Italy into the Great War as our ally,
T
and it was the natural outcome of this alliance that the fruits of victory
should be shared. In due course it was decided that, in lieu of acquiring an
actual portion of conquered territory, Italy should receive the Province of
Jubaland, to be shorn from the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya. The
cession took place on 29 June 1925, and was signalized by the change of the
national flags at Kismayu on that day. It was my lot to be present at this

ceremony, and I do not think that our friends and late allies could grudge the
feeling of regret that fell upon the small band of Britishers who supported our
High Commissioner, the late Mr. J. 0. W. Hope, C.M.G., on the occasion.
For exactly a year from the date of cession Jubaland, renamed Oltre­
Giuba, existed and flourished as a separate Italian colony under the High

Commissionership of H.E. Corrado Zoli. Road construction and building
advanced apace, and many great improvements were worked in Kismayu.
On 29 June 1926 the colony was absorbed by Italian Somaliland and forth­
with completely lost its entity in a number of pre-existent provinces. Signor
Zoli, having handed over his responsibilities to the Governor, H.E. de Vecchi,
returned to Italy to take up a senior post in the Colonial Office.

The authority for the cession of Jubaland was the Anglo-Italian Treaty of
15 July 1924, ratified by Parliament on 27 March 1925. Under Article 12 of
this treaty there was authorized the appointment of an Anglo-Italian Com­
mission, later known as the Jubaland Commission, with power to investigate
and decide certain matters specifically stated in the treaty, and also to decide

generally on the manner in which the treaty should be put into force. The
Jubaland Boundary Commission, on the other hand, did not receive its charter
directly from the treaty, but was naturally a servant of the Jubaland Com­
mission, owing allegiance to it in all matters regarding delimitation, survey,
and demarcation of the boundary. It might well be imagined that this over­
shadowing of the junior commission by another field commission would have

led to confusion in many directions, but fortunately during the period of field
activities the Senior Commissioners of both nationalities held their titles with
respect to both commissions, and on occasions when a decision had been
made, it was a nice point as to whether the responsibility was due to the senior
or to the junior commission.
Earlyin 1925 the leadership of the British Section of the Commission was

offered to me, and my acceptance was not delayed many hours. Then there
followed a month or so before the appointment was finally approved by
higher authority, and I devoted a portion of this time to a very careful perusal
of the treaty description of the boundary, which ran as follows:

"From the confluence of the rivers Ganale and Daua, along the cours e of
the Daua upstream to the southern point of the small southerly bend of the
latter river in th e vicinity of Maika Re ; thence in a south-wdirection

This contAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditionseb 2015 17:15:00 P▯MAnnex 81

Ferry on the Juba river at Dolo

The Webi Daua, looking east from Malka Rie boundary pillar

Somali camels at Yaqali

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Annex 81

..

The Wajer-El Wak road

A road crossingthe boundary

A well at El Sadi, Wajer Dima

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsAnnex 81

THE WORK OF THE JUBALAND BOUNDARY COMMISSION 421

in a straight line to the centre of the pool of Dumasa; thence in a south­
westerly direction in a straight line towards Eilla Kalla (which remains in
British territory) to such meridian east of Greenwich as shall leave in Italian
territory the well of El Beru; thence along the same meridian southwards

until it reaches the boundary between the provinces of Jubaland and Tana­
land; thence along that provincial boundary to a point due north of the point
on the coast due west of the southernmost of the four islets in the immediate
vicinity of Ras Kiambone (Dick's Head); thence due southwards to such point
on the coast. Ras Kiambone (Dick's Head) and the four islets above men­
tioned shall fall within the territory to be transferred to Italy.
"In the event, however, of it being found by the Commission referred to in
Article IZ that the well of El Beru does not contain water either sufficient or
suitable for the maintenance at that point of an Italian frontier post, then the

line, as between El Beru and Eilla Kalla, shall be so drawn by the Commission
as to include in Italian territory the neighbouring well of El Shama."
There were several points in this description that promised to produce

difficult but inter esting problems on the ground, but there was one which
appeared to me to need immediate amendment. The inland terminal of the
old Jubaland- Tanaland boundary was a little shaky. Measurement on the 1 /M
treaty map showed the pivotal point of the international boundary in this
region as occurring at 0 °so' S. latitude . My proposal that this latitude should

in fact be adopted was accepted without demur, and subsequently this corner
point was very conveniently named "Zero Cinquanta."
As my knowledge of Jubaland was very small, I requested that I might pro­
ceed to Kenya forthwith with one non-commissioned officer and reconnoitre.

This request was accorded; and I sailed from England in March 1925 with
Sergeant Foster, R.E. Captain E. H. M. Clifford, M.C., R.E.,and another non­
commissioned officer topographer were earmarked to follow me when
required.
Arrived in Kenya, I found that Mr. J. 0. W. Hope, c.M.G., the duly

accredited High Commissioner for the cession of Jubaland, was on the point
of proceeding to Kismayu, and I arranged to accompany him, as this appeared
to be the surest way of establishin g contact with the Italians. Unfortuna tely,
I was somewhat in advance of useful events, as there then ensued two most

unprofitable months of waiting. At last, on 29 June 1925, as already related,
Jubaland ceased to fly the British Flag. I then apprec iated the situation as
follows: The Italian Mission was fast approac hing. Work on the boundary
would undoubtedly begin in the region of El Wak as soon as the Jubaland
Mission had decided which well should determine the "long meridian."

Wajer would be the British advanced base in the first instance. I then made
my request that my reinforcements should be made available in Kenya as soon
as possible. Unfortunately the Kenya Government was not able to abide by
its contract regarding the provision of personnel for the Boundary Commis­

sion, as originally schemed, to the extent of a Political Officer, a Doctor, and a
Topographe r.
By good luck, however, I had on my staff as interpreter in Italian to the
Senior Commiss ion, Captain E. N. Erskine, M.c., son of St. Vincent Erskine.
whose name will be remembered in connection with the exploratory work of

the 'seventies. This officer, who had just severed his connection with the

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422 THE WORK OF THE JUBALAND BOUNDARY COMMISSION

Kenya Government, had obtained wide experience of administration in Juba­
land and the N.F.D. whilst soldiering with the K.A.R. I engaged him forth­

with as Political Officer to the Boundary Commission, pending confirmation
from the Colonial Office, and a most "Admirable Crichton" he proved to be.

The deficient topographer was made good from home. At an early period I
tried, in conjunction with my Italian colleagues, to obtain the services of a
doctor of the Oltre-Giuba Administration. When the news of failure arrived

much time had passed, and as the transport question had become extremely
acute, I very foolishly decided to save the extra lift involved.

As soon as the Senior Commission began to function an itinerary was

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TANGANYIKA TERRITORY

The Jubaland Boundary
The old Province of Jubaland comprised the area between the Juba and the new Inter­
national Bounda ry, plus a triangle with vertex in the Lorian Sw amp (about the L in Lak

Dera) and base the meridional section of the boundary

arranged to Wajer via the Juba River, Serenli, and El Wak. Captain Erskine
hurried ahead to Serenli in order to assist Lieut.-Col. Costa over the purchase
of camels, whilst Mr. Hope, Sergeant Foster , and I ascended the Juba to the

same place in the Buffin Bird, a powerful little river steamer named after the
mythical bird of Jubaland which is reputed to fly backwards, as it dislikes to

have dust in its eyes! The Italian Mission followed us by land a month later
and reported two amusing incidents on the way. The survey chronometer,
which had been nursed with such infinite care ever since a tram conductor in

Florence was requested to drive carefully because of his precious burden, was
projected by an angry mule into the bush with such force that it parted com­

pany not only with the European who shared its degradation, but also with the

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THE WORK OF THE JUBALAND BOUNDARY COMMISSION 423

wooden case in which it was securely locked. On another occasion the intrepid
Major Zammarano was requested by some villagers to destroy a lion which had
worked sad havoc in the countryside. He spent a watchful night in a tree over
a specially prepared bait, but to no purpose, for the lion preferred to stroll to

the other side of the camp, where he deliberately killed and ate his fill of a
grazing camel belonging to the Commission.
The Italian Section of the Boundary Commission was now completely
assembled at Serenli and consisted of Lieut.-Col. Giovanni Datto in com­
mand, assisted by two topographers, Captains Armando Marino and Cosima

Bertacchi, and a wireless operator, Sergeant-Major Angelo Branco. It will be
noted that there was no Political Officer, no escort officer, and at this time no
special transport officer.
As the British Section was now also in Africa, though not assembled, it is

convenient here to detail its full composition: Senior Commissioner, myself,
Lieut.-Col. L. N. King, O.B.E., R.E.; Assistant Commissioner, Captain
E. H. M. Clifford, M.C., R.E.;Political Officer, Captain E. N. Erskine, M.c.;
escort officer, Lieut. C. B. G. Watson, K.A.R.;wireless operator, Mr. A. Kane;
topographers: Sergeant C. W. R. Foster, Corporal L. T. Higson, and Corporal

J. Keleher, all of the Royal Engineers. In addition to his duties as Political
Officer, Captain Erskine was responsible for all matters pertaining to trans­
port, supply, water supply and discipline, other than military discipline.
Up to this date all arrangements had been made in anticipation of Lieut.­
Col. Datto's arrival, and it was fortunate that he was able to accept them in

every detail. As soon as the transport was ready we bade adieu to our very
true friend, Lieut.-Col. Costa, who had entertained us so kindly for many
weeks, and the two Missions moved in echelon to \\rajer, via El Wak, along
one of the oldest slave routes in Africa.
Two days after my arrival in Wajer I left my Italian colleagues in the

sympathetic charge of Captain Mahoney, who was administering the station
and district, and made a flying visit to Nairobi by car, bringing back with me
Captain Clifford and Mr. Kane, the two non-commissioned officers being left
on the road to expedite the forwarding of stores. The question of transport

between Nairobi and Wajer had caused Captain Clifford immense trouble.
He was eventually compelled to make private motor contracts at ruinous
prices,as the K.A.R. transport was more than fully occupied with the change
of administration from military to civil. My return to Wajer was most oppor­
tune, as I had evidently been racing the "short" rains which now, November

1925, broke with exceptional violence and rendered the earth road behind me
quite impassable for many weeks.
Mr. Hope, whose work with the Senior Commission was concluded for the
time being, was just able to escape with the returning car, and this was the
last sight I ever had of my very dear friend.

Previous to Mr. Hope's departure the Jubaland Commission had decided
that the well of El Shama, and not that of El Beru, should define the boundary
in this region.
From personal observation of the type of country already traversed from
Serenli, combined with comparative information supplied by Captain Erskine

regarding the various portions of the frontier, it was apparent that the topo-

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424 THE WORK OF THE JUBALAND BOUNDARY COMMISSION

graphical conditions were as follows: Hills from Maika Rie to El Wak and
slightly farther south; then an immense ple.inextending to the sea; a ridge or
two ofcoral outcrop near the coast. The vegetation, dense camel thorn about
rz feet high from Maika Rie to Zero Cinquanta; thence rather more open
gladey country to Jibichilaowa; then a dense tropical forest, giving place again

to camel thorn near the coast. The conditions of water supply were likely to
prove extremely precarious, as there was no permanent water adjacent to the
boundary other than the wells of Wajer Bor and the El Wak group; elsewhere
surface water after rain was all that could be expected.
In acountry overgrown for the greater part with dense bush and harbouring

nomad tribes by whom trespass and pillage were considered virtues, it seemed
obvious that, in the interests of subsequent administration, the boundary
should be demarcated most clearly. The British proposal that it should be
marked throughout its length by a lane cut through the bush was accepted
by the Italian Mission after long deliberation .

Further arguments in favour of the proposal were that such a line would be
unmistakable to the local tribes, that the bush was of a very slow-growing
variety, that the lane once cut would undoubtedly be kept open by natives
driving their stock between pasturages, that it provided the first element of a
motor road, and that it assisted the boundary survey.

On first consideration it appeared reasonable that triangulation might be
adopted with profit in the north, that accurate traversing would be necessary
elsewhere, and that the whole should be stiffened by astronomical determina­
tions of position and direction. On closer examination it transpired that
triangulation was inadvisable for both technical and economic reasons.

Technically it failed as a proper scheme, in that plane-tabling was impossible
owing to the universal thorn bush, and the topographical detail, consisting
chiefly of tracks and water-holes, could best be tied to points on the actual
boundary-line by traverse. Economically it failed owing to the difficulty of
rapid transport, supply, watering, and defence measures for the various

parties in this dry and inhospitable country, where concentration of force and
effort was clearly indicated.
It was therefore decided that all the main control points should be fixed
astronomically in combination with wireless time signals, and that the topo­
graphy should be surveyed normally by compass traverse, supplemented when
possible by the plane-table or theodolite, and that a key for the topography

should be obtained by running a taped traverse between main control points.
The resulting field sheets were to be on the r:roo,ooo scale with a vertical
interval of 30 metres, and were to cover a strip of country extending 4 kilo­
metres on either side of the boundary-line. Both Missions were to fix the
main control points sympathetically, but the topography between El Wak

and Maika Rie was to be shared, as an experiment, each Mission being
responsible for its own side of the boundary, a scheme which was very soon
discarded.
Having made these weighty decisions, the Italian Mission proceeded to El
Wak, whither I followed them shortly in company with Mr. Kane. Captains
Clifford and Erskine remained behind at Wajer until the supply question was

completely solved. At El Shama I made the first astronomical fixation jointly

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426 THE WORK OF THE JUBALAND BOUNDARY COMMISSION

with the Italian Mission, and Sergeant Foster with a self-contained unit
started cutting and beaconing the boundary-lane in a southerly direction. I
then proceeded to Damasa and fixed that point astronomically in conjunction
with my Italian colleagues, returning to El Wak in time for Christmas cele­

brations. Sergeant Foster's party then reversed the direction of its work and
started cutting towards Damasa.
Meanwhile the Italians had fixed Dolo and Maika Rie, and we shortly
followed suit with regard to the latter point. The fact that there was no most
southerly bend of the river at this place did not seriously upset matters, as the

Commission quickly decided on a convenient starting-point for the boundary
which would leave Maika Rie in Italian territory.
No sooner was this last operation completed than Lieut.-Col. Datto
informed me that his local Government considered his programme of work
to be too generous in every direction, and had given him definite instructions

regarding curtailment .
I immediately cabled home to the Colonial Office requesting support for the
fuller proposals, and arranged with Lieut.-Col. Datto a temporary scheme
which would permit of reversion to the original programme if matters shaped

their course as we hoped. The British were to fix a point near the hill of Finno
alone, and one or two points to the south of El Wak in conjunction with the
Italians. The Commission was then to leave the British non-commissioned
officers surveying and demarcating in the north (though of course Lieut .-Col.
Datto did not participate in these instructions), and to proceed to Ras Kiam­

honi, where the boundary breaks out to the coast.
Immediately after having made this compact, Lieut.-Col. Datto was com­
pelled, through ill health, to break off his connection with the Commission
and return to Italy. We were all very sorry to loseour courteous and friendly
collaborator.

The interim programme which we had arranged was of necessity further
abridged after the fixation of Finno, as the Italians found their transport and
supply in such a bad state that an immediate return to Kismayu was impera­
tive. The British Mission moved via Wajer, Dif, and Afmadu, and at the
latter place met the new Italian Senior Commissioner, Major Aniello

Napolitano.
On 3 April 1926 the joint headquarters was assembled at Kismayu, and on
the 8th the High Commissioner called a conference at which he informed the
Commission ers that the Italian Government had reconsidered its views re­
garding the survey and demarcation of the boundar y. He then advanced

certain proposals which were sufficiently close to those originally formulated
to warrant my acceptance .
We then sailed by dhow for Kiamboni, leaving Captain Erskine behind to
purchase more camels, and to close the Wajer base in favour of Dif. The
work at Kiamboni involved the selection of a point on the headland on to

which the boundary-line emerging from the interior would be directed, to
fix this point astronomically, to unite the small islands and various other
points in a small triangulation scheme and to demarcate the boundary in its
small deflection near the coast. All this was completed by the end of May
1926, when we returned to Kismayu. My companions then proceeded to Dif,

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THE WORK OF THE JUBALAND BOUNDARY COMMISSION 427

where they resumed work. I, unfortunately, was put out of action for some
time by ill health, and was unable to join headquarters before July 13, when I
found the situation as follows: The British non-commissioned officers had

completed survey and demarcation to a point roo kilometres south of El Wak,
and had then betaken themselves to Dif some days in advance of headquarters
for economic reasons. About 90 per cent. of the camels had died, and Captain
Erskine was still struggling with the replacement problem. Captain Clifford,
in conjunction with the Italians, had fixed a control point. Lieutenant Holmes

had relieved Lieutenant Watson in command of the escort.
It was then decided that the British Mission should fix a control point
where their non-commissioned officers had interrupted their work, that survey
and demarcation should be continued thence southwards by this latter party,
and that the Italian Mission should survey and demarcate northwards and

southwards of Dif with two field parties. These decisions were then put into
operation.
As soon as the two parties working north of Dif had joined hands , the
Italians accepted responsibility for demarcation and survey southwards as far

as Zero Cinquanta, whilst the British were to complete the line from that
point to the sea.
Based now on Tabda, the British fixed the Liboi point alone, the Guloli
point in conjunction with the Italians, and the Dambala point alone. The
non-commissioned officers, who had been filling in time with a little work

on the line at Guloli, were then put in at this last-mentioned point and
started working towards Zero Cinquanta.
At this period the transport question began to assume the difficulties that
had been predicted, our camels dying at the rate of approximately one per
diem owing to infection by "baa!" fly. The water question was also becoming

somewhat alarming as the local rain pools were reduced almost to mud, and
the "short" rains, which were long overdue, threatened to fail completely.
Tow ards the end of October the two headquarter parties assembled at Zero
Cinquanta, and by November 5 this important control point was jointly
fixed. From this date immediate contact with the Italian Mission was lost

untilthe end of their field activities.
The British headquarters remained at Zero Cinquanta until their demarca­
tion party had closed on that point. Both parties then moved south-east, the
former proceeding to the Italian post of Wama Idu, where a base had now

been formed, and the latter cutting from Dambala towards the sea. The rains
had now broken, and the flat parched land became a veritable morass, thus
rendering the supply duties, with rapidly disappearing camel transport,
increasingly difficult.
Abreast of Wama Idu the nature of the vegetation changed completely, the

normal Jubaland bush giving place to occasional large grassy expanses. In
such instances the "cut" was not considered to be sufficiently impressive and
was therefore supplemented by intervisible cement pillars.
At this time Lieutenant Holmes, the escort officer, very kindly volunteered
to proceed to Lamu, there to recruit labour, himself start a fresh No. 2

demarcation party working from the coaat, and at the same time to replenish
the labour suitable for No. I demarcation party. This proposal I gratefully

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428 THE WORK OF THE JUBALAND BOUNDARY COMMISSION

accepted, and after receiving instruction for a few hours in the use of a
theodolite, Lieutenant Holmes started on his special mission. Meanwhile
the British headquarters proceeded to "cut-head" and there, alone, fixed the
control point Did Sanga.
Since many tales were current as to the inhospitable nature of the country

ahead, Captain Erskine set out on a reconnaissance from this camp, and after
working his way with a compass through almost impenetrable bush, he joined
hands with Lieutenant Holmes, who was well started on his task of demarca­
tion, and returned to camp on Christmas Day with most valuable information,
including traverse sketches. The report which was credited by the native

staff that there existed a dense forest, harbouring masses ferocious elephants
and buffalo, was apparently mythical, though the vegetation was certainly
very much thicker than had been experienced hitherto, and contained patches
of trees of considerable girth.
On December 30 I quitted the field party in order to confer with Major

Napolitano at Kismayu, and left the conduct ofthe technical work in the hands
of Captain Clifford: the supply, transport, political and other services being
under Captain Erskine as hitherto. Mr. Kane quitted the field at the same
time, as his most admirable work in connection with wireless reception was
now completed.

Major Napolitano reported that the Italian demarcation party had reached
Zero Cinquanta on December 12, that the whole Mission had then returned
to Kismayu, that Captains Marino and Bertacchi had sailed for Europe in
January, and that he was due to follow them on February 9· It was then
arranged that the Commission should reassemble in Florence early in May

1927.
On February 3 I took steamer to Lamu, whence I proceeded immediately to
Kiamboni in order to establish touch with my field parties. I found that
Lieutenant Holmes of the escort had cut 17kilometres of the boundary, un­
assisted by any other Europeans, and that he had held his direction with
accuracy, the whole constituting a performanc e of great merit. Th e direct

result of this officer's action was a saving of approximately one monthin the
duration of the work. On February 10 the junction between the two working
parties was effected, and on February 18 I dispatched a telegram to the
Governor of Kenya to the effect that the boundary was then completely
demarcated.

The evacuation of personnel and stores to Kiamboni was effected by
February 24. This was mainly by porter transport, as, owing to disease, less
than twelve very weak camels remained out of some 250. Lamu was reached
by dhow on February 25.
From February 25 to the dates of sailing in early April the Mission busied

itself inLamu, Mombasa, and Nairobi with sales, packing, accounts, etc.,
and with the preparation of tracings of such portions of the boundary survey
as were effectedby itself. The British non-commissioned officers sailed from
Mombasa on 2 April 1927, and thus concluded their labours with the Com­
mission. Four days later Captains Clifford and Erskine and I set sail from

the same port for Italy.
On April 28 the Commission resumed its duties in Florence, and as the

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Jirma

Water-pits, Baghtili, Mada Marodi

Boundary pillar on coast, south of Ras Kiamboni, and islets of Dhiwa
Dhamashaka

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THE WORK OF THE JUBALAND BOUNDARY COMMISSION 429

majority of its members were at this time accredited to the Senior Com­
mission also, they found themselves confronted mainly with political business.

Of boundary work there was little more to occupy us beyond the plotting of
the Italian field work and the reproduction ofthe final map. General Vacchelli
very kindly accommodated us all in the Istituto Geografico Militare, of which
he is the Chief, and our grateful thanks are due to him for this courtesy and
for undertaking all the processes of reproduction from the fair drawing to the

final printing of the map.
The end of my narrative appears to be a fitting place to say that our rela­
tions with the Italians were of the most friendly, and in some cases almost
affectionate, nature. It would take much to efface the memory of the im­

partiality and friendship of H.E. Signor Zoli both in Africa and Italy, the
kindness and hospitality extended to us by the Officers'Club in Kismayu, by
Lieut.-Col. Costa at Serenli, by the Marchese della Stufa at the humble
station of El Beru, and by the administrative officers of Afmadu. Within the
Commission we were the happiest offamilies, free from the usual international

suspicions, and it would be a sad day for me were I to know that I would not
see every one of these good friends again.
Finally, I would say a word regarding the help afforded to the Commission
by our own people. In Kenya I found most ready assistance everywhere, but

there were certain individuals who added a large measure of personal interest
and friendship to what might otherwise be considered as a duty. My friends
of olden days in the Survey Department, Mr. Baker and his staff officer Mr.
Williams, did not always wait to be asked but often sought ways in which
they might help us. Captain Mahoney at Wajer, well-nigh swamped with

work due to the coming change of administration, dreaded the approach of the
Commission, and yet when we materialized he was most open-handed in his
hospitality and general help. Captain Legge, and later Mr. Pease, at Madera
made us thoroughly realize that to help us was a real pleasure. Mr. Platts was

of very material assistance to us over the question of labour in the later stages
of the work, and he and his wife extended to us the first hospitality of real
civilization whilst we were winding up affairs in Lamu. Mr . Doherty in his
capacity as Government Coast Agent at Mombasa must have thought un­
kindly of us on many occasions, as we threw a very heavy burden upon him

with respect to general agency services. Lastly I mention mygood friend Mr.
Dick, the whilom British Consul at Kismayu, who most willingly, and quite
outside the call of his office,performed most laborious duties for us, and who
ever held the doors of his bungalow at Halwalud wide open to any member
of the Commission. As regards the members of my staff on the Commission,

I would like to give full rein to my praise, but let it .sufficethat one and all
gave of their very best under most trying conditions, .and by their excellent
team work and unfailing loyalty brought to a successful issue a small task in
the interests of Empire.

APPENDIX A. TRANSPORT AND LABO'UR
Two main supply bases were established, at Wajer and Kismayu, and the

linesofcommunication connecting these with the civilized world and also with
the advan ced bases, are shown on the map . Connection betw .een the advanced
bases and the field working parties was effected by c;;tme•!.Europeans were

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430 THE WORK OF THE JUBALAND BOUNDARY COMMISSION

mounted on mules whenever possible, but this was rarely the case when

actually in the "cut," owing to the water shortage.
Owing to the insufficiency of camels in the Wajer District, permission was
obtained for purchases to be made at Serenli to the extent of 100. At a later
date the full complement of 250 and replacements had to be made good from

the very scanty supply available in Kenya. A camel troop comprised so beasts
in the charge of two Lance-Naiks, and each syce was responsible for three
camels.
In the north animal mortality was very light, but directly the south ern area

was reached and the baal fly season began, deaths amongst the camels that had
to be kept in the infected zone developed enormously and eventually resulted in
the almost complete extinction of our animal transport. In the last stages of
boundary demarcation a tsetse belt was encountered, and this caused the deaths

of the remaining riding-mules, which had necessarily been converted into
baggage animals some time previously, and of the two donkeys which had been
bought in an effort to save the situation . The final extraction of the working
parties was actually effected by the nati ves who had been cutting the boundary.

As regards labour ers, the greatest difficulty was experience d in inducing any
of the Bantu tribes to leave their comfortable well-watered lands and to face the
waterless regions of Jubaland and the hostile and aggressive Somali tribes, of
which they lived in constant fear. The Somalis themselves, who overran the

whole territory, were far too proud to undertake any sort of job entailing manual
labour. The first consignment of about twenty-five men was enlisted in Nairobi,
chiefly from "corner" boys, as the better class of native preferred the higher
wages to be obtained on shooti ng expeditions . However, a course of regular

work combined with good feeding and strict discipline changed a somewhat
miserable-looking gang into a cheerful, contented, and well-developed brother­
hood of hard workers . After a year of continuous employment this gang was
relieved by another, recruited by Mr. Platts, the District Commissioner at
Lamu, which served for the remaining six months of the field work. Fresh

drafts were added towards the end of operations, thanks again to the kind ser­
vices of :Mr. Platts, assisted by my escort officer, LieutenantHolmes.
As special police, eight members of the Jubaland Arm ed Constabulary
(Somalis) were retained on disbandment of that corps. This small body proved

itself most efficient , well disciplined, and trustworthy . They were used for
policing the camp and for making small purchases of livestock for both food
and transport.
It was deemed exped ient, for many reasons, but largely on account of the

doubtful attitude of the local tribes, to clothe the entire native staff in uniform,
and to place them under strict military discipline. All N.C.O. syces bore arms.

APPENDIX B. SURVEY INSTRUMENTS
The wireless receiving set was specially arranged by the Marconi Company

at the shortest of notice and served its purpose most admirab ly. The details of
the set were as follows : A four-valve long-wave heterodyne receiver of range
1o,ooo-2s,ooo m. Two transformers were of ratios I to 6 and Ito 7 respectively.
Condenser was of o·oox mfd. value. The set was mounted in a strong teak box,

21 in. X12 in. X 12 in., of total weight 20 lbs.
The valves used were "Weco" with American type base, manufactured by the
Western Electric Co., Ltd., now the Standard Telephones and Cab les, Ltd.
They were found very satisfactory, and owing to the small consumption of cur ­

rent (0"25 amp.) highly suitable for working off dry cells. They are very robust,
and being small are easily packed for transport.

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THE WORK OF THE JUBALAND BOUNDARY COMMISSION 431

The headphones (Sterling 4000 ohms), supplied by the Marconiphone Co.,
Ltd., were entirely satisfactory.
Messrs. Siemens Bros. & Co.'s Type No. 53 Inert Cell gave satisfactory

results for filament batteries, but did not stand up well to the roughness of camel
transport. It was frequently found that the positive element inside the cell was
broken.
Smaller cells by the same firm, Type No. 53, were found to be excellent, and
were also used for theodolite diaphragm illumination and for azimuth lamps.

They are very light and therefore easily transported, even by porter.
Silvertown I.J.Inert Cells, supplied by the India Rubber, Gutta Percha, and
Telegraph Works Co., Ltd., were used for high-tension batteries and stood up
well to the work and conditions.
The aerial used was 100 feet of 7-strand bare copper wire, with a lead in of

20 feet.
A zo-feet ash mast, in two 10-feet sections, was used during the first six
months, but had to be abandoned to relieve the transport.
The earth terminal was connected to a 3-feet copper tube driven into the
ground a few feet from the receiver .

The chronometer was by Thomas Mercer, a special type, non-swinging, with
a microphone arrangement by means of which the half-second ticks were made
audible in an ordinary headphone. Although this timepiece did not exhibit a
very good rate, it served its purpose most admirably and was largely responsible
for the good results obtained in longitude determinations.

The chief theodolite, which was used almost entirely for astronomical work,
was an 8-inch micrometer type, by Troughton & Simms. Mr. A. G. Baker , the
Director of Surveys of Kenya, very kindly lent me this instrument, but I am
afraid I cannot give it a very good character, as the trunnion supports had spread
and caused us much trouble.

The remaining instruments and also the camp equipment were of types to be
found on any normal survey expedition, and I do not propose to occupy time
in a description of them.

APPENDIX C. SURVEY AND DEMARCATION

The control of the boundary survey was based primarily on determination
of position and of azimuth effected astronomically in combination with wireless
time signals. These fixations rarely occurred actually on the boundary-line, but
were connected thereto either by a traverse or by a small local system of

triangulation. Subsidiary control was provided by surface measur ements along
the boundary-line adjusted between main control points, direction being
maintained by means of a tracing theodolite . The value of a control point was
much enhanced if its fixation was effected in advance of demarcation.
When the British and Italian Missions co-operated in fixing a point their

camps were wit hin reasonable distance of each other, and the comparisons of
their results were made by means of short theodolite traverses.
All British latitudes were measured by the circummeridian method, time by
east and west stars, and azimuths by altitudes of stars on or near the prime
vertical. Longitudes were obtained by the ordinary relative method, i.e.the

difference between the chronometer errors on local and Greenwich times at the
same epoch .
The night's programme was generally so arranged that the result s of the
time observations when meaned gave the chronometer error exactly at the epoc h
of wireless compa risons, thus obviating the necessity <;>cfonsidering the rate of
the chronometer.

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432 THE WORK OF THE JUBALAND BOUNDARY COMMISSION

The method of measurement of chronometer times during a time observation
was possibly original. The chronometer stood on the booker's table. The
observer wore a headphone by means of which the chronometer beats were
brought to his ear, and he was thus able to measure the time of the star's passage
as well as its altitude, though the responsibility was shared to a certain extent

by the booker. The procedure was as follows: Shortly before contact the
observer gave the warning "stand by," and, slightly later, " time." The booker
then called out the values of three successive second beats as z, 3, 4, or 9,10, 1,
never calling a higher value than 10. The observer, having picked up the beat

value, conti nued the count himself, recommencing at I if he should have
occasion to pass 10. Immediately after contact he called his time to the booker
to the nearest decimal of a second. It was the job of the booker to watch the
chronometer so that he could complete the value called by the observer, with

regard to the particular group of 10 seconds in which it fell and also with regard
to the correct minute.
Wireless telegraphy was employed primarily for the reception of the long­
wave time signals, but also for press, and latterly for the interception of tele­

grams addressed to the Commission.
The time signals employed throughout were the rhythmic series of Paris
Observatory transmitted by Bordeaux (LY). These fitted in very conveniently
at about zz h. 30 L.M.T., in the middle of astronomical observations, while

the morning signals provided a most convenient check on the chronometer.
These were also the strongest signals emitted from any station.
The series transmitted by Lyon (YN) were tried several times in 1925, but
were weaker. They were discontinued in 1926. Tho se from Nauen (POZ) were

also tried, but were inconvenient, as at 14 h. 30 L.M.T. interferenc e from
atmospherics was often considerable, and by 2 h. 30 astronomical work was long
since completed.
The new procedure introduced by Paris Observatory in 1926 was a marked

improvement on the former system. Reception and comparisons were facili­
tated, while computations were considerably simplified.
In the earlier stages of the work time signals were taken in the operator 's tent,
but as this involved carrying the chronometer backwards and forwards from

the astronomical station in the middle of the observations, a IOo-feet headphone
lead was later utilized to enable the signals to be received at the booker's table
without moving the chronometer.
Atmospherics were less of an obstacle than had been expected. On only one

occasion did they pre vent the reception of the time signals. They were at their
worst about a month prior to the breaking of each rainy season, but once the
rains had broken there was no serious interferenc e. From 14 h. to zz h. L.M.T.
was the worst period of the day, after which atmospherics gradually died off

until at 2 h. 30 L.M.T. they were almost nil.
Rugby annoyed us excessively by sending out press at 2 0 h. G.M.T. Until
the rhythmic beats of the time signal from Bordeaux started, Rugby was silent,
but simultaneously with the start of the beats Rugby opened up, and, owing to
its power and the insufficient difference in wave-length, could not be eliminated,

tuning out at such a period not bein g feasible with our receiving set.
As I have already stated, the wireless comparisons were effected by means of
the rhythmic series of signals emitted from Paris Observatory via Bordeaux.
With the apparatus at our disposal we were able to bring the Paris signals into

one ear-piece of a headph one and the local chronometer ticks into the other,
thus rendering the record ing of synchronizations an easy matter.
As regards the results of our fixing of control points, interest will naturally

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THE WORK OF THE JUBALAND BOUNDARY COMMISSION 433

focus on the determinations of longitude. Twelve points were fixed, astro­
nomically, on the line (vide the map). The mean number of independent British

values obtained at a station was 3, and the mean extreme range at any one station
was oo·26s. The Italians co-operated in fixing seven of these stations, the
greatest discrepancy between their values and ours being 21 Ifeet, the least 5
feet, and the average 54 feet. Each longitwile value depended on eight observa­

tions for time; four before and four after reception of time signals. Captain
Clifford and I shared the observing and booking about equally, but the respon­
sibility for each individual value of the longitude was not divided.
I will now discuss the processes of demarcation and survey simultaneously.

The progress of the party responsible for these two duties I have already related
in my general narrative. The actual line was driven by theodolite with the
greatest care. In view of the fact that the main control points were fixed
astronomically, it could not be expected that two demarcation parties approach­
ing each other from opposite directions should exactly meet without some final

adjustment of direction. The procedure generally adopted was as follows:
When the two parties were separated by about 8 kilometres, a Verey Light
was fired at night from one of the "cut heads" and was observed through a
theodolite set over one of the alignment pickets near the other "cut head."

Then, on the assumption that both parties had been preserving the correct
azimuth, both directions were equally deflected in accordance with the angle
observed with the theodolite. This procedure was repeated when the "cut
heads" were about 4 kilometres apart. The final adjustments were made in one

or more corrections based on observations to a flag on a tall pole.
l\!Ieasurements along the boundary -line were all surface measurements,
effected with an ordinary steel tape. All crossings of tracks were noted in
passage, and these served as a control to the topographical work.
The ordinary compass sound and wheel traverses were adopted in the first

instance for surveying tracks and other detail. These traverses when plotted
were adjusted to fit control points. The British non-commissioned officers,
however, soon developed a system which tended to greater speed. They first
trained themselves to a uniform rate of walking, and then by experiment estab­

lished a time scale which automatically absorbed the increased length of each
leg due to curves met on the track, and allowed them to plot direct on to the
field sheets. It was found that the normal traverses fitted the control work
without further correction.

The form lines defining the relief of the country were based on barometric
heights, corrections being taken from a table prepared by the non-commissioned
officers after careful observation of the diurnal wave.
Plane-tabling could not be adopted except in the hilly country towards the

north and on the coastal belt, the fiat plains elsewhere rendering it quite
inapplicable.
The total length of the boundary is 681 km. Of this 407 km .were demarcated
by the British Mission and the remaining 274 km. by the Italian Mission. Each
mission made a topographical survey along those portions of the boundary

which it demarcated.
The lane which was cut throughout the length of the boundary was approxi­
mately 12 feet broad and clear of all loose brushwood, but, in the first instance,
was not cleared of stumps. However, since the departure of the Commission
from Africa, much of this lane has been adapted to a motor road. In addition to

cutting the lane, the demarcation parties distributed pillars and cairns through­
out its length. Main pillars were built at both terminals of the boundary, at all
pivotal points, and at approximately every intermediate interval of 30 kilometres.
2 F

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434 THE WORK OF THE JUBALAND BOUNDARY COMMISSION

These were numbered consecutively from the north. Each pivotal pillar was
furnished with two small pointer pillars, one set in each directioof the

boundary. One large cairn was built where the boundary passes the flank of
Finne. Small cairns and pillars were built at approximately e10rkilometres
and elsewhere to accentuate the boundary where it crosses tracks of any im­
portance and also where it crosses grassland in which the lane becomes ill
defined. The map produced by the Commission shows the particular type of

beacon used in each instance.
In the north the pillars were built of rough stone set in cement, but in the
south they were rendered more shapely by building them within a wooden
mould. In some cases the cores had to be made of tree-trunks and even of
bottles owing to the absence of stone.

The spelling of place-names for the Boundary Map presented a problem that
was not settled for some time, as the Italians are not familiar with the R.G.S. II.
system, and Italian spelling would ·be meaningless, or even misleading, to most
British officials. The problem was rendered more intricate by the fact that five

different languages were involved. It was ultimately decided that for the names
of places lying in British territory the R.G.S. II. system should be used, and
Italian spelling for those in Italian territory; while important localities, such as
El Wak, lying astride the boundary, should be given in both methods. This
decision, carrying with it the preparation of a gazetteer, entailed an enormous

amount of work on the part of Captains Erskine and Clifford.
The following are some examples of divergence between the two systems of
spellings:
R.G.S. II.
Italian.
BAKAJA OBE BACCHEG OBBE
BUBUSH BUB USC
DHIWA DHAMASHAKA DIUA DAMASCIACA

GHAIYAG HAI-IAGH
GHAWL HOHL
JINJILI GIENGIOLE
KITUNGENI CHITUNGHENI
NYURA GNIURA

YAQALI IACLE

Note by Captain C#fford.

The river name which we have spelled Daua is given in the First List of
Names in Abyssinia, published by the P.C.G.N. as Dawa, pronounced Ddwa,
with the warning" not Daua." This pronunciation is certainly not correct near
the Kenya frontier. The name is pronounced as the first two syllables in

"dowager," the second being nearly mute, and should by the P.C.G.l'll: rules
be Daua. It inay not be an Abyssinian word.
The present inhabitants of the area between the Juba and the river in ques­
tion-i.e. north of the latter-are Somalis, but they are of course compara­
tively new-comers, having displaced Galla tribes. However, many of the place­

names in that part of the world are Somali, not Galla.
We got our names into shape by means of a Committee, consisting of two
officers (one of whom knows a little Somali), cross-examiningan assortment
of natives selected from varying tribes and sections, and including Somalis
from British Somaliland. For pronunciation we went by the local people, pro­

vided the various tribes and sections agreed, and then followed a discussion of
the language and meaning of the name until all were agreed. In this way we

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsAnnex 81

NOTES ON JUBALAND 435

took advantage of tribal jealousies-agreement would not be reached unless
the statements were correct.
"Webi," is certainly Somali, possibly a dialect. But it is a word one fre­
quently meets, e.g.Webi Shebelli, the main source of irrigation of Italian
Somaliland, which means "the river of the place of leopards." "Daua," as far
as I can recollect, was not quite "Look at it," but perhaps rather "Look," or

"Behold." This is also perhaps a dialect, but was emphatically stated to be
Somali. The Somali language has plenty of dialects.

NOTES ON JUBALAND: Read in part at the Meeting of 7 May I928

with the precedingpaper, by
CAPTAIN E. H. M. CLIFFORD, M.C., R.E.

HE outstanding characteristic of the topography of Jubaland is its
T featureless flatness. At Dolo, where theJuba leaves Abyssinia on latitude

4° 10' N., the altitude is only just over 200m., though the mouth of the Juba
is on latitude o 15' S. The greater part of the country is covered with thorn
bush, on the average about II to 12 feet high.
To consider the country in greater detail. At Maika Rie on the Webi Daua

the altitude is about 300 m. Proceeding southwards we climb gradually
through Gogal until reaching the northern escarpment of the Dirhara plateau,
the western edge of which coincides with the boundary, and along which lie
the highest points-about 7oom. altitude. We then drop gently until reaching
the southern escarpment which takes us down from 500 m. to 300 m. In this

zone, just in British territory, lies Bur Wein, probably the highest hill in the
country, 825 m. This escarpment is quite rugged, though covered with
dense thorn bush.
We now reach the plain of Central Jubaland, very gently undulating. As we
progress southwards, we see less and less camelthorn and the bush is generally
0
less dense. About I N. we meet a new feature, a "lak" or watercourse-dry,
of course, except after heavy rain-in the bed of which the vegetation is
denser, but of a sappy nature and mixed with long grass.
The Lak Dera basin runs roughly east and west about 0° 30' N. through
a zone of open spaces. This watercourse is shown on the map quite rightly as

an important water feature; but water ran in it in the summer of 1926 for the
first time for twenty-two years. Its course is shown entirely incorrectly on
hitherto existing maps.
South of the Lak Dera on the British side is Rama Guda, uninhabited and
feared by all natives as a veritable " land of thirst."

About 0° so' S. we enter another zone of open country, park-like and
traversed by a number of "laks," some open, some bush-covered, ending
abruptly at a belt of extremely dense sappy forest known as the Bada. In the
middle of this is a gap, in which lies the Durnford River of the older maps,
actually a well-defined watercourse whose only name is the Lak. The Bada

gradually gives place to a forest of "bean trees," which in turn yields to thorn
bush on reaching the coastal hills. These rise to about 6o m. and are some
10 km. across.

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Annex 82

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, International Boundary Study
No. 134: Kenya-Somalia Boundary (14 May 1973)International Boundary Study

No. 134 – May 14, 1973

Kenya – Somalia
Boundary

(Country Codes: KE-SO)

The Geographer
Bureau of Intelligence and Research Annex 82

International Boundary Study

No. 134 – May 14, 1973

Kenya – Somalia
Boundary

(Country Codes: KE-SO)

The Geographer
Office of the Geographer
Bureau of Intelligence and ResearchAnnex 82

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY STUDY

No. 134

KENYA – SOMALIA BOUNDARY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. Boundary Brief...............................................................2

II. Historical Background................................................. 2

III. Alignment........................................................................6

APPENDIX
Documentation ................................................9..................1

The Geographer
Office of the Geographer
Bureau of Intelligence and Research INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY STUDY

No. 134

KENYA – SOMALIA BOUNDARY The Kenya - Somalia boundary is about 424 miles long. In the north the tripoint wit
Ethiopia is located on the thalweg of the Daua, and in the south the boundary extends
to the Indian Ocean. It is demarcated by boundary pillars and consists o
TABLE OF CONTENTS straight-line segments.

Page

I. Boundary Brief...............................................................2
Initially the Kenya - Somalia boundary delimited British and Italian spheres of influence
II. Historical Background................................................. 2 in East Africa between the Indian Ocean and the Daua (Daua Parma, Dawa). In 1887
the British East Africa Association was formed for the development of the British sphere
III. Alignment........................................................................6 of influence, and it obtained a concession from the Sultan of Zanzibar fo
mainland territories. During the following year the Association was incorporated under a

Royal charter as the Imperial British East Africa Company, and it assumed
APPENDIX large area now included in the presentd
Documentation .................................................9.................1
Also in 1887 the military forces of Italy and Ethiopia clashed at Dogali, which resu
the treaty of Wichale (Ucciali) the following year. Almost immediately
treaty were a source of disagreement between the two states. Italy considered Ethiopia
to be an Italian protectorate, and that it had the right to administer Ethiopian for

policy. Ethiopia interpreted the treaty to mean that the Emperor could request Italian
advice and help in foreign affairs if he so desired.

Beginning in 1889, through a number of treaties of protection with the Somalis, Italy
made various claims to the coast of Somalia along the Indian Ocean. In addition the
Imperial British East Africa Company sublet the ports of the southern Benadir Coast
north of the Giuba to Italy, ports which it held in lease from the Sultan of Zanzibar. In

1891, Italy, acting in the role of protector of Ethiopia in accordance wi▯ th its interpretation
of the treaty of Wichale (Ucciali), reached an agreement with the United Kingdom on
their respective spheres. An Anglo - Italian treaty signed at Rome on March 24 of this
year delimited a boundary as follows:

1. The line of demarcation in Eastern Africa between the spheres of infl▯ uence

respectively reserved to Great Britain and Italy shall fol low from the sea the mid-
channel (thalweg) of the River Jube [Giuba] up to latitude 6° north, Kismayn
[Chisimayu] with its territory on the right bank of the river thus remain
England.

In 1892 the Sultan of Zanzibar ceded the ports of Brava, Merca, Mogadiscio, and
Uarsciech (Warsheikh) to Italy for 25 years subject to a fixed annual r

years later Italy purchased the ports from the Sultan. During 1895 the administration of
Kenya was transferred to the British Crown, and the entity b ecame known as the East

The Geographer
Office of the Geographer
Bureau of Intelligence and ResearchAnnex 82

African Protectorate. In 1896, following a second clash between Ethiopia ▯ and Italian
forces, the two states signed a peace treaty which officially annulled th ▯ e treaty of
1
Wichale. On June 24, 1897, the Menelik - Nerazzini treaty a ttempted to draw a
definitive boundary between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. The boundar ▯ y was to be
determined by a line drawn on a map by Emperor Menelik between British So ▯ maliland
and the cataracts of Van der Decken on the Giuba immediately north of Bardera.
Shortly thereafter, with both states using different terms of reference f ▯ or the location of

the line, the alignment of the boundary became a source of dispute between Ethiopia
and Italy. An Anglo - Ethiopian agreement of December 6, 1907, establ ished a
boundary between the East African Protectorate and Ethiopia, which on the east started
at the confluence of the Daua and Ganale - Dorya. The following year, on May 16,
1908, an Ethiopian - Italian treaty afforded a new boundary between Ethiopia and Italian

Somaliland which extended northeastward from Dolo, located at the confluence of the
Daua and Ganale - Dorya, and British Somaliland. In June 1920 the East Africa
Protectorate became Kenya colony and the coastal strip leased from the Su ▯ ltan of
Zanzibar became the protectorate of Kenya. 2

Italian Somaliland was expanded by the Anglo - Italian treaty of July 15, 1924, under
which an estimated 36,000 square miles of Kenya territory, commonly called Jubaland
or Trans-Juba, was ceded to Italy in 1925 i n accordance with an undertaking started in
World War I. Jubaland was administered by Italy as a separate colony for ▯ one year and
then incorporated into Italian Somaliland in 1926. Article 1 of the trea ▯ ty describes the
3
boundary as follows:

From the confluence of the rivers Ganale [Ganale - Dorya] and Daua, along the
course of the Daua up-stream to the southern point of the small southerly bend of

the latter river in the vicinity of Malka Re [Malca Rie]; thence in a sou ▯ th- westerly
direction in a straight line to the centre of the pool of Dumasa [Damasa]; thence
in a south-westerly direction in a straight line towards Eilla Kalla (which remains
in British territory) to such meridian east of Greenwich as shall leave▯ in Italian
territory the well of El Beru [El Beru Hagia]; thence along the same meridian

southwards until it reaches the boundary between the provinces of Jubalan ▯ d and
Tanaland; thence along the provincial boundary to a point due north of th ▯ e point
on the coast due west of the southernmost of the four islets in the immediate
vicinity of Ras Kiambone (Dick's Head); thence due southwards to such p ▯ oint on

1
Nerazzini of Italy.alled because it was negotiated by Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia and Major
2
The Kenya protectorate comprised the mainland holdings of the Sult▯ anzibar, in respect of which
an annuity of 16,000 pounds per annum was paid to His Highness for their▯ lease by the British. With an
area of slightly less than 2,000 square miles, it consisted of a strip of▯ land extending 10 sea miles inland
along the coast of the Indian Ocean between Tanganyika and the northern branch of the Tana river,
including the islands of the Lamu archipelago (Lamu, Manda, and Patta).▯ The original concession was
made in 1887 to a company later called the Imperial British East▯ ompany; however, the
administration of the strip was transferred to Her Majesty's Govern▯ 895. The territory was
3 ceded by the Sultan to Kenya at the time the state became independent in▯ 1963.
The Kenya - Somalia boundary is sometimes referred to as the Milner - Scialoja line. Lord Milner of the
United Kingdom and Senatore Scialoja of Italy were the principal negotiat▯ ors of the boundary in 1920.

Page 3African Protectorate. In 1896, following a second clash between Ethiopia ▯ and Italian
forces, the two states signed a peace treaty which officially annulled th ▯ e treaty of
1
Wichale. On June 24, 1897, the Menelik - Nerazzini treaty a ttempted to draw a
definitive boundary between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. The boundar ▯ y was to be
determined by a line drawn on a map by Emperor Menelik between British So ▯ maliland
and the cataracts of Van der Decken on the Giuba immediately north of Bardera.
Shortly thereafter, with both states using different terms of reference f ▯ or the location of

the line, the alignment of the boundary became a source of dispute between Ethiopia
and Italy. An Anglo - Ethiopian agreement of December 6, 1907, establ ished a
boundary between the East African Protectorate and Ethiopia, which on the east started
at the confluence of the Daua and Ganale - Dorya. The following year, on May 16,
1908, an Ethiopian - Italian treaty afforded a new boundary between Ethiopia and Italian

Somaliland which extended northeastward from Dolo, located at the confluence of the
Daua and Ganale - Dorya, and British Somaliland. In June 1920 the East Africa
Protectorate became Kenya colony and the coastal strip leased from the Su ▯ ltan of
Zanzibar became the protectorate of Kenya. 2

Italian Somaliland was expanded by the Anglo - Italian treaty of July 15, 1924, under
which an estimated 36,000 square miles of Kenya territory, commonly called Jubaland
or Trans-Juba, was ceded to Italy in 1925 i n accordance with an undertaking started in
World War I. Jubaland was administered by Italy as a separate colony for ▯ one year and
then incorporated into Italian Somaliland in 1926. Article 1 of the trea ▯ ty describes the
3
boundary as follows:

From the confluence of the rivers Ganale [Ganale - Dorya] and Daua, along the
course of the Daua up-stream to the southern point of the small southerly bend of

the latter river in the vicinity of Malka Re [Malca Rie]; thence in a sou ▯ th- westerly
direction in a straight line to the centre of the pool of Dumasa [Damasa]; thence
in a south-westerly direction in a straight line towards Eilla Kalla (which remains
in British territory) to such meridian east of Greenwich as shall leave▯ in Italian
territory the well of El Beru [El Beru Hagia]; thence along the same meridian

southwards until it reaches the boundary between the provinces of Jubalan ▯ d and
Tanaland; thence along the provincial boundary to a point due north of th ▯ e point
on the coast due west of the southernmost of the four islets in the immediate
vicinity of Ras Kiambone (Dick's Head); thence due southwards to such p ▯ oint on

1
Nerazzini of Italy.alled because it was negotiated by Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia and Major
2
The Kenya protectorate comprised the mainland holdings of the Sult▯ anzibar, in respect of which
an annuity of 16,000 pounds per annum was paid to His Highness for their▯ lease by the British. With an
area of slightly less than 2,000 square miles, it consisted of a strip of▯ land extending 10 sea miles inland
along the coast of the Indian Ocean between Tanganyika and the northern branch of the Tana river,
including the islands of the Lamu archipelago (Lamu, Manda, and Patta).▯ The original concession was
made in 1887 to a company later called the Imperial British Eas▯ ompany; however, the
administration of the strip was transferred to Her Majesty's Gover▯ 895. The territory was
3 ceded by the Sultan to Kenya at the time the state became independent in▯ 1963.
The Kenya - Somalia boundary is sometimes referred to as the Milner - Scialoja line. Lord Milner of the
United Kingdom and Senatore Scialoja of Italy were the principal negotiat▯ ors of the boundary in 1920.

Page 3Annex 82

accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the Treaty), the boundary shall follow
such meridian southwards to the point of intersection of such meridian wi▯ th the
parallel of South Latitude 0°50'; thence proceeding in a south -easterly direction
to a point situated about six kilometres north of the point on the coast due west of

the southernmost of the four islets in the immediate vicinity of Ras Kiam ▯ bone
(Dick's Head); thence due southwards to such point on the coast. The coast
shall be defined as the line of mean sea level ordinary spring tides."

The Commission declares that the general terms of this formula, since ame ▯ nded
in accordance with the decisions recorded in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of this
Agreement, have been embodied in Appendix I, Description of the Boundary. ▯

5. Ras Chiamboni is a headland about 200 metres in breadth and about 800
metres in length, with its length parallel to the coast. It consists of▯ a series of
small coral eminences. The highest of these is approximately central.

Having been empowered to do so by the two Governments, the Commission

decided that the summit of this highest eminence should be accepted as the
terminal point of the directional line for the boundary towards the interior.

6. Article 1 of the Treaty states that there are 4 isle ts in the immediate vicinity of
Ras Chiamboni.

The Commission found that there are actually 6 islets.

One of these is a prolongation of Ras Chiamboni to the north.

The other 5 form a group about 2 kilometres south- west from the control point of
Ras Chiamboni, and are known collectively as Diua Damasciaca.

The most southerly islet of this group is little more than an almost cir▯ ular coral

rock about 50 metres in diameter.

The Commission, having been empowered to do so by the two Governments,
decided that the parallel of latitude tangential to the southern extremit▯ of this
latter islet should define the position of the point at which the bounda▯ y reaches
the coast.

7. Having been empowered to do so by the two Governments, the Commission
decided that the short portion of the boundary defined in the Treaty by a me ▯ ridian
of longitude in the region of Ras Chiamboni should be moved parallel to i▯ tself in a
westerly direction so that its southern terminal point should be 15 metres inland
from high water mark and on the parallel of latitude mentioned in paragraph 6;
the coastal waters being very shallow and high water mark being defined b ▯ y the

crumbling edge of a sand terrace.

Page 5accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the Treaty), the boundary shall follow
such meridian southwards to the point of intersection of such meridian wi▯ th the
parallel of South Latitude 0°50'; thence proceeding in a south -easterly direction Concurrence was reached on additional points connected with the demarcation of the
to a point situated about six ki lometres north of the point on the coast due west of boundary in an Anglo - Italian agreement of August 27, 1930. The present alignment of

the southernmost of the four islets in the immediate vicinity of Ras Kiam▯ bone the boundary is contained in an exchange of notes between the United King
(Dick's Head); thence due southwards to such point on the coast. The coast Italy, which includes the "Agreement of the Boundary Commission, Appendices, and
shall be defined as the line of mean sea level ordinary spring tides." Map."

The Commission declares that the general terms of this formula, since ame ▯ nded Following the Italian occupation of Ethiopia in 1935
in accordance with the decisions recorded in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of this administered as part of Italian East Africa until World War II. Between▯ 1941 and 1950,
Agreement, have been embodied in Appendix I, Description of the Boundary. ▯ Italian Somaliland was occupied by United Kingdom and other Commonwealth forces.

In 1950 the U.N. Trust Territory of Somaliland (Somalia) was organized▯ and placed
5. Ras Chiamboni is a headland about 200 metres in breadth and about 800 under Italian administration. An independent Somali Republic was proclaimed with the
metres in length, with its length parallel to the coast. It consists of▯ a series of termination of the Trusteeship of Somaliland on July 1, 1960. At the same time Somalia
small coral eminences. The highest of these is approximately central. merged with former British Somaliland (which previously had become indep
June 26, 1960) to form a single state.
Having been empowered to do so by the two Governments, the Commission

decided that the summit of this highest eminence should be accepted as the Kenya was given internal self- government in May 1963 and became independent the
terminal point of the directional line for the boundary towards the interior. following December. Exactly one year after independence, the constitution wa
changed to make Kenya a republic.
6. Article 1 of the Treaty states that there are 4 isle ts in the immediate vicinity of
Ras Chiamboni.

The Commission found that there are actually 6 islets.

The exchange of notes between Italy and the United Kingdom on November 22
One of these is a prolongation of Ras Chiamboni to the north. contains the following alignment of the Kenya

The other 5 form a group about 2 kilometres south- west from the control point of
Ras Chiamboni, and are known collectively as Diua Damasciaca.

The most southerly islet of this group is little more than an almost ci▯ ular coral

rock about 50 metres in diameter.

The Commission, having been empowered to do so by the two Governments,
decided that the parallel of latitude tangential to the southern extremit▯ of this
latter islet should define the position of the point at which the bounda▯ y reaches
the coast.

7. Having been empowered to do so by the two Governments, the Commission
decided that the short portion of the boundary defined in the Treaty by a me ▯ ridian
of longitude in the region of Ras Chiamboni should be moved parallel to i▯ tself in a
westerly direction so that its southern terminal point should be 15 metres inland
from high water mark and on the parallel of latitude mentioned in paragraph 6;
the coastal waters being very shallow and high water mark being defined b ▯ y the

crumbling edge of a sand terrace.

Page 5Annex 82

passes through a point at Dar Es Salam 15 metres inland from High Water M ▯ ark
and due west of the southern extremity of the southernmost of the group of 5
islets known as Diua Damasciaca;

thence due south along this meridian as far as the point at Dar Es Salam▯ defined
above;

thence, in a south-easterly direction, to the limit of territorial waters in a straight
line at right angles to the general trend of the coastline at Dar Es Salam, leaving

the islets of Diua Damasciaca in Italian territory.

Second Part -Detailed Description.

The boundary throughout its length is traced on the ground by a lane
approximately 4 metres wide cut throu gh the vegetation, and is indicated in a

more permanent manner by primary and secondary beacons at intervals, each ▯ of
which will be described hereinafter. The primary beacons have been numbered
consecutively from the north, and these numbers are marked in ordinary arabic
figures on the side of the beacon facing Italian Somaliland and in origin ▯ al arabic
figures on the side facing Kenya.

At each angle of the boundary line there is a masonry or cement primary beacon
together with a supplementary beacon on each side to indicate the directions of
the two boundary lines converging on that point.

For convenience of description the boundary is divided into sections, each
section corresponding with one of the straight portions of the boundary l▯ ine

already defined in the "General Description."

In each section, the lane is cut as nearly as possible in a straight line between its
terminals; but owing to the errors inherent in the methods of survey adop ▯ ted, very
slight deviations from the straight line have inevitbly resulted in certain localities.

All distance quoted hereinafter are reckoned from the northern terminal of the
section concerned, and are correct to 100 metres.

The geographical positions of the points in the frontier zone given in Ap ▯ pendix II
are those actually determined by astronomical and trigonometrical observat ▯ ions.

Normally the position of a control point, where a beacon was subsequently ▯ built,
was fixed before the cut lane reached that point; but the positions of Pr ▯ imary
Beacons Nos. 1 2, 24, 25, 26, 27 were dependent on astronomical observations
made after the lane had been cut and they are thus slightly displaced fro ▯ m the
positions they should occupy.

Page 7passes through a point at Dar Es Salam 15 metres inland from High Water M ▯ ark
and due west of the southern extremity of the southernmost of the group of 5
islets known as Diua Damasciaca;

thence due south along this meridian as far as the point at Dar Es Salam▯ defined
above;

thence, in a south-easterly direction, to the limit of territorial waters in a straight
line at right angles to the general trend of the coastline at Dar Es Salam, leaving

the islets of Diua Damasciaca in Italian territory.

Second Part -Detailed Description.

The boundary throughout its length is traced on the ground by a lane
approximately 4 metres wide cut throu gh the vegetation, and is indicated in a

more permanent manner by primary and secondary beacons at intervals, each ▯ of
which will be described hereinafter. The primary beacons have been numbered
consecutively from the north, and these numbers are marked in ordinary arabic
figures on the side of the beacon facing Italian Somaliland and in origin ▯ al arabic
figures on the side facing Kenya.

At each angle of the boundary line there is a masonry or cement primary beacon
together with a supplementary beacon on each side to indicate the directions of
the two boundary lines converging on that point.

For convenience of description the boundary is divided into sections, each
section corresponding with one of the straight portions of the boundary l▯ ine

already defined in the "General Description."

In each section, the lane is cut as nearly as possible in a straight line between its
terminals; but owing to the errors inherent in the methods of survey adop ▯ ted, very
slight deviations from the straight line have inevitbly resulted in certain localities.

All distance quoted hereinafter are reckoned from the northern terminal of the
section concerned, and are correct to 100 metres.

The geographical positions of the points in the frontier zone given in Ap ▯ pendix II
are those actually determined by astronomical and trigonometrical observat ▯ ions.

Normally the position of a control point, where a beacon was subsequently ▯ built,
was fixed before the cut lane reached that point; but the positions of Pr ▯ imary
Beacons Nos. 1 2, 24, 25, 26, 27 were dependent on astronomical observations
made after the lane had been cut and they are thus slightly displaced fro ▯ m the
positions they should occupy.

Page 7Annex 82

through the cemented masonry Primary Beacon No. 3;

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading southwards from Hu ▯ nduda
in Kenya;

through two secondary cairns astride a branch of the last- mentioned track north
of Bur Gawse, which hill is in Kenya;

through two secondary cairns astride another branch of the same track,
immediately south of Bur Gawse;

through two secondary cairns astride the same track w here it turns away from
the boundary towards Mata Arba in Italian Somaliland;

through a secondary cairn;

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading from Beila Machesa in

Kenya to Mata Arba in Italian Somaliland;

though the area known as Hareri Hawseli;

through a secondary cairn;

through the area known as Hara Gulgula;

through a grave;

through the cemented masonry Primary Beacon No. 4, leaving the hill of Ma ▯ ta
Arba about 9 kilometres in Italian Somaliland;

through two secondary cairns ast ride the track leading from Hafura past Ber

Hawamadi in Kenya to El Uara, which well lies in Italian Somaliland km. 2.1 from
the boundary;

through a secondary cairn;

through two secondary cairns astride the track passing between Finno and▯

Hegali in a south-easterly direction;

through a large Primary Cairn erected on the south- east spur of the hill of Finno,
the summit of which lies in Kenya;

through the cemented masonry Primary Beacon No. 5 and the adjacent
secondary cairn, located astride the track le ading from Hafura in Kenya to Iacle

in Italian Somaliland;

Page 9through the cemented masonry Primary Beacon No. 3;

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading southwards from Hu ▯ nduda
in Kenya;

through two secondary cairns astride a branch of the last- mentioned track north
of Bur Gawse, which hill is in Kenya;

through two secondary cairns astride another branch of the same track,
immediately south of Bur Gawse;

through two secondary cairns astride the same track w here it turns away from
the boundary towards Mata Arba in Italian Somaliland;

through a secondary cairn;

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading from Beila Machesa in

Kenya to Mata Arba in Italian Somaliland;

though the area known as Hareri Hawseli;

through a secondary cairn;

through the area known as Hara Gulgula;

through a grave;

through the cemented masonry Primary Beacon No. 4, leaving the hill of Ma ▯ ta
Arba about 9 kilometres in Italian Somaliland;

through two secondary cairns ast ride the track leading from Hafura past Ber

Hawamadi in Kenya to El Uara, which well lies in Italian Somaliland km. 2.1 from
the boundary;

through a secondary cairn;

through two secondary cairns astride the track passing between Finno and▯

Hegali in a south-easterly direction;

through a large Primary Cairn erected on the south- east spur of the hill of Finno,
the summit of which lies in Kenya;

through the cemented masonry Primary Beacon No. 5 and the adjacent
secondary cairn, located astride the track le ading from Hafura in Kenya to Iacle

in Italian Somaliland;

Page 9Annex 82

through two secondary cairns astride the road from Damasa to El Wak;

through a secondary cairn;

leaving the pool of Avein Nur km. 2.0 in Italian Somaliland;

leaving the pool of Daba km. 0.3 in Italian Somaliland;

through the cemented masonry Primary Beacon No. 7;

through a secondary cairn on the side of the road from Damasa to El Wak at a

point where this road touches, but does not cross, the boundary on the Italian
Somaliland side;

through a secondary cairn;

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading from Jalanto Lango in

Kenya to Uenti Dima km. 1.0 in Italian Somaliland, leaving the pool of Uenti Digo
km. 1.9 in Italian Somaliland;

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading from Arda Dadaja km. 1.0
in Kenya to Uenti Dima, in Italian Somaliland;

through a secondary cairn;

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading from Jaba Kurmama km.
0.8 in Kenya to Uarsesa Raghi km. 3.6 in Italian Somaliland;

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading northwards from Go ▯ lati,
which lies km. 3.0 in Italian Somaliland;

through a cemented masonry pointer beacon to the cemented masonry Primary ▯
Beacon No. 8, leaving El Golija and El Saqo in Kenya km. 2.4 and km. 4.1, ▯
respectively, from this beacon.

Section 3.

From Primary Beacon No. 8

(angle at El Wak) to Primary Beacon No. 23 (Latitude 0°50'00.00" South,
Longitude 40°59'44.34" East of Greenwc i h).

Leaving Primary Beacon No. 8, the boundary passes due south, the alignment
being indicated by a cemented masonry pointer beacon:--

Page 11through two secondary cairns astride the road from Damasa to El Wak;

through a secondary cairn;

leaving the pool of Avein Nur km. 2.0 in Italian Somaliland;

leaving the pool of Daba km. 0.3 in Italian Somaliland;

through the cemented masonry Primary Beacon No. 7;

through a secondary cairn on the side of the road from Damasa to El Wak at a

point where this road touches, but does not cross, the boundary on the Italian
Somaliland side;

through a secondary cairn;

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading from Jalanto Lango in

Kenya to Uenti Dima km. 1.0 in Italian Somaliland, leaving the pool of Uenti Digo
km. 1.9 in Italian Somaliland;

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading from Arda Dadaja km. 1.0
in Kenya to Uenti Dima, in Italian Somaliland;

through a secondary cairn;

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading from Jaba Kurmama km.
0.8 in Kenya to Uarsesa Raghi km. 3.6 in Italian Somaliland;

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading northwards from Go ▯ lati,
which lies km. 3.0 in Italian Somaliland;

through a cemented masonry pointer beacon to the cemented masonry Primary ▯
Beacon No. 8, leaving El Golija and El Saqo in Kenya km. 2.4 and km. 4.1, ▯
respectively, from this beacon.

Section 3.

From Primary Beacon No. 8

(angle at El Wak) to Primary Beacon No. 23 (Latitude 0°50'00.00" South,
Longitude 40°59'44.34" East of Greenwc i h).

Leaving Primary Beacon No. 8, the boundary passes due south, the alignment
being indicated by a cemented masonry pointer beacon:--

Page 11Annex 82

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading from Ramu in Kenya
through Ilalo to Bilaca in Italian Somaliland, leaving the group of wells of Ilalo

about a third of a kilometre in Italian Somaliland;

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading from Al i Golo in Kenya to
Gorgala, which is km. 2.0 in Italian Somaliland, leaving a small pool unnamed
km. 0.2 in Kenya;

through the cemented masonry Primary Beacon No. 11;

through a secondary cairn on the north side of the track leading from El Kura,
which is km. 1.8 in Kenya to Hara Cadera in Italian Somaliland;

through two second cairns astride the track leading from Kura Yeri in Ken ▯ ya to

Hara Cadera in Italian Somaliland;

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading from Kura in Kenya ▯ in a
direction south-south-east;

through a secondary cairn;

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading from Konton in Ken ▯ ya to
Serenli in Italian Somaliland;

through a second cairn and the adjacent cemented masonry Primary Beacon No.
12 located astride the road from Wajer Bor in Kenya to Serenli in Italian

Somaliland, leaving the pool of Dadol km. 0.2 in Kenya;

through a secondary cairn;

leaving two small pools unnamed km. 0.2 in Kenya;

through a small pool unnamed;

through a secondary cairn;

leaving the pools of Bactili about -1/2 kilometres in Italian Somaliland;

through the cemented masonry Primary Beacon No. 13;

through two secondary cairns astride the road leading from Wel Garas, whi▯ ch is
km. 4.4 in Kenya, to Gherille, which is km. 4.9 intaIlian Somaliland;

through a secondary cairn;

Page 13through two secondary cairns astride the track leading from Ramu in Kenya
through Ilalo to Bilaca in Italian Somaliland, leaving the group of wells of Ilalo

about a third of a kilometre in Italian Somaliland;

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading from Al i Golo in Kenya to
Gorgala, which is km. 2.0 in Italian Somaliland, leaving a small pool unnamed
km. 0.2 in Kenya;

through the cemented masonry Primary Beacon No. 11;

through a secondary cairn on the north side of the track leading from El Kura,
which is km. 1.8 in Kenya to Hara Cadera in Italian Somaliland;

through two second cairns astride the track leading from Kura Yeri in Ken ▯ ya to

Hara Cadera in Italian Somaliland;

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading from Kura in Kenya ▯ in a
direction south-south-east;

through a secondary cairn;

through two secondary cairns astride the track leading from Konton in Ken ▯ ya to
Serenli in Italian Somaliland;

through a second cairn and the adjacent cemented masonry Primary Beacon No.
12 located astride the road from Wajer Bor in Kenya to Serenli in Italian

Somaliland, leaving the pool of Dadol km. 0.2 in Kenya;

through a secondary cairn;

leaving two small pools unnamed km. 0.2 in Kenya;

through a small pool unnamed;

through a secondary cairn;

leaving the pools of Bactili about -1/2 kilometres in Italian Somaliland;

through the cemented masonry Primary Beacon No. 13;

through two secondary cairns astride the road leading from Wel Garas, whi▯ ch is
km. 4.4 in Kenya, to Gherille, which is km. 4.9 itaIlian Somaliland;

through a secondary cairn;

Page 13Annex 82

through the cement Primary Beacon No. 18 and the adjacent secondary earth
gabion located astrice the road from Benani in Kenya to Au in Italian Somaliland;

crossing Lak Ghorqani, in which the "bisq" scrub is particularly dense;

crossing Lak Dera;

through a secondary earth gabion and the adjacent cement Primary Beacon N ▯ o.
19, located astride the track leading from Liboi in Kenya to Dobli in ▯ lian
Somaliland;

through a small pool unnamed;

through a secondary earth gabion;

through a secondary earth gabion;

through a secondary earth gabion;

through a cement Primary Beacon No. 20, approximately on the Equator;

through a secondary earth gabion;

through a secondary earth gabion and the adjacent cement Primary Beacon N ▯ o.

21, located astride the track leading in a north- westerly direction from Dib Ul
Chena in Italian Somaliland;

through a secondary earth gabion;

crossing the road leading from Jara Jila, which lies km. 2.6 in Kenya, ▯ Cormale
in Italian Somaliland;

through asecondary earth gabion;

through the area known as Uarrach;

through a secondary earth gabion;

touching the east edge of the pool of Gangesa, which remains entirely in▯ Kenya;

through a secondary earth gabion, leaving the pool of Dubra km. 2.9 in Italian
Somaliland;

through the cement Primary Beacon No. 22 on the south side of the road leading

from War Dod in Kenya to Cauitti in Italian Somaliland, leaving the pool of Bakaja
Obe km. 2.7 in Kenya and that of Corio Cauitti km. 2.3 in Italian Somalil▯ and;

Page 15through the cement Primary Beacon No. 18 and the adjacent secondary earth
gabion located astrice the road from Benani in Kenya to Au in Italian Somaliland;

crossing Lak Ghorqani, in which the "bisq" scrub is particularly dense;

crossing Lak Dera;

through a secondary earth gabion and the adjacent cement Primary Beacon N ▯ o.
19, located astride the track leading from Liboi in Kenya to Dobli in ▯ lian
Somaliland;

through a small pool unnamed;

through a secondary earth gabion;

through a secondary earth gabion;

through a secondary earth gabion;

through a cement Primary Beacon No. 20, approximately on the Equator;

through a secondary earth gabion;

through a secondary earth gabion and the adjacent cement Primary Beacon N ▯ o.

21, located astride the track leading in a north- westerly direction from Dib Ul
Chena in Italian Somaliland;

through a secondary earth gabion;

crossing the road leading from Jara Jila, which lies km. 2.6 in Kenya, ▯ Cormale
in Italian Somaliland;

through asecondary earth gabion;

through the area known as Uarrach;

through a secondary earth gabion;

touching the east edge of the pool of Gangesa, which remains entirely in▯ Kenya;

through a secondary earth gabion, leaving the pool of Dubra km. 2.9 in Italian
Somaliland;

through the cement Primary Beacon No. 22 on the south side of the road leading

from War Dod in Kenya to Cauitti in Italian Somaliland, leaving the pool of Bakaja
Obe km. 2.7 in Kenya and that of Corio Cauitti km. 2.3 in Italian Somalil▯ and;

Page 15Annex 82

through two cement secondary beacons astride the road leading from Dambal▯ a
in Kenya to Cussa in Italian Somaliland;

through two cement secondary beacons astride the track leading from Konoghori

in Kenya to Dola in Italian Somaliland;

through the cement Primary Beacon No. 24;

through a cement secondary beacon opposite the pool of Juma Korke which l▯ ies
in Kenya;

through a series of three cement secondary beacons spaced across the
scattered tracks leading from Rama Jebia in Kenya to Hola Dugium in Itali▯ an
Somaliland;

through a series of five cement secondary beacons accentuating the partition of
the pools of Kolbio;

through a series of three cement secondary beacons spaced across the
scattered tracks on the caravan route leading from Lama Det in Kenya to U ▯ ama
Idu in Italian Somaliland;

through the cement Primary Beacon No. 25, in the area of Did Sanga;

passing a small pool unnamed which falls in Kenya;

through a cement secondary beacon;

through a belt of forest with dense undergrowth, known as the "bada";

crossing the Lak at Gibitcilaua which remains in Italian Somaliland;

through a cement secondary beacon;

through another belt of the "bada";

leaving the group of pools of Hele Keberye km. 0.4 in Kenya;

through two cement secondary beacons on the edge of the depression of a p ▯ ool
unnamed half-way between the groups of Kon Tuwari in Kenya and Nuidi in
Italian Somaliland, the pool lying in Italian Somaliland;

through acement secondary beacon, leaving the pool of Doria in Kenya and that
of Burrada Ier in Italian Somaliland;

Page 17through two cement secondary beacons astride the road leading from Dambal▯ a
in Kenya to Cussa in Italian Somaliland;

through two cement secondary beacons astride the track leading from Konoghori

in Kenya to Dola in Italian Somaliland;

through the cement Primary Beacon No. 24;

through a cement secondary beacon opposite the pool of Juma Korke which l▯ ies
in Kenya;

through a series of three cement secondary beacons spaced across the
scattered tracks leading from Rama Jebia in Kenya to Hola Dugium in Itali▯ an
Somaliland;

through a series of five cement secondary beacons accentuating the partition of
the pools of Kolbio;

through a series of three cement secondary beacons spaced across the
scattered tracks on the caravan route leading from Lama Det in Kenya to U ▯ ama
Idu in Italian Somaliland;

through the cement Primary Beacon No. 25, in the area of Did Sanga;

passing a small pool unnamed which falls in Kenya;

through a cement secondary beacon;

through a belt of forest with dense undergrowth, known as the "bada";

crossing the Lak at Gibitcilaua which remains in Italian Somaliland;

through a cement secondary beacon;

through another belt of the "bada";

leaving the group of pools of Hele Keberye km. 0.4 in Kenya;

through two cement secondary beacons on the edge of the depression of a p ▯ ool
unnamed half-way between the groups of Kon Tuwari in Kenya and Nuidi in
Italian Somaliland, the pool lying in Italian Somaliland;

through acement secondary beacon, leaving the pool of Doria in Kenya and that
of Burrada Ier in Italian Somaliland;

Page 17Annex 82

through a cemented masonry pointer beacon to the large cemented masonry
Primary Beacon No. 29 at Dar Es Salam.

DOCUMENTATION

1. Protocols between the Governments of Her Britannic Majesty and of His ▯ Majesty the
King of Italy, for the Demaracation of their respective Spheres of Influence in Eastern
Africa, March 24 and April 15, 1891. Great Britain Treaty Series, Italy No. 1 (1891), C.
6316.

2. Agreement between the United Kingdom and Ethiopia relative to t he Frontiers
between British East Africa, Uganda, and Ethiopia, December 6, 1907. Great Britain
Treaty Series No. 27 (1908), Cd. 4318.

3. Convention between Italy and Ethiopia for the settlement of the Front ▯ ier between the
Italian Possessions of Somali and the Provinces of the Ethiopian Empire, May 16, 1908.

The Map of Africa by Treaty , 3 vol., 3rd Edition (London: Harrison and Sons, 1909),
Vol. 2, pp. 1223- 4.

4. Treaty between the United Kingdom and Italy regulating Certain Questi▯ ons
concerning the Boundaries of their respective Territories in East Africa, July 15, 1▯ 4.
Great Britain Treaty Series, Italy, No. 1 (1924), Cmd. 2194[with maps].

5. Treaty between the United Kingdom and Italy regulating Certain Questi▯ ons
concerning the Boundaries of their respective Territories in East Africa, July 15, 1924.
Great Britain Treaty Series No. 29 (1925), Cmd. 2427 .

6. Agreement recording the Decisions of the Commission appointed under the Treaty
between the United Kingdom and Italy of July 15, 1924 r egarding the Boundary
between Kenya and Italian Somaliland, December 17, 1927. Great Britain Treaty

Series, Italy, No. 1 (1933), Cmd. 4230.

7. Agreement between the Local Commissioners appointed to settle certain ▯ points
connected with the Demarcation of the Boundary between Kenya and Italian Somaliland
as determined by the Commissioners under the Treaty between the United Kingdom
and Italy of July 15, 1924; August 27, 1930. Great Britain Treaty Series, Italy No. 2

(1933), Cmd. 4231.

8. Exchange of Not es between His Majestyʼs Government in the United Kingdom and
the Italian Government regarding the Boundary between Kenya and Italian Somaliland
with the Agreement of the Boundary Commission, Appendices and Map, November 22,
1933. Great Britain Treaty Series No. 1 (1934), Cmd. 4491 .

Page 19 through a cemented masonry pointer beacon to the large cemented masonry
Primary Beacon No. 29 at Dar Es Salam.

DOCUMENTATION

1. Protocols between the Governments of Her Britannic Majesty and of His ▯ Majesty the
King of Italy, for the Demaracation of their respective Spheres of Influence in Eastern
Africa, March 24 and April 15, 1891. Great Britain Treaty Series, Italy No. 1 (1891), C.
6316.

2. Agreement between the United Kingdom and Ethiopia relative to t he Frontiers
between British East Africa, Uganda, and Ethiopia, December 6, 1907. Great Britain
Treaty Series No. 27 (1908),Cd. 4318.

3. Convention between Italy and Ethiopia for the settlement of the Fron▯ ier between the
Italian Possessions of Somali and the Provinces of the Ethiopian Empire, May 16, 1908.

The Map of Africa by Treaty , 3 vol., 3rd Edition (London: Harrison and Sons, 1909),
Vol. 2, pp. 1223- 4.

4. Treaty between the United Kingdom and Italy regulating Certain Questi▯ ons
concerning the Boundaries of their respective Territories in East Africa, July 15,▯ 4.
Great Britain Treaty Series,Italy, No. 1 (1924), Cmd. 2194 [with maps].

5. Treaty between the United Kingdom and Italy regulating Certain Questi▯ ons
concerning the Boundaries of their respective Territories in East Africa, July 15, 1924.
Great Britain Treaty Series No. 29 (1925), Cmd. 2427.

6. Agreement recording the Decisions of the Commission appointed under the Treaty
between the United Kingdom and Italy of July 15, 1924 r egarding the Boundary
between Kenya and Italian Somaliland, December 17, 1927. Great Britain Treaty

Series, Italy, No. 1 (1933), Cmd. 4230.

7. Agreement between the Local Commissioners appointed to settle certain ▯ points
connected with the Demarcation of the Boundary between Kenya and Italian Somaliland
as determined by the Commissioners under the Treaty between the United Kingdom
and Italy of July 15, 1924; August 27, 1930. Great Britain Treaty Series, Italy No. 2

(1933), Cmd. 4231.

8. Exchange of Not es between His Majestyʼs Government in the United Kingdom and
the Italian Government regarding the Boundary between Kenya and Italian Somaliland
with the Agreement of the Boundary Commission, Appendices and Map, November 22,
1933. Great Britain Treaty Series No. 1 (1934), Cmd. 4491.

Page 19 Annex 83

United States, Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Limits in the Seas, No.
92, Maritime Boundary: Kenya-Tanzania (23 June 1981) Annex 83

U.S.DTRENOFSTA·BUROFINTEWGECEDRESEAI' UBYTHEGEOGRAPHER

LIMITS IN THE SEAS

\

No. 92
MARITIME BOUNDARY:

KENYA-TANZANIAAnnex 83

This paper is one of a series issued by The Geographer,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of
State. The aim of the series is to set forth the basis
for national arrangements for the measurement of the
territorial sea or the division of the maritime areas
of coastal nations.

Intended for background use only, this research document
does not represent an official acceptance of the
United States Government of the line or lines represented
on the charts or, necessarily, of the specific principles
involved, if any, in the original drafting of the lines.
Principal analyst for this study: Robert W. Smith.
Additional copies may be requested by mail from
The Geographer, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

LIMITS IN THE SEAS

No. 92

MARITIME BOUNDARY:

KENYA-TANZANIA

June 23, 1981

Office of The Geographer

Bureau of Intelligence and Research Annex 83
2

MARITIME BOUNDARY: KENYA-TANZANIA

On December 17, 1975, the Republic of Kenya sent a note to the United Republic of
Tanzania proposing the terms of an agreed delimitation of the boundary b▯ tween their
respective territorial waters and other maritime jurisdictions of the two States. The United
Republic of Tanzania replied on July 9, 1976, accepting these terms. The exchange of
notes constitutes an agreement on their maritime boundary which entered i▯ nto force on July

9, 1976. The full textof the agreement is as follows:

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA AND
KENYA CONCERNING THE DELIMITATION OF THE TERRITORIAL WATERS

BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE TWO STATES

I
Kenyan note

December 17th, 1975

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to the meetings held between officials of the United Republ▯ ic of

Tanzania and of the Republic of Kenya on 8th May, 1972 at Mombasa, Kenya▯ and from 6th
to 8th August, 1975 at Arusha, Tanzania and on 4th September, 1975 at Dar ▯ -es-Salaam,
Tanzania, on the delimitation of the territorial waters boundary between our two countries
and to state that, as a result of the said meetings, the following ▯ were agreed:

1. Boundary:
Base Lines:
(a) Ras Jimbo beacon-Kisite Island (rock)
(b) Ras Jimbo-Mwamba-wamba beacon
(c) Mwamba-wamba beacon-Fundo Island beacon (rock)

(d) Fundo Island beacon (rock)R- as Kigomasha lighthouse
(e) Kisite Island (rock)-Mpunguti ya J-lighthouse

2. The description of the boundary:
(a) On the West: The median line between the Ras Jimbo beacon-Kisite

Island/Ras Jimbo-Mwamba-wamba beacon base lines to a point 12 nautical
miles from Ras Jimbo up to a point hereinafter referred to as 'A', l▯ d at
4°49'56"S and 39°20'58"E;

(b) On the East: The median line derived b y the Intersection of two arcs

each being 12 nautical miles drawn from Mpunguti ya Juu- lighthouse and
Ras Kigomasha lighthouse respectively hereinafter referred to as point 'B',
located at 4°53'31"S and 39°28'40"E and point C, located at 4°40'52"S and
39°36'18"E;Annex 83
3

(c) On the South: An arc with the center as the Northern Intersection of arcs

with radii 6 nautical miles from point 'A' as described in paragraph 2(a ▯ )
above and point 'B' which is the Southern Intersection of arcs from Ras
Kigomasha lighthouseand Mpunguti ya Juu lighthouse.

(d) The eastward boundary from Point C, which is the Northern Intersection
of arcs from Ras Kigomasha lighthouse and Mpunguti ya Juu lighthouse as
described under paragraph 2 (b) above, shall be the latitude extending
eastwards to a point where it intersects the outermost limits of territorial▯
water boundary or areas of national jurisdiction of two states.

(e) The marine charts of 1:250,000 describing the coo -rdinates of the above
points shall form an integral part of tsiagreement.

3. Fishing and fisheries:
(a) It was agreed that indigenous fishermen from both countries engaged in
fishing for subsistence, be permitted to fish within 12 nautical miles of ▯ either
side of the territorial sea boundary in accordance with eix sting regulations.

(b) It was agreed that there be reciprocal recognition of fisheries licenses,
regulations and practices of either State applicable to indigenous fisher ▯ men
aforesaid. The fishing within the area specified in paragraph 3 (a).

After due consideration of the said points of agreement, including the attached m ▯ ap
describing the co-ordinates of the boundary as delimited, the Government of the Republic
of Kenya hereby confirms that it accepts the above recommendations having ▯ been fully

convinced that they are for the mutual benefit of our two countries.

If the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania is of the same view, ▯ then it is
suggested that this Note and your reply thereto in the affirmative shall▯ constitute an

Agreement for the te rritorial waters boundary between our two States and other related
matters referred to above and the same shall enter into force on the date ▯ of the receipt of
your said Note in reply.

Accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours

Dr. Munyua Waiyaki
Minister for Foreign Affairs

H.E. Mr. Ibrahim Kaduma, M.P.,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,

United Republic of Tanzania
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 3

(c) On the South: An arc with the center as the Northern Intersection of arcs

with radii 6 nautical miles from point 'A' as described in paragraph 2(a ▯ )
above and point 'B' which is the Southern Intersection of arcs from Ras
Kigomasha lighthouseand Mpunguti ya Juu lighthouse.

(d) The eastward boundary from Point C, which is the Northern Intersection
of arcs from Ras Kigomasha lighthouse and Mpunguti ya Juu lighthouse as
described under paragraph 2 (b) above, shall be the latitude extending
eastwards to a point where it intersects the outermost limits of territorial▯
water boundary or areas of national jurisdiction of two states.

(e) The marine charts of 1:250,000 describing the coo -rdinates of the above
points shall form an integral part of tsiagreement.

3. Fishing and fisheries:
(a) It was agreed that indigenous fishermen from both countries engaged in
fishing for subsistence, be permitted to fish within 12 nautical miles of ▯ either
side of the territorial sea boundary in accordance with eix sting regulations.

(b) It was agreed that there be reciprocal recognition of fisheries licenses,
regulations and practices of either State applicable to indigenous fisher ▯ men
aforesaid. The fishing within the area specified in paragraph 3 (a).

After due consideration of the said points of agreement, including the attached m ▯ ap
describing the co-ordinates of the boundary as delimited, the Government of the Republic
of Kenya hereby confirms that it accepts the above recommendations having ▯ been fully

convinced that they are for the mutual benefit of our two countries.

If the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania is of the same view, ▯ then it is
suggested that this Note and your reply thereto in the affirmative shall▯ constitute an

Agreement for the te rritorial waters boundary between our two States and other related
matters referred to above and the same shall enter into force on the date ▯ of the receipt of
your said Note in reply.

Accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours

Dr. Munyua Waiyaki
Minister for Foreign Affairs

H.E. Mr. Ibrahim Kaduma, M.P.,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,

United Republic of Tanzania
Dar es Salaam, TanzaniaAnnex 83
5

The salient coastal points affecting these outer limits are indicated on▯ the attached map as

the bases from which the light-red construction lines are drawn. Both countries are able to
extend their maritime zones eastward to a full 200 nautical miles without overlapping an
opposite State to the east. For most of its length the boundary traverses waters deeper
than 100 fathoms. From the land boundary terminus to point A, the water depths are less

than 100 fathoms. Boundary segments A-B and B-C are situated in the Pemba Channel
where depths range from 100 to 300 fathoms (600 to 1,800 feet). Seaward from point C
the depths range from 250 fathoms to over 2,000 fathoms.

The interesting section of the boundary is situated near shore in the Pemba Channea l rea
(see map insert). Article 1 of the agreement establishes straight baselines for each
country in the boundary region, although some of these baselines do not seem to influence
2
the course of the boundary. The first boundary segment extends from theland boundary
terminus at Ras Jimbo to point A, which is 12 nautical miles seaward from ▯ Ras Jimbo.
Point A, however, is only 6.8 nautical miles from Kisite Island and the T ▯ anzanian baseline.
This segment is equidistant between the two baselines described in Article 1 (a) and (b):

i.e., lines connecting Ras Jimbo to Kisite Island (Kenya) and Ras Jimbo ▯ to Mwamba-
wamba beacon (Tanzania).

Turning points B and C have been situated in locations where the 12n -autical-mile arcs as

drawn from Mpunguti ya Juu lighthouse (Kenya) and Ras Kigomasha lighthouse (Tanzania)
intersect. In order to establish boundary segment - AB, point X was created. Point X is the
northern intersection of 6-nautical-mile arcs drawn from points A and B. With point X as
the center, a 6-nautical-mile arc was drawn between points A and B to form that segment

of the boundary. Points B and C are connected by a straight line. The agreement,
however, does not state what kind of lines are to be employed, i.e., geodesics, great
circles, or rhumb lines. From point C the boundary continues eastward along the parallel of
latitude of point C to, as previously noted, an undefined terminal point. ▯

The course of the final boundary combines numerous delimitation methodologies. The first
boundary segment is equidistant between the two claimed straight baselines. Segment-A ▯
B has been developed by drawing an arc from point X, an artificially esta ▯ blished point.

Segment B-C is equidistant between selected coastal points one from each country. The
seaward extension of the boundary from point C is based on a parallel of latitude. Thus,
the boundary represents an agreement which has been established in accord ▯ ance with

equitable principles and which is satisfactory to both countries.

2Baselines in international law serve the purpose of defining the limit between internal waters and the territorial
sea. Various international law principles are used rmining the baseline. The establishment of baselines
by bilateral agreement is not a common practice. The status of the baselines created by this agreement is not
clear and, under any interpretation, could not be binding on third State▯s. 5

The salient coastal points affecting these outer limits are indicated on▯ the attached map as

the bases from which the light-red construction lines are drawn. Both countries are able to
extend their maritime zones eastward to a full 200 nautical miles without overlapping an
opposite State to the east. For most of its length the boundary traverses waters deeper
than 100 fathoms. From the land boundary terminus to point A, the water depths are less

than 100 fathoms. Boundary segments A-B and B-C are situated in the Pemba Channel
where depths range from 100 to 300 fathoms (600 to 1,800 feet). Seaward from point C
the depths range from 250 fathoms to over 2,000 fathoms.

The interesting section of the boundary is situated near shore in the Pemba Channea l rea
(see map insert). Article 1 of the agreement establishes straight baselines for each
country in the boundary region, although some of these baselines do not seem to influence
2
the course of the boundary. The first boundary segment extends from theland boundary
terminus at Ras Jimbo to point A, which is 12 nautical miles seaward from ▯ Ras Jimbo.
Point A, however, is only 6.8 nautical miles from Kisite Island and the T ▯ anzanian baseline.
This segment is equidistant between the two baselines described in Article 1 (a) and (b):

i.e., lines connecting Ras Jimbo to Kisite Island (Kenya) and Ras Jimbo ▯ to Mwamba-
wamba beacon (Tanzania).

Turning points B and C have been situated in locations where the 12n -autical-mile arcs as

drawn from Mpunguti ya Juu lighthouse (Kenya) and Ras Kigomasha lighthouse (Tanzania)
intersect. In order to establish boundary segment - AB, point X was created. Point X is the
northern intersection of 6-nautical-mile arcs drawn from points A and B. With point X as
the center, a 6-nautical-mile arc was drawn between points A and B to form that segment

of the boundary. Points B and C are connected by a straight line. The agreement,
however, does not state what kind of lines are to be employed, i.e., geodesics, great
circles, or rhumb lines. From point C the boundary continues eastward along the parallel of
latitude of point C to, as previously noted, an undefined terminal point. ▯

The course of the final boundary combines numerous delimitation methodologies. The first
boundary segment is equidistant between the two claimed straight baselines. Segment-A ▯
B has been developed by drawing an arc from point X, an artificially esta ▯ blished point.

Segment B-C is equidistant between selected coastal points one from each country. The
seaward extension of the boundary from point C is based on a parallel of latitude. Thus,
the boundary represents an agreement which has been established in accord ▯ ance with

equitable principles and which is satisfactory to both countries.

2Baselines in international law serve the purpose of defining the limit between internal waters and the territorial
sea. Various international law principles are used irmining the baseline. The establishment of baselines
by bilateral agreement is not a common practice. The status of the baselines created by this agreement is not
clear and, under any interpretation, could not be binding on third State▯s. Annex 84

E.M. Mathu and T.C. Davies, “Geology and the environment in Kenya”, Journal of African
Earth Sciences, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Nov. 1996) Annex 84

Journal of African Earth Sciences, Vol. 23, No.4, pp. 511-539, 1996
e 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd
~ Pergamon
Pll: 50899-5362(97)00016-X All rire~~ 3:~ ~~~;~~~·t+Br~t~

Geology and the environment in Kenya

E. M. MATHU 1and T. C. DAVIES 2

·'Department of Geology, University of Nairobi, P.O. Box 301Nairobi, Kenya
School of Environmental Studies. Moi UniversitP.O. Box 3900, Eldoret, Kenya

Abstract-Kenya is in a unique environmental setting by virtue of its geographical location.

range of altitudes and perhaps most importantthe Great Rift System that traverses it.
The country displaysvirtuallevery facet of environmental geologicalphenonmena -

seismicityvolcanism, mass-movements, the impact of mining,mineral processingand
geothermalenergy resources development, soil and beach erosion, desertificatiair,

water and soil pollutietc. A significanmass of data on these topics already exists,
but it lies scattered in various journals and agency reports, some of which are not readily

availableo environmental researchers and country-planners. The aim of this paper, therefore.
is to highlight some features of geology and the environment in Kenya and to set the scene

for the subsequentpapers in this issue, which examine more deeply various aspects of
the subject. The uniqueness of the country's environmental setting is emphasised throughout,

since it gives it a special appeal to geomorphologigeophysicists,hydrologistsand
land-use planners. A comprehensive listreferences is given at the end of this paper in

orderto aid the search process of those who seek additional information on areas covered
in this review. 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

R6sum6-Du point de vue environnemental,le Kenya occupe une place unique par sa

situation geographique, ses variations d'alet, peut-etre plus encore, par le systeme
du Grand Rift qui le recoupe.Le pays presente pratiquement toutes les facettesde

phenomenes geologiques en relationavec l'environnement: seismicite,volcanisme.
mouvements en masse, impact tant des activites minieres que du traitede matieres

premiereset du developpement de ressources en energie geothermiquerosion du sol et
des plages, desertificatiopollutionde l'airde l'eau et du sol, etc. Une importante

quantitede donnees existe deja sur ces sujets mais elle est dispersee dans diverses
revues et rapportsd'organismes,dont certains ne sont pas facilemenaccessibles aux

chercheurs de l'environnementainsi qu'auxresponsables de Ia planificatinationale.
C'est pourquoile but de cettenote est d'insistesur certainsaspects geologiqueset
environnementaux duKenya en introduisant, par Ia meme occasion, les notes subsequentes

de ce volume traitantde fac;:on plus approfonddivers aspects du sujet. La situation
unique du pays dans le domaine environnementaest mise en evidence dans cet ouvrage

puisqu'ellsuscite!'intereparticuliedes geomorphologues, geophysicienshydrologues
et autres planificatede !'utilisatdes terres. A Ia fin de Ia note, une liste detaillee de

references est fournie afinider les recherches de ceux qui souhaitent une information

complementaire dans l'un des domaines couverts par cette synthase."' 1997Elsevier
Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

(Received 23 F=ebruary 1995: revised version received 11 March 1996)

INTRODUCTION
Environmental geoscience research carried out in investment, an acceleration of environmental

Kenya today focuses on the solutions to problems degradation in fields such as water pollution, soil

pertaining to surface- and groundwater pollution, erosion, desertification and mining is still witnesed.
geo-hazards and land-use. Despite a rapid growth These phenomena and processes can often be

in research, institution building, training and related to the country's unique geography and

Journlll of African Earth ScienCes511Annex 84

Geology and the environment in Kenya

geology, which are in turn dominated by the great altitude varies from sea level at the coast to
Rift Valley. This is a 50-70 km wide chasm over 5,000 m at the top of Mt Kenya, which is

extending south from Lake Turkana and deepens located almost exactly on the equator. Like the
to 600-900 m below the surrounding land. The other volcanoes of East Africa, its origin is linked
formation of this spectacular geological with the formation of the Rift Valley. From the

phenomenon, as well as other aspects of the edge of the steep scarp slopes of the Rift Valley
geology of Kenya, is summarised under the section system one discerns a breath-taking scenery
on 'Geology and Mineralisation'. comprising savannas, salt lakes, picturesque

Kenya is a country of great diversity in the extinct volcanoes and the well-tended landscapes
regional sense. The diversity of Kenya's landscape, of large farms providing maize, wheat, milk and
for instance, is shaped by the relief, the formation meat for the growing urban population.
of which, together with other pertinent aspects of

the country's geography, are outlined in this paper. Relief
Almost exactly on the equator, the 5,200 m high Four major relief zones are distinguishable within
glaciated peaks of Mount Kenya overtop the the country. These are the coastal and eastern

country, rising above sweeping plateaus of Tertiary plains,the central and western highlands, the Rift
lavas and towering over grassy plains alive with Valley Basin and the Lake Victoria Basin.
countless species of flora and fauna. Kenya's relief

is of overiding importance for the climate of the The coastal and eastern plains
country, particularly as regards the amount of These plains cover approximately one third of the
precipitation and temperature. These climatic total area of the country.They are roughly enclosed

factors in turn condition the ecological endowment by the Indian Ocean and the Somali border to the
and the agrarian capacity, which greatly influence east, the 39°E longitude to the west, the
the density and distribution of the peasant and Tanzanian border to the south and the 3°N latitude

herding populations. to the north. Their elevation varies from 0 at the
About 83% of the country falls within arid and coastal belt up to 500 m at the hinterland coastal
semi-arid lands (ASAL). These ASALs have hill masses.

undergone long-term degradation that has
reduced both their actual and potential The Rift Valley Basin
productivity, thus increasing unemployment in The Rift Valley Basin has an elevation of about
such areas (Central Bank of Kenya, 1991 ).
500 m in its lowest and widest sections (the Lake
Desertification can be attributed in part to Turkana area in the north and the Lake Magadi
drought and in part to the highly variable area in the south). However, the highest elevation
precipitation, but its effect and extent have been reaches 500 m in its narrowest and middle zone

greatly aggravated by unsustainable increases around the equator, where it is enclosed by the
in human and livestock populations. Only 20% Mau Hills to the west and the Aberdares Mountains
of the country's land is suitable for agriculture. to the east (Fig. 1). This basin runs approximately

The Kenyan approach to these problems through north-south along the 36 °Elongitude and separates
gee-scientific research and community both the eastern and western highlands. At its
participation are dicussed in this paper. broadest northern part, around Lake Turkana, it is

about 300 km wide, but between 50 and 60 km
wide at its narrowest section around the Na1vasha
GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING and Nakuru areas. The Laik1pia and Mau

location Escarpments then mark the eastern and western
The Republic of Kenya is located astride the equator boundaries, respectively, of this basin at its
on the eastern side of Africa (Fig. 1). It extends narrowest zone. Between the two escarpments,

between latitudes 5°30'N and 4°30'S and the Tungen Hills form a spectacular horst in the
longitudes 34°00'E and 42°00'E and is bordered middle of this basin.
by Sudan and Ethiopia to the north, Uganda to the

west, Somaliato the east and Tanzaniato the south. The eastern and western highlands
Kenya has a 500 km long coastline with the Indian The eastern and western highland regions,
ocean and atotal area of about 583,000 km 2• separated by the Rift Valley Basin, have an altitude
varying between 1500 and 5200 m above sea

Physiography level. East of the Rift Valley Basin, the Ndoto
Kenya has a varied relief which controls and Mountains mark the northern limit of these
constrains its drainage system (Fig. 1). The highlands, while the Aberdares Range (about 4000

Journof AfrEarth Sciences 513 Annex 84

E. M. MA THU and TC. DAVIES

SCALE
0 50 100 150 200km

ETHIOPIA

z 0

<t
zo (!) en 2

::::> 0
3:

l>
r

l>
oo

o Garissa

.,. ..

41\1
<-4

1\11
Rainfall 4
Over 1500mm

500-1500mm
§
Less than 500mm

Figure 2. Generalised annual rainfall map of Kenyafrom EAEP Limite1991)

m) and Mt Kenya (about 5200 m) mark the highest The western highlands are marked by the Mau
peaks in the high central area of these eastern Hills (about 31 00 ml, which occur in the central
highlands. The Nyambene Hills are an immediate part of the region and face the Aberdares Range.

northeastern extension of the Mt Kenya highland Furthernorth they are marked by Mt Elgon (about
region. Further southwards these eastern 4300 ml on the Kenyan-Ugandan border, and the
highlands pass into the Athi and Kaputei Plains, Cherangani Hills (about 3400 m). The Nandi, Nyando
which extend southeastwards to form the Chyulu and LolgorienEscarpments separate the western
Range. The Chyulu Range thereafter adjoins the highlands from the Lake Victoria Basin in the

Taita Hills. northern, central and southern sides, respectively.

514 Journal of African Earth SciencesAnnex 84

Geology and the environment in Kenya

SCALE
0 50 100 150 200 250km

0

VEGETATION

~ Forest and Woodland

~ Savanna

0 Dry bushland, Desert and Scrub

Figure 3. Generalised vegetatmap of Kenya (modified from EAEP Limit1991).

The Lake Victoria Basin Drainage

This basin has a general elevation of about 500- Drainage iscontrolled bythe four major relief zones
1000 m above sea level. It is separated from the described earlier. Thelongest rivers in Kenya are
western highlands on its eastern side by the three
the Tana and the Athi, both over00 m long. They
escarpments mentioned in the preceeding section. rise from the eastern highlands and drain
Semi-circular in shape and enclosing Lake Victoria, southeastwards, finally reaching the Indian Ocean.

this basin is approximately bounded on the eastern Most of the other rivers also originate in the
side by the 35°E longitude and by the latitudes precipitation-richKenya Highlands and run off

1°N and 1°S, respectively. radially; in so far as they do not dry out in the

Journal of African Eanh Sctences 515 Annex 84

E. M. MA THU and T C. DA VIES

sem1-arid areas or end up in swamps, they merge months (April and May) which receive over 20 em
with the Tana and Athi (Fig. 1). of ramfall each.
The water level of the rivers varies greatly. The highlands receive an average annual rainfall

Whereas in the dry season they dry up or contract of50 em to > 200 em. During the hot months the
to a narrow channel, in the rainy season they swell temperatures are 22-28°C and during the cool

enormously and carry large amounts of sediment. months 15-20°C. January, February and July to
The Rift Valley is basically a long north-south September are the driest months with an average

onentated 1nland dramage catchment with a ramfallof less than3 em each. The wettest months
number of lakes occurring along its entire floor. are April to May and October to November with

From the north to the south, they include Lakes an average rainfall of between 10 em and 20 em
Turkana, Baringo, Bogoria, Nakuru, Elmentelta, each month.

Naivasha and Magadi. The rest of the Rift Valley The semi-desert climate is hot to very hot
lakes in Kenya occur in its middle zone where they throughout the year. Temperatures are over 25°C

are found astride the equator. Both Lakes Turkana in the cool months and over 30°C during the hot
and Magadi are terminal basins within the larger months. The climate is largely dry and during the

Rift Valleycatchment. wet months of March to May and October to
Two long rivers, the Turkwel and the Kerio, rise December, the rainfall is less than 5 em each month.

from the western highlands and dram northwards The vegetation varies according to the climate
mto Lake Magadi from the eastern and western and relief (Fig. 3). In the lake basin, the highlands
s1des of the southern Rift Valley scarps. The
and the coastal climatiC zones, the vegetation
southern Ewaso Ngiro River drains along the Rift vanes from predominantly savanna type (grassland)
floor into Lake Natron at the Kenyan- Tanzanian to scattered woodlands and equatorial forest. In

border, adjacent to Lake Magadi. their upper reaches the montane forests are fringed
The Rift Valley lakes vary m salinity. Lake by bamboo and heather growth, which gradually

Naivasha is a fresh water lake, and Lake Baringo give way to grassland and moorland (highland forest
1sonly weakly saline. The remainder of the lakes and shrub). In the semi-desert climate, which

are alkaline to hyperalkaline in their chemistry. Lake accounts for over three quarters of the total area
Victona, a large fresh water lake, occupies a basin of the country, the vegetation is mainly desert and

1nto wh1ch the maJority of the nvers and streams shrub. Moorland vegetation ISfound at the top ot
nsmg from the western highlands dram. These the Mt Kenya region. A few scattered areas With

nvers mclude the Sio. the Nzoia, the Yala, the KuJa swamp vegetation also occur withm the country.
and the Mara. Their largest development is found slightly north

of the equator about 150 km west of the Somali
Climate and vegetation border in the Lorian swamp, where the River

Lying in the middle of the equatorial belt, Kenya Engare Uaso Nyiro disappears through a network
displays a vanable climate and vegetation cover of tributaries.

consistent with 1tsrange of altitudes. Four broad
climatic zonesare distinguishable within the country Soils
and include the lake basin around Lake Victoria to Over three quarters of the country is covered by

the west, the highlands (western and central loam soils, which are particularly well-developed
highlands including Nairobi), the coastal and the in the semi-arid and desert regions. These are well

semi-desert (including desert) climates (Fig. 2). drained soils with an adequate amount of soil
The lake basin climatic zone receives an average nutrients and therefore ideal for agriculture.

annual rainfall of 150 em to > 200 em with the Nevertheless, the lack of adequate rainfall or other
driest month receiving an average minimum of only forms of water continues to impede agricultural

5 em and the wettest month an average minimum development in these areas. In the lake basin and
of 20 em. Temperatures are warm to hot, rarely central highlands regions, clays are the dominant

falling below 20°C and reaching a maximum of soils. Young, very fertile, volcanic ash soils ideal
about 30°C. for agriculture are found ithe high mountain areas

The coastal climatic zone receives an annual such as Mt Kenya, Mt Elgon and the Aberdares
rainfallof 100-200 em. During the hot months Range. These soils are known to have a high

temperatures are about 30°C and in the warm sorption capacity and are a contributory factor to
months about 25°C. With the exception of January landslide events in these areas (Davies and

and February, which receive a rainfall of less than Nyambok, 1993). Along the coastal region, a
1 em each, the rest of the months receive an narrow band of coastal sand borders the land
average r3infallof5-10 em, except for the wettest adjacent to the Indian Ocean.

516 Jouruf AlnEartll SctencesAnnex 84

Geology and the environment in Kenya

Table 1.Population of Kenya according to the 1989 grown both as subsistence as well as cash crops.

Census Cattle rearing, mainly for beef, is practised
particularly in the semi-arid areas. Ove70 percent
Province Population
of the country is not arable and arable lands are
Nairobi 1,324,570 only found in the central, western and coastal
Central 3,116,703
regions. Climatic conditions, vegetation and
Coast 1,829,191 agriculture are largely controlledy the relief of the
Eastern 3,768,677
country which has already been discussed earlier.
Northeastern 371,391
Nyanza 3,507,162 Economics and industry

Rift Valley 4,981,613 The economy of Kenya is largely dependent on
Western 2,544,329 tourism and agriculture. Since independence in

Total (Kenya) 21,443,636 1963, the economy has undergone an overall
structural transformation accompanied by
Source: Central Bureau of StatisGovernment of Kenya
(1994). significant changes in the contribution of various
sectors to the gross domestic product.

Agricultural production, which accounted for
Population 44.2 and 38.4% of the gross domestic product

The population of Kenya based on the last census in 1954 and 1963. respectively, declined to
(1989) is21.4 million people, with a projected about 30% in 1990 (Central Bank of Kenya,

figure of about30 million in the year1996 (Central 1991 ). This reflects the growing importance of
Bureau of Statistics,1994). The highest population the other sectors of the economy. Nevertheless,
densities (> 3 million people) are found in the Rift this sector remains the backbone of the

Valley, Eastern, North Eastern, Nyanza and Central economy, supporting the almost 80% of the
Provinces, respectively (Table 1). population that live in rural areas.

The capital city, Nairobi, has a population of about The tourism industry has gained increased
1.5 million people (Central Bureau of Statistics, importance 1n the Kenyan economy since 1963.

1994), while Mombasa and Kisumu are the next With the weak performance in coffee and tea over
major towns, respectively. Other major population the last few years, this sector has become the

centres include Nakuru, Eldoret, Meru, Thika, Nyeri, country's leading foreign exchange earner. The
Kisii,Kericho, Bungoma, Busia, Malindi and phenomenal expansion in this sector reflects not

Machakos (Fig. 4). only the diverse tourist attractions that Kenya has,
The population density is controlled mainly by but also the enormous investment that the country

agriculturalproductivity, which is in turn largely has undertaken in infrastructuralfacilities such as
determined by rainfall. The high and medium density hotels of international standard and roads connecting
areas of the central highlands region and the Lake the national parks and main urban centres.

Victona and coastal regions, receive medium to The contribution of the manufactunng sector to
h1gh rainfalls and have good arable lands. Major the gross domestic product has also increased

towns have high populations because they are significantlysince independence. Manufacturing
either largely administrative and/or commercial and production has been dominated by food, beverages

industrial centres. Incontrast the low population and tobacco, chemical and petroleum products and
density areas are either arid or semi-arid. metal products. The country has several tea

processing factories within the tea growing zones
Land use inthe western and central regions (the Kericho,

A wide variety of crops, depending on their ideal Murang'a, Nyeri and Kiambu districts). Coffee
climatic and soil conditions, are grown in the factories are also common in the coffee growing

differentparts of the country (Fig. 5). However, zones, the majority of which are located in the
only the major crops and agricultural activities are central region. The tea and coffee industries utilise
described in this section. Along the coastal strip huge quatitiesof water and environmental pollution

cashew nuts, coconuts and sisal are the main cash is frequently noted in the nearby rivers and streams
crops grown. into which factory effluents are discharged.

In the central highlands coffee, tea, rice, fruit, Wood and paper factories are located in Thika,
sisal and pyrethrum are the main cash crops, while Nairobi and Webuye. The Pan Paper Mill is located

in the western Kenya region these are sugar cane, in Webuye and discharges its effluent into the River
cotton, tea and rice. Some coffee and tobacco are Nzoia (Fig. 1).The level of toxic gas em1ssion into

also grown in this region. Maize and wheat are the atmosphere, as well as organic and metal

Journal of African Earth Sc1ences 517 Annex 85

M.G. Hassan and M.H. Tako, “Current status of marine fisheriessessmen&lia”, inA

monitoring mfArinsystem(S. Lokman et al. eds., 1999)Assessment & Monitoring of Marine System

________________________________________________________________________▯_____________

15 ARF

Current status of marine fisheries in Somalia

MUSSE GABOBE HASSAN & MAHAMUD HASSAN TAKO

Maritime & Fishery Institute,

Abdul-Aziz District, Mogadishu, Somalia

Key words: Economic Analysis, Effects, Evaluation, Recommendation, Stock

Abstract

Somalia's fishery is under exploited due primarily to four factors. The ▯first factor is the abundance of
livestock, which makes peo ple reluctant to utilize the resources in the sea. The second is the absence of
vital and important infrastructure. The third is the division of Somalia into severa-controlled regions,

which are presently functioning as self- governing states. The fourth is the imperceptive of both local and
international markets.

No one is responsible for fisheries resources and activities have failed due to inadequate security. Some of
the reasons include the following; firstly unrealistic perceptions, particularly p rimitive attitudes of
ignorance, non-competitiveness, and other fallacious attitudes of nomadic agropastroal people; secondly,

there are scarcity of professionals who take how realistic approaches would come to being; thirdly,
sectarianism with respect of clan based divided territories where the artisanal fisheries are being
intimidated; fourtly, isolation organizational structures where lack of communication exists between the
fisheries professionals and artisanal fishermen because of unclear policies of t he political leaders; fifty,
fragmentation of the international donors whose interest is ignition and flaming new fighting as they
receive risk allowances and their false approach would not be traced.

Introduction

Geographically, Somalia locates in the Eas t Africa, in the east it is adjacent to Indian Ocean and in the

north the Gulf of Aden of Red Sea. The size of the land is estimated 637, 540 km square; with coast line of
3333 km square with population of 9, 639, 541; sovereignty territorial waters up 200 nautical miles. Its
economy mainly depends on agriculture, livestock, forestry and fisheries. Livestock, which is predominant
export, an important source of animal products (mostly milk) for internal markets and subsistence. Crop
cultivation dominated by rural subsistence sector, which generated sufficient surplus to sustain domestic
informal markets and barter economy. Fisheries are mainly engaged in lucrative commerce from enclave
along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean as far south as to the coast Kismayo. Annex 85

Assessment & Monitoring of Marine System

________________________________________________________________________▯_____________

15 ARF

Current status of marine fisheries in Somalia

MUSSE GABOBE HASSAN & MAHAMUD HASSAN TAKO

Maritime & Fishery Institute,

Abdul-Aziz District, Mogadishu, Somalia

Key words: Economic Analysis, Effects, Evaluation, Recommendation, Stock

Abstract

Somalia's fishery is under exploited due primarily to four factors. The ▯first factor is the abundance of
livestock, which makes peo ple reluctant to utilize the resources in the sea. The second is the absence of
vital and important infrastructure. The third is the division of Somalia into sever-controlled regions,

which are presently functioning as self- governing states. The fourth is the imperceptive of both local and
international markets.

No one is responsible for fisheries resources and activities have failed due to inadequate security. Some of
the reasons include the following; firstly unrealistic perceptions, particularly p rimitive attitudes of
ignorance, non-competitiveness, and other fallacious attitudes of nomadic agropastroal people; secondly,

there are scarcity of professionals who take how realistic approaches would come to being; thirdly,
sectarianism with respect of clan based divided territories where the artisanal fisheries are being
intimidated; fourtly, isolation organizational structures where lack of communication exists between the
fisheries professionals and artisanal fishermen because of unclear policies of t he political leaders; fifty,
fragmentation of the international donors whose interest is ignition and flaming new fighting as they
receive risk allowances and their false approach would not be traced.

Introduction

Geographically, Somalia locates in the Eas t Africa, in the east it is adjacent to Indian Ocean and in the

north the Gulf of Aden of Red Sea. The size of the land is estimated 637, 540 km square; with coast line of
3333 km square with population of 9, 639, 541; sovereignty territorial waters up200 nautical miles. Its
economy mainly depends on agriculture, livestock, forestry and fisheries. Livestock, which is predominant
export, an important source of animal products (mostly milk) for internal markets and subsistence. Crop
cultivation dominated by rural subsistence sector, which generated sufficient surplus to sustain domestic
informal markets and barter economy. Fisheries are mainly engaged in lucrative commerce from enclave
along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean as far south as to the coast Kismayo.Annex 85

_______________________________________________

G.H. Musse & H.T. Mahamud (1999) In Assessment & Monitoring of Marine System. S. Lokman, M.S.N.
Azhar, M.S. Nasir & M.A. Borowitzka (eds.), Universiti Putra Malaysia Terengganu, Kuala Terengganu,
Malaysia (p 255 - 264).

Fish distribution is strongly influenced by environmental factors such as the temperature, salinity, nutrients,
upwelling, and the thermocline. Seasonal variations in abundance are considerable with two peaks in the
landing i.e. in November and in March with Southwest monsoon landing declines. In the absence of a
central government, a few qualified professionals and active private sectors with the help of non-
governmental organization have attempted to cover all possible needs up to t heir extreme capacity. They

forward consultancy, private project management; fisheries development, procurement of boats, gears,
marketing and all other necessary accessories need by the fishing industry. Since there is chronic shortage
private investors a nd fisheries professionals who would take the realistic steps which could lead how the
resources would be utilized. Research initiatives and forwarding recommendations could establish solutions
for the shortage output by elevating with establishment rehabi litation and development activities.

Constraints to the Development

Unrealistic Perceptions

Perhaps the most pervasive threatening which halts the consumption of fish is primarily the abundance of
livestock. Fishing which is generally considered recent intrusion into otherwise nomadic pastoral economy.
Obviously, Somalia maintain the same culture, which it happens based on misconception of Somali

descendants who were nomads, and whose life style depended on livestock and cultivating farms. It is
rooted in the cultural, social fabric with centuries -old precedents. Somalis are simple, postural economies
and highly adaptive to their environment. While some others, parts of the world were engaged actively in
fishing. The potential is too high and the fishery is under exploited. The artisanal nature of fishery is often
construed as being high level but insufficient, due to non- effective mobilization. Yet, fishery development

has fallen drastically since the fall of the late dictatorship Siad Bare. Although fishing has been taken as an
opportunity since the environment of employment has faded, with the emphasis on increased number of
fishermen with susceptible infrastructures.

Lack of Professionals

Fisheries professionals of Somalia were very few priors to the civil war. Lack of professionalism regarding
fish, fishermen, and fisheries, and the run -down degree of sectarian influences, which extends all the way
down to the day- to-day operation levels. The small number of fisheries professionals who were positioned

at ministry of fisheries and marine resources and the small proportion of ma▯ritime and fisheries institute
and those of department of fisheries of technical college have scattered almost all over the world.
Currently, small companies owned by some remainder of the fisheries professionals and some artisanal
fisheries are the sole expert. It is quite complex and has its difficulties to regenerate the existence of
fisheries professionals in the region. It is recognized that in the empty environment of fisheries

professionals due to presence domination of factional warring territories would not enrich on the sound
management and socio -economic information. What is needed is a cadre of multi- discipline, intellectuals
willing to communicate to solve the problems, create free atmosphere for fisheries professionals, and
aritisanal fisheries, and encourage more production and training. The most communities are lacking skilful
participants due to financial and security constraints.

Sectarianism_______________________________________________

G.H. Musse & H.T. Mahamud (1999) In Assessment & Monitoring of Marine System. S. Lokman, M.S.N.
Azhar, M.S. Nasir & M.A. Borowitzka (eds.), Universiti Putra Malaysia Terengganu, Kuala Terengganu,
Malaysia (p 255 - 264).

Fish distribution is strongly influenced by environmental factors such as the temperature, salinity, nutrients,
upwelling, and the thermocline. Seasonal variations in abundance are considerable with two peaks in the
landing i.e. in November and in March with Southwest monsoon landing declines. In the absence of a
central government, a few qualified professionals and active private sectors with the help of non-
governmental organization have attempted to cover all possible needs up to t heir extreme capacity. They

forward consultancy, private project management; fisheries development, procurement of boats, gears,
marketing and all other necessary accessories need by the fishing industry. Since there is chronic shortage
private investors a nd fisheries professionals who would take the realistic steps which could lead how the
resources would be utilized. Research initiatives and forwarding recommendations could establish solutions
for the shortage output by elevating with establishment rehabi litation and development activities.

Constraints to the Development

Unrealistic Perceptions

Perhaps the most pervasive threatening which halts the consumption of fish is primarily the abundance of
livestock. Fishing which is generally considered recent intrusion into otherwise nomadic pastoral economy.
Obviously, Somalia maintain the same culture, which it happens based on misconception of Somali

descendants who were nomads, and whose life style depended on livestock and cultivating farms. It is
rooted in the cultural, social fabric with centuries -old precedents. Somalis are simple, postural economies
and highly adaptive to their environment. While some others, parts of the world were engaged actively in
fishing. The potential is too high and the fishery is under exploited. The artisanal nature of fishery is often
construed as being high level but insufficient, due to non- effective mobilization. Yet, fishery development

has fallen drastically since the fall of the late dictatorship Siad Bare. Although fishing has been taken as an
opportunity since the environment of employment has faded, with the emphasis on increased number of
fishermen with susceptible infrastructures.

Lack of Professionals

Fisheries professionals of Somalia were very few priors to the civil war. Lack of professionalism regarding
fish, fishermen, and fisheries, and the run -down degree of sectarian influences, which extends all the way
down to the day- to-day operation levels. The small number of fisheries professionals who were positioned

at ministry of fisheries and marine resources and the small proportion of ma▯ritime and fisheries institute
and those of department of fisheries of technical college have scattered almost all over the world.
Currently, small companies owned by some remainder of the fisheries professionals and some artisanal
fisheries are the sole expert. It is quite complex and has its difficulties to regenerate the existence of
fisheries professionals in the region. It is recognized that in the empty environment of fisheries

professionals due to presence domination of factional warring territories would not enrich on the sound
management and socio -economic information. What is needed is a cadre of multi- discipline, intellectuals
willing to communicate to solve the problems, create free atmosphere for fisheries professionals, and
aritisanal fisheries, and encourage more production and training. The most communities are lacking skilful
participants due to financial and security constraints.

SectarianismAnnex 85

Fish is caught with line and hooks, gill nets, drift nete seine. It is consumed within 24-hours of catch
within the same area where it is caught. Negligible quantities of frozen fish fillet form are exported to

UAE. The true status is subsistence fishing. The production capacity in Somalia is about 5,000 peres
year. However, because of lack of infrastructure and means to reach export markets the production is about
2,000 tones per year. There are several trawlers owned by Somali Government, operating in Somali waters
and landing their catch in foreign ports. It is not known their annual catches so as the illegal fishing with
sweeping trawl were observed over there.

Boats and Fishing Gears

Most fishing boats used in Somalia are wooden outboard motor Boats and rowboats. These boats catch
most of fish with gill nets, lines & hooks, trolling lines, short pelagic longlines, and hand lines, drift nets,

purse seine. They are owned by individual fishing families. There are about 1,000 in the country. Somalis
are proficient in their manufacture and maintenance. These boats are rowed while some are outboard
motors. There are also about 400 small fiberglass boats 6- 10 meters long. These boats are mechanized;
however, the motors and other equipment for these boats are old and debilitated. It is difficult to find spare
parts for them. Some of these boats were manufactured in the country by a ▯project funded by FAO, but was
its infancy when the civil war broke out. On gear and spare parts, there is very little or almost no place to

buy.

The most active fishing in Somalia (ex cluding illegal fishing from foreign trawls) is being carried out along
coastal waters. Over all 866 functional motorized GRP vessels are observed actively engaged in fishing.

Similarly, the largest number of traditional fishing boats (i.e. the canoe- like Houris and the larger wind-
powered Mashuas and Bedens) were counted in Somalia as shown in Table 1▯. The numbers of fishermen
who are actively engaged in the sector of fishing and make a living out of it are estimated 4500 fishermen,
although varying consid erably in the coastal regions of the country. However, the greater majority of these
unaccounted fishermen are not working in the field either because of they are lacking fishing equipment
and/or boats or because local or export markets outlet are not avai lable.

Most of the valuable marine organisms found along the entire coastline of the country are being exploited
by local aritisanal fishing community, but the level of utilization is far below the potential sustainable
capacity of the territorial waters. The reduced level of the exploitation is also due to lack of functional

infrastructure available in the country. At the present, in fact, no demersal and pelagic fish are being
exploited in Somalia for the fresh frozen markets. Only small quantities are being fished, most of which are
gutted, salted, sun -dried and then exported to Mombassa, Kenya. Very small volumes of fresh fish are
being consumed in the country itself and mainly by a small percentage of the inhabitants of some of the
larger settlements along the coast (e.g. Berbera, Bossasso, Mogadishu & Kismayo). Due to the absence of
the additional infrastructure such as ice plants, adequate transportation means, processing facilities, etc., the

industry is at the present limited to the production and ma rketing of sun- dried and salted products. Shark
meat as well as a variety of demersal and pelagic fish species is being utilized. However, although reliable
figures are not available, the total quantities of dried products produced and exported infew years is
likely to have been very low.

Table 1. The total number of motorized fishing vessels imported or manufactured locally with the country
of origins.

Country of Origin LOA (m) Engine Power (hp) No. of Units Material

USSR (Lifeboat type) 8.8 USSR 25 150 WoodFish is caught with line and hooks, gill nets, drift nee seine. It is consumed within 24-hours of catch
within the same area where it is caught. Negligible quantities of frozen fish fillet form are exported to

UAE. The true status is subsistence fishing. The production capacity in Somalia is about 5,000 peres
year. However, because of lack of infrastructure and means to reach export markets the production is about
2,000 tones per year. There are several trawlers owned by Somali Government, operating in Somali waters
and landing their catch in foreign ports. It is not known their annual catches so as the illegal fishing with
sweeping trawl were observed over there.

Boats and Fishing Gears

Most fishing boats used in Somalia are wooden outboard motor Boats and rowboats. These boats catch
most of fish with gill nets, lines & hooks, trolling lines, short pelagic longlines, and hand lines, drift nets,

purse seine. They are owned by individual fishing families. There are about 1,000 in the country. Somalis
are proficient in their manufacture and maintenance. These boats are rowed while some are outboard
motors. There are also about 400 small fiberglass boats 6- 10 meters long. These boats are mechanized;
however, the motors and other equipment for these boats are old and debilitated. It is difficult to find spare
parts for them. Some of these boats were manufactured in the country by a ▯project funded by FAO, but was
its infancy when the civil war broke out. On gear and spare parts, there is very little or almost no place to

buy.

The most active fishing in Somalia (ex cluding illegal fishing from foreign trawls) is being carried out along
coastal waters. Over all 866 functional motorized GRP vessels are observed actively engaged in fishing.

Similarly, the largest number of traditional fishing boats (i.e. the canoe- like Houris and the larger wind-
powered Mashuas and Bedens) were counted in Somalia as shown in Table 1▯. The numbers of fishermen
who are actively engaged in the sector of fishing and make a living out of it are estimated 4500 fishermen,
although varying consid erably in the coastal regions of the country. However, the greater majority of these
unaccounted fishermen are not working in the field either because of they are lacking fishing equipment
and/or boats or because local or export markets outlet are not avai lable.

Most of the valuable marine organisms found along the entire coastline of the country are being exploited
by local aritisanal fishing community, but the level of utilization is far below the potential sustainable
capacity of the territorial waters. The reduced level of the exploitation is also due to lack of functional

infrastructure available in the country. At the present, in fact, no demersal and pelagic fish are being
exploited in Somalia for the fresh frozen markets. Only small quantities are being fished, most of which are
gutted, salted, sun -dried and then exported to Mombassa, Kenya. Very small volumes of fresh fish are
being consumed in the country itself and mainly by a small percentage of the inhabitants of some of the
larger settlements along the coast (e.g. Berbera, Bossasso, Mogadishu & Kismayo). Due to the absence of
the additional infrastructure such as ice plants, adequate transportation means, processing facilities, etc., the

industry is at the present limited to the production and ma rketing of sun- dried and salted products. Shark
meat as well as a variety of demersal and pelagic fish species is being utilized. However, although reliable
figures are not available, the total quantities of dried products produced and exported infew years is
likely to have been very low.

Table 1. The total number of motorized fishing vessels imported or manufactured locally with the country
of origins.

Country of Origin LOA (m) Engine Power (hp) No. of Units Material

USSR (Lifeboat type) 8.8 USSR 25 150 WoodAnnex 85

Artisanal fisheries in Somalia have great developmental potential thanksto the abundance of marine
resources in its coastal waters as can be seen in Figure 3. In order to support the growth of this industry,

development efforts should be concentrated initially in strengthening the various activities already
undertaken by the local fishing community and traders (i.e. the lobster fishery and trade of d-salted
products). At the same time efforts should be made to encourage the consumption of fresh and dried fish
among the Somalia even though only an export market can ensure the growth of the sector beyond the
artisanal stage.

Table 2. The major commercial marine species, crustacean & other species exploited in Somali coastal
waters

English Name Scientific Name

Barracuda Sphyraena spp. (Sphyraenidea)

Cobia Rachycentron canadu (Rachycentride)

Croaker Otolithes ruber (Sciaenidae)

Dolphin Fish Coryphaena spp. (Coryphaenidae)

Emperors Lethrinus spp. (Lethrinidae)

Frigate Mackerel Euthynnus affinis (Scombridae)

Goatfish Upeneus spp. (Mulldae)

Grouper Epinephelus spp. (Serranidae)

Hammer Shark Sphyna zygaena (Sphyrnidae)

Mullet Liza spp. Valamugil spp. (Mugilidae)

Rays Numerous species (Rajiidae)

Sailfish Istiophorus platypterus (Istiophoridae)

Sardine Sardinella spp. (Clupeidae)

Saw Shark Pristis pectinata (Pristidae)

Skipjack Tuna Katsuwonus pelamis (Scombridae)

Snapper Lutjnus spp. (Lutjanidae)

Spanish Mackerel Scomberomorus commerson (Scombridae)

Spinefeet Siganus spp (Siganidae)Artisanal fisheries in Somalia have great developmental potential thanks to the abundance of marine
resources in its coastal waters as can be seen in Figure 3. In order to support the growth of this industry,

development efforts should be concentrated initially in strengthening the various activities already
undertaken by the local fishing community and traders (i.e. the lobster fishery and trade of d-salted
products). At the same time efforts should be made to encourage the consumption of fresh and dried fish
among the Somalia even though only an export market can ensure the growth of the sector beyond the
artisanal stage.

Table 2. The major commercial marine species, crustacean & other species exploited in Somali coastal
waters

English Name Scientific Name

Barracuda Sphyraena spp. (Sphyraenidea)

Cobia Rachycentron canadu (Rachycentride)

Croaker Otolithes ruber (Sciaenidae)

Dolphin Fish Coryphaena spp. (Coryphaenidae)

Emperors Lethrinus spp. (Lethrinidae)

Frigate Mackerel Euthynnus affinis (Scombridae)

Goatfish Upeneus spp. (Mulldae)

Grouper Epinephelus spp. (Serranidae)

Hammer Shark Sphyna zygaena (Sphyrnidae)

Mullet Liza spp. Valamugil spp. (Mugilidae)

Rays Numerous species (Rajiidae)

Sailfish Istiophorus platypterus (Istiophoridae)

Sardine Sardinella spp. (Clupeidae)

Saw Shark Pristis pectinata (Pristidae)

Skipjack Tuna Katsuwonus pelamis (Scombridae)

Snapper Lutjnus spp. (Lutjanidae)

Spanish Mackerel Scomberomorus commerson (Scombridae)

Spinefeet Siganus spp (Siganidae)Annex 85

management, regulations, etc. Currently, there are no mandates at all levels. Substantially, there are no
funds for all, some offices still exist but they are used for other purp▯oses and no personnel. It is

recommendation that local state governments should set an advisory commission, consisting of fisheries
experts and fisheries education/information- transfer specialists for these appropriate agencies.

Largest segment of the Somalis have realized, that there is a large natural resources beneath their seas and

are intent to exploit it. Almost everyone is waiting formation of a federal government and the availability of
financial facilities. We believe the incoming government will concentrate on the development of these
natural resources, mainly on agricultural production. It is quite obvious that the government will purchase
boats, gear, processing plants, ports training and research equipment. To accomplish these projects the
government will need the technical know how of companies to expertise. More importantly, the consensus
in Somalia is to develop through private sectors not like the previous government whose policy degraded

all the natural resources due to highly favor of individualistic. Fisheries management is prima rily the
management of people. It is exceeding difficult to develop effective management if people are not aware
the existing problems, their potential consequences, and possible solutions. Without participation and co-
ordination of fishermen, management w ill be difficult at best, and more likely impossible. At the present
there are established channels for dialogues among local state governments to set on structure, this takes
care for all necessary measures.

The reviewers do claim that there is a room for integrating the development within the marine fisheries of
Somalia. However, the areas worthy of attention are not limited. But more or less, appears to be the room

for generating among pelagic or demersal resources, notably, sharks, mackerels, tunas, swo rdfish, lobster,
squid, etc. Ideally, finding international markets with co- operation, co-ordination, and technical assistance
donor countries and/or international non- governmental organizations can increase exploitation. It is
recommendation that the gove rnment agencies be restructured and they revise the way they interact with
the fishermen and serve the public. While the fishermen and professionals be involved in resources
management with international organizations to advocate to prevent foreign vessels engaged in fishing in

Somalia coastal waters or/and other companies which dispose fatal waste ▯products into Somali waters
within its EEZ.

It has been identified four levels in the fishery industry of Somalia which are highly linked to one another.

Unquestionably, the industry exists, regardless of its development, it is necessary that the fishing
community also exists and which is engaged in fishing activities. This constitutes the first level in the
industry, i.e. "Production". The followed by "Conservati on and Processing", the third one being
"Marketing", while fourth level is "Fisheries Experts" who recommend reliable information about the
uniqueness of the follow of the process. Whenever a fishing industry exists all four levels described above
are developed to some extent, however the degree of sophistication depends on the development status of

the industry itself. All these activities are linked to one an other but become more complex and technically
demanding the more developed the fishing sector in this particular region. Reliable achievements and
commitments for implementing new approaches to the resources are highly recommendable.

Participatory approaches have increased considerably besides a passive role to the people to benefit. All the
previous failures lead to the realization to the best measure of development to exploit the abundance of
wealth production. In order to qualify to improve the quality of life of poor coastal residents, the small
farmers and fishermen, the urban poor and other margi nalized people, but the pervasive constraints
recovery paradigms (patterns) are expected recently. At the present time, it is necessary to extend our
outcry and appeal internationally to find some type of commitment into action programs, which are more

practical and appropriate. There have often been European Union member countries, United States and UN
and many non governmental organization which in fact worked hard enough to ease our complexity of
destruction and still at out side for re -establishing and reorganizing all the lost efforts. Now the technology
transfer domination has attained to the oriental countries so we are looking forward for their technical
assistance as well.

Referencesmanagement, regulations, etc. Currently, there are no mandates at all levels. Substantially, there are no
funds for all, some offices still exist but they are used for other purp▯oses and no personnel. It is

recommendation that local state governments should set an advisory commission, consisting of fisheries
experts and fisheries education/information- transfer specialists for these appropriate agencies.

Largest segment of the Somalis have realized, that there is a large natural resources beneath their seas and

are intent to exploit it. Almost everyone is waiting formation of a federal government and the availability of
financial facilities. We believe the incoming government will concentrate on the development of these
natural resources, mainly on agricultural production. It is quite obvious that the government will purchase
boats, gear, processing plants, ports training and research equipment. To accomplish these projects the
government will need the technical know how of companies to expertise. More importantly, the consensus
in Somalia is to develop through private sectors not like the previous government whose policy degraded

all the natural resources due to highly favor of individualistic. Fisheries management is prima rily the
management of people. It is exceeding difficult to develop effective management if people are not aware
the existing problems, their potential consequences, and possible solutions. Without participation and co-
ordination of fishermen, management w ill be difficult at best, and more likely impossible. At the present
there are established channels for dialogues among local state governments to set on structure, this takes
care for all necessary measures.

The reviewers do claim that there is a room for integrating the development within the marine fisheries of
Somalia. However, the areas worthy of attention are not limited. But more or less, appears to be the room

for generating among pelagic or demersal resources, notably, sharks, mackerels, tunas, swo rdfish, lobster,
squid, etc. Ideally, finding international markets with co- operation, co-ordination, and technical assistance
donor countries and/or international non- governmental organizations can increase exploitation. It is
recommendation that the gove rnment agencies be restructured and they revise the way they interact with
the fishermen and serve the public. While the fishermen and professionals be involved in resources
management with international organizations to advocate to prevent foreign vessels engaged in fishing in

Somalia coastal waters or/and other companies which dispose fatal waste ▯products into Somali waters
within its EEZ.

It has been identified four levels in the fishery industry of Somalia which are highly linked to one another.

Unquestionably, the industry exists, regardless of its development, it is necessary that the fishing
community also exists and which is engaged in fishing activities. This constitutes the first level in the
industry, i.e. "Production". The followed by "Conservati on and Processing", the third one being
"Marketing", while fourth level is "Fisheries Experts" who recommend reliable information about the
uniqueness of the follow of the process. Whenever a fishing industry exists all four levels described above
are developed to some extent, however the degree of sophistication depends on the development status of

the industry itself. All these activities are linked to one an other but become more complex and technically
demanding the more developed the fishing sector in this particular region. Reliable achievements and
commitments for implementing new approaches to the resources are highly recommendable.

Participatory approaches have increased considerably besides a passive role to the people to benefit. All the
previous failures lead to the realization to the best measure of development to exploit the abundance of
wealth production. In order to qualify to improve the quality of life of poor coastal residents, the small
farmers and fishermen, the urban poor and other margi nalized people, but the pervasive constraints
recovery paradigms (patterns) are expected recently. At the present time, it is necessary to extend our
outcry and appeal internationally to find some type of commitment into action programs, which are more

practical and appropriate. There have often been European Union member countries, United States and UN
and many non governmental organization which in fact worked hard enough to ease our complexity of
destruction and still at out side for re -establishing and reorganizing all the lost efforts. Now the technology
transfer domination has attained to the oriental countries so we are looking forward for their technical
assistance as well.

References Annex 86

F. Carbone et al., “The Modern Coral Colonization of the Bajuni Barrie▯r Island (Southern
Somalia):AFacies Model for Carbonate-Quartzose Sedimentation”, Geologica Romana, Vol. 35
(1999) Annex 86

FEDERICO CARBONE*, GIOVANNI ACCORDI*, ANTONELLO ANGELUCCI**,
RUGGERO MATTEUCCI**
*Centro di Studio per if Quatemar/'E\'0/u ~ihinlfa/e, C.N.R., Roma

**Dipartimento dScien ella 1i'ITa, Uni1·ersitlidegli SSapien~a aom,a

THE MODERN CORAL COLONIZATION OF THE BAJUNI BARRIER ISLAND

(SOUTHERN SOMALIA): A FACIES MODEL FOR CARBONATE-QUARTZOSE SEDIMENTATION

The Somali coast south of Kisimayo has been long investigated and a modern depomodel is proposed.

Several evolutive phases have been identified, corresponding to eustatic sea-level variations starting from isotope stage
5e. which led to the present coastal setting, characterized by mixed carbonsedimentation and conditio­
ned by climatic factors. The sea level fall below the continental shelf edge during the last glacial period caused subae­
rial exposure, erosion and weathering sedimentary substratum. As a consequence a braided fluvial net developed

on the coastal belt and coastal dune ridges migrated toward the shelfencing the distribution pattern
modern sedimentarynd ecological environments. Holocene inundation of the shelf caused the drowning of the
channels, the overflowinghe interdune areas. the formation of the Bajuni barrier island, of wide coastal lagoons and
channelized tidal flats. The relationnherited morphology. supply of terrigenous material and development of

coral communities is shown in a series of ecological profiles and sketch maps of facies distribution. The depositional
systemsof outer shelf, marine passes, coastal sound and braided channels have been investigated in detail in some key
areas.he types of coral colonization as well as their interaction with seagrass meadows have been examined. In outer
shelf corals grow in form of fringing reefs and coral carpets around the abraded flat of the islands and along some

morphological steps corresponding to old sea-level stillstands. In the marine passes crossing the barrier island, the hard
substrate is colonized by fringing and pinnacle reefs. coral carpets their distribution is controlled by the
energy dispersion the tidal currents. In the coastal sound corals grow to form at places small fringing reefs and car­
pets along the protected edgese islands and near the channel mouths, whereas patch and table reefs are found on

isolated erosion remnants inside widessodendron meadows. The braided channelized area of the coastal belt is
characterized by the developmentangal and salt flat depositional systems where the facies distribution is control­
led by the extensionthe tidal prism.

PAROLE CHJAVECoral reefharrier island, coastal environment, Somali coast, Indian Ocean, Holocene.

KEY WORDS: Scogliere coralline, harrier island, amhiente costiero, costa soma/a, Oceano lndimw, 0/ocene.

Introduction different textural facies characters, types of bottom
colonization and of coral associations. Furthermore an

This paper synthesizes data collected during the extensive survey carried out on the whole archipelago
investigations carried out in the 80's (Angelucci eta/., allowed to recognize the general development and the

1982; Angelucci et al. 1984; Carbone, 1987; Angelucci areal distribution of these depositional systems.

et al. 1987; Carbone and Matteucci, 1990; Carbone et The study of the modern coral reefs and of the
al., 1994) along the coastal belt of southern Somalia, Pleistocene reef terraces cropping out along the coast

from the Juba river to the Kenyan border (Fig. I). allowed to recognize a series of depositional phases
Purpose of this research is to define an evolutive which cannot be exactly placed in the stratigraphic

model of the modern depositional pattern in a compa­ record, but certainly connected to the sea-level fluc­
ratively unknown region characterized by a range of tuations since the last interglacial. These data are

elongate islands parallel to the shore, separated from synthesized in a series of schematized outlines consi­

the mainland by a narrow marine sound. sting of some maps of the main depositional environ­
During the Pleistocene and the Holocene, climate ments and of a series of ecological profiles which,

changes and sea-level fluctuations continuously modi­ besides having local meaning, provide also an exam­
fied the depositional environments by means of the ple of the sedimentary models developed along the

varying interaction of the skeletal carbonate with the southern Somali coast.
quartzose sedimentation. The main factors which con­

trol the sedimentary processes along this coastal belt
Geographical and geological setting
are referable to those involved in the barrier island
systems (Hoyt, 1967).

Different depositional systems have been deeply The Somali continental shelf of the Indian Ocean is
investigated in key areas of the archipelago to define for the most part narrow and its edge lies at compara-

GEOLOGICA ROMANA, 35: 111-149, 14 fig. 5 tav, Roma (1999)Annex 86

112 F CARBONE ET ALII

Pleistocene reef limestone covered
by co!ianite and mobile dunes

D !:~cdrt~~~i~sa~~~%:~;~~ce~:;mps

0 !Okm
Indian Ocean

Fig. I - Sketch map of the Bajuni Islands.

-Cartaschematica delle !sole Bajuni.

tively shallow depths, commonly between 60 m and Beyond this ridge the sea-floor reaches a depth of
I00 m, few km off the coast, where it turns into a short I00 m in less than 2 km and with similar gradients is

steeper slope. In places there appears to be no shelf connected to the Somali Basin (Fig. 2).
along straight stretchesof the coast, suggesting a fault Along the southern Somali coastal belt, the pre­
origin. Southwards, indentations of the coast generally sent-day geological setting has been closely related to

coincide with a widening of the shelf and appearance the recent, relative sea-level fluctuations. The modern
of insular strings. sedimentation takes place over a bedrock forming the
The coast extending from Kisimayo to the Kenyan coastal abraded shelf and channel and sea cliffs. It

border is characterized by two peculiar morphologic consists of the uppermost part of the Plio-Pleistocene
elements: the Bajuni Islands and three channels, con­ sedimentary succession of the Merka Formation made
nected with the sea through large mouths which are up of sands, shales and skeletal limestone, typical of

named, from north to south, Lac Badana, Lac Anole, paralic and shallow marine environments.
and Lac Busc Busc (Fig. I). These channels are cha­ For the African coast of the Indian Ocean, there is
racterized by the presence of three villages, respecti­ scarce radiometric age-dating of the uplifted Pleistoce­

vely Istanbul, Kudai and Burgao. ne coral reef terraces. Braithwaithe (1984) gave a com­
The flat coastal beltof the Kisimayo region shows plete descriptionof the depositional units outcropping
a marine carbonate substratum covered, near the sho­ along the Kenyan coast, reporting data from different
reline, by reddish soils and dune bodies and, inland, by authors (Hori, 1970; Toyah et al. 1973; Battistini,

alluvial and marshy deposits. An old dune ridge, made 1976) concerning the age-dating of the various terraces
up of poorly cemented, reddish, quartzose sand, sepa­ cropping out along the coast at different elevations.
rates a narrow coastal belt from the inland plain which Radiocarbon dating of the northernmost sector of the

is crossed by the three channels; the inner region Kenyan coast, scarce and poorly reliable, was general­
shows a sub-endorheic regime, with wide areas floo­ ly referred to the isotope stage 3 and thus not compati­
ded during the rainy seasons. ble with the sea-level position about 100 m b.p.s.l.

The Bajuni archipelago consists of a series of recognized by Colonna et al. (1996) on the basis of
islands, islets and skerries roughly aligned and parallel 23Th/ 23U age-dating of about 34,000 years BP of
to the coast. It extends for about 130 km from Kisi­ samples from the Mayotte Reef in the Cornaro Islands.

mayo to Burgao. Southwards, other islands are found Regarding the Somali coast, age dating is still
along the northern coast of Kenya from Ras Chiambo­ insufficient and not enough reliable; 23Th/ 23U age­
ne to Lamu. The islands are separated from the coast dating performed on Tridacna and massive coral sam­

by a narrow marine sound up to I0 m deep, ranging in ples from the coral reefs 5-6 m a.s.l. outcropping just
width from I to 3 km south to north. Water exchange south of Mogadishu produced conflicting dates of
between this sound and the open sea is allowed by 35,000 ± I000, 53,000 ± 2,000, I05,000 ± 3,000 and
shallow passes. 123,000 ± 5,000 years BP (unpublished data). Dates

Seawards of the islands, the continental shelf is obtained from the fossil reefs near Lamu are on the
limited by an elongated depression, 25-35 m deep, fol­ contrary all restricted to the isotopic stage 5, ranging
lowed by a narrow ridge coinciding with the shelf between I 09,000 ± 4,000 and 131,000 ± 5,000 years

edge. This ridge, 1.5-3 km wide, at places rises up to BP (unpublished data).
less than I0 m below sea level, showing axial depres­ The raised reef, which forms the coastal cliffs in
sions which are not corresponding to the passes cros­ the Bajuni region and into which various quarries in

sing the barrier island. the outskirts of Kisimayo are dug, shows a sequence, Annex 86

THE MODERN CORAL COLONIZATION OF THE BAlUN/ BARRIER ISLAND 113

6-7 m thick, of skeletal limestone characterized by rowing bivalves, both suspensivorous and detritus-fee­
well developed, domal-shaped coral colonies, often in ders (Tel/ina, Mactra, Loripes, Lucina and cardiids).
growth position, loose in a coarse skeletal sediment. Vegetarian and predator gastropods are also abundant

Sheety acroporids as well as crusty - massive and (trochids, naticids, conids). This 2 m thick mollusk
massive types prevail in the coral community (Favia, facies, indicativeof a protected lagoonal environment,
Favites, Goniopora, Porites). The top of the raised is gradually replaced, through a sandy layer rich in

reef is generally calichified and shows several cavities ostreids, by fine skeletal wackestone, 6-8 m thick, rich
filled with reddish sandy sediments. In places, such as in large specimens of the bivalve Anadara antiquata,
the levees of Lac Badana channel near the village of scattered or grouped in patches together with ostreids

Yamani, the sequence ends with rhodolith facies depo­ and red algae with columnar shape. This assemblage is
sited during a regressive phase linked to an interstadial indicative of quiet, shallow water environments in
period of the isotopic stage 5. backshore areas. The succession is topped by a thin

Fossil reefal bodies, scattered all along the coastal bioclastic layerof coral debris and mollusks (Codakia,
belt, are well exposed in the runway of the old airport Tel/ina and trochids) typical of back-reef vegetated
of Kisimayo, where coral colonies in growth position sandy bottoms. In different places south of Kisimayo,

can be seen on the landing surface. This coral facies is the top surface of the Pleistocene sedimentary sequen­
replaced by a shallow lagoonal sequence, well expo­ ce is topped by thin reddish paleosoils and deeply
sed in some backshore areas in the outskirts of Kisi­ bioeroded, specially by the boring action of clionids

mayo. At the Beder quarry the most complete sedi­ and lithophagous bivalves.
mentary succession, 9-10 m thick, crops out (Fig. 3 ). Along the coastal belt eolian sediments are wide­
A packstone layer at the bottom is characterized by spread and mostly consisting of reddish, siliciclastic,

spherical sandy concretions, 7-11 em in diameter, poorly cemented dunes and carbonate eolianites for­
strongly calichified, interpreted as internal moulds of ming ridges parallel to the coastline. The outermost of
coconuts (Carbone, 1987) and by internal moulds of these ridges shows fossil wave notches which prove a

bivalves and gastropods which testify beach environ­ recent progradation of the coastline. Mobile dune
ments. The overlying succession is made up of wacke­ fields of both quartzose and carbonate sand cover the
stone and packstone with gastropod and bivalve shells older eolian deposits.

and moulds, in places so abundant to form a coquina. The geology of the Bajuni islands is monotonous,
The fossil community consists of predominately bur- as they all are made up of eolianite reaching an eleva-

I3aJUI11
barncr tsland

Om

-I()()

-~00

Fig. 2- Block diagram of the Somali coast south of Kisimayo_

- Bloccodiagrammadella costa somata a sud di Kisimayo_Annex 86

114 F. CARBONE ET ALII

by monsoon winds. The country has an average
annual rainfall of about 250 mm with severe droughts

being quite common. The mean annual rainfall in the
north is less than 250 mm, about 400 mm in the south
G and 700 mm in the south-west (Fantoli, 1965;

NOAA, 1991; FAO, 1995). The rainfall distribution
is bimodal, falling in two seasons, the Gu from
10m
March to May and the Der from October to Novem­
ber. Occasionally the Gu season extends into June or
D July because of the Haggai rains which are produced
c A
by the onset of the moist onshore winds. The
I southernmost Somali coastal belt is then characteri­
B zed by the only rainy season of the Haggai rains, with
a I
an average annual rainfall of about 600-700 mm. The
Gu and Der rains are caused by the passage of the
Fig. 3 - Lithofacies of the Pleistocene sequence outcropping alInter Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) which fol­
coast south of Kisimayo: A) reef rudstone, locally bindstone with
encrusting corallinaceans and sheety corals; B) calichified waclows the apparent movement of the sun's zenith. The
with mollusk and coconut-limoulds; C) skeletal grainstoD): ITCZ is where the surface winds of the northern and
ostreidwackestone;E) rhodolithrudstoneF) reddish crust with
ostreids and encrusting corallinaceans: G) Acharina eolianite: southern hemispheres meet and then rise in a low
cemented, quartzose reddish sand:rbonate-quartmobile dunes pressure zone of considerable atmospheric instability.
with Achatina and Georgia shells. This instability causes rain to fall in isolated storm

- Litofacies della sequenza pleistocenica affiorante lungoud cells, the result of which in an extremely irregular
di Kisimayo: A) rudstone di scogliera, a luoghi bindstone con corallina­ion both in space and time. The ITCZ also
cee e coralli incrostanti; B) wackestone fortemente alterato con model­ the annual pattern of wind direction. From
li interni di molluschi e probabili noci di cocco: C) grainstone biocla­
May to September when the ITCZ is l5°N, the wind
stico: D) wackestonad ostreidi; E) rudstone a rodoliti; F) crosblows from the south-west and from December to
arrossate con ostreidi e corallinacee incrostanti; G) eolianiteFebruary when the ITCZ is 15°S, the wind blows pre­
na: H) sabbia rossastra quarzosa poco cementata: I) dune mobili carbo­
natico-quarzose ad Acharina e Georgia. dominately from the north-east. During the transitio­
nal periods (Tangambilis), the wind drops or becomes

erratic in direction.
The mean daily temperature is very constant throu­
tion of about I0 m a.s.l., usually covered by grassy ghout the year, the hottest months, March and April,

and shrubby vegetation. The well cemented eolianite being only a few degrees warmer than the coolest
of the islands shows evident cross-bedding episodes months, July and August. At Mogadishu the mean
separated by irregular erosive surfaces which reflect daily temperature ranges from 25.5°C to 32.2°C in

the discontinuous growth of the dune systems. Proces­ April and from 22.8°C to 28.3°C in July (NOAA,
ses of calichification and karstification are also evi­ 1991). However the diurnal temperature fluctuations
dent, especially in the most depressed areas where the are much greater and can range from 20°C to 35°C.

rock is topped by thin layers of red soil. Small mobile The mean daily relative humidity pattern is the oppo­
dunes accumulate on the landward side of the islands. site of the temperature pattern, with high humidity
The boundary between eolianite and underlying corresponding to low temperatures.

skeletal limestone is barely detectable on the islands, A noteworthy feature of the marine circulation
and only in rare cases can it be found at the base of the along the Somali coast is the presence of the Somali

seacliff, coinciding with the nearshore abraded flat. Of Current running parallel and close to the coast (Fig. 4).
paleoenvironmental interest is the finding at the base Though frequently strong, this current is actually a
of the eolianite of a Nautilus shell, commonly found narrow flow, so that at more than 100 miles offshore it

also nowadays along the Somali coast, blown by wind is often quite weak. To the south at about 2°S, along
even much beyond the seashore. the east African edge, variations in the coastal currents
In conclusion, the Bajuni archipelago is made up of throughout the year are only slight. To the north of that

a ridge of eolian sediments accumulated on the abra­ latitude, on the contrary, the Somali Current reverses
ded shelf surface after the sea-level fall below the in direction during the year, as do the monsoon winds
shelf edge during the last glacial period. of the area, but it does not necessarily change at the

same time.
In the investigated area the coastal currents flowing
Environmental parameters from south to north are stronger than the reversed

ones; as a matter of fact the spit at the mouth of the
The climate in Somalia is tropical, from arid to Juba river is very well developed northwards due to
semi-arid, with a bimodal rainfall pattern influenced the predominance of the southern coastal currents. Annex 86

THE MODERN CORAL COLONIZATION OF THE BAlUN/ BARRIER ISLAND 115

Constance of the current:
Low Medium High----+

Fig. 4-Water current patterns along the Somali coast during January and July.

- Flusso delle correnti marine lungoa somala in gennaio e luglio.

The sea surface temperature is warmest in April of the channels, the effect of the tidal streams becomes
and coldest in August, with a mean annual temperatu­ increasingly important.
re of 26°C. In August the water temperature is subject

to a sudden lowering along the northern coast of
Somalia with a minimum of 21 oc at Ras Hafun, Major environmental changes from
because of upwelling. High variations from normal Late Pleistocene to present-day

values are recorded in shallow water environments,
especially in the southernmost part of the Somali The geological setting of the Somali coast is the
coast, where the presence of wide floodable areas resultof the interaction between tectonics of the passi­
during the rainy season causes the drainage of fresh ve east African margin and recent sea-level fluctua­

water towards the sea. Thus temporary schizohaline tions. Regarding the southern Somali coast, the depo­
environments develop along the channels and near sitional event sequence documented by sea-level
their mouths, with water temperatures varying several indicators, such as the height of fossil raised reefs,

degrees from mean values. wave-cut notches and bioeroded surfaces, cannot be
Mixed, semi-diurnal, and diurnal tides occur in the definitely placed in the Pleistocene-Holocene strati­
Indian Ocean (Anonymous, 1980). Tidal exchange in graphic record because of insufficient age dating.
230 34
coastal waters of the western Indian Ocean is charac­ Nevertheless, some still unpublished ThJ2 U dating
terized by a mean tidal level of 1.9 m and a tidal range of massive corals and Tridacna shells from Mogadishu
of 4.0 m. These tides cause strong localized currents to and Lamu areas places the older reef cycle cropping

flow in breaks around the islands and the reefs that are out along the coast between 105,000 and 131,000
superimposed onto the overall longshore current. On years BP. Thus, assuming the relative stability of the
the east African coast, the tide range increases from Somali coast, a connection can be hypothesized

South Africa (1.5- 2m) to Mozambique (up to 5.5 m), between a basal transgressive episode and the deposi­
then decreases to 3 - 3.5 m in Kenya, and to 1.5 m in tional event of the last interglacial period of the isoto­
Somalia, at 11°N. The tidal streams are generally weak pe stage 5. In the investigated area several evolutive
phases have been identified, corresponding to eustatic
along the Somali coast, except very close inshore,
where the currents are comparatively strong and sea-level variations starting from isotope stage 5e (See
subject to considerable variation with changing of the enclosed chart):
wind. The effect of the tidal streams on the resultant

water flow is negligible at more than a few miles off­ Marine transgression - Sea level rise during isoto­
shore. South of Kisimayo, in the vicinity of the outlets pe stage 5e with landward migration of a fringing reefAnnex 86

116 F CARBONE ET ALII

complex made up of variously sized buildups, often of beachrock took place just above the present sea­
with bindstone texture. They pass laterally to coarse level; abraded flats and wave notches were cut also in

skeletal grainstone and rudstone, overlying beach the inner areas of the channels. In places coral knobs,
ridge facies. The development of protected lagoonal patch reefs and fringing reefs started growing.
environments during this period is proved by muddy
deposits rich in gastropod and bivalve communities Present-day sea-level stillstand- The present facies

(Anadara antiquata, Lopha cristagalli) in the outskirts pattern has been reached in very recent times, fol­
of Kisimayo. lowing a regressive tendency, marked by accretionary
beach ridges, long shore bars and wide tidal bars deve­

Interstadial forced regression - Sea-level drop with loped at the outlets of the channels. The presence of
progressive migration of the fringing reef complex partially buried old notches, bordering the mangal flat
towards the shelf edge during the isotope stage5. This landward, suggests a prograding tendency of the coa­

phase is shown by the deposition of muddy sand at the stal area. Today, many areas inside the Bajuni sound
top the coraf reef complex and of rubble with abun­ appear to be shallowing, with increase of the mangro­
dant rhodoliths forming a marine regressive surface ve colonization and decrease of the coral community
along the banks of Lac Badana. in favour of Thalassodendron meadows.

Sea-level fall below the shelf edge - During the last
glacial period the sea level reached a minimum of 145 Sedimentary facies and bottom colonization

m b.p.s.l. about 18,500 years BP (Colonna et al.,
1996), i.e. far below the shelf edge. As a consequence, Depending on the type of depositional substratum
a long subaerial exposure of the continental shelf sur­ and of corresponding biota, a series of sedimentary
face occurred, with subsequent erosion and weathe­ facies, shown by ecological profiles, has been defined,

r·mg; a braided fluvial net developed, with its base forming as a whole the barrier island model. Localiza­
level lower than the present one, and dune ridges tion and extension of these facies are different, some
migrated towards the shelf edge. of them being ubiquitous and widespread both inside

and outside the island ridge, some other being on the
Sea-level bypass of the shelf edge - The rapid sub­ contrary indicative of specific morphologic and ener­
mergence of the east African coast during the Holoce­ getic characters of the substratum. They are connected
ne rise caused the inundation of the Bajuni shelf, cha­ to different bottom types: sandy bottoms, either mobi­

racterized by the presence of a submerged ridge along le or stabilized by marine vegetation; abraded hard
the shelf edge. Hopley (1994) found a similar morpho­ bottoms, with poor or lacking sediment cover and
logic setting in the Great Barrier Reef and according finally bottoms colonized by corals forming different

to him this ridge, whose base is located 20 m b.p.s.l., types of buildups.
could indicate the foundation site of the modern reef,
which probably begun 8,000 years BP. The lowermost I) Washed sandy beach - The side of the islands

part of this submerged ridge could also represent towards the open sea shows wide high energy beaches
either the outermost dune ridge connected to the pre­ alternating with cliffs cut into the Pleistocene well
vious continental phase or the accumulation of subma­ cemented eolianites. The present-day wave notch bor­
rine skeletal sand banks (Halimeda banks) connected ders an abraded flat with wide areas emerging during

to the first phase of the shelf recolonization (Orme et low tide and with variously sized, steep sided pits,
al., 1978; Marshall and Davies, 1988). In fact the coral whose bottom depth sometimes exceeds the low tide
growth during the initial phase of the inundation level. The cliffs are steep and the wave notch at their

seems to be negligible because of probable high water base shows the effects of boring and grazing. The bea­
turbidity deriving from reworking of previously depo­ ches consist of well rounded, variously grained skele­
sited soil and regolith and of upwelling of cool sub­ tal sand (Pl. 5, Fig. F) and show different profiles of
surface water reaching the shelf edge. Some morpho­ equilibrium due to wave energy and their position

logical steps parallel to the coast in outer shelf areas respect to the main wind directions.
can be related to stillstands during this phase.
2) Millepora and alcyonarian sandy bottom - In
Flooding of the Pleistocene shelf- The complete
outer shelf areas near the islands, flat or gently dipping
inundation of the Pleistocene shelf causes the drow­ sandy bottoms, ranging in depth from 4 to 10 m, are
ning of the channels cut during the lowstand period characterized by large, isolated colonies of Millepora
and the overflowing of the interdune areas. This cau­ (M. cf. platyphylla), showing globular or cylindrical

ses the formation of the Bajuni barrier island, of wide shape and a size range of 2-4 m in diameter and 1-2 m
coastal lagoons and channelized tidal flats. About in height; colonies of branching alcyonarians are also
5000 years BP the sea level reached the height of frequent with similar sizes. Small thickets of bran­
about 2 m a.p.s.l. (Carbone, 1987) and the deposition
ching Acropora, poorly developed in height and patch Annex 86

THE MODERN CORAL COLONIZATION OF THE BAlUN/ BARRIER ISLAND 117

Fig. 5 -Aeriphoto-mosaic of the northernmost
part of Bajuni Islands.

- Foto-mosaicodel settore piu settentrionale
delle Isole Bajuni

reefs are sporadic, of small size and made up of are colonized by a flourishing coral community of
various species of poritids, faviids and crustose coral­ massive and crustose forms (poritids, faviids, hyd­
nophorids) and by colonies with short and stout bran­
linaceans.
These sandy bottoms, where phanerogam vegeta­ ches, mainly pocilloporids. Rich fungiid communities
tion is absent or very scarce, either pass gradually to thrive on bottoms covered with dead coral.
shallower vegetated areas, or border the outer slope of

the fringing reefs off the islands, as at Ilisi (Fig. 7C). 3) Rippled skeletal sandy bottom - In correspon­
Furthermore they alternate at places with raised, flat dence of the inlets crossing the island ridge, where the
hard bottoms, some hundreds of meters wide, which substrate deepens to 5-7 m assuming a channel

can reach the sea surface and are surrounded by steep morphology with a flat bottom, washed and coarse
walls. An encrusting community of corallinaceans sandy sediments are deposited to form lunate megarip­
characterizes these hard surfaces, whereas the walls ples perpendicular to the flow direction. Some widerAnnex 86

118 F.CARBONE ET ALII

and shallower reaches of these inlets are covered with Towards the outlets, in areas of scarce sand accumula­
Thalassodendron seagrass beds crossed by small-scale tion, the abraded bedrock is colonized by encrusting

braided sandy channels characterized by ripple red algae, thin algal mats trapping fine sediment, and
systems. small scattered coral colonies; the cliffs bordering the
abraded flat are colonized by Saccostrea cuccullata,

4) Sandy tail - Wide tidal flats close to the islands barnacles and boring bivalves (Lithophaga and
are built by sandy bodies crossing the sound, characte­ Gastrochaena ).
rized by deposition of both mud and skeletal grains.
8) Channel bottom - Two different sedimentary
The proportions of the two components evidence a
cyclic deposition connected with tidal currents or sea­ patterns characterize the subtidal channel environ­
sonal trends, but usually this character is hidden by ments: in the high subtidal zone, sedimentation is
intense bioturbation by infauna, shown by abundant dominated by sand showing different sorting, while in

mounds on the surface (Pl. 2, Fig. A). the deepest zone of the channels, where maximum
flow speed on the water/sediment interface is reached,
5) Bryozoan sandy bottom - The bottoms of the washed coarse sand is deposited. The sediment grain

sound facing the channel mouths and ranging 8-10 m size and composition are very variable, depending on
in depth are generally characterized by bioclastic water energy degree and in situ production of carbona­
washed sands rich in bryozoans, mostly of reteporid te biogenic grains (Fig. 14 ). The carbonate/quartz
type. The grains are rounded, polished and often stai­ grain ratio normally increases towards the mouth of

ned by oxides. Part of this sediment originates from the channels (See enclosed chart). The coarser grain
productive surrounding areas and hosts epibiontic fraction is mainly made up of thin shell bivalves, bryo­
organisms such as bryozoans, polychaetes, encrusting zoans (Pl. 5, Fig. C) and at places abundant Halimeda

foraminifers and red algae. The bryozoan colonies are remains. The foraminiferal assemblage gradually
frequently broken, but well preserved colonies of rete­ increases seawards, including miliolids, textulariids,
porid forms are also found, showing the typical folia­ soritids,Amphistegina, Heterostegina, Ammonia and
te, at times convolute, morphology of the zoaria. The the epiphytes Rosalina and Planorbulina; their tests

textural characters of these sediments are typical of are often abraded and black stained.
environments subject to tractive currents generated by
tides through the channel mouths. 9) Salt flat - High intertidal-supratidal areas with

sabkha characters are found in some areas of the old
6) Tidal delta -Where the channels flow in the beach ridge along the coastal sound, as well as in areas
sound, wide and shallow mobile sandy bodies are built connecting the mangal flat of the channe\ with the
by a mixture of carbonate and quartz grains to form inland, showing at places a wide areal development

accretionary tidal bars and shoals widely emerged at (Pl. 3, Fig. A). In these areas processesof evaporative
low tide (Fig. 6). The surface of these shoal deltas pumping, deflation and adhesion of eolian sediment
shows the typical sedimentary pattern described by are common. Arid and semi-arid conditions cause a

Evans et a!. (1973) in the Persian Gulf and by Davies sedimentry pattern to develop, characterized by diffe­
(1970) in western Australia. Seawards sandy deposits rent types of algal mats and sedimentary structures
form swash bars and linear tidal shoals, often associa­ already described for the Persian Gulf (Purser, 1973),
ted with sets of both symmetrical and asymmetrical western Australia (Davies, 1970) and Andros Island

megaripples. (Hardie, 1977).

7) Channel bank - The channel levees are general­ I0) Thalassodendron meadow with scattered coral

ly characterized by medium to fine grained sandy knobs and heads - Seagrass beds are widespread in
deposits (Pl. 5, Fig. E). The sediment grain size and shallow water areas of both outer shelf and coastal
composition are very variable, depending on water sound, where the genus Thalassodendron is common

energy degree and on in situ production of carbonate on flat bottoms lying at shallow depths of 1-6 m, with
biogenic grains. The muddy flats of the mangals are medium to high water energy. These phanerogams,
replaced by wide sandy bodies towards the channels' typical of sandy-gravely bottoms, but able to colonize
mouths, where production of skeletal sediment is high hard bottoms as well (Fig. 7B), are usually very thick

and tidal currents are strong. Here the channel banks and resistant to high water energy and to partial subae­
are covered with swash bars alternating with shoals rial exposure at low tide. The substrateof the meadow
highly burrowed by small crabs and with asymmetric is more elevated than the surrounding, unvegetated sea
ripples orientated according to the tidal flow. Small floor, which is either covered by rubble and coarse

washover fans built by skeletal sand and muddy depo­ skeletal sediment or shows the rocky bottom. These
sits characterize the protected areas at the backof the depressed areas are at places colonized by coral pat­
bars, where small sheltered schizoaline ponds coloni­ ches and knobs of varying sizes which at times reach

zed by Terebralia and small gastropods are found. the sea surface; The top surfaces assume a microatoll- Annex 86

THE MODERN CORAL COLONIZATION OF THE BAlUN! BARRIER ISLAND 119

]
05

=
-" '"
co "'
u "'
." u
'0 "'
." '6
0 u1.)
E <-2
6 ..:;:
.c "0::;
0.. 0
~ ·~
0
-I E
-o 6
u.
u"" I

like morphology, clearly depressed in the middle and and alternates with abundant encrusting red algae.
colonized along the peripheric ridge. The coral asso­ Dead corals are intensely bioeroded by lithophagous

ciation consists of crusty, plate-like and massive forms bivalves, clionid sponges and polychaetes. Coral colo-Annex 86

120 F CARBONE ET ALII

inhibited by wave action and tidal currents, whereas
nization inside the meadows is on the contrary very
scarce except for some heads of Galaxea fascicularis crustose coralline algae, vermetids and scarce crustose
and isolated colonies of Millepora (Pl. 1, fig. A, B). In corals, mainly poritids and faviids grow on the flat and
high subtidal zones, where seagrass is thin, free-living rough surface. In the most protected areas they form

corals, mostly Goniopora stokesi, are subject to shif­ small reefs in association with small colonies of pocil­
ting by waves. The competition between phanerogams loporids and acroporids. The colonization is further­
and corals for the bottom colonization is mostly con­ more achieved by scattered tufts of Halimeda and Sar­
trolled by the hydrodynamism occurring inside the gassum and veneers of crustose corallinaceans. Small

meadow (Angelucci et al., 1982). The speed of the depressed zones, characterized by decrease in water
water flow crossing the seagrass beds decreases due to energy, are covered with coarse deposits of coral frag­
the resistance offered by plant blades, with subsequent ments and rounded lithoclasts encrusted by red algae,

decrease of suspended load and deposition of sediment vermetids and foraminifers; bioerosion is intense,
which is trapped by thick vegetation. mostly by clionids and polychaetes. The largest peb­
bles show a rough surface hosting dense aggregates of
11) Mangal.flat - Low energy intertidal environ­ the foraminifer Haddonia cf. torresiensis. Where

ments, located in the most protected areas of the sound water energy is particularly high, only boulders and
and along the channel banks (Pl. 4, fig. A), are subject rhodoliths 5-7 em large accumulate (Fig. 8A). Their
to widespread colonization by mangroves. They thrive shape is subsphaerical or slightly flattened, the surface

both in protected areas of some islands and along the is smooth or globular and the nucleus usually consists
coast of the mainland, especially in coves and beach of a coral fragment.
ridges, where high accumulation rates of the sediment
causes the rapid progradation of the coastline and sub­ 13) Fringing reef- Well developed coral buildups,

sequent set-up of marshy environments in the back­ showing a typical fringing reef zonation, are set up in
shore. Also the intertidal abraded flats facing the chan­ shallow water in coincidence with morphologic steps
nels are widely colonized by red mangroves marking the outer edge of the abraded flat of some
(Avicennia and Rhizophora) and are bordered inland islands (Fig. 7C). A reef wall, usually very steep, sepa­

by old wave notches, passing to the wind scoured rates the back reef - reef flat zones, 20-100 m wide,
bedrock surface where acacia and baobab grow. At from the fore reef sandy bottom, 5-12 m deep. The
places mangals are backed landward by narrow belts short distance between reef and shore and the scarce

with salt flat characters. The development of a compli­ lateral extension of the coral fringes inhibits the deve­
cated aerial root system further favours the energy lopment of real lagoonal environments which are
decrease, allowing the deposition of muddy sediment. replaced by very shallow back reef flat areas. Here the
The substrate is generally rich in organic substances coral community gradually decreases on behalf of

due to large accumulation especially of underground phanerogams and algae which characterize the bottom
portions of roots; the mud is dark and its disturbance closer to the shore.
produces a strong smell of hydrogen sulphide, indica­
ting the anaerobic environment. Mangrove roots emer­
14) Coral fringe and carpet - Along the edges of
ging at low tide are encrusted by Saccostrea cucculla­ the widest passes and inside the sound, on the edges
ta (Pl. 4, fig. C), barnacles, tubicolous polychaetes and of the abraded flat surrounding the islands, along
bored by clionid sponges, whereas Littorina cf. scabra some stretches of the mainland shelf, where morpho­

lives on trunks and leaves, even when completely logy and water energy degree are favourable, a coral
emerged. Saccostrea flourishes in the low and middle community thrives, forming coral carpets, small frin­
intertidal zone in front of the channels and suddenly ging reefs and patch reefs (Fig. 8C) of varying size.
decreases towards inner areas. In sheltered muddy bot­ On the submerged shelf separating the island coast

toms of mangrove thickets, where semi-permanent from the passes, two depositional environments are
pools persist during low tides, the infauna is domina­ set up: an inner one, characterized by a discontinuous
ted by the fiddler crab Uca (Pl. 4, fig. E), while the veneer of muddy-sandy sediment at places stabilized

gastropod Nerita occupies the peripheral part of the by Syringodium seagrass; an outer one, where a
mangal flat. The inter-mangrove pools are highly discontinuous coral colonization is performed by
populated by potamiid Terebralia palustris, Cerithidea small-sized Pocilloporids, Poritids, Hydnophorids,
decollata and by an infauna of polychaetes and crabs Faviids and Milleporids. Small colonies of soft corals

(Pl. 4, Fig. B). are also frequent, together with corallinaceans, codia­
ceans and Halimeda. Where conditions are particu­
12) Encrusted hard bottom - Wide areas ranging in larly favourable, real fringing reefs develop on the
depth from 0 to 3 m show a hard abraded bottom edge of these flats, consisting of successive coral

lacking sedimentary cover at all. Such a type of bot­ generations and showing a clear zonation from the
tom is mainly found along the barrier island, in interti­ reef front to the reef flat. Growth and diversification
dal, open marine areas (Fig. 8B). Sedimentation is of corals are variable according to water energy and Annex 86

THE MODERN CORAL COLONIZATION OF THE BAlUN/ BARRIER ISLAND 121

Ciovai Is.

Open shelf¢

MHT
Thalassodendron meadow

¢:J Coastal sound Open shcl fQ
MHf
Composite patch reef
Thalassodendronmeadow

!
E

B 100mw1dth

¢:J llisi Island
Opcnshclf ¢
')
MilT
Corallinacean reef flat

100m width

Leafy coral Galaxea
shccty coral,~:· Goni:strea Plat_vgyra Fat'ffes

BranchingAcropora Small flattenedAcropora Massive Porites BranchingPorites Millepora

Sarcophyton Encrusting corallinacean Articulate corallinacean Halimeda ill Caulerpa

Thalassodendron,.:[2_ Echinoid Strombid Bivalve Barnacle Chiton Burrow Vennctid

Fig. 7- Schematic cross sections showing the relationships between suhstratum and living community: A) washed sandy beach on the seaward side of

Ciovai: B) tlat bottom colonized by Thalassodendron seagrass, scattered composite patch reefs and coral knobs: C) Ilisi fringing reef showing the
highest coral diversification observed in the archipelago.

- Profili schematici mostranti le relazioni tra substrato e comunita vivente:) spiaggia sabbiosa ad alta energia sui Jato verso mare dell'isola di Cio­

vai: B) fondale pianeggiante colonizzato da una prateria aThalassodendron e da patch reef e knob corallini; C) scogliera a frangia di Ilisi mostrante Ia
piu alta diversificazione corallina osservata nell'arcipelago.Annex 86

122 F. CARBONE ET ALII

Rocky bottm awash

¢:l Coastalsound Openshelf ¢

MHT

!
E

Outer shelf ¢
'¢:l Coastalsound
MHT
Low tide emerging hard bottom
Scarcely colonized abraded tlat

200m \\ldth

B

Cuvumbi Is.

:lcropora and 1i1hipora
¢:1(_'oastal sound reef flat
.\tin

"0
E

Branching Acropora Small flattened Acropora
c

Massive Porites Branching P(Jn/es Porites micrnatoll Tuhipora

Mi/lepora Sarcoph_J·ton ~'6":· Encrusted coral tfagmcnt
Encrustingcorallinaccan

Rhodolith Horny sponge Vcnnctid Scagrass bed Tha!assodendron bed

Fig. 8- Schematic cross sections showing the relationships between substratum and living community: A) rock emerging at low tide on the seaward

side of Fuma Island. The continuous wave shifting on the sea-floor is respomible for the scarce coral cover and the growth of rhodoliths; B) unpro­
tected rough sea-tloor. partially emerging at low tide, near a marine passof Cuvumbi Island. The bottom is scarcely colonized by small coral colonies,
encrusting corallinaceans and vermetids; C) small fringing reef on the western side of Cuvumbi Island, facing the pass. Different types of branching

Acropora characterize the reef crest and reef tlat.

- Profili schematici mostranti le relazioni tra substrato e comunita vivente: A) scoglio a fior d'acqua sui Jato esterno dell'Jsola di Fuma. La continua
agitazione del fondo ad opera delle onde ecausa della scarsa copcrtura corallina e della crescita di rodoliti; B) fondale non protetto accidentato, affio­
rante in bassa marea, in prossimita di un canale di marea dell"lsola di Cuvumbi. II fondo e scarsamente colonizzato da piccole colonie di corallo, da

corallinacee incrostanti e vermetidi; C) piccola scogliera a frangia sui Jato occidentale dell' Isola di Cuvumbi prospiciente il canale di marea. Diverse
specie di Acropora ramificata caratterizzano il reef crest ed il reef !lat. Annex 86

THE MODERN CORAL COLONIZATION OF THE BAlUN/ BARRIER ISLAND
123

turbidity which is often responsible for the develop­ whereas they are backed by quartzose-carbonate sand
ment of oligotypic associations of the most adaptable which in turn passes landward to mud with Terebralia

species. Some coral fringes, especially those on the palustris (Pl. 4, fig. B).
protected side of the islands, show a clear coral zona­
tion. Along the mainland coast, in the areas subject to
the currents flowing from the channels, the coral
Depositional environments derived from selected
cover is on the contrary scarce and restricted to the type areas
high intertidal narrow belt.
South of Kisimayo, the modern sedimentary pat­

I5)Acropora pinnacle reef- Some rocks, reaching tern developed both on the coastal belt and the conti­
the width of some tens of metres, rise from the bottom nental shelf is highly controlled by the presence of the
of the deepest (about I0 m) passes. When the top sur­ Bajuni island ridge, aligned parallel to the coast. The

face of these rocks does not exceed the low tide level, depositional systems developed seaward of the archi­
it is covered with a flourishing coral community (Fig. pelago show the characters of a shallow water open
I0). Where tidal currents allow water exchange platform, where sedimentation is mostly controlled by
without strong energy increases, very large colonies of the interaction of the depositional interface with the

Acropora hyacinthus grow on the top surface in wide fair weather wave base (FWWB) and the storm wave
umbrellas leaning out of the edges. The walls of the base (SWB). The landward zone shows more complex
~ock' \~',c~lonized by mighty colonies of Acropora characters, as it includes both a depositional SJ'S.t.t'.w

sp. with stout branches reaching 30 em in diameter, typical of a coastal sound (Fig. 5) and another one of
forming large colonies which expand outside in search channelized tidal flat developed beyond the coastline
of light. as their growth is hampered by the overlying (Fig. 6). The present-day morphology, partially inheri­
Acropora hyacinthus. These two species are predomi­ ted from the Pleistocene modelling of the shelf, plays

nant and only few left spaces are occupied by other a basic role in the facies distribution. In the areas close
branched (Acropora spp., Pocillopora spp.) and cru­ to the islands and inside the sound, the facies distribu­
stose (Poritids,Hydnophora) coral colonies. tion is influenced by the presence of inlets crossing the

island ridge which allow water exchange even in the
16) Composite patch reef and table reef- In many inner zones of the sound during the tide flows.
places inside the coastal sound, usually in correspon­ In the outer shelf, off the step corresponding to the

dence of the largest passes, patch reefs grow, showing low tide level, other stepsoccur parallel to the islands,
different coral assemblages.The maximum coral bloo­ probably suggesting past sea-level stillstands and
ming is reached only in the upper part of the walls, influencing both biota and sediment distribution. The
whereas it decreases rapidly downward and inward. mainland is bordered by a wide abraded flat, running

Sheltered, elevated flat sea floors, originated by inhe­ both along the coast and the channel levees, characte­
rited morphological highs, show a typical feature of rized by the development of mangal and salt flat
table reefs (Fig. 9C), schematized for the Bermuda systems, specially along the channels.

platform (James, 1983). Different coral communities Our investigation mainly concerned shallow water
develop along the walls, 5-6 m high: branching Acro­ environments of the innermost zone of the continental
pora assemblages prevail on the landward side, whe­ shelf, such as the channelized coastal belt, the coastal
reas leafy and plate-like communities are common on sound and the barrier island, whereas in the outer shelf

the seaward side (Pl. 1, Fig. E). they were limited to the bottoms near the islands up to
the depth of I0 m. For a better knowledge of the main
17) Saccostrea reef- Scattered small buildups with depositional systems, a series of key areas was chosen

domal shape, up to I m high, of successive genera­ whose sedimentological and ecological characters are
tions of Saccostrea cuccullata (Pl. 4, fig. D) are found representative for the whole archipelago.
where mangrove trees thin out, on a wide intertidal
flat separating the channel from the land. This flat

consists of the Pleistocene bedrock and is locally The outer shelf
blanketed by sandy sediment. The Saccostrea buildu­
ps are often arranged in strings parallel to the levee on The part of the shelf seawards of the islands starts

the channel bank; the shells adapt themselves to the with a flat bottom extending for a width of less than I
substrate without a preferential orientation and are km. Itis bordered by a straight edge at the depth of I0
locally associated with Nerita, barnacles and poly­ m and has a gently dipping topography characterized
chaetes. This facies is particularly widespread at Lac by low morphologic steps parallel to the coast and

Busc Busc, just north of Ras Bobo, in the belt small channels perpendicular to the coast, frequently
between the channel and the mangal. Here the Sacco­ corresponding with the tidal inlets crossing the island
strea reefs are bordered towards the channel by a sub­ ridge. A wide depressed area follows, reaching the

tidal zone covered with sand stabilized by seagrass, depth of 25-35 m and a variable width of 0.5-3 km.Annex 86

124 F. CARBONE ET ALII

Kuantie Is.

'¢:l Coastal sound

MilT

Porites lutea
knob

Cuvumbi Is.

A
'¢J Coastal sound
MHT

Scarcely colonized hard bottom

200m wtdth

B

~ Mainland HasanIslandpassQ
MilT
Abraded flat colonizbyfree-living corals and red algae
Acropora and Millepora

c

Sheely coral Massive Porites BranchingPorites I~J Massive Faviid Free-living coral

Platygyra Plate-like coral Plate-likePavuna Millepora ~ Small flattened Acropora

Encrusting corallinacean
BranchingAcropora Massive Porites knob Articulatecoralhnacean

Rhodolith ill Caulerpa Halimeda i.(•JGastropod L!Ji:- Barnacle Chiton

Fig. 9- Schematic cross sections showing the relationships between substratum and living community: A) ecologic profile of the shallow shelf on the
landward side of Kuantie Island. The relatively quiet water environment favours the growth of flourishing thickets of branching Acropora; B) sea-tloor

morphology and colonization of a high water energy marine pass on the northern side of Cuvumbi Island; C) table reef in the coastal sound near Hasan
Island.Acropora and Millepora rim a wide tlat area where algae and free-living corals grow.

- Profili schematici mostrantie relazioni tra substrato e comunita vivente: A) fondale di acque basse sui lata protetto dell'isola di Kuantie. L'ambien­
te relativamente tranquillo consente lo sviluppo di rigogliosi boschetti di Acropora ramificata; B) morfologia del fondo e colonizzazione di un canale
di marea ad alta energia lungo Ia costa settentrionale di Cuvumbi; C) table reef sviluppato nel braccio di mare costiero presso !'isola di Hasan. Acro­

pora e Millepora bordano un'ampia zona piatta occupata da alghe e coralli «free-living>>. Annex 86

THE MODERN CORAL COLONIZATION OF THE BAlUN/ BARRIER ISLAND 125

file of these remnants is marked, on the side facing the
island, by a pronounced wave notch showing several
cavities bioeroded by chitons, whereas encrusting

organisms, such as ostreids and balanids, are rare. The
wide intertidal sandy share of the beach is connected
landward to accumulations of skeletal, sometimes

coarse sediment at places stabilized by shrubby vege­
tation. This sediment can extend up to the fossil notch
of the island. The share of the beach which is always

submerged is separated by the previous one by a nar­
row channel, about I m wide, covered with skeletal
sandy sediment washed, well rounded and rippled.

15m width The loose sediment is gradually stabilized seawards by
Thalassodendron seagrass.
Stout brano.:hmg Acrnpora
The llisi Island fringing reef Located some km

flJdllllphora south of Ras Mtuni, Ilisi is the northernmost of the
small islands forming the Bajuni archipelago (Fig.
7C). Seaward it is bordered by a shelf 500-600 m
Fig. I0 - Pinnacle reef extensively topped by large umbrellas of Acro­
pora hvacinthus overgrowing on stout branched Acropora sp. colowide, with a large intertidal belt and connected throu­
/.ing the steep walls. gh a steep reef wall to a sandy floor 8-12 m deep. The
following facies belts were recognized along a cross
- Scogliera a pinnacolo copertaandi colonie ad ombrello di Acro­
pora h\'(/cinthus ricoprente verso l'esterno colonie di Acropora sp. dairom the sea to the coast (See enclosed chart):
rami tozzi che colonizzaareti subverticali.
Fore reef- It ranges in depth from 8 to 12 m and is

made up of a flat sandy floor, characterized by Mille­
pora and alcyonarian facies. The bioclastic sediment
shows a significant percent of aragonite spicules of

Further out the bottom is shallowing again up to less alcyonarians and a very little percent of non carbonate
than I0 m, forming a ridge coinciding with the edge of material.
the continental shelf.

The facies distribution around the islands is subject Reeffront - The wall is very steep, at places almost
to the competition of Thalassodendron meadows vs. vertical and shows high coral cover mainly in the
coral colonization. The former covers wide areas of middle-upper portion. The lower portion is covered

the flat substratum close to the islands, the latter deve­ with carpets of soft corals, mainly Sarcophyton, with
lops in form of small fringing reefs and knobs espe­ single colonies, very short and crustose, forming a
cially on morphologic steps and along the passes. The complete cover of the substratum even for several

areal distribution of these communities is closely con­ square metres. Empty spaces are occupied by crustose­
trolled by the way in which wave energy is dissipated foliaceous corals (Montipora, Hydnophora, Echinopo­
and therefore by the distance of the breaker zone from ra), small tufts of acroporids with short and stout bran­
ches, small emispherical massive corals (Favia,
the coastline. In the belt ranging in depth from 0 to 12
m, five main depositional facies can be distinguished: Favites, Porites) and heads of Galaxea fascicularis.
washed sandy beach (FI ); Millepora and alcyonarian The abundance of soft coral carpets is not only due to
sandy bottom (F2); Thalassodendron meadow with their ability to colonize or recolonize empty spaces,

scattered coral knobs and heads (F I0); encrusted hard but also to the lack of active competitors and to the
bottom (FI2); fringing reef (FI3). The following two scarce action of predators. In the middle-upper portion
type-sites of Ciovai and Ilisi are representative respec­ of the reef wall soft corals are gradually replaced by

tively of a high water energy beach (FI ), and of a well colonies of branching Porites.
developed fringing reef (Fl3).
Reef crest - It widens out for about 30 m and is den­

The Ciovai Island beach. This is one of the longe­ sely covered with a coral carpet of mainly monospe­
st islandsof the archipelago and its eastern side shows cific branched Porites colonies reaching a width of
a wide beach whose sandy sediments (FI) cover part some tens of square metres. The most common spe­

of an abraded flat extending for a width of about 600 cies is Porites somaliensis, characterized by short and
m up to the breaker zone (Fig. 7A). Isolate erosion stout branches with rounded tips, sometimes club­
remnants occur along the coastline, showing at their shaped. Large colonies of Millepora platyphylla and
rare tufts of small flattened Acropora cf. hyacinthus
seaward base a trottoir of corallinaceans and verme­
tids, emerged at low tide. The highly asymmetric pro- and Favites (Pl. I, fig. F) are found together. Crusto-Annex 86

126 F CARBONE ET ALII

se-foliaceous (Montipora, Montastraea) and crustose produced by tidal currents and waves crossing the bar­
or crustose-massive (Hydnophora, faviids) corals thri­ rier island causes the set up of different facies, among

ve in cavities, whereas small clumps of Acropora which common are: rippled skeletal sandy bottom
palifera gradually replace colonies towards the reef (F3); encrusted hard bottom (FI2); coral fringe and
flat. The reef crest and the slope are repeatedly cut by carpet (FI4); Acropora pinnacle reef (Fl5). Cuvumbi

shallow channels perpendicular to the edge and wide­ island and Chete Chete rocks type-sites are representa­
ning towards the fore reef. Their bottom is covered tive of various features of coral colonization (F14).
with coarse bioclastic material, whereas nearby zones
are covered with broken coral branches encrusted by The Cuvumbi island coral fringe. Cuvumbi is part

corallinaceans. of a group of islets and ledges located south of Ciovai
(Fig. 8C). After the pass separating the islands of
Reef flat - The sea-floor of this zone shows a progres­ Bagadini and Kinene, the archipelago bifurcates to

sive decrease of the coral cover, consisting of small form two alignments of which Cuvumbi is the outer
colonies of massive forms of Favia, Goniopora, Pori­ one. The sea-floor near the islands shows a wide­
tes, Platygyra, small scattered heads of Galaxea fasci­ spread, recent coral colonization, mainly developed in

cularis, Lobophyllia and Tubipora, tufts of Acropora sheltered areas far from the wave action but connected
and crustose-massive forms, among which Hydnopho­ with the passes which provide water exchange with
ra is frequent,. Empty spaces are encrusted by coralli­ the open sea (See enclosed chart). The coral distribu­
naceans or covered with coarse bioclastic sediment of tion is then subject both to the sea-floor morphology

coral remains and mollusk shells encrusted by coralli­ and to water energy. Between the wave protected coast
naceans and polychaetes and densely bored by clio­ of Cuvumbi and the awash substratum encompassing
nids, siphunculids, etc.Very abundant ophiuroids live the isletsof Hasan and Kuantie, a shallow water area
in cavities of the rough substratum.
shows highly diversified coral facies (Fig. 9A; Pl. I,
fig. C). The areal distributionof corals is mainly con­
Back reef- Most of the flat surface facing the island ditioned by the presence of two passes cut into both
shore is covered with a dense Thalassodendron mea­ the sides of the Cuvumbi shelf. Along the channel

dow; the stalks of the plants are encrusted with muffs edge and on part of the abraded flat between the west
of crustose red algae (Pl. 2, fig. B) and tufts of the arti­ side of the island and the sandy beach, a small fringing
culate corallinacean Jania (Pl. 2, fig. D). Further reef thrives, showing a well diversified coral zonation.

towards the shore, phanerogams are replaced or alter­
nate with different types of vegetation. These mea­ Reef edge - It consists of a small steep wall with ver­
dows are often interrupted by depressed, unvegetated tical zonation of the coral community: the bottom of
areas covered by rubble or coarse sediment originating the wall, 5-6 m deep, is colonized by tabular forms of

from skeletal material produced in situ by corallina­ Acropora hyacinthus and bushes of Acropora gemmi­
ceans, Halimeda, corals, mollusks and echinoids; sori­ fera and A. danai, whereas in the upper part branched
tids and amphisteginids are the most common among Acropora formosa and Porites nigrescens are com­

foraminifers. Coral colonies are scattered and mainly mon. Outside the coral fringe, the sandy bottom of the
located in poorly vegetated areas or in the sandy fore reef zone is covered with scattered colonies of
depressions where Porites and faviid knobs and soft Porites somaliensis, P. lutea and Platygyra lamellina
corals (Pl. I, fig. D) grow. (Fig.II).

Reef flat - It is characterized by a rich community of
The marine passes small flattened branching Acropora and Tubipora

musica (Fig. 12). They gradually decrease shoreward,
The communication between outer shelf and coa­ being replaced by microatolls of Favia stelligera and
stal sound is allowed by a series of passes of varying small colonies of Acropora abrotanoides, Favites

shape and size, which sometimes play the role of real flexuosa, F. abdita and Porites nigrescens.
tidal inlets crossing the barrier island and characteri­
zed by a winnowed hard substrate. On the contrary, Back reef- In sheltered areas close to the coast of
where the islands become rare and are frequently evol­ Cuvumbi, abundant muddy-sandy sediments accumu­

ved into rocks rising from the abraded platform, the late, intensely bioturbated and in places stabilized by
water exchange into the sound is ensured by tidal cur­ algal mats and seagrass beds (Fig. 13). Where the
rents flowing on wide shares of abraded shelf emer­ abraded platform is narrower and the channels are cut
ging or reaching the sea surface at low tide. Rarely, in very close to the island, the present-day cliff is subject

the areas facing the mouths of the large coastal chan­ to clear bioerosive processes. In the first 4 m above
nels, some passes are found, deeper than I0 m. The the abraded platform three belts show different faunal
interaction between the undulating floors forming rid­ associations (Fig. 9B): the first with barnacles and chi­

ges and grooves of varying size and the water energy tons coincides with the higher part of the notch, where Annex 86

THE MODERN CORAL COLONIZATION OF THE BAlUN/ BARRIER ISLAND 127

the effects of bioerosive processes are clearly shown; tered coral colonization extending also on the abraded
the second reaches the low tide step and shows an out­ flat.Corals consist of small massive forms (Porites

standing increase of barnacles together with rare somaliensis, Platygyra lamellina and Favites spp.) and
gastropods (trochids); the third, coinciding with the flat, stout branching colonies of Acropora, associated
stretch of the cliff which is always submerged and with encrusting forms of Echinopora gemmacea and

subject to wave action and tidal currents, shows a scat- Hydnophora exesa.

Fig. II -Somefeatures of the reef front of the Cuvumbi Island coral fringe: A) Acmpom hmcinthus colony growing along the reef crest: B) dense Fun­
giaclump localized in reef crest areas where the coral is dead and encrusted by corallinaceans; C) huge single colony of Porites lutea grown at the foot
of the reef wall. about 8 m deep: D) large colony of Porites on the reef crest showing the abraded top surface due to subaerial exposure at low tide.

- Alcuni aspetti del front della scogliera a frangia di Cuvumbi: A) colonia di Acropora hvacinthus caratteristica del reef crest: B) addensamento di
Fungia in zone del reef crest dove ilecmorto ed incrostato da corallinacee: C) grossa colonia di Porites lutea cresciuta ai piedi del reef ad una
profondita di circa 8 m: D) colonia dis cresciuta a! tetto della scogliera, mostrante Ia superficie superiore abrasa a causa dell'esposizione subae­
rea durante Ia bassa marea.Annex 86

128 F CARBONE ET ALII

Fig. 12 - Some features of the reef flat of the Cuvumbi Island coral fringe: A) panoramic view of the reef flat exposed during low tide, extensively

colonizedby branching Acropora; B) close-up view of the inner part of the reef flat showing the abraded surface of the coral carpet partially covered
by Acropora detritus; C) close-up view of the small branching Acropora forming the extensive cover flat; D) close-up view of the reef flat
surface showing scattered small domal colonies of Tuhipora musica and small branching Acropora on a substrate partially encrusted by corallinaceans.

- Alcuni aspetti del reef flat della scogliera a frangia di Cuvumbi: A) veduta panoramica del reef flat emerso in bassa marea, estesamente colonizzato
da Acropora ramificata; B) dettaglio della zona interna del reef flat mostrantee abrasa del tappeto corallino parzialmente coperto da fram­
menti di Acropora; C) dettaglio delle piccole colonie di Acropora ramificata che forma l'estesa copertura del reef tlat; D) dettaglio della superficie del
reef flat mostrante piccole colonie domiformi di Tuhipora musica e di Acropora ramificata surato incrostato da corallinacee.

Chete Chete rocks coral carpet. Facing the mouth and vermetids, whereas corals consist of small scatte­
of Lac Busc Busc, they are the remnants of the old red tufts of pocilloprids, hosted in cavities of the hard

Pleistocene dune ridge (See enclosed chart). On their substrate. The coral cover increases gradually through
seaward side a subvertical cliff without notch faces the passes towards protected, high subtidal zones,
the abraded platform which is encrusted by red algae colonizing the bottoms up to the depth of 4 m. The Annex 86

THE MODERN CORAL COLONIZATION OF THE BAlUN/ BARRIER ISLAND 129

community lacks a clear zonation and consists of bling. The faunal assemblage mainly consists of small
Acroporids, Pocilloporids, Hydnophorids and Faviids, endobiontic bivalves. Beach rocks crop out on the
and shows a sharp transition to surrounding Thalasso­ beach near the high tide limit and mainly consist of
dendron meadows.
coarse remains of gastropods, bivalves and corals.

Mounded sandy bottom - This facies borders the coast
The coastal sound of the island and extends also perpendicular to the

channel axis towards the mainland; it consists of fine
The waterway between the mainland and the sand densely burrowed by crabs and polychaetes
islands is very shallow, such as to make difficult in worms. Seagrass beds of Thalassodendron and Syrin­
low tide the sailing even of small boats. Low water godium, partially buried by fine sediment (Pl. 2, fig.

energy environments characterized by fine sediment A), realize at places, just below the depositional inter­
deposition are widespread; the prevailing skeletal sedi­ face, reducing conditions. Small gastropods such as
ment is frequently enriched in detrital quartz transpor­ strombids and cipreids characterize this facies, whe­

ted both by wind and by the three channels. A striking reas in outer areas facing the channel they join with
sedimentologic character of the sound is the high pro­ abundant holoturians which produce typical faeces
duction and accumulation rate of skeletal sediment, heaps, usually dispersed by the tidal flow.
which is partly produced in situ and partly originating

from the channels and distributed longshore. Wide and Rippled and burrowed sandy bottom - It develops in
flat tidal deltas develop at the mouth of the channels the high intertidal zone perpendicular to the coast,
and sandy bodies accumulate along stretches of the characterized by widespread asymmetric ripples for­

coast protected by the insular ridge. Longshore cur­ med by tidal currents. The muddy-sandy sediment is
rents are furthermore responsible for sediment tran­ intensely pelleted by crabs. Bioturbation gradually
sport, causing the progradation of wide beach ridges. increases towards the channel, produced by bottom
The action of monsoon winds combines with that dweller bivalves such as Solen which build mounds of

of tidal currents and causes tails and sandy bars to faecal origin.
develop perpendicular to the sound, isolating areas
with low water energy conditions. Where water Thalassodendron meadow - The transition to subtidal

exchange with open sea is active, coral reefs develop environments along the channel edge is characterized
with varying prosperity and specific diversification. by a rapid development of Thalassodendron seagrass
Therefore also the habitat of the coastal sound is which thrive on the deepest skeletal sandy bottom of
subject to diversification in different depositional the coastal sound.

facies: sandy tail (F4); bryozoan sandy bottom (F5);
Thalassodendron meadow with scattered coral knobs The Ciovai Island protected she(f Ciovai is one of
and heads (F I0); mangal flat (FII); coral fringe and the biggest islands of the archipelago and is located
carpet (FI4); composite patch reef and table reef just in front of Lac Badana mouth. Thus it interferes

(FI6). The following type-sites concern the sandy tail with water flow from the channel causing a sharp
sedimentation developed at Fuma island (F4), the water energy decrease and a subsequent quick accu­
coral colonization of the protected shelves of Ciovai mulation of the sediments both in areas often emer­

island and Istanbul(Fl4) and the table reef near Hasan ging at low tide and on channel bottoms not deeper
island (FI6). than I 0 m. A flourishing and well diversified coral
community thrives on the south-western tip of the
The Fuma Island tail. On the landward side of abraded shelf of Ciovai facing one of the largest tidal

Fuma Nangue island, the combination of a flat sedi­ channels. This shelf ranges from I00 to 200 m in
mentary substratum with the wave and tide energy dis­ width and is gently dipping toward the sound, to
sipation causes the accretion of a wide sandy body which is connected by a slope 30-50 m wide. In this

perpendicular to coast (See enclosed chart). A narrow area four facies belts can be distinguished from the
channel, about I 0 m deep, separates this sedimentary coast towards the sound (See enclosed map):
tail from the mainland. The intertidal zone is characte­
rized by different facies belts, nearly perpendicular to Rocky shore - It includes the notch, which is colonized

the coast, whose distribution is mainly controlled by by a typical association of Saccostrea cuccullata and
time of subaerial exposure and energy produced by balanids, and the intertidal belt of the abraded flat
tidal flows. encrusted by red algae, at places passing to sandy bea­
ches or seagrass meadows.

Sandy beach - In small protected coves along the
north-western coast of the island some beaches are Acropora formosa thicket - This species grows in well
built by accumulation of poorly sorted skeletal sand developed colonies forming large thickets. Living
characterized by an alveolar structure due to air bub- coral is normally found only in the uppermost part ofAnnex 86

THE MODERN CORAL COLONIZATION OF THE BAlUN/ BARRIER ISLAND
137

Cio ha prodotto Ia formazione e migrazione verso mare dei campi di
Rhi~opho crlanizzano le piane interitidali protette dei canali e di
dune costiere, in parte oggi formanti il cordone insulare e forse il ridge alcune isole. Lo sviluppo della comunita corallina segue l'andamento
sommerso limitante il bordo esterno della piattaforma continentale. Di irregolare dei bordi della piana d'abrasione che circonda le isole for­
uguale importanza per Ia fascia costiera e stat<J lo sviluppo del reticolo
mando scogliere a frangia di varia estensione, colonizzando con radi tap­
anastomizzato dei canali originato dalla combinazione dell' abbassa­ peti fondi duri pianeggianti, spesso emergenti in bassa marea e forman­
mento del livello di base con il probabile sviluppo di una fase climatica do scogliere isolate di varie dimensioni e forma in aree protette del
piu umida dell'attuale.
braccio di mare costiero. Nello shelf esterno bordi recifali sono localiz­
Altri fattori hanno agito a media scala, non determinando il tipo di zati incorrispondenza dei gradini morfologici corrispondenti agli antichi
modello deposizionale rna influenzando le caratteristichedei singoli livelli di stazionamento del mare, mentre costruzioni coralline disconti­
sistemi deposizionali. Nella piattaforna esterna le interazioni tra sub­
nue piu estese sono segnalate lungo il margine esterno della piattaforma.
strata deposizionale e base dell'onda normale e di tempesta determina­ Le praterie a Thalassodendron, pur occupando substrati di diversa
no Ia distribuzione dei sedimenti e le caratteristiche della comunita ben­ natura sia lungo costa che in aree esterne della piattaforma, rappresen­

tonica. La presenza del rilievo sommerso lungo il bordo esterno dello tano spesso il risultato finale di un processo sedimentario che porta alia
shelf, attribuibile ad un cordone sommerso pleistocenico di dune o a stabilizzazione di coperture di sedimento, formate in prevalenza da
vecchi banchi di sabbia organogena (banchi ad Halimeda), condiziona frammenti grossolani di corallo, spesso incrostato da corallinacee. ai

senza dubbio Ia distribuzione delle facies nella retrostante depressione quali si somma il materiale piu fino prodotto e intrappolato dalla prate­
della piattaforma. ria via viache si sviluppa.
Nel braccio di mare costiero, oltre a fattori morfologici quali rap­ I rapporti tra comunita corallina e vegetazione a fanerogame sono

porto ampiezza - lunghezza dell' area protetta dalle isole. numero e fortemente intluenzati da fattori locali, infatti J'espamione a,reu\\o·&liL·
dimensione dei canali di marea che interrompono il cordone insulare. due comunita econdizionata sia da fattori energetici locali che di carat­
determinante e Ia presenza dei tre grossi canali a cui sono legati in gran tere piu generale, coinvolgenti l'intero ecosistema. Numerosi fattori

parte Ia mobilizzazione e il trasporto del quarzo relitto. contribuiscono ad indurre mutamenti areali nella distribuzione delle sin­
Flussi tidali e correnti lungo costa generate dai venti monsonici gole comunita che definiscono ambienti e subambienti sedimentari. tra
sono responsabili dell'attuale quadro di distribuzione del sedimento tra cui ipiu importanti sono: lo smantellamento progressivo dei corpi insu­

le isole e Ia costae del suo mutamento durante i cambiamenti stagiona­ lari adopera del moto ondoso e della bioerosione: l'accrescimento o lo
li del clima. spostamento di corpi sabbiosi che variano Ia geometria delle isole: il
Un esubero nella produzione e accumulo di sedimenti rispetto allo cambiamento di intensita e verso delle correnti /ungo costa e dei venti

sviluppo del lasso di accomodamento ha generato una chiara fase di dominanti stagionali; le modificazioni nell'upwelling lungo Ia scarpata
progradazione della linea di costa e del contemporaneo insabbiamento somala dovute aile variazioni della circolazione oceanica: i fenomeni di
di zone marine di acque basse. bleaching indotti, nitre che da fattori climatici globali, anche dalle

II settore occupato dal barrier island risulta ampiamente conditio­ variazioni nelle quantita di apporto torbido e di acqua dolce drenata
nato dalla presenza della fascia continua di bassi fondali abrasi dalla durante le stagioni piovose.
quale si ergono le isole. le isolette e gli scogli che formano l'arcipela­ II modello deposizionale attuale risulta applicabile solo per un

go. In questa zona Ia dissipazione dell'energia prodotta dal moto ondo­ breve intervallo di tempo, essendo il frutto della ricolonizzazione recen­
so e dalla costante azione dei tlussi tidali sui fondi a pelo d'acqua e te della piattaforma continentale cominciata in varie parti del mondo
attraverso i canali di mareae il fattore determinante nella distribuzione circa 8000 anni fa (Hopley, 1994), quando il mare ne ha superato il

delle facies ed in particolare nel tipo di colonizzazione di organismi bordo esterno durante Ia risalita olocenica. II quadro attuale di distribu­
sessili quali le alghe rosse e i coralli. In queste condizioni zone a bassa zione delle facies sulla piattaforma delle isole Bajuni si e sviluppato su
energia sono presenti solo lungo il versante delle isole rivolto verso un tratto di costa africana tettonicamente stabile durante I'Oiocene.

terra, dove l'accrescimento di barre e tomboli sabbiosi permette lo svi­ dove I' accumulo di sedimenti quarzosi rimaneggiati e di sabbia organo­
luppo di ambienti intertidali protetti dovee possibile Ia depositione di gena prodotta in silu non trova un analogo incremento nelle variazioni
sedimento fino. relative del livello del mare. Da cio deriva uno scarso accumulo verti­

II reticolo di canali sviluppato lungo costa mostra nella distribuzio­ calc di scdimento che porta ad una marcata migrazione laterale dei
ne degli ambienti attuali un forte condizionamento esercitato dalla corpi sabbiosi lungo Ia linea di costae intorno aile isole e al concomi­
paleomorfologia e dal volume del ricambio d'acqua operato dai tlu"i tatlle smantellamento progressivo dei corpi insulari. dove l'energia ele­

tidali. Le ampie superfici pianeggianti intagliate nei calcari pleistoccni­ vata e Ia scarsa profondita dell'acqua impediscono Ia sedimentazione. II
ci che bordano i canali. spesso limitate verso terra da solchi di battigia risultato finalee yuindi quello di avere un modello di sedimentazione di
fossili. formano oggi ampie fascie intertidali dove si sviluppano fiorcn­ barrier island etTimero. destinato a subire nel corso del tempo marcate

timangrovieti. modificat.ioni che porteranno ad un inglobamento dell'arcipelago delle
Anche a piccola scala Ia distribuzione delle facies si prescnta Bajuni in un nuovo profilo di costa spostato verso mare e allo sviluppo
influenzata dall"adattamento delle comunitit bentoniche al substrato sull"antistante piattaforma di un ambiente marino aperto simile a yuello

modellato da processi erosivi e deposizionali sviluppatisi in tempi molto giitpresente lungo molti tratti dellacosta somala deii'Oceano lndiano.
recenti. Costruzioni coralline e praterie alwlassodendron si contendo­
no /"habitat marino di acque basse, mentre le mangrovie (A1·icennia c Acce//a/o per Ia slillnfw il 15 mar:o 2111111

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ANGELUCCIA.. CARBONEF. & MATTEUCCIR. (!982) - La scoglicra 8.\ITI\ liNI R. (1976)- Application des methodes Th230-U234 it Ia data­

corallina di Ilisi nelle !sole dei Bajuni (Somalia meridionale). Boll. lion des depots marins anciens de Madagascar et des iles voisines.
Soc. Paleml/ol. Ira/..21 (2-3 ): 201-209, Modena. Ass.. VI/('gal. Erude.1Quarem. Afi: Bull. Liason s,;l/(;gal. 49: 79-95.
ANCiELUCCAI.. ARUSHM.A., CARBONEF.. MATTEUCCR I . & SAIDA.A. Dakar.

(1984) - The Bajuni Islands: some observations on the actual sedi­ BRMIII\\.-\111·C..I.R. ( llJX4J - Depositional history of late Plei-;toccne
mentation. In: Labahn T (ed.), Proceedings of"rhe Second lnrenw­ limestones of the Kenya coast. }ow: Ceo/. Soc. London, 141: 6X5-
riona/ Congress on Somali Srudies, Uni1•ersitv ol Ham/){1/g. 1983. 4: 6lJ9.London.

363-372. Helmut Buske Verlag, Hamburg. C.\BIOC"H.G.. Mor\IMiCiiONI. L.F., FAL:RE,G. & RIBM'D-LAL"RENTIA . .
ANCiEl.UCCA I .. CARBONEF., MATTEUCCR I . & SAIDA.A. (1987)- Alcu­ (1999)- Reef coral gal assemblages as recorder-; of paleobathymetry
ne caratteristiche sedimentarie del canale di Burgan a sud eli Chisi­ and ,ea le1el changes in the Indo-Pacific province. Qualernan·

maio (Somalia meridionale). Quad. Ceo/. Somalia. 9: 9-17. Moga­ Science Rn·ieH".\. 18. (14): 16X1-169, Oxford.
discio. C.\RHONE.F. (19X7) - Modern and ancient coral reefs and coa,tal sedi­
ANONYMOUS(1980) - Africa Pilot Vol. 3, 294 p., 13th Edition, Tile ments along the southern Somali coast. In: Carbone F. (ed.), Guide­

hwlrographer of !he Navy, England, Taunton. hook f:".rcur.\ionC. Geo.\"01117lnlenwlional Meering: Geo/ogr of Annex 86

138 F. CARBONE ET ALII

Somalia and Surrounding Regions, Mogadishu, 1987, 71 p., Cotec­ HOPLEYD. (1994)- Continental shelf reef systems. In: Carter R.W.G. &

no, Roma. Woodroffe C.D. (eds.), Coastal evolution: Late Quaternary shoreline
CARHONEF. & MATTEUCCIR. (1990) - Outline of Somali Quaternary morphodynamics, 303-340, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
coral reefs. Reef Encounter, 7: 12-14, Wilmington, NC. HORI N. (1970) - Raised coral reefs along the southeastern coast of

CARBONEF., MATTEUCCIR.. ROSENB.R. & Russo A. (1994) - Recent Kenya. Ceogr. Rep. Tokyo Metrop. Univ., 5: 25-47, Tokyo.
coral facies of the Indian Ocean coast of Somalia, with an interim HoYT J.H. ( 1967)- Barrier island formation. Ceo/. Soc. Amer. Bull., 78:

check list of corals. Facies, 30: 1-14, Erlangen. 1125-1136, Boulder.
COLONNAM., CASANOVAJ., DULLOW.C. & CAMOING.F. (1996)- Sea­ JAMES, N. (1983)- Reef Environment. In: Scholle P., Bebout D. &
level changes and d"O for the past 34,000 yr from Mayotte Reef. Moore C. (eds.), Carbonate depositional environments. Amer. A.1s.

Indian Ocean. Quaternary Research, 46: 335-339, Seattle, WA. Petrol. Ceo/. Mem. 33, Tulsa, 345-462.
DAVIESG. (1970) - Carbonate bank sedimentation and environments, MARSHALLJ.F. & DAVIES P.J. (1988) - Halimeda bioherms of the
eastern Shark Bay, western Australia. In: Logan B (ed.), Carbonate northern Great Barrier Reef. Coral Ree.fl, 6 (3-4): 139-148, Berlin.

sedimentation and environments, Shark Bay, western Australia, NOAA (1991) -Climates of the world. Historical Climatology Series 6-
AAPG Memoir 13: 85-168, Amerimn Association of' Petroleum 4. U.S. Department of Commerce, Asheville, NC.
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EVANSG., MURRAYJ.W., BIGGSH.E.J .. BATER. & BUSH P.R. (1973) - trends in the lee of outer (ribbon) reefs, northern region of the Great
The oceanography, ecology, sedimentology and geomorphology of Barrier Reef. Phy/osophical Transactions Roval SocietY London,
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Purser, B.H. (ed.), The Persian Gulf, 233-277, Springer- Verlag. PURSERB.H. (1973)- The Persian Gulf, 471 p., Springer Verlag, Hei­
Berlin. delberg.
FANTOLIA. (1965) - Contributo alia climatologia della Somalia. Mini­ PURSERB.H. & EVANSG. (1973)- Regional sedimentation along the

stem degli Atlari Esteri. Report n. 112, Roma. Trucial coast, SE Persian Gulf. In: Purser B.H. (ed.) The Persian
FAO (1995) - Irrigation in Africa in figures. Water Reports Series, Gulf, 211-231, Springer Verlag, Heidelberg.
Report n. 7. Rome. SCHWARTZM.L. ( 1971) -The multiple causality of barrier islands. low:

HARDIEL.A. (1977) - Sedimentation on the modern carbonate tidal tlats Ceo/., 79: 91-94, Chicago, IL.
of northwest Andros Island, Bahamas. The John Hopkins University TOYAHH., KADOMURA,H., TAMURA,T. ANDHORI, N. (1973)- Geo­
Studies in Geology No. 22, 202 p. The John Hopkins Universitr morphological studies in southeastern Kenya. Ceog1: Rep. Tokyo

P1ns. Baltimore. Metrop. Univ., 8: 51-137. Tokyo.

Federico Carbone. Centro di Studio per il Quaternario e I'Evoluzione Ambientale. Dipartimento di Scienze della Terra, Universita degli Studi "La

Sapienza". P.le A. Moro. 5. 00185 Roma, Italy.
email: [email protected] l.it
Giovanni Accordi. Centro di Studio per il Quaternario c J'Evoluzione Ambientale. Dipartimento di Scienze della Terra, Universita degli Studi "La

Sapienza". P.le A. Moro. 5. 00185 Roma, Italy.
emaiI: [email protected]
Antonello Angelucci. Dipartimento di Scienze della Terra. Universitit degli Studi "La Sapienza", P.le A. Moro, 5. 00185 Roma, Italy.

Ruggero Matteucci, Dipartimento di Scienze della Terra. Universitit degli Studi "La Sapienza", P.le A. Moro. 5, 00185 Roma, Italy.
email: matteucci Gciluniromal.it Annex 87

Mohamad D. Abdullahi,Culture AndC ustoms os omAliA(2001)Annex 87Annex 87

Cultureand
Customsof

Somalia

MohamedDiriyeAbdullahi

CToyinFaiola,SeriesEditorrica

~
Westport, Connecticut • London Annex 87

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ahdullahi, Mohamed Diriye.
Culture and customs of Somalia I Mohamed Diriye Abdullahi.

p. cm.-(Culrure ami cusroms of Africa, ISSN 1530-8367)
Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-313-31333--4 (alk. paper)
I. Ethnology-Somalia . 2. Somalia-Social life and customs. I. Title . II. Series.

GN650 .S65 A34 2001
306'.096773-dc21 2001016169

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.

Copyright© 2001 by Mohamed Diriye Abdullahi

All righrs reserved. No portion of this book may be

reproduced, by any process or technique , without the

express wrirren consentof the publisher.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2001016169
ISBN: 978-0-313-36137-1 (pbk.)

ISSN: 1530-8367

First published in 200 I

Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westpon, CT 06881

An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.
www.greenwood .com

Primed in the United Stares of America

The paper used in this book complies with the

Permanent Paper Standard issued by rhe National
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10 9 8 7 6
Every reasonable effort has been made totrace the owners of copyright materials in this book,

but in some instances this has proven impossible. The editor and publisher will he glad to
r~:cc iformcation leading co more complete acknowledgments in subsequent primings of

the book and in the meamime extend their apologies for any omissions.

In order lo kttp lhis tille In print and available to the academic cnmmunily, Ihis edition
was produced using digital reprint technology11~lative slort print run. This would

nothave been attainable using traditiolllll methods. Although the cover has been changed
from its original appearance, the text remains the same all materials amd methods
used still conform lo the highest book-making standurd!i.Annex 87

1

Introduction

GEOGRAPHY

IN THE BEGINNING was the land, which has been called many things: Punt,

Land of the Barbaroi, Terra Aromatica (Land of Aromatic Planrs), Regia
Cinnamafore (Land of the Cinnamon), Land of Milk and Myrrh, Land of

the Somalis. The northern coasts on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and
the adjacentmountains are the ancestral home of the Somalis. This area was
known as Punt (The Land of the Gods) tothe ancient Egyptians, as rhe land

of the Barbaroi to the Greeks, and as Regia Cinnamafore to the Romans
who thought the Somali coasts produced cinnamon. 1
Later in the nineteenth century, the whole peninsular section of northeast

Africa, the projecting region that gave risto the name of the "Horn of
Africa" would be known as the Somali Peninsula. The Somali Republic,
formed in 1960 from the former British Somaliland {the North) and the

former ItalianSomalia {the South),is situated in the Somali Peninsula . It is
the Somali Republic, now in disarray, which is popularly known as Somalia.

TOPOGRAPHY

In the northern regions, facing the Gulf of Aden, the topography of the

land consists of three zones. These are the coasCuban, the mountainous
Colis,and the high plateauHaud.
The Guban is a low-lying stretch of country about twenty to thirty-five

miles in length that is crossed by numerous dry riverbeds, knowntog,that Annex 87

2 CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

become swift torrents when they carry the runoff water of the Golis moun­
tains.Italso has ridges and knolls in some places. Irs name means "the burnt,"

in allusion ro its desert environment, searing heat, and sandstorms. However,
even if it is generally dry and has sand dunes in some places, it has grass and
shrubs in other areas, which afford excellent grazing to sheep and goats,

especially when it rains.
During rhe hot season Qune-September), Guban temperatures are high

during the day and are accompanied by hot winds; traveling on foot is not
advised therefore in daytime . The local people move to higher ground when

char is possible to the extent that the population of the coastal towns is
sometimes at half the usual·during that time of the year. In hot weather, the
locals say that snakes never come out during the day and hum only under

the rays of the moon.
Traditionally, nomads used to move their stock from the Guban to the

slopes of the Golis in a familiar pattern of rranshumance. But this is being
modified by permanent settlements on higher grounds, leaving less land for
transhumance between coast and mountain. The Guban is not just a slice of

desert terrain below the mountains; it has the most ancient towns and places
of habitation in the entire region. Zeilah, Berbera, Bulahar, and Bosaso are

just some of the ancient pons that dot the Guban coastline and that had
been visited by sailors, travelers, and merchants as far back as the time of
ancient Egypt. Guban beaches, practically unknown to international tourism,

are also fabulous, and with their hot sands they are said to cure one of
rheumatism in just one day.

As one travels inward from the coastal Guban, the land steeply risesas one
scales the mountains. Modern roads follow the caravan routes of old along
the mountain passes. Becauseof the abrupt ascent, the road tothe mountains

can be at places precipitous. The most spectacular pass is the Sheikh pass, a
serpentine route sometimes hewn straight out of the mountain Rank. The
Sheikh pass lies on the Berbera-Burao tarmac road and proceeds through the

mountain town of Sheikh. The northern mountains top at places at altitudes
of almost 8,000 feet above sea level. The highest peak is Mount Surat. The

width of this wne varies; its widest parts are in the west and far east, and
with the center having the shortest width. Borame, Hargeisa, Erigabo, and
Sheikh are the only major towns situated in the mountains.

The Oogo is a small strip with varying lengths that forms the first southern
descent of the mountains and at places the table rop of the mountains. How­

ever, itis ecologically a parr of the mountain region. Itmeans "the top" in
Somali.
The Haud plateau is the zone that slowly descends in a north to southAnnex 87

INTRODUCTION 3

d' ecrion; it extends from below the city of Hargeisa in rhe west to as far
tth as the plains of central Somalia and the Somali region of Ethiopia.
500 a1· d · " f h. k d I . "
Haud is rhe Som 1 wor mcanmg a country o r tc .cts an grassy p ams.
This z.one forms rhe best rangelands for rhe pasmralists and suppom the
largest number of Livesrock;ir is Livestockfrom tlus region that forms the

bulk of Somali livestock exportsto Arabian markets on the other side of the

seSouth of the northern regions, the landscape consists of mosrly flat plains,

as rhe Ethiopian high plateau slowly smooths to sea level. However, there
arc outcrops rhar occasionally break the monotony of rhc land, such as the

:BurHakabo rock, which resembles the famous Ayers rock of Australia. This
zone has Somalia's only two permanent rivers, the juba and rhe Shebelle,
both rising in rhe Ethiopian hlghJands. The juba reaches the sea near the

cicyof Kismayu, while the Shebdle finishes irs course in sand dunes, a few
miles away from the Indian Ocean.

CLIMATE

The southern tip of the land of the Somalis straddles the equator. But the

Somalis do not live in a lush tropical country but in a dry land where hu­
midity is not a factor except along the southern coastal areas.
In the interior depending on the elevation, day and night temperatures

can vary considerably,and the unwary traveler might be exposed to uncom­
fortably cool nights in the mountains or to cool drafts blowing over the
prairiesnd scrublands. On the higher summits of the Colis, such as where

the cicy of Hargeisa is situated, sometimes rain with hailstones, known as
dhagahyaale (rain with stones), falls, injuring people and destroying crops
such as corn. In July 1999, for example, one such hail storm hit the small

town of Arabsiyo to the west of Hargeisa, damaging homes and crops, and
leaving in irs wake large blocks of ice on the ground that took two days to
melt.

Somalis divide the weather into four main seasons: gu, haggaa.dayr, and
jiilaal.Gu and dayr are the wet seasons while haggaa and jiilaal are the dry
seasons, although coastal areas might get some light showers during the hag­

gaa, known exactly as haggaayo (haggaa rains).
The gu season might be called "the long rains"; it starts in March or April
and tapers off in June, and in a good year in July. It is the season that both

the land and the people await and pray for; if missed, the consequences are
disastrous for both agriculturist and pastoralist, that is for the majority of the
population. If the long rains come in plenry, the gray scrublands and yellow Annex 87

4 CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

prairies become lush green; water is plentiful again for both man and beast;

the voice of the frog is heard again and the people rejoice-it is abarwaaqo
(prosperous year). The word barwaaqo itself is deeply rooted in the ancient
culture and religion of the Cushicic people of northeastern Africa, of whom

Somalis form part. It is composed of bar (raindrop) and waaqo (the ancient
Cushitic god) whose abode is the sky. The rains are therefore Waaqo's rain­
drops and Somalis wish each other bashbashiyobarwaaqo (plenty of pros­

perity and splashing) from bashbash ,n onomatopoeia for the sound made
while splashing in water, and barwaaqo (god's raindrops). This shows the
dose relationship between water and human life in a dry country where water

graphically equates with life.
The gu rains are usually accompanied by thunderstorms and strong gusts

that precede rainfall. During this time unpaved country roads can become
unsuitable for motor vehicles, especially in areas where the soil is prone to
water-logging such as in riverine regions. The numerous dry rivers also be­

come torrents at this time of year, and, depending on the width of the river,
some have a current swift enough to upturn a six-ton vehicle. Large-scale
flooding might also occur in riverine areas, especially if it rains a lot in the

Ethiopian plateau, which feeds the Somali river systems.
The haggaa (shorr dry season) runs through July, August, and September.
This is the hottest time of the year anywhere. Temperatures can vary from

80°F (43°C} on the southern coastal areas to around 100°F (48°C) along the
northern maritime zone. This is the time of the southwest monsoon; it brings
slight showers to the southern coastal areas; however, in other areas, it is a

dry wind that blows sand. The Guban zone is hot and windy at this time of
year, when the Kharif wind drives sandstorms during the day that have the
strength to loosen the tethers of a tent.

The dayr (short rains) season runs from October through December. The
dayr rains are usually heaviest in the immediate vicinity of the Golis moun­
tains. If the dayr rains fall heavily and are widespread, pastoralists look for­

ward to the dry season without apprehension.
The long dry season, jiilaal, runs from around the middle of December to
March or April. This is the season that both pastoralists and cultivators fear.

It corresponds to the dry winds of the northwest monsoon. However, the
sun being away in the Southern Hemisphere, temperatures are not high. In
fact, they are at their lowest. This is the cool season in the northern highlands.

Everywhere water levelsdrop dangerously low, and vegetation, except in areas
of permanent water, is reduced to a drab gray scenery. The Guban receives

light showers knowns as hays. If the rains do not come in May or April, the
country is said in the grip of abaar, the dreaded drought. Livestock pricesAnnex 87

INTRODUCTION 5

celow at chis time of year, asthe herds become gaunt. People start praying
~o rair, sometimes holding public prayingceremonies- roobdoon (suppli­

~tif oorrain)-especially if rhe jiilaal seems to persist.
In rime, rhe jiilaal is followed by the long rains again; just before the onset
of dtc t•ains, rhere is a short period of intense hear lasring about a monrh

known asktJLiiThus ends the cycle of seasons in rhe lands of the Somalis.
Rainfall varies from zone to zone. Guban might be said to receive less

chan ten inches; generally, the Colis receives the most rain. However, rainfall
can differ from year to year; for example, 1998, due toElhNifio weather
phenomenon, a warming of rhe Pacific waters, there were unusually high

levelsof rainfall and vast areas of the south riverine were Aooded. The two
rivers,Juba and ShebciJc, overflowed their banks and temporarily formed an
inland lake where there had been human habitationand fields. Crocodiles ,

hippopotamuses, and snakes were reported robe vying with humans for the
lirrle ground still above water in some places. A year Iacer,as mostly

a drought year with dire consequencesin the South, while rain storms in­
flicred heavy damagesro some: areas in rhe Golis in August and October,
especially around the norrhern capital, Hargeisa.

VEGETATION

The land of the Somalis is usually portrayed as a desert. True, there are
desert patches with rolling sand dunesd little vegetation. Bur such places
are usually confined to the coastal areas. Inland, the vegetation is that of a

dry land but not that of a true desert. The coastal areas have little vegetation,
although because of the togs char carry rainwater from higher ground, thick­

ets are sometimes found near the sea. In the lower ranges, especially at
their western and eastern extremities, there is little or no vegetation on the
mountains. However, at around 4,000 feet in elevation, the mountains have

a good coverof short grasses, acacia woodlands, and flowering aloes. Some­
times the lower banks of mounrain cogs and gorges have dense thickers of
trees, grass, and climbing plants.

On rhe highest peaks in the central Colis, there is still a remnant of the
ancient cedar forests (the cedarLebanon); the besr standing forest of this
rype is the one at Daalo mounrain, near the cown of Erigabo. It is a reserve

now. The cedar tree itself is known dayibin Somali.
The mountains, after rains, are a sight tobe missed; everywhere small
rivulets and cascades water are to be seen and all the plants and trees bring

forth flowers. The African violet is one of the many small Aowering shrubs
thatdot the higher slopes of the mountains at such times of the year. Annex 87

6 CULTUREAND CUSTOMSOF SOMALIA

The Haud zone has undulating grasses in its plains (ba11)and clumps of
acacia treesin thicket country (gaaroodz) . his can be said to be savanna or
veld country. In the old days, the gaaroodi country used to have a lot of tall

acacia trees-so much so that a saying developed: gllllroodowgee/maaragtey?
(oh thicket country, have you seen my camels?), which the Somali say when

something is indistinguishable from irs surroundings. This saying alludes to
the fact that from a distance the legs of grazing camels in gaaroodi country
look like treetrunks; it is the equivalent of the English saying "not cosee the

wood for the trees."
In the areas between the two rivers, jiq (thick bush), an impenetrable
country of thorn bushes and tall grass is found, in addition to open plains

and spaces devoid of vegetation . Clumps of trees and bushes, known as gosha,
also occur on the banks of the Juba and the Shcbellc Rivers, and is especially

true of the banks of the Juba . There are also seasonal swamps in the river
areas that dry up during periods of prolonged droughts. The gosha country
is infested with tsetse flies and other biting insects such as mosquitoes so

nomads avoid encampment ncar rivers. Somalis have known for a long time
that mosquitoes carry a feverish disease, a fact rharRichard Burron, an Eng­

lish traveler arriving in the land of Somalis in the nineteenth century attrib ­
uted to a superstition, the link between malaria and the mosqujtoes being
then unknown in Europe. 2

No discussion of the vegetation of the Somali peninsula can be complete
without a mention of the shrubs that produce frankincense and myrrh, prod­
ucts rhat brought fame and wealth to the northern coasts of the Somali

peninsula for thousands of years. The trees, rwo species of the boswellia tree
(BorwelliaJrereanna and Boswelliacarun) and one of rhe commiphora (Com­

miphora myrrha), grow in the eastern and central mountains of the Golis.
The trees also occur, although to a considerably less extent, on rhe Arabian
side of the Gulf of Aden. The aromatic trees grow on high mountain slopes

out of the rocky ground. The young trees supply the most valuable gum,
while the older ones produce a dear, glutinous fluid that resembles coral
varnish.

Frankincense and myrrh were very important and expensive products in
chc ancient world. They were che perfumes of the ancient civilizations and

religions. They also had important medicinal uses, as part of the pharma­
cology of the ancient peoples; myrrh, especially, had a starus of being a
panacea for many illnesses. The medicinal values of myrrh are not un­

founded, and a recent scudy showed rhar Somali myrrh as used in Somali
traditionalmedicine has amibacterial as well as antidiarrhealeffeccs. Today'sAnnex 87

INTRODUCTION 7

use ' however, largely limited ro making incense, used a lot in theMuslim
world, and co manufacturing pascilles.

In rhe fifteenth centura.c. Queen Harshepsut of Egypt sem a commercial
expedirion to Pum ro fetch rhe precious substances. The Greeks and Romans

in rurn were much interested in getring rhese res.inous products. Herodotus,
the Greek author known as rhe Father of Hisrory, scares in his Historiesrhar
franlcincensewasimportant in borh ancient Egypt as well as in ancient Persia

and Assyria. He says that an amount of cwo and one-half cons was offered
every year ro Bel, the Babylonian god, on the great aJrar of Bel's temple in
Babylon. He also points out that the frankincense producing region was

-abour cwomonth's journey in a southerly direction from Egypt, an indication
chat corresponds ro the northern Somali coasts. We also learn from Herod­

orus rhar incense was called ledanon by rhe Arabians- the Greeks thought
all incense came from Arabia-incidentally. that name is sriU recognizable
in Somali as luubaan, a generic name for incense.

To obtain incense sap, a deep, longitudinal incision is made in the trunk
of rhe tree with a sharp instrument called amangaf. When the milk-like sap

comes out, it is left on the trunk and is exposed to the air for a few days
until it hardens into yellowish "tears." The workers return several days later
w collect the now dear globules and to make new incisions. The harvest

season runs from May to about the middle of the short rains. Working in
the hillside aromatic grovessnot an easy cask,yet laborers usually are without
ladders or climbing equipment, thus, accidents that happen on the slopes are

often fatal. The groves themselves belong to hereditary owners, members of
the dans in rhe area who pass them from father to son.

THE PEOPLE

The population figures for the Somali Republic have never been uniform.
However, a figure of about ten million at the present time is reasonable. Too
often, the people have been represented as homogeneous-the ideal nation­

state.The central government actively promoted the idea that the Somali
Republic was the most homogeneous nation in Africa and one of the few in

the world. That view was further spread by scholars both Somali and non­
Somali.6 It is true that Somalia in terms of ethnic or linguistic diversity was
far from being like the Congo, the Soviet Union, and even neighboring

Ethiopia. However, behind Somalia's shroud of homogeneity are a number
of ethnic groups and cultures different from those of the majority Somalis,

after whom the country took its name. Annex 87

8 CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

The word Somali itself today refers to .any inhabitant of Somalia; it also
refers to any person of ethnic Somali origin in the Horn or elsewhere. But

"it seems chat the ethnic name Somali has been extended . . . in much the
same way as the various inhabitants of the British Isles are known to for­
7
eigners as 'English.' " No agreed-upon etymology exists for the word itself.
One possible source is the mythical father, Samale, whose supposed descen­
dancs form the majority of rhe population. Other popular unscientific ety­

mologies include saomaa4 which means "go and milk," heard, as the story
says, by some foreigners who were visiting rhe land. Hence, the people be­

came known by that name. However, the source might as well have been
salama, which means "became a Muslim," since Somali identity is inter­
twined with Islam.

The Somalis

The Somalis are a people of a predominantly pastoralist culture, even if
their ancient cities have maritime traditions spanning several millennia. The

original Somali homeland was along the coasts of the Gulf of Aden and the
Red Sea areas; it is there among the hot coasts and the cool mountains that

oral history places the ancestral homes of the clans. This is true even for clans
such as the Abgal, whose members are found today residing in southern
Somalia, around Mogadishu, and in the Benadir hinterland. According to

legend, the founder of the Abgal clan, itself a subclan of the larger Hawiye
clan, lies buried at Abdal, near the northern port of Berbera. The northern

regions therefore hold a significanr spiritual and cultural significance for all
Somalis.
Somalis speak one language, Somali, and are not confined ro Somalia or

Somaliland alone but also inhabit parts of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya.
They are culturally homogenous with few varia.tions. However, Somalis di­

vide themselves into numerous dans and dan confederations. The largest
clan confederations are the Hawiye, rhc Darod, the lsaaq, and the Dir. The
lsaaq predominate in rhe northern regions, the Darod, the eastern pans of

the north and the cencral regions, and rhe Hawiye, parts of the central regions
and pans of the Benadir farther south; the Dir are found in the extreme

north and in parts of rhe south.
Clan confederations are historically the resultpolitical groupings, several
minor clans banding into a large clan for a pragmatic reason. However, over

time, Somali clan historiographies, much like the noble lineages of Europe,
have become convoluted, as the genealogies were embellished with saints and
noble ancestors. At rhe same rime, rhe clan became associated wirh notionsAnnex 87

INTRODUCTION 9

of common ancesrry, perhaps as a result of Islam; later, the colonial practice

of giving salaries ro chiefS also helped to institutionalize what was a minimal
associarivesystem inro a more reified one.The result is chat rivalries becween

rhe clans, which in rhe old days used ro involve minor vendenas between
dose neighbors in rhc countryside, in rhc fashion of the legendary Hatfields
and McCoys of U.S. lore, have become politicized under rhe hands of po~

Iideal leaders who are jockeying for po itions of defending their own interests.

The Sab (Maay, Tunni, Dabare, Garre, and )iido)

The largest minority in Somalia is the related group of peoples referredto

as the Sab, who live in southwestern Somalia in the riverine area. "Strictly,
the word 'Somali' does nor apply to the Sab, who say rhemselves that they
are 'Sab,' and are so described and distinguished by the 'Somali.' ... The

Sab stand opposed to the Somali." Sometimes the Sab are called the Digil
and the MiriAe, after their (political) clan confederations, and sometimes
9
they are simply called rhe Rahanwein. The Sab are thought to be descended
from an admixture of migrating Somalis, Oromo substrare popularions who

had preceded rhe arrival of Somalis in the area and pre-Cushitic Bantu vil­
lagers,and even more ancient hunter-gatherers of the area. The Oromo, also

known in the literature as the Galla, are a group of people who belong, like
the Somalis, ro the Cushitic-speaking peoples of northeast Africa.0They live

mostly in neighboring Ethiopia.
The origins of the word Sab are obscure. It has been, however, linked to
Saba, an Oromo clan, the Baran, which contribured strongly w the ancestry
11
of the Sab in Somalia. Linguistically, the Sab groups consist of five
linguistico-ethnic groups; the Maay (or Maay-Maay), the largest and domi­

nant group, while the other smaller groups are comprised of the Jiido, the
Dabare, the Tunni, and the Garre. It is in rhe language more than anything

else that the Oromo connection is evident among the Sab groups . Their
languages lack, just like the Oromo dialects, the sounds from the pharynx,
which are characteristicof Somali.

The Maay number about a million while the four other groups are much
smaller; perhaps each of the groups Jiido, Dabare, Tunni, and Garre, do nor

have a population of more than 50,000. Under the traditional clan polirics
these smaller groups formed a political confederation, the Digil,tocounter­

weight the Maay-speaking dans of the Mirifle confederation. The Sab prac­
tice agriculture, especially of the rain-fed type, more than the Somalis proper. Annex 87

10 CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

The Benadiri

Benadiri inhabit the southern coastal region ofBenadir, which historically
correspond s ro Mogadishu, and then sourhward down the coast. Th e Ben­

adiri were part of rhe coastal Swahili peoples and ciry-states that stretched
along the East African coast before the Portuguese and later the British mod ­
ified rhe commercial relations between the Indian Ocean and Gulf basin

counrries.Their ethnic origins are eclectic and include coastal Bantus, Persian
and Arab immigranrs, and without doubt people of Cuslutic origin such as

SomaJjs. The Benadiri speak a Somali dialect known as coasral Somali or
Benadiri, born out of the situation of contact between Somali and Maay
speakers on one hand and Swahili speakers on the other.

The Bantu Groups

The Banru groups, also known variously as Wagosha or as the Gosha (the
people of marshes} in reference to the location of their villages near the lush
river banks, are rather scattered groups in southern Somalia. Their farming

communities and villages are strung along the Juba and Shebelle Rivers up­
ward to the sources of these two rivers in Ethiopia. Before the invasion of

the nomadic Somali and Oromo, their oral traditions told of a legendary
kingdom known as Shungwaya that had control of the riverine areas and the
adjacenr coastal zones. In some areas, they are known by rhe nameof Baarfuui

(the palm people} as they are the only people that know how toplant and
care for the palm trees in Somalia . Some of them have migrated to urban
towns in the Benadir and to other southern towns where rhey rend ro reside

in one quarter. Thus in Mogadishu, rhe Waaberi quarter is associated with
them, even if other groups reside in it. In urban centers, they tend to work
as carpenters, mechanics, plumbers, electricians, or masons. They speak either

the Somali dialect of rhe Benadiris or the Maay language of the Rahanwein,
depending on the location of their community.

Only one small community, Mushunguli, still speaks a Bantu language
that is nor a Swahili dialect. The Mushunguli are mostly rural folk and tend
to be very close-knit and reserved probably because of the language barrier.

The Eyle,the Hunter-Gatherers

In ancient times, hunter-gatherer societies held sway over much of south­
ern Somalia. Things changed when the Bantu peoples migrating northwardAnnex 87

INTRODUCTION 11

d southern Somalia.Later, the Cushidc Oromo and Somali, migrat­
reace
ing sourhward •.wtd~verrun everyone ~lsAsa.re~ muostofrhe hunter -
gatherer socieues d1sappeared by ahsorpnon. Today s llnle known Eyle are

emnantsof rhar bushman population.
r Eyle in Somali means "dog owners." The Eyle use dogs in their hunting

forays;by coorrasr, rhe Somali and Sab nomads neither hum nor own dogs­
rhey despise hunrers and consider dogs as dirty creatures whose contact che
Muslim must avoid ar any price. Physically, the Eyle have a slightly yellowish

~omple axdsligtly slanted eyes. InJ960s and 1970s, they inhabited
some hunring and farming communities in the plainse south ofBaidoa.

However, rheir communities have been constanrly in decline since rhe 1960s
d1.1w assimilation with rhe Sab and Bantu agricultural communities or

through migration to large towns such as Mogadishu where they found em­
ploymentas butchers. Moreover, the civil war has scattered those few com­
munities they had,nd it would be difficultOreconstitute their former

settlements.

TheSwahili-Speakers

There are two small ethnic groups that still speak Swahili (Bantu) dialecrs

in the Benadir region. These are the Barawani, also known as the Amarani,
and the Bajuni.Their origins like those of rhe Benadiri are from diverse

groups suchas coastal Bantu, the hunter -gatherer societies of southern So­
maliasuchas the Eyle, and Iaceradditions such as Arab, Persian, and Cushiric
immigrants.he Barawani live chiefly in tne ciry of Barawe or Brava.

The Bajuni are perhaps the smallest minority, numbering around JO,OOO
in the 1970s. Some authors have thought they have some resemblances to
13
Indonesians because their physical featurInstead of an outside factor,
however, whatever Asiatic resemblances they may exhibit are probably due
to the absorprion of large numbers of rhe bushmanoid hunter -gatherers of

the region than anything else. By tradi,tion, they a.re seafarers and fishers.
Their habitats rhe tiny Bajuni islands off Kismayu and, on the coast, the

town of Kismayu and the villages around it. In recenr years, some migrated
to Kenya, where rhey have joined the Bajunis Kenya in Mombasa and
other coastal towns.

HISTORY

Early theories mostly speculated on a view called the Hamitic myth under

which the Somalis were characterized, by virtue of not closely corresponding Annex 87

12 CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

to a standardized image of the African, as being relatively newcomers to Africa
whose ancestors crossed over from Asia and mixed with the former inhabi­

tants. This was a view that was based on the nineteenth-century European
view of inhabitants of African as a monolithic group; any variation between

African groups was then to be explained in terms of external migrations. By
the same token, the great Egyptian civilization was to be lopped off from

African history and African contributions by virtue of some early Egyptians
not corresponding closely to the standardized image of the African. Today
serious scholars recognize the wider cultural unity of the peoples of Africa as

well as the localized variations in its populations from north to south, all as
part of the African mosaic.

One of the more recent theories about Somali history is provided by Her­
bert Lewis, an anthropologist, and E.R. Turton, a historian. 14They base their

theories solely on the strength of the "theory of migration" postulated by the
linguist Isidore Dyen, which might be summarized as: if a certain region has

more dialects than another region where similar dialects are spoken then the
first regionis the original homeland of the group that speaks related dialects.5

Lewis and Turton, noticing more linguistic variety in southern Somalia,
therefore theorized that early ancestors of the Somalis lived around Lake
Turkana in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia where they were suppos­

edly living until well into the beginning of the first millennium.
However, Dyen's theory is not a physical law, and when applied to lin­

guistic diversity in Italy, for example, it would wrongly predict that the Ro­
mans originated from the border area between Italy and France, since there

is much more linguistic diversity in that zone, and then spread out toward
Rome and central Italy, whereas in fact the opposite is true and is known
from recorded history. Additionally, as far as linguistic diversity in southern

Somalia is concerned, Lewis and Turton were laboring under the assumption
that Maay, Jiido, Garre, Tunni, and Dabare are all dialects of the Somali

language. In fact, they are not Somali dialects but are separate though related
languages, whose main characteristics, moreover, in sound and syntax show
them to have much in common with the Oromo language; this is not sur­

prising since it is well known that Oromo speakers were in the southern areas
well before the Somalis arrived. Despite such serious limitations, Lewis's and

Turton's theories have caught on and have been subsequently well quoted
in recent works. As for the relative lack of diversity of the Somali language

proper, it is due to the intermingling of pastora!ists, to constant trade, to
itinerant clergy and their students, andto history, such as epochal times when

Somalis had to unifY their ranks in the face of Christian groups such as theAnnex 87

INTRODUCTION 13

j\mhara -Tigrcans or in the face of tbe Galla (the Oromo), who had in me
old days mosdy ancemal faiths. 16

Even if Herberr Lewis presents no orber evidence, except Dyen's theory,
itself an intuitive posrularion incapable of explaining all forms of linguistic
diversity, he affirms, "At rhemoment we have no writren evidence nor oral

rradidons to supporr chis view, but neither, I submit, have we any -evidence
seriously ro quesdon ir."17To the contrary, Somali oral history as well as that

of related groups such as those of the Oromo and even of d1e Bamu groups
in Kenya provide abundanr material al>our rhe general direction of Somali

movements. The version of southbound migration sketched by another
scholar is more accurate In that it is corroborared by both Somali oral history
18
and accounts from early travelers.
The Somalis were still migrating southward in search of greener pastures
when the British arrived in Kenya and put a stop to the Somali advance on

what became British East Africa. One historian tells us that "the British
government in Kenya halted the Somali migration ar rhe Tana River in

I910, and the point beyond which Somalis could nor pass came to be known
as the 'Somali line.' "9Without that edict, Somalis would have been roday

probably south of Kilimanjaro and in Tanzania.
Ancient visitors to the Red Sea areasand to the Gulf of Aden systematically

give descriptionsof peoples whose modes of livelihood, government, culture,
and even physical appearance agree with those of coastal Cushites such as
Somalis and Afars. Medieval Arabs knew today's Somalis as the Berbers, a

name still borne by the port ciry of Berbera in the north. Medieval Arabs
also traded with peoples farther sourh than Somalis in what became the

Swahili city-states,bur rhey knew the inhabitants of these areas as the Zenj.
The word Berber is itself related to the older word Barbaroi, wh.ich is used
in the document PeriplusMarisErythraie (The Periplus of the Red Sea), a
20
document written in Greek in the middle of the first century A.D. This
document indicates that the Barbaroi, meaning the inhabitants of northern

Somali coasts, were trading with the inhabitams of Arabia before Islam; mey
were also trading with Egypt, then under the Romans. The document then

lists some articlesf commerce in the land of the Barbaroj such as frankin ­
cense; it also gives the names of some of the ports of the Barbaroi such as
Avalites, doubtless roday's Zeilah.

Other than the fact that the Barbaroi were able sailors and traversed the
Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden themselves for commercial purposes, what is

more interesting is the comment on their mode of government . The author
of the Peripluswrote that the Barbaroi were without a central government, Annex 87

14 CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

with each port city an independent political entity; they were, he wrote, an

unruly people. From that description, it iscertain that the author was writing
about the ancestors of today's Somalis and other coastal Cushites. In fact,

the mostly nomadic peoples of northeast Africa have been for most of their
history without a king or feudal lord. The Englishman and explorer Richard
Burton, arriving some l,900 years on the same coasts after the Periplus was

written, found, in 1854, the same organizational mode among the Somalis
and described them as "a fierce and turbulenr race of republicans." 21

However, more ancient glimpses of these "republican" inhabitants of the
coasts than those recorded by the Periplus exist. For example, Herodotus

wrote that the Ethiopians, meaning the peoples immediately south of Egypt,
on the Red Sea coasts ate a lotof meat and drank a lot of milk; we learn also
that they had little esteem for those who ate the fruits of the soil. 22These

cultural traits are still mostly applicable even today to Somalisnd their Mar
neighbors. In contrast, their cousins, the Oromo, have adopted, for the most

part, an agriculture-based mode of life after having mixed with non-Cushite
agriculturists in the southwest of today's Ethiopia and in the south of today's

Somalia.
However, we can go further than the Greco-Roman times for information

about the early inhabitants of the northern coasts. In the fifteenth century
B.C. Egyptian Queen Hatshepsut sent a commercial expedition to Punr to
get supplies of the precious myrrh and frankincense, so indispensable to their
23
religion. The expedition arrived in what is today's northern coast, where
the best frankincense in the world grows not far from the sea. Ancient Egyp­

tians knew the difference berween true frankincense and the varieties found
much nearer their home in cerrain pans of the Sudan. Mter the return of

the expedition, the queen had engraved the account of the event on murals
at Deir ei-Bahri near Luxor in the Valley of the Kings. What can be learned
from the history of that voyage is that the Egyptians depicted themselves as

arriving in the land of another brotherly people and that, during the course
of their stay, they lived in the homes of the Pumices. We also learn from the

murals that the people depicted, whether they were Egyptians or Puntites,
looked alike, as far as physical appearance, clothing styles, pigmentation , and
24
hairstyles were concerned. We can say those depicted resemble the Cushites
such as Somalis still living on the same coasts.
What is more, whether it is by reason of a common linguistic origin or

by reason of culrural influence, the Somali language has many terms that
have an equivalent term in the religion of ancient Egyptians, which the

Lewis-Turton hypotheses would not be able to explain since, according to
their theories, Somalis were around Lake Turkana and far away from theAnnex 87

INTRODUCTION
IS

R d Sea and the Gulf of Aden as recently as rhe dawn of rhe second millen­

1:m. An example of these words is the worneterfor diverse divinities in
~ ptian religion; the Soma.li equivaisnidarche righter of wrongs. So-

~ is say:Nibar baa ku heli(The Nidar will find and punish you). The
;gypcian word of spir(ba)has the Somali equivalentbah (soul, comage).
Somalissay: bahdiibaaLagasaaray (His essence and soul have: been rakc:n

our from him; be has no more courage). There is also an equivalenr for the
Egyptian moon diery ayah in the Somalidayah (moon). ~dditio t.hn~ally,
hzmr bird (the marabou, a large black stork), the herald of death m Somah

mythology, is akin to the Egyptian biHorus, depicted as the diviniry of
death.

The facts as we know them, either from historico-cultural sources or from
rhe accounts of ancient, classical, or medieval travelers, tell us that the an­
cesrorsf today's Somalis were in fairly stable existence for millennia in their

northern homeland, following their herdssheep and goats back and forth
between mountain and coast in a pattern that still continues today.
In the end, increasing populationd the need to find pasture for their

livestock were the initial causes for the southward migrationhites; it
might be said the direction of the migration was dictated by the sea barrier

in the northern direction. Also, in the case of Somalis, their adoption of
Islam incited thetopropagate the faith. The mode of migration of Somalis
was not a hapzard one, in fact Somali nomads sent exploratory expeditions

(sahan)before breaking camp so that thmaato (women and children) as
well ahoolo(livestock) would not be exposed to danger from lack of water,
pasture, or peace. Only when the sahan were back and brought news of

desirable pastures would the camp be broken. If therefore, Somalis were in
northern Kenya any rime before the nineteenth century, chen they would
have headed straight for the verdant lands of Kenya and Tanzania. It ishighly

improbable that they would have migrated northward in the directionf
drier land.
Briefly the period from 1000o 1900 witnessed a continual expansion of

Somalis from their original coastal homeland downwarto Kenya. In the
west, Somali expansion was hindered by the Christian kingdoms, which
themselves were expanding east, west,south and constantly josding with

the Somalis,s the proponents of another missionary religion in the region.
As the Somalis advanced from their northern homeland, they dashed with
theOromo who had preceded them in that direction. (n the riverine areas

of southern Somalia, they found diverse populations consisting of Galla pas­
toralistsd agropasroraliscs, agricultural Bantu populations who had stayed

behind after theromo advance, leftovers from still older populations such Annex 87

16 CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

as the hunter-gatherer Eyle, and, in the coastal areas, the Swahili peoples of
the Benadir, all living by then in a fairly stable accommodation long after

the Oromo attacks had ceased in the region. By the fourteenth century, the
Ajuuraan Somali clan had moved into the riverine areas and had established

a hereditary dynasty, thereby controlling the flow of trade between the coastal
cities of the Benadir and the southwestern hinterland. 25
Meanwhile, in the southwestern direction Somalis clashed with the Chris­

tian Amhara-Tigreans and the largely pagan Gallas. From the twelfth to the
sixteenrh centuries wars tinged with religious fervor raged between Muslim

Somalis and the Christian Amhara-Tigreans. The period between the tenth
and the sixteenth centuries brought the development of important Muslim

sultanates such as Ifat, later called Adal, based in the port city of Zeilah. In
1331, Ibn Battuta, the Arab traveler, visited the port cities of Zeilah in the
north and Mogadishu in the south.

If the era between the tenth and sixteenth centuries was an era of devel­
opment for coastal cities and city-states, it was also an era of turbulence and

religious antagonisms. Information from the Crusades-the series of wars
fought from the late eleventh through the thirteenth centuries, in which

European kings and warriors set out to gain control of the land in which
Jesus had lived, the Holy Land, from the hands of Muslims-were filtering
down to the Horn of Africa and feeding local conflicts between Muslims and

Christians. To the Somalis, the crusaders would be known as the Faranji (the
Franks), a word which to this day denotes a European.

THE WAR OF 128 YEARS (1415-1543)

The increasing populations and prosperity of Muslim sultanates, especially
of Ifat, ledto renewed confrontations with the highland Christian Amhara­

Tigreans. The history of the most tumultuous confrontations roughly cor­
responds with the start of the depredations of Negus Yeshaq, king of the
Christians, and ends with the death of Imam Ahmed Guray, the leader of

the Somalis; that era was a period of rampaging armies and continuous wars
between the Christian highlanders and Muslim lowlanders. In 1415, Negus

(King) Yeshaq, qualifYing the Muslims as "enemies of the Lord," invaded
Ifat, defeated the Muslim armies, sacked Zeilah, burnt its mosques, and killed
its ruler Sa'adad-Din on the island off Zeilah that would ever after bear his

name. Yeshaq compelled the Muslims to pay a tribute and had a victory song
composed for him in which we find the first written record of the word

Somali. But the story would not end there; Sa'ad ad-Din's sons would re­
organize Muslim forces and one of his sons, Jamal ad-Din, would chase
Yeshaq into the confines of the Blue Nile, burning in revenge ChristianAnnex 87

INTRODUCTION 17

26
h hes and citiHowever, the war was inconclusive for either group
c du wrul~onlybein the 1530s when the next major battles would take
an It

platrhe1530s, the Somalis, who were fragmented in their political organ­
. ~oaschey had always been, raUied under the Imam Ahmed Gurey (the

;:~ha knnwdasGragnetorhe Amhara -Tigreans. He unified the Mus ­
lims, obtained some muskets from Turkish sources, which were rhe most
dvanced weapons ar the rime,nquered the Christian highlands. He
aracrically cook possession of their land "save aBur thell forts."

~orc -wuhglie thesEuropeans held the legend of rhe kingdom of
thel'rester John, a Christian kingdom, which, if only it could be contacted,
would comeo the ajd of the Christian Europe against the Muslim Tucks­

came around the Cape of Good Hope in southern Africa, sailed up to the
Red Sea, and arrjustin dmetoshore up the defeated forces of the
Christian king. Imam Ahmed Gurey would die from a barde wound received

from rhe Portuguese-Capric forces, and the Somalis who were yearning to
go bactotheir lowland homes fell back. The history of this turbulent period
has been captured in writing by the Somali chronicler of the time, Shihad

Ad-Din, in hisuhAl-Habaswhich is one of the important documents
of the history of the Horn.
The Christian-Muslim wars eased after the middle of the sixteenth century,

largelybecause of the devastation that both groups had wrought upon each
other. However, another religio-ethnic group, worshiping mostly an ancestral
divinity thWaaqothe Gallas (Oromos) moved against both Muslim and

Christian. Galla depredations of the time were described as a "scourge" that
afflicted both the Christian Amhara-Tigreans and the Muslim Somalis. So­
maliswere pushed back toward the sea on the northern front, with the Galla
penetrating sometimesar as the sea. These far-flung Galla attacks were

possible because of the use of the horse, which the Galla had earlier acquired
from the SomaliHowever, the Somalis would recover from the Galla
invasions and the Portuguese attacks on their coastal cities in the mid­

seventeenth centoattempt to drive out the Galla from their northern
territories and consolidate their southern possessions.
In the south, because of the increasing migrations of Somalis, the area

became Somalized and coastal cities such as Mogadishu, Merca, and Barawa,
which were traditionally part of the Swahili world, became more and more
Somali in dialect and culture. Itthe west of the Benadir coastal
strip, the populations that remained from the Galla, for all of them had not

been pushed out by the southward driving Somalis, and Somali migrants,
incorporated into their tribes through the traditional method
new arrivals, gave rise to the present Digil and Mirifle confederations-the Annex 87

18 CULTUREAND CUSTOMSOF SOMALIA

29
Sab. Toward the end the nineteenth century, the Somalis crossed the Tana
River in what is now northern Kenya.

The Decline of the City-States

As soon as they came into the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, the Por­
tuguese started harassing the coastal cities. Unable to take the cities by force,

they would then content themselves with bombarding them from their ships
and making brief sallies for loot; thus in 1499 Mogadishu was bombarded

by Vasco DaGama; in 1507, Barawe (Brava) was sacked by Trista da Cuita;
Zeilah was burned in 1517, and Berbera sacked in 1518. By the eighteenth

century the glory of the city-states was mostly gone. Both Zeilah in the north
and Mogadishu in the south were a pale shadow of themselves; the effect of
Portuguese plunder and new trade patterns, set by the arrival of the Euro­

peans in the East and in the Indian Ocean, had caused a downward spiral in
growth and trade.

The former glories of Zeilah and Mogadishu have been handed to us by
travelers through the centuries. In the sixteenth century (circa 1517-18)

Duarte Barbosa, a Portuguese, said of Mogadishu: "It has a king over it, and
is a place of great trade in merchandise. Ships come there from the kingdom
of Cambay [India] and from Aden with stuffs of all kinds, and with spices.

And they carry away from there much gold, ivory, beeswax, and other things
upon which they make a profic. In this town there is plenry of meat, wheat,
barley, and horses, and much fruit; it is a very rich place."

The Arab traveler Ibn Battuta visited in 1331 both Zeilah and Mogadishu.
He described Zeilah as "a large town with an important market," where a

lot of fish are landed and many camels slaughtered for meat, evidently to
feed a large urban population. 31After a sea voyage of fifteen days, Ibn Battuta
arrived in Mogadishu where he found the inhabitants also slaughtered many

camels for meat. He also mentioned that its merchants were wealthy and
exported locally manufactured clothing to Egypt and other places.

The decline of Mogadishu was such that the Omanis of Zanzibar started
exercising a nominal suzerainty over the Benadir in the nineteenth century.

As for Zeilah, when Richard Burton, arriving aboard a Somali sailboat from
Aden, visited it in 1854, he found it barely able toassert any control beyond
its walls; its governor, Sharmarke Mohamed, nominally tied to the Ottoman

Empire, through their Mukha representative, was still dreaming, according
to him, despite his advanced age, of carving out a new state by conquering

the rebellious Somalis. lrwas never to be and in 1875, the Egyptians, under
the then khedive (viceroy), Ismail Pasha, who was having his own dreams ofAnnex 87

INTRODUCTION 19

. an empire of his own in northeast Africa,occupied, with British

elQura~eme't.both Zeilah and Berbera and then went inland ro colonize
i dependent cJry-srareof Harar.
th: Egyp~iasevacuatedtheir Somali possessionsin 1885, unable to sus­
. ~e occuation financially.Emperor Menelik, rhe founder of modern

~~~ ihnattaieaH,rar in 1887, defeated its Muslim inhabitants, and
I ced Ras Makonen, rhe father of would-be emperor, Haile Selassie,as
p ernorof Harar. Realizingrhe significaoceof his victoryover Harar, sear
g~v lhmeaGnuray, rhe conqueror of rhc Christian highlands in the

:hueenrhcentury, Menelik was ro declare: "This is nm a Muslim counrry,
aeveryoneows.32

ThePartitionof the SomaliLands

The last rwodecadesof the nineteenth cemury were ones of uncertainty
for Somalis;Europeans were activelyreconnoitering their areas-explorers

suchas Rkhard Burton and G. Revoilhad visited rheir lands; rumors of the
Faranji(theFranks)coming roChristianize rhemand roraketheir landswere
rife.Their traditional political and religious rivals, the Amhara-Tigreans,
freshlyarmed by the Europeans, rheir coreligionists,wereventuring out of

their mountain redoubts for the first time since the sixteenth centmy and
expandingtheir control to traditional Muslim areas.
In rheend, the Somali populations would be partitioned in the late nine"

teenrhcentury between three European coumries and the Amhara-Tigrean
kingdom of Menelik. The three European countries were Grear Britain,
which gor rhe northern regions; ltaly, which got the southern regions;and
Prance,which got a portion of the extreme north, subsequently known as
FrenchSomaliCoas,nd which would become parr of the present stare of

Djibouti.
Britishinteorthe northern Somali coast as wellas the Yemenicoast
weremotivatedby theirstrategicplanfor their more valuablecolonyoflndi.a,
especiallyafter the openSue :nal in 1869. Aden in Yemenwas

robea coalingstation forshiptoIndia and a garrison cicyfor the
rroops guarding it. In rurn, the Somali coast was co be the feeder of the
troops in munon, and so it had ro beadded ro the British dominions, in
order, as the Bridsh Lord Cunon stated, "to safeguard the food supply of

Aden,just as the Roman Protectorate wasextended over Egypt to safeguard
thecorn-supply of Rome." Aden,of course, had prior commercialrelations
wirh the northern coast before the arrival of rhe Brirish. Bur the British

sought to strengthen th~ot their garrison and rhe population of Annex 87

20 CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

Aden were totally dependent on shipments from the northern coasts for
meat. 34

To secure the northern coast from its European competitors, which were
scouring the area after the opening of the Suez, Britain signed treaties of
protection with the northern clans between 1884 and 1888. This was the

beginning of the British Protectorate of Somaliland. However, in the early
years, the British presencewas a nominal one consisting of political residents

in the main ports such as Zeilah, Berbera, and Bulahar whose responsibility
was limited to ensuring the flow of maritime shipments. At that time, the

protectorate was actually governed through the British colonial government
in India. The Indian connection cominued for fourteen years afrer which
Britain became more involved in Somaliland due to the war in the Sudan.

The British administration in the north has been characterized as one of
indirect administration, since the Somali traditional system of politics was

included in the ways the country was run; the qadijudicial system as well as
the functions of clan chiefs, thakils,were recognized and even strengthened.

The British rule was not therefore felt in the north as too harsh or too alien.
However, the reason for British magnanimity in the north might be dismissed
as benign noninvolvemenr in the affairs of a country that had neither gold

mines nor verdant lands suitable for European settlement such as the green
lands of East Africa or Southern Africa.

While the British were establishing themselves on the northern coast, mod­
ern Ethiopia was taking shape under the guns of the naftanya (Menelik's
riflemen). The Europeans gave supplies of modern weapons to Menelik,

while denying them to the Somalis; more important, Menelik, recognized as
a head of a Christian state, could buy weapons from European merchants
35
whereas the Somalis could not. The Somalis saw the whole affair as Chris­
tians helping other Christians .Be that as it may, Menelik's hordes, without
pay or provisions, were now well armed and raiding Somali pastoralists and

expropriating livestock far away from their mountainous country.
With increasing European maneuvers on their shores and Amhara plunder

in the rear, Somalis were caught in a spiral over which they had no control.
The Europeans stood to profit from the Amhara menace they had created in

their quest for protectorate agreements. No doubt the Somalis were utterly
confused, bewildered, and powerless. Somali sentiments of the time had been
caught admirably well by the poet Farah Nur:

The British, the Amhara and the Italians are conniving

The country is snatched, divided by whosoever is strong
The country is sold without our knowledge!Annex 87

INTRODUCTION 21

Somali reacrions to these events included both defiance and a call fojihad

(srruggle) as well as acceptance of Eu~~phe egemnony, and e~e Anmhara
hegemony; in 1891, Col. Swayne, a Brmsh officer, for example, found mem­
bersof rhe Somali Barrire clan acring as "car's paw" for rhc Ambaras; armed

by rhe Amhara with rifles, they were requisitioning catde from ocher Somali
clans such as rhe Habar Awal and the Ogaden for the Amhara garrison ar

Jigjiga6The Somalis among whom Swayne traveled pleaded with him by
saying: "e are not allowed co import firearms, the only effective weapons
against rhe Abyssiniaos [Amharas];nd W!' !sk the British, who have occupied

our ports, eithero protect us, or to allow us to import guns with which we
can prorect ourselves."lA!ia result of Amhara depredations, Swayne found

everywhere he traveled Somalis pleading to be placed under British protec ­
tion; even the riverine culrivawrs at Imey, now in Ethiopia,of non-Somali

origin but of Muslim fitirh, were pleadjng robe placed unde r British procec­
cion, and when Swayne did no sign rite paper of allegiance, one of rhe
councillorsof chief Gabba Oboho cried, "Ah, it is as we feared, you English
38
have sold us to Amhara ."
Among those who called for a jihad was notably a man by the name of

Mohamed Abdulle Hassan (the Mad Mullah). His appeals got him in rhe
beginning a large number of followers from the Somali clans. However,
despite his rhetoric of pushing the invaders to the sea, his massacres of

thousands of innocent Somalis, including women and children, and his
camel-rustling activities spoke louder chan his words,nd he was in the end

abandoned by the seaward clans. He was still, however, for many years able
to keep a band of coerced followers from the more hinterland clans, notably
members from his father's clan, the Ogaden, and from his mother's, the

Dhulbahante. His activities paralyzedovement and trade in the hinterland
and brought his followers head to head with British forces. In fact, the British,
who as long as trade kept going had no interest in venturing much into the

hinterland, were obliged to mount expeditionary forces far into the interior
to capture the sanguinary mullah,who by then had acquired a mythical fame

of being invincible-legend had it that he had sold his soul to the <aasho
badhi,a desertlizard believed to be the abode of rhe devil, in exchange for
invincibility.

Mohamed Abdulle Hassan was also a poet of keen finesse and did not
spare any words to exhort his followers with poetry while at the rime painting

his Somali adversariesas "infidels" whose massacre would earn paradise for
his followers. His contemporary and fellow poet, Ali Jama Haabiil, engaging
him in poetic duel answered him in the now the famous line: Nimaan mu­

umunimo kugu dhaqaynmuslinimokhaasah, gaal maxastakuu dhowraood Annex 87

22 CULTURE ANDCUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

magamataadh11ama (An infidel who will not hurr your weak and will protect
you is better than someone who will nor govern in a just and Muslim way).

He would be routed in 1921 when rhe British organized a force among the
Somalis who were fed up with his banditry and massacres; bur once more

the elusive mullah got away to die in exile among the Oromo.
Ironically, instead of defending the Muslim faith, his massacres left so
many children orphans that priests from a Catho lic mission were picking up

roving and dying kids from rhe desert. By rhe succor afforded them, rhey
became the first Christian Somalis in several centuries. The Mad Mullah's
orphans would give rise to several Chriscian Somali families, some of whom

would become household name.s; they include the Mariano family of the
Habar Jelo lssaq, and the Siyad of rhe Dhu lbahante Oarod.

Other British colonial possessions in Somali areas included the mostsourh­
erly Somali habitation, which became parr of British East Africa and later
part of Kenya. That territory was labeledNFD (the Northern frontier Dis­

trict) and placed under a special administration with the aim of checking
Somali advances in the area. The British organized a referendum in 1962 to

ascertain rhe wishesof Somalis in that region before Kenya gained its inde­
pendence; 83 percent of Somalis expressed a wish to join rhe Somali Republic
rather than stay in Kenya. However, higher imperatives of the British, who

were threatened wirh an expulsion of their farmers from an independent
Kenya by the leaders of Kenyan independence, meant chat the wishes of the
Somalis of rhe NFD were:conveniently disregarded . 39After independence,

Kenya renamed the Somali area the Nonhero Province and fought Somali
independence guerrillas for a decade afterhedeparmre of the British. Today,
NFD, as the Somalis srill call it, endures as the least developed of Somali

territories, as the comainmem oflslam and Somalis undertaken by the British
has been succeeded by neglect and outright discrimination in independent

Kenya.

France and the French Somali Coast

In 1862, France got the port of Obock in Afar country , then it extended

irs protectorate over a spit of a country inhabited by Somalis on the coast,
after Britain cheated it out of the main ciry and pon, ZciJah. This small
coasral colony was firsc mistaken ly called French Somali Coast, since, at the

time, it conrained moscly Afars; but Afars are not Somalis, although rhcy
share with the Somalis common ethnic origins and a common religion in
Islam, as well as a common hisrory of feuding with the Christian highlanders.Annex 87

INTRODUCTION 23

the Republic of Djibouti resulting from that French colonization is
Today. lf Somalt m population.
abourha

Romanente:In the Manner of the Romans

Romarrcn tn the manner of rhe Romans) read the milestones on the first
. road built by the Italians in their Somali colony. The Italians were
~al: rothe gme sof colony making in Africa, as Italy itself was con­

a:tedas an independent. entity in 1861, but they invoked ancient Roman
s~o ronspired1sm. The Italians went looking for their "place in the sun"
fas if (he hear of southern lraly was not enough), as was the fashion of the

limes among Ewopean powers. Unlike the British, who in the early years
made no tangible attempt at administering the land and whose residems on
rhc coast ler the Somalis go about rheir business without hindrance, the

Italians were more aggressive and soon got involved in the local commerce.
These direcr conracrs increased the number of incidents between rhe Ital­
ians and the local populations. On Oct11, 1893,the Italian flag was

hoistedn Merca for rhe first rime. A Somali attacked and killed an Italian
soldier, who in turn was shot by rhe ltIn 1895, an Ethiopian force
reached the vicinity of Lugh, increasing Somali suspicions of an Ethiopian

takeover of the area. In 1895, the Italians established an outpost at Lugh in
rhe far southwest, under the guise of protecting the Somalis from the ever­
expanding AmbaraT igrean empire of Ethiopia. In 1895, Captain Cw :hi, a

proponent of Italian assertiveness in the Somali peninsula, set out from the
eoasr, in an arrempr to increase Italian influence, toward Uleinterior, bur his
forces were defeated by the warriors of the Biyomaal clan al a place called
Lafole "the place of bones" in the vicinity of Afgoye. The captain, thirteen
41
Italians, and theirri(locally recruited troops) perThis event set
backactive Italian penetration for a while in tIn1907,htwo thou­
sand Somalis attacked an Italian regiment at Turunley; the attackers, from

the Biyomaalan, were defeated and sustained high casualtieshun­eral
dred dieH.In 1908, with calls for a forceful occupation mounting, Italian
troops were sent to the hinterland.n of Mererey, which had attracted

resistorsfrom the coastal towns, was destroyed and more than seventy fighters
of the local Hintire dan perished.
In a more northern direction, the Italians had placed in 1899 a protectorate

under the sultan of the Majeerreen clan, and also over Ali Yusuf, warlord,
adventurer, and sailor, who had established himself in Obbia; an Italian
consul general based in Aden had responsibility over those northern areas. Annex 87

24 CULTUREAND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

In 1908, the southern coastal area of the Benadir and the northern Italian
protectorates were unified. In the more northern regions, Italian penetration

was even more nominal than that of the southern areas, and Italian expedi­
tionary forces had to be sent in several times. However, Somalis were dis­

organjzed, unlike rhe highland Christians who had been united by the
suongman tactics of Menelik; therefore, despite their spirited resistance and

calls for ajihad,Italian administration was firmly established by 1927 in all
regions, with Mogadishu as the capital.
Italian colonial endeavors were also helped by the British, who were afraid

of competition from the Germans, whom the British considered more potent
contenders. As one Somali said, the British were practicing the Somali prov­
45
erb that says "give your stick to someone from whom you can repossess."
The British facilitated Italian occupation of the central regions. In addition,

in 1924, Britain ceded the Jubaland province, in the extreme south, to Italy.

THE RISE OF MODERN SOMALI NATIONALISM

While Somalis had always been aware of being part of one ethnic group

unified notably by one language and one religion, historically, they had rallied
more on the basis of religious identity rather than nationalist identity. In

their brief moments of great cohesion, Somalis had come together as Muslims
instead of as Somalis. City-states, sultanates, and independent clans were the
normal mode of Somali government since rime immemorial. The advent of

modern Somali nationalism and its centralist stare are therefore a tributary
of the nationalist ideals and the concept of the nation-stare that starred to
rake shape in nineteenth-century Europe. Somalis had always been seafarers

and travelers, and with the opening of the Suez, they were working and
traveling in Europe and even as far as Australia. They came back with the

feelings of a need for a state for their nation. Colonial experience also, even
if it divided up Somali territories, brought together the disorganized clans,
sultanates, and city-states under a single administration and indirectly helped

foster Somali nationalism.
Some writers start the Somali struggle for nationhood with the so-called

Dervish disturbances, instigated by Mohamed Abdulle Hassan (the Mad
Mullah). However, Mohamed Abdulle Hassan had no grasp of the wider

implications of Somali nationhood in the order of nations; his movement
and rheroric as well as his many bloody battles were parochial in nature and
involved large-scale looting of camels, exacerbation of clan antagonism, and

massacres of innocent Somalis in unprecedented numbers; in fact, the one
other Somali who equals him in wanton destruction and massacres is GeneralAnnex 87

INTRODUCTION 25

.d Barre. ohamed Abdulle Hassan's other endeavwerealso about local
S13 ch as the competition betwesuf(religious) orders or expressions
eventSsu · h' b M 1· d Ch · ·
historical anupar 1es erweeus 1msan nsuans.
of~=:c and thoughful Somali nationalist movements started in the
in urban settings.single person can be called the father or mother
19305
f5oma li nationalism. There certainly had been a number of individuals in
0h ovement, suchas Farah Omar (1864- J948), a man who, like Mahatma
~:; of;Iniaisought change in a peaceful way by writing and petitioning
46
B idsh authoritieThe Somali poets and composers who produced a large
:woire of nationalist literature in the 1940s and 1950s had indisputably
rIrlargest role m om1nattona 1stconsctousness.

r Early Somali discussions coalesced, only nacucal, into the formation
of political and social groups. We witness the first such organizations in the
north. where the British colonial regime was politically more tolerant rhan

the fascist lralian regime in the south, which was advocating separation of
cheracesand had no tolerance for rhe political emancipation movements of
checolonized. Somali nationalist sentiments crystallized particularly after the

end of World War 11,as happened in many nations under colonial regimes.
Somalishad fought and died in Africa, Asia, and Europe for the Allies.
had also fought on the losing side with the Italians in Ethiopia . These events

brought them even more in contact withe oursidc world and the other
peoplesaspiring for liberty from colonialism.
lo the north, the Somali National Society was formed in 1935. This or­
47
ganization later evolved into the SNL (Somali NadonaJ League)his
would be rhe main nord1ern political organization until independence from
Britain. In the south, after the defeat of fascist Italy, its colony was placed

under British military administration. [r was during rhis period that the SYC
(Somali Youth Club)as formed in 1943 under rhe encouragement of Brit­
ish officers who did nor like the powerful pro-Italian lobby in Mogadishu.

There was a sizable number of Iralians and pro-hafia.n locals in urban south ­
ern cemers at rhar rime who were clamoring for a return ro an halian colonial
srarus. The SYC changed irs nato SYL (Somali Youth League) in 1947.

The SYL dominated southern politics until independence from rhe Italian
trusteeship period and continued irs hegemony afrer tbe amalgamation of
north and south imo rhe Somali Republic.

While the Somalis had no history of a single central administration, they
had territorial contiguity, a widely diffused language, one religion, and of
course a single ethnic origin, for the most parr. The various minoriLies in the

south were also warm£Onationalist aspirations since the word Somali was
acquiring wider meanjng rhan the people to whom it referred in the Annex 87

26 CULTUREAND CUSTOMSOF SOMALIA

past. The unification of rhc Somali territories nacurally became a burning

question - the Somalis wanted one administration over rheir heads. In par­
ticular, the return of Somali-speaking territories such as NFD that went to
Kenya and the ·Somali areas rhat fell to Menelik's Ethiopian empire were

sought in a movement that would be known as "Somali irredentism," which
would lead m dispures with both Kenya and Ethiopia . The sentiment of

restitution applied also ro rhe French colony of Somaliland, only partially
Somali in erhnic composition.
In 1946, British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin pleaded for the unification

of all Somali lands under one administration. He was vetoed by the three
other members of the Four Power Commission, comprising rhe victors of

World War II (United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia), and charged
to decide the future of former Italian possessions in Africa after the war.
Russia suspected Britain of expanding its colonial possessions in norrheast

Africa. The commission traveled ro rhe south in 1948 and had audiences
with the populations of the region. The pro-Italian lobby did an intense

campaign for thirty years of uusreeship under Italy; however, rhe commission
granred only ten years of trusteeship.

ln the norrh, nationalist senrimenrs focused on the transfer of the Haud
and Reserved Areas in 1954 to Emperor Haile Selassie's Ethiopia. This
Somali-inhabited area served as the main grazing land forthe clans in British

Somaliland. The Somalis of the north felt a sense of immense betrayal and
hastened m send the .British home. With poets rallying them at every point,

norrhern Somalis went through paroxysms of nationalism that took them to
independence and co a hasty amalgamation with their fellow Somalis in the
south in 1960. On June 26, 1960, the SNL, the majority party, headed by

Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, led British Somaliland to independence. Bur the
resulting Scareof Somaliland was short-lived; on July I, ic combined with
Somalia, on the same day rhe Iralian colony gained its independence. In the

British paper, the Herald, it was called "The Colony That Rejected Free­
dom"48 and the name stuck.

THE FORMATION OF THE SOMALI REPUBLIC

The amalgamation of the north and the south was the result of a nationalist
fever in the north; the southerners were not much interested in a union; rhis

was specially true of the southern leadership who were afraid tolose their
prominence. The northerners flew to Mogadishu, the southern capital, a few
days before the "precipitate union," and were housed in a hotel.9The south­

erners deliberated alone for a day about what their conditions would be forAnnex 87

INTRODUCTION 27

·on with the norrh. Finally rhey summoned the nonherin rhe
die un• . .
01ddleof the night and present ed them wnh a set of opnons rhar aUstarted
•h rhe wordha! a word which means "one" in sourhern Somali dialect
w•t htdlmeant a "she-camel" in the northern dialect antobe ex­
but w
31. ed ro some of the norrhern delegates. The southerners rarded off five
P ~id "ohenpres:ent is one, and iisgoing robe ours; the prime
0
011i isne.taed r i going ro be ours; the capital is one, and ir is going
be ours; the currency is one, and ir is going to be ours; the flag is one,
:~ itisdoing to be ours.The southerners thought they had raised the

stakes so unpalatably high char rhe northerners would nor be able be to
swallowrheir conditions. Bur the northerners knowing cbe narionalist fervor

in the norcl1duly accepted rhe southern proposition .
"The unification effort, however,horr of the legal requirements man­
dared by domesric and international lThe new stare. rhe Somali Re­

public, would have "nothing more than the recognirion of ochetostates
cescifyto the exisrence of Somalia as a unifieDespite the union,

rhenew country was functioning in all realjry as rwo coumries under one
flag:there were rwo adm.inisrrarive sysrems, rwo monetary scus~ms, rwo
roms and taxation systems, rwo official languages, and rwo educ.uional

systems. Wirh faraway Mogadishu calling the shors and Jralian rhe language
of the government, rhe northern population soon felt a sentiment of "m.arry
in haste and repent in leisure." Wimin a yea1961,rhe north voted,

in a referendum, against the constitution of rhe new republic. The main
northern party called for a boycott referendum; voting djd take place

burthe result was still a negative vote in The south voted over­
whelmingly for the constiturion . Jn an effort to declare a massive yes vote,
ourherners not only reponyesvote higher than the estimated population

for rheir region but also declared a small village called Wanla Weyn in me
vicinity Mogadishu to have registered a yes vore higher than the I00,000
ballots cast in the entire This not only gave northerners a new term

for southerners-WanlaWeyn-bur it also made them suspicious of the
political culturesourherners.No other referendum was held for the
constitution even if it waspproved by the north.

THE CHAOTIC DEMOCRATIC YEARS

In the first years of the Somali Republic, northerners had no influence on
the government and felt politically marginalized. In the newly formed Na­

tional Army, things were no better;r the Italian Trusteeship adminis­
tration, the south had only police contingebur no standing army. Annex 87

28 CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

However, just before the union, the police officers of the south, themselves

produC£s of the semiliterate colonial force, gave themselves, with the full
knowledge of their political bosses, generous promotions in rank with the

express aim of "outranking" the northerners. In the north, the British had a
territorial armyof2,000 men whose junior officers were graduates of distin­
guished British military academies such as Sandhurst and Mons. These young

officers now fell under the command of the old carabinieri(police) officers
such as Siad Barre. The northern officers were outraged and staged a coup

to sever ties with the south. However, the coup, poorly organized, failed as
noncommissioned officers did not follow their orders. The officers were ar­

rested but could not be sentenced in a courc The judge decided to acquit
them "on the basis that, in the absence of an Act of Union, rhe coun had
55
no jurisdiction over Somaliland. " Relations between the north and south
continued ro simmer.
In May 1962, Egal, the man who took the north into union despite his

personal misgivings, allied himself with some southern opposition leaders in
a new political formation, rhe SNC (Somali National Congress). Egal. unlike

many of his northern counrrymen, understood the workings of southern
politics, which were articulated around clan politics and clan balancing
mainly between the Hawiye president, Aden Abdulle Osman, and his

Majeerteen-Oarod prime minister. The challenge was ro wrest power from
the SYL and irs alliance of clans through a more diverse grouping. When the

first national postindependence elections were held in 1964, the SNC coa­
lition of northerners and southerners did not win the election, but it nar­
rowed the SYL seats to 54 out of 123; the SNC won 22 sears, the

Digii-MiriAe party (the HOM$) won nine seats, and the SOU 15 seats. More
than anything else, the election proved that the SYL, the governing party,

could be beaten. But instead of preparing for the next elections, Egal shrewdly
realized the significance of the American adage: If you cannot beat them,
join them. He joined the SYL and was instrumental in getting Abdirashid

Ali Sharmarke elected in 1967 as the second president of the Republic by
corralling the northern deputies against the incumbent Aden Abdulle Os­

man, the man who had presented the five conditions of the union to the
northerners. As a result, Egal, now in the SYL, was invited by President

Sharmarke to form the next government. The Republic had thus its first
northern premier.
Gradually, the integration of the two regions improved and northerners

felt less alienated in the union mainly for three reasons: {1) rhe crossed po­
litical alliances such as the SNC or Egal'sentry into the SYL inner circle; (2)

the increasing use of English in the south as a resuh of rhe internationalizacionAnnex 87

INTRODUCTION 29

f talanguage; and (3) increased commerce between north and south and
?n:~ rnte outeby rorhern businesspeople who built the highest

~ '!dings in Mogadishu .
u~i larof north -south breakup evaporated, Somali politics became a
eof dan parties, as politicians sought to mobilize members of their clan
~a: ofeeaindelection solely on a debated platform. Party formation was

:nfronc ro getting elected, and it did nor reflect any ideological convictions
or any specific visions. The number of registered parties thus arose phenom­
ehally. The smaU one-man parties were meant to dissolve as soon as the
eleccionwas over by joining the SYL. In the last free elections held in the

counrryn 1969. 68 parries and more chan 1,000 candidates representing
rhe intricate set of dans and subclans of the Somali clan mosaic contested
the elections.SYL again won the elections, amid sharp accusations of

electoral improprieties, through the use of public resources and slush funds.
Inevitably, the general public became disillusioned with the machinations
of rhe politicians, who while electioneering would promise to bring in de­

velopment projects ro rheir districts but who would be seen soon after ca­
tering first co their personal needs. Little surprise then that one politician
was dubbebad-ma'aaneq(he who sweetens the sea), as he was fond of
hyperbole while fishing for votes. Perhaps more than ever before, the legis­

lative electi1969were a mess of disorder and irregularities that only
widened the gulf between the political class and the ordinary people.
After the election was over and the new parliament duly sworn in, Presi­

dent Sharmarke was assassinated by one of his bodyguards, apparently for a
grudge tied to the elections in his own district. This incident added a new
unsettling elemente coumry's already volatile political situation. Sud­
denly, the highest political office in the country was vacant, and a mad

backstage marathon started toe new position. There could have been
no better political situation for the army brass and its Soviet advisers to hatch
a coup d'etat.

The history of the plotting that led to the fall of the civilian governmem
has never been written down. One fact that is well known is that Premier
Ega! had antagonized the commander of the army General Siad Barre by
allusions ro his inadequate education in military science and wanted him ro

retire. According to one version of the plot, a junior northern officer Captain
Khaawe, with the support of General Barre, side-stepped the higher-ranked
but militarily less-educated southern officers and wem about organizing the

coup in a methodical manner.d chis by recruiting some of his former
classmates and fellow officers, such as Ismail Ali Abokar, Mohamed Ali Shire,
and Ahmed Suleiman AbdalleThen Siad Barre and the young officers Annex 87

30 CULTUREAND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

co-opted a few of the senior officers. The plotters had not given any infor­
mation as to whom was going to be in their junta council a whole week after
57
the coup. Apparently ardenr discussions were going on between the young
junior officers and the old guard who had the benefit of better-known names.

Thus, on the first press conference, Siad Barre and General Ainanshe, both
of the old Italian police force, were present5 The young officers saw in Siad

Barre a transitional compromise figure, an old rusticof no particular keenness
of mind, to be conveniently replaced later on. Unluckily, what the promoters
of the coup did not know was that behind the rustic figure of Siad Barre was

a mind endowed with enough talent to sow suspicion among strong friends
and hatred between brothers.

After the soldiers had staged their coup without any bloodshed, they ar­
rested members of the government and parliament and suspended the par­

liament and the constitution. Then, taking a leaf from a trend that was
common in the Third World, they constituted the SRC (Supreme Revolu­

tionary Council) and started governing by simple decree without consulting
anyone except themselves. Barre, the chair of the SRC, was named the pres­

ident of the Republic, renamed appropriately in the same military-leftist style
of the era, the Somali Democratic Republic. Unfortunately, the population
tired of the inefficiency and corruption of the civilian regime, and, seduced

by the propaganda of the military leaders who promised a new era of justice,
discipline, efficiency, and development, poured out into the streets tacitly

endorsing the coup.

THE YEARSOF THE DICTATORSHIP AND CIVIL WARS

In the first two years, the military regime had genuine popular support.

Basing their speeches on populist socialism and nationalist ideals, the junta
leaders exhorted the population to reach self-reliance. Popular slogans such

as Hadalyariyohaw/badanbaahorumarlagugaadhaa (Lessspeech and more
work is the way to progress) festooned all public places. The Somali urban
elites, schoolteachers, civil servants, and students were caught in the populist

movement as the military leaders promised justice and advancement through
merit and hard work. On the first day of the anniversary, Somalia was offi­

cially declaredto be a socialist country; nationalizations of the banks, insur­
ance companies, fuel distribution companies, newspapers, the sugar refinery,

and any enterprise of importance were carried out. State companies were set
up to import and export items. Unemployed youth were rounded up and
organized into agricultural reams known as crash programs to increase food

production and decrease urban unemployment. Multiplying egalitarian stepsAnnex 87

INTRODUCTION 31

Typical propaganda poster of the Barre regime.

in a country where egalitarianism was a reality by the near absence of a

significant bourgeoisor a landed gentry class, the regime, in the fashion of
the Paris Commune, declared chat from that time on everyone should be

addressed asjaalle{comrade) without distinction torank, age, or sex.
The propaganda machinery through the state-owned media (private media
being forbidden) was relentless in inculcating upon the people the arrivalf

a new era and the banishment of corruption, afiniisharnimo (rumor­
mongering, literally having a serrated mouth), and tribalism. Public cere­

monies were held in which effigiesf tribalism were burned and then puhlicly
buried.All the while, however, Barre was consolidating power into a clique
of his own making; his first scheme was to divide the SRC by winning to

his side those who shared clan roots with him. Soon, a joke was circulated
that when the effigyof tribalism was buried, Barre sneaked out in the middle

of the night, dug out its skeleton, and placed it in his cupboard.
At the same time, repressive measures were put into place: the right of
habeas corpus, the freedoms of political association, public expression, and

the right to form labor unions and to strike were suspended and made an
offense punishable by death in some cases. Advised by the security services

from the Soviet bloc countries suchas the Soviet Union itself, East Germany,
and Romania, a new security service, the National Security Service (NSS)
was created. Its followers woulds~ow i, the coming years, thar they were Annex 87

32 CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

the equals of Hitler's Gestapo in sheer brutality and cold-blooded murder­
the very mention of the NSS became enough to make someone break into

a cold sweat. Next, a popular militia, the Guulwadayaal (Pioneers of the
Revolution), was created with chapters in almost every village of the country.

The Guulwadayaal, recruited from among the members of the illiterate urban
youth and from common criminals, were trained in rudimentary military
techniques and uniformed in green fatigues, a dress which earned them the

derogatory name of Green Dog, whose utterance was punishable by a harsh
sentence. Their task was to spy on the members of every household and on

ordinary people, freeing the NSS to pursue the more educated enemies of
the regime. One of the common pretexts that rhe NSS or the Guulwadayaal
used to arrest someone was to state they heard that person utter the word

Afwryne (big mouth), Barre's sobriquet. This was rhe childhood nickname
given to him by his fellow camel boys in Shilaabo in eastern Ethiopia where
9
Barre was born. ~ Farah Galooley, the wit of Mogadishu, a man whose pun­
gent political satire was couched in fables and aphorisms, summed up the

repressive atmosphere in these words: Ama Afweyne amaan, ama Afgooye
aad,amaafkaagahayso (Either sing Big Mouth's praises, or go to the Afgoye
prison [literally the mouth cutter] or shut your own mouth).

By 1974, barely five years after the coup, Barre had firmly established the
basis of his system, Siadism if it could be called a system.The keystone of

the system was put in place in 1976 by the creation of the SRSP (Somali
Revolutionary Socialist Party).he central members of the SRSP were chosen

in a by-invitation-only meeting attended by members handpicked from the
Guulwadayaal and government-controlled organizations such as the Workers'
Union and various groups previously established by the propaganda office of

the junta for women and youth. The criteria for inclusion into the party
membership was an obedient temperament or blood links to Barre.
The army, on whose strength Barre's power ultimately rested, was given

a special consideration. Officers judged to have a mind of their own and
those not related to the inner circle of Barre's power base were dismissed,

retired, or assassinated. The cadets who applied for admissiontothe military
academy were henceforth to be from loyal clans, which meant the Marehan,

the president's paternal clan, the Ogaden, his maternal clan, or the Dhul­
bahante, his son-in-law's clan; the alliance of those clans became known as
MOD. The National Army was restructured in essence as an instrument for

internal oppression; gone was the professionalism of the army whom the
people of Somalia used to be immensely proud of and rely on in moments

of disaster; in its place was a ragtag army headed by hastily trained semi­
illiterate cadets who did not hesitatto.destroy whole towns and villages.Annex 87

INTRODUCTION 33

er rhe years, Barre would create a class of semiliterate appararchilcs who
0
dvrhdr food, homes, and luxury co Barre. His circle of family members
~: ha;gers..on had one aim in minro stay in power and endure. Nothing
roo sacred to profanema._~ rsoahcroes ro ponder ro ensure the

~a rersof rhe ''family." The circle that ran the country had become a mafia,
,nosa trttGone werethe 1 ea s anme egacy ofsomammw. .soma .1sm,
1101
~ue~ burhe eomali patriots from rhe colonial era. One by one., Barre
J his inner circle cur all rhe bonds mar heJd Somalis rogether as a narion:
:olidarir:y,compassion, decency, humanity, and sacredness of life and prop­

erry1n shon, rhe values of rhe Somali society were turned upside down. The
Somali nation-state was in shambles , burnt by the idiosyncracies of a crazed

old man and his greedy relatives, who let go only when flames from the
burningttqa(house) fell on them.
But many who knew Barre from his boyhood and during his srint in the

colonial policeder the Italians were nor chat surprised . Barre was not a
normal person; he was a psychopath whose mercurial spirit vacillated between

ravinghatred in onement and woFds of prajand reconciliation the next
moment. He was said to have wirnessed the murder of his own father when
he was only ren years old during the turbulem year of l921, when the clan

conflicts instigated byed AbduJie Hassan were raging across the land
(Hassanwas also an orphan of dan wars). Barre was reportedly forever after

deeply marked by rhe murderf his father. He became sadistic, and as a
member of the fascist colonial police, he had the ear of his italian com­
manders.He was subsequendy trained in interrogatiand intelligence
61
methods as a "special branch" police in the colonAsJa commander
of a police station, he waslOpractice torture, especially on nationalist
Somalis.e had a particular liking for deriding and intimidating his col­

k-agues, even his most ardent followers. He rewarded the corrupt and the
embezzlers;r was puhljcly said that if a particular minister was not corrupt,
he would soon dismiss him for fear thar rhe honest minister would witness

against him one day.
lseems that, early in his life, Batoeheart rhe lesson chat craftiness

and guile were more rewarding than honesty hard work. He was fond
of retelling how he "craftily earned" his first promotion in the colonial police
and how a "clever man," possibly an allusionelf, srole another recrujr's
62
har and ended wjrh two hars while the guileless recruit went withour one.
'fo the end of his life, he ostensibly thought he could remain the "clever

man" and would oursmart everyone else. The personality culr he developed
around him was much ro his Uking; he was called among other eloquent
names "the fatherf the narion ," and "rhe f·.uher oflmowledge ." His porrrair Annex 87

34 CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

was mandatory in all public and private establishments; every public insti­
tution had an illuminated concrete and glass structure in its front yard where

an immense ponrait of the macal/inka (the teacher) was displayed, and this
in a country where most people were poor and without electricity. Instead

of being the redeemer the people were dreaming of in 1969, he became the
monster child born to the woman of the African legend who had incessantly
bothered God for the gift of a son.

In 1977, with Barre's popularity waning, he sent the army into Ethiopia
to lend a hand to the guerrillas of the Somali region in Ethiopia. The Ethi­

opian army was quickly pushed back. Uniting Somali-speaking territories
had always been popular with Somali masses, and with a victory to show,

Barre improved his popularity overnight. Bur the victory would be a short­
lived one. The Soviets, who had been the country's ally and major arms­
supplier since the 1960s, switched their friendship to Ethiopia, now ruled

by the Marxist regime of Colonel Mengistu. The Soviets saw Barre'ssocialism
as a facade for his clan dictatorship; in contrast, they saw in Colonel Mengisru

a younger and more knowledgeable leader, more committed ro communism,
than the colonial policeman that Barre was. Additionally, Ethiopia was the
bigger country and, therefore, the bigger catch, and the more so since it was

being stolen from rhe Western camp. What happened next was a replay of
a scenario right our of the sixteenth century-a foreign ally was coming to

the help of the defeated of the Amhara- Tigreans, now of course ruling a
larger country, Ethiopia, with many nationalities including Somalis. The

Soviets mounted their largest military campaign since World War II and
airlifted a huge arsenal of weapons and thousands of troops, mostly from
Cuba and Sourh Yemen, inro Ethiopia. With veteran Soviet generals in the
63
war room, the operation "was almost over before it started."
In 1988, the Somali army and irregulars returned toSomalia after having

incurred many losses. The Somali state was bankrupt. Additionally, as an
aftershock of the war, thousands of refugees of Somali or Oromo origin,
afraid of ethnic reprisals in Ethiopia, flooded Somalia. Barre's newfound

popularity vanished overnight, and Somalis wanted him to leave. But he
would find a new cold war patron in the name of the United States. For the

United States, this was a rime perceived as an expansionist period for the
Soviet influence. With the Shah of Iran overthrown and Soviet troops in

Afghanistan, Washington felt the Soviets were getting too close to the oil
fields of the Middle East. An agreement was therefore reached with Barre
providing his regime with arms and other aid in 1980 in exchange for use

of Somali pons and airporcs, especially Berbera, the former Soviet naval andAnnex 87

INTRODUCTION 35

. basein the norrh. For Barre, this was a godsend; once again, he had pulled

a•racour of his sleeve. He felr more confldent than ever and saw no com·
a~l rosliin o his internal critHesbrazenly jailed seven members of
his regime iI982, includingthepopular former foreign minister Omar

Arreh. The group included the most senior member of his regime from the
north,Vice Presidenc Ismail Ali Abokar. The surprise move was designed

also as a way of crushing lsaaq critics, whom he feh were becoming more
daringin rheir opposition ro him. Among those arrested were rwo members
from his Marehan subclan, which was a Machiavellian maneuver intended

rocamouBage his objective of crusd1enorrhcrn lsaaqs who had just set
up a guerrilla movement across the border in EthiBarre was a keen
bluffer as a gambler- he had learned European card game techniques in his
5
days as a colonial policeman.(\
Barre's tactics and methods of rule deeply clivided the Somalis. To mose

who opposed him, no punishment was harsh enough; to those who obeyed
:l'ndserved him, no reward was roo highBy 1980, the Somalis were
deeply divided; rhe dan, a minimalist association for pasrure and conll icc

management in me countryside, had under Barre become transformed inro
social and poli.ricnlidentities no different from theethnic identities
where language, religion, or physical appearance are the differentiating fac­

tors.
The year of 1981 is important in Somali history. It corresponds to the
foundation of the Somali National Movement (SNM) by members of the

lsaaq clan. For sure, thewas not the first frotooppose Barre. The
SSDF {Somali Salvation Democratic Front), a front set up by members of

~h eajeerteen subclan of me Darod, was in operarion since 1978. Bur Barre,
by playing his clan cards well, which meanr calling for Darod solidarity
against the ocher clan families, lured irs fighters back into Somalia and

them up north ro fight the northern lsaaq insurgents who were becoming
more and more troublesome. The norrhern lsaaqs are ethnically no different
from the Darods, Barre'sdan family, or rhe Hawiye, the major sourhern dan

family, or any orher dan for that marter. However, as rhe majority population
of the norrh, they had joined the south in 1960. In the early 1960s they
were fearfulf southern domination; but those fears subsided in the late

1960s as the northerners became more integrated economically with the
south. Now a combination of factors, all emanating from Barre's adminis­
tration, alienated the lsaaq population. First the most important causal factor

was political alienation. Norrherners, who came from a different political
culture than that of the sourh, where fascist Italian rule had rendered ordinary Annex 87

36 CULTUREAND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

people to be less questioning of those in power, were less willing to accept
Barre's clan rule.
Second, the northerners have historically been more of a trading society

than the more hinterland Somalis as participants in the historical trade be­
tween sea ports and the Ethiopian highland. Barre's state-run enterprises and

bureaucracy crippled their commerce . Third, the northerners were not blind
to the fact that they produced the mass of Somalia's wealth in the form of
livestock exports and workers' remittances from the Gulf countries bur re­

ceived in return an insignificant amount of government investment-invar­
iably, major socioeconomic projects in the form of factories, hospitals, and

institutions of higher learning would go co the sourh.6('Schools and roads
built by the departing British were deteriorating in the north. The worsening

socioeconomic infrastructures led in 1981 to the formation of a self-help
group in Hargeisa, the main northern city, by a group of doctors and teachers
with the aim of improving conditions in the main hospital. They were tried

for insurgency and sentenced to stiff prison sentences . But instead silencing
opposition in the north, schoolchildren held demonstrations and were met

with bullets, leading to the death of several schoolchildren .
Fourth, the number of refugees from Ethiopia settled in the north was
disproportionate in comparison to those resettled in the sourh. Nevertheless,

the northern population had welcomed the refugees, many of whom were
ethnic Somalis, and collected pots and pans for them. What happened next
was mind-boggling and objectionable to the northerners: the refugees were

recruited into the Somali army and stationed to interrogate and harass the
local populations.

Finally Barre's viceroys in the north, first General Ganni and then General
Mohamed Said Hcrsi (alias General Morgan), who were iron-fisted individ­
uals with no compassion for their fellow citizens, used outright killings and

exposition of the corpses of presumed guerrillas, who were nothing more
than unlucky Isaaq nomads collected from the countryside, as the preferred

methods of silencing the population. The two tyrants would both earn the
names of "butcher of Hargeisa."
T he irony was that ethnic cleansing was a reality in a country that had

prided itself, to a xenophobic level, on the homogeneity of its people, and
the enemy was now officially the country's northern citizens. But with no

changes emanating from the regime, a largely unreported war was fought
from 1981 to 1990. The regime's answer to popular challenge in the north
would be scorched-earth tactics, and by all means the regime was by now a

fascist one.As one British scholar wrote in a most revealing way, "the North
began to look and feel like a colony under a foreign military tyranny." 67Annex 87

INTRODUCTION 37

But events rook a tragic turn i1988. In that year, with the army increas­
'ngly bogged down with fighting the SNM, Barre made a volte-face and
1
i ned a peace agrecmenc with Colonel Mengisru of Ethiopia; the deal suited
both dictators, as eac saw m tt ahance toe 1mmate msurgency movements:

the Northern rebellion for Barre and the Somali,romo Erirrean insurgency
for Mengisru. Borh agreed ro cur off assistance to their respective client
insurgents. This basically meant sropping assistance in arms and munitions,

shutting propaganda broadcasts by rebel radios, and evicting the guerrillas
from the safe bases in each other's territory. The Ethiop ian groups had few

safe bases in Somalia to speak of, so the latter point was aimed at evicting
che SNM from their sanctuaries in the Somali region of Ethiopia. Before the
unknown. the leaders of the SNM decided to rake the initiative and risk all

in rheir home territory instead of being reduced to a toothless tiger in Colonel
Mengisru's lap. On May 27, 1988, rhe SNM seized Bmao, the third-largest

city in rhe country, and freed political prisoners including schoolchildren
from the main jail. On June l, they attacked Hargeisa, the nonhero capital,
ami captured ir excepl for the airport in irs ourskins. The regime was caught

completely off guard .
The regime's response was swift and brutal; the plan followed was nothing

less chan a genocide. Earlier in 1986, Barre's viceroy in the north, General
Said Hersi,who was the dictator's bodyguard before he married a presidential
daughter, told some nomads at a waterhole, who were not even capable of

distinguishing between government soldiers in camouflage from rebels also
in camouflage, "if you lsaaqs resist, we will destroy your towns, and you will
inherit only ashes." This same man in a policy lerter wriuen co ltis father­

in-law, which came ro be known as "the letter of death," proposed the foun­
dations for a scorched-earrh policy ro get ridanti -Somali germs.••GThose

morbid words became a realiry in the north, as the army directed irs fire
power agajnst the civilian populations. Jet fighters would rake off frolar­
geisa airport and drop their deadly cargo a few miles away in downtown

Hargeisa. Anillery units positioned on che ridges thar surround rhe city would
train their sights on the residential quarters of the city and fire round after
round of sheik Then soldiers would go door ro door ro physically eliminate

any remaining residents and ro loot homes. In one momh , Hargeisa and
Burao were reduced ro rubble and became ghost rowns.

By rhen any SW'Vivingurban lsaaqs had fled across the border into Ethi­
opia, pursued along the way by fighter-bombers piloted by mercenary South
African and ex-Rhodesian pilots paid $2,000 per sortie. Abour 50,000 to

LOO,OO Oere killed in the first two months of the conflict. But this was a
war foughr in obscurity, the regime nor allowing any reporters imo r.herc- Annex 87

38 CULTUREAND CUSTOMSOF SOMALIA

gion. Even the Red Cross was denied access to bring food and medicines to
the civilian population. The survivors of that attempted genocide claim today

that only the bravery of the SNM fighters saved them from an outright
annihilation; but in reality, it was more than that. Every man and woman

became a fighter with nothing to lose but everything to gain.
These events happened long before the word "ethnic cleansing" gained
currency, long before "humanitarian intervention" was thought to override

the prerogatives of sovereign states. This tragedy happened at a time when
the cold war was still in effect, when a patron superpower would look the

other way to keep the privilege of having a regime in its camp, even one that
was massacring its own citizens. That is why at the height of the fighting,
the United States delivered weapons "of obvious and urgent value to the

Barre government, and no one in the United States doubted that they would
be used to kill people."69The weapons were distributed to Barre's forces in

the north.
Toward the end of 1988, the regime's forces, at the cost of total depop­

ulation, recaptured the main towns from the SNM guerrillas; however, the
SNM fighters, now no longer fighting a dictator for the sake of a better
government in Somalia but a veritable liberation war to retake their homes,

farms, towns, and land from a brutal occupying force, retreated to the moun­
tains and to the countryside. This was the beginning of the end for the Barre

regime; and the end would have happened sooner were it not for the external
aid principally from the United States, Italy, and Saudi Arabia that kept

flowing tothe regime. Barre thought he had played his cards well and found
a solution to the lsaaq problem, but he underestimated the resolveof a people
pushed ro the wall.

The war in the north was becoming an insatiable juggernaut in human
and financial terms for the regime. Batches of fresh young conscripts would

be sent up norrh while their wounded comrades would be brought to the
capital. Soon the hospitals of Mogadishu ran out of beds and blood supplies.
Inevitably open resistance spread to the south. The southern Somalis, in

particular the Hawiye, on whose land Mogadishu lies, joined openly the
rebellion in large numbers especially after the setting of the USC (United

Somali Congress). Another important blow to the regime came from Colonel
Omar Jess'sdefection to the SNM; later, he would set up his own front, the
SPM (Somali Patriotic Movement). Suddenly, Barre's clan alliance centered

largely on the Darod clan family, whose inner circle had been dubbed MOD
(after the acronym for the subclans of the Darod: the Marehan, the Ogaden,

and the Dhulbahante), which was falling apart as Colonel Jess, an Ogaden
by his father's sidebut Isaaq by his mother's side, paned ways with Barre.
By the end of 1990, the rebellion was reaching Mogadishu as USC forces ap-Annex 87

INTRODUCTION 39

hed the red sand dunes th.ar mark Mogadishu's norrhern periphery.
Proac , d . · b · d
The legend Barresecreas magtgmap was cc.onung more amo~e
icyAccording to legend, m the early years of hts rule, Barre paused m
~r~ ofrmap of Somalia in one of the rooms of his palace. While he was
3
:ing at the map, rhe devilspoke to him and said: "Behold, President. This
15 magic map; it will granr you any wish you may ask; but afrer every
swer,it willshrink accordiBarre'smap of authority, after so much
~u~ shad ,y now shrunk so much that he was dubbed the "mayor of

Mogadishu."
Asthe guerrillasof the USC dosed on him, Barreadopted the same meth­
ods of destruction. Artillery pieces from his hilltop palace-barracks shelled

downtown Mogadishu. Civilians were ciedtogether in batches and shot sum­
marily by the members of his feared Red Berets presidential brigade, who
weredrawn cothe man from asmall Marehan subclan. To a group ofHawiye
elderswho asked htostep down, Barrestormed: "When I came to Mog­

adishu.. . [t]bere was one road bu.iltby rhe Italians. lf you try to force me
costand down, I will leave rbe city as I found ir. 1 came to power with a
gun; onJy the gun can make me go."

On January 271991, on a Friday co a Saturday night, the people of
Mogadishu,who had been exposed to rwo months of artillery bombardmem
from loyalist barracks citygave the final assault to the presidential
palacein a popular revolt that eerilylooked like r.heraking of the Bastilleby

the people of Paris. Befored.awn,instead of facing rhcshowdown, Barrefled
in a rank. In rhe end, as his own prophecy would have ir, Barre, who came
with the gun in front olenwirh the gun in his back.

Unluckily rhe dawn thate to Mogadishu on January 28,1,did
notlead to peace.The followingday, wirhour consulting either rhe northern
SNM or Lhesouthern SPM or even with rhe cenrralcommittee of the largely
Hawiye USC, Ali Mahdi, a politically hitherto obscure man but repuredly a

rich hotelier and a member of the AbgaJsubclan of rhe Hawiye, in a pre­
emptive move that left the Hawiye insurgency movemenl utterly divided,
self-proclaimed himself president of Somalia. To the northerners, who saw
things rather in regional terms, this felt likean insult added ro their grievous

injury from Barre'sdeprcd.[nrhe USC itself, d1emain rift happened
when General Aidid, who had coordinated the fight against the regime for
the USC, felt himself cheaced by a man who had been >Jmmutag

(orange juice in Italian, as ir is called in Mogadishu) while he had been
fighting in rhe bushesand in the deserr.Wirh each man nowdrawing support
from his own subclan miliriaand independent marauders lavishlyarmed with
rhe spoils of the army- rhe Somali army's main arms dcpors have always

been in and around Mogadishu- the rwo equally obsrinare men crossed Annex 87

40 CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

swords in 1991 in a bloody urban war that would destroy the remaining
infrastrucrure of Mogadishu.
Meanwhile, the leaders of the northern SNM, taking note of the southern

audacity, convened an assembly of the populations of the north, including
those that openly fought on the side of the regime. The northern convention

was attended by members of all the northern dans including the Gadaboursi,
the Issa, the Dhulbahante, and the Warsangali. The assembly, composed of
traditional and eminent leaders of northern communities, after having delib­

erated first in Berbera and then later in Burao, judged that the region was
stepping back from the unconstitutional union it had in 1960 with Somalia.

Accordingly, the region was declared on May 18, 1991, as an independent
state to be known as Somaliland within the confines of the ex-British Pro­

tectorate of Somaliland and the State of Somaliland of 1960. Although no
country has yet to recognize Somaliland, the existence of its administration
has spared it the civil wars that continue to plague the south to this day.

Reconstruction, fueled by livestock exports and workers' remittances, has
started in the north, creating a boom economy that has attracted migrant

workers not only from the south but from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti as
well.
In the south, while the enemy Hawiye brothers, Ali Mahdi and General

Aidid, were dueling in Mogadishu, Barre and his loyalist troops were at­
tempting a comeback. When Barre Red Mogadishu, he set up shop, with the

remains of his army, at Baidoa, the granary of the south and capital of the
Maay. There, "General Morgan," in a manner reminiscent of his genocidal
program in the norrh, hatched a plan for eliminating the Maay and other
72
agricultural peoples from the fertile interriverine area. A top-secret docu­
ment carrying his signature said implicitly "to pursue a military campaign

between the two rivers (Shebelle and Juba) in the south so that it will be safe
for our people."73 However, months before the planned ethnic cleansing was
put down on paper, Barre'sremnant army was already massacring and raping

across the region with the wrath of a defeated army and the rapacity of unpaid
soldiers. The Maay and other riverine leaders asked for Aidid's help; the

Hawiye general credited with having thrown Barre out of Mogadishu, who,
out of his own self-interest and fearing that Siad Barre would fight his way
back to Mogadishu 'as long as he was in Baidoa, joined the fight. The Econ­

omist noted: "Mr. Aidid's forces were drawn from the Hawiye; Mr. Barre's
from the Darod clan. Each side, in the course of advances and retreats across

the farmland that feeds Somalia, looted without restraint. This was partly
because the armies received no rations. The land they fought across belonged
to farming clans that traditionally occupy the lower rungs of Somali society.Annex 87

INTRODUCTION 41

They were stripped of their crops and livestock. Today's awful famine is the
I •'74

rcMost of the actua oo{lng was one y arre s 10rces, ut Aid1d's m1ma,
Jlieto chc weak Rahanwcin militia, SDM, contributed to the depletion of

aesources. In rhe end, after several pitched battles, Aidid and a coalition of
~ehpeasant communiti es, indudjng the Maay and other riverine groups,

chased Barre and his remnan t army under Morgan out of the riverine region
and inroKenya in April I992. In October 1992,four months later, Morgan,
rearmed by Kenya'sDaniel arap Moi, a good friend of Barre's (since the day

he was saved from a certain coup by a Kenyan general who happens to belong
ro cbc same Somalj clan as Barre), was back in the region with a vengcance.

Soon he recaptured Bardera, massacred its population, and was on his way
ro Baidoa when rhe marines landed at Mogadishu in December 1992, bring­
ing a temporary halt to his advance on Maay lands.

Throughout the fighting, four planting seasons, two per year, were missed
in the Baidoa area as the farmers abandoned the villages, which were the first
placeswhere Barre'ssoldiers would forage for food. With underground grain

silos,bakaar,empty, the young and the old journeyed on foot to Baidoa,
which was secure from the attacks of Morgan. The problem was that there

was no food in Baidoa; death was waiting for them at the end of the trek.
As the dying peasants flooded in, the town became the epicenter of the famine
and was dubbed the City of Death by the Western media.

As for Barre himself, after a brief stay in Kenya, he went into exile in
Nigeria where he would die in January1995. There ended the life of a man

who had begun it, like most Somalis, as a nomad. His first break from a
typical nomad's life came when he enlisted in the Italian colonial police by
craftily hiding his birthplace in the Somali region of Ethiopia lest he be

disqualified for not being a subject of the Italian colonial regime; he would
rhen rise rhrough the ranks of the colonial police by stoically obeying his
superiors evenif he hadw harass and torture Somalis agitating for freedom.

He would be promoted to chief of staff of rhe Somali army after independ­
ence, only to emerge as the strongman of the junta that seized power in

1969. He claimed to be a socialist but was known for his limited understand­
ing of social theories, never having had the benefit of any formal schooling.
In Somali history, only one man, who was a model to him, ranks close to

him in brutality. That man is Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, known as the Mad
Mullah. Both were orphans at an early age and were thus exposed to a harsh
reality in their formative yearsis known Barre had witnessed his father's

assassination by a fellow clansman. Both had a gift for rhetoric, Barre in prose
and Mohamed Abdulle Hassan in both prose and poetry. Both were short Annex 87

42 CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

in stature, obese, and had raspy voices. Both were short-tempered but oth­
erwise, both had pleasing personas that could be taken for sincerity. Both
cultivated personality cults: Barre dubbed himself macalinka (the teacher)

and aabahaaqoonta (the father of knowledge); Hassan had his followers and
anyone else address him only as sayidka (the master) in a land of "fierce

republicans" where no one was a subject or a master. Incidentally, both stuck
around in power, although Hassan's was only above his followers and cow­
ered subclans in the far hinterland, for twenty-one years after which both

were defeated and chose to turn tail instead of fighting to the bitter end.
Both died in exile far from Somali inhabited areas.

Barre spent a lot of money glorifYingMohamed Abdulle Hassan, the Mad
Mullah; he commissioned an expensive towering equestrian statue set on a

marble pedestal as a tribute to him, while a campaign of revisionist history
was launched to wash away the Mad Mullah's massacres. School manuals
were written to teach that Hassan was a "hero of Somali nationalism" while

Barre was the "father of the revolution." Perhaps one day, some deranged
dictator would also rescore Barre's image as another "hero of Somali nation­

alism." One thing is sure: Barre will always figure prominently in Somali
history. "History is no more than the portrayal of crimes and misfortunes,"76
at least in large measure. Within living memory, Barre compares only to Pol

Pot of Cambodia or to Hider in sheer madness and desolation visited upon
a people. Somalis have already called him "Black Hider" and no more fining

epitaph can be found.
By 1992, as a result of the fighting between Barre loyalist forces and those
led by Aidid, the famine in the southwestern region between the rivers pop­

ulated by Maay-speaking groups and other minority groups reached a climax
and was viewed around the world. The emaciated faces of the interriverine
peasants shown on Western television screens prompted humanitarian non­

governmental organizations and media crews to pour inro southern Somalia.
A change occurred at the UN, which under Perez de Cuellar, a man with

linle interest in Africa, had been largely indifferent to the plight of Somalis.
The Egyptian Boutros Boutros-Ghali became the first African to head the

world body; with his characteristic but undiplomatic candor, he accused the
West of preoccupying itself solely with "the rich man's war" in the Balkans
to the detriment of other troubled spots in the world. Suddenly, Somalia,

was on the agenda in every Western capital and numerous parliamentarians
and celebrities went to visit.

By the end of 1992 the famine in the southwest region had been largely
contained by efforrs of nongovernmental organizations both Somali and for­
eign; however, U.S. President Bush, then a departing president, offered toAnnex 87

INTRODUCTION 43

d he marinetoSomalia under the auspices of che UN, initially with the
e~ ~i ofseering ports, airporrs, and ltoallow smooth deliveries
:~~ co~tefadinevie Earlir,.n Apri24, 1992che Bushad­ mi~

. don had opposed the 1deaof se500garmedUN troops to Soma Ira
•stcost $20 m1.Jon, argumgt1arCongress woudnot support ano .er
~arrpeacekeeping mission in an election President Bush'ssudden

c~: ofmindecame, therefore, as a stoSomalia warchers and many
Gorives had been advanced for his sudden decision; bur on rhe whole ic
mems chat American foreign policy, which has always Aucruated beLWeen

:alarionism and inrervemionism, was particularly conducive to intervention­
ismar char momenr, as a resulr of the victory against Jraq.
On December 3,1992,rheUN Securiry Coun cil unanimously adopted

resoluti794(1992)welcomiQg the Uniced States's offer ro lead humani­
tarian inrervenrion in Somalia and authorized, under Chapter Vll of the
Charter, the use of "all necessary means." Some Somalis had misgivings about

rhe idea of sending foreig7 rroops to Somalia, especially given the haste in
which the operation was lauoched.er, in general Somalis were abom
evenlydjvided on rhe issue.
The U.S.-Ied operation was code-named "Restore Hope." The marines

landed on the beaches of Mogadishu on the cool night of December 9. They
were welcomed by hordes of journalisrs and television crews in what was rhe
first televised marine landing of all rime, rhe warring factions of Mogadishu

havingt:.cided in advance not to oppose them .
The inrernarional forces were militarily well equipped, bur the polirkians
who sent them had nor given much rhought ro rhe possible problems ahead.

Were che factions going to be disarmed? Was an international tribunal going
to be set up, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia? How were the revoir
leaders and Barre's men, like Morgan, the butcherisa, or Barre
himself goingbe dealt with by the UN forces? lf the aim of the operadon

wasthe delive•y of food ro rhe famine-stri cken southwestern region, why nor
create a "secure zone"ar area assuggested by Frederic Cuny, a consul rant
m the U.. Agency for Imernational DevelopmeHow were the inter­

national forces going to to rhe deaths of rheir soldiers? Answers to these
questions probably were not explored bdorfn shorr, the simplicity
with which the operarion starred was worthy of rhe advemuthes ofTintin,

Frenchcanoon character.
Unfonunatcly,this was not a cartoon expedition to Africa and mistakes
borne out of expediency soon piled up. In rbe belief rhat Somalis obey onJy

a superior force, the internarional rroops were toldirst, and talk
larer." "Somalis admire military strength a. Ill-timed diplomatic Annex 87

44 CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

gestures can be interpreted as a sign of weakness," the marine booklet in­
structed.80The guide book, on the other hand, glossed over in a half sentence

how Washington and Moscow, armed to the tune of hundreds of millions
of dollars, propped up the abominable Barre regime in the pursuit of their

cold war objectives, frustrated Somalia's democratic forces, and helped create
the conditions that led to the armed insurgency. 81

The supponers of Aidid of the USC and his ally, Jess, became suspicious
of the actions of Unitaf (Unified Task Force), as the operation was renamed

later, soon after the forces of Morgan took Kismayu with the tacit approval
of Unitaf, shortly after Jess's own forces had been ordered out of the town
by a Unitaf commander. Demonstrations were held with banners stating

"This is not [Operation] Restore Hope, this is Restore Morgan." 82That the
operation could be referred to as "Operation Restore Morgan" even in jest

should have been a serious cause for concern to the international commu­
nity-Gen. Morgan, as Barre's right-hand man and as his viceroy in the

north, is second only to Barre for having led Somalia into the very violence
from which the world was trying to rescue it. Suspicions of unfair conduct

were also aroused by the uncoordinated disarmament efforts that happened
to target the forces of the Aidid-Jess alliance in Mogadishu and in Kismayu.

On the other hand, some progress was made in the first few months to
reconcile the factions of Aidid and Ali Mahdi in Mogadishu through the
good offices of Ambassador Robert Oakley, the U.S. representative in Mog­

adishu, and the "green line" dividing rhe city was erased. The situation,
however, deteriorated after the command of the operation, now officially a

UN operation under the name of UNOSOM (United Nations Somalia Mis­
sion), was passed, in May 1993, to Admiral Jonathan Howe, a U.S. retired
navy general, who had practically no experience in Somali politics or any

civilian diplomacy at all.
With the supporters of Aidid already suspicious of the true objectives of

the mission and feeling targeted, the shots that would set the whole mission
on the slippery path of war with Aidid's faction were fired on June 5, 1993.

On that day Howe sent a group of Pakistani soldiers to Radio Mogadishu,
which the mission had accused of spewing anti- UN propaganda. Word soon
spread that the Pakistanis had come to shut down the radio. Officially, the

UN would claim that it had dispatched its troops to inspect a nearby arms
cache. A crowd of Somalis gathered informally from all around ro watch the

operation . Tensions were running high. No one knows who fired the first
shot but shooting started. One version of the events says that the Pakistanis
fired the first shots and killed some Somalis, which only infuriated the So­

malis and encouraged them to rakeon the Pakistanis beforeand after the inspec-Annex 87

INTRODUCTION 45

ion.83 In the ensuing barde between Somali irregulars and the Pakistani
~ro the paksta.is sustained rwenty-four dearbs; but the Somalis being

·usr armed civmans sustained a far greaternt of faral casualties. The
~ho evlntewas just an accident; it had nor been planned in advance, as

some claimed in the_rush ro condemn Aidid. If it were General Aidid would
p-ve sent his veteran fighters and rhe deaths among rhe lighdy armed UN

croopswould have been much higher. However, on june 6, less than cwenry­
four hours later, the Security Council hurriedly passed resolution 837 putting
the blame squarely on the Aidid camp, without even so much as starting an
4
investigatioH.A military solution was ro be privileged in Somalia and the
Somali gnatwas to be stricken wirh a sledgehammer.

On June II, the UN forces launched a coordinated attack on what was
perceived to be Aidid targets. Shells and missiles fired from Cobra helicopter
gunships hir densely populated areas. Radio Mogadishu, housing a hallowed

site of SomaJi culture, the audio-visual tape library, was destroyed. Many
Somalis died. The war was now officially on berween the UN and the Aidid

camp-the UN had just become another faction in the Somali civil war,
albeit a better armed one. The hunt for Aidid was officially launched and
Howe, whom the nickname-loving Somalis soon dubbed "Animal Howe,"

added a Wild West dimension to theanhunt when he threw in a bounty
worth $25,000 and had "wanted" posters plastered all over Mogadishu.

The Pakistani soldiers would get their chtochave another encounter
with the Somalis; on June 13, 1993, they simply fired volley after volley into
an unarmed crowd of protesters consisting mostly of women and children.

The Pakistani commander, Brigadier Generallkraui-Hassan, would claim
char his troops were provoked by shots fired at their bunkered positions, but

Paul Watson, a reporter from theTorontoSun, who certainly was not a
Somali,and who happened to be in the unarmed crowd of demonstrators,
gave an eyewitness reportf a Pakistani contingent simply avenging their
86
fallen comrades from June5. Itwas clear that the UN forces were not
acting in coordination atl but rather that each contingent was acting in­
dependently in many ways and sometimes engaging in vengeful shootings

with Somalis.
Unluckily, more bloody operations would follow; onehe worst, called

a massacre by the Vatican paper, CatholicRegistehappened on July 12
when U.S.-UN forces, acting on mistaken information, showered missileand
cannon rounds from Cobra helicopters on a meeting of elders, religious men,
87
and intellectuals in a "conference cenThe death toll among conferees,
who ironically were trytogcome up with ways to reduce tensions with the
88
UN, was high with 100 dead. Aidid was not even at the conference center. Annex 87

46 CULTUREAND CUSTOMSOF SOMALIA

By that time, Howe had alienated all of the people he needed to help hirn

work with rhe Somalis; earlier, the Italians had to recall their ambassador,
the only Western ambassador who had stayed in Mogadishu since the down­
89
fall ofBarre, ro "avoid a head-on confrontation with Admiral Howe." Howe
next hounded the Italian commander, General Bruno Loi, out of Somalia,
90
accusing him of complicity and leniency toward the Somalis. Loi's mistake
seems to have been walking among Somali crowds, microphone in hand,

while Howe was staying longer and longer in his bunker, which was said to
remind him of his submarine headquarters.
It seemed the Italian call for moderation was forcefullyput down by Howe

and U.S. officials, who were pursuing "Rambo" policies and had no patience
for the Italian "Machiavellian" diplomatic approach. 91 Howe also won sup­

port for his "hardline approach'' from the UN Secretary General Boutros­
Ghali,92 who had an "animus against Aidid" and was equally obsessed with
93
his capcure. The secretary general had suffered humiliation at the hands of
Aidid supporters on January 3, 1993, the day when his historic visit, capping

his activities in favor of Somalia, was rudely disrupted by Aidid supporters,
who threw stones at his car. 94

The French defense minister Alain Juppe reminded Howe that several
French soldiers had been killed in the Balkans, but that they were willing to
implement a peace agreemenr. 95 Howe seemed to have no ears for calls for

moderation; he was said to be obsessed with Aidid and ro have adopted him
as his "great white whale."96 Howe was a key man in the capture of Noriega
97
in Panama and might have thought that he was in familiar terrain again.
However, Somalia was more akin to Afghanistan or to Vietnam in terms

of locals with fighting experience or tenacious guerrillas than the Panama
enclave, historically under close U.S. guard. Nothing, in the end, suc­

ceeded in swaying Howe's hardline approach in Mogadishu. Yet warnings
of an impending crisis were abundant. As early as July 1993, Newsweek
had written, "The mess in Mogadishu is the result of a team effort at mis­
98
management that would be comical if lives weren't at stake." Two jour­
nalists called for a change of approach and head of mission at about the

same time, in an article aptly tided "Talk, Don't Shoot in Somalia," writ­
ing: "The only way to restore UN credibility is to drop Howe's militaristic

approach. A trusted outsider must be appointed to restart political and dis­
armament talks." 99

Neither the manhunt for Aidid nor the punitive measures that brought
death to so many civilians and more damage to a battered city eased until

the final fatal encounter of October 3, 1993, when a terrible firefight erupted
between a group of American soldiers dispatched to grab the elusive AldidAnnex 87

INTRODUCTION 47

and Somali militiamen. Among the resulting casualties on the American side
were 18 dead and 70 wounded. The Somali casualties, mosrly civilians as the

barde happened in an urban serting, were in the hundreds - the esrimates
vary from 500 to 3,000 dead. The sad events have been explored by a

Philadelphia Inquirer reporter in "Blackhawk Down: An American War
Swry." 100lr rclls a story of young soldiers, unsu.re of what ro do, who, being
shot at, blasted away in turn every living target in sight including men,

women, children, and animals.
Four days later, PresidentClinton announced that he was ordering U.S.

troops out of Somalia by March 31, 1994. With the pullout of American
forces,who were the linchpin of the international intervention, the UN
operation collapsed. The U.S. forces pulled out in March 1994 after their

worst losses in barrie since Vietnam.The rest of the UN peacekeepers left in
1995. The final death toll on the UN side was 135 dead, with several hundred
101
wounded. The Somali casualties were much higher at around 6,000
killed.02

After the depanure of UN forces, it was thought that fighting would erupt
all over again; but that did not happen, although sporadic fighting had been
reported, major flare-ups of violence have not happened. But still no central

government has bee.n formed. For the moment, the old Somali state does
nor exist anymore; in its place are two lands corresponding to the old colonial

borders.One, the north, calls itself Somali land and is a de facto state with a
government, a parliament, a constitution, a Aedgling economy, and two
newly opened universities. Its people, who created their own peace without

imernational help and started reconstruction on their own, resent being rou­
tinelylumped together with Somalia by the UN and other international
organizations. The Southern Somalia still has no peace nor governance and

is fragmented into several faction-held territories.
The UN has held several conferences with the aim of helping the Somalis

to set up a government; at the same time, several countries such as Ethiopia,
Kenya, Djibouti, and Egypt have also held conferences with that objective.
So far nothing has come of all those endeavors. The main reason is that the

conferences were trying to set up a government without having closure on
the past; in short, Somalis were being asked to make peace among themselves

without justice for war crimes.Heinous atrocities had taken place in Somalia
and Somalis needed some kind of a healing act to bury the past. In particular,
Somalis needed a war crimes tribunal like the one set up for Yugoslavia or

Rwanda and even a "Nuremberg." Itdid not happen. In the absence of peace
with justice, another centuries-honored alternative of the Horn, time, a

greater healer but a slow one, has been left to take care of wounds. With Annex 87

48 CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

enough time, the rancor of war has always disappeared among Somalis, and
this time, it seems the process might even be faster due to a new breed of

Soma lis-businesspeople.
Unfettered by bureaucracy and guided only by the bottom line, Somali

businesspeople are cutting across all communal divides; they have set tele­
communications, fishing, trading, and transport companies including the
largest private airline companies in the Horn of Africa. They have introduced

wireless telephone and the Internet to Somalis. Lured by the new prospects,
the Somalis in the diaspora have in return started drifting back, often to

invest and prosper. Therein lies the Somali hope and perhaps the only thing
Somalis need from others the most is to be leftto themselves. Over millennia,

Somalis have endured and adapted; they will surely overcome their present
disorganization.

Nons

I. However, it appears northern Somali pores were only half-way depots for

much of the cinnamon that found its way to the Roman world and to Europe; no
cinnamon has been known to grow ofTSomali coasts, unlike frankincense and myrrh,
which are indigenous tothe region. See Lionel Casson (1989). ThePeriplusMaris

Erythraie.Princeton: Princeton University Press.
2. Richard Burton (1987, 1856). FirstFootstepsin EastAfrica.New York: Do­

ver Publications, 17.
3. Thomas J. Abercrombie, "Arabia's Frankincense Trail," National Geo­
graphic, 168, no. 4 (October 1985): 474--513.

4. Per Claeson, "Pharmacognostic Studies on Scented Myrrh with Emphasis
on the Biological Activities of the Isolated Sesquiterpene T-cadinol." Fildr Degree
Dissertation: Uppsala Universitet (Sweden), 1990.

5. Aubrey De Selincoun (1972). Herodotus:The Histories. london: Penguin
Books, 114.
6. Samatar and Laitin compare, for example, the "homogeneity" of Somalis

with the "plethora of tribes" in other African countries . Said S. Samatar and David
Laitin (1987). Somalia:A Nation in Searchof a State. Boulder, Colo.: Westview

Press,21.
7. I.M. Lewis (1961 ).PastoralDemocracy. London: Oxford University Press,
12.

8. I.M. Lewis (1955). ThePeopksofthe HornofAfrica:Somali,AfarandSaho.
London: lmernational African Institute.
9. Some writers spell Sab as Saab, to avoid, it is said, confusion with Sab, a

word which refers to low-caste groups among Somalis.
10. The Cushitic languages are a group of languages spoken in the Horn of

Africa; as pan of the Afroasiatic superfamily of languages, they are relatodancientAnnex 87

INTRODUCTION 49

Egyptian,Semiticlanguages(Arabic,Amharic?etc.), Chadic languages(Hausa, etc.),

and Berbergroup of languages.
11. Cerruli, cited by Lewis.See l.M. Lewis(1955), 32.

12. George Peter Murdock (1959). Africa:Its Peoplesand TheirCultureHistory.
New York:McGraw-Hill, 302.
13. I.M. Lewis(1955), 42.

14. Herben S. Lewis(1966). "The Origins of the Galla and Somali."journal of
African History7, no. I: 27--46. E.R. Tunon (1975). "Bantu, Galla and Somali
Migrations in the Horn of Africa:A Reassessmentof theJubba/Tana Area."journal
ofAfricanHistory16: 519-37.

15. Isidore Dyen (I956). "Language Distribution and Migration Theories."
Language32, no. 4: 611-26.
16. B.W. Andrzejewski(1971). "The Role of Broadcasting in the Adaptation

of the Somali Language to Modern Needs," in Whiteley, W.H., ed., LanguageUse
andSocialChange:ProblemsofMultilingualismwithSpecialReftrencetoEasternAfrica.

London: Oxford UniversityPressfor International African Institute, 263-73.
17. Herben S. Lewis(1966), 41.
18. I.M. Lewis(1960}. "The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa."journal
ofAfricanHisturyI, no. 2: 213-29.

19. MargaretCastagno (1975). HirturicalDictionaryofSomalia.Metuchen, N.j.:
ScarecrowPress.
20. Casson (1989), 7.

21. Burton (1987), 122.
22. De Selincourt (I972), 212.
23. A. Hersi (1977). TheArab Factorin Somali History.Unpublished disserta-

tion, Universityof LosAngeles.
24. Ibid., 52.
25. Castagno (1975), 103--4.

26. M.R. Basser,rrans. (1897). Histoirede Iaconqueredel'Abysrinie(XVI siecle)
par Chihab EddinAhmad Ben 'AbdEl Qader.Paris: Ernest Leroux.
27. R.W. Whiteway, trans. and ed. (1902). The PortugueseExpeditiontoAbys­
siniain 1541-1543 asNarratedby Castanhasowith Some ContemporaryLetters;the

ShortAccountof Bermuder,and CertainExtractsfrom Correa.London: The Hakluyt
Society.
28. Hersi (1977), 229.

29. I.M. Lewis(1955), 46.
30. Cited by Hersi (1977), 196.
31. G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville(1962). TheEastAfrican Coast:SelectDocuments

fi"omthe Firstto the EarlierNineteenthCentury.Oxford: Clarendon Press.
32. Samatar and Laitin (1987), 12.
33. Lord Curzon (I907). Frontiers.Oxford: Oxford University Press,41.

34. Dileef Patwardhan (1981). "Imperialism by Proxy:Aden and Somaliland."
Indica18, no. 2: I05-120. Annex 87

50 CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

35. Samatar and Laitin (1987). 52.
36. H.G.C. Swayne (1895) . SeventeenTripsthroughSomali/and. London, Row.

land Ward, Ltd.
37. Ibid., 121.

38. Ibid.•226-27.
39. Conversation with a former Somali diplomat, Ismail Mohamed Diriye.
Montreal, 1999.

40. Lee V. Cassanclli (1982). The Shapingof Somali Society:Reconstructingthe
Historyofa PastoralPeople,1600--1900. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press,

202.
41. Touval (1963), 45.
42. Cassanelli (1982), 204.

43. Ibid.,227.
44. Ibid., 202.

45. Conversation with a former Somali diplomat, Ismail Mohamed Diriyc,
Montreal, 1999.
46. Castagno (1975), 71.

47. Ibid., 147.
48. Victor Anant (1960). 'The Colony that Rejected Freedom," The Herald,

(London) June 29.
49. Touval (1963), 110.
SO. Farah Hersi, October 25, 1999. Somaliland Forum ([email protected].

monash.edu .au). No records of course exist, as written documents in several areas of
Somali history do nm exist; but according m l;arah Hersi that is what Colonel Musse

Rabile Goud, a northerner who was present at that midnight meeting, said was
exchanged between the two parties. In particular, the colonel was the one who asked
the head of the northern delegation, Egal, what the word hal meant .

51. Anthony J.Carroll and B. Rajagopal (1993). "The Case for the lndt:pendent
Statehood of Somaliland." journal of InternationalLaw and Politics 8, no. 653 .
52. Ibid.

53. To uval (1963), 121.
54. M. Hussein Adam (1994) . "Formation and Recognition of New States:
Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea." ReviewofAfrican PoliticalEconomy 59, 21- 38.

55. Carroll and Rajagopal (1993) , 14.
56. Ali K. Galaydh (1990). "Notes on the Stare of the Somali State." Horn of

Africajournal II, no. I and 2: 1-28 .
57. }euneAfrique no. 462, (November 5, 1969).

58. Ibid.
59. Richard Greenfield (1991) . "Siad's Sad Legacy," Africa Report (March-
April).

60. See I.M. Lt:wis(1994) .
61. Galaydh (1990) , 24.
62. Jama M. Ghalib (1994) . The Costof Dictatorship:The Somali Experience.

New York: Lilian Barber Press.Annex 87

INTRODUCTION 51

63. "The Ogaden Debacle" (1978). Newsweek (March 20).
64. Samatar and Laitin (1987), 157.

65. He was reported to be playing cards even after his ouster to while away his
boredom in the Gedo region.

66. See Hannah Lawrence {1989). "Somalia's Troubled North," AfricanBusiness
Qanuary), 9-10.
67. I.M. Lewis {1990), 58.

68. R. Greenfield (1987). "Somalia's Lerter of Death,New African Quly), 14.
69. Colin Campbell (1988). "Libya, Mercenaries Aiding U.S.-Supported So­

malia,"TheAtlanta journal-Constitution{October 6).
70. Serge Michel (1990). "La somalie en peu de chagrin,"LejournaldeGeneve
(May I5),2.

71. Richard Greenfield (1991). "Siad's Sad Legacy," Africa Report (March­
April), 13-18.

72. Richard Greenfield (1992). "Siyad's Plan to Seize Power Frustrated,New
AfricanQune), 18.
73. "Secret Document Reveals Siad Barre Aides' Tactical Plan to Retake So­

malia" (1992).TheEstimate 9, no. 7 {March 27-April 9).
74. "Somalia: A New Shadow" (1992). TheEconomist {October 17), 52.

75. Jane Perle-£(1992). "A Somali Place that Even the Alms Givers Fear,New
YorkTimes (November 9) 3.
76. Voltaire,L1ngenu.

77. "If Sarajevo, Why Not Somalia?" (1992). The Globeand Mail Quly 22),
AlB.
78. Hassan Hirave {1992). "No One Invited U.N. Troops toSomalia," Toronto

Star(November 27), 31.
79. LeslieH. Gelb {1992). "Shoot to Feed Somalia," New YorkTimes {Novem­

ber 19), 27.
80. "Somalia: Hopeful Handbook" (1993). AfricaConfidentia/34, no. 8 (April
16),8.

8I. Ibid.
82. Geoffrey York (1993). "Coalition Hits Somali Faction," Globeand Mail
Oanuary 26) A9.

83. Robert M. Press (I 993). "UN Calls Off Manhunt for Aideed in Somalia,"
ChristianScienceMonitor (November 18), 6.
84. Richard Greenfield (1994). "Somalis on Their Own Terms," AfricaReport

(May-June), 23.
85. For example, General Mackenzie, the former UN commander in Bosnia,

stated: "Unlike Bosnia, Somalia is a relatively easy military problem to deal with.
They (UN) have to make the point ... and this is the place to make it." Andrew
Bilski and Hilary Mackenzie (1993). "On The Arrack," Maclean's (Toronto) Oune

28), 19.
86. Paul Watson (1993). "Reporter Watches Troops Even Score Against Un­
armed Civilians," Ottawa CitizenQune 14), A7. Annex 87

52 CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF SOMALIA

Bl. "Somalia: Hope Denied" (1993). A}Yica Conjidentia/34, no. 14 Ouly 16).
88. Ibid.

89. h ·ancis Kennedy (1993). "Rambo versus Machiavelli in Afr·ica," Globe and
Mail, Uuly23), AIS.
90. Donau:lla Lorch (1993). "Disunity Hampering U.N. Somalia Effort," N~:~u

York TimesUuly 12), All.
91. Kennedy, "Rambo versus Machiavelli," AI5.
92. "Somalia: If You Arc Not Pan of the Solurion . .. " (1993). Africa Confi­

dential34, no. I9. (September 24), 1.
93. Elaine Sciolino(1993)."UN Chief Warns U.S.AgainstTroop Pullout Fmrn
Somalia," New York Times(Ocwbcr 1),A8.

94. Allison Mitchel (1993). "Angry Crowds of Somalis Disrupr Visir co Mog­
adishu by U.N. Chief," New York TimesOanuary 4), AI.
95. Elaine Sciolino (I993). "Pentagon After Goals in Somalia Failure," New
York Times(September 28), AI7.

96. Michael R. Gordon and John H. Cushman Jr. (1993). "U.S. Supported
Hum for Aidid; Now Calls U.N. Policy Skewed," New York Times(October 18),
Al.

97. Patrick Cockburn (1993). "Somalia: U.S. LashesOut at UN's Envoy," Ot­
tawa Citizen (October 8), A6.
98. "The Pirfallsof Peacekeeping"(1993). NewsweekUuly 26), 32.

99. Karl Maier and Richard Dowden (1993). "Talk, Don't Shoot in Somalia,"
Ottawa Citizen Uuly 13), A8.
100. Mark Bowden (1997). "Blackhawk Down: An American War Story," Phi/..

adelphiaInquirer(Nov.- Dec.).
101. Robert M. Press (1995). "Rerreat from Somalia," ChristianScienceMonitm·
(February 27), 9.
I02. Ankomah Baffour (1994). "A Great Wrong," New African (May): 8-9 .

SUGGESTEO RF.ADING

AfricaWatch. 1990. Somalia:A Governmentat Warwith Its Own People . New York:
Africa Warch.

Carroll, Anrhony ]. and B. Rajagopal. 1993. "The Case for the Independent State­
hood of Somaliland." journal of InternationalLaw& Politi8, no. 653.
Cassanclli, LeeV. 1982. The Shapingof Somali Society:Reconmuctingthe Historyof

a PastoralPeople,1600-1900. Philadelphia: Universiryof PennsylvaniaPress.
Casragno, Margaret. 1975. HistoricalDictionaryof Somalia.Meruchcn, N.].: Scare­
crow Press.

Hersi, A. 1977. "The Arab Factor in Somali Hisr01y." Docroral dissertation, Uni­
versityof LosAngeles.
Jimale Ali,Ahmed, ed. 1995. TheInventionofSomalia. Lawrenceville,N.j.: Red Sea
Press.Annex 87

INTRODUCTION 53

Lewis,I.M. 1955. ThePeoples ofthe/-/omofAfrica:Somali,AfarandSaho.London:
InternationalfricanInstitute.

-· 1960. "The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa."Journalof African
History1. no. 2:213-229.
-· I')61.PastoralDemocracyA : StudyofPastoralisAmongtheNorthernSomali

oftheHom ofAfrica.London: Oxford UniversityPress.
-· 1994. Bloodand Bone:TheCallofKinshipin SomaliSociety.Lawrenceville,
N.J.: Red SeaPress.
Samatar,Said S., and David Lairin. 1987. Somalia:A Nation in Searchofa State.

Boulder,Colo.: WestviewPress.
Touval,S. 1963. SomaliNationalism.Cambridge, Mass:Harvard UniversityPress. Annex 88

U.N. Environment Programme, The State of the Environment in Somalia: A Desk Study (Dec.
2005) Annex 88

The State of the Environment in

Somalia

A Desk Study

United Nations Environment ProgrammeAnnex 88

December 2005

© 2005 United Nations Environment Programme
Graphics by: Global Resource Information Database (GRID) Arendal/Viktor
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Layout by: N. Meith
Cover photo: Jean-Marc Bouju/AFP/Getty Images)

This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educational or non-profit purposes
without special permission from the copyright holder provided acknowledg
ent of the source is made. UNEP

would appreciate receiving a copy of any publication that uses this publi
cation as a source. No use of this
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herein, do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the publisher or the participating
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United Nations Environment Programme

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CH-1219 Châtelaine, Geneva
Tel. : +41 (0)22 917 8615

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Fax: +254 20 623928
http://www.unep.org/roa/ Annex 88

Table of Contents

A NOTE ON DATA SOURCES, NOMENCLATURE AND MAPS .........................................3..............

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................
...............4...................................

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................
........................6.............................. .........

COUNTRY CONTEXT ........................................................................
..................8....................................

Geographical features........................................................................
...................................................... 8

Location........................................................................
....................................................... ............. 8

Physical features ........................................................................
...................................... ................ 8

Climate ........................................................................
....................................................... ............ 10

Cultural features........................................................................
....................................................... ...... 10

Political history ........................................................................
...................................... ........................ 12

Population and economy........................................................................
................................. ............... 16

Role of natural resources........................................................................
.............................. ................. 17

Legal and institutional framework for environmental managemen.t......................................................... 18

The role of non-governmena t l organizations........................................................................
................... 20

Future prospects........................................................................
....................................... ..................... 20

HUMAN AND URBAN ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................23..
.......................

Introduction........................................................................
....................................................... ............. 23

Human Settlements........................................................................
...................................... ................. 23

Water and Sanitation........................................................................
...................................................... 25

Waste Management........................................................................
....................................................... 26

Energy ........................................................................
....................................................... .................... 26

Livestock and Agriculture........................................................................
............................................... 28

Industry ........................................................................
............................................... .......................... 31

Transport and Telecommunications........................................................................
................................ 31

Shipping........................................................................
....................................................... .................. 32

Natural Disasters........................................................................
...................................... ..................... 33

Displaced people........................................................................
....................................................... ..... 35Annex 88

NATURAL RESOURCES ........................................................................
......38........................................

Introduction........................................................................
....................................................... ............. 38

Land........................................................................
....................................................... ........................ 38

Forests and Woodlands........................................................................
.................................. ................ 40

Freshwater Resources........................................................................
................................................... 44

Marine and Coastal Environment........................................................................
................................... 45

Mineral resources ........................................................................
.......................................................... 48

Biological diversity........................................................................
................................... ...................... 49

Protected Areas........................................................................
........................................ ..................... 54

RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................
.........55.........................................

Introduction........................................................................
....................................................... ............. 55

Specific Recommendations ........................................................................
............................... ............ 55

Overview ........................................................................
....................................................... ......... 55

Interventions for ImmediateAction ........................................................................
......................... 55

Interventions for Medium-term Action........................................................................
..................... 57

REFERENCES ........................................................................
..................59................................... ...........

ANNEX I Chronology of Key Political Events in Somalia ............................................63....................

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................67....
...........................

Environment in Somalia UNEP Desk Study
2 Annex 88

Country Context

Geographical features

Location

Somalia is Africa’s easternmost country, and is bordered by Kenya to the south, Ethiopia to the west, Djibouti
to the north-west, the gulf of Aden to the north, and the Indian Ocean
the east. It has a land area of 637,540
2
km , and a coastline of 3,300 km, the longest of any African country, 1,300 km of which is on the Gulf of Aden
and the other 2,000 km on the Indian Ocean. The country stretches for al
most 1,550 km from north to south
o o o o
between latitudes 1200’N and 137’S, and 1,095 km from west to east between longitudes 4010’ and 5121’E
(see Somalia: General map).

Physical features

Somalia is underlain by rocks dating from pre-Cambrian to recent times.
The north is severely affected by

faults and fractures. Pre-Cambrian rock and sandy limestone from the Cr
etaceous and Jurassic periods
constitute the main sources of sandy soil that occur widely throughout S
omalia (Herlocker et al, 1997). In the

north, a maritime plain (theguban) parallels the Gulf coast, varying in width from about 12 km in the west to as

little as 2 km in the east. Theguban is scrub-covered and crossed by broad shallow watercourses that flow
only in the wet season, when the vegetation is quickly renewed and provi
des important grazing for nomad

livestock.

A young Somalian girl takes care of her family’s sheep, Jowhar, North of Mogadishu. © Simon Maina/AFP/Getty Images

Environment in Somalia 8 UNEP Desk StudyAnnex 88

Environment in Somalia UNEP Desk Study
9 Annex 88

Somalia is for the most part a flat country, but there is rugged country in the southern and central regions and
inland from the guban are the precipitous north-facing cliffs of the Karkaar range, which ext
ends from the

north-western border with Ethiopia to the tip of the Horn. These are th
e highest mountains in Somalia, up to
2,000 m high and peaking at 2,407 m with Shimer Berris in Sanaag region
(EC/IUCN, 1993). To the south, they

descend to an elevated plateau devoid of perennial rivers. This region of broken terrain, shallow valle
ys and
usually dry watercourses is known as theOgo. The eastern part of theOgo gently slopes towards the Indian

Ocean and, in Central Somalia, constitutes the Mudug plain. An important feature of this region is the Nugaal
valley which has an extensive network of seasonal watercourses. The wes
tern part of the same plateau is

crossed by numerous valleys and dry watercourses. This plateau again slo
pes gently southwards and merges
with the Haud, a broad undulating area that is some of the best grazing land for noma
ds, despite a lack of

rainfall for more than half the year. Enhancing the value of theHaud are natural depressions which become
temporary lakes and ponds during the rains. South-western Somalia is dom
inated by the country’s two perma-

nent rivers, the Shabeelle and the Jubba, and favourable rainfall and soi
l conditions make this riverine area a
fertile agricultural zone and the centre of the country’s largest sed
entary population.

The coastline consists of a series of sandy beaches interrupted at intervals by rocky cliffs, some o
f which

protrude into the ocean. With a total area of 35,000-40,000 km(UNEP, 1984), the continental shelf is generally
narrow, rarely exceeding 15 km in breadth, but drops off sharply into deep water. Only between Ras Asir and

Ras Hafun on the north-east coast does the shelf extend to almost 80 km in some places.

Climate

The climate varies among locations between tropical and sub-tropical, an
d between arid and semi-arid.
Temperatures inland average 28°C, but may be as low as 0°C in the mo
untain areas and as high as 47°C along

the coast. The average annual rainfall is about 280 mm, although this ca
n reach 500 mm in some areas, such
as the westernOgo highlands (Hughes and Hughes, 1992), and precipitation in generally bo
th negligible and

erratic, with seasonal totals being highly variable. Droughts occur ever
y 2-3 years and are often followed by
devastating floods, particularly in the south where the Shabeelle and Ju
bba are vulnerable to heavy rains in

the Ethiopian highlands. Between 1961 and 2004, 18 floods were recorded i
n Somalia, killing 2,671 people and
directly affecting the lives of almost 1.8 million. In the same period,
there were 12 droughts that killed 19,671

people and affected almost four million (Columbia University, 2005).

Erratic and unreliable as they are, there are seasonal patterns of rainf
all that are strongly influenced by the
Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), the north-south movement of which results in two dry seasons and two

wet seasons each year. The Jilaal, from January to March, is the harshest dry season and results from dry
north-easterly winds sweeping down from the Arabian Peninsula. This is f
ollowed by theGu rainy season from

April to June, then theHagaa dry season from July to September, during which sea breezes from the Indian
Ocean help cool at least the southern parts of the country. The cycle is completed by the Deyr, a short and

unreliable wet season in October and November. The coastal region in the south around Mogadishu and
Kismayo has an additional rainy season, the Xagaay,ein July and August, during which there may be isolated

showers. Livestock husbandry and farming are adapted to this climatic r
egime, with herds being concen-
trated around water sources in theJilaal, but driven to pastures deep in the interior during Gu, when rain-

fed agriculture also becomes briefly possible (see map Somalia: Topography and drainage).

Cultural features

The Cushitic peoples of the Somali coast in the Horn of Africa have an a
ncient history. Archaeological
evidence indicates their presence in this region by 100 A.D, and possibly
earlier. By the 7century A.D., they

began to mingle with Arab and Persian traders who had settled along the
coast. Interactions of this nature
over the following centuries led to the emergence of a Somali people bound by common traditions, a single

language, the Islamic faith, and a clan-based social and political system.

Environment in Somalia 10 UNEP Desk StudyAnnex 88

Environment in Somalia UNEP Desk Study
11 Annex 88

Somali elders at a ceremony. Credit: G. Farmer

A strict, and respected, lineage underpins Somali society with divisions defined along clan and sub-clan lines

(UNDP, 2001; see Box 1). Within each clan, there are many sub-clans and sub-subclans. There are six major
clan-families. Four of these are predominantly pastoral – the Dir, Daarood, Isaaq and Hawiye – together

representing about 70 per cent of the population, while the remaining tw
o (the Digil and Rahanwayn) are
agricultural and comprise about 20 per cent of the population. Other So
malis include castes such as the

Tumal, Yibr, Yahar, Midgan and Eyle. The non-ethnic Somali population includes the urban
nd coastal people,
the Reer Hamar/Banadir and Barwanese people of mixed Arab, Persian, Paki
stani, Portuguese and Somali

heritage, the Bantu riverine agriculturalists, Swahili-speaking Bajuni fi
shing communities, and Arabs of Yemen,
Oman and Zanzibar descent.

Today, about 60 per cent of all Somalis are nomadic or semi-nomadic pastorali
sts who raise cattle, camels,
sheep and goats. Less than one-quarter of the population are settled farmers, most of who live in the fertile

agricultural zone sandwiched between the country’s two main rivers in
the south. The remainder of the popu-
lation is urban based, the main centres being Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Burco,
Berbera, Bosasso, Garowe, Galkaiyo,

Kismayo and Baidoa (see Boxes 1 and 2, and map Somalia: Traditional deegan (ecological) classification).

Political history

Colonialism in the eastern Horn of Africa did not penetrate Somalia as deeply as it did other parts of Africa but

did have the effect of imposing an alien political structure, the centra
l state, on a society with a highly
decentralized, stateless political tradition ,P1998). The Somali Republic (1960-1991) gained its independ-
ence on 1 July 1960 through a merger of the Somaliland Protectorate, whic
h had been under British rule from

Environment in Somalia UNEP Desk Study
12Annex 88

Box 1. The Somali clan-based social system

Lineage identity or clannism is a central organising force in Somali soc
iety and is more significant in
contemporary stateless Somalia than in previous decades. In the period of state collapse, clannism has

proved to be both divisive and a destructive tool in the hands of politi
cal leaders as well as a vital source
of group protection, social security and customary law in the absence of the state. Clan identity in
Somalia is very fluid. Each Somali can trace their genealogy over 30 generations, giving Somalis
membership in many sub-clans.Which level in one’s lineage is mobilized as one’s ‘clan’ depends entirely

on the issue at hand.

Clannism exists with a range of other cross-cutting affiliations – professional associations as well as
regional, class, factional, gender and religious movements (including t
he IslamistIttihad organization),
some of which are described below.

The council of clan elders, for example, is the dominant institution in most locales expected to p
rovide
wisdom and build consensus among clan ranks in matters of clan interest especially in times of crisis.

In Somali society all married men can claim to be elders and speak in clan assemblies ( shir) earning
Somalia a reputation as a ‘pastoral democracy’. Elders’ councils are not institutionalized and often they
react more than they act

The main religion is Islam with almost the entire population being Sunni Muslims. Islamic
values
provide hope and solidarity to cope with the harsh conditions prevalent in the country.They have also
been used to build trusted institutions, both commercial and juridical. The most visible sign of the latter

are the Islamic courts based on shari’a law. They are widely appreciated by local communities and
dispense justice in zones where customary law fails to maintain law and order. Radical Islam, organized
as Al-Ittihad in Somalia, is a growing trend, with a presence throughout the country. However, even

within the Al-Ittihad movement, there are numerous splits along clan lines.
Networks of functionalprofessional associations (made up of non-governmental organizations (NGOs),

professionals in education, health and other fields) serve as bridges a
cross clan and factional conflicts
promoting human development, reconciliation and good governance. On several occasions women’s
groups have successfully managed to place pressure on militia to release
kidnapping victims or cease
fighting. But they have also been at the forefront of mobilization of cl
annism for armed conflict.

Source: UNDP, 1998

February 1884 until 26 June 1960, and Italian Somaliland where the coloni
al administration relinquished con-

trol on 1 July 1960. The northern area previously known as Italian Somal
iland was therefore independent as
“Somaliland” for five days before being integrated within the Soma
li Republic. This fact later served as the

principal legal justification for the right to secede that was claimed b
y “Somaliland” in May 1991.

Territorial skirmishes with Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia occurred during the 1970s in particular, but these were
eclipsed in intensity by fighting amongst the various groups within Soma
lia which began in the late 1980s.

President Mohamed Siyad Barre came to power in 1969 and ruled Somalia un
til January 1991, when clan-
based warlords overthrew the government before turning on each other. Since that time, much of the country

has been under the control of various warlords and armed gangs, with man
y areas both urban and rural
experiencing fierce fighting (EU/IUCN, 1993). The situation in the capi
tal and largest city, Mogadishu, remains

chaotic. It has been heavily bombarded and thousands of civilians were killed in an outbreak of violence in
November 1991. With the destruction of the country’s infrastructure m
illions of people have faced famine.

Annex 1 provides a summary chronology of major events in Somalia from 186
9 to 20005.

A two-year reconciliation process resulted in October 2004 in the formation of a transitional parliament kn
own
as the Transitional Federal Assembly. A Transitional President, Mr Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed, was elected by the

Assembly and a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed shortly thereafter. In December 2004, Mr Ali
Mohamed Gedi was approved by the Transitional Federal Assembly as Prime Minister. Continuing insecurity

prevented the full scale establishment of government in Somalia itself, and until June 2005 all Somali officials

Environment in Somalia 13 UNEP Desk Study Annex 88

Box 2. The Somali Traditional ecological classification system, deegaan

The Somali people, especially the nomads, who live in close contact with
the environment have an

extended knowledge of plant-animal-fundamentals (Barkhadle, 1993). Mos
t plants and animals have a
local name and their phenology, distribution and ecological zones are known: the use of virtually every
plant within the grazing zone – the deegaan, which might range from 200 km 2 to 2,000 km – is known.
Under the traditional system of ecological classification, 16 categories
are recognized, as follows

(Barkhadle, 1993):

Guban – “burnt area” in Somalia language – land ( Dhulka Guban)

Buraha – mountain – land ( Dhulka Buuraleyo)

Howd – bush or thicket – land ( Dhulka Howd)

Daror – large plain – land (Dhulka Dharoor)

Sol – a highland area – land ( Dhulka Sool)

Nugal – a specific valley – land ( Dhulka Nugaal)

Mudug – much of central Somalia – land ( Dhulka Mudug)

Iid – named after the yicib plant – land ( Dhulka Ciid)
Deh – without high shrubs or trees – land ( Dhulka Deexda)

Doboy – clay – land ( Dhulka Dhobooy)

Bakol – an area where Commiphora trees dominate – land ( Dhulka Bakool)

Gedo – land only suitable for animal (especially camel) grazing) – land ( Dhulka Gedo)

Bay – the area which receives the highest rainfall – land ( Dhulka Baay)

Adable –flat area with small mountains – land ( Dhulka Adableh)

Doy – between the two banks of the Jubba and Shabeelle rivers – land ( Dhulka Dooy)

Wamo – land lying between Badhaadhe and Kismayo and from Kismayo to the Kenyan border – land
(Dhulka Waamo)

based in Nairobi, Kenya. The full cabinet returned to Somalia in June 2
005 to begin the difficult process of

national reconciliation and reconstruction.

Three teams were established, of which the first comprised 30 members of government led by the Prime
Minister and left for Mogadishu in February 2005. Smaller groups from th
is team were then deployed to other

regions in the south and central Somalia with the intention of establishing the TFG’s presence there and to start
dialogue with the people. A second group of ministers was tasked with t
he physical relocation of the mem-

bers of parliament and the delegates who participated in the peace proce
ss, while a third team, which
remained in Nairobi, assessed the challenges and obstacles to the relocation process and prepared the

agenda, strategies and an action plan for the installation of the governm
ent inside Somalia. For administrative
purposes, Somalia is divided into the 18 regions orgobollada (singulargobolka) of Awdal, Bakool, Banaadir,

Bari, Bay, Galguduud, Gedo, Hiran, Jubbada Dhexe, Jubbada Hoose, Mudug, Nugaal, Sanaag, Shabeellaha
Dhexe, Shabeellaha Hoose, Sool, Togdheer, and Woqooyi Galbeed.

Despite the existence of a new government, a proliferation of competing a
dministrations, factions and militias

remain, all of which strive to assert their own authority (UNHCR, 2005a
). Hence there is the self-declared state
calling itself “Somaliland” in the north-west, the self-declared a
utonomous region calling itself “Puntland” in

the north-east, and the continuing warlordism in “Jubbaland” in and around Mogadishu in the south. Neither
“Somaliland” nor “Puntland” has been recognized by the inter
national community, but it is only in these two

Environment in Somalia 14 UNEP Desk StudyAnnex 88

Environment in Somalia UNEP Desk Study
15 Annex 88

areas that fighting has been more or less brought under control, and whe
re there is any indication that the
economy and peoples’ livelihoods have started to pick up.

Population and economy

The last official census of Somalia was in 1975, when 3.2 million people
were counted, and this number was
estimated to have grown to 9.5 million by 2002 (UN, 2002). With an ave
rage population density of about 15

people per square kilometre, this is a sparsely populated country in whi
ch 75 per cent of the people have
lived historically in rural areas. Population growth was estimated at 4.
1 per cent per year for 1975-1980 and

3.1 per cent per year for 1995-2000, while some urban centres such as Mog
adishu showed growth at a rate of
10 per cent a year (UN, 1998). As a result of this urbanization proce
ss, it is possible that a majority of Somalis

now live in towns, albeit often in squalid and dangerous conditions. Th
ere is also a substantial diaspora of
Somalis living abroad, and their remittance payments are an important so
urce of funds for many Somalis

inside the country.

The collapse of the government in 1991 led to one of the fastest and largest population displacements ever
recorded on the African continent. At the peak of this crisis, more than 800,000 Somalis were thought to have

fled to neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2003). The number of refugees ha
s since declined and continues to do
so, as more and more people are undergoing voluntary repatriation, partic
ularly to “Somaliland” and “Puntland”.

Sizeable numbers of Somali refugees, however, remain in several neighbouring countries: at the end of 2004,
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees noted that there were almost 390,00
0 Somali refugees (UNHCR, 2005b),

many still in exile in Kenya, Yemen, Ethiopia and Djibouti, with a sizeable number also living further a field.

The enduring conflict also resulted in an estimated 370,000 internally di
splaced people, who remain a serious
humanitarian concern (UNHCR, 2005a). Inadequate protection and meagre l
evels of humanitarian assistance

place a severe strain on the coping mechanisms of these people, the hosting communities and local authori-
ties. Somalia also has a large number of destitute people, including noma
ds who lost their livestock as a result

of drought and who now live in camps, relying on food aid. Widespread fam
ine in 1992-1993, caused by war
and drought, resulted in one of the largest UN humanitarian and peacekeeping operation in history.

As the economy has virtually collapsed, many people have turned to natur
al resource exploitation as a
means of survival. Somalia has a higher proportion of pastoralists than
any other country in Africa, and

nomadic pastoralism is the traditional basis for the rural economy. An almost overwhelming dependence on
livestock can have its risks, however, as has become obvious during times of drought or when export markets

are closed and large herds of livestock can also cause serious environmental damage. Agriculture remains
the most important economic sector (see Table 1 for numbers of people involved), with livestock accounting

for about 40 per cent of gross domestic product and about 65 per cent of
export earnings. Nomads and semi-
nomads, who are dependent upon livestock for their livelihood, make up a
large portion of the population

(see Table 1).

Table 1. Number of people involved in main economic activities in Somalia

Economic Activity 1987 1997 (estimate)

Agriculture 2,085,000 2,486,000

Industry 277,000 430,000

Services 534,000 847,000

Source: UN, 1998

Environment in Somalia 16 UNEP Desk StudyAnnex 88

Box 3. Vulnerability of the economy to environmental change

Somalia has always been vulnerable to frequent external and internal sho
cks, including changes in
foreign markets and recurrent droughts. The two most important merchandise exports, livestock and

bananas – are dependent on single markets – Saudi Arabia and Italy. Similarly, one internal shock
that often disrupts economic activities is recurrent drought. Recurrent
droughts in Somalia are
symptoms of complex trends and inter-linkages that are related to popula
tion growth, dwindling capacity
of a fragile ecological system, environmental degradation, weather cycle
s and the absence of
agricultural and non-agricultural rural development. Droughts may still be far more consequential to

society and development aspirations that external shocks.

Source: UNDOS, 1999

Somalia’s small industrial sector, based on the processing of agricultural products, has been extensively
dam-
aged, with much of its equipment being sold as scrap metal. Livestock, h
ides, charcoal, and bananas are

Somalia’s principal exports, while sugar, sorghum, corn, fish,qaat (Catha edulis, Celastraceae, a plant with
mild narcotic properties grown in the highlands of Ethiopia and Kenya),
and machined goods are the chief

imports. Reliable economic data, however, are scarce (see Box 3).

The overwhelming dependence on livestock became a national crisis in 200
0 when Saudi Arabia placed a
sudden and complete ban on all livestock imports from Somalia over concern for Rift Valley Fever, a mosquito-

borne disease which can infect and kill livestock and humans. According
to a joint report from the Food
Security Assessment Unit and the USAID Famine Early Warning System, the
ban caused substantial loss of

income at the macro and household levels which in turn limited the purch
ase of many goods, including
medicines, and accelerated the depletion of assets for many households in
Somalia (UN OCHA, 2001).

Despite the conflict in many areas, Somalia’s service sector has somehow managed to survive and grow.

Telecommunication firms provide wireless services in most major cities and offer the lowest international call
rates on the continent. In the absence of a formal banking sector, money exchange services have sprouted

throughout the country, handling between US$500 million and US$1 billion in remittances annuall
y (CIA, 2005).
Mogadishu’s main market offers a variety of goods from food to the la
test electronic gadgets.

Role of natural resources

Somalia’s natural resources fall into three broad categories: marine
resources such as fish and salt; surface

resources which include forests and forest products such as the aromatic
extracts of frankincense (from
Boswellia spp.) and myrrh (fromCommiphora spp., both Burseraceae), as well as surface water; and subsur-

face resources such as rocks and minerals, fossil fuels, and groundwater.
Many of them have been directly or
indirectly impacted by the extended civil conflict, but competition for
access to some resources has also

been, and continues to be, a source of conflict in itself.

In the absence of a government, many traditional forms of natural resourc
e management and control systems

have been abandoned or are now ignored. In several instances, this has r
esulted in clearly unsustainable
exploitation, a trend which may prove difficult to reverse. For example,
parts of the north-west, and the

Kismayo area, are showing signs of environmental degradation as a result
of overgrazing and the uncontrolled
harvesting of trees for charcoal making (UNDP, 1998).

Despite the country’s long coasts, Somalis are not traditionally a fishing or fish-eating people, although some

small coastal communities have in the past been engaged in subsistence f
ishing. Somalia has one of the
world’s lowest fish consumption rates in the world (Van der Elst, 1997), with just 2 per cent of protein intake

coming from fish (WRI, 2003). Fishing was however strongly promoted by
the government during the 1970s,

Environment in Somalia 17 UNEP Desk Study Annex 88

partly in response to the drought of 1973-1975, when the Coastal Develop
ment Project resettled 14,000
nomadic people from inland regions to the coast (Nur, 1998). In 1984, it was estimated that a million people

lived on the Somali coast, of whom almost 10 per cent were directly or i
ndirectly involved in artisanal fishing
(Bihi, 1984). Training and equipment were provided, and numerous fisheries co-operatives established, but the

fate of this initiative is now largely unknown.

Although recent data are sparse, one source reports that Somalia exported almost U
S$2.5 million-worth of fish
and fish products in 2000, a 464 per cent increase from 20 years earlier
(WRI, 2003). Near-shore fisheries now

target just a few key species, lobster and shark in particular, with much of the catch being exported. Recent
observations (FAO, 2005a) suggest that better arrangements for control and processing are
urgently needed

since stocks of target species are being over-fished, and there is much
astage in both catching and process-
ing. In the fisheries sector, the absence of effective policy, access arrangements, management procedures

and biological reference points for monitoring has resulted in serious
erexploitation of certain species (Van
der Elst, 1998), and this is likely to be continuing to date.

Hundreds of fishing vessels from a variety of nations ply the waters off
Somalia, most operating without any

licensing agreement. Some of these vessels have even attacked local Somal
i fishermen and destroyed their
boats and equipment (UN, 2005). Illegal fishing by foreign interests
presents a loss of much-needed revenue

for the new Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the regional authorities of “Puntland”
and “Somaliland”
(UN, 2005).

There has been a rapid expansion in the production of charcoal in recent years, with much of it being
exported to meet demand in Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates, where local forests are more

strictly protected. Charcoal may today represent one of Somalia’s most
valuable exports: a bag of charcoal
in Somalia might fetch US$3-4, but the same bag could be sold for US$10 i
n the Gulf States (EDC News, 2001).

This same trade, however, has also caused open conflict between clans in Somalia, involving shoot
-outs and
mine laying, as well as environmental damage.

The transient rights to use resources that are so critical to nomadic pa
storalism were ignored when the na-

tional land tenure regime – which favoured crop cultivation – was b
eing developed (Unruh, 1995). Among the
direct results of this action has been land degradation, resource use co
nflicts, a decline in pastoral produc-

tion and impacts on Somali clan alliances, which in many cases serve to
regulate rational natural resource
access and use.

The lack of any effective government has meant that many people, both loc
al and foreign, have engaged in

many kinds of illegal and damaging activities. Despite a number of intern
ational investigations, rumours have
persisted for many years concerning hazardous pollutants being dumped in
Somali waters and on beaches by

foreign vessels. The rampant trade in charcoal as well as unregulated of
f-shore fisheries are also widely
reported as having a damaging impact on the country’s natural assets, which can be expected to limit and

restrict options for national recovery and sustainable development.

Legal and institutional framework for environmental management

Until the establishment of the Ministry of Environment and Disaster Management in 2005, Somalia lacked any

central body responsible for these matters. Instead, a National Environm
ental Committee, with representa-
tives from 13 Ministries/Agencies, served as the co-ordination body for
nvironmental governance (Gudel and

Mwanza, 1979). Most environmental issues, however, were referred to two organizations within the Ministry of
Livestock, Forestry and Range, these being the National Range Agency and
the Central Rangelands Develop-

ment Project.

A key concern relating to sound environmental management relates to the a
doption and effective enforce-
ment of a suite of international, regional and national agreements which
define the country’s own responsibilities

Environment in Somalia 18 UNEP Desk StudyAnnex 88

Somalia’s Environment Minister Mohamed Osman Maye at a press conference in Nairobi. ©Tony Karumba/AFP/Getty Images

as well as those of the international community. The regulatory framework for most of Somalia is poorly

developed, although the country has signed a number of important international conventions (UNEP, 1996)

relating to natural resource use and management, including:

G Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES);

G Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals;

G Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and the Gulf of
Aden Environment;

G
Protocol concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil
and other Harmful Sub-
stance in Cases of Emergency;

G UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;

G Protocol concerning Protected Areas and Wild Fauna and Flora in the East
ern Africa region;

G Protocol concerning Co-operation on Combating Marine Pollution in cases
of Emergency in the

Eastern African region; and

G
Convention for the protection, Management and Development of the Marine a
nd Coastal Environ-
ment of the Eastern Africa Region (Nairobi Convention).

At the same time, however, Somalia has also signed a number of other major international and regi
onal
agreements but has so far failed to ratify these:

Environment in Somalia19 UNEP Desk Study Annex 88

G Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water;

G
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space
including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies;

G
African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources;

G Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement

and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa; and

G Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community.

While there is a clear need for a thorough revision of the country’s
national legislation on management of

natural resources, this will require considerable effort and co-operatio
n from all interested parties. A number
of gaps in the legal system also need to be addressed, for example the l
ack of any reference to a national

water act or adhesion to the Contracting Parties to the Convention on th
e Prevention of Marine Pollution by

Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 (the London Convention), the latter being especially relevant to

the alleged dumping of toxic and hazardous materials in Somalia during 2004 and 2005.

Other opportunities to benefit natural resource management could be based
on improved regional co-operation
and co-ordination. The establishment of an Indian Ocean Sanctuary for the
conservation of whales, for exam-

ple, and the Protocol Concerning Protected Areas and Wild Flora and Faun
a in the Eastern African Region,

both provide a framework for collaboration in the development of marine
protected areas and species
conservation programmes. Other possible legal instruments which could ser
ve a similar purpose (but to which

Somalia may not currently be a Party) include:

G the Convention on Biological Diversity;

G the Ramsar Convention;

G FAO Code of Conduct (which relates to the sustainable management of fisheries resources);

G UN Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks;

G
the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission; and

G the Marine Turtle Conservation Strategy and Action Plan for the Western Indian Ocean.

The role of non-governmental organizations

The establishment of a new government and the growth of stability in “
omaliland” and “Puntland” are not the

only signs of hope in the current situation in Somalia. Boxes 4 and 5 s
ummarize certain non-governmental
initiatives exist which are proving effective in environmental resour
anagement.

Future prospects

Somalia currently has an historic opportunity to choose a new and better
path. A transitional government is
becoming established and is seeking popular recognition throughout Somali
a, despite the country’s fragmen-

tation with two breakaway regions and a third still plagued by conflict.

Peace and stability are absolute prerequisites for any future rebuilding
and development of Somalia, and

continued access to natural resources is essential to the livelihoods of
the vast majority of its people. Urgent

Environment in Somalia UNEP Desk Study
20Annex 88

Box 4. Local institutions take the lead in environmental management

With funding from Novib (Oxfam-Netherlands), the Resource Management Somali Network (RMSN) was
founded in 1996. Its mission relates to avoiding land degradation and desertification, protecting and

ensuring more sustainable use of forests, effective management and protection of biodiversity, efficient
water management, and dealing with pollution problems and population pre
ssure on natural resources.

Among the actions undertaken by its members have been to:

G challenge the charcoal making industry, which included mounting a campaign aimed at raising

awareness of the degradation, its causes and why it needs to be controll
ed;
G
checking the illegal trade of wildlife;
G
denouncing the ruthless exploitation of marine resources by internationa
l trawlers;
G
promoting the conservation of threatened marine species and promoting sustainable use of fisher-
ies; and

G establishing linkages with external actors.

Members of the RMSN include:

G RMSN Lower Shabeelle region
G
RMSN Middle Shabeelle region
G
Gedo Resource Management Organisation
G
RMSN Mudug region
G
Environment Education Team
G
Sool Resources Management Organisation
G
ASAL – ex Bari Team
G RMSN Western Sanaag region

G RMSN Golis Area

G RMSN Candlelight (Somaliland)

G RMCO (Costal areas)

G Horn Relief (Sool and Sanag)

G RMSN Buran Team

G HARDO (Hiran region)

Source: Novib, Presented at a Round Table Discussion on the Environment Situation in Somalia, UNEP Headquater
s, Nairobi

(June, 2005)

actions need to be taken on a number of fronts, however, including legislation, regulation, co-ordination,
empowerment and wise management of natural resources. Many of the environ
mental issues, concerns and

urgent needs highlighted in this study can be addressed through land-use
planning and management, taking

account of issues such as legislation and rights, forestry, water management, livelihood security and biologi-

cal diversity. These are a minimum of necessary actions to be taken before more specific and focused

responses can be developed and properly institutionalized.

Somalia’s natural assets – its grazing and agricultural lands as w
ell as its rich marine fisheries – are a platform

on which the peoples’ livelihoods might be rebuilt. Taking control of these assets and managing them produc-

tively, sustainably and equitably will, however, remain a considerable challenge for the decision-makers and
population of the country. Somalia will not be able to reverse the current situation overnight. One compli
t-

ing issue is the fact that a number of other countries already have vest
ed interests in exploiting Somalia’s

resources, including fisheries, charcoal and livestock. Finding a solution to the current levels of over-exploita-

tion will therefore not only depend on reaching acceptable solutions betw
een stakeholders within the coun-

try, but also hinges on the co-operation and assistance from neighbouring states.

Environment in Somalia 21 UNEP Desk Study Annex 88

Box 5. Simple methods prove effective

Simple, but appropriate, methods are often the most effective means of conserving and managing

natural resources – something which local non-governmental organizations or community structures are
well suited to carry out, as demonstrated in the two examples highlighted below.

Simple rock dam at Awsane built in March 2005 (left) before the rains and two months later after rain (right)

Founded in 1991, Horn Relief, a Somali NGO was established to help build
the capacity of up-coming
grassroots groups in Somalia. It works in four main areas to form a holi
stic approach to community
development: natural resource management, human health, animal health, and leadership development.

Among its environment-related activities are:

G water conservation through the construction of water barriers such as ro
ck walls or rock dams to
slow the water flow;

G water retention through blocking water from entering the sinkholes throu
gh soil bunds;

G improving the fertility of the surrounding areas to ready them for plant
ing trees, shrubs and grasses;

and
G
improving selected rangelands by diverting water
from roads onto them.

Founded in 1998, the Regional Marine Conservation
Organisation (RMCO) works with local communities and

encourages natural resource management practices that
help conserve land and marine resources. Among its

activities are the following:

G public environmental awareness raising and advo-
cacy through training, meetings and media events;

G establishment of an environmental database, keep-
ing record of environmental hazardous wastes inci-

dents;

G providing support to communities in resolving re-
source-based conflicts;

G monitoring and documenting environmental change;
and
Mangrove recovery following awareness raising
G mangrove forest conservation. programmes

Source: Novib, Presented at a Round Table Discussion on the Environment Situation in Somalia, UNEP Headquater
s, Nairobi
(June, 2005)

Environment in Somalia UNEP Desk Study
22Annex 88

HUMAN AND URBAN ENVIRONMENT

Introduction

Land ownership and land disputes are central to much of the conflict in
contemporary Somalia. During the
rule of the last regime (1969-1991), government tended to increase its
control over land previously owned

collectively by rural communities. This was accomplished through shifting
land-ownership from communal to
state levels through the pursuit of revenues. Sections of the 1973 Unified Civil Code abolished traditional clan

and lineage rights of use and access over land and water resources (Hoo
glund, 1993). The 1975 Land Law
nationalized all land in Somalia. This required mandatory land registrat
ion which traditional landholders re-

sisted or were unable to fulfil, for example, by not having enough money
to travel to Mogadishu to register
their claims and pay the required fees (official and non-official). Th
is has progressively limited local rights

rather than encourage or support them.

As the state authorities lacked capacity to manage and control the nationalized land, however, it effectively

became “no-man’s land”, with open access to its use or misuse. The effect of thi
s law is therefore highly
relevant to the ongoing scene of land and natural resource degradation.
An epidemic of land grabbing

began in the 1980s with well placed civilians, civil servants and government officials registering large tracts of
land in their names, even though such land might have been under the mana
gement of local communities for

generations (UNDP, 1998). Many of Somalia’s smallholders were quickly transformed from
subsistence farmers
to landless or semi-landless sharecroppers and rural wage earners.

This situation persists today, made even worse in some situations by militia groups demanding substant
ial parts

of any crop or potential income, often not even in return for protection
from other militia groups. New arrivals
have also staked claim to abandoned state farms, while clans which might
be more powerful than others have

also taken advantage of the chaos to extend the boundaries of their own g
razing lands.

Land disputes in urban areas are also a major problem. Houses abandoned
by people who fled the turmoil
have been occupied by squatters who will only relinquish them when paid a
fee for “guarding and improving”
the property (UNDP, 1998). The same applies to many institutional buildings such as school
s and government

offices.

Human Settlements

Prior to the 1980s, some 75 per cent of the population were thought to li
ve in rural areas. Now, however, it is
estimated that no fewer that 60 per cent of the people live in urban are
as, many of them without adequate

shelter (Qasim Hersi Farah, 2005). Information is sadly lacking on liv
ing conditions – education, health and
sanitation, for example – in almost all urban centres, but the same r
eport states that 85 per cent of the

population live in slums or partially destroyed homes.

This shift is largely due to internal displacements on account of the civil war, but the result has been that parts
of many cities and towns have become seriously overcrowded, while other areas remain unpopulated. In the
absence of regulations and controls, building takes place without proper
planning and consideration for any

essential services, including sanitation and waste disposal. In response
to the growing needs identified, the
Somali Urban Development Programme, an initiative supported by the European Commission and UN-HABITAT,

was launched on 5 January 2005, targeting all major cities and towns through the impl
ementation of projects
and capacity building activities in the urban development sector.

According to the UN Population Fund (UNFPA, 2004), only 24 per cent of the houses in Somalia can be

considered permanent. The majority of all other buildings are constructe
d from wooden sticks with a mud
infill. These suffer widely from termite attacks, requiring people to rebuild on a regular basis, an activity which

has direct implications for the country’s wood resources.

Environment in Somalia UNEP Desk Study
23 Annex 88

Traditional and modern building in one compound in Hargeisa. Credit: UNDP Somalia

Settled by Arab colonists around 900 A.D., Mogadishu had become an impor
tant trade centre for the east

coast of Africa by the 12th century. During the 16th century, Mogadishu was controlled by Portugal. In 1871,
the city was occupied by the sultan of Zanzibar, who leased it to the Italians in 1892. In 1905, Italy purchased

the city and made it the capital of its colony of Italian Somaliland. By
1914 Mogadishu’s population was
estimated to be approximately 12,000 people. The city was captured and o
ccupied during World War II by

British forces operating from Kenya.

Rebel forces entered the city in 1990 during Somalia’s long civil war. Intense battling between clan-based
rebel factions damaged many parts of Mogadishu in 1991 and 1992, and the city was again the scene of

fighting after the international peace-keeping forces of UNOSOM II, whic
h had arrived in 1992, left in 1995.
Today the city lacks any form of central government and control remains i
n the hands of competing militias.
Key services such as the airport and port facilities likewise remain und
r the control of vying factions. Mogadishu’s

population is currently estimated to comprise around 2,450,000 people (http://www.shimbir.demon.co.uk/;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mogadishu)

Kismayo, also located on the Indian Ocean coast in south-western Somalia
, is the principal town and port of

the Jubbada Hoose region. It was founded in 1872 by the sultan of Zanzibar, passed to Great Britain in 1887,
and was held until 1924, when it was transferred to Italian control. Ki
ayo is today the main port for charcoal

exports to the Gulf States.

Hargeisa, in north-western Somalia, is an important commercial centre and
watering place for nomadic stock
herders. The town is a transportation hub and has an international airpo
rt. It was taken in 1870 by Egyptian

forces, then under Ottoman Turkish control, who withdrew in 1884 to fight the rebellion in the Sudan led by

Environment in Somalia UNEP Desk Study
24Annex 88

Muhammad Ahmad or the Mahdi, whose forces cap-

tured Khartoum in 1885. The British later took control
of Hargeisa and, in 1941, made it the capital of British

Somaliland. The city is the capital of the faction which
declared northern Somalia independent as

“Somaliland”.

Although predominantly a rurally-based population and
culture, there are strong patterns of rural-urban migra-

tion in Somalia (Gundel, 2002). For a time during the
war, this process was reversed as people fled the main

towns and moved to areas where their clans originated. A make-shift kitchen of a nomadic family. Credit: FAO/D. Signa

Consequently the population of previously small re-
gional towns such as Belet Weyne, Galkaiyo, Baidoa, and Bossassoo rose dr
amatically as people fled fighting

in Mogadishu, the Lower Jubba and the inter-riverine areas.

Rapid urban migration has since become a particular issue in Hargeisa whe
re the majority of returning Somali
refugees from Ethiopia have chosen to settle. The concentration of busin
esses and aid programmes in the

administrative capitals has also served to attract people from rural area
s (Gundel, 2002). The same applies to
Somalis returning from the diaspora – mainly an urban community primarily formed on a family and clan basis

– as well as economic migrants from Bay and Bakool regions. The relat
ive stability afforded by areas such as
“Puntland” has encouraged a large influx of people who migrated fr
om the southern areas affected by the

civil unrest. This has contributed to reduce the availability of water i
n this dry region, where the inhospitable
climate makes water a vital resource (EU, Undated).

Water and Sanitation

Water resources vary by location. In much of the north and north-east, s
ub-surface water is generally saline

and often the only permanent source of water can be found in deep boreholes. I
n the south, however, water
is obtained from rivers as well as shallow wells. In the tsunami-impacte
d part of the country, many wells in

coastal areas have been clogged, or buried by sand washed in by the wave
s, resulting in brackish and
polluted water (UNEP, 2005). Seawater may have also invaded the porous rocks contaminating
the under-

ground water with salt.

The Human Development Report for Somalia (UND ,2001) estimates that Somalia’s annual renewable freshwa-
ter fell from 2,500 m per person per year in 1950, to 980 m3 in 1990, with a prediction of 363 m3 by 2025. It is

generally accepted that when this value
3
falls below 1,000 mper year, water scar-
city begins to hamper health, economic

development, and human well-being;
below 500 m per year it becomes life

threatening.

Recent data on access to water are not
available for much of the country, but it

is thought that fewer than 5 per cent of
the total population may have secure

access to water throughout the year
(UNDP, 1998). An estimated 31 per cent

of the population has access to safe

drinking water in the north-west, while
Somali women collecting water from a deep well. Credit: UNDP Somalia comparable figures for the north-east

Environment in Somalia 25 UNEP Desk Study Annex 88

and southern part of the country are 19 per cent and 20 per cent respectively. In Mogadishu, the figure is not

more than 35 per cent in the urban area and 10 per cent in rural Benadir
(UNDP, 1998).

In many parts of Somalia, such as the Galgudud region and the middle regi
ons, the nearest water source may
be 70 km or further from settlement areas. Elsewhere, the water table ma
y be very deep and not easily

accessible; one may have to drill to a depth of 170-240 m before reachin
g water (Mardi, 2000). Accessing
safe and reliable water sources is therefore a major concern in most are
s, for people as well as for livestock

and agriculture. During the late dry season many wells become more salin
e and foul, and hence cause
diarrhoea and other water-related diseases.

The level of sanitation services was limited before the civil war and th
e coverage has certainly not increased

since the early 1990s. At present, only 48 per cent of the overall popul
ation has access to improved sanita-
tion, whereas only 20 per cent of the rural and nomadic population has a
ccess to the same service (EU,

Undated).

Waste Management

With little industry, a weak economy and marginal
consumerism, Somalia does not have the problem of

excessive waste collection, treatment and disposal
that some other countries in the region face. Some

industrial sources, however, have the potential to
pollute the marine environment in particular, such as

the oil refinery south of Mogadishu, slaughter houses
at major ports, and tanning factories at Brava and

Kismayo (UNCTAD, 1998). Other forms of pollution
include sewage discharge and industrial waste, silt-

ing and fertilizers.

Since less that half of the population live in house- Solid waste on the banks of river Shabelle. Credit: FAO/D.Signa
holds without adequate sanitation or waste manage-

ment systems, the risks to human health from poor sanitation are real (
UNEP, 2005). Human and household
waste disposal sites are generally close to dwellings and water sources.
There is lack of garbage collection

and proliferation of plastics bags (UNEP, 2005). Seepage from waste dumping sites is also a potential contami-
nant of ground and surface water resources. Near human habitations, espe
cially in Bossassoo, Berbera and

Sailac, solid waste is dumped onto the shore and into the sea, causing d
amage to coastal and marine life
(World Bank, Undated).

Another possible health hazard stems directly from on-site processing of
fish on the beaches where catches
are landed (FAO, 2005a). Domestic waste and discarded fish are left to rot on the beaches in the heat, often

in close proximity to villages. Not only does this represent a serious h
ealth hazard, it is also a considerable
waste of otherwise valuable materials which might be consumed or transformed into useful products such as

fertilizers. Hygiene levels when cleaning and storing fish are also a co
ncern (see Box 6).

Energy

Charcoal plays an important role in the energy sectors and the economies
of most African countries, and

Somalia is no exception. Southern Somalia is the centre of most charcoal production today, this being ex-
ported to markets in the gulf through the port of Kismayo in particular.

Somalia has long relied principally on domestic wood and charcoal as well
as on imported petroleum to meet

its energy needs. Electrical utilities had been state owned since 1970,
when foreign-owned enterprises were

Environment in Somalia 26 UNEP Desk StudyAnnex 88

Box 6. Abandoned pesticides

An abandoned pesticide storage depot formerly belonging to the Desert Locust Control Organization for
Eastern Africa is located on the escarpment above Hargeisa in north-west Somalia. Pesticides stored at

the depot include Dieldrin, Heptachlor, BHC, DDT, Malathion, Fenitrothion, Mevinphos, Diazinon and
Tetrachlorvinphos.The depot was damaged during an air raid in 1988 which may have resulted in some
pesticides leaking into the environment (WHO, 2005). Local inhabitants are believed to have emptied
large quantities of pesticides into the ground in order to re-use the st
orage drums. Contaminated soil was

also excavated by local people for use in pest control and for resale in Hargeisa’s market. In 1993, FAO
commissioned an environmental assessment of the situation as there was c
oncern that the pesticides
might enter water supplies as a result of surface run-off during seasonal rains.The assessment, however,

concluded that there was no hazard.
The subject was aired again in 2003 when concern was expressed over possible contamination of

ground water resources, and a possibility to use the affected area for housing. A subsequent WHO
investigation showed low levels of organochlorine and organophosphate ex
posure in all those sampled,
compared with data available from the UK and USA. As emergency measures, the WHO report
recommended, among other actions, reduction of the release of the chemic
als from the depot through

technical measures such as roofing and sealing of contaminated areas; an
environmental study to
determine the fate of the pesticides released from the depot; prohibition of access by site security
measures such as fencing and guarding the area; and awareness raising th
rough the development of a
risk communication strategy for vulnerable groups.

The site has since been fenced, roofed and access restricted. However, nothing has been done to

contain the pesticides in the face of an increasing population residing
in close proximity to the depot.

Sources: WHO, 2005; IRIN, 13 May 2005, UNDP Somalia

nationalized. Throughout the country, about 80 different oil-fired thermal and diesel power plants were estab-

lished, each relying on imported petroleum. With aid from Finland, new pl
ants were constructed in the Kismayo
and Baidoa areas in the mid-1980s. Attempts to harness the power of the J
ubba River at the proposed Baardheere

Dam had not come to fruition by early 1992.

Somalia relied on foreign donors (first the Soviet Union and then Saudi
Arabia) to meet its petroleum needs. In
the late 1970s, Iraq helped Somalia build a refinery at Jasiira, north-e
st of Baraawe, which had a capacity of

10,000 barrels a day. When the Iran-Iraq War broke out in 1980, however, deliveries were suspended, and
Somalia once again required refined oil imports. As of mid-1989, Somalia’s domestic requirements were again

being met by this refinery, but deliveries of Iraqi crude oil were erratic. In May 1989, Somalia s
igned an
agreement with the Industrial Export, Import and Foreign Trade Company of Romania by which the company

was to construct an oil refinery in the outskirts of Mogadishu. The proj
ect was to cost US$500 million and result
in a refining capacity of 200,000 barrels per day. Given the political upheaval which followed, however, this

project never materialized.

Throughout the 1980s, various international oil companies explored for oi
l and natural gas deposits in Somalia.
In October 1991, the World Bank and the UN Development Programme announce
d the results of their hydro-

carbon study in the countries bordering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden
. Offshore oil explorations were
conducted during the 1980s, the results showing that Somalia’s contin
ental shelf may have oil and gas re-

serves. Several international oil companies applied for concessions, som
e of which were awarded in the
eastern and central parts of the Gulf of Aden coast. No reserves of econ
omic importance were detected,

and neither oil nor gas is currently being exploited (World Bank, Undat
ed).

One apparently successful innovation was the completion of a wind energy
project. Four wind turbines, each
rated at 50 kilowatts, were embedded in the Mogadishu electrical grid. I
n 1988 these turbines produced

Environment in Somalia 27 UNEP Desk Study Annex 88

699,420 kilowatt hours of energy. Total

electric energy produced in 1988, the lat-
est year for which figures were available

in early 1992, was 257 million kilowatt hours.
Five self-contained wind energy conver-

sion systems in rural centres were also
planned, but as of May 1992 there was no

information that these had been built (US
Library of Congress, 1993).

Livestock and Agriculture

Pastoralism is the dominant mode of life
for a large number of Somalis – both no-

madic and sedentary herding of cattle, A herd of camels. Credit: UNDP Somalia
sheep, goats, and camels are carried out.

Livestock production has been the backbone of the Somali economy for cen
turies. It is also the most impor-
tant source of cash income for the predominantly rural population, and m
eat, together with milk, assures 55

per cent of the calorific intake of the entire population (EU, Undated)
. Most recent projections estimate
livestock numbers to include around 5.2 million cattle, 13.5 million she
ep, 12.5 million goats and 6.2 million

camels, with cattle being concentrated mainly in the south and camels in
the northern part of the country.

The predominance of the nomadic rearing system – with herds moving ev
en across borders into Kenya and

Ethiopia in search of forage and water – and the almost complete abse
nce of fixed assets, has meant that
livestock production has not been as heavily impacted by the civil war a
s other production systems. This has

also been a precautionary move against unreliable precipitation, allowin
g pastoralists access to different
parts of the country containing quality forage and water sources, thus mi
nimising risk in order to provide some

degree of security for the household.

Compared with other nomadic livestock systems, that of Somalia is very m
uch market-oriented. Approxi-
mately 2.5 million animals are exported each year with livestock exports
(including raw hides and skins)

representing about 40 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 80 p
er cent of foreign currency earnings
(World Bank, 2003). Perturbed by the export bans placed on Somalia by
countries like Saudi Arabia (see

above), the export of live and slaughtered animals is also hampered by the collapse of the public veterinary
system and the absence of an animal health surveillance system in particular. The lack of a regulatory frame-

work for livestock exports may also be a weakening factor in this trade,
as much is controlled by individuals
(see Table 2).

Overstocking, overgrazing, declining fertility of pastures, disease outb
reaks and unpredictable rainfall are

among the perils and risks that livestock owners have to face. Southern S
omalia’s environment has suffered less
from the livestock pressure of nomadic pastoralists that the northern parts of the country, but agricultural

development and southward expansion of the cattle industry are now placin
g severe pressure on many of the
region’s remaining wild habitats (Simonetta, 1988) (see Box 7).

Migration of pastoralists and their herds from eastern Ethiopia (especi
ally the Shinnile zone) to north-western
Somalia (Adwal) since late 2002 has exerted pressure on grazing land in
these areas (USAID/FEWS, 2003). The

numbers of livestock are reported to be exceeding the carrying capacity, and could cause overgrazing and
outbreaks of disease.

Livestock exports – especially for sheep – normally increase sharply during Januar
y and February, coinciding

with the Haj (USAID/FEWS, 2003). This, however, also places stress on localized grazing and watering points near
main ports, as well as fuelling conflict over access rights.

Environment in Somalia 28 UNEP Desk StudyAnnex 88

Table 2. Number of livestock

1988 1997 (estimate)

Camels 6,841,000 6,100,000

Cattle 4,983,000 5,200,000

Goats 20,550,000 12,500,000

Sheep 14,304,000 13,500,000

Horses/Mules/Donkeys 49,000 46,000

Source: UN, 1998

The 1973 Land Reform Act was formulated to give advantage to state enterprises and mechanized agricultural

schemes. Arable land had to be leased from government; pastoralists no l
onger had claim to land they
previously depended on (Gunn, 1990). Obtaining leases to land was cumbe
rsome and beyond the scope of

most small farmers. Large estates were established – often enclosed an
d guarded – and pastoralists charged
a fee for access to, for example, water. A 1974 law on co-operative development, originally intended to

promote the vegetative recovery of grazing lands, initially established
14 co-operatives 200-300 ha in size
(Unruh, 1995). More ambitious range co-operatives followed in the late 1970s, with assistance
from the North-

ern Rangelands Development Project, all of which were further to the detriment of smaller herd owners.

Agriculture today remains the second most important production system in
Somalia. In the past, agriculture
contributed up to 19 per cent of GDP and accounted for some 20 per cent of employment (IUCN, 1997), but

current values are not known. Crop production, however, is limited primarily by irregular and unpredictable
rainfall but also to some degree by soil conditions and traditional pract
ices. Southern Somalia’s alluvial plains

are the country’s most fertile soils and, together with the inter-riverine area of Bay, used to account for almost
90 per cent of agricultural production.

Rainfed and irrigation cropping are practised in parts of southern Somali
a, especially the Jubba and Shabeelle

river valleys, while Bay and the lower Jubba and lower Shabeelle regions
rainfed cropping is combined with
camel and cattle keeping (IUCN, 1997). Rainfed cropping also occurs on
the sandy soils of the coastal

hinterland north-east of Mogadishu while only very limited crop producti
on is possible in the northern part of
the country. Rice, maize and sesame are the main

irrigated crops in the Shabeelle and Jubba riverine
areas although irrigated farming has suffered from

Box 7. Livestock movements lack of irrigation management, deteriorating infra-
and food security structure and susceptibility to flooding (see Box 8).

For nomadic pastoralists – who comprise 60 Maize and sorghum are the main rainfed crops
per cent of the Somali population – the January
grown in areas with rainfall above 450 mm per year,
to March (Jilaal) dry season is considered the and cow peas are the main rainfed crop elsewhere.
most difficult. During this period, herds are
moved longer distances from homesteads This farming practise, always at risk on account of
which, in turn, reduces the supply of milk to erratic and generally low rainfall levels, depends

the remaining members of the household. on soils being allowed to return to fallow for a
Heightened food stress is likely to be number of years in order to recover, and is no
experienced at such time.
longer practised as widely as it once was on
account of increasing population pressure and

Environment in Somalia 29 UNEP Desk Study Annex 88

Box 8. Causes of food insecurity in Somalia

There has been a steady decline in per person food production for years. Food aid constituted 20 per

cent of all food imports from 1970 to 1974 and 5 per cent from 1980 to 1984.The difference between food
produced and total food consumption (the ‘food gap’) changed from a surplus of 5 per cent in the former
period to a deficit exceeding 30 per cent in the latter. This decline in food self-sufficiency occurred

between 1960 and 1990 despite massive international investments in the rural sector and despite
considerable untapped potential in the agricultural areas. Among the re
asons for this decline are:

G rapid population growth, which outstripped increases in food production in the 1980s;

G rapid urbanization, which places a growing percentage of the population
out of pastoral or agricul-
tural food production;

G changes in food consumption habits among urbanized Somalis who prefer wheat, rice and pasta
over locally grown maize and sorghum;

G inappropriate government policies such as price controls in the 1970s wh
ich created disincentive

for farmers to produce grain crops;
G unintended impact of large-scale annual and often poorly timed delivery
of food aid, which de-

presses prices and drives farmers out of agriculture; and
G
alienation of portions of the country’s most fertile irrigable land for cash cropping of bananas for
export rather than grain.

The food security situation has been worsened by the civil war and statelessness. Without a government,
farmers have lost access to agricultural inputs and services formerly provided by the state. The private
sector has responded to a degree, but the unregulated sector has led to
misuse of resources and inputs,

poor quality control and the spread of drug-resistant diseases.

Source: UNDP, 1998

demand for land (IUCN, 1997). Poor management practices on rainfed crop
ped and fallowed land is leading

to lower levels of soil fertility and soil erosion which, in turn, trans
lates into lower productivity and increased
hardship for people living is such areas.

The major cash crop is bananas whose annual exports exceeded 120,000 tonnes before the war. However,

production and exports collapsed during the war and have not yet recovere
d. Despite some recovery in the
mid-1990s, commercial farming was hard hit by the El Niño rains of 199
7-1998 which destroyed an estimated

80% of the country’s banana plantations, causing about 100,000 famili
es to lose their primary source of

income (EU, Undated).

Other important crops include sugar cane in rain fed and irrigated areas
, sorghum in drier zones as well as
corn, mangoes, sesame seeds, beans, rice and cotton. About 400,000 ha ar
e cropped in the main season

and 230,000 ha in the secondary one. The planted area changes significantly from one season to another,

depending on the rainfall pattern. From 1994 to 2000, an average of 300,
000 tonnes of cereals were har-
vested each year; a significant reduction compared to the pre-war product
ion of 480,000 tonnes, mainly due

to the reduced area under agriculture (EU, Undated).

The prolonged civil war has had some marked impacts on the manner of natu
ral resource use and manage-
ment systems, with more negative consequences being recorded in the agriculture sector compared with

livestock production or fisheries. Farming communities in the south have
been displaced taking with them their

knowledge of fruit tree management and harvesting systems. New arrivals c
ommonly lack experience of tree
management which has resulted in considerable tracts of vegetation being
cleared for charcoal or trans-

formed into pasture. Deteriorating infrastructure such as irrigation sys
tems, as well as reduced agricultural

Environment in Somalia 30 UNEP Desk StudyAnnex 88

inputs and disrupted technical support services, and a collapse of processing and marketing facilities, have

all contributed to agricultural decline and subsequent loss of income and security for many communities. As
young men have been drawn into the civil war there is also insufficient labour, with many farming households

now being headed by women. Ownership of land has also become an evident
issue which will need to be
addressed if this sector is to recover.

Industry

The industrial sector in Somalia was never well developed, largely perhap
s on account of their being no fossil
fuels or minerals ready for extraction. Agricultural processing once con
stituted the bulk of the Somalian

industry sector but even this has been seriously restricted in scale and
scope. Meat exportation and process-
ing as well as fish – primarily tuna – canning were and remain the two main industrial activities, supplemented

by sugar refining, oilseed processing, leather tanning and the productio
n of cotton textiles.

Minerals only ever made a small contribution to Somalia’s exports and
the economy in general. Small amounts
of gemstones, gypsum, salt and sepiolite (meerschaum) were still being
produced in 2004.

In the informal sector, charcoal production has become a significant industry in many parts of the country,
with charcoal leaving by sea as well as by land. Lobster and shark proces
sing are also important activities for

certain fishing communities, with processing and shipment being done lar
gely by individuals who construct
freezing and storage facilities and then arrange onward freight. These i
dustries are generally not co-ordinated

and operate primarily under individual interests.

Transport and Telecommunications

Somalia’s transportation system is poorly developed and often in poor state of repair. At independence,

Somalia inherited only a few paved roads in the more populated areas in
the south and north-west, four
undeveloped ports equipped only with lighterage facilities, and a handful
of usable airstrips. During the next

three decades, some improvement was made with the help of substantial fo
reign aid. By 1990 all-weather
roads connected most of the important towns and linked the northern and southern parts of the country. Three

ports had been substantially improved, eight airports had paved runways, and a regular domestic air service
was also available. The deteriorating security situation in the early 19
90s, however, put an end to further

investments and necessary maintenance.

In 1988, the total expenditure for transportation and communications was
US$57.8 million. Nearly 55 per cent

of this amount was for new infrastructure; 28 per cent was for rehabilit
ation and maintenance of existing
infrastructure. This activity must be understood in the context of the o
ngoing civil war in Somalia; much of the

infrastructure particularly bridges in the north, had either deteriorated or been destroyed as a result of the
fighting. There has been no systematic study of the infrastructural cost
s of the civil war.

In 1990, Somalia had more than 21,000 km of roads, of which about 2,600 k
m were paved all weather roads,

2,900 km were gravel, and the remainder were improved earth. The country’
s principal highway was a 1,200
km two-lane paved road that ran from Kismayo in the south through Mogadis
hu to Hargeisa in the north. North

of Mogadishu, this route ran inland, roughly paralleling the border with
Ethiopia; a 100 km spur extended to the
Gulf of Aden at Berbera. By early 1992 much of this road, especially the
northern part between Hargeisa and

Berbera, was unsafe due to land mines. Somalia’s 1988 plan provided fo
r another connection from this main
route to Bossassoo on the Gulf of Aden. Somalia had only one paved road that extended from north of

Mogadishu to Ethiopia; all other links to neighbouring countries were dir
t trails impassable in rainy weather (US
Library of Congress, 1993).

Mogadishu International Airport was the nation’s principal airfield, but this facility has remained closed since

the departure of UNOSOM II in 1995.

Environment in Somalia 31 UNEP Desk Study Annex 88

Shipping

Maritime transport has long played an important role in Somalia, with mo
st exports and imports being made

via the sea. Four ports handled almost all of Somalia’s foreign trade
: Berbera and Bossassoo on the Gulf of
Aden, and Mogadishu and Kismayo being deepwater ports protected by breakw
aters on the Indian Ocean.

Mogadishu has traditionally been the principal port of entry for most general cargo but the port is now rarely
used as different factions continue to struggle for management of the fa
cility. The port is also in need of

dredging to be able to accommodate the larger vessels which once docked
there. Berbera has tended to
receive general cargo for the northern part of the country and handles much of the nation’s livestock exports.

It is also an important seaport access point for Ethiopia. Bossassoo is
also used for livestock export as well as
fisheries products and incense. Kismayo’s main function was the export
of bananas and meat, the latter being
processed and packed at the port.

The world’s main transport route for hydrocarbons passes through the
Gulf of Aden – 590 million tons of oil a

year (UNEP, 1987) – and the frequency of tanker movements poses a constant threat of oil spillages. Somalia
has no national capacity to deal with an oil pollution incident of an
gnitude, which is a concern given the

ecological importance of marine and coastal ecosystems in the region (World Bank, Undated) (see Figure 1).

The closest clean-up equipment is located at the IMO Regional Response C
entre in Djibouti for the Gulf of

Aden region (UNCTAD, 1998). This facility, however, is awaiting re-activation (World Bank, Undated).

Boats in the port of Bossassoo. Credit: G. Farmer

Environment in Somalia UNEP Desk Study
32Annex 88

Figure 1. Livestock exports from Somalia, Ports Berbera and Bossaso.

The absence of surveillance means that tankers routinely discharge oily
ballast off the Somali coastline:
annual discharges were once estimated at 33,000 tonnes (UNEP, 1982). Tar balls are regularly found on certain
sections of the Somali coastline, above all high-energy beaches in the western sector (World Bank, undated)
.

Sewage and solid waste discharge from marine vessels is another unregula
ted activity (see Box 9).

Natural Disasters

Drought has been the single most devastating and recurrent natural disas
ter to affect this country in recent

decades. Severe droughts interrupted by devastating floods occur frequent
ly resulting in large-scale starva-
tion and the death of thousands of people and their livestock. As recent
as March 2004, an estimated 200,000

Box 9. Alleged dumping of hazardous waste

Since the early 1990s, reports have been circulating in Somalia and the international media regarding
the dumping of hazardous waste along the coastline of Somalia, including regular sightings of suspected
containers. Assessment missions were undertaken by international organizations in 1992 as well as in
1997 but no hazardous waste was found.

Following an increase of reported sightings after the December 2004 tsunami, UNEP, through its Joint
UNEP/OCHA Environment Unit, and in co-operation with the International M
aritime Organization (IMO),

International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), the Un Development Programme (UNDP) and World
Health Organization (WHO), has been investigating these reports with no results to support the presence
of hazardous waste.

A UN technical fact-finding mission visited the “Puntland” region
of Somalia from 25-29 May 2005, to
investigate allegations of toxic waste hazards uncovered by the tsunami.The mission visited three key
populated coastal locations at Hafun, Bandarbeyla and Eyl, a region stre
tching over 500m in length. No

traces of toxic waste were found, but the UN added that “the urgent n
eed remained for a more
comprehensive assessment of the natural environment of Somalia, which would include further
investigations of alleged toxic waste sites on land, and dumping of toxi
c waste at sea”.

Main source: UN Press release 7 October 2005 (UN Mission to “Puntland” on Toxic Waste in the Coastal Areas of Somalia)

Environment in Somalia UNEP Desk Study
33 Annex 88

pastoralists in the northern and central regions were threatened by drou
ght considered to be the worst in 30
years (UN OCHA, 2004). By mid-2005, the UN reported that 500,000 people
remain in a state of humanitarian

emergency or livelihood crisis in drought-affected areas (UN, 2005). D
espite the good Deyr rains of 2004-

2005, which improved water availability and pasture, recovery is slow as pastoralists have been unable to fully
benefit from the improved conditions due to significantly reduced herd si
zes, excessive debts and widespread

destitution. Recovery is also hampered by recurrent instability which li
mits access to markets, grazing and

other resources (see Figure 2).

Recent flooding in the Jubba and Shabeelle regions has caused cereal prod
uction to fall to its lowest post-war

level. Flooding has continued in the Gu rainy season in the Hiran and Middle Shabeelle regions where the

situation was described as “precarious”, with several thousand hou
seholds being forced to flee their riverine
villages (UN, 2005).

Coastal areas of Somalia, particularly in “Puntland”, suffered damage and the loss of several hundred lives as
a result of the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The tsunami came at
a time when many parts of the

country were beginning to recover from four years of consecutive drought and pe
riodic flooding (UNEP, 2005).

Apart from loss of life, the livelihoods of some 44,000 people are though
t to have been affected, through loss
of housing, loss of fishing materials (and associated revenues) and the
need for relocation in some instances

following salinization of coastal fresh water sources. Coastal infrastructure such as roads was also damaged

(see map Somalia: Impacts of the 26 December 2004 tsunami).

Figure 2. Natural disaster risk distribution in
Somalia.

Gulf of Aden

Berbera Hafun

Boorama Ceerigaabo
Hargeisa
Burco Bandarbeyla

Laas Caanood Garoowe

Eyl
ETHIOPIA
Gaalkacyo Garacad

Hilalaye
Dhuusamarreeb
Hobyo
S
h Beledweyne
b
u l
b Baydhabo le
ab Jowhar
INDIAN OCEAN
Mogadishu

Dominant nature hazards
Buaale Marka
- droughts

- droughts and floods
Kismaayo
- floods

0 200 400 - limited information

Kilometres

Source: Center For Hazards and Risk Research at the
Columbia University 2005 (http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/chrr)

Environment in Somalia 34 UNEP Desk StudyAnnex 88

A Somali child rescues a kitten who was stuck on the roof of a floo
use in Fagan in the lower Jubaf river area, southwest o
Mogadishu. © JEAN-MARC BOUJU/AFP/Getty Images

The desert locust plagues of 1986-1989 and 1996-1998 serve as examples o
f how agricultural pests and dis-

eases can easily spread across borders and cause emergencies. Although Somalia has been spared from this
experience in recent years, there is still a threat of outbreaks in the
region, with attention focussing on the

Chad/Sudan border and the Eritrean Red Sea coast (FAO, 2005b).

Environmental vulnerability is likely to intensify in Somalia with repeated droughts and flooding, in particular.
Changing climatic conditions, combined with growing pressure on the land and for specific coastal resources,

will only worsen this situation, in a country which currently lacks the capacity to prepare for, prevent and
ultimately deal with disaster-related events (see Table 3).

Displaced people

Migration is at the heart of Somali nomadic culture, a culture characterized by a subsistence ec
onomy, a

trading mentality and nomadism, a traditional and well-established form
f livestock keeping attuned to the
region’s climate.

During the period of British colonialism, an early Somali diaspora eme
d as seamen from British Somaliland

worked in the Merchant Navy and settled in ports such as Cardiff and Lon
don, UK (Gundel, 2002). This was
followed during the 1970s when Somalia became a major labour exporter to
the oil producing countries and
once again after independence, by others who had lost their assets. Sever
al hundreds of thousands of people

left seeking better employment than they could find in Somalia.

Not all population movements, however, were so voluntary in nature. The Ogaden war of 1977-1978 provoked
a massive refugee movement, forcing thousands of ethnic Somalis from the
Ethiopian Ogaden region into

Somalia. By 1981, these refugees constituted perhaps as much as 40 per c
ent of the population of Somalia.

Environment in Somalia UNEP Desk Study
35 Annex 88

Environment in Somalia UNEP Desk Study
36Annex 88

Table 3. Recent natural disasters in Somalia

Disaster Date Number of Number of
peoplekilled people affected

Drought December 1964 700,000

1974 19,000 230,000

1987 600 500,000
January 2000 650,000

June 2001 1,100,000

December 2001 500,000

2004 200,000

Flood November 1961 200

October 1997 2,311 1,230,000

July 2000 220,000

Epidemic March 1985 1,262

October 1997 500

January 1986 1,307

February 1998 248
April 2000 390

Wave/Surge (tsunami) December 2004 298 44,000

Famine March 1999 375,000

Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, www.em-dat.net. Université catholique de Louvain, Brus-
sels, Belgium. May 2005.

Additional Ogaden refugees as well as Ethiopian Oromos joined this group
of refugees from 1984 to 1991. By

1987, one in six persons in Somalia was registered as a refugee (Gundel,
2002).

The eruption of the civil war in 1988 was another period of mass populat
ion movement, when more than
600,000 people fled from Somalia to Ethiopia. Further escalation of the
conflict produced a refugee flow of

more than one million people from southern Somalia to neighbouring and di
stant countries. Refugees contin-
ued to leave southern Somalia in large numbers until 1995. Since then th
ere has been a decline in refugee

flows from Somalia and a gradual process of repatriation and re-integrat
ion has been taking place, with
people resettling in “Somaliland” and “Puntland” in particular. By 2004, UNHCR had recorded the voluntary

repatriation of some 476,000 refugees (UNHCR, 2005a). At the same time, however, a quarter of a million
Somalian refugees remain in camps in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Yemen and other neighbouring countries.

Hundreds of thousands of other Somali refugees are scattered across the
globe.

In addition to this massive human upheaval to neighbouring countries, there is also a significant population of
internally displaced people in Somalia. The largest war-related internal displacements from central and south-

ern Somalia took place between 1991 and 1993, initially on account of the war, but also because of drought
and food scarcity. In September 1992 there were estimated to be between 556,000 and 636,0
00 ‘visible’

displaced people in camps of which 50 per cent were in Mogadishu (Gunde
l, 2002). The overall trend since
1993 has been one of diminishing internal displacement as the war subsid
ed and people either returned to

their homes or resettled in different regions. But the vagaries of clima
te and economic hardship are now the
main causes of population movement. In 2000, there were estimated to be 300,000 internally displaced

including 40,000-50,000 newly displaced in 1999. Internally displaced pe
rsons constitute more than 60 per
cent of those Somalis considered to be ‘food insecure’ (Gundel, 2
002).

Environment in Somalia 37 UNEP Desk Study Annex 88

NATURAL RESOURCES

Introduction

On land and offshore, Somalia possesses important and some unusual biolo
gical resources within its varied

biogeographic zones. At the same time, however, it is not well-endowed with an abundance of natural re-
sources which means that particular care needs to be taken in their management. This, unfortunately, has not

always been the case and there is a dismal history of resource over-expl
oitation for personal or clan-based
gains. Massive hunting in the early part of the 1990s depleted virtually
all of the once great herds of wild

animals: today, similar activities are destroying much of the country’s forest resources and seriously impacting
several different components of Somalia’s rich marine fisheries.

The country’s infrastructure was poorly developed at independence and it has had
little time of stability,

security and directed assistance to establish a favourable framework for
natural resource management. This
seems all the more important in this country where the vast majority of
the people – at least directly in rural
areas – depend upon the environment for their livelihoods. The legacy
of exploitation only worsened during

the country’s civil war, as communities and clans vied with one another for access to grazing
nds, watering
holes and access to lucrative fisheries.

Known issues of particular concern are an almost complete breakdown of le
gislative and traditional controls

governing use and access to natural resources; deforestation near, but no longer exclusive to, populated
areas; overfishing of selectively targeted offshore and nearshore marine species; desertification and soil

erosion; inadequate water supplies and periodic drought; an inadequate a
nd dysfunctional system of pro-
tected areas; an urban environment in disarray; and the effects of politi
cal and economic mismanagement

of land tenure (EC/IUCN, 1993). Many of these problems actually stem fr
om or have been aggravated by the
prolonged civil strife which Somalia continues to experience on some of
its territory.

Environmental management issues featured in some of the country’s ear
lier development plans but the first
targeted initiative was launched in 1996 when the World Conservation Union (IUCN) began the Somali Natural

Resources Management Programme. This was designed to promote sustainable
use of natural resources use,
and through it the country began to address specific environmental issue
, including fuel-wood conservation,

fisheries management, marine conservation and land-use planning. Physica
l coverage of all of the country
was incomplete due to security concerns, but by the time the programme e
nded in 2000 a number of key

management issues had been identified which may allow the core of a compr
ehensive and integrated man-
agement system to be formulated. The future of any such system, however, must fully address the needs of the

people in Somalia whose current livelihoods are so heavily dependent on
a diminishing and deteriorating
natural resource base.

Land

Having access to land is a concern of a sizeable part of the population i
n this country where pastoralism is an
established way of life. Estimates vary, but from 46-56 per cent of Somalia’s land area can be considered

permanent pasture. About 14 per cent of the country is classified as for
est, while another 13 per cent is
thought to be suitable for cultivation, arid, semi-desert conditions mak
ing much of the country relatively

unproductive. In most areas, the barren coastal lowland strip – which
is widest in the south — is abruptly
succeeded by a rise to the interior plateau which averages around 900 met
res in height and stretches toward

the northern and western highlands. Only two main rivers – the Jubba and Sha
beelle – occur, both of which
are in the south.

Relatively high rainfall in the highlands around Hargeisa has raised the
organic content in the sandy calcare-

ous soils characteristic of the northern plains, allowing some dry farmi
ng to be practised. South of Hargeisa

Environment in Somalia UNEP Desk Study
38Annex 88

Environment in Somalia UNEP Desk Study
39 Annex 88

begins theHaud, whose red calcareous soils continue into the Ethiopian Ogaden. This soi
l supports vegetation
ideal for camel grazing. To the east of theHaud is the Mudug plain, leading to the Indian Ocean coast; this

region, too, supports a pastoral economy. The area between the Jubba and Shabeelle rivers has soils varying
from reddish to dark clays, with some alluvial deposits and fine black s
oil. This is the area of plantation

agriculture and subsistence agropastoralism (www.somalinet.com/library).

Practices concerning land rights vary from rural to urban areas and even
within the latter in some parts of the

country. In precolonial times, traditional claims and interclan bargaining were u
ed to establish land rights. A
small market for land, especially in the plantation areas of the south,
developed in the colonial period and

into the first decade of independence. However, the socialist regime which took control of the country from

1969-1991 sought to block land sales and tried to lease all privately own
ed land to co-operatives as conces-
sions. Despite the government’s efforts, ade facto land market developed in urban areas, while in the rural

areas, the traditional rights of clans were maintained.

The Siyad Barre regime also took action regarding the water system. In northern Somalia from 1988-1991, the

government destroyed almost all pumping systems in municipal areas contr
olled by the Somali National
Movement (SNM). Failing that, equipment was either stolen or vandalize
d. In rural areas, the government

poisoned the wells by either inserting animal carcasses or engine blocks
and car batteries that leaked oil and
acid. As a result, northern Somalis had to rely on older gravity water systems, use poor quali
ty water, or buy

water. Following the declaration of independence by “Somaliland” in the nor
th in May 1991, the secessionist
government began ongoing efforts to reconstruct the water system.

In the south, from the late 1980s onward, the water situation in the towns tended to resemble that of the north,

largely as a result of war damage and chaos. Few pumping systems were op
erational in early 1992. Condi-
tions in rural areas varied. Many villages had at least one borehole fro
m which poor quality water could be

obtained in buckets; pumps generally were non-functioning. Somalis who li
ved near the Jubba or Shabeelle
rivers obtained their water directly from the river (www.somalinet.com) (see Box 10).

Forests and Woodlands

The vegetation in Somalia is predominantly dry deciduous bushland and th
icket dominated by species of
Acacia andCommiphora, with semi-desert grasslands and deciduous shrubland in the north and al
ong much

of the coast. In general, the vegetation becomes more dense towards the south – much of the north-eastern
part of the country is devoid of trees (see Box 11).

Forest growth in general is limited due to poor soils and low rainfall.
Closed forest cover occupies only about

2.4 per cent of the country (IUCN, 1992) but, if the Juniperufsorests and evergreen tracts in the mountains in
the north are included, the total forest coverage would probably amount t
o around 14 per cent (90,000 k)m2

of the land (see Box 12).

Virtually all of the tropical floodplain forest that once existed along
the Shabeelle River has been cleared for
smallholder agriculture together with sugar and banana plantations, exce
pt for a small patch set aside as a

reserve at Balcad by the Somali Ecological Society. Aerial photographs in 1960, 1983-1984 and 1987 reveal a
drastic acceleration of forest clearance in the Jubba valley as well, li
kely encouraged by irrigation and

drainage schemes. Only the poorly accessible Middle Jubba, with its pred
ominantly saline, alkaline, imper-
meable soils, has retained significant areas of relict floodplain forest.
Compared with the surrounding wood-

land and bush, these floodplain forests are floristically rich and are n
otable for their diversity of specialized
birds and animals (Madgwick, 1989).

A number of mangrove stands have been reported, the best areas being between Saada Din Island and Saba

Wanak, in the estuaries of three watercourses which reach the sea west of
Bossassoo, and in the three estuar-
ies just north of the Kenyan border (Hughes and Hughes, 1992). These and other stands, however
, have been

Environment in Somalia 40 UNEP Desk StudyAnnex 88

Box 10. Land ownership and land disputes in Somalia

Land ownership and land disputes are central to much of the conflict in contemporary Somalia. The
pastoral lands have always been a common good – pasture is claimed by
clans and not individuals so

land conflicts in the pastoral setting are usually matters of power stru
ggles between two clans. In cases
where one clan gains an upper hand, neighbouring clans can be pushed out
of prime pasture land and
lose access to their own wells. Agricultural land has traditionally been
allocated to households by village
elders. Although not technically ‘owned’, this land is passed from one generation to the next and could

be rented or sold.

In the 1970s, a modern land tenure law was passed decreeing that land ti
tles be acquired from the state
which ‘owned’ all the land in order to claim usufructuary rights. At the same time riverine farmland which
had been held by Bantu and other farming communities for over a century was rapidly rising in value
,
thanks to major irrigation projects and the revival of the banana export business in the 1980s. Consequently,

an epidemic of land grabbing began in the 1980s. Civil servants, well-co
nnected businessmen and other
Somalis with access to the Ministry of Agriculture began to register large tracts of land in their name,
even though the land had been historically farmed by villages. Few smallholder farmers could afford to
register their land as that required expensive trips to Mogadishu and br
ibes to civil servants. Even then,

individuals that were more powerful could obtain titles to the same tract of land and pay for the backing
of police to ensure that their title was seen as the legitimate one. At the same time, the state expropriated
tens of thousands of hectares of prime riverine land from farming commun
ities, offering them no
compensation (since technically the unregistered land was unclaimed) f
or the establishment of

internationally financed state farms. Within a decade many of Somali’s smallholders were transformed
from subsistence farmers to landless or semi-landless sharecroppers and rural wage labourers. This
episode of land grabbing by both the state and private speculators sowed
the seeds for endemic land

conflicts in later years and depressed many of the riverine agricultural communities.
The civil war and state collapse accelerated this struggle for land, rep
lacing title deeds with semi-

automatic weapons as the instrument of choice for appropriating land fro
m weaker groups. As during the
1980s, land grabbing in the 1990s did not involve militia and their kins
men taking up agriculture
themselves, which is seen as a low-status occupation. Instead it involve
d laying claims to the fruits of
the harvest of the farmers. In parts of the riverine zones, smallholder farmers were subjected to coerced

sharecropping by militia overlords who may or may not have provided security in return for 50 per cent
of the harvest. In other instances militias have been used by powerful l
andowners to force villages to
supply labour to their farms or plantations, with or without pay. On abandoned state farms, newcomers
have staked claims to plots without regard to the fact that the land had
been expropriated from the

villagers. Clans that were more powerful also pushed their herds into pasture land of weaker groups,
grazing their livestock on villagers’ ripening crops.

Not all relations between militia and local communities were so hostile. In some instances armed
newcomers agreed to settle land disputes in order to secure better relations with re
sidents. There is
evidence that some militia settled and married into local communities suggesting the possibility, in

some areas, of gradual normalization. In other cases, individuals who ha
ve lost valuable land or houses
have had to request relatives in other clans to look after property, sharing their rent or harvest profits in
the process.

Unravelling the thousands of land and property disputes emanating from the collapse of the State has
been at or near the centre of nearly every peace process since 1991 and will be a major hurdle in

reconciliation efforts.

Source: UNDP, 1998

seriously ravaged for firewood and construction timber. Some have been completely denuded and are now
salt marsh ecosystems. Overall the regenerative capacity of the mangrove
ecosystems may have declined in

recent decades – a state which will almost certainly affect the capac
ity of these areas to function as breed-
ing and nursery sites for near and offshore fish, crustaceans and mollusc
s, but one which also now affords less

protection to the coastline. An assessment should be carried out of the e
xtent of damage to mangroves and
other coastal vegetation (UNEP, 2005) so that responsible actions can be undertaken.

Environment in Somalia 41 UNEP Desk Study Annex 88

Much of the country – around 60 per
cent – is covered by sparse savannah

woodlands. Forests and woodlands are Box 11. Degrading lands
important resources on account of the
Rangeland degradation and the formation of sand dunes now
fact that wood is the main source of affects considerable parts of the country. Dregne (1982)
household energy and construction
concludes that all rangelands are degraded while a World
materials for the bulk of the population, Bank (1987) survey found Somalia’s northern ranges to be
but charcoal – and certain other wood the most seriously (as much as 50 per cent) degraded owing
to their steep topography, large numbers of livestock and
products – are also important for the
revenue they provide. Important native proximity to ports for livestock export. Over much of the
country, areas around water holes or wells are all degraded.
forest exports include frankincense
from Boswellia species growing in the

north-east, Commiphora, which pro-
duces myrrh, in the south-west, gum Arabic from Acacia spp,

and Cordeauxia edulis (now thought to be endangered) which
produces yicib nuts in the central regions (UNEP, 1984). In 1985 Box 12. Mist forests of

Somalia was the world’s largest source of incense, and produced northern Somalia
over 2,000 tonnes. Forestry has usually accounted for about 2.5
th
per cent of GDP. Frankincense used to be Somalia’s 4 largest The mist forests of the Goolis
foreign currency export earner with an annual production of 12,000 mountains of "Somaliland" are the
only true forest areas of Somalia
tonnes. Due to their value,Boswellia are highly prized trees with and are important centres of
tree tenure systems. Although not cut for charcoal or other uses,
biological diversity and species
their natural regeneration is threatened by over-grazing endemism. On account of their
(EC/IUCN, 1997). biological richness, mist forests –
so called because of their ability

On the basis of a study made on wood-based energy dynamics to remove moisture from the air as
it blows in from the coast and rises
in Somalia, the charcoal output of north-east Somalia in 1996 above the plateaux – are also
alone was estimated to be in the order of 4.8 million sacks, each important resources for pastoral-

weighing 25-30kg, 80 per cent of which were exported. Produc- ists during dry seasons and periods
ing such a volume required cutting about 2.1 million Acacia of drought.

nilotica trees. At an average density of 60 trees per hectare, this Gacaan Libax, a highland area
translates into a deforestation rate of 35,000 hectares of land a reaching 1,719 m asl in north-

year. Such a rate of deforestation would have cleared 170,000 western Somalia, hosts one of the
hectares of land during the last five years of the 1990s alone, largest and most intact mist forest
areas in Somalia. Local people are
when the area witnessed a massive outflow of charcoal for well aware of the importance of
export (WSP, 2001) (see Box 13).
these forests to their livelihoods,
especially for the grazing and water
resources they provide. The loss
of traditional grazing lands to

private livestock exclosures, as
well as an increased number of
livestock and the lack of law
enforcement combine to now force

people to demand more and more
from these forests.

As a result, soil erosion is
becoming more evident as over-

grazing and deforestation take
place. To avoid conflicts from
developing, opportunities like this

provide an ideal setting for the
development of community-based
land management plans.
Somali women carrying wood. Credit: UNDP Somalia

Environment in Somalia 42 UNEP Desk StudyAnnex 88

The lucrative charcoal trade raises many concerns for the country’s remaining forests. Yusuf (1997) estimated
that 30,000 tonnes of charcoal were being exported by ship to the Arabian Peninsula, particularly the United

Arab Emirates. Many species are felled to produce charcoal buA tcacia bussei, a slow-growing hardwood is
the preferred species. Usually a scattered species, it was formerly foun
d growing in high densities in the

plateau areas of Sanaag, Sool, Bari, Togdheer, Woqooyi Galbeed, Bay and Bakool – all regions where char-
coal production was very high at one stage (EC/IUCN, 1997). Reports fr
om north-western Somalia reveal that

Somali charcoal producers now produce charcoal in Ethiopia, both for int
ernal consumption as well as for
export (EC/IUCN, 1997).

Vegetation cover is also important in this country and region in terms of stabilising soils, preventing erosion and

encouraging ground water absorption. This is especially important in area
s which endure high levels of grazing
since apart from direct grazing pressure, movement of livestock over bar
ren or fragile soils easily leads to

erosion or compaction of the surface soils.

Box 13. Trade in black gold

Charcoal plays an important role in both the energy sectors and economies of many African countries,
and Somalia is no exception. Charcoal making provides a considerable amo
unt of employment in rural

areas but the scale of this operation has escalated to such an extent th
at environmental degradation has
now been reported from most parts of the country.

Most charcoal is today made in southern Somalia – more than 80 per ce
nt of trees used are Acacia
species. The growth rates of these trees – even if some reforestation was taking place, which is not the
case – is not fast enough to replace felled trees, so there is a constant net loss of vegetation cover.The
destruction of trees for charcoal production is also leading to conflict over these resources as many

trees provide dry season forage for camels, cattle, sheep and goats, but
heavy grazing pressure itself is
also a reason for lack of regeneration.

While fuelwood and charcoal are the main energy sources for most rural and urban dwellers, respectively,
it is the foreign demand which primarily drives the scale of charcoal pr
oduction today in Somalia. A
prohibition was passed in 1969 preventing the export of charcoal and firewood, in order to protect trees.
In 1993, however, export oriented charcoal production was restarted in the Bari and Sarang regions (at

least) for export to the United Arab Emirates.
In the period 1980-1984 charcoal consumption in Mogadishu alone was thou
ght to range from 32,000 to

45,000 tonnes per annum, while consumption for the remainder of the coun
try was estimated at 30,000
to 35,000 tonnes. Estimated annual inflow of charcoal to Hargeisa was 65
,000 tonnes in 1999, with per
capita charcoal consumption estimated at 206kg, with a mean daily househ
old consumption rate of
4.2kg. All charcoal consumed in Mogadishu and other main urban centres c
omes from sources several

hundreds of kilometres away, all former nearer sources having been long depleted.
The relations between charcoal producers and local communities are compl
ex. In many cases, producers

are actual members of the community, but in some cases outsiders have taken control of forest resources,
production and sale of charcoal. Many conflicts have arisen and casualti
es recorded over this business.
Although producers may be aware of traditional rules and regulations governing harvesting of whole
trees, branches or dead wood, violations of such rules are now widesprea
d – many people having no

alternative option as a source of livelihood.
Most charcoal is produced in kilns, of which two kinds are used in Somal
ia: a pit/trench type which is

used mainly in Middle Shabellee and a vertical mound type, most commonly seen in the Bari and
Sarang areas. A 1997 report concluded that “charcoal production in Somalia is inefficient”, with recovery
rates from these kilns only at around 10-15 per cent (IUCN, 1997b). H
igher recovery rates – 25-30 per
cent – were recorded from skilled charcoal producers using kilns in “
Somaliland” in another review

(IUCN, 1999b). Even the tree harvesting practices have been noted as w
asteful, with as much as 15 per
cent of tree materials being lost.

Traditionally the supply of charcoal to main towns in Somalia was managed by Charcoal Co-operatives
and the market structure for charcoal was reportedly well managed.

Based on: Agrosphere (2004), Bird and Shepherd (1989), IUCN (1997b,
1999a,b)

Environment in Somalia 43 UNEP Desk Study Annex 88

At least 151 plants in Somalia have known medicinal
values (IUCN, 1997a), but the limited data available

is insufficient to describe the status of these resources Box 14. Frankincense
or the degree to which rural communities, in particu-
Frankincense was traditionally a major export
lar, rely on these or manage them in some way or activity, especially from the northern part of
another (see Box 14).
the country, but today this sector is in a state
of neglect. Under the Barre government, state
support to frankincense producers facilitated
Freshwater Resources certain aspects of production and export trade

but this same state control destroyed private
Somalia is to a large degree an arid or semi-arid coun- trading networks leaving behind a vacuum
try where rainfall is periodic and irregular. Water scar- when the government collapsed. Now, since

city has been one of the main traditional sources of production and export is no longer regulated,
social conflict in Somalia. Traditionally such conflicts there are concerns over the scale at which
trees are being “milked”.
arise when local supplies are diminishing, particularly
during dry periods of the year or during a drought. Source: Somaliland Centre for Peace and Develop-
ment, 1999
Nomads are commonly embroiled in water access
negotiations at such times. Another source of ten-

sion, however, occurs when a new group of consum-
ers moves into a new area – perhaps following displacement of agricul
turalists by pastoralists who may lack

the experience of former management systems and practices (see Box 15)
.

Extensive, permanent swamps and floodplains occur on the Shabellee river,
while additional swamps abut the
Jubba river, the two large perennial rivers which rise across the border in Ethiopia
and flow across the southern

part of Somalia to reach the Indian Ocean. These two rivers are importan
t sources of water for people and
livestock, as well as irrigation – the area lying between the two riv
ers being the country’s main agricultural

zone. Temporary watercourses, known as lachs or laks, drain the south-east sloping plateau of north-eastern
Kenya into southern Somalia, the main ones being Lach Awaro, Lach Bogal
and Lach Dheere (Hughes and

Hughes, 1992). Cisterns (Berkads) are another source of surface water for at least a few months of the year,
these being pans or dams whose bottoms and sides are cemented and covered
to ensure that water is not lost

to evaporation and seepage (Amuyunzu, 1997). Underground aquifers are a
lso widely exploited, either through
boreholes, shallow wells or at natural springs.

In 1987 – the latest figures available – agriculture ac-
Box 15. Repairing damage –
counted for 97 per cent of all freshwater withdrawals,
securing the future primarily the irrigation programmes of southern Soma-

lia (WRI, 2003). At the same time, however, this figure
On 7 June 2005 a newly rehabilitated Duduble corresponded with a withdrawal rate of only 8 per cent
(China) canal was inaugurated in Jowhar,
Middle Shabellee Region. This project is of the country’s actual renewable water resources.
expected to benefit 50,000 people by allowing Neglect and abandonment of many of these schemes,

them access and control over the River however, has likely meant a significant decline in the
Shabellee for irrigation purposes, to avoid amount of freshwater being extracted for agriculture.
perennial flooding and to boost revenue
potential. The canal was first constructed in Data from 1999 suggest that less than 19 per cent of
cropland in Somalia was irrigated at this time (WRI,
the early 1980s but had fallen into serious
disrepair during the time of the civil war, through 2003).
silting and physical destruction of
A National Conservation Strategy for Somalia (Govern-
infrastructure and equipment. As a result, with
heavy rains falling in the Ethiopian highlands, ment of Somalia/IUCN, 1990) states that the country
large tracts of the Middle Shabellee would has adequate water resources to supply the popula-
flood, displacing thousands of people,
tion and sustain its major activities, but the difficulty is
destroying their homes and crops.
its distribution. Currently there are no dams on the
Source: UNDP/WFP, 2005 Shabellee river although an off-stream storage exists
at Jowhar (200 million m ). A future reservoir has been

Environment in Somalia 44 UNEP Desk StudyAnnex 88

proposed upstream as well as a hydropower dam on the Jubba river. In a country with a high dependency on

water, the control of the dams could be a likely source of conflict. In addition, large dams can be associated
with a number of negative social, economic and environmental effects (UNEP, 2003).

Freshwater fisheries are primarily a subsistence activity practised by B
ntu people along the rivers in southern

Somalia. Freshwater fish catches were estimated at 400 tonnes in 1990 (
EC/IUCN, 1993), but more recent
figures suggest that this catch had halved by 2000 (WRI, 2003). There is some potential for commercial fishing

which was carried out by at least one fishing co-operative prior to the civil war. With the breakdown of
irrigation infrastructure and persistent water logging, it can be assumed
that fish stocks are at high levels and

thus offer renewed economic potential. However economic sustainability w
ill be dependant on continued
ecological sustainability of the fishery.

Marine and Coastal Environment

The Somali maritime zone is one of the largest in the western Indian Ocea
n and has one of the most important
large marine ecosystems – the Somali Current Marine Ecosystem – in
the Indian Ocean (Fielding and Mann,

1999). A prominent feature of this ecosystem is a seasonal upwelling which gives rise to high levels of biologi-
cal productivity which in turn sustains rich fishing grounds, most notabl
y in the northern area between Ras Asir

and Ras Mabber (TRAFFIC, 1997).

Somalia has both fringing reefs and patches of coral reefs along the Gulf
of Aden coast as well as in the south
near the Kenyan border. Few studies have been conducted on these reefs but one off the northern coast east

of Berbera highlighted extensive coral bleaching, with some reefs suffer
ing almost total mortality (Schleyer
and Baldwin, 1999). The Red Sea coral reefs off the coasts of Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia, howe
ver, are

reportedly in good, often pristine condition with 30-50 per cent live co
ral cover and the richest diversity of
coral and other reef species in the entire Indian Ocean (Pilcher and Al
suhaibany, 2000).

Southern Somalia also has numerous small islands north of the Kenyan border. The Banjuni islands and the
mainland southern coast are home to the only two ethnic groups – Baju
ni and Rermanyo – who have a

tradition of fishing in Somalia (Lovatelli, 1996).

Surveys carried out in the 1970s estimated that the potential yield of m
arine fishery resources could range
between 380,000 tonnes and 500,000 tonnes per annum (Haaksonsen, 1983).
More conservative estimates,

however, suggest that the annual catch potential is likely to lie between 180,000 tonnes and 200,000 tonnes
per annum (Van der Elst, 1997). Small pelagic species such as sardine, anchovy and s
cad likely make up much

of the catch but tuna, shark and other species are also actively sought.

Overfishing has been noted in a number of sectors, primarily offshore – where trawlers from many nations ply
the waters untroubled by any national maritime force – but also insho
re, particularly with regards the shark

and lobster fisheries, both of which are of considerable importance in t
erms of the revenue they provide.
While commercial fishing in the past focused primarily on crustaceans an
d fish (Stromme, 1987), artisanal

fishing of shark species now centres mainly on the production of dried s
hark meat and fins for export, and
local use of shark liver oil for maintenance ofdhows – traditional fishing craft (TRAFFIC, 1997). In addition to

uncontrolled exploitation of marine resources, the sea bottom is also bei
ng damaged by heavy trawls (World
Bank, Undated). According to one report (FAO, 1995), there is no knowledge of the extent to which illegal

fishing – much of which takes place at night – is having off the Somali coastline. A more recent report from
FAO (FAO, 2005b) noted that this practise continues to date.

Artisanal fishing has a long tradition with some coastal communities, alt
hough historically this has been carried
out at a relatively low level and focused on a relatively narrow band of
species. Following the drought of 1973-

1974 the government resettled large numbers of nomadic herdsmen along th
e coast and trained them as
fishermen. The Somali National Development Plan attached high priority to the fis
hery sector, aiming for an

Environment in Somalia 45 UNEP Desk Study Annex 88

annual growth of 23 per cent per annum (Nur, 1998). Twenty-
one fishing co-operatives were established and a large

number of vessels purchased or donated through foreign
assistance: an estimated US$100 million was spent from

1987-1990 to assist with the development of the artisanal
fishery (Van der Elst, 1997). Other development assistance

followed with an associated increase in both the number
of fishermen as well as improved catch methods, all of

which have combined today – in the complete absence
of any regulatory mechanisms – to place a number of

species under threat.
Fishing waste on shore. Credit: FAO/D. Signa

The lobster fishery is one such fishery showing undisput-
able signs of overexploitation, driven by strong markets in several Middl
e Eastern countries, Dubai in particu-

lar. A variety of lobsters of the gesanulirus are found along the coastline as well as two deep water lobsters
of the genusPuerulus which are fished at depths of 150-400 m by trawlers. Some reports mentio
n a deepwater

crustacean fishery of 1,000-2,000 tonnes per annum (Everett and Kelleher, 1998) but there is no information on
the species composition of this catch mainly as deep water trawling has
always been carried out by foreign

vessels which submit no catch and effort data (Fielding and Mann, 1999).

Since 1990 the lobster fishery has become the single most important fish
ery along Somalia’s east coast. A
significant increase has been reported on the number of people engaged i
n this activity while associated

investments have also been made by traders, supplying freezer trucks, bo
ats, outboard engines, fuel and
fishing gear. Fielding and Mann (1999) report an increasing trend to fish lobster throughout the year, in contrast

with former practices which resulted in a seven month closed season duri
ng the monsoons. No control is
currently exercised on the amount, size or reproductive condition of lob
sters caught – every lobster caught

is retained.

Sharks and rays also represent an important part of Soma-
lia’s artisanal fishery (TRAFFIC, 1997), with highest catches

being reported from the north coast and the southern por-
tions of the east coast. It has been estimated that sharks

comprise 40 per cent of the artisanal landings in the south-
eastern coastal area (TRAFFIC, 1997). The main species

landed include the hammerhead Sp(hyrnaspp.) and mako
(Isurus spp.) sharks (Stromme, 1987). At least 10 other spe-

cies occur in the nearshore waters (Remmerswaal, 1996
cited in TRAFFIC, 1997).
Crabs eating finless shark abandoned on shore.

Credit: FAO/D. Signa Trade in shark products is dominated by the trade in fins

and to a much lesser extent dried and/or salted shark
meat. Fins are exported primarily to Dubai, sometimes

via Djibouti, and then re-exported to Asia for consump-
tion in soup (TRAFFIC, 1997). While export figures for shark

fins are largely unavailable, one report notes the export
of 10,530 kg of fins from Bossassoo between January and

July 1996 (Anon, 1996). A rough estimate of the yearly
shark catch was 6,700 tonnes (but this does not account

for all deep sea vessels operating in Somali waters as the
are no data on these vessels) which is not thought to be a

Drying shark fins on the shore of Somalia. significant threat to shark populations in Somali waters
Credit: FAO/D. Signa (TRAFFIC, 1997). Other reports, however, remark on

Environment in Somalia 46 UNEP Desk StudyAnnex 88

Lobster, commonly fished in Somali waters. Credit: G. Farmer

overfishing of sharks in the north-east region so, as with the lobster fishery, action should be taken to halt the
overfishing and promote fisheries management in the area.

In “Puntland” at least, there has been a significant decrease in t
he catches of the three main fishery types in

the past 10 years (FAO, 2005b). This is possibly due to the continuous and unsustainable off
ore fisheries, but
is also linked with the indiscriminate exploitation of lobster and shark
resources by artisanal fishermen. A
number of the once abundant shark species (saw, hammerhead, white and mako), have totally disappeared

in some areas while the average sizes of some other shark species landed
have decreased over the past five
years. The same scenario has been reported to be the case for lobsters, w
ith 80 per cent of the original stock

now believed to have been lost (FAO, 2005b). Post-harvest losses of fish and shark catches along the “Puntland”
coast are estimated at 60 per cent and 70 per cent, respectively.

A related threat to the coastal environment, in “Puntland” at least
” is the presence of discarded lobster traps.

According to a recent survey, local fishermen reported that wire lobster traps corrode easily and have an
average life span of approximately 20 days, following which they are comm
only dumped at sea (FAO, 2005b).

Thousands of such traps can be discarded each year which may represent a
potential environmental threat
from heavy metals since the traps are constructed using galvanized wire mesh web and lead welding (see

Figure 3).

The protracted civil strife in Somalia has disrupted all aspects of the
fishing industry. The capacity to control

foreign incursions into the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Somali
region does not exist, which leaves the
door open for foreign vessels to exploit these resources. At the same
e, the complete lack of any regulatory

Environment in Somalia UNEP Desk Study
47 Annex 88

Figure 3. Estimated average yield/boat/trip of

fishermen in “Puntland”over the past 10 years

Estimated fishery pcroductivity

“Puntland” territorcy of Somalia
Kilogramme/boat/trcip

700
Marine products
600
Fish
Lobster
500
Shark

400

300

200

100

0
Ten years agoFive years agoPresent time

Source: FAO 2005

mechanisms or structures to prevent a crash of certain species provides a
n invitation for anyone to engage in

what still remains a lucrative business opportunity at a small scale.

Adding to these pressures to some degree was the impact of the December
2004 tsunami along approxi-

mately 650 kilometres of the coastline, primarily in the stretch between
Hafun and Garacad. Initial reports of
leakage of possible toxic wastes from drums along part of this stretch of
coast would appear to be unsubstan-

tiated (see also Box 9). Waste pollution – mainly from coastal communities – however, has been cited in a
number of reports (e.g. FAO, 2005a; UNDP, 1998), with wastes ranging from discarded batteries to household

wastes and animal carcases. An estimated 1.5 million people live in coast
al areas. Most coastal municipalities
do not have capacity to handle the quantities of sewage and solid waste
generated. Sewage treatment

plants are few in number and are generally poorly maintained (Pilcher an
d Alsuhaibany, 2000) (see Box 16).

Mineral resources

Somalia’s mineral sector has traditionally played only a small role i
n the country’s overall economy – in 1988
it represented just 0.3 per cent of total GDP. While the local geology suggests the presence of valuable

mineral deposits, as of 1992, however, only a few significant sites had been located. Somalia in particular has

some large uranium deposits in the Galguduud and Bay regions, and in 198
4 work began to develop them.
Significant iron ore deposits have also been recorded in the Bay region.

Other rocks and minerals are known to exist and available for exploitatio
n include tin in the Majiyahan-Dhalan

area (south of Boosaaso-Ceelayo coastal strip), sepiolites from Ceel Bur, and quartz, granite, marble, lime-
stone and gypsum in different parts of the country. These natural resources include primary raw materials for

various kinds of industry, for example, manufacturing cement, prefabricated walls, roofing materi
als, floor,
wall tiles and aggregates.

Existence of good petroleum indicators has been known for a while, and r
ecent data highly encourage the
exploration potential of the country (Hersi, 2000).

Environment in Somalia 48 UNEP Desk StudyAnnex 88

Box 16. Decentralization of ‘fisheries enforcement’ to the community
level: a response to the absence of organized government

In a potentially hostile area lacking a national fisheries administratio
n, community empowerment has
filled an institutional vacuum.The driving forces behind community empowerment in fishery enforcement

stem from:

G recognition of the basic property rights problem of an open access fishe
ry and its unlikely resolu-
tion in the current socio-economic and political context; and

G the precarious state of the fisheries resources, especially lobster and
shark.

Somali coastal communities have taken enforcement action against illegal fishing. Two prosecutions

have been undertaken under Islamic Shari’ah law generating in excess of US$1 million which was
reportedly given to the villages apprehending the offending vessels (rather than for use to increase
surveillance capacity).The international publicity resulting from such prosecutions may act as a deterrent

against continued illegal fishing and ensure compliance by foreign vessels, either with or without a
dubious license.

Challenges facing coastal fishing communities include:

G lack of physical enforcement capacity;

Source: FAO, 2005a
G logistics to gather evidence;

G lack of procedural code for boarding and prosecutions; and

G presence of armed guards on foreign fishing vessels.

Source: UNCTAD, 1998

Biological diversity

Arid and semi-arid conditions have persisted in the Somali region throug
hout the long-term climatic fluctua-
tions that have affected much of the African continent (Simonetta, 1988
). As a result, this region has been an

evolutionary centre of fauna and flora adapted to these conditions. Ruthless overexploitation, however, has

meant that many of the country’s wildlife species are now endangered
or rare, while key ecosystems have
been seriously degraded.

Early explorers, hunters and colonial officials travelling through Somali
a during the late 1800s reported on the

astonishing abundance and diversity of wildlife – Somalia at the time
had a reputation of being one of the
best wildlife havens in Africa. This, however, is no longer the case. Even as recently as the mid-1980s, the status

of wildlife in Somalia was reported as being sparse and scattered due to
a combination of livestock grazing

and illegal hunting (IUCN/UNEP, 1986). Now only small remnant pockets of wildlife exist, with many species
approaching extinction. Some, such as the elephantL(oxodonta africana), black rhino (Diceros bicornis) lion

(Panthera leo) and Swayne’s hartebeestA ( lcelaphus buselaphus swayne)i have been wiped out from most of
the country, while the wild ass(quus asinus somalicus) – which once occurred here in their thousands, have

been reduced to just a few dozen (Sommerlatte and Umar, 2000). Environmental problems such as desertification

due to the loss of forests and pastures, soil erosion and the formation
of sand dunes are increasingly exacer-
bated by drought and increased pressure from human and livestock populati
ons.

Among the country’s mammals there are 22 species of antelope, of whic
h 14 are considered to be threat-

ened. Seriously reduced numbers have been noted of the following species
: the beisa oryx ( Oryx gazella

Environment in Somalia 49 UNEP Desk Study Annex 88

G

beisa), formerly widespread, but now reduced by poaching to a mere 1,000-1,2
00; the hirola (Beatragus
hunteri), which occurs only in the Lake Dere region along the Kenyan border; th
e bDrarc(atragus megaloti),

which is restricted to the northern mountains and whose numbers have dec
reased because of drought; the
dibatag (Ammodorcas clarkei), found along the central coastal region, threatened by drought, overgr
azing

and poaching; Soemmerring’s gazelleG ( azella soemmerringi) and Speke’s gazelle G( azella spekei), both of
which are still widespread but greatly reduced in numbers; and Pelzeln’s gazelle G( azella dorcas pelzelni),

which is found along the northern coastal zone (IUCN, 1990).

Elephants, belonging to what may be a distinct small subspeciesLoxodonta africana orleansi, still survive in
the south, but poaching is extensive and their numbers have fallen below 6,000. The black rhinoceros has

been poached almost to extinction, although it might survive in the Lag Badana area at the southernmost tip
of the country. The cheetahA (cinonyx jubatus), giraffe (Giraffa camelopardalis), Grevy’s zebra (Equus grevyi)

and three rare species of gerbil are also reduced to numbers considered
critical. The Abyssinian genet
(Genetta abyssinica) might occur in the north, and the rare golden-rumped elephant shrew R (
hynchocyon

chrysopygus) might occur in coastal forest in the extreme south, but their status
and conservation require-
ments are not known (IUCN, 1990).

Ten species of bird are threatened in Somalia, of which two are critically endangered. The Somali thrush

(Turdus ludoviciae) occurs only in mountain-top woodlands in northern Somalia. It was considered to be
locally common in 1979, most notably in Daloh Forest Reserve, but its pop
ulation is known to be in decline as

its habitat (juniper woodland) has been cleared. The bulo burti boubo
u (Laniarius liberatus) is known only

from an individual caught in Acacia scrub in 1988, 140 km inland on the Shabeelle river in central Somalia.
Although subsequent searches were carried out in 1989 and 1990 no further sightings were made. This, however,

Biodiversity in Somalia. Credit: G. Farmer

Environment in Somalia 50 UNEP Desk StudyAnnex 88

Table 4. Rare and endangered bird species

Species Threat Category

Socotra Cormorant Phalacrocorax nigrogularis Vulnerable

Lappet-faced Vulture Torgos tracheliotus Vulnerable

Lesser Kestrel Falco naumanni Vulnerable

Madagascar Pratincole Glareola ocularis Vulnerable

Ash’s Lark Mirafra ashi Endangered

Archer’s Lark Heteromirafra archeri Vulnerable

Bulo Burti BoubouLaniarius liberatus Critical

Somali ThrushTurdus ludoviciae Critical

Basra Reed-warblerAcrocephalus griseldis Endangered

Warsangli LinnetCarduelis johannis Endangered

Source: BirdLife International

is likely to be a result of the difficulty of accessing this region due
to security concerns. Any remaining
population may be tiny (BirdLife International, 2004) (see Table 4).

Three endemic species are found on the coastal grass plains – the les
ser hoopoe ( Alaemon hamertoni),

Obbia lark (Calandrella obbiensis) and Ash’s larkM( irafra ashi). Four endemic bird areas are recognized – the
Central Somali coast, East African coastal forests, the Jubba and Shabee
lle valleys and the North Somali

mountains (BirdLife International, 2004). A further 24 important bird areas have also been identified.

Somalia is the most important country for bustards in the northern hemis
phere, with restricted populations of
Heuglin’s bustard (Neotis heuglini), Hartlaub’s bustard (Eupodotis hartlaubi), and the little brown bustard (E.

humilis). Larger species, namely the Arabian bustard Ar(deotis arabs) and Denham’s bustardN (eotis denham)i,
a declining species, are heavily hunted (IUCN, 1990).

Despite its harsh physical environment, Somalia is home to some 3,028 sp
ecies of higher plants, of which 17

are known to be threatened (WRI, 2003). Somalia is considered a centre
of floral endemism (White, 1983) and
of the known species 700 (17 per cent) are endemic – a feature only
surpassed by the South African floral

region. Endangered flora includeEuphorbia cameroni and Whitesloanea crassa, rare succulent scrubs found
only in the northern mountains,Wissmania carinensis, the Bankoale palm, found in small numbers in the north-

east, andCordeauxia edulis, the Yaheb y ( icib) nut bush, which survives near Adawalif. This last species is under
severe threat because its highly prized edible nuts are often collected,
preventing regeneration (IUCN/EC,

1993). As with the fauna, however, large concentrations of livestock together with the felling of trees f
or
charcoal and firewood have had a profound impact on species composition,
ground cover and the structure

of vegetation (Sommerlatte and Umar, 2000). Grazing pressure and soil erosion are now a serious problem
and, together with periodic droughts, have had a devastating effect on th
e vegetation and soils.

Somalia has the most extensive and least spoiled coastline in Africa. Im
portant coral reefs, seabird colonies

and turtle nesting beaches are currently unprotected. At the end of the last century there were believed to be
large dugong populations and extensive seagrass beds in nearshore waters
. Important seabird nesting sites

include Mait island, Zeila island and islets off Mogadishu.

Environment in Somalia 51 UNEP Desk Study Annex 88

Lesser Hornbill in Eyl, Somalia. Credit: G. Farmer

Thousands of green turtles (Chelonia mydas) used to nest annually along the eastern coast (IUCN, 1990), but

the status of this population is not known. Four other species of marine
turtle – loggerheadC(aretta caretta),
hawksbill (Eretmochelys imbricata), olive ridley ( Lepidochelys olivacea) and leatherback ( Dermochelys

coriacea) – are known from Somali waters but there is no knowledge of these s
pecies nesting. The main threat
to turtles is from opportunistic harvest of green turtles which includes
direct harpooning, incidental gill net
entrapment and capture of nesting females (Schleyer and Baldwin, 1999).
Eggs are also collected during the

southwest monsoon season occasionally by fishermen but also by nomadic he
rdsmen who maintain tempo-
rary shelters and animal pens on certain beaches.

Small cetaceans are abundant in the waters off Somalia. The impact of th
e coastal fisheries on dolphin and

porpoise populations is not known, and it is unclear whether conservati
action is needed (see map Somalia:
Biodiversity and protected areas).

Many of these species and their habitats are threatened by drought, secu
rity problems, overgrazing, defor-

estation, and poaching. Other less obvious species which are also endange
red can expect to receive even
less attention: two of the country’s 223 reptile species and three of
its 331 species of fish are known to be

threatened, for example (WRI, 2003). With no protected area system and
woefully inadequate legislation and
enforcement, over-use of natural resources continues and the country’s critical sites are being impoverished
rapidly. Hunting of most species of large mammal has been intense, leading to catastrophic declines in

population; the long-term survival of several species seems unlikely. Somalia has ratified the CITES Convention
(see Legislation), but few if any practical measures are being taken t
o ensure due implementation.

Environment in Somalia UNEP Desk Study
52Annex 88

Environment in Somalia UNEP Desk Study
53 Annex 88

Protected Areas

Latest reports (WRI, 2003) show that there are 14 protected areas in t
otal, but only one exceeds 100,000

hectares. Eleven wildlife areas have been declared since 1970 but only t
wo are thought to be functional
(IUCN/UNEP, 1986). Less than one per cent of the country is included in protected areas, much of this being

occupied by the Lag Badana National Park. In reality, however, there has been no formal protection offered
to any of these sites since at least the early 1990s. With such an incom
plete network of protected areas –

terrestrial and marine – there are serious grounds for concern over t
he long-term prospects for biodiversity
conservation and to any form on development based on sustainable use of r
esources.

The most important sites in need of protection are Zeila, Las Anod-Taleh-El Chebet (already proposed as a
national park), Ras Hajun-Ras Gubah, El Nammure, Hobyo, Haradere-Awale, Jowhar-Warshek, Harqan-

Dalandoole, and Lack Dere (also proposed for national park status) (IUCN, 1990). Two mountain sites of par-
ticular interest are Goan Libaax and the Daalo forest, the latter which
has somJuniperus forest.

Priority wetlands in need of protection include Jowhar-Warshek, Har Yiblame, Eji-Oobale, Awdghegle-Gandershe,

Arbowerow, the Boja swamps, Angole Farbiddu (which includes riverine forest) and lake Radidi (IUCN, 1990).
Since Somalia is not a Party to the Ramsar Convention, no wetlands of in
ternational importance have been

declared under it.

Overall, if key representative examples of this country’s natural her
itage are to be preserved, a massive
increase in public awareness is needed, coupled with appropriate solution
s being found that will enable and

encourage traditional range and land management systems to be used and perhaps further refined. Rural
communities especially must be involved in decisions relating to future i
ntended development and manage-

ment of any existing or intended protected area systems (see Table 5).

Hunting wild animals for meat has never been widely practised in Somalia
, although certain species were

hunted prior to the enactment of the 1969 Law of Fauna (Hunting) and Fo
rest Conservation for their skins and
as trophies (UNE, 1984). During the 1960s, approximately 60,000 gazelle skins, 250,000 dik dik skins, 18,000 kg

of ivory and between 3,000 and 5,000 live monkeys were exported.

Table 5. Protected areas of Somalia

Name Type of Reserve Size (ha) Year Established

Bushbush Game 334,000 1969

Geedkabehleh Game 10,360 1969

Mandera Game - 1969

Mogadishu Game - 1969

Alifuuto (Arbowerow) Nature 180000 -

Balcad Nature 200 1985

Belet Wein Partial game - 1969

Bulo Burti Partial game - 1969

Jowhar Partial game - 1969

Oddur Partial game - 1969

Source: UNEP, 2003

Environment in Somalia 54 UNEP Desk Study Annex 89

Godfrey Mwakikagile, K enyA: dentity of n Ation(2007) Annex 89

Kenya: Identity of A Nation

Godfrey Mwakikagile

1Annex 89

Copyright (c) 2007 Godfrey Mwakikagile
All rights reserved.

Kenya: Identity of A Nation
Godfrey Mwakikagile

First Edition

ISBN 978-0-9802587-9-0

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form for
commercial purposes without written permission from the

publisher.

New Africa Press
Pretoria, South Africa

2 Annex 89

Chapter Five:

The People of Kenya:

An Ethnic Profile

KENYA has people of all races but the vast majority of

them are members of indigenous groups. They are black
African.
Although there are significant numbersof Kenyans of
Asian, Arab and European origin, they are vastly
outnumbered by the members of black African tribes or

ethnic groups.
The main non-indigenous groups are Gujaratis,
Punjabis and Goans from India; Arabs mostly from Oman;
and the British. Although they are not black, theye also

African since Africa is their home.
Kenyan Professor Ali Mazrui classifies non-indigenous
people in Africa as Africans of the soil, as opposed to
black Africans whom he calls Africans of the blood.
There are basically 42 black African ethnic groups or

tribes in Kenya.. But the number goes up to 49 depending
on who defines them.
Some of them are related and are so close that they are
not considered to be separate tribes.
All 49 are listed here in alphabetical order:

Ameru, Bajuni, Bukusu, Choyi, Digo, Duruma, Elgeyo,
Embu, Giryama, Isukha, Jibana, Kalenjin, Kamba, Kambe,

94Annex 89

Kauma, Kikuyu, Kipsigis, Kissi, Kore, Kuria, Luhya, Luo,
Maasai, Maragoli, Marakwet, Marama, Miji Kenda,
Nandi, Ogiek, Orma, Oromo, Pokomo, Pokot, Rabai,

Rendille, Ribe, Sabaot, Samburu, Sengwer, Somali, Suba,
Swahili, Tachoni, Taita, Taveta, Terik, Tugen, Turkana,
Yaaku.
Together with the five non-black groups we mentioned
earlier -the Gujaratis, Punjabis, Goans, Arabs, and

Britons- Kenya has 53 ethnic groups.
We are going to take a closer look at somethem to
get a better understandingthe ethnic composition of this
East African country.
Black African ethnic groups in Kenya are divided into

three linguistic categories: Bantu, Nilotic, and Cushite.
The Bantu constitute the majority. They include the
Kikuyu, the Kamba, and the Luhya who are also among
the five largest ethnic groups in the country.

The Kikuyu, the Luhya, the Kamba, the Meru, the
Embu and the Gusii (Kisii) constitute the majority of the
Bantu in Kenya. And they are mostly farmers like most
Bantus are. But many of them also own cattle.
The Kikuyu homeland is around Mount Kenya and it is

believed they arrived in the area in the 1700s.
There are many theories concerning their origin. Some
say they migrated from Mozambique; others say from
Congo.
What is clear from archaelogicaland linguistic

evidence is that they arrived in East Africa about 2,000
years ago from West Africa, especiallyfrom the
Nigeria/Cameroon border area, as did the rest of the
Bantu-speaking people, and their language belongs to the

Niger-Congo family.
They have interacted with their neighbours, the Maasai,
for a long time. The Maasai usually raided the Kikuyu for
cattle and women, and the Kikuyu fought back. But in
spite of all that, the two groups built strong commercial

ties through the years and their people have been

95

~.•..

L Annex 89

intermarrying almost from the time they first came into
contact with each other in central Kenya.
Another major Bantu ethnic group, the Kamba, also has
an interesting historyIt is said the Kamba migrated from

what is now western Tanzania, a region occupied by the
Nyamwezi ethnic group, one of the largest in Tanzania;
implying that they were part of the Nyamwezi or are
related to them. They moved east to the Usambara
Mountains in northeastern Tanzania and eventually found
their way to a semi-arid region in eastern Kenya which

became their new home.
Other researchers contend that the Kamba are a product
of many ethnic groups who intermarried and ended up
creating a new ethnic group.
Whatever the case, it is generally believed that they
arrived in their present homeland east of Nairobi towards

the Tsavo National Park about 200 years ago.
The Kamba today are one of the most successful
groups in Kenya, and one of the most well-known in East
Africa.
In the past, they had a reputation as excellent traders,
carrying on trade from the coast all the way to Lake

Victoria, and all the way up to Lake Turkana. They traded
in ivory, honey, weapons, beer, and ornaments.
They also excelled in barter, exchanging goods for
food with their neighbours: the Maasai and the Kikuyu. It
was a matter of survival. They could not always produce

much since their home region was arid or semi-arid land,
forcing them to find food elsewhere.
And during colonial rule, the British "respected" them
for their intelligence. They also had a reputation as
fighters, another quality the British liked since they could
use them as soldiers and as policemen. Many Kambas

were conscripted into the army and fought in both world
wars.
Even today, many Kambas serve in the armed forces
and in law enforcement.

96Annex 89

The Luhya are another major Bantu ethnic group in

Kenya. Although successful, they have had to contend
with problems of high population density through the
years in a region where there is not enough fertile land for
all the people.

The Meru and the Embu are the other Bantu ethnic
groups in Kenya. They are related to the Kikuyu and are
essentially farmers. They grow coffee, tea, maize, potatoes

and pyrethrum as well as other crops. The Embu are also
well-known for their honey and for dancing on stilts.
Then there are the Nilotic-speaking people as a major
linguistic category in Kenya besides the Bantu.

The Nilotic group includes the Luo, the third largest
ethnic group in the country. Other Nilotic-speaking groups
include the Maasai, the Turkana, the Samburu, and the
Kalenjin.

Originally, the Luo were pastoralists. But they changed
their way of life when rinderpest killed their cows and
they became farmers and fishermen. Their involvement in

fishing was facilitated by their geographical proximity to
Lake Victoria in their new home region after they
migrated from Sudan via Uganda. Some of them came
straight from Sudan.

Like the Kikuyu, the Luo also played a major role in
the struggle for independence. Some of the most
prominent Luo politicians of national and international
statures include former Vice President Oginga Odinga,

Minister of Economic Planning Tom Mboya, Foreign
Affairs Minister Dr. Robert Ouko, and independence
leader Achieng Oneko.
And the most prominent Luo outside Kenya and Africa

is United States Senator Barack Obama of Illinois. His
father, also named Barack Obama after whom the son was
named, earned a Ph.D. in economic from Harvard

University and returned to Kenya where he served under
President Jomo Kenyatta. He died in a car accident in
Kenya in 1980.

97 Annex 89

He was one of the hundreds of Kenyan students who
went to school in the United States on scholarships on the
famous Tom Mboya Airlift in 1959.
Another Nilotic group, the Kalenjin, has an interesting
history in terms of identity. The Kalenjins are actually a

collection of related ethnic groups who speak the same
language. They include the Kipsigis, renowned worldwide
as long-distance runners; the Nandi, the Tugen and the
Elyogo. President Daniel arap Moi was a Tugen.
The Kalenjin were once mainly pastoralists like the
vast majority of the Nilotic-speaking people. And many of

them still are today. But they are also engaged in
agriculture in their fertile home region, the Rift Valley
Province.
Besides the Luo, the most well-known Nilotic-speaking
Kenyans are the Maasai, followed by the Turkana and the
Samburu. The Maasai, who also came from Sudan like

other Nilotic-speaking peoples in Kenya, Tanzania and
Uganda, are a small minority in both Kenya and Tanzania
but are known worldwide because of their lifestyle and
reputation as warriors.
They are also fiercely proud of their culture and way of

life and have strongly resisted external pressure -
including pressure from some national leaders - to change
and adapt to "modem" ways, which is a euphemism for
the "Western" way of life.
They own not only cows but also goats. But cows are
their most important possession in their social, political

and economic life.
There are two ethnic groups closely related to the
Maasai: the Samburu and Turkana.
The traditional homeland of the Samburu is around
Maralal in northern-central Kenya, an arid region. Like the
Maasai, they also have the morani, the young warriors;

also like the Maasai, they prefer red blankets and use red
ochre to paint their heads.
The women wear beads. And like the Maasai, they also

98Annex 89

own cows and goats, with the cows being their most
important possession and the centre of their social,
political and economic life.
Unlike some Nilotic-speaking people who have
adopted other ways of life to adjust to new realities, the
Samburu have remained pastoralist, preferring a nomadic

way of life. When pasture becomes scarce in their arid and
semi-arid homeland, they pack up and go, taking their
manyata (portable houses and other essential items) on
their camels to find better pastures. This is similar to what
Somalis do. But they are not related. The Somali are

Cushitic.
The other major Nilotic-speaking group is the Turkana.
The Turkana have a reputation as fierce fighters, just like
their kith-and-kin the Maasai and the Samburu. They own
other animals besides cows. They have goats, sheep, and
camels, but cow ownership is still the most important

aspect of their social, political and economic life. They
live in an arid region near Lake Turkana.
And all three - the Maasai, the Samburu and the
Turkana - are cattle rustlers. The government has not been
able to stop them and law enforcement officials usually
leave them alone.

Disputes among them are settled by their elders. They
were colonised like the rest of the Africans but the
colonial rulers failed to conquer them in one fundamental
respect: their way of life which has remained intact for
hundreds of years.

The other major linguistic group is the Cushitic. The
Cushites are a minority in Kenya and live mostly in the
North Eastern Province which borders Somalia and
Ethiopia. They include the Somali, the Boran, the El Molo,
the Burji Dassenich, the Gabbra, the Orma, the Sakuye,
the Boni, the Wata, the Yaaka, the Daholo, the Rendille,

and the Galla.
The Somali and the Galla are the most well-known. But
it is the Somali who are the dominant group in the region.

99 Annex 89

They own cattle, goats, sheep, and camels in the arid and

inhospitable region of northern Kenya and lead a nomadic
way of life in search of water and pasture for their herds.
They also have a reputation as fierce fighters.
Another group is the Swahili. They are some of the

most well-known people in East Africa, especially in
Kenya and Tanzania, but they don't constitute an ethnic
group the way the Kikuyu or the Luo do. They are

essentially a linguistic and cultural group, and a product of
many tribes and non-indigenous groups especially the
Arabs. They live mostly along the coast.
Also most of the Arabs live along the coast. They are

one of the three main non-indigenous groups in Kenya, the
other ones being Asian and British.
Most Arabs speak Swahili and see themselves as
Africans, not as citizens of the Arab world. Most Arabs in

Kenya are Kenyan citizens.
There are also many Arabs in Kenya who are not
Kenyans. They come mainly from Yemen and are small

traders. They are commonly known as Washihiri or simply
Shihiri, but mostly as Washihiri in Kiswahili; a term also
applied to them in neighbouring Tanzania.
The British are also a significant minority and Kenya

has one of the largest European communities in Africa.
Kenyans of British descent include members of the
aristocracy. And many of them continue to have great
influence in the country especially among the elite

including national leaders.
Kenyans of Asian descent, commonly known as
Indians, are the most prosperous group in Kenya - and the
rest of East Africa - besides the British and other whites

who have always been on top.
The term "Indian" is collectively used to identify
Pakistanis as well, although the majority of the Asians in

Kenya came from India.
India and Pakistan were one country until 1947 and
most of the immigrants in East Africa today immigrated to

100Annex 89

the region before Indian independence in 1947 when the
sub-continent was split into India and Pakistan.
So, in a way, the term "Indian" is the appropriate
designation even for those who came from Pakistan. They
all came from the Indian sub-continent as a geographical

entity.
The prosperity of Indians in Kenya and other parts of
Africa has been a source of resentment towards them
among many black Africans. But the resentment is also
attributed to the mistreatment of the indigenous people

whom the majority of Indians see as inferior to them.
Itis raw-naked racism even if one may argue that they
are clannish more than anything else. Indians are both
clannish and racist; a fact acknowledged even by some
Indians themselves who admit that black Africans are
exploited and mistreated by them.

And social interaction between the two as equals is
almost totally out of the questionIt is also extremely rare
for black Africans and Indians to intermarry. Where such
unions have taken place, mostly illicit relationships, it has
been between Indian men and black African women.
Black men dating Indian girls or women, let alone

marrying them, is considered taboo by most Indians,
although there have been a number cases where this taboo
has been broken especially in recent times.
Marriage within the "clan," that is, within the Indian or
Asian community as it is also called, is strictly enforced

almost with religious zeal and devotion. And anyone who
defies that risks ostracisation.
However, many Indians are tolerant of marriage with
whites - and even accept it whether or not it involves
Indian women and white men. The biggest concern has
been about non-Indians, especially blacks, dating or

marrying Indian women.
The willingness of Indians to accept unions between
whites and Indians has only reinforced the belief and
vindicated the claim of those who say Asians are racist

101 Annex 89
~--------------------

towards blacks more than anybody else.
In spiteof the poor race relations between Indians and
black Africans in Kenya and other African countries, there
isno question that the vast majority of Indians consider

Africa to be home.
This was clearly demonstrated in the late sixties and in
the seventies when many Indians left Tanzania and Kenya
for India with the intention of living there permanently.
They said they were returning to their homeland. And they
did in large numbers.

But they couldn't fit in and returned to East Africa
despite the fact that India was their ancestral homeland.
That is because they were African more than anything
else. India was the home of their ancestors, not theirs.
They were born and brought up in East Africa, as were

their parents and grandparents in many cases, and were
therefore East Africans, not Indians of India.
After looking at the major ethnic and linguistic groups
in the country, we now turn our attention to some of the
other groups which are numerically smaller but no less

important as an integral part of Kenya.
The Bajuni are among those groups. They are a small
ethnic group in the Coast Province. They live mostly in
northern Kenya. Some of them also live in southern
Somalia. And they are mostly fishermen and sailors. But

they are also involved in other economic activities
including metalwork. They speak a language which is
basically Kiswahili, or Swahili, although they call their
version Kibajuni.
The word Kibajuni is also a Kiswahili term. Ki- is a

prefix in Kiswahili applied to all languages. Thus, the
Kikuyu speak Kikuyu, the Kamba, Kikamba, and the Luo,
Kiluo. It goes on and on.
The Bajuni call themselves and are known as
Wabajuni; which is another Swahili or Kiswahili term.

Wa- is a prefix denoting collective identity. The Kikuyu
are called Wakikuyu in Kiswahili; the Meru are called

102Annex 89

Wameru; the Somali are called Wasomali; and Swahili are

called Waswahili.
Then there are the Bukusu among the smaller groups.
They don't constitute a distinct ethnic entity but are a sub­
ethnic group of the Luhya. There are 17 such sub-groups

which collectively constitute the Luhya ethnic group.
The Bukusu are therefore an example of many other
groups in Kenya which are not considered by some people

to be tribesor separate ethnic groups but sub-tribes. But
they are the largest sub-group in the Luhya ethnic entity
which some people call the Luhya "nation."
The Luhya is called a "nation" - mostly by the Luhya

themselves - mainly because of its size; the same thing
which could be applied to other large ethnic groups such
as the Kikuyu, the Luo and the Kamba.
The Nandi, although a sub-group of the Kalenjin, are

considered to be a separate tribe just like the other
Kalenjin sub-groups - the Turkana and the Kipsigis. They
live mostly in the highland areas of the Nandi Hills in the

Rift Valley Province and have a reputation as fierce
fighters like their brethren, the other Kalenjins. They are
farmers and cattle-herders.
The Pokot are also Kalenjin but a distinct group. They

live in West Pokot District and Baringo District. They are
found in eastern Uganda in Karamoja District. They also
have a reputation as fierce fighters as most Nilotic­
speaking tribes do. They are both farmers and pastoralists,

usually depending on where they live. The Hill Pokot live
in the highlands and are farmers; while the Plains Pokot in
the dry and infertile plainsown livestock - cattle, sheep,

and goats.
The Gusii, also known as Kisii, are Bantu and live in
Kisii (Gusii) District in Nyanza Province in western
Kenya whose dominant group is the Nilotic Luo.

They are isolated as a Bantu group in the sense that
they are surrounded by Nilotic-speaking tribes - the Luo,
the Maasai, the Kipsigis, and the Nandi - who

103 Annex 89

traditionally have been hostile towards them. As a result,
they became tough fighters themselves in order to be able
to defend themselves against the Nilotic cattle raiders.
The Kisii live in a very fertile hilly district where they

grow a lot of tea, coffee, bananas and other crops. But
there is shortage of land and many Kisii have migrated to
other parts of Kenya.
The Kisii are also one of the largest ethnic groups in
Kenya. They rank fifth after the Kamba who are preceded
by the Kikuyu, the Luhya, and the Luo.

All the largest ethnic groups in Kenya are Bantu -
Kikuyu, Luhya, Kamba, and Kisii - except the Luo who
rank third; they used to be second until they were
surpassed by the Luhya.
The Kuria straddle the Kenyan-Tanzanian border close
to Lake Victoria. They are found in Mara Region in

northern Tanzania - which is also the home region of
former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere who was a
member of the Zanaki tribe in Musoma District, Mara
Region- and in Nyanza Province.
The Digo are another ethnic group found in both Kenya
and Tanzania. They are a Bantu group and live along the

coast in both countries between Mombasa in southern
Kenya and Tanga in northern Tanzania. The majority of
them live in Kenya.
The Orma live in southeastern Kenya mostly along the
lower Tana River. They are also called Galla, a term

commonly used in Ethiopia to identify the same ethnic
group.
They are semi-nomadic and move from their
southeastern desert homes only during the rainy season
when they go inland in search of pastures for their
livestock.

The Oromo are found mostly in Ethiopia but also in
Kenya and Somalia in smaller numbers. In fact, they are
the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia. They are Cushitic.
They are also one of the largest Cushitic-speaking

104Annex 89

ethnic groups in Eastern and Northeastern Africa which
includes the Hom of Africa. And their physical features,
and language as well as culture, clearly distinguishes them
from Bantu and Nilotic groups in Kenya, pointing to their
"origin" in the Hom of Africa. The Orma or Galla are

related to them.
The Pokomo are a Bantu group who live along the
Tana River in the Tana River District and are mostly
farmers.
The Rendille are one of the groups which are
considered to be on the verge of extinction unless

something is done to save them from this catastrophe.
They are nomadic pastoralists and live in the Kaisut
Desert. in Northern Kenya where they roam on their
camels with their livestock which is their main source of
sustenance. Meat and milk are a main part of their diet.
Another group that is considered to be a part of another

tribe yetis distinct from that tribe and has its own identity
is the Samburu whom we earlier briefly looked at.
They are related to the Maasai. And they call
themselves Lokop or Loikop. And they speak the Samburu
language, not Maasai.

But like the Maasai, they are part of the Maa-speaking
people. And about 95 per cent of the words of both
languages - Samburu and Maasai - are the same, showing
that they are indeed basically the same people.
In fact, even the name Samburu is ofMaasai origin and
comes from the word samburi which is a leather bag used

by the Samburu to carry a variety of items. But, for
whatever reason, they acquired their own ethnic identity.
Some people have attributed this to the colonial rulers who
sometimes divided people to "create" different ethnic
groups for administrative purposes and to facilitate
colonial rule.

They are also said to have multiple origins, although all
related. Some Samburu are descended from the Maasai,
and others from the Turkana, Borana (also called Boran),

105 Annex 89

and Rendille. And all these are Nilotic groups.
Although they own mainly cattle, they also have sheep,
goats and camels as an important part of their livestock in
an arid region which forces them to have a large number

of animals many of which don't survive because of the
harsh climate.
Samburu District was once a large part of the Northen1

Frontier District (NFD) - as the region was called before
and a few years after independence - which is now the
North Eastern Province. It was isolated for all practical
purposes and only government officials were allowed to

enter the region.
It was closed to foreigners and one had to get special
permission to enter the Northern Frontier District. Even
today, Samburu District is a remote, harsh area.

Like the Maasai, the Samburu also came from Sudan.
And they are more conservative - much more traditional
in life and attitude - than their cousins the Maasai; which

is quite a distinction since the Maasai themselves have
quite a reputation for resisting alien influences. And they
are equally proud of such stiff resistance.
Another small tribe is the Taveta. The Taveta are a

Bantu ethnic group who live in south-central Kenya. They
are called Wataveta in Kiswahili, and call themselves that,
and their language - also in Kiswahili - is known as
Kitaveta.

There are also elements of other tribes in the Tavetan
population, especially the Taita, the Kamba, the Maasai,
and the Chaga. The Chaga are a tribe in northeastern
Tanzania in Kilimanjaro Region on the southern and

southeastern slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro and throughout
Moshi District.
The Taveta live mostly between Tsavo National Park

and the Tanzanian border and are mostly subsistence
farmers. Some of them also work on local sisal plantations
and are engaged in other economic activities.
Then there are the Yaaku. They are of Cushitic origin

106Annex 89

but gave up their original language and now speak a
Maasai variant known as Mukogodo-Maasai. They were
assimilated by the Maasai but some words from their old
Yaaku language are a part of their vocabulary today.
They live in the Mukogodo forest west of Mount
Kenya, which is a division of the Laikipia District in the

Rift Valley Province, and were once hunter-gatherers and
bee-keepers. They eventually adopted the Maasai
pastoralist culture, although some of them are still bee­
keepers.
They now consider themselves to be a sub-tribe of the

Maasai, and are indeed Maasai in terms of language and
culture. All the old people who spoke the original Yaaku
language are dead.
Tragically, the Yaaku are some of the people who have
lost their original language and culture dueo assimilation,
a fate that has befallen other indigenous groups in different

parts of the world with dire consequences: loss of identity,
turning them into carbon copies, poor carbon copies, of
other people.
Itis a tragic loss.

107 Annex 90

E. Milano and I. Papanicolopulu, “State Responsibility in DisputedAreas on Land and at Sea”,
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völker▯ cht (ZaöRV), Vol. 71 (2011) Annex 90

State Responsibility in Disputed Areas on Land

and at Sea

Enrico Milano*/Irini Papanicolopulu**

I. Introduction 588
II. Territorial and Boundary Disputes on Land 592
1. Territorial Sovereignty of States 592
2. Ius ad Bellum Rules 597
3. Ius in Bello Rules 603
4. The Obligation to Make Every Effort to Prevent the Aggravation of the

Dispute and not to Hamper the Final Settlement 604
5. An Obligation to Make Every Effort to Enter into Provisional Arrangements
of a Practical Nature? 607
III. Contested Maritime Areas 608
1. The Third Paragraph of Art. 74 UNCLOS and Art. 83 UNCLOS 611
a) The Obligation to Make Every Effort to Enter Into Provisional

Arrangements 613
b) The Obligation not to Hamper or Jeopardise the Final Settlement 616
c) Consequences of the Violation of Art. 74 Para. 3 UNCLOS and
Art. 83 Para. 3 UNCLOS 618
2. Ius ad Bellum and Other Rules on the Use of Force 621
3. Ius in Bello Rules 625

4. Sovereignty, Sovereign Rights and Jurisdiction 626
IV. Third Parties’ Obligations in the Context of Contested Areas 632
V. Conclusion 636

Abstract

Departing from the observation that traditionally the law of State respon-
sibility has hardly interacted with the law of territory, the article examines

how these two fields of international law may relate in the case of State ac-
tion in contested areas, be they terrest rial or marine. Assessing recent inter-

national practice, particularly the case law of the International Court of Jus-
tice and arbitral tribunals, and differe ntiating between land and maritime

Associate Professor of International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Verona.
*
** Marie Curie Fellow, University of Oxford and Senior Researcher, Faculty of Law, Uni-
versity of Milano-Bicocca.
The present article is a revised version of a paper presented at the 20 Anniversary Confer-
ence of the International Boundaries Research Unit, “The State of Sovereignty”, Durham
University, 1.-3.4.2009. The Authors would like to thank Professors Maurizio Arcari, Bernard
Oxman and Tullio Scovazzi for their helpful comments on an earlier version.

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disputes, it identifies the primary ob ligations incumbent upon States when
acting in contested areas – relating to State sovereignty and sovereign rights,

ius ad bellum , ius in bello , procedural obligations pending the final settle-
ment of the dispute – and it examines the consequences of the breach of
those primary norms, in terms of secondary obligations, as well as third
States’ duties and obligations. The lega l framework specifically created for

disputed maritime areas by Art. 74 para. 3 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and Ar t. 83 para. 3 UNCLOS, including its
implications for land disputes, is speci fically analysed. The authors submit
that, at a time of increasingly pro-active policies and robust actions taken by

States in contested areas, more attentio n should be devoted to the extent to
which the law of State responsibility, es pecially with regard to relevant
forms of reparation, has to adapt to the content and scope of primary norms
applicable to that specific context.

I. Introduction

It is undisputed that, according to well-established principles and norms
of international law, a State exercises sovereignty over its land territory and

its territorial sea and sovereign rights and jurisdiction in adjacent maritime
zones. Sovereignty involves the possibility of acting upon a territory and of
excluding other States from acting ther eupon. Sovereign rights at sea entail
exclusiveness as to the exploration and exploitation of resources, thereby

preventing other States from exercising such activities (though not from the
maritime space where such activities ta ke place). Consequently, whenever a
State acts on the territory or in the te rritorial sea of another State without

the latter’s permission, it is in breach of the latter’s territorial sovereignty. In
the same way, whenever a State engages in activities relating to the resources
of another State or in other activitie s that fall under the latter’s exclusive
rights or jurisdiction in the latter’s mari time zones, it is in breach of its ex-

clusive rights. This necessarily entails the former’s international responsibil-
ity and a duty to provide full reparation for the injury caused.
Traditionally, however, the law of territory (we use here the term in a
broad sense, comprising not only land and sea areas subject to the sover-

eignty of a State, but also maritime areas subject to the jurisdiction of a
State) and the law of State responsibili ty have hardly interacted. Three cir-
cumstances seem to have determined such an “uncosy relationship” be-
tween the two bodies of law. Firstly, the settlement of boundary disputes

normally requires the drawing of a b oundary or a line of delimitation,

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whether effected through diplomatic means or through judicial means.

Claims of State responsibility will be considered in the ancillary at best, at
worst an impediment to the settlement of the dispute. 1 Secondly, most

boundary disputes on land derive from the lack of demarcation and from
the diverging views on the interpre tation of an existing boundary. An ex

post facto characterisation of a territorial situation as “adverse occupation”
will not automatically lead to a determination of State responsibility for

wrongful occupation or for acts relate d to the occupation prohibited under
international law. Primary norms prot ecting territorial sovereignty in the
context of territorial disputes are ar guably based on a standard of due dili-

gence; that, in turn, renders disputes ov er territory less amenable to the ap-
plication of standard forms of reparati on. Thirdly, with regard to delimita-

tion disputes at sea, the question is even more intricate. Most of the times,
delimitation with regard to maritime zones by the parties or by a judicial

body will not be simply declaratory of an existing boundary, but it will
draw that boundary “from scratch”. Till their delimitation, disputed sea ar-

1 It is not to be wondered at that althoug h nineteen cases concerning maritime delimita-
tion have been decided by international judges, in only two cases the parties have raised issues
of responsibility; see Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria , Judge-

ment of 10.10.2002, ICJ Reports 2002, 303 (Cameroon/Nigeria Judgement), and Guyana and
Suriname, Award of 17.9.2007, 47 ILM 166 (2008) ( Guyana/Suriname Award); and in the
latter the judge has only decided on the merits. Numbers with regard to disputes on land are
equally striking: if we take the ICJ case law, eighteen cases concerning territorial disputes have
been brought before the Court; in three cases only, Cameroon/Nigeria, Nicaragua/Colombia
and Costa Rica/Nicaragua issues of State responsibility have been raised by the applicants. In

Cameroon/Nigeria, the claim has been left unanswered by the judges (see below), in Nicara-
gua/Colombia the Judgement on preliminary objections has upheld Colombia’s objections to
the effect that the dispute over the Islands of San Andres and Providencia, in respect of which
Colombia had reserved its right to seek reparation, would fall outside the scope of the Court’s
jurisdiction; see Territorial and Maritime Dispute, Judgement of 13.12.2007, ICJ Reports
2007, 832 ( Nicaragua/Colombia Judgement). In the recent dispute between Costa Rica and
Nicaragua over the wetland of the Isla Portillos (listed by Costa Rica under the Ramsar Con-

vention’s List of Wetlands of International Importance) and the activities conducted by Nica-
ragua in the area, Costa Rica has requested the Court to determine the reparation which must
be made by Nicaragua for breaches of its territorial integrity and of a number of international
instruments relating to territorial de limitation between the two Sates; see Certain Activities
Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area , Application Instituting Proceedings,
18.11.2010, para. 9, http://www.icj-cij.org. Witregard to the activities of the Permanent

Court of International Justice during the inte r-war period, in 1932 in the dispute between
Denmark and Norway concerning the status of South-Eastern Greenland, Denmark, in its
application, reserved the right to seek repartion for Norway’s violation of the status of
South-Eastern Greenland (Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland, Applica-
tion Instituting Proceedings, 18.7.1932, PCIJ Series C 1933, no. 169, 12 et seq.). The case was
discontinued the year after. In all these cases , the application was brought unilaterally under

an optional clause declaration in accordance with Art. 36 para. 2 Statute of the International
Court of Justice.

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2
eas might be considered, up to a certain extent, as belonging to either of the
parties to the dispute, without there be ing one with a definitive claim. In

such a legal context, it is even harder to substantiate a claim of State respon-
sibility for acts prohibited by international law. On the other hand, unlike

for territorial disputes on land, the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea provides some guidance th rough Art. 74 para. 3 UNCLOS and

Art. 83 para. 3 UNCLOS concerning the rules regulating States’ conduct
pending a final delimitation agreemen t on the exclusive economic zone and
on the continental shelf respectively.

Yet, in the last decade, judicial litig ation in at least three cases, namely
Cameroon/Nigeria, Eritrea/Ethiopia 3and Guyana/Suriname , has shown

that claims of State responsibility may be raised, that the interplay between
the law of State responsibility and the rules on contested territory and mari-
time areas is far from unproblematic and that a consistent and thorough

elaboration by international tribunals , together with further scholarly
analysis, is especially due. The question does not affect international judicial

bodies only, in that they are the actors most likely to have to consider and
make determinations with regard to claims of State responsibility in the

context of territorial or delimitation di sputes. It is also of great import for
policy makers, diplomats and private operators, as in many parts of the
world interest for contested areas, both on land and at sea, is on the increase

as a result of a number of factors, including: a) the global economic crisis
and the process of gradual exhaustion of resources in traditional gas and oil

fields, hence the need to explore and exploit new fields, including in the
continental shelf beyond 200 n.m., even where legal title is contested; 4 b) the

2
3 This extent is determined by the concept of “reasonable claim” discussed below.
See the following decisions by th e Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission: Central Front,
Ethiopia’s claim no. 2, Partial Award of 28.4.2004, 43 ILM 1275 (2004); Jus ad Bellum, Ethio-
pia’s Claims no. 1-8, Partial Award of 19.12.2005, 45 ILM 430 (2006); Guidance Regarding Jus
ad Bellum Liability , Decision no. 7 of 27.7.2007, 46 ILM 1121 (2007Ethiopia’s Damages
Claims, Final Award of 17.8.2009, 49 ILM 177 (2010).
4E.g. the dispute over the Spratly Islands and related sea areas involving a considerable
number of south Asian countries, see C. Schofield/I. Storey , The South China Sea Dispute:
Increasing Stakes and Rising Tensions, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org; the dispute between

Bangladesh and India and Myanmar, that has re sulted in the submission to the International
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea and the constituton of an arbitral tribunal; the continuing
tensions over the exploitation of natural resources in the Timor Sea,N. S. M. Antunes ,
Spatial Allocation of Continental Shelf Rights in the Timor Sea, Centre for Energy, Petroleum
and Mineral Law and Policy 13 (2003), Online Journal, Art. 13, http://www.dundee.ac.uk; C.
Schofield, Minding the Gap: The Australia-East Timor Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrange-
ments in the Timor Sea (CMATS), IJMCL 22 (2007), 189 et seq.; the recent “flare-up” in the
dispute between the UK and Argentina over the exploitation of natural resources in the con-

tinental shelf off the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. Numerous disputes relate to areas of conti-

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State Responsibility in Disputed Areas on Land and at Sea 591

threat of international terrorism and piracy, leading States to take robust
enforcement measures even in areas wher e previously they were hesitant to
affirm their jurisdiction; 5c) the great emphasis, especially in richer coun-

tries, on the control of illegal immigration fluxes, again leading them to take
enforcement measures in disputed areas. 6The legal questions raised by these
phenomena are manifold, complex and they invest different areas of domes-

tic and international law. In terms of international law, they relate to the
precise identification of the primar y obligations incumbent upon States
when acting in contested areas; they require a working distinction between

disputed areas on land and disputed areas at sea, as the law of the sea is
codified in UNCLOS; they impose th e determination of a threshold be-

yond which legitimate manifestations of claim may result in an infringement
of the counterpart’s right; and they must consider the extent to which the
law of State responsibility, especially wi th regard to relevant forms of repa-

ration, has to adapt to the content and scope of primary norms applicable to
that specific context.
The present article endeavours to address these questions. It examines the

relevant legal principles concerning th e application of the law of State re-
sponsibility to territorial disputes both on land and at sea, that is disputes
involving two or more St ates’ competing claims over land territory and/or

sea areas. It is divided in three sections. In the first section, it identifies the
relevant primary rules applicable in the context of territorial and boundary
disputes on land and the consequences deriving from breaches thereof, with

reference to the practice of States a nd international organisations and to
relevant case law. The same methodolog y is adopted in the second section,

yet looking at the context of delimitation disputes at sea. The commonalities
and differences in terms of applicable primary rules and how the application
of these rules may affect determinations of State responsibility and conse-

quent reparation in each of the two terri torial contexts are brought to the
fore. In the third section, the article examines the position of third parties
with regard to disputed areas on land and at sea. Finally, an overall appraisal

of relevant State practice, applicable rules and case law is made with a view

nental shelf beyond 200 n.m. and have impacted the work of the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf (CLCS); see A. Oude Elferink/C. Johnson, Outer Limits of the Conti-
nental Shelf and “Disputed Areas”: State Practice concerning Article 76(10) of the LOS Con-
vention, IJMCL 21 (2006), 461 et seq.
5 See J. Bayoria, The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border, Council on Foreign Relations,

2006, http://www.cfr.org.
See I. Gonzales Garcia, El acuerdo España-Marruecos de readmision de immigrantes y
su problematica applicacion: les avalanches de Ceuta y Melilla, Anuario español de derecho
internacional 22 (2006), 255 et seq.

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592 Milano/Papanicolopulu

to highlighting similarities and differences between the two contexts and to
identifying existing gaps in the unders tanding of this area of international

law.

II. Territorial and Boundary Disputes on Land

As mentioned, issues of State responsibility have hardly arisen in the con-
text of boundary or territorial dispute settlements on land, which makes a

reading of the interplay between the la w of territory and the law of State
responsibility particularly complex. The only two cases in which claims re-
lated to State responsibility have been considered by international judicial

bodies in that context are quite recent – we are referring to the 2002 Judg-
ment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Cameroon/Nigeria
territorial dispute and to some awar ds of the Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims
Commission – but they are not free from ambiguities in their application of

the law of State responsibility. State practice is not of much help either. Dip-
lomatic means of dispute settlement no rmally involve a determination or
demarcation of the boundary and the withdrawal of any military presence
or civilian administration established by the “adverse occupant”: issues of

State responsibility are left aside for the sake of a speedy implementation of
the settlement.
As anticipated, the first task we have endeavoured to accomplish is that
of identifying the most important primary rules regulating the actions of

States, how they operate in the context of territorial disputes and the legal
consequences deriving from breaches ther eof. We have identified four sets
of relevant primary rules, whose re levance and practical operation in the

context of territorial disputes are worth attention.

1. Territorial Sovereignty of States

The first set of rules relates to the pr otection of the State’s territorial sov-
ereignty, generally put, the right that every State enjoys to freely act upon
its land territory and to exclude othe rs from doing so. It is telling that

among the examples of continuing wr ongful acts cited by the International
Law Commission (ILC), we may also fi nd the “unlawful occupation of the

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Brownlie s PrinCiPles oPuBliCinternAtionAll Aw (James Crawford ed., 8th ed. 2012) Annex 91

BROWNLIE S PRINCIPLES OF

PUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

Eighth Edition

BY

JAMES CRAWFORD, SC, FBA

UNIVERPRESSAnnex 91

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP,

United Kingdom

Oxford University Press Isa depar1"otf the University ofOxJord .
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, sd tolarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford UnJvcrsitPr$~SintheUK and in certain otcountrie~

©Es tate ofSir Ian Brownlie and James Crawford 2012

The moral rightsf the author have been asserted

Fifth Edition published in 1998
Sixth Edition published in 2003

Seventh Edition published in 2008
Impression: 2

AJIrightsrserved.No par i oflhis publication maybe reprodliced ,s tored in
a rctt'icval system, or transmitted, in nny form or by any means, without the

priorpermissionLnwritingofOxford University Pressnsexpressly permitted
by law, hy licence or under term agreed witn the appropria te reprographics
rights orgaoJzatio n.En quirics concerning reproduction outside the scope of the

boveshould be sCLtllo Ll1eRights Department, Oxford Universiat thess,
address above

Youmust not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer

Public sectlnformnll on reproduced unc.el.rOpen Government Licence vl.O
(ht: t/pww.wntionalarchives.g- oso.vekr/nmo~nllo-leicence/
opeu-governmen t·licence.htm)

Crown Copyright material reproduced with the permissione

Controller,SO (under the termsof the Click Use licence)
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

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Printed in Great Britain by
Ashford ColourPress Ltd, Gosport, Hampshire

Linkstlthi.rd par ty websltes ore provided by Oxford in good faith and
for info t·malion only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials

contained In any third pnrty website referenced in this work. Annex 91

12

MARITIME DELIMITATION

AND ASSOCIATED

QUESTIONS

Corametjudice in altomaresumusin manu Dei.

1
1. INTRODUCTION

The rules of entitlement to maritime iones are set out in chapter 11.But a coastal

state may be so located vis-a-vis its neighbours that its potential zones overlap con­
siderably-what maybe termed 'overlappingpotential entitlement'. In fact there is no

coastal state in the world that does not havean overlapping maritime zone with atleast
one other state (see Figure 12.1).There is also a question of entitlement vis-a-vis the

high seas and its seabed, an effectivedelimitation between the coastal states severally
and the international public domain or 'globalcommons', a commons until recently

in sharp retreat.
Most maritime boundaries are determined by agreement and recorded in a treaty.

Many remain undelimited. A significant number are disputed. Resolving such dis­

puteshas become an important task for the International Court and, to a lesserextent,
other tribunals. A great variety of geographical situations is encompassed, from

1
Generally: O'Connell,International Law of t(1984) 684-732; JaMaritime Boundary
(1985); KittichaiThe Law of the Sea and Maritime Delimitation in Sout(1987) 57-119;
Johnston & Saunders OceanBoundaryMaking (1988); Wei!LawofMaritime Delimitat(1989);
EvansRelevantCircumstancesandMaritime Delimi(1989);Evans (199ICLQ1;Churchill & Lowe,
T1rl.,w oftlu:(rdcd ~919.ch 10;AntuneToward>rh'c:urctwli.wtnofMaritime Delimitation

(2003); LagonVie g eds).Maritime Delimita(ZOOCi);ana.kPIWiiclrthl'lltyrmd Flexibility in the
l-nwof Mar/lime Delilll(2006); Rothwell & StepT11Jntemational LofthSea (2010) ch 16;
Scovazzi,'Maritime Delimitation Cases before International Courts anMPEPIL.nals' (2008)
2 for.pnrticollectiwww.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTR:EATlES/rcgions list.htm.
' Jnd uding, perhaps surprisi ngly,ime boundaries between C11n.ada and the US: McDorman,

Sa4WflteNelg/1/wu(2009).
Since lhc first decision ih 1969, 18 cases outourt '&docket (including cases later con·
soJidated) have concerned either maritime delimitation or applications for the reconsideration of earlierAnnex 91

N00N t-'~ 0 'Tl::r::JT>

!

C'roZ< dependencies.
are

An{l'~o)

which
bouofaries.

all

associated

and

zones
overlapping

marwithout Taunton

Office,
200islands

those
showing
are Hydrographic

Map UK
areas
Sea,

the
of

HighlightedLaw

Head,

Maritime

Cleverly,
Global

Robin
12.1Dr

Figureurce: Annex 91

MARITIME DELIMITATION AND ASSOCIATED QUESTIONS

5
long-coastline adjacent states crowded together on a concave coastline to small islands
facing out into the open ocean. Yetcourts and tribunals are expected to decide on mari­

time delimitation in aprincipled way,without recasting geography yet still achieving an

equitable result. The consequence has been a considerable test ofjudicial technique-or
according to some, a demonstration of its failure.

2. TERRITORIAL SEA DELIMITATION BETWEEN

7
OPPOSITE OR ADJACENT STATES

Delimitation of territorial seas between states opposite or adjacent to each other

is primarily governed by Article 15 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), which is virtually identical to Article 12(1) of the Geneva Convention

on the Territorial Sea (GCTS) and is considered reflective of customary international
10
law. Article 15provides:

Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two

Statesisentitled,failing agreement betweenthem to the contrary, toextend itsterritorial sea
beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the

baselinesfrom which thebreadth ofthe territorial seasofeachofthe two Statesismeasured.

Theaboveprovision does not apply,however,whereit isnecessary byreason ofhistoric title
or other specialcircumstances to delimit the territorial seasofthe two Statesin awaywhich

isat variance therewith.

Article 15stipulates primacy of agreement, and failing that, application of the princi­

ple of equidistance. Departure from the equidistance principle is possible only where

necessary by reason ofhistoric title or other 'special circumstances'Y Thus apresump­
tion of equidistance exists in the case of the territorial sea, justified by the compara­

tively small distances involved.

decisions on maritime delimitation. A further four cases have concerned related questions of sovereignty

over islands in overlapping maritime zones or boundaries lying along rivers.
5 E.g. North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany /Netherlands ; Federal Republic of

Germany/Denmark)• ICJ Reports 1969p 3; Guyana v Suriname (2007) 139ILR 566.
6 E.g. Barbados v Trinidad and Tobago (2006) 139ILR 449.
7 Generally: Arnaut (2002) 8 OCL! 21;Shi (2010)9 Chin JIL 271, 279-81.

' 10December 1982, 1833UNTS.
9 29 April1958, 516UNTS 205.
10 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v Bahrain), IC]

Reports 2001 p 40, 93-4.
11As to what may be considered 'special circumstances', there is no closed list: Continental Shelf (Libya/
Malta),ICJ Reports 1985 p 13, 40; Guyana v Suriname (2007) 139 ILR 566, 650-1. On occasion, a tribunal

may need to have recourse to the ILC commentary to the 1956draft articles to determine the meaning ofthe
term: e.g. Guyana v Suriname (2007) 139ILR 566, 650; Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua
and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Honduras), IC) Reports 2007 p 659, 744. Also: Rothwell &

Stephens (2010)400.Annex 91

LAW OF THE SEA

Given the institutional age of the territorial sea, many of the disputes surround­

ing its application have been resolved. Major cases have included Qatar v Bahrain,l2
13 14 15
Caribbean Sea, Guyana v Suriname, Eritrea v Yemen, and Bangladesh/Myanmar 16

but several decisions were handed down pre-UNCLOS, notably the Banks of
17
Grisbadarna between Norway and Sweden and the StPierre and Miquelon arbitra­
tion between France and Canada. Following the Qatar v Bahrain and Caribbean Sea

maritime delimitations , a methodologyl has developed; in Caribbean Sea the Court

considered the application of the following process in the context of an UNCLOS

Article 15territorial sea boundary delimitation:

(1) Consideration should first be given to the drawing of a provisional line of
equidistance. 20

(2) But the provisional equidistance line may be abandoned due to special
circumstances. 21

(3) The tribunal in question may then consider its own means of delimitation, or

adopt those proposed by the partiesY

(4) At all stages, the tribunal will need to take into account relevant coasts, includ­

ing the geography of the immediate coastline, the delimitation of the territorial

sea of adjacent states and geomorphological features of the area adjacent to the
endpoint of a land boundary. 23

12
ICJ Reports 2001 p 40.
" ICJ Reports 2007 p 659.
14 (2007) 139ILR566.
15
Eritrea v Yemen (Phase Two) (1999) 119ILR 417.
16Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary betwee11Bangladesh and Myanmar in the

Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh!Myanmar) , Judgment of 14March 2012, ITLOS Case No 16. Furth er; Churchill
(2012) 1CJICL 137.
17 (1909) 11RIAA 147.
18
Dillimi taticof Mari time Areas between Canada and the French Republic (StPierre and Miquelon)
(1992) 951LR (145(though in that case, the parties continued to update their positions based on develop­

ments occu rr ing nt UNCLOS lll ).
" In thecontext of the territo rS¢",bow1dnricsarc often delimited within the context ofa single deter­

minatio nen~ompa ngsbith the eEZ <tnd related.contlncntn.lshelf areas: e.g. Guyana v Suriname (2007)
139ILR 566, whereau UNCLOS Annex Vl l tribunal fir I dcllitlited the territorial sea, followed by the con­
tinental shelfand the EEZ.
2
° Caribbean Sea, ICJ Reports 2007 p 659,740.
21 ICJ Reports 2007 p 659,744-5. Also: Qatar vBahrain, ICJReports 2001p 40, 179('Themost logical and

widely practiced approach is first to draw provisionally an equidistance line and then to consider whether
the line must be adjusted in light of the existencef special circumstances.'). Cf Bangladesh/Myanmar,
ITLOS Case No 16, §§151-2 (holding that St Martin's Island was not considered a special circumstance

requiring abandonment ofequidi stance).
22 Thus, in Caribbean Sea, the Court found that the presumption of an equidistance line was displaced

due to the natur e of the coastline and the difficulty in identifying suitable baseline points from which a
determination of equidistance could be made. The alternative was a 'bisector' line: ICJ Reports 2007 p 659,
741-5.
23
Ibid, 748. This will be especially important where a river mouth forms part of the land boundary:
Rothwell & Stephens (2010)398. Annex 91

MARITIME DELIMITATION AND ASSOCIATED QUESTIONS 285

Whether or not there is aformal presumption ofequidistance in territorial sea delimi­
tation may be debated, but it is certainly the norm.

3· CONTINENTAL SHELF DELIMITATION BETWEEN
24
OPPOSITE OR ADJACENT STATES

(A) SOURCES

The continental shelf has its immediate origins in the Truman Proclamation of 28

September 1945. In a remarkable exercise in prescience, the Proclamation addressed

delimitation in the following terms:

In caseswherethe continental shelfextendsto the shoresofanother State,or issharedwith

an adjacentState,the boundary shallbe determined bythe UnitedStatesand the Statecon­
cernedin accordancewith equitable principles.

At this time there was almost no delimitation practice: the 1942 Gulf ofParia Treaty,

the first seabed delimitation treaty, represented an attempt by Venezuela and the UK

to delimit the Gulf, a shallow inland sea between the British colony of Trinidad and
the Venezuelan coast.26At its core, the treaty simply described three lines according

to longitude and latitude, allocating to the UK those areas east and north of these
27
lines.
Practice was not much further advanced upon consideration by the ILCbeginning

in 1953. On cartographical advice, the ILC proposed and the Geneva Conference
29
adopted GCCS Article 6. Article 6 applies to those cases where the 'same conti­
nental shelf' extends between opposite or adjacent states. In separate provisions, it

stipulates that the boundary is determined byagreement but 'in the absence ofagree­
ment, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances', the

boundary shall be determined by a median line, that is, a line equidistant from the

nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each
stateis measured.

24
Generally: Bowett (1978BY4l; PazarcLa Delimitation du plateau continental (1982);iles
Hutchinson (1984) BY133; Colson (2003)AJIL91; Kunoy (2006)NILR 247; Rothwell & Stephens
(2010)ch 16.
25
1945 United States Presidential Proclamation No 2667,reprinted in LTheLegalOrder
oft]," Ocsm(t09) L9.
'• Trea ty relating to the Su.brnn.-ine Arens of LheGulf of Parla , 26 flebrun q •1942, 205 LNTS 121.
" fbid, Art 3.

~•ln 1952ChJ.ePeru, :\EcLaidor adoptedSantiagoDecInrnlioJJAugust 1952, 1006 UNTS 323,
~st lshb.ianEgEZ-type zone ;effcon de.limitalissubi11dia: MaritimDisp (ueu 'Chi/;;)
(200R,pending). Furth er: olscm970A}lL9 1.
''' 29Apr1958, 499 UNTS 3·11. Annex 92

A. C. Beier and E. Stephansson, Environmental and Climate Change Policy Brief: Somalia (28
Oct. 2012) Annex 92

Environmental and Climate Change Policy Brief

Somalia

Photo: Somali Center for water and Environment

2012-10-28

Anja-Christina Beier

Eva Stephansson

Sida's Helpdesk for Environment and ClimContact: name and e-mail
www.sidaenvironmenthelpdesk.se Team Leader: Anders Ekbom [email protected]
Quality Manager: Eva Stephansson [email protected] 92

Executive Summary

This environment and climate change policy brief aims at briefly presenting key
environmental sustainability challenges and opportunities in Somalia, their linkages to
poverty reduction and the millennium development goals three, four and five. It is a ‘light
version’ and does not contain in-depth analysis.

The key environmental challenges in Somalia are several and are related to deforestation, land
degradation, increasing aridity and overgrazing, water scarcity, waste disposal, climate
change and ecosystem services. These challenges cause negative trends to poverty, health,
economy and ecological and human resilience. Climate change is expected to add to already

existing stresses.
The key poverty-environment linkages in Somalia are related to: increased conflict and

general instability particularly related to further marginalisation of vulnerable men and
women; lack of secure tenure to land and other natural resources; vulnerability to natural
disasters and resilience; polluted water and waste disposal especially along coastland
destructive to health; unreliable access to food and water leading to malnutrition and famine;
low ability of particularly female-headed households to accumulate assets including land; and

access to forest produce for monetary income. Women and girls are disproportionately at risk
due to gender roles and inequalities. Corruption is an issue holding back the development of
Somalia and is a dilemma also affecting further environmental degradation or an
environmental recovery.

Somali men and women have different and unequal access to agriculture, livestock and
fisheries production inputs and technology. They also experience vulnerabilities differently
and resort to distinct coping strategies. Female Headed Households (FHH) among Somali
populations experience higher vulnerability to shocks related to livestock losses relative to

male headed households in the same wealth groups. Women and girls are often the ones
responsible for collecting water, an assignment that gets more difficult when water gets
degraded. It is also a highly security issue as many women and girls are becoming victims to
violence.

Children’s health and nutritional well-being are strongly linked to their access to safe water
and proper sanitation. Lack of sanitation, safe water facilities and services and poor hygiene
are significant contributors to the high rates of disease in Somalia. A comprehensive approach

to reducing malnutrition and disease must include increasing access to sanitation and safe
water services and addressing hygiene behaviour.
Maternal Health in Somalia is worse than in almost any other country in the world. A major

problem is the infrastructure, transport facilities and distance to professional medical
assistance as well as the access to safe water and sufficient and adequate nutrition.

A key concern relating to sound environmental management relates to the adoption and
effective enforcement of a suite of international, regional and national agreements which
define the country’s own responsibilities. The regulatory framework for most of Somalia is
poorly developed, although the country has had signed a number of important international
conventions. While there is a clear need for a thorough revision of the country’s national

legislation on management of natural resources, it will require considerable effort and co-
operation from all interested parties.
The list of problems and challenges in Somalia can be made very long, however there are also

positive aspects to grasp; despite the collapse of the public sector, people have shown
remarkable resilience, and an energetic and engaged private sector and vibrant civil society

ii Annex 92

have emerged, as for example in communications and money transfers, transportation and
import/exports. Not least in the light of a newly elected parliament, a new presidency and a
new constitution there are opportunities for Somalia. The transition process lying ahead of the
Somali people will be a good window of opportunity to find ways to combat environmental

degradation in order to act for poverty reduction.

iiiAnnex 92

Contents
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... ii  

1.   Introduction ...........................................................▯........................................................... . 1

2.   Key Environmental Challenges..........................................................................................2  

3.   Effects of the environmental challenges ............................................................................5  
3.1   Impacts on Poverty......................................................................................................5  

3.2   Impacts on Public Health.............................................................................................7  

3.3   Impacts on Food Security and nutrition ......................................................................8  
3.4   Impacts on Economic development.............................................................................9  

3.5   Resilience .............................................................▯.................................................... .10

4.   Millennium Development Goals......................................................................................12  
4.1   Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women............................................12  

4.2   Goal 4. Reduce child mortality........................................................................▯..........14  

4.3   Goal 5. Improve maternal health...............................................................................15  

5.   Policy Framework to manage environmental challenges.................................................16  
5.1   Key actors .................................................................▯..............................................6.  1

5.2   Governance, implementation and enforcement.........................................................17  

6.   Conclusions ............................................................▯..........................................................1 
7.   Recommendations to Sida........................................................................▯........................20  

References .............................................................▯..................................................................  22

Annexes ................................................................▯.................................................................. . 25
Annex 1 ......................................................................▯........................................................ . 25

Annex 2 MDG reference for Somalia..................................................................................26  

iv Annex 92

1. Introduction

This Environmental and Climate Change Policy Brief has been written as an input to the
Swedish results strategy process in preparation of a revised strategy document for Somalia. It

aims at briefly presenting key environmental sustainability challenges and opportunities in
Somalia, and focuses on the millennium development goals 3, 4, and 5.

The analysis was conducted as a desk study during end of October and beginning November
and is based on selected reports, research papers and statistics. It has been written as a ‘light

version’ as the time constrain has been significant, therefore this is only a first draft.
In the case of Somalia it has to be noted that statistics and reports are not always

comprehensive or existent, which also shapes this desk study in the sense that there may be
discrepancies in statistics and figures may not be up to date. However, some of the statistical
data on Somalia is currently collected and disseminated by a number international agencies

and NGOs; but such data collection is mostly guided by the needs and priorities of external
actors linked to their areas of intervention rather than the national needs and priorities of
Somalia.

The Swedish Government has identified environment and climate change as one of three

thematic priorities for development cooperation. This is reinforced in the Swedish policy on
environment and climate change in development cooperation concluding that these aspects are
a “central point of departure for all development cooperation” . The Policy further requires
that environmental impacts, effects of climate change and associated risks are assessed and

integrated in analysis, planning, strategies, implementation and follow-up in Swedish
development cooperation.
3
The previous country strategy is based on a combination of humanitarian assistance and
support for reconstruction. The humanitarian assistance was aimed at mitigating the effects of

the humanitarian disaster. The reconstruction programmes were designed to lend support to
the regional and local peaceful political structures which have grown up and to contribute to
poverty reduction efforts.

For the forthcoming strategy period focus is set on women and children as well as their
resilience and a development towards transparent and participative governance.

1
This Environmental and Climate Change PolicyBrief was written, at the request of Sida (Urban Sjöström) by
Anja-Christina Beier and Eva Stephansson at Sida’s Helpdesk for Environment and Climate Change. The views
expressed in this Environmental and Climate Change Policy Brief are those of the authors and do not necessarily
2epresent the views of Sida.
Swedish Government Offices, 2009
3Country strategy for development cooperation Somalia January 2003 – December 2005 Development
assistance to Somalia

1Annex 92

2. Key Environmental Challenges

Somalia is one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world and as such presents

exceptional challenges in terms of natural resource management. As a result of more than 25
years of civil unrest, Somalia’s governance structures have fallen apart, and militias control
different parts of the country. In addition, the regions of Somaliland and Puntland have
4
unilaterally declared autonomy.
Somalia has five main World Ecosystem types: Coastal Aquatic (11 percent), Desert and

Semi-Desert (38 percent), Grass and Shr5b (36 percent), Crop and Settlements (one percent),
and Interrupted Woods (14 percent). The three main productive sectors are livestock,
charcoal production and crops. Livestock (mainly live animals and some products) is the

largest export with charcoal production ranking second. Fifty-nine percent of the population
practice nomadic and semi-nomadic agro-pastoralism, followed by 17 percent made up by
farmers. 6
Food insecurity and livelihoods, lack of marine and coastal management, probable hazardous

waste, and the mitigation and management of environmental degradation along with natural
disasters are environmental concerns.

The key environmental challenges in Somalia are related to women and children, natural
resource degradation and democratic instability. Most challenged areas are:

- Deforestation
- Land degradation

- Increasing aridity and overgrazing
- Water scarcity
- Waste disposal

- Climate Change
- Ecosystem services

7
Deforestation
Forests cover about 11.4 percent of the total land area of Somalia. Large areas of rangelands

used to be covered by various tree species, mainly acacias. Flood plain forests along the
Shebelle River have been destroyed by clearing land for small farms and plantations.

Forests form the habitat of many of Somalia’s 1,078 known species of animal and 3,028 plant
species some of which are unique. The rate of loss of forest and wooded habitat between 1990
and 2005 is estimated at 13.9 percent or 1,151,000 ha with pressure coming from charcoal

production and agriculture. Charcoal-burning has become a major source of income for 70
percent of poor and middle-income pastoralists. It is estimate that four trees are cut to produce
one sack of charcoal. The charcoal industry has significant implications on livelihood security

exacerbating community conflicts and increasing vulnerability to drought as well as it is
rapidly depleting the forest resource.

4
CIA Fact Book
5 FAO strategy and plan of action 2011-2015 http://faosomalia.org/uploads/FAO%20Somalia%205-
6ear%20strategy.pdf and Animal Info http://www.animalinfo.org/country/somalia.htm
FAO strategy and plan of action 2011-2015 http://faosomalia.org/uploads/FAO%20Somalia%205-
year%20strategy.pdf
7FAO strategy and plan of action 2011-2015 http://faosomalia.org/uploads/FAO%20Somalia%205-
year%20strategy.pdf and trading economics http://www.tradingeconomics.com/somalia/forest-area-percent-of-
land-area-wb-data.html

2 Annex 92

Land degradation

Somalia is a semi-arid country with about 1.6 percent of arable land . Arable land (in
9
hectares) includes land defined by the FAO.

Land tenure system is based on communal ownership combined with individual ownership.
Usually property transfers from male to male with few exceptions. Female heritance is seldom
allowed.

As the livestock sector is based on a nomadic system high mobility is required as well as

access to extensive grazing resources. As land use is limited by soil quality, low rainfall and
limited water availability, besides opportunistic movement that is possible, overgrazing is a
10
consequence.

Land degradation is a key environmental issue in Somalia, closely linked to desertification,
drought and unsustainable livestock and agricultural practices and is also leading to conflict.
Conflicts as such also result in land degradation as it obstructs and hinders a more sustainable

traditional agricultural practice.

Aridity and Overgrazing

Increasing aridity of Somalia’s climate, excessive logging and overgrazing, are leading to
rapid environment degradation (deforestation and extension of the desert area) in the Horn of

Africa country. As livestock is the main livelihood for approximately 60% Somali’s the
available land is overused and under ecological resilience stress. Growing competition for
land is leading to conflict and further aridity and overgrazing. 11

The transient rights to use resources that are so critical to nomadic pastoralism were ignored

when the national land tenure regime was being developed. Among the direct results of this
action has been land degradation, resource use conflicts, a decline in pastoral production and

impacts on Somali clan alli12ces, which in many cases serve to regulate rational natural
resource access and use.

Overgrazing in parts of the coastline has resulted in the gradual movement of coastal sand
dunes inland, posing a serious threat to agricultural areas and human habitation. 13

Water scarcity

Somalia has 6 cubic kilometers of renewable water resources with 97% used for livestock and

agriculture. Three percent is for urban and domestic use. A bit more than 26% of the entire
population have access to safe drinking water. 14

8
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html
9 Land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas are counted once), temporary meadows for mowing or for

pasture, land under market or kitchen gardens, and land temporarily fallow. Land abandoned as a result of
10ifting cultivation is excluded.
FAO strategy and plan of action 2011-2015 http://faosomalia.org/uploads/FAO%20Somalia%205-
year%20strategy.pdf
11FAO strategy and plan of action 2011-2015 http://faosomalia.org/uploads/FAO%20Somalia%205-
year%20strategy.pdf
12UNEP 2005 The State of the Environment in Somalia
13
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Somalia-ENVIRONMENT.html#ixzz…

3Annex 92

Most of the country receives less than 500 mm of rain annually, and a large area
encompassing the northeast and much of northern Somalia receives as little as 50 to 150 mm.

Generally, rainfall takes the form of showers or localized torrential rains and is extremely
variable. The main rainy season, referred to as the Gu, lasts from April to June. This period is
characterized by the southwest monsoons, which rejuvenate the pasture land, especially the

central plateau, and briefly transform the desert into lus15vegetation. The Dayr, which is the
shortest rainy season, lasts from October to December.

With an extremely low, variable and often unreliable rainfall, and misuse, mismanagement
and ongoing conflict etc water scarcity is at its worse.

Less than 30 % of Somali people have safe drinking water and for rural community, the
number spirals to almost zero. The lack of access to safe water is a striking feature in almost

all parts of Somalia.

Waste disposal

Somalia's long, remote shoreline has been used as a dump site for the disposal of toxic waste

for many years now. Circumstantial evidence indicates that the dumping of illegal waste have
been made for almost 20 years. Although unverified, there are persistent reports of illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing and illegal waste dumping off the coast up until today . 16

The illegal dumping includes radioactive, hazardous and medical waste.

The huge waves which battered northern Somalia after the tsunami in 2004 are believed to
have stirred up tons of nuclear and toxic waste dumped illegally in the country by
industrialised countries and foreign firms over the years. There is a total lack of any waste

management.

Climate Change

Due to Somalia's proximity to the equator, there is not much seasonal variation in its climate.

Hot conditions prevail year-round along with periodic monsoon winds and irregular rainfall.
18
Recurring droughts; dust storms over eastern plains in summer; floods during rainy season
are becoming more frequent and prolonged making the situation for people and the
environmental degradation in the country even worse. In the most recent drought famine was

increased.

Natural resources and Ecosystem Services

Somalia’s natural resources fall into three broad categories: marine resources such as fish and

salt; surface resources which include forests and forest products such as NTFP (Non-Timber
Forest Products) as well as surface water; and subsurface resources such as rocks and
minerals, fossil fuels, and groundwater. Many of them have been directly or indirectly

14
15http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Somalia-ENVIRONMENT.html#ixzz…
16http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Somalia
17UN security council 2011
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somalia#cite_note-factbook-3
18https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html

4 Annex 92

impacted by the extended civil conflict, but competition for access to some resources has also
been, and continues to be, a source of conflict in itself.19

In the absence of a government, many traditional forms of natural resource management and
control systems have been abandoned or are now ignored. In several instances, this has
20
resulted in clearly unsustainable exploitation, a trend which may prove difficult to reverse.
Ecosystems provide different types of life supporting services that are vital for livelihoods,

good health and economic development and provide resilience to natural disasters and climate
change. Conversely, if ecosystem services are degraded or access is denied, poverty is
exacerbated. This profound connection between the environment and poverty is likely to be

increasingly visible as the impacts of climate change manifest.

Ecosystem services are the benefits people derive from nature and one obvious ecosystem
service in Somalia is drinking water. As freshwater habitats are destroyed, the beneficial
ecosystem services they provide to people are lost. It directly affects the livelihoods of many

poor men and women who depend on these services.

3. Effects of the environmental challenges

Somalia’s major environmental challenges constitute over dependency on trees for energy and

charcoal exports, increasing population pressures and urbanization and natural resource based
conflicts. Degradation of water catchments, rangelands, agricultural lands and the marine
environment, combined with illegal fishing and logging remain critical and urgent issues to

address.

3.1Impacts on Poverty

The regions that have established autonomy and experienced relatively peaceful conditions —

Somaliland in the north-west and Puntland in the north-east — have achieved a greater degree
of stability than the rest of the country. The southern part of the country is inevitably poorer
and in a more critical situation regarding food security, infrastructure and services .21

In terms of measuring deprivations related to poverty, Somalia’s Multidimensional Poverty
Index (MPI) of 0.47 out of 1 would place it at 94 out of 104 countries in 2010 if comparisons
were made to the ranking in the global HDR for that year. An estimated 82 percent of Somalis

(99% of the nomadic population) are considered poor across multiple dimensions. The divide
between urban and rural populations is significant – 61 percent and 94 percent, respectively.
In south central Somalia, 89 percent of people are poor across several dimensions, compared
22
to 75 percent in Puntland and 72 percent in Somaliland.

Women and men that were already vulnerable prior to the 1990s have been further

marginalized by the conflict and general instability. In particular indigenous groups and ethnic

19
20UNEP 2005 The State of the Environment in Somalia
UNEP 2005 The State of the Environment in Somalia
21IFAD 2011 http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/somalia
22The Somalia Human Development Report 2012 http://www.so.undp.org/shdr/

5Annex 92

minorities have fallen into greater poverty, and many have been expelled from their
traditional lands.

Women have particularly low status in Somalia. Many are illiterate or poorly educated, and
they have inadequate access to health and family planning services. Female genital mutilation
is widespread. The country has one of the highest rates of maternal mortality in the world. 23

Every day about 45 women die as a result of pregnancy and childbirth (see further in chapter
4.3).

Forests are economically important for the production of NTFP and charcoal. From the
environmental standpoint (as ecosystem services) forests are valuable as habitat, for soil

stabilization and fertility and water runoff control.
Charcoal production is a major cause of deforestation. Traditionally, Somalis used wood

collected from forests for fuel but charcoal is now the preferred local source of fuel and has
become a lucrative export commodity, ranking second behind livestock. As a result of
charcoal production, trees in traditional grazing areas of Northern Somalia were devastated
24
and the damage continued as the industry moved south. Forest management for recovery,
sustainable use and protection is an urgent issue. Public policy, regulations and the
institutional capacity to implement, monitor and enforce will need rebuilding along with

programmes to inform and enlist people’s participation. Alternative energy sources are
needed to reduce the demand for charcoal and wood for fuel. Other income earning
opportunities will also help to limit poor people’s reliance on destructive forest exploitation. 25

Today, about 60% of all Somalis are nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists who raise cattle,

camels, sheep, and goats. About 25% of the population is settled farmers who live mainly in
the fertile agricultural zone between the Juba and Shabelle Rivers in southern Somalia. The
remainder of the population (approximately 15%) is urban.

Extreme poverty has become widespread and large numbers of people are unable to meet
basic food requirements. Many Somalis have been internally displaced, often from rural to

urban areas. The strongest clans have taken over valuable agricultural land, expelling weaker
clans and indigenous peoples from their traditional lands. Vulnerable people have lost their
assets and livelihoods. Famine and disease have raged unchecked, causing the death of about

one milli26 people. Extensive damage to roads and other infrastructure makes it extremely
difficult.

Extended civil conflict has had a direct or indirect impact on many resources, but competition
for access to some resources has also been and continues to be a source of conflict itself. In
the absence of a central government and regulation, many traditional forms of natural

resource management have been abandoned, leading to unsustainable exploitation. For
example, overgrazing and deforestation have led to environmental degradation that may be
difficult to reverse. Un-regulated off-shore fishing threatens marine resources. 27

Livestock is a key local consumption commodity for household food security.

23IFAD 2011 http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/somalia
24
25IFAD 2011 http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/somalia
FAO strategy and plan of action 2011-2015 http://faosomalia.org/uploads/FAO%20Somalia%205-
26ar%20strategy.pdf
IFAD http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/somalia
27 IFAD http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/somalia

6 Annex 92

3.2Impacts on Public Health

Approximately 30% of the population in Somalia has access to improved drinking water
sources; 67% in urban areas while 9% only in rural areas 28. Approximately 23% of the

population has access to improved sanitation facilities; 52% in urban areas while 6% in rural
areas. This is a reason why cholera is endemic in Somalia and Acute Watery Diarrhea (AWD)
and cholera peaks generally following the rains. Cholera can be devastating during the rains,

especially for a region in famine as well as it claims hundreds of lives annually, particularly in
densely populated areas. Increasing access to safe water must also be accompanied by
efforts to ensure the quality of drinking water. Water quality monitoring and house water

treatment and safe storage are critical interventions that aim to reduce the risk of
contamination of water supplies. 30

Safe water can make the difference between life and death in a poverty-stricken environment.
As the present famine crisis forced more than a million Somalis to flee their homes in search

of food and water, many Somalis have fled to Mogadishu. There are now more than 100
camps for displaced Somalis scattered around the capital.

Water may also become severe; half dried and flooded water pumps and wells can spread life
threatening deceases when polluted. Heavy floods contribute to soil erosion, destroy crop and
swamp unprotected villages and lead to additional land degradation. Together with lack

and/or absence of governmental services like infrastructure, health care centers etc the
situation has become cruel.

According to reports by the UNEP, illegal and uncontrolled waste disposal has resulted in far
higher than normal cases of respiratory infections, mouth ulcers and bleeding, abdominal

haemorrhages and unusual skin infections and diseases consistent with radiation sickness
among many inhabitants of the areas around the north eastern towns and along the Indian
Ocean coast. UNEP adds that the current situation along the Somali coastline poses a very
31
serious environmental hazard not only in Somalia, but also in the eastern Africa sub-region.

Qat is considered an illegal substance in the regions controlled by the Islamists. In the regions
under Al-Shabab the selling of qat leaves is completely prohibited in small towns and
villages, whereas in the densely populated cities, (Kismayo, Marka, Mogadishu, etc.) they

have designated special selling places, usually outside the city centre. Qat addiction among
the population has increased with years of war. Excessive chewing of qat leaves leads to
apathy and disinterest in family and work: It reduces productivity and leads farmers to
32
abandon animal husbandry .

Despite the lack of coherence in overall statistics (coverage versus mortality), they indicate

there are major gains to be made through basic health activities, water and sanitation services,
and increasing and sustaining high levels of vaccination coverage, as well as improved food
security with particular focus on improving feeding practices and the quality of food for

young children.

28The statistic figures for water availability are very variable and not very reliable. Also some sources rely on
old figures mixed with uncertain estimates to attain more recent figures.
29
30WASH Cluster Somalia; http://ochaonline.un.org/somalia/WASH
31http://www.unicef.org/somalia/wes_95.html
FAO strategy and plan of action 2011-2015 http://faosomalia.org/uploads/FAO%20Somalia%205-
year%20strategy.pdf
32IFAD http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/somalia

7Annex 92

3.3Impacts on Food Security and nutrition

Food security in Somalia is severely constrained by recurrent drought and land degradation,
and climate change will make the problems worse over time. A report released by UNDP in
February 2012 showed that ensuring food security goes beyond addressing agricultural

production. It also requires better basic rural infrastructure, access to credit, resilience to
shocks, and an end to armed conflict. A comprehensive developmental approach with a
medium to longer-term focus is required to build greater food security. 33

The nutrition situation shows continued improvements from the past two seasons. The number

of acute34 malnourished children under 5 years is now estimated to be 236,000 down from
323,000 . However, the south of the country remains in a state of acute nutrition emergency.
The central and northeast parts of the country have displayed sustained improvements and are

classified as serious.

The situation began to improve following reasonable Deyr rains during October and
December of 2011, and in February 2012, the FSNAU (Food Security and Nutrition Analysis
Unit) and FEWS NET (Famine Early Warning Systems Network) 36 announced that famine

conditions had receded. Other factors that contributed to this improvement included a slight
decrease in the price of food, enhanced access to food and the impact of humanitarian
assistance. However, more than 2.5 million people remain in crisis throughout the country,

and any gains made in food security and nutrition must be considered fragile as communities
are recovering from many seasons of failed rains and subsequent drought. The Gu rains (April
to June) have been uneven in geographical coverage and below average and there are fears

that recent gains could be lost without continued humanitarian assistance. Furthermore,
another 1.8 million people are also estimated to be acutely food insecure and in a stress
situation where they are barely able to meet their minimum food requirements. Without

livelihoods assistance and adequate rains in the coming months, this portion of the population
could revert to severe malnutrition. Meanwhile, insecurity and conflict continue to contribute
to poor household food security and high malnutrition rates. 37

Since the start of the Somali civil war, the country's 3,330 km (2,000 miles) of coastline – the
38
longest in Africa – remains the country's most untapped resource . Domestic fresh fish
consumption is limited to coastal areas because of poor infrastructure, which has restricted
access to fish for a large portion of the population, lack of familiarity with fish, seasonality of

supply and a tradition of meat-eating among the Somali communities, are among other
reasons for one of the lowest per capita fish consumption rates in the world.

While traditional tastes and lack of consumer education programmes to promote fish
consumption have confined the market to certain coastal areas, the shortage of meat

experienced particularly during the recurring droughts has diverted some demand towards

33
UNDP
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourperspective/ourperspectivea…-
death-issue-in-horn-of-africa.html
34WFP https://www.wfp.org/countries/somalia/food-security
35FSNAU http://www.fsnau.org/
36FEWS NET http://www.fews.net/Pages/default.aspx
37
38WFP https://www.wfp.org/countries/somalia/food-security
WFP https://www.wfp.org/countries/somalia/food-security

8 Annex 92

fish, especially among low income groups like internally displaced people (IDP) . They are

today the driving force for a growing demand for fish.

Somalia's fisheries sector lacks key equipment such as jetties and fishing boats. Lack of
research and training opportunities for fishing communities and absence of a regulatory
framework for the industry and serious limitations in the cold chain, compound the problem. 40

3.4Impacts on Economic development

In Somalia there is a mix of Agro-pastoralist; agriculture and li41stock production based
livelihood and Agriculturalist; agriculture based livelihood. Pastoralists exist throughout
Somalia with high concentrations of strict pastoralists in the north and central areas and

pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in the southern areas. Throughout greater Somalia (including
areas of Ethiopia and Kenya), rainfall patterns force a complex series of movements in search
42
of grazing-land between the different seasons .
The livestock sector is the largest contributor to Somali livelihoods with over 65% of the

population engaged in some way in the industry. Exports of livestock and their products
account for 80 percent of exports in normal years but exports have been periodically

interrupted by droughts and international bans. Despite the ban imposed by Saudi Arabia 43
2000, livestock exports continue to be the largest traded commodity for Somalia .

Agriculture is an important economic activity in Somalia not only in terms of meeting the
food needs of the population but also in terms of generating income through crop sales and

agricultural labour opportunities. With roughly 50% of population’s cereal requirements are
met through domestic production, agriculture is a major component particularly for two of the
main rural livelihood systems in Somalia; Agro-pastoralist, mix of agriculture and livestock
44
production based livelihood and Agriculturalist, agriculture based livelihood .

Somalia is not abound in resources and depends heavily on agriculture to sustain its economy.
Agricultural productivity is often at the mercy of climatic extremes, including periodic

droughts and flooding. Livestock is essential to the economy. Over 60 percent of the
population depends directly on livestock for food and income. Outbreaks of disease frequently
go unchecked and untreated as a result of the lack of an effective disease control strategy.

Over the last decade Saudi Arabia has imposed several livestock bans because of disease
concerns, and these have severely hampered the sector and generated serious problems for the
pastoralists whose livelihoods depend upon the sale of livestock. 45

Large stocks of animals put considerable pressure on grazing land, causing land degradation

and generating disputes over land rights. In the absence of regulatory measures and the
competition over resources, especially land and water, is a major component of the current

conflict and affects economic development tremendously.

39FAO strategy and plan of action 2011-2015 http://faosomalia.org/uploads/FAO%20Somalia%205-

40ar%20strategy.pdf
FAO strategy and plan of action 2011-2015 http://faosomalia.org/uploads/FAO%20Somalia%205-
41ar%20strategy.pdf
http://www.faosomalia.org/environment
42http://www.faosomalia.org/environment
43FAO strategy and plan of action 2011-2015 http://faosomalia.org/uploads/FAO%20Somalia%205-
year%20strategy.pdf
44
45http://www.faosomalia.org/environment
IFAD http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/somalia

9Annex 92

Qat addiction among the population has become a real problem . The consumption of Qat is
deeply entrenched within the Somali society, albeit gradually diminishing. However it has

also become an important trading commodity and for traders it appears to be a good
alternative .7

Corruption is an issue hampering the development of Somalia and is a dilemma also affecting
further environmental degradation or an environmental recovery. A UN report say that 70
48
percent of money donated never made it into public coffers in 2009 and 2010 .

The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories according to their

perceived levels of public sector corruption. It is an aggregate indicator that combines
different sources of information about corruption, making it possible to compare countries.
Both petty and grand forms of corruption are prevalent in Somalia, permeating key sectors of

the economy such as ports and airports, tax and custom collection, immigration,
telecommunication and management of aid resources. According to a recent audit report by
the Prime Minister’s office, corruption manifests itself through various practices, including

gross public financial mismanagement, large scale misappropriation of public and donor
funds, and concealment of actual resource flows. 50

3.5 Resilience

Resilience is the ability to anticipate, resist, absorb and recover in a timely and efficient
manner from external pressures and shocks in ways that preserve integrity and do not deepen
vulnerability. This includes the ability to withstand threats and the ability to adapt if needed

and the ability to further develop to new options in the face of shocks and crises.

The people of Somalia are remarkably resilient, especially given the multiple and protracted

challenges that have marked Somalia over time but this varies by gender, age and livelihood
group. This resilience is grounded in determination, entrepreneurialism, mobility and

communities of solidarity and generosity. More than other societies, given the inadequacies in
public and private, formal and informal systems that provide support, Somalis principally
have had to rely on their own resilience to protect their lives and livelihoods.

51
The following characteristics can help to acknowledge and understand where it is possible to
find entry points to work with resilience in different areas.

- ...knowledgeable and healthy. Have the ability to assess, manage and monitor risks.
Learn new skills and build on past experiences.

- ...manage natural assets. Recognises their value and has the ability to protect,
enhance and maintain them.

46IFAD http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/somalia
47Somaliland press http://somalilandpress.com/qat-in-somalia-the-multi-million-dollar-batt…
48Voice of America http://www.voanews.com/content/un-reports-says-somali-government-
corrupt/1405372.html
49
50Transparency International
51Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Somalia 2012
IFRC 2012

10 Annex 92

- ...organised. Has the capacity to identify problems, establish priorities and act.

- ...connected. Have relationships with external actors who provide a wider supportive
environment, and supply goods and services when needed.

- engaged in the development of local policy for reducing risks.

- ...infrastructure and services. Has a strong system in place to help mitigate for
instance climate change. Has strong housing, transport, power, water and sanitation

systems, and the ability to maintain and renovate them.

- ...economic opportunities. Has a diverse range of employment opportunities, income
and financial services. Is flexible, resourceful and has the capacity to accept

uncertainty and respond (proactively) to change.

Local resiliency has its difficulties, especially given sustained and myriad threats often
generated by factors well beyond the control of individuals or communities. One Minister
52
neatly summarizes these threats as “war, weather and weak governance/economy” . As
witnessed in the famine of 2011, some shocks overwhelm the resiliency of the poorest or
marginalised, leading to destitution, displacement, hunger, illness, death and the breakdown
of families and communities. These intolerable outcomes needs a paradigm shift in support of

the resiliency of the poor or marginalised. The delayed response to the warnings of crisis
issued from 2010 starkly demonstrated the limits of the international humanitarian and
development community as well as the extent of inadequate efforts to build resilience in the
years prior to the famine. 53

However in promoting resilience it is necessary to recognise the need for an enabling
environment based on an understanding of local resilience and vulnerability as well as a
policy and regulatory framework for effective service delivery as possible.

Building resilience can be done by different actions addressed comprehensively.

- Improve basic social services – to strengthen/empower vulnerable households and

human capital (men and women) by creating systems able to assess communities,
capture the information needed and assure participation for men and women.

- Establish predictable safety nets – to address the most vulnerable people’s basic

need through predictable and sustainable transfer of food or cash for the destitute or
seasonally at risk populations without discrimination.

- Strengthen the productive sectors – to increase household income by diversifying

livelihood strategies, enhancing the access to markets and market information and
assure impartial access to natural resources such as land, forest and water as well as
eco system services.

52Partnership Forum on Resilience 2012 Preparing Somalia’s Future: Goals for 2015
53Partnership Forum on Resilience 2012 Preparing Somalia’s Future: Goals for 2015

11Annex 92

4. Millennium Development Goals

The last population census was done in 1985/86, but no data was released. Only a few data
were released from the earlier census conducted in 1975. A settlement survey was done by
United Nations Development Program back in 2005/06 . 54

A lack of baseline data in all areas is a major constraint facing Somalia for policy making and

planning in the country general and in South/Central in particular. Over the past 25 years
neither national population census nor national demography and household income and
expenditures survey were conducted due to prevailing political situation. 55

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been signed by Somalia.

In terms of progress toward achieving Millennium Development Goals, Somalia has seen a

gradual improvement in maternal, under-five and infant mortality rates. However, the current
humanitarian crisis (famine) may have implications for maternal and child health. In addition,
the poor quality health services may jeopardize the recent health gains and limit the progress
56
in achieving the MDG targets.

4.1Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women

Gender inequality is alarmingly high at 0.776 out of a value of 1 (complete inequality), with

Somalia at the fourth lowest position globally on the Gender Inequality Index (GII) if
internationally comparable data were available. Women suffer severe exclusion and inequality
in all dimensions of the index – health, employment and labour market participation. Somali

girls are given away in marriage very young, and violence against girls and women is
widespread. Traditional laws, used in lieu of a state judiciary, are highly discriminatory
against women. 57

Many courageous efforts of Somali women to rise above patriarchy have been isolated and

short lived, and they have yet to achieve the critical mass in decision-making required to
effect wider change. Young women end up greatly disadvantaged in all spheres of life, a
reality that hinders their rights and development, and perpetuates intergenerational cycles of

gender inequality and the feminization of poverty.

For Somalia, the Gender Parity Index (GPI), which is the ratio of female to male primary and

secondary net attendance ratios, for both secondary and tertiary education is significantly
behind by global comparisons, at 27% and 18% respectively. The GPI for tertiary education
has actually declined to 18% from 22% in 1990. 58

Women generally have a weak position in the labour market and represent a large proportion
of vulnerable employment. The share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural

sector remained constant at 22% from 1990 to 2002, experiencing a significant increase only
afterwards to a share of 36% in 2010. Women in wage employment in the non-agricultural

54UNFPA
55UNDP 2010 Millennium Development Goals Progress Report Somalia
56WHO cooperation Strategy at a glance

57tp://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccsbrief_som_en.pdf
http://www.indexmundi.com/somalia/millennium-development-goals.html and The Somalia Human
58velopment Report 2012 http://www.so.undp.org/shdr/
The Somalia Human Development Report 2012 http://www.so.undp.org/shdr/

12 Annex 92

sector reached its highest value in Puntland 40% followed by Somaliland 36%, while the
lowest value is in South Central at 33%. 59

Despite national gender equality policies and provisions, for example, gender-based violence
and discrimination against Somali women continue to brutally suppress human rights and

often go unpunished. Traditional Somali society is conditioned not to openly discuss issues
such as domestic violence and rape, which further hampers women’s access to justice and to
have equal rights with men in the society. 60

Further, Somali men and women have different and unequal access to agriculture, livestock
and fisheries production inputs and technology. They also experience vulnerabilities

differently and resort to distinct coping strategies. For example, Female Headed Households
(FHH) among Somali populations experience higher vulnerability to shocks related to
61
livestock losses relative to male headed households in the same wealth groups.

Women and girls are often the ones responsible for collecting water, an assignment that gets

more difficult when water gets degraded. It is also a highly security issue as many women
and girls are becoming victims to violence.

Sound management of chemicals can improve women’s working and living conditions,
increase their knowledge about health risks and proper handling of chemicals and thereby
help protect them and their families. Proper integration of gender dimensions into safe

chemical management initiatives can promote women’s participation in regulatory and policy
decision-making processes on chemical safety, and enable women to play a more informed
role in the management of chemicals. 62

Overall, only 30% of pupils in upper primary education are females, compared with 30% in
lower Primary education (2006/2007). Gender disparity rapidly increases in higher grades.

Early marriage, timing of classes and economic constraints force many girls to leave school
early, leading to higher girl dropout rates. Secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios are very
low, gender specific data is not readily available. Many women are forced to take up informal

and unskilled employment due to their low educational attainment, which further marginalizes
them from professional employment opportunities. 63

Men and women who depend on small-scale farming in developing countries will be
differently vulnerable to climate change impacts due to pre-existing inequalities. For example,

rural women tend to have less financial, physical and human resources than men, so they will
have fewer options for responding to the effects of climate change. Also, poor women tend to
rely more than men on natural resources, so when these are directly hit by climate change,

women’s livelihoods will also be affected. Adaptation strategies that do not take into account

59http://www.so.undp.org/index.php/Millennium-Development-Goals.htmland UNSD 2010 Somalia Household

60rvey
61The Somalia Human Development Report 2012 http://www.so.undp.org/shdr/
UNDP http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/envi…-
library/chemicals-management/how-is-the-sound-management-of-chemicals-related-to-the-
mdgs/banner_A3_web1.pdf
62
UNDP http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/envi…-
library/chemicals-management/how-is-the-sound-management-of-chemicals-related-to-the-
63gs/banner_A3_web1.pdf
The Somalia Human Development Report 2012 http://www.so.undp.org/shdr/

13Annex 92

the differences between men’s and women’s vulnerabilities and resources are less likely to
64
succeed.

4.2 Goal 4. Reduce child mortality

The infant mortality rate is defined as the number of infants who die before reaching one year

old for each 1000 live births. This rate has decrea65d from 152 deaths per 1000 live births in
1990 to 86 deaths per 1000 live births in 2006.

The under-five mortality rate (U5MR) reached its highest (in South-Central Somali) with 231
deaths per 1,000 live births and its lowest with 188 (in Somaliland), and 225 (in Puntland) in
66
1999.

Children’s health and nutritional well-being are strongly linked to their access to safe water

and proper sanitation. Across Somalia, unpredictable rainfall patterns, ongoing conflict, and
lack of maintenance has resulted in only 29 per cent of the population having access to clean
water and 39 percent to sanitation. Diarrhoea, a key water and sanitation related illness, is

closely associated with malnutrition and is the cause of nearly one in five deaths (19 percent)
of children under five. 67

Lack of sanitation, safe water facilities and services and poor hygiene are significant
contributors to the high rates of disease in Somalia. A comprehensive approach to reducing

malnutrition and disease must include increasing access to sanitation and safe water services
and addressing hygiene behaviour. The mapping of access to water and sanitation taken from
an analysis of WASH data collected during FSNAU household surveys in 2009 and
68
2010 services shows a close correlation between areas of high malnutrition and areas with
poor access to water and sanitation. Frequently poor hygiene and sanitation practices

combined with the use of unsafe water combine to cause chronic and/or acute diarrhea.
Integrated interventions which include nutrition and WASH components can help to reduce
the incidence of diarrhoea. 69

Children are particularly sensitive to adverse effects from the improper use of chemicals.

Raising awareness about the importance of sound management of chemicals is essential to
help safeguard children’s mental and physical development and enable them to attend school.
In addition, providing basic science education will help countries develop the skills needed to

manage chemicals safely. Every year many children die as a result of chemical poisoning in
the home, and in the case of Somalia there is a special high risk along the coastal area. Sound

64How men and women farmers are differently affected (10 March 2008, Rome). Climate change a further

65allenge for gender equity
UNDP http://www.so.undp.org/index.php/Millennium-Development-Goals.html
66UNSD, UNICEF MICS 2000 and 2006
67UNDP http://www.so.undp.org/index.php/Millennium-Development-Goals.html
68
69FSNAU http://www.fsnau.org/sectors/gender
UNICEF http://www.unicef.org/somalia/wes_95.html

14 Annex 92

management of chemicals plays a vital role in reducing children’s exposure to hazardous
chemicals and improving their working and living conditions. 70

71
4.3Goal 5. Improve maternal health

The level of maternal mortality in Somalia, which is extremely high and on the rise, has been

the highest worldwide, at 1200 per 100,000 live births in 2008.

Maternal Health in Somalia is worse than in almost any other country in the world. Most
deliveries are still being done home attended by family members or traditional birth attendants
(TBA) which has limited knowledge and resources when it comes to complications related to
72
pregnancy. A major problem is the infrastructure, transport facilities and distance to
professional medical assistance.

The vast majority of childbirths (55.9%) take place with the help of Traditional Birth
Attendants (TBA). Conversely, only 3.4% of deliveries are handled by medical doctors, 9.4%

are assisted by family members, and 25.4% are done with the help of nurses and midwives.

The percentage of current contraception use among married women (15-49 years old) in

Somalia is no more than 15%. In addition, use of modern contraception methods is even much
lower (1.2%).

Antenatal care coverage, an indicator of access and use of health care during pregnancy, is
very low, at 31.6% in 2006 (Source: MICS 2006). After birth access to safe water and
sufficient and adequate nutrition is problematic.

Female genital mutilation (FGM) afflicts an estimated 98 percent of Somali women. The

highest maternal and infant mortality rates are in FGM-practicing regions. The actual number
of girls who die as a result of FGM is not known. Under the new Somali Constitution 2012
73
FGM has been banned .

Certain types of chemicals can build up to dangerous levels in humans, causing adverse

reproductive, developmental, immunological, hormonal and carcinogenic effects. Exposure to
these chemicals can also result in miscarriages, low birth weight babies and premature births.

Women can pass on these toxic chemicals to their children, both prenatally and through
breastfeeding. There is no evidence on how chemicals inflict on maternal health, however in
Somalia with high levels on waste disposal it is important to consider. 74

70UNDP http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/envi…-
library/chemicals-management/how-is-the-sound-management-of-chemicals-related-to-the-

71gs/banner_A3_web1.pdf
If no other source given; STATISTIC Trends in maternal mortality: 1990 to 2010 WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA
and The World Bank WHO 2012
72UNFPA http://countryoffice.unfpa.org/somalia/2012/05/23/5039/succeeded_delive…
73http://somalilandpress.com/21-years-somalia-adopts-constitution-abortio… and
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2012/aug/17/female-genital…
74
UNDP http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/envi…-
library/chemicals-management/how-is-the-sound-management-of-chemicals-related-to-the-
mdgs/banner_A3_web1.pdf

15Annex 92

5. Policy Framework to manage environmental challenges

The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was the internationally recognised government
of the Republic of Somalia until 20 August 2012, when its tenure officially ended and the

Federal Government of Somalia was inaugurated. The TFG was established as one of the
Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) of government as defined in the Transitional Federal
Charter (TFC) adopted in November 2004 by the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). 75

A new constitution is about to be taken in force, however there is no Supreme Court

functioning, also no nationwide legal system is in place.

Somalia has not had a central body for environmental issues nor functioning environmental
policies, environmental management plans or strategies.

More than 15 years without an effective central government and a chaotic state of ongoing
civil conflict and lawlessness have had a devastating effect on the country's population and
76
the resources they depend upon for their survival.

As an example; many of the environmental aspects are related to water in Somalia. The
country never had a water act, socially and political acceptable legal-based mechanism
reflecting climatic conditions and cultural values of the people is needed and has to be

developed in consultation with local communities. In the making of a Water Resource
Management system being effective, separation of functions of the national and local
institutions in water business is absolutely necessary, while encouraging private-public

partnership. At the time of peace, water institutions with centralised and decentralised
elements will be necessary. Future development of the two rivers Juba and Shabelle, which
supply the most fertile regions and the rice bowl of the country, requires a national authority
77
with an autonomous structure.

5.1 Key actors

Somali civil society

A meeting that took place in Istanbul May 27 -30, 2012 was hosted by the Government of
Turkey. The meeting was intended to create a space for Somalis to come together and to talk
78
about the post-August 2012 transition. This conference was for Somalis and by Somalis.
The conference did provide space for Somalis to come together and to talk about collective
issues. It proved to be very positive and for development cooperation to be sustainable it is

important that there is a committed and thriving civil society.

Although civil society plays an important role in assisting vulnerable and unarmed civilians, it
suffers a lack of adequate support , nevertheless new initiatives are signs of hope in the
current situation in Somalia. 80

75
76http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somalia#cite_note-factbook-3
IFAD http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/somalia
77Somali Centre for Water and Environment (SCWE) 2000 http://www.somwe.com/water.html
78http://www.internationalpeaceandconflict.org/profiles/blogs/somali-civi…-
by-ladan-affi?xg_source=activity
79
IRIN http://www.irinnews.org/Report/81760/SOMALIA-Civil-society-support-is-k…-
80lief-plan
UNEP 2005 The State of the Environment in Somalia

16 Annex 92

Somali Diaspora

In 2012 UNDP commissioned an investigation of the role of the Somali Diaspora in relief,
development and peace building. It was found that in all areas, the Diaspora was heavily
involved in promoting education, healthcare, public infrastructure and private enterprise. In

the relatively peaceful north the emphasis was on post-conflict reconstruction and
development, whereas in the south the humanitarian situation meant more people were
involved in providing life-saving support to their relatives and communities. It was also found
that in many areas, people from the Diaspora were returning temporarily to provide technical
skills, advice and leadership in addition to their financial support. Support came not only from

older people, but crucially – and unexpectedly – fr81 young Somalis as well, even people
who had been born and raised outside the country.

Swedish actors

In connection to the environmental aspects and its challenges, Sweden has several actors that
may contribute with skills and knowledge.

These may be; Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) is in Somalia already supporting
in the area of humanitarian aid through multinational organisations; Swedish Chemical

Agency (KemI) accomplish activities for the sound management of chemicals and has
cooperation in the region as well as with UN organisations also active in Somalia;
Swedesurvey (Lantmäteriet) has in-depth experience in e.g. mapping, cadastral and land
registration; Swedish National Heritage Board (RAÄ) working for the cultural heritage has

also good insights in development cooperation in working with UNESCO; Swedish
Environmental Protection Agency (Naturvårdsverket) work according to the saying
Cooperation across boundaries is a prerequisite for a healthy environment; Swedish
University for Agricultural Sciences (SLU) work with many of the environmental areas
important in Somalia for a healthy future, for example livestock, pollution, crop production,

climate change issues etc.

5.2 Governance, implementation and enforcement
Historic legacy and situation today

Somalia has ended 20 year-long era of transitional and interim administration that spawned
statelessness, protracted conflicts, political vacuum and warlordism.

With the collapse of the central government in 1991 Somalia was not able to regain internal
political unity because of internal schisms and widespread conflict. In 2000 the Transitional

National Government (TNG) was formed, but was not effective and was succeeded by the
TFG in 2004.

After more than two decades, the country has assumed its full responsibility of post
transitional government, adopted a new – federal - Constitution, installed a new president and
a prime minister and downsized parliament.

81Cash and Compassion 2011 Laura Hammond et.al.
http://www.so.undp.org/docs/Cash%20and%20compassion.pdf and http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-

development/poverty-matters/2012/feb/20/what-role-somalia-diaspora-rebuilding

17Annex 92

Given Somalia’s recent past, this is a historic and generational moment.
The appointment of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, a longtime civil society activist represents a

new and genuine leader who seeks to resuscitate Somalia from the quagmire, and unlike
previous governments he was appointed in the capital Mogadishu and thus enjoys a degree of
legitimacy .2

However, fundamental facts remain unchanged; government institutions are woefully
dysfunctional, insecurity has reached unacceptable levels, Somali forces are heavily

dependent on AMISOM’s assistance every step of the way and the government is bankrupt.
And despite al-Shabaab being severely degraded, they still remain a very potent force that
controls a sizable swath of territory in the central parts of Somalia.3

Somalia has a mixed legal system of civil law, Islamic law, and customary law (referred to as
Xeer).

Skilled labour is scarce or unavailable due to loss of talent abroad, a 20-year lapse in
educating and training new generations and financial constraints that hamper the mobilization

of available talent. On the positive side, with the collapse of the public sector, people have
shown remarkable resilience, and an energetic and engaged private sector and vibrant civil
society have emerged, as for example in communications and money transfers, transportation

and import/exports.

National Environment management

The lack of any effective government has meant that many people, both local and foreign,
have engaged in many kinds of illegal and damaging activities. Despite a number of

international investigations, rumours have persisted for many years concerning hazardous
pollutants being dumped in Somali waters and on beaches by foreign vessels. The rampant
trade in charcoal as well as unregulated off-shore fisheries are also widely reported as having
a damaging impact on the country’s natural assets, which can be expected to limit and restrict
84
options for national recovery and sustainable development.

Until the establishment of the Ministry of Environment and Disaster Management in 2005,
Somalia lacked a central body responsible for environmental matters. Instead, a National
Environmental Committee, with representatives from 13 Ministries/Agencies, served as the
coordination body for environmental governance.

A key concern relating to sound environmental management relates to the adoption and

effective enforcement of a suite of international, regional and national agreements which
define the country’s own responsibilities as well as those of the international community. The
regulatory framework for most of Somalia is poorly developed, although the country has had
signed a number of important international conventions. While there is a clear need for a

thorough revision of the country’s national legislation on management of natural resources, it
will require considerable effort and co-operation from all interested parties; nationally as well
as internationally. A number of gaps in the legal system also need to be addressed, for
example the lack of any reference to a national water act or adhesion to the Contracting

Parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and

82Abdihakim Aynte; The Road Forward for Somalia, Challenges for the Post-Transitional Government. 2012
NAI
83Abdihakim Aynte; The Road Forward for Somalia, Challenges for the Post-Transitional Government. 2012
NAI
84UNEP 2005 The State of the Environment in Somalia

18 Annex 92

Other Matter, 1972 (the London Convention), the latter being especially relevant to the
alleged dumping of toxic and hazardous materials along the coastline. 85

Other opportunities to benefit natural resource management could be based on improved
regional co-operation and co-ordination. Somalia’s natural assets – its grazing and agricultural

lands as well as its rich marine fisheries – are a platform on which the peoples’ livelihoods
might be rebuilt. Taking control of these assets and managing them productively, sustainably
and equitably will, however, remain a considerable challenge for the decision-makers and

population of the country. Finding a solution to the current levels of over-exploitation will
therefore not only depend on reaching acceptable solutions between stakeholders within the
country, but also hinges on the co-operation and assistance from neighbouring states. 86

6. Conclusions

Somalia currently has an historic opportunity to choose a new and better path. A government
is becoming established and is seeking popular recognition throughout Somalia, despite the

country’s fragmentation with two breakaway regions and a third still plagued by conflict.

Peace and stability are absolute prerequisites for any future rebuilding and development of
Somalia, and continued access to natural resources and ecosystem services is essential to the
livelihoods of the majority of its people. This is basic if the Millennium Development Goals,
for instance the ones that will be targeted by Swedish development cooperation are going to

have any progress in near future.

In Somalia adaptive capacity and building resilient livelihoods are fundamental challenges but
also crucial for survival and combating deep poverty. The ability to adapt will be of
increasing importance not least in the shade of climatic change . 87

Security is being threatened by climate change and resulting in natural disasters, such as the
88
drought afflicting Somalia 2011 . As vulnerability, natural resources, health and gender-
issues are so closely connected having a holistic approach in programming is necessary and
will also positively strengthen the outcome of a contribution.

Multiple risks and their impacts on vulnerable people must be considered together with
assessments of capacities and efforts to strengthen these. Relevant both to humanitarian work

and for development programming is inclusiveness, sustainability, accountability and
participatory approaches.

Human health and well-being and also individual knowledge and awareness are central to
the ability of households individually and collectively to be able to prepare, respond, to
recover from environmental shocks and stresses and develop afterwards. As well as it is

important to have assets and access to wider resources beyond the immediate control for
individuals and of a community.

85UNEP 2005 The State of the Environment in Somalia
86
87UNEP 2005 The State of the Environment in Somalia
Moench: Water, Climatic Variability and Livelihood Resilience: Concepts, Field Insights and Policy
Implications. 2012
88http://www.climateactionprogramme.org/news/extreme_drought_climate_chan…

19Annex 92

7. Recommendations to Sida

In regard to resilience the environment and climate change policy brief recommend the
following:

‘Ingångsvärden’ for Swedish development cooperation in Somalia are:

- MDG 3, 4 and 5
- strengthening peoples livelihood in regard to / regarding their resilience
- development of a democratic society with emphasis on human rights, transparency and
accountability
- further suggestions in areas where Sweden has comparative advantages; waste

management

As pointed out in chapter 3.5 resilience includes the ability to withstand threats and the ability
to adapt if needed and the ability to further develop to new options in the face of shocks and
crises (man-made or natural). The people of Somalia are remarkably resilient, especially

given the multiple and protracted challenges that have marked Somalia over time. Somalis
principally have had to rely on their own resilience to protect their lives and livelihoods;
however this varies by gender, age and livelihood group.

In order to understand what resilience may contain in development cooperation a few

statements are made:

 To achieve resilience in programming objectives has to be comprehensive. The
starting point for support must be recognition and appreciation of the efforts of
individuals and their households and communities. This includes of course the

participation and contribution of the target group which is paramount to reduce their
vulnerability.

 Understanding diverse underlying causes of vulnerability and disaster and crisis risks

requires holistic assessments, planning and implementation across various sectors. It is
not possible to isolate issues or relate to one sector.

 Working with vulnerability and resilience is not possible in short term; it requires
long-term engagements and investment.

 Building strategic partnerships; relevant stakeholders on different levels; locally,
regionally and nationally (as well as international, not least within the donor
community).

By striving to achieve progress in MDG, strengthening livelihood and democratic
development there are certain activities that can be introduced when building resilience and
integrating environmental and climate change aspects.

 Including training;
- Assure that men and women access training on equal terms in areas of health,
environment and good governance both in urban and rural areas.
- Include advocacy and increased knowledge in sustainable natural resource
management practises, adapted to local situations and future scenarios.

20 Annex 92

- For example train local water operators on the operation and maintenance of newly
constructed or rehabilitated water supplies as well as the importance of security

matters to raise the issue of violence in relation to water collection.

 Building partnerships;
- Linking to different national institutions agencies and ministries to ensure the
sustainable management of the country’s natural resource base.

- Revitalising environmental co-operation with neighbouring countries and within the
region, in order to support peace building, enhance important environmental
initiatives, share knowledge and information and strengthening institutional
development.
- For example use of environmental management, analysis and assessments as a tool to

build community resilience to crises and influence policy-making at community and
national levels.

 Strengthening institutional capacity:
- Conducting environmental assessments to guide the setting of priorities for

environmental recovery, resource management and development planning.
- Development of an adequate policy and legal framework for environmental
management.
- Conducting field-based environmental assessments to inform future decision making.
- For example include capacity development in all areas of programming.

 Locally adapted technical solutions;
- Assure access through improved infrastructure and locally placed health
service/clinics in especially rural areas.
- Incorporate proper management of waste, to achieve effective containment and/or

clean-up of all remaining stocks of pesticides in the country.
- For example investing in systems powered by renewable energy (solar powered
pumps) that are accessible, affordable and possible to maintain on local basis.

 Supporting communities’ ability to cope and respond to emergencies;
- for example strengthening the sustainability of infrastructure and services means that
in times of crisis communities can continue to access essential water and sanitation
services and that there are mechanisms in place to guide local governments to manage
the emergency.

- Increasing access to safe water must be accompanied by efforts to ensure the quality
of drinking water. Water quality monitoring and house water treatment and safe
storage are critical interventions that aim to reduce the risk of contamination of water
supplies.
- Combating climate change requires investment in soil conservation, water harvesting,
reforestation and restoration of grazing and control of soil erosion.

- For example assure system and registration of ownership and land tenure by male and
female headed households to secure natural resource management.

It might be difficult to measure resilience as well as to apply to different programmes.
Nevertheless, achieving positive outcomes will require that we fall back to more familiar

concepts like adequate risk and risk management, and not least allow cross-disciplinary and
cross-issue discussions.

21Annex 92

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factbook-3

24 Annex 92

Annexes

Annex 1

POPULATION (2010):
9.3 MILLION

GDP (1990):

$917.04 MILLION
INFANT MORTALITY RATE (PER 1,000 LIVE BIRTHS - 2010):

108.3
LIFE EXPECTANCY (2009)

50.63 YEARS

CORRUPTION MEASUREMENT TOOLS

The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt a country’s public sector is
perceived to be. It is a composite index, drawing on corruption-related data from expert and business surveys
carried out by a variety of independent and reputable institutions.

RANK:
182 /183

Scores range from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean).

SCORE:
1 /10

OTHER GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
Rule of law N/A

Press freedom index N/A

Voice and accountability N/A

25Annex 92

Annex 2 MDG reference for Somalia

Indicator 1990 2002 2007 2015 Target
Female No Data 54 31 100
Primary
school

enrollment
rate%
Female 22 18 31 100
Secondary
school and

Tertiary
enrollment
rate%
Proportion of No Data No Data 8 100

seats held by
Women in the
national
parliament%

Source: UNICEF

26 Annex 93

Jeff R. Vogel, Fishing for Answers to Piracy in Somalia Fishing for Answers to Piracy in Somalia

Jeff R. Vogel

ince the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, illegal, unreported and unregulated

(IUU) fishing in the Somali Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has decimated fish stocks and
S left Somali fishermen with little economic opportunity. IUU fishing led Somali fishermen
to take violent measures to protect the Somali EEZ in the absence of a centralized government and coast
guard. The initial attacks revealed the profit potential of piracy, providing income for displaced
fishermen and opportunistic Somali militants. Violence then became the norm in Somali waters,

undermining the economic and security interests of the United States and the entire region. To reduce
the incidence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, the U.S. must provide alternative and
superior income streams to Somalis engaging in piracy. The U.S. can achieve this strategic effect by
focusing its efforts on fisheries redevelopment, which represents the greatest potential for economic
and social development in Somalia. By ensuring the rights of Somalia within its EEZ, directing U.S. aid
toward Somali fishermen, and employing existing government programs to develop a novel aquaculture

industry, the U.S. can achieve its security objectives and help to foster a stable and moderate Somalia.

Historical Fisheries in Somalia

The marine fisheries industry has historically held an important position in the Somali economy
and culture. Somalia has a large coastline, covering 3,300 kilometers and a corresponding EEZ covering
39,000 kilometersIn 1990, prior to the collapse of the Somali government, fisheries contributed 2

Jeff Vogel is a 2012 graduate of the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed in this article are the
author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Naval War College, the Department of Navy, or
any other federal agency or department.

13
FISHING FOR ANSWERS TO PIRACY IN SOMALIA /luce.nt/ Annex 93

Fishing for Answers to Piracy in Somalia

Jeff R. Vogel

ince the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, illegal, unreported and unregulated

(IUU) fishing in the Somali Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has decimated fish stocks and
S left Somali fishermen with little economic opportunity. IUU fishing led Somali fishermen
to take violent measures to protect the Somali EEZ in the absence of a centralized government and coast
guard. The initial attacks revealed the profit potential of piracy, providing income for displaced
fishermen and opportunistic Somali militants. Violence then became the norm in Somali waters,

undermining the economic and security interests of the United States and the entire region. To reduce
the incidence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, the U.S. must provide alternative and
superior income streams to Somalis engaging in piracy. The U.S. can achieve this strategic effect by
focusing its efforts on fisheries redevelopment, which represents the greatest potential for economic
and social development in Somalia. By ensuring the rights of Somalia within its EEZ, directing U.S. aid
toward Somali fishermen, and employing existing government programs to develop a novel aquaculture

industry, the U.S. can achieve its security objectives and help to foster a stable and moderate Somalia.

Historical Fisheries in Somalia

The marine fisheries industry has historically held an important position in the Somali economy
and culture. Somalia has a large coastline, covering 3,300 kilometers and a corresponding EEZ covering
39,000 kilometersIn 1990, prior to the collapse of the Somali government, fisheries contributed 2

Jeff Vogel is a 2012 graduate of the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed in this article are the
author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Naval War College, the Department of Navy, or
any other federal agency or department.

13
FISHING FOR ANSWERS TO PIRACY IN SOMALIA /luce.nt/Annex 93

percent of the overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP), an estimated $15 million USD per annum, while
2
providing over 18,000 tonnes of fish for human consumption. Domestic demand for fish remains high
throughout the country, “especially in the capital Mogadishu. . . since fish consumption is estimated at
3
over 9 tonnes per day.” Redevelopment of the fisheries industry represents an opportunity to
reinvigorate the Somali economy. Furthermore, the inability of Asian and European countries to meet

their domestic demand for fish within their own EEZs drives IUU fishing throughout African waters.
These countries, if pressured to comply with international laws regulating fishing rights, represent

tremendous prospective trading partners for Somali fishermen.

Collapse of Somali Fisheries

Article 56 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ratified by Somalia

in 1989, provides Somalia with “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the
4
seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil.” Additionally, UNCLOS Article 58 provides that “states shall
have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal state and shall comply with the laws and
5
regulations adopted by the coastal State.” Somalis have clear rights to harvest fish stocks from their EEZ
under UNCLOS; however, these rights are predicated upon the ability of Somalia to protect its waters

and the good faith of signatory states to respect these sovereign rights.

The collapse of the Somali government in 1991 created a significant void in the ability of Somalia

to protect its EEZ. Elliott Anderson points out that “The absence of a functional method for enforcement
of maritime fishing law, due to a non-functioning government and complete lack of naval force, meant
6
that fishing vessels from Europe and Asia were able to deplete the nation’s fisheries.” The United
Nations estimated that in 2005 over 700 unlicensed foreign vessels were fishing in Somali waters. The

Marine Resources Assessment Group estimates that the total value of fish stocks removed from Somali
waters each year totals over 100 million US dollars. This number represents nearly 15% of the total

Somali GDP from 1990 and is likely a larger percentage of the current GDP. The catch sizes are nearly ten
times more than prior to 1991 because Somalis typically use artisanal fishing methods and have not had

the benefit of new fishing technologies used by foreign fishermen. Additionally, foreign fishermen have
no stake in the future of Somali fish stocks and are willing to over-fish species that are slow to

reproduce, such as tuna and sharks, leading to an aggregate collapse in Somali fish stocks.

Fisheries Collapse and Piracy

The absence of a coast guard protecting the Somali EEZ drove Somali fishermen to take direct,
often violent, action against foreign fishermen. Piracy in Somalia thus grew out of the desperate actions

of fishermen, who sought to protect their natural resources and livelihoods. A Somali pirate leader,
Sugule Ali, recently explained that the foundational motive of the Somali pirate remains “to stop illegal
10
fishing and dumping in [Somali] waters.” From the original laudable goal of protecting the Somali EEZ,
however, piracy developed into a multi-million dollar industry as opportunistic Somali militants realized

the profit potential of holding foreign mariners and cargo for ransom. Piracy quickly grew beyond the
original fishermen as Somalis with ties to various militias, who also lacked sufficient economic

14
FISHING FOR ANSWERS TO PIRACY IN SOMALIA /luce.nt/percent of the overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP), an estimated $15 million USD per annum, while
2
providing over 18,000 tonnes of fish for human consumption. Domestic demand for fish remains high
throughout the country, “especially in the capital Mogadishu. . . since fish consumption is estimated at
3
over 9 tonnes per day.” Redevelopment of the fisheries industry represents an opportunity to
reinvigorate the Somali economy. Furthermore, the inability of Asian and European countries to meet

their domestic demand for fish within their own EEZs drives IUU fishing throughout African waters.
These countries, if pressured to comply with international laws regulating fishing rights, represent

tremendous prospective trading partners for Somali fishermen.

Collapse of Somali Fisheries

Article 56 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ratified by Somalia

in 1989, provides Somalia with “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the
4
seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil.” Additionally, UNCLOS Article 58 provides that “states shall
have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal state and shall comply with the laws and
5
regulations adopted by the coastal State.” Somalis have clear rights to harvest fish stocks from their EEZ
under UNCLOS; however, these rights are predicated upon the ability of Somalia to protect its waters

and the good faith of signatory states to respect these sovereign rights.

The collapse of the Somali government in 1991 created a significant void in the ability of Somalia

to protect its EEZ. Elliott Anderson points out that “The absence of a functional method for enforcement
of maritime fishing law, due to a non-functioning government and complete lack of naval force, meant
6
that fishing vessels from Europe and Asia were able to deplete the nation’s fisheries.” The United
Nations estimated that in 2005 over 700 unlicensed foreign vessels were fishing in Somali waters. The

Marine Resources Assessment Group estimates that the total value of fish stocks removed from Somali
waters each year totals over 100 million US dollars. This number represents nearly 15% of the total

Somali GDP from 1990 and is likely a larger percentage of the current GDP. The catch sizes are nearly ten
times more than prior to 1991 because Somalis typically use artisanal fishing methods and have not had

the benefit of new fishing technologies used by foreign fishermen. Additionally, foreign fishermen have
no stake in the future of Somali fish stocks and are willing to over-fish species that are slow to

reproduce, such as tuna and sharks, leading to an aggregate collapse in Somali fish stocks.

Fisheries Collapse and Piracy

The absence of a coast guard protecting the Somali EEZ drove Somali fishermen to take direct,
often violent, action against foreign fishermen. Piracy in Somalia thus grew out of the desperate actions

of fishermen, who sought to protect their natural resources and livelihoods. A Somali pirate leader,
Sugule Ali, recently explained that the foundational motive of the Somali pirate remains “to stop illegal
10
fishing and dumping in [Somali] waters.” From the original laudable goal of protecting the Somali EEZ,
however, piracy developed into a multi-million dollar industry as opportunistic Somali militants realized

the profit potential of holding foreign mariners and cargo for ransom. Piracy quickly grew beyond the
original fishermen as Somalis with ties to various militias, who also lacked sufficient economic

14
FISHING FOR ANSWERS TO PIRACY IN SOMALIA /luce.nt/Annex 93

pirates with a viable, low risk, and sustainable income alternative. Fisheries development will thereby
reduce the flow of the piracy labor force as well as cut off a vital funding source for Somali militias,

bolstering U.S. economic and security interests.

Legal Reform

To rebuild Somali fisheries, IUU fishing in the Somali EEZ must end, allowing fish stocks to
rebuild. IUU fishing, particularly originating out of Europe and Asia, continues to be a persistent problem
to this day. Estimates show European fishermen take a total catch out of Somali waters worth more
17
than five times the value of European annual aid sent into Somalia. The USS Kidd’s recent rescue of
thirteen Iranian fishermen held hostage by Somali pirates confirms that fishing vessels continue to be a
18
primary target for piracy and reinforces the need to secure the Somali EEZ. Article 56 and 58 of
UNCLOS already provide for the necessary legal rights needed to secure the EEZ, but these provisions

must be enforced. The USmust increase pressure on its NATO allies and Asian trading partners to
respect the substantive provisions of UNCLOS, which the US accepts as conventional international law.

The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) should lead a coalesced
effort through the Navy, Coast Guard, and NATO forces to protect the Somali EEZ from IUU fishing.

Vessels found fishing within the EEZ should be inspected and, if necessary, escorted by force to
international waters. In addition, legal action must be brought against noncompliant countries that

continue to allow their fishing vessels to harvest catches from the Somali EEZ. Annex VI, Article 21 of
UNCLOS provides jurisdiction to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) for all disputes
arising under UNCLOS. 19AFRICOM, CENTCOM, and NATO forces should keep accurate records of any

vessels engaging in IUU fishing so Somalia can bring appropriate action against other signatory countries
before the ITLOS.

The US and its NATO partners cannot, however, be expected to enforce international laws in the
Somali EEZ indefinitely. Therefore, as suggested by Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, UN Assistant Secretary-

General for Political Affairs, the US and its international partners must start “developing Somali capacity
to deal with piracy on land and waters close to shore through the establishment of a coast guard.” Mr.0

Zerihoun’s proposition, however, is merely one piece of a much larger puzzle. A Somali coast guard
would be meaningless without the proper domestic legal infrastructure to prosecute those who are

caught in Somali waters participating in IUU fishing or piracy activities. This legal infrastructure, of
course, cannot exist without a stable and legitimate central government. What results is a causality

dilemma wherein economic development cannot take place without a centralized government but such
a government will not exist until the economic situation improves. It is clear that there is no single
panacea to the Somali problem and both economic and security reform must take place simultaneously.

By focusing on fisheries first, however, both benefits can be achieved incrementally because it provides
economic opportunity while also reducing the Somali pirate’s base. Even at this early stage, plans should

be simultaneously created to allow for the long-term sustainability of Somali redevelopment, such as
the initial training of a Somali coast guard force and preliminary drafting of the supporting legal

framework.

16
FISHING FOR ANSWERS TO PIRACY IN SOMALIA /luce.nt/pirates with a viable, low risk, and sustainable income alternative. Fisheries development will thereby
reduce the flow of the piracy labor force as well as cut off a vital funding source for Somali militias,

bolstering U.S. economic and security interests.

Legal Reform

To rebuild Somali fisheries, IUU fishing in the Somali EEZ must end, allowing fish stocks to
rebuild. IUU fishing, particularly originating out of Europe and Asia, continues to be a persistent problem
to this day. Estimates show European fishermen take a total catch out of Somali waters worth more
17
than five times the value of European annual aid sent into Somalia. The USS Kidd’s recent rescue of
thirteen Iranian fishermen held hostage by Somali pirates confirms that fishing vessels continue to be a
18
primary target for piracy and reinforces the need to secure the Somali EEZ. Article 56 and 58 of
UNCLOS already provide for the necessary legal rights needed to secure the EEZ, but these provisions

must be enforced. The USmust increase pressure on its NATO allies and Asian trading partners to
respect the substantive provisions of UNCLOS, which the US accepts as conventional international law.

The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) should lead a coalesced
effort through the Navy, Coast Guard, and NATO forces to protect the Somali EEZ from IUU fishing.

Vessels found fishing within the EEZ should be inspected and, if necessary, escorted by force to
international waters. In addition, legal action must be brought against noncompliant countries that

continue to allow their fishing vessels to harvest catches from the Somali EEZ. Annex VI, Article 21 of
UNCLOS provides jurisdiction to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) for all disputes
arising under UNCLOS. 19AFRICOM, CENTCOM, and NATO forces should keep accurate records of any

vessels engaging in IUU fishing so Somalia can bring appropriate action against other signatory countries
before the ITLOS.

The US and its NATO partners cannot, however, be expected to enforce international laws in the
Somali EEZ indefinitely. Therefore, as suggested by Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, UN Assistant Secretary-

General for Political Affairs, the US and its international partners must start “developing Somali capacity
to deal with piracy on land and waters close to shore through the establishment of a coast guard.” Mr.0

Zerihoun’s proposition, however, is merely one piece of a much larger puzzle. A Somali coast guard
would be meaningless without the proper domestic legal infrastructure to prosecute those who are

caught in Somali waters participating in IUU fishing or piracy activities. This legal infrastructure, of
course, cannot exist without a stable and legitimate central government. What results is a causality

dilemma wherein economic development cannot take place without a centralized government but such
a government will not exist until the economic situation improves. It is clear that there is no single
panacea to the Somali problem and both economic and security reform must take place simultaneously.

By focusing on fisheries first, however, both benefits can be achieved incrementally because it provides
economic opportunity while also reducing the Somali pirate’s base. Even at this early stage, plans should

be simultaneously created to allow for the long-term sustainability of Somali redevelopment, such as
the initial training of a Somali coast guard force and preliminary drafting of the supporting legal

framework.

16
FISHING FOR ANSWERS TO PIRACY IN SOMALIA /luce.nt/Annex 93

that they can perform the necessary repairs. This education would not only allow for greater use of the
provided fishing equipment, but will also help to develop a secondary marine mechanic industry,

allowing for further domestic economic development. USAID has budget constraints; however, the
primary and secondary effects of the suggested aid programs would provide for greater economic

development in Somalia than could be achieved through the delivery of food aid and agrarian support
alone. In addition, the proposed programs would provide tremendous nutritional potential for the

Somali population while having a direct and substantial impact on U.S. security and international trade.

Aquaculture

There is an additional opportunity to grow Somali fisheries beyond previous levels through the
development of a new aquaculture industry. Somalia’s rich waters and pelagic species provide an idyllic

setting for the development of a fish-farming industry. Aquaculture now represents over 30 percent of
all fish products consumer worldwide, accounting for over 52.5 billion USD per annum and could have a
23
remarkable impact on the Somali economy. Additionally, reliance on aquaculture would allow wild fish
stocks sufficient time to rebuild, ensuring the environmental sustainability of a redeveloped Somali

fisheries industry.

A perfect model for aquaculture development already exists in Chile. The rise of aquaculture in

Chile has caused many artisanal fishermen to transition to aquaculture due to the guarantee of a steady
paycheck. Chile is now one of the top five fish-producing countries in the world, with aquaculture
products accounting for 46.5 percent of its total fish exports. A partnership between the Chilean

government and international nonprofit organizations led the development of the Chilean aquaculture
industry. The Chilean artisanal fishing culture was also a key component during the development of

the Chilean aquaculture industry. This cultural consideration helped to ease the transition to sustainable
aquaculture practices and yielded a higher satisfaction of life for Chilean fishermen. Using the Chilean

model, USAID, NOAA, AFRICOM, and CENTCOM should engage with nonprofit organizations to develop a
Somali aquaculture industry. Somali waters are home to many of the same fish and mollusks found in

Chilean waters; therefore, much of the requisite technology already exists. It would also be imperative
to account for Somali fishing culture, to empower stakeholders in the transition from artisanal fishing to

modern aquaculture practices. Direct communication with Somali representatives would also be a
necessary during the development process. To achieve the greatest efficiency, engaging AFRICOM’s in-

theater resources to work with local populations and to act as sensors in identifying any potential
development opportunities is essential.

The complete development of a Somali aquaculture industry would require a significant
investment in infrastructure and education. To encourage domestic investment, the US could explore

the use of amnesty programs for those currently engaging in piracy. For example, amnesty could be
granted to those funding piracy in exchange for disarmament, repentance, and investment in

aquaculture projects. Similar programs have been attempted by the Nigerian government, which has
offered education and business development assistance in exchange for disarmament in an effort to
27
reduce terrorism in Niger Delta, with positive results. Amnesty would allow those that take advantage
of the program to reap the financial benefits of aquaculture development while providing a tremendous

18
FISHING FOR ANSWERS TO PIRACY IN SOMALIA /luce.nt/that they can perform the necessary repairs. This education would not only allow for greater use of the
provided fishing equipment, but will also help to develop a secondary marine mechanic industry,

allowing for further domestic economic development. USAID has budget constraints; however, the
primary and secondary effects of the suggested aid programs would provide for greater economic

development in Somalia than could be achieved through the delivery of food aid and agrarian support
alone. In addition, the proposed programs would provide tremendous nutritional potential for the

Somali population while having a direct and substantial impact on U.S. security and international trade.

Aquaculture

There is an additional opportunity to grow Somali fisheries beyond previous levels through the
development of a new aquaculture industry. Somalia’s rich waters and pelagic species provide an idyllic

setting for the development of a fish-farming industry. Aquaculture now represents over 30 percent of
all fish products consumer worldwide, accounting for over 52.5 billion USD per annum and could have a
23
remarkable impact on the Somali economy. Additionally, reliance on aquaculture would allow wild fish
stocks sufficient time to rebuild, ensuring the environmental sustainability of a redeveloped Somali

fisheries industry.

A perfect model for aquaculture development already exists in Chile. The rise of aquaculture in

Chile has caused many artisanal fishermen to transition to aquaculture due to the guarantee of a steady
paycheck. Chile is now one of the top five fish-producing countries in the world, with aquaculture
products accounting for 46.5 percent of its total fish exports. A partnership between the Chilean

government and international nonprofit organizations led the development of the Chilean aquaculture
industry. The Chilean artisanal fishing culture was also a key component during the development of

the Chilean aquaculture industry. This cultural consideration helped to ease the transition to sustainable
aquaculture practices and yielded a higher satisfaction of life for Chilean fishermen. Using the Chilean

model, USAID, NOAA, AFRICOM, and CENTCOM should engage with nonprofit organizations to develop a
Somali aquaculture industry. Somali waters are home to many of the same fish and mollusks found in

Chilean waters; therefore, much of the requisite technology already exists. It would also be imperative
to account for Somali fishing culture, to empower stakeholders in the transition from artisanal fishing to

modern aquaculture practices. Direct communication with Somali representatives would also be a
necessary during the development process. To achieve the greatest efficiency, engaging AFRICOM’s in-

theater resources to work with local populations and to act as sensors in identifying any potential
development opportunities is essential.

The complete development of a Somali aquaculture industry would require a significant
investment in infrastructure and education. To encourage domestic investment, the US could explore

the use of amnesty programs for those currently engaging in piracy. For example, amnesty could be
granted to those funding piracy in exchange for disarmament, repentance, and investment in

aquaculture projects. Similar programs have been attempted by the Nigerian government, which has
offered education and business development assistance in exchange for disarmament in an effort to
27
reduce terrorism in Niger Delta, with positive results. Amnesty would allow those that take advantage
of the program to reap the financial benefits of aquaculture development while providing a tremendous

18
FISHING FOR ANSWERS TO PIRACY IN SOMALIA /luce.nt/Annex 93

4United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 56 (1982), 40.
5
6Ibid., Art. 58, 44.
Elliott A. Anderson, “It's a Pirate's Life for Some: The Development of an Illegal Industry in Response to an Unjust
Global Power Dynamic,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2010), 327.
7
Sean Kane, “Fishing for the Motives that Lie Behind Piracy,” Lloyd’s List, (Mar. 5, 2008), 19.
8Marine Resources Assessment Group, “Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in

Developing Countries,” (June 17, 2005), 6.
9Anderson, “It's a Pirate's Life for some: The Development of an Illegal Industry in Response to an Unjust Global

10wer Dynamic,” 328.
Ganesh, Arun, “How Western Companies Motive Somali Pirates,” Business Pundit, (Fed. 22, 2011).
11Ibid., 65.
12
Derek S. Reveron, Exporting Security (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 127.
13CMDR Bruce A. Apgar, Jr., USN, “USAWC Strategy Research Project: Countering 21 Century Piracy in the Horn of

Africa,” (Feb. 2010), 5.
14ICC International Maritime Bureau, “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report for the Period 1 July 2011 –

30 December 2011,” 5-6.
15 1Yoshihara, Toshi. “Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: Missed Opportunities?” Naval War College, Newport, RI,

16an. 9, 2012). Lecture.
Sunguta West, “Piracy Revenues Financing Warlords in Somali Insurgency,” Terrorism Focus, Vol. 4 No. 42
(Dec.19, 2007).
17
Toumi, Habib. “What the Media Conviently Ignores,” Gulf News, (June 27, 2009).
18Chiver, C.J. “For Iranians Held by Pirates, U.S. to the Rescue.” New York Times, (Jan. 7, 2012), A1.
19
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Annex VI, Art. 21 (1982), p. 183.
20“Current Efforts to Stem Piracy Off Coast Must Be Strengthened.” UN News Service, (Oct. 31, 2011).
21
22FAO, “Fishery Country Profile: The Somali Republic,” 8.
16 U.S.C. § 1861a(b).
23Ana Pitchon, “Sea Hunters or Sea Farmers? Transitions in Chilean Fisheries,” Human Organization, Vol. 70 No. 2

(2011), 201.
24Ibid., 201.
25
Ibid., 203.
26Ibid., 205.
27
Ogunmade, Omololu, “Amnesty Has Boosted Economic Growth,” This Day (Nigeria), (Dec. 16, 2011).

20
FISHING FOR ANSWERS TO PIRACY IN SOMALIA /luce.nt/ Annex 94

L. Persson et al., “Failed State: Reconstruction of Domestic Fisheries Catches in Somalia 1950-
2010”, University of British Columbia Working Papers Series, Working Paper No. 2014-10
(2014) Annex 94

Fisheries Centre

The University of British Columbia

Working Paper Series

Working Paper #2014 - 10

Failed State: Reconstruction of Domestic Fisheries
Catches in Somalia 1950-2010

Lo Persson, Alasdair Lindop, Sarah Harper, Kyrstn Zylich
and Dirk Zeller

Year: 2014

Email: d.zeller@�isheries.ubc.ca

This working paper is made available by the Fisheries Centre, University
of British
Columbia, Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z4, Canada.Annex 94
Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

Failed state:

Reconstruction of domestic fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

a b b b b*
Lo Persson, Alasdair Lindop, Sarah Harper, Kyrstn Zylich and Dirk Zeller

a
Sveriges Lantbruksuniversitet, Umeå, Sweden
bSea Around Us, Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia

* Corresponding author:[email protected]

Abstract
Somalia is a country in north eastern Africa that has suffered a high degree of political and social

instability since the collapse of its last national government in 1991. This study reconstructs domestic

fisheries catch data between 1950 and 2010, including the industrial, artisanal, subsistenceand

recreational sectors. We found that the Somali reconstructed totalcatch was nearly two times the

landings reported by the FAO on behalf of Somalia for the time period, most of which is attributed to the

reconstructed small-scale sector. Although there is an initial decline in catchesafter the collapse of

government, small-scale catches increase significantly after the mid-1990s, as a result of increased

private investment in artisanal fisheries, changes in seafood consumption habits and population

displacement to the coast due to the civil war. However, the absence of monitoring and enforcement in

Somali waters, coupled with the lack of transparency amongst international monitoring agencies in the
Indian Ocean, resulted in a lack of reliable data for the significant level ofillegal and semi-illegal foreign

fishing activity also taking place in Somalia’s EEZ and therefore it is not included in this study.

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 1 Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

Failed state:

Reconstruction of domestic fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

a b b b b*
Lo Persson, Alasdair Lindop, Sarah Harper, Kyrstn Zylich and Dirk Zeller

a
Sveriges Lantbruksuniversitet, Umeå, Sweden
b Sea Around Us, Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia

* Corresponding author:[email protected]

Abstract
Somalia is a country in north eastern Africa that has suffered a high degree of political and social

instability since the collapse of its last national government in 1991. This study reconstructs domestic

fisheries catch data between 1950 and 2010, including the industrial, artisanal, subsistenceand

recreational sectors. We found that the Somali reconstructed totalcatch was nearly two times the

landings reported by the FAO on behalf of Somalia for the time period, most of which is attributed to the

reconstructed small-scale sector. Although there is an initial decline in catchesafter the collapse of

government, small-scale catches increase significantly after the mid-1990s, as a result of increased

private investment in artisanal fisheries, changes in seafood consumption habits and population

displacement to the coast due to the civil war. However, the absence of monitoring and enforcement in

Somali waters, coupled with the lack of transparency amongst international monitoring agencies in the
Indian Ocean, resulted in a lack of reliable data for the significant level ofillegal and semi-illegal foreign

fishing activity also taking place in Somalia’s EEZ and therefore it is not included in this study.

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 1Annex 94
Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

2010). Due to the fighting, recent population numbers are highly uncertain and range from about 8-10

million (Kelleher 1998; Anon. 2009b).

After the fall of the Siad Barre Government in 1990, Somalia was not able to effectively manage its

natural resources due to the lack of effective national governance (Kelleher 1998 ; Jennings 2001).
Although foreign fishing in the offshore waters off Somalia was prevalent during the early decades from

1950 to 1980, no major illegal fishing incidents or confrontations with foreign vessels was reported

during that time period (Sabriye 2005). Given that EEZs were not internationally recognized until the late

1970s or early 1980s, and Somalia’s status and recognition of their claim for jurisdiction beyond 12 nm

territorial waters remains uncertain and challengeable ( but see below), any such offshore fishing was

only considered ‘illegal’ in the context of international law with the ratification of UNCLOS by Somalia in

1989. As Somalia declared a 200 nm territorial sea in 1971 that is contested and not based on accepted

international law ( Schofield 2008), but ratified UNCLOS in 198 9, this ratification could be argued to
supersede Somalia’s previous territorial sea claim and replace it with a legitimate 200 nm EEZ since 1989

(C. Schofield, pers. comm.). Furthermore, the effective collapse of the national government in 1990 also

exposed its coastal waters to un controlled access by foreign fleets ( Samatar 2007). During the post -

regime period, the state failed to exercise its rights both at land and sea due to a dysfunctional

government (Dupont 2003).

Several issues contributed to the problem with unregulated and unlicensed fishing vessels. The majority

of Somalia’s maritime neighbours are not equipped with adequate monitoring, control and surveillance

(MCS) infrastructure to address violations by foreign fishing vessels. This includes Kenya(Anon. 2008a,
2008b, 2008d), Tanzania (Anon. 2008e) , Yemen (Anon. 2009a). None of these countries have regular or

adequate fisheries observer schemes, port state control, mandatory Vessel Monitoring System (VMS)

requirements or aerial surveillance for foreign vessels operating in their own EEZs. After the fall of Siad

Barre’s government inthe early 1990s, the majority of Somali licensed foreign vessels re-flagged their

vessels to Kenya or Flag of Convenience countries (e.g., Belize, Honduras) to conduct illegal fishing

operations in Somali waters (Kulmiye 2001; Anon. 2008c). Starting in the mid 1990s, foreign illegal

fishing vessels started encountering increasing resistance from local clans along Somalia’s coastline, and

started paying local warlords and militia a nominal amount for protection to fish in local waters. The

1
“Tanzania, SADC join forces against illegal fishing”. Available at www.stopillegalfishing.com [Accessed Feb. 2010].

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 3 Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

2010). Due to the fighting, recent population numbers are highly uncertain and range from about 8-10

million (Kelleher 1998; Anon. 2009b).

After the fall of the Siad Barre Government in 1990, Somalia was not able to effectively manage its

natural resources due to the lack of effective national governance (Kelleher 1998 ; Jennings 2001).
Although foreign fishing in the offshore waters off Somalia was prevalent during the early decades from

1950 to 1980, no major illegal fishing incidents or confrontations with foreign vessels was reported

during that time period (Sabriye 2005). Given that EEZs were not internationally recognized until the late

1970s or early 1980s, and Somalia’s status and recognition of their claim for jurisdiction beyond 12 nm

territorial waters remains uncertain and challengeable ( but see below), any such offshore fishing was

only considered ‘illegal’ in the context of international law with the ratification of UNCLOS by Somalia in

1989. As Somalia declared a 200 nm territorial sea in 1971 that is contested and not based on accepted

international law ( Schofield 2008), but ratified UNCLOS in 198 9, this ratification could be argued to
supersede Somalia’s previous territorial sea claim and replace it with a legitimate 200 nm EEZ since 1989

(C. Schofield, pers. comm.). Furthermore, the effective collapse of the national government in 1990 also

exposed its coastal waters to un controlled access by foreign fleets ( Samatar 2007). During the post -

regime period, the state failed to exercise its rights both at land and sea due to a dysfunctional

government (Dupont 2003).

Several issues contributed to the problem with unregulated and unlicensed fishing vessels. The majority

of Somalia’s maritime neighbours are not equipped with adequate monitoring, control and surveillance

(MCS) infrastructure to address violations by foreign fishing vessels. This includes Kenya(Anon. 2008a,
2008b, 2008d), Tanzania (Anon. 2008e) , Yemen (Anon. 2009a). None of these countries have regular or

adequate fisheries observer schemes, port state control, mandatory Vessel Monitoring System (VMS)

requirements or aerial surveillance for foreign vessels operating in their own EEZs. After the fall of Siad

Barre’s government inthe early 1990s, the majority of Somali licensed foreign vessels re-flagged their

vessels to Kenya or Flag of Convenience countries (e.g., Belize, Honduras) to conduct illegal fishing

operations in Somali waters (Kulmiye 2001; Anon. 2008c). Starting in the mid 1990s, foreign illegal

fishing vessels started encountering increasing resistance from local clans along Somalia’s coastline, and

started paying local warlords and militia a nominal amount for protection to fish in local waters. The

1
“Tanzania, SADC join forces against illegal fishing”. Available at www.stopillegalfishing.com [Accessed Feb. 2010].

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 3Annex 94
Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

according to Yassin (1981) SOMALFISH exported between 10,000 -20,000 t·year . After the Soviets

terminated their operations in Somalia, industrial fishing was carried out through joint ventures and

licensing of foreign vessels from countries such as Italy, Japan, Greece, Singapore and Egypt (Van Zalinge
2
1988) as well as China. SOMALFISH itself purchased two Australian built shrimp trawlers and nine

Yugoslavian built trawlers (Lawrence 1980). The two Australian vessels started operating in the late

1970s, but it is unclear if the nine Yugoslavian trawlers ever operated (Haakonsen 1983). An Italian

company called Amoroso e Figli operated three freezer trawlers off the north east coast in 1978 and

1979 (Stromme 1987). SIDACO, a joint venture between Somalia and Iraq was formed in1977 (FAO

1978). However, according to Haakonsen (1983) their vessels never operated, while another source

(Anon. 1982) stated that in 1982 SIDACO operated four trawlers. SOMITFISH, a joint venture between
Somalia and Italy, operated three Italian built trawlers between 1981 and 1983 (Van Zalinge 1988). In

1983, ten Japanese longliners were fishing for large pelagic fish, and in 1984 six Japanese and eighteen

Korean longliners fished in Somali waters. In 1983 and 1984, Romanian trawlers fished for small pelagic

fish as a scientific expedition. Italian and Japanese bottom trawlers as well as several pelagic pair

trawlers from Singapore operated in Somali waters in late 1984 (Elmer 1985). In 1985, ten licenses were

issued to foreign vessels from four different countries (Anon. 1987). After a few years of inactivity,

SOMITFISH was re-established as SHIFCO, and with new and rehabilitated vessels started operations in

1987 (Anon. 1988; Sabriye 2005). In addition, five Italian trawlers and one French trawler were licensed

to fish in Somali waters (Anon. 1988). During the 1980s, China increasingly supported the Siad Barre

government with direct supplies of weapons and other military supplies. In exchange, Somalia

transferred its territorial fishing rights to China, which was formalized through an agreement signed in

1989. In essence this was a ‘guns-for-fish’ agreement. It is likely that with the fall of the Siad Barre

government in 1990, this fishing may have continued uncontrolled for some time.

Post 1991: collapsed government
The Siad Barre regime maintained a surveillance force to protect the offshore waters of Somalia,

although nothing is known about its effectiveness. When the government collapsed in 1991, the waters

were left unmonitored and unguarded, and this was exploited by fishing vessels from various countries

2
Country Studies Series by Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress . Available at www.country-
data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12055.html [Accessed August 2012].

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 5 Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

according to Yassin (1981) SOMALFISH exported between 10,000 -20,000 t·year . After the Soviets

terminated their operations in Somalia, industrial fishing was carried out through joint ventures and

licensing of foreign vessels from countries such as Italy, Japan, Greece, Singapore and Egypt (Van Zalinge
2
1988) as well as China. SOMALFISH itself purchased two Australian built shrimp trawlers and nine

Yugoslavian built trawlers (Lawrence 1980). The two Australian vessels started operating in the late

1970s, but it is unclear if the nine Yugoslavian trawlers ever operated (Haakonsen 1983). An Italian

company called Amoroso e Figli operated three freezer trawlers off the north east coast in 1978 and

1979 (Stromme 1987). SIDACO, a joint venture between Somalia and Iraq was formed in1977 (FAO

1978). However, according to Haakonsen (1983) their vessels never operated, while another source

(Anon. 1982) stated that in 1982 SIDACO operated four trawlers. SOMITFISH, a joint venture between
Somalia and Italy, operated three Italian built trawlers between 1981 and 1983 (Van Zalinge 1988). In

1983, ten Japanese longliners were fishing for large pelagic fish, and in 1984 six Japanese and eighteen

Korean longliners fished in Somali waters. In 1983 and 1984, Romanian trawlers fished for small pelagic

fish as a scientific expedition. Italian and Japanese bottom trawlers as well as several pelagic pair

trawlers from Singapore operated in Somali waters in late 1984 (Elmer 1985). In 1985, ten licenses were

issued to foreign vessels from four different countries (Anon. 1987). After a few years of inactivity,

SOMITFISH was re-established as SHIFCO, and with new and rehabilitated vessels started operations in

1987 (Anon. 1988; Sabriye 2005). In addition, five Italian trawlers and one French trawler were licensed

to fish in Somali waters (Anon. 1988). During the 1980s, China increasingly supported the Siad Barre

government with direct supplies of weapons and other military supplies. In exchange, Somalia

transferred its territorial fishing rights to China, which was formalized through an agreement signed in

1989. In essence this was a ‘guns-for-fish’ agreement. It is likely that with the fall of the Siad Barre

government in 1990, this fishing may have continued uncontrolled for some time.

Post 1991: collapsed government
The Siad Barre regime maintained a surveillance force to protect the offshore waters of Somalia,

although nothing is known about its effectiveness. When the government collapsed in 1991, the waters

were left unmonitored and unguarded, and this was exploited by fishing vessels from various countries

2
Country Studies Series by Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress . Available at www.country-
data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12055.html [Accessed August 2012].

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 5Annex 94
Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

parts and infrastructure. The small-scale fishers also suffered from the cessation of government support

(Lovatelli 1996) and their catches declined (Kelleher 1998). However, in later years,the absence of

government control of the fishing industry resulted in increased influence of the privatesector and

entrepreneurs which was the main force behind the gradual revival of the fishing trade (Lovatelli 1996).

In more recent times, the investment from the private sector together with foreign aid, and also the

change in consumption habits of Somalis seemto have resulted in an expansion of the small-scale
fisheries sector and substantially increased small-scalecatches in the post-war period (Gulaid 2004;

Mohamed and Herzi 2005; Sabriye 2005).

Lack of statistics and reliable data

Lack of sufficient and reliable statistics was identified as a majorproblem for the development and

management of fisheries in the Indian Ocean (IOFC 1982). The Somali Ministry of Fisheries does not

seem to have had a tradition of collecting fisheries statistics. For example, Elmer(1985) reported that it
was difficult to make the Ministry pay the people responsible for gathering of data, as there was a lack

of understanding of the importance of data collection. The national legislation in Somalia (i.e., the

Maritime Code) also hindered the gathering of fisheries statistics since it did not give the Ministry of

Fisheries the authority to collect fishing data. The national statistics law did cover data collection to

some extent, however, it did not include provisions ensuring the Ministry of Fisheries would receive

data on fisheries (Lawrence 1980). The absence of workable government institutions since the late

1980s has prolonged and exacerbated the problem of unreliable data (UNEP 2005).

The existing fisheries statistics from the 1970s and the 1980s are thought to be incomplete. For

example, the ‘production from all sectors’ in 1985as reported by the Somali government (Anon. 1985),

was based solelyon catchesby the 23 co-operatives and re-settlements, the offshore catches, and the

purchases by companies from small-scale artisanal fishers. The reported production from the co-
operatives and re-settlements was deemed to represent the artisanal (i.e., small-scale, commercial)

production and was reported as 6,223 t in 1985. This is thought to be an underestimate, since it

excluded data from fishing villages along the coast that were not part of a co-operative. For example,

Jennings (1998) reported 31 fishing communities, while Mohamed and Herzi(2005) suggested that

before the civil war there were about 50 fishing villages. Furthermore, the FAO country profile reports

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 7 Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

parts and infrastructure. The small-scale fishers also suffered from the cessation of government support

(Lovatelli 1996) and their catches declined (Kelleher 1998). However, in later years,the absence of

government control of the fishing industry resulted in increased influence of the privatesector and

entrepreneurs which was the main force behind the gradual revival of the fishing trade (Lovatelli 1996).

In more recent times, the investment from the private sector together with foreign aid, and also the

change in consumption habits of Somalis seemto have resulted in an expansion of the small-scale
fisheries sector and substantially increased small-scalecatches in the post-war period (Gulaid 2004;

Mohamed and Herzi 2005; Sabriye 2005).

Lack of statistics and reliable data

Lack of sufficient and reliable statistics was identified as a majorproblem for the development and

management of fisheries in the Indian Ocean (IOFC 1982). The Somali Ministry of Fisheries does not

seem to have had a tradition of collecting fisheries statistics. For example, Elmer(1985) reported that it
was difficult to make the Ministry pay the people responsible for gathering of data, as there was a lack

of understanding of the importance of data collection. The national legislation in Somalia (i.e., the

Maritime Code) also hindered the gathering of fisheries statistics since it did not give the Ministry of

Fisheries the authority to collect fishing data. The national statistics law did cover data collection to

some extent, however, it did not include provisions ensuring the Ministry of Fisheries would receive

data on fisheries (Lawrence 1980). The absence of workable government institutions since the late

1980s has prolonged and exacerbated the problem of unreliable data (UNEP 2005).

The existing fisheries statistics from the 1970s and the 1980s are thought to be incomplete. For

example, the ‘production from all sectors’ in 1985as reported by the Somali government (Anon. 1985),

was based solelyon catchesby the 23 co-operatives and re-settlements, the offshore catches, and the

purchases by companies from small-scale artisanal fishers. The reported production from the co-
operatives and re-settlements was deemed to represent the artisanal (i.e., small-scale, commercial)

production and was reported as 6,223 t in 1985. This is thought to be an underestimate, since it

excluded data from fishing villages along the coast that were not part of a co-operative. For example,

Jennings (1998) reported 31 fishing communities, while Mohamed and Herzi(2005) suggested that

before the civil war there were about 50 fishing villages. Furthermore, the FAO country profile reports

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 7Annex 94
Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

acceptability for various species by markets, onboard storage capacity, and distance to port, between

40% and 80% of the total catchwas discarded(Tussing et al. 1974). In the shrimp trawl fishery, discards
may have been as high as 90% (Hariri 1985). For later years, Kelleher (2005) reported that the general

discard rates in the western Indian Ocean were 9% in the tuna fishery, 92.3% in the shark fin fishery, 30-

40% in the long-range longline fishery, 5% in the purse seine fishery, and 21.7% in regular longline

fisheries. Kelleher (2005) did not report a specific demersal trawling discard rate for the western Indian

Ocean, but his global weighted average discard rate for demersal finfish trawling was 19.6%.

Small-scale fisheries

In the small-scale fishery, a large number of different species are fished and consumed (Mohamed and

Herzi 2005), although pelagic species suchas tuna and mackerel are commonly favored (Costello et al.
2012). Furthermore, in some casesor areas, this fishery may focus on a narrow range of species for

retention (UNEP 2005). Kelleher (2005) reports that east African artisanal fisheries have negligible

discards. However, due to the eating habits of the Somalis, the lack of storage/processing facilities and

market opportunities, some sources acknowledged that discarding occurred also in the small-scale

fishery (e.g. Lovatelli 1996; Mohamed and Herzi 2005)

Here, discarding by small-scalefisheries is considered negligible overall, andhas not been included in

the catch reconstruction.Discarding of shark meat as part of the shark fin fishery, however, has been

estimated here. Many of the small-scale fishers target shark for their fins and only a few of the fishers

retain the meat (Lovatelli 1996).

Overall, we follow a catch reconstruction approach as described by Zelleret al. (2007), with the main

purpose of comprehensively estimating total catches taken from the EEZ-equivalent waters of Somalia
since 1950, by domestic fisheries.

Methods

Somalia’s domestic fisheries

Landings data for Somalia supplied to FAO were reported as ‘marine fishes nei’, ‘cephalopodsnei’ and
‘tropical spiny lobster nei’, and were assumed to represent industrial catches, the production from the

co-operatives and purchases of some artisanal catches by smaller companies. Here, the total reported

landings were assigned to small-scaleand industrial fisheries based on a breakdown of landings between

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 9 Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

acceptability for various species by markets, onboard storage capacity, and distance to port, between

40% and 80% of the total catchwas discarded(Tussing et al. 1974). In the shrimp trawl fishery, discards
may have been as high as 90% (Hariri 1985). For later years, Kelleher (2005) reported that the general

discard rates in the western Indian Ocean were 9% in the tuna fishery, 92.3% in the shark fin fishery, 30-

40% in the long-range longline fishery, 5% in the purse seine fishery, and 21.7% in regular longline

fisheries. Kelleher (2005) did not report a specific demersal trawling discard rate for the western Indian

Ocean, but his global weighted average discard rate for demersal finfish trawling was 19.6%.

Small-scale fisheries

In the small-scale fishery, a large number of different species are fished and consumed (Mohamed and

Herzi 2005), although pelagic species suchas tuna and mackerel are commonly favored (Costello et al.
2012). Furthermore, in some casesor areas, this fishery may focus on a narrow range of species for

retention (UNEP 2005). Kelleher (2005) reports that east African artisanal fisheries have negligible

discards. However, due to the eating habits of the Somalis, the lack of storage/processing facilities and

market opportunities, some sources acknowledged that discarding occurred also in the small-scale

fishery (e.g. Lovatelli 1996; Mohamed and Herzi 2005)

Here, discarding by small-scalefisheries is considered negligible overall, andhas not been included in

the catch reconstruction.Discarding of shark meat as part of the shark fin fishery, however, has been

estimated here. Many of the small-scale fishers target shark for their fins and only a few of the fishers

retain the meat (Lovatelli 1996).

Overall, we follow a catch reconstruction approach as described by Zelleret al. (2007), with the main

purpose of comprehensively estimating total catches taken from the EEZ-equivalent waters of Somalia
since 1950, by domestic fisheries.

Methods

Somalia’s domestic fisheries

Landings data for Somalia supplied to FAO were reported as ‘marine fishes nei’, ‘cephalopodsnei’ and
‘tropical spiny lobster nei’, and were assumed to represent industrial catches, the production from the

co-operatives and purchases of some artisanal catches by smaller companies. Here, the total reported

landings were assigned to small-scaleand industrial fisheries based on a breakdown of landings between

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 9Annex 94
Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

(Table 2). To complete the time series, linear interpolation was done between the derived catch anchor

points and the catches reported in 1962 and 2005 (Table 2).

Number of operational boats

The traditional boats in Somalia are the wooden canoe called ‘houri’, and the less common sail boats

called ‘beden’ or ‘mashua’ (Lovatelli 1996). According to Thurow and Kroll (1962), the small-scale fishing

fleet in the early 1960s consisted of 1,875houris of whom 1,500 were always active, 175beden of which
150 were always operating, and 25 other boats (called ‘dunnis’), together accounting for a total catch of

16,500 t (Table 2). Thus, the fraction of traditional boats that were operational at any one time was

about 80%. This fraction was applied to the reported total number of traditional fishing boats in later

years (see below).

During the 1970s, a number of motorized boats were issued through fisheries development programs.

Haakonsen(1983) reported that 685 motorized boats had been providedduring the previous years and
that 500 of those boats were issued during the five year development program 1974-1978. According to

Hariri (1985), 700 motorized boats were issued from 1972 onwards, and by the late 1970s only 40%

were working. UNDP/FAO (1992) reported that 600 motorized boats were issued between 1974-1978

and that in 1979, 150 new engines were provided by the UK to rehabilitate some of these boats.

Jennings (1998) reported that 600 motorized boats were issued and that within five years only 20% were

working. According toLovatelli (1996), 450 boats had been issued by 1982. As the number of motorized

boats reported by the above sources are all in the same range, we used the earliest source (i.e.,
Haakonsen 1983). The year 1978 is in the middle of the ten year period reported on by Haakonsen

(1983) for the distribution of 685 boats, hence we assumed that all boats were distributed by 1978 to

create an anchor point. By the time the report was written (1983), more than 50%, and maybe as much

as 75%, of the distributed motorized boats were not operating due to lack of spare parts and knowledge

on maintenance(Haakonsen 1983). Hence, we assumed that 40% were working and applied this to the

total number of motorized boats to derive a total of 274 operational motorized boats for 1978(i.e., 685

* 0.4 = 274).

The traditional boats are thought to have had a muchhigher fraction that were operational, due to

lower mechanization and easier, more traditional maintenance requirements. Therefore, the fraction of

operating traditional boats (80%) fromThurow and Kroll (1962) was used. Haakonsen (1983) reported

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 11 Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

(Table 2). To complete the time series, linear interpolation was done between the derived catch anchor

points and the catches reported in 1962 and 2005 (Table 2).

Number of operational boats

The traditional boats in Somalia are the wooden canoe called ‘houri’, and the less common sail boats

called ‘beden’ or ‘mashua’ (Lovatelli 1996). According to Thurow and Kroll (1962), the small-scale fishing

fleet in the early 1960s consisted of 1,875houris of whom 1,500 were always active, 175beden of which
150 were always operating, and 25 other boats (called ‘dunnis’), together accounting for a total catch of

16,500 t (Table 2). Thus, the fraction of traditional boats that were operational at any one time was

about 80%. This fraction was applied to the reported total number of traditional fishing boats in later

years (see below).

During the 1970s, a number of motorized boats were issued through fisheries development programs.

Haakonsen(1983) reported that 685 motorized boats had been providedduring the previous years and
that 500 of those boats were issued during the five year development program 1974-1978. According to

Hariri (1985), 700 motorized boats were issued from 1972 onwards, and by the late 1970s only 40%

were working. UNDP/FAO (1992) reported that 600 motorized boats were issued between 1974-1978

and that in 1979, 150 new engines were provided by the UK to rehabilitate some of these boats.

Jennings (1998) reported that 600 motorized boats were issued and that within five years only 20% were

working. According toLovatelli (1996), 450 boats had been issued by 1982. As the number of motorized

boats reported by the above sources are all in the same range, we used the earliest source (i.e.,
Haakonsen 1983). The year 1978 is in the middle of the ten year period reported on by Haakonsen

(1983) for the distribution of 685 boats, hence we assumed that all boats were distributed by 1978 to

create an anchor point. By the time the report was written (1983), more than 50%, and maybe as much

as 75%, of the distributed motorized boats were not operating due to lack of spare parts and knowledge

on maintenance(Haakonsen 1983). Hence, we assumed that 40% were working and applied this to the

total number of motorized boats to derive a total of 274 operational motorized boats for 1978(i.e., 685

* 0.4 = 274).

The traditional boats are thought to have had a muchhigher fraction that were operational, due to

lower mechanization and easier, more traditional maintenance requirements. Therefore, the fraction of

operating traditional boats (80%) fromThurow and Kroll (1962) was used. Haakonsen (1983) reported

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 11Annex 94
Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

Species composition
We assigned the estimated catch to different species, by sector, based on information found in various

sources (Table 3).

Industrial
The domestic industrial catch was assumed to consist of demersal species caught by trawl(80%), and

pelagic species (20%). The pelagic catch was in turn split between large (80%) and small (20%) pelagic

taxa. Individual taxa were assigned percentages within each category (Table 4) based on the general

information contained in the sources in Table 3.

Small-scale
Much of the literature suggested that sharks and rays made up a substantial part of the small-scale

catch (artisanal sector only; shark fishing assumed to be a commercial endeavour); therefore they were

treated as their own category. Thurow and Kroll (1962) reported that sharks made up 21% of the total
catches in the early 1960s. The fraction of sharks and rays in the small-scalecatch increased to about

40% during the 1980s (Anon. 1987), and to 55-65% by the 1990s(Lovatelli 1996). We assumed 55% of

the catch in the mid 1990s was sharks. Foreach of these anchor points, in order to be conservative, it

was assumed that these percentages applied to the artisanal catch only. For the most recent time

periods, the fraction of sharks was29% of the total small-scale catch in southern central Somalia

(Sabriye 2005), whereas in Puntland it was 81% of the reported catches, although substantial finfish

catches were missing from the data (Mohamed and Herzi 2005). We estimated the shark catches in
Somaliland by assuming the same shark to finfish ratio as for south-central Somalia (i.e., 29%; Table 1),

and added them to the reportedartisanal catches (Gulaid 2004), which resulted in a totalfraction of

sharks of 43% in 2005 for Somalia (Table 1). Considering that the Puntland percentage is an over-

estimate and that the Somaliland tonnage had to be estimated, we applied the 43% in 2005 to the

artisanal catch only, in order to remain conservative. Note that this in turn resulted in a slightly lower

shark tonnage for 2005 within our reconstruction than was found in the literature. All of this information

was used to create a time series of the shark and ray fraction within the artisanal sector. Linear
interpolation was done between the anchor points in 1962 (21%), 1985 (40%), 1995 (55%) and 2005

(43%). Data for 1962 was carried back to 1950 unaltered and the anchor point in 2005 was carried

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 13 Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

Species composition
We assigned the estimated catch to different species, by sector, based on information found in various

sources (Table 3).

Industrial
The domestic industrial catch was assumed to consist of demersal species caught by trawl(80%), and

pelagic species (20%). The pelagic catch was in turn split between large (80%) and small (20%) pelagic

taxa. Individual taxa were assigned percentages within each category (Table 4) based on the general

information contained in the sources in Table 3.

Small-scale
Much of the literature suggested that sharks and rays made up a substantial part of the small-scale

catch (artisanal sector only; shark fishing assumed to be a commercial endeavour); therefore they were

treated as their own category. Thurow and Kroll (1962) reported that sharks made up 21% of the total
catches in the early 1960s. The fraction of sharks and rays in the small-scalecatch increased to about

40% during the 1980s (Anon. 1987), and to 55-65% by the 1990s(Lovatelli 1996). We assumed 55% of

the catch in the mid 1990s was sharks. Foreach of these anchor points, in order to be conservative, it

was assumed that these percentages applied to the artisanal catch only. For the most recent time

periods, the fraction of sharks was29% of the total small-scale catch in southern central Somalia

(Sabriye 2005), whereas in Puntland it was 81% of the reported catches, although substantial finfish

catches were missing from the data (Mohamed and Herzi 2005). We estimated the shark catches in
Somaliland by assuming the same shark to finfish ratio as for south-central Somalia (i.e., 29%; Table 1),

and added them to the reportedartisanal catches (Gulaid 2004), which resulted in a totalfraction of

sharks of 43% in 2005 for Somalia (Table 1). Considering that the Puntland percentage is an over-

estimate and that the Somaliland tonnage had to be estimated, we applied the 43% in 2005 to the

artisanal catch only, in order to remain conservative. Note that this in turn resulted in a slightly lower

shark tonnage for 2005 within our reconstruction than was found in the literature. All of this information

was used to create a time series of the shark and ray fraction within the artisanal sector. Linear
interpolation was done between the anchor points in 1962 (21%), 1985 (40%), 1995 (55%) and 2005

(43%). Data for 1962 was carried back to 1950 unaltered and the anchor point in 2005 was carried

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 13Annex 94
Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

The crustacean fishery incurs a small amount of discards as well. Discards were estimated to equal 1.1%

of the crustacean landings.This is an assumption.

Small-scale fisheries
Although references have been made to somediscarding of fish in the small-scalefisheries (e.g.,

Lovatelli 1996; Jennings 1998; Mohamed and Herzi 2005), they may be low (except for artisanal fisheries

supplying Yemeni mother boats).

Here, we focused specifically on discards in the shark fin fishery which have been estimated. In Somalia,
dried shark meat was an export commodity, hence, sharks were not only targeted for their fins (Lovatelli

1996; Jennings 1998). In 2005, it was reported that dried shark meat was collected in Mogadishu from

all regions and thereafter exported to Mombasa in Kenya (Sabriye 2005). In the mid 1990s,Lovatelli

(1996) reported that only a small percent of fishers retained the meat, and Gulaid (2004) reported that

only fins were retained by fishers in Somaliland. Thus, overall discards of sharks (except fins) were

assumed to be relatively large. To estimate the shark discards in the small-scale fisheries, data from

IUCN (2003) and Mohamed and Herzi (2005) were used. According to IUCN (2003), the community of Eyl

produced 200 t of shark fins, which requires about 10,000 t of live-weight sharks. In addition,Mohamed

and Herzi (2005) stated that Eyl’s estimated yearly locally landed and utilized shark catch (not finned)
was 1,830 t in 2004. Thus, we assumed that the discards of shark meat in Eyl due to shark finning alone

were about 8,170 t (10,000 t – 1,830 t = 8,170 t), which was 69% of the total estimated shark and ray

catch in 2004 in Eyl (8,170 t / 11,830 t = 0.69). In order to remain conservative, and also because the

retained fin weight was not taken into account in this calculation, we reduced this to 49.1%, and used

this as a total small-scale shark discard rate in 2004 for all of Somalia. Half of the 2004 discard rate was

used as an anchor point in 1990 (i.e. 24.5%) to reflect the rapidly growing demand for shark fins

reported during the 1990s(Clarke 2004). Thurow and Kroll (1962) reported that dried sharks were

exported from Somalia and that shark fins fetched a higher price, however, there were no indications of
shark meat discards in the report. Therefore, we conservatively assumed that shark discards were 0% in

1960. Linear interpolation was done between the1960, 1990 and 2004discard rates to derive the

fraction of artisanal shark meat discards over time, and the 2004 rate was carried forward to 2010

unaltered.

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 15 Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

The crustacean fishery incurs a small amount of discards as well. Discards were estimated to equal 1.1%

of the crustacean landings.This is an assumption.

Small-scale fisheries
Although references have been made to somediscarding of fish in the small-scalefisheries (e.g.,

Lovatelli 1996; Jennings 1998; Mohamed and Herzi 2005), they may be low (except for artisanal fisheries

supplying Yemeni mother boats).

Here, we focused specifically on discards in the shark fin fishery which have been estimated. In Somalia,
dried shark meat was an export commodity, hence, sharks were not only targeted for their fins (Lovatelli

1996; Jennings 1998). In 2005, it was reported that dried shark meat was collected in Mogadishu from

all regions and thereafter exported to Mombasa in Kenya (Sabriye 2005). In the mid 1990s,Lovatelli

(1996) reported that only a small percent of fishers retained the meat, and Gulaid (2004) reported that

only fins were retained by fishers in Somaliland. Thus, overall discards of sharks (except fins) were

assumed to be relatively large. To estimate the shark discards in the small-scale fisheries, data from

IUCN (2003) and Mohamed and Herzi (2005) were used. According to IUCN (2003), the community of Eyl

produced 200 t of shark fins, which requires about 10,000 t of live-weight sharks. In addition,Mohamed

and Herzi (2005) stated that Eyl’s estimated yearly locally landed and utilized shark catch (not finned)
was 1,830 t in 2004. Thus, we assumed that the discards of shark meat in Eyl due to shark finning alone

were about 8,170 t (10,000 t – 1,830 t = 8,170 t), which was 69% of the total estimated shark and ray

catch in 2004 in Eyl (8,170 t / 11,830 t = 0.69). In order to remain conservative, and also because the

retained fin weight was not taken into account in this calculation, we reduced this to 49.1%, and used

this as a total small-scale shark discard rate in 2004 for all of Somalia. Half of the 2004 discard rate was

used as an anchor point in 1990 (i.e. 24.5%) to reflect the rapidly growing demand for shark fins

reported during the 1990s(Clarke 2004). Thurow and Kroll (1962) reported that dried sharks were

exported from Somalia and that shark fins fetched a higher price, however, there were no indications of
shark meat discards in the report. Therefore, we conservatively assumed that shark discards were 0% in

1960. Linear interpolation was done between the1960, 1990 and 2004discard rates to derive the

fraction of artisanal shark meat discards over time, and the 2004 rate was carried forward to 2010

unaltered.

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 15Annex 94

Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

the industrial fishery was discards, which contributed 15% of the total reconstructed industrial catch

(75,200 t).

The overall species composition of the industrial catches suggested that Diagramma picta was the most

important individually identifiable taxon for the industrial fisheries (15.7%), consistently contributing

between 14.5-16.1% of the catch each year. This was followed by Lethrinus nebulosus(9.3%) and

Epinephelus areolatus (8.6%), while the most important pelagic species were yellowfin tuna (Thunnus

albacares; 6.4%) and bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus; 4.9%). Discards accountedto 15% of the total

reconstructed industrial catches (Figure 2a).

Small-scale

Reconstructed total small-scale catches were over 1.3 million t for the entire period (Figure 2a), which

was just over 2.6 times the volume of FAO landings assumed to represent small-scale catches. The

reconstructed total small-scale catches during the colonial era (1950s) were estimated to be16,500
-1 -1
t·year . After 1960,total small-scalecatches started to increase to almost 20,000 t·year by 1977,
-1
before declining during the 1980s to about18,500 t·year . After the collapse of the national
-1
government in the early 1990s, catches dropped substantially toa low of9,200 t·year in 1995. Small-
-1
scale catches increased substantially thereafter to approximately 47,700 t·year by the late2000s.

Small-scale catches were estimated to consist to 74% ofartisanal catches and 26% subsistence catches.

Discards contributed 10%to the overall artisanal catch.

The species breakdown ofsmall-scalecatches, based on information available to us, suggested that

sharks and rays dominated catches. Their fraction of the landed artisanal catch (subsistence fisheries
-1
were assumed not to target sharks) increased from about 21% in the earlier period (2,100 t·year ),

steadily rising from the mid-1960s to a peak of almost54% in 1996(4,600 t), and then declined to about
-1
43% (14,000 t·year ) in the most recent years (2005-2010). Discards of shark meat (the result of

targeted shark finning) were estimated at around 100,000 t between 1950 and 2010.

Although sharks and rays as a group were dominant in the small-scale catches, the most dominant

individual taxa in the totalsmall-scalecatch were Lethrinus nebulosus(7.5%) and Thunnus albacares

(6.1%).

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 17 Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

the industrial fishery was discards, which contributed 15% of the total reconstructed industrial catch

(75,200 t).

The overall species composition of the industrial catches suggested that Diagramma picta was the most

important individually identifiable taxon for the industrial fisheries (15.7%), consistently contributing

between 14.5-16.1% of the catch each year. This was followed by Lethrinus nebulosus(9.3%) and

Epinephelus areolatus (8.6%), while the most important pelagic species were yellowfin tuna (Thunnus

albacares; 6.4%) and bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus; 4.9%). Discards accountedto 15% of the total

reconstructed industrial catches (Figure 2a).

Small-scale

Reconstructed total small-scale catches were over 1.3 million t for the entire period (Figure 2a), which

was just over 2.6 times the volume of FAO landings assumed to represent small-scale catches. The

reconstructed total small-scale catches during the colonial era (1950s) were estimated to be16,500
-1 -1
t·year . After 1960,total small-scalecatches started to increase to almost 20,000 t·year by 1977,
-1
before declining during the 1980s to about18,500 t·year . After the collapse of the national
-1
government in the early 1990s, catches dropped substantially toa low of9,200 t·year in 1995. Small-
-1
scale catches increased substantially thereafter to approximately 47,700 t·year by the late2000s.

Small-scale catches were estimated to consist to 74% ofartisanal catches and 26% subsistence catches.

Discards contributed 10%to the overall artisanal catch.

The species breakdown ofsmall-scalecatches, based on information available to us, suggested that

sharks and rays dominated catches. Their fraction of the landed artisanal catch (subsistence fisheries
-1
were assumed not to target sharks) increased from about 21% in the earlier period (2,100 t·year ),

steadily rising from the mid-1960s to a peak of almost54% in 1996(4,600 t), and then declined to about
-1
43% (14,000 t·year ) in the most recent years (2005-2010). Discards of shark meat (the result of

targeted shark finning) were estimated at around 100,000 t between 1950 and 2010.

Although sharks and rays as a group were dominant in the small-scale catches, the most dominant

individual taxa in the totalsmall-scalecatch were Lethrinus nebulosus(7.5%) and Thunnus albacares

(6.1%).

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 17Annex 94
Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

(Gulaid 2004), the relocation of displaced people due to war, and the increased use of motorized boats

by artisanal fishers (Anon. 2001).

The landings data reported by FAO on behalf of Somalia were for many years incomplete or highly

uncertain. This is not surprising, given the lack of a central government and administration, and FAO is

to be commendedfor being able to provide any estimates at all, given that national reporting of catches

collapsed in the late 1980s due to civil unrest (Anon. 2001).

Foreign illegal and semi-illegal fishing
Since the Siad Barre government collapsed in 1991 (and possibly even before that), Somalia has not

been able to comprehensively patrol and protect its waters. Numerous vessels from various countries

are thought to have exploited the situation by fishing illegally in Somali waters(e.g.Qayad 1997;

Jennings 2001; Mwangura 2006b; Schofield 2008). There are contradictory reports about the number of

illegal fishing vessels operating off the Somali coastline. Some of the more recent numbers suggest a
decline from 500 foreign fishing vessels in 2006 (Mwangura 2006a) to 200 fishing vessels in 2009(Anon.

2009c). However, exact numbers are not known due to the absence of monitoring and enforcement

capacity within Somali waters. Furthermore, the number of foreign fishing vessels operating in Somali

waters is also difficult to monitor due to the lack of transparency in data sharing among international

monitoring agencies working in the Indian Ocean. As a matter of fact, misleading the public seems

commonplace, as many fishing vessels, even while being attacked by Somali pirates, systematically

withheld accurate position reports from relevant agencies, such as the IMB (International Maritime
Bureau) and IMO (International Maritime Organization), and these agencies avoid reporting positions in

favor of likely dubious self-reporting by vessels (Hansen 2009). In contrast, the commercial MaRisk

system, using position data collected via satellites and remote sensors from the military coalition fleet,

showed that fishing vessels were deep within Somalia’s EEZ when captured by pirates (Hansen 2009).

The autonomous, but unrecognizedterritories of Somaliland and Puntland had some limited success in

controlling illegal fishing for short periods. For example, the Puntland administration assigned

responsibility for controlling coastal resources to private security companies such as Hart Security
(British) for 2000-2001, SOMCAN (United Arab Emirates) from 2001-2006, and Al Hababi Marine

Services (Saudi Arabia) in 2006 (Hansen 2008). However, these initiatives met with limited success as

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 19 Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

(Gulaid 2004), the relocation of displaced people due to war, and the increased use of motorized boats

by artisanal fishers (Anon. 2001).

The landings data reported by FAO on behalf of Somalia were for many years incomplete or highly

uncertain. This is not surprising, given the lack of a central government and administration, and FAO is

to be commendedfor being able to provide any estimates at all, given that national reporting of catches

collapsed in the late 1980s due to civil unrest (Anon. 2001).

Foreign illegal and semi-illegal fishing
Since the Siad Barre government collapsed in 1991 (and possibly even before that), Somalia has not

been able to comprehensively patrol and protect its waters. Numerous vessels from various countries

are thought to have exploited the situation by fishing illegally in Somali waters(e.g.Qayad 1997;

Jennings 2001; Mwangura 2006b; Schofield 2008). There are contradictory reports about the number of

illegal fishing vessels operating off the Somali coastline. Some of the more recent numbers suggest a
decline from 500 foreign fishing vessels in 2006 (Mwangura 2006a) to 200 fishing vessels in 2009(Anon.

2009c). However, exact numbers are not known due to the absence of monitoring and enforcement

capacity within Somali waters. Furthermore, the number of foreign fishing vessels operating in Somali

waters is also difficult to monitor due to the lack of transparency in data sharing among international

monitoring agencies working in the Indian Ocean. As a matter of fact, misleading the public seems

commonplace, as many fishing vessels, even while being attacked by Somali pirates, systematically

withheld accurate position reports from relevant agencies, such as the IMB (International Maritime
Bureau) and IMO (International Maritime Organization), and these agencies avoid reporting positions in

favor of likely dubious self-reporting by vessels (Hansen 2009). In contrast, the commercial MaRisk

system, using position data collected via satellites and remote sensors from the military coalition fleet,

showed that fishing vessels were deep within Somalia’s EEZ when captured by pirates (Hansen 2009).

The autonomous, but unrecognizedterritories of Somaliland and Puntland had some limited success in

controlling illegal fishing for short periods. For example, the Puntland administration assigned

responsibility for controlling coastal resources to private security companies such as Hart Security
(British) for 2000-2001, SOMCAN (United Arab Emirates) from 2001-2006, and Al Hababi Marine

Services (Saudi Arabia) in 2006 (Hansen 2008). However, these initiatives met with limited success as

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 19 Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

contributed to the prolongation of instability in the country, since neither foreign fishing interests or

local authorities (warlords) would have benefitedas much from properly controlledlegal operations

(Coffen-Smout 1998;Jennings 2001). Importantly, the value taken out of Somali waters by the illegal
foreign fleets would not be available to the Somali people and society(David Ardill pers. comm.,

February 2010). In contrast, with fully transparent and legal licensing through foreignfishing access

agreements, a functionalnational government would have beenable to derive benefits for all of Somali

society from one of their largest natural resources. Such controlled accesswould be an important source

of foreign exchange income for legal national authorities, and may contribute to stability in the country

(UNEP 2005).

If one examines semi-illegal fishing, i.e., foreign fishing based on ‘licenses’ and protection bought from

local or regional authorities in contravention of international law, one finds that fishing companies that

bought semi-illegal licenses were often treading a thin line, as being licensed by one warlord or local

authority did not ensure safe treatment by another if the vessel entered the perceived local territories

of another warlord. Furthermore, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia has documented misuse of

revenues generated from the sale of semi-illegal fishing licenses to the benefit of local warlords to

maintain militias and purchase weapons (UN 2006). This concern is not restricted to central and
southern Somalia, but is also prevalent along the coast of Somaliland, where Yemeni vessels exchanged

arms for fishing rights (UN 2008).

Conclusions
Overall, the likely total catches taken from the waters of Somalia by domestic vessels, as deri ved
-1 -1
through our catch reconstruction, increased from 18,250 t·year in 1950 to 64,900 t·year in 2010, and

total catches were 98% higher than officially reported data. The occurrence of extensive illegal foreign

fishing in the waters of a sovereign state, mainly during a time of severe internal instability, although not

quantified here, illust rates an astounding lack of flag -state control by predominantly European and
Asian fleets, and a global failure of control over ra mpant unregulated fisheries exploitation. It seems a

poor testimony of international affairs that, in the 21stcentury, the global community continues to be

incapable or unwilling to act decisively in the interest of poor and dev eloping countries. The clear show

of unanimous inaction with r espect to the renewable resources in the waters of Somalia can only be

called ‘commercial colonialisms’ in the name of globalization and the pursuit of unfettered profit.

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 21Annex 94
Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

contributed to the prolongation of instability in the country, since neither foreign fishing interests or

local authorities (warlords) would have benefitedas much from properly controlledlegal operations

(Coffen-Smout 1998;Jennings 2001). Importantly, the value taken out of Somali waters by the illegal
foreign fleets would not be available to the Somali people and society(David Ardill pers. comm.,

February 2010). In contrast, with fully transparent and legal licensing through foreignfishing access

agreements, a functionalnational government would have beenable to derive benefits for all of Somali

society from one of their largest natural resources. Such controlled accesswould be an important source

of foreign exchange income for legal national authorities, and may contribute to stability in the country

(UNEP 2005).

If one examines semi-illegal fishing, i.e., foreign fishing based on ‘licenses’ and protection bought from

local or regional authorities in contravention of international law, one finds that fishing companies that

bought semi-illegal licenses were often treading a thin line, as being licensed by one warlord or local

authority did not ensure safe treatment by another if the vessel entered the perceived local territories

of another warlord. Furthermore, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia has documented misuse of

revenues generated from the sale of semi-illegal fishing licenses to the benefit of local warlords to

maintain militias and purchase weapons (UN 2006). This concern is not restricted to central and
southern Somalia, but is also prevalent along the coast of Somaliland, where Yemeni vessels exchanged

arms for fishing rights (UN 2008).

Conclusions
Overall, the likely total catches taken from the waters of Somalia by domestic vessels, as deri ved
-1 -1
through our catch reconstruction, increased from 18,250 t·year in 1950 to 64,900 t·year in 2010, and

total catches were 98% higher than officially reported data. The occurrence of extensive illegal foreign

fishing in the waters of a sovereign state, mainly during a time of severe internal instability, although not

quantified here, illust rates an astounding lack of flag -state control by predominantly European and
Asian fleets, and a global failure of control over ra mpant unregulated fisheries exploitation. It seems a

poor testimony of international affairs that, in the 21stcentury, the global community continues to be

incapable or unwilling to act decisively in the interest of poor and dev eloping countries. The clear show

of unanimous inaction with r espect to the renewable resources in the waters of Somalia can only be

called ‘commercial colonialisms’ in the name of globalization and the pursuit of unfettered profit.

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 21Annex 94
Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

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Clarke S (2004) Understanding pressures on fishery resources through trade statistics: a pilot study of
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n0 51.

Clarke S (2004) Understanding pressures on fishery resources through trade statistics: a pilot study of
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United Nations, Sweden Funds-In-Trust, Field Document 2, June 1985, Rome.
FAO (1972) Fishery resources survey Somali Democratic Republic. Report prepared for the Fishery
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FAO (1978) Development of fisheries in the exclusive economic zone of Somalia: report. Food and
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Haakonsen J (1984) Scientific socialism and self-reliance. The case of Somalia'a "instant" fishermen.
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and Agriculture Organization, Rome. 170 -184 p.

Hansen SJ (2008) Private security & local politics in Somalia. Review of African Political Economy 118:
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Hariri K (1985) Fisheries development in the North West Indian Ocean. The impact of commercial fishing
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regions. PNAS 105: 1965-1970.
Sabriye A (2005) Feasibility report on the fisheries sector in South and Central Somalia. Current status,
opportunities and constraints., United Nations Development Programme, poverty reduction and
economic recovery. Discussion paper, April 2005,. 36 p.

Samatar AI (2007) Somalia's Post-Conflict Economy: A Political Economy Approach. Bildhaan 7(8): 43.
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list of irresponsible fishing vessles as a tool to combat illegal unregulated and unreported fishing
in Eastern Africa. The World Conservation Union, March 2007, Nairobi, Kenya.

Sanders M and Morgan G (1989) Review of the fisheries resources of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden., FAO
Fisheries Technical Paper 304, 1989, Rome.
Schofield C (2008) Plundered waters; Somalia's maritime resource insecurity. pp. 102-115 (332) InDoyle
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Shaves G (1984) Somalia technical assistance for marketing and cooperatives. Sweden Funds-In-Trust,
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Rome. 16 p.

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Coastal and marine environmental problems of Somalia. UNEP Regional Seas Reports and
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biophysics and economics of world fisheries. Nature Climate Change 1: 449-456,
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Perssonet al. (2014) Page 25Annex 94

Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

Table 1. Small-scale catches reported and estimated (in italics) for 2005 for Somalia.

Region Fish (t) Shark (t) Total (t) Shark (%) Source

South-central Somalia 14,825 6,113 20,938 29 Sabriye (2005)

Puntland 2,144a 8,990 11,134 81 Mohamed and Herzi (2005)

Somaliland 6,030 2,486 b 8,516 29 Gulaid (2004)

Total Somalia 22,999 17,589 40,588 43

aA substantial part of the finfish catches from Puntland are sold to Yemen and not included in the reported

catches for Puntland; Estimated using the fraction of shark catches from south-central Somalia

Table 2. Anchor points used for interpolation of small-scale catch for Somalia. Values in italics are

interpolated.

Operational Catch
Year Source
boats a anchor points (t)

1950 n/a 16,500 b

1962 n/a 16,500 Thurow and Kroll (1962)

1978 1,874 18,740 c Thurow and Kroll (1962), Haakonsen (1983)

1980 1,725 17,250 c Lawrence (1980)

1988 1,725 17,250 c

1995 792 7,920c Kelleher (1998)

2005 n/a 40,588 d Gulaid (2004), Mohamed and Herzi (2005), Sabriye (2005)

2010 n/a 40,588 e

aSee text for sourcesAssumed equal to 1962 value; Based on average catch rate of 10 t·boat ·year (Elmer
d e
1985); Estimated shark catches for Somaliland were added; Assumed equal to 2005 value.

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 27 Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

Table 1. Small-scale catches reported and estimated (in italics) for 2005 for Somalia.

Region Fish (t) Shark (t) Total (t) Shark (%) Source

South-central Somalia 14,825 6,113 20,938 29 Sabriye (2005)

Puntland 2,144a 8,990 11,134 81 Mohamed and Herzi (2005)

Somaliland 6,030 2,486 b 8,516 29 Gulaid (2004)

Total Somalia 22,999 17,589 40,588 43

aA substantial part of the finfish catches from Puntland are sold to Yemen and not included in the reported

catches for Puntland;Estimated using the fraction of shark catches from south-central Somalia

Table 2. Anchor points used for interpolation of small-scale catch for Somalia. Values in italics are

interpolated.

Operational Catch
Year Source
boats a anchor points (t)

1950 n/a 16,500 b

1962 n/a 16,500 Thurow and Kroll (1962)

1978 1,874 18,740 c Thurow and Kroll (1962), Haakonsen (1983)

1980 1,725 17,250 c Lawrence (1980)

1988 1,725 17,250 c

1995 792 7,920c Kelleher (1998)

2005 n/a 40,588 d Gulaid (2004), Mohamed and Herzi (2005), Sabriye (2005)

2010 n/a 40,588 e

a See text for sourcesAssumed equal to 1962 value; Based on average catch rate of 10 t·boat ·year (Elmer
d e
1985); Estimated shark catches for Somaliland were added; Assumed equal to 2005 value.

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 27Annex 94

Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

Table 4. Species breakdown of industrial catches for Somalia, as derived for the present study, based on qualitative

information from sources listed in Table (3). Percentage breakdown relates to the total industrial catch.
Category Size Family/group Species Common name Industrial catch (%)

Pelagic Large Scombridae Thunnus albacares Yellowfin tuna 7.7

Pelagic Large Scombridae Thunnus obesus Bigeye tuna 5.9

Pelagic Large Istiophoridae Tetrapturus audax Striped marlin 0.7

Pelagic Large Istiophoridae Makaira mazara Indo-Pacific blue marlin 0.3

Pelagic Large Xiphiidae Xiphias gladius Swordfish 0.4

Pelagic Large misc. billfish Other billfish 0.1

Pelagic Large misc. pelagic fishes Pelagic fishes 0.9

Pelagic Small Clupeidae Sardinella longiceps Indian oil sardine 1.9
Pelagic Small Clupeidae Etrumeus teres Round herring 0.8

Pelagic Small Scombridae Scomber japonicus Chub mackerel 0.8

Pelagic Small Carangidae Decapterus spp. Scad 0.3

Pelagic Small misc. pelagic fishes Pelagic fishes 0.2

Sub-total pelagic 20.0

Demersal Lethrinidae Lethrinus nebulosus Spangled emperor 11.3

Demersal Lethrinidae Lethrinus lentjan Pink ear emperor 5.7
Demersal Lethrinidae Lethrinus olivaceus Longfaced emperor 5.7

Demersal Lethrinidae Misc. emperors 5.7

Demersal Serranidae Epinephelus areolatus Areolate grouper 10.4

Demersal Serranidae Misc. groupers 2.6

Demersal Lutjanidae Etelis spp. 4.1

Demersal Lutjanidae Aprion spp. 4.1

Demersal Lutjanidae Misc. snappers 2.0

Demersal Haemulidae Diagramma pictum Painted sweetlips 19.0
Demersal Mullidae Parupeneus indicus Indian goatfish 9.4

Sub-total demersal 80.0

Total 100.0

aLarge = 80%, small =20% of the pelagic fraction of the industrial catch.

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 29 Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

Table 4. Species breakdown of industrial catches for Somalia, as derived for the present study, based on qualitative

information from sources listed in Table (3). Percentage breakdown relates to the total industrial catch.
Category Size Family/group Species Common name Industrial catch (%)

Pelagic Large Scombridae Thunnus albacares Yellowfin tuna 7.7

Pelagic Large Scombridae Thunnus obesus Bigeye tuna 5.9

Pelagic Large Istiophoridae Tetrapturus audax Striped marlin 0.7

Pelagic Large Istiophoridae Makaira mazara Indo-Pacific blue marlin 0.3

Pelagic Large Xiphiidae Xiphias gladius Swordfish 0.4

Pelagic Large misc. billfish Other billfish 0.1

Pelagic Large misc. pelagic fishes Pelagic fishes 0.9

Pelagic Small Clupeidae Sardinella longiceps Indian oil sardine 1.9
Pelagic Small Clupeidae Etrumeus teres Round herring 0.8

Pelagic Small Scombridae Scomber japonicus Chub mackerel 0.8

Pelagic Small Carangidae Decapterus spp. Scad 0.3

Pelagic Small misc. pelagic fishes Pelagic fishes 0.2

Sub-total pelagic 20.0

Demersal Lethrinidae Lethrinus nebulosus Spangled emperor 11.3

Demersal Lethrinidae Lethrinus lentjan Pink ear emperor 5.7
Demersal Lethrinidae Lethrinus olivaceus Longfaced emperor 5.7

Demersal Lethrinidae Misc. emperors 5.7

Demersal Serranidae Epinephelus areolatus Areolate grouper 10.4

Demersal Serranidae Misc. groupers 2.6

Demersal Lutjanidae Etelis spp. 4.1

Demersal Lutjanidae Aprion spp. 4.1

Demersal Lutjanidae Misc. snappers 2.0

Demersal Haemulidae Diagramma pictum Painted sweetlips 19.0
Demersal Mullidae Parupeneus indicus Indian goatfish 9.4

Sub-total demersal 80.0

Total 100.0

aLarge = 80%, small =20% of the pelagic fraction of the industrial catch.

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 29Annex 94

Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

Table 6. Species breakdown of artisanal catches (excluding sharks and rays) for Somalia, based on quali tative

information from sources listed in Table (3).
Category Family Species Common name Catch (%)

Pelagic Scombridae Thunnus albacares Yellowfin tuna 15.0

Pelagic Scombridae Thunnus tonggol Longtail tuna 5.0

Pelagic Scombridae Euthynnus affinis Kawakawa (Little tuna) 5.0

Pelagic Scombridae Scomberomorus commerson Narrow-barred Spanish mackerel 10.0

Pelagic Scombridae 5.0

Pelagic Clupeidae Sardinella longiceps Indian oil sardine 4.0

Pelagic Clupeidae 1.0

Pelagic Carangidae Selar crumenophthalmus Bigeye scad 2.0
Pelagic Carangidae Trachurus indicus Arabian scad (Horse mackerel) 2.0

Pelagic Carangidae 1.0

Pelagic Coryphaenidae Coryphaena hippurus Common dolphinfish 5.0

Pelagic Istiophoridae Tetrapturus audax Striped marlin 1.7

Pelagic Istiophoridae Makaira mazara Indo-Pacific blue marlin 0.8

Pelagic Xiphiidae Xiphias gladius Swordfish 2.0

Pelagic Misc. billfish Other billfish 0.5

Sub-total pelagic 60.0
Demersal Lethrinidae Lethrinus nebulosus Spangled emperor 8.0

Demersal Lethrinidae Lethrinus lentjan Pink ear emperor 4.0

Demersal Lethrinidae Lethrinus olivaceus Longfaced emperor 4.0

Demersal Lethrinidae Emperors 4.0

Demersal Lutjanidae Etelis spp. 2.0

Demersal Lutjanidae Aprion spp. 2.0

Demersal Lutjanidae Snappers 1.0

Demersal Serranidae Epinephelus areolatus Areolate grouper 4.0
Demersal Serranidae Groupers 1.0

Demersal Mullidae Parupeneus indicus Indian goatfish 2.5

Misc. marine fish 7.5

Sub-total demersal 40.0

Total 100.0

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 31 Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

Table 6. Species breakdown of artisanal catches (excluding sharks and rays) for Somalia, based on quali tative

information from sources listed in Table (3).
Category Family Species Common name Catch (%)

Pelagic Scombridae Thunnus albacares Yellowfin tuna 15.0

Pelagic Scombridae Thunnus tonggol Longtail tuna 5.0

Pelagic Scombridae Euthynnus affinis Kawakawa (Little tuna) 5.0

Pelagic Scombridae Scomberomorus commerson Narrow-barred Spanish mackerel 10.0

Pelagic Scombridae 5.0

Pelagic Clupeidae Sardinella longiceps Indian oil sardine 4.0

Pelagic Clupeidae 1.0

Pelagic Carangidae Selar crumenophthalmus Bigeye scad 2.0
Pelagic Carangidae Trachurus indicus Arabian scad (Horse mackerel) 2.0

Pelagic Carangidae 1.0

Pelagic Coryphaenidae Coryphaena hippurus Common dolphinfish 5.0

Pelagic Istiophoridae Tetrapturus audax Striped marlin 1.7

Pelagic Istiophoridae Makaira mazara Indo-Pacific blue marlin 0.8

Pelagic Xiphiidae Xiphias gladius Swordfish 2.0

Pelagic Misc. billfish Other billfish 0.5

Sub-total pelagic 60.0
Demersal Lethrinidae Lethrinus nebulosus Spangled emperor 8.0

Demersal Lethrinidae Lethrinus lentjan Pink ear emperor 4.0

Demersal Lethrinidae Lethrinus olivaceus Longfaced emperor 4.0

Demersal Lethrinidae Emperors 4.0

Demersal Lutjanidae Etelis spp. 2.0

Demersal Lutjanidae Aprion spp. 2.0

Demersal Lutjanidae Snappers 1.0

Demersal Serranidae Epinephelus areolatus Areolate grouper 4.0
Demersal Serranidae Groupers 1.0

Demersal Mullidae Parupeneus indicus Indian goatfish 2.5

Misc. marine fish 7.5

Sub-total demersal 40.0

Total 100.0

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 31Annex 94

Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

Figure 1: The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Somalia, based on

general UNCLOS principles, and the shelf waters to 200 m depth.

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 33 Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

Figure 1: The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Somalia, based on

general UNCLOS principles, and the shelf waters to 200 m depth.

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 33Annex 94

Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

Appendix Table A1. FAO landings vs. total reconstructed catch (in tonnes), as well as total reconstructed catch by sector, with

discards shown separat1ly, for Somalia, 1950-2010.
Year FAO landings Total reconstructed catch Industrial Artisanal Subsistence Discards
1950 6,000 18,300 1,480 9,900 6,600 272

1951 6,000 18,300 1,480 9,960 6,550 272
1952 7,000 18,500 1,730 10,010 6,490 317
1953 7,400 18,700 1,830 10,070 6,440 335

1954 5,300 18,000 1,310 10,120 6,380 240
1955 9,500 19,300 2,340 10,170 6,330 430
1956 10,000 19,400 2,470 10,230 6,270 453

1957 9,000 19,100 2,220 10,280 6,220 407
1958 8,000 18,800 1,970 10,340 6,160 362
1959 5,000 18,000 1,230 10,390 6,110 226

1960 4,500 18,000 1,110 10,600 6,050 195
1961 4,500 18,000 1,110 10,660 6,000 213
1962 4,500 18,000 1,110 10,710 5,940 231

1963 4,500 18,200 1,110 10,930 5,930 249
1964 4,500 18,400 1,110 11,080 5,930 272
1965 4,600 18,800 1,130 11,450 5,920 289

1966 4,600 19,000 1,130 11,600 5,910 315
1967 4,700 19,100 1,160 11,670 5,910 353
1968 5,000 19,300 1,230 11,820 5,900 398

1969 5,000 19,500 1,230 11,970 5,880 435
1970 5,600 19,900 1,380 12,200 5,870 494

1971 5,700 20,200 1,410 12,350 5,860 537
1972 5,800 20,400 1,430 12,500 5,850 583
1973 5,900 20,600 1,460 12,660 5,830 631

1974 5,980 20,900 1,520 12,870 5,820 685
1975 10,350 21,500 1,650 13,320 5,800 766
1976 8,268 22,800 2,690 13,330 5,780 980

1977 9,830 24,400 3,850 13,530 5,770 1,225
1978 8,384 20,100 510 13,090 5,750 745
1979 10,984 24,700 4,780 13,010 5,460 1,495

1980 14,330 29,900 9,760 12,650 5,180 2,285
1981 9,523 24,200 5,040 12,360 5,120 1,648
1982 8,730 23,100 4,110 12,420 5,060 1,542

1983 11,195 25,000 5,640 12,530 5,000 1,869
1984 19,639 32,200 11,690 12,530 4,950 3,034
1985 16,467 30,400 10,180 12,540 4,890 2,828

1986 18,255 24,800 5,020 13,000 4,830 1,971
1987 19,546 31,900 11,150 12,780 4,770 3,154
1988 19,827 30,200 9,680 12,790 4,720 2,999

1989 21,046 29,600 10,270 11,900 4,300 3,090
1990 22,295 28,900 10,880 10,970 3,890 3,178

1991 23,500 28,300 11,470 10,040 3,490 3,295
1992 24,620 28,100 12,450 9,080 3,100 3,465
1993 24,212 27,800 13,420 8,070 2,720 3,623

1994 23,904 27,700 14,450 7,110 2,340 3,755
1995 23,851 27,800 15,690 6,180 1,980 3,900
1996 26,044 30,300 14,620 8,670 2,760 4,265

1997 27,750 32,800 13,540 11,180 3,520 4,606
1998 25,550 35,400 12,470 13,710 4,250 4,972
1999 28,400 40,900 13,860 16,290 4,970 5,798

2000 23,950 42,200 11,690 18,800 5,660 6,009
2001 31,700 50,600 15,470 21,460 6,330 7,295
2002 28,800 52,800 14,060 24,050 6,980 7,663

2003 29,800 57,200 14,540 26,700 7,610 8,369
2004 29,800 61,100 14,540 29,370 8,210 9,001
2005 24,800 61,800 12,100 32,000 8,790 8,947

2006 29,800 64,800 14,540 32,190 8,660 9,415

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 35 Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

Appendix Table A1. FAO landings vs. total reconstructed catch (in tonnes), as well as total reconstructed catch by sector, with

discards shown separate1y, for Somalia, 1950-2010.
Year FAO landings Total reconstructed catch Industrial Artisanal Subsistence Discards
1950 6,000 18,300 1,480 9,900 6,600 272

1951 6,000 18,300 1,480 9,960 6,550 272
1952 7,000 18,500 1,730 10,010 6,490 317
1953 7,400 18,700 1,830 10,070 6,440 335

1954 5,300 18,000 1,310 10,120 6,380 240
1955 9,500 19,300 2,340 10,170 6,330 430
1956 10,000 19,400 2,470 10,230 6,270 453

1957 9,000 19,100 2,220 10,280 6,220 407
1958 8,000 18,800 1,970 10,340 6,160 362
1959 5,000 18,000 1,230 10,390 6,110 226

1960 4,500 18,000 1,110 10,600 6,050 195
1961 4,500 18,000 1,110 10,660 6,000 213
1962 4,500 18,000 1,110 10,710 5,940 231

1963 4,500 18,200 1,110 10,930 5,930 249
1964 4,500 18,400 1,110 11,080 5,930 272
1965 4,600 18,800 1,130 11,450 5,920 289

1966 4,600 19,000 1,130 11,600 5,910 315
1967 4,700 19,100 1,160 11,670 5,910 353
1968 5,000 19,300 1,230 11,820 5,900 398

1969 5,000 19,500 1,230 11,970 5,880 435
1970 5,600 19,900 1,380 12,200 5,870 494

1971 5,700 20,200 1,410 12,350 5,860 537
1972 5,800 20,400 1,430 12,500 5,850 583
1973 5,900 20,600 1,460 12,660 5,830 631

1974 5,980 20,900 1,520 12,870 5,820 685
1975 10,350 21,500 1,650 13,320 5,800 766
1976 8,268 22,800 2,690 13,330 5,780 980

1977 9,830 24,400 3,850 13,530 5,770 1,225
1978 8,384 20,100 510 13,090 5,750 745
1979 10,984 24,700 4,780 13,010 5,460 1,495

1980 14,330 29,900 9,760 12,650 5,180 2,285
1981 9,523 24,200 5,040 12,360 5,120 1,648
1982 8,730 23,100 4,110 12,420 5,060 1,542

1983 11,195 25,000 5,640 12,530 5,000 1,869
1984 19,639 32,200 11,690 12,530 4,950 3,034
1985 16,467 30,400 10,180 12,540 4,890 2,828

1986 18,255 24,800 5,020 13,000 4,830 1,971
1987 19,546 31,900 11,150 12,780 4,770 3,154
1988 19,827 30,200 9,680 12,790 4,720 2,999

1989 21,046 29,600 10,270 11,900 4,300 3,090
1990 22,295 28,900 10,880 10,970 3,890 3,178

1991 23,500 28,300 11,470 10,040 3,490 3,295
1992 24,620 28,100 12,450 9,080 3,100 3,465
1993 24,212 27,800 13,420 8,070 2,720 3,623

1994 23,904 27,700 14,450 7,110 2,340 3,755
1995 23,851 27,800 15,690 6,180 1,980 3,900
1996 26,044 30,300 14,620 8,670 2,760 4,265

1997 27,750 32,800 13,540 11,180 3,520 4,606
1998 25,550 35,400 12,470 13,710 4,250 4,972
1999 28,400 40,900 13,860 16,290 4,970 5,798

2000 23,950 42,200 11,690 18,800 5,660 6,009
2001 31,700 50,600 15,470 21,460 6,330 7,295
2002 28,800 52,800 14,060 24,050 6,980 7,663

2003 29,800 57,200 14,540 26,700 7,610 8,369
2004 29,800 61,100 14,540 29,370 8,210 9,001
2005 24,800 61,800 12,100 32,000 8,790 8,947

2006 29,800 64,800 14,540 32,190 8,660 9,415

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 35Annex 94

Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

Appendix Table A2.Total reconstructed catch(tonnes) for Somali, 1950-2010, by major taxonomic group.

Year Lethrinusnebulosus Thunnus albacares Batoidea Epinephelusareolatus Diagramma pictum Others1

1950 1,870 1,290 533 1,005 281 13,300
1951 1,860 1,290 536 1,002 281 13,300
1952 1,890 1,320 541 1,025 328 13,400

1953 1,890 1,330 545 1,032 347 13,500
1954 1,830 1,300 543 976 248 13,200
1955 1,940 1,390 555 1,081 445 13,900

1956 1,950 1,400 559 1,091 469 14,000
1957 1,910 1,390 560 1,062 422 13,800
1958 1,880 1,380 561 1,034 375 13,600

1959 1,790 1,330 557 954 234 13,100
1960 1,770 1,320 558 933 202 13,200
1961 1,760 1,330 565 931 202 13,200

1962 1,760 1,330 573 928 202 13,200
1963 1,750 1,340 608 926 197 13,400
1964 1,750 1,340 644 927 197 13,500

1965 1,750 1,340 681 922 187 13,900
1966 1,750 1,340 719 922 187 14,000
1967 1,760 1,350 759 927 197 14,100

1968 1,760 1,360 801 935 211 14,300
1969 1,760 1,360 844 935 211 14,400

1970 1,780 1,370 888 947 234 14,700
1971 1,780 1,370 933 949 239 14,900
1972 1,780 1,380 980 951 244 15,000

1973 1,780 1,380 1,027 953 248 15,200
1974 1,780 1,390 1,076 956 257 15,400
1975 1,800 1,400 1,129 971 285 16,000

1976 1,890 1,470 1,189 1,060 451 16,700
1977 2,010 1,540 1,251 1,165 646 17,800
1978 1,680 1,320 1,279 862 95 14,900

1979 2,040 1,560 1,308 1,230 839 17,800
1980 2,430 1,820 1,336 1,619 1,621 21,000
1981 1,990 1,520 1,348 1,223 910 17,200

1982 1,880 1,440 1,384 1,123 742 16,600
1983 2,020 1,550 1,443 1,267 1,018 17,700
1984 2,690 2,000 1,544 1,884 2,159 21,900

1985 2,510 1,870 1,578 1,724 1,881 20,900
1986 1,910 1,460 1,600 1,184 912 17,800
1987 2,560 1,900 1,724 1,793 2,042 21,800

1988 2,360 1,780 1,783 1,629 1,792 20,800
1989 2,320 1,720 1,723 1,636 1,901 20,300

1990 2,270 1,670 1,654 1,641 2,017 19,700
1991 2,220 1,620 1,586 1,642 2,128 19,100
1992 2,220 1,610 1,508 1,689 2,318 18,700

1993 2,230 1,600 1,419 1,741 2,513 18,300
1994 2,240 1,590 1,316 1,795 2,708 18,000
1995 2,270 1,600 1,201 1,868 2,938 17,900

1996 2,360 1,680 1,694 1,861 2,734 20,000
1997 2,450 1,780 2,128 1,857 2,530 22,100
1998 2,570 1,900 2,555 1,865 2,326 24,200

1999 2,950 2,220 2,994 2,121 2,585 28,000
2000 2,950 2,280 3,393 2,019 2,183 29,300
2001 3,600 2,810 3,832 2,522 2,890 34,900

2002 3,680 2,950 4,215 2,498 2,626 36,800
2003 3,980 3,250 4,599 2,668 2,717 40,000
2004 4,220 3,520 4,968 2,791 2,717 42,900

2005 4,200 3,620 5,239 2,667 2,263 43,900
2006 4,450 3,820 5,282 2,906 2,717 45,600
2007 4,440 3,830 5,304 2,899 2,717 45,600

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 37 Fisheries catches in Somalia 1950-2010

Appendix Table A2.Total reconstructed catch(tonnes) for Somali, 1950-2010, by major taxonomic group.

Year Lethrinusnebulosus Thunnus albacares Batoidea Epinephelusareolatus Diagramma pictum Others 1

1950 1,870 1,290 533 1,005 281 13,300
1951 1,860 1,290 536 1,002 281 13,300
1952 1,890 1,320 541 1,025 328 13,400

1953 1,890 1,330 545 1,032 347 13,500
1954 1,830 1,300 543 976 248 13,200
1955 1,940 1,390 555 1,081 445 13,900

1956 1,950 1,400 559 1,091 469 14,000
1957 1,910 1,390 560 1,062 422 13,800
1958 1,880 1,380 561 1,034 375 13,600

1959 1,790 1,330 557 954 234 13,100
1960 1,770 1,320 558 933 202 13,200
1961 1,760 1,330 565 931 202 13,200

1962 1,760 1,330 573 928 202 13,200
1963 1,750 1,340 608 926 197 13,400
1964 1,750 1,340 644 927 197 13,500

1965 1,750 1,340 681 922 187 13,900
1966 1,750 1,340 719 922 187 14,000
1967 1,760 1,350 759 927 197 14,100

1968 1,760 1,360 801 935 211 14,300
1969 1,760 1,360 844 935 211 14,400

1970 1,780 1,370 888 947 234 14,700
1971 1,780 1,370 933 949 239 14,900
1972 1,780 1,380 980 951 244 15,000

1973 1,780 1,380 1,027 953 248 15,200
1974 1,780 1,390 1,076 956 257 15,400
1975 1,800 1,400 1,129 971 285 16,000

1976 1,890 1,470 1,189 1,060 451 16,700
1977 2,010 1,540 1,251 1,165 646 17,800
1978 1,680 1,320 1,279 862 95 14,900

1979 2,040 1,560 1,308 1,230 839 17,800
1980 2,430 1,820 1,336 1,619 1,621 21,000
1981 1,990 1,520 1,348 1,223 910 17,200

1982 1,880 1,440 1,384 1,123 742 16,600
1983 2,020 1,550 1,443 1,267 1,018 17,700
1984 2,690 2,000 1,544 1,884 2,159 21,900

1985 2,510 1,870 1,578 1,724 1,881 20,900
1986 1,910 1,460 1,600 1,184 912 17,800
1987 2,560 1,900 1,724 1,793 2,042 21,800

1988 2,360 1,780 1,783 1,629 1,792 20,800
1989 2,320 1,720 1,723 1,636 1,901 20,300

1990 2,270 1,670 1,654 1,641 2,017 19,700
1991 2,220 1,620 1,586 1,642 2,128 19,100
1992 2,220 1,610 1,508 1,689 2,318 18,700

1993 2,230 1,600 1,419 1,741 2,513 18,300
1994 2,240 1,590 1,316 1,795 2,708 18,000
1995 2,270 1,600 1,201 1,868 2,938 17,900

1996 2,360 1,680 1,694 1,861 2,734 20,000
1997 2,450 1,780 2,128 1,857 2,530 22,100
1998 2,570 1,900 2,555 1,865 2,326 24,200

1999 2,950 2,220 2,994 2,121 2,585 28,000
2000 2,950 2,280 3,393 2,019 2,183 29,300
2001 3,600 2,810 3,832 2,522 2,890 34,900

2002 3,680 2,950 4,215 2,498 2,626 36,800
2003 3,980 3,250 4,599 2,668 2,717 40,000
2004 4,220 3,520 4,968 2,791 2,717 42,900

2005 4,200 3,620 5,239 2,667 2,263 43,900
2006 4,450 3,820 5,282 2,906 2,717 45,600
2007 4,440 3,830 5,304 2,899 2,717 45,600

Perssonet al. (2014) Page 37 Annex 95

Luke Patey, Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
Paper Series No. WPM 53 (Oct. 2014) Annex 95

October 2014

Kenya:

An African oil upstart in transition

OIES PAPER: WPM 53 Luke Patey
Danish Institute for International Studies &
Research Associate, OIESAnnex 95

The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not
necessarily represent the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of

its members.

Copyright © 2014
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

(Registered Charity, No. 286084)

This publication may be reproduced in part for educational or non -profit purposes without special
permission from the copyright holder, provided acknowledgment of the source is made. No use of this

publication may be made for resale or for any other commercial purpose whatsoever without pr ior
permission in writing from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.

ISBN
978-1-78467-011-5

October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition i Annex 95

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Adrian Browne, Bassam Fattouh, Celeste Hicks, Martin Marani, and Mikkel
Funder for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper. I alone remain responsible for any
errors or shortcomings.

October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition iiAnnex 95

Executive Summary

In late March 2012, Kenya entered the East African oil scene with a surprising splash. After decades
of unsuccessful on -and-off exploration by international oil companies, Tullow Oil, a UK -based firm,
discovered oil in Kenya’s north-west Turkana County. This paper analyses the opportunities and risks

facing Kenya’s oil industry and its role as a regional oil transport hub. It provides a snapshot of
Kenya’s economic, political, and security environment, offers a comprehensive overview of the
development of Kenya’s oil indu stry and possibilities for regional oil infrastructure cooperation with
neighbouring countries in East Africa, and considers the potential political, social, and security risks

facing the oil industry and regional infrastructure plans.

Kenya Overview

In the aftermath of the large-scale violence that followed its December 2007 general elections, Kenya
has turned a corner. In June 2008 its government launched Vision 2030, an ambitious development
blueprint, to modernize and make Kenya a middle -income eco nomy; in 2010 it passed a new
constitution; and in 2013 contested, yet largely peaceful, general elections were held. The discovery

of oil in 2012 immediately provided an extra boost to Kenya’s already growing and diverse economy
and its position as East Africa’s strategic transport and communications hub.

But over the past two years, political and security tensions have risen dramatically to threaten Kenya’s
bright future. In the political arena, the 2010 constitution stipulated the devolution of powers f rom the
central government to newly constituted counties, but its full realization must overcome enormous
systematic, structural, and political implementation hurdles. At the same time, devolution will hardly be

a success if it only leads to the decentrali zation of Kenya’s political troubles (which include ethno -
politics and corruption) to the local level, where more political officials are now in competition with one
another. Oil and other resources will influence disputes between central authorities and c ounties and
communities seeking to assert new-found powers.

On the security front, terrorist attacks, highlighted by the September 2013 killings by the Somalia -

based militant group al -Shabaab at Nairobi’s upscale Westgate Shopping Mall, have grown in
Kenya’s coastal and north -eastern regions. These attacks threaten to enflame and intermingle with
long-standing animosities between communities in these regions and the central government in
Nairobi, undermining the popular development aspirations introduced b y the new constitution.
Possible insecurity from political and social tensions sits ominously alongside the oil industry’s plans

to move from the exploration to development phase and to construct key export infrastructure on the
coast.

Kenya’s oil sector and regional infrastructure cooperation

Kenya’s role as a regional hub for East African crude oil and petroleum products may be more
significant than its potential position as an oil and gas producer. To date, Kenya’s oil resources are
estimated to be 600 million barrels and new discoveries may still only make the country a small
African producer. Oil exploration in Kenya began in the 1950s with Shell and BP carrying out the first

survey work, mapping out major geological basins, and drilling the first oil well in 1960. Over 40 wells
have since been drilled on and offshore, but it was not until 2012 that potential commercially viable oil
resources were discovered through Tullow Oil’s Ngamia 1, together with subsequent findings in
Turkana County in Kenya’s north-west.

Recent interest grew out of Uganda’s 2006 onshore oil discoveries, and offshore gas findings in
Mozambique and Tanzania. The regional proximity of proven oil and gas reserves, coupled with

sustained high international oil prices, attracted a wid e variety of oil companies to Kenya; these
included Africa Oil, Tullow Oil, BG Group, and Total. Tullow is seeking to finalize appraisal and testing
of an estimated 600 million barrels of oil resources held in Turkana by the end of 2015. At that point, if

October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition iii Annex 95

the discoveries prove to be commercially viable, the company aims to also settle plans with the Kenya
government for an export pipeline to the coast at either Lamu or Mombasa.

However, the huge and diverse infrastructure development goals of Kenya’s $25 billion Lamu Port,

South Sudan, Ethiopia, Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor will be significantly delayed and likely need to
be downsized. A piecemeal approach – beginning with a basic export pipeline and port terminal at
Lamu – may well be adopted. Rather than Kenya joining Ethiopia and South Sudan in plans for export
and product pipelines to Lamu, it is more likely that, in the short term, Uganda and Kenya will

establish the first pipeline links while other neighbours join through oil, road, and rail links in the
medium and long term.

Kenya could go it alone and develop an 850 kilometre export pipeline from Turkana to the coast for its
oil resources, but since its findings still remain relatively small, a regional agreement with Uganda to
share an oil pipeline would be more viable. But there remain hurdles to achieving such cooperation. It
will take two to four years to ascertain final commerciality of Kenya’s oil discoveries and in the

meantime Uganda remains eager to push forward with generating revenues from its long idle but
proven oil reserves.

Political, social, and security risks

As the oil industry shifts from exploration to development and production in Kenya, required
investments will grow from hundreds of millions to billions of dollars for new oil infrastructure. Tullow
Oil, and in particular its smaller and more exploration -orientated partner Africa Oil, will likely sell a
share of their interests in the Turkana concessions to larger industry players, such as oil majors and

Asian national oil companies, to provide the required capital investments to develop the oil fields. It is
at this juncture that risk incentives among the involved oil companies will decline profoundly. During
the exploration phase, in the initial drive to discover oil, oil industry operations have been left relatively
free from regulatory constraints and political interference. In the upcoming development and

production phase this will likely not be the case. The nascent oil industry will not be completely
insulated from increased risks in a shifting political and security landscape.

First, the regulatory environment for the oil industry in Kenya is in flux. The establishment and
implementation of a new National Energy Bill and Petroleum Exploration and Development Production
Act will have important consequences for the oil industry. New laws will encourage investment on one

hand, particularly in natural gas where there is a lack of regulation, but on the other hand such laws
can increase the costs of doing business. And since the political and regulatory environment in Kenya
is intertwined, the government may exploit new rules and regulations to advance political and
economic goals. Once production does begin, and petrodollars flow into government coffers, oil

revenue sharing will become a fixture of Kenya’s often-divisive politics.
Second, the successful advancement of the 2010 constitution offers potential economic and social

development benefits and help in reversing high levels of inequality in Kenya. Such a process,
however, offers challenges to the oil industry as communities in oil regions, and their political
representatives, grapple with the convergence of new economic resources and increased political
power through devolution. But a failure by the Kenyan government to im plement devolution could be

even more damaging to the timely development of the oil industry. Such an outcome could see
aggrieved counties contest oil resources with the national government and international oil
companies. If the objectives of devolution i n the new constitution are fulfilled and political power and
economic resources shift from the centre to county level (particularly in restless peripheral regions

such as Turkana) then conflicts over scarce resources can be mitigated.

Third, political ins tability and insecurity is threatening not only the commencement of Kenya’s oil
production, but also its exit to international markets on the coast. Kenya’s coastal and north -eastern
communities have longstanding social and political grievances with the ce ntral government in Nairobi.
Internal politics alone has the capacity to create insecurity for the oil industry if planned pipeline and

other downstream infrastructure are targeted. But there is also the possibility that these disputes

October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition ivAnnex 95

could become a toxic mix with the incursion of the Somalia-based militant group al-Shabaab, delaying
and hampering large-scale investments.

Al-Shabaab may be positioning itself to exploit social and political tensions to win support from local
populations on Kenya’s coast. But if the Kenyan government is able to advance political devolution to
coastal counties, while working to contain al -Shabaab in an apolitical manner, then there is a strong

likelihood that, with regional and international support, Nairobi can curb the mili tant group’s activities,
providing the oil industry with a relatively secure environment. If Kenya is to become the transit hub
for East Africa’s oil boom then relative stability and security on the coast must be achieved.

October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition v Annex 95

October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition
viAnnex 95

Contents

Acknowledgements ..............................................................................................................................ii
Executive Summary.............................................................................................................................iii
Kenya Overview................................................................................................................................. iii
Kenya’s oil sector and regional infrastructure cooperation................................................................ iii
Political, social, and security risks......................................................................................................iv

Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................1
Kenya Overview ....................................................................................................................................1
Economic aspirations..........................................................................................................................1
Political and security challenges.........................................................................................................4
Kenya’s oil sector and regional infrastructure cooperation.............................................................8
Exploration ........................................................................................................................................10

Development and production............................................................................................................12
Regional oil infrastructure development............................................................................................14
Political, social, and security risks ...................................................................................................17
Political risk.......................................................................................................................................17
Social risk..........................................................................................................................................19
Security risk.......................................................................................................................................24

Conclusion...........................................................................................................................................26

Figures

Figure 1: East African Community – GDP billion (USD, 2013)..............................................................2
Figure 2: East African Community – GNI per capita (USD, 2013)..........................................................2
Figure 3: Economic Structure, Kenya 2013 ............................................................................................3
Figure 4: Kenya’s annual growth rate (%) – illustrating economic decline and multi -party elections
(1992, 1997, 2002, 2007)........................................................................................................................5

Figure 5: Kenya’s new political constituencies.......................................................................................7
Figure 6: Licensed Petroleum Exploration Companies in Kenya as of June 2014.................................9
Figure 7: Kenya exploration blocks.......................................................................................................11
Figure 8: Turkana County oil development prospects ..........................................................................13
Figure 9: Regional oil pipeline possibilities ...........................................................................................15

October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition vii Annex 95

Introduction

In late March 2012, Kenya entered the East African oil scene with a surprising splash. After decades
of unsuccessful on -and-off exploration by international oil companies, Tullow Oil, a UK -based firm,
discovered oil in Kenya’s north -west Turkana County. Quite unceremoniously, then President Mwai

Kibaki announced the find at the end of a planned speech on performance evaluation results for
public agencies: ‘I wish to make an important announcement to the nation .. . This morning, I have
been informed by the Minister for Energy that our country has made a major breakthrough in oil

exploration … This is the first time Kenya has made such a discovery and it is very good news for our
country. It is, however, the beginning of a long journey to make our country an oil producer…’ 1

This paper analyses the opportunities and challenges facing Kenya’s oil industry and role as a

regional oil transport hub. First, it provides a snapshot of Kenya’s political and economic environm ent.
Second, the paper offers a comprehensive overview of the development of Kenya’s oil industry, from
exploration to the upcoming production phase, the main players, and the possibilities for regional oil

infrastructure in cooperation with neighbouring c ountries in East Africa. Finally, the paper considers
the potential political risk from new rules and regulations, the social risk from relations with local
communities and officials in Turkana County (where oil has been discovered), and the security risk

facing oil industry and regional infrastructure plans. The paper does not fully engage questions
revolving around the ‘resource curse’ in Africa – concerning how oil will impact Kenya’s economic,
political, and social development. Rather it does the revers e, by examining how Kenya’s political

economy and security environment will impact the industry in the future.

Kenya Overview

Economic aspirations
Kenya is the economic centre of East Africa. It has the largest economy in the East African

Community (Figures 1 and 2) and one of the largest in Africa. It also has one of the most diverse
economies on the continent. Tea, coffee, and other agriculture, alongside tourism and services, are a
major part of Kenya’s economic success story (Figure 3). This is in shar p contrast to other large

African economies where oil, gas, and minerals dominate. On the back of growth in tourism and
telecommunications, Kenya enjoyed average annual growth rates of 5.4 per cent between 2002 and
2007. 2 The economy was unsettled by the i nsecurity that followed the 2007 general elections, but it

has picked up pace again in recent years. In 2014, international investors demonstrated their
confidence in the economy when Kenya raised $2 billion in its first sovereign bond offering, a record -
breaking debut for an African country. 3

1‘Speech by his excellency Hon. Mwai Kibaki, C.G.H., M.P., President and Commander-in-Chief of the defence forces of the

Republic of Kenya during the official announcement of the evaluation results of the performance of public agencies for the
financial year 2010/11’, Kenyatta International Conference Centre, Nairobi, 26 March 2012, statehousekenya.go.ke, accessed
23 July 2014.
2Geir Sundet & Eli Moen, ‘Political Economy Analysis of Kenya’, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Oslo, 2009,
10.
3Katrina Manson & Javier Blas, ‘Kenya’s debut $2bn bond breaks Africa record’,Financial Times, 16 June 2014.

1
October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transitionAnnex 95

Figure 1: East African Community – GDP billion (USD, 2013)

Uganda
20%

Kenya
41%

Tanzania
30%

Burundi
2%
Rwanda
7%

Source: World Bank

Figure 2: East African Community – GNI per capita (USD, 2013)

1000

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0
Kenya Burundi Rwanda Tanzania Uganda

Source: World Bank

October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 2 Annex 95

Figure 3: Economic Structure, Kenya 2013

29%

Agriculture

Industry
53%
Services

17%

Source: CIA – The World Factbook

Kenya’s economic strength is bolstered by its strategic position in East Africa. It is the main entry and

exit point for trade from landlocked East and Central African countries – Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi,
and South Sudan. Uganda was its largest export partner in 2013, accounting for 13.6 per cent of total
Kenyan exports. 4Mombasa is East Africa’s largest port, followed by those in Tanzania and Djibouti.

Kenya is seeking to exploit its strategic location on the Indian Ocean f urther by leveraging its relative
proximity to large and growing Asian markets, particularly those in India and China which are Kenya’s

largest import partners, representing 14.2 per cent and 12.2 per cent respectively of total imports in
2013. 5 Kenya is a lso the financial and communications hub for East Africa. ‘Silicon Savannah’, an
initiative to establish a major techno -city in Konzo, 40 miles outside Nairobi, seeks to make Kenya

East Africa’s technology hub as well. IBM established its first African res earch lab in Nairobi, while
Google, Microsoft, and Intel also have regional headquarters there. 6

Kenya’s diversified economy needs substantial infrastructure development in order to industrialize. In

2008, the Kenyan government under then President Mwai K ibaki established Vision 2030 to
modernize Kenya and make it a middle-income country. One of the flagship projects of the initiative is
the $25 billion Lamu Port, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor. This seeks to

establish road, rail, and oil pipeline links between the regional neighbours, airports, and resort cities at
Isiolo and Lamu, as well as a new port at Manda Bay and a 120,000 barrels/day (b/d) oil refinery at
7
Lamu. The twin goals of this ambitious undertaking are to promote region al economic development
and to develop northern Kenya (which has long been economically marginalized compared to central
counties) and integrate it into the national economy.

Although there has been little progress in its implementation since the 2012 off icial launch of
LAPSSET, 8Kenya is also spearheading other related regional infrastructure agreements. President
Uhuru Kenyatta hosted Chinese Premier Li Keiqiang in May 2014 and, alongside regional leaders

4
Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Kenya’, Country Report, EIU, London, 1 June 2014.
5Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Kenya’, Country Report, EIU, London, 1 June 2014.
6Mwangi S. Kimenyi & Josephine Kibe, ‘Africa’s Powerhouse’, Brookings, Opinion, 6 January 2014
www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/30-kenya-economy-kimenyi, accessed 28 July 2014.
7‘Lamu Port and New Transport Corridor Development to Southern Sudan and Ethiopia (LAPSSET)’, Progress Report, Kenya

8ision 2030, Government of the Republic of Kenya, www.vision2030.go.ke.
Drazen Jorgic, ‘Kenya attacks undermine plans for east African trade hub’,Reuters, 20 June 2014.

October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition 3Annex 95

from South Sudan, Rwanda, and Uganda, signed an a greement to establish a new East African

railway line. At nearly $4 billion, Chinese companies will build the first stage, a 610 -kilometre line from
Mombasa to Nairobi. 9As a sign of Kenya’s broadening international ties, the planned Chinese -built
railway will replace the original line established during British colonial rule over 100 years ago. If

Kenya is to continue to act as the gateway to East Africa in the face of outside competition (Tanzania
is busy enhancing its own ports with Chinese cooperation), then such infrastructure projects will need
to move forward.

The discovery of oil could help Kenya finance its large infrastructure needs. The current government,

under Uhuru Kenyatta, included oil, gas, and mineral resources as a sixth priority sector w ithin the
economic pillar of Vision 2030; this seeks to harness oil to increase export earnings and produce
higher GDP growth, broader social development, infrastructure development, and job creation. 10The

oil industry needs billions in infrastructure development investment if it is to act as a driver for Kenya’s
broader economic and social development goals. But over the past two years political and security
tensions have risen dramatically, threatening to upend Kenya’s economic aspirations.

Political and security challenges

It had been expected that 2013 would be a breakout year for Kenya – the country was turning a
corner after having held largely peaceful general elections in March that year. Its new Jubilee
government may have been dogged by the indictment of President Uhuru and Deputy President Ruto

by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for their alleged role in the 2007/08 post -election violence,
but a resurgent economy gave promise for the future. Jubilee pushed forward with former president
Kibaki’s Vision 2030 to modernize Kenya; the government was generally business friendly, engaging
11
a younger generation of industrialists and entrepreneurs compared to previous governments.

But 2013 would not be the year of stability and growth for which Ken ya had hoped. The 2010
constitution stipulated the devolution of powers from the central government to newly constituted
counties, but its full realization needed to overcome enormous systematic, structural, and political

implementation hurdles. All the wh ile terrorist attacks – prominent among which was the September
2013 massacre carried out by the Somalia -based militant group al -Shabaab at Nairobi’s upscale
Westgate Shopping Mall – have grown in Kenya’s coastal and north -eastern regions. These attacks

threaten to enflame and intermingle with long -standing animosities between communities in these
regions and the central government in Nairobi, undermining the popular development aspirations put
forward by the new constitution.

Oil and other resources will influence disputes between central authorities and counties and

communities seeking to assert new -found powers stipulated by the constitution. Possible insecurity
due to political and social tensions sits ominously alongside the oil industry’s plans to mov e from the

exploration to the development phase, combined with construction of key export infrastructure on the
coast. The insecurity has hurt Kenya’s tourism sector, one of its main economic engines and job
producers. The World Bank downgraded its forecas t on economic growth in 2014 and 2015 from 5.2
12
per cent to 4.7 per cent for both years on account of the insecurity. A failure to grapple with these
structural problems through fully implementing devolution, to settle the ICC indictment, and to tackle
terrorism will undermine development.

Kenyan politics are ethnically and regionally-driven and are deeply embedded in business. Kenya has

been described as an ‘ethnocracy’; a democracy in which politics are steered along ethnic lines and

9
10China to build new East Africa railway line’, BBC News, 12 May 2014.
11‘Second Medium Term Plan 2013-2017’, Kenya Vision 2030, Government of the Republic of Kenya, Nairobi, 2013, 68.
David Booth, Brian Coosey, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, and Karuti Kanyinga, ‘East African prospects: An update on the
political economy of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda’, Overseas Development Institute, Report, May 2014, 22.
12David Malingha and Sarah McGregor, ‘East Africa Powerhouse Kenya Shaken as Attacks, Politics Mix’,Bloomberg, 8 July
2014.

October 2014 - Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition
4 Annex 96

U.S. Central IntelligenceAgency, The World Factbook: Somalia, available at https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html (last accessed 3Apr. 2015) Annex 96

The World Factbook

Africa :: Somalia

Introduction :: Somalia

Background :

Britain withdrew from British Somaliland in 1960 to allow its protectora▯te to join with Italian Somaliland and form the
new nation of Somalia. In 1969, a coup headed by Mohamed SIAD Barre ushe▯red in an authoritarian socialist rule
characterized by the persecution, jailing, and torture of political oppo▯nents and dissidents. After the regime's collapse
early in 1991, Somalia descended into turmoil, factional fighting, and a▯narchy. In May 1991, northern clans declared an
independent Republic of Somaliland that now includes the administrative ▯regions of Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed,

Togdheer, Sanaag, and Sool. Although not recognized by any government, this entity has maintained a stable existence
and continues efforts to establish a constitutional democracy, including▯ holding municipal, parliamentary, and
presidential elections. The regions of Bari, Nugaal, and northern Mudug ▯comprise a neighboring semi-autonomous state
of Puntland, which has been self-governing since 1998 but does not aim a▯t independence; it has also made strides
toward reconstructing a legitimate, representative government but has su▯ffered some civil strife. Puntland disputes its
border with Somaliland as it also claims portions of eastern Sool and Sa▯naag. Beginning in 1993, a two-year UN

humanitarian effort (primarily in the south) was able to alleviate fam▯ine conditions, but when the UN withdrew in 1995,
having suffered significant casualties, order still had not been restore▯d. In 2000, the Somalia National Peace Conference
(SNPC) held in Djibouti resulted in the formation of an interim government, known as the Transitional National
Government (TNG). When the TNG failed to establish adequate security or governing institutions, the Government of
Kenya, under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Developm▯ent (IGAD), led a subsequent peace process

that concluded in October 2004 with the election of Abdullahi YUSUF Ahme▯d as President of a second interim
government, known as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of the ▯Somali Republic. The TFG included a
275-member parliamentary body, known as the Transitional Federal Parliam▯ent (TFP). President YUSUF resigned late in
2008 while United Nations-sponsored talks between the TFG and the opposition Alliance for the Re-Liberation of
Somalia (ARS) were underway in Djibouti. In January 2009, following the creation of a TFG-ARS unity government,
Ethiopian military forces, which had entered Somalia in December 2006 to▯ support the TFG in the face of advances by

the opposition Islamic Courts Union (ICU), withdrew from the country. ▯The TFP was doubled in size to 550 seats with
the addition of 200 ARS and 75 civil society members of parliament. The expanded parliament elected Sheikh SHARIF
Sheikh Ahmed, the former ICU and ARS chairman as president in January 20▯09. The creation of the TFG was based on
the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC), which outlined a five-year man▯date leading to the establishment of a new
Somali constitution and a transition to a representative government foll▯owing national elections. In 2009, the TFP
amended the TFC to extend TFG's mandate until 2011 and in 2011 Somali pr▯incipals agreed to institute political

transition by August 2012. The transition process ended in September 201▯2 when clan elders replaced the TFP by
appointing 275 members to a new parliament who subsequently elected a new president.

Geography :: Somalia

Location :

Eastern Africa, bordering the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, east of▯ Ethiopia

Geographic coordinates:
10 00 N, 49 00 E

Map references:

Africa

Area:
total: 637,657 sq km
country comparison to the world: 44

land: 627,337 sq km
water: 10,320 sq km

Area - comparative:Annex 96

almost five times the size of Alabama; slightly smaller than Texas

Land boundaries:

total: 2,340 km
border countries: Djibouti 58 km, Ethiopia 1,600 km, Kenya 682 km

Coastline:
3,025 km

Maritime claims:

territorial sea: 200 nm
Climate:

principally desert; northeast monsoon (December to February), moderate▯ temperatures in north and hot in south;
southwest monsoon (May to October), torrid in the north and hot in the▯ south, irregular rainfall, hot and humid periods
(tangambili) between monsoons

Terrain:

mostly flat to undulating plateau rising to hills in north

Elevation extremes:
lowest point: Indian Ocean 0 m
highest point: Shimbiris 2,416 m

Natural resources:

uranium and largely unexploited reserves of iron ore, tin, gypsum, bauxi▯te, copper, salt, natural gas, likely oil reserves

Land use:
arable land: 1.73%
permanent crops: 0.05%

other: 98.23% (2011)
Irrigated land:

2,000 sq km (2003)

Total renewable water resources:
14.7 cu km (2011)

Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural):

total: 3.3 cu km/yr (0%/0%/99%)
per capita: 377.6 cu m/yr (2003)

Natural hazards:
recurring droughts; frequent dust storms over eastern plains in summer; ▯floods during rainy season

Environment - current issues:

famine; use of contaminated water contributes to human health problems; ▯deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion;
desertification

Environment - international agreements:
party to: Biodiversity, Desertification, Endangered Species, Law of the Sea, Ozone Layer Protection

signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements
Geography - note:

strategic location on Horn of Africa along southern approaches to Bab el▯ Mandeb and route through Red Sea and Suez
Canal

People and Society :: Somalia

Nationality :
noun: Somali(s)
adjective: Somali

Ethnic groups:

Somali 85%, Bantu and other non-Somali 15% (including 30,000 Arabs)

Languages:
Somali (official), Arabic (official, according to the Transitional Federal Charter), Italian, English

Religions:

Sunni Muslim (Islam) (official, according to the Transitional Federal▯ Charter)

Population: Annex 97

U.S. Central IntelligenceAgency, The World Factbook: Kenya, available at https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf_ke.pdf (last accessed 3
Apr. 2015) Annex 97

The World Factbook

Africa :: Kenya

Introduction :: Kenya

Background :
Founding president and liberation struggle icon Jomo KENYATTA led Kenya ▯from independence in 1963
until his death in 1978, when President Daniel MOI took power in a const▯itutional succession. The country
was a de facto one-party state from 1969 until 1982 when the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU)
made itself the sole legal party in Kenya. MOI acceded to internal and e▯xternal pressure for political

liberalization in late 1991. The ethnically fractured opposition failed ▯to dislodge KANU from power in
elections in 1992 and 1997, which were marred by violence and fraud, but▯ were viewed as having generally
reflected the will of the Kenyan people. President MOI stepped down in D▯ecember 2002 following fair and
peaceful elections. Mwai KIBAKI, running as the candidate of the multiet▯hnic, united opposition group, the
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), defeated KANU candidate Uhuru KENYA▯TTA and assumed the
presidency following a campaign centered on an anticorruption platform. ▯KIBAKI's NARC coalition
splintered in 2005 over a constitutional review process. Government defe▯ctors joined with KANU to form a

new opposition coalition, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), which ▯defeated the government's draft
constitution in a popular referendum in November 2005. KIBAKI's reelecti▯on in December 2007 brought
charges of vote rigging from ODM candidate Raila ODINGA and unleashed tw▯o months of violence in which
as many as 1,500 people died. African Union-sponsored mediation led by f▯ormer UN Secretary General
Kofi ANNAN in late February 2008 resulted in a power-sharing accord brin▯ging ODINGA into the
government in the restored position of prime minister. The power sharing▯ accord included a broad reform
agenda, the centerpiece of which was constitutional reform. In August 2010, Kenyans overwhelmingly
adopted a new constitution in a national referendum. The new constitutio▯n introduced additional checks

and balances to executive power and significant devolution of power and ▯resources to 47 newly created
counties. It also eliminated the position of prime minister following th▯e first presidential election under
the new constitution, which occurred on 4 March 2013. Uhuru KENYATTA, th▯e son of founding president
Jomo KENYATTA, won the March elections in the first round by a close margin and was sworn into office
on 9 April 2013.

Geography :: Kenya

Location :
Eastern Africa, bordering the Indian Ocean, between Somalia and Tanzania

Geographic coordinates:
1 00 N, 38 00 E

Map references:
Africa

Area:

total: 580,367 sq km
country comparison to the world: 49
land: 569,140 sq km
water: 11,227 sq km

Area - comparative:Annex 97

five times the size of Ohio; slightly more than twice the size of Nevada

Land boundaries:

total: 3,477 km
border countries: Ethiopia 861 km, Somalia 682 km, South Sudan 232 km, Tanzania 769 km, Ug▯anda 933
km

Coastline:
536 km

Maritime claims:
territorial sea: 12 nm

exclusive economic zone: 200 nm
continental shelf: 200 m depth or to the depth of exploitation

Climate:
varies from tropical along coast to arid in interior

Terrain:
low plains rise to central highlands bisected by Great Rift Valley; fert▯ile plateau in west

Elevation extremes:

lowest point: Indian Ocean 0 m
highest point: Mount Kenya 5,199 m

Natural resources:
limestone, soda ash, salt, gemstones, fluorspar, zinc, diatomite, gypsum▯, wildlife, hydropower

Land use:
arable land: 9.48%

permanent crops: 1.12%
other: 89.4% (2011)

Irrigated land:
1,032 sq km (2003)

Total renewable water resources:
30.7 cu km (2011)

Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural):

total: 2.74 cu km/yr (17%/4%/79%)
per capita: 72.96 cu m/yr (2003)

Natural hazards:
recurring drought; flooding during rainy seasons
volcanism: limited volcanic activity; the Barrier (elev. 1,032 m) last erupted in▯ 1921; South Island is the

only other historically active volcano
Environment - current issues:

water pollution from urban and industrial wastes; degradation of water quality from increased use of
pesticides and fertilizers; water hyacinth infestation in Lake Victoria;▯ deforestation; soil erosion;
desertification; poaching

Environment - international agreements:
party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species,
Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Marine Life Conservati▯on, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship

Pollution, Wetlands, Whaling
signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements

Geography - note:
the Kenyan Highlands comprise one of the most successful agricultural production regions in Africa;
glaciers are found on Mount Kenya, Africa's second highest peak; unique ▯physiography supports abundant
and varied wildlife of scientific and economic value

People and Society :: Kenya

Nationality :
noun: Kenyan(s)
adjective: Kenyan Annex 98

African Energy, “SOMALIA- TotalFinaElf to explore offshore”, Financial Times: Energy
Newsletters (26 Feb. 2001) Annex 98

Financial Times, Energy Newsletters - African Energy February 26, 2001 Oil

SOMALIA- TotalFinaEif to explore offshore

SOURCE: African Energy

TotalFinaElfhas secured rights to conduct preliminary exploration work offshore southern Somalia. A spokesman told African Energy the
company signed a technical evaluation agreement inMogadishu in late January with officials from the ministry of water and mineral resources .

The agreement - valid for up to 12 months - allows the company to conduct 2D seismic work in the Jorre region off the southern coast.
TotalFinaElf said thatwork would commence shortly and that the agreement could "evolve towards a concession" should the seismic studies
prove fruitful.

Minister of water and mineral resources Hassan Abshir Farah said the company had agreed to open a liaison office in Mogadishu.

For Mogadishu's transitional government, which has said itis eager to attract foreign investment, the arrival ofTotalFinaElf comes as something
of a blessing. Other companies such as Sweden's Lundin Oil, which has two onshore concessions, have been forced to declare force majeure
and are not treating their properties as a high priority. But TotalFinaElf maintains that its work offshore will be free from interference. "We are

an oil company so we don'twant to get involved in any political aspect," the spokesman said.

Officials in the breakaway republic ofSomaliland meanwhile have said that the deal with Mogadishu has no bearing in the north-west where it
claims the most prospective hydrocarbon targets are located.

TotalFinaElfha s maintained a presence in Somaliland in recent years with the rehabilitation and operational managementof the oil terminal at
Berbera port, as well as providing aviation fuel services at the airports in Berbera and the breakaway capital Hargeisa.

The French firm told African Energy that it hado immediate plans to pursue exploration in Somaliland. The Somaliland oil and water ministry
has said in the local press thatno E&P companies have visited the country and that no negotiations are under way with any companies to open
up the upstream oil and gas sector. Annex 99

Dana Petroleum plc, Annual Report & Accounts 2002 (2003) Annex 99

Dana Petroleum plc Annual Report & Accounts 2002Annex 99

EX PLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL

Africa Far East Russia

Offshore Africa holds some of the world’s most Indonesia and Australia continue to offer Dana’s early entry into the West Siberian basin
prolific hydrocarbon basins which have deliveredmaterial opportunities to the Group with furtherhas left it well positioned to exploit the recent
a series of giant discoveries with very low findingloration and appraisal drilling expected resurgence of industry activity in the region.The

and development costs.Dana has built extensive during the next year. The planned development development of the vast Salym group of fields
licence interests offshore Ghana,Mauritania and of the Ujung Pangkah field, following earlier offers organic growth,building on the success of

Kenya– threepotentiallyhighimpact regionswith exploration success, should turn the region intothe South Vat-Yoganskoye field which continues
a range of exciting exploration prospects emerging.ash generator by 2006. as a baseline source of oil production.

mauritania

blocks 7 & 8
block 1 south vat-yogan

salym sortym
ghana

western kenya
tano
block l
block 7
blocks 10 & 11 sidayu ujung pangkah

wa-226-p

Reserves Production Turnover Net Profit

+10% +41% +45% +22%

105.2 116.0 5,777 8,170 £26.6m £38.6m £5.6m £6.8m
mmboe mmboe boepd boepd

2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 Annex 99

Dana Petroleum plc is a British independent oil and gas company

focused on growth through high-impact international exploration

and the development of low risk production from the UK North Sea.

Contents: 04 Chairman’s and Chief Executive’s Review 08 Review of Operations 12 Financial Review
14 Directors and Officers 15 Directors’Report and Accounts 2002 47 Proven and Probable Reserves
48 Exploration and Production Interests49 Directors,Advisers and Other Information

Dana Petroleum plc 2002 Annual Report 3Annex 99

Chairman’s & Chief Executive’s Review

2002 was an excellent year for Dana. A successful acquisitions and

divestments programme complemented ongoing field development
activity and was enhanced by further exploration success,all resulting in a

record operating and financial performance.

Annual production grew by 41% and this delivered record levels of turnover,
cash flow and profit in 2002, placing Dana in a strong position to execute

its exploration and development work programme during 2003 and 2004.
The combination of acquisitions,new discoveries and development of
existing fields,led to proven and probable oil and gas reserves rising to

an all-time high at year-end.

Dana’s 2002 exploration effort focused on high potential areas offshore
Africa and commercially attractive opportunities in the North Sea.Extensive

Charles M Smith, CBE new seismic was acquired and four exploration wells were drilled, with
Chairman three discoveries being recorded, continuing the Company’s excellent strike

rate. A number of exploration deals were concluded, leading to new
acreage and licence extensions in the UK, Ghana, Mauritania and Australia,
as well as farm-outs on blocks in Australia and Mauritania to reduce Dana’s

overall cost exposure. Positive outcomes from ongoing technical work have
enabled significant new seismic and drilling work to be planned for

offshore Ghana, Mauritania and Kenya over the next two years.

The Board’s strategy of ensuring Dana maintains a balanced portfolio of
production, development and exploration opportunities is showing clear

benefits,with new reserves being added at very low finding cost and
strongly rising UK cash flow.The Company is now well positioned for
further growth with a balance of attractive exploration prospects,rising

production from new developments and a platform to execute further
commercially astute acquisitions.

Results

Average daily oil and gas production increased by 41% from 5,777 boepd to
Thomas P Cross 8,170 boepd, primarily due to the addition of Hudson, Banff and Otter field

Chief Executive interests,during the second half of 2002. Overall, the ratio of oil to gas
produced by the Group in the year was approximately 85% to 15%. As a
result of increased production and an increased average realised UKCS oil

price of $24.7/boe (2001:$20.3/boe), turnover for the period increased by
45% to £38.6 million (2001:£26.6 million). Operating profit and operating

cash flow were £9.3 million and £16.4 million respectively. Profit after tax
and minority interest increased 22% to a record high of £6.8 million (2001:

£5.6 million). Earnings per share rose to 0.62 pence.

4 Dana Petroleum plc 2002 Annual Report Annex 99

“Four exploration wells yielded three discoveries, continuing Dana’s

successful track record with 11 oil and gas finds from its last 14 wells.

Ongoing field developments are further increasing cash flow, which will

enable our high-impact exploration plans to be actively pursued.”

In connection with the acquisition of assets from However, the Company’s production and
Exploration and Appraisal
ENI-Agip, the Company put in place a US$75 development business expanded materially in The past year witnessed further North Sea
million revolving credit facility,which has now the second half,following two important North exploration success,with the discovery of the

been substantially drawn down to fund the Sea asset portfolio deals with ENI-Agip and Barbara gas-condensate field and the drilling of
acquisition and ongoing development of these ConocoPhillips. Both transactions were in line a high reach well to examine the Drum structure

assets. Discussions to extend this facility in 2003 with Dana’s strategy and involved acquiring to the west of the Claymore field. Barbara was
are now well advanced. current and near term UK production at encouraging,finding a substantial section of

attractive prices,using a mixture of cash and Forties sand reservoir full of rich gas-condensate,
The Board has carefully considered the financing exploration positions as currency.The results but the field will require further appraisal before
requirements for Dana’s current exploration and were very positive. By year-end peak production
reserves can be determined.The Drum well,
development programme, which, although of 15,000 boepd had been achieved, an almost which was drilled from the Claymore platform
capital intensive at present, demonstrates the three-fold increase from the levels seen in the and found oil in a complex reservoir setting,has

capacity to deliver significant future value. first half of the year. Furthermore, Dana’s been tied directly into the Claymore facilities.
The Directors believe that at this relatively early production now originates from seven different

stage of Dana’s development it is important to fields thereby lowering the potential impact of Turning to international exploration, Dana drilled
apply the Company’s cash resources to leverage any single field event and materially improving its second well,WT-2X, in the shallow water area

those projects which have the potential to yield the reliability of its cash flow base. offshore Ghana.The well encountered a high
exceptional returns.Therefore the Directors quality Maastrichtian age sandstone reservoir
do not recommend payment of a dividend at The ENI-Agip deal also provided an entry for
containing a relatively viscous oil. Subsequent
this time but will keep this under review as Dana into the Northern North Sea, with interests remapping of this accumulation has
profits build. in the Hudson oil field, the Otter oil development demonstrated the potential for oil-in-place

and the Brent pipeline system into which both volumes of around 200 million barrels. However,
Total hydrocarbons produced in 2002 were 3.0 fields now deliver. Dana also gained an interest future commerciality will be heavily dependent

mmboe. A total of 13.8 mmboe of proven and in the Banff oil & gas field in a core area of the on recovery efficiency which will be the subject
probable reserves were added, due to the net Central North Sea. Since completion, all three of further development studies during 2003.

effect of additional discoveries,field revisions fields have exceeded expectations.Hudson oil In the deep water area, the focus is on the most
and new acquisitions. At year-end, total proven ratesincreased following a workover campaign; significant prospect, known as Fan 6. Indications
and probable oil and gas reserves therefore Otter achieved first production some two
are that additional 3D seismic may be required in
increased to a new record level of 116 mmboe. months ahead of schedule; and a significant order to lower technical risk and hence optimise
Dana’s balance sheet remains strong with total boost to Banff production was achieved with a the location for this first deep water well.

net assets at 31st December 2002 of £137.3 new infill well. In addition, Dana’s commercial
million (31st December 2001:£130.4 million). team also renegotiated the crudesales In Mauritania, Dana has concentrated its

agreements for these fields,achieving improved resources on the acquisition and interpretation
Production and Development premiums.The ConocoPhillips deal began to of 3D seismic over its Block 7 and Block 1 licences.

The first half of 2002 saw Dana’s existing fields, deliver its aim of accelerated UK cash flow in Following the identification of a large number
Claymore,Victor and South Vat-Yoganskoye, February 2003,as the Caledonia oil field was of prospects in Block 7,some with stacked
continue to provide a sound base of production brought onstream. geological horizons providing multiple targets

and cash flow for the Company,much in line for a single well, Dana has elected to proceed
with expectations. into the first drilling phase of the PSC.

Consequently a well is being planned for later
this year to test the most interesting prospect

in Block 7,with reserves potential of several

Dana Petroleum plc 2002 Annual Report 5Annex 99

Chairman’s & Chief Executive’s Review
continued

hundred million barrels. In Block 1, following The Morangie well offshoreWestern Australia, Once the revised Combined Code has been

signature of a farm-out agreement with Energy in which Dana negotiated a complete cost carry, finalised and published, the Board will consider
Africa to cover Dana’s costs,a major 3D seismic proved non-commercial. However,the presence of any minor adjustments which are appropriate

survey was acquired in the fourth quarter of significant volumes of residual oil and excellent for the Company.
2002.This survey is now under accelerated quality reservoir has provided sufficient
interpretation with the aim of identifying encouragement for the joint venture group to In June 2002, Mr Colin Goodall joined the Board

specific drilling targets to enable a decision on extend the licence by several years and continue as a non-executive director following a career
the first drilling phase of this PSC by July 2003. exploration in this area. Further 3D seismic is spanning 24 years with the BP group.In addition

This may ultimately lead to a two well drilling planned this summer. to his normal board duties,MrGoodall also serves
programme being undertaken over both blocks. as a member of Dana’s Audit and Remuneration

Acquisition & Divestment Committees. Mr David MacFarlane joined the
In Kenya, Dana completed the work programme The Company continued to prioritise portfolio Board as Group Finance Director,in November

for the first two year exploration period in management in 2002. Dana’s business 2002. Mr MacFarlane holds more than 20 years’
October 2002. Presented with very encouraging development team demonstrated its proficiency experience in financial control and management

results,Dana has now elected to proceed into with the negotiation and closure of two UKCS in the upstream oil and gas business. Both Colin
the next two year period, which will see the production and development deals,with ENI- and David have already made very valuable

Company acquiring 2D seismic over each Agip and ConocoPhillips. A key element in both contributions to the business.
of its four Kenyan Blocks. It is expected that this transactions was the use of exploration interests

new survey will be shot in the second half of by Dana as part of the consideration.This strategy In December 2002, it was agreed that
2003 to allow sufficient time to make the‘drill- has the dual benefit of providingDana with a Mr Graham Stewart would step down from the
or-drop’decision required by October 2004. competitive edge and reducing the cash element Board in order to become Chief Executive of Faroe

paid by Dana for the acquired production.The Petroleum Limited, in which Dana now owns a
In Indonesia, preliminary interpretation Company also tookthe opportunity in December direct shareholding.Wethank Graham for his

of a transition zone seismic programme acquired 2002 to increase its stake in the new UK holding excellent work at Dana over recent years and we
in 2002 has confirmed the possibility of a company for Føroya Kolvetni, named Faroe are pleased that he will still be adding value to

significant western extension to the Ujung Petroleum Limited, to the maximum available the Group through his important role at Faroe
Pangkah field.This is likely to be the subject of stake prior to the 2003 Faroes drilling Petroleum.

appraisal drilling during the early part of the programme.
field development so that additional reserves, Strategy

if proven, can be accommodated within the Board Development Dana’s strategy is to create significant,
existing core development scheme. Additional & Corporate Governance shareholder value by delivering strong growth in

exploration prospects are emerging in this PSC The Directors recognise that Dana is a growing hydrocarbon reserves,production and earnings.
and the first of these, theWest Sidayu oil public company and therefore aim to set and In the Board’s experience, this is best achieved by

prospect, may be drilled before the end of 2003. maintain high standards for managing the a balanced approach. Dana therefore combines
Group’s assets,business development and a portfolio of exploration opportunities,which

corporate governance. each have the potential for material step
increases in reserves,with the exploitation of
The recommendations contained in the Higgs cost effective production and development

and Smith Reports on corporate governance, assets which generate strong,stable cash flow
which were issued in January 2003,have been to finance the exploration programme.

reviewed in detail and Dana exhibits a high level
of compliance.

6 Dana Petroleum plc 2002 Annual Report Annex 99

Looking ahead, following the completion of is working hard to speed up timetables and is
Dana’s strategy has four key elements:
1. Balancing investment in high-impact, medium intensive 3D seismic programmes this year,deep optimistic that the current divestment programmes,
water drilling is scheduled in Mauritania and initiated by the majors,may be a catalyst for the
risk oil and gas exploration, with value
enhancing acquisitions,and investment in low Ghana. Planning is also in progress for Dana’s acceleration of projects of this type.
risk, low cost oil and gas production and field first seismic programme offshore Kenya. Further

developments; wells are also being considered in Europe and Commercial Transactions
the Far East, such that by end 2004 Dana can Dana will continue to actively pursue new

2. Maximising the probability of exploration and expect to participate in a total of up to eight opportunities,particularly production and
development success by reducing the technical additional exploration wells. development assets in its home base of the UK

risk associated with individual investments to a North Sea, where attractive targets are being
minimum and by ensuring the Companyholds a Production and Development created by the asset rationalisation of major oil

portfolio of attractive exploration prospects and Production is expected to grow further during companies. In order to maximise future
development opportunities; 2003 as the Caledonia field reaches full capacity potential, Dana will also seek opportunities to

and with the completion of two additional gain early entry into new exploration areas
3. Commercialising exploration success production wells on Otter by mid year. which offer exceptional upside. As the

with a bias towards asset trading for existing Company’s portfolio builds,both acquisition and
or near-term production when this allows Development sanction is anticipated this year for divestment opportunities will arise from within

accelerated value extraction; and two new developments, the Cavendish gas field the existing asset base.These will be exploited
in the Southern North Sea and the Ujung where cash or other forms of value can be added

4. Operating a sound financial framework which Pangkah gas field in Indonesia, both of which quickly and efficiently.
seeks to ensure that the exploration programme should contribute significantly to production

can be financed from cash flow generated by the targets in 2005. Commercial discussions have In summary,Dana has a solid foundation and
production portfolio. been moving forward positively between continues to perform well against a background

neighbouring coventure groups in the Greater of increasing production and healthy crude oil
outlook Kittiwake Area of the Central North Sea area and prices.These factors,combined with a strong
this should enable plans to be advanced for balance sheet, sound financial management and
Exploration and Appraisal
North Sea exploration activity in 2003 will development of the Goosander field. a portfolio of high quality opportunities will
allow Dana to continue to grow over the coming
include a proposed well to test an undrilled fault
block adjacent to previous discoveries in the Looking further ahead, Dana now has, through years.The future success of the Company
Melville area, to the South of the Hudson field. both discovery and acquisition, a substantial depends on the commitment, enthusiasm and

Faroe Petroleum, in which the Company now inventory of development opportunities which hard work of the Dana team. On behalf of the
holds a 20.6% interest, will drill the Marimas well will provide the basis for organic production Board, we would like to thank all staff for their

this summer to test multiple prospects in growth in future years.This includes several important contributions in 2002 and commend
Licence 002 of the Faroe Islands,with potential potential field developments which will be subject to shareholders their technical excellence and

reserves of up to 500 mmboe.The ENI-Agip/ to further technical study and commercial dedication to the Company.
Faroe Petroleum joint venture has already negotiation in 2003. In the case of new UKCS

identified further prospects in its two Faroes projects,the current complex ownership structures
licences and Dana’s shareholding provides the prevalent can often hinder progress towards 27 March 2003

Company with a stake in this upside. development sanction. However, the Company

Dana Petroleum plc 2002 Annual Report 7Annex 99

Review of Operations

continued John Downey
Exploration Manager

Africa

“Offshore Africa positions Dana with substantial growth potential.The vast

acreage and prospectivity of the areas under licence give us important
strategic holdings across a range of geological provinces. Following two

discovery wells in shallow water Ghana and the extensive acquisition and
interpretation of high definition seismic, we will soon be ready to drill the

first of our large, deep water targets offshore Mauritania.”

Mauritania Ghana Kenya
Following the success ofWoodside Energy’s 2001 Dana drilled its second discovery well,WT-2X, in Dana has now successfully completed the agreed

Mauritanian drilling campaign which resulted in theWestern Tano Contract Area (Dana 90.0%) in work programme for the first two-year exploration
the discovery of the Chinguetti field in offshore 2002.Whilst the quality of the lower Albian age period, which ended in October 2002, for each of

Block 4, the hydrocarbon potential of the region sandstone target proved disappointing, the well the four exploration Blocks which it operates
was further demonstrated in 2002 with the discovered 75 feet of high quality oil bearing offshore Kenya, namely L-5,L-7,L-10 and L-11

discovery of the nearby Banda field and a sandstone reservoir in a shallower Maastrichtian (Dana 80.0%).This involved a thorough study of
successful two-well appraisal of the Chinguetti age formation at a depth of around 6,100 feet. all available historic geological and seismic data

field which is now expected to lead to the Subsequent remapping of this accumulation has for the area under licence, which represents a
country’s first oil development. demonstrated the potential for significant oil-in- vast (45,000 km ) under-explored Cretaceous-

place volumes of around 200 million barrels. Tertiary basin in water depths of 200 to 2000
Offshore Northern Mauritania, Dana continued Oil samples recovered from the well have shown metres.The study identified seven potential‘play’

its regional geological studies in Blocks 7 and 8. the crude to be relatively viscous.Therefore, types,both structural and stratigraphic, from
The Company concentrated its resources on the future commerciality will depend on how which around 100 early stage exploration

interpretation of the 3D seismic survey which appropriate technology can be applied to prospects have been characterised to date.
was acquired over Block 7 (Dana 80.0%). maximise recovery efficiency and this will be the

Following the identification of a number of subject of development studies to be conducted Presented with these very encouraging results,
very significant exploration prospects,many in 2003. Dana elected to proceed into the next two-year

indicating stacked reservoir horizons, the original exploration period in Kenya, during which the
Block 7 co-venturers elected to enter into the first Good progress was made in 2002 in understanding Company plans to acquire a minimum of

drilling phase of the PSC.Woodside, which had the exploration potential of the deepwater region 500 km of 2D seismic over each block. It is likely
an option to join the group in the next phase, of theWestern Tano licence, with the focus now that Dana will shoot this new survey in

decided not to proceed. Preparations are now largely on the most significant prospect 2003 to allow sufficient time to evaluate the
underway to drill a well before the end of 2003 currently identified, known as Fan 6.With some new data and make the‘drill-or-drop’decision

to test an exciting prospect located in the South of the highest potential oil-in-place volumes in required by October 2004.
of Block 7,which has reserves potential of several the area, this prospect also exhibits good

hundred million barrels. apparent reservoir continuity and evidence of
direct hydrocarbon indicators on the 3D seismic

Interpretation of the infill 2D seismic survey data. In line with its strategy,Dana is considering
acquired over Block 1 (Dana 48.0%) in 2001 has a plan to further reduce technical risk ahead of

resulted in an upgrading of the Block’s potential. drilling,and thus increase the chance of a first
Consequently,following signature of a farm-out deepwater discovery,by shooting a further 3D

agreement with Energy Africa that covered seismic survey in 2003 over a previously unsurveyed
Dana’s costs,a major 1,340 km 3D seismic part of Fan 6.This would enable an optimum

survey was acquired offshore Southern drilling location to be selected for 2004.
Mauritania in the fourth quarter of 2002 with

the aim of firming up specific drilling targets In recognition of the importance of Dana’s
in Block 1.The data from this survey is now exploration work to date and the value of taking

being fast-track interpreted to allow a decision forward the deepwater work programme, the
to be taken on the first drilling phase of the Ghanaian authorities have offered Dana a three

PSC by July 2003. year extension of the term of its exploration
licence, to mid 2007.

10 Dana Petroleum plc 2002 Annual Report Annex 100

Thomas Pearmain, “Woodside Spuds Offshore Well; Kenya’s Oil Future to Be Determined in
2007”, Global Insight (5 Dec. 2006) Annex 100

Same-Day Analysis

Woodside Spuds Offshore Well; Kenya's Oil Future to

Be Determined in 2007

Published: 12/5/2006

Subscribe | Archives

Kenya's first offshore well for 28 years has been spudded; the next 12 months should give a clear indication of
whether Kenya will become an oil-producing country

Global Insight Perspective

Significance Woodside Petroleum has spudded a deepwater well
in Block L5 offshore Lamu on the Kenyan coast.
China is also set to prospect for oil in the country,
having signed a deal earlier this year

Implications Residents of Lamu already believe they will be shortly
enjoying huge oil riches; however, even if commercial

oil deposits are discovered, this will not lead to local
employment opportunities as the Lamu workforce is
unskilled.

Outlook Kenya's upstream activities will also determine the
scale of investment and the future of the country's
downstream sector, with Mombasa's refinery either
set to be expanded or shut down and turned into a

mass storage facility for imported products. The next
12 months will determine Kenya's future as an oil
producing nation.

Drilling Begins for Oil in Kenya

Offshore drilling has begun in Kenya as Australia's Woodside Petroleum spudded the Pomboo-1 exploration well in
deepwater Block L5. By the end of next year, when other test wells have been drilled, analysis of initial results

should tell whether the country has the commercial deposits to become an oil-producing nation.Annex 100

Woodside leads a consortium of independent exploration companies and is the operator in Block L5 with a 30%

stake, Dana Petroleum (30%), Repsol (20%), and Global Petroleum (20%) are the other partners (see Kenya: 10
August 2006: Dana, Woodside and Global Petroleum Get Ready to Sink Exploratory Wells in Kenya).

Woodside has said that it will spend more than US$90 million to drill a single well in Blocks L5 and L7 in the Indian
Ocean. Woodside has previously stated that the Kenyan coast is "the most prospective part of East Africa with

several large geological structures hosting multiple targets similar to those found on Australia's North-West Shelf".
Dana Petroleum has also said that it believes that the blocks could contain over one billion barrels each. The first
well is being drilled in 2,200 metres of water to a planned total depth of 5,005 metres. The drilling will be

undertaken by the Japanese deepwater drilling vessel MV Chikyu.

Oil Deposits Will Not Bring Employment Opportunities

The drilling is taking place about 135 km off Lamu, but residents have already started believing that a future living

off the riches of petrodollars is only a short time away. Mary M'Mukindia the managing director of Kenya's National
Oil Co. (NOCK) is therefore having to calm the levels of excitement by organising seminars and public rallies to
educate the local population. Even if commercial oil deposits are discovered in the Lamu basin, revenue is not

expected to start rolling in until 2011-14. Another problem that the residents of Lamu are set to experience is that
oil production would not increase the employment opportunities as the local workforce is largely unskilled and most
jobs would be contracted out.

There is also the need for an independent environmental impact assessment as Lamu's waters represent the
livelihood of its fisherman and despoliation of the environment would be a catastrophe for them and for the vital
tourism sector. A National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) investigation is being carried out, but
NEMA represents the government, which has a vested interest in oil being found in Lamu's deepwaters.

China to Prospect for Oil in Kenya

In April 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao flew to Kenya to meet President Mwai Kibaki and conclude a deal for
the China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) to prospect for oil in mainly offshore areas (see Kenya: 27 April

2006: Chinese President Agrees to Offshore Oil Exploration Deal During State Visit to Kenya). Fu Chengyu
chief executive of CNOOC Ltd, announced last week that the companyʼs subsidiary, CNOOC Africa Ltd, would
take on six production-sharing contracts (PSCs) in Kenya. These six PSCs cover Blocks 1, 9, 10A, L2, L3, and L4

in three basins of Lamu, Anza, and Mandera, with a total area of 115,343 sq. km. This marks the first time that
CNOOC has explored in East Africa (see Sub-Saharan Africa: 1 May 2006:China Increases Security of Supply
with Energy Deals in Nigeria and Kenya). The agreement appears to be a low-risk investment for Kenya, with

China taking on all exploration costs. While Kenya is seen as a highly prospective region, China's deal with Kenya
can be seen as an insurance policy for its government, which is desperate to protect its investment in neighbouring
Sudan, which ships the majority of its oil to Chinese markets. Most of Sudanʼs oilfields are in the centre or south of

the country and the Kenya Pipeline Corp. (KPC) has offered to build a pipeline transporting oil from southern
Sudan to the port of Lamu. This could protect Sudanese marketing routes in the event that the south of the country
decides to secede under the terms of its six-year interim peace agreement with the government in the Sudanese
capital, Khartoum. Annex 100

KPC managing director George Okungu told officials from southern Sudan that Kenya's position on the eastern
coast of Africa and its experience in pipeline management would best enable Sudan to exploit its proven oil
reserves (see Kenya: 8 April 2006: Kenya Pipeline Corporation Wants to Build Pipeline from Southern

Sudan to Kenyan Coast). However, it is believed that a pipeline connecting south Sudan to the Kenyan coast
would cost around US$1.4 billion, which makes the idea very much a long-term project.

Outlook and Implications

Next year will be crucial in determining whether Kenya has a future as an oil-producing country. Woodside, which
has already spent 852 million Kenya shillings (US$12 million) in exploration work and seismic data since 2003, is
committed to drilling at least two wells over the next 12 months, and it will sink 13 wells throughout Africa in the

next year.

Kenya will be hoping the test results show hydrocarbon deposits, not least because its neighbour Uganda proved
this year it has commercial amounts of oil and is set to become an oil-producing country by 2009. Ugandan

President Yoweri Museveni has stated his government will launch an "Early Oil-Production Scheme" that will see
the creation of a mini-refinery next year that will produce diesel, kerosene, and heavy oil by 2009. At a later date,
the country will be able to produce gasoline (see Uganda: 10 October 2006:President Museveni Says Uganda

Will Begin Producing Oil in 2009).

The question of whether Kenya discovers oil through its exploratory activities also has downstream implications.
The Kenya Petroleum Refineries Ltd (KPRL) needs around 21 billion Kenya shillings (US$300 million) to redevelop

the country's Mombasa refinery; in its current state it is a burden on the economy. The inefficient refinery costs the
taxpayer 5 billion Kenya shillings a year as a result of its poor performance; any upgrade to the refinery would
need to enable it to produce environmentally friendly low sulphur diesel as the current refinery does not contain a

de-sulphurisation plant. Also, by modernising the Mombasa refinery, one of the government's aims—of increasing
Kenyaʼs production of liquid petroleum gas—could be achieved. If drilling results show a future as an oil-producing
nation, this could lead to a much larger expansion and investment in the Mombasa refinery.

However, if over the next 12 months no commercial oil deposits are discovered in Kenya it could lead to the
refinery being shut down and transformed into a mass storage facility for imported refined products. George
Wachira general manager at the Petroleum Institute of East Africa said that it cost 2-3 Kenya shillings per litre

more to refine a litre of fuel compared with importing refined products from the Middle East, where large and
efficient refineries take advantage of economies of scale. (see Kenya 1 November 2006: Inefficient Kenyan
Refinery a Burden on Economy). With Uganda already saying that it will construct a mini refinery on the basis of

its known crude reserves, this could place Uganda in control of the East Africa fuels market.

Now the first well has been spudded in Kenya—the first offshore well for 28 years—the country has stepped up its
programme to determine whether Kenya has a future as an oil-producing nation. This has been accompanied by

the country's Energy Minister Kiraitu Murungi publishing a gazette of 38 exploration blocks in the country, in total
covering 115,242 sq. km. Kenyans and energy industry observers will gain a clearer in 2007 as to whether the
country will join Sudan and Uganda in having proven hydrocarbon reserves.

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Global Insight

January 23, 2007

Woodside Well in Kenya a Duster

BYLINE: Thomas Pearmain

SECTION: In Brief

LENGTH: 202 words

Australia's Woodside Petroleum, which spudded the Pomboo-1 exploration w
ell in deepwater Block L5 in Kenya last

December, has announced that it has failed to detect any hydrocarbons .W
oodside said logging tools had confirmed the
absence of hydrocarbons in the well, which was drilled to a depth of 4,887 metres. The drilling took place about 135 km
off Lamu and the Japanese deepwater drilling vessel MV Chikyu will now plug and abandon the well. Woodside leads a

consortium of independent exploration companies and is the operator in Block L5 with a 30% stake, Dana Petroleum
(30%), Repsol (20%), and Global Petroleum (20%) are the other partners (see Kenya: 10 August 2006: ).

Significance: This is very disappointing news for Kenya and for the cons
ortium, which believed the Kenyan coast to be

"the most prospective part of East Africa with several large geological structures hosting multiple targets similar to
those found on Australia's North-West Shelf". Dana Petroleum had also said that it believed the block could contain
over one billion barrels. The offshore drilling will continue as Woodside has said that it will also drill a single well in

Block L7 in the Indian Ocean (see Kenya: 5 December 2006: ).

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OIL & GAS EXPLORATION AUSTRALIA

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SUBJECT: PETROLEUM PRODUCTS (90%); OIL & GAS EXPLORATION (90%); OIL & GAS EX
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http://w3.nexis.com/new/results/docview/docview.do?r...54814298&treeMax=▯true&treeWidth=0&csi=250053&docNo=5 (1 of 2)1/24/2007 10:41:46 AM Annex 102

Total S.A., Press Release: Total Enters Exploration in Kenya by Acquiring a 40% Stake in Five
Offshore Blocks in the Lamu Basin (21 Sept. 2011) Annex 102

FRANÇAIS

BROWSE Search

Home › Media › News › Press-releases

TOTAL ENTERS EXPLORATION IN KENYA BY

ACQUIRING A 40% STAKE IN FIVE OFFSHORE

BLOCKS IN THE LAMU BASIN

September 21, 2011

September 21, 2011: Total today announces its acquisition,

through its Total E&P Kenya B.V. subsidiary, of a 40% interest
in five offshore exploration blocks in the Lamu Basin, blocks L5,

L7, L11a, L11b and L12. Subject to the approval of the Kenyan
authorities, Total will acquire:

Kenya Map - a 20% stake from Anadarko Kenya Company, which will
continue to be the operator with a 50% interest in the permits ;

- a 5% stake from Cove Energy, which will maintain a 10% interest in the permits ;

- a 15% stake from Dynamic Global Advisors, which is selling all of its interest to Total.

Covering an area of more than 30,500 square kilometres, the exploration blocks are
located offshore the Lamu Archipelago in water depths of between 100 and 3,000

metres.

A 3,500 square kilometres 3D seismic survey is currently underway. If the results are

satisfactory, one or more exploration wells will be drilled once the survey has been
completed.

By continuing browsing this website, you accept the use of cookies or

“This transaction is part of a bold exploration strategy that consists in acquiring large
stakes in high-potential frontier plays,” says Marc Blaizot, Totalʼs Senior Vice President,
For more information and for tracers settings
Exploration. “Recent discoveries in offshore Mozambique and Tanzania offer a very
promising outlook for these Kenyan permits.”

DismissAnnex 102

Following its recent entry in the exploration and development of reserves in Ugandaʼs

Lake Albert region, and its selection to develop exploration activities in Tanzania, this
acquisition is another step in Totalʼs strategic focus on strengthening its exploration and

production presence in East Africa.

Total in Kenya

Total has been present in Kenya - one of its longest established host countries in Africa
-since 1955 via Total Kenya, headquartered in Nairobi. Total Kenya is listed on the

Nairobi Stock Exchange and employs 385 people.

Market leader since its acquisition of Chevronʼs assets in 2009, Total Kenya conducts

all of the Groupʼs marketing operations, which include general retail and lubricant, LPG
and aviation fuel distribution operations, via a network of 165 service stations.

For further information, please contact:
Tel. : +33 (0) 1 47 44 46 99 - Fax : +33 (0) 1 47 44 68 21

Send an e-mail to Media Relations

CALENDAR

TOTAL ON SOCIAL

NETWORKS

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Total's Key Figures Institutional Investors

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TOTAL ON THE WEB Annex 103

Barry Morgan, “Kenyan block still attractive”, Biyokulule Online (13Apr. 2012) Annex 103

Kenyan block still attractive
Barry Morgan
Upstream

April 13, 2012

LE AST heralded among Kenya's prospective undril led areas is Block 1, a
sprawling tract operated by Lion Petroleum in partnership with Afren in the
Mandera-Lugh basin, writes Barry Morgan .. The basin stretches into Somalia

and the Ethiop ian Ogaden, where significant quantites of oil have been found .

A tota l of 17 leads in Block 1 resemble similar gas finds across the border in

Ethiopia, while oil-filled fractures abound in the Murri Format ion, among
which the Tarbaj oil seep has the potential on its own for designation as an
oilfield, says Lion chief executive Alec Robinso n.. Sproule Internat ional told

Lion the leads could not be mapped without additional seismic, so Robinson
ordered more before a planned listing on the Toronto Exchange and a one­
well commitment in 2013.

Robinson pegs block reserves at 750 millio n barrels of oil equiva lent, but
hints the upside is much greater. Nairobi's Energy Ministry appears to concur

and is agitat ing for the block to be split into three parts .

Australian oil services outfitAmsas Consulting is targeting Somali acreage

directly abutting Block 1. Amsas is run by Somali businessman Ali Abdullahi .
Having already snared the Somali government block on the coast, Abdullahi
has sought additional acreage off sout hern Somalia to the nort h of the Jorre

block, contiguous with the disputed Kenyan maritime boundary. "I had the
well logs and reports on my laptop, whic h was stolen, though I had it all
backed up. I suspect foul play by those who might benefit if I couldn't prove

my claim, given the chaos in the present Soma li admin istrat ion.

"I wor ked hard for the Somali Energy Ministry in 2005 to secure all the

digitised data from Harms & Brady in Colorado, then Shell sent most of its
data back to Mogadishu but it was sto len en route . Nobody knows by whom -
but we got it a year later." Jorre was secured by Total in 2007 as a tec hnical

evaluation area. Howeve r, Tota l failed to convert the play into a production
shar ing contract when the government collapsed on the very day it was
scheduled to pay a $5 million signature bonus - that too, is now up for

grabs .. Several homeg rown Kenyan indepe ndents, such as Bahari Resources,
have sensed relinquishment in the air, alongside regiona l operators Petrobras
and Cove Energy, all actively pursuing demarcated acreage in sout hern

Somalia.

© 2012, Upstream.

©Copyright BiyoKulule OnlineAll rightsreserved®

[email protected] roobdoon2000@yahcao Annex 104

Kelly Gilblom, “Kenya, Somalia border row threatens oil exploration”▯, Reuters (20Apr. 2012) Annex 104

SCRIPTSCRIPTSCRIPTSCRIPTSCRIPT

World | Fri Apr 20, 2012 7:36am EDT Related: WORLD, UNITED NATIONS

Kenya, Somalia border row threatens oil exploration
NAIROBI | BY KELLY GILBLOM

A row between Kenya and Somalia over their maritime border may deter multinational oil

companies from exploring for oil and gas offshore east Africa, and a Somali official warned

that the argument could escalate.

The two coastal nations disagree over the location of their boundary line in the Indian

Ocean. At stake are their legal claims to sell rights for exploration and collect revenue from

any discovery.

Kenya recently identified eight new offshore exploration blocks available for licensing, and

all but one of them are located in the contested area.

"The issue between Somalia and Kenya is not a dispute; it is a territorial argument that

came after oil and gas companies became interested in the region," Abdullahi Haji,
Somalia's minister of foreign affairs, told Reuters in Mogadishu.

"If the argument continues unsolved, it will change into a dispute that may result at least in

souring the deep relation between our two countries and (cause a) war at last," he said.

East Africa has become a hot spot for oil and gas exploration, spurred by new finds in

waters off countries including Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique. In the Horn of Africa,

Somalia's semi-autonomous Puntland and Somaliland regions have also licensed
exploration blocks.

Kenya announced its first oil discovery in March by British oil firm Tullow Plc, which was on

land.

The row between Kenya and Somalia threatens to upend some exploration rights that
Kenya has granted to oil and gas companies, which have already started exploring in the

area.

French firm Total and Texas-based Anadarko and the only two companies so far holding
licenses from Kenya to blocks in the disputed area. They have no immediate plans to drill

there. Both companies declined to comment on the border issue.

UN INTERVENTION?

Martin Heya, Kenya's petroleum commissioner, said he was confident the United Nations,

which could be requested to help delineate the border, would agree with his country's view,

and he expected companies to continue their exploration activities.

"Do you stop working just because the boundaries have not been determined? No," he told
Reuters.

Consultants involved in border demarcation said the two countries won't have a legitimate

boundary until they sign a treaty that delimits the border, but that is unlikely to happen until
Somalia has a stable government.

Heya says the maritime border between the two countries should run horizontally east

from the point at which the two countries touch on land. The practice in east Africa hasAnnex 104

been for boundaries to run along the line of latitude, Heya said.

"For the time being, this is where we believe the border should be," he said, referring to the

horizontal east-west maritime border.

Somali officials say the onshore border continues into the ocean diagonally southeast and

that a horizontal border would be unfair.

If the Somalia-Kenya border was continuous from land into the ocean, making it lie

diagonally from the northwest to the southeast, Kenya would be left with a small triangle in

the Indian Ocean over which it could claim mineral rights.

Kenya has had stable diplomatic relations with its war-torn neighbor, but the east African

economic powerhouse sent troops into Somalia last October in pursuit of al Qaeda-linked

al Shabaab rebels, accusing the militants of cross-border attacks on its territory.

UNSTABLE SOMALIA

Joshua Brien, a legal adviser with the Commonwealth Secretariat, who has consulted with

Kenya on maritime border matters, said the two countries won't have a legitimate boundary
until they write and sign a treaty.

The absence of a stable government in Somalia could hinder this process, he said.

Somalia's government has been battling an insurgency by al Qaeda-linked rebels for years

and barely controls the capital, even with the help of an African peace-keeping force

executing a U.N. mandate to prop up its Western-backed government. It is unlikely it would

have the ability to wage a war on Kenya.

Brien also said the two countries' border disagreement is not unique. Throughout the world

there are unresolved maritime boundaries.

"It is not uncommon for maritime boundary issues to become heated, especially where

petroleum exploration and development is concerned," he said.

"In the case of Somalia, the matter is exacerbated by the governance and offshore

security situation in that country, both of which are well known."

Kenya is pushing on with oil and gas exploration, but petroleum commissioner Heya

acknowledged the border dispute could cause problems in the future.

Heya said companies will be unable to drill in their respective blocks until the boundary is

settled, because it will be unclear where to direct revenue from a resource discovery.

"Where the revenue goes is not apparent," Heya said.

(Additional reporting by Mohamed Ahmed in Mogadishu; Editing by James Macharia and

Jane Baird)

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Crop report: Prices are low, but Annex 105

Total S.A., Press Release: Total Steps Up Exploration Activities in Kenya with the Award of the
Offshore L22 License in the Lamu Basin (27 June 2012) Annex 105

Home › Media › News › Press­releases

TOTAL STEPS UP EXPLORATION ACTIVITIES IN KENYA WITH THE AWARD

OF THE OFFSHORE L22 LICENSE IN THE LAMU BASIN

June 27, 2012

Paris, June 27, 2012: Total today announced the signature of a production sharing contract with the Kenyan

government for Block L22, which it will operate with a 100% interest.

Covering an area of more than 10,000 square kilometers, the exploration license is located offshore the Lamu
Archipelago in water depths of between 2,000 and 3,500 meters. The first phase of the exploration program
consists of a 3D seismic survey.

Following the signing ceremony, Jacques Marraud des Grottes, Senior Vice President for Exploration &
Kenya's Map
Production in Africa commented: “This most recent award is aligned with Total’s strategy of building a strong
presence in the new basins of East Africa offering high­potential plays for exploration by leveraging our

internationally recognized deep offshore expertise.”

Total in Kenya

Total has been present in Kenya — one of its longest established host countries — since 1955 through Total Kenya, headquartered
in Nairobi. Total Kenya is listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange and employs 385 people.

Market leader since its acquisition of Chevron’s assets in 2009, Total Kenya conducts the Group’s marketing operations in the

country, notably with a network of 167 service stations, and positions in general retail, lubricants, LPG and aviation fuel distribution.

Total has been present in exploration and production in Kenya since 2011 and holds a 40% interest in the L5, L7, L11a, L11b and

L12 exploration licenses in the Lamu Basin, which are operated by Anadarko. Drilling of an exploration well is scheduled to begin
in 2012.

For further information, please contact:
Tel. : +33 (0) 1 47 44 46 99 ­ Fax : +33 (0) 1 47 44 68 21

Send an e­mail to Media Relations(/en/media/media­relations­contacts)

We use cookies on this site to enhance your user experience

By continuing browsing this website, you accept the use of cookies or other tracers for statistics of visits to optimize the functionality of the site.

For more information and for tracers settings (http://www.total.com/en/cookie­policy)

Dismiss Annex 106

Eni S.p.A., Press Release: Eni enters Kenya with the acquisition of three exploration blocks (2
July 2012) Annex 106

Eni enters Kenya with the acquisition of three exploration blocks

San Donato Milanese (Milan), July 2, 2012 – Eni announces the signing of three product

sharing contracts, awarded by the government of Kenya, for the acquisition of exploration
blocks: L-21, L-23 and L-24, thus marking the entry of Eni in the country. The blocks are

located in the deep and ultra-deep waters of the Lamu Basin, off the coast of Kenya.

The initial exploration phase of the three blocks, which will be operated by Eni with 100%

participation and cover an area of more than 35,000 square kilometers, will consist of the

execution of a seismic acquisition program.

Eniʼs entry into Kenya reinforces its presence in the exploration of the frontier basins of

East Africa, which has recently led to the discovery of significant volumes of natural gas in

the deep waters of Mozambique.

With this operation, Eni further strengthens its leadership in Sub-Saharan region where it
is already present in Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Ghana, Togo, Angola, Democratic

Republic of Congo and Mozambique with an operated overall production of 450,000

barrels of oil equivalent per day and a rapidly growing exploration activity.

Press Office: Tel. +39.0252031875 – +39.0659822030
Freephone for shareholders (from Italy): 800940924
Freephone for shareholders (from abroad): +39. 800 11 22 34 56
Switchboard: +39-0659821

[email protected] Codice campo modificato
[email protected]
Codice campo modificato
[email protected] Codice campo modificato

Web site: www.eni.com Codice campo modificato Annex 107

Kelly Gilblom, “Somalia challenges Kenya over oil blocks”, Reuters (6 July 2012) Annex 107

SCRIPTSCRIPTSCRIPTSCRIPTSCRIPTSCRIPTSCRIPTSCRIPTSCRIPTSCRIPTSCRIPT

Industries | Fri Jul 6, 2012 10:14am EDT Related: UNITED NATIONS, ENERGY

Somalia challenges Kenya over oil blocks

* Offshore blocks located in disputed seas

* Border row threatens exploration in new hotspot

* Kenya's plans to extend continental shelf stalled

By Kelly Gilblom

NAIROBI, July 6 (Reuters) - Somalia's government accused Kenya on Friday of awarding
offshore oil and gas exploration blocks illegally to multinationals Total and Eni because the

concessions lie in waters claimed by Somalia.

The spat between Kenya and its war-ruined neighbour could complicate the hunt for

resources along a part of the East African coastline, rapidly emerging as one of the world's

hottest oil exploration prospects.

Somalia's deputy energy minister, Abdullahi Dool, said contracts awarded for four blocks in

deep waters were invalid and the government planned to complain to the United Nations,

which oversees maritime border laws.

"We are concerned about the lease of blocks," Dool told Reuters. "I am sure we will lodge

complaints."

The blocks are among seven awarded by Kenya last week, three of them to Italy's Eni and
one to France's Total .

They lie in an area long contested by Kenya, East Africa's biggest economy, and Somalia,

wrecked by more than two decades of civil war, split between an interim government and
Islamist rebels and serving as the main base for Indian Ocean pirates.

Kenya rejected the accusation that ownership of the blocks was contested and said there

was no need to hold up exploration.

Kenya's first major oil discovery in March has raised expectations of more to come.

"Saying these are not Kenyan blocks is like saying we don't have a full-fledged
government, like we are a banana republic," petroleum commissioner Martin Heya said.

An Eni spokesman said the company would not comment on the challenge to its rights to

blocks L21, L23 and L24. Total, awarded block 122, did not respond to requests for
comment.

Kenya says the maritime boundary, over which there is no formal agreement, should run

due east from the point at which the land border meets the coast, like the maritime
boundaries of other countries along the coast.

Somalia says the boundary should extend perpendicular to the coastline, giving it a big

chunk of the waters claimed by Kenya.

The dispute mirrors those in other parts of Africa where resources straddle boundaries thatAnnex 107

were first drawn only vaguely by colonial era map makers.

Kenya and Somalia signed a memorandum of understanding in 2009 that the border would

run east along the line of latitude, but Somalia, which has lacked an effective central

government since 1991, then rejected the agreement in parliament.

The quarrel over the oil blocks strains otherwise close ties between Kenya and the Somali

government. In fact, Kenya sent troops into Somalia last year to hunt down the Islamist al

Shabaab rebels who control swathes of the country.

Joshua Brien, a legal adviser with the Commonwealth Secretariat who is advising Kenya

on the matter, said no legal boundary can be established until both governments sign a

U.N.-approved agreement or move the issue to an international court.

"It's not impossible they could come to a resolution, but the situation in Somalia is so

uncertain," Brien told Reuters by phone from London.

An added frustration for Kenya is that it cannot extend its claim to the continental shelf

beyond its 200 nautical miles (370 km) of territorial waters until the border spat is resolved.

That holds up the award of more exploration licenses. (Editing by Richard Loughand

Matthew Tostevin)

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Dollar Shave Club Annex 108

Kennedy Senelwa, “Kenya ministry signs contracts for oil drilling”, The East African (7 July
2012) Annex 108

Business

Kenya ministry signs contracts for oil drilling

The Ministry of Energy has signed production sharing contracts (PSC) for exploration of crude oil and gas in Kenya
with six international prospecting firms.

Awarding of the seven exploration areas to the firms follows increased international interest after the discovery of oil in
Ngamia well drilled in northwestern Kenya by Tullow Oil and Africa Oil Corporation.

Martin Heya, the Petroleum Commissioner at the Ministry of Energy, said the government has signed PSCs for onshore

exploration area 11A and L19 with ERHC Energy and Rift Energy Corporation respectively.

Pacific Seaboard Investments was awarded the L20 acreage in Lamu basin.

“Kenya is asking for more favourable terms as the country is no longer a frontier exploration area as Tullow has

discovered oil,” said Mr Heya.

Total was awarded offshore L22 acreage while ENI got L21, L23 and L24 exploration areas. Edgo of Qatar is
negotiating for onshore L14 and offshore L26 exploration areas. Statoil is pursuing offshore L25 acreage.

In 2011, Total got 40 per cent interest in offshore exploration areas L5, L7, L11A, L11B and L12 where oil and gas
wells will be drilled soon.

Total has been operating in Kenya since 1955, and is involved in marketing and distribution of refined oil products. The
firm acquired Chevron (Caltex) in 2009.

ENI, which was known as Agip in Kenya, has returned and been awarded L21, L23 and L24 exploration areas.

“ENI’s entry into Kenya reinforces its presence exploration of frontier basins of East Africa, which has recently led to
discovery of significant volumes of natural gas in deep waters of Mozambique,” said the Italian firm.

The company will map oil and gas sites through a seismic survey in exploration areas L21, L23 and L24 covering over
35,000 square kilometres in the deep and ultra-deep waters of Lamu basin.

Back to The East African: Kenya ministry signs contracts for oil drilling Annex 109

Rawlings Otini, “Kenya expels oil giant Statoil from exploration plan”, Business Daily Africa (5
Nov. 2012) Annex 109

CORPORATE NEWS

Kenya expels oil giant Statoil from

exploration plan

Energy Permanent Secretary Patrick Nyoike. File

IN SUMMARY

Experts say the 3D survey system is more advanced and precise compared to the 2D, which is cheaper and preferred by operators who are not keen to pump money in exploration
blocks that do not assure them a high success rate.

Norwegian oil giant Statoil has suffered a blow after Kenya expelled it from exploring oil in the country for flouting contract terms.

Also read:orwegian firm Statoil joins the search for oil in Kenya

The company was among the latest entrants in the Kenya oil search that has so far attracted more than 24 players by August after it was awarded
block L26 in the deep offshore and had planned to start drilling in January.

On Monday, the Permanent Secretary in the Energy ministry, Patrick Nyoike, said the government had withdrawn Statoil’s licence for failing to
stick to the 3D seismic survey, which is a more accurate exploration tool compared to the 2D that Statoil preferred.

“Statoil said they wanted to do it their own way but we could not accept and hence we had to let them go,” said Mr Nyoike in an interview.

“These conditions are applying across the board with companies such as Total, ENI and Agip doing as we had instructed, but they instead rejected
and we had to send them off.”

Experts say the 3D survey system is more advanced and precise compared to the 2D, which is cheaper and preferred by operators who are not keen
to pump money in exploration blocks that do not assure them a high success rate.

The offshore block awarded to Statoil is expected to be snapped by other oil majors amid increased demand for oil blocks in East Africa.

In recent months, East Africa has been a centre of oil and gas exploration after several big discoveries, including Kenya’s second ever oil find

announced by British explorer Tullow Oil and Canadian venture partner Africa Oil last week.

Licensing of the deep water offshore blocks at the Kenya coast has also been enhanced by discoveries along the coastlines of Tanzania and

Mozambique. Some of the latest entrants included French oil major Total and Eni of Italy.

Experts reckon Kenya is keen on 3D seismic survey to boost oil finds that are expected to continue the country’s surge of exploration activity as it

races to find commercially viable oil.

Oil strikes will also make the country attractive to oil giants at a moment when Kenya is seeking to benefit more from foreign oil and gasAnnex 109

exploration firms.

The Business Daily yesterday failed to get a response from Statoil, which has a presence in more than 30 countries with a total revenue of Sh10

trillion ($119 billion).

The energy firm with operations in six African countries including Egypt, Algeria, Tanzania, Ghana, Angola and Libya, recently struck a rich vein in

East Africa after securing large deposits of gas in Tanzania.

Kenya plans to gazette and auction off new blocks for oil and gas exploration.

The ministry of Energy said UK explorer Tullow Oil and Anadarko Petroleum would surrender acreage in a total of seven blocks in the coming weeks
as required in their production-sharing contracts with the government.

Tullow Oil could give up a quarter of its territory in block 10BB, where it made its March oil discovery, as well as a quarter of block 13T. Both are

onshore.

Anadarko will surrender 25 per cent of each of its five offshore blocks.

As part of production-sharing contracts, explorers must surrender a quarter of their unused blocks after two years if the block is onshore or three
years if it is offshore.

On Monday, Mr Nyoike said Anadarko Petroleum is scheduled to begin exploring for oil and gas in Kenya in December, with plans to drill two wells.

Anadarko is the operator of blocks L7 and L11B and holds 45 per cent of the licences in each. Total has a 40 per cent stake and Cove Energy holds

the remainder.

Anadarko has said it hopes to find oil, rather than gas, because it is cheaper and easier to produce. It plans to spend about Sh10 billion in its
Kenya’s exploration activities.

The Energy ministry expects explorers to drill at least a dozen more wells in the next 12 months onshore and offshore Kenya.

[email protected]

Back to Business Daily: Kenya expels oil giant Statoil from exploration plan Annex 110

Tullow Oil plc, Tullow in Kenya 2013 Annex 110
TULLOW KENYA PROFILE

TULLOW IN

KENYAAnnex 110

ABOUT THIS REPORT

Tullow Oil is a leading independent oil annd gas,

exploration and production group.

Tullow acquired our first operated interests in the rift basins

of Kenya in 2010. Just 18 months later we drilled the first wildcat

exploration well. Since then we have discovered an estimated

600 million barrels of oil resources in the South Lokinchar Basin.

This Kenya profile explores our journey so far in and the future

for this potential new oil province.

We have included information on our operational activities,

our economic contribution to Kenya and how we are playing

a role in the country’s social and economic development.

We call this commitment to Kenya and our host countries,
‘Creating Shared Prosperity’.

TULLOW OPERATIONS
2013 Group totals
Countries 24

Licences 146

Acreage (sq km) 321,521
Total workforce 2,034

Working interest production (boepd) 84,200
3
Reserves and resources (mmboe) 1,409
Sales revenue ($m) 2,673

Operating profit ($m) 381

Profit after tax ($m) 216
Operating cashflow ($m) 1,901

ABOUT TULLOW OIL CONTENTS

Tullow is focused is on finding onil in Africa anOur Journey – Introduction from Martin Mbogo 1
Atlantic Margins, combined with selective developExploration timeline 2
high-margin production to fund our exploration-led strategy.
World-class petroleum province potential 3
started almost 30 years ago in 1986, with nthe Group’s firstxploration success 4
licence in Senegal. Now, our portfolio of over 140 licences transparency 6
spans 24 countries and is organised into three regions.
Creating shared prosperity in Kenya 8
We are headquartered in London and we have a total globalevelopment potential 10
workforce of over 2,000 people, with over 50% of Local investment in numbers 12
working in our African operations.

Our shares are listed on the London, Irinsh and Ghana
Stock Exchanges and the Group is a constituent of
the FTSE 100 index. Annex 110

OUR

JOURNEY

“THIS IS A VERY EXCITING TIME FOR
KENYA & ITS NATURAL RESOURCES
HOLD SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR
THE COUNTRY.”

The discoveries made by Tullow over the last two years have put
Kenya at the heart of Eayst Africa’s emerging oil province. Despite
this success, we do not underestimate the challenges that lie aheady
in bringing first oil to market.

Development and production of these ryesources is a long-term
proposition, and so wye must work together with stakeholders to
build understanding and knowledge about what actiyvities need to
take place at each stage of the journey.

Securing an appropriate and economically viable plan for
development will be critiycal to project success. However having the
right infrastructure in place to support oil production will be equyally
important. Significant infrastructure upgrades will be required in
order to transport the oil from an area largely inaccessible today to
the sea, over 850 kilometres away. Furthermore, Tullow will require
access to a wide range of skills as well as competitive, high quality
goods and services.

We also recognise the fragility of our operating environment.
The environmental, social and cultural sensitivities wiyll require
careful management and extensive consultation. Our ability to develop
the Nation’s resources will be a collective effort and we are fully
committed to working with the Natyional and County Governments,
the communities in which ywe operate, and other stakeholders
to realise the full potential of Kenya’s resources.

Kenya’s natural resources hold significant potential for the
country’s people and we are committed to ensuring this is
delivered in a responsible manner.
Martin Mbogo
Tullow Business Manager, KenyaAnnex 110

Strategic Report

KENYA

TIMELINE

2010
licences 10BA, 10BB, 10A, 12A rand 13T
after signing agreements with Africa Oil
and Centric Energy. Agreements duly
approved by authorised Government
entity in Kenya

2011
Full Tensor Gradiometry (FTG) Gravity
survey commenced and drilling starts
at Ngamia-1

2012

Fby Twiga South-1 well in Block 13Ted

2013
Three more discoveries at Etuko-1,
Ekales-1 and Agete-1.
Government of Kenya to allow a multiplehe
field approach to development

2014
Discoveries at the Amosingr-1 and
Ewoi-1 exploration wells. Estimate of
diSouth Lokichar basirn potentialerall
of over one billion barrels of oil

2014+
Accelerating parallel exploration,
appraisal and development programmes Annex 110

TULLOW IN
Ethiopia
EAST AFRICA South Omo
Tullow has had significFant exploration success
in the rift basins Fof East Africa, opening basins iFSudan
Lake Albert Rift Basin iFn Uganda in 2006 aFnd more
recently in the South LokiFchar Kenya Rift Basin.
Accelerated exploration, appraisal and early
parallel in Kenya and Ethiopia, acrFoss the 11 basins Block 10BA
where we have over 85,000 sq km of Facreage. 1A
EA 1 Block 13T Block 10BB
EA Uganda
EA 2
“WE HAVE WORKED IN AFRICA PL 1/12bert Block 12Omo Basin
FOR ALMOST 30 YEARS & RECOGNISE
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REGION’S
WORLD-RENOWNED ENVIRONMENTAL Kenya
& CULTURAL HERITAGE.” Lake VictorBlock 12B

Aidan Heavey 150km
Chief Executive Officer

WORLD-CLASS

PETROLEUM PROVINCE POTENTIAL

KENYA ACREAGE
In Kenya, Tullow operates in one of the world’s most
environmentally and culturally sensitive regions
including the SibilFoi, the South IslanFd and the Central
Island National Parks. These are home to sites of
global archaeological and paleontological importance.
From the outset, Tullow recognised the need to protect
these areas of cultural and historical significance and
partnered with the NationalF Museums of Kenya (NMK)
and Turkoperations in these areas.to help manage our

Tullow’s acreage comprises geography with a wide
variety of topography including very rough volcanic
terrains in the South aFnd East of the region, to vast
savannahs and far-reaching deserts in the North-West.

65,000 SQ KM

ACREAGE IN KENYA

www.tullowoi3.comAnnex 110

RIFT BASINS
Rift basins are a core part of Tullow’s East
African exploration strategy and the plays
targeted in Kenya are relatively young, at a
occurred when the Earth’s plates were pulled
apart by forces deep within the Etarth’s
interior. As separation occurred, the ground
collapand linked to the sea.ich deepened

filled with sediment deptosits. The organic
remains of micro-organisms that
accumulated on the lake floor were then
heated, compacted and converted to oil as
they became buried in the collapsing rifts.
The early stages of rifting are present in
Kwith sediment eroded from the surroundingfilled
mountains. The combination of shales and
sands that are deposited contain the oil
sourceis now exploring.cks that Tullow

ACHIEVING

EXPLORA TION SUCCESS

SURVEYING
EXCELLENCE
IS DRIVING EXPLORATION
Rift basins in Kenya share many similar geological
qualities with the Lake Albert Rift Basin int Uganda
resources of over 1.7 billion barrels of oil since the first
exploration well in 2006. This etxperience in the East
Africa region gave us valuable and advantageous
teadoption of key technologies in developing ourarlty
exploration campaign in Kenya. We conducted the
world’s largest airborne Full Tensor Gradiometry (FTG)
gravity survey, at that time, as well as more
Basins. FTG is efficient in terms of time and provides
high-resolution information about variations in the
density of subsurface materials, which is hightly
valuapossible hydrocarbon deposits.n identifying

4 Tullow Oil plc A MULTI-BASIN EXPLORATION CAMPAIGN
This diagram shows the basins that Tullow has acreage in onshore Kenya. Success in South Lokichar isignificantly
de-risked the remaining areas. Tullow plans to explore in the Kerio and Turkana Basins in 2014.

Discover201€‚201ƒ „otential .…asin o„ening wells

TURKANTURKANA
BASIN BASIN

Ki…oko

Basement

ACHIEVING

EXPLORA TION SUCCESS

7/8
OIL DISCOVERIES TO DATE
IN SOUTH LOKICHAR BASIN

“WE USED INNOVATIVE
EX& VALUABLE TECHNICALES
INSIGHT IN PLANNING OUR
CAMPAIGN IN KENYA.”
Robin Sutherland
Exploration Manager – Sub iSaharan AfricaAnnex 110

Payments to major Estakeholder groups
(KES billion)
Social investment
KES 6. 1 0.1 governments
1.9
BILLION
At Tullow, we are committed to being Local contentbout our
payments to government as we believe th4.1enables communities,
csustainable management of oila revenues. Our total paymentse
to all Kenyan stakeholder groups, including taxes to the national
Goveinvestment in community projects amounted to discretionary
KES 6.1 billion ina 2013. Annex 110

KES 1.9

BILLION
Over the last 12 months we paid KES 1.9 billmion in
taxes to the national Government of Kenya, which
includes VAT, withholding tax on imported services
and PAYE on our employee salaries. We have just
these are Kenyan nationals. Tullow Kenya has also
employed over 2,000 sub-contractors through our
suppliers, 87% of whom are nationals, with 59%m
from Turkana, where our operational activities are
taking place. The roles required by our suppliers call
foskilled, semi-skilled and unskilled. Within these as
categories, Turkanas make up 24% of the skilmled
workforce, 78% of the semi-skmilled workforce and
98% of the unskilled workforce.

FOCUSED ON

TRANSPARENCY

COMMITTED TO LOCAL CONTENT
Spend with Kenyan suppliers has been
operational activity and amlso due to
sensitisation of contractors on the need to
optimise local content. In addition to the
KES4.1 billion Tullow spent with local
suppliers in 2013 (2012: KEmS2.4 billion), our
Kenyan businesses in 2013, KES 259m millionth
of which was with Turkana businesses.

KES 4.1 BILLION

Loc(KES billion)Kenya

4.1

2.4
2.1

11 12 13

www.tullowoi7.comAnnex 110

WATER SCARCITY
SUPPORTING LOCAL The amount of water needed for
development and production will incrJease
JOB CREATION substantially from the exploration phase and
We are committed to bridging the existing typically approximately 3-4 barrels of water is
ensure that Kenya’s emerging oil and gas iJused for every barrel of oil produced. Tullow
rof 2013, there were approximately 100 permanentre that its operations in Kenya are in
employees in Kenya, over 70% of whom are Kunderstand the water sources needed byng to
nationals. To date, we have achieved 100% lTullow and the local communities. Tullow is
our HR, External Affairs and Legal roles. Wemapping local subsurface water sources
looking at development opportunitiJes for grthrough a hydro-geological survey, which
experienced personnel to drive the localisatiwill establish a baseline ofJ water sources
both nationally and with respect to the area of operin the region.

CREATING SHARED

PROSPERIT Y IN KENYA

““ESTABLISHING THE COMMUNITY RESOURCE OFFICES NOT ONLY
REINFORCES OUR COMMITMENT TO WORKING IN PARTNERSHIP WITH
OUR HOST COMMUNITIES, BUT THEY ALSO PROVIDE A POINT OF
CONTACT FOR STAKEHOLDERS WHO ARE INTERESTED IN &
IMPACTED BY OUR OPERATIONS.”
Martin Mbogo
Tullow Business Manager, Kenya

ADDRESSING
STAKEHOLDER

CONCERNS
In 2013, we faced stakeholder concerns as our
operations ramped up. In late October, we
temporarily shut down our drilling opJerations in
triggered by community concerns over local
employment and business opportunities.

We recognised the communities’ concerns and
a Memorandum of Understanding which set oJutish
a way forward and sought to improve both impact
management and engJagement.

8 Tuw Oiill ppllccPROSPERIT Y IN KENYA

SOCIAL INVESTMENT
In 2013, we invested KES 233 millionp in social projects
in Kenya and have almost doubled this budget for 2014.
Our spend will target priority areas that impacted
communities have identified as essential to Turkana’s
long-term sustainable development, namely
water, education, health, envipronment and
alternative livelihoods.
An example of our social invpestment project includes
working to improve community education levels by
providing over 3,000 bursaries and scholarships to
students over the past two years. Fifty primary andp
secondary schools have been provided with teaching
materials in our efforts to build capacity in the local
school system. Forty primary schoolps have been
equipped with 80 soplar lamps so that students studying
for theirrevision after sunset.s can continue their

While we aim to invest in long-term initiatives,
we also recognise that our operpating environment is
fragile and host communities suffer from prolonged
periods of drought. Recently, and in response to the
worsening drought situation in pTurkana County, Tullow
contributed KES 20 million pthrough the Kenya Red Cross
Society and the Coupnty Government of Turkana to
implementTurkana County.ng programme inAnnex 110

FUTURE

DEVELOPMENT

POTENTIAL

WORLD-CLASS
OPERATED ONSHORE OIL PROJECT
Given the significant volumes discovered and the
programme planned to fully assess the upsideION
partner have agreed with the Government of KenyaDISCOVERED
to commence development studies. In additioBn, the(GROSS)
pFEED study for an export pipeline. ThBe currentBASIN
ambition of the GoBvernment of Kenya and the joint
development, including Ban export pipeline, inB ther
period 2015/2016. BIf further exploration success
opendevelopment to be expanded.will be scope for the

10 ulOiill ppllcc Annex 110

MAJOR ONGOING PROGRAMME
In 2013, we successfully flow tested the initial two oil PROPOSED

discoveries of the Ngamia-1 Nwell followed by the Twiga EXPORT PIPELINE
South-1 well. Both wells flowed at constrained rates of
around 3,000 bopd ofN 25 to 35 degree API sweet waxy oil The proposed export pipeline route will run mostly
with no indication of pressure depletion. Unconstrained underground over 850km from the Lokichar BasiNn to a
marine terminal on the coast. As the waxy crude oil
rates of over 5,000 bopd per wNell are considered possible.
A significant programme of some 40 exploration and found in Kenya solidifies at ambNient temperature, the
appraisal wells in the coming two years will assess not pipeline will contain a specialised heNating system to
only the South LokicharN Basin but up to a further six keep the crude oil flowing. Once built, the pipelinNe will
separate Tertiary Rift BasinsN across Tullow’s Kenyan be the longest heated pipeline in the world.

acreage. Tullow is currently operating four rigs,
including one test rig, in Kenya. SOUTH OMO

South Omo

Ethiopia

Block 10BA

Block 10BB

Lokichar Basin Discoveries

Block Kenya
13T Block12A

Nairobi

Lamu
Legend
Oil Discovery
Proposed Pipeline 100km

MILESTONES TO REACH PRODUCTION

Achieving first oil is dependent oNn many technological, legal, social and finNancial factors which have
to be considered and agreed by a large group of stakeholders. In Kenya, the following key milestones
need to be reached in order to progress development.

• Confirmation of commercial • Agreement and funding for • Approval of pipeline route,
threshold oil volumes via regional infrastructure (major terminal location and all fiscNal
field appraisal; roads, rail and terminals); and legislative frameworks;

• Approval of Kenya’s • Agreement of basin-wideN • Land acquisition for export
Petroleum Legislation; environment and social pNlans; pipeline; and

• Commitment from all • Regional government alignment • Securing investors for
stakeholders to a Basin-wide FielNd and support of export pipeline; pipeline construction.
Development Plan and subNsequent
Field Development Plans;

www.ullwooiiml..11oomAnnex 110

INVESTMENT

IN NUMBERS

SUB-CONTRACTORS EMPLOYED THROUGH TULLOW’S SUPPLY CHA (N of 31 December 2013)

Kenyan Nationals

% Expats % Nationals% Turkanas in
Contractor Level Expat Non-Turkana Turkantotal workftotal worktotal workforce
All contractorsDirector 1 4 0 20% 80% 0%

Management 53 18 2 73% 27% 3%

Skilled 201 476 217 22% 78% 24%

Semi-skilled 18 92 380 4% 96% 78%

Unskilled 12 4 677 2% 98% 98%

Total 285 594 1276 13% 87% 59%

The figures above do not include Tullow employees

12 Tullow Oil plc Annex 110

2013

KES 4. 1

BILLION
SPEND WITH KENYAN SUPPLIERS
The Group also spent KES 8u.8 billion with international
with international companies for work carried out in Kenya.on

KES 224
MILLION
SPEND BY TULLOW CONTRACTORS
Tullow contractors spent KES 3.9 biullion with Kenyan
businesses in 2013, KES 2u24 million of this was
with Turkana businesses.

KES 6. 1

BILLION
STAKEHOLDER GROUPS
In 2013, Tullow paid KES 1.9 billuion to governments,
spent KES 0.1 billiuon on social investment activities.

“WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO
CONTENT IS A KEY COMPONENT 2014
OF OUR SUPPLY CHAIN.
ENGAGEMENT WITH OUR
CONTRACTORS, WE WILL KES 390+
TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE MILLION
OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE AT COMMITTED FOR SOCIAL
THE OPERATIONS.”ES OF OUR INVESTMENT IN 2014
Martin Mbogo Thiwater, health and environment in consultationas education,
Tullow Business Manager, Kewith the community. This amount will morue than
double the amount spent iun 2013.Annex 110

Strategic Report

Tullow Kenya B.V

Ground Floor
Acacia House
Westlands Office Park
P.O Box 63298–00619
Nairobi

Kenya
Tel: +254 (0) 20 428 ▯ 0

Email: [email protected]

Website: www.tullowoil.com

2 Tullow Oil plc Annex 111

Total S.A., Factbook 2013 (2013) Annex 111

Factbook 2013Annex 111

SUMMARY

Need more information on a specific subject ?
Profile U U U U U U U 1 U
‡og on to www.total.com
HigHligHts U U U U U U U žeading €nvestors/€nstitutional investors/Publications

CorPorate soCial resPonsibility U U U U 4 Ÿou can display online T†TA‡ˆs factbook‰ download
it in P‹F or collect all the tables in ‚„cel format.

CorPorate U U U U U U U7

Financial žighlights..................S..................S..................S..................S..................S..................S...š
†perational žighlights by quarter..................S..................S..................S..................S................‘•

Market ‚nvironment ..................S..................S..................S..................S..................S................‘•
Financial žighlights by quarter..................S..................S..................S..................S..................S..‘—

Market ‚nvironment and Price ƒealizations..................S..................S..................S..................S‘”

Žonsolidated Statement of €ncome ..................S..................S..................S..................S...........‘”
Žonsolidated balance sheet ..................S..................S..................S..................S..................S....‘š

Žonsolidated statement of changes in shareholderˆs equity ..................S..................S...........—— DownloaD
…etŠdebtŠtoŠequity ratio ..................S..................S..................S..................S..................S..........—”
all tHe tables
ƒ†AŽ‚ by business segments ..................S..................S..................S..................S.................—“
Žash flows from operating activities ..................S..................S..................S..................S..........—š exCel format

Žapital e„penditures ..................S..................S..................S..................S..................S...............—9

‹ivestments by business segment ..................S..................S..................S.........Abbreviations.........—9
Share information..................S..................S..................S..................S..................S..................S...–‘
b: barrel
cf: cubic feet
/d: per day
UPstream U U U U U U U 33 U/y: per year
€: euro
Žombined liquids and gas production..................S..................S..................S..................S........–˜
dollar:U.S. dollar
Žhanges in oil‰ bitumen and gas reserves ..................S..................S..................S..................S.”•
ƒesults of operations for oil and gas producing activities..................S..................S................“– oil equivalent
kboe/d: thousand boe/d
Žost incurred in oil and gas property acquisition‰ e„ploration and development activitie.s.....““ kb/d: thousand barrel/d
Btu: British thermal unit
Žapitalized costs related to oil and gas producing activities ..................S..................S...........“6
Standardized measure of discounted future net cash flows ..................S..................S...........“šlion
MW: megawatt
‡…Œ positions as of ‹ecember –‘‰ —•‘– ..................S..................S..................S..................S...6“(direct current)
ƒeŠgasification terminals as of ‹ecember –‘‰ —•‘– ..................S..................S..................S.....66hour
AP€: American Petroleum €nstitutehority
€nterests in pipelines..................S..................S..................S..................S‚ƒM€:..European Refining Margin Indicator.
‚ƒM€ is an indicator intended to represent the
Acreage including maps, main producing assets and acreage by region: margin after variable costs for a hypothetical
comple„ refinery located around ƒotterdam in
‚urope..................S..................S..................S..................S..................S....…orthern ‚urope. The indicator margin may not be
Africa..................S..................S..................S..................S..................S....representative of the actual margins achieved by
T†TA‡ in any period because of T†TA‡ˆs
Žommonwealth of €ndependent States ..................S..................S..................S.............particular refinery configurations‰ product mi„
effects or other companyŠspecific operating
Middle ‚ast..................S..................S..................S..................S..................conditions.........S............9•
AsiaŠPacific..................S..................S..................S..................S..........F‚‚‹:..FrontŠ‚nd ‚ngineering and ‹esign.9“
FPS†: Floating Production Storage and †ffloading
South America ..................S..................S..................S..................S........€FƒS:..€nternational Financial ƒeporting Standards
…orth America ..................S..................S..................S..................S........‡…Œ:...liquefied natural gas.S.....‘•“
‡PŒ: liquefied petroleum gas
ƒ†‚ ƒeturn on ‚quity
ƒ†AŽ‚: ƒeturn on Average Žapital ‚mployed
refining & CHemiCals U U U U U 109 U S‚Ž: United States Securities and ‚„change
Žommission
SAŒ‹: Steam Assisted Œravity ‹rainage
ƒefinery capacity..................S..................S..................S..................S..................S..................S..‘‘“
Main production capacities at yearŠend..................S..................S..................S..................S....‘‘˜
Conversion table
Sales by geographic area..................S..................S..................S.................‘ boe ’ ‘ barrel of crude oil ’ appro„. “‰”•– cf of gas
Sales by geographic area..................S..................S..................S..................S..................S.......‘‘š
‘ t ’ appro„. ˜.“ b (for a gravity of –˜™ AP€)
Sales by activity ..................S..................S..................S..................S....‘ Bm–/y ’ appro„. •.‘ Bcf/d......S..‘‘š
‘ m–’ appro„. –“.– cf
‘ t of ‡…Œ ’ appro„. ”š kcf of gas
119 ‘ Mt/y of ‡…Œ ’ appro„. ‘–‘ Mcf/d
marketing & serviCes U U U U U U
(‘) This ratio is calculated based on the actual average
Petroleum product sales (e„cluding trading and bulk sales)..................S..................S.....equivalent energy content of T†TA‡›s natural gas
reserves and is subŒect to change.
ServiceŠstations..................S..................S..................S..................S..................S..................S...‘—6 Annex 111

TOTAL UPSTREAM AFRICA ACREAGE 85
FACTBOOK 2013 NIGERIA ALGERIA REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
GABON LIBYA SOUTH SUDAN SOUTH AFRICA
REPUBLIC DEMOCRATIC UGANDA MADAGASCAR
OF CONGO REPUBLIC KENYA MOZAMBIQUE
ANGOLA OF THE CONGO CÔTE D’IVOIRE
MOROCCO MAURITANIA

REPUBLIC

OFSOUTHSUDAN

TOTAL is negotiating a new contract with
the state authorities that would make it
possible to resume exploration activities in

part of Block B. Since the independence of
the Republic of South Sudan on Jul€ ‚ƒ 2011ƒ

TOTAL is no longer present in Sudan.

UGANDA

TOTAL has been active since 2012 and
holds a 33.33„ interest in the …A†1ƒ …A†1A

and …A†2 licenses as well as the Kingfisher
license. All of these licenses are located in
REPUBLIC
the Lake Albert regionƒ where oil resources Block B
have alread€ been discovered. TOTAL is OF SOUTH ETHIOPIA
the operator of licenses …A†1 and …A†1A
SUDAN
and a partner on the other licenses.

‡ On the appraisal license …A†1ƒ a

campaign of wellsƒ production tests and a
3ˆ seismic surve€ are underwa€. Five
development plans will be submitted to the

authorities before the end of 201‰Š ‹giri
Œsubmitted in ˆecember 2013Žƒ Jobi†Rii

ŒApril 201‰Žƒ and ‘p€oƒ ’un€a and Jobi DEMOCRATIC
…ast Œˆecember 201‰Ž. REPUBLIC
OF THE EA 1 (Dev)
CONGO EA 2 Buliisa
‡ The …A†1A license expired in Februar€ SOMALIA
2013ƒ following a campaign involving the EA 2 Mputa-Nzizi-Wsaraga
drilling of five exploration wells that resulted EA 3-KJ
Block III
in one discover€ ŒL€ecŽ. “ith the exception KENYA
of the scope relating to this discover€ƒ the KAMPALA

license has been returned to the authorities UGANDA

‡ On the appraisal license …A†2ƒ the L5

campaign of wells and production tests
started in 2012 continued during 2013. An L7
additional well is due to be drilled in 201‰.
L12
Two development plans were submitted to L11A L22
the authorities in June 2013 ŒKasamene
TOTAL Operator L11B
and “ahrindi fieldsƒ as well as those of TOTAL Partner
Kigogoleƒ ‹gegeƒ ‹gwara and ‹sogaŽ.
0 km 400 km
‡ The development plan for the Kingfisher TANZANIA
INDIAN OCEAN
fieldƒ which is located on the …A†3
production licenseƒ was approved b€ the

authorities in September 2013. The basic
engineering studies are currentl€ being KENYA were drilled in Blocks L˜ and L11bƒ but did

prepared. not result in positive results. šn 2012ƒ the
TOTAL ac–uired a ‰0„ stake in five offshore ’roup also ac–uired the L22 offshore
At the initiative of the ”gandan licenses in the Lamu basin in 2011ƒ namel€
governmentƒ discussions are underwa€ licenses L—ƒ L˜ƒ L11aƒ L11b and L12. license Œ100„ƒ operatorŽƒ located in the
same basin. šn ˆecember 2013ƒ TOTAL
concerning the construction of a refiner€ Following the 3ˆ seismic surve€ campaign
that will be developed in two phases Œ30 covering 3ƒ—00 km™ that was conducted sold 30„ of its stake in this license.
A 2ˆ seismic surve€ and sea core drilling
kb•d in the first phase followed b€ a during the initial exploration periodƒ 2—„ of
second phase providing an additional 30 the surface area of the five blocks was operations are in progress on the L22
offshore license.
kb•dŽƒ as well as an export pipeline. relin–uished. šn 2013ƒ two exploration wellsAnnex 111

see you on
www.total.com

TOTAL S.A.
Registered Office:
2, place Jean Millier - La Défense 6
92400 Courbevoie - France
S€are capital: ‚,944,ƒ9‚,400 euros
‚42 0‚ƒ ƒ„0 RCS …anterre
†††.total.co‡ Annex 112

Kelly Gilblom, “Middle Eastern oil explorer gives up licence in Kenya”, Reuters (28 Jan. 2013) Annex 112

SCRIPTSCRIPTSCRIPTSCRIPTSCRIPT

Middle Eastern oil explorer gives up licence in Kenya

* Exploration block handed back to Kenyan government

* Edgo Energy blames technical problems, border dispute with Somalia

* Four companies to drill offshore in Kenya in 2013

By Kelly Gilblom

NAIROBI, Jan 28 (Reuters) - Edgo Energy, the exploration unit of Jordan's Edgo, has
relinquished a licence to explore an area offshore Kenya, citing the technical difficulties of

drilling in very deep water.

The licence area, a triangular block off Kenya's southern coast known as L26, lies in "ultra
deep water" - meaning the ocean floor is more than 1,500 metres beneath the water's

surface, which makes drilling complicated and expensive.

"Edgo Energy has agreed with the Kenyan Ministry of Energy to relinquish block L26 due
to the technical challenges of its location in the ultra deep waters of the Lamu basin," said

the company in an email sent to Reuters on Monday.

East Africa and the continent's Horn of Africa region have become hot spots for oil and gas

exploration in recent years, spurred on by new finds in countries including Uganda,
Tanzania and Mozambique.

Edgo obtained the L26 licence jointly with Qatar First Investment Bank in July 2012,

according to the company. It has one additional licence with the same bank in onshore
block L14 where it has already began preparing for seismic work.

Edgo said it was still interested in an upcoming licensing round offshore, which will be
composed of an estimated five blocks within Kenyan waters.

"We will be looking at that ... we're interested," said Mazen Masri, managing director of

Edgo, in a phone interview with Reuters last week.

With Edgo's surrender of L26, Kenya has additional acreage to licence to interested

explorers, who flocked to the country in 2012 after U.S. explorer Apache Corp found non-
commercial quantities of gas offshore and Tullow Oil discovered oil in two separate

onshore wells.

Masri said last week a maritime border dispute between Somalia and Kenya was also a
challenge in L26 -- which sits squarely in an area both countries claim to be part of their

offshore commercial acreage.

However, a spokeswoman for the company said in a phone interview on Monday it was not
the main factor in Edgo's relinquishment.

Currently one company, Houston's Anadarko Petroleum, is drilling offshore Kenya - in a
non-disputed block called L11-B - while the UK's Tullow Oil is in the midst of drilling two

onshore wells. BG Group, Ophir and Afren also each plan to drill offshore in 2013, though
they are not drilling in contested territory. Annex 113

Nina Rach, “Kenya forges ahead”, oedigital.com (1 July 2013) Annex 113

Kenya forges ahead

Written by Nina Rach
Monday, 01 July 2013 00:00

Recent offshore drilling by Apache and Anadarko help gauge the potential of the Lamu
basin.

Vision 2030 is Kenya’s development strategy which aims to transform

the economy and “create a globally competitive and prosperous nation
with a high quality of life by 2030.” The government is committed to
continued institutional reforms in the energy sector, and stresses
public­private partnership.

NOCK

The National Oil Corporation of Kenya (NOCK) was incorporated in 1981, and began to oversee
exploration activities delegated from the Ministry of Energy, in 1984. The Petroleum
(Exploration & Production) Act, Cap 308, (1986) provides legal framework and regulates the
negotiation of productionsharing contracts with potential investors. PSCs are also governed by

the Environmental Management & Coordination Act (2000; NEMA).

In 2010, NOCK launched a program to digitize all of Kenya’s oil and gas exploration data. In
February 2013, CEO Sumayya Hassan­Athmani announced in the company’s “Energized
Bulletin” that the project was complete, data would soon be uploaded, and available to the public
online.

Exploration history

The first wells drilled in Kenya were onshore,
in the Lamu embayment, beginning in 1960.

The earliest offshore exploration activities

were 2D seismic data acquisition programs,
beginning in 1970. The first three offshore
wells were drilled in the Lamu basin. Total
drilled the Simba­1 well (Block L­9) in 1978,
to 3604m (11,824ft) TD. In 1982, Cities
Services drilled the Maridadi­1B well in Block
L­6, to 4,198m TD. In 1985, Union drilled the
Kofia well in Block L­7, to 3,629m TD.

After an in­house study in 1991, NOCK

subdivided the Lamu embayment (both
onshore and offshore) into 10 exploration
blocks, created 2 more blocks in 2001, and
several more in the last decade. Kenya signed
seven production­sharing agreements (PSC) in
2000­2002.

In August­October 2003, Woodside Petroleum acquired 7884km of 2D seismic data in the
offshore Lamu basin, over Blocks L5, L6, L7, L8, L9, L10, L11, and L12.Annex 113

In 2006, Woodside drilled the first deepwater well off Kenya, the Pomboo­1, on Block L­5, in
water 2193m (7195ft) deep.

NOCK acquired offshore Block 14T in Magadi in November 2010, and in 2012, signed an
agreement with Japan national oil company, Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corp.

(JOGMEC) for joint exploration. Full­tensor gravity gradiometry (FTG), 2D seismic, magneto
telluric, and time­domain electromagnetic studies began in June 2012.

Recent offshore wells

In 3Q 2012, Apache Corp. drilled its Mbawa South well in Block 8, in water 864m deep. The
well encountered 53m net gas pay, making it the first hydrocarbon discovery offshore Kenya.
Apache operates the block with 50% interest.

Anadarko has working interests in five blocks off Kenya: L5, L7, L12, L11A, and L11B. It
began work offshore in December 2012 with Transocean’s Deepwater Millenium drillship. In

April 2013, the company announced that it had completed the Kubwa well in the L­07 Block,
which it operates (50% WI) on behalf of partners Total E&P Kenya B.V. (40%) and PTT
Exploration & Production Plc (10%). The well had non­commercial oil shows.

“We are very encouraged with our first test of Kenya’s previously unexplored deepwater basin,
in which mudlog and well­site evaluation of core data indicates the presence of a working
petroleum system with reservoir quality sands,” said Anadarko Sr. Vice President, Worldwide
Exploration. “The Kubwa well tested multiple play concepts and provided useful data regarding

the prospectivity of our six­million­acre position offshore Kenya. The rig will now mobilize
south to drill the Kiboko well.”

Anadarko is drilling the Kiboko prospect on Block L­11B. Anadarko said the Kiboko well is
testing both Upper and Lower Cretaceous sands, just above the thick Jurassic carbonate section.
So we’re just getting started in Kenya, and we’re pretty excited about what we see.” OE Annex 114

Midway Resources International, Media Release: Midway Resources International (“MRI”)
completes gravity-magnetic seismic data acquisition programs on Blocks L13 and L4, Kenya (19
July 2013) Annex 114

Midway Resources

Media Release

RNS Number : 7093J
Midway Resources International
19 July 2013

19 July 2013

Media Release

MIDWAY RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL

http://www.midwayresources.com

MIDWAY RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL ("MRI") completes
gravity‐magnetic seismic data acquisition programs on
Blocks L13 and L4, Kenya.

MRI, through its wholly owned subsidiary Zarara Oil & Gas Limited, holds a
75% working interest and operatorship of PSCs for Blocks L4 & L13, Kenya,
now in their 1tAdditional Exploration Period of 3 years. The Blocks cover
2
7,446kms of the coastal region of Kenya, north of Lamu Island and straddle
the Lamu geologic basin. The L4 Block contains the Pate‐1 gas discovery well
(drilled by Shell, 1971), hereafter designated as the 'Pate Prospect'.

Completion of Pate Island Prospect 2D Transitional Seismic Survey

MRI has now completed its 383 line kms 2D survey over the Pate Prospect.
The survey covered Pate Island and surrounding transitional mangrove and
sea channel areas and was undertaken by BGP Kenya Limited.

Seismic data are being processed by Geokinetics, Inc., of Houston USA and
interpreted by MRI. Approximately 40% of the data has been processed and
interpreted to date, with the balance anticipated to be completed over the

next quarter.

Sufficient data has been interpreted to enable MRI to identify the location of
a drilling site (Pate‐2) which will replicate the original discovery well (Pate‐1).
Pate‐ 1 intersected and flowed (uncontrolled) gas and was subsequently
plugged and abandoned. MRI will commence planning for Pate‐2 in the next
quarter which process could take up to 12 months before the well is spudded.

Depending on Ministry of Energy approval, MRI's intention is to completeAnnex 114

Pate‐2 as a producing well which will undergo extended well testing to
supply temporary electric power generating units. These could supply
electricity to the local extension of the Kenyan national grid. Assuming that
Pate‐2 confirms MRI's current P50 resource estimate, this early gas
production would represent Phase 1 of a full‐field development to be based

upon long term commericalisation of the gas resources. Phase 2 would
involve development of a 350‐500MW power station connected to the
Kenyan domestic electricity grid. The grid is currently being extended to the
proposed new Lamu Port, located some 15‐20kms from the site of the
original Pate‐1 well.

Block L4 & L13 ‐ exploration activities

Gravity‐Magnetic survey: MRI has completed the acquisition, processing
and interpretation of 6,262 line kms of gravity‐magnetic data across the
original area of its operated Blocks L4 and L13.

The survey was flown by New Resolution Geophysics, based in South
Africa, using a 2km flight line separation with 10km north ‐ south tie

lines.

Analysis of the survey data has identified nine additional anomalies or
leads on Blocks L4 & L13 which will be followed‐up by an additional

seismic survey programme to be executed by MRI over the next 24
months.

The Pate‐2 well and regional seismic acquisition survey will be funded

through a combination of additional equity and a possible partial farm‐
out of MRI's 75% working interest. MRI is now actively pursuing such
funding.

For more details you are referred to the MRI website:

http://www.midwayresources.com

History:

Midway Resources International was founded in 2005 by Dr. Mark Bristow, its
chairman. Its strategy is to secure relatively lower risk discovered, but undeveloped,
oil and gas resources across Africa, and to rapidly develop and commercialise them.

It acquired its interests in Zarara Oil & Gas Limited in quarter 2, 2012, and following

extensive negotiations with the Kenyan Government regularised its PSCs by advancing
into the 1 Additional Exploration Period of 3 years ending December, 2015.

MRI's other current focus area is Nigeria, where it is pursuing a material and
attractive shallow offshore undeveloped discovery. It already has an existing Nigerian
investment, via its 20% shareholding in Inergia Petroleum Limited, in the Oza (in
development with production expected quarter 1, 2014) and Atala (awaiting
appraisal) fields, onshore Nigeria.

For further information contact: Annex 114

CEO Peter Worthington ‐ Mobile: +44 7710 680826

CFO Patrick Barr ‐ Mobile: +44 7788 920915
[email protected]
Telephone: +44 20 79457072

This information is provided by RNS
The company news service from the London Stock Exchange

END

NRAEAXXNFDNDEEF Annex 115

Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, Second-Quarter 2013 Operations Report (29 July 2013) Annex 115

1

29, 2013

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times ays to pwaterde oiries aty
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compleicly update or revise
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,imely
tributed to Anadarko’s

SECOND-QUARTER 2013 ANADARKO
quarter, while drilling muORATION SUCCESS
days. Ine spud-to-rig-release cycl5tnddatPal gsa.stinoavenado
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N ENABLES FUTURE GR YSE: APC
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www.anadarko.com | N

ECOND MIDSTSigIntBone Spring pFrocna2a1iynew crude oil rail-loading
S ADVThe compinctrresipchrdxilalperfirty)prLocstioparrmaains,ihhe)gnrejoct, l CAUTThonrmedrQ,any forward-looking sta Annex 115

n 3
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2Q13M 1,192 1,866

Rockies Alaska
Lower 48 Total U.S. estments of $138 millio
SECOND-QUARTER 2013 Midstream* ANADARKO
Gulf of Mexicoational
Total Company*
CAPITAL INVESTMENTS

Southern & Appalachia Capitalized Items/Other

*ncludes WES capital inv

1.3 7.7
2Q12 28.17.546.4 12.159.8 67.5
MMBOE

0 0
bilWr 2cluding Gas 822 357
2Q12 MMcf1,365 2,187 2,544 2,544

quarter were within 0 9 0
2Q12s 42 26 68 77 77
nd MBbl/d

ingthe2ectations for the full-yea Oil 48 29 77 14 65 85
2Q12 MBbl/d 156 241

1.19.0 6.5
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SALES VOLUMES
CACapital investments durseersxneg. 0 0
2Q13 280
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er day
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ad liquids 36 41 77 83 83
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2Q13 MBbl/d
YSE: APC
is increasing its full-yea
oluidance at 68.3 million bous range of 279
quarter. The company h
rd Alaska ne rejection
RockiesLower 48 Total U.S.

Gulf of Mexicoational
Total Company
www.anadarko.com | N
VERVIEW

O Southern & Appalachia*
SASeconoilBObenefit of a tanker lifAOnEa.darko *Reflects impact of ethaAnnex 115

4 0 1 1 0 0 4
11 17
1Q1Operated

AVERAGE
RIG ACTIVITY5 12 0 1 1 0 1 20
2Q1Operated

SECOND-QUARTER 2013 ANADARKO
94 11 23 6 51 25
323 533
2Q13MM
CAPITAL
INVESTMENTS

EOR
Otherotal

Wamsutter
Wattenberg

Pinedale / Jonah
Powder River Basin
s g d , s al
Greater Natural Buttes
d 20

97 1 96
ce environment 2Q12s 440251 103377
MMcf/d 1,365

e company made the00 BOE/d 4 9 0 0 3
assets12deliveredsquarter and drilled a tot 13 13 42
2Q12LsMBbl/d
The company average

3 1 2 1 9 2
quarter.Duetothepri 2Q12l 30 48
MBbl/d
nd

Anadarduring the quarter, tho re m the 1
45627488 89 270 114
2Q13s 1,292
MMcf/d

SALES VOLUMES* 3 3 0 0 3
18 36
2Q13LsMBbl/d

3 1 1 2 1
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2Q13 MBbl/d

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OCKIES
R
*Reflects impact of etha Annex 115

ate 5
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million during

SECOND-QUARTER 2013 ANADARKO
companyrated wells, with additi
successfully test multipaged approximately 526lled 67 wells
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OCKIES ATTENBERGttenberg field avntinued tohorizon
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5 4 8 0 7 0 0 1 0 25 6
1Q13
Operated

AVERAGE 5 4 9 0 7 0 0 2 0
RIG ACTIVITY 27
2Q13
Operated

SECOND-QUARTER 2013 ANADARKO
4 2 0 5
114 91 35 94 38 383

CAPITAL3$MM

INVESTMENTS

Total
Bossier Ozonahalkher
PermMarcellusfordHugoton

in

East Texas/Haynesville

quarter of 2012.
achiandegion were
quarter of 2013 and a
st
quarter, sales volumes 2Q12s 46 31461 96 158 41 27 34 45 822
nd MMcf/d

2 0 8 0 8 2 3 5
(2) 26
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38 97 84 39 25 27 30
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1,075

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2 0 14 0 16 2 3 4 0 41
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MBbl/d

7 0 0 3 0 0 6 1
PPALACHIA 2Q13l 18 35
MBbl/d
YSE: APC

& A
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www.anadarko.com | N
East Texas/Haynesville
OUTHERN
S Annex 115

11 ce ststo
teural wellss ine has 7
raquarter ration
nd

SECOND-QUARTER 2013billion cubicd-to-to 15.5 days. costs. The company upo ANADARKO
lumes for the qhe company spud 13ite water flowback filt

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:

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OUTHERN Anadafr61%relativetoThspucdm9panyelopedarng troximssdltiofpletdmtrilgduoring
S EGL�FORD � �Annex 115

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SECOND-QUARTER 2013 ANADARKO

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www.anadarko.com | N

ULF OF Total
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Durreporteextovariee,nsccelswcant a Annex 115

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quarter.
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: quarter.
SECOND-QUARTER 2013 As a result, first product an infield developm expected told dected to begin producing ANADARKO
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: nd
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ULF OF A discovfeentresults of the initial well aloweroTreehran th
G EXPLORATIODe�oto Canyon 535 (AYC WWalk�r Ridge 95 (APC WI 1 Annex 115

11

SECOND-QUARTER 2013 ANADARKO

25 30 46 15 81 100 61 358
2Q13 $MM
CAPITAL
INVESTMENTS

Oil 14 59 0 17 9 0 0 99 f tanker liftings.
2Q12 MBbl/d

0 9 0 0
SALES VOOilES 12 43 19 83
2Q13 MBbl/d timing and scheduling o

Alaska Brazil Otherotal
Algeria*hina*

Mozambique s are influenced by size,

Jubilee FPSO, Ghana Ghana/W. Africa*

*Quarterly sales volume

the
ncingtend oil tedidadeded

RONTIER

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issioned. In Ghana,
caraproo increase, and the secoperidade field.

www.anadarko.com | N

ITERNATIONAL Anadarko made signifil megfiondrti,jtsawl gtsf tAnnex 115

of ishe
and 12

SECOND-QUARTER 2013 ANADARKO
.5ators of Offshore Areas 1nich

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D Annex 116

Deloitte, “Kenya”, hedteloittguide to il Ang As ieAstA friC: niquelystruCtured

(2014) Annex 116

The Deloitte Guide to Oil
and Gas in East Africa

Uniquely structured

2014 EditionAnnex 116

2 Kenya

2.1 Overview 2.2 Key facts

Kenya is a former Brwitish colony which wbecame Population: 44 million (July 2013 estimate)w
independent in 1963w. Its first president, the chariswmatic Median age: 18.9 years

Jomo Kenyatta, led the cowuntry from 1963 to his deatwh Currency (code): Kenya shilling (KES)
in 1978. His succewssor, Daniel arap Moi left power Exchange rate at February 2014: KES 86.3 = US$ 1 w

in 2002 after 24 ywears in office, a perwiod marked by (Central Bank of Kenya)
major corruption scwandals. Kenya’s transition to stable, w Exchange controls: none, but banks must wreport

democratic government hasw been somewhat erratic, foreign exchange transactions on excewss of US $
with continuing allegations of corruwption. The 2007 10,000.

election was followed by widespread violence resulting GDP (purchasing power paritEy): US$79.9 billion
in the deaths of awround 1,500. Following the unrest, (2013 estimate)

a peace deal was brokered by former UN secwretary GDP per head of popuElation: US$ 1,800 (2013
general, Kofi Annan which resulted in the forwmation estimate)
of a coalition betwween the main politiwcal parties. GDP growth: 5.1% (2013 estimatwe)

Kenyans voted in a wnational referendum to approve a Principal industriEes: small-scale consumer gowods,
new constitution inw August 2010 which wentailed the agricultural products, horticulturwe, oil refining;

creation of a bicamerwal assembly and thew abolition aluminium, steel, leawd; cement, commercial ship repair,
of the post of primew minister. As part of the new and tourism

constitution, 47 cowunties each with a wgovernor and Official languages:E English, Kiswahili
county assembly havwe been established.w Kenya held a Unemployment rate: 40% (2008 estimate)w

peaceful general election in Marwch 2013 and electewd Hydrocarbon production: nil
a new President – Uhuru Kenyatta (son of thwe first Petroleum production usage: 82,000 barrels per day

president) with William Ruto as his dewputy. Devolution equivalent (2011 ewstimate)
to county governmenwts has proved to be difficult but isLegal system: mixed legal systemw of English common w

progressing. Kenya’s economy remains energy starved law, Islamic law, and customary law.
with restricted access two electricity. Head of State: President Uhuru Kenyatta

Head of Government:E Uhuru Kenyatta
Transparency International Ecorruption perception
index 2013: 27 (placed 136)

Sources:
• BBC country profile (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/

world-africa-13681341);
• CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/

publications/the-worwld-factbook/geos/kew.html);
• Transparency Internationalw (http://cpi.transparency.

org/cpi2013/results/)

Source: PetroView®

The Deloitte Guide 9to Oil and Gas in 9Easaniquely structur9d Annex 116

2.3 Industry ovearview

Kenya has 4 prospective sedimentary basins: Anzza,
Lamu, Mandera and the Tertiary Rift. The Lamu basin

extends offshore.

Kenya has no proven commercial hydrocarbon

discoveries at the ztime of writing. BzP and Shell carried
out exploration work in the z1950s with the firszt

exploration well being drilled in 1960. Over tzhe past
50 years many othezr oil and gas compaznies have tried

their luck onshore and offshore, including Exxon, Total,
Chevron, Woodside and CNOOC.z Of 33 wells drilled

in the country prizor to 2012, 16 showzed signs of
hydrocarbons, but none wzere considered commercial.

Only 4 had been drilzled offshore prior to 2012 anzd

of these only 1 (inz Block L5, drilled by Woodside in
2007) was in deep zwater. Following recent successes

in Mozambique and Tzanzania, offshore exploration
has become the flavozr of the moment anzd industry

confidence was boosted in 2012 by the announcement
that Apache’s Mbawa-1 well (Block L8) had Source: PetroView®

encountered gas. Extensive zactivity is expectzed over
the next 2 years, wzith drilling planned by Afren (Block

L17/18), Anadarko (zBlock L12), BG Group (Blocks L10A

and L10B) and FAR (Block L6). Operator Block Consortium partnersa
ADAMANTINE ENERGY BLOCK 11B BOWLEVEN PLC

Onshore drilling by CNOOC duringz 2009 in Block 9 AFREN L-18 -
(Anza Basin) proved unsuccessful, dzespite high hopes z
L-17 -
and reports of gas findsz. Tullow Oil farmed into z6
blocks in the Turkana Rift Basin zin late 2010 (5 in zKenya BLOCK 1 TAIPAN RESOURCES INC

and one block in Ethziopia). The geology of this zarea AFRICA OIL BLOCK 9 MARATHON OIL
is similar to that zin the Albertine Graben of Uganda
ANADARKO L-11B TOTAL, GOVERNMENT - KENYA, PTTEP
and a well drilled in 1992 by Shell found evidence ofz L-12 TOTAL, GOVERNMENT - KENYA, PTTEP

waxy crude similar zto that in the Ugazndan arm of the L-11A TOTAL, GOVERNMENT - KENYA, PTTEP
Rift Valley. On 26 March, 2012, Tullow announced an
L-7 TOTAL, GOVERNMENT - KENYA, PTTEP
oil discovery in Block 1z0BB. A further discovery of oil
in Block 13T was anznounced in Novemberz 2012 and L-5 TOTAL, GOVERNMENT - KENYA, PTTEP

drilling in the area continues at thze time of writing z A-Z PETROLEUM L-1A -
with a total of 7 dziscoveries out of z7 wells drilled and
L-3 -
estimates of 600 mzillion barrels of oil in place. zKenyaBG GROUP L-10B PREMIER OIL, PANCONTINENTAL, PTTEP
blocks are currently licensed as fozllows:
L-10A PTTEP, PANCONTINENTAL

CAMAC L-16 GOVERNMENT - KENYA

L-1B GOVERNMENT - KENYA

L-27 GOVERNMENT - KENYA

L-28 GOVERNMENT - KENYA
CESPA BLOCK 11A EHRC ENERGY, GOVERNMENT - KENYA

EDGO GROUP L-14 QATAR FIRST INVESTMENTS

Source: PetroView®

10Annex 116

Operator Block Consortium partners

ENI L-21 -

L-23 -

L-24 -
FAR LTD L-6 PANCONTINENTAL OIL

L-6 ONSHORE MILIO INTERNATIONAL, PANCONTINENTAL

OIL

IMARA ENERGY CORP. L-2 -

MIDWAY RESOURCES L-4 SWISS OIL COMPANY, NOCK
L-13 SWISS OIL COMPANY, NOCK

MILIO INTERNATIONAL L-20 PACIFIC SEABOARD

NOCK BLOCK 14T -

OPHIR ENERGY L-9 FAR LTD, GOVERNMENT - KENYA, VANOIL
ENERGY

L-15 GOVERNMENT - KENYA

PANCONTINENTAL L-8* -

PREMIER OIL BLOCK 2B TAIPAN RESOURCES INC

RIFT ENERGY CORP L-19 -

SIMBA ENERGY INC BLOCK 2A -

TOTAL L-22 -
TULLOW OIL BLOCK 10BA AFRICA OIL

BLOCK 10A AFRICA OIL, AFREN PLC

BLOCK 10BB AFRICA OIL

BLOCK 13T AFRICA OIL, NOCK

BLOCK 12B SWALA ENERGY

BLOCK 12A AFRICA OIL , MARATHON OIL, NOCK

VANOIL BLOCK 3B -
BLOCK 3A -

*Pancontinental is rpeapplying for the L-8 license after opperator APACHE left the blockp.

Source: PetroView®

Kenya is home to thep region’s only operating Sources:

refinery although in pthe recent past there have been • National Oil Corporpation of Kenya website (http:p//
differences between the pgovernment and the pprivate www.nockenya.co.ke/)

sector owners whicph has resulted in a temporpary • A Dash for Gas (anpd Oil…) in East Afprica (Citigroup
shutdown. The nameplate capacitpy of the Mombasa Global Markets, 4 pJuly 2011)

refinery, operated on a tolling basis by Kenya Petroleum • Tullow Oil website (hpttp://www.tullowoil.com/)

Refinery Limited (KPRpL), is 80,000 barrpels per day. In • Essar website (httpp://www.essar.com/)
2009 Essar acquired a 50% interest in KPRL from a • KPRL website (http:/p/www.kprl.co.ke/)

consortium of BP, Shell and Chevron. The remainder is
owned by the Kenyan government. At that point it wasp

announced that Esspar would invest USDp 400 – 450
million in a significanpt upgrade. This project appears to

be stalled at the time of pwriting.

The Deloitte Guide 1to Oil and Gas in 1Easaniquely structure11 Annex 116

2.4 Regulatory e▯nvironment Key features of the current model production sharing

The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act (cap contract include:
308), last revised in 2012, is Athe fundamental law A • Negotiation of an Ainitial exploration period with

governing upstream activities in KAenya. This vests the possibility toA extend this twice. A
ownership of hydrocarbons in the hanAds of the Kenyan • An agreed percentage of the contAract area is to be

government and grants significant poweArs over the surrendered at the end of eaAch exploration period.

sector to the Cabinet Secretary in the MinisAtry of • In the event of a commercial development the total
Energy and Petroleum. Day to day rAesponsibility for Athe contract duration is negotiablAe.

sector lies with theA Petroleum Energy Department of • Surface fees are provided for but are negotiable.
the Ministry. • Annual contributionAs to the Ministry Aof Energy

training fund.
The Act envisages upstream activities beinAg conducted • The PSC does not provide for bonus payAments or

via a state oil comApany established foAr that purpose royalties.
or through contractors under a petrAoleum agreement • A cost recovery cap per perAiod is envisaged buAt the

or “in any such othAer manner as may bAe necessary amount of this is Aalso negotiable.

or appropriate” (section 4A (3) (b)). The Minister is • Capital costs are subject to recovery at a rate of
empowered to sign petroleum agreements on behalf A 20% per annum (straight-line).

of Kenya and is required to make a model Aagreement • The sharing of profit oil is based soAlely on
available to potenAtial contractors: this can beA production volumes witAh the maximum statAe

downloaded from the website of tAhe state oil companAy share achieved when production exceeds 100,A000
(the National Oil ACorporation of Kenya Ltd (NOCK) - barrels per day. The state share may be taken in A

see http://www.nockenya.co.ke/). A cash or in kind.
• Separate rules for sharAing gas production are not

The Act is brief and provides little detaiAl, particularly provided.

on questions relating to developmAent and production • The state’s share of profit oil is inclusivAe of income
activities. There are a couple of pointAs worth noting: tax (see below for Amore detail).

• Where petroleum operations are carried out • The model provides for an additional allocation of
onshore, the Act provides the contractor with profit oil to the staAte, triggered when the oil pricAe

right of access to Aprivate land at 48 Ahours’ notice exceeds a specified tAhreshold.
subject to various Aconditions. • In the event of a Adevelopment, the goAvernment

• A contractor is required to give preference to has a right to parAticipate directly or via its
locally available goods Aand services, but tAhere is no designee (presumably this would Abe NOCK). The

definition of what “lAocally available” meanAs and no percentage share to be transferred is subject for

specific percentage of local conAtent is prescribed. negotiation. The PSC envisages tAhat this will not
entail reimbursement of cosAts up to the adoptiAon

NOCK was establisheAd in the 1980s to sApearhead of the development Aplan, but the goveArnment or
exploration on behalf ofA the Kenyan government. AThis its designee will be obliged to funAd the respective

remains a key role, but since 1997A it has also builtA up share of costs thereafter, no carry arrangement
a retail business and Atoday controls around 5% of the being envisaged.

retail market for pAetroleum products in Kenya. • The contractor is obliged toA supply the domestiAc
market out of its share of production in accordance

with instructions frAom the Minister. This will be at

market price.
• The contractor and its subconAtractors will be

entitled to import Agoods and equipmentA for
petroleum operations free from customs duties.

12Annex 116

• The PSC is subordinate to the laws ofa Kenya and it The government is caurrently working on itas policy

is not envisaged thaat it will be given force of law framework for natural resources (which is expecated to
itself (e.g. by gazeatting). In the evenat of a change be published duringa the course of 2014a) as well as on

in laws or regulations that impaacts the economic a draft Energy Bill.
benefits of a party tao the PSC, it is praovided that

the parties “shall agree to make the neceassary Sources:
adjustments” to restore the status quo. • National Oil Corporation of Kenya website (http:/a/

• In the event of dispute arbitration is provided for www.nockenya.co.ke/)
under UNCITRAL rulesa. This is to take placae in • Website of the Kenya Ministry of Enaergy (http://

Nairobi. www.energy.go.ke/)
• The accounting procedure specifies the usea of US • The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act,

dollars. Chapter 308, 1986

• The Petroleum (Exploration and Production)
Regulation

The Deloitte Guide 1to Oil and Gas in 1East Afaniquely structure13 Annex 116

2.5 Taxation of oil ande gas projects Key points addressed in the scheduwle which apply to

The responsibility for wadministering taxesw in Kenya rests petroleum companies are as follows:
with the Kenya Revenue Authorwity (“KRA”). The tax • There are specific and detailwed rules for

year is the calendawr year for natural persons, and thwe determining the valwue of sales for tawx purposes
financial year which wends in June for awll other persons. together with specifiwc transfer pricing rulesw. These

mirror the provisions of the modwel PSC.

Kenya resident companies awnd branches of foreign • Capital expenditure is depreciated for tax purpwoses
legal entities are taxed on all income accruing in w at a rate of 20% per annwum (straight-line)

or derived from Kenya. The calculation of prwofits commencing in the yewar the asset is brwought into
is based on the IFwRS financial statemenwts. The rate use or the year inw which production commences

for resident companies iws 30% and for branches whichever is later. Operating costs (including G&G
is 37.5%. There is no branch profits tax or branch and intangible drilwling) are fully deductible in thwe

remittance tax. Dividwends paid by a resident company year incurred.
to a non-resident shareholder are usually subject to • There are also specific thin wcapitalization rulews

withholding tax at a rate of 10%. Capital gains are for petroleum companies. These apply to bothw

generally not taxed in Kenya (whilst there is capital branches and residents. Interest expenses are
gains tax legislatiown this has been suwspended since restricted if the lowan amount or interwest rate

1985). Losses incurred may be offset iwn the year in exceeds an arm’s length amount. Now specific debt:
which incurred and any of the w4 following years. equity ratio is prescribed (unlike thwe general thin

capitalization rulews which impose a maxwimum debt:
Income tax on employwment income is generwally equity ratio of 3:1).

collected via withholding at source under “pay as yowu • Petroleum companies are permitted to carrwy back
earn” (PAYE). The marginal rate is 30% and addwitionally losses arising in twhe final year of prwoduction for

employers are required to collect certain social swecurity up to 3 years. No wcarry back is permitwted under

contributions. general tax rules.
• Any gain arising onw the disposal of a PSC iwnterest

As noted above, the wKenyan model PSC prwovides will be taxed as incomew (the suspension owf tax on
that income tax (incwluding tax on dividends paid) capital gains is therefore not a benefit to petroleum

imposed on the contwractor will be allocated from companies). The gain is the difference between
the government’s share of production. The PSC does proceeds and capital ewxpenditure that has not yetw

not provide detailed rulews for calculating thwe implied been depreciated for tax purpwoses. The rules are
gross-up or guidance own how the allocation is to be silent on what happwens in the case of wa loss. In the

carried out if the wcompany has more than one PSA or w case of a partial dwisposal the KRA mayw apportion

other activities. the tax basis betwewen the part sold awnd the part
retained.

The Kenya Income Tax Act contains a specificw • In the event a disposal wholly or partly in exchwange
schedule (the Ninthw) which deals with twhe taxation of for the undertakinwg of a work obligatiwon the

upstream activities and iwncludes a special regime for value of the work owbligation is excludewd from the
subcontractors. At the time of writiwng, we understand calculation of the gwain.

that these rules awre under review but it is notw clear • Amendments to the wIncome Tax Act introduced
what changes may be wmade or when they mwight be at the end of 2012w introduced an additional

introduced. The rules are clearly drafted and deal withw withholding tax on direct and indirect transfers

most routine situations wlikely to be encounwtered during of PSC interests. The rate is 10% of the wvalue of
the exploration phase. They have not been twested total consideration in the case owf transactions

through development anwd production, of course.w with residents and 20% iwn other cases. Befowre the
Finance Act 2013, this was a wfinal tax. However,

the Finance Act 2013 amended thiws position such
that the withholding tax deducted will be an

advance tax effectivew 1 January 2014.

14Annex 116

• On a disposal the assignexe is permitted to xtax Production) Act (Cap. 308) upon recommendation by
depreciate the full consideration (i.e. a step-xup in the Cabinet Secretary responsible for enerxgy.

basis is permittedx).
• The schedule does noxt provide for ring fencixng of General Law also provides an exemptionx from

individual PSCs for taxx purposes, so theorxetically customs duty on eqxuipment imported foxr purposes of
a petroleum company shoulxd pool all income and exploration and developmxent activities. This mirrors

expenditures for purposes of xcalculating income x the exemption provided in the PSC, txhough it does not

tax. This is likely to caxuse difficulty in practice as apply to subcontractors.
the model PSC allocates income tax xout of the

government share of production and logicaxlly the In addition to the above,x the Finance Act 2013
mechanism for doing xso can only operate on in introduced a Railway Dxevelopment Levy (RDxL) under

individual PSC basis. Section 117A of the xCustoms and Excise Axct, which
will be imposed on alxl goods imported foxr use in

As mentioned above,x the Ninth Schedule axlso Kenya. The levy will be at the rate of 1.5% of the

deals with the taxatxion of “petroleum service customs value of thxe goods (i.e. Cost,x Insurance and
subcontractors”. The definition restricts the scope xto Freight for sea shipmexnts and Cost and Ixnsurance for

non-resident companies xwhich contract directly with air freight), and shall be payable by thex importer at the
a petroleum company, i.e. it excludes xa resident entity time of clearing thex goods.

and also any lowerx tier subcontractors. The rules
created a simplified xtax regime for companiesx which The effective date ofx this amendment wasx 1 July, 2013.

are within the scope:x The Kenya Oil & Gas Association sought exxemption on

• They are subject to tax atx the non-resident rate the basis that the Pxroduction Sharing Conxtracts signed
(37.5%) on a deemedx profit of 15%. by the oil companiexs exempt them from any such

• The resulting tax (5.625%x) is to be withheldx by the levies. This application wasx denied on the basixs that
petroleum company and xis a final tax. there is no legal provision allowing for exemptionx. The

• The base for calculaxting the tax excludexs costs Association is currxently engaging the Txreasury with a
reimbursed by the pextroleum company (inclxuding view to resolving this. Howexver, the National Treasury

mobilization and dxemobilization costxs). is yet to formally comment.

• The rules only applyx to activities witxhin Kenya and
its exclusive econoxmic zone. Sources:

• Kenya Income Tax Act
For activities undexrtaken by lower tixer subcontractors, • Kenya VAT Act

or services otherwixse outside the scopxe of these special x • Customs and Excise Axct
rules other rates of withholding tax may be applxicable, • East African Communxity Customs Management Axct

depending on the specific xfact pattern.

In addition to income taxx on companies, Kenya

operates a VAT system along convxentional lines. The
standard VAT rate is 16% but expoxrts are generally

zero-rated. Imports of goxods and services nxormally
trigger a VAT liability. The model PSC provides an

exemption from VAT and customs dutyx on imports

of goods by contractors and subcontxractors. The
new Kenyan VAT Act which came into xeffect on 2

September 2013 alsox provides for exemptioxn from
VAT in respect of supplies,x excluding motor vehicles,x

imported or purchased for direct and exclusive uxse in
oil prospecting or explorxation, by a companxy granted

a prospecting or explorxation license in axccordance
with the provisions of Petroleum (Exploration and

The Deloitte Guide 1to Oil and Gas in 1East Afaniquely structured15 Annex 117

Total S.A., Factbook 2014 (2014) Annex 117

Factbook 2014Annex 117

SUMMARY

Need more information on a specific subject?
PROFILE V V V V V V V 1 V
Log on to www.total.com
HIGHLIGHTS V V V V V V V 2 Heading Investors/Institutional investors/Publications

You can display online TOTAL’s factbook, download
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY V V V V 4
it in PDF or collect all the tables in Excel format.

7
CORPORATE V V V V V V V

Financial Highlights.........................................................................
......................................9

Market Environment .........................................................................
...................................9
Operational Highlights by quarter.........................................................................
...............10

Financial Highlights by quarter.........................................................................
...................10
Market Environment and Price Realizations.....................................................
0................1

Consolidated statement of income .........................................................................
...........12

Consolidated balance sheet .........................................................................
.....................16
Consolidated statement of changes in shareholders’ equity...............................................19

Net-debt-to-equity ratio .........................................................................
...........................20
ROACE by business segment .........................................................................
..................21

Consolidated statement of cash flow .........................................................................
........22
Cash flow from operating activities .........................................................................
...........23

Capital expenditures ........................................................................
.................................24
Abbreviations
Divestments by business segment .........................................................................
b:.....barrel4
Share information.........................................................................
......................................26
/d: per day
/y: per year
29 €: euro
UPSTREAM V V V V V V V $ and/or
dollar:U.S. dollar
Combined liquids and gas production.........................................................................
.......33 ton
boe: barrel of oil equivalent
Changes in oil, bitumen and gas reserves .................................................................kboe/d: thousand boe/d
kb/d: thousand barrel/d
Results of operations for oil and gas producing activities................................................Btu:49 British thermal unit
Cost incurred in oil and gas property acqusiition, exploration and development activiites......51 M: million
B: billion
Capitalized costs related to oil and gas producing activities ............................................MW:52 megawatt
Standardized measure of discounted future net cash flows ...............................................54MWp: megawatt peak (direct current)
TWh: terawatt hour
LNG positions as of December31, 2014 .....................................................................AMF:
.French Financial Markets Authority
API: American Petroleum Institute
Re-gasification terminals as of December 31, 2014 ........................................................ERMI: European Refining Margin Indicator.
Interests in pipelines.........................................................................
................ERMI is an indicator intended to represent the
margin after variable costs for a hypothetical
Acreage including maps, main producing assets and acreage by region: complex refinery located around Rotterdam in
Northern Europe. The indicator margin may not be
Europe.........................................................................
................................representative of the actual margins achieved by
TOTAL in any period because of TOTAL’s
Africa.........................................................................
................................particular refinery configurations, product mix
Commonwealth of Independent States .........................................................................
....83ects or other company-specific operating
conditions.
Middle East.........................................................................
....................FEED:..Front-End Engineering and Design
Asia-Pacific.........................................................................
...............................................91rage and Offloading
IFRS: International Financial Reporting Standards
South America .........................................................................
.................LNG:...liquefied natural gas
LPG: liquefied petroleum gas
North America .........................................................................
.................ROE....Return on Equity101
ROACE: Return on Average Capital Employed
SEC: United States Securities and Exchange
105 Commission
REFINING & CHEMICALS V V V V V SAGD: Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage

Refinery capacity.........................................................................
..............Conversion table.......111
Petrochemicals product – main production capacities at year-end...................................113
1 boe = 1 barrel of crude oil = approx. 5,400 cf of gas
Petrochemicals product – sales by geographic area.........................................................113/d = approx. 50 t/y
1 t = approx. 7.5 b (for a gravity of 37° API)
Speciality chemicals product – sales by geographic area.................................................111 Bm3/y = approx. 0.1 Bcf/d
Speciality chemicals product – sales by activity ..............................................................114prox. 35.3 cf
1 t of LNG = approx. 48 kcf of gas
1 Mt/y of LNG = approx. 131 Mcf/d

MARKETING & SERVICES V V V V V 115 (1) This ratio is calculated based on the actual average
equivalent energy content of TOTAL's natural gas
reserves and is subject to change.
Petroleum product sales (excluding trading and bulk sales)..............................................121
Service-stations.........................................................................
......................................122 Annex 117

TOTAL AFRICA ACREAGE
UPSTREAM 81
FACTBOOK 2014 NIGERIA ALGERIA UGANDA MADAGASCAR
ANGOLA DEMOCRATIC KENYA MOROCCO
REPUBLIC REPUBLIC OF CÔTE D’IVOIRE MOZAMBIQUE
OF THE CONGO THE CONGO MAURITANIA
GABON REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
LIBYA SOUTH SUDAN SOUTH AFRICA

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

OF THE CONGO

In the Lake Albert region, the Block III
(66.66%, operator) exploration license was

granted in 2012 for an initial three-year
period. As a result of the security situation

in the eastern part of the country in 2012,
the license was extended for one year.
The prospecting program is limited to

the northern portion of the license, which
is outside the Virunga park.

REPUBLIC
Block B
OF SOUTH ETHIOPIA
REPUBLIC SUDAN

OF SOUTH SUDAN

TOTAL is negotiating a new contract with
the authorities that would enable it to

resume exploration activities in part of
Block B. Since the independence of the

Republic of South Sudan in 2011, TOTAL
is no longer present in Sudan.

DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC EA 1 (Dev)
UGANDA OF THE
CONGO EA 2 Buliisa
SOMALIA
TOTAL has been active since 2012 in Uganda EA 2
and the Group holds a 33.33% interest in EA 3-KJ
the EA-1, EA-1A and EA-2 licenses as well Block III
KENYA
as the Kingfisher license, located in the KAMPALA
Lake Albert region. TOTAL is the operator UGANDA

of the EA-1 and EA-1A licenses and a
partner on the other licenses. L5

• On the EA-1 license, a campaign of wells,
L7
production tests and a 3D seismic L12
survey were carried out between 2012 L22
L11A
and mid-2014. As of year-end 2014, five L11B
development plans had been submitted TOTAL Operator
TOTAL Partner
to the authorities: Ngiri (submitted in
December 2013), Jobi-Rii (submitted in 0 km 400 km TANZANIA
June 2014) and Mpyo, Gunya and Jobi INDIAN OCEAN

East (submitted in December 2014).

• The EA-1A license expired in February 2013

following a campaign of five exploration production license, was approved by the In 2013, two exploration wells were drilled
wells that resulted in one discovery authorities in September 2013. in Blocks L7 and L11b.
(Lyec). With the exception of the area
• The Kanywataba license expired in 2012 On the offshore L22 license, seabed core
relating to this discovery, the license has
been relinquished to the authorities. and was relinquished to the authorities. drilling operations were carried out in early
2014 and a 3D seismic survey was carried
• On the EA-2 license, a campaign of wells out, benefitting from synergies with the

and production tests that began in 2012 KENYA adjacent blocks.
was completed in 2014. Two development
TOTAL has interests on the offshore L5 and
plans were submitted to the authorities L7 licenses (40%) and the L11a, L11b and
in June 2013 (Kasamene and Wahrindi
L12 licenses (30% after selling 10% of the
fields, as well as those of Kigogole, stake in December 2014) and is the operator
Ngege, Ngara and Nsoga).
of the L22 license (70%) located in the
• The development plan for the Kingfisher Lamu delta in water depths ranging from

field, which is located on the EA-3 1,000 m to 3,500 m.Annex 117

see you on
total.com

TOTAL S.A.
Registered Office:
2, place Jean Millier - La Défense 6
92400 Courbevoie - France
Share capital: 5,963,168,812.50 euros
542 051 180 RCS Nanterre
www.total.com Annex 118

Chris Lo, “Offshore Kenya: keeping up the neighbors”, Offshore Technology Market &
Customer Insight (13 Jan. 2014) Annex 118

Offshore Kenya: keeping up with the

neighbours

13 January 2014 Chris Lo

Oil and gas exploration companies have flocked to the Kenyan coast after
major discoveries in nearby Tanzania and Mozambique. But do Kenyan
waters hold the same resource potential as the country's neighbours?
Preliminary exploration work has been mildly disappointing, but there is
still time for the Lamu Basin region to prove itself.

Kenya might be the largest economy in East Africa, but in some respects
it lags significantly behind its neighbours. Agriculture and tourism to the
country's wildlife reserves provide a driving force behind Kenyan growth,

but the dominance of these sectors makes the country vulnerable to poor
harvests or shifting tourism trends, as well as leaving much of its
population living in poverty.

The Kenyan Government, both before and after the March 2013 elections
that brought President Uhura Kenyatta to power, has been working to
develop a more diverse base for economic growth, throwing its support
behind the country's burgeoning manufacturing and financial services
sectors.

The exploitation of natural resources is another important area that could
create sustainable growth and lasting benefits for Kenya's people. It's also
an area in which Kenya is playing catch-up with nearby countries such as
Mozambique and Tanzania, which both have increasingly mature mining
industries and are currently hosting significant hydrocarbon discoveries,
both on and offshore. Recent offshore gas discoveries in the two countries
reportedly total around 100 trillion cubic feet.

Meanwhile, Kenya remains a "Kenya is playing
completely unproven oil and gas
destination, regardless of the catch-up with nearby
impressive finds being made further countries such as
south of Africa's east coast. A January
2013 Deloitte report on East African Mozambique and
oil and gas potential summed up the
slight disappointment that has met Tanzania."
exploration efforts in the country.

"Over the past 50 years, many other oil and gas companies have tried
their luck onshore and offshore, including Exxon, Total, Chevron,
Woodside and CNOOC," the report states. "Of 33 wells drilled in the
country prior to 2012, 16 showed signs of hydrocarbons, but none were
considered commercial. Only four had been drilled offshore prior to 2012
and of these only one (in Block L5, drilled by Woodside in 2007) was in
deepwater."

Exploration in the Lamu Basin

However, the Deloitte report acknowledges the 'hotspot' status that has
been granted to East Africa and its coastal waters after the successes
seen in Tanzania and Mozambique. The report notes that 'offshore
exploration has become [the] flavour of the moment' and that 'extensive
activity' from the industry is expected in Kenya over the next two years.

Kenyan offshore blocks have certainlyAnnex 118

"The L6 area has
attracted significant attention from a
potential to contain wide range of energy companies,
large and small, over the last few
approximately 3.7 years. With only one of the four
billion barrels of oil or prospective sedimentary basins in
Kenya extending offshore (the Anza,
10.2 trillion cubic feet
Mandera and Tertiary Rift basins are
of gas." all onshore, while the Lamu Basin runs
beneath Kenyan waters), the country's
onshore O&G potential has understandably been the greatest focus of
industry interest and media speculation, especially in the wake of Tullow
Oil's fifth consecutive oil discovery since beginning exploratory drilling in
Turkana County in 2012.

Nevertheless, Kenya's offshore potential, lent legitimacy by major
discoveries further south, has drawn significant investment from
companies looking to survey explore the Lamu basin for oil and gas. For
the many companies with a stake in the 15-odd blocks off Kenya's east
coast, including the likes of Eni, Anadarko, Total, Camac Energy and BG
Group, early indications were encouraging.

Australian company Pancontinental, which owns a 40% stake in the L6
block in partnership with operator and 60% stakeholder Far Ltd, was
certainly confident in a trading statement released in February 2013.

"The L6 area has potential to contain approximately 3.7 billion barrels of
oil or 10.2 trillion cubic feet of gas prospective resources on a gross, un-
risked, best-estimate basis according to an assessment by operator FAR
Limited," the statement estimated, based on 2D and 3D seismic surveys in
the region.

Destined to disappoint?

Despite the sustained investment the oil and gas industry is making

offshore Kenya, so far the region's potential remains unrealised. In an
offshore area thought to be the next frontier of East African oil and gas, it
is discouraging for industry and investors that exploratory drilling has not
yielded more impressive finds.

Though the offshore drilling work being carried out by most explorers is
still in the early stages, several companies have already started to scale
back their presence in the area after only non-commercial discoveries. In
October 2013, US-based Apache Corporation relinquished its 50% stake in
the L8 block it had been developing with Pancontinental and Tullow Oil,
saying the quantities of gas it had found were not commercially viable.

"We determined that other areas in our worldwide portfolio provided
better opportunities for future capital investments," Bob Dye, Apache's
senior vice-president of corporate affairs told Reuters.

British oil firm Premier Oil followed suit in December, when it announced
that after an exploration review, it was withdrawing from Block L10A,
relinquishing its 20% stake in the license. Premier still has a 25% share in
the neighbouring Block L10B, which it will continue to explore leading up
to a 'drill or drop' decision in mid-2014.

"Whilst we remain committed to exploration in Kenya, we continue to
focus our resources on projects that meet our internal corporate
investment metrics and to high-grade our exploration portfolio
accordingly," said Premier CEO Simon Lockett.

In fact, the best news that Kenya's "Several companies
offshore explorers seem to be able to
muster at the moment is that the have already begun to
area's potential remains high, even if scale back their
no breakthroughs have been made
yet. Anadarko announced in April presence in the area."
2013 that it had not found commercial
quantities of oil at its Kubwa well in the L7 block, but remained upbeat
about future prospects.

"We are very encouraged with our first test of Kenya's previously
unexplored deepwater basin, in which mudlog and well-site evaluation of
core data indicates the presence of a working petroleum system with
reservoir-quality sands," said Anadarko's senior vice-president for
worldwide exploration Bob Daniels. "The Kubwa well tested multiple play
concepts and provided useful data regarding the prospectivity of our six-

million-acre position offshore Kenya."

Meanwhile, Pancontinental might have given Apache Corp executives
reason for a slight amount of regret when it made a modest discovery of
gas in the L8 block in December, but even so, the company had to add Annex 118

the caveat that the well would only be viable if combined with other wells
in the area, continuing the uncertainty.

"The well on its own may not currently be commercially viable, but could
be when aggregated with other gas discoveries which may occur in the L8
or nearby blocks," said Pancontinental's finance director Ernest Myers.

Is Kenya's offshore resource potential destined to disappoint? The
exploration of a relatively unmapped region is a protracted process, and
it's still too early to know if the companies that have already bowed out of
the area were jumping the gun. But with ten new exploration wells
expected to be drilled in the country every year for the next three to five
years, 40% of which will be offshore, according to National Oil Corporation

of Kenya chief executive Sumayya Hassan-Athmani, it won't be too long
before the fate Kenya's embryonic offshore industry is put beyond doubt.

Follow Chris Lo on Google+

Related content

Eastern promise: Soma Oil & Gas buys into Somalia's

energy boom

War-torn Somalia has some of the largest prospective oil and gas
resources in East Africa and UK company Soma Oil & Gas is investing
£20m to gain first-mover advantage.

East Africa's new gas frontier: exploration without
exploitation

The East African offshore oil and gas industry is about to become one of
the world's biggest energy frontiers. Annex 119

Eduard Gismatullin, “Tullow Finds More Kenyan Oil to Boost EastAfrica Exports”, Bloomberg
Business (15 Jan. 2014) Annex 119

Tullow Finds More Kenyan Oil to Boost

East Africa Exports

by Eduard Gismatullin
January 15, 2014 — 12:15 PM EST

Jan. 15 (Bloomberg) ­­ Tullow Oil Plc made two new discoveries in Kenya, boosting prospects for turning
East Africa’s largest economy into an oil exporter.

The U.K. oil explorer doubled its Kenyan resource estimates to more than 600 million barrels after the
Amosing and Ewoi wells found crude, Tullow said today in a statement. The company, which plans more

than 20 wells in northern Kenya over the next two years, said it had started preliminary design work on a
pipeline to an export terminal.

“Kenya is one of our core and key areas going forward,” Tullow Chief Executive Officer Aidan Heavey
said in a phone interview. “We are also starting discussions with the government now on the development

plans.”

Kenya may become East Africa’s first oil exporter as soon as 2016 as Tullow and its partner Africa Oil
Corp. continue to explore the Lokichar Basin in the north of country. Tullow, which works with France’s

Total SA and China’s Cnooc Ltd. to develop fields in neighboring Uganda, has plans to combine oil exports
from the two countries through one pipeline network.

The Amosing well drilling results “significantly” exceeded expectations in Block 10BB, Africa Oil said in a
separate statement. The companies agreed to relinquish their license to Block 10A, where the Paipai well

discovered gas last year.

‘Very Remote’

“It’s very remote, we really have enough to do with a lot of basins,” Heavey said. “We are going to

concentrate on the oil basins.”

Tullow’s blocks in northern Kenya may be found to hold more than 1 billion barrels of oil resources as

drilling continues, the company’s exploration chief, Angus McCoss, said in today’s statement.Annex 119

“Tullow’s exploration in Kenya continues to deliver,” Oswald Clint, an analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein &

Co. in London, wrote in an e­mailed report. “Perhaps more excitingly, this year we expect to see three
completely undrilled East African basins targeted from Tullow’s onshore acreage in Kenya and Ethiopia.”

Tullow also reported today a $730 million exploration charge mostly because of unsuccessful wells off

French Guiana, Mozambique and Norway.

The shares rose 0.8 percent to 863 pence in London. Africa Oil climbed 3.1 percent to 58.5 kronor in

Stockholm.

Tullow, which operates Ghana’s largest oil field, expects to produce 79,000 barrels to 85,000 barrels a day
this year after output rose 6.3 percent to 84,200 barrels of oil equivalent a day last year.

Last­year revenue rose 11 percent to $2.6 billion from a year earlier. Investments in projects will jump 22

percent to $2.2 billion this year, London­based Tullow said today.

To contact the reporter on this story: Eduard Gismatullin in London at [email protected]

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Will Kennedy at [email protected] Annex 120

Nina Rach, “Kenyan explorers look deeper offshore”, oedigital.com (1 July 2014) Annex 120

Print this page

Kenyan explorers look deeper offshore

Written by Nina Rach
Tuesday, 01 July 2014 00:00

Rate this item (0 votes)

Offshore East Africa is among the newest frontier
exploration regions, with results of wildcats eagerly
awaited. The area still lacks infra- structure to support
meaningful development and logistics remain a challenge
to all comers. The activity has spread beyond the shores
of Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, reaching Madagascar,
the Comoros, and the Seychelles.

All of Kenya’s offshore blocks are in the Lamu basin,
which formed during the separation of Madagascar from
Africa and has Middle to Late Jurassic source rocks. The
exploration focused in the Lamu basin follows a

successful trend from Mozambique and Tanzania. Small BG Group used Odfjell's Deepsea Metro I
independent operators are surrounded by majors, drillship for the Sunbird-1 in Block L10A
leading to interesting industry partnerships and strategicthis year. Photo from BG Group.
opportunities for companies large and small.

Years of activity

In 1964, BP and Shell drilled the onshore Dodori-1 well to 4311m TD very close to the coast. The
well reached Campanian rocks in the late Cretaceous section, with oil and gas shows in Tertiary and
Cretaceous. This well flowed at 3.1mcf/d.

In 1971, BP and Shell drilled the Pate-1 well south of the Dodori well, in the L5 area, to 4188m TD,
reaching Eocene sediments with gas shows. It flowed at 12.7mcf/d.

In the same year, they drilled the Kipini well to the south, close to the coast in the nearby L-6 area,
to 3663m TD. It reached the Campanian section, with fluorescence and gas shows in Tertiary and
Cretaceous section.

In 1978, France’s Total drilled the offshore Simba-1 well to 3604m TD, with wet gas shows (C1-C5)
in the Tertiary.

In 1982, a consortium of Cities Services, Marathon and Union drilled the offshore Maridadi-1 well to
4198m TD with gas shows in the Tertiary, and in 1985, drilled the offshore Kofia-1 well to 3629m
TD, with oil and gas shows.

A Lamu basin study 1991- 1995 led Kenya to subdivide the Lamu embayment (both onshore and

offshore) into 10 exploration blocks and then add two more after 2001.

Between 2000-2002, seven production sharing agreements were signed for offshore Lamu basin
blocks L5, L6, L7, L8, L9, L10, and L11. In 2003, Australia’s Woodside Petroleum acquired 7884 km
of 2D seismic data covering the seven licensed blocks as well as Block L12. Woodside then drilled
the deepest offshore well in 2006.

Anadarko acquired 5000 line-km of 2D seismic Annex 120

reef at 1583.7m subsea. It became Kenya’s first offshore oil discovery, confirmed in June 2014.

What’s ahead

Several major international oil companies—BG

Group, Tullow, Total, ENI, and Anadarko—
have aggressively pursued prospects off Kenya,
and operators appear more willing to drill
commercial- sized oil prospects now that
source rocks and oil-generation timing has
been proven.

Will Anadarko drill again off Kenya? Perth-
based Pancontinental Oil & Gas NL said in a
June 2014 presentation that it would

potentially re-enter Kenya offshore Block L8 in
the second half of this year. The Kenyan
government also granted the company a 12-
month extension for the initial exploration
period of the L10B license area. Ophir Energy,
which holds a 90% inter- est in Block L9, had
said it would drill a well in 3Q 2014, but in a
June 2014 investor presentation, announced
that it was pushed to 1H 2015. This may be

related to the farm-out to FAR of 30%, subject
to government approval. The prospect has P50
reserves of 190MMboe gross and 171 MMboe
net.

FAR anticipates drilling a well in Block L6 at the
end of 1Q 2015.

Afrin (EAX) is preparing to drill two wells in
2015 in Blocks L17/L18.

Ultra-deepwater Block L26 is not currently
under license. Edgo Energy, the exploration
unit of Jordan’s Edgo, and joint venture
partner Qatar First Bank relinquished the block
in January 2013. Mazen Masri, managing
director of Edgo, cited the technical and monetary challenges of drilling in water depths beyond
1500m, and also mentioned that the block is subject to a maritime border dispute, claimed by both
Kenya and Somalia.

NOCK

The National Oil Corp. of Kenya Ltd. (NOCK) is a state-owned company that was established in April
1981 to spearhead exploration.

A new Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Act was enacted in 1984, and revised in 1986, when
royalties were replaced with production sharing con- tracts. Through 2012, most of Kenya’s PSCs
gave NOCK a 10% stake in production, raised to 25% in 2013, along with higher fees and new
capital gains tax rules. Kenya’s first competitive licensing round has been postponed to at least

4Q 2014, and GlobalData’s sub-Saharan upstream analyst John Sisa said in May that the delay
could benefit the country if additional discoveries are made in the interim.

Logistics

Adequate ports and docking facilities are still in short supply along the East African coast. The
different types of vessels needed to support a robust exploration program require supply and repairAnnex 120

data over offshore blocks L5, L7, L12, L11A and
L11B, fol- lowed by 3D seismic.

By December 2009, Origin Energy acquired
900sq km of 3D seismic over Block L8, using
M/V Seisquest to tow eight streamers, 5100m
long.

Afren, through its subsidiary EAX, acquired
460km of shallow-water and transition-zone 2D

seismic over Blocks L17 and L18, completed in
October 2010.

In 2011-2012, Ophir Energy acquired Dominion
Petroleum for £118m (US$186million).

In November 2011, BG began acquiring 3D seismic data in license areas L10A and L10B, followed
by a 2D seismic sur- vey over the western area of the blocks (the Sunbird area).

In January 2012, Afren (EAX) completed acquisition of 1207km of 2D data in the deeper water
portions of Blocks L17 and L18. In December 2012, it completed acquisition of 1006sq km of 3D

data (in lieu of a well commitment), and the 3D was processed by July 2013.

In June 2012, Total signed a PSC for 100% of offshore license Block L22, with water depths of
2000m to 3500m. The first phase of exploration is 3D seismic acquisition.

In July 2012, PTT E&P Thailand agreed to a $1.93billion acquisition of Cove Energy, which had
interests in several blocks offshore Kenya.

In 2012, Fugro-Geoteam AS completed the Kifaru 3D seismic survey including 778sq km over Block
L6 for FAR Ltd. and Pancontinental. Fugro’s Geo Caribbean seismic vessel stopped in Cape Town in
May 2012.

Discoveries

Working oil and gas systems were only recently proven offshore Kenya, beginning with the Mbawa-1
well on the western side of Block L8. The well reached 2553m in September 2012 and encountered
51.8m net gas pay in porous Cretaceous sandstones. It was then drilled further to 3275m TD.
Apache Corp. operates the license (50%) on behalf of partners Origin Energy (20%), Pancontinental
(15%), and Tullow (15%). Apache’s Exploration Director Angus McCoss said at the time: “A gas
discovery on prognosis in the shallowest objective at Mbawa-1 is an encouraging start to our East
African transform margin exploration campaign.” However, the find was not commercial, although
Apache said it would keep the option to re-enter the well open.

In April 2013, Anadarko announced that its Kubwa well in Block L7 was not commercial. The
company’s Senior Vice President for worldwide exploration Bob Daniels said, “The Kubwa well tested
multiple play concepts and provided useful data regarding the prospectivity of our six-million-acre
position offshore Kenya.”

In October 2013, Apache relinquished its 50% stake in the L8 block, saying that gas volumes were
not commercially viable.

Likewise, in December 2013, Britain’s Premier Oil announced that it was with- drawing from Block
L10A and relinquishing its 20% stake in the license. However, Premier retained its 25% share in

neighboring Block L10B.

Pancontinental announced a small gas discovery in Block L8 in December. Pancontinental’s finance
director Ernest Myers said, “The well on its own may not currently be commercially viable, but could
be when aggregated with other gas discoveries which may occur in the L8 or nearby blocks.” On 6
January 2014, Pancontinental and BG spud the Sunbird-1 well with the Deepsea Metro-I drillship in
723m water depth, Block L10A, and drilled to 2850m, penetrating the top of the Sunbird MioceneAnnex 120

yards and berthing options.

The Kenya Ports Authority manages the Port of Mombasa, named Africa’s fifth largest for container
shipping in 2013, based on increased traffic after capacity expansion. In January, incoming KPA
Chairman Danson Mungatana expressed his support for the development of small ports program and
said the new commissioning of the standard gauge railway line would “revamp the transport sector
and...support port efficiency.”

Kenya is boosting existing port facilities with the construction of a $3.5billion Lamu port.

The Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA) was set up in June 2004 to provide regulatory oversight of the
Kenyan marine industry. KMA implements international maritime conventions and promotes safety,
security, maritime training, search and rescue, pollution prevention and the preservation of the
marine environment. KMA’s mandate, as stipulated in Kenya’s KMA Act 2006, is “to regulate
coordinate and oversee maritime affairs.”

Roads connecting ports, airports, and other supply routes need to be bolstered to support the
heavy loads, as well as move personnel.

The oil and gas industry along with emerging sectors of the economy and a growing middle class
have boosted civil aviation needs in the region. The country’s main airport is Jomo Kenyatta
International (Nairobi), and there are smaller airports at Wilson, Mombasa, Eldoret, and Kisumu.

Bobby Bryan, Delta Airlines commer- cial manager for East Africa and West Africa, told the Discover
Global Markets Conference in May that airports, aircraft, adequate fuel supplies and staff are nec-
essary to service vessels and crews. Delta has an office in Nairobi and opened one in Dar es Salaam
a year ago. It partners with KLM and Kenya Airways.

In a January 2013 report, Deloitte & Touche described Kenya’s economy as “energy starved” and
that may hamper rapid infrastructure development.

Security

Securing infrastructure, operations and personnel safety is a primary consideration. Given Kenya’s
proximity to Somalia and shared, but porous, maritime border, critical infrastructure – electric, gas,
telecoms, transportation, water and food supplies – supporting the offshore industry may be a

constant target.

Increasingly frequent terrorist attacks, some of which the Kenya National Disaster Operation Centre
attributes to Somali militant groups, may negatively influence investment investments and possibly
forestall exploration activity in Kenya.

Earlier this year, bomb and grenade attacks in Nairobi and the coastal city of Mombasa led the UK,
US, France and Australia to issue travel warnings. As this issue goes to press, Somali militants

attacked hotels and killed dozens in Mpeketoni, a coastal town in Kenya’s Lamu County, another
blow towards destabilizing the tourist economy.

With evolving threats, Kenyan govern- ment efforts to protect people and critical infrastructure must
evolve as well, or the country risks losing petroleum investment.

The East Africa Oil & Gas Summit (EAOGS) will take place in Nairobi this October, and we’ll see what
a few months more will bring.

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Tagged under Kenya Africa offshore BG Group Odfjell Anadarko exploration east africa Annex 121

World Bank, Press Release: Kenya: New World Bank project will support country efforts
to better manage oil and gas developments and revenues to invest in lasting growth and
development (24 July 2014) Annex 121

Kenya: New World Bank project will support country efforts to better manage oil and ... Page 1 of 2

Home About Data Research Learning News Projects & Operations Publications Countries Topics

PRESS RELEASE

Kenya: New World Bank project will

support country efforts to better manage

oil and gas developments and revenues to

invest in lasting growth and development

July 24, 2014

WASHINGTON, July 24, 2014—The World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors today approved US$50
million for the Government of Kenya to strengthen its capacity to manage the oil and gas sector and the

distribution of its revenues to create sustainable growth across all areas of the country’s economy.

With the recent discovery of oil, the International Development Association (IDA)* credit for the Kenya
Petroleum Technical Assistance Project (KEPTAP) will focus on development measures to generate

more private investment in the country’s oil and gas industry, boost more efficient production, manage the
impacts, allocate higher government oil and gas revenues for development priorities, and increase

collaboration between the these extractives sectors and the domestic economy.

“The Government of Kenya acknowledges that the development of a successful petroleum sector is never

about petroleum alone, but also about managing its impacts for sustainable development",” said Diarietou
Gaye, the World Bank’s Country Director for Kenya. “The World Bank supports the government’s efforts

to streamline the petroleum sector to increase efficiency of decision-making related to policy formation,
planning, investments, and private sector participation,”

Successful implementation of the project will pave the way for economic growth and enhanced well-being for

the people of Kenya, contributing to poverty reduction and shared prosperity. Transparency and good
governance in oil contracts and revenue will be ensured through stronger collaboration between the national

and county governments hosting the new petroleum resources and also with civil society organizations,
private sector and local communities in these areas.

In order to help stimulate economic growth in Kenya, the project will promote petroleum activities to

contribute to fiscal and foreign exchange revenues. It will also support entrepreneurial activities by improving
the investment climate for the private sector and enhancing the oil and gas legal and institutional framework.

In addition the project will support the drafting of key policy and planning documents as well as capacity
building among existing government institutions and clarification of their roles and responsibilities. There is

significant emphasis on training so government staff is well equipped to deliver the expected outcomes. The
project will also increase vocational training capacity for the oil and gas sector of Kenya therefore increasing
the availability of trained staff to the private sector.

“The project supports effective government management of the oil and gas industry through capacity
building, technical assistance, training programs, and the development of a legal and institutional

http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/07/24/kenya-new-wor…... 5/22/2015Annex 121

Kenya: New World Bank project will support country efforts to better manage oil and ... Page 2 of 2

framework,” said Alexander Huurdeman, the World Bank Task Team Leader for the project. “We are
excited for its implementation and the potential to create sustainable impacts for Kenya, including the

development of a petroleum industry, improved transport infrastructure, expanded power supply, job

creation, and positive economic benefits from strategic investment of the revenues generated.

MEDIA CONTACTS

In Washington
Aby Toure

Tel : 202 473-8302
[email protected]

In Nairobi

Peter Warutere
Tel : +254-20-293-6444

[email protected]

PRESS RELEASE NO:

2015/045/AFR

© 2015 The World Bank Group, All Rights Reserved.

http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/07/24/kenya-new-wor…... 5/22/2015 Annex 122

John Gachiri, “National Oil,American firm finish survey of Lamu oil blocks”, Business Daily (2
Dec. 2014) Annex 122

MONEY MARKETS

National Oil, American firm finish survey of

Lamu oil blocks

Sumayya Hassan-Athmani, CEO National Oil Corporation of Kenya. Photo/FILE Nation Media Group

IN SUMMARY
The survey has been going on for three months.
The Energy ministry and National Oil also stand to recover some of the exploration costs by selling the data to other companies.

National Oil Corporation of Kenya and Schlumberger, a Houston-based firm, have finished carrying out seismic surveys on the Lamu offshore blocks
with a view to estimating how much oil and gas Kenya’s coastline may have.

The survey has been going on for three months.

National Oil chief executive Sumayya Hassan-Athmani said the data on blocks L21 to L28 will enable the Energy ministry and National Oil to draft
better contracts with potential explorers.

“The availability and interpretation of such data by Kenya broadens and deepens theding of the offshore potential, which is necessary
prior to negotiating an agreement with oil companies or operator,” said Ms Hassan-Athmani.

National Oil contracted Schlumberger in April and the decision was made to jointly do the seismic surveys to share costs in the risky venture.

“The benefit of such an approach is that the costs of the survey are shared between the companies involved. This has the effect of reducing the
exploration costs not only for companies but also for the government since such costs are recoverable if petroleum is discovered,” said Ms Hassan-
Athmani.

The Energy ministry and National Oil also stand to recover some of the exploration costs by selling the data to other companies.

Camac Energy, a US firm that is prospecting for oil on blocks L27 and L28, had earlier said it had acquired seismic data on the offshore blocks from
Schlumberger.

“Further, Camac Energy acquired 2D seismic covering offshore Blocks L27 and L28 in March 2014.ey results are currently being
processed by WesternGeco, a division of Schlumberger,” said the firm in September when it gave an update.

The data will then determine if additional work such as drilling will begin.

Camac has set aside Sh3 billion for drilling on its blocks, which also include L1B and L16unty.

While most of the exploration work has been on the onshore blocks, catalysed by Tullow Oil which has struck a series of successful wells on itsAnnex 122

northern Kenya blocks, there is growing interest in offshore blocks.

Tullow so far has drilled 11 wells out of which eight have been fruitful.

The UK firm plans to drill another eight by the end of 2015 but in the meantime it said that some locals will lose out on jobs as some of the
activities are coming to an end.

But other people will be hired in the new areas where it plans to explore.

The firm employs between 2,000 and 2,500 employees in any given month.

Back to Business Daily: National Oil, American firm finish survey of Lamu oil blocks Annex 123

IHS Inc., EDIN Database, Kenya: Contracts Block L24 (2015) Annex 123

IHS EDIN Database
Kenya: Contracts - Block L24

Contract Type Production Sharing Cont

Rights Type Exploration/Production
Award Date 02 October 2012

Expiry Date ?
ENI
Group Name
Operator Eni SpA
Name
Contract
Surface Exploration/Drilling
Status
Stage Numb 1 2
Start Date 2-Jul-2012 2-Oct-2012

End Date 2-Oct-2012
Contract Contract
Stage Events Signature Official Award
Contract
10025.38 10025.38
Sqkm
Pct Of
Original Area 100 100
Remaining

Onshore
Sqkm
Shelf Sqkm

Deep Water 10025.38 10025.38
Sqkm Annex 124

IHS Inc., EDIN Database, Kenya: Contracts Block L26 (2015) Annex 124

IHS EDIN Database
Kenya: Contracts - Block L26

Contract Type Production Sharing Cont

Rights Type Exploration/Production
Award Date October 2012

Expiry Date 28 January 2013
LAMU OG
Group Name
Operator Lamu Oil and Gas Ltd
Name
Contract Expired/
Surface Exploration/Drilling
Status Relinquished
Stage Numb 1 2 3
Start Date 5-Jul-2012 Oct-2012 28-Jan-2013

End Date Oct-2012 28-Jan-2013 28-Jan-2013
Contract Contract Official Relinquish-
Stage Events Signature Award ment

Contract 13063.92 13063.92 13063.92
Sqkm
Pct Of
Original Area 100 100 100

Remaining
Onshore
Sqkm
Shelf Sqkm

Deep Water 13063.92 13063.92 13063.92
Sqkm Annex 125

Elayne Wangalwa, “World Bank approves US$50 million for Kenya’s oil and gas sector”, CNBC
Africa (12 Feb. 2015) Annex 125

World Bank approves US$50million for

Kenya’s oil and gas sector

Elayne Wangalwa

Last Updated: 12 February 2015|16:10 GMT

The bank approved 50 million US dollars for the Kenyan government

to help the country with the distribution of its revenues to create a
sustainable growth across all areas of the nation’s economy.

“The government of Kenya acknowledges that the development of a

successful petroleum sector is never about petroleum alone, but also
about managing its impacts for sustainable development. The World
The World Bank has pledged to help Kenya
gas industry.s capacity to manageBank supports the government’s efforts to streamline the petroleum
sector to increase efficiency of decision-making related to policy

formation, planning, investments, and private sector participation,” Diarietou Gaye, the World Bank’s
Country Director for Kenya said.

This grant will see the East African country address challenges in the sector like uncertain regulatory

framework, corruption and poor physical infrastructure. The bank is seeking to boost efficient production,
manage the impacts, allocate higher government oil and gas revenues for development priorities, among

others.Annex 125

(READ MORE: Future of the oil & gas boom of East Africa)

Kenya's oil and gas discoveries have already registered an impressive record of a 60 per cent success

rate. Nine out of 15 were discovery wells. The government is shelving proposals to have local content
inclusions into the country’s energy and mining bill by coming up with a legislation on local content

before August 2015.

However, according to a recent report by, PwC on Africa Oil and Gas, delays in passing the Mining Bill,

and the resulting regulatory uncertainty, could see the country lose billions of shillings in lost investment.

Kenya's oil and gas industry is nascent, and the World Bank’s International Development Association,

which helps poor countries by giving zero-interest loans and grants, will assist the Kenya Petroleum
Technical Assistance Project (KEPTAP) focus on development measures to attract more private

investment in the country’s oil and gas sector.

(READ MORE: Kenya's oil and gas sector shows impressive performance )

Alexander Huurdeman, the World Bank Task Team Leader for the project said, “We are excited for its

implementation and the potential to create sustainable impacts for Kenya, including the development of
a petroleum industry, improved transport infrastructure, expanded power supply, job creation, and

positive economic benefits from strategic investment of the revenues generated.” Annex 126

“Anadarko to Drill Play-Opening Deepwater Well in Kenya”, Oil & News Kenya (3 Mar. 2015) Annex 126

I. ANADARKO TO DRILL PLAY-

OPENING DEEPWATER WELL IN KENYA
 March 3, 2015

 in Top News

Anadarko says it expects to drill its play-opening exploration deepwater well in Kenya in
2015 as part of nine to 12 deepwater exploration/appraisal wells planned for 2015 in
various licenses including Colombia and Gulf of Mexico.

Anadarko which operates offshore blocks L5, L7, L12, L11A and L11B will be drilling

any of the undrilled blocks having tasted of tough luck in the Kenyaʼs part of the Indian
Ocean.

Anadarko which operates the L7 Block with a 50-percent working interest has had an
unlucky run in offshore Kenya after it struck non-commercial oil shows at the Kubwa
well in early 2013.

The Kubwa well however confirmed a working hydrocarbon system within reservoir
quality sands.

Co-venturers in the L-07 Block included Total E&P Kenya B.V. (40 percent) and PTT

Exploration & Production Plc (10 percent).

“During 2015, we are confident in our ability to leverage our deep, high-quality portfolio
of opportunities, strong balance sheet and efficient capital allocation to preserve value
and maintain flexibility,” said Anadarko Chairman, President and CEO Al Walker.

The start of exploration in East Africa comes even as the company announced it was
reducing spending by about 33 percent this year in light of low crude oil prices with
plans to cut U.S. onshore rig activity by 40 percent and defer about 125 onshore well
completions in the Wattenberg field in Colorado, the Eagle Ford shale and Permian
Basin in Texas.

Other than acreage in Kenya in East Africa Anadarko also has interest in
Mozambique where it has discovered large volumes of natural gas and is continuing to
progress its LNG project. Annex 127

Tullow Oil plc, Kenya exploration and appraisal update (11 Mar. 2015) Annex 127

TLW 372.60GBp 6.40p (1.75MARKET CAP (£b) 3.40

FACEBOOK TWITTER LINKEDIN YOUTUBE GOOGLE+

Kenya exploration and appraisal update

Published on: 11 MARCH 2015

Tullow Oil plc (Tullow) provides an update on exploration and appraisal activities

in onshore Kenya Block 10BB, 13T and Block 10BA.

ENGOMO­1 EXPLORATION WELLAnnex 127

The Engomo­1 exploration well in Block 10BA was drilled to a total depth of 2,353

metres utilising the SMP­106 rig. The well encountered interbedded sandstones,
siltstones and claystones but no significant oil or gas shows were encountered

and the well has been plugged and abandoned. Engomo­1 was the first well
drilled in the large North Turkana Basin and is located west of Lake Turkana

where numerous naturally occurring oil slicks and seeps have been observed.
Analysis is being focused on high­grading the remaining prospectivity in the

basin. The SMP­106 rig will now be demobilized.

SOUTH LOKICHAR BASIN APPRAISALACTIVITY

Tullow is continuing its extensive exploration and appraisal programme in the
South Lokichar Basin in Blocks 10BB and 13T, which has the joint objectives of

proving reservoir qualiy and defining the resource estimates to ultimately
progress the development of the discovered resources.

The SMP­5 rig recently installed well completions in Amosing­1 and Amosing­2A
in preparation for an Extended Well Test (“EWT”) of the field and the rig has now

been released. The EWT involves test production and injection to provide

dynamic flow characterisation of the Amosing stacked oil reservoi rs. Both wells
have been completed in five zones with hydraulically controlled selective

completions that permit independent tests of selected intervals without well
intervention. Initial rig­less clean­up testing has been concluded on both wells

with excellent results. The Amosing­1 well flowed at a combined maximum rate of
5,600 bopd from five zones and the Amosing­2A well flowed at a combined

maximum rate of 6,000 bopd from four zones, the fifth zone being in the aquifer.
Both wells demonstrated high quality reservoir sands and flowed 31 to 38o API

dry oil under natural flow. Pressure data during the initial clean­up flows shows

connectivity between the two completed wells in the upper three zones with
further production testing required to test connectivity in the lower two zones.

These findings support the static pressure data which indicated connectivity
between the Amosing­1, 2, 2A and 3 wells in multiple zones. The Amosing EWT

forward programme is to conduct longer­term oil flow and water injection tests,
commencing mid­March with results expected in the second quarter of this year. Annex 127

The PR Marriott 46 rig recently drilled the Ngamia­7 appraisal well to a final depth

of 2,914 metres. The well was drilled to test the Ngamia oil field’s eastern flank
and was located 1,800 metres north­east of Ngamia­1 and 1,300 metres east of

Ngamia­3. The well encountered up to 132 metres of net oil pay and has
expanded the proven extent of the field. The well has now been suspended for

future use. Static pressure data from the Ngamia­1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 wells supports
connectivity between the wells at multiple reservoir horizons which will be tested

with the planned Ngamia EWT.

Planning is also under way to conduct an EWT of the Ngamia field. The PR

Marriott 46 rig, which is currently drilling the Amosing­4 well with a result expected

in April, will mobilize back to the Ngamia field to drill and coete the Ngamia­8
well which will be the main producer for the EWT. Additionally, two of the existing

suspended Ngamia wells will be completed as EWT wells. Initial flow testing of
the Ngamia EWT wells is expected to commence around mid­year.

The Weatherford 804 rig is currently drilling the Ekales­2 appraisal well to test an
eastern fault block on the structure and also test a deeper exploration obj ective

within the Lokhone shale source rock that has tested oil elsewhere in the basin.
The well is currently at a depth of 2,817 meters and has drilled through the

primary objective and encountered 50 to 70 metres of potential net oil pay. Final
results from the well should be available in April. Following completion of this well,

the Weatherford 804 rig will be released.

Finally, the 3D seismic surve y data set over along the western basin bounding

fault discoveries has been processed and is being interpreted. These data
already indicate significantly improved structural and stratigraphic definition and

additional prospectivity not evident on the 2D seismic.

Tullow Operates Blocks 10BB, 13T and 10BA with 50% equity and is partnered

by Africa Oil Corporation, also with 50%.

COMMENTING TODAY, ANGUS MCCOSS, EXPLORATION DIRECTOR, SAID:Annex 127

“Whilst we would have hoped for basin opening success in the North Turkana
Basin’s first wildcat well, Engomo­1, we still have a vast amount of undrilled

acreage with identified prospects and leads providing significant remaining

exploration potential.

“There is further good news from our appraisal programme in Northern Kenya

where the Ngamia­7 well has successfully tested and extended the eastern flan k

area of the oil field. This result, and the promising initial flows from the Amosing
oil field extended well test, give us further confidence in the size and scale of our

two cornerstone fields for the development of the South Lokichar Basin. The

results to date from Ekales­2 are also very encouraging and we are very pleased
with the results from the 3D seismic survey which reveals there is important

additional prospectivity in this exciting new oil province.”

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

TULLOW OIL PLC
PHONE: +44 20 3249 9000

Chris Perry
Investor Relations

James Arnold

Investor Relations

George Cazenove
Media Relations

LONDON Annex 127

CITIGATE DEWE ROGERSON

PHONE: +44 20 7638 9571

Martin Jackson

Shabnam Bashir

LONDON

MURRAY CONSULTANTS

PHONE: +353 1 498 0300

Pat Walsh

Joe Heron

DUBLIN

NOTES TO EDITORS

Tullow is a leading independent oil & gas, exploration and production group,

quoted on the London, Irish and Ghanaian stock exchanges (symbol: TLW). The

Group has interests in over 130 exploration and production licences across 22
countries which are managed as three regional business units: West & North

Africa, South & East Africa and Europe, South America and Asia. Annex 128

African Development Bank, Information Centre for the Extractives Sector (ICES), “Oil & Gas”,
available at http://ices.or.ke/sectors/oil-gas/ (last accessed 22 May 2015) Annex 128

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Oil & Gas

Of all the elements of the extractives industry in Kenya, oil is the most significant in terms ofthesizeandvalueof

deposits, and therefore its ability to contribute to Kenya’s growth and development.

1. State of the Sector

Exploration for oil and gas in Kenya began in the 1950s, with the first well drilled in 1960. Shell andKenol drilled ten

wells in the Lamu basin but didn’t find oil in commercially viable quantities. Subsequently, exploration continued at a low
level, with only 33 wells drilled by 2012, none of which indicated commercially attractive quantities of oil or gas.

However, interest in Kenya increased after the discovery of large deposits of oil and gas in Mozambique, Uganda and
Tanzania. In 2012, Tullow Oil, in partnership with Africa Oil and Marathon Oil began drilling in Turkana (in the Tertiary

Rift Basin), and announced a discovery of an estimated 300 million barrels of oil. After drilling further exploration wells,
Tullow announced in early 2014 that it had now identified c600 million barrels of oil.

As of September 2014, Ngamia area was reported to have the largest potential of 660 million barrels, followed by
Amosing with 231, Agete well with 163 while Twiga has 142.

It is anticipated that reserves in the Tertiary Rift Basin will continue to rise after further exploration in the region has
taken place – the Tertiary basin has 7 sub-basins (Lake Turkana, Lokichar, Lokitipi, Kerio South,Suguta Valley, Nyanza

Trough and Magadi Trough. Exploration in the Mandera region is likely to result in further dramatic increases in the oil

reserves. Africa Oil estimates that Lokichar and Mandera basins have a total of 2.9billion barrelsof oilas of September
2014.

With oil currently priced at around $100 per barrel, Kenya’s oil wealth is at present an estimated $290 billion.

It is not yet clear whether exploration in the Lamu basin (on and offshore) willresult in significant gas finds, as in the

case of Mozambique. However, the general trend is that from being a shadow on the global oil map, East Africa has in the
past few years emerged as one of the hottest new regions, with Kenya destined to take its place among neighbouring

countries.Annex 128

2. Governance of the Sector
The legal framework for oil and gas in Kenya is currently the Petroleum (Exploration and Production)Act(1986).

However, a draft Energy Policy and draft Energy Bill have been prepared and will replace the existing framework in due
course.

The Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MOEP) oversees both upstream oil and gas, downstream petroleum, electric power
(including renewable energy and geothermal), as well as the coal sector. Coal and natural gas are a major part of MOEP’s

plans to increase power generation from the current 1,660MW to 5,000MW by 2016.

In addition, there are two inter-ministerial bodies that oversee the oil and gas sector. The “Inter-Ministerial Committee on

the Policy and Legal Framework for Geology, Mining and Minerals” has the Ministry of Finance as its lead agency.

The National Fossil Fuels Advisory Committee (NAFFAC) is the licensing review body for oil and gas in Kenya. NAFFAC is

led by the MOEP and includes NOCK, the Attorney General, NEMA, the Kenya Revenue Authority, the Ministry of Finance
and the Petroleum Institute of East Africa (PIEA) as members.

3. Main Actors in the Sector

Tullow Oil is the most significant international oil company operating in Kenya in terms of acreageandmarket
capitalization. Tullow holds the largest market value among Kenya’s small oil players, at around $9.5 billion, followed by

the two Canadian companies Africa Oil, with $2.5 billion, and Taipan Resources, with $23 million. Other companies
involved in Kenya’s upstream oil and gas sector at the moment areFAR, Afren, Marathon Oil, Total, Anadarko and PTTEP.

The National Oil Corporation of Kenya (NOCK) is the state-owned national oil company, which sits underMinistryof
Energy. NOCK has historically focused on the downstream retail sector, but has a strategic focus on developing its mid

and upstream reach. NOCK has had an exploration licence (Block 14T) since 2010.

The Petroleum Institute of East Africa (PIEA) was formed in 1999 and has until recently been the main professional body Annex 128

for the oil industry in the region. PIEA includes the School of Petroleum Studies under its banner.

More recently, the Kenya Oil and Gas Association (KOGA) has been set up to focus on supporting private sector interests
specifically in the upstream sector.

In terms of civil society, themmunity Action for Nature Conservation (CANCO) has been involved in and pioneered oil

and gas community, stakeholder engagement and advocacy since 2009. The Kenya Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas
has also recently been formed to support awareness and advocacy among civil society organisationsandcommunity

groups in oil-affected regions.

4. Prospects and Issues

Tullow estimates that its production in Turkana could start as early as 2016, with the crude trucked by road andrail,

though others, including the IMF, predict that more time will be needed. Flows through a planned pipeline to the coast (at
Lamu) could begin by 2019. This means that revenue from the sector accruing to government could commence within the

next two years.

There are a variety of issues and concerns that the rapid development of the oil sector in Kenya raises, such as:

Local content: How can local companies benefit from supporting the sector, ensuring that “extractives enclaves” are
avoided?

Community development: How can some of the finite revenues from oil and gas be used to stimulate sustainable

development?
Conflict prevention: How does Kenya avoid oil production leading to conflict, as has happened elsewhere?

Environmental safeguarding: How best can Kenya avoid pollution through oil spills, pipeline damage andgas
flaring?

Corruption: What measures can be put in place to ensure that revenues from oil are used effectively and efficiently

for the benefit of all Kenya citizens, and therefore to avoid corruption and mismanagement

FIND OUT MORE ABOUT
MINING

Contact Us:
Information Centre for the Extractives Sector
African Development Bank

Khushee Tower, Longonot Road, Upper Hill
P.O. Box 4861-00200, Nairobi, Kenya

Tel: +254 20 299 8301/ 271 2925/6/8
E-mail: info{@}ices.or.ke

Subscribe :

News Round-up

A summary of top national and regional extractive industry news (with links) sent to your Annex 129

Petroleum Geo-Services, “Kenya-Lamu Basin PGS MultiClient2D”, available at http://www.
pgs.com/pageFolders/241891/kenya_lamu_mc2d_a3ds_0412_std.pdf (last accessed 8 June 2015) Annex 129

Kenya-Lamu Basin PGS MultiClient 2D Kenya-Lamu Basin

Harrier Explorer - Acquisition Parameters Offshore Lamu Basin: New insights on deepwater hydrocarbon

prospectivity from the 2008 2D seismic data
2D Acquisition 2D Processing Parameters
Acquisition Mode: Single source, single streamer Reformat: SEGD to PGS internal format.
Trace / Shot Edit: Bad traces and shots zeroed.
Energy Source Resample: To 4ms, incorporating anti-

Shot Interval: 37.5 m alias filter.
SourceType: Bolt 1900 LLXT Low Cut Filter: 2.3 - 4.6Hz
Air Pressure: 2000 psi High Cut Filter 100 – 125Hz
Volume: 3090 cuin Designature: To Zero Phase, incorporating

Strings per Array: 3 debubble.
String Separation: 12.5 m System Delay: -58ms
Source Depth: 6 m Navigation/Seismic Merge:
2D Geometry: Apply 2D geometry.

Streamer Despike
Streamer Length: 8100 m Swell Noise Attenuation: Using SWOOP
Streamer Depth: 8 m Swell Noise Attenuation: Low frequency noise
No. of Groups: 648
modelled in FK domain and
Group Interval: 12.5 m subtracted from data.
Group Length: 12.5 m Linear Noise Attenuation: Data modelled inTau-p
domain and subtracted from

Data Recording data.
Record Length: 12000 ms SRME: Surface Related Multiple
Sampling Rate: 2 ms Elimination.
Low-cut Filter: 4.6 Hz / 6 dB per octave Velocity Analysis: Every 1km

Hi-cut Filter: 206 Hz / 276 dB per octave Radon Demultiple: Application from Water
Format: SEGD 8048 Bottom x 2
MDA: Multiple Diffraction
Navigation Attenuation.

Positioning System: Veripos PSTM: Kirchoff Pre-Stack Time
Migration Including 6th
order NMO.
Velocity Analysis: Every 1km.

Radon Demultiple: Application from Water
Bottom x 2
RMO Analysis: Automatic Residual Moveout
analysis.

Mutes: Inner and outer trace mutes.
Gain: Residual gain.
TVF: Band pass filter.

PGS in association with the National Oil Corporation of Kenya have completed

the acquisition of 3,400 km of non-exclusive 2D data in the Lamu Basin,
offshore Kenya.

This dataset is the first major survey in the deepwater area of the basin and

provides high quality modern imaging in an unexplored region.

It covers an area of around 27,000 sq.km in water depths up to 3,200m and

was designed to highlight the untested prospectivity of this area.

10/04/12

Petroleum Geo-ServiPetroleum Geo-Services
Chris Drage Yasmin D’Este A Clearer Image
Tel: +44 1932 37637Tel: +44 1932 376365
[email protected]@pgs.com www.pgs.com Annex 129

Kenya-Lamu Basin PGS MultiClient 2D Kenya-Lamu Basin

Harrier Explorer - Acquisition Parameters Offshore Lamu Basin: New insights on deepwater hydrocarbon

prospectivity from the 2008 2D seismic data
2D Acquisition 2D Processing Parameters
Acquisition Mode: Single source, single streamer Reformat: SEGD to PGS internal format.
Trace / Shot Edit: Bad traces and shots zeroed.
Energy Source Resample: To 4ms, incorporating anti-

Shot Interval: 37.5 m alias filter.
SourceType: Bolt 1900 LLXT Low Cut Filter: 2.3 - 4.6Hz
Air Pressure: 2000 psi High Cut Filter 100 – 125Hz
Volume: 3090 cuin Designature: To Zero Phase, incorporating

Strings per Array: 3 debubble.
String Separation: 12.5 m System Delay: -58ms
Source Depth: 6 m Navigation/Seismic Merge:
2D Geometry: Apply 2D geometry.

Streamer Despike
Streamer Length: 8100 m Swell Noise Attenuation: Using SWOOP
Streamer Depth: 8 m Swell Noise Attenuation: Low frequency noise
No. of Groups: 648
modelled in FK domain and
Group Interval: 12.5 m subtracted from data.
Group Length: 12.5 m Linear Noise Attenuation: Data modelled inTau-p
domain and subtracted from

Data Recording data.
Record Length: 12000 ms SRME: Surface Related Multiple
Sampling Rate: 2 ms Elimination.
Low-cut Filter: 4.6 Hz / 6 dB per octave Velocity Analysis: Every 1km

Hi-cut Filter: 206 Hz / 276 dB per octave Radon Demultiple: Application from Water
Format: SEGD 8048 Bottom x 2
MDA: Multiple Diffraction
Navigation Attenuation.

Positioning System: Veripos PSTM: Kirchoff Pre-Stack Time
Migration Including 6th
order NMO.
Velocity Analysis: Every 1km.

Radon Demultiple: Application from Water
Bottom x 2
RMO Analysis: Automatic Residual Moveout
analysis.

Mutes: Inner and outer trace mutes.
Gain: Residual gain.
TVF: Band pass filter.

PGS in association with the National Oil Corporation of Kenya have completed

the acquisition of 3,400 km of non-exclusive 2D data in the Lamu Basin,
offshore Kenya.

This dataset is the first major survey in the deepwater area of the basin and

provides high quality modern imaging in an unexplored region.

It covers an area of around 27,000 sq.km in water depths up to 3,200m and

was designed to highlight the untested prospectivity of this area.

10/04/12

Petroleum Geo-ServiPetroleum Geo-Services
Chris Drage Yasmin D’Este A Clearer Image
Tel: +44 1932 37637Tel: +44 1932 376365
[email protected]@pgs.com www.pgs.com Annex 129

Kenya-Lamu Basin - PGS MultiClient 2D

Hydrocarbon Potential
The Lamu Basin represents part of an obliquely rifted passive margin and as such contains numerous extensional Pomboo-1 has proven the existence of Upper Cretaceous turbidite sands and high amplitude channel events can
heel structures on the shelf and a related, gravity-driven, compressional toe thrust zone in the deepwater. Evidence also be seen throughout this deepwater survey area.There are a number of trapping geometries evident at several

of the oblique nature of the rifting is shown by reactivation of the extensional faults as transpressional flower levels on the deepwater lines, which remain to be tested.These include both tilted fault blocks, and compressional-
structures which have a present day expression at the sea floor. A number of potential structural and stratigraphic related structures, along with stratigraphic plays in deepwater channels. Structures are sealed by shales, which
plays have been identified in the deepwater areas where all play elements are expected to be present. biostratigraphic analyses show to be a deepwater facies.

Onlap of bright sand-prone packages: Lower Cretaceous

Drape anticlines

Chronostratigraphic

chart deepwater Lamu
Basin showing

Pomboo-1 well

Bright potentially sand facies onlapping syn-rift/trangressional
syn-rift highs Annex 129

Kenya-Lamu Basin - PGS MultiClient 2D

Hydrocarbon Potential
The Lamu Basin represents part of an obliquely rifted passive margin and as such contains numerous extensional Pomboo-1 has proven the existence of Upper Cretaceous turbidite sands and high amplitude channel events can
heel structures on the shelf and a related, gravity-driven, compressional toe thrust zone in the deepwater. Evidence also be seen throughout this deepwater survey area.There are a number of trapping geometries evident at several

of the oblique nature of the rifting is shown by reactivation of the extensional faults as transpressional flower levels on the deepwater lines, which remain to be tested.These include both tilted fault blocks, and compressional-
structures which have a present day expression at the sea floor. A number of potential structural and stratigraphic related structures, along with stratigraphic plays in deepwater channels. Structures are sealed by shales, which
plays have been identified in the deepwater areas where all play elements are expected to be present. biostratigraphic analyses show to be a deepwater facies.

Onlap of bright sand-prone packages: Lower Cretaceous

Drape anticlines

Chronostratigraphic

chart deepwater Lamu
Basin showing

Pomboo-1 well

Bright potentially sand facies onlapping syn-rift/trangressional
syn-rift highs Annex 130

Schlumberger, “Multiclient Latest Projects: Kenya Deepwater 2D 2013 Multiclient Seismic
Survey”, available at http://www.multiclient.slb.com/en/latest-projects/africa/kenya_2d.aspx
(last accessed 9 June 2015) Annex 130

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While major discoveries have been made along the East African margin in
Africa Seismic Surveys recent years, the Lamu basin of Kenya remains underexplored. Covering both

onshore and offshore, the Lamu basin forms part of the Kenyan passive
Kenya Deepwater 2D 2013 continental margin.
Multiclient Seismic Survey
Over the past few years, Schlumberger has developed several large acquisition

Tanzania Reprocessed 2D and reprocessing projects in East Africa, including the introduction of 2D
Seismic Surveys multiclient ObliQ sliding-notch broadband acquisition and imaging technique in

2013.
Mozambique Seismic Survey
In Kenya, the ObliQ technique is bringing a new understanding of the deepwater

Angola Kwanza Basin Seismic offshore Lamu basin, imaging complex geological features and opening new
avenues for exploration. More than 9,000 km of high-res 2D
Survey multiclient seismic from Kenyaʼs
Deepwater Lamu basin.

Available Now 1 of 3

Petrel E&P software platform and SEG-Y deliverables available now.

First insights into deepwater offshore geology with data covering open

blocks L25, L26, L29, and L30. United Kingdom: +44 1293 55 6533

Benefits Seismic Acquisition
The benefits of broadband seismic technology can be seen in the clarification of

impedance contrasts within the data, enabling easier differentiation of
sedimentary packages that is vital in a previously unexplored and largely
undrilled area. The additional low frequencies give the signal an envelope that

enables lithological variations to be more easily distinguished and improves thervey Design & Modeling
correlation of horizons across faults. The improved low-frequency content also

enables good imaging of deeper potential reservoirs.

Based on its study of the available data, Schlumberger and its partner, National
Geophysical Processing &
Oil Corporation of Kenya (NOCK), are building a solid understanding of the basCharacterization
and producing a new generation of fit-for-purpose products.

This 2D multiclient seismic survey covers the deepwater blocks offshore Kenya
and provides new insights into the prospectivity of the Lamu basin. The data will
be available for the upcoming licensing round.

Key facts

Over 9,000 km of 2D broadband data acquired using the ObliQ technique,

completed in March 2014.

Tilted transverse isotropy (TTI) Kirchhoff prestack time migration (PSTM),
completed in July 2014

Key highlights

2D surface multiple prediction

2D anisotropic TTI Kirchhoff prestack time migration

Spatially continuous velocity analysis
Angle stacks and inversion-ready gathers

Available initial geology report based on vintage data interpretation

Improved resolution of complex geological features like channels, tilted blocks,
and basin floor fans

Related services and products

Marine Seismic Acquisition Annex 131

Schlumberger, “Kenya Multiclient Seismic Surveys: 2D offshore data”, available at http://www.
multiclient.slb.com/africa/east-africa/kenya.aspx (last accessed 9 June 2015) Annex 131

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You are here: Multiclient Seismic Data Library > Africa > East Africa > Kenya Multiclient Seismic Surveys

Kenya Multiclient Seismic Surveys
Multiclient Data Library
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2D offshore data

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Africa

East Africa

Kenya

Mozambique

Somalia

Tanzania

United Kingdom: +44 1293 55 6533

Our multiclient data library in Kenya contains over 10,000 km of 2D seismic data.
We have extensive knowledge in this area having acquired the first multiclient

seismic survey in Kenya in 1975, along with processing seismic data foSeismic Acquisition
region in-house.

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Survey Design & Modeling

Geophysical Processing &
Characterization

© 2014 Schlumberger Limited. All rights reserved. | Privacy | Terms | Sitemap | Contact Annex 132

Schlumberger, “Kenya Multiclient Seismic Surveys Map”, available at http://www.multiclient.
slb.com/africa/east-africa/kenya.aspx (last accessed 9 June 2015) Annex 132

Multiclient

Kenya

East Africa

L-1B

L-3 JORRE
L-2

L-13
L-21
L-14 L-4

Kenya L-5

L-23

L-22
L-20 L-6 L-15 L-7

L-24

L-16 L-8 L-12 L-25

L-19 L-26
L-17
L-9 L-11A L-27

L-10A

L-28
-11-14 L-11B
L-18 L-10B

BLOCK 12

TANGA
BLOCK 11
© 2014 Schlumberger. MCMS 21

For more information on this or any multiclient data please
call: +44 1293 55 6533 email: [email protected] web: www.multiclient.slb.com Annex 133

IHS Inc., EDIN Database, Kenya: Contracts Block L-05/Block L05 (2015) Annex 133

10 75
8648

9 75

New Interests New Interests

WOODSIDE 3
8 75
12367411.5 12367411.5 12367411.5
Name Chg
Co Status &

7 75

Woodside Energy (Kenya) Pty Ltdterests-2006 28-Sep-2006 13-Mar-2007

6 75
00-May-
ReReduction

9-O11-Jul-08

Explorat/Production1 Surface Exploration 100
Production Sharing Cont Interests
Change of
Operator~ New
IHS EDIN Database

4
100
CoAcquisition
Kenya: Contracts - Block L-05/Block L05

DANA 1

3 r-2001 22-Nov-2002 9-May-2003 9-Oct-2004 00-May-2005 20-Jul-2005 24-Aug-2006
100
Change ofrests
Dana Petroleum (E&22-Nov-2002 9-May-2003 9-Oct-2004
Operator~ New

2

Official Award
Ltd

STAR PT

11571 100 11571 107429 111571 7429 111571 7429 111571 7429 18648
CoSignature
Star Petroleum Int'l (Kenya)

Name Status Sqkm Area Sqkm Sqkm
Award DateDateratorntract Start Dateten11-Jul-200000RemaininShelf Sqkm 2603 2603 2603
Contract TypepGroup Name Stage Numb Stage EvePct Of Original Deep WaterAnnex 133

8
Renewal

7 Co
Chge
Shareholding

6 Co
Chge

Shareholding

5

RenReduction
?
Anadarko Kenya Co
30-Jun-09
ANADARKO 1
Surf Expl/ Drilling

3 100 100 26.86 26.86 26.86
Explorat/Production
Production Sharing Cont

IHS EDIN Database

2 100

Kenya: Contracts - Block L-05/Block L05 Official Award New Interests New Interests

1236.5 1236.5 1236.5
Corp 1 100
Contract
AnaPetroleum Signature

12 75
Expired/ Contract
Expiry of
Relinquished

9-Oc11-Jul-08 Pty Ltd
WOODSIDE 3
11 75
Surface 8648 86412367.411.587312367.411.5735 7498.58735 7498.5
Woodside Exploration11-Jul-2008Ext11-Jul-2008 30-Jun-2009 13-Oct-2010 6-Oct-2011 30-Jun-2012
13-Mar-2007 11-Jul-2008 00-Apr-2009 30-Jun-2009 13-Oct-2010 6-Oct-2011

Name Status Sqkm Area Sqkm Sqkm
Award Date Dateatorontract Start DatetetracContract RemaininShelf Sqkm
Contract TypeGroup Name Stage Numb Stage EvePct Of Original Deep Water Annex 134

IHS Inc., EDIN Database, Kenya: Contracts Block L-13 (2015) Annex 134

?
74.97

100
Renewal Area Change

100
CoAcquisition
ZARARA OG 2
Zarara Oil & Gas Ltd

?
2007 100
Granted
IHS EDIN Database Valid Exten

Exploration/Production
Kenya: Contracts - Block L-13 Surface Exploration/Drilling

100

Change ofr~
New Interests

100

Official Award

SOHI DODR
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
SOHI Gas-Dodori Ltd 100 43.16 43.16 43.16
CoSignature

Date NaContracts Events Area Sqkm
Rights Typerd DGroup NameDec-Stage NumbDec-2008-Sep3-Dec-2008ininS3-Deep Waterul3-Dec-2008-Dec-3-Dec-2008 May 2012
Contract Type ContractContract Sqkmnsho2905.66 12905.66 12905.66 Annex 135

IHS Inc., EDIN Database, Kenya: Contracts Block L21 (2015) Annex 135

IHS EDIN Database
Kenya: Contracts - Block L21

Contract Type Prod Sharing Cont
Rights Type Explorat/Production

Award Date 02 October 2012
Expiry Date ?

Group Name ENI
Operator
Name Eni SpA

Contract Surf Expl/Drilling
Status
Stage Numb 1 2

Start Date 2-Jul-2012 2-Oct-2012

End Date 2-Oct-2012
Contract Contract Official
Stage Events Signature Award
Contract
15303.21 15303.21
Sqkm
Pct Of
Original Area 100 100

Remaining
Onshore
Sqkm
Shelf Sqkm

Deep Water 15303.21 15303.21
Sqkm Annex 136

IHS Inc., EDIN Database, Kenya: Contracts Block L23 (2015) Annex 136

IHS EDIN Database
Kenya: Contracts - Block L23

Contract Type Production Sharing Cont
Exploration/Production
Rights Type
Award Date 2-Oct-12
Expiry Date ?
Group Name ENI
Operator
Eni SpA
Name
Contract
Status Surface Exploration/Drilling
Stage Numb 1 2

Start Date 2-Jul-2012 2-Oct-2012
End Date 2-Oct-2012
Contract Stage Contract Official
Events Signature Award

Contract Sqkm 10305.73 10305.73

Pct Of Original
Area 100 100

Remaining
Onshore Sqkm

Shelf Sqkm
Deep Water
10305.73 10305.73
Sqkm

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Volume IV

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