Written Observations of Nicaragua on the admissibility of Colombia's Counter-Claims

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE DISPUTE CONCERNING ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND MARITIME SPACES IN THE CARIBBEAN SEA (NICARAGUA V. COLOMBIA) WRITTEN OBSERVATIONS OF NICARAGUA ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF COLOMBIA’S COUNTER-CLAIMS 20 APRIL 2017 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE DISPUTE CONCERNING ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND MARITIME SPACES IN THE CARIBBEAN SEA (NICARAGUA V. COLOMBIA) WRITTEN OBSERVATIONS OF NICARAGUA ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF COLOMBIA’S COUNTER-CLAIMS 20 APRIL 2017 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION......................................................................................1 PART I COLOMBIA’S COUNTER-CLAIMS DO NOT COME WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT...............................7 A. THE PACT OF BOGOTÁ CEASED TO BE IN FORCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES THREE YEARS BEFORE COLOMBIA SUBMITTED ITS COUNTER-CLAIMS................... 7 B. COLOMBIA HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF DISPUTES WITH NICARAGUA ON THE SUBJECT MATTER OF ITS COUNTER-CLAIMS............. 21 C. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE MATTERS COLOMBIA PRESENTS COULD NOT, IN THE OPINION OF THE PARTIES, BE SETTLED BY NEGOTIATIONS............................................................................ 24 PART II COLOMBIA’S COUNTER-CLAIMS ARE NOT DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH THE SUBJECT MATTER OF NICARAGUA’S CLAIM........................................................................29 A. COLOMBIA’S FIRST AND SECOND COUNTERCLAIMS ARE NOT DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH NICARAGUA’S CLAIM................................................................ 36 B. COLOMBIA’S THIRD COUNTER-CLAIM IS ALSO NOT DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH NICARAGUA’S CLAIM............................................................................................. 42 C. COLOMBIA’S FOURTH COUNTER-CLAIM IS NO MORE DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH NICARAGUA’S CLAIM THAN ANY OF ITS OTHERS............. 45 PART III CONCLUSION........................................................................................53 SUBMISSIONS........................................................................................57 CERTIFICATION...................................................................................59 LIST OF ANNEXES................................................................................63 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1. Pursuant to the Court’s decision communicated in its 17 January 2017 letter to the Parties, Nicaragua respectfully submits these Observations showing that Colombia’s counter-claims are inadmissible.1 1.2. Colombia’s counter-claims are set out at pages 233–349 of its Counter-Memorial. Colombia identifies four counter-claims. In summary, they concern: (1) “Nicaragua’s violation of its duty of due diligence to protect and preserve the marine environment of the Southwestern Caribbean Sea”;2 (2) “Nicaragua’s violation of its duty of due diligence to protect the right of the inhabitants of the San Andrés Archipelago, in particular the Raizales, to benefit from a healthy, sound and sustainable environment”;3 1 Nicaragua notes that it uses the term “admissibility” here in its broad sense. As Colombia itself observed in presenting its counter-claims: “‘[A]dmissibility in this context must be understood broadly to encompass both the jurisdictional requirement and the direct-connection requirement…’.” Counter-Memorial of the Republic of Colombia (“CMC”), para. 7.7 (quoting Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), Counter-Claims, Order of 6 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, pp. 315-16, para. 14). 2 Ibid., para 8.2. 3 Ibid. 2(3)“Nicaragua’s infringements of the artisanal fishing right to access and exploit the traditional banks”;4and(4)“Nicaragua’s straight baselines decree, which is contrary to international law, violates Colombia’s sovereign rights and maritime spaces.”51.3.Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court provides:“The Court may entertain a counter-claim only if it comes within the jurisdiction of the Court and is directly connected with the subject-matter of the claim of the other party”.1.4.The Rule is clear that “two requirements must be met for the Court to be able to entertain a counter-claimat the same time as the principal claim, namely, that the counter-claim‘comes within the jurisdiction of the Court’ and, that it ‘is directly connected with the subjectmatter of the claim of the other party.’”6These two requirements are, 4Ibid., ch. 9.5Ibid., ch. 10.6Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 208, para. 20.3moreover, 3 moreover, “cumulative; each requirement must be satisfied for a counterclaim to be found admissible.”7 1.5. Colombia’s counter-claims do not meet either requirement. 1.6. They do not “come within the jurisdiction of the Court” for three different reasons: • The Court’s jurisprudence makes clear that a counter-claim constitutes an autonomous legal act the object of which is to submit a new claim to the Court. The critical date for determining jurisdiction over a counter-claim must therefore be the date on which it is presented to the Court. Yet here, the nominal title of jurisdiction, the Pact of Bogotá, ceased to be in force between the Parties nearly three years before Colombia submitted its counter-claims; • Colombia has not established the existence of a dispute with Nicaragua with respect to its first, second and third counter-claims; and 7 Ibid., p. 210, para. 27. Even if the counter-claim meets these two requirements, the use of “may entertain” rather than “shall entertain” in Article 80(1) of the Rules of Court makes clear that acceptance of the counter-claim as a part of the case is wholly within the discretion of the Court; it still remains open for the Court to decline to address the counter-claim within the proceedings. 4•Colombia has not shownthat any of the mattersitsubmitscould not, in the opinion of the Parties,be settled by negotiations, as Article II of the Pact of Bogotá requires.Indeed, the evidence is to the contrary.1.7.None of Colombia’s four counter-claims is“directly connected”in fact or law with the subject matter of Nicaragua’s main claim because:•The facts on which Nicaragua relies concern Colombia’s illegal exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction in areas adjudged to appertain to Nicaragua;•Nicaragua bases its legal claim on the Court’s 2012 Judgment and the rules of customary international law recognizing the exclusive sovereign rights and jurisdiction of a coastal State within its maritime areas, as reflected in Parts V and VI ofthe 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”);•Colombia’s first two counter-claimsrelate to Nicaragua’s purported violations of its obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment; 5 o The alleged acts on which Colombia purports to rely, which concern Nicaragua’s nominal failure to fulfill its duty of due diligence within its own maritime areas, are of a different nature from Nicaragua’s claims; o By seeking to establish Nicaragua’s international responsibility under the rules of customary international law related to the preservation and protection of the environment, as reflected in Part XII of UNCLOS, as well as various provisions of the CITES Convention, the Cartagena Convention, and the FAO Code of Conduct on Sustainable Fishing, Colombia is pursuing a different legal aim from that of Nicaragua; • Colombia’s third counter-claim concerns Nicaragua’s ostensible refusal to respect the traditional fishing rights of Colombian residents of the San Andrés archipelago. o The facts on which Colombia relies concern individual harms allegedly suffered by Colombian fishermen as a result of Nicaragua’s enforcement of its sovereign rights and jurisdiction within its own maritime areas, and are therefore of a fundamentally different nature from the facts on which Nicaragua relies; 6oBy acting as parens patriaeto vindicate the alleged non-exclusivetraditionalfishing rights ofits citizensin areas thatappertain to Nicaragua, Colombia is pursuing a different legal aim from that pursued by Nicaragua;•Colombia’s fourth counter-claimalleges that Nicaragua’s 2013 straight baselines violate international law;oThe facts relied upon by Colombia, which concern solely the extentof Nicaragua’s territorial seaare of a different nature fromthose relied upon by Nicaragua, which concern Colombia’s challenge to the existence of Nicaragua’s rights in areas of EEZ8already adjudged to appertain to it;andoThe Parties are also pursuing different legal aims because Colombia’sclaims are based on the rules ofcustomary international law on straight baselines rules,whichare wholly irrelevant to Nicaragua’s main claim.1.8.For each of these reasons, and for all of them, Colombia’s counter-claims areinadmissible.8Nicaragua’s 200 nautical mile (“nm”) limit is the same whether measured from normal baselines or its declared straight baselines. See infra, para. 3.49 and Figure 1.7PART 7 PART I COLOMBIA’S COUNTER-CLAIMS DO NOT COME WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A. THE PACT OF BOGOTÁ CEASED TO BE IN FORCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES THREE YEARS BEFORE COLOMBIA SUBMITTED ITS COUNTER-CLAIMS 2.1. The first requirement for a counter-claim to be admissible under Article 80, paragraph 1, is that it “comes within the jurisdiction of the Court”. 2.2. Colombia argues this requirement is met because the Pact of Bogotá “was still in force, and expressed the consent of the Parties to jurisdiction of the Court, on 26 November 2013, the date when Nicaragua lodged its Application instituting the present proceedings.”9 Colombia is mistaken: the critical date for determining jurisdiction over its counterclaims is the date on which those claims were submitted, not the date of Nicaragua’s Application. And because the Pact of Bogotá ceased to be in force between the Parties nearly three years before Colombia submitted its counter-claims, they do not come with the jurisdiction of the Court. 9 CMC, para. 7.14. 82.3.In the versionsof theArticle prior to the 2001amendment,the jurisdictionalrequirementwasplaced after the direct connection requirement.Inthe current formulation,theorder isreversed. 2.4.Thereversal emphasizesthesignificance of the jurisdictional requirement. A former Registrar of the Court observedthat the new article 80 inverses the order of the conditions and puts the jurisdictional requirement first in order to stress the importance of the jurisdictional requirement.102.5.The reason that Article 80, paragraph 1,of the Rules requires acounter-claim to come “within the jurisdiction of the Court”stems from the consensual nature of the Court’s power;the Court “cannot decide a dispute between States without the consent of those States to its 10Torres BernardezSantiago, “La modification des articles du règlement de la Cour internationale de Justice relatifs aux exceptions préliminaires et aux demandes reconventionnelles”, 49 Annuaire français de droit international (2003), p. 242, para. 132: (“La seule modification à cet égard du texte du paragraphe 1er de l'article 80 concerne l'ordre dans lequel les conditions sont énoncées dans la disposition. Dans la version de 1978, la condition de la connexité directe précédait celle de la compétence de la Cour. L'ordre inverse des conditions ne modifie en rien le sens ou la portée de la règle car les deux conditions sont toujours, comme on vient de le dire, cumulatives, mais elle montre tout de même une sensibilité accrue pour les questions de compétence que peuvent poser les demandes présentées par voie reconventionnelle. D'autre part, l'inversion est logique du moment où la règle est formulée en termes de ce que la Cour ne peut pas faire et non plus, comme en 1978, en fonction des demandes que les parties peuvent présenter comme demandes reconventionnelles. Il est évident que si la Cour constate que la demande reconventionnelle ne relève pas de sa compétence dans l'affaire, on n'aura pas besoin d'examiner si la deuxième condition est remplie pour conclure à l'irrecevabilité de la demande en tant que demande reconventionnelle.)” (emphasis added). 9 jurisdiction”.11 As the Court put it in the Genocide case: “The Respondent cannot use a counter-claim as a means of referring to an international court claims which exceed the limits of its jurisdiction as recognized by the parties.”12 2.6. The jurisdictional requirement also stems from the nature of a counter-claim. It is “independent of the principal claim in so far as it constitutes a separate ‘claim’, that is to say an autonomous legal act the object of which is to submit a new claim to the Court.”13 11 East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 101, para. 26. See also e.g., Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Application for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 25, para. 40; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 431, para. 88; Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1986, p. 579, para. 49; Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), Application to Intervene, Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1990, pp. 114-116, paras. 54-56, and p. 122, para. 73; Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1992, pp. 259-262, paras. 50-55; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, pp. 18- 19, para. 21 and p. 39, para. 88; Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 200, para. 48. 12 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 257, para. 31; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Counter-Claim, Order of 10 March 1998, I.C.J. Reports 1998, pp. 203-204, para. 33; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), Counter-Claims, Order of July 6, 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 316, para.15. 13 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 256, para. 27; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), Counter-Claims, Order of 6 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 315, para. 13; Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, pp. 207-208, para. 19 (emphasis added). 102.7.The mere fact that the Court has jurisdiction over the Applicant’s principal claim is therefore not, by itself, sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the counter-claim. Judge Higgins explained in her separate opinion in the Oil Platformscase that what matters in a counter-claim is “the jurisdiction mutually recognized by the partiesunder the Treaty—not the jurisdiction established by the Court in respect of the [principal claim].”14Indeed, if the existence of jurisdiction over the principal claim meant ipso factothat there was also jurisdiction over the counter-claim, the jurisdictional requirement in Article 80, paragraph 1, would be rendered meaningless.2.8.Whether a counter-claim “comes within the jurisdiction of the Court” must be established by reference to normal jurisdictional principles.The Committee for the Revision of the Rules made this absolutely clear.Inaddressing the requirement that a counter-claim comes within the jurisdiction of the Court,the Committeeexpressed the viewthat “a counter-claimantcould not introduce a matter which the Court would not have had jurisdiction to deal withhad it been the subject of an ordinary application to the Court.”1514Separate opinionof Judge Higgins, Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Counter-Claim, Order of 10 March 1998, I.C.J.Reports 1998, p. 220(emphasis in original).15Ibid.,p.219 (emphasis in original). 11 2.9. Here, it is clear that the Court would not have jurisdiction over Colombia’s counter-claims had they been the subject of an ordinary application. The title of jurisdiction on which Colombia relies, the Pact of Bogotá, ceased to be in force as between the Parties on 27 November 2013. Colombia’s counter-claims were not presented until 17 November 2016, nearly three years later. They therefore “exceed the limits of its jurisdiction as recognized by the parties”16 and must be rejected. 2.10. The Court’s case law is clear that whether a counter-claim comes within the Court’s jurisdiction must be determined by reference to any limitations inhering in the title of jurisdiction. In Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), Italy attempted to bring a counter-claim under the 1957 European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (the “European Convention”), the same instrument that conferred jurisdiction over Germany’s principal claims. Article 27(a) of the European Convention, however, excludes from jurisdiction “disputes relating to facts or situations prior to the entry into force of the 16 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 257, para. 31; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Counter-Claim, Order of 10 March 1998, I.C.J. Reports 1998, pp. 203-204, para. 33; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), Counter-Claims, Order of 6 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 316, para.15. 12Convention …”.17The question before the Court was whether Italy’s counter-claim concerneda dispute whose source, or real cause, wasto be found in facts and situations arising prior tothe EuropeanConvention’s entry into forceas between Germany and ItalyinApril1961.2.11.In its Order oncounter-claims, the Court foundthat the dispute that Italy tried to bring before the Court did in fact relate“to facts and situations existing prior to the entry into force of the European Convention as between the Parties”,and therefore fell “outside the temporal scope of this Convention.”18The Court was therefore without jurisdiction over Italy’s counter-claims.2.12.The Court’s rejection of Italy’s counter-claim showsthat jurisdiction over counter-claims must be assessed independently of jurisdictionover the principal claims, based on the requirements of,and limitationsin,the title of jurisdiction.2.13.Similarly, in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Serbia brought a counter-claim allegingthat Croatia violated its obligations under the Genocide Convention by taking action, 17European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Article 27 (a), United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 320, p. 256; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State(Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p.118,para. 42.18Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), Counter-Claims, Order of 6July 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, pp. 320-321, para. 30.13and 13 and failing to punish actions taken, against the Serb population in the Krajina region of Croatia. The counter-claim related exclusively to the fighting which took place in 1995 in the course of what was described by Croatia as Operation “Storm” and its aftermath.19 2.14. Examining its jurisdiction over Serbia’s counter-claim, the Court observed: “By the time that Operation ‘Storm’ took place, both Croatia and the FRY had been parties to the Genocide Convention for several years. Croatia does not contest that the counter-claim thus falls within the jurisdiction of the Court under Article IX of the Genocide Convention.”20 A contrario, had the Convention not been in force between the parties at the relevant time, Serbia’s counter-claims would not have come within the Court’s jurisdiction. 2.15. The conclusion is therefore unavoidable: jurisdiction over a counter-claim must be assessed by reference to the date on which it was filed, not the date of the Application. 2.16. Colombia’s Counter-memorial does not address any of this authority in arguing that its counter-claims come within the jurisdiction of the Court. In fact, it cites no authority at all. As stated, it simply contends, 19 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment of 3 February 2015, paras. 51, 443-444. 20 Ibid., para. 121. 14without elaboration, that the Pact of Bogotá “was still in force, and expressed the consent of the Parties to jurisdiction of the Court, on 26 November 2013, the date when Nicaragua lodged its Application instituting the present proceedings.Thus, jurisdiction [over its counter-clams] is established both ratione personaeand ratione temporis.”212.17.The only would-be justification Colombia offers for thisapproach is found inthe assertion that “the Court’s jurisdiction over incidental proceedings must be assessed at the time of the filing of the main proceedings.”222.18.Colombia is mistakenon all fronts.2.19.There is no support for Colombia’s assertionthat the critical date for determining jurisdiction over a counter-claim is the date of the filing of an Application instituting proceedings on the main claimand, as stated, Colombia offers none.2.20.Colombia’s approach is incompatible with the Court’s consistent jurisprudence, which treatsa counter-claim as “independentof the principal claim in so far as it constitutes a separate‘claim’, that is to 21CMC, para. 7.14 (emphasis in original).22Ibid., para. 7.15.15say 15 say an autonomous legal act the object of which is to submit a new claim to the Court.”23 2.21. Colombia’s invitation to treat a counter-claim not as an independent legal act, but rather a dependent one, the date of which should relate back to the date of the Application would turn this jurisprudence on its head. It would also stand in direct opposition to the observation of the Committee for the Revision of the Rules that jurisdiction over a counterclaim must be assessed as if it has “been the subject of an ordinary application to the Court.”24 2.22. Colombia itself notably concedes that if a matter were introduced as a “separate claim” after the treaty conferring jurisdiction ceases to be in force, it would not come within the Court’s jurisdiction. Specifically, in connection with making its (erroneous) argument that the Court does not have jurisdiction to consider Colombia’s violations of Nicaragua’s rights committed after the Pact of Bogotá ceased to be in force between the Parties, Colombia argues: 23 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 256, para. 27; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), Counter-Claims, Order of 6 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 315, para. 13; Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, pp. 207-208, para. 19 (emphasis added). 24 Separate opinion of Judge Higgins, Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Counter-Claim, Order of 10 March 1998, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 219. 16“The situation is different when it comes to post-critical date events. Pursuant to Colombia’s denunciation of the Pact ofBogota on 27 November 2012, the Pact, including its dispute resolution provisions, ceased to be in force for Colombia as of 27 November 2013, the day after Nicaragua’s Application was filed. Given that Colombia’s consent to the Court’s jurisdiction lapsedas of that day, the Court has no jurisdiction ratione temporis to consider any alleged violations that occurred afterwards. Stated another way, any facts on which Nicaragua relies in support of its claim that post-date 26 November 2013 are not apposite orsubject to judicial review. Had those facts been adduced in connection with a separate claimor anew caseintroduced by Nicaragua against Colombia after 26 November 2013, there clearly would have been no jurisdiction.”252.23.This is a critical admission. TheCourt has repeatedly emphasizedthatthe purpose of a counter-claim is precisely to submit a “separate claim” and a “new claim”26of just the sort over which Colombia says the Court “would have … no jurisdiction”.27Colombia’s own reasoning therefore dictates that its counter-claims be rejected.2.24.Colombia’s attempt to analogize counter-claims to other “incidental proceedings” is equallyunpersuasive. The purpose of other 25CMC, para. 4.21 (emphasis added).26Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 256, para. 27;Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), Counter-Claims, Order of6July 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 315,para. 13;Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, pp. 207-208, para. 19.27CMC, para. 4.21.17incidentalproceedings 17 incidental proceedings such as interim protection and preliminary objections is not to submit a “new claim”. Rather, such proceedings all effectively constitute subsidiary procedures bearing on the main claim. They are therefore appropriately subject to the forum perpetuum principle. 2.25. To consider counter-claims subject to the forum perpetuum principle merely because the provisions governing them happen to be included in Section D of the Rules of Court would elevate form over substance to an absurd degree. Counter-claims are of a fundamentally different character from other “incidental proceedings”, and the rules applicable to incidental proceedings cannot properly be extended to counter-claims based simply on the assertion that they are “analogous”. 2.26. The history of the Court’s Rules confirms the point. In the 1922 Rules of Court adopted by the Permanent Court of International Justice, the provision on counter-claims (then Article 40) was included in the section on “Written Proceedings.”28 In the 1936 revision of the Rules, Article 40 became Article 63 and was placed in the section captioned “Occasional Rules” (“Règles particulières”).29 The same was true in the 28 Permanent Court of International Justice, Rules of the Court (adopted 24 March 1922), Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice (1922-1946), Series D, No. 1, 1926, p. 21. 29 Permanent Court of International Justice, Elaboration of the Rules of Court of March 11th, 1936, Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice (1922-1946), Series D, fourth addendum to Nº.2, 1943, p. 261; Permanent Court of International 181946 and 1972 revisionsof theRules of this Court. Only in 1978was thename of thecategory changed from “Occasional Rules” to “Incidental Proceedings”.302.27.This history shows that the category “Incidental Proceedings” was intended as a“catch-all”for proceedings other than the main proceedings on the principal claim, rather than a group defined by formal juridical characteristics.Colombia therefore has it wrong when it arguesthat the jurisdictional principles applicable to other incidental proceedings apply equally to counter-claims. The Court’s jurisprudence discussed above is clear:the jurisdictional considerations applicable to counter-claims are different.2.28.Because Colombia’s counter-claims were submitted nearly three years after the Pact of Bogotá ceased to be in force between the Parties, they do not come withinthe jurisdiction of the Courtand must be dismissed.Justice,Statute and Rules of Court,Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice (1922-1946),Series D. Nº.1, fourth Edition -April 1940, pp. 52-53.30International Court of Justice, Rules of Court (Adopted on 14 April 1978 and entered into force on 1 July 1978), Section D(Incidental Proceedings), available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=3&p3=0.192.29. 19 2.29. The text of the Pact of Bogotá itself further confirms this conclusion and shows that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Colombia’s counter-claims. 2.30. Article XXXI of the Pact states: “[T]he High Contracting Parties declare that they recognize, in relation to any other American State, the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory ipso facto, without the necessity of any special agreement so long as the present Treaty is in force, in all disputes of a juridical nature that arise among them …” 2.31. Stripped to its essence, Article XXXI provides that States “recognize … the jurisdictional of the Court … so long as the present Treaty is in force, in all disputes of a juridical nature ….”. By its plain terms, this means that States no longer recognize the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of disputes that are submitted after the Pact ceases to be in force between them. Such disputes “exceed the limits of [the Court’s] jurisdiction as recognized by the parties.”31 2.32. This is significant because the disputes Colombia attempts to bring before the Court are plainly different from the dispute Nicaragua submitted in its Application. They are, in other words, new disputes in 31Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 257, para. 31. 20respect of which the Parties no longer recognize the jurisdiction of the Court.2.33.Whereas the dispute Nicaragua submitted concerns Colombia’s violations of Nicaragua’s exclusive sovereign rights and jurisdiction as determined by the Court in 2012, the disputes that Colombia has submitted concernNicaragua’s alleged violations of:(1) its obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment (first and second counter-claims);(2) thetraditional fishing rightsof the Raizales (third counter-claim); and(3) customary international law governingstraight baselines (fourth counter-claim).2.34.The Court itself has already expressly foundthese issues tobe differentfrom the dispute reflected in Nicaragua’s Application. The Court will recall that Colombia initially resisted the Court’s jurisdiction on multiple grounds. In its third preliminary objection, Colombia argued that because the Parties had expressed openness to dialogue in the wake of the Court’s 2012 Judgment, they were not of the opinion that the dispute on Nicaragua’s main claimcould not besettled by negotiation, as Article II of the Pact of Bogotá requires.3232Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 17 March 2016, paras. 80-83.212.35. 21 2.35. The Court rejected this argument in its 17 March 2016 Judgment denying Colombia’s preliminary objections in their entirety. It observed: “The issues that the Parties identified for possible dialogue include fishing activities of the inhabitants of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina in waters that have been recognized as appertaining to Nicaragua by the Court, the protection of the Seaflower Biosphere Marine Reserve, and the fight against drug trafficking in the Caribbean Sea. The Court notes, however, that the abovementioned subject-matter for negotiation is different from the subject-matter of the dispute between the Parties.”33 2.36. The text of Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá is clear: because (1) the alleged disputes Colombia submits are different from the dispute Nicaragua has presented, and because (2) the Pact of Bogotá long since ceased to be in force between them, the Parties do not recognize the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Colombia’s counter-claims. B. COLOMBIA HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF DISPUTES WITH NICARAGUA ON THE SUBJECT MATTER OF ITS COUNTER-CLAIMS 2.37. Colombia’s first, second and third counter-claims do not come within the Court’s jurisdiction for another reason: Colombia has 33 Ibid., paras. 97-98. 22failed to establishthe existence of a dispute with respect to thesubject matter of those claims.342.38.The Court’sfunction under Article 38 of itsStatute is to decide disputes in accordance with international law.Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotáprovides thatthe States parties accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Courtfor “all disputes of a juridical nature that arise among them”.The existence of a dispute between the Parties is therefore acondition of the Court’s jurisdiction.352.39.It iswell-established thata “dispute”is “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons”.36It is equally well-established that “[w]hether there exists an international dispute is a matter for objective determination” by the Court.37This determination “must turn on an examination of the facts. The 34Colombia’s fourth counter-claim concerning Nicaragua’s straight baseline decree is different. Colombia protested Nicaragua’s decree by diplomatic note submitted to the General Secretary of the United Nations on 1 November 2013. “Diplomatic Note No. S-GACIJ-13-044275 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organization”, (CMC, Annex 25). Thereis therefore a “dispute” on this issue. 35Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974,pp. 270-271, para. 55 (“The existence of a dispute is the primary condition for the Court to exercise its judicial function.”). 36Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions(Greece v. United Kingdom), Judgment (Merits), 30 August 1924, 1924 PCIJ (ser. A), No. 2, p. 11;seealso Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011,p. 84, para. 30.37Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 442, para. 46; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. 23 matter is one of substance, not of form.”38 2.40. The facts must show “that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other.”39 What matters is that “the two sides hold clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance or non-performance of certain” international obligations. 40 Although the existence of a dispute can sometimes be inferred, it must nevertheless be shown “on the basis of the evidence, that the respondent was aware, or could not have been unaware, that its views were ‘positively opposed’ by the applicant”.41 2.41. In the section of its Counter-Memorial presenting its counter-claims, Colombia elides the “dispute” requirement. Still less does it adduce any evidence demonstrating that a dispute exists. There is Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 84, para. 30; Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp. 270-271, para. 55; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 476, para. 58). 38 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 84, para. 30. 39 South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 21 December 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 328. 40 Interpretation of Peace Treaties, Advisory Opinion (First Phase), I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74. 41 Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Island v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 5 October 2016, para. 41 (citing Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 17 March 2016, para. 73; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 99, para. 6, pp. 109-110, para. 87, and p. 117, para. 104. 24nothing in the recordwhether by way of diplomatic note,public statementsfrom high-ranking officials or anything else—that shows that Colombia counter-claims are positively opposed by Nicaragua.2.42.There istherefore no basis on which the Court can even infer the existence of a dispute and therefore no basis on which it can exercise jurisdiction over Colombia’scounter-claims. They must be rejected for this reason as well.C.THERE IS NO EVIDENCETHAT THE MATTERS COLOMBIA PRESENTS COULD NOT, IN THE OPINION OF THE PARTIES, BE SETTLED BY NEGOTIATIONS2.43.Even if the Court were to find that the Pact of Bogotá offers a basis for jurisdiction and even if the Court were to find that a dispute exists, there is yet one more reason that Colombia’s counter-claimsdo not come within the jurisdiction of the Court: Colombia has notmet—andcannotmeet—the jurisdictional preconditionstated in the Pact of Bogotá.2.44.Article II of the Pact obligesStatesparties to have recourse tothe dispute settlement mechanismsprovided in the Pact in the event the dispute “in the opinion of the parties, cannot be settled by direct negotiations through the usual diplomatic channels”.The Court has repeatedly held that this Article createsa precondition to the exercise of its 25 jurisdiction. 42 Indeed, as stated, Colombia itself initially attempted to avoid the Court’s jurisdiction in this case based in part on this very provision.43 2.45. It makes no difference that Colombia has presented its claims in the form of counter-claims. For the reasons explained in Part I(A), jurisdiction over counter-claims must be assessed by reference to normal jurisdictional principles as if they had been submitted by way of an ordinary application. Preconditions stated in the title of jurisdiction must still be satisfied. Germany v. Italy is decisive on this point: the Court’s application of the precondition in the European Convention that was the basis of its jurisdiction in that case is a clear application of this principle.44 2.46. Like the “dispute” issue addressed in the previous section, the Article II precondition is another matter on which Colombia maintains a studied silence. It makes no argument concerning the opinion of the Parties regarding the alleged “disputes” it presents. Still less does it provide evidence that the Parties, whether individually or collectively, 42 Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 94, para. 62; Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 17 March 2016, para. 101. 43 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 17 March 2016, paras. 80-83. 44 See supra, Part I, paras. 2.10-2.12. 26were of the opinion that the matters Colombia raises could not be settled by direct negotiations.2.47.The absence of evidence is by itself decisive. The Court has made clear that States are “expected to provide substantive evidence to demonstrate that they considered in good faith that theirdisputescould or could not be settled by direct negotiations through the usual diplomatic channels.”45Colombia’s failure to meetthis expectation dictatesthat its counter-claims be rejected.2.48.Even beyondthe lack of evidence, the fact is that the Parties were notof the opinion that the matters Colombia raisescould not be settled by direct negotiations. Indeed, Colombia itself previouslyadmitted this tothe Court, at least with respect to the first, second and third counter-claims.2.49.Colombia’s first three counterclaims concern the protection of the marine environment and the traditional fishing rights of the Raizales. In its preliminary objections to jurisdiction in this case, Colombia pointed to the Parties’ publicly expressed willingness to negotiate on these same issues as a reason to decline jurisdiction. It stated: “Colombia was, and continues to be, looking for the resolution of any 45Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 17 March 2016, para.93.27controversy 27 controversy that might stem from the Court’s 2012 Judgment within the framework of ‘direct negotiations’”.46 2.50. In language quoted already above, the Court itself took note of this fact, observing: “The issues that the Parties identified for possible dialogue include fishing activities of the inhabitants of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina in waters that have been recognized as appertaining to Nicaragua by the Court, the protection of the Seaflower Biosphere Marine Reserve, and the fight against drug trafficking in the Caribbean Sea.”47 2.51. Even after the Court issued its Judgment in this case rejecting Colombia’s preliminary objections, Colombia still wanted to negotiate. Immediately after the Court issued its Judgment, the President of Colombia stated emphatically that “The bilateral issues between Nicaragua and Colombia … should be addressed through direct negotiations between the parties…”.48 2.52. Colombia cannot have it both ways. It cannot be allowed to say that these matters could be settled by negotiations when it served its 46 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections of the Republic of Colombia, 19 December 2014 (Vol. I), para. 4.61. 47 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 17 March 2016, para. 97 (emphasis added). 48 “Colombia Rompe con la Corte de la Haya por Pleito con Nicaragua”, El Heraldo, 18 March 2016. (“Los temas bilaterales entre Nicaragua y Colombia no van a seguir sujetos a la decisión de un tercero y deberán abordarse mediante negociaciones directas entre las partes, de conformidad con el derecho internacional”.) (NWO, Annex 2). 28litigation interests, and then say the same issues could notbe settled by negotiations when itsinterestschange.Its counter-claims do not come within the jurisdiction of the Court for this fourth reason as well. 29 PART II COLOMBIA’S COUNTER-CLAIMS ARE NOT DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH THE SUBJECT MATTER OF NICARAGUA’S CLAIM 3.1. Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Rules also requires that a counter-claim be “directly connected with the subject‑matter of the claim of the other party”. 3.2. The direct connection requirement exists to prevent a respondent from using a counter-claim as a “means to impose on the Applicant any claim it chooses, at the risk of infringing the Applicant’s rights and of compromising the proper administration of justice”.49 3.3. The direct connection requirement is a stringent one: a counter-claim must be directly connected with the main claim “both in fact and in law”.50 The facts on which the counter-claim is based must be 49 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 257, para. 31; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Counter-Claim, Order of 10 March 1998, I.C.J. Reports 1998, pp. 203-204, para. 33; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), Counter-Claims, Order of 6 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 316, para.15. 50 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 212, para. 32. 30of the “same nature” as the facts underpinning the principle claim, and the Parties must be pursuing the “same legal aims”.513.4.With respect to the required factual connection, the case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)provides an instructive example. There, the Court found admissible Uganda’s counter-claim relating to the DRC’s attackson Uganda’s diplomatic premises and certain Ugandan nationals. The Court determined that“the facts relied upon by each party are of the same nature, in that they allege similar types of conduct”; namely, “acts of oppression accompanying an illegal use of force”.523.5.In contrast, in the case concerning Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)the Court rejected Nicaragua’s third counter-claim because the facts alleged by Nicaragua were of “a different nature from those underpinning 51Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 212, para. 32; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 258, paras. 34-35; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Counter-Claim, Order of 10 March 1998, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 205, para. 38; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda), Counter-Claims, Order of 29 November 2001, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 679, paras. 38 and 40).52Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda), Counter-Claims, Order of 29 November 2001, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 679, para. 40.31Costa 31 Costa Rica’s claims[.]”53 Whereas Nicaragua’s counter-claim was based on the “damage allegedly caused by Costa Rica’s effort to prevent Nicaragua from dredging the San Juan River”, Costa Rica’s main claims concerned the alleged violations of its territorial sovereignty and Nicaragua’s ostensible violations of its international environmental obligations by dredging the San Juan River.54 3.6. The Court concluded that “the facts relied on by Costa Rica in its principal claims and the facts invoked by Nicaragua to substantiate its third counter-claim” were of a “different nature.” 55 The direct connection was therefore not met despite the fact that there was overlap between the Parties’ claims (in the sense that Costa Rica complained about the harm caused by Nicaragua’s dredging and Nicaragua complained about the harm caused by Costa Rica’s efforts to prevent it from dredging). 3.7. In assessing whether the facts alleged are of the “same nature”, the Court has sometimes considered whether the facts relied upon 53 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 214, para. 36. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 32in the main claimand in the counter-claimrelate to the same geographical area and the same time period.563.8.In theCertain Activities case,for example, the Court found Nicaragua’s second counter-claiminadmissible because it did not relate to the same geographic area as Costa Rica’s main claim. The Court did so even though Nicaragua’s claim related tothe former Bay of San Juan del Norte,which liesimmediately adjacentto the area that was the subject of Costa Rica’s principalclaims: Isla Portillos.The Court explained: “In geographical terms, Nicaragua’s second counter‑claim relates, in a general sense, to the same region that is the focus of Costa Rica’s principal claims, an area that is near the mouth of the San Juan River. However, the geographical point of reference of each Party’s claims is different,in the sense that the claim and the counter‑claim do not relate to the same area.”573.9.Territorial connection “inageneral sense”is thus not sufficientto establish a direct connection in fact; a counter-claimmustrelate to the same area, narrowly defined,as the principalclaim.56Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p.258,para. 34; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Counter-Claim, Order of 10 March 1998, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 205, para. 38;Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 212,para. 32.57Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Counter-Claims, Order of 18April 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p.213, para.34 (emphasis added). 33 3.10. But even then, the mere fact of a geographic and temporal overlap is not, by itself, enough. Here again, DRC v. Uganda is instructive. In addition to its counter-claims concerning the DRC’s attacks on its diplomatic premises and nationals, Uganda also submitted a counter-claim relating to the DRC’s alleged violations of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.58 The Court dismissed the counter-claim because the facts relied upon by the parties were not of the same nature, even though they related to the same geographic area and took place during the same time period as the DRC’s main claim. 3.11. The Court stated: “Whereas Uganda’s claim concerns quite specific claims [that refer] to the Congolese national dialogue, to the deployment of the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC and to the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups; whereas these questions, which relate to methods for solving the conflict in the region agreed at multilateral level…concern facts of a different nature from those relied on in the Congo’s claims, which relate to acts for which Uganda was allegedly responsible during that conflict...”59 3.12. Thus, while the existence of a geographic and temporal overlap between a claim and counter-claim may sometimes be indicative 58 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda), Counter-Claims, Order of 29 November 2001, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 678, para. 37, p. 680, para. 42. 59 Ibid., p. 680, para. 42 (emphasis in original). 34of a direct factual connection, it is not dispositive. The facts alleged must still be of the same nature.3.13.The requirement that a claim and counter-claim be directly connected in law is equally strict. There must be“a direct connection between the counter-claim and the principal claims of the other party based on the legal principles or instruments relied upon, or whether the Applicant and Respondent were considered aspursuing the same legal aim by their respective claims.”603.14.DRC v. Ugandaonce again provides useful guidance.The Court found Uganda’s counter-claim relating to the DRC’s alleged violations of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement inadmissiblenot just because the facts alleged were of a different nature,but alsobecause it lacked the requisite direct legal connection. The Court reasoned thatthe DRC sought to establish Uganda’s responsibility based on the violations of the rules governing the use of force, whilst Uganda sought to establish 60Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 212,para. 32(emphasis added). 35 Congo’s responsibility based on violations of the Lusaka Agreement, which established mechanisms for resolving the conflict.61 3.15. In the Certain Activities case, the Court similarly found no direct legal connection between Nicaragua’s third counter-claim (pursuant to which Nicaragua sought a declaration that it had navigational rights on the Colorado River) and Costa Rica’s principal claim, even though they were both based on provisions of the same 1858 Treaty of Limits. The Court held: “Nicaragua has failed to establish the existence of a direct legal connection between its third counter‑ claim and Costa Rica’s principal claims. Costa Rica and Nicaragua do not pursue the same legal aims in their respective claims and counter‑ claim. Costa Rica’s claims concern allegations of violations of its territorial sovereignty and its navigational rights on the San Juan River, and of environmental damage to its territory. Nicaragua, for its part, seeks to assert its alleged navigational rights on the Colorado River, on the basis of Article V of the 1858 Treaty of Limits, which provided for the temporary shared use and possession of Punta Castilla and designated the Colorado River as a boundary until such time as Nicaragua recovered full possession over the Port of San Juan del Norte, which it did in 1860.”62 61 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda), Counter-Claims, Order of 29 November 2001, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 680, para. 42. 62 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 214, para. 37. 363.16.It is therefore not enough that the conventional or customary law at issue in the claim andcounter-claimbe the same in a general sense. Rather, there must be sufficient identitybetween the legal bases of the claims such that it can truly be said that the parties are pursuing the “same legal aim”.A.COLOMBIA’S FIRST ANDSECOND COUNTER-CLAIMS ARE NOT DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH NICARAGUA’S CLAIM3.17.Colombia’s first and second counter-claims are inadmissible because they are not directly connected with Nicaragua’s principal claim either in fact or in law.3.18.The claims of Nicaragua over which the Court has found that is has jurisdictionconcern:3.19.Colombia’s obligation not to violate Nicaragua’s maritime zones as delimited in paragraph 251 of the ICJ 2012 Judgment,as well as Nicaragua’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction in these zones;3.20.Colombia’s obligation not to violate Nicaragua’s rights under customary international law as reflected in Parts V and VI of UNCLOS; and373.21. 37 3.21. Colombia’s obligation to comply with the 2012 Judgment, wipe out all legal and material consequences of its internationally wrongful acts, and make full reparation for the harm caused by those acts.63 3.22. Colombia describes its first counter-claim as being “based on Nicaragua’s violation of its duty of due diligence to protect and preserve the marine environment in the Southwestern Caribbean Sea”64; and its second counter-claim as being “a logical consequence of the first one and dealing with Nicaragua’s violation of its duty of due diligence to protect the right of the inhabitants on the San Andres Archipelago, in particular the Raizales, to benefit from a healthy, sound and sustainable environment.”65 3.23. Colombia argues that these two counter-claims are directly connected in fact with Nicaragua’s main claims because they relate to “the same geographical area” and “the same period of time”.66 3.24. Nicaragua observes in the first instance that Colombia is factually mistaken; some of the alleged facts upon which it relies do not relate to the same geographic area as Nicaragua’s claims. Specifically, the 63 Application in the case concerning Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), p. 24. 64 CMC, para. 8.2. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid., paras. 8.5 and 8.7. 38incidents of alleged predatory fishing and pollution by Nicaraguan fishermenthatColombiarefers to in paragraphs8.13-8.16and8.42-8.44of its Counter-Memorialoccurred either in the territorial sea aroundColombia’sSerranaCay orin the Colombia-Jamaica Joint Regime Area.67Incontrast, the scope of Nicaragua’s claims rationeloci is limited to Nicaragua’s undisputed EEZ. To thatextent, “the geographical point of reference of each Party’s claims is different, in the sense that the claim and the counter‑claim do not relate to the same area.”683.25.Moreover, regardless of whether they relate to the same geographic area, allthe alleged facts underlying Colombia’s first and second counter-claimsinvolve different types of conduct than thefacts supportingNicaragua’s claims.3.26.The facts relevant toNicaragua’s claims concern Colombia’s interference with and violationsof Nicaragua’s exclusive sovereign rights and jurisdictionin maritime areas adjudged by the Court to appertain toNicaraguain 2012. In contrast, the ostensible facts on which Colombiarelies in its first and second counter-claims relateto Nicaragua’s alleged failure toobserve itssovereign duties;specifically, its 67SeeIbid., paras. 8.13-8.16, 8.42-8.44.68Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Counter-Claims, Order of 18April 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p.213, para.34.39duty 39 duty of due diligence to protect and preserve the marine environment in the Southwestern Caribbean Sea. 3.27. Colombia itself admits this critical difference. It states: “Nicaragua asserts that Colombia has violated its sovereign rights and maritime spaces. But these accusations fail to take into account that Nicaragua has legal obligations with respect to its own conduct in the same areas.” 69 Colombia nevertheless argues that the direct connection requirement is met because its “counter-claims represent the other side of the coin of Nicaragua’s claims, and are thus of the same nature.”70 3.28. This “other side of the same coin argument” is unavailing. In the Certain Activities case, it might equally have been said that Nicaragua’s counter-claim relating to the “damage allegedly caused by Costa Rica’s effort to prevent Nicaragua from dredging the San Juan River”71 was the other side of the same coin to Costa Rica’s main claim concerning Nicaragua’s alleged violations of its international environmental obligations by dredging the very same river. The Court nevertheless rejected Nicaragua’s counter-claim for want of a direct factual connection. 69 CMC, para. 8.6 (emphasis added). 70 Ibid. 71 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, I.C.J. Reports 2013, p. 214, para. 36. 403.29.Uganda’s counter-claim concerning violations of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in DRC v. Ugandacould alsohave been said to be “the other side of the same coin”to the DCR’s principal claims. The DRC’s claimsarose from the fact of an armed conflict and Uganda’s counter-claim from methods for solving that conflict. Yet, the Court had no difficulty rejecting Uganda’s counter-claim because the required factual connection was lacking. 3.30.At a more practical level, the facts on which Nicaragua and Colombiarelyin the present case areof a fundamentally differentcharacter. Nicaragua’sclaimsconcern Colombia’s activeassertion of rights and jurisdiction in areas that do not appertain to Colombia (whether in the form of the harassment of Nicaraguan vessels by the Colombian navy or the unilateral assertion of rights in areas adjudged to be Nicaragua’s). In contrast, Colombia’s claims are based on the alleged inactivityof Nicaragua in the face of the environmentally destructive practices of Nicaragua’s own citizens.The Parties’ claims plainly do not concern facts of the same nature.3.31.Colombia’s first two counter-claims are also inadmissible because they are not directly connected with Nicaragua’s claim as a matter of law. The respective claimsare not based on the samelegal principles andinstruments, and thereforedo not pursue thesame legal aim. 41 3.32. Colombia argues that the direct connection requirement is met because its counter-claims are based on the same corpus of international law as Nicaragua’s claims; namely, “customary international law.” 72 Such a high level of generality is unacceptable. Far greater specificity is required lest the direct connection in law requirement be read out of the Court’s jurisprudence in its entirety for all practical purposes. 3.33. Even the most cursory review of the Parties’ claims shows that they are not pursuing the same legal aim. With its first two counterclaims, Colombia seeks to establish Nicaragua’s international responsibility for alleged violations of the rules of customary international law relating to the preservation and protection of environment, and the exercise of due diligence, 73 as well as the provisions of various international instruments, including the CITES Convention, the Cartagena Convention, and the FAO Code of Conduct on Sustainable Fishing.74 3.34. None of these instruments or rules is relevant to Nicaragua’s claims. Nicaragua relies instead on the Court’s 2012 Judgment and the rules of customary international law as reflected in Parts V and VI of UNCLOS, which recognize the exclusive sovereign rights and jurisdiction of a coastal State within its maritime areas. 72 CMC, para. 8.8. 73 Ibid., para. 8.6. 74 Ibid., paras. 8.38, 8.40. 423.35.The Parties are therefore not pursuingthe same legal aims. B.COLOMBIA’S THIRD COUNTER-CLAIM IS ALSO NOT DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH NICARAGUA’S CLAIM3.36.Colombia’s third counter-claim, which relates to Nicaragua’s alleged violations of the traditional fishing rights of the residents of the San Andrés archipelagoin Nicaragua’s EEZ, also fails the direct connection testand is thereforeinadmissible.3.37.The facts underlying Colombia’sthird counter-claim dogenerally relate to the same geographical area and the same time period as the facts stated in Nicaragua’sclaim. They are nevertheless of a different nature. 3.38.Colombia argues to the contrary. It asserts that:“it suffices to say that Colombia’s counter-claim relates to Nicaraguan Naval Force’s harassment of the artisanal fisherman of the Archipelago. Accordingly, there is a parallel between the alleged conduct of the Colombia Navy vis-à-visNicaraguan fishermen and the Nicaraguan naval force’s treatment of the artisanal fishermen of the Archipelago.”753.39.This argument misses a critical point. The facts pertinent to Nicaragua’s claim concern Colombia’s violations of Nicaragua’s 75Ibid., para. 9.7.43sovereign 43 sovereign rights and jurisdiction as adjudged and declared by the Court in 2012. The facts underlying Colombia’s third counter-claim, in contrast, concern damage individual Colombian fishermen allegedly suffered as a result of Nicaragua’s efforts to enforce its indisputable sovereign rights and jurisdiction within its own maritime areas. 3.40. Put another way, although it may be true that the facts relied upon by the Parties took place in the same geographic areas, they took place in very difference legal zones. The harassment that Nicaragua complains about took place in its own maritime zones and was committed by another State that has no sovereign rights of jurisdiction in those areas. The harassment Colombia alleges, on the other hand, took place outside Colombia’s maritime zones in areas that are subject to excusive sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Nicaragua. This distinction makes all the difference. The facts Colombia alleges are not of the same nature. 3.41. Colombia is equally wrong in suggesting that the legal principles and instruments that underlie its third counter-claim are the same as those that underlie Nicaragua’s principal claims. 76 Whereas Nicaragua seeks to vindicate its exclusive sovereign rights as adjudged by the Court in its 2012 Judgment, Colombia’s third counter-claim concerns the alleged non-exclusive private rights of its citizens to continue 76 Ibid., para. 9.8. 44traditional fishing activities in Nicaragua’s EEZdespite the 2012 Judgment.Unlike Nicaragua, which seeks reaffirmation of its rights and jurisdiction quasovereign,Colombia is acting as parens patriaeon behalf of its people toassertputativeprivate rights.3.42.Colombia itself admits the significance of this distinction. In attempting to explain why it never raised the issue of these so-called traditional fishing rights in the earlier delimitationcase,Colombia states: “The former [i.e., traditional fishing rights] are often invoked independently from the drawing of the boundary in order to allow certain nationals to fish where they have done so customarily.”773.43.Colombia thus acknowledges the importance of the legal distinction between traditional fishing rights, on the one hand, and drawing of maritime boundaries, with the attendant allocation of sovereign rights and jurisdiction, on the other.3.44.Because theParties claims do not have the same legal foundation, Nicaragua and Colombia are pursuingdifferentlegal aims.As a result, Colombia’s third counter-claim is inadmissible.77Ibid., para. 9.13.45C. 45 C. COLOMBIA’S FOURTH COUNTER-CLAIM IS NO MORE DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH NICARAGUA’S CLAIM THAN ANY OF ITS OTHERS 3.45. Colombia’s fourth counter-claim alleges that Nicaragua’s 2013 straight baselines decree is contrary to international law and violates Colombia’s sovereign rights and maritime spaces. This counter-claim is no more directly connected with Nicaragua’s principal claims than any of the others and should therefore be dismissed. 3.46. The heart of Colombia’s argument that the direct connection requirement is met is its assertion that Colombia’s challenge to Nicaragua’s straight baseline decree is a “domestic legal act fixing … the extent of all Nicaragua’s maritime zone in the Caribbean Sea”78 just like Colombia’s declaration of its Integral Contiguous Zone is a “domestic legal [act] fixing the extent of a maritime zone, namely Colombia’s contiguous zone.”79 On this basis, Colombia claims that “[t]he connection between Nicaragua’s claim and Colombia’s counter-claim is obvious in fact and in law”.80 3.47. Colombia may call the connection “obvious”, but that does not make it so. In fact, the required connection is lacking. 78 Ibid., para. 10.9. 79 Ibid., para. 10.6. 80 Ibid., para. 10.12. 463.48.With respect to the required factual connection, the facts relied upon by Colombia are not of the same nature as the facts underlying Nicaragua’s claim. In the first instance, they do not concern the same geographic area. All of the facts Nicaragua invokes, including Colombia’s declaration of its Integral Contiguous Zone, relate to Colombia’s violations of Nicaragua’s rights and jurisdiction in itsEEZ. The facts relevant to Colombia’s counter-claim instead relate only to the extent of Nicaragua’s internal waters and territorial sea.There is no question of Nicaragua impinging on any of Colombia’s maritime zones either to the west or to the east of San Andrés and Providencia.3.49.In this respect, Nicaragua observes that, as depicted on Figure 1, its 200 nmlimit is precisely the same whether measured from its straight baselines or from normal baselines. This is because Nicaragua’s 200nmlimit is entirely controlled by the most seaward land features used to define its straight baselines.3.50.Moreover, on Colombia’s own admission, its challenge to Nicaragua’s 2013 baseline decree concerns “the extentof all Nicaragua’s maritime zones in the Caribbean Sea.”81In contrast, the facts bearing on Nicaragua’s claim concerning Colombia’s Integral Contiguous Zone relate 81Ibid., para. 10.9 (emphasis added). 47 to Colombia’s challenge to the existence of Nicaragua’s exclusive sovereign rights and jurisdiction in maritime 48Figure 1. Nicaragua’s 200 nautical miles limits493.51. 49 3.51. areas delimited in the 2012 judgment and recognized under customary international, as reflected in Parts V and VI of UNCLOS. 3.52. Put another way, Nicaragua’s claims concern matters that were expressly settled by the Court in 2012. Colombia’s claim, on the other hand, relates to an issue that the Court had no occasion to address in 2012: the baselines from which Nicaragua measures the breadth of its territorial sea.82 3.53. Colombia equally fails to show a direct legal connection between its counter-claim and Nicaragua’s principal claims. 3.54. Nicaragua bases its claim on the 2012 Judgment establishing the maritime boundary between the Parties within 200 nm, as well as the customary international law rules codified in Parts V and VI of UNCLOS providing for Nicaragua’s exclusive sovereign rights and jurisdiction in maritime areas adjudged to appertain to it. Colombia’s claim, in contrast, is premised on the assertion that Nicaragua’s baseline 82 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 683, para. 159: “Nicaragua’s coast, and the Nicaraguan islands adjacent thereto, project a potential maritime entitlement across the sea bed and water column for 200 nautical miles. That potential entitlement thus extends to the sea bed and water column to the east of the Colombian islands where, of course, it overlaps with the competing potential entitlement of Colombia derived from those islands. Accordingly, the relevant area extends from the Nicaraguan coast to a line in the east 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of Nicaragua’s territorial sea is measured. Since Nicaragua has not yet notified the Secretary-General of the location of those baselines under Article 16, paragraph 2, of UNCLOS, the eastern limit of the relevant area can be determined only on an approximate basis.” (emphasis added). 50decree does not comport with the rules of customary international law governingstraight baselines,as reflectedin Article 7 of UNCLOS. These rules are wholly irrelevantto Nicaragua’s claim.3.55.Colombia nevertheless attempts to analogize its counter-claim to Nicaragua’s principal claim by claiming that Nicaragua’s straight baselinesviolate “Colombia’s rights and jurisdiction by claiming absolute sovereignty, or sovereigntysubject to innocent passage, in areas where Nicaragua has no absolute sovereignty, or where freedom of navigation and overflight are to be respected”.83This argument elides a critical difference between the Parties legal claims. Nicaragua’s claim is basedon Colombia’s violations of its exclusivesovereignrights and jurisdiction as a coastal Stateunder customary international law. Colombia’s counter-claim, on the other hand, is based on Nicaragua’s alleged violations of Colombia’s non-exclusivenavigational rights that belong to the ships ofall States.3.56.Finally, Colombia attempts to salvage its claim by arguingthat the Parties are pursuing the same legal aims because Nicaragua’s straight baselines decree “violates Colombia’s EEZ and continental shelf”84in a manner that is allegedly akin to the way Colombia’s Integral 83CMC, para. 10.10.84Ibid. 51 Contiguous Zone violates Nicaragua’s EEZ and continental shelf. But, as stated, this is not true. Nicaragua’s 200 nm limit is precisely the same whether measured from its straight baselines or from normal baselines. The straight baseline decree therefore does not have the effect of impinging on Colombia’s EEZ or continental shelf in any way. 3.57. Because the Parties are not pursuing the same legal aim, Colombia’s fourth counter-claim should be rejected. 5253PART 53 PART III CONCLUSION 4.1. All of Colombia’s counter-claims must be dismissed because none of them comes within the jurisdiction of the Court or is directly connected with the subject-matter of Nicaragua’s principal claim. 4.2. In Nicaragua’s view, Colombia’s meritless counter-claims are not a genuine effort to bring serious international disputes before the Court. They are, instead, a transparent attempt to distract the Court from the gravity of Colombia’s actions flouting the Court’s 2012 Judgment. Colombia hopes that by trying to make it seem like Nicaragua too is failing to fulfill its international obligations in the Caribbean Sea, its own behavior will be viewed in a less harsh light. The Court should not countenance such an inartful litigation ploy by agreeing to entertain Colombia’s counter-claims. 4.3. Indeed, Nicaragua cannot help but observe that in addition to being an obvious tactical device intended to blur the Court’s focus, Colombia’s counter-claims constitute an act of extraordinary chutzpah. Immediately after the Court issued the 2012 Judgment, the President of Colombia emphatically rejected it because of what he called “omissions, 54errors, excuses, inconsistencies that we cannot accept”.85The Minister of Foreign Affairs went further, declaringthe Court to be Colombia’s “enemy”.86These statements were promptlyfollowed by Colombia’s renunciation of the Pact of Bogotáon 26 November 2013.4.4.Later, when Nicaragua brought its Application instituting these proceedings, Colombia sought to deny Nicaragua its day in courtby presenting five different preliminary objections to the Court’s jurisdiction. And when the Court denied Colombia’s preliminary objections in their entirety, Colombia reaffirmed its hostility to the Court and its jurisdiction. At a press conference heldimmediatelyafter the Court’s Judgment on preliminary objections, President Santos statedthat Colombia “will not continue appearing” in the proceedings because the Court “fell intocontradictions”.87He added:“Colombia respects the law,but it also demands respect for the law and that is not what has happened today”.884.5.Against this backdrop, for Colombia to argue that the Pact of Bogotá still “expressed the consent of the Parties to jurisdiction of the 85Application in the case concerning Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces inthe Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia),p. 8.86Ibid.87“Colombia Rompe con la Corte de la Haya por Pleito con Nicaragua”, El Heraldo, 18 March 2016. (“El presidente Juan Manuel Santos anunció que el país ‘no seguirá compareciendo’ ante la Corte Internacional de Justicia, CIJ, de La Haya para tratar el litigio marítimo con Nicaragua porque considera que ese tribunal incurrió en ‘contradicciones’ en los fallos emitidos ayer”.) (NWO, Annex 2).88Statementof the Colombian President, Juan Manuel Santos, onthe judgments of the International Court of Justicein The Hague, 17 March 2016. (“Colombia respeta el derecho, pero exige también respeto al derecho, y eso es lo que NO ha ocurrido hoy”.) (NWO, Annex 1). 55 Court” nearly three years after the Pact ceased to be in force between the Parties and to ask the Court to entertain its counter-claims are bold affronts to this Court and the system of international justice for which it stands. 4.6. For the reasons explained in Part I of these Observations, the travaux of the Rules of Court and the Court’s consistent jurisprudence dictate the conclusion that when the title of jurisdiction lapses between the filing of an application and the filing of counter-claims, the counter-claims do not come within the jurisdiction of the Court. 4.7. This rule has even greater force here. It was Colombia, the would-be counter-claimant, that severed the consensual bond between the Parties recognizing the Court’s jurisdiction. Having done so, Colombia cannot and should not be heard to say that the Court may nevertheless entertain its wholly baseless counter-claims. They must be rejected. 5657SUBMISSIONSFor 57 SUBMISSIONS For the reasons expressed in these Observations, the Republic of Nicaragua requests the Court to adjudge and declare that: • Colombia’s first, second, third and fourth counter-claims as presented in its 17 November 2016 Counter-Memorial are inadmissible. The Hague, 20 April 2017 Carlos J. Argüello Gómez Agent of the Republic of Nicaragua 5859CERTIFICATIONI 59 CERTIFICATION I have the honour to certify that these Written Observations and the documents annexed to it, are true copies and conform to the original documents and that the translations into English made by the Republic of Nicaragua are accurate translations. The Hague, 20 April 2017. Carlos J. Argüello-Gómez Agent of the Republic of Nicaragua 6061DISPUTE 61 DISPUTE CONCERNING ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND MARITIME SPACES IN THE CARIBBEAN SEA (NICARAGUA V. COLOMBIA) WRITTEN OBSERVATIONS OF NICARAGUA ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF COLOMBIA’S COUNTER-CLAIMS ANNEXES 6263LIST 63 LIST OF ANNEXES ANNEX No. DOCUMENT PAGE 1. Statement of the Colombian President, Juan Manuel Santos, on the judgments of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, 17 March 2016 [English and Spanish version]. 65 2. Colombia Rompe con la Corte de la Haya por Pleito con Nicaragua”, El Heraldo, 18 March 2016 [English and Spanish version]. 71 3. Decree No. 33-2013, Baselines of the Marine Areas of the Republic of Nicaragua, 19 August 2013 [English and Spanish version]. 85 6465Annex 65 Annex 1 Statement of the Colombian President, Juan Manuel Santos, on the judgments of the International Court of Justice in The Hague 17 March 2016 6667Bogotá, 67 Bogotá, Thursday, 17 March 2016 Statement by the President of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, on the judgements of the International Court of Justice in The Hague The International Court of Justice has just made public its decisions on its jurisdiction to hear two new lawsuits filed by Nicaragua against Colombia in 2013, despite the fact that Colombia definitively withdrew from the jurisdiction of the Court in November 2012. On the one hand, Nicaragua asked this tribunal to declare our country responsible for failing to comply with the ruling of 2012 and for threatening to use force. The Court declared itself competent, NOT to verify whether Colombia is violating the 2012 ruling, as Nicaragua intended, but only if it had ignored the rights of Nicaragua in light of customary law. And [the Court] acknowledged that Colombia's presence in international waters did NOT pose a threat to the use of force. On the other hand, in its second lawsuit, Nicaragua requested to extend its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, until arriving at the proximities of our own continental coast in the Caribbean. This is a claim that [Nicaragua] had already raised before the Court, and that this tribunal had denied in its ruling of the year 2012. In other words, that issue was res judicata. Based on this, Colombia was clearly opposed to this Nicaraguan claim, since the Court could not again adjudicate an issue on which it had already ruled. However, the international tribunal - in a tie rarely seen in the Court - declared itself competent to hear this claim. In this pronouncement - which is of form - The Hague Court fell into contradictions: First, it did not respect its own judgment of the year 2012. Second, it ignored its own Statute, which indicates that it cannot reopen a case that is already closed. Annex 1 68And third, itintends to apply to Colombia a treaty to which we are NOT a party, that is, the Convention of the Sea.Therefore, and in the face of such contradictions, I have decided that Colombia will NOT continue appearing in this case before the International Court of Justice.I have taken this determination after a thorough analysis and dialogue with the experts who are part of the Colombian defense team, and after having listened to the Advisory Commission on Foreign Relations and political actors.We are clear that-whatever the final result -the maritime boundaries of our country can only be established or modified by an international treaty, as provided for in Article 101 of our Constitution, and as our Constitutional Court has said repeatedly.The bilateral issues between Nicaragua and Colombia will NOT remain subject to the decision of a third party and should be addressed through direct negotiations between the parties, in accordance with international law.Colombia respects the law, but also demands respect for the law, and that is what has NOT happened today.Colombians can rest assured that Colombia will preserve until the last inch of our territory.I invite the Colombians -all without exception, from all political sectors and citizens -to unite and makea united, firm, unshakable front to protect the highest interests of Colombia in our Caribbean Sea.Thank you very much.Annex 1 69 Bogotá , jueves, 17 de marzo de 2016 SIG - SIG DECLARACIÓN DEL PRESIDENTE DE COLOMBIA, JUAN MANUEL SANTOS, SOBRE DECISIONES DE LA CORTE INTERNACIONAL DE JUSTICIA DE LA HAYA La Corte Internacional de Justicia acaba de hacer públicas las decisiones sobre su competencia para conocer de dos nuevas demandas presentadas por Nicaragua contra Colombia en el año 2013, a pesar de que Colombia se retiró definitivamente de la jurisdicción de la Corte en noviembre de 2012. Por una parte, Nicaragua pidió a este tribunal que declarara a nuestro país responsable de haber incumplido el fallo del año 2012, y de haber amenazado con el uso de la fuerza. La Corte se declaró competente, NO para verificar si Colombia está incumpliendo el fallo de 2012 –como pretendía Nicaragua–, sino sólo si había desconocido los derechos de Nicaragua, a la luz del derecho consuetudinario. Y reconoció que la presencia de Colombia en las aguas internacionales NO significaba una amenaza del uso de la fuerza. Por otra parte, en su segunda demanda, Nicaragua solicitó extender su plataforma continental más allá de las 200 millas náuticas, hasta llegar a las proximidades de nuestra propia costa continental en el Caribe. Esta es una pretensión que ya había planteado antes a la Corte, y que este tribunal había negado en su fallo del año 2012. Es decir, ese tema ya era cosa juzgada. Con base en esto, Colombia se opuso de manera tajante a esta pretensión nicaragüense, pues la Corte NO podía volver a conocer de un tema sobre el cual ya había fallado. No obstante, el tribunal internacional –en un empate pocas veces visto en la Corte– se declaró competente para tramitar esta demanda. En este pronunciamiento –que es de forma– la Corte de La Haya ha incurrido en unas contradicciones de fondo: Annex 1 70Primero, no respetó su propia sentencia del año 2012.Segundo, desconoció su Estatuto, que le indica que no puede reabrir un caso ya cerrado.Y tercero, pretende aplicar a Colombia un tratado del que NO hacemos parte, como es la Convención del Mar.Por lo mismo –y frente a tales contradicciones–, he decidido que Colombia NO seguirá compareciendo, en este asunto, ante la Corte Internacional de Justicia.He tomado esta determinación luego de un profundo análisis y diálogo con los expertos que hacen parte del equipo de defensa de Colombia, y luego de haber escuchado a la Comisión Asesora de Relaciones Exteriores y a los sectores políticos.Tenemos claro que –cualquiera que sea el resultado final–los límites marítimos de nuestro país sólo pueden ser establecidos o modificados mediante un tratado internacional, como lo dispone el Artículo 101 de nuestra Constitución, y como lo ha dicho nuestra Corte Constitucional en reiteradas ocasiones.Los temas bilaterales entre Nicaragua y Colombia NO van a seguir sujetos a la decisión de un tercero y deberán abordarse mediante negociaciones directas entre las partes, de conformidad con el derecho internacional.Colombia respeta el derecho, pero exige también respeto al derecho, y eso es lo que NO ha ocurrido hoy.´Los colombianos pueden estar tranquilos de que Colombia preservará hasta el último centímetro de nuestro territorio.Invito a los colombianos –a todos sin excepción, de todos los sectores políticos y ciudadanos–a unirnos y hacer un frente común, firme, inquebrantable, para proteger los más altos intereses de Colombia en nuestro mar Caribe.Muchas gracias.Annex 1 71 Annex 2 Colombia Rompe con la Corte de la Haya por Pleito con Nicaragua El Heraldo, 18 March 2016 7273EL 73 EL HERALDO COLOMBIA| 18 March 2016 – 05:02 Colombia breaks with The Hague Court over the litigation with Nicaragua The president stated that the ICJ fell into “contradictions” and that bilateral issues will not depend on a “third party”, so he noted that “direct negotiations” is the way forward. President Juan Manuel Santos announced that the country “will not continue appearing” before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague to deal with the maritime litigation with Nicaragua because it believes that the court fell into “contradictions” in its rulings issued yesterday. “Bilateral issues between Nicaragua and Colombia will not remain subject to the decision of a third party and should be addressed through direct negotiations between the parties, in accordance with international law,” he said. Yesterday the ICJ declared itself competent over two claims that Nicaragua filed against Colombia in 2013 about the maritime delimitation in the Caribbean. The National Government categorically rejected the decision stating that the issue, which dealt with matters of form and not of substance, “was already res judicata.” The first case was filed on 16 September 2013. In that case, Nicaragua asked the ICJ to grant it an extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its coast in the Caribbean, a claim rejected by Bogota. “This is a claim that had already been raised before the Court, and this court had rejected it in its ruling of the year 2012,” Santos said. The second claim was filed on 26 November of the same year. In that case, Managua argued that Colombia has failed to comply with the ruling of 19 November 2012, through which The Hague court redefined the maritime boundaries between the two countries. Colombia said then that the 2012 ruling was “inapplicable” because the boundaries of the country may not be altered by third parties. Around the Annex 2 74same date, Colombia withdrew from the Pact of Bogotá, leaving Colombia outside the jurisdiction of the ICJ.According to Santos, in the first place the ICJ “did not respect its own ruling of 2012”; in the second place, “[the court] ignored its Statute, which provides that it cannot reopen a case that has already been decided”; and in the third place, “[the court] intends to apply to Colombia” the Sea Convention, a treaty to which Colombia is not aparty.Later, Santos in an address –during which he was joined by representatives of the political parties that make up Unidad para la Paz, as well as by ministers of his government -described the ICJ's decision as “offensive.”“Allowing this action (byNicaragua) is offensive to the respondent State, as well as to the functioning of the judicial system for resolving international disputes,” the President said. Santos plans to travel today to the archipelago of San Andres and Providencia to reaffirm Colombian sovereignty over the waters surrounding it and which are subject to the litigation with Nicaragua.What the ICJ said. The ICJ’s president, Ronny Abraham, read in the great hall of the UN High Court in The Hague the two rulings related to the two lawsuits brought by Managua against Bogota a few months apart.The court began by rejecting Colombia’s five preliminary objections one by one until it declared that it had jurisdiction to hear the claim filed by Nicaragua on 26 November 2013. The court took this decision by fourteen votes to two.In that claim, Managua asked the ICJ to find that Bogota violates its obligation not to use or threat to use force, and its obligation not to violate the Nicaraguan maritime zones delimited by the court on 19 November2012, as well as Nicaraguan sovereign rights and jurisdiction over these areas.That year the ICJ defined the unique maritime boundary between the continental shelf and the Nicaraguan and Colombian exclusive economic zones within 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of Nicaragua’s territorial sea is measured.Annex 2 75 The judges affirmed Colombian sovereignty over seven cays of the San Andres archipelago, and granted Nicaragua a maritime strip in that zone, which Colombia calculates in about 75,000 square kilometers. Abraham made it clear that the ICJ is also competent to adjudicate Nicaragua’s second claim of 16 September 2013, in which Nicaragua asks the court to grant it rights over a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. In its application, Nicaragua also requested the ICJ to indicate the rights and duties of the two States in relation to the area of overlapping claims and the use of their resources until the border line is delimited with precision. The ICJ thus rejects Bogota’s argument, which denounced on 27 November 2012 the Pact of Bogota accepting the jurisdiction of the ICJ, according to which the denunciation “had immediate effect” with respect to the initiation of new proceedings against Colombia. Article 56 states that the Pact of Bogota may be denounced with an advance notice of one year, after which it will cease to apply for the claimant. Nicaragua introduced the proceedings on 16 September 2013, before the expiration of the one-year notice. Reactions. For Colombia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maria Angela Holguin, the rulings issued yesterday do not constitute “a defeat for Colombia.” With respect to the claim of non-compliance, the Minister of Foreign Affairs said that the Court stated that it will look at “whether Nicaragua’s rights in the zone have been respected.” With that Nicaragua “loses something that was really transcendental”, that is its allegations regarding the “use of force.” With respect to the claim for an extended continental shelf, Holguín said that “for the first time” the Court will look at this issue “and it does so in a very complex and very difficult way.” Meanwhile, Bogota’s agent before the ICJ, Carlos Gustavo Arrieta, was surprised by the two judgments which he considered “completely unjustified.” “I am absolutely amazed by a decision that I consider to be completely unjustified and by no means lawful,” Arrieta told reporters in The Hague. Annex 2 76He asserted that “without any legal basis the court made a decision that affects the interests of Colombia”.For his part, former president Alvaro Uribe said that “it is better to endure a century of diplomatic difficulties than to concede a millimeter of the homeland,” and supported President Santos’s decision that the country should not continue attending hearings on the Nicaraguan issue because, as he stated in a press conference, “Colombia cannot accept any jurisdiction" of the ICJ.At the same time, the liberal senator Viviane Morales, warned that “Nicaragua’s claims on our continental shelf ignore international law and demonstrate Nicaragua’s voracious appetite in the Caribbean.”Meanwhile, liberal Senator Juan Manuel Galán, proposed that “who does not support Juan Manuel Santos as head of government, must support him as head of State in the case of the ICJ and Nicaragua.”On the other hand, the Green Alliance senator Claudia Lopez said that “we lost the litigation over the competence of the Court but we have to win the merits of the litigation over the continental shelf.”Meanwhile, Green Alliance senator Antonio Navarro said that “with respect to the Hague, we must maintain our position: we cannot accept that court to continue deciding over our borders.”Praise in Nicaragua. The ICJ’s decision shows that its judgments “must be respected”, said the Nicaraguan agent, Carlos Argüello.“This sends a clear message, which is that the judgments of the ICJ must be respected, period,” Argüello said from The Hague to the Nicaraguan government’s media.In addition, experts and politicians in Nicaragua applauded the ruling: “With this decision, the ICJ is confirming Nicaragua’s historic right to defend the sovereignty of its continental shelf, it did not make sense for Colombia’s position to try to evade the ICJ”, said the deputy of the opposition party Movimiento Renovador Sandinista and former deputy minister of foreign affairs of Nicaragua Víctor Hugo Tinoco (1981-1990).For its part, the legal analyst Manuel Madriz added that “the ICJ made a decision according to law, because the Pact of Bogota states that when a state withdraws from it, it has to wait a year to become effective, but Nicaragua filed the lawsuit before a year from the notice.” Annex 2 77 Reappearance Although Vice President Germain Vargas Lleras had led different political meetings in his office, after a surgery on January 30 to remove a benign meningioma in his brain, yesterday he appeared in public for the first time. Vargas Lleras was present during the speech that President Santos made last night on the rejection of the decision issued by The Hague Court. Analysis: “Not to appear before The Hague could play against Colombia”. By: Juan Ramón Martínez (Internationalist and professor at the Universidad del Rosario). The ICJ decided on the admissibility of two claims submitted by Nicaragua in addition to the one adjudicated in 2012. One refers to a claim on the extended continental shelf and another is on Colombia’s alleged non-compliance with the judgment of 2012 and, furthermore, the use and threat of force is alleged. The Court found that it had jurisdiction to decide the merits of the lawsuits. The fact that Colombia decides to abstain from appearing before The Hague may be counterproductive to the national interests, because the process continues. The Court at the time will have only the Nicaraguan position and Colombia would not put forward arguments to contradict it. So the process would continue without Colombia, and the risk of an adverse judgment may be greater if we do not participate in the legal discussion. Annex 2 7879COLOMBIA Annex 2 79 COLOMBIA ROMPE CON LA CORTE DE LA HAYA POR PLEITO CON NICARAGUA Juan Manuel Santos acompañado de representantes de partidos políticos y ministros de su gobierno. Por: Redacción ELHERALDO.CO 18 de Marzo de 2016 - 05:02 El presidente advirtió que la CIJ incurrió en “contradicciones” y que los temas bilaterales no dependerán de un “tercero”, por lo que señala que el camino son “negociaciones directas”. El presidente Juan Manuel Santos anunció que el país “no seguirá compareciendo” ante la Corte Internacional de Justicia, CIJ, de La Haya para tratar el litigio marítimo con Nicaragua porque considera que ese tribunal incurrió en “contradicciones” en los fallos emitidos ayer. (Ver infografía). Annex 2 80“Los temas bilaterales entre Nicaragua y Colombia no van a seguir sujetos a la decisión de un tercero y deberán abordarse mediante negociaciones directas entre las partes, de conformidad con el derecho internacional”, dijo.La CIJ se declaró ayer competente para juzgar dos demandas que Nicaragua presentó contra Colombia en2013 por la delimitación marítima en el Caribe, decisión que el Gobierno Nacional rechazó tajantemente al considerar que el tema, que trató asuntos de forma y no de fondo, “ya era cosa juzgada”.La primera demanda es del 16 de septiembre de 2013 cuando Nicaragua pidió a la CIJ concederle una plataforma continental extendida más allá de las 200 millas náuticas desde su costa en el Caribe, ambición rechazada por Bogotá.“Esta es una pretensión que ya había planteado antes a la Corte, y que este tribunal había negado en su fallo del año 2012”, afirmó Santos.La otra es del 26 de noviembre del mismo año, cuando Managua argumentó que Colombia ha incumplido el fallo del 19 de noviembre de 2012 mediante el cual La Haya redefinió los límites marítimos entre ambos países.Colombia dijo entonces que ese fallo de 2012 era “inaplicable” porque los límites del país no pueden ser modificados por terceros y se retiró por las mismas fechas definitivamente del Pacto de Bogotá, con lo cual quedó fuera de la jurisdicción de la CIJ.Según dijo Santos, la CIJ en primer lugar “no respetó su propia sentencia del año 2012”, en segundo, “desconoció su Estatuto, que le indica que no puede reabrir un caso ya cerrado”, y en tercero, “pretende aplicar a Colombia” la Convención del Mar, un tratado del que Colombia no hace parte.Más tarde, Santos en unaalocución –acompañado por representantes de los partidos políticos que integran Unidad por la Paz y ministros de su gobierno–calificó de “injuriosa” ladecisión de la CIJ.Annex 2 81 “Permitir esta acción (de Nicaragua) constituye algo injurioso para el Estado demandado, así como para el funcionamiento del sistema judicial de resolución de las disputas internacionales”, dijo el presidente. Santos tiene previsto viajar hoy al archipiélago de San Andrés y Providencia para reafirmar la soberanía colombiana en las aguas que lo circundan y que son objeto del litigio con Nicaragua. Lo que dijo la CIJ. El presidente de la CIJ, Ronny Abraham, leyó en la gran sala del alto tribunal de la ONU en La Haya las dos sentencias correspondientes a sendas demandas que planteó Managua contra Bogotá con pocos meses de diferencia. Empezó rechazando una por una las cinco objeciones preliminares de Colombia, hasta declarar que tiene jurisdicción para juzgar la demanda que Nicaragua interpuso el 26 de noviembre de 2013, y lo hizo por catorce votos contra dos. En ella Managua pidió a la CIJ que declare que Bogotá viola su obligación de no utilizar o no amenazar con el uso de la fuerza y de no violar las zonas marítimas nicaragüenses delimitadas por la corte el 19 de noviembre de 2012, así como sus derechos soberanos y su jurisdicción sobre estas zonas. Aquel año la CIJ definió la frontera marítima única entre la plataforma continental y las zonas económicas exclusivas nicaragüense y colombiana dentro del límite de las 200 millas náuticas a partir de las líneas de base desde las cuales se mide la anchura del mar territorial de Nicaragua. Los jueces dejaron bajo soberanía colombiana siete cayos del archipiélago de San Andrés, y a Nicaragua le otorgaron una franja marina en esa zona, que Colombia calcula en unos 75.000 kilómetros cuadrados. Abraham dejó claro que la CIJ también es competente para juzgar la segunda demanda de Nicaragua, del 16 de septiembre de 2013, en la que pide a la corte que le reconozca los derechos sobre una plataforma continental más allá de las 200 millas náuticas. Annex 2 82En su demanda solicita a la CIJ, además, que indique los derechos y deberes de los dos Estados en relación con el área de pretensiones superpuestas y el uso de sus recursos hasta que se delimite con precisión la línea fronteriza.La CIJ rechaza así el argumento de Bogotá, que denunció el 27 de noviembre de 2012 el Pacto de Bogotá por el que aceptaba la jurisdicción de la CIJ y afirmaba que la renuncia “tuvo efecto inmediato” con respecto a la iniciación de nuevos procedimientos contra Colombia.El artículo 56 dice que el pacto de Bogotá puede ser denunciado mediante aviso anticipado de un año, transcurrido el cual cesará en sus efectos para el demandante. Nicaragua introdujo su procedimiento el 16 de septiembre de 2013, antes de que expirara el plazo de un año.Reacciones.Para la canciller de Colombia, María Ángela Holguín, los fallos emitidos ayer no constituyen “una derrota para Colombia”.En lo que tiene que ver con la demanda por incumplimiento, la ministra de Relaciones Exteriores señaló que la Corte definió que mirará “si los derechos de Nicaragua se han respetado en la zona”, con lo que ese país “pierde algo que era realmente trascendental” como su alegato sobre el “uso de la fuerza”.En cuanto a la demanda por la plataforma continental extendida, Holguín aseguró que la Corte “por primera vez” mirará este tema “y lo hace de una manera muy compleja y muy difícil”.Entre tanto, el agente de Bogotá ante la CIJ, Carlos Gustavo Arrieta, se mostró sorprendido por las dos sentencias “completamente injustificadas”.“Estoy absolutamente sorprendido por una decisión que considero completamente injustificada y para nada ajustada a derecho”, declaró Arrieta a la prensa en La Haya.Afirmó que “la corte tomó una decisión que afecta a los intereses de Colombia sin ningún fundamento jurídico”.Annex 2 83 Por su parte, el expresidente Álvaro Uribe afirmó que “es mejor soportar un siglo de dificultades diplomáticas que ceder un milímetro de la patria”, y respaldó la decisión del presidente Santos de que el país no siga compareciendo a las audiencias por el tema de Nicaragua porque, según dijo en una rueda de prensa, “Colombia no puede aceptar competencia alguna” de la CIJ. A su vez, la senadora liberal Viviane Morales, advirtió que “las pretensiones de Nicaragua sobre nuestra plataforma continental desconocen el Derecho Internacional y demuestran su apetito voraz en el Caribe”. Entre tanto, el senador liberal Juan Manuel Galán, propuso que “quien no quiera respaldar a Juan Manuel Santos como jefe de Gobierno, que lo respalde como jefe de Estado en el caso de la CIJ y Nicaragua”. De otro lado, la senadora de la Alianza Verde Claudia López señaló que “perdimos el litigio sobre la incompetencia de la Corte pero tenemos con qué ganar el litigio de fondo sobre la plataforma continental”. Mientras tanto, el senador de la Alianza Verde Antonio Navarro planteó que “frente a lo de La Haya, hay que pararse en la raya: no podemos aceptar que esa corte siga decidiendo nuestras fronteras”. Aplauden en Nicaragua. La decisión de la CIJ demuestra que sus sentencias “tienen que respetarse”, afirmó el agente de Nicaragua ante dicho tribunal, Carlos Argüello. “Esto manda un mensaje claro, que es que las sentencias de la CIJ tienen que respetarse, y punto”, dijo Argüello desde La Haya, a través de medios del Gobierno de Nicaragua. Además, expertos y políticos aplaudieron en Nicaragua el fallo: “con esta decisión, la CIJ está confirmando el derecho histórico de Nicaragua de defender la soberanía de su plataforma continental, no tenía sentido la posición de Colombia, de tratar de evadir a la CIJ”, dijo el diputado del opositor Movimiento Renovador Sandinista y ex vicecanciller de Nicaragua Víctor Hugo Tinoco (1981-1990). Annex 2 84Por su parte, el analista jurídico Manuel Madriz agregó que “la CIJ está fallando conforme a derecho, porque el Pacto de Bogotá señala que cuando un Estado se retira del mismo, tiene que esperar un año para hacerse efectivo, pero Nicaragua presentó la demanda antes de un año”.ReapareceAunque el vicepresidente Germán Vargas Lleras había liderado diferentes reuniones políticas en su despacho, luego de la cirugía que le fue practicada el 30 de enero pasado para extirparle un meningioma benigno en su cerebro, ayer tuvo su primera aparición en público. Vargas Lleras estuvo presente en la alocución que hizo el presidente Santos anoche sobre el rechazo a las decisión emitida por la Corte de La Haya.Análisis: “No comparecer ante La Haya podría jugar en contra de Colombia”.Por: Juan Ramón Martínez (Internacionalista y profesor de la Universidad del Rosario).La CIJ decidió sobre la admisibilidad de dos demandas presentadas por Nicaragua adicionales a la que se falló en 2012. Una se refiere a una pretensión sobre la plataforma continental extendida y otra es sobre el supuesto incumplimiento de la sentencia de 2012 por parte de Colombiay, además, se alega una supuesta aplicación de amenaza y del uso de la fuerza. La Corte encontró la competencia para estudiar el fondo de las demandas. El hecho de que Colombia decida abstenerse de comparecer ante La Haya puede ser contraproducente para los intereses nacionales, porque el proceso continúa. La Corte en su momento tendrá solamente la posición nicaragüense y Colombia no presentaría argumentación para contradecirla. De manera que el proceso continuaría estando Colombia no presente, y el riesgode una sentencia adversa puede ser mayor si no participamos en la discusión jurídica.Annex 2 85 Annex 3 Decree No. 33-2013, Baselines of the Marine Areas of the Republic of Nicaragua 19 August 2013 Available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFIL ES/NIC.htm 8687 87 Republic of Nicaragua Central America La Gaceta Official Journal Telephone: 2228-3791/2222-7344 Printing: 650 copies Price C$45.00 28 pages córdobas Year CXVII Managua, Tuesday, 27 August 2013 No. 161 Contents PageGovernment HouseDecree No. 33-2013 ...........................................6701 Annex 3 888927 August 2013 La Gaceta Government House Government of Reconciliation and National Unity United Nicaragua Triumphs Decree No. 33-2013 The President of the Republic Comandante Daniel Ortega Saavedra, Considering I That in accordance with Article 10 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua, the sovereignty, jurisdiction and rights of Nicaragua extend to the adjacent islands, cays and banks, as well as the internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone and the corresponding airspace, in accordance with the law and the standards of international law, II That on 3 May 2000 the Republic of Nicaragua ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, an instrument that brings together the essential principles guaranteeing the rights of States in their marine areas, III That on 5 March 2002 the Republic of Nicaragua, in the interests of strengthening international law and its commitment to international law, adopted Law No. 420 on Marine Areas of Nicaragua, IV That the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua has a special configuration owing to the presence of numerous coastal islands closely linked by their history and economy to the mainland, and also owing to the fact that the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, and that it is of vital importance to maintain the territorial integrity, peace and security of the nation, V That the International Court of Justice issued a historic judgement on 19 November 2012 regarding the Territorial and Maritime Delimitation between Nicaragua and Colombia in the Caribbean Sea, in which it found that the islands adjacent to the coast of Nicaragua in the Caribbean Sea are part of the respective coast and contribute to the establishment of the baselines, Annex 3 89 VI That in view of the foregoing, the Republic of Nicaragua in the exercise of its full sovereignty over its marine areas and in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Law No. 420 on Marine Areas of Nicaragua, is proceeding to determine the straight baselines from which to measure the breadth of its marine areas in the Caribbean Sea, In the exercise of the powers granted to him by the Political Constitution, Has issued the following: Decree Baselines of the Marine Areas of the Republic of Nicaragua in the Caribbean Sea Article 1. The straight baselines of the Republic of Nicaragua to be used to measure the breadth of its territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the Caribbean Sea shall be established. Article 2. The baselines shall be determined by the geographical coordinates set forth in Annex I, as indicated in the chart that is included as Annex II to this Decree. Both annexes shall constitute an integral part of this Decree. Article 3. The waters located within the interior of the baselines established under Article 1 of this Decree shall form part of the internal waters of the Republic of Nicaragua in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 4. In compliance with the provisions of Article 16, paragraph 2, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, this decree shall be duly publicized and a copy thereof, together with the annexes, shall be deposited with the Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Article 5. All legal provisions or regulations that contradict this decree shall be repealed. Article 6. This decree shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the official journal La Gaceta. DONE in the City of Managua, Government House, Republic of Nicaragua, on 19 August 2013. Daniel Ortega Saavedra, President of the Republic of Nicaragua Paul Oquist Kelley, Private Secretary for National Policies Annex 3 9091Annex I Straight baselines of Nicaragua in the Caribbean Sea WGS84 datum geographical coordinates Item No. Latitude (N) Deg. Min. Sec. Longitude (W) Deg. Min. Sec. Name 1 15 00 05.9 083 07 43.0 Cabo Gracias a Dios 2 14 49 15.8 082 41 00.0 Edinburgh Cay 3 14 22 31.2 082 44 06.1 Miskito Cays 4 14 08 40.6 082 48 29.0 Ned Thomas Cay 5 13 03 11.6 083 20 38.6 Man of War Cays 6 12 56 10.8 083 17 31.9 East of Great Tyra Cay 7 12 16 55.5 082 57 54.0 Isla del Maiz Pequeña (Little Corn Island) 8 12 10 39.3 083 01 49.9 Isla del Maiz Grande (Great Corn Island) 9 10 55 52.0 083 39 58.1 Harbour Head ____________ Annex 3 91 Annex 3 92 Annex 3 93 Annex 3