Memorial of Ukraine

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
MEMORIAL
SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE
12 JUNE 2018

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Part I: INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................1
Russia’s Campaign for Hegemony in Ukraine................................ 3
Structure of the Memorial .............................................................. 9
Part II: THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S VIOLATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM..14
Section A: Evidence Showing the Financing of Terrorism in Ukraine.....................17
Chapter 1. Systematic Terrorism by Russia’s Proxies in Ukraine ............................17
Since Their Inception, Russia’s Proxies Have Engaged in a
Pattern of Terrorist Acts to Intimidate Civilians and Coerce
the Ukrainian Government .........................................................18
The Shoot-Down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17.........................28
The Shelling Attacks on Civilians in Donbas.............................. 37
The Campaign of Bombing Attacks in Ukrainian Cities............. 67
Chapter 2. Russian Financing of Terrorism in Ukraine...........................................80
The Massive, Russian-Supplied Arsenal of Weapons to
Illegal Armed Groups in Ukraine ................................................81
The Russian Buk Anti-Aircraft Missile Used to Destroy
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 .........................................................86
The Russian “Grad” and “Smerch” Multiple-Launch Rocket
Systems Used to Shell Ukrainian Civilians ................................98
The Russian Explosives Used to Bomb Ukrainian Cities ......... 104
The Russian Training Camps For Members of the DPR, LPR,
Kharkiv Partisans, and Other Armed Groups .......................... 109
Russian Fundraising for Illegal Armed Groups in Ukraine......... 113
Chapter 3. The Russian Federation’s Failure to Assist Ukraine in
Preventing and Punishing the Financing of Terrorism.........................120
Russia Has Failed to Take Measures to Prevent Weapons
Transfers Across the Ukraine–Russia Border.......................... 120
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Russia Has Failed to Cooperate with Ukraine’s Requests to
Freeze Bank Accounts Used for Terrorism Financing and
Investigate Individuals Linked to Terrorism Financing ...........122
Russia Has Failed to Assist with Ongoing Criminal
Investigations Concerning Terrorism Financing or to
Extradite Suspected Perpetrators..............................................126
Section B: The Russian Federation Has Breached Its Obligations Under the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism............................................................................................... 131
Chapter 4. Russia’s Proxies Committed Numerous Acts of Terrorism in Ukraine
Within the Meaning of ICSFT Article 2................................................. 131
The ICSFT Has a Broad and Comprehensive Definition of
Terrorism................................................................................... 131
Since the Spring of 2014, the DPR and LPR Have Openly
Engaged in Attacks Against Ukrainian Civilians that
Constitute Terrorist Acts Under ICSFT Article 2(1)(b) .............136
The DPR’s Downing of Flight MH17 Constitutes a Terrorist
Act Under ICSFT Article 2(1)(a)................................................139
The DPR’s Shelling Attacks of Civilian Areas Constitute
Terrorist Acts Under ICSFT Article 2(1)(b)...............................142
The Bombing Attacks in Ukrainian Cities Constitute Terrorist
Acts Under ICSFT Article 2(1)(a) ..............................................162
Chapter 5. Russian Officials And Other Russian Nationals Knowingly Financed
Terrorism in Ukraine.............................................................................165
Numerous Russian Officials and Private Actors Have Provided
Funds to Groups Engaged in Terrorism in Ukraine..................166
The Financiers Knew That the Funds They Provided Were to
Be Used, in Full or in Part, for Carrying Out Acts Covered by
ICSFT Articles 2(1)(a) and (b) ................................................... 171
Chapter 6. The Russian Federation Bears State Responsibility For
Violations of The ICSFT ....................................................................... 180
The Russian Federation Is in Breach of Article 18.................... 180
The Russian Federation Is in Breach of Article 8 ..................... 189
The Russian Federation Is in Breach of Articles 9 and 10 ........ 190
The Russian Federation Is in Breach of Article 12.....................193
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Section C: Jurisdiction.............................................................................................196
Chapter 7. The Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Parties’ Dispute
Concerning the ICSFT............................................................................196
There Exists a Dispute Between Ukraine and the Russian
Federation with Respect to the Interpretation or Application
of the ICSFT...............................................................................196
The Dispute Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation
Could Not Be Settled Through Negotiation Within a
Reasonable Time ...................................................................... 198
Ukraine and the Russian Federation Were Unable to Agree
on the Organization of the Arbitration Within Six Months
from the Date of Ukraine’s Request for Arbitration.................200
Part III: THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION.................................................................................................... 203
Section A: Evidence Showing Russia’s Policy and Practice of Racial
Discrimination in Crimea.....................................................................206
Chapter 8. The Russian Federation’s Campaign of Cultural Erasure in
Crimea ..................................................................................................206
The Historical and Social Context for Russia’s Campaign of
Cultural Erasure .......................................................................206
Origins of Russia’s Campaign of Cultural Erasure Against the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian Peoples in Crimea .....................216
Chapter 9. The Russian Federation’s Policy of Discrimination in
Political and Civil Affairs...................................................................... 232
Disappearances, Murders, Abductions and Torture ................ 232
Political Suppression of Crimean Tatars.................................. 243
Arbitrary Searches and Detentions .......................................... 259
Forced Russian Citizenship and Subsequent Discrimination
Against Non-Russians .............................................................. 265
Chapter 10. The Russian Federation’s Policy of Cultural Discrimination
and Suppression ................................................................................... 276
Suppression of Culturally Significant Gatherings..................... 276
Media Restrictions and Harassment......................................... 293
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Degradation of Cultural Heritage..............................................302
Suppression of Minority Education Rights...............................308
Section B: The Russian Federation Has Breached Its Obligations Under the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination...................................................................................... 322
Chapter 11. CERD’s Meaning and Applicability in the Present Case ...................... 322
The Principles of Non-Discrimination and Equality Before
the Law Are Bedrock Principles Under the Convention and
Should Be Given Their Broadest Meaning ............................... 323
The Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian Communities in Crimea
Are Ethnic Groups Protected by the Convention ..................... 328
Chapter 12. The Russian Federation’s Violations of the CERD............................... 335
Article 2 – Obligation to Eliminate Racial Discrimination ..... 335
Article 4 – Incitement to Racial Discrimination .....................340
Article 5 –Equality Before the Law...........................................341
Article 6 – Effective Protection and Remedies ........................ 353
Article 7 – Education to Combat Racial Discrimination ......... 354
Section C: Jurisdiction........................................................................................... 357
Chapter 13. The Court Has Jurisidiction Over the Parties’ Dispute
Concerning the CERD .......................................................................... 357
There Exists a Dispute Between Ukraine and the Russian
Federation with Respect to the Interpretation or Application
of the CERD. ............................................................................. 357
The Dispute Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation
has not been Settled by Negotiation or by the Procedures
Provided for in the CERD......................................................... 358
Part IV: SUBMISSIONS..........................................................................................................362
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PART I: INTRODUCTION
1. The Russian Federation is responsible for a brazen and comprehensive assault
on human rights and international law in the territory of Ukraine. In carrying out this
campaign, Russia has committed systematic violations of the International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (“ICSFT”), and the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”).1
2. In Ukraine’s east, the Russian Federation relies on proxies — illegal armed
groups that advance Russia’s agenda, in significant part by terrorizing and intimidating the
population. These proxies used a Russian-supplied Buk, a component part of a powerful
missile system, to shoot down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 from Ukraine’s skies, murdering
nearly three hundred innocent civilians. They used Russian-supplied rockets to bombard
known civilian areas, including residential neighborhoods and a civilian checkpoint. And
they used Russian-supplied military-grade explosives in Ukraine’s cities, targeting unity
rallies and nightclubs, and attempting to silence outspoken public figures.
3. In Crimea, the Russian Federation acts overtly and directly. There, in
Ukrainian territory that Russia unlawfully occupies, Russia maintains its domination
through a policy of racial discrimination and cultural erasure directed against those ethnic
communities that dared to oppose its purported annexation of the peninsula. It has
methodically trampled the political and civil rights of these communities: disappearing,
torturing, and murdering Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian activists; subjecting others to
arbitrary searches and detention; and banning the Mejlis, the representative institution that
has been a bulwark for the rights of the Crimean Tatar people since it returned from Stalin’s
ruthless exile. Russia is also choking off the cultural expression that these communities need
1 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 2798 U.N.T.S. 197
(entered into force 10 April 2002) (hereinafter ICSFT); International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969)
(hereinafter CERD).
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if they are to preserve and perpetuate their distinct identities: banning or disrupting cultural
gatherings; suppressing the media outlets serving Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian audiences;
and restricting opportunities for children from those communities to be educated in their
native languages.
4. These well-documented and widely-condemned actions violate international
law. The U.N. Security Council immediately demanded accountability for the shoot-down of
Flight MH17, and the attack has been meticulously investigated by a multinational Joint
Investigation Team. That team announced on 24 May 2018 that the Buk missile that
downed Flight MH17 was supplied by the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade of the Russian
Federation.
5. U.N. monitors from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(“OHCHR”) have reported on the systematic intimidation and terror perpetrated by Russia’s
proxies in eastern Ukraine, as well as Russia’s role in arming them. A monitoring mission of
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (“OSCE”) has documented these
groups’ responsibility for attacks on civilians.
6. The U.N. General Assembly has repeatedly condemned the discriminatory
closure of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, and other acts of discrimination by the
Russian occupation authorities in Crimea.2 In resolution 72/190 adopted on 19 December
2017, for example, the U.N. General Assembly condemned “violations, abuses, measures and
practices of discrimination against the residents of the temporarily occupied Crimea,
including Crimean Tatars, as well as Ukrainians and persons belonging to other ethnic and
religious groups, by the Russian occupation authorities[.]” The OHCHR also has
documented the pervasive discrimination against Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea.
7. Far from suppressing the financing of terrorism, Russia has comprehensively
supported such financing. Far from seeking to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination,
2 See, e.g., U.N. General Assembly Resolution 72/190, U.N. Doc. A/Res/72/190 (19 December 2017)
(Annex 50).
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Russia has employed such discriminatory tactics. Yet Russia has evaded responsibility. This
Memorial establishes Russia’s international responsibility for violating its treaty obligations
in relation to these acts.
Russia’s Campaign for Hegemony in Ukraine
8. Although Russia’s means and methods have differed, they reflect a common
aim: to maintain Russian control over those parts of its “near abroad” that it considers under
its rightful sphere of influence. When Ukraine declared its independence from the Soviet
Union in 1991 and began to chart its own sovereign course, the Russian Federation
committed to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its settled
borders. It has become clear, however, that Russia is only prepared to honor that
commitment if Ukraine agrees to remain under Russian hegemony.
9. In recent years, the Russian Federation’s view of its role in the region, and its
attempts to force Ukraine into closer integration with Russia on its terms, have been
challenged by Ukraine and its people. Ukraine has pursued an approach to international
affairs in which it is not beholden to Russia. Russia has responded with punitive trade
sanctions, gas cut-offs, and threats to Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Perhaps less visibly,
Russia mounted a campaign of ideological subversion and propaganda, funding pro-Russian
organizations in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and spreading false information through
media and other outlets.
10. Russia’s efforts to subordinate Ukraine and compel it to forge a closer union
with Russia failed. From November 2013 to February 2014, thousands of Ukrainians
gathered peacefully in Kyiv’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti (“Independence Square”). Despite
brutal tactics, including the murder of unarmed protestors, support for leaders who had been
compromised by Russia evaporated. In its “Revolution of Dignity,” Ukraine reaffirmed its
core values under its Constitution and its desire for true independence.
11. Since its campaign of propaganda, threats, and economic warfare did not
weaken Ukraine’s resolve, the Russian Federation escalated to more extreme methods in
pursuit of hegemony over Ukraine. In Crimea, Russia’s rhetoric boiled over into action and
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overt aggression. In late February 2014, the Russian military amassed at Ukraine’s border
and armed men wearing green uniforms without insignia — later identified as Russian
Armed Forces3 — started appearing at strategic locations in Crimea. These “little green men”
worked alongside paramilitary groups, including Self-Defense Forces, Cossacks, and
elements of the Berkut special police that had fired upon protestors in Kyiv’s Independence
Square.4
12. While the Russian Federation claimed at the time that it had nothing to do
with these developments, that was later shown to be a lie. By Russian President Putin’s own
admission, he convened a meeting on 22 and 23 February 2014 to “begin working on
returning Crimea to Russia.”5 Indeed, planning for the invasion of Crimea had no doubt
begun before that date.
13. On 27 February 2014, Russian forces — still wearing no insignia — seized the
Crimean Parliament Building and raised the Russian flag. Under the supervision of these
armed men, the hijacked Parliament purported to dismiss the existing government and
illegally appointed Sergey Aksyonov, leader of the previously marginal Russian Unity Party,
3 As these men wore green uniforms camouflaged in patterns similar to the uniforms of the Russian
Armed Forces, but with no insignia, the local media dubbed them the “little green men.” Vitaly
Shevchenko, “Little Green Men” or “Russian invaders”? BBC News (11 March 2014) (Annex 567).
Many of these “little green men,” as President Putin later acknowledged, were members of the Russian
Armed Forces. Alan Taylor, ‘Believed to Be Russian Soldiers’, The Atlantic (11 March 2014)
(Annex 505).
4 Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, President of Russia (17 April 2014), p. 78 (Annex 51).
5 Vladimir Putin, Interview given to the TV channel “Rossiya” as part of a documentary “Crimea: Path
to the Homeland” (video) (Annex 53).
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as the “Prime Minister of Crimea.”6 Over the next few days, Russian forces seized other key
installations and surrounded Ukrainian military bases.7
14. Russia sought to convert its unlawful occupation of Crimea into outright
annexation through a sham “referendum.”8 As President Putin would euphemistically put it,
“Russia created [the] conditions” for the referendum to occur.9 The international
community roundly condemned it. The U.N. General Assembly declared the referendum
unlawful and said that its results could not be recognized, and the Venice Commission of the
Council of Europe concluded that it violated constitutional principles.10 Nevertheless, on 18
March 2014, the Russian Federation cited the referendum as the basis for its purported
annexation of Crimea.
15. With Crimea under its physical control, Russia began to mete out punishment
to ethnic communities that had stood in its way. In doing so, Russia has compounded its
blatant violations of the U.N. Charter with overt violations of the CERD, in an open
campaign of discrimination and cultural erasure directed against the Crimean Tatar and
Ukrainian communities.
6 Resolution No. 1656-6 /14 (27 February 2014) (Annex 435); OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in
the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22
February 2014 to 12 September 2017), paras. 5, 23 (Annex 758).
7 BBC News, Putin Reveals Secrets of Russia's Crimea Takeover Plot (9 March 2015) (Annex 52); Kyiv
Post, Russian Armed Forces Seize Crimea as Putin Threatens Wider Military Invasion of Ukraine (2
March 2014) (Annex 503).
8 Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Resolution No. 1702-6/14, arts. 1‒2 (6
March 2014) (Annex 604).
9 Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, President of Russia (17 April 2014), p. 28 (Annex 51).
10 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 68/262, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/262, Territorial Integrity of
Ukraine (27 March 2014) (Annex 43); Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on “Whether the Decision Taken by the Supreme Council
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine to Organize a Referendum on Becoming a
Constituent Territory of the Russian Federation or Restoring Crimea’s 1992 Constitution is
Compatible with Constitutional Principles,” CDL-AD(2014)002 (21–22 March 2014) (Annex 354).
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16. At the same time that Russia openly intervened in Crimea, it employed more
covert tactics — supporting and arming illegal proxy groups — to assert its influence and
dominance over eastern Ukraine. In the east, Russia sought to use many of the same
techniques that it had employed in Crimea, attempting to instigate and support separatist
movements to proclaim “people’s republics” across a wide swathe of territory from Odesa in
the south to Kharkiv in the north east. The first steps of Russia’s proxy campaign were taken
in February and March 2014. In this period, Russia instigated, organized, and financed antigovernment
protests across cities in eastern Ukraine with significant Russian-speaking
populations.11 As the OHCHR documented, there were numerous reports that “people were
brought in buses and paid to take part in protests and conduct them according to specific
scenarios, including causing violent incidents.”12
17. Russia’s attempts to foment a general uprising in eastern Ukraine failed to
gain broad public support. So Russia turned to arming its proxies to advance its agenda
through violent means. With Russia’s active support, multiple armed groups comprised of
pro-Russian Ukrainians and Russian nationals often fresh from service in other theatres,
emerged in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, spanning the Donetsk and Luhansk
oblasts. Many of these groups’ early leaders had close ties to, and received support from, the
11 Putin-advisor Sergey Glazyev discussed providing funds to pro-Russian organizations in Ukraine,
mobilizing Russians or pro-Russian Ukrainians to join demonstrations, and encouraging takeovers of
regional councils. See Protocol of Intercepted Conversations of Sergey Glazyev, Advisor to Russian
President Putin (12 June 2014), pp. 10‒14 (Annex 392); Witness Statement of Andrii Tkachenko (5
June 2018), para. 14‒17 [hereinafter Tkachenko Statement] (Annex 10).
12 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 April 2014), para. 68 (describing
demonstrations in early March) (Annex 44).
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Russian Federation, and key Russian advisers to these armed groups helped to facilitate their
operations.13
18. In March and April 2014, these illegal armed groups occupied public and
administration buildings in Donetsk and Luhansk.14 On 11 May 2014, some of these armed
groups, calling themselves the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”) and “Luhansk People’s
Republic” (“LPR”), announced their political goal as autonomy from Kyiv, and held a
purported “referendum” that, like the one in Crimea, has been roundly condemned.15
19. Throughout the unrest in Donbas, Russia has insisted that the DPR, LPR, and
associated armed groups are distinct from the Russian Federation. At the same time, as with
Crimea, Russia has not been able to maintain its false claim that “[t]here are no Russian
units in eastern Ukraine — no special services, no tactical advisors.”16 In fact, Russia would
go on to admit having its advisors on the ground, with President Putin claiming that “[w]e
never said there were not people there who carried out certain tasks.”17
20. Over the summer of 2014, the armed groups associated with the DPR and
LPR had become increasingly organized. As reported by the OHCHR, “[t]heir leadership,
many of whom are nationals of the Russian Federation,” have “brought together” “[w]hat
13 See Ukraine Crisis: Key Players in Eastern Unrest, BBC News (28 August 2014) (Annex 541);
Council of the European Union, List of Persons and Entities Under EU Restrictive Measures Over the
Territorial Integrity of Ukraine pp. 17, 19 (2017) (Annex 541).
14 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, (15 May 2014), para. 90 (Annex 45).
15 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 June 2014), paras. 2, 160‒161
(Annex 46).
16 Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, President of Russia (17 April 2014), p. 5 (Annex 46).
17 The Guardian, Putin Admits Russian Military Presence in Ukraine for the First Time (17 December
2015) (Annex 585).
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was previously something of a rag tag [band] of armed groups with different loyalties and
agendas.”18
21. These armed groups also received a massive influx of weaponry from the
Russian Federation. Russian nationals who have served in the Russian military also
embedded within the DPR and LPR, in order to provide advice, assistance, and add
manpower.19 In parallel, the DPR and LPR were also elaborating their political agenda
through detailed demands for greater autonomy from the Ukrainian government. In early
September 2014, in the midst of negotiations in Minsk between the Ukrainian and Russian
governments to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the DPR and LPR articulated a list of
political demands: that the Ukrainian government recognize the special status of their
territories and grant them greater autonomy; grant them the right to make Russian their
official language; and grant each region the ability to engage in its own economic relations
with Russia.20 On the eve of further negotiations in Minsk in February 2015, leaders of both
groups again released a detailed list of political demands that included “constitutional
18 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 July 2014), para. 8 (Annex 296).
19 See, e.g., Signed Declaration of Vladimir Starkov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (27 July 2015), pp.
1‒4, 6‒8, 10, 13‒16, 18 (admitting that he is a member of the Russian military who, along with over 70
other officers, was told he “would be going either to the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ or to the ‘Lugansk
People’s Republic,’” and that he was sent to serve “as [an] advisor[] to the local senior officers, to train
them in how to take charge of a particular service correctly”) (Annex 234); see also Signed Declaration
of Serhiy Semenchenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (10 July 2017), pp. 2‒6 (Annex 267); Signed
Declaration of Paylak Mikhaelian, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (10 October 2016), p. 2 (Annex
249); Signed Declaration of Volodymyr Vodyratskyi, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (11 September
2015), p. 9 (Annex 243); Signed Declaration of Oleksandr Oleksechuk, Suspect Interrogation Protocol
(16 February 2017), p. 1 (Annex 255); Signed Declaration of Igor Panchyshyn, Witness Interrogation
Protocol (18 June 2015), p. 3 (Annex 232).
20 MKRU, The DPR and LPR Promise Kiev That They Will Remain Part of Ukraine in Exchange for
Recognition of Their Status (1 September 2014) (Annex 542); Petyr Kozlov & Alexey Nikolsky, The
Self-Proclaimed Republics in the East of Ukraine Put Forward their “Negotiation Demands” to Kiev,
Vedomosti (2 September 2014) (Annex 543).
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reforms in Ukraine, including extensive decentralization by granting individual areas of the
Donbas an autonomous status.”21 In service of these aims, Russia’s proxies engaged in what
OHCHR has described as a “reign of intimidation and terror.”22 That reign of terror was not
confined to Donbas, but rocked the streets of Kharkiv, Odesa, and later Kyiv in a series of
bombings by the Kharkiv Partisans and other groups.
* * *
22. Whether covert or overt, a common element of the Russian Federation’s
campaign for hegemony in Ukraine has been its disrespect for human rights and the rule of
law. While not every aspect of this campaign is before the Court, Ukraine asks this Court to
hold the Russian Federation accountable for its systematic breaches of its obligations under
the ICSFT and the CERD which have brought great harm to Ukraine and its citizens, and
indeed the world. In ratifying the ICSFT and the CERD, Russia committed to suppress the
financing of terrorism and to eliminate racial discrimination. Far from respecting those
commitments, Russia has transferred vast quantities of dangerous weapons and other funds
to groups on Ukrainian soil known to engage in terrorist acts, and has adopted a systematic
policy of racial discrimination in a territory it illegally occupies. Such egregious wrongs
demand a judicial remedy. Pursuant to the ICSFT and the CERD, Ukraine calls upon this
Court to uphold international law, find Russia responsible for treaty breaches under the
ICSFT and the CERD, and provide a remedy for the shocking and continuing toll these
violations have taken on the people of Ukraine and the broader international community.
Structure of the Memorial
23. The Russian Federation has submitted to this Court’s jurisdiction for the
resolution of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the ICSFT and the
CERD. Ukraine has repeatedly objected to the Russian Federation’s violations of the ICSFT
21 Lb.ua, Media Publish the Demands of the DPR and LPR for the Resolution of the Conflict
(Documents) (11 February 2015) (Annex 558); Zn.ua, The DPR’s and LPR’s Proposals at the
Negotiations in Minsk (11 February 2015) (Annex 559).
22 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 July 2014), para. 26 (Annex 296).
10
and CERD and has demanded that Russia cease its illegal actions and make appropriate
reparation. The parties engaged in numerous rounds of negotiations relating to the disputes
under both treaties, but made no progress. Accordingly, on 16 January 2017, Ukraine
submitted an Application instituting proceedings before this Court pursuant to Article 24 of
the ICSFT and Article 22 of the CERD. On 19 April 2017, the Court issued an order finding
that it prima facie had jurisdiction over the case and indicating provisional measures.
24. Part II of this Memorial presents Ukraine’s claims under the ICSFT. Under
the ICSFT, Russia is responsible for numerous acts of commission and omission. Ukraine
claims that illegal armed groups in its territory have perpetrated terrorist acts covered by the
ICSFT; that Russian officials and other Russian nationals have provided massive amounts of
funds to these groups knowing of their acts of terrorism, including providing specific
weapons used in terrorism; and that Russia is responsible for violating the ICSFT in relation
to these terrorism financing offenses, including by failing to prevent its own officials from
directly engaging in such offenses themselves. Part II of the Memorial elaborates on this
claim and provides the detailed factual and legal support for it.
25. Section A of Part II (Chapters 1, 2, and 3) sets forth the facts and evidence
establishing these violations. Chapter 1 presents the numerous and well-documented acts
of terrorism that Russia’s proxies — the DPR, the LPR, the Kharkiv Partisans, and others —
have committed in Ukraine since the spring of 2014. Chapter 2 demonstrates how Russian
officials and other Russian nationals escalated their provision of weapons, training, and
financial support to Russia’s proxies, knowing that they were engaged in a “reign of terror” in
the spring and summer of 2014, and continued to do so as these groups committed
additional acts of terrorism. Chapter 3 shows that Russia has systematically refused to
cooperate with Ukraine in its efforts to stop the influx from Russian territory of weapons,
money, and other support to Russia’s proxies operating in Ukraine.
26. Section B (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) demonstrates on the basis of this evidence
that Russia bears international responsibility for violating the ICSFT. Chapter 4
establishes that the acts documented in Chapter 1 are covered acts of terrorism under the
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ICSFT. Chapter 5 shows that the provision of funds by Russian officials, as well as by other
Russian nationals, to these groups that committed acts of terrorism in Ukraine, constituted
knowing financing of terrorism within the meaning of ICSFT Article 2(1). Chapter 6
establishes that Russia has violated ICSFT Article 18 by failing to take practicable measures
to prevent and stop the financing of terrorism by any persons under its jurisdiction,
including Russian officials. It also demonstrates that Russia has violated its other
cooperation obligations under ICSFT Articles 8, 9, 10, and 12. Finally, Chapter 7, Section C
establishes that all pre-conditions to this Court’s jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute under
the ICSFT have been met in this case.
27. Part III of the Memorial presents Ukraine’s claims under the CERD.
Ukraine claims that the Russian Federation has engaged in a systematic campaign of
discrimination against the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea, in the
course of which it has violated numerous obligations under the CERD. Specifically, the
Russian Federation has engaged in discrimination in violation of the CERD by carrying out
or tolerating a series of abductions, disappearances, murders, and torture of Crimean Tatar
and Ukrainian individuals; suppressing the political rights of the Crimean Tatar community
through persecution of the Mejlis and its leaders; conducting arbitrary searches of Crimean
Tatar homes, schools, and towns; restricting the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities’
attempts to hold culturally-significant gatherings; restricting media outlets designed to serve
the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea; and by suppressing the
educational rights of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea. The Russian
Federation’s pervasive policy and practice of racial discrimination, aimed ultimately at the
cultural erasure of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea, is a further
violation of the CERD.
28. Section A (Chapters 8, 9, and 10) sets forth the evidence of a Russian
campaign of racial discrimination in Crimea aimed at the cultural erasure of the Crimean
Tatar and Ukrainian communities. Chapter 8 provides historical and ethnic context for the
Russian Federation’s actions in Crimea and describes the origins of Russia’s campaign.
12
29. Chapter 9 describes in detail how the Russian Federation has selectively
deprived the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities of their civil and political rights,
placing them in a vulnerable position. This includes instigation or toleration of the
abduction, torture, and murder of numerous Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian activists to create
a climate of intimidation in the run-up to the referendum; stripping the Crimean Tatar
people of representative structures on which they have relied to defend their interests since
their return to Crimea; the use of arbitrary and discriminatory searches and detentions to
keep the broader Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in a state of fear and
uncertainty; and the imposition of Russian citizenship, residency, and immigration
legislation to justify discrimination against non-citizens of Russia in Crimea.
30. Chapter 10 describes the Russian Federation’s discriminatory actions
directed at the cultural activities by which the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities
express their distinct identities and pass them on to future generations. This includes
blocking or disrupting gatherings of cultural importance to the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
communities; silencing independent Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian media outlets, either by
direct physical action or by the pretextual denial of applications to reregister under Russian
law; degrading Crimean Tatar cultural heritage and Ukrainian cultural activity in Crimea;
and reorienting the education system in Crimea to support Russian cultural dominance, with
opportunities to learn in the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages sharply curtailed.
31. Section B (Chapters 11 and 12) addresses the legal consequences under the
CERD of Russia’s conduct in Crimea. Chapter 11 describes the fundamental obligations of
non-disrimination assumed by States Parties under the CERD. Chapter 12 describes the
myriad ways in which Russia’s conduct in Crimea violates the CERD. Finally, Chapter 13,
Section C, establishes that all pre-conditions to this Court’s jurisdiction over the parties’
dispute under the CERD have been met in this case.
* * *
32. Russia has pursued its goal of regional hegemony through various methods
and means. But whether it operates overtly through a discriminatory occupation regime or
13
indirectly by arming proxies and fostering support for their campaigns of violence and
intimidation, Russia has displayed a fundamental disrespect for its obligations under
international law, and for the human rights of the Ukrainian people. Ukraine urges the
Court to hold Russia accountable for its violations of both the ICSFT and the CERD.
14
PART II: THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S VIOLATIONS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE
FINANCING OF TERRORISM
33. In adopting the ICSFT, States Parties recognized the financing of terrorism to
be “a matter of grave concern to the international community as a whole,” and concluded
that “the number and seriousness of acts of international terrorism depend on the financing
that terrorists may obtain.”23 The ICSFT sought a comprehensive solution to this matter of
grave concern, born of the “urgent need to enhance international cooperation among States
in devising and adopting effective measures for the prevention of the financing of
terrorism.”24
34. Russia’s proxies have committed numerous acts of violence and intimidation
against civilians in the territory of Ukraine, with extensive support from the Russian
Federation. This Part of the Memorial establishes that through its role in this campaign of
terrorism financing, the Russian Federation has systematically and flagrantly violated its
obligations under the ICSFT.
35. Under ICSFT Article 2, the main offense of providing funds for use in
terrorism is defined in two distinct steps. First, Article 2 defines the acts of terrorism that
are covered by the Convention, covering violations of an enumerated list of treaties (Article
2(1)(a)), and a broad category covering any act intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury to a civilian, and which by its nature or context has the purpose of intimidating a
population or compelling a government to do or abstain from any act (Article 2(1)(b)).
Article 2(1) then makes it an offense for “any person” to provide “funds” — defined broadly
by Article 1 to constitute “assets of every kind” — intending or knowing that they are to be
used, in full or in part, to carry out a covered act of terrorism. Article 2(1) provides in full:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this
Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly,
unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds [defined in
23 ICSFT, pmbl.
24 Ibid.
15
Article 1 to mean “assets of every kind”] with the intention that
they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be
used, in full or in part, in order to carry out:
(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and
as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex [including
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, and the International Convention
for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings]; or
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active
part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the
purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.25
36. Article 2(5) further provides that any person who “[o]rganizes or directs
others to commit an offense” under Article 2(1) also commits a covered offense under the
ICSFT.
37. The ICSFT also creates a series of obligations on States to prohibit or act to
prevent the Article 2 offenses of financing terrorism. Most comprehensively, Article 18
obliges States to take all practicable measures to cooperate to prevent and to counter
preparations in their territories for the commission of acts of terrorism financing both within
and outside their territory. Article 18 requires States to prevent acts of terrorism financing
by ”any person,” a broad term under Article 2 that encompasses both state officials and
private actors. Article 18(1) provides:
States Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of the offences
set forth in article 2 by taking all practicable measures, inter
alia, by adapting their domestic legislation, if necessary, to
prevent and counter preparations in their respective territories
for the commission of those offences within or outside their
territories . . . .26
38. The ICSFT also enumerates a range of concrete steps States must take to
cooperate in the prevention of terrorism financing, including the identification, detection,
freezing, seizing, and forfeiting of funds allocated for financing terrorism (Article 8),
25 Ibid., art. 2(1).
26 Ibid., art. 18(1).
16
investigating and prosecuting or extraditing financiers of terrorism (Articles 9 and 10), and
affording other States the greatest measure of assistance in investigations of terrorism
financing offenses (Article 12).
39. In Section A below, Ukraine makes a detailed factual showing that Russia’s
proxies in Ukraine have carried out a campaign of violence and intimidation against civilians
(Chapter 1); that Russian officials and other Russian nationals have directly and indirectly
provided these groups with funds including both arms and money (Chapter 2); and that the
Russian Federation has not taken practicable measures to cooperate in the prevention of
such financing; but, rather, has rebuffed Ukraine’s requests for good-faith cooperation
(Chapter 3). Section B then shows how Russia’s actions violate the ICSFT. It establishes that
Russia’s proxies carry out terrorist acts covered under ICSFT Article 2 (Chapter 4); that
Russian officials and other Russian nationals knowingly fund those terrorist acts (Chapter
5); and that by failing to prevent, tolerating, encouraging, and even supporting these acts of
terrorism financing, the Russian Federation violates Articles 8, 9, 10, 12, and 18 of the ICSFT
(Chapter 6).
40. Finally, in Section C (Chapter 7), Ukraine establishes that all prerequisites for
the Court’s jurisdiction have been met.
17
Section A: Evidence Showing the Financing of Terrorism in Ukraine
Chapter 1. SYSTEMATIC TERRORISM BY RUSSIA’S PROXIES IN UKRAINE
41. Since the spring of 2014, Russia’s proxies — the DPR, the LPR, the Kharkiv
Partisans, and others27 — have committed numerous brazen and deadly acts of terrorism in
Ukraine. This Chapter details some of these groups’ most serious acts of terrorism. Targeted
killings and torture of civilians in the spring and summer of 2014 progressed to the shocking
shoot-down of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 (“Flight MH17” or “MH17”) in July 2014. This
pattern continued with major shelling attacks on Ukrainian civilians in January and
February 2015, and a sustained bombing campaign in the city of Kharkiv from July 2014 to
February 2015. And in early 2017, just days after Ukraine filed its Application in this Court,
Russia’s proxies mounted an attack on the civilian population of another city, Avdiivka, and
attempted to assassinate a Ukrainian member of parliament in Kyiv.
27 As referenced in Chapter 1, Section A, Russia’s proxies emerged in the Donbas region of eastern
Ukraine in the spring of 2014, comprised of loosely affiliated groups of pro-Russian Ukrainians and
Russian nationals, some of whom declared themselves the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”) and
the “Luhansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”). In cities outside of Donbas, Russian proxy groups such as
the Kharkiv Partisans also fomented unrest and engaged in violent activities.
18
Map 1: Terrorism by Russia’s Proxies in Ukraine
Since Their Inception, Russia’s Proxies Have Engaged in a Pattern of
Terrorist Acts to Intimidate Civilians and Coerce the Ukrainian
Government
42. From their earliest days, the DPR and LPR committed acts of violence and
intimidation targeted at civilians in furtherance of their political objectives and their attempt
to consolidate control over areas of Ukrainian territory. Terrorist acts form a key element of
their modus operandi. As the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights (“OHCHR”) has extensively documented, the DPR and LPR adopted a persistent
practice of targeting civilian political opponents with violence and intimidation.
43. One of the most notorious acts of terrorism against a civilian opposing the
DPR and LPR — the abduction, torture, and murder of Horlivka town councilor Volodymyr
Rybak — occurred in April 2014. Mr. Rybak was well known for his support of Ukrainian
19
unity.28 As OHCHR reported, on the afternoon of 17 April 2014, Mr. Rybak tried to replace
the DPR flag with the Ukrainian national flag outside the Horlivka town hall, but he was
rebuffed by DPR supporters.29 Later that day at approximately 18:00, several masked and
armed men seized Mr. Rybak and forced him into a waiting car.30 That was the last time he
was seen alive.
44. Mr. Rybak’s body was found a day later on 18 April 2014 in a river near the
settlement of Raigorodok, along with the body of student Maidan activist Yurri Popravko.31
As reported by OHCHR, forensic evidence revealed that “before his death, Rybak was tied;
his abdomen ripped off, and he was thrown into the water.”32 Mr. Popravko’s body also
showed signs of torture.33 Less than two weeks later, the body of another student Maidan
activist, Turii Diakovskyi, was found at the same site, also bearing signs of torture.34 He had
last been seen alive traveling with Mr. Popravko to the town of Sloviyansk.35
45. Intercepted telephone conversations link DPR commander Igor Bezler to Mr.
Rybak’s abduction, torture and murder. Bezler, a Russian national with ties to the Russian
28 Luke Harding and Oksana Grytsenko, Kidnapping of Ukrainian Patriots Has Russia’s Full
Support, Says Kiev, Guardian (23 April 2014) (Annex 507).
29 OHCHR, Accountability for Killing in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016 (2016), p. 33
(Annex 49).
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid. paras. 33–35.
35 Ibid. Contemporaneous reports also documented these events. See, e.g., OHCHR, Report on
Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 May 2014), paras. 95-96 (Annex 45).
20
military, helped lead an illegal armed group in Horlivka associated with the DPR.36 In
intercepted calls on 17 April 2014, Bezler can be heard ordering a subordinate to capture Mr.
Rybak:
Bezler: Listen carefully, go inside of the city administration,
Rybak is misbehaving there [cursing], go inside of the city
administration, people are trying to restrain him there. Press
him!
[ . . . ]
Look, guys, press him slightly, [put] him into your car and take
him as further out [cursing], further out [cursing]. And then,
stop and tell me where I should come. Do you understand? Do
it.
Soon after Mr. Rybak’s torture and murder, Ukrainian authorities released these
intercepts.37 At the U.N. Security Council, a member condemned these “attacks targeting
political figures in the strongest terms.”38 The message from Mr. Rybak’s torture and
murder was clear: those who dare to show support for Ukrainian unity will be targeted, made
to suffer, and potentially even be killed.
46. Igor Girkin (also called “Strelkov” or “Strelok”), another DPR commander
with ties to Russian intelligence services, also targeted supporters of Ukrainian unity in
36 Council of the European Union, List of Persons and Entities Under EU Restrictive Measures Over
the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, p. 19 (2017) [hereinafter EU Sanctions] (Annex 357); BBC News,
Ukraine Crisis: Key Players in Eastern Unrest (28 August 2014) (Annex 541); Glavcom, Igor (Bes)
Bezler: I Don’t Watch TV - I don’t Know About the Minsk Agreements (21 October 2014)
(Annex 545).
37 See, e.g., Jamie Dettmer, ‘In Cold Blood’ in Ukraine, The Daily Beast (3 May 2014) (Annex 545);
MKRU, SBU - People’s Mayor Slavyansk Discussed with an Officer of the GRU RF How to Red of the
Corpse of Deputy Rybak (24 April 2014) (Annex 509).
38 U.N. Security Council, Records of 7165th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7165 (29 Apr. 2014), p. 8
(Annex 290).
21
spring 2014.39 Girkin supported Russia’s military intervention in Crimea as an advisor to
Crimean “Prime Minister” Sergei Aksyonov. He then moved on to Donbas to help lead an
illegal armed group associated with the DPR operating out of the city of Sloviyansk.40 In an
interview, Girkin admitted that in Sloviyansk in 2014 he engaged in “executions,” including
one person he considered an “ideological” supporter of a Ukrainian political movement.41 In
early July 2014, the OHCHR reported on Girkin’s ruthless tactics, including summary
exeuctions.
47. This cold-blooded targeting of civilians for their political stances — and the
unmistakable message of intimidation it sent — was hardly an isolated incident. These acts
of terror also coincided with the emergence of Russian nationals with close ties to the
39 The European Union has identified Girkin as “staff of [the] Main Intelligence Directorate of the
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU).” EU Sanction, pp. 17, 40
(Annex 357); MKRU, Colonel of the FSB Igor Strelkov Called the Senseless Assault on the Donetsk
Airport (1 December 2014) (Annex 548).
40 Zavtra, Who Are You, Shooter? (20 November 2014) (Annex 546); BBC News, Ukraine Crisis: Key
Players in Eastern Unrest (28 August 2014) (Annex 541); Aleksander Vasovic & Maria Tsvetkova,
Elusive Muscovite with Three Names Takes Control of Ukraine Rebels, Reuters (15 May 2014)
(Annex 515); Alec Luhn, Fight Club, Donetsk, Foreign Policy (18 June 2014) (Annex 523). Like DPR
leader Borodai, he also previously worked for Konstantin Malofeev, a Russian billionaire with close
ties President Putin. Courtney Weaver, Malofeev: The Russian Billionaire Linking Moscow to the
Rebels, Financial Times (24 July 2014) (Annex 533).
41 Anna Shamanska, Former Commander of Pro-Russian Separatists Says He Executed People Based
on Stalin-Era Laws, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (19 January 2016) (Annex 587). OHCHR,
Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 July 2014), para. 47 (“Written records of
execution orders authorized and signed personally by the ‘Commander-inChief’ of the armed groups,
Igor Girkin (known as Strelkov), as well as protocols of hearings of a ‘military tribunal’ convicting
people to death, were found in Slovyansk by a journalist on 7 July. The convictions were apparently of
people associated with armed groups, and a common criminal.”) (Annex 296).
22
Russian Government as leaders of the DPR and LPR.42 OHCHR reported at the time that the
DPR and LPR targeted countless other political opponents, real or perceived, of the “people’s
republics” for death or injury throughout the spring and summer of 2014.43 For example:
• On 8 May, “the burned body of Valeriy Salo, a farmer and head of a local
cultural organization known as a ‘Pro-Maidan’ activist, was found a day after
he had been abducted by armed persons from his village.”44
• Two days later on 10 May, OHCHR reported that “three ‘Pro-Ukrainian’
female activists not involved in any fighting were abducted and detained by
armed persons in Kramatorsk.”45 One of them was released the next day
after reportedly being tortured. She was subsequently hospitalised in
Slovyansk, suffering from broken ribs, a pierced liver, a head injury and
multiple bruises.”46
42 In addition to Bezler and Girkin, soon after the purported DPR and LPR “referendums” described in
Part I, Section A, Alexander Borodai, who has close ties to Russian intelligence services, became the
purported “prime minister” of the DPR. Christopher Miller, Russian Resigns to Make Way for
Ukrainian as New Head of ‘Donetsk People’s Republic,’ Guardian (8 August 2014) (Annex 536);
Alexander Borodai: I am a Russian Imperialist, Actual Comment (24 November 2014) (Annex 547);
Harriet Salem, Who’s Who in the Donetsk People’s Republic, VICE News (1 July 2014). Borodai had
previously served as an advisor to Aksyonov in Crimea and also worked for Mr. Malofeev. Courtney
Weaver, Malofeev: The Russian Billionaire Linking Moscow to the Rebels, Financial Times (24 July
2014) (Annex 533); Henry Meyer and Onur Ant, Analysis: The Russian ‘Philosopher’ Who Links
Putin, Bannon, Turkey: Alexander Dugin, Chicago Tribune (3 February 2017) (Annex 591);
Christopher Miller, Russian Resigns to Make Way for Ukrainian as New Head of ‘Donetsk People’s
Republic,’ Guardian (8 August 2014) (Annex 591). Russian national Valery Bolotov, who served in the
Soviet Army in the late 1980s, emerged as the leader of the LPR. Tom Balmforth, A Guide To The
Separatists Of Eastern Ukraine, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (3 June 2014) (Annex 519).
43 See, e.g., OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 May 2014), para. 102
(reporting that “[o]n 29 April, a local activist, was allegedly abducted by unidentified persons, and is
now unlawfully detained by an armed group in the occupied building of the State Security Service in
Luhansk”; “[o]n 2 May in Donetsk an armed group abducted an activist and aide. He was unlawfully
detained, beaten and interrogated for three days. He was released on 5 May”; “[o]n 3 May, pro-unity
activists were unlawfully detained, beaten and interrogated in Luhansk. They were released on 4
May”) (Annex 45); OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 June 2014), para. 205
(reporting that on May 9‒10 in the Donetsk region, “an armed group together with police officers
allegedly abducted the parents of a local activist from ‘Svoboda’”) (Annex 46).
44 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 June 2014), para. 209 (Annex 46).
45 Ibid. para. 199.
46 Ibid.
23
• On 18 May, DPR members forcibly seized an elderly farmer from his home in
a village near Slovyansk who was accused of bringing food to the Ukrainian
forces.47 They brought him into his yard, read a “‘sentence’ in the name of the
‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and shot [him] dead, in front of his family and
neighbours.”48
• On 29 August 2014, the LPR murdered Mr. Hennadii Khitrenko, a retired
policeman and a member of the Krymske village council, in his own home in
front of his father.49 Khitrenko’s father stated he believed his son “was killed
because he was known to be a supporter of the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Several days before, he had gone to the military commissariat of the town of
Lysychansk (Luhansk region) to volunteer into the National Guard of
Ukraine.”50
48. Far from concealing their aim of terrorizing Ukrainian civilians, leaders of the
DPR have openly acknowledged this practice. In a July press briefing, U.N. Human Rights
Chief Navi Pillay noted a “disturb[ing] . . . message on the website of one leader of the selfproclaimed
‘Donetsk People’s Republic’, which state[d] that underage children and women
are legitimate targets and that the goal is to ‘immerse them in horror.’”51
49. The OHCHR further reported in May 2014 that “[a]rmed groups [in eastern
Ukraine] have increasingly committed human rights abuses, including abductions,
torture/ill-treatment, unlawful detentions and killings[.]”52 For example:
• Throughout May 2014, the OHCHR received “several reports of killings at
checkpoints held by armed groups.”53 On 8 May, for example, the OHCHR
47 Ibid. para. 210.
48 Ibid.
49 OHCHR, Accountability for Killing in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016 (2016), para. 50
(Annex 49).
50 Ibid.
51 OHCHR, Intensified Fighting Putting at Risk Lives of People in Donetsk and Luhansk — Pillay (4
July 2014) (Annex 295).
52 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 May 2014), para. 58 (Annex 515).
53 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 June 2014), para. 209 (Annex 45).
24
reported that “an Orthodox priest was shot dead at a checkpoint near his
hometown of Druzhivka[.]”54
• The OHCHR also documented “numerous cases” of torture of civilians
throughout April and May 2014.55 On 4 May 2014, for example, “a group of
armed men abducted six residents of Novogrodovka in Donetsk region,
including town councillors and trade union members,” and held them in the
occupied building of the Regional State Administration in Donetsk.56 The
civilians “were severely beaten and tortured while unlawfully detained.”57
50. In July 2014, the OHCHR summarized that “[e]gregious human rights abuses
have been committed in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine, where armed
groups supporting the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and ‘Luhansk People’s
Republic’ (DPR and LPR respectively)” operate.58 OHCHR continued that “[t]here have
54 Ibid.
55 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 June 2014), paras. 212‒14
(Annex 46).
56 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 May 2014), para. 102 (Annex 45).
57 Ibid. See also OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 June 2014), para. 200
(reporting that from May 4 to 18, a female interpreter was abducted by the DPR, and “[u]pon her
release, she reported having been detained by armed groups in Donetsk and to having being subjected
to ill-treatment and sexual assault”) (Annex 293); ibid. (reporting that on 8 May, a woman with cancer
and undergoing chemotherapy was abducted by the DPR in Slovyansk while trying to secure the
release of her son) (Annex 46).
58 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 July 2014), para. 2 (Annex 296). See
ibid. para. 38 (“Intimidation and violence by the armed groups against civilians in the east has
continued, with people being abducted and detained often for purposes of hostage taking. The armed
groups also carry out acts of ill-treatment, torture and murder.”).
25
been hundreds of abductions with many victims tortured. Increasing numbers of civilians
have been killed.”59 OHCHR issued similar reports throughout the remainder of 2014.60
51. In keeping with their political goals of greater autonomy from Ukraine, DPR
and LPR acts of violence against civilians were frequently targeted at perceived opponents of
their organizations and supporters of Ukrainian unity. In addition to the shocking murder of
Mr. Rybak and other atrocities referenced above, more generally, OHCHR reported in June
2014 that:
NGOs in Donetsk have highlighted to the [monitoring mission]
a growing pattern of the systematic persecution against civil
society. According to them, fear is spreading in the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions, with an increasing number of acts of
intimidation and violence by armed groups, targeting
“ordinary” people who support Ukrainian unity or who openly
oppose the either of the two “people’s republics.”61
52. A Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) report released in August 2014 similarly
documented “[s]ince April 2014 . . . over two dozen of cases of insurgents torturing political
activists they detained in Donetsk, Sloviyansk, Makyivka, and Luhansk.”62 In December
59 Ibid. para. 2. See OHCHR, Accountability for Killing in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016
(2016), para. 37 (reporting that “[a] considerable number of bodies bearing signs suggesting summary
executions were found in the territories controlled by the armed groups”) (Annex 313).
60 See, e.g., OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (19 September 2014), paras. 16–
17 (reporting that “the armed groups continued to carry out abductions, physical and psychological
torture, ill-treatment and other serious human rights violations,” and that it had received reports of
“armed groups preventing residents from leaving the regions, including by harassing them at
checkpoints . . . and firing at vehicles transporting fleeing civilians, and reportedly using them as
human shields”) (Annex 317); OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 November
2014), para. 6 (reporting that “[i]n territories under the control of both ‘republics’, cases of serious
human rights abuses by armed groups continued to be reported, including torture, arbitrary and
incommunicado detention, summary executions, forced labour, sexual violence, as well as the
destruction and illegal seizure of property”) (Annex 48).
61 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 June 2014), para. 207 (emphasis
added) (Annex 46).
62 Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Rebel Forces Detain, Torture Civilians (28 August 2014), p. 10
(Annex 444).
26
2014, OHCHR reiterated that “[p]ersecution and intimidation of people suspected of
supporting Ukrainian forces or merely holding pro-Ukrainian sympathies (or perceived as
such) remains widespread[.]”63
53. As intended, the DPR’s and the LPR’s strategy of violence against civilians in
eastern Ukraine created “an atmosphere of intimidation and consequent fear” in Donetsk
and Luhansk, in the words of OHCHR.64 In July 2014, OHCHR reported:
The armed groups fighting in the east must abide by
international law but unfortunately this has not been the case.
Grave human rights abuses have been committed by those
armed groups. And it must be remembered that these groups
have taken control of Ukrainian territory and inflicted on the
populations a reign of intimidation and terror to maintain their
position of control.65
54. During a briefing to the U.N. Security Council in early August on this report,
Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Ivan Simonović reinforced this message,
warning that the “report details what amounts to a reign of fear and terror in areas under
control of the armed groups, twinned with the breakdown of law and order.”66
55. In response to this reign of terror and intimidation, many Ukrainian civilians
fled from areas under DPR and LPR control. In August 2014, the OSCE documented that
“[t]he activity of armed gangs targeting the local population and, in general, a lack of rule of
63 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 December 2014), para. 41 (Annex 303).
64 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 June 2014), para. 4 (Annex 46).
65 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 July 2014), para. 26 (Annex 256). See
OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (19 September 2014), para. 16 (“The reign of
fear and intimidation by the armed groups has been well-documented in the reports of the Human
Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. Forced mobilization and threats of the death penalty were
additional means to terrorize the population in the territory under the control of the armed groups.”)
(Annex 47).
66 Statement to the Security Council by Ivan Šimonović, Assistant Secretary-General for Human
Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (8 August 2014), p. 2 (Annex 298).
27
law” motivated people to flee.67 Many did so specifically because of “[d]irect experience or
the witnessing of acts of violence, such as killings, abductions, threats and intimidation, as
well as the perception by people that these acts of violence could affect also them
personally.”68
56. The OHCHR has released regular, contemporaneous public reports on the
DPR’s and LPR’s practices, regularly briefing the United Nations Security Council and other
U.N. bodies of which Russia is a member.69 Many of these attacks were also covered by the
international and local Ukrainian and Russian media. The thorough and contemporaneous
reporting of the OHCHR, OSCE, HRW, and other neutral observers, as well as local and
67 OSCE, Thematic Report: Internal Displacement in Ukraine (Aug. 12, 2014), pp. 5–6 (Annex 316).
68 Ibid.
69 See, e.g., Press Statement by the ASG Ivan Simonovic, UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Launch of the Second Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 May
2014) (Annex 291); Briefing by ASG Ivan Šimonović to the UN Security Council (16 April 2014)
(Annex 289); OHCHR, UN Official Cites ‘Worsening’ Human Rights Situation in Southern, Eastern
Regions (21 May 2014) (reporting that OHCHR briefed the Security Council on its 15 May 2014
report) (Annex 292); Statement of the Assistant Secretary-General Ivan Šimonović at the Security
Council meeting on Ukraine (24 June 2014) (Annex 294); Statement to the Security Council by Ivan
Šimonović, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Ukraine
(8 August 2014) (Annex 298); Statement to the Security Council by Ivan Šimonović, Assistant
Secretary-General for Human Rights, meeting on Ukraine (24 October 2014) (Annex 302); see also
OHCHR, Human Rights Council Takes Up People of African Descent, Racism and Racial
Discrimination, and Situation in Ukraine (23 September 2014) (Annex 300); Statement by Mr. Ivan
Šimonović, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, at the Interactive Dialogue on the
Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine at the 27th Session of the Human Rights Council (24
September 2014) (Annex 301).
28
international press,70 put the entire international community — and certainly the DPR’s and
LPR’s patron, the Russian Federation — on notice of what was happening in eastern Ukraine.
57. Against this backdrop, and with this knowledge from reports to the U.N
Security Council and other sources, the Russian Federation decided not to suppress the
financing of this ongoing campaign of terrorism. Instead, Russia decided to promote and
support illegal armed groups in eastern Ukraine, including by using state officials to send
money and weapons to these groups known to terrorize the civilian population.
The Shoot-Down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17
58. As detailed further in Chapter 2, as the pattern of violence against civilians
continued in Donbas at the hands of DPR and LPR, Russian support escalated, enhancing
these groups’ firepower as well as their capacity to harm innocent civilian life. The
catastrophic downing of Flight MH17 was one tragic result.
59. On 17 July 2014, the DPR destroyed Flight MH17, a civilian aircraft flying in
civilian airspace over eastern Ukraine. The attack murdered all 298 civilians on board,
including three infants, 280 other passengers, four flight crew members, and 11 cabin crew
members. Many of those onboard were Dutch tourists heading to vacation destinations on
the Kuala Lumpur-bound flight. More than 30 nationalities were onboard, including a
70 See, e.g., Ukrainian Orthodox Church Confirms Priest Murdered in Donetsk Region, Kyiv Post (10
May 2014) (Annex 514); In Donetsk Region, an Orthodox Priest Was Killed, Gazeta (5 May 2014)
(Annex 511); Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Captives Describe Brutal Beatings (5 May 2014)
(Annex 441); Hannah Levintova, Armed Groups in Ukraine Target Gays, Journalists, Minorities, and
Anyone Who Speaks Up, Mother Jones (21 May 2014) (Annex 518); Luke Harding and Oksana
Grytsenko, Kidnapping of Ukrainian Patriots has Russia's Full Support, Says Kiev, The Guardian (23
April 2014) (Annex 507); Ukrainian Deputy Rybak Was Tortured and Then Drowned, MKRU (23
April 2014) (Annex 508); Tatyana Popova, Leaders of the Outrages of the DNR, Ukrainska Pravda (23
September 2014) (Annex 544); The Body of the Heads of the Krasnolimanskaya Prosvita Was Found
in a Burned Car, Radiosvoboda (8 May 2014) (Annex 513); Details of Shooting a Farmer Near
Slaviansk, PN (19 May 2014) (Annex 517); Terrorist Shot a Resident of Donetsk Region in Front of his
Family, Unian (18 May 2014) (Annex 516).
29
significant number of Malaysian and Australian nationals. The armed groups used a 9M38
series missile, launched from a Buk TELAR that had been delivered by the members of a
Russian military brigade to DPR-controlled territory in Ukraine. The DPR deployed this
weapon despite the fact that it could not reliably distinguish between military and civilian
targets, and that civilian airspace was open.
60. The international community’s reaction to this atrocity was swift. On 21 July
2014, the Security Council passed a resolution in which it “[d]emand[ed] that those
responsible for this incident be held to account and that all States cooperate fully with efforts
to establish accountability.”71 Far from supporting these efforts, Russia obstructed them,
propagating false narratives about the attack, and vetoing a Security Council resolution that
would have established an international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for the
attack on Flight MH17.72
61. Despite Russia’s obstruction, multilateral efforts to investigate the attack
proceeded. As part of this international response, the Dutch Safety Board (“DSB”)
conducted an independent investigation into the causes of the crash. The DSB operated “in
accordance with the international regulations that apply to independent accident
investigation, laid down in Annex 13 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation.”73
Pursuant to these regulations, the DSB cooperated and shared information with relevant
States, including the Russian Federation.74
62. At the same time, a criminal investigation was launched by a Joint
Investigation Team (“JIT”), comprised of the Netherlands Public Prosecutor’s Office, the
Dutch National Police, and law enforcement authorities from Australia, Belgium, Malaysia,
71 U.N. Security Council Resolution 2166, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2166 (21 July 2014), para. 11 (Annex 297).
72 UN News Centre, Security Council Fails to Adopt Proposal to Create Tribunal on Crash of
Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 (29 July 2015) (Annex 311).
73 See Dutch Safety Board, Crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 (17 July 2014), p. 7 [hereinafter
DSB Report MH17 Crash] (Annex 38).
74 Ibid.
30
and Ukraine. While that process is still ongoing, Mr. Gerardus Wilhelmus Christiaan Thiry,
chief inspector with the National Crime Squad of the Dutch National Police, has submitted
two official reports to this Court addressing key pieces of evidence from the JIT’s ongoing
investigation. Those reports are found at Annexes 39 and 40. That evidence definitively
shows Russian responsibility for supplying the Buk TELAR that was used to shoot down
Flight MH17, as discussed further in Chapter 2.
63. On the basis of forensic study and other investigative techniques, the DSB and
the JIT determined that Flight MH17 was destroyed by a Buk TELAR, and ruled out
alternative hypotheses. In summary, the DSB found:
The combination of the recorded pressure wave, the damage
pattern found on the wreckage caused by blast and the impact
of fragments, the bow-tie shaped fragments found in the
cockpit and in the body of one of the crew members in the
cockpit, the injuries sustained by three crew members in the
cockpit, the analysis of the in-flight break-up, the analysis of
the explosive residues and paint found, and the size and
distinct, bow-tie shape of some of the fragments, led the Dutch
Safety Board to conclude that the aeroplane was struck by a
9N314M warhead as carried on a 9M38-series missile and
launched by a Buk surface-to-air missile system.75
64. Based on potential missile trajectories that could have caused the pattern of
damage seen on the aircraft, the DSB narrowed the launch zone to a 320-square kilometer
area, encompassing the Ukrainian towns of Snizhne and Pervomaisky,76 located in the
Donetsk oblast and under separatist control.77
75 Ibid. p. 137.
76 Ibid. p. 144.
77 Official Report of the Dutch National Police, and accompanying annexes, at Annexe 1 p. 11 (16 May
2018) (original in Dutch) (noting area under separatist control) [hereinafter 16 May Dutch National
Police Report] (Annex 41).
31
65. The JIT similarly determined that “flight MH17 was shot down on 17 July
2014 by a missile of the 9M38 series, launched by a BUK-TELAR.”78 As part of this
investigation, the JIT identified the specific launch site as a field near Snizhne and
Pervomaiskiy.79 Satellite imagery shows that on 16 July 2014, the day before the attack, the
field looked ordinary. In the days following the attack, the field appeared scorched and
plowed:
Figure 180
Left: Satellite image of the launch site on 16 July 2014.
Right: Satellite image of the launch site on 21 July 2014.
66. The Buk was also photographed and captured on video by local residents in
Snizhne on 17 July, who posted the images to the Internet shortly before the attack. Dutch
investigators examined and validated these images, concluding that the Buk convoy was in
fact in Snizhne shortly before the attack.81
78 Joint Investigation Team, Presentation Preliminary Results Criminal Investigation MH17,
Openbaar Ministerie [Public Prosecution Service] (28 September 2016) [hereinafter 2016 JIT
Presentation] (Annex 39).
79 16 May Dutch National Police Report, p. 1; ibid., Annexe 1 pp. 12‒14 (noting the launch site as an
area near Snizhne, and analysis of scorched fields near Snizhne); ibid. p. 16 (“The investigation also
ascertained that the Buk TELAR that brought down flight MH17 launched a missile from an
agricultural field south of Snizhne and west of Pervomaiskyi.”) (Annex 41).
80 2016 JIT Presentation (with accompanying animation, MH17 Animation regarding the transport
route and the launch site, at 8:59‒9:35) (Annex 39); see also 16 May Dutch National Police Report,
Annexe 8 (photos in original Dutch version) (Annex 41).
81 16 May Dutch National Police Report, Annexe 6 (Annex 41).
32
Figure 282
Left: Photograph of the Buk in Snizhne on 17 July 2014. Right: Screenshot from footage of the
Buk taken shortly after the shoot-down of Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014.
67. The transportation of the Buk TELAR to the launch site was also discussed in
an intercepted conversation that specifically refers to Snizhne:
Caller 1: Listen . . . it turns to be the last checkpoint leaving Snizhne before
Stepanivka . . . to the left . . . Is my sense of direction correct?
Caller 2: You have to go rightwards in Stepaninka and across the field to this
f*ckng what’s it . . . this f*cking Snizhne?
Caller 1: Yes.
Caller 2: So, go to Snizhne. I’ll give you further directions there.
82 16 May Dutch National Police Report, Annexe 1 pp. 6‒16 (photo in original Dutch version, pp. 7, 9)
(Annex 41).
33
Caller 1: Got it. Ok.83
68. The mobile phone belonging to one of the participants in the conversation —
which took place at 13:09, just minutes before the attack — was connected to the telephone
tower located closest to the agricultural field near Pervomaisky.84
69. Russia’s proxies deployed the Buk missile against Flight MH17 fully aware
that the skies of eastern Ukraine within range of their weapon were open to civilian air
traffic. Under a public Notice to Airmen (“NOTAM”), the airspace below 32,000 feet was
restricted to Ukrainian state aircraft, meaning that civilian air traffic above that level was
expressly permitted.85
70. Substantial civilian air traffic passed through the airspace above eastern
Ukraine until the attack. Based on data from the European Organization for the Safety of Air
Navigation (“EUROCONTROL”), the DSB determined that “a large number of operators
continued to use routes over the eastern part of Ukraine.”86 In June and July 2014, each day
an average of 220 flights transited the air traffic zone where Flight MH17 was ultimately shot
83 See Intercepted Conversation between “Krot” and “Zmey” (17 July 2014) (Annex 396); Confirmation
of Authenticity, Senior Special Investigator with the Second Branch of the First Pre-Trial
Investigations Department at the Main Investigations Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine (4
June 2018) [hereinafter Confirmation of Authenticity, SSU] (Annex 184); see also 2016 JIT
Presentation (with accompanying animation, MH17 Animation regarding the transport route and the
launch site, at 7:36‒8:02) (Annex 39).
84 2016 JIT Presentation (with accompanying animation, MH17 Animation regarding the transport
route and the launch site, at 8:02‒8:09) (Annex 39).
85 DSB Report MH17 Crash, pp. 195‒97 (Annex 38). Ukraine’s NOTAM was based on the lack of
indication, at the time, that Russia had supplied illegal armed groups with surface-to-air missiles
capable of hitting civilian airliners at cruising altitude. This is consistent with the general practice in
conflict zones where there is no apparent threat to civil aviation at high altitudes. See ibid. pp. 199‒
205.
86 Ibid. p. 223.
34
down.87 On 17 July, the day of the attack, 160 flights passed over this area until the airspace
closed following the shoot-down.88
71. Flight MH17 was following a typical flight pattern. After taking off from
Amsterdam en route to Kuala Lumpur, it reached a cruising altitude of 33,000 feet, a
standard flight level for civilian aircraft.89 Anyone with access to the Internet could have
seen this pattern of civilian traffic, and could even have identified Flight MH17 over the
airspace of eastern Ukraine in the early afternoon of 17 July. Just one example of a public,
free online service providing this capability is Flightradar24, which displays live air traffic.90
Flightradar 24 has preserved and shared a live view of Ukrainian airspace shortly before the
shoot-down, showing both Flight MH17’s altitude and its trajectory toward eastern
Ukraine.91
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid. p. 224.
89 Ibid. pp. 23, 36.
90 Live Air Traffic, FLIGTHRADAR24 (23 May 2018) (Annex 666).
91 Social Media Page (Twitter) of Flightradar24, archived on 17 July 2014 (Annex 617).
35
Figure 392
Flightradar live view of Ukrainian airspace, 17 July 2014.
72. Despite this pattern of civilian air traffic, Russia’s proxies nevertheless
deployed a powerful weapon designed to shoot down an aircraft, the Buk TELAR, knowing
that it could be a civilian aircraft that fell from the sky.
73. The operation of a Buk missile system, and its TELAR component in
particular, is explained in detail in the report of Associate Professor Anatolii Skorik of the
Ivan Kozhedub Kharkiv University of the Air Force, an expert in the Buk system, its
operation, and training for its use. Dr. Skorik explains that a Buk missile system is intended
to be operated with several components: a combat control center, a target locator, three
launcher-loader modules, and six TELARs.93 The Buk TELAR can operate in a centralized
control mode, in which the combat control center identifies the target and instructs the
TELAR to engage it.94 A TELAR can also operate more independently, in standalone mode,
92 Ibid.
93 Expert Report of Anatolii Skorik (6 June 2018), para. 9 [hereinafter Skorik Report] (Annex 12).
94 Ibid. paras. 18‒25.
36
by identifying targets itself, though still on the basis of orders from, and in coordination
with, the combat control center.95 In either case, targeting decisions are informed by the
combat control center’s access to substantial information such as “information about the air
space (including civilian air traffic information) received from the Radio-Technical Troops of
the Air Force and their radars.”96 Crew members of the combat control center are trained “to
process large arrays of data,” and can alert the TELAR when civilian aircraft has been
detected on the basis of that information.97 Thus, while “[t]he Buk-M1 SAM system is very
seldom used in situations where the airspace is open to civilian aircraft,” if it “operates in
coordination with the combat control center, information from radio-radar forces about
civilian air traffic will be brought to the attention of the commander of the Buk-M1 battery in
a timely manner, thereby substantially reducing the risk of attacks on civilian aircraft.”98
74. The DPR took the rare step of deploying a Buk TELAR where the airspace was
known to be open to civilian traffic. It did so, however, without critical support; there is no
evidence that the TELAR that downed Flight MH17 operated in conjunction with a combat
control center.99 As Dr. Skorik explains, the “technical capabilities of the Buk-M1 TELAR do
not make it possible to accurately distinguish a civilian aircraft from a military one”; on the
95 Ibid. para. 26.
96 Ibid. para. 21.
97 Ibid. para. 38.
98 Ibid. para. 34.
99 16 May Dutch National Police Report, Annexe 1 p. 16 (“In Snizhne the Buk TELAR was offloaded
and then drove on, under its own power, to a field west of Pervomaiskyi.”); Annexe 3 p. 1 (noting that
“[t]he convoy consisted of the following vehicles: a dark-coloured Peugeot 3008, a (light) grey/silver
Toyota RAV4, a white Volvo lorry with red flatbed carrying a Buk TELAR, a green UAZ 469, a darkcoloured
Volkswagen Transporter and a white Ssanyong Korando” and not mentioning other
component parts of the Buk missile system) (Annex 41).
37
operator’s screen, military and civilian aircraft are “practically indistinguishable.”100 These
technical constraints are compounded by the intense pressure facing the TELAR operator,
who is trained to act “with lightning speed” to engage a target, while relying on the combat
control center to assess the broader air situation.101 Dr. Skorik therefore concludes that
operating a Buk TELAR on its own, in civilian-trafficked airspace, is “extremely dangerous
for civilian aircraft.”102
75. Yet the DPR, once again displaying its disregard for human life, chose to
deploy the Buk TELAR in these conditions. The downing of Flight MH17, with disasterous
human consequences, was the result.
The Shelling Attacks on Civilians in Donbas
76. After the downing of Flight MH17, the violence did not cease, but only shifted
form. In the span of less than a month in January and February 2015, Russia’s proxies
committed three major shelling attacks against Ukrainian civilians in Volnovakha, Mariupol,
and Kramatorsk. Using sophisticated rocket artillery weapons systems, the DPR aimed to
sow fear among civilians and to exert pressure on Ukraine’s government during active ceasefire
negotiations. Russia’s proxies engaged in renewed shelling, this time in Avdiivka, in
early 2017.
The Attack on a Civilian Checkpoint Near Volnovakha
77. One such attack occurred in the middle of the afternoon of 13 January 2015.
On that day, the DPR launched a rocket artillery bombardment in the vicinity of a civilian
checkpoint (the “Buhas checkpoint”) located approximately two kilometers north of the
100 Skorik Report, paras. 28, 39 (emphasis added) (Annex 12).
101 Ibid. para. 36.
102 Ibid. para. 31.
38
Ukrainian town of Volnovakha. The Buhas checkpoint sits on a well-traveled highway and
regularly experiences long queues of civilian vehicles. Having amassed considerable
weapons from the Russian Federation, as detailed below, DPR militants used BM-21 Grad
multiple-launch rocket systems (“BM-21 Grad” or “Grad”) to shell the civilian checkpoint.
The DPR unleashed a hailstorm of at least 88 rocket volleys that struck the area around the
checkpoint.103 One of the rockets exploded near a civilian passenger bus that was waiting in
line to cross the checkpoint, killing 12 civilian passengers and injuring 19 more. In a swift
reaction, the U.N. Security Council issued a statement condemning the “shelling of a
passenger bus in Volnovakha,”104 and demanding an investigation to bring the perpetrators
to justice. Both Ukrainian law enforcement and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine (“OSCE”) reached consensus on the key facts, including the timing of the attack, the
type of weapons used in the attack, and the area from which the attack originated.
78. The Buhas checkpoint is located on the H-20 highway,105 the main
thoroughfare connecting the two biggest cities in the region — Mariupol, controlled by the
Ukrainian government, and the city of Donetsk, controlled by the DPR and other armed
103 See, e.g., Witness Statement of Dmytro Volodymyrovych Zyuzia (29 May 2018), para. 16
[hereinafter Zyuzia Statement] (Annex 6); Record of Review, drafted by Captain of Justice V.
Romanenko, Senior Investigator at the Internal Affairs Agency of the Investigations Department of
the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk Region (16 January 2015), pp. 8‒18
(Annex 87); OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine Based on
Information Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv Time) (13 January 2015), p. 1 (Annex 320); OSCE, Latest
from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine Based on Information Received as of
18:00 (Kyiv Time), p. 1 (16 January 2015) (Annex 324).
104 U.N. Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Killing of Bus Passengers in Donetsk
Region, Ukraine (13 January 2015) (Annex 305).
105 Witness Statement of Maksym Anatoliyovych Shevkoplias (31 May 2018), para. 6 [hereinafter
“Shevkoplias Statement”] (Annex 4); Main Military Prosecutor’s Office, Prosecutor General’s Office of
Ukraine Letter No. 10/4/1-44-08-15 to the Main Donetsk Regional Administration Office of the
National Police (26 February 2016), p. 1 (Annex 146).
39
groups. Approximately three thousand vehicles travel on the highway per day.106 On
weekdays, at least 15 passenger buses per day run through the Buhas checkpoint.107
79. There were many practical reasons for this steady flow of traffic. Many
Donetsk residents regularly traveled to government-controlled cities to receive their pension
and other social benefit payments from the Ukrainian government.108 According to the bus
driver interviewed after the incident, many of the passengers that day were in fact returning
to Donetsk with their benefits.109
80. The Buhas checkpoint has long undertaken general traffic supervision
functions, including checking vehicles for law enforcement purposes.110 Since the outbreak
of hostilities, the checkpoint took on additional functions as a de facto border post, to
manage the security risks that arise from civilians traveling into and out of DPR-controlled
106 National Police, Main Donetsk Regional Administration of the National Police Letter No.
1812/04/18-2016 to the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office, Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine (18
March 2016), p. 1 (Annex 146).
107 Shevkoplias Statement, para. 7 (Annex 4).
108 Ibid. In January 2015, people living in territories controlled by the DPR and LPR could only collect
their payments from the Ukrainian government at banks located in the territories controlled by the
Ukrainian authorities. Volnovakha is one of the closest cities under Ukrainian control and the most
convenient place for residents of the city of Donetsk to collect their social benefits. Ibid.
109 Signed Declaration of Sergey Cherepko, Witness Interrogiation Protocol (20 January 2015), p. 5
(Annex 208).
110 National Police, Main Donetsk Regional Administration of the National Police Letter No.
1812/04/18-2016 to the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office, Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine (18
March 2016), p. 1 (Annex 146); Shevkoplias Statement, para. 9 (Annex 4); Signed Declaration of
Oleksandr Chekorskyy, Witness Interrogation Protocol (5 April 2016), p. 3 (Annex 248).
40
territory.111 On the day of the attack, members of the police and border guards stationed at
the checkpoint were performing passport and security checks of vehicles, buses, and people
passing through the checkpoint.112
81. As the checkpoint is situated on a heavily-trafficked highway and the
necessary security checks take time, there is usually a line of cars and buses at the Buhas
checkpoint. For example, later OSCE reports document that the checkpoint occasionally had
hundreds of civilian vehicles lined up, waiting for clearance.113 The period between 2:00 and
15:00 on weekdays is particularly busy, in part because passenger buses traveling between
Volnovakha and Donetsk regularly arrive at the checkpoint in this time period.114
82. The day before the attack, the Defense Intelligence Department of the
Ministry of Defense of Ukraine determined that unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAV”) were
111 See Shevkoplias Statement, para. 9 (Annex 4); Signed Declaration of Anton Ovcharenko, Witness
Interrogation Protocol (18 January 2015), pp. 3‒4 (testifying that, as a member of the Border Guard
Service, his “duties at the said checkpoint include checking the passports of persons passing through
the checkpoint, as well as checking vehicles, finding weapons, drugs and other prohibited cargo items,
and identifying members of the terrorist organizations DPR . . . and LPR . . . .”) (Annex 206); Signed
Declaration of Anton Fadeev, Witness Interrogation Protocol (16 December 2015), p. 3 (testifying that,
as a member of the “Kyiv-2” police special forces battalion, his “duties included checking the vehicles
and people passing through the checkpoint”) (Annex 244); Signed Declaration of Artem Kalus,
Witness Interrogation Protocol (17 January 2015), p. 2 (testifying that, as the senior police
investigator, he “was checking the passport data of people who had passed through the checkpoint”)
(Annex 204); Signed Declaration of Yaroslav Maksymov, Witness Interrogation Protocol (17 January
2015), p. 3 (testifying that, as the local police inspector, his “duties included checking vehicles and
persons passing through the checkpoint”) (Annex 205).
112 See supra, note 111; ibid. (indicating that members of the “Kyiv-2” police special forces battalion,
five members of the Border Guard Service, local police were stationed at the checkpoint on 13 January
2015).
113 OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine Based on Information
Received as of 28 August 2015 (28 August 2015), p. 2 (Annex 336).
114 Shevkoplias Statement, para. 7 (Annex 4).
41
used near the town of Volnovakha.115 On the day of the attack, there was a line of vehicles
traveling in the direction of the city of Donetsk waiting at the Buhas checkpoint when the
DPR deployed its Grad missiles. Sergey Cherepko, the driver of the bus hit in the attack,
arrived as usual at the Buhas Checkpoint with a fully loaded bus at approximately 14:10.116
He testified that up to three other passenger buses were at the checkpoint ahead of him when
he arrived.117 A video recorded by a dashboard camera shortly before the attack (Figure 4)
shows several civilian cars waiting to pass through the checkpoint.
115 Witness Statement of Vadym Skibitskyi (5 June 2018), para. 26 [hereinafter Skibitskyi Statement]
(Annex 8).
116 Signed Declaration of Sergey Cherepko, Witness Interrogiation Protocol (20 January 2015), p. 4
(Annex 208).
117 Ibid. p. 4. See also Signed Declaration of Anton Fadeev, Witness Interrogation Protocol (16
December 2015), p. 3 (Annex 244).
42
Figure 4118
118 Dashboard Camera Footage of Shelling on 13 January 2015 (video) (Annex 696). See also Human
Rights Watch, Ukraine: Rising Civilian Death Toll (3 February 2015), p. 7 (noting that “a video
recorded by a dashboard camera at the time of the attack show[s] civilian cars passing through the
checkpoint and several cars waiting in line”) (Annex 1108). Surveillance camera footage from the
checkpoint also shows several cars passing through the checkpoint as shells start to fall around and
directly onto the road. Footage from a Surveillance Camera at the Checkpoint (10 January 2015)
(video) (Annex 695); Shevkoplias Statement, para. 14 (Annex 4).
43
83. At 14:25 on 13 January 2015, the DPR deployed three Grad systems at the
checkpoint, delivering at least 88 high-explosive rockets into the concentration of civilian
vehicles and passenger buses.119 Mr. Cherepko described his experience as follows:
[W]hile waiting for my turn to go through passport control at
the checkpoint, . . . I suddenly heard a whistling noise
approaching from roughly a northerly direction. I did not
register exactly where it came from, however, because it
happened very fast. And a fraction of a second later, from the
right side of the bus (going from Volnovakha in the direction of
Donetsk) I heard a loud boom, which sounded like an
exploding shell, and the windows of the bus simultaneously
shattered, while metal fragments damaged the body of the
bus.120
84. Numerous explosions detonated within seconds of each other, spanning
hundreds of meters.121 Map 2 illustrates the 88 crater impacts around the Buhas checkpoint,
and Figure 5 is an image from an OSCE unmanned aerial vehicle.
119 Record of Review, drafted by V. Romanenko, Senior Investigatorthe Security Service of Ukraine (16
January 2015), pp. 8‒18 (Annex 87); Record of Site Inspection, drafted by A. G. Albot, Investigations
Department of the Volnovakha District Department of the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (13 January 2015), pp. 2‒3 (Annex 85). See also Signed
Declaration of Anton Ovcharenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (18 January 2015), pp. 3‒4 (Annex
206).
120 Signed Declaration of Sergey Cherepko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (20 January 2015), p. 4
(Annex 208).
121 Record of Review, drafted by V. Romanenko, Senior Investigator for the Security Service of
Ukraine (16 January 2015), pp. 8‒18 (Annex 87).
44
Map 2: Shelling Impacts at the Buhas Checkpoint near Volnovakha122
122 The points of detonation depicted in this map use the underlying data of the investigation team, as
documented in contemporaneous crime scene inspection reports. See Zyuzia Statement, paras. 14‒16
(Annex 6); Annexes 87, 151 (crime scene inspection reports).
45
Figure 5123
Image of the Buhas checkpoint taken by the OSCE’s unmanned aerial vehicle on 14 January 2015
85. No missiles hit the checkpoint.124 Two missiles directly hit the road, and an
additional seven missiles struck close enough to affect the road and the vehicles on it.125 One
of the projectiles landed 12 meters from the right side of the bus driven by Mr. Cherepko,126
123 OSCE, OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Status Report as of 20 January 2015
(20 January 2015) (Annex 326). Note: this image has been flipped horizontally to reflect a traditional
map orientation.
124 Record of Review, drafted by V. Romanenko, Senior Investigatorthe Security Service of Ukraine
(16 January 2015), pp. 8‒18 (Annex 87).
125 Ibid.; Map of Crater Impacts (Annex 89). See also Expert Report of Lietenant General Christopher
Brown, para. 31 (5 June 2018) [hereinafter “Brown Report”] (concluding this after examining this
report and map) (Annex 11).
126 OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 14 January 2015: 12
Civilians Killed and 17 Wounded When a Rocket Exploded Close to a Civilian Bus Near Volnovakha
(14 January 2015) (Annex 323); Record of Site Inspection, drafted by A. G. Albot, Investigations
Department of the Volnovakha District Department of the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (13 January 2015), p. 2 (Annex 85); Record of Review, drafted
by V. Romanenko, Senior Investigator, the Security Service of Ukraine (16 January 2015), p. 8 (Annex
87).
46
killing 12 civilian passengers and injuring 19 others.127 The damage caused to the bus can be
seen in Figure 6.
Figure 6128
Photographs of the civilian bus hit in the Volnovakha attack.
86. Three days after the attack, OSCE monitors conducted a comprehensive
inspection of five shell craters from the attack and concluded that the “craters examined
were caused by rockets[.]”129 Ukrainian investigators reached a similar conclusion, as did
Human Rights Watch experts who concluded from in-person examination of shell craters
127 OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 14 January 2015: 12
Civilians Killed and 17 Wounded When a Rocket Exploded Close to a Civilian Bus Near Volnovakha
(14 January 2015) (Annex 323). The injured included one police officer stationed at the checkpoint.
Record of Review, drafted by V. Romanenko, Senior Investigator, the Security Service of Ukraine (16
January 2015), p. 8 (Annex 87).
128 Record of Site Inspection, drafted by A. G. Albot, Investigations Department of the Volnovakha
District Department of the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
(13 January 2015), p. 5 (Annex 85); Maddie Smith, Ten Civilians Killed in Ukrainian Bus Attack as
Donetsk Airport Control Tower is Destroyed, VICE (13 January 2015) (Annex 552).
129 OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine Based on Information
Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv Time) (16 January 2015), p. 1 (Annex 324).
47
and debris that “the area had been struck by Grad rockets.”130 Lieutenant General
Christopher Brown, a retired British Army artillery expert with over 36 years’ active duty
service, has provided the Court with an expert opinion on the shelling of Ukrainian cities.
General Brown likewise concludes that “[t]he Volnovakha shelling was carried out using BM-
21 Grad MLRS firing high explosive rockets.”131
87. While the DPR officially denied involvement in the shelling attack,132 forensic
analyses of the attack site as well as other evidence confirm that DPR armed groups in fact
committed the attack. OSCE monitors concluded based on their analysis of the impact
craters that “all craters examined were caused by rockets fired from a north-north-eastern
direction.”133 Human Rights Watch likewise explained that “[t]he tube-like shape of the
craters clearly indicated that the rockets had come from the northeast. A video recorded by a
surveillance camera at the checkpoint shows dozens of explosions to the north of the
checkpoint over a short period of time.”134 The Ukrainian investigative team also inspected
130 Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Rising Civilian Death Toll (3 February 2015), p. 6 (Annex 1108).
Zyuzia Statement, paras. 13‒14 (Annex 6); Expert Opinion No. 63, drafted by Ukrainian Scientific
Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examinations, Security Service of
Ukraine (18 January 2015), pp. 6‒8 (Annex 88); Expert Opinion No. 64/1-30/6, drafted by Ukrainian
Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examinations, Security
Service of Ukraine (26 March 2015), p. 7 (Annex 113). See also Expert Opinion No. 16/8, drafted by
Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examinations,
Security Service of Ukraine (7 May 2015), pp. 17‒18 (Annex 123); Forensic Expert Report No. 38/6,
drafted by Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert
Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (18 May 2015), pp. 8‒9 (Annex 126).
131 Brown Report, para. 37 (Annex 11).
132 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPR, The Statement on Bus Shelling near Volnovakha (13
January 2015) (Annex 634).
133 OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine Based on Information
Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv Time) (16 January 2015), p. 1 (Annex 324).
134 Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Rising Civilian Death Toll (3 February 2015), pp. 6‒7 (Annex
1108).
48
the shell craters and measured their impact angles at 52-55 degrees.135 As General Brown
explains, such crater analysis is generally reliable, and indicates that the missiles would have
been launched from a range of 19.4 to 19.8 kilometers. 136 The town of Dokuchayevsk,
controlled by the DPR, falls squarely within the origin of the Grad attack as determined by
this crater analysis.137
88. Intercepted phone conversations between DPR members on 13 January 2015
also discuss the attack. At 13:54, approximately 30 minutes before the shelling attack began,
DPR member Yuriy Shpakov138 received a phone call from his subordinate with the nom de
guerre “Opasnyi [Dangerous],” who informed Shpakov that he was “loading.”139 The location
of Opasnyi’s mobile phone was determined to be linked to the cell phone tower servicing the
town of Dokuchayevsk.140 Later that day at around 15:29, Shpakov told his spouse that he
“blew a Ukropian checkpoint to hell.”141 No other checkpoint was shelled near Volnovakha
135 Record of Review, drafted by V. Romanenko, Senior Investigatorthe Security Service of Ukraine
(16 January 2015), pp. 3‒6 (Annex 87); Expert Report, drafted by Serhiy Onikeyenko, Investigations
Department at the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office, Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine, and Viktor
Levchenko, Lieutenant Colonel, Missile and Artillery Troops of the Ground Troops Command of the
Ukrainian Armed Forces (1 June 2016), p. 2 (Annex 150).
136 Brown Report, para. 26 (Annex 11).
137 Ibid.; Expert Report, drafted by Serhiy Onikeyenko, Investigations Department at the Main
Military Prosecutor’s Office, Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine, and Viktor Levchenko, Lieutenant
Colonel, Missile and Artillery Troops of the Ground Troops Command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces
(1 June 2016), p. 2 (Annex 150). See also OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine
(1 December 2014 to 15 February 2015), para. 24 (Annex 309).
138 Ukrainian investigators determined that he used the nom de guerre (or “call sign”) “Yust.” Zyuzia
Statement, paras. 26, 31 (Annex 6).
139 Ibid. para. 29; Intercepted Conversations of Yuriy Shpakov (16 September 2016) (Annex 430).
140 Ibid.
141 Intercepted Conversations of Yuriy Shpakov (16 September 2016) (Annex 430). The next day on 14
January 2015 at around 10:51, Shpakov directed his subordinate “Opasyni” to “man the main firing
position and open up on the checkpoint that we gave a workout to yesterday.” Ibid.
49
that day.142 At 16:54, Anatoliy Sinelnikov, a Russian national who has served as a colonel in
the Russian Armed Forces and was embedded within DPR armed groups143 called Shpakov
to discuss the shelling of “Volnovakha from Dokuchayevsk today.”144
89. There was no military reason for a bombardment of the Buhas checkpoint,
whereas someone wishing to harm and intimidate civilians would find the cluster of civilian
vehicles lined up to pass through a checkpoint an attractive target. Neither the checkpoint
nor personnel stationed at Buhas played any offensive role in Ukraine’s Anti-Terrorist
Operation.145 According to General Brown, the size of the Buhas checkpoint and the number
of personnel manning it suggest that the checkpoint could not have conducted any effective
defensive role against anything more than attacks by a few individuals.146 Any military
advantage from an attack would be trivial at best, and easily outweighed by the waste of
effort and loss of surprise.147
The Attack on the Vostochniy Neighborhood ofMariupol
90. On 24 January 2015, less than two weeks after the attack on the civilian
passenger bus near Volnovakha, Russia’s proxies used the same type of weapon against the
city of Mariupol, attacking the Vostochniy neighborhood (“Skhidny” in Ukrainian, “Eastern”
in English), a densely populated residential neighborhood.148
142 Zyuzia Statement, para. 30 (Annex 6); Shevkoplias Statement, para. 12 (Annex 4).
143 Zyuzia Statement, paras. 33‒34 (Annex 6).
144 Intercepted Conversations of Yuriy Shpakov (16 September 2016) (Annex 430).
145 Shevkoplias Statement, paras. 8‒9 (Annex 4).
146 Brown Report, para. 27 (Annex 11).
147 Ibid.
148 The Vostochniy “microdistrict” is part of the larger Ordzhonikidze district (renamed the
Livoberezhnyi district in 2016). The shelling fell not just in the Vostochniy District but also further
west, past Olimpiiska Street.
50
91. DPR militants, acting with substantial Russian support, deployed a barrage of
no less than 154 rocket volleys.149 Thirty civilians died, including one child killed when his
home was struck by a projectile, and 118 civilians were injured.150 In total, the shelling attack
damaged at least fifty-three residential buildings, four schools, three day-care centers, eight
grocery stores, a post office, two banks, a pharmacy, and two markets.151
92. The U.N. Secretary-General immediately condemned this launching of rockets
“indiscriminately into civilian areas.”152 Two days later, the Under-Secretary-General for
Political Affairs concluded that the attackers “knowingly targeted a civilian population” in a
city that “lies outside of the immediate conflict zone.”153 The Vostochniy neighborhood, and
the rockets that fell on it, are depicted in Map 3 below.
149 See, e.g., Witness Statement of Igor Evhenovych Yanovskyi (31 May 2018), para. 14 [hereinafter,
[hereinafter Yanovskyi Statement] (Annex 5); Expert Opinion No. 143, drafted by the Ukrainian
Scientific Research Institute of Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examination, Security Service
of Ukraine (3 April 2015), p. 12 (Annex 117).
150 Letter from the Mariupol City Council Healthcare Directorate of Donetsk Region No. 01/133-08-0
to the Deputy Head of the SBU Directorate in Donetsk Region (12 February 2015), p. 15 (Annex 104).
OSCE monitors documented multiple impacts on buildings, retail shops, homes and a school. OSCE,
Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), 24 January 2015: Shelling
Incident on Olimpiiska Street in Mariupol (24 January 2015) (Annex 328).
151 Donetsk Region Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, All Necessary
Measures Being Taken to Deal with the Consequences of Militants’ Shelling of Mariupol (25 January
2015) (Annex 91); Mariupol City Council, City Mayor Yuri Hotlubey and Donetsk Oblast Public
Prosecutor Nikolai Frantovsky Held a Briefing at Which They Described the Current Situation in
Mariupol (video) (24 January 2015) (Annex 553).
152 U.N. Secretary-General, Statement Attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on
Ukraine (24 January 2015) (Annex 306).
153 U.N. Security Council, Official Record, 7368th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.7368 (26 January 2015), p. 2
(statement of Jeffrey Feltman, U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs) (Annex 307).
51
Map 3: Shelling Impacts in the Vostochniy Neighborhood of Mariupol154
154 The points of detonation depicted in this map use the underlying data of the investigation team, as
documented in contemporaneous crime scene inspection reports. See Yanovskyi Statement, para. 14
(Annex 5); Annexes 92, 96-97 (crime scene inspection reports).
52
93. At 18:00 the day before the attack, DPR member Sergey Ponomarenko
(referred to within the DPR by his nom de guerre “Terrorist”) told another DPR member,
Oleksandr Evdotiy (“Pepel”), another DPR member, to: “F*cking crush it, I f*cking asked
you, that one, f*cking Vostochniy.”155 “Pepel” responded, “I will, I’ll do Vostochniy tonight as
well, don’t worry.”156
94. On 24 January 2015 at approximately 09:15, the attack on the Vostochniy
district began with a barrage of Grad rockets.157 At around 10:36, a DPR lookout named
Valeriy Kirsanov reported that the attack hit “on houses, on nine-story buildings, on private
residences, the Kievskiy market[.]”158 Two minutes later at 10:38, Kirsanov gave
Ponomarenko a similar report.159 Less than thirty minutes later at approximately 11:00,
another shelling attack struck the Vostochniy neighborhood.160 Figure 7 depicts a still taken
155 Yanovskyi Statement, para. 16 (Annex 5); Intercepted Conversation between Sergey Ponomarenko
and Oleksandr Evdotiy (23 January 2015) (Annex 418).
156 Intercepted Conversation between Sergey Ponomarenko and Oleksandr Evdotiy (23 January 2015)
(Annex 418).
157 OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), 24 January 2015:
Shelling Incident on Olimpiiska Street in Mariupol (24 January 2015) (Annex 328). Many residents
who suffered from the shelling attack also testified that the first attack came at around 09:15. See,
e.g., Signed Declaration of Olena Demchenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (24 January 2015), p. 1
(Annex 214); Signed Declaration of Natalya Mutovina, Witness Interrogation Protocol (30 January
2015) (Annex 217).
158 Intercepted Conversation between Oleksandr Evdotiy and Valeriy Kirsanov (24 January 2015)
(Annex 413); Yanovskyi Statement, para. 17 (Annex 5).
159 Intercepted Conversation between Valeriy Kirsanov and Sergey Ponomarenko (24 January 2015)
(Annex 414); Yanovskyi Statement, para. 17 (Annex 5).
160 Yanovskyi Statement, para. 13 (Annex 5); Video of the shelling of Mariupol (24 January 2015), p. 2
(Annex 697).
53
from a dashboard camera footage of this 11:00 attack. The OSCE reported additional
shelling attacks in the area at 13:02 and 13:21.161
Figure 7162
95. OSCE monitors arrived in the Vostochniy neighborhood to investigate this
attack, and concluded based on the impact craters that “rockets [used in the attack]
originated from a north-easterly direction, in the area of Oktyabr (19 km north-east of
Olimpiiska Street),” and “from an easterly direction, in the area of Zaichenko (15 km east of
Olimpiiska Street).”163 The Ukrainian investigative team also inspected the shell craters and
determined based on their impact angles that the attack had been launched from the
northeast and east, in the area of Sakhanka and Leninske.164 Reviewing these analyses,
161 OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), 24 January 2015:
Shelling Incident on Olimpiiska Street in Mariupol (24 January 2015) (Annex 328).
162 Yanovskyi Statement, para. 13 (Annex 5); Video of the shelling of Mariupol (24 January 2015), p. 2
(Annex 697).
163 OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), 24 January 2015:
Shelling Incident on Olimpiiska Street in Mariupol (24 January 2015) (Annex 328).
164 Expert Opinion No. 143, drafted by the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Special
Equipment and Forensic Expert Examination, Security Service of Ukraine (3 April 2015), p. 11 (Annex
117); Inspection Report, drafted by Mykhaylo Onyshchenko, Senior Special Investigator at the
Investigations Department, Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine (25
January 2015) (Annex 92).
54
General Brown agrees with their conclusions, and notes that the Ukrainian and OSCE
analyses are “consistent.”165 All the areas identified by the OSCE and the Ukrainian
investigators were controlled by the DPR at the time of the attack.166 Map 4 below depicts
the general launch site for the attack.
Map 4: Launch Zone for Attack on the Vostochniy Neighborhood of Mariupol
165 Brown Report, para. 46 (Annex 11).
166 OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), 24 January 2015:
Shelling Incident on Olimpiiska Street in Mariupol (24 January 2015) (noting that these areas were
“controlled by the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (‘DPR’)” at the time of the attack) (Annex 328);
Yanovskyi Statement, para. 15 (Annex 5).
55
96. The OSCE also determined from its analysis of the shell craters that the attack
was committed using multiple launch rocket systems equipped with Grad and Uragan
rockets.167 The Ukrainian investigative team reached the same conclusion based on its
analysis of the shell craters and fragments found at the impact sites.168 General Brown also
concludes that “[t]he Mariupol shelling was carried out using BM-21 Grad MLRS firing high
explosive rockets.”169
97. There was no plausible military reason to attack the Vostochniy
neighborhood. No Ukrainian Armed Forces (“UAF”) were deployed there at the time of the
attack.170 While a National Guard Battalion had its headquarters in eastern Mariupol, the
headquarters was located more than three kilometers south-west of the Eastern district,
from the attack.171 The National Guard also had a checkpoint north of the Vostochniy
neighborhood, located at the junction of the two main routes running into Mariupol from the
east.172
167 OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), 24 January 2015:
Shelling Incident on Olimpiiska Street in Mariupol (24 January 2015) (Annex 328).
168 Expert Report No. 143, drafted by the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Special Equipment
and Forensic Expert Examination, Security Service of Ukraine (3 April 2015), pp. 10‒11 (Annex 117);
Expert Opinion No. 142, drafted by the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Special Equipment
and Forensic Expert Examination, Security Service of Ukraine (30 March 2015), p. 8 (same) (Annex
115); Brown Report, para. 45 (Annex 11).
169 Brown Report, para. 56 (Annex 11).
170 Ministry of Interior of Ukraine, Main Department of the National Guard of Ukraine Letter No.
27/6/2-3553 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (31 May 2018), p. 1 (Annex 183).
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid. (referring to this checkpoint as chekpoint No. 4014, located at the eastern outskirts of the city
of Mariupol, 100 meters east from the intersection of the Olympic Street and the M14 highway). This
checkpoint was not damaged in the shelling attack. Ibid. p. 2.
56
98. Soon after the attacks, a resident of Mariupol said that “[o]bviously, everyone
in the city is very scared.”173 Some were so terrified that they fled the city.174
99. Yet, DPR members celebrated the terror they had caused. In one call,
Kirsanov discussed the shelling attack with Ponomarenko:
Kirsanov: Yeah, Talakovka unleashed a bombardment first
thing in the morning.
Ponomarenko: I know.
Kirsanov: And then Vostochniy.
Ponomarenko: Let the f*cking bitches be more afraid.175
The Attack on a Residential Neighborhood in Kramatorsk
100. On 10 February 2015, less than three weeks after the attack on Mariupol,
Russia’s proxies used an even more powerful and sophisticated multiple-launch rocket
system to bombard a residential neighborhood in the city of Kramatorsk. The DPR attacked
Kramatorsk twice, first at 12:30, and again five minutes later at 12:35. Using a BM-30
Smerch system (“Smerch”), the DPR deployed cluster munitions against an area of the city
containing apartment buildings, homes, schools, hospitals, and day-care centers, killing
seven civilians and seriously injuring twenty-six more, including five children. In the
aftermath of the attack, the OSCE Chief Monitor in Ukraine condemned the attack as
another instance in which “innocent civilians are bearing the brunt of a violent conflict
173 Oleksandr Stashevsky and Dmitry Zaks, Ukraine Rebels Announce New Offensive as Rockets Kill
30, AFP (24 January 2015) (Annex 520).
174 Viktoria Savitskaya, Mariupol Recovers after Shelling, LB.ua (24 January 2015), p. 4 (reporting
that “[s]ince the shelled neighborhood is now without water, gas, electricity and heat, many of its
residents have left”) (Annex 556).
175 Intercepted Conversation between Valeriy Kirsanov and Sergey Ponomarenko (24 January 2015)
(emphasis added) (Annex 415); Statement of Authentication, Volodymyr Piven, Senior Investigator,
Main Investigation Office, Security Service of Ukraine (5 June 2018) (Annex 185).
57
characterized by [an] increasing . . . death-toll and indiscriminate shelling.”176 Both the
OSCE and Ukrainian law enforcement reached agreement on the key facts.
101. Kramatorsk is a densely populated city in eastern Ukraine located
approximately 50 km northwest of the contact line. Its population was more than 194,000
as of 2015.177
102. At around 12:30 on 10 February 2015, numerous separate explosive
submunitions178 detonated within seconds of each other.179 Approximately five minutes
later, the DPR launched another attack.180 The attacks separately hit a residential
neighborhood in Kramatorsk as well as the Kramatorsk airport, located two kilometers
southeast of the neighborhood. The fifty-eight crater impacts from the cluster submunitions
and carrier elements launched in both attacks are depicted in Map 5.181
176 OSCE, Statement by OSCE Chief Monitor in Ukraine on Situation in Kramatorsk (1o February
2015) (Annex 332).
177 State Statistics Service of Ukraine, Population of Ukraine as of 1 January 2017 (2017) , p. 3
(Annex 1110).
178 Convention on Cluster Munitions, art. 2(3), 2688 U.N.T.S. 39 (entered into force 1 August 2010)
(defining “explosive submunition” as “a conventional munition that in order to perform its task is
dispersed or released by a cluster munition and is designed to function by detonating an explosive
charge prior to, on or after impact”).
179 Record of Site Inspection, drafted by Major of Justice A. Kholin, Senior Investigator with the
Operative Unit of the Investigative Department of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast
(12 February 2015) (Annex 105). OSCE monitors, stationed at that time in Kramatorsk, reported that
they “heard at [at 12:33] at least four blasts in the surrounding area [and observed] a rocket landing
30 metres from their position behind a building on Kramatorsk Boulevard #50, . . . a second set of
unexploded ordnance (UXO) [landing] at Lenin Street #45 . . . [and] a third UXO [landing] on the
yard side (north-west) on Dvortsova Street #32.” OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring
Mission to Ukraine (SMM): Shelling in Kramatorsk (10 February 2015) (Annex 332).
180 Witness Statement of Kyrylo Ihorevych Dvorskyi, para. 8 [hereinafter Dvorskyi Statement] (Annex
3).
181 Ibid. para. 9; Record of Site Inspection, drafted by Major of Justice A. Kholin, Senior Investigator
with the Operative Unit of the Investigative Department of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk
Oblast (12 February 2015), pp. 2‒21 (Annex 105).
58
Map 5: Shelling Impacts in Kramatorsk182
182 The points of detonation depicted in this map use the underlying data of the investigation team, as
documented in contemporaneous crime scene inspection reports. See Dvorskyi Statement, paras. 6–9
(Annex 3); Annexes 103, 105 (crime scene inspection reports).
59
103. As in Volnovakha and Mariupol, there was no plausible military reason to
attack the residential neighborhood in Kramatorsk. While a police station, military
enlistment office, and administrative building of the Border Guard Service were stationed in
the neighborhood, none of these government installations were involved in hostilities.183
General Brown concludes that these administrative offices are insignificant from a military
standpoint, and their presence cannot explain the kind of attack that hit the residential
neighborhood in Kramatorsk.184
104. Some of the rockets targeted the Kramatorsk airport, which did have value as
a Ukrainian Armed Forces headquarters.185 But the airfield was two kilometers away from
the residential neighborhood, which was separately attacked.186 As General Brown
concludes, given the sophistication of the Smerch system and the dispersion of the bomblets
in the residential neighborhood, it is implausible to suggest that the rcokets that struck the
residential neighborhood aimed to hit the airfield and missed by two kilometers.187
Moreover, even if the attack on the airfield simultaneously placed civilians in the line of fire.
General Brown explains that when Smerch rockets dispense their bomblets, the “carrier”
elements of the rockets (i.e., the pieces that carry the bomblets) continue on their trajectory,
falling beyond the target and wreaking “as much, if not more, damage as the submunitions.”
188
183 Dvorskyi Statement, para. 8 (Annex 3).
184 Brown Report, para. 67 (Annex 11).
185 Signed Declaration of Oleksandr Chorniy, Witness Interrogation Protocol (12 February 2015), p. 2
(Annex 219); Signed Declaration of Vitaliy Hrynchuk, Witness Interrogation Protocol (19 August
2015), pp. 1‒2 (Annex 237).
186 Dvorskyi Statement, para. 8 (Annex 3).
187 Brown Report, paras. 72‒73, 76 (Annex 11).
188 Ibid. para. 70.
60
105. Russia’s proxies carried out the attack on Kramatorsk using BM-30 Smerch.
OSCE monitors concluded based on their analysis of the impact craters and submunitions
that the shelling came from the south-southeast, and that the “strike was fired by one single
launcher system - probably a BM-30 Smerch or Tornado” equipped with cluster
submunitions.189 Human Rights Watch and Ukrainian investigators also determined that
BM-30 Smerch equipped with cluster munitions were used in the attack, and the Ukrainian
investigative team located the launch site as the outskirts of the city of Horlivka, which lies to
the south-southeast of Kramatorsk.190 General Brown likewise concludes that “[t]he
Kramatorsk shelling was carried out using BM-30 Smerch MLRS firing high explosive
bomblet rockets” based on these forensic analyses, and the long range of BM-30 Smerch191
and concurs that the firing position for the attack was located “within a 10 km radius of the
centre of Horlivka.”192 This area was controlled by DPR forces at the time of the attack.193
106. The DPR’s attack took a heavy toll on civilians. A 13-year old boy who had
been playing with two friends in the courtyard of his apartment block at the time of the
attack described the chaos in vivid detail:
189 OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine Based on Information
Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv Time) (11 February 2015), p. 1 (Annex 333); OSCE, Spot Report by the
OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM): Shelling in Kramatorsk, 10 February 2015 (10
February 2015) (Annex 331).
190 Expert Opinion No. 193, drafted by Oleksiy Bordunos, drafted by the Ukrainian Scientific Research
Institute of Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examination, Security Service of Ukraine (24
April 2015), pp. 9‒10 (finding that “the shells were fired by a Smerch multiple rocket launcher[ from]
the northeastern outskirts of the town of Horlivka”) (Annex 121); Human Rights Watch, Ukraine:
More Civilians Killed in Cluster Munition Attacks (19 March 2015), p. 7 (noting that its investigators
“examined the tail sections of two Smerch rockets, one of which was still standing in the ground, and
the remnants of a cargo section from a Smerch cluster munition rocket”) (Annex 449).
191 Brown Report, para. 75 (Annex 11).
192 Ibid. para. 65.
193 Dvorskyi Statement, para. 11 (Annex 3).
61
When we heard the first explosion we started running toward
the entrance. But then many bombs started exploding all
around us. Shrapnel was flying everywhere. I looked back and
saw that one of my friends was holding his shoulder. A
fragment also pierced my thigh. It wasn’t very painful at first,
but I felt that my pants became wet from blood. We had to wait
for a long time for the ambulance, and my head started
spinning.194
107. The shelling attack hit the downtown of Kramatorsk, causing extensive
damage to civilian infrastructure. OSCE monitors documented multiple impacts on
apartment buildings,195 and Human Rights Watch investigated impact areas that included
multistory apartment buildings and a hospital.196 The Ukrainian investigation team
recorded explosions near a pharmacy, an apartment building, hair salon, bank, pharmacy,
and toy store.197 In total, the shelling attack damaged fifteen residential buildings, a
kindergarten, an art school, and a local hospital.198
Attacks on Civilians in Avdiivka
108. The catastrophic winter of 2015 ended with the Minsk II agreement, just days
after the shelling of Kramatorsk. Though Russia’s proxies violated the ceasefire, military
clashes settled into a more stable pattern. But this did not mean that Ukrainian civilians
194 Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: More Civilians Killed in Cluster Munition Attacks (19 March
2015), p. 6 (Annex 449).
195 OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM): Shelling in
Kramatorsk, 10 February 2015 (10 February 2015) (Annex 331); OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special
Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine Based on Information Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv Time) (11
February 2015), p. 1 (Annex 333).
196 Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: More Civilians Killed in Cluster Munition Attacks (19 March
2015), p. 6 (Annex 449).
197 Record of Site Inspection, drafted by Major of Justice A. Kholin, Senior Investigator with the
Operative Unit of the Investigative Department of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast
(12 February 2015), pp. 3‒4 (Annex 105).
198 Executive Committee of the Kramatorsk City Council Letter No. F1-28/4812 to the Investigations
Department at the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the SBU (26 November 2015), p. 1 (Annex 142).
62
were safe from attack and intimidation. A striking example is the relentless and
indiscriminate shelling of Avdiivka in January and February of 2017.
109. Controlled by the Ukrainian government, and with a population of 35,000,
Avdiivka is located close to the contact line, approximately 17 km north-east from DPRcontrolled
Donetsk.199 Just as a new U.S. administration took office, Russia’s proxies
suddenly mounted an all-out offensive on Avdiivka — and on the vulnerable population of
that city.200
110. Rather than focus on military objectives, the DPR attacked civilian residences,
a kindergarten, a hospital, commercial buildings, and the Avdiivka Coke factory
(“Koksokhim”) that provided power to the city. The NGO International Partnership for
Human Rights sent an investigation team to Avdiivka, and based on contemporaneous
investigations of impact sites, analysis of debris, and interviews of witnesses, identified
numerous attacks from DPR-held territory against civilian sites.201 Many of these attacks, as
well as others, have been documented in OSCE reporting and by Ukrainian investigators,
although investigations are at an earlier stage given the relative recency of the attacks. At
least five civilians were killed and twelve more were injured in Avdiivka.202
199 OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on
Information Received as of 19:30 (27 January 2017), p. 2 (Annex 342).
200 See, e.g., John Wendle, In Avdiivka, Ukrainians See Surge in Fighting as Putin Testing Trump,
TIME (3 February 2017); see also International Partnership for Human Rights, Attacks on Civilian
Infrastructure in Eastern Ukraine, (2017) pp. 15, 44‒45 [hereinafter IPHR Report] (Annex 454); U.N.
Security Council, Official Records, 7876th meeting, U.N. Doc S/PV.7876 (2 February 2017), pp. 2‒4
(briefing by Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman on increased fighting and the humanitarian
situation in Avdiivka) (Annex 315).
201 IPHR Report, pp. 48‒50 (Annex 454).
202 Ibid.
63
111. Throughout this assault, the DPR fired at civilian targets indiscriminately.
For example:
• 27 January: Three civilian residences struck by BM-21 Grad rockets on
Zavodska St., in the heart of a residential area far from any arguable military
target.203
• 30 January: Avdiivka Coke Factory (“Koksokhim”), far from any military
target, hit by artillery shells, causing power loss throughout the city amid
freezing temperatures.204
• 31 January: Civilian apartment building on Komunalna St., near a hospital,
struck by Grad rockets, nearly 2 km from any arguable military target.205
• 1 February: One civilian killed, three injured, and 52 civilian residences totally
or partially destroyed by Grad rockets, with many of the targets “located over
2km from nearest UAF positions, including (again) Zavodska St.”206
203 Expert Conclusion No. 77, drafted by M. Ustymenko and A. Pavlenko, Ukrainian Scientific
Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examinations, Security Service of
Ukraine (3 March 2017) (Annex 167); Expert Conclusion No. 78, drafted by M. Ustymenko and A.
Pavlenko, Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert
Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (3 March 2017) (Annex 168); Expert Conclusion No. 79,
drafted by M. Ustymenko and A. Pavlenko, Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Special
Equipment and Forensic Expert Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (3 March 2017) (Annex
169); Expert Conclusion No. 80, drafted by M. Ustymenko and A. Pavlenko, Ukrainian Scientific
Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examinations, Security Service of
Ukraine (3 March 2017) (Annex 170); Expert Conclusion No. 81, drafted by M. Ustymenko and A.
Pavlenko, Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert
Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (3 March 2017) (Annex 171).
204 IPHR Report, p. 48 (Annex 454); OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (31 January 2017), pp. 3‒4 (Annex 343).
205 IPHR Report, p. 48 (Annex 454); OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (1 February 2017) (Annex 344).
206 IPHR Report, p. 49 (Annex 454); Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine
(SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30, p. 2 (2 February 2017)
(Annex 1); Extract from Criminal Proceedings No. 12017050140000081 (6 February 2017) (reporting
damage to seven buildings on 30 January 2017) (Annex 164); Extract from Criminal Proceedings No.
12017050140000085 (Annex 164); Record of Site Inspection, drafted by N. Protsyk, Senior
Investigator (1 February 2017) (Annex 162); Record of Site Inspection, drafted by Y. Ponomarenko,
Senior Investigator (1 February 2017) (Annex 163); Record of Site Inspection, drafted by A. Zaychik (1
February 2017) (Annex 161).
64
• 2 February: Ambulance driver killed at humanitarian aid distribution point,
and civilian buildings, residence, a school, and hospital struck by 120 mm
mortars.207
• 3 February: Civilian residence struck by shell, 2.5 km from nearest UAF firing
position.208
• 16 February: One civilian killed and two injured in Grad rocket attack on
multiple civilian residences and a commercial building, 1 km from nearest
UAF firing position.209
• 17 February: Two civilians injured and multiple residences struck by eight
tank shells, more than 1 km from any arguable military target.210
• 24 February: Civilian residences struck by 122mm mortar shells, more than 1
km from any arguable military target.211
• 2 March: Several civilian residences, school, and kindergarten struck by
125mm tank projectiles, more than 1 km from any arguable military target.212
112. Map 6 documents the impact sites of many of these attacks:
207 IPHR Report p. 49 (Annex 454); OSCE, Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine: Casualties, Damage to Civilian Infrastructure Registered in Donetsk Region Following
Fighting (3 February 2017), p. 1 (Annex 345).
208 IPHR Report, p. 49 (Annex 454); OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (5 February 2017), p. 4 (Annex 347).
209 IPHR Report, p. 50 (Annex 454); OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (19 February 2017), p. 3 (Annex 349).
210 IPHR Report, p. 50 (Annex 454); OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (19 February 2017), p. 3 (Annex 349).
211 IPHR Report, p. 50 (Annex 454); OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (26 February 2017), p. 3 (Annex 350).
212 IPHR Report, p. 50 (Annex 454); OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (5 March 2017), p. 4 (Annex 351).
65
Map 6: Shelling Impacts in Avdiivka213
213 The points of detonation and other points of interest depicted in this are based on the investigative
reporting of the independent non-governmental organization International Partnership for Human
Rights, as well as contemporaneous Ukrainian investigative reports. See IPHR Report, pp. 15, 40–52
(Anex 454); Annexes 167-171 (expert forensic reports).
66
113. As intended, the relentless and unpredictable pace of these attacks created
widespread fear among civilians living in Avdiivka. As Svetlana Zadorozhnyuk, a mother
living in Avdiivka put it, “I’m just so tired of all this. . . . The situation now is just terrible,
terrible. Right now no one knows what will happen in the next five minutes.”214 Hanna
Fadeeva, a 76-year-old woman from Avdiivka who was in her apartment when it was struck
by a shell at around 04:00 on 31 January, awoke to the sound of glass breaking and the walls
of her apartment collapsing. She testified: “After the explosion subsided I saw that I was
trapped in my own house and could not get out. The shelling continued and I was very
scared when I realized that at that time I could not get out of the building and was
trapped.”215
114. The terror gripping this city under fire was compounded by the targeting of
the Avdiivka Coke Factory in the north of the town, which caused a power outage throughout
Avdiivka as it faced -20o Celsius temperatures.216 At a briefing to the U.N. Security Council
on 2 February, the chief OSCE monitor in Ukraine warned that with the electricity down,
“[t]he conditions for civilians who have remained in Avdiivka have reached emergency
levels.217 As General Brown concludes, the shelling “was carried out across the city,”
214 John Wendle, Avdiivka, Evacuating Again as Fighting Escalates, Al Jazeera (8 February 2017)
(Annex 594).
215 Signed Declaration of Hanna Mykolayva Fadeeva, Witness Interrogation Protocol (15 February
2017), para. 4 (Annex 254).
216 IPHR Report, p. 48 (Annex 454); OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received as of 19:30 (31 January 2017), pp. 3‒4 (Annex 343);
Al Jazeera, Avdiivka Civilians Caught in Crossfire as Clashes Rage (5 February 2017) (Annex 593).
217 U.N. Security Council, Official Records, 7876th meeting, U.N. Doc S/PV.7876 (2 February 2017), p.
4 (Annex 315).
67
including “many attacks of residential areas located nowhere near military targets.218 In
short, the DPR took aim at the entire population of Avdiivka.
The Campaign of Bombing Attacks in Ukrainian Cities
115. While Russia’s proxies subjected civilians in Donbas to rocket barrages, other
illegal armed groups, including the Kharkiv Partisans, carried out parallel efforts to instill
fear in Ukraine’s major cities far from the contact line. In Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest
city of 1.4 million people, the “Kharkiv Partisans” and related terror cells orchestrated a
campaign of civilian intimidation through bombing attacks, including targeting a patriotic
unity march and a crowded nightclub.219 Russia’s proxies have sent a strong message that,
from Odesa to Kyiv, no one is beyond their reach and civilians who support Ukrainian unity
will pay a price.
Bombings in Kharkiv
116. A string of bombing attacks in Kharkiv killed at least three civilians, injured
nearly 20 more, and also damaged numerous buildings. From July 2014 to May 2015, the
OHCHR counted more than 45 separate explosions in the city.220
117. This string of attacks was carried out under the umbrella of the “Kharkiv
Partisans” and similar groups. In reality, these terrorist cells were not united within any
coherent organizational structure; the common denominator was simply pro-Russian
individuals in direct or indirect contact with Russian government patrons. The main group
of extremists styling themselves “Kharkiv Partisans” was founded in the summer of 2014 by
218 Brown Report, para. 95 (Annex 11).
219 Official Site of Kharkiv City Council, Mayor, Executive Committee, History of Kharkiv (27 July
2017) (Annex 653).
220 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 February–15 May 2015), para. 24
(Annex 310).
68
Oleg Sobchenko and Vadym Monastyrev, both Ukrainian nationals.221 Sobchenko and
Monastryrev participated in anti-government protests in Kharkiv in February 2014, and then
fled to Belgorod, Russia, just over the Russian border.222 Once there, they began to receive
funding and support from Russian intelligence services.223 For example, one Kharkiv
Partisan member testified that “Mr. Sobchenko also said that he had people everywhere, and
221 See e.g., Signed Declaration of Aleksandr Bondarenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (23 October
2014), pp. 3, 7, 8 (in July 2014, “Oleg” gave him an offer to come to Belgorod to “make some money,”
after which he was trained to use explosives, and later in August, “Oleg introduced us as the Kharkiv
Partisans”) (Annex 190); Signed Declaration of Yevhen Kaliberda, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (21
October 2014), pp. 4, 6 (in mid-July in Kharkiv, he met “someone called Oleg (Sobchenko, as I
subsequently learnt),” who “said that an organization was being set up to protect public order, which
would be helping the militia,” and later called them the “Kharkov Partisans”) (Annex 189).
221 See e.g., Signed Declaration of A. M. Tyshchenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 December
2015), p. 2 (during the anti-government protests in Kharkiv in February 2014, he “met Mr.
Sobchenko,” who “was going and talking to people”) (Annex 17); Signed Declaration of Andrii
Baranenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (23 October 2014), p. 3 (in August 2014, “Monastyryev
told me that it was getting dangerous to be in Kharkov and that I should go to Belgorod”) (Annex 191).
222 See e.g., Signed Declaration of A. M. Tyshchenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 December
2015), p. 2 (during the anti-government protests in Kharkiv in February 2014, he “met Mr.
Sobchenko,” who “was going and talking to people”) (Annex 245); Signed Declaration of A. V.
Baranenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (23 October 2014), p. 3 (in August 2014, “Monastyryev
told me that it was getting dangerous to be in Kharkov and that I should go to Belgorod”) (Annex 191).
223 See e.g., Signed Declaration of Andrii Baranenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (23 October
2014), p. 3 (Monastyrev arranged a meeting for him with “an employee of the Russian FSB”) (Annex
191); Signed Declaration of Yaroslav Zamko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 August 2015), p. 4
(Manastyrev was his “supervisor” of Zamko’s training in a Russian military camp and that Russian
military officers also trained him) (Annex 241); Signed Declaration of Vadim Chekhovsky, Suspect
Interrogation Protocol (9 May 2015), p. 5 (“Oleg Sobchenko proposed that [he and others] go shooting
and on a training exercise . . . being organized officially by the RF authorities”) (Annex 229); Signed
Declaration of Kostiantyn Nuzhnenkoenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 July 2015), p. 2 (after
“Monastyriov offered [him] to recruit a group in Ukraine that would engage in sabotage and
destabilize the situation in the country,” he “received a call from a man who suggested we meet in
Belgorod in the street,” and in that meeting, “presented an ID of a Federal Security Service officer”)
(Annex 233); Signed Declaration of Dmytro Kononenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (22 February
2016), p. 2 (“Monastyrev, he told me that the financing from the RF special services for subversive
activity and other actions aimed at supporting the activities of the ‘Kharkov Partisans’ on the territory
of Ukraine had been suspended, and that the handover of weapons through ‘hideouts’ had also been
suspended”) (Annex 246).
69
he himself had FSB handlers[.]”224 Another testified that “Vadim [Monastyrev] . . . said
during our conversation that [a planned bombing] was being monitored by representatives
of the Russian special services who could assist me if necessary.”225 Sobchenko and
Manastyrev loosely recruited, arranged training, and supported numerous members to carry
out acts of violence in Kharkiv.226 Six of these significant Kharkiv bombings are shown in the
map below.
224 Signed Declaration of A. M. Tyshchenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 December 2015), p. 7
(Annex 245).
225 Signed Declaration of Dmytro Kononenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (13 May 2015), p. 2
(Annex 246).
226 See, e.g., Signed Declaration of Yaroslav Zamko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 August 2015),
p. 3 (“Sobchenko and Vadik Monastyryov (senior) offered the six of us to go to a military training
camp . . . .”) (Annex 241); Signed Declaration of Vadim Chekhovsky, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9
May 2015), p. 5 (“Oleg Sobchenko proposed that [he and others] go shooting and on a training
exercise . . . being organized officially by the RF authorities”) (Annex 229); Signed Declaration of A.
M. Tyshchenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 December 2015), p. 3 (Sobchenko arranged for his
training in a Russian military camp) (Annex 245); Signed Declaration of Yevhen Kaliberda, Suspect
Interrogation Protocol (21 October 2014), p. 5 (“Sobchenko told me that in addition to the courses
that I had arrived for, there were also courses in combat training,” and after which he attended a camp
in Russia) (Annex 189).
70
Map 7: Bombings in Kharkiv
118. One example of this campaign is a string of bombings in November 2014 by
Ukrainian national Marina Kovtun. Russian intelligence operatives, who arranged Kovtun’s
training, introduced her to “Vadim” — Kharkiv Partisans’ leader Monastyrev’s first name —
who “invited [her and her travel companion] to collaborate with them, as they needed our
71
help and could procure some weapons for us,” to which Kovtun agreed.227 Once back in
Kharkiv, Kovtun told her associates that “weapons had been given to us by ‘Kharkiv
Partisans.’”228 As described further in Chapter 2, Russian officials armed Kovtun with an
array of weapons, including three SPM limpet mines, a military weapon developed for use in
naval warfare.229 On the night of 8 November 2014, Kovtun and an accomplice planted the
first of these limpet mines in an attempt to destroy the Malyshev Plant, a large factory and
major employer in Kharkiv.230 Kovtun filmed her accomplice planting the mine on her cell
phone.231 Though the attack did not achieve its objective of blowing up the plant (the
227 Signed Declaration of M Kovtun, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 November 2014), pp. 6‒7
(Annex 196). Sworn statements of others working with the Kharkiv Partisans confirm that Kovtun
agreed to work with the Kharkiv Partisans. Kharkiv Partisans member Chekhovsky, for example,
stated that he attended training in Russia arranged by Sobchenko, and that his colleague had given
weapons Chekhocsky had procured to “Marina,” who was “involved in the explosion on the Stena rock
pub.” Signed Declaration of V. Chekhovsky, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9 May 2015), pp. 5‒7
(Annex 229).
228 Signed Declaration of M. Kovtun, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (19 November 2014), p. 2
(Annex 196).
229 SPM limpet mines are designed to engage and destroy military and transport vehicles, military and
industrial equipment, railway cargo trains, and other fortified objects. Expert Conclusion No.
532/2014, drafted by the Forensic Research Center, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, Main
Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Kharkiv Region (3 April 2015), p. 34 (“An
SPM mine is an anti-object time-fuse incendiary mine intended for destroying movable and stationary
items with metal parts, and can be used on land and under water.”) (Annex 116).
230 Signed Declaration of M. Kovtun, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 November 2014), pp. 8‒9
(Annex 196).
231 Ibid. p. 9 (“[W]e placed the mine in a cellophane bag and tied a rope to it. Then Vasily pulled out
the pin and lowered the mine to the bottom of the pipeline shaft, which was covered with a grill. . . .
Meanwhile, I was filming everything on the camera . . .”); Kovtun video of Malysheev Plant bombing
(video) (Annex 693). A forensic investigation conformed that fragments collected from the attack site
came from an SPM limpet mine. Expert Conclusion No. 557/2014, drafted by the Forensic Research
Center, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Ukraine in Kharkiv Region (23 March 2015), p. 17 (concluding that “an explosive device, probably a
limpet (magnetic) SPM mine (medium limpet mine), equipped as a standard with a VZD-1M fuze, was
detonated”) (Annex 112).
72
pipeline that Kovtun targeted was not, as she believed, running gas into the factory), it did
serve as a prelude to more destruction to come.
119. The next evening, 9 November 2014, Kovtun and her accomplice planted the
second SPM limpet mine, this time in a crowded nightclub in the city center — the Stena
Rock Club, a popular venue for local activists who supported national unity.232 Kovtun
testifies that, at around 21:00, she delivered the armed mine to another Kharkiv Partisan
member who placed it in a concealed bag under the counter of the bar at the Stena Rock
Club.233 The mine exploded at around 21:45, injuring several civilians.234 Ukrainian forensic
experts confirmed that fragments collected from the club came from a SPM limpet mine.235
232 Signed Declaration of M. Kovtun, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 November 2014), pp. 8‒10
(Annex 196); Signed Declaration of R. Chernenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (10 November
2014), p. 3 (a bartender at the Stena Rock Club recounting that “an explosion rang out inside the
building” that day) (Annex 194); Signed Declaration of M. Ozerov, Witness Interrogation Protocol (10
November 2014), p. (Annex 193); Signed Declaration of Ye. Datsenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol
(11 November 2014), p. 2 (stating that the Stena Rock Club was popular with individuals with pro-
Ukrainian sentiments) (Annex 195).
233 Signed Declaration of M. Kovtun, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 November 2014), pp. 8‒10
(Annex 196). One of the victims of the explosion testified he remembered seeing Kovtun’s accomplice
sit at the section of the bar where the mine detonated. Signed Declaration of G. Shmorovoz, Witness
Interrogation Protocol (17 December 2014), pp. 1‒2 (Annex 203); Record of Person Identification
from Photographs by Shmoryvoz (17 December 2014) (Annex 81).
234 Signed Declaration of R. Chernenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (10 November 2014), p. 3
(recounting the time of the explosion) (Annex 194); OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring
Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, Based on Information Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) (10 November
2014) (Annex 318).
235 Expert Opinion No. 532/2014, drafted by the Forensic Research Center, Ministry of Internal Affairs
of Ukraine, Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Kharkiv Region (3 April
2015), p. 43 (concluding that “[a]round 21.38 on 11.09.2014, an SPM medium limpet mine with a
delayed action VZD-1M fuze was detonated at the Stena bar”) (Annex 116). The next day, Kovtun gave
the third SPM limpet mine to the same associate who bombed the Stena Rock Club, who said he
intended to bomb the Britannia Hotel. Signed Declaration of M. Kovtun, Suspect Interrogation
Protocol (16 November 2014), pp. 9‒10 (Annex 196).
73
Kovtun admitted that her cell targeted popular pubs in order to “destabilize the situation in
Kharkiv.”236
120. A spate of similar attacks by radical pro-separatist cells likewise advanced the
Kharkiv Partisans’ agenda and terrorized the city. For example, three extremists fired a
MRO-A rocket-propelled grenade at the regional office of PrivatBank.237 The same cell went
on to fire a MRO-A at a military enlistment office, and detonate an explosive device at the
office of “Dia” (“Action”), a pro-unity volunteer organization.238
121. This wave of violence culminated in the deadly attack on a unity march on 22
February 2015. A cell comprised of Volodymyr Dvornikov, Viktor Tetutskiy, and Sergey
Bashlykov — all of whom have confessed to the crime — detonated a military-grade antipersonnel
mine in the midst of a peaceful unity march marking the one-year anniversary of
the Revolution of Dignity.239 The day before the march, Dvornikov scouted the downtown
march route along Marshal Zhukova Street.240 He returned at 03:00 that night and
236 Signed Declaration of M. Kovtun, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 November 2014), p. 11 (Annex
196).
237 Signed Declaration of Vasily Pushkarev, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (31 August 2015), pp. 4‒5
(Annex 142); Signed Declaration of M. Rezniakov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (13 August 2015), p.
6 (Annex 236).
238 Signed Declaration of Vasily Pushkarev, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (31 August 2015), pp. 6‒7,
11‒12 (Annex 142); Signed Declaration of M. Rezniakov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (13 August
2015), p. 6 (Annex 236); Video published by the Kharkiv Partisans (video) (taking credit for these
attacks) (Annex 707).
239 Signed Declaration of V. Dvornikov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 February 2015), pp. 3‒5
(Annex 223); Signed Declaration of S. Bashlykov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 February 2015),
pp. 4‒5 (Annex 221); Signed Declaration of V. Tetutskiy, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 February
2015), pp. 3‒6 (Annex 222).
240 Signed Declaration of V. Dvornikov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 February 2015), p. 4
(“During the day on February 21, 2015, I drove my Ford along Prospekt Zhukova in order to scope out
the area and find the locations with the largest accumulations of snow, where it would be possible to
conceal the mine.”) (Annex 223).
74
concealed the landmine in a snowbank.241 Once the parade began, Dvornikov waited until
marchers were near the mine, and then detonated it at approximately 13:15.242 The OSCE,
which was monitoring the rally and march, “heard the blast and felt shockwaves from their
position 100m away.”243 OSCE monitors arrived at the scene of the explosion soon after the
attack and observed “two dead individuals covered with Ukrainian flags[.]”244 Andriy Sanin,
a participant in the rally and march, recounted that “[i]n the first seconds there was panic.
Everyone was screaming, running[.]”245 As OSCE and U.N. monitors reported, three
civilians were killed, including a 15-year-old boy and a police officer, and 15 more were
injured.246
122. The string of bombings committed by the Kharkiv Partisans and other armed
groups in 2014 into early 2015 created an atmosphere of fear among civilians. Volodymyr
Noskov, a local journalist, reported in February 2015 that “[t]he fear, everyone carries it in
241 Ibid.; Signed Declaration of S. Bashlykov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 February 2015), pp.
4‒5 (Annex 221); Signed Declaration of V. Tetutskiy, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 February
2015), pp. 4‒5 (Annex 222).
242 Signed Declaration of V. Dvornikov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 February 2015), p. 5 (“I
saw people in uniform marching along Prospekt Zhukova, after which I pressed the button to dial the
cellphone number 066-887-45-59, thereby setting off the mine that I had planted earlier.”)
(Annex 223); Signed Declaration of S. Bashlykov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 February 2015),
p. 5 (Annex 221); Signed Declaration of V. Tetutskiy, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 February
2015), p. 6 (Annex 222).
243 OSCE, Spot Report by Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 22 February 2015: Explosion in
Kharkiv at March Commemorating February 2014 pro-Maidan Events (22 February 2015)
(Annex 334).
244 Ibid.
245 Simon Shuster, Meet the Pro-Russian 'Partisans' Waging a Bombing Campaign in Ukraine, Time
(10 April 2015), p. 4 (Annex 571).
246 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 February–15 May 2015), para. 24
(Annex 768); OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine Based on
Information Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) (24 February 2015) (Annex 335); OSCE, Spot Report
by Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 22 February 2015: Explosion in Kharkiv at March
Commemorating February 2014 Pro-Maidan Events (22 February 2015) (Annex 334).
75
their own way. We’re getting used to our new conditions. We all understand that this war is
not for one year; the physical, moral exhaustion really wears out your body.”247 Other
residents of Kharkiv described civilians as constantly on edge, noting that “[p]eople are
hiding. They’re sitting and waiting.”248 Vladimir Bondarenko, a furniture restorer, put the
toll — and the strategy behind the attacks — perhaps most aptly: “the anxiety raised by the
bombings is painful[.] . . . [T]hat’s the whole point of terrorist acts — to bring people to a
pitch of fear where they can be easily broken.”249
Attempted Assassination of a Ukrainian Member of Parliament in
Kyiv
123. Russia’s proxies have taken their campaign to Ukraine’s capital city of Kyiv.
In a recent, major plot, Ukrainian nationals working with LPR militants and Russian
intelligence operatives planted a car bomb in an attempt to assassinate Anton Gerashchenko,
a Ukrainian member of Parliament and outspoken critic of Russian aggression.
124. This plot was led by Andriy Tyhonov, a member of the LPR who worked with
Eduard Dobrodeev, an officer of Russia’s military intelligence service (“GRU”).250 Tyhonov
247 Linda Kinstler, A Ukrainian City Holds Its Breath, Foreign Policy (20 February 2015), pp. 2‒3
(Annex 561).
248 Ibid. p. 4.
249 Corey Flintoff, Bomb Attacks Increase In Ukraine's Second-Largest City, Kharkiv, NPR (6 April
2015), p. 2 (Annex 570).
250Witness Statement of Taras Stepanovych Horbatyi (31 May 2018), para. 5 [hereinafter Horbatyi
Statement] (Annex 2); Signed Declaration of H. Rizayeva, Witness Interrogation Protocol (14
February 2017), p. 3 (captive of the LPR who saw Tykhonov while in captivity, and stated that
“Tykhonov was directly involved in combat operations on the side of the LPR militants as head of a
combat unit or one of its leaders”) (Annex 258); Signed Declaration of Oleksiy Andriyenko, Suspect
Interrogation Protocol (18 December 2016), pp. 2‒3 (Annex 252); Oleksiy Andriyenko Court
Testimony (18 December 2016), p. 5 (Annex 261).
76
recruited three Ukrainian nationals — Oleksiy Andriyenko, Svyatoslav Zhirenko, and Dmytro
Jakob — to assassinate Gerashchenko.251
125. On 12 December 2016, Andriyenko met with Tyhonov in his apartment in
Belgorod, Russia — and recorded their conversation.252 During the meeting, Tyhonov
explained that another person “took . . . money” for “the mission [to assassinate
Gerashchenko] that . . . the Main Intelligence Directorate is chasing” but had “disappeared,”
leaving Tihonov to carry out the mission.253 In requesting Andriyenko’s assistance, Tyhonov
claimed that the assignment was “Putin’s personal wish, for him [Gerashchenko] to quiet
down.”254
126. On 19 December 2016, Andrienko’s two accomplices arrived in Kyiv.255
During the following weeks, they surveyed Gerashchenko’s movements in Kyiv and made
preparations for the assassination attempt, including by obtaining materials to make a
home-made explosive device.256 These conspirators discussed their plans to plant the
explosive device in Gerashchenko’s car and detonate it remotely, and then flee to the Russian
251 Horbatyi Statement, para. 5 (Annex 2); Signed Declaration of Oleksiy Andriyenko, Suspect
Interrogation Protocol (18 December 2016), p. 2 (“When I was in Belgorod, during a conversation
which we had while consuming alcoholic beverages, [Tyhonov] told me that he had got an instruction
to organize a murder of Anton Gerashchenko.’) (Annex 252); Oleksiy Andriyenko Court Testimony
(28 April 2017), pp. 4-5 (Annex 261).
252 Horbatyi Statement, para. 8 (Annex 2); Oleksiy Andriyenko Court Testimony (28 April 2017), p. 15
(Annex 261); Recording of Conversation between Andrienko and Tyhonov (12 December 2016)
(Annex 251).
253 Transcript of Conversation between Andrienko and Tyhonov (12 December 2016), p. 2 (Annex
251); Horbatyi Statement, para. 8 (Annex 2).
254 Transcript of Conversation between Andrienko and Tyhonov (12 December 2016), p. 10 (Annex
251).
255 Horbatyi Statement, para. 7 (Annex 2).
256 Ibid.; Security Service of Ukraine Surveillance Video of Zhirenko and Jakob (video) (Annex 706);
Record of Incident Scene Inspection, drafted by Major of Justice A. S. Bakhovsky, Senior Special
Investigator, Security Service of Ukraine (20 December 2017), p. 3 (Annex 117).
77
Federation.257 Unbeknownst to his accomplices, however, Andriyenko had reported the
assassination plot to the Ukrainian Security Service.258 On 20 January 2017, Ukrainian law
enforcement apprehended the would-be assassins when they left their apartment with an
explosive device to place in Gerashchenko’s car.259
Bombings in Odesa
127. Like Kharkiv, Odesa was subjected to a string of bombing attacks against progovernment
organizations in 2015.260 But in 2017, pro-separatist operatives targeted pro-
Ukrainian individuals for assassination.
128. On 24 July 2017, a car parked in a residential neighborhood in Odesa
exploded near the home of Marko Gordiyenko, the head of a pro-Ukrainian unity NGO.261
The attack was carried out by two Ukrainian nationals — Myroslav Melnyk and Semen
Boytsov — who had been recruited by a man named “Aleksandr” (who also went by
“Morpekh”).
129. As Melnyk testified, they were aware that Aleksandr was “a representative of
the Russian special services.”262 Aleksandr invited them to attend a military training camp
257 Horbatyi Statement, para. 11 (Annex 2); Intercepted Conversation between Svitaslav Zhirenko and
Dmitriy Yakob (20 January 2017) (Annex 706).
258 Signed Declaration of Oleksiy Andriyenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (18 December 2016), p.
3 (Annex 252).
259 Horbatyi Statement, paras. 5, 7 (Annex 2); Security Service of Ukraine Surveillance Video of
Zhirenko and Jakob (video) (Annex 706).
260 David Stern, Lethal Divisions Persist in Ukraine’s Odessa, BBC News (2 May 2015) (Annex 573);
Corey Flintoff, Who’s Behind a String of Bombings in Ukraine’s Black Sea ‘Pearl’?, NPR (1 July 2015)
(Annex 706).
261 OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on
Information Received as of 19:30 (24 July 2017), p. 4 (Annex 353); Signed Declaration of Semen
Boytsov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9 August 2017), pp. 36‒37 (Annex 269).
262 Signed Declaration of Myroslav Melnyk, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9 August 2017), p. 52
(Annex 268).
78
in Russia.263 Following their training, Melnyk and Boytsov agreed to “a job in Odesa” in
exchange for money.264 Later, Aleksandr “sent [them] a message with the names of the
people who had to be assassinated, it was Gordiyenko and another name.”265 On 21 June
2017, the conspirators arrived in Odesa from Donetsk and settled in an apartment that was
leased by Aleksandr’s operatives.266 Following Aleksandr’s directions, Melnyk and Boytsov
retrieved an antitank mine with attached TNT block charges.267
130. On 24 July 2017, they planted the explosive in a car and parked the car on a
street near Gordiyenko’s home.268 At around 10:20, Boytsov detonated the explosive device,
just as Gordiyenko was passing by.269 Soon after the explosion, the OSCE visited the scene
263 Signed Declaration of Semen Boytsov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9 August 2017), p. 34
(Annex 269).
264 Ibid. pp. 34‒36.
265 Ibid. pp. 35‒36.
266 Ibid. p. 36.
267 Expert Conclusion No. 120-B/1818-X, drafted by Odesa Expert Criminal Forensic Research Center,
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (24 November 2017), p. 5 (Annex 176).
268 Declaration of Semen Boytsov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9 August 2017), pp. 36-37 (Annex
269); Signed Declaration of Myroslav Melnyk, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9 August 2017), p. 55
(Annex 268).
269 Signed Declaration of Semen Boytsov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9 August 2017), pp. 36‒37
(Annex 269); Signed Declaration of Marko Gordiyenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (14 September
2017), p. 3 (stating that “[a]t around 10:23” on 24 July 2014, “[a]s I walked past a white VAZ-2101 car
parked at the side of the road opposite No 30 vul. Zhukovskogo, Odessa, the said vehicle exploded”)
(Annex 270). While Melnyk and Boytsov were supposed to kill Gordienko, they claim that they
changed their minds at the last minute, and detonated the explosive when no one was around. Signed
Declaration of Myroslav Melnyk, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9 August 2017), p. 55 (Annex 268);
Signed Declaration of Semen Boytsov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9 August 2017), p. 37
(Annex 269). This is contradicted by Gordiyenko’s sworn statement. Moreover, Aleksandr
(“Morpekh”) did not change his mind to support the bombing attack; Melnyk in fact stated that
Aleksandr (“Morpekh”) threatened them when they expressed doubts about the plan: “‘Morpekh’
clearly told us to plant the bomb regardless of the presence or absence of people, otherwise he
threatened that Semen Boytsov and I would turn out to be useless and that no-one would give us
assignments, and we may not even be able to return to Donetsk.” Declaration of Myroslav Melnyk,
Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9 August 2017), p. 55 (Annex 268).
79
and observed a destroyed car with parts scattered on both sides of the street, as well as
broken windows at a nearby café.270 Gordiyenko fortunately survived, but the message was
clear: even in Odesa, and even in 2017, supporters of Ukrainian unity are not safe.
270 OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on
Information Received as of 19:30 (24 July 2017), p. 4 (Annex 353).
80
Chapter 2. RUSSIAN FINANCING OF TERRORISM IN UKRAINE
131. Russia did not work to stop the acts of terrorism described in Chapter 1. To
the contrary, at the same time the United Nations was documenting and reporting on the
DPR, LPR, and similar groups’ pattern of targeting civilians for violence and intimidation,271
the Russian Federation was coordinating a campaign to provide lethal assistance to its
proxies. Ignoring the OHCHR’s explicit warnings against “transfers of arms and
ammunition” given the “substantial risk that they will be used in serious violations or abuses
of international human rights or humanitarian law,” including through “indiscriminate
shelling,”272 powerful weapons capable of causing such civilian harm streamed unabated
across the border.
132. This Chapter describes the myriad ways in which the Russian Federation,
acting through numerous state officials, not only tolerated but fostered and supported the
funding of illegal armed groups in Ukraine, including by providing weapons used for the acts
of terrorism recounted in Chapter 1. The most notorious transfer was the delivery to DPRcontrolled
territory of a Buk TELAR by members of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade of
the Russian Armed Forces (“53rd RAF Brigade”) — a transfer which has been painstakingly
documented by the Joint Investigation Team. Russian support for terrorism in Ukraine goes
much further than a single Buk TELAR, including the supply of the Grad and Smerch
multiple-launch rocket systems used to bombard civilian areas, and the explosives used to
terrorize Ukrainian cities. This effort includes Russia’s establishment of training camps
along the Ukraine–Russia border, the extensive direct monetary contributions made to
Russia’s proxy groups, as well as large-scale fundraising efforts that the Russian Federation
has allowed to thrive in its territory.
271 See supra, Chapter 1, Section A.
272 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16 November 2015 to 15 February
2016, p. 10, para. 24 (Annex 314).
81
The Massive, Russian-Supplied Arsenal of Weapons to Illegal Armed
Groups in Ukraine
133. As illegal armed groups in Ukraine began acting in violent opposition to the
government, high-level Russian officials orchestrated the supply of weapons and
ammunition to these groups. The OHCHR has confirmed the “cross-border inflow of heavy
and sophisticated weaponry as well as foreign fighters, including from the Russian
Federation.”273 In 2015, the OHCHR again concluded that “[t]he absence of effective control
of the government of Ukraine over considerable parts of the border with the Russian
Federation (in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions) continued to facilitate an
inflow of ammunition, weaponry and fighters from the Russian Federation to the territories
controlled by the armed groups.”274
134. The scale of the “inflow” of weaponry described by the OCHCR is massive.
Beginning in the spring of 2014, the UAF began seizing from DPR and LPR armed groups
surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles,275 multiple-launch rocket systems (“MLRS”),276 and
273 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 December 2014), pp. 3, 17, paras.
1, 86 (Annex 303).
274 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16 August to 15 November 2015, p. 2,
para. 2 (Annex 312).
275 On 18 May 2014, the UAF recovered from DPR members a GROM-E2 man-portable, surface-to-air,
air-defense missile (which can reach targets up to 11,000 feet) with serial number “1016.” After
pictures surfaced of the seized weapon in the press, Georgian authorities notified Ukraine that the
weapon had been captured by the RAF from Georgia in 2008, and that it had presumably been in
Russian possession since. See Ukrainian Prosecutor’s Office File on GROM-E2 (including Letter of
Assistance Request from Georgian Government) (Annex 186). On 6 June 2014, the State Border
Service of Ukraine recovered an empty munitions box for a 9M39 Igla man-portable, surface-to-air,
air-defense missile in the village of Marynivka, approximately four kilometers from the Russian
border. Official Russian-government records found in the container indicated that the missile
belonged to the Russian Ministry of Defense, specifically a Russian military base near Rostov-on-Don,
Russia. See, e.g., Ukraine State Border Service Letter No. 72/36-994-73 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
and annexes (dated 10 December 2014) (Annex 406); Interfax Ukraine, Kyiv Demands Moscow to
Explain Use of Igla MANPADs in Donetsk Region, Kyiv Post (19 June 2014) (Annex 524).
276 See infra, Chapter 2, Section C.
82
main battle tanks, bearing undeniable marks of Russian origin.277 Since the spring of 2014,
and even after the shoot-down of Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014, the rate at which Russia has
armed these groups has only increased, as corroborated by foreign and international
intelligence,278 international organizations,279 non-governmental organizations,280
277 See Tkachenko Statement, paras. 34‒36 (Annex 10); Inspection Report by Colonel Roman
Stepanovich Kovalchuk, Head of Operational Group of Military Counterintelligence of the Security
Service of Ukraine (23 November 2015) (explaining the characteristics of tanks seized from the DPR
and LPR that are indicia of Russian origin) (Annex 140); Inspection Report by Colonel Vasyl
Vasyliovych Kolodiazhnyi, the Deputy Head of Operational Group of Military Counterintelligence of
the Security Service of Ukraine (23 November 2015) (same) (Annex 143); Protocol of Inspection by
I.V. Nimchenko, Senior Investigator on Special Cases of the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office,
Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine (28 October 2015) (explaining marks indicating Russian origin
of BM-21 Grad) (Annex 136).
278 See, e.g., Andrew E. Kramer & Michael R. Gordon, Russia Sent Tanks to Separatists in Ukraine,
U.S. Says, N.Y. Times (13 June 2014) (Annex 521); NATO Allied Command Operations, NATO
Releases Imagery: Raises Questions on Russia’s Role in Providing Tanks to Ukraine (14 June 2014)
(Annex 364); Allied Powers Europe, New Satellite Imagery Exposes Russian Combat Troops Inside
Ukraine (28 August 2014) (Annex 365).
279 OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16 August to 15 November 2015, p. 2,
para. 2 (Annex 312).
280 See, e.g., The Atlantic Council, HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT (2015) (Annex 448); International Crisis
Group, EASTERN UKRAINE: A DANGEROUS WINTER, Europe Report No. 235 (18 December 2014), p .14
(Annex 447).
83
investigative journalists,281 and photographic and video evidence.282 Eyewitnesses have also
observed Russian weapons convoys crossing the Ukraine–Russia border.283
135. Between September 2014 and December 2015,284 intelligence reports from the
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense indicate that Russia supplied the DPR and LPR with
hundreds of MLRS, heavy artillery guns, anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as train cars
281 Shaun Walker, Aid Convoy Stops Short of Border as Russian Military Vehicles Enter Ukraine, The
Guardian (15 August 2014) (Annex 538); Roland Oliphant, Kamensk-Shakhtinsky & Tom Parfitt,
Russian Armoured Vehicles And Military Trucks Cross Border Into Ukraine, The Telegraph (14
August 2014) (Annex 537).
282 See, e.g., 2016 JIT Presentation (Annex 39); The Atlantic Council, HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT (2015)
(Annex 48); James Miller, Pierre Vaux, Catherine A. Fitzpatrick & Michael Weiss, AN INVASION BY ANY
OTHER NAME (September 2015) (Annex 450); Security Environment Research Center “Prometheus,”
DONBAS IN FLAMES (2017) (Annex 455).
283 Signed Declaration of Oleksandr Mohilevsky, Witness Interrogation Protocol (22 May 2017)
(Annex 264); Signed Declaration of Oleksandr Voytov, Witness Interrogation Protocol (24 April 2017)
(Annex 257); Signed Declaration of Roman Melnykov, Witness Interrogation Protocol (27 April 2017)
(Annex 260); Signed Declaration of Amonenko Oleksiyovich, Witness Interrogation Protocol (23 April
2017) (Annex 256); Signed Declaration of Yuri Martynovsky, Witness Interrogation Protocol (26 April
2017) (Annex 258); Signed Declaration of Oleksandr Kvartyn, Witness Interrogation Protocol (23 May
2017) (Annex 265); Signed Declaration of Denys Skibin, Witness Interrogation Protocol (21 May 2017)
(Annex 262); Signed Declaration of Andriy Yanushevsky, Witness Interrogation Protocol (27 April
2017) (Annex 259).
284 Skibitskyi Statement, paras. 22, 39 (Annex 8); Ukrainian Military Intelligence Summary of Cross-
Border Weapons Transfers (September 2014 to December 2015) (Annex 74).
84
and truck loads of ammunition.285 Many of the weapons bore symbols identifying them as
property of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.286 These Ukrainian government
assessments are consistent with the kinds of convoys witnessed by the OSCE in DPR- and
285 Skibitskyi Statement, paras. 22, 39 (Annex 8); Ukrainian Military Intelligence Summary of Cross-
Border Weapons Transfers (September 2014 to December 2015) (Annex 74); Administrative
Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/78 (9 January
2015) (Annex 83); Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Letter No. 300/1/C/916 (23 February 2015) (Annex 108); Administrative Directorate of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/712 (13 February 2015) (Annex 106);
Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No.
300/1/C/576 (6 February 2015) (Annex 99); Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/3739 (20 July 2015) (Annex 132); Administrative
Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/3588 (10 July
2015) (Annex 131); Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Letter No. 300/1/C/3309 (26 June 2015) (Annex 130); Administrative Directorate of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/3068 (13 June 2015) (Annex 129); Administrative
Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/2917 (5 June
2015) (Annex 128); Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Letter No. 300/1/C/2801(29 May 2015) (Annex 127); Administrative Directorate of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/2539 (15 May 2015) (Annex 125); Administrative
Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/2430 (9 May
2015) (Annex 124); Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Letter No. 300/1/C/2329 (2 May 2015) (Annex 122); Administrative Directorate of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/2056 (18 April 2015) (Annex 120); Administrative
Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/1917 (11 April
2015) (Annex 119); Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Letter No. 300/1/C/1640 (28 March 2015) (Annex 114); Administrative Directorate of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/1451 (20 March 2015) (Annex 111);
Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No.
300/1/C/1059 (27 February 2015) (Annex 109).
286 Tkachenko Statement, paras. 34‒36 (Annex 10); Inspection Report by Colonel Roman Stepanovich
Kovalchuk, Head of Operational Group of Military Counterintelligence of the Security Service of
Ukraine (23 November 2015) (explaining the characteristics of tanks seized from the DPR and LPR
that are indicia of Russian origin) (Annex 140); Inspection Report by Colonel Vasyl Vasyliovych
Kolodiazhnyi, the Deputy Head of Operational Group of Military Counterintelligence of the Security
Service of Ukraine (23 November 2015) (same) (Annex 143); Protocol of Inspection by I.V.
Nimchenko, Senior Investigator on Special Cases of the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office, Prosecutor
General’s Office of Ukraine (28 October 2015) (explaining marks indicating Russian origin of BM-21
Grad) (Annex 136).
85
LPR-held territory.287 These weapons included Grad and Smerch MLRS, a TOS-1 Buratino
thermobaric heavy flamethrower MLRS,288 and a Buk surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile
system.289
136. The Russian Federation has gone to great lengths to conceal these weapons
transfers to the DPR and LPR. Russian servicemen and former DPR and LPR members have
described how they sanitized Russian weapons and military equipment to destroy RAF
markings and other indicia of original Russian ownership, and sometimes even forged UAF
markings.290 Russia has not, however, succeeded in concealing its supply of weapons to the
DPR and LPR from the world. And as explained in more detail below, these Russiansupplied
weapons have been used for horrific acts of terrorism against civilians.
287 OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information
received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) (22 January 2015), p. 1 (Annex 327); OSCE, Latest from OSCE
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv
time)(30 November 2014), p. 1 (Annex 319); OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission
(SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) (9 September 2014), p. 2
(Annex 317).
288 The OSCE confirmed that the DPR acquired a TOS-1 MLRS. See OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special
Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 27 September 2015, p. 4
(Annex 337); Anton Zverev, OSCE says spots deadly Russian rocket system in Ukraine for first time,
Reuters (2 October 2015) (Annex 581); BBC News, Ukraine Rebels Have Powerful New Russian-
Made Rockets - OSCE (2 October 2015) (Annex 582).
289 The Joint Investigation Team confirmed that the Russians supplied a Buk surface-to-air antiaircraft
missile on at least one other occasion. See 2016 JIT Presentation (Annex 39).
290 Signed Declaration of Konstantin Kutikov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 March 2016), p. 9
(Annex 247); Signed Declaration of Oleksandr Sachava, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (30 January
2015), pp. 1–3 (Annex 218); Roland Oliphant, Russian Paratroopers Captured in Ukraine
‘Accidentally Crossed Border’, The Telegraph (26 August 2014) (Annex 540); Transcript of Video
Declaration of Petr Khokhlov, Suspect Interrogation (published 27 August 2014) (Annex 188); The
Interpreter Magazine, We All Knew What We Were Going For and What Could Happen (English
translation of an interview in Novaya Gazeta by Elena Kostyuchenko dated 2 March 2015)
(Annex 564); Zoya Lukyanova, Translator for the DPR: “This is a Performance for the Whole World,”
LB.ua (21 April 2015) (Annex 572); The Russian Secret Behind Ukraine’s Self-Declared ‘Donetsk
Republic’, France 24 (15 October 2015) (video), mm 00:02:54 (Annex 583).
86
The Russian Buk Anti-Aircraft Missile Used to Destroy Malaysia Airlines
Flight 17
137. In the spring and summer of 2014, the Russian Federation escalated this
supply of weapons to its proxies in Ukraine, including the transfer of a powerful Buk TELAR.
Within hours of the Buk crossing the border into Ukraine, it was used to destroy civilian
aircraft Flight MH17. Official reports submitted to this Court by a representive of the Dutch
National Police confirm: “The investigation has . . . shown that the Buk TELAR is from the
Russian Federation and that it returned to the Russian Federation in the night of 17-18 July
2014.”291 Moreover, “there is sufficient evidence that the Buk TELAR in question came from
the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade [], which is based in Kursk in the Russian
Federation.”292
138. Between 23 and 25 June 2014, a convoy of the 53rd RAF Brigade transported
several military systems, including six Buk TELARs, through western Russia from Kursk to
the Millerovo military airbase in Rostov Oblast.293 The convoy attracted significant local
attention.294 Many residents took photographs and videos of the event, and some posted
what they witnessed on the Internet.295
291 16 May Dutch National Police Report, p. 1 (Annex 41).
292 Official Report of the Dutch National Police, p. 1 (24 May 2018) (original in Dutch) [hereinafter 24
May Dutch National Police Report] (Annex 42); see also Joint Investigation Team, Narrative
conference 24 May 2018, Openbaar Ministerie (24 May 2018) [hereinafter 2018 JIT Presentation]
(Annex 40).
293 2018 JIT Presentation (with accompanying video, JIT MH17 Witness Appeal About 53rd Brigade,
mm 00:00:40–00:01:00) (Annex 40).
294 See, e.g., Max Vit, Military Equipment in Stary Oskol, KaviCom.ru (24 June 2014) (Annex 525).
295 2018 JIT Presentation (with accompanying video, JIT MH17 Witness Appeal About 53rd Brigade)
(Annex 40).
87
Figure 8296
Image of Buk seen in Russia in the 23–25 June Convoy.
139. Likewise, Russian servicemen published photographs on the Internet. The
Joint Investigation Team and Eliot Higgins, Director of the Bellingcat investigative
collective, have independently linked the Buk TELAR to the 53rd RAF Brigade through these
soldiers.297
140. In addition to confirming the presence of Buk anti-aircraft systems in the
convoy, the videos and photos posted contemporaneously by local residents help establish
the route of the convoy toward the border. The Joint Investigation Team “compared number
plates and other relevant characteristics of the vehicles in the convoy,” analyzed “all visible
characteristics of the surroundings of the places that the convoy passed,” and compared the
296 Annex 77; Witness Statement of Eliot Higgins (5 June 2018), paras. 112‒14 [hereinafter Higgins
Statement] (Annex 9); see also 2018 JIT Presentation (with accompanying video, JIT MH17 Witness
Appeal About 53rd Brigade, mm 00:02:20–00:02:45) (Annex 40).
297 24 May Dutch National Police Report, p. 3 (“Soldiers who could be linked to the 53rd [Anti-Aircraft
Missile Brigade] through open-source investigation posted messages during and about the convoy.
The photos and videos of the convoy show soldiers wearing the uniform of the 53rd [Anti-Aircraft
Missile Brigade].”) (Annex 42).
88
objects to Google Street View in order to “validate every location.”298 Mr. Higgins further
elaborates how each of these videos can be “geolocated” (i.e., their location on the map can
be pinpointed).299 The route of the convoy through western Russia toward the border can
thus be recreated:
298 24 May Dutch National Police Report, pp. 2‒3 (Annex 42).
299 See generally Higgins Statement (Annex 9).
89
Map 8: Route of the Buk Convoy
141. As local residents and members of the 53rd RAF Brigade were documenting
the Buk convoy, others in the international community were monitoring Russia’s collection
of weapons for illicit transfer into Ukraine. Dutch military intelligence, for example,
90
reported on 8 April 2015 the arrival of advanced anti-aircraft systems to a collection site in
the west of the Russian Federation.300
142. With the Buk positioned near the border, the Russian Federation was ready
when its DPR proxies requested more assistance. That call came from Igor Girkin —the
former Russian intelligence officer turned DPR leader who had already committed notorious
acts of terrorism against Ukrainian civilians.301 In a telephone conversation, Girkin
requested “air defense” from his Russian patrons.302 Then on 16 July, another DPR member
specifically requested to “receive a Buk in the morning.”303
143. That night, Russians clandestinely transported a Buk from the territory of the
Russian Federation into Luhansk oblast in Ukraine.304 An intercepted conversation from
09:22 on 17 July 2014 indicates that the Buk had already crossed “the line” —i.e., the border
—by that time:
Caller 1: Did it come in self-propelled mode? Or on a lowbed
semitrailer?
Caller 2: It crossed, crossed the line.
Caller 1: Aaaah, and now you brought it on a lowbed
semitrailer, yes?
Caller 2: Yes, yes, yes.
300 DSB Report MH17 Crash, Appendix T, p. 138 (attaching as Appendix T the Dutch Review
Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services, Review Report (8 April 2015)) (Annex 38).
301 See supra Chapter 1, Section A.
302 See Intercepted Conversation between Igor Girkin, Viktor Anosov, and Mykhaylo Sheremet (8 June
2014) (Annex 391); Confirmation of Authenticity, SSU (Annex 184).
303 See Intercepted Conversation between “Khmuryi” and “Sanych” (16 June 2014) (Annex 394);
Confirmation of Authenticity, SSU (Annex 184); 2016 JIT Presentation (with accompanying video,
MH17 Intercepted Call on 16 July 2014 at 19:09 Hours, mm 00:00:27–00:00:30,00:01:05–00:01:07)
(Annex 39).
304 Politie, MH17 (30 March 2015) (video), mm 00:02:00–00:02:25 (Annex 703).
91
[. . . ]
Caller 1: I’ll say now where it should go. It will go together
with the Vostok tanks.305
144. Another intercepted call from 17 July confirms the delivery of the Buk:
Caller 1: I’m listening to you, Buriatik.
Caller 2: Hello, . . . . And where should we unload this beauty, .
. . ?
Caller 1: Which one? This one?
Caller 2: Yes, yes, the one I brought with me. I’m already in
Donetsk.
Caller 1: The one that I thought about, yes? The one is M?
Caller 2: Yes.
Caller 1: DM.
Caller 2: Yes, yes, yes, yes. Buk.
Caller 1: Oops, BM. Yes, yes, yes. I got it.
Caller 2: Buk, buk, buk.
Caller 1: So, so, so. And is it on whatsit a truck?
Caller 2: Yes, it’s on whatsit . . . it needs to be unloaded
somewhere in order to hide it.
Caller 1: Is it with a crew?
Caller 2: Yes, it’s with a crew.
Caller 1: You don’t need to hide it anywhere. It will go there
now. Did you understand where?
305 See Intercepted Conversation between “Khmuryi” and “Bibliotekar” (17 July 2014) (Annex 397);
Confirmation of Authenticity, SSU (Annex 184); see also 2016 JIT Presentation (with accompanying
video, MH17 Animation Regarding the Transport Route and the Launch Site, mm 00:01:30–
00:02:20) (Annex 39).
92
Caller 2: I understood, but they need at least . . . time so that
they had a look at it . . . .306
145. As with its journey within Russia toward the border, the Buk was caught on
video and photographed several times as it was transported from Luhansk to the launch site,
as documented by the Joint Investigation Team. The Buk was seen multiple times on a
Volvo low-loader truck and escorted by a Volkswagen transporter and a UAZ jeep, carrying
four missiles under a camouflage net.307
146. At around 08:00 local time on 17 July 2014, the Buk arrived in Yenakiieve,
Ukraine.308 The Buk then moved on to Donetsk, where witnesses saw the Buk and posted
comments, pictures, and videos on the Internet.309 A still image from one of these videos
was published by the magazine Paris Match, and the video itself has been analyzed by the
Joint Investigation Team.310
306 See Intercepted Conversation between “Khmury” and “Buriatik” (17 July 2014) (Annex 398);
Confirmation of Authenticity, SSU (Annex 184); Politie, MH17 (30 March 2015) (video), mm
00:02:39–00:03:35 (Annex 703).
307 16 May Dutch National Police Report, Annexe 1 pp. 1–3, 4 (number of missiles), 7 (number of
missiles), 16 (Dutch investigation conclusions); Annexe 2; Annexe 3 p. 1 (kinds of vehicles in the
convoy) (Annex 41); Higgins Statement, paras. 14‒86 (Annex 9).
308 16 May Dutch National Police Report, p. 1 (Annex 41); 2016 JIT Presentation (with accompanying
video, MH17 Animation Regarding the Transport Route and the Launch Site, mm 00:01:20–
00:01:36) (Annex 39).
309 16 May Dutch National Police Report, p. 1; Annexe 1 pp. 1–3; Annexe 2 (Annex 41); Higgins
Statement, paras. 23‒27 (Annex 9).
310 16 May Dutch National Police Report, Annexe 2 (Annex 41); Higgins Statement, para. 23‒27
(Annex 9).
93
Figure 9311
147. Starting at around 11:00 the convoy traveled from Donetsk to Snizhne,
passing Makeevka, Zuhres, and Torez.312 Several more photographs and videos showed the
Buk in these locations.313 For example, a photograph analyzed and validated by the Joint
Investigation Team depicted the Buk in Torez at around 12:00 or 12:30.314
311 Annexes 534, 692; 16 May Dutch National Police Report, Annexe 2 (photo in original Dutch
version, p. 2) (Annex 41); Higgins Statement, paras. 24‒27 (Annex 9).
312 16 May Dutch National Police Report, p. 1; Annexe 1 pp. 3–6; Annexes 3–4 (Annex 41); Higgins
Statement, paras. 28‒54 (Annex 9).
313 16 May Dutch National Police Report, Annexe 1 pp. 3–6; Annexes 3–4 (Annex 41); Higgins
Statement, para. 28‒54 (Annex 9).
314 The location of that photograph can be confirmed by identifying the landmarks in the picture,
including the yellow edifice. See 16 May Dutch National Police Report, Annexe 4 (photo in original
Dutch version, pp. 1–2) (Annex 41).
94
Figure 10315
Photograph of the Buk missile launcher in Torez, Ukraine, 17 July 2014 with an enlargement of
the Buk seen in the photo.
148. Around 13:00, the Buk arrived in Snizhne, Ukraine.316 It then drove on its
own to the launch site.317 Shortly thereafter, the Buk deployed a missile and shot down
Flight MH17, killing 298 civilians, as recounted in Chapter 1, Section B.
149. After the deadly attack on Flight MH17, the Buk was promptly returned to
Russia. The Buk went from Snizhne to the Russian border in Luhansk Oblast, passing
315 Ibid.
316 Ibid., Annexe 1 pp. 6–16; Annexe 5–6; Higgins Statement, paras. 48‒54 (Annex 9).
317 16 May Dutch National Police Report, p. 1; Annexe 1 pp. 8–9, 16 (Dutch investigation conclusions)
(Annex 41 ); Higgins Statement, paras. 49‒54 (Annex 9).
95
Krasniy Lutch and Debaltsevo.318 An intercepted conversation indicates that, at 21:32 on
17 July, the Buk passed a checkpoint in Snizhne in Ukraine319
150. On 18 July, at around 04:00 or 05:00, the Volvo truck transporting the Buk
was witnessed in Luhansk, Ukraine, heading in the direction of Krasnodon/Sjeverne and to
the Russian border.320 A video shows the Buk in Luhansk, missing a missile.321 Despite
Russian claims — based on a doctored version of the video — both the Joint Investigation
Team and Bellingcat have demonstrated the video’s location in Luhansk.322
318 16 May Dutch National Police Report, p. 1 (Annex 41).
319 Intercepted Conversation between “Krot” and “Ryazan” (17 July 2014) (Annex 395); Confirmation
of Authenticity, SSU (Annex 184); Politie, MH17 (30 Mar. 2015) (video), mm 00:05:55–00:06:25
(Annex 703).
320 16 May Dutch National Police Report, p. 1 (Annex 41); 2016 JIT Presentation (with accompanying
video, MH17 Animation Regarding the Transport Route and the Launch Site, mm 00:10:15–00:10:26)
(Annex 39); Higgins Statement, paras. 64‒86 (Annex 9).
321 16 May Dutch National Police Report, Annexe 7 (Annex 41); 2016 JIT Presentation (with
accompanying video, MH17 Animation Regarding the Transport Route and the Launch Site, mm
00:10:15–00:10:32) (Annex 39); Higgins Statement, paras. 64‒86 (Annex 9).
322 16 May Dutch National Police Report, Annexe 7 (photo in original Dutch version, p. 2)
(Annex 41); 2016 JIT Presentation (with accompanying video, MH17 Animation Regarding the
Transport Route and the Launch Site, mm 00:10:15–00:10:32) (Annex 39); Higgins Statement, paras.
64‒86 (Annex 9).
96
Figure 11323
151. At around 08:00, another intercepted conversation shows that the Buk left
Ukraine and crossed the border into Russia:
Caller 1: They brought the vehicle up to the crossroad, left it
there, the lads went on themselves. . . So the vehicle
has left in the correct direction and arrived
successfully. . . . The vehicle is in Russia.324
152. The Joint Investigation Team has “compared several images made along the
way this BUK-TELAR traveled on 23, 24 and 25 June 2014” in Russia, to the “footage of 17
and 18 July 2014” of the Buk in Ukraine. Based on this comparison, checked against
numerous other images of different Buk missile systems, the investigators conclusively
established that the Buk in Russia and the one in Ukraine share the same “fingerprint.”325
Specifically, investigators identified seven distinct common features on the images:
1. On the left side of the Buk TELAR, in the middle section: a
white mark consisting of a circle with a cross in the middle.
This is presumed to be a centre-of-gravity marking, which is
applied on these types of vehicles when they are transported.
323 Annex 621; 16 May Dutch National Police Report, Annexe 7 (photo in original Dutch version, pp. 1–
2) (Annex 41); Higgins Statement, paras. 64‒86 (Annex 9).
324 Intercepted Conversation between“Khmuryi” and “Krot” (18 July 2014) (Annex 399); Confirmation
of Authenticity, SSU (Annex 184); see also 2016 JIT Presentation (with accompanying video, MH17
Animation Regarding the Transport Route and the Launch Site, mm 00:10:45–00:12:11) (Annex 39).
325 24 May Dutch National Police Report, p. 1 (“The Buk TELAR that was filmed and photographed on
17 and 18 July 2014 was found to have the same unique combination of distinctive characteristics as a
specific Buk TELAR that was part of a convoy of the 53rd [Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade] on 23, 24 and
25 June 2014 in the Russian Federation.”) (Annex 42); 2018 JIT Presentation (with accompanying
video, JIT MH17 Witness Appeal About 53rd Brigade, mm 00:05:40–00:06:30) (Annex 40).
97
2. On the left side of the Buk TELAR, in the middle section: a
white marking consisting of a series of characters, starting with
an ‘H’ (the Cyrillic ‘N’) and followed by, at least, the numeral 2
(twice) and then two illegible digits. This mark is applied on
these types of vehicle when they are transported by train and
refers to the degree of overloading of the vehicle in relation to
the wagon that it is on.
3. On the left side of the Buk TELAR, in the middle section:
parts and contours of the tactical vehicle number. This
number, which normally consists of 3 digits, indicates the
position of the vehicle within the brigade.
4. On the left side of the Buk TELAR, on the rubber side skirt:
a white spot.
5. On the right side of the undercarriage of the Buk TELAR: a
combination of wheels, where all the wheels except the second
one have spokes.
6. On the right side of the Buk TELAR, in the middle section: a
space between the various parts of the rubber side skirt.
7. On the right side of the Buk TELAR, on the rubber side
skirt: a white mark.326
153. A video released by the Joint Investigation Team vividly illustrates that the
Buk that was seen in Russia in June 2014, and the Buk that was seen in Ukraine in July 2014
on its way to down Flight MH17, are one and the same. That video is provided as Annex 40.
326 24 May Dutch National Police Report, p. 2 (Annex 42); 2018 JIT Presentation (Annex 40). The
only difference between the Buk TELAR seen in Ukraine on 17‒18 July and the Buk TELAR seen in
Russia on 23‒25 June was the tactical vehicle number. As the official report of the Dutch National
Police explains: “The photos and video from Ukraine depict only traces of this number. But these
traces are perfectly consistent with the marks from the tactical vehicle number, which are mostly
legible in the footage of the ‘3X2’ from the Russian Federation. It is common practice to remove or
paint over a tactical vehicle number when a Buk TELAR is operationally deployed.” 24 May Dutch
National Police Report, p. 2 (Annex 42).
98
Figure 12327
Stills from Joint Investigation Team Video. Right: Image of the Buk seen in Alekseyevka,
Russia in the 23‒25 June convoy, with distinct markings highlighted. Left: Image of the Buk seen
in Makeevka, Ukraine in the 17‒18 July convoy, with the same distinct markings highlighted.
154. The conclusion is inescapable: the Buk TELAR that shot down Flight MH17
came from Russia, specifically the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade of the Russian Armed
Forces.
The Russian “Grad” and “Smerch” Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems Used
to Shell Ukrainian Civilians
155. One of the most potent weapons Russia’s proxies have used in their campaign
of terrorism in Ukraine has been multiple-launch rocket systems, a type of weapon that can
be used — and has been used by the DPR — to indiscriminately bombard civilian targets and
sow fear among civilian populations.
156. Russian military officials began supplying the DPR and LPR with multiplelaunch
rocket systems at least as early as June 2014, and these transfers continued
throughout the remainder of 2014 and into summer 2015. Multiple DPR and LPR fighters
327 2018 JIT Presentation, mm 00:07:45–00:08:00 (Annex 40).
99
have admitted that they received or witnessed the receipt of these weapons systems from
Russia.328 Ukraine has also documented numerous specific transfers, including:
• On 13 June 2014, the UAF captured a BM-21 Grad near the town of
Dobropillia in the Donetsk Oblast.329 The weapon exhibited numerous indicia
of originating from the 18th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 58th
Army of the South Military District of the Russian Federation.330 For
example, the doors of the MLRS were emblazoned with that Brigade’s tactical
symbol (a rhombus inside of a rectangle).331
• On 5 July 2014, a Lieutenant Colonel of the Ukrainian Security Service
observed a convoy including Grads cross into Ukrainian territory in
Izvaryne.332
• On 15 July 2014, outside of the border village of Koshrne, Ukraine
government agents witnessed five Grad MLRS arrive from the Russian
Federation under the cover of darkness.333 One week later, on 22 July 2014,
agents saw fourteen Grad MLRS arrive from Russia in the same area.334
328 See, e.g., Signed Declaration of Oleg Stemasov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9 December 2014),
p. 8 (Annex 207); Signed Declaration of Igor Koval, Suspect Interrogation Testimony (9 June 2015), p.
3 (Annex 231).
329 Tkachenko Statement, paras. 27‒29 (Annex 10); Protocol of Inspection by I.V. Nimchenko, Senior
Invetigator on Special Cases of the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office, Prosecutor General’s Office of
Ukraine (28 October 2015) (explaining marks indicating Russian origin of BM-21 Grad) (Annex 136).
330 Tkachenko Statement, paras. 27‒29 (Annex 10); Protocol of Inspection by I.V. Nimchenko, Senior
Invetigator on Special Cases of the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office, Prosecutor General’s Office of
Ukraine (28 October 2015) (explaining marks indicating Russian origin of BM-21 Grad) (Annex 136).
331 The Grad also contained a shelling chart with a seal of the military unit “27777 58 A” (the unit
number of the 18th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 58th Army of the South Military District
of the Russian Federation) and various other indicia of Russian origin. Tkachenko Statement, paras.
27‒29 (Annex 10); Protocol of Inspection by I.V. Nimchenko, Senior Invetigator on Special Cases of
the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office, Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine (28 October 2015)
(explaining marks indicating Russian origin of BM-21 Grad) (Annex 136).
332 Krasnodon Municipal District Office of the Luhansk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of
Ukraine Letter No. 63/32/233 (24 July 2014) (Annex 65).
333 Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine Letter No. 55/2208 (10 December
2014), p. 3 (Annex 80).
334 Ibid., p. 4.
100
• In August 2014, a detained Ukrainian servicemen witnessed the supply of
Grads to LPR forces in the weeks following his capture.335
• In September 2014, 12 Grads were transferred from Russia to near the border
villages of Dibrivka and Novoazovs’k.336 A former DPR member, Oleg
Stemasov, acknowledged that at the same time, his battalion received from
Russia at least six Grads and four BM-27 Uragan systems.337
• At the end of October 2014, Ukrainian agents observed the delivery of 58
more Grads from Russia to the DPR in the towns of Uspenka, Gukova,
Izvaryne, and Dibrivky.338
• By January 2015, the DPR and LPR possessed advanced MLRS that the UAF
does not possess (and could only have come from Russia), such as the 2B26
“Grad-K.”339
• On 23–24 January 2015, Ukrainian intelligence verified that 40 Grads
entered Ukrainian territory in Kusnitsy in the direction of Novoazovsk,
originating from a MLRS regiment of the Russian army.340
• From February 2015 through the end of July 2015, more than one hundred
additional MLRS arrived from Russia.341
335 Signed Declaration of Roman Cheremsky, Witness Interrogation Protocol (undated), pp. 3‒4
(Annex 271).
336 Skibitskyi Statement, para. 39 (Annex 8); Ukrainian Military Intelligence Summary of Cross-
Border Weapons Transfers (September 2014 to December 2015) (Annex 74).
337 Signed Declaration of Oleg Stemasov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9 December 2014), p. 8
(Annex 207).
338 Skibitskyi Statement, para. 39 (Annex 8); Ukrainian Military Intelligence Summary of Cross-
Border Weapons Transfers (September 2014 to December 2015) (Annex 74). Eyewitness residents in
local border villages confirm that Grad MLRS continued arriving from Russian territory through the
end of the 2014. Signed Declaration of Oleksandr Mohilevsky, Witness Interrogation Protocol (22
May 2017) (Annex 264); Signed Declaration of Andriy Yanushevsky, Witness Interrogation Protocol
(27 April 2017) (Annex 259).
339 Atlantic Council, HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT, P. 21 (Annex 448); Witness Statement of Ivan Gavryliuk (2
June 2018), paras. 22‒23 [hereinafter Gavryliuk Statement] (Annex 1) .
340 Skibitskyi Statement, para. 27 (Annex 8); Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence
Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/9010203 (25 January 2015 09:00)
(Annex 93).
341 See Annexes 83, 99, 106, 108, 109, 111, 114, 119, 120, 122, 124, 125, 127, 120–132.
101
157. By summer 2016, the DPR and LPR had amassed a significant arsenal of
MLRS. In August 2016 alone, the OSCE observed at least sixty-eight MLRS under DPR or
LPR control.342 In all likelihood, this vastly underestimates the number of MLRS that the
DPR and LPR controlled at that time, as both groups have blocked OSCE monitors and
hidden weapons from inspection.343 Between September 2016 and December 2016, Russia
delivered dozens of additional MLRS to the armed groups in eastern Ukraine, and into 2018
continued to provide thousands of units of Grad and Smerch rockets to the DPR and LPR.344
158. This pattern of Russian supply of multiple-launch rocket systems includes
examples tied to acts of terrorism against Ukrainian civilians.
342 OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information
received as of 19:30, 9 August 2016 (two Grads in Luhansk) (Annex 338); Statement of Alexander
Hug, Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE SMM (19 August 2016), 00:03:02 (video)(47 MLRS in
Muisyk) (Annex 341); OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine,
based on information received as of 19:30, 12 August 2016 (four Grads in Khrustalnyi, formerly
Krasnyi Luch) (Annex 339); OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine,
based on information received as of 19:30, 14 August 2016 (15 Grads in Donetsk) (Annex 340).
343 OSCE, THEMATIC REPORT: RESTRICTION OF SMM’S FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND OTHER IMPEDIMENTS
TO FULFILMENT OF ITS MANDATE (January to June 2017) (Annex 352); Intercepted Conversations of
Maxim Vlasov (23–24 January 2015), p. 26 (Annex 408); Yanovskyi Statement, para. 36 (Annex 5).
The DPR and LPR continued to receive substantial numbers of MLRS after this point.
344 Skibitskyi Statement, para. 20, 39 (Annex 8); Ukrainian Military Intelligence Summary of Cross-
Border Weapons Transfers (September 2017 to December 2017) (Annex 175); Administrative
Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/2917 (5 June
2015) (Annex 128); Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Letter No. 300/1/C/3068 (13 June 2015) (Annex 129); Administrative Directorate of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/3309 (26 June 2015) (Annex 130); Administrative
Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/3588 (10 July
2015) (Annex 131); Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Letter No. 300/1/C/3739 (20 July 2015) (Annex 132); Administrative Directorate of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/576 (6 February 2015) (Annex 99);
Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No.
300/1/C/712 (13 February 2015) (Annex 106); Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/78 (9 January 2015) (Annex 83); Administrative
Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/916 (23 February
2015) (Annex 108).
102
159. In the days immediately leading up to the 13 January 2015 attack against
Volnovakha, for example, there was a documented increase of cross-border MLRS transfers
from Russia to Ukraine.345 By 11 January, the DPR had deployed concentrated battalions to
the area.346 One eyewitness testified that on 13 January, the day of the attack, he saw three
BM-21 Grads with insignia of the DPR’s Oplot battalion enter the village of Elenovka through
a DPR checkpoint at around 12:00, and then travel towards Dokuchayevsk, the launch site of
the attack.347
160. There is also compelling evidence that after the shelling of civilians on
Volnovakha, members of the Russian Armed Forces supplied more BM-21 Grads, which were
used to shell Mariupol. Early in the morning of 24 January 2015, a DPR member was
dispatched to the border to meet the “guests.”348 In a series of conversations, DPR members
reported on the path of the convoy from the border, specifically mentioning the border town
of Kuznetsy and, at 08:10, their arrival in Bezimenne, just a few kilometers from the launch
area.349 The route of the Grad convoy can be recreated based on the intercepted
conversations tracking its progress:
345 Skibitskyi Statement, paras. 23‒25 (Annex 8).
346 Ibid.
347 Signed Declaration of Oleksandr Pavlenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (23 January 2015)
(Annex 209).
348 Intercepted Conversations of Maxim Vlasov (23–24 January 2015), p. 6 (Annex 408); Yanovskyi
Statement, paras. 26-27 (Annex 5).
349 Intercepted Conversations of Maxim Vlasov (23–24 January 2015), p. 8 (Annex 408); Yanovskyi
Statement, para. 29 (Annex 5).
103
Map 9: Route of the BM-21 Grad Convoy350
161. The operation to supply Grad systems for use against Mariupol involved
Major-General Stepan Yaroshchuk, the Commander-In-Chief of the Rocket Forces and
Artillery of the Russian Armed Forces Southern Military District. Around 14:00, after the
shelling, Major-General Yaroschuk called a Russian colonel who was advising the DPR with a
warning to “[l]et them leave somewhere.”351 Just eight minutes after that call, DPR members
discussed “hid[ing] all the vehicles” because “the OSCE mission is coming.”352 By the early
350 The underlying data points for Map 9 are based on the intercepted conversations referenced above
and the calculated launch zone described in the report of General Brown. See Intercepted
Conversations of Maxim Vlasov (23–24 January 2015), pp. 6–8 (Annex 408); Yanovskyi Statement,
paras. 28-31 (Annex 5); Brown Report, para. 65 (Annex 11).
351 Intercepted Conversation Between Maxim Vlasov and DPR Advisor Tsapliuk (24 January 2015)
(Annex 408); Yanovskyi Statement, para. 36 (Annex 5).
352 Intercepted Conversations of Maxim Vlasov (23–24 January 2015), p. 17 (Annex 408); Yanovskyi
Statement, para. 36 (Annex 5).
104
evening of 24 January, the Grad convoy arrived back at the border town of Kuznetsy for its
return to Russia.353 Russian military officials also supplied the more sophisticated MLRS —
the BM-30 9K58 Smerch — that its proxies deployed against a residential neighborhood in
Kramatorsk.354 Satellite imagery shows a collection site for Smerch systems in Rostov oblast
just 6 kilometers from the Ukraine-Russian border.355 These images reveal a noticeable,
temporary reduction in Smerch systems in February 2015, coinciding with the Kramatorsk
shelling.356 Moreover, undercover agents reported on the transfers of Smerch systems to
Ukrainian territory, including shortly before the attack.357
The Russian Explosives Used to Bomb Ukrainian Cities
162. Russian military and intelligence operatives also provided pro-separatist
individuals and groups with explosives, far away from any conflict zone. These explosives
were used in a campaign of terrorist acts, both completed and attempted, against innocent
civilians and infrastructure.
163. From Kharkiv to Kyiv to Odesa, Russian involvement in these bombing
attacks fit a striking pattern. The perpetrators communicated with Russian intelligence
agents based in Russia, most in Belgorod. Then they would confirm their willingness to
353 Intercepted Conversations of Maxim Vlasov (23–24 January 2015), p. 26 (Annex 408); Yanovskyi
Statement, paras. 37-40 (Annex 5).
354 See Chapter 1, Section C(2) (discussing the expert crater analysis that determined the attack used
Smerch MLRS).
355 Skibitskyi Statement, paras. 29‒33 (Annex 8).
356 Ibid. Ukraine Main Directorate of Intelligence Letter No. 222/4D/535 (17 May 2018) (attaching
Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense No.
222/3D/90/09 (2 January 2015 at 9:00)) (Annex 182).
357 Skibitskyi Statement, paras. 34‒37 (Annex 8). It is also impossible for the Smerch used to attack
Kramatorsk to have come from anywhere but Russia; Ukraine has not lost any of these valuable
systems to any illegal groups operating in Ukraine. All of its Smerch systems are accounted for.
Gavryliuk Statement, paras. 19‒21 (Annex 1).
105
carry out bombing attacks in Ukraine. And the Russian intelligence officers would arrange
for the perpetrators to receive explosives, money, or both. Several witnesses, for example,
confirm the Kharkiv Partisans’ relationship with Russian intelligence, including its “FSB
handlers,”358 and the practice of “RF special services” arranging the “handover of weapons
through ‘hideouts.’”359
164. This pattern is visible in the specific terrorist acts recounted in Chapter 1.
Volodymyr Dvornikov, the perpetrator of the Kharkiv unity march bombing, told Russian
intelligence officers in Belgorod he was willing to carry out bombings in Kharkiv.360
Dvornikov’s Russian collaborators offered to help, and FSB officers arranged for a MON-100
antipersonnel mine to be placed at a “dead drop” location in Kharkiv.361 Once Dvornikov
learned of the planned unity march, he emailed the FSB officers and asked how much they
would pay him to bomb the march.362 They agreed to pay him 10,000 USD.363
165. Russian intelligence officers similarly supplied the weapons that Marina
Kovtun used in her bombing spree, including the attack on the crowded Stena Rock Club.
After training at a Russian camp, Kovtun was introduced to Vadym Monystarev, a leader of
the Kharkiv Partisans with close ties to Russian intelligence agents, who offered to “procure
358 Signed Declaration of A. M. Tyshchenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol ( 26 December 2015), p. 7
(Annex 17).
359 Signed Declaration of Dmytro Kononenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (22 February 2016), p. 2
(“Monastyrev, he told me that the financing from the RF special services for subversive activity and
other actions aimed at supporting the activities of the ‘Kharkov Partisans’ on the territory of Ukraine
had been suspended, and that the handover of weapons through ‘hideouts’ had also been suspended”)
(Annex 246).
360 Signed Declaration of Volodymyr Dvornikov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 February 2015),
pp. 2–3 (Annex 223).
361 Ibid. p. 3.
362 Ibid.
363 Ibid.
106
[her] weapons.”364 The assault rifle seized from Kovtun had specific markings allowing it to
be traced to Crimea, and thus taken by Russia after its invasion.365 And while the serial
number on Kovtun’s SPM mines were no longer visible after detonation, just weeks later
Ukrainian authorities recovered an SPM mine near Kharkiv with Russian markings.366
166. Russian intelligence officers also provided weapons to the terrorists that
bombed PrivatBank offices and a military enlistment office.367 One of the perpetrators
testified that his Russian collaborators offered to provide weapons,368 including rocketpropelled
flamethrowers, and deliver them to a meeting point at the Ukraine–Russia border
near Belgorod.369 Maksym Mykolaichyk, the Ukrainian man who arranged for the
364 Signed Declaration of Marina Kovtun, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 November 2014), p 7
(Annex 196); Signed Declaration of M. Kovtun, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (19 November 2014), p.
2 (stating that “ the weapons had been given to us by ‘Kharkiv Partisans’’) (Annex 196).
365 Central Missile and Artillery Directorate Of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 342/2/3618 (11
March 2015) (Annex 110).
366 Specifically, the mine had a lot number showing it was manufactured in 1990; Ukraine does not
have units of this Russian-made weapon manufactured after 1987. Extract from Criminal Proceedings
No. 22017220000000060 (22 November 2014) (Annex 79); Gavrlyiuk Statement, paras. 38‒40
(Annex 1).
367 Signed Declaration of Vasily Pushkarev, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (31 August 2015)
(Annex 242). The flamethrowers received by Pushkarev and left at the scene of his crimes, as
determined by the serial numbers on those weapons, were never supplied to the Ukrainan Armed
Forces and were never possessed by the Ukraian Armed Forces. Indictment in the criminal case
against Vasyl Vitaliyovych Pushkariov Registered in the Uniform Register of Pretrial Investigations
Under No. 22015220000000431 on 22 December 2015 (Annex 145); Gavryliuk Statement, paras. 33‒
35 (Annex 1).
368 Signed Declaration of Vasily Pushkarev, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (31 August 2015), pp. 5–6
(Annex 242).
369 Signed Declaration of Sergey Stlitenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (10 August 2015) p. 3.
(testifying that during his meeting with Dmitriy in Belgorod he asked him “to provide him and his
group with firearms and that Dmtriy agreed that “it would not present any difficulties”; later Stlitenko
met with Dmirtriy near the boundary marker at the Ukrainian–Russian border and received the
weapons) (Annex 235).
107
delivery,370 identified the Russian collaborators as “officers of the Federal Security Service of
the Russian Federation,” who had “organized a channel for illegal smuggling of weapons and
explosives.”371
167. Russian intelligence operatives also provided support to the terrorists who
bombed the leader of a pro-Ukrainian NGO in Odesa. The perpetrators testified that they
met with a Russian intelligence operative in the Smolensk region of Russia, agreed to carry
out a bombing attack in Odesa, and retrieved the powerful explosive they used in the attack
— an anti-tank mine with six attached block charges — from a location given to them by that
operative.372 A participant in the plot to assassinate Ukrainian politician Anton Geraschenko
in Kyiv testified that he met with an LPR member working closely with Russian intelligence
in Belgorod, discussed the assassination plot, received 3,000 USD for expenses, and then
was promised a large sum — 50,000 USD — for his participation.373
168. From this evidence, a clear pattern can be discerned. First, Russian
intelligence officers would identify and make use of middlemen who travelled between the
Russian Federation and Ukraine to recruit would-be terrorists. Sobchenko and Monastyrev
370 Signed Declaration of Vasily Pushkarev, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (31 August 2015), pp. 8–11
(Annex 242).
371 Declarations of Maksim Mykolaichyk, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (15 April 2015), p. 2
(Annex 227).
372 Signed Declaration of Myroslav Melnik, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 July 2017) (Annex
268); Signed Declaration of Semen Boitsov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9 August 2017), p. 36
(Annex 269).
373 Transcript of Oleksiy Andriyenko Court Testimony (28 April 2017), p. 5 (Annex 261); Signed
Declaration of Oleksiy Andriyenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (18 December 2016), p. 3
(Annex 252).
108
openly boasted about this arrangement to no less than seven people,374 Mykolaichyk
admitted it outright,375 and the practice repeated itself in Odesa and Kyiv. Then, after
securing those middlemen, the Russian intelligence officers would fund them with money
and explosives to distribute to recruits. This has been independently confirmed by several
perpetrators who have admitted to receiving money and explosives from these men.376
Together, the pattern demonstrates a scheme coordinated by Russian intelligence officials to
place explosives in the hands of radicalized Ukrainians intent on bombing civilian targets in
Ukrainian cities.
374 See supra, Chapter 1, Section D (citing Signed Declaration of Andrii Baranenko, Suspect
Interrogation Protocol (23 October 2014), p.3 (testifying that Monastyrev set up interviews with FSB
operatives)) (Annex 191); Signed Declaration of Yaroslav Zamko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26
August 2015), pp. 3–5 (testifying that Manastyrev supervised of Zamko’s training in a Russian
military camp and Russian active duty officers trained Zamko) (Annex 241); Signed Declaration of
Vadim Chekhovsky, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9 May 2015), p.5 (testifying that Sobchenko
offered Chekhovsky to go to a military training camp in Russia organized officially by Russian
authorities) (Annex 229); Signed Declaration of Andrii Tishenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26
December 2015), p.6 (testifying that Sobchenko is supervised by Russian FSB agents) (Annex 245);
Signed Declaration of Kostiantyn Nuzhnenkoenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 July 2015), pp.
2–3 (testifying that Monastyrev introduced him to Russian FSB operatives in Belgorod) (Annex 233);
Signed Declaration of Dmytro Kononenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (13 May 2015), pp. 2–3
(testifying that Monastyrev informed him that Russian intelligence representatives will follow the
execution of a terrorist act and will provide help if needed) (Annex 230).
375 Signed Declaration of Maksim Mykolaichyk, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (15 April 2015), p. 2
(Annex 221).
376 Signed Declaration of Volodymyr Dvornikov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 February 2015), p.
3 (admitting that he received explosives through an arrangement orchestrated by FSB officers)
(Annex 223); Signed Declaration of Marina Kovtun, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (19 November
2014), p. 2 (stating that “the weapons had been given to us by Kharkiv Partisans’’) (Annex 196);
Signed Declaration of Vasily Pushkarev, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (31 August 2015) (admitting
that he received explosives through Mykolaichyk), p. 8 (Annex 242); Signed Declaration of Oleg
Doroshenko (21 April 2015), p. 7 (admitting that he received explosives through Mykolaichyk)
(Annex 228); Signed Declaration of Oleg Mikulenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (22 February
2015), p. 6 (admitting that he received explosives from Sobchenko) (Annex 220).
109
The Russian Training Camps For Members of the DPR, LPR, Kharkiv
Partisans, and Other Armed Groups
169. Russia has supplied other valuable support, equipment, and provisions to the
DPR, LPR, and other armed groups that have enhanced their ability to carry out acts of
terrorism. This support includes, significantly, comprehensive training on Russian territory.
170. At their creation in early 2014, the DPR and LPR were a collection of
disorganized mercenaries with relatively little military or covert experience. So, too, were
the pro-separatist extremists in Kharkiv. Over the spring and summer of 2014, Russian
operatives deployed considerable resources on or near the border with Ukraine to develop
and staff guerilla training camps to dramatically enhance the capabilities of DPR, LPR, and
other pro-separatist recruits.377
377 See supra Chapter 2; see also Signed Declaration of Konstantin Kutikov, Suspect Interrogation
Protocol (16 March 2016), p. 7 (Annex 247); Signed Declaration of Oleg Serachov, Suspect
Interrogation Protocol (5 November 2014), pp. 6–11 (Annex 192); Signed Declaration of Igor Koval,
Suspect Interrogation Testimony (9 June 2015), pp. 5–6 (Annex 207); Signed Declaration of Maxim
Pislar, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (4 March 2015), pp. 2–3 (Annex 224); Signed Declaration of
Olexi Lvov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (4 March 2015), pp. 2–3 (Annex 225); Signed Declaration
of Mykola Varva, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (18 November 2014), pp. 2–4 (Annex 198); Signed
Declaration of Konstantin Morev, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (18 November 2014), pp. 2–3
(Annex 197); Signed Declaration of Pavlo Korostyshevskiy, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (18
November 2014), pp. 138–39 (Annex 199); Signed Declaration of Vadim Chekhovsky, Suspect
Interrogation Protocol (9 May 2015), pp. 5–6 (Annex 229); Signed Declaration of Andrey Bozhko,
Suspect Interrogation Protocol (19 November 2014), pp. 4–6 (Annex 201); Signed Declaration of
Andreii Bessarabov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (19 November 2014), pp. 153–55 (Annex 200);
Signed Declaration of Marina Kovtun, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 November 2014), pp. 4–5
(Annex 196); Signed Declaration of Stanislav Kudrin, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (19 November
2014), pp. 5–7 (Annex 202); HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT, pp. 7, 23 (Annex 448); AN INVASION BY ANY
OTHER NAME, pp. 43, 54, 74 (Annex 450); Large Military Staging Ground Detected in Russia, The
Interpreter Magazine (7 January 7 2015) (Annex 550); Mumin Shakirov, I Was a Separatist Fighter in
Ukraine, The Atlantic (14 July 2014) (Annex 528); Thomas Grove & Warren Strobel, Special Report:
Where Ukraine’s Separatists Get Their Weapons, Reuters (29 July 2014) (Annex 535).
110
171. These training camps instruct DPR and LPR recruits, Russian servicemen that
later joined the DPR and LPR, and members of other violent groups based in Ukraine.378
The training and equipment provided at these camps cover a wide range of activities,
including the operation and assembly of explosive devices;379 the use of sophisticated heavy
378 Signed Declaration of Konstantin Kutikov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 March 2016), p. 7
(Annex 247); Signed Declaration of Oleg Serachov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (5 November
2014), pp. 6–11 (Annex 192); Signed Declaration of Igor Koval, Suspect Interrogation Testimony (9
June 2015), pp. 5–6 (Annex 207); HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT, pp. 7, 23 (Annex 448); AN INVASION BY ANY
OTHER NAME, pp. 43, 54, 74 (Annex 450); Large Military Staging Ground Detected in Russia, The
Interpreter Magazine (7 January 2015) (Annex 550); Mumin Shakirov, I was An Opposition Fighter
in Ukraine, The Atlantic (14 July 2014) (Annex 528); Deadly Bomb Blast Hits Rally In Ukraine, Al
Jazeera (22 February 2015) (Annex 562); Victoria Butenko & Sergei L. Loiko, Bomb Blast at Pro-
Ukraine Rally in Kharkiv Kills 2; Kiev Blames Russia, L.A. Times (22 February 2015) (Annex 598);
Thomas Grove & Warren Strobel, Special Report: Where Ukraine’s Separatists Get Their Weapons,
Reuters (29 July 2014) (Annex 535).
379 Signed Declaration of Vasily Pushkarev, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (31 August 2015), p. 8
(Annex 242); see also Signed Declaration of Maksim Mykolaichyk, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (15
April 2015) (Annex 227); Signed Declaration of Oleg Doroshenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (21
April 2015) (Annex 228).
111
weaponry, including Grads;380 and weapons smuggling.381 After being trained at these
camps, individuals report directly to illegal armed groups fighting in Ukraine.382
172. The existence of these camps has been admitted. Alexander Zakharchenko,
for example — the self-proclaimed “prime minister” of the DPR — stated as early as August
2014 that DPR soldiers benefitted from Russian training.383 Many individuals have also
recounted their training in these camps. For example:
• Oleg Serachov, a former member of the DPR, discussed his training at a camp
outside of Rostov-on Don, Russia in June and July 2014 where Russian
380 Signed Declaration of Tornike Dzhincharadze, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (21 May 2017), p. 4
(Annex 263); Signed Declaration of Igor Koval, Suspect Interrogation Testimony (9 June 2015), pp.
5–6 (Annex 207); Mumin Shakirov, I Was an Opposition Fighter in Ukraine, The Atlantic (14 July
2014) (Annex 528).
381 Signed Declaration of Konstantin Kutikov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 March 2016), p. 9
(Annex 247); Signed Declaration of Oleksandr Sachava, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (30 January
2015), pp. 1–3 (Annex 218); Roland Oliphant, Russian Paratroopers Captured in Ukraine
‘Accidentally Crossed Border’, The Telegraph (26 August 2014) (Annex 540); Transcript of Video
Declaration of Petr Khokhlov, Suspect Interrogation (published 27 August 2014) (Annex 188); Maria
Tsvetkova, Special Report: Russian Fighters, Caught in Ukraine, Cast Adrift by Moscow, Reuters (29
May 2015) (Annex 576); Maxim Tucker, Russia Launches Next Deadly Phase of Hybrid War on
Ukraine, Newsweek (31 March 2015) (Annex 568); Robert Hackwill, Caught Red-Handed: the
Russian Major Fighting in Ukraine, EuroNews (8 December 2015) (Annex 584).
382 Signed Declaration of Konstantin Kutikov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 March 2016), p. 9
(Annex 247); Signed Declaration of Oleg Serachov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (5 November
2014), p. 11 (Annex 192); Signed Declaration of Igor Koval, Suspect Interrogation Testimony (9 June
2015) (Annex 207); Mumin Shakirov, I Was an Opposition Fighter in Ukraine, The Atlantic (14 July
2014) (Annex 528); The Interpreter Magazine, We All Knew What We Were Going For and What
Could Happen (English translation of an interview in Novaya Gazeta by Elena Kostyuchenko, dated 2
March 2015) (Annex 564); Zoya Lukyanova, Translator for the DPR: “This is a Performance for the
Whole World,” LB.ua (21 April 2015) (Annex 572); Julian Röpcke, How Russia Finances the
Ukrainian Rebel Territories, Bild (16 January 2016) (Annex 586); James Rupert, How Russians are
Sent to Fight in Ukraine, Newsweek (6 January 2015) (Annex 549); Desire to Break Free from
Ukraine Keeps Devastated Donetsk Fighting, PBS Newshour (5 July 2016) (Annex 589); DONBAS IN
FLAMES, pp. 58–60 (Annex 455); Maria Tsvetkova, Special Report: Russian Soldiers Quit Over
Ukraine, Reuters (10 May 2015) (Annex 574); Tomasz Piechal, The War Republics In The Donbas One
Year After The Outbreak Of The Conflict, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich (17 June 2015) (Annex 578).
383 Shaun Walker, Ukraine Rebel Leader Says He Has 1,200 Fighters ‘Trained in Russia’ Under His
Command, The Guardian (16 August 2014) (Annex 539).
112
instructors taught him to handle and operate weapons, camouflage them, and
generally conduct “sabotage.”384
• On 2 March 2015, the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta published an
interview with an active Russian soldier injured on Ukrainian territory,
Dorzhi Batomunkuev.385 Batomunkuev stated that he had been re-stationed
to a Rostov military camp in Russian territory, where he was trained to
destroy Russian markings on military equipment before being ordered to
move those sanitized weapons into Ukraine.386
• Vladimir Starkov, a Russian soldier captured in Ukraine driving a truck full of
ammunition, told Euronews (and later a Ukrainian court)387 that he was an
active RAF soldier recruited to assist the DPR by training their soldiers at
Russian military camps.388
173. Bombers operating in Kharkiv and Odesa were also trained in Russian camps
outside of Belgorod, Kursk, Rostov, and Tambov:
• Myroslav Melnik and Semen Boitsov, the men who detonated a car bomb in
Odesa,389 were trained by Russian officers in a military camp in Rostov to use
and handle explosives.390
• Marina Kovtun, who planted military-grade mines at a crowded nightclub and
other targets in Kharkiv, trained in Tambov, Russia to use “magnetic mines,
384 Signed Declaration of Oleg Serachov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (5 November 2014), pp. 10–11
(Annex 192).
385 The Interpreter Magazine, We All Knew What We Were Going For and What Could Happen
(English translation of an interview in Novaya Gazeta by Elena Kostyuchenko, dated 2 March 2015)
(Annex 564).
386 Ibid. Similarly, On 31 March 2015, BBC Russia published an interview with Dmitry Sapozhnikov, a
commander in the DPR special forces, confirming that DPR forces were trained by Russian generals
and other military leaders and provided with Russian arms. Olga Ivshyna, Commander of the
“Special Forces of the DPR”: Russia’s Help was Decisive, BBC Russia (31 March 2015) (Annex 569).
387 Signed Declaration of Vladimir Starkov (27 July 2015), p. 7 (Annex 234).
388 Robert Hackwill, Caught Red-Handed: the Russian Major Fighting in Ukraine, EuroNews (8
December 2015) (Annex 584).
389 See Chapter 1, Section D(2).
390 Signed Declaration of Myroslav Melnik, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9 August 2017), p. 43
(Annex 268); Signed Declaration of Semen Boitsov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (9 August 2017), p.
34 (Annex 269).
113
MON anti-personnel mines, and ‘bouncing mines,’as well as TNT sticks,
detonators, and fuses.”391
• The PrivatBank bombers attended a military training camp in Russia where
they learned to handle and operate explosives.392
• A number of other participants in the Kharkiv Partisans and similar groups
have admitted to receiving training from Russian FSB officials outside of
Tambov, Russia, learning how to store, handle, arm, and detonate various
explosives.393
This training was a valuable form of support designed in part to assist perpetrators on
Ukrainian soil in committing a range of terrorist acts.
Russian Fundraising for Illegal Armed Groups in Ukraine
174. In addition to providing weapons and training, the Russian Federation has
allowed and facilitated vast amounts of monetary support to illegal armed groups in eastern
Ukraine. Donbas has been flooded with Russian currency, effectively replacing the
391 Signed Declaration of Marina Kovtun, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (16 November 2014) (Annex
196).
392 Signed Declaration of Vasily Pushkarev, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (31 August 2015), p. 10
(Annex 242); Signed Declaration of Myckhaylo Reznikov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (13 August
2015), pp. 4–5 (Annex 236).
393 See supra Chapter 1, Section D; Chapter 2, Section E. Signed Declaration of Stanislav Kudrin,
Suspect Interrogation Protocol (19 November 2014), p. 4 (Annex 202); Signed Declaration of
Konstantin Morev, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (18 November 2014), pp. 2–3 (Annex 197); Signed
Declaration of Oleg Doroshenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (21 April 2015), p. 6 (Annex 228);
Signed Declaration of Yaroslav Zamko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 August 2015), pp. 4–5
(Annex 241); Signed Declaration of Alexander Bondarenko, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (23
October 2014), pp. 6–7 (Annex 190); Signed Declaration of Andrii Tishenko, Suspect Interrogation
Protocol (26 December 2015), pp. 3–4 (Annex 245); Signed Declaration of Andrii Baranenko, Suspect
Interrogation Protocol (23 October 2014), pp. 3–4 (Annex 191); Signed Declaration of Myckhaylo
Reznikov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (13 August 2015), pp. 4–5 (Annex 236); Signed Declaration
of Mykola Varva, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (18 November 2014), pp. 3–5 (Annex 198); Signed
Declaration of Pavlo Korostyshevskiy, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (18 November 2014), pp. 139–
142 (Annex 199); Signed Declaration of Andreii Bessarabov, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (19
November 2014), pp. 154–156 (Annex 200); Signed Declaration of Vasily Bunchkov, Suspect
Interrogation Protocol (4 March 2015), 2–3 (Annex 226).
114
Ukrainian hyrvnia as the de facto currency in the region. As the so-called Supreme Council
of the DPR put it, “we would not have survived without support” from Russia.394
175. One prominent financier is wealthy Russian businessman Konstantin
Malofeev, who is internationally known as “one of the main sources of financing for Russians
promoting separtism.”395 As a Putin adviser has explained, Malofeev “suits Russian
authorities because they don’t want to take responsibility for certain things.”396 In this
instance, that has meant providing “financial, material, or technological support” for the
DPR, including his former employees – Alexendar Boredai, the so-called “Prime Minister” of
the DPR, and the notorious militant Igor Girkin.397
176. Malofeev is just one example; fundraising in Russia for illegal armed groups
in Ukraine is rampant, with individuals and legal entities sending millions of rubles and
weapons to Ukraine. For example:
• The “Coordination Center for Assistance to Novorossia,” raised well over three
million rubles in support of the DPR and LPR between September 2014 and
394 The Russian Secret Behind Ukraine’s Self-Declared ‘Donetsk Republic’, France 24 (15 October
2015) (video), mm 00:03:00–00:04:00; 00:12:00 (Annex 583).
395 Press Release, U.S. Treasury, Treasury Targets Additional Ukrainian Separatists and Russian
Individuals and Entities (19 December 2014) (Annex 478). See also Press Release, Council of the
European Union, List of Persons and Entities Under EU Restrictive Measures Over the Territorial
Integrity of Ukraine (14 September 2017), p. 37 (Annex 358); Swiss State Secretariat for Economic
Affairs, SECO Bilateral Economic Relations Sanctions, Programs (Situation in Ukraine: Ordinance of
27 August 2014), Individual Malofeev Konstantin Valerevich (23 May 2018) (Annex 481); Australian
Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ukraine Sanctions: Review of Australia’s
Autonomous Sanctions Imposed on 84 Individuals and Entities in Relation to Ukraine (2 September
2017) (Annex 479).
396 Ilya Arkhipov, Irina Reznik & Henry Meyer, Putin’s ‘Soros’ Dreams of Empires as Allies Wage
Ukraine Revlot, Bloomberg (16 June 2014) (Annex 522).
397 Press Release, U.S. Treasury, Treasury Targets Additional Ukrainian Separatists and Russian
Individuals and Entities (19 December 2014) (Annex 478).
115
January 2015, using Sberbank and Yandex.Money (“Yandex”) accounts.398, 399
These funds were used to purchase weapons components and other military
equipment on the black market to be delivered to the DPR and LPR.400
• The “Sverdlovsk Oblast Fund for Special Forces Veterans,” informed the
Russian government sometime in 2014 that it was actively raising money to
train, equip, and transport “volunteers” to the DPR and LPR who would then
follow orders and receive salaries from those groups.401 According to the
leader of that organization, by early January 2015, the group had raised at
least 50 million rubles, trained and provisioned at least 150 individuals, and
transported them to eastern Ukraine to receive instruction from the DPR and
LPR.402
• Alexander Zhuchkovsky publicly boasted about raising millions of rubles and
purchasing armored combat vehicles and weapons to benefit the DPR and
LPR.403 He used a Russian Internet domain and Sberbank accounts to
accomplish this.404 The website maintained by Zhuchkovsky —“Strelkov-
Info.ru” — solicited funds through August 2017, and generally reported
398 Report of the CCNR on the Results of 2014, COORDINATION CENTER FOR NEW RUSSIA (12 January
2015) (Annex 633).
399 Sberbank is a State-owned bank headquartered in Russia, and Yandex.Money is joint venture
between Sberbank and Yandex, a Russian-headquartered technology company. See About Us,
SBERBANK (last visited 25 April 2018) (Annex 664); Press Release, Yandex Money, Yandex and
Sberbank of Russia Finalize Yandex.Money Joint Venture, (4 July 2013) (Annex 600).
400 As the group’s website shows, the “humanitarian” assistance it provided to the DPR and LPR came
in the form of, among other things, rifles, grenades, handguns, and ammunition. See, e.g., Report on
Past Deliveries, COORDINATION CENTER FOR NEW RUSSIA (19 August 2014) (Annex 626); Communist
Party for the DKO (Volunteer Communist Detachment), COORDINATION CENTER FOR NEW RUSSIA (30
December 2014) (Annex 631); Regular Dispatch Is Not Humanitarian Aid, COORDINATION CENTER
FOR NEW RUSSIA (19 November 2014) (Annex 629).
401 James Rupert, How Russians are Sent to Fight in Ukraine, Newsweek (6 January 2015)
(Annex 549).
402 Ibid.
403 See, e.g., Alexander Zhuchkovsky, On the Advisability of Purchasing Armored Vehicles,
STRELKOVINFO (4 September 2014) (Annex 628).
404 See, e.g., Actual Requests for Assistance to the Militia of Novorossia, STRELKOVINFO (as archived
on 10 August) (noting also that Yandex and WebMoney accounts are available through inquiry, but
not publicly posted because the owners keep blocking the accounts; “WebMoney” is a method of
electronic money transfer using Yandex services, see WebMoney Purse Linking, YANDEX (last visited
21 March 2018) (Annex 688).
116
collections in the hundreds of thousands of rubles per month.405 The
organization continues to raise funds to this day, now using the Russian social
network VKontakte.406
• Similar organizations such as the EU-sanctioned front for Igor Strelkov’s
“New Russia Movement,”407 the “Novorossia Humanitarian Battalion,”408
“Save the Donbas,”409 “Help the Russians,”410 and “Help Donbas,”411 have
publicly raised funds for the DPR and LPR, and continue to do so. Together,
they have likely raised in the hundreds of millions of rubles to benefit the
“militias” or “armies” of the DPR and LPR.412 Each organization uses
Sberbank or Yandex accounts to collect and transfer their funds once raised.
177. As noted in a report in the New York Times documenting the fundraising
goals of these groups, some went so far as to “advertise” their organization on mortar shells,
using the image of a lethal weapon to solicit donations.413 Fundraising appeals stated that
405 See, e.g., Report on Expenditures and Purchases for the Militia of Novorossia, STRELKOVINFO (22
July 2017) (Annex 651); Report on Expenditures and Purchases for the Militia of Novorossia,
STRELKOVINFO (30May 2017) (Annex 650); Report on Expenditures and Purchases for the Militia of
Novorossia, STRELKOVINFO (14 April 2017) (Annex 649); Report on Expenditures and Purchases for
the Militia of Novorossia, STRELKOVINFO (24 February 2017) (Annex 648).
406 See Summaries from the Militia of Novorossia, VKONTAKTE (last accessed 21 March 2018)
(including a donations option on every page) (Annex 662).
407 THE MANAGING COMPANY OD “NOVOROSSIYA” - ANO “KNB”: TRANSFER OF MONEY FOR OD
“NOVOROSSIA” II. STRELKOV (last visited 21 March 2018) (Annex 663); Council Implementing
Regulation (EU) 2015/240 of 9 February 2015, Official Journal of the European Union L40/7 (16
February 2015), p. L/40/ 13 (Annex 356).
408 NOVOROSSIA HUMANITARIAN BATTALION, gumbat.ru (last visited 21 March 2018) (Annex 661).
409 SAVE THE DONBAS (last visited 21 March 2018) (Annex 654).
410 HELP THE RUSSIANS (last visited 21 March 2018) (Annex 659).
411 HELP-DONBAS (last visited 21 March 2018) (Annex 660).
412 NOVOROSSIA HUMANITARIAN BATTALION, gumbat.ru (last visited 21 March 2018) (raised 11,837,304
rubles as of 21 March 2018) (Annex 661); SAVE THE DONBAS (last archived on 12 September 2017),
(raised 82,215,174 rubles as of 21 March 2018) (Annex 654); Financial Reports, THE MANAGING
COMPANY OD “NOVOROSSIYA” - ANO “KNB”: TRANSFER OF MONEY FOR OD “NOVOROSSIA” II. STRELKOV
(last visited 21 March 2018) (latest reporting shows 2,242,000 rubles raised in six months pre-dating
11 September) (Annex 658).
413 Jo Beckler & Steven Lee Myers, Russian Groups Crowdfund the War in Ukraine, N.Y. Times (11
June 2015) (Annex 577).
117
funds were to provide weapons and other military equipment for “the militia of New Russia”
and the “Donbas Militias,” weapons – not bona fide “humanitarian” assistance.414
178. Prominent members of the Duma, Russia’s Parliament, also have publicly
raised funds for DPR and LPR. For example:
• Vice Chairman of the State Duma Vladimir Zhirinovsky donated an armored
fighting vehicle to the LPR in May 2014, inviting the Russian press to the
announcement.415 Between September 2014 and 2017, Zhirinovsky organized
the donation of at least six more military vehicles.416
• Duma members Sergey Mironov and Gennadiy Zyuganov, actively and
publicly solicited funds and donations for the benefit of the DPR and LPR in
both their personal and official capacities. Mironov used his government
position to rally support among the public for the DPR and LPR, and worked
to allocate government funds to the DPR and LPR.417 Zyuganov appealed to
his constituents to donate to the DPR and LPR, even providing banking and
routing information for such donations.418
179. More covert, but no less significant, is the creation and use of a shadow
banking system to launder funds originating in Russian territory. Ukrainian investigation
and independent reporting confirm that a newly-created bank with branches in the Abkhazia
414 See, e.g., Alexander Zhuchkovsky, On the Advisability of Purchasing Armored Vehicles,
STRELKOVINFO (4 September 2014) (Annex 628); Report on Past Deliveries, COORDINATION CENTER
FOR NEW RUSSIA (19 August 2014) (Annex 626); Communist Party for the DKO (Volunteer Communist
Detachment, COORDINATION CENTER FOR NEW RUSSIA (30 December 2014) (Annex 631); Regular
Dispatch Is Not Humanitarian Aid, COORDINATION CENTER FOR NEW RUSSIA (19 November 2014)
(Annex 629).
415 Zhirinovsky Gave a Military Vehicle to the Ukrainian Militiamen, 161.RU (6May 2014), (video and
text) (Annex 512).
416 Prosecutor General’s Office Put Zhirinovsky in Suspicion of Financing Terrorism, Front New
International (23 August 2017) (Annex 597).
417 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Donetsk People’s Republic, Press Conference with Aleksandr
Kofman and Sergei Mironov in Donetsk (28 December 2015) (Annex 646); Mironov Promises Draft
Bill “On the Status of the Donbas Militas,” RIA.ru (14 September 2016) (Annex 590).
418 See, e.g., Fundraising for the Rendering of Humnanitarian Assistance to the Residents of the
Southeast of Ukraine, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (17 June 2014) (linking to a
bank deposit slip with account numbers for the LPR); Lugansk Terrorists Are Financed by the
Communist Party of Russia, DETAILS (26 June 2014) (Annex 605).
118
and South Ossetia regions of Georgia — regions that are internationally recognized as under
Russian occupation and control — serve as clearing houses to funnel billions of rubles from
accounts in Russian-State-owned banks to the account of the LPR “Ministry of Finance.”419
Intercepted emails and bank records show that since May 2015, the newly-created
“Mezhdunarodny Rashchyotny Bank” (“MRB”) has hosted, processed, and kept secret these
transactions.420 In Russia, various donors deposit funds into MRB Account Number
301018110100000000105, belonging to a so-called “Fund of Support for International
Humanitarian Projects” (the “Fund”).421 From the Fund’s account, money is then
transferred to accounts that the LPR leadership maintain at MRB, and ultimately winds up
in the accounts of the “State Banks” of the LPR.422 Bank records indicate that the
“Foundation” funded the DPR and LPR leadership with approximately seven billion rubles
(approximately 100 million Euro) during just part of 2017.423 All of this money originated
from the Russian-State-owned bank Vneshtorgbank (“VTB”).424
180. In sum, a large-scale fundraising apparatus, both overt and covert, has been
allowed to flourish on Russian territory. This is just one more way in which Russia has
419 Witness Statement of Oleksii Oleksiyovych Bushnyi (5 June 2018), paras. 7 – 14 [hereinafter
Bushnyi Statement] (Annex 7); Information About the Commercial Banks of RSO, NATIONAL BANK:
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH OSSETIA (last visited 2 May 2018) (Annex 665); Julian Röpcke, How Russia
Finances the Ukrainian Rebel Territories, Bild (16 January 2016) (Annex 586); Nikolaus von Twickel,
South Ossetia: A ‘Little Switzerland’ for Donbas?, EURASIANET.org (31 May 2017) (Annex 596).
420 Bushnyi Statement, para. 11 (Annex 7); Consolidated Banking Records of Transfer Between the
Fund and the State Bank of the LPR (various dates) [hereinafter Bank Records] (Annex 434); Julian
Röpcke, How Russia Finances the Ukrainian Rebel Territories, Bild (16 January 2016) (Annex 586);
Nikolaus von Twickel, South Ossetia: A ‘Little Switzerland’ for Donbas?, EURASIANET.org (31 May
2017) (Annex 596).
421 Bushnyi Statement, para. 11 (Annex 7); Bank Records (Annex 434); Julian Röpcke, How Russia
Finances the Ukrainian Rebel Territories, Bild (16 January 2016) (Annex 586); Nikolaus von Twickel,
South Ossetia: A ‘Little Switzerland’ for Donbas?, EURASIANET.org (31 May 2017) (Annex 596).
422 Bushnyi Statement, para 12 (Annex 7); Bank Records (Annex 434); Julian Röpcke, How Russia
Finances the Ukrainian Rebel Territories, Bild (16 January 2016) (Annex 586); Nikolaus von Twickel,
South Ossetia: A ‘Little Switzerland’ for Donbas?, EURASIANET.org (31 May 2017) (Annex 596).
423 Bushnyi Statement, para. 12 (Annex 7); Bank Records (Annex 434); Julian Röpcke, How Russia
Finances the Ukrainian Rebel Territories, Bild (16 January 2016) (Annex 586); Nikolaus von Twickel,
South Ossetia: A ‘Little Switzerland’ for Donbas?, EURASIANET.org (31 May 2017) (Annex 596).
424 Bushnyi Statement, para. 11 (Annex 7).
119
enabled, rather than prevented and suppressed, the financing of organizations engaged in
terrorism in Ukraine.
120
Chapter 3. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S FAILURE TO ASSISTUKRAINE IN
PREVENTING AND PUNISHING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM
181. As massive amounts of weapons and rubles flowed across the Russia–Ukraine
border, with the Ukrainian people enduring a series of terrorist acts as a consequence,
Ukraine made repeated requests to Russia to fulfill its legal responsibilities to prevent the
financing of terrorism — as it is required to do under the ICSFT. Yet rather than cooperate
with Ukraine and take steps to stop the funding of terrorism, Russia repeatedly refused
Ukraine’s appeals for cooperation and assistance and instead promoted terrorism financing.
182. Russia’s refusal to cooperate has taken many forms. Russia has failed to
police its border with Ukraine to stop the flow of weapons and other funds to groups engaged
in terrorism. Russia has ignored express Ukrainian warnings about terrorism fundraising
and requests to freeze or seize assets used for that fundraising. And Russia has repeatedly
failed to provide meaningful assistance to Ukraine in connection with criminal investigations
into the financing of terrorism.
Russia Has Failed to Take Measures to Prevent Weapons Transfers
Across the Ukraine–Russia Border
183. As U.N. monitors have repeatedly stated, the lack of a controlled border
permits the flow of weapons into Ukraine, which, as OHCHR concludes, has resulted in
devastating consequences for civilians.425 While Ukraine’s access to the border is
temporarily blocked by illegal armed groups, Russia’s side of the border remains under its
425 See, e.g., OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16 November 2015 to 15
February 2016, pp. 49–50, 10, paras. 24, 207 (“The Government of Ukraine did not have effective
control over considerable parts of the border with the Russian Federation . . . . The continued
occurrences of indiscriminate shelling and presence of anti-personnel mines that cause civilian
casualties in the conflict affected area raise concerns about the inflow of weapons. . . . [A]rms should
not be transferred in situations where there is a substantial risk that they will be used in serious
violations or abuses of international human rights or humanitarian law.”) (Annex 314).
121
control. Yet Russia has done nothing to ensure that powerful weapons — a Buk TELAR,
countless Grad and Smerch multiple-launch rocket systems, and many others — do not flow
from its territory to the territory of Ukraine and into the hands of illegal armed groups.
184. The Ukrainian State Border Guard Service has consistently informed the
Russian Border Service of impending transfers of weapons, ammunition, and money from
Russian territory into Ukrainian territory to the DPR, LPR, and others, and requested
Russia’s assistance and cooperation in preventing these attempts.426 Those requests have
fallen on deaf ears. The Ukrainian Border Guard has also requested joint meetings with the
Russian Border Service in order to cooperate on the prevention of illegal border crossings
and weapons supply convoys, at times repeating these requests daily.427 Yet again Russia
chose to take no action; no joint meetings or meaningful coordination ever happened, Russia
took no steps to police its border, and the well-documented flow of weapons continued
unabated.
185. Russia tentatively agreed to a joint meeting in October 2014 — approximately
five months after Ukraine’s first, urgent request — but that meeting never occurred. Instead,
Russia determined that such a meeting was “premature” because the Russian Border Service
“decided to conduct further legal due diligence” on the issue of joint border control.428 A
426 Ukraine State Border Guard Letter No. 0.22-3958/0/6 to the Russian Border Directorate of the
FSB, dated 22 May 2014 (Annex 387); Ukraine State Border Guard Letter No. 0.42-4016/0/16-14 to
the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 24 May 2014 (Annex 388); Ukraine State Border
Guard Letter No. 0.42-4289/0/6 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 3 June 2014
(Annex 389); Ukraine State Border Guard Letter No. F/42-3243 to the Russian Border Directorate of
the FSB, dated 5 June 2014 (Annex 390); Ukraine State Border Guard Letter No. 0.42-5504/0/6-14 to
the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 13 July 2014 (Annex 393).
427 Ukraine State Border Guard Letter No. 0.22-3958/0/6 to the Russian Border Directorate of the
FSB, dated 22 May 2014 (Annex 387); (Annexes 55-73) (various Ukrainian Border Guard letters
requesting Russian assistance).
428 Russian Border Directorate of the FSB Letter No. 0.42-8801/0/6-14 to the Ukrainian State Border
Guard, delivered 11 October 2014 (Annex 402).
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month later, the Head of the Border Directorate of the FSB declared that it was beyond his
agency’s authority to “clear the passage of vehicles transporting cargo” to Ukraine.429 Yet
there are numerous Russian-manned check points that do routinely monitor the flow of
traffic across the border and check the passports of those coming and going.430 And the
question of which Russian agency has the necessary authority is beside the point; the
Russian Federation has a responsibility to police its border, and it cannot shirk that duty by
declining to identify the appropriate government agency.
186. To this day, four years after Ukraine’s initial request to Russia, Russia still
refuses to cooperate with Ukraine or to exercise any control over its border to stop the flow of
weapons to Ukraine. Russia’s deliberate refusal to cooperate has led to dangerous weapons
being delivered into the hands of groups engaged in terrorism against Ukrainian civilians.
Russia Has Failed to Cooperate with Ukraine’s Requests to Freeze Bank
Accounts Used for Terrorism Financing and Investigate Individuals
Linked to Terrorism Financing
187. Ukraine has repeatedly notified the Russian Federation that specific Russian
nationals or entities have taken part in fundraising efforts for the support of groups engaged
in terrorism in Ukraine. Ukraine expressly requested the Russian Federation’s cooperation
and assistance by (1) freezing or seizing all identified assets collected for the support of
terrorism and (2) investigating the facts of the allegations as detailed by Ukraine. Despite
Ukraine’s requests, Russia did not freeze or seize any assets, it did not thoroughly investigate
429 Russian Border Directorate of the FSB Letter No. 26-1209 to the Ukrainian State Border Guard,
dated 7 November 2014 (Annex 403).
430 Signed Declaration of Yevhen Bokhanevych, Suspect Interrogation Protocol (26 May 2017), p. 8
(Annex 266); Declaration of Serhiy Semenchenko, Witness Interrogation Protocol (10 July 2017), p. 1
(Annex 267).
123
the facts brought to its attention, and it did not take any other measures to suppress
financing of the DPR, LPR, Kharkiv Partisans, and other violent groups in Ukraine.
188. First, Ukraine provided Russia with dozens of individuals’ and organizations’
names, along with their corresponding Russian bank accounts, Russian bankcard numbers,
Russian tax-payer identification numbers, Russian tax-registration codes, and other
identifying administrative numbers.431 For example, Ukraine notified Russia of the
following:
• Melkov Olexiy Valeriyovych, Pyleska Olga Volodymyrivna, Kutyumova
Tetyana Mykhailivna, Yaralov Dmytro Olexiyovych, and Ovsyannikova Ganna
Volodymyrivna used the Russian-based Kolibri and Zolota Korona Payment
Systems to transfer more than 150 million rubles to two Russian banks
accounts maintained by Saralpova Laura, namely specified accounts at Kredyt
Dnipro and Terra bank, respectively.432
• The “Liberation Movement Russian Sector — Ukraine” established and used
accounts with Sberbank, identifying the beneficiary as Sergey Igorevich
Khyzhnyak and the account number.433
• Tatiana Mykhailovna Azarova actively raised funds in Russian territory to be
deposited into her accounts or onto her cards (identifying Sberbank account
and card numbers) for groups engaged in terrorism in Ukraine.434
• Andrei Gennadiyevich Lazarchuk used Sberbank Bank Card (number
identified) and its corresponding account to finance groups engaged in
terrorism in Ukraine.435
431 Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2087 to Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs (12
August 2014) (Annex 369); Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2221 to Russian Federation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (29 August 2014) (Annex 371).
432 Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2087 to Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs (12
August 2014) (Annex 369).
433 Ibid.
434 Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2221 to Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs (29
August 2014) (Annex 371).
435 Ibid.
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• Accounts related to DPR and LPR activities were funded by electronic wallets
or bank cards from Yandex and Sberbank (account and card numbers
identified).436
189. In each of those instances, Ukraine notified Russia that the identified
individuals and organizations had purposefully and knowingly used those accounts to collect
and transfer money to finance terrorist activities in Ukraine.437 Ukraine then requested
Russia’s assistance under the ICSFT to freeze or seize the identified funds and other
assets.438 Russia, however, has never provided any indication that it complied.
190. Second, Russia has failed to provide substantive responses to many of
Ukraine’s requests to investigate those individuals it suspected of financing terrorism or,
when Russia produced findings from purported investigations into terrorism financiers
identified by Ukraine, the results betrayed a lack of good faith cooperation.439 For example:
• After being informed that Ukraine believed that Konstantin Malofeev had
knowingly financed terrorism, Russia’s response almost a year later was that
“it was not possible to identify the location of Mr. K.V. Malofeev.”440
Malofeev, however, is one of the most prominent businessmen in Russia, has
close ties to President Putin, and was known to have been regularly working
436 Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2087 to Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs (12
August 2014) (Annex 369); Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2221 to Russian Federation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (29 August 2014) (Annex 371).
437 Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2087 to Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs (12
August 2014) (Annex 369); Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2221 to Russian Federation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (29 August 2014) (Annex 371).
438 See, e.g., Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2087 to Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (12 August 2014) (Annex 369); Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2221 to Russian
Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs (29 August 2014) (Annex 371).
439 See, e.g., Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2087 to Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (12 August 2014) (Annex 369); Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2221 to Russian
Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs (29 August 2014) (Annex 371); Russian Federation Note
Verbale No. 10448 to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (31 July 2015) (Annex 376).
440 Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 10448 to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (31 July
2015) (Annex 376).
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at his offices throughout the first six months of 2015.441 Claiming to be unable
to locate one of the most prominent individuals in Russia is plainly not a
good-faith response to a request for cooperation.
• Ukraine requested that Russia investigate Oleksander Zhuchovsky, who in
public interviews had stated that he was fundraising for the DPR442 — a group
that by that point had been publicly implicated in a series of terrorist acts
against civilians.443 On 3 November 2014, Ukraine followed up its original
request by informing Russia of additional terrorism financing offenses
committed by Zhuckovsky, and provided further identifying information and
information regarding his complicity in specific crimes.444 On 31 July 2015,
Russia inexplicably responded that “[i]n the course of the investigative and
operational proceedings it was found that a citizen with personal data related
to Mr. Olexandr Grigorievych Zhuckovsky does not exist in the Russian
Federation.”445 Yet on Zhuckovsky’s social media page — about which
Ukraine alerted Russia — he is shown in Russia hosting a fundraiser for the
DPR.446 And in public interviews, Zhukovsky both stated that he was a
Russian national and admitted to financing the DPR.447
• Ukraine requested that Russia investigate terrorism financing activity
connected to Andrei Gennadiyevich Lazarchuk, Nina Igorevna Lotysh, Vadim
Yuriyevich Kunayev, and Tatiana Mykhailovna Azarovna, providing Russia
with the individuals’ respective dates of birth and their exact bank account
numbers.448 Almost one year later, on 31 July 2015, all Russia could say was
441 John Thornhill, Fear Vladimir Putin’s Weakness Not His Strength, The Financial Times (17 August
2015) (Annex 580).
442 See Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2087 to Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(12 August 2014) (Annex 369). The evidence provided by Ukraine consisted of a link to Khukovsky’s
“Vkontakte” social media profile which, at that time and still today, showed indisputable evidence that
Zhukovsky had raised funds for and provided weapons to the DPR. For example, one post boasts of
paying for a BTR (armored fighting vehicle) with cash, and then giving it to the militias of “New
Russia.” Cf. Alexander Zhuchkovsky, On the Advisability of Purchasing Armored Vehicles,
StrelkovInfo (4 September 2014) (Annex 628).
443 See supra, Chapter 2, Section A.
444 Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2717 to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (3
November 2014) (Annex 374).
445 Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 10448 to Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (31 July 2015)
(Annex 376).
446 Social Media Page (VKontakte) of Oleksandr Zhukovsky (post of 15 March 2015) (Annex 635).
447 See, e.g., Alexander Zhuchkovsky’s “Militia” of the DPR: The Only Support is in the Russian
Media, ZAKS (10 June 2014) (Annex 520).
448 Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2221 to Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs (29
August 2014) (Annex 371).
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that “[t]he investigative and operational work to identify the persons
mentioned in the note . . . , as well as the details of their bank accounts is
being processed at current time.”449
• On 12 August 2014, Ukraine requested that Russia investigate terrorism
financing activity connected with the the Coordination Center for Assistance
to Novorossia.450 Almost a year later, on 31 July 2015, Russia responded with
the results of its investigation, claiming that the Coordination Center for
Assistance to Novorossia “does not have electronic accounts” and that
“military items are not acquired” by the group.451 Had Russia merely
consulted the group’s publicly-available website, however, it would have
discovered that the Coordination Center for Assistance to Novorossia not only
links to its established electronic bank accounts for donations, but it also
boasts of donating weapons.452
191. As these examples demonstrate, Russia has taken no interest in suppressing
the financing of terrorism in Ukraine. Russia never froze accounts or seized assets linked to
the financing of terrorism. Nor did Russia investigate claims of terrorism financing in good
faith, as the examples above vividly illustrate.
Russia Has Failed to Assist with Ongoing Criminal Investigations
Concerning Terrorism Financing or to Extradite Suspected Perpetrators
192. As weapons and money has poured across the Russian border and into the
hands of armed groups engaged in terrorism, Ukraine has sought to investigate and
prosecute the perpetrators of this terrorism financing. As the ICSFT anticipates, such law
enforcement actions often require cooperation, particularly with the government in whose
449 Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 10448 to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (31 July
2015) (Annex 376).
450 Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2087 to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (12 August
2014) (Annex 369).
451 Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 10488 to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (31 July
2015) (Annex 376).
452 See, e.g., Report on Past Deliveries, COORDINATION CENTER FOR ASSISTANCE TO NEW RUSSIA (19
August 2014) (Annex 626); Communist Party for the DKO (Volunteer Communist Detachment),
COORDINATION CENTER FOR ASSISTANCE TO NOVOROSSIA (30 December 2014) (Annex 631); Regular
Dispatch Is Not Humanitarian Aid, COORDINATION CENTER FOR ASSISTANCE TO NOVOROSSIA (19
November 2014) (Annex 629).
127
territory the suspects are located. 453 Far from assisting, however, Russia has rebuffed even
the most basic requests for cooperation, and has avoided taking steps to support prosecution
or extradition contemplated under the ICSFT.
193. Ukraine has requested Russian aid in the ongoing criminal investigations of
accused terrorist financiers in numerous diplomatic notes and more than twenty requests
under mutual legal assistance treaties (“MLAT requests”).454 At every turn, the Russian
Federation has frustrated Ukraine’s efforts to prosecute terrorism financiers by delaying
responses, invoking unreasonable technical objections, and even refusing outright to assist.
194. For example, beginning as early as 12 August 2014, Ukraine requested
Russian assistance and other information in connection with the investigation of terrorism
financing crimes committed by O. Kulygina, a Russian citizen.455 Kulygina was charged with
facilitating the operation of a terrorist group by supplying it with weapons.456 Ukraine
requested discrete assistance from Russia, including the collection of certain personal data
on Kulygina; documents relating to her membership in illegal armed groups; information on
any illegal possession of firearms in Russia; information on whether Kulygina crossed the
Ukraine–Russia border; and help identifying and questioning relatives of Kulygina.457
453 ICSFT, art. 12(1).
454 See, e.g., Annexes 400–405, 419–423, 431, 433 (relevant Ukrainian notes verbale and MLAT
requests, spanning June 2014 to March 2017)
455 See, e.g., Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2087 to Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (12 August 2014) (Annex 369); Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No.
22014050000000015 (30 September 2014) (Annex 401).
456 See Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22014050000000015 (30
September 2014), p. 1 (Annex 401).
457 Ibid.; see also Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2087 to Russian Federation Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (12 August 2014) (Annex 369).
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195. The Russian Prosecutor’s Office did not respond for more than a year. Then it
claimed that Ukraine’s request for border-crossing records was “a procedural formality that
is irrelevant to the subject matter of the pretrial investigation being conducted by the Central
Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine,” even though Kulygina was being
investigated for a crime that involved crossing the Ukraine–Russia border with weapons.458
The Russian Prosecutors also claimed without basis that the request for documents
concerning Kulygina’s involvment with illegal paramilitary groups “fail[ed] to state which
procedural or other formalities should be carried out in order to provide legal assistance.”459
As to many other remaining requests, the Russian prosecutors erroneously claimed that
Ukraine failed to invoke proper formalities, and thus refused those requests as well.460
196. In another case, Russia simply did not respond for more than a year.461 In
others, Russia just denied the facts about its proxies in Ukraine. For example, in one
instance in which Ukraine sought assistance concerning financing of the LPR, Russia refused
on the basis that Ukraine had not supplied “information regarding the specific finding on
which the declaration of the ‘Luhansk Peoples Republic’ as a terrorist organization is
458 Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation Letter No. No. 82/1-5444-14 (dated 23
October 2015, sent 6 November 2015) (Annex 428).
459 Ibid.
460 Ibid. Kulygina was ultimately convicted in an Ukrainian court, and the MLAT request withdrawn
on this basis, notwithstanding Russia’s refusal to assist the investigation.
461 Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22015050000000021 (23 March
2017) (Annex 431).
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based.”462 Yet as established above, it was well known, especially to Russia, that the LPR
engaged in terrorism, including its role in “a reign of intimidation and terror to maintain
[its] position of control.”463
197. Ukraine has lodged similar requests for assistance in ongoing criminal cases
regarding specific Russian military personnel and officers,464 and Russian nationals under
the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation,465 concerning terrorism financing offenses. Many
have been refused outright or are still pending years later.
198. Of particular note, on 10 October 2014, Ukraine informed the Russian
Federation that it had initiated criminal terrorism-financing investigations into four Russian
officials: Sergey Kuzhegetovich Shoigu, Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation;
Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovsky, Vice-Chairman of the State Duma, the Federal Assembly of
the Russian Federation; Sergey Mikhailovich Mironov, member of the State Duma; and
462 See Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation Letter No. 82/1-759-16 (14 September
2016) (“Information provided by the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine on July 8, 2016 regarding
No. 14/3-25775-16 indicates that the procedure for declaring a terrorist organization is established by
the Ukrainian Law ‘On Combating Terrorism.’ In pursuance of the requirements of this law, the
‘Luhansk Peoples Republic’ was declared a terrorist organization based on court decisions. According
to the information received, electronic copies of the court decisions are contained in the Unified State
Register of Judicial Decisions of Ukraine.”) (Annex 429).
463 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 15 July 2014, p. 7, para. 26 (Annex 296).
464 See, e.g., Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 42014000000000457 (28
July 2015) (concerning Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Russian Federation, and other various Russian soldiers); Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance
Concerning Case No. 42014000000000457 (15 September 2015) (concerning Vladimir Startkov)
(Annex 423).
465 See, e.g., Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22014000000000286 (3
July 2015) (concerning Igor Girkin) (Annex 422); Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning
Case No. 22014000000000283 (3 July 2015) (concerning Igor Bezler) (Annex 421); Ukrainian
Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22014000000000266 (2 July 2015) (concering
Alexander Mozhaev) (Annex 419); Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No.
22014000000000245 (3 July 2015) (concerning Alexander Borodai) (Annex 420); Ukrainian Request
for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 22015000000000001 (14 November 2017) (concerning
Gleb Kornilov) (Annex 433).
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Gennadiy Andreyevich Zyuganov, member of the State Duma.466 In relation to these
criminal investigations, Ukraine requested Russia’s assistance pursuant to the ICSFT.467
Ukraine followed its diplomatic cable with three separate MLAT requests, each requesting
prosecutorial assistance and cooperation.468 Russia, however, flatly rejected the specific
MLAT requests on the purported basis that cooperation would jeopardize its sovereign and
national security interests, without further explanation of why its officials’ participation in
the financing of terrorism implicated Russia’s sovereignty or security interests.469
199. Again, this pattern of refusal fits into Russia’s general modus operandi.
Russia has used smokescreens, delay, inaction, wilful blindness, and outright falsehoods to
avoid cooperating with Ukraine to prevent, investigate, and punish acts of terrorism
financing.
466 See Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2529 to Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(10 October 2014) (Annex 372).
467 See ibid.
468 See, e.g., Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 12014000000000293 (11
November 2014) (concerning Mironov) (Annex 404); Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance
Concerning Case No. 12014000000000292 (4 September 2014) (concerning Zhironovsky)
(Annex 400); Ukrainian Request for Legal Assistance Concerning Case No. 12014000000000291 (3
December 2014) (concering Zyuganov) (Annex 405).
469 Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation Letter No. 87-159-2015 (17 August 2015)
(Annex 426); Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation Letter No. 87-158-2015 (17
August 2015) (Annex 425); Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation Letter No. 87-157-
2015 (17 August 2015) (Annex 424).
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Section B: The Russian Federation Has Breached Its Obligations Under the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
200. The Russian Federation has committed serious, repeated, and continuing
violations of the ICSFT. This Section explains these violations in three steps. First, as set
forth in Chapter 1, Russia’s proxies in Ukraine have engaged in a consistent pattern of
terrorist acts within the meaning of Articles 2(1)(a) and 2(1)(b) of the ICSFT. Second, as
established in Chapter 2, Russian state officials, as well as private actors located in Russia,
knowingly financed this campaign of terrorism within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the
ICSFT. Third, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, Russia has refused to cooperate in relation to
these documented acts of terrorism financing.
201. As a result, Russia has brazenly violated its numerous obligations under the
ICSFT. Most comprehensively, this includes Russia’s obligation under ICSFT Article 18 to
take all practicable measures to prevent the financing of terrorism by “any person,” including
state officials. Russia has further failed to identify, detect, freeze, and seize funds allocated
for use in terrorism financing in violation of ICSFT Article 8; it has failed to investigate and
extradite or prosecute acts of terrorism financing as required by ICSFT Articles 9 and 10; and
it has violated its duty under ICSFT Article 12 to afford Ukraine the greatest measure of
assistance in connection with criminal investigations concerning acts of terrorism financing.
Chapter 4. RUSSIA’S PROXIES COMMITTED NUMEROUS ACTS OF TERRORISM IN
UKRAINE WITHIN THE MEANING OF ICSFT ARTICLE 2
The ICSFT Has a Broad and Comprehensive Definition of Terrorism
202. Unlike the terrorism conventions that preceded it, the ICSFT does not focus
on one particular type or method of terrorism. Its more ambitious objective was to eliminate
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the support that enables all manner of terrorist acts.470 To effect this goal, the ICSFT broadly
defines the kinds of acts that may not be financed, including an enumerated list of acts
recognized by previous treaties, as well as a broad, general category of terrorist acts.
203. Article 2(1)(a) identifies specific acts prohibited by prior terrorism
conventions.471 The incorporated treaties include, as relevant to the flagrant shoot-down of
Flight MH17, the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation (“the Montreal Convention”), which prohibits the intentional
destruction of an aircraft in service.472 The list also includes the International Convention
for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (“the ICSTB”), which prohibits the use of
explosives in places of public use and similar locations, and is relevant to the spate of
bombings and attempted bombings in Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Odesa.473
204. In addition to these enumerated acts, Article 2(1)(b) creates a broad, general
definition of terrorist acts that may not be financed.474 An act is covered by Article 2(1)(b) if
it is (1) “intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person
not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict,” and (2) the
470 Marja Lehto, Indirect Responsibility for Terrorist Acts 258 (2009) (“The focus of the Convention is
broadly preventive, and it has been designed to effectively cut off the financial flows in a network of
terrorist financing . . . .”) (Annex 490).
471 ICSFT, art. 2(1)(a) (prohibiting the supply of funds to “[a]n act which constitutes an offence within
the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex”).
472 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, art.
1(1)(b), September 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 178 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
473 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, art. 2(1), 15 December 1997,
2149 U.N.T.S. 284 [hereinafter “ICSTB”].
474 ICSFT, art. 2(1)(b).
133
“purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”475
205. The first element of Article 2(1)(b) makes plain that covered acts may occur in
“situations of armed conflict,” so long as the act is intended to cause harm to civilians as
opposed to combatants taking active part in hostilities.476 Thus, an attack by an armed group
targeting civilians in the course of an armed conflict may simultaneously be a war crime and
an act of terrorism within the meaning of Article 2(1)(b) of the ICSFT.477
206. “Intent” is not defined in the ICSFT, and it is appropriate, therefore, to look to
common usage in international law to discern its meaning.478 “Intent” in international law
does not have a singular definition but instead is a general term that describes various mens
rea. Intent encompasses a desire to achieve the consequence of one’s conduct (dolus
directus), an awareness or knowledge that the consequence will occur in the ordinary course
475 Ibid.
476 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable
Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, pp. 70‒71, para. 108
(Special Trib. for Lebanon 16 February 2011) (“[R]atifying the Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism without making any reservation, thereby accept[s] the notion
that the financing of persons or groups attacking innocent civilians in time of armed conflict,
as well as, in consequence, the perpetration of such attacks, may be categorised as ‘terrorism.’”).
477 See, e.g., Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of
the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition), T-208/11, p. 5 (16 October 2014) (noting
that Article 2(1)(b) of the ICSFT “expressly envisages the commission of terrorist acts in the context of
an armed conflict within the meaning of international law,” and “confirms that, even in an armed
conflict within the meaning of international humanitarian law, there may be terrorist acts liable to be
punished as such and not only as war crimes”) (Annex 471).
478 See Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), Judgment of 13 December 1999, 1999 I.C.J.
Rep. 1045, pp. 1062‒63, para. 27 (relying on common international legal use to determine ordinary
meaning of treaty term).
134
of events (dolus indirectus),479 or where one sees his action is likely to produce the
consequence and nevertheless he willingly takes the risk of so acting (dolus eventualis).480
This reading conforms with the authentic French version of the ICSFT — “[t]out autre acte
destiné à tuer ou blesser grièvement un civil . . .” — which points toward the normal
destination of an act as such, not a specific desire of its author.
207. Reading “intent” in context and in light of the broad and comprehensive
object and purpose of the ICSFT to suppress financing of the widest possible range of
terrorist acts against civilians,481 the most appropriate reading of intent in Article 2(1)(b)
encompasses all of these mens rea. Thus, as an example, the Italian Supreme Court of
Cassation interprets Article 2(1)(b) of the ICSFT to cover “an attack using explosives against
a military vehicle in a crowded market,” because the “factual circumstances of the event
show that serious harm to life and the physical integrity of civilians is certain and
479 Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, art. 30, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(defining “intent” to include situations where the person “is aware that [a consequence] will occur in
the ordinary course of events”) (Annex 749).
480 See, e.g., Kai Ambos and Steffen Wirth, The Current Law of Crimes Against Humanity: An
Analysis of UNTAET Regulation 15/2000, 13 Criminal Law Forum (2002), pp. 36‒37 (“With regard
to the commission of international crimes mere negligence is in most cases insufficient. These crimes
require a state of mind which in civil law jurisdictions is referred to as dolus or intent. Dolus exists in
the following forms: dolus directus first degree (also called dolus directus), dolus directus second
degree (or dolus indirectus) and dolus eventualis.”) (Annex 486); Rome Statute for the International
Criminal Court, art. 30, 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (defining “intent”) (Annex 749);
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, p. 99, para. 220 (15 July 1999)
(“What is required is a state of mind in which a person, although he did not intend to bring about a
certain result, was aware that the actions of the group were most likely to lead to that result but
nevertheless willingly took that risk. In other words, the so-called dolus eventualis is required (also
called ‘advertent recklessness’ in some national legal systems).”) (Annex 463); see also infra Chapter
4, Part D(1).
481 ICSFT, pmbl. (emphasis added) (“[r]ecalling also all the relevant General Assembly resolutions . . .
in which the States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirmed their unequivocal
condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable,
wherever and by whomever committed”) (emphasis added).
135
unavoidable.”482 As explained in more detail below, however, Russia’s proxies have acted
with the strongest degree of intent (dolus directus) to harm civilians, including in situations
where there was no plausible military target at all.
208. The second element of an Article 2(1)(b) offense is that the act’s purpose is to
intimidate civilians or coerce a government or international organization. The drafters
included this element “so as to exclude ordinary crimes” from the definition of terrorism.483
The ICSFT recognizes that direct evidence of the attacker’s specific agenda will often be
unavailable, and so provides that purpose to intimidate or compel is to be inferred from the
“nature or context” of the act.484
209. As the practice of States Parties make clear, attacks on civilian areas will, by
their nature or context, generally be regarded as having the requisite purpose. Notably, the
Russian Supreme Court treats an “armed attack on populated localities” as indicating a
482 Italy v. Abdelaziz and ors, Final Appeal Judgment, No. 1072, 2007, 17 Guida al Diritto 90, ILDC
559, Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy, 17 January 2007, para. 4.1 (Annex 473). This interpretation
accords with the view of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) that
“[i]ndiscriminate attacks, that is to say, attacks which strike civilians or civilian objects and military
objectives without distinction, may qualify as direct attacks on civilians ICTY.” Prosecutor v. Galic,,
Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 57 (5 December 2003) (Annex 464); see also
Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 4 n.4, 472 (12 June 2007)
(Martić fired indiscriminately at an area with both civilians and military targets; because he “knew of
the effects of [his] weapon,” he “willfully made the civilian population of Zagreb the object of his
attack”) (Annex 465).
483 Annex III, Informal Summary of the Discussions in the Working Group, prepared by the
Chairman, in Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism: Report of the Working Group, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/54.L2, p. 62, para. 87 (26 October 1999) (Annex 277).
484 ICFST, art. 2(1)(b). This language was included in the final version of the Convention specifically
to ensure that “proof of the perpetrator’s subjective state of mind” would not be required. Annex III,
Informal Summary of the Discussions in the Working Group, prepared by the Chairman, in
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism: Report of the Working Group, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/54.L2, p. 62, para. 88 (26 October 1999) (Annex 277).
136
purpose to intimidate.485 The Italian Supreme Court of Cassation likewise has stated,
interpreting Article 2(1)(b) of the ICSFT, that attacks on civilian areas will generally “creat[e]
fear and panic among the local people,” thereby “achiev[ing] the particular results that
constitute terrorist purposes.”486 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Denmark has held that the
use of “imprecise mortar shells in civilian areas” constitutes a terrorist attack under its
ICSFT implementing legislation.487 And considering the analgous war crime of terrorism,
the ICTY infers a purpose to spread terror from “both the actual infliction of terror and the
indiscriminate nature of the attack.”488
Since the Spring of 2014, the DPR and LPR Have Openly Engaged in
Attacks Against Ukrainian Civilians that Constitute Terrorist Acts Under
ICSFT Article 2(1)(b)
210. As set forth in Chapter 1, Section A, the United Nations and other
independent bodies have extensively documented Russia’s proxies’ practice of attacking
civilians who play no role in the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. These attacks, which
485 Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, No. 1 of 9 February
2012, “On Some Aspects of Judicial Practice Relating to Criminal Cases on Crimes of Terrorist
Nature,” para. 3 (“Other actions frightening to the population . . . should be understood as actions
with the consequences comparable to an explosion or arson, for example . . . armed attack on
populated localities . . . .”) (Annex 438). Russian legislation implementing the ICSFT defines a
“terrorist act” to require a connection to “frightening the population.” Federal Law “On Combatting
Terrorism,” art. 3 (6 March 2006) (Annex 440).
486 Italy v. Abdelaziz and ors, Final Appeal Judgment, No. 1072, 17 Guida al Diritto 90, Supreme
Court of Cassation, Italy, 17 January 2007, para. 4.1 (Annex 473).
487 “Fighters and Lovers Case,” Case 399/2008 (Sup. Ct., Den., 25 March 2009) (Annex 476).
Implementing Article 2(1)(b), section 114(1) of the Danish Criminal Code defines a terrorist attack as
one that is committed “with the intent to frighten a population to a serious degree or to unlawfully
coerce Danish or foreign public authorities or an international organisation to carry out or omit to
carry out an act . . . .” Criminal Code of Denmark, section 114(1).
488 Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 37
(12 November 2009) (holding that “both the actual infliction of terror and the indiscriminate nature
of the attack were reasonable factors for the Trial Chamber to consider in determining the specific
intent of the accused”) (Annex 467).
137
have included the murder and torture of civilians — and which were expressly found by U.N.
monitors to have been undertaken to intimidate the population — constitute terrorist acts
under ICSFT Article 2(1)(b).
211. The DPR, LPR, and other armed groups targeted countless civilians for
murder and torture throughout the spring and summer of 2014. One of the most notorious
acts was the kidnapping, torture, and murder of Horlivka town councilor Volodymr Rybak, a
known supporter of Ukrainian unity, on 17 April 2014.489 But the DPR and LPR also killed
and tortured countless other civilians who opposed their agenda. On 18 May 2014, for
example, DPR members killed an elderly farmer from a village near Slovyansk who was
accused of bringing food to the Ukrainian troops.490 And on 29 August 2014, LPR members
murdered Mr. Hennadii Khitrenko, a retired policeman and a member of the Krymske
village council who was an outspoken proponent of Ukrainian unity.491
212. These and the many other murders documented in Chapter 1, Section A, were
plainly “intended to cause death . . . to [] civilian[s].”492 The pattern of torture was just as
clearly “intended to cause . . . serious bodily injury to [] civilians.”493
213. An examination of the “nature or context” of these attacks reveals that their
purpose “is to intimidate a population,” in this case Ukrainian civilians.494 As U.N. Human
489 See supra Chapter 3, Section A.
490 See supra Chapter 3, Section A.
491 See supra Chapter 3, Section A.
492 ICSFT, art. 2(1)(b).
493 Ibid. By definition, torture is an “act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . .” Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 1(1), 10 December 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
(emphases added).
494 ICSFT, art. 2(1)(b).
138
Rights Chief Pillay described, at least one DPR leader has admitted to the objective of
“‘immers[ing] [civilians] in horror.’”495 The OHCHR and OSCE also repeatedly concluded
that civilians were terrorized by DPR and LPR attacks. In July 2014, for example, the
OHCHR reported that “armed groups fighting in the east . . . have taken control of Ukrainian
territory and inflicted on the populations a reign of intimidation and terror to maintain
their position of control.”496 OSCE interviews with internally-displaced persons from areas
under DPR and LPR control reveal that many fled these regions because of “[d]irect
experience or the witnessing of acts of violence . . . as well as the perception by people that
these acts of violence could affect also them personally[.]”497 The experience of terror by
victims is powerful confirmation of the DPR and LPR attackers’ intent to intimidate.498
214. According to the OHCHR, the DPR and LPR “target[ed] ‘ordinary’ people who
support Ukrainian unity or who openly oppose the either of the two ‘people’s republics.’”499
The circumstances of Mr. Rybak’s abduction, for example — in public, hours after he tried to
495 OHCHR, Intensified Fighting Putting at Risk Lives of People in Donetsk and Luhansk — Pillay (4
July 2014) (quoting “the website of one leader of the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’”)
(Annex 295).
496 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 15 July 2014, p. 7, para. 26 (emphasis
added) (Annex 296); see also OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 15 June 2014,
p. 3, para. 4 (reporting that armed groups’ attacks on civilians had created “an atmosphere of
intimidation and consequent fear” affecting the civilian population in Donetsk and Luhansk)
(Annex 46); OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 19 September 2014, p. 6, para.
16 (“The reign of fear and intimidation by the armed groups has been well-documented in the reports
of the Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. Forced mobilization and threats of the death
penalty were additional means to terrorize the population in the territory under the control of the
armed groups.”) (Annex 47).
497 OSCE, Thematic Report: Internal Displacement in Ukraine, pp. 5‒6 (12 August 2014) (Annex 316).
498 Cf. Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54, Appeals Chamber Judgment, p. 18, para.
37 (19 November 2009) (considering “the actual infliction of terror” as evidence that the “primary
purpose” of attacks was to “spread terror among the civilian population,” as required in the elements
of the war crime of terror) (Annex 467).
499 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 15 June 2014, para. 207 (Annex 46).
139
replace the DPR flag with the Ukrainian flag in front of a crowd of onlookers — sent a clear
message of intimidation to civilians in Horlivka and throughout eastern Ukraine that
resistance would be punished.
215. The context of these hostile acts against civilians is also significant as it
reveals a purpose “to compel a government . . . to do or abstain from doing any act.”500
These acts occurred as the DPR and LPR demanded greater autonomy from Ukraine’s
central authorities. Targeting supporters of Ukrainian unity signaled to the Ukrainian
government that the armed groups were prepared to kill innocent Ukrainian civilians as long
as their political demands, including changes to the constitutional structure of Ukraine, were
not met.
216. The well-documented pattern of attacks on individual civilians perpetrated by
the DPR and LPR thus satisfies both elements of the ICSFT’s general definition of terrorist
acts under Article 2(1)(b).
The DPR’s Downing of Flight MH17 Constitutes a Terrorist Act Under
ICSFT Article 2(1)(a)
217. With additional assistance from the Russian Federation, the DPR was soon
able to commit acts of terror on a larger scale and with deadlier consequences. As set forth
in greater detail in Chapter 1, Section B, on 17 July 2014, the DPR downed Flight MH17, a
civilian airliner, with a Buk missile supplied by the Russian Federation. The consequences of
this attack were both tragic and horrific. The attack also violated Article 1 of the Montreal
Convention, and was thus a covered act under Article 2(1)(a) of the ICSFT.
218. Article 1(1)(b) of the Montreal Convention provides:
Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and
intentionally: . . .
500 ICSFT, art. 2(1)(b).
140
(b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an
aircraft which renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to
endanger its safety in flight . . . .”501
219. Article 4(1) of the Montreal Convention separately provides that the treaty
“shall not apply to aircraft used in military, customs or police services.”502 Thus, to commit
an offense under Montreal Convention Article 1(1)(b), a person must (1) intend to destroy or
damage an aircraft in service, (2) act unlawfully, and (3) destroy or cause damage to a
civilian aircraft. Each of these elements is met in the case of the DPR’s destruction of Flight
MH17.
220. First, it is beyond debate that the DPR intended to destroy an aircraft in
service.503 The weapon used — a Buk TELAR, one component of a sophisticated anti-aircraft
missile system — is highly effective and accurate at destroying its target.”504
221. Second, the DPR’s downing of Flight MH17 was “unlawful,” as it was not
“done with legal authority or as a measure of self-defence or with other legal justification.”505
Armed groups operating illegally in Ukraine had no valid legal justification, under Ukrainian
law or international law, for firing weapons at aircraft.
222. Finally, the Article 4 exclusion of military aircraft from coverage by the
Convention has no relevance because Flight MH17 was indisputably a civilian aircraft.
Under the ordinary meaning of Articles 1 and 4, in the context of the Montreal Convention’s
overall structure, the civilian or military status of the aircraft is a jurisdictional element of
501 Montreal Convention, art. 1(1)(b).
502 Ibid. art. 4(1).
503 Article 2 of the Montreal Convention defines an “aircraft in service” to include when the aircraft is
“in flight.” Ibid., art. 2(b). It is undisputed that MH17 was in flight when it was destroyed.
504 See generally Skorik Report (Annex 12).
505 International Civil Aviation Organization, International Conference on Air Law, Montreal,
September 1971, Volume II: Documents, p. 30, para. 5.3 (1973).
141
the offense. Article 1(1)(b) states that a person commits an offense if he/she “intentionally . .
. destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft.”506 It requires no
intention as to the status of the aircraft. This neutral approach to the status of the victim is
not unusual. For example, under the treaty governing attacks on “internationally protected
persons” (which, like the Montreal Convention, is incorporated in Article 2(1)(a) of the
ICSFT), an offense exists if the victim has a particular status (e.g., a diplomat), but does not
require the attacker to know the victim’s status.507 Likewise, under the Montreal
Convention, if the elements of Article 1 are met (intent to destroy an aircraft, and unlawful
destruction of an aircraft), and Article 4 is not separately triggered (because a civilian, not a
military, aircraft is destroyed), a violation is established. It is no defense to assert that the
perpetrator meant only to destroy (unlawfully) a military, rather than civilian, aircraft.
223. Moreover, even if intention as to the civilian status of an aircraft were
required, the DPR did know that it was deploying a powerful anti-aircraft system in heavilytrafficked
civilian airspace.508 And as Dr. Skorik explains, “the technical capabilities of the
Buk M-1 TELAR do not make it possible to accurately tell civilian aircraft from military
targets.”509 Operating a Buk TELAR without guidance from a combat control center, and in a
high-pressure environment with just seconds to make targeting decisions, is “extremely
506 Montreal Convention, art. 1(1)(b) (emphases added).
507 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 14 December 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; see UNODC, Legislative
Guide to the Universal Anti-Terrorism Conventions and Protocols 12‒13 (2008); see also Prosecutor
v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, p. 112, para. 249 (15 July 1999) (“The
Prosecution is, moreover, correct in asserting that the armed conflict requirement is a jurisdictional
element, not ‘a substantive element of the mens rea of crimes against humanity’ (i.e., not a legal
ingredient of the subjective elements of the crime).”) (Annex 463).
508 See supra Chapter 1, Section B.
509 Skorik Report, para. 28 (Annex 12).
142
dangerous for civilian aircraft.”510 Destruction of such an aircraft was the natural
consequence of deploying a Buk TELAR with civilian aircraft present.511
224. The destruction of Flight MH17 thus meets all the elements of an offense
under Article 1(1)(b) of the Montreal Convention, and constitutes a covered act under ICSFT
Article 2(1)(a).512
The DPR’s Shelling Attacks of Civilian Areas Constitute Terrorist Acts
Under ICSFT Article 2(1)(b)
225. Undeterred by the widespread international condemnation of their attack on
Flight MH17, six months later Russia’s proxies committed three more major terrorist acts —
shelling populated civilian areas in eastern Ukraine — in a span of 30 days coinciding with a
period of tense diplomatic engagement. These attacks killed more than 50 civilians and
wounded at least 170 more. Each of them was a covered act of terrorism under Article
2(1)(b) of the ICSFT.
The DPR’s Shelling Attack on a Civilian Bus in Volnovakha is a
Covered Terrorist Act Under ICSFT Article 2(1)(b)
226. As explained in Chapter 1, Section C, on 13 January 2015, the DPR shelled a
civilian checkpoint in Volnovakha. One shell exploded near a civilian passenger bus, killing
12 civilians on board and wounding 19 others. This is a covered act of terrorism under ICSFT
Article 2(1)(b).
510 Ibid. para. 31.
511 Cf. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 415‒16 (5 December
2003) (finding that “SRK soldiers shot without knowing whether the movements they saw on the
runway were caused by civilians or by soldiers dressed as civilians,” and noting that these “episodes of
indiscriminate firing against people crossing the runway [are] relevant to establishing that
indiscriminate fire against civilians by SRK forces was an accepted and known fact”) (Annex 464).
512While it is sufficient to establish the downing of Flight MH17 as a covered act under the ICSFT by
way of the Montreal Convention, the downing of Flight MH17 also constitutes a covered act under
ICSFT Article 2(1)(b).
143
227. In shelling the checkpoint, the DPR fighters intended to cause death or
serious bodily harm to civilians. The Buhas checkpoint did not play a role in the ongoing
conflict, and there was no military reason to attack it. Rather, the checkpoint’s function was
to monitor, and search as necessary, civilian vehicles coming and going from governmentcontrolled
territory, just as border and customs officials do at an actual border.513 It played
no offensive role in the military conflict, and based on the small number of personnel
stationed there, it could not have conducted any effective defensive role against an organized
attack.514 Lieutenant General Christopher Brown, a retired British Army artillery expert with
over 36 years’ active duty service, has provided the Court with an expert opinion on the
shelling of Ukrainian cities. Based on these circumstances, General Brown “cannot identify
any military justification for attacking the checkpoint.”515 General Brown explains:
It is difficult to argue that the checkpoint was taking an active
part in the hostilities, or that its destruction gave the DPR any
military advantage. The function of the Volnovakha
checkpoint appears to have been a continuation of its longstanding
civilian role of checking vehicles, albeit reinforced by
armed personnel in order both to provide a greater degree of
protection to the police forces manning the checkpoint and
also to extend the role of the checkpoint to include checks for
the movement of weapons and separatist personnel. There is
no evidence to suggest that the checkpoint played any offensive
role; indeed, its size and the number of personnel manning it
suggest it could not even have conducted any effective
defensive role against anything more than attacks by
individuals with small arms. While the checkpoint could
undoubtedly warn Ukrainian Armed Forces of any impending
attack along the road to Volnovakha, any advantage of a
conventional military attack on the checkpoint, either by direct
assault or by indirect fire, would in my opinion be outweighed
513 See supra Chapter 1, Section C(1).
514 See supra Chapter 1, Section C(1); Brown Report, para. 27 (Annex 11).
515 Brown Report, para. 27 (Annex 11).
144
by its waste of resources and a loss of surprise if it were a
precursor to a larger attack.516
228. While the attack had no apparent logic when viewed through a military lens, it
does makes sense when viewed through the lens of harming civilians. As everyone familiar
with the area knew, the checkpoint was positioned on a well-trafficked highway and attracted
a long line of stopped civilian vehicles, both in general and on the day of the attack.517 For an
attacker that wished to harm civilians, the checkpoint provided an attractive, and logical,
target. The inescapable conclusion is that the DPR militants intended to harm the long line
of civilian vehicles they knew would be present.518
229. At the very least, the DPR knew that great harm to civilians would occur in the
ordinary course of events. Employing a BM-21 Grad against a small target such as a
checkpoint in the midst of heavy civilian vehicle traffic at a minimum qualifies as an
indiscriminate attack, where serious harm to civilians was a certain outcome. As General
Brown explains, this type of weapon system is designed to target an area, rather than small
targets such as a checkpoint.519 Even if the checkpoint had been the true objective and had
been accurately targeted, and there is no evidence of that, “[t]he choice of weapon system
and its method of targeting were incapable of damaging the checkpoint without hitting the
road and civilian traffic on it; indeed, the attackers would have known that their actions
would impact the road and any civilian traffic more than the checkpoint.”520 The DPR could
not have aimed Grad rockets at a crowded civilian checkpoint — with the apparent
assistance of unmanned aerial vehicles to scout the area the day before the attack521 — in the
516 Ibid. (internal citations omitted).
517 See supra Chapter 1, Section C(1).
518 Cf. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 193, 288 (31
January 2005) (concluding from the fact that there were no “firing positions or heavy weapons” that
the intent was “to target civilians”).
519 Brown Report, para. 14 (Annex 11).
520 Ibid. para. 39.
521 See supra, Chapter 1, Section C(1).
145
middle of the day without knowing what would happen to civilians as a virtually certain
consequence.
Map 10: Expected Area of Impacts if Buhas Checkpoint Targeted522
522 Shaded grid (drawn to scale) reflects the expected spread of fire around the checkpoint. See Brown
Report, paras. 29, 30 and Figure 1 (Annex 11).
146
230. The nature or context of the attack also demonstrates that the DPR’s purpose
in shelling the checkpoint was to intimidate civilians. The fact that the DPR intentionally
shelled a civilian checkpoint during the middle of the day establishes a purpose to intimidate
civilians.523 That they did so using Grad MLRS — a weapon whose name means “Hail” —
only bolsters that conclusion. General Brown explains:
Unannounced MLRS fire has the effect of shocking and
surprising any military personnel in the target area, even if
they are not killed or physically injured. As an area weapon
from which it is impossible to run or drive, unannounced
MLRS fire tends to cause fear, confusion and panic. Its
unannounced saturation of an area combined with the noise of
multiple explosions is highly frightening and creates a sense of
helplessness. It has a similar, potentially greater psychological
effect on civilians.”524
231. Moreover, targeting “sites well-known to be frequented by [civilians] during
their daily activities, such as . . . public transport,” can be particularly intimidating to
civilians.525 The Buhas checkpoint is a quintessentially civilian site; civilians needed to pass
through it to carry on their daily activities, including to pick up benefits payments from
Ukrainian government offices.526 Attacking such a target conveys the unmistakable message
that no aspect of civilians’ lives are safe from the ever-present threat of attack.
523 See supra, Chapter 4, Section A.
524 Brown Report, para. 17 (internal citation omitted) (Annex ).
525 Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, pp. 290‒91,
para. 881 (12 December 2007) (Annex 466); see also Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court
of the Russian Federation, No. 1 of 9 February 2012, “On Some Aspects of Judicial Practice Relating to
Criminal Cases on Crimes of Terrorist Nature,” para. 3 (emphasizing that “shelling . . . houses,
schools, hospitals, [and] administrative buildings” frightens the civilian population) (Annex 438).
526 See supra, Chapter 1, Section C(1).
147
232. The DPR and LPR’s pattern of intimidation over the course of the spring and
summer of 2014 is also relevant context for the Buhas checkpoint attack. One noteworthy
parallel between the 2014 and 2015 attacks is that the DPR has consistently targeted those it
sees as collaborators with the Ukrainian government. The Buhas checkpoint allowed
Ukrainian civilians to cross from DPR-held territory to government-controlled territory, and
was often a waypoint for Ukrainians to collect pension and social benefit payments from
their government.527 Just as the assassination of Mr. Rybak sent a message to all who would
show respect to the Ukrainian flag, the destruction of a bus filled with pensioners near
Volnovakha sent a message to all who would cross into government territory to accept
benefits from the Ukrainian government.
233. The intimidatory purpose of the attack is thus sufficient to meet the second
element of Article 2(1)(b), but that element is also satisfied for the independent reason that
the attack was, by its nature or context, intended to compel a government to act or refrain
from acting. The DPR’s attack on civilians was in service of its political goals of greater
autonomy from Kyiv, and its demand of fundamental changes to the constitutional structure
of Ukraine.528
234. The DPR did not just have abstract political goals; it was actively seeking
concessions from the Ukrainian government during the same time period as the attack. The
Trilateral Contact Group, comprised of representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation,
and the OSCE assembled to pursue diplomatic resolution of the situation in Donbas, held a
meeting on 31 January 2015 in Minsk to discuss options for a cease-fire.529 Attacking
527 See supra Chapter 1, Section C(1).
528 See supra, Introduction, Section A.
529 OSCE, Statement by the Chairmanship on the Trilateral Contact Group Consultations in Minsk on
31 January 2015 (1 February 2015) (Annex 330).
148
civilians in close proximity to peace efforts is a classic terrorist strategy designed to
maximize leverage at the bargaining table.530 This political context of the Volnovakha attack
further supports the conclusion that the attackers aimed to coerce the government of
Ukraine into acceding to the DPR’s demands.
The DPR’s Shelling Attack of a Residential Neighborhood in Mariupol
is a Covered Terrorist Act Under ICSFT Article 2(1)(b)
235. On 24 January 2015, less than two weeks after the attack in Volnovakha, the
DPR carried out another large-scale attack on civilians, this time bombarding the Vostochniy
residential neighborhood of Mariupol, as well as other residential areas to its west. As in
Volnovakha, the DPR used BM-21 Grads. Thirty civilians, including children, were killed,
and 118 civilians were injured.531 In committing this atrocity, DPR militants again
committed an act of terrorism under Article 2(1)(b).
236. First, the DPR intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians in
shelling this residential area of Mariupol. The Vostochniy neighborhood is densely
populated, yet it was attacked with at least four separate BM-21 Grads firing at least 154
rockets, causing damage across that residential area and further west.532 The U.N. Under-
530 See, e.g., Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young, Terrorism, Spoiling, and the Resolution of Civil
Wars, 77 J. of Politics 115, 1119 (2015) (“Terrorist violence can occur anytime during the entire
process, and it is one means by which groups try to achieve their goals. Throughout the peace process,
groups might only seek a temporary interruption to gain more leverage over future negotiations or
implementation.”) (Annex 495).
531 See supra, Chapter 1, Section C(2).
532 Brown Report, para. 43 (Annex 11).
149
Secretary-General for Political Affairs drew the most obvious conclusion from such an
attack: that the DPR targeted a residential neighborhood outside the zone of conflict.533
237. The attackers themselves discussed this objective in an intercepted
conversation the night before the attack. DPR member Ponomarenko (“Terrorist”) asked his
comrade Evdotiy (“Pepel”) to “F*cking crush it, I f*cking asked you, that one, f*cking
Vostochniy.” Evdotiy responded that “I will, I’ll do Vostochniy tonight as well, don’t
worry.”534 The next morning, at approximately 09:15, the DPR did hit Vostochniy, as well as
the area west of it past Olimpiiska Street. A DPR lookout reported at 10:36 that the attack
hit “on houses, on nine-story buildings, on private residences, the Kievskiy market,”535 and
then a half an hour later a new barrage of Grad rockets struck the Vostochniy
neighborhood.536
238. General Brown concludes that the overall circumstances of the attack support
the same conclusion that the Vostochniy area was the target. At the time of the attack, the
National Guard was responsible for the protection of Mariupol. But as General Brown
explains, “[t]he distance of any of the Ukrainian National Guard sites from the residential
areas shelled in the attack is too great for those National Guard sites to be considered a
plausible target of the attack.”537 The nearest such site was a National Guard checkpoint at
the northern edge of the city, far from the mean point of impact; given the distance and the
533 U.N. Security Council Official Record, 7368th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/PV.7368 (26 January 2015), p. 2
(statement of Jeffrey Feltman, U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs) (stating that the
attackers of Mariupol “knowingly targeted a civilian population” in a city that “lies outside of the
immediate conflict zone”) (Annex 307).
534 See supra, Chapter 1, Section C(2).
535 Ibid.
536 Ibid.
537 Brown Report, para. 57 (Annex 11).
150
wide “spread of fire achieved,” General Brown concludes that “the northern checkpoint was
not the actual target of the attack.”538 Moreover, given the size and functions of the
checkpoint, there was “no apparent military advantage” in attacking unless as a prelude to a
ground assault, which was not forthcoming.539 When “distance and lack of military
advantage are taken into account,” General Brown concludes that it is “highly implausible”
that neutralizing the checkpoint was the objective of the attack.540
239. Moreover, even if all four BM-21 Grads had for some reason been aimed at a
single small target (despite the obvious overkill), such an attack would still reflect an intent
to harm civilians. General Brown explains that “[t]he weapons system used in the attack and
its method of targeting were incapable of damaging the northern checkpoint without hitting
the residential area,” meaning the “[t]he attackers would have known that their actions
would impact the residential area.”541
538 Ibid. para. 48.
539 Ibid. para. 58.
540 Ibid. para. 48.
541 Ibid. para. 59.
151
Map 11: Expected Area of Impacts if Northern Checkpoint Targeted542
240. Second, the nature or context of the attack makes clear that the DPR’s
purpose in shelling Mariupol was to intimidate civilians and to coerce the Ukrainian
542 Shaded grid (drawn to scale) reflects the expected spread of fire under the parameters of the
Mariupol attack, if the target had been the northern checkpoint. See ibid. paras. 51, 52, and Figure 2.
152
government. As with the attack in Volnovakha, the nature of the DPR’s attack — an
intentional shelling, using a weapon nicknamed “Hail,” against a densely populated civilian
area — establishes that the DPR’s purpose was to intimidate civilians. The natural purpose
of such an attack, in the words of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation interpreting the
ICSFT, is to “creat[e] fear and panic among the local people.”543 The DPR’s prior, welldocumented
pattern and practice of targeting civilians for intimidatory purposes throughout
the spring and summer of 2014, and its attack against civilians in Volnovakha less than two
weeks earlier, only strengthens that conclusion.
241. DPR members even celebrated the terror they had caused. Ponamerenko, the
DPR member who had asked for the attack the night before, said about “Vostochniy” after
the first barrage: “Let the f*cking bitches be more afraid.”544
242. The DPR also carried out the shelling attack on Mariupol in a manner that
maximized its intimidating effects. The attack hit all types of civilian sites essential to daily
life.545 In total, fifty-three residential buildings, four schools, three day-cares, eight stores, a
post office, two banks, a pharmacy, and two markets were hit and damaged during the
shelling attack.546 The timing of the attack also heightened its terrorizing effects. The DPR
chose to launch its first volley on a Saturday morning, when many civilians were likely either
to be at home with their families, or outside conducting their errands for the day. And then,
as Ukrainian authorities were responding to the attack, Vostochniy was struck again.547
543 See, e.g., Italy v. Abdelaziz and ors, Final Appeal Judgment, No. 1072, 2007, 17 Guida al Diritto
90, ILDC 559, Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy, 17 January 2007, para. 4.1 (Annex 473).
544 See supra, Chapter 1, Section C(2).
545 Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, pp. 290‒91,
para. 881 (12 December 2007) (Annex 466).
546 See supra, Chapter 1, Section C(2).
547 See ibid.
153
243. A message was sent to Ukrainian civilians in Mariupol: no place was safe, and
further attacks could occur at any time. Unsurprisingly, residents were in fact terrorized and
some fled Mariupol altogether.548 The actual experience of terror that residents of Mariupol
experienced reinforces the DPR’s purpose to intimidate.549
244. As with the Volnovakha attack, Article 2(1)(b)’s purpose requirement is also
met for an independent reason. By shelling Mariupol, the DPR sought to pressure the
Ukrainian government to meet its political demands including modifications to Ukraine’s
constitutional structure to achieve greater autonomy.550 The DPR shelled Mariupol only a
week before the planned meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group, and on the heels of the
DPR’s attack on civilians in Volnovakha less than two weeks earlier. The nature or context of
the attack shows that the DPR’s purpose was to ratchet up the pressure on the Ukrainian
government as this meeting rapidly approached, in the hope that the Ukrainian government
would bend to its demands, rather than risk further harm to innocent civilians.
The DPR’s Shelling Attack of a Residential Neighborhood in
Kramatorsk is a Covered Terrorist Act under ICSFT Article 2(1)(b)
245. Undeterred by the international outcry over its attacks on Volnovakha and
Mariupol, the DPR again attacked civilians in eastern Ukraine. On 10 February 2015, less
than ten days after the Trilateral Contact Group meeting, and one day before additional
peace talks were scheduled with Germany and France, the DPR shelled a residential
neighborhood in Kramatorsk. Seven civilians were killed, and twenty-six more, including
548 See ibid.
549 Cf. Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 37
(19 November 2009) (Annex 468).
550 See Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law:
Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, para. 106 (Special Trib. for
Lebanon, 16 February 2011) (Annex 469).
154
five children, were injured. This attack also was an act of terrorism under ICSFT Article
2(1)(b).
246. First, the DPR intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians. As
General Brown explains, “there is no evidence of any military targets in the residential area
of Kramatorsk that would justify targeting it with a BM-30 salvo.”551 While there was a
legitimate military target of an airfield approximately two kilometers away from the
residential neighborhood, General Brown concludes from the dispersion of bomblets that
“[i]t is implausible that the bomblets which landed in the residential area were targeted at
the airfield.”552
247. As General Brown explains, the weapon used to shell Kramatorsk was a BM-
30 Smerch, a highly accurate system that includes features specifically designed to decrease
errors in targeting, including autonomous determination of the bearing of fire. 553 There
were also reports of UAV in the area at the time of the attack, which further improve
reliability.554 Given the BM-30 Smerch’s accuracy, General Brown concludes that “[i]t is
highly unlikely that even poorly trained and supervised firers could commit an error of this
magnitude inadvertently, let alone well-trained operators with access to UAV
observation.”555
551 Brown Report, para. 67 (Annex 11).
552 Ibid., paras. 73, 76. The airfield, which housed the ATO headquarters, also was struck that same
day, and caused r grave injury to civilians. The pattern of impacts on the airfield further supports
General Brown’s conclusions that the bombletts that landed in the residential area were not aimed at
the airfield. Ibid.
553 Ibid. para. 62.
554 See supra Chapter 1, Section C(3).
555 Brown Report, para. 73 (Annex 11).
155
248. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that many bomblets landed
squarely in the middle of the residential neighborhood in Kramatorsk. As General Brown
continues, “the coincidence of the missiles erroneously landing in a civilian area, as opposed
to the fields around the airfield target, further indicates that any suggestion that this was an
error would have to be viewed with extreme scepticism.”556 The simpler explanation is the
real one: the DPR intended to target the residential neighborhood and to harm the civilians
it knew lived there.
556 Ibid.
156
Map 12: Expected Area of Impacts if Airfield Targeted557
249. A separate volley of rockets did target an airfield. The DPR nonetheless would
have known that those rockets, too, also would cause injury to civilians not engaged in armed
557 Shaded grid (drawn to scale) reflects the expected spread of fire in an attack on the airfield under
the parameters of the Kramatorsk attack. See ibid., paras. 69, 70, and Figure 3.
157
conflict. As General Brown explains, the “carrier” elements of the rockets (i.e., the pieces
that carry the bomblets) would be expected to sail beyond the airfield and hit the residential
neighborhood, harming civilians.558
250. Second, the nature or context of this attack demonstrates that the DPR’s
purpose was once again to intimidate and coerce. The BM-30 Smerch is a powerful multiplelaunch
rocket system, and thus its use against civilians establishes that the DPR’s purpose
was to terrorize civilians. The DPR’s past practice of targeting civilians to intimidate them —
including the two egregious shelling attacks in the weeks prior — bolsters this conclusion.
251. The sites struck and the timing of the attack further suggest that the purpose
of this shelling attack was to intimidate Ukrainian civilians. Similar to the Mariupol shelling,
multiple quintessentially civilian sites were struck in the shelling attack in Kramatorsk,
including sixteen residential buildings, a kindergarten, an art school, and a local hospital.559
The shelling attacks were launched at a time — around noon — when civilians were likely to
be outside, and thus more likely to be hurt in the attack.
252. The DPR’s chosen launch site for the attack also supports the conclusion that
the DPR committed the attack with the aim of intimidating civilians. As General Brown
notes, there were alternative launch sites nearby Horlivka from which the DPR still could
have targeted the airfield while also ensuring that no carrier elements from the rockets
would fall into residential neighborhoods in Kramatorsk:
Even if only the airfield had been targeted and that had been
done accurately, the choice of weapon system and the launch
558 Ibid. para. 77 (“Even if all the rockets had been targeted exclusively at the airfield, and done so
accurately, the carrier elements would still have been expected to land in the residential area. Given
that the carrier elements are as much a part of the missile as the sub-munitions, the firers would have
known that the carrier elements would fall several kilometres beyond the bomblets’ impact points,
with harm to civilians guaranteed.”).
559 See supra Chapter 1, Section C(3).
158
position in the Horlivka area made it inevitable that carrier
elements would fall on civilian residential areas of Kramatorsk.
This fatal decision could have been mitigated by selecting a
launch position to the south-west of Horlivka. This would have
minimized the chances of carrier elements landing on civilian
areas of Kramatorsk. If the launch position had been in the
area of Yasynuvata, the bearing from the launch position to the
target at Kramatorsk airfield would have been 345o; as a result,
the majority of carrier elements would have landed harmlessly
in the open ground to the north of the airfield.560
In sum, as General Brown explains, “once the choice of weapon system and launch position
had been made, it was inevitable that carrier elements would fall on civilian residential areas.
The attackers would have known that their actions would impact the civilian areas.”561
253. That the DPR nevertheless chose to launch the attack from Horlivka
reinforces that at least one purpose of the attack was to intimidate the civilians living in
Kramatorsk. By attacking Kramatorsk from Horlivka, which is around 70 kilometeres from
Kramatorsk, the DPR signaled to civilians in the area — who may have thought they were
safely out of range — that they were, in fact, at risk of losing their lives and suffering serious
injury due to missiles and debris raining down on their neighborhood, without warning, in
the middle of the day. And civilians heeded this warning; after the attack on Kramatorsk, the
city’s population decreased by approximately 1,500 by the end of 2015.562
254. Finally, as with the Volnovakha and Mariupol attacks, the timing of this attack
in relation to the political negotiations taking place reveals that the DPR attacked civilians in
Kramatorsk in an effort to strengthen its negotiating position with the Ukrainian
government to achieve its political goals. At the 31 January 2015 Trilateral Contact Group
meeting, little progress was made as “the signatories of [the Minsk Protocol and
560 Brown Report, para. 74 (Annex 11).
561 Ibid. para. 78.
562 See supra, Chapter 1, Section C(3).
159
Memorandum] from Donetsk and Luhansk did not participate,” and “[t]heir representatives
who were present . . . called for revision of the Protocol and Memorandum.”563 In the wake
of these failed talks, international pressure mounted for a cease-fire and peaceful settlement
to the dispute. On 7 February 2015, France and Germany put forward a new peace plan,564
and a summit involving the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany was scheduled
for 11 February 2015 to discuss it.565 The day before that scheduled meeting bombs rained
down on Kramatorsk. This broader context strongly suggests that the DPR attacked civilians
in Kramatorsk far from the contact line to pressure the Ukrainian government to give in to
the DPR’s political demands.
The DPR’s Repeated Shelling and Artillery Attacks on Civilians in
Avdiivka Are Covered Terrorist Acts under Article 2(1)(b)
255. The weeks-long indiscriminate shelling of residential neighborhoods in
Avdiivka also constitutes a series of terrorist acts under Article 2(1)(b).
256. First, these attacks were intended to cause death or seriously bodily harm to
civilians. Although Ukrainian military positions were operating along the south of the city,
military objectives do not explain the many rocket and mortar attacks far from those military
zones. For example, DPR fighters deployed Grad rockets and killed a civilian on Zavodska
Street, a residential location “over 2km from [the] nearest UAF positions.”566 Russia’s
proxies also relied heavily on gun artillery and mortars, which General Brown explains are
563 OSCE, Statement by the Chairmanship on the Trilateral Contact Group Consultations in Minsk on
31 January 2015 (1 February 2015) (Annex 330).
564 Stephen Brown and Noah Barkin, Merkel Rules Out Arming Ukraine Government But Unsure
Peace Push Will Work, REUTERS (7 February 2015) (Annex 557).
565 Vladimir Soldatkin and Pavel Polityuk, “Glimmer of Hope” for Ukraine After New Ceasefire Deal,
REUTERS (12 February 2015) (Annex 560).
566 IPHR Report, p. 49 (Annex 454).
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much more accurate than Grads,567 and yet the DPR repeatedly hit targets that “were too far
away from any UAF site to be plausibly considered to have been directed at military
targets.568 In striking civilian areas far from any military targets, the DPR intended to harm
civilians.
257. The DPR also must have known that serious harm to civilians would occur if
they deployed numerous Grad rockets and artillery shells throughout the city. The use of
Grad rockets in residential areas is especially striking, since military targets in Avdiivka were
well within range of more accurate artillery (which the DPR in fact used in other
instances).569 As General Brown concludes, “[t]he use of BM-21 in an urban area was
guaranteed to cause civilian damage. The attackers would have known that their actions
would harm civilians.””570 The DPR embraced that outcome, continuing to use Grad systems
against the city of Avdiivka with full awareness of the civilian harm these attacks would
cause.
258. Second, the nature or context of the attacks demonstrates that the DPR
sought to intimidate civilians in shelling Avdiivka. The indiscriminate use of Grad rockets
and artillery, the DPR’s prior record of using such weapons to intimidate civilians and the
DPR’s decision to hit civilian targets reinforce this conclusion. Numerous civilian homes
were struck in the shelling attacks, as was a kindergarten, hospital, and civilian commercial
buildings.571 So too were critical civilian infrastructure facilities, including a power plant that
supplied heat for the entire city amid sub-freezing temperatures. As General Brown
567 Brown Report, paras. 88‒93 (Annex 11).
568 Ibid. para. 95; see also supra Chapter 1, Section C(4).
569 Brown Report, paras. 80, 85‒86, 95 (Annex 11).
570 Ibid. para. 96.
571 See supra Chapter 1, Section C(4).
161
concludes, it is “difficult to imagine” a military reason for striking the Avdiivka Coke
factory.572 What this attack did do was contribute to a humanitarian emergency for civilians
in Avdiivka, as the chief OSCE monitor informed the U.N. Security Council.573 This targeting
decision, together with the DPR’s pattern of indiscriminate firing, reflects a purpose of
intimidating the entire population of the city.
259. That the shellings and other attacks struck at apparently random times over
the course of more than a month also heightened their intimidatory effect. The ICTY has
relied on evidence of repeated, random attacks against civilian areas to establish intent to
terrorize civilians, and that is precisely what the DPR did in Avdiivka.574 Finally, the fact that
civilians in Avdiivka were in fact terrorized by the attack heightens the inference that the
DPR sought to intimidate civilians.575 Many were so scared that they fled the city.576
260. The broader context also demonstrates that the DPR’s attacks on civilians in
Avdiivka were intended to extract further political concessions from the Ukrainian
government. Roughly a week before the attacks began, a new U.S. administration took
power, creating political uncertainty for Ukraine, Russia, and Russia’s proxies. Just as it had
done in the tense political environment two years before, the DPR seized on a moment of
geopolitical uncertainty to heighten the pressure on the Ukrainian government to recognize
the DPR’s political demands.
572 Brown Report, para. 84 (Annex 11).
573 U.N. Security Council, Official Records, 7876th meeting, U.N. Doc S/PV.7876 (2 February 2017), p.
4 (Annex 315).
574 Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, p. 291, para.
881 (12 December 2007) (identifying “long term and persistent attacks on civilians . . . as indicia of the
intent to spread terror”) (Annex 466); cf. Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić, Hazim Delić,
Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, p. 372, para. 109 (16 November 1998)
(“[T]he Trial Chamber finds that the detainees in the Celibici prison-camp were exposed to conditions
in which they lived in constant anguish and fear of being subjected to physical abuse. Through the
frequent cruel and violent deeds committed in the prison-camp, aggravated by the random nature of
these acts and threats made by guards, the detainees were thus subject to an immense psychological
pressure which may accurately be described as an ‘atmosphere of terror’.”) (Annex 462).
575 See supra Chapter 1, Section C(4).
576 Ibid.
162
The Bombing Attacks in Ukrainian Cities Constitute Terrorist Acts Under
ICSFT Article 2(1)(a)
261. Russia’s proxies did not limit their campaign of terror to the Donbas region.
As the DPR, LPR, and other armed groups were attacking civilians in Donetsk and Luhansk,
the Kharkiv Partisans and others engaged in a series of bombing attacks in Kharkiv, Kyiv,
and Odesa. From July 2014 through May 2015 in Kharkiv, and again in 2017 in both Kyiv
and Odesa, a series of attacks were carried out targeting civilians and places of public use.
262. Several of these bombings and attempted bombings constitute acts of
terrorism under Article 2(1)(b) of the ICSFT. In the first instance, these attacks were
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to civilians. For example, detonating an
anti-personnel mine at a unity march in Kharkiv, triggering a limpet mine in one of Kharkiv’s
popular nightclubs, blowing up a car as a civic leader in Odesa nears, and planting a bomb to
assassinate a member of the Ukrainian Parliament, are all acts designed to kill and wound
civilians.577
263. Additionally, the nature or context of these attacks demonstrates that their
purpose was to intimidate civilians and compel the Ukrainian government to change its
policies. The Kharkiv march was a celebration of Ukrainian unity and a commemoration of
the Revolution of Dignity; targeting this event sent the chilling message that if you support
the Revolution of Dignity, you are not safe anywhere in Ukraine, even in a city far from any
fighting. Detonating a bomb at the busy Stena Rock Club, a venue frequented by supporters
of Ukrainian unity, sent the same unambiguous message. Unsurprisingly, civilians in
577 See supra, Chapter 1, Section D.
163
Kharkiv in fact were terrorized by these attacks. As a journalist aptly summarized the effect
of this string of bombings, “the physical, moral exhaustion really wears out your body.”578
264. In 2017 in Kyiv and Odesa, Russia’s proxies were again determined to send
the same message, this time targeting high-profile individuals for their political activities.
Anton Gereschenko is a member of Parliament and an outspoken critic of Russia’s illegal
actions against Ukraine.579 Marko Gordienko leads an Odesa non-governmental
organization that supports Ukrainian unity.580 By their nature, targeted attacks on such
individuals reflect a purpose to intimidate and compel, warning Ukrainian civil society that
there is a price for activism, and warning government officials that opposing Russian
aggression can be deadly.
265. These attacks and others set forth in Chapter 1, Section D also constitute
offenses under the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
(“ICSTB”), and are therefore covered acts under ICSFT Article 2(1)(a). Article 2(1) of the
ICSTB provides:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this
Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally delivers,
places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal
device in, into or against a place of public use, a State or
government facility, a public transportation system or an
infrastructure facility:
(a) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
578 Linda Kinstler, A Ukrainian City Holds Its Breath, FOREIGN POLICY (20 February 2015) (Annex
561).
579 See supra, Chapter 1, Section D.
580 Ibid.
164
(b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a
place, facility or system, where such destruction results in or is
likely to result in major economic loss.581
266. The Kharkiv unity march bombing, the Stena Rock Club bombing, and the
assasination attempts in both Kyiv and Odesa, all constiute offenses under Article 2(1)(a) of
the ICSTB. Each of these attacks involved explosives, were intended to cause death or
serious bodily harm (as explained above), and were done in “place[s] of public use” (a
crowded street, a nightclub, and on the streets of residential neighborhoods).582
267. In addition, the night before the Stena Rock Club bombing, the Kharkiv
Partisans also attacked the Malyshev Plant (a “business” that is a “place of public use”),583
with the intent of disabling the factory (thus causing “extensive destruction” that is “likely to
result in major economic loss”).584 Likewise, the regional headquarters of PrivatBank, a
commercial center and “place of public use,” was attacked with a rocket-propelled grenade
designed to cause “extensive destruction” and “major economic loss.”
268. These and other bombing attacks constitute terrorist acts under ICSFT Article
2(1). Across major Ukrainian cities, seemingly safe from the hail of Grad rockets, a different
type of terrorist act was being used to unsettle the public’s sense of calm and instill fear.
581 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing art. 2, 15 December 1997, 2149
U.N.T.S 256 [hereinafter ICSTB].
582 See supra, Chapter 1, Section D; ICSTB, art. 1(5).
583 ICSTB, art. 1(5).
584 Ibid. art. 2(1)(b).
165
Chapter 5. RUSSIAN OFFICIALS AND OTHER RUSSIAN NATIONALS KNOWINGLY
FINANCED TERRORISM IN UKRAINE
269. Article 2(1) of the ICSFT provides that “[a]ny person commits an offence
within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly,
unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used
or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out” covered
acts of terrorism as set forth in Articles 2(1)(a) or 2(1)(b).585 Article 2(5) further provides
that “[a]ny person also commits an offence if that person . . . [o]rganizes or directs others to
commit an offence as set forth in” in Article 2(1).586
270. Offenses under Article 2 may be committed by “any person.” As Anthony
Aust, former Deputy Legal Adviser of the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, observed shortly after the ICSFT was drafted, the phrase “any person” “encompasses
anyone, whether private individuals or public or government officials.”587 This is consistent,
as Aust notes, with “existing counter-terrorism conventions.”588 Such treaties use the phrase
“any person” to cover officials acting on behalf of a government, including the International
585 ICSFT, art. 2(1).
586 Ibid. art. 2(5).
587 Anthony Aust, Counter-Terrorism—A New Approach: The International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 5 Max Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 285, 294 (2001) (Annex 485);
see also Lehto, at 17 (“A textual analysis suggests that the UN anti-terrorist conventions and protocols
apply to any natural persons with no distinction between representatives and agents of a state, on the
one hand, and private individuals, on the other.”) (Annex 490).
588 Aust, at 294 (Annex 485).
166
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,589 the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 590 and the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.591 And like all of these treaties, the
ICSFT uses the phrase “any person” without qualification.
271. It is thus an offense under ICSFT Article 2(1) for Russian officials, as well as
private individuals and legal entities, to provide funds with the intention or knowledge that
they are to be used, in full or in part, to carry out covered acts of terrorism, and under Article
2(5) for Russian officials to “organize[] or direct[]” such acts. The previous Chapter
established that Russia’s proxies in Ukraine committed numerous, deadly covered acts of
terrorism. This Chapter shows that Russian officials and private actors alike knowingly
funded these acts of terrorism, committing an array of offences under Article 2 of the ICSFT.
Numerous Russian Officials and Private Actors Have Provided Funds to
Groups Engaged in Terrorism in Ukraine
272. Article 1 of the ISCFT defines “funds” broadly to mean:
[A]ssets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable
or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or
instruments in any form, including electronic or digital,
evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not
limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques,
589 Ben Saul, International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, UNITED NATIONS
AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 3 (2014) (“It remains an offence for ‘any’ person to
commit hostage-taking under article 1 of the Convention and there is no exception for any actor (State
or non-State) . . .”) (Annex 493).
590 The drafters “expressed support for the basic principle” that the Convention would “apply to a
person who commits an offence acting on behalf of a Government,” and considered this accomplished
by the text that “clearly referred to ‘any person’ without qualification.” International Maritime
Organization, Report of the Ad Hoc Preparatory Committee on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2nd Session, 18–22 May 1987, IMO Doc. PCUA 2/5, paras.
65–66 (Annex 361).
591 ICSTB Article 19 excludes “the activities undertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise of
their official duties” — an exclusion that would have been entirely unnecessary if State officials were
not otherwise covered by the phrase “any person.” ICSTB, arts. 2, 19.
167
money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of
credit.592
273. The ordinary meaning of “assets of every kind” covers all forms of property,
whether monetary instruments or tangible items, such as weapons. The drafters of the
ICSFT drew from the broad definition of “property” in the Narcotics Convention, which like
“funds” in the ICSFT is defined to mean “assets of every kind.”593 Aust explains that the term
“funds” was “drawn deliberately wide.”594 Similarly, Roberto Lavalle, Minister-Counsellor of
the Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the United Nations and a member of the Sixth
Committee when it considered the draft text of the ICSFT in 1999,has observed that the
definition of funds includes “animals, buildings or vehicles,” and “virtually anything under
the sun,” such that the treaty covers all “material assistance” to those who commit
terrorism.595 The travaux préparatoires confirm that the ICSFT’s definition of “funds” “was
intended to refer to all property.”596
274. As elaborated in Chapter 2, from the spring of 2014 onward, Russian state
officials, as well as private actors and legal entities under Russia’s jurisdiction, supplied
illegal armed groups in Ukraine with various types of funds, including weapons and money,
592 ICSFT, art. 1(1).
593 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances art. 1(q), 20
December 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S 95; see Annex III, Report of the Working Group on Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism, 54th Session, U.N. Doc. No. A/C.6/54/L.2, at 59 (26 October
1999) (“A preference was also expressed for the formulation contained in document
A/A.252/1999/WP.60, as well as for the definition of ‘property’ contained in article 1, paragraph (q),
of the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances.”) (Annex 277).
594 Anthony Aust, Counter-Terrorism—A New Approach: The International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 5 Max Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 285, 287 (2001) (Annex 485).
595 Roberto Lavalle, The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
60 ZaöRV 491, 496‒97 (2000) (Annex 484).
596 Annex III, Report of the Working Group on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 54th
Session, U.N. Doc. No. A/C.6/54/L.2, at 58 (26 October 1999) (Annex 277).
168
that (among other consequences) enhanced these groups’ ability to commit acts of terrorism.
The sheer scope of these groups’ arsenals is evidence of Russian support, as is these groups’
possession of weapons that could only have come from Russia. Indeed, members of the DPR
and similar groups have admitted that they are supplied by Russia; Ukrainian authorities
and others witnessed these weapons transfers; and the weapons themselves often bore
distinctive Russian markings, despite attempts to obscure them. Confirming all of this
evidence, U.N. monitors with the OHCHR have reported on the massive inflow of weapons
across the Russian border into Ukraine.
275. This massive supply of funds could not have occurred without the
participation, organization, and direction of high-ranking Russian officials. For example,
Russian Minister of Defence Sergey Shoigu is responsible for the armaments of the Russian
Armed Forces;597 weapons belonging to the Russian military could not have been
systematically distributed to illegal armed groups in Ukraine without his participation,
organization, and direction. Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Russian Federation, and Igor Sergun, Director of the Main Intelligence
Directorate (“GRU”), likewise organized and participated in the supply of funds to Russia’s
proxies through the armed forces and military intelligence agents; in fact both were
sanctioned by the European Union for their actions concerning eastern Ukraine.598
276. Many other Russian officials participated in specific weapons and money
transfers, including:
597 Powers of the Russian Minister of Defense, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (19
January 2011) (Annex 439).
598 Official Journal of the European Union, Council Implementing Decision 2014/238/CFSP (28 April
2014) (Annex 355).
169
• Members of the 53rd Brigade of the Russian Armed Forces delivered the Buk
TELAR that was used to destroy Flight MH17.599
• Major-General Stepan Yaroshchuk, the Commander-In-Chief of the Rocket
Forces and Artillery of the Russian Armed Forces Southern Military District
in Rostov oblast, together with individuals under his command, was
responsible for Grad and Smerch systems being transferred to Ukraine,
including those used against Volnovakha, Mariupol, Kramatorsk, and
Avdiivka. One Grad system recovered in Ukraine had the markings of a
brigade of the Southern Military District, and thus was under Major-General
Yaroschuk’s command.600 There is also direct evidence of Major-General
Yaroschuk’s personal participation in the operation to supply Grad systems
for the attack on Mariupol.601
• Various military intelligence operatives supplied explosives and weapons to
the perpetrators of bombings in Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Odesa. Russian
intelligence officers provided, for example, the anti-personnel mine used
against the Kharkiv unity march, and the SPM limpet mine used against the
Stena Rock Club.602 Eduard Dobrodeev, a GRU officer, financed the
attempted assassination of Anton Geraschenko.603
• Vice Chairman of the Russian State Duma, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, openly
donated military equipment and money to the LPR.604
• Russian soldiers, including Dorzhi Batomunkuev and Vladimir Starkov,
admitted to smuggling weapons and ammunition into Ukrainian territory for
delivery to the DPR.605
277. At the same time, many private Russian nationals and legal persons were
openly providing funds to the illegal armed groups in Ukraine, including:
• Konstantin Malofeyev, a prominent billionaire and close Putin associate,
“funds separatist activities in eastern Ukraine and is closely linked with
Aleksandr Borodai, Igor Girkin (a.k.a. Igor Strelkov), and the so-called
599 See supra Chapter 2, Section B.
600 See supra Chapter 2, Section C.
601 Ibid.
602 See supra Chapter 2, Section D.
603 See supra Chapter 1, Section D(2).
604 See supra Chapter 2, Section F.
605 See supra Chapter 2, Section E.
170
Donetsk People’s Republic.”606 The U.S. Treasury Department determined
that he “materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or
technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of the so-called
Donetsk People’s Republic.”607 Malofeyev is accordingly sanctioned by the
United States, the European Union, Switzerland, and Australia, among
others.608
• Alexander Zhuchkovsky is a major fundraiser for the DPR and LPR, publicly
boasting about raising millions of rubles and purchasing weapons.609
• Sberbank, a large financial institution that is majority state-owned, has used
its infrastructure to facilitate billions of rubles’ worth of transfers to the DPR
and LPR.610
• Various non-governmental organizations, including the “Coordination Center
for Assistance to Novorossia,” the “Sverdlosk Oblast Fund for Special Forces
Veterans,” Girkin’s “New Russia Movement,” and the “Novorossia
Humanintarian Battalion” have delivered millions of rubles as well as
weapons and ammunition to the DPR and LPR.611
278. In addition to all of these individuals and entities who have been identified, by
name or position, many others have been concealed by the Russian Federation, in its
determination not to cooperate in the prevention and punishment of terrorism financing
offences. But identified or concealed, it is beyond doubt that innumerable Russian persons,
acting on behalf of the Russian government, with its tacit blessing, and otherwise, provided
“funds” within the meaning of the Convention to illegal groups in Ukraine.
606 Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Targets Additional Ukrainian Separatists
and Russian Individuals and Entities (19 December 2014) (Annex 478).
607 Ibid.
608 Ibid.; Press Release, Council of the European Union, List of Persons and Entities Under EU
Restrictive Measures Over the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine (14 September 2017), p. 37 (Annex 357);
Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, SECO Bilateral Economic Relations Sanctions, Programs
(Situation in Ukraine: Ordinance of 27 August 2014), Individual Malofeev Konstantin Valerevich (23
May 2018) (Annex 481); Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ukraine
Sanctions: Review of Australia’s Autonomous Sanctions Imposed on 84 Individuals and Entities in
Relation to Ukraine (2 September 2017) (Annex 479).
609 Alexander Zhuchkovsky, On the Advisability of Purchasing Armored Vehicles, StrelkovInfo (4
September 2014) (Annex 628); Social Media Page (VKontakte) of Oleksandr Zhukovsky (post of 15
March 2015) (Annex 635).
610 See supra, Chapter 2, Section F.
611 See ibid.
171
The Financiers Knew That the Funds They Provided Were to Be Used, in
Full or in Part, for Carrying Out Acts Covered by ICSFT Articles 2(1)(a)
and (b)
279. Since early in the conflict, it was apparent that these illegal armed groups in
Ukraine had committed, and were willing to continue to commit, terrorist acts. Despite the
DPR and LPR’s early and open embrace of terrorism, followed by a series of significant acts
of terrorism, Russian state officials repeatedly provided these groups with additional funds.
These facts alone — that Russia’s proxies openly engaged in terrorism and Russia armed
them nonetheless — establish that those persons who supplied funds to these groups
knowingly financed terrorism within the meaning of Article 2(1). And while it not necessary
to prove more, the facts also establish that Russia and its officials knew specific types of
funds were to be used to commit particular terrorist acts.
280. Article 2(1) of the ICSFT provides that, to commit a violation, a financier must
have “knowledge” that the funds provided “are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry
out” a covered act of terrorism.612 This requires knowledge that the financier is providing
funds to groups or individuals known to commit terrorist acts, because doing so necessarily
facilitates the recipient’s ability to engage in further acts of terrorism. This is the only goodfaith
interpretation that advances the ICSFT’s object and purpose of addressing the “urgent
need” to prevent and deter the financing of terrorism.613 If instead Article 2(1) were read to
require knowledge that particular funds provided will be used for particular terrorist acts, it
would be “very difficult if not impossible to establish a precise link between items provided
to terrorists and a particular act or acts of terrorism,” particularly where the recipient also
“carries out activities, lawful or unlawful, other than terrorist acts.”614 The text of Article 2(1)
itself anticipates this scenario by requiring knowledge that the funds are to be used “in full or
in part, in order to carry out” terrorism. So does Article 2(3), which specifies that “it shall
612 ICSFT, art. 2(1).
613 Ibid. pmbl., recital 12.
614 Roberto Lavalle, The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
60 ZaöRV 491, 503 (2000) (Annex 484).
172
not be necessary that the funds were actually used to carry out” an act of terrorism. It is thus
no defense to say that the recipient meant only to support a group’s non-terrorist activity, or
that the funds provided were ultimately used for such activity.
281. Lavalle, in his contemporaneous commentary on the ICSFT, agrees that in
light of the treaty’s “object and purpose,” an offense is established by proof “that the
recipient or recipients, actual or intended, of the ‘funds’ are terrorists, that that person was
aware of this, and that accordingly he or she had to know that the ‘funds’ would probably be
used (or could be used) to commit” a covered act of terrorism.615 Marja Lehto, who led
Finland’s delegation during the treaty negotiations, similarly writes that “[t]he perpetrator in
terrorist financing does not have to be aware of any specific crime being planned or
prepared, and no actual terrorist acts need to be committed as a result of his or her financial
contribution”; all that must be proved is that the financier “is aware of the possibility,
sometimes even the probability, that the funds may be used for the commission of terrorist
acts,” and “willingly took the risk that they would be so used.”616 It therefore “must be
assumed that the financing of a group which has notoriously committed terrorist acts would
meet the requirements of paragraph 1” of Article 2.617
282. Guidance on the ICSFT issued by the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”)
and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (“UNODC”)618 reinforces this
615 Ibid. p. 504.
616 Lehto, pp. 293, 298 (Annex 490).
617 Ibid. p. 289.
618 The U.N. General Assembly mandated the UNODC to strengthen the ability of Member States to
implement the ICSFT.
173
interpretation.619 The FATF instructs that “[t]errorist financing offences should not require
that the funds or other assets . . . be linked to a specific terrorist act(s).”620 UNODC’s
legislative guidance likewise explains that the ICSFT covers the financier who provides funds
to an organization that is known to engage in terrorist activities, even if that organization
also engages in humanitarian activities that the financier wishes to support.621 As UNODC
observes, “the offence implementing the Convention must also punish provision or collection
of funds with the knowledge and willing acceptance of the possibility that they may be used
for terrorist acts.”622
283. States Parties also have interpreted the knowledge requirement of Article 2 as
satisfied where the financier provides funds to groups known to commit acts of terrorism.
The Supreme Court of Denmark held that it was sufficient, for purposes of a terrorism
financing offense, to establish that individuals provided money to the FARC, knowing that
the FARC generally committed terrorist acts.623 U.S. courts have held that “[a]nyone who
knowingly contributes [even] to the nonviolent wing of an organization that he knows to
engage in terrorism is knowingly contributing to the organization’s terrorist activities.”624
619 See, e.g., U.N. G.A. Res. 57/173, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/173, Strengthening the United Nations
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme, in Particular its Technical Cooperation
Capacity, para. 2 (21 January 2003) (Annex 282).
620 FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of
Terrorism & Proliferation: The FAFT Recommendations, p. 35 (2012) (Annex 359).
621 UNODC, Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime Against Terrorism 30‒31 (2008)
(Annex 285).
622 Ibid. (emphasis added).
623 “Fighters and Lovers Case,” Case 399/2008 (Sup. Ct., Den., 25 March 2009) (Annex 476).
624 Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 698 (7th Cir. 2008) (Annex 474). The
statute interpreted in Boim, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, tracks the language of Article 2(1) of the ICSFT,
criminalizing the provision of material support “knowing or intending that they are to be used” for
covered acts of terrorism. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2009) (Annex 475).
174
The French Cour de Cassation considers it sufficient to demonstrate that the financier
knowingly contributed to an organization classified as terrorist.625 And Canadian courts
consider that “when a group has been identified as a terrorist entity,” it is “difficult to argue
that a financier was unaware that the amounts he has allocated to this group would be used,
in full or in part to carry out terrorist actions.”626
284. The travaux préparatoires confirm this approach. A working document
prepared by France explained that the Convention is aimed at financiers “who are aware of
the use of the funds,” and those “who are aware of the terrorist nature of the aims and
objectives of the whole or part of the association which they support.”627 According to Lehto,
negotiators repeatedly agreed that the required knowledge under Article 2 would be met by
“the funding of an organisation that carries out multiple activities of a political and social as
625 French Cour de cassation, Judgement of May 21st 2014, No. 13-83758: (“Attendu qu'en l'état de ces
motifs reproduits partiellement aux moyens, qui établissent que l'association Centre culturel kurde
Ahmet Kaya a apporté, en connaissance de cause, par ses organes ou ses représentants, en l'espèce
par les dirigeants de fait identifiés ci-dessus, ayant agi pour son compte, un soutien logistique et
financier effectif à une organisation classée comme terroriste, la cour d'appel a caractérisé en tous
leurs éléments les infractions dont elle l'a déclarée coupable.”) (emphasis added) (Annex 477); see
also French Cour de cassation, Judgement of April 12th, 2005, No. 04-84264 (Annex 472); Tribunal
correctionel de Paris, 28 September 2017 (Annex 480). France’s implementing statute of the ICSFT,
Article 421-2-2 of the Code pénal, closely tracks the Convention’s knowledge requirement (“en sachant
qu'ils sont destinés à être utilisés, en tout ou partie, en vue de commettre l'un quelconque des actes de
terrorisme prévus au présent chapitre. . .”).
626 See Bertrand Perrin, “L’incrimination du financement du terrorisme en droits canadien et suisse,”
42 Revue générale de droit 1, p. 237 (“Cependant, lorsqu'un groupe a été inscrit comme entité
terroriste, il est plus difficile pour un prévenu d'arguer qu'il ignorait que les montants qu'il lui a
alloués seraient utilisés, partiellement ou totalement, en faveur du terrorisme.”) (Annex 492).
627 France, Working Document: Why an International Convention Against the Financing of
Terrorism?, later reproduced as U.N. Doc. A/AC.252/L.7/Add.1, (March 11, 1999), para. 5 (Annex
275).
175
well as military nature, and where it may not be possible for the financier to make a
distinction between the different possible end uses.”628
285. By the spring and summer of 2014, the whole world was aware of the terrorist
nature of the aims and activities of the DPR and LPR. These groups were openly seeking to
compel the Ukrainian government to grant them political autonomy, which would have
required changes to Ukraine’s constitutional order. In service of that objective, they were
engaged in a pattern of violence against civilians, targeting political opponents with the
unmistakable purpose of intimidation. In April 2014, for example, U.N. monitors reported
on the murder of Volodymyr Rybak, and leading DPR militant Bezler was publicly linked to
that crime.629 In June 2014, U.N. monitors publicly reported that the DPR and related
groups were committing “an increasing number of acts and intimidation and violence . . .
targeting ‘ordinary’ people who support Ukrainian unity.”630 And in early July 2014 —
before members of the 53rd RAF Brigade delivered a Buk to Ukraine — the same U.N.
monitors condemned the DPR and LPR’s “reign of intimidation and terror,”631 and High
Commissioner Pillay warned of a DPR leader’s admitted intention to “immerse [children] in
628 Lehto, p. 293 (Annex 490). Reflecting this agreement, the delegates rejected several proposed
amendments to Article 1 that would have exempted the provision of property “also used for
humanitarian purposes by the beneficiary person or organization” or even property meant “exclusively
to be used for humanitarian purposes.” U.N.G.A. Ad Hoc Comm. established by G.A. Res. 51/210 of 17
Dec. 1996, Rep. on its 3d session, 15‒16 March 1999, U.N. Doc. A/54/37 (5 May 1999), Annex III,
para. 1, Annex VI, para. 9 (Annex 276). In response to the first amendment, delegates “objected to its
inclusion on the grounds that it would unnecessarily limit the scope of the convention and diminish its
effectiveness.” Ibid. Annex IV, para. 9.
629 See supra Chapter 1, Section A.
630 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 June 2014), para. 207 (Annex 293).
631 OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 July 2014), para. 26 (Annex 296).
176
horror.”632 OHCHR would later expressly warn that the transfer of weapons into Donbas
created a “substantial risk that they will be used in” indiscriminate attacks on civilians.633
286. At the same time, Russia and its officials had inside knowledge of the DPR’s
and LPR’s strategies and plans, including the importance of terrorism to their agenda. Key
leaders of the DPR and LPR in 2014 into early 2015 had connections to the Russian
government.634 Russian nationals who have served in the Russian military also have
embedded within or advised the DPR and LPR, providing these groups with operational
advice and support, and serving as an additional conduit of information to the Russian
government.635 In light of the contemporaneous reporting about the DPR and LPR’s
activities, bolstered by Russia’s close ties to those groups, the Russian Federation cannot
credibly deny that its officials knew of these groups’ pattern of terrorist acts against civilians.
287. Yet despite knowing these organizations’ callous approach to civilian life,
Russian military officials provided the DPR with a Buk TELAR, knowing that the airspace
above eastern Ukraine was still open and heavily trafficked by civilian aircraft.636 In doing
so, Russia and its officials knew that their proxies’ indifference to human life would continue.
In fact, the Buk had been requested by Igor Girkin himself — who by that time was already
targeting civilians in Donbas and known for his ruthless tactics.637 Even a responsible
fighting force, which the illegal armed groups operating in Ukraine plainly were not, could
not have safely operated a Buk TELAR in civilian skies. As Dr. Skorik explains, coordination
632 OHCHR, Intensified Fighting Putting at Risk Lives of People in Donetsk and Luhansk — Pillay (4
July 2014) (Annex 295).
633 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine: 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016, p. 10, para. 24 (Annex 314).
634 See supra, Chapter 3, Section A(1); see also Anton Zverev, Ex-Rebel Leaders Detail Role Played by
Putin Aide in East Ukraine, REUTERS (11 May 2017) (“Five sources, including one close to the
presidential administration and another who worked with Surkov in the Kremlin, said Surkov has
regular meetings with separatist leaders, both in the breakaway territory and in Russia.”) (Annex 595).
635 See supra, Introduction; Yanovskyi Statement, paras. 41-46 (Annex 5); Zyuzia Statement, paras.
32-34 (Annex 6).
636 See supra, Chapter 1, Section B; Chapter 2, Section B.
637 See supra, Chapter 1, Section A.
177
with a combat control center is vital in such a situation, because the TELAR’s “technical
capabilities . . . do not make it possible to distinguish a civilian aircraft from a military one,”
and a TELAR operator acting under intense time pressure would not be able to make
sophisticated judgments about the air situation.
288. The 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade undoubtedly understands how a Buk
missile system works, and the grave danger of deploying a TELAR against open skies. Yet
members of the brigade supplied the TELAR without a combat control center, which could
have at least mitigated the extreme risk. In short, the Russian officials who provided the Buk
TELAR knew that it could not be used in a manner distinguishing civilian from military
targets, and even declined to supply additional equipment that would have lessened the
danger to civil aviation.
289. The Russian Federation’s actions concerning its own airspace further confirm
its knowledge of the grave risk that its proxies would shoot down a civilian plane. A day
before the attack, as Russian military officials were preparing to send the Buk into Ukraine,
Russian aviation authorities restricted access to parts of Russian airspace bordering Donbas
up to 53,000 feet (higher than existing Ukrainian restrictions), effectively closing civilian
airspace.638 By closing Russia’s own airspace to civilians at the same moment the Russian
military was providing a Buk to the DPR, Russian officials manifested their own guilty
knowledge of the dangers of operating a Buk in civilian-trafficked skies.
290. In light of all of these circumstances, particularly when viewed against the
backdrop of the DPR’s established track record of targeting civilians for violence, Russia and
the officials acting on its behalf knew that the Buk would be used, in full or in part, to
commit violations of the Montreal Convention (i.e., intentional and unlawful destruction of
an aircraft in service).
291. If U.N. reporting on a “reign of terror” against civilians were somehow not
enough, the DPR’s approach to civilian life was surely common knowledge in the aftermath
638 DSB Report MH17 Crash, p. 180 (Annex 38).
178
of the downing of Flight MH17. Yet Russia hindered international efforts to hold the
perpetrators of the shoot-down of Flight MH17 accountable, all the while continuing to
support and arm those perpetrators. It did so in part through its officials’ provision of
numerous multiple-launch rocket systems into Ukraine, systems that can cause tremendous
civilian harm — particularly in the hands of those with a track record of indifference to
civilian life. The Volnovakha attack, using a Grad system against a busy civilian checkpoint
with no apparent military value, fit this pattern.639 Less than two weeks later, members of
the Russian military supplied the same type of weapon, this time to be deployed against the
population of Mariupol.640 Russian military officials also delivered to illegal armed groups in
Ukraine an advanced Smerch system, resulting in the deadly attack on Kramatorsk.
292. Russian military officials advised the DPR as it committed these Article
2(1)(b) offenses in January and February 2015.641 The involvement of these Russian military
advisors adds to the evidence that high-level Russian officials knew of the terroristic
methods the DPR would employ, and thus knew that funds supplied to DPR were to be used
in part to commit terrorist acts.
293. The Russian intelligence operatives that provided explosives to terrorists in
Kharkiv and elsewhere in Ukraine likewise knew they were to be used to commit terrorist
acts. As documented in Chapter 2, Section D, Russian military intelligence officers follow a
consistent pattern in providing explosives and money for use in bombing attacks in
Ukrainian cities. The explosives that these Russian agents provided — SPM limpet, antitank,
and anti-personnel mines — are designed to cause large-scale destruction, and have no
639 See supra, Chapter 1, Section C(1).
640 See supra, Chapter 2, Section D.
641 See supra, Chapter 1, Section C.
179
legitimate purpose in the heart of a city like Kharkiv. One Russian intelligence officer agreed
to supply 10,000 USD to a bomber even after being told of the plan to attack the Kharkiv
unity march.642 Another Russian intelligence officer arranged the financing of an
assassination attempt on an outspoken member of Ukraine’s parliament.643
294. In sum, the Russian persons who financed terrorism in Ukraine — including
Russian officials — acted with knowledge within the meaning of Article 2(1).
642 See supra, Chapter 2, Section D.
643 Ibid.
180
Chapter 6. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION BEARS STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
VIOLATIONS OF THE ICSFT
295. The inescapable conclusion is that Russia is violating its obligations under the
ICSFT. Chapter 4 established that Russia’s proxies have committed numerous acts of
terrorism in Ukraine within the meaning of Article 2(1)(a) and 2(1)(b) of the ICSFT. Chapter
5 explained how Russian officials’ and Russian citizens’ provision of funds to these groups
constituted knowing financing of terrorism within the meaning of Article 2(1). This Chapter
demonstrates the ways in which this campaign of terrorism financing has led to numerous
violations of the ICSFT, for which the Russian Federation is responsible.
The Russian Federation Is in Breach of Article 18
296. Article 18 of the ICSFT requires States to “cooperate in the prevention of the
[terrorism financing] offenses set forth in article 2.” That obligation includes “taking all
practicable measures . . . to prevent and counter preparations in their respective territories
for the commission of those offenses within or outside their territories.”644
297. This case concerns acts of terrorism financing both by private actors and
public officials. Russia has taken the position that it only has a duty to prevent acts of
terrorism financing “committed by private actors.”645 That ignores the words of the treaty.
The Article 18 duty to prevent relates to “the offences set forth in article 2.”646 The offenses
set forth in Article 2, in turn, may be committed by “any person”647 — not “private actors”
only, as explained above.
644 ICSFT, art. 18(1).
645 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v.
Russian Federation), Verbatim Record (7 March 2017), p. 36 (Zimmermann).
646 ICSFT, art. 18(1).
647 Ibid. art. 2(1).
181
298. Russia thus has a clear obligation to prevent acts of terrorism financing from
its territory by “any person,” whether a private Russian national or a state official, and
whether or not acting pursuant to Russian government policy. Russia has manifestly failed
both these facets of that obligation. There are at least four “practicable measures” Russia
could have taken, but did not take, to prevent the commission of Article 2 terrorism
financing offenses by any person.
The Russian Federation Has Failed to Take the Practicable Measure of
Preventing State Officials from Financing Terrorism
299. When a State allows or encourages its own officials to finance terrorism, it
necessarily fails to take all “practicable measures” to prevent the financing of terrorism. This
is clear from the ordinary meaning of Articles 2 and 18, interpreted in good faith and in light
of their context and object and purpose.648
300. As explained above, an Article 2 terrorism financing offence may be
committed by “any person,” including a person that acts on behalf of a State’s government.
Article 18 then obliges States to “cooperate in the prevention of the offenses set forth in
Article 2 by taking all practicable measures.”649 Reading Articles 2 and 18 together, Russia
must take all practicable measures to prevent its own officials from committing Article 2
offenses. When a State instead permits terrorism financing from its territory, including acts
of terrorism financing committed by state officials, it fails in that obligation. No measure
could be more practicable than a State directing officials under its control not to finance
terrorism. This straightforward application of Articles 2 and 18 reflects the principle that
“[w]here crimes against international law are committed by state officials, it will often be the
648 VCLT, art. 31(1).
649 ICSFT, art. 18(1) (emphasis added).
182
case that the State itself is responsible for the acts in question or for failure to prevent or
punish them.”650
301. This interpretion effectuates the object and purpose of the Convention, as
reflected in its preamble. The ICSFT recognizes that “the financing of terrorism is a matter
of grave concern to the international community as a whole,” and has as its ambition a
“comprehensive legal framework” to address “the prevention, repression and elimination of
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.”651 The ICSFT’s comprehensive framework is
premised on the understanding that “the number and seriousness of acts of international
terrorism” “depend on the financing that terrorists may obtain.”652 It is plain that many acts
of terrorism “depend” on State financing. Moreover, the preamble recalls the U.N.
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, which recognizes that the
problem of international terrorism “include[s] those [acts] in which States are directly or
indirectly involved.”653 And the preamble to the ICSFT further recalls General Assembly
650 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, Draft Articles
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 53rd. Sess., U.N.
Doc. No. A/56/10 (23 April–1 June, 2 July–10 August 2001), art. 58 & commentary, pp. 142–143,
para. 3, reproduced in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, vol. II(2) (Annex 279).
As another example, the Convention Against Torture requires States to “take effective . . . measures to
prevent acts of torture.” Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85. It is
well-established that on the basis of this obligation, “States bear international responsibility” when
public officials commit acts of torture. Committee Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, para. 15
(Annex 286).
651 ICSFT, pmbl., recitals 5 & 9.
652 Ibid., recital 10.
653 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 49/60, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60, Declaration on Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism (9 December 1994) (Annex 273).
183
Resolution 51/210,654 which similarly calls on “States to refrain from financing,
encouraging, providing training for or otherwise supporting terrorist activities.”655
302. In light of its object and purpose, the Convention would be left with an
unacceptable lacuna if interpreted to leave financing of terrorism by State actors untouched.
That Article 18 does not leave this major gap is further supported by context. Article 20 of
the Convention provides:
The States Parties shall carry out their obligations under this
Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of
sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.656
303. Thus, in “carrying out their obligations” to cooperate in the prevention of
Article 2 offenses, Russia must act consistent with the principles of sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and non-intervention. Contributing to the funding of terrorist acts in the territory
of another State is not consistent with these principles.
304. This interpretation is further consistent with “relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”657 In 2005, the Security
Council unanimously (and with Russia’s support) expressed concern at the “evidence
pointing at the involvement of . . . Syrian officials in” the terrorist bombing of Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.658 In light of this, the Security Council “determine[d] that the
involvement of any State in this terrorist act would constitute a serious violation by that
State of its obligations to work to prevent and refrain from supporting terrorism, in
654 ICSFT pmbl., recital 6.
655 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 51/210, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210, Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism (17 December 1999) (emphasis added) (Annex 278).
656 ICSFT, art. 20.
657 VCLT, art. 31(3)(c).
658 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1636, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1636 (31 October 2005) (Annex 283).
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accordance with [Resolutions 1373 and 1566].”659 The Council, including Russia, thus
recognized that where a State’s officials are implicated in a terrorist act, that State has failed
in its duty to prevent support for terrorism.
305. Finally, interpreting Article 18 of the ICSFT to require a State to prevent its
officials from committing Article 2 terrorism financing offenses is the only good faith reading
of the Convention. It is simply not in good faith for the Russian Federation to commit to
preventing the financing of terrorism by any person, yet insist on its own prerogative to
finance terrorism – that is, to direct, encourage, or allow state officials to supply funds to
groups that are known to engage in terrorist violence against civilians.
306. This conclusion is further supported by this Court’s interpretation of a
different treaty in the Bosnia Genocide case. The core obligation on states under the
Genocide Convention is “to prevent and to punish” genocide.660 In Bosnia Genocide, this
Court held that the obligation to prevent necessarily prohibits states from committing
genocide themselves, even though “such an obligation is not expressly imposed by the actual
terms of the [Genocide] Convention.”661 As the Court observed:
It would be paradoxical if States were thus under an
obligation to prevent, so far as within their power,
commission of genocide by persons over whom they have a
certain influence, but were not forbidden to commit such
acts through their own organs, or persons over whom they
659 Ibid. (emphasis added). See also U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373
(28 September 2001) (deciding that “all States shall” “[p]revent and suppress the financing of terrorist
acts,” and “[p]revent those who finance . . . terrorist acts from using their respective territories for
those purposes against other States or their citizens”) (Annex 280).
660 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1, 9 Dec. 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (“The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or
in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.”).
661 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, I.C.J. Reports
2007, p. 113, para. 166 [hereinafter Bosnia Genocide].
185
have such firm control that their conduct is attributable to
the State concerned under international law. In short, the
obligation to prevent genocide necessarily implies the
prohibition of the commission of genocide.662
307. It would be an equally paradoxical reading of the ICSFT if States were
obligated to prevent acts of financing terrorism by “any person,” yet “were not forbidden to
commit such acts through their own organs, or persons over whom they have [control].”
308. The Russian Federation has flagrantly violated its obligation to take all
practicable measures to prevent the financing of terrorism by “any person,” including state
officials, as required by Article 18. Chapters 1 and 4 of this Memorial established that
Russia’s proxies in Ukraine engaged in a consistent pattern of terrorism against civilians
within the meaning of the ICSFT. Chapters 2 and 5 established that persons acting on behalf
of the Russian government provided funds to groups known to engage in terrorism against
civilians, and who in fact used that support to engage in further acts of terrorism within the
meaning of the Convention. These acts of terrorism financing violated Article 2(1) of the
ICSFT, and the organization and direction of these acts violated Article 2(5). By failing to
prevent — and instead fostering —these Article 2 offences by state officials, the Russian
Federation violated Article 18.
The Russian Federation Has Failed to Take the Practicable Measure of
Not Encouraging Third Parties to Finance Terrorism
309. Another practicable measure a State can take, and thus under Article 18 must
take, is discouraging others to commit Article 2 terrorism financing offenses. It is not
conceivable that, having bound itself to take all practicable measures to prevent acts of
terrorism financing, a State may nonetheless encourage third parties to finance terrorism.
662 Ibid.
186
310. Directly financing terrorism is not compatible with this obligation not to
encourage. In Russia’s view of the Convention, it is obliged only to prevent “the financing of
terrorist acts committed by private actors,”663 which it may do while also financing terrorist
acts itself. But it is impossible to do both: a State that directly finances terrorism cannot
credibly discourage, and thus “prevent,” its nationals from doing the same. The unequivocal
message of engaging in conduct is that it is in fact encouraged.
311. Russia’s financing of terrorism in Ukraine thus leads to an Article 18 violation
in a further respect. A simple and practicable measure a State can take to prevent Article 2
terrorism financing offenses is to discourage its nationals from perpetrating such offenses —
and not encourage those offenses by its own participation in terrorism financing.
The Russian Federation Has Failed to Take the Practicable Measure of
Policing its Border with Ukraine to Stop the Financing of Terrorism
312. It was also well within the Russian Federation’s power to police its border
with Ukraine to stop the flow of funds — from “any person,” including public officials and
private actors — that enabled terrorist acts in eastern Ukraine. Russia has not taken this
entirely practicable measure, either.
313. As detailed in Chapter 2, from the spring of 2014 onward, Russian officials
and other Russian nationals have supplied the DPR, LPR, Kharkiv Partisans, and other
groups with weapons, money, and training resources that, among other consequences,
enhanced these groups’ ability to commit acts of terrorism on a larger scale.
314. But the Russian Federation has failed to take any steps to prevent the transfer
of these funds, including weapons, into Ukrainian territory. As detailed in Chapter 3,
Ukraine has repeatedly informed Russia about impending transfers of funds from Russian to
Ukrainian territory. Russia ignored these continuous warnings and took no steps to stop the
flow of funds, including weapons. Indeed, Russia’s Border Service informed Ukraine’s
663 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v.
Russian Federation), Verbatim Record (7 March 2017), p.36 (Zimmermann).
187
Border Service that it would need an order from those at higher levels if it was to actively
police its border to prevent weapons and other funds from crossing the border into Ukraine.
That order never came.
315. States can and must police their own borders. Russia can practicably do so in
a manner that ensures that funds — including large pieces of heavy weaponry — do not leave
its territory and cross into the territory of a neighboring State. Specifically, in the case of the
Ukraine-Russia border, Russia is capable of monitoring its border, which it controls in full.
By failing to take the practicable measure of policing its border with Ukraine to stop acts of
terrorism financing by any person, Russia violates Article 18.
The Russian Federation Has Failed to Take Practicable Measures to
Stop the Open Fundraising on its Territory in Support of the DPR and
LPR
316. Another practicable measure that the Russian Federation could have taken to
prevent the financing of terrorism in its territory is to monitor banking activity and other
open fundraising activities undertaken by Russian nationals or non-governmental
organizations for the benefit of the DPR, LPR, or other illegal groups engaged in terrorism in
Ukraine. Russia could have taken steps to shut down these networks. To facilitate law
enforcement efforts against such financing, the Russian Federation could have designated
the DPR and LPR on its list of known extremist and terrorist groups maintained by the
Federal Financial Monitoring Service (“Rosfinmonitoring”). Russia took none of these
measures, and as a result dozens of Russian non-governmental organizations and individuals
have openly supplied weapons and raised billions of rubles for the DPR, LPR, and other
extremist groups in eastern Ukraine, as detailed in Chapter 2, Part F.
317. In other contexts, when the Russian government identifies a group known to
engage in terrorism, Rosfinmonitoring takes affirmative steps to “monitor legal entities and
individuals’ compliance with Russia’s . . . terrorist financing legislation, and prosecut[e]
188
violators.”664 Rosfinmonitoring then “suspend[s] transactions with monetary funds or other
assets” of those terrorist groups, effectively freezing all assets of those groups or assets
destined for those groups.665 As made clear by the director of Rosfinmonitoring, Yuri A.
Chikhanchin, it is not difficult for Russia to take these measures, and it has done so more
than 3,500 times.666
318. Russia did not, however, take what it admits by its conduct is a practicable
measure to prevent the financing of terrorism: “monitor legal entities’ and individuals’”
transactions with the DPR or LPR. As discussed in Chapter 3, Ukraine identified numerous
groups actively engaged in fundraising for the DPR and LPR by simply combing the
Internet.667 These unlawful activities are in plain sight. The New York Times identified
others, also using publicly-available sources.668 These groups purport to have raised,
collectively, billions of rubles for the DPR and LPR. Ukraine has further provided evidence
that a Russian non-profit organization, “Fund of Support for International Humanitarian
Projects,” has directly deposited billions more rubles into the “state-run” accounts for the
LPR — something Rosfinmonitoring surely should have been able identify if it had been
looking.669 Because Russia did not take simple, practicable measures to monitor and block
664 Rosfinmonitoring Functions, FEDERAL FINANCIAL MONITORING SERVICE (19 September 2017)
(Annex 436).
665 Ibid.
666 ROSFINMONITORING ACTIVITY PUBLIC REPORT (2016), pp. 35–36 (Annex 437); see also Jo Becker &
Steven Lee Myers, Russian Groups Crowdfund the Wars in Ukraine, N.Y. Times (11 June 2015)
(Annex 577).
667 See supra, Chapter 2, Section F.
668 Jo Becker & Steven Lee Myers, Russian Groups Crowdfund the Wars in Ukraine, N.Y. Times (11
June 2015) (Annex 577).
669 See supra, Chapter 2, Section F.
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assets of or destined for the DPR and LPR, those groups received financing, enhancing their
ability to engage in further acts of terrorism.
The Russian Federation Is in Breach of Article 8
319. Articles 8(1) and (2) of the ICSFT provide that:
1. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures, in
accordance with its domestic legal principles, for the
identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds
used or allocated for the purpose of committing the offences
set forth in article 2 as well as the proceeds derived from such
offences, for purposes of possible forfeiture.
2. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures, in
accordance with its domestic legal principles, for the forfeiture
of funds used or allocated for the purpose of committing the
offences set forth in article 2 and the proceeds derived from
such offences.670
320. The obligation to detect, identify, freeze, seize, and ultimately forfeit funds
allocated for use in the financing of terrorism is mandatory — “shall,” not “may.” And while
the ultimate forfeiture of private property may require more extensive procedures, the
freezing of assets was intended to be prompt. As the U.N. Counter-Terrorism Committee
concluded, on consideration of both the ICSFT and related Security Council resolutions,
“where the authorities of a country have evidence supporting a reasonable suspicion that a
person or group . . . is actually engaged in activities in support of terrorism,” “there is no time
to be lost” and the relevant assets must be frozen.671 Similarly, guidance from the FATF
states that there should be “measures to freeze without delay funds or other assets of
670 ICSFT, arts. 8(1) & (2).
671 Letter from J.W. Wainwright, Expert Adviser, to the Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism
Committee, para. 7 (12 November 2002), endorsed by the Counter-Terrorism Committee on 24
November 2002 (Annex 281). The panel of experts viewed language in Security Council Resolution
1373 expressly alluding to the ICSFT as especially relevant to the interpretation of paragraph 1 of
Article 8 of the ICSFT regarding the freezing of assets. Ibid. para. 4.
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terrorists, those who finance terrorism or terrorist organisations in accordance with . . . the
prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts” “based on reasonable grounds,
or a reasonable basis, to suspect or believe that such funds or other assets could be used to
finance terrorist activity.”672
321. The Russian Federation has entirely defaulted on its obligations under Article
8. It has plainly not attempted in good faith to “identif[y]” and “detect[]” funds used or
allocated for use in acts of terrorism financing. As explained in Chapter 2, Part F,
fundraising for the DPR and LPR was open and prevalent in Russia, including on the
Internet and through the banking system. Any State serious about its commitments under
the ICSFT could have identified and detected this fundraising, but the Russian Federation
made no effort to do so.
322. Likewise, even when the use of funds for terrorism financing was made
apparent to Russia, it did nothing to “freeze” or “seize” those funds. As described in Chapter
3, Ukraine brought numerous instances of terrorism financing to the attention of Russian
authorities. These requests, together with the publicly known facts of the DPR’s and LPR’s
activities, at a minimum raised a reasonable suspicion of terrorism financing that obliged
Russia to freeze the assets concerned. Yet the Russian Federation did nothing, in violation
of Article 8 of the ICSFT.
The Russian Federation Is in Breach of Articles 9 and 10
323. Together, Articles 9 and 10 of the ICSFT require States Parties to investigate,
locate and ensure the presence in its territory of, and then prosecute or extradite as
warranted, all individuals whom it has reason to believe may have committed an offense
under Article 2 of the ICSFT. The text reads:
Article 9
1. Upon receiving information that a person who has
committed or who is alleged to have committed an offence set
672 Financial Action Task Force, Special Recommendation III: Freezing and Confiscating Terrorist
Assets (Text of the Special Recommendation and Interpretative Note) (October 2001, as updated,
adopted, and published February 2012) (emphasis added) (Annex 360).
191
forth in article 2 may be present in its territory, the State Party
concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary under
its domestic law to investigate the facts contained in the
information.
2. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, the
State Party in whose territory the offender or alleged offender
is present shall take the appropriate measures under its
domestic law so as to ensure that person[’]s presence for the
purpose of prosecution or extradition.
. . .
Article 10
1. The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender
is present shall, in cases to which article 7 applies, if it does not
extradite that person, be obliged, without exception
whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in
its territory, to submit the case without undue delay to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through
proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Those
authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in
the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the law of
that State.673
324. The nature of the obligation to investigate in Article 9 is broad and
straightforward: if a State receives “information” that a person who “may” be in its territory
is “alleged to have committed” a terrorism financing offence, the State receiving this
information must investigate. And this investigation must begin “as soon as the suspect is
identified in the territory of the State,” as this Court has held interpreting a comparable
obligation to investigate under the Convention Against Torture.674 Article 10 is a similarly
straightforward aut dedere aut judicare clause.
325. As catalogued in Chapter 3, the Russian Federation received abundant
information showing that alleged perpetrators of terrorism financing were on its territory.
Ukraine asked Russia to investigate more than 50 named individuals for offenses related to
673 ICSFT, arts. 9 & 10.
674 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment of
20 July 2012, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 454, para. 86 [hereinafter Belgium/Senegal]; International Law
Commission, The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare): Final Report of the
International Law Commission (2014), p. 9 (Annex 288).
192
terrorism financing. But far from initiating an investigation “as soon as the suspect is
identified,” Russia delayed at every turn. For example, after being notified in August 2014
that a number of individuals were using Russian entities and State-owned banks to finance
terrorism, Russia waited almost a year to begin to “establish the full personal data” of those
individuals.675 Almost four years after Ukraine’s request, the Russian Federation has
provided no evidence that it took any action to investigate these cases.
326. When Russia has responded to Ukraine’s requests, the results betray a lack of
any good-faith investigation. For example, in purportedly “investigating” terrorism
financing by the Coordination Center for Assistance to Novorossia, Russia claims to have
discovered that the Center “does not have electronic accounts,” and that “military items are
not acquired” by the group.676 Yet the Center’s own website provides links to its electronic
bank accounts, and boasts of sending weapons to the DPR and LPR.677 Similarly, when
Ukraine presented evidence that Oleksander Zhukovsky was financing terrorism — including
a video he posted to the Internet showing himself in Russia fundraising for the DPR —
Russia simply claimed that Mr. Zhukovsky “does not exist in the Russian Federation.”678
And when Ukraine informed Russia of Konstantin Malofeev’s involvement in terrorism
financing, Russia provided the remarkable response that “it was not possible to identify the
675 See supra, Chapter 3.
676 Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 10448 to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (31 July
2015) (Annex 376).
677 See Ukrainian Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2087 to Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(12 August 2014) (Annex 369); see also Communist Party for the DKO (Volunteer Communist
Detachment), Coordination Center for Assistance to New Russia (30 December 2014) (Annex 631);
Regular Dispatch Is Not Humanitarian Aid, Coordination Center for Assistance to New Russia (19
November 2014) (Annex 629); Report on Past Deliveries, Coordination Center for Assistance to New
Russia (19 August 2014) (Annex 626).
678 Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 10448 to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (31 July
2015) (Annex 626).
193
location of” this prominent businessman with close ties to President Putin.679 These were
not “investigations” under any good-faith interpretation of Russia’s treaty obligation.680
The Russian Federation Is in Breach of Article 12
327. The text of Article 12(1) of the ICSFT provides that “States Parties shall afford
one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or
criminal or extradition proceedings in respect of the offenses set forth in article 2, including
assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings.”681 Far
from giving assistance to that mandated level, time after time, the Russian Federation has
refused to provide any assistance to Ukraine’s investigations of terrorism financing.
328. For example, Russian has cited the failure of Ukraine to translate documents
into the Russian language as a reason to withhold assistance, even though it admitted that
the documents in question fulfilled Ukraine’s obligations.682 Russia has also claimed that
Ukrainian requests material to the prosecution of a crime are “irrelevant” to the pre-trial
investigation conducted by Ukraine.683 The bases for Russia’s refusals have, time and again,
invoked unnamed and non-existent “procedural formalities.”684 The overarching pattern of
delay and obfuscation by the Russian Federation falls substantially short of “the greatest
measure” of assistance. In all of Russia’s refusals, it never cited any reason that would make
679 Ibid.
680 See Belgium/Senegal, pp. 453-454, para. 85 (duty to investigate not satisfied where the State does
not make “any inquiry into the charges”).
681 ICSFT, art. 12(1) (emphasis added).
682 See supra, Chapter 3, Section C; Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation Letter No.
82/1-759-16 (14 September 2016) (Annex 429).
683 See supra, Chapter 3, Section C; Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation Letter No.
No. 82/1-5444-14 (dated 23 October 2015, sent 6 November 2015) (Annex 428).
684 See supra, Chapter 3, Section C.
194
it impossible — or even more difficult — for Russia to carry out Ukraine’s requests.
Searching for technicalities to avoid cooperation is not good-faith performance of Russia’s
obligation to provide the greatest measure of assistance to Ukraine.
329. Even more fundamentally, Russia routinely delays its responses to Ukraine’s
MLAT requests for more than a year, when it responds at all.685 In other instances, Russia
has denied assistance altogether, not by citing pretextual technical deficiencies, but with a
bare invocation of its sovereignty and security interests, pursuant to Article 2(b) of the
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 1959686 and Article 19 of
the Minsk Convention on Legal Aid and Legal Relations on Civil, Family and Criminal
Matters of 1993.687 This Court has stressed, however, that a State’s discretion to invoke such
exemptions “is still subject to the obligation of good faith codified in Article 26 of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.”688 As such, a State must “show[] that the
reasons for refusal to execute the [request] fell within those allowed for in [the
agreement].”689 A “bare reference” to the exception allowing refusal is insufficient; “[s]ome
brief further explanation [is] called for,” not just as “a matter of courtesy” but to
685 See ibid.
686 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, art. 2(b) (12 June 1962)
(“Assistance may be refused . . . if the requested Party considers that execution of the request is likely
to prejudice the sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests of its country.”)
(Annex 460).
687 Minsk Convention on Legal Aid and Legal Relations on Civil, Family and Criminal Matters of 1993,
art. 19 (22 January 1993) (“The request about granting legal aid may be rejected, if granting such aid
may inflict damage to the sovereignty or security, or contradicts the legislation of the requested
Contracting Party.”) (Annex 461).
688 Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment of 4
June 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 229, para. 145 [hereinafter Case on Mutual Assistance] (stating
that while mutual assistance treaties “provide a State to which a request for assistance has been made
with a very considerable discretion, this exercise of discretion is still subject to the obligation of good
faith codified in Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”).
689 Ibid.
195
“substantiate [the requested State’s] good faith” and permit the requesting State to make
appropriate modifications.690
330. Pursuant to Article 12(5) of the ICSFT, Russia was obligated to afford Ukraine
the greatest measure of assistance concerning the investigation and prosecution of terrorism
financing offenses through legal assistance.691 To validly refuse assistance under Article 12,
Russia must have validly refused assistance consistent with the obligation of good faith this
Court has found informs such agreements. A blanket set of refusals with a “bare reference”
to sovereignty or security concerns is not in good faith, as such violates Russia’s MLAT
obligations, and so further violates Article 12 of the ICSFT.
690 Ibid. p. 231, para. 152.
691 ICSFT, art. 12(5).
196
Section C: Jurisdiction
Chapter 7. THE COURTHAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES’ DISPUTE
CONCERNING THE ICSFT
331. Article 36(1) of the Statute of the Court provides this Court with jurisdiction
over “all cases which the parties refer to it and matters specially provided for in . . . treaties
and conventions in force.”692 Ukraine invokes this Court’s jurisdiction with respect to its
terrorism financing claims under Article 24(1) of the ICSFT, to which both Ukraine and the
Russian Federation are parties. Article 24(1) provides:
Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot
be settled through negotiation within a reasonable time shall,
at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If,
within six months from the date of the request for arbitration,
the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the
arbitration, any one of those parties may refer the dispute to
the International Court of Justice, by application, in
conformity with the Statute of the Court.693
332. Ukraine and the Russian Federation have therefore agreed to submit disputes
concerning the interpretation or application of the ICSFT to this Court, provided that three
preconditions are satisfied: (1) the existence of a dispute; (2) failure of settlement through
negotiation within a reasonable time; and (3) lack of agreement on the organization of
arbitration within six months from a request for arbitration. All three preconditions are met.
There Exists a Dispute Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation with
Respect to the Interpretation or Application of the ICSFT
333. As this Court has explained, “[a] dispute between States exists where they
‘hold clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance or non-performance
692 Statute of the Court, art. 36(1).
693 ICSFT, art. 24(1).
197
of certain’ international obligations.”694 Based on the record in this case, the Court has
already found that a dispute exists.695 In particular, the Court summarized the competing
positions of both States: “Ukraine contends that the Russian Federation has failed to respect
its obligations” under the ICSFT, whereas “[t]he Russian Federation positively denies that it
has committed any of the violations set out above.”696
334. Since 2014 and for nearly two years thereafter, Ukraine sent more than thirty
diplomatic notes to the Russian Federation detailing numerous specific violations of the
ICSFT. For example, in Ukraine’s first explicit correspondence on the Convention, Ukraine
asserted that the Russian Federation had committed acts in violation of the ICSFT.697 The
Russian Federation, in turn, made it clear that it rejects Ukraine’s claims, even while refusing
to acknowledge the existence of a dispute.698 As this Court has explained, “[t]he mere denial
694 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 19
April 2017, p. 11, para. 22 (citing Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the
Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016, p.
26, para. 50, and Interpretation of Peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase,
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74) (hereinafter Ukraine v. Russian Federation).
695 Ibid., pp. 13‒14, paras. 29‒31.
696 Ibid., p. 13, para. 29.
697 Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-484-1964 to Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs (28
July 2014) (“The Ukrainian Side states that . . . facts available [] demonstrate that the actions by the
Russian Side, including by citizens of the Russian Federation, are directly or indirectly, unlawfully and
willfully aimed at provision or collection of funds with the intention that they should be used or in the
knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out terrorism as prohibited
according to the said Convention.”) (Annex 368).
698 See, e.g., Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 14587 to Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (24
November 2014) (summarily dismissing Ukraine’s claims as “imaginary facts and groundless
accusations”) (Annex 375); Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 13457 to Ukrainian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (15 October 2015) (referring to Ukraine’s claims as “fictitious information,”
“unsubstantiated accusations,” and “patently false”) (Annex 377).
198
of the existence of a dispute does not prove its non-existence.”699 Instead, “[w]hether there
is a dispute in a given case is a matter for ‘objective determination’ by the Court.”700 The
objective facts of this case demonstrate that the Parties hold “clearly opposite views”
concerning the question of the performance or non-performance of certain ICSFT
obligations. The first precondition under Article 24(1) of the Convention is therefore
satisfied.
The Dispute Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation Could Not Be
Settled Through Negotiation Within a Reasonable Time
335. In its Order on Provisional Measures, this Court already found that the
dispute between Ukraine and the Russian Federation “could not . . . be resolved by
negotiation.”701 The record shows that Ukraine made extensive efforts to negotiate
bilaterally with the Russian Federation over the course of two years and during four inperson
negotiating sessions.702 The time and effort Ukraine has invested in these
negotiations has been well beyond what could be considered reasonable, and certainly more
robust than those negotiation attempts which this Court has seen in the past. For instance,
in Belgium v. Senegal, this Court concluded that the dispute at issue could not be settled by
negotiation where Belgium and Senegal exchanged correspondence over a period of only
699 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Advisory Opinion of 30
March 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74.
700 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 1 April 2011,
I.C.J. Reports 2011, p. 84, para. 30 (citing Interpretation of Peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary
and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion of 30 March 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74)
(hereinafter Georgia/Russian Federation).
701 Ukraine v. Russian Federation, pp. 18‒19, para. 52.
702 The four in-person sessions took place on 22 January 2015, 2 July 2015, 29 October 2015, and 17
March 2016.
199
eight months and never held any detailed, in-person negotiations.703 There is no comparison
between an eight-month written exchange and Ukraine’s two years of extensive, though
fruitless, negotiations in person and in writing with the Russian Federation.
336. This Court has explained that where negotiations are deadlocked and
continued negotiations would be futile, the precondition for the seisin of the Court is
satisfied.704 And as this Court’s predecessor put it in Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions,
when a party “refuses[] to give way,” there can be “no doubt that the dispute cannot be
settled by diplomatic negotiation.”705
337. In this case, Ukraine detailed in Note after Note and meeting after meeting
actions by the Russian Federation’s violations of the ICSFT.706 However, through the end of
2016, the Russian Federation continued to deny the existence of a dispute, let alone address
703 Belgium/Senegal, pp. 433‒36, 446, paras. 24‒28, 58‒59.
704 Georgia/Russian Federation, p. 133, para. 159 (citing Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions,
Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 13; South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa;
Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 345‒346; United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1980, p. 27, para. 51; Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the
United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p.
33, para. 55; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 122, para. 20).
705 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Objection to the Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment No. 2,
1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 13 (emphasis omitted).
706 See, e.g., Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2087 to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (12
August 2014) (Annex 369); Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2185 to the Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (22 August 2014) (Annex 270); Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2221 to the
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (29 August 2014) (Annex 371).
200
the substantive claims raised by Ukraine.707 As the record demonstrates, in more than two
years, there was no evolution of the Russian Federation’s position with respect to Ukraine’s
substantive claims. The Russian Federation refused to “give way.” Since the ICSFT does not
impose an obligation to negotiate past the point of futility, the second precondition under
Article 24(1) of the Convention has been met.
Ukraine and the Russian Federation Were Unable to Agree on the
Organization of the Arbitration Within Six Months from the Date of
Ukraine’s Request for Arbitration
338. As with the other preconditions, this Court has found that Ukraine submitted
a request for arbitration to the Russian Federation, and that “within six months from the
date of the arbitration request, the Parties were unable to reach an agreement on its
organization.”708 In considering a similar precondition for the Court’s jurisdiction, this
Court has explained that a “direct request to resort to arbitration” or “an explicit offer . . . to
have recourse to arbitration” satisfies the requirement of a request for arbitration.709 Here,
Ukraine submitted a direct request to the Russian Federation to proceed to arbitration in its
Note Verbale of 19 April 2016.710 By the plain terms of Article 24(1), Ukraine could have
submitted this dispute to the Court on 21 October 2016, six months after the date of its
707 See, e.g., Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 13355 to Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (14
October 2014) (expressing a need for “factual data on the issues” instead of responding substantively)
(Annex 373); Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 14284 to Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (11
November 2016) (stating “the fact of the discussion of any issues during the consultations as well as in
the diplomatic correspondence between the Parties can predetermine neither the issue of their
regulation by the ICSFT, nor the existence of a dispute on interpretation and application of the
ICSFT”) (Annex 373).
708 Ukraine v. Russian Federation, para. 53.
709 Belgium/Senegal, pp. 446‒48, paras. 60‒62.
710 Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-610-954 to the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs (19
April 2016) (“Accordingly, pursuant to Article 24, paragraph 1 of the Financing Terrorism Convention,
Ukraine requests the Russian Federation to submit the dispute to arbitration under terms to be agreed
by mutual consent.”) (Annex 378).
201
request. However, Ukraine continued to attempt to bridge its differences with the Russian
Federation as to the organization of the arbitration for nearly nine months.711
339. More than two months after Ukraine’s request for arbitration, the Russian
Federation finally responded, expressing readiness to “discuss issues concerning setting up
arbitration,” and proposing a fifth in-person negotiation to take place the following month.712
Ukraine proceeded in good faith to present its views on the organization of the arbitration
during the Parties’ meeting on 4 August, and followed up with a written proposal later that
month.713 The Russian Federation did not provide its views on Ukraine’s proposal until early
October, when it rejected Ukraine’s suggestion for the settlement of dispute by an ad hoc
Chamber of this Court and offered its own proposals for the organization of arbitral
proceedings.714 Ukraine and the Russian Federation continued to discuss their respective
proposals through the end of 2016.715
340. In the context of a similar treaty provision, this Court has held that “the lack
of agreement between the parties as to the organization of an arbitration . . . can follow . . .
from a proposal for arbitration by the applicant, to which the respondent . . . has expressed
its intention not to accept.”716 Through the end of 2016, the Russian Federation made clear
711 Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-663-82 to the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs (13
January 2017) (informing the Russian Federation that Ukraine intended to refer their dispute to this
Court) (Annex 385).
712 Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 8808 to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (23 June
2016) (Annex 379).
713 Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-620-2049 to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (31 August
2016) (Annex 380).
714 Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 14426 to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (3 October
2016) (Annex 381).
715 See Ukraine Note Verbale No. 72/22-194/510-2518 to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2
November 2016) (proposing “core principles concerning the organization of the arbitration”)
(Annex 382); Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 16886 to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(30 December 2016) (responding to Ukraine’s proposals “on the organization of arbitration”) (Annex
384).
716 Belgium/Senegal, pp. 447‒48, para. 61 (quoting Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 41, para. 92).
202
its intent not to accept a number of Ukraine’s proposals on the organization of the
arbitration. The Parties therefore were unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration
within the time period specified by Article 24(1). Accordingly, the final precondition for this
Court’s jurisdiction under the ICSFT is satisfied.
203
PART III: THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S VIOLATIONS OF THE
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
341. The Russian Federation’s sponsorship and financing of terrorism in eastern
Ukraine, described in the preceding Part, demonstrates the lengths to which it will go when
neighboring countries seek to escape its hegemony. The systematic campaign of racial
discrimination that Russia has pursued in Crimea, described in this Part, illustrates the
extent of its disregard for basic human rights in territory where it is able to exercise
dominance.
342. That campaign is an affront to the ideals that inspired the drafters of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”). At the
adoption of the CERD by the General Assembly in 1965, the United Nations Secretary
General noted that the treaty was “a most valuable instrument” which would allow the
United Nations to “carry forward its efforts to eradicate the vestiges of racial
discrimination.”717 The Secretary General welcomed the adoption of the CERD, not only
because it called for an end to discrimination, but also because it “establish[ed] the
international machinery which is essential to achieve that aim.”718 The text of the CERD
reflects the parties’ “[r]esolve[] to adopt all necessary measures for speedily eliminating
racial discrimination in all its forms and manifestations.”719
343. Specifically, Article 1 of the CERD broadly sets forth the impermissible
grounds for discrimination under the CERD, including discrimination on grounds of ethnic
origin, and specifies that conduct will violate the CERD if it has either the purpose or effect
of discrimination. Article 2 of the CERD requires States Parties to pursue a policy of
eliminating discrimination in all its forms. Article 2(1)(a) prohibits States Parties from
717 U.N. General Assembly, 20th Session 1406th Plenary Meeting, Official Records, U.N. Doc.
A_PB.1406, para. 135 (21 December 1965) (Annex 782).
718 Ibid. para. 138.
719 CERD, pmbl. (Annex 738)
204
engaging in any acts or practices of racial discrimination, and requires them to ensure that
all public authorities and public institutions act in conformity with this obligation. At Article
2(1)(b), the CERD forbids States Parties from sponsoring, defending, or supporting racial
discrimination by any person or organization.
344. Thereafter, the CERD sets forth more specific prohibitions of discriminatory
conduct. At Article 4, the CERD obligates States Parties not to promote or incite
discrimination, and requires them to condemn propaganda and organizations that are based
on, or which attempt to justify, racial superiority. CERD Article 5 requires States Parties to
guarantee equality before the law with respect to, among other things, freedom from bodily
harm, equal treatment by the organs of justice, freedom of movement, freedom of opinion
and expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and the right to education
and training. Article 6 requires States Parties to assure everyone within their jurisdiction the
right to effective protection and remedies, through national tribunals and other state
institutions, against any acts of racial discrimination. And Article 7 requires States Parties to
take effective measures in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information with a
view to combating prejudices which lead to racial discrimination.
345. By its treatment of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea,
the Russian Federation has violated every one of the aforementioned articles. Worse, not
only has it failed to live up to its affirmative obligations under the CERD; it has put in place a
policy and practice of racial discrimination that is the exact opposite of what the CERD calls
for.
346. Following its unlawful occupation of Crimea, the Russian Federation now
seeks to entrench Russian dominance there and to erase the competing cultural claims of the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities. To achieve that goal, it has pursued a two-part
strategy. First, Russia has brought the full weight of its authoritarian security machinery
into force in Crimea and has applied it selectively to crush political dissent from the Crimean
Tatar and Ukrainian communities. Second, it has abused its position as an occupying power
to promote its own culture, while choking off the means available to the Crimean Tatar and
205
Ukrainian communities to preserve their own separate identities, whether through cultural
gatherings, mass media, education or otherwise. The desired end result is as transparent as
it is abhorrent to the multi-ethnic heritage of Crimea: the cultural erasure of the Crimean
Tatar and Ukrainian communities on the peninsula.
347. Section A describes the background to and various components of Russia’s
campaign of racial discrimination in Crimea. Chapter 8 provides the historical context for
the Russian Federation’s conduct and describes how Russia’s occupation and annexation of
the peninsula in February and March 2014 laid the foundation for it. Chapter 9 describes in
more detail the first prong of the campaign, directed at stripping the Crimean Tatar and
Ukrainian communities of their political and civil rights. Chapter 10 describes the second
prong of the campaign, targeting the cultural life of these communities. Section B addresses
the legal consequences of Russia’s actions under the CERD. Chapter 11 describes the core
principles embodied by the CERD and establishes that the Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians in
Crimea are protected groups under the Convention. Chapter 12 explains how Russia’s
conduct comprehensively violates its obligations under the CERD. Finally in this Part,
Section C, comprising Chapter 13, explains why the Court has jurisdiction to decide the
Parties’ dispute.
206
Section A: Evidence Showing Russia’s Policy and Practice of Racial
Discrimination in Crimea
Chapter 8. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S CAMPAIGN OF CULTURAL ERASURE IN
CRIMEA
348. Russia’s current campaign of racial discrimination in Crimea can only be fully
understood in a historical context. That context includes both the formation over many
centuries of a richly multi-ethnic society in Crimea and the immediate events surrounding
Russia’s military occupation and purported annexation of the peninsula in February and
March 2014. This chapter examines each of these dimensions in turn.
The Historical and Social Context for Russia’s Campaign of Cultural
Erasure
349. Over at least the last 2,500 years, numerous successive cultures have
flourished in Crimea, creating rich ethnic diversity within the population. Especially within
the last century, however, relations between the different communities have not always been
harmonious. From 1991 onwards, the newly independent Ukraine confronted the challenge
of reintegrating into Crimean society whole peoples returning from exile following Stalin's
mass deportations of 1944 (known to the Crimean Tatars as the Sürgün). Since 2014,
Russia's campaign of cultural erasure against communities that oppose its unlawful
occupation of Crimea has reawakened memories of those dark days.
The Development of Crimea’s Multi-Ethnic Culture
350. As Professor Paul Magocsi, Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of
Toronto, explains, Crimea's historical development has been shaped by its role as a “contact
and transit zone for sea and land routes that have connected the steppelands of eastern
Europe and central Asia to the Black Sea and beyond via the Bosporus to the Aegean and
207
Mediterranean Seas.”720 The strategic importance of Crimea as a commercial crossroads
between Asia and Europe was what first drew ancient Greek colonists to the shores of the
peninsula in approximately 600 BCE. 721 Since then, numerous civilizations have left their
mark on the peninsula, helping to create the richly multi-ethnic population that
characterized Crimea prior to the events described in this Memorial. In the approximately
two thousand years separating the arrival of the first Greek colonists and the annexation of
Crimea by the Russian Empire in 1783, the peninsula was governed or settled by, among
others, the Roman and Byzantine empires, numerous Germanic and Turkic tribes, medieval
Italian city states including Venice and Genoa, Armenian and Jewish merchants, the
Crimean Khanate established by the successors to the Golden Horde, and the Ottoman
Empire.722 By the end of the eighteenth century, this amalgam of nations and cultures had
fused into the people that today self-identifies as Crimean Tatar.
720 Expert Report of Professor Paul Magocsi (4 June 2018) ), para. 7 [hereinafter Magocsi Report]
(Annex 21).
721 See ibid., para. 8.
722 Ibid., paras. 8–12.
208
Map 13: Geography of Crimea
209
351. The predominance of Slavic peoples in Crimea’s population is a relatively
recent phenomenon. Slavs have lived in smaller numbers on the peninsula for much of its
recorded history. The more northern and steppe-like parts of the peninsula were settled by
Slavs from Kyivian Rus’ well before the arrival of the Mongols in Crimea.723 Over the
following centuries, Mongol raids into what is now Ukrainian territory resulted in more Slavs
joining the population of Crimea. But it was only with the establishment of Russian imperial
rule in Crimea at the end of the eighteenth century that the demographic balance tipped
decisively in favor of the Slavic community.724 As Professor Magocsi describes, this was the
result of a deliberate policy by the Russian Empire to encourage “voluntary” emigration by
the Crimean Tatar inhabitants of the peninsula.725 Over the course of the nineteenth
century, Crimean Tatars decreased progressively as a proportion of Crimea's population,
ultimately becoming a minority in the second half of that century.726 Many thousands of
Crimean Tatars left the peninsula, moving to territory occupied by the Ottoman Empire.727
Turkey remains home to an important Crimean Tatar diaspora to this day.
352. Over the centuries, the central authorities in Moscow have periodically sought
to “russify” Crimea. Especially under Stalin, the period of Soviet rule, with Crimea now part
of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (“RSFSR”), saw a further concerted
attempt in that direction. In 1944, the Crimean Tatar people were brutally deported en
masse, together with several other nationalities, on the pretext that they had collaborated
723 Ibid., para. 9.
724 Ibid., para. 13.
725 Ibid., para. 31.
726 Ibid., para. 32.
727 Ibid., paras. 31–32.
210
with the Nazi occupation.728 Thousands died on the way to their new Central Asian homes
(principally in Uzbekistan), many more upon arrival at their destination.729 For the next 50
years, the displaced Crimean Tatars sought to preserve their distinct language and culture
and the bravest among them campaigned to be allowed to return to their Crimean
homeland.730 Meanwhile, in Crimea, the local Russian authorities did their best to eliminate
all traces of the Crimean Tatar past, renaming towns and villages and encouraging Slavic inmigration
from both the RSFSR and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (“Ukrainian
SSR”).731
353. The distinction within Crimea's Slavic population between Russians and
Ukrainians is also a relatively recent development, assuming its modern form only in the
second half of the nineteenth century, as the Ukrainian national movement gained
momentum.732 From the first Russian census in 1897 onwards, residents of Crimea were
asked to identify themselves as Ukrainian (or “Little Russian,” the term used in the 1897
census to designate Ukrainians) or one of several other nationalities pre-designated by the
authorities.733 Although census respondents likely regarded this nationality question as an
invitation to disclose their dominant ancestral heritage rather than how they currently selfidentified,
the resulting statistics provide at least a rough approximation of the proportions
728 Ibid., para. 33; see also State Defense Committee of the Soviet Union Decree No. 589ss “On the
Crimean Tatars” (11 May 1944) (chapeau) (Annex 871).
729 Magocsi Report, para. 34.
730 Ibid., para. 36.
731 Greta Uehling, Genocide’s Aftermath: Neostalinism in Contemporary Crimea, Genocide Studies
and Prevention 3 (2015) (Annex 1021); Witness Statement of Mustafa Dzhemilev [hereinafter
Dzhemilev Statement], para. 4 (Annex 16).
732 Magocsi Report, para. 50 (Annex 21).
733 See ibid., paras. 46–48, 52.
211
of the Crimea population describing themselves as Russian and Ukrainian from 1897
onwards. As Table 2 to Professor Magocsi's report shows, the percentage of Ukrainians
counted by successive censuses by the Russian Empire and subsequently the Soviet Union
rose steadily throughout the twentieth century, reaching approximately a quarter of the
population by the time Ukraine became an independent country in 1991.734 That fraction of
the population included Ukrainians whose first language was Ukrainian and others who
preferred to converse in Russian.735
354. The decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to transfer Crimea from
the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954 did not have any significant durable impact on the
cultural balance in Crimea.736 While the Soviet Union remained in existence, with Moscow
at its center, Russian remained the language of self-advancement and was generally
preferred for instructional purposes by Crimean Slavs, whether of Russian or Ukrainian
ancestry.737
355. With Ukrainian independence in 1991, Crimea came to present a multifaceted
challenge for the authorities in Kyiv. Even before the dissolution of the Soviet Union
in December 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR had granted Crimea the status
of an autonomous republic within Soviet Ukraine.738 Upon independence, however, a vocal
minority called for the peninsula to be reunited with the Russian Federation and was
encouraged in its demands by nationalist Russian legislators in Moscow. Under President
Yeltsin, the Russian government repeatedly confirmed that Crimea was part of Ukraine, and
signed several treaties committing the Russian Federation to respect Ukraine’s territorial
sovereignty on that basis.739 After 1994, the secessionist movement largely disappeared
734 Ibid., para. 46, table 2.
735 See ibid., para. 52.
736 Ibid., paras. 53–57.
737 Ibid.
738 Ibid., para. 28.
739 Ibid., para. 17.
212
until stoked back into life by the Russian Federation as cover for its military invasion of
Crimea in February and March 2014. As a new generation of post-Soviet Crimeans grew up
on the peninsula, the idea of Crimea as part of independent Ukraine became progressively
less controversial, and for many younger people being Ukrainian became an accepted part of
their self-identity.
356. Meanwhile, the government of newly independent Ukraine was confronted
with the challenge of reintegrating hundreds of thousands of returning Crimean Tatars into
the economy and society of the peninsula. A few pioneering Crimean Tatars, including
Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov, had managed to return to Crimea from exile in
Uzbekistan even before the end of the Soviet Union.740 After 1991, the trickle turned into a
flood, as the Crimean Tatar masses followed this example, with encouragement from the
Ukrainian authorities. By the time of the 2001 census, some 250,000 Crimean Tatars were
back on Crimean soil, up from zero as recently as 1959.741 In 2013, a needs assessment for
the OSCE’s High Commissioner for National Minorities praised the Ukrainian government
for its efforts to reintegrate the Crimean Tatar and other formerly deported peoples, while
noting that much work remained to be done.742
The Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian Communities in Contemporary
Crimea
357. As Professor Magocsi explains, the Crimean Tatar people did not allow their
forced exile in Central Asia to diminish their sense of separate identity. To the contrary, the
community formed its own civic organizations, including a newspaper, journals and a
740 Ibid., para. 17.
741 Ibid., para. 39.
742 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe High Commissioner for National Minorities,
The Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine: Needs Assessment (August 2013)
(hereinafter “HCNM Needs Assessment”), p. 2 (Annex 805).
213
publishing house, to keep its traditions alive.743 Among the new civic organizations formed
in this period was the Union of Crimean Tatar Youth, co-founded by Mustafa Dzhemilev,
which played an important role in the coming years advocating for the right to return to
Crimea.744 Adherence to a moderate form of Islam continued to be a defining feature of the
Crimean Tatar people during this period.745 The chief casualty of life in exile may have been
the Crimean Tatar language, which in many families was replaced as the chief mode of
communication by the Russian taught in local schools.746
358. The large number of Crimean Tatars who have returned since the late 1980s
have continued this tradition of civic activism and have overlaid it with the establishment of
elected institutions charged with representing the interests of Crimean Tatar people as a
whole. In June 1991, the Crimean Tatars organized the election of the Qurultay, akin to a
National Congress of 250 delegates.747 This democratic body, whose name recalls an ancient
institution of the Crimean Khanate that governed Crimea from the fifteenth to the eighteenth
centuries, adopted a Declaration of National Sovereignty of the Crimean Tatar People.748
The Qurultay of 1991 also elected a Mejlis, an executive body to be the legitimate
representative voice of the Crimean Tatar community when the Qurultay is out of session.
Mr. Dzhemilev served as the chair of the Mejlis from 1991 until 27 October 2013, when he
was replaced by the current chair, Mr. Chubarov.749
743 Magocsi Report, para. 36 (Annex 21).
744 See Statement of Mustafa Dzhemilev, para. 2 (Annex 16).
745 Magocsi Report, para. 82 (Annex 21).
746 Magocsi Report, paras. 73–74 (Annex 21).
747 Ibid., para. 5.
748 Andrew Wilson, The Crimean Tatars: A Quarter of a Century After Their Return, Security and
Human Rights 24 (2013), pp. 418, 423–24 (Annex 1018).
749 Black Sea News, Chubarov Elected Chairman of Mejlis of Crimean Tatar People (28 Oct. 2013), at
http://www.blackseanews.net/en/read/72236 .
214
359. The practical concerns of the Crimean Tatar people and their representative
institutions during this period have been conditioned by the after-effects of the Sürgün.
Stalin’s order deporting the Crimean Tatars in 1944 required that their land and other real
estate be taken over by the local authorities.750 Returning Crimean Tatars therefore had
nowhere to live. As a result, “land, housing and property [were] by far the most sensitive
issues and the most likely to cause tensions”751 prior to the Russian occupation. In view of
the impact of exile on usage of their native language, Crimean Tatars also pressed for greater
opportunities for their children to be educated in the Crimean Tatar language.752 At the
political level, the Mejlis worked hard to obtain recognition of the Crimean Tatars as one of
the indigenous peoples of Crimea, as a means of entrenching their rights in modern
Crimea.753
360. The Ukrainian community in contemporary Crimea encompasses both those
who speak Ukrainian as their primary means of communication and who follow overtly
Ukrainian customs, as well as a significant number of Russian-speakers who identify as
Ukrainian. The census taken by the Ukrainian authorities in 2001 recorded some 492,000
750 State Defense Committee Decree No. 5859ss (11 May 1944), para. (a) (Annex 871).
751 HCNM Needs Assessment, supra note 742, p. 9 (Annex 805).
752 Magocsi Report, para. 71 (Annex 21).
753 See Crimean Tatars Demand Recognition as Indigenous People, Kharkiv Human Rights
Protection Group (18 September 2013) (noting that “[o]ne of the key characteristics of indigenous
peoples is that regardless of their legal status, they preserve some or all social, economic, cultural and
political institutions”) (Annex 936).
215
Ukrainians, approximately 24 percent of Crimea’s population.754 Only 40.4 percent of these,
approximately 199,000 people, described Ukrainian as their native language.755
361. Prior to the Russian intervention, the Ukrainian-speaking portion of the
Ukrainian community in Crimea was well-served by Ukrainian-language TV and radio
broadcasts originating in other parts of Ukraine.756 Additionally, a number of nongovernmental
organizations worked to increase the reach of Ukrainian language and culture
in Crimea. The witness statement of Andrii Shchekun, a Ukrainian cultural and educational
activist, for example, describes his work through a variety of NGOs to increase access to
education in the Ukrainian language in Crimea and to promote Ukrainian-language print
and broadcast media on the peninsula.757
362. Russian speakers who identified as Ukrainian had access to a wide variety of
independent Crimean-based media, broadcasting or publishing in the Russian-language but
from a Ukrainian or Crimean perspective. For example, the most popular Crimea-based TV
channel was ATR, a Crimean Tatar-owned station that produced programs of local interest in
Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian and Russian.758 Enterprises such as the Center for Journalist
Investigations reported on local news from an independent perspective, covering such
sensitive issues as corruption within local government.759
363. While the Ukrainian community was not politically and culturally mobilized
to the same extent as the Crimean Tatars, there were Ukrainian-language based educational
754 All-Ukrainian Population Census National Composition of Population, Autonomous Republic of
Crimea (2001) (Annex 731).
755 All-Ukrainian Population Census Linguistic Composition of Population, Autonomous Republic of
Crimea (2001) (Annex 730).
756 See, e.g., Michael Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern
Ukraine, RAND Corporation (2017), p. 13 (noting that Russian forces turned off signals from nine
Ukrainian television channels on 9 March 2014) (Annex 1025).
757 SeeWitness Statement of Andriy Shchekun (12 June 2018), paras. 4–8 [hereinafter Shchekun
Statement] (Annex 13).
758 Witness Statement of Lenur Islyamov, paras. 2–3 [hereinafter Islyamov Statement] (Annex 18).
759 Witness Statement of Anna Andriyevska (4 June 2018), para. 6 [hereinafter Andriyevska
Statement] (Annex 14).
216
and cultural opportunities available for those who wanted them. And the relatively liberal
media environment allowed the majority of Ukrainians in Crimea who were predominantly
Russian-speaking to participate in Ukrainian social and political life more generally. In
short, before the current Russian campaign began, a genuinely multi-ethnic society of
Ukrainians, Russians, and Crimean Tatars, as well as other groups had taken hold in Crimea.
Origins of Russia’s Campaign of Cultural Erasure Against the Crimean
Tatar and Ukrainian Peoples in Crimea
364. The progress made to reintegrate the Crimean Tatars into Crimean society
within independent Ukraine has been abruptly reversed following Russia's unlawful invasion
of the peninsula in February 2014. Today, 70 years after they were first deported by Stalin,
the Crimean Tatar community once again finds itself singled out for its perceived disloyalty
to Moscow. This time the Crimean Tatars' alleged crime is to dare to utter what the rest of
the world already knows and openly declares: that Crimea is part of Ukraine's sovereign
territory and Russia's unlawful aggression does not change that fact.
365. The Crimean Tatars find themselves joined in Moscow's bad graces by the
Ukrainian community in Crimea. For a Russian regime that will brook no opposition to its
territorial expansionism, the Ukrainian community – a key part of whose identity rests on
the conception of Crimea as part of Ukraine – is an obvious and necessary target.
Russia’s Unlawful Invasion and Purported Annexation of Crimea
366. As described in Part I, the Russian Federation now admits that the unlawful
secession of Crimea from Ukraine was engineered in Moscow.760 In his witness statement,
Mustafa Dzhemilev describes being asked to speak to Putin about the future of Crimea as
760 See supra Chapter 8, Section B.
217
early as 15 February 2014.761 President Putin says that he resolved to intervene militarily in
Crimea during a meeting of 22-23 February.762
367. In any event, on the ground it was clear by the evening of 25 February 2014
that a military intervention was underway and that Russia's next move would be to engineer
a declaration of independence by the Crimean Parliament.763 Representatives of the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities mobilized in an attempt to prevent this from
happening. The Mejlis organized a rally to take place the following morning, 26 February, in
the square in front of the Crimean Parliament building in Simferopol, in opposition to
Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation.764 According to the notification filed by the
Mejlis, the rally was for preservation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and resistance to the
Crimean Parliament’s decisions aimed at destabilizing the autonomy of Crimea.765 As Mr.
Andrii Shchekun recalls in his witness statement, the Mejlis invited representatives of the
Ukrainian community to join them in the protest.766
761 Dzhemilev Statement, paras. 10–11 (Annex 16); see also Back into Exile, The Economist (18 June
2015) (Annex 1057).
762 See, e.g., BBC News, Putin Reveals Secrets of Russia’s Crimea Takeover Plot (9 March 2015)
(Annex 52); DW, Putin reveals details of decision to annex Crimea, (9 March 2015) (Annex 1051).
763 Thomas D. Grant, Aggression against Ukraine: Territory, Responsibility, and International Law 5
(2015) (Annex 1023).
764 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Accountability for killings in
Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016, Annex I, para. 2 (Annex 49). For detailed reconstruction of
the rally of 26 February 2014, see Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, Report of the
International Expert Group: 26 February Criminal Case (2017) (Annex 958).
765 Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Notification to Simferopol City Council (inserted in Ukrainian
Helsinki Human Rights Union, Report of the International Expert Group: February 26 Criminal Case
(2017), p. 12 (original), p. 98 (English translated) (Annex 960).
766 Shchekun Statement, para. 13 (Annex 13).
218
Figure 13
Demonstrators stand opposite each other near the parliament building in Simferopol
(Artur Shvarts / European Pressphoto Agency)
368. As the pro-Ukrainian demonstrators gathered in the square the following
morning, a large number of young men carrying Russian flags began forming up opposite
them. A large contingent from the pro-Russian Self-Defense Forces was also present.767 An
intense standoff between the groups lasted for hours.768 Over the course of the day, the two
sides sought to push each other's supporters out of the forecourt of the Parliament building,
into which the crowd had spilled. Two people died in the crush and some 70 people were
injured.769
767 Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, Report of the International Expert Group: 26 February
Criminal Case (2017), p. 17 (Annex 958).
768 Ibid., pp. 26–62.
769 Ibid., p. 12; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of
human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of
Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22 February 2014 to 12 September 2017), para. 23 (Annex 759).
219
369. Early in the morning of 27 February 2014, a group of heavily armed men
wearing uniforms without insignia seized the building of the Parliament and raised the
Russian flag.770 While occupied by these armed forces, the Crimean Parliament convened an
extraordinary closed session, dismissed the existing government, and elected Sergey
Aksyonov—leader of the radical Russian Unity Party—as the new Prime Minister of
Crimea.771 At the time this vote was held, the Russian Unity Party held a mere three seats out
of 100 in the Crimean Parliament.772
370. On 6 March 2014, the Crimean Parliament resolved that a referendum would
be held ten days later, in which Crimean voters could choose (1) reunification with Russia, or
(2) restoration of Crimea’s prior status as part of Ukraine.773 On 11 March 2014, the
Parliaments of Crimea and Sevastopol adopted a joint Declaration of Independence stating
770 See, e.g., Harriet Salem et al., Crimean Parliament Seized by Unknown Pro-Russian Gunmen, The
Guardian (27 February 2014) (Annex 1037).
771 See Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Honouring of Obligations and
Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe, Recent developments in Ukraine: threats
to the functioning of democratic institutions (8 April 2014), at 16-17 (hereinafter “PACE Recent
Developments in Ukraine”) (Annex 820); Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and
the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22 February 2014 to 12 September 2017), paras. 5 & 23 (“On 27
February, members of the Parliament of Crimea, in the presence of gunmen, dismissed the local
Government and elected Sergey Aksenov as the Head of Crimea”) (Annex 759).
772 Simon Shuster, Putin's Man in Crimea Is Ukraine's Worst Nightmare, Time (10 March 2014)
(Annex 1041).
773 See PACE Recent Developments in Ukraine, p. 17 (Annex 820); Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22 February 2014 to 12
September 2017), para. 5, n.7 (Annex 759); Crimean Parliament Votes to Become Part of Russian
Federation, Referendum to be Held in 10 Days, ABC News (6 March 2014) (Annex 1038).
220
that Crimea and Sevastopol would form an independent state called the “Republic of Crimea”
and seek integration into the Russian Federation based on the result of the referendum.774
371. The Russian Federation tried and failed at the most senior levels to induce the
Crimean Tatars to support annexation in advance of the referendum. Mustafa Dzhemilev
testifies to a telephone call with President Putin on 12 March, engineered by the Russian
side.775 During the conversation, Putin sought the Crimean Tatar community's support for
union with Russia in return for unspecified favorable treatment in the future. He was firmly
rebuffed by Mr. Dzhemilev who continued to insist that Crimea was part of Ukraine.776
372. Putin's offer of favorable treatment was belied by events on the ground in
Crimea where pro-Russian forces were creating as intimidating an environment as possible
for the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communitiess. In Simferopol, a Crimean Tatar activist
protesting in front of the Cabinet of Ministers building was kidnapped on 3 March 2014 in
broad daylight by men wearing the uniforms of the Self-Defense Forces.777 The victim's
murdered body was discovered two weeks later, bearing signs of torture.778 Ukrainian
activists were abducted, illegally detained and subjected to torture, only being released once
774 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of human rights in
the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22
February 2014 to 12 September 2017), para. 5 (Annex 759).
775 Dzhemilev Statement, paras. 16–27 (Annex 16); see also Back into Exile, The Economist (18 June
2015) (Annex 1057).
776 Dzhemilev Statement, paras. 16–27 (Annex 16).
777 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Accountability for Killings in
Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016, paras. 119–20 (Annex 49).
778 See infra Chapter 9. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Accountability for Killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016, para. 121 (Annex 49);
Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Disappeared Man Found Killed (18 March 2014) (Annex 939).
221
the referendum had taken place.779 The walls and gates of Crimean Tatar houses were
marked with crosses on their doors,780 a chilling reminder of a practice used by the Soviet
authorities in 1944 to round up members of that people for deportation.781 Unidentified,
uniformed men had begun appearing in Crimean Tatar settlements, claiming rights to
Crimean Tatar properties.782
373. On 16 March 2014, the pro-Russian authorities in Crimea announced that
96.77 percent of participants had voted for union with the Russian Federation, on a turnout
of 83.1 percent.783 Similarly, it was announced that 89.5 percent of participants in the city of
Sevastopol had cast their ballots, of whom 95.6 percent had voted to join the Russian
Federation.784 Opponents, including the vast majority of the Crimean Tatar community,
779 See infra Chapter 9, Section A; see, e.g., Sergey Zayets et al., The Peninsula of Fear: Chronicle of
Occupation and Violation of Human Rights in Crimea (2016), pp. 58–74 (Annex 976); see also
Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Attacks, ‘Disappearances’ by Illegal Forces (14 March 2014) (Annex
939); see also Shchekun Statement, paras. 19–25 (Annex 13).
780 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues on
Her Mission to Ukraine (7–14 April 2014), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/64/Add.1 (26 August 2014), para. 51
(Annex 760).
781 Natalia Antelava, Who Will Protect the Crimean Tatars, The NEW YORKER (6 March 2014) (Annex
1039).
782 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the human rights
situation in Ukraine (15 April 2014), para. 88 (Annex 44); United Nations Human Rights Council,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues on Her Mission to Ukraine (7–14 April 2014),
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/64/Add.1 (26 August 2014), para. 51 (Annex 760).
783 State Council of Crimea, Announcement of the Results of the Crimea-wide Referendum Held in
Autonomous Republic of Crimea (16 March 2014) (Annex 886).
784 Media Relations Department of Sevastopol City Council, Results of the Crimea-wide Referendum
of March 16, 2014 Ratified at the Session of the City Council (17 March 2014) (Annex 1086).
222
boycotted the poll. 785 The United Nations General Assembly,786 the Council of Europe's
Venice Commission,787 and many others in the international community788 condemned the
referendum as unlawful. Numerous international observers have questioned the referendum
results reported by the Crimean authorities, finding other figures mistakenly released by the
Russian government more credible.789 On 17 March 2014, the Crimean Parliament illegally
declared the Republic of Crimea as a state independent of Ukraine.
785 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the human rights
situation in Ukraine (15 April 2014), at 4, n.2 (noting that observers reported that no more than 1,000
members of the Crimean Tatar community cast ballots in the referendum, out of a total population of
290,000 – 300,000) (Annex 45).
786In Resolution 68/262, adopted on 27 March 2014, the U.N. General Assembly underscored that
“the referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on 16 March
2014, having no validity, cannot form the basis for any alteration of the status of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea or of the city of Sevastopol” and called “upon all States, international
organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on the basis of the above-mentioned referendum and to
refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as recognizing any such altered status.”
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 68/262, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/262, paras. 5–6, Territorial
Integrity of Ukraine (27 March 2014) (Annex 43).
787 See Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission),
Opinion on “Whether the Decision Taken by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea in Ukraine to Organize a Referendum on Becoming a Constituent Territory of the Russian
Federation or Restoring Crimea’s 1992 Constitution is Compatible with Constitutional Principles”
(hereinafter “Venice Commission Opinion”), CDL-AD(2014)002 (21–22 March 2014) (Annex 354).
788 See, e.g., Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recent Developments in Ukraine:
Threats to the Functioning of Democratic Institutions, Resolution 1988 (2014)1 (9 April 2014) (Annex
821); European Commission, Statement, Joint statement by President of the European Council
Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso on Crimea
(Brussels, 16 March 2014) (Annex 828); Harper blasts Crimea referendum, protesters express
solidarity with Ukraine, CBC (16 March 2014) (Annex 1042); Merkel: Crimea grab 'against
international law' The Local (18 March 2014) (Annex 1044); U.S., NATO Allies Condemn Russian
'Land Grab' In Ukraine, RFE/RL (18 March 2014) (Annex 1045).
789 For example, Luzius Wildhaber, former President of the European Court of Human Rights, has
called Russia’s purported official results implausible, and observed that Russia’s Human Rights
Council later communicated much more credible figures, i.e., that some 30-50% had taken part in the
vote, and out of these, some 50-60% (roughly 22% of potential voters) favored annexation. See
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights,
Legal remedies for human rights violations on the Ukrainian territories outside the control of the
Ukrainian authorities (26 September 2016), p. 23, n.130 (Annex 826).
223
374. Despite the international community’s rejection of the referendum, on 18
March 2014, the Russia Federation entered into a purported treaty with the so-called
Republic of Crimea, incorporating Crimea and the City of Sevastopol into the territory of the
Russian Federation.790 On 21 March 2014, President Putin signed a law rushed through the
Duma and Federation Council over the previous two days, formalizing the annexation as a
matter of Russian law.791
Russia’s Use of Hate Speech to Polarize Crimea’s Multi-Ethnic
Population Before and After the Referendum
375. The referendum was preceded by a vigorous disinformation campaign in
which the Russian Federation and its agents sought to undermine the multi-ethnic
underpinnings of Crimean society by creating a climate of fear among the Russian speaking
majority there. The goal of this campaign was to convince its audience that fascists had
seized power in Kyiv and that they intended next to come to Crimea to punish ethnic
Russians there. With the assistance of leaked documents, the Washington Post has
documented how a concerted campaign by the Russian military intelligence service, the
GRU, resulted in posts appearing across social media from 22 February 2014 onwards
claiming that Crimea was under threat from Nazis.792 To reinforce this message, Russia also
took advantage of the fact that Russian speakers in Crimea generally received their news
790 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of human rights in
the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22
February 2014 to 12 September 2017) (2017), para. 5 (Annex 759).
791 Federal Constitutional Law No. 6-FKZ of March 21, 2014 "On the Admission of the Republic of
Crimea into the Russian Federation and the Formation of New Constituent Entities of the Russian
Federation: The Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol" (21 March 2014) (the “Law on
Admission”) (Annex 888).
792 Ellen Nakashima, Inside a Russian Disinformation Campaign in Ukraine in 2014, Washington
Post (25 December 2017) (Annex 1072).
224
from Russian-based TV channels. As one detailed account of the Russian military operation
in Crimea notes:
On February 26, Russia began aggressively promoting its
message that regime change in Ukraine was illegitimate. …This
message was advanced by several Russian figures and elites;
for example, Sergei Mironov, leader of Russian political party
Spravedlivaya Rossiya, on the Russia 24 news channel, and
Ramzan Kadyrov, head of the Chechen Republic, on the
LifeNews Channel contended that Russians were under threat
in Crimea and required protection and that Russia needed to
act to secure their safety. The message was straightforward:
“[N]ationalists and fascists took power in Kyiv, they will force
Russians to abandon the Russian language and present a
general threat.”793
376. The message was reinforced on the ground in Crimea by pro-Russian
sympathizers. As reported in a contemporary press article:
“We don’t want what happened in Kiev to happen here. Nazis
and bandits have seized power there. And if we have to fight,
we’ll fight with everything we can get our hands on,” said a
member of the local chapter of the Night Wolves biker gang.
The bikers – part of a gang with strong ties to Russia and who
have ridden with Vladimir Putin in the past – are far from
alone.794
The newly-installed Mayor of Sevastopol, Alexei Chaliy, exploited the resulting tensions to
drive recruitment to self-defense units in the city, inviting volunteers to sign up for the new
units at the town hall.795 Two days later in Simferopol, similar sentiments were being voiced
outside the Crimean Parliament, this time demonizing Crimean Tatars: “Yesterday Russian
people were attacked and murdered by Tatar extremists. We will not allow this fascism from
Kiev to happen here, said 43 year-old construction worker, Spartak.”796
793 Michael Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, RAND
Corporation (2017), pp. 13–14 (Annex 1025).
794 Roland Oliphant, Vigilante Units to Defend Crimea City Against ‘Fascist’ Threat from Kiev, The
Telegraph (25 February 2014) (Annex 1036).
795 Ibid.
796 Harriet Salem et al., Crimean Parliament Seized by Unknown Pro-Russian Gunment, The
Guardian (27 February 2014) (Annex 1037).
225
377. Much has been written about Russia’s use of disinformation and propaganda
as part of its integrated military campaign to seize control of Crimea and simultaneously stir
up unrest in other parts of Ukraine. As one commentator observed:
The Russian occupation of Crimea and the war against Ukraine
in Donbas was an apogee in terms of propaganda use, media
manipulations, fake news stories, and forgeries propounded by
the Kremlin. These are just part of the active measures
conducted by Russia, which then amends its military capacity
and diplomatic actions to conceal the deception. These actions
are part of an overall strategy that has been termed hybrid
war.797
378. There was, of course, no truth to the rumors spread by Russian media and
more covertly by its intelligence services. But the coordinated and constant repetition of
untrue stories across a variety of media had a corrosive effect on relations between the
various ethnic groups in Crimea, undermining the years of work undertaken during
Ukrainian rule to promote multiculturalism on the peninsula.798
379. In the run-up to the referendum the following month, the efforts to depict
Ukrainians as fascists and the forthcoming vote as a choice between union with Russia and
submission to Nazism continued, including in divisive campaign posters.
797 Yevhen Fedchenko, Kremlin Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures by Other Means, Söjateadlane
(Estonian Journal of Military Studies), Volume 2, 2016, pp. 141–42.
798 See Witness Statement of Yulia Tyshchenko [hereinafter Tyshchenko Statement], paras. 4–17
(describing a series of initiatives in the field of multicultural education undertaken in the years prior
to 2014) (Annex 17).
226
Figure 14799
Campaign Poster for Crimean Referendum
380. The same crude characterizations were still being used by senior Russian
figures immediately following the referendum. Addressing the Russian legislature on 18
March 2014, President Putin claimed that:
[T]hose who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine … were
preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to
seize power and would stop short of nothing. They resorted to
terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis,
Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They
continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day.800
381. The Crimean Human Rights Group has undertaken a comprehensive analysis
of the use of hate speech in the Crimean media between March 2014 and July 2017. It found
a total of 718 examples of hate speech on Russian TV channels broadcasting in Crimea,
799 Paul Roderick Gregory, Putin’s Destabilization of Ukraine Overshadows Today’s Crimean Vote,
Forbes (16 Mar. 2014) (Annex 1043).
800 Address by President of the Russian Federation, 18 March 2014, The Kremlin, Moscow, at
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 (Annex 887).
227
websites run by the Russian occupation authorities, and websites of mass media outlets
operating in Crimea with Russian permission.
The study established several ethnic, religious and social
groups that hatred was incited towards in the media landscape
of Crimea. These are Ukrainians (as an ethnos and/or civic
community), Crimean Tatars, members and supporters of the
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, Euromaidan activists,
Muslims and migrants.801
Russia Lays the Foundation for Its Discriminatory Campaign Against
the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian Communities
382. If the seeds of Russia’s campaign of cultural erasure against the Crimean
Tatar and Ukrainians in Crimea were sown in the events surrounding the Russian
occupation and the referendum, the Law on Admission, incorporating the peninsula into
Russian territory following the referendum and 18 March Annexation Treaty, provided the
fraudulent foundation for its implementation. The very act of annexation placed the Russian
authorities on a collision course with the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities. A
defining characteristic of both communities at this time was their loyalty to the principle of
Crimea as part of independent Ukraine. By treating Crimea as part of its own sovereign
territory, rather than as occupied territory as international law dictates, the Russian
Federation set itself on a collision course with these two ethnic groups.
383. The Law on Admission provided some important foundation stones for
Russia’s subsequent discriminatory campaign. Article 4 of the law provided that:
From the date of admission of the Republic of Crimea to the
Russian Federation … citizens of Ukraine and stateless persons
permanently residing in the territory of the Republic of Crimea
or the federal city of Sevastopol on that day shall be recognized
as citizens of the Russian Federation, with the exception of
persons who within one month from that date declare their
desire to keep the other citizenship that they and/or their
underage children have, or to remain stateless.802
801 Crimea Human Rights Group, Hate Speech in the Media Landscape of Crimea (2018) (Annex 967).
228
As will be further described in Chapter 9, this provision would have a profound
discriminatory effect on Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians. Those who accepted Russian
citizenship were put in the position of having to swear allegiance to a foreign sovereign that
had unlawfully seized their homeland from the country to which the vast majority of these
communities remained loyal. The practical consequences of this act included potentially
making oneself susceptible to conscription into a hostile army. But those who took
advantage of the opt-out to avoid accepting Russian citizenship were choosing the status of a
foreigner in their own country. Under Russian law, that status meant being denied many of
the civic and economic benefits enjoyed by Russian citizens. The discriminatory
consequences of Russia’s policy of “forced citizenship” will be examined in more detail
below.
384. Article 23(1) of the Law on Admission would prove no less important in
Russia’s discriminatory campaign:
Legislative and other normative legal acts of the Russian
Federation shall be valid in the territories of the Republic of
Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol from the date of
admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation
and the formation of new constituent entities of the Russian
Federation, unless otherwise provided for by this Federal
Constitutional Law.
This provision opened the door to the application of Russia’s full suite of criminal and other
laws in occupied Crimea. Just weeks later a further federal law confirmed that the Criminal
Code and Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation would have full force in
Crimea.803
803 Federal Law No. 91-FZ, “On Application of the Provisions of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation and Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation in the Territories of the Republic
of Crimea and City of Federal Importance Sevastopol (5 May 2014) (Annex 889).
229
385. The Russian Federation used the opening created by Article 23 of the Law of
Admission to apply to Crimea a battery of repressive laws that could then be used selectively
to deny the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities equal enjoyment of their civic,
cultural and other human rights. Chief among these was the corpus of legislation and
Criminal Code provisions constituting Russia's anti-extremism laws.804 Federal Law No.
114-FZ on Combating Extremist Activities of 25 July 2002, for instance, lists as “extremist
activity” a wide array of vaguely defined actions, such as “stirring up of social, racial, ethnic
or religious discord.”805 Notably, the definition does not require violence as an element.806
A similarly broad definition of “extremist materials” covers not only those documents aimed
at “calling for” an extremist activity, but also those “substantiating or justifying the necessity
of such activity.”807 Further, Article 280.1 of Russia’s Criminal Code, amended on 28
December 2013, makes “public calls for implementation of actions aimed at violation of
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation” a criminal offense, punishable by up to five
years in prison.808
386. These laws have been severely criticized by the Venice Commission and
others as giving the Russian authorities the ability to arbitrarily interfere with freedom of
804 Federal Law No. 114-FZ on Combating Extremist Activities of 25 July 2002 (Annex 876).
805 Ibid., art. 1(1).
806 See, e.g., European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion No.
660/2011 on the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity of the Russian Federation, CDLAD(
2012)016 (20 June 2012), para. 35 (noting that in the 2002 version of the legislation, the conduct
was defined as having to be “associated with violence or calls to violence”) (Annex 817).
807 Federal Law No. 114-FZ on Combating Extremist Activities of 25 July 2002, art. 1(3) (Annex 876).
808 Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, article 280.1 (Annex 874).
230
expression.809 The Commission concluded that Russia’s Extremism Law “has the capacity of
imposing disproportionate restrictions of fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined in
the European Convention on Human Rights . . . and infringe the principles of legality,
necessity and proportionality.”810 These findings by the Commission are consistent with
other international human rights opinions on the Extremism Law.811 Indeed, in the
Concluding Observations to its last review of the Russian Federation, the CERD Committee
observed:
The Committee is concerned that the definition of extremist
activity as contained in the Federal Law on Combating
Extremist Activity remains vague and broad, which is further
exacerbated by the new Criminal Code provisions with similar
contents, and that no clear and precise criteria on how
materials may be classified as extremist are provided in the
law. The Committee is particularly concerned that such broad
definitions can be used arbitrarily to silence individuals, in
particular those belonging to groups vulnerable to
discrimination, such as ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples
or non-citizens.812
809 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion No. 660/2011
on the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity of the Russian Federation, CDL-AD(2012)016
(20 June 2012), para. 74 (Annex 817).
810 Ibid., para. 77.
811 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations Report Regarding Russia's Compliance with
the ICCPR, Russian Federation, 1.CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6 (24 November 2009), para. 24 ([T]he State
party should revise the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity with a view to making the
definition of "extremist activity" more precise so as to exclude any possibility of arbitrary
application...Moreover, in determining whether written material constitutes "extremist literature", the
State party should take all measures to ensure the independence of experts upon whose opinion court
decisions are based and guarantee the right of the defendant to counter-expertise by an alternative
expert.”) (Annex 756); For comprehensive analysis of Russia’s sweeping and arbitrary application of
its anti-extremism laws from 2012 to 2017, see, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Online and on All Fronts:
Russia’s Assaults on Freedom of Expression (July 2017) (Annex 962).
812 CERD Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the
Convention, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
Russian Federation, CERD/C/RUS/CO/23-24 (20 September 2017), para. 11 (Annex 804).
231
387. As will be explained in more detail below, the anti-extremism laws ironically
support extremist behavior by Russian authorities. They are only the most visible and
notorious of a multitude of Russian laws introduced in Crimea in violation of international
humanitarian law (“IHL”) as a means of repressing the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
communities.813
388. The Russian Federation has used these and other powers at its disposal to
systematically discriminate against Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea in numerous
aspects of public life, ranging from public safety, through political expression and police
searches and detentions, to the right to gather in public, freedom of media, cultural
preservation and education. Russia has tried to secure Russian dominance first by quashing
the political participation and expression of ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, and then
by expunging their ethnic cultural identity. These two prongs of Russia’s campaign of racial
discrimination in Crimea are described in Chapters 9 and 10 respectively.
813From the Hague Regulations onwards, it has been an established rule of customary international
law that occupying powers must respect "unless absolutely prevented" the laws previously in force in
occupied territories. Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) (October 18, 1907),
art. 43 (“[T]he occupant . . . shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in
the country.”) (Annex 979).
232
Chapter 9. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S POLICY OF DISCRIMINATION IN POLITICAL
AND CIVIL AFFAIRS
389. In the first prong of its campaign of discrimination against the Crimean Tatar
and Ukrainian communities, the Russian Federation has undertaken a systematic assault on
their political and civil rights.
390. In the weeks leading up to the illegal referendum, Crimean Tatar and
Ukrainian activists in Crimea were the targets of a series of disappearances, murders, and
torture. After the referendum, these disappearances and murders continued, and were
compounded by a campaign of banishment and persecution aimed at the Crimean Tatar
leadership, most notably the members of the Mejlis. This campaign culminated with
Russian courts declaring the Mejlis — as described above, a crucial institution for
representing Crimean Tatar interests — an extremist organization and banning its activities
altogether.
391. The Russian Federation has also attacked the political and civil rights of the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian populations more broadly. The FSB and police have targeted
the Crimean Tatar community in particular for arbitrary search and detentions at homes and
businesses, often under the guise of looking for religious extremist materials. In this
discriminatory campaign, the Russian authorities have blockaded and searched entire towns
which are predominantly populated by Crimean Tatars. Further, after imposing its own
citizenship on the residents of Crimea, the Russian Federation has enforced a series of
restrictions on the rights of non-citizens that disproportionately affect members of the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities.
Disappearances, Murders, Abductions and Torture
392. As described in Chapter 8, the Russian Federation’s systematic violations of
the CERD began almost as soon as its military forces commenced their operation to take
control of the peninsula. Knowing in advance that its plan to annex Crimea would face
opposition from those who self-identified as Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian, Russia and its
agents targeted activists from those communities with extreme violence, including
233
abduction, torture, disappearance and murder. The apparent purpose and certain effect of
these heinous offenses against Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians was to intimidate and silence
inconvenient critics and to warn others in those communities not to resist the Russian
takeover. While the worst wave of this violence occurred in the three months following the
launch of Russian operations in Crimea, prominent Crimean Tatar individuals have
continued to be abducted since.814
393. As described below, the Russian Federation has either directly engaged in acts
of physical violence against Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians, or it has encouraged and
tolerated such acts carried out by its agents. These acts of violence and the physical harm
that has resulted were based on a racial or ethnic distinction, in that they targeted members
of the two communities known to oppose Russia’s annexation of Crimea, with the purpose
and/or effect of intimidating those communities into submission.
Disappearances of Crimean Tatar and ethnic Ukrainian activists
394. For more than three years, numerous international observers have reported a
pattern of disappearances and murders directed against members of the Crimean Tatar and
814 The instances of disappearance, murder, abduction and torture described in this section are not
exhaustive. For details of similar crimes carried out against members of the Crimean Tatar and
Ukrainian communities, see, for example, Sergey Zayets et al., THE PENINSULA OF FEAR: CHRONICLE OF
OCCUPATION AND VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMEA (2016) pp. 38-44, 55-74 (Annex 976); and
RFE/RL, Crimea: Political Activists Who Were Killed, Kidnapped, or Went Missing (30 August 2017),
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-crimea/28707006.html (Annex 1068); Crimean Human Rights
Group, The Victims of Enforced Disappearance in Crimea as a Result of the Illegal Establishment of
the Russian Federation Control (2014-2016) (Annex 952).
234
Ukrainian communities. The Crimean Tatar community has been particularly hard hit, as
noted in a September 2017 report of the United Nations monitoring mission in Ukraine. 815
395. An early victim of these violent attacks against Crimean Tatars was Reshat
Ametov, a well-known activist and father of three. On 3 March 2014, Mr. Ametov stood in
silent protest in front of the Cabinet of Ministers building in Simferopol, when uniformed
men kidnapped him in broad daylight, and forced him into a car.816 Two weeks later, Mr.
Ametov was found dead, with signs of torture on his body.817 The perpetrators of this
chilling crime are still at large notwithstanding the existence of video footage which could
help to identify them.818
396. Crimean Tatar individuals continued to disappear in the weeks and months
after the referendum, including Timur Shaimardanov. Mr. Shaimardanov was a leader of a
local activist group, and disappeared on 26 May 2014 – the day after he spoke about the
disappearance of another activist, Leonid Korzh, a few days previously. 819 On 30 May 2014,
815 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of human rights
in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)
(22 February 2014 to 12 September 2017), para. 102 (“OHCHR documented 10 cases of persons who
disappeared and are still missing: six Crimean Tatars, three ethnic Ukrainians and one Russian-Tatar
– all men.”) (Annex 759).
816 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the human rights
situation in Ukraine (15 April 2014), para. 85 (Annex 44); Human Rights Watch, Crimea:
Disappeared Man Found Killed (18 March 2014) (Annex 939).
817 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Accountability for Killings in
Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016, para. 121 (Annex 49); Human Rights Watch, Crimea:
Disappeared Man Found Killed (18 March 2014) (Annex 939).
818 Videos of Crimean Tatar Reshat Ametov kidnapping, h[e] was found dead on March 15, 2014
Crimean crisis, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=11S2Vhkr-bc (Published on 6 April 2014) (Annex
1100).
819 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the human rights
situation in Ukraine (15 November 2014), para. 214 (Annex 48); Human Rights Watch, Crimea:
Enforced Disappearances (7 October 2014) (Annex 942).
235
another Crimean Tatar activist, Serian Zinedinov, disappeared after trying to locate
Shaimardanov. 820 All three activists were members of the pro-Ukrainian group, Ukrainian
House.821
397. This pattern of disappearances continued into 2016, with the disappearance
on 24 May of Ervin Ibragimov. Like other Crimean Tatar individuals who have disappeared,
Mr. Ibragimov was a prominent member of the community, as a member of the Coordination
Council of the World Congress of Crimean Tatars and the Bakhchysarai regional Mejlis.822
Video footage from a nearby shop shows a group of men stopping Mr. Ibragimov’s car,
apprehending him, forcing him into a van, and driving away.823 While Mr. Ibragimov has
not been found, his employment record book and passport were located near a bar about a
week after his disappearance.824
398. Ukrainians also suffered similar harassment and violence at the hands of
Russian forces, and numerous Ukrainians disappeared under suspicious circumstances. As
the United Nations has reported, 90 percent of persons who have disappeared and are still
820 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the human
rights situation in Ukraine (15 June 2014), para. 288 (Annex 764); Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine (15 November
2014), para. 214; Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Enforced Disappearances (7 October 2014) (Annex
942).
821 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Accountability for Killings in
Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016, para. 125 (Annex 49); Human Rights Watch, Crimea:
Enforced Disappearances (7 October 2014) (Annex 942).
822 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 May–15 August 2016), para. 154 (Annex 772).
823 See ibid.; Amnesty International, URGENT ACTION: Crimean Tatar Activist Forcibly Disappeared
(26 May 2016) (Annex 951).
824 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 May–15 August 2016), para. 154 (Annex 772).
236
missing are either Crimean Tatar or Ukrainian.825 Euromaidan activists Vladislav Vaschuk
and Ivan Bonariets, for example, disappeared together on 7 March 2014 in Simferopol.826
On the eve of the referendum, on 15 March 2014, AutoMaidan activist and Sevastopol
resident Vasyl Chernysh was reported missing.827 Neither Mr. Vaschuk nor Mr. Bonariets
nor Mr. Chernysh has been heard from since.
Refusal to investigate, delays in investigation.
399. From the highest levels down, the Russian occupation authorities have chosen
to ignore this pattern of ethnically-targeted disappearances. For example, in an article dated
16 October 2014—after numerous well-publicized disappearances of Crimean Tatars and
Ukrainians in Crimea—Sergei Aksyonov admitted that at least four people had disappeared
but declined to acknowledge that the disappearances constituted a pattern.828
400. The occupation authorities have failed to assure the conduct of effective
investigations of those disappearances and murders which have already occurred. Despite
the fact that Mr. Ametov’s kidnapping was videotaped — and the occupation authorities have
had more than four years to locate the perpetrators caught on film — the United Nations
825 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of human rights
in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)
(22 February 2014 to 12 September 2017), para. 102 (“OHCHR documented 10 cases of persons who
disappeared and are still missing: six Crimean Tatars, three ethnic Ukrainians and one Russian-Tatar
– all men.”) (Annex 759)
826 See Sergey Zayets et al., The Fear Peninsula: Chronicle of Occupation and Violation of Human
Rights in Crimea (2015), p. 47 (Annex 976).
827 Andrii Klymenko, Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea, Atlantic Council, p. 16
(Annex 1058). Automaidan is a "group of motorists founded in November [2013] to support Ukraine's
European integration and counter police assaults against pro-EU demonstrators." Activists on
Wheels: Ukraine's Embattled Automaidan Protesters, RFE/RL (24 Jan. 2014), at
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-activists-automaidan/25241507.html (Annex 1035).
828 Interfax, Head of Crimea Acknowledges Disappearance of Crimean Tatars on Peninsula (16
October 2014) (Annex 1048).
237
monitoring mission in Ukraine recently expressed “serious doubts about the effectiveness” of
the investigation into Mr. Ametov’s disappearance and murder. 829 Although the individuals
shown abducting him were initially interrogated as witnesses to the abduction, they were
later released and the investigation was suspended, allegedly because Mr. Ametov’s
suspected murderer was no longer in Crimea.830
401. Indeed, the Russian occupation authorities have even thwarted family
members’ attempts to learn about the disappearances of their loved ones. Specifically, Mr.
Ametov’s brother has asked twice to review the materials of the criminal investigation into
his brother’s disappearance and murder,831 and a third request was filed by his attorney.832
The Russian investigators have refused to allow Mr. Ametov’s brother to read any case files,
however, citing their own suspension of the investigation as the reason.833
402. The Russian occupation authorities failed even to open an investigation into
Mr. Shaimardanov’s disappearance until 9 July 2014, nearly two months after the event.834
As of the date of this filing, Mr. Shairmardanov has not been found. The occupation
829 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of human rights in
the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22
February 2014 to 12 September 2017), para. 81 (Annex 759).
830 Ibid.
831 Complaint dated 8 August 2017 by R.M. Ametov to Head of the Central Investigative Directorate of
the Investigative Committee of Russian in the Republic of Crimea (Annex 924); Petition dated 16
February 2018 filed by R.M. Ametov to Investigator of High-Profile Cases at the First Investigative
Office of the Directorate for Investigation of High-Profile Cases with the Central Investigative
Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Republic of Crimea (Annex 1112).
832 Letter dated 24 July 2017 from the Central Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee
of Russia in the Republic of Crimea to E.M. Kurbedinov (Annex 865).
833 Ibid.
834 Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Enforced Disappearances (7 October 2014) (“Shaimardanov’s family
reported his disappearance to the police on May 27, but the criminal investigation into his
disappearance was initiated only on July 9.”) (Annex 942).
238
authorities likewise failed to promptly initiate an investigation into Mr. Zinedinov’s
disappearance. Although Mr. Zinedinov’s family reported his disappearance on the morning
of 31 May, authorities waited two months before initiating a criminal investigation.835 Like
the investigation into Mr. Ametov’s disappearance, investigations into the disappearances of
Messrs. Shaimardanov and Zinedinov were suspended, and the United Nations monitoring
mission in Ukraine has expressed concern about the “lack of accountability” in these two
cases.836
403. The occupation authorities similarly failed to promptly investigate Mr.
Ibragimov’s disappearance. In fact, when Mr. Ibragimov’s father attempted to file a
complaint, complete with video of the abduction, the FSB office in Simferopol turned him
away.837 As the European Union has stated, the disappearance of Mr. Ibragimov is
“regrettably only one of the most recent examples,” and part of a “brutal” “persecution of
Crimean Tatars.”838 The Russian Federation’s refusal to institute an investigation into Mr.
Ibragimov’s disappearance is particularly disturbing because it occurred in May 2016, after
numerous international observers had already voiced concerns about the Russian
835 Ibid. (“Zinedinov’s relatives reported his disappearance to the police on the morning of May 31, but
the police started a criminal investigation only two months later.”).
836 In particular, the investigation into Mr. Shaimardanov’s disappearance was suspended on 9 June
2015 allegedly because the perpetrator had not been found. See Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 May–15
August 2015), para. 171 (Annex 769).
837 See ibid., para. 154.
838 EU Statement on “Russia’s Ongoing Aggression against Ukraine and Illegal Occupation of
Crimea”, OSCE Permanent Council No. 1106, PC.DEL/945/16 (24 June 2016) (Annex 814).
239
Federation’s ineffective investigations into the disappearances of Messrs. Ametov,
Shaimardanov, Zinedinov, and others in 2014.839
404. The failure to investigate such egregious crimes undermines protection
against similar abuses in the future because it leads would-be perpetrators to assume that
they can abduct, torture and kill with impunity. And without proper investigation there is
little or no chance that the victims’ families will ever have the remedy of seeing past
perpetrators face justice.
Abduction and torture of Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian activists.
405. A further instrument of intimidation employed by the Russian Federation and
its agents in the run-up to the referendum was to kidnap and torture prominent activists
from the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities. Once the referendum was completed,
the victims were released.
406. Mykhailo Vdovchenko, for example, was abducted just days before the
referendum, after posting pro-Ukrainian messages on Facebook and participating in
839 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 May–15 August 2015), para. 193(o) (calling on the “de facto authorities of
Crimea” and the Russian Federation to “[i]nvestigate the killing of Crimean Tatar Reshat Ametov and
enforced disappearances of Crimean civil society and human rights activists Timur Shaimardanov,
Seiran Zinedinov, Leonid Korzh and Vasyl Chernysh, and bring perpetrators to justice”) (footnotes
omitted) (Annex 769); OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6–18 July
2015) (17 September 2015), para. 147 (discussing the prosecutor of Crimea’s failure to investigate
disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture, and ill-treatment of Euromaidan activists, journalists,
and others) (Annex 812); Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Enforced Disappearances (7 October 2014)
(describing disappearances of Ametov, Zinedinov, Shaimardanov, and others and the occupation
authorities’ failure to investigate them) (Annex 942).
240
peaceful pro-Ukrainian demonstrations in Crimea.840 He endured ten days in Russian
captivity, during which he was repeatedly beaten and interrogated.841 Mr. Vdovchenko was
released on 21 March 2014, and fled to mainland Ukraine.842
407. On 9 March 2014, EuroMaidan activists Andrii Shchekun and Anatoly
Kovalsky were abducted at the Simferopol train station as they prepared to stage a
demonstration on the occasion of the birthday of Taras Shevchenko, an important day of
celebration for Ukrainians in Crimea. 843 In his witness statement, Mr. Shchekun details the
treatment he and Mr. Kovalsky received while unlawfully detained. They were initially taken
to an unknown location, stripped, and tied to chairs. 844 Like Mr. Vdovchenko, Messrs.
Shchekun and Kovalsky were held captive for more than ten days, and both were tortured
repeatedly while in custody. 845 They were blindfolded and both threatened with and
subjected to physical violence, including electric shocks on multiple occasions.846 Mr.
840 Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Attacks, ‘Disappearances’ by Illegal Forces (14 March 2014)
(Annex 938); Kharkiv Human Rights Group, Sentsov-Kolchenko trial, Crimea and what Russia has to
hide 10 July 2015) (Annex 946); Mike Eckel, A Cry from Crimea, World Policy Journal (2014–15)
(Annex 1019). According to one account, Vdovchenko was stopped by three men at around 3:30 pm on
11 March 2014, while he was carrying a Ukrainian flag. Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Attacks,
‘Disappearances’ by Illegal Forces (14 March 2014) (Annex 938). The men tied Vdovchenko’s hands
behind his back and began beating and pushing him. Ibid.
841 Mike Eckel, A Cry from Crimea, World Policy Journal (2014–15) (Annex 1019).
842 Ibid.
843 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the human
rights situation in Ukraine (15 April 2014), para. 85 (Annex 762); Andrii Klymenko, Human Rights
Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea, Atlantic Council, p. 16 (Annex 948); Human Rights Watch,
Crimea: Attacks, ‘Disappearances’ by Illegal Forces (14 March 2014) (Annex 938); Shchekun
Statement, paras. 19–20 (Annex 13). Shchekun and Kovalsky had come to the train station to pick up
a parcel from Kyiv that contained Ukrainian flags. Ibid., para. 19; Human Rights Watch, Crimea:
Attacks, ‘Disappearances’ by Illegal Forces (14 March 2014) (Annex 938).
844 Shchekun Statement, para. 22 (Annex 13).
845 Ibid. paras. 22–23.
846 Ibid. para. 23.
241
Shchekun’s hands and knees were shot at with an air gun.847 After they were released on 20
March 2014, Messrs. Kovalsky and Shchekun fled to Kyiv.848
408. Aleksandr Kostenko was tortured while in official custody. Mr. Kostenko was
arrested on or about 6 February 2015 for allegedly throwing a rock at a Ukrainian Berkut
special police official on 2 February 2014 during the Maidan demonstrations in Kyiv. 849 The
alleged offense thus took place outside of Crimea and before the Russian Federation’s
unlawful annexation. The day before his arrest, Mr. Kostenko was violently attacked by
individuals in plain clothing, thrown in a van, and taken to an unknown location. In FSB
custody, Mr. Kostenko was deprived of food and water, beaten, tortured with electricity,
subjected to a mock execution, and forced to sign a false confession. 850 He suffered several
broken bones including a broken elbow, severe injuries to his abdominal cavity, a dislocated
shoulder, and significant bruising.851 The Deputy Head of the Office of the Human Rights
847 Ibid.
848 Ibid. para. 25. Andrii Klymenko, Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea, Atlantic
Council, p. 16 (Annex 948). In an apparent attempt to further intimidate the ethnic Ukrainian
community in Crimea, Sergei Aksenov and Sergei Tsekov both publicly announced the detention of
Schekun and Kovalsky — who were well-known Ukrainian activists — and stated that they would
remain in custody until after the referendum. Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Activists Detained and
Beaten, One Tortured (25 March 2014) (Annex 940); Shchekun Statement, para. 24 (Annex 13).
849 OSCE , Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015) para. 143,
(17 September 2015) (Annex 812).
850 Ibid.; Crimean Human Rights Field Mission, Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea (April 2015) ,
pp. 7-8 (Annex 945); U.S. Department of State, 2015 Human Rights Reports: Ukraine (Crimea), 13
April 2016 (Annex 1089); Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report
on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 February–15 May 2015), para. 158 (Annex 768).
851 Crimean Human Rights Field Mission, Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea (April 2015) (Annex
945).
242
Ombudsman in Crimea confirmed these injuries, though refusing to assign any responsibility
for the harm. 852 Mr. Kostenko was beaten on several more occasions in prison.853
409. These abductions and torture continue to this day. Renat Paralamov, a
Crimean Tatar who lived in Nizhnegorskiy, was detained in September 2017 on suspicion of
involvement with the Islamic organization Hizb ut-Tahrir. 854 On September 13, a group of
masked men searched his home.855 After conducting the search, the masked men threw Mr.
Paralamov in a van and left. 856 His family, lawyer, and other activists who amassed to seek
any information on his detention were not told anything for 24 hours. 857 The FSB claimed
Mr. Paralamov was voluntarily answering questions. 858
410. Later that day, Mr. Paralamov called his family from a bus station in
Simferopol, seriously injured and unable to walk. 859 Mr. Paralamov’s family took him to a
852 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 August–15 November 2017), para. 138 (Annex 776); Crimean Human Rights
Field Mission, Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea (April 2015) (Annex 945).
853 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 May–15 August 2015), para. 168 (Annex 769); Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16
February–15 May 2015), para. 158 (Annex 768).
854 Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Persecution of Crimean Tatars Intensifies, 14 November 2017
(Annex 964).
855 Ibid.; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human
Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 August–15 November 2017), para. 138.
856 Ibid.
857 Ibid.
858 Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Persecution of Crimean Tatars Intensifies, 14 November 2017
(Annex 964).
859 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 August–15 November 2017), para. 138 (Annex 776); Human Rights Watch,
Crimea: Persecution of Crimean Tatars Intensifies, 14 November 2017 (Annex 964).
243
hospital which diagnosed him with multiple hematomas and bruises.860 He and his family
then fled to Kyiv, where Mr. Paralamov spent fifteen days in a hospital being treated after his
torture.861 During his 24-hour detention at the FSB station, Mr. Paralamov was denied a
lawyer and forced to sign a confession of his involvement with Hizb ut-Tahrir. 862 The FSB
officers placed a bag over his head, taped his mouth, and punched him repeatedly.863 He was
also tortured with electric shocks and then forced to record his confession on camera.864
411. These are just a few examples of torture and forced disappearances
illustrating the grave situation Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians have faced and continue to
face in Crimea. Ongoing reporting by numerous organizations on the ground in Crimea has
revealed numerous additional instances of forced disappearances, murders, and torture in
post-annexation Crimea.865
Political Suppression of Crimean Tatars
412. As described in Chapter 8, when President Putin wanted to win the support of
the Crimean Tatar community for annexation, he knew who to approach: the Mejlis, as the
legitimate representative body of the Crimean Tatar people and, specifically, its first chair,
Mustafa Dzhemilev, whose history as a Soviet dissident had won him wide support within
the community. When the desired support was not forthcoming, the Russian occupation
forces equally knew how to exact collective punishment against the Crimean Tatar
community: by banning the same body—the Mejlis—from operating as its representative
860 Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Persecution of Crimean Tatars Intensifies, 14 November 2017
(Annex 964).
861 Ibid.
862 Ibid.
863 Ibid.
864 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 August–15 November 2017), para. 138 (Annex 776); Human Rights Watch,
Crimea: Persecution of Crimean Tatars Intensifies, 14 November 2017 (Annex 964).
865 See sources cited supra in footnote 814.
244
body and exiling and otherwise depriving it of its political leadership. This section describes
how the Russian Federation did just that.
413. After the referendum in Crimea, the Russian Federation intensified its
campaign of discrimination against the Crimean Tatar community, and in the weeks and
months following the referendum, took a series of actions with the apparent purpose and
foreseeable effect of crippling the political leadership of the Crimean Tatar community.
Statements of officials of the Russian occupation authorities show that the measures taken
against the Mejlis and against individual Crimean Tatar leaders were part of a strategy
targeting the Crimean Tatar community as a whole. For example, Alexander Formanchuk,
an advisor to Sergey Aksyonov (Head and Prime Minister of the so-called Republic of
Crimea), publicly identified the Crimean Tatar community as “the main problem in the
integration of Crimea into the political and legal space of Russia today.”866
Restricting the Movements of Crimean Tatar Leaders
414. In April 2014—just weeks after the referendum—the Russian Federation
banned Mr. Dzhemilev from entering Crimea for five years.867 Given the great respect that
Mr. Dzhemilev inspires in the Crimean Tatar community and his status as the former
longstanding Chairman of the Mejlis, his banishment was a significant blow to the Crimean
866 See Kommersant, The Crimean Tatar Ego (3 March 2015) (Annex 1050).
867 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the human
rights situation in Ukraine (15 May 2014), paras. 152, 229 (Annex 45); OSCE, Report of the Human
Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6-18 July 2015) (17 September 2015), para. 229 (Annex 812);
Amnesty International Public Statement, Harassment and Violence against Crimean Tatars by State
and Non-State Actors (23 May 2014) (Annex 941).
245
Tatar community. Shortly after banning Mr. Dzhemilev, in July 2014, Russia imposed a
similar five-year ban on Refat Chubarov, the current Chairman of the Mejlis.868
415. The effective decapitation of the Crimean Tatar’s self-chosen political
leadership, combined with repressive measures against other Mejlis members still resident
in Crimea (discussed below) forced the Mejlis to relocate to Kyiv. This relocation
immediately limited the ability of the Mejlis to act as the defender and advocate of Crimean
Tatar rights within the peninsula.869
416. After banning Dzhemilev and Chubarov from Crimea, the Russian Federation
further increased the political vulnerability of the Crimean Tatar community by excluding a
number of other leaders from Crimea, or otherwise restricting their movement in and out of
the peninsula. For example, on 9 August 2014, the Russian Federation imposed a five-year
exile on Mr. Ismet Yuksel, general coordinator of the Crimean Tatar media outlet QHA and
868 See OSCE, Thematic Report on the Right to Freedom of Movement across the administrative
boundary line with Crimea (19 June 2015), p. 9 (Annex 811); OSCE, Report on the Human Rights
Assessment Mission on Crimea (6-18 July 2015) (17 Sepember 2015), para. 152 (Annex 812);
European Parliament Policy Department Study, The situation of national minorities in Crimea
following its annexation by Russia (April 2016), p. 18 (Annex 829). Letter from Federal Migration
Service to R. Chubarov (8 January 2015) (stating that Chubarov’s exile is “necessary to ensure the
defense or security of the state, public order, or public health” under Article 27(1) of Federal Law No.
114-FZ) (Annex 849); Letter from FSB to R. Chubarov (13 March 2015) (same) (Annex 858).
868 See Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Thematic Report: Freedom of
Movement across the Administrative Boundary Line with Crimea (19 June 2015), p. 9 (Annex 811);
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Report of the Human Rights Assessment
Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015) (17 September 2015), para. 152 (Annex 812). Prosecutor
General’s Office of the Russian Federation, Information on the outcomes of the analysis of arguments
set out in the letter of the Permanent Delegation of Ukraine to UNESCO (23 October 2015) (Annex
911).
869 See generally Andrew Wilson, The Crimean Tatar Question: A Prism for Changing Nationalisms
and Rival Versions of Eurasianism, 3(2) JOURNAL OF SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETIES 1,
37-38 (2017) (Annex 1024).
246
an advisor to the Mejlis.870 Mr. Yuksel attempted to appeal his exile in the Russian courts,
but this appeal was denied.871
417. Eskender Bariiev, the coordinator of the Committee on the Protection of the
Rights of the Crimean Tatar People and a prominent member of the Mejlis, describes in his
witness statement how he was stopped and searched no fewer than 39 times as he travelled
in and out of Crimea between the Russian invasion of Crimea and January 2015.872 On the
night of 22 to 23 January 2015, Bariiev was detained along with two other members of the
Committee on the Rights of the Crimean Tatar People – Sinaver Kadyrov, and Akmedzhit
Suleimanov – while the three of them were returning to Crimea from mainland Ukraine.873
This detention occurred just after the Russian authorities had squelched their efforts to hold
events marking International Human Rights Day (discussed in Chapter 10 below),874 an
event celebrated by Crimean Tatars since 1990.875 After hours of detention while Mr.
Kadyrov was interrogated, Mr. Bariiev and Mr. Suleymanov were eventually released. Mr.
Kadyrov, however, was taken to court, fined, and banned from entering Crimea because of an
870 See OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on
Crimea (6–18 July 2015) (17 September 2015), para. 229 (Annex 812); Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22 February 2014 to 12
September 2017), para. 128 (Annex 759); Sergey Zayets (Regional Center for Human Rights) et al.,
The Fear Peninsula: Chronicle of Occupation and Violation of Human Rights in Crimea (2015), p. 63
(Annex 976).
871 Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, No. 5-APG15-110s, Ruling (18 November 2015) (Annex
912).
872Witness Statement of Eskender Bariiev, para. 30 [hereinafter Bariiev Statement] (Annex 15).
873 Ibid., para. 31.
874 See infra Chapter 10, Section A.
875 Bariiev Statement, para. 31 (Annex 15).
247
alleged immigration violation.876 As explained further below, the immigration charge
against Mr. Kadyrov was itself an act of racial discrimination.877
418. Mr. Bariiev was ultimately forced to relocate to Kyiv with his wife and two
sons after the Russian occupation authorities brought fabricated criminal charges against
him of engaging in and funding extremist activity, organizing public disturbances, and
compromising the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.878 On the same day that
Mr. Bariiev relocated to Kyiv, another prominent Mejlis leader, Mr. Akhtem Chiygoz
(discussed below), was arrested.879
419. Russia's campaign of discriminatory political suppression against Crimean
Tatars has affected not only the ability of Crimean Tatar leaders to enter Crimea, but also
their ability to leave. For example, in September 2014 Mr. Ali Ozenbasha, Chairman of the
Audit Committee of the Qurulaty of Crimean Tatars and a member of the Mejlis, was
removed from a train by the Russian occupation authorities while attempting to cross into
mainland Ukraine for medical treatment.880 About a year later, several prominent Mejlis
leaders were prevented from leaving Crimea to attend the World Congress of Crimean
Tatars,881 a gathering attended by hundreds of delegates from dozens of countries, as well as
876 Ibid.; see also Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the
human rights situation in Ukraine (1 December 2014–15 February 2015), para. 98 (Annex 767).
877 See infra Chapter 9, Section C.
878 Bariiev Statement, para. 32 (Annex 15).
879 Ibid.
880See OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Based on
Information Received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time) (11 September 2014) (Annex 809).
881 See OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on
Crimea (6–18 July 2015) (17 September 2015), para. 238 (Annex 812).
248
numerous NGOs, at which strategic issues and future plans are discussed.882 The Crimean
leaders who were prevented from attending this event included some of the most senior
members of the Mejlis and the Qurultay, namely first deputy chairman Nariman Dzheljalov
and chairman of the central electoral commission of the Qurultay, Zair Smedlyaev.883
420. These incidents of harassment of Crimean Tatar leaders were not random or
coincidental. The Russian authorities are well aware that the Crimean Tatars cannot
organize themselves effectively if their leaders are not free to travel. The effects of the
Russian Federation’s discriminatory campaign to curtail the freedom of movement of
Crimean Tatar leaders were therefore felt across the entire Crimean Tatar community, whose
political effectiveness it ultimately undermined.
Oppression of theMejlis of the Crimean Tatar People
421. It was not enough for the Russian Federation to undermine the effectiveness
of the Mejlis by exiling and harassing its leaders; the Russian occupation authorities also
undermined the Mejlis as a whole by carrying out searches of the Mejlis’ building, by seizing
assets of entities associated with the Mejlis, and ultimately by banning the Mejlis as an
organization. As can be seen in the series of attacks suffered by the Mejlis and associated
bodies within just a few days in September 2014, there was a coordinated campaign on the
part of the Russian occupation authorities to put this representative institution (and through
it the entire Crimean Tatar community) under maximum pressure.
882 Ridvan Bari Urcosta, New Eastern Europe, Crimean Tatar World Congress: Fear and Expectations
(4 August 2015), available at http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/interviews/1680-crimean-tatarworld-
congress-fears-and-expectations (Annex 947).
883 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High Commissioner
on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6–18
July 2015) (17 September 2015), para. 155 (Annex 812).
249
422. On 16 September 2014, the FSB carried out a 17-hour search of the Mejlis
building in Simferopol.884 During this search computers belonging to the Mejlis and the
charitable foundation Krym were seized, as well as religious texts, hard drives, and some of
Mr. Dzhemilev’s personal belongings.885 After the search, the building was placed under
arrest and sealed.886
423. On the same date, the homes of Mejlis members’ Eskender Bariiev and
Mustafa Asaba were also searched, their personal belongings were seized, and their families
were terrified.887 Mr. Bariiev describes in his witness statement the rough and intimidating
manner in which the search of his house was conducted after four men carrying assault
rifles, wearing masks and camouflage suits barged into the apartment that Mr. Bariiev
shared with his wife and two young children at 6:30 am that day.888 The search at the home
884 See United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the human rights situation
in Ukraine (15 November 2014), para. 218 (Annex 766); OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the
Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015) (17 September 2015), para. 232
(Annex 812); Excerpts of Protocol of Search of Mejlis Building (Annex 1114); Bariiev Statement, para.
29 (Annex 15).
885 See United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the human rights situation
in Ukraine (15 November 2014) (Annex 48), para. 218; OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the
Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015) (17 September 2015), para. 232
(Annex 812); Excerpts of Protocol of Search of Mejlis Building (Annex 1114); Bariiev Statement, para.
29 (Annex 15).
886 Bariiev Statement, para. 29 (Annex 15); Protocol of Search for Home of Eskender Bariiev (Annex
1115).
887 See United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the human rights situation
in Ukraine (15 November 2014), para. 218 (Annex 766); Human Rights Watch, Rights in Retreat
(November 2014), at 16 (943); Protocol of Search for Home of Eskender Bariiev (Annex 1114).
888 Bariiev Statement, para. 27.
250
of Mr. Asaba was carried out in a similar manner, and the authorities seized religious
materials and a booklet on the Crimean Tatar national movement.889
424. On 17 September 2014, the Crimea Fund, the charitable organization that
owns the Mejlis building, was given 24 hours to evacuate the Mejlis building pursuant to a
court order.890 As the OSCE observed at the time, this action essentially “confiscated” the
property of the Crimean Fund and the Mejlis.891 Pursuant to a separate court order, of 25
September 2014, property of the Bakhchysarai Regional Mejlis was likewise seized. This
court order — which was affirmed on appeal — forced the Bakhchysarai Regional Mejlis to
vacate the premises they had previously rented.892
425. The Russian occupation authorities significantly escalated their attacks on the
Mejlis as an organization in April 2016, taking the extreme step of banning the Mejlis’s
activities altogether. Ironically, it did so by invoking Russia’s own anti-extremism laws, with
the prosecutor of Crimea alleging that the Mejlis was an “extremist” organization because,
among other reasons, it had organized a pro-Ukraine rally on 26 February 2014.893 The
Supreme Court of Crimea ruled in the prosecutor’s favor in a judgment of 26 April 2016.
426. It was obvious from the outset to independent observers that Russia’s ban on
the Mejlis was a political measure directed at the Crimean Tatar community as a whole, and
889 Bariiev Statement, para. 28.
890 See United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the human rights situation
in Ukraine (15 November 2014), para. 218 (Annex 766).
891 See OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission in Crimea (6-18 July 2015) (17
September 2015), para. 232 (Annex 812); Interim measures for Civil Suit No. 2-1688/2014
(prohibiting Crimea Foundation from exercising ownership of its properties and sequestering its bank
accounts) (Annex 929).
892 See OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission in Crimea (6-18 July 2015) (17
September 2015), para. 233 (Annex 812).
893 Decision in the name of the Russian Federation, Case No. 2A-3/2016 (26 April 2016) (Annex 913).
251
that the allegations of extremism were a pretext. Indeed, even before the ban was imposed,
the Council of Europe stated that a ban “would indicate a new level of repression targeting
the Crimean Tatar community as a whole.”894
427. Despite the criticism, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld
the ban on 29 September 2016. Thereafter, Russian occupation authorities enforced the ban
against eight Mejlis members in October and November 2016 by imposing fines for holding a
meeting at the home of Deputy Chairman Ilmi Umerov.895 Mr. Shevket Kaybullayev, for
example, was fined five hundred roubles for his participation in the meeting,896 and Mr.
Mustafa Maushev was fined 750 roubles.897
428. Notwithstanding its obligation to comply with binding orders of the Court, the
Russian Federation has done nothing to lift the ban despite this Court’s order on 19 April
2017 that Russia must “[r]efrain from maintaining or imposing limitations on the ability of
the Crimean Tatar community to conserve its representative institutions, including the
Mejlis.”898 To the contrary, Russia has rebuffed attempts by the Mejlis as an institution and
by certain of its members to obtain a suspension of the ban though the Russian government
and court system.
894 See Council of Europe Report of 11 April 2016, p. 4 (Annex 825).
895 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human
Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 August–15 November 2016), para. 168 (Annex 773).
896 Ruling in Case No. 5-1591/2016 (4 October 2016) (Annex 916).
897 Ruling in Case No. 5-1588/2016 (23 November 2016) (Annex 917).
898 Order on Provisional Measures 19 April 2017, para. 106.
252
429. On behalf of the Mejlis, its Chairman –Refat Chubarov — wrote to both the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation899 and the prosecutor of Crimea900
following the Court’s Provisional Measures Order, asking them to take steps to lift the ban.
To facilitate their own efforts to defend the rights of the Crimean Tatar people, the Mejlis
requested that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs provide certified copies of this Court’s
provisional measures order so that these copies could be used in Russian domestic
proceedings.901 In a cursory response dated 9 August 2017, the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs assured Mr. Chubarov that it was taking all appropriate steps to implement the
Provisional Measures Order, while at the same time emphasizing the temporary nature of
that order.902 The 27 September 2017 response from the prosecutor of Crimea was no more
helpful, simply reiterating the purported legal basis for the ban on the Mejlis and indicating
that it could only be reconsidered if new evidence was discovered.903
430. Separately, on 12 July 2017, Mr. Bariiev filed a private complaint with the
Supreme Court of Crimea seeking reconsideration of the ban of the Mejlis and attaching this
Court’s Provisional Measures Order.904 Less than ten days later, however, the Crimean
Supreme Court rejectedMr. Bariiev’s complaint on procedural grounds.905 Mr. Bariiev
899 Ruling in Case No. 5-1588/2016 (23 November 2016) (Annex 917).
900 Letter of 27 September 2017 from the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Crimea to Refat
Chubarov (Annex 867).
901 Ibid.
902 Letter dated 9 August 2017 from Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to R. Chubarov (Annex 866).
903 Letter of 27 September 2017 to R. Chubarov from the Prosecutor of Crimea (Annex 867).
904 Letter of Petition for reconsideration, signed by Eskender Bariiev (12 July 2017) (Annex 863).
905 Case No. 2A-3/2016, Decision of 26 April 2016 of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea
concerning the appeal of the ban of the Mejlis (Annex 913). Specifically, The Crimean Supreme Court
stated, surprisingly, that it was not able to authenticate a copy of its own ruling of 26 April 2016 which
was attached to Bariiev’s complaint. Ibid.
253
appealed to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in August 2017,906 but has yet to
receive any response.
431. The ban has been widely and strongly condemned both before and after this
Court’s Provisional Measures Order. A June 2016 United Nations report observed that the
Mejlis ban “could be perceived as a collective punishment against the Crimean Tatar
community” and opined that the ban “confirm[ed] the significant restrictions already
imposed by the de facto authorities on [the Mejlis] since March 2014.”907 On 19 December
2017, the United Nations General Assembly called on the Russian Federation to revoke the
ban on the Mejlis “immediately.”908
Retroactive prosecutions and convictions related to demonstrations
of 26 February
432. In addition to attacking the Mejlis as an institution and exiling much of its top
leadership, the Russian Federation has resorted to politically-motivated prosecutions of
those Mejlis leaders who remained in Crimea. Along with several other Crimean Tatars,
Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis, Akhtem Chiygoz, faced charges arising from the
demonstrations in front of the Crimean Parliament building on 26 February 2014 (described
in Chapter 8 above).
433. The discriminatory nature of these proceedings is clear from the absence of
any similar prosecution of participants in the pro-Russian counter demonstration that day
906 Private complaint against the Decision of 21 July 2017, by Eskender Bariiev (Annex 864).
907 United Nations, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine (16 February–15 May 2016) (3
June 2016), para. 188 (Annex 771).
908 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 72/190, U.N. Doc. A/Res/72/190, Situation of human rights in
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine (19 December 2017) (Annex
50). The General Assembly also took note of this Court’s Provisional Measures Order, and called on
the Russian Federation to “refrain from maintaining or imposing limitations on the ability of the
Crimean Tatar community to conserve its representative institutions.” Ibid.
254
and from the extraordinary spectacle of Russian-controlled courts applying Russian criminal
law to events that occurred well before 18 March 2014, the date on which Russia claims for
all other purposes that its law first became applicable on the peninsula.909 While Ukrainians
have also suffered from the retroactive application of Russian law in Crimea,910 no ethnic
Russian supportive of the purported annexation has suffered a similar fate.911
434. As Mr. Chiygoz explains in his witness statement, he was held in deplorable
conditions during his pre-trial confinement and spent long periods in solitary
909 Federal Constitutional Law No. 6-FKZ (21 March 2014) (Annex 888); Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22 February 2014 to 12
September 2017), para. 77 (Annex 759); OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights
Assessment Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015) (17 September 2015), para. 236 (Annex 812).
910 For example, Mr. Kostenko, whose torture is discussed above, was arrested on 8 February 2015 on
suspicion of wounding a Berkut police officer on 18 February 2014 during the Maidan protests, before
the illegal referendum had been carried out. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 February to 15 May 2015),
para. 158 (Annex 768). Mr. Kostenko was sentenced to four years in prison based on alleged violence
against police officers during this time. See Council of Europe Report of 11 April 2016, p. 10 (Annex
825). Similarly, Maidan activist Andriy Kolomiets was sentenced to 10 years in prison in June 2016
for Maidan protest activities. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine (16 February to 15 May 2016), para. 189 (Annex
771); Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Ukrainian Jailed in Crimea over Euromaidan ‘Murder’ Charge
(10 June 2016) (Annex 1081).
911 See OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on
Crimea (6–18 July 2015) (17 September 2015), paras. 146, 236. As the European Parliament has
stated, this case violates the norms of international humanitarian law, in particular the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, as well as the Russian Criminal Code, because the de facto authorities
retroactively applied Russian legislation to events that occurred before the occupation. See European
Parliament Policy Department Study, The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its
annexation by Russia (April 2016), at 15 (Annex 829). Six others were also arrested in connection
with this case. See OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the
High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment
Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015) (17 September 2015), para. 236 n.373 (Annex 812).
255
confinement.912 He was denied basic human accommodations such as being permitted to
attend his mother’s funeral,913 being provided with the pork-free food required by his
Muslim faith, or being informed of the cardinal directions so that he could pray in the
manner prescribed by that faith.914 Other inmates were not subjected to such treatment, and
officers at the facilities where Mr. Chiygoz was held repeatedly reminded Mr. Chiygoz that
they had special attitudes toward him.915
435. After more than two years in custody, Mr. Chiygoz’s trial began in the summer
of 2016.916 Numerous witnesses in this trial testified in opposition to the prosecution’s case,
and some even testified that they had been pressured into giving false evidence against Mr.
Chiygoz.917 As Mr. Chiygoz explains, of the 213 alleged witnesses and victims, only four gave
detailed direct testimony against him — and three of these four witnesses were so-called
secret witnesses.918 Mr. Chiygoz was consistently denied the right to fully and effectively
defend himself, as he was not permitted to attend his trial in person but rather only via a
poor video connection, despite the fact that he was being held in a detention facility within
easy reach of the courthouse.919 At the end of the grossly defective trial, the Crimean court
found Mr. Chiygoz guilty of organizing a mass riot under Article 212 of the Criminal Code of
912Witness Statement of Akhtem Chiygoz, paras. 8, 12 [hereinafter Chiygoz Statement] (Annex 19).
913 Ibid., para. 26.
914 Ibid., para. 9.
915 Ibid., paras. 13, 15.
916 See ibid., para. 16.
917 Ibid., para. 18.
918 Ibid., para. 17.
919 Ibid., para. 19.
256
the Russian Federation and sentenced him to eight years in prison.920 Mr. Chiygoz is free
today due to an informal agreement between Turkey and the Russian Federation, reflecting
the political nature of the charges against him.921
Arrest, detention, and trial of Ilmi Umerov
436. On 12 May 2016, the Russian FSB arrested Ilmi Umerov and charged him
with undermining the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.922 Mr. Umerov is also a
Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis, and at the time of his arrest in May 2016 was one of the few
senior Mejlis leaders who remained free in Crimea. Mr. Umerov’s prosecution was a
significant blow to Crimean Tatars due to his multiple roles as a founding member of the
Mejlis, and in the Crimean provincial and local governments.923 In these roles, Mr. Umerov
had been a significant force in supporting the rights of the Crimean Tatar community, and
for decades had linked Crimean Tatars’ self-governing bodies and Crimean government
institutions.
437. Mr. Umerov remained a strong voice for Crimean Tatars after Russia’s
military intervention, giving numerous interviews in which he forthrightly described the
occupation and purported annexation of the peninsula by Russia as a violation of
international law.924 Given his outspokenness on this issue of evident sensitivity to the
920 Ibid., para. 27; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of
human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of
Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22 February 2o14–12 September 2017), para. 77 (Annex 759).
921 Chiygoz Statement, paras. 28–33 (Annex 19); RFE/RL, Crimean Tatar Leaders ‘Freed,’ Fly To
Turkey (26 October 2017) (Annex 1070).
922 United Nations Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 February to 15 May 2016 (June
3, 2016), para. 182; United States Mission to the OSCE, Ongoing Violations of International Law and
Defiance of OSCE Principles and Commitments by the Russian Federation in Ukraine (26 May 2016)
(Annex 1070).
923Witness Statement of Ilmi Umerov [hereinafter Umerov Statement], paras. 2–4 (Annex 20).
924 Ibid., para. 7.
257
Russian occupation authorities, it is perhaps unsurprising that he became a target of their
repressive tactics. The brutality with which he was treated by those authorities, however,
shocked world opinion.925
438. Mr. Umerov’s ordeal began on 12 May 2016 with his interrogation and the
search of his house. 926 As Mr. Umerov describes in his witness statement, although he made
no effort to resist, he was escorted from his home to his interrogation in Simferopol by three
police cars and two special forces buses, along with dozens of armed men in masks.
Similarly, Russian occupation authorities sent numerous armored vehicles and dozens of
armed men to carry out a search of Mr. Umerov’s home that day, but the search itself was
cursory and lasted only a few minutes.927 Mr. Umerov concludes that the show of
unnecessary force was an attempt to intimidate the wider Crimean Tatar community.928
439. In August 2016, the Russian occupation authorities revived a brutal Soviet
technique for suppressing dissent, involuntarily committing Mr. Umerov to a psychiatric
925 See, e.g., Max Seddon, Moscow cracks down on embattled Crimea Tatar dissidents: Russian
tactics echo KGB practice of forced psychiatric confinement, Financial Times (11 October 2016)
(Annex 1082); Christina Paschyn, Russia Is Trying to Wipe Out Crimea’s Tatars, New York Times (19
May 2016) (Annex 1083); Human Rights Watch, Crimean Tatar Activist Confined in Psychiatric
Hospital (26 August 2016) (Annex 953); RFE/RL, Russian Court Convicts Crimean Tatar Leader
Umerov of ‘Separatism’ (28 September 2017) (Annex 1084).
926 Umerov Statement, paras. 9-15 (Annex 20).; Decree for the Initiation of criminal proceeding and
Pre-trial Investigation (12 May 2016) (Annex 932); Protocol, Interrogation of the Suspect (12 May
2016) (Annex 933). A few days later the occupation authorities issued a formal decision to prosecute
Mr. Umerov. See Decision to Prosecute As Defendant Adopted by I.A. Skripka, Senior Lieutenant of
Justice and the Investigator of the Investigation Department of the Department of Federal Security
Service (FSB) of Russia in the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (19 May 2016) (Annex
934).
927 Umerov Statement, para. 14 (Annex 20).
928 Ibid., para. 15.
258
facility for evaluation and detaining him there for three weeks.929 During this period—which
Mr. Umerov refers to as a 21-day torture—Mr. Umerov was held in a ward for persons with
incurable mental diseases.930 While in this ward, Mr. Umerov endured unhygienic
conditions, and was forced to share a small space with three other persons.931 Because the
ward lacked doors, sound traveled freely throughout, meaning that all 100 patients could
hear each other, and even approach each other’s beds.932 On many occasions, Mr. Umerov
awoke in the night to see another patient standing over his bed, looking down at him.933 The
Chair of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s human rights committee described Mr.
Umerov’s detention as “a worrying new low in Russia’s stigmatization of the Crimean Tatar
community.”934
440. The Russian authorities’ persecution of Mr. Umerov continued over the
summer of 2017, when Mr. Umerov was subjected to a lengthy criminal trial.935 As Mr.
Umerov describes in his witness statement, this trial revealed numerous, obvious errors and
929 See OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 May–15 August 2016), para.
178 (Annex 772); Human Rights Watch, Confined Tatar Activist Confined in Psychiatric Hospital (26
August 2016) (Annex 953); RFE/RL, Punitive Medicine? Crimean Tatars Shaken By Leader’s
Confinement to Mental Asylum (25 August 2016) (Annex 1063).
930 Umerov Statement, para. 17 (Annex 20).
931 Ibid.
932 Ibid., 17.
933 Ibid.
934 See Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Press Release: Parliamentary Assembly
Human Rights Chair Calls for Release of Crimean Tatar Leader Umerov (27 August 2016) (Annex
815); Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 May–15 August 2016), para. 178 (Annex 772); Human Rights Watch, Crimean
Tatar Activist Confined in Psychiatric Hospital (26 August 2016) (Annex 953).
935 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 May–15 August 2017), para. 140 (Annex 772); RFE/RL, Crimean Tatar
Leader Umerov Goes On Trial On Separatism Charge (7 June 2017) (Annex 1066); RFE/RL,
Crimean Tatar Leader Umerov’s Trial Resumes in Simferopol (21 June 2017) (Annex 1067).
259
falsehoods in the charges against him, including a mistranslation of the statement by Mr.
Umerov that formed the basis of his charges.936 Despite such clear errors and falsehoods,
Mr. Umerov was convicted of alleged separatism on 27 September 2017, and sentenced to
endure two years of forced labor.937 For Mr. Umerov, who suffers from heart disease and
Parkinson’s disease, this sentence was particularly harsh.
441. Reflecting the political nature of the charges against him, Mr. Umerov was
ultimately released by the Russian Federation only as part of an agreement between Turkey
and the Russian Federation.938
Arbitrary Searches and Detentions
442. As explained in the preceding section, abusive searches and detentions are
just one of several techniques used by the Russian occupation authorities to harass the
leaders of the Crimean Tatar community, and to make it harder for them to defend the rights
of their people. But Russia has put that particular technique to wider use in Crimea,
employing arbitrary searches against lower level activists, Crimean Tatar schools and
mosques to keep the entire community off-balance.
443. Since the occupation, Russian authorities have targeted members of the
Crimean Tatar community by searching their homes, raiding public spaces, and blocking off
entire towns to conduct massive inspections and ID checks against Crimean Tatar
individuals.939 Numerous Crimean Tatar individuals have been detained in the process,
sometimes merely for being bystanders. Frequently, the asserted basis for these
discriminatory raids has been Russia’s laws on anti-extremism. As explained in Chapter 8,
936 Umerov Statement, para. 20 (Annex 20).
937 RFE/RL, Russian Court Convicts Crimean Tatar Leader Umerov of ‘Separatism’, 27 September
2017 (Annex 1069).
938 Umerov Statement, para. 22 (Annex 20); RFE/RL, Crimean Tatar Leaders ‘Freed,’ Fly To Turkey
(26 October 2017) (Annex 1070).
939 Crimean Tatar Resource Center, Analysis of human rights violations in the occupied Crimea in
2017 (presentation), 2 February 2018 (concluding that a vast majority of detentions and arrests
conducted in Crimea in 2017, as well as resulting fines, were directed at Crimean Tatars) (Annex 970).
260
these laws were extended to Crimea in violation of international humanitarian law and have
been widely criticized as so vaguely written as to be susceptible to discriminatory application.
Searches of Homes of Crimean Tatars
444. In the weeks and months following the referendum, the occupation
authorities targeted Crimean Tatar families in their homes, with spurious searches for socalled
extremist materials. In August and September 2014, for example, the occupation
authorities entered the homes of numerous Crimean Tatar families, purporting to conduct
searches for illegal drugs and weapons.When they did not find illegal drugs or weapons, the
Russian FSB members confiscated so-called extremist literature or personal belongings of
the families. 940 In some cases, homeowners were taken to police stations for interrogation,
and held there for hours.941
445. These searches continued after 2014. On 12 October 2016, for example, the
Russian FSB forcefully broke into six Crimean Tatar homes and conducted searches in the
presence of children.942 As with the 2014 searches, the FSB did not find weapons or drugs,
940 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human
Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 September 2014), para. 153 (describing a 28 August 2014 search of the
home of a Crimean Tatar family in Bakhchysarai at which no drugs or weapons were found, but socalled
extremist literature was confiscated) (Annex 765); ibid., para. 156 (describing searches of at
least 10 Crimean Tatar homes on 4 and 5 September 2014 in Simferopol, Nizhnegorsk,
Krasnoperekopsk and Bakhchysarai, and stating that police found no weapons during these searches
but confiscated religious literature); ibid., para. 154 (describing a 10 September 2014 search of two
Crimean Tatar homes in the village Kamenka (Leninskiy district) at which two notebooks, a mobile
phone and two religious books were confiscated).
941 Ibid., para. 155 (describing a 10 September 2014 search of two Crimean Tatar homes in the village
Kamenka (Leninskiy district) at which two notebooks, a mobile phone and two religious books were
confiscated and the homeowners were taken to Simferopol for interrogation, and were released after
18 hours).
942 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 August–15 November 2016), para. 165 (Annex 773).
261
but instead confiscated religious literature.943 As the United Nations monitoring mission in
Ukraine recently observed, these intrusive raids of private homes have “disproportionately
affected the Crimean Tatars.”944
446. Such searches have continued since the initiation of these proceedings;
indeed, the Russian authorities have carried out mass arrests in Crimean Tatar
neighborhoods on charges of extremism, breaching public order, and other spurious
allegations. On 21 February 2017, for example, the occupation authorities searched the
home of Crimean Tatar activist Marlen Mustafayev on the pretext of suspected “extremist”
activity.945 When other Crimean Tatars began filming the search in an effort to protect Mr.
Mustafayev’s human rights, these individuals were arrested.946 In connection with this
search, ten Crimean Tatars were found guilty of breaching public order and impeding the
movement of civilians.947 According to the Crimean Tatar Resource Center, all nine house
searches conducted in Crimea in the month of January 2018 were of houses of Crimean
Tatars.948
447. In many instances, searches against Crimean Tatar individuals were based on
accusations of religious extremism. On 2 October 2017, for instance, the Crimean branch of
943 Ibid.
944 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of human rights
in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)
(22 February 2014 to 12 September 2017), para. 12 (Annex 759).
945 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 February to 15 May 2017), para. 144; RFE/RL, Russia Detains 11 Crimean
Tatars (22 February 2017) (Annex 1064).
946 Ibid.
947 Ibid.
948 Crimean Tatar Resource Center, Analysis of human rights violations in the occupied Crimea over
January 2018 (presentation), 15 February 2018 (Annex 971).
262
the Russian FSB conducted house raids of four Crimean Tatar men who were arrested for
allegedly engaging in “extremist” activities.949 The men were accused by the FSB of being
members of Tablighi Jamaat, a Sunni movement banned in the Russian Federation (but not
Ukraine) as an extremist organization.950
448. Similarly, on 11 October 2017, the FSB and Special Forces units searched
homes of Crimean Tatars in Bakhchysarai, and arrested six Crimean Tatar men on charges of
alleged membership in a terrorist group.951 The men were this time accused of being
members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, another organization labelled as terrorist and banned in the
Russian Federation (but not Ukraine).952 On the same day, 11 other Crimean Tatar men who
filmed the actions of law enforcement officers were also detained and charged with
participating in an unauthorized public gathering leading to disruption of public order.953
Nine were sentenced to administrative fines.954
449. Considering that Islamic extremism had not been part of the history of the
Crimean peninsula before the Russian occupation, the frequency with which Russian
949 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 August to 15 November 2017), para. 136 (Annex 776).
950 Ibid., para. 136 & n.218.
951 Ibid., para. 137.
952 Human Rights Watch, Crimea: Persecution of Crimean Tatars Intensifies (14 November 2017)
(noting that Russian authorities have arrested at least 26 people on charges of involvement with Hizb
ut-Tahrir since 2015, facing from five years to life in prison, “solely for acts – often in private – of
expression, assembly, opinion, or religious and political belief that the Russian authorities claim
constitute affiliation with Hizb ut-Tahrir”) (Annex 964).
953 Ibid.
954 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 August to 15 November 2017), para. 137 (Annex 776); Human Rights Watch,
Crimea: Persecution of Crimean Tatars Intensifies (14 November 2017) (quoting a lawyer present to
witness the detention who told the media that “police [had] struck several of the activists while
transporting them to the police station”) (Annex 964).
263
authorities are using this accusation to justify their searches and detentions of Crimean Tatar
individuals strongly suggests that it is a pretext for discrimination.955
Raids in Public Spaces Targeting Crimean Tatars
450. The occupation authorities have also raided public places such as markets,
mosques, cafés, restaurants, or theaters. In these raids, like the searches of private homes,
Crimean Tatars have particularly been targeted.956 On 1 April 2016, for example, a group of
armed and masked individuals entered a café in the village of Pionerske (Simferopol district)
and began destroying furniture, allegedly in search of drugs.957 In connection with this
search, dozens of Crimean Tatars were detained at the Simferopol police’s Centre for
Countering Extremism, where they were interrogated, photographed, and required to
provide DNA samples and fingerprints.958
451. The occupation authorities have engaged in arbitrary searches at even larger
scale in some instances, setting up blockades around towns and conducting full or random
checks of passing individuals. In April 2015, for example, such blockades and searches
occurred in Zhuravki village of Kirov district, Yarkoe Shchelkovo, Lenino, Battalion,
Semisotka, Vojkovo, Bagerovo villages, near Simferopol Fountains and in Saki.959 About
955 Magocsi Report, para. 82 (Annex 21); see also Askold Krushelnycky, Ukraine: Crimea's Tatars --
Clearing The Way For Islamic Extremism?, RFE/RL (26 August 2004) (Annex 1033); Thomas J.
Reese & Daniel I. Mark, Losing Their Religion in Crimea, Foreign Affairs (15 April 2015) (discussing
Russia’s use of its oppressive laws to persecute religious minorities in Crimea) (Annex 1054).
956 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of human rights
in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)
(22 February 2014 to 12 September 2017), para. 96 (“OHCHR noted a prevalence of members of the
Crimean Tatar community among people apprehended during police raids.”) (Annex 759).
957 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 February to 15 May 2016), para. 183 (Annex 771).
958 Ibid.
959 See Crimea Human Rights Field Mission - Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea (April 2015), pp.
10-11 (Annex 945); Human Rights Group Report of October 2015, pp. 7-8 (Annex 949).
264
100-150 armed officers mounted sandbags on all roads leading to and from the villages.
They required the passing cars to show documents and be inspected. At least in two villages,
machine guns and road blocks were installed instead of sandbags.960
452. In cases where random inspections were conducted, the officers targeted
Crimean Tatar individuals. Slavic-looking people needed only to show government-issued
IDs, while Crimean Tatars with the same documentation were in many cases accompanied to
their homes, where authorities conducted searches.961
453. It is important to note that the foregoing searches are merely illustrative of a
broader policy and practice carried out by the Russian occupation authorities in Crimea.962
In fact, the Russian Federation’s campaign of discriminatory searches has continued into late
2017 and 2018, and continues to oppress the Crimean Tatar community.
454. In November 2017, for example, the Russian occupation authorities carried
out an aggressive search of at café favored by Crimean Tatars.963 Vedzhie Kashka, an 82 yearold
Crimean Tatar activist, was present at the café when the search began and was taken to
the hospital in the course of the search.964 She died shortly thereafter. On 26 April 2018, the
Russian occupation authorities carried out a series of armed searches at the homes and
businesses of Crimean Tatars, and detained prominent members of the Crimean Tatar
960 See ibid.
961 See ibid.
962 See, e.g., Crimean Tatar Resource Center, Security officers conducted regular searches in the
houses of the Crimean Tatars in Crimea (23 January 2018) (Annex 969); Crimean Human Rights
Group, Statement on Unlawful searches and detainments of Crimean Tatar national movement
activists and veterans in Crimea (24 November 2017) (Annex 965); Human Rights Watch, Crimea:
Persecution of Crimean Tatars Intensifies (14 November 2017) (Annex 964).
963 See RFE/RL, Veteran Crimean Tatar Activist Dies As Associated Detained By Russia (23
November 2017) (Annex 1071); Human Rights Watch, Another Day, Another Tragedy in Crimea (27
November 2017) (Annex 966).
964 See ibid.
265
community, on the absurd pretext that they possessed food products that were beyond their
sell-by dates.965 By carrying out this pervasive pattern of searches, the Russian Federation
undermines the Crimean Tatar community’s basic sense of safety and belonging in their
indigenous homeland.
Forced Russian Citizenship and Subsequent Discrimination Against Non-
Russians
455. As described in Chapter 8, the Law of Admission’s provision for permanent
residents of Crimea to automatically receive Russian nationality laid a foundation for
systematic discrimination against Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea. This section
describes in more detail how the law was implemented and its impact on both those who had
no choice but to accept Russian nationality and the smaller number who were able to opt out.
Implementation of the Law of Admission’s Citizenship Provisions
456. The Law of Admission, by which Russia purported to incorporate Crimea into
its federal structure, extended Russian nationality to all “citizens of Ukraine … permanently
residing in the territory of the Republic of Crimea or the federal city of Sevastopol … with the
exception of persons who within one month from that date declare their desire to keep the
other citizenship that they and/or their underage children have.”966
965 Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, Crimean Tatar businessman & philanthropist seized and
new FSB offensive in Russian-occupied Crimea (3 May 2018) (Annex 973); Unrepresented Nations
and Peoples Organizatino, Crimean Tatars: Russian Repression Continues with Arrest of Crimean
Businessman (8 May 2018) (Annex 974).
966 Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation of 21 March 2014 No. 6-FKZ “On the
Admission of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation, and the formation of new
Constituent Entities of the Russian Federation: The Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of
Sevastopol,” art. 4(1) (Annex 888).
266
457. Implicit in this formulation was a deviation from the general Russian practice
of recognizing dual citizenship.967 By its terms, the Law on Admission extended Russian
citizenship only to those Ukrainians who did not desire to keep their Ukrainian citizenship,
creating a presumption that those individuals who accepted Russian nationality had
renounced their Ukrainian citizenship.968
458. In practice, the number of people who were able to declare their desire to
retain Ukrainian citizenship likely represented only a fraction of those who wanted to do
so.969 The Law on Admission created a very tight deadline for such declarations – one month
from 18 March 2014,970 the date that Russian law treats as the day on which Crimea was
admitted to the Russian Federation by virtue of the purported treaty between Russia and the
so-called Republic of Crimea. Because Russia’s Federal Migration Service did not issue
967 See Federal Law 62-FZ “On Citizenship of the Russian Federation,” art. 6(2) (Annex 875); see also
Open Society Foundation, Report: Human Rights in the Context of Automatic Naturalization in
Crimea, para. 76 (Annex 975).
968 Any such presumption is not, however, determinative of the possession or otherwise of Ukrainian
nationality by a given resident of Crimea. As this Court has recognized, "it is for every sovereign State,
to settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition of its nationality, and to confer that
nationality by naturalization granted by its own organs in accordance with that
legislation." Nottebohm Case (Second Phase) (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment of 6 April 1955 I.C.J.
Reports 1955, p. 20. Forced acquisition of Russian nationality by Ukrainian nationals residing in
Crimea is not recognized by Ukraine and is not accepted as a ground for loss of nationality in Ukraine.
Law of Ukraine “On guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of nationals and on the legal regime in the
temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine,” art. 5 (cited in Crimea Beyond Rules, p. 45 (Annex 955)).
969 According to the Russian Federal Migration Service, 3,427 permanent residents of Crimea
successfully opted out of Russian citizenship. OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the
Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine),
A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017) para. 59 (Annex 778).
970 By contrast, in 1991 the Russian Federation gave former USSR citizens residing in its territory one
year to declare their unwillingness to accept Russian nationality. See Regional Centre for Human
Rights, et al., Crimea Beyond Rules: Thematic review of the human rights situation under
occupation, Vol. 3, Right to nationality (citizenship) (2017), p. 22 (quoting Article 13(1) of Law of the
Russian Federation of 28 November 1991 no. 1948-I “On Citizenship of the Russian Federation”)
(Annex 955).
267
instructions on the refusal procedure until 1 April 2014, however, in reality people wishing to
decline Russian citizenship had only 18 days to do so.971 Further, the Russian occupation
authorities allowed people to opt out of Russian nationality at only four locations in the
entirety of Crimea, two of which were available only from 4 April 2014 and the other two
from 9 April 2014.972 Crimean residents who wanted to receive Russian passports could do
so by mail, apply at 160 designated offices around Crimea (including the four locations
designated for opt outs) or apply at any Russian consulate or embassy in the world.973
459. Leaving aside the logistical difficulty of opting out of Russian citizenship,
many Ukrainians in Crimea would have been deterred by the likely implications of doing so.
As described in Chapter 8, beginning in late February 2014, the Russian government and
media had used disinformation and hate speech to inflame tensions between Ukrainians and
pro-Russian Crimeans.974 In an atmosphere in which Ukrainians were being labeled as
fascists and neo-Nazis, many Crimeans who identified as Ukrainian (including both
Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars) would not have wanted to risk the opprobrium of their pro-
Russian neighbors by publicly declaring their desire to retain Ukrainian citizenship.
971 See OHCHR, Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 15 May 2014, para. 127 (15 May
2014) (Annex 763); Open Society Justice Initiative, Human Rights in the Context of Automatic
Naturalization in Crimea (June 2018), paras. 77 & 79 & 82 & 211 (Annex 975); Regional Centre for
Human Rights, et al., Crimea Beyond Rules: Thematic review of the human rights situation under
occupation, Vol. 3, Right to nationality (citizenship) (2017), p. 22 (Annex 955); See Human Rights
Watch, Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea, p. 29 (2014) (Annex 943).
972 See OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on
Crimea (6–18 July 2015), para. 39 (17 September 2015) (Annex 812).
973 Open Society Justice Initiative, Human Rights in the Context of Automatic Naturalization in
Crimea (June 2018), para. 82 (Annex 975); Human Rights Watch, Rights in Retreat: Abuses in
Crimea, p. 30 (2014) (Annex 943).
974 See supra Chapter 8, Section A.
268
460. Moreover, as described in more detail below, opting out of Russian citizenship
meant choosing the status of a foreigner within one’s own country and, with it, many
important material disadvantages compared to Russian nationals. For example, the Law on
Admission extended to Crimea the prohibition in Russian law on citizens or permanent
residents of third states from being employed in government and municipal jobs.975 Any
government or municipal worker opting to retain Ukrainian citizenship was also therefore
opting for dismissal from employment. Many Crimeans who identified as Ukrainian would
have chosen not to opt out to avoid this and other forms of discrimination that retaining
one’s Ukrainian citizenship would have invited.
461. Conversely, because the Law of Admission made Russian citizenship available
only to “permanent residents” of Crimea, many Crimeans were excluded from the process,
becoming by default foreigners in their own land. Many Crimeans, especially Crimean
Tatars and Ukrainians, did not have the proof of permanent residency that the authorities on
the ground interpreted the Law of Admission to require, such as a residency registration
stamp in their passport or a court decision proving residence.976 Crimean Tatars who had
recently returned from exile in Central Asia, may not have overcome all the hurdles to
becoming a registered permanent resident of Crimea before February 2014.977 Ukrainians
975 See Law on Admission, art. 4(3) (Annex 888).
976 For detailed analysis of hardship that Crimean residents faced for not possessing proof of residency
required by Russia, see, e.g., Crimean Human Rights Group, Memorandum: Discrimination of
Crimean Residents for Non-Possession of Russian Documents Issued Unlawfully by Russia in Crimea
(2018) (Annex 968); see also Open Society Justice Initiative, Human Rights in the Context of
Automatic Naturalization in Crimea (June 2018), paras. 92-97 (Annex 975).
977 See HCNM Needs Assessment, p. 4 (noting, as a major legal challenge, “the regulation of the legal
status of individual [formerly deported persons] returning to Crimea, including the regulation of their
repatriation and residency status and access to citizenship.”) (Annex 805).
269
who had moved to Crimea from other parts of Ukraine may not have bothered to change
their formal residency status.978
462. Other Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea who held permanent
resident status and remained loyal to Ukraine, would have elected to do nothing when
confronted with the deadline in the Law on Admission. Members of this group would have
taken the view that any application to the Russian occupation authorities pursuant to the
Law on Admission risked lending legitimacy to Russia’s unlawful acts of occupying and
purporting to annex Crimea.
463. As described below, each of these groups suffered harm as a result of Russia’s
imposition upon Crimea of its own citizenship and permanent residency regime, albeit in
different ways. These harms were generally not borne by members of the ethnic Russian
community who supported annexation.
Harms Suffered by Those Who Did Not Opt Out and Were
Subsequently Deemed to Be Russian Citizens
464. For those self-identifying Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians who for these or
other reasons did not opt out, the forcing upon them of Russian citizenship created an
invidious conflict. As Russian citizens, they assumed an obligation of loyalty to the Russian
Federation that could leave them subject to severe punishment if they cooperated with
Ukraine, the state with which they actually identified. For example, Article 275 of the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation provides for prison terms of up to 20 years for
Russian citizens who provide “any financial, material and technical, consultative or other
assistance to a foreign state, an international or foreign organization, or their representatives
in activities against the security of the Russian Federation.”979 In view of the arbitrary way in
978 Crimean Human Rights Group, Memorandum: Discrimination of Crimean Residents for Non-
Possession of Russian Documents Issued Unlawfully by Russia in Crimea (2018), p. 2 (Annex 968);
Human Rights Watch, Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea (November 2014) (noting that “many
people, while in practice residing in Crimea, either did not have the registration stamp in their
passport at all or were formally registered in mainland Ukraine”) (emphasis added) (Annex 943).
979 Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, art. 275 (“High Treason”) (Annex 927).
270
which Russia’s anti-extremism laws have been deployed against Crimean Tatars and
Ukrainians in Crimea, members of these communities who acquired Russian citizenship
against their will would likely regard Article 275’s broad language as potentially reaching
even innocent acts of cooperation with Ukraine or international organizations (including the
United Nations and OSCE) monitoring events in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.
465. As Russian citizens, this group of people also now faces the prospect of being
conscripted into the Russian armed forces and potentially being made to fight against the
very country with which they most identify. The Law of Admission expressly contemplates
“[c]itizens of the Russian Federation who are conscripted into military service in the
Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol,” providing that such service should
take place within Crimea and Sevastopol until the end of 2016.980 With that deadline now
expired, there is no barrier to Crimean conscripts being deployed by the Russian armed
forces in other theatres of conflict, including eastern Ukraine.
466. The forcing of Russian citizenship on Ukrainian nationals in Crimea has also
opened the door to other abuses. Ukrainian citizens who were in prison in Crimea between
18 March 2014 and 18 April 2014 did not have a meaningful opportunity to opt out of
Russian citizenship. Because they are now considered Russian citizens, such prisoners are
vulnerable to forced transfer to prisons anywhere in the Russian Federation, in
contravention of international humanitarian law.981
467. According to human rights groups in Crimea, more than 4,700 Ukrainian
citizens kept in places of detention in Crimea have been transferred by the Russian
980 Treaty of Admission, art. 5(6).
981 See Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), art. 76 (“Protected persons accused of offences shall be
detained in the occupied country, and if convicted they shall serve their sentences therein.”)
271
authorities to locations within Russia.982 One especially notorious example is Oleg Sentsov,
a film-maker and Russian-speaking member of the Ukrainian community in Crimea, who
helped to deliver food and supplies to Ukrainian forces blockaded by the invading
undeclared Russian forces.983 Sentsov was arrested and charged with plotting acts of
terrorism.984 When he came to trial in 2015, the court claimed that he had automatically
acquired Russian citizenship with the annexation.985 The attempts of the Ukrainian
authorities to intervene on his behalf, including by seeking his transfer to Ukraine, were
rebuffed by the Russian government on grounds of his Russian nationality.986 And, after
having been sentenced to 20 years in prison he was sent first to a prison in the Russian
federal subject Sakha Republic and later transferred to Russia’s northernmost prison in
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug.987 Again, Sentsov’s incarceration in Russia was justified
on the grounds of his Russian citizenship.
982 Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG), Human Rights Information Centre (HRIC), Regional
Centre for Human Rights (RCHR), and Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU), Joint
Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review: Russian Federation, para. 26 (2017) (Annex 954).
983 Lilya Palveleva, Ukrainian Filmmaker Remains Behind Bars Despite Growing Support, RFE/RL
(26 June 2014) (Annex 1078).
984 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea
and the city of Sevastopol, para. 117, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017) (Annex 778).
985 Masha Gessen, Opinion, Oleg Sentsov and the Kremlin’s Thin Skin, NYTimes (28 August 2015)
(Annex 1079).
986 See Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, Officially: Mr. Oleg Sentsov is the
citizen of Ukraine (8 April 2015) (picture of redacted copy of the State Migration Service of Ukraine
letter embedded) (Annex 1085).
987 Ukrainian Filmmaker Sentsov Reportedly To Be Transferred To Russian Far North Prison,
RFE/RL (30 September 2017) (further noting: "Sentsov's whereabouts have been a mystery since
early this month. Members of a public oversight commission in the Far Eastern city of Irkutsk
reported on September 9 that Sentsov had been transferred from that city to the Urals city of
Chelyabinsk. However, defense lawyers have had no idea of his location since then") (Annex 1080).
272
468. Mr. Chiygoz similarly testifies that he was threatened with transfer to a prison
in the Russian Federation, where he would face much tougher conditions, unless he
withdrew his appeal:
[T]wo FSB officers from Moscow … demanded that I withdraw
my appeal. When I rejected their demands, threats followed.
One of the officers told me that a man of my age would
probably not be able to survive the conditions of the transfer
across Russia from a red zone (a special supervision zone) to
the next, all the way to Magadan. I recalled that some of the
special unit officers wearing masks had previously made
similar threats, saying that they were waiting for me and that I
would suffer physical harm.988
469. The use of forced deportation into the Russian prison system as a means of
coercing prisoners is a clear breach of Russia’s IHL obligations. The disproportionate use of
such threats, and actual transfers, against Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian prisoners
additionally constitutes racial discrimination within the meaning of the CERD.
Harms Suffered by Inhabitants of Crimea Who Did Not Receive
Russian Nationality
470. Those Crimeans who did not receive Russian nationality – either because they
opted out or because they did not qualify for it – suffered in different ways.
471. Permanent residents of Crimea who opted out of Russian citizenship were
allowed to apply for residency permits. This status entitles the holder to some of the benefits
enjoyed by Russian citizens, including state pensions, free health insurance and social
988 See Chiygoz Statement, para. 28 (Annex 19).
273
allowances.989 But foreign holders of residency permits suffer many other disadvantages
compared to Russian citizens. As indicated above, they are not permitted to take
employment in government or municipal jobs. Nor are they allowed to run for government
or municipal office.990 Other Russian laws extended to Crimea barred them from applying to
hold a public gathering991 or owning a media entity,992 among others.993 As foreign
989 OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea
and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (2017), para. 61 ("Residents of Crimea who opted out of Russian
Federation citizenship became foreigners. They could obtain residency permits through a simplified
procedure, giving them certain rights enjoyed by Russian Federation citizens, such as the right to
pension, free health insurance, social allowances, and the right to exercise professions for which
Russian Federation citizenship is not a mandatory requirement."); Crimean Human Rights Group,
Memorandum: Discrimination of Crimean Residents for Non-Possession of Russian Documents
Issued Unlawfully by Russia in Crimea (2018), 6 (explaining that free medical insurance policy is
available, pursuant to Article 10 of Federal Law No. 326 of 29 November 2010 ‘On obligatory medical
insurance in the Russian Federation, to Russian citizens, foreign citizens and stateless persons “with a
residence permit or temporary stay permit on the [Russian] territory” and those defined as refugees
under Russian law) (Annex 777).
990 See Law on Admission, art. 4(3) (Annex 888).
991 See Federal Law on Assemblies, Meetings, Demonstrations, Marches and Picketing No. 54-FZ of 19
June 2004 of the Russian Federation, as amended by Federal Law No. 65-FZ of 8 June 2012, art. 5
(Annex 877); see also Law of the Republic of Crimea on Creating Conditions for the Exercise by
Citizens of the Russian Federation of the Right to Hold Assemblies, Rallies, Processions, or Small
Protests in the Republic of Crimea No. 56-ZRK of 21 August 2014, art. 2(4) (Annex 895).
992 Law of the Russian Federation on Mass Media, No. 2124-1 of 27 Dec. 1991, art. 7 (Annex 872);
Federal Law N 305-FZ “On Amending Russian Federation Law ‘On Mass Media,’” dated 14 October
2014, Art. 1.3 (Annex 873).
993 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of human rights in
the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (25
September 2017), para. 62 ("[O]verall, persons holding a residency permit and no Russian Federation
citizenship do not enjoy equality before the law and are deprived of important rights. They cannot own
agricultural land, vote and be elected, register a religious community, apply to hold a public meeting,
hold positions in the public administration and re-register their private vehicle on the peninsula."
(footnotes omitted) (Annex 778).
274
nationals, this group also was subject to Russian migration controls, making them vulnerable
to permanent exclusion from Crimea at the discretion of the Russian authorities.994
472. The large number of Crimeans who could not prove permanent residency, and
to whom the grant of automatic Russian citizenship did not therefore extend, were placed in
an even worse position. These individuals were considered foreigners under Russian law. As
such they were not permitted to stay in Crimea more than 90 days within a period of 180
days from the moment they entered the peninsula.995 Moreover, in addition to all the
disadvantages suffered by permanent residents who had opted out of Russian citizenship,
this group was also denied the rights conferred by permanent resident status, including state
pensions, free health insurance and otherf social allowances.
473. Discriminatory enforcement of Russia’s immigration laws is a particular
problem for this group, meaning that its members are in constant jeopardy of being arrested
and expelled from the place they call home by the Russian authorities. For example, as
described earlier in this Chapter, Sinaver Kadyrov, a Crimean Tatar activist and founder
member of the Committee for the Protection of Rights of Crimean Tatars, was detained at a
checkpoint and thereafter ordered deported from Crimea for overstaying Russia’s 90-day
limit for foreigners. Kadyrov had on principle taken no action either to take or to opt out
from Russian citizenship. 996
474. By contrast, OHCHR has reported that those with pro-Russian sympathies
receive the benefit of the doubt from the immigration authorities. For example:
994 See Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, Crimea Beyond Rules: Right to Nationality
(Citizenship) (2017), p. 40 (Annex 957).
995 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea
and the city of Sevastopol, para. 64, UN Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017) (Annex 778).
996 Written statement submitted by the Society for Threatened Peoples, p. a, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/28/NGO/97 (23 February 2015) (Annex 784); see also Bariiev Statement, at 31 (Annex 15).
275
A Ukrainian citizen who claimed to be “an active participant of
the Russian Spring in Sevastopol” claimed that his family was
in Crimea and therefore deportation would “interfere with his
private and family life.” … The Supreme Court of Crimea
accepted his argument, preventing deportation.997
* * *
475. In sum, by introducing its own nationality and immigration framework into
Crimea, the Russian Federation has massively increased the ability of its enforcement and
judicial authorities to discriminate against Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians who deny the
legitimacy of the Russian Federation’s actions on the peninsula.
476. In common with other aspects of its assault on the political and civil rights of
these communities, Russia purports to act on the basis of facially neutral laws. But the
application of Russia’s nationality, residency and immigration laws in occupied Crimea is no
more legitimate than its extension to the peninsula of its anti-extremism and other penal
laws and, because it leads to disproportionate enforcement of these laws against members of
the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea, it constitutes racial discrimination
within the meaning of the Convention.
997 Open Society Justice Initiative, Human Rights in the Context of Automatic Naturalization in
Crimea (June 2018) at 33 (quoting OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied
Autonomous Republic of Crimea, No. 12-401/2016, 17 Nov. 2016 (Annex 777)) (Annex 975).
276
Chapter 10. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S POLICY OF CULTURAL DISCRIMINATION AND
SUPPRESSION
477. In addition to the systematic assault on political and civil rights described in
Chapter 9, the Russian Federation has methodically choked off cultural expression by the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities over the last four years of occupation. This
additional dimension to Russia’s campaign of racial discrimination raises the specter of the
total erasure of these distinct cultures from the Crimean peninsula.
478. Russia has cracked down hard on public gatherings by these communities to
commemorate events of cultural importance to them. It has eliminated independent
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian voices from the media and civil society, leaving only
unrepresentative stooges to speak for those communities.998 It has allowed their cultural
heritage to be irreparably damaged. And it has attacked the ability of these communities to
pass their distinct identities on to future generations by elevating Russian culture at the
expense of their own in the educational system.
479. This chapter summarizes in turn each of these dimensions to Russia’s assault
on Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian culture.
Suppression of Culturally Significant Gatherings
480. The restrictions that Russia has imposed on cultural gatherings by the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities are particularly damaging. As Professor Magocsi
explains in his expert report, the commemoration of historical figures and events is central to
the Crimean Tatar culture and sense of identity and was a key factor in preserving them
during the years in exile in Central Asia.999 In particular, annual commemorations of the
998 SeeWitness Statement of Lenur Islyamov paras. 17–18 (Annex 18); Recording of conversation
between M. Efremova and L. Islyamov (Annex 1101).
999 Magocsi Report para. 75 (Annex 21).
277
deportation of 1944 – the Sürgün – have been a central part of Crimean Tatar life in
independent Ukraine.1000 For the Ukrainian community, such cultural events are no less
important as a means of preserving an identity separate from that of ethnic Russians on the
peninsula, with the annual celebration of the birthday of Taras Shevchenko – the cultural
father of the Ukrainian nation – chief among them.
481. Since February 2014, the Russian occupation authorities have actively sought
to prevent the continuation of these traditions. In violation of IHL, Russia has introduced its
own repressive laws governing public gatherings into occupied Crimea. It has then applied
those laws discriminatorily to deny Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians an opportunity to
commemorate culturally important events equal to that afforded the ethnic Russian
community.
Russia’s Unlawful Application to Crimea of Its Laws Restricting
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
482. Under Ukrainian law applicable prior to the occupation, an event organizer
needed only to submit a preliminary notice of peaceful assembly; no permissions or licenses
were required to hold a public gathering under the Ukrainian Constitution.1001 Such
gatherings were generally permitted to proceed, no matter which ethnic group had noticed
the event, subject to an appropriate police presence. Gatherings could only be minimally
restricted “in accordance with law” and “only in the interests of national security and public
order, for the purpose of prevention of disturbances or crimes, protection of the health of the
population, or protection of the rights and freedoms of other persons.”1002
483. Following its purported annexation of Crimea, the Russian Federation
extended to Crimea its own repressive laws requiring affirmative approval by relevant
authorities. As with the extension of Russia’s anti-extremism laws, this was a violation of
1000 See Witness Statement of Eskender Bariiev at para. 5 (describing the annual commemorations of
the event on Lenin Square in Simferopol from 1990 to 2013) (Annex 15).
1001 Ukrainian Constitution (8 December 2004) Art.39 (protecting the right to peaceably assemble
subject only to advance notification) (Annex 732).
1002 Ibid.
278
Russia’s IHL obligations, because Russia was not “absolutely prevented” from keeping in
place the Ukrainian regulatory scheme for public gatherings. Moreover, even before Russia’s
intervention in Crimea, its laws had attracted much criticism for their failure to guarantee
the right to freedom of assembly. For example, the Venice Commission’s analysis of Law No.
54-FZ of 19 June 2004 concluded, inter alia:
[T]he regime of prior notification … should be revised; the cooperation
between the organisers and the authorities … should
be settled on a voluntary basis respecting the assemblies’
autonomy and without depriving the organisers of the right to
hold an assembly on the ground of a failure to agree on any
changes to the format of an assembly or to comply with the
timeframe for notification of the public event; the power of the
executive authorities to alter the format of a public event
should be expressly limited to cases where there are compelling
reasons to do so …, with due respect for the principles of
proportionality and non-discrimination and the presumption
in favour of assemblies.1003
484. In addition to applying existing Russian laws, on 8 August 2014, the State
Council of the Republic of Crimea enacted Law No. 56-ZRK, replicating the Russian
regulatory regime by requiring prior approval for public gatherings and imposing a list of
stringent technical requirements that a notice must satisfy.1004 Based on these laws, the
occupation authorities have repeatedly rejected requests by Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
1003 Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission),
Opinion on the Federal Law No. 54-FZ of 19 June 2004 On Assemblies, Meetings, Demonstrations,
Marches and Picketing of the Russian Federation (adopted 16-17 March 2012) para. 49 (Annex 816).
1004 Law of the Republic of Crimea No. 56-ZRK of 21 August 2014, Art. 2 (Annex 895); Letter from
Administration of Simferopol to the Committee for Protection of Rights of the Crimean Tatars, No.
12154/24/01-66, dated 9 December 2014 (citing, in addition to Federal Law No. 65-FZ, Article 2 of the
Law of the Republic of Crimea No. 56-ZRK of August 21, 2014) (Annex 846).
279
groups to hold gatherings in Crimea and have threatened administrative penalties in case of
incompliance.1005
Russia’s Application of Its Laws to Deny the Crimean Tatar
Community’s Right to Mark Events of Cultural Significance
485. The occupation authorities have applied these repressive laws to
systematically suppress the ability of the Crimean Tatar community to mark events of
cultural significance. For instance, the Russian occupation authorities have repeatedly
frustrated plans by the Crimean Tatar community to mark the Sürgün. As previously
discussed, commemoration of victims of the Sürgün on 18 May each year has been
particularly important to Crimean Tatars, many of whom have only recently returned to their
homeland following the 1944 deportation. The ceremony commemorating the victims of the
1944 deportation had traditionally been held on Lenin Square — the main square of
Simferopol — under the auspices of the Mejlis.1006 On 16 May 2014, less than three months
after the purported annexation — and just two days before the 70th anniversary of the
Sürgün — the occupation authorities abruptly issued a decree that prohibited all public
1005 See, e.g., Letter from Executive Committee of Republic of Crimea Simferopol City Council to the
Committee for Protection of Rights of the Crimean Tatars, (2 December 2014), No. 9818/24/01-66
(citing Articles 31 and 55 of the Russian Constitution, Federal Law No. 54-FZ of June 19, 2004 On
Assemblies, Rallies, Demonstrations, Processions, and Small Protests, and Federal Law On the
General Principles of Organization of Local Government in the Russian Federation) (Annex 841);
Letter from Administration of Simferopol to the Committee for Protection of Rights of the Crimean
Tatars, No. 12154/24/01-66, dated 9 December 2014 (citing, in addition to Federal Law No. 65-FZ,
Article 2 of the Law of the Republic of Crimea No. 56-ZRK of August 21, 2014)( warning the Crimean
Tatar organizers that Federal Law No. 65-FZ of June 8, 2012 considerably increases the liability for
violating the established procedure for arranging or conducting an assembly, rally, demonstration,
procession or small protest) (Annex 846).
1006 See Bariiev Statement, para.5 (Annex 15); see also OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the
Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015) (17 September 2015) para. 252
(Annex 812).
280
assemblies in Crimea until 6 June 2014, purporting to prevent any provocations by
extremists and avoid disruption of the holiday season.1007
486. In the following years, the occupation authorities repeatedly rejected
applications to commemorate this event in various locations around the peninsula. In May
2015, the Simferopol authorities refused to issue a permit for a proposed ceremony
commemorating the victims of the deportation on public safety grounds.1008 In 2016, a
notification was rejected by Voinka village administration of Krasnoperekopsky, this time on
account of land improvement works to be carried out on the park where the event was
planned.1009 In 2017, numerous Crimean Tatars were found guilty of administrative offenses
and faced fines for driving cars displaying the Crimean Tatar flag to mark this day.1010
487. Numerous other events of cultural importance to Crimean Tatars have
similarly been thwarted. For example, in 2014 the occupation authorities repeatedly denied
permits for the Crimean Tatar community’s usual commemoration of International Human
Rights Day on 10 December. Prior to the occupation, Crimean Tatars had marked this day
with rallies in Lenin Square in Simferopol.1011 This annual event had passed off peacefully
for years with modest policing by the Ukrainian authorities.
1007 Decree No. 29 on Mass Gatherings in Connection with the Events in Ukraine’s Southeast, Chapters
of the Republic of Crimea (16 May 2014) (Annex 891).
1008 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on
Crimea (6–18 July 2015) (17 September 2015) para. 252 (Annex 812).
1009 See Crimean Human Rights Situation Review, May 2016, Annex 9, p. 16 (Annex 950).
1010 See, e.g., Case No. 5-239/2017, Decision of 8 June 2017 of the Bakhchysarai District Court
concerning Umerova, SD (Annex 919); Case No. 5-238/2017, Decision of 8 June 2017 of the
Bakhchysarai District Court concerning Abdurefiyeva, IL (Annex 918); Case Nos. 5-237/2017 & 5-
236/2017, Decision of 8 June 2017 of the Bakhchysarai District Court concerning Mamutov, NN
(Annex 920).
1011 Bariiev Statement, para. 9 (Annex 15); RFE/RL, Crimean Tatars Demand Their Rights Be
Respected (10 December 2012) (Annex 1034).
281
Figure 151012
Refat Chubarov addressing the crowd gathered to mark International Human Rights Day
in December 2011
488. The witness statement of Eskender Bariiev, Coordinator of the Committee on
the Protection of the Rights of the Crimean Tatar People, describes in detail the repeated
applications made by the rally organizers and the obstructive bureaucratic responses they
received from the Simferopol City authorities.1013 An initial application on 28 November
2014 to hold a conference, a photography exhibition, and a street drawing competition for
children close to Lenin Square1014 was rejected for failure to specify the estimated number of
participants and on the unlikely grounds that the events posed a threat to the life and health
1012 Official Website of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, http://qtmm.org/en.
1013 Bariiev Statement, paras. 9–18 (Annex 15).
1014 Ibid. para. 10 (Annex 15); Letter from Executive Committee of Republic of Crimea Simferopol City
Council to the Committee for Protection of Rights of the Crimean Tatars, No. 9818/24/01-66, dated 2
December 2014 (Annex 841).
282
of the population if held in the noticed locations.1015 A second request, to hold a small
protest in Lenin Square, 1016 was rejected because the square was allegedly fully booked
between 1 December 2014 and 7 January 2015 in connection with the Christmas and New
Year holidays.
489. The City authorities suggested instead that the protest take place at a
peripheral park, one of four locations far from the administrative center of Simferopol that
had been approved by the authorities for public gatherings.1017 While perhaps suitable for
small, purely cultural events, the park was an entirely inappropriate venue for a rally
addressing human rights issues.1018 When the Committee responded accordingly on 9
December 2014 and noticed three alternative venues closer to the administrative center,1019
the authorities disapproved again, this time because the notification was untimely and failed
to provide the required details of the event.1020 The authorities also warned that Federal Law
No. 65-FZ of 8 June 2012, which amended Federal Law No. 54-FZ of 19 June 2004,
considerably increased the liability for violating the established procedure.1021
1015 Ibid.
1016 Letter from the Committee for Protection of Rights of the Crimean Tatars to Viktor Nikolaevich,
No. 001/12, dated 5 December 2014 (Annex 844).
1017 See Letter from the Committee for Protection of Rights of the Crimean Tatars to Viktor
Nikolaevich, No. 001/12, dated 9 December 2014 (explaining that the approved venue is for
recreational purposes, not suitable for a protest) (Annex 847).
1018 Bariiev Statement, para. 13 (Annex 15).
1019 See Letter from the Committee for Protection of Rights of the Crimean Tatars to Viktor
Nikolaevich, No. 001/12, dated 9 December 2014 (Annex 847); Bariiev Statement, para. 14 (Annex
15).
1020 Letter from Administration of Simferopol to the Committee for Protection of Rights of the
Crimean Tatars, No. 12154/24/01-66, dated 9 December 2014 (Annex 846).
1021 Ibid.
283
490. This course of events is an object lesson in how, as the Venice Commission
had pointed out two years earlier, the shortcomings in Russia’s gatherings law can be
exploited to unduly restrict freedom of expression and assembly. Rather than respecting the
organizers’ preferred format and venue and working with them to accommodate any genuine
public safety concerns, the authorities exploited the thicket of procedural requirements in
Russian and Crimean law to run down the clock until it could rule the last application
untimely.
491. When subsequently the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of the
Crimean Tatar People sought to avoid the requirements of the gatherings laws by organizing
events at private premises, the Russian occupation authorities chose to orchestrate or
tolerate disruption of those events by organized groups of hooligans. A press conference on
10 December 2014 at the Simferopol Regional Mejlis was disrupted by male protestors who
threw green paint on the organizers. 1022 A conference organized by the Committee in a
private hotel a month later was delayed when a group of approximately 20 thugs sought to
physically block the participants from taking their seats. 1023 Although the police were
present in numbers, they did nothing to restore order until they realized that their complicity
in the disruption was being filmed by activists.
1022 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on
Crimea (6–18 July 2015) (17 September 2015) para. 135 (Annex 812); Bariiev Statement, para. 15
(Annex 15). See also Video footage of the event (Annex 1102).
1023 Bariiev Statement, paras. 17–18 (Annex 15). Video of Bariiev Instructing the Crimean Tatars to
Show Their Peaceful Intentions in the Face of Provocation (Annex 1101).
284
Map 14: Permitted v. Desired Locations for Public Gatherings in Simferopol
285
492. The Mejlis' application in 2015 to mark International Human Rights Day was
likewise refused, this time due to an alleged suspension of mass gatherings from 22
November onward.1024 Notwithstanding this suspension, however, pro-Russia groups were
permitted to gather for an anti-Turkey rally on 27 November 2015 in the central square of
Simferopol.1025 After the Mejlis was banned as an organization in early 2016, it no longer
sought official permits from the occupation authorities to mark International Human Rights
Day.
493. Applications to celebrate Crimean Tatar Flag Day on 26 June have also
repeatedly been rejected. Before the occupation, Crimean Tatars had celebrated this
occasion with traditional music and dance performances, as well as events for Crimean Tatar
children.1026 In June 2015, the city administration of Simferopol denied a request to hold a
similar public event because other organizations had purportedly submitted notifications for
the same date, which could create conditions in which public order would be violated. 1027
Although the organizing committee submitted two additional notifications for a different
time and place, the administration simply repeated its earlier response.1028
494. The occupation authorities also prohibited the local Mejlis from carrying out a
rally commemorating the 97th anniversary of the death of Noman Ḉelebichan, the first
President of the short-lived Crimean People's Republic, who was executed by a firing squad
1024 Mejlis of Crimean Tatars were not allowed to take action in Simferopol to Human Rights Day (11
December 2015) (Annex 1061).
1025 Ibid.
1026 Crimean Human Rights Group, Unsanctioned Freedom (May 2017) p. 4 (Annex 961).
1027 Crimean Human Rights Group, Unsanctioned Freedom (May 2017) p. 4 (Annex 961).
1028 Crimean Human Rights Group, Unsanctioned Freedom (May 2017) p. 4 (Annex 961).
286
of the Black Sea Fleet in 1917. 1029 Prior to the occupation, Crimean Tatars had marked this
occasion by placing flowers at the monument to Ḉelebicihan in Simferopol and holding
traditional prayer services. Faced with this rejection, the Mejlis proposed to change the
venue of the event from Simferopol to the private courtyard of the Khan's palace in Saray,
Bakhchysarai. This application too was rejected by the Bakhchysarai authorities.1030
Russia’s Application of Its Laws to Deny the Ukrainian Community’s
Right to Mark Events of Cultural Significance
495. The occupation authorities have also enforced these laws to impede the
celebration of anniversaries of cultural significance to ethnic Ukrainians, and have punished
those who nonetheless sought to peacefully honor these occasions.
496. Chief among these annual events is the anniversary of the birthday of Taras
Shevchenko on 9 March 1814. Shevchenko is a figure of vast cultural significance to the
Ukrainian nation: as a poet and writer he is considered by many to be the founder of modern
Ukrainian literature. Always an important day in the Ukrainian cultural calendar, the
celebration of this day in 2014 was of special significance for the Ukrainian community, as it
marked the 200th anniversary of Shevchenko’s birth.1031 The ruthlessness with which the
attempted celebrations were shut down sent a chilling message to the Ukrainian community
about what it could expect from Russian rule.
497. In Simferopol, where a major celebration had been planned, two key
organizers – Andrii Shchekun and Anatolii Kovalsky – were detained in broad daylight at the
1029 Magocsi Report para. 27 (Annex 21).
1030 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Freedom of Assembly in Crimea Occupied
by the Russian Federation, Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting (16–17 April 2015),
PC.SHDM.NGO/14/15 (17 April 2015) p. 3 (Annex 810).
1031 Shchekun Statement, para. 19 (Annex 13).
287
main train station, where they had planned to collect Ukrainian flags.1032 In his witness
statement, Mr. Shchekun describes how he and Mr. Kovalsky were initially stopped by
members of the Self Defense Forces, taken to the police, and then passed into the custody of
members of the Russian military intelligence agency, the GRU. This was just the beginning
of an 11-day ordeal in which they were unlawfully detained, blindfolded and tortured.1033
498. The planned celebration in Sevastopol was also disrupted, this time by a
group of violent young pro-Russian men, similar to those who would later become familiar at
Crimean Tartar cultural gatherings. The events were caught on film by a BBC camera crew
whose footage shows the pro-Russian activists picking fights with the Ukrainian attendees,
attacking a car driven by a Ukrainian and dragging another into the bushes to beat him.1034
The pro-Russian group even threatened and chased the international journalists covering the
event, but the journalists managed to escape.1035
499. Subsequent plans to commemorate Shevchenko’s birthday in Crimea were
also thwarted. In March 2015, authorities refused the application of the Ukrainian Cultural
Center to hold a gathering in a central location in Simferopol to commemorate the 201st
anniversary of Shevchenko’s birth, relegating the event to a peripheral park.1036 When the
1032Shchekun Statement, paras. 19–22 (Annex 13).
1033 Shchekun Statement, paras. 22–25 (Annex 13).
1034 BBC News, Pro-Ukraine activists beaten up in Crimea (9 March 2014) archived at
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-26504449/pro-ukraine-activists….
See also the video recording of these incidents located at the same link (Annex 1040).
1035 Ibid.
1036 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on
Crimea (6–18 July 2015) (17 September 2015) para. 140 (Annex 812); Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe, Freedom of Assembly in Crimea Occupied by the Russian Federation,
Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting (16–17 April 2015), PC.SHDM.NGO/14/15 (17 April 2015)
p. 8 (Annex 810).
288
event took place at the designated park, the police detained three participants for waving a
Ukrainian flag inscribed with the (accurate) statement that Crimea remains part of Ukraine.
All three were found guilty of violating public assembly laws by displaying “extremist”
symbols.1037 In March 2016, the planned commemoration could not take place because of
the previously described blanket suspension of public events starting from November
2015.1038 In 2017, the application to hold a commemorative event was simply denied,
without any explanation.1039
500. Attempts by the Ukrainian community to mark other culturally significant
events have similarly been denied. For example, the occupying authorities have repeatedly
blocked the celebration of Ukrainian flag day on 23 August and have acted against those who
attempted to celebrate it. Before the occupation, Crimea residents used to fly Ukrainian flags
in different regions of the peninsula and visit public places that house the Ukrainian flag or
its colors.1040
1037 See OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on
Crimea (6–18 July 2015) (17 September 2015) para. 140 (Annex 812).
1038 Crimean Human Rights Group, Unsanctioned Freedom (May 2017) p. 5 (Annex 961).
1039 Ibid.
1040 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Freedom of Assembly in Crimea Occupied
by the Russian Federation, Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting (16–17 April 2015),
PC.SHDM.NGO/14/15 (17 April 2015) p. 6 (Annex 810).
289
Figure 16
A monument to Taras Shevchenko adorned in flowers and the national flag of Ukraine, a
site of the 2012 celebration of Ukrainian flag day (Source: Government)
Figure 17
Women in traditional clothing lead the ceremony during the 2012 celebration of Ukrainian
flag day (Source: Government)
501. During the 2014 attempted celebration of this day, however, members of the
Self Defense Forces detained Sergei Oak, the head of the Adult Intensive Care Department of
the Simferopol Perinatal Center, when he tried to visit the monument of Taras Shevchenko
290
carrying a Ukrainian Flag. Oak was handcuffed and taken to a police station where he was
charged with "petty hooliganism" under Article 20.1 of the Code of Administrative Offenses
of the Russian Federation, based on the false testimony of the Self Defense Forces members
that he had used foul language in a public place.1041 Oak was forced to pay a fine of 1,000
Rubles and was subsequently removed from his post as the head of the Adult Intensive Care
Department, being demoted to the position of regular doctor instead.1042
502. The Ukrainian community have also been prevented from celebrating
Ukrainian Independence Day. During attempted celebrations of the anniversary in 2014,
eight people with Ukrainian flags congregated at the pedestal at the monument of Ukrainian
hetman P. Sahadachny. The police detained Viktor Neganov, the organizer of the
celebration, and Sergey Kornienko, a participant, both of whom had brought Ukrainian flags
to the Sevastopol monument.1043 They were held at the police department of the Gagarin
district of Sevastopol for several hours before being released without charges.1044 According
to Neganov, the police threatened him with violence and psychological pressures during his
detention.1045
The More Favorable Treatment Accorded the Russian Community.
503. The laws used to restrict planned gatherings of Ukrainians and Crimean
Tatars, have not been applied in like manner to pro-Russian groups.1046 The occupation
1041 Ibid., p. 6.
1042 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
1043 Ibid., p. 7
1044 Ibid.
1045 Ibid.
1046 Ibid., p. 2
291
authorities have consistently approved applications by Russian groups falling short of the
statutory criteria — even ones clearly violating the law.1047 For example:
• On 6 June 2014, public gatherings were held in Simferopol to mark the 215th
birthday of Alexander Pushkin1048 and to dedicate a monument to Sergius of
Radonezh, an important figure in the Russian Orthodox church.1049 These
events should have been disallowed under Decree No. 29 of May 2014, which
had barred any public gatherings until 6 June 2014, including ones to mark
the 70th anniversary of the Sürgün.1050
• In February 2015, three political and social groups who support the
“Antimaidan” campaign and President Vladimir Putin’s agenda indicated
their intention to host a rally to spread their message. The occupying
authorities allowed the event to take place in the center of Simferopol, at the
intersection of Karl Marx and Pushkin streets, which is not a permitted
location for gatherings under the applicable regulations.1051 Moreover, the
organizers were permitted to drive cars and motorcycles in the pedestrian
zone, in direct contravention of the law.1052
• Pro-Russia groups were permitted to gather for an anti-Turkey rally on 27
November 2015 in the central square of Simferopol, whereas the Mejlis
application to mark International Human Rights Day two weeks later was
rejected on account of an alleged suspension of mass gatherings that was in
place.1053
• Between 2 and 12 June 2017 — as Crimean Tatars were facing administrative
charges and fines for displaying Crimean Tatar flags on 18 May — the
1047 Ibid.
1048 See Solemn Meeting of Residents and Guests of Simferopol, Dedicated to the 215th birthday of
Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin (6 June 2014), archived at http://crimea.gov.ru/foto/society/060614
(Annex 1088).
1049 See A Monument “Sergius of Radonezh - the Collector of Russian Land” Was Opened in
Simferopol (6 June 2014), archived at http://crimea.gov.ru/foto/society/0606142 (Annex 1087).
1050 Decree No. 29 on Mass Gatherings in Connection with the Events in Ukraine’s Southeast,
Chapters of the Republic of Crimea (16 May 2014) (ordering any mass gatherings in the territory of
the Republic of Crimea be prohibited until 6 June 2014) (Annex 890).
1051 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Freedom of Assembly in Crimea Occupied
by the Russian Federation, Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting (16–17 April 2015),
PC.SHDM.NGO/14/15 (17 April 2015) p. 2 (Annex 810).
1052 Ibid.
1053 Mejlis of Crimean Tatars were not allowed to take action in Simferopol to Human Rights Day (11
December 2015) (Annex 1061).
292
occupation authorities permitted some 60 events all over Crimea to mark a
Russian-language festival called “the Great Russian Word.”1054
504. In addition, numerous gatherings have been held every year since 2014 to
celebrate events associated with the occupation of Crimea, including gatherings to honor the
establishment of the people’s militia (i.e., the Self Defense Forces) on 23 February,1055 and
events to mark the anniversary of the illegal referendum on 16 March.1056 On the first
anniversary of the occupation, the occupation authorities permitted a week of celebrations,
which included singing the Russian national anthem at the parliament of Crimea.1057
1054 See, e.g., In Yalta the Solemn Opening of the XI International Festival “Great Russian Word” Was
Held (6 May 2017), archived at http://crimea.gov.ru/foto/society/050620177. (Annex 1090);
Chairman of the State Council of Crimea Co-Chairman of the Organizing Committee, Program of
Events of the Great Russian Word 11th International Festival (16 May 2017) (Annex 1116).
1055 Photos of the first anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Militia(2015) archived
athttp://crimea.gov.ru/foto/anniversaries/230220155 (Annex 1095). The occupation authorities’
celebrations of the so-called people’s militia are particularly disturbing in light of reports of that this
group has carried out widespread attacks, abductions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention,
torture, and even a summary execution. OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily
Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22 February 2014 to
12 September 2017) paras. 3, 86, 89 (Annex 759).
1056 See Photos of the First Anniversary of the Crimean Spring (16 March 2015), archived at
http://crimea.gov.ru/foto/anniversaries/151503 (Annex 1098); Photos of the Anniversary of the
General Referendum (16 March 2015), archived at http://crimea.gov.ru/foto/anniversaries/160315
(Annex 1097); Photos of an event celebrating Crimea and Russia (16 March 2015), archived at
http://crimea.gov.ru/foto/anniversaries/16032015090316 (Annex 1096); and Photos from a Crimean
Spring Photo Exhibition (16 March 2015) archived at http://crimea.gov.ru/foto/society/16032015205
(Annex 1099). Similar events were also held in 2016 and 2017.
1057 RFE/RL, Russia Celebrates Crimea Annexation Anniversary (16 March 2015) (Annex 1052).
293
Figure 18
People celebrate in Lenin Square, Simferopol on 16 March 2016 to mark the second
anniversary of the illegal referendum (Source: AP Photo / Vadim Ghirda)
Media Restrictions and Harassment
505. The Russian Federation has followed a similar strategy to that used to restrict
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian public gatherings to limit those communities' opportunities to
use print and broadcast media to nourish and invigorate their respective cultures.
Repressive Russian laws have been extended to occupied Ukraine in violation of
international humanitarian law and a registration requirement enforced as a means of
excluding potentially critical voices in the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian media.
506. Before the purported annexation, Crimea’s media offerings were diverse,
reflecting the multi-ethnic population of the peninsula and its varied needs and interests.1058
This comprehensive array of media allowed individuals to explore and develop their cultural
identities, be it through access to media in one’s native language or programming geared
towards instilling cultural awareness and pride in younger generations. Since March 2014,
1058 Shchekun Statement, paras. 5–8 (describing Ukrainian media outlets before February 2014)
(Annex 13); Witness Statement of Lenus Islyamov paras. 2–8 (describing the various media outlets of
ATR Holdings operating in Crimea before the purported annexation) (Annex 18).
294
however, Russia has unlawfully introduced measures that significantly restrict freedom of
opinion and expression in Crimea. The apparent purpose and unquestionable effect of these
measures has been to burden the free speech rights of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
communities in particular.
Unlawful Forced Closure of Ukrainian Media
507. Ukrainian TV channels serving Crimea were an early target of the Russian
forces that seized control of the peninsula in February and March 2014. The
Chernomorskaya Television and Radio Company was the largest independent broadcaster in
Crimea prior to the occupation,1059 providing a mixture of Ukrainian- and Russian-language
programming. On 3 March 2014, Russian–backed forces shut down Chernomorskaya TV1060
and, a few days later, the station’s signal was cut and replaced with that of a Russian
station.1061 On 28 June 2014, Chernomorskaya TV and other Ukrainian channels were
wholly removed from major cable networks in Crimea,1062 thus depriving the Ukrainian
community of media outlets that focused on programming of interest to it. The Russian
occupation authorities also raided Chernomorskaya TV’s premises on 1 August 2014, and
seized cameras and computers belonging to the station.1063 When the seized property was
1059 OSCE, Report by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (28 November 2013 to 23
May 2014) p. 5 (Annex 806).
1060 Ibid.
1061 Ibid.
1062 OSCE, Report on the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6-18 July 2015) (17
September 2015), para. 111 (Annex 812); OSCE, OSCE Representative warns of further threats to
media pluralism in Luhansk and Crimea, notes threats to media workers (11 July 2014) (Annex 807).
City authorities also took steps to remove Ukrainian television channels from Crimean cable. See
RFE/RL, Crimean City Cuts Off Ukrainian TV Channels (18 April 2015) (Annex 1055).
1063 OCSE, OSCE Representative condemns steps aimed at full silencing of Chernomorskaya TV in
Crimea (4 August 2014) (Annex 808).
295
returned months later, many cameras had no batteries or memory cards, and the hard drives
and sound cards of computers had been removed.1064
508. The Russian occupation authorities have also oppressed Ukrainian-language
print media in Crimea. For example, the Russian occupation authorities forced the closure
of Krymska Svitlytsya, the most significant Ukrainian-language newspaper in Crimea. 1065
This newspaper had existed since Ukrainian independence,1066 and was unlawfully evicted
from its offices – its departure hastened by the Self-Defense Forces threatening staff to leave
the premises immediately.1067
Discriminatory Application of Russian Law to Restrict the Operation
of Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian Media
i. Russia’s Unlawful Extension to Crimea of Laws Restricting
Freedom of Opinion and Expression
509. Since the purported annexation, Russia has unlawfully applied its own laws
governing media activities to Crimea, as well as other laws that severely curtail freedom of
expression. For example, Russia’s Law on Mass Media requires all “mass media,” defined to
include all TV and radio channels as well as print media, to register with the federal
authorities before engaging in media activity.1068 The registration regime imposed by this
law on all pre-existing media operating in Crimea is more onerous than the licensing
1064 Sergey Zayets et al., THE FEAR PENINSULA: CHRONICLE OF OCCUPATION AND VIOLATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CRIMEA (2015), p. 61 (Annex 976).
1065 See, OSCE, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6-18 July 2015)
(September 17, 2015) para. 257 (Annex 812).
1066 Ibid.
1067 Shchekun Statement, para. 27 (Annex 13).
1068 Law on Mass Media, No. 2124-1 of 27 December 1991, as subsequently amended, Art. 2 (Annex
872).
296
required of these entities under the Ukrainian law that Russia should have been applying in
compliance with IHL.1069
510. As described in Chapter 8, Russia has in addition imposed its own antiextremism
laws in Crimea, including Federal Law No. 114-FZ on Combating Extremist
Activities of 25 July 2002 and various similar anti-extremism measures embodied in
Russia’s Criminal Code. Among the latter, Article 280.1 of Russia’s Criminal Code was
amended on 28 December 2013 to make “public calls for the violation of territorial integrity
of the Russian Federation” a criminal offense, punishable by up to 5 years in prison. Russia’s
anti-extremism legislation has been severely criticized by the Venice Commission and others
as giving the Russian authorities the ability to arbitrarily interfere with freedom of
expression.
ii. Russia’s Discriminatory Enforcement of Its Laws Against
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian Media Outlets
1. Discriminatory use of re-registration requirement to ban
Crimean Tatar media on pretextual grounds
511. After purportedly annexing Crimea, the Russian Federation required all TV
and radio stations and all print media to undergo a re-registration process pursuant to its
own Law on Mass Media by April 2015. 1070 The Russian occupation authorities used this
requirement as a pretext to ban disfavored Crimean Tatar media entities for supposed minor
defects in their re-registration documents. For example, the Russian occupation authorities
1069 The Freedom House standards rankings for Freedom of the Press in 2017 demonstrate the drastic
difference in media laws and freedom in the two countries. Ukraine is given the status of “partly free,”
earning a score of 53/100 (with 0 being the most free). Russia received an 83, earning the status of
“not free.” Freedom of the Press 2017, FREEDOM HOUSE (6 June 2018), accessed at
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/ukraine (Annex 977) and Freedom of the
Press 2017, FREEDOM HOUSE (6 June 2018), accessed at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedompress/
2017/russia (Annex 1113).
1070 Federal Law No. 402-FZ (1 December 2014) (Annex 879).
297
rejected the re-registration application of ATR Television station, as described in the witness
statement of Mr. Lenur Islyamov, the owner of ATR Holdings. ATR Television Station had
been in operation since 2006, and was the only Crimean Tatar television station in the
world.1071 It offered programming in the Crimean Tatar language, as well as Russian- and
Ukrainian-language programming.1072 The channel emphasized programming that
highlighted Crimean Tatar news and culture, but also featured a wide array of programming
including political shows and classic films.1073 It was also the most popular TV channel in
Crimea before annexation. 1074 As Mr. Islyamov describes, the Russian occupation
authorities offered various spurious reasons for denying re-registration to ATR, claiming that
the station had paid re-registration fees to the incorrect bank account,1075 failed to submit
sufficient information about its shareholders,1076 and failed to properly authenticate
documents supporting its application.1077
512. Russian occupation authorities offered some of the same reasons in their
repeated rejections of re-registration applications filed by other media entities serving the
1071 Andrii Ianitski, Crimean Tatar TV back on air, Open Democracy (30 June 2015) (Annex 1058).
1072 Islyamov Statement, paras. 2–3 (Annex 18).
1073 Islyamov Statement, para. 3 (Annex 18). The station also had its own orchestra, which played
weekly televised performances of Crimean Tatar folk music, and organized a children’s competition
called TatliSes (“sweet voice” in Crimean Tatar) that encouraged young Crimean Tatars to learn their
native songs, dance, and literary arts. Witness Statement of Lenur Islyamov para. 6 (Annex 18).
1074 Islyamov Statement, para. 8 (Annex 18).
1075 Letter from the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Media of the Russian Federation to ATR Television
Company, dated 26 January 2015 (Annex 850).
1076 Letter from the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Media of the Russian Federation to ATR Television
Company, dated 6 March 2015 (Annex 855).
1077 Letter from the Headquarters of the Federal Service for Oversight of Telecom, Information
Technologies, and Mass Media to ATR Television Company, dated 14 November 2014 (Annex 839).
298
Crimean Tatar community, including children’s television station Lale,1078 the website 15
Minutes,1079 and other outlets.1080 When ATR representatives sought to meet with Crimean
media regulators to discuss the re-registration process, the regulators cancelled the meeting
on short notice, and did not offer to re-schedule.1081 Another major Crimean Tatar media
entity to be denied re-registration was Avdet, a newspaper that had been published since 15
July 1990 and specialized in reporting events of interest to the Crimean Tatar
community.1082 After the Russian occupation authorities refused re-registration to these
entities, they could not lawfully operate in Crimea after 1 April 2015, and they were forced to
either shut down or move their operations to mainland Ukraine. These moves significantly
restricted Crimean Tatars’ access to the media outlets that had historically served the
community.1083
1078 See Letter from the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Media of the Russian Federation to Lale, dated
6 March 2015 (alleging that Lale had failed to submit with its application sufficient information about
its shareholders) (Annex 856); Letter from the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Media of the Russian
Federation to Lale, dated 27 January 2015 (alleging that Lale had paid its re-registration fee to the
incorrect bank account) (Annex 851).
1079 Application dated 19 December 2014 for re-registration of 15 Minutes (Annex 905); Letter from
the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Media of the Russian Federation to 15 Minutes, dated 2 February
2015 (alleging that 15 Minutes had paid its re-registration fee to the incorrect bank account) (Annex
853).
1080 See Letter from the Ministry of Telecom and Mass Media of the Russian Federation to Meydan
Radio Channel, dated 14 November 2014 (stating that Meydan radio channel had failed to submit
properly authenticated documents to support is re-registration application) (Annex 840).
1081 Islyamov Statement, para. 26 (Annex 18); Letter from ATR Holdings to Federal Service for
Communications, Information, Technologies, and Mass Communications, dated 12 February 2014
(Annex 834).
1082 RFE/RL, The Editors of the Crimean Tatar Newspaper Are Summoned for Interrogations on
Suspicion of Extremism (3 June 2014) (Annex 1047).
1083 Islyamov Statement, para. 34 (stating that Russian blocking prevents Crimean residents to access
the content of ATR media outlets only through VPN, Facebook, or dedicated applications on
smartphone or tablet, as those outlets have been forced to operate from mainland Ukraine) (Annex
18).
299
513. The United Nations and other international organizations, as well as a variety
of NGOs dedicated to media freedom, have reported that the re-registration requirements
were applied in a manner that disproportionately disfavored Crimean Tatar media.1084
Ukraine is not aware of any media entities serving the Russian community in Crimea that
were denied registration on comparably pretextual grounds.
2. Discriminatory enforcement of Russia’s anti-extremism
laws to harass and intimidate Crimean Tatar and
Ukrainian media outlets
514. The Russian occupation authorities have also abused the arbitrary powers
accorded them by Russia’s anti-extremism laws to harass and intimidate Crimean Tatar and
Ukrainian media. Specifically, the authorities have relied on the recently enacted
criminalization of statements against the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation to
target Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian media outlets that have questioned the lawfulness of
Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
515. In 2014, for example, the editor of the Crimean Tatar newspaper Avdet,
Shevket Kaybullayev, received repeated warnings from the Russian FSB regarding Avdet’s
publication of materials that the occupation authorities considered “extremist.”1085 In June
and September 2014, the FSB admonished Kaybullayev that he could be held accountable if
1084 OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of
Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine) (22 February 2014 to 12 September 2017), paras. 8,
156–157 (Annex 759); OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the
High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Report of the Human Rights Assessment
Mission on Crimea (6–18 July 2015) (17 September 2015) paras. 75–79 (Annex 812); Freedom House,
Freedom of the Press: Crimea 2015 (last visited 25 September 2017) (Annex 963); Freedom House,
Freedom of the Press: Crimea 2016 (last visited 8 March 2018) (Annex 972); Human Rights Watch,
Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea (November 2014) pgs. 2, 25–26 (Annex 943).
1085 Notice about the Inadmissibility of Violations of the Law (3 June 2014), issued to Shevket
Kaybullayev by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (Annex 891); Official Notice
dated 17 September 2014, issued to Shevket Kaybullayev by the Federal Security Service of the
Russian Federation (Annex 897).
300
Avdet published materials that “creat[ed] conditions favoring” a violation of Russia’s antiextremism
law1086 and expressed concern regarding alleged “concealed” appeals to readers to
violate Russian law.1087 Occupation authorities also conducted a 17-hour search of Avdet’s
offices in September 2014, paralyzing its operations for the day.1088
516. Like Kaybullayev, the general coordinator of Crimean Tatar media outlet QHA
Ismet Yuksel faced personal harassment and persecution by the Russian occupation
authorities. On 30 June 2014, the FSB issued a decision to ban Yuksel from Crimea for five
years.1089 Yuksel challenged the ban in the Russian courts, but it was upheld.1090
517. The Russian Federation’s suppression and intimidation of individuals
associated with Crimean Tatar media outlets continued even after these outlets were banned
from the peninsula. For example, on 2 November 2015, occupation authorities carried out
searches simultaneously at the home of Mr. Islyamov and the homes of ATR Television
Stations’ general director and senior editor.1091 This oppression even continued into 2016.
Specifically, on 30 May 2016, the Crimean Prosecutors issued a warning to ATR’s deputy
1086 Notice about the Inadmissibility of Violations of the Law (3 June 2014), issued to Shevket
Kaybullayev by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (Annex 891).
1087 Official Notice dated 17 September 2014, issued to Shevket Kaybullayev by the Federal Security
Service of the Russian Federation (Annex 897).
1088 See OHCHR, Report on Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (15 November 2014) para. 226;
Human Rights Watch, Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea (November 2014) p. 13 (Annex 943).
1089 See Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (18 November 2015) (upholding the 14 May 2015
decision of the Moscow City Court to reject Yuksel’s appeal); OSCE, Report on the Human Rights
Assessment Mission on Crimea (6-18 July 2015) (17 September 2015), para. 229 (Annex 812).
1090 Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, No. 5-APG15-110s, Ruling (18 November 2015)
(upholding the 14 May 2015 decision of the Moscow City Court to reject Yuksel’s appeal) (Annex 912).
1091 Islyamov Statement, para. 30–33 (Annex 18).
301
director Budzhurova regarding her alleged “extremist” views — which arose from her
criticism of the arrests of Crimean Tatars on social media.1092
518. The Russian occupation authorities have also invoked anti-extremism laws to
silence media outlets and media representatives that adopt a pro-Ukrainian stance. A
particular target for the Russian occupation authorities’ repression has been the Center for
Journalist Investigations. As the Russian military began to take control of Crimea in late
February 2014, the Center refused to adopt the editorial line encouraged by pro-Russian
elements, that this was a spontaneous uprising of the Crimean people desirous of union with
the Russian Federation. Instead the Center rigorously documented the Russian takeover and
described it, accurately, as a violation of international law. Due to increased harassment and
inspections, the Center was forced to move its activities to mainland Ukraine in September
2014, but the Russian Federation continued its attempts to silence the organization.1093
519. On 13 March 2015, the Russian occupation authorities charged Center
journalist Anna Andriyevska with “anti-state activities” based on an article she had authored
stating that Crimea was part of Ukraine.1094 The Russian authorities characterized this as
questioning the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. Andriyevska was in Ukraine
at the time the charges were entered against her. In her absence, the FSB subjected her
family and friends to arbitrary searches and interrogation.1095
520. The same day the charges were made, the Russian occupation authorities
raided and searched the home of Andriyevska’s parents, seizing Andriyevska’s old notebooks
1092 See OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 May–15 August 2016) para.
169 (Annex 772).
1093 Andriyevska Statement, para. 13 (Annex 14).
1094 Ibid. paras. 14–15 (Annex 14).
1095 Ibid. paras. 16–18 (Annex 14).
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and her father’s computer.1096 As she had not lived with her parents in over ten years before
the time of the search, the clear purpose was to intimidate and harass Andriyevska and her
family. Also on that day, the home of Andriyevska's friend and colleague, Center editor
Natalia Kokorina, was searched. After the search, Kokorina was detained and taken to the
FSB headquarters, where she was interrogated for six hours.1097 In 2016, the Russian
Federal Financial Monitoring Service added Andriyevska to its list of terrorists and
extremists.1098
521. These non-exhaustive examples are illustrative of the harassment that
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian journalists and media organizations have faced and continue
to face in Crimea. A fuller account of the persecution suffered by journalists and media
groups from these two communities, prepared by local human rights groups, is annexed to
this memorial.1099
Degradation of Cultural Heritage
522. The Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities have also suffered a
more general assault on their respective cultural heritage. For the Crimean Tatars, this has
come in the form of the partial destruction of their most important remaining cultural
1096 See Andriyevska Statement, paras. 16–17 (Annex 14); Council of Europe Media Freedom Alert,
Harassment of Journalists Natalya Kokorina and Anna Andrievska in Crimea, Ukraine by Russian
Officials (2 April 2015) (Annex 823).
1097 See Andriyevska Statement, para. 18 (Annex 14); Council of Europe Media Freedom Alert,
Harassment of Journalists Natalya Kokorina and Anna Andrievska in Crimea, Ukraine by Russian
Officials (2 April 2015) (Annex 823).
1098 Andriyevska Statement, para. 19 (Annex 14); List of Organizations and Individuals on which There
is Information that They are Involved in Extremist Activity or Terrorism, ROSFINMONITORING [16May
2018], accessed at http://www.fedsfm.ru/documents/terrorists-catalog-portal-act (Annex 926).
1099 Regional Centre for Human Rights, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, and CHROT,
Crimea Beyond Rules: Thematic Review of the Human Rights Situation Under Occupation (2017),
pp. 26-40, 77-81 (aNNEX 956); Human Rights Information Centre, Crimean Tatar Media in Crimea:
Situation in 2014 – 2016 (10 April 2017) (Annex 960).
303
artefact – the Khan’s Palace in Bakhchysarai. For the Ukrainian community, it has taken the
form of the progressive closure of virtually all institutions focused on cultural expression in
the Ukrainian language.
Destruction of the Khan’s Palace
523. The large majority of Crimean Tatar historical sites were destroyed by the
Soviet authorities as they sought to wipe the peninsula of any trace of the Crimean Tatar
people in the wake of the Sürgün.1100 One exception, and by far the most important
remaining historical site of this people is the Palace of the Crimean Khans (“the Khan’s
Palace”), a complex in Bakhchysarai that dates back to the sixteenth century.1101 The Palace
was originally the primary residence for the monarchs of the Crimean Khanate. But its
cultural significance to the Crimean Tatars does not end there — the first Qurultay was held
at the Khan’s Palace in 1917 and members of the modern Qurultay swear their oaths of office
there.1102 In 2013, UNESCO listed the Khan’s Palace as a potential addition to its World
Heritage List. 1103
524. The integrity of the Palace and the broader historical Preserve of which it
forms part has, however, been seriously undermined by a culturally insensitive renovation
commissioned and managed by the Crimean authorities. The contractor hired to lead the
renovations, ATTA Group, and its subcontractor Kiramet have no experience renovating
historical buildings and, in their initial phase of work, have already caused significant
1100 Greta Uehling, Genocide’s Aftermath: Neostalinism in Contemporary Crimea, Genocide Studies
and Prevention 3 (2015) (Annex 1021).
1101 Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, Save the Khan’s Palace (2018) p. 1 (Annex 734).
1102 Ibid., p. 4.
1103 Tony Wesolowsky, Facelift Or Farce? 'Restoration' Of Palace Shocks Crimean Tatars (18
February 2018), accessed at https://www.rferl.org/a/crimea-khan-s-palace-restoration-bakhchisarysho…-
tatars-persecution-unesco/29046866.html (Annex 1073).
304
damage to the Khan’s Palace, to the extent that experts consider this work to be new
construction, as opposed to the much less invasive restoration required for historical
architecture.1104 The depredations visited on the site to date include:
• Destruction beyond repair of the concourse to the complex.1105
• Damage to the roof to the mosque in the Preserve by unnecessarily invasive work,
with 104 original joists replaced with completely new ones built with modern
technology, even though only six actually needed to be replaced and five more
restored.1106
• Complete replacement of the original oak anti-seismic belt supporting the roof
with a completely new one made of incongruous concrete and metal.1107
• The stripping and discarding of historical handcrafted tiles (“Tatarka”) from the
roof of the mosque in the Khan Palace’s complex and their replacement by
modern Spanish tiles.1108
• Damage to the interior of the mosque because of a failure to adequately protect it
from moisture during work on the roof.1109
525. In sum, “[t]he large- scale replacement of wooden structural elements with
modern materials is not consistent with the construction principles of the Crimean Tatar
khanate, subverts the historical accuracy of the entire ensemble, and causes irreparable
1104 A.E. Antoniuk, National Coordinator of International Center for the Study of the Preservation and
Restoration of Cultural Property in Ukraine, Letter No. 12 (April 2018) (Annex 1030).
1105 Center of Monument Studies, “Restoration” of the Great Khan Mosque (Biyuk Khan-Djami) in
Bakhchisaray: on the Tile Roofing (14 March 2018) p. 1 (Annex 1031); Ministry of Information Policy
of Ukraine, Save the Khan’s Palace (2018) pp. 7, 19 (Annex 734)
1106 Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, Save the Khan’s Palace (2018) p. 8 (Annex 734).
1107 A.E. Antoniuk, National Coordinator of International Center for the Study of the Preservation and
Restoration of Cultural Property in Ukraine, Letter No. 12 (April 2018) (Annex 1030); Center of
Monument Studies, “Restoration” of the Great Khan Mosque (Biyuk Khan-Djami) in Bakhchisaray: on
the Tile Roofing (14 March 2018) p. 1 (Annex 1031); Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, Save
the Khan’s Palace (2018) p. 11 (Annex 734).
1108 Center of Monument Studies, “Restoration” of the Great Khan Mosque (Biyuk Khan-Djami) in
Bakhchisaray: on the Tile Roofing (14 March 2018) p. 1–7 (Annex 1031); Ministry of Information
Policy of Ukraine, Save the Khan’s Palace (2018) p. 10-11 (Annex 734).
1109 Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, Save the Khan’s Palace (2018). p. 13–14 (Annex 734).
305
damage to the history and culture of the Crimean Tatars as a nation.”1110 With a second
phase of renovation affecting the most important part of the complex, the main house, due to
begin soon, the Crimean Tatar community is understandably deeply concerned at the further
damage that may be inflicted on its most prized historical site. The harm inflicted on the site
to date has prompted no intervention by the director of the complex, a former prosecutor in
Luhansk who is neither a Crimean Tatar nor a Muslim.
526. The Crimean Tatar community’s efforts to have ATTA Group and Kiramet
removed from the renovation project have been rebuffed by the Crimean courts.1111 Yet when
the same companies were engaged to renovate objects of cultural importance to the ethnic
Russian community, the Lenin District court in the Rostov Oblast did not hesitate to
intervene, finding that they had violated renovation standards in their work on the
Aivazovsky House cultural heritage site in Feodosia in 2017.1112
Harassment and Closure of Ukrainian Cultural Institutions
527. Meanwhile, Ukrainian culture in Crimea is under siege across the board. As
the witness testimony of Mr. Andrii Shchekun indicates, prior to the Russian occupation of
Crimea, Crimea-based NGOs were instrumental in promoting Ukrainian-language
newspapers and the broadcasting of television programs in Ukrainian.1113 The Russian
occupation authorities have cracked down especially harshly on activists promoting
1110 A.E. Antoniuk, National Coordinator of International Center for the Study of the Preservation and
Restoration of Cultural Property in Ukraine, Letter No. 12 (April 2018) (Annex 1030).
1111 Zheleznodorozhny District Court of Simferopol of the Republic of Crimea (dismissing the claim by
the former director against the contractor and sub-contractor for lack of standing without addressing
the harms of the construction work to this cultural heritage) (Annex 930).
1112 Judgment in an administrative offence case, 11 October 2017, Rostov-on-Don, Case No. 5-438/17
(Annex 925).
1113 See Shchekun Statement, paras. 5–6 (Annex 13).
306
Ukrainian culture. As previously described, Mr. Shchekun himself was kidnapped with a
colleague in March 2014, subjected to ten days of unlawful detention, blindfolded and
tortured, before eventually being released.1114
528. Other Ukrainian cultural activists in Crimea have also been harshly dealt with.
In May 2015, Leonid Kuzmin founded the Ukrainian Cultural Centre in Simferopol with the
express mission of preserving Ukrainian language and culture on the peninsula.1115 The
Centre published a Ukrainian-language newspaper under the title “Krymsky Teren” featuring
stories about Ukrainian culture. With a print run of approximately 500 copies, Krymsky
Teren was the only Ukrainian-language newspaper in circulation in Crimea following the
Russian occupation.1116 Mr. Kuzmin and his fellow staff at the Centre were, however,
subjected to unremitting harassment by the Russian security services in Crimea, involving
frequent arrests and the threat of criminal charges . As one NGO report in March 2017
stated:
Four members of the Ukrainian Cultural Centre have been
subjected to FSB interrogation in a move that seems clearly
aimed at intimidation and at labelling any pro-Ukrainian
activities however unpolitical, as “extremist.” One of the
original founders of the Centre has been driven out of Crimea
and is now facing charges effectively for opposing annexation,
while another activist is threatened with possible criminal
charge for a photo on her social network page with a Ukrainian
flag.1117
1114 Ibid., para. 23–25 (Annex 13).
1115 Interfax, FSB Detains Activist of Ukrainian Cultural Center in Crimea (12 January 2017) (Annex
1074).
1116 Hromadske International, The True Cost of Remaining Ukrainian in Crimea (2 April 2018),
accessed at https://en.hromadske.ua/posts/exclusive-the-true-cost-of-remaining-ukra…
(Annex 1076).
1117 Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, Menacing FSB Interrogations of Ukrainian Cultual
Centre Activists in Russian-Occupied Crimea (23 March 2017), accessed at
http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1490184936 (Annex 937).
307
The Ukrainian Cultural Centre was ultimately forced to close and, with it, Crimea’s sole
Ukrainian-language newspaper.
529. Ukrainian cultural entities elsewhere in Crimea are withering. The Lesya
Ukrainka museum in Yalta, for example, was dedicated to the famous nineteenth and
twentieth century Ukrainian writer, activist, and feminist who had lived for some time in
Yalta, Crimea. The museum shut down in 2016 for renovation; when it reopened, the
museum’s collection of Ukrainka’s items had been diminished from an entire floor to a small
corner of the building.1118
530. In Simferopol, a Ukrainian-language children’s drama school was forced to
shut down after local officials accused the school of promoting Ukrainian nationalism and
western symbols. The ire of the officials was triggered when the school staged a work by a
Crimean author titled “Songs of the Amazon.” According to one account:
[Co-founder] Polchenko said officials interpreted political
undertones throughout the performance, taking particular
offence at the costume of a young girl wearing a golden crown
and impersonating the sun, which he says they saw as a
reference to New York’s Statue of Liberty.
…
… “They also described the embroidered clothing and the
Ukrainian-language scenario as brazen Ukrainian
nationalism.1119
531. Without activists to champion the cause of Ukrainian culture, it is becoming
harder for Ukrainians in Crimea to express themselves culturally. Even speaking publicly in
Ukrainian has become suspect. As one journalist notes:
1118 See infra note 1121.
1119 The Guardian, Crimea Children’s Theatre Forced to Shut for ‘Promoting Western Propaganda (6
January 2016) (Annex 1075).
308
Finding a place to talk to journalists, especially in Ukrainian, is
problematic. Many people worry that the hotels are unreliable
(you could be overheard at any point.). In the cafes, there are
too many onlookers while speaking Ukrainian on a bus, taxi or
café could attract unwanted attention; it would be an indicator
of dissent, a political stance.1120
532. The stigmatization of the Ukrainian language and speakers of it indicates the
extreme pressure that Ukrainian identity is under in Crimea as a result of the Russian
Federation’s discriminatory policies.
Suppression of Minority Education Rights
533. A strategy of cultural erasure would not be complete without measures to
prevent the target culture being passed on to future generations through the educational
system. Accordingly, the Russian occupation authorities have worked overtly and covertly to
limit opportunities for Crimean children to be taught in the Crimean Tatar or Ukrainian
languages. This has been accompanied by a new emphasis on Russian as the dominant
language of tuition and a reorientation of both the curriculum and educational qualifications
towards Russia.
534. Since March 2014, the Russian Federation has introduced a number of
measures in Crimea that significantly inhibit the education and training of Ukrainians and
Crimean Tatars. The apparent goal has been erasing non-Russian cultures from Ukraine’s
history. The unquestionable purpose and effect of these measures has been to exclude
Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar culture and history from education as a general matter, as well
as to decrease the quality and availability of education specific to the Ukrainian and Crimean
Tatar communities in Crimea.
1120 Ibid.
309
Restricting Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian language education
535. From Ukraine’s independence in 1991, Crimeans expressed their patriotism
and their now-recognized freedom of expression by returning to their cultural roots. In
Soviet times, students had no choice but to be educated in Russian. After independence,
Crimea saw a growing demand for education in both the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar
languages. The first school in Crimea to primarily teach in Crimean Tatar opened in 1993.1121
By 1998, only five years later, that number of Crimean Tatar educational institutions quickly
rose to six. Likewise, the first school in Crimea to teach primarily in Ukrainian opened in
1997. Five years later, four schools used Ukrainian as the language of instruction. 1122
536. Families’ desire for their children to be instructed in their native language
only strengthened with time. Native language education continued to grow, and schools that
offered instruction in several languages also became more popular.1123 Whereas only 82
students were educated in Ukrainian in Crimea a year after independence, 12,694 were
learning in Ukrainian by 2014. 278 pupils learning in Crimean Tatar a year after
independence grew to 5,551 by 2014.1124 Before February 2014, numerous programs for
multi-ethnic and multi-lingual education were developed and implemented in Crimea.1125
These programs are described in the witness statement of Yulia Tyshchenko, who was
1121 Education Statistics from Ministry of Education of Ukraine (Annex 735).
1122 Ibid.
1123 In his witness statement, Shchekun describes the various language offerings of the 571
comprehensive schools in Crimea before the occupation, and the distribution in language of
instruction at that time. Shchekun Statement, paras. 30–31 (Annex 13).
1124 Education Statistics from Ministry of Education of Ukraine (Annex 735); see also Shchekun
Statement, para. 8 (noting that Crimean schools were receptive to increasing their Ukrainianlanguage
and Ukrainian cultural offerings prior to February 2014) (Annex 13).
1125 Tyshchenko Statement, paras. 4–17 (Annex 17).
310
actively involved in these programs from 2008 to early 2014, in collaboration with the OSCE
High Commissioner for National Minorities and other organizations.1126
537. In June 2014, the Crimean Ministry of Education signaled the coming assault
on the increasing demand for minority language teaching, declaring that studying the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages “must not be conducted at the expense of
instruction and study of the official language of the Russian Federation,” i.e. Russian.1127
More recently, the Governor of Sevastopol, Sergey Meniaylo, displayed his disregard for
Crimean Tatar language education in an 18 March 2016 interview. In this interview,
Meniaylo acknowledged Crimean Tatars’ concerns that they were forgetting their own
language under the Russian occupation regime, and replied “[e]xcuse me, friends, speak
your own language with your family.”1128
538. Consistent with such statements, many Crimean parents have found that their
requests for Ukrainian or Crimean Tatar language instruction have been ignored by the
Russian occupation authorities. Other parents have felt unsafe even making such
requests.1129 At community meetings, school directors have reportedly attempted to dissuade
parents from seeking to have their children educated in Ukrainian by arguing that the
language will decrease the child’s opportunities for higher education and employment.1130
1126 Ibid.
1127 Republic of Crimea, Ministry of Education, Science and Youth, Letter No. 01-14/ 382 (25 June
2014) (Annex 836).
1128 Interview with Sergey Meniaylo, the Governor of Sevastopol published on Meduza.ru on (18 March
2016) (Annex 1062).
1129 OSCE, Report on the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6-18 July 2015) (17
September 2015), para. 190 (Annex 812); Tyshchenko Statement, para. 25–27 (Annex 17).
1130 Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, “Annexed” Education in Temporarily
Occupied Crimea, Monitoring Report 2015, para. 23 [hereinafter UCCIP 2015 Monitoring report]
(Annex 944); Tyshchenko Statement, para. 25–27.
311
539. In fact, the CERD Committee itself has expressed concern about treaty
violations caused by restrictions that the Russian Federation has placed on education in
Crimea. In particular, the CERD Committee took note of the restrictions that the Russian
Federation had imposed on using and studying the Ukrainian language in Crimea since
2014. The CERD Committee recommended that the Russian Federation, in light of its
obligations under the CERD, take effective measures to ensure that the Ukrainian language
is used and studied without interference.1131
Decrease in the number and quality of Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
schools in Crimea.
540. The Russian Federation’s actions have significantly decreased the number of
schools in Crimea that currently serve the Ukrainian population, and the number of
Ukrainians in Crimea currently enrolled in Ukrainian schools there. In the 2013–14 school
year, general education in the Ukrainian language was provided to 12,694 children.1132 In the
following school year — the first year after the occupation began — the number of children
1131 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Russian Federation, CERD/C/RUS/CO/23-24 (20 September
2017), paras. 19, 20 (Annex 804).
1132 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 August–15 November 2015), para. 157 (Annex 770); see also Permanent
Delegation of the Russian Federation to UNESCO, Information on the Situation in the Republic of
Crimea (the Russian Federation) within the Scope of UNESCO Competence as of April 8, 2015 (14 April
2015), p. 2 (Annex 785).
312
receiving Ukrainian-language education plummeted to 2,154.1133 In the 2015–16 school year,
that number was cut in half, reduced to less than 1,000 students.1134
541. At present, 318 students are reportedly educated in Ukrainian, a mere 0.2
percent of children attending public schools in Crimea.1135 The number of children learning
Ukrainian as an elective subject has decreased by 50 percent since the occupation began.1136
As the U.N. reported in December 2016, of the seven Ukrainian-language educational
institutions that existed in Crimea until 2014, only one remains in operation, and even this
school has ceased instruction in Ukrainian in the first and second grades.1137
1133 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 August–15 November 2015), para. 157 (Annex 770). The Russian Federation
has admitted this decrease, and in fact reported a lower number (1,990) for the 2014–15 school year.
See Permanent Delegation of the Russian Federation to UNESCO, Information on the Situation in the
Republic of Crimea (the Russian Federation) within the Scope of UNESCO Competence as of April 8,
2015 (14 April 2015) p. 2 (Annex 785).
1134 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 August–15 November 2015), para. 157 (Annex 770).
1135 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 November 2017–15 February 2018), para. 126 (Annex 779).
1136 Ibid.
1137 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine (16 August–5 November 2016), para. 180 (Annex 773).
313
Map 15: Suppression of Ukrainian Schools in Crimea since February 2014
542. Consistent with these figures, parents report that the Ukrainian-language
schools that their children previously attended in Crimea are simply being switched over to
Russian-language institutions. For example, one father reported that his two children had to
stop their education in the Ukrainian language in Simferopol in September 2014.1138 At that
time, his son’s 9th grade class – which had been in Ukrainian previously — was divided into
two smaller Russian-language classes.1139 His daughter’s classes, also previously in
1138 Tanya Cooper & Yulia Gorbunova, Russia is Violating Crimeans’ Rights, Kyiv Post (3 May 2017)
(Annex 1065).
1139 Ibid.
314
Ukrainian, were likewise made Russian-language classes in September 2014 after several
Russian-speaking children were added to the class.1140 This man sent his son to school in
mainland Ukraine, but the daughter continues to be educated in Crimea in Russian.1141
543. As set forth below, the dire situation of Ukrainian language education has not
improved, despite this Court’s 19 April 2017 Provisional Measures Order that required the
Russian Federation to “[e]nsure the availability of education in the Ukrainian language.” In
fact, Russian suppression of minority schools is not a new phenomenon, and the CERD
Committee observed as early as 1996 that “[s]everal minority and indigenous groups [in
Russia] have no access to education in their own language.”1142
544. Although the number of students receiving education in Crimean Tatar
schools has remained relatively steady since the Russian occupation of Crimea began, the
quality of education provided at these schools had decreased significantly. As set forth in the
statement of Ms. Tyshchenko, the Russian occupation authorities failed to provide textbooks
to Crimea Tatar schools until the 2017-2018 school year, more than three years after the
annexation of Crimea.1143 Those textbooks that were provided present a heavily russified
version of history, portray Stalin as a hero — despite his 1944 deportation of the Crimean
Tatars — and minimize discussions of the Sürgün. 1144 Far from being truly supportive of
1140 Ibid.
1141 Ibid.
1142 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Russian Federation, CERD/C/304/Add.5 (28 March 1996),
para. 7; see also para. 16 (“The State Party should take all appropriate measures to ensure the
promotion of minority and indigenous people’s languages. The Committee recommends that
education programmes be provided in the appropriate languages.”) (Annex 795).
1143 Tyshchenko Statement, para. 21 (Annex 17).
1144 Ibid. para. 22.
315
Crimean Tatar education, such textbooks provided by the Russian Federation are an affront
to the Crimean Tatar community and demonstrate the depths of its discriminatory
actions.1145
Creation of an artificial teacher shortage
545. Separately, the Russian occupation authorities have manufactured a shortage
of teachers to provide instruction in Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages in Crimea,
ensuring that those schools which remain in existence cannot provide proper education to
their students. To achieve this artificial teacher shortage, the Russian Federation ended a
number of teacher-training programs that had been in existence in Crimea since the mid-
1990s. Specifically, in Fall 2014, the Russian occupation authorities closed the Ukrainian
Philology Faculty of the Tavrida National VI Vernadsky University.1146 This faculty had
previously graduated about 50 Ukrainian-language teachers per year, but in the 2014-2015
academic year, only about 15 students were accepted to become Ukrainian-language
teachers.1147
546. As described in the statement of Ms. Tyshchenko, the closure of this faculty is
a significant blow to Ukrainian language education in Crimea. This faculty had been
established in the mid 1990s, and had served as a strong basis to ensure that Ukrainian
language education was available to those in Crimea who sought it.1148 The Russian
1145 Ibid. paras. 22, 24 (describing school games in which Crimean Tatar schoolchildren are asked to
draw their parents wearing Russian traditional dress and the frequent lectures in Crimean schools
about fighting “Islamic Extremism.”).
1146 OSCE, Report on the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6-18 July 2015) (17
September 2015), para. 191 (Annex 812); UCCIP 2015 Monitoring Report para. 7 (Annex 944).
1147 SCE, Report on the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6-18 July 2015) (17 September
2015), para. 191 (Annex 812); Tyshchenko Statement, paras. 13, 19 (Annex 17).
1148Witness Statement of Tyshchenko paras. 13, 19 (Annex 17).
316
occupation authorities have also shrunk the Ukrainian-English program the Crimean
Polytechnic Pedagogic University, which had about 240 students before February 2014, but
now has only 40 students, all of whom are studying Russian.1149
547. By July 2015, the Russian occupation authorities had taken a similar step with
respect to Crimean Tatar language teachers. Specifically, the Russian Federation cancelled
the basic training for Crimean Tatar language teachers that was previously carried out by the
Crimean Polytechnic-Pedagogic University and Philology School of Tavrida National V.I.
Vernadsky University.1150 Like its Ukrainian-language counterpart, this program for the
training of Crimean Tatar language teachers had been established in the mid-1990s, and was
part of the efforts by the Ukrainian government to revitalize the Crimean Tatar language
after years of oppression under Soviet rule.
548. The Russian Federation’s purpose in cancelling these programs — promoting
Russian-language education — was made plain in August 2014, when the Russian occupation
authorities ordered that 300 Ukrainian language and literature teachers would be retrained
to teach Russian.1151
Discriminatory searches of Crimean Tatar schools.
549. The Russian occupation authorities have disrupted Ukrainian and Crimean
Tatar education in Crimea by carrying out intrusive searches of schools and educators
serving these communities. On 24 June 2014, for example, a particularly intrusive search
1149 Witness Statement of Yulia Tyshchenko para. 19 (Annex 17).
1150 OSCE, Report on the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6-18 July 2015) (17
September 2015), para. 291 (Annex 812).
1151 Republic of Crimea, Ministry of Education, Science, and Youth, Order No. 116 of 6 August 2014
(Annex 893); Witness Statement of Yulia Tyshchenko para. 20 (Annex 17); see also UCCIP 2015
Monitoring report p. 7 (discussing Ministry of Education of the Republic of Crimea [Decree] No. 132
of 29 August 2014) (Annex 944).
317
was carried out at a religious school in the village of Kolchugino near Simferopol.1152 The
search was carried out by some 30 armed FSB agents and policemen, who forcibly entered
the school and spent around 5 hours searching the school, the library, and students’ personal
possessions. They confiscated school computers and memory sticks, and then searched the
home of the school’s deputy director. Similar searches have taken place at numerous other
Crimean Tatar schools, and other school officials have likewise faced retaliation for providing
education to this community.1153 Ukrainian schools in Crimea have also been raided and
Ukrainian textbooks have been confiscated by the occupation authorities.1154
Biased teaching of history in remaining schools
550. More generally, Crimean schools have been affected by the Russian
Federation’s biased teaching of history, which — in the words of the PCIJ — prevents the
ethnic Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar communities from preserving their traditions and their
national characteristics. Perhaps most notably, the history of Ukraine and Ukrainian
literature has disappeared from the list of humanitarian disciplines offered in Crimean
schools.1155 Before the purported annexation of Crimea, by contrast, all students at
1152 Human Rights Watch, Rights in Retreat (November 2014), p. 17 (Annex 943).
1153 See, e.g., Council of Europe, Report by Nils Muiẑnieks Following his mission in Kyiv, Moscow,
and Crimea from 7 to 12 September 2014 (Oct. 27, 2014), para. 21 (stating that by mid-September
2014, searches had been carried out in 8 out of 10 religious schools, madrasas, belonging to the
Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Crimea, Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musulman Kryma) (Annex
822); OSCE, Report on the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea (6-18 July 2015) (17
September 2015), paras. 242-43 (stating that three Madrassas in Simferopol, the Education Centre on
Victory Avenue, a women’s madrassa in Kamenka and Seit-Settar madrassa were searched between
June and September 2014) (Annex 812); Tyshchenko Statement, para. 22 (describing a raid on 9
September 2014 at a preparatory school for the gifted in Taknove, Bakhchysarai District, Crimea)
(Annex 17).
1154 UCCIP 2015 Monitoring Report, p. 24 (Annex 944).
1155 Ibid. pp. 5, 13 (Annex 944); Tyshchenko Statement, para. 24 (Annex 17).
318
comprehensive schools in Crimea studied Ukrainian language and literature.1156 Omitting
Ukrainian history from Crimean education effectively extinguishes the Ukrainian community
as a distinct culture in Crimea, by denying its very existence.
551. The history of Crimean Tatars as a distinct ethnic group is also absent from
Crimean school curricula under the Russian occupation regime. As set forth in the statement
of Ms. Tyshchenko, the Russian Federation’s history curriculum seeks to show that Crimea is
part of the great Russian empire; and Crimean Tatar culture, as distinct to this ethnic group,
is simply not part of the story that the Russian occupation authorities wish to teach Crimean
students.
552. The history of the Crimean peninsula itself is also lacking from general history
courses in Russian-occupied Crimea, apart from the events of March 2014.1157 The account of
the annexation of Crimea presented to students on the peninsula is highly russified, seeks to
“emphasize the feasibility of Crimea’s annexation from the viewpoint of international law,
moral and ethical norms.”1158 Even general history classes were reoriented toward a pro-
Russian ideology, and teachers are encouraged to incorporate teaching materials that seek to
legitimize the annexation of Crimea.1159
553. Creative writing contests for Crimean students under the Russian occupation
regime are also russified. For example, Crimean students are asked to write poetry about the
“Crimean Spring”1160 and compete in essay contests on “my contribution to the future of a
1156 Shchekun Statement, para. 32 (Annex 13).
1157 UCCIP 2015 Monitoring report, p. 13 (Annex 944).
1158 Ibid., p. 14 (Annex 944).
1159 Ibid., pp. 5, 12 (Annex 944).
1160 Ibid., p. 29 (Annex 944).
319
Russian Crimea.”1161 As described in the statement of Ms. Tyshchenko, Crimean Tatar
children are asked in school to depict their parents in traditional Russian dress. Such
contests suppress Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar cultural identity in education and training,
while championing Russian identity, in violation of the CERD.
554. The Russian Federation is well aware of its obligations to avoid such biased
teachings under the CERD. In 2012, the Russian Federation acknowledged to the CERD
Committee that “[s]upport for education with an ethnic focus plays a major role in
preserving ethnic identity.”1162 The CERD Committee has already recognized that the
Russian Federation is not taking sufficient steps to support education in a manner that
preserves ethnic identity, however, and encouraged the Russian Federation in 2017 to ensure
that “history education [is] taught in such a way as to prevent a dominant historical narrative
and ethnic hierarchizing.”1163 As the foregoing makes plain, the Russian Federation has
clearly implemented a programme of education in Crimea that presents a dominant
(Russian) historical narrative, contrary to the admonition of the CERD Committee and in
violation of Article 5(e)(v).
1161 See Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea, Order No. 41 of 15
January 2015 “On holding in 2018 the republican contest for the best essay in the official languages
of the Republic of Crimea ‘My contribution to the future of a Russian Crimea,’”
http://monm.rk.gov.ru/file/scan01300720180115173945.pdf (Annex 906).
1162 Russian Federation, Reports submitted by States parties under article 9 of the Convention,
Twentieth to twenty-second periodic reports of States parties due in 2012, Russian Federation,
CERD/C/RUS/20-22 (6 June 2012), para. 336 (Annex 793).
1163 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Russian Federation, CERD/C/RUS/CO/23-24 (20 September
2017), paras. 31-32 (Annex 804).
320
Reorientation of Crimean educational system towards Russian higher
education system.
555. More generally, the Russian occupation authorities have reoriented the
Crimean educational system towards the Russian higher education system, coercing Crimean
families to enroll their children in Russian-focused elementary education so as to prepare
them for entry into the Russian higher-education system.
556. On 5 May 2014, the Russian Federation implemented a new law — contrary to
the law of occupation — that brought Crimean education qualification levels into conformity
with those in place in the Russian Federation, and established a process for admitting
graduates of Crimean schools to Russian universities.1164 Russian occupation authorities also
shifted Crimean schools toward the use of the five-point Russian grading scale, and away
from the twelve-point European scale, thereby virtually assuring that they must study at
Russian higher education institutions, rather than Ukrainian institutions.1165
557. The re-alignment of Crimean schools goes beyond mere qualification levels
and grading scales, however, and permeates all aspects of the educational system. For
example, the stated objective of an 18 December 2014 decree by the Russian occupation
authorities was to ensure implementation in Crimea “a public policy on patriotic upbringing
by accelerating efforts to close the gap between the common Russian and local practices in
terms of the ideological, content-specific, and methodological aspects.” 1166 This decree goes
1164 UCCIP 2015 Monitoring Report, p. 15 (Annex 944)
1165 Ibid., pp. 30–31 (Annex 944); Witness Statement of Yulia Tyshchenko para 26 (Annex 17).
1166 Decree of the Head of the Republic of Crimea, Approving the Concept of Patriotic, Spiritual and
Moral Upbringing of the Population in the Republic of Crimea (18 December 2014) (Annex 894);
UCCIP 2015 Monitoring report, p. 26 (Annex 944).
321
on to set forth the necessary steps to ensure that Crimean children have the appropriately
“patriotic” upbringing with respect to culture, history, and morals.1167
558. Even school holidays in Crimea have become russified, with mandatory
celebrations of Russian Constitution Day, the Day of Heroes of the Fatherland, the Day of
Russian Elections, among other Russia-centric holidays.1168 Meanwhile, teachers are
encouraged to report Crimean Tatar children who are absent from school on 18 May, the
date of the Crimean Tatars’ traditional remembrance of the Sürgün.1169
559. It is hard to imagine a more brutal choice than to either leave your child
uneducated or to allow him or her to be entirely indoctrinated into a foreign culture. The
many steps taken toward general reorientation of the educational system away from Ukraine
and towards Russia, are both inconsistent with the Russian Federation's obligations as an
occupying power and discriminatory towards the Crimean Tatar and, even more so, the
Ukrainian communities. Those communities are characterized by their common desire to be
part of the Ukrainian political and socio-economic space. Radically shifting the Crimean
educational system towards Russia alters the choices of future generations, deprives
Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians of future educational and job opportunities in their preferred
country, and since the Russian occupation began, has forced many Crimean families to
relocate to mainland Ukraine in order to preserve the vestiges of their native culture..
1167 Decree of the Head of the Republic of Crimea, Approving the Concept of Patriotic, Spiritual and
Moral Upbringing of the Population in the Republic of Crimea (18 December 2014) (Annex 894).
1168 UCCIP 2015 Monitoring Report, p. 27 (Annex 944).
1169 Tyshchenko Statement, para. 22 (Annex 17).
322
Section B: The Russian Federation Has Breached Its Obligations Under the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
560. Section A described the actions taken by the Russian Federation in Crimea
that form the basis for Ukraine’s claims under the CERD. This section will explain how those
actions violate Russia’s obligations under the Convention. Chapter 11 describes the core
principles of non-discrimination and equality before the law embodied in the Convention
and establishes that the Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea are protected ethnic
groups under the CERD. Chapter 12 addresses in sequence the specific CERD provisions
implicated by the Russian Federation’s conduct in Crimea and describes how that conduct
violates each provision.
561. The Russian Federation has already acknowledged in this proceeding that the
CERD applies in Crimea.1170 Yet the overall picture presented in this section is one of total
Russian contempt for its solemn obligations to seek to eliminate all forms of racial
discrimination.
Chapter 11. CERD’S MEANING AND APPLICABILITY IN THE PRESENT CASE
562. The prohibition against racial discrimination elaborated in the CERD is one of
the fundamental protections of international human rights law. The UN Charter states in its
opening article that one of the purposes of the United Nations shall be to “promot[e] and
encourag[e] respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
1170 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v.
Russian Federation), Verbatim Record (7 March 2017), p. 54, para. 4 (Lukiyantsev) ("Russia does not
dispute the applicability of CERD in the territory of Crimea.").
323
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”1171 Three years later, in 1948, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) set out as one of its guiding principles that
“[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race …”1172 The CERD was adopted by the General Assembly
on 21 December 1965, the first of several universal human rights treaties elaborating on the
principles set forth in the UN Charter and UDHR.1173 At its heart lies the obligation on every
State Party to “pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating
racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races.”1174
Today, the prohibition of racial discrimination is recognized as a peremptory norm of
general international law.1175
The Principles of Non-Discrimination and Equality Before the Law Are
Bedrock Principles Under the Convention and Should Be Given Their
Broadest Meaning
563. Racial discrimination is defined in Article 1(1) of the Convention:
In this Convention, the term “racial discrimination” shall mean
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural or any other field of human life.1176
1171 UN Charter, art. 1(3).
1172 UDHR, art. 2.
1173 U.N. General Assembly, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX) (21 December 1965) (Annex 738).
1174 CERD, art.2(1).
1175 See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970,
p. 32, para. 34 (referring to obligations erga omnes in contemporary international law, including “the
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from
slavery and racial discrimination.”).
1176 CERD, art 1(1).
324
564. The ordinary meaning of this language is consistent with the Convention
having a broad field of application:
565. First, “racial discrimination” is not limited to distinctions based on race alone,
but includes measures based on several other features that may define a group protected by
the Convention, including ethnic origin.1177
566. Second, the definition does not require that discrimination be intentional but
instead reaches all conduct with a discriminatory “purpose or effect.” Accordingly, the
Convention bars both intentional or purposeful discrimination (sometimes called direct
discrimination, or de jure discrimination), as well as discrimination manifested through the
disparate impact or effect of facially neutral laws or regulations (sometimes called indirect
discrimination, or de facto discrimination).1178 In her expert report, Sandra Fredman,
Rhodes Professor of the Laws of the British Commonwealth and the USA at the University of
1177 The CERD Committee has clarified that discrimination “based on” these criteria has the same
meaning as discrimination “on the grounds of” these criteria, as that phrase appears in paragraph 7 of
the CERD preamble. General recommendation 14 (Annex 788). In addition, the CERD Committee
has taken a broad view of whether actions are based on protected criteria within the meaning of CERD
Article 1. As the CERD Committee has opined, “[t]he ‘grounds’ of discrimination [in Article 1] are
extended in practice by the notion of ‘intersectionality’ whereby the Committee addresses situations of
double or multiple discrimination - such as discrimination on grounds of gender or religion – when
discrimination on such a ground appears to exist in combination with a ground or grounds listed in
article 1 of the Convention.” General Recommendation 32 (Annex 790).
1178 The CERD Committee has confirmed in its general recommendations that CERD prohibits both
direct and indirect discrimination. As the CERD Committee has explained, making purposeful
distinctions based on race or ethnicity will constitute direct discrimination, while indirect
discrimination occurs when an action “has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon a group
distinguished by” the criterial in CERD Article 1. General Recommendation 14. The Committee has
further stated that indirect discrimination may result from the application of facially neutral laws,
where such application “would put persons of a particular racial, ethnic or national origin at a
disadvantage compared with other persons.” Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under article 9 of the Convention, United States
of America, CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (8 May 2008), para. 10 (Annex 801).
325
Oxford, concludes that a showing of intent to discriminate is not needed to establish indirect
discrimination.1179
567. Third, the definition is not limited to conduct that impairs the equal
enjoyment only of human rights enumerated in the Convention, but instead reaches all
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the field of public life.
568. A broad construction is consistent with the object and purpose of
international human rights treaties generally1180 and this Convention in particular, as
reflected both in its title, which targets the elimination of “all forms” of racial discrimination,
and its preamble, which refers back to the expansive statements concerning racial
discrimination in the UN Charter and the UDHR. For example, the latter instrument makes
clear that “all of the rights and freedoms” enumerated in the Declaration are to apply without
racial distinction.
569. The preparatory works of the Convention also confirm that it was intended to
apply broadly to ensure preservation of distinct cultural identities. As one CERD drafter
opined, “[e]thnic differences were absolutely dependent for survival on language, schools,
publications and other, cultural institutions” and “[h]owever well-treated in other respects a
member of an ethnic group might be, if he were cut off from his tradition and culture, he
1179 Expert Report of Professor Sandra Fredman para. 52 et seq [hereinafter Fredman Report] (Annex
22).
1180 See The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human
Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Ser. A) No. 2 (1982), para. 29 (Annex 832):
Modern human rights treaties in general … are not multilateral
treaties of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal
exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting States.
Their object and purpose is the protection of the basic rights of
individual human beings irrespective of their nationality, both
against the State of their nationality and all other contracting States.
326
would be the victim of discrimination and the right of his group to survive would be
jeopardized.”1181
570. A concept closely related to that of racial discrimination in the CERD is
“equality before the law.” Indeed, in his noted dissenting opinion in South West Africa,
Judge Tanaka treated the concepts of non-discrimination and equality before the law as
effectively interchangeable.1182
571. Under Article 5 of the Convention, States Parties undertake:
[T]o prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its
forms and to guarantee the right of everyone , without
distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to
equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the
following rights …1183
The article then sets out a long list of examples of specific rights to which equality before the
law is guaranteed. The use of the word “notably” to introduce that list indicates that it is not
intended to be exhaustive. As noted above, other provisions of the CERD make clear that the
Convention’s scope of application reaches all human rights and fundamental freedoms, not
just those specifically articulated in its text.
1181 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (Sixteenth Session), Summary Record of
the Four Hundred and Eleventh Meeting Held 16 January 1964, E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.411 (5 February
1964) (Annex 737).
1182 South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966 (Diss. Op. Tanaka), pp. 250, at
287-88 (“The question is whether the Charter of the United Nations contains a legal norm of equality
before the law and the principle of non-discrimination on account of religion, race, colour, sex,
language, political creed, etc.”).
1183 CERD, art. 5.
327
572. The principle of non-discrimination or equality before the law does not
require equal treatment of all persons regardless of the circumstances. As Judge Tanaka
observed:
[T]he principle of equality before the law does not mean the
absolute equality, namely equal treatment of men without
regard to individual, concrete circumstances, but it means the
relative equality, namely the principle to treat equally what are
equal and unequally what are unequal.1184
Judge Tanaka went on to point out that different treatment of individuals must, however be
reasonably related and proportionate to the differences between them and that
“reasonableness as a criterion for the different treatment logically excludes arbitrariness.”1185
573. The CERD Committee’s practice is consistent with these principles.1186 As
explained in its General Recommendation No. 32:
The term “non-discrimination” does not signify the necessity of
uniform treatment when there are significant differences in
situation between one person or group and another, or, in
other words, if there is an objective and reasonable justification
for differential treatment. To treat in an equal manner persons
or groups whose situations are objectively different will
1184 South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966 (Diss. Op. Tanaka), pp. 305-06.
1185 Ibid. p. 306 (“[N]ot every different treatment can be justified by the existence of differences, but
only such as corresponds to the differences themselves . . .”).
1186 In addition to broadly prohibiting discrimination, the CERD also created a committee (the CERD
Committee) which was tasked with receiving reports from CERD parties and making “suggestions and
general recommendations” regarding compliance with the CERD. CERD, art. 9(2). The Committee
has not been given general competence to interpret the Convention, but may do so as required for the
performance of its functions. While the Committee’s interpretation of the Convention for that
purpose is not binding on States Parties, it “shapes the practice of states in applying the Convention
and may establish and reflect their agreement regarding its interpretation.” Theodor Meron, The
Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 79 AM. J. INT’L L 283, 285 (1985) (ANNEX 1011).
328
constitute discrimination in effect, as will the unequal
treatment of persons whose situations are objectively the same.
574. As demonstrated below, there was no “objective and reasonable justification”
for the differential treatment meted out to the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities by
the Russian Federation.
The Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian Communities in Crimea Are Ethnic
Groups Protected by the Convention
575. As discussed above, the CERD defines racial discrimination in terms of
distinctions “based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.”1187 The
Convention does not, however, identify the factors to be considered in determining whether
a group identity falls within the scope of its protections. In this case, Ukraine alleges that the
Russian Federation’s conduct towards two ethnic groups – the Crimean Tatars and
Ukrainians in Crimea – constitutes racial discrimination for the purposes of the Convention.
This section describes the criteria the Court may consider in determining what constitutes an
ethnic group for the purposes of the Convention. It then explains how the Crimean Tatar
and Ukrainian communities in Crimea satisfy those criteria.
Meaning of Ethnicity for the Purposes of the Convention
576. The ordinary meaning of “ethnicity” relates to “membership of a group
regarded as ultimately of common descent, or having a common national or cultural
tradition.”1188 The context in which “ethnic origin” appears in Article 1(1) provides some
additional guidance. Ethnicity is listed separately from race, color, descent and national
1187 CERD, art. 1(1).
1188 Oxford English Dictionary (2018), http://www.oed.com/. See also https://www.merriamwebster.
com/dictionary/ethnic ([O]f or relating to large groups of people classed according to
common racial, national, tribal, religious, linguistic, or cultural origin or background.”) (Annex 1091).
329
origin in the definition, implying that it is different in some way from all these things.1189 In
particular, the separate reference to “descent” indicates that, for the purposes of the
Convention, ethnic origin is not simply an identity inherited by each generation from the
previous one. Instead it can evolve across the generations in response to the political and
social context.
577. In addition to the ordinary meaning in context, other relevant rules of
international law may be taken into account in interpreting the term pursuant to Article
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention.1190 The CERD is part of an interlocking corpus of treaty
instruments intended by their drafters to constitute a comprehensive regime of human rights
protections. Many of the underlying human rights to which the CERD applies are referenced
in the UDHR and have been further developed in subsequent universal instruments
concluded under the auspices of the United Nations or pursuant to the regional
arrangements contemplated by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.1191 The concept of ethnicity
is addressed by several other international human rights treaties dealing with
discrimination, as well as by multilateral conventions in the fields of minorities law and
1189 Ibid.
1190 VCLT, art. 32.
1191 See Patrick Thornberry, THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMIATION OF ALL FORMS OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A COMMENTARY 317, 321, 383 (2016) (referring to UDHR, ICCPR, and other
instruments as “background standards” for particular CERD provisions and that CERD provisions
“connect[] closely” with provisions of other human rights instruments) (Annex 1029); Natan Lerner,
THE UN CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (2015), at 59-63
(stating that most of the rights catalogued in CERD Article 5 “correspond to those listed in the
Universal Declaration” and comparing the language of CERD provisions with similar provisions in the
ICCPR and ICESCR) (Annex 1027).
330
international criminal law. All these instruments are relevant rules of international law for
the purpose of determining the meaning of ethnicity under the CERD.1192
578. In her expert report, Professor Fredman describes how, under discrimination
law, minority law and international criminal law, the general practice is to look to both
subjective and objective criteria in determining whether a group shares an ethnic identity.
Subjective factors include the perception of a dominant population as to whether a given
group is ethnically different, as well as self-identification by individuals as belonging to a
given group. Objective factors include sharing a common culture, religious affiliation, and
physical appearance.1193 The CERD Committee has taken the view in its general
recommendations that “if no justification exists to the contrary,” an individual will be
identified as being a member of a particular racial or ethnic group “based on selfidentification
by the individual concerned.”1194
579. Professor Fredman finds that the weight to be given to different factors will
vary depending on the context and that not all factors need to be present to determine that
an individual belongs to a particular ethnic group.1195 Thus, speaking a common language
may be sufficient to qualify some members as belonging to an ethnic group, while others who
1192 VCLT, art. 31(3)(c); see also Theodor Meron, The Meaning and Reach of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 79 Am. J. Int’l L 283, 294
(1985) (Annex 1011).
1193 See Fredman Report, paras. 19–37 (Annex 22).
1194 CERD Committee, General Recommendation VIII concerning the interpretation and application of
article 1, paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Convention (1990) (Annex 781).
1195 Fredman Report, paras. 32-51 (Annex 22).
331
do not speak that language may also belong based on other criteria.1196 Moreover, the nature
of ethnic identity is fluid over time and the criteria determining whether someone belongs
may evolve, especially in times of conflict or other crisis.1197
The Crimean Tatars Are a Distinct and Identifiable Ethnic Group
580. A host of subjective and objective factors confirm that the Crimean Tatars are
an ethnic group for the purpose of the Convention. Addressing subjective factors first, the
Crimean Tatars consider themselves to be a separate people, indeed one of the indigenous
peoples of Crimea, and have been so recognized by the Government of Ukraine,1198 the
European Parliament1199 and the United Nations, among others. The Soviet Union treated
the Crimean Tatars as a distinct group when Stalin singled them out for deportation in
1196 Fredman Report para. 34 (Annex 22). See also Finland, Reports Submitted by States Parties
under Article 9 of the Convention, Twelfth periodic reports due in 1993, CERD/C/240/Add.2 (17 May
1995), para. 53 (responding to the CERD Committee’s concern that it may have used language as the
“sole criterion” to determine group membership, Finland confirmed that it had relied on individual
self-identification for this purpose) (Annex 794).
1197 Fredman Report, paras. 11–18 (Annex 22).
1198 The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Resolution “On Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine re guarantees of rights of the Crimean Tatar people as a part of the State of Ukraine,”
VERKHOVNA RADA (20 March 2014), accessed at
http://rada.gov.ua/en/news/News/News/89899.html (Annex 733).
1199 European Parliament Resolution of 12 May 2016 on the Crimean Tatars, 2016 O.J. C 76/27 (noting
that “so-called authorities have targeted the indigenous community of Crimean Tatars,” and “the
entire population of Crimean Tatars, an indigenous people of Crimea, was forcibly deported to other
parts of the then USSR in 1944, with no right to return until 1989”; recognizing “the Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar People" as “the legitimate … representative body of the indigenous people of Crimea”
and that “the indigenous Crimean Tatar people have suffered historic injustices which led to their
massive deportation by Soviet authorities”) (emphasis added) (Annex 830).
332
1944.1200 Since 1991, both Ukraine1201 and the Russian Federation1202 have treated the
Crimean Tatars as a separate ethnic group for census-taking purposes. And, since Russia’s
unlawful occupation of Crimea, the Russian Federation has treated the Crimean Tatars as a
separate group, including by offering them benefits as a group if they would collaborate with
annexation.1203
581. Among the numerous objective factors confirming their distinct identity as a
national or ethnic group, the Crimean Tatars share their own language (although, as a result
of their exile after 1944, many contemporary Crimean Tatars do not speak it) and are
typically adherents of the same moderate form of Islam.1204 The shared history of the
Crimean Tatar people includes having their own state, the Crimean Khanate, prior to its
annexation by Imperial Russia in 1783.1205
582. Considered together, these factors establish that discrimination against
Crimean Tatars that otherwise meets the Article 1(1) definition constitutes a violation of the
CERD.
1200 State Defense Committee of the Soviet Union Decree No. 589ss “On the Crimean Tatars” (11 May
1944) (ordering the Crimean Tatars “to be banished from the territory of the Crimea”) (Annex 871).
1201 All-Ukrainian Population Census National Composition of Population, Autonomous Republic of
Crimea (2001) (Annex 730).
1202 Russia Census in the Republic of Crimea, National Composition of the Population (2014) (Annex
878).
1203 Witness Statement of Mustafa Dzhemilev para. 24 (Annex 16). See also Back into Exile, The
Economist (18 June 2015) (Annex 1057).
1204 Magocsi Report, at 82 (Annex 21).
1205 Ibid at 9, 13, 51 (Annex 21).
333
Ukrainians in Crimea Are a Distinct and Identifiable Ethnic Group
583. A combination of subjective and objective factors also confirms the separate
identity of Ukrainians in Crimea as a distinct group encompassing both Ukrainian speakers
and others who self-identify as Ukrainian on civic grounds.
584. Imperial Russia, the Soviet Union, Ukraine and the Russian Federation have
all treated Ukrainians as a separate category in their census forms over the centuries.1206
Recent censuses taken by both Ukraine1207 and the Russian Federation1208 have distinguished
between Ukrainians in Crimea who speak Ukrainian and those who do not. Members of the
Ukrainian community in Crimea feel a shared sense of identity based not only on language,
but also on a shared outlook with regards to Crimea remaining part of Ukraine’s sovereign
territory and the importance of defending individual freedoms.1209
585. Objective factors establishing a Ukrainian ethnicity in Crimea include, for that
part of the Ukrainian community that speaks it, the existence of a distinct Ukrainian
language. For non-Ukrainian speakers who identify as Ukrainian, attachment to other facets
of Ukrainian culture may be a relevant factor, such as Ukrainian history, folklore, music, or
sports teams.1210 Social identity and political beliefs also contribute to the distinct Ukrainian
ethnicity in Crimea.1211 For the community identifying as of Ukrainian ethnicity, such social
identity and political beliefs may include, since March 2014, the conviction that Crimea is
part of Ukraine, and that the Russian occupation of the peninsula is unlawful.
1206 Ibid. at 33, 46 (Annex 21); All-Ukrainian Population Census National Composition of Population,
Autonomous Republic of Crimea (2001) (Annex 730); Russia Census in the Republic of Crimea,
National Composition of the Population (2014) (Annex 878).
1207 See supra note 754.
1208 Russia Census in the Republic of Crimea, National Composition of the Population (2014) (Annex
878); See also Address by President of the Russian Federation, The Kremlin, Moscow (18March
2014) (observing that Crimea’s population included 350,000 “Ukrainians who predominantly
consider Russian their native language”) (Annex 887).
1209 Andriyevska Statement, paras. 3-4 (Annex 14).
1210 Fredman Report, para. 37 (Annex 22).
1211 Fredman Report, paras. 43–52 (Annex 22).
334
586. Considered together, these factors establish that discrimination against
Ukrainians that otherwise meets the Article 1(1) definition constitutes a violation of the
CERD.
335
Chapter 12. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S VIOLATIONS OF THE CERD
587. Measured against the standards set out in Chapter 11, the Russian
Federation’s treatment of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea
unambiguously violates numerous of its obligations under the CERD. Not only does the
Russian Federation fail to live up to the affirmative obligations it has assumed under the
CERD – Russia's systematic campaign of racial discrimination against the Crimean Tatar
and Ukrainian communities in Crimea is the exact opposite of what the CERD requires.
Instead of taking measures to eliminate racial discrimination, Russia has implemented
measure after measure the purpose or effect of which is to generate racial discrimination.
Article 2 – Obligation to Eliminate Racial Discrimination
588. In the chapeau of Article 2(1), each State Party undertakes “to pursue by all
appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its
forms ….” To that end, the States Parties further undertake in Article 2(1)(a) “to engage in
no act or practice of racial discrimination ….”
589. It follows from these undertakings that when a State Party engages in
individual acts of racial discrimination it violates the CERD. When a series of acts
undertaken by the State Party constitutes a practice or a policy of racial discrimination, that
entire course of conduct is equally a violation of the CERD.
590. The scope of state responsibility under the CERD is broad, encompassing
violations of the Convention on account of actions (or inaction) by the State or its officials, as
well as actions by third parties that are tolerated by the State.
591. Under CERD Article 2(1)(a), parties must “undertake to engage in no act or
practice of racial discrimination” and “ensure that all public authorities and public
336
institutions, national and local, shall act in conformity with this obligation.”1212 Accordingly,
States Parties are responsible not only for acts of racial discrimination carried out by central
government but also for such acts perpetrated by regional or local authorities.1213 Moreover,
that responsibility extends to all public authorities and institutions, including government
ministries, the civil service, armed forces, police and other security forces.1214
592. CERD Article 2(1)(b) goes further, requiring States Parties “not to sponsor,
defend or support racial discrimination by any persons or organizations.” The ordinary
meaning of the verbs “sponsor, defend or support” captures a wide spectrum of state
behavior accommodating racial discrimination by non-state actors ranging from active
financial or other assistance, through express or tacit encouragement or approval, to mere
tolerance of racial discrimination.1215 This reading of Article 2(1)(b) as including passive
acceptance of racial discrimination by non-state actors is reinforced by the surrounding
context, including the affirmative obligation placed on States Parties by Article 2(1)(d) “to
prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means … racial discrimination by any
persons, groups or organization.” The phrase “any persons or organizations” is wide enough
1212 CERD, art. 2(1)(a).
1213 The scope of state responsibility under Article 2(1)(a) has been interpreted expansively in practice
to encompass discrimination by organizations under the control or influence of government organs.
For example, in connection with an individual claim brought under CERD, the Australian authorities
removed a racially derogatory sign from a sports stadium whose trustees were subject to government
appointment and removal, and the trustees managed the stadium for public purposes. Hagan v.
Australia, Communication No. 26/2002, CERD/C/62/D/26/2002 (14 April 2003), paras. 4.5, 5.4, 7.3
& 8 (Annex 797).
1214 See, e.g., Turkey, Combined fourth to sixth periodic reports of States parties due in 2013,
CERD/C/TUR/4-6 (17 April 2014), para.35 (confirming, in response to a request from the CERD
Committee, that Turkey had prohibited discrimination by organs of state, administrative bodies, civil
servants, and the armed forces) (Annex 802).
1215 See Thornberry, supra note 1191, at 185 (“‘Support’ is wider and may include assistance,
encouragement, or approval as well as financial support; in a related sense it may include ‘endure’ or
‘tolerate.’”) (Annex 1029).
337
to capture political parties, private militias, paramilitaries and other organized groups
ostensibly outside the control of the state.1216
593. The Russian Federation has comprehensively violated Article 2. First, its
systematic campaign of discrimination against the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
communities constitutes a practice and policy of racial discrimination contrary to its
undertakings in both the chapeau of Article 2 and in Article 2(1)(a). Second, each and every
discriminatory component of Russia’s campaign independently violates its Article 2(1)(a)
obligation to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination. Third, to the extent that
Russia claims that any particular discriminatory act was undertaken by non-state agents and
the act was not prevented by Russian authorities, it simply confirms that Russia has violated
its Article 2(1)(b) obligation not to tolerate acts of discrimination by “any persons or
organizations.”
Russia’s Overall Policy and Practice of Discriminating Against the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian Communities Violates Article 2(1)
594. The catalogue of human rights violations suffered disproportionately by the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities, as described in Chapters 8 to 10, are part of a
single course of conduct on the part of the Russian Federation. Russia’s discriminatory
policies are intimately bound up with its drive to dominate Crimea politically, militarily and
culturally. The Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea are an obstacle to that ambition
because a defining characteristic of each community is its loyalty to the principle that Crimea
is part of Ukraine’s sovereign territory. There could be no more graphic illustration of that
1216 See, e.g., Kenya, Fifth to seventh periodic reports of States parties due in 2014, CERD/C/KEN/5-7
(28 January 2016), para. 29 (reporting, in response to a CERD Committee request for information on
implementation of this article, that Kenya had tasked a domestic institution with “discourag[ing]
persons, institutions, political parties and associations from advocating or promoting discrimination
or discriminatory practices on the ground of ethnicity or race.”) (Annex 803).
338
central fact than the sight of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar flags confronting Russian flags
above the heads of the demonstrators in front of the Crimean Parliament building on 26
February 2014.1217
595. Integral to Russia’s purported annexation of Crimea has been a broad assault
on political and civil rights by the Russian occupation authorities designed to shut down
opposition to the annexation. This assault has been both comprehensive and concerted.
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian activists were targeted for kidnapping, followed by torture
and, in some cases, murder, in an attempt to intimidate their respective communities in the
run-up to the referendum.1218 The Mejlis was harassed and its activities eventually
banned.1219 Its leadership was variously excluded from Crimea, imprisoned in Crimea on
trumped up charges, and subjected to repeated arbitrary searches.1220 The broader Crimean
Tatar community has been subjected to a pattern of similarly arbitrary searches and
detentions on the pretext of rooting out religious extremism.1221 Russian citizenship has
been forced on the inhabitants of occupied Crimea, creating conflicting loyalties for Crimean
Tatars and Ukrainians who acquiesced to it and allowing the Russian occupation authorities
to overtly discriminate against those who did not..1222
596. The Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities are, in part, defined by their
loyalty to the principle that Crimea is part of Ukraine’s sovereign territory and that Russia’s
purported annexation of the peninsula is therefore illegitimate. As a result, these two
communities have been disproportionately burdened by Russia’s crackdown on political and
civil rights. There is no legitimate justification for the differential treatment suffered by
1217 See supra Chapter 8, Section B, Figure 13.
1218 See supra Chapter 9, Section A.
1219 See supra Chapter 9, Section B.
1220 See ibid.
1221 See ibid.
1222 See supra Chapter 9, Section C.
339
these communities compared to that enjoyed, for example, by ethnic Russians who support
annexation. Eliminating opposition to annexation is not a cognizable defense, all the more
so where the very act of invading and then integrating Crimea into the Russian Federation is
a gross violation of international law.
597. In addition to its assault on political and civil rights, the Russian Federation
has also systematically suppressed cultural expression by the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
communities. Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian cultural gatherings have been disallowed or
disrupted while Russian gatherings have proceeded unhindered. Independent Crimean
Tatar and Ukrainian voices in the media have been eliminated. Access to education in the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages has been limited. All these actions demonstrate that
the end goal of Russia’s policy and practice of racial discrimination is to culturally erase the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities, leaving Russian culture to dominate on the
peninsula. This policy, reminiscent of Stalin’s attempt to wipe out whole cultures in Crimea
through mass deportation, likewise can have no legitimate justification.
598. Viewed together, the various components of Russia’s discriminatory conduct
in Crimea form a single policy or practice: to collectively punish the two communities that
have stood out against the establishment of Russian hegemony over Crimea. Russia’s
pursuit of a policy so inimical to the objectives of the CERD blatantly violates its obligations
under Article 2 to “pursue … a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms” and
to “engage in no … practice of racial discrimination.”
Russia’s Discriminatory Acts Individually Violate Article 2(1)(a) or
Article 2(1)(b)
599. For the reasons explained above, each of Russia’s individual acts of
discrimination in violation of Article 4, 5 and 6 (as described below) also violate either
Article 2(1)(a) or Article 2(1)(b). Where the act in question is attributable to the Russian
Federation itself, it violates Russia’s Article 2(1)(a) obligation “to engage in no act … of racial
discrimination .. and to ensure that all public authorities and public institutions, national
and local, shall act in conformity with this obligation.” Where the act cannot be attributed to
340
the Russian Federation but has been tolerated by the Russian authorities, it violates Russia’s
Article 2(1)(b) obligation “not to sponsor, defend or support racial discrimination by any
persons or organizations.”
Article 4 – Incitement to Racial Discrimination
600. Article 4 requires States Parties to “condemn all propaganda … which attempt
to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form” and to “adopt immediate
and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, [racial]
discrimination.”1223 Among other measures to this end, States Parties are required to
“prohibit organizations which promote and incite racial discrimination”1224 and not to
“permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial
discrimination.”1225 Again, in Crimea the Russian Federation has done the exact opposite of
what the CERD requires. Instead of taking measures to eradicate incitement to racial
discrimination, the Russian Federation has itself deliberately inflamed racial tensions and
has encouraged (or, at least, tolerated) third parties who have done the same.
601. As described in Chapter 8, an integral part of the Russian Federation’s
operation to seize control of Crimea was a disinformation campaign designed to persuade
ethnic Russians in Crimea that Ukrainian fascists were about to descend upon them.1226 This
campaign appears to have been initiated by the Russian intelligence services on social media
and then amplified by Russian television channels broadcasting into Crimea.1227 This
campaign has been coordinated by the highest levels of the State, as Russian officials up to
1223 CERD, art. 4 (chapeau).
1224 Ibid. art. 4(b)
1225 Ibid. art. 4(c).
1226 See supra Chapter 8, Section B.
1227 See ibid.
341
and including President Putin made remarks playing into this false and inflammatory
narrative.1228
602. The Russian Federation’s unlawful extension to Crimea of its anti-extremism
laws and disproportionate deployment of them against Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
individuals has made matters worse. The targeting of Crimean Tatars as religious
extremists1229 and of Ukrainians as threats to Russia’s territorial integrity1230 under the antiextremism
laws fuels mutual distrust between ethnic communities and makes racial
discrimination more, not less, likely.
603. Again, there is no reasonable justification for Russia’s conduct. The Crimean
Tatar people have a long history of following a moderate form of Islam. Creating the
impression that Crimean Tatar society has been penetrated by Islamic extremists serves no
public safety function and, indeed, is more likely to generate conflict in the long term by
turning Crimean Tatars into objects of fear and hate. Similarly, there is no reasonable
justification for branding Ukrainians as fascists and accusing them under the anti-extremism
laws of threatening Russia’s territorial integrity. The use of such historically loaded terms
can only inflame tensions among neighbors, making ethnic conflict more, not less, likely.
The inflammatory nature of the Russian Federation’s racially divisive policies is even clearer
when contrasted with Ukraine’s prior efforts to promote multiculturalism within Crimea’s
ethnically diverse popluation prior to 2014.1231
Article 5 –Equality Before the Law
604. Article 5 requires States Parties to guarantee equality before the law in the
enjoyment of a series of underlying rights, many of which are further elaborated in other
universal or regional human rights instruments. Russia’s conduct violates many of these
1228 See supra Chapter 8, Section B.
1229 See, e.g., ibid.
1230 See, e.g., ibid.
1231 See Tyshchenko Statement, paras. 4–19 (Annex 17); Islyamov Statement, paras. 2–8 (Annex 18);
Shchekun Statement, paras. 4–8 (Annex 13); Andriyevska Statement, paras. 2–4 (Annex 14).
342
specific provisions because it disproportionately burdens the human rights of Crimean
Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea, as compared to other ethnic groups.
Article 5(a) – Equal Treatment Before Tribunals
605. CERD Article 5(a) guarantees equality before the law with respect to “[t]he
right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs administering justice.” The
ordinary meaning of this provision is that States Parties must ensure non-discrimination in
the operation of their judicial systems. The CERD Committee has interpreted Article 5(a) as
covering acts undertaken by the police and prison system, in addition to courts.1232
606. The Russian Federation’s judicial assault on the Mejlis and its leadership
violates this provision. The Russian courts have banned the Mejlis as an extremist
organization,1233 frozen the assets of the NGO that funds it,1234 and convicted top Mejlis
leaders on trumped-up and, in Mr. Chiygoz’s case, blatantly discriminatory charges.1235 No
other ethnic group in Crimea has faced similar repression. Even after this Court ordered
Russia to “[r]efrain from maintaining or imposing limitations on the ability of the Crimean
Tatar community to conserve its representative institutions, including the Mejlis,” the
Supreme Court of Crimea rejected on flimsy procedural grounds the applications of Crimean
Tatar litigants for review of the ban.1236
1232 See also CERD General Recommendation No. 31 (recommending various actions related to
policing and the prison system in connection with implementation of CERD Article 5(a))(Annex 789).
1233 See supra Chapter 9, Section B.
1234 See supra Chapter 9, Section B.
1235 See supra Chapter 9, Section B.
1236 See supra Chapter 9, Section B.
343
607. Russia has further violated Article 5(a) by disproportionately targeting the
Crimean Tatar community for arbitrary searches and detentions.1237 These searches have
been carried out at Crimean Tatar schools, homes, businesses, as well as throughout entire
villages populated predominantly by Crimean Tatars.1238
608. These differences in the treatment of the Crimean Tatar community have no
reasonable justification. The Russian Federation has repeatedly invoked its anti-extremism
legislation to justify the court cases against the Mejlis and its leadership and its targeting of
Crimean Tatars for searches and detentions.1239 But those laws – much criticized by the
Venice Commission and others as enablers of arbitrary state action1240 – were extended to
Crimea in violation of Russia’s obligations under IHL and cannot be invoked as a
justification. Moreover, the use of those laws to prosecute Crimean Tatar individuals and
institutions for upholding Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea is contrary to international law.
Even if the Russian Federation could lawfully apply Russian law in Crimea, its use of these
laws to justify searches for so-called religious extremist materials is plainly pretextual, given
that the Crimean Tatar community has traditionally adhered to a moderate, not an extreme
or violent, form of Islam.1241
Article 5(b) – Right to Security of Person and Protection Against
Violence or Bodily Harm
609. CERD Article 5(b) guarantees equality before the law in enjoyment of “[t]he
right to security of person and protection by the State against violence or bodily harm,
1237 See supra Chapter 9, Sections A and B.
1238 See supra Chapter 9, Section C & Chapter 10, Section D; Islyamov Statement, paras. 13, 17, 25–28
(Annex 18); Tyshchenko Statement, para. 22 (Annex 17).
1239 See supra Chapter 9, Sections B and C.
1240 See supra Chapter 10, Section A.
1241 See supra Chapter 8, Section A; Magocsi Report at 82 (Annex 21).
344
whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual, group or institution.” This
provision has a broad sweep, covering all violence or injuries inflicted on protected groups,
not just the more aggravated violence – “torture or … cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment” – referenced in other key human rights instruments.1242
610. Russia has violated this provision by sponsoring or tolerating disappearances,
abductions, murder and torture selectively directed at Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
activists. Reshat Ametov was kidnapped in broad daylight by uniformed men before being
brutally tortured and murdered.1243 Andrii Shchekun was detained by the Self Defense
Forces and processed by the police before being unlawfully detained and tortured,
apparently by members of the Russian intelligence services.1244 The UN reported on a
“pattern” of disappearances overwhelmingly affecting Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian men in
the run-up to the referendum.1245 The Russian Federation is either directly responsible for
the discriminatory violence directed at Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians, has assumed
responsibility by incorporating the Self Defense Forces into the law enforcement structure of
Crimea,1246 or is responsible for tolerating violence inflicted by non-state agents seeking to
intimidate opponents of annexation.
1242 See, e.g., UDHR, art. 5; ICCPR, art. 7. The official French version of Article 5(b) is consistent with
this broad interpretation, referring to “voies de fait” (usually translated as “assaults”) and “les sevices”
(abuses).
1243 See supra Chapter 9, Section A.
1244 See supra Chapter 9, Section A; Shchekun Statement, paras. 19-25 (Annex 13).
1245 See supra Chapter 9, Section A.
1246 See supra Chapter 9, Section A; Statute on the People’s Militia of Crimea, No. 1734-6/14 (11 March
2014).
345
Article 5(c) – Right to Participate in Elections and Take Part in the
Government
611. CERD Article 5(c) guarantees equality before the law in the enjoyment of:
Political rights, in particular the rights to participate in
elections – to vote and to stand for election – on the basis of
universal suffrage, to take part in the Government as well as in
the conduct of public affairs at any level and to have equal
access to public service.
612. This provision is violated by the Russian Federation’s imposition and
enforcement of laws limiting the rights to run for government and municipal office and to be
employed in government and municipal service to Russian citizens who do not hold
citizenship in another state.1247 These restrictions discriminate against Crimean Tatars and
Ukrainians who were able to opt out of the imposition upon them of Russian citizenship by
declaring their desire to retain their Ukrainian citizenship, as well as the large number of
Ukrainian and Crimean Tatars who were ineligible for Russian nationality because they
lacked proof of permanent residency in Crimea. The operation of these laws also selectively
injures Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians in government or municipal employment who did
not reject Russian nationality for fear of losing their jobs and who as a result are subject to
conflicting loyalties and duties.
613. There is no reasonable justification for this different treatment of non-
Russian citizens and Russian citizens who hold a second nationality. Nor may the Russian
Federation invoke Articles 1(2) or 1(3) of the CERD to avoid scrutiny of these discriminatory
measures.1248 The discriminatory distinctions at issue here are the result of Russia’s
annexation of Crimea and imposition of its citizenship in violation of IHL.1249 Russia cannot
1247 See supra Chapter 9, Section C; Law on Admission, art. 4(3).
1248 CERD, art. 1(2) (CERD not applicable to distinctions between citizens and non-citizens); 1(3)
(CERD does not affect legal provisions concerning nationality, provided that such provisions do not
discriminate against any particular nationality).
1249 See Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), art. 47 (protected persons not to be deprived of rights by
“any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupied
Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.”); Laws of
War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), 19 October 1907, art. 45 (“It is forbidden to
compel the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile Power.”) (Annex 979).
346
invoke its own internationally unlawful acts as a basis for restricting the obligations it owes
to Ukrainian citizens in occupied Crimea.
Articles 5(d)(i) & (ii) – Right to Freedom of Movement and Residence
within the Border of the State; Right to Leave and Return to One’s
Country
614. Article 5(d)(i) guarantees equality before the law in the enjoyment of the
“right to freedom of movement and residence with the border of the State.” Article 5(d)(ii)
sets forth the same guarantee with respect to the “right to leave any country, including one’s
own, and to return to one’s country.” Pursuant to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties,1250 the scope of the underlying rights protected by these articles
should be interpreted as encompassing the corresponding rights arising under IHL
applicable to Crimea in view of the Russian occupation.1251 Specifically, Article 49 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 provides:
Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of
protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of
1250 In the context of the present case, international humanitarian law (“IHL”), and in particular the
law of occupation, are relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties. Notwithstanding the unlawfulness of its military intervention, as recognized by the United
Nations General Assembly, the Russian Federation has the status of an occupying power and owes
obligations to the population of Crimea under IHL. Those obligations do not supersede or limit the
operation of the CERD in occupied territory. By its terms the CERD does not permit States Parties to
derogate from its provisions in situations of occupation. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226, para. 25 (derogations from ICCPR in times
of war limited to those expressly provided for in Article 4). And IHL itself imposes a parallel nondiscrimination
obligation on occupying powers. See Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), art. 27 (“[A]ll
protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose
power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political
opinion.”).
1251 CERD Article 1(1) brings within the scope of the Convention all discrimination with respect to “the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.” When the existence of an
armed conflict or state of occupation triggers the operation of IHL, the human rights and fundamental
freedoms guaranteed by IHL also fall within the scope of the CERD.
347
the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied
or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.
615. The Russian Federation has violated the right to freedom of movement and
residence by excluding Crimean Tatars, including Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov
from Crimea for political reasons, and by inhibiting the ability of numerous other Crimean
Tatars to pass freely in and out of Crimea.1252 Political leaders from other ethnic groups have
not been subjected to like treatment. More generally, by subjecting Ukrainian residents of
Crimea who lack Russian nationality to Russian immigration regulations, the Russian
Federation has impaired the enjoyment of these rights by members of the Ukrainian and
Crimean Tatar communities.1253 Russia’s transfer of Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian prisoners
to prisons in mainland Russia not only constitutes deportation in violation of Russia’s
obligations under IHL,1254 but also discriminates against Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
prisoners who, unlike pro-annexation ethnic Russians, identify the Russian Federation as a
hostile environment.
Article 5(d)(iii) – The Right to Nationality
616. Russia has forced its citizenship onto the Ukrainian population of Crimea in
violation of its obligations under the law of occupation.1255 Among those that it now treats as
its own citizens for purposes of Russian law are many Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians who
continue to consider themselves citizens of Ukraine. These include individuals who
justifiably declined to lend legitimacy to Russia’s purported annexation by applying to retain
1252 See supra Chapter 9, Section B; Bariiev Statement, paras. 31–32 (Annex 15); Dzhemilev
Statement, para. 29 (Annex 16).
1253 See supra Chapter 9, Section C.
1254 See supra Chapter 9, Section C.
1255 Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), 18 October 1907, Art. 45 (Annex
979).
348
Ukrainian citizenship pursuant to Article 4 of the Law of Admission;1256 others who would
have applied pursuant to Article 4 if they had been given a more reasonable opportunity to
do so1257; government and municipal employees who were coerced into accepting the
conferral of Russian citizenship through fear of losing their jobs1258; and vulnerable
individuals, such as those in state custody at the time the Law on Admission came into effect
and who were not given a meaningful opportunity to reject Russian citizenship.1259
617. The right to nationality of these Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians who did not
want to become Russian citizens is significantly burdened by the Russian Federation’s
disregard for their Ukrainian citizenship. For example, by virtue of their presumed Russian
nationality, this group of people are now subject to conflicting loyalties and exposed to
application of severe penalties reserved for Russian citizens under Russian law if they are
found to be assisting Ukraine.1260 Members of this group are now subject to conscription
into the armed forces of the Russian Federation where they face the possibility of being
required to take up arms against Ukraine.1261 Members of this group also risk having their
rights under international law – including their rights as protected persons under IHL –
violated as a result of the Russian Federation’s decision to treat them as Russian citizens.
For example, Oleg Sentsov continues to be held in prison in the far north provinces of the
Russian Federation, and to be denied the consular assistance of his true state of nationality,
on the false premise that he is a Russian and not a Ukrainian citizen.1262
618. This burden falls disproportionately on members of the Crimean Tatar and
Ukrainian communities, as these communities remain loyal to Crimea’s status as part of the
1256 See supra Chapter 9, Section C.
1257 See ibid.
1258 See ibid.
1259 See ibid.
1260 See ibid.
1261 See ibid.
1262 See ibid.
349
sovereign territory of Ukraine. Ethnic Russians who welcomed the purported annexation of
Crimea by the Russian Federation do not suffer the same impairment of their right to
nationality.
Article 5(d)(viii) – Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression
619. The severe restrictions placed on free speech in Crimea by the Russian
Federation since February 2014 have disproportionately burdened the Crimean Tatar and
Ukrainian communities. One of the principal aims of Russian-imposed censorship is to
prevent journalists and others from challenging the legitimacy of Russia’s purported
annexation of Crimea.1263 This restriction predictably and necessarily has a disproportionate
impact on Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian journalists and media entities, given the well-known
opposition of those communities to Russia’s military occupation and purported annexation
of the peninsula.1264 Accordingly, numerous Crimean Tatar media entities have been denied
re-registration by the Russian authorities for pretextual reasons.1265 Ukrainian media
entities and journalists have been harassed and have had to relocate to other parts of
Ukraine in order to continue operating.1266
620. This differential treatment of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities
has no reasonable justification. The United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly
condemned the Russian Federation’s invasion and purported annexation of Crimea as a
violation of the most fundamental norms of international law.1267 Discriminatory
restrictions on the ability of journalists and others to publicly state that Crimea remains part
of Ukraine’s sovereign territory accordingly violate Article 5(d)(viii).
1263 See supra Chapter 10, Section B.
1264 See Islyamov Statement, paras. 9-30 (Annex 18); Andriyevska Statement, paras. 8–20 (Annex 14).
1265 See supra Chapter 10, Section B.
1266 See ibid.; Islyamov Statement, paras. 13, 26 (Annex 18); Andriyevska Statement, para. 12 (Annex
14).
1267 See, e.g., U.N. General Assembly Resolution 68/262, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/262, Territorial
Integrity of Ukraine (27 March 2014) (Annex 43); U.N. General Assembly Resolution 72/190, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/72/190 (19 December 2017) (Annex 50).
350
Article 5(d)(ix) – Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and
Association
621. The Russian Federation has violated this provision by unlawfully replacing
Ukraine’s liberal regime for public assembly with its own much more restrictive laws and
applying those laws in a discriminatory manner to deny the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
communities the ability to commemorate culturally important events. Even under these
restrictive laws, events of cultural importance to the ethnic Russian community — such as
the birthday of Alexander Pushkin, the Great Russian Word festival, and events associated
with the anniversary of the illegal annexation — have been allowed to proceed unhindered.
Meanwhile, as described in Chapter 10 and in the witness statements of Eskender Bariiev
and Andrii Shchekun, attempted commemorations of such anniversaries as International
Human Rights Day,1268 the Sürgün1269 and the birthday of Taras Shevchenko1270 have been
frustrated either by the denial of official permission on pretextual grounds or the
intervention of pro-Russian thugs. To the extent the latter genuinely have no connection to
the Russian occupation authorities, Russia violates Article 2(1)(b) by tolerating the
discriminatory conduct of third parties. Events of cultural importance to the ethnic Russian
community have been allowed to proceed unhindered.
622. There is no reasonable justification for this different treatment of the Crimean
Tatar and Ukrainian communities, whose commemorations of the same annual events prior
to 2014 were entirely peaceful.
1268 See supra Chapter 10, Section B; Bariiev Statement, paras. 9–19 (Annex 15).
1269 See supra Chapter 10, Section B; Bariiev Statement, paras. 5–8 (Annex 15).
1270 See supra Chapter 10, Section B; Shchekun Statement, para. 19 (Annex 15).
351
Article 5(e)(i) – Right to Work and Free Choice of Employment
623. This provision guarantees equality before the law in the enjoyment of:
The rights to work, to free choice of employment, to just and
favourable conditions of work, to protection against
unemployment, to equal pacy for equal work, to just and
favourable remuneration.
624. The Russian Federation has violated this provision by unlawfully extending to
Crimea its restrictions on the employment of non-Russian citizens in government and
municipal jobs.1271 These restrictions discriminate against Crimeans who were able to opt
out of the imposition upon them of Russian citizenship by declaring their desire to retain
their Ukrainian citizenship, as well as the large number of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatars
who were ineligible for Russian nationality because they lacked proof of permanent
residency in Crimea. The operation of these laws also selectively injures Crimean Tatars and
Ukrainians in government or municipal employment who did not reject Russian nationality
for fear of losing their jobs and who as a result are subject to conflicting loyalties and duties.
625. As explained in relation to Russia’s violation of Article 5(c), Russia may not
invoke Articles 1(2) or 1(3) of the CERD in defense of this conduct because any distinction in
this regard between citizens and non-citizens is predicated on an underlying violation of
IHL.
Article 5(e)(iv) – Right to Public Health, Medical Care, Social Security
and Social Services
626. The Russian Federation has violated this provision by providing pensions,
free medical insurance and other social allowances to Russian citizens and permanent
residents in Crimea, while denying the same to the large number of Ukrainian and Crimean
Tatars who were ineligible for Russian nationality because they lacked proof of permanent
residency in Crimea.1272 As previously explained, Russia may not invoke Articles 1(2) or 1(3)
of the CERD in defense of this conduct because any distinction in this regard between
1271 See supra Chapter 9, Section C.
1272 See supra Chapter 9, Section C.
352
citizens and non-citizens is the result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and imposition of its
citizenship, both in violation of IHL.
Article 5(e)(v) – Right to Education and Training
627. The Russian Federation has violated this provision by favoring education in
the Russian language at the expense of instruction in the Crimean Tatar and, especially, the
Ukrainian languages.1273 The Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities have suffered
further discrimination by the introduction of textbook teaching a pro-Russian slanted
version of history, which is particularly repulsive to the Crimean Tatars in the way that it
plays down the Sürgün and glorifies Stalin.1274 Courses of study on Ukrainian history and
literature have wholly disappeared from the offerings at Crimean universities.1275 Moreover,
the reorientation of the educational system to feed into the Russian higher educational
system and job market disproportionately affects Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians as
communities that wish to continue living with the Ukrainian social and economic space.1276
628. There is no reasonable justification for this difference in treatment of the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities. In particular, any reduction in formal requests
for instruction in the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages is the result of pressure on
parents not to request such instruction in the first place.1277
Article 5(e)(vi) – Right to Equal Participation in Cultural Activities
629. The Russian Federation has violated this provision through its discriminatory
restrictions on Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian public gatherings, media and education, all of
which also have the effect of restricting these communities’ cultural life in ways not
experienced by different ethnic groups in Crimea. The Crimean Tatar community has
suffered further discrimination in this field of public life through the Crimean courts’
1273 See supra Chapter 9, Section C.
1274 See supra Chapter 9, Section C.
1275 Tyshchenko Statement, paras. 20, 24 (Annex 17).
1276 See supra Chapter 10, Section C.
1277 See supra Chapter 10, Section C; Tyshchenko Statement, paras. 25–27 (Annex 17).
353
selective refusal to grant protection against the damage inflicted by shoddy renovation work
on its one significant cultural site in Crimea, the Khan’s Palace in Bakhchysarai.
630. There is no reasonable justification for this difference in treatment of the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea who, as minority populations deserve
special solicitude in their effort to sustain and preserve their distinct cultural identities as
part of Crimea’s rich multi-ethnic heritage.
Article 6 – Effective Protection and Remedies
631. Article 6 requires State Parties to assure “everyone within their jurisdiction
effective protection and remedies, through the competent national tribunals and other State
institutions, against any acts of racial discrimination.”
632. The ordinary meaning of this language requiring “effective protection and
remedies” is that contracting States must not only provide ex post recourse to victims of
racism but also take affirmative action to ensure that they are not subjected to racial
discrimination in the first place. The word “effective” qualifies both “protection” and
“remedies” and indicates that the State’s efforts in this regard should be tailored to achieve
their desired effect, rather than simply the appearance of protection or a remedy.1278
633. The CERD Committee’s general recommendations make clear that Article 6
requires CERD parties to ensure that police receive discrimination complaints “in a
satisfactory manner,” meaning that complaints are recorded “immediately”, and
investigations are pursued “without delay and in an effective, independent and impartial
manner.”1279 In addition, police must be willing to accept complaints of discrimination, and
1278 Oxford English Dictionary (2018) ( “effective” defined to mean, among other things, “that is
attended with result or has an effect.”) (Annex 1092).
1279 CERD General Recommendation 31, para. 11 (Annex 789).
354
“[a]ny refusal by a police official to accept a complaint involving an act of racism should lead
to disciplinary or penal sanctions.”1280 The Committee has emphasized that in instances of
alleged State harm, Member States must fully investigate and then punish any responsible
actors.1281
634. Russia has comprehensively violated this provision. As indicated above,
rather than protecting the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities from racial
discrimination, the courts have actively participated in Russia’s course of discriminatory
conduct, convicting Crimea Tatar leaders on trumped-up charges, banning the Mejlis,
denying relief to protect Crimean Tatar cultural heritage, and jailing Ukrainian activists.
635. In addition, neither the courts nor other public institutions have helped to
redress the effects of Russia’s discriminatory conduct. The police have failed to properly
investigate the disappearances of Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian activists.1282 The father of
one victim was turned away by the FSB in Simferopol when he attempted to report the
disappearance of his son, complete with video of the abduction.1283 And the Supreme Court
of Crimea has brushed off applications by Crimean Tatar litigants seeking review of the ban
on the Mejlis in the wake of this Court’s Provisional Measures order.1284
Article 7 – Education to Combat Racial Discrimination
636. In this article, States Parties “undertake to adopt immediate and effective
measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information, with a
view to combating prejudices which lead to racial discrimination.” The ordinary meaning of
1280 Ibid. para. 12. When torture, ill-treatment or executions are alleged, the CERD Committee
recommends that investigations be conducted in accordance with the Principles on the Effective
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrsary and Summary Executions and the Principles
on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. CERD General Recommendation 31, para. 14 (citing UNGA Resolution
555/89 of 4 December 2000) (Annex 789).
1281 Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Assembly Official
Records: 48th Session, Supp. No. 18, A/48/18 (19 January 1994) para. 543.
1282 See supra Chapter 9, Section A.
1283 See ibid.
1284 See supra Chapter 9, Section B.
355
this provision is that it places an affirmative obligation on States Parties to integrate into
their educational, cultural and information policies measures aimed at overcoming
prejudice, in particular as directed at racial or ethnic minorities.
637. The Russian Federation's conduct in Crimea plainly violates this provision.
Not only has Russia failed to put in place educational or other measures designed to combat
prejudice, in the educational, cultural and information fields, it has instead implemented
measures that can only have the effect of increasing the prejudice that leads to racial
discrimination.
638. In the fields of teaching and education, it has abandoned the efforts that took
place under Ukrainian governance to encourage multi-culturalism in the Crimean education
system.1285 In its place, the Russian Federation has introduced a “Russia First” educational
ethos – reducing the resources devoted to education in languages other than Russian1286 and
introducing new textbooks that glorify Russian history and culture at the expense of other
communities.1287
639. In the field of culture, the Russian Federation has set up its own culture as
superior to those of other ethnic groups in Crimea. Public gatherings with a Russian cultural
theme are freely permitted while those designed to commemorate events or people of
cultural importance to the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities are routinely
disallowed.1288 Russian media broadcasts freely in Crimea, while Ukrainian TV channels
were switched off in the earliest days of the occupation and independent Crimean Tatar and
1285 See Tyshchenko Statement, paras. 4–17 (Annex 17).
1286 See ibid. paras. 18–27 (Annex 17); see supra Chapter 10, Section C.
1287 See Tyshchenko Statement, para. 23 (Annex 17).
1288 See generally Chapter 10, Section A.
356
Ukrainian broadcast and print media are denied registration under Russia’s repressive
media laws for pretextual procedural reasons.1289
640. And in the field of information, it has embarked on a vicious campaign of hate
speech and disinformation in which it has labeled Ukrainians as fascists and Crimean Tatars
as religious extremists.1290
641. Rather than “combating prejudices” and “promoting understanding, tolerance
and friendships among nations and racial or ethnical groups,” Russia’s conduct inflames
ethnic tensions in Crimea. As such, it flagrantly violates Russia's obligations under Article 7
of the CERD.
1289 See generally Chapter 10, Section B.
1290 See generally Chapter 8, Section B.
357
Section C: Jurisdiction
Chapter 13. THE COURT HAS JURISIDICTION OVER THE PARTIES’ DISPUTE
CONCERNING THE CERD
642. As with its claims under the ICSFT, Ukraine brings its claims under the CERD
to this Court pursuant to Article 36(1) of its Statute.1291 Ukraine and the Russian Federation
are both parties to the CERD, under which Article 22 provides:
Any dispute between two or more States Parties with respect to
the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is
not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly
provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any of
the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International
Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to
another mode of settlement.1292
643. Ukraine and the Russian Federation have therefore agreed to submit disputes
concerning the interpretation or application of the CERD to this Court, provided that two
preconditions are satisfied: (1) the existence of a dispute; and (2) failure of settlement “by
negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for” in the CERD. Both preconditions
are met.
There Exists a Dispute Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation with
Respect to the Interpretation or Application of the CERD.
644. Based on the record in this case, the Court has already found that there exists
a dispute between Ukraine and the Russian Federation as regards the interpretation or
1291 Statute of the Court, Art. 36(1); See supra Chapter 9.
1292 CERD, Art. 22.
358
application of the CERD.1293 The Court summarized the competing positions of both States:
“Ukraine has claimed that the Russian Federation violated its obligations under this
Convention,” whereas “[t]he Russian Federation has positively denied that it has committed
any of th[ose] violations.”1294
645. Since 2014, Ukraine has brought to the Russian Federation’s attention
numerous and specific violations of the CERD. Following Ukraine’s first diplomatic note to
the Russian Federation regarding the CERD, Ukraine followed up with eighteen additional
notes. The Russian Federation responded with fifteen notes of its own, and both sides
engaged in three rounds of negotiations on this subject, but to no avail. Since Ukraine has
demonstrated that the Russian Federation “[is] aware, or could not [be] unaware, that its
views are ‘positively opposed’” by Ukraine, a dispute exists under these circumstances. 1295
The Dispute Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation has not been
Settled by Negotiation or by the Procedures Provided for in the CERD.
646. In its Order on Provisional Measures, this Court found that Ukraine has
“demonstrate[d] that” the parties “engaged in negotiations regarding the question of the
[Russian Federation’s] compliance with its substantive obligations under CERD,” and that it
“appears from the record that these issues had not been resolved by negotiations at the time
1293 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures,
Order, pp. 15-16, paras. 37-39. In particular, the Court noted that “the Parties differ on the question
of whether the events which occurred in Crimea starting from late February 2014 have given rise to
issues relating to their rights and obligations under CERD.” Ibid. p. 15, para. 37.
1294 Ibid.
1295 Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to
Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. Pakistan), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2016, p. 568, para. 38 (citing Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime
Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2016 (I), p. 32, para. 73; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 99, para. 61, pp. 109-110, para. 87, p. 117, para. 104).
359
of the filing of the Application.”1296 There can be no serious doubt that Ukraine’s efforts to
negotiate bilaterally have been substantial and genuine. Indeed, Ukraine’s efforts to
negotiate have been significantly more robust than Belgium’s attempt to negotiate with
Senegal, where the Court concluded that the dispute at issue could not be settled by
negotiation.1297
647. Where there has been “no change in the respective positions of the Parties,”
this Court has determined that “negotiations did not and could not lead to the settlement of
the dispute.”1298 The record here is clear that Ukraine and the Russian Federation have been
unable to find common ground. Notwithstanding Ukraine’s repeated attempts to negotiate,
the Russian Federation has consistently declined to engage substantively.1299 As a
consequence, the dispute was “not settled by negotiation,” and the preconditions under
Article 22 of the CERD have been met.
648. The Russian Federation has argued that after spending more than two years
pursuing bilateral negotiation to the point of futility, Ukraine was further required to engage
Russia in the CERD Committee’s voluntary conciliation procedures. Russia’s position is
contrary to the ordinary meaning of Article 22 and would thwart the object and purpose of
the CERD.
1296 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures,
Order, pp. 20-21, para. 59.
1297 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2012, pp. 433-35, paras. 24-28 p. 446, paras. 58-59; see supra Chapter 9.
1298 Ibid. para. 59. See also Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 2, p. 13 (when a party “refuses … to give way,” there can be “no doubt that the dispute
cannot be settled by diplomatic negotiation”).
1299 See, e.g., Russian Federation Note Verbale No. 4413 to Ukraine, dated 25 April 2016 (instead of
addressing Ukraine’s numerous and specific claims, urging Ukraine “to provide to the Russian Side
more specific information and refrain from vague summaries”).
360
649. Article 22 is phrased in the disjunctive: “Any dispute … which is not settled
by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention….”1300 The
most natural reading of this language is that parties must exhaust either negotiation “or” the
procedures provided for in the CERD before referring matters to this Court.
650. The broader context of Article 22 within the CERD also demonstrates that the
drafters intended to permit states to bring disputes to the Court without having to exhaust
two separate preconditions. The CERD Committee procedures referred to in Article 22 are
voluntary, providing that a State “may bring the matter to the attention of the
Committee.”1301 To do so, however, the treaty is quite clear about the preconditions for that
settlement procedure, clearly stating that the Committee may only deal with a matter “after it
has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted.”1302
Had the drafters meant to make the voluntary procedures of Articles 11-13 mandatory in
order to access judicial procedures, it would have been straightforward to use similarly clear
language.1303
651. The object and purpose of the CERD similarly show that the preconditions in
Article 22 are alternative, not cumulative. Indeed, as several Members of this Court have
explained, the “logic and purpose” of the text of Article 22 are “conclusive” 1304:
The point of this text cannot be to require a State to go through
futile procedures solely for the purpose of delaying or
impeding its access to the Court. The end sought is not purely
one of form; if we look at it from the perspective taken by the
1300 CERD, art. 22 (emphasis added).
1301 CERD, art. 11(1). Notably, the CERD Committee’s website makes clear that the inter-State
complaint procedures have “never been used.”
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/HRTBPetitions.aspx#i…
1302 Ibid. Art. 11(3) (emphasis added).
1303 See also Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, dissenting
opinion of Judge Trindade, p. 283, para. 96 (“[W]hen the draftsmen of the CERD Convention
considered it necessary to establish a procedural condition, they clearly did so, leaving no margin or
room for further interpretation or doubts.”).
1304 Ibid. joint dissenting opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue, and
Judge ad hoc Gaja, p. 156, para. 43.
361
Court, the rule has a reasonable aim, to reserve judicial
settlement for those disputes which cannot be settled by an
out-of-court means based on agreement between the parties.
[. . .]
If the text is understood in these terms, it becomes illogical to
consider the two modes referred to in Article 22 as necessarily
cumulative. Each mode ultimately depends on an
understanding between the parties and their desire to seek a
negotiated solution. This is obvious in the case of “negotiation”
and it is equally true for the “procedures expressly provided
for” in Part II of CERD. The Committee established by the
Convention has no power to impose a legally binding solution
on the disputing States. . . . Ultimately, a favourable outcome
depends on the readiness of the parties to come to an
agreement, in other words, on their willingness to negotiate.
Consequently, where a State has already tried, without success,
to negotiate directly with another State against which it has
grievances, it would be senseless to require it to follow the
special procedures in Part II, unless a formalism inconsistent
with the spirit of the text is to prevail.1305
652. Here, Ukraine exhaustively pursued negotiations to the point of futility, and
no reasonable observer could conclude that a negotiated settlement with Russia is possible.
In such circumstances, it would be “highly unreasonable” to read Article 22 as requiring
Ukraine to delay seeking binding judicial relief and pursue time-consuming conciliation
procedures with no prospect of success.1306
1305 Ibid. pp. 155-56, para. 43.
1306 Ibid. pp. 157, para. 44.
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PART IV: SUBMISSIONS
653. For the reasons set out in this Memorial, Ukraine respectfully requests the
Court to adjudge and declare that:
ICSFT
a. The Russian Federation is responsible for violations of Article 18 of the ICSFT by
failing to cooperate in the prevention of the terrorism financing offenses set forth in
Article 2 by taking all practicable measures to prevent and counter preparations in its
territory for the commission of those offenses within or outside its territory.
Specifically, the Russian Federation has violated Article 18 by failing to take the
practicable measures of: (i) preventing Russian state officials and agents from
financing terrorism in Ukraine; (ii) discouraging public and private actors and other
non-governmental third parties from financing terrorism in Ukraine; (iii) policing its
border with Ukraine to stop the financing of terrorism; and (iv) monitoring and
suspending banking activity and other fundraising activities undertaken by private
and public actors on its territory to finance of terrorism in Ukraine.
b. The Russian Federation is responsible for violations of Article 8 of the ICSFT by
failing to identify and detect funds used or allocated for the purposes of financing
terrorism in Ukraine, and by failing to freeze or seize funds used or allocated for the
purpose of financing terrorism in Ukraine.
c. The Russian Federation has violated Articles 9 and 10 of the ICSFT by failing to
investigate the facts concerning persons who have committed or are alleged to have
committed terrorism financing in Ukraine, and to extradite or prosecute alleged
offenders.
d. The Russian Federation has violated Article 12 of the ICSFT by failing to provide
Ukraine the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations
in respect of terrorism financing offenses.
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e. As a consequence of the Russian Federation’s violations of the ICSFT, its proxies in
Ukraine have been provided with funds that enabled them to commit numerous acts
of terrorism, including the downing of Flight MH17, the shelling of Volnovakha,
Mariupol, Kramatorsk, and Avdiivka, the bombings of the Kharkiv unity march and
Stena Rock Club, the attempted assassination of a Ukrainian member of Parliament,
and others.
CERD
f. The Russian Federation has violated CERD Article 2 by engaging in numerous and
pervasive acts of racial discrimination against the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian
communities in Crimea and by engaging in a policy and practice of racial
discrimination against those communities.
g. The Russian Federation has further violated CERD Article 2 by sponsoring,
defending or supporting racial discrimination by other persons or organizations
against the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea.
h. The Russian Federation has violated CERD Articles 4 by promoting and inciting
racial discrimination against the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in
Crimea.
i. The Russian Federation has violated CERD Article 5 by failing to guarantee the right
of members of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities to equality before the
law, notably in their enjoyment of (i) the right to equal treatment before the tribunals
and all other organs administering justice; (ii) the right to security of person and
protection by the State against violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by
government officials or by any individual group or institution; (iii) political rights;
(iv) other civil rights; and (v) economic, social and cultural rights.
j. The Russian Federation has violated CERD Article 6 by failing to assure the Crimean
Tatar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea effective protection and remedies
against acts of racial discrimination.
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k. The Russian Federation has violated CERD Article 7 by failing to adopt immediate
and effective measures in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information,
with a view to combating prejudices which lead to racial discrimination against the
Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea.
654. The aforementioned acts constitute violations of the ICSFT and CERD, and
are therefore internationally wrongful acts for which the Russian Federation bears
international responsibility. The Russian Federation is therefore required to:
ICSFT
a. Cease immediately each of the above violations of ICSFT Articles 8, 9, 10, 12, and 18
and provide Ukraine with appropriate guarantees and public assurances that it will
refrain from such actions in the future.
b. Take all practicable measures to prevent the commission of terrorism financing
offences, including (i) ensuring that Russian state officials or any other person under
its jurisdiction do not provide weapons or other funds to groups engaged in terrorism
in Ukraine, including without limitation the DPR, LPR, Kharkiv Partisans, and other
illegal armed groups; (ii) cease encouraging public and private actors and other nongovernmental
third parties to finance terrorism in Ukraine; (iii) police Russia’s
border with Ukraine to stop any supply of weapons into Ukraine; and (iv) monitor
and prohibit private and public transactions originating in Russian territory, or
initiated by Russian nationals, that finance terrorism in Ukraine, including by
enforcing banking restrictions to block transactions for the benefit of groups engaged
in terrorism in Ukraine, including without limitation the DPR, LPR, the Kharkiv
Partisans, and other illegal armed groups.
c. Freeze or seize assets of persons suspected of supplying funds to groups engaged in
terrorism in Ukraine, including without limitation illegal armed groups associated
with the DPR, LPR, and Kharkiv Partisans, and cause the forfeiture of assets of
persons found to have supplied funds to such groups.
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d. Provide the greatest measure of assistance to Ukraine in connection with criminal
investigations of suspected financers of terrorism.
e. Pay Ukraine financial compensation, in its own right and as parens patriae for its
citizens, for the harm Ukraine has suffered as a result of Russia’s violations of the
ICSFT, including the harm suffered by its nationals injured by acts of terrorism that
occurred as a consequence of the Russian Federation’s ICSFT violations, with such
compensation to be quantified in a separate phase of these proceedings.
f. Pay moral damages to Ukraine in an amount deemed appropriate by the Court,
reflecting the seriousness of the Russian Federation’s violations of the ICSFT, the
quantum of which is to be determined in a separate phase of these proceedings.
CERD
g. Immediately comply with the provisional measures ordered by the Court on 19 April
2017, in particular by lifting its ban on the activities of the Mejlis of the Crimean
Tatar People and by ensuring the availability of education in the Ukrainian language.
h. Cease immediately each of the above violations of CERD Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7, and
provide Ukraine with appropriate guarantees and public assurances that it will
refrain from such actions in the future.
i. Guarantee the right of members of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities to
equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the human rights and
fundamental freedoms protected by the Convention.
j. Assure to all residents of Crimea within its jurisdiction effective protection and
remedies against acts of racial discrimination.
k. Adopt immediate and effective measures in the fields of teaching, education, culture
and information, with a view to combating prejudices which lead to racial
discrimination against the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian communities in Crimea.
l. Pay Ukraine financial compensation, in its own right and as parens patriae for its
citizens, for the harm Ukraine has suffered as a result of Russia’s violations of the
CERD, including the harm suffered by victims as a result of the Russian Federation’s
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violations of CERD Articles 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7, with such compensation to be quantified
in a separate phase of these proceedings.
12 June 2018,
_____________________________
Ms. Olena Zerkal
Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine
Agent of Ukraine
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CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that the annexes are true copies of the documents
referred to and that the translations provided are accurate.
12 June 2018,
_____________________________
Ms. Olena Zerkal
Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine
Agent of Ukraine