Corrigé
Corrected
CR 2016/5
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 2016
Public sitting
held on Friday 11 March 2016, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Abraham presiding,
in the case regarding Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation
of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament
(Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom)
Preliminary Objections
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2016
Audience publique
tenue le vendredi 11 mars 2016, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Abraham, président,
en l’affaire des Obligations relatives à des négociations concernant la cessation
de la course aux armes nucléaires et le désarmement nucléaire
(Iles Marshall c. Royaume-Uni)
Exceptions préliminaires
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________ - 2 -
Present: President Abraham
Vice-President Yusuf
Judges Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Robinson
Crawford
Gevorgian
Judge ad hoc Bedjaoui
Registrar Couvreur
- 3 -
Présents : M. Abraham, président
M. Yusuf, vice-président
MM. Owada
Tomka
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Greenwood
Mmes Xue
Donoghue
M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
MM. Bhandari
Robinson
Crawford
Gevorgian, juges
M. Bedjaoui, juge ad hoc
M. Couvreur, greffier
- 4 -
The Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Tony deBrum,
Mr. Phon van den Biesen, Attorney at Law, van den Biesen Kloostra Advocaten, Amsterdam,
as Co-Agents;
Ms Deborah Barker-Manase, Chargé d’affaires a.i. and Deputy Permanent Representative of the
Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations, New York,
as Member of the Delegation;
Ms Laurie B. Ashton, Attorney, Seattle, United States of America,
Mr. Nicholas Grief, Professor of Law, University of Kent, member of the English Bar,
United Kingdom,
Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor of International Law, University of Florence, Italy, Honorary
Professor of International Law, University of Geneva,
Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Professor of International Law, University of Macerata, Italy,
Mr. John Burroughs, New York, United States of America,
Ms Christine Chinkin, Emerita Professor of International Law, London School of Economics,
member of the English Bar, United Kingdom,
Mr. Roger S. Clark, Board of Governors Professor, Rutgers Law School, New Jersey, United States
of America,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. David Krieger, Santa Barbara, United States of America,
Mr. Peter Weiss, New York, United States of America,
Mr. Lynn Sarko, Attorney, Seattle, United States of America,
as Counsel;
Ms Amanda Richter, member of the English Bar,
Ms Sophie Elizabeth Bones, LL.B., LL.M., United Kingdom,
Mr. J. Dylan van Houcke, LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D. Candidate, Birkbeck, University of London,
United Kingdom,
Mr. Loris Marotti, Ph.D. Candidate, University of Macerata, Italy,
Mr. Lucas Lima, Ph.D. Candidate, University of Macerata, Italy,
Mr. Rob van Riet, London, United Kingdom,
Ms Alison E. Chase, Attorney, Santa Barbara, United States of America,
as Assistants;
Mr. Nick Ritchie, Lecturer in International Security, University of York, United Kingdom,
as Technical Adviser. - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la République des Iles Marshall est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Tony deBrum,
M. Phon van den Biesen, avocat, van den Biesen Kloostra Advocaten, Amsterdam,
comme coagents ;
Mme Deborah Barker-Manase, chargé d’affaires a.i. et représentant permanent adjoint de la
République des Iles Marshall auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies à New York,
comme membre de la délégation ;
Mme Laurie B. Ashton, avocat, Seattle, Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
M. Nicholas Grief, professeur de droit à l’Université du Kent, membre du barreau d’Angleterre,
Royaume-Uni,
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Florence, Italie, professeur
honoraire de droit international à l’Université de Genève,
M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Macerata, Italie,
M. John Burroughs, New York, Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
Mme Christine Chinkin, professeur émérite de droit international à la London School of
Economics, membre du barreau d’Angleterre, Royaume-Uni,
M. Roger S. Clark, Board of Governors Professor à la faculté de droit de l’Université Rutgers,
New Jersey, Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. David Krieger, Santa Barbara, Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
M. Peter Weiss, New York, Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
M. Lynn Sarko, avocat, Seattle, Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
comme conseils ;
Mme Amanda Richter, membre du barreau d’Angleterre,
Mme Sophie Elizabeth Bones, LL.B., LL.M, Royaume-Uni,
M. J. Dylan van Houcke, LL.B., LL.M, doctorant au Birkbeck College, Université de Londres,
Royaume-Uni,
M. Loris Marotti, doctorant à l’Université de Macerata, Italie,
M. Lucas Lima, doctorant à l’Université de Macerata, Italie,
M. Rob van Riet, Londres, Royaume-Uni,
Mme Alison E. Chase, avocat, Santa Barbara, Etats-Unis d’Amérique,
comme assistants ;
M. Nick Ritchie, chargé de cours en sécurité internationale à l’Université d’York, Royaume-Uni,
comme conseiller technique. - 6 -
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is represented
by:
H.E. Sir Geoffrey Adams, K.C.M.G., Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the Kingdom of the Netherlands;
Mr. Iain Macleod, Legal Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
as Agent;
Mr. Shehzad Charania, Legal Adviser, Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, The Hague,
as Deputy Agent;
Mr. Christopher Stephen, Assistant Legal Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
as Adviser;
Sir Daniel Bethlehem, Q.C., member of the English Bar,
Mr. Guglielmo Verdirame, Professor of International Law, King’s College London, member of the
English Bar,
Mrs. Jessica Wells, member of the English Bar,
as Counsel and Advocates. - 7 -
Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord est représenté
par :
S. Exc. sir Geoffrey Adams, K.C.M.G., ambassadeur du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et
d’Irlande du Nord auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas ;
M. Iain Macleod, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères et du Commonwealth,
comme agent ;
M. Shehzad Charania, conseiller juridique à l’ambassade du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et
d’Irlande du Nord au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent adjoint ;
M. Christopher Stephen, conseiller juridique adjoint au ministère des affaires étrangères et du
Commonwealth,
comme conseiller ;
sir Daniel Bethlehem, Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre,
M. Guglielmo Verdirame, professeur de droit international au King’s College, Londres, membre du
barreau d’Angleterre,
Mme Jessica Wells, membre du barreau d’Angleterre,
comme conseils et avocats. - 8 -
Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience est ouverte. Cet après-midi, la Cour
entendra les plaidoiries des Iles Marshall pour le premier tour de la procédure orale en l’affaire des
Obligations relatives à des négociations concernant la cessation de la course aux armes nucléaires
et le désarmement nucléaire (Iles Marshall c. Royaume-Uni).
Je donne la parole à M. Tony deBrum, coagent des Iles Marshall.
Mr. deBRUM:
INTRODUCTION
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is again a privilege and honour to appear before
you as Co-Agent for the Republic of the Marshall Islands, this time in the dispute between the
Marshall Islands and the United Kingdom.
2. The Marshall Islands’ counsel will address the finer points of the legal arguments made by
the United Kingdom.
3. In the first part of this opening statement, I will respond to certain mischaracterizations
that the United Kingdom made in its oral pleadings on Wednesday.
4. These matters relate to:
(a) the very real claims at issue in this dispute, and the strategic bargain of the NPT; and
(b) the fallacy of the United Kingdom’s claim that ordering relief would be equivalent to ordering
1
the United Kingdom to be a “one hand clapping” .
5. For the second part of this opening I will address the peaceful settlement my country seeks
and the rule of law so very important to it.
6. For the final part, I will address briefly the Marshall Islands’ acceptance of this Court’s
compulsory jurisdiction.
7. As a preliminary matter, I wish to confirm that the Marshall Islands seeks no monetary
compensation in this case.
CR 2016/03, p. 32, paras. 58-59. - 9 -
Part I
(a) The very real claims at issue in this dispute and the strategic bargain of the NPT
8. I turn now to the very real claims at issue in this dispute and the strategic bargain of the
NPT.
9. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the allegation that this case is “an artificial case” is
baseless. I listened to the United Kingdom counsel make that allegation five times in a single
2
paragraph on Wednesday . In response, I will address the very genuine nature of my country’s
claims, including the motivation of my country.
10. Official confirmation of the seriousness of the Marshall Islands’ position exists as far
back as 1995, when it officially wrote to this very Court in the Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons case. That 1995 Statement from the RMI is at tab 1 of your judges’ folders . On page 2 3
of that Statement, my country begins an explanation of the dire health consequences suffered by the
Marshallese following nuclear contamination, including extreme birth defects and cancers. For
example, I will quote Ms Lijon Eknilang of Rongelap Atoll, page 4 of tab 1 in the judges’ folders:
“[W]omen on the island [] have given birth to babies that look like blobs of
jelly. Some of these things we carry for eight months, nine months. There are no
legs, no arms, no head, no nothing. Other children are born who will never recognize
this world or their own parents. They just lie there with crooked arms and legs and
never speak. Already we have seven such children.”
The Statement also describes many tragic losses to the Marshallese. I will not quote those but they
are available for the Court’s review at tab 1 in the folders.
11. Importantly, also in that filed Statement, the Marshall Islands links the destruction of its
lands and harm to its people from nuclear weapons to its decision to join the NPT, as follows:
“Given its extensive first hand experience with adverse impacts of nuclear
weapons, Marshall Islands decision to ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty this
year is understandable. The objective of the treaty of the ‘cessation of the
manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and
the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons’ is wholly consistent with
Marshall Islands’ foreign policy of peaceful co-existence as well as with the
overarching goal of the international community to achieve global peace.” 4
2CR 2016/03, p. 32, para. 58.
3
Letter dated 22 June 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations,
together with Written Statement of the Government of the Marshall Islands, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/95/8720.pdf [accessed on 10 March 2016]; judges’ folders, tab 1.
4
Ibid., p. 5. - 10 -
12. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the allegation by the United Kingdom that our
claims are “artificial” is, at best, mistaken in the extreme. In all seriousness, the Marshall Islands
does not go around the world entering into treaties just for fun. It does not give up its legal rights
in exchange for no consideration.
13. Briefly, the NPT strategic bargain was that non-nuclear-weapon States would agree to
not acquire nuclear weapons, and the existing nuclear-weapon States would agree to negotiate in
good faith nuclear disarmament and an end to the nuclear arms race. This is described in our
5
Application .
14. The RMI eagerly joined the NPT in 1995 as a non-nuclear-weapon State and in return
received the binding legal promise of the States parties to the Treaty, including the UK. The fact
that the obligation is multilateral does not immunize the United Kingdom from a legal action based
on its own conduct.
(b)The Fallacy of the United Kingdom’s One-Hand-Clapping Claim
15. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I turn now to the United Kingdom’s “one hand
clapping” argument. We heard in oral pleadings from the United Kingdom that a hypothetical
order requiring it to comply with its obligation to pursue in good faith such negotiations would
6
force it to be the “one hand clapping” . So the point we take from that is that the
United Kingdom’s position is that no hands, including its own, are clapping — or negotiating —
yet.
16. This is another way of saying that, to the United Kingdom, no parties are pursuing in
good faith such negotiations. Or, put differently still, it is like the person who, caught in poor
conduct, replies: “Everybody’s doing it.”
17. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the “everybody’s doing it” defence never worked
in my own household, does not work in my country, and should not hold water before this Court.
Moreover, the United Kingdom entirely ignores the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States,
such as the Marshall Islands, that are now seeking such negotiations in earnest.
Application of the Marshall Islands (AMI), p. 29, para. 82.
CR 2016/03, p. 32, paras. 58-59. - 11 -
18. The support of this vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States is reflected in the voting
of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) for resolutions calling for the immediate
commencement of negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention, similar to a chemical weapons
convention .
19. While the United Kingdom opposes such negotiations and opposes a treaty banning
nuclear weapons, it cannot in any reasonable sense claim to this Court that it would be the “one
hand clapping” if it were ordered to pursue in good faith nuclear disarmament in all its aspects
under strict and international control, and fulfil its Article VI obligations.
Part II: Peaceful Settlement and the Rule of Law
20. Turning now to the peaceful settlement of this dispute and the particular importance of
the rule of law to the Marshall Islands.
21. Mr. President, Members of the Court as context, and in further response to the UK’s
claim Wednesday that our claims are “artificial”, I wish to provide a brief summary of my
country’s history with nuclear weapons. While it was designated as a Trust Territory by the United
Nations, no fewer than 67 atomic and thermonuclear weapons were deliberately exploded as “tests”
in the Marshall Islands.
22. During the “testing” that caused such contamination, several islands in my country were
vaporized. Many, many Marshallese died and as described earlier, many suffered birth defects
never before seen and cancers. Tragically, the Marshall Islands thus bears eyewitness to the
horrific and indiscriminate lethal capacity of these weapons, and the intergenerational and
continuing effects that they perpetuate over 60 years later.
23. One “test” in particular, called the “Bravo” test, was one thousand times stronger than
the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. From approximately 200 miles away, I witnessed
this shocking explosion as a 9-year-old child while fishing with my grandfather, on the beach of
Likiep Atoll: the entire sky turned blood red. This distance from which I witnessed this explosion
was, in rough terms, approximately equal to the distance between The Hague and Paris so a
significant distance.
Memorial of the Marshall Islands (MMI), p. 41, para. 91, citing UNGA resolution A/RES/68/32, 5 Dec. 2013
(137-28-20). - 12 -
24. Radioactive material from fallout from this test was detected in Australia, India, Japan,
the United States and Europe. Any suggestion that these thermonuclear weapons can be contained
in space and time, or within the domestic borders of any States, is wrong.
25. Additionally, the statement that this dispute is a political matter is likewise mistaken. As
is the case here, it is usually the countries that are most powerful that implore others to view
existential threats to survival as political matters.
26. When the Marshall Islands — not yet sovereign — brought their objections to nuclear
testing to the United Nations and called for it to stop, the United Nations did not heed the call and
the so-called testing continued.
27. And matters got even worse. A year before the Marshallese were relocated back to the
contaminated Rongelap Island in the RMI, in 1956, the health and safety chief of the Atomic
Energy Commission infamously said:
“That island is by far the most contaminated place on earth and it would be very
interesting to get a measure of human uptake when people live in a contaminated
environment . . . While it is true that these people do not live the way Westerners do,
8
civilized people, it is also true that these people are more like us than the mice.”
This quote is referenced in tab 2 of the judges’ folders.
28. Later, in 1969, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger infamously said: “There are only
9
90,000 people out there who gives a damn.”
29. This latter statement, along with others, was made at a time when, according to the UK in
its oral pleadings on Wednesday, the UK was operating pursuant to its first mutual defence
agreement with the United States with regard to nuclear weapons. Certainly this statement, as well
as the “testing” and resulting suffering and treatment of the Marshallese are not the basis for our
current dispute with the UK. But these experiences give us a unique perspective that we never
requested. They help explain why a country of our size and limited resources would risk bringing a
case such as this against a nuclear-armed State such as the UK.
8
Robert C. Koehler, Happy Savages: What We Did to the Marshall Islanders, 15 Feb. 2012,
http://www.commondreams.org/views/2012/02/15/happy-savages-what-we-did-… [accessed on
10 March 2016]; judges’ folders, tab 2.
9Letter dated 22 June 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations,
together with written statement of the Government of the Marshall Islands, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/95/8720.pdf [accessed on 10 March 2016]; judges’ folders, tab 1, p. 3. - 13 -
30. And the experiences highlight a very sharp contrast: although the population of the
Marshall Islands is very small, at under 70,000 people, it stands as an equal with the UK before this
Court. Specifically, as reaffirmed in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter, nations “large
10
and small” have “equal rights” . Indeed, as elaborated in Article 2 of the Charter, the United
11
Nations “is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members” . To the Marshall
Islands, the rule of international law, and the equality of all States under such law, cannot be
overstated and is acutely significant.
31. The Marshall Islands is committed to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
including specifically that nations resolve their legal disputes peacefully pursuant to Article 33.
32. Article 33 of the UN Charter provides States a list of options to take when seeking a
12
peaceful solution to their disputes . “Negotiation” is a listed option, as is “judicial settlement”.
The selection of the preferred option is a matter of a State’s “own choice” . The Marshall Islands’
choice here is reflected in its filing of the Application against the UK. The Marshall Islands seeks
“judicial settlement”.
33. Our goal is to obtain the UK’s pursuit in good faith of the required, promised and
bargained-for negotiations for nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.
Part III: The Marshall Islands Acceptance of Jurisdiction
Encompasses this Dispute
34. The trusteeship of the Marshall Islands, authorized by the United Nations, was not
terminated until December 1990, and the Marshall Islands was not admitted to the United Nations
until 17 September 1991. Our acceptance of this Court’s compulsory jurisdiction covers all
disputes arising after that date.
35. In our Statement of Observations, at pages 21-24, we demonstrate that my country’s
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court was not only in relation to or for the
10
UN Charter, Preamble.
11UN Charter, Art. 2 (1).
12
UN Charter, Chap. VI, Art. 33 (1).
13
Ibid. - 14 -
14
purpose of this dispute with the UK . This includes references to the RMI’s contemplation of
climate change litigation in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and other matters. I will not
repeat that detail here, but would note here that I personally am the signatory to the RMI’s
15
declaration .
36. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the Marshall Islands’ claims in this dispute are
based on the UK’s own conduct and its breach of NPT Article VI, since the time that the Marshall
Islands became recognized as sovereign in the international community. The claims are not based
on the conduct or breaches of other States. Nor are they based on conduct before the Marshall
Islands had any international legal rights.
Conclusion
37. Mr. President, Members of the Court, there will come a time when eyewitnesses to the
nuclear and thermonuclear explosions and their lethal power will no longer be alive. Given what
the Marshall Islands knows first-hand about these weapons, how could it not bring this legal
dispute to this Court?
Mr. President, may I kindly request that you give the floor to my colleague,
Mr. Phon van den Biesen. Thank you very much.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Excellence. Je donne la parole à M. van den Biesen,
coagent des Iles Marshall.
Mr. van den BIESEN:
General observations
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is an honour for me to, again today, appear before
this court, this time to on behalf of the Marshall Islands respond to the United Kingdom, the
Respondent in this case.
2. Mr. President, the opening statements presented by counsel to the Respondent are
certainly clarifying where exactly the Parties in this case find themselves. The Respondent states,
1Written Statement of Observations and Submissions of the Marshall Islands (WSMI), pp. 21-24, paras. 51-61.
1MMI, Ann. 70, p. 2. - 15 -
quoting the most authoritative source available to it, that is quoting itself, that “[t]he
United Kingdom has a strong record on nuclear disarmament” . 16 Mr. President, the
Marshall Islands does not agree. The standard against which the conduct of the United Kingdom
needs to be tested in this case is not “strong, stronger, strongest” but is whether or not the
United Kingdom is “pursu[ing] in good faith, and bring to a conclusion, negotiations leading to
nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”. The
United Kingdom is not engaged in such negotiations; on the contrary it is and continues to be
opposed to such negotiations.
3. Also, the United Kingdom states “we agree . . . that more should and must be done
towards the objective in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to pursue negotiations in
17
good faith on effective measures towards nuclear disarmament” . Mr. President, the Marshall
Islands does not agree. The standard against which the conduct of the United Kingdom needs to be
tested in this case is not “less” or “more”, but is whether or not the United Kingdom is “pursu[ing]
in good faith, and bring to a conclusion, negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its
aspects under strict and effective international control”. The United Kingdom is not engaged in
just this, on the contrary, it is explicitly opposed to such negotiations.
18
4. The United Kingdom states “there is no dispute between us” . Mr. President, the
Marshall Islands does not agree. The United Kingdom keeps acting according to a standard, which
is not the standard that ought to be applied here. What the United Kingdom is doing here, is simply
changing the applicable standard into one of its own making in order to enable itself to claim
that presumably the Parties agree.
5. At no time during these proceedings or for that matter outside of these proceedings,
has the United Kingdom claimed that it entirely honours the obligation which is central to these
proceedings. I will repeat this in order to clarify to the Respondent what precisely the case is
16
CR 2016/3, p. 11, para. 3.
1CR 2016/3, p. 12, para. 2.
18
Ibid. - 16 -
about: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations
leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” 19
6. Obviously if, arguendo, the United Kingdom were to change its position overnight and
come back on Monday here to say that it would comply fully with that standard, being the
obligation as spelled out by this Court in its Advisory Opinion, the Marshall Islands
would while being happy about this change not agree with the presumed position that the
United Kingdom would be acting in accordance with that obligation, because such statement needs
to be evidenced by an actual and lasting change of its conduct. All of this just demonstrates that
these are issues that all belong to the merits of this case and are unrelated to questions of
jurisdiction or admissibility.
7. The United Kingdom alleges, in its preliminary objections, that the Marshall Islands’
claims are “manifestly unfounded as to the merits” . Possibly, however not likely, possibly at the
merits stage of these proceedings, the Court would come to a finding that the United Kingdom is,
indeed, honouring its obligations, but it certainly is not to be excluded that the Court would uphold
the Marshall Islands’ position. The Marshall Islands in any event has alleged more than enough
facts at this point in time to demonstrate that, at a minimum, there is nothing here that is manifestly
unfounded. The United Kingdom has not, at any point, alleged, let alone argued, let alone proven
that it is acting in accordance with the obligation spelled out by the Court in the Advisory Opinion.
Which raises the question as to what exactly is manifestly unfounded in these proceedings?
8. Manifestly unfounded certainly also applies to the Respondent’s allegation that the
Marshall Islands would have argued that the United Kingdom has been acting in bad faith. The
Marshall Islands never has taken this position and this does not change if the United Kingdom
21
repeats this allegation seven times as it did last Wednesday . Yes, the Marshall Islands is, indeed,
of the opinion that the United Kingdom is not discharging its obligations in good faith. That is not
the same as an allegation that the United Kingdom is acting in bad faith. Back in the 1950s,
1Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 276,
para. 105 (2) F.
2Preliminary Objections of the United Kingdom (POUK), p. 3, para. 5.
21
CR 2016/3, p. 12, para. 3; p. 15, para. 15; p. 19, para. 24; p. 20, para. 27; p. 26, para. 41; p. 27, para. 44; and
p. 31, para. 55. - 17 -
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice stated: “There is a natural reluctance to ascribe bad faith to States, in the
sense of a deliberate intention knowingly to circumvent an international obligation.” Now, the
United Kingdom does not seem to be hindered by any reluctance in this case, but this case is not
about naming and shaming the United Kingdom but is, indeed, about establishing that the
United Kingdom failed and continues to fail to act in good faith . 22
9. Mr. President, the Marshall Islands wanted to have all nine States possessing nuclear
weapons appear before this Court and still thinks that all of them should have been here this week;
each one in its own case. Not because we cannot do without them from a legal perspective, but
because the behaviour of the others deserves also being adjudged by this Court. The
United Kingdom takes a similar position (for example, POUK, Part III, Sect. C and Parts IV and V
of the oral pleadings by Ms Wells ), albeit for entirely different reasons: it states that without the
other nuclear weapon States being present, presumably in one single case involving the nine, this
Court is unable to reach the requested judgment and therefore is not even allowed to rule on the
merits of this case. The United Kingdom’s approach cannot be accepted, since there is no necessity
for the Court to establish first the legal position of any third party before it may begin to adjudge
the Marshall Islands’ submissions in the present case. Each and every State is in the light of the
obligation spelled out in the Advisory Opinion to be judged on its own particular behaviour.
Where the Marshall Islands has referred to shared responsibilities, this does not imply that the
Marshall Islands considers that the nine States should be seen as participating in some sort of “joint
nuclear enterprise”, since there exists no such thing between them. Each State draws up its own
plans and policies and in any event each of them is at liberty to determine its own choices regarding
nuclear weapons. Each also has its own responsibilities in that respect, including its own legal
responsibilities.
10. This case against the United Kingdom, therefore, needs to be adjudged on its own
particular merits, which will lead to a judgment that is only binding between the Marshall Islands
and the United Kingdom (Article 59 of the Statute). Obviously, such a judgment may provide
2Sir Gerald Gray Fitzmaurice GCMG QC, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice”,
1954-9: General Principles and Sources of International Law, 35 BYBIL 183, 209 (1958).
2CR 2016/3, pp. 47-57, paras. 11-38. - 18 -
reasons for other States to rethink their own behaviour and policies. But that is true for most
judgments and most advisory opinions delivered by this Court and, certainly, never a reason for the
Court not to deliver a judgment.
11. In its oral pleadings of last Wednesday (para. 52), the United Kingdom seemed to
suggest that the Marshall Islands is asking the Court to somehow confirm its the
Marshall Islands “political appreciation about the way in which NPT States parties should
address their NPT Article VI obligations to negotiate”. There again, the United Kingdom is
modifying the Marshall Islands’ position and then attacks the modified but incorrect position.
That is not very helpful. The declaratory relief that the Marshall Islands is requesting requires a
legal assessment from the Court, nothing less, the same is true for the injunctive relief requested by
the Marshall Islands. Discussing the particularities of each of the demands submitted by the
Marshall Islands is an issue for the merits and not for the present stage of the proceedings.
12. Then, Mr. President, the United Kingdom seeks to start looking for another way out and
claims that negotiating nuclear disarmament is extremely sensitive and would require “fine political
judgments in a highly unstable and dangerous world” . The Marshall Islands does not ask the
Court to engage in the details of negotiations, but merely requests the Court to apply the law and
only the law with respect to the obligation, the existence of which was unanimously determined by
this Court at paragraph 105 (F) of its Advisory Opinion.
13. At this point, the United Kingdom’s pleadings undergo an explosive crescendo where the
United Kingdom qualifies a judgment in which the Court would uphold the Marshall Islands’
claims as “astonishing” and not only that but according to the United Kingdom such a judgment
“would raise some pretty fundamental and searching questions about the judicial function and the
26
principle of effectiveness” . This sounds like a threat, Mr. President, and not a threat aimed at the
Marshall Islands; several paragraphs down it becomes clear that this was not an unfortunate slip of
a pen, since in paragraph 59 the United Kingdom rather bluntly states that:
“the assumption of jurisdiction in this case would call into real question the judicial
function of the Court as an arbiter of legal disputes between States. It would raise
24
CR 2016/3, p. 31, para. 55.
2Ibid.
26
Ibid. - 19 -
far-reaching questions about the judicial function. It would go to the very heart of the
Court’s optional clause jurisdiction and its sustainability as a mechanism to found and
develop the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. It would raise real questions about
the wisdom of such declarations. The systemic implications of an assumption of
jurisdiction in this case are self-evident and are manifest.” (Emphasis added.)
14. Mr. President, some time ago, in law school, I was taught that de minimis non curat
praetor. The United Kingdom, here tries to introduce an opposite concept, de maximis non curat
praetor. Obviously, such concept does not exist and would be entirely incompatible with a world
society that is based on the rule of law. Besides all that, the Marshall Islands has no reason to
believe that this Court would not be capable of adjudging cases that fall in the category “maximis”.
This Court has been dealing with issues of genocide, violations of humanitarian law, the use of
force, the issue of self-determination and, no one would be surprised if it, at some point, will also
be requested to adjudge the overwhelming consequences caused by climate change. Suffice it to
say, Mr. President, that the Marshall Islands puts its trust in this Court and requests that it will not
be barred by this Court from having a fair hearing on the merits of its claim.
15. Thank you, Mr. President. I would kindly request you to give the floor now to my friend
and colleague Professor Luigi Condorelli.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci. La parole est à M. le professeur Condorelli.
M. CONDORELLI :
L’EXISTENCE DU DIFFÉREND ENTRE LA R ÉPUBLIQUE DES ILES M ARSHALL
ET LE ROYAUME -UNI
Monsieur le président, Mesdames et messieurs les juges, je suis honoré de pouvoir prendre la
parole encore une fois devant vous au nom des Iles Marshall, que je remercie très vivement de la
confiance qu’elles continuent de m’accorder.
Première partie
1. «La Cour, comme organe juridictionnel, a pour tâche de résoudre des différends existant
entre Etats. L’existence d’un différend est donc la condition première de l’exercice de sa fonction
judiciaire» : voilà un locus classicus des plus célèbres de la jurisprudence de la Cour et des plus
27Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 270-271, par. 55 et Essais nucléaires
(Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 476, par. 58. - 20 -
cités, y compris ces jours-ci dans cette grande salle de justice. Et en voilà un autre : «la Cour ne
28
peut exercer sa compétence contentieuse que s’il existe réellement un différend entre les parties» .
Par ces deux phrases nettes et très bien tournées, votre Cour exprime une notion fondamentale du
droit international contemporain au sujet de laquelle il y a cela va de soi plein accord entre
les Parties à la présente affaire.
2. Elles sont en revanche en désaccord complet sur la question de savoir si, dans le cas de la
présente affaire dont votre Cour est saisie par les Iles Marshall contre le Royaume-Uni, l’existence
du différend est incontestable (comme le demandeur le croit fermement), ou bien doit être exclue
(ainsi que le soutient le défendeur). Votre Cour a entendu avant-hier le Royaume-Uni illustrer
(avec l’éloquence de sir Daniel Bethlehem) l’argument principal sur lequel se base sa thèse
négative. Cet argument est parfaitement synthétisé dans le résumé figurant dans la partie IV des
exceptions préliminaires du Royaume-Uni :
«In consequence of the failure by the Marshall Islands to give the
United Kingdom any notice whatever of its claim, there is no justiciable dispute
between the Marshall Islands and the United Kingdom with the consequence that the
Court lacks jurisdiction to address the claims and/or the claims are inadmissible.»
3. Le propos d’après lequel, du fait de l’absence de notice donnée au Royaume-Uni, il n’y
aurait pas de différend «justiciable», implique en vérité l’admission qu’il y a bien en l’espèce un
différend, mais que ce différend ne pourrait pas faire l’objet d’un règlement judiciaire, une
condition prétendument nécessaire à cette fin faisant défaut. Saluons en tout cas ce retour sur scène
d’une distinction quelque peu vieillotte qu’on avait tendance à oublier : celle entre différends
«justiciables» et «non justiciables». De façon à peu près similaire, lorsque le professeur Verdirame
disait mercredi dernier : «I will show that the dispute which the Marshall Islands alleges it has with
the United Kingdom is a dispute with regard to situations or facts prior to the earliest possible date
for the Court’s jurisdiction», il semblait admettre qu’il y a bien in casu un différend, quoique
échappant d’après lui ratione temporis à la compétence de la Cour.
4. Mais il convient de laisser de côté ces remarques formelles et focaliser l’attention
sur ce qui est central. Chacun sait que suivant la plus traditionnelle des définitions
28Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 271, par. 57 et Essais nucléaires
(Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 477, par. 60. - 21 -
jurisprudentielles pour pouvoir affirmer qu’un différend existe «[i]l faut démontrer que la
réclamation de l’une des parties se heurte à l’opposition de l’autre» . Cependant, on nous explique
du côté du défendeur que non, que cela n’est pas suffisant : on ne saurait admettre que le différend
existe (ou plutôt qu’il est justiciable, c’est-à-dire susceptible d’être soumis au juge international)
tant que le potentiel demandeur n’a pas préalablement informé de ses griefs le potentiel défendeur.
Le Royaume-Uni soutient, en effet, qu’il existerait un principe de droit international coutumier
selon lequel un Etat qui entend introduire une instance contre un autre Etat doit l’en informer en lui
notifiant sa réclamation, ceci en tant que précondition à l’existence d’un différend susceptible de
former l’objet d’un règlement judiciaire. Autrement dit, aucun différend (ou tout au moins aucun
différend «justiciable») ne pourrait exister tant que l’Etat qui entend soumettre le différend au juge
n’a pas préalablement porté son grief à la connaissance de l’autre. Nos contradicteurs allèguent
que ce principe est énoncé à l’article 43 des Articles de la Commission du droit international
(ci-après la «CDI») sur la responsabilité de l’Etat et que son existence est confirmée par les
instruments juridiques régissant l’activité d’autres cours et tribunaux internationaux.
5. Monsieur le président, il est sans doute intéressant de noter que le Royaume-Uni, en
invoquant le principe de la notification préalable, tente de convaincre que des communications et
des formes d’interaction entre les parties à un différend devraient obligatoirement et dans tous les
cas précéder la saisine de la Cour. En somme, un mode de contact préalable entre les parties serait
de toute façon requis, même si l’on n’arrive pas à exiger de véritables négociations préalables. En
prêchant en faveur de ce que nous pourrions appeler «le préliminaire réduit», on tente du côté du
Royaume-Uni d’ajouter une condition que les Etats devraient remplir pour saisir la Cour, dont ni la
Charte des Nations Unies ni le Statut ne parlent aucunement, et cela en échappant ainsi à la rigueur
de l’enseignement de votre Cour d’après lequel :
«Il n’existe ni dans la Charte, ni ailleurs en droit international, de règle générale
selon laquelle l’épuisement des négociations diplomatiques serait un préalable à la
saisine de la Cour. Un tel préalable n’avait pas été incorporé dans le Statut de la Cour
permanente de Justice internat30nale … Il ne figure pas davantage à l’article 36 du
Statut de la présente Cour.»
29Sud-Ouest africain (Ethiopie c. Afrique du Sud ; Libéria c. Afrique du Sud), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 328.
30
Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 303, par. 56. - 22 -
6. Il n’y a donc pas de «règle générale selon laquelle l’épuisement des négociations
diplomatiques serait un préalable à la saisine de la Cour», précise la Cour, laquelle admet
cependant, nous le savons, qu’une règle spéciale en la matière pourrait fort bien être établie dans tel
ou tel domaine spécifique. Mais aucune règle spéciale n’existe, souligne la Cour avec vigueur,
lorsque la Cour «a été saisie sur la base de déclarations faites en vertu du paragraphe 2 de
l’article 36 du Statut, déclarations qui ne contiennent aucune condition relative à des négociations
préalables à mener dans un délai raisonnable» . 31
7. Insistons-y en passant, ceci est particulièrement pertinent dans la présente affaire, votre
Cour ayant été saisie justement sur la base des déclarations unilatérales faites par le Royaume-Uni
et les Iles Marshall en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l’article 36 : deux déclarations qui ne contiennent
aucune condition relative à des négociations préalables ni à épuiser, ni à entamer !
8. Monsieur le président, il est donc certain que ni le droit international général ni le Statut
de la Cour n’imposent des négociations préalables à la saisine de la Cour . Mais il y a encore un
préalable qui n’est pas requis. Je laisse la parole de nouveau au professeur Rosenne qui articule
parfaitement ce point :
«Neither general international law nor the Statute requires a potential applicant
to inform the potential respondent of its intention to institute proceedings. In the
absence of any such obligation and of any infringement of the respondent’s
corresponding rights, the respondent cannot in good faith challenge the jurisdiction of
the Court on the ground that it had not rece33ed previous notice of the intention to
bring the proceedings before the Court.»
9. Monsieur le président, ainsi que je viens de le remarquer, des négociations préalables à la
saisine de la Cour peuvent certes avoir lieu, mais ne sont pas exigées, et il n’était pas exigé que le
demandeur ait informé préalablement le défendeur de son intention de l’attaquer en justice. Ce qui
serait par contre requis nous informe le Royaume-Uni est un autre, un nouveau «préalable»,
un «préalable réduit», à savoir qu’un Etat qui entend soumettre au juge un différend l’opposant à
un autre Etat doit avoir porté préalablement son grief à la connaissance de cet Etat en le lui
notifiant. Mais d’où vient cette condition que les Etats devraient remplir pour pouvoir saisir la
31
Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 322, par. 109.
32Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 2006, p. 1153.
33
Ibid. - 23 -
Cour dont, je le répète, ni la Charte des Nations Unies, ni le Statut, ni le Règlement de la Cour ne
parlent aucunement ? Elle vient nous explique-t-on d’un principe de droit international
coutumier que la CDI a reconnu et transcrit dans l’article 43 des Articles sur la responsabilité de
l’Etat pour fait internationalement illicite. Un principe portant le titre «Notification par l’Etat
lésé», qui est formulé ainsi :
«1. L’Etat lésé qui invoque la responsabilité d’un autre Etat notifie sa demande à cet
Etat.
2. L’Etat lésé peut préciser notamment :
a) le comportement que devrait adopter l’Etat responsable pour mettre fin au fait
illicite si ce fait continue ;
b) la forme que devrait prendre la réparation, conformément aux dispositions de
la deuxième partie.»
10. Monsieur le président, il n’est pas question de contester l’existence et la pertinence d’un
tel principe. Les Iles Marshall se gardent bien de le faire ! En effet, il va de soi que, si un Etat qui
se considère lésé dans ses droits par les agissements d’un autre Etat entend faire valoir la
responsabilité internationale de cet Etat, il faut bien qu’il lui en adresse la demande. Ainsi que le
commentaire de la Commission du droit international (CDI) l’explique, en effet
«[m]ême si la responsabilité d’un Etat est engagée de plein droit à raison de la
commission par lui d’un fait internationalement illicite, il est nécessaire, dans la
pratique, que l’Etat lésé et/ou l’autre ou les autres Etats intéressés réagissent s’ils
souhaitent obtenir la cessation du fait en question ou la réparation. Les réactions
peuvent revêtir diverses formes, allant du rappel officiel et confidentiel de la34écessité
d’exécuter l’obligation à la protestation formelle, aux consultations, etc.»
Un peu plus loin le même commentaire indique : «Les présents articles n’ont pas vocation à
détailler la forme que l’invocation de la responsabilité doit revêtir.» 35
11. Monsieur le président, voilà le point central : la forme de l’invocation de la responsabilité
du Royaume-Uni pour violation de ses obligations découlant de l’article VI du traité de
non-prolifération (TNP) qu’ont choisie les Iles Marshall n’a pas été celle des protestations plus ou
moins formelles ou des consultations, mais directement la saisine de la Cour. Autrement dit, c’est
au moyen de sa requête que l’Etat marshallais a «notifié sa demande» invoquant la responsabilité
34Annuaire de la Commission du droit international, 2001, vol. II, 2 partie, p. 119.
35Ibid., p. 325. - 24 -
du Royaume-Uni, en précisant d’ailleurs tant le comportement que devrait adopter l’Etat
responsable pour mettre fin aux faits illicites que la forme que devrait prendre la réparation.
12. Rien, je dis bien rien, n’interdit de concevoir que la saisine de la Cour soit un mode
approprié et parfaitement légitime par lequel l’Etat lésé «notifie sa demande» à l’Etat dont la
responsabilité internationale est invoquée. Ni les Articles de la Commission du droit international
sur la responsabilité de l’Etat, ni le commentaire de la CDI y relatif ne s’y opposent aucunement.
Tout par contre s’oppose à concevoir la «notification par l’Etat lésé» comme une condition
supplémentaire de recevabilité des instances à introduire devant le juge international ou de
compétence de celui-ci, comme le prétend le Royaume-Uni. Le commentaire des Articles est
explicite à ce sujet : «Les présents articles ne traitent pas des problèmes de compétence des cours et
tribunaux internationaux, ni en général des conditions de recevabilité des instances introduites
36
devant eux.» Autrement dit, les Articles en question ne concernent pas l’accès au règlement
judiciaire des différends internationaux en matière de responsabilité internationale, ni ne
prescrivent des conditions spéciales auxquelles un tel accès serait subordonné.
Deuxième partie
13. Monsieur le président, les considérations que je viens de présenter m’autorisent, je pense,
à formuler le point suivant : afin d’exercer sa compétence judiciaire dans le cas présent, la Cour
doit certes vérifier que le différend entre les Iles Marshall et le Royaume-Uni existe : c’est-à-dire
doit-elle juger que la réclamation des Iles Marshall se heurte à l’opposition du Royaume-Uni ? Par
contre, la Cour n’a pas à se soucier de la question de savoir s’il y a eu ou non une «notification par
l’Etat lésé» préalable à la saisine, étant donné que, contrairement à ce qu’on prétend de l’autre côté
de la barre, une telle notification ne fait pas partie des éléments constitutifs du différend, et n’est
pas non plus une condition dont l’absence empêcherait la cristallisation du différend ou le rendrait
«non justiciable».
14. Venons-en donc à la vraie question concernant l’existence du différend : peut-on dire ou
non dans notre cas que la réclamation des Iles Marshall se heurte à l’opposition du Royaume-Uni ?
Monsieur le président, la réponse est facile, d’autant plus que, une fois que la question a été réduite
36Annuaire de la Commission du droit international, 2001, vol. II, 2 partie, p. 327. - 25 -
à l’essentiel, on constate aisément que des deux côtés de la barre les opinions ne divergent pas
vraiment. Vous avez, de ce côté-ci, les Iles Marshall invoquant le manquement du Royaume-Uni
aux obligations qui lui incombent à l’égard du demandeur (ainsi que d’autres Etats), en vertu de
l’article VI du traité de non-prolifération sur les armes nucléaires de 1968 et du droit coutumier, de
poursuivre de bonne foi et de mener à terme des négociations devant conduire au désarmement
nucléaire dans tous ses aspects, sous un contrôle international strict et efficace. De l’autre côté de
la barre, le Royaume-Uni vous dit d’emblée «the United Kingdom considers the allegations to be
manifestly unfounded on the merits», en se référant justement à la requête des Iles Marshall contre
le Royaume-Uni «alleging a breach inter alia of Article VI of the NPT, and of asserted parallel
obligations of customary international law» . De plus, le Royaume-Uni n’hésite pas à présenter un
autoportrait de véritable champion dans le respect de l’article VI du TNP, sans doute pour mettre
aussitôt en évidence combien infondées et gratuites devraient être jugées les accusations formulées
par les Iles Marshall. Il n’en faut pas plus, me semble-t-il, pour démontrer que votre Cour est
confrontée à quelque chose qui ressemble singulièrement à «un désaccord sur un point de droit ou
de fait, une opposition de thèses juridiques ou d’intérêt entre deux personnes» : je suis en train de
citer la plus célèbre des définitions du différend.
15. Il faut souligner que le Royaume-Uni, en effet, se garde bien de se lancer dans la
tentative de démontrer qu’il n’y aurait pas entre les Parties un différend, entendu au sens de
«opposition entre thèses juridiques…». Ce serait impossible ! Il tente seulement de mettre en
difficulté le demandeur en s’accrochant au principe selon lequel «la compétence de la Cour doit
normalement s’apprécier à la date du dépôt de l’acte introductif d’instance» et que, à cette même
date, doit s’apprécier l’existence du différend. Dans cette mouvance, une place d’honneur est
réservée par le Royaume-Uni à la citation du passage de l’arrêt de 2008 en l’affaire Croatie
c. Serbie que voici :
37Exceptions préliminaires du Royaume-Uni, p. 3.
38
Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine
c. Yougoslavie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 613, par. 26 ; Questions d’interprétation et
d’application de la convention de Montréal de 1971 résultant de l’incident aérien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne c. Royaume-Uni), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 9, par. 44 ; Application de la
convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Géorgie c. Fédération de
Russie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (I), p. 70, par. 31. - 26 -
«il importe de souligner qu’un Etat qui décide de saisir la Cour doit vérifier avec
attention que toutes les conditions nécessaires à la compétence de celle-ci sont
remplies à la date à laquelle l’instance est introduite. S’il ne le fait pas, et que lesdites
conditions viennent ou non à être remplies par la suite, la Cour doit en principe se
prononcer sur sa compétence au 39gard des conditions qui existaient à la date de
l’introduction de l’instance.»
16. Le but poursuivi par nos contradicteurs est finalement celui de faire valoir que l’on ne
pourrait pas tenir compte des échanges de vues entre les Parties ayant lieu au cours de la procédure
(donc après la date de la requête) afin de vérifier qu’un différend existe, puisque nous dit-on
tous les éléments constitutifs de cette existence doivent être réunis à la date de l’introduction de
l’instance . Il s’agit cependant, Monsieur le président, d’un faux problème lorsqu’il est question
d’évaluer s’il y a ou non opposition manifeste de la part du défendeur à la réclamation du
demandeur. Et le précédent Croatie c. Serbie n’est nullement pertinent à ce sujet : les échanges de
vues intervenant entre les parties sous les yeux de la Cour en cours de procédure, et avant que
celle-ci puisse prendre au sujet des exceptions préliminaires de recevabilité sa décision, peuvent
bien témoigner de l’existence ou non d’une véritable opposition entre les thèses juridiques des
parties, peuvent en offrir la preuve. Il ne faut cependant pas confondre la date de la preuve avec la
date de l’événement qu’il s’agit de prouver ! Autrement dit, si les échanges de vues et les
documents échangés entre les parties sous les yeux de la Cour permettent d’inférer ou confirmer
que le défendeur s’oppose aux prétentions du demandeur, c’est à la date de ces prétentions que
l’opposition du défendeur doit être rapportée, et non pas à la date des éléments, des paroles ou des
documents desquels on tire la preuve de l’existence effective d’une telle opposition. Permettez-moi
un exemple quelque peu audacieux : si je vous avouais maintenant qu’avant-hier j’ai volé l’une de
vos magnifiques robes de juge, le fait de mon vol vous est avoué aujourd’hui mais cela ne
permettrait à personne d’affirmer qu’aujourd’hui, c’est également le jour du vol.
17. De toute façon l’existence du différend entre les Parties à la présente affaire peut aussi
être inférée aisément d’événements antérieurs à la saisine de la Cour. Je me réfère tout
spécialement aux prises de position très officielles, très significatives et tout à fait pertinentes que
les Iles Marshall ont publiquement adoptées avant la saisine de la Cour : des prises de position dont
39Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Croatie c. Serbie),
exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2008, p. 438, par. 80.
40CR 2016/3, p. 17. - 27 -
les écritures et les plaidoiries du demandeur ont déjà souligné et continuent de souligner
l’importance.
41
18. C’est surtout sur la déclaration de Nayarit de février 2014 qu’il convient d’attirer
encore une fois l’attention de la Cour. Les Iles Marshall s’exprimaient ainsi :
«the Marshall Islands is convinced that multilateral negotiations on achieving and
sustaining a world free of nuclear weapons are long overdue. Indeed we believe that
States possessing nuclear arsenals are failing to fulfill their legal obligations in this
regard. Immediate commencement and conclusion of such negotiations is required by
legal obligation of nuclear disarmament resting upon each and every State under
Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and customary international law.»
19. En février 2014, bien avant la saisine de la Cour, les Iles Marshall se sont donc
spécifiquement et solennellement adressées à tous les Etats possédant des arsenaux nucléaires, y
compris le Royaume-Uni évidemment, qui n’était cependant pas présent à la conférence de Nayarit.
Une conférence très importante, ayant joui d’une participation très large d’Etats ainsi que d’une
vaste couverture médiatique, et dont les résultats et délibérations ont été largement répandus à
l’échelle mondiale. Il est d’ailleurs difficile de comprendre comment cela se fait que le
Royaume-Uni n’en ait pas eu connaissance, comme l’a déclaré sir Daniel Bethlehem mercredi
dernier (quand il a soutenu sans doute par erreur en avoir eu vent seulement grâce à la
requête des Iles Marshall qui, à vrai dire, n’en parlait pas). Ce que les Iles Marshall ont reproché
aux Etats nucléaires, à tous les Etats nucléaires et, partant, au Royaume-Uni est bien précis : elles
les ont accusés de manquer à leurs obligations relatives aux négociations devant aboutir à la
cessation de la course aux armements nucléaires et au désarmement nucléaire ; de surcroît, la
source des obligations en question était identifiée : l’article VI du TNP et le droit international
coutumier.
20. Monsieur le président, la Cour saura dans sa sagesse apprécier si la déclaration de
Nayarit des Iles Marshall mérite ou non d’être évaluée comme une forme de «notification de l’Etat
lésé» préalable à la saisine de la Cour, notamment à l’égard du Royaume-Uni. En soi, en vérité, le
seul fait de ne pas avoir réagi et de l’avoir ignorée ne serait nullement idoine à lui ôter une telle
signification. Mais quoi qu’il en soit, la déclaration de Nayarit garde en tout cas beaucoup de
41Seconde conférence sur l’impact humanitaire des armes nucléaires, Nayarit (Mexique), 13-14 février 2014
(http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/n…). - 28 -
pertinence s’agissant du processus d’appréciation par la Cour «par inférence» de l’existence d’un
différend entre les Iles Marshall et le Royaume-Uni.
21. Monsieur le président, je clos ici mon intervention, en remerciant vivement la Cour de
son attention et de sa patience. Puis-je vous prier, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir donner
e
maintenant la parole à M Laurie Ashton.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur le professeur. Je donne la parole à Mme Ashton.
Ms ASHTON:
O PTIONAL CLAUSE DECLARATION RESERVATION 1 (III)
Introduction
1. Thank you. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to appear before you
again on behalf of the Marshall Islands, this time in its dispute with the United Kingdom.
2. The UK alleges that reservation 1 (iii) in its optional clause declaration precludes
jurisdiction here. For clarity, I note here that the UK declaration at issue is the one dated
5 July 2004, which controls this case, not the 31 December 2014 declaration.
3. Reservation 1 (iii) excludes disputes where the “other Party to the dispute has accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice only in relation to or for the purpose of
the dispute” or where the acceptance of this Court’s jurisdiction was filed “less than 12 months
prior” to the filing of the application .
4. This reservation does not preclude jurisdiction in this case.
5. As a preliminary matter, the Court confirmed in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case that a
declaration must be interpreted “as it stands” with regard to the words “actually used” . 43
Additionally, under the reasoning of the Aerial Incident of 1999 decision, any intention of the UK
with regard to its reservation must be reflected in the actual text of the declaration .44
4Memorial of the Marshall Islands (MMI), Ann. 70, p. 3; judges’ folders, tab 2.
43
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 454,
para. 47, citing Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1952,
p. 105.
44
See Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), I.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 31, para. 44. - 29 -
United Kingdom reservation 1 (iii): acceptances “only in relation to or for the purpose of”
this dispute
6. Mr. President, Members of the Court, turning now to the reservation. In its preliminary
objections, the UK raised the “12 months” language but stated it was content to rest its arguments
on other bases. The Marshall Islands explained in its Statement of Observations why the
“12 months” language does not bar jurisdiction , and the UK did not dispute that explanation in
46
the oral pleadings . Therefore, the “12 months” portion of this reservation is not at issue today.
7. Mr. President, Members of the Court, turning to the other portion of the reservation: the
Marshall Islands’ acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction was not “only in relation to or for the
purpose of” this dispute with the United Kingdom.
8. As a preliminary matter, the United Kingdom does not dispute that the word “only”
modifies both “in relation to” and “for the purpose of” in this reservation . 47
9. And during its oral pleadings, the United Kingdom conceded for the first time, as follows:
“It is true, Mr. President, that the acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction by the
Marshall Islands was not only in relation to the particular dispute that it has submitted
to the Court. The terms of that acceptance are sufficiently broad to capture other
potential disputes.” 48
10. But the United Kingdom asks this Court to find that even though the Marshall Islands’
acceptance is sufficiently broad to capture other disputes, jurisdiction is still barred because the
Marshall Islands’ acceptance was allegedly “only for the purpose of” this dispute with the UK.
That is simply incorrect.
11. The difference in meaning between “in relation to” and “for the purpose of” is, in the
present circumstances, a distinction with no difference. It is unsurprising that in the UK’s only
citation to the history of this reservation, the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State explained in
1957 that the entire reservation is intended to reserve jurisdiction where a consent is “only for the
49
purposes of that particular dispute” . Thus, the allegation of UK counsel in oral pleadings that the
UK intended to separate out two different meanings in the reservation is both contrary to the
45
Written Statement of Observations and Submissions of the Marshall Islands (WSMI), pp. 24-25.
46See CR 2016/3, p. 32, para. 58 (Bethlehem).
47See CR 2016/3, p. 43, para. 40 (Verdirame); see also, WSMI, p. 21, para. 52, citing the Preliminary Objections
of the United Kingdom (POUK), para. 8 (3), p. 33, and pp. 34-35, para. 79.
48
See CR 2016/3, p. 43, para. 41 (Verdirame); emphasis added.
49POUK, pp. 34-35, para. 79. - 30 -
testimony of the UK Secretary of State — and entirely unsupported by anything in the record in
this dispute. And it is also irrelevant.
50
12. The UK cites a single instance of what it labels “circumstantial” conduct on the part of
the Marshall Islands, to controvert the Marshall Islands’ detailed explanation that its acceptance
51
was not “only” for the purpose of this dispute . That conduct, according to the UK, is simply the
filing of the Application on 23 April 2014.
13. But the filing date of the Application says nothing about whether the Marshall Islands’
acceptance of jurisdiction was only for the purpose of this dispute. It simply does not follow
logically that the proper timing of the Application against the UK evidences an acceptance of the
Marshall Islands to jurisdiction “only” for the purpose of this dispute.
14. And the RMI has never claimed that the proper timing of the filing of the Application
was a coincidence, as the UK contends.
15. In any event, the UK has failed to overcome the Marshall Islands’ detailed demonstration
in its statement of observations that it did not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court only
for the purpose of this case. Therefore, fundamentally, the word “only” in the reservation remains
decisive in this matter. That the Marshall Islands’ declaration was not deposited only for the
purposes of this dispute remains evidenced by at least three points.
16. First, nothing in the wording of the Marshall Islands’ declaration reflects any intention
that it apply “only” for the purpose of this dispute. The very breadth of the language of the
reservation demonstrates both that it was not “only in relation to this dispute”, and that it was not
“only for the purpose of” this dispute.
17. And while the UK references the Oxford definition of “purpose”, the definition more
telling here is the definition of “only”, which is: “and no one or nothing more besides; solely or
exclusively” .52
18. It is worth briefly comparing at this point the wording of the 2004 UK declaration at
issue here, with the wording of the Marshall Islands’ declaration. The two, short declarations are at
50POUK, pp. 26-27, para. 60; see also, ibid., p. 33, para. 76.
51WSMI, pp. 21-22.
52
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/only (last accessed on 10 March 2016). - 31 -
tabs 3 and 4 of the judges’ folders . A quick comparison reveals that with few exceptions, they are
identical. Other than different ratione temporis dates, the differences are that the UK reserves
jurisdiction where another party is a member of the Commonwealth, and where a declaration is
filed less than 12 months prior to the Application. In other words, the Marshall Islands’
declaration, to the extent it is not identical to the UK declaration, is broader and allows for even
more disputes to be heard by this Court.
19. Second, the Marshall Islands’ consent to compulsory jurisdiction has been on file for
nearly three years, and the Marshall Islands has not denounced, modified or limited its declaration
since it was deposited on 24 April 2013. If the Marshall Islands had intended to accept jurisdiction
only for the purpose of this dispute, it could easily have withdrawn that declaration after
commencing these proceedings. But it has not done so.
20. Third, importantly, if the Court were to look beyond the Marshall Islands’ declaration,
ample evidence exists that the Marshall Islands publicly anticipated climate change litigation
before this Court for many years. This is reflected in press articles quoting the Marshall Islands’
Co-Agent, Tony deBrum, and is covered in the Marshall Islands’ Statement of Observations at
pages 21 to 23. I will not repeat those points here.
21. Suffice it to say that the Marshall Islands’ acceptance of the Court’s compulsory
jurisdiction clearly had a history independent of these proceedings.
22. As this Court held in Right of Passage , by filing a declaration a State:
“must be deemed to take into account the possibility that, under the Statute, it may at
any time find itself subjected to the obligations of the Optional Clause in relation to a
new Signatory 55 the result of the deposit by that Signatory of a Declaration of
Acceptance” .
23. And in the case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
56
Nigeria , this Court likewise held that any State that files a declaration of consent makes
53MMI, Ann. 70; judges’ folders, tab 3 (UK declaration); tab 4 (RMI declaration).
54Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1957, p. 146.
55
Ibid.
56Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 290, para. 22. - 32 -
“a standing offer to the other States party to the Statute which have not yet deposited a
declaration of acceptance. The day one of those States accepts that offer by depositing
in its turn its declaration of acceptance, the consensual bond is established and no
further condition needs to be fulfilled.”
24. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the UK’s apparent indignation at the Marshall
Islands’ acceptance of the UK’s standing invitation to resolve disputes involving international law
and the interpretation of treaties is misplaced.
25. For the foregoing reasons, the Marshall Islands’ consent is, unequivocally, not within the
UK’s reservation that excludes jurisdiction where acceptance of this Court’s jurisdiction was “only
in relation to or for the purpose of” this dispute.
I thank the Court for its attention and would ask you, Mr. President, to give the floor to my
colleague, Professor Christine Chinkin or, if the Court would prefer, to have the break now.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Madame. Oui, la Cour entendra Mme Chinkin après une pause de
15 minutes. L’audience est suspendue.
L’audience est suspendue de 16 h 20 à 16 h 35.
Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. Je donne maintenant la parole à
Mme la professeur Chinkin.
Ms CHINKIN:
R ATIONE T EMPORIS
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is truly a privilege to appear before this Court as a
representative of the Republic of the Marshall Islands in this case against the United Kingdom.
2. In these submissions I will address the United Kingdom’s argument that the Court lacks
jurisdiction because of the ratione temporis exclusion in the Marshall Islands’ optional clause
declaration.
3. The Marshall Islands accepts that by operation of the condition of reciprocity, the relevant
date for determining whether a dispute is within the Court’s jurisdiction is that specified by the
57Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 291, para. 25. - 33 -
Marshall Islands in its Article 36 (2) declaration, that is, “all disputes arising after
17 September 1991, with regard to situations or facts subsequent to the same date”.
4. The UK denies that it has a dispute with the Marshall Islands in this regard. But and
somewhat contradictorily it also argues that, if there is such a dispute, it rests upon facts and
situations arising before 17 September 1991 indeed, on a continuous pattern of conduct by the
United Kingdom dating back to the entry into force of the NPT for the UK on 5 March 1970 and
that accordingly jurisdiction is excluded ratione temporis. The Marshall Islands disagrees and its
position is supported by the case law of this Court.
5. In the leading case, that concerning the Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, the
Permanent Court held that “a dispute may [and we might in parentheses add, inevitably does]
presuppose the existence of some prior situation or fact, but it does not follow that the dispute
arises in regard to that situation or fact” .
6. That distinction was reiterated by this Court in the Right of Passage case. Accordingly, a
distinction must be drawn between “the situations or facts which constitute the source of the rights
claimed by one of the Parties and the situations or facts which are the source of the dispute”. Since
only the latter are to be taken into account for the purpose of applying the declaration accepting the
jurisdiction of the Court, the Court must determine what were the situations or facts which
59
constituted the source, “those which are ‘[the] real cause’ [of the dispute]” .
7. The United Kingdom has made much of the fact that in its Memorial, the Marshall Islands
had outlined a course of conduct by the United Kingdom stretching back to 1970 and even beyond.
But the Marshall Islands was in no way suggesting that such conduct was the source of the dispute.
Rather, the purpose was to explain the historical context and background that led up to the
subsequent facts and situations that are materially relevant to the Marshall Islands’ rights under
Article VI of the NPT and customary international law, and are the source or real cause of the
dispute. I will outline some of these facts and situations shortly. Contrary to the
United Kingdom’s assertion, pre-1990s situations are not at the heart of this case or the object of
the Marshall Islands’ claims. The reference in the Application to “ensuring that the legal
58Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, Judgment, 1939, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 77, p. 82.
5Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 35. - 34 -
obligations undertaken 44 years ago by the United Kingdom . . . do indeed deliver the promised
result” was because, as a matter of historical fact, 1970 was when the NPT entered into force for
the United Kingdom.
8. So it is not the case as the United Kingdom argues that “[t]he source or real cause of the
dispute goes back to at least 1970”. As I shall now explain, new situations have arisen which
render the ratione temporis reservation inapplicable to the dispute between the Marshall Islands
and the United Kingdom.
9. First, Mr. President and Members of the Court, the Marshall Islands was admitted to
membership of the United Nations on 17 September 1991 the critical date in its optional clause
declaration. As the President of the United Nations Security Council had earlier observed, this
admission marked “the final steps in the process leading to the full integration of the Republic of
the Marshall Islands into the international community” . 60
10. In its oral submissions, the United Kingdom cited the Phosphates in Morocco case where
the Permanent Court held, inter alia, that in determining whether a given situation or fact is prior or
subsequent to a particular date, or determining the situations or facts with regard to which the
61
dispute arose, “it is necessary always to bear in mind the will of the [Declarant] State” . The
Marshall Islands (whose optional clause declaration we are dealing with) chose as its “critical date”
the date on which it became a member of the United Nations and thus a fully-fledged and fully
integrated member in the international community.
11. This was a logical date to choose. The Marshall Islands could not be a party to a dispute
with another State until that point in time. And any facts or situations prior to that date can have no
relevance as the source or real cause of this dispute between the Marshall Islands and the
United Kingdom or indeed of any dispute between the Marshall Islands and any other State,
except of course with the United States regarding the latter’s conduct during the Trusteeship
period. It would also make no difference if the boot were on the other foot and the Marshall
Islands were the respondent State accused of violating its international obligations. A new
6Statement of the President of the Security Council, following the adoption of Security Council resolution 704,
9 Aug. 1991.
61CR 2016/3, p. 36, para. 16. - 35 -
situation existed as of the date of the Marshall Islands’ entry into membership of the
United Nations. The clock could not and did not start ticking until that point in time.
12. A little over three years later, on 30 January 1995, the Marshall Islands acceded to the
NPT. This is a juridical fact and one that is not in dispute. But it is also the source of another new
situation of vital significance for this case: until that date, there was no relationship under the NPT
between the United Kingdom and the Marshall Islands. There could not be, as the Marshall Islands
was not a party to the NPT until then. Accordingly, the Marshall Islands makes no legal claim
under the NPT with respect to any facts or situations arising before that date: 30 January 1995.
13. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the source or real cause of the Marshall Islands’
dispute with the UK concerning the latter State’s conduct in relation to Article VI of the NPT
cannot pre-date the moment at which the legal relationship between the two States under that
Treaty was established and mutual rights and obligations under the Treaty came into existence.
The Marshall Islands’ position in this regard is also supported by the jurisprudence of this
Court. In Right of Passage, the Court held that there were three elements to the dispute: (1) the
disputed existence of a right of passage in favour of Portugal; (2) the alleged failure of India in
July 1954 to comply with its obligations concerning that right of passage; and (3) the redress of the
illegal situation flowing from that failure. The Court went on to say that all three constituent
elements had to be present: “The dispute before the Court, having this three-fold subject, could not
arise until all its constituent elements had come into existence.” 62
14. Now, while the Court was considering there the existence of a dispute rather than the
facts or situations which were its source or real cause, it emphasizes that there cannot be a dispute
until there is a right, or at least a claimed right. And since there cannot be a dispute until there is a
right, any facts or situations prior to the date on which the right came into existence can have no
relevance as the source or real cause of that dispute. Until then, such facts or situations are
unattached unrelated to any legal claim.
6Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 35. - 36 -
15. In respect of Italy’s counter-claim against Germany in the Jurisdictional Immunities
case , this Court found that the violations of international humanitarian law during World War II
were not the source or real cause of the dispute. The source or real cause of the dispute was the
legal régime established after the war for the payment of reparations. That régime still pre-dated
the compromissory clause in the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and
thus excluded the counter-claim from jurisdiction. But the point is that the source or real cause of
the dispute was the legal régime determining the rights and obligations of both parties.
16. In the present case, the applicable legal régime is the NPT, which could not be relevant
until the United Kingdom and the Marshall Islands had both become parties to it.
17. Although the critical issue is not the date on which the dispute arose but the date of the
facts or situations in relation to which the dispute arose , as regards Article VI of the NPT, neither
of those dates can possibly pre-date the Marshall Islands’ accession to the NPT. To find otherwise
would be to apply the NPT retroactively, contrary to the principles enshrined in Article 28 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. While the dispute may presuppose the
existence of prior situations or facts, the specific facts or situations with regard to which it has
arisen and which are its source or real cause all post-date the Marshall Islands’ accession to the
NPT.
18. The breaches section of its Application demonstrates that the Marshall Islands claims are
founded on the post-1995 conduct of the United Kingdom. Since 1995 the United Nations General
Assembly has adopted resolutions calling for the commencement of multilateral negotiations on
nuclear disarmament and establishing an Open-ended Working Group to Take Forward Multilateral
Negotiations on Nuclear Disarmament. The United Kingdom has opposed these resolutions.
Those resolutions are cross-referenced in paragraphs 102 and 103 of Part IV of the Application,
Obligations Breached by the United Kingdom. Paragraph 106 of the Application, concerning
breach of the obligation relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race, is based in part on the
United Kingdom’s efforts to qualitatively improve its nuclear weapons system and to maintain and
6Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), Counter-Claim, Order of 6 July 2010,
I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 320, para. 28.
64
Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 25,
para. 48. - 37 -
extend that system indefinitely. That paragraph cross-refers to Part II.C.4 of the Application,
which concerns United Kingdom conduct in the period from 2006 to 2013. Such conduct is clearly
inconsistent with the obligation to negotiate in good faith.
19. Similarly, the date of the facts or situations in relation to which the dispute concerning
the customary international law obligation has arisen cannot be before that obligation was
authoritatively recognized for the first time on 8 July 1996, when this Court delivered its Advisory
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, in which it concluded,
unanimously: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international
65
control.”
20. It is only from the date of the Advisory Opinion in which this Court recognized that a
rule of customary international law had emerged, that States could reasonably be expected to be
aware of the universality and scope of that obligation. Accordingly, the Marshall Islands alleges no
such obligation of the United Kingdom towards it under customary international law prior to
8 July 1996.
21. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the United Kingdom’s conduct under the NPT
goes back to the Treaty’s entry into force for the United Kingdom in 1970. The dispute may even
presuppose the existence of certain prior situations or facts. But the specific situations or facts
which are the source or real cause of the dispute in this case are, with regard to Article VI, the
United Kingdom’s conduct after 30 January 1995; and, with regard to customary international law,
the UK’s conduct after 8 July 1996.
22. Both of those dates are well after the critical date of 17 September 1991 in the
Marshall Islands’ optional clause declaration the date on which the Marshall Islands became a
member of the United Nations and was fully integrated into the international community, and the
date on which the clock began to tick. For this reason, the ratione temporis reservation does not
exclude the jurisdiction of this Court over this dispute.
6Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 267,
para. 105 (2) F. - 38 -
23. Mr. President, Members of the Court, those are my submissions. I thank the Court for its
kind attention and ask you, Mr. President, to invite my colleague, Professor Paolo Palchetti to the
podium. Thank you.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Madame. Je donne la parole à M. le professeur Palchetti.
Mr. PALCHETTI:
A BSENT THIRD PARTIES
1. Thank you. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to address this Court
again on behalf of the Republic of the Marshall Islands. In its Preliminary Objections and in its
oral presentation, the United Kingdom argued that the Court cannot entertain the present dispute
because of the absence of essential parties whose interest, in the United Kingdom’s view, would be
66
“directly and inevitably” engaged by the Marshall Islands’ claims . In my submissions, I will
address this objection.
2. I will divide my pleadings into three parts. The first part focuses on the subject-matter of
the present dispute. The United Kingdom would have the Court believe that the real object of the
Marshall Islands’ claims in the present case is the “shared responsibility” of all States possessing
nuclear weapons . 67 I will argue that this misconstrues the dispute as presented in the
Marshall Islands’ Application and Memorial. In the second part, I will examine this Court’s case
law concerning the scope of the Monetary Gold principle. Unsurprisingly, in its Preliminary
Objections and in its oral presentation, the United Kingdom has attempted to downplay the
importance of the Court’s Judgment in the Nauru case. In that Judgment, this Court has clarified
that the Monetary Gold principle only applies where the determination of the responsibility of a
third State is a prerequisite for the determination of the responsibility of the respondent State. I
will argue that this is the test to be used in order to assess whether the Court should decline to
exercise its jurisdiction over the Marshall Islands’ claims. In the third and last part of my
presentation, I will argue that precisely because the determination of the responsibility of a third
6CR 2016/3, p. 57, para. 39. See also Preliminary Objections of the United Kingdom (POUK), para. 113 (c).
6CR 2016/3, p. 46. See also POUK, paras. 87 and 93. - 39 -
State is not a prerequisite for the determination of the responsibility of the United Kingdom, the
objection made by the Respondent must be rejected.
3. I first address the question of the subject-matter of the present dispute.
I. The subject-matter of the present dispute
4. In its recent Judgment in Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean, this Court
observed that “[t]o identify the subject-matter of the dispute, the Court bases itself on the
application, as well as the written and oral pleadings of the parties. In particular, it takes account of
the facts that the applicant identifies as the basis for its claim.” 68
5. The Application of the Marshall Islands, as well as its Memorial, leaves no doubt as to the
subject-matter of the present dispute. The subject-matter is, in form and in substance, whether the
United Kingdom, through the conduct of its organs, has breached its obligation to negotiate in good
faith nuclear disarmament. The Application does not ask the Court to adjudge that States
possessing nuclear weapons are jointly responsible. There is no need for the Court, in order to
establish the responsibility of the United Kingdom, to determine, as a preliminary matter, whether
other States possessing nuclear weapons are equally responsible.
6. The United Kingdom argues that the real subject-matter of the present dispute is the
69
“shared responsibility” of all States possessing nuclear weapons . In its view, the fact that the
Marshall Islands filed similar Applications against the other States possessing nuclear weapons
would be evidence that the object of the present dispute is different from that described in the
Application. It is not clear, however, why this circumstance should be relevant at all for the
purposes of determining the subject-matter of the present dispute. It is not.
7. As this Court has frequently observed, “applications that are submitted to the Court often
70
present a particular dispute that arises in the context of a broader disagreement between parties” .
The present dispute against the United Kingdom arises in the context of a wider disagreement
between the Marshall Islands and all States possessing nuclear weapons. This does not mean that
68Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of
24 September 2015, para. 26.
69CR 2016/3, p. 46. See also POUK, paras. 87 and 93.
70
Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of
24 September 2015, para. 32. - 40 -
the subject-matter is the joint responsibility of all these States. Nor does it mean that the Court is
precluded from exercising its jurisdiction over this dispute.
8. The United Kingdom also argued that Marshall Islands’ claim inevitably involves the
conduct of other States because of the very content of the obligation allegedly breached.
According to the United Kingdom, its conduct in negotiations can only be assessed in the context
of the attitude and actions of other States and therefore the Court will inevitably be drawn into a
71
consideration of absent third States . Mr. President, there is no reason to believe that compliance
by each and every State with the obligation to negotiate cannot be assessed separately. The Court
can evaluate whether a State, by its conduct, has breached its obligation to negotiate in good faith
without this requiring an assessment of the conduct of the other States. In its Judgment in the
Pulp Mills case, this Court focused on the conduct of Uruguay in order to establish whether this
State had complied with its obligation to negotiate. It found that, “by authorizing the construction
of the mills and the port terminal at Fray Bentos before the expiration of the period of negotiation,
Uruguay failed to comply with the obligation to negotiate laid down by Article 12 of the Statute” . 72
In the present case, the Marshall Islands asks the Court to do the same: to focus on the conduct of
the United Kingdom in order to establish whether such conduct is compatible with its obligations
under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and under customary international law.
9. Mr. President, I would emphasize a point with respect to the conduct of the
United Kingdom that this Court is now called upon to assess. Both in its Preliminary Objections
and in its oral presentation, the United Kingdom made reference only to a very limited set of
specific acts. These essentially consist of joint statements made by the United Kingdom with other
States and bilateral agreements concluded with third States. By focusing exclusively on these acts,
the United Kingdom attempts to demonstrate that the real subject-matter of the present dispute is
the conduct of third States. I will examine these acts later. Here I draw the Court’s attention to the
fact that the conduct which the United Kingdom focused on constitutes only a minor part of the
overall sets of acts and omissions referred to by the Marshall Islands as evidence of the alleged
7CR 2016/3, p. 46.
72
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), pp. 67-68,
para. 149. - 41 -
breach. The greatest part of the factual allegations underlying the Marshall Islands’ claims
concerns acts and omissions which are attributable exclusively to the United Kingdom. This
includes in particular the qualitative improvement of United Kingdom’s nuclear arsenal. An
assessment by this Court of the lawfulness of these acts would in no way affect the interests of third
States. The assessment of these acts would be sufficient to show that the United Kingdom has
breached its obligation to engage in good faith negotiations.
II. The scope of the Monetary Gold principle in the case law
of the International Court of Justice
10. I now move to the question of the scope of the Monetary Gold principle.
11. The Monetary Gold principle is constantly invoked when a judgment of this Court may
have implications of whatever nature for the legal interests of third States. However, it has been
applied only in exceptional cases. According to its Judgment in Monetary Gold itself, this Court is
prevented from exercising its jurisdiction when the legal interests of the third party “would not only
be affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-matter of the decision” . This Court
has also recognized that “[t]he circumstances of the Monetary Gold case probably represent the
limit of the power of the Court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction” .74
The Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal dealing with the dispute between the Philippines and China
has recently noted that there are only “few cases” in which an international court or tribunal has
declined to exercise its jurisdiction due to the absence of an indispensable third party . It cannot
be otherwise. An extensive interpretation of the scope of Monetary Gold principle, such as the one
suggested by the United Kingdom, would be tantamount to recognize immunity from judicial
scrutiny in a great variety of situations.
12. This Court has been careful in restricting the operation of the principle. In particular, it
has applied it only to situations where the prior determination of the responsibility of a third State
is required for the determination of the responsibility of the respondent State. This point was
7Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France; United Kingdom and United States
of America), Preliminary Question, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 32.
7Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 431, para. 88.
75
The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
29 October 2015, para. 181 (http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1506). - 42 -
clearly made by the Court in its Judgment in Nauru. It has constantly been reaffirmed in
subsequent judgments.
13. On Wednesday, counsel for the United Kingdom attempted to introduce a new test in
order to determine the applicability of the Monetary Gold principle. According to Ms Wells, the
key question is “whether the effect of the Court’s judgment will be to evaluate (expressly or by
implication) whether a third State’s conduct is unlawful under international law” . The key words
here are “by implication”. With these two words the United Kingdom extends the scope of the
Monetary Gold principle dramatically. Should the Court decline to exercise jurisdiction each time
that a judgment may have implications for the legal position of a third State, this Court would be
deprived of a great deal of its jurisdiction. More importantly, this test squarely contradicts the
position of the Court as spelled out in Nauru.
14. In the Nauru case, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom were jointly
responsible for the administration of the territory. The Court, however, excluded the application of
the Monetary Gold principle, finding that “the determination of the responsibility of New Zealand
or the United Kingdom is not a prerequisite for the determination of the responsibility of Australia,
the only object of Nauru’s claim” . The Court also observed that
“a finding by the Court regarding the existence or the content of the responsibility
attributed to Australia by Nauru might well have implications for the legal situation of
the two other States concerned, but no finding in respect of that legal situation will78e
needed as a basis for the Court’s decision on Nauru’s claims against Australia” .
15. The Court itself uses the word “implications”. However, the Court’s position is
diametrically opposed to that advanced by the United Kingdom: the fact that the legal position of a
third State may be affected “by implication” by a judgment is not sufficient to trigger the Monetary
Gold principle. A preliminary finding in respect to that legal situation is needed as a basis for the
Court’s decision. Put simply, the determination of the responsibility of the third State must be a
prerequisite for the determination of the responsibility of the respondent State. Mr. President, if
this is not enough clear, let me use Professor Kolb’s words: “the only situation which up to now,
76CR 2016/3, p. 55, para. 33.
77Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 261, para. 55.
78
Ibid. - 43 -
the Court has accepted as permitting it not to exercise its jurisdiction is when the Court would, in
order to decide the dispute before it, have to give a prior decision on the legal position of, or on a
79
dispute with, a third State” .
16. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Nauru is not an unfortunate, isolated incident.
I can understand that the United Kingdom is uneasy with Nauru and would prefer to rely on the
views expressed by some dissenting judges. However, the test applied in Nauru has been
consistently confirmed by this Court.
17. The Judgment in the Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 is of
particular interest for the purpose of the present case. In the Interim Accord case, the
subject-matter of the dispute concerned the lawfulness of acts taken by Greece within the context
of an international organization NATO. This case presents some similarities with the present
dispute. Among the acts complained of by the Marshall Islands, there is also the voting record of
the United Kingdom in the United Nations General Assembly. Now, the United Kingdom argues
that the Court cannot assess the lawfulness of its voting records because this would have
implications for the legal positions of third States . In the Interim Accord case, Greece had raised
the same objection. It argued that the Court could not exercise its jurisdiction since it would have
needed to determine the responsibility of NATO or of its member States in order to assess the
conduct of the Respondent. This Court rejected such objection. It noted:
“The present case can be distinguished from the Monetary Gold case since the
Respondent’s conduct can be assessed independently of NATO’s decision, and the
rights and obligations of NATO and its member States other than Greece do not form
the subject-matter of the decision of the Court on the merits of the case (Monetary
Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France; United Kingdom and United
States of America), Preliminary Question, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 19;
East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 105, para. 34);
nor would the assessment of their responsibility be a ‘prerequisite for the
determination of the responsibility’ of the Respondent (Certain Phosphate Lands in
Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992,
p. 261, para. 55).”81
79
R. Kolb, The International Court of Justice, 2013, p. 574.
80CR 2016/3.
81
Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia v. Greece), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (II), pp. 660-661, para. 43. - 44 -
III. The Monetary Gold principle does not apply to the present dispute
18. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the Monetary Gold principle does not apply to the
dispute brought by the Marshall Islands against the United Kingdom. To summarize, first, the
subject-matter of the present dispute is the United Kingdom’s international responsibility. Second,
the focus of the Marshall Islands’ claim is on the conduct of the United Kingdom. Third, none of
the conduct referred to in the Application requires a prior determination of the responsibility of any
third State.
19. The United Kingdom’s attempt to distinguish the present case from Nauru is devoid of
any merit. The specific acts referred to by the United Kingdom to justify the application of the
Monetary Gold principle are acts attributable simultaneously to the United Kingdom and to third
States, or acts taken by the United Kingdom within an international organization. The Court’s
Judgment in Nauru provides clear authority for the proposition that the Monetary Gold principle
does not apply when the conduct complained of can be attributed simultaneously to the respondent
State and to third States; it does not apply where the respondent and third States, by undertaking
distinct acts, contribute to the same wrongful act; it does not apply when the respondent and third
States commit distinct wrongful acts by breaching the same obligation. In all these cases, the
determination of the responsibility of the respondent State “may well have implications” for these
other States. But contrary to what the United Kingdom suggests, this is not sufficient to trigger the
application of the Monetary Gold principle.
20. This concludes my presentation. I thank the Members of the Court for their kind
attention and I would ask the Court to give the floor to Professor Nick Grief.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur le professeur. Je donne la parole au professeur Grief.
Mr. GRIEF:
“T HE JUDGMENT W OULD B EINEFFECTIVE ”
1. Thank you, Mr. President and Members of the Court, it is an honour and a privilege to
address you again today on behalf of the Marshall Islands. I will conclude the Marshall Islands’
oral pleadings today by responding to the United Kingdom’s observations on the judicial function
of the Court and its assertion that a judgment on the merits would be ineffective. - 45 -
2. This is not a situation like Northern Cameroons where any judgment would be incapable
82
of “effective application” or would not have “some practical consequence” .
3. In its opening oral pleadings, however, the United Kingdom professed to be unable to see
any practical consequences of the relief sought by the Marshall Islands. The United Kingdom
reduced the requested relief to an order that would require good-faith participation in negotiations
83
once underway . This not only misrepresents what the Marshall Islands is claiming but, as clearly
laid out in its Application, Memorial, and Statement of Observations on the United Kingdom’s
Preliminary Objections, and as I will discuss in more detail shortly, the Marshall Islands requests
both declaratory relief and injunctive relief. As to declaratory relief, the Marshall Islands asks the
Court to find, under both conventional and customary law, first, that the UK is in breach of the
obligation to pursue and bring to a conclusion negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament;
secondly, that the United Kingdom is in breach of the obligation to pursue and bring to a
conclusion negotiations on cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date; and thirdly, that the
United Kingdom is in breach of the requirement that these obligations be implemented in
accordance with the principle of good faith.
4. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in making findings as to whether the conduct of the
United Kingdom is consistent with its legal obligations, the Court would be performing a task “at
the heart of the Court’s judicial function”, to quote the dissent by four judges in the Nuclear Tests
84
cases . Moreover, such findings would in turn require the United Kingdom to bring its conduct
into conformity with the obligations, as the Court made clear in Haya de la Torre , thus having5
“some practical consequences”. Indeed, in this case, what is envisaged is not merely “some”
practical consequences but the fulfilment of promises which the United Kingdom made when it
became a party to the NPT.
82Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963,
pp. 33, 34.
83
CR 2016/3, p. 30, para. 51 (Bethlehem).
84Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974; joint dissenting opinion of
Judges Onyeama, Dillard, Jiménez de Aréchaga and Sir Humphrey Waldock, p. 314, para. 7; Nuclear Tests
(New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974; joint dissenting opinion of Judges Onyeama, Dillard,
Jiménez de Aréchaga and Sir Humphrey Waldock, p. 496, para. 7 (in slightly different words).
85Haya de la Torre (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 82. - 46 -
5. In the Statement of Observations, at paragraph 130, the Marshall Islands explained the
practical effects of a finding with respect to the obligation to pursue negotiations on complete
nuclear disarmament, and stated that: “In conclusion, the Republic of the Marshall Islands’ first
submission seeks forward-looking, legally and practically meaningful declaratory relief. That is
also true of the other submissions.” 86
87
6. Mr. President, Members of the Court, let me revisit, briefly, the first submission . As the
88
Marshall Islands’ Application and Memorial document , in its votes on General Assembly
resolutions the United Kingdom systematically opposes the commencement of multilateral
negotiations on nuclear disarmament. For example, in 2013 the United Kingdom opposed
deliberations aimed at facilitating such negotiations through the United Nations Open-ended
Working Group on Taking Forward Multilateral Negotiations on Nuclear Disarmament. The
General Assembly established the Open-ended Working Group to develop proposals to take
forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a
89 90
world without nuclear weapons . The United Kingdom voted against the resolution establishing
91
the Working Group and did not attend any of its meetings . In a statement made with France and
the United States in the General Assembly First Committee in November 2012, the
United Kingdom declared that it was “unable to support this resolution, the establishment of the
Open-ended Working Group and any outcome it may produce” . 92
7. Members of the Court, the United Kingdom continues to oppose such deliberations. It
recently voted against the General Assembly resolution establishing the 2016 United Nations
86WSMI, p. 48, para. 130.
87
AMI, p. 39, Remedies, (a).
88
MMI, paras. 76, 77, 82, 91, 92; AMI, 69, 71, 79, 80.
89A/RES/67/56, “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and
maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons”, 3 Dec. 2012 (147-4-31).
90UN doc. A/67/PV.48, pp. 20-21.
91Hansard, HL Deb, 15 July 2013, col. WA93.
92
Available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1…
_France-UK-US.pdf; emphasis added. - 47 -
Open-ended Working Group , in which the UK is not participating. The 2016 Open-ended
Working Group is a resumption of the 2013 Working Group.
8. A finding of this Court affirming that Article VI and customary international law require
the United Kingdom to pursue multilateral negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament would
entail the following: first, that the United Kingdom end its systematic opposition to such
negotiations and instead systematically support their commencement in relevant forums, including
the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament, NPT Review Conferences, and other
bodies such as the United Nations Open-ended Working Group; secondly, that the
United Kingdom participate in good faith in deliberations and negotiations on complete nuclear
disarmament; and, thirdly, that the United Kingdom, if necessary, initiate such negotiations.
94
9. As the Marshall Islands said in its statement of observations , such a finding would not
necessarily require the United Kingdom to vote for a particular General Assembly resolution. This
is just an example, in line with the Court’s recognition that States have some latitude in
implementing legal obligations based on considerations such as practicality and expedience. A
finding would require, however, that the United Kingdom adopt an effective and proactive
approach to bringing about the commencement of negotiations and participating in them. It would
not require the United Kingdom to engage in pointless activity, such as “negotiating” without
partners.
10. Mr. President, Members of the Court, a finding of the Court as requested by the
95
Marshall Islands’ second submission would require the United Kingdom to pursue negotiations to
cease nuclear arms racing, in particular, qualitative improvement of nuclear forces, through a
96
comprehensive disarmament measure or other measures . The earlier points about the pursuit of
negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament under the first submission apply equally here. Such
a finding would also require the United Kingdom to cease taking actions to qualitatively improve
its nuclear weapons system and maintain it for the indefinite future.
9A/RES/70/34, “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”,
7 Dec. 2015 (140-26-17); voting result at http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com
/1com15/votes-ga/34.pdf.
9WSMI, p. 47, para. 127.
95
AMI, p. 39, Remedies, (b).
96
See MMI, p. 94, para. 221 and fn. 366. - 48 -
11. The third and fourth submissions restate the first and second submissions as a matter of
customary international law, and are within the Court’s judicial function for the reasons I have just
stated.
12. The fifth submission requests the Court to adjudge and declare that
“the United Kingdom has failed and continues to fail to perform in good faith its
obligations under the NPT and under customary international law by modernizing,
updating and upgrading its nuclear weapons capacity and maintaining its declared
nuclear weapons policy for an unlimited period of time, while at the same time failing
98
to pursue negotiations as set out in the four preceding counts” .
A finding by the Court upholding this submission would have practical consequences. It would
entail that the United Kingdom cease those activities.
99
13. A finding pursuant to the sixth submission would require the United Kingdom to alter
its conduct, particularly with respect to its pursuit of multilateral disarmament negotiations, to
facilitate rather than obstruct the performance of Article VI obligations by non-nuclear weapon
States.
14. In summary, Mr. President, findings upholding the Marshall Islands’ submissions would
themselves have practical consequences. A declaratory judgment is in itself relief. As the Court
stated in Haya de la Torre, a decision by this Court that an action is not in conformity with an
international legal obligation “entails a legal consequence, namely that of putting an end to the
100 101
illegal situation” . Regarding the requested order , it would encompass the consequences
flowing from the submissions and impose a time frame. The Marshall Islands would underline that
in this contentious proceeding, it seeks a binding judgment of this Court, subject to Article 94 (1)
of the United Nations Charter, which provides: “Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to
comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.”
15. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I turn finally to Sir Daniel Bethlehem’s suggestion
on behalf of the United Kingdom, that:
97
AMI, p. 39, Remedies, (c) and (d).
98Ibid., (e).
99Ibid., (f).
100
Haya de la Torre (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 82.
101Ibid., p. 40. - 49 -
“If, contrary to our other submissions, the Court concludes that the Marshall
Islands’ Application is otherwise admissible and within the Court’s jurisdiction, the
Court should decline to exercise that jurisdiction in this case on the ground that to do
so would be incompatible with its judicial function.” 102
Members of the Court, there is no basis in law for that suggestion. The Court does not have a
residual discretion in contentious proceedings to decline to proceed because of some perceived fear
of the political aspects of the case, or because of a veiled threat by one of the parties to withdraw
from the optional clause. There may well be a discretion to refuse to answer in advisory
proceedings, although the Court has declined to exercise it, even in some very politically fraught
situations. But this is not the case in contentious proceedings. The Court should exercise its
judicial function, no more and no less.
16. As the Court said in the Nuclear Tests Judgment: “This is not to say that the Court may
select from the cases submitted to it those it feels suitable for judgment while refusing to give
judgment in others.” 103 And The joint dissenting opinion in that case makes the same point: “[The
Court] has not the discretionary power of choosing those contentious cases it will decide and those
it will not.”104 And Professor Tomuschat comments:
“The Court would emasculate itself if it refrained from agreeing to clarify the
legal position in disputes of great importance for the peace and security of the
world . . .
Rightly, [he continues] the ICJ views itself as part and parcel of the machinery
established by the UN Charter with the foremost task of promoting the purposes and
principles of the Charter over their entire breadth. Neither any act-of-State doctrine
[he concludes] nor any political-question doctrine hampers the discharge of its
105
function.”
17. The United Kingdom asserts, Members of the Court, that the Marshall Islands has
devised an “artificial” case 106and that it is “seeking to use the contentious jurisdiction of the Court
107
as a device to procure from the Court an advisory opinion” . Mr. President, the Marshall Islands
102CR 2016/3, pp. 31-32, para. 57; emphasis added.
103Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 271, para. 57; Nuclear Tests
(New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C J. Reports 1974, p. 477, para. 60.
104Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974; joint dissenting opinion of
Judges Onyeama, Dillard, Jiménez de Aréchaga and Sir Humphrey Waldock, p. 322, para. 22; Nuclear Tests (New
Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974; joint dissenting opinion of Judges Onyeama, Dillard, Jiménez de
Aréchaga and Sir Humphrey Waldock, p. 505, para. 21.
105
C. Tomuschat, “Article 36”, in A. Zimmerman, C. Tomuschat, K. Oellers-Frahm & C. Tams (eds.), The Statute
of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary, 2nd ed., 2012, p. 645 (footnote omitted).
106
CR 2016/3, p. 32, para. 58.
107CR 2016/3, p. 33, para. 60. - 50 -
has not come to this Court to obtain some sort of political guidance; there are other forums for that
purpose. The Marshall Islands requests a judgment honouring its rights under the NPT and under
customary international law. The Marshall Islands does not deny that there are political aspects of
the search for nuclear disarmament. One would be hard pressed to find a legal dispute between
States that did not have a political aspect. But in the Tehran Hostages case, the Court observed that
“never has the view been put forward before that, because a legal dispute submitted to the Court is
only one aspect of a political dispute, the Court should decline to resolve for the parties the legal
108
questions at issue between them” . The Court, as noted earlier in that quotation by
Professor Tomuschat, and unlike some national courts, does not have a “political question”
doctrine which enables it to avoid making a decision on the basis that the dispute is politically
sensitive. The Marshall Islands contends that there are legal issues here, issues that can be refined
and adjudicated upon in terms of the sources of law in Article 38 of the Statute of the Court.
18. Mr. President, Members of the Court, thank you for your kind attention. This brings me
to the end of my submissions and concludes the Marshall Islands’ first round of oral pleadings in
these proceedings. Thank you.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le professeur. Un membre de la Cour
souhaite poser une question qui s’adresse aux deux Parties. Je lui donne la parole.
Monsieur le juge Bennouna.
Judge BENNOUNA: I thank you, Mr. President. I would like to put my question to both
Parties. My question is as follows:
One of the United Kingdom’s counsel stated at the hearing of 9 March 2016:
“The Court’s jurisdiction in this case must be determined by reference to the
question: was there a dispute between the Marshall Islands and the United Kingdom
over the United Kingdom’s compliance with its Article VI NPT obligations, and any
alleged parallel obligation of customary international law, on 24 April 2014, the date
of the filing of the Marshall Islands’ Application instituting proceedings.”
[CR 2016/3, p. 18, para. 22 (Bethlehem).]
108United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 20, para. 37. See also the discussion of the Court’s extensive comparable jurisprudence in
Advisory Proceedings in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 155, para. 41. - 51 -
Can the United Kingdom and the Marshall Islands clarify to the Court, each for its own part,
what their position was, on the date when the Application in this case was filed, 24 April 2014, as
regards the interpretation and application of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and in what context they explicitly or implicitly adopted that position?
I thank you, Mr. President.
Le PRESIDENT : Thank you. Le texte de la question sera communiqué aux Parties sous
forme écrite dès que possible. Les Parties sont invitées à y répondre oralement au cours du second
tour de plaidoiries.
Cela met fin à l’audience d’aujourd’hui et clôt le premier tour de plaidoiries. Les audiences
dans la présente affaire reprendront le lundi 14 mars à 15 heures, pour entendre le second tour de
plaidoiries du Royaume-Uni. A l’issue de l’audience, le Royaume-Uni présentera ses conclusions
finales sur les exceptions préliminaires qu’il a soulevées en la présente affaire.
Les Iles Marshall, pour leur part, prendront la parole le mercredi 16 mars, à 15 heures, pour
leur second tour de plaidoiries. A la fin de l’audience, les Iles Marshall présenteront à leur tour
leurs conclusions finales.
Je rappellerai que le second tour de plaidoiries a pour objet de permettre à chacune des
Parties de répondre aux arguments avancés oralement par l’autre Partie ou aux questions posées par
les membres de la Cour. Le second tour ne doit donc pas constituer une répétition des
présentations déjà faites par les Parties, qui ne sont, au demeurant, pas tenues d’utiliser l’intégralité
du temps de parole qui leur est alloué.
Je vous remercie. L’audience est levée.
L’audience est levée à 17 h 35.
___________
Public sitting held on Friday 11 March 2016, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Abraham presiding, in the case regarding Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom)