Written Statement of Argentina

Document Number
15666
Document Type
Date of the Document
Document File
Document

ê
Embassyof the
ArgentineRepublic

Nro. 015/2009

The Hague, A17,2009

DeaMr.Registrar:

I have the honour to refer to your133310of Octob20, 2008,
regarding the request for an advisory opinion submitted to the International
Court of Justice by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the question
of the "Accordancewith InterLawiof the UnilateralDeclaration of
IndependencebytheProvisionalInstitutionsofSeltfKosovo".eno

In this regard and on behalf of the Government of the Argentine Republic I
hereby submit a written statement on the above mentioned question. Following
your recommendation, please find attached t(30)bound paperhirty
copies of the statement and one (1) CD-ROM containing its electronic version.

I avail myself of the opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my highest
consideration.

Santos GofliMarenco
Ambassador

Mr.Philippe COUVREUR
Registrar of the International Court of Justice
The Hague INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
THE UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE BY

THE PROVISIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT
OF KOSOVO

REQUEST FOR AN ADVISORY OPINION

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE
ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

17 April 2009 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 5

Section I: Jurisdiction of the Court and the Propriety of Its Exercise 10

A. The Court has jurisdiction to give the advisory opinion requested 10

(1) The General Assembly has competence to request the advisory opinion 10
(2) By definition, the question raised is a legal one 12

B. There Are Not Compelling Reasons Preventing the Court to Exercise Its

Jurisdiction 13
(l)The matter has been of UN concern for a long time and the UN bears a special

responsibility thereto 14

(2) The Court's advisory opinion will have concrete consequences for the future

action of the UN and other international organisations, as well as UN member

States 15

(3) The directly interested State has given its consent 18

Section II: Principles and Rules Relevant to the Question Raised by General

Assembly Resolution 63/3 19

A. The critical date: 17 February 2008 20

(1) The unilateral declaration of independence must be analysed at the time

it was issued 21
(2) Events that occurred subsequent to the unilateral declaration of

independence have not modified the situation 22

B. The unilateral declaration of independence 24

C. The powers of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of

Kosovo do not include the declaration of independence of the territory 26

D. The framework established by SC Resolution 1244 (1999) 27

E. The principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States 28
F. The obligation to respect individual human rights and the rights

of minorities 33

G. The principle of self-determination is not applicable 34 4

H. The obligation to reach a settlement through negotiation 40

I. The corollary obligation not to adopt unilateral measures that
attempt to impose afait accompli 42

Section III: The Answer to the Question Raised by the General Assembly 45

A. The Provisional Institutions of Self-Govemment have no competence

to proclaim the independence of Kosovo 45

B. The unilateral declaration of independence infringes

SC Resolution 1244 (1999) 45

C. The unilateral declaration of independence violates the territorial
integrity of Serbia 47

D. The unilateral declaration of independence constitutes a breach of

the obligation to settle disputes through peaceful means 47

E. There are no legal grounds for the unilateral declaration of independence 48

Conclusions 50 5

Introduction

1. The present written statement is filed pursuant to the Court's Order of 17

October 2008 upon the request for an advisory opinion made by the General

Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 63/3 of 8 October 2008.
2. The terms of the request made by the General Assembly are as follows:

"Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional

Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with

international law?"

3. The question put before the Court regards a wide range of issues of

particular importance not only for the maintenance of peace and security in

the region concerned but also with regard to fondamental principles of

international law and to the respect thereof, which are of general concern.
4. Having in mind both the particular and the general relevance of the General

Assembly's request, the Argentine Republic (hereinafter Argentina) voted in

favour of Resolution 63/3. The representative of Argentina explained this

vote in the following terms:

"The pillar of the United Nations system is international peace and

security. The principal organ of the Organization with powers in this

area is the Security Council. The whole of the collective security
system is based on the fact that Members of the United Nations are

duty bound to abide by the relevant resolutions of the Organization.

In the case of Kosovo, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), for

which Argentina voted in the affirmative, establishes clearly the legal

and political parameters for the solution to the situation of the Kosovar

minority in Serbia, ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of

Serbia, as well as the settlement of the disputes through a negotiated

agreement that is mutually accepted by all parties. Argentina believes 6

that that resolution is clear. Nevertheless, we join with the majority in

agreeing to the request for an advisory opinion on this matter." 1

5. Argentina, as a member of the Security Council at that time, voted in favour

of Resolution 1244 (1999). Stressing the importance and the historie

transcendence of this Resolution, the Argentine representative stated:

"The resolution just adopted by the Security Council is of singular

importance for various reasons. First, it marks the end of a

humanitarian tragedy in which the main victims were thousands of

innocent civilians whose fondamental human rights were being

systematically and persistently violated.

Secondly, it lays the foundation for a definitive political solution to the

Kosovo crisis that will respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity

of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The rights of minorities and of

all the inhabitants of Kosovo, without exception, to live in a climate of

peace and tolerance must also be unequivocally recognized.

Thirdly, this resolution confirms the central and irreplaceable role of

the United Nations, and in particular that of the Security Council and

the Secretary-General at times when there is a need to join efforts in

order to maintain international peace and security.

Lastly, it represents an interpretation of the Charter that reflects the

current recognition of human rights throughout the international

community." 2

6. Following the unilateral declaration of independence of 17 February 2008,

Dr. Jorge Taiana, Argentina's Minister of Foreign Affairs, International

Trade and Worship, made a declaration that was summarized as follows:

"Minister Taiana reaffirmed that the Argentine Republic does not

recognise the said unilateral declaration, and that [Argentina] endorses

the full force of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

(1999).

In this context, the Foreign Affairs Minister recalled the importance of

respect of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity as a

1 Mr. Argüello (Argentina), United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-third session, 22d plenary
meeting, 8 October 2008, UN Doc. A/63/PV.22, p. 12.
2 th
Mr. Petrella (Argentina), United Nations Security Council, Fifty-fourth Year, 4011 Meeting, 10 June
1999, UN Doc. S/PV.4011, pp. 18-19. 7

basis towards finding a political solution in the region, in accordance

with what is provided in the said resolution, signaling that a sustainable

solution for the status of Kosovo must be the result of a negotiated
3
agreement that is mutually acceptable to the Parties concerned" •

7. The legal status of Kosovo at the time that the unilateral declaration of

independence was made is beyond discussion. Kosovo is and was at that
time Serbian sovereign territory, under international administration and

enjoying substantial autonomy, in conformity with Security Council

Resolution 1244 (1999). It is also uncontroversial that the Provisional

Institutions of Self-Government, created as part of that international

administration, did not possess the legal capacity to declare the

independence of Kosovo. Even States having encouraged the independence

of the territory and that have subsequently recognised the so-called

"Republic of Kosovo", cannot deny these uncontroversial facts.

8. SC Resolution 1244 (1999) also envisaged a political process designed to

determine the future status of Kosovo. Negotiations were conducted with

that aim in mind. It is well known that some voices at the international level

favoured independence for Kosovo and have acted accordingly. The Special

Envoy Martti Ahtisaari made a proposal to that end, which did not result in

an agreement between the negotiating parties, and has not been endorsed by

the Security Council.

9. It is against this background that the question submitted by the General

Assembly should be addressed. At the outset, Argentina stresses the
importance that all concerned actors - the United Nations, all member

States, the local autonomous institutions of Kosovo, and the different

communities constituting the population of Kosovo - act in plain conformity

with what is prescribed by international law. Only an outcome based on the

respect for international law will provide a lasting solution for Kosovo,

bringing stability to the region and allowing all parts of the population in

Kosovo to enjoy their human rights in the framework of a multiethnic

society. What is at stake is not only the future of Kosovo and the stability of

3Translation. Press Release No. 105/08, 14 April 2008, available at: www.mrecic.gob.ar. 8

the Balkans, but also, and more generally, respect for the rule of law at the

international level.

1O. Argentina's commitment to the maintenance of peace and security in the

region, and its involvement in United Nations action towards this goal, is

well established. In particular, it must be recalled that Argentina has

participated in UN peacekeeping and other UN authorized operations in the

territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter

SFRY) since 1992. Argentina has contributed forces in Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the

United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO), the United

Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western

Sirmium (UNTAES), the United Nations Civilian Police Support Group

(UNPSG), the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP),

the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the

Multinational Stabilization Force (SFOR); in Macedonia, to the United

Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). In the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (later on Serbia and Montenegro and presently

Serbia), Argentine military and civilian personnel participated in the Kosovo

Force (KFOR) and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in

Kosovo (UNMIK) since July 1999. In particular, Argentine personnel

contributed to the creation of the new local police and the establishment of a

system of criminal justice. An Argentine diplomat acted as Mayor of

Mitrovica during 2002. Argentina participated in KFOR from 1999 to 2003.
Participation in UNMIK lasted until December 2008. Seven members of the

Argentine troops participating in these operations lost their lives

accomplishing the tasks decided by the Security Council.

11. Argentina vigorously promotes global respect of fondamental human rights

and compliance with the obligation to settle disputes through peaceful

means. In Argentina's view, respect for United Nations resolutions is also of

paramount importance if the international community wishes the

Organization to remain at the core of the international system.
12. Consequently, Argentina is convinced that the advisory opinion that the

Court will render with regard to the situation in Kosovo will be of practical

importance. As the Court has previously stated: "The jurisdiction of the 9

Court under Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute, to give

advisory opinions on legal questions, enables United Nations entities to seek

guidance from the Court in order to conduct their activities in accordance

with law". The United Nations and the whole international community are

in acute need of the Court's guidance in this respect.

13. This written statement is divided into three main sections. The first section

will address the competence of the General Assembly to request an advisory

opinion and the reasons for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction in this

regard. The second section addresses the principles and rules relevant to the

question raised by General Assembly Resolution 63/3. The third section is

devoted to the answer to be given to that question. Finally, a conclusion

states the submissions of Argentina.

4
Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations, Advisory Opinion,.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 188, para. 31. 10

Section I

Jurisdiction of the Court and the Propriety of Its Exercise

14. In this section, it will be shown that the General Assembly has competence

to request the present advisory opinion, since it clearly raises a legal

question falling within the scope of its powers and fonctions. Likewise, this

section addresses the absence of compelling reasons that would lead the

Court to use its discretionary power not to exercise its advisory jurisdiction.

A. The Court has jurisdiction to give the advisory opinion requested

15. The competence of the General Assembly to request an advisory opinion of

the International Court of Justice is derived from Article 96 (1) of the

Charter of the United Nations, which reads as follows:

"The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the

International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal
question."

16. Both the reference to the General Assembly as one of the two named

principal organs of the United Nations and the phrase "any legal question"

exemplify the broad competence of the Assembly to request advisory

opinions. Consequently, it is submitted that, by requesting the present

advisory opinion, the General Assembly rightly exercised this competence

(1) and that the question raised is a legal one (2).

(1) The General Assembly has competence to request the advisory opinion

17. The Court has noted that Article 10 of the Charter "has conferred upon the

General Assembly a competence relating to 'any questions or any matters'

within the scope of the Charter."5

5
legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 233,
para. 11;legal Consequences of the construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion,.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 145, para. 17. 11

18. The request for an advisory opinion by the General Assembly concerns a

declaration of independence by provisional institutions of self-government

created by the UN in a territory which is under the administration of the UN.

This declaration raises questions concerning respect for the Charter, in

particular its purposes and principles, and for decisions of the United

Nations organs, as well as compliance with fondamental principles of

international law. In conformity with Chapter IV of the Charter, the General

Assembly has the competence to deal with these issues.

19. It should be noted that the General Assembly has specifically dealt with the
6
situation in Kosovo for over a decade. Equally, during the discussion of

Resolution 63/3, no State has challenged the competence of the General

Assembly to request the present advisory opinion.

20. It could be argued that since it was the Security Council which was the

United Nations organ that adopted the core resolution setting out the

international regime for Kosovo (Resolution 1244 (1999)), the question

could not be addressed by the General Assembly. This is not the case for

many reasons.

21. First, according to Article 10 of the Charter, "[t]he General Assembly may

discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter

or relating to the powers and fonctions of any organs provided for in the

present Charter". Second, Article 12 of the Charter limits the authority of the

General Assembly to making recommendations with regard to a dispute or

situation in respect of which the Security Council is exercising the fonctions

assigned to it by the Charter. When interpreting this provision, the Court

noted that "there has been an increasing tendency over time for the General

Assembly and the Security Council to deal in parallel with the same matter

6 See General Assembly resolutions 54/62 ('Maintenance of international security - stability and
development of South-Eastern Europe', 10 January 2000]; 55/27 ('Maintenance of international
security - good-neighbourliness, stability and developmement in South-Eastern Europe', 20 December
2000]; 56/18 ('Maintenance of international security- good-neighbourliness, stability and development
in South-Eastern Europe', 9 January 2002); 57/52 ('Maintenance of international security - good­

neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe', 30 December 2002); 59/59
('Maintenance of international security - good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South­
Eastern Europe', 16 December 2004); and 61/53 ('Maintenance of international security - good­
neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe', 19 December 2006). 12

concerning the maintenance of international peace and security". 7 Third, in

any case, the limitation of Article 12 does not apply to a request for an

advisory opinion, since this request is not a "recommendation". 8

22. Furthermore, the General Assembly has also dealt with conflicts emerging

from other attempts at creating States in contradiction with fondamental

principles of international law in the past, such as the Bantustans and the so­
9
called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

23. Clearly, the General Assembly has a direct interest in ensuring respect for

international law in general, and all the more so if the matter is of direct

concern to the Organisation, as is the case of the challenge posed by the

unilateral declaration of independence. Consequently, Argentina considers

that the competence of the General Assembly to request this advisory

opinion is well established.

(2) By definition, the question raised is a legal one

24. The second requirement for granting advisory jurisdiction to the Court

through the General Assembly is that the question raised is a legal one.

According to the Court, questions "framed in terms of law and rais[ing]

problems of international law... are by their very nature susceptible of a
10
reply based on law... [and] appear. ..to be questions of a legal character".

25. The question in the present case submitted to the Court for advice is clearly

a legal one, relating as it does to the accordance with international law of

the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of

Self-Government of Kosovo. To some extent, it can be said that nothing falls

more squarely into the category of a "legal question" than the determination

of the accordance of an act, fact or situation with the applicable law. To use

the words of the Court itself, the request for the present advisory opinion

requires "an assessment of whether [the unilateral declaration of

7
Legat Consequences of the construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory. Advisory
Opinion. I.C.J. Reports 2004, 149, para. 27.
8Ibid., p. 148, para. 25.
9 General Assembly Resolutions 31/6 ('Policies of apartheid of the Govemment of South Africa') of
26 October 1976, and 37/253 ('Question ofCyprus') of 13 May 1983.
10See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 18,para. 15 and legality of the Threat

or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, 233, para. 11. 13

independence] is or is not in breach of certain rules and principles of
11
international law." As such, "it is by its very nature susceptible of a reply

based on law; indeed it is scarcely susceptible of a reply otherwise than on

the basis oflaw." 12

B. There Are No Compelling Reasons Preventing the Court to Exercise lts

Jurisdiction

26. Having established the jurisdiction of the Court to render the present

advisory opinion, it is argued in this section that there are no compelling

reasons for the Court to use its discretionary power to decline to give an

advisory opinion. 13 Taking into account the implications of the question on

the activities of the United Nations, the Court's answer to the request for an

advisory opinion will represent its participation in the activities of the
14
Organization as its principal judicial organ. Thus, there are compelling

reasons to render the advisory opinion requested. These are: the fact that the

matter has been of UN concern for a long time and that the UN bears a

special responsibility thereto (1); the concrete consequences that the

advisory opinion will have on future action taken not only by the UN and

other international organisations, but also by UN member States (2); lastly,

the issue of whether the consent of the interested State is required for the

exercise of the advisory jurisdiction is not relevant here, since the interested

State, the Republic of Serbia, has at any rate given its consent (3).

11 Legal Consequences of the construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004,p. 154, para. 39.
12Ibid., p. 153, para. 37.
13
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17,paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion,
I.C.J. Reports 1962, Application for Review ofjudgment no. 333 of the UN Administrative Tribunal,
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1987, p. 31; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p.
21, para. 23; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996,
p. 235, para. 14.p. 155; Difference Relating to lmmunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of

the Commission of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1999, pp. 78-79, para. 29; Legal
Consequences of the construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 2004, p. 157, para. 45.
14 lnterpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950,p. 71; Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17,para. 2, of the

Charter), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962,p. 155; Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal
Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1999 (!), pp. 78-79, para. 29; Legal Consequences of the construction of a Wall in Occupied
Palestinian Territory, advisory opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004,156, para. 44. 14

(1) The matter has been of UN concern for a long time and the UN bears

a special responsibility thereto

27. The United Nations plays a core role in the situation in Kosovo. This

involvement began with the participation of the Organization in, and the co­

presidency of, the Conference of Peace for Yugoslavia, originally held by

the then European Communities at the time of the collapse of the former

SFRY in 1991. The International Conference was conceived as a permanent

body "until a final solution to the problem of former Yugoslavia [was]

found". 15 This process ended with the transformation of the former

Republics composing the SFRY into new States. At not time was the

transformation of entities within the Republics into States at issue, such as

existing autonomous regions like Kosovo and Vojvodina in Serbia, or new

entities created within Bosnia and Herzegovina or Croatia. Consequently,

the participation of the Kosovo Albanians was limited to one of the six
16
Working Groups on ethnie and national communities and minorities.

28. A second stage in the UN involvement in Kosovo occurred in 1998, when

the Security Council declared that the situation in Kosovo constituted a

threat to international peace and security, and adopted measures under

Chapter VII of the Charter. 17

29. As is well known, after the aggravation of the civil strife and the violations

of human rights committed in Kosovo, NATO undertook an armed operation

on 24 March 1999, which in the words of the Court, "raise[d] very serious
18
issues of international law". As a result of the end of this armed

intervention, a third step in the UN involvement in Kosovo was the adoption

of Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, which

established an international civil presence and authorised a security

15
See: The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. Official Papers (ed. By B.
16mcharan, The Hague: Kluwer, 1997), p. 3.
Weller, Marc, The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999 (Cambridge: International Documents & Analysis,
1999), pp. 89-90.
17Resolution 1160(1998)of31 March 1998.
18legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999,

I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 132,para. 17. 15

presence, "for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless

the Security Council decides otherwise". 19 Both presences continue until

today, since the Security Council has not decided otherwise. The unilateral

declaration of independence seriously challenges this regime.

30. Bearing in mind the UN administration of the territory, what happens in

Kosovo is not only of UN concern; it is a matter concerning the direct

responsibility and the role of the UN. This involves the responsibility of the

Secretary-General with regard to the administration of the territory, the role

and responsibility of the Security Council as the organ that has the exclusive

capacity to decide upon both presences in Kosovo, and the role of the

General Assembly as the organ that may discuss the fonctioning of the other

organs and addressing issues related to the principles and purposes of the

Organisation. In relation to the Court, it can be advanced that there would be

no more specific case in which the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction

"should not be refosed", 20since "[b]y lending its assistance in the solution

of a problem confronting the General Assembly, the Court would discharge

its fonctions as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations." 21 As

such, it is for the Court to provide legal guidance to the other UN organs in

this particular matter of direct UN concern.

(2) The Court's advisory opinion will have concrete consequences for the

future action of the UN and other international organisations, as well

as UN member States

31. When explaining the purpose of the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction, the

Court has stated:

"The fonction of the Court is to give an opinion based on law, once it

has corne to the conclusion that the questions put to it are relevant and

have a practical and contemporary effect and, consequently, are not

devoid of object or purpose." 22

19SC Res. 1244 (1999), para. 19.
20Ibid.
21Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 21, para. 23.
22
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 37, para. 73. 16

32. This is the case with the present request of advisory opinion. The question

put by the General Assembly is not one of pure academic interest. The

ascertainment of the legality or otherwise of the unilateral declaration of

independence plays a pivotal role in the determination of the concrete action

to be followed by the organs of the United Nations, as well as member States

and other relevant actors. What is at stake is the credibility of the binding
decisions of the Security Council as the UN organ charged with the principal

responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; the

respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a UN member State;

and the capacity of the Organisation to conduct negotiations between the

parties concerned in a manner by which these negotiations have real value

and cannot be unilaterally brought to an end by one of the parties that

attempts to impose its own views on the other party.

33. Although continuing to exercise his duties under SC Resolution 1244

(1199), the Secretary-General has announced a policy of "neutrality" with

regard to the unilateral declaration of independence, due to the fact that the

Security Council is unable to provide him with guidance concerning his role
23
and responsibilities. This position creates serious legal and practical

problems and in the long-term undermines the functioning and the

credibility of the Organisation and its organs. The advisory opinion will

undoubtedly contribute to overcoming these difficulties.

34. Of particular importance is the impact of the advisory opinion in helping the

activity of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo
(SRSG). According to the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self­

Government in Kosovo, adopted under the authority vested to him in

accordance with Security Council resolution 1244 (1999):

"The exercise of the responsibilities of the Provisional

Institutions of Self-Government under this Constitutional

Framework shall not affect or diminish the authority of the

SRSG to ensure full implementation of UNSCR 1244 (1999),

including overseeing the Provisional Institutions of Self-

23
See United Nations Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo', 24 November 2008, UN Doc. S/2008/692, p. 8, para. 26,
p. 10,para. 46, p. 11,paras. 49 and 50. 17

Government, its officials and its agenc1es, and taking

appropriate measures whenever their actions are inconsistent

with UNSCR 1244 (1999) or this Constitutional

Framework." 24

35. It has been argued that the unilateral declaration of independence has created

an "irreversible fact" and consequently that the request for an advisory

opinion would be deprived on any concrete effect. 25 This is merely wishful

thinking of those voices in favour of independence for Kosovo, and their

attempt to impose this purported independence on the rest of the

international community. Leaving aside the actual inaccuracy of this claim,

and the fact that the majority of the international community does not share

this perception, it is a position that raises serious concern as to the manner in

which these voices attempt to sideline international law. The fact remains

that the international administration (UNMIK/EULEX) and the security

presence (KFOR) continue to be deployed in Kosovo in accordance with

Resolution 1244 (1999), and are vested with the paramount administrative

and security power on this territory. Even a de facto exercise of sovereign

authority by the provisional institutions of self-government (the self­

proclaimed "Government of the Republic of Kosovo") is far from being

demonstrated.

36. Obviously, the Court could not uphold the position of the "irreversibility" of

the situation emerging from the unilateral declaration of independence

without depriving international law of any relevance. As will be detailed

later,6 in contemporary international law, the creation of States is not a pure

matter of fact, but also a matter of law. And this is all the more the case

when the United Nations itself is administering the territory concerned and

has not decided, as was the case in other territories under its administration,

that the ultimate goal ofthis administration is the independence of Kosovo.

24
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Regulation No. 2001/9 on a Constitutional
Framework for Provisional Self-Govemment in Kosovo, 15 May 2001, Chapter 12 (emphasis added).
Available at: http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/misc/FrameworkPockENG Dec2002.pdf.
25United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-third session, plenary meeting, 8 October 2008, UN

Doc. A/63/PV.22, in particular comments by Sir John Sawers (United Kingdom), p. 2; and comments
26 Ms. DiCarlo (United States of America), p. 5.
Infra, para. 129. 18

(3) The directly interested State has given its consent

37. The Court has consistently held that "the absence of an interested State' s

consent to the exercise of the Court' s advisory jurisdiction does not concern
27
the competence of the Court but the propriety of its exercise". In the

present case, there is no need to examine whether such consent is required as

a matter of propriety, since the only directly interested State, Serbia, has

given its consent. Indeed, it was Serbia that proposed that the General

Assembly request an advisory opinion of the Court. 28

*

* *

38. For the abovementioned reasons, Argentina considers that the Court has

jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion. Further, there are not compelling

reasons for the Court not to give its answer. On the contrary, the request by

the General Assembly raises fondamental issues that require the guidance of

the Court in its advisory opinion.

27Western Sahara, advisory opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 20, paragraph 21; Legat Consequences of

the construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004,
288, para. 47.
United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-third session, Agenda item 71, Draft resolution submitted
by Serbia entitled 'Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on whether the
unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo is in accordance with international law', 23
September 2008, UN Doc. A/63/L.2. 19

Section II:

Principles and Rules Relevant to the Question Raised by General

Assembly Resolution 63/3

39. The question submitted by the General Assembly concerns the accordance

with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence by the

Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo. In order to respond

to it, "the Court must identify the existing principles and rules, interpret

them and apply them [... ], thus offering a reply to the question posed based
29
on law" •

40. The organs that unilaterally declared independence are a direct creation of

the United Nations. The first question to be ascertained is whether these

organs had the capacity to take such a decision in conformity with the
relevant UN rules. Secondly, this declaration must be examined in the

framework of SC Resolution 1244 (1999), which established the

international legal regime for Kosovo on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN

Charter and envisaged a political process leading to the determination of the

future status of the territory. Thirdly, the unilateral declaration must be read

against the background of the fondamental principles of international law

that can be at issue. In this regard, it will be advanced that the principle of

respect for the territorial integrity of States is of paramount importance, as

recognised by SC Resolution 1244 (1999). The principle of respect of

fondamental human rights and the rights of minorities is equally relevant,

but does not lead to the existence of a right to declare the independence of

the territory. It must also be stressed that another fondamental principle of

contemporary international law, the right of peoples to self-determination, is

29Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 234,
para. 13. 20

not applicable in the present situation, in other words the inhabitants of

Kosovo do not constitute a "people" entitled to self-determination. Finally,

the obligation to settle disputes through peaceful means is also relevant in

this case. Fourthly, in order to complete the legal analysis, other arguments

that could serve as justification for the unilateral declaration of

independence will also be examined. At any rate, before dealing with the

application of the relevant rules to the object of the request for an advisory

opinion, the determination of the critical date appears as the starting point.

As the Court may wish to address the arguments advanced by the authors of

the unilateral declaration of independence to consider any justifications

submitted thereto, this written statement will equally consider them.

A. The critical date: 17 February 2008

41. Although the present proceedings do not concern a territorial dispute, the

notion of critical date is applicable to the present advisory opinion, as it has
30
been applied by the Court in the context of other matters •

42. The accordance of an act with law,, must be determined at the moment that

the act was accomplished. Subsequent acts cannot modify this original

qualification. The question put to the Court exclusively concerns the legality

of the unilateral declaration of independence made by the Provisional

Institutions of Self-government. It is for the United Nations and its Member

30 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1953, p. 111, pp. 122-123; Case concerning the right of passage over Indian territory (Portugal v.

India), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1957, p. 125, pp. 142-144; Case concerning Border and
Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, I.C.J. Reports
1988, p.69, p. 95, para. 66; Questions of lnterpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United
Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 9, pp. 25-26, paras. 43-44;
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial
Incident at lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 115, pp. 130-131, paras. 42-43; land and Maritime Boundary

between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1998, p. 275, p. 318, para. 99; Case Concerning legality of Use of Force (Serbia and
Montenegro v. Belgium) (Serbia and Montenegro v. Netherlands) (Serbia and Montenegro v. Canada)
(Yugoslavia v. Spain) (Serbia and Montenegro v. Portugal) (Serbia and Montenegro v. United
Kingdom), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports
1999, p. 826, Separate opinion of Judge Higgins, p. 867, para. 4; Request for Interpretation of the
Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria

(Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections (Nigeria v. Cameroon), Judgment, i.C.J. Reports 1999,
p. 31, Dissenting Opinion ofVice-President Weeramantry, pp. 46-47. 21

States to determine their future action m the light of the Court's

ascertainment.

(1) The unilateral declaration of independence must be analysed at

the time it was issued

43. The rule according to which an act must be examined in the light of the law

in force at the time that the act occurred is well established in international

law 31•The question raised by the General Assembly's request only concerns

the accordance with international law of a specific act that occurred on a

precise date, i.e. 17 February 2008. Consequently, the Court's analysis must

examine whether the unilateral declaration, at the time that it was adopted,

was or was not in conformity with international law.

44. Acts that have occurred after the critical date are not significant in order to

determine the accordance of international law of the unilateral declaration of

independence. The Court stated, in the context of a territorial dispute but

nevertheless applicable to the present question, that:

"it cannot take into consideration acts having taken place after the date

on which the dispute between the Parties crystallised unless such acts

are a normal continuation of prior acts and are not undertaken for the

purpose of improving the legal position of the Party which relies on
32
them" .

45. As a result, what must be taken into consideration in order to make a legal

ascertainment of the situation under scrutiny is the unilateral declaration of

independence adopted by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of

31As Judge Max Huber noted in the Island of Palmas Case (or Miangas) (United States of America v.
The Netherlands), Award, II UNRIAA 829, p. 845: "[... ] a juridical fact must be appreciated in the
light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to

it arises or falls to be settled." Rosalyn Higgins has noted that "Few arbitral dicta have been more
widely cited, or have corne to assume a more important place in international law, than [this] of
Judge Huber in the Islands of Palmas case": Rosalyn Higgins, 'Sorne Observations on the Inter­
Temporal Rule in International Law', in Jerzy Makarczyk (ed), Theory of International Law at the
Threshold of the21" Century - Essays in Honour of Krysztof Skubiszewski (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 1997), reprinted in Rosalyn Higgins, Themes and Theories. Selected Essays, Speeches,

32d Writings in International Law,ol. 2, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 867,
Sovereignty over Pulau ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2002, p. 682, para. 135. See also Territorial Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the
Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment of 8 October 2007, para. 117; Sovereignty over
Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), Judgment of
23 May 2008, para. 32. 22

Kosovo on 17February 2008, the reaction thereto by the State concemed

(Serbia) the same day, and relevant principles and rules of international law
applicable at that tiine.

46. To paraphrase what the Court affirmed in a previous advisory opinion, "this

does not mean that any information regarding [the] legal status [of the

unilateral declaration of independence] at other tunes is wholly without

relevance for the purposes of this Opinion. It does, however, mean that such

information has present relevance only in so far as it may throw light on the

questions as to what [was] the legal status [of the unilateral declaration of
33
independence] at that period" •

(2) Events that occurred subsequent to the unilateral declaration

of independence have not modified the situation

47. For the sake of completeness, it is noted that no subsequent events or

decisions, or changes in the law -which in at any rate did not occur-, have

modified the situation regarding the legal status of the territory in relation to

which the unilateral declaration of independencepurported to apply.

48. To date, 56 of the 192Member States of the United Nations have recognised

the entity claiming to be a State in the declaration of independence. As is

well established in general international law, recognition does not have a

constitutive effect 34• It is useful to recall here what the Canadian Supreme

Court stated in Re Secession of Quebec: "international recognition is not

alone constitutive of statehood and, critically, does not relate back to the

date of secession to serve retroactivelyas a source of a 'legal' right to secede

in the first place" 35 • A fortiori, recognition cannot change the legal

qualification of the unilateral act at issue when a large majority of States

does not recognise the entity purportedly created by the unilateral

declaration of 17 February 2008. This is also true with regard to

international organisations: not one of them, either at the universal or the

33
34WesternSahara,Advisory Opinion, J.C.J.Reports 1975,p. 12,p. 38, para. 78. th
Cf. Article 3 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the 7 International
American Conference at Montevideo on 26 December 1933 (League of Nations, Treaty Series, 1936,
vol CLXV, p. 20.
35ReferencereSecessionofQuebec case, [1998]2 S.C.R. 217, (1998) 115 ILR 536, p. 589, para. 142. 23

49. More importantly, the international civil and security presences have

continued to be deployed in Kosovo. After drawing the unilateral declaration

of independence to the attention of the Security Council, the UN Secretary­

General "reaffirmed that, pending guidance from the Security Council, the

United Nations would continue to operate on the understanding that

resolution 1244 (1999) remains in force and constitutes the legal framework

for the mandate of UNMIK" 36•As already mentioned, the Security Council

did not take any new decision related to the implementation of Resolution

1244 (1999) and consequently the regime set up by this resolution remains in

force. Consequently, the Secretary-General has continued to submit his

periodical reports on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission of
37
Kosovo (UNMIK) to the Security Council •

50. Further, the security presence remains present in Kosovo on the exclusive

basis of SC Resolution 1244 (1999). In a statement by NATO on 18 February

2008, it was stated that "Following Kosovo's declaration of independence

yesterday, NATO reaffirms that KFOR shall remain in Kosovo on the basis

of UNSCR 1244, as agreed by Foreign Ministers in December 2007, unless
38
the UN Security Council decides otherwise" •

51. Strikingly, even after that unilateral declaration, organs of the Provisional

Institutions of Self-Government, even if they contend that they are organs of

a State, have continued to participate in events at the international level only

as part of the delegation of the UNMIK. When they tried to participate on

their own, they were not accepted and their attempt was qualified by the

Secretary-General as "irregular" 39.

52. The European Union mission in Kosovo (EULEX), which in the eyes of

those having proclaimed or encouraged the independence of Kosovo would

36UN Doc. S/2008/211 (28 March 2008), para. 4.
37Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

of 17 March 2009 (UN Doc. S/2009/149), 24 November 2008 (UN Doc. S/2008/692), 15 July 2008
(UN Doc. S/2008/458), 12 June 2008 (UN Doc. S/2008/354), and 28 March 2008 (UN Doc.
S/2008/211).
38Avai!able at: http://www.nato. intidocu/pr/2008/p08-025e.htm l.
39Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo of
17 March 2009 (UN Doc. S/2009/149), para. 28. 24

act on the basis of the purported "new reality" created by the unilateral

declaration, nevertheless operates "under the overall authority of the United

Nations, under a United Nations umbrella headed by [Secretary-General's]

Special Representative, and in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999)" 40•

This arrangement was agreed upon by the State that has sovereignty over the

territory, and was backed by the Security Council 41.

53. The considerations above not only demonstrate that subsequent facts have

not brought about any change in the legal situation existing on 17 February

2008, but also that from a factual point of view the situation remains

substantially as it was before that date.

B. The unilateral declaration of independence

54. The key paragraph of the unilateral declaration of independence of 17

February 2008 reads as follows:

"We, the democratically-elected members of our people, hereby

declare Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state. This

declaration reflects the will of our people and it is in full accordance

with the recommendations of the UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari
42
and his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement".

55. Three propositions are advanced in the above passage: 1) the democratic­

elected character of those having adopted the decision, 2) the will of the

"people" and 3) the accordance of the declaration with the Ahtisaari Plan. As

preliminary considerations, a number of comments can be made in respect of

these propositions.

56. Firstly, the fact that an organ 1s democratically elected does not

automatically imply that a decision taken by such an organ is in accordance

with international law. An organ must have the competence to adopt the act

in question. This is a universally accepted principle applicable to all kind of

40Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, UN Doc.
S/2008/692 (24 November 2008), para. 23; see, also, para. 50.
41See Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2008/44 (26 November

4208).
Text reproduced in (2008) 47 !LM 467. 25

institutions.43 The question whether the Provisional Institutions of self­

Government had the competence to proclaim the independence of Kosovo is
44
addressed below .

57. Secondly, to invoke the will of the "people" suggests a reference to the
45
principle of self-determination. But as will also be addressed below , only

"peoples" in the sense of international law are entitled to the right of self­

determination. Put it in other terms, not just any human group is vested with

this right.

58. Thirdly, the Ahtisaari Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status

Settlement is just a recommendation made by the Special Envoy of the UN

Secretary-General. In his first public appearance in Pristina after having

been appointed, the Special Envoy himself stated:

"In the final analysis it is not me, I have also made it perfectly clear, it

is not me, neither us, who will decide the timing, the Secretary General

has an important role, and finally it is up to the Security Council to

decide how the future status will look like" 46•

59. Consequently, the Ahtisaari Proposal is devoid of any binding character. It

cannot therefore constitute a legal ground for the unilateral declaration of

independence.

60. The unilateral declaration also contends "that Kosovo is a special case

arising from Yugoslavia's non-consensual breakup and is nota precedent for
47
any other situation". Three remarks can be made. First, at no time during

the International Conference on Yugoslavia, set out at the beginning of the

process of the collapse of the SFRY, was even the mere possibility of an

independent Kosovo envisaged. Second, the Arbitration Commission of the

Conference on Yugoslavia (also known as Badinter Commission) found that

the process of dissolution of the SFRY had corne to an end with the adoption

of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and that this State

was composed of Serbia - including its two autonomous regions: Kosovo

43 See, for example, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conjlict, Advisory

44inion, I.C.J. Reports 1996,. 66, p. 74, para. 18.
45See irifra,paras. 61-64.
See irifra,paras. 88-91.
46United Nations Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Future Status of Kosovo
(UNOSEK), Press Briefings, 23 November 2005, available at: www.unosek.org.
47Ibid. 26

and Vojvodina - and Montenegro 48 . Third, the mere invocation of the

purported independence of Kosovo as being a "special case" and "not a

precedent", no matter whether this is the case or not, cannot perse provide a

legal justification. It has not been advanced which particular rules of

international law would provide for a special outcome if Kosovo would be a

"special case". Asto the nature of the case as a "precedent", certainly if the

declaration is in conformity with international law, it would constitute a

"precedent". If, on the contrary, it is not in accordance with international

law, it cannot constitute either a "precedent" or a "special case" according to

the principle ex iniuria ius non oritur.

C. The powers of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of

Kosovo do not include the declaration of independence of the territory

61. In operative paragraph 10 of Resolution 1244 (1999), the Security Council

decided that the international civil presence would perform the civilian

administrative fonctions and would "establish[ ... ] and oversee[... ] the

development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions".

62. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General was vested with the

highest authority of the international administration. The Provisional

Institutions of Self-Government were created by UNMIK Regulation N°

2001/9 of 15 May 2001, issued by the Special Representative 49•They were

conceived as a local governing institution under the supervision of the United

Nations. Consequently, the external affairs related to the administration of

the territory remained in the hands of the Special Representative 50.Nothing

in the long and detailed list of powers on responsibilities granted to the PISG,

neither explicitly nor implicitly, allow to these institutions to make decisions

on the sovereignty of Kosovo.

63. On the contrary, the Constitutional Framework clearly establishes that "[t]he

Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and their officials shall: (a)

Exercise their authorities consistent with the provisions of UNSCR 1244

48Opinion No. 8 of the Arbitration Commission on former Yugoslavia of 4 July 1992, 31 !LM 1521,

4923 (1992).
5 Available at: http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/misc/FrameworkPocketENG Dec2002.pdf.
°Chapter 8 of the Constitutional Framework. 27

(1999) and the terms set forth in this Constitutional Framework" and that

"the exercise of the responsibilities of the Provisional Institutions of Self­

Government in Kosovo shall not in any way affect or diminish the ultimate

51
authority of the SRSG for the implementation ofUNSCR 1244(1999)" •

64. Clearly, the two sources of the powers and responsibilities of the PISG,

UNSCR 1244 (1999) and UNMIK Regulation 2001/9, do not authorise these

institutions to declare the independence of Kosovo.

D. The framework established by SC Resolution 1244 (1999)

65. UNSCR 1244 (1999) is the specific instrument governing the international

legal regime of Kosovo and as such constitutes a fondamental legal

instrument with respect to which the accordance or not of the unilateral

declaration of independence with international law must be determined.

66. The main characteristics of the legal regime established by that Resolution

are:

• Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal

2
Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia)5 ;

• International administration of the territory, through a civil and a security

presences 53;

• Substantial autonomy for Kosovo 54;

• A political process leading to determine the future status of the
· 55
terntory ;

• Safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their

homes in Kosovo and to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life

56
for all inhabitants of the province ..

• No time limits for this regime, which will last until the Security Council

will not decide otherwise 57.

51Chapter 2 and Preamble of the Constitutional Framework.
52
53See preambular para. 10,principle 6 of Annex 1, and para. 8 of Annex 2 to Resolution 1244 (1999).
Ibid., operative paras. 5-11, 14-16, and 19.
54Ibid., preambular para. 11, operative paras. 10 and 1l(a), and para. 5 of Annex 2.
55Ibid., operative para. 1l(e).
56
Ibid., preambularparas. 4 and 7, operative paras. 9(c), 10, 1l(k), 13,principle 5 of Annex !, paras. 4,
5 and 7 of Annex 2.
57Ibid., operative para. 19. 28

67. This is the legal framework against which the unilateral declaration of 17

February 2008 must be examined. The Security Council did not decide to put

an end, either totally or in part, to the regime established in accordance with

its resolution of 10 June 1999. As demonstrated above, the existing factual

situation on the ground continues to correspond to this established regime.

68. Most of the points constituting the legal regime set out by Resolution 1244

(1999) are also fondamental principles and rules of general international law

and consequently the basis of their application rests not only on Resolution

1244 (1999), but also on general international law.

E. The principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States

69. Respect for the territorial integrity of States is a well established principle of

international law, without which the very existence of international law, as a

corpus of rules governing primarily the relationship among sovereign

entities, could not be envisaged. In its first judgment, the Court stressed that

"[b]etween independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an

essential foundation of international relations". 58 Sorne years later the Court

reaffirmed "the duty of every State to respect the territorial sovereignty of
59
others" .

70. The aim of the principle of territorial integrity is to protect a quintessential

element of a State - its territory - whereby any modification of a State's

territorial sovereignty must take place in accordance with international law,

mainly through the consent of the interested State. As a corollary of the

sovereign equality of States, the principle of the respect of territorial integrity

is a fondamental principle of international law. The 1970 Declaration on

Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations lists as one of

the elements of the equal sovereignty of States the principle that "[t]he

territorial integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable" 60 .

58Corfu Channel, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 35.
59 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Merits, Judgment of 26 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 111, para. 213, and p. 128, paras.
251-252.
60
General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of24 October 1970, (d) 29

71. The United Nations Millennium Declaration, as well as the 2005 World

Summit Outcome, equally support "all efforts to uphold the sovereign

equality of all States, [and] respect for their territorial integrity and political

independence" 61 •

72. Respect for the territorial integrity of States can be founded in an impressive

number of international instruments, sometimes coupled with the

"inviolability ofboundaries", and at other times coupled reaffirmations of the

sovereignty, political independence and security of States 62• The respect of

the territorial status quo was also mentioned as an equivalent of territorial

mtegnty· 63.

73. At the regional level, like in other parts of the world, respect for the

territorial integrity has been a matter of particular concern in Latin America.
64
At all levels, in the Inter-American system as well as in sub-regional

levels 65, and in a wide range of different issues and no matter the State

concerned, the need to respect the territorial integrity of States has been

underscored. This is not just a regional concern, or the expression of a

particular rule that is not applicable to the rest of the world. It is a legitimate

common aspiration to see this fondamental principle universally respected, as

one of the main foundations of the entire international legal system and as a

concrete manifestation of the sovereign equality of States.

61General Assembly Resolutions 55/2 of 8 September 2000 and 60/1 of24 October 2005.
62
Notably: Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; Article 2, para. 4, of the Charter of the
United Nations and the Helsinki Final Act adopted on 1 August 1975 by the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, among others.
63See for instance the opinion N° 3 of the Arbitration Commission of the International Conference for the former
Yugoslavia (32I.L.M. 1993, p. 1500).
64
It can be mentioned among other instruments: Articles 1, 13,28 and 29 of the Charter of the
Organisation of American States, AG/RES. 2250(XXXVI-O/06), "Obligation of Member States to
Respect the Rules and Principles of International Law Contained in the OAS Charter in Order to
Preserve and Strengthen Peace in the Hemisphere"; A/RES/41/128, 4 December 1986, Declaration on
the Right to Development; AS CP/RES. 935 (1648/08), Support for the Process of Dialogue, Peace,

and for Democratic Institutions in Bolivia; OAS Declaration on Security in the Americas, 2003, doc.
OEA/SER.K/XXXVIII, CES/dec.1/03 rev. 1; Resolution CP/RES. 859 (1397/04) "Support to the Peace
Process in Colombia"; Declaration of Managua, OEA/SER.K/XLI. l, EPICOR/doc.05/04 rev. 6, 9 July
2004; Resolution CP/RES. 930 (1632/08), Resolution of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, RC.25/RES. 1/08, 17 March 2008; Legal Opinion of the Inter-American

Juridical Committee on the Resolution CP/RES.586 (909/92) of the Permanent Council of the
Organization of the American States about the decision issued by the Supreme Court of the United
States of America in the Case US vs. Alvarez Machain, Rio de Janeiro, 15 August 1992.
65 Group of Rio: "Declaration of the Heads of State and Govemment of the Rio Group on the recent

events between Ecuador and Colombia", adopted in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 7 March
2008 (OEA/Ser.G CP/INF.5653/08); UNASUR: Constituent Treaty of the Union of South American
Nations, 23 May 2008, Preamble (available at:
http://www.integracionsur.com/sudamerica/TratadoUnasurBrasil08.pdf). 30

74. It emerges from State practice that three main elements constitute the core of

the notion of territorial integrity:first, the notion of plenitude. This amounts

to the capacity to display all State fonctions over the whole territory of the

State. Restrictions upon that display can only be the result of the consent of

the State concerned itself or a binding resolution adopted by the Security

Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. The international administration of

Kosovo is an example of both means. Second, the notion of inviolability.

According to this notion there exists an international obligation not to display

State jurisdiction over the territory of another State without its consent. The

Permanent Court underscored the consequence of this for the other States as

follows: "the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon

a State is that - failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary - it
may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State" 66.

Third, the guarantee against any dismemberment of the territory. That

explains, for instance, that the support of secessionist movements 1s

considered a violation of the territorial integrity of the State concerned 67.

75. In contemporary international law, respect for the principle of territorial

integrity is an obligation that applies not only to States and international

organisations, but also to other international actors, particularly those

involved in internal conflicts threatening international peace and security.

Evidence of this is the particular case under the consideration of the Court, in

which the Security Council referred to the respect of the sovereignty and

territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia).

Resolution 1203 (1998) addressed directly to the Kosovo Albanian part.

After reaffirming the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia, it demanded that "the Kosovo Albanian leadership and all other

elements of the Kosovo Albanian community comply fully and swiftly with

resolutions 1160 (1998) and 1199 (1998)".

76. Resolution 1244 (1999) reaffirmed "the commitment of all Member States to

the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and

66
67"Lotus", Judgment of7 September 1927, P.C.1.J.,Series A, No. JO,p. 18.
See, among others, Resolutions 145 (1960) of22 July 1960, 169 (1961) of24 November 1961, 404
(1977) of 8 February 1977 and 496 (1981) of 15 December 1981. 31

annex 2". For its part, Annex 2 enumerates the principles to be followed for

the resolution of the Kosovo crisis, among which it is found: "A political

process towards the establishment of an interim political framework

agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full

account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and

territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other

countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK" 68.

77. The Security Council has also adopted the same stance in other cases. Thus,

in its Resolution 787 (1992), the Security Council

"Strongly reaffirms its call on all parties and others concerned to
respect strictly the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
affirms that any entities unilaterally declared or arrangements imposed
69
in contravention thereof will not be accepted".

78. Equally, the declaration of the President on behalf of the Security Council of

2 December 1994 points out that

"The Security Council has received with deep concern a report from
the Secretariat concerning a statement of 26 November 1994 attributed

to the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia. It believes
that any unilateral act purporting to establish a sovereign Abkhaz entity

would violate the commitments assumed by the Abkhaz side ta seek a
comprehensive political settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conjlict.
The Security Council reajjirms its commitment ta the sovereignty and
70
territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia" •

79. Security Council resolution 981 (1995), while referring to the situation of the

Krajina in Croatia, affirmed "its commitment to the independence,

sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia" and called

upon "the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb

authorities to refrain from the threat or use of force and to reaffirm their

commitment to a peaceful resolution of their differences". 71

68Principle 8.
69
70Emphasis added.
S/PRST/1994/78 (emphasis added). See also Resolution 971 (1995), which urged "the parties to
refrain from any unilateral actions which could complicate or hinder the political process aimed at an
early and comprehensive settlement of the conflict" andalled upon "the parties to intensify efforts (...) to
achieve an early and comprehensive political settlement of the conflict, including on the political status of
Abkhazia,fully respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia" (emphasis added).
71See also Security Council Resolutions 990 (! 995), 994 (1995) and 1009 (I 995). 32

80. More recently, the Security Council reaffirmed the territorial integrity of

Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and Georgia in the

72
context of internal and secessionist conflicts .

81. Double standards in international law are unacceptable, even if they are

concealed under the veil of a purported "special" case which would not

constitute a "precedent". They can find no legal justification. Rather, double

standards undermine the necessary respect for, the perception, and the

effectiveness of international law. During the crisis in the Balkans, Argentina

adopted a strict and coherent policy of respect for the territorial integrity of

States in all the situations in which the principle was at stake, i.e. in relation

to Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and now Serbia. The same consistent

approach has also been taken by Argentina with respect to other conflicts in

other parts of the world. 73 It is respectfully submitted that the advisory

opinion should stress the need to apply and respect the territorial integrity of

all States, irrespective of the particular State concerned in a given case.

82. Moreover, such a reaffirmation from the Court is especially required in the

present case where the Security Council, while establishing the international

administration on part of the territory of one member State, also expressly

guaranteed respect of the territorial integrity of this same State. This

guarantee was in accordance with all previous Security Council resolutions

adopted prior to Resolution 1244 (1999), 74 and following which the Security

Council has not modified its policy.

72
See Security Council Resolutions 1772 (2007) of 20 August 2007, 1784 (2007) of 31 October 2007,
1756 (2007) of 15 May 2007 and 1808 (2008) of 15April 2008.
73For example, with regard to the conflict in Georgia of August 2008, "[t]he Argentine Government
declares its satisfaction for the cessation of hostilities in Georgia, reached as a result of steps taken by
the President of the European Union, and calls upon the concerned Parties to find a negotiated and

mutually acceptable solution to the currently existing conflict that respects the principles universally
accepted by International Law, such as the territorial integrity of States and full respect of the human
rights of the persons affected" (Press Release No. 275/08, 14 August 2008), available at:
http://www.mrecic.gob.ar.
74 Prior to the adoption of Resolution 1244 (1999), the Resolutions I160 (1998) of 31 March 1998,
1199 (! 998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998, and 1239 (1999) of 14 May I999

were adopted. 33

F. The obligation to respect individual human rights and the

rights of minorities

83. The population of Kosovo has suffered and continues to suffer from serious

violations of fondamental human rights. Argentina has condemned the grave

violations of human rights, whoever their authors and victims may be, and

has insisted on the requirement of an effective restoration of the enjoyment

of these rights, particularly the right of all refugees and displaced persons to

return to their homes safely, a just solution regarding the situation of the

disappeared people, and the respect of the rights of all the ethnie groups that

make up Kosovo's population. Before the Security Council it was affirmed

that

"Argentina believes that there cannot be a prosperous and peaceful

future for Kosovo without full respect for the diversity of the people

who live there. A sustainable resolution of the question of Kosovo

must be achieved with full application of the principle of territorial

integrity. In this context, we attach the greatest importance to respect

for human rights, including the rights of refugees and displaced

persons, as well as for international humanitarian law and minority

rights."75

84. Little progress has been made with regard to the return of refugees or

displaced persons. As noted in the Report of the Secretary-General on the

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo of 24 November

2008, "The number of minority returns has declined sharply in comparison
76
with previous years and remains disappointing" • The most recent

Secretary-General's Report also observed that "The returns statistics for

2008 show a dramatic decline in the number of voluntary minority returns to

Kosovo compared to earlier years" 77. The reconstruction of an effective

multiethnic society still rests an aim to be achieved 78• To say the least, a

75 Intervention of Mr. Mayoral (Argentina), United Nations Security Council, Sixty-first year, 5373
meeting, 14 February 2006, UN Doc. S/PV.5373, p. 13.
76
77,UN Doc. S/2008/692, p.4, para. 11,
Report of I7 March 2009, UN Doc. S/2009/149, p. 6, para. 21.
78Numerous inter-ethnie security incidents continue to take place: Report of the Secretary-General on
the United Nations Administration Mission in Kosovo, I7 March 2009, UN Doc. S/2009/149, p. 3,
paras. 9-II; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Administration Mission in Kosovo, 34

unilateral declaration of independence is certainly not the best way to make

progress with respect to both these two concerns.

85. The fact that Kosovo Albanians were victims of serious violations of human

rights and of the humanitarian tragedy that occurred in 1999 does not imply

the emergence of a right to obtain independence. This right, which is one of

the possible outcomes of the exercise of the right to self-determination by

those peoples entitled thereto, is not granted on the basis of the major or

minor violence inflicted upon particular groups of individuals. The so-called

theory of "remedial secession" is nothing more than an argument made in

doctrine, and which has not received any legal consecration. According to

the Canadian Supreme Court, "it remains unclear whether this [... ]
79
proposition actually reflects an established international law standard".

Conventional or customary rules dealing with minority rights, both at the

individual and the collective level, do not recognize minorities as holders of

the right to self-determination and make no distinction whether they were

victim of major human rights violations or not. 80

86. In the concrete case of Kosovo, during the worst period of the conflict in

which serious breaches of fondamental human rights and the rules of

international humanitarian law were applicable, all Security Council

resolutions adopted in 1998-1999 concerning the situation in Kosovo

stressed the need to respect the territorial integrity of the FRY, which is
81
tantamount to denying any kind of "remedial secession" .

G. The principle of self-determination is not applicable

87. Argentina has always promoted and defended the right of peoples to self­

determination. Today, this right is a well established fondamental principle

of international law and possesses an erga omnes character, as the Court has

24 November 2008, UN Doc. S/2008/692, p. 2, para. 6; Report of the Secretary-General on the United

Nations Administration Mission in Kosovo, 28 March 2008, UN Doc. S/2008/211, pp. 3-4, paras. 11-
79.
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, (1998) 115 ILR 536, paras. 134-135.
80See Article 27 of the ICCPR; Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnie,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/135; Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (opened for signature I February 1995, entered
into force I February 1998), CETS No. 157.
81
See Security Council resolutions 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998) and 1244 (1999) 35

had occasion to affirm 82• However, the right to self-determination is framed

by international law and this includes the determination of both the holders

of the right as well as its scope and consequences.

88. With regard to the holder of this right, not every human group is entitled to

self-determination. As the Court stated in the context of decolonisation:

"The validity of the principle of self-determination, defined as

the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples,

is not affected by the fact that in certain cases the General

Assembly has dispensed with the requirement of consulting

the inhabitants of a given territory. Those instances were based

either on the consideration that a certain population did not

constitute a 'people' entitled to self-determination or on the

conviction that a consultation was totally unnecessary, in view

of special circumstances" 83.

89. A basic premise for the application of the principle of self-determination is

the qualification of the holder of that right as a "people". This is a legal

qualification in the context of international law and not a mere sociological

or ethnie qualification.

90. The UN organs have played a key role in applying self-determination and

have adopted an impressive number of resolutions with regard to both

general and particular situations. This has notably been the case of the

General Assembly, the Trusteeship Council and the Decolonisation

Committee. In all the cases in which the relevant organs have recognised the

existence of a "people" in the legal sense and consequently their right to self­

determination, they have expressly indicated so. Regional organisations have

equally played a role in the recognition of human groups as "peoples"
84
entitled to self-determination.

82"ln the Court's view, Portugal's assertion that the right of peoples to self-determination as it evolved

from the Charter and from United Nations practice, has an erga omnes character, is irreproachable [...],
it is one of the essential principles of contemporary international law". East Timor (Portugal v.
Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 102, para. 29; see also Legat Consequences of the
construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,.C.J. Reports 2004, p.
I72, para. 88, and p. I99, para. I56.
83Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 33, para. 59.
84This has been the case with regard to the peoples of the former Portuguese colonies, South-Africa,

Namibia and Palestine. 36

91. Even in the case of decolonisation, which is the situation m which the

principle led to the creation of a major number of newly independent
85
States , self-determination has not been applied in all circumstances. The

UN developed a methodology for identifying the Non-Self-Governing

territories and also concerning the specific ways to put an end to the colonial

situation 86. This includes the decision about the applicability or not of the

principle of self-determination. There have been cases in which the General

Assembly and its Decolonisation Committee have not considered applicable

the right of self-determination to the inhabitants of some Non-Self­
87
Governing Territories • In the case of the right to self-determination with

regard to territories under foreign occupation, such recognition has occurred

with regard to the Palestinian people. As the Court stated in its 2004 advisory

op1mon, "[a]s regards the principle of the right of peoples to

self-determination, the Court observes that the existence of a 'Palestinian

88
people' is no longer in issue" .

92. Nothing of this sort has occurred with respect to Kosovo. By way of

comparison, the case of Timor Leste is illustrative, since the Security

Council dealt with it contemporaneously to Kosovo in 1979. Whereas the

right of the East Timorese people and its possible choice of independence

were recognized, this was not the case for the inhabitants of Kosovo 89•

93. A distinction between peoples entitled to self-determination and minorities or

indigenous populations is of particular importance. The Inter-American

Commission on Human Rights in the Miskitos Case, while acknowledging

the principle of self-determination of peoples, nevertheless stated that "[t]his

does not mean, however, that it recognizes the right to self-determination of

85Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports

8671, p. 31, para. 52.
See eg. General Assembly resolutions 9 (!), 66 (!), 1541 (XVI), and 1654 (XVI).
87Cf. the cases of !fui (GA Resolution 2428 (XXIII) of 18 December 1968), Gibraltar (GA Resolution
2353 (XXII) of 19 December 1967) and the Malvinas Islands (GA Resolutions 2065 (XX) of 16
December 1965 and 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 among others. See also the amendment draft

to the text that became Resolution 40/21 of 27 November 1985, rejected by the General Assembly
(Doc. A/40/L.20 of22 November 1985).
88 Legal Consequences of the construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, pp. 182-183, para. 118.
89Resolution 1246 (1999) of 11 June 1999. 37

90
any ethnie groupas such." To hold otherwise would lead to a complete blur

between the distinction clearly made in international law between peoples

and minorities.

94. At any rate, recognition of the right to self-determination does not

automatically imply the right to independence. The distinction between

internal and external self-determination is relevant here. For instance, the

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted on

7 September 2007, recognised the right of indigenous peoples to self­

determination91. However, Article 4 provides that "Indigenous peoples, in

exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or

self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well

as ways and means for financing their autonomous fonctions". Furthermore,

this Declaration establishes that:

"[n]othing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying

for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in

any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the

United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any

action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the

territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
92
independent States" •

95. In the case of Kosovo, neither within the UN nor within a regional context, is

there a recognition of the applicability of the right of self-determination to a

so-called "Kosovar people". Further, the International Conference on

Yugoslavia did not accept the request by the representatives of the Kosovo

Albanians to be considered as entitled to independence and they were not
93
even authorised to participate in its plenary sessions. Notably, the

Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia did not accept that

the Serbian populations of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were entitled

90The Miskito Case, Case 7964 (Nicaragua), Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on
the Situation of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin, OEA/Ser.L./V.II.62, doc.
10 rev. 3, 29 November 1983, Part Two(B) § 9.
91General Assembly Resolution 61/295, Annex, Article 3.
92Ibid., Article 46.
93
See the exchange of letters between Dr. Rugova, leader of the Kosovo Albanians, and Lord
Carrington, Chair of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia of 22 December 1991 and 17 August 1992,
reprinted in Marc Weller, Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999 (Center of International Studies University of
Cambridge, 1999), pp. 81 and 86. 38

to external self-determination 94, in a situation resembling that of the Kosovo

Albanians.

96. Indeed, relevant instruments dealing with the principle of self-determination

have clearly established its relationship with the principle of territorial

integrity. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) containing the

Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and

Peoples, after stating the right of peoples to self-determination in paragraph

2, incorporated another paragraph by which it declares that "[a]ny attempt

aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial

integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the
95
Charter of the United Nations" . The seventh paragraph of the principle of

equal rights and self-determination of peoples of the Declaration contained in

Resolution 2625 (XXV), known as the "safeguard clause", provides:

"Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorising or

encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in

part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent

States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal

rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus

possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the
96
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour".

97. This paragraph has been interpreted a contrario as accepting secession if the
97
State does not possess a government representing the whole people. It has

never been interpreted in such a way by any competent body. The travaux

preparatoires 98 as well as the subsequent practice does not allow such

94Opinion No 2 of the Arbitration Commission on former Yugoslavia.
95General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, para. 6
96General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV).
97
For an account ofthis doctrinal position, see Ch. Tomuschat, 'Secession and Self-Determination' in
Marcelo G. Kohen (ed.) Secession. International Law Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006), 48; J. Dugard and D. Raie, 'The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of
Secession' in Marcelo G. Kohen (ed.), in ibid., 28; A. Cassese,-Determination of Peoples: A Legal
Reappraisal (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1995), p. 118.
98 See Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly

Relations and Co-operation among States, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth
Session, Supplement No. 19, UN Doc. A/7619, p. 67, para. 187; Statement by Mr. Arangio-Ruiz on
behalf of Italy, UNGA, 1970 Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States: Summary Records of the One Hundred and Tenth
to One Hundred and Fourteenth Meeting held at Palais des Nations, Geneva, from 31 March to 1 May
1970, UN Doc. A/AC.125/SR.110-114, p. 22, and p. 110, para. 221. 39

99
interpretation. At any rate, the policy of the Albanian population itself of

not participating in the Yugoslav (later Serbian) State organs since the
100
beginning of the 1990s precludes the invocation of this doctrinal

interpretation.

98. The Rambouillet Agreement proposed in February 1999 contained a clause

related to the future status which read as follows: "Three years after the entry

into force of this Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to

determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the

will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts

regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act,

and to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this

Agreement and to consider proposals by any Party for additional

measures". 101

99. There is a reference to the "will of the people", but this by no means amounts

to a recognition of a "people" in the legal sense. No explicit reference to the

right to self-determination is made. An implicit reference cannot be

constructed either: "the will of the people" merely appears as one of the

bases to be taken into consideration. Conversely, if the principle of self­

determination would be applicable, the "will" of the people would be

paramount and not as just one element among others to be taken into account

for the determination of a future status. Moreover, the reference to the

Helsinki Final Act, which strongly stressed respect of the territorial integrity

and the inviolability of boundaries, is another element which supports the

consideration that the proposal made at Rambouillet did not recognise the

99
See for example, Helsinki Final Act, Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between
Participating States, Principle IV, see, also, Principles I and VIII; for other international instruments
confirming the principle of territorial integrity of States see Chapter 6, Sections B & C; Committee on
the Elimination of Ail Forms of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation XXI, Right to self­
determination, adopted on 23 August 1996. Available at:

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/dc598941 c9e68a 1a802565 Ie004d31d0?Opendocument;
and Human Rights Committee, General Comment 12, Article 1 (Twenty-first session, 13 March 1984),
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty
Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 12 (1994). Available at:
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/f3 c99406d528f3 7fc12563ed004960b4?Opendocument.
100
This Jack of participation followed an earlier declaration of independence by the Kosovo Assembly:
Resolution on Independence, September 7, 1991 in Marc Weller,Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999 (Center
of International Studies University of Cambridge, 1999), p.72.
101Annexed to the Letter dated 4 June 1999 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 7 June 1999, UN Doc. S/1999/648, p. 85, para. 3, 40

applicability of the right of peoples to self-determination to the inhabitants of

Kosovo.

100. Consequently, the principle of self-determination cannot be considered as a

legal ground for establishing the accordance of the unilateral declaration of

independence of 17 February 2008 with international law.

H. The obligation to reach a settlement through negotiation

101. The Security Council, when it established an international administration for

Kosovo, also determined the procedure according to which the future status

of the territory would be determined and it consequently envisaged the end of

that international presence. Hence, UNSCR 1244 (1999) stated that one of
the tasks of the international civil presence would be that of "[f]acilitating a

political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into

account the Rambouillet accords", 102 and later, as "a final stage, overseeing

the transfer of authority from Kosovo' s provisional institutions to institutions

established under a political settlement". 103

102. Clearly, as actually occurred later, "political process" and "political

settlement" referred to negotiations between the parties concerned, that is,

the central government of Serbia and the representatives of the Kosovo

Albanians and later the local government of the province of Kosovo under

international administration. Annex 2 of UNSCR 1244 (1999) provides that

"[n]egotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or

disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions". A

"political settlement" also means an agreement as a result of these

negotiations. For its part, "future status" implies that there is an existing

"present status"; pending a "political settlement", the present status remains.

This is even more evident in the present case, for two reasons: jirst, the

negotiations involve the government of a State and a government of one of

the State' s internal units; andsecond, the negotiations do not have as goal the

settlement of a dispute of the legal status of an existing situation, but the

modification of an existing situation.

102
103Paragraph 11, (e).
Paragraph 11, (f). 41

103. Although the negotiations are not between two subjects of international law,

the negotiations nevertheless have an international character since they form

part of an international regime established by a binding Security Council

resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. This is not the only case

where such a situation has arisen. Other domestic conflicts after having being

qualified as threats to the international peace and security have become

subject to a Security Council requirement for negotiations to be conducted
104
between the parties to these conflicts.

104. The negotiations concerning the province of Kosovo were marked by the role

played by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari,

who acted as a mediator. His Comprehensive Proposal, endorsed by the
105
Secretary-General, has not and cannot have a binding effect. For this
reason, it is not necessary to analyse here whether this proposal meets the

requirements established by UNSCR 1244 (1999) or even whether the

process was carried out in an impartial manner, because it is merely a

proposal for the consideration of the parties and as such, it cannot be

imposed on them as though it were compulsory.

105. The Court has already described in length the main features of negotiations

as a peaceful means to solve international disputes:

"Defining the content of the obligation to negotiate, the Permanent

Court, in its Advisory Opinion in the case of Railway Traffic between

Lithuania and Poland, said that the obligation was 'not only to enter

into negotiations but also to pursue them as far as possible with a view

to concluding agreements', even if an obligation to negotiate did not

imply an obligation to reach agreement (P.C.IJ, Series AIB, No. 42,

1931, at p. 116). In the present case, it needs to be observed that

whatever the details of the negotiations carried on in 1965 and 1966,

they failed of their purpose because the Kingdoms of Denmark and the

Netherlands, convinced that the equidistance principle alone was

applicable, in consequence of a rule binding upon the Federal

Republic, saw no reason to depart from that rule; and equally, given

104
This occurred in the cases of Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and Georgia
105tioned above, para. 80.
Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security
Council, 26 March 2007, UN Doc. S/2007/168. 42

the geographical considerations stated in the last sentence of paragraph

7 above, the Federal Republic could not accept the situation resulting

from the application of that rule. So far therefore the negotiations have

not satisfied the conditions indicated in paragraph 85 (a), but fresh
106
negotiations are to take place on the basis of the present Judgment" •

106. With the necessary adjustments to the particular case, this analysis applies in

the case of Kosovo. Negotiations must be conducted in good faith. If they

have failed to reach an outcome then fresh negotiations must be conducted

with the aim of reaching an agreement on the basis of what is provided in

Resolution 1244 (1999) and that respects international law.

I. The corollary obligation not to adopt unilateral measures that

attempt to impose a/ait accompli

107. By definition, negotiations imply that one side cannot unilaterally impose its

position on the other. If negotiations or mediation fails, the parties should

continue to seek a settlement either through further negotiations or by other

peaceful means of settling disputes. As the Manila Declaration on the

Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes states:

"In the event of failure of the parties to a dispute to reach an early

solution by any of the above means of settlement, they shall continue

to seek a peaceful solution and shall consult forthwith on mutually

agreed means to settle the dispute peacefully" 107•

108. In the present case, the exclusion of an imposed unilateral solution has been

explicitly mentioned at the beginning of the negotiations. The Contact Group

adopted guiding principles governing these negotiations, stating that "[a]ny

solution that is unilateral or results from the use of force would be
108
unacceptable" •

106North Sea Continental ShelfCases (Federal Republic ofGermany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of
Germany v. Netherlands), I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 47-48, para.87. See also: land and Maritime
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p.

424, para. 244.
107GA Resolution 37/10 of 15 November 1982. See also the Declaration of Principles of International
Law annexed to Resolution 2625 (XXV).
108Annex to Letter dated 10 November 2005 from the President of the Security Council addressed to

the Secretary-General, 10November 2005, UN Doc. S/2005/709, p. 3, para.6 (emphasis added). 43

109. Previously, at the time of the creation of the Provisional Institutions of Self­

Government, the UNMIK-FRY Common Document signed on 5 November

2001 clearly reaffirmed "that the position on Kosovo' s future status remains

as stated in UNSCR 1244, and that this cannot be changed by any action
109
taken by the Provisional Institutions of Self-government" • The Security

Council welcomed the signing of this document and emphasised "the

responsibility of the provisional institutions of self-government and all

concerned to respect Jully the final status provisions of resolution 1244

(1999). It underlines its continued commitment to the full implementation of

resolution 1244 (1999), which remains the basis for building Kosovo's

future."110

11O. The Guiding principles of the Contact Group for a settlement of the status of

Kosovo also affirmed that "[t]he Security Council will remain actively seized

of the matter. The final decision on the status of Kosovo should be endorsed
111
by the Security Council" .

111. If negotiations are to be fruitful, each party must abstain from adopting

unilateral measures that aggravate the dispute or the conflicting situation and

prevent the dispute or situation from being settled. This is an important

corollary of the obligation to settle disputes through peaceful means, one of

the fondamental principles of international law 112, applicable in the particular

case under the examination by the Court.

112. This analysis is equally relevant for those States that supported the solution

proposed by Mr. Ahtisaari and, that subsequently have encouraged the

unilateral declaration of independence, and have supported it in a campaign

in favour of recognition. The failure of these States to obtain the agreement

of the concerned party for the desired aim should not lead to an attempt to

impose this aimas a mere fait accompli. In the present context, such a policy

can be qualified as intervention and, as the Court perceptively stated fifty

years ago, this is "the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the

past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the

109
Emphasis added. UNMIK-FRY, Common Document (5 November 2001), para. 5 (available at:
http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Policy/Priorities/KIM/unmik _e.html).
110Emphasis added. Presidential Statement of9 November 2001, UN Doc. S/PRST/2001/34.
111UN Doc. S/2005/709, 10November 2005 (Annex).
112
See the Friendly Relations Declaration adopted by GA Resolution 2625 (XXV) of24 October 1975. 44

present defects m international organization, find a place m international

law" 113.

113. It was suggested during the General Assembly discussions of the request for

this advisory opinion, that it was Serbia that unilaterally rendered the

successful negotiations impossible, because of the adoption of a new

Constitution that "unilaterally reasserted control over Kosovo" and

114
consequently tied the hands of the Serbian negotiators . This is not

accurate. The new Constitution reaffirmed Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo
115
and explicitly referred to its enjoyment of substantial autonomy , which is

in conformity with Resolution 1244 (1999). Moreover, the Constitution

leaves open the possibility of amendment 116. This argument is therefore

devoid of any relevance.

114. On the contrary, it is the unilateral declaration of independence itself that

attempts at modifying the existing status and putting an end to the

negotiations between the parties.

113Corfu Channel. Merits, Judgment, I.C.J Reports 1949, p. 35.
114Sir John Sawers (United Kingdom), United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-third sessin, 22 nd

115nary meeting, 8 October 2008, UN Doc. A/63/PV.22, p. 3.
Preamble and Article 182. Available at:
http://www.parlament.sr.gov .yu/content/eng/akta/ustav /ustav_ceo.asp
116Article 203. Available at: ibid. 45

Section III:

The Answer to the Question Raised by the General Assembly

115. Having determined the rules and principles of international law relevant to

the question posed by the General Assembly, this section will ascertain

whether the unilateral declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 is in

accordance with those rules and principles.

A. The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government have no

competence to proclaim the independence of Kosovo

116. It has been determined that the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
117
have no competence to proclaim the independence of Kosovo.

Consequently, being organs created by the Special Envoy of the Secretary­

General in the framework of the responsibilities vested to the latter by UNSC

Resolution 1244 (1999), their unilateral declaration of independence is an

ultra vires act in violation of that Resolution and the Constitutional

Framework set out by UNMIK Regulation 2001/9.

B. The unilateral declaration of independence infringes SC

Resolution 1244 (1999)

117. As discussed above, the specific international legal provision governing the

situation in Kosovo is UNSCR Resolution 1244 (1999). 118The Provisional

Institutions of Self-Government, which were created by virtue of this

resolution, are naturally required to respect its provisions.

118. The unilateral declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 infringes

UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999) in a number of ways:

117
Supra, paras. 61-64.
11Supra, para. 65. 46

• It is an act of de-fiance against the continued applicability of the

Resolution itself, and as such attempts to undermine the competences

of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the

United Nations;

• It contravenes the authority of the international administration

established by the Resolution;

• It attempts to put an end to such presence established on the basis of

the Resolution, something which can only be decided by the Security

Council itself;

• It disregards the political process that must lead to the determination

of the future status of the territory, i.e. negotiations between the
parties concemed;

• It attempts to impose a given political settlement, even though this
can only be the outcome of negotiations;

• It does not respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia,

explicitly preserved in the Resolution.

119. This open de-fianceto a binding SC resolution in force is attested by the last

report on Kosovo prepared by the Secretary-General: "The Kosovo

authorities, who have been under significant pressure from opposition

parties, have repeatedly stated during the past months that resolution 1244

(1999) is no longer relevant and that the institutions of Kosovo have no legal

obligation to abide by it" 11.

120. If member States are obliged to comply with Security Council resolutions,

this is also the case for organs created on the very basis of resolutions. The

serious undermining of the collective security system set up by the Charter

by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Govemment of Kosovo cannot be

tolerated. The very credibility of this system is at stake.

119Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo,
17 March 2009, UN Doc. S/2009/149, para. 4. 47

C. The unilateral declaration of independence violates the territorial

integrity of Serbia

121. As has been stated above, respect for the territorial integrity of States is not

only an obligation for States but it is also a requirement opposable to parties
120
to internal armed conflicts threatening international peace and security. It

has already been noted that respect for the sovereignty and territorial

integrity of Serbia is expressly provided in Resolution 1244 (1999).

122. Because the very purpose of the unilateral declaration of independence of 17

February 2008 is the creation of a new sovereign State from the territory

under the sovereignty of an existing State, the declaration infringes the

obligation to respect the territorial integrity of Serbia.

D. The unilateral declaration of independence constitutes a breach of the

obligation to settle disputes through peaceful means

123. Furthermore, the unilateral declaration of independence of 17 February 2008

violates the obligation of the Provisional Institutions of Self-government of

Kosovo to negotiate the future status of the territory with the sovereign State.

This obligation stems not only from UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999), but from

general international law as well.
121
124. As stated above ,non-State actors, most particularly in the case of internal

conflicts which are of international concern, are also the addressees of

injunctions of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN

Charter. When the Security Council imposes on all sides of the dispute the

obligation to solve the crisis through negotiations or other peaceful means,

this requirement implies that the general rules related to the peaceful

settlement of international disputes are applicable. In concrete terms, this

means that failure of a round of negotiations does not liberate the parties

from the obligation to pursue the settlement of their dispute through available

peaceful means, including further negotiations.

120
121See supra, paras. 69-82.
Supra, para. 75. 48

125. As such, the unilateral declaration, by attempting to unilaterally put an end to

the negotiation process, constitutes a breach of the obligation to settle the

disputes through peaceful means.

E. There are no legal grounds for the unilateral declaration of independence

126. Having established that the unilateral declaration of independence of 17

February 2008 is an ultra vires act of the Provisional Institutions of Self­

government of Kosovo that infringes Resolution 1244, the territorial integrity

of Serbia and the obligation to settle disputes through peaceful means, it will

be analysed here whether there are grounds to legally justify that declaration.

127. The unilateral declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 cannot be

grounded either on the existence of a right to secession in domestic law or on

the consent of the parent State given afterwards. With regard to the former

situation, some constitutions provide for such a right. Indeed, this was the

case of the Constitution of the SFRY of 1974, but only limited to the

constituent Republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,

Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) and not to the provinces (Kosovo and

Vojvodina) 122• Later Constitutions, such as those of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Serbia, did not grant that right to
123
the autonomous regions either . As it is well known, Serbia has not

consented the secession of Kosovo. On the contrary, it has declared the
124
unilateral declaration to be null and void •

128. The situation of Kosovo is also in clear contrast with other situations, such as

those of Bangladesh, Eritrea and the Baltic States, in which the parent States

accepted the separation of part of their territories and inhabitants. In the case

of Eritrea moreover, the territory of this former Italian colony had been

122The preamble to the Basic Principle of the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, 1974, provides "The nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to

123f-determination, including the right to secession".
See Articles 2, 3 and 6 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 1992; Preamble
and Article 5 of the Constitutional Charter of the Union ofSerbia and Montenegro of2003; and Article
8 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia of 2006, currently in force and available on the website
of the National Assembly of the Republic ofSerbia at
<http://www.parlament.sr.gov .yu/content/eng/akta/ustav/ustav_ceo.asp>.
124Letter from Mr. Boris Tadic, President of the Republic of Serbia, to the Secretary-General of 17

February 2008, U.N. Doc. A/62/703-S/2008/111. 49

incorporated to Ethiopia by a binding UN General Assembly resolution on

condition of the enjoyment of autonomy of the territory in the framework of

125
a federation . In the case of the Baltic States, their illegal annexation in

1940 is relevant to their subsequent separation from the parent State. These

situations are clearly different from that of Kosovo.

129. It could be argued that the creation of States is a matter of fact and not of

law. Certainly, a State cannot exist if the material elements traditionally
126
mentioned are absent • These days, however, the creation of States must be

the result of a process in which respect for international law is assured. This

explains why entities claiming to be States, and that show effective and

exclusive control over the territory and its inhabitants, but which were

created in violation of international law, have not been considered to be

States. Examples include "Katanga", "Southern Rhodesia", the "Turkish

Republic ofNorthern Cyprus" and "Somaliland", among others. The creation

of States being also a matter of law today means that international law does

not remain neutral vis-à-vis secession. For this reason, the unilateral

declaration of independence cannot produce its purported effect. A fortiori,
127
as has been previously mentioned , there is no such effective and exclusive

control by the Provisional Institutions of Self-government in the case of

Kosovo.

130. To sum up, there are no legal grounds justifying the unilateral declaration of

independence.

131. Before concluding, Argentina wishes to insist on the need for a resumption

of the negotiations between the parties concerned, with the aim of reaching a

lasting settlement on the basis of international law and that permits all the

inhabitants of the territory - including the displaced persons who are not in a

position to exercise their right to return - the full enjoyment of their human

rights in a multiethnic society. Imaginative solutions in the framework of

international law are always possible and certainly they were not exhausted

125
"Eritrea shall constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the
126iopian Crown." (GA Resolution 390 (V), Article 1) th
Cf. Article 1 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the 7 International
American Conference at Montevideo on 26 December 1933 (League of Nations, Treaty Series, 1936,
vol CLXV, p. 20. See also: Opinion No. 1 of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on
Yugoslavia, 31 !LM 1494 (1992).
127
Supra, para. 35. 50

between 2005 and 2007, during the negotiations lead by Mr. Ahtisaari. It is

also the responsibility of those States directly involved in the Kosovo process

to insist upon the parties that the respect of international law is an essential

part of the conduct of any actor in international relations.

Conclusions

132. On the basis of the arguments set out above, Argentina respectfully submits

that:

(a) The Court hasjurisdiction to answer the question raised by the General

Assembly;

(b) There are not compelling reasons preventing the Court from exercising its

advisory jurisdiction;

(c) The unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of

Self-Government of Kosovo is not in accordance with international law, since:

(i) It is an act which did not fall within the competences of its authors, as

stemming from Resolution 1244 (1999) and the Constitutional
Framework adopted by UNMIKRegulation 2001/9;

(ii) It infringes the competences and responsibilities of the Security

Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;

(iii) It infringes Resolution 1244 (1999) in a way described in paragraph

118 of this written statement;

(iv) It constitutes a violation of the territorial integrity of Serbia:

(v) It constitutes a breach to the obligation to settle disputes through

peaceful means, in particular the obligation to reach a settlement for
the future status of Kosovo through negotiations.

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Written Statement of Argentina

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