INTERNATIONACOURTOFJUSTICE
TERRITORIAND MARITTMETSPUTE
(NICARAGUvCOLOMBIA)
MEMORIAL OF THE
GOVERNMENT OFNICARAGUA
VOLUMEI TABLE 03? CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ....................:..........................
....................
PART 1:THEISSUEOF SOVEREIGNTY ..........................3...........
CHAPTER1:THEMOSQUITOCOASTAND ADJACENTISLANDS
THE UTIPOSSIDETIS IURlSAS A NORMATIVEPRINCIPLE .......5.
I.Introducti............................................1....
...............
I1.PreliminarObservation................................................
A .THE~~OSQUITOCOAS TNDITSISLAND S...................1...........
B .THEORIGINOF THEDISPUTEOVERTHE MOSQ UFO COAS .......18..
C A PPLTCATIOOF THEUTlPOSSIDETlIURISTOTHE SE~TLEME OF T
THE DISPUTE T:HMOLINA-GUA TLREAT YF15MARCH 1825.....20.
II.Considerarioof thTitles..............................2................
A .THETITLESOFTHEPARTIESBEFORETHE ROYAL ORDER OF20
NOVEMBE fR03........................................25......
.......................
B. THEROYA LRDER OF~~NOYEIWB E803:POSiTfON.........2.....
C .THEROYA LRDER OF20NOVEER f803 DIDNOT~MPLYA
TRANSFEROF TERRTfORIAJURJSDICTIOEJFTHEMOSQU~T C OAS TO
THE IIICERYALTYOFSANT AE............................................
0 .THEI?fo~-Ex~cu~ rND PO.7TPONEMEN TF THEROYA L RDE RF
...............................................
........................
I803 35
E .THEROYA LXPUNATO ORYDEROF 13NOVEMBE fR06......39...
F .THEATTITUDEOF THEFORMER SOVEREIG ..................4........
G .THEDIFFERENCE INHISTORICALPERSPECT~V................6......
IV .Conclusion..........................................57..
..................
CHAPTERKTHE LEGALSTATUSOFTHE1928TREATY .........9..
I
1 Section 1:Historil ackgroundandContemporaneousEvents
Leading totheSignaturandRatification theBarcenas-Esguerra
Treaty of1928...........................................6...
..................
PA~A .HISTORIC AACKGROW ................................~.......
PART 3.THE CUNCLUS~ONo FTHE1928TREAT ................-........
SectionII:TheInvaliditythe 1928Treaty.............................
I PARTA.THE 1928TREAT WASCONCLUDED INMANIFEST\710L4TIOOF
THENICARACUAN CONSTITUTI ONENINFORCE .......................
PARTB.THE NICARAGU AN VERNMEW NASDEPRIVEDOF ITS
INTERNTlONAL C.APA.CITYDURINGTHEPERTINEPERIODSINCEIT
COULDNOTFREELY EXPRESSI- 1ONSENTTOBE BOUND BY
INTERNATIONATREATLE....................................................
Section I7I:ConrandJuridicaIAna~ysisthe 1928Treat.......25
A.Exc~usmh OF CERTAI JNSUUR FEATURE RO:NCADO RERR AA.
Qurr~sv~ir.o........................................................................
3.REFERENCE TO~ffM~ERID ~AoF82 WESTr~REUT~O TNUTHE
'I..
ALtUCATiohOFfmm ......... 1............................................
Section1V:Evenithe 1928Treatyeverenteredintoforce.ithasbeen
terminateasaconsequenceof itsbreacbyColombia ............8..
PARTII:MARITIME DELIMITATION .........................1.3...........
CHAPTER1II:MARITIMD EELPITATION .....................85........
I
I Introduction.................:.......................185.....................................
I.TheDe>imitatioRequestedand theApplicablLaw ..................
LI.TheGefieraGeographicalFramework....................................
Iy.The DeIirnilatArea .................................191.............................
V.The RelevantLRgisIationandClaims ofNicarag.............7....
VI.The Relevant LegisIationandCIaimsColumbia.............2...
VTI.The DelimirationBetweethe MainlanCoastsofNicaraguaand
...............................................
........................
Colombia 204
A.I~r~outrcriu~.....................................-204.....
........................
3.THEPRFNC~P U~E-EQUR DfV~SIOOF THEAREASOF
CONVERGENCE .........................................205...
........................
C.THE PRINCIPL OEE~UALDIVISIONAPPLIESINDELIMITATI OFA
SINGLMEARITIM BEOUNDARY..............................208.........................
D.THE COURS EFTHE BOUNDAR ;Y.......................212....................
E.NOLEGA BLASISORTHE ADJUST OMTHEEN TDIANLINE......^^^
F.THE RELEVAN C EGEOLOG AND GEOMORPHOL ..............
VII.The~elirnitationBetweentheMainlandCoastsofNicaraguaand
Colombia:EquitablCritericonfirmingtheEquitableResu........ RELEVA C'RCUTMSTA~CE................................216............................
C.THE PRINCIPL .IZ~EQUIT A CBELESOTHE NATURA R ESOURCES
OF THEDISPUT~ A~DEA...............,..................220..................
D.SECURIT Y UNSIDERAT .O............................2...........
E.THE FACTO RFPROPOAT~ONAL~ TY..........................................
F.THE INTERES OF OTHER STATE SNTHEREG~O ..................
IX.The eli imitatintheRegionofSanAndres:the Nicaraguan
Positionon theBasisof NicaraguanTi.....................2.7........
A.INTRUDWT~ .........................................7.....
............
B.2% COASTA RLEUT~ONSH ...S.................................................
C.THE SANMDRES GO II: ITRE& TION TTHE MEDIA NINE
DIVISIO NFTHEAREA OF DELIMITAT I.......................................
X The DelimitationitheRegion of SanAndres:the Nicaraguan
Positionon the Basisof theAllegedColombianT.............3....
A.JNTRUD~CT ......................................-..8.............
3.THE N~CAR~GW POS~T~O..............................3............
C.THE SANANDRES GROUP DOES NOT FORM PART OF THECOASTAL
FRON TFCOLOMB IA..................................................
D.THE PREDOMINA INTERESTOFNICARAGU IATHERELEVA NREA
...............................................
...2.6....................
XI.ThePresence of~miii iithk~aritime DelimitatiArea248
A.INTRODUCTION.......................................248.......
......................
B.Potr~rc~~GEOGRAPH ................................2.8..............
C.THE WE~GH TF THECAYSfNTHEMA R~T~MDEL~MITAT~ BEIVEEN
N~RAGUA ANDCOLOMB~A ...............................254...........................
XI1.Conclusion.........................................2.1....
............
SUBMISSIONS ................................................
..................
LISTOFMAPSAND FIGURES ................................................
LISTOFDOCUMENTSDEPOSITED WITHTHE REGISTRY .......70
LISTOF ANNEXES .........................................271.....
...................... MEMORIALOF THE
GOVERNMENT OFNICARAGUA INTRODUCTION
1. The Order-ofrhe Court of 26 February 2002 fixed 28 ApriI2003 as
the time limit fothefiling of thNicaraguan MemoriaIin the case
concerning the Territorial and MaritimD eispute (Nicaragua v.
Cofombia). This Memorialis fiIedpursuant tothat Order.
2. This case was brought before the Court on 6 December 2001 by
means of an Applicationfiled by theRepublic of Nicaragua against
the Republicof Columbia concerni ngispute over title to territory
and maririrnedeIirnitationinthe Caribbean Sea. In itsApplicafion
the Government of the Republic of NicaraguahasaskedtheCum to
adjudge and declare:
"First, thatthe RepubIic of Nicaragua has sovereignty
over rhe islandsof Providencia, San Andres and Santa
Catalinaand all theappurtenantislands and keys, and
also over the Roncador, Serrana, Serranilla and
Quitasueio keys (in so far as they are capable of
appr-upriation);
Seco~~di ,n rhe Iightof the determinations concerning
title requested above, the Court is asked further to
determine the course of the singlemaritime boundary
between the areas of continental shelf and exclusive
economic mne appertaining respectively to Nicaragua
and CoIombia, in acm-dance with equitableprincipIes
and relevant circumstances recognized by general
internationallaw as applicableto such adelin~itationof
a single maritime boundary."
3. Jurisdiction.is based on Article 36,paragraphsI and2 othe Statute
ofthe Court. Firstly, inaccordancwith the provisionsof Article36,
paragraph I, of the Statute,jurisdiction exists by virtue of ArticIeXXXI of the American Treaty an Pacific SettIernenr adopted at
Bogor5, CuIu~nbia on 30 ApriI 1448 and commonly known as the
Pact of Bogoti. The Republic of Nicaragua and the Republic of
Colombia are parties tothis Pact,which was ratified by the former
on 21June 1950 without any pertinenrreservation, whiIsr the Iatter
ratifiedion I4 October 1968without any reservations.Second1 y,in
accordance with theprovisionsof Articles 36, paragraph 2, of the
Statute jurisdiction alsoexistsby virtue of the operation ofthe
DecIararionof the AppIicanrState dared 24 September I929 and the
DecIarationof CoIombiadated 30 October 1937.
The disputenowbefore the Court islongstanding.It dates back to
the first years aftetheInde~iendencefrom Spainof rhe respective
territories ofwhich Nicaragua and CoIombia formed part. The
Independence of the territories forming part of the Captaincy-
General of Guatemala, of which present day Nicaragua was a
province,datesfrom 15 September:I82 1.The Independence of the
Vice-Royairy of Gra~lada o,f whid~ present day Colombia was a
part, is officialldated by Colombia from 20 July 1810 although
therewas abriefSpanishreconquestof theUnitedProvincesof New
Granada between 1814and 181 6.
Under the authority of a Royal Order of 20 November 1803
> 8
Colombia claimed sovereignty over the Mosquito Coast of Central
America by means .f,a ~ec-k of 5 July 1824. This provoke d
reaction of the United Pro~inces of CentraI America, of which
Nicaraguawas a part, and negotiationswere started with Colombia.
An agreementwas reachedwith Colombia and signed in Bogoti on
15 March 1825. This Treaty established that their respective -.-
)'2i;t.:.'':!:-:.''i':c;.I'.
.-'..
,-.;x:-.'
..,.:
territories would be subjecti~io the principle which later became
known as the uti possidetis iuris. At the moment of the
!;;8,;,$:: .&;A7,?;'+
Independence of Colomb~a - be it-1810or 1816 - or at the moment
of the Independence of Nicaraguain 1821, Colombiahadno part of -
the present day Nicaraguan territory under her possession (her
passidetis) deiureor defucto. Thisincludes the Mosquito Coastand
its appurtenant islands,which she later claimed and someof which
formpartof the present disputebefore the Court.
6. CoIombia claims that she took possession of the isIands of San
Andres,SantaCataIinaandProvidencia in 1822and has had them in
her possession continuously since that period. The position of
Nicaragua is that theseislands and other maritimefeatures presently
in dispute appertained to her during the Colonial period,and hence
at the momentof independence.Thus, by appIicarionof the principle
of utipossidetis iuristhese isIandsareIegaIIypart of theNicaraguan
territory.
7. The United Provinces of Central .America as indicated above,
contested the occupationbyCo1ornb;ia of San Andres i~nmediately.
This ambiguous possession of Sail Andres, to which we must add
that of Santa Catalina and Providenci but, not that of the other
islets, reefs and banks in dispute that were not under her possession,
continued unchanged during the 19lh century.
8. The claims of CoIombia included 1101 orlly what is present day
Nicaraguan territory but up to 1900 also the Mosquito Coast of
Costa Rica that waslocated between Nicaragua and the Colombian
territory comprising present day Panama. This dispute was
submitted to arbirration and President Loubet of France rendered an Award on I ISeptember I900 recognizing the sovereigntyof Costa
Rica over her Caribbean Coast. The effectsofthis Awardprovoked
Colombia to Iook for other ways of obtaining recognition of her
claims.
9. Sl~ortfyafter this Award Panama was taker1 from Colombia by
President Theodore RooseveIt of the United Srares and decIared
indeper~dentin 1903.Ten years IatertheUnitedStates negotiated the
Charnorro-Bryan Treaty with Nicaragua in 1914' whereby
Nicaragua, among other things,gave an option to the United States
far building a canaI anywhere in her territorand the Iease of the
Con1IsIands(calledMas delMaizby NicaraguaandIslas Mangles
by Colombia) located offthe Nicaraguan Caribbean Coast. This
Treaty strained further the relations between Colombia and the
UnitedStates since it explicitly recognizedNicaraguan sovereignty
over the Mosquito Coastand over the Corn Islands.
10. The Treaty with Nicaraguacame at a moment when Colombia was
negotiating with the United States a Treaty of compensation for the
loss ofPanama. The Senate of theUnited States ratifiedthis Treaty
with inodifica~ionsand the exchange. of ratificationfinaIIytook
pIacein Bogotaon 1~mh'l922.
11. In thecontext of these negotjations,or atleast contemporaneously
with them, Colombia sought a settlement of the dispute with
Nicaragua. CoIombia proposed an agreement whereby CoIombia
wouIdrecognizethe sove~~eignty of Nicaragua over her Atlantic or
Caribbean Coastand over the Maiz(Corn) orManglesIslandswhile
1 SeeChap. I. SecI, pans2.:36-2.4below. .->.,''
Nicaragua would recogni2k~;~~olornbian sovereignty over the
Archipelagoof San~ndrds.~
;,(!I;,( r?miL:id
.-
12. Nicaragua at firsfirmly refused any negotiation thatwould involve
I
Ioss of sovereignry of the Archipelago of SanAnd&. The posirion
of Nicaragua towards the settlement proposed by Colombia
changed radicallyafter United States MarinesoccupiedNicaraguain
1927andthe President ofNicaragua became, inthe words offormer
United States Secretary of War Henry Stirnsun, a simple
"f~~urehead".~The occupation and control of Nicaraguaand her
Government by the United States lasted from 1927 to 1932.During
thisperiod rhe United States directly or irldirecflyexercised vima1
control ofall Government functions in Nicaragua incIuding army
and internalsecurity forces, finances,customscollection,the only
railroad, theNationalBankandtheelections,
: I3. The United States hada special intere tsnt Nicaragua should accept
the Colombianproposalbecause itwould avoid any interference
from Colombia in herplans of cutting a canalacrossNicaraguathat
would naturally invali thi,~asibb&n Coast ofNicaragua and the
use of the Corn (Maiz)IsIands.These rights had been acquired by
the UnitedStates from Nicaragua in the Chamorro-BryanTreaty,
referred to inparagraph 9 above,andtheygave theUnitedStates,in
the words of the Secretary of State of the United States "more rhan
an academic interest ~II the adjustment" between Nicaragua and
Colombia. (See para. 2.97 below).
..
2
3See Chap. 11,Sec. I,paras. 2.85-2.86below.
See Chap. 11,Sec. Ipara. 2.44.14. Under these circumstances ~icaragua was forced ro accept the
arrangement sought by Colombia in spite of thefact that iopenly
violatedthemandates of theNicaraguan Constitution thatprohibited
any disposal of Nicaraguan To this effect the Treaty
known as the Biscenas-hguerrg Treaty was signed on 24 March
1928 andreIuctantIyapprovedby Nicaraguaby Decree of 6 March
1930. For her part,Colombia eagerly approved the Treatyby Law
93 of 17November 1928.
15. The textof theTreaty,assigned in 1928,in itpertinent parts states,
"The Republic of Colombia and The Republic of
Nicaragua desirous of putting an end to the territorial
disputebetween them and to-strengthen thetradiriona1
tiesoffriend ship which unite them, have decided to
concIude the presentTrealy...
Article I. The Republic of Colombiarecognizesthe
full andentire sovereignty oftheRepublicof Nicaragua
over the Mosquito coast betweencape Gracias a Dios
and the San Juan river, and aver Mangle Grande and
MangleChico IsIandsin-the ArlanticOcean (GreatCwn
IsIand and Little CU~' Island). The Rtpubiic of
Nicaraguarecognizesthe full and entire sovereignty of
the Republic of Colombia over the islands of San
Andres, Providencia,and Santa Catalifia and over the
other islands, islets and reefs formingpart of the San
Aildls Archipelago. hepresent Treary does no1 apply
to thereefsof Roncaclor,Quitasuefio and
Serrana, sovereignty over-which is in dispute between
Colombia and the United Statesof America.
Article11. The presentTreaty Shall,in order to be
did, be submitted to theCongresses of both Sratesand,
once approved by them, exchango ef ratifications shalI
takeplace atManaguaor ~og6t53s soon aspossible."3
SeeChap. 11Sec. 11paras.2-103-2.121below.
5See NM Vol. TIAnnex19. . .16. When the 1928 Treaty before the NicaraguanSenate for
ratificationit was suggested thata limit be put to the Archipelagoof
San And& becankerf this~was nut 'iibneColombia could cIairn any
isIandsor reefs off the Coast of Nicaragua as being partof the
Archipelago. For this reason the Nicaraguan Congressapproved it
with a Declaration that iwas being ratified:
"in theunderstanding that tirearchipeIago of San And&
that ismentioned in the first clause of theTreaty does
not extend to the West of meridian 82 of Greenwich in
the chart published in October 1885 by the
Hydrographic Office ofWashington under the arrtl~ority
of the Secretary of the Navy of the United States of
North~~nerica."~
17. The ColombianEmbassyin Managua was consulted as to whether
the Declaration made by the Nicaraguan Congress would be
accepted by the Government of Colombiaand whether itwouId need
to be submitted again to the Coiombian Co~~gresf sor rtpproval,The
Colombian Ambassador inManagua,Dr.ManuelEsguerra,who had
cosigned the Treaty with the Nicaraguan Under Secretary of State,
Dr. Jose Bircenas, Iapr -rep< 3.. ",,t he had "consulted this paint
with the Ministry, which answered that itaccepted it, and that since
itdid not alterthe text orthe spiritoftheTreaty, itdid not need to be
submitted ru the consideration of theLegislative c ranch. "'ith this
Minisreria1approval, the Declaration of the Nicaraguan Congress
becamepartof theminutes (Acta) of the exchange of ratifications
thattook place on 5 May 1930.~
SeeNM Vol.I1Annex19andChap.II,Sec. III,PartB.
Informedel Ministrode RelacionesExteriores a1 Congreso de 1930,Bogoti,
8rnprentaNacional,1930, p. 223.
SeeChap. 11,Sec.I, PartB.IS. For the next 40 years the situation remained as on the day of the
exchange of ratificationsOn 6 June 1969 the situationchanged and
Colombia notified Nicaragua thatthe Declaration appended by the
Nicaraguan Congress to the 1928 Treaty was a maritime boundary
and [hat, rherefare, Nicaragua had no maritime areas, including
continentarshelf, east of the 82" meridian of longitude West of
Greenwich. This belated interpretationmade by Colombia deprives
Nicaragua of more than 50 % of her mariti~neareas intheCaribbean
and amounts to 'a veritabIe despoilment of her territory since
Colombia's vastly superior military forces immediately backed the
Colombian interpretation.
19. A few years Iater,on 8 September 1972,the United Statesexpressly
renouncedany claim tosovereignty over the cays of Roncador and
Serrana and the Bank of Quitasueiio. Nicaragua immediately
reasserted her claimthatthese cays were specificaIIyexcludedfrom
the 1928 Treaty and thatthey appertained toNicaragua by virtueof
the doctrine of utipossidetis iurislinked to the factof the much
greater adjacencyof these featuresto theNicaraguan mainland than
tothe CoIombian.
20. The arbitrary Colombian interpretation of the 1928 Treaty that
would deprive Nicaragua of the greater part of her maritime
resources inthe Caribbean and that for more than 30years has been
enfarced by the Colombian naval fdrces and the Colombian refusal
to recognize Nicaraguan sovereigntyover the Roncador and Serrana
cays and the Quitasueiio Bank, induced Nicaragua to analyze more
closely [Ire dispute with CoIombia. The concIrr5ion reached by
Nicaragua was that iwas evident -that thDecIaration appended ro
the approvalof the Treaty did not establish a lofedelimitation and thatthe provisionsof-the Treatydid not imply a enunciation by
Nicaragua ofRoncador,SerranaandQuitasueiioN . icaraguatookthe
;j;::,,,,, .*:?'+,.)
view that the belated and self-seiv iter$retation of Colombia
constituted a violation of rke Treaty whose main purpose, as
expressed in its Preamble, was that of "puttingan end to the
territorialdisputebetween them."Nicaraguadecided,furthermore,
to set the historicalrecord strait and thus recalled that the Treaty
itseIfwas invaIid from its inception because itopenly violated the
Constitutionof the period and the Unites States, thathad speciaI
interestsinvolved in thematter,hadimposed the Treatyagainst the
wiIIof theNicaraguanGovernment.
21. Having reached these conclusioN nicaragua made a pubIic
statementon4 February 1980 declaringthe nullityand invalidityof
the 1928 Treaty and at the same time inviting Colombia to a
constrrrctve diaIogue on the situation.' This DecIaration was not .
accompanied byany materid attemptto recover possession of the
Archipelagoon the part of Nicaragua. Colombia,for herpart,has
consistently reject& any dialogue on this matter and has simply
, I... .,...
maintainedand reinforc neval palrulsand the capture of any ships
bearing the Nicaraguan flag that fishes or attempts to explojt or
exploreanyresourceseast of the82"meridian.
22. Before describi thg content of the Memorial itis imponan o
point oui that in the 20'hCenmry Nicaragua suffered two major
earthquakesin the CapitalCity of Managua thatlargelydestroyed
herpublicrecords.Thefirstof theseoccurred on 31March1931the
year after the ratification of the 1928 Treaty. Most of the
See NMVol.I1Annex 73. documentation surrounding the concIrrsion of this Treaty has
therefore bee11lost to Nicaragua. The Survey of Relations of the
Unites Statesand Nicaragua, 1909-1932, has a record of this event.
because the marines were stillin Nicaragua and the United States
Army engineers thatwere conducting a survey fur a new canal lo
through NicaraguaheIped controI the ensuing widespread fire that
brokeout.The Surveyrecalls:
"Every Iarge Government building except the NatianaI
Bank, and vi~?uaIIya11the archives of rhe Nicaraguan
Governmentwereburned."I I
The situation was repeated on 22 December 1972 when another
earthquake and fire destroyed most buildings in the center of
Managua.For this reason, the public recordsof Nicaragua are scant
and many of the factscited in the Memorial are taken from official
publications ofother Governments and of scholarsthat are readily
availabIeto thepublic.
23. The NicaraguanMemorialdeals with this case in the following
manner. Part I of the Nicaraguan Memorial addresses the issue of
sovereignty. In Chapter I Nicaragua begins her case by putting
before the Court thelegal basis thatcurlfirmsthatat the moment of
her independence she had fuli sovereigntyover her Atlantic Coast
and the appurtenant islandsoff the coast including theArchipelago
of San Andres.After presenting the historicalbackground and the
context in which the Bhcenas-Esguerra Treaty was concIuded in
1928,Chapter 1Iexplains the reasonsfor thenullity and invalidity of
10
See bebw, Chap. TI ,ec.1,paras.2.74-2.76.
" Surveyof Adtrriunfrom 1G09ro 1932, U~iredSraresGovernment Printing
Oflce, Woshingrun,1932p. 112. - . T...
the Treary and the conse:eqi~&nco efs irs vioIarion by Colombia.
Additionally, Chapter I1 in a subsidiary fashion, in case the Court
.'+,iJ:r:< ,.,;v.,i,
would consider 'the' 1928 Treaty shll valid, shows that the
Dec1ar;ttiororf the Nicaraguan Congress didnut transform the Treaty
into one of dcli~nitafionand furthermore that the provisions of the
Treaty did nut involve any renunciation of Nicaraguarrsovereignty
over the cays of Roncador and Serrana and the Bankof Quitasueiio.
The Chapterconcludes with the reasonswhy, even if theTreaty had
been vaIidIy concirrded, its violation by Colombia justified its
termination.
24. Part II of the Memorial consists of Chapter In and addresses the
issue of delimitation. It makes clear that the delimitation involves
the mainland coasts of Nicaragua and Colombia and, hence, the
issue of the sovereignty over the isIands, reefs, cays and banks is not
central to the delimitation. Aftera shorr inrroduction, it addresses in
Section II the delimitation requested and the applicable Iaw.Section
111 describes the general geographical framework for the maritime
delimitation between Nicaragua and Colombia and section IV
'9. . *> .;G'.
defines the delimitation area. sections V and VI describe the
r.elevant legislation and claims of respectively Nicaragua and
Colombia. The delimitation between the mainland coasts of
Nicaragua and Colombia is addressed in sections VZT andVIII.The
following sections discuss the weight to be accordedto the various
isIands andcays in the delimitation area. This concenrs the islands
and cays in dispure between Nicaragua and Colombia, which dispute
forms part of the presentproceedings. Sections IX and X discuss the
weight to be accorded the islands of San Andresand Providencia, PARTI
THEISSUEOF SOVEREIGNTY CHAPTER I
THE MOSQUITOCOASTANDADJACENTISLANDS
THE UTIPOSSIDETISIUR£S AS A NORMATIVEPRINCIPLE
I. Introduction
1.1 The objective of this chapter isto show that the Mosquito Coast
(Caribbean Coast) of Nicaragua and theadjacent islandsappertainto
Nicaraguain accordanceto the principle ofutipossidet iuris.
1.2 The positionof Nicaraguais that theBgrcenas-EsguerraTreaty,of 24
March 1928is nulland void.'* Hence, the applicationofthe tldi
possidetis iuriprinciple is decisivnot only because of the general
legal significance of this principle, and its inclusion in the
1
constitutiunaI laws oftheParties,but also becausethe Molina-Gual
Treaty of 15 March I825 stated that this principIeshould govern
matters ofboundaries betweenColombia and theUnited Provinces of
CentralAmerica, one ofthe successorsof whichis Nicaragua.
1.3 The Mosquito Coast and adjacen slands were part of the Audiencia
of Guatemala (which included theprovince ofNicaragua) atthe time
of independence from Spainin 182 1.
1.4 Colombia in 1824,relying upona RoyalOrder of 20 November 1803,
claimed titlover the Mosquito coast.Taking intoaccount thatthis is
the only document that Colombia can invoke as a titleover the
See sltpra Introduction, para.21 andraap.I1Sec.11. ArchipeIa ofoSan Andrks, Nicaragua shaII devote a good partof
[hisChapter rorefuting thatclaim.
1.5 The Royal Order of 1803 - an unclear, precariousand on top ofthat,
ephemeral title - implied a change in the traditionalway of
organizing the tersitu~.iaIdomainof the Crown, and was seen as
such bya11inreresre-dartiesat thetime.
1.6 The Royal Orderof 20 November 1803: 1) did not transferterritorial
jurisdictiv~over the Mosquito Coast and adjacent islandsfrom the
Audiencia ofGuatemala to the Viceroyaltyof Santa Fe (Colombia);
2)it was neverimplemented,and, 3) it wasin any case repealed by
the RoyalOrderof 13November 1806.
1.7 Therefore, Colombia's possession over San Andres and Providcncia,
IargeIy in name onIy and in any case dating from afrer riltime of
independencefrom the Spanish Crown, cannot prevail over a title
foundedon theutipossidefisiurisatthe momentof independence.
11.PreliminaryObservations
A.THEMOSQUITC OOAST AND ITS ISLANDS
1.8 The so-called Mosquito Coast is the coastal area or strip of the
provinces of Cornayagua (Honduras), Nicaragua and Costa Rica,
which was always consideredas a unit, includingthe coastal isIands,
withinthe Audienciaor Kingdomof ~uatemala". There are constant
l3See,for exampIe:"Diaryofparticuo lacurrencesrhattook place othetwo
occasions rhat the FrigareCaptainandComrnavder of tCorvairSariPio Don
Gonzalo Vallejo was commissioned on the Mosquito Coast from the Tinto
River to the settlements of ~arlovento[...I(20 Februa1yll5July 1787),
remittedtothe SecretaryofState of the'Navy.Published by ManueSenmo y references tothe Mosquiro &kt and adjacent isiands in the official
documentation of the era.14
;r?$,: 4'II.,6~';
1.9 The isIandsof San Andrks, Providencia (and Santa Cafalina). asweI1
as theCornIslands, the MisquituCays, Roncador, Ser~ana,SerraniIIa,
Bajo Nuevo and any other cays, and islets located adjacent to the
coast were al1dependencies ofthe Audiencia of Guatemala.
1-10 This was due to the organizational Iogic and other procedures
fullowed by the Catholic Monarchy. As discoveredterritories, given
the traditional jurisdictional distribution of spacitwas impossible
that they did notform part ofthe districtof anAudienciaand, given
the buundaries of theKingdom, this had tu be thatof GuatcmaIa.The
islandsfoIIowed theIegalfateof theircontiguous coast.
1.11 Thisis confirmedby the "suwey of the IslandsandMosquito Coast"
carried outby Ship Lieutenant Josédel Rio un a missionordered by
the Captain-Gene oraluatemaIa berween 2 1 March and 25 August
Sanzin Historicaland geographiculrelationsof CentralAmerica(Collectionof
BooksandDocumentsrefe*ng to the historyof America.Vol. VJII),Madrid,
VictorianoSuarez General Library, 1908,pp ,19-256;and by the Boletfildel
Archivo Generaldei Gobiemu (Guatemala), VI-2(194I ),pp.134-150.Certain
dociirnentation gatherein the Captaincy-GeneraIof GuatemaIn around 1800
was extremely explicitand indudes a wry interesting document that saysit
was "doneinJnnuaty 1793": "Severai news reports from theSan JuanRiver,
istandsadjacentto theMosquitoCoast,provincesanddistrictsthat belongto the
Kingdom of Goatemala. Description of the Port of Blufiers, idem of the
Province of Nicaragua (Years 1791 to 1804)."Apud Relucioneshistbricas y
geogi-cificasdeAméricaCentral, cir., pp.287-328; and Btilerirtdel Archivo
Geneml cM Gabierno (Grraternala), V11-3(ApriI I942), pp.157- 175, citing,
especiall, 69- I71.
14Thus,for example,theCounciIof Statein Aranjuez,7May t792,considerd
the "results of the grnerai $fileun the settlements ofthe Mosquito Coast
regartdittthe evacuation by the English of the adjacentislands calledSan
And&, Providencia, ad other contiguous ones." (General Archive of
Simancas, Guerra Modema, Dossier 6950, File 4, p.56). See NM Vol. Ii
Annex 1. of 1793.This survey included the isIandsof San Andres,P~.ovidencia
arrdSanta Catalina, Mangles and the enrire Mosquito Coast up to
Trujilloin present day ~onduras.'~It clearlyunderlinesthe fact that
these territories were dependencies of the Captaincy-General of
GuatemaIa. SirniIarIy, the map entitIed "Spanish North America,
Soothern Part",drawn and engraved furThornson's new general atlas
of 1816, depicts all the islands and featurespresentlyin disputeas
part of CentralAmerica (seeNMVol.I MapI).
1.12 It iworthwhile to notethat RicardoS. Pereisa,theConsuI Genera1 of
CoIombia in Spain,expresslyacknowledged in I883 that San Andrks
and Providencia were "islands that were an integral part of the
territory of the Mosquito," which impliesthat their fate was tieto
rhar of the Mosquito Coast. It was a territory under a single
jurisdictionI6
B. THE ORIGLN OFTHE DISPUTE OVER THE MOSQUITOCOAST
1.13 According to the Constitution othe Republicof Colombia of 2 July
1821:
"5. The rerritoryofthe Republic ofColombia shall be the
territory included wirhinthe boundaries of the General
-
'5"Dissertationonthetripmadeby,order of the Kingby Ship Lieutenant othe
Royal Navy Jod del Rio to the Islands of San Andris, Santa Catalina,
Providencia,and Mangles,on the Mosquito Coast";precededby the letter with
which it was sentto rhi: Captain-General oGuatemala (TrujiI 25oA,ugust
1793), and (5 March 1794) to the Secretaryof War, ~ncludinginteresting
considerations (General ArchiveofSimancas, GrrerraMuderna,Dossier6950,
FiIe4,p 53,53 his,54).SeeNM VoI. II Annex3.
l6 R. S. Pereira,Documentos sobre 10sLimites de los Estados Unido~ de
Colombia copiados de 10soriginales quseencueratranenel Archivode Indias
de Sevilla1883,p. 156.See NMVol.I1Annex69. ;,.....
Captaincy of Venezuela aha the Viceroyalty and General
Captaincy of the New Kingdom of Granada;but the
designation of it~~specificlimits shall be reservedfor a
;J.k; <, ..,./..
moreapportune rnbrnent."
1.14 On 5 July 1824 Columbia enacted a Decree [hatin Article IdecIared
as illegal any attempt aimed at colonizing the Mosquito Coast
between Cape Gracias a Dios (in present day Nicaragua) and
including rI~eChagres River (inpresent day PanarnB), "which be1011gs
tothe domain andproperty of theRepublicof~o~ornbia ..."I7
1.I5 The United Provincesof Central ~rnerica," a Federation whose
Members were the States of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, EI
Salvador and Guatemala,considered the CoIornbia claims to the
MosquitoCoast to be baseless.
1.16 TheConsrirutionof theCentraIAmerica11 Federation of 22 November
1824 provid esdfoIIowsin Aflicle 5:"The territoryof the RepubIic
is that which formerly comprised the Ancient Kingdom of
Guatemala, with the exception, for the present of the Province of
Chiapas," According1 .,.,.'.U:i..-.,;q,r:,escIaimedrhe Mosquito
Coast as a partofthe Kingdom bf'Gr~aternalbaased on rhe Spanish
~aws.'~
17
The Decree was reproduced inAnnex no 2 of the Nicaraguan Note of 10
September 1919(Deposited with theRegistry,Doc. N. 4). TheDecree does not
mention the Archipelagoof San Andres,whichconfirms the unitary concept -
rharincludte he isIands- held otheMosquitoCoast.
18 The provinces of Central America declared their independenfc rem the
SpanishCrown an 15 September 1821. Months Iarer they were annexed to
Mexico (5 January 1822). But on 29 June 1823, the National Congress of
Central America,acting as Constituent Assembly,declaredthe independenceof
the UnitedProvincesofCentralAmerica.
14See B.F.S.P.Vol. XI11p.725. See infrapara.1.38. C.APPLICATIONOF THE UTl PUSSlDETiURISTO THE SETTLEMENT OFTI-LE
DISPUTE T:HE MOL~NA-GU TALEAT YF 15MARC H825''
1.17 To settletheterritorimatteranddecide the framework of relations
with Colo~nbia,rhe UnitedProvinces ofCentral America sent Mr.
Pedro MoIina toBogorB,soon aftethe I824 Decreewas enacted.
1.18 The recordsof the meetingsheldby PedroMolinawiththeMinister
of Foreign Affairsof Colombia, Pedro GuaI, arefully reflecina
ColombianNoteof 24June 1918.~'According tothesedocuments,in
this meeting(4 March 1825) Gualclaimed Colombian sovereignty
over theMosquito Coast basedon theRoyal Order of20 November
1803 and theDecreeof 5 July 1824.
1.19 TheColombianForeign MinisteraddedthathisGovernment:
"hadresolved not to abandon its rights, unless mnfual
concessions are made and through a speciaI boundary
freary, and that Mr. Molina had ir~stmcrionsfrom his
government toenterinto thatnegotiationhe wouldhave
no problem venturing that it- is quite possiblthat
Colombia would be satisfied with establishing its
dividing line ithatarea fromthemouth of the SanJuan
Riverup to the entranceof Lake Nicaragua...In [his
way ...GuatemaIa would keep ...a11the par{ of the
Mosquito Coastup from the northbank of the San Juan
river."22
1.20 This offer evincesthe reaI interlrion of Colombia in cIaiming the
Mosquito Coast. Its real objewas ro gain controof the SanJuan
River and access to the Great Lake of Nicaragua, which was
perceived as the best possible interoceanic route through the
20B.F.S.PVal. XI1pp.802-811.
Depositewith thRegistry,DocN. I.
Memoria presentada1Congreso Naciunal1918,Vol.I, 382. NMVol. 11.
Annex25.I ~sthmus.~'By offering tretfdfinctheirclaimto practicaIIa11the
CaribbeanCoastof Nicaraguainexchange fortheSanJuanRiver,the
G:*"::is$, n:~.l:+.-
Colombian game kmmes.perfectly 'clea(seebelowpara. 1.103and
Chapter11,Section I, par2.6-2,9),
I
1. 2 Given that Mr. MoI11arepliedthat he "dinot have instructio~to
carry out that demarcation," the Colombian Foreign Minister
respondedthatin thatcasethe attributiof territorwouldhave to
bewithreference to?he utipossidetisof1810or 1820,whichever,"
! andhe agrd todraftsome micies for~nsideration?~
! 1.22 On 10 March 1825,Mr. Gual deliveredto ttheCentralAmerican
representativadrafttreatyand the nextdaya certifiecopy of the
documents mentioned during theimetti~rgon4 March.Mr. Molina
simpIyacknowledgedreceipt ofthesameon 12 March.Finally,onI3
i March, thetexof theMoEina-Gua lreatywasapproved.
!
1.23 TheTreatyof "Perpetual,Union,League and Confederation'\igned
in Bogotrion 15-arch 1825 bydon PedmGual. on behalfof
CcIombia, anddon Pedro ,MoIina,,:behaIf oftheUnited Provinces
,,7 :<,<'
ofCentra l merica,providedinArticlVII:
"TheRepublic ofColombiaandthe United Provincesof
CentralAmerica, obligeand bindthemselves torespect
theirBwndiwiiesas they exisrat presentreservi og
themselvesto settle in a friendlymanner,and Bmeans
ofa specialconvention,thedemarcati oornivisionalline
between the two States,so swn as circumstanceswill
permit ,r so soon aonePartyshallmanifestto theother
itsdispositiotoenterintosuchnegotiation."
23TheSan JuanRim ispartof presendayNicaraguanterritory. southern
marginisthehrdmIinewifhCost'Rim.
Memoria1918,opcit,p. 382.1.24 And,accordingto Article V:
"Borh Contracti~rg Parties mutuaIIy guarantee the
integrity of their respective territories, against the
attempts and invasions of the subjectsoradherents of the
King of Spain, on the same footing as they existed
previously tothe present war ofindependence."
The adverb"naturalfy " was interlinedby the Federa1Government of
CentralAmericabefore the word "existed"when itratified thetreaty
in order to clarify the referenceto the condition of the territories
beforethe war of independence in Article V.
1-25 AriicIeVIIIprovides that
"...each of the Contracting Parties shallbe at libertyto
name commissioners, who may visitallthe ports and
places of the frontiers,and draw such plans of themas
mayappearconvenientand necessaryfor establishing the
line of demarcation, without any inkrrupifon on rhepan
of [he LocalAuthorities, but on the contrary with a11the
protection and assistance that such Authorities can
possibly afford tothem, towards the due execution of the
business in which they areengaged, after the production
of the Passport of the respectiveGovernment authorizing
them to act."
1.26 Finally, accordingtoArticIe IX:
"The two Contracting Parties, desirous in the meantime,
of providing a remedy against the evils which may be
caused to either, by the Colonization of unauthorized
Adventurers, on any part of the Mosquito Shore, from
Cape Gracias B Dios to he River Chagres, incIusive,
agree to employ theirForces by sea and Iandagainst any
individual or individuals who 'may attempt to form
Establishments on the said Shore, without having first
obtained the permissionof the Government, to which it
belongs in dominion and property."1-27 The ColombianGovernmer~ti?ikiie fdthe treatyon 12 April 825and
theFederal Government of CentralAmericaon 12 September ofthat
-r!fG;,!?: -&:b;- + -.
same year withthe clarificationindrczs in paragraph 1.24above.
The instrumentsof ratificatiu~~were exchanged in rhe city of
1.28 On4 September 1826the Ministerof Colombia to CentralAmerica
requestedthe Secretary ofState of the UnitedProvince is,orderto
negotiate the specialconvention of demarcationprovided bythe
Molina-GuaI Treaty,toinstruct himon"whathas beenconsidered to
date thenaturallimitsbetween thetwo RepubIics." The Secretaryof
State answerid on8 January 1827that"thenaturallimitsthatdivide
the territorof the Republicof Central America with that of
Colombia{are) theEscudo de Vemguasin thk seaui the North. the
mourhof rhe Borucnriver in the provincoe Costa-Ricaon the South
,525
and the distriofChiriqu in thaof Veragua sy land...
1-29 Oncethe Cen trnlAmerican Federationbrokeup26 ,heConstitutionof
Nicaragua of12November 1838provided, inArticIe2,thar
'. - ...:.,- 1
"the territoryof the Stateis thsame asthat previously
includedin theprovinceof Nicaragua:her boundar-iesare
on theEast and NorthEast, thesea oftheAntilles;on the
25The Sgc~taryof Statetransmittedrk agreement of the Presidenof the
RepubIicof CentralAmerica,an thatsame dateThe Ag- wiladopted
"taking intaccountthe geographichartand thelaws contained iBook znd,
Title15,ofthe CompilationoftheIndiesand, finallthe Compendiumofthe
Historyof theCityofGuatemala writtenbybrotherDomingo Juarros, work
writtenwitha viewofallthedataexistingonthysubjectSee NicaraguanNote
of20 Match1917, which isreproducedinAnnex n'31.Memoriapresrntadaa1
Congreso Wacimaf 1917, Vol. U, Tipogmfia Alemana de C. Heuberger,
Managua.p. 400. See NM VoI. 11Amx 24. (Depositedwithhe Registry,
Doc. N.2)
Decreeof the ConstituenAssembly ofthe Stit(ofNicamgrra)on 30 April
1838. North andNwth Wesr the Stateof Honduras;on the West
and the SorrtithePacific Sea;andon the SouthEast the
StareofCosta ~ica."~~
1.30 TheMolina-GualTreatyprovidesthebasisfor theapplicationof uti
possidet iuristo thesolutionof territoridisputespendingbetween
Colombia and the Central American Republics thatsucceeded the
United Provinc esCentral America. The argumentsof the parties
are based on theutipossidetisiuris.
1.31 For example,in 1837 don Lino del Pombo, Secretary of State for
Foreign Relations of Colombia, argued before the Government of
Central America (Nore of2 March) the righrs of Nlreva Granada
based on the 1803 Royal Order and the Molina-GualTreaty.
Although Don Lino reiteratedthat"NuevaGranada would not have,
however,anyproblemin ceding to Central Americaherrights over
the Mosquito Coast in exchange for a less extensive territorbat
easier to govern", believing that "reasonsand poIitics" advised a
renewalof negotiations.*'
1.32 Even in the noteof 6 August 1925 the Colombian ForeignMinister
refersto the Molina-Gual Treaty as "the regdating norm of legit1
relationsbetween CoIombia an'& United Provinces of Central
America", to therightsof which last Nicaraguais a successor."Itis
undoubtedlythat what was establishedthereon issues of territorial
boundaries is the normtd settle any disputethatmay arise from its
dernarcafionordef~nition."~~
27See NMVol.I1 Annex 60a.
28This Note was amply transcribedbythe Colombian Foreign Ministry iits
Note of24June 1918(Deposired withthe Regist?, DocN. 3).
29See SeeNM VoI.I1Annex27, L :
,. .:- , 0:i, ,.
111.~onsidiiriitjodfthe Titles
1-33 The triipossideti.i:ris principleis5conclusive for decidin tge
sovereig nisyutebetween Nicaragua and Colombia.Nut onlydoes
thisprinciplehave a general normativevalue, which is especially
acknowledged in the LatinAmericanregion, but, as we havejust
I
seen, iwasalso expIicitIyincl~rdeinthe first constitutiolawsof
thePattiesandagreed bythem inthe Molina-GuaT l reaty(1825) as
decisiveforregulatinmattersof boundaries.
I
A.THETITLES OFTHE PARTIESBEFORE THE ROYA OLRZ)EROF20
1.34 It igenerallyacceptedthat,beforethe Royal Orderof 20 November
I
1803, thejurisdictioof thearchipelagoof San Andds and overall
theislandsadjacenttothe Msquito Coast belonged totheAtldiencia
ofGuatemala ,fwhichthe provinceofNicaragua was part.
;,$ 0*
1.35 Infact,Article1 ofthkColdrnbiaii&wee of5 July 1824,attributed
to theRoyal Order of1803the effwt of segregatingthe Mosquito
. ,..
Coastfrom Cape~raci& abibsdowh toandinelusive ofrheChagres
River,'from thotjuri.~dion of theCaptaincy-General [Guatemala]
towkichiif~nwrly belonged. " (emphasisadded).3'
I.36 For Colombia,accordit nogherMenlorandurn af 5 November 1915,
the jurisdiction of theAudienciaof Guatemalawasrecent,briefand
circumstantial"onlybriefly, from 20 May 1792 to 30 November
30In Colombiathedateof theRoyal&dm isoftenrefed toas30 November
1803becaus eatwas thedateonwhichtheOrder's notificatito thViceroy
of SantaFewas signed.
ThisDecree isreproducedinNicaraguanNote of 10September 1919,annex
2. (Depositewith thRegistry,Doc.N.4). 1803, with a Royal Decree on thar date, the Spanish Sovereign
granted to theCaptain-General ofGuatemala authorizationto send a
Governor tothe islander^."'^
1.37 In fact, the jurisdiction of rhe Audiencia of Guatemala was
longstanding, permanent and conrinuous. The Consul-General of
Colombia inSpain,Ricardo S. Pereira,acknowledgedin 1883,rhat:
'The Viceroys ofSanta Fe exercised in i(the Mosquitos
territory) repeated acts 'ofjurisdicrioir adomain, by
virrne of the extraordinary powers that had bee11
conferredto dealwith the defenseof thatcoast without,
because of that, being consideredan integralpartof the
Viceroyalty" and "Itwas not'until 1803, in which this
incorporation took pIace by SpeciaI RoyaI Order when
rhat coast was considered as aterritorybeIonging to the
Viceroyalty...,33
1.38 The boundaries of the Audiencia of Guatemala were established by
theRoyaI Decree of 28 June 1568, confirmed in 1680 by Law VI,
Title XV, ofBook I1of the CompiIatior~ofrhe Indies (Recupiliacidn
de leyesde 10sReynosde las Indius),whichannulled and substituted
the provisions previously issued. The Audiencia of Guatemala
covered, according the Law VI, Title XV, Book 11, the "said
province of GuatemaIa and thohe of Nicaragua,Chiapas,Higueras,
Cabo de Honduras, Verapaz and Soconusco, with the islandsof the
" See NM VoI.II, Annex23. TIre same positionwas reiterated in Colombian
Note of24 Jrrne 198(Deposiredwiththe Registry,Doc.N. 3)and consoIidated
as official doctrine. This poshion was refuted by Nicaragua by the
Memorandum explanatoryofthecontroversybetween Nicumgua and Colombia
on theDominionofSart Andres Islandsof24 March 1924.Depositedwith the
Registry, DocN. 5.
33 R. Pereira, Dacumenrossobre liqirrfelos Estados- UfiirlRe Colombia
copiados Reiosorigitrales qlsemcuenrrrrn en el archive deindim deSevillir
y acompaiiudosde breves consideraciot~essobre el verdaderutipossidetis
jurisde1810,p. 156.See NM Vol.11'~nnex68.7 , ;: .'I." . b.
' .Wf. .
Coast, bounded on the cas@#$ the Audiencia of Tierra Firme..."
(emphasisadded).34
+i,->*+*uJi: F!..,.."
1.39 At theend ofthelgqhcenturyGreat Britain- which was claimingthe
Atlantic Coasts of CentralAmerica - was forced to leave "'the
Countryof the Mosquito ,swell asthe'Continen tngeneral,and the
Islands adjacent,without exception.""Jnorder to implement this
Agreemenr, rhe UiriversaI Ministry of the Indies issuedthe Royal
Order of 24 September 1786, instructingthePresideno tf Guarernnla
to organize theevacuation ofthe English residentsfrom theCoast of
the~oquito?~
1.40 The Royal Order of 20 May 1792,add=& tothe Presidentof
Guatemala, partially revokedthe previous order, allowingEnglish
residents to remainin the Coast of the Mosquito undercertain
34La Ley VI. Tim10 XV, Gbgo II,,deI...copilacidnde 1680is reproduced
unchangedin the"~ovfsima 'RecoPi~aciirprnornulgairned774 byGXIM 111.
Thiswas ~eproduced inAnnex nu 23 ofrheNicaraguN anoted I0 September
1919 (Deposited with theRegistry,Dm. N. 4). Also in the Mem&m
explanatory offhe conmversy beweer1 Nicaragun and Colombia on rhe
Dominion of Sun Andres Islands,of the NicaraguanForeignMinister J.A.
Umho, of24 March I924,p. 7Depositedwith the RegistrDoc.N.5,
35ArzicleI of the"Convention to expIain,broadenand make effecrive that !
stipulatein ariicle 6 ofthe DefinitivPeace Treaty of 1783," concluded
between SpainandGreat Britainon14July1786. See NM Val.I1Annex I I. i
'' The Royal Order is reproducedin Menaorundrrm explanatory ofthe i
controversybetweenNicaraguaand Colombiaonshe Dominim of SufAndres , I
i.~iando.ftheNicaraguanForeignMinister J,A. Urtecho,of 24 March 1924, I
.17-20.Depositedwiththe Registrg, oc.N.5.
';he RoyalOrder was repmiwed as Annex ng35 ofrheWicamguan Nne of
10 September 1919(Depositd with theRegistry,Doc.N- 4).GeneralArchive
of Simancas ,uerraM&rm, Dossier 6950,file, 17. %e NM Vol. IIkmex
2.1.41 The version sent ro Sanra Fe (Nueva Granada) made it clear, after
communicating theroyaIdecision:
"I advise Your Excellency for your knowledge and
fulfillmentand so thatyou mayin turncommunicate iru
rhe interesred parries, explaining ro them their
dependencyon thePresident of GuatemaIa asChiefof the
settlementsof theMosquito Coast,to whomonthisdateI
adviseof this situatioandask that he sendtheGovernor
andParishpriestof his choice."
1-42 The RoyaI Order of 20 May 1792, menrioned by the Colombian
aurh~rities~~, adbeen precededas we have seen, by those of 24
September1786 and 20 August 1789. Even before that, theRoyal
Ordersof 25 August 1 783-clarifiedthe central responsibilityofthe
President ofthe Arrdie,ciof Gu,atemaIa indisIodgiirgtheBritishand
theauxiliarycharacferof theaction piother authorities."
1.43 The intervention of the Archbishop-Viceroy of Santa Fe (Nueva
Granada), Caballero y Gbngora, in kxecnting the Royal Orders was
-.
always done in agreemenr with the President of the Arrdisncia of
..
Guatemala, and in acknowledgment of the latter'sterritorial
38See suprapara.1.40.
39The RoyalOrdersof 25 August 1783and24 September1786figureas Annex
no28 tothe Noteof 20 March 1917 (DepositedwiththeRegistry,Doc. N. 2)
andin Annexes no4 and 5 tothe Note of10 September 1919.See NM Vol. I1
Annex 24.(Deposited withthe Registry,Doc. N. 4).
From the Archbishop Viceroj;ofSanraFe ro His ExceIIency Mr. Antonio
VaIdCs y Bazin, Secretary of War, 27 FebruaIyMarch and 16 October 788.
General Archiveof Srrnancas,GuerrcMudenla, Dossier 6948, File30,pp263
and 266,andFile 32, Page 278.Similarly,thcorrespondencefrom theViceroy
of SantaFe of 9 MarchI793, Ibid D.,ssier7087,File 17.The"assistance"of
the Viceroyof SantaFe was not,on theotherhand,exclusive.ThePresidentof
GuatemalaaIsorequestedthese and obtain+ rhesame from theCaptain-General
of La Habilna (See, forexarnpIe, GkneraI Archive of Simancas, Guer-ra
Moderan,Dossier6950,File'4,pp. 27-30).1.44 FinaIIy,the British resident$$'bSan Andres did not evacuate the
island.Tn response.-r2heirpetitiontheRoyalOrderof 6 November
1795.issued in coiis6l~atiowithtHe''ouncilof Stateand sent tothe
Presidentof Gua~emal% decided "forthe timebeing notto forcethe
EngIish to evacnate the isIandof San And1.e~ and gather inthe
establishmentof ~luefields,~~] ndratherto influenceand encourage
them to the evacuation at the opportune time and using prudent
measures." Tom6s O'NeiIIe was named as Governor*under the
explicithierarchicaldependencyof theCaptain-Genera lf Guatemala
and he actedinthatcapacity duringthefollowing years.42
1-45 Accordingto the notificatioof the Royal Order of 20 Novemkr
1803to theViceroyof SantaFe:
''TheKing has decided thartheislandof San Andres and
thepartionof theCoast ofMosquitofrom CapeGmcias a
Dios inclusiveto the ChagresRiver, be segregatedfrom
theCaptaincy-Gen ,cilbf~is$te$ala and madedependent
on theViceroyaltyof Santa~e,:..yadviseyourExcellency
inorder that,thrwgh the Departmen entrusted toyour
directionbe issued the ordersconducive tothe carrying
outof thissove~eigndecision..."43
- -
'"ity locatedintheCaribbeanCoast of Nicaragua.Againthiemphasizesthe
connectionofSan Andrdstothemainland ofNicaragua.
''The copyof this RoyalOrderisfound in the GeneraArchiveof Simancas,
Gwrm ModerrraDossier6850,File4, p69.See NM VoI.U Annex 4.
Nicamgwa d
Memo-& explcltraimy of thcwttmversy benveen
Colombiaon[he h-nion of&n Andes fshds, 1924,pp.35-48.Depmited
withtheRegistq, Dm. N. 5,the~epm issuedby theJunraof Fmtificatjcms
and Defense (Juntade FortificacionesyDefensa) on 2 September and 21
October1803, aswellasIpp,48-50]thetextofthe RoyalOrder aswas notified
totheCaptain-Genera of GuatemalaandtotheViceroy ofSantnPe.Given that
thetextofrhenotificatiovariedinthetwocases,theMemorandum goes ontoI 1.46 Accor-ding toColombia, the Royal Order of 20 November 1803 had
the effect of transferring jurisdiction overthe Mosquito Coast
I
between the Chagres river and Cape Gracias a Dios and adjacent
i
islands, frothe Audiencia of Guatemala to theViceroyalty of Santa
I
! Fe (Nueva~ranada).~~ Nicaraguadenies that thRoyaIOrder had this
effect, intealia,because rhis was not the method of transferring
jurisdictioin accordance withthe Laws of the Indies and theOrder
was nevercarried out and was shortly afterwards set aside by a new
Order in 806.
1 1.47 The Nicaraguan arguments were presented by the Nicaraguan
I
Minister of Foreign Affairs, J. A. Urtecho, in the Memorandum
Explanatory of24 March 1924,in thefollowing way:
"I" That theRoyaIOrder of 1803 did not, asit coulnot,
abrogate the statute VI, Titie XV, Book II of the
Compilation of the Laws of the Indies, statute which
instituted the jurisdictional distofctthe Audiencia of
Guatemala;
2""hat whar was abrogated by theRuyaI Order of1803
was theCommission entrustedtothe Caprain-Ge~reralof
GuarernaIa by Royal Order of September ~4~ 1786, in
order to occupy, settleand defend the establishments of
the Mosquito Coast from themouth of theSan Juan River
to Rio Tinto, this last named establishment alone
remaining immediately dependent on thatmilitarychief;
31d That theRoyalOrder of November 20~ 1803 having
beenobjectedto, on rhe-scoreof the flawofobreption, by
the subinspector of militiand by theCaptain-Generalof
Guatemala in expostulationdated on May 29Ihand June
3d 1804, theMinister of War did not insist on its being
discussthe significanceof differences(yp. 0-56)See NM VoI.11Annexes
5 and6.
See, forexample,Note of24June 1918 (Depositewith theRegistry,DocN.
3);or, morerecently,the WhitePaperoColombia 1980pp.19,25-32. --
;;r8~.-,3*I.' ;?'y,*-id*
carried out and, in consequence, said order was quite
givenup;
4'h That besid& 'ging givent 'uh the Royal Order of
November 2oth 1803, the Ministryof War drewup the
Royal ExplanatoryOrder of November 13'~ 1806, in
virtuewhereof wererenewed and rzaffirmed all theruyaI
orders thatprior to1803had made the establishments of
the Mosquito Coast irnmediateIy dependent on the
Captain-General of Guatemala, this Royal Explanatory
Order absolutely annulling the Royal Order of 1803 as
coming after itnU4'
C. THEROYAO LRDER OF20 NOVEMBE1 R803 DID NOT LMPLY A TRANSFER
OF TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OFTHE MOSQUIT COOAST TO THE
VICEROYALT OF SANTA FE
1.48 The Royal Order of 20 November 1803 arose in the ephemeral sphere
of exceptional commissions (ctrmisidfiprivativ~) that the King
deIegared to his representativeour of practica1considerations, and
not in the lung-lastingsphereof territorialjurisdiction.
1.49 The editions of the Compilation.ofr,theIndies following 1803 and
thosecommenting on those laws say nothing about theRoyal Order,
and maintain, unchanged, the same wording in the Iaw establishing
the boundariesofthe districof the Andiencia ofGuatemala.
1.50 Nicaraguaargues,firstly,thatthe document was insufficient in rank-
a Royal Order (Real Orden) and not a RoyalDecree(RealC6dula)- to
produce the transfer of territorial jurisdictitheoMosquitoCoast.
It is surely not by chancethar thedipIomaticcorrespondence from
45 Memorandum explamrory of' the cunrraver.~ybemeen Nit.aragm and
Colombiaon theDuminiortof SanAndresIslarrds,of 24Mmh 1924,p.79. See
alsopp.91-93.Depositedwith theRegistry,Doc.N. 5. Colombia refers to thRoyal Order of 1803 as the "RoyaI Decree
(Real CXdnh),"in order tojustify,byheightening itshiemrcRicaI
statusthe argumentthatthis modest RoyalOrder actuaIIentaileda
transfeof territorjur.isiction.
1.51 TheNicaraguan Note of20March 19 17indicatedthatitwould
"be absoIuteIy impossibIe yo assert that a pureIy
administrativeactas was thecase of the aforementioned
Royal Order (of 1803) ,ouid repeal a IegisIativact
emanatingfrom thionlytribuna lhargedwithexercising
the supreme jurisdictionofthe businessof the Tndies,
such as theCouncil346ihe.amename,according toLaw
11T, itlel,ook a.
1.52 Nicaraguaargues, serondly. rhat theRoyaIOrder of20 November
1803 was no more than an exceptional commission (cumisi4n
privativa) commending to the Viceroy of Santa Fe the military
vigilance of the Mosquito Coas.and,earby islands,without said
46Memoriadei hfitzirc deriolacionaExreriosede Nicaraguade 391%up.
sit.p.244.The notes alsays:"By virtueof Law XIV,Titl11BookI1 n fir11
meetingoftheCol~nciwas requireto dealwith serious matters, awhich
arementioned the repealoflaws and the takingapartnf Audiencias..,the
procedurefsorthesernatters'htobe the'objectoan advanceandcomplete
information,ccordintoLaw XTI,Titl11,Book II..Thus, assumingthathe
Royal Orderof1803 was a lawto dismembera territor"tk Government of
Nicaraguadoesnocunderstandhowthey couldhave beenomitted.,thesolemn
procedurefor thitype of.matterdemandedby the hws inforce,how an
incompeten tuthoritcouldhaveundermined rhe onlyand leghime Council
of the Indiesin flagran'violatioof hw 'III,TrIe 11.BookI1 of the
Compilationof Lawsof t+ Indies,which orders 'rhat nonof ~rhroyal
corrnco irCs,urt~1caldesor ~udge sf burRoyalDomain orinour Capital
Chanceriesaudienciasnoranyotherjudge...shallpretendcognizanceofthe
Affaireof theIndies,ormattpertainiritoourCounci oftheIndiea sm,'ng
which one must undeniablyincludethe'tjoundao rfitesAudiencias and
Provinces".TheLaw II,itli1,Book 11-antheLaw III, TitleBook 11,are
repmduced inthe ~ernorc?ndumt.xplanoiuty ofthe conrrclversyfietween
Nicnmgua and &Mia un the Domilrion.of&Andfes fsiu~dof 24March
1924,pp.34). Depositedwiththe~e~istr~. ocN. 5. commission implying, accordingtocustom, achangein the territorial
boundariesof theA.E'e-.I,of Guatemala.
i$.\,:-< l..r._!.
1.53 The district of;he Audiencias.wasthe standardalways used to
structure the Spanish domain overAmerican territory. It is I
compatible with any other divisions (such as military) and
I
entitlements (such as commissionts hat were more or less
circumstanriaand theresultoftheneed sfa give noment.
1.54 The defence andpopuIationof theterritorieofAmerica were matters
pertainingto the Ministryof War,according to Law XI,Title VI,
Book ID of the Novisima Compilation of the Indies. Their
management did not require the territoriamodification ofthe
Audienciasc,reatedbythe boundary lawsofTitle XV, Book 11of the
Compilation.The Spanish Monarchy at times due to special
circumstancestransferredadministratio nswell as military,udicial
or ecclesiasticaresponsibil ovteiecsrtain territories without
segregatingthem ru-m he provinc tuwhichthey belonged under
ordinary~aw.~~ Inorder tochange theterritorialdemarcationsit was
absolutelynecessary f&Iihea..,.t$ibbe ordered in an expliciand
clearmannerby the~ovelei~n.~~
-
47NicaraguanNotesof20 March1917(DepositedwiththeRegistry,Doc.N. 2)
and 10September1919(Depositedwith.theRegistrDoc. N.4).Memorandum
expianaro ofythecon.troversbetween Nicaragua anti Colombia on the
Dominion of& AndresIsbnds of24 March 1924,pp.23-24.Depositedwith
theRegistry. ocN. 5.
4"~tmran~ explrmarory of thecoarroversy beween Nicaragua and
Colombiaon the Dominionof SunAndre$ islandof24 Match1924, p.28-30,
DepositedwiththeRegistryDoc.N. 5. Mr.Urtecho refertothearbitratiof
the King of Spain in the territoricontroversybetween Colombia and
Venezuela in which Colombia, accordingto Mr. Urtecho (pp. 32-35),
maintainedrhissame rhry? which wa9 confirmed by the RoyalArbiter,
(Asimismo,MemIJa deReiacinnegExreriores1924VoI.I,pp.XXl Iff.)1.55 That had been rhe case, for example, for thc colony ofUsorno,
Iocated in thc province of La Concepci6n of Chile bur which was
conferredin an exceptionalcommissionto the President, Ambrosio
O'Higgins,who retained itevenafterhavingbeenappointedViceroy
of ~irna.~'
I.56 And [hat was the case for rhe Mosquito Coast andAdjacentIslands.
TheNicaraguan Noteof 20 March191 7 developsthispoint:
'The RoyaIOrder of 1803,essentially miIiraryin nature,
conferred upon theViceroyof SantaFe,in his positionas
Captain-Genera!, the exceptional and extraordinary
powersthathadbeen granted tothe Captain-Generao lf
Guatemala,as a resultof the orderof the evacuationof
Englishcitizens from theMosquitoCoast,accordingto
the Treatyof Versaillesof 1783..."~'
1.57 With the RoyaIOrder of 1803the Viceroyof Santa Fe, in hisrniIitary
capacity,was commendedwith the mission previouslygiven to the
Captain-Generalof Guatemala, to occupy, populate and defend [he
territory between Cape Gracias a Dios and the Chagres River. This
was an "exceptional corninission" from which no civilor political
jurisdictiowas derived,justastheViceroyaltyof Nueva Espaiia did
not derive saidjurisdictionfromthe factthat it had ordersto send a
49This was brought upby theSecretariatofJrrstiin the note attachetothe
rulingmddeat thereqiiestothe Secrerariaofwar inthe proceeding thatleto
the RoyalOrderof 13 November 1806(see infrupara.1.76).This rulingwas
included as Annexno24 -duplicate- of theNote of 20 March 1917.See also
Annex no6 Noteof 10 September1919(Depositedwiththe Registry,Doc. N.
4).
SOThe attributioncorrespondingto thepostsof Preside~~tftheAudienciaand
Captain-General, alrhoughusually brought togelheraisingle individuawere
nored distinctlyas is indicatedby Law XLIII, Title XV, Book II (afthe
Compilatio nf theIndies)."Theviceroys wereby law thenaturalPresidentsof
the Audiencias(Law IV, Title 111,Book 111)and CaptainsGeneralof the
provinceoftheirdistricts(Law111, itl111Book111). yearlyamount forthe sustenance of the settiementson the Mosquito
Coast.
A?...n? --.i-?;J
1.58 It waslogical to commissionthe ~iceb~alty of NuevaGranada with
the defence of the Mosquitia and its adjacent islands, taking into
account the condition of Cartagena de Indiasas a strong naval port
and at the same lime maintainingthese clearly Central American
territories under tire jur.isdictiof the entity, the Audiencia OF
Guaternaia,to whichaIIof CentralAmerica beIonged.
I
I
D.THENUN-EXECUTIO AND POSTPONEMENTOFTHE ROYA L RDER OF
1803
1.59 Colombia asserts that the Royal Order of 20 November1803 was
executed immediate1 y.But, in fact, was never executed.
I
1.60 There are many reasons to assert thatthe Royal Order of 1803 was
not executed, but ratherwas postponed and became irrelevantin the ,
enormous and extremeIy complex gears of the Spanish monar.chy's
instituriona1machinery,subjected to growingtensions in her colonies
and in European affairsThe NapoleonicWars that would soon after
establish Joseph Bonaparte as the King of Spain heightened this
tension.
I.6I The Captain-Genera lfGuatemala protested theRoyaIOrder of 1803
and thisunequivocally meant that, according tothe laws at the time,
itsexecution was suspended. Those in Guatemalaresponsibleforthe Mosquito Coast and adjacent IsIands continued to act and make
decisiorlsasif thRoyal Order of 1803did not exis15*.
1.62 TheCaptain-Genera olf Guatemaladid not stoptaking the Mosquito
Coast into accclu~~ir his plans forthe defence of rhe Kingdom of
GuaternaIa. Thus, in December of 1804, rhc Junta of Fortifications
and Defenseagreedwiththe Captain-Genera oln theconvenience of
creatingofficersinthemilitiascompanyof Chontales, being a:
"poinr rh~.oughwhich there is communication with rhe
Bay of BIuefields, and that in addition the Towns
indicatedby theGovernorof Guatemalaa ,nd possessions
of thoseareasare subjectto attacksbythe Mosquitoand
ZamboIndians, itis therefore of'importanceto cover
rhern,with an opposingforce whose vigor and discipIine
may contain the aforen~entionedIndians who want to
destroy thecountry, or fight them off if twereto carry
out anysuddeninva~ion."~~ .
1.63 At thesame time,the Court continued to makedecisionsthataffected
theCoast andIslands and whichcanonly be understoodif the Royal
Order of I803 had been discarded, tharis, if it hadbeen left without
effect.
1.64 There are many RoyaI 0;ders that assume that the Coast of the
Mosqnitos is under the jurisdictionof the Captaincy-Gene oral
Guatemala, suchas thatof 8 August1804,orderingthecreationof a
guardpost inSanJuanof ~icara~ua?~ those of 20 and28 November
51The conrrq actions ofthe Viceroy ofSarrrFe can be explainedbecausehe
did not receive a copy of the correspondencefrom the Captain-Generaolf
52atemala, andthuswas unaware ofit,whichlead toadministrativconfusion.
Reportof theJuntaof FortificatioandDefense,6 December 1804 (Military
HistoricaService,~oieccidn.Genemi deDbcu.Gcnro~ -.1.12.91141).
53M .M. PeraIta, Costa Ric~iy CosradMo.i.quitdoeumenrospara lof~isforia
de la jurisdicci4rer-riiorirleC& Rim.y Colombia,1898. pp.426-432.I y;;.;,:$.;$;*,:Jt+$;.q:$&y:
' ' t I.. . .,,'
, .:b..'
1804,given totheViceroyof ~ueia Espaiiasothat he wouidsend
one hundred thousand pesos yearly to the Captain-Genera of
i .>$a%r>. .A;,.A
Guatemala in orderfd dintain the~stdblishmnt sfthe ~osquitia;~~
I
the of 20 Novemberand 13December 1805, whichrefer tothe
I
I amounts initially designatedfor the general maintenance of the
settlementsof the Mosquito or that of 31 March 1808,
I
regarding navigationand tradeon the San JU~ riverarrdtheplan to
establishatown of up to threehundredresidents "in'theproximityof
saidriverin ~icara~ua". ~n~otherRoyal Order of4 July 1810warns
I
the Viceroyof Santa Fethat boatsof the Viceroyaltshouldnottrade
I
withCentraI America ports,includingSanJuan of Nicaragua w,ithout
I
abidingbythe -specificmIesand orders for their fitting
1.65 In any case, one can be sure that no effectivemeasures hadbeen
I
I takenby rheViceroyaltyby the timetheislands fellintothehands of
I England ~n 26 March 1806, at which time it simply became
I impossibleto puttheRoyalOrder intopractice.
Mentionedin theNicaraguanN:ote.o:20 March191 7.See NM Vol,I1Annex.
(Depositewith the~egistr~,-I&h? .j. 'i'
54{hid.pp455-456.India Archive(Sevilla).Shf 102,Case4,DossierII.
Mentionedin the NicaraguanNote of20 March 1917. (Depositedwith the
RegistryDoc. N. 2). For that of 20 November 1804, seeMeat~randm
exphtory of the controversy between Nicaraguaand Colombia on the
DuminiotrofSanAndres Island, 1924p.68,fn.1.Depositedwiththe Registry,
Doc.N. 5,SeeMM Vol. IAnnex 8,
''MvlcntiondintheNicaragua11Note of20 March 1917.(Depositedwith the
RegistryDoc.N, 2)
'"mentioned in the Nicaraguan Notof20 March 1917. (Depositewith the
RegistryDoc,N. 2)
57GeneralArchiveof the IndiesAudicrzciadeSanta Fe, Shelf, 118, Cas7,
Dossier9.M.M, Femlta,Costa Rim yEjfodos Unidos de Coimbia de 1573
81881 sujurisdiccihy.TUXk-fcs rerriforial~gtin /usrdoc~mento~irridiios
IJPImhiw dejndias deSvifftt p otms atrrortdrecogid upwblimdm con
noms paclaracioneshistbrimy geogd_licas1886. pp.324-325.See NM Vol.
IIAnnex10.1-66 The history irnrnediateIyfollowing thatdate is extremely cwlfusing.
The "definitive treaty of peace, friendshipand alliance" signed in
London between the King of Spain and His British Majesty on 14
January 1809 contributes nothing on this s~bject.~'
1.67 It is rherefore unknown when and under what condirions and
authoritiesthe Island of San Andrdsagain cameunder the domain of
the SpanishMonarchy; butone can assertthat, followingthe removal
of O'NeiIIe as Governor by virtue of the Royai Order of 26 May
1805, [hereisno trace wharsocverin theappr-opriatecenrral registries
ofthe Spanish Authorities having appointed another governor for the
Island.
1.68 A year before thecrisis inthe Spanish Monarchy that was caused by
the abdicationsofthe Kings of Spainin Bayonnein 1808, itwas clear
thatthe Royal Orderof 1803had already become one more of the
manyroyal decisions made inresponse to veryspecific ciscumstances
and later forgotten afterthe circumstances changea dnd it became
impossible to put theminto effect. Now, as before,the Court simply
debated different plans tpopulate the area in ordetoprovidea more
effectivedefence forthose territories.
58It wasratifieinSeville on15 February1809. B.F.S.PVol. I, PartI,pp667-
673. SeeNM Vd. I1Anrrex12. ,,.:', , .{.
I6 The Iack of execution of the I803 orher is exemplified in a well-
documented case.This affair invoIved [heconflict of jurisdiction that
arosebetweentheCaptain-Generao lf GuatemalaandtheIntendantof
the Comay agua Province, regarding the appointment of certain
regularmayorsandtheissueof land titles distributed inTrujillo.The
conflict attempted to clarify who was incharge of governin the
settlements locatedon theMosquito ~oasr.~'
1.70 A largeamountof documentation was generatedin thecourseof this
conflict. This include two lettersfram rhe Captain-General to the
Secretaryof War, expressing whathe considered were the legalbases
for believingthatthe settlementsof theMosquitoCoast feIu nder his
jurisdiction. Theseletterswere bothdated3 March1804, and were
numbered 416 and 41 7.6'
59TheRoyalOrderof 13November1806is reproducedin M. M.Peralta,Costa
Rica y Cmfa de Mosquiro: documenros para la fiisroriCIPla jurisdiccid~
rrrvitoriade Costa Rita y Cnlombirr, 1898. pp.496-498. IndiesArchive
(SeviIIa),Shel101.Case4, Dossier4.See NM VoI.11Annex9.
'' General Archiveof the Indies,Guatemala, Dossier 649: Fileof whi ws
presented by the President of the Audiencia of Guaremnla regarding the
authoritiesfrequentlasked oftheintendantgovernor ofComayugunregarding
kn~wledgeof businessactivitiesin Trujiland the other posiof the Mosquito
Coasr; arrdoa rhe approval or selection offhtwt7ordinav mayors and rhe
syndiccarriedour byrhePresident,ad the resolurionissuedby rheMinistlyof
Warmakirrgknown irsposirion infavor ofrhePresidem.
61LetterNo416 of theCaptain-Generao lf Guatemala on 3 March 1804 and the
documentsaccompanyingit are Annex No 24 of the Note of20 March 1917.
(Similarlyas Annexno38 of the Note of 10 September 1919- Depositedwith
the Registry, Doc. N. 4).See NM Vol. 11Annex 24. (Depositedwith the
Registry,Doc. N.2).In the firsofthese, the Captain-General stares that "The settlements
of Mosquiro have always depcnded directly on this Captaincy-
General in the different branches of the power. Nobody had
questioned as clear and obvious in view of the Royal Orders issued
and the system followed ever since those coIonies were founded.
However-,"theCaptain-Genera1adds, "..rheIntendant of Comayagua
Col. Mr. RamonAnguiano, under the excuse that those settlements
are within theterritoryof his province, is now attemptingtoexercise
in them the authority of his own Ordinance, which is that ofthe
Intendantsof NuevaEspaiia,from four December 1786.''
According to this Ordinance, the Captain-Generalgoes on to explain,
"(the intendant) must be the judge ad hoc andsole chief of the four
branchesof justice, police, treasuryand war, entirelyindependent of
any other chief ortribunal,and with noother-remedies beyond those
of appeal, in certain cases, to the Royal Junta of treasury or the
district audiencia." However,the Presidentsof the Audiencia in fact
have heard "the cases ofthose fourbranches inthe newcolonies. The
King has commissioned them ro settIe those cases and make
arrangements for the same. They are respor~siblefor everything that
happens thereand report directlon all thesematters to the Ministry
of Your Excellency, where they were established by virtue of the
Royal Order of 20 May 1790. Conseque~rtIy, this system is
incompatibIe wirh the powersof said Ordinance of Intendants," never
applied there previously, "always under the concept that the
settlements of the coastand their events were part ofa single unity
commissionedenrireIyro theCaptaincy-General.[...]."u 1.73 Tojustifyhis position,theCaptain-General sentdong withhis letter. .
a very cornplete "Note of the reasons that this Presidency and
-r;&>".::-
Captaincy-Gen haertolconsidei'Gd ts mrnediatedependency
tlrc settlements theMosquito Coast." This IetterIisreal1the royaI
provisionsissued irihis favour since 2782 regarding the Mosquito
Coast and adjacent islands, to which we have already made
referen~e.~~
1.74 The Captain-General requestedin hisIetreNo. 416 thât theSecretary
of War "inform H.M. so that he may send down the appropriate
declaration that I shall continue taking casof the matters of the
~
Mosquito Coast, as hasbeen dune by rnypredecessors.[...]"
1.75 III response to the request made by the Captai~r-GeneraIof
Guatemala, the Royal Order of 13 November 1806 resolved thathe
was the one:
; "..that ito take exclusiveandabs~lrrb~cognizance of al1
affairs arising in rhe settlement at TrujiIIand orher
militaryposts un theMosquito Coast, concerning thefour
branches referredto,in cqmpI~an.cw eith the royaorders
issued since thej&r 1782, irdthbrizinghimto occupy,
defind and settle thathst, unril, rhipurpose c*arried
0i.iinfulolrparri~iiy,HisMajesrylhinks ifBi £0alrer rhe
art~ai system [...]"(emphasisadded.63
1.76 The Royal Order went much further thanresohing the jurisdictiorial
conflict thatarose in the settlement of Trujillo, and thus was
62
I Seesuprapara.1.M.
63See Nicaragua* Note of 20 Mach 1917, chat goes inIength inm the
consideration of this RoyOsder(transcribed in Annex no26 of theNote)
(Deposited wittheRegistry,Doc. N. 2). Similartermswereusedinthe Note
ofIOSeptember1919, reproduced inAnnex No 6,intherulingof theSecretary
of Justice on 12Octuber 180See NM Voi.iiAnnex 24. (Depasitedwiththe
Registr.Doc.N. 4). cornrnnnicatd to the different interestedau~horities.~Above all, as a
wvereign declaration, it was aimed ar dispelling the doubts and
difficultiesarising fromthe complex and tensional history of thenew
colonies, particularly fthose involvedin government.
1.77 The decision co~rtainedin the Royal Order of 1803 thus cannot be
reconciled with the FictsorresoIutionsconfirmed by the Royal Order
of 13 November 1806. It may be concluded that this Royal decision
of 1806can only beunderstood as having leftwithout force or effect
theOrder of 1803.
1.78 "Of this important document,enacted with such solemnity," readsthe
Nicaraguan Note of 20March 1917 in reference to theRoyal Order of
13November1806,
"one can also inferrhe following facts: aIn fact thestate
of affairs created by the Roya1 Order...of 20 November
1803, ifany, were abolished and annulled by the Royal
Order of 13November 1806,as the'latter reestablishesin
that year 1806, the aurhoritof the Captain ofGuatemala,
excluding any other; over rniIitary postsofthe Mosquito
Coast, with no exceptions;b) Makingno exceptions by
the Royal Order ...about any military posts of the
Mosquitos Coast, ... thus included, ips0 fucto, the
jurisdiction on the Archipelago of San Andrks,which
belonged to itgeographica c)Tyh;t asthisRoyal Order
reestablished those prior to ,1803, with which it
cofiflicted,that ~rrbrntfed to the Captain-General of
44 The Royal Order was transmittedby the Secretaryof War notonly to the
Captain-Generalof Guatemala,hutalso to the'secretariesof Justiceandof the
Treasury.in both cases:"The Ministry under your charge Inay issthe orders
conducing to itsexecution.!Itwas aIsosent to theGovernor ofthe Council of
the Indiesand to the Royal AndienciaofGuatemala (on 18 November), "fbr
your irtfarmatiojianfrrlfiiirnandwiththisobjectiveYourExcellencyshoukd
infort mheInrendantgovernor ofComayaguuMr. Ramdn Anguiano." (Annex
no 26 11,and 27, of the Note of 20 March1-917).See NM Vol. I1Annex 24.
(Deposited withtheRegistry,Doc. N. 2). Guatemala all themilitary posts of the Mosquito Coast,
the following, among others, became effective: I - The
Royal Order 05 !23,,January 1 787-,*covering the entire
Nicaraguan Mosquito Coast 'knd' part of that of
Honduras ...II T.he Royal Order by means of which the
Archipelago of San Andrks was placed under the
dependency of the Captaincy-General of GuaternaIa
[November 1 7951..111.The Royal Order of 26 February
1796to the PresidentofGuatemalaregardingtheopening
of the port of SanJuandel Norte ..."
1.79 The conclusion reached by the NicaraguanNote isthat:
"the Royal Order of 13 November 1806 returnedto the
Captain-General of Guatemala the right and all
jurisdiction over the military esrablishmenrs of the
MainIand ofMosquito and its isIands that could have
been taken away in 1803 by the RoyaI OrderofSan
Lorenzo on 20 Novemberof saidyear."65
F.THE : TTITUDE OFTHE FORMERSOVEREIGN
: 1.80 In orderto confirm the attributiorl of rhe Mosquito Coast and its
.-,, ,
island dependenciks to theAudienciaof Guatemala and, specifically,
to itsprovinceof Nicaragua, it isimportant to review the accrediting
*;;:,-,*.?.,.I:'$i
rIocunlentsof tlre ferriforia1representation the representativesthat
participatedin the ConstituentAssembly (Curses Constituyen~esj of.
Cidiz in 1812, aswell as theconfiguration of electoral districts atthat
time.
The Reply of Costa Rica in theArbitration with Colombia before the
1.81
French President ~oubet,"~ refers to the decrees of the Spanish
55 Memoriadel Minisr~riode RelacionesExrerioresde Nicaragua, 1917, op.
cit., p235.See also, Note of I0 dc Septembeof 1919.See NM Vol. II Annex
24.
66Replyto theAllegationofthe Republicof Colombiafiled to theArbitratothe
President of the Republicof France, Loubet, by the Agent of Costa Rica, legislative AssembIies (Corres EspufioiusJof I December 1811, as
well as roArticle IOof theConstitutionof 19 March 1812,to Article
1of DecreeCLXIVof 23 May 1812, that established theprovincial
representations of Guatemala, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, and to
Articles I and2 of Decree CCI of 9October 18 12,that reformed the
Audiencia of~uafemala.6~ A11of these have confirmed the Iaws and
royal acts by virtue of which the mentioned provinces were
constituted and subsisted, with the same boundaries that were
establishedanddefined by KingPhiIip 11inthe 16Ihcentury.
1.82 Decree CLXIV of 23 May 1812 deserves special mention as it
authorizes the"politicaldivision of theterritoriesof Costa Rica and
Nicaragua." According to Peraha "thisdocument PI-oves that at thar
time the Cmsr vj'rhe Mmquiro and [he entire ArIantic coast of
Nicaragua and of Costa Ricu continued to be under the peaceful
jurisdictionofthose provinces."68
1.83 Similarlythe Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1A. Urkcho,
devoted the document titled Significance (Supplement to the
Memorandum of March 28, 19241,dated 8 September of the same
year,to summarize Article 10 ofthe Spanish Cor~stiturionof 19
March 1812 as the "last comtitutive Iaw providi~lg for territorial
divisionamongst Hispanic American colonies," aswell as Decree
CLXIV of theCourts of Cidiz, on 23May 1812.He underscores that
thisdecreeexplicitly fothe firsttime attributed ttheprovinces the
ManuelM. de Peraltaand published in Paris in 1899 under theJurisclictinn
Territurialde la Ripublique de CostaRica. For the Loubet arbitration, see
below paras.1.106-1-111.
67 M. M. Peralta, Jurisdiction TerrirordelfaRkpubliquede Costa Rim,
Paris,1899,p.46, para47.See NMVoi. I1Annex 69.
68Ibil pp.55-56,para.55.See NM VoI.I1Annex 59. islandsadjacentto them, and not tothe Audienceto which they
belonged,as hadbeen doneinTitle XV, Book Il ,ftheCompilation
dy *:,-g+.
cftheIndies of 1685 The ~rchikl&bT8f SanAndtis, of course,is
adjaoen o thepmvinceof ~icarqya!~
1.84 Itis alsoof intertostudy theattitudeotheSpanishCrown toward I
theemancipated republics,s reflecteinthe treatiesorecognition
I
andthoseestablishingdiplomatirelations.
1.85 IntheMarcoleta-PidalTreatywitI?Nicaragua,ignedinMadrid on 25
July 850, Spain recognizedthe independenceofNicaragua with a
territothatincludedadjacenitslands:
"HerCatholis Majesty ..mmunces for ever,in themost
formal and sulern mnanner, for haelf and her
successors,'bds ArticleI, "..the sovereignty,rights
and attributeswhichappertainto herover the American
territorsituatedbetween the Atlantic Ocean and the
%ci fic, wititsadjacentisi~ndsformerly knownunder
thedenomination of theProvinceof Nicaragua,now the
Republic of the same name." "In consequence? reads
Article 11,"Her Catholic Majesty acknowledges the
Republic of Nicaragua,as a- .free, sovereign and
,*".. ...,'
independent nation,with alltke territories thanow
belongto ifftomsea to se.."(emphasisadded).?'
1.86 Thus itwas madeclear, and acknowledgedexplicitlyby the former
sovereign power, rhar Nicamgua had an Adantic (Caribbean,
Mosquito)Coast from the timof herbirth.Furthermoresinceon the
PacificCoast there are no islands of any significanceworth
''Memorandum explanatoryf the controvemy between Nicamgua and
Colombiuon theDorninioof SunAndres Island,924,p. 98. Depositwith
MheRegistrDoc. M-5.
B.F.S.(1852-1853,Vol.XLII,pp,1206-1Z I2.NM Vd. IAnnex13. mentioning in a Treaty of rhat nature, the reference in the Treaty is,
natnraIIyto theCaribbean isIands adjacent to thMosquitoCoasr.
1.87 Thisreasoningis morepersuasivewhenconsideringthat inthetreaty
(of30 January 188 1),in whichSpainacknowledges theindependence
ofColombia,no referenceis made to "adjacentis~ands".~'
G. THE DIFFERENCE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
I.Thefactofpossessiotr
1-88 The applicationof the utipossidetisiuris makesde facto possession
by one partyor the other,or by a thirdparty,irrelevanin attempting
rosettle a territorial dispbetween Statesthat have separated from
rheSpanishCrown.Possessionis nothing in the face of a titIederived
from a sovereignact.72
1-89 Nicaraguadoes not invoke herpossession of theAtIanticCoast or the
Corn Islands as titles of sovereigntbur ratheras a confirmation of
the same according to ~fpossidetisitsris.Possession ison1y relevant
forjustifyingadecision thatisnot clearinterms of utipossidetis.
1.30 In the pastColumbia hasinsistedon the importanceofheroccupation
of San Andres and Providencia in 1822'~ and her continuous
71B.F.S.P.(1880-1881) Vol. LXXII,pp. 1216-1217See NM Vol.IIAnnex 15.
72 See for example para. 68 of the Judgment of 10 October 2002 in the
73meroorn Nigerinease.
See Memorandumof 5 November 19 15,IV; Note o24 Jurrc1918 (Deposited
with the Registry, DocN. 3); White Paper ofCoio~ibiaof1980, pp. 22-23.
(Deposited with the Registry, Doc. N. I).When the provinces of Cenlrai
Americadeclared theirindependencefromSpainon 15 September1 821, San
Andresand Providenciawere actuallyunder theoccupation of acorsairLuis l.:h(. i,;, . I
possessionfromthatdate onward.This ciefacr ourisdictiobesides
beingirrelevanIeftmuch tobedesired duringthosemanyyears.
1.91 Nicaragua hasrejectedthelegaleffectsof thipossession- whichin
anycase didnot includezhe cayson thebanks of Roncador S,emna,
SerraniIIandBajo Nuevo, orany oftheotherbanks adjacent tothe
Mosquito Coast - sinc t is notapossessio iuris.TheNicaraguan
Note of20 MarchI91 7statesthat,
"...mainlybecause saidarchipel daoesnot fall within
the limitof theformerViceroyaltyof theNew Kingdom
of Granada, and because the current possession by
Colombia datesfrom theyear 1824,thatis,aftethe date
of theaforementioneduripos~ideris"?4
1.92 The Note mentioned aboveaddsthat theMolina-Gual Treatyof 1825
provide admodusvivedi thathad not ended,andbecause ofthisthe
Iateracts of sovereignty exercised over the archipelagoby the
Colombian government "isnot legalreasonto cause orconfirm the
lcl,
domain over that 'teriitorynot to consolidate any material
1.93 The White Paper ofColombia 1980,however, doesnotlimit itselto
invoking possession to confirm historical titlesas previous
Aury,flyingtheflagof theFederat erovinceof BuenosAiresandChile.
ColombianoccupationbeganafterAur'sdeath.
74
Memoria del Minisferio dRelucio~~es x/crriores,Marlagua, Nicuragua.
1917,op.citp.249.
75Similarlyt,hNicaraguan Noteof O September 1919(Deposiredwith the
Registy,Doc.N. 4).Colombia's "precariopossessionovertheSan And&
Archipelagwas precis eecauseof thesfatusquoestablishebyarticleVII
oftheMol ina-GuaTreaty.(Memoria delMinistaride RelationeExteriares
correspondiensn 1919,op.cir., p. XXU). See also theMemorandum
exp/at~atorofthe controversy betwen Nicaragu~d Colombia on the
Dominionof San AndresIsland, IE4,pp. 80-82,93-94.Depositedwith the
RegiscryDoc. N.5,whichdiscards whdt iscallethe "prescriptide fact0
possession*'. CoIombian documents had done:6 rather it makes this the
legitimating foundation of her sovereignty stating that even if the
Esguerra-Bhrcenas Treaty had not been signed and the many
validations of Colombian titledid not exist, the Archipelago still
belonged to Colombia. And that the peaceful and uninterrupted
possession of a territorby a Stateover a long period,aIong with the
animo dumine and the acquiescence of thirdStates, was sufficient
titIefor sovereignty.
1.94 In reality, foIlowing independence the exercise of jurisdiction by
Colombiaover the Archipelao gfoSan Andrks and Providencia was
merelynominal.'Throughout the 191h century theislanders' relations
continued to be chiefly with the Central American coast rather than
withCartagena" o,bservedJ. J.parsons.'?
1.95 For a better understanding of the moment when the difference
(re)appeared on the agendas of the parties,one on1y need recaIIthat
the MosquitoCoast and theadjacent islands,sparsely inhabited,were
under the controlof agents of his BritishMajesty who managedand
protectedthe chiefs of the Mosqnitos and Zambos (see below paras.
2.10-2.11).
76Thus, theCommission'sReport to theColombian Senate for thauthorization
of the ratificatioof the BArcenas-EsguerrTareaty had already devoted its
section I1to thacts of sovereigntyof the Republiof Colombia,since itwas
established, over that territoBut it did so in orderto reaffirm the titles
originating fromthe trrpossiderisiuris.This Report was reproduced in the
"Report forthe first debate"otheCoIombianSenate,caIIingfor a positionto
be taken on the Saccio-VAzquezTreaty of I972 (Atzalesdei Congrt.so, 12
December1972,p. 1644).See alsotheExpositionof Motives ofthebillthrough
which the Saccio-Vazquez Treatywas approved(lot, hirdparagraph) .eeinfra
Chap. 11,Sec. IIsubsec.A, 3.
771.J.Parsons. Sun Andris yProvihcia: unageogrufiahistdricade kts istcrs
colombiunasdel Caribe, i956.p. 117.See NM Vol.I1Annex70.1.96 in the middleofth,!a,'"centuryk,,owl.edgeabouttheterritorof the
Mosquitos was not extensive.In those timestheCentralAmerican
government s ereattemptingto attracEuropean immigrantswiIIing
to colonizeuninhabited and largelyunknownam. Nicaraguahad
only threehundredthousand inhabitantsand ofthesenot even fifteen
thousand were intheMosquitia T.heauthoritiesofManagua werenot
able toset theirsightson theArchipelago as Iong as they had not
firmIyestablishedthemselvesinthe AtIantiCoast,and itwas neither
easy norquick togettheEnglish outof thaarea.
1.97 The claim over the Mosquitia is in thNicaraguan Constitutionof
1858." Shortly thereafter, througthe Zeled6n-Wyke Treatyof 28
January 1360, Great Britainrecognized"as beIong ig toandunder
the sovereignty of Republicof Nicaragua the country hitherto
occupied or cIaimed by the MosquitoIndians," and assumed the
obligationthat'TheBritishprotectoratoef thatpartofthe Mosquito
Territory..cease"(ArticleI). The treatyestablishedtheMosquitiu
Resenre"underthe kreignty of .epublic of Nicaragua" (Article
111.~~
I.98 By a Decree of 4 October1864 the Government ofNicaragua
declaredas property oftheStatetheislandsand isletadjace nother
Atlantic mast, placing regulationson commerce of imports and
exports.TheBritishGovernmentfeltrha' thisdecreecontradictedthe
SeeArticleINM Vol.JIAnnex 60b,
l9Article11ofthe Treatyassigneto the Mosquito IndiansaDistriwithin
which theywouldenjoy the rigto governthemselvesandallotherresidents.
SaidDistrictcoveredthe areasbetweenthe Rama and Hueso riverson the
Atlantic.Thedifferences over tinterpretationthis treatwere resolved
throughthearbitratioof the AustriEmperor (Awardof 2July 1881)who
affirmedNicaragua'sovereigntB.F.S.P .1859-I860Vol.L, pp.96-105.See
NM Vol. 11Annex14. agreementsof the Zeled6n-Wy ke Treaty,but Nicaraguareplied that,
by acknowIedginghersovereignty over theMosquitiaand delimiting
the territory assignedto the Mosquito indians, the adjacent isIands
and isletwere underNicaraguansovereignty.
1.99 By I869 Nicaragua had enacted IegisIation onthe exploitation of
turtlefisheries in an island "jurisdictionaI district" iCaribbean,
subjecting fishermento a tributthat was imposedat leastfrom 1896,
andwentasfar as seizingseveralCaymanIslandschooners in 1904.
I.100 In practiceNicaragua had only rid herseIf ofthe diminished British
influencein the lastdecadeof the 19Ihcentury, and formalized thisin
the first decadeofthe2dh century. In effecton 5 March 1890,Isidro
Urtecho, PoliticalDeIegateof the Republic in theMosquita Reserve
and Inspector General of the Atlantic Coast, decreed that "the
jurisdiction thathe municipa1government ofthe Mosqui taReserve
has been exercising in the islands of sheAtIantic Coast, across from
theterritory of the Reserve"was "contrary tothe fullsovereigntyand
domain of the Republic in said islands" (the Corn Islands) and
therefore, LLconsequently,from the time of the publication of this
decree only authorities ofthe Republic may exercise jurisdiction in
saidislands."s0
PresidentRoberto Sactcasapprovedthe Urtecho Decree by means ofanother
Decree on I8March, pubIishedin the GacetaOficiu onl.he 23.On thosesame
datesother decreeswere approved(also publishedinthe Gtlcetaonthe 23rd)by
virtue of which the "District of Corn IsIandwas establishedwith "allthe
islandsof theAtlantiCoast,acrossfrom theterritoryoftheReserve andwhich
to date have been under their own jurisdiction" and declared "The ports of
'Brig Bay' and 'South Bay' on CornIslandand 'Pelican Bay' onLittleCorn
Island ...free ports for commercto all nations,under the rulthat will be
establishedseparatelyin the 'Ordinanceof Corn Island'." See NM Vol. 11
Annexes61and 62.1.101 Four yearslater,in Februarof 1894,under the PresidencyofJosd
SantosZelaya, the MosquitaReserv was abolished.The definitive
+>*:#:,' -.. -?*i,m.
withdrawalof theBritishwas accomplished withthe signingof the
AItamirano-HarrisonTreaty (19 April 1905). This treaty, which
abrogatedthe Zeled6n-Wyke Treaty, "recognize(d) theabsolute
sovereigntof Nicaragua" (Articn)."
1.102 Colombia, on the other hand, jivedwith her back turnedto the
territorishe claimed.Measure suchas the Decreeof 5 July1824
had aboutas mucheffecr, M.M. Peraltanoted,"asPap1 bulls and
mandates haveamong nonbelievers"." The only purposin making
theclaimto theMosquito Coastwas inorderto be takenintoaccount
inany canalprojectintheterritorof ~icara~ua.~~
I.103 &me yearslaterCoIombia was offeringherselftotRe Government
of Her BritannicMajestyas a counterpar tn negotiationover the
boundariesof theMosquitia, seekingto thusobtain,as theBritish
consulinCentral AmericaFedericoChatfieIdwasquick ronotice,the
backingofGreat Britaiin herterritoriclaimsintheCaribbean.
,I. ' I.
I"'
1.104 Chatfieldclearldid notbelieveinthe qualityofatitlbased on the
RoyaI Orderof 1803: 'Nueva Granada shmldprove" C,hatfieIdsaid
ina notetoLordPalmerston, 15AprilI847,
"that those rights and claims ...are supporredby
something more wIid than the RoyaI Order of San
Lot-enzofrom 30 November 1803,or thatsaidorderwas
nor simply a military measur...Without that proof I
presume thattheGovernment ofHer Majesty will nobe
''B.F.S.P.(1~1805~ Val.XCVIII.pg.W71. SeeNM Vol.IAmx 16.
a!Cited ithe Mi~uan Note of 10September1919 (Depasitd with the
Registry,oc.N.4).
83Seeabove,para.1.2andbelowChap. 11,SecI, para2.6-2.9. able tocommit itself tacknowIedgingthe rightsclai~ned
by Nueva Granada in a territory owhich others possess
titleof some weightwhilehersare notlegitimate.''84
1.105 In 1883,R.S.Pereira bemoaned the lackof Colombian interest inthe
Mosquitoterritoryw, hich includ hdeArchipeIago,and that she"has
donenothingtodate toassureour sovereignty,"85
2.The faubei Awardof1I Seprember1900
1.105 The CoIornbianclaims to theMosquitoCoast affected theCaribbean
Coast of Costa Rica as much as that ofNicaragua.Colombia and
Costa Rica signed the first commitment to setrIe thedisputein 1880
(Castrc-Quijano OteroTreatyof 25 DecemberI 880~~) . n additional
agreement of 20 January1886designated the King of Spainas sole
Arbiterover their territorialdispute.87 Given that these treaties
expiredbefore an Award was issued, the Par-tiessigned the Treaty of
4 November 1896 (Esquivel-Hol Cgunivention),designatingas
arbitrator theresidentoftheFrenchRepublic, mile Loubet.
84Chatfieldnoticed, in additionthat the"Viceroyof Nueva Granadanever
exercisedlegislativeauthorioverthisterritoryandthereare also notracesof
there everhaving been an establishmentor localgovernment subjectto his
command on the coasts of tMosqrritosor ofCentraIAmerica." The Opinion
ofChatfieId on the Royal Order of1803 is reproducedas Annex nu 8 of the
Nicaraguan Noteof I0 Septemberof I919.B.F.S.P.See NM VoI.II Annex77.
85R. S. Pereirop. citp.156. Pereiraadds:,"That olombiadoes notneed that
territorynorhasitgiven much evidence of coveting iitis possible..we do
not see whyColombia wouldrelinquishthepoliticalconvenience ofbeing part
ofthe CenfraI American Confederatio..justbecause todayitlacksthe means
to occupy itandconveniently promore itcivilizatioand progress."See NM
VoI. IAnnex SF.
ArticleVII.B.F.S.P.LXXI,p. 215.
87The textof thisConvention,signedad rt.frendum on 20 January1886and
approvedby decrees of 25 and 30 August ofthe same year, is includedas
Annex No 3of theNote of 20 March 1917 (Depositedwith the Regisrry,Doc.
N. 2).B.F.S.P.XCII,pp. 1034-1035-pa~sa~o~Ld~alwparmr r! ~pnmv aq JU yd~i:l%~~s!d~,;eyqurolo3jo sajqs
paqun aqr or s%uoyaq'uogda3xa lnoql!~ 'spuqs!asaq JO XIoqrralay~,,Inyl
Zu!pu~lsrapu n('3puv 6~s '*juanbasqnpup ~pfi.dd 'un8ma~ Avx~ trfs03
ap Z)IJV.IBUIJ]ap uaurnxaunX sopmuawo~ 'SD~OUUO~]~pof?~~ ap?33!pspn!
ns ap D~OJS~ wlw~wd s01uawn3op SOA~HU :v?quto103 ~3!y as03 2p sa1!ur!7
'a~~nd -m '~nl)31~ EISQ cCqpa~u!~pIOUpur!,>ypuy uaS JO I~UPI-lo am~u
ay)raprrn'ern8~utr340au!no~d JaurJojrrJU 11~daq oipasn3~41 '---EUELIE~
jo snurqlsIayl pu~ 1s~o3 o~~rrbso~341uaafiraqpa~imo~pur:juau!ruo3 aqj
urq 6sm~JayrreJspur?~ayb,orsrajarI?'~trysuss rayr40~samyuoupu~ lsak
palvml aIam Lay,31B~IX ~1~03 01pue 'euo~ymund JOIsvayltlopup rseaayj
01pa~v3o lIam Laq, '~1qurolo01 PROD aqlmu ~YUEPV ayj u!pal~o[ sywq
pup sials!'spu~[!ql ~lSu!l~xpnfprlaljr'~JBMV Iaqno?ayl 1vy1aruls!11,,
'IZ XauuV 11'PA WN '8EOI'd313X 'IOA 'd*S'd'fl,,'s~!lqnda?l
~napuadap u~1 ayr uaamlaq 5~81 u! papnpuo3 61r?a 11l jo suo!l~~nd!~s
aq~ put: cog1 jo s.rapJg IELU~ayr !s.~ead%u~ficy~u .w L~nlua3
,g~ ayrJO as~no3ayj u!EIEuralenE)j]~lauag-L~u!e aqln 3asoyr suljam
SE ;r~r?ju30L11~Xo~ax~ aylJO sarluoylnEy%!qaql01 pa13ar1pw u8pa~os
ysrued~ aql Lq panss! suoI~3tu1ii'u'araalpayl pue fgg~[ IaqwanoN OE
~ZPLL Jaq0330I£ :OPLL PZ '6cL.11sn8nv02 :ZZL1JaqmahoN 51 pUE
12 JO saxsaa ~~.lfoaq3fuo!lvl!druoieq)JO XI PUF IA 'ATSMBI Al~elna!lr~d
'0891 JU sap1 aqljo smq jq,up!lq!duro3 y~ f5~~1 IaquIasaU'op~~d
68'Salrgpaz=ri~eylo aylpus~081 JO -Tap0~~ifoa aq1
JO anlm am snyl 3u113afa v3!~ ~1so3 Lq paur~ep1sleo3 ~IJLIE~)ayj
Jaho s1y31 ~ ~~qruo~o3pazrodrnd asayl pa~uap(0061~aq~ua~da 11)
~.~DMV raqrrq ayl '(,,so!a v srty3eq ade3 Igun dn 'ISEUDayr 8uoyt.
puqju dys E) ,,so!Q-~-sB!~EJ~ap d~3 n~,nbsn 'a192 EI ap 3rro1
a1 'luepua)a,su!tmalap apu~qaun,, o) lqSu lay palJassee!quroloD 80~~1 ,1.109 There is onIyone Mosquito Coast. CIearIyone cannot jump from the
folmer Duchy ofVeraguain Pana~ni(then stillpart of CoIornbia)to
San Juandel Norte in Nicaragua,once the AtlanticCoast of Costa
Ricahad been lost byColombia.
I.I10 The LOubeb Award hada sequeI.Upon attaining independence from
Colombia in 1903, Panama asserted against Costa Rica the same
claimspreviouslyset forth by Colombia basedon the Royal Orderof
20 November 1803.A new arbitration was agreed upon with Costa
Rica (Treaty of 17 March 1910) ~csolve bd means of rhe Whire
Award (12 September 1914) thatin essenceconfirmed the Award by
theFrenchPresident.
1.I11 TheWhite Award statesthat "nothingtherein shallbeconsideredas in
anyway reope~ring orchanging thedecree in thepreviousarbirration
rejectingdirectlyorby necessaryimplicationthe claim of Panamato
a territoriaboundary up to Cape Gracias 6 Dios". Concerning the
islandsacross from the coast, the arbitrator felhe did not need ru
.-
by Nicaragua and acknowledging therightness oftheNicaraguan protest, the
Minister of ForeignAffairsof thFrench Republic,TheophileDelcassC,wrote
on 22 October 1900to theMinisterofNicaragua in Paristoclarifthe Award:
"Taking said Convention into account, as well as the general des of
intemationa1 law, the ~rbjter, on nominatively designating the islands
mentioned in the awardhasnot hadinhis mindto sayanythingfartherthan that
the territoof thesislandsmenrroned inthe TreatysignedanMarch 30~1865
bytheRepublicsof CoaaRicaandColombia,doesnot belongto CostaRica.In
theseconditions thrights of ~icara~uover these islands standunalterand
intactas heretofore,the Arbiter havingby no means intended to decide a
question notsubmitted tohis judgment." Emphasis added. (Reprodi~cin the
Annex no33of theNicaraguanNote of 20March 1917 (Depositedwith the
Registry, Doc. N. 2). Also, Nicaraguan Note of I0 September 1919
(Depositedwith the Registry,Doc. N. 41,and Memorandum expianarmy of
the controversy between Nicaruguaand Colombia on the Dominion of Sun
Andres Islund. 1924,pp. 83;84).Deposited with the Registry, Doc. N. 5.
See NM Vol.I1Annex78. take aposition"notk,. , in this decree shabe considered as affecting
the previous decre#'i.-.*ing the islands off the coast since neither
party has suggeste$& this hearing&at :ny question concerning said
islands was here openforconsideration inanyrespect whare~er."~~
3.Theidependence ofPanamtr
Once the LcrlrbeAward denied Colombia's claim over the Atlantic
Coast of Costa Rica, it was absurd to claim, with the same titles
discredited by the Award,sovereignty over a coast located farther
north and aIso over the isIands adjacent tothat coast. In addition,
once Panama separatediron1 Colombia in 1903, Colombia Iost,
particularly following her acknowledgement of Panama as an
independent Stare (Urrutia-Thompson Treaty, 6 Apri1 1914, article
1Il)Y1anylegalbasis tomakeclaimsbasedonher formersovereignly
over Panama which in colonial time was the province of Tierra
Firme. Colombia had.been claiming the Mosquitia and adjacent
islandson the base oftheir suppos&fadscription to thisprovincethat,
in turn, was pan of #the Vicero);aIry of Nueva Granada of which
Colombia wassuccessor.
113 This argument was set forth by the Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign
Affairs,J.A. Urfecho, in hisMemoru~dum Explanatory of28 March
1924andwasbroadly developed in ajudgment of the Supreme Court
of Nicaraguaon 4 May 1928.
90Thedispositifof theWhireAward of 12December 19 14 isincludedas Annex
no 4 of thNoteof20March I91 7(Depositedwith theRegistry,Doc.N. 2).See
also inNM Vol.I1Annex22.
91MoIIey,VoI.111. 1910-1923.p.2538. SeeNM VoI.I1Annex 17.I.I14 According to Urtecho the CoIombian assertion tllat her
acknowledgement of Panama was made within the limits prescribed
for that department by Colombian Law on 9 June 1855 (which
excludedfrom it thMosquito Coastand the adjacenrislands),Iacked
IogicaI and juridica1 consistency, ait was a fast rhat even after
Panama's secession in 1903, Colombia went on claiming the
territories in dispute with Nicaragua based on the alleged adscription
of the territories in colaniaI rimes the province of TierraFirme,
presentday
1.115 According to the Supreme Court of Nicaragua in its judgment of 4
May 1928:
"Once CostaRicaand Panamahad accepted thereview of
theLoubetAward byArbitrator,White,the lastheir of the
old Colombia in matters of boundaries with the Federal
Republic of Central American and the States that
succeeded it, it should be considered executed, and
therefore the conrinental and island territory of the
Nicaraguan Atlantic free of ciain~ from the former
Colombia and hersuccessors,Nueva Granada, the United
States of Colombia, and finally the Republic of
1.116 The Supreme Courtof Nicaragua concIuded initjudgment of 4 May
192sg4:
"Upon Colombia losing, with the independence of
Panama in 1903, the territor[hatbecause its adjacency
to CentraI America was tied to the'matterof boundaries
92 Memorandum explanato~ of the controversy between Nicaragua and
Coiombirron 1!2eDomirrionofSm Andres Island, 1924pp.94-9 D5.posited
with theRegistry,Doc.N:5.
'3Boletin Judicial: Gaceta.1928,pp. 6324 - 5328.See NM VoI.I1Annex
79.
94Idem.SeeNM Vol. I1Annex 79. contemplated in the 1825 treaty, Colombia lost its
condition of heiress, her legalstanding, and the rightto
benefitfrom th e.conce+ssion of the status quo established
.'...<.
in ArticIe VII':(I825 Treaty), to maintain de facro
possession over the Archipelago of SanAndrks ..."
IV.ConcIusions
1.117 The MosquitoCoast and the adjacent islands which were subject to
the territorial jurisdiction of the Audiencia of Guatemala, are
Nicaraguan according to the principle of ttlpossisiderisiurisThey
were Nicaraguanbefore the Royal Order of 20 November 1803, and
continuedto be so afterthatOrder.
1.118 They were Nicaraguan before 83e Order of 1803 according to
provisions going back to the middle of [he century that were
# confirmed in Law VI, Title XV, Book 111 of the Compilatio onfthe
Lawsofihe Kingdoms ofthe indie s,omulgated on 16May 1680.
1.119 They were Nicaraguari affei-'180j'becaure rhe Royal Order of 20
November 1803, whichis not mentionedin thelater Compilations of
Laws of the Indies, did nortransfer territorialjurisdiction ovethe
Mosquifo Cum and ndjnce~t islands from the Andiencia of
Guatemala to theViceroyalty ofSantaFe (CoIombia): 1) iwas o111y
an exceptional commission (comisibn privativ a)arging the Viceroy
of Sanra Fe with its. defense without transferring territorial
jurisdiction; 2) ir was not executed; and, 3) i11any case itwas
abolished bythe RoyalOrder of I3 November 1806.1.I20 The explanatoryRoyal Qrder of 13 November 1806, based on a
request(represeatacidn)of the Captain-Generaolf'Guaxernalaof 3
March1804,confirms theterritoria jurisdictioof theAudienciaof
Guatemalaover theMosquitoCoastanditsdependencies.
1.121 Therefore,Colombia's possessionover SanAnd& and Providencia,
largelyinname andin any casedating afteindependence from the
Spanish Crown, cannot prevailover a titlefounded on the uti
possidetiiuris.
1.122 In any case,thatdefactopossessiondidnotextend,duringat leasthe
whole of the lgthcentury, to thecays on the banks of Roncador,
Serrana,Serranillaand Bajo Ntievo or on any otherbank offthe
MosquitoCoast. CHAPTERI1
THELEGALSTATUSOFTHE 1928 TREATY
2.1 The purpose of the present Chapter is to establish rhat the
sovereignty over the islands of Providencia, San Andres and Santa
Catalina and all the appurtenant islands and cays still appertaito
Nicaragua, norwithstanding the "Bh-cenas-Esgnerra Treaty"
concerning TerritoriaI Questions at Issue between CoIombia and
Nicaraguasignedat Managuaon 24 March 1928.
2.2 In Section I, Nicaragua will introduce theevents leadingup to the
I928 Treaty and the circumstances surrour~dirrg itsconcIusion. In
Section II ,he wiIIshow that theTreaty is invalidand can have no
legal consequence whatsoever.In Section III, she will offer a legal
analysisof the contents of the Treaty. And she will demonstratein
I Section IV that, admittingthe Treaty ever entered inro force, it has
!
I beenterminatedas k consequenceof its breach by Colombia.
2.3 This analysis will be carried out on the basis of the rules and
principles embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treatiesof 23 May 1969, which has been ratified by Colombiaon 10
April 1985 and to which Nicaragua isriota Pmj. However, she
accepts that,with respect to both interpretation of treaties(Articles
31 and 32 of the Convention) and their conditions of validity
(Articles46 to 53j and of rermirlation(Articles 60 to 64), the
I Convention codifies existingrulesof customary inrernationa1law. Section1
Historia1 Backgroundand ContemporaneousEvenfs Leading tothe
SignatureandRatificationof theBarcenas-EsguerraTreatyof 1928
2.4 This Section explainsthehisto1-icabackgroundthatis necessaryfor
understanding the reasons why Nicaragua signed the Barcenas-
Esguema Treatywith Colombia in 1928 and ratified it in 1930.The
Section willbe divided in two parts.Part A highlightsepisodes of
Nicaraguan history afrer-her independence from Spain in1821 with
specialemphasis on theperiod of 1927-1930.PartB wiIIdeal with
the eventsdirectlrelatedto theconclusion of the Barcenas-Esguerra
Treaty of 1928.
2.5 During the Colonjal period Nicaragua, togetherwith the other four
present day Central American Republics, constituted what was
knownas rheCaptaincy-General of GuarernaIa.This entitybecame
ir~dependentofSpainon 15Seprernber 182 1but on 5 Janrraryof the
following yearit was absorbedby the MexicanEmpireof Agustinde
Iturbide.This situation was short lived and in July 18the Central
American RepubIics separated from Mexico and finaIly became
independent of any other Power be itof the Old or of rhe New
World. They ratified their independence and unioby approvingthe
Constitutionof the Central AmericanFederation on 22 November 1824 that included Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua
and Costa Rica. Th, ,Federationonly lasted 15 years andon April
.<$'p'... .,:
30, 1838 Nicaragua became the ii&t 'dzrnber to separate from the
Federation and decIareher sovereigntyandindependence.
2.Influenceofgeogruphy inthehistoryofNicaragzu
2.6 The history of Nicaragua from her indepertder~ceonwards has been
the history of foreign intervention in her internal affairs or of
outrightoccupation.This was not the fateofthe other four provinces
that had e~nerged to independence from the disintegration of the
Captaincy-General of Guatemala. Geography is what made
Nicaragua different. Nature had endowed her with Lake Nicaragua,
the largest lake in Central America, more than 8,000 square
kiIometers in size that connected to the Caribbean by means of the
San Juan River.,and was only separated from tirePacific Oceanby a
smallstripof land of approximately 20 kilometers.
f". -1.- '--,
2.7 A former U~rited States Minister to Nicaragua from 1912- 1913
perceived the importance of the Nicaraguan geographical position on
itshistoricaldevelopment:
"In a11 of these cases of Nicaraguan internarional
conrroversies with Europe, Mexico, and Colombia the
real cause of he trouble was the desire to control the
interoceaniccanalroute."95
P5 A~nericanPolicy in Nicaragua.Mernorandurn on the Convention Between
theUnited States and Nicaragua relative to aninteroceanic Canal and a
Naval Station in the Gulf of Fonseca, signed at Marragua,Nicaraguaon
February 8, 1913. By GeorgeT. Weitzel, Former AmericanMinister to
Nicaragua,1912- 1913.WashingtonG , overnmentPrintingOffice, 1916,p.7.2.8 The interest ofthese countries cerrainly isundoubted but Minister
WeitzeI fails to add the name of his owrrcountry to the list of
interested parties to the Nicaraguan canal route! For it was the
United States, aswill be seen in the following narrative,which most
persisrenfIywught to obtainproprietaryrights over this route.
The possibilities of interoceanic passage through Nicaragua were
appreciated from the earliest days of her colonization. The Spanish
Conquistadors from the very first sought the "uncertain strait"
(estrecho dudoso) rhar would connect rhe Atlantic Ocean to the
PacificOcean.When the Great Lake of Nicaragua was explored and
the San Juan River discovered, this straiwas sought incessantly
through Nicaragua. The interest in Nicaragua as a possi bIe
interoceanic route was manifestedsoon after independenceby the
different maritime powers of the 19'h Century: the Netherlands,
France, Great Britain and the United States. In 1848, for example,
PrinceLouis Napoleon accepted a concession for the buildingof the
"NapaIeon CanaIof Nicaragua" and is said to have commented: "In
the New World there is a State so superbly located as
Constantinople. .We are referring tothe State of Nicaragua...thatis
destined to reach an extraordinary degree of prosperity and
grea~ness.'"6
- --
96Citedin:ThosB. Atkins.NicuragraaCanal.An Account of theexplorations
and surveys for this canal from 1502to the presenttime, and a statement
showing therelationstheretof theGovernnientof theUnited StatesPresented
by the Nicaragua CanaIConsfmcriorr Co., Warner MilIer, President. NY
PrintingCo.(RepublicanPress),New York, 1590,p.If. 3. Thespecial interesof Great Britainand he tlniredSratesin Nicnrrrgua
>:c.>;. .. -1'
2.10 Great Britain had shown an interest in Nicaragrrasince the Colonial
period.She hadestabIished a special relation with the inhabitantsof
the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua, the so-called Mosquito Coast.
Many of these were descendants of the Nicaraguan indigenous
people and of Africans brought to the Caribbean by slave traders.
Afterthe independence of Nicaraguaand the conseqnenrloss of what
protection Spain had afforded to her former Colony, Great Britain
saw her chance to gain a firm foothold on what was considered the
most feasiblecanal route tothe Pacific.IFGreat Britain couldcontrol
the Caribbean Coast of Nicaragua,there was no possibilityof a canaI
beingcutthroughNicaraguawithout her consent.
2.11 Nicaragua was powerless to hinder the relations established by the
t British Government with the leaderof the Mosquitonativeswho was
t
i proclaimed and recognizedas"King of the Mosqrritcs" by the British
Government. In 1844 Great Britain officially proclaimed a
protectorate overthe "Kingdomof the Mosquitos"andestablished as
its 1imitsCapeCamaron in presentdayHondurasand BocasdelToro
inpresent day Panama. This psocIarnationwas folIowed in 1848by
theseizure of the port of San Juan def NorteIocared at the mouth of
theSanJuan River. The port was renamed Greytown.
2.I2 Not only was GreatBritain acrive but, as pointed out above, the
United Strttesdid nut remain far behind. The contemporanearrs
discovery of gold in California in 1848 drew the attention of the
United States more strongly to the strategic positionof Nicaragua in
r'eiationto a canal between both oceans or for any interoceanic traffic. The United States Minister in Nicaragua, Mr.EIijahHise,
concluded a Treaty with the Nicaraguan representative, Mr.
Buenaventura Selva, in June 1849 giving the United States a
concessionfor buildinga canal through Nicaragua.This was seen by
Great Britain as an intolerable provocarand the United States did
notratifytheTreaty.
2.13 In order to avoid an armed conflict betweenthe United States and
Great Britain the Treaty knownas the Clayton-Bulwer Treary was
signed in Washingtonon 19 April 1850.This cornprumiseagreement
was designed to harmonize contending British and United States
interests in Central America. By thisTreaty the Partiesagreed,
amongother things, that neither Party wouldhave exclusivecontrol
over anycanal buiItacross rhe Isthmus;thatboth Partieswould have
equal rights of ~ravigatioacross it,and that neither Pany wouId
exercisedominion over Nicaragua,Costa Rica, theMosquito Coast:
or anypartof CentralAmerica (Art.11.~'
4.Firs occcrpa~ioof'icaragua: WiIIiamWulker1855-1857
2.14 A few years after the signature ofthe Clayton-Bulwer Treaty the
fiIibusteringexpedition of William Walker aIIawed him to become
the onIy United States citizen tbe President of a Latin-American
Country. Walker arrived in Nicaraguawithhis mercenary army in
mid-1855 after having ,triethe previousyear to take from Mexico
BajaCaIifornia and the Stateof Sunora. By the end of 1855he was
virtualmaster of Nicaragua. He procIairnedhimself president of
Nicaraguaon July 12, 1856 and in a special ceremony on 19July
97B.F.S.P.Vo1.XXXVIIIp. 4.
64 was recognized by the United States MinisterinNicaraguaM , r.John
Wheeler. During bm.:.:c:,.tion of Nicaragua,Walker tried tomold
:'.!:-.::
the Nicaraguan le&And social systemtd that of the Southern States
of the United States,forexamplebyenactingIegisIarionesrablishing
slavery in Nicaragua. He maintainedhimself againsfa coalition of
Central American States until his defeat in May 1857. In order to
avoidcapture, he surrenderedto the United States Navy and returned
to the United States.
2.15 The magnitude of thiswarofoccuparion can be better understoodby
simplypointingout that moreUnited Stateswarring citizens died in
this "filibuster war" than in the famous war between the United
States and Spain a few decades later in1898. The attemptto conquer
Nicaraguaproved more costly in American Iivesthan rhe takeover of
Spain'scolonies: Cuba, Puerto Ricoand the ~hili~~ines!~'
1 2.16 The United States Government was not publicly and officially
i !
involve id theWaIkerinvasion butin fact itcould be considered a
covert war waged against Nicaragua. And itwas a covert war
because any official ~riitdd Stbtk'si.nvolvement would have been a
violation of the Claylon-Bulwer Treaty that had been signed a few
years before. It was not a coincidenc teat Nicaragua was selected
for this "filibustering'"invasion and not one of the other Central
Americanneighbours. The reason clearly was that Nicaragua was a
key transport link between Atlantic and Pacific Ocean shipping.
Writing three quarters of a century Iater, in1927, Henry L. Sti~nson
in a defensivebook that rried texpIainthe motivationsfor the then
98 .. .
Berrnann,Karl: Und~r theBigStick: Nicaragua and the UnitedSruresSince
1848 (SouthErrd Press,Bbsron 1986),pp. 72-76. currentUnited Statesoccupation of Nicaragrra,hadthis to say about
WaIker:
"...iis interestingto notethatthetwo matterswhichhavebeen
principally seized upon by our critics in Latin America as
evidencinga contraryand imperialisticpolicy on our part took
place three-quarters of a century ago and Iargel ynder an
influence which no longer exists in the United States. Our
aIIegedspoliationofMexicanterritory atthetime of theMexican
Warandthe popularencouragementgiven in this country to the
filibusteringexpedition ofWilliamWalkerto Nicaraguaeight
yearslaterhavebeenthe two incidentsmostcommonlyused by
hostile critito offsetrhelong and honorable record towhich I
have referred.
Both these took place ata time when negro slavery was a real
anddominatingpowerin the UnitedStates,seekingto acquire
new territoryunder the southern sun forthe furtherance of its
peculiarinterest;and itwas amongthe adherentsof that slave
power thar theMexican Warand WaIkerExpeditionreceived
theirmost ardentsupport."49
2.17 By placing on an equal level the MexicanWar and the WaIker
"expedition"General Stimson confirms the hiddenUnited States
hand in this affair. After all, General Slimsknew what he was
talkingabout. He had been Secretaryof Warof thc UnitedStares
from I9I I-I913, and laterwas Secretaryof State and, during the
Second World War he was againSecretary of War.
militaryadventni+einthe 19'~Century,alrhough interesinthecanal
persistedand several attemptswere made toreachagreementswith
privateUnitedStatescompaniesandsome works were even started
in theSanJuan River. .
9P HenryL. Stirnson,American Policyin Nicat-ugua,New York,
CharlesScribner'sSons,1927,pp. 102-103, 5.Theseiecrionof Pnlmtasthesitfor b~ifrfgcanal
i$f*<\.. -.,::-3-,
2.19 By the endof the1!JfCenturytheUnitedStates haddecided thaif
anycmaI was tobe builtit had lobe by the United States
Government itself annotbyany other-State andthat the United
Statesshould havecornpierecontroIaverit.'#Thismeant thatthe
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty had to be scrapped. This was finally
accomplished with the Hay-Pauncefort ereaty of 18 November
1901 thatdefinitely abrogatedthTreaty of 1850 and gave the
UnitedStatesa frehand tobuildthecanal,
2.20 At thatpointintimetheUnited Statewas studyintgwo optionsthe
Panama route andthe Nicaraguanroute.The decisionwas finally
taken tobuild the canathroughPanama, whichwasthenpartof
I ColombiaSince agreement withColombia was not forthcomingin
the way theUniredStatesGovernment wanted,Panama was"taken"
by ResidentTheodore Roosevettand the UnitedStateandthenew
Nation, which she had8c&ated Ad:hoc, signed a CanalTreatyin
February 1904.
2.21 Tn the meantime in Nicaragua,after a lengthy rule by the
Conservative Pany during the secondhalf oithe Century,a
success IieraI rev011hadbrought Jose S. ZeIayato powerin 1893. The EncyclopaediaBrita~n rica srrccinctlycharacterizhTs mIe
as fo1Iows:
"Zelaya,though a dictator, was a committed nationalist.
He promoted schemes for Central American reunification
and refused to grant the United States transisthmian
canal-building rights on concessionary terms, thus
encouragi tngU~rited States tochoose Panama for the
project. This, plus rurnoursthatZeIayaplanned toinvite
Japan to constructa canal thatwouldhave competed with
the U.S. warerway,causedthe United Sraresro encourage
Zelaya'sConservativeopposition to stage a rev~lt."'~'
2.22
In November 1909 the execution by Zelaya of two "American
soldiersof fortune,Canon and Groce, who heId cummissions in the
revolutionary army, precipitated a crisis."'" The United States
notified the ChargC d'Affdires of Nicaragua in Washington that it
was breaking relations.inthis communication,known in Nicaraguan
history as the "Knox note" after its signatory theUnited States
Secretary ofState, if was statedemphatically, among other things,
rhat:
"TheGovernmentof theUnited States isconvinced that
the revolution represents the idealsand the will of the
majority of theNicaraguan people more faithfully than
the Government of President Zelaya, and that its
peaceable control is well-nigh as extensive as that
hirherro so sternIy a~tem~ted by rhe Government at
~ana~ua."'"
101
History of Nicaragua: Independence, Encyclopaedia Britannica 200 1,
StandardEd.CD-ROM, 1994-2000,PublisherBritannica.comInc.
102The United Stateand Nicaragua:A Ssrvey ofRelrrtionsfrumI909 ro1932,
Ufiire.Srate.rGovernmefiPrinringOBce, Washiqtufi, I932,p.7.
10S~twey 1909-1932,op citp.8.2.23 AlthoughZeiayari:igned, theUnitedSfks refusedtorecognize his
successor, the liberalJod Madriz. Moreover, American forces
;t;>;,: ...'.-:
preventedthe Governmenttroops of PresidentMadriz fromrouting
the revolution. 111view of rhis setback,President Madriz abandoned
Nicaragua in August 19 10. The disconrented Liberal General
Estrada, who had betrayed Zelaya and turnedover to the rebelsthe
garrisonof the city of Bluefields on the Caribbeancoast, assumed
conrroI of the Govenrment. He irnmediatelysought recognirion by
the UnitedStares.
7.TheDcawson Pacts
2.24 In order to concede the recognitionsought by Generaj Estrada, the
United States Ministerto Panama, Mr. Thomas Dawson,"was sent
to representthe views of theState Department". Theconditionslaid
down by Mr. Dawson led the Liberal Estrada and his conservative
-
coIleagues to thesignature of a seriksof pactson 27 October 1910.
Thesepactswere"commorr~ ynown as the DawsonPacts,although
Mr.Dawsonwas notft.signatory,'!. ,y
2.25 In these pacrs the r-evulurionarycoalition agreedto caIIelections for
a Consrituent AssembIy the foiIowing November.This Assembly
would convene in December and elect a President and a Vice-
Presidentfor a period of 2 years.Furthermore, the signatoriesagreed
to support the candidacyof GeneralEstradaforPresidentandthat of
Mr. AdoIfo Diaz as Vice-Presid fernhat period. A constitution
wasto be drawn up guaranteeing,among other rhings, the rights of
foreigners(Pact 1).Pact2 established a claimscommissionthatwas
104
Survey1908-1932,up cit. p.10.
69 tobe appointed by the Gover-nrne~rotf Nicaragua "in harmony wirh
that of the United States" and rheAmerican Agent would approve
the election and number of its members and the plan of its
proceedings. Pact 3 was an agreementto request the aid of the
United Stateswith theobject ofobtaining a loan tobe gnar-anteedby
the customs receipts of Nicaragua that would be colIected in
accordance with terms satisfact tooroth Governments.The fourth
Dawson Pact entailedthatGeneral Estrada could not becandidate in
the next election and that the next President had to be from the
Conservativeparty .Iu5
2.26 The politicalaspects of the Pacts were carried out as agreed: a
Constituent Assembly was elected and, on 31 December 19 10,
General Esrrada was elected Presidentand Diaz Vice-Praidenr. The
United States extended recognition to the new Government the
followingday .IMThe rule of Esrradawas short-lived.HisMinister of
War as well as the Armywere against him and hehanded over the
Presidency toMr. Adolfo DiazinMay 191 1.
2.27 Further civiwar Ied to the inrervention of United States ~narines in
August 1912 in support of the Conservative, Adolfo Dim. "In
suppressing the revolution, seveAmerican marines andbluejackets
lost their li~es."'~ ~lectians were heshortIyafterthe suppression
ofthe Revoluriun and Mr.Diaz, who had been acting Presidentsince
19II, andwas theonly candidate forPresidentw, aselectedfor a full
term.
105ThesePactsarereproducedinSurvey 1909- 1932,opcit,pp.I25-126.
Survey 1909-1932,p.1I. 8 .
I0Survey 1909-1932o,p.citp.22.2.28 Toynbee points uu t tbarthe Censer-vative RevoIutian of 1909-1910
that had ousted Zelaya,
,.jpr,-: -,8, , v"
"was promoted by a Nicaraguan (orCosta Rican)clerk in
the employmentof an American oil company, who made
to the revcIutionar-ycampaign fund a contribution six
hundred times as large as the annun1stipend which he
was receivingfrom hisAmerican empIoyers; and after the
revolutionhad started,the triumph of the Conservatives
was materially assisted by the interventiorof US naval
forces.''108
This ''clerk"was none orher than Adolfo Diaz, thenew President of
Nicaragua.His dedication ro rhe interests of rhe United States was
finallyamplyrewarded.
2.29 The financialaspectsof the Pacts were also carriedout.Pact 3 led to
a IoanConvention between the United Statesand Nicaragua that was
signed June 6, 1911 (Knox-Castrillo onv vent ion).' T^his
Convention provided that the security of the,Ioan was to be the
customs collections of Nicaragua and that Nicaragua cauIdnot alter
the existingcustoms duties for importsorexports(Art. PI)the use of
the funds fromthis loan had tobe periodicallyreviewedandreported
to theDepartment of State(Art. TQ; and that the appointment of the
coIIector of customs had to be approved by the President of the
United States(Art. IV).
2.30 The United States Senate did not ratifthisConventionbut, inspite
of this, the Collector-Generalwas appointed.He was Mr. Clifford
Ham, an American citizen who had been with the Philippine
10ArnoIdJ. Toynbee, Survey offntemaiion Ag1ai~s,1927,Oxford University
Press,London:Humphrey Milford,1929, p.484.
10Reproducedin Survey 1909-1932, op cit, pp. 1228.
71 Customs Service. He assumed officeinDecember 1911 and was on
duty untilJune 1928when he resigned. Mr. IrvingLindbergwho had
been DeputyCollector-Generalsince 1912succeededhim. I0
2.31 The Constituent Assembly approved the Decree establishing the
Mixed Claims Commission provided for in Pact 2. Itwas to be
composed of 3 members: 2 Nicaraguans,one freey appointedby the
Nicaraguan Government and theother on rhereco~n~ne~ldationfthe
State DeparTmenr, and the thir anumpiredesignated by theState
Department.
2.32 The NationalBank was incorporatedunder the lawsof Connecticut
as the Banco NacionaI de Nicaragua and opened for-business in
August 19 12. Its management was under supervision of United
States bankers.
2.33 The Pacific Railwayof Nicaragua hadbeen constructedfrom1878to
1903. It was taken overby American bankers and incorporatedin
Mainein June 1912.'The banker appointed theJ.G. White Co. as
operatingmanager of rhe rai~wa~."'~'
8. CanalTreatieofNicaragua andthe UnitedState1913-1914
2.34 On 8 February 1913, a Treaty (Chamorro-Weitzel) was concluded,
giving theUnited Statesan option on a canal route in returfor a
cash payment of US$3,000,000. This Treaty included provisions
similato thosecommonlycalled thePlatt Amendment thathad been
inserted in the Treaty of the UnitStateswith Cuba of 1903. The
Platt Amendmentprovisions inthe CubanTreaty meantthat,
'IDSurvey 1909-1932,up cir,p14-15.
I11Suwey, 1909f9.3'2,pcir, p25-27.
72 "By its terms, Cuba would not transferCuban land to any
power other than the United States, Cuba's right to
negotiatetreaties was limited, rightsto a naval base in
Cuba (Guantanarno Bay) were ceded to theUnited Srares,
U.S. intervention in Cuba"for the preservation of Cuban
independence" was permitted, and a formal treaty
detailing all the foregoing provisions was provided
for."l2
2.35 The United States Senate refused ratification of the Charnono-
Wei tzelTreatybecause itdid not wanr to accept the responsibilities
brought on by the Platt Amendment provisions it ~ontained."~
2.36 A new Treaty, which was concluded on 5 August 1914 (Chamorro-
I4
Bryan) omitted the expIicit PIatrAmendment type of
AIrhoughrhose provisions were eliminated, the new Treaty made
even more of a mockery of Nicaraguan sovereignty.ArticleI of the
Treaty granted in perpetuity to the United States the proprietary
rights necessaryand convenient for bidding a canal "by way of any
route over Nicaraguan territory". Ar-ticleI1 granted a lease of the
Corn Islands; thright toestablisha naval base "atsuch pIace on tire
territoryof Nicaragua bordering upon the Gulf 'ofFonseca as the
Government of theUnited States may select";and, furthermore, that
these areas "shalI be subjectexclusively to the laws and sovereign
authority of the United States."Even the carrot partof the deaI, the
three million dollars, carried big stick: thesefunds could only be
112PiarAmenhem, &;cyciopedia BrirnnnicaSrandardEd. 2001, CD-ROM,
1994-2001,PublisherBritannica.comInc.
11Survey11909-1932o ,pcit, p29.
'jThe textof thisTreatyisreproduceidnSurvey1909- 1932,opcit,pp. 128-130. disposedof with the approval.of "theSecr+etar of Srateof the USor
by such personas he maydesignare." (Art.ILJ)
The PIatr Amendment type of provisions were really an
inconvenience forthe United States since they imposedan obligation
of ir~terventiofor.the preservation of theindependence of the Srare
under this Typeof protectorare. Withoutthese obIigationsthe Unired
States could decide freely when and where to intervene, as infact
she did on manyoccasions throughout the Caribbean, without being
held to defend the protectorateas ade iureobligntwn.Besides, in the
presentcase, the provisions of the Chainorru-Bryan Treaty made any
cIausesof thePlatt Amendment type superfluous.The United Stares
could invoke at any moment and at her own discretion her right to
protect her option to buildthe canal andtheterritories leasedto her.
2.38 In fact,this is exactIy thejustificarion given by President Coolidge
for the "second occupation ofNicaragua, 1927-1933.""' In his
speech to Congresson 10 January1927,PresidentCoolidge stated:
"The proprietary rights of rheUS in the Nicaragmn canai
route,with rhe necessary implications growing out of it
affectingthe Panama Canal, togetherwith the obligations
flowing from the investments of allclasses of our citizens
in Nicaragua, place us in a .position of peculiar
responsibility..Ithas always been and remains the policy
of the US in suchcircumstances to takethe stepsthar may
be necessary for the preservation and protection of the
lives, the property,andthe interestsof itscirizensand of
thisGovernment -
l lLand and Nawl Operations in which Marines hive participated,
Washington,U.S.Marina Corps,HistoricalDivision, 1948p. 5.
'IJames W. Gaurernbein,ed.:T& ~vol~ri*nof our Latin-AmericarrPolicy:A
Doc~menraryRecord,New York,C ' oIrrrnbi. niversityPress1950,p.625. . ...; . .
2.39 One of the consequences of:the Chamorro-Bryan Treaty was that it
occasioned frictions in the relations of the Central American States.
;;ti;<:;:;- v.a,,,;;.
The right the Treaty gave to the United States to build a navalbase in
rhe Gulf ofFu~rsecawas seen by El Salvador as a violarion ofher
rights in that historical bay and EI Salvadorhad recourse to the
CentraI AmericanCourt of Justice thathad been established in the
Washington Conferences of 1907. Costa Rica also had recourse to
the Court because she considered that the Treaty violated her
navigationrights in rhe San Juan River.The Court decided in favor
of the applicantsbecause it considered that rhe Treaty violated the
rights of those States and, furthermore, that it violated express
provisions of the, Nicaraguan Constitution that prohibited treaties
affecting her territory. Consequently, the Court decided that
Nicaraguawas under the obIigatio11 rorestore the situation as it was
before signingthe ~r.eat~.~'~
I
I 2.40 The provisions of the Chamorro-Bryan Treaty completed the United
States domination'of Nicaragua. By the time of this Treaty the
Unifed Stateshad contsol.- ove. -t.:.I1-ances, customs, mixedclaims
commission and the railroad'of Nicaragua. The presence of the
Marines was relatively symbolic in that only a Legation Guard of
130 men remained after crushing the revolution of 1912. But itwas a
powerful symbol. The Legation Guard was there as a reminder that
at any moment many more of thcir coIIeagues could be caIIed back
in as, in effect, happened after the Civil War of 1926-1927. But, in
the meantime, Nicaragua was relative1y at peacefor the next dozen
years. Elections were held in 1916, 1920 and 1924, with the
ConservativeswinningrhePresidency and controlof Congress.
117
See Sa. IIofthisChap.,Subsec.Part A.
75 8.1925-1933:Revoiurionand MiiirnrOccirparinnufNic~rrrguhy thet/nired
Stales
2.41 The NicaraguanGovernmentinaugurated on 1January 1925 was the
result ofan election that had not been controIIed by [Ire United
states*'"he electedGovernment was acoalitionof aspIinterof the
ConservariveParty in power since 1910 and the Liberal Party. The
President, Mr. Carlos Solorzano,was from the Conservative Party
and the Vice-President, DrJuan B. Sacasa, from theLiberal Party.
The mainstreamConservative candidatethat lost theeIections was
The United States Legation Guard thathad been kept in Managua
since 1912 was withdrawn from Nicaragua on 4 August 1925."~
Two months later on 25 October, the Conservative candidate who
had lusttheeIecbionsin 1924stageda coupd'gtat and rook de facto
controI ofrhe country as Commander in Chief of the Army. He
forced thePresident toexpel from Government all the members of
the Liberal Party and to replace them with his supporters. Some
months IaterPresident SoIor.zanoresigned and General Chamom,
after having been appointed interim President by the Nicaraguan
Congress and not receiving recognition from the United States
Government, decided to resign. Finally, o14 November 1926 the
NicaraguanCongresscontrolled by ChamorrodesignatedMr. Adolfo
Diaz as President of Nicaragua. Diaz had been President of
Nicaragua from 1910to 1917 and had faithfullserved the interests
11A BriefHistoryof theRelatiorzsBetweenthe UnitedStates and Nicaragua
1909-1928,UnitedStatesGovernment PnntingOffice, 1928,p26.
11A BriefHistoy, opsit, p.28. of the United States ~overnment. General Charnornu considered rhat
this specia rllationof Diaz with the United Stares would help his
,...?+,
cause. Three days $f?ei&e appointment of Diaz as President,on 17
November, theUnitedStates Charge delivered a noteof recognition
to the NicaraguanMinister of Foreign~ffairs.'~'
2.43 Diaz did nor Iose much time in rryingto bring his friendship to bear
with the United Srates. On 20 February 1927he even went beyond
rhe wishes ofthe'united States in proposing "that a ae offensive and
defensive treaty be negotiatedbetween the US and Nicaragua for the
purpose of securing the territorial integrity of Nicaragua and
guaranteeing to the US its canal rights."12' In fact, his proposal
amounred to a ne'wversion of the Platt Amendment provisions he
had wanted and had written intothe First CanaITreaty of 1913 rhar
the United States Senate had not ratified as indicated above in
paragraph2.35.
10.1926- 1927 Revolutionand the StimsonAgreements
. I , ' .
2.44 In the inrerim, a civil war had startedin Nicaragua and the United
States marines came back in greater force but did nut take part
overtIyin helpingone faction or the other. However, their presence
put an end to the advance of what seemed the inevitable victory of
the Liberal forces fighting the Government. In view of the chaotic
situation, President Coolidgesent his personal representative, former
United States Secretary of War- Genera1 Henry L. Stirnson, to
I
12P~pers Rehring roihe Foreign Refurionsofrhe UnitetiSfares1926, VoI. II,
p.807.
12BrieJ'Histoly, pcit,p.45. oversee thesituation.I2'On his arrival to Nicaragua,Stimson found
thar althe Parties were readytoaccept Unired States controof the
elections and otherIegaIproceedin hgpsroposed.The sticking point
ofrhe negotiationswas rhe insistence othe LiberaIsthatPresident
Diaz should resign and an interim President be appointed until
elections were held. Diaz was ready to resign but on this point
Stimson was adamant. In one communication with the Secretary of
State, Stimsonnotes:
"I deem retention of Diaz practically necessary for.
adoption of such consritutiona1 method. Our serrlernent
planwould makePresident a mere Figurehead sofar as
Executivepower isconcerned.Thishasbeenand will be
explained to Liberals. Diaz will accept this limitation of
his powers and cheerfully and loyally cooperate with
execution of plan. After careful consideratiowe know
no other Nicaraguan whom we could trust to so
7,123'
cooperate.
In his book published some months after the eve~ltsStimson made
no secret of his preferencefor Diaand his insistencrhat he should
$5I24
remain inoffice:Diaz was ready tobe a"figurehead .
2.45 Stimson's inflexible positionfinallbore results and an agreement
was reached bringingthe civilwar to an end in May 1927. Both
factions had finally acceptedthatDiaz cunti~rueasPresident until
eIections wereheld the foIIowingyear. These elections were to be
heldunder the co~npIeteconrroloftheUnitedstates. 'I5
Ibidop,cit, p.46.
Papers Relatingto the Foreignelatio ofnsheUnite States1927,Vol. 111
,335.
'M Stirnson,ocit,p.66.
125Papers Reiarirto [heForeignRelarionsofthe UnitedSttries 192VoI. 111
p.50.2.46 The May 1927 Agreement: was accepted by a11but one of rhe
generals fighting under Genera1 Moncada, who was rhe milirary
leaderof the LiberalRevblution. This &:. GeneralSandino who did
not accept the Agreement and the tightening of the economic,
political andmilitarycontrolof theUnited StatesoverNicaragua.He
withdrew with hismen to the rnonnrainsand waged a guerrillawar
against rhe United States Marines that Iasted until theIastMarine
was evacuated from Nicaragua in 1933. At the height of the war
against Sandino in late 1928, there were 5,480 marines and navaI
forces in ~icara~ua,'*T~he firstaerialbombings of anopencity in
world historytook place in Nicaragua during this period.If we
comparethe numberof forces in Nicaraguaandherpopulation of
around 700,000 in 1928, atthe time the impressionistllatof an early
version ofthe Vietnam War. A11 theevents that occurred from I927
to 1933 must be seen 'in the Iighrof this military occupation. The
NicaraguanAuthoritiesfromthePresidentdowncould not but Iisfen
carefully to the "suggestions"of the United States Legation in
Managuasince they couldnotbe obliviousto the fact thatseveral
thousand of the best armedmen in.,theworld were backingthese
suggestions.
2.47 Stirnson speIIedout the Agreement to the Secretary of Stare in a
telegram dated 5May 1927.It isanextensive message thatmight be
summedupinthesewords:
"...President Diaz proposesthe creationby Nicaraguan
law of an electoral commission to be controlled by
Americansnominated by the Presidenr of the United
Sbtes and offers to turn over to this board the entire
poIice power of the State..He further offers todisband his army andto delivertheirarms to thecustody of the
United ~tates."'l~'
2.48 The firststep ithe implementationof theAgreemeno tf 1927 was
that bothParties, the Rebeand the Governmentforces, would be
disarmed andtheirweapont surnedover totheUnitedStates military
forces. UnitedStatesAdmiral Latimerissueda proclamationon 10
Mayaddressed tothosewho were i~possessionof weapons:
To avoidthe regrettable and uselesssheddin ogf blood
all individuaandleadenofgroups, now havingin their
possessionorin hidingserviceablerifles, machineguns
or ammunition or who know the location of such
munitionsasmaybe hidden,shouldimmediately deliver
them to the custodyof the nearestdetachment of the
American forces. Upon such deliverypayment of 10
cordobasw iIbe made...928
12.UniteStatesControoftheLegislativeandJudicialBmnches
2.49 The nextstepsin theimplementation oftheAgreement involvedthe
revampingof Congressandthe JudicialBranchof theGovernment.
The Liberal membersof theSuprerneCourt and Congress whohad
been ouste by Chamorro were reinstateand theirsubstitutinmrn
were ousted.This was done unde he instructionsofStirnsorIn a
message sent by Stimson to threbelleaderGeneralMoncada, on
11May heinformshim:
-
In Papers RelatintotheForeignRelationsotheUnitedState1927,Vol.ItI
pp.339-342.
{bidp,345. "I have recommended roPresident Diaz that theSupreme
Court be reconstituted by the elimination of the illegal
judges placed in, thatcourt under Sr. Chamorro...I have
alreadyadvised tha."he.~ongredSb8';kconstituted.. .,,129
2-50 The changesin thejudiciarywent beyond the SupremeCour~.It was
in fact a complete overhaul of the judicial branch under the
supervision of the UnitedStates.The United States Minister kept the
Secretary of State informed of every detailuf this overhaul. This
include cdrnrnlrnicaions on the way rhe Supreme Court would
decideon those cases thathadbeen already decided by the previous
Court and how the appellate courts would be reintegrated. This
correspondence runs from 16 June to 29 September.The solution
finaIIy found for.this revamping of the judicial branch met the
approval of the Stare Depar~ment,Acting Secretaryof Srate Car-r
wired the American Chargk in Managua his opinion on the way
things would be settled. In his words to the Charge: "Solution
outlined by you issatisfactoryto t.e.e~artrnent."'~~
J3i Conr&lover Finances
2-51 Next came the control of the finances. A comptroller of customs
appointed by the StateDepartrnc~ltwas already in place from 191 1
onwards. Customs collections represented approximately 50% of the
revenues of the Government but the United States wanted a stricter
control and to appoint a comptrolIer of internal revenue. Even the
pIiable Diaz resisred this Iast measure because it would have
I2[hid,p,346.
13Ibid,pp.389-398.
81 removed his lasttoken powers in ~icara~usr.'~'It was thought best
notto insist furhe present on thispoint and thatpriorto makinga
final decision an expert wouldbe brought into make an evaluation.
This expert was to be Dr. Cumberland, who since 1923had been
Financial Adviser and Customs Receiver for the Haitian
Government. He arrived in Nicaragua in December of 1927and had
presentedhis report by March of 1928. He found that the financial
condition of the Government of Nicaragua was comparatively
satisfactory. For this reasonthe Secretary of State informed the
United States Minister in Managuaon 19 ApriI1928that he saw no
urgency in impIernenting the financial pIan becauseitwould cause
damageto the image ofthe United States:
"A powerfulweapon would be placed in the hands of
those who criticize us in the US and elsewhere, who
would undoubtedly charge that theGovernmerltof the US
was taking advantageof a so-taile mdi1tary occupation
of Nicaragua to impose u on it a permanenteconomic
and financialdomination."'P
2.52 Inanothermessageon 28 April1928, theSecretaryof State told the
Ministerin Managua that official implementation of tplan was nut
really necessary:
"We do not feelthat it is aallimpossible to solve this
difficultyif the Presidenwill ingood faithcourageously
use all the power at hisdisposal.A few men designated
by General McCoy and appointed by the President of
Nicaragua to key positions inthe Finance Ministry,the
railroad,theNationalBank and therevenueservice might
be aIIthatisrequired."'33
''Ibidp,.416.
'32Papers Relating the Foreign Relrrrioofthe United Stare1828,Vol. III
533-535.
";bid, pp. 537-539.2.53 The way this situationwashandledbrings to light the methodsused
by the United Statesto try to hide the handthat had Nicaragua in her
$:r +., ..-7:
grip.Toynbee describes the truenati11.of United Statesdominion:
"In opening upTropicaIAmericaeconomically, thepeopleof the
US eschewed the outward visible signsof poliricalcontroIin the
shape of 'spheres of influence', 'protectorates', and
annexations ..Yet, although the US did not paint the political
mapof Tropical Americawith her owncolours, the undercurrent
of events in Tropical America was much the same. In both
regions,economic penetrationbrought paIiticalinterventionin irs
train."134
14. EstablishmentaridControloftheNationalGuard
2.54 Another step rowards control of Nicaragua was the creation of a
National Guard (Guardia National). This was done by means of an
Agreementbetween the United States and Nicaragua establishingthe
'Guardia NacionaI de Nicaragua', signed 22 December 1927.TIlis
Nicaraguan Army was to be trained and commanded by United
States Marineofficers .nd the Director-General of the Guardia was
to be a United StatesMhine Gerieral.35
15.To& conrruoifrhe1928, f930 urrd1932elections
2.55 The most difficult step taken to implement the Stimson Agreements
was to spell out thelegal framework under which [he United Stakes
wouIdexercisecontrolof theeIections.
134~oynbeeo ,pcit.p.482.
PapersRelating 10the ForeignRelationsofthe UnitedStates 1927,Vol. III
pp.433-439. The documentary records of thecorrespondence between the Unired
StaresLegation inManagua and the Depar-trnen tfState for the first
quarter of theyear 1928 reflect the enormous pressure put on the
Nicaraguan Government in order that the electoral law giving full
powen roGeneral McCoy be approved in its original The
Nicaraguan Congress was stiII dominatedby the Conservatives and
they were inflexiblyopposed to its enactment. The opposition was
based on very logical constitutional grounds that prohibited the
appointment of a foreigner as Chairman of the NationaI Board of
eIections who, furthermore, would have powersof IegisIation in the
implementarion of the electoral pr.ocess.Thiwas the position taken
by GeneralChamorro,leaderof theConservative Party,and the large
majorityof Deputies who refused to enact the law.
2.57 General McCoy originally wrote the drafr that was before the
Deputies in English. This law would give him quasi-dictatorial
powers over Nicaragua.All suggestions fortoning down the draft of
electoral law were rejected by the United States.For example, rhe
Nicaraguan Foreign Minister suggested that the transIarion from
English to Spanish presented to the Nicaraguan Congress was
imperfect and that an improvedversion might obtainthe approval of
the ~e~uties.'~~Mr. Hughes had already reported thata suggested
cha~rge was, for example, "if the provisiongiving General McCoy
authorityto put into force measuresthatwonid havethe force oflaw
" See Pnpers Relatingttfhe ForeigtrRelations oftheUnited Sfares 1928,
Vol.II Ip.418-486.
13'Telegram from the Chairman of rhe A~ner-icanDelegation to theSixth
Irrternational Conferendf American States (Hughes) to the Secretary of
State, reportiameetingwith the NicaraguanForeignMinisteronJanuary21,
1928)See Ibidp,.446. could be changedto read:'thavefull force'... "ut3he United
Stateswas adamant thatthe powersof GeneralMcCoyhad to be
.-. ....-.
spelledoutexacfly &en.
2.58 The recordsshowthe greatpressure pon thePresidentinManagua
and on the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister who was in Havana
attendingtheSixthInternationClonferenceof AmericaStatesThe
Unite dtateChar@ inManaguawas aIsomakingforcefuldemands
to the members of theChamber of Deputies. He informedthe
I SecretaryofStateon 18January1928 thahehad made icleartothe
Deputies "thatheremustbe no diminutionof the absolutpowers
whichGeneralMcCoy mustexercise."'39
2.59 The cuntruIover the Presidenwas complete in everydetailThe
United StatesMinisterinManagua repottedon 1 February tothe
SecretaryofStatethat President Diand Chamorro had summoned
50 prominent membersof the ConservativePartyto ameeting in
order todiscusstheelectorallawTheMinister reportschathe told
Diaz to cancelthe meetingand thatDiaz '"remise do recalthe
invitatioand insteadto confir with thConservativeleadersin
smallgroups andtosend themto the~e~ation."'"
2.60 There wasa strongresistab ncetheConservativePartymembers ro
the totapowers give noMcCoy not onlybecauseofConstitutional
or nationalistscrupleingiving thesepowersto a foreiggeneral,
l
but also becausethey feltthattheUnited States wasbiased and
wanted Moncada and theLiberal 'towinthe elections.Thiwas
explicitly mentionedto the Americans on several occasions.
'x-Ibidp,.438-439TeIegraof Januar19, 1928,
'3Ibid p,436437.
]bidp.459. "Chamorro asserted that his attitude was iargelythe resultof his
beliefthatthe Department of State had decided to have Moncada
elected president'4'
2.61 On January 17, 1928the Ministerof Foreign Affairsof Nicaragua,
accompanied by the Presidentof the ElectoralBoard of Nicaragua,
visited the Secretaryof State in Havana,Cuba.The Memorandum of
the meetingprepared by the Assistant Secretaryof State, Mr. White,
reports that in thcourse of the meeting the Nicaraguanstold the
Secretary ofStatethat theimpression had been caused in Nicaragua
that theUnited Stateswanted Moncada and the Liberals to win the
electionsand "thatthisimpression had perhaps beencausedbecause
certain of the marines in Nicaragua had made statements and
propaganda in favor of the ~iberais.""~The Chairman of the
American Delegation in Havana reported on 8 February that the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nicaraguhad shown him a telegram
he had received from PresidentDiaz himself. "It stated that he was
doing his bestfor the electoral lawbut thatthe difficuItwas that
Congress and the public in generalfee1that the US is supportinnot
theLiberalPartybutGeneral Moncada personally ."I4'
2.62 The Secretary of State informed the United States Minister in
Managuaon 23 February 1928 that he had received thevisit of the
Nicaraguan Minister inWashington who had brought tohisartention
news reports from American papers conveying the impression that
the American government favored the election of Moncada.
''ConversationwiththeUnited StatesChargC in Managuaas reporteby him
totheSecretaryof StateonJanuary15,Ibidpp.422-423.
14Ibid pp.431-435atp.432.
14Ibid p.464. Furthermoret ,hat his was the impression given by American
officialinNicaragua whoseattitudeseemedpartia o ~0ncada.l~
L?>J,'L . -: :+,
2.63 The supportof the UnifedStatesfor Moncada was also seenin the
doubleshndard usedin measuring the qualificatioofMunmda
and Chamom as candidates to the Presidency.In the caseof
Chamorro the Department of State made it clearon different
occasionssincetheagreementwithStimson inMay of 1927thathis
candidaturefur presidentwouldnot be approved by the United
States.The aIIegedreaso was thar hehadbeen de factoPresident
for a few monthsduring1926. Moncada's fatewas different.The
Conservativeschallenged thadmission ofhis candidacyOneof the
3 members of the NationalElectoralBoard chaired by General
MCC~ ,I4' the Conservative member, presented a statement
opposing the acceptance by the Board of GeneralMoncada's
nominationon severalgrounds.The mostcompelling ground forthe
1 challenge,becauseithad thesame basisasthe impedimen otnwhich
Charnorm had beendenied the righof being acandidate , asthat
GeneralMoncada had been head ,I,.revolutionaryarmy thathad
trieto topple a legitimat~overnhent - the Diaz GoverrrIliet
thathad been recognized as legitimateby the United States in
Novemkr 1926. GeneralMcCoy and the Liberalmemberof the
Boarddecided tomaintainMoncada's n~minsrtion.'~
2.64 Theotherelementprovoking an inclinatiotosupportMoncada was
thecostly struggle the UnitedStawas waging againsthe rebels.
/bidp.469.
14'sspara.2.60.
Repon oftheUnitedStateMinisteinManagua totheSecretaryoSrateon
August 23.PapersRchtingrotheForeignRe!fftiooffkeUnitedSmtesJ928,
Vol.111pp.503-504. The polirical a~rdmiIitarycost of having muse than 5,000 United
Sratesrroops fighting in Nicaragua cannot be overIooked. A well
infonned observer at the time, the renowned historian Arnold
Toynbee,wrote that:
"...as time passed and the omens began ro point to
stalemare rather than check-mate, the statesmen ar
Washington found their acts subjected to a more and
more critical and embarrassing scrutiny on the part of
publicopinion -firstandforemost at home,in the second
degree in Latin America, and insome degree throughout
the
If Chamorro or another Consel-vative leader were to have been
elected President of Nicaragua, therecould not be any foreseeable
end to the fighting on the partof the Liberalrebel leader,General
Sandino, and his men. Things might be different if his former boss,
the former Libera1 rebe1Ieader, Genera1Moncada, were towin rhe
elections. Thisobvious deraiIworrId not have been lost upon the
StateDepartmentnor tothewily Conservative General Chamorro. It
was even believed by many thatpart of the arrangements made by
Mr. Stimson withGeneral Moncada - and the reason whyMoncada
accepted [hat Diaz should continue as President untiI thend of his
period -was the guaranty of his beingelected President in 1928The
fact is that he won the election in 1928 and the other Liberal leader
of the revolution, Dr. Juan B. Sacasa won thnext elections in 1932.
Both elections were underthe complete controlof the United States.
2.65 The struggle of the U~ritedSrates against Chamorro was apparent
even in details. On 18 February the United States Minister in Managua inforrned'iithSeci-etaryof State that the Conservatives
were restive and that:
.t,-.. .:I
"In.view of this situation we have decided to have the
guardia take over the polici~rg of Managua...The
Government has shown an inclination to object this step
but we shall insist upon it.The presentpolice force is
completelydomina~ed by ~harnorro."'~~
2.66 This was rhe reason why the Conservative Deputies opposed to rhe
bitter end the attempts of the State Department to have the
Nicaraguan Congress approve the Electoral Law giving absolute
power to General McCoy. The State Depar~rnentminced no words
with the Conservativesand openIythrearened 10 take serious action
if the Law was not approved. On 17 January 1928 the Acting
Secretary of State wiredthe Charge in Managua and instructed him
to deliver a nore to President Diaznotifying him that ifthe Law was
not enacted the Stare Department would consider it a "breach of
faith"and that further delay in the enactment "would compel this
!
Government to consider seriously what other measures it can and
should take. This warning must he understood in the Iight of
I - 1
rhe more than5,000 unit& taresmarines then inNicaragua!
2.67 But in spiceof the threats, theChamber of Deputies finally rejected
the ElectoralLaw prepared by GeneralMcCoyby a vote of 24 to 18.
The Deputies knew itsapproval would be the deathwarrant of the
Conservarive Party. The United States Minister in Nicaragua
148
Papers Relating tothe Foreign Relations oftheUnited States1928, Vol. 111
pp.468-469.
14fhirf,p425. reported therefusalof the Deputies tothe Secretary ofState on 13
arch.'^' After thisdefeat of the electoral Iawthe United States
MinisterinformedPresident Diaz that he mustmove to organize the
National Board of Elections and that thiscould be done with a
PresidenriaI Decree containin ing substance the eIecrora1 law
preparedby General Mc Coy. The Acting Secretary of State
approved this decisionbut reminded the United States Minister in
Nicaragua: "We assume thatyou will submit thetext ofthe decree
forconsideration here prior to prornu~gation T.he1D5'cree was
signed by President Diaz on 21 March and promulgated in the
Gazeta on 26 March. General McCoy tookoffice as Chairman of the
NationaIBoardof Elections before the Supreme Court of Nicaragua
on 20 arch.'^^
2.68 The eminent historian, ArnoldToynbee, describes thecontents of
thisDecreeinthe foIIowingterms:
"On the 21" March Seiior Diaz published a presidential
decree investingthe National Board of Elections-asnow
constituted under the Electoral Law of the 2othMarch,
1923, with GeneralMcCoy as Chairman-with full and
genera1 autho~~yitto supervise the elecrions of 1928;
suspending the said Electoral law, and all subsequent
laws and decrees relating to elections, in all other
respects; and granting the Chairman of the Board
extraordinary powers.For inststncehe was empowered to
require the removaI of any of his colIeagnes or their
proxies;ro constitutea quorum by his presence alone, at
his own discretion; and, also at his own discretion, to
declare any action or determination an emergency
measure and then pass it, at twenty-four hours 'notice,
150]bid,p476.
I" TelegramdatedMarch 15'h,Ibid,478.
152Ibidp .481, ,'- ('?.
over his colleaQbes'heads. No action or decisionof the
Board was to be valid unless the Chairman concurred,
and in case of a:..: y,was to ha.--,.-7.tingvote."'53
2.69 Thepowers granted by the Decree to GeneraIMcCoy were so greal
that there was even friction with other American afficials in
Nicaragua.The Secrefaryof StafeIlad to send a message toGeneral
McCuyon 21 March informing him that the Guardia Nacional was
not underhis control and command and remainedunder "the control
andcommand of the proper officers ofthe 2ndBrigade, United States
~ari~~es''.~'~
2.70 General Moncadainformed the UnitedStates Legationthat he would
be glad to enter into an agreement with the Conservatives for the
supervision by the Unites States of theelections of 1932.This was
reporteclby the United States Minister in Managua tu the Secretary
of State on 1 October 1928pointing out that he consideredthat this
request should be granted because; in his words, "Now that we
controI the Narional Guard we shaIImore than ever be subject tu
weIIfounded criticism. if we permit:one party to perpetuate itself in
power by dishonestelections."He added, as afurther reasonwhy the
request should be accepted, that 'The situation in Nicaragua is
differe~rtfrom that in anyother Centra1Americarrcountries because
the strengthof the two parziesis so nearly eqriaI and Party feeIing is
so bitter."lS5The Secretaryof State responded on 3 October that
"The Depariment would of course be glad to give a most
sympathetic answer" but that the United States Minister in Managua
. .
153Toynbee,op citp.510.
154
Papers Relaringto rheForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates 1928, Vol. IiI
p.48 1
155fbid, pp505-506. shouId not be the intermediary between Moncada and rhe
Conservatives because this mightbe seen "asindicating a desire on
the partof this Governmentto instigatetheNicaraguanauthorities to
request continuance of the American occu~ation for another 4
years." (Emphasisadded)1 5his epithet on the American presence
in Nicaragua - occupation -was used by Secretaryof State Kellogg
who was aneminentjurist and becamea few yearslatera Memberof
rhe PermanentCourt of InternationalJustice.The Nobel Peace prize
co-sponsorof theBriand-Keitogg Pacr was well aware of the words
he was using.
2.71 The electionstook place on 4 November 1928. The United States
I Ministerin Managuareported the resultto the Secreraryof Stateon
I
12 November indicating that 'The total reportedvote was 132,949
>157 ~h~
and shows a Liberal party majority of 19,471 votes.. .
I inaugurationof Moncada took placeon 1January 1929.The United
States Minister reportedthat same day that "General Beadle, the
chief ofthe Guardia, was respwrsible for mostof the anangernents
for the inauguration..."lS8And so General Moncadawas elected
with the presenceof one United States marine for every 24 voters,
I
I with [he votes counted by Arnerican.Genera1McCoy and was sworn
i1office underthe protectionofUnitedStatesGeneralBeadle!
IsIbid pp.506-507,
I"Ibid p.517.
IsIbid p. 522. 2.72 The electoral victory of November 1928 marked the start ofLibera1
Party rule in Nicaragua that wonld only end in July 1979 with the
'"1:;". '-';.' ,. ."L..
overthrow of the Sornoza ~ov&rihent. United States Marines
controlledthe Congressionalelections held in November 1930 in
exactly the same fashion as the General Electionof 1928.Captain
Johnson of the United States Navy was Przsident of the NationaI
Board of ~lections.'~ The totaIUnited Statespersonnel incharge of
the eIectora1Mission in the I930 elections embraced 36officers and
536 enlisted men and 153 additionalmarines. This personnelwas
evacuated shortlyafter the e1ection.l"The presence of the Marines
in theseelectionshad clearlychangedthe"nearequality"of the two
parries in the view of the United Stares Minister in Managuaas
expressedin the telegramto theSecretaryof Stateon I October I928
quared in paragraph2-70above.
18. TheSpecialInterestsoftheUnitedStates InNicaragua
!
2.73 Whatwerethespecialinterests oftheUnited States inNicaragua that
prornpred the proIonged United Sates occupation? Resident
Coolidge spelled out to 'Congreii inhis January 1927speech, quoted
above paragra2 .h8, thegenera1intereststhat theUnitedStates was
pursuing in the occupation of Nicaragua. The special envoy he sent ,
to Nicaragua, Mr.Stimson,wrote afterhisreturn:
"Nicaragua is aIso relatedrothis Isthmian policy of the
United Stated in a peculiar way not common to its four
Papers Relaringto theForeignRekaiiotrsofthe Uniled Stares1930,VoI.111,
~~652.
See telegramof 14 November 1930 of the United States Minister to
Secretary of StateStimson,Papers Relating to the Foreign Relationsof the
UnitedStdtes, 1930,Vol.111p.655. Central American sisters. It contains within its
boundaries the transisthmian route,which, by common
consent is, nextto thePanama route, mostfeasibIefor an
interoceanic canaI. Sooner or later, thougnot wirhin the
Iives of this generation or possibIy the next, a second
canaI will be constrvcted through the isthmus by that
route, and this canal when completed will necessarily
command the same dominating strategic relation to the
safety ofthe United Statesas thepresent one atPanama.
By the Bryan-Charnorro Treaty, rarified in 1916,
Nicaragua grantedto the United Statesthepermanentand
exclusive right to consrrucLsuch acanal. Any lodgment
of a possibIy hostile foreign influence uponthe terrirory
of Nicaragua would therefore in a doubIe sense be
perilous tothe safetyof the Unitedstates."16'
19.ANew Canal throughNicaragua
2.74 Mr. Stirnson's prediction about a future canal through Nicaragua
became a possibility sooner than even he expected. The roaring
twenties were in full swing, the United States economy was
booming, international commerce was thriving and the capacity of
the Panama Canal seemingly would be surpassedin the nearfuture.
The need for a new canal was in the air. The cost was seen as
negligibIe in the euphoria of the twenties and the military and
commercial benefitsenannous.
2.75 Against thisbackground,
"On March2, 1929,rheCongressof the US passeda joint
resoiution providingfora new studyof interocea caicl
16Srirnscn,opcitpp. 113-114.
94 . I . .-
I' .1.m,:, k , ..
routes. The resolution, approvedby the Presidenton
March 4, 1929, expressed special interest in the
possibiIityof t,nlargementof the.PanamaCanalandin
theprojectfor r;& canalthrough~icara~ua."'~
2,76 FieIdworkon the surveyof the Nicaraguanroute began in August
I929 and was finishedbefore July 1931. The report of the
Interocea CnincaBoard, basedon thissurvey,was presentedtothe
United StatesCongress on 10 December1931. It indicated thatan
interoceanicship canal across Nicaragua was practicable and
involved no problems that could not be solved successfuIIyThe
1909-1932 Survey of ReIations goes on to say that despitethe
advantagesof such acanal,the recommendatio nf theInteroceanic
CanalBoard stated;
"73. The presentconditionsof worldtrade,thenecessity
foreconomy in expenditureof publifunds,andthefacts
thattrafficthroughthe Panama Canal nowrequiresonly
abut 50 per centof itscapacity..leadto theconclusion
that no immediate steps must be taken to provide
increased facili forepassingwater-borne traffic from
ocean to
2.77 The reasons givenby theCanalBoard can be reduced toone: The
Great Depression that began in theUnited States afterthe stock
market crash of October 1929 and spread to Europe and the
industrialized worldd,rasticaIlyreducedinternationaltradeand,
hence, trafficthrough the Panama Canal. The undertaking of
expensive projec wtssobviouslyout ofthe question. hiseconomic
S~.tme1909-1932 ,p.citp.113.
Ibidp,p.113-I14. reality affected the plans the United Statesin the Caribbean, and
particularly in Nicaragua. With the canal project cancelled or
postponed indefinitelyand the financialwoes in theUnited States,
the interest of Washington in the fate of Nicaraguawas drastically
reduced. Itbecame only a matterof leavingin power a Government
loyalto itsinterestsand of organizing an orderly withdrawal from
Nicaragua.
20.TheWirhdrawal ofUniredStatesMarines
The reasonfor United Stateswithdrawal was notthat thecountryhad
been pacified.The situationinNicaragua in 1930remained basically
the same as in 1928 except for the deteriorationof the national
economy due to the international economic depression. Secretary of
State Stirnsonsent PresidentMoncada,on 24 November 1930, an
extensivemissive anaIyzing the situationin Nicaragua. He indicated
thatthere were still 1,500United Statesmarines in Nicaragua, and
that these marines, together with the more than two thousand
Guardia NacionaI trained and commanded by a United States
Genera1and staff of marineofficers,had sti1notbeen able tocontrol
thesituation thatseemed"as unsettledas itwasthree years ago."Ia
2.79 CeriainIy the"unsettled" situation continued. The guerrilla warfare
was still ragingBut the interesof the United States in Nicaragua
had waned. As noted by Toynbee, "At this stage, the poIicyof the
US Government seemsto have been to leavethis trouble to be dealt
I"Papers RelatingtorheForeignRejarionsofthe UniredStares1930,Vol.111,
pp.683-69 1,atp.684.
96 with by rhe Nicaraguan National Guard under their US offi~ers."''~
By Febn~ary 1931, Mr. Srimson, at that time Secretary of State,
.::; t-, ,;.'.i.
announcedthatmoi-emarines would be withdrawn.It was only after
the elections of 6 November 1932, again won by the Liberals, and
again under the control of a UnitedStatesmilitaryofficer,Admiral
CIark Woodward, who was appointed PI-esidentof the National
Board of Elecrions,and the cominginto officeof the newPresident
on 3 January 1933, that United States military officersturned over
command ofthe National Guard ro Nicaraguan officers.'66 On 3
January 1933 the NicaraguanMinister of Foreign Affairs sent a
telegramto the Secretaryof Stateinforminghim:"yesterday the last
body stationed inNicaraguaof the USArmyleftthe ~e~ublic."'~~
2.80 With the wirhdrawa1 of the Unired Srates marines rhe main
justificationofGenera1Sandirlo for waging his warfarehad ended
and shartIy after he laid down his arms and started peace
negotiationswith thenew President,Dr.Sacasa.The Encyclopaedia
Britannicn describes theseevents:
. I"I
"TheMarines withdrew upon the inaugurationof Sacasa,
andSandino submitted to his government. A Nicaragua11
Nafional Guard(GuardiaNacionaI),trained by the U.S.
Marines and commanded by Genera1 Anastasia Sornuza
Gascia, was now sesponsibIe for maintainingorder in the
country. In 1934 high-rankingofficers led by Sornoza
met andagreed to the assassination of Sandino.Somoza
thendeposedSacasawiththe supportof Factionsof both
'6Toynbee, 1930Survey,p.339.
66 PapersReltziifi10 ihe ForeignReinlionsofthe United Smes 1932, Vol. V
pp.924-925,Telegramof United Stares Minisrerin Managua tothe Secretary
ofStateon2 January 1933.
Ihid,p. 925. Liberals and conservatives, and in a rigged electionhe
became president onJan. i,1 937."158
2.81 No marinescame back to resrore CunstitutionaI Government. After.
aII,the rnan handpicked by the United States to head thearmed
forcesof Nicaragua,General Somoza, was in chargeof Nicaragua
and would look after United States interests. Two years later, in
1939, Somoza was invited to Washington and was received by
President Rooseveltwith allhonours.Genera1Sornoza and hissons
rnIedNicaraguauntiloverthrown in 1979.
THE CONCLUSION OF THE 1928TREATY
As shown in the previous Chapter of the presenr Memorial,
Nicaragua's titlover the San Andresgroup and the neighbouring
islands and caysat rherimeof independence is firmly establishedin
accordancewith theusipossidetisiuri.principle.Because Colombia
was well aware of thelegalsituation,she tookadvantageof theU.S.
occupation of Nicaragua toextort from her the conclusion of the
1928 Treaty. Rre various episodes and rhe surrounding
circnrnstancesof thisextortiodeserve some expIanations.This Part
wiIIreviewthe egoti ti at itat ledto the signature of the Treaty on
24 March 1928 and the events leadingto its ratificationon 5 May
1930.
16Historyof Nicaragua:The Sornoza years,EncycIopaediaBritannica2001,
StandardEdition CD ROM, 1994-2001. i.Conclusionoffhe f928 Treary
.. ' . .-
::.; %> . .. ...
2.83 Inits 1930 Report toCongress, the ColombianMinistryof Foreign
Affairspointsout thatin1922 itstudiedthe possibilityof reachina
negotiatedsolutionofthe disputewithNicaraguaandconcluded that
itwasconvenient toreach adirectagreementwithNicaragua on the
basisthatDlornbia wouldrenounce any righrs over rhe Mosquitia
andtheMangles Islandqonwndition thatNicaraguawoulddesist of
any ciaims over the other islarrds, isletsand keys of the
~rchi~ela~o." The~~Report continues ro indicate that the
Colombian Ministerin Nicaragua,Dr. Manuel Esguerra, wasgiven
fulpowers tonegotiatewith Nicaragua on thatbasisand succeeded
inconcludingthe Treaty of24 March1 928.Im
The Report isnotentireIycorrect. The provisionsofthe 1928Treaty
2.84
did not reflect thproposa1 thatColombia had decided to maketo
Nicaraguain1922 as isindicatie ndtl~ precedingparagraphT . he
1928 Treatyexpresslyexcludedthe caysof Rondor- Smna and
Quitasuefiowhichwasnot partof the,agreemenats foreseenin3922.
For presentpurposes itmust be pointedout thatthis modificatioof
theoriginal offerby Colombiais significanbecause itwas notmade
because of any Nicaraguan quest As indicated in thefollowing
pragmph, Nicaragua up to I927simply had no intention of
recognizing rhe sovereignty of Colombiaover the San And*s
Infome ifel MirristrrjeRelnciones Exierioreal Congreso de 1930,
Imprenta NationalBogotB, 1930,at p.213.The referencro rhe"Mosquitia" '
isto theMosquitoCoast;thatisthe CaribbeanCoastofNicaragua."Mangles"
istheColombian name of thislandsknownin Nicaragua asIdas delMaizor
Corn Islands.SeeNM Vol.I Annex 71. i
In,The ndve iscontainedininfo- del Mnistro deRehcioms Exteriorex
a1 Cungresode 1930,op.citpp.212-213. Archipelago. The 1928 Treaty excluded these features because the
UnitedStates was interestedin them. This simpIy highlights thefact
thatthe realnegotiatorsof the Treaty wereColombia and the United
Srates, and that Nicaragua was merely an onlooker awaiting
instnrcrions. This aspect of the negotiations will be dealtwith in
Section IZIbelow.
2.85 Before the Revolution of 1926 the Government of Nicaragua had
been clearly opposed to the conclusion of any agreement involving
the acceptance that theArchipelago of San Andr6 was Colombian.
As Iate as 1925 the Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Nicaragua "requested the good offices of the Secretary of State to
persuade Colombia to submit to arbitration the question of the
ownership of the San ~ndrks' ~khi~ela~o".~" The reply of the
Secretary of State was that "The proposal of the Colombian
Government, which would recognize.the sovereignty of Nicaragua
over theMosquito Coast and the Corn Islands and the sovereignty of
Colombia over the Sari Andrks Archipelago" constituted an
arrangement that "wouId afford an equitable solution of the
matter."172
2.86 In the report of the United Srates Charge in Nicaragua to the
Secretary of State aftertrrtnsmittingchismessage he indicates that
the Nicaraguan "Minister, Dr. Urtecho, appeared to be greatly
disappointed by Mr. Kellogg'snote, and indicated an unwillingness
''Papers Relatingto[he ForeignRela[ionsuf rhetlnir~dSrclr1925, Vol.I p.
431.
17Ibid. pp433-434. to discuss the desirabil iftterminatingthe controversy by
acceptingthepmpal made by~olombia.'''~~
I 2.87 Afterthisfaileattemptof theUnitedStateto haveNicaraguasign
a treatyrecognizingColombiab sovereigntyover the SanAndres
I
Archipelagono further negotiatitookplaceuntil aftthevisiof
I Mr. Stimsonand theagreements he reachedwith theNicaraguan
I
Governmen tnd the rebeisiMay 1x7.''~ Thuson 28 July1927,
I
I theUntied StateMinisterin Managua , r.Eberhardt,nformedthe
Secretarof Statethathe:
"Colombian Minister hasjustreturnedtoManagua and
statesthathe expected to revive witthe Nicaraguan
Government the questioof theSanAndrksArchipelago.
1 (Ebtshardt) have discussedtsubjectwith Diaz who
informs me thathe favors thesettlementproposed by
Colombia assetforthintheDepartmentV isstruction12
directedtoSecretaryThurstonunder date of March25
[ZI] 1925 and if the Departmet odesireswill instruct
Ministerfor ForeignAffairsto commence preliminary
negotiatiowithColombian Ministertendingtowardsuch
~ettlement.""~
I 2,88 Asnarratedabovein paragraph2.48-2.72fromthismomentup until
theratificatioftheTreaty in 1930Nicaraguawas under virtually
totalcontrol ofthe United States: militarily,economically and
I politicallThe situationow was rip forobtainingtheagreement
I
of Nicaragua to the Treaty. The proposal that had "greatly
I
I disappointed"Minister Urtecho- as reportedin paragraph2.86
above- was nowperfecty1acceptabltoPresidentDim.
1
Idem.
17See para2.4above.
17PnpersRelatingtodzeForeignRelatioofthe UlzitStates1927Vol, I,
pp.322-323.2.89 A Memorandum by the AssistantSecretaryof State (Mr.White) on I
August 1927 summarizes a meeting he had with the Colombian
Minister to discuss the matter of a treaty with Nicaragua. The
meeting was held atMr.White's request and the folIowing day the
Colombian Minister returnedwith furtherproposaIson how to reach
an agreement. These meetings indicate that the real negotiating
partiewere CoIombiaand the UnitedStates and thatNicaragua was
notpresentandonlyawaited orders.
2.90 The transcript ofthe notes sent by the UnitedStates Minister in
Nicaragua tothe Secretaryof State from AugustuntiI November of
thatyear iIIustratthesubordinate positionof Nicaragua.Ina note
dated 31 August 1927, the United States Minister informs the
SecretaryofState:
"It would, however, be appreciated by both President
Diaz and this Legation if the Department would indicate
whether a settIement along the lines proposed by the
Department in its instruction No. 212ofMarch 25 1211,
1925,still seemsadvisabletotheDepartment, or what,if
any, additional representations and points might be
brought up in negotiationstending toward the settlement
of thisoldquestion."'77
2.91 There are more notes from the United States Minister in Managua
informing the Department of State that thePresidentof Nicaragua
was awaiting instructions from Washington,although,of course, the
diplomatic language reads "The President asked me today to
ascertainwhen the Department would be ready toexpress an opinion
regardingthe San Andres ~rchi~ela~o."'~ ~ nd so iwent on for the
17Ibidp,p.324-328.
'IIhid ,.329.
"'Noteof 4 October 1927Ibidp.,330. rest of the year of 1927."' At one point the Secretary of Stare
informs the Charge in Nicaragua "that it has been necessary to
dB)1.--; ,.:,LIT
consult another ~gpartrnent in corinectidn with this question and
your instructions have beendelayed pendingreceio pftrhisreply."78'>
We can only speculate on whar other interests of the United States
were at play in the context of these supposedly good offices they
wereconducting in the interestsof two Latin Americancountries.
2.92 Finally, theUnited Sratcs Deparfmentgave the green lightto proceed
along thelinesproposedby Colombia.The UnitedStatesMinister in
Nicaragua informedthe Secretary of State on 4 February1928 that
he had transmitted the views of the Department of State to the
President of Nicaragua. This transmission was done in a most
illuminatingfashion. Thereportof theMinisterstates that:
"At therequest of theColombian Minister I called upon
rhe President with him yesterday and repeated what Ihad
already toId the President about the Depaflment's
viewing wirh favor a settIernent aiorlg the lines which
CoIombiahadproposed.ThePresident said thathe would
be very gladto have the matter.s"ttled inthis way..9,181
Thus, in order to complete the bilateralnegotiationsColombia was
conducting wirh the United States it was not only necessary ro
"inform" the President of Nicaragua of the views of the State
Department but it was necessary to do so in the company of the
Colombian Minister!
179
Ibid pp,.329-331.
'sIbid, p.330.
''IPapen Reiaiing10Ihe ForeignRejarions rtfhe UnitedStaffs 1928,VoI. Ip.
701. 2.93 On 23 March 1928, one day before the signarure oftheTreaty, tlre
Secretary ofStateinformed the United Statesemissaryin Managua
that:
"Asthis treatyrecognizes(Nicaraguan) sovereignty over
Grear and LittIc Corn Islands,which were leased torhe
US for a term of ninety-ni yners by Nicaragua in the
Conventionsigned at Washingtonon August 5, 1914,the
Department feels thaitwouldbe a distinctadvantageto
havethisproposed treatyconcl~ded."'~~
2.94 Public opinion in Nicaragua was so averse to thecontent ofrhis
TreatythattheUnitedStates Ministerin Nicaraguainformedthe
Secretaryof Stateon 27 Marchthat:
"an efforzhad been made to negotiate rhe Trearybefore
the rerrl fonm HavanaofDr. CuadraPasos (the Foreign
Minister), in ordethat he mightavoidresponsibilityfor
relinquishingNicaragua's claims to the San Andres
Archipelago. ."
I
For thisreason the Treaty bears thename of his Deputy Barcenas
Meneses who signed the Treaty on behaIf of Nicaragua.
Furthermore, theUnited States envoy informsthatthe "Nicaraguan
Government has desired thatthe signatureof this treatybe kept
absolutely se~rer."'The Treary was eyentually made pubIicon 22
September 928.lW
2.95 The oppositionfromall quartersto the Treatybecomes clearin a
telegram of 14 September1928from theUnitedStatesMinisterin
Managua tothe Secretary of Statein which hecommunicate the
I8Ibid,p702.
laidem.
Papers Relatinto theForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates1928,Vol. Ip.
701.p.705. requestofPresidentDiazthatthe StateDepartment make known thar
theTreatywith Colombiahad beenenteredintowiththeblessing of
.-:.:! h;.:;;-t'.i
Washington.The op~nionof theM~n~ste ras that"Itwdd seem
only fairtocomply with hisquest assuchaction wiI1save him, to
some extentfrom the bittemliticalattackshe willbesubiectd tu
Jsiclfor accedinnto theDepartment's suaaesdon thatColombia's
proposalbe accepted."(Emphasis added) He furtherinformed that
the Legationhaddiscuss thedwiththeLiberal candidate, eneral
Moncada,andhe had "promised to usehisinfluencto moderatethe
criticism of the Libpress."'85
2.96 It wasnotcoinciden ttalthisTreatywas signe dfew daysafter
theUnited Statehad backed PresidentDiaz into cornerand made
him sign theEktml Decreeof21 MarchI928 giving enomus
powers to GeneralMcCoy (seepara.2.68 above).Neither was ir
I coincidentalthattheElectoralDecree of 21 March 1928 and the
I
I Barcenas-EsguerraTreaty of24 March 1928 wereboth signed in -
dear violatioof theNicaraguan~onsrirution.'~he realitwas that
bth the legal ordeOF Nicaraguaand her institutionwere at that
.- . *-_-
timesubjecttothewillofthe~nired SEW Sovernment.
2.97 The United Stateswas veryanxiousfor the Treatytobe prornptIy
ratifieThe Secretaryof Statedoes notleave thereasons for this
interesin doubt.On 2 February 1929 he informedhis envoy in
Managua , r.Hanm rRat
'= {bidp.704.
Iw Seebelow SecSIof thisChapSubsec.PartA. "The Goverrlment of the US has Inore that an academic
interest inthis adjusrrnenr, sinceit ivroIves Great arrd
Little Corn Islands,Icasedro [he US by Nicaragua in the
convention of 1914,and therefore the Governmentof the
US would be much concerned if the treaty..should
fai."Ia7
2.98 Somc months later, on7 October 1929, theSecretaryof State waned
Mr. Hanna that:
"In anyconversationyou may hold on this subject,itis
desired that you shallrefrain from discussing the treaty
arrangements affecting the Corn Islands to which this
Government is a party, although you shoriId, ofcourse,
make itclearthat the of the United States has
no nIteriormotive for its interest the ratification of the
Treaty...$188
2.99 The pressure for ratificationwas so great that the United States
Minister in Colombia i~rformed fhe Secretary of State on I0
September 1929 thatthe Congress of CoIombiahad alreadyratified
the Treaty and that the Colombian Foreign Minister wanted United
States "good offices" in order to obtain itsratification by the
Nicaraguan Congress at its approaching December sessions.
Furthermore, the United Stares Minister goes on to "respectfully
suggest*'to hissuperior "that theLegation at Managua be authorized
to exert its good officesinthe ~rernises(. Em'p~~asisadded)This
in effect meant that theLegation atManagua was going to "exertits
good offices"in the"premises" of the NicaraguanCongress!
ls7Papers RelatingtotheForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates1929,Vol. I p.
934.
{bidp.937.
IS'&id, p.935. :y,;.::,,
2.100 But,afteralltherequest of theUnitedstates MinisteriColombia
was only naturalHe knew theNicman Congress was composed
.of memberswho had either been put in office ByMr. Stirnmnin
1927, orhad beenputin office irheeIecticns o1928controlledby
the UnitedStatesandallwanted tobe returnedto office in t1930
electionsthatwouldalso beunder the total control of tUnited
States.BesiBes,therewere severaIthousandmarina tobackhis
good offices.
2,101 For this reasonandnot withstandinthe fact thathisTreaty was
"personallyopposed"by Presidentr on coda and'general public
opinion"',theeffectof the exertionoftheAmericanLegation"in
thepremises"resultedin its discussiin theNicaraguan Congress
withtheresultingapprova lf theTreatbytheChamber ofDeputies
and the Senaton 6March 1930.lg2
'90{bidp 936.
19?bidp,.936.
~azetaN. 98,of7May 1930.SeeNM Vol.IIAnnexes80 and19. SectionI1
TheInvaIidityof the1928Treaty
2.102 The "Treaty"of24 March 1928concerningTerritorial Questionsat
Issue between Colombia and Nicaragua ismarred by several defects
that make it null and void as Nicaragua formallydeclaredon 4
February l980lg3:
- it was concluded in manifest violation of the Nicaraguan
Constitutionof 1911that was in forcein 1928(A);
- rhe Nicaraguan Government at thattime was deprived of its
internatiu~lalcapacity sinceit couldnot freely express its
consent tobe bound by internationaltreati(B).
PART A.THE1928TREAT WYASCONCLUDED INMANIFEST VIOLATION OFTHE
NICARAGUA NONSTITUTI OHEN INFORCE
2.103 At [herime ofthc ~oncIusionof the 1928 Treaty,theConstitutiun in
force in Nicaraguawas that of 11December 1911, which remained
in force unti1939'". Articles 2and 3 of the Constitution of 1911
readthus:
19See Declarationconcerning the islands of San Andrds,Providenciaand
SurroundingTerritoriesand tWhite Paperof thasamedate. See NM VoI.11
Annex 73.
I"The Consriruriono1939 maintainp eracricallythesameprinciples. Article 2
.<, '.
"Sovereignty is one, inalienable and irrevocable, and
essen~iaiIyresides in thepeop1e;from whom rhe officiaIs
establishedby the Constitution and the laws derivetheir
powers.Consequently,treatiesmay not be reached that
oppose the independenceand integrity of the nation or
thatin some wayaffect her sovereignty, except for those
rhatpromote union with one or-more of the RepubIicsof
CentralAmerica".
"Public officials only enjoy those powers expressly
grantedthem by Law. Any actionof theirsthat exceeds
theseis null."
2.104 Nicaragua'sacknowledgmentin Article I of the Bhrcenas-Esguerra
Treaty of Colombiansovereigntyover the San Andrksarchipelago
contravened rheintegrityof the nationandaffectedher sovereignty.
2.105 It istrue that the Constitution of Nicaragua did not expressly state
that the San Andres archipelagowas part of national territory.
However, as shown in ChapterI above (paras. 1.37-1.381,this
positionhadconstantly been upheld since Colombia firstassertedher
cIairn over the islands. In addition, prior to independence, the
Audience of Guatemala maintaineditsjurisdictionagainstthe claims
of theAudienceof NuevaGranadaT . he 1850 Treaty inwhich Spain acknowledged Nicaragua's independena clso include adjacert
islands.
2.f06 Oneepisode is particularly worthyof notice in this respect.As late
as 4 May 1928, that is shortlyafterthe signature of the BBrcenas-
Esgrrerra Treaty, but before this fact was made known ro the
public,'g5 the Nicaraguan Supreme Court of Justice denied a
Colombian request for the extradition of a person, Mr.Luis Ortiz,
whohad committeda crime on the island of SanAndrks.The Court
judged that:
"Colombia, in her request of the extradition of Ortiz,
lacks the necessaryand fundamentalbasis which is the
right of sovereignty over the area where the crime was
committed, and she does not even have the temporary
interim possessionauthorized by ArticIeVIIof theTreaty
of 1825 which it had unriIthecessionof Panama".
2.107 As aconsequence, the Court considered thatto accepttheextradition
"would imply an attack on the very territorial sovereigntyof the
RepnbIic"and
"considered appropriate that the judicial procedures
against Ortiz, whichever ,the Government whose
interests had been damaged by him, should be
continued by the appropriate Nicaraguan Judge, who is
the DistrictCrirninaIJudge9,195.r,efieIds,to whom the
proceedings would be'sent..
2.108 This ruling clearly established that in conformity with the
Nicaraguanlegalsystemof the period,she had sovereigntyover San
Andris at the time of the signing of the Treary. Therefore, said
'9See Sec.I,para.2.94. ,
'9BoletirOfici dellaGaceta,no433,31May1930, pp.6324-6328. Treatyclearly"opposes ...tBeintegrityof thenation"and"affect(s)
her sovereignty"an,,,,I-;-uentlycould notbeconcludedsaveif the
,;;$,,,v:y!, ..,.J.-
Constitutionitselfwas amended, wi f hwas not the case.
2.109 The Judgmentby the CentralAmerican Court of c us tic ofl9^
Mach 1917, which has been amply ci~edby ihe Chamber of the
InternationaICourtof Justicein thecase concernitn he Lnnd,Island
and Maritime Frontier Dispute between El Salvadorand'Honduras
(Nicaraguaintervening),1gi8s of relevance.
2.110 The case before the Central American Cour-t was initiated by EI
SalvadoragainstNicaragua inter uliabecause the latter, throughthe
Chamorro-Bryan Treaty of 5 August 1914,'~'had violatedher own
ConstitutionaI Iimitation upon the disposaI of her territory in
violationof ArricIeI1of the Treaty of Peace and Arnityentered into
by the republics of CentralAmerica that declared that "every
disposition or measure that may tend to alter the constitutional
organizarioninanyofthem is to bedeemed aMENACE to thepeace
of said~e~ublics.''~~T~he Court fohn shat,
"The Government of Nicaragua, in infringing a
constitutional standar- such as that whichrequires the
rnainrenanceof territoriainregrir- hasconsummated an
actthar menaces the Republic of EI SaIvador, which is
lWThe Courtwas establishedbythe five CentraAmerican Republics in the
additionalConvention tothe GeneralConventionof the Central American
Peace Conference,Washington, 20 December 1907. For a contemporarynote
an the Court, see Hudson, M.O., The Centrai American Coun of Jusiice,
f 932)26A.J.I.L. 759,
lgSee e.g.:ICJReport 1992, p.557, para.330; and pp. 589- 601,para.387-
403.
IgSee Sec. I,para2.36andpara. 2.39.
2# TextofArticIe I1inA.J.I.L.1917,p.650at p.725. interestedand obligated by the Treatiesof Washington to
maintain the presrigeof the pubric institutions of Central
~rnerica."~"
The case was well knownin the region and CoIurnbia couId nut have
been unaware of it and certainly not the United States. This
precedent should therefore have alerted her, all the more since the
righis in quesrion under the Charnorro-Bryan Treaty were less
detrimentaI ro Nicaragua's sovereignty and ter1-iroriaIintegrity, in
that they were leases of territory, than those abandoned in the
BArcenas-EsguerrT areaty thatpermanentlydisposed of part of her
territory.
2.112 According to Article 46 ofthe 1969Vienna Convention on theLaw
of Treaties concerning "Provisions of internal law regarding
competence to concIndetreaties":
"1. A State may not invoke the factthat itconsent to be
bound by a treatyhas been expressed in violation of a
provision of its internallaw segasdi~rg competence to
concIude treaties as invalidatingits consent unless that
vioIationwasmanifest and'concerned a mle ofits internal
law of fundamentalimportance.
"2. A vioIation is manifest if it wouId bc objectively
evident to any Stare conducting itself in the matter in
xcordancc with normalpractice and in goodfaith".
.- .-
20A.J.I.L.1917,p.650 atp.726.2.113 These provisionsreflethe :':.
"well estabiish6t;.imle ofinternationallaw that the
validityofa tdy my beopen toquestionif it hbeen
concIudedin vioIatioof theconstitutionlaws ofme of
the states party to it since the state'sorgans and
representative s usthave exceeded theirpowers in
concludingsuchatreaty."202
in the case of theBgrcenas-Esguerr areaty itisclear that the
Nicaraguan officiais whconcludedthe TteatyviolatedArlicIe2of
the Constitution since the acknowledgement of Colombian
sovereigntyover the San Andds archipelagowas contrary tothe
integritofthe nation anaffect hersovereigntyThe consequence
is thathe consentof Nicaraguato bebound bythe Treatywasnot
only null according to Article 3 of the Constitution, ut also
constituteda flaw of consent which can be invoked at the
inter onatIIeveIas provided for ingeneralintemationuIlaw as
reflecteinArticle46 oftheConvention on thehw of Treatiewith
theresultthatthetreatisinternationallnvalid.
2.115 In the presencase,the requirementsreferredtoin paragraph2 of
Article46 arefulfilled:
-the vioktticnconcerned"a rule ofinred law of fundamental
irnportance"incIude idthe ConstitutioitselfawideIy pub cized
documen t hichexpresslywarnedthatanybreachof thistype would
be consideredanullity;
- it was"manifest"andshouIdhave been"objectiveIyevidenttoany
Stateconductingitsel...inaccordancewiththenor~nnlpracticeand
in goodfaith" since theviolatiowasnot thatof an obscurelaw
20SirRoberrJenningsandSirArthurWatts,OppenkeirPrInternationalLaw,
ninteditionLongman,London. p.1285,para.36;seeaIsoy.1288. requiring extensive research to find, nor of a provisio~rthar is
difficulttointerpret; thespecificrule violared does notrequire any
kind of interpretation. After the judgement othe Central American
Court of Justice ignorance of this Constitutional limitation othe
Nicaraguan Government could not be alleged by anyone in the
Americas.
2.116 It is worth notingin this respectthatColombia herselfbelieves that
any shortcoming or violation of a constitutional provision regarding
the steps to be carried out in enacting a law approvinga Treaty,
nulliiies such aIifwand,for a11purposes, nuIIifiesrhe ratification of
thatlawby the Government.
2.117 Thus, on 14 September1979, Colombia and the United Statessigned
an Extradition Treaty aIIowing for the extradition of CoIornbian
nationals.This Treaty was approvedby the Colombian Congress on
14 October 1980and was sent to the President ofthe Republic for
his approvalandenacrrnentinto law. Ir was, however, approvednot
by the President, but by Minister German Zea to whom President
Turbay of Colombia, absent for a 3-day official visit abroad, had
delegated the exercise of "constitutional functions" during his
absence as required by article 128 of the Constitution. For its parr,
the Unired Srates Senate quickly approved the Treaty,and itentered
into effect on 4 March 1982. However, the Supreme Court of
Colombia on 12 December '1986 ruled thatLaw 27, approving the
Treaty, could nut be considered valid"in as much as it was not
constituriuna11approvedby the Presidentof the ~e~ublic."~~~
2.118 In view of this Ruling, the then Colombian President Don Virgilio
Barco feItthe Ruling meant that presidentialapproval was needed
for Law 27 and he proceeded to approve itagain and publish it as ,:,,,y>,. , -. -
I- .it-?; ..'",';;,*.F!:,,
. .
-., ,:?,
Law 68 of 1986.Immediately, the constitutionality of this newLaw
was questioned on the basis that the President had approved a non-
,*L',8,
existent Iawsince the RuIing of the Court hadleftLaw27 as nu11 and
void. The Suprernc Court ruled thar this new law was
unconstitutional on 25June t9~7.~'~
2.119 SimiIarly,as noted by Pr.ofessorAntonioRemiroBrotons,
"on 23 October of1992 the Colombian CounciIof Srate
annulled the diplomatic note of 22 November 1952 in
which the Minister of ForeignAffairs of that country, Mr.
Usibe Holgrrin,recognized the Venezuelan natureof the
archipelago (Las Monjes),claiming that in doing so the
ministerhad gone beyond his powers".20"
2.120 It appears therefore that even mistakes based on abstruse
interpretations of the CoIombian Constitution tseIf Iead ro the
nullificationoftheratificariongiven by the Executivefur a treaty,
I
2.121 Applyingthesame testto the "ratification" of the 1928Treaty by the
NicaraguanCongress, itcan only be concluded that the approval of
fhe Congress was ig'haniiest 'Giolation of the constitutional
provisions then in force in Nicaraguaand that, therefore, it was
invalidab initio andhas neverenteredinto force.
2" Text Ibi dtp.498.
'05 "Problemus de Fronteras en Iberoatnericana", inLa Escuela de Salamanca
y el Derecho Internacionalen America,ed. Araceli Mangas, Salarnanca,1993,
p. 132. PART B. THE NICARAGU AOVERNMENT WAS DEPRIVEDOF ITS
INTERNATiONALCAPACIn DURINGTHE PERTINENTPERIODSINCE ITCOULD
NOTFREELYEXPRESSITS CONSENT TOBE BOUND BY INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES
2.122 CoIombia ought to have bee11 a11rhe more sensitive to a stricr
compliancewith Nicaraguanconstitutionalrequirementsin that it
was well known by theColombian authorities thatNicaragua was at
the time underoccupationby tilUnited ~tates.'~
2.123 According to the carefullydraftedArticle 52 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention ontheLawof Treaties:
"A treaty is void if irs concIusion has beenprocured by
the threat ouse of force in violationof theprinciplesof
internationallaw embodied in the Charterof the United
Nations".
2.124 Therecan be no doubtthat, given thecircumstancesinwhich itwas
concluded, the Bircenas-Esguema Treaty would be considered
unquestionably void ah iniriIradirbeen co11cIuded aftertheentry
inro force of the Charter. However, the 1928 Treaty "must be
appreciatedin thelightof the law.on.temporary withit"207and that
Lawas expressedinthe 1969Conventionhasnoretroactive effect.
2.125 However,this is rottheend of the question.
2asThe occupationof Nicaraguabyhe UnitedStateswasacknowledgedby the
U.S.Govemrne~ltS. eeabove,Sec.I, para2.38and2.70.
207P.C.A.,Max Huber'sArbitralAwardof 4 April 1928,Idand of Palmas,
RIAA,Vol.It,p. 845. '~,,->1..*--3 ::ryfI*''I,,r
2.126 Indeed, the Charter was not yet in force, but the Covenant of the
League of Nations was, and 1928 was the year when the
,$!:;G 20i :d,\,. :,
BriandlKeIloggPact was signed. And, as rhe International Law
Commissionput it in the commentary of the correspondingprovision
in its Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties:
"With the Covenant andrhe Pact of Paris [here began to
develop a strong body of opiniu~rwhich held that such
treaties[which were broughtabout by the threat or the
use offorce]shouldno longer be recognized as valid."209
2.127 It must be noted that this trend was especially marked in the
Americas, where the Sixth Conference of American States had just
adopted,on 18 February 1928, two resolutions condemning the war
of aggressionand the war as an instrumentof nationalpolicy in their
muma1 A11dwhile "[a] resol~ttionpresented to the
Conference, declaring that nostat ead the right to intervene in the
internal affairs of another was withdrawn in the face of firm
American opposition, 5,211based on a claim to a right of so-called
"humanitarian intervehtion** to pioieci the lives and property of
nationals, Article 8 of thecelebratedMontevideo Convention on the I
RightsandDuties of States declares in firm terms that:
208Thecosponso ofrrhisPact was Mr. FrankKeIIogg,Secretaryof Stateofthe
United States when these events were taking pIace in Nicaragua. See above
209.I, para.2.70.
Commentary of draftArticle49, ILC Yearbook 1966,Vol. 11,p.246, para.
(1).See also:H. Lauterpacht, Report on theLaw of Treaties, AICN.4163,ILC
Ymrbook 1953, p. 147. comment of draft Article 12 ("Absence of
Compulsion"),pam. 1 and 2, aid KC Report in ILC I'ec~rbaoX 19:63.VoI. 11,
commentaryof draftArt. 36.p.197, para.(11.
210See Ian Brownlie, Irtft.rna~io~aL inw and rhe Use of Force by Slates,
Clarendon Press,Oxford, 1963,pp. 73-74.
'I1ihid.p.74. "No State has rhe right to intervene in the internal or
externalaffairsofanother."7212
This statementwas seen as declaratoryof thethenexistinglaw.
2.128 Thishas been clearly acknowledged "in [heteachings of the must
qualified publicists" inLatinAmerica at thetime. Thus, in hiscourse
at The HagueAcademy in 1930, AmbassadorJ.M.Yepes, then the
President of the Board of Legal Advisers of the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Colombia, wrote: "le Nonveau Monde a tonjours gtC
unanirne 2 condamner Ia guerse (. ..comme contraire Bla mar-ale
9,213
internationale . This same authoralso suggestedthat the principle
of non-intervention
"est cornme I'epine dorsaIe du droir international au
Ncuveau Monde. Depuis le commencement de Ieur vie
independante, toutes les Rkpubliques amkricainesont
proclam6 leur droit i se dkvelopperlibrement, sans
contrale ni intervention d'akune autre puissance. La
doctrine de Monroe n'erait,au fond.quela roclamarion
72P4
soIenne1Iedu principede rron-intervention .
In 1925, the American Institute of International Law adopted the
Draft on the "Fundamental Rights on the American Continent"
prepared by the ChiIean, AIejandro AIvarez, who later became a
Judgein [hisCourt. ~ccordin~ to this text:
'I2See also the Declaration of Principlesadopted in Buer~asAires on 23
December 1936 by the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of
Peace; rheConference also adopted that same day an AdditionaI ProtocoI
reIaivetoNon-Interventio nsee;bidp p,.97-99).
"La contributionde I'Amirique latine au diveloppement du droit
international publicprivd",32 Recueil des cours, 1930-1, .743;see also p.
744: the veryideato outlawwar may "are revendiqukpar I'Amdrique latine
cornmerrnede sescontributionsIesplus importantes au progrkdrrdroit des
gens".
21Ibidp .,745. "un tatextra-continental ne peut ni directement ni
indirectement (..) occuper mhe temporairement un
territoire d'un:t:j;?Iricain ... :,,4:>
"Les tars d3AmCrique ont foufe libelre pourconduire
leu15 affaires intgrieures et extkrieures sous Ia forme
qu'ils jugent convenable. Aucunhat ne pourradonc
intervenirdans les affairesindrieures et exterieuresd'un
autre tat amkricain contre sa volontt.La seule ingkrence
qui pourra y2treexerckesera nne ingerence amiable et de
conciIiarionsansaucuncaractere decoerci tion.""'
2.129 Nicaraguaherselfhas forcefullymaintainedbeforetheCourt that the
principle of non-intervention in theAmericas precedet sheCharters
of the United Narions and of rhe Organization of American States.
This was maintained by Nicaragua in a context in which it would
havesufficed to simplyinvokethese lastCharters without need of
provingthatthisprinciplehad aspecialsignificanceintheAmericas,
I lung before theycame intoe~istence.~'"
2.130 It must also be kept in mind that both the prohibition of theuse of
force and of intervention .in the ,internalaffairs of States are
peremptorynorms of general internationallaw within the meaningof
Article 53of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (jm
c~~plrs).~'~Therefore, even ad~nirringthat theseruIes were not of a
peremptory natureatthe time,Article64 of the Vienna Convention
215 AIvarez (A.),Le nolrventrdroil inrernatihnnipublier sa codifcario~~en
Ame'riqcieP,arisLibrairiAerthu r ousseau,1924,p.6.
I.C.J. Pleadings, Militaryclad Paramilitary Activities inand against
Nicaragua(Nicaragua v. UnitedStatesof America),Vol. IV, p. 86 andVol. V,
9;426.
See E.R.:/LC, commentaryof draft Article50 of the 1956DrafrAnicles on
theLawof Treaties,ItC Yearbook,vol. 11,p.248, para.(3)ofthe commentary. wuuId apply and the Treaty must be deemed ashaving become void
and havingterminated. ArticIe 64 states,
"If a new peremptory norm of general internationallaw
emerges,any existingtreaty which is in conflictwith that
norm becomes voidand terminates."
2.I3 1 Moreover and in any case,the capacity of concludinga treaty and of
expressing consent to be bound lies in stateho~d.~'~"However, a
state possesses thiscapacityonly insofaras itis so~erei~n. A"s~'e~
Permanent Court made clear in the Wimbletioncase: "the right of
entering into internafiona1engagements is an attribute of State
sovereignty".220 Therefore,"nu1 lity is a consequenceto be implied
7,221
from an actdonewithoutcapacity . Moreover,in defining a treaty
as an "agreement concluded berweeq States" (XrticIe 2, paragraph
I.(a)),the Vienna Convention makes implicit the need of "the
existence of the necessary capacity, sothatits absence deprives the
resultinginstrumentof itscharacter asa 'treaty.7227
2.132 As has been expIained in the previous Sectionof thisChapter, the
situation of Nimragrra at thetime of rhesigningand rarification of
the Bircenas-EsguerraTreaty was that her territorywas under the
- ,
militaryoccupation and the dejuc,o ,inancialand politicalcontrol of
the Unired States: The foIIowing facts, for example, are irrefutable
and based directIy on documen .ts made public by the Stare
Department of the United States and detailed above in Section I,
paragraphs2.41-2.81 :
21sSeeAflicIe6 ofthe 1959 ViennaConvention.
219Sir Rokrt Jenningsand Sir Arthur Watrs, Ogpenfwim'sinternarionalLaw,
2mnrhecliliaLongman,Lqndorr.1992,p. 1217,para.595.
21 Judgmentof 17August 1923,SeriesA, No I,p.25.
SirRobertJennings andSir Arthur Watts, op. cip. 1219, fn14.
222Ibid. .:2'~3;?i5$h!$xe%:j>)P$[
%',
-there were more than 5000 United Statesmarinesoccupying
Nicaragua atthe-ime theTreatywas conc~uded;~
-the chief of the'Natio~uadSdtkR&a~a wasa Unitedstates
Genera1 andrheofficerswere UnitedStatesmarina;
-the eIectionwere runrmder Ithabsolu coentrolofthe United
Statesmarines.ThePresident ofNicaragua was forcedto bypass
Congress and dictate an unconstitutiona l xecutive Decree
giving absoIute powersover theeIectio tnsiheUnited States .
marines.This nnwnsfifutionalDecw wasdictatedon 21 March
1928 three days before the conclusion of the also
unconstitutionaBArcenas-Esguer raeatyof24March1 928;224
-custo~nsrevenues were coIIectebyan officeappoint bydthe
State~e~anment:"~
- finances were controlledby persons designatedde facto by
UniredStatesGeneralMCCO~;~ ~nd
-theonIyBank and theonlyraiImadin Nicaraguawereunder the
controlofperm appoint edith the approvalof the State
~e~amnen tP7
II
2.133 The controlover Nicaraguabas notbasedon aTreaty and itwasnot
always overtbut inmany casessub rusa.Section I, paragrap2.51
above,trartscrik a communicationbetmn theSecretaryof State
of theUnited Statesandhis MinisterinManagua TheSecretaryof
Statetells himinvery cleartermsthat it wasnot convenie antthe
infernafionalevelfor thUnited Startstobeseen imposingtighter
financia1conrroIs in Nicaragua,especially becausean American
22"ee aboveSec.1para.2.46.
22Seeabove Sec. I, paras.2.67and2.68.
22See aboveSec.I,para2.51.
naSeeabove Sec , para.-51.
See aboveSecI.para.2.52. experrappointed by rhe State Department had indicated that thc
finances were not doing badIy, but that this couId be xhievcd
surreptitiously:
"Afew men designated by Genera1McCoy and appointed
by the President ofNicaragua to key positions in the
Finance Ministry. the railroad, the National Banand the
revenue service might be althatis required."
2.134 Therefore, whileNicaragua kepr the appearanceof a certainamount
of sovereignty, the realpower resided in thehandsof the Unites
States.This did not prevent her from concluding treaties. However,
the circumstances prevented Nicaragua fromconcluding t-reatiesthat
rancontrary to the interestsof the UnitedStatesas wellas prevented
her from rejecting the concInsion of treati teasthe United States
demandedher to conclude.The capacity of Nicaragua relating to
undertakings of treaty commitments must be assessed within this
speciaIizedpoIiticaIcontext.
2.135 In the presentcase, as explainedaboveYz8the United States was
interested in havingNicaragua accede to Colombianclaims overthe
San Andrks Archipelago in orderto clear all obs~aclesforcuttinga
CanaI through Nicaragua and using the lease on the Corn (Maiz)
Islands. The United States interestalso arose from her desire to
improve relations with Colombia, seriously damaged by the United
States having brought about the independenceof Panama in 1903,
foIIowing Colombia's rejection of the Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty
providing for [he constructionof an inrer-oceaniccanal rhroughthe
22SeeaboveIntroduction ,ara.13and Sec. Iparas.2.97and2.98.Panamanian isthmus. Moreover, in 1914, the United States and
Colombia had si.n,d the Urrutia-Thompson Treaty by which
A'.I?~~*, I ,b +IE.
Colombia acknowlEdgedthe independeriie of Panamain exchange
for cumpensarion in the sum of $ 25,000,000.00. However, this
arrangement was not well received in CoIumbia (as is witnessed by
the factthat the saidTreaty was not ratified until 1922).Because of
this,the United States was still concerned aboutimprovingrelations
wirh that country, which led her ro pressure Nicaragua to accedeto
rhe Colombian claims over the San AndrksarchipeIago.
The situationunder which the Treaty was signed in 1928 and ratified
in 1930 cIearIy shows that this was an instrument that was really
negotiated betweenColombia and the United States andimposedon
Nicaragua and her unwilling population (see paragraph 2.150-
2.151) The documents cited above in Section I, paragraphs2.83-
2.101 leave no doubt that it was only after the more pervasive
occupation of rhe United States began in 1927, that the rraditiona1 ,
policy of Nicaragua changea dnd she agreed to conc1udethe 1928
Treaty.
8 L , a,,
The dispute with CoIombia was nor the only territorial dispute of
Nicaragua. She had a more poIiticaIIy tense and deIicate dispute
with neighbouring Honduras thatinvolved more than 30,000 square
kilometres of territory. The United States had no interestsinvolved
in thisareaand hence av-oided involvingherselfinanywaysimilar to
her involvement in bringing about the Barcenas-EsgrrerrT areaty of
1928. The Nicaraguan dispute with Honduras had rowait30 more
years for solutionby theCourt in 1960.2.138 Therefore,whether itis viewed as imposed through coercion oras
concluded by an incapdcita tdmdinistratiothe treatyof 1928
cannot be considered a validly concluded Treaty. One of the
signatorieswas notin apositionto expressherconsent tobe bound
freeIy- anddidnot do so. SectionIII
Content and JuridicalAnalysisof the 1928 Treaty
2.139 The present Section analysesthe BArcenas-EsguerraTreary of 1928
under the assumption, which Nicaragua does not accept, that the
Treaty was validly concluded and is in force.Sub section A will
discuss the intention and meaning of the exclusion made in the
Treaty of thecays of Serrana,Roncador and QuirasnefioSub section
B will explain the origin, intention and meaning of the condition
under whichthe NicaraguanSenateratified theTreaty.
2.140 In the firsrparagraphof Article I oftheBircenas-Esguerra Treaty,
Nicaragua acknowledged the sovereignty of the Republic of
Colombia overthe Archipelago of San Andrks. The Treaty did not
providea precise definition of the ArchipelofSan Andrks.
2.141 According to the rep011 by Governor O'NeiIle, issued at the
beginning ofthe19lhcenturywhen he was tryingtohavethe Islands
of the Archipelago annexed to the Viceroyalty of Santa Fe
(~olornbia),'~~thislands are''fivein number, towit: San Andrds,
Providenc ian,taCatalina,San Luis of Mangle Grande, lor]AIto
229Seesxpm Chap. I. or Corn Island,and MangleChico, surrounded byseveral isIets and
cays of thesame type."'"
2.142 TheNicaraguanCongress,in approving theratification othe Treaty
in 1930 clarified - and this was accepted by Colombia in the
exchange of ratificarions - that the ArchipeIago of San And&
mentioned in the first clause of the Treatydid not extend west of
Meridian82of ~reenwich.~~'
2.143 There was noexactdefinirion of the terminalpointsto the North and
South of rhat lineof attributioof islands and orher insularfeatures,
but there isno possible argument tosupport the view that cays such
as Roncador, SerranaS , erranillaand Bajo Nuevo orthe Quitasueiio
Bank now form, or may have formed, part of the so-caIIed
"Archipelago ofSanAndrks".
2.144 In any case, the second paragraph of Article 1 of the B6rcenas-
Esguerra Treaty explicitly excluded from its scope of application
Roncador, QrritasuefioandSerrana, under tirdefacto possessionof
the United States,and IIUmention wasmade ofStidranila orof Bajo
Nuevo, as Colombia was not at that time laying claim over these
features.
2.145 The exclusion of rhese features from the Treaty did nor involve a
renunciation by Nicaragua of her tiIeto them.
230Reproduced in the ColombianNote of 24 June 1918 (Depositedwith the
Registry,Doc.N. 3).
21SeeinfrC ahap. n,Subsection B of thisSection. 2. TheOrigin of the niti Stnte's.claimsrlreGlkcdtfslandsAa f f855)arzd
its applicationtcertaincaysand banks
., ..- , .8.
2.146 The Guano Islands Act enacted by the United SratesCongress on 18
August 18%~~~ conceded to the citizens of the United States
authority to occupy and claim uninhabited islands'not withinthe
lawfuljurisdiction of any other government" where guano deposits
werefound. At the discretion of thePresidentthese islandscould be
considered as "per~ainingto rhe Unired States," at least as Iung as
they had guano. Its purpose, more than promoting the territoriaI
expansion of the United States, was to guaranteethe supply of a
cheap fertilizeto the farmersof the The occupation of
uninhabited islands and their appropriation by the Unired Srates in
accordance with the Guano Islands Act dashed direcrly with the
LatinAmerican principleof uti possidetis iuris and the absence of
terrae nullius in the territorial sphere controlled by the Spanish
Crown.
2.I47 According to theGuano Islands Act, the State Department issued
certificatesof fulfillment of the conditions imposed by the law in
favor of W. Jennet for "Serrana and adjacent keys" in 1868, for
Roncador andQuitasueiio in 1869 andsoon thereafter for Serranilla,
23348 U. S.C. 1411-1419.
Seeftheseries of volumes under therilleMiscelltmeoustetfers relarinto
Guano Islank, inState Department Archivesor the 476-page strrdjby rhe
Office ofthe Legal Adviserof rhe State Department in I932 under the tirIe
I Sovereignty of IslandsCClairneHnderthe Guano A a uttdofthef\lor&htvesrern
Hawaiian Islnncls, idway and Wake. J. 3. Moore,A Digest ofInternational
Law, WashingtonD.C., 1908,Vol. I, pp556-580, providesinformation on the
historyof the Guano islands as of 1856; G. H. Hackworth,Digest of
f~rtemationalLaw,Vol. I, Washingron,1940,pp. 5Ct2-524. with the Treasury Department considering rhem on the Iist of guano
islandspubIishedin 187 1 "asappertaining to theUnited
2.148 Nevertheless,on 25 February(Serranaand Quitasuefio) and 5 June
(Roncador)1919,outside of the context of guano exploitation,the
United States President W. WiIson issued decrees reaffirming rhe
appropriation of the cays and reservingthem in order to establish
navigational aids onthem.23"
3. The sizuntionin 1928.-ArricIe1, sei-ojd paragraph, of the Blirceulas-
Esguerra Treary;exchange of noresbetween Colombia-UniledSlates on 10
April 1928
2.149 According to the second paragraph of Article I of the Brircenas-
Esguerra Treaiy: "The present Treaty dues nor apply tothe reefs of
Runcarlor, Quitasuefio and Serrana,sovereignty over which is in
dispute between Colombiaand the United States of America."An
exchange of notes between theGovernments of these countries, on
10 April 1928, confilmed the sfatug s~o.23%itho~t settling the
clain~s by both panies, Coiornbia acknowledged the right of the
United States to maintainnavigational aids in the cays and the
23J.B. Moore, A DigestofInternationalLAICW', ashingtoD.C., p.566.G. H.
Hackworth , igestuflnternational Lawcit.p.520-521, observe id1940 that
"SerraniIlaeysarestii lncludedinthe lisof bonded GuanoIslands.There is,
however, norecord of theDepartment of Statehaving issueda certificateor
~chmarion with regarto these Keys".'
35 Consult G. H. Hackwonh, Digesrof'Inrrrnutional hw,cit.,
pp.521-522.
23See NMVol. 11Annex 18. United Statesackno ,;l0dgei'herightsof Colombian nationalsto
fish ithe adjace wntters.23i
:a:;-,.
2-150 Colombia has iit&reted ~ficlc I, second pangraph. of the
B~RB-Esgucm Treaty as an implicitrelinquishment of any
Nicaraguanclaimover thesovereig ontyhementioned cays.The
Government oftheUnited Statesinan Aide-Mhoire of itEmbassy
in Managua, I6 JrrIy1981,says thatthe UnitedStatesGovernment
did not takepositionon thatstatementNicaragua, for herpartIlas
consistentlrejectidtheColombian interpretation.
2.151 The secondparagraph ofArticleI of theTreatywasnot includedin
the draftpresent odthe GovernmentofNicaraguaby theMinister
of Colombia in Managua, Mr, AAanueI kguerm This provision, ,
accordingto aColombian source,
"was requested by rhe North American government,
considering thatthey had sovereign righover therays,
and rhe substantialtermsof rhe same were negotiated
between the CoIornbiari ambassador Enrique OIaya
Herreraandthe State~e~artrnent."~~'
The terns finallyadoptedwere the.iesult oa Colombian proposal,
as theinitiaStareDepartment proposal,reject bydColombia, had
read ':t isundernod tharthe presenttreatydm notinclude the
The text of the notes provide"Takini gntconsiderationthat both
Governmentshave allegedrightsof sovereignty aver said caysresolts
conservethe statusquo on the marter. ConsquenfIytheGovernment of
ColombiashaIIabstainfromobjectintothemaintenanc ey the UnitSrata~
ofthe Serviceit haestablisheandmay establison saidcaysto assisin
navigationand the Government of the UnitedStatesshallabstainfrom
objectintotheuseof thewaterbelongingtothecaysbyColombian nationals
forthepurposeoffishing."
''C. Moy ano,ElArkipiiiago& Sm Andre3yPrOvidertckI483p.124. See
NAn Vol.11Annex75. cays of Roncador,Quitaslreiioand SermniIIa (sic),'3the sovereigny
ofwhich rhe two Partiesagree to no longerclaim from now on."*%'
2.152 After minutely reviewing the correspondence between the United
States and Colombia with respectto rhe wordirrg of the Treaty in
I-elationro the reefs of Serrana, Runcador and Quitasueiio, the
Colombian Professor Moyarro conciudes that it was an
"unquestionable fact that Nicaragua restricted herself to approthe
provision proposed by Colombia without having taken part in its
e~aborarion."~" However, what is unquestionable in rhese
circumstances isthe right of Nicaragua,a countryexcludedfrom the
negotiation of the 1928 Treaty and forced to accept clauses agreed
by others that affected her territorial sovereignty,to demand tthe
interpretationof these clauses be madein a restrictedmanner and
corztrrproferenlem.
2.153 Obviously, if the point was to force the relinquishment of
Nicaragua's rightsto some cays indispute between theUnited States
and Colombia, it could have been statedin a much more clearand
expIicit manner. But the United States was not interested in that,
unless itcame along with a Colombian relinquishment.
2.154 For CoIornbia the cays were simply a bargaining chip in her
negotiations with the United States in order to obtain Nicaragua's
recognition ofsovereignty over SanAndrks and Providencia. That is
why Colombia was willing, during the negotiationwith the United
239The StateDepartment'spmposaI incurred presumably in a confusion between
SerraniIIa and Serrana.Abouttt characteristand Iocaiizationof thosecays,
see infraPart1The MaritimeDelimitation,Chap.111S, ubsecXI.
24C. Moyano, op.citp.125. SeeNM Vol. Annex75.
24Ibid p,125.See NM Vol. I1Annex 75. , States,toacknowledgeNicaragua'ssovereignty over thesecays in
I . 't
orderto transfeto'~icara~u heburdenof relinquishin gerclaims
,I'' h" .'
infavourof theUnitedStares.
2.155 Thus in cable na 28, of 31 August 1927, to the CoIornbian
1 Ambassador in Washington, the Colombian Foreign Ministry
authorizesthat,"proceedingaccording tothe Advisory Commission
and the Foreign Relations Commissionsof the Senate and the
Chamber- of Depuries",he assures,incaseshe United Statesdid not
accept arbitratiover thecays,
"a directagreement with Nicaragua on these terms:
CoIombiaac know Iedp Nicaragua 'slute domain
over the Mosqnitia,the Mangles Idands and the cays of
Roncador,Q ' uitasueiloand~trranilla,~with the express
condition illain saidcays the CoIornbian mayexercise
the fishingrightforperpetuity.Nicaraguaacknowledges
Colombia's absolutedomainover all theother islandsof
the Archipelagoof San AndrisandProvidencia.'"
The objectistofacili theteansferofthecays tothe UnitedStates:
"It is considered preferable,"the Note adds, 'that
Nicaragua be the one toreceiveand cede the caysto the
United States because thus we can avoid any
constitutiomIdifficultythat might arise anthe mssbn
wouldbcJessdiscussed in Congressand the prm~"~'
2.156 ArticleI,second paragraph o,f thBarcenas-EsguerraTreatydid not
have asa consequencethe relinquishnien tyNicaraguaof her sights ,
over the cays,butrathersimply confirmed thatthere was a third
party involved, the United States, The soIutiofi of the conflict
242 I
This addsto the confusionbetween Semnilla and Serrana.See supra
foonote239.
14Citedby C.Moyano,El A rchipidhgodeSM Andrtfy Providencia pp.525-
526.SeeNM Vol.IIAnm 75- between Colombia and the United States would identify rhe party
with which Nicaragua would have todecide thefinal determination
of sovereigntyover these features.
4. The Saccio-Vhzqu Treaty, 8Sepienzber 1972: resinter alios acta: {he
yosilianof Nicaragua,beforeand a&r irwassigned
2.157 Althoughthe situationresultingfrom the exchangeof notes between
the United Statesand Colombiaon 10April 1928 hasbeen qualified
7.244
by Colombia as a "provisiona1condominiumregime , the "Report
for the first debate"in the Colombian Senate of the draftlaw by
which the Saccio-VhzquezTreatywas approvedin 1972spoke of the
"undetermined character" of this exchangeof notes thatresulted ina
"really disadvantageous situation" for Colombia. The Report
specified:
"First. That neither Colombia nor theUnited States could
exercise full sovereignty over said territories. Second.
That Colombia could neither bIock orher governments
from considering that these territorieshad no owner.
Third. That if thiswas continued the sovereignty of our
countrycouid be extinguishedby the indecisive situation
existing there."245 .
2.158 According toColombia, thissituation requiredcIar+ificationinrhe
formof a new treaty,and in 1970Colombia began theproceduresfor
244
Expositionof Motives ofthedrafrIaw by which Saccio-VilzquezTreatywas
approved.
24Anales delCongreso, Colombia, 12 December 1972, p.1644. negotiations with the United .~tates.""~h the Nicaraguan
Ministryof Foreig1.-ffairsbecame aware of these negotiationsit
senta Memoranduf toi the UniteStatesState Department (N.026)
dated23June 1971, in whichitreservedNicaragua'srights overthe
Continental Shelf and reiterarethe statement in the samesense
made on3June 1971 by Dr. Leandro Marin Abarrnza,Ministerof
ForeignAffairs(in functionto Mr. RobertWhite, CI1arg6d'Affaim
a.i.oftheUnited
2.159 Itisnecessa tryunderscore thatthis negotiationtook placeonly
af~erthe disputebetween Nicaragua and Colombia on jurisdiction
over thecontinentalshelfarosein 196924a8ndCoIombia decided to
give up the possibility of anegotiated solution withNicaragua.
Colombiathen followed a policy based on: 1) the unilateml
transformatio nf theBarcenas-Esguerr Treatyand theProtocolof
exchang of ratifications inatreatythatpurportdlyestabIisM a
maritime boundary thatfollowed the Meridian 82" W; 2) tlre
conclusion of tredties with other Caribbean neighbors wiIIingta
consent to it; and 33 the exclusionof Nicaragua from the area
unilaterally"~olombianized" by means of a dissuasive naval
'*Note of 8 Apriof thethenForeignMinister,AlfonsLdpezMichelsen,to
the U,S.ambassadorin BogatdThe negotiationbeganinBogota on 25 June
1971.
24See NM Val.I1Annex31.
In fm the cable dispatchfrom Assmlased Press dated 2 June 1971,
! announcedthebeginningof thenegotiatioat theinitiatioftheCuIombian
ForeignMinistry''arguingthatheywere due tothe interesshorn byU.S.
companies in exploring the und-er shelf adjacenr"to @itameliot
Roncador ,erranaandSerranilta.
24See infrCahap.11Subsec.B ofthiSection.2.160 The "protracted and detailed" negotiation included: I) The United
States renouncing her c1ai1ns of sovereignty; 2) the fishing regime
around the cays; and, 3) theregimeof Iighthouses and 11avigationa1
aids.
2.161 According to Article 1 of the treaty the United States relinquishes
"any and all claimsof sovereignty over Qnita Suefio, Runcadorand
Serrana." The fishing regimeis estabIished in Articles 2,3,4 and 5.
ArticIe 6 provided thar thematterof navigationalaids wouId be dealt
with in separate notes,which were exchanged on the same date the
Treaty was concluded.Article7 expressed that the Treaty "shallnot
affectthe positionsorviewsof eitherGovernment with respectto the
extent of the territoriasea, jurisdicrion of the coastal state over
fisheries,or any orher rnarter not specificaIIy dealtwith in" [his
Treaty. The treaty included two more articles, one on the entry into
effect (Article8: "uponthe exchangesof instrumentsof ratification,"
that would leadto the immediatederogation of the exchangeof notes
of 10 ApriI 19281, and the other about its duration (Ar-ticle9:
"indefinitely unless terminated by agreement of both
,,250
Governments ).
2.162 Colombia has interpreted Article 1 of the Saccio-VazquezTreaty in
her own interest as an acknowledgement by the United States of
CoIornbian This is not true.The Treaty, ratified by
the United Sratesin 1981,simply reIinquishes her claims over rhe
25TIAS 10120 pp. 3-6.
25Thisis stated,forexample,in theExpositionof Motives ofthedraftlawby
whichthe Saccio-Visquez Treatywas approved: "Colombia has been leftas
the sole legitimate owner bf said cays" (Introduction, secondparagraph).
Similarly, ithe"Report for rhfirst debateV'tfisdraftIaw in the Colombian
Senate (AnaIcsdel Co~greso,12December 1972,p. 1644). cays inexchange for certaiiadvantages.Furthermore,the exchange
of notesbetweentheUnited States andColombiawhensigningthe
$.," :.,, .: , ,,,
Treatyon 8 Septembci 1972, expresslyr'easserts the position of the
United States thar Qrritasuefio is a bank that, as such, does not
generate rightsof sovereignty?52
2.163 Ina furtherexchangeof notes, the Government of the UnitedStates
of America indicated that it"agrees to grant in perpetuity to the
Republic of ~olombia ownershipof the lighthouse lacared on Quira
SueRo andthe navigational beacons on Roncador and ~errana.'*~'~
Colombia, on herpart, recognized therightof the United States to
fishin the waters of the cays. Similarly,the Parties agreed not to
conclude, wirhout rhe consen1 of the other, agreernenrs with third
parties that may affect or undermine the rights guaranteed by rhe
Treaty to theirvessels and nationals.The Treatydid not specify to
whichwaters itreferred.
!
2.164 Nicaraguamadeeffortsto,first,b~ockthe~regotiaticnofthisTreaty,
latertocause the failure ofitsratification and,finally,tomoderate its
consequences through political declaration asnd clarificationsof its
purposebytheUnited States.
2.165 On 6 December 1971, referringto the Nicaraguanmemorandumof
23 June 1971 (see above,para.2.I%), a Note of the Secretaryof
State totheNicaraguanAmbassadorinWashington,endedwiththe
assurance that the Government of theUnitedStateswouldtakeinto
account the rights of the Nicaraguan Goven~ment over the
I continer~taslhelf.
253TIAS 10120, pp.11-12.
Note of 8 September 1972(N. 693) from theUnitedStatesAmbassadorin
Bog016 tothe ColombianForeignMinister.TLASI0120 p. 24.2.166 Once the treaty was signed: I) The National Constituent Assembly
of Nicaragua approved on 4 October I972 a formal declararion of
sovereignty over "the banks of Quitasuefio, Roncador and Serrana,
enclaved in our Continental Shelf and Patrimonial
con~rnunicating itto the interested governments and the United
Nations on 7 October; 2) on thatsame date, the Foreign Ministry of
Nicaraguareiterated on behalf of the National Government Junta its
formal protest to theColombian Foreign Ministry and the United
States State Department, with a detailedexplanation of the IegaI
basis for its claim (Notes No 053 y 054)'~'; 3) similarly, the
Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry mobilized itsdiplor-naticnetwork,
particularlyin Latin Americaand especially in CentralAmerica and
the Caribbean, to reportits rejectionof the Saccio-VizquezTreaty
and the protest notes in thisregard to the United States of America
and the Republic of ~&lornbia~~\and to request, in each case,
See NM VoI. II Annex8I.
255"My Government, naturally, cannot under any circrrrnsta~~cesaccept
agreemenrs reached or that may he reached by other countries when these
directly orindirectlyaffnationalterritoryortherightsoffulldomain arising
from the same, such as isthe case of the treaty andexchange of notesof
referenceand thereforeitpresentsitsmost formal protest,these Notes read,
thatgo on ro reiterate. "that the bmkslocated in rhar zuIrare pan of its
ContinentaI Shelf,and because of thisit is wilIingto use a11 peaceful
procedures provided byInteknarionaILaw to safeguardits legitimaterights."
See NM Vol.I1Annexes34and 35.
256See forexample Note R.E.D. No 100172,dated in SantoDomingo on 20
October 1972from the Ambassadorof Nicaragua,AlfredoL6pezRamirez to
the Dominican Secretary of State Victor G6mez VergCs. See NM Vol. I1
Annex 37.
'" See for exampleNoteG. 124, Nu P 87 MREG,of 28 October 1972, tothe
Foreign Minister de Guatemala, Jorge ArenalesCaraIAn,from the Nicarag~~an
Ambassador, CarlosManuel Perez Alonso, and thGuatemalanresponse(Nore
W 28044, 14 November of the same ye?), in which the Government of
Guatemala grants its fraternal suppoto Nicaragua, accordingto "the strict
I36 2.167 Although theUnited StatesPresid eentthetmty to theSenatefur
itsadviceandcons e.ton 9January 1973?" itwasshelved for years.
-*is ,I.
The delayin UnitedStatesratificaiibiL$in largemeasure due to
effonsto takeNicaraguanconcerns intoaccountas isacknowIedged
intheAide-Mmoire of theUnitedStaresEmbassy inManagua of16
July1981.
2.168 On 16September 1975 the~ssistantSecretaryof Stare for Latin
American Affairs,WiIIiamD. Rogers,appearedbefore the Senate
ForeignRefationsCornmilteeto explainthepurpose ofhe Sacciu-
Vizquez Treaty:TheTreaty,Rogerssaid,
"doesnor refer rnor does it affecnorisitintendedto
affectthemerits ofany Nicaraguan cIaimor difficuIty
with Colombia. We have so stated formallyto the
Nicaraguan Governmen ...We desireonlyto relinquish
any rightswe may havegainedunderthe earlier1928
agreement with Colombia and to withdraw from any
quad abut theis~ets."'~~~
Accordingru tRe:StateDepartmentthere was noreason for the
I
Senatenottoproceed with theadvisea'ndconsentof theTreatyand I
.,
Rogers felthe time &dl 'riphi binthe SenateForeign Relations I
Committee had inviteto aldnc~ltoon 25 September.as panof his
I
i
observanceofcontracteobligationin successideclaratioofMeetingsof
ForeignMinistersof theCentralAmericanRepublics(AntiguaGuatemala,
ResolutionIIJ of the First Meeting, 17-24 Augus1955; Tegucigalpa,
ResolutioTIof theFifthMeeting21-25July1962;Panama, ResolutioIIof
the Sixt hneeting,0-12 December1952)"by means of whichtheCentraI
Americanrepublicsarecommitted tohelpeach otherwithsoIidariinany
claimone of themmay havewithStatesoutsidtheCentralAmericansystem
1 overissuesregardingsovereigntand territorialintegrSee.NM Voi. II
Annexes 38and39.
"' TheColombian Congress,hadrushedto authoriztheratification12
15Qctmbr 1972
SeeNM VoI.I1Annex82. officiavisito Washington, the then Presidenrof Colombia,AdoIfo
L6pez Michelsen, who was "1ar.geIyresponsiblefurthe initiatioof
negotiationswhen hehad been MinisterofForeign ~ffairs.*~'
2.169 During thepublichearingstheAssistantSecretaryof State for Inter-
American Affairs testified,in response to questions asked by
ChairmanSparkman, that:"Wereceiv ednote fromNicaragua and
we have made clear thenand now thatwhat we aredoing here is
essentially without any prejudice whatsoever to Nicaragua's
conrinuingclaimto the is~ands."~~'
Inaddition,Note Nu 124 of theUnited States EmbassyinManagua,
of23 November1976,referring toa previousNote fromtheForeign
Ministryof Nicaragua,on 8 November,anda separateMemorandum
aimed at requestinga review OF the United Stares position in the
dispute, assert thathe position of the United StatesGovernment
continued unchanged. Thatis,that thepositionof the United States
was thatthe VGzquez-SaccioTreatydid not prejudice any claims
over-the caysin dispute;thatitdid not prejudice the jurisdictiona1
clainls of Nicaragua and, that the reof the dispute between the
Government of Nicaragua andtheGovernment of Colombia should
be negotiatedbilaterallywithoutinvolvingthe Governmentof the
United States.
2.171 Nicaragua didmanage,in mid-1978,to get the White House toagree
with thePresidentof theSenateCommitteeto translatthisideainto
260
The bxt ofthis statemenwas circulated on 19 September 1975 by the
United States Embassy in Managua to rhg Nicaraguan Ministryof Foreign
Affairs.
Cired in the Ielfrom rhe NicaraguanAmbassador inWashington,on 14
July 1981, tothe members of the Senate Foreign Relation(A.M.D.G. W
0294-811.See NM Vol.I1Annex 42. a "formal understanding" that shouId be an inregraI part of the
Treaty, which involved renewed consultations with Colombia.As a
*.9.:,: ' J 'r
result,on 23 May 1979, the Deputy Secretary of State transmitted to
the Chairman of the Committee the text of a proposed formal
understanding of theTreaty, which makesexplicit thar thepruvisiuns
of the treaty did not confer rights or impose obligations upon, or
prejudice the claims of, thirdstates. Still not satisfied,the Senate
Committee on 4 Decemberof 1979,sent the Treaty to the fullHouse,
on receiving a written statement from the State Department
confirming that theproposed understanding worrId belegally binding
on both parties to theTreaty.
2.172 In response to a Note (No 033) thatthe United States Embassy in
Managuahadsent on 30 January 1981 expressing that it was in the
interestsof both Governments to finda formula which would reflect
the intenti011of the United States to relinquish its claims arrdat the
same time reflect the position ofthe Govcrflmentof Nicaragua that it
was the sole legiiiinate title holder to these banks and cays, the
Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry reiterated and amply explained its
I .;
position in another Note (ACZIgg. No 027, 4 February 1981),
proposing that:
'The United States relinquish its supposed rights over
Roncador, Serrana and Quitasueno before the
Government and People of Nicaragua, or relinquish them
unilaterally before the world ... to prove the U.S.
Government's inten77262to damage the unquestionable
rights of Nicaragua....
2.173 According to the resolurionof ratification that was fir~aIypproved,
the Foreign RelationsCommitteerzcomrnendedrhat the Senategrant
26SeeNMVol.I1Annex 41.
139 consent to the ratification othe treaty with the understanding that:
I) the provisions of the treaty do not confer rights or impose
obIigations upon, or prejudice the claims, of third States; 2) rile
United States of America and the Republic of Colombia as well as
other nations in the WesternHemisphere, are obligated under the
Charter of the United Nation and the Charterof the Organizationof
American States to settle their differences peaccfuIIy, 3) as
recognized by SenareResolution 74, Ninety-third Congress, States
may contribute to the deveiopmentof international peace through
law by submitting territorial disputesto the InternationalCourt of
Justice or other impartial procedures for binding settlement of
disputes.
2.174 Considering thatthis textwas innocuous,Nicaraguain facrproposed
that the Senate's advice and consent of the Saccio-Vizquez Treaty
be grantedsubjectto the understandingthat:
1) The provisionsof ItheTreaty did not alter rhefact that the
juridical status of Quitasueilo, ~bncador, and Serrana is i~r
dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua, and the provisioirs of
the Treaty did not prejudice the claims of either Colombia or
Nicaragua;
2) The pruvisions of rhe Treaty did not exempr either Columbia
or Nicaraguafrom their obligation toresoIve their disputeover
the juridica1 status of Qrritasrrefio,Runcador-,and Serrana in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
Charterof the Organisation of American States; and that
3) No provisions of the Treaty, nor of the exchang ef notes,
would be implementedprior to final resolutionofthe dispute by those peacefu mleans indicatedin the Chartersofthe United
Nationsand o?;:.:h,rganisatioofAmerican States,or byany
other peaceful means agried iibn by Colombia and
~iczragua~~
But what is most important is the previously mentioned Aide-
Mhoire, dated 16 July1981 and presentedby the United States
Embass n Managua totheMinistryof ForeignAffairstodescribe
its conside&Ie efforts to satisfy the concerns of Nicaragua,
unfounded in the view of the UnitedStatesGovernment,that the
Saccio-VQuez Treaty might in some manner prejudice the
Nicaraguan claimto thesbanko srcays(Quitasneifo,Runcadorand
Serrana).
2.176 The Aide-Mkmoire, entitled United States &gal Position,
emphasized thatthe basicUnited States interessince theearly -
I 19Ws had beentowithdrawthe outstandingUnited Stateclaim to
the threecays, preservedin the 1928agreementbetween United
Statesand~olornbia. At the same time, the UntiedStateshad no
interestintaking sideas between theother claimantto thecays.
United Statesactior~shavebeen premised on these twoprinciples.
The Aide-Mimoire went on to statthatthe UnitedStateshad not
taken, and did not intend to take any position regding the
respectiveIegalmerits ofthe competingclaims of Colombia and
Nicaragua-
2.177 InconcIusion,the UnitedStatesrelir~quishea11her hypothetical
I rightsoverthecays throughthe Saccio-VizquezTreaty,butshe did
notdo so by acknowledging Colombia'srights.To the contrary,
SeeNM VoI11Annex4Z
141 when ratifying the Treary,the United States was careful to express
her neutrality regarding the Iegitimate cIairns and interestsof third
parties, particularly Nicaragua,stating clearlythat the treaty didnot
grant Colombia morerights than those shepossessed before, nordid
itprejudice the rightsof Nicaragua.
2.178 In any case, an eventual cession bythe United Stalesof her claimed
rights to Colombiawould have been formally irrelevant in terms of
Nicaragua,as theNicaraguan-Colombian dispute was based uponthe
uri posside~isiuris If in 1821there was no terrae nuIIit(s
in SpanishAmerica, the cays must havebeen Nicaraguan,regardless
of the guano adventure or other similar events. The legitimate
interests of Nicaragua could not be damaged by the Saccio-Vkquez
Treaty, which in any case was res infer-alioactrr.
5. Theutipossidetisiuris:presumptions
2.179 There is no explicitn~enrion of Roncador, Serrana or much less the
bank of Qiritasuefioin the acts of theSpanish Crown. Being ar best
cays, theapplication of uti possidetis iurishould be understood,as
isthe case of SerranillaandBajo Nuevo, in termsof attachment or
dependence on the closes7continental fenitory, thatoi~icara~ua.~~'
CoIombia, murc than rhree hundred and sixty nauticaI miles away,
triestotiethem to the Archipelago of San Andrksand Providencia in
264See supraChap. J . -
265Juan de Soldrzano Pereira, De f~diamm &re. Liber 11: De adquisirione
Indinrum (Cap. 1-15). Ed.y tradrlcci6nde J.. M. Garcia Aiioveros et aI.,
Madrid,1994:'The property is given tothe inhabit-antbut theauthorityand
jurisdiction over thoplacesbelong to who hasthe domain over the mainland,
as iis clearlin theGlosa using theVenditorLawargument"(II.6, ns. 19-22:
pp.186-188). order tobringthemcloser toherjurisdiction,baxd on herclaimed
i
sovereigntyover I.?.:..lands. T)*'-..-:abit orduninhabitable
cays wouldthus &cohd'b dependencyof he Archipelago.
2.180 However, itshonI de mentionedthatin the treaties concluded by
Colombiawith CostaRica in the second half of the 191hcentury
(1856, 1865, 18731,that never entered intoforce, the Mangles
Islands(Cum Islands) are incIuded and also the Islandof San
And&, Providenc S aah,Ohlina and the Alburquerqucays,but ,
nothingissaidaboutRoncador, Serrana,QuitasuefioSerranilland
Bajo Nuevo, and iis notknown that theColombianlegislation,at
thattime,mentioned thosefeaturesaspart ofthe "Cant6n of San
And=.
2.181 Ina 1916Note theAssistantSecretaryof StatFrancisWhitesays to
the Colombian Ministerin Washington: "It would be good to
definitivdyexpress thatthose isIands havenot been par? OF the
1
Archipelagoof San~ndr&.~%
2.182 InresponsetotheNotesoftheNicaraguan Ambassado on 10 and17
October 1972 askingforsolidarityinthediplomatic battleagainst
the ratificatiof the Saccio-VasqrrezTreaty, the Costa Rican
ForeignMinisterGonzaloI. Facio, expressein Mote IT68.682 o,f
18October 1972:
"After a carefulstudy of the case, including the
arguments providedby theEnlightenedForeig Mninistry
of Columbia in defence of itspositionand foIIowi~rg
instructionfrom the Przsidentof the Republic. I am
pleased to express the following: My government
256The WhitePaperofNicaraguaontheCaseof San AnMs andProvidencia,
p.21.(Englishversionp.18).SeNM Vul.IIAnnex 73. considers that the cays and isIets called Quitasueiio,
Roncador and Serrana are located on the ContinentaI
Shelf of the RepnbIic of Nicaragua. Consequently,
according to article 2 of the Convention on the
Continental Shelf.. ., in force between our States,
Nicaraguaexercisessovereigntyoversaidbanks ..;Even
ifatreaty towhich CentralAmerica was parryestablished
ingeneral terms tharthe ArcI~ipcIago of San Andrdsand
Providencia beIong to CoIornbia, [his genera1concept
may not involve the banks,whethersubmergedor not,
that are an integralpartof the NicaraguanContinental
2.183 The Cosra Rican Foreign Minister GonzaIc Fdcio emphasized later,
in 1981,oncethewhite papers of Nicaragua and Colombia had been
published,that the differences between,on the one hand, the islands
of San Andsks and Providencia, and on the other, the uninhabited
cays emerging from the NicaraguanconrinentaI shelf, Roncador,
Serranaand Quitasueiio,is thattheformerare underthesovereignty
of Colombia and the latter, lacking independentlife from the
continental shelf from which they emerge, should be under the
sovereignty of~icara~ua.~~~
2.184 Ontheother hand,even if one accepts, for thesakeof argument ,hat
Roncador, Serrana (and Quitasueiio)formpartof theArchipelago of
SanAndris and Pruvidencia arrhe time ofthe emancipation from rhe
Spanish Crown, the ~lripossideris iurisprincipIe would strengthen
the right of Nicaragua.The eventual validity of the Barcenas-
EsguerraTreatycould not affect the Nicaraguan title, as the cays
'"See NM VoI.I1Annex36.
26Facio,G .,EIdif~re~domtre Nic~traguay Coiombiasobre d Arciripie'Iago
de Sun AndrPs y Pt-ovitIencia, Relacirrraes frtternucites [Escueia de
Relaciones Internacionales,UniversidadNacional de Costa Rica, Heredia),
1981,aiio2, num. Ipp. 13-28,SeeNM Vol. I1Annex 74. ,'.5-:;' . .
were excInded from it. The occupation produced after the crirical
dateof I5Septembe,+ , !21 couId also norbe of reIevancebecause it
would go contraryto thenatureand significance of the utyossidetis
principle. In any event,the occupation of the cays by the United
States in the mid 191h century demonstrates that Colombia did not
effectiv eolysessrhernat that time nor, of course,at the moment
when theBgrcenas-kguem Treaty was agreed upon.
6. Conclusions
2.185 The express exclusion from the 1928 Treaty of the features of
Roncador, Serranaand Quitasueiio did not amount to a Nicaraguan
renunciation of her cIaim ofsovereignty over them. The textof the
Treary does not assertthisand the negoriatinghistorydoes not imply
that thiswas the case.The rules of contrrrprofevenfernand inrlrrbio
mitius indicate that the clause that was added to the Treaty, in
relationto these featuks, should beinterpreted in afashion that is
the leastonerousfor Nicaragua.
2.186 In theSaccio-VazquezTreaty the UniredStares renounced any claim
to sovereigntyover the cays but this renrrnciariwas not in favor of
Colombia: (i) thUnited Sates Senare ratifiedit on thunderstanding
that the Treaty would not confer rights or impose obIigations or
prejudicetheclaims of thirdstatesand, (ii) thUnited StatesSenate
also noted that any territorial disputeshould be submitted to the
I InternationalCourt.
I
/ 2.187 The features explicity excluded irom theBgrcenas-EsguerraTreaty
are not legally w geug~.aphi carlloy the Archipelago of San
Andrks and Providenci aa, they belong, accordin to the uri possidetis iuris,Nicaragua by virtueof theirgreaterproximityt-o
the continental coasr that is Nicaraguan. In addition, since
Quitasuefio is a bankit is simply panof Nicaragua's continental
2.188 The Bircenas-EsguerraTreatydid not mention Serranillaor Bajo
Nuevo,since at thattime Colombia wasnotclaimingthese features.
The factthatthesefeaturesarenot mentionedin thetreaty,and that
they are located respectivel165 and 205 nautical miles fromthe
nearest isIandof the Archipelagoof San ~ndrks?" rhe Island of
Pravidencia, is proofthat they are norgeographicaIIyor IegaIIypart
of the "Archipelagoof San Andrks".They appertainto Nicaragua
sincetheyarelocatedon hercontinentalshelf and,as a resultof the
application of the utipossidet isristhey also appertain to
Nicaraguagiventheirgreaterproximitytohermainland.
B.REFERENC TOTHE MERIDIA NF82" WEST
INRELATIO TO THE ALLOCATIO ONISLANDS
2.189 Thepresent sectiowill dealwith thequestionof how theTreaty of
1928,whose objectwas tosettlea territoria1dispute of sovereignty
over severalisIandsand rhe CaribbeanCoastof Nicaragua,has been
self-serviny1 convelred by Colombia, forty years after its
conclusion,intoa purportedTreatyof delimitatioof maritimeareas
thatwere unknown andunrecognized by internationallaw athetime
of itsconclusion.
269See in& Chap.LII,SecXI.
270SeeChap. LII,paras.3.120a3.121below.
145 I.Thereferenih?themeridianof829WestoGreenwich
2.190 TheBarcenas-EsguerrT areatyconcludedon 24 March1928,was
approvedby theNicaraguan President n27 March1928 and later
submittedto theNicaraguaCongressforitsratificatiThe textof
theTreatycanbe seeninNicaraguan MemorialVolume iIAnnex 19
andisreproduced in paragraph1of theTntroduction.Thepertinent
partoftheTreatyforpresentpurposestates,
"'TheRepublicof Colombiarecognizethe fullandentire
sovereigntyof the Republic of Nicamgua over the
Mosquito Coast between CapeGracias a Dios and the
SanJuan river,and overMangle Grande and Mangle
Chico Islandsin theAtlantic Ocea(GreatCorn IsIand
and Little Corn Island). TheRepublic of Nicaragua
recognizesthefull andentiresovereigofytheRepublic
ofColombia overthe isIandofSan Andres,Providencia,
andSantaCatalina and overtheother islands,islets and
reefsforming partofthe San And& Archipelag Th.e
presentTreatydoesnot apply tothereefsof Roncador,
Quitasuefiuand Serrana,sovereignty over which is in
disputebetween Colombia and the United Statesof
America."(Emphasisadded)
2.191 The NicaraguanSenateappointed aCommissionof' its members in
orderto studytheTreatyand giveitscounsel.The C~mmissiort's
reportwas readinSession XLVIIIof the Senaton 4 March 1930.
TIE consideredopinionoftheCommission wasthatthe wordingof
the Treatydidnotclari tfyextentof "theotherislands,isletsand
reefs forming parofthe San Andrks Archipelago"The pertinent
transcriptf thminutesof the Sessiostatethatthe Reportofthe
SenateCommission chargedwithstudyingtheTreaty,
"was in favourof the ratificationtheTreatyentered
into by thtwo Republicsthe 24of March of 1928 ,nd
approved by ExecutivePower on the 27 of the same month and year; Treaty that puts andend to the matter
pending between the two RepubIics over theArchipelago
of San Andris and Providencia and the Nicaraguan
Mosquitia; in the undersranding that the San Andres
archipelago mentionedin the first clause ofthe Treaty
does not extend to the Westof meridian82 of Greenwich
in thechart published in October 1885by the Washington
Hydrographic Office under the authority ofthe Secretary
of the Navyof the United Statesof North~rnerica."~~'
2.192 The question then arose whether the addition othisdeclaration, this
"understanding", to the ratification of theTreaby Congress would
implythe need of submitting it again to theColombianCongress that
had alreadyratifiedthe Treaty on 17November 1928. To deal with
thismatter, the Senate summonedthe Minister of ForeignAffairs,
Mr. ManuelCorderoReyes, in order to obtain his views on this
question. The Ministertook part inSession XLyl of the Senate on 5
March I930 and gave the views of the Nicaraguan Government and
also that ofthe Colombian governmentthat had been consulted on
this matter.The Ministersaid,
"that heunderstood that he had been called to hear the
opinion of the'ExecutivePoweron the subject relating to
theColombian affair; that in meeting at theMinistry of
Relationswith the Honourable Commission of Relations
ofthe Senate, itwas agreed by the Commission and the
Advisors of the Government to accept as limit in this
dispute with Colombia the West 82 meridian of
Greenwich and of the HydrographicOffice of the
Ministry ofthe Navy of the United States of 1885; that
then Senator Paniagua Prado expressed his worries that
byadding thiamendment orclarificationitwould be put
(again) to the approvalof the CoiornbianCongress and
would be a causefor delay for itsapprovaland therefore,
for putting end to thisannoyingsubject.But that having
taken this matter up with the Honourable Minister of
27See NM Vol.I1Annex 80.
I48 Colombia and he with his Government, which requested
that theTreaty should not be altered because itwould
again have Lobe.pup.to the consideration of the Congress;
having insinuatgdio dis ExceI1&cyMinister Esguerra, ro
deaIagain wit11 his Government on this matter,and after
having obtained an answer, he told me: that his
Governmentauthorizedhim to say that theTreaty would
notbe put to the approvalof the ColombianCongress,in
view ofthe clarificationthatdemarcated the dividingline,
that therefore, and although there was not anything in
writing, hcouId assurethe HorlorabIe Chamber, in name
of the Government, that the Treaty would be approved
with no needto put itagain to theapproval of Congress.
"The Minisrer added, that thexplanation does notr.efom
the Treaty, because it onIy irltends to indicatea Iimit
between fhe archipelagoes thathad been reason for the
dispute and that the ColombianGovernment had already
accepted that explanation by means of his Minister
Plenipotentiary, onlydeclaring,that this explanation be
made in the 1.atiFicationact of the Treaty: thar this
explanation was a necessity for thfuture of bothnations
because itcame to indicatethe geographic Iimit between
the archipelagoes in disputewithout which it would not
be defined the matter completely; and that therefore he
requestedto rhi ~unomb~eChamber the approvalof the
Treaty with the proposede~~~anation..."~~~
-.
2.193 The Session was then continued in'secret and the Senate finally
approved the Treaty with the declaration recommended by the
Commissionthat restrictedthe ArchipeIago of San Andrks to areas
East of the 82" meridian of Iongitude Wesr. This condition was
included in the Congressional Decree of ratificationof 6 March
1930, which was promulgated by the President of Nicaragua in the
Gazette, theofficialbr11Ietiofthe Republic of Nicaragua on 22 JuIy
1 1930.'~~ his Decreeratifies theTreafy,
I
272SeeNM Vol. I1 Annex SO.
n3 ta Gacein, Diaric Ofrcial, Aiio, XXXIV,Managua. D.N., Wednesday, 2
July 1930.N" 144, pp.I145-1146. "in the undersranding that the San Andres archipciago
mentioned in thefirst cIausoftheTreaty does norexrend
to the West of meridian82 of Greenwichin the chart
published in October I885 by the Washington
Hydrographic Office underthe authorityofthe Secretary
of the Navyof the United States of NortAmerica."
2.194 The Decree furtherspecificallyordersthatthe Decree with thetext
of the understanding should be included in the Instrumentof
~atification.~~~
2.195 On 5 May 1930, the CoIornbian and the Nicaraguan
plenipotentiaries,respectively,AmbassadorManuel Esguerraand
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Julian Irias, exchanged the
instruments of rarification of the Treaty of 24 March 1928
concerning territorialquestionat issue betweenthe two countries.
Theyspecified intheProtocolof Exchangeof Ratifications:
"The undersigned, invirtueof thefuIIpowers which have
been granted to rhem and on the instructionof their
respective Governments, hereby declare that the San
Andresand Providencia Archipelago mentione id the
firstarticleof thesaidTreatydoes not extendwest of the
82"* degreeof Iongitr~dewest of ~reenwich."~'~
2.196 The mutual understandingon the part of both Nicaraguaand
Colombia of the intentand meaning of the declaration thatwas
added by theNicaraguanCongressto the 1928Treaty,as reported by
the NicaraguanForeign Ministerto the Senate (see above, para.
2.191) is confirmedintheReportof theColombianForeignMinister
tohis Congress. The Report of the Minister to Congresscontains a
transcriptioofa repori by Ambassadorhguerra on the activit ofes
275SeeNM Vol. I1Annex i9.
SeeNM Vol.11Annex 19. his Legation. His report of the- process of ratificationby Nicaragua
states,
,:'$;:.;,>. I 8,.
"It was rhe Senate (of Nicaragua) that firstconsidered the
Treaty, and after approving ir in a first debate it
introduced to ita clarification clause onthe western limit
of the Archipelago, and fixing this limit on the 82
meridian of Greenwich. The Legation was consulted
whether this clarification wolrId be acceptable to the
Government of Colombia and whether it would need
subsequentapprovalby Congress, 1consuked this point
with the Ministry, which answeredthat itaccepted it,and
that since it did not alter the text or the spirit of the
Treaty, it did not need to be submitted to the
co~rsiderationof the Legislative ranch."^"
2.197 The legal nature of this conditionisobvious. In the wordingaccepted
by the International Law Commissionin the Draft Guide to Practice
on Reservarionsro Treaties rhat itis elaborating, it is a "'conditionaI
2.198 Draft Guideline 1.2.1 - Conditional Interpretative Declarations
provides:
"A unilareralstaikment iomilited by a State or an
international organization when signing, ratifying,
formally confirming, accepting, approvingor acceding to
a treaty,or by a Statemaking a notification of succession
to a treaty, whereby the State or international
organization subjectsits consent to be bound by thetreaty
to a specific interpretao tiotne treaty or of certain
provisions thereof, shall constitute a conditional
interpretativedeclaration9.277
1
I
276Informe del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores a1 Congreso de 1930,
277otB,Imprenta Nacional,1930,p.223. See NMVol .IiAnnex71.
I.L.C.Report on the Workof its51''Session(19991,GAOR, 54I hession,
SuppIement No 10,A154110 p,207.2.199 This is exactIythecase here:the Nicaraguan Congress subordinated
itsacceptanceof theTreaty to aprecisedefinitionof what was meant
by the expression "San AndrksArchipelago" in Article I of the
Treaty. This interpretationwas a condition for the ratificatioand
was formaIIyaccepted as such by CoIornbia in the Protocol of
Exchange of Ratifications that was registered together with the
Treatyitself by the League of Nations on 16 August 1930, under
Regisrration Number 24~6."~ It then constifntes an "authentic
interpretation" otheTreaty.
2.200 As explainedin Oppenheim's InternationalLaw,Ninth Edition, the
partiestoa treat myay:
"before, during, or after the concltrsior~of the treaty,
agree upon the interpretatioof aterm, eitherinformally
(and executing the treaty accordingly) or by a more
formal procedure, as by an interpretativedeclaration or
protocol or a suppicrnentw areyry. Such authentic
interpretationsgivenby the partiesoverride genera1mIes
of interpretation.'"'g
2.20 1 Tt might be the case that "conditional interpretative declarations"
must be assimilaredro reservations as fotheirIegaI Bur
this doesnot change thepicture; athe ILChasnoted:"A rese~~vation
to a bilateral treathas an objectiveeffect:if itis acceptedby the
2"SeeLNTS, VoI. 16,16August1930, pp.340-341.
27Sir Robert Jenningsand SirArthurWatts,Oppenheim'sInternational hw,
Ninth Edition, vol. I, Peace, Longrnan, London, 199p.1268 - footnotes
omitted. See also JeanSalmon edDictionnairededroit intemtioml public,
BnryIanrlAUF,BmxelIes, 2001,p.504 or PatricDaiIIier el AIaPellet,Droir
iniei-noiiopublic(Nguyen Qunc Dink),L.G.D.J..Paris,7hed.,2002,p.254.
See I.L.C., Reporon he Work of its51" Session(19991,GAOR, 54*
Session, SupplemenNo 10,A154110,commentar o fdraftguideline 1.2.1,pp.
245-248,para(11)to (14). 'i I
other State, itis the treaty itklf that is amended."L8'In the present
case, the conditio,-,irnposed by the ~icara~uan Congress was
-*.;,',:.
accepted by Colorhbia as wiinessed by the Prorocol of Exchange of
Ratifications.If the Treatywerevalid at a11,guod non, this condition
hasbecomean integralpart of the Treaty and binds both Parties.
2.202 But, ofcourse, this authentic interpretation (or added provision)
rnust,itself, be interpreted correctly. IIIthis respect, there are clear
differences between the Parties, and thesedifferencesare an integral
part of thepresent dispute.
2. Theclaims and praciice ofthe Parties
2.203 For several decades afterthe events described in paragraphs2.189-
2.193 above, CoIurnbiaIiad not suggestedrhat the mention of the
8zndmeridian in the Prutocolof Exchange of Ratifications could be
interpreted as effecting an overall delimitationof the respective
maritime areasbetween the Parties. It was only forty years afterits
signature that, as pari of a radicaIpulicy of expansion of the
Colombian sovereignty and jurîsdiction in the Caribbean, the
authorities of Bogoti circulated a doctrine that Calombia and
Nicaragua had rtgreed on meridian 82"W as a maritime bourrdary,
and that Thiswas the purpuse of the understanding added to the
Protocol of Exchange of Ratifications of the Bhcenas-Esguerra .
Treaty.
I
i 2.204 The definition of the 8znd meridian as a maritime boundary was
1 claimed by CoIombia for the first tirne in a dipIomatic note tu
281 Ibid., comrnentaryof draftguideline 1.S.1 ("Reservations" to bilateral
treaties), 299,para.(15). Nicaragua of 4 June 1969, reserving her rights regarding
reconnaissancepermits and concessions for oiland gas exploration
granted by Nicaragua in portions of her continental shelf.282The
responseof Nicaragua of 12June 1969 was immediate and clear in
the defence of her The Nicaraguan reaction provoked
Colombia to reiterateand somewhat elaborate her claim thatsame
yearin a furtherVerbal Note of 22 September 1969,~~~in which she
made "a formal declarationof sovereignty in the maritime areas
Iocated EastofMeridian 82 of Greenwich, and pariicuIarIy for the
effects of exploration or exploitation of the submarine shelfand the
living resources of the sea", considering "that the concessions
granred by the Republic of Nicaragua tocompanies or individuaIs
thar go beyond said Iine, wuuIdlack any legal va1ue".The reasons
given for this were:
"a.The definitiveand irrevocablecharacter oftheTreaty
on Boundaries signed by Colombia and Nicaragua on 24
March 1928.
b. The clarificatioby the Complementary Protocol of 5
May 1930, in the sense thatthe dividing line between
respective maritime areaor zones was set atGreenwich
Meridian 82.
c. The stipulatiocontained in Article1of the Treatyof
24 March 1928, which excludes the Roncador,
QuitasueRo and Serrana Cays from any negotiations
berween CoIombiaandNicaragua.
d. Finally,thearbitr-aalwardproffered bthePresident of
France, Emile Loubet, on September 11, 1900, between
Costa Ricaand Colombia."
282SeeNM VoI.I1Annex28.
"' See NM VoI.IIA.nnex29 and para.2.212 below forfurther detaiIsthis
note.
284See NMVol.11 Annex 30. ..
2.205 Suchassertionsha*&, sincethen,beenrepeated sever81 times28a5nd
the Colombianoffi,h';,:ma., of !,e. kgion have been modified
accordingly.
2.206 However, itmust be notedthat,evenfrom the 970s andup tonow,
the Colombian positionin thisrespecthasbeen farfromfirm and
i
consistent.
2.207 Thus, in a speech at the AIrnirante PadiIlaNavaI School of
Cartagena, deliveredon 3 JuIy 1975,the President of CoIombia
himself, Alfonso L6pez Michelsen,declared: "We are going to
continueour talkswith Venezuelaand makecontactswith Panama,
Ecuador, Peru, Nicaraguaand the countries neighbauring to the
Archipelago of San And& and the cagls ._.to negotiate the
territorisea."2"Whatever thementionof the 9ten-orialsea"might
imply,the VenezuelanPresident clearly meant that nodelimitation
withNicaragua had been achieved.
2.208 ThreeyearsIater,a'Irnoitttheentibfhismandate, in aspesch of24
May 1978 atthe same.Nava1 Schoo!,inCartagena,President Upez
Michelsen, after pising theconventional delimitationpolicy of
CoIornbia .tated:'Thereare dilI pending,itistm, mare compkx
Befinirionssuchas the socalIed"difwendo"thar we have had for
severalyearswith thesisterRepublicof Venezuela,and theone we
stilmaintain,unresolwd, withthe Republic of~iiuar~ua,"~~L~ater
on,in1 986,asaformer PresidentUpez Michelsen debatedwith he
rhen ForeignMinister RamfrezOcnrnpo, who hadstared that there
was nothing tonegotiatewithNicaraguaI .n aletteto the President
="~eee-g,NoteDM-571 of20OctoberI976SeeIUM Vd. TtAnnex 40.
~lT~crnpo ,og& 4 July1975.pp.1y Id-C S.eeNM Vol. IAnnex 83a.
28EJTiempa, Bog&, 25 May 1978,iralicaddedSee NM VoI-IIAnnex83b. of the RepubIic,asking him to convene the Advisory Commission of
Foreign Relations, L6pez MicheIsen asserted:"I can reiterate ithe
most strong and irrefutable terms that we must negotiate with
Nicaragua the delimitation of our marine and submarine areas. ..
Invoke theBgrcenas-EsgrrerraTreatyover domain of the islands of
the Archipelago ..using meridian 82 as a reference point,is not arr
argumentto abstain from openingtalks about marine areas and the
continentalshelf".288
2.209 These speeclres by AIfonso Lbpez MicheIsen are paflicnlarly
relevant,not onIy since he had been the Presidentof the Republic of
Colombia, but also because he held thatposition when most of the
maritime delimitation treaties of Colombia were being negotiatedin
the Caribbean, andafterhe himself had beenForeignMinister.They
are aIso relevant because his opinions on the subject are:not
politicallyoriented but rather are based on legal reasoning. For
example, in an interview of which the Colombian newspaper El
Muirriclgives an account, he reminded the Iocai press of rhe
GuineaGuinea-Bissau case of 1985 and told tIrern that the
International Court of Justice would not accept that treatiedating
back before 1945 could have the effect odelimitingmaritimespaces
beyond the rerritorialsea.For'thireason he concluded thar"itis far
betterto open directnegotiations with Nicaragua sole1y on themarter
of the marineand submarineareas than to start aconflictbetween
both countries in theCourtof The Hague."(ElMundo 12September
1995) It is noteworthy that the man who made the reclaiming of
maritime sovereignty the main mission of Colombians in the 20Ih
288"~Negociar con Nicaragua?Negociariqd? ",El Siglo ,ogoth, 21 March
1986.Citedin A. Zamorra nteresesTerritorialesdeNicaragua E.ditorialCira,
Managua,2000,p. 79. . *!'
century289oes notlean on,ineridian 82toconsider assettledthe
entangledconflicof interestswi.,NicaraguT.othe contrary,even
asrecentlyas12December 1999th fe-r Presidentpublishedan
articleinthe newspapeEl Tkmp ofBog& inwhich he explicitly
indicatesthatmeridian82"wasadopted "asthelimi ofallocatioof
theislandsthosethatwere tothewestof themeridian foNicaragua
and thosto theeastfo~olombin").~'~
2.210 Oneother suchrevealinginconsistencinthe Colombianpositionis
that theFacio-FernhdezTreaty signedon 17 March 1977 by
Colombiaand CostaRica (and neve ratified bthelatter)belies
Colornbin'sapparentms~in themeridian82" West as hermaritime
boundarywithNicaragua:Article1 .I3f thiTreaty places the limit
ofherborderwith CostaRicaat 82' 14w ,29L
2.211 The Nicaraguanpracticeandpositionhave alwaysbeen remarkably
constantand consistent: she has firmly rejectetheColombian
claims immediately,after they were firstmade and, affirmed
positivelyhesovereignrightsthercontinenra1shelf.
a ..
- 2.212 Nicaraguatook thecited (para.2.26above) Colombian Noteof 4
June 1969 very seriously. Her Foreign MinisterMr. Lorenzo
Guemm, byNote W 00021, of 12June 1469,officiallyresponded
loColombia: confirming that the concessionsmadin thd ArIantic
Coastwerewithin the continental shelfNicaragua,inaccordance
withthe principleof internationlaw and rejectingtheview that
.- -- -
ZS9 "Samperhas cmed a new border litigation",El Mwndu,kg&, 12
September1995See NM Val.U Annex 83c.
29"Ni~araguattheCrossroads'",Tie-, 12December 1999,SeeNM Vol.
I1Annex.Italiadded.
'" SeeNM Voi.IIAnnex20and Vol.IFigl~rU. the meridian82" W wasthe Iimitof Nicaragua~n rationalsovereignty,
since itonly marks the western border of the Archipelago of San
Andrks. Minister Guerrero added "My Government considers
inappropriatethe reservation made by the EnIightened Government
of Colombiaas a resnItof theabovementionedConcessions, as these
were granted in use of the clearand indisputable rights it holds and
in full exerciseof its sovereignty." He unequivocally asserted that
his Government,"does EirmIyinsist on the recognition and respect
fur its inaIienabIe rights to the expIoitation of existing natural
resourcesin the national territory, owhich the Continental Shelf is
an inseparablepart."292
2.213 Referring more preciseIy to the interpretation of the Nicaraguan
legislative decree, incorporated in the Protocol of Exchange of
ratifications otheB6rcenas-EsguerraTreaty, the Noteexplains:
"A simple reading of the transcribedtextsmakes itclear
that the objective of this provision is to cIearIy and
specifically establish in' a restrictive manner, the
extension of the Archipelago of San Andrks,and by no
valid means can it be interpreted as a boundary of
Nicaraguan rights or creatorof a border between the two
counrries. On thecontrary, itack*owledges and coniims
the suvereignry and fuil domain of Nicaragua over
national territoryinthat zone.329.
2.214 Later, the denial of Meridian82" W as a maritimebwder was
accompanied by docurnentariurr on the diplomatic battle waged
against theconclusionof the Saccio-Vizquez
29See NM Vol. I1Annex29.
See NM VoI.I1 Annex29.
294See,for example,the Memorandaof23 June 1971 (Ministryof Foreign
Affairs.Secretariat General, DiplomaticSectionNo 026) See NM Vol. II 2.215 Nicaraguamaintained herfirin.positioon theoccasionof incidents
concerningfishin-'$h~$,;,:.-.shLa,mbr,hefollowingexamples in
thepasfdecade.
2.216 On 9 June 1943,helicoptersfromtheColombianNavyharassed the
I Nicaraguanboats "My Wave" and "All John"md, on 7 July, a
Colombian coastguard seizedthefishingboat"Sheena MC II",with
Honduran flag, whichwas working witha Nicaraguan licenceThe
Nicaraguan ForeignMinistry protestedthese incidentson II June
and 9 July 1993. According totheseNotes, theseincidentstook
placewest of meridian82'. TheForeignMinistry of Colombia, 19
duIy 1993- maintainedthatthe events hadoccurred eastofsaid
meridian-Given this circurnsrance,the Nicaraguan Ministry of
ForeignAffairs,26July 1993wrotem:
"The Governmentof Nicaraguawishes to'make it very
clearthat, evenif thvesselsreferredtohad been found
at the coordinates referredto in the Nafe of Your
ExceIIency,the.resultwouldhave been the same,given
thatthose waters,undoubtedlya,lsobelong toNicaragua
andate partof themaritimespaces overwhichNicaragua
exercises full jurisdictio:-according to history,
geography, custom ad Intmatimal Law. Therefore he
statementsof cIaimedColombian sovereignty over the
waters aretotaIIinadmissible."
I
Annex31 orthe Notesof7 October1972, N0053 ad 054. SeeNM Vol. Jl
Annexes34and 35.See abovep.m. 2.158.
'"Nor= W 9301%. M"930158,DM, 01418 andW 930164,See NM VoI.II
Annexes44.45,46 and47.2.217 On 27 March 1995the CoIornbian vessel"Sea Dog" was seized by
the Nicaraguan Navy Force east of meridian 82" for fishi~rg
iIlegal.z96
2.218 On 9 October 1995Nicaragua protested thseizureby a Colombian
corverre of the VenezueIan morwboat "Gavil5n" which, with a
Nicaraguanfishinglicence,was fishingeastofmeridian82 o.297
2.219 On 27 November 1996 the Nicaraguan Naval Force seized the
CoIornbian boat "Miss Tina" at Iongirnde 82",and the CoIombian
Foreign Ministryprotested, rrndersrandingthat the seizurehad taken
place east of that position.29Again, the Nicaraguan Ministry of
Foreign Affairsanswered29 that:
"...even ifthe seizurehad takenpIace arcoordinates 13"
47' N and 8lo 57'W, borh pusitions are rrnquesrionabIjrin
waters withinthe maritimejurisdict~onof Nicaragua".
The Noteadds:
'The Ministryof Foreign Affairscategorica rejIctsthe
mention made inthe [CoIornbian] notethat position13"
43' N 82" 00' W constitutes the boundary of our two
countries, since Nicaragua has signed no maritime
delimitation treatin the Caribbean Sea,neitherwith the
Republic of Colombia, norwith anyother country inthe
region and, consequentI y, the sovereignty, jurisdiction
andrights of Nicaraguain theCaribbean Sea extend to all
maritime spaces attributed to iby International Law in
effect, includingthe islands,caysbanks, reefs and other
geographicalaccidents adjacent to itscoasts,as well as
29SeeColombian Note 0304 ,f3April 1995,andNicaraguan of4 and 5 othe
same monrhand year.No.95015 1and 950162. NM Vol. 11Annexes49,50and
31.
2wSeeNoteNo 950459 - NMVol. I1Annex 52.
29See NoteDM.VA. No 004313,29 January1997.NM Vol.II Annzx 53.
29See NoteNo 97006 1of 11February 1997NMVol.I1Annex 54. the continental shelfand 'formationsthat emerge from it
orarelocated on it."
2.220 Later,the Colombiafi'Note DM No..37678 of 18 July 1997,'~ refers
tothe incidentson 4 April and 28 May 1997when Nicaraguancoast
guards attempted to detain boats that were working with a
Colombianlicense eastof meridian 82";Nicaragua:
"...emphatically rejectsthatrhe maritime areas in which
it asserrsevents took pIace ...beIongs to any Economic
Zone of Colornbia but rather, to the contrary, are
maritime areas which, based on current International
Law,belongto Nicaragua."
Similarly,Nicaragua
"...rejectsany srrggestionon the order that its authorities
cannot defend the sovereignty and national sovereign
rights over maritime areas that extend to the east of
meridian820."~~'
2.221 On 28 October 1997, the NicaraguanNavaI Force seized eastof rhe
said meridianthe Colombianboat "Gulf Sun" while it was carrying
out illegal fishingactivities.The Foreign Ministry of Nicaragua
notified the Colornbiifl~mbiis~'in:.hlanagua"so itcould take the
necessaryrneasurzsin rhe caseto assurethatsimilarincidentsdo not
continue tohappe~r."3m
2.222 Later, on 19 February 1999,another Honduran fishing boat licensed
to fish inNicaraguan waters, the CapitanElo, was captured by the
CoIombian navy, atIaritude14" 20' 00" N Iongitude 82"00' 00" W,
and taken to SanAndres.Following the prevaiIingtrend, rhe Foreign
300SeeNMVol.IIAnnex55,
301See NoteNo 9700532 of13 August 1997NMVoi. I1 Annex 56.
3CzSee Note No9700765, of 30October 1997.NM VoI.TIAnrrex 57 MinistryofNicaraguanotifiedonceInorerhe CoIombian Embassy in
&lanaguaW3 requesrng:
"an exhaustiveinvestigation...in order clarifythisact
and to avoid the repetitionof similar incidentsin the
frrmre."
More recently,on 14December 2002the fishing boaChurlyJuni~r,
was captured in Nicaraguan waters located at 14"52'00" and
longitude 081'28'00. Nicaragua presented to Colombia"the most
vigorous protest"304and requested the immediate release of said
vesseland irscrew.
2.223 The firm position adopted by Nicaraguaas a reaction to the
Colombianclaimthatthe 82"meridianis a lineof delimitationof
their maririrnearras, can be'appreciatin Articttfosabre Derecb
del Mar, published by the editwid services of the Ministry of
I ForeignAffairs of Nicaraguain 1971. TheauthorwasDr.Alejandro
Mootiel Argiiello,ForeignMinister of Nicaraguaon two different
occasions. He propwed three reasons to deny tl~c statusof the
Meridian82" W as a maritimeboundary:
"1. That at the time of the signing of the Bircenas
Meneses-EsguerraTreaty and its approval by the
Congress of Nicaragua,thar is, in 1928and1930, no one
was thinking abour theexistenceof rightsof Stales over
theunderwatershelf,and then[Ire82 meridiancould have
been a border drawn athigh sea,whichis notreasonable
tosupposethiswasthepurpose.
"2. That itwould certainly be, atleast,unnsuai for an
importantmatter such as the delimitarion of a boundary
303See NoteNo 99100093of 23February 1999,NM Vol. I1Annex 58.
305See NoteMREIDM-JV1703112 of026December 2002,NMVol.11Annex
59.
162 between two Statesto be not incIude idthe body of a
Treaty, but rather relegated to an interpretative
declaration approved by the Congress of one of its
:',
signatories andIn a statement inthe protocolof exchange
of ratificationand
"3. That the determination of 82 meridian is only of a
restrictive natureand not attributive of sovereignty, as
can clearlybe seen in thetext of the protocol of exchange
...In fact, it reads that the Archipelago of San Andr6
does nut extendWest of 82 meridian,which is equivaIent
ro agreeing tharthere are no CoIombia~rislands West of
that Meridian,but it does nor exclude the possibiIifythar
there may be Nicaraguan islands, not part of the
Archipelago of San Andrks, to the East of said
~eridian.""~
2.224 The three grounds given by Foreign Mi~risterMontiel, rogcther wirh
others,are compellingreasonsto rejectthe Colombian interpretation.
3. Themeridim of82" Wesr&s norconsfitufeLbhounrlary
2.225 According toArticle 31, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the 1969 Vienna
Conventiononthe Law of Treaties:;"'
"I. A rreaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in theircontextand in thelight:ofits
objectandpurpose.
"2. The context for the purpose.of the interpretation
of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text,
i11cIudin ts prea1~1b1and annexes:
'0A. MontielArgiiello, Arficiclosnobre DerechoclelMclr,Publicacionesdel
MinisteriodeReIacionesExteriores,ImprentaNational,Managua, 1971,p.93.
NMVoI.I1Annex 72. "(a)any agreement reIaring to the treat~hid~was made
between a11the parries in cunnexian with the corlclusion
ofthe treaty;
"(b) any instrument which was made by one or more
parties in connexionwith the conclusion of the treatyand
accepted by the orher partiesas an instrument related ro
the rreaty".
2.226 As the Court has consistently found, these provisions reflect
customaryinternationa law.306
2.227 CctnsequentIy, not only musf the I928 Treaty be interpreted in
accordance with these principIes - that is,i~r particular, in its
t'context" as constituted e.g. by the declaration included in the
Protocol of Exchange of Ratifications-, butalso the Protocol itself
must be inrep-etcd accordingly.
2.228 The textofthe latteis crystalclear:it is limiteto the"San Andrks
and Providencia Archipelago", the limits ofwhich it specifies:"...
the San Andrks and Providencia Archipelago mentioned in the first
Article of the 1928Treaty] does nut exlend west of the 8znddegree
of longitude west of ~reenwich.""" It relatesonly tothe second part
of the first paragrapof the Treaty, according towhich:
"The Republic of Nicaragua recognises the fulland entire
sovereignty of the Republic of Colombia over the islands
3% See e.g.:Judgmentsof 3 February1994, Territorial Dispute LibyanArab
JamahiriydChud), I.C.J.Report 1994, pp. 21-22,para.41; 15February1995,
Maritime Delimitation and TerritoriaQuestion bsetween Qatar and BahraUt
{Qatar v.Bnhmin),Jurisdictionand Adnzissibiiiry,I.C.JRepurl 1495, p.I8,
par-a.3; I2 December 1996, OilPla@urms (IslamicRepublicof Iran v.U~ired
SraresofAmerica),Preliminary Objection,LC.J.Report 1996(II), p8 12,para.
23: 13 December 1999, Ka.rikili/Sedudu Island (BoshslandiVarnibia)1,C.f.
Report 1999 (n), p. 1059,para. 18 or 17 December 2002, Sovereigntyover
PulauLigitaaand PuluuSipudun(IndonesidMalaysia),para.37).
30See NM Voi. I1Annex 19. ofSan Andrks,ProvidenciaandSantaCatalinaandover
theother islands,islandreefsformingpartofthe San
Andr6sArchipel ago.:' qa
2.229 W biletheabove quotedphrase includea sketchdefini~ionofthe
San And& Archipelago (Tan And*, Providetrciaand Santa
Catalina"nd the adjaceislands,isletsandreefthiswasnotseen
asreassurinenough by theNicaraguan Congres s,particularthe
Senate(see above, para2.191-2.1 9hic, made itapprovaIof
the Treatysubjecto this furthpoint inorderro specifywhich
"islandsi,sletsandreefs"fmed '"art San And& Archipelago".
Thi sonditiowas formallyaccepteby Colombia and,accordingly,
theislandsisleand reefslayinwest ofthe82"meridiancannotbe
claimedto belongtoColombia.TheProtocolof1930 says nothing
lessandnothingmore.
2.230 DefiningisIandpossessions archipela bymseansof meridians
andparallels is far funpreceden mtdedtwas,indeed,common
practicatthetime..hus,forexample,ArticlIlloftheTreatyof 10
December 1898 between Spainandthe United Statesdefiningthe
"archipel agown 'as'the PhiiirjIjineIslands" giaeprecise
definitionbased on paraIand meridians,Iatitudes and longitudes.
Previouslyon 7August 1895, Spainand Japansigned inTokyo,a
'"Declaratineterminingthelimitoftheirespectivepossessiots
theWestofthe Pacific Ocean"whosenumber Ipruvidesthat"Pour
lebesoi decetfeDclaration,lepara1Ikqeuipasseparlemilieudu
Canalnavigablede ~achi["']estpriscomme ligne dedkmarcntion
30The Bachi(orBaschicanalseparattheislandsothatname(alsocalled
BatanesfromtheislanofFormosa. entre les possessions espagnoIes et japunaises dans I'Oucst de
2.231 As noted by ProfessorB.H.Oxman,
"liltis not uncommon for treatiesdeaIing with cessions
or allocations of sovereignty over isIands or other
territory to define the areas ceded or allocated between
those states on the basis of lines drawn at sea. The
essential purposeof those lines is to providea convenient
reference for determinatingwhich islands and rerritories
are ceded or alIocared to a pa~ficularparty. Among other
things, thisapproach avoids the need to identifyprecisely
allislandsandother territoryceded.""'
2.232 On the other hand, those treaties allocating territories or islands
would usual1y not deIirnir therespective maritime jurisdiction of the
Parties- except, of course, if otherwise expressIyprovided. In the
same way as, "reciprocally",absent any provision to the contrary,a
treaty defining a land boundary would not be interpreted as
deIimirating themaririmeboundaryat sea noreven as constirutir~an
aIIocationof islands, as the Court recently recalled in the case
concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau ~i~adan.~ '~
309According ro this treatyJapan states thaif hasrro cIaironrspretensions
over the islands Iocatto the sorrthand southeast othedernrrrcaionline and
Spain declaresthe same regarding the islandsnorth and northeaof thatsame
line.See also Article1,last'para.,of the PariConvention of 12 May 1886
between France and Portugal,relating to thedelimitation of theirespective
possessionsin Western Africa,mentionedin the Awardof rhe ArbitrdlTribu~laI
of I4 Febmary 1985,Diiimirarion de la fro~~iPremclririmeGuinie/Guirrie-
Bissau.R.G.D.I.P.,1985,p.505,para. 45.
"'OPoliriml,Srrmegic,andHistorictrlConsiderations,inJ.I.Charney and L.M .
311xandereds., InternationaMaritimeBoundaries,Vol. I, p. 32.
Judgment of 17 December 2002, para. 51. See also I.C.J.,Chamber,
Judgment of 12 October 1984,Delimitatio~~ of the Maritime Bounrlary inthe
GulfofMdi~e Area, fCJRepurr 1984,p. 301, para.119:"Itis donbrfrrlwhether
a rreatyobligation which is in termsconfined to the delimitationof the
continental sheIfcan be extended, in a inarmer rhat would manifest Iy2.233 In this respect, the very title'of the 1928 Treaty is reveaIing 312.it
concerns "Territorial questions at issue between Colombia and
L;>,<f;;> I..*'.,I
Nicaragua", nut the maritime delimitation, nor the border between
the two States.
2.234 ' This is confirmed by the preamble and the very text of the first
paragraphof Article I:
"The Republic of Colombiaand the Republicof Nicaragua,desirousof
puttingan end to the territorial disputebetween them.. ."
Article I
"The Republic of Colombia recognises the full and entire
sovereignty of the Repn blic of Nicaragua over the
Mcquito CoastbetweenCape Gracias a Dios and the San
Juan river, and over Mangle Grande and Mangle Chico
islands in the Atlantic Ocean (Great Corn Island and
LittleCorn Island).The Republic.of Nicaraguarecognises
the fuII and entire sovereignty of the RepubIic of
Colombia over the islands of San Andrks,Providencia
and Santa Catalina and over the other islands, isletsand
reefsforming part of San And& Archipelago".
2.235 As the Court and itspredecessor havefrequentlyrecalled,
beyond the Iirnitimposedby the srrict criteria governingthe interpretation of
trearyinstmmenrs, 10 afield which is evidentIy much greater, unquestionably
heterogeneous,and accordinglyfundamentalld yifferent".
312See ibid.,para. 72. "/h]aving before it a clause which Ieaves IittIe to be
desired in thenatureof cleariless, it is bound appIy this
clause as it stands, without considering whether other
provisions might with advantage have been added to or
substitutedforit."'I3
2.236 In irsAward of 14 February 1985, the ArVbitraITribnnaI which
deIirnired the Maritime Boundary between Guinea and Guinea-
Bissaunoted that:
"I'usagefrkquen tdes rermes possessionse tterrtoire dans
le texte de la convention [de I886 relative B la
dkIimitarion des possessions franqaises et pofiugaises
dans 1'Afriqueoccidentale] prouve que celle-ci avaiten
rkalitkpour objet les possessions colonialesde la France
et duPortugalen Afriquede llOuest, mais que I'absence
des mots earrx,mer, maritimeoumer terrtor-ialeco~~stitne
nn indice skrieuxdece quail ttaitessentieIIernenquestion
de possessions tetre~tres.~'~
2.237 The same holds truein thepresent case. Moreover, theprovisions of
the 1928Treaty -which is more simple and straightforward than the
1885 Convention mentioned in the Award of 1985 - Ieaves nothing
to be desired inthe nature of clarity: iaims atsettling theterritorial
dispute between the Parties and, tothis end itallocates sovereignty
313P.C.I.J.,Advisory Opinion, 15 September 1923, Acqcrisirioof Polish
Narionali~, Series 3, No 7, p. 20; I.C.J.,Judgment, 3 Febmary 1994,
;Trrr.iroril ispipu1Cf Report 1994, p. 25, para. 51;see also: Advisory
Opinion, 3 March 1950, Competence of the Geneml Assembly for the
Admission ofa State totheUnited Nations,ICJ Report 1950,p.8;Judgments,
12 November 1991 ,ArbitralA ward of3 1July 1989,ICJ Repot? 1991,pp. 69-
70,para.48, or 27June2001,&Grand, para. 77).
714R.C.D.I.P.1985,rr02,p.511, 56psrea.sop.515, para.71.
fnternaiionaILegal Materials,VoI.XXV,p. 251 atp.279, para56.
"The frequent use of the terms possessions and territoryithe text of the
Convention [of 1886 relativetothe maritime boundary between French and
Portugal respectivpossessions inthe West Africa] proves thatthe colonial
possessionsof France and Portugal in West Africa were itsobject; but the
complete absence ofthewords waters, sea, maritimeorterritoriseaisa dear
signthar essentiaIlandpossessionswere invoive hdre." over territoriein,dispute'-,that theProtocoI of Exchange of
,:;.
ratificationsspec-;.; ::respectI,y r.omeans doeitherof these
instrumentdsefina bouidary betweentheParries.
2.238 It can alsobe noted thatArticle 3 the 1939 Constitution of
Nicaragua , hichlists heneighbouringcountriesdoes not mention
Colombia:
"The basis fornationaterritoristheutipossidetisiuris
of 1821. Itextends between the Atlanticand Pacific
Oceansand the Republics of Honduras andCosta Rica,
andalso includesthe adjacentislands,erritorisea and
the corresponda irgpace.TIretreatieorthe lawsshall
establisthe boundariesnutyetdetermined.''
2.239 Similarly,Article 3 ofthe 1945 ColombianConstitution (which
reproduces thecorresponding textof 1936) ,oes not mention a
common borderwith Nicaragua.
2.240 In this rcspccr,it must be kept in mind that the San And&
Archipela igoituatedapproximately360 nauticalmilesfrom the
most proximatepoint oftheColombiln coast andapproximatel y05
milesfrom thecoastof Nicaragua(&d under 80miles fmrn theCorn
islands,theNicaraguan islandsmostproximate tothe archipelago),
Not only was &re no need formaritime delimitatiobetween the
two countries,but,at rhattime,thi wsas simply unthinkab tlee:
usuallyaccepte mdaximumpermissible breadthofthe territorisea
was three milesat mostsix (as Colombia decided in1930~' and
therewas no questionofa continentashelf,a concept whichonly
appeared inthe legal sphere in 1945,and even less thatof an
exciusiveeconomic zunt.
315
See M. Whiteman,Digest of ItrrerruztiLlaw,Department of State,
Washingto n.C.,1965,Vol.4,p.23. The 82" meridian of longitude Wesr islocated approximateIy 100
nauticaI miles off [heNicaraguan coast in thedirection of theIsland
of San Andris and this latterisland is located approximately 20
miles from the meridian whilst the other main island of the
Archipelago, the Island of Providencia, issituared 40 nauticalmiles
from ir.Ifthis meridian had been intended as fixing a boundary it
would have meant that in 1930 Nicaragua and Colombia were
claiming maritime areas unauthorized and even unknown in
inremational law. And to lop irall, thiswuuId mean that these
orrtrageous daims, for the time period involved, were being
sponsored by the United States, one of the maritime nations that
mostzealouslydefendedthethree nauticalmiles limit.
2.242 In this respect,the present case is similato the case concerning the
Maritime Boundary between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. In its
unanimousAward of 14 February 1985, the Arbitral Tribunal,after
Iistinga series of treariattr+ibutinsovereignty over islands ~~otes:
"A la connaissance du ,Tribunal, il n'a jamais it6
considkrk 2 l'kpoque qu'aucunde ces instruments ait alors
attribukhI'un des signatairesune souverainetken mer sur
autre chose que .les eaux territoriales comrnun6rnent
adrni~es."~'~
-
3'6R.G.D.I.P.,1985,no 2,p.519, para.81.
InternationnLegalMaterials,Vol.XXV,p.251 atp.287,para.8 1.
TheEnglish text readasfollows:
"To the knowIedge of the TribunaI, it was never consideatthe rimethar any
of these treary granted maritime srrvereigntto any of the signatoriesover
anythingexcept thecommonIyrecognizedtenirorial waters."2.243 Consequentlyt,heTribunac loncludes:
"toutindiqueqbi &~deux Brat [h France a lePortugal]
n'mt pas entendudtablirunefrontih maritime gentrale
entre his possessid onsGuink. TJsont seulement
indique, dam une +ion h la giographie complexe ct
encore ma1 connueq ,uelles ilesappartiendraien tu -
Portugal.End%utre termes,dans letextfinalde l'article
kr, dernier alinba,dcetteconvention[laConvention de ,
1886 relativela dtlimitariodes possessionsfranqaises
et portngaisedansI'Afriqsroccidenta It eo,'Iimite'
II'~pas Iesensjuridiquept$cisdefrontiht maisun sens
plus~ar~e.""'
2.244 Thisreasoni nsallthernoe compellingin the presentcaseinthat
neither the 1923 Treaty, nor the Protocol of Exchange of
RatificationOF 1930 indude thewordYimit", or "boundary", or
'bborder"B.oth instrumentsareclearlydraftedinsuch a way as to
exclude any ambiguity:they simplyaim at allocatingislandsand,
supposingthey were valid,quod nan, this wetrlbe theirexcIusive
purposeandeffect.
2.245 Another ArbitralAward is particularrelevanin thepresentcase:
the Award concerning the &limitation ofthe MaritimeBoundary
between Guinea-Bissau andSenegal of31JuIy 1989.InthisAward,
that the Court deemed valid by itsJudgment of 12 November
'1{bid.para.82.
ttrternafiulegalMaterials, VoXXV, p.251at p.288,para.82-
The Englishtexreadsasfolbws:
".,everythingindicatesththese two State[Franceand Portugal]hadno
intentioofestablishia generalmaritimboundarybetweentheirpossessions
in Guinea.Inacomplexandstill littknown geographicaarea,theysimple
indicatewhichislandswwld belongto PortugalIn otherwords.in the Iast
paragraphofthe finrextofArricIeIofthisContmrion, [of1886reIarivto
the maritimboundarybemeen French andPortuga lespectivepossessioin
theWestAfrica]the word"limit"doesnothave xhepreciselegameaning of
boundary ,utnwidermeaning" 1991 ?I8the ArbitraITribunaI was called tointe~pretan Agreement
of 26 April 1960 concerning the sea boundary between France and
Portugal. It firmly stated:
"Le Tribunal estime que I'Accordde 1960 doit 2fre
interprktk 2 Inmieredu droiten vigueur A la date de sa
ccnclusiun.C'estnnprincipegenera1 bien ktabliquiunfait
juridique doit Etre apprecik h la lumikre du droit en
vigueurau moment ou ilse produit, et ]'applicationde cet
aspectdu droit intertemporelhdes cas cornmecelui de la
prksente esp?ce est confirm& par Ia jurisprudence en
rnarikrede druit de Ia rner." (InremafionalLaw Reporrs,
1951, pp. I61 ss.; The hitematbnal and Cornpararive
Luw Quaterly, 1952,pp. 247 ss.).
"A la lumikre de son texte et des principes de droit
intertemporelapplicabIesIeTribunaIesfirneque I'Accord
de I960 Ire dilirnitepas 1es espaces maritimes qui
n'existaient pasB cettedate, qu'on Ies appeIIe zone
kconomiqueexclusive, zone de p&cheou autrement. Ce
n'est, par exemple, que rrksrecernment que la Cour
internationale de Justice a confirm6 que les rkgles
relarives la 'zonekconomique excIrrsiveapeuvent 2tr.e
considkrkes cornme faisant pmie du druf international
genkralen Iarnatikre(C.I.I., Recuei1982, p.74, Recueil
1984, p. 294, Recueil1985, p. 33).Interpreterun accord
conclu en 1960 de madre h comprendre aussi la
delimitation d'espaces comrne 'la zone kconomique
excIusive1impIiquerait uncv6itabIe modif icatiunde son
rexte et, seIon un dictum bien connu de la Conr
internationale de Justice, un tribunal est appelk a
interpriter lestrait& et non pas 5 les rkviser (C.I.J.,
Recueil 1950,p. 229,Recueil 1952,p. 196,Recueil 1966,
p. 48). I1 ne s'agit pas ici de I'~volntduncontenu, ni
memede Ia&endue d,'unespacemaritime qui aurait existi
en droir internationalIorsque ]'Accordde 1960 a &ti
conclu, mais be1 et bien de I'inexistence en droit
internationald'un espace maritime comme la 'zone
318
ICJReport 1991,pp.75-76,para. 69. . . ..
-:!?&i.I ". %.
2.246 Similarly,the textof the1928 Treatymust be interpretedin lightof
the law prevaiIing atthe time of its conclusion.And it would be
absurd to claim thatitdelimited maritime areasbetween rhe Paflies
such as their respectivecontinental shelfor exclusi evcenomic
zone, which zones simplydid not legallyexist at the time. Any
contrary assertionwould amou'nn rottointerpretingtheTreaty,but to
revisingitandchanginglegal history.
'''R.G.D.I.P.1990, no1, pp.269-270,para. 85.See also:I.C.J.,Chamber,
Judgmen of 11September1992, Land Islandand Maritime FrontierDispute,
ICJReport 1992,pp-606-607,para.415.
itrtemarionhw Report,Vol.83,p.45,para.85.
The Englishtexreadsas follows:
'"TheTribunalconsiders thatthe 196Agreement must be interptetd
in the lighof the law in forcat the date of itconclusion.It isa well
establishedeneralprinciplthatalegaleventmusr be assesse n thelightof
thelaw inforceat thetime oitsoccumneeand theapplicatioofthataspect
ofinterternpallaw tocasessuch asthe presentoneis confirmeby case-law
inthemlrn of thhw ofrk sea.(InrerndiibfiEaw Reports,I95I, pp*6 1er
seq;TheInfemationntand Compurative h w Qualerly,1952,pp.247 etseq.)
IntheIightofthetext,arrof the&plicabIeprincipleofintertemporal
law,the TribunaIconsidersthatthe 1960 kgreern&ntdoes notdelimit hose
maritime spaces which didnot existat the date, whetherthey be termed
'exclusiveconomic zone','tisherieszonesor whatever. Foexample, iwas
onlyvery recentlythattheInternatioClouttof Justichasconfirmedthatthe
rulesrelatintothe 'exclusiveconomic zone' can becunsidzedas forming
partofgeneml intematiomIIaw inthe matter-la Repurrs 1982,p.74; ICJ
Reporrs1984,p. 2% ICJ Regorts 1985, p.33).To interpretanagreement
concludie nd1940 soas tocover alsothe delimitationoareas nrchas the
'exclus ecvnomic zone'wouldinvolve a realmodificationoits texand,in
accordancewiththewellknown dictumof theInternationaCourtofJustice t
isthe dutyof the courto interpret treatnot,torevisethem(ICJ Reports
i
I 1950,p.229; ICJReports1952, p, 196;ICJ Reports 1966,p48). We arenot
concernedhere with thePvolutionof thecontent,ofeven ofthe extetlof a
maritimespacewhich existedin internationaw at the timof theconciusion
ofthe 1%0 Agreement,burwith theactualnonexistence in internationaw
ofa maritimespar;esuch s the 'exclusivewmmic zone 'tthe datof the
conclusionofthe1960 Agreement."2.247 This, indeed,was not the purpose of theNicaraguan Congress when
itconditioned its approvaI of theTreaty upon the insertionof rhe
clause then includedin the Protocol of Exchange of Ratifications.
Nor was itthe intent of Colombia when she accepted it. This comes
across with complete clarity in the Congressional Records of
Nicaragua and ~IIthe Report of the Colombian Minister of Foreign
Affairs rohisCongress as can beseen inparagraph2.195 above.
Had the clarification made by the Nicaraguan Senate modified the
Treaty, it should have been subinittedagain to the Colombian
Congress in conformity with its Article 11,since irwoulhave been a
differenr Treaty, concerning no longer the "territorial dispute"
between the Parties, but the delimitation of an area involving
thousands of square miles of their respective maritime territorie-a
change which, once again,could not have been contemplated at the
time. In any case, the Treaty was nut submitted again to the
Colombian Congress, which reconfirms,if need be, that, by no
means, was the clarification othe 1930Protocolintended to modify
or revise the 1928 Treaty. Moreover, any interpretation to the
contrary wouId be another cause of nuiIity of the ~r-eaty~"which
wouId nor have bee11ratifiedin conformity with itsown terms nor in
accordance with the ColombianConstitution then in force.32'The
debate in the Nicaraguan Senate as well as the assurances formally
given by Esguerra,show thatboth Parties were conscious of this
j2See Article46 ofthe 1969Vienna Convention on theLaw of Treaties.
321See Article1of Act 3 of 1910revising the Colombian Constitution: "The
bordersbetween the Republic and neighbouringcountriecanonly be modified
through public treatduly approved bybothCongressional Chambers." M. A.
Pornbo et al, Cmsririicionesde ColomBia recopiladnsy precedidas de urta
breverese~ hisrdrica2Ed.Imprenrade LaLu z, Bogcti, 11 . obligationanddeliberately chose not-to submit theTreaty to the
Colombian ~ongre:.*..:'< ... '
. 2-249 Tn view ofthe ataovethe only possib coeclusionis thatitwas not
the purpuse ofeither theTreaty orof the Protocol of Exchango ef
Ratificationstodelimit the respectivmaritimeareasbeIonging to
the Parties: the only object of the Treatywas to determine
sovereigntyover theterritorielistediArticleI and theclarification
made inthePmmcuIof 1930only aimed at specify hendefinition
of the "an And& ArchipeIa goentioned insaidArticIe and at
confiningtheterritorieon whichNicaragua supposedly"recognized
the fulland entire sovereigntyof the Republic of Colombia" to
islands,islets and reefsituatedeast of the 82heridian West of
Greenwich.
2.250 Since themeaning oftheTreaty,interpretedin lighof itscontext,is
clear, it isnot "necessary to resort tosupplementary means of
I
interpretation, such as the travaux prt5paratoires... or the
ci~rumstance sf itconclusion".However, as in othercasesdecided
by theCourt, thisinter'iretatcanbt confirmed byrecourse tosuch
supplementarymeans.i23 In this respect, the reasons for the
clarificationmadeby the Nicaraguan Congress and the reasonswhy
theGovernmentofColombiaconsidered itunnecessaryto submitthe
Treaty again to CongressionalappvaI is worth noting. The
response of theGovernmenZ of Colombiaconsidered hat sincethe
- -
322Se ebove,paras.2.191-2.192,
"3Cf. I.C.3.udg~nentof 17Dece~nbe 2r002 ,overeign0 over Puh tlgifun
andPubu Sipadfinpara53;see also:Judgments3 Februarjl 1994,ICJReflori
1994, p. 27,pd. 55 w 15 February 1995, MwiiriaseD~iimii~iioand
Terrironui Questions between Qatar nnd Bahrain fJurisdicrinn and
Admissibilir,CYReport 1995,p.2 1,para.40). ~Iarification"did nut aIter thtext or the spirit of rhe Treaty, it did
not need to be submitted to rhe consideration of the LRgisIative
ranch."^^^
2.251 Inan environment of susceptibilities and mistrust, the fact that
ArticIe I, first paragraph, of rhe Treatonly refersto the main two
Corn Islands (Great Corn Island and Little Corn Island), with no
mention of the other islands, islets and cays adjacent to the
Nicaraguancoast, while, on the contrary, it alluded to "the other
islands, islets and reefs forming partof San Andres Archipelago",
expIains rhat rhe Nicaraguanlegislators, even if feeling obliged to
consen[ roa hateful treatywould wa~rtto preventfuturesurprises.
2.252 The clarification ofthe Nicaraguan Congress accepted by Colombia
in the exchange of ratifications as indicated above in paragraph
2.195 declar~s: ''thatthe San Andres and Providencia ArchipeIago
mentioned in rhefirst article of rhesaid Treatdoes notextend west
of the 82" degreeof longitude west of Greenwich".Nowhere does it
impose any limitation on Nicaragua but only on the Archipelago. In
other terms, the meridian 82" West of Greenwich estabIishes the
limit of the archipeIagoitseIf norofits ~naritimedomain - and not
of Nicaragua.
2.253 By the same token, it will beapparent that this definition only bears
upon the Archipelago itself and has no bearing wharsoever to the
North or Sourh of the San Andrksand Providencia ArchipeIago
which at most Iiesbetweenparalieis 12" 10' and 13" 25'; that is the
stretch between the Albuquerque Cays and the Island of Santa
Catalina. South and north of these limits, the 1928 Treaty as
321
See pragraph 2.196above.interpreted by the 1930 Protocol of Exchangeof Ratificationsis
silent and can be of.no 'se to delimiting the respective maritime
jurisdictionsof the$antes. Therefore, even if thTreaty were found
to be validandwere found to have estabIished a maritimeboundary,
which Nicaraguadoes not accept, the limits to the south of the
parallelof 12"10' N and to the north of the parallelof 13" 25' N
must in any case be decidedby the Court in accordance with general
lLuIesofthe law of thesea. Section IV
Evenif the 1928Treatyever enteredintoforce,
it hasbeenterminated asa consequenceof its breachby CoIonrbia
2.254 As has been shown in some details inthe previous Section of the
present Chapter, Nicaragua ratifiedthe 1928 Treatyon rhe express
condition that "the San Andres and Providcncia Archipelago
mentioned in thefirstArticleof the saiTreaty does not extend west
ofthe82" degree of longitude west of Greenwich". The clarification
was introduced in theProtocol of Exchange of Rarificationsof 5
May 1930.This mnsr be considered asan authentic interpretationof
the Treaty,on which bothParties agreedand which was a condition
forthe ratificatioby theNicaraguan ~dn~ress.~~'
2.255 This coInrnon understanding of the meaning of theTreaty was not
challenged by Colombia until 1969 when, for the firsttime, she
contended that the 82" meridian, ,which was clearly intended to
circumscribe the wcstern Iimit of the San Andres archipelago,
consriruted rhe mariti~neborder between herseIf and Nicaragua in
their respectivemaritimeareas.
2.256 This radical shift ithecommon interpretation of cheTreatyclearly
coi~stitutesa mareria1breachof this instmmenr.
2.257 There can be no doubt that an interpretatioof atreatythat changes
its meaning is a violatiofthat treatyAs Lord McNair hasnoted:
32Seeabove,para. 2.195. . "The performance of treatiis subjecto airover-riding
obligatioof mutual good faith.Thisobligationis also
operativeinthz-yhere ofthe interpretationof-treaties,
and itwould bea ti'eachof thibbligationfor a partto
make use of an ambiguity jn order to putforward an
interpretatin hichit was hwn tothe negotiatorsof
rhetreatynot to bthe intenlionothe
I
; 2.258 It must also be admitted that a whimsical and self-serving
interpretatiof a fundamentalclause,which radicallychangesthe
intentionof the contming parties,constitutasmaterialbreach of
h document This isindeed thecasehere:admittinghat theTreaty
enteredintoforce,qd non, thisinterpretatiby Colombiaseveral
decadeslater,regardingthe object andpurpose of thiinstrument,
twisted thmeaningof theTreaty, thatwas aimed atresolvingthe
"territorialconflpending berween'ythePartiesand made ita too1
torevive thatdispute.In effect, this Colombianinterpretatiin
practicmeans thattheNicaraguan AtlanticCoast,the Nicaraguan
mvereigntyover which was"acknowIedgedb "yCoiambia,is amast
with Iimitedmaritime spaces. This sIeightof hand makes the
immense continental shelfshared by Colombia and Nicaragua
suddenlybelong toColombia. In cefiainareasthe 82meridianruns
ascloseas70 mil- fromthe:Nicaraguan Coastwhilstitis Iucated
over 58tl milesfrom tk Colombian cwst. Figure VII givesa good
indicationof thedivisionof maritiareasthathasbeen imposedby
Colombia on Nicaragua sinceshe "discovered" in 1969,that 40
yearsearlier- anticipat biyngalfa century theUnitedNations
Convention on theLawofthe Sea of I982 - she had "delimited"
with Nicaragua the maritime areas authorized by the 1982
-
326Thebw ofTreatiesClarendonPressOxford.96 1p.465. Convenrion. Colombia's interpretation of thisTreaty is as far f~an~
beingpiausibIe asit isfrom beinga good faith interpretation.
2.259 Suchaneccentricinterpretation aimsatconvertinga purely"insular"
provisionof a territorial treaty, dcfining the maximalextent of fhe
ArchipeIagoof San Andrks,into a treaty drawing a 250 nanticaI miIe
maritime boundary line and dividingthousands of squaremiles of
maritimeareas.
2.260 Moreover, itmust be kept in mind that this interpretation has not
been a theoretical exercisebur rathw that Colombia, ail byherseIf,
decided thatthis was the interpretationof the treaty andimposeda
blockade to preventNicaraguafrommakinguse of her watersand
continental shelf east of meridian 82. This has represented an
enormous loss of resources for Nicaragua, as we11as a loss of
potential development for the inhabitantsof Nicaragua'sAtlantic
coast. Forthis reason Nicaragua,in paragraph 9 of theapplication,
reservedher rights to claim compensation. This reservation is
maintained in thisMemorial.
2.261 This material breach fulfils the conditions according to which
Nicaraguahad the rightto terminate the Treaty in accordancewith
Article 60of the 1969ViennaCorlventionon the LawofTrearies:
"1.A n~ateriabreach of a bilateraltreaty byone of the
partiesentitlesthe other to invoke the breach as a
groundfor terminating the treaty or suspendingits
operationinwholeor inpart.
"3. A materialbreach of a treaty,forthepurposesof this
article,consists in: "a) a repudiationof the treatynot bythe
presentConvention; or
.'?;?
the violation of a provision essential to the
"b)
accornplishrnerlt othe objector purposeof the
treaty".
2.262 This provision is a pure codification oa customary norm as the
Court has acknowledged on severaloccasions.""
Nicaragua had made k~rown that her acceptanceof the Treatywas
dependent on the interpretatithen farmaIIyacceptedby Colombia,
according to which"the San Andrksand Providencia Archipelago
mentionedinthe firsArticleofthe saidTreaty does notextend west
of the ~2~ degreeoflongitude west ofGreenwich"I . naaordanoe
with the ordinarymeaningofthese terms, the scopeof the Treaty
was thus clearlylimitedto definingthe extremeextension to the
West of the archipelaw goihoutanyintention of delimitingthe
resptive maritime aras on which the Parties may claim
jurisdictionBy complete1y shiftinthisinterpretatioC,olombia has
clearly breached"a provisionessentiato theaccomplishmen orfrhe
object orpurpose of the treaty",nil the condition itself subjtot
which Nicaragua had ratifietheTreaty.
Seee.8.: AdviwrOpinion2,1 June1971,hgni Cmsapenccs for S~nte of
the ContinuedPresence of Sop& Africa inNamibia {SHA WEST Africa)
notwithstandinSecuritCouncilResolution276(19701,ICJReports1971, p,
47; Judgments , February1973,FisheriesJurisdiction(UniteKingdom v.
Iceland)Jurisdicsiuofthe Courf,ICJReport 1973,p. 18 or25 September
1997,GubCikovo-Nagymuro PsrojecZCJReportI 997,p. 38,para,46 andp.
62,para.99. PART11
MArnIME DELIMITATION CHAPTER m
MARITIME DELIMITATION
I.Introduction
3.1 The present part of the Memorial wiIl assess the delimitationof
maritimeboundariesbetween Nicaragua and Colombia,in the light
of thoutcome of the determination of sovereignty to made by the
Court. A number-of possibiIiries can be envisaged in this respect.
The Court can make a determinarion thataIIof the San Andres and
Providenciagroupis NicaraguanorColombian. Apartfrom thar, the
Court may aIso determine thatthe islands referredto in ArticleI,
paragraph 1, ofthe 1928 Treaty are Colombian and that the other
featuresnot included ithisTreatyare Nicaraguan.The factthat the
outcomeof the territoridisputeis not known makes it necessaryto
address theseand other possibleoutcomes and this will bedone in
the relevant sectibelow.
3.2 As a necessary first stepthe nature of the deIimiration requested,
and theapplicablelaw, wiIIbe examined.
11.The DelimitationRequestedand theAppIicabIeLaw
3.3 Inthe Applicationthe Republic of Nicaraguarequested theCourt:
"Second, in the light of the determinations concerning
titIe requested above, the Cour-t is asked further to
determine the course of the single maririme boundary between the areas of continental shelf and exclusive
economic zone appertaining respectively to Nicaragua
and Colombia, in accordance with equitable principles
and relevant ciriurnstances recognised by genera1
inrernarionallaw as appIicabIe t.such a delimitation of a
single maritimeboundary."
3.4 The presenr proceedings are essentiaIIy similar to thGulf ofMaine
case. In thatcase it washeld that, aIthorrghboth the Parties were
partiesto the Continental ShelfConvention, the provisions of Article
6 of the Convention were not applicable to a case involving a single
maritime boundary. In the present case, Nicaragua isnot a party to
the Conventionon theContinental Shelfin any event, but ratified the
Law of the Sea Convention on 3 May 2000. Conversely, Colombia
is a parzyto the ContinentalSheIfConvenrion, but is not a party to
the Law of theSea Convention. In anycase thelogic appIied by the
Chamber in the Gr@ ofMaine case is relevant in thecircumstances
of thepresent case.
In the result,theChamber in effect appliedthe general principles of
maritime delimitation. The key passages in the Judgment are as
follows:
"156. The Chamber may [herefore begin by taking into
consideration, without its approach being influenced by
predekrrnined preferences, rhe crireriand especiaIIy the
practica1 methods that may theoretically be appIied to
determining the corrrseof the single maritime boundary
between the United States and Canadain the Gulf of
Maine and in the adjacent outer area. Itwill then be fur
the Chamber to select,from thisrangeof possibilities, the
criteria that it regardsas the mostequitable fothetask to
be performed in the present case, and the method of
combination of practicalmethods whose application will
best permit oftheir concrete implementation. ~2&::='#-. ..'
' 157. There has been:?i.n~.~~y~arnati~+definition of the
equitablecrireria thatma4be taken into consideration for
an international maritime delimitation,and this would in
any event be difficult a!priori, because of their highly
variable adaptability to different concrete situations.
Codification efforts have left this field untouched. Such
criteria have howevir been mentioned in the arguments
advanced by the parties in cases concerning the
deterrnina~ion of continental sheIf boundaries and in the
judicial or.arbit121decisionsin those cases. There is, fur
exarnpIe, the criterion expressed by the classic formula
that the land dominates the sea: the criterionadvocating,
in cases where I special circnrnsrances require
correction thereof, the equal division of the areas of
overlap of the maritime and submarine zones
appertaining to the respective coasts of neighbouring
States; the criterion that, whenever possible, the seaward
extension of a State's coast should not encroach upon
areas thatare too closeto the coast of another State; the
criterion of prevenring,as faras possible,any cut-off of
the seawardprojectionof the coast or.of partof the coast
of either of the States concerned; and the criterion
whereby, in ceriain circrrmstances, the appropriate
consequences may be drawn from any inequalitiesin the
extent of the coasts of two States into the same area of
delimitation.""'
3.6 Of particular interest is the linwhich the Chamber saw between the
modalities of the applicable law and the general approach to the
delimitation process. ;As the Chamber observed in the two most
significant paragraphs of theJudgment:
"194. In reality, a deIirnitationby a single line, such as
that whichhas to be carried out inthe presentcase, i-e., a
delimitation which has toapply atone a~rdthe same time
to the continental shelf and to the superjacent water
column can onlv be carriedout by the application of a
criterion, or combination of criteria,which does not give preferential treatment to one ofthese two obiects to the
detrimentof the other, and atthe same time is such asto
be eauaIIv suitable rothe division of either ofthem. In
rhat regard, moreover-, itcan be foreseen that with the
gradualadoption by the majorityof maritime Statesof an
excIusive economi? zone and, consequently, an
increasinglygeneral demand for singIdelimitation,so as
to avoid asfar as possiblethe disadvantages inherent in a
plurality of separate delimitations, preference will
henceforth inevitably be given to criterithat,becauseof
their more neutral character, are best suited for usin a
multi-purposedelimi tation.
'195. To return to the immediate concerns of the
Chamber, it is accordingly, towards an application to the
present case of criteria more especiaIIy derived from
geography that itfeeIs bound ro turn. What is here
understood by geography is of course mainly the
geography of coasts, which has primarily a physicaI
aspect, to which may be added, in second place, a
politicaaspect. Within this framework, it is inevitable
thattheChamber's basicchoice shouldfavour a criterion
long held tobe asequitableas itis simple, namely that in
principle, while having regard to the special
circumstancesof the case, one should aim at an equal
division of areas where the maritime projectionsof the
coasts of the States between which delimitation isto be
effected converge and cverIap. (emphasis added)."329
3.7 In rhe Case Concerning Maritime Delimitatiutz and Territorial
Questions Between Qutar and Bahrain the Court adoptedthe same
approach and expressly invoked the Gulf of Maine case, quoting
from paragraph 194of the Judgment: see theJudgment in Qatar v.
Bahrain, paragraphs 167-173, at paragraph 173. The same
1nethodoIogy was adopted by the Court in the Case Concerning he
Land and Maritime Bouncla~: bye&en Cameroi7lm and Nigeria, and
paragraph 194 of the Gug of Maine Judgmenr was once again
329IC.J.Reports 1984,p.327.
188 ?, ,-.:.'.#.,, ..i- :.:
quofed:see rhe .~~tigS.sR .,~ d?oei&@:?. aaoarraphs 285-287,
i;!.
atparagraph287. --.-
...-
3.8 The type of delimitationre$iested in the presentproceedinig ss
essentiallthe same as thatrequested inthe GuyofMahe case and
:- ; L;, :;;...,
theapplicablelaw is similar.The appropriatemethodology will be
appliedindrrecourse, but iis necessaryat thisstagetoestablishthe
generalgeographica1framework for themaritime delimitarion.
Ill. TheGeneralGeographica lramework
3.9 The generalgeographical framewor fkrthemaritime delimitation
between Nicaraguaand Colombia isformed bythesouthwesterp nart
oftheCaribbean Sea. The coastsof Nicaragua ,osta Rica,Panama,
Colornbia.andJamaica surround thispartof the CaribbeanSea. The
part of theCaribbean coast ofColombia startingfrom the terminal
point of itsland boundarywith Panama generally runs in a
northeasterly direction. The coast of Nicaragua runs on an
essentiallnorth-southaxis.
3-10 Thereare a numberof islands located inthesouthwesternpartof the
Caribbean Sea. Most of theseislandsare situatedoff themainland
coastof Nicaragua. To thenorth the most important islangroup is
formedby ttte Caps Miskitos. The main islandof this group,
Miskito Cay, has atotalarea of 8 squarenauticalmiles. Funher to
thesouth there is anothergroupof islandsunderthe sovereigntyof
Nicaragua. Of these islands,the Corn (Maiz) Islands areplaced
Furthessteaward, at 32 to 36 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan mainlandcoast. The Corn Islands, consistingof Big Corn Island and
Little Corn Idand, arerhemost sigrrificanof these islands.Fu~ther
seaward arethe isIandsaf San Andresand Providencia.
3.11 The isIands of San Andres and Providenciaare locatedmuch nearer
to the Nicaraguan mainland coast than to thatof Colombia. The
distancebetween the Nicaraguan mainland coast and the islands of
San Andres and Providencia is about 105 and 125 nautical miles
respectively. As a result, the exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf orhe mainIand coast of Nicaragua surrounds and
extends beyond the islands. As a cpnsequence [he relationship
betweenthe mainlandcoasts of Nicaragua and rheislands cannot be
characterizedas merely opposite. The maritime zones generatedby
the mainland coast of Nicaragua and the islandsnot only meet and
overlap between these two coasts, butalsoextend beyond one of the
coastswhichfaceeach other. Inthis sense therelationshipbetween
the mainland coast of Nicaragua and that of the islands of San
A~rdreasnd Providencia is simiIato that betweenrhe mainlandcoast
of France and the Channel IsIa~~dsinthe Anglo-FrerrchCunfirrenful
Shelfcase.
3.12 On theother hand, thedistances between theislands of SanAndres
and Providencia and the mainland coast of Colombiaare respectively
385 and 384 nautical miles. This makes the relationship between
these coastsone of oppositeness asthe exclusiveeconomic zones of
the isIands andthe CqIon~bian coast only overlap tothe east of the
islands.
3.13 An additionaIfeature of rhe geography consists of a number of
features situated either to the east'San Andres and Providencia t
(Runcador) or furthetothe north (Quitasuefiand Serrano a)inthe
vicini of rhe Nicaraguan Rise (Serranilland Bajo Nuevo). These
-4r'..,- ;,_..I,
featuresandtheirramificationsformthe subjectof separateanalysis
belowin Section XIof thisChapter.
IV. TheDelimitation Area
3.14 The judicial authorities alwaysinsist tthechoice of thepertinent
methodof delimitation'is essentiallydependentupon geography:'
see the Judgmentin the Gulf of Maine case, Z.C.JReports 1984,
p+93,paragraph 216. In thepresentcase the delimitationareais a
legal concept butinvoIve elernenrsof borh physical and poIiticaI
geography: see the G~tf qf Maine case, ibid.pages 272-273,
paragraph41 andpage 327, paragraph 195.
3.15 Thecoasts definingthedelimitationarea (seeNM VolumeI, Figure
I)forpresentpurposes areas follows:
I
the mainland coast ofNicaragua from the
(a)
terminus oftl~eIand boundary with Honduras
(in the north) to the terminus of the Iand
boundary with CostaRica (in the south).
(b) The mainlandcoast of Colombiaopposite the
coast of Nicaragua,andfrontingon thesame
maritimeareas.
3.16 This assessment is not substantiaIIyaffected byrhe questionwhether
San Andresand its dependencies aredetelLrnintdto bNicaraguanor Colombian. As Nicaragua will explainin due course, even if,for the
sake of argument, the San Andres group were derermined ro be
Colombian, rhe consequences of such a determination wouId not
affectthe essentialgeographicid ~Iationshi p of themaidand coasts
of theParties.
3.17 Nor is the assessment affected by the presence of claims by third
States: see Nicaraguan Memorial Volume I Figure TI. For present
purposes the coastaI relationship of the parties must be assessed
independently of third srate claims. It isto be recalled that the
incidence, to the south of Malta, of cIaims by Italy, in the
Liby&ita case,did not inhibitthe Court from determining which
of the coasts of Libya were opposite Malta and therefore constituted
relevant coasts for the purposes of delimitation: see the Judgment in
the LibydMalsa case: I.C.J. Reports 1985, gages 49-50, paragraph
68:
"Within the bounds setby the Court having renard to the
existence of claims of third States, explainedabove, no
question arisesof any limit, setby those claims, to the
relevant coasts of Malta to be taken into consideration.
On the Libyan side, Ras Ajdir, the tenninus of the
frontierwith Tunisia, must clearly be the startingpoint;
the meridian 15"IO'E which has been found by rhe Court
to definethe Iimitsof rhearea inwhich the Judgmentcan
operate crosses the coast of Libya not far from Ras
Zamq, which is regarded byLibya as the Iimirof the
exrentof itsrelevantcoast. If the coastsof MaItaand the
coast of Libya from Ras Ajdir to Ras Zarruq are
compared, it is evident that there is a considerable
disparity between the lengths, to a degree which, in the
view of the Court, constitutes a relevant circumstance
which should be reflected in the drawing of the
delimitation line. The coast of Libya from Ras Ajdir to
Ras Zarruq,measured FoIIowing itsgeneral direction, is I92 mi1e.slong, and tIi&st of Ma]& from Ras i1-
Wardija ro Delimara Point,followingsrraightbaselines
but excIudingthejs!<t oFiIfla+.is2miles long. Jnrhe
view of theCourt,thisdifferenceis sgreatas tojustify
the adjustment of themedian line so as to attributa
largershelfareato Libya:the degreeof such adjustment
does not dependupon a mathematical operationand
remains tobe examined."(emphasisadded).
3.I8 The mass of NicaragrraandColombiaare essenziaIIy opposite: see
NicaraguanMemorial Volume I. Figure I. However. it is not
rrecwry, for legalptlrpoes, thcoastsshonM beprecise plyaIIeI
or 'directlyopposite.Theposition was exp1aine-d ytheChamber
in the Gulf ofMainecase in terms of a relationshipof 'frontal
opposition'.Inthewords of theChamber:
"But inpu ~ingforward itprwposak forhe delimitation,
Canada hasfailedtotakeaccount ofthe factthat,asone
moves away from the internationaboundary terminus,
and approaches the ourer openings of the Gulf, the
geographical sittrationchanges radically from that
descrikd in the previousparagraph. Thequasi-right-
angle lateraladjacencyrelationshipbetweenpartof the
Nova Scotia co&, and especially between their
extensionacrossthe opening ofthe Bay ofFundy and
GrandMananIsland,and theMainecoasts, givesway to
afrontaloppositionrelationshibetween the remaining
coas~s ofNovaScotiaand those ofMassachusettswhich
nowface them. 3:isthisnew relationshipfiaisthemost
characreri fettu~eof the objective situatioin the
contextof which the delimitationis being effected.
Moreover, when the geoglaaphicaclhar;icteristofthe
deIimiratioarea were describeditwas shown thatthe
relationshbetweenthe linesthatcanbe drawn,between
theelbow of CapeCod andCape Ann (on the United
Stateside),andbetween CapeSableandBrier Island(on
the Canadian side),is oneof markedquasi-parallelism.
Inthissituationeven adelimitationline on thebasisof
the equidistmcemethod would have to bedrawntaking into account the change in the geographical situation,
which Canada did not do when itwas necessary. In any
event what had to beavoidedwas todraw,the whole way
to theopening of the Gulf, a diagonaI Iine dominated
soIeIy by the reIationship between Maine and Nova
Scctia, even where the relationship between
Massachusetts and Nova Scotia should have
predominated"'3! (emphasisadded)
3.19 Both in the passage quotedandin laterpassages theChamber used
the description ofthe'quasi-parallelism'of the two coasts: see ibid.
pages 333-334, paragraph 216; and see aIsu page 331, paragraph
206.
3.20 The reIarionship of the coasts of rhe Parties is of par-ticuIar
significance,asthe Chamberexplained in theGulf ofMaine case:
"The Chamber has already considered this aspect in
Section VI, paragraphs 188-189, in commenting on the
delimiration Iine proposedby Canada. Irthen expressed
itsdisagreement precisely in relationto the fact tha~the
Party in questionhad proposed a delimitation that faiIed
ro rake account of the fact thar a change in the
geographical perspective of theGulf isto be ~rcttedat a
certain point. Giverrthe importanceof this aspect, the
Chamber considers that it will here beapposite,by way
of reminder, to repeat its observatithat itis only inthe
northeastern sector of .the Gulf that the prevailing
relationship othe coasts of thUnited States and Canada
is part of lateral adjacency as betweenpart the coast of
Maine and partof the Nova Scotian coast. in the sectw
closestto the closi~rgIine,theprevailing ~~Iationshipis,
on rhe contrary, one of opposireness as betwee11 the
facing stretches of the Nova Scotian and Massachusetts
coasts. Accordingl iyn,he firssetctor, geography tseIf
demandsthat, whatever the practicaImethodselected, the
330
I.CJ.Reports 1984,p.325,para:1 89.
194 boundary should be a 1&f&ra deIi~nirationIine. In the
second, it is onceagain geography which res scribtsat
the deIirnirarion-Iinshould .rather+be a median Iine
(whether strictor corrected remains to bdetermined) fur
delimitation as between opposite coasts, and it is
moreover~eonraphy yet againwhichrequires that this
line, given the almost perfect parallelismof the two
facing coasts involved, should also follow a direction
practicallyparalleto their^" (m"p.hasisadded)
3.21 The delimitation area ithepresent case consisrsof thefigure shown
in Nicaraguan Memorial VoIume I, FigureI. Ifcan be seen tIlatthe
frontal opposition between Nicaragua and Colombia consists of
coasts whichare not parallel,but which are nonetheless opposite
ratherthan adjacent.IntheTunisidLibya case theCourt,in relation
to thesecond sector of the boundary, adoptedthe position thatthe
criterionwas the predominant relationship of the coasts:seeI.C.J.
Repurrs 1982, page 88, paragraph 126. Inthe present case the
predominant relationship isone of oppositeness.
3.22 In conclusion,thefollowingpassage from the Judgment inthe North
Seacasescontinuestoberelevant:
"Before going further iwill be convenient todeal briefly
with two subsidiarymatters. Most of thedifficultiesfelt
in the Inremational Law Commission related,as here,to
the case of theIateraIboundary berween adjacent States.
Less difficulry was feltover that of the median Iine
boundary between opposite States, aIthongh ittoo is an
equidistance Iine. Furthisthere seems to theCourt to be
good reason.The continentalshelfareaoff, anddividing,
opposite States,can be claimedby each of themto be a
naturalprolongation of itsterritory.These prolongations
meetandoverlap,and can therefore onlybe delimitedby
3" 1.C.J.Reporf1984,p.331,para.205.
195 means of a median line; and, ignoring the presence of
islets, rocks and minor coastal projections, the
dispr.uportionalI distorting effecr of which can be
eIirninated by other means, such a line must effect an
equaldivision of theparticulararea involved. If thereisa
thirdState on one of the coasts concerned, the area of
rnutnaI naturaI prolongarion with that of the same or
another oppositeState willbe a separate and distinct one,
to be treated in the same way. This type of case is
therefore different fromthat of laterally adjacent States
on the samecoast with no immediately opposite coast in
frontof it, and does not give rise to the same kind of
problem - a conclusion which also finds some
confirmation in the differenceaf Ianguage tobe observed
in the two paragraphs of Article 6 of the Geneva
Convention (reproduced in paragraph 26 above) as
respects recourse in the onecase to median lines and in
the other to IateraI equidisrance Iines, inthe eve111 of
absence of
3.23 As the distinguished Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French
Continental Shewcase pointed out, .these observations aregenerally
applicable: Infetnationaf taw Reporis, Volume 54, pages 61-62,
paragraphs 85-86. TIlus the principlesset forthby the Court inrhe
passage from the Judgment in the North Sea cases appIy
appropriarely to the geographical situatioilin the south-western
Caribbean.
3.24 The circumstances relating to San Andres and Providencia will be
examined separately in due course.
33I.C.J.Reports1969,pp.36-37,para. 57.
196 V. The Relevant ~e~isl'BtioandClaimsof Nicaragua
- ..-,?t ,... I.
3-25 In herApplication,N~caraguastatethe positiothus:
"Since 1945 generalinternationallwhas developedin
sucha way asto encompass sovereign rightstoexplore
and expIoittheresourceosf thecontinentalsheltogether
with rightsto an exclusiveeconomic zonetwo hundred
milesinhradtb. The provisions ofthe 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention have ~cugnised and confirmed these
IegaIinterns ocoastaIStates,
In conformitywith thesedevetopmen ts,the Nicaraguan
Constitutionas earlyas 1948 affirmed that the national
territoryincludethecontinentap l latformon boththe ,
Atlanticand Pacific Oceans. The Decrees of 1958
relatintotheexploitationof naturalresourceandtothe
explosarionandexploitation of petroleum made itclear
thatthe resourcesof the continentalshelfbelonged to
Nicaragua. In 1965 Nicardgua decln~d n "nahnal
fishingmne" ofXI0 nauticaImilesseaward on both the
PacificandAtIanticOceans."
3.26 Nicaragua ratifiedtheLaw of theSea Conventionon 3 May2000,
thatis,prioto thefilinof theApplicationon 6December2001.
3-27 Uponratificarionthefollowingdeclarationwasmade:
"Inaccordancewith article 310 ofthe United Nations
Conventionon the Law of the Sea,the Government of
Nicaragua hereby declares:
].Thatitdoes not consideritselfbound by anyof the
declarationsor statements,however phrasedor named,
made by other Stateswhensigning, accepting,ratifying
oracceding to the Convention andthat it reservesthe
righto stateitspositioon any of thosedeclarationsor
statementat anytime. 2. That ratificationof the Convention does rut imply
recognitionor acceptanceof any territorialcIairnmade by
a Srate party lthe Convention, norautomaric ~wogniticn
of any landor sea border.
In accordance with articIe 287, paragraph I, of the
Convention, Nicaragua hereby declares that it accepts
only recourse to the ~nternationalCourt of Justice as a
means of the settlement of disputes concerning the
interpretationor application of the Convention.
Nicaragua hereby declares chatit acceptsonly recourseto
the International Court of Justice as a means For the
setrIernentof the categories of disputes set forth in
subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) ofparagraph I of a17icIe
298 of theConvention."
3.28 In accordance with the provisions ofthe Law of the SeaConvention
and, inso far as relevant, thprinciplesof general international law,
Nicaragua claims a single maritime boundary based upon themedian
line dividing the areas where the coastal projections of Nicaragua
and Colombia convergeand overlap.
3.29 Over. a long period Nicaraguan legislation has reflected
deveIopments in the law of the sea,and, in particularthose reIaring
to the exploitationof the resources of the continentalshelf. The
Decrees of 1958 relating tothe exploitationof natural resourcesand
to the explorationand exploitationof petroleum made it clear that
the resourcesof the continentalshelf belongedto Nicaragua: see the
Decree No. 3I6 of 12March 1958 (General Act on the Exploiration
of Natural Resources), and Decree No. 372 of2 December I958
(Special Act on the Explorationand Exploita~ionof ~etroleurn).'~~
33SeeNM Vol.TI ,nnexes 63and64.
198 3.30 In 1965 Nicaragua declared a''national fishingzone' of 200 narrtica1
mileson both the A..,.,--:.1:uaci$;.:?obsts:see DecreeNo. 1L of 5
April 1965 deljrn~ting the national fishing zone of 200 nautical
rni~es."~
j 3.31 In 1979 Nicaragua adopted Act No. 205, which provided, in material
part,asfollows:
Artide 1
"The continenfa1 shelf of Nicaragua, throughout its
extension,is an integraIpan and a natur-aprolongationof
national territory,and is accordingly for alI purposes
subject tothesovereignty of the Nicaraguannation.
Article2
'The sovereignty a~rdjurisdiction of Nicaragua over the
sea adjacent to its seacoasts shall extend up to 200
nauticalmiles.
Article3
'Thesovereignty and national jurisdictionexercisedover
the continenla1shdf and the adjacent sea shallextend to
the airspaceand a11the islands, cays, banks, reefs and
other geugr-aphical features situated within the limits
determinedin the foregoing articleswhether these are on
the surface ofthe waters or submerged,or are elevations
risingfrom the continental shelf.
'A11the mineralsandnatural resources wirhin these areas
of sovereig~ltyarrdjurisdictionbelong to theNicaraguan
nation and are independent of the actual or nominal
occupation by Nicaragua of the areas, as determined
above.
'Rights far the purpose of expIoring and exploiting.
utiIizing and managing the minerals and natural resources
334SeeNMVol. II, Annex 65 sl~allbeIong excIusiveIy to Nicaraguwirhotrprejudice
to the rights and obligations contracted under.
internationaltreatiesor convenrions.
Abrogation
Article6
'ThepresentAct abro53ses a11previousprovisionwhich
are inconflictwithit."
3.32 On 5 March 2002 theabove Actof 1979 was supplantedby LawNo.
420~"jrhe provisior~ofwhich foIlow:
LA GACETA
DIARIOOFFICIAL
Managua,D.N.,Friday22 March 2002, No.57
LawNo. 420
(.--I
LAW ON MARITIME AREAS OF NICARAGUA
Art.lThe maritime areasof Nicaragua include azones
currentlyallowedby International Law.
Art2 The n-raririrnareasof Nicaraguacorrespondro
thosereferre10 inInten~ationaILawas:
1 The TerritoriaSea;
2 The InteriorWaters;
3 TheContiguousZone;
4 The ExclusiveEconomicZone;
5 TheContinenla1Shelf
335Act NO. 205of 19 December 1979 Relating ttheContinental Shelf and
TerritoriaISeSee NM Vol. 11,Annex66.
I3%c NM VoI.11Annex 67. . -
Ar-t.3 The breadth of thk TerritorialSea is 12 marine
miles, measured from the straight base line or low tide
establishedalongthe length of thecoasts.
ArtA The stateexercises sovereignty i~rmaritime areas
known as the Interior Maritime Waters that are Iocrtred
betweenthecoasts and theNicaraguantenitoriaI sea.
Art.5 The Nicaraguan Contiguous Zone extends 24
marine miles from the base lines from which the breadth
of the territorial sea is measured, in accordance with this
Lawand its regulations.
Art.6 In the Contiguous Zone to the territoria1sea, rhe
State shaIIexercise thecontrol and supervisionmeasures
necessaryto:
1 Prevent the violation of the laws and
regutations related to customs, criminal law, tax law,
immigration or healrh in its territory, in its interior
maritime warers, or in its territoria1sea.
2 Punish the violation of rhese Iaws and
regulations committed in its territory,interior maritime
watersor territorial sea.
3 Prevent the unauthorized removal of
archeoIogicaIor historical objectfound in itterritory, in
irs interiormaritime watersor territorial sea.
Art.7 The Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republicof
Nicaragua extends 200 marine miles from the base line
from which the territoriasea is measured.
Art.8 The Continental Shelf of Nicaragua covers the
bed and subsoiI of the submarine areas that extend
beyond irs ter.ritorialsea as an extensio~r and naturaI
projection of its territory undethe sea to the minimum
distance of 200 marine miles and a maximum of 350
marine miles, as recognizedbyInternational Law.
Art.9 In processes of maritimedelimitation, the interests
of the Nation shaII be upheld, in agreement with the
provisionsof TnrernarionaL law. Art.I0 This Law repealsany other law thatopposes it.
Art.II This Law shall enter into effect upon its
publication in LaGaceta,Diario Official.
VL The ReIevantLegidationand CIaimsof Colombia
3.33 In 1978,on the basis of Law No.10, Colombia established a twelve-
mile territorial sea, a two-hundred mile economic zone and an
undefinedcontinental shelf. The materialprovisions areas fuIIows:
"Establishing mIes concerning the territorial sea, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, and
regulating other matters.
Article 1. The territorial seaof the Colombian nation,
over which the latter exercises fuII sovereignty, shaII
extend beyond its mainland and isla~rdrerritory and
irrtcrnawaters to a distance of 12 nautical rniIesor 22
kilometres, 224metres.
National sovereignty shall also extend to the space over
the territorial sea as wellto itsbed and subsoil.
Article 2. Ships of all States shall enjoy the right of
i~rnocentpassagethrough the territoriasea,in accordance
with rhe rulesof inkrnationa1law.
Article 3. The outer limit of the territorial sea shall be
constituted by a line every point of which is 12 nautical
miles from the nearestpointof the baselinereferred to in
the nexrarticIe.
Article 7. An exclusive economic zone shall be
established adjacent to the territorialea; the zone shall
extend to an outer limit of 200 nauticalmiles measured from the baselines from. which the breadth of the
territorialeais measured.
, ,,-,$', -
Article8. In thezoneestablished by the precedingarticle,
the Colombian nation shallexercise sovereign righ~sfor
the purpose of expIoring, exploiting, conserving and
managing the Iiving and nun-living nabraI resources of
the sea-bed, the subsoil arrd the superjocent waters; it
shall also have exclusive jurisdiction for scientific
researchand thepreservation of the marineenvironment.
Article9. In pursuanceof this Act, theGovernment shall
identify thc Iines referred to in the preceding arricIes
relatingto its continental te~~itor,he archipelago of San
Andrks and Pruvidencia, and other-isIand territories; the
said lines shall be published in the official maritime
chartsinaccordance with therelevantinternationar lules.
Article 10. National sovereignty shall extend to the
continenta1 sheIF for the purposes of explorirrg and
exploiting its naturalresources.
3.34 In 1984Colombia pr.ornuIgated the straight baseIincsDecree:Decree
No. 1436 of 13 June 1984, in accar.dancewith Article 9 of Law Nu.
10 of 1978 (see above para. 3.33). As theCourt willrecall,straight
baselines andthe concomitantbasepoints are not necessarilyto be
given effect in the context of a delimitation in accordance with
equitable principles:see the Libya/Mai~n case, I.C.J. Reporrs f983,
page 48, paragraph 64;infra, paragraph 3.55.
3.35 Inany event,the legal validityof the Colombiansystem is open to
serious challenge. In the conclusion to itsanalysisof the legislation
rhe Bureau of InreIIigence and Research of the United States
Departmentof State observes that: "With the exception of severaI select areas, straight
baselines do not appear -to bc appropriate for the
CoIombian coastline.There are very few islands off
either coast; those in the Pacific are mostly islands
associated withthe riverdeltas. Exceptfor several bays,
thecoastline along bothcoastsis relatively smooth. And,
in most areas, the changes in coastal directions do not
createdeep irrdentati~ns."~"
3.36 Colombia signed the Law of the Sea Convention on 10 December
1982,but has not ratified the instrument.
VlI. The DelimitationBetweenthe Mainland Coasts ofNicaragua
andColombia
3.37 In approaching the central question of delimitation between the
mainlandcoasts of Nicaragua and Colombia, the first reference must
be to the Application of Nicaragua, which requests the Court "to
dearmine the course of the single maritime boundary between the
areasof continenla1shelfand exclusive economic zone appertaining,
respectively to Nicaragua and Colombia .." The Application refers
to the principles of generainternational law asthe applicable lawin
such a case, and these principles include the general principIes of
maritime delimiration relating to cases involving singIe maritime
boundaries.
33Departmentof Stare, Bureauof Intelligenceand Resmrch, Limirsin{hSeas,
No. 103,p.6. . ..'
B.THEPRINCIPL OF EQUAL DIGISIONOFTHE AREAS OF CONVERGENCE
3.38 In the geographical'ci~kumstan acpeica~iehcriterion is the
principle of equal division. This criterion was confirmed by the
Chamber of the Court in the Gulf of Maine case. The two most
relevant passagesare as follows:
(i) 'To raeturto the immediateconcernsof the Chamber, it
is, accordingly,towards an applicationto the presentcase
of criteria more especially derived from geographythatit
feels bound to turn. What is here understood by
geography is of course mainly the geography of coasts,
which has primarily a physical aspect, to which may be
added, in the second place, a politicaspect. Within this
framework, ir is inevitable that rhe Chamber's basic
choice shonId favour a crirerion long held to be as
eauirabIe as ifis sirnpIe, nrtrneIthatin principle,while
havine renard to the speciaI circumstancesof the case,
one should aim at an equal division of areas where the
maritimeproiections of the coasts of the Statebetween
which delimitation is to be effected converge and
overlap."738(emphasis added).
(ii)"At this point, accordingly, the,Chamber finds that it
must finalIv confirm its choice, which is tu take as its
starting point the above-mentioned criterion of the
division- in principle, equaldivision - of the areasof
convergence and uverIapping of themaritime ~~+oiections
ofthe coastlinesof the Statesconcerned in Thedelimirataon.
criterionwhich need onlv be stated to be seen as
intrinsically equitable. However, ithe Chamber'sview,
the adoptionof this starting point musbe combined with
the paralleladoption of the appropriate auxiliary criteria
insofar as it is apparent: that this combination is
necessitared by the relevant circumstances of the areas
concerned, and provided they are rlsedonly to the exte~~r
acrrraIIdicratedby thisnecessity. By this approrrchthe
338I.C.J.Reporfs1984, p.327,para395. Chamber seeks to ensurethe most correct application in
the present case of the fundamental mIe of intematiana1
law applicabIe, which requires that any rnaritime
delimitation detween States should be carried our in
accordance with criteria thatare equitableand are found
more specificaIIy to be so in relation to the parricuIar
aspects of the case under consideration.""' (emphasis
supplied)
3.39 The principleof equal division is also formulated in various other
sections of the Judgment of theChamber: see also pages 300-301,
paragraph 115;pages 33 1-332, paragraph 209; page 334, paragraph
217; and page 339, paragraph228.
3.40 The principle of equal division was also confirmedin the context of
continental shelf delimitatioby the Court in the Libyu/Multacase:
I.C.J. Reports 1985, page 47, paragraph 62. And the general
principles were affirmed by the Court once againin the Jm Mayen
case,where the Court summarized thepositionas foIIows:
"Judicialdecisions on the basis of the customary law
governing continentalshelfdelimitation between opposite
coasts have likewise regarded the median line as a
provisional line that may then be adjusted or shifted in
order to ensure an equitable result. The Court, inthe
Judgment in the case concerning 'theCoarinentafShelf
{Libyan Arab Jamohiriya/Ucilraf already referred to
(paragraph46 above), in which it tookparticularaccount
of [heJudgment in the NorthSea Conrinenral Shelf cases,
said:
"The Court has itself notethatthe equitablenature ofthe
equidistance method is particularlypronounced in cases
were delimitation has to be effected between Stateswith
opposite coasts".(IC.J.Reports 1985,p.47, para.62)
39
!bid.,p.3228. ara.197.
206 ..
Ttthen went on to cite the passage inthe Judgment in the
North Sea Continental Shelf cases .where theCourt stated
that the continental 'shelf off; and dividing, opposite
Srates"can ...only be delimited by means of a median
Iine" (1.C.J.Reports 1969, p.36, para. 57; see aIso p.37,
para.58). The Judgment in the LibydMaira case then
continues:
"But it is in fact a delimitation exclusively between
opposite coaststhat the Court is, forthe firstime,asked
todeaIwith. Itis clearthat, in these circumstances,the
[racingofa median Iine between those coasts, by way of
a pruvisional step In a process tobe continned by other
operations, isthe most judicious manner of proceeding
with a view to the eventual achievement of an equitable
result."(I.C.J. Reports1985, p.47,para. 62).340
3.41 This passagereIared to the delirnirariof shelfareas. In the context
of thede1imitation of fishingzones, theCourt applied thesame basic
principles:
"52. Turning now to the deIirnitacion of the fishery
zones, the Court must consider, on the basis of rhe
sources listed iArticle 38 ofthe Starute ofthe Court, rhe
law applicable to the fishery zone, in the Iight aIso of
what has been said above (paragraph 47) as to the
exclusive economic zone. Of the international decisions
concerned with dual-purpose boundaries, that inthe Gulf
UJ Maine case - in which the Chamber rejected the
appIication ofthe 1958 Convention, and relied upon the
customary Iaw - is here material. After noting thar a
particularsegment of tIlc deli~nitationwas one between
opposite coasts, the Chamber went on to question the
adoption of the median line "as final without more ado",
and drew attention to the "difference in length between
rhe respective coastlines of thetwo neighbouringStates
which border on the deIimitation area and on that basis affirmed"the necessitof applying tothe median Iineas
initially drawn cwrection which, though limited, will
paydue heed tothe actualsituarion" (I.CReports f984,
pp.334-335, paras.217,218).
"53. Thisprocess clearly approximate tsthatfollowed
by the Court in respect of the LibydMalta case in
determinit nhe continental sheIf boundary between
oppositecoasts. It followsthat iis alsoan appropriate
starting-point the present case: not Ieasr became the
Chamberin the Guy of Maine case, when dealing with
thepart of the boundary between opposite coasts,drew
attention tthesimilarityof theeffect oArticle6 of the
1958 Convention in that situation, even though the
Chamber had alreadyheld that th1958Convention was
not IegaIIybindingon.the Parties, Itthusappearsthat,
both fortheconrinenta1sheIf and for the fisheryzones in
thiscase,itis properto begin theprocessof delimitation
by smedianlineprovisionallydrawn."341
3.42 Whilstthe principleof equaldivision and the equidistancemethod
produce a similar result, they may be employed as partof a lwo-
srage merhodology as in the Guff'ofMaine case: see the careful
analysis of Professor Weil, The Law of Maritime Delimitation-
Reflections,Cambridge, 1989,pages 194-196.
C. THE PRINCIPLE OFEQUAL DIVISION APPLTEIN DELLMITAT IFN
SINGLE MARITIME BOUNDARY
3-43 Thejurisprudenceconsistentlyappliestheprincipleof equaldivision
to a variety of types of delimiration:to the continenta1 shelf
(LibydM~ita case and Jan Mupn case),and to fishery zoIres (Jcm
Mayancase). Theapplicability of theprinciplwas also affirmedby
34'1.C.JRepon 1993,pp.61-62.
208 the Court of Arbitraiion in tfigi&gio-~re.nch Continenid Sheifcase:
Internatiofialhw .,{'jyt..:,Iume c.*..-;ge 96, paragraph182.
3.44 There is no reason of principle or policy to preventhe application of
the principle to a single maritime boundary, and this view is
confirmed by the Judgment of the Chamber in the Gulf ofMaine
case. In thewords of Chamber:
"194. In reality, adelimitation by a single line, suchas
that which has to be carried out in the presentcase,i.e a
delimitation which has to applyat one and the same time
to the continental shelf and to the superjacent water
column can only be carried out by the application of a
criterion,or combination of criteria,which does not give
preferential treatmentto oneof these two objects to the
detriment of the other, andat the same time is such as to
be eqrtaIIysuitable to the division of either of them. In
thar regard,moreover, itcan be foreseen that witlrthe
gradual adoption by the majority of maritime States of an
exclusive economic zone and, consequently, an
increasingly general demandfor singledelimitation, so as
to avoid as far as possible the disadvantages inherent ia
plurality of separate delimitations, preference will
henceforth inevitably be given to criteria that, because of
their n~oreneutraI character, are best suited fur use ina
multi-purposedelimitation.
"195. To return to the immediate concerns of the
Chamber, itis, according tow ards an applicationru the
present case of criteria more especially derived from
geography that itfeels bound to turn. What is here
understood by geography is of course mainly the
geography of coasts, which has primarily a physical
aspect to which may be added, in the second place, a
political aspect. Within this framework, it is inevitabIe
thatthe Chamber's basicchoice shorrIdfavoura criterion
long held to be as equitabie asiris sirnpIe,namely that in
principle, whiIe having regard to the special
circumstances of the case, one shonId aim at an equal division of areas where the maritime projections of the
coasts of the Srates between the delimitation is to be
effectedconverge and overlap.r342
3.45 In the GuinenJG~inea-Bissau Arbill-arim the Corrrrof Arbirration
applied the principles of general international lawas tbasis for the
single maritime boundary called for by the Parties, invoking the
provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention as evidence of the
position in general international law: iarernuriunal Law Rei-~ori.~,
Volume 77,pages 658-659, paragraphs,42-43.
3.46 In its recentdecision intheBahrain/Qa#arcase the Corrrrresponded
favourablyto the application of neutral criteriabest suited for use
in a multi-purpose delimitation, and relied on its previous case law.
. .
In thewords of the Court:
"224. The Court wiII now deaI with the dsawing of the
single maritime boundary in that part ofthe delimiration
area which covers both rhe continenfa1 shcIf and the
exclusive economic zone(seepara.170above).
225. In its Judgment of 1984, the Chamberof the Court
dealing with the Gulf of Muiae case noted that an
increasing demand for single delimitationwas foreseeable
in orderto avoid the disadvantages inherent ina plurality
of separate delimitatia occsrding to theChamber,
"preference wiIIhenceforth inevitably be given rocr-ireria
that, because of theim roreneutraI character, are best
suited fur use in a mnIri-purpose delimitation" (1.C.J.
Reporrsf 984, p.327, para.194)
226. The Court itself referred to the close relationship
between continental shelf and exclusive economic zone
for delimitation in its Judgment in the caseconcernin he ~untinektal Shey fLibydMafta). It
observedthat:
<,,::'& r 1
"even though ,the.,present cise' relates only to the
delimitarionof the continental shelf and nut tthatof the
exclusive economic zone, the principles and mIes
underIying the Iaffer concept cannot be left ou~of
consideration. As the 1982 Convention demonstrates the
two institutions - continental shelf and exclusive
economic zone - are linked together in modernlaw."
(IC.J. Reports1985,p.33,para.33)
"And the Courr went on to say that, in case of
deIimitation, "greater importance must be attribured to
elements, such as distance from the coast, which are
commontobothconcepts" (ibid.)
"227. A similarapproach was takenby the Courtin the
Jm Mayen case, where it was also askedto drawa single
maritime boundary. With regard to rhe dcIirnitationof
the conrinenra1sheIftheCourt statedthat:
"evenif itwere appropriate to apply ...customary law
concerning the continentalshelf as developed in the
decidedcases [theCourthad referred tothe Gulfof Maine
and the LibyaM~ilra cases], it is in accord with
precedents to begin with the median Iine as a provisiona1
line and then toask whether 'Special circumstances' [the
term used in of the I958 Convention on rhe
ContinentalShelf, which was the applicable law in the
case] require any adjustment or shifting of that line"
(I.C.J.Reports 1993, p.61,para. 51).
"228. After having come to a similar conclusion with
regard to rhe fisherzones, the Courtstated:
"Itthus appearsthat,bothfor thecontinentalshelfandfor
the fisheryzones in this case, it is proper to begin the
process of delimitationby a medianline provisionally
drawn." (&id, p.62,para.53.)
"229. The Cour-twent on to saythat itwas furthercalled
uporl to examine those factors which might suggest an adjustment or slriftingof rhe median Iine in order to
achieve an "equitable result"The Court concInded:
"It is thus apparent that special circumstances which
might modify the result produced by an unqualified
application of the equidistance principle. General
internationallaw, as it has developedthrongh the case-
law of the Cou1.tand arbitral jurisprudence,and thruugll
the work of theThird UniredNations Conference on the
Law of rhe Sea, has empIoyed the concept of 'relevant
circumstances'. This concept can be described as a fact
necessary to be taken into account in the delimitation
process". (ibid,p.62,para;55).
3.47 It isto be emphasized thar rhe BahraidJSatar case invoived the
deIimitationof thecuntinenta1shelf and the exclusiveeconoiniczone
incombination.
3.48 More recently, and more succinctly, the Court has confirmed the
appIicabi Ifiteysame general methodoIogy in the Cameroon v.
Nigeria case:see the Judgment af 10October 2002, paragraphs 286-
290.
3.49 At thisstage ir inecessary to indicatethe course of the delimitation
within the delimitationareadescribed ear-Iie(paras. 3.15-3.24).The
applicable law consists ofthe principles of general internationlaw
relating to the delimitation of a single maritimeboundaryand thisis
thetypeof de1imitationrequestedof theCourt inrheApplication,
3.50 The appropriate form of delimitation within the geclgraphica1
framework which obtains in this case is the principle of equal
division:see above Subsection C of this Chapter. On this basis, the
Court is requested to co~lsfmctan equidistance Iine between the mainland coastsof ~icaragr~a'ahdCulo~~lbiar,espectively, inordeto
dividethe delimitationareain accordancewithequitableprinciples.
i -d>.. -! .
3.51 According to the jurisprudence of the Court,such an equidistance
Iine iro be consicieredprovisionalinthesense that it is subjetoa
process ofadjustment resulti~rgfrom any relevant circumsrances.
The question of relevantcircumstances will be elaboratedupon in
due course.
3.52 The effectofthe islandgroupsof SanAndres and Providencia on the
delimitation caIIs for separate examination and therefore the
examinationof thisquestionis reserved.
E.NU LEGAL BASIS FORTHE ADJUSTMEN OFTHE MEDIA NINE
3.53 As a matter of IegaI principIe whether the methodology of
delimitationis based upon thprincipleof equal divisionorupon the
provisional median Iinesubject to adjustment inorder to ensure an
equitable resultrhe 'appropriate auxiIiarycriteria'are still to be
applied: sethe Judgrnenrof the Chamber in rheGuy ofMaim case,
IC.J.Repurfsf 984, pages 327-328, paragraphs 195-197.
3.54 The presenceof small islandsmust, of course,be considered. The
delimitation ithe region oftheSanAndres group will be examined
inSubsection IX ofrhisChapter.
3.55 The question of adjustment also requiressome considerarion of
basepointsand baselines. It isaxiomatic that a coastastatecannot
establishbasepointsand baselines in order tochange the course of the eqr~idistance Iine between opposite coasts. As the Court
observed in theLibyu/Mafra case:
"An immediate qualification of the median line which the
Court considers must be made concerns the basepoints
from which itisto be constructed, The Iineput forward
by MaIta was constructed from rhelow-water markof the
Libyancoast, but with regard to the Maltesecoast from
straight basdines (inter ah) connecting the island of
Malta to the uninhabited islet Filfla. The Court does not
expressanyopinionon whether the inclusion of Filfla in
the Maltese baselines was legally justifiedbut in any
event the baselines as determined by coastal Stares are
not per se identicalwith the poinrschosenon a coast ro
make itpossible tocalculate rhe area of continentalshelf
appertaining to that State.In thiscase,the equitableness
of an esuidistance line depends onwhether the precaution
is taken of eliminating the disproportionate effect of
certain "islets, rocks and minor coastal proiections",to
use the language of the Court in its 1969 Judgment,
suoted above. The Court rhrrsfinds itesuitable not to
takeaccount ofFiIflai~rthe caIcuIationof the ~rovisional
median line between Malta and ~ibya."" (emphasis
added)
3.56 It is against this background that the Colombian Decree No.1436,
estabIishing a system of straighr baselines,is to be assessed. The
reIevant segrnenrs of this baseline regime stretch from rhe northern
aspect of the Guajira Peninsula to the Panama land boundary
terminus, and involve turning points 3 to 15. The system is
described in detailby the U.S. Departmentof State inLimi1.isn the
34I.C.J.Reports1985,p.48, para.64;andsee also pp.50-51, para70.
214 4
Seas,No.103,at pages4-6.3''Lihe Officeofthe Geographerof the
Departmeno tfStat\,24\4.%,:ach.,>'3inesegment andwncluded:
"With the exceptionofseveral select areas sraight
baselines do not appear to be appropriate fur the
CoIombian coastline. The1-eare very few islands off
either coast;those in the Pacific are mostlyislands
associatedwiththeriverdeltas,Except forseverabl ays,
thecoastline alongbotcoastsisrelativelsmooth. And,
in nzd areas,thechanges incoastaldirectionsdo not
createdeepindentations."34s
As theUnited StatesDepartmen tfStatecommentary makesclear,
the regime of baselines on the relevantColombiancoast is
substantiallincompatibIe with thpertinentprinciplesof general
internationalaw, sucprinciplesbeinrgeflectedinArticIes4 and7
of the Geneva Convention on the TerritoriaSea and Contiguous
Zone andin Articles7and10 oftheUnitedNationsLAW ofthe Sea
Convention .he necessar yonclusio nustbethat,Inanyevent, as
indicat iepdaragraph3.55above, a self-serving baselinsystem
cannotbepermitted tobringaboutadineqnitabIedisplacementofthe
median line.
3.58 The positionoftheGovernment ofN.icaraguaisthatgeologicaland
geornorphologicalfactorhavenorelevance forthedelimitationf a
single maritime boundarywithin the delimitation area. As
demonstratedby thepertinentgraphicsthe partieshaveoverlapping
See NhlVoI-11,Annex76.
"5U.S.Departmendr StaleinLimifinrk SeasfNo.IU3,p8. legal interesrs withinthe delimiration areaand it is IegaIiy
appropriattharthese should bedividedby meansof anequidistance
line.
'VIlITheDelimitation Between the MainIandCoastsofNicaragua
and Colombia:EquitableCriteriaconfirmingtheEquitableResuIt
3.59 In thepresenrSection of the Memoriatheequitable character of the
delimitation proposedabove will be assessed in the Iighr of
additionalcriteria:namelytheincidenceof natural resourcesin the
disputed area,the principle of equitableaccess to the natural
resources ofthe disputearea, andsecurityconsiderations,each of
these eIemenrsbeinggenerallyrecognized as relevacircumstances
in[IreprocessofdeIirniratiori.
B. THE INCIDENCE OFNATURAR LESOURC ENTHE DISPUTE ADREA :
RELEVAN CTIRCUMSTANCE
3.60 Since the &rh Sea Cmtine~rralShelfcasesithas been recognized
that the incidenceof natural resources ithedisputed area may
constitute a relevant circumstance affecaidelimitation. Inthe
Dispositif in the NorfhSea'casesthCourtspecified"the factors to
be taken into account" to include the natur-aresources of the
continental sheIf areas involved"so far as known or readily
ascertainable": 1.CReports 1969,page4 atpages53-54.
3.61 In its Judgment ithe Continental Shelfcase(TunisidLib Arabn
Jarnnhiriyo)rheCourtobserved hat: "Asto the presence ofoil wellsin anarea tobe delimited,
itmay, dependingco; the facts;bd'anelement to be taken
info account in the process of weighing all relevant
factorstoachieve anequitable result.
3.62 The Court reaffirmedthisview in theLihydM~fl~ aase. In thatcase,
the Court observed:
"The natural resources of the continental sheIf under
delimitatiorr "so far aknown w readily ascertainable"
might we11 constitute relevant circnmstatrces which it
would be reasonable to take into account in a
delimitation, as the Court stated in the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases...). Those resources are the
essential objective envisaged by States when the put
forward cIaims to sea-bedareasconrainingthem. a7
3.63 The Awardof the Court of Arbitrationinthe GuinedGuinlaea-Bissau
case(1985) is also relevant. The relevanpassages arecomplexand
thus requirefuIIquotation:
"121. Les Parries ant invoqui Ies circonstances
kconorniquesen les qualifiant diversement een appuyant
leurs thkses respectives d'exemples relatifs notammeni
leur kconomie, a l'insuffis aenleurs ressources etB
leurs plans en vue de leurdkveloppement. Elles ont
discutkde questions reIativeau transpm maritime, A Ia
psche, aux ressorrrces petroIikres, erc.et Ia Guinde-
Bissau a fait vaIoien particulier I'interet que ponrrair
prQenter pour eIIe i I'avenir le Iibreaccb au port de
Bubapar lechenald'Orango et l'estuaire durio Grande."
"122Le Tribunal constate sue la Guinke et la Guinke-
Bissau sont deuxEtats en dkveloppement,confrontes I'un
3461.C.J.Reporfs1982,p.18arpp. 77-78,para.107.
3471.C.J.Rep~rf193.5p. 13arp.4 I,para50.
21 7et I'aurre de grand= difficuItks kcanomiques ct
financiersqn'uneaugmentation des ressources provenant
de Ia mer uour-railattknuer. Chacrrn d'errxasaire 5juste
titre2 tirerde ses richessespresentesou potentielles de
'uste profits au bknkfice deson peuple. Certes, pas plus
bue la cour internationale de Justice en I'affaire du
Plateau continental (~uhisie/Jurnaa hrabe~lbyenne)
(1.C.J. Recueif 1982, 77-78, paragraphe 1071, le
TribunaI n'a acquis Iaconviction que 1es probkrnes
~conorniques constituentdes circonstances permanents ?i
prendreencompte en vie d'une dklimitation. Puisque
seule une evaluation actuelleestdu ressortdu Tribunal, il
ne serait ni juste ni equitable de fonder une dilimitation
surl'tvaluaiion de doin~es qui changent en fonction de
facteursdontcertains soit aldatuires.
123. Cerrains Etats peuvent avoir ete dessinb par la
nature d'une rnanikrefavorable iiI'&ablissernentde Ieurs
frontikres ou ileurdkveloppement kconornique; d'autres
peuvent avoir ete'dksavantagis. Les frontikres fix&s par
I'homme ne devraient pas avoirpourobjet d'augmenter
les difficulrisdes Etats on de compliquer leur vie
economique. I1 est vrai que ie TribunaI n'as pas 1e
pouvoir de cornpenser Iks inkgaIit6s ~conorniqnes des
Etats interessesen modifiant uned6limitationqui lui
semble s'imposer par le jeu de considerations objectives
et certaines. I1 ne saurait non plus accepter que les
circonstances kconomiques aient pour conskquencede
favoriser l'une des Parties andktri~nent de l'autre en ce
qui concerne cette dklimitation. I1 ne peut toutefois
corn~lktement perdre de vue Ia ICnitirnit6desprgknt ions
en verrn dessuelIes Ies cirLconstanceseconornisues sont
invosudes, ni contester'ledroit des peuples intkress6s 2
un dkveloppementkconorniqueet social qui leur assurela
jouissance de leur plein di~nite. Le Tribunal pense que
ces pr~occupations Gconorniqrres si Iigitimernent
avanckes par les Parries doivent ponsser tout
natureIIernentcelles-cia une coop6ratio11rnntueIIernenr
avantageuse susceptible de les rapprocher de Ieuobjectif
quiest le d6veloppement."
124. Aux circonstances kconomiques, IesParties ont 1%
une circonstance tirde de la skcuritk, laquelln'est pas
sans intkt, bien qu'ilconviennede souligner que ni Ia .;.:'.
zone hnomique exclusi%& ni le plateaucontinentalne
sont des zones de souverainet6. Cependant Ics
implicationsque.,c4e$ieirconstanceauraitpu avoir sont
dPj5 dsolues par lefait que, dans la solutionqu'il a
&gag&, IeTribunala tenu hce quechaqueEtat contr6Ie
lesterritoirmaritimes situ& enfacede sesc6reset dans
leurvoisinag C e.tepr6occupationa constammerttguide
le Tribunaldans sa recherched'nne solution equitable,
Son objectifpremier a dt6d'eviterque,pour une raison
ou pourune autre,une desParties voies'exerc en face
de sesdtes etdans Ieus voisinage imrn€diaredesdroits
qui poumient porter atreinte 3 son Bruit au
d4veloppemeno ru comprometrre sa &urittLn (emphasis
supplied)(footnotesomitted).(Ibidatpara 12 11241.~~~
348~eportsoflnfenratio~ArbitmiA wards,Val,XlX, p.140,pp. 93-194.
The EngGsh texreadsasfoIIows:
"121. TheParties haveinvoked economic circumstances,havequaIified
them in variousways and have based their respective arguments on
examplesrelatinforthemost parttotheieconomy, theilackof resources
andtheirdevelopmen tlans.They haveputforwardargumenrs relatinto
maritimetransport,ishingpetroleumresources,etc.and Guinea-Bissau
hasmentioneditsparticulinteresinhavingfuturefeemess totheportof
Bubaby theOrango channelandthe RioGrande estuary."
. ..
"122. 2
develo~in~ counhies.both beingconfrontedwith considerableconomic
~~ffiicultiese6w~h ind resourcesfromthe seacouldhelp
to menuate. noth of theiusrlasok to oh~alinifrir profitfromthis
gresent or~otentiawealth furhe benefiof 111cpeoples. However,this
TribunaIhasnot,any more rhan theInrernntinnalCorrof Justicein rhe
TufiisidLihj-wcasef1.CReports198.3pp.77-7 8aagraph 107)-aqu ired
thewnvictionthateconumicprobIems constitutepermanentc~rcumstmces
tobetakenint omnt forpurposesofdelimitation.
"Asthe Tribunacanbe concernedonly witha contemporarevaluationit
wmld be neithejustnorequitabletobasea dejirnitatian theevaluation
of datawhichthan* inrelationtfactorIhatarescmetimesuncertain."
"123. Some Statesmay have beentreatedbynature in a waythat favours
their boundaries or their economic development; others may be
disadvantaged.Theboundarie sixedby man must not be designedto
increasthedifficultiesoStatesortocomplice theireconomic lifeme
Tactisthr theTrihuva!doesnot have thepower to compensatefor the
economicinequalirreofrheStatesconcerned bymodifying adelimitation3.64 The facrors invoked by Preside naths and his distinguished
culleagues, Judges Bedjaoui and Mbaye, must apply in the
circumstances of the presentcase. The division of resources will
thereforeresultfrom the determinationof aboundary baseduponthe
principle of equadivision,and the division of resourcewiIIbe rhrts
effecredby operationof Iaw.
C.THEPRINC~P LFEEQUITABL AECCES SO THE NATURAR LESOURCES
OF THE'DISPUTE AD EA
3.65 In addition to the incidenc of natural resources as a relevant
circumstance,there isthe recently formulatedprincipleof equitable
which itconsidersis calIedfor by objective and certainconsiderations.
Neither canittake intoconsideratithefact thateconomic circtrrnstances
may Lead toone of the Partiesbeingfavouredto the detrimentof theother
where this delimitatiis concerned. The Tribunalcan neverthelessnot
completelvlose sightof the legitimateclaibyvirtueof whicheconomic
circumstancesareinvolved,norcontestthe rightof thepeoplesconcerned
toa level of economic andsocial dweIopmenrwhich fuIIy preserverheir
dignity. TheTribunalisof sheopinionthattheconomic preoccupationsso
IegitirnateIyput forwarby thePartiesshould quitenaturaIIyencourage
them lo consider rnutunIiyadvantageous cooperationwith a view to
achievingtheirobjective,whichis thedevelopmentotheircountries."
"124. To the economic circumstances,the Partieslinkeda circumstance
concerned wirh security. This isnot without interest,butit mnsr be
emphasis4 thar neitherthe exclusive economic zone northecontinenfai
shelf are zones of sovereignty. However, the implicatio~rsrhat this
circumstancemighthavehad were avoided bythefactthat,in its proposed
solution,theTribunalhastakencare to ensurethateach Statecontrolsthe
maritimeterritoriessituatedopposititcoasts and in theirvicinity. The
Tribunalhas constantlybeen guided by its concerntofind an equitable
solution. Ittlrimeobjective has beentoavoid thateither Parrfor one
reason or ,mother. should see rightsexerciovwositeitscoast or in the
immediate vicinitythereof, which couId preventheexerciseof its own
rightto deveIopment or compromise its security." (emphasissuppiied)
(footnotesomitted)(InternarionalLawReports,Vol. 77, p. 635 atpp.688-
689). .. ,,!,.
0'
access m thenaturalresour= ofthedisputedarea. Intmh, the two
principlesarelogi+at..:'H.s;elami M;. 0
3.66 TheAwardof theCourtof Arbitration inthe GuinedGuinea-Bissuu
case (above,para.3.63) containsreference toconsiderationswhich
are closelyrelatedtotheconcept ofequitableaccess. The emphasis
on ihe right toeconomic developmentin .that Award must be
presumed to reston the premise that theseis an equalright to
devdopment.
3.67 In any eventthefirst formuIatioofthe principlof equitableaccess
in terns appearsintheJudgment of theCourt inthe JanMayen case,
The mostrelevantpassagesare asfollows:
"72. The Court now turnsto thequestionwhether access
to the resources of The area of overlapping claims
consritutea factorelevanttothe delimitation.So faras
sea-bedresources are concerned, the CourwouldrecaII
what was said- in fie ContinentalShelf (Libyan Arab
Ja~~hiriyaMa Ernase:
"The natural ~&rces of the continentalshelf under
delimitation"so far as knownor readily ascertainable"
might well constitute relevantcircumstanceswhich it
would be reasonable to take into account in a
delimitation,as the Court stated in the North Sea
Cornriae Sh efcases (LC1 Reporfs 1969, p.54,para
IOI@) (2)). Those murces are theessential objective
envisagedby Stareswhen they put forwardclaims tosea-
bedareas containing them". (I.C.J.Repor?$ 1985, p.41
paraXI)."
"Littleinformationhashowever been given to theCourt
inthat respect, lthoughreferencehas been made to the
possibilityof their being deposits of polymetallic
sulphidesand hydrocarbonisn thearea.""73. With regard to fishing,both Partieshaveemphasized
the importanceof their respecrive interestsin the marine
resources ofthearea.. ."
"75. As has happeneid n a number of earliermaritime
delimitation disputes, the Parties are essentially in
conflict overaccess to Fisheryresources: this explainsthe
emphasis laid on the importance of fishing activities for
their respective economies and on the traditional
character of the different types of fishing carried out by
the populationsconcerned. In the Guy of Mgine casc,
which co~rcerned a single maririme boundary for
continenla1 shelf and fisheryzones, the Chamber dealing
with the case recognized the need to take account of the
effects of the deIimitation on the respective
fishing activities by ensuringrhat thedelimitationshould
not enrail "catastrophic repercussions for the Iiveiihood
and economic well-being of the population of the
countries concerned" (I.C.J. Reports 1984, p.342, para.
327). In the light of this case-law, the Court has to
consider whether any shifting or adiustment of the
median line as fishery zone boundary, would be required
to ensure equitable accessto thecapelin fishery resources
for thevuInerabIafishing,communitiesconcerned."
"76. It appearsto theCourtthat the seasonaImigration of
the capelin presents a pattern which, north of the 200-
mileIineclaimed by IceIand,may be said rocentre on the
southern part of the area of overlapping clai~ns,
appr.oximately between that Iine and the parallel of 72"
North latitude, and that the delimitation of the fishery
zone should reflect this fact. It is clear that no
delimitation inthe area could guarantee to each Party the
presence inevery year of fishable quantitiesof capelinin
the zone allotted to it bytheline. It appearshowever to
the Court that the median line istoo far to theWest fur
Denmark to be assured of an equitable access to the
capelin stock, since it wouId a~rribure to Norway the
whoIe of the areaof overIappingcIairns. For this reason
also the median line thus requires to be adjusted or
shiftedeastwards(cf paragraph 71 above]." ,,,*.-:
. '2..$:,
,$if
-....
.::\4 !3 ',
"90. The Court!has.found(pgraph 44 above) thatitis
bound toa@y, and ithasapplied,the law applicable to
the continental shelf and tIaw applicableto the fishery
zones, Havingdone so, ithas arrival atthe conclusion
that rthemedian line pmvisianal~ydrawn,employed as
startingpointfor thedelimitationof the continentalshelf
and thefishery zones,mustbeadjusted or shiftedsoas to
attributnelargerarea ofmaritime spaces toDenmark. So
far as the continenfa1 shelf is concerned, these isno
requirementfiat the linebe shiftei=astwads consistently
throughout itslength:ifother considem~ionsmight point
toanother formof adjustment o adopt it wouldbe within
the measure of discretionconferredon the Cou~? by the
need toarrive at an equitableresuIt. For the fishew
zones. esrritablacces to the resourcesof the so11the.m
partof the area ofoverlamina claims ha to be assured
by a substantial adjustmentor.shifting of themedian line
provisiun darIEnyin hat region. In the view of the
Court the delimitationnow to be described,whereby the
positionof thedelimitation linesforthetwo categoriesof
maritime spaces is identical, constitutes, in the
circumstances of thiscase, a proper applicationboth of
the law applicable to the continentalsheIf and of that
app[icableio ihCfisheryzones."
"92. Thesouthernmos t one 1,corresponds essentiallto
the principal fishingam referred to in paragraph 73
above, Hn the view ofthe Cuurt, thetwo parties should
enjoy e uitabtleaccess,ru the fishing resourm of this
zone...9r49(emphasissupplied).
3.68 In the circumstances of the presentcase, there are no special
consideration shich wcuId militateagainstthe practicalssumption
thatthe principleofequal division of the dispatched areas would
guarantee the desired standard of equitableaccessto the known resources. Moreover, a stable regime for delimitation would enable
Nicaraguan fishing boats to operate withour ha~+assrne~frrtom rhe
anned forces ofthe other Party.
3.69 International rribrrnaIhave given firm recognirionro the reIevance
of security consideratjons to the assessment of the equitable
character of a delimitation.
3.70 The principIe was expressedand applied by rhe distinguished Court
. .
of Arbitration inthe Guine-. case. In tirewords ofthe
Court:
" 124. AUX circclnstances6conorniques,IesPar-ticsunt Iik
une circanstance tire de la skurite, IaqueIIen'est pas
sans inter& bien qu'ilconvienne de souligner que ni la
zone economique exclusive, ni le plateau continental ne
sont des zones de souverained. Cependant les
implications quc cette circonstance auraitpu avoir son1
dijB rksolues par le fait que, dans la solution qu'il a
digagie, le Tribuqal a tenue B ce que chaque Efaf
contr.6Ieles territoire.maritimes situes en face de ses
c6tes et dans leur voisinage. Cette preoccupation a
constamment guide le ~hbunal dans sa recherche d'une
solution equitable. Son objectif premier a kt6 d'kviter
que, pour uric raisonoil pour une autre, une deb Parties
vcie s'exercer en face de scs c6tes etdans Ienr voisinage
irnmkdiar des dsoits qui ponrraient pomr arteinte 5 son
droit au diveloppement ou cornpromettre sa stcuriti."
(emphasis supplied) (footnotes omitted) (lbid at para.
121-124).~~~
350 "I24. To rhe economiccircumstances, rhe Parties linked a circumstance
concerned with security. ?his is not withour interest, burit must be
ernphasisedthat neither the exclusive economic zonenor the continental
shelfare zones of sovereignty. However, the implications that this .A ..
" ."1< 2 .
':;,g*.
3.71 The principIe has aIso bigfir recognized by this Court in the
Libya/Malfa case (f.C.2.Reporrs f?85,p.42, para. 5I), and again in
. .L, '1.:"
fhe Jan Muyencase (;bid, 1993, pp. 74-75, para. 81). In the latter
Judgment the Court affirmed that the principIes applied to all
maritimedelimitations:
"Norway has agreed, in relationto [heDanish claim toa
200-mile zone off Greenland, that "the drawing of a
boundary cIoser to one State than to anotherwouIdimply
an inequitable displacement of the possibility af the
formerState to pmiect interests which require
It considers that. while courts have been unwilling to
allow such considerations of security to intrude upon the
major task of esrabIishing a primary boundary in
accordance with the geographical criteria, they are
concernedto avoid creatingconditions of imbalance. The
Court considers that the observation in the LibydWalta
Judgment (I. C.J. Reports 1985, p.42, para. 51 ) that
"security considerations are of coursenot unrelatedto the
conceptof the continentalshelf', constituted a particular
application, to the continental shelf', with which the
Court was thiri dealing, of a general observation
concerning all maritime spaces. In the present case the
Court has already rejected the 200-mile line. In the
Contincnral SheIf (LibyanArab Jamuhiriya/ Mrrftn) case,
the Court was satisfied that "the delimitation which wiII
resuIrfrom the application of the present Judgrnenr is.. .
not so near to the coast ofeither Party as to make
circumstance might have had were avoided by the fact that,in itproposed
solution,theTribunalhas taken care to ensure thateach State controls the
maritime territoriesituated opposite its coasts and in theirvicinity. The
Tribunal has consranrlybeen guided by its concern to find an equitable
soIution. Its prime objective has been toavtvoidthar eirherParty f,r one
reasonor another, should see rights exercised opposite irs coasts or in the
immediate vicinity thereof, which couId prevent the exercise of itsown
right to development or compromise its security." (InternationalLaw
Reports, Vol.77,p. 689, para.124). questions of security a, particular consideration in the
present case17..51
"The Court is simiIarIy satisfied in the present case as
regards the delir~~itatioto be described below".
3.72 The reasoning set forth by the CULI~I of Arbitration in the
GuinedGuinea-Bissaucase applies very aptly to the political and
geographical circumstances of the present case. The equidistance
method produces an alignment which effectively ensures 'that each
Statecontrols the maritime territoriessituated opposite to its coasts
intheir vicinity'.
3.73 At this stare of the pleadings the Government of Nicaragua will
.
examine thequestionofproportivnaIityon a preliminary basis.
3.74 As a matter of principle proportionality is not 'an autonomous'
criterion or method of delimitation and this was affirmed by the
,.,
Chamberin the Gulf ofMainecase, I.C.J. Reports 1984, pages 334-
335,paragraph 218. ~nd theChamber observed:
"...to take inroaccount the extent ofthe respeclivecoasts
of the Partiesconcerned dqes not inifselfconstitureeither
a criterionservingas a direct basisfor a delimitation, ora
method rhat ran be used 1.0implement such delimifalion
... a maritime 'delimitation can certainly not be
established by a direct division of the area in dispute
proportional to the respkctive lengths of the coasts
belongingto the partiesin the relevant area,.."
351
I.C.JReports 1985,p. 42, para.5. ,;:-.
3.75 The principalfeature of propbAiona~ity is, ofcourse,that itrelates to
space but not to l.'8 i.,<'In othe{t.,;,s proportionality as such
cannor produce a delimitation. he-lndic pra cticehas been, wirh
someexceptions, to use propo~~tionalit ys a facror,rhe function of
which is to check u posbeviori that a delimitation based upon the
standard criteria of equity does not produce an unreasonable
disproportionbetween the areas:see Weil, op. cit.,pages 79, 237-
238.
3.76 In the firstplace, theprecise formulation of thebasic principleis to
be establishedfirst. Thus, inthe North Sea Conlinenfa1 Shelfcases,
the CourtdescribedrheproportionaIiry'factor' asfoIIows:
"A finalfactor to betaken intoaccount of is theeIement
of a reasonable degree of proportionality which a
delimitation effected according to equitable principles
oughtto bring about between the extent ofthe continental
sheIfappeflaining tothe Stares concerned and the lengths
oftheir respective coastlirles. - these being measured
according to their general direction in order to establish
the necessary balance between States with straight, and
those with markedly concave or convex coasts, or to
reduce very irregular coastlines to their truer
pro~orfions."352(emphasis supplied)
3.77 In the same casethe Dispositif,paragraph101(D)(3), addressed the
sameissue in similarlanguage:
"the eIernent of a reasonable degree of proport iunaIity,
which a deIimitation carried out in accordance wirh
equitable principles ought to bring about between the
extentof the continental shelf areas appertaining to the
coastal State and the length of its coastsmeasured in the
52
LC.J.Reports1959,p. 52, para98.
227 general direcrionof thecoastIine,accotlnt bei11gtaken for
thispurpose of the effects, actual or prospectiveof any
orher continental shelf 'delimitation between adjacent
Statesin thesame region.":(ernsp upaliid)
I
3.78 TlresefomnIations were subsequentlyreferred toby the Courtin rhe
. I
LibydM~lra CmrfinentalSheg case (see I.C.J. Reports 1985, p.43,
para.55)and inthe Jan Mayen case(see I.C.J.Reports 1993,pp.67-
68,para.66).
3.79 In cenain geographic ircumstances the issue of proportionality,in
terms of a significant disparity in coastallengths,may constitute a
relevant circumstance. Thus, in the context of a single maritime
boundary for-thecontinenfa1 shelf andfishery zones, the Chamber in
the GuiJoj'Mainecase observed:
"a maritime delimitation can ...not be established by a
direct divisionof the area in dispute proporrional ru rhe
respectiveIengrhs of rhecoasts beIunging to the partiesin
the relevantarea,but itis equallycertainthar a substantial
disproportion to the lengthsof those coaststhat resulted
from a delimitation effected on a different basis would
constitute a circumstance calling for an appropriate
corre~tion.''~~~
3.80 In the Libyfiltu case the issue of proportionality (in terms of
coastal lengths) was a 'relevant circumstance': see IC.J. Reports
1985, page 49, paragraph 67. In this context the Coun used a
353Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the GuLj of Muine Area.
Judgment,I.C.J.Reports 1984,p.32&3,para.185.
228 . .,. '
':,..,.,'i
T.1 ,,
standardof 'avery marked &&hence incoastallengths'in order to
bringtherelevantci..-2stance in...Pay.AstheCourtexplains:
"'..,thereremainshoweverthe very marked differencein
Iennthsaf the reIevant cmistsof the Parties, and the
element of theconsiderabledlstan beeweenthosecoasts
referredtoby both Pfirtie, ndtobe exrhct below. In
connection with Iengtl~of coasts,attention should be
drawn ro an important distinction which appears to be
rejected by MaIta, between Ihe reItvance of coastal
lengthsas apertinentcircumstancefor adelimitationand
use of those lengthinassessingratiosofproporrionality.
The Court has al~ady examined the role of
proportionalityin a delimitationprocess,and has also
refed to theoperation,employed inthe TunhidLibya
case,ofassessingthe ratiosbetween Iengthsofc~asrsand
areas ofcontjnerrtashelfattributeon the basisof those
coasts.It hasbeen emphasise thatthislatteoperationis
to be employed solely as a verificationof the
equitablenessof theresultmi vedatbyothermeans. Ttis
howeverone thing toemployproportion calcrtlytionrs
to check a result; it is anotthing totake note, inthe
course of thedelimitationprocess,oftheexistence ofa
verymarkeddifference incoastallengths,and toattribute
the appropriatesignificanceto thatcoastalrelationship,
without seeking todefine itin quantitativetermswhich
are onIysuited ro thex post assessmentof relationships
of coasrto area. Thetwo operationsare neithermutually
axciusive,nor so closely identifiedwith eachotherthat
the one would necessarily render the other
supererogatory. Considera ion of the comparability or
orherwiseof thecuastallengthsis apartof theprocess.of
determini and equitable boundary on the basisofan
ir~itiamedian line;the testof a reasonable degree of
proportionality,n the otherhand ,sone which can be
applied tocheck the equitable ofanss linewhatever
the method used to arriveat that line."35(emphasis
added)3.81 This principIeinvolvingrhe disparity in rhe Iengthsof the relevant
coasrs of theparties was recognized andapplied by the Court in the
Jan Mayen case,asin the followingpassages from the Judgment:
"65. Itis of course this prima facie equitable character
which constitutes the reason why the equidistance
method, endorsed by Article 6 of the 1958 Convention,
has played an importantlpart .in the practice of States.
The application of that method ro delimitations between
opposite coasrs produces, in most geagsaphical
circumstances, an equitabIe resnlr. There are however
situations- and the present case is one such - in which
the relationshipbetween the length of the relevant coasts
and the maritime areas generated by them by application
of rhe equidistance method is so dispropartio~~at hat ir
has been fou~rdnecessary. torake this circumstance into
account in order to ensure an equitable solution. The
frequent references in 'the case-law to the idea of
proportionality - or disproportion - confirm the
importance of the proposition that an equitable
delimitation must, in such circurnsrances, take inro
account the disparity &tween the respective coastal
Iengrhsof the relevant area."755
"68. A delimitation by the median line would, in the
view of theCourt, involve disregard of the geography of
the coastaIfrontsof eastern Greenland andof Jan Mayen.
Itis not a questionof determining theequitabIenature of
a delimitationas a fun&ion of the ratioof the lengths of
the coasts in comparison with that of the areas generated
by the maritime projection of the points of the coast (cf.
Contineatcs l helf(Libyan'ArubJumahiriydMalta ),I.C.J.
Reports f985, p.46, $ra. 59) nor of "rendering rhe
situationof a State with an extensivecoastIine similar to
that of a State with a resrricred coastlirre" (NorshSea
ContinentalShe& I. C.J. Reports 1969, pp. 49-50, para.
91). Yetthe differences in lengthof the respective coasts
of the Parties areso sigriificantthat this feature must be ?::.-:.-,.
r,':,j.;;.- - '
,. --,<-:!.iJ:-
taken into considemthfi. during the delimitation
aperation. It should be recalled that-in the Gulfof Maine
case the Chamber.,considered ~hat,a ratio of 1 ro 1.38,
calculated in the 'Gulf of ai& 'as defined by the
Chamber, was sufficient to justify "correction" of a
mcdian Iine delimitation (I.C.J. Reporfs 1984, p.336,
paras.221-222). The disparity between the Iengths of
coasts thus constitutes a special circumstance within the
meaning of Article 6, paragraph 1, of the 1958
Convention. Similarly,as regards the fishery zones, the
Court is of the opinion, in view of the great dispariry of
the Iengthof the coasts. thatthe application of the median
IineIeads tornanifestlyinqui tiibleresults.'
'69. Itfollows that, in the Iightof the disparity ofcoastal
lengths, the median line should be adjusted or shiftedin
sucha way as to effect a delimitation closer to the Coast
of Jan Majre~i. Ttshould, however, be made clear chat
takingaccount of the disparity of coastal lengths does not
mean a direct and mathematical appiication of rhe
relacionship between the Iength of the coastaI fronr of
eastern Greenland and that of Jan Mayen. As the Court
has observed.
"IFsuch a use of proporrionaIitywere right, ir is difficult
indeed to see what room would be Ieft for any other
consideration; for ik w&Id be at once tlie principle of
entitlement to continental shelf rights and also the method
of puttingthat principleinto operation. Its weaknessasa
basis of argument, however, is that 'the use of
propurtionaIityas a rnethod in ifsown right.is wanting of
supportin the practice of States, in the pubIic expressiori
of their views ar (in particular) the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, or in the
jurisprudence." (Continental Shelf (Libyun Arab
Jamahiriyd Ma ha), I.C.J. Reports 1985, p.45, para.
581'" "6
3.82 TheCourt thus requires'a verymarkeddifference'in coastalIenglhs
or a 'great disparity'of the lengths of coasts. In the TunisidLibya Coatinentul Shelf case, the Court appIied the tesrof proportionality
in thefollowingmanner:
"The Court notes thatthe length of the coast of Libya
from Ras Tajorrra to Ras Ajdir, measured dong the
coastline without taking account of small inlets, creeks
andlagoons, is approximatel y 185 kilometres; the length
of thecoast of Tunisia from Ras Ajdir to Ras Kaboudia,
measured in a similar way, and treatingthe island of
Jerbaas though itwere a promontory,is approximately
420 kilometres. Thus the reIevarrtcoastIine of Libya
stands in the proportion of approxirnately 3 1:69 to rhe
relevant coastIine of ~unisia. It notes further that the
coastal front of Libya, represented by a straight line
drawnfrom Ras Tajoura, to Ras Ajdir, stands in the
proportion of approximately 34:66 to the sum of the two
Tunisian coastal frunrs 'represented by a straight line
drawn from Ras Kaboudia rothe most westerly poi~rtof
the Gulf of Gabes, and a secorid straight line from that
point toRas Ajdir. With regard tosea-bedareas, it ilotes
that theareas of shelf below low-water mark within the
area relevant for delimitation appertaining to each State
followingthe method indicated by the Court stand toeach
other in approximatelythe proportion:Libya 40; Tunisia
60. This result, taking into account a11 the relevant
circumstances, seems to the Court to meet the
requirements of the test'of proportionality aan aspect of
equity."3s7
3.83 IntheLibydMtliraConiinenfui~hejiasetheCounanaIyredrhe
, '
coastaldifferences in thefo110,winp garagraph:
"Within the bounds ser by the Court having regard to the
existence of claims af third States, explainedabove, no
quesrionarises of any Iimit, setby those claims, to the
357
1.C.J.Reports 1982,p.9 1,para.131.
232 .-
relevanrcoasts oi ~aln~''?8 be taken into consideration.
On the Libyan side,Ras Ajdir, the terminus of the
frontierwithTunisia;! must clearly.be the starting point;
the meridian 15" 10'Ewhichhas been found by the Court
to define the Iimtsof the area in which theJudgment can
operate crosses the coast ofLibya not far from Ras
Zunuq which is regarded by Libya as the Iirnit of the
extentof itsrzlevanrcoast. Ifthe coastsof Ma1 taand the
coast of Libya from Ras Ajdir to Ras Zurruqare
compared, it is evident that there is a considerable
disparitybetweentheir lengths,to a degree which, in the
view of the Court, constitutes a relevant circumstance
which shouId be reflected in the drawing of the
delimitationIine. The coast of Libya from Ras Ajdir to
Ras Zumq measured foIIowing itsgeneral direction,is
192 miles long,and thecoast of Malta to Ras il-Wardija
to Delimara Point, following straight baselines but
excluding theislet of Filfla, is 24 miles long.the view
of the Court, this difference isso greatas to justifythe
adjustment of the median Iirleso as to attribute a Iarger
sheIf areato Libya :the degree of such adjustment does
notdependupon a mathematica1 operation and remains to
be
3.84 The questionof thedisparity of lengthsof coastswas alsothe subject
of examinationin the Jan Mayen case:
"Afirstfacto of a geophysicalcharacter,and one which
has featured most prominently in the argument of
Denmark, in regard toboth continental sheIf and fishery
zone, ithe disparityor disproporzionbetweenthe Iengths
of the "relevant coasts", defined by Denmarkas rhe
coasts lying between points E and F on thecoast of Jan
Mayen, andG and H on the coast of Greenland,defined
as explained in paragraph 20 above. The following
figuresgiven by Denmarkfor thecoastal lengths havenot
been disputed by Norway. The Iengths of the coastal
358
I.C.J.Reports 1985,p50, para.68. fronrs of Greenland and Jan Mayen, defined as straight
linesbetween G and H, and between E and F, are:
Greenland, approximateiy 504.3 kilornetres; Jan Mayen,
approximately 54.8 kilometres. If thedistances between
G and H and between E and F are measured along the
successive baselineswhich' generate the median line, the
total figures are approximately 524 kilometres for
Greenland and approximitely 57.8 kilometres for Jan
Mayen (see sketch-map'N0.2, p. 80 beIow). Thus the
ratio between the cum 'bf Jan Mayen and that of
Greenland is Ito 9.2 un the basisof thefirst calculation,
and 1to 9.1on the basis'ofthesecond."359
3.85 In the Jan Mayea case, theI bases on which the adjustment of the
median Iine was made were complex and it is not necessary to
eIaborate upon thisaspectof the matter.
3.86 The pertinence of this jurisprudencefor present purposes must now
be considered. It will be obvious to the Court that the cases
concerning islandsor isIaridStates Iying opposite Iongcoast States
have no bearing upon the issvesof deIimitationpresenrIy before the
Court. In these casesthe disparity in the lengths othecoasts of the
'long coast' state and the coast of the island opposite was very
substantialindeed. The LibyaLMaltaandJun Muyen cases can thus
be setaside.
3.87 The TunisicdLi buydtine4rp{Shetfcase is, in geographical terms,
nor very similar to the +itnation in the present case.
However, the coastal relationship has a certain analogy to the
, I
relationshipsof the mainlaridcoasrsof Nicaraguaand Colombia. In
the key paragraphs of the Judgment (paras. 130-131) the Court
insists on establishing a legal relationship between the coasts of
Tunisia and Libya, even when the coastal fronts were in an
3"I.C.J.ReporfsIY93, p.65, para.61. , . -..!
essentially oblique re~ation.~~~*i"htirsesome similarity here to the
concepr of frontaloppq,. ,,, which ..,referredto by theChamber in
. ,..I <,;,,:,:
the GulfofMainecase:ide above,paragraph s.18-3.20.
3.88 Inthe Gulf ofMaine case the decisionof the Chamberinvolveda
highly specialized set of circumstances, which related to the
intersection ofthe coast at theback of the Gulf by the Iand boundary
between Canada and the United States. In these unnsrraI
circumstances the Chamber decided to correcr the median line by
means of a 'smalltransversedisplacement' of thesecond(orcentral)
segment of thedelimitationline:see I.C.J. Reports 1984 pages334-
337, paragraph2 s17-222, andsee paragraph 222, in particular.The
precise poIiticaI geography of the case now in front of the Court is
entireIy different, and it was the poIirica1geography of the Gulf,
rather than rhe lengths of masts as such, on which the Chamber
relied.
3.89 Of the variouscases, the TunisidLib caase isthe most similarin
geographical terms. In that case the relevantcoastlineof Libya
standsin the propoflion of 3 1169 to rherelevantcoastlineof Tunisia.
In terms of ccastaI fronts the proportion becomes 3456 (see above
para. 3.82). The sea-bed areas involved wirhin the areas r+eIevantor
delimitation appertaining to each State thus srand toeach other in the
proportion: Libya40;Tunisia 60. And theCourtconcluded:
"This result, taking into account allthe relevant
circumstances, seems to the Court to meet the
requirementsof the testof proportionality asan aspectof
equity.w360
36I.C.J.Reports1982,p.91, para.131
2353.90 In the present case, the coastal frontages do not exhibit 'a marked
difference in coastaI lengths', -andtl~etat of proportionality,as a
relevantci~.cumstanco er ot.er. ise,does not reveaIanynecessity for
correctionof the median line.
F.THE INTERES TSOTHER STATE NTHE REGION
3.91 The interests ofother Srares in rheregion do not constitutea reIevanr
circumstancein the proper meaningof the term. As Professor WeiI
explains:
"Taking account of de!irnit.dtionasffecting third States
thus covers two concepts and two approaches which
should be carefully distinguished: On the other hand, it
may lead the court to' limit its decision so as not to
encroach upon future delimitations affecting States not
partytothe case. On the otherhand, itmay lead thecourt
to extend its investigation to geographical facts fdlling
outside the dispure before it. In the first caseit isthe
exrenrof the judicialf&ction which is at issrre. Inthe
second, it is the determination ofthe reIcvantcoasts and
the area of delimitarion. In neithercase is the purpose of
taking other delimitations into account to test the
equidistance liy. In shoi, therefore,it isnot a relevant
circumstance in the proper~rneaningof the term.""'
3.92 Two paintsshouId be emph a,-zed. In the firstplace,the assessment
of the ove1-aIc1oastal reia.i.,-shisetween Nicaraguaand Colombia
is nor aiiectedby the exisfcn'<eof the claims of third Stares,as the
Court stated in itsJudgmeFt in theLibya/Malba case, I.C.J.Reports
1985, pages 49-50p ,aragr,a.ph68 (see above, para. 3.17). And,
secondly, the only consistent drincipleto emerge from the case law
is the principle that the Court lacks the competence to make
361The Law ~JMaririmn e eIimitnr@n- Re&crions,Cambridge, 1989,p.255. .1.:.',;'
,.:-,;>-,.
n:*'r---:.
determination shich may :it theclaimsof thir States.It must
be obvious thatsuch an inhibition doenot involve a recognitionby
;.;..n pvi\
theCourt ofthelegal validityofthe thirdStateclaims.
IX. The Delimitatiotminthe Region ofSanAndtes:the Nicaraguan
Positionon the BwsisofNimmguanTitle
3.93 The purpose of thissection of the Memorialis to examine the
maritimedelimitation applicableon thebasis ofNicaraguan titlro
the San Andres and Providen croupof islands. The basis of
Nicaraguan titlehasbeenelaborated upon in ChapterI above,
3.94 The relevantislands.San AndresandProvidenciaare, respectively,
105 nautical miles and I25 nauticalmiles from the Nicaraguan
mainlmld coast. In addition San Andres and Providenc ara,
respesctively,85 nauticalmiles and 3244nautical miles from the
Colombian coastat Cartagena. The coastalfrontsof SanAndres and
Providenciaare 7 and4.5 nauticalmiles respectivelyinmlationto
the coastof Nicaraguawhichis appruximateIy 250 nauticalmiles in
length.
#
3.95 The relevant data showthat both San AndresandProvidencia fall
within he cuntinenta!shelf of Nicaraguaad withinits exclusive
economiczone. C.THE SAN ~DRES GROUPI:TSRELATIO TNOTHE MEDIAN LINE
DIvrsroN OF THE AREA OF DELIMITATION
3.96 On thebasisthat theSanAndresgroupfallsunder the sovereigntyof
I ;i
Nicaragua, ahe issue which then arisesis, wha effect doesthe group
' I '
have on the median line division of the overall delimitationarea
1
between the mainland coasts of Nicaragua and Colombia? In
. .
principle,the solutionbasedppon equidistance,andthe principle of
equal division,wouldapply and thesovereigntyof Nicaragua would
not have any effect on rhe d:..mitation between the mainlands of
- ,
Nicaragua and Colombia. .
X.The Delimitationin the Region of§an Andres:theNicaraguan
' ..
Position on the Basis of theAlleged ColombianTitle
3-97 The purpose ofthe present sction of the Memorial isto examine the
,,
maritime delimitationon t h, hypothesis of an alleged Colombian
title tothe San Andres ai.. Providenc graup of islands. The
Colombian assel?ionof title is, course, contested,and the basisof
Nicaraguan titlhas been elaborated uponin Chapter I above.
3.98 In the opinion of the Government ofNicaragua the isIandsof San
Andres and Providenc siou1.dbe enclaved within the continental
shelf areas appurtenantto Nicaragua and the exclusive economic if&$&:.
zone of Nicaragua,and accorded a territorialsea entidemenof
twelvenauticamile.;'.>.mberof.-<y-lements inthegeographical
and legal framework justifythis form of delimitationas the
appropriate equitable sulution.These elements wiII now be
examined.
C.THE SAN ANDRES GROU mPE!3NOT ~RM PART OFTHECUA~TAL
3.99 The variouspartsoftheSan Andresgroup are between360 and385
nauticalmilefromthenearest partoftheColombian mainland. The
principaislmd is7 nauticalmiIs Ionand 3.? nauticaImils broad
(aris widestpoint).The main1andcoast ofColombiaoppositethe
mainlandcoast ofNicaragua isapproximately400 nauticalmiles
long. By comparisonthe coast ofNicaragua isapproximately250
rniIeslong. FopurposeosfdeIirnitatiby a medianline,thepoints
contributinto amedian line spreaover a longerdistancon the
Nicaraguancoastthanon thatofColombia. As he Courtpointedin
the LibydMaltacase:
"...iisbyIneariosfthe maritimefmnr of this landmass,
in orherwords byits coastaopening,thatthis territorial
suvereignty brings its continental shelf rights into
effect..Thejuridicallinkbetweenthe State'sterritorial
sovereigntyand itsrightsto certainadjacentmaritime
expansesisestablis byhmdeansof itcoast,'9362
3.100 It ievidenrthatinthe contextof thecoastarelationships, the San
Andr-esgroup canorliyhave aminimal rolein generatinmaritime
rights. D.THEPREDOMINAN INTEREST OF NICARAGUA JN THE RELEVAN ATREA
3.101 Nicaragua is the major rip>ri.r State in this part of the Caribbean.
San Andresand its dependenciIs..'e within the exclusive economic
zone of Nicaraguaandare situated within the areas of continental
-..
shelf appurrenanttoNicaragua. San Andres is 105 nauticaI miles
from the maidand cusr of Ni,ar,gua. Moreover, thereare other
Nicaraguanpossessions in the vicinity,includingthe CornIslands.
,, ,
3.102 There is a certain analogy kith the situation relatingto fhe Channel
Islandsin rheAnglo-Freilch Cp,tinenralShetf case. There the Conrr
of Arbitration reasoned as follqws:
"As to the conclusion to be drawn from those
considerarions in connectionwith the delimitationof the
continenta1 shelf,the Courtrhinks it sufficient 10 saythat,
in its view,thevtendto evidence the medominantinterest
of the French ~epublic 'in the southern areas of the
EnplishChannel, a predominance which is also stronglv
indicated by irs usi it ioMnasa riparan State alonn the
whole of the ChanneI's 'soritcoast."Jb5 (emphasis added).
r ... , ,
3.103 Whilst the geographicalsituation in the western Caribbean isnot in
all respects parallel, the predominance of the mainland coast oi
-.
Nicaraguais sufficiently evident. The significance of the factor of
predominant interest is rec,ognI izedby Judge David Andersonin his
commentary on the Anglo-Frenchcase in the compendium of
' .
practice editedby Charney and Alexander,InternationalMaritime
Bolmdm-ieV so,Iume11,page 1735 atpage 1744. He refers ro 'the
363Internationalhw Reports,Vo1.54 p,98, para.188.
,, 8.,i
predominant French the southern coast of the
Channel'. .'.&*I' 2 ,:
3.104 To allow the San Andses pup to have a significant maritime
extensionof anykindwould involv settingaside the principleor
factorof proportionality. ThreIevantprincipleshave been setforth
by the Court of Arbitrafionin the Anglo-FrenchContifientd Skef
casein thefollowingpassag ofstheAward:
"197. The Court refersto thepresence of the Channel
Islands close to the French coast as constituting a
citcumstance crenrive of inequity, and a "special
circumstance" within rhe meaning of Article 6, merely
prima facie,becatrsea delimitation,tobe "equitable"or
"justified"must be so in relationto bothParties andin
the lightof allthe relevantcircumstances. The United
Kingdom,moreover, maintains that the specific features
of theChannel Islandsregionmilitatepositivelyinfavour
of rht delimitatioit proposes. 11invokes the particular
characterof theChannel Islandsasnot rocks orisletsbur
populous islands of a cersain polirid and economic
importance; it ernphasises the close ties between the
islands and the United Kingdom and the latter's
responsibilityfor their defence and security; and it
invokes these as calling for the csntinentasheifof the
isIandsCvbe linked to thatof the United Kingdom.
Above all,itstressesthat atbest itis vnIy in the open
watersof theEngIish Channel roheir west and notth rhat
they have any possibilityof an appreciablearea of
continentalshelf. Inthe lightofall these considerations,
itsubmitsthatto dividethis area tothe westand north of
thk islandsbetwen the Channel Islandsandthe French
Republic by zhe median line which itproposes does not
involveany"disproporfioo nr exaggeration."' ' 199. The Court considers that the primary element in
the present problem is the fact that thc CkanneI Islands
region forms part of the English Channel, throughout the
whole length of which 'the Parties face each other as
opposite States having almost, equal coastlines. The
problem of the Channel.'Islandsapart, the continental
shelf boundaly in the' Channel indicated by both
customary law and ~rtklq 6, as the Court has previously
stated, is a median .lib{-iunning from end to end of the
ChanneI. The existence of the Channel Islands close to
the French coast, if permitted to divert the course of that
mid-channel rhedian1ine:'effects.a radical distortion of
the boundarv creative.:'ofinequity. The case is quite
differentfrom thatof small islandson the right side of or
close tothe median ljne;.and itis aIsoquitedifferent from
the case where ~umerquslislands stretch out one after
another Iong distances! from the rnainIand. The
precedents of semi-enclaves, arising out of such cases,
which are invoked by the United Kingdom, do not,
therefore, seem to thecdurt to be in point. The Channel
Islandsare not only "dn' fhe wrong side" of rhe mid-
Channel median Iine but whollv detached ~eo~ra~hicaIIy
from the United Kingdom'.(emphasisadded).3a -
..'.I
. ,
. .
3.105 Inthe light of these con ,siderations, the position of the San Andres
I .'
groupcan be appreciated:
First: The presence of the Sap Andres grouprelativelyclose to the
Nicaraguan coast, and within the continental shelf areas and
, ,
exclusive economic zone o.f,,icaragua,constitutes a circumstance
creativeof inequity(see par?.199quoted above).
. .
Second: If the Sarr Andres G roup is notenclaved, thiswould result
in a disproportion in the maritime areas as between Nicaraguaand
Colombia(see para. 198of theAward in the Anglo-French,case).
3M Iniertzniionnj LawReporis,VoI..54, pp.10 1-102. ---
Third: The existeno cfe San Andres group close to the
Nicaraguancoast,ifpyik.qlqto djv/'9,J-ourse ofthemedianline
between thetwo mainlands,would effecta radicaldistortionof the
boundar creativeofineqlty (seepara.199quoted above).
--urth-TheSan Andresgroupis notonly'on the wrong side%f the
median linebut whollydetachedgeographicallyfromColombia (see
para. 19quoted above).
3.I06 ExampIes of Fullenclaves are rare:see LeganIr and Hankey, in
Charneyand Akxander (eds. u),.cit.Volume I, pagm 212-213-
Apart from the enclavingof the Channel Islands,the only other
example isthe Australia-Papua-NewGuinea Agreement of 18
December 1978(Limits;itheSeos,No. 87). ThisIarredelimitation
is verycomplex and reflecthighly spmiaIizedgeographi anadl
culturaldesiderata.
3.107 The rarity of full enclavingsimply reflectthe factthat the
geographicalcircurnsra dncenst oftencall fora full enclave.
However, the practiceof both emlaving and semi-enclaving is
recognizedin the doctrinewithout reservationsee,for example,
Weil, TheLawof MuritimeDelimitation- Reflections,1989,pages
52,230,273; LegaultandHankey,in Gamey and Alexander(eds.),
op.citVuIurne 1,pages212-213,LucchiniandVeIckel, Druif de fa
Mer, Volume11, pages145-147;Evans, RelevantCircumstunce snd
MaritimeDelimitation,989 ,ages149-150.3.108 The position inttr~asof practice is describedin authoritative terms
byLegaultandHankey: -
"Another mahod, which Fay be usedindependentloyr in
conjunctionwif1some uther method suchas equidisbnce
is 'enclaving':thatis, aitributiagmnririme belt ro an
islandby means of a buirndary consistingof arcs of
circledrawn from appropriateheadlands. This method
invariablresultsina reducedarea of maritime spacefor
..-..
the statwhose island.sen&ived, ~lative to wh that
slatwouldhaveobtained iftheislandhad been wed as a
basepointindrawing equidistant line.
:m - -
The enclavi mnethod &I produce eitherafullenclave,
where themaritime beltaccordedto theislandiswholly
separatedfrom theoffshdiezone bfthe mainland coastof
the statetowhich the islandbelongs,or,alternativelya
semi-enclave,where themaritimezoneappertainingfo
theislandmerges withthe;kriiime zone ofthemainland
coast.Thesemi<nclave-effect occurswhentheislandis
situateonor closeto r._<.-.d'stantline.
. -. -
Although.in principlei*la~es may beof any bdh.
in practicedley have irrGariabIybeen3 or 12 miles,
representinthe breadth.ofthe tertoria1sea, o13miIes,
to allow an additiorial'mile of econoinic zone or
continentalhelfbeyondtheterritoriaslea.
Examples of fullenciaves arefound in the Australia-
PapunNew Guinea agreement of18 December1978 (No.
5-3) andthe 1977 tlrrgb:Freack Cmtinentai Sky award
{No. 9-3). In tk, Australia-Papua New Guinea
agreement, twelve ~usvalian islands lying closto the
coast of Papua New Guinea were accorded 3-mile
territorisea enclaves. Inthe Anglo-French award,the
BritishChanntI Islands,dhich laywithin 12miles ofthe
French coast,were accorded 12-mileencIaves (3miIeof
territoriasea and 9 miles of continental sheIf and
contiguou sishingzone)."F5
365IRgmltand Hankeyo.p.cit.Vol.I,pp.212-213. must depend on the,;+:::uphical an*;,...ticacircumstances in each
case. There is,however, some evidence of a tendency in the State
practice to deny a continental shelf entitlement to relativeIy small
islandsinorder to avoid a distorting effect upon adjacenshelfareas.
The Agreement between Italy and Tunisia signed on 20 August
1971, reIatingto the delimitation of the continental shelf, accorded
semi-encIaves to certain Italian isIands,as followa:12nrnzone for
Lampione, and a 13nmzone for Pantelleria, Lampedusa and Linosa:
see:Limits in theSeas, United States Departmentof State,No.89, 7
January 1980;and Charney andAlexander(eds.), Volume TI ,ages
161 1-1625.
3.1I0 A similar approach can be seen in the Award of the Court of
Arbitration in the Dubai-Sharjah case. The critical passage of the
Awardreads as follows:
"[ThisCourt]has come to the conclusion that to allow to
the island oAbu Musaanyentitlement to an area of the
continental shelf of the Gulbeyond rheextc~rtofits belt
ofterrirorialsea would indeed produce a distortirlgeffect
upon neighhouring sheIf areas. The appIication of
eqrrirableprir~cipjhere, so asto achievea limitationthat
isa function or reflection ofthe geographical and other
relevantcircumstances of the area,must leadto no effect
beingaccordedto the island of Abu Musa for the purpose
of plotting median or equidistancc shelf boundaries
between it and neighbouring shelf areas. We are
concerned in this Award, of course, only with the
continental shelf boundary between the Ernir+aateof
Dtlbaiandof Sharjah.The totaIareaof sea encIosed by a
12 miIe limit oterriforiaseaaround Abu Musa has been
calculated (by the Court's hydrographer) to amount to
544.5 square nautical miles, which includes an area of
some 18.5square nauticalmiles where the territorial sea
boundaryof the islandproceeds in an arc beyondpoint E on the Chart, which intersects a (notional) extension of
the lateralequidistance Iine.The claim of haIf-effectfor
the isIandultirnateIy adkanced by the Government of
Sharjahin the lea din bgeore the Coan would have
added a further 133.8s'quarenautical miles to thatarea;
this, in the view of the Court and in the light of the
considerations adverted tokar~ier,would have produced a
disproportionate and exaggeratedentitlement to maritime
space as between theParties to the presentdispute. To
give no effect to the continental shelf entitlementof the
island of Abu Musa &uld preserve the equities of the
geographic stuarion and would be consistent, for
example,with comparable regiona1practiceas appIied to
the islands of ~l-'~;abi~ah and Farsi in the Saudi
Arabian-Iranianagreement of January 1969, and Dayinah
in the AbuDhabi-Qatar agreement of March 1969,where
the continental shelf rights of islands were limited to
coincide with their respective territorial waters, but not
used as base points for. the purpose of constructing
median or equidistance boundaries in respect of the
continental shelves &!ween upposite or adjacent
0 -.
~tates."~~ '
I"
3.111 The parallelswith the situati.n,ofthe Channel Islands are striking,
and the decision in theAnglu-Frenchcase in respect of the n~ethod
of encIavih ng not attracted any criticism. Thesituarionof the
Andres group generates indications that these is here an even
strongercase fur enclaving. , ..,'i,, I
'',.'?j+>,j.-.:$
I,t2b1?
3.112 Thefactsspeak forthernsel~&%thiis respect:
Population: In 1985'-theopopulati oh an Andresand Pmvidencia
was 35,836 In 19?7 the Channel Islandshad a populationof
130,800:seethe Decisionof30 June19n. paragraph171.
Area- San Andres and Pmvidencia haveanareaof 8 and6 square
u
nautical milesrespectivelyThe Channel Islandshaveanareaof 75
squaremiles.
Distance from the res~ective mainland's: San Andres and
Providencialie respectively385and 384 nautical milesFrom the
mainland of Cdornbia. Guernsey, Jersey and AIderneytie
respec~iv 55,y70 and 45 nauticaImiIes fromthemainland of the
UnitedKingdom.
Generallengthof the coastsof the islandsmeasuredas one straight
line segment for each island: 5an Andres and h.ovidencia have
respectiveIy 7 and 4.5 naurical rniIesof coaseal length whilst
Guernsey,Jersey andAlderney have a coastallengthrespectivelyof
9, 10and 3 nauticalmiles.
3.113 In the Iight of these comparisonsand in the light of the legal
considerationsSetfonthinparagraphs 3.107-3.1I0 above,it mustbe
evidentthat the enclaving method alone representsthe equitable:
solution. Thisis the soluriodictatedbythegeographicaland legal
fmmework and which does not involve any 'disproportiwr or
exaggelation ' XI. The Presenceof SmaII Cays in the Maritime DelimitationArea
3.114 The previous sections of . '.is Chapter addressed the maritime
delimitation involving the mainland coasts of Nicaragua and
Colombia, including theweight to be accorded tothe islands ofSan
Andresand Providencia in such a delimifation. Thepresent section
,,
considers the weight to be accorded to a number of ma11 cays
located in the maritime ap between the mainland coasts of
Nicaraguaand Colombia. This concernscertain small cays scattered
throughout the western part of the delimitationarea. The present
section will alsodeaI with the bankof Quitasuefio,which I~as been
.
includeid n various insfnrments of relevance for the present
proceedings.However, there a'rno islandson this bank,which have
maritime zones of theirown. Before turningto the roleof the small
cays in themaritime deIimiption, a shofl description of thepoIiticaI
geography of fho& small cays and the bank of Quirasueiio is
provided.
3.1 15 The continental shelfextending from the Central American mainland
coast isrelatively shallow and there are numerous banks in this
area.367 Some of these banks are close to the sea surface in Iarge
areasandin some pIaces smallcays siton top of them. The present
'6For an overview ofthegeography of thearea concernedsee alsoNM,Vol. 1,
Figure111. ..- -
. <',,'#' '
$5;>'., '
descriptionof thesebanks ad 'baysstartfrom thesouthwest of [he
areaof relevancefor the delimitat.o1 1 deals with all thbanks
.I%.-
and cays lyingbetween Cayusde Albuquerque inIhe southwestand
the bankof BajaNuevointhe northeast.
3.116 TheCayos de Albuquerque are two smallcays, Cayodel Norteand
Cayo del Sur, which both are only a couple of hundred meters
across,andwhich are locatedonthe eastside ofan isolatedcoral
bank, The approximatp eositionof theCayosdeAIbuquerque is:12"
11'N, 81'50' W and theylie about100 nauticalmilestothe eastof
the mainland ofNicaragua, 65 nauticalmilesto theeastof theCorn
Islands (IslasdelMaiz) and 20 nauticaIrniIestothe south ofthe
islandofSan Andres.The distancetoCoIurnbiais about375 nautical
miles.
3.I17 The Cayos delEsteSudeste arelacatedattheposition 12"24' N, 81"
27'W, about 35 kiIometerstu the nclrthe af~the Cayos de
A1 bnquerque onrhc southeasternparof an isolatedbank.These cays
include theCayo del Este,Cayo Bolivar and Cayo Arena, none of
whichis more thana few meters high.The distancefromthese cays
to themainland of Nicaragua,the Cum Islands(blas delMaiz) and
the island ofSan Andres is respectively about 120,9Q and 20
nauticalmiles.The distancetoColombiais abut 360 nauticaIrniIes.
3.118 Thebankof Roncadorlies about 75nautical milesto theeast ofthe
islandofPrLovidenciaand 190 nnlrtical miItto the east of the
mainlandof Nicaragua ,tanapproximat esition of 13"34' N, SO"
W W. Thedistance ofthe bank of Roncador to Colombia is about
320 nauticalmiles.The only cay on thisbank,alsocalledRoncador, isIocatedon the northern part ofthebankand is composed of sand
and corals. - .
3.119 Thebankof Serranais an extensive areawithdangerous shoals.Itis
about 20 miles inlength and 6 miles wide and is about45 miIes to
thenorth of the bankof Roncador.There are a number.of caysoIr
thisbank, inciudirrgNorth Cay and Southwest Cay. The bankof
Serranais located atthe of 14P24' N, 80" 16'W and lies80
nauticalmiles from Providencia, 145 nautical miles from Cayo
Miskito and 170 nauticaIini~esfromthe mainIand of Nicaragua.The
distancetoColombia is about350nauticalmiles.
3.120 Thebank of Serranillaliesabout 80 miles to thenorthof thebankof
Serrana,at theposition of15" 55' N, 79"54' W. The smaII cays on
ScrranilIincIude EasrCay id BeaconCay, which are composedof
sandandcoral. The bankof Serranilla is locatedto thenortheastof
the mainlandcoast of ~icar:~ua,Cayo Miskitoand the island of
Prouidencia.The distanceof thesecoasts toSerranilla is respeaively
200, 190and I65 nauticaImiles.The distanceto Colombia is about
400 nauticalmiles.
3.121 The bankof Bajo Nuevo lies due east othebankof Serranilla,at the
location 15"53' N, 79" 15' W, and is abour 14 miles long and 5
~nileswide. The mosr prominent cay on Bajo Nuevo is Low Cay,
which isjust 300 meterslong and40 meterswideand iscomposed
of coralfragments andsandandabout5 feet high. Low Caylies at a
distance of about 205 nautical rniIes from Providencia and
respectively 265 and 245, nauticaI miles from the Nicaraguan
mainlandandCayo~iskito. The distanceto Colombia isabout 360
nauticalmiles. . .
3.122 The present Memoriaihas *lkflicarethe basisfor sovereignty of
Nicaraguaover all .7'...e abovem..<i'.ed cays andconsequently
requeststheCourt to declarethatNicaraguahas a titltoallof them.
However, it cannot be excluded that the Court reaches diffetent
conclusions inrespectofthis issueThe present sectionwilladdress
the roleof thecays in themaritime delimitationbetweenNicaragua
and Colombia, takinginto account the differenoutcomes thatare
psible in respecr of rhe question of sovereign l y.ever,
independently ofthe outcomeof the part ofrhe presentproceedings
concerningsovereignty,the positionof Nicaragua is thatall these
cays are ofsuch a minor significancthattheirrolein the maritime
deIirnitatiohas inany case to belimitd toan absoluteminimum.
Haw this istobe achieved issetoutbelowin subsectionC.
3.123 Thebankof QuitasueEo issituatedbetweentheCnyosMiskitos,the
island ofProvidenciaandthe Bank ofSemna. Thedistancefrom
Cayo Miskito,the mainidand intheCayos Miskiros ,oQuitasueiia
is aborr90 nauticalmiles, anthe distancto Psovidenciaissome 40
nauticalmiles.Thebankof Quitasueiio, asdefinedbythe 200 meters
isabath,extendsabout34 nautical miles ina north south direction
and has a maximum widthof some 13.5nautkaI miIes.Nicaragua
considersthat,asthereare nocays onthebank,* ifhas no relevance
for the maritime delimitationto be etTectedbetween herselfand
Colombia. Nomare would haveto be saidabout Quitasuefiow, ereit
not far the fact thaColombia in the past bas takenan equivocal
psilion inrespect of thisbank- Far instance,in an Exchange of
358See,foinstance,SailingDirecfiu(Enroure)Caribbean Sea;Vui.2,Fifrk
Ediaioll(Defense MappingAgency, 1995), p. 105;East Coastsof Central
Americaand Gulf ofMexico Pilot;We~ternCaribbean Sea and theGulfof
Mexico from Pmra Tirbi toCap Sable inclridingYucatarCh~nnel; second
editio(HydrographeroftheNavy, 19931,p.56. .-
Notes in connection wirh the Treaty concerning rhe statusof Quita
Suefio, Roncador and Serrana of 8 September 1972 between the
United Statesand ~olornbia, the latter indicated that the 'physical
status of Quita Sueio is not incompatible with the exercise of
sovereignty'.'69On the other.hand,the Unired States indicat iesd
legalposition tobe that 'QuiraSuefio, being permanently submerged
at high tide, isat the present time not subject to the exercise of
sovereignty'.370The United States gave a more detailed view on the
status of Quitrtwefio in a Note fr-omthe Secretary of State to the
Nicaraguan Ambassadorin Washirlgton of 6 December 197 1.This
Note, responding to urgent demands from Nicaragua, which
considered that the negotiations between the United States and
Colombia over Roncador, Serrana and Quitasueiioaffected itrights,
observes rhat the United States Government had investigated the
1rahra1 condition of the Quitasuefio bank and had come to he
conclusion that the bank was permanently submerged in high tide.
. .
Thereforeconsidered the Quitasuefio bank as part ofthe high seas
and norsubject ru any cIaimof sovereigntybyany State.
3.124 Nicaragua cansistentIy sought to obtain an assurance from the
United States thather titletothe cays on the banksof Roncador and
Serranaand her rights over thecontinental shelf, including the areas
of these banks and that ofQuitasuefiu wouId not be prejudiced by rhe
co~rclusionand ratification ofthe 1972Treaty between the United
States and Colombia. In response, the United States issued various
36SeeNM, Vol. 11Annex33b TIAS 10120.
37See NM, Vol.11,Annex33a.TIASII..012,. statementsindicatingthatthBq872 Treatyis withoutprejudice to the
Nicaraguanposition. 371 .,.
..'L,.
3.125 There is a lighthouse on the bank of ~uitasueiio."~ However, a
Iighthouse does not possess the status of an isIandand does not have
a territorialsea of itsown, nordoes itaffectthe delimitationof the
territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental
shelf.373
3.126 If the Court were to find that there are features on the bank of
QuitasueHothatqualifyas islandsunder internationallaw, theCourt
is requestedto findthatsovereignty overthemrestswithNicaragua,
for the same reasons as setout above for the cays Iyingon Roncadw
and~tn-ana.~'~ In the maritime delimitation between Nicaraguaand
Colombia, the same considerations would applyas set out below in
subsection C fortheothercaysconcerned.
"'See fr~rrheNM, Chap. 11,paras.2.158-2.178.
37ThroughanExchangeof Notes in connectionwith theTreatyconcerning the
statusof Quita Sueiio, RoncadorandSerrana of 8 September1972betweenthe
UnitedStatesandColombia, the UnitedStatesagreed to grantin perpetuityto
Colombiatheownership ofthe lighthouseon Quitasuefio(NM, Vol. 11,Annexes
32b. 32a). The United States indicated that this granr was subject to the
understandingthatitwas withoutprejrrdicero itslegalpositionthatQuitasuefio,
being pemarre11t1ysubn~erged at high ridewas not subjectto theexercise of
sovereignty.
373UnitedNationsConventionon the Law of the Sea, article60(8), refersto
artificialislands,installatandstructures generally.Article60(8)is reflective
of customary internationalaw.
37See furtherNM, Chap.IT, Sec.III.Srrbsec.A. C. THE WEIGHT OFTHE CAYS IN TFE MARITIMD EELIMITATT OETWEEN
NICARAGU AND COLOMBIA
3.127 Nicaragua holds that all of the cays concerned, dueto theirsize,
locationand other characterisrics,donot have to be accordedany
weigh1inestablishingthe maritimetj~undary betweenNica~aguaand
Colombia.Incase thecays areNicaraguan,giving no weightto them
impliesthat they are included in the maritimezones of Nicaragua
generatedby her othercoasts.
3.128 Any caythat were tobe found to beCoIon~bianhas to beenclaved in
the maritime zones of Nicaragua. As will be recalled, Nicaragua
submits thatmaritime delimitationlaw prescribesthatthe islands of
San Andres and Providencia,'ifthey wcre found to be Colombian,
have robeenclavedin themaritimezonesof Nicaraguabydrawing a
12nautical mile limit arounthem.
3.129 As far as the cays are concerned, even an enclavernent in a 12
1rautica1mile limitwonId give them a disproportionate effecand
led toan inequitab1~result. This can beiiiusrraby an example. A
hypotheticalisland,consistingof a singlepoint, beyond 24 nautical
miles from any other baseline,has a 12 nautical mile zone of over
450 square nauticaI miles. Thisstands in sharp contract with a
(mainland) coast,which is formed by a straight Iinc. In this cite,
takesa stretchof more than 37 nautical milesto generatethe same
areaof territorisea.375As was setout above, almost alof the cays
underconsideration inthissection areatmore than 24 ~larrticalmiles
fromother coasts.Only a 12 nauticalmile encIavearound theCayus
375Seealsothe illustratincludedi,NM,Vol.I,FigureIV. .,&?"_
de Albuquerqueandthe Cayosdel Este Sudesteoverlapsto a Iiinited
extend with a 12nautica .,milezone a>::>., the islandof SanAndres.
, -
This implies that 12 nautical mile endaves around allof these cays
qua1 an area of fhonsands of square nautical miles.Obviorrsly, this
cannot be anequitableresult,takinginto account the overaIIcoastal
relationshipbetween Nicaraguaand Colombia.
3.130 Nicaraguaconsiders that the only possibIeequitablesolution for the
cays, incase they were to bc found to be Colombian, is to deIirnita
maritime boundarybydrawing a3 nautical mileenclave aroundeach
individual cay. This would give each of these small cays a maritime
area of more than 28 squarenautical miles. There can be no doubt
that this is an equitable resulr, ifthe size of this maritimearea is
compared to the sizeof thecays.
There islittleprecedentthat isdirectlyof relevance for thistype of
encIaving of srnaII cays. There is no want of case law and stare
practice that have cornpIetely ignored minor insular features in
establishing maritime boundaries. However, in general, such features
are located on the same side of the maritime boundary as the other
~erritorieof rhe sovereignconcerned. In thesecases there is no need
to address the maritime boundary around such features separate1y.
Nonetheless, there are a number of examples inthe case law, which
indicate that, in order to achieve an equitable result, it is not
necessary to give minorfeatures a full 12nautical mile territorialsea,
even in cases ir dues not overlap with the territoria1sea of Iarger
islandsor mainland.
I 3.132 In the Case concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial
Qaesrionsbetw~enQatar and B~hraifi the Con~rhad roconsidertheweight to be accordedro the verysmaIIisIand of Qir'atJaradah. The
Judgment of the Court of 16 March 2001 observes in this
connection:
"219. The rlextquestion 15be consideredis thatof Qit'ar
Jaradah. The Court observes thatQit'arJaradah isa very
small isIand,uninhabited and withont any vegetation.
This tiny island,which-asthe Court has determined (see
paragraph 197 above)-comes under Bahraini
sovereignty, is situated about midway between the main
islandof Bahrain and theQatar peninsul Co.sequently,
ifirslow-water Iine were.'ro be used for determi~ringa
basepoinrin the constmctiun of the equidisranceIine,
and this Iine taken as Ithe deIin~itation Iine, a
disproportionate effect would be given to an
insignificant maritimefeature(..).
In similar situations the Court has sometimesbeenled to
eliminate the disproporrionatecffecr of smaII islands
(see NorthSetr CortbinenralShe& f;.C.R.rporfs1969,p.
36, para. 57; Cmrinentaf Sheg (Libyan Arab
Jumuhiriycr/Malta), Judgment, IC.J. Reports 1985, p.
48, para.64) . he Court thus finds that there is a special
circumstance in this case warranting the choice of a
delimitation Iine passing immediately to the east of
Qir'atJaradah.
220. The Court observed earIier (see paragraph 216
above) that,since it didnot determine whether Fasht al
Azm is part of Sitrah island or a separate low-tide
elevation, it is necessary to draw provisionally two
equidistance linesIf no effectis given toQit'atJaradah
and in he event that Fasht alAzm is considered to be
pan of Sitrahisland,the equidistance linethus adjusted
cuts through FashtadDibaI leaving the greaterpartof it
on the Qatari side. If, however, Fasal:Azmis seen as a
low-tide elevation. the adjusted equidistance line runs
west of Fasht ad Dibal.In view of the fact thatunder
borh hypotheses, Fasht ad DibaI is IargeIyor rutallyon
the Qarari side of the adjusted equidistar~ceIine, the
Couri considers itappropriateto draw the boundary Iine
between Qit'atJaradahandFasht ad Dibal. As Fasht ad
Dibal thus is situated inthe territorial sea ofQatar, it
256 ., ,r;
3 ';.'*i.
1 '
fallsforthatreasonundii7hesovereignty of thatState.
I-..)
222. Taking account-of allof the foregoing, theCourt
decides that, frum the point of intersectionof the
respectivemaritime Iirnits ofSaudi Arabia on the one
handand of Bahrain and Qatar on the other, which
cannot be fixed, the boundary will foIIow a north-
easterlydirection,thenimmediately turnin an easterly
direction,aftewhichit will passbetween Jazimt Hawar
and Janan:itwill subsequentlyturnto thenorthand pass
between theHawarIslands and the Qatarpeninsu ana
continue ina northerIy direction, Icavinthe low-ride
elevationof Fasht BuThus, and Fasht aIAzm, on the
Bahrainiside, and the low-tideelevations of Qita'ael
Erge and Qit'atashShajarah on theQatariside;finallyit
will pass between Qit'at Jaradah and Fasht ad Dibal,
leavingQit'atJaradah on theBahrainisideand Fmhr ad
Dibal ontheQafariside."
The delimitationeffected by the Court resuItsinan area Iying only
within12 nauticalmiles of Qit'at Jaradah,which island falls under
thesovereignty of Bahrain,being attributdto
3.133 The Gcsi~edGuinea-Bissa~ alrbitratioprovidesn furtherillustration
of the fact thasmallisletsmaynot be givena full 12nauticalmile I
territo reaaeven if thisterritoriaseadoes notoverlapwith the I
* Itcanbe noted thatthis area iswifhin I2nauticamilesof the low-tide
elevationof FashtadDibat.However,in respectofthislow-tideelevationthe
Court,afteradiscussionof thstatusof low-tidelevationsunderinternational
law observes:
"209.The Court,conseqtrentIy,iofthe viewthatin
thepresencase thereis ngroundfor recognizingthe
righof Bahrainto usas aheli nethe low-waterIirre
of those low-tideelevationswhinresituatedinthe
zone ofoverlappingclaims,orforrecognizingQatar
as having such a right. The Court accordingly
condndes that for the purposw of drawingthe
equidistancline, wch low-tideelevationsmust be
disregarded," territorial seof other coasrs. The ~nartiime boundary esrablished by
the Court of Arbitration granted the isIet of AIcatraz only a 2.25
nautical mile maritime belt of territorialea to the north. The Court
of Arbitration found it eq.itable to grant Alcatraza 12nautical mile
territaria1 sea to the wesr. Howeyer, this cancession was made
withouttaking into accountany reefs."' In orher words,even to the
west of Alcatraz, where it faces the open ocean, the Court of
Arbitration considered thatan equitable delimitation had toresult in
limiting theexte~rtof theterritoria1seaof Alcatsaz.
3.134 Statepr-acticeoffersabundantevidenceofthefactthat,inorderto
arrive at an equitable resultan entitlement of one State that does not
overlap with a similar entitlement of another State nonethelesscan
be curtailed. This concerns, for instance, any biIatera1 delimitation
agreement that arrives at rheouter Iimitsof the maritimewnes of the
States concerned at a point that is not equidistantfrom the relevant
baselinesof both States. 378An example of such a delimitation is
formed by the Agreementbetweenthe Governmentof Argentina arld
the Government of Chile reIating to the Maritime DeIirnitation
between Argentina and Chile of 29 November 1984."' The
boundaryruns along a meridianup to the outer limit ofthe exclusive
economic zones of both States.Article 7 of theAgreement provides
that the ChiIean excIusive economic zone is aIso bounded by this
meridianin the area where it does not overlap with the exclusive
economic zone of Argentina., An example of a territorial sea
delimitationinvolvingthis issue is provided by theProtocol berween
theGovernment of the RepubIic of Turkey and the Government of
377G~inedG~irzea-Bism arbitratio, ward of 14February 1985, para.I11a).
378For agraphicillustratingthissituitionsee NM,Vol1,Figure V.
379
Lawofthe Sea BulletinNo.4 (1985), p.50.
258 theUnion of Soviet ~ociaiibi'~e~c ubncerning theTerritorial
Sea Boundary betweentheTwo State.s,the Black Seaof 17April
z.*. +,-b
1973.~ A ~mtowl-Descripfion~~ 'rawnupinconnection with the
Protocoldefinesthererrirori1 eauptaapointthar is onIywithin TZ
nauticalmiles of the basdine of Turkey, but beyond 12 nautical
milesofthe baselineof theformerSoviet~nion.~**
3.135 Colombiaherself has taken the positionthatno weight has tobe
given to small isIets in connectionwith the deIimi~ationof her
maritimeboundary with Venezuela inthe Gulf ofVenezueIaand
outside of the Gulf in the CaribbeanSea. Colombia bordersthe
northwestentranceof the Gulfof Venezuela and Venezuela borders
therestof theGuIf.The Iand boundarybetween both Sratesreaches
theGulf of Venezuela at CastiIletatthe northwesternshoreof the
Gulf. At the entranceof theGulf of Venezuela, beyond the 12
nauticalmileterritorilea ofthe mainlandcoasts of bothStates,lie
Los Monjes, n number of srnaIIislets under thesovereigntyof
Venezuela.Los MonjesareIocated19 nauticalmiIesfromColombia
and 41.5nauticalmilesfrom themainland of Venezuelaepposi tethe
Colombian coast. Colombia has submittedthat the maritime
boundary between herselfand Venezuelahasfobeanequidismce
line between the mainland mass, mq1~rely disregarding Los
~onjes."' Such an equidistanceline placesthese Venezuelanislets
w1UNTSVol ,340,No. 4475.
Protocol-lhaiptionoftheCourseof tkeSoviet-Turkih enBoudaq Line
1 bawmn theTerritotiSeasoftheUnion ofSovia SocialistRepubIiandthe
a 32publicofTurkeyintheBlackSeaof II September1980.
J.I.Charney and L.M. Alexander,Intematw~~~l MaritimeBoundaries,
Dordrecht1993,p. 1682.
38See,for instance,tLetteroftheMinisterof ForeignAffairofColombia
of16August1987 tothisVe~lezutIacounterpar(NM,VoI. 11,Annex43; or insiderhe maritimezonesof Colombia, not according them any be11
of territor-iaIsat
3.136 In conclusion, Nicaragua holds that the maritime delimitation the
Courtis requested to effect shouldnot give any weight to the small
cays scarreredthroug~~orrrthwesrernpart of thedelimitation area. In
case the cays are Nicaraguanrhe cays arelocated on the Nicaraguan
side ofthe median line maritime boundary proposed by Nicaragua.
In this case, the cays aincludedin themaritime zonesof Nicaragua
generatedby her other coasts. In case any ofthecays were found to
be Colombian,such cays would be simated on the wrong side ofrhe
median line maritime boundary proposedby Nicaragua. In this case,
the solutionshould be to draw a 3 nautical mile enclavaround such
cays. If thCourt were to find that there are features the bankof
Quirasuefio rhat qualify as isIands under internationa1law, in the
maritime delimitation between Nicaragua and Colombia the same
considerations as set oufor theother caysconcerned would apply to
such islands.
Note D.M. 01851of the Ministerof Foreign Affairsof Colombiato the Minister
ofForeignAffairsofVenezuela of 15September I993 (NM, VoI .TI, nnex48)
" Fora graphicillustratingthe delimitationline resultingftheColombian
positioseeNM,Vol. I,FigureVI. +L
XII.Conclusions
- f -.LC
3.137 In cases involvingmulti-purposedelimitation,the Cour-shouldaim
at an equal divisionof areaswhere the maritimeprojections of the
coasts of the Statesbetween which delimitationis to be effected
converge. The jurisprudence of the Court provides ample
mfirmation that the principle of quai division applies in
.delimitationofasinglemaritime boundary.
3.138 The coastsdefiningthedelirntationarea(seeVolume I, Figure I) for
present purposesareas follows:
(a) Themainland coastof Nicaragua fromtheterminus ofthe
land bwndrtry with Honduras (in the noflh) to the
terminusof the land boundary with Cesra Rira {inthe
south),
{b) The mainland c-I of CoIornbia opposite thecoast of
Nicaraguaa,ndfrontingon thesame maritime areas-
3.139 Thisassessmentis not substantiallaffectedbythe questionwhether
San Andres and itdependencies are determinedto beNicaraguan or
Colombian. Even ifforthe sakeofargument, theSanAndres goup
were determined to beColombian, the consequencesof such a
determinationwould not affect the essential geographical
relationshiof themainlandcoastsof theParties.3.140 The equidistance line which results from application oftheprinciple
ofequal division is provisionaIin the sense ahat itissubject to a
process of adjustment resulting from any relevant circumstances. In
the circumstances of the present case there is no legal basis for the
adjustmentof the median line.
3.14I The relevant equitablcriteria confirmthe equitable character ofthe
resulting median line. The relevant criteria are: the incidence of
natural resources in the disputed arethe principleof equal accessto
the natural resources of the disptlred area, and securiry
considerations.
3.142 In the present case the test of proportionality does not reveal any
necessity for correction of thmedian line.
3.143 In case the Court finds that Colombia has sovereig~ltyin respecrof
the islandsof San Andres and Providencti hase islands should be
enclaved and accorded a territorialseaentitlement of twelve nautical
miles, thisbeing the appropriateequitable soIution justified by the
geographical and IegaIframework.
3.144 The Republic of Nicaragua has sovereigntyover the following cays:
the Cayos de Albuquerque; theCayos de Este Sudeste; the cay of
Runcador; North Cay, Southwest Cay and any other cays on the
bankof Serrana;East Cay, Beacon Cay and any other cays on the
bank of Serranilla;and Low Cay and any other cays on the bank of
BajoNuevo.
3.145 If the Courr were to find thar there are features on the bank of
Quirasueiio thatqualifyas islands under inremariona1Iaw, the Court
is requested tofindthat sovereignty over them rests with Nicaragua.
252 ,.'.
3.146 Nicaragua holdsthat allof'tk cays concerned due totheirsize,
locationandothercharacteristicshould not beaccorded anyweight
in establishingthe maritime boundarybetween Nicaraguaand
Colombia. In casethe cays are Nicaraguan, giving no wight to
hrn implies that they are included in the maritime zones of
Nicaraguagenerated by her othercoasts.
3,147 If any of the cays were determined tobe Coiornbian, such cays
wouldbe accordedenclavesin accordam with the principlesof
maritimedelimitation. Nicaraguaconsiders thatthe only possible
equitable solutionforthe caysin thecase theywereto be found to
be CoIornbian,is to delimita ma~i~ime boundary by drawing a 3
nauticalmile enclavearound them. SUBMISSIONS
i Having regard to the legal considerationsand evidence set forrh in this
I
! Memorial: Mayit please theCourt toadiud~eand declare that:
(1) the Republicof Nicaragua has sovereigntyover the islandsof San
Andres, Providencia, and Santa Catalina and the appurtenant
isletsand cays.
(2) the Republic of Nicaragua has sovereignty over the following
cays: the Cayos de Albuquerque; the Cayos del Este Sudeste; the
Cay of Roncador; North Cay, SouthwestCay and any other cays
on the bank ofSerrana;EastCay,BeaconCay and anyother cays
on the bankof Serranilla;and Low Cay and anyother cays on the
bankof BajoNnevo.
(3) if the Court were to find that there are features on the bank of
Quitasuedo that qualify as isia~ldsunder international law, the
Court isrequested tofind that sovereignty over such features rests
with Nicaragua.(4) the Barcenas-Esguena Treaty signed in Managua on 24 March
1928 was nor IegaIIyvalid and,in particular, did not provide a
legalbasis forColombianclaims toSanAndres and Providencia.
(5) in case rhe Court were Lofind thattheBarcenas-EsguerrT areaty
had been validly concInded, then the breach of this Treaty by
Colombia entitled Nicaragua todeclareits termination.
(6) in case theCourt were to find thathe Barcenas-EsguerraTreaty
had been vaIidIy concluded and werc still in force, then to
determine that thisTreaty did notestablisha delimitationof the
maritime areasalongthe82"meridianof longitudeWest.
(7) in case theCourt finds thatCoIombia hassovereigntyin respecr
of the islandsof San AndresandProvidencia,these islands be
enclaved and accorded a territorialsea entitlementof twelve
rniIes,rhis being thappropriateequitabIesoIutionjustifiedby rhe
geographical and IegaIframework.
(8) the equitablesolutionforthecays, in case theywereto be found
to be Colombian,is todeIimit a rnariti~neboundarybydrawing a
311auticamile enclave arorrndthem.
(9) theappropriate form of delimitation,withinthe geographicaland
legalframeworkcunstitutedbythe mainland coasrs of Nicaragua
265andColombia,is a single maritimeboundatheform ofa
medianlinebetweedthemainlancoasts.
TheHague,28 April2003.
CarlosJ. ARG~ELL GO6mz
AgentoftheRepubliofNicaragua LISTOF MAPS AND FIGURES
FIGURES
FIGUREI Thedelimitatiarea.
FIGUREI1 ThirpartyExclusivEconomicZone.
FIGURE111 ThepositioofrelevantcaandisIers.
FIGURE TV The effectsmalcays.
FIGURE V The effeofanonequidist manrtimeboundaron
! the territorialsea.
FIGURE VI MaritimboundaryintkeGuiof Venezuelaadvocafecl
byColombia.
FIGUREVII ColombianExclusivEconomicZoneclaim
MAP
MAP1 Historimapofthearea. LISTOF DOCUMENTSDEPOSITED
WITH THE REGISTRY
Document 1 Memorandum from the Minister of ForeigAfhirsof
CoIornbia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Nicaragua.5 November 1915.
Document 2 DiplomaticNote from the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of ~kara~ua to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Colombia. 20 March 1917.
Document 3 DipIol catote from theMinister of ForeigAffairs
of CoIombia to the Ministerof Foreign Affairs of
Nicaragua.24 June1918.
Document4 DiplomaticNote from the Ministerof Foreign Affairs
of Nicaragua to the Minisrerof Foreign Affairs of
Colombia. 10 September 9I9.
Document5 Memorandum explanatoryof thecontroversybetween
Nicaragua and Colombia on the Dominion of San
AndresIslands,from theMinistryof Foreign Affairof
Nicaragua tothe ~ecrktar~ofStateof theUnitedState
ofAmericaof 24 March 1924. LIST OFANNEXES
(VOLUME 11[)
ANNEX 1 The Councilof StatatAranjuez . May I792 I
.......................
ANNEX 3 Disswutionon thetripmadeby ShipLieutenant
ofthe RoyalNavy JosedelR iototheIsIandsofSan Andres,
SantaCatalim,Pruvidenciaand Mangles,on theMosquito
Coast .5August 1973and documents related 'i
..................
ANNEX 4 RoyalOrderof 6 November 1795...........................................
I ANNEX 5 Reportsissuedby theJuntaofFortificationsanDefense....,lI
ANNEX 6 NotificationotheRoyalOrderof 20November 1803 to
theCaptain-Generalof GuatemaIaandm the Viceroyof
SantaFe................................................
.......................
ANNEX 7 RoyalOrder ofSan Ildefonsoof8August 1804.-----..-h--.-----
I TREATIES
i
ANNEX 11 Article1oftheConventionbetweenGreat Britaiand Spin
relativtoAmerica.SignedarLondon, the 14thofduIg,
17%- -.----**-**---*---------+-*-------------------37-
ANNEX12 TreatyofPeace,Friendshipa,ndAlliancebetweenHis
BritannicMajestyandHis CatholiMajesty Ferdinand
VU.Signed atLendon,14thJanuary, 1809 ......................
ANNEX13Articles I and2of theTreatyof Pace andFriendship
betweenSpain andNicaragua Signe dtMadridd, ul25,
18% --*----...----..----...---------------------------.----.----.-----.
ANNEX 14 Article1oftheTreatyktween GreatBritainandNicaragua,
relativtotheMosquito Indiansand totheRightsand Claims
of BritishSubjects.SignatManagua, January28, 1860---.45 ANNEX 15Treatyof Peace and Frie~rdshipbetween Spain and
CoIornbia. Signed atParis,January 30,1881 .--.-.----._-----__---
ANNEX16 Article2 of the Treatybetween GreatBritainandthe
Republicof Nicaragua,with regard totheMosquito
Territory.Signeat Managua, 19April 1905 --...-+--..----49.........
ANNEX 17 ArticIe3of theTreaty fortheSertlementof Differer~ces
Arisingourof the eventswlrichtook pIaceon the
Isthmusof Panama in November, 1903.Signed ar
Bogota Apil 6, 1914 51
ANNEX 18Arrangement between the United Stateand Colombia
respectingthe statusof SerranaandQuita Suefiobanks
and Roncadorcay,effectedbyexchangedof notes
53
aprill0,1928
ANNEX19Tnstnrmen otf Ratificatiand Protocol of
Exchangeof Ratificationsof theTreaty between
Nicaragua andColombia, signed at Managua,
24March1928(BarcenasEsguerraTreaty) 55
ANNEX 20ArticIeI of theDelimi tatioTreaty af Marineand Srlbrnari~re
Areas and MaritimeCooperation between theRepublic
ofColombia and theRepublicof CostaRica. Signed
at SarJose,7 March 1977 ...............................61......................
AWARDS
ANNEX 21 Award inthe Arbitration otheBoundary Dispute
between rhe RepnbIics ofCwla Rica and CoIornbia.
(LoubetAward). I1 September1900 .....................65...............
ANNEX22Awardin theArbitration of the BoundaryDispute
between theRepublicsof Costa Ricaand Panamaof
March 17.1910.Washington,September12, 1914 .-----__-_7--
DIPLOMATICCORRESPONDENCE
ANNEX23Memorandum fromthe Minister of ForeignAffairs
of Colombiato the MinisterofForeignAffairsof Nicaragua.
5 November 19 15.-------------......-....---------------------------------
ANNEX24DiplomaticNo~effrLor nheMinisterofForeignAffairs
of Nicaraguaro theMinisterofForeignAffairsof
Colombia. 20 March 1917 ---...----...----...--"---------3-.--- ANNEX ZDiplomaticNote from theMinisterof ForeignAffairs
ofColombia to theMinisterofForeignAffairs of
Nica~a- 24 June1918+:::i:- :..........................3.........
ANNEX26Diplomatic Note from the MinisterofForeignAffairs
of NicaraguatotheMinisterof ForeignAffairsof
Colombia. I0September 1919...........................5..........
I
ANNEX 27DiplomaticNote from theMinisterof ForeignAffaires
ofColombia to theMinisteorfForeign Affairsof
Ni=ra%ua* 6 Augus1 1925 .........................................
ANNEX 28DiplornaicNote N. 092.From theAmbassador of
Colombia toNicaragua, to thMinisterofForeign
AffairsofNicaragua - June 1969.-----------.****-.-**.101
ANNEX29Diplomatic Note N. 0021.From the Ministeof
ForeignAffairsofNicaragua tothe Ambassador of
i Colombia toNicar~m. I 2June 1969 ...................107..............
ANNEX30Diplornaci Ncote N.0197F .rom the Minister of
ForeignAffairsofColombia totheMinisterof
ForeignAffairsofNicaragua2 .2 September1969 +-..-++++111*=-++
ANNEX 3lMemrandurn N. 026.From theMinistry ofFmign
AffairsofNicaragua totheStateDepartmentof he
UnitedStatesof America.23 Jatre1971....-.............1....-..
ANNEX 32Exchange sf NotesbetweentheUnited Statesand
Colombiarelated tothelighthouseenQuitaSueho
and thenavigationalbeaconson Runcadorand
Serrana - September1972-+_*
+* ---+--------++---+117--
Annex32 ~DipIornaticNurfrr693.From theEmbassy of?% U~ifed
SmtesofAmerica theMinisterofForeignAflairof
cal~mbh--...........................................f.7.....
.........
Annex32 bDipIomaticNoteN. 482.FromtheMinisrv ofFamignAgain
ciCfolombiato heAmhssrrdur nfrheUdied Stateof'
A~~T~C Q0c5J~mbi~...*................................................................
ANNEX 33Exchanges ofNatesbetweenthe United StatesandColombia
(legal position)aboutQuita SueHoRoncadar and Serrana.
8September 1972 ....................................12......................
Am 33rrDiphuf icNoteN.694 Fm the Enbossyofrh~Unifed
Smes ofAmerica totheMinistryofForeignAfiirs
0fCdombia "-*----------------**-*Q.QQ.-------------f2J
Annex33b Diplomtic NoteN. 484.From TheMinisiryof ForeignAfluirs
ofCobnabin totilEmbassyoftile UniteStatesoAmerica---..l23ANNEX 34Diplomatic Note N. 053. From [heMinister of Foreign
Affairs ofNicaragua to the Minister oForeign Affairs of
Cojombia. 7 October 1972 ................................125....................
ANNEX35Diplomatic Note N. 054.From theMinister of Foreign
Affairsof Nicaragua tothe Secretaryof Statcof theUnited
States ofAmerica. 7 October 1972 ...,..,----------------129-----------
ANNEX 36DipIo1naitc Note N. 68,682 - PE.From the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica tthe Ambassador
of Nicaragua to Costa Rica. 18 October 1972 133
ANNEX 37DiplornaticNote N. 100172F . rom the Ambassador
of Nicaragua to rhcDominican Republic to the
Secretary ofState ofForeign Affairsof theDominican
Republic.20 October 19-72................................135...................
ANNEX 38Diplomatic Note N. G 724. From the Ambassador
of Nicaragua to Guatemala tothe Ministerof Foreign
Affairs4f Gnaten-~aI2a. October 1972---...--L.........--137----------_
ANNEX39DipIomaticNorefrom the Ministerof Foreign Affairs
of Guatemala to theAmbassadorof Nicaragua to
&latemala. 14 November 1972 ..----...---.....---.----.-139--.-.--....--..,-
ANNEX 40Diplomatic Note D-571. Fromthe Minister of
Foreign Affairsof Colombia tothe Ministerof
Foreign Affairsof Nicaragua. 20 October 1976 _----------. ......
, .
ANNEX 41DiplomaticNote N. 027. From the Ministry of Foreign
Affairsof Nicaraguato the Embassyof the United
Statesof America to Nicaragua. 4 February 198 1.---..----1--3-
ANNEX42DipIornariN c ote A.M.D.G. N.0294-81. From the
Ambassador of Nicaragua to Senator Charles Percy.
I4 July 1981 and Proposal of Ratificatio.,----...---...--145----.---..
ANNEX43DiplomaticNotefrom theMinisterof Foreign
Affairsof Colombia to the Minister of Foreign
Affairsof Venezuela. 16 August 1987 .-------__ --.-..-----149
ANNEX 44Diploma~ic Note N.930150.From theMinisterof
ForeignAffairsof Nicaragua to the Ministerof
Foreign Affairsof Colombia.1I June 1993 .,----...--...---.51..----
ANNEX45DiplomaticNote N.930 158.From the Actidg Minister
ofForeign Affairs of Nicaraguato the MinisLerof
ForeignAffairsof Colombia. 9 July 1993 ......------_------53------ ANMX 46 DiplomaticNote fromtheMinisterof Foreign
AffairsofC.olombiatothe.MinisreorfForeign
Affairsof Nicaragua.9 .Jly1993.............--.--..--155
ANNEX 47DiplomaticNote N.93 064.From theMinister
of ForeignAffairof NicaraguatorheMinister
I of ForeignAffairsofColombia.26July 1993 ............157.........
!
ANNEX4SDiplomati c otefromthe Ministerof Foreign
Affairesof Colombiatothe Ministerof
ForeignAffairsofVenezuela. 15September I993.........I59.....
ANNEX 49DjplomticNote N.DM. f~Ilei le) 0334From
theMinistryof ForeignAffairof Colombia tothe
Ministryof ForeignAffairof Nicaragua.3April1995 ....161*
ANNEX SDDiplomatiN coteN. 950151.From theMinistryof
Foreign AffairsoNicaraguatotheMinistry of
I Foreign AffairofColombia. 4 April1995............................
ANNEX SlDiplomaticNote 950162.From theMinisterofForeign
Affairsof NicaraguatotheMinisterofForeignAffairs
ofColombia- 5April 1995,-............................65..........
ANNEX 52DiplomaticNote N. 950459.From theMiniam of Foreign
AffairsofNicaragua toThe MinisterofForeignAffairsof
c~l~~bia- 9 ~c~~berlg%.m..MM .....m..................6.......
ANNEX5SDiplomati coteN. DM. VA.0043 13.From the
Ministryof ForeignAffairof Colombia tothe
Ministryof ForeignAffairsofNicaragua.
29 Januar~1r9% .....................................1.9................
ANNEX54DiplomaticNote N. 97006 1From theMinistryof
ForeignAffairsofNicaragua to thMinistryof
ForeignAffairsofColombia.1 1 February1997 ---_------171----+++
ANNEX55Diplornatic NoteN. 37678.Fromrhe Ministerof
ForeignAffairsofCoiombia to theMinisterof
ForeignAffairsofNicaragua. 18JuIy1997 ,.............1.3.....
ANNEX 56DiplornaticNoteN. 9700532.From theMinister
of ForeignAffairof Nicaraguatothe Ministeof
ForeignAffairsof CoIornbia.I3August IWJ --_--_____-_175__+-___
[
t ANNEX 57DiplumaticNote N. 9700765.From thfMinistryof
ForeignAffairsofNicaraguato theMinistryof
Foreign AffairsoColombia.30 October1997 ...........177........ ANNEX 58DipIomaticNoreMRE199100093 .rom the
Ministry ofForeign Affairsof Nicaraguato the
Embassyof ColombiatoNicaragua.23February1999-.._--1 -.9
ANNEX 59DiplomaticNoteMREIDM-JII 703112/02.Fromthe
Minister ofForeignAffairs of Nicaragua toThe Minister of
Foreign Affairsof CoIurnbia.16 December 2002......-------81__
NICARAGUANLEGISLATION
ANNEX 6OPoliticaCl onstitutionof Nicaragua.......................185.............
Anaex 60 uArticle2 ofrkePdiricnlConsrirurioof
Nh~agaa of12November1838 ---------__-_......-.-185
Annex60 b Ar~irlef ofthePoIiricalCo~sriruriof
Mcarq~~ ofKJAugusf 1858 .----..-----.----L.....-185----...--..---.
ANNEX 61DecreeestablishingthatonlytheAuthoritiesof the
Republic shallexercisejurisdictionovertheIslands
of theAflanficCoast- 1%March 18% ------.__-_---.....".-87
ANNEX 62Decrees relatingtoCorn IsIands. 18March 890 .-.-------------
ANNEX63GeneralLawOntheExploitationof Natural
Resources3 Decree N-3 16 .-...------...----...LLL-..-----191---.-.---..----.---,.
ANNEX 64SpecialLawon the OilExploration and Exploitation,
Decr-eeN- 37'2.--* I95
ANNEX6SLirnitsEstabIishedfor-NationalFishingZone,
DecreeN. 1-L .---,-.----....-.-..-----...------.------.----.-.L--....-.-..---...---..
---
ANNEX66Law OnThe ContinentalShelfAnd Adjacent Sea,
Act N. 205 ...----.----------..-*-------------...---.----203.-...----------
ANNEX67LawonMaritime Areas of Nicaragua, Law N. 420 ........,207--.
BOOKS
ANNEX68R. S. Pereira, ocumentus sobre10sLimites de 10s
Esracios Uaidu se Columbia qiadus de bs
origilrks qlrese encuenrrmen d Archivode Ia&s
de ~e~j~~ ~883,F. 1% ..................................213......................
ANNEX69M.M.Peralta, Jurisdiction Territorialedla
Rbpublique de Costa-Rica,Paris.1899, p.46, para.47 215 ANNEX TOJ.J.Parsons,St1Andrgs y Pruvidtacia:una Geogmfis
Hstbricadelas islacolombianas delCaribe.El Ancora
Editores..956p. 117.-.:=........................................................
ANNEX7lMinisterio de RelacionesExterioreInfonnedel Miaistro
de ReiacionesExteriorea! Congresn de 1930.BogotB.
t Imprenm NacionaI.1930 pp-2 12-213,223............................
!
ANNEX 72A. Man tielArgiieilo,Arficufuss& Derecho $el Mar.
Pub1icacionesdelMin isterideRelacionesEx teriores.
ManaguaN , icaragua1971.pp.94- 95..................2.........
ANNEX 73MinisteriodelExterior.WhitePaper (LibroBlancosobre
efcaso deSafiAndris yProvidencia).4 de Febsero1980
*pp 1.-3, 14-22---*.----.-.-------*---.-*---------------+-+.--
ANNEX 74G. Facio.ElDqerendo enlreNicaraguay Colombia
sobre elArchipi6EagodeSariAnclrksy Providencia.
RelacionesInternacionales(EscueladeRelaciones
Internacionales,UniversidaNacionalde Costa
Rica,Hetmedia )981,Afro.2, Num. 1.p.28 -+-._-___-------5++
ANNEX 7fC. Moyano . ldgerendoenrreICfi.earngycr~bmhia
subre elArchipie'IngoeSun Andre'syProvinerzcia.
EstudioHisto'ricJldrCdico la luzdeDerecho
Intemacional.EditoriaTEMIS LibrerC a,ogota,
Colombia.1983.pp. 124-125,525-526..................2.........
ANNEX 76United StatesDepartmentof StatBur~nu of
IntelligenceandResearch .imifsinfieSeas
NO- 10.SrraighrBaeiines: CobmbMM pp.4-6++*____-____+----.-._--
OTHER DOCUMENTS !
I
ANNEX 77Note of Mr.FrederikChatfieldBritishCharge I
i
D'AffairestoCentrstAmerica. ISApril 1847............2.47..
ANNEX %Note from Theuphik Delcns+MinisterofForeignAffairs
ofFranc terhe Ministerof Nicaraguto Paris22 !
October190.0.......................................2.......
...........
ANNEX 79Judgmen otftheSupreme Court ofNicaragua . May I
I
1928.................................................
.......................
I ANNEX 80Minntes ofthe SessionsoftheCha~srbe rftheSenateof
257
Nicmgua. 4 Iind5March 1930-+-------.............................ANNEX 81FormalDeclaration of Sovereig~~ty over "[he banksof
Quitasueiiu, Roncador and Serrana, encIaved i~rour
Con tinenla1Shelf and PatrimoniaISea"Approved by
theNational ConstituentAssemblyof Nicaragua 4
October 1972 .+---...----.--_-....-----...----...----...-.....---26-1..---..---,..---
...L
ANNEX 82s tatement made by theAssistant Secretary of State
for Latin American AffairsWiIIiarnRogersat a
hearing of the SenateForeignRdationsCommittee.
16September 1975-------__--- ......--------__---------. ..-----263
ANNEX83Newspapers 267
Annex 83 a El Tiempo, Bogota, 4July 1 975 ----.---.----...--...----.267-.
Amex 83 b
El Tiempol Bogofa.25 May 978-. ..----...--... ...-----267
Annex83e ElMundo,Medellin12SeptemherIY95 258
Artnex 83 d Ei Tienyo, Bogort~12December 1999. ....------------+--259---
Memorial of Nicaragua