Written Statement of Nauru

COURINTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

MEMOIRES, PLAIDOIRIES ET DOCUMENTS

AFFAIRE DE CERTAINES TERRES

~ A PHOSPHATES À NAURU

(NAURU cAUSTRALIE)

VOLUMEII
Exceplioiisprélimdel'Australie ;expodeNauru

INTERNATIONAI. COURT OF JUSTICE

PLEADlNGS. OKALARGUMENTS. DOCUMENTS

CASECONCERNING

CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS IN.NAURU
1 (NAURU KAUSTRALIA)
l

VOLUME II
I'reliminüry ObjofAustra; WrittStatement of Nauru Référencebrégée.
CLJ Mkmoires,Certainesteruphosphateri Nauru
(Nauru c Australie),IIol.

Abbreviatedrefere'ce
I.C.J Pleadings,CerlairiPhosphateLandsin Nauru
(IVuuruv. AustrnVol.II

Nodevente:
lSSN 0074-4433 Salenumbcr 835 1
ISBN 92-1-070937-3 AFFAIRE DECERTAI-NE SERRES
A PHOSPHATES A NAURU
(NAURUc. AUSTRALIE)

CASECONCERNING
CERTAINPI-IOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU
(NAURU vAUSTRACIA) COUR INTERNATIONDEJUSTICE

MÉMOIRES, PLAIDOIRETDOCUMENTS

AFFAIREDE CERTAINESTERRES

À PHOSPHATES A NAURU

(NAURU c. AUSTRALIE)

VOLUMEII
Exceptions prélidse l'Australie;edeNaururit

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

PLEADINGS, ORAARGUMENTS, DOCUMENTS

CASE CONCERNING

CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS JINNAURU

(NAURUv.AUSTRALIA)

VOLUME 11
PrelirninaryObjections of Australia;Written Statementof Nauru L'affairede C~riuinesterres uphosphates à Naund(Nauru c.Ausirulie), inscrite
au rôle généra l ela Cour sous lenuméro80 le 19mai 1489,a fait l'objet d'un
arrêtrendu le 26juin 1992(Certainesterre àsphosphure.~rI Nauru ('Nauruc. Aus-
~ralie).exceptionspr.kliminaires,nrrêr, 1.1 Recueil1992, p. 240). Ellc cn a ét.4
rayéepar ordonnance de la Cour du 13 septembre 1993, 2 la suite du dksistc-
ment par accord des Parties (Certaines ferres a phosphriresÙ Nauru (Nauru c
dusaralie), C.I.1 Re~usil 1993,p. 322).
Les pièccsde procédurerelatives cette affaire sont publiéesdans l'ordre sui-
vant :

Volume 1 Requêteintroductive d'instancede Nauru; mémoirede Nauru.
Volume JI.Exceptions préliminairesdc l'Australie; expose écritde Nauru sur lçs
exceptions préliminaires
Volume 111 Contre-mémoirede l'Australie; procédureorale sur les exceptions
préliminaires;rkponscs ccritcsaux questions; choix de correspondance; docu-
ment présenté ila Cour.

Au sujet de la reproduction des dossiers, la Cour a décidéque dorenavani,
quel que soit le stade auquel aura pris fin uneafiire, ne devront Etre retenus à
finde publication que les piiccs de procédureécriteet les comptes rendus des
audiences publiques,ainsi que les seuls documents, annexes et correspondance
considéréscomme essentiels a l'illustration de la dicisioii qu'elle aura pEnse.
outre, la Cour a demandéexpressément que, chaque fois que les moyens tech-
niques le permettraient, lcs volumes soient composésde fac-similts dcs pièces
déposeesdevant elle, en l'étatou ellesontCtC produites par les parties.

De ce fait, certaines des piècesreproduites dans la présente éditionont étk
photographiées d'aprélseur présentation originale.
En vue de faciliterl'utilisationde l'ouvrage,outre sa pagination continue habi-
tuelle, le présent volumecomposte, en tant que de besoin, entre crochetssur le
bord intérieurdcs pagcs, l'indication de lpagination onginale des piècesrcpro-
duites et occasionnellement. entre parentheses, la pagination du document
original.
S'agissantdes renvois du Greîfe, les chiffres romains gras iiidique~itle volume
de la présenteédition,s'ilssont immédiatement suivis par une référencedc page,
ccttc rkfircnce renvoie à la nouvelle pagination du volume concerné. En
revanche,les numérosde page qui sont précédé se l'indicationd'une:piècedc
procidure visent la pagination ongtnale de ladite pièceet renvoient donc à la
pagination entre crochets de la piècementionnée
En ce qui concerne lesexposésoraux, Ia pagiiiation originale est prkçédéedu
numéro d'ordredes comptes rendus distribués sousforme niulticopiéeprovisoire
sous la cote CR911-- et, pour les renvois, c'estaussi à la pagination corres-
pondante plack entrc crochets sur le bord intérieur despages qu'il Faudra se
reporter.
Ni la typographie iiila présentatioiinc sauraiclit Etre iitilauxefinsdc I'iii-
terprétation destextes reproduits

La Haye,2003. The casc concerning Certain Phosphate Lands In Nauru (Nauruv. Austrnliu) ,

entered on the Court's General List on 19May 1989under Number 80' was the
subjcct of a Judgment delivered on 26 June 1992(Ceriain PhosphuteLands in
Nauru (Nauru v. Aust mlia), PreliminaryObjeclions, Judgme?~~ ,C I Reports
1992,p. 240).The case was removedfrom thc List by an Order of 13September
1993, followingdiscontinuance by agreement of the Parties (Certain Phosphnte
Lundsin Nauru(Nauru v. Ausirnliu), I.C.1 Reports 1993, p. 322 ).
The pleadingsin the case are being published inthe followingorder :
Volume1.Application instituting proceedingsof Nauru; Mernorial of Nauru.

Volume Il. Prelirninary objections of Australia; written statement of Nauru on
the preliminary objections.
VolumcIII. Counter-Mernorial of Australia; oral arguments on the prelirninary
objections; written replies to questions, selection of correspondence; docu-
ment submitted to the Court.

Regarding the:reproduction of case files, the Cours has decided that hence-
forth, irrespectiveof the stage al which acasc has terminated, publication should
be confined to the written proceedings and oral arguments in the case, together
with those documents, annexes and correspondence considcrcdessential to illus-
trate its decision. The Court has also specificallyrequested that, whenevcr tech-
nically feasible, the volumes should consist of facsirnite versions of the docu-
ments submitted to it, in the form in which theywereproduccd by the parties.
Accordingly,ceriain documents rcproduced in the present volume have beeii
photographed from their original presentation
For case of use, in addition ta the norinal continuous pagination, wherever
neccssary this volume also contains, bctween square brackets on the inner
margin of the pages, the original pagination of the pleadings regroduced and
occasionally,within parenlheses, the paginatioti of the original document.
In referencesby the Rcgistry,bold Roman numeralsare used to referto Vol-

umes of this edition. ifthey are irnnicdiatelyfollowedby a page reference, ihis
rclatesto the new paginaiion of ihe Volumcin questjon. On the other hand. ihe
page nurnbcrs which are precededby a referenceio one of thepleadings relate to
the original pagination of that pleading and accordingly refer to the bracketed
pagination of tliedocunlcnt in question.
In the case of the oral arguments, the originalpàgination 1spreceded by the
number of the verbaliin records as issued in a provisional duplicaied form aiid
carrying the rcference CR911-- and it is also to the corresponding pagination
between squarc brackcts on the inner margin of the pagcs that onc should refer
for al1cross-referenccs.
Nelther the typography nor thc presentation may be used for the purpose of
inicrprctiiig the textsreproduced.

The Hague, 2003. Page

Exceptions préliminaires présenth par l'Australie. Preliminary Objec-
tions Submitted by Australia
Introduction ...........................................

Section 1. Outline of preliminary objections ....................
Section II. Histoy and scope of dispute as outlined by Nauru ......
A. What the dispute covers .............................

B. Time when the dispute arose ..........................
C. Summary ........................................
Sedon III. Schemeof thesePreliminary Objections .............

PARTI.BACKGROUND ....................................
Introduction ..........................................
Chapter 1. Factual and historical background ..................

Section I. Mandate Period ..............................
A . 1914capitulation ................................
B. Grant of Mandate ovcr Nauru ......................
C . The 1919 Agreement ............................
D. Terms of the Mandate .............................
E. Administration of Nauru unde.r the Mandate ............
F. Phosphate rnining under the Mandate ..................
G. Period of the war ................................

Section II. Nauru under thc Trusteeship....................
A. The Trusteeship Agreement .........................
R The administrative syçiem ..........................
C. Royaltiesand economic.advance ......................
D. Progresçin health and cducation .....................
E. Political and administrative advancement ................

Çcction III. Political and economicevolution 1959-1966 .........
A. The resettlement praposals ..........................
3. Changing policies ................................
C. AustralianlNaurian discussions,May-June 1965 ...........
D. The new consititutionalorder ........................
E . The rehabilitation investigations ......................

1. The CSIRO inquiry ............................
2. BPÇ estirnatcs ...............................
3. The Davcy Comini~lec ...........................
4. Rçccpiion of lhe DaveyReport ....................
E. Proposcd ncw phosphate arrangements .................
G. Nauruai~lPartnerGovernments'discussions, JunclJuly 1966 ...

Section IV. The phosphate and political scttlcmeiits 1967-1968 .....
A . Policyre-thiiikieg by thc Partner Governments ...........X
TABLE DES MATIÈRES . CONTENTS
Page

B . Resumed discussions withthe Nauruans .............. 46
1. Phase 1: 12-20April 1967 ........................ 46
2. Phase 2: 9-20May 1967 ...................... 48
3 Phase 3: 13-14June 1967 ...................... 50

4. Phase 4. Political discussio15,June 1967 ............ 51
5. The purchase of BPC asseton Nauru ............... 51
C. NauruanlPartner Governments'political discussions ........ 54
5. The Phosphate Agreement. 14Novembcr 1967 ........... 55
E Constitution making ............................ 56
F.Tndependenq 31January 1968 ...................... 57
SectionV.Summary ................................ 59

Chapter 2 .The social and economic situation on Nauru asa result of
phosphate-mining .................................... 60
Section1 History of the BPC on Nauru ............... 60
Section I.Benefits frorn phosphate mining ............... 64
Section III. Financial situation at indcpendence and roday .... 66

Chapter 3. United Nations consideration of claims raised by Nauru . . 69
Section .General United Nations supervision and conclusionsas to
record of Administering Authority ..................... 69
A. 1964 ...................................... 71
B 1965 .................................. 71

C. 1966 ..................................... 74
D. 1967 ...................................... 16
E. Termination of the Trusteeship Agreement ........... 74
1. 13th Special Sess~on,Trusteeship Council. November 1967 79
2. United Nations GeneraI Assembly. Dccember 1967 . . 80
Section II. Nauruan participation the Unitcd Nations ......... 83
Section111. Financial reportito the United Nptions .......... 84
SectionIV.Resettlemen tand rehahilitation aspects .......... 85

PART II. OBJECTIONS TO IURISDICTIO ANND ADMISSIBILIT BASED ON
INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITEDNATIONS ...... ............. 95
Chapter I. Inadmissibiliof the claim: the termination of the Trustcc-

ship in 1967precludes the present claimsby Nauru .......... 97
Section1 Nature of the obligationsundeMandatcs and Trusteeships . 97
Scction II. The Trustccship Council and General AssenibIyhad exclu-
sivejurisdictiun to settle any dispute .................. 100
Section III. Termination of a TrusteeshipAgreement settlcs al1clairns
relatingtotrusteeship obligations ..................... 103
Section IV Thc termination of khcTrusteeship Agrccment settled al1
claims by Nauru arising under the Trustccship Agreement ..... 107
Section V. Nauru 1s bound by the settlement of the dispute by the
United Naiions ........... ...... ...... 115
Section VI. The legal consequcnccs that flow from settlement of the
Nauruan claim by termination of the Trustccahip Agreement . . 115

Chapter 2. Lack of jurisdiction: the Australian dedaration under
Article 35 (2of'thc Statute excludcs~urisdiction ............ 117
Section1. Relevantjurisdicttonal grouiids ............... 117 Page

Sectton II. During the conmuance of the Trusteeship. Nauru agreed
to settle its claims by direct negotiation ..................
A. United Nations recommendations ....................
B. The negotiations and resulting Canberra Agrccmcnt ......
Section III. At the termination of the Trustccship. Nauru agreed to

scttlemcnt of al1issuesbetween it and the Administering Authority
by resolutiun of the Trusteeship Council and General AssembIy .

PART . OBJECTION TOSJURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY BASED ON
ABSENCE OF CONSEN TF THIRD PARTIES .................

Chapter 1. The Nauruan theory of liability ..................
Section 1 The Nauruan contentions .......................
Section II. The general internationalawposition ..............
Section III. The rule in domesticlegal systems corresponto thc rule
in international law...............................
Section IV. Conclusion ............................

Chapter 2. Specihc issues ithepresentcase concerning Iiability .....
Section 1. Can Australia alonbe sued? ...................
A. The viewof Ihe United Nalions ..............
B. The viewof Nauru itself ..........................

C. The viewof the three Governments .................
D. The implications of the legal principle for the present suit.
Section II. If.contrary to the above Submission. thc Court does allow
the claim tobe made against Australia alone. can sucha claim be
made for thc whole damage 9 ......................

Chapter 3 The absence of jurisdictioii without the consent of a third
State ........................................
Section1. The principle and its implications ...............
Section II The right of intcrvcntion does noi eliminate the need for
consent ........................

PART IV. ADDITIONAL CLAIMS MADE FOR FIRSTTIME IN THE MEMO-
RIAL CONCERNIWG THE OVERSEAS ASSETS OF BPC ............

Chapter 1. The claim by Nauru has not been made within areasonable
tirneand cannot be entertarned by the Court ..............
Section1.International lawrecogniscü rulcof extinct~veprescription .
Section II Previous claims by Nauru have noi asserteda legal claim

and. hence. do not precludean argument based on delay .....
Scction II. The prejudice now faced by Australia in meeting the
Nauruan claim ..... ..................
Section IV. The choice of an appropriate limitatioii period for this
case .....................................
Çhaptcr 2. It would bc contrary to judicial propriety Torthe Çouriio
hear the clah ......................................

Section 1 The principlc of good faitin international lawXII TABLE DES MATIERES . CONTENTS

Page
Section II. Nauru has failed ta aet consistently and in good faith in

relationto rehabflitation while making a claim in this regard
against Australia ............................... 164
Section II1.The Court's judicial function sequires dismissof the
claim ........................ ............ 165
167

List ofAnnexes ......................................... 168

Exposé écrideNauru . Written Statement of Nauru

Selectchronoiogyof evrnrs affectiNauru .................... 239
Personrrliuon Nauru .......................... ..... 241
votesan sourcesandlegishrion ............................. 242
Introduction ........................................ 243

PART 1.AUSTRALIA'S APPROAC HU THE FACTS .............. 245

Section l Introduction ............................... 247
Section 2. Australia and the administration OFNauru.......... 247
Section 3 The transactions leadingto indepciidence ........... 250
Seciion4 The Nauruan approach to rehabititatioii ............ 256

PARTII. THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIS C~TURTIO NN NAURU : RESPONSE
TO APISTRALIA N SSERTION .......... ....... 265
Section1. Introduction ................... ..... 267
Section 2. The British Phosphate Commissioners ......... 267
Section 3. The rightsenjoycdby the British Phosphate Commissioners 269
Section4. Distribution of benefits from pre-1967 phosphate mining. . 270
Section 5. Thc econornic situation at independence............ 273
Section 6 Conclusion ... ..................... 274

275
277
Chapter 1.The allcgedagreementto settledisputes by direct negatiation
Section 1. The Australian argument ...... ........ 277
Secrion 2. Confusions in the Australian position ...... 277
Sec~ioii3. Thcre 1sno evidencc of an agreement to tlegotiate aail
excliisivemethod of dispute settlement .............. 278
Section 4. The relevanceof United Narioiis resolutions ........ 280
Sec~ioi~5 The actions and staternentsof the Nauruan represcnta-
tives beforc independence..................... 280
Sectioii 6 Coiiclusion ........................ 281

Chapter 2. Thc phrase "some otlrcr method of pcaccfulsettlement" . . 283
Seciiui~1. Thc ordinary meaniilg of the reservation ............ 283
Section 2. In any case the reservation can only hüvc a contingeiif
operation ........................................ 283
Section 3. Tlie teiiiporal application of the reservation ..........84
Section 4. The rcscrvationiiirelationtaArticle 79, paragraph 7, of
the Rulesof Court ................................. 284
Scction 5. There was no agreement in hct ................. 284

287 Page
Chapter 1. Dclay or prescription ........................... 289

Section 1. Analysis ofthe legal elements .................... 289
Section 2. There has been no implied waiver of the claim ....... 295
Section 3. There has been no delay in notification of the claim con-
cerning rehabilitation ............................... 295
Section 4. Australia has not suffered any disadvantage .......... 300
Section 5 . The conduct of thc respondent State ............... 300
Section 6. The relevanceof Article 79, paragraph 7, of the Rules of
Court ........................................... 301

Section 7. Conclusion ................................. 301
Chapter 2 . Waiver ..................................... 303
Section 1. The Australian argument ....................... 303
Section 2. There was no waiver in fact ..................... 304

Section 3 .The Nucirai- Tesiscases are frrelevant .............. 307
Section 4. The objection based on allegedwaiver does not possessan
exclusivelypreliminary charaçter ........................ 308
Section 5. Conclusion ................................. 308
Chapter 3. Prior settlement of the dispute ..................... 3Il

Section 1. The Australian argument ....................... 311
Section 2. The argument fromsilence ...................... 312
Section 3. Thc Canberra Agreement of 14 November 1967 ....... 312
Section 4 . Conclusion ................................. 313
Chapter 4. Termination of Trusteeship ...................... 315

Section 1. Introduction ............................... 315
Section 2. The objection based on the effectsof ter~ninationdoes nor
possess anexclusivelypreliminary character ................ 315
Section 3. The Nauruan claim survived the termination of the:
Triisteeship: surnrnary of arguments ..................... 316
Section 4. The General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council did
not Iiaveexclusiveauthority to determine legal issues arising from
the Trusteeship Agreement ............................ 317
Section 5. "rumination of the Trusteeship did not extinguish the
Nauruan claim either by operation of law or otherwise ........ 318
Section 6 . The General Assembly did noi intend or purport 10 ier-

minate rights vested in the Nauruan people ................ 324
Section 7. Even if express recognition by the cornpeten1 United
Natioiis organ was required to preserve the right, there was such
recognition here .................................... 325
Section 8. Conclusion ............................... 325
f Chapter 5. Joii~deror consent of third parties .................. 327

Section 1. Introduction and suinmary of argumeiits ....... 327
Scction 2. Thc issuc bcforc thc Court üt thc prcsent stagc of thc pro-
ccedings ................................... 328
Scction 3 The scope of ihc alleged "indispciisablc parties" r~ilc iii
intcrnational law .............................. 329
Section 4 The relcvanceof niuiiicipal law analogies to the question
whether Australia is properly sued aloiie ............. 336
Section 5. There was no special legal regime requiring thejoinder of
the other Partner Governments ................... 342XIV TABLE DES MATIÈRES . CONTEhTS

Puge
Section 5. The Nauruan Application is admissible even if. inconse-
quence. Auslraliü may have a right of rewurse against the other
two States ........................ .c 346
............
Section 7. In the circumstançes.the proceedings are progerly brought
against Australia alone .............................. 349
Section 8. The proper administration of international justice requires
rejection of the Australian argument ................... 351
Section 9. Incornpeten= of thc Court to determine jurisdictional
issues affecting the United Kingdom or New Zealand in these pro-
ceediogs ....................................... 353
Section 10. ConçIusion .................. ; ......... 353

PART V . THE ER SE AS ASSETS OF THE BRITISH PHOSPHAC TOEMMIS-
SIONERS ........................................
Chapter 1. The differenceconcerning unlawful disposal of the overseas
assets constitutes a legaldisputc .........................
Chapter 2. The claim concerning the overseas assets does not constitute
a new basis of claim ............................

Chapter 3. Jurisdictionexistscven if the issue rclating to the overseas
assets constitutes a new basis of claim ..................
Chapter 4 The legal interestof Nauru in the overseas assets of the
British Phosphate Commissioners ............ ........
Section 1. The Australian argument ............ ........
Section 2. The nature of the legal interest of Nauru ...........
Section 3. Joinder to the merits ....... ..........
Section 4. Bocumentary evidence ......................
Section 5. The principle of consent ta jurisdictionis not an impcdi-
ment to adrnissibility ............................
Section 6. Other issuesaf admissibility ...............

PARTYI. ISSUES OF JUDICIAL PIWPRIETY ........ ;.......
Section I. The Australianargumcnt .........................
Section 2. Nauru has alwaysacted in good faith ................

Section 3. "Gaod failh" in relation ito rehabilit.at:uthe lack or pro-
priety and irrelevanceof the AustralianaIIegation .............
Section 4. Good faith in relatio~ito the principleallegunsconiraricnari
estnudbidus .......................................
Section 5. Thc doctrine of "clean hands" .....................
Section 5. The coiiditions requiriiig the Court to ~nkc exceptional
measures to maintain judicial integrity arenot present ..........
Section 7. Conclusion ..................................
CONCLUSION ...........................................

1. The dispute has cxisted since before the independence of Nauru ...
2. Australia recogniscs that the dispute has existed since before inde-
pendence .......................... ... .......
3. There has been no delay,waiver or prior settlement of thc dispute .
4. Thc Nauruan claim survived the termiilarion of the Trusteeship ...
5. T. .joiiider or consentof ~hirclparties inot a condition of adrnissi-
bility .............................................
6. Thc clairn relating to the overseas asscts of the- British Phosphate
Cominissioiicrs isadniissible ........................... TABLEDES MATIÈRES - CONTENTS XV

Page

1 7.Therewas no argumentto settle the disputexclusivelby negotia-
tion ...... 398
8. There is nobasisfor theAustraliancontentionsrelatingto judicial
propnety ....................................... 398

Appendix. Responsc to Annex 26 of Ihe AustralianPreliminaryObjec-
tionsbyK. E. Walker ................................ 403 EXPOSÉÉCRITDE NAURU

WRITTENSTATEMENTOF NAURU[vil WRI~TENSTATEMENT OFNAURU 239

SelectChmnologyoî'Eventafkthg Naum

1886(April6) AngIo-German LonventiodemarcatingPacific
Omanspheres ofinfluence
@pria1 German Gwement Proclamation
ratinNauru intRotedorate of the
",'&a 1slaods

19M Minirrgofphosphatecommences

Gerrnanadministration Naurusurrenderto
Australianforces

Nauruoocupied Australianforcesunder
administratio% esternPacificHighCommission
eementbetweenAustraliaUnited
Kingdomaandy ew Zealand

bague of NationMandateforNaum

LandsOrdinance(Nau)

SupplementaqAgreementtoNauruIsland
Agreement

CouncilofChiefsestablished
LandOsrdinanceAmendment (Nau)

OccupatiobyJapanesearmed farces

UnitedNationsTrusteeshipAgreemeforNauru

UnitedNationVisiting Mission(No. 1)

NauruLocalGovernmentOrdinance(Nau)
UnitedNationsVisitingMissi(No.2)

CommonwealthScientifandIndustriaïesearch
OrganisatiReporton resoiling

HarnmerDeRoburtelectedHead Chief

UnitedNationsVisitiMission(No.3)240 CERTAIN PHOSPllATELANDS IN NMRU [vii]

1959 United NationsVisitingMissio(No.4)
Nauruansoffered immigrationtoAustralia,United
Kingdomor NewZealand

NauruLocal Government CouncilimpectsCurtis
Island(Austtalia)

1962 United NationsVisiti Mnission(No.5)

1364 ResettlementrejectedbyNaunians

Australiapemiits thNauruans iohave independent
ectinomicadviceatroyaltynegotiations

Commencement ofNauruTalb concerning the
futureoperationsofthe hosphate industr-
Canberra Conferencc 1buly-~uguat)

1965 United NationsVisitingMission(No ,)

Nauru LocalGovernmentCouncil -Australian
mcial Meeting (May-June)
1966 DaveyCornmitteeReporton Rehabilitation

1966 CanberraConFerenç2 e (June-July)

1967 Canberra Conference3.(Apnl-June)

Agreement relating to the Naum IslandPhosphate
lndustry

1968(3 1January) NauruIndependence ,

DiplornaticcontactswithAustralia relatCOg
rehabilitaticin
1986-1988 Commission ofInquiryinto the rehabilitation of the
worked-outphosphate landsofNauru

Agreementto terminate theNaum Island
Agreement 1919

Presentation of the Repoofthe Commissionof
Inquiry

1989 (19May) Application institutingproceedibysNauni against
Australiain the International Court of Justice[viiij WRIïTBN STATEMENT OF NAURU

PersonaliaonNauru

HeadChiefs(sinceformationofCounciofChiefs1927)

Daimon
TirnothDetudamo
Raymond Gadabu
Hammer DeRoburt

Presidents

HammerDeRoburt 1968-1976
BernarDdowiyogo 1946-1978
LagumotHarris 1978
HammerDeRoburt 1978-1986
Kennan Adeang 1485
HammerDeRoburt 1986-1989
BernardDowiyogo 1989-presenr

AusttalianAdministratosfNauruUnderMandateandTrusteeship(1920.
1968)

Brigadier-Generl . GGnffiths 1921-1927
W.& Newman 1927-1933
Commander RupertC.Garsia 1933-1938
Lieutenant-colonelF.R. Chalmers 1938-1943

JapaneseOccupation 1942-1945

M.Ridgway
H.H.Reeve
R.S.Richards
J.K Lawrence
R.SLeydin
J.PWhite
BrigadierL.D.King CERTAINPHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU

NoteonSources

Thefollcwingw~rksarecitedfrequentlinthiWs&en Statement,andcopiesof
themhavebeen lodgedwiththeRegistrarotheCourtforconvenientreference:

B,Macdodd, In bit oftk SauedTM, New ZealandInstitutof
International ffairs,OccasionaiPaNo.3,1988

Republicof Nauru,Commissionof InquÎq inta theRehabiiitatioof
Worked-OutPhosphateLandsof Nauru (Chair:ProfessorC.G.
WeeramantryR ),eprf10 vols1988

M. Williams& B. Macdonald,The PhosphdeersM, elbourneUniversity
Press,Carlton, 1985

N.Viviani,Nauru.PhosphateandPolitichgress, AustralianNational
UniversiîPres Cs,nberra19701. On 8 February1991the Court de anOrder EWng19July 1991 asthe
tirne-lim'ivithwhichtheRepublicofNauru mayptesent awrittenstaternent
ofitsobservationsandsubmissionsonthe prelimhty objectionraisedby the

Commonwealth ofAustralia".

2. This Wriîten Statemenf of the Republic of Nauru is presented in
accardanc eith thOrder ofthe Court.

3. Ithasnot beenfound necessarytofurnishanynew annexe stthisstage,

and thesingleappendixha beenincludedinthisvolume. PART 1

AUSTRALIA'SAPPROACHTOTHE FACTS PART 1

AUSTRALLAA 'SPFROACH TO THEFACTS

Section 1Introduction

4. Nauru relieson the factuandhistorid account iha alreadypresented
in PartOne of its Memorbi.None of thenaterialadvanced by Austrdia in
Chapter 1of itsPrdiminayObjectionalters either the direcorothe weighof

that factuamatenal. In some ways, itstrengthensit. There are, however,
variations of emphasis and certain implications byaAustralia ato which
some comment iscdled for on thepartof the AppIicanState.These are the
subjectofconsiderationin thPart.

Sectio2, AustraliaandtheAdministrationof Nauru

S. When Imperia1Germanywa defeated in the FirstWorld War, Mr W.M.
Hughes, the Australian Prime Minister, dong with the ihen Australian
Government, was anxious to annex Nauru for the sole purpose of the
exploitation of tknownresemes of phrisphatierock to assist the development
of agriculturinAustralia.The New Zealandfearsof annexation of Nauruby

Australia drove its Prime MinisteUrW.F. Massey, to suggesta Mandate
includingitseif and the United Kingdom. In the result,as described in the Nauru
~emori; (vol. 1chapter 2section 11,Naurubecame a Class"C" Mandate to be
administered as "an integralportion"of the territory of the Mandatory.
Throughout the course of both the Mandate and the Trusteeship, Austwasia
to appoint the Adrninistratorand to adminiNauru through adepartment of

the Australian Government. The histaryis recordedin a number ofplaces
including by B. Macdonald, In Purmit ofthe Sacred Trusi: Tmteeship and
Independence in Nauru,New Zealand lnstitute of InternationaZ Affairs,
OccasionalPaper No. 3, Wellington,198pp.5-18especiallyat p-13.

6. Australiamakes some point ofemphasisingthe tripartinature of the
Mandate (Preliminaty Objectiom, para, 24) and of the British Phosphate
Commissioners (id.,paraJO) .he realityovetheyearswas fardifferentasthe248 CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS INNAURU 161

Nauru Metnorialhasrecwnted (vol 1,chapters2& 3). Indeed Toussaint, her
studyof the Trusteeship System,comments thatby the time the Mandate for
Nauruentered into force, Austrdiahad becorne the administerinauthonty
andwas thustheactualMandatoryC :.E.Toussaint, heTwteeship Systemofthe
UnitedN&OILF L,ondon,1956 ,.205.

7. There was some concernshown by both the United Kingdom andNew
Zealand at the maintenance of their positaspartnersin the early histoof
the British Phosphate Cornmissioners(seM. Williams & B.MacDonald, ne
Pho3phateers: A Historyof The B&k Phosphate CornmiEsionenand the
ChrkmiasIsland PhosphateCommLssionM , elbourne1985,pp.159,160)but the

foiiowingpointsillustrathe inaeasing dominance of Australiain relation to
mining onNauru.

(a} Australia called for increasintonnages of phosphate for its own
agriculture(VivianNautsr,Tabre8,pp.186-7).

(b) After theearl dominance of the British Cornmissioner,Mr Dickinson,
the British Amphaie Cornmissioners set up iü heidquancn in
Manaouereuphto1954,was stationedin Melbournewith excellent contacts
withtfe AustralianGovemment and ita departmcntr.

(c) The Adrninistratorremained an Australiancivilservantappointed by the
Australiangovernent throughoutthe Mandateand theTrusteeship.

(d) TheAdministratorc,ertainly€rom1923onwards, reporteddirectlro the
Australim Governent through the Austr+an Department reçponsible
for administeringitsTerritones.

(e) Every muai report to the Leagueof Nations, and later toGeneral
Assernblyof the United Nationswas presented byAustralia and orally
Nations and the Trurteeihip Council of the United Nationsa& ethe
Australian delegation.

( Australiandefenceforces layed the ieading roles in both wars in seeking
to defend thtemtory an2 eventuallinrestoringcivilianrule and order.

(g) In the 19505 and 1960s, it was Australia which was instrumental in
reporting on the feasibility of Naunian rehabilitation through its
instmmentality, the Commonwealth Scientific and industriResearch
Organisation, and then throu h the Davey Cornmittee (Preliminq
ObCetiom,vol. 1, paras. 69-72 ~CSCSIRN auru Memodal, vol. 1paras.
17d-83 ~~ilvqCornmittee]).171 WRI'ïTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 249

(h) Australian curren wu thelepi currencyof Nauruand imports came
alrnostcxclusively%ornAustralla.

(il Ausualia bad exclusiveauthori toenact lawsfor Nauru,ever since it
tmk over theadministrationO7 the Temtory. By tbis wer toenact
iaws, Aurtrdia estabiished and o rated, for the bl",ation of its
administrationa aytem of manopo~aisr the pbmpbate indurtrysee
Nauru Memotid, vol. 1paras.512-1r5oielahration on thispoint.
The Nauru Act 1965which establisheda LRgislativeCounci on Nauru
6) was exclusivelyAustralianlegîslation,awaç the Nauru Independence
Act 1967.

(k) The other former partner governments conceded that the actuai
responsibilityfor administration of the Terrwasvested in Australia
(see, e.g.the statementbyMr Shaw of the United Kingdom: United
Nations Trusteeship Council, Of&ial Records, 13th Special Session,
1323rdmeeting, p.4para. 30).

8. In short, thrtiughout the post-period,Australia treatNauru as"an
integral portion"of its ewnterritory, in contradistinctionto the positionof either
the United Kingdomor NewZealand.

The Lands Ordinances 1921and 1927

9. Australiahas reserved its position with restothe Lands Ordinances
(PreliminmyObjecfions,para. 38), but argues thar any breach of obligwason
not shply that of Australia done but mustbs related also to the othetwo
governments.

10. However, these Australian Ordinances were basic to the Australian
administration throughout the penod until November 1367 (Nauru Mernorial,
paras 97-100). The Ordinanees were administeredthroughout by Australian
administrators.Under the 1927 Ordinance, the hold othe British Phosphate

Commissioners over the land was drawn tighter(Nauru Mernorial,para. 90).
Any rights the landowner might have had under the 1921 Ordinance to stay
rnining were withdrawnin favourof the control of miningin the hands of the
British Phosphate Commissioners(NauruMernonui,para. 91). The"leasewhich
wa granted under the Ordinance was in effecan actof expropriationin that
when land was handed back to the landowners by the British Phosphate

Commissioners it was a worthless shelof what had earlier ken conveyed
(Naur u emord, para.98).250 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS INNAURU FI

11. In thicsontext,theAustraliancase seems to be that the royalpayments
in some wayrepresentedeffective compensation (Preliminary Objecn'om ,aras.

39,40,47, 58,49). Thishasnofaaual basis,nor canit disguisethedevastation
wrough t yAustraliainquest ofcost pricephosphate (seeNauni Mmorid, vol.
1, Appendix 2, pp.289-311). The framework set outbythe Land Ordinances
provideda cloakof domestic legality toan administrationof exploitationin

Nauru under the guiseof the Trust. AW.J. Hudsoncommented:

"thAwaiian interewasahwt soMy toexploit.The administrationruasm
set a decenminimum;naimagkmtiiveeffortwasapptoetbfateofthefew
thousandklandcwbwe homewss literdsbipwdmerseas."

(Hudsou,Aw&da md theCoimialQuesiimm the Ii'mNdations,Sydn3970,
p.14 ,uoteinMadonal4 ZnAirsuioftheSucmdTmt, p.18.)

Section3, TheTransactionsLeading toindependence

12. Australia States(PreihinaryObjectiom, para. 29) that the controf the
BritishPhasphate Cornmissioners over phosphates was changed by the 1967
Agreement relatingto the Naum Island Phosphate Industry(Nauru Mernorial,
Anna 6). It is truethatthe 1967Agreement eventuallybrought about Naunian

control of the industry,but it also maintained evident advanitoAustralia in
that isecuredsecurityof supply(para S.1))and fixedthe pnce (para. 6and the
rate ofsupply (para. S(2)).The Agreement also speltout the obligations of
Nauru in relation zo payment for the assets of the British Phosphate

Commissioners onthe island(Part In). TheAgreement had an initial thryear
tem, but was to continue in force zhereafter. The law applicable to the
Agreement was thatof theAustralianCapital Temtory. The Agreement, signed
a little marethan two monthsbeforeindependence .epresented dearly that
Australiawould maintain anelement of controloverthe phosphate industry in

Nauru in ensuingyearsinareasconsideredimportant byit.

13. What is mostsignific iathtt therewas no mention in anypart ot the
1967Agreement of rehabilitation. During the negotiations a deçperate attempt
wasmade to havethe Nauruan claim torehabilitation withdrawn (PrelimUuuy

Objection p.,71,but this thNauruan delegation steadfastrefused todo (see
Nauru Mernorial ,aras.592-602). WRlTTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 251

14.In a carefullpbrased paragraph(Prelimimzy Objections,ara591, Austrdia
puts a series of propositiodesigned to lead to what it considers to be the
apparentlyirresistible argument ththe1967 Agreement wu the nilminating
point ofnegotiationsbetween the hvo sidesrepresentingan overallsettlement

leading to temination of theTrusteeship. But thehisfory between 1945and
1968 &es nosupport to the propositionfodated by Australia(see Naum
Memorial,Part1,Chapter 4).

15. Some salient matterneedtobe reaounted.Inthe view ofthe Australian

administration and thBritishPhosphate Commissioners,rehabilitation, even if
possible,was going to be expensive and thereforeclearlydetrimental to the
cheap subsidisedphosphatepo1icyFhat had attracted them toNauruinthe fist
place. Phosphate mining on the islands oNaum and Banaba(Ocean Island}

was similar,in that the phosphatrockwas gouged out £rombetween pillarsof
coral limestone(corapinnacles) whichwere leftwhen the miningwascomplcre
(seeNauruMemorial,vol.2, Photographs 2,5 and7). Inthe caseof Banaba, the
twin island (seNauru Memonal,vol, 2,Map 11,the Banabans,who belonged to
the Britishrom Çolony of the Gilbert and Ellice Islan(asit thenwas),were

resettledon theFijianislandofRabi. Fiji, at that time,wasalaocolonyof the
United Kingdom.

16. Resettlement, the Banaban solution, whilst attractive tu the British
Phosphate Commissioners, was not seen as necessary by the Australian

administration in the early 1950s ,hou* it had been contemplated by
Mr Halligan, the Secretary of the AustralianTerritories Department, who later
becarne a British Phosphate Commissioner (see Nauru Mernorial, para. 166).
Before1940, Australia had responded to the Permanent Mandates Commission
that the rim araund the island would be land enough for the Naunians
(Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes,31st Session, 1937,p.50). However,

with the increasing phosphate requirements of the Australiafamers in the
post-wu period (see Naum Memorial,vol. 1,Table 1,4,p.2741,and the increase
in the Naunian population (which doubled between 1950 and 1967) (Nauru
Memord, para. 221), it becarneclear that the islandwas litolbeworked-out
at amuchearlier period thanwas first estimated, and that the nrn was not going

to lxsufFicienttaccommodate the needsof the increasingNauruanpopulation.
Resettlement, therefore, became increasingly attractivto the Ausirdian
administration.252 CEKTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS 1N NAURU [Io]

17. But Nauru wasnot a colonybut a TrustTerritoryand anjfsubstantial
movement of people byAustralla would haverequired theconcurren of the
United Nations and,accordingiy,the supportofthe greaterproportionof the
indigenousinhabitantsThis put Nauruin adifferentcategoryfromBanaba.

18. There was a hrther difficulty,glossedovbyAustralin when discussing
the "longterm solution" (PreliminaObjections,para.Ml). Regetdement was
simplya quidpro qtrofor deprivingthe Naunian communityof suitable and
productive living spacas a consequence of thedevastation of their la(cf,
Nauru Mernorial,para.177). It wasalso,perhapsaway of avoidingthe issuof

rehabilitation.But Nauni would, at that point, stiühave remained under
Trusteeship. Resettiement wouldnot have grantedto Ausvaiia or the British
Phosphate Cornmissioner snyfurther title to the thanthatwhich theycould
claim under the Trusteeship.By the act of resettlement. Nauruwas not be
annexed to Aujtralia. AJ a self-determination unit, the Nauruan community

could stilseek control inNauru both politically, throughindependence, and
economically,inrespectof the phosphate industv.

19. Funherrnore, resettlement was designed eaentially ease pressure by
providing alternative livingspace with employmentpossibi-iaireplacement
for lost land(Naur u emoriai,para.177). It was never envisaged that al1

Naunianswould take up the offer.Many wouldstay, anditwas understood that
Nauru would alwaysremaina spiritual homefor those resettled. Clearlno
matter how extensive the arrangements for resettlement, it waa separate
consideration fromboth independence and economic contra1ofthe phosphate
industry. matever happened with resettlement'Nauruwould remain under
Trusteeship until independence.

20. For that reason the 196proposalofpermanent residence and citizenship
"after the Europeamarner"(Naum Mernorialpara.167;PreliminmyObjections,
para. 61)wasdoorned to failure, fowaiteffectivelyan attemptobreak up the
Nauruan identity and their strong personal and spiritual relationship with the
island. This is explained in the statemenof the Head Chief, MrHamrner

DeRaburt, discussingthe resettlement issue (Nauru Memoriai,v1,.Appendix
1,paras.18-23,especiallygara22).

21. Rehabilitationwas alwaysthe preferred option to resettlement so far as
the Nauruan cornmuniiywas concemed (seeNaum Mernoriai,vol.1,Appendix 1,

paras. 1819). TheNauruan concernabwt rehabilitation arosasmon asitwas 11 WRITTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 253

noticed how catatrophicaily the land was affected by mining. Hence the
attempts,as earlyas 1925,to bit itscope, although without success(Nauru
Memorid, paras. 523-527) 12was not long kfore the Permanent Mandates

Commission was seeking somesort of an answerfrom Australiaas towhatwas
to be done with the land (Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes 1,th
Session, 1929,p.42; 25th Session, 1934, p.512;7th Session, 1935, p.35; 33st
Session,1937,p.51;34th Session,1938,p.20).

22. When the pressurebeganro be applied both by the Naunians and the
TnisteeshipCouncil,the 13ritisPhosphate Codionerç and Australia were at
pains to assert the compIete economic impracticabilitof restoration. The
Banabanshadby this time been resettleand thisseemed to Australiatobe the

wayout inthe case oftheNauniansas well. matever resettlernent might mst,
it would be less than restoration ano doubt, in thend, itcouldbe financed
like everythinelseout ofphosphate returns.The 1953Report by an Australian
governent organisation, tCommonwealthScientificand IndustrialResearch

Organisation, with limited terrm of reference, strongly reçisted restoration
(Preliminq Objections,paras. 69-72). Facedwith thiReport, andwitb the view
forcefullyarticulated bythe Australian administrationand the Bntish Phosphate
Commissionersthat any rehabilitation woube ttoocostly(Nauru Mernorial,vol.

1, Appendix1, para. Z), the Naunian comrnuniw tayseventually moved to
explorethe possibilityof resettlement.

23. Butthe resettlernent alternatwas, after careful consideration, rejected
by the Naunians (Nauru Memurid, paras. 159-74). This was not done

capnciously, butfor the sound reason that a community so united and stable
required asituation that wouldpreserve their national identity. The Head Çhief
has express itdn tbeseternis:

'Sofaras Çurtis Islawas concerne4 wc wernot seeking Fsovereign
independenceb,anphingwhichdid notpreservand maintaiourseparate
identiwasquitunacceptable."

(NaurMernoriavol.i, Append1, par21.)

24. The resettlement proposal was rejected because Australia failed to

accommodate this legitirnate concern of the Nauruan comrnunity. The
alternativewas rehabilitatioor restoration of tworked-out phosphate lands.
Itwas, asit were, the revese sidofthecoin,andthere was onlyone coin. This
was recognisedby the Naunian comrnunityand the Australian administration,254 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS INNAURU 1121

though in the lattercase with some trepidation(Nauru Monorial,vol. 1,
Appendix 1,para. 23, p.256;see also id.para. ln and the staternentby
Mr Warwic kmith,citeid.,para1.75). Iimmediatelyled totwo furthepieces
of advicesoughtby theAustralianadministration.The kt was an estimateby
the British PhosphaCommissionero sfthe costofrehabilitationassociatedwîth
resoiling withimportedsoi1 (Preümutq Objeçtiom, para.73). The secand

wnsisted of a revaluationby the AuçtralianCommonwealth Scientifiand
IndustriaResearchOrganisation of its earl1953study.Both the estimate and
the revisedstudypredictablystressedwbat tbey saw as thevastexpense and
impracticabilitofthe operation. Further lettewfrom the BritishPhosphate
Commissionero sn shippinmsis and the passibiliofa pilotprojedwere no
more encouraging (PreliminmDybjecriom, aras.767).

25. It was in this particular climate that, wiNauruans holding to their
position requifing rehabilitation, and the United Natiom General Assembly
calling for immediate stepto be taken towards rehabilitation (Resolution
21I1(XX) 21 December1966 ;auru Mernoriai,vol. 4Annex 15),theDavey

Cornmittee was appointed bytheAustralian administrationwith tagreement
of the NauruLocal Governent Council to investigate the feasibility of
rehabîlitation,The Report(Nauru Mernorial,vol.3Annex 3) was submittedin
June 1966 -eighteen monthsbefore independence.

26. Whilethe Nauru LocaiGoverment Councilrejectedthe Report because
itfell short of recommending full restoratian, neverthit wasappreciated

thatthe Davey Cornmittee bad broken new ground. It had demonstrated that
there were practical possibilities, denied previouslyby the Australian
administration,for rehabilitation (NauruMernoparas,189,199). The Report
raised expectations that Australia woufd punue a course leading to
rehabilitatianf aiready worked-out areas, particularas the Nauru Local
Government Council, realising the needsof Australia and New Zealand for
continuityof miningand semrityofsupply,had declared that the respansibiliw

for rehabilitatiin respectofposf-independence miningwould lie wîth Nauru
(Nauru Mernorial,vol.1,Appendix 1para.25).

27. But the NauruLocal Government Cauncil was to be disappointed.In
reality, the settup oftheDavey Cornmitteeby Austrdia wassimpIyto pacify
the Nauru Locd Governent Çouncil and in some way to appear to respond to

General AssemblyResolution 2111(XX) .ustraliahad stood out againstany256 CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS INNAURU [141 1

32. Against this backgroun dt,is temarkable tbatAustralia, somewhat
lamely,attemptsto demonstratea change ofhem by Nauru through thespeech
of Mr DeRoburtin the Fourth Conunittee of the United Nations General
Assembly (PreIUninarOybjectionspara1.25). The implicationcontained in the
lut sentence of para. 59 of the PreIirninarObjections,that the phosphate

agreement and thepoliticasettlement leading on tu independence ded with
it a waiver or renunciation of the rehabilitation isdependent an nothing
other than an over-straineand out of context interpretatiof some words
spoken bytheHead ChIefto the FourthCornmittee.

33. TbeIackof legalsubstancetothe Ausudian argumen itanaiysedlater in
1
this Wrinen Stdement (paras. 166-80) .iven the hist&y of the Naunian
rehabilitation clairnbobefore and after the speec(Nauru Mernoriai,paras.
615-18 t iremarkable that ishouldbe relied oasa waivivenfact. 1

Secrion4.The NaunianAppmach toRehabilitaition

34. In its fielimkary Objections, par404, 405 and 406,Australia makes
some pehndory rernarksimplying that Nauru has not acfed consistentlin
respect of its claand that it has not actedgood faith. There ilittlor no
evidence offered isupport oftheseremarks. It is submitted by Austraiia (id.,
para. 404) that the present proceedingsare notmore thm a guiseforNauru
seeking "additionamonetary resources", "despitebavingbeen provided with

adequate financial resources". Thdegation is tendentiousand simplyavoids
the issuesatstake. The legal aspects of this matter are considered further in
paragraphs392429 below. At this point, certain issofsfactareexarninedby
way ofreply.

35. There is inherent in paragraph404-6 ofthe PreiimirzutyObjections,the
implication that Nauruhas exhibited al1thfaultsof a misspentyouth in not

cootrollinor runningitsaffaiprroperly. This has nbearingon the mattersin
issue.The Court is requested by Nauru to adjudgeanddetermine the legalbasis
of its rehabilitatidaim against Australia. The ratber extravagant paper
(Freliminay ObjectionsAnnex 26) produced at the requestof the Australim
Depanmeni of ForeignA£fairsand Trade,and fromwhich muchof the comment
seems to spring,i~repliedto in Chapter 2 andin an Appendixto this Written

Stalement.Twopoint ae simplymade here. Il 51 WR~TTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 257

36. Eirsîwhether ornot Nauru hadadequatesesources at independence is
not the issue. Nauru then became an independent State (with a certain
patrimonyand an obligationtcare foritpeoplefor the future)The extentof
itsphysicalor other resourcesatthat the ha no bearing on the question

whether Australiafajluretorehabilitatethminediiut phosphate lands wu a
breach of thetrusteeshipobligatioa This is tantamount to claimingthata
trustee muld defenda claim forbreac hftruston the bais that, despite its
defalcations,tbeueficiarstillhasenougm honey to survive!

37. Secondly,theAgreementrelatingtothe Naum ïsland Phosphatelndustry
1967 requiredNauru to mainîain a very high level of miningin the years
foiiowingindependence(NauruMetnoid, vol.3,Annex 6; 1967 Agreement,
para.S(2)) .auru didsu,and fulfillAustralfanrequlrements of reliabilityand
1 quantityof supply. At the samtime,however, thiscommitted Naum through

miningto simicant levelsofdamageto its lands. Thwasto be the continuing
priceofAustralian"generosity".

38. More specifically,Australiasubmits tNauru haçdone nothing itself to
advance itown causein respecof rehabilitation. As evideofethis,Australia

mentionsthe RehabilitatiFund whichitsaysnowhas money sufficienttcany
outrehabiîitation,bnone of whichhasbeen expended.

39. This Fund, whichAustralia statwas establishepriorto independence,
was established by an AustraliaOrdinance in1968, the Nauru Phosphate
Royalties (Payment and Investment) Ordinance 1968. This Ordinance

commenced operation just five daybefore independence. It was simply an
Ordinance, such asthNauru Phosphate RoyaltiesTrust Ordinance 1968,made
in preparation for the handing oofradministratioon 31 January 1968,and
theNaunian cornmunity played a signifiant role in the formulatiof these
ordinanceson the evof independence. The Rehabilitation Fund as a statutory
fund did not existbef25eJanuary1968.

40, Section7of the Ordinance reads:

"(1) A Fund is hereby established to be known a the Nauru
Rehabilitation Fund.

(2) Moneys standing to the creditof thNauru Rehabilitation Fund
shall note expended otherwi shan forthepurpose of restoring or improving the arts of the Islandof Nauru tbathave been
affectedbymining orphosphate.

41. Section T(2) of the Ordiminc iea cleat statutory requirement that
moneysstandingto the credit of tNauru RehabiiiiatimFund can be expended
onnootherpurposethan rehabilitatiof mined-outlands.By reason ofArticle
85 of theConstitutionofNauru ,heNam Phosphate Rqalties (Payment and

Investment)Ordhmce 1968,wmmencing but fivedays Mare independence,
continued inforceafterindependena. Moneyshencefortbwerepaid intothe
RehabilitationFundinaccordance with section 11(4)(viof the Ordhmce.
Article 83(2)of the Cornditutionmaka it clearthai moneys paid intothe
RehabilitationFmd are only to bexpended bythe Goveniment of Nauru on
lands raineafte1r July1967.

42. The administration of this Fuwas placed under thestatutoryNauru
Phosphate RoyaitiesTrust. This body was setup underthe Nauru Phosphate
RoyaltiesTrustOrdinance1968, an Ordinance promulgated at thsame limeas
the Payrnen tndlnvestrnentOrdinance referred tabove.The Trust Ordinance
continued in force by reasoof the transitionprovisionin Article 85 of the

Constitution of Nauru. A separate fund account is maintained for the
Rehabilitation Fund in accordancewith section 24of the Nauru Phosphate
Roydties Trust Ordinance. The Fund iç augmented £rom time to time by
payments made to the Trustbased on a statutoryformula foreach tonne of
phosphate shipped from Nauru, asalso by retums on investments of moneys
from theFund.
1

43. Since independence, theTrust througb a carefulinvestment policy has
acmulated a mm approximating M260 million. lnstead of applaudi% this
endeavour, Australiattacksthisas isomeway indicatinbad faitbecauseno
partof thimoneybas yet been expended, even though is cleathat the money
isin apublicTrustFund and reserved forthepurpase ofsestoring or improving
landsaffectedby miningsince 1July 1967.

44. In acnimulating a fund against the day when major financial
commitmentswere to bemade, itwas prudent to ensuras Nauru has done,that
such a fund should be able to stand annualpayrnen& from it thatwillnot
diminishthe fundto anygreat extent over the tem of the rehabilitaproject.

Whatever specific methodsmay be adopted byway ofrehabilitation, the tirne[171 WR~TTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 259

involved could be anythingup to two generations (Commission of Inquiry,
Report,vol.5,p.1140). The Australian delegationat tNauru Talks1967, itself
suppofted the viewthat asubstantiapi end of the would be invoivedin the

phmmg and implementation ofrehabilitatio(Memodal,Annexes vol.3,Annex
5,pp.87-8).There Mr Reseigh (Australia)indiateci thatgreat deaof thecos1
elernentdepended uponDrming and, bjimpiication,arefui planninT g.istends
to supportthe NaunianGoverment poliq withrespect to theRehabilitation
Fund, partîcularlywhenitistaken into account that the Rehabilitationwa.sd

builtup afterindependence.

45. But Nauru has not simply stood stiii,since independencin respect to
rehabilitation.Infact, it has aaed consktently, as the folIoilrinaccount
dernonstrates.

46. Upon independence, the Head Chief, MïHammer DeRoburt, as
Chairmanof the transitional &und of State,made it clearthat Nauru was
expectingAuslcaiiaand the other former partner govements to tehabilitate the
landsmined before 1July 1967(seeNauruMemord, vol. 4,Annex 69).

47. On 5 Decernber 1968,Mr Hammer DeRoburt, now the Presidentof
Nauni, sought thtough the Ministeof Extemal.Affairsof Australiaassistance
for the constructioof an airstnp to intemationai specificatas partof the
rehabilitation e£forts (Nauru Mernorial,vol. 4, hnex 76).s approach was
consistent with the statementMr DeRoburt had made in the Trusteeship

Counul (above,para. 31) and was made against the background of the
recommendatiom of the Davey Cornmittee. The Davey Committee, it will be
recdied,had reoommendedthe airstripnot onlyto enhance communicationsbut
as a usefulcatchmentarea for the storage owater. On 4 February1569 the
Ministerof Extemal Mais of Australia, Mr Hasluck,repli(Naur u ernoriai,
vol. 4,Annex 77) ihat Austraiia and the other partnergovernments didnot

accept the sespomibilityfor rehabilitation, and that the ternof the 1967
settlementwere sufncientlygenerous for Nauru to cope with rehabilitatand
development. Australia therebyrehsed to assistfinanciaily.

48. Nauru, which was at that time cailupon to payA$21,000,000to the
BFjtish Phosphate Commissioners for the depreciatedcost of the capital

infrastructure of the phosphatendustryworks on Nauru , as in no financial
position to undertaksucha major taskas an airstrip anawater storage.plant
on rnined-outlands. At thsame time, iwas recognisedIhatin suchan isolated 1
l

260 CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU [181

locdity, air transport wua aecessitytu establishuimmunicati~nswith the
outsideworldandthattheprojectshould riot edelayed bymany years.The
NauruGoverneut. thereforehadto takethe secondbestdecisionofgradually
caqbg outmajorreconstmction of the oldSecond World War &trip which

was locatedon the southem coastalh. This basbad the effect of depriving
Nauru of substantial residentid land. (NauruMernorial ,ol. 2Map2 and
Photograph 8.)

49. In 1983 ,he PresidentofNauru, Mr HammerDeRoburt, wrote to the

AustralianFrÎrneMinister(Naur u ernorialvol.4, Annex 78),foîiowingtwo
earliercontactsbythe President of Nauni withthe earlier Whitlam Labour
Grnement, raisingthe rehabilitatiissuebut to no avai(Nauru Memorid,
vol. 1,Appendix1,para.30). By 1983,it was clear ththerehabilitation issue
withAustraliahad a~çiimedmoreurgency, dueto the projectedenof miningin

twelveto fifteeyearsand the continued neeforthe useof the "plateau"living
spacewith theriseinpopulation. Time factors5uchasthosementioned in Mr
Reseigh'scomments (NauruMernorial,vol. 3, Amex5,p.88) werebeginningto
assum emportance.

50. Nauru had already cded out some preliminary planning with the

establishment from the time of independence of a Department of Island
Development and Industry. The Department's task wa~to planand explore
development possibilitiearnongstwhich was rehabilitation ofthe"topside"
plateau. Matterssuchas traaspost, communications,geology,water storageand
desalinationwere the subject of considerationAlso,lmmediately following
independence, the Nauni Phosphate Corporation, mindful ofthe need to

conservethe overburden (the topsoilrernovedbefore Ifiiningcommences)an the
mine-sites(NauruMemonal, vol.2,Photograph 61,stockpiledthisoi1foruseas
top-soi1followingrestoration. This practice,whadhnot been pursuedbythe
former British Phosphate Commissioners, continues, and a valuable and
substantial stock-pihas now been assernbled. It nirrently standat stirne
272,000cubi mcetres.

SI. When in 1984 the Austrdian Prime Ministerrejectethe requestofthe
Presidentof Nauru to undertake rehabilitation of pre-independmining,he
repeated the earlier reptythat the former partner governments remained
convinced that "thtem of the settlement wittheGovernrnentof Nauru were

sufficientlgenerous to enable itto meet itsneeds far rehabilitatian and
devetopmentn .jgnificantly,the AustraPrime hlinistealsoadded: -- - - --

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU
(191

The formerpartneg~~nimwtF agrecdatthat the tbat $ wasa requiofmenr
terminationothe trusieeshipapernint thatwereentireh&ami ofany
onusorhaocidrespooddhy fortherchabüitatofNad.

(NaurMernorial,vol.4 Annex79.)

52. Whatever the formes partnergovemments may have decidedamongst
thernselves, theview expressed by the Australian Prime Minister was not
conveyed to anyofficialorgan of theUnitedNatio nsthe tirne. Nowas iever
conveyed to the Nauniansthemselves,whohad consistentlyfolloweda murse

chat the rehabilitation disputeshould be dealt wirhas a separate issueto
independence, as pointed out by Mr HammerBeRoburtin hisspeech to the
TrusteeshipCouncil in 1967(Naur MuemoruJ, para.609).

53. The assertioncontaineu'intheAustrdian Prime Mnister's letier hadnot

previausly been made. Itsernergence now was a contributingfactor in the
decisionof the Naunian Governent to setup an independent Commissionof
Inquiry,chaired by ProfessorC.G. Weeramantry (ashe then was),to investigate
the tesponsibilityfor rehabilitation of mined-out landsand to explore the

economicand practicai feasibiIityof rehabilitation. The Commissiowu set up
in December 1986,and the AustralianGovernment was immediatelyInformed of
itby a DiplornatiNote (Nauni Mernoriaiv, ol4,Annex80, No. 1).

54. The Nauru governrnententertained the hope expressedin the Dipfomatic
Note that Australia would asist this endeavour by granting access tci
documentationheld by Australia and further that Australia wouldparticipatin
the proceedingsof the Commission. Australia,however, did notgrant accessto

the AiiatralianArchives, exceptforthe open access periodgranted to ibown
citizens(NauruMernoriai ,ol4, Annex 80, No. 15). Inrelation to participation,
the Australian Minister for Foreign Aîfairs stated that the Australian
Government was exarniningthe Nauruanrequest forAustralian assistancein the
Commissionof Inquiry, and would shorily advisethe extent to which it would

assist(Nauru Mernorial,vo!.4, Annex 80, No. 13). In fact Australia never
answered thisrequestbut was content to state that "itwouidnot boundby the
findings of the Commission OCInquiry" (Nauru Mernorial, vol. 4, Annex 80,
No. 15).

55. The Commissionof Inquiry satthroughout 1987and cornpileditsReport
in tenvolumes in 1988. The Report was presented to the Presidenof Nauru on262 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS INNAURU [20]

29November1988 andwastabled in theNaunianParliament on 20 Decembr
19U. On that daya mpy ofthe Repart was senttcigethewitha Diplomatic
Note carefullyexplainingthe positiontaken by the Naunian goverment
followhg the receipoftthe recornmendationsmntained in the Report ofthe

Commissi onlnquiry tothe AustralianHigh CommissioninNauru(Naum
Memord, vol.4, Annex80,No. 24). Copiesof the Reporof theCommissionof
Inquiry into the Rehabilitation of the Worked-Out Phosphhdç of Nauru
have been deposited in the LibroftheCourt.

56. Someof theprincipalconclusionof the Report ofthe Commissionof

Inquirywere :

(1) tbat the failure to restthe landsminedaut pnar to 1 July1967 to
usable conditionor to cornpensate thNauniamfor the lossof use of
tiieirlands,was a violation of internationalaw and the relevant
agreements;

(2) PartnerGovemmen~fromed otberuponsibility to rehabilitate the lands;

that a mt-feasible plan of rehabilitation of al1the workelandson
(3) Nauru can bedeveloped.

57. These condusionswere conveyedto the AustralianGovemment, together
with a copyof the Report, with the further cal1 to Australia acceptits
responsibilitiesaccordingly.

58. Nauru commenced proceeding~by Applicatiom ihe International Court

of Justice in The Hagueon 19May 1989, a copy ofwhich was oonveyedto
AustraliabyDiplomaticNote (Naum Mernoid, vol.4, Annex80,No. 28).

59. One ofthe recommendationsof the Report of tCammission af Inquiry
was to caq out apilot project, designed by R.H. Challen,acivil engineer
and one of themembers of the Çommission of lnquiq. The pilot projectshould

cover anumber of areasof rnined-outland (CommissionofInquiry,Report,vol.
5, p.1386).Thisisa complexoperation reguiring identificationpiirchaseof
majar equipment, suitablarrangements made with original landowneand a
carefulassessrnentof results. Theequipmehasbeen purchased and shipped to
Nauru ,nd theprojechas commenced.[Tl] WRIïTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 263

60. Nauni has mnsistemly and with concern applied itself to the
rehabilitationquestionmer many years. To submit,as Australia hasdone,that
tbe Naunianclaimis made withoutgd faithand shows a Iackofmmististenciy,
whoUy unfounded Infaet,giventhe historof the matter, anAustralja'srolein
il.Thatclairnisalsounfoundedinlaw,as isdemonstrateciinparapaphs 392-429

below.

61. Comment has already been made with respec to para. 405 of the
PreliminruyObjectiam, butin the second sentence of thparagaph, mention is
made of the factthatastheRehabilitationFund now stands ithas within it

"more than the estimatedcustofrehabiiitatioofthe whole kland". It must be
emphasised here that no spedcation hasken made in the Naunianclaim of
"the estimated cost".he Naunran daim isfor adeclarationby the Courtthat
Australia bears responsibility fbreachesof certain lepl obligations, that
Nauruhasa legaI entitlement tothe allocationofthe overseas assetsof the

British Phosphate Commissioners upon their dissolution in 1987, and that
Australiaasa conçequenceshould make appropriatereparation in respectof the
lossescaused to the Republic of Nauru (Mernorial,Submissions,p.250). The
question ofreparationis dealt within more detailinthe MemoriaI, para.621.
Nauru there states that "itisappropriatethat theparbeegiventheoppottunity

to discuss the form and precise quantum of reparaticin in the light of the
Judgment ofthe Court." It adheres to this positiAt.this stage, accordingly,
thereisnospecified oragreed quantum.

62. In any event, to suggestthat the Nauru RehabilitationFund contains
sufficienfunds te financ tee whole of the operation of rehabilitatiof the

island is irrelevant. The RehabilitatFundexiststo finance the rehabilitation
of lands minedsubseguently tr,the coming into forceof the1957 Agreement.
The possibilitthatthe Fundmay contain more money than may be needed for
rhatpurpose issirnplbeside the point. PARTII

THESOCIALANDECONOMICSTTUARON ON NAURU:
RESPONSETOAUSTRALKANASSERTIONS268 CERTAINPHOSPHATE LANDS INNAURU El61

ignaresthe realitthat the British Phosphate Cornmissioners,representing the
threegovernments,were notjust concessionaires,bwere agentsput inplace to
cany out the realpurposeof the 1919 Agreement,namely, phosphate mining.
(See Nmuu Menid, vol.1,chapter2;Macdond4 î%eS d Tm, pp.8-18.)

67. In relation tophosphate mining, the 1919 Nauru IslandAgreement
(Artide 6) purported toconfer title tthe phosphate depositson the British
Phosphate Cornmissioners. The Naunians were not consultedasto the tem of
the Agreement, nor is rhereany indication that their interests weretaken into
acmunt.

68. ThePacificPhosphateCompanyassigneditsri&&,whateverthey might
havebeen,in thephosphate of Nauruand Oman Island (Banaba)together with
itsassetson the two islandsto thethreeGovements for a sumof 3.5million
pounds (Mernorial ,ol4, Annex45). The mets, thus purchased , ereaçsigned

by indenture to the British Phosphate Commissioners(Mernorial,vo4, Annex
46). The cost (3.5 millionpounds) paito thePacifiePhosphate Company was
regarded as an advance to the BritisPhosphate Commissioners by the three
Governments, and was expeaed to be repaid (and was in factrepaid) with
interest ove50 years£rom the sale of phosphate rockIn other words,like the
industrialnd island administraticosts,thesesums were,in facttabe paidout

of receiptderivedfrom the rnininof phosphate rock. Nauruanassets thus paid
the billofthe ihree Governments(see Nauru Island Agreement 1919,Article
Ir}.

69. In itsPreliminaiyObjectiom, para. 33, Australiaassertsthatthe 1921 and

1927Lands Ordinances prescribed the mode of leasingtothe British Phosphate
Commissioners. Butthe Ordinances didfarmore than that: theyseoutin detail
the means by which British Phosphate Commissioners gained access to the
phosphate on terms which stripped the Nauruanlandmers ofany bargaining
power (see Nauru Mernorialparas.97-8). The Ordinances,enacted by AustraIia
as the authonty with legislativepower civer Nauru, thus put the British

Phosphate Commissionerseffectivelyin the position of mntrollial1phosphate
land,and important areasofnon-phosphate land aswell.

70. The arrangements made in the Nauru Island Agreement 1919 relatinto
the administration and the settiup of the British Phosphate Cornmissioners
illustratthe interplaybetween the three Panner Gwemments, the British

Phosphate Commissioners andthe Australim administration.The whole history1 1271 WR1TTF.N STATEMENTOF NAURU 269

of phosphate exploitation in Nauru between 1920 and 1967 has a strong
govermental base,with Australiabothas themainbeneficiary and the soie
gwementd authontyfor thisland.

71. The BritisPhosphate Commissionerc sonstitutethe sourceof revenue
for Naum. iEverything in the Administration,even the sdary of the

Adrninistrato ras tobefinancedfrom theeamings derivedfromthemining of
phosphaterock. Thecharterof the British Phosphate Commissioners was to
prduce and market that phosphatrock ata priceasclose ttheactualcostsof
mining aspossible. Iwas inevitabletbattbeBritishPhosphateCommissioners

would be concemed ta keep cos^ to a minimumand would brook no
Interference,articularly ihadas itobjec anintere ofthe inbabitantsthat
couM affect mining or mining costs. The Grifhths incident, imolving an
unsuccessfulproposal to limit the depth ofmining in the interests of the
Nauruans, is an excellent example.In thatcase theAustrdian Government
quicklyintervenedto proteci the British Phosphate Commissioneaght the

Administraior(Naum Mernorialparas. 523-30).

Section3. TheRlghtsEnjoyed By TheBritish PhosphateCommissioners
I
72. Australiaargues (Pseliminq Objectionspara. 136)thataccount should

be taken of the "valuablerightç" enjoyed by the British Phosphate
Commissionersunder the concession,which were given awayin 1367 without
compensation.This is,of coursamatter relatingto the meriofthe case,and
onewhichthe Courtisnot calledon to dealwitatthis stageNauru reservesits
position in respectof this issue.

73. However, sofaras this concemsthe future"right"to mine by the British
Phosphate Cornmissioner and its so-called concessiMr, Walker, who was
presentat andaparticipaninthe negotiationforthe 2957Agreement, notes in
theAppendix (below,para.A151 that thiwasnot a rnatteeven raisedwith, let
aione put in argumentto, the Nauruanrepresentatiresat the timwasTnever

raiseasa matterof argumentin theTrusteeshipCouncil. As MrWalker States:
'The Nauruan peoplelongregarded thephosphate asbeing theiras amatter of
right." Thiwas a consistentlyhelview (see thepaper entitled'The Law of
Land Holding In Nauru"by B. Dowiyogo (now President of Nauru), Nauru
Mernorial,vol4,Annex 74,p.492).270 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU C281

74. The matter of "concessioriarycompensation"fo"ri&& lostn(Preliminary

ObjectIom,para 135) wu nevea tddresçedby either sidinnegotiationson the
future of the phosphate indus9 on Nauru nor was itventilated in the
TrusteeshipCounciidebates. If ihadbeen raised.iwould have been dismissed
out of hand. The Administering Authority would have been seeking
compensationfroma Tmst Territorhm whichit hadderivedsubstantialprofit
through the activitiof a monopolyminhg enterprise. At thesame the as

taking those profits, the enterprihad progressîvely made the land mined
unusable tothe point wbere dlpartieswere seeking ta resettle the "pratected"
indigenousinhabitants.Etwas not a tenablearpent then,and itis nomore
attractive now. It alsignoresagumentç basedonthe Naunianlaw of land
ownership andon the rightof the Naunian people at internationallaw to

permanent sovereigntyover theinaturalwealthand resources.

75. Asnoted already,thewhole questionof theacquisitionof"rightsby the
British PhosphateCommissioners from thePacificPhosphate Companyrelating
to the phosphaterockminin gn Nauni isa matterin issuebetween the parties.

It is onewhich the Court is no1 requiredtodealwith in thiç phase of the
proceedings,

Section4. Distributioof BenefitsFmm Pre-196P 7hosphateMining

76. It istrue that the mininofphosphate rock on Nauru moved the island
community Ftom an isolated subsistence economyto part ofan international
economy (PreIiminaryObjectionspara 141). Much is made of this point by
Australia, asthou$ this in sarneway meeis arguments respecting breach of
tmsteeship obligations. It wouldhave been oddin the extremehad the Naunian
cornmunitynot received any benefitat dlhm a large-scale industrialactivity

canied on on its ierritory. What is stakeis whether Australiha breached
certain internationalegalobligations andis thereby under a dus to make
reparation for loss, particularly the loss occasi~nedby the long-term damage
wrought on the island by a miner acting with the consent and active
encouragement of Australia asthe governmentalauthorityin place on the Island.

77. The phosphate island, Christmas Island, situinthe IndianOman,is
an Auatrdjan extemal territory. Members of the British Phosphate
Commissiuners,acting in their capacityas memliersof the Christmas Island
Phosphate Commission, were responsiblefor the phosphate mining on the
island. Duringthe 1960sand early 1970sphosphatemining there wasscen to be1 [291 WRITïEN STATEMENTOF NAURU 271

enWonmentally danmghgto forests and certain wiidlife. Presswas applied

in Australito desisfrom mbhg. Thememben ofthe Commission bowed to
thepressureand carriedoutconservationand restorativmeasures (Williams&
Macdonald,The Phosphareecsp,p.532-3). Sucrestarationduringthe same time
period,was not wnsidered appropriattoprote3 Nauru a,Tmt Territory,and
the interests of the Nauniansbeneficiarieofthe Trust.

78. In respect of employment policyon the idand,Australia stated that
'because of other benefrts Nauruans "didnot End itnecessary to seek
ernployment"in the industry(Rem Objdns, paras. 143, 144). The
British Phosphate Commissionen hd ahvays a very stratifiedview of

employrnentpolicy. Managementand aeniorlradesmen were European (mostly
Australian). Cheap skilledlabour was imposted hom Hong Kong, aswas
ordinaq labour fromthe 1920sto 1950Erorn1950 remitment of labourers was
undertaken from the Gilbert and EllIslandscolonyofthe United Kingdom.

79. For reasons of control aeaseof production, labourwould not normally

be remited frorn the isfand whereminhgwu being undertaken (Viviani,
Nmrru, p.36).This allowed comparativefreedom toship out therecalcitrant,
unnily,rebelliousor unproductiveworker who was sirnply under contract.
Despite this policy the British Phosphate Cornmissioners and Australian
AdministrationinNauru had renin-ing difficulties with Chinese laboThe

introductioof Gilbert and EllicIslanderafter thWar had "asalutaryeffect
on the prductivity and behaviour of the remaining Chinese" (WiIIiams &
Macdonald,The Phosphrueers,.405). The BritishPhosphate Commissionersdid
not have the same eue of dealing with the Nauniam. While a few were
employed,there was some reluctance to employthem. The Naunians naturally
wanted to progress inthe industry thrmgh to management level, but when

employed were always placed in the area of skilled or semi-skilled workers
(VivianiNm, p.90). Thismaybecomparedwith the present situation where
the senior management positionsof Generd Manager and Assistant General
Manager areheld by Nauruans, anda number of managerial positions are also
filleby Nauruans.

80. Dunng the early 1950st,e BritishPhosphate Commissionerswere under
pressure to producemore revenueto the United Kingdom for development in
the Gilbert and ElliceIslanda. At same tirne,increased royaltwere being
sought in Nauruand the Tmsteeship Council was pressing the Australian
administration on resettlement. Questions were being saised whether272 CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU WI

resettlementohouid be a charge against the cost of production, yet another
attackon Naunian assets{MacdonaldI,n PUIFlLIftheSd Tmt, p.45).

81. In thiselimatethe Prfme Minister oNewZealand,MrKeithHolyuake,
had stated in1963 to MrPaul Hasluck, the Ministerfor Exterd AEfairsof

Australiathat "the main objecofthe whole exerciseistosecure the supply of
cheap phosphate to Australiaand New Zealand" (MinisterialTalks,12 June
1963, Records of the New ZeaIand h.iinistry oAgriculture and Fisheries,
Nation alrchivesWellington,1%4/914 citedin MacdonaldI,n Rm-uit ofthe

SacredTrust,p.45).The originalphilosophyconceivedbyMrHughes,legîslateé
forbyAustralia inthe NauruIslandAgreement Act 1919(Ob) andapplied by
the Australian administration,wamaintainedthroughout. In accordancewith
itscharter, theBritishPhosphate Cornmissionersstrenuouslysought 10 keep
wsts dom. Itorganised a reIativelycheap labour policy,foughthard against the
demands of the Australian waterfront unionsfor white crews (William &

Macdonald, The Phosphateers,pp.369-72), exerçised concern over increasing
cos& of administration in Naum and taxesOcean lsland[Banaba),and sought
to ensure that the TrusteeshipCound (iike its predecessor,the Permanent
Mandates Commission) should not have tocimuch inforrnatioa and, In

particular, its detailed iaccounts,disclosetoit. The pattern of the British
Phosphate Commissioners was O€ a tight mercantilisi group pursuing their
chartered aim to provide the cheapest possible phosphate to Australia and New
Zealand. They provided no golden eggto Naum or tothe Nauman çomrnunity.
It wasa governmentaiorganisation setup to subsidisethe farmers of Australia
andNew Zealand andthus taassist theu productionandgrowrtat the expense

of the Nauruan Communiry.

82. Australia mentions (PreliminaryObjectium,para.142)that un occasion
resourceswere directed by the British PhosphatCornmissionersto assist in
Naunian housingprojects or other public projwhen the administration could
not respondto the need. This was so,but the BritishPhosphate Commissioiiers

did not do this gratuitouslEach project was costed and paid foout of the
proceedsof mining (cg. post-warhousing:Viviani,Nauru,p.90). In othwords,
Nauman assets paid for everything.Australia made surefulfilliMr Hughes'
prophecy,that Nauru didnot cast the Australian ta-payarcent. The benefits
mer-dl wereto beAustralian, not Nauruan.r 3I WRITTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 273

SectionS. The EEonornic SituationatIndependence

83. Australia (PreliminmyObjectionrp,aras.146-51)statesthatNauru was in
1968 potentiallyavery rich Statebecause it nowhad mntrciIof its phosphate.
This has no relevanaeto theissuesinvolvedin thepresent claim. Nevertheless
some matiersneedto be keptin mind inrespectof the situatiofacedbyNauru.

(9 The isIandis very small,and when mined out, four-fifths wibe
uninhabitableudess substantiarestorationis &ed out (Nauru

Memonal,vol. 2, photograph 1).

(ii) Suppliesof phosphaterock representa wastingasset. Totaikofa
percapita income ina partinilayeax or achosen setofyearsis a
rni~leadingstatlstic. With the endof primary mining in a few
years,theprcapita income figurewill bmeasurably reduced.

(iii) Nauru, through its Nauru Phosphate Royaities Trust, has a
substantial investrneprogramme, and given the vagariesof the

world'sinvestmentmarkets it hasperformed creditably.Ithardly
meritsthe gratuitousremarks ofAustralia thaNauru "shouldbe a
communityof essentially retiredpersons - with no necessity to
work - living on the substantial income from the phosphate
resources" (Preliminay Objections, para 151). Nauru is

demographicatly a youngand expanding communiiy (Nauni
Mernorial,para.222) with its hopes firmiy set on thfuture and
withthe desire to plaaprogressiverole in the Pacific.

(iv) The argument presented in Annex 26 of the Preliminary
Objections is hardlygermane to the subject.The Naunian claim
concem breach of obligations under the Tmst. There is no

Nauruan daim "that it was leftwith inadequaie resourcesat the
time ofindependence"(PreliminruyObjections,para. 151). That is
a completeirrelevance.274 CERTAINPHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU 1321

Wtion 6. Conclusion

84. AustraliainChapter2 of itsPreiiminq Objection(para.142) hasitself

dernonstratedtheclose entanglementof theAustralianadministra tih the
BritishPhosphateCommissioners. The BritishPhosphateCommissionerswere
nevera çompletelyseparateentig. Theywere partand parceloftheschemeof
things.

85. Onthe subjectof the economyofNauru thehelimhaq Objections(and
especiailyiitAnnex 26) de& inappropnatelyand gratuitomlywith matters
whichareof norelevance tbthiscase.Whateverthereaons Ausidia may have
for placingthismaterialbefore the Court,it does nothingto supportthe
Austrsliancase,The same canbe saidafortion'of volume3 of thePreliminmy
Objectionswhich simplyconsistsof one articleproducedifulftoma popular

magazine,apparentlymitten by a jtiurnatisin relatiotûwhom there Is no
evidence of any panicular expertise concerningthe Island. There isno
evidentidmaterid produced by Australiawhichin anyway demonstratesthat
Nauru ha acted inconsistentlorexhibiteda lack ofgood faith.The legal
groundsforrejectingthoseassertio aresdealtwithinfurtherdetailbelow(see
below,paras.392-4291, PARTm

ISSUEOFJURlSDTCTISTRICTOSENSU PART m

ISSUESOFJURISDICTION STRICTOSENSU

THEALLEGED AGREEMENT TO SEITLE: DISPUTESBY DIRECT
NEGûTIATION

SeEtion1. 'ElieAustralianArgument

86. In its Preliminaty Objections, paras. 276-91, Australia presenta
jurisdictionalobjection on the basis oreservatioto Australia'sacceptance

ofthe Court'sjurisdictiwhichexcludes:

"anydisputeregartowhichthepartiestheretohaveaorshd agretohave
recouretosomeothermetboofpeacelulsettlement".

87. The legalsignificancof this formulatiowill be examined below in

Chapter 2, and the conclusion offered there is that the reservationdnot
extend trdirectnegotiation. However,on the hypothesisthat the reservation
could saextend, the questiontbe addressedin the present chapteriswhether,
on the facts, therwas an agreement to settlthe Naunian daim by direct
negotiatiom as contended by the Respondent State (PrelimUimyObjectiom,

paras:278-83).

Section1. Confusionsinthe AustralianPosition

88. Rie Australian pasitiocontainssignificanelements of confusionand

these result ina seriesof essentially conflictingpropositions,whcan be
surnrnariseas follows:278 CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU Pb]

(a) Nauruageed to settle its claiby direct nego~iatioduring the
continuance of the Tmsteeship (PreliminaryObjectionr,paras. 278-

831.

(b) There was a "cornprehensive settlement" beolleenNauru and the
Respondent Statesigned on 14 November 1967 (ibid.paras. 10,15,
28&3).

(c) There was an absence of agreement on tbe rehabilitationoworked
outphosphate lands inthe period 1964-19 5ut therewasan express

waiver by the Head Chief, Mr Hammer DeRoburt, on 6 December
1967(ibid.paras.125,251-54,268,273-4).

(d) Irrespective of the factuaI assertions involved in the above
propositians, therwas a settlemerit of the issue of rehabilitation by
the organsof the United Nations (ibid., paras.267-71,284-91).

89. These very marked elements of confusionprovide strong indications that
the assertionthat thewas "anagreement to the settlement of disputes bydirect
negotiation"isnot supported by reliable evidence. The four propositions relate
113questions of fact but the Australian Governent hasmade no attempt to

reconcile fhese inconsistentfactuaiassertioThus it is impossibletreconcile
the existenceof"acornprehensivesettlement"(the Canberra Agreement of1957)
with "an agreement ta the setuernent of disputes by direct negotiation"
(FreliminmyObjections,para. 283). Likewise itis impossible to reconcile the
idea of a "comprehensive settlement" in the Canberra Agreement with the
proposition that theres a waiver of the claiby the Head Chief in December

1967. It isalsodifficultto reconcile tassertionthat therwas an agreement
(of some kind) wiih the proposition that the Tmsteeship Couno1 and General
Assembly hnd "final autharity to resolve any disputes semafning unsettled"
(PreliminarObjections,para. 286).

Section3. Thereisno Evidenceof an Agreement toNegotiate asan Exclusive
Mead of Dispute Settiement

90. The Goverment ofNauru contends that thereis no evidence of any
agreement to resortto negotiatioas an exdusive method ofdisputesettlement,

and that no such agreement was ever made. The Australiari Goverment hasE371 WRITTEN STATEMENTOF NAURU 279

produced no partimlars ofsuchagreement. No cluesare providecas to itform
or even the date onwhichitwasmade.

91. The agreement alieged doesnotfom part of theCanberra Agreement of
1967,and this iacceptedbythe AustralianGovernment(PreliminaryObjections,
para. 280). If it is suggested thasucb an agreement were concluded as an
ancillaryaspect ofthe negotiationsof 1967 no document ts prove thisare
introduced.

92. The principal argumentpresentedbyAustralia is to theeffectthatthe
Canberr Agreement of 1967 constituted"a comprehensive settlement of all
claimsby Nauniin relation to thphosphate industry"(PrelimVtatyObjections,

para. 282). This assertion contradias the argument (ibid., para. 283) that there
was an agreement to settledisputebynegotiation.Nor did the1964 Agreement
explicitlyorby necessaryimplication state that it constit"aecomprehensive
settlement ofailclaims"by Nauru in relation to phosphate industry, including
that of rehabilitation. In view of the nature and promiofthe rehabilitation

clairnfor Naum, such a stipulatiowas notody imperativebut would normally
havebeen expected;its absence onlymeans that there wasno agreement of any
sortand that the 196Agreement întended todealwith matters it expresslydealt
with,namely transfer of ownershiofthe phosphate industryand arrangements
forits operations.

93, The evidence of the dealings between the Nauru Local Government
Counciland the Administering Authorityin the period immediately priot to
independence revealsthat the issuoef rehabilitation remained untesolved and
was lefton one sideseethe NaumMemonal, paras.585602.

94. Similarlyin the various contacts, whettier formal or informal, between
the two sides since independence there isno single reference toan agreed
procedure, and no proposahfor direct negotiation have been made by the
Australian Government at any time. Australia has in fact alwap refused to
negotiate.

95. The relevant United Nations records in the period preceding
independence contain noreference to an agreement to negotiate. CERTAINPHosPlihTE LANDS 1N NAURU
1381

Seciion4. TheRetevance ofUnitedNationsResolutions

96. InitsPreIimVuvy Objechm (paras. 284-91) Australiaallegesthatatthe
terminationoftheTrusteesN haup,iagreedtosettlement"ofdi issuesbetween
itandtheAdministering Authority,byresolutionof theTnisteeshipCoiinciland
Generai Assemblr. It is diffïnito see howthis can relateto theAustralian
reservationwhjch is basedupon the consen of the Partie "so same other

methodofpeaçefuîsettlement".

97. The authorityof the hsreeship Cound and the GenesalAssembly in
relatioto thesettlementoflegaldisputeswillbebeed inPar IV, Cbapter
3 of thiWnrten StatemerilFarpresentpurpases itf sdcient to indica taet

thereis no reasonto suppose tbat the authorityofthe General kssernblyta
terminate the Trusteeshipderived,or could derive,£rom the consentof the
Parties.

98. In anyeventneither Nauru nor Australiaat any time called uponthe

GeneralAssemblytoresolve therehabilitatiodispute,

99. The fact thattheTrusteeship Councilencouragn eedgatiatianbetween
Nauruan representatives and the AdministeringAuthority (d Preliminmy
Objections,paras. 278-9) does not take matters much Eurther. These

deveiopmentsdo not provideany indicationthatdisputeswhich rnight remain
unresolvedat the timeof independencecouldody be resolvedby negotiation,
muchless do they establishthexistenceof an agreemenbetween the Partieiso
settIe disputesexclusivelybynegotiation.

Section5. The Actionsand StatemenisOPthe~aurban Representativesbefore
Independence

100. Inthe contextof the argumentbased upon the alleged agreement to
negotiate,Australirnakesthefollowingstatement:

The RepubiicofNaurubaseits caseonMientitltoinvoketiheactionsand
slatements of representativthefNauruanpeople,before independence.
Clearly,thmusialsh boundbytheir actionsstatemcnathatlime."

(hiiminuy Objections,p290.)[391 WRI~TEN STATEMENTOF NAURU 281

101.Inresponse to thk Austrdian contention isnecessaryto providecertain
elements of clarification. It is not unuforlinternational tnbunalto accept
the relevance and validitofpre-independence transactionswhen the nature of

the issuesand the historyof the dispute rnilitate in favourof such acceptance.
This is particularly appropriawben both Parties recognise the relevancand
validityof the pre-independenmtransactions:see,forexample,the Sudgrnentin
the TempleCase (Merlrs)1,CJ.Reports 1962,p.16.

102. In the present proceedings both Partiesremgnise the continuity and
sequence of the relationbetween theNauruan representatives,n the one side,
and the Adrninistering Authority on the other, inthe yearsleading up to
independence in 1967. In thepassage setforthabove (para.tOO)the Austrdian
Governrnentunequivocallyrecognisesthis continuity.

103. In panicular, the very natureof the prelirninary objections, and the
arguments based on an alleged pre-independence settlement or an alleged
agreement to negotiate, couldnlyhave anyvatidityon the supposition that the
constitutive factsof thelegaldispute priorto independence have been duly

recognised in principlby the Respondent State asa legaldispute persistinat
the rimeof independence,in subsequentdiplornaticexchmges, and in the course
of these written pleadings. Except on this premiss, the plea to the jurisdiction
which isthe subjecof this chapter wouldnot have beepresented to the Court.

Section6. Conclusion

104. On the evidence there was no agreement to negotiate asan exclusive
methcd of the settlement of disputes. In particular, the conduct of the
Australian Govemmentcontradicts this position. Australia hasalwaysrejected

Nauruan initiativesleading toward negotiations. Nauruhas alwaysbeen willing
to settleoutstanding issuesby negotiation.

105. In any event the alleged agreement couId not refer to the clairn
concerning the overseas assetç of the British Phosphate Commissioners

(Memonai, paras. 469-84):see below,ParV.

106. The questions of an alleged express waiver and an alleged prior
settlement of the dispute raised in the PrelimUiwyObjectiomwbeladdressedin
Part IV,Chapters 2& 3of this WriitStatement. PART III

CHkPTER 2

THE PHRASE"SOME OTHERMETHOD OF PEACEFUL SE'ITLEMENT

Section1. The OrdinaryMeaningor the Reservaüon

107. The reserrationinvokedby tbeRespondent State excludes"anydisputein
regard towhich the parties thereto have agreorshall agree to havremune
tosorne other method of peaceful settlemenEnthe viewof theGcsvernmen tf

Nauru the ordinarymeaning of thk phrase would involvmethods of thesarne
type asrecourse to judicial settlement, that isay,otherforma1 thud party
setdement procedures leadingtoalegallybindingdecisionSucb "othermethods
of peacehi settlement" would include arbitratïan and certain fom of
conciliation, whichinvolve established procedures which are capable of finally

resolvingthe dispute.

108. The term "recourse" and "peacefusettlement"connote established legal
procedures whichlead toadefinitiveresolutioofthe disputeThis isreinforced
by the word "other'*in the phrase "someother method opeacefulsettlement".

This sets up a"other method"as analternative ta recourse to the Court, which
indicateçthat the "other" methodwould have the sameconsequtncesand be of
broadly the samekind,asrecour s4the Court,Le.,that it would involsome
satisfactoryand conclusiveprocedure fbringingthe disputtoan end.

109. It EolIowsthat diplornatic negotiation anprocedures of non-binding

conciliation ormediationdo nofdlwithin the relevanclass.

Section2, In anyCasethe Reservatioacanonly havea ContingeneOperation

110. In the alternative the Goverment ofNauru submits that, even if the
reservation includes resort to negotiatit cm only operate contingently and

thuscan have effectto prevent the exerciofjuiisdiction onlyif arbitrahasn
been tried in goodfaithbut withoutsuccess or if the Applicant State, against
whom the seservationis invokehasconsistentlyrefusedto negofiate.284 CERTAIN PHOSPFIATELANDS INNAURU [42]

111. On this view of the reservation the Australian Government, havîng
tonsistentlrefused tonegotiate, cannottely uponit toexclude the jurisdiction
of theCourt. The evidence of the Australiaattitudeinthi rsespecisreviewed
inPart IV,çhapter 1.

Section 3.TheTemporal ApplicationoftheRedienation

112. In the furtheralternative, andon the hypothesis that thereservation

includesresarttoarbitration,the formulation cannotapply to the transactions
between the Naunian representatives and the AdministeringAuthority pnor to
independence. The retrospecîive application of the reservatcannot ÎnvoIve
referenceto n periodin which Nauru could not have beeaa partyto the system
ofçompulsoryjurisdiction.

113. This view of thematter isbased exclusivelyon the logiof jurkdictional
instruments and the system of the Optional Clause. This positionis entirely
compatible with the argument (see Chapter 1 above, paras. 100-103)that the
constitutivefacts of the legal dispute prior to independence have been

recognised by theRespondeat Stateasa legal disputepersisringat thetime of
independence.

Section4.TheReservationin relationtoArtide 79,paragraph7of the Rulesor
Court

114. In the subrnissionof the Government of Nauru the appIicationof the
Australian reservationisintimately related to the evidenceas to the overall
development of the dispute. Consequently,the objection based upon this
reservation does not possess, in the circumstanceof thecase, an exclusively
preliminary character : see the Judgment inthe Cae Conceming Militruy and
Pmilitaty Activitisinand againsrNicaragua, l.ÇJ. Reports 7984,pp.425-6,

para.76; LCJ.Reports 1986,pp.29-38,paras. 37-56.

Section5. There was noAgreementin Fact

115. By way of apostscripttothe present Chapter the Government of Nauru

wishes toreaffirmits position that no agreemeto settle thdisputeconcer~ng
rehabijitatiowas infact made. Apart£romthe other evidence available,itisto
bepresumed thata State in the positiof Nauru would be unlikelytomake an1431 WRITTEN STATEMENTOF NAURU 285

agmement to settletherehabilitatiodisputeexclusivelybynegotiation. This
would have amounted to allowing the Respondent State todetermine the
outcorneby theexpedientofrefusingtonegotiate. PARTIV

AUSTRALIANARGUMENTS BELATING ADMISSIBILïIT PART TV

AUSTRALIAN ARGUMENTSRELATtNG TO ADMISSIBILITY

DELAY OR PRESCRImON

Section1.Analysisolthe kgal Elements

116. The AustralianGovernment presentsan argumenb tased uponextinctive
prescription,nthefollowingterms:

"..Austrawouldneverthelesubmitthat tCourrshoulddeclitohearthe
daims onthcgroundthatthe passagoEtimemakesitinappropriaforthe
Courttoheartbem,andbatit shouintheexerckeofitdisaetiodetermiDe
thatmore thaa reasonabamouni oftimehaselapsedin whito bringthe
claims".

(hliminwy Objectio,ara.381.)

This objectioappears tobe presentedasa ground ofinadmissibility,

117. The objectionisexpresslybased upon arule ofextinctive prescriptionin
general internationallaw(PreliminruyObjectio nsras.382-6). Theexistenceof

such a rule is perharather more problematicalthan appearsfrom the account
inthe PreliminruyObjections.Thus CharlesRousseau pprvidesa substantial list
of teferences in a passage entitled "Doctrine hostile l'admission de la
prescriptionextinctive: roiittemaionai public,Tome V, Paris, 1983,pp.179-

80, para. 174 (citing Anzilotti, among others), Another distinguishedFrench
lawyer,Roger Pinto,has also adopteda verycautiousattitudetowardextinctive
prescription:RecueidesCours, HagueAcademy, vol.87 (1955,1),pp.440-8.

118. However, the Goverment of Nauru does not wish ro enter upon a
doctrinaldiapute.There isgeneral agreementthatincertainconditionsdelay on290 CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU Iqg]

the pariof a claimant State may render a claiminadmissible.Thereis more
diEficultyn detedning what theçeconditionsare. Both the jurisprudence and
the legd literaniredrawcertaindistinctt ioensastcommonand incisiveof

whichareasfoiiows:

119. The Preliminary Objectiom(paras. 382-3)conveys the impressionthatthe
lapseof timeperse maybar a daim. This isnot a correv ciewof thelaw,and it

is nota position supportedbylegal authority.The standardauthoritiesrequire
one ormoresuperaddce onditions fora clairntabebarred,usualiy In the form
of some element of culpability on thtpartof the claimantor unfairness to the

respondent.

120. ThusOppenheim statestheposition as follows:

The principleofeminctiprescription,[batist,hebarofdaimsbylapsthe,
isrecc-gkd byInternationl aw.lt haken appEedbyarbi~stiontribunain
a numbr of casesHowever, ik desirabletbattheappiiution of the principle
shouldremah flexibleandthatno attemptsbobemade toestablisrixedtime
limits. Delayin fheprosecuofa claioow aotifito thdefendantStateis
notsa likeltoprm fatal io ihe sucof theclaimasdelay in iioriginal
notificatias,one of the mainjustificatiousofp&ciple is toavoidthe
embarrasment OFthedefeudanthyreasonof hi inabiütioohtaievidencein
regardtoa ciaiof whichb otùySrbernesawarewheait iaireadystale;anda
protestathetime othe mumence of thdelinquencbasben beldtoprevenr
timefromru& dst thedaim Forirsredress."

(Intmiahnd Lmu, vol1,8theh.byHerschLauterpacL hatn,do1955,pps-
50; quotedin Whitemau(ed.), Digw oj IntematidLaw, Washington,1963,
vol2,p.1062)

121. The tendency of the jurisprudenceis not to adopt the view thaz lapseof
time as suchbars a clairn. The AustralianGovernent has quoted Erom the

decision in the StevensonCase (Prtliminary Objections ,ara.3831, and it may
assistthe Court if thepassage quotedis accompaniedby the passage bywhichit
isfolIowed.The passage quotedinthePreliminaryObjectionsis as follow~:

"When a daimisinternationdpreseotedforthefmttime aftea longlapsof
cime,therearisbotba preaumptionanda fa&. Thepresumptionmorcor les
strongaccordingrothe attendingUrcumstanceai,s thatthere issome la& of
honestyin the;claeitherthattherwas aeverabasiforitortbatitbasbeen
paid. Thefactisthatbythedelayin mskingtheclaimtheopping part- in1 id91 WRITEN STATEMENTOF NAURU

thi mse theGwernment - is preventedfromamumuiatingtheevidencew its
partwhichwouldopposethe daim, andw ihi fad ark anotherpresumption
that imuidhave hm adduced.In suchacas the delayofth&ant, ifit did
noî establisktthe presumpjustreferre10,wouldworkinjustiu:andinequity

initsrelatitotbe respondeni overneni."

122. The passage which immediakly followsit, but which isnot quotedin the

Ptdiminary Objections,isas follaws:

This casepresentrneitkterof thefeahiresWbenkst producd befocathe
MixedCommissicmof 1869t ,heclai or 513Jï7.6f0or injuriestheRio de
Oro estatewas allegetolx of &te February1859, was alsothedaim for
$77,645onacuiuntoftheLa&mna, Mapirifo,and Sm Jgimeestate. Theclaim

of theBumal estatforS43,660.8[as laidahappeningin 1863and theclaim
oftbeSanJa&o estatfor$1,260wasIai hdlW, Mar& 6. So tbatthearijest
çlaimwas about ten pa014 thenexiinorderonlysipxars, whileth1stclah
wasso lateas thave beeninfactsiibsequetotheconventionestablishithat
Commission. Hete wasplacedbeforetheGoverment a carefdkt, innumber
and charaaer,ofthe lussessuffered,andthe diReraestatesw whicheach
separateclaimrested,witbtbedates on wbchth.dinereatdaim s rose. This
gavethe respondeG utvernmentan opportuniito acquainitselfwithe facts
and to&tain cnuaterprmfifroundadable orimportantSkce the withdrawai
ofthisdaimfromthe Md Commissionof 1864therecui no jwtallegalion
oflacbesproperlychargeableteithcr tciaiman trtheclaiman twemment.

The delayhasbeen either inthioaWty or theunwdhgaess of Venezuelato
respondto tbidaim.The mion ofthisunW;Xnpess md the reasonwhy ir
wasplacedon the kt of "unrecognizd'imsareprogerlymatterforproofand
consideratiobeforethiCommission,butit wouldlxevidentinjusticerefuse
the daimant a hearingwhen the delaywas apparentlywioned bythe
respodent Govenuneut."

(ReportsofInternationAlrbitrAwards,volIX,pp.386-7.)

123. The Australian Government asserts that "analogies canbe drawn from
domestic lawin order toassist theCoun to detemine an appropriate limitation

period":Pseliminary Objectioru,para. 386. It may be doubted whether such
analogies cm have any significancein therelations of States: see, for exarnple,
Pinto, Recueil des Cours, vol. 87 (1955, I),p.447, para. 57. The vicissitudes of

international relations do not jusiifyrecourse to rigorous time limits, especially
in the relations betweensmall States and more powerful States. Unless the deiay
isunreasonabie,claims will be accepred after long periads, as in the Stevenson

Case, whichrelated to claimsoriginating between 44 and 34 yearsearlier.292 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU

126. In his major treatise, Charles ~msseau' presents the foIlowing
observationsby way ofconclusion:

'iwuvientpourîindepr&nter deuxobserdons.

1)Lorsquelapremiptiwestrejeté,'esnonparpace'eln'exispaseohuit
internatiom,aiparcequelesraisonsdel'appliquermanqea l'pefe....

2)LesdCesion asbitralesécartn6tnéralemlt presaiptidanslescasoti
le retard -me nan la présentatiode la rkhnatian, mais son
renouveliem.t.

Lesdécisionsestimquela réclamatin'estarpdte cwipte tenu dfait
qu'elleadejA&ré ,résent&une premikrfoisetquelaraisonde son non-
renouvellement doipas nk&ement êtrcherchtedam la nk&enw de
1'Etrkclamant:

(Droiiniemationalpublic,TV,P&, 1983 ,p.181-2.)

125. lt is generdly accepted that delay may in the cirmmstances of the
partinilarcase constitutan impliedwaiver oftheclaim. This involvesno more

thanthe application of theprinciplesof consentand renunciationto the law of
internationalclaims. Tlieremustbe adequateproofof the intentionto waive the
claim,and Iapseof timewillnotnormallyconstinitesuchproof.

C. THER ES APRBSUM~O AGAINSI.E~N~ON OPA CIALM BY LAPSE OP T[WE
SUES~UW TU Nmi~rano~ OFTHe &M TOTHE RESPONDE SNA~E

126. The authoritiesreved thatthe principalelementin the conceptof "undue
delay"or "presniption"is delay in the original notificatiof the clairnto the

Respondent State. Once a daim has been notified or presented to the
authoritiesofanother Statetbereis a strongpresumptionagainsttheexistence of
undwe delay: see the DaylighfCme, (1427) Reports of InternationalArbitral

Awards,vol. IV, p.164atp.169;Tugli~femC i ase,ibid.,p.59atp.593.

127. This position has very strong support in the legai literatore, Thus

Witenbergand Desrioux expressedthe position:1511 wRInEN STATEMEm OF NAURU

"EnFin si 1~ retard se produit aprks que I'Etat demandeur a prkatd
diplomatiquemenlar6damatinn I'Etat&fendeur,la presa-iptiest alors
cat&~riquemenrtepoussk."

(L'Org~iPatioJudiciah:h Lad&n? a Ln Sentence IrzImdmnlesParis,
197,p.142,para.36.)

128. Theeighth edition ofOppenheim bySirHerschLauterpachtmakesthe

samepointin adiEerent way:

"Delayin theprosecutioaodaimoncen& tothedefendantStateinot so
ükelytoprwe fatto thesuccesof thedaimasdehy iitsmgbd notifiçation,
asoneofthemainjustificationtheprincipleisto avoidtheembarrassrnenotf
thedefendantbyreasoofhi snabiittoobtainevidericeinregardto a cofim

whichheodybecornesaware&en it iaire* staiand aprotesaithetimeof
the occurrenceof tdehqueucyhas been hetdtoprtventtimefromrudq
againstthdaimfor iredrw."

(Oppenheim,Intmm'~ Lnw,8th eh. by Su HerschLauterpacht,London,
1955,pp.349-W.)

129. The same opinion may k found in the major treatise of Charles
Rousseau:

"Lesd6ckionsestimenquelareclamation'espasprescricte pteienudufait

qu'ella dkjhktk pprésentmee premikrefoiet que lac&n de sonmon-
renouveiiement e dopasnecessairementêtrcherchéedansla oéglgencede
I'Etatrkclammt."

(Droit iniern~~onaigu,omeV,Paris,1983,p.182.)

130. Other relevantcitationsincludethe follawing:Borchard,The Diplornatic
Protection of Cirirem Abroad, New York, 1925, p.831; Ralslon, The Luw and
Pmcedure of Infernariona lribwtals,rev.edn. ,tanford,1926, pp.379-82, paras.

688-94; Cheng, GeneralPrinciples of Cm, London, 1953, pp.384-6;Whiteman
(ed.), Digest oJ IntemafionalLaw, Washington, 1963 , ol.2, p.1062 (quoting
Oppenheim,above, para.128).294 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU [521

131. This principle,which emerges clearly €rom the decisions of arbitral
tribunalsi,srelatto theprinciple(PrinciplCabove)butis treateinthelegal

sourcesto some extentas adistin pritçiple of procedurdequity.Apart from
the element of notificati(examinedabove), the mostsignincantquestion of
proceduralfaimess concernsthe availabiliof evidencezoallow a Respondent
State adequate means of defence. This element wns referred taby Umpire
Blumley in theStwemon Cuse, Reportsof International ArbitrAwards, vol.

IX, p.385, and also inthe Award in theAmbdkbs Cme, Commission of
Arbitralion1956,p.13.

132. However, whencircumstmcesindica ttefno procedural disadvantage
existedinfact,then there canbeno legalbasisforb~nng the claim. There is

considerable outhority for the proposition that the notifica claimper se
exdudes the principle of extinctive prescriptionsee the Tagliufem Cm,
Repens of International Arbitral Awards, vol.IV, p.592 atp.593; and the
GiacopiniCae, ibid.,p.59at p.595.

133. In like mamer a claim cannotbe barred if the Respondent State had a

contemporav record of the facts, omay reasonably beexpected to possess
records relevant to the claim: see Ralston, Tke Lm and Pmedwe of
InternationalTribd, rev. edn., Stanford1926. pp.38@1, para. 691; King,
(1934) 15 BritiFYearBook of InternationaLm. p.90. Nor will prescription
apply iftherelevantfacts are admittedor are otherwi ne isputablesee the
WUim Case,Reports of InternationalArbitral Awards, vol.IV, p.4181 at

pp.4197-8.

134. The dilatorinessor prevaricationof the Respondent State is afactor

excludingthe extinction oa daim on the grounds ofprescription. Thisisa
logicalcorollarof the principle basupon the procedurd disadvantage to the
Respondent State (above).Thus Borchard observes: WRITTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 295

"[Wlhere.the dilatorinessof the defendantgoverutsresponsiblefor the
delayin prosecutionorpayment,the daim havingbeenscasonablybrougitso
attention,thedaimnotcansideredasbarredbyprescription.'

(nieDiplomatiePmiectionoCitizemAbd, NewYork, 1925,p.831-(references
omitted).)

The same point of principle appears inother authorities: see Ralston, TheLaw
and Procedureof Intemational Tribwrals, rev. eh, Stanford, 1926, pp. 381-2,

paras. 693-4;Cheng,Generalhhciplerof Law, London, 1953, p.384.

Section 2.Therehas beenno ImpliedWaiverof the Claim

135. On the evidence there has been no implied waiver of the claim on the
part of the Republic of Nauru. Moreover,the Respondent State does not relyon
any waiver orabandonment of the claim since independence. According to the

evidence the clairn was notified to the Austraiian Government prior to
independence and communicated to that Government at the highest level on
vanous occasionssubsequent to independence. This evidenceis reviewed below.

Section3. Therehas been no Delayin Notificationof the Claimconcerning
Rehabilitation

136. The Australian Govenunent has argued that the claim by Nauru has not

been made within a reasonable time (PreliminaryObjections,paras. 381, 398).
The argument focusesupon the means bywhich a claim is pursued or enforced,
whereas the principle of prescription relates to the notification of claims. The
persistent refusaiof the Australian Government to enter upon negotiations has

created a situation in which it was reasonable that Nauru should have recourse
to alawfuland normal alternativemeans of settlement.

137. The claim of the Nauruan communityto rehabilitation of the worked out

phosphate lands has been a major feature of the political and historical record
since 1964,when the option of resettlement on another island was finally laid
aside (Nauru Memonal, paras. 567-80). The negotiations between the Nauru
Local Government Counciland the Australian Govemment in the years 1965to

1967 related to three major questions: politicalindependence, control of the
phosphate industry, and responsibility for rehabilitation of the worked out
phosphate lands.296 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDSIN NAURU (541

138. The Nauruan delegation participating in the talks consistently
distinguishedbetweea the obligation to rehabilitate the phosphate lands mined

out before 1July1967 and the responsibilityof the Republic to rehabilitate land
mined out subsequentfy. This remained the position of the Nauruan
representatives in the period immediately prior to independence on 31 January

1968. It was,for example, reflected in an amendment to the Nauni Constitution
made shortlyafter independence: see the Memord, paras. 615-8.

139. At the UUrd Meeting of the Trusteeship Councii, Head Chief Mr.

Harnmer DeRoburt referred to the as yet unresolved issue of rehabilitation in
these words:

"XI. On al1those matten, NL agreement had been reached between the
AdministeringAuthority and the representatives of the Nauruan people. There
was one subject, however, on which there wasstiii a difference of-opinion
responsibiity forthe rehabitation of phosphate lands. The Nauruan peoplefdy

acceptedresponsibity in respedof land minedsubsequen1iJuly 1967,since
under the new agreement theywere receiving the net proceeds of the sale of
phosphate.Prior to that date, however,they had not receivedthe net proceeds
and it wastherefore their contention thathreeGoveniments shouid bear
responsibiity for the rehabitation of land mined1pJuiy1%7. ntaf war
not an issuerelevantto the teminotion of the TnuteeshipAptement, nor did the
Nawuam wish to make it O matterfor United Nations dhcursion. He mereiy
wishedto place on recordthat the Nwwan Govemment would continueto seek
whd wac,intheopinionof fheNawuanpeople,ajust seulementof theirclaUni."

(TrusteeshiCouocil@cial Records, Uth SpecialSessio22 November 1967,
p.3(empbasisadded).)

140. This unequivocal statement to the effect that the rehabilitation issue had
not been the subject of agreement was not contradicted by anydelegation in the
Trusteeship Council.

141. A remarkable aspect of the Preliminary Objections is the attempt to
establish that the Head Chief, Mr Harnmer DeRoburt, gave an expresswaiver of
the ciaim relating to rehabilitation, and did so on 6 December 1967. This

contention has no basis and the question of an alleged waiver is examined in
Chapter2 of thisPart (see paras. 162-87below). For present purposes it is to be
noted that the Australian argument involves a recognition that the issue
remained open after the Canberra talksof 1967.CS51 WRIlTEN STATEMENTOF NAURU 297

142 That rehabilitation wasa major issuewnnected withindependence and
that itremained unresolved at the the of independence were both mattersof
public recordin theofficialrecordsof theTmteeship Cbuncii,the Cornmittee
of Twenty-Four, and the Fourth Cornmittee ofthe General Assembly(Naum
Mernorial,paras. 603-14).

143. The fina rlund of talksbetween theNaunianrepresentativesand "the
Joint Delegationof Partner Governments" tmk place inCanberrabetween 12
April and 14 June 1967. The agenda was the"future arrangementsfor the
phosphate industry". During these talks the Nauruan Delegation expressly

repudiated the idea that the Naunians had accepted responsibiiity for
rehabiIitation (NauruMernorial,paras .93-601T ).he JointDelegation was left
in no doubt about theprominence in the minds of theNauruan representatives
of the questionof rehabilitation.

144. Neither the Heads of Agreement resultingfrom the 1967falks(Memonal,
voI. 3, Annex 5,p.420) nor the text of theNauru IslandPhosphate lndustry
Agreement of 14November 1967(ibid.,Annex 6)containedanyreference to the
issueof rehabilitation.

145. In the view of the Nauruan Delegation takinpartin the Canberra talks
in Apiil-June 1967the question of rehabilitation remained unresolved. This is

clear fromthepositionof the Head Chief expressedin the Trusteeship Council
on22 November1967(see above, para.139).

146. Consistently with this position, at the tirne of independence the Head
Chiefstated that:

We holditaght BritaiAuslrdiaandNew Zealantorecognisthait Btbeii
respoasibitorehabilitateonethithe &land."

(SeeNauruMernoria,aras.6s-17.)298 CERTAINPHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU i561

147. After independencethe issue of rehabüitationremainedvery much in
view. Latein 1958 the Presidentof Plauru,Mr HammerDeRoburt,addresseda

request for the holdingof talks onthe waysand mem of conçtructing a new
airstrip"asarehabilitationproject"tothe AustraliaeMinist ofr xtemal AEfairs
(Le tterdated5 December1968; Nauru Mernorial ,ol4, Annex76).

148. The Australianrespome, in a Ietter dated 4 Febniary 1969, showeda
keen sensitivitiotheissueof rehabilitatioand dedtwithit inaformal contexr:

"1bave~orrsuiiedthe NewZealanandBntishGwernments onyour proposai.
You will rd that theFartner Gwernments, in thtalksprecedingthe
terminationof the TrustdpAgreement.didnotampt responsibityFothe
rehaùiitariofmined-ouptimphatelandsT.he PartneGovernmentsremah
uinvincetdat thtermsof the settlementwithYoExceilencyGmrnment
weresufticientlygenerousto enableit to rnneedsfor rebabiiitatioraind
developmeot. In the circumstrurcest,hesyourdi derstand bat the
PartnerGovernmentsreaotableto weeiiyourpro@."

(Mernoiiol,volAnnex77.)

149. It wasnot onlg the Australianside whichunderstoodthe continuitywith

the pre-independence developments as the statement of the Head Chief,
MrHammerDeRoburt, appended to theMemoï+al,shows (Memonal,Appendix
1,paras.27-31). This statement also recaltsthatthe issueof rehabilitatiowas

raised atthe highestlevel in 1973 and 1974. Inthe words of the then President
of Nauru:

"Ona StarVkit toCanberrain lm,1 raiE cdththe thenPrimeMinister,the
HonourableE.G.Whitlam,the questionOFrebabilitasa matteofconcem.
Apain, when SeoatorWillesetheActing MinisteroForeignAffairs in the
WhiflamGwernmentinAustralia.visitedNam i1974,1raisecitmatterwith

himbuttono avd. A subsequeot approatothAustralianPrimMinisterthe
HonourableRJ.L. Hawkein1983merwith asimii tespanse.Athatpoint,my
Govement, weUunderstandiagthatprimarymining ophosphatwas withia
fewyearsofuimpletioq decidedthan independent study ofrehabüitation
problemshouldbeset-upandsothcCommkion ofInquirwaslaterlaunched."

(ibid.,para.M.)[571 WRITTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 299

150. The Australianresponse to the Resident'sinitiativof1983 (Mernorial,

vol.4,Amex 78)mk the fomi ofa letterhm the Prime MinisteM r,rHawke,
dated 14Match 1984. Thilsettercontainsthesiatemeat:

"Aftercarefulmariderationof yquesf inuwsulta~onwith myMinSm
wncemed, I wito infom youthaA~alia staadsbyrhepitiw 1ttmk in
1957wheaiqgethewithNew Zealaudandtbc UnitedKlngdomit rejedea
simiar requafw rehabilita&ce. Theformerpartner govements
agrd at thahue bat iwas a requircmcoftemidon of thetntrteeship
ageementtha heywereentireideartd of anyanushanciairesponsibility
fotherehabilitaonPiauni.'

15L Thispassage clearly assumes the existence of alegal issuewhich had
subsistedafterindependence. A legaiargumentis proposed - the effectofthe

terminationof theTrusteeshipAgreement - butthere isa clearrecognitionthat
a disputeexistsSuch recognitioncanalsobe found in theAustralianNote dated
3Februq 1988(Mernorialv, ol.Annex 80,No. 20).

152. The Preliminay Objectionspresentsan argument to the effect that the
"prewioucslaims by Nauruhavenot asserteda legal daim and,hence,do nui
preclude an argument based on delay" (p. 158,heading to SectionII). This
argument involvesa confessionin thatitsbasisi~thaa claimwas made but(itis

asserted)theydid not involve"any claimof legal right" (Prelimhq Objecrions,
para.393). Inpartlcularitisalleged:

"Frorn1968unt19a3NaurumadenoforniaistatementordemantoAustralia
inrelationits presentdaiNo.wniw ofalegaentitlerntasmade.In
particulnorassertiobasedon breachof the TrusteesAgreement was
made.'

(ibid.,pa389.)

153. This argument is miscanceived. The fundamentalquestion is whether
reasonable noticewa given ofthe existenceof the claimconcerned.This issue
is one ofproceduralequityand it issubstancerather than form which countç.
TheAustralianresponse to the variousinitiativeson thpartof Nauruhasnot

involve any elementof surprise. The Australianresponse has been topIead
that iherehad been a settlement in 1957. There could not have been any
elernentof surprise.300 CERTAINPHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU [581

154. Rie Naman initiatives werof a diplornaticcharmer and included
personallettersfromthe Sresident ofNauni to theAuçtralianPrime Minister.
The purposewas to initiatnegotiarions.It would not lx miormalinsucha
contexttoparade alegd argument, muchless to setforththecauses of action.

Gien the historof Nauman-Australinn reIations,threferenceto the question
of rehab'üitatiowould be perfectlyclearto allmncemed The Australian
responses to Nauman requests did not take thefora of requestsfor further
information,becausenonewas needed. Nor do the Aiistïaüan documents
cornplainof anybreak in~lntinulty.Thougbouttheperd £romindependence

until thpresentprmedings the AustrdianGoverment was weU aware of the
Naunianpositionon rehabilitation.

Section4. Australinhas notSufferedany Disadvantage

155. The Respondent State claims that it facesprejudice in meeting the
Nauruan claim,and, in particular,difficukiesarising£rom"thedisperor110%
of criticevidenceandthedificultyof assernbling relevantmaterialthat dates
not just to 1968butgoesback to thestartof at IeastthTrusteeshipperiod in
1947"(PrelirnimqObjeçfions ,ara.395).

156. Inthe submissionofthe Govement of Nauru thisassertionhasnobais
in factA significantproportion of the reledocument ase officialrecords of
the bague of Nations or organs ofthe United Nations The recards of the
Naunian-Australian talks of the period 1965 to 1967 were in Ausualian
possessionfromthe start. Otherdocumentsexisrin the AustralianArchives.

157, Indeed,in the çircumstancesof thiscaseit is Australiawhich has the
advantage because,at the tirne of independence and at arnatenaltimes, the
Austrdian Govement has had exclusiveaccessto certain mateRa1evidence
and could choose towhat exteni, if atdl, Nauru could have notice of this
evidence. It is at present Nauru whihasoutstandingrequests to Australia for

assistancein thesmatters:see the Mernoriaparas.642-8.

Section5, TheConductoftheResponde ntate

158. The passage of tirne since the firstoccasion on which Nauruan
repreaentativepsressedthe ciaimconcerni tegabilitatioisdue to the refusal
of Australia to respond aconsiructivewayto the Nauman approaches. There[54] WRITTENSTATEMENTOF NAURU 30 1

isstrongevidence thatAusudiahadtaken a mistaken view ofthe legalposition,
especiallyinrelationtothe Nauru lslandAgreement af1919 (see the Memwial,
paras.325-31). in particiilar, the attitude of the AustralGoverameuthas

always reflected the position adoptedby the Solicitor-Generalin 1965 (ibid.,
paras.329-31).

159. Whatever the reasonsfor Australian complacency and intransigence in
face ofthe Naunian claim, thiscomplacencya, nd theresdtantdelayinrecourse

to asettlementprocedure, mot infahess be allowedto prejudicethe position
of Naum.

Section6. TheRelevance of Article79,-ph 7 ofthe Rulesof Court

160. In the submission ofthe Governrnent of Nauruthe Australian argument

based on extinctiveprescription closelyrelated 10the evidence conceming the
overalldevelopment of the dispute and the general conduct of theRespondent
State hth before and after independence. Consequenf iyaccordance with
Article 79paragraph 7 of the Rules ofCourt,theobjection baseduponlapse of
time does not possess, in the çirçurnstances of the case,an exclusively

preliminary character: see the Judgmentsin the CaseConcerningMilitary and
Pammililq Aaivitiesin and agaimt Nicaragw, I.CJ. Reports 1984,pp.425-6,
para.76;LCJ. Reports 1986,pp.29-38,paras.37-56.

&xtlon 7.Conclusion

151. In conclusionthe followingelernentsmaybe givenemphasis:

There has been no failure to give notification of the substancof the
(a) Naunian daim.

(b) The existence of "deiayi'fany kind relatesto the persistent refusal of
Australia to negotiate oropropose third partysettlement. As Urnpire
Plumleysaid inthe StevensonCase (above,para. 131):

The delay ha ben either inthe inabilior the unwdhpess of
Venemela torespontothicslaim".302 CERTAINPIiOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU Wol

(c) The Ausualian argumentbased on the alleged agreement to have
remurse io negotiationis incompatiblewith the allegation of
unreasonabledelay.

(d) Australiadoesnotrelyon any waiverorabandonmeno tf theclaimsince
independence.

(e) There $as been no inequitabletreatmentof the RespondentState. To
thecontrarytheAustralianGovernent bas hadthe advantageinrespect

of mntrolofand accesstokeysource osevidence.

(f) The objectionbaseu dpon"delay"doesnot applytothe clah relatinto
the overseasassetsof the British PhosphatCe ommissioners,andthe
Australianobjectioninotrelatedtothiclaim. Section1, TheAushdhm ment

162. The Respondent State does not relyon any allegation of the waiveor
abandonment of the daim sincethe independence of Nauru. Moreover, major

aspects of the hliminary Objections involve the arguments, presented
separately, that thCanberra Agreement of 14 November 1967 constituted a
"comprehensivesettlement" ofall outstanding issues anfurthet,that there was
a settlement of the issue of rehabilitation by the organs of the UNations.
Suchargument tg,etherwiththe contention thaNaum had agreedto settleits

daim by separate negotiation, are incompatible with the asserti ohnt the
Naunian representativeshad waived the claimconcerningrehabilitation.

163. Againsithis unpromisingbackground,it is a matter ofsurpri oefind that
an argument basedon the allegatbnofa waiver before independence appears in

the PreIiminnryObjections.However, the argument is introduced inalow key
and is presented withinthe penumbraofother arguments.

164. The allegation of the waiver appears two passagesin thePreliminaiy
Objections,atpara. 125, and again at paras.247-75. The evidence relied on
consistsexclusivelyof a passage in the address by the Head Çhief, Mr Hammer

DeRoburt in the Fourth Cornmittee of theGeneral Assemblyon 6 December
1967,and the constructionwhichthe Australian Gevernment seeksto place upon
the wordsused.

165, The context of the argument iç the recognition in the PrelimUtq

Objectionsthat a legal disputconcerning rehabilitation existed at the time of
independence, the nature and modalitiesof which related in parteventsprior
to independence. The contingency of a waiveror renunciationofthe claim isa304 CERTA~NPI-IOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU [621

mdaiity ofsuch a dispute,andthe argumentbasedon a waivereffective after
the independenceof Naurumnstitutesrecognitionthat, but for the alleged
waiver,a legadisputewouldsubsist&er theindependenceofNauru.

Section2. ïhem was no Waiver inFnct

166.Theassertion thata waiverexistedrestsexclusivelupona singlepassage
inthe speechdelîveredby the Head Chief of Nauru,MrHammerDeRoburt, in
the Fourth Cornmittee on 6 December1967. The passage ifquoted in the

~Iirnhvy Objectionr,ara.251 andthewordsalleged to constituaewaiverof
theclaimare as foliows:

The revenuewhicNam hadrmivedinthepastad wouldrceeiintheneiU
tweoty-fiyearsould,however,makepossiblesolvethproblem".

(FotheentirepassainitwntexseeNam Memord,paras. 509-12.)

167. The AustralianGovernrnentha failed to providany panicularsof the
waiver allegedbeyond anassertionhat the words used mnstitnteawaiver.The
context - "theproblem"referred to- was the general econamiç prospect for
Nauru after independence in the lightof the eventual ehaustion of the
phosphatedeposits. The contextwas notan appraisalofthelegaiagenda at the

time of independence. Cansequently,the wordsusedand the contextcannotbe
relied upon as prducing an apms waiver (and ir is significanthat the
AustralianGovenunent avoidsthe epithet"express").

In the absence of the indicia of an expresswaiver, the Australian
168.
Governent ha the burden of establishingthat theconduci of the Naunian
representativesgenerdlyin thematerialperiodconstitutedanUnpliedwaiver. It
is,in anyevent, well secognisethattherenunciationof legalrightsinot tobe
presurned,asthe opinionsofthefollowingauthonties bearwitness:

*
Guggenheim,Tmdé de droit internationGenéve, 1953,p.144; 2nd edn,
1967,vol.1p.281;

* Suy,La ActesJuridLpes Unildru en droit internationpublic, Paris,

1962,pp.159-64;1 Ch31 WRI'TTENSTATEMENT OF NAURU 305

* Fitzmaurice,(1953) 30 BritirhEfearBook ofInlemafionui h pp.44-5

(aisoinFitzmaurice,The Lnu and Ptrxeduo retheIntemaibnal Courf of
Justice,Cambridge ,986,vol.1,pp174-5);

* Rousseau, Droit intedord public,Paris,Tome V, 1983, p.182,para.
176.

l
169. In theabsence ofan expresswaiver, a transactionomlly accompanied
bysomedegreeof fomality, and at leasevidenoeof somequidpro quo or causa,
it is incumbenupon the RespondentState to demonstrate thatthe conductof
the clairnanrno wholegaveunequivocailndicationsof the renunciation of the

daim.

170. The evidence clearlyindicates the absence of any such renunciatioNo
mnternpraq Aurtraiian source referr to the existeof a waiver,expressor
otherwise.The relevant Generai Assernblyresolutions referred tci the duty of

rehabilitationand the resolution granting independence (Resolution
2347(XXII)) recalled thetwo earlier resolutions which contained prominent
teferencesto rehabilitatisee the NauruMernorial ,ara. 613.

171. As tathe conductof the Nauruan representativeintheperiod leadingup

toindependence, thekey stepsare asfollows:

172. (a) During the talks of 1967the Nauruan Delegation formulated its
position on responsibility for rehabilitation verclearlyand
maintained this position throughout the talks. The Australian
Government has not invoked the records of the 1967 talks to

support thewaiver hypothesis.(The relevant material is reviewed
in the Nauru Mernoriai,paras593-502.)

173. (b) The Nauru IslandPhosphate IndustryAgreement was signedon 14
Novernber 1967. This wa in effect the result of the taiks.
express waiver had been decided upon as an aspect of the

bargaining process, iwas this juncture at which sucha waiver
would have surfaced. And itwould have emerged in the form oa
clause in the Agreement. Itiscontrary to good sense and normal
practiceto suppose that,afterhe conclusionof the talks and the
end of the processofnegotiation, the Naunian side should choose

to make a renunciation cawally and in response tano initiative 1

CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS 1NNAURU 1641

which would providea rationabasisforsu& a radicashiftfroma

longheldposition.

174. (c) During the important debate in theTmteeJhipCound on the
issu of NauruanindependencetheHeadChief made a veryclear
statement of the Naunian position on the rebabilitationof

phosphate lands. The contexwas thempe of the agreement with
the AdministerinAguthorityand thepurptmo zfthestatement was
"toplace on record that thNaunianGovermentwould continue
to seek what was, inthe opinionof the Naunian people, ajust
settlementof their daims" (see iheMemd, para 609). Tbis

stakment was made on 22 Novembet 1%7, shortly der the
signing of the1967Agreement a,ciit specincaily addresses the
rehabilitation issue.ess expresslywithdrawn (and this dinot
occur) such a reservatioof rightswould continue to have effect
even if iwerenot repeatedon every occasionon which Nauruan

representativesaddressedorgamof the United Nations.

175. (d) On 6 December 1367 the Head Chief addressed the Fourth
Committee of the General Assembly, and iis a passage£rom this
speech which is relieupon by the Respondent Stateasa waiver.

In the cirnirnstances the presumption is that the Head Chief had
no intentiontoVary orweaken,much less toresile £rom,the clear
and forcehl staternenpresentedto the TrusteeshipCouncil on 22
November. Nor was his statement in the Fourth Cornmittee
referred toor understood by other delegationas constiturina
waiver.

176. (e) At the time of independence Mr HamrnerDeRoburt, now the
President of Nauru, immediately re-affirmeclthe claim relating to
rehabilitatio(seethe references inthMemord, paras. 615-17).

177. In thesubmission ofthe Goveniment ofNauru thepatternof conductin

the criticperiod fromApril 1957untilJanuary 1968doesno1 provide any bais
forthe contention of the Respondent State thMr Harnmer DeRoburt waived
the claim,moreor tessinpassin& duringhisaddresson 6 December 1967. In
panicular,thereis no reasonablebais on which theCourt could infer thar the
wordsused on 6Decembe r ere intended to supplant the verylucid formai

affirmationof22 November.1651 WRITTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 307

178. To this theGovernment ofNauru wouldadda further submîssion. Even

if,whtchh not admitted,the wordsused bythe Head çchieon 6 Decemberwuid
be consmed as king in some degreeout of linewith the overallpatternof
conductficim April 1967until Januq 1968,superficialinconsisten~escannot
derogatefrom the general weight andmnsistencyof the evidence asto the

positionofthe Partiynvolved.

179. This submissionon the lawcan be supponedbyreference tothe poliq
adopted by the Court inthe Anglo-Nomie& Fbheries Care,in whichthe Court

said:

".itisimpossjbto relyugma fewordrtaLw hm a srnglenotodraw rhe
condusiothatthe NorwegiaGovernmenthadabandoueda positionwhichits
earliofficidocumentbsaddearliodhted.'

180. Inhischronicleof thejurisprudenceof the Coun SirGerald Fitzmaunce,
dting with referencetothe rubricof "admissions"f,mulated the principlethat
"too much account should not be taken of superficialcontradictionsand

inconsistencies(see thepassages citedin paragraph 168above). In supportof
this SirGerald quotes the Court'sjudgrnentin the Anglo-Norwegwl ELFheries
Cafe:

The Courtfonsidersthtm much importanceneednobeattachediothefew
uncertainrorscontradictions,real or appwhich.theUnitedKingdom
Gwerament daimstohaveùkmered inthe Norwegiapractice."

{I.LJ,Repor1951,p.138.)

Section3. The NuclearTests CaserareImlevant

181. The Australian Govemmtnt contends that as a consequence of the

alleged waiver na dispute existed between Nauru and Australia and that
therefote the claimis withoutabject (PreliminmyObjections,paras. 273-5). In
support of thiscontentionpassagesare quotedfromthe Judgment intheNuclear
TestsCases.308 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU

182. Inthe submissionof the Governent of Naum this argument lacis
substanceand addsnothing tothe argumentbasedontheexistenceof anaileged
waiver. Inthe presentcase"the objecof the claimha not disappeared(cfthe
Nuclear Test Cares,1.CJ.Reports 1974,pp27 1-2).The Respondent Statcbas
not expressedanywillingueçbto settle tdaim specifiedintheApplicationand

Memotiai. There is noactortransactionequîvalenttotbe staternentmadeby
the French Gwenunent. Suchan act or transactioncouldonlyhave the legal
effectcontended forif it removed thbasisforthe relief soughIn the preçent
casethe allegedwaiver forms part ofthe menu of thecase andrepresents an
issuewhich can be resolvedinthe ordinaq way as anaspectof the rnerits.As

the Nuckm Tests Cares shows,the disappearanceof the object of theclah
involv prsciaelythat: has remedialconsequenaes Iyinoutside the question
going tothernerits.

Section4,The Objectionbased on AllegedWniverdoesnot possessan

ExclusirelyFreliminaryCkaracter

183. The preliminary objectionbasedon an alleged waiverraisesquestions
directly related to thissuesof merits and the examination of a varietyof
transactionsand the conduct of the Partiesin general. Consequently the
objection does not possess, in the cirmrnstances of thcase,an exclusively
preliminarycharacterfor thpurposes of Articl79,paragraph 7of the Rules of

Court.

Section5. Conclusion

184. In the subrnission of the Goverriment of Nauru the Naunian
representativesdidnot waive the claim concerning rehabilitation at any time
priorto independence. Itmay be noied that the Respondent Staha not retied

on any allegationof a waiversincethindependenceof Nauru.

185. The a~e~ation that the words used by the Head Chief, Mr Hammer
DeRoburt,on6 Decernber 1967constituted a waiver cannotbe justified for the
foilowingreasons:

(a) There is no basis for the view that the statement on 6 December
constituteda formal waiver, and comequently waiver could only be
proved on the basis of inference from the conduct of the Naunian
representativesgenerallyin the relevant period.[G71 WRITTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 309

{b) The statement madeby theHead Chiefon 22 November 1967 addressed
the issuoef rehabilitation directlyandinformal terms: there couldbe no
reasonable inference that the wordsused on 6 Decemlier involved a

changeof positionon sucha crucialquestion.

The wordsused on 6 Deoember 1967 do not in any event refer to
(c)
Australianresponsibilityfor rehabilitatiobut tothe long term economic
prognosisfor Nauru.

(d) Otherdelegations attending the Fourth Cornmittee meetings at the 22nd
Session of the Generai Assembly did not construe MrHammer
DeRoburt's statement asa waiver ofthe daim to rehabilitation.

(e) The pattern of conduct by the Naunian representatives in the critical
period from April 1967 vntil the arriva1ofindependence is complelely

incompatible with the Australiandlegation ofa waiver.

186. The Nauruan position was express bed Mr Hammer DeRoburt in the
Trusteeship Councilon 22 November 1967 in ~hefollowingwords:

W. On aU thosematters,fuii agreement bad been renchebetween the
AdministeringAuthoriandthe representatiofthe Nauruanpeople.There
was onesubjcct,however,onwhich there wasd a diierena of opinion-
responsibiityfthe rehabilitaofphosphatelands.he Nawuanpeoplefully
accepterespoosibiity in reof Iandmioedsubsqueetlto 1Jdy 1967s,ince
undsr the new agreement tbwere receiving the pro~eedsofthesale of
phosphate. PrioIOthat dathowevcr theyhadnot receivethenet pro~eeds
and it watherefortheu wnteoiioo thathethree Gavements sbouldbear
responsibilfor the rehabilitof landrnineprior 1July1967.That was
notan hue relevant ttheterminatioofthe Tmteeship Apeement, not did
theNamuam wish tomake ira matter for Ueitcd Nations &donHe merely
wishedto placon recorthat thNauruanGoverment wouldcontinue to seek
whatwas,intheopbon of the Naman people,justsettlementtheu claims".

(Trusteeship Councmcid Records, Uth SpeciSessioq22 November1967,

p.3.)

187. This clear statement on an important issue of principle was ntit
contradicted by any delegation, The statement formed part of the debate

leading to the adoption cif Resolution 2149fS-XIII) entitled 'The Future of
Nauru" (Mernorial,vol.4,hex 19).This resolutionlaid the foundation for the319 CERTAINPHOSPHATELANDS INNAURU [681

actionbythe GeneralAssemblyinvolving terminatioof theTrusteeship.The
sraternentof the HeadChief wnstituteda definitiveversionof the Nauruan
positionconsistentwitbtheNauruanstanceduring the talksof 1967,nd itwas
notretractedsubsequently. PART IV

CHAPTER 3

PRIORSEmMENT OFTHE DISPUTE

Section 1.The Austdan Argument

188. The PreliminmyObjectionspresents the argument that the claim ofNauru
is inadmissibleon the specifiground that the Agreement relating to the Nauru

Island Phosphate industry of 1967(the "Canberra Agreement") represented "a
comprehensivesettlement of al1claims by Nauru in relation to the phosphate
industry"(Prelrininw Qbjections,para 282;and see alsopara.20).

189. The evidential bais of this argument is extraordinarily weak and this
weakness is heralded by the contradictions between the various factuai

hypotheses proposed in the PrelimimtyObjectiom. Thus the "comprehensive
settlement" hypothesis lies uneasily alongside the "agreement to settle by
negotiation" hypothesis(see Part ILI,Chapter 1, above), and also the 'baiver"

hypothesis (seethisPart,Chapter 2, above). This latter contradiction stands out
in paragraph 125 of the Preliminq Objectiom, in which the "comprehensive
settlement" has been ovenidden by the allegation of a waiver. In the words of

paragraph 125:

"Evermajorpoliticand phosphatgoal,barone,chathe Naunianleaderhad
set themselves tbhadaçhieved.The exception- thetehabilitatiof the
phosphatelandworkedout toJune1967 -was onewhich ocitherthenor the
PartnerGwenunentsmuidagree uponintheerrtendenegotbtionsithepend
1W-1967. Botb sidesstatcdand restatethek positiontoeach otherin
CanberraandNew York mtil on6 Decembr1967Head ChiefDeUoburt,witb
hiseyes set on independenceand cnnsciousof thedistancethe Partner
Governmcotshad wme in the uegotiatwaivedthe daim by aclrriowledgmg
that'threvenucwhicbNauruhadreceivedin the past wouldreceiv during

the uexr2.5yearwouldhowevermake itpible tosolve thiproblem'. The
subsequentchangeof heartpst 31Jmuary 1368,does notinvaüdatethat
reaunciation." CERTAINPHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU 1701

Section2. TheArgument f'mm Silence

190. Inthesubmission ofthe Government ofNauru thereisa mmpleteIack of
evidence thatthe CanberraAgreement of 1967imrolveda renunciation of the
Nauman claim relating to rehabilitdtirIndeed, tbeAustralian Gwernment

offerswhat isessentiallan argument from silence. ThePreIimbmyObjections
recognises that theAgreement was silent on the issue@aras. 280-2). The
Australian argument isthat thesilencof the Agreement istobe construed as a
renunciationon the partof Nauru, notas a reflectionoa lackof agreement on
the particular issueSucha sequence is extremelyunlikelboth asa rnatter of

legallogicand ofpoliticalexperience.

191. As the Australian Governmentrecognises:'The silencof theAgreement
on the issueis a clearsignofthe recognitionthat the twosides could not agree
on an express provisi...(PreliminutyObjectionspara 280). In suçha case the
normalinference wouldbe that the issue had been leftaside.It is certainthat

there is nbais in lawforan implicationofa renunciation.

192. Moreover, as a rnatter of principle, there isno presumption of a
renunciation of right(see the authorities indicatedin Chapter of this Part,
para. 1681a,nd the general patternof conducton the part ofNaum militates

stronglyagainstthe likelihooofan impliedwaiver (see Chapter 2,above,paras.
169-80).

Section 3. TheCankrra +ment of 14Wvember 1967

193. It is common ground that the Agreement (Memorial,vol. 3, Anriex 6)
containsno provision relatingto respnsibility for rehabilitationreason for

thisis fairobvious,@en theobjectivesof the Agreement. The objectiveswere
to establish arrangements "forthe future operatofnthe phosphate industryon
Nauru" and thisk stated in the preamble. This recital is basupon the first
paragaph of the Heads of Agreement concluded in Canberra on 15 June 1967
(Memorial,vol.3, Annex 5,pp.419-25).

194. The contentsofthe Agreement related exclusivelyto thfutureoperation
of the industry. The provisionshavea coherent setofpurposesand na part of
the Agreement is devoted to any claims or liabilities relating to the previous
period of miningoperations. In sucha miliea renunciationofclaimswould not1711 WRITTEN STATEMENTOF NAURU 313

be ej&m geneh. IEis diffidt teenvisaa geprms of implication whichas
no correspondingarea of expresprovisionsinwhich taoperate. The procesaof
implicationrequiresa communityof intention and rneaning anda resultant
association.

195. It isalso commongound that therwas no renunciation duringthetalks
at which the Canberra Agreement wasprepard. In thePreliminaryObjecfiom
Ausualia expressly recognises thiinseveralpassages. Thus it is stated
(ïrehinary Objectio pnra. 125thatthe issuoefrehabilitatiowas one which
neitherthe Nauruanleaders nar the PartnerGovernrnents"couldagreeuponin

the extendednegotiationsin thepend 1W1%7". Again,in paragraph 280,it
isacceptedthat "rehabilitatiwa~mt expreçslydealwith in thAgreement".

196, The documentary record of the 1967 talks dernonstrates that the
Naumansadhered totheir position onrehabilitati(seethe Mernoria!p, aras.

592-602). Moreover, an attempt by the Australian Governent to includea
clauseapprolnmate to a renunciation in the dtaft wasunsuccessful(ibid., para.
598). The Nauruan position was reanirmed by Mr Harnrner DeRoburt in the
Tmsteeship Council on 22 November 1967, shortly after the conclusiofthe
Canberra Agreement.

Section4. Conclusion

197. At the end of the day the Australian Government hi15failed to offer a
single document insupport of itscontention that there was a "comprehensive
settlement" in 1367. The documentaryrecord indicates the contrary. Theris

nothing on theface ofthe Canberra Ageement of 1967which suggeststhai it
was such a settlement. Many issuesconcerning Nauru were lefaside,and the
trilateral Agreementof 9 Febmary 1987 (terminating the 1919 Agreement)
(Memonal, vol.4,Annen31)provides evidenceof this.

198.
Funhe rvidencethat the CanberraAgreemenrhada limitedsignificance
isprovided by General Assernbly Resolution U47(XXII) adopted on 19
Decernber 1967, which involved the decision to teminate the Trusteeship
Agreement. This Resolutionrecordsan agreement between the Naunian people
and the Administering Authority to the effect that Nauru shouid accede to
independence on 31 January1968 (see the operative part, para. 1).n this

caritextthe Resolution states that "the Administefing Authority complied
with the requestof the representatives of the Nauruan people forfull and314 CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS INNAURU C721

@$ed independence"(emphasisadded). In its preamblethe remlution

recallsthepreviousresolutionsof 1965and 1956 bth ofwhichmakeprominent
referencetotheissueofrehabilitation(NauruMernorialp ,aras613-14).

199. In particular the preamble refers to Generd AssernblyResolution

1514(XV of 14 December 1950 wbichcontains the si@cant üeclarationon
the Grantingof Independence to Colonial Gountries andPeoples. In the
operativepartofthe Declarationparagraph 5 providesasfo2lows:

"5. Immediaiestepsshd iaken, TnisiandNw-Self-GovcrningTerrituries
or aUotherterritorieswhave~ioya attaineindepwdcncc, etrader ail
powerstothepeaplesof hase territari- wanymadith orresedoas,
inaccordariceiththeirfreexpd WUand dUsacw,iibwtaodkhctioo
as to raceuced orwlour, in orderto enablethem IOtjoy comptete

independenceanheedorn:

200. In thelightofthisprovision,anditskeyphras'e hithoutanyconditionsor
reservations"i,is tobe presumedthat theGeneralAssemblyand its Fourth

Cornmitteewouldnot have countenanced the viewthat Nauru was ta attain
independence on the bais of animplied renunciaticiofal1rightsnot expressly
acknowledged by thePartner Govemnts intheCanberra Agreement. PART IV

Section1.Introduction

201. In the Pr~1imVi.y Objections,paras,213-75, Australia argues that the
Nauruanclah & inadmissiblebecause "the termination of the Tnistebyhthe
United Nations precludes allegations of breaches of the Trusteeship Agreement
from now being examined by the Court "d.,para. 213). According io the

Australian subrnission,this is eitbecause the Trusteeship Council and the
General Assembly had aclusivejurisdiction to determine issues relating to the
Trusteeship Agreement (id.paras. 2%30), os because the terminationof a
Tmsteeship Agreement necessarily settled"al1 legal issues relating to
Tmsteeship Obligations"(id.,para231-75).

Section2. The Objectionbased onthe Effectsof Terminatiodoes notPossess
An ExclusivelyPreliminatyCharacter

202. AJ wil1be arguedbelow (paras.212-243), the legal consequences of the
relevantGeneral Assemblyresolutions, and especiallyResolution U47(XXiI),

can only be determineci&er a full analysis of tcirnimstances leading to
independence, of the Naunian and Australian positions on the various issuesin
dispute, and of the negotiations which preceded independenc- negotiations
which, as Austrdia elsewhere concedes (see Prelimhaty Objectiom, paras.
278E.),were capable of having continuinglegai consequences. The General
Assemblydid not expresslyresolve the Nauruanclaim relating to the issue of

rehabiliiation, sinaeresolution of that claimwas not necessary to resolve the
immediate question of Nauruan independence, and the Generai Assembly was
wt asked to resolve it. The legal consequencesof Resolution 2347(XXII) are
accordingiybound upwiththe whole cornplexof transactionswhich aroseinthe316 CERTAlN PHOSP1,IATBLANDS INNAURU [741

cruci are-independence period,and whichare centraltothe Nauman claimon
the meri&.

203. Inthese circumstances theissue of the legal consequences of Generd

Assernbly Resolution 2347(XXTI)should not be subjected to a summaq
resolution of the kind soughtby Australia. Moreover it isnot an issue of
jurisdictiosm'ctosensu ,uch asought to be determinedata preliminary stage.
For tthesreasom it is submitted that the question dws notpossess,in the
circumstancesof thecase,an exclusivelypreliminarcharacter.

Section3. The Nauman Clalm SuMved theTermination of the
Tnisteeship: Summary of Arguments

204. In the alternative,issubmitted that the clairnwhichis the subjed of the

present proceedings suMved the termination of the Agreement and was not
extinguished,or authoritatively determined iaway adverse to Nauni,by the
General Assembly. The bases for this submission,which aredeveloped in the
followingSections,areasfollows:

(a) Lhe General Assembly and the Tnisteeship Council did not have
exclusiveauthority to determine legal isarisingfrom the Tru~teeship
Agreement (seeSecti onparas.205-11below).

The termination of the Tnisteeship did not automatically extinguish dl
(b)
legal claims arising€rom the administration of the Trust Territbut,
onlythosewhich itwas necessaryto dealwithin order to giveeffetothe
self-determinatioof the territoror which were actuallypresented for
decision(see Sectio5,paras.212-34below).

(c) The Generd Assembly did not intend or purport to terminate rights
vestedin the Naunian people under the Tnisteeship Agreement and
associateniles of international law(see Sectioparas.235-7below).

(ci) Even ifexpress recognitionbythe competent United Nations organwas

requiredto preserve Nauru'srights, there was such recognithere(see
Section7,paras.238-42below),

These issueswillbe dealt within turn.E751 WRITTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 317

Sertion4. Lhe General AssemblyandtheTnisteeshipCouncildid nothave
ExclusiveAuthoritytoDetermineLRgal IssuesMsing Prom the Trusteeship
ment

205. Australiaarguesthat "thecompetence to determine anyalleged breach of
the Tmçteeship Agreementand Article 76 of the Charter rested exclusivelywith
the Trusteeship Coiincil and the General AJsembly"(hlimhwy Objeatom,
para.224). It doesso nohthstanding its mncession (id.,paras.217-8) that the

obligationsarisingunder the TrusteeshipAgreement andrelated rulesare legai
obligations whichare inpnnciplejusticiable.

206. The exclusivecompetenceof the politid organsof the United Nations to
deterrnine legd questiom is not tobe presumed. Aftet dl, the Court is"the

principal judiciaorgan ofthe United Nations"under Article 92 of theCharter.
Not even the SecurityCouncil's"prirnaryauthority"over matters of international
peace and securiryexcludes the jurisdictionof the International Court to
determine legal issues relating to the use of force: see e.g. Militap and

Pammilitary Activitia in Md Agaimt hricamgrra (Nicaragua v United Stafes),
JurisdictionandAdmksibility,I.C.JReports 1984 p,.392aipp.431-6;Meits, LCJ.
Reports 1986, p.14atp.25. NeitherChaptenXIIandXII1 of the Chartenor the
Trusteeship Agreements conferred "prirnary"le,t alone exclusive,authority on

the TrusteeshipCouncil or the General Assembly.

207. It has been doubted whether the poiiticaorgansof the United Nations
have the power "to settle legal disputes"as such, (Cf. H. Lauterpacht, The
Dmelopmen t ofInternationaLaw bythe Intemaiional Court, London, 1958,325-

9.) Article 96 of the Charter, andArticle 36(3) of the CauStatute,implythat
legal disputes are subject to authoritative determination through the judicial
proçess, and especially through tbiCourt, the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations. What the political organs of the United Nations can do isto
mate new legal and factual situations, thereby producing the result that the

investigationof the legaistm quo anie becornes wholly hypothetical, and no
longer capable of affecting present legal rights. Thiswhat happened in the
Norihem Camemm Cme: it certainlyhanot happened in thepresent case.

20&. The Courtin the NamibiaOpinion rejeçtedthe argument that the matter

of cornpliance witha mandate agreement was exclusiveiya matter for the
General Assernbly. This was despite theapparentiyrestriaivelanguageof the
requestforthe advisoryopinion, which referred onlyto the consequences othe318 CERTAINPHOSPHATELANDS INNAURU [761

relevant SenuityCouncil resolutioa See I.CJ.Reports i971p ,.6atpp.45,47,
50,52. On the Çoun's treatment ofthisissueseeals JudgePetrtn,id.,at p.129;
Judg Onyem atpp. 143-5;JudgeDillard, atpp.151-2.Thatpositionapplies
equallytoaTrusteeship Agreement.

209. Ifcornpliancewitba Tnisteeshlp Agreement was exclusivela matter for
the politid organs of the UnitedNations, thenthe legd position of a Trust
Territorywould be weaker than that of a non-self-govemingterritory under
Çhapter XI,whichcannot becorrect. In factthe Courthasfrequeatlydealtwith

legal issuearisingfrom mandated, trust and non-self-governingterritones, men
where those issues involved politically charged controversies or diffïcult
questionsof appreciation.On the occasio wnhsenit hasreW to deQde such
issues (theNoxthem Camemm Caseandthe South Wesl Afnka Cm (Second
Phrrse)),it diso for distinct and limited reawns, reasons whidid notirnply

that the politicorgans of the United Nations had exclusivecornpetence over
legal issues. factthe implicationwas preciselythe opposite.

210. Australia relies on the absence of a compromissory clause in the
Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru to argue that, at least in tcase,only the

political organsof the United Nations were comptent to adjudicate upon or
deal with legal issuearising£romthe Agreement (PrelimUzarOy bjections,para.
BO). In principle the existence of -an international legal obligationis
independent of thejurisdictionoany international couor tribunal with respect
tu that obligation. Moreovermanyof the casesbeforethe Court under Çhapters

and XII1involvedterritories in respect of whichtbwas no campromissory
clause. The Austrdian argument is anotherof the many unsuscessfulattempts
by administeringpowers to treattenitones which had beenClas sç' mandates
a a farm of disguisedannexation: see further NamibiOpinion, I.C.J.Reports
1971,p.6at p.32.

211. For these reasons the argument rhat the Tmsteeship Coiincil and the
GeneralAssemblyhad exclusiveauthority over legal disputisuntenable.

Section5. Termination oftheTnisteêship did notExfinpish theNauruan
Llaim eitherbyOperation of Law orOthemise

212. Austrdia argues (PreliminatyObjectiom,paras.231-615that theGeneral
Assernblyby its resolution settled "al1the legal issues"that had arisen or cauld
have arisenwith respect to the Trusteeship Agreement and related niles of WR~TTENSTATEMENTOF NAURU 319
l [773

internationallaw. For ihisproposition it relinspartinilaon the decisionof
theCourt in theNonhem Camemm Case,1.C.J. Reports 1963,p.15.

213. But this propositionwas not adopted by theCourt in the Morthem
Camemns Case. That case relatesody to legai daims necessatily and

intrînsicallyinvolveinthe decisionas to themodeof implementation ofself-
determinatiog or legal claims expressly presented to the relevant United
Nations bodiesfor decision. Both situations existin the NorthemCameroons
Case. Neitherexktshere.

214. Furthermorethe issue presented tiythe Republic of Çameroon in that
casecould not be dealt withby theCourt withi tnhelirnits of itsjudipawer,
because thatissuewas acornpletelyabstractone,and because,within the United
Nations systemof self-determination,the Republic of Camermn couldassertno
right thatwas inconsistent with the primarynght of the peopie d theTmst

Territoryto self-determination. Againas will be seen, neither situatexisis
here.

215. For these reasons,whichareelaborated more hlly below, the Australian
argument iwithout substance.

216. It bas long been recognized that a Trusteeship Agreement has two
aspects,the aspect oatreaty andthe aspectof a regime forthe administration

of territory in the inteofthe people of the territa regimeof Trusteeship.

217. Ifthe relevant categorfor the purposes of the suMval of rights is the
categoryof ueaties, then the general principle is that the teminaaifreaty
does not tenninate rights acquired under it:cf. Sourh Wesr A@ Cases

(Prelimimy Objections],.CJ.Reports 1962,p.319.

218. If the relevant category for the purposes of the sufival of rights is the
categoryof trusteeshipregimes,then the general principle is that rightsacqiiired
under sucha regime su~ve the dissolutionof the treaty which creatitif that
isnecessay in order to protect the intereofthe beneficiary:cf. Intemarionai

StahcsofSouthWestAfi-i.cnI,.C.J.Repor1950 p.128.320 CERTAINPHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU 1781

219. On either bais, then, arightor legitimatclah of the peopleofNauru
under the Trusteeshipmust bepresumed to havesuMvedthetermination of the
TrusteeshipAgreement. Such arightorclaim muld have been extinguisheonly
if duly fermjnatedby the cornpetentauthority,orif such terminationwas the

necessaryconsequenceof actslawfullyperformedbysuchanauthority.

220. The Courtin the Nodwn Cmemm Cmedid not decidethat al1 legal
claims &ing €roma Trusteeship Agreement wereterminateci,by operationof
law, on the terminationof the agreement. It was concerned with a spe&c

situation, clearpresentedfor its decisi-nviz. te futureof thepeople of the
Tmst Tenitory, and in particularthe validitof the plebiscitethat had been
held. As the Court said, "the termination of tTrusteeshipAgreement was a
legaieffectof the wnclusions in paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolutio1608(XV)",
whichparagraphsexplicitlyaddressed those issues (I.C.J.Reports 1963p.15 at
p.32).

221. TheCourt in its judgment noted that the Republicof Cameroon had
raiseditsplea af nullity of the plebiscites before the General Assembly,and
construedparas.2 and3 of Resolution 1608(XV) as aspecificrejection othis
plea. The Court's holdingon terminationof the Tmsteeshipis co&ned to this

issue. Inthe presentcase,at thesuggestionof the Nauntan representative and
without anydemur from Australia, the cornpetent United Nations organs
rebained from dealing with the rehabilitation issue, and treated that isase
distinct fromthe question of independence and terminatioof the Trusteeship.
Accordingly tednation of the Trusteeship can operate as a bar on@ to
reopening the question of political status, andnot in relation to other

outstandingissues.

222. Itistrue that the Courtdid state that rights and privileges grantto
other United Nations members or their nationals came to an end (id., at p.34).
But that comment relatedonly tothe exerciseofthose rightssubsequentto the
tednation of the Trusteeship. This was axiomatic, since clearly those ri&&

were onlyconferred forthe durationofthe Tmsteeship. The Court did notdeed
to decide whether the nght tdaim reparation for breacheof thoserights and
privilegeswhich had already ocçurred would have survived the fermination of
the Agreement. BothJudge WellingtonKoo and Judge Eitzmauricethought that
had such rightsexisted under the Tmsteeship Agreement, they would have

survived:id.at pp.55,120.The Court itselfleft the isopen: id.,at p.35.I791 WRITTEN STATEMENTOF NAURU 321

223. Narwas the Court conçerned wiihthé question whethera rightorclairn
vested in the peoplofthe Trust Territriwodd have survivedthe termination
cif the TrusteeshiAgreement. In tbe circumstancesthis wa~ not surprising,
since the people concerned were to bemme part of another State and ex
hypothi would lack any separatelegaipemnabity as a basisfor rnaintaining

such aclaim.

224. The Courtalsoeqressedthe viewthat "theRepublicof Çameroon would
not have had a rightafter1 June 1961w ,hea the TrusteeshipAgreement was
terminated and the Tmst ir~elcame to an end,to ask theCourt to adjudicate

upon questionsaffecthg the rights of the inhabitantsof the former Trust
Temtory and the general interestthesuccessfufunctioningof the Tnisteeship
System" (id.at p.36)But again thiwas not becauseofanygeneral mle that"al1
legal issues"arising hom the Trust weripsojure terrninated, bbecause any
rightof the ApplicanStatetobnng proceedingswaspart of thewhole "systemof

protection" establishby the Agreement and byChapters XII andXilI of the
Charter. The Applicant State's right wnot personalor individualbut was a
right related to the "general interasJudge Wellington Koo stressed (id., at
~p.46~55 )hat nght terrninated withthe terminatofthe otheraspectsofthe
syste mf supervision.

225. By contrast the rights thepeopIe of ihe temtory concernedwere the
vey object and purpose of the system, and not merely an aspect of its
supervision. As theCouri held in the lntema~l'onl taruofSouth WestAfrca
Case, 1.CJ.Reports 1950,p.128,therewas no rezson whythose substantiveand
persona1rights shouldbe regarded asterminaiedwith the terminaticin of the

systemof supervision. Thiswould onlyocmr if (aswas thecase in the Northem
Camemm Cme) the people who were thebeneficiaries had themselveelected
to abandon any separate starus and identit- in which case the rightwourd
terminate because thebearer of the righceased to exis- or if the righwa~
expresslyterrninatebya competent authority.

226. To summarize,the effect ofthe General AssemblyResolution extended
only to the legal questionsnecessarilyinherent in the termination of the
Trusteeahip,oractuallyraised for decisionthatconnection. The present lcgal
claimof the RepublicofNaum fallsinto neitherofthese categories.

227. If
therewas an automatic terminationof allegalclaimsby operation of
law, the possibility of claims by an independent Namibia ansing outof the322 CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS 1~NAURU [sol

former South African administration wouldbe excIuded - yet itis widely
recognized(includingby the General Assembly andtheSecÿnty Council) that
thosedaims sunivedand enured tothe benefiof the newlyindependentState
of Namibia. On îhe WalvisBay dispute, see SecuriÇound Resolution432

(1978)O .n the disputeover uranium min@ in Namibia see United Nations
Councilfor Namibia, Decree No. for theProtectioof theNatural Resources
ofNamibia,27 September 1974 (NauruMernorialvol.4,Annex21).

k THE NAURUAN DlnNOT HAVE Tû BE~LVED IORDERTO TERMINA THE
T-

228. Inthe Notihem Camemns Case, thequestionbeforethe Courthad to be
resolvedby theGenerd Assembly before the teminationofthe Agreement, for

two reasons.Fust, thenecessaryresulofthe GeneralAssembly's decisiowas
the creationofa territorirightina thirdState(Nigeria). The decîsion was
effectivelyirreversibandcertainlyirreversible without Nigeparticipation
and consent.Secondly,the decisionhadthe immediateand necessaq effecrof
extinguishingthelegalentity, thpeople ofthe Trust Tenitoryinwhom the

primary Tmsteeship righwasvested, or io whomthe prirnary obligatiowas
owed. Thatpeoplehaving ceased to exiany rightsvestein ihemalso oeased.
NeitherOCthese problems existeInthe presentcase.

C. THE NAURU A NM WAS N(TPRESWD TO THUm NATION SORDECISION

INTHECO- OP THTEWINA~O OFTHE TRUSIE~

229. nere isa presumption thatthe exercisof the pwers of the General
Assernblyunder the United Nations Charter doesnot involvethe settlemoft
legd disputescircrimstantiamnneaed with actiontsken, unless the action
concerned is the precise subjeçt-matter of the legaldispute. Not evarecourts

recognizedns havingauthorirytodecide issueswhicharenot presentedbefore
them for decisionby thepartiesand thatprinciple would appla forh'onin
respect of disputesover legal rights,to the General Assembly.

230. In the NorihemCamemm Cm, the issueof theternisand outcome of

the plebisciheldin the NorthernCameroons wassquarelybefore the GeneraI
Assembly,and was theprincipalfocuof itRaolution 1608(XV) The Republic
of Cameroon had expresslyraisethisissubeforethe General Assemblyas the
Courn toted(I.C.J.Reporis1963p.15at p.32).[Si] ' WRITTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 323

231. By mntrast, the Naunian representative expressly stated before the

United Nations in 1367tbat the issueof rehabilitawasnnot a rnatter "relevant
to thetermlnationof the Tmsteeship Agreement,nordid the Naunianswishto
make ita rnattefor United Nationsdiscussion".tt was aseparate issue tobe
taken up after independenc- as in factiwas. SeeNauru Mernorial ,aras.603-
12,esp.para.609,for the relevanpassages£rom thedebates.

232. The Court in theNorthem Cmnetvo~~ ~m did notdeny that the issue
presented before it involvea iegal issueit was simply that,asbetween the

parties to lhat case,no remedofanykind - thatisto &y, noreliefwhichit was
in thepowerof the partieto giveor the Courtto require- could be awarded.
Because the Applicant State did not claim that thewa~ anything the United
Kingdom could do to give effecttoa judgment of theCourt whether by the
payrnent of reparatioor anyother act, the issubeforethe Court was "remote
from reaiity(1.C-T.Reports 1963, at p33); the Court could not render "a

judgment capable of effective application" (ibid.), ocapable of affecting
"existinlegal rightorobligations(p.34).See alsoat pp.37-8.

233. Again, and self-evidently,the position isquite different here. In the
present caseNauru does no1seek to reciefineits political and territorialstatus.

Its claimencompasses breachesof obligationsby the Respondent State under
the Tmsteeship Agreement and under general international law,Uilerdia, with
respect to the rigof the Nauruan people to permanent sovereigntyover their
naturalwealth andresources,and having asthe primar)objectthe rehabiiitation
of theirlands minedbefore independence. Satisfactionof the Nauruan claimis
nota rnatter "remotefrom reality". nthe contrary the Courisin a positioto

render a judgment capable of effective application, one capable of affecting
existingrightsand obligations.

234. In the North Cameroons Cme, there was a considera eneion
between theApplicant State's claim that there had beena breach of the
Tmsteeship Agreement, and its acceptance of the General Assembly's
conclusion that the plebisciwas a validexpressionof the peopIeisviews. As324 CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS INNAURU rs21

the Court pointed out, sincehad not been asked"to reviewthat conclusionof
the General Assembly, a decision by the Court, for example that the
AdrninistericiAuthorityhad violated the TrusteeshipAgreement, would not
establisha causal conneaion ktween the violation and the result ofthe
plebiscite":3.C.J.Reports1963,p.15atp.33,and see &O Judge Fimurice at

pp.99-100.By contrast the piesent clacan be seenasa furth cornsequenceof
the Nauruan people's right to self-determination,juas its sumval aftethe
tenninationof the Tmsteeship was a çonsequence ofthe expressedwishof the
Naunian representatives to leave the questiontoresolvedseparately.

Section6. TheGeneralAssembiydid not Intendorhvport toTerminateRights
Veçtedin theNaunian People

235. The rehabilitation issin 1967derîved from and wu assertedon the
bais ofthe fightof theNaunian people. The presumption must be that, eveif
tbey had authorityto doso,the relevant United Nations bodies woulnot seek

to detennine a claim which was not logicallyor necessarilyinvolved in the
conferra1ofNaunian independence (i.ea daim whichwasnot in law or in the
event aprerequisite to independence) and whiccouldbe left to be resolved by
the parties by negotiationor other appropriatemeam in accordance with
internationalaw.

236. Resolution 2347(XXI1 does not purport to terminate, or adjudicate
upon, the Naunians' claim. This is especiallyclear in the light of that
Resolution's referenceto the earlier resolutions on the issue (Resolutions
2111(XX) and 2226(XXi)),resolutionswhich caIledfor the rehabilitation of the

lands.

237. The Nauru Mernoriai(paras. $05-8,610) sets out examplesof the support
for theNauruan positionby some United Nations members (e.g.Liberia, the
SovietUnion). While these statements were made in the Tmsteeship Council,
there are also statements of delegatiinthedebates inthe FourthCommittee

of the General Assembly, made subsequent to Head Chief Mr Harnrner
DeRoburt's statement of 6 December 1967, which were supportive of the
Nauruan position on rehabilitatisee e.gthe SovietUnion, General Assembly,
mcid Records, FourthCommittee,1740thMeeting,6 December 1967, p.401 at

p.4û2,para. 22;India, id7,December 1967,p.406,para. 5 (dso reproduced in
the Prelimin-y Objections,volII,hex 30, pp.254ff,at pp.263266). Having
regard to these canternporary and fimlyheld views, iisquite clear that theLw WITTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 325

relevant resolutionswould mot have been unanimouslypassed if they had
involvedor been thoughtto involvethe termination of the Naunians'claim with
respect to rehabilitation.

Section 7.Evenif Express Recognition theComptent U.N.Organ was

Required toPreserve the Right,therwas SuchRecognition Here

238. There isno authority foa generalrulerequiring express recognitioby
the competent organs of the United Nations as a premndition to the
continuation of the rights of the people concemed. But even if express

recognitionbythe relevantpoliticalorganwasrquired, itissubrnittethatthere
wassufficientrecognition of tharighhere, havingregard tothe proceedingsof
the Tnisteeship Council, the Cornmittee of Twenty-Four, and the General
Assembly itself, anto the approach they had taken to the issue in the years
leadingto independence.

239. lnparticular there was ample recognitionof the Naunianclaibyreason
of:

(a) the terrns of General Assembly Resolutions 2111(XX) and
2I26(=Q;

(b) the reaffirmatioof those resolutions in United Nations Generd
Assembly Resolution 2347(WCII);

(c) the Resolution of the Cornmitteeof Twenty-Fourof 27 September
1967.

See the Nauru Memurlal,paras.586-7,604-8,610,6 f134etaiis.

240. It should be stressed that the righnotscreated by the decision of the
political organ:itKistsby reason ofthe relevant rules of international las
they apply in the circumstances of the case. Thusthe mosr that could be
required inthe case oftermination woulbe recognitionof theclaim in question
asa subsistingclaim,and there iample evidenceof suchrecognitionhere.

241. Moreover,United Nations resolutionsare, liktreaties, to be interpreted
in the mntext of the relevant principleof general internationalaw. In the
present case the relevant principle isthe principle of self-determination,326 CERTAIN PIIOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU fs41

includingtbe mle, çtated in paragaph 5 of Generai Assembly Resolution
1514(XV t),ttheindependence ofTmstand Non-Self-GoverningTerritoriesis
to occurkithout any conditionor resewations,inaccordancewith theirfreely
expressed wilt and desire..in order to enable ihern to enjoy complete
independence" (seeabove,para. 199for the fultextofparagraph5). Therole

of United Nationsorganswas to giveeffectto thprînciple,andtheyshouldbe
presurned,in theabsenceof clearevidence tothe contraryto have done so.
Thereisnosuch evidencehere.

242. Itshouldbe stressedagainthat theNauruanpositionin respectof this

issuewas well known to delegationsparticipatinginthe proceedingsof the
Tnisteeship Council and the General Assembiy: see above,para. 237. No
delegation(not eventhe Austrdian) contradictedthe Nauruanrepresentative's
reservaeionwith respectotheissueof rehabilitation.

Section 8Concl~isicrn

243. For these reasom, it isubrnittedthat the NauruanclairnsuMved the

terminationoftheTmsteeshipAgreementand the independenceofNauru.1851

PARTTV

JOINDEROR CONSENT OFWIRD PARTiES

Section1. IntroductionandSummary ofkguments

244. In thePreliminq Objections,Australia arguesthNauru'sAppIicationiç
inadmissiblebecause the Court "cannotdetedne the Nauruan claimsagainst

Austrdia in the absence of the 0th Govemments that formed the
AdministeringAuthority forNauru (para. 318).The followingarguments are
usedby Australiain supportofitssubmission:

thattherewas a "joint"responsibilityof the hree Partner Governments
(a)
for the administration ofNauru, and that (applying domestic law
analogies)theconsequenceis that no partimlarStaisliable individually
for anybreach(paras342-6);and

that the other twoStates are "indispensablepartitothe proceedings,
(b)
within the principle ofCase concemingMonetaty Goià Removed from
Rome .h 1943,I.CJ. Reports 1954, p.32 (hereafter referred as the
Monetq GoId Case),either becauseany decisionaàverse to Australia
would imply a right of recourse against those States (PreIirninary
Objectiom, paras.347-fiorbecause anysuch decisionwould implythat

those States are also legallyresponsible,andthey have not consenaedto
determination of that issue(id., paras.349-66).

245. It is submitted that, in the circlumstancesof the present case, isstralia
properly sued alone. The bases for this submission,which is develaped in the
followingSections,arasfollows:

(a) Neither New Zeaiand nor the United Kingdom are "indispensable
partieswithinthe meaning of the MoneimyGoIdprinciple,as developed328 CERTAIN PIIOSPHATELANDS 1N NAURU lg61

in the consistenjurisprudenceof the Court (seebelow, Sectio3, paras.
249-65);

(b) Municipallaw analogies onthisissue are oflittle relevane; but in any
event the most appropriateanalogiessupport the Naunian position (see
below, Secti4 o,paras.266-82);

There isno requirement,arising£rom the regime for the administration
(c)
of Nauru as a Tmt Temtory and opposable to Nam, that it bring
proceedingsagainst alithreeStatestoge&er (see below,Section 5,paras.
283-96);

The Naunian clairniadmissibleeven if, iconsequene, Australia may
(d)
have a rightof recourse againstthe otbtwo States (seebelow,Section6,
paras.297-309);

(e) Alternativelyeven if the normalrequirement for enforhg a liability of
several States acting together is to joaH the affected States,in the
arcumstances of the administration of Nauru, the claim is properly

brought agaimt Australiaalone(see below,Section7,paras.3tLL316);

( The proper administration of international justice dictates that the
present proceedings should be declared admissible, witha new to

obtaininga deciçion on the merits of the Naunian claim (seebeIow,
Sectio 8nparas.317-21).

&fore expandingon thesearguments, some comment is necessary onthe issues
whichthe Çouri basto decide atthisstage.

btion 2. The Issuehiore the Court atthe PresentStageof the beedings

246. It isubmitted that the onlyissue presented for Court at this stagis
whether the casecan proceed againstAustralia alone, The extenrof Australia's
liabilityin respeofNauru's daim isa mattergoing to themeritsofthat claim.

247. The jurisdictiofan international couover a claimand thequantum of
any liability in respect of the clairnare distinct issues,logicand in law.
This is the case, hatevethe substantive test for liabilitymayinthe case of
conduct pa-ticipated inbymore than one State. So much is conceded by[871 WRITTEN STATEMENTOF NAURU 329

Ausualiain itsPrelimYiaryObjections(para.320); seedso id.para 318,whereit
isstatedthat "the onlyappropriatecourse for the Court isto enamine indetail

the factsof this particular case"a task obviously better suitedto the Merits
phase.

248. Sincethe question of the extentorquantum ofliabilityisa matter of the

merilsof thedaim, onlythe "indispensable parties"issue properlyarisesin the
presentphaseof the proceedings.

Section3. The &ope of theAiieged "indispensablePartiesnRuIe in

InternationalLaw

249, There isno "indispensableparties"rulein internationalaw. Ilsuch a iule
does exist, it is lirnito the situation wherethe legal nghtsof another State

would form the very subject rnatterofthe decision,as they did in the Monetay
GoId Cme, LCJ.Reports 1954 p.32. Tharis not the situation here.

250. The Court unanimouslyrejeded the "indispensableparties" argument in

theCase concemîng Milit-y and PammilitaryAcrivitia in and Agaimt Nicarapa
(Nicarqua v. United Stater) LCJ. Reports 1984, p.392. In that case, the
Nicaraguan Application directlimplicated thirdStates,in particular Honduras,
in the activitiesit çornplainof.The United States argued thatfor the Courtto

decide on the rneritsof the Nicaraguan clalm against the United States 'fvould
necessarily involve the detemination of the attendant international
responsibilitof those third States"(UniteStatesÇounter Mernorial(1984 para.
4371, and "wouldnecessarilyinvolvethe adjudication of the rightsof thosethird

Stateswith respectto measures take no p&tect themselvesagainstunlawful uses
offorce" (id.para.438). It dsoargued that:

"The Courtmot adjudicatethdawfuiness ofUnited States assistatoe
tbirdStatistheregiowithoutpassingjudgmentatowhetherthosStatesare
engaged,orareplannintoengage,inthe lawhile~ercof theiriaberagtht
ofindividualand~Uective self-defenceNticaragua..:

(id., para.443.)

251. Without seeking to deny the potential implicationofanydecisiw on the

merits,the Court unanirnouslyrejected these arguments. Itstated: CERTAIN PkIDSPHATELANDS IN NAURU
I8&1

"Inwe isnod~ubtthaiinappropriate&cumstaoeartheCourt wiü dediue,it
did intheCase cancmuig Monehy Gold Remmed he in lW3, to

wrck thejurisdictanferrd upw it decc thIegdintereo staStatenet
partto thproceedmgs%ouid not onllxaff& bya decirio,utwouldfonn
thewry subjtu-matteofthedeasion'.Wherchoweve kims ofa leganature
aremade byanAppiicautagainsia Rupondentinprwxdnp More theCourt,
andmade thesubjedof submirsiont,eCourthas inprincipkmereitodecide
upon tbwe submissionwai,thbindingforce the &es ody, ad no der
Stateinaccordam% withArtic5 leofthe Ststute.As the Courbar aiready
indicated,ohr StatewEch uinsidethat the).maybe a@& are hee to

instituteseparaieproceeborto employtheprdm ofhcrveation.Tbere
isnotraceeitherinthSratuteorinthepradiceofiatemathd tribun& ofan
'iadispenspaabrtes' ilaf the bd arguedfor bythe UnitedStateq whicb
would dy be conceivab inparaIlelto a powcr, whlthc Courtdoesnoi
po~sess, tdirecthai a tbird Stalx made a party to-. The
ch-tances ofthe MuneîaryGdd caseprobabiyrepreseatéelimitof the
pwer of theCourttorefusetoexercisitsjurisdidonand nane of thStates
refenedtocaube regardedasinthesamepositioasAlbaaiainthatcasesoas
tabetdy indîspeasabiteothepursuanceoftheprmeedjngs."

(I.CJ.Reports1984p,392 p.431.)

252. On thisparticular issue the Courtwas unanimous:see also the brief
observationsin the separate opinionof Judge Ruda (id.,p.457) and in the
dissentingopinionof JudgeSchwebel (id., p.562). See alsothe Court'sdecision

on the Merîts,LC.J.Reports 1986 p.14atp.36,wheretheCourt statedthat:

"ItheCourtfoundthatttoarmedattachad occurredtbeenot onlywould action
bythe UnitedStateinpurportedexercisOFtherightafcolledvesef-defeace
prwe ta!x unjustifieclb,aisuwouldanya~tiowhichEl Salvadormighttake

or rnightbavetakon the assertedgrouofindividuaslelf-defencc."

This was a majorreason why the Court held thatnon-parties to the case were
"affectedbyihe decision",within the meanirtg of the United States multilateral
treatyreservation. But itwent on to exercisejurisdictionovertheme relyingon

other sources of law,despite the relativelydirecteffect of its decisioon third
parties.

253. This is consistentwith the Court 'psproach in othercases where third
parties were more or less directly involved, as the following analysis

demonstrates.ls91 WRITTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 331

254. In the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (LibyanAmb Jamahirja v.
Malta),Applicafi'on to Intemene,1.C J. Reports1984,p-3,ltalysoughtpermission
to intervenein the proceedings, so asto avoid the Court's delimitationdecision

trenchingon Italianrights and interestsin its adjoiningcontinentalshelf. In
rejectingthe Italianapplication ,he Court said...

"itmustbe ~onEede thdatitheCourt wereMy eniightenedas tuthedaims and
fantentions of Italitmigbtbe in a better pchiiito give thePartiessuch
indicationas would enable hem to delimittheu areasof cwrtiaentaisheif
Wout difncuity',acmrdance witbdrtide I oftheSpeaal Agreemec&even
thoughsufficieninformationasioIws daim forthe purposeof de^^
itsnghtshasbeeo giventothe Couriduringtheproceedingsonthe admissibility

of theItalianApplicationBut the qdon isnotwhetber theparticipationof
ItalymaylxurefuloreveaIieŒssasytothe Court iisdeber, muming Itdy's
non-participatiolegaiinteresofItalyien cmse oris likelybe afïeaedby
the decision. In the absencin the Court'sprmedures of any system of
compdmry interventiowherebya thkd Statewuld lx citedbythe Courtto
wme in as partyi,mustbe opcnto the Court,and indeeditduty,ta ive the
fullestdecisitmayinthe circumstan~esOFeachcase,unlessfcoursea,sinthe
caseOFtheManetaryGdd RemovedJmm Rome in 1943, thelegalînieresof the

thtd State'wouldnotoniybe dected by a decision,butwouldform the wry
subjeümatter of a decisio(I.CJ.Reports 1954p,.32)which isnotthc case.
here."

(I.C.J.Repart1984, pl at p.%.Cf.the Case Concerningthe ContinentalSheif
(Tunisiafiibym Amb Jarnahi+),Appliçm-on toInremne, 1.J. Reports 1M1,

p.3a!p.19.)

255. The strength of thisfinding was emphasized,forexample, by Judge Oda

inhis dissentingopinion,wherehe notedthat...

"whatisredy disputecbetween Libyaand Mdta rdatw zo titlesto submarine
areas. Thdaims wnmed are tbusof aterritorilatureandassuch aremade
ety omnes..[. lhinterestwhch a thirStatmayhaveinclaimi atititoan
areamnui escapeany effe&resultingfromwhatisdeterminedbythe Court in
xifar ashatfillis attriburtu my of thelitigantStates in tbe principalcase.
As aiready mentioned, Article 5of the Statute may not be ampted as

guaranteeinthata decisionotheCourt inacase regardmgthc titeip omnes
wiHnotaffectaclah bya thirStaterothesame title."

(I.CJ.Reports1984,p.3atpp.109-10See alsotheknting opinionsofJudges
Sette-Camua (at p.87)A,go (at p.128Schwebel (at pp.1345),Je* (ai
pp.149-50,157-60)Itshoulk notedthatnoueof thesejudgcdsccidd the case

w the bas&of theMoneimyGold principle.For the Court'eventualtreatment
of Etaly'ssubstanclaimsseeI.CJ.Reports1485,p.13atpp.25-8.)332 CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU 1901

256. Inthe Case comeming the From'erDirpute (Burkbta Paso v. Republic 4
Muii) I.CJ. Reports 1986p ,.554 ,ne issue was the entent of the Chamber's

cornpetence ta delirnita boundarywhich migbt involve a tripoint between the
two partiesanda thirdState, Niger.Ontbispoint the Chamber statedthat:

'The Chamber ah considersthaitjurisdictionisnordded simply because
the end-poinof thefr~ntieLieon thefrontierof athirStatenot a ptyto the
prmedjngs. The ngblsof tb~ migbkmuring Siate,Niger,are in any event
safeguarded by theoperationof Article59 of thStatuteof the Court..The

Fades couldat anythe havemnduded anapeement for thedelimitationothe
bontier, a~~mding t~ whatwer perceptionthey may have had of it, andan
agreement of tbatkinda,lthoughlegdy binding up tbem byWiue of the
principlevia mit setvandu,dd not b opposable toNiger. A judicial
detkion..m.ereiysuktitutes fthe solutionstemm dmdy fromtheirshared
intention,thsolutionmived at by awurt under amandatewhichtheyhave
@en it. Inboth instances,the solutioody has le& md biiding effectas

between the Statewtiichhaveacceptedit, eitbdirdy oras aconsequene of
bavingaccepted the court's jurisdictiondecide thecase... At most, the
Cbambershould considerwhether,inthicase,wnsiderations reiattotheneed
to safeguardtheinterestsothe thirdStareconcemd rquire ito refraifrom
exercisihgitjurisdictiondetermine thwholecourseofthe he..."

(I.CJReports 1986p,.55 4,pp,ST-8.)

257. Intheevent,the Chamberconcludedthat il wu...

"requirednot tofa a tripointwhichwould necessitatethe consentof dithe
StatecnnŒrned, but toaxertain, inthe Iightthe evidencewhichthe Parties
bavemade avdabte to it, howfarthe frontier whi&theyiriheritefrom the

colonialower &ends. Certainly sucha I;od;ngirnpfiw, asa lcgiciroUary,
borbthat the territoofa thirdShr~Lies beyood theend-point,and that the
partiebaveexdusive,swereilpinghtsupto thatpoint. Howeverthiis no more
tban a twofaid presumptiw which undcriics anyboundary situation.this
presumption remains inprincipleirrebuttain thejudiad wntext of a given
E&, in the sensetbatneitheof the &putant parties,haringuintended that it
pwsessesa cornmon [routiewiPhtheothor as Faasa speuf~cpoint, cm&ange

its wtion to relyon the deged existenceof sovereigtpertaininIO a rhird
State;butthis presumptiondoes nottherebycreatea ground ofopposability
outside thamnten and a@mt the thirdState. Indeed, tkithe whole point
of.Article59of theStatute. It k trthat ia givencas etmay be ciear from
the recordthathelegalinteresof athirdState'wouldnoton@ be aflècrtiy a[911 WRITï-EN STATEMENTOF NAURU

dekion, butwwldform theverysubled-maticof thedecision'MoncturyGold
Remoiaedjhn Romeh IW3, I.CJ.Rem 1941 ,S) sotbat thCourt hasto
use its pmr 'torefuseto exetciseitEjurkddion' (1-ÇJReprts 1984, p.431,

para.88).Howeverihaiis notthecasehere."

(I.CJ.Reports1986,p.554atp5ï9.)

258. In theCm concemingBorderMd Tmborder Amed Actions(Nicampa
v. Hon$was) Jut-hdktion and Admksibility, 1.CJ. Reports 1988,p.69, the Court

rejecteda Honduran argument that...

"the 'proceduralsituation'creatby Nicaragua s'iilittingpf the overail
cnflct intoseparatedisputesk contrartothe requûementsof gd faithand
theproperfundioningof internatiojlstice.'

(I.CJ.Reports1988 ,.69atp.91.)

259. Accordingto the Court, itcciuldnothe accepted that.,.

"oncethe Courthasgivenjudgment ina caseinvalringcenain allegatim lact,
andmade fmdingsimtbatrespxi,no newprwdure can h commencedinwhich
those,asweiias wher,fa& mighthave tobe mnsidered. Inanyevent,it isfor
the Faniesto estabikbibefads inibepresentcase tabg accountofthe usual

des ofevidence,withouilking pssibleta relonwrisideratiomofiwjudicma
inanother caseOM involrinthesame parties(secArtide 59of the Statut...
The Court k uniunawarcof the dinicultiestbamay aris where particular
aspectsof a cornplexgeneralsituationarebroughtbeforetheCouforsepiuate
decision. Neverthele%as the Courtobserved in the caseconccrningUnited
StatesDiplumatic and ÇmsrrlwSfflin Teh, 'noprovisionoftbe Statuteor
Rdes contemplates thatthe Court shodd dedine to takc cqpkmce ofooc
itsped of a disputemerelyhuse bat dlpuie has der aspeçtshowcver
important'(I.CJ. Report1980p.19,paraXI)."

(I.CJ. Reports 1988p.69at p.92. See also the Separate. Opinion of Judge
Schwcbçl:id.atp.131.)

260. Inthe Case conceming the Lad, Isld Md MMIime FrontierDirpute (EI
Salvador v.Honduras),Application byNicamp for PemiLEsion to Inlewene(I.Ç.J.
Reports1990,p.921, Nicaragua sought tointervenein theproceedings. It argued

inter alia that itslegai interest in the subject-matter of the case, so far as it
related tci the Gulf of Fonseca and adjacentwaters, wu SUCR that the Court

could not, under the hf~nefq Gold principle,proceed to decide the case in
Nicaragua'sabsence (id., at p.114).TheCharnberw , hileallowingNicaraguato334 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU v2]

intervene to a limited extent and in respect of oneaspectof the casebefore it,
rejectedthat particular argument h.said:

'Nhile theChamber istbussatisfmdthatNicaraguahasa legal interestwhich
may h beeded by thede&ion of theChamberon the questionwhehr ornoi
thewater sfthe GuIfofFonseca aresubjedtoacwdomirll uma'wmmunity
of interestof the threeriparian States, canaofawp4 the contentionof
Nicaragtu hatthelegainteresofNicaragk uuald form theveq subjecmatter
ofho decision'ithesensinwhich thatphrasewas usaiin thcasemnmming
Monelay Gold Remmdfmm Romein1943 todesaib te interestsAlbania...

So farasthe uwdominium ismnŒrned,the e~ential questioin issbetweeo
the Fanies L motthe in~ic validitof the 1917 Judgemeniof iheCenual
Ameriçan Court of Justicasbetween thepartiestothe proceedin gsthat
Court,but the;pposabi toHonduras,whicb wasnot such a Party, eithdr
that Judgementikelforof the dgbe dedaredby the Judgemetit. Honduras,
whilerejccLintheopposabiütytoilselofthe 1917Judgement,doesnotask the
Chamber to dedare itinvalid. IfNicaraguais pcnoitfcd to interveothe
Judgnent tolx given bythChamberwill not declarasbewen Nicaraguaand
the othertwo States, that Nicaraguoes or doesnotpmsess nghts under a

condominium in the waterof the Guiflxyond its agreeddelimitatiowiih
Honduras,but merelythat,asbetweenEl Salvadoand Honduras,the regimeof
wndominium declaredbythe CentralAmerim Court ioris not opposablto
Honduras. It is true tha deQsionof the Chamlm rejeding El Salvador's
wntentioas, andfmdingthatthereisno wndorninium in the waters of Gulf
which is oppble toHonduras, wouidbe taniamountto a fui* that there is
no uindomini umaii, Similarla fmdingthat theisno such 'uimmunityof
interab'asis claimedbyHonduras, ktwccn Et SalvadorandHonduras Lntheir
capacityasriparian Stateofthe Gulf, wouîd btantamount to aFmdingbat

&ere isno such"mmunity of interestinthe Gulfat aii. In eieventsuch a
decisionwould therefore endentlaffec an interesof a legal natureof
Nicaragua; but eveoso lbat intewouldnot lx the tcry subjectmattofthe
dccis'm'in tbewaytha r helnterestofAlbaaia werein thecas& conceroing
Monernry GoId Remowdmm RomeNi lP43. As explainedahve ..it follows
from thi bat the questiowhether theChambr woiildhave powertorake a
decision on tbosequestions, withouthe participatioof Nicaraguain tbe
proceeding dc,s not -, but thar the muditions oan interventioby
Nicaraguiotht asped ofthe casareneverihelesdearlfuKdied.'

(I.CJ.Reports 159,.= at p.122.Sealsoid.atpp.130-1.)

261. This can be contrasteciwith the Monetary GoId Case. In that case the
right of the Respondent States to transfer zoItaiy monetaq gold admittedly
owned by Albania,and due to it under Part nI ofthe Paris Act of 14 January

1946,dependedon two matttrs. The firstwas the respomibility of Aibaniata
Ttalyby reason of theAlbanian law of 13 January1945. The secondwas the right

orpower of the Respondent Govemmerits to tsansferproperiyto which Albania [931 WRITTENSTATEMENT OF NAURU 335

was entitledto Italy,so asto satis5theliabilitiesof Albania to Italy. Both

mattersrequired that thelegalrightor iiabilitiofAlbaniabe deterrninedin a
form whichwas bindingupon it.Sinceunder the Statutethat could ody be doue
inproceedings towhich Albania was a partyjtheCourt hadno alternative but to
declineto exercise its jurisdicti1,CJ.Reports 1954,p.18 at pp.33-4;cf,id.,
p.35 (President McNair),p.38(JudgeRead}. Seethe analysk ofthe casebythe

Chamber of the Court inthe Case comemhg the Lad, Island Md Mm'time
Fmtier Dispute (El Salvador v. Hodwm), Appücah'on by Nicaraguafor
Permkion to Inteniene I.CJ. Reports 1990,p.92 at pp.114-16; andsee also
Rosenne, The LAZW and Pmctice of the Intamiional Co&, 2nd rev edn.,
Dordrecht, 1985,pp.143-8.

262. It is clear that the prescase is quite unlike the Uonetq Goid Cme.
The legal rightsor propeq of the United Kingdom and New Zealand are not
the subjectmatterof the present claimNo legalrigbtor responsibilityof either
State would bedetermined by the Couritn thiscase,both byvirtueof Article59
of the Statute and because the focof the claim is on the acts aomissionsof

Australia andof Australian officiais responsforethe administratioof Nauru.
Accordingly the detennioation of the liability of a third Stame one of the
1 parties is nota precondition to the determination of the case,as it was in
Monetq Goid. If oneapplies the tesofjurisdictional cornpetence appIieby
the Chamber in the Case concenting the Frontier Dispute (Rurha Faro v.

Republicof Mali)I.C.J.Reports 1986,p.554(above, paras. 256-7),in the present
case,there is nothing analogouta the determination ofatripoint involvingthe
sovereign rightsof athird Stateor States. There could be no legal objection
from any third State to Australia reaching an agreement with Nauru for
Australia toassist,financiaorymateriallyinthe rehabilitatioofthe phosphate

lands workedout before independence, even thoughthat agreement was based
on an admission of responsibilibyAustralia fora breach of trust in its capacity
asone of the partnesGovernments. It followsthat there canbe no objectionto
the Court reaching thesame conclusion,asbetween the parries,in thepresent
proceedings.

263. The Monetq Cold Casewas a caseof conditional liabiliiy, in the sense
that anyrightor dutythat the threeRespondent States mayhave had to transfer
the gold to Italywascontingenor conditionalupon adetermination ofAlbania's
legal liabiiityto Italy. notal1situationof conditional liabilitywouldrequire
joinder of the third party.For example one State rnight undertake, vis-a-vis
another, that it wilassume responsibilityfor a particular liability asuthe336 CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU E941

repayment of aloan bya thirdState)ifthe liabiiiisnotmetbya specifiecidate.

This -muidbe a veaty of guarantee.Itwouldcontradict the purpasesof such a
treatyifthe guarantorcouldopposejudicialproceedings again t on thebuis
thatan adverse determinationwodd inevitablyreflectuponthe original creditor
State: seeRess, "Guarantee Treatieswin R. Bernhardt (ed.),Enqclopediaof
PublicIruedonal Law, Amsterdam, 1984,vol.7,p.117.

264. As a procedural malter the absencoe f the UnitedKingdomand New
Zealand inno wayprevents the Courthm effectivelyhearingand dealingwith
the presentcase. There is ,orexample,no indication that relevantevidenceis
not available tthe Court by reasond thenon-participationinthe proceedings
ofany other State.

265. It is submîtted, therefore, tthecaseis properly constituted andrnay
proceed against Australiaas the sole Respondent State, The joinderof other
Statesin the proceedingsinot required.

Section4. The Relevanceof Municipal Law Analogiestothe QuestionWhether
AustrallaisProperly Sued Alone

266. Australia argues that "[tlhe positioninternationailawconceming the
absence of ang ruthority which would support the Naunian contentions on
liabilitisnot essentiallydifferent£romthe positionindomestic legalsysterns"

(PreliminmyObjections, para. 309). In particularitargues that "as a general
principleof law, the liabiliof a partner is joint, annot several, with other
partnersin relation to contractsinto which he has tnteas agent for the firm"
(id.,para. 342).The suggestion is that Australia's liability here is similarly
"joint",nd that on the municipal law analogy this requires the joinder of the
other two States.

267. The cases relied on in this context in the Preliminmy Objectiow
(para.344) involved privatelaw partnerships suing or being sued in tribunais
with jurisdictiaover private partiesas well asStates. Those cases have no
application to proceedings before the InternationalCourt of Justice. The
Court'sjurisdictiois exclusivetoStates,andisdependent upon consent. There

ino reason to thinkthat international Ifollowsmunicipallaw inattributing to
thejoint actiond States the consequences that may flow from partnerships
between privateparties under municipallaw,especiallysincprivateparties are1951 WRI~TEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 337

amenabIe to the jurisdictioof municipal courtisn whose temitory they (or
persons actinas theiragents)çarryonbusiness.

268. As the Court noted inthe Nicampa Cme, a generd powerofjoinder of

parties is tnecesçasrcorollaryofan"indispensable partiesde: LCJ. Reports
1984,p.392 at p.43 1above, para.251),and the Court hasno such power. Cf.
alsoCmeconcemingthe Lad, Islami Md Miaithe Fm& mpus (El Salvador
v.Hondww), Application byNicampa for PermLrrion te IntentenI.ÇJ. Reports
190, p.92 atp.135. The essentialpointk that municipallaw analogies are only

relevant in intemational lawif tstructureof thesituation whick the subject
of the analogy is thsame,or very similar.Thismaybe thecase issome areas
(e-g.the idea of intemtionai tnisteeship),but inthe area of international
adjudicatoryjurisdictiothe positionis differentNational courstystems have

generaljurisdictiooverthe subjeas oftheir law;thaisthe bals fortheirpower
ofjoinder. The International Çourhasnogeneral jurisdiction,and npower of
joinder of parties. Itsjurisdiction is particuldependen ontconsent. This
point was made, for example, by Judge Jimknez de Artchega in the Case
Conceming theConiïnentalShev (LibymArabJamahirja W. Malta), Application

to Intewene,I.C.J.Reports 1984,p.3,69. See also L. Damrasch, "Multilateral
Disputes"in L.Damrosch (ed.),The Infe~'onad Court ofJusticaia CrossmadF,
DobbsFerry,N.Y., 1987,p.37 6t pp.378-80.

269. Forthese reasons itis submittelhat municipal lawanalogies,including

cases involvinprivate parties in mixedarbitrtribunalsare of lirnitedvalin
the present context. But in any event, if it is sought to rely on municipal law
analogies itisimportant touse the most appropnate analogies,the ones which
rnostcloselycorrespondto the situation under discussion.

270. At cornrnonlaw, the Iiabiljtyof co-trustees isand several,not joint,
so that the beneficiary has the rightsueanyindividualtrustee for the whole
arnountof the damage: ClanvilleWilliam, Ioini Obligaiions,London, 1949,
p.159 and casesthere cited. Thereliancein the PrelimUt-yObjectionson cases
whichinvolvepartnerships rather thantrusts ignores the point that the Nauman
claimisessentiallybasedon an international foroftmsteeship.

271. Even the partnership anafogy, duly explored, pointsin the opposite
direction to that suggestedin PreliminaiyObjections. In thcomrnon law,for
example, the liability opastners in relation to torts or civil wrciand, in
relationta breach oftrust,isjoint and several: 35 Halsbury'sCawsof Eglaand,338 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS INNAURU

4th edn.,1981p ,aras67-8;Lindley $rBanks on Pamienhip, 16th edn., London,
1990,pp.324-5; B&th v.Fladgate[1891] 1 Ch. 337,353; Lti@aors of Imperid
Me~anhYeCdit hocaion v. ColemanLR. 6 H.L.189 (1873) a,d authorities

there cited. The reliance in the Prelimimvy Objectiom on casesinvo1~g
contractsignoresthe point that tNaunianclaimis based oncivilwongs done
by tnistees to tbeneficiaq of the tmt.

272. Anorher possible andogyrelatesto partnershipwhich have been wound
up. The liabilityopartnerspriorto the dissolutiof the partnership continues
in relation toam imputable to the partnership: it doesnotIapsewhen the
partnership lapses.Seee.g.LindleydLBmb on ort~ammhip1 ,6thedn,, London,
1990, pp.348,645; Dattiels TruckinInc.v.Rqem 643 P. 2d llOs (Kan. App.

1982). Thusmen der the capaciryoftrustee ceasesthe liabilityremains. There
isalso some authonty for the proposition that thejoint liaofpartners(e.g.
in conuact) becomes a joint and several liability upon the dissolutofnthe
partnership:see Simpson& Co.v.Fieck(1833) 3Men.2 13;StoltenhofsEsfatev.

Howard (1907 )4 S.C. 693, both South African cases. Cases cited for the
contrary proposition (e.g.Rev.Ramey 80 N.E 2.d 250(Ohio Ct of App,1947),
cired in68 Co~us Ju6 Secunhm 5.352 Ault v.Goodrlch(1828) 4 Russ. 430,
citedin 35HaLFbuiy'L saws ofEngland 4th edn.,1981,para. 187)areconcerned
ratherwith thecontinuingliabiliof panners after dissolutionof thepartnership

than with the issue of joinder, or with whether the liabisdso several: cf.
United StateW.fitine 211 F.Supp. 168(1952);AutittP KelleConrrructionCo v.
DrewAgenq Im 361 N.W. Sd 79(Minn. App. 1985).

273. A broadersurvey of comparative law materialssupports thview that, if

there isa general principleof Iaw here, itis that liability for wrongful acts
committed by more than one defendant is concurrent rather than joint,byf
"joint liability"is meant an inseparable liability reqtorbegenforced in a
single actionagainst al1 the debtors. Thus Weir, in hiç revieof "Cornplex
Liabilities" for the InfernaiiondEncyclopofiComparativeLaw, points out the

diversityofmunicipal law regimes dealing with multiple debtors in contrort
tort. He pointsout, forexample,thattwodistinctformsof"solidarity"ave been
developed in bath France and Switzerland. (SeeInlemariond EncycI~pedia of
Comparutive Law, Vol XI, Torts,A. Tunc, Çhief Editor, Lhapter 12, k Weir,

"CornplexLiabilities",1983,p.41.) But hegoes otoconcludethat:

"it is thegeaerarulebatifa tortfeaskhaiourisheldtobea causof
the victihm, thetortfeasorL lito payforalofthehm socauscd, WRITTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU

notwithstmding rhatherw easa Eoncurrencause ofthatLm and that anotber

isresponsible for rharuse... ln otherworktbe liabitof a tortfeasorisnot
&ctd vis-a-visthe victimbthe musiderarto hnt mother is mncurrentiy
liable."

(Id.p.43.)

274, Ln response to the question whether açcounrk to be taken of debtorsnot

before the court, Weir concludes that:

"ltis extremely inçonvenienand may be,unjust,toriy toda m. In those
juridictions whera contributiodaim may te raisedonlyinthe W s suit,

dy thosepresent canh consideredandthk k the particeelsewherealsoder
wrongdoers remainimg Liablto claimantsdm are underpaid andwntribiitors
whohaveoverpaid."

(14 p.7'2(refereoces omitted).)

275. In the same volume of the Encybpedia, Professor Honoré, writing on

"Causationand Remoteness of Damage" ,oncludes that...

"Most legalsystemshavespecialprovisionwhich m&e thwc who partiupate in
jointactionLabre insolidumfor thehm done by all4,th the limitsofthe

uimmon purpose, whaiever the nature and eideofthe contributionof the
variousagents.GERMAN kw wüiervc asan example: bythat,iseveral haveby
an ualawful act committed jointly Cgemeinschriflicbepgene unenhbte
Hmdung) caused damagc,eachis Liablforthe whole damage."

(Id.,p.7-1(refereoceomitted).)

276. Honork alsa States, in his treatrnent of the relevanceof third parties,

that...

"Sometimes the coniribution of the third perissuchthat the hm iothe
injurcd partis regardedar,notbeing causedbythe torileasor'wnduct or as
being forsome other reasontoo remot...More often the contribution of the

thudperson isootsuch asto exoneratethe iodeasor entirelyThe cnnduct of
the tortfeasaod the conductorstateor the third person aeach concurrent
caws of thhm. Inthat case it istraditiondy held in alsystemsthat,if
thehm is indivisible, the tortfisliablem solidum. Thu, the FRENCH
CourtofCassation bol&thata iortfeasorwho hascaiised damagetoanoihcrby
his faumut make gwd the uinsequences without himg abletorelyas against
the injureParty,on tbe coexistenfault ofa tbird person, eveas apartial
exooeratiofcomhis responsibrlity."340 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU

(Hom&, "Conduaand StatofTbirdPersans",id,p.7-1&9(refereomitted).
See alsLam & Markes&., Tort'ouLinbiîi@forUnit~iîmthd Hm k~the
CornmonLmv md the CiviImu,Cambridge,1982,pp.l?&3fhfarksinisThe
Gemian Lawof Tm Oxford ,386pp5234.)

277. Thi sositionwas reliedonbytheUnited States intheCm conceming the
AeriaIIncidentof27J* 1955(United Statesv Buharia). in itsMernoria lnthat

case theUnitedStates arguedthat:

'Itibue thatk- S~tatutandRuies of thsourtdonui,nor,asfatascm be
seeq d~s thejurisprude nfthi rourtd,ealpeafidiy witbthe probleOF
theapportionmentof liabibetweenjointtortfeawrn BUIthe application,if
oeedbe,d Article l(cand(d)oftheStatutegr& adquate authorifor

it a- thainal1civilizedcounbies nileissulxbn~ thesame. An
meved plain~iffmay sue aor all joint tortfcajointiy oseveraiiy,
althougbe may ooUeEtfromthem,or anyone or moreof hem, onlythe full
amountof bkdamage. Tberehtionshipbetweerhcjointtortfemrs ihemselves
isaseparaiptoblem."

(UnitedStateMernoriai,end Incidento27lu& 19% PIeadin..pp.229-30.
TheUnited Statesweaon todemanstratebyasurveyofcomparativematerials
similaiothatundertakeber& tht"[tjhlawthatliabiiityofjointtortfeasorsk

botbjointaad severaappas unive&. id., p.23, nfor ha camparative
survesee id.,pp,23a-33. TCourtdid motneedtodealwiththeÿsue the
Casewas discontinued.)

278, Itshould bestressed againthatthe issue atthisstageof theproceedingsis

not themeasureof damages,butthe questionwhether theaction cm proceed at
all. As explaineciin paras.202-204 abave, the issufor the Court atthe present
phase iswhether al1 States whlch have engaged in some degree of cornmon

conductneed to be joined in an action brought, in cirnimtances such as the
present, againsi one of those States. But here again the comparative law
experiencecontradictsthepositiontaken inthePreliminmy Objections.

279. The history of the "indispensableparties"rule in major legal systems
dernonstrates that it isbetterzreatedas a conclusion ta an inquirywhethera

court canproperly exercisejudicialpowerinthecircumstances of acase before it
ratherthan asan independent andprelirninaryruleof procedure. The point was
made ti the United StatesSupremeCourt in theleading case:

"Whethera persois'iodispensable't,hatis,whethera particulmustwbei
dismisseciin tbe absenceofthatpecanonlybedeterminedinthewntea of
particulIitigat..kuming theexistenofa personwhosbouldbejoinedif1991 WRITTENSTATEMENTOF NAURU

fedle, the onlyfurthwquestiao riscwhen joind ernotPosyble and the
courtmustd&e whethw to dismi rrto praeed withouhim..To saythata
court 'musdiimi intheakace ofanindkpcnsablepartyand ht it 'cannot
procee dd'ut him puis the mattwthe wrongwayaround-a murt doesoot
koowwhethera phular personis'indirpwsable'ni3ithas examinedthe
sihiatitodeterminewhetheritcan proce&ut him."

(ProvidenTmdesrnw'sBmk B Tnrr Co v.Fmm 390U.S. 102 (1569 )t
pp.11819 @ardm). On the developmmtof Udd StatedoctriDetowards
thi ssirionsee also Reed,*hpulsory Joiiidu ofPartiesinCml Actions"
(6957)55 MiChip LR 327, 4a3, G.CHazardJr, "hdispnsable Part).The

HitaricaOnp ofa Proaedwa lhantom"(19616)1CokunbiaLR 1244.)

Underthisapproach , courtshouldseek to dojusticebehveetn he parties asfar

as itcan.

280. Thesame conclusion emerges from the extensive comparative shidy
conductedbyDr Cohnfor the InternationaEl ncydopediaof Comparative Law.

He concludesthat:

The conceptof cumpulsoryplwalityincludesa harwre of cases, whicare
fairlyeasilydefioableandwhbytheir natuwouldasa de notbeadequately
servedbythedes onpermissiveplurahly.Thcategoryconsktaftwo Mereut
groupsofcasesL,e.firstthoseinwhiitia reqkcment of substantilawrhat

a ngbtnot beexercisedotbenvisetbaobyoagkt aIcwcerned, arisecondly
thosein whichthebmdq forcoefajudgment necedy &eEtsdire* more
tban one parr..Experienceinthe COMMoN L~W muatries bafurthemore
sbown thateven inthe caseofthe two groupswhichcao be readiiyenougb
defrnedthestatutordefdtions donot alwayoperatesatkfactorily in practim
and thateveoiothescasesthereisoccasionaladear rieeto granexemption
kom therequirernenotfjoiniaithos e ho,acuirdmgtoa stricruleoflaw,
ougbt to bejoiaed. Imay theteforebe eqwted thatinthisfield a growing

spherewillbave tlx leftojudid discretion guidedeibyepragmaiic rules
orby more orlesficiblprecedents."

(InternationalEocydopediaoComparative LawVal XVI, CiMIRixedure,M.
Cappelietti,ChiefEditor,Chap5,EJ. Cohn"Parties1976 ,.45.)

281. It should be mted that even in legal systems which include an
"indispensableparties"rule, that mle frequentlyhas exceptions in cases where

the "indispensableparry"is not amenable to the jurisdictionof the court,or342 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS INNAURU [looj

where (as under the "mmplete diversity" nile under the United States
Constitution)tojoin that partywouldinvolvethe lossof the Court'sjurisdiction.~

282. Rie present caseinvolves a claimfor breach of trust,or altemativelfora
civil wrong, made against the State which was a principal Party to the
Trusteeship and whichwas responsible through its own officiais and by itown
laws forthe administrationof the TmstTemtory. The partnership arrangement

between the three States has been dissolved. 'Ifie properuse of analogies in
thesecircurnstancesdictates that thecase shouldbe permitted to proceed.

Section5. There WasNo Specialkgal Regime Requiringthe Joinder of the
OtherParlner Goverrimentg

283. The involvementof the United Kingdom and New Zealand in the British

Phosphate Commissioners,and in the administration of Nauru, did not createa
special legal regime requiring the joinderofal1thtee States in any proceedings
arising outof the Trusteeship.

284. The "AdministeringAuthorig" waç nota separate legal entity, in tway
that an internationalorganizationis an entiîyseparatefrom its members. It was
simply a legal description fora partiçular arrangement involvinga degree of

participation on the part of the other two States, a device for associating the
United Kingdomand New ZeaIandin the administration of Nauru. Znfact that
association, though initiaHy intended ro be substantial, was nominal and
consultativeonly.

285. ThePreliminq Objeciionsdenies that Australia was under any ohligatian
to comply with the 'Fnisteeship Agreement, attributing that obIigaiion to a
"Partnership" constitutingthe AdrninisteringAuthority(para. 321). But there is

no general principle oflaw thata "parrnership"constitutesa separate legalentity,
and there isno evidence of any intention on the part of the United Nations to
constitute or recagnize as a separate legal entity an "AdminiçteringAuthority"
somehow separate and distinct from the States which were involved. The

liabiliiyof an "AdministeringAuthority" isnothing more than the Iiability of a
State for itsacts and omissionsin that capacity.

lu England,joindcrOFa joint contractoisnot required Îf lhat perisout of the.
jurisdictiGlanvillWiams, loin1ObligationLondon,1949,p.53and casesthere cited.
In Frenchlawjoindecanbe orderednonvithsiand prnbgleor venue,huirnotavailable

inmes wherethecourt hasnojurisdidioovertbc Frsontbe joined:Cohnop. cit.,p.39.1 [loll WRITTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 343

S86. ifthe "AdministeriogAuthoriy wasa separatelegai entitinthe caseof
Nauru, this must havebeen sowith alother Tmteeship Agreements: the terrn
"admlnisteringauthority" is usein Chapters XLIand X3Jl of theChaner to
apply indifferentltoa single administering authorîtyand an adminiçtering

authoriiywnsisting oftwo or more States,or of aninternational organization.
But if thawas sothen it difncultto seehowthere couldbe any questionofthe
liabiliof a Stateafterithad ceased tobean administering authoritythrough
the terminationor expiry of the relevant treaty. It wouldfor example,be
difficultnotimpossibleto justifythUnited Nations'positiononSout Ahfrica's

mntinued liabilityfcertain actioinnsNamibiaprior to itsindependence:see
above,para.227. Thesewouldbeclaimsagainsta separate "Authority"which
had ceased to exist.

287. The Australian relianceon the International TinCouncil case in the

Hwse of Lords (Rq~ner (J..H.J(Mincinghe) Ltd v.Dement of Trade;
Maclaine Watson v.Depruiment of Tmde [IWO] AC. 428) is misplaced (see
PreliminatyObjections, par314). That case was concerneciwiththe questions
(1) whether certain contractual obligations hadbeen entered into by the
International Tin Counciasa separate legal entity, and (2) whether anyliability
the Member States may have owed by reason ofthe Sixth International Tin

Agreement couldbe enforced by thcreditorsin the Englishcourts. TheHouse
of Lords held thatonlythe Council was a partyto the contracts, and tbany
liabilitiMember States might havehad were unenforceable in English law
because they derived directly from an unimplemented treaty.The House of
Lords did not have to decide - and on their view of theeffectof the Skth

InternationalTin Agreement did not have jurisdictionto decide - whether
under the Agreement there was a rîghtof recourse asbetween the Member
States. The present case, by contrat, arisesat the internationai, not the
municipal level, and concerm the actsand omissions of a Srate which acted
directlythrough itsownofficiaiandorgans,rather than indirectlyin capacity

as a shareholdeor stakeholderinsome separate corporateentity.

288. The differenttolesand responsibilitiofthe three States in respecof
the administration of Nauru are evident from evena cursoty reading of the
variouslegalinstruments:

Under theNauru IslandAgreement of 2 Juty 1919 between the
289. (a)
three States (Nauru Metnorial, vol, 4, Annex 26), the CERTAlN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU
[IO2]

administrationof the IsIand was vested in an "Administrator"
appointed by the AustraljanGovernment for a term of 5 years
(Art. l)and thereafteas agreedbetween theparties.

290, (b) Underthe LRague of NationsMandateforNauni of 17De~ember
1920 (Nauru Mernorial,vol. 4, Anna 27), the Mandate was
conferredupon "HÎs BntannicMaje~tf,and the Mandatory was

given "full power of administration and legkdationover the
territorsubjectto the preseniMandate asan integraportion of
his territory" (Arti2). At tbat the, and at di tirneprim to
Naunian independence, thir "fulpower"was in fact vested in the
Commonwealth of Australiunder arrangemen wthichcould not
be change wdithoutAustralianconsent. Nauru was administered

as an integralpart of Australian territoras distincfrom the
tenitory ofanyotherState.

291. (c) The primary roleof Australiain the administration of Nauwas
strengthenedby the Supplementary Agreement concerningNauru

of 30 May 1923(Nauru Mernorial,vol.4,Annex 28). Under that
Agreement, ordinancesmade by the Administraiorwere subject to
disallowance by the appointing Government only (Article 1).
Copies of ordinances, proclamations andreplationswere to be
forwardedto the other twoparties, but only "fortheir information"

(Article3). Rie Adntinistrator wasrequired toconform to the
instructioof the appointingGovemment (Article 21, andnat to
the instructioofthe other two Govemments. Austrdia waçthe
appointing Govenunent throughout ,the whole perioà of the
administrationof Nauru,from1919until independencein1968.

292. (d) mat Nauni hadbeen adrninisteredby Australiawas recognizedin
the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Nauru of 1
November 1947 (Nauru Mernorial, vol. 4, Annex 29), which
prwided that the Govemment of Australia would continue to
exercis"fulpowers of legislation,administratandjurisdiction

in and over the Temtory" on behalf of the Administering
Authority unlessotherwise agreed (Article 4). It was never
otherwiseagreed.(1031 WRITTENSTATEMENT OF NAURU 345

293. (e) Undet.the Agreementbetween the tbree Partner Govements
relating to Nauruof26 November 1965(NauruMemorîd, vol.4,
Annex 30), a NauruanLegislativeCounciI was established, but
"withoutaffectingthepowen of the CommonwealthParliament to

rnake laws forthe Government of the Tetritory(Article l(2.1).
The Australian Govemor-General bad tbe powerto disallow any
Ordinance made bythe LegislativeCouncil(Articlel(5.)).The
administration of the hland was vested in "an Administrator
appointed by theGovernmentof theCbmmonweaIto hf Australia"

(Artide 3), thus ending eventhe theoretid possibilitthat the
parties might have agreedu nder the 1923 Supplementary
Agreement, on an Administrator appointed by some other
Government. Appealsfrom the Nauruac nourtswent to theHigh

Court of Australia(Articl5(4.)).Australia reservedtherlght to
make "suchother provisionsin relation to the govemment of the
Territory m the Govemrnent of Aumadia deems neçessay or
convenient"(Article6, emphasis added). Article 1 of the 1929
Agreement, and the whole of the 1923 Agreement, were

terrninated (Article 7)- thereby terrninating thduty of the
Administrator to"supply hrough the ContractingGovemment by
whichhe has been appointed such other information regardingthe
administrationof the Island aseither of the other Contracting
Govemments shall require"(1923Agreement, Article3).

294. The reason for assodating the United Kingdomand New Zealand in the
administration oNauru wasthe conçem felt at the potential comequences of
exclusiveAustralian convol, including, to some degree at least, the adverse
consequences for the Naunians. See Nauru Mernonui, paras. 80-9, 107-10;

Macdonald,IR PwJuit ofthe Sacd TM, pp.4-18. It would be nirious if the
additionofother States in the administratofthe temitorymade Australia Iess
accountablefor theseadverseconsequences.

295. The three States in the 1987 Agreement themselvesenvisagedseparate
proceedingsbeingbrought agaimt one or other of them, in respect of the actions

of the Cornmissioners or former Commissioners of the British Phosphate
Commission a.ssuch: Agreement to Terminate the Nauru Island Agreement
1919, 9 Febniary 1981 , rticle 3Nauru Mernonul, vol. 4, Annex 31. This
provisiondoes not in ternis relatactsdone by the Administratoor byone of
the Govements, in the exerciseof govermental authority over Nauru346 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU [Io41

(whether or notthe present claim is properldescribedas "arisingoutof the
actioriof the Commissionersor former Commissioners as sucb":see below,
para.306). But theCornmissionerswere muchmureanalogoustaa commercial

pannership thanwa the arrangement for theadministrationof Nauru. If,as
envisagedby the 1987Agreement, asystem ofjointand severalliabilityapplied
to the actsofthe Commissioners afier the dissolutionthe partnership, this
must be true,a fortto inthe caseof aclah againslAustralia in respeof it~
administratioof Nauru under theMandate and Trusteeship.

296. For these reasons, isclear thathere wasno arrangemen tpposable to
Nauru whiçhrequired, or whichnow requires, thejoinderof anyother Statein
proceedingsagainstAustraliaarisingoutof itradministrationNauni.

Section4. TheNauruanAppIicationis AdmlssiMe men ic iwnsequence,
Austreliamayhave a Rightot Reoourseagainstthe otherTwo States

297. Australia argues that the Monetaty Gold principle apherebecausea
decisionadverse to it would necessarily imply that Australihas a nght of

recourseagainstthe United Kingdom and NewZealand (Preliminq Objections,
paras 352-3). It is submiited, first, thaissuedoes notanse at the present
stageof the prweedings; secondly,thata decision adverse to Australia in the
present proceedings wouid not necessarily entai1 that it has suahright of

recourse; thirdly,evenaidecisionin the presencasedid carrythat implication
or entailment, nonetheless the present proceedings are admissible; and finally
thatanyright of recourse Australiamayhave against NewZealand or the United
Kingdomis governedby arrangements between those Statestu whiçh Nauru is
not apartyand which arenot opposable to it.

k THE IMPLICATIONOP A DECISI ODNERS~'TO AUSITALI00 NOTPOSE.% INTHe
CIRCUM~AN CNESXCLUJ~LY PRELIMMRC YHARACIER

298. It was submitted above (paras. 246-8) that the extent and basis of

Australia's liability in the prescaseis a matter fordetermination on the
merits. Itfollows that whether in this respect the non-joinder of the United
KingdomandNew Zedand callsfor the applicationofthe Monetmy Cold
principle(by reasonthat theCourt decision necessarilyimplies that Australia

has a right of recourse against those States) isa question which in the
circurnstanceof thiscasedoes notpossessan exclusivelypreliminaqcharacter.
For example, that issue would notaise if the Court held Australia nto be[losl WRITTENSTATEMENT OF NAURU 347

liableatal4 or ifitheldAustrdia to beliableon a bask or forareason which
(quite apart £romArticle 5ofthe Statute) did notappltothe otherStates.

299. This point ismade even by criticof the Court'sconsistenapproach to

theindispensablepartiesissue.ForexampleDamroschconcludesthat ...

'Ie~ceptimalcaset maybe appropriafortheÇaurt tdecünetode on
certainissuesifanabsentstatenghborobiigationsareinextncablybound
up withthdaims ordefenc esthepartieTs.isdeclsiisbestmadeon a
case-by-c bassistthemeritphase,ratherthanw thbis OFfrapentaq
iaformatioavailabenprelimmarybjections,"

(Damrosch,"MuItiIaterIisputein TheIrmmaümd Cmti ofJwke n
Cmsd, DobbsFerry,N.Y., 19p376atp.400.)

300. Inany event, a decision of the Court against Australia would not
determine the issuewhether Australia haa right of recoursagainsrthe United

Kingdomand NewZealand (PreliminaryObjecriom,paras 352-3).The existence
and extentof a righof remurse between Statesjointly participating in wronghl
activitisa separateissuferom the liabiliofone ofthose States ta thirdparty
injuredby the activity. The United Kingdomand New Zealand my well have

defences toanAustraliandaim: the existenceand extentofany suchdefences is
a matter to be determinedin separatproceeding. As the Chamber pointed out
in the Cme concemirtg fhe Lmd, Irland and MmMtim eronfierDkpute (El

Salvadorv.Hondwm), Applicalionbyhricmgun forPermki~n fo Intewene,I.C.J.
Reports 1990, p.92 at p.134,"[a]casewith a new party,and new issues to be
decided.would be a new case."

301. Thus the possible liabilofthe United Kingdom and New Zedand in a
"recourse"action byAustralia isnot a reason for applying the Monei-y Gold
principleinthiscase.

C. THE PROCEEDI ARG IMISSIBLE EVENIFA5AREÇULT AU~IA HA5A R1CikITOF
RECOUR ~EAINSAN- STATE ORSTATGS

302. Alternativelyeven if the Court's decision in this case çarried the
necessary implication that Australia hadprimafacie right of recourseagainst348 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU Ilo6]

the United Kingdomand New aaland, that should not prevent Cour trom
exercisingitsjurisdictionin the present proceedings.

303. It has alreadybeen seen that the Court ha not aiiowed itselto be
deterred from the due adminisuation ofinternationajusti cyeany "logid
oorollaryof its hdings hîerpm-teon the bais thaArticle59of the Statutis

sufficieutto protethirdparties (CaseconcemingtheFm& Dispute(BtukUia
Faso v.RepublicofMi) 1.ÇJ. Reports1986p,.554at p.578 a;ove,para 257).
Similarlythefactthata findinasbetween thepartieswouldbe Yantarnount"to
a hding in respecotf the legal position oa thirdpartywould not have

prevented theCour£tmm exercisingjuridiction in Caseconceming theLand,
Islandand MmMtime Fmnli'eDispute(El Sdvdor v.HoncUvas. Applicatbn by
Nicwa for Permissioto Infewene)I.C.J.Reports1990,p.92 atp.122;above,
para.260).

304. As the survey of comparative law materials inparas.273-231 above
reveais,the generally açceptemles for liability proceed on the basis ahat
victimshould not be denieda remedy againstone wrongdoer merely because
other wrongdaers who may have been involveciare not amenable to justice.

Similar considerationsapphere. As between Nauru and Australia, the burden
of seekingcontribution for thewrongdonto Nauru shouldbe caston Australia
- which was,and is, in positiontotake appropriatactionto assert whatever
rightsimayhave.

D. &TY RTGK OP.&OURSE AUSITAL MAY HAVE AGA~FINEW Z w OR THE
UWW KINGDO IMGOVERNE BDARMNG~MEN WHSIMARE NOTOPPOSA TOLE
NAUR AND ~ O T BEReLtm ONipme ?mm RROCEWINGS

305. Findly, it issubmitted that Austrdia my not rely,in the present

proceedings.on any arrangement it may have made, or on any regime of
recourse that may exist,as between Australia and third States. Such an
arrangement, or suca regime,isresinlealioactaso £asasNauru isconcerned,
andis not opposabletoit.

306. The provisions ofthe 1987 Agreement, which relate to recourse as
between the three States respectofclaims arisingfrom thactsof the British
Phosphate Cornmissioners assuch ,ave been referredtoin para. 295 above.
The Court is of course not cailed an in thepresentproceedings to decide

whether the Nauruan cIaim is one "arisingout of the actions of the350 CERTAINPHOSPHATE LANDS INNAURU Ios1

cirnirnstançeof the administrationof Nauru,the claim is properly broughi
againstAustrdiadane. Whatever the casernaybe witha group of States each
contributinga partonly toan overall loss oinjurya Statewhose actsarethe

soleor principacause of the injury, or wh6-the principawrongdoer, can be
sued alone.

311. Australiawas theeffectivegoverningauthority,and was recognized as
suchby dl conoerned, includingthe UnitedNations T.he ttctsdecisions and

negotiationwhich fom the bais ofNauni's daim were al1madeor carriecout
by Australia and by Australian oficiasee above,para 288 foran analysisof
the treaty provisions.

312. ConstitutionallyNauru was at al1times an Australian externtettitory,

governed byAusirdian officiais under executivpowers applicabletoa Crown
colony,and (after1965 )nder Australian leaslation (the Nauru Act 1965(Cth);
Nauru Memotid, vol. 4, Amex 39). No legislatiowas passed for or goveming
authorityexercisedover the TrusTemtoryof Nauru by the UnitedKingdom or
NewZealand. See Nauru Mernorial,vol.1BartIV, Chapter 3, anparas.641-3.

313. Ail the relevant negotiations with resptotNauru in the period1964-
1957, and dl the legal acts required to brinNauru to independence, were
ded out byhstrdian officiais under Australian goverrimentaiauthority, and
by AustraiianlegislationThe role of the UnitedKingdom and New Zealand

was consultativeonly. Iiis a fictioto say that "the Administrator was
responsibleto al!three Governments"(Preliminq Objectiom, para. 341). fact
only the Australian Government gave instructionsto the Administrator, and
legally(asa matterof the administrativorpublic law of the territoonly the
Australian Government was competent to give the Administrator instructions.
Cornplaintswhichthe United KjngdomorNewZealand may havehad abut the

Administrator wouldhave had to be made through the diplornaticçhanntothe
AustralianGwernment, which possessedthe sole effective decisionalpower, as
the 1919Agreement andsubsequent changes toitreflect.

314. Even theearlierlimited rightsof the UnitedKingdornandNew Zealand

withrespect rothe administratioof Nauruwere substantiallyeliminated by the
1965Agreement, which was as between the threePartner Governments the
governinginstrument in the cruciapre-independence period: see above,para.
288.11091 WiWi-ïEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 351

315. It is thus ntnie toaay thatNew Zealand and the United Kingdom "in
no relevant senseacteddifferentlyfromAustralian(hIUnUlary Objections,para.
359). No United Kingdom or New Zealand officialexetcised goveniing
authority averNam as Adminktratoror otherwisc. No United Kingdom or
New Zealand legislationformedpart of the lawof Nauru. Both the ternion

whichand the mddities by which Nauruachievedindependenoe were the result
of Austrdia'sacts- a conclusionwhich isnotde~ted by the fact that there was
consultationwith the other two Governments kom time to the about those
issues. See further abovpara. 6-8,

316. Itis true that,on principlesof agencyrem-d in the Trusteeship
Agreement, there isa real possibilbat the UnitedKingdomand New Zealand
might also be legally liable to Nauru in respect of the actç of Australia
cornplaineciof. Whether thztt liability exists,farwitextends,and whether

thereareany separate defences tany claimthat mightbe brought byNauni, are
matters for detenninationin any subsequentpraceedings that may be brought.
They do not affecttheissueof Australianliability.

Section8. Thehper Administrationof InternationalJusticeKequires

Ktejectionof theAuçtralianArgument

317. The Court could not play ils proper role in the administration of
international justiceif a State could immunize itself frorn jurisdictionby
associating itself witothers in the commissionof some wrong.nius the

principle of discrete or concurrent liabilicorresponds with the normal or
cornmon-sense approach to issuesofinternationalresponsibility.

318. The Australian theory of liabilitywould make States effectivelyimmune
from international proceedings against them in respect of their own acts,

providedthoseacts were perfcirmedjointlywith oon behaif ofanother Stateor
States. Infact theCourt ,onfronted with suchcases,has alwaysdeait with the
issue before ion itsrneritsexceptwhere the rightof another Statewere (asin
the hfonetmy Gold Case) the verysubject matter of the dispute. See above,
paras. 205-216.In anysituation shorofMoneraiy Gold, "the appropriate remedy

to protect the interests of thirdparinpendingcontentious proceedings"who
do not wishto rely solelyon Article 59for them to iniervene: cf. Judge Sette-
Camara, Continental Shelf (Libyan Amb Jamahirja v.Malta), Applicaion ro
Inteivene,LCJ.Reports 1984,p.3,at p.89.352 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU 1101

319. Thisis borneout,for example, by theCo& ChmmI Che, J.CJ, Reports
1949,p.1. There the Cous held thatAlbania wasliablefor thedamage done to

United Kingdomshipsby mines laid in Aibanianterritoryalthaugtithe mines
werenot laid byAlbania itselfThere was evidencein thatcasethat the mines
were laidby hvo Yugoslav mine-sweepers (cf i.., pp.16-17). Afternotinthat
Yugoslaviawas not a Party to the case,the Court mmmented that the only

questionithad tadecide was whetherAlbaniawas liableunderÎntenrationallaw
forthe damage (id.,p.17) .theldthat Abania was so LabIeo, nthe bais thatil
hadmeansof knowingabout the presence of the mines,and went on to assess
the hl1 amountof the British loss (id.p.23; and see Co@ Chnnnel Case

(Assement o- C~rnpens~on),LC J. Reports1949,p.244). Thus the Courtheld
Mbania fullyliablfor the10%. This point was stressed in the dissenJudge
Azevedo.who statedthat:

The victitetainsthrightosubmia daimagain steonlyotheresporisibte
parties,isoli&, in accordan&th the choicc whicbis alwsysto the
disnetion oftvidim, inthpurelecon~micfield;wbereascriminjudge
caaaotinprinciple,pronouanaccornpüreoa principguilwithouaithe
sametime esiabllbmtbe guidtthemainauthororactuaperpetratofthe
offense."

320. In its PreIiminay Objections (para. 345) Australia refers to the
"hypotheticalsituation" of a compromissory clause in the Tmsteeship
Agreement. Butsuch a compromissoryclause could neverhave been availedon
by Nauru, since bydefinitionit would have been terminateprior to (or at the
point O£) Nauru's becamingindependent. In &y event the "hypotheticai

situation" probablcould not have arisen,since the Court held in 1966that no
proceedings couldbe brought bythird States allegingnon-cornpliancwittithe
basic obligation c~ntainedin a Mandate: South WRFI Afnca Casa (Second
Phase), I.CJ. Reports1465p ,.6. Such third Stateitheld, lackedany interest

"specificaiyuridicalincharacter": idatp.34. There is noreason to think that
the Court in that case wuuld have treated any differently obligationsarising
under a Tmsteeship Agreement. Butplainlyit ca~ot be saidthat Nauruhad no
interest"specificalljuridicalin character": thepeople of Nauru were the
beneficiaryof the Tmsteeship, and not rnere byçtanders. Afteindependence,

Nauru, representing its people, mube able to seek redress againstanyState it
cm show to have ken inbreach of itobligations- obligations owedto the
Naunianpeople, and noi,ornot only,tootherStates.l [llll WRIITEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 353

l
321. A more releva nhypotheticalsituationwwouldlx toassume that Nauru
had succeededin negotiating some redresfrom the UnitedKingdom and New
Zealand,on a 'bithoutprejudice"basis. Despitethi it must foUw from the
Australian argument thathe Courtwodd havenojurisdiction to determinethe
extent of Austraiialiability. Ifact thepositionof those non-parties is fully

protectedbytheStatute and theRules ofCourt.
l
1 Section9. Incornpetenco ethe Cauri toDetemine Jurlsdictiwna issues
affectingthe UniteKingdomor NewZaimd iathesePnmdlngs

322. Finally,itisnecessaq to enterareservationon one point. The Australian
argument consistentlassumes (1) thatthe mnsent of theUnited Kingdom and
New Zealand isessentiato the present proceedingsand(2) that they havnot
consented:see Preliminq Dbjectiom, paras.349, 355. For the reasons given
dready, the firstof these assurnptionis unfounded. So faras the second

assumption is concerned, both States are parties to the Statute and have
dedarations in force under the Optional Clause,andisnot conceded tbat they
have not consented.Thecentral point isthat the CourIsnot competent in the
present proceedings to interpret any provisions in the Optional Clause
Declarations of the United Kingdom and New Zealand that they might have
soughtto relyon,if thewere parties tciproceedingscornmencedby Nauru - or,

for that matter, if were parties to proceedincommenced by Australia.

Section10. Conclusion

323. For these.reasons, it isubmitted that the present case is properly
constitutedas toparties,and may properlyproceed against the Respondent

Statealone,Zeavingit up to thaState ttake suchactionasrnaybe availableto
itto seek frornthe othtwo Statesany redress twhich it maylxentitled. PARTV

THEOVERSEASASCOMMISSIONERSISHPHOSPHATE PARTV

THEOVERSEAS ASSETS OFTESE BRITISHPHOSPHATE
COMMISSIONERS

The DifïerenceConcerningUnlawfulDisposal of theOverseasAssets
Constitutesa LqpEDispute

324. Australia first of dl takes the point rhat "there has formalclairn

byNauru to theseassets nor any discussions or negotiations in relation to the
daim to theseassets(Preliminq Objectiom,para.369).

325. There is norequirement either in general international lor inthe
Statute othe Court that a claishouldbe a "formal clairn,nd the Australian

Government citesnoauthorhiestosupportItsview. IRits practice the Court has
not shown any fondness for formalismand this precisely in the context of
jurisdictional questions: see thCo+ Chel Case (Cornpetence), LCJ.
Reports1948 p,p.27-8NorlhernCameroons Case,LC.J. Reports 1963,pp.27-8;

Hersch Lauterpacht, TheDevelopment ofIntemafionalLaw bythe International
Cour! ofJirstiLondon, 1958 p,p.200-S.

326. The Australian Government also contends that there is no "legal dispute"
between AustraliaandNauru"inrelation tothe daim byNaum forcertain of the
overseasassetsofthe British Phosphate Commissioners"(Preliminq Objections,

para. 368,and çee alsopara. 372).

327. The diplumaticcorrespondence presentedin the Mernorial(paras. 471-7)
clearly reveals the existenof "a disagreement on a point of iaw or fact"
between Nauni and Australia in accordancewitthe succinct definition of the

Permanent Courtin theMavrommatis Palestine ConcessionsLare, P.C.I.J.,Series
A, No.2, p.11.358 CERTAINPHOSPHATE LANDS 1N NAURU 161

328. The practice of the Court is basedupon deterrnining the substance of

things and not theirsuperficialappearançeor fom. Thus in the Notthern
Çameroom Cme the Courtreferred to "the opposingviews of the Parties" as
reveali "ntgeexistenceofa dispute in theserisereoognisedby the jurisprudence
of the Court and its predecessa...(LCJ. Reports1963p, .27). SimiIarlyi,n its

AdvisoryOpinion in the Headquartm Agreement .ase (LCJ. Reports 1988,p.27)
the Courtreferredto the SouthWest Afica cases(1.C.J.Reports1962,p.328)and
observed that:'The Court foundthat theopposingattitudes of the partieclearly
established the existenceof a dispute". In the present casethe exchangeof

lettersof 1987 (se@ below, 335-41) establishes "the opposing attitudesof the
parties"in themost straightfoswardway.

329. The existenceof a disputeisnot conditionedby the factthat theNauntan

letters didnot set forth"anylegal bais for the claim" (Preliminq Objections,
para. 370). The expressionof viewbyNauru is unequivocal,and both sideswere
aware of the background and the precise history of the issues relating to the
phosphate industry.

330. Nor can the issue be dected by the fact tharthe daim relating to the
overseas assetswas raised "in 1987at the earliest" (hliminary Objectionspara.
371). In the opinion of the NauruGovernment at the material time the whole

famiIy ofissuesconcerningthe phosphate industryremained unsettled. It B thus
astonishing tofind that the Australian Government ciairnsto be surprisedthat
Naurureacted to the disposal of the assets in 1987.11was naturalthat Nauru
would react when it discovered the intentions of the former "Partner
Govemments"in respect of asçetsin whichNauru had anevident interest.The

reacrion was entirely congruenw tith the general attitude of Nauru in face of
Australianreluctance to take Naunianclaimseriously.

331. In relation to the diplornatic correspondence of 1987 the Australian

Government assertsthat:

The referencta leavithematter bepursud atanotherthe orplacc(letter
of 23 July, NaurMemwial, para.476) dms noiindicaithat any'positive
oppositioto thedaimhad yetemergcdbetweenNauruand Australi50 as Io
çonstiiuadispute..."

(PreliminaObjections,para.372.)11171 wRlnEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 359

332, The passage concerned, allowing for the normal level of oourtesy
maintainedbetween the twoparties, indicateunequivdy the non-acceptance
by Nauniof the key propositionin Mr Hayden's letterof 15 June 1987. The

PresidentofNaum des dear thathe doesnot accept'leur statement that tbe
residud assetsoftheBritish Phosphate Commissionerswere not derivedinpart
fromits Nauru operatiom" (lettedated 23July1987). The President's hrther
statement that the rnatter wounot be pursued "here"butat another placeand
time carmot, in ordinaryusage,be taken as a qualificatioof his rejectionof

Mr Hayden's statement.

333. This correspondence was precipitatedby the news îhat the Partner
Gwements were planning the disposaof thea~sets.Inthe view of Nauruthe

existenceof aNauman interest in theassetswas amatter ofcommonknowledge
mong oficlals. The disposaiof the assets coatitua furtherdevelopmentof
the existing disputçoncerning Australian responsibilitforbreaches of legal
duty in thperiodof Trusteeship.

334. The originofthe British PhosphateCommissionersassetsisrecognisedin
the leading historyof the phosphate industry,which contains the following
passage:

"Excepftorthoriginalpurchpriccandthe aaumdated susplusre-invested
wiihtheCornmirsionsn1950,heComrnisswner~ad been abtohce al1
developmentsfmwithitheindustry3

(WsiiiamsMacdonald,InePhosphufeers,Melbcu1985p.404.)

335. The Governent of Naum was derted tothe proposed windingup of the

British Phosphate Commissionersby press reportsand a note wassent to the
Australian Government requesting information and requesting consultatio"in
matters relating tcsthe disbursement othe assetsof the B.P.C." (Mernorial,
Annex 84 No.4; Note dated 5January 1987). In reply the Austraiian
Govemmentconfirmeci"that arrangementsfor the winding up are inhand and

that it is proposed that the partner govemments, including the Australian
Government, sign an agreement shortly to bring this about" (Note dated
20January 1987;MernoriaiA, nnex80,No.7).

336. In response the Nauru Govemment dispatched a note of which the

significapassages are asfollows:360 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU [lipI

"The Department ofEiaeraal Anairs ofthe Republicof Nauni presenfs its
uimpliments to the AutitrafiaHi Commission and has the honour to
aclrnowledgweitbthanl tesHigbCommission N'te No.3/8ï dated 20Jaouary
1987in respedofthe Department'squeryuincerningthe earherpresreporton
the windingupoftheBritishPhosphateC-wers.

The Departmentof EjPernaiAnairs has the fiirthehmour to note that an
agreement wiU k hignedsbortly amwg the thrw partaergovments to
fadiate wlndiog-upofthe &airsof Be BritishPbwphatcCommissioners .he
Departmeut expreues regret îhat the three partaer gwernments are
mntemplating the windhg-up of the Bntth Phohphte Commissionersand

distributiofthe'ifunk at the presentjunfture,wheNauru hasset idmotion
an independent and impartialCornmirsion of Inquji intothe questionof
rehabihtationandresioration of the phosphathds workeda by British
PhŒphateCommissionera sndnthcnduringthe petid beforetbeindependence
of Nam.

In view d the abwe, the Departtuentof Mernal Alfaim requesrs ththree
partncr gwenments of Australia,NewZealmdandthe United Kingdomto lx
god enough atleasttokeep the fuadsof thBritisPbosphateCommissimers
intaciwithout disbunement, until the conclusion of thtask of the said
Cornmisionof Inquiry.

The Departmentfurther requeststhe threeparber govenunedtsthatthe alfice

rm& and dhe~ documentsofthe BritishPhosphateCommissionersmaykiudiy
be keptpreservedand that the said CommissionInquirybepermittedto have
acçessto and use ofthese:records and documents, Uso faras theymay be
relevantandusefulfortheWhcnt of themaadaieofthe &d Cornmkian.'

(Note dated30Jaauaq 1987M;emoiid,Anna 80, No.11.)

337. Thisnote of 30 January 1987 did not receive a responseandin duecourse

thePresidentof Nauru,MrHammerDeRoburt, wrote to the AustraiianMinïster
of ForeignAffairs, theHonourableW.G. Hayden,inthefollowing tem:

"1 have readwithsomc interest of the reeent kit to Autralia of SirGeoffrey
Howe, the BritishForeign Seaetq. From newsrewris it appearthatheand
youbave discus~edamongstotherthmp mattersof regionaiPacilicinterest.

Itoccuned tome,therefore,amat opportunemomentto raisewitbyoua mattar

of greatconceru ta my gwement. We were coocerned tolem by your
DiplornaticNoteinJanuary,dong withNotesfromthe UniiedKingdomand New
Zealand,thatthe assetsoftheBritishPhosphateCommissionerswere abouttbe
woundupby anagreementthea shortlytbesiped. As youare, nodoubt,aware
my goverment voicedihat wnsern bya TurtherDiplornatiNote toyou dared
30 January 1987.This was sentin çimiar terms tobath the otherpartuer

governmentsintheformer Tmt. SOfar therehmbeen no replytothiNote.11191 WRrïTEN STArEMENT OF NAURU

Mygoverurnenttakes thestronview Lhastuchasse& +ose ultimatederivation
Iargelyark from theveq &i of Nauni Island,shouldbedireaed towards
assistancin itrehabüitationparticuiarto that me-thirwhich was mined
priortoIndependence.

The Note io you andorfiergovcrnmcnts,howm; wasby way OF an interitu
measuremerelymoving youto withholâishibati01~oassetutilthe reportof
the presenlindependentCnmmKFimof Lquhy inthe Rehabitationof the
Worked-OutPhosphatehds ofNauru hasken wmpieted andpublished.My
gwernment ÿ, of course, optimisticthatpur Airstraliagwernment wiii
participain suchioqujrandmakesuch tiubmissiono it aideemsfit.

The*le rehabitationquestioisa mat ve&g problem. On thiq Fuestion,
thereappearstobe a numberofintmgikk, andiiisthebdief ofmygovernent
thatirre~ocableiancesshoulaotbe asoumedby thevariougwernmentsatthe
autsei.Forthatreasonwelmk forward to areportfromtheCommissionwhich
we hope wilbehth cmistntaiw.andüluminating. achievethatdesirabend,
my government wouldseekhm theAustraliangwernment wbateverassistance
it canrenderthivsatuableinquiry1 nahrrailmk lorwardto yourfamurable

reply."

(hIiminuy Objech'omvol.ii,ex 13.)

338. Thisletter from the Presidentinvolves a clearaffirmation of an interestin

the British PhosphateCommissioners' assets anda linkingof the questionof the
disbursemeno tf the assetswiththeissuo ef rehabilitation.

339. The nature of thedisputewas givenhrther confirmation asa resultofthe
exchangeof letters withwhich the sequence of correspondence ended. The

Preaident's letterof4 May 1987 drew the followingresponse from theAustralian
MinisterofForeignAffairs:

"1refeto your letter dated 4 May regardthe disposal of assetsof the
BritisPhosphateCommissioners.

The agreementsignedon 9 Febmary 1987whichcompletedthewind up pro~ess
foiimredterminaiionof theBritishPhosphCommissioners'sfunctionsi1BI.
The British Phosphate Commisioners and the partner goverrimenth have
dischargecfairlal1ouistandingobligatiwsThe rwidualasers ofthe Britkb
PhosphateÇommiSSioaers ere noderid fromitsNauruoperatiom.

Ausirdian parliameniq practicerequires that rno~es acEniing to the
Goverurnenare aedited townsoiidaied revenufor allcxationin accordance CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS INNAURU LI2o]

witùnamai budgetarpyrdures. ïhatcoursw easfdowed intbtcaseof the
BritishFhphate Commisshnersmidual ametS.

TheAWaliam Gwemment ircarefdiye-4 Nmls requegtfoAustralia
to asktinintCommissionofLnquky. We expedshortlyto bina pition Io

advisetheextentdich Australia be abletameetthatrequsLm

340. TothisthePresidentofNaururepliedon23Jdy1987 as foiiows:

'1refetopur letterdated15tJuae1987relating tothematterof thedisposal
of as&s oftheBritishPhosphaCommissioners.

1 am sure, takmintoaccountmy Governmeat'sknmvkdge ofthe manner of
accumulatioofsurplusfunk bythe BritishPhosphaieCommhioncrs,tbatyou

wouldnot lx surprisedif wereto saythat1 fmditdioicuitIO accepyour
staternentththeresidu aasetsof the BritishPhosphateCommissiowere
notderivedinpartbom its Nauruoperatiou1.shalnot.however,pursuthat
herebu!leaveiperbapsforanotherplacandanotherthe.

On thequestîoofyourGwernment'o asYstaoctotheInquiry,loo konvardte
a replysbdy. Permitme tucomment,howwer,thaiinrepltotheChairmanof

the InquUy,thepartner gwements' British PhosphatCamm~oners have
refuscaccesstoits recordInthe Brereststmthanda freeinquiryitseems
tome that a- to sucinformationivkd. 1am surethatpurGovernment
andthoseofthe othepartnetswouldappreciaithat1 wouldbewatefulifthe
mattermuid bead&&. Itwas, aspu would be awm, a matterraid by
DiplornaticNotM of Januar1987bymy DepartmentOFExteruaAffairsand
addressetoyour HighCommission iNauru."

341. In the submissionof the Cioveinmerit of Naum this correspondence
clearlyconfirmsthe existenceof a dispute concerni nhelegal interest of Naum
in theBritishPhosphate Commissioner sssets.The nature of theissueas one of

Iegal entitlementemerges with sufficientclarity.

342. There is one finalpoint. The AustralianGovernment isconçerned to
demonstratethe lackof a "legalbasis"for the claim relating10 the overseas
assets of the British PhosphateCommissioners (PrelimUlary Objecrions,para.

367). Moreover,Australiacontendsthat thisclairnis divorced £rom the claim
relatingto sehabilitationandis a "newclaim"(id., para.374).[II11 WRITTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 363

343. Therealityisotherwise.TheNaunianleadership was alwaysawareof the
problem of rehabilitation. As awin as Naunians were allowed acoess to

independentprofessionalexpertise (in 19641, their entitlements auld be
expressedin awiderframework.Inany evenf the apparatusof VisitingMissions
hadmade theTmsteeship system verymucb a partofNaumanthinking.

344. The documentary recordshowsthat the Nauman Ieadershipwas weii
aware of thelegd framewosk withinwhich Auçtrdh responsibilitarose.Thus,
in the courseof the 1956talks, the Nauruandelegationmade the following

forma1 statement:

Tbe Nauruanpeople hsve ccmistentlydaimed that itthe fundamental
responsibioof theAdminirteringAuthodytoreatorth minedphosphate
landsto thtir miginal muditioThismsponsibilistem in par+rn trie
oblip'on theAdminbimhgAirUimi-yhmund. theU.N.Tmiewhipsysterto
s4fqumd theWre ofthe NawuonPeople. It alsstemsfromtheverylarge
profitsfrwi past miPing&tythatheAdminkteringAutborihas cboseto
disiributo phosphatconsumersinAustraliaNew Zedand and theUnited
Kingdom@ynot char- worlpricea)insteadof return~gtto the Nauruan
peopleastheidueeotitlement."

(Mernukî, vo3,Annex 4,p.52Sessionof20June 1966section B, par1.

(emphaskadded).)

345. This section of the statement has the heading'The Responsibiiityfor
RehabilitatingNauru". The NauruanDelegation wa~ led by the Head Chief,

MrHamrner DeRoburt,andinduded two otherrnembersof the Naum Local
Governent Council. Given the strongelements of continuity inthe political
lifeof Nauru, there can be no doubt thatthe leaders, both before and after

independence , erewell aware ofthe legalbasisof theirclaim. In thiscontext
the clairn tthe overseas assets waspart of a consistent and longestablished
pattern TheClaim concerning the Overseas Assetsdws notConstitute a New Basis of

Claim

346. TheAustralian Govement's fondness for argument dsepending upon
formalism is illustratedin the followingpassage of the Preliminq Objeetiom
(para 373):

"Ttidaimis Eurtheprecludefrom determinatio,venifa &pute wereheld
toexist,forthefoHowingreasoAn.ApplicationisrequiredbyArtided3the
Rulesofthe Courtto "s& the precisenatuof thedaim'. The Naunian
ApplicationcontainednreFerence to thdaim to the assetofthe British
PhosphateCommissioners.Itis not prmkiblefor Nauru,wben 1- its
Mernoria,o addacompletelynewbasisofdaimthatLFurelated ttheoriginal
daimoffaduretorebabilita..."

347. This cornplaintlacks substance. The Government of Nauru enpressly
reserved "therightto supplement or to amend itApplication (see paragraph 51

thereor). Whilstthere are no doubt certain constrain&upon the prrulessof
amendment of the claimspecifiedinan Application, the Australian Governrnent
has failed to referta anyprinciple which would preciude the Court from
exercisingits cornpetence in respect of the unlawful disposai of the overseas

assetsof British Phosphate Commissioners

348. The passage from the Preliminay Objectionsquoted in para. 346 above
misdescribes the Nauruan claim and thus refers to "the onginal failure to

rehabilitate".In reality the Nauruan claimas presented both in the Application
and in the iUemorial,are based upan a setof inter-connected breaches of legal
obligationsarising in connection with the Tnrsteeship Agreement. The "failure

to rehabititate" is onlone, albeita major, consequence of the inter-comected
matrix of breaches of legal obligations. The daim of Nauru reflect the366 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU

substantiaifailuresof the AdrninisteringAuthority in respectof the duties of
Trusteeship.

349. The claim relatingto udawful disposal of the overseas assets of the
BritishPhosphateCommissionersis closelyrelatedto,andfom a ramification

of, the matrixof factsand law concerningthe managemeno tf the phosphate
industry inthe period£rom1919until independence.

350. The practice of tiie Court has established that a sufficiently dose
relationshipbetween an Application anda subsequentsubmission justifiethe

exercise of jurisdiction. Ln the Temple Case(Meris) Cambodia in itsfinal
submissionshadasked the Courtro order restitutionof sculpturesand other
objects remwed fromthe Temple by the Thai authoritiesin 1954. The Gout?

foundno difficultinmaking a determination of thisrequest in spiteof the fact
that thisclaim had nui appearedin the Application. Inthis respect the Court
abserved:

"As regardthe Fif thbmissionof Cambodiacnncerningrestitutiont.he Court
cornidersthat therequesi madein it doesnot represenany elension of
Çambodia'soriginadaim (i whichcaseitwould havebeenLreŒivable atthe
stage at whicitwas tusadvanced). Ratherisit, like fourthSubmissioq
impliut in, andconsequenonathcclaiofsovereipty iis...'

(I.CJ. Report1962p.36.)

35 1. In the FUheries Junkdicti Coase(Merits)(FedemlRepublic of Gemiany v
Iceland) the Court had to deal with the same type of question. The relevant

passagesin theJudgmentare as follows:

TI. Bythefourthsubmÿsionin its Mernormaîntainedintheoralproceedingr,
theFederaiRepublicofGermanyraiscdthequesrionofcompensati fonaiieged
actsof harashmcntof its fis-vessekby Iceland mictal patrol batsthe
submissiooreadas follows:
'Thatthe actofinterferenccbyIwlandiccoastal ptrobats withf~hing
vesselregistered in the FedRcpublicof Germany or witb their fahing
operationsbythethreatouse d [orceareunlawhiunder internationallaw,
andbat Içetandisunderanobligatiotamake compensationtherefoto the
FederalRepublicofGcmany.'

72.The Courtçannotacceptthe viewthatiwould lacjurisdictito deai with
thksubmissian.The matterraisctheceinkpartofthe controverbetweetnhe
Partieasn,dconstiiutasdisputenlatinto Iceland'extension its fisheries
jurkdictionThesubmissioois onebasedonfactssubsequento the Minofthe
Appli~atiobut arisindirectout ofthequestionwhicisthesuhjcct-matirf 251 WRIïTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU

thaApplicationkF suchitfa& withithe wpe of the Court'jurisdiciion
dehed inthe wmpro~ dauseoftheEkchangoefHota of 19Jul1951."

(I.CJ. Repor19'74,p.203.)
l
352. Whilstthe Cour referstothe circumstance that thesubmissionwas based

on factssubsequent to thefilingof theApplicationt,hereis no reason to assume
thatthiswas a necessaa rsyopposeilto asufficieut,conditionforthe existenceof
jurisdiction.The important, and necessary ,onditionappears tohave been the

existenceofa reIationshipwiththe subject-matter ofthe Application.

353. In theFiShenes Jhdiction case in a Separate Opinion Judge Waldock
express eupport for the approachof the majority of the Court ro theclaim

concerningacto sf harassrnent(I.C.J.Reports 1974,pp.231-2).

354. The Australian Governent invokesthe decision in thecase of Militq

andPmilitay Acfivitim inNicaragua (Jhdiction), 1.C.J.Reports 1984,p.392
at p.427 (PreIUninmy Objectîons,para. 374). This decision, iis contendedby
Australia,establishesthatit ipemissible to add triagraund ofjunsdiction but

not"to add to the substantiveclairnmade".

355. A carefulperusalof the relevantpassages in theJudgment ofthe Court in
the Mititq and ParamiliiaryActiviiiescase (I.C.J.Reports 19û4, paras. 77-83)

reveals that the views expressedby the Court do not assist the Australian
argument.

356. There are WQ key passages in the Judgment. The first deals with the
point concerning"an additionalground ofjurisdictionand isa follows:

"TheCourt considers that the fact t1956Treaty wu net invokeinthe
Applicatias atitlofjurisdictdoesnot in itself uinsa bartoreEance
beingpla~eduponitinthc Mernorial. Since the Court must alwaysbesatisfied
thaf has jurisdictioo bfore procetomexaminethe merits a caseitis
çertaiodesirahthat'the legalgroundsuponvfhichjukdictioof the Court
is sato ùebased'sh~uiixindicateatanearlystageintheproce* attd
Artide38of thRulesofCourtthereforprovideforthestobespxiî~ed'asfat
aspossible"the application.additiongound ofjurisdictionmhowever
b broughttu the Court's attention latheCourt may takithto afcount

provided the Applicmakesit cIcarthit intentoprocee dpon thatbasis
(CenoinNowgim hms, I.CJ. Reports 1957,p.and providecalsthatthe
resultnot toîramformthe disputebrougkbre the Courby theapplication
intoanotherdisputewhichisdiffererit in character (SaciétJCornmemioie& CERTAIN PHOSPFIATELANDS 1N NAURU
I1261

BelgiqueKU, SeriesA/B, No. %, p.1). Baththese. cnnd;riomarsatidedin

rhepresentcase.*

(I.CJ.Reports1g84p,p.426=1p.ara$0.)

357. The secondpassage£rom the Judgment is of particular relevancefor
presentpurposes,andin it the Court is clearlyreferrhg not only to the issue of

jurisdictionbut &O to rnattersof substance:

Takmg into accountthest Artides of the Treaty of 1956,particularIthe

provisionininter& Artide forthefidom ofcommerce andnavigation.
and the referencein the Preamble topeace and ûiendship here cm be no
doubt thai,in the &cumskmw in whicbNiwagua broughtitsApphtioa tothe
Court,audonthe basii ofthefa& tbereaxerted, thereis a dispbeen the
Partiesinterdia, asto the'iaterpretatior application'ofthT;reaty.That
disputeisalsdearlyonewhichisnot 'satkfactaradjiistebydiplomacy 'ithin
themeaningof ArtideXXIV ofthe1956 Treaty(cfUnitedSirrtesDiplom&'cand
fhzmlnr SlqffiTehm, I.CJ.Reports1980p ,p+26-28,aras.50to 54).laview

oftheCourt,itdoesnotneccmy followthatbecausea Staie basnoe.Xpm$~ly
refmd in negociationswithmother Statetoa particulartreaas havingbeen
violatecbiy uindua of thai other State,it isdebarrcdfrom invokmg a
compromismry dause in thattreaty.The United Stateswas WU aware that
Nicaragu aiiegedthrt itmnduct was a breacbof internationaobligations
kforethe presentcasewasinstituteandit LSnow awarethatspeuf~cartic1sfo
the1956 Treatyareallegedto bavebeen violated.It wouldmake no sense to
requireNicaragunow to institufresbproceediqp baseon theTreaty,whichit

wouldbe Fullyentitled do. &i the Permment Couri okrved 'the Court
caanotdow itseltobe hamperedbya mere defeaofform. the removalowhich
dependssolel on the partywncemed' (CertainGerman Inferestin Polish
Upper Shi% Jurisdidion, Judgmcot No.6,1925,CU SeriesA,No. 6, p.14).
Accordinglyt,hCourt fin& that,tathe extentthat theclaituin Nicaragua's
Applicationcanstituta disputasto theinterpretationotheappücatianofthe
Articleof theTreatyof 1956desribedin paragrapb 82 above,the Court has
jurÿdictionunderthatTreaîtoentertaisuchclaims."

(LCJ.Reports19S4,pp.428-9,para.83.)

358. This passagecontains~hreepropositionseach of which militates against
the Austsaliancontentionthat no jurisdiction exists in relation to the claim

conceming the overseas assets:

Firsi: there must be evidence of a dispute in relationto the subject

matterinvolved.
Secondb: the issuemust have beenventilatedbefarethe proceedings

were begun. WRITTENSTATEMENT OF NAURU 359

l
nird&: defectsofformcannot beallowedto defeatconsideratiom of
pracricalconvenience.

359.In the presentcase, itissubmitted that "itwould make no sense to
requireNauru "now toinstitutfreshproceediagsb"aseduponArticle38(2}of

the StatuteThedecisionof the Court in theJurisdictionPhas e ftheMilitary
und Pmilitmy Achities Cme had sigdcant oonsequences for theMerits
Phase,astheJudpnt on the Meritdemonsrnate sI.CJ.Reports1386, pp.135-
42,paras.27CL82) .he Dtsposhifcontainsfour6ndingsbased upon theTreatyof
1956(ibid.pp.146-50,para.292),and itk mistakento explainthetwo decisions

of1984and1986 exclusivelinterms ofgroundsofjurkdictian.

360. Inthe lighoftheconsiderationssetforthabove,the claim reIatingtthe
overseasassetsdoes not constttutea completelnewbais of claim and in the
circumstancestherais no obstaclto theexerciseof theCourt'sjurisdictionin

this respect. PART V

Jurisdktioi Existsmenif theIssu relatingto theOvemas AssetsConstirutes a

New Basisof CLaim

361. The primary contention advanced by Nauru rests upon the proposition

that the clairn concerning the overseas assets of British Phosphate
Cornmissioners does not constihita new basis of claim (seabove, Chapter2)
In the alternativethe Gavement of Nauru submitsthat, evenif this cladoes
constitute insome sense a new claim, there would still be no obstacle to the
exerciseofjurisdictioin respectof the subjectmatter.

362. The basis for this submission in the aiternative is to be found in the
reasoning of the Court in the MilitaryMd Puramilitq Actbities(Jurisdicn'on)
Case. In the passage quoted in para. 357 above, the Court insisted on the

importanceof the threefactors,listein para. 358above. The third factoisthat
defects of form cannot be allowed to defeat considerations of practical
convenience.

363. In the contexof the third factor, positionadopted iy the Courtin the

Militaryand Parami1it-y Achities (JuridictionCme is applicable even if, ia
forma1 sense,''anew bais ofclairnuisinvolved. As the Couri said in1984:"It
would make no sense to require [the claimant State] now to instiiutEresh
proceedings"based upon the relevant compromissoryclause (in that case)and
the same logicapplies in the present proceedings baçed upon Article36(2}of the

Statute.

364. Twoother factors favour the exercise ofjurisdiction in the circumstances
of the presentcase.In the first plaeven if anew baris of claimwere involved,
the subjectmatteris closelyrelated to the parent claim bothtermsof the legal

relationships involved andin ierms of the matrix of documenta7 and other
evidence.372 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU E 101

365. Secondly, there is no public policy which would indicate a refusal to
exercisejurisdictionIn particular,there ino question of Australibeing taken

by surprise. Australiawas given cIear noticeof the existenceof Nauru's legal
interestinthe extendedcorrespondence of 1987.See above,paras .35-41.

365. In thisseriesthe letterof 4May 1987 from the nesident ofNauru to the

AustralianMinister of Foreign Affairs,Mr Hayden, stands out. The President
expressesthepositionof Nauru with fimess andlinks the questionof the assets
of British Phosphate Commissionerswith other issues, including that of
rehabilitation.Inthe President'swords:

'Mygwernmeuttakesthestrongviethatsuchassetws,osui~c derivation
largelarks fromthe verysoi1 of NauIsland, shouldbdirectetowards
assistanceitsrehabilitatiparticulatoythaone-thirdwhich wamined
priotoIndependence.'

367. Thisevidencesupports the view thateven ifthebais of claim is"new" in
a forma1 sense,it is intimatellinkedwith the grouping of issues arisinout of
the breaches of theTmsteeship Agreement associatedwith the management of
the phasphaie industry.

368. Inconclusionit may be pointed outthat the exerciseofjurisdictioover
the clairnconcerning the overseas assets of Brirish Phosphate Cornmissioners
will notcause any prejudice to theRespondent,a factor gîven ernphasisby the

Court in the Barcelona Traction Case (Pre1imin.y Objections),1.C.J.Reports
1964,p.25, precisely in relation to the modification of submissiooEtwas the
generd policy of the Permanent Court to adopt a liberal policy toward the
modification of submissionsin cases instituted by application: see the Ch6w
Factoty case (Mmits), P.C.IJ., Ser. A, No. 17, pp.25-9;Phce von Piew case,

P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 52, pp.13-14; Smikfé Commeriaie de Belg@e case,
P.Ç.I.J., No78, p.173. There appears tobe no change in circumstanceswhich
wouldjustifya departure from this poIiq bythe present Court. PART v

The Legal InteresofNauru in theOverseasAssetsofthe British Phosphate

Commissioners

Section 1.The Austraüan Argument

369. As a questionof admissibilitytheAustralian Governent çontends that
Nauru lacks any legal inierest in the overseas assetof British Phosphate
Commissioners (Preh'rninayObjectiow, para. 375). The bais for thisis the
allegationthat "thassetsdidnot belongto Nauru andwere freeIydisposable by
the PartnerGovernmentç" (ibid.).

370. The positioof the Government of Nauru isasfollows:

(a) The question of legalinterestnot,in the circumstanceof this case,
an exclusivelyprelirninaryquestion and should be joined to the

merits.

(b) On the evidence thereis asufficientlegal interestto rentheclaim
toapart of the assetsadmissible.

Section2. The Nature ofthekgal Interesof Nauru

371. InitsPreIiminaryObjecfio?Lpara. 373, Australiaassens the Iackof any
legal interesby Nauru in theassetsof the British Phosphate Commissioners,
which, Australia infosmed Nauru, amounted ro A$57.9 million upon the

termination of the 1919 Nauru TslandAgreement in 1987 (Memotid, vol. 4,
Annex 31). Nauru has, of course,in this action limited itstoa claim on the
AustraEianallocation which on terminationof the 1919 Agreement became
47.5% of the net surplus rather than 42% in the origAgreement (Agreement374 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU il321

between Australia,New Zealand and the United Kingdom, 9Februaty 1987,
Artide l(1) ; ernoria,ol.4,Annex3 1).

372. The 1919Agreement wascentrai to the administration of Nauru under
both the Mandate and Trusteeship. Within that administration the British
Phosphate Cornmissioners, an agency created by the partner governments,
playeda major role andwasthe fiscusofthe island. It operatedtandem with

the administration.Any power to accumulate and deal withassetswas subject
first to the Mandate and thereafter to the TrusteeshipAgreement(Mernoriai,
para.481).

373. The funds auiumulated by the British PhosphateChmmissioners which

were distributed amongst the three partner govemments under the 1987
temination agreement arose from the operations of the British Phosphate
Commissionersin mining phosphate on the three islandsNauru, Banaba and
Christmas Island. From time to time, the British Phosphate Commissioners
profitedfrom itsoperations even thougitsuppliedphosphate atcostprice,paid

the administration oNauru, provided interest on capital and a sinfund for
the redemption of capital, al1out of the proceeds of minino gf phosphate.
Profits came about by reasonofsales to other countries,or by other means or
cirmmstances. (1987 Agreement, Article 123. In addition there was alwaya

substantialcontingencyfund whichrepresented a net surplusasset.

374. When the Nauru Phosphate Corporation took over from the British
Phosphate Cornmissioners in 1969, there was a substantiasurplus in British
Phosphate Cornmissionershnds the greater proportion of whichwa~ denved

£rom Nauru operations. Apart from the profiand contingencyfund surplus
therewas the groperty homi asPhosphate House in Collins Street, Melbourne,
Australia,nd a fieet of vessels. British Phosphate Commissionersassets both
liquid and in the form of propertyin 1969were broughtabout substantially
through theperation of mining on Nauru.

375. Accumula!ionsby the British Phosphate Commissioners were made
pursuant to Articles11 and f2 of the 1919Agreement. These accumulations
were held in trust by the Cornmissionersfopossiblelater distributito the
three partner governments. The Bct that%sets,ammulated substantially as a

resulof Nauru operations, later increased in value through trust invesbyent
the Commissionerswouldnot prevent, in itsea daim to theincreased valueof
theassets$y Nauru. Any assetof the British PhosphatCommissioners which1 il331 WRITTEN STTEMENT OF NAURU 375

hadas itssource the operationsof the phosphate industsy on Nauru would fa11
withinthesubjectof the claim,

1 376. The data contained in the previous paragraphsis, it is subrnitted,
suffiçient in lawto establish the existence of a Naunian legal intetest atthe

admissibilityphase and on the assumption that thequestionof legal interestis
not postponed IO themeritsphase. Theevidence available issufficientto ptove

that the phosphate miningon Nauru pnor to independence was a substantial
sourceof the accumulated assets.

377. Nauru has thus demonstrated a legaiiy protected interest in an
I identifiablebody of assets ata specXc the in1987. As a matter of adrnissibility
there is no need to specib particularassets or indicaiea precise percentage of

the value ofthe assetsto whichNauru is entitled. In respect of this typeof claim
no more is required of Nauni.

l 378. President Jennings basexpressed the legal positionasfollows:

"Ininternationlaw,nolestbanindomesticlaw,aplaintimustbe ableto point
to some de Pha@veshim a causeofaction. 1tina enoughtolx abletoshow
thattherespdeot hasaded Uegally. Thireqkernent imm importanto tbe:
wholelaw ofStaterespoosibil,thether of the traditionalkind or in relation to

human rigbtsThisiswhy anappliwt State must, for examsatisftheruleof
nationaliof claimin adaim in theiraditionlaw,itorderto show not only
that the respondeni Siate hasaaed unlawfuiiybut, thattherebyinjurcd
60me legallyprotectinterespossessedby theapplicantthat it hainother
words,a cause oaction. ConsequentltheapplicanihaImus stmdi ina court
othcrwisehavinjurisdictiononwbere thereian bue offa& orlaw between
thepatticularpanies in tbe semthat it afferrlegalinterest vested in the
applicant.Iis not suficrne*+ toshowsomebreach ofa le@ obligationon
chegarlofLhe mspodnr; itmur be mme obligatiotbat touchea legaily
proreçtedintereofthe applicant.AUthisofuiurse,is legaitruismbutilk
oneof the tughestimportanŒand&o onewhichissometirnesforgotten.,..'

(RecueidesCouts,Hague Acadcmy,vol.12(1x7, II), p.5(empbasiadded).)

379. Thepassageitalicisedisquoted withappravalbyJudge Mbaye,as he rhen

was,in his lectures on "Linterkt pout agir devant la Cour internationale de
justice"(Recueildes Coun, Hague Acaderny, vol.209 (1988, II),p.302). In so far
as Judge Mbayeindicated that the view ofPresident Jennings might be open to

question, this involved asking whether the view expressed a ioo narrow
conceptionoflocus standi (ibidpp.302-41).376 CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU /1341

380. Itisoften statedthattheconceptofIegd interestis notçonfined to purely
materiai interestssee former PresidentJiménez de Aréchaga R,eme,iidesCours,
HagueAcademy, voI.159 (1978 1),pp.267-8. Againstthib sackground the legaI
interestof Naurusatisfiesthe more cautious criterionset fortbby President

Jenningsandobviouslyfallswithinthemoreliberaldefuitionsoffered by other
authorities.

382. In anyevent the keyrnaybe foundin the normal definition of a "legal
dispute". As Hudsonputthernatter:

"A disputek && if it relattoa daimof a ight confend by law;intht

cnnnedton,ebly toa daim oa rigbtderred byinternatjwalLaw."

(nie PermanenCuun ofIniematîonallust192&1942,New York2ndrw. edn.,
1443p,.455.)

382. k similarapproachappears in thestandard work byDrRoseme:

"..iseemsthattheapplicanStatemua be ablIO showsomedirectcnnŒrnin
theoutme ofthe case imustirselbea reaandnot merelyatheoreticalparty
tothedisputeeveaiftbauincern cannobeneatlreducedto prek caregories
ofprotedon ofthenghtsoroftheintereofchatState".

(7IeLmu nridPMCticof thIniematimd Coun,2nd rev.edn.,ordrecht1985,
p.519.)

Section3. Joinder to the Merits

383. Aithou@ the issueof imw standi is stimetimesexclusivelypreliminaq in

charactertheamal circumstancesof the particularcase rnaydictatea different
ourcome,as happenedin the Bmelona Tractioncase (PteIiminq Objections),
I.C.J.Reports 1964, pp.44-6). In relationto the preliminaryobjectionwhich
raisedthe issueofjussrdi, the Court made thefollowingdetermination:

m'e thud Objectionin vol^ a numberofclwelinterwavenstrandofmixed
law,factandstatuto a degreesucbibatthCourtcodd not pronounmuponit
at thistagein fuconfidencthat it win possesionofal1the elementsrhat
mighthavea bcaringon its decision. .xktenceof thissituareceivedan
implicitrecognitionfromthe Parties,ibythee20which evenat thistage,
they went into questionsomeritsinthe courseoftheirwrittenand oral
pleading Ms.remer,itwaspanicularlyonbehalfof theRespondentthitwu
sougbttojus* theprocessof discussingquestafmerits,as hvolvingmattersil351 WRlTTEN STATEMENTOF NAURU

pertinento or coruiectedwith ththirdand fourtbObjeaiom, which the
Respondenthaditselsdvanced,

The Courtisnot calledupoatospeafywbich partidar pointr,relatto tbe
questionsof fad and lawinvolvedby the thtd Objedion,itconsiden an
examinationofthemeritsmighthlptocIati afyorwhairewn it rnigbtso.
The Court will thoreforeconteitsdf by saykthat it deG&sto jaiorhis
objedon to thc meritbeçaiis- to quote tPermanent Court intheP.ajzsr
CsMy, EsterhW cas(PCU, SeriesA/B,No-66aip.9)- "...t.prmedqs on
the merit..d plam theCourt inaMW positio tnadjudicatewith a full
knowf* ofthe facts";andbecau'thequationsraid by ..theseobjections
and thosearizin...on the metitare tw intimatelyrelatedmdtooclosely
interconaw&efdor thCourtta & abk to adjudicaupoo theformer witbout
prejudgintheLatter'."

(ibidp.46.)

384. In the view of the Government of Nauru the factors indicated by the
Cour n thispassageare applicabIein relationto the claimconcemingthe assets
of the BritishPhosphate Commissioners. Comequently, it is appropriate to

applyArticle 79,paragraph 7of theRules of Courtto thisquestion.

Section4. Murnentary Endence

385. It was indicated in the Memorid (paras. 662-69) that Nauru bas been
largely unsucceçsfulin gaining access to document held by Australia and
consequenttythe Government of Nauru reserved its position on theproduction
ofdocuments(Mernord, para.663). In this contextitwillnodoubtbe necessary

for Nauru to seek toobtain evidenceof the full extent of the BritishPhosphate
Commissionersassets after the present phase of these proceedings ismmpleted
and inthe eventthat the Court seesfit tauphold theNauru positionsconceming
jurisdicrion and adrnissibility.Until those issues are decided, it wourd be

premature to seek to obtainthat evidence;but on theother hand Nauru should
nothe prejudiced atthisstage by Australian failurto discloseobviousIyrelevant
material.

385. In panicular, Nauru ufi selk toob~ainfrom Australiafull documentation
relating to the accountsof the British Phosphate Commissionersfrom 1968 to
1987,and documentsrelating to the termination of the 1919 Agreement and the

disposa1af theassetsinaccordancewiththetripartiteAgreement of1987.378 CERTAIN PIIOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU il361

Section5. The PrincipleofConsent toJurisdictioris notan Irnpedimentto

Admissibilfty

387. In itsPreliminaryObjections (para. 379, Australia presents further
argumentsas toadmissibiiityandjurisdictioin thefoilowingpassage:

"In nyevenceveoifNauruwereheldto bavea leginteretsheclai mouid
remainbadmiwibleandthe Courwouldla& juridictiforthe more geaerai
rem# artidated relatiotothe otherNaunianciaimi.parhmh, Nauru
mot awid thefacht itdaim dudy implicatethnghtsand interestsof
tbder twoGovernmenrs partytothl967Agreement."

388. The Government of Nauru bas aZready explainedthe considerationson
the basW of which the Monetcuy Goldprincipleis notapplicable tothe present
praceedings ((seeabove, paras. 249-322), and thosenimiderations are equally

relevant in thpresent context.nie Naunian daim wirhrespect trthe assetsof
Bntish Phosphate Cammissioners relates only to the proportion of the assets
held by Australia, Thisproportion ispreciselyquantifiedin t1987 Agreement.

389. Not only is the Moneemy Gold principle not applicable to the
circumtances of the presentcase but, ifitwere, the consequenees wouId be
oontrary to a teasonable conception of the administrationof justice. It is
contratyto go4 sensethat a Respondent Statewhich had,jointlywith one or

more other States,seized propertyclaimed byan AppIicantand subsequently
divided theproceeds,could prevent the Court adjudicating uponthe Applicant's
shareof the propertybyrelying onthe wrongdoingof other States.

Section 6.Other Issues orAdmissibility

390. Even if the Court were ta find that thclaim in respect of the overseas
assetswas in some sense a new bais of claim,such a daim cannot be met by
objectionsof delay,prior settlement,orrecourse to negotiationasan exclusive

method ofdispute settlernent.

39'1. At the samettme the positionof Nauruis ihat suchpreliminaryobjections
are notapplicablein any event:seeabove, paras.361-68. PARTVL

ISSUESOFJUDICIAPROPRIETY PART VI

ISSUESOFJUDICIAL PROPlUFTY

Section1, The Australian Argument

392. In its Prelimlnq Objectbns (paras 4W7), Australia invokes "the
principleof gd faith in internationlawn and &es the follawing allegation
of faa:"By itswnduct since independence and given thecîrcumstance n which
the clairnisbrought,Naum can be regarded as not actingin goodfaith"(para.

401).

393. This allegation is uirnpIetebaseless as a matter of fact (see above,
paras 34-62). For present purposesitisnecessary to address the peculiaritofs
the legal argument. In the first place Australia emplays the ptinciofegood
faithas thebais of an argument that judicial proprietyrequires that tCourt

"should..declineto hear the Nauruan claims"(para. 407). No authorityiscited
to support the entirely novel suggestion that a breach of principleof good
faith mayJustifthe dismissalofa claimas anissueof propriety.

394. The conditions which are to be fulfilled in order for the tcexercise

its discretiotrdismissa clairnon thebasisof praprietywEIlbe reviewed below.
Breach of the principleof good faith is not among theni, and thisis hardly
surprising. The question of good faith goesto issuesof rnerits, whereas the
concept O€ judicial propriety involves radical cirnimtances which operate in
Iinine and which dictate that thereisno basis for the exercisof the judicial

function. Moreover, judicial propriely involves discretion aa Dr Roseme
points out, this is "doubtltosbe sparingly used": The Lw Md Practiceof the
Intemdionui Cous,2nd rev. edn., Dordrecht, 1985,p.308.

395. There is no bais in the exiguouspleading offered by the Australian
Government for the exercise of a discretion with the radical effects nonnalIy

associatedwith propriety. The factsalleged fa11into twa categories. The first
such caregory (Preliminmy Objectinm, paras. 401-3) involves allegations of
inconsistencyin the canduct ofNauru sinceindependence. The second caregory
(paras. 404-7)relates toallegations thatNaum is not genuinely interested in
rehabilitation.382 CERTA~NPHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU 1401

396. The firsrofthese categoriecomistsof subject-matterwhichis essentiaiiy
part of the meritsand therefore doesnot in the cirnimstancespossess"an
excIusivelypreiiminary character". The Australian pleading in this respect
involvesan argument on the merits whic4properly described,does not have a
preliminarycharmer at all.

397. The second category of ailegationsisirrelevanttothe case and isalso
objectionableon othergrounds (seebelow,paras.404-6).

Section2. Nauruhas AlwaysActed in Gmui Faith

398. As amatter of evidence,the AustralianGovernment is requireto satise
a high standard of proof in orderto establish the atlegations of bad faith in
accordancewith appropriate standards in these matters. Thereaipresurnption
of regularity in the conducof international relations, abad faith must be

proved beyond reaonable doubt.

399. The assertion of an absence of good faith taketwo forms,the first of
which relates tothe "consistencyof the conductof Nauru and this allegaiion
would (if substantiated) be relevantbut only at the merits stage of these

pxoceedings.

400. Inany casethe allegationof inconsistencyisnot justibyethe evidence.
The PreIiminaryObjeciiom (para, 403) rnakes no effort to provide adequate
particularosfthe alleged laof "consistency".Therelevantpassageconsistsof a

seriesof mere assertion"Yer, it is coniended,Naunha notdone this. Mile it
may have continued sporadically to seek additional compensation for
rehabilitatiosince independence, itc~nduct hm ken such that the claim it
nowmakes based on legal groundsshouldbe rejected by this Court as not made
in good faith."

402. The precise context is the evidence concerning the ways in which the
nature of the Naunian claim was reaffirmed in the period after independence.
The relevant materials are reviewed in Chapter 1 of Part IV of thisWntfen
Srdement (paras.145-54T )h.eAustralian Govemment doesnot corneup to any

minimal standard of proof on the issue of "consisiency". Indeed, the issue of
"consistency"is noeven pmperly identified.P411 WRITTEN STATEMENTOF NAURU 383

402. The Governent of Nauru migbrreasonably expect that the issuesof
prescriptionandwaiverraised in the Pt-eliminntyObjections wouldinvolvethe

evduation ofevidenceas to conduct,and that ninsistency wouldbean element
in suchevduation. But to describesuch a questionin ternis ofan absena of
"good faith"is eccentricandinappropriate. These issues are not properly
claEed as questionsof gmd faith.

403. What remains is theseconc dategoryof Australianallegationsrelatinto
the interesof Nauru in rehabüitation.LnfactNauruhasundertakena serieof
measureswitha view to the long-termrehabiljtationof the landminedshce
1967. These are fulldescribed inPart1 (above,paras.34-62),and itissufficient
here toprovidea summary by way of mernorandm.Theprincipal measures are

as foTlows:

(a) A substantial sum has been set aside anRehabilitation Fund expressly
created asa sinking fund contingent upon an eventual rehabilitatian
programme.

(b) A lengthyand detailed studof the feasibilityof rehabilitatha been
conducted.

The "overburden"from land mined has been retained and stored as a
(c)
contributionto thprocessof rehabilitation.

(d) Technical trialto discoverthe best methods of sehabilitation abeing
çarried out currently.

Section3. "hd Faith"in relatioto Rehabilitation:theLack ofPmpriety and
Irrelevanceof theAiiçtraliaALlegation

404. In three passagesof the Preliminq Objections (paras.404-61,asenes of
allegatiansare madewhich irnpugn Nauru'smotivesfor hringingthecase. Tliese
allegationsbotgenerallyand in detailare untrue and irrelevant.

405. The facts that the problem of rehabilitation has not been solved, or
taçkled in accordancewith a particularmodus opedi, are irrelevant to the
proprietyof these proceedings. The Nauruan claimreflects a legal entitlernent
and were articulatedbefore independence. It is also a strange assertion
(PreliminmyObjectiom,para. 406) ta say (ineffect)that the claimant should384 CERTAINPHOSPHATE LANDS INNAURU U421

have expended funds in respec of overd rehabilitation asa preconditbn of
pursuing a claim in respect of the responsibilities innimbent upon the
Respondent State.

406. It ialsoirrelevantto assertthat"Nauruis a wealtby country or atleast
had the potential to beso if ithad properlyrnanagedthe potentiai wealth it
inheritedat thetime ofindependence"(ibid..para.404in jk). This assertion i$
examined as to itseconornic implications in chapter2 of Part 1 of these

observations. For present purposes it is sufficientopoint out that such an
assertionW notonly irrelevant buunusuaiin proceedingskfore the Court.

407. Itmust corneas a surprisefor anyApplicant Statetasee the proposition
that Iegalseçponsibilitiscontingentupon the relativaffluenceof the Parties.

It maybe noted that the Court has not show any favourtoward "economic
disparity"argument is the context of maritime delimitationsee the TunLFia-
Libya cme, I.C.J.Reporta1982, pp.77-8,para. 106-7;Libyn-Malla case,I.C.J.
Reports 1985,p.41, para. 50.Ifeconomic factors are irrelevanaselements in
delimitation, theyare even more certainlyirretevantin the context of State

responsibility.

Section4. GoodFaith inrelation tothePrincipleAilegansContraria Non Est
Audiendus

408. The AustraZia n overment attempts togivesubstance tcithe principle of
good faith in termoflegal specificsby referencto nirIegal principles,that of
consistencyand the doctrineof "cleanhands"(PxelimuiaryQbjecriom,para. 402).
These references are inevitablacademic in character because the principof
gooéfaith governts he performance ofobligationsbut doesnot create them. As

theCourt observed inthe Borderan$ TmnsborderAmed Actionscase" :tisnot in
itsela source of obligation where none would othenvise exist"(I.CJ. Reports
1988,pp.105-6,para.94).

4û9. By parityof reaoning theprinciple shouldnot psovidea condition of the
justiciability of an otherwise perfectly valid claim. This would
be the more
unjustifiablewhenas in the Australian pleadings,the referenisinfact to two
specialisedandsophisticatedramificationofgoodfaith. The firstoftheseis the
principleof wnsistency in the form of the maxim:allegm contrarianon &
audiendus.Thisis the version providedin Cheng (Generd Phciples of Law as

Applied byIntemaiîonal Coufisond TribluiaiLondon1 ,953p,.141).11431 WR~TTENSTATEMENT OF NAURU 385

410. ProfessorCheng's excellent work is the principal source cited in the
PreliminatyObjectiom. His examination (op. cit., pp141-9)reveals that the
rnaxirnfundons as an umbrella for avarietyof principles. Neither Cheng nor
any other authoritylinks thconceptof consistencywith the question ofjudicial

propriety.In fact thexamples to be found in Cheng involveissuesexclusivelof
merits,and related maltersofewdence whichthe writer classifieas examplesof
"admissions os "equitableestoppel".Tùe subject-matter offered byChengrefefs
neitherto issuesoftheadmissibilityofclaimsnor tojudicial propriety.

411. The ody other source citein thiscontext inthe PreliminaryObjeçtiom
@ara. 402) isMartin,L'Estoppelendmiî int~'onalpublic, Park, 1979,pp.194-
210, This warkrefen to thepresentalionof Cheng, and the examplesproduced
are of the sametypeas those emproyed byCheng.

412. In sum, the Australian Government has failed to indicate any link
behveenthe principle of good faithandthe issueof judicial propriety. Indeed,
the precisematerial referreto (byChengand Martin) is relatedto good faith in
veryindirectand academic fom, if atall.It isperfectly possibtoventilate the

problems relating to admissions and estoppel withciut the involvementof the
category of "good faith". To associate these technical questions of proof and
merits with theradical concept (when it isapplicable) of judicial propriety is
illogicaland inappropriate.

413. In anycase the Prelimhvy Objectionsfails to provide the partinilars of
the dleged inconsistencyon the part of Nauru whichjustifiesbarring itsdaim.

Section5. The Doctrine oFRClean Hands"

414. The Australian pleadingfollowsthe invocation of "the principle of good
faith witha similarlterse and undevelopedinvocation of the doctrine of "clean
hands" which the PreliminmyObjec$iom(para. 402) describesas"ariotherspecific
principle forrningpart of the more general principle of good faith that is
applicablein international lawasin other legsyste .n"s

415. As in thecase of the principlof good faith the Australian Government
fails to provideany, or any adequate, partinilars of the alieconducton the
part ofNauru whichwauld bar its claim.The Preliminaty Objecfiorzr(para. 403)
simply assertsthat the doctrine of "clean hands" sequires "a state to act 386 CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU E1441

mnsistentlyand in a way thais not contrary to thclaimsthat imight assert".
Rius the requirement of consistenq and the doctrineof "cleanshands"are
equated.

416. This equatlon iscontrary tolegal principle, The Govemment of Nauru
reserves the righto explainitspositionmore fuQ in the oralhearingsifthis
becomes necessaryin viewofAustralian persisteme in inappropriatdlegations
of bad faith. Fopresent purposesit willsufficetopoint out that the doctrine of
"cleanhands"has been applied in cases iwbichthe partimlar arbitral tribunal
consideredthat theillegaconducf (notthe"înmnsistency ")theclaimant(asan

individual)had rendered the claim inadmissible. Thetype of conduct in
questionwouldiypicdly involvehostileactivitdirected againsthe Respondent
State ;Orinterference in its intemaaffair ss:Rousseau, ha intemdïonnl
public, Tome V,Paris, 1983,pp.170-1, para. 156. As Rousseau points out,
caution is needed idetermining the content of the concept of "cleanhands",and

itisnot to be confusedwith allegednegligencein pursuinga claim asa form of
extinctiveprescriptionid.p.171,para. 157.

417. Lnany event twofom of the "cleanhands"doctrine asrecognisedin the
fiterature do mt have any applicatianinthe present proceedings. Inthe first

place, a major elernentof the doctrine relates to the dutof the individual,
whose causeha been takenup by the State of hisohernationality,Md who ir a
residentofthe Rapondent Side, to avoid breachesof the domestic law of that
State:see Borchard,DiplornaticProtectionof CifuensAbroad, New York ,925,
pp.713 et seq.;Witenberg& Desrioux, L~~rgananh'onjudiciaire,laprocéduretia

sentenceinternationales,Paris, 19,7.159para.53.

418. The second categorywhich appearsin the literature consists of conduct
on thepart of the claimant whiçh iscontrary to public intemationa! lawsee
Rousseau, op. ci?.,Vpp.173-77,paras. 163-9;Borchard,op. citpp.713 et seq.;
Witenberg & Desrioux.,op.cit.,p.160para. 64.

419. The foregoing observationson the doctrineof"clean hands" haverested
on the hypothesisthat thiformsa part ofgeneral international law,or aleast
thatcertaineiementshave that status. The reality is different andthe subisct
very controversial:see the studies of Salmon, Annuaire de droit
inlemarionui1964, pp.225-66;and Miaja de la Muela, Mélanges Andrmy, La

Haye, 1368,pp.189-213.U451 WRITTEN STATEMENTOF NAURU 387

420. The arnorphoiisnessand intangibiliof thesubject iswellreflectedby the
conclusion offeredby Rousseau &ter a carefulanalysisofthe sources:

*170C.onclusio. On voipar cettanalysequ'iesldifficilede wdérerLa
conduitirrdguL&redurédamant m e un &ta& Eonstantet absoluB la
recwabiütdesrédamationsinterdodes. On pourmit&trtented'établirwt

tgmd une&thaion eotre la riohion delaloi inteetlaviolationdu droit
intemationa, aiune telle cnnstrudoserd d&k, car ,éme dans ce
domaine,ia (31nmkions ont fait droit derequêtesde particuliayant
manifestementmanqueau devoide neutraliquis'impobai PUat auquelils
cesortksaient.

Pourtoutescesraisnusin'estpas possibdewnsidkrerla tbhrides mains
proprescomme une institutdundroitcoutumier&&al, lamerence des
autresmuses d'irreeevabkI'ttudedesqueUsnanivm eainfenaat."

(Dr& Vifem~'ondpublic, TomV,Park,1983p.177.)

421. In the submissionof the Governent of Nauru there is no basis for the
barring of Nauru's clairn ta be derived from the doctrinof"clean hands".Even

on the assumption that this doctrine hascrystallised suficiently, there is no
evidenceof iIlegalconduct on the part ofNauru.

422. There is a hnher considerationwhich cm be expressed quite briefly. In

its Mernorial, Nauru foundit necessary to present documentary evidence
concerningfailures on the partofthe Administering Authority to report fulland
fairlyon the financialaspects of the production and disposal of the phosphate

deposits:see the Mernorial,paras.320-63,54260.

423. Tbe Australian Government has notseen fitto ded with these important

mattersin itsPreliminay Objectionsp ,referringto relyon the forma1proviso as
to "the facts and law on which the preliminaryobjections are based"(para. 1).
This way of proceeding is,ofcourse,uncibjectionabIeas suçh. However, untilthe
phase is reached at which the Respondent State sees fito seek to refute these

serious cornplain&involvingthe good faith of the Australian Government, itis
sureiy inappropriate for rhe Respondent State to invoke a doctrine of "clean
hands".

424. Such an appeal to the doctrine is even more incongrnous when the
cornplaintsrelate tothedischarge of the duiiesofthe Administering authorityof
a territoryunder Trusteeship.388 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU 11461

-ion 6.TheConditionsRequirÎngthe Court to takExceptionalMeasures to
maintain JudieialIntegritare mt hsent

425. Whilst it iprobablyimpassibleto determine in advancethe occasionson

which the Court might feel bound to avoidexerking itsjudiciafunction on
grounds of propriety,elestinexperîenceindicates two situations in which the
relevant discretimay beexercised.

426. (a) The case inwhich it ilogicallimpossibleto decide a legal issue

withautbreacb of a fundamental principleofjudicid procedure.
Thusin theMonetary Gold case the Court found thatthe second
Italian claim dependedupon the first, that is, the clbetween
ltaland Albania. This latteclaimcouldnot be decided withouta
breach of the principle audimret dera pars:see I.C.J. Reports

1954,pp.334; Rosenne, ï& Law and Practiceofthe Inferriaiional
COM, 2ndrev. edn.,Dordrecht,1985 pp.308-9,310.

427. (b} The Cour tillnot adjudicateon the meRtsofanissuewhichlacks,
or hasceased ta have,the qualityof being"an actualcontroversy

involvingaconflictoflegal interests beoiieentparties":seethe
hlarthem CameroonsCase, I.C.J.Reports1963,pp.33-4,37-8.

428. The circumstances giving rise to the Naunian claim in the present
proceedings bear no relation to the two situationautlined above. In the

subrnission ofthe Naunian Governrnent, the evidence offerein the Mernorial
providesthe evidence for thisWowever, and as an alternative subrnissiany
issueof proprietycould onîybe resolvedinaccordancewith normal standardsof
judicialprocedureafteran examinationof the merits.

Section7.Conclusion

429. The Cour(.is respectfully requestte rejectthe Australian contentions
basedupon judicial propriety onthe followinggrounds:

(a) There isnoevidence ofbad faith on the paof Nauru.

(b) The contentions relating to rehabiiitat(Preliminarabjections,paras.
404-6)areirrelevant.P471 WRITTEN STATEMENTOF NAURU 389

(c) Theargumentsretating, tathe pnnciple ofgoodfait have no bdng
upon admissibiliand(a fortion)nobearingupon judiciapropriety.The
principlof gd faith does notaeate obligationsItgovem '"thewayin
which existingobligationare canîed out or existuigrightsexerçised

(Thirlway 1989)60Brihh Year BDok ofIritemahbnnlLmu p.21).

(d) Theprincipleailegm contmrianon estdiendus has no connedion with
theissueofjudicialpropriety.

(e} The doctrine of "clean bands" has no application to the present
prmeedings.

(f) Theconditionswhichwouldjustify theCourt in bamng claimsongrounds
ofjudicialproprietarenot applicablehere.

(g) ThissectionoftheAustralianargumentisconcerned withthinlydisguised
issue ofmerits. CONCLUSION

1.The dispute hasexiste sincebefore theriidependenceof Nauru

430. When the option of resettlernenof a substantiapart ofthe population
was rejected, the questionofrehabilitationand the issue ofrespomibilityfor
fundin gehabilitation, becama more explicitpart of theagenda in theyears

before independence inJanuary 1968. Consequently, rehabilitation appeaasa
major issuein the negotiationsbetween the Nauruancommunity and the Partner
Governments inthe period 1964to 1967.

431. There is thus a continuity in the histary of the dispute mncerning

responsibilityfor rehabilitation. This continuityis evident from the donirnentary
record. The reafEirmationof theexistenceof the dispute over rehabilitatiby
the President of Nauru at the time of independence issymptomatic of this
continuityin thehistorofa dispute whichhad crystallisedbefore independence:
see the Memurid,pp.230-1.

2. Australia mognises that the dispute has existedsinkfore independence

432. In the Preliminq Objecti~m the Respondent State clearlyaccepts the
essentid continuitof the historyof the disputesincebefore independence. The
very nature of several of the preliminary objectionsassumes this continuity.

Ttius the arguments based on an alleged pre-independence settlernent or an
a1legedagreement to settle the dispute exclusivelyby negotiation couId onlybe
valid on the bais that the constitutivefacts of rhe 1egaI dispute prior to
independence have been recognisedby the Respondent Statea a legal dispute
which (subject to the considerations supposed to support the preliminary
objections)peraitedCUthefime ofindependeme.

433. The recognition of this continuityis inheren it the logic of various
preliminaryobjections deployed by Australia. isalso givenexplicitform in the392 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU LI501

text of the PIeliminaryObjecibm. The relevant passagesfrom the Austraiian

pleadinginclude the following:

434. (a) m. In resped, i.partidar, totbe aud alehabina bue, tbese
inbereut limitatioon the judiaaifundionappiywith parti& force.

As theCourt bassaid,it'ha $st toexaminea questio wnhichit findto
be essentialipreümi> nameiy the exÿteoce ofa dispute' (K.CJ.
Reports 1974,at p.260b)etween Nauru and Australia.It is submitted
thatsucha &pute ww settled anddisappeared when Nauru waivedits
daim before the FourthCornmittee of the Cenerai kssembly. And
certainlthe daim disappearedwhen theGeueral krsernbiyterminated

the Tnisidp Ag~eement, thereby acquithg the Administering
Authoriiy of any further respoasibity,and without reseMng the
questionofrespoasibilityorrehabilitation.

274. As hasken saidbythisCour inthe NuciearTests case:

'theCourt, asa court of law,is ded upon io resolve
eding disputes betweenStates. Tbusthe existencaf a
dispute isthe primaryconditiforthecourtto exerciseits
judiciaifundion*(tCJ.Rev, 1W4otpp.27&271).

The Court added:

'ihe disputhaving disappeard, the ciaim advanced,..no
longer has anyobjcd. It roUm that anyfurtherf~clin$
wuid bave ne"raison d'etre..The Court canexerciseits
jwiddion in cwtentious proceedio nngswhen a dispute
pnliinelyeitltbetween the parties. In reftaieingfrom
furtheractionin tbiscase the Courtisthereforemetely
actinginaccnrdance witb theproper kterpretation of its

judiQalfunciio..The ûbjed of the c h bavingdearly
dLappeared, thereisnothing on whicb tagiveju$gment'
(atpp.271-m).

In accordance witb these considerations thCourt held that,in the
circumstancesof that casehe daim 'nolonger bas anyaect and that
tbe Court isthereforc not called upoto give a decisionthermn"(at

p,272).

275. The sameconduion applieshere."

435. W. Auiorduig tothe Ausirahandcdarationac~epting thejurisdiaion
(b)
ofthe Court it is nefessaryththe partito the dispute havagreedto
bve recourse to "some other methd of settlement". In thcas, the
Naurum agreement to the method of sttlement involvingthe
TrwteeshipCouneil andthe GeneraIAssembly resultfrom the fad tbat
the representatives ol CheNaunian people, freelyand of tbeirown WRITTENSTATEMENTOF NAURU 393

accord,particîpareinthe debates of the Trwceship Coud and of the
FourihCommitiee oE the Generai krsembly, ampted thesefora for
daim9 raisiDganddisEusFi the vetyquestionswbkb are nowthe

subjxt-matter of the dispute braught to the Court. These
representatives comntedto anddid noi oppose remlution 2347(XXIï).
AU thiurinstituted agreementbyconduct.

290.The Republicof Nautu bases it~ase on bei entitledto invoke
actionsand statements of the reprasentativeofthe Naunian people,

&fore independem. Çleariy, they mut ah lxbound byth& adions
and staiementsarthatthe.

291. Nor tan Nauru bc heard tosay that thit nnoiina psitiao to
participate fdy as an independent nation in the United Nahm

uideration of thebues raisedby ils daim.It was a thirdparty
ben&+ of the tnisteeshipsysiemandmut, therdore, lxboundby
and taken to bave ageed to tbe method of sctdemeoc provided for
throughrbe UBiredNationsorgans."

436. (c) 377.Naurucm show no legal interestsuch mets, which btlonged to
an instnünentdity of the rhrPartoer Governments and in relation80
whichNauru badno legal or otber endttement. Nauru simply asserts
thatthe 1387 Agreement mnstitutes "anuneqiiid recognitionof the
Nawuan ioterestinthe BPC mets (para.485 Nauru Memon'd). It

assertstbt the reference in the Agreement to the BK bad the
mnsequenw of refemiq atso"to the legamnuimitsnt of the erlsteace
of the Commisioners and the administration of Nauru duhg the
osrrency of the Lrusteeshi(para.481,Nauru Memonal). Yet, even if
thiswere 50,it dms motestablish anadequate Naunian interestin the
partidar claim to the 1987 assets. Unlike the Naunian clairnsin

relation to the performanofthe TrusteeshipAgreemenr, in relation to
whichAustralia concedes that Nauru bas a legal interest, there isno
similarbasisfor a daimto the 198assets."

437. 391. Even ifthe 19â3letier represenasrelevantraisinofthe Naunian
(d) daimsit is sti U6 yearsafter agreement wasreacbedon independence

and the termination oftheTrustceship and, more particiilarly, on the
terms of the settlement of dithe pbw~hate industryissues. This in
Australia'vjewisa delaythatisfatato the presettt Nawuan claim.

392. But, more importantly in Austrda'view,it isnatuntiDecember
1988 that Naurucan be saidto bavcformaililyraised wiAustralia and
the aber formerAdminisicringPowersits position that responsib'üityfor

rehabilitatioof phosphate lands worked-out prior to 1 July 1967
remained the aesponsibilityof the rhreefotmerPartnGwernments as
a matter of Law. That k 21 years frum whea the matter was last
uinsidered bythe United Nations an4 in theviewof Australiaand the
olher Partner Govenunenis,scttled. CERTAlNPHOSPHATE LANDS tN NAURU
IlS2]

393. Nauru inits Notesof 20kmber Mâ tothe threePartner
Gwemm refersto thepopiti'& lmbeen consistenyakenby

the Governent of Naurusinceindependence,ndwhich watiakenby
the&&ed representatiw the NaunianpeopleMore independence"
(Annex M, Noa.22,23aad 24, V01.4,NaunianMernorial).Yeas the
diplmaticrmrd show.,whateverNaurucnwidersitr posititheFact
istba Ntaurudidpohîug toassertanydaim of lepiri+tagabt the
Parmer Govements for mwe than 21years aftethe rnattewas
fonsideredefmitiwlintheUnitedNation s.er tkat dathePartner
Gw-ents mdd legitllnaihaveassumd tha he Naunian daim
wassettleddefinitivbyterminationoftheTmtdp Agreement with

the apprwal of the supervisor)lautho*To now dm Nauru to
reactivatea stde daimcanonlyworkswere prejudtoAuhalia. The
Court should exercise its discreto dedineto hearthe claims.
Furiher,thifailureby Nauruto pursuethk daim for suahlengthy
periodiadicatetbatNauru iiseiwnsidered theclaimIo havebeen
settied.

394. ThisipmticulmlyMJgive haiNauru fded througbotheUnited
Natiw considerationofthe km toenunciateany daimbasedos an

allegedbreach of iniernariondlaw. The relevaritUnited Nations
supekory bodypronounmdon the matternowthe subjectoa daim
anditselfded tornakeany Fmdingsof breachof lawosuggesttbat
ther~wasany outstandingicgissueasberneenAustraiiandNauru
concerningmmplian~withthe TmteeshipAgreement. As a resulof
thpassag efrimesince1965Awralia legitimatauid havemumd
thaiiwasnotliableasa matterlawinrelatiotoitpastactionssome
twentyearsder itinvolvemeninNauru cametoan end."

438. The consequeni csethat Australia has waived any question of
admissibilityrelatingto the factthat the eIementsof the disputearose priorto

the independence of Nauru. In the submissionofNauru, whilstthe Courthas a
powerto raiseiegal issuesproprio rnotu,in the contextof admissibilitythispower
should oyy be exercised if importantconsiderationsof internationalpublicorder

so requite. In the present proceedings it is impossible to discern any
considerationswhichwauldjustifythe re-examination of a question on which the

partieshave a common view.

439. However, ifthe question were to be examined by the Court, in the

submission of the NaunianGovernent al1the pertinentconsiderations oflegal
principlemilitatein favour of the recognitionof the existenceof a Iegaldispute
betweenAustralia and Nauru which persistedafterindependence. il531 WRI~TEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 395

440. In the cîrcumstance osf the Tniszeeship there was a continuityin the

legal persoaality of the Naunianpeople as a ôenefiuary of the Trusteeship
regime and asa person of international Iaw after independence. This is a
position accepted expresslyby Australiainthe PreEimhy Objech'om,in

prtrticulairnparas. 290-1,377 (for thetex&- ofwhich seeparas.435-6 abwe).

441. Inany event, given the erga omnes character of the legal principles

invokedbyNauni.anyMemberof the UnitedNations, and anyState with the
capacityto become a party to the Statute of the Court, has a sufficient legal

interestin the subject-matter ofthe dispute.

1 442. Thetwelve judgesformingthe majorityof the Court in the BarceIona

I Tmction Case expressed the matterin the followingpassages:

"33.When a Staie admits into its redtoq forcipi imestmentsor foreign
national, whether natural or juristic pit,isboundto exteridto them the
protection d thelaw andassumes obhgationc o ~ ~ the treatmentCObe
dorded them. Theseobligatioos,however,areneither absolute orunquaMed.
In particular,essentiadistinctionshobeddrawnbehveenthe obligatioofa

State towards the internatmmmunity asa wbole,andthos &ehg vis-&-vis
another State in thefield ofdiplomaticprotection. Bythvvernature the
formerare thewocern of alStatesI.n viewof the importanceof the+ts
involvedl Statecarbe held thavea legd intereintheir protedion; ihey are
obligationsepomnes.

34.Suchobligationsderive, forexaminuintemporaq international law,from
theoutlawiqd acïsofagqession,andof genocideasalso[rom theprhciples
anddes coo~ernitnhgbasi cghtsofthe human person,indudingprotectian

from slaverand racial discrimination. %me of the correspondmg figofs
protectiobaveentered intotbody ofgeaeral internatilaw(Reservation10
theConventionon the Prweniiori wd Aurishmenof ihe Crimeof Gemi&,
Advisory OptrionI.CJRepom 1951, p.23)othersare conferred international
instruments ouniversaorquasi-universcharacter.

35. Obligatiotheperformanceofwhichla the subjed of diplomatic protection
arenotof thesamecaiegor...*

(1,CJ.Reports 1970,p.32.)

443. This position, based upon the special chasacter of obligations erga
amnes, .isaccegted in the ThirdRestatement oftheLaw (ForeignRelationsLaw of

the UnitedSfara), Amencan Law Institute, St.Paul, Minn., 1987,vol. 2,para.
902,p.349.396 CERTAINPHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU [1541

444. Itmaybe recalledthatinthe Norîhem Cameroonr Case the Court did
notregard the issueoftemporalityasa major contingency and it was not allowed

to intrudeuponthe carefulreasoningof the Judgment: see, inpadcular, I.CJ.
Reports 1963,at pp.35-6.

3.Therehaskenno delay,waiveror priorsettlementOPthe dispute

445. The Australlm objections basedupon the legal categories of delay,
waiverand prior settlement, havno justification fact.

4.TheNaunian elaimsunived thetemination ofthe hstaesbip

446. The Naunianclajm ha survjvedthe termination ofthe Tmsteeship. The
considerations whichjustify this position (whiare sufficienseverally}are as
follows:

(a) The Generai Assembly and the Trusteeship CounciE did not have
exc\usiveauthonty to determine legal issuesarîsingfrom the Trusteeship
Agreement.

(b) The termination of the Tnisteeship did not autornaiically extinguish al1
legal claimsarisingfrom the adIPtjnistrationof the TruTerrirory,but
ody those whichitwas necessaryto deal with in order to giveirnmediate
effecftothe self-detemination of the Territoryor which were actually
presented for decision.

(c) The Generai Assembly did not intend or ,purpart to terminate rights
veçted in the Naunian people under the Tnisteeship Agreement and
associatedrulesof internationIaw.

(d) Even if express recognitioby the competent United Nations organ was
requiredto preserveNauru's rights,therwas such recognitionhere.

5.Thejoinder orconsentof thirdpartiesisiot aconditionof admissibility

447. Inthe circurnstancesof the presencaseAustraEia iproperly sued alone.
This legal conciusionisjustifiedbythefallowingconsiderations,each of whichis
a sufficientjustification: 551 WRITTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 397

(a) Neither New Zealandnor theUnitedKingdom isan "indispensableparty"
within the meaning of Monetwy Gold principle, as developed in the
consistentjurisprudenceof theCourt.

(b) MunicipalIawanalogieson thisissueare of littlrelevance;but Inany
eventthe most appropriate analogiesupport the Naunian position.

There is no requirement,arisingErom the regimefor the administration
(c)
of Nauru as a Trust Territory and opposable to Nauru, that it bring
proceeding sgainstal1thre Setates together.

(d) The Naunian claim isadmissibleeven if, inconsequence, Australia may
havea right of recouseagainstthe othernro States.

(e) Alternativelyeven ifthe normal requirement for enforcing a liabiliof
severalStates acting together istojoin all the affected States, in the
cirmmstances of the administration of Nauru, the claim is properly
broughtagainst Australiaalone.

(0 The proper administration of intemationai justicedictates that the
present proceedingç should be declared admissible, with a view to
obtaining adecisionon the merits of tNaunian claim.

6. The rlaimrelatingto theoverseasassetsofthe British Phosphate
Commissioners isadmissible,

448. The claim relatingtoNauru' lswfulinterest in the oversea mets of the
BPC which were wrongfililydisposedof in1987is admissible for thefollowing

reasons:

(a) The daim anfsesfrom a legal dispute the existence and general character
ofwhich isconfirmedin the documentary record, including the diplornatic
correspondence.

(b) The clairndoes not invoIveanew bais of clairn, being intrinsicallya part
of Nauru's general claim, and thetisno objection to the exercise of the
Court'sjurisdiction.398 CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU [156]

(c) Jurisdictiorixistseven if the daim to the overseaassetsinvolvesa new
basisof claim.

(d) There is sufficientevidenceavailable to establish the legal interest of
Nauru in theoverseasassetsforthe purpasesof this phase of tcase.

7.Therewasne agreementto settlethedispute exclusivelbynegotiation

449. On the evidencethere was no agreement tosettIethe dispute exdusively
bymeansof negotiation andthereforethere isno objection to the exesciseof
jurisdictioon the bais of the reservatiinvokedby the Respondent State.

450. Lnany me, on a proper constructionofthe reservationnegotiationdaes

not constitute"sornother method of peacefül settlement".

8. Thereisno basisfor theAustralisn contentionsrelatingtojudiciaproprieîy

451. Tbere isno bais of anykind for the Austrdian contentions relatingto

considerations of judicid proprietyThe foilowingconsiderations indicate the
baselessnessand irreleva nftee factorsinvokedin thePreIiminrq Dbjectionr:

(a) Thereis no evidenceof bad faith on the paofNauru.

(b) The contentions relatinto rehabilitation (Prelirninq Objeciiom, paras,
4046) are irrelevant,

(c) nie arguments relating to the principlofgood faith have no bearing
upon adrnissibi anit(afortio~)nobearinguponjudicialpropriery.

(d) Thepnnciple allegm conimria non est mrdi~ndw has no connectionHith
the issuof judicialpropriety.

(el The doctrine of "clean hands" has no application to the present
proceedings.

(f) Noneof the conditionswhichwouldjustifythe Court in barringclaimson
grounds ofjudicial proprieare applicable.[1571 WRITTEN STATEMENT OF NAUKU 399

452. The Governmentof Nauru considers that the casiialmarnerin which
issues ofproprietyare raised in thePreiiminaryObjech'omisunusual and
inappropriatin thewntmrofpcweedingsbeforethis Court. Inconsiderationofthe foregoingtheGovemmeniof Nauni requeststhe
Court:

To rejecthepreliminaryobjectionsof Awtralln,and

(a) that the Court has jurisdiaion inrespect of the clah
presentedin theMernorialofNaum,and

(b) thatthe claimisadmissible.

(Signed)V.S.hlANI

Co-AgentsoftheGovemmentof
theRepublicofNm RESPONSE TOANNEX 26 OF THE AUSTRALUN PRELIMINARY
OBJEtXIONS

A. Introduction

Al. The Pre1Unin.y Objectionr,Annex 26, voI.II, p.173 containa paper,
entitled"An barnination of Nauru'sRock Phosphate Incorne". The paperwas

cornmissionedbythe AustralianDepartment of Foreign Affairsand Trade from
a private research fim based in Canberra,Australia, calIed the Centre for
InternationalEmnomics (hereafter"C.I.E.").

M. The stated purpose of this paper "is to examine Nauru' pshosphate
incorneand itsuse both beforeandafterindependence". Two majorconclusi~ns

aresuggestedby C.I.E.:

"...evidence suggests that the phosphate incorne has not always
ken wellspent. Educationaland health standards hafallenand
large sumsof money havebeen wasted on itemssuch asa national
airline.(p.174)

"Rehabilitatioha corneto be seen as an important element of
Nauru's economic future (secti5). However rehabilitation does
not in itself guarantee the economic future of the island. The
future willbe largelydetermined by Nauru's ability to attract
foreip direct investment." (p.174)

A3. While these matters wilbe discussedinmore detail below,it should be
noted that thefirsconclusionnecessarilyrelieheavily on unacceptablevalue
judgments thatare, inanycase, quite irrelevant to the overall case before the
Court. The second conclusionis triteOf course, "rehabilitation does not in

itseif guarantee the economic futurof the island". But rehabilitatiis an404 CERTAIN PHOSPHATELANDS INNAURU Cl621

essentialpre-conditionfor teconomic future of the islaWithour it land will
be inadequate toaccommodate population growth and the increasedeconomic
a~ivitywhich willhelpattractthforei gnvestmentproposed by C.LE.

B. PhosphateIncorneBefomIndependence

A4. The C.LE. paper notes thatin the years pnor tciindependence the
phosphate industrywas ovenvhelmingly the sourceof hance to meet Nauru's
administrationcosts. This representeda sign%cantsaving to tbe Australian

taxpayerthoughat the sarnetimeit added tothe costof Nauruphosphaterock.
Not surprisinglya,signifianproportionoftotalgovernmentspending on Nauru
was devoted io education and health. This, in part, reflecthe absence of
spending on defence. sociaservicesshipping and airlineetc.that occur ina
number of countries.

M. Figure 2Ip.176)illustrates tsrnaIamount of phosphate incornepaid to
Naunianlandowners (and toNauru Tmst Funds) in theyears More 1965-66.
From 1966-6 o independence, increasing sums of money were paid to
landowners(and to Tmst Fundsa )sa resultofagreements reached between the

Nauru Zocal Goverment Council(N.LG.C.) and the partner goveniments. It is
of significancthat theN.LG.C. decided to allocatemost of the increasein
royaltiesin these years tothe Trust Funds whereas much smaller increases
occurredin direct payments to tand~wners.

A6. When disnissing the econoniic development of Naum and the
contribution made by the phosphate industry, the point is made thaz despite
having a highper capita income and benefitinfrom government spendin gn
Naum "some have argued that the returm to the Naunians could have been
higher"(p.182). Several cornmentcan be made regardingthese considerations.
Firstly, the pecapitanational income figuregiven in Table 3ofUS$2130 in

1966-67is in fact As2130 (see Table B1 on p.20rl)and the correctfigure is
US$1902 usingtheC.I.E.exchang reie quoted at the tofp,204 .imilarlythe
averageincorne in the fiveyearsbefore independence jsquoted inTable5 as
US$J174 whereas ilis actuallyAs1174 (see Table BI). However it mus1be
realised thatofthe As2130 in 1965-67As1354 representspayments to Trust

Funds which did not contributetaa higherstandard of livinon Nauru in the
year in which payments were received. Indeed theseTmst Funds were not
availableforvery many years;most of the Tmst Fundsare still not available toEl631 APPENDIX TO WRITTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 405

the Nauruan Comnity since theyare intended toprovide incomeonce the
phosphateindustry ceasesto meet the needs of theCommunity. In terms of
standardsof livingtherelevant incamepercapita figurein 1956-6 w7asA$ïï6
not A$2130.

A7. Secondly,not mereIy did "someargue that the return ts theNauruans
should have been higher", but thepartuergwernments agreed in 1967 that
Nauruphosphate sbouldbe purchasedbyhem atMl1 perton beingthe agreed
world price of Ml2 pet ton lessa mement fee ofAâ1 paid tothe British

Phosphate Cornmissioner(sB.P.C.)while they rnanaged the industry onNauru.
This managementfee was not paidin cashbut insteaû the phosphatwa~ sold at
A$11 perton.

Ag. &art from anythingelse this agreemenconfinw the.existence oaworld

price -somethingbltherto denied. It should be nored that Australia purchased
phosphate rock fromsources as geographically diverseasMorocco, Senegai,
Logo, Makatea (French Polynesia) and Florida. Phosphate rock istraded
throughout the worldand thete iaworld pricethat takes accounof quality,etc.

As demonstrated in the Nauru Mernorial ,ol. 1, pp.294-5, for the perunder
review the Makatea F.0.b. price is the most relevant indicator for Nauru
phosphate rock because it was traded intemationally, itwas of comparable
quality and it wassourcedgeographically closeNaum.

Ag. C.I.Ethen proceed toargue that, even if theis aworld price,it should

not be murned that Nauru wouldhavesoldthe same quantity of phosphatrock
as wassoldat the lowerpriceactuallychargedby the B.P.C. Theargument here
revoivesaround the elasticityofdemandforphosphate rock.

Whilefertiliser consumptioncan,anddoes, fluctuat£rom year ta y@=,in
A10.
part due to variations in seasonal weaiher conditions,the fact rethatmost
Australian soils are phosphorus deficient and many rural industries are
dependent on the mntinued application of phosphatic fertilisers.Single
superphosphate is sti31the moscommon phosphatic fertilisinuse in Australia
in 1991, because it provides both phosphorus and sulphur. It shoube noted

that Australia'spastoral land requires continued application of sulphur. In the
years pricirto 1967,the period covereby the analysisof the B.P.C.costsand
prices,singlesuperphosphate wasvery much thefertiliseof choicein Australia.
This war largelyfortechnicalreasons and reflected the neeto use phosphatic405 CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU Cl641

fertiliseras an importantinputinmanyruralindustries.This dependenceon
phosphaticfertilisersclearlyresulteda retativelackofsensitintyofdemandto
pria changes.Itshould be notedthat Nauruphosphate rock isparticiilarlywell

suited to the manufactureosinglesuperphosphate.

All. A seconfd actorcontributingto dernand insensitivityto pria is rhe fact
Uiatthe oostof fertilkers asvery srnaproportion oftotaifarm costs.Thusin
1989190 total fertiliscosts were 55% of farm input costsin Australia.

Phosphatic fenilisers woulaccount for lessthan5% of farminput costs, It is
very Iikely that these fertilisers would have munted for an even smaller
percentage of farminput oosts inthe years before 1967,sinc fertilisepnces
were muchlowertwentyyears ago thanthey are today.Thus ihe marketpnce of
single superphosphate averaged $16.20 per tonne in 1970171compared with

$165.80in 1989190.

A12. Some evidenceof thereaction ofconsumptionto price cm be obtained
fromTable 1,whichshowsthat in the ten yearsending 1969/7 t0e totaacreage
fertilisedby phosphatic fertilisersrose from 18.70mihectaresto 28.1miIlion

hectares. The usage of phosphaticfertilisers rose fro2.25million tonnes to
3.70 milliontonnes. lmports ofphosphate rock fromNaum rose from 1.03
milliontonnes to 1.48 milliotonnes while the f.o,bpriceofNauru phosphate
rock increased£rom $4.69per ton to$11.00per ton. Clearlythehigher pricefor
Nauru phosphate rockhad little if any impacton Australian demand, and it is

significantthat, throughothenegotiations that reçulted in the higprice,the
B.P.C., thtough the partner governments, sought the agreement of Naum to
increase productiontonnages. Thiswish for increased tonnages, despite higher
Nauru prices,shows that theB.P.C d.d not believe thahese price increaçes
would result in lower dernand. In fact, asthe Tashows, overail demand rase
steadilythroughout the period.

A13. Given these factorsthere is every reason to eqect that the price
elasticitof dernand for Nauru fertiliser veryIow and thatitis alegitimate
procedure to prepare estimates on the bais that Nauru phosphate could be sold
at theworldpria without havingany, or anysignifiantimpact on demand. APPENDIX TO WRlTTEN STATEMiENT OF NAURU

C. IncorneatIndependence

A14. InSection3 of itç paper,C.I.E.considerswhat it regards asthe "two
financiallegaciesNauru receivedat independence.The hrst of thesewas
"fund ssvedonbehalfof theNauniansbeforeindependence( "p.185 ) .i sives

the clear impression that sornew eise did the saving "onbehalf of the
Naunians ". The fact isthatthe Naunian people savedtbe rnoneythemeIves
from the royaltiespaid by the B.P.C. It wns tbe NauruLocal Government
Çouncil that set aside tfundsinthe TmstFunds. TheTmt Funds existedat
independence,but they eiustebecauseofNaunian decisions to foregaportion
ofcash royalties.

A15.The second "financidlegacy"thatNauruis comidered to have received
'kas the capitalised valuofthe rightto mine phosphate"(~~185 It.isstated
that at independence "...the PartneGovernments gave this assetto Naum"
(p.186). Again there Is a clear implicatiowhich is that the righr tomine

belorlgedto somebody other than the Nauruap neople. Not eventhe partner
governments atternpted to put this argument to Naunian representatiinthe
negotiations prioto independence. The Naunian people long regarded the
phosphate asbeing theirsasa matter ofright. In their view, it had been taken
€rom them by the colonial powersand at independence they simply obtained

what had been rightfullytheirs.But even if iwere conceded that the B.P.C.
would have had certain entitlements to mine under Nauruan law up to
independence, inthe absence ofthe 1967Apeement, those entitlernents would
have been without prejudiceto the Nauruan Government'sright to taxthe
proceeds of mining in the public interest. The proposition that the Nauruan
people were "given"the capitalised rightto mine begs the question, under the

guiseof an economicvaluation.

11.Phosphate tncomeafierIndependence

A16. Section 4 of the C,LE. paper deals with phosphate income after
independence. After quoting figureof the broad distribution ûf phosphate

income inselected years since independence aof the distributiof royalties
in each of the fiveyeaended June 1982(together with the nirrent valofthe
Tmst Funds as at 30 June 1989) the paper tums to a major theme: that
successivegovernments on Nauru have mis-spent the money theyhave had ai408 CERTAIN PIIOSPHATELANDS INNAURU Cl661

iheir disposai.The"proof' of thisis that"..the largest itemof govemment
expenditure are Air Nauru and debt senicing ..items suchas health and
education havebeoome relativelysmalmmponenisof gwement expenditure"
(p.190).

A17. The main aacern expressed aboutAir Nauru is thatit is expensiand
accountsfor ahigh proportion of governmenspending.The ha isthatNauru is
a small,isolatedishd inthe vast reaches of thPacZiç and that thereisvery
littllikelihood thaan exted airlinewould provideairsemices toNaumon a
nomal oommer~al basis. Air services could conceivablylx provided on a

contractbasis or even on a charter basis. But on whateverbais they were
provided,itisinevitablethat theprovisionwouid lxa castlymercise.

,418. It should also be notethat until recenyeass,Air Naum operated to a
number of Pacificisland countries, maidy at the request.of those countries.

Table A7 in theC.I.E.paper showsthat governrnentexpenditure on Air Nauru
bas falleninrecentyearswhilerevenue hasincreased.

A19. Considerable attention is given tothe srnallproportian of govemment
spending on health and education. Of course, percentages can brnisleadingig,
especially internationacornparisonswhen one country (Nauru) has a high

percentage of spendingon air services thal do appear to the sameentent in
other countries. Mention imade of aude deathrates but UN figuresshow that
in the period1985-19 9he average life expeaancy at birton Nauru was 68
years compared with 6û years for alisland developingcciuntries58years for
smalIisland developingcountries, 49yearsforItastdeveloped countriesand 59
years for al1developing coiintrieSee: United Nations Conference on Trnde

and Development, "Problemsof Island DevelopingCountries andProposals for
Concrete Action",Doc.TD/B/AC.46-2,25 Apnl 1990,Table 2,p.21.

A20. There is no doubr that Nauru, likmanyorher countries, would prefer to
avoid external debt but, given annual fluctuatioin phosphate revenue (see
Table A6, p.201$, itis not surprising that the Government ha had to have

recourse io borrowed funds. What is unclear in the C.I.E. analysiis its
relevance tothecase before the Court. APPENDIX TO WRlTTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 409

E. Rehabiütationand Eroiomic Future
1

Ml. The finalsectio onthe C.I.E. paperdeal sithrehabilitationandthe
economic futureof Nauru. The paperverybrieflyoommentson earlier snidies
of the feasibiliof rehabiiitatinmhed iand. It refersto the 1987 Naum
Commission of Znquj. estimatesofthe oostof rehabilitating minphosphate

land asbeing$127,000perhectarw e,ichisequivalentto $215.9millionfo1700
hectares. Etnotes that thls amountiswithinthe $242.0millionin the Nauru
RehabilitationFund as at 30June1989. The Reportthen concludes that this
'bould alsoseem tobear out Australîa'scontentionthatNauru was leftina
positiontohce rehabilitatio£romitsownresources"(p,195).

A22. This conclusionisquiteunfounded. The amount ofmoney nirsently in
the Nauru Rehabilitation Fund is entirelybeside the point. Australia
contributed nothing to the Fund.It didnot exkt until independenceand its
existenceis due to the discipline oNaunian peopleandthe Governrnent of

Nauru whereby funds were set aside frorn phosphateearnings in orderro
establish thisEund and to ensure that each yearthe Fund receavroyaltper
tonne ofphosphate sold.

F. Evaluationof1966 Working PartyRepoit of FinanciaArrangements
1

A23. The PreliminaryObjections of the Governrneni of Australia make
reference (vol. pp.61-2)tostudies thawere camed outin 1966into financial
and commercial arrangements invanous pans of theworld where mining exists
and intothe rateofprofitability of a selecofoAustralianmining companies.
The results othesestudieare giveninvol.2,pp.39-55.

-4. This WorkingPartywas establishedinthe contextof discussions whereby
the B.P.C. rernained thmining operator on Nauruand received paymentfor
providingthisseMce. The partner governments approached this question by
examiningarrangements in a number of relevant countriewhereas the Nauni
Local Governent Council adopted the approach of açsessina Management

Fee based on profitability. It is noted on pageof2vol1 "thatthe Nauman
suggestion ha been that a return of 15% on shareholders fun& was an
appropriate measure of the managementfeepayable to the B.P.C.".410 CERTAIN PHOSPi-IATELANDS IN NAURU /1681

A25. In the event this approach was abandoned, becaus he Nauru Lacal
Government Council decided against continued B.P.C i.volvement in the
phosphate industryon Nauru,prefernnginstead to haveNaunianmanagement
of the industry.The partnergovernmentsproposed that the B.P.C. should
continu te operate the industry (withoispecial remuneration). This wa~
rejectedbythe N.LG.C.whointum proposed thatthe B.P.C.shouldremainon

Nauru only foras long asittook Nauru to pay forcapitalassetof the B.P.C.
locatedon Nauru.

A26. When this proposal waaccepted,N.L.G.C. representativesaidthat the
B.P.C. should receivsome remuneration whilemanaging the industry, ana

figureofAs1 per ton wasagreed.It had earliebeenagreed that theworldprice
of Ml2 per ton was the appropriatef.0.b. pricfor Nauru phosphate. The
pmner governmentç saidthey wouId preferto see the f.0.b. price redutud
AS11per ton rather than it remain at A$12 per toand theB.P.C r.ceivea
payrnent ofAs1 perton. Thiswas agreedto bytheN.L.G.C .he prie returned

toAs12 per taonce Nauru assiirnedcontrooverthe industry.

A27. In para, 140(p.6ofvol. 1) the quite unwarranted statemIsmade:

"What the repofi highlighted,howevwas that therwas certainly
no practiçe whicb would suggestthaa State hasa nght to take

over a concession completely without the payrnent of any
compensation.,."

(Itmay benoted in passing that the so-called"cqncession"was not compatible
with the normal requirements of a concessionwhich implies a contractual

bargain. 'Ihere was no bargain asthe B.P.G's nghtç were conferred by the
Administration under the 1919Agreement and theLandsOrdinances.)

A28. The issue ofcompensation for the "take over" of t"concession"waç
never addressed by the Working Party, which was concerned with ongoing
situations involriagoverment, aminingoperator and landowners.

A29. At no otage was the question owhat happem when a Staterakes over
from a mining operatorever consideredby the Working Partyand it is not
legitimate ro draw any"conclusions"on this issue from theWorking Party
Report. APPENDIX TO WRITTEN STATEMENT OF NAURU 411

MO. Moreover,as haç been noted earlier, ai nstage did the partner
governmentseven propose thattheyshouldbe compensatedfor the 10sof the
"SO-calledconcessionwhsn Naurutook orer the operationof the phosphale
industry.