Judgment of 15 December 2004

Document Number
113-20041215-JUD-01-00-EN
Document Type
Incidental Proceedings
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE

(SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO v. UNITED KINGDOM)

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

JUDGMENT OF 15 DECEMBER 2004

2004

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES AR|TS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE A v LA LICEuITu
DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE

(SERBIE-ET-MONuNuGRO c. ROYAUME-UNI)

EXCEPTIONS PuLIMINAIRES

ARR|TDU15DE uCEMBRE 2004 Official citation:
Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 1307

Mode officiel de citation:
Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Serbie-et-Monténégro c. Royaume-Uni),
exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2004, p. 1307

Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441 N de vente: 893
ISBN 92-1-071004-5 15 DECEMBER 2004

JUDGMENT

LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE

(SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO v. UNITED KINGDOM)

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

LICuITu DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE

(SERBIE-ET-MONTuNuGRO c. ROYAUME-UNI)

EXCEPTIONS PREuLIMINAIRES

15 uCEMBRE 2004

ARRE|T 1307

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

2004 YEAR 2004
15 December
General List 15 December 2004
No. 113

CASE CONCERNING
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE

(SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO v. UNITED KINGDOM)

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

Case one of eight similar cases brought by the Applicant — Court to consider
arguments put forward in this case as well as any other legal issue, including
issues raised in other seven cases.

**
Contentions by Respondents that case should be dismissed in limine litis as a
result of Applicant’s changed attitude to Court’s jurisdiction in its Observations.

Whether Applicant’s changed attitude amounts to discontinuance — Appli-

cant expressly denied notice of discontinuance and wants the Court to decide
upon its jurisdiction — Court unable to treat Observations as having legal effect
of discontinuance — Court has power, ex officio, to put an end to a case in
interests of proper administration of justice — Not applicable in present case.

Whether Applicant’s position discloses substantive agreement on jurisdiction
resulting in absence of dispute for purposes of Article 36, paragraph 6, of
Statute — Distinction to be drawn between question of jurisdiction and right
of party to appear before the Court under the Statute — Latter not a matter
of consent — Court must reach its own conclusion.

Court cannot decline to entertain case because of a suggestion as to motives
of one of the parties or because its judgment may have influence in another case.

Whether, in light of Applicant’s contention that it was not party to the Geno-
cide Convention until March 2001, the substantive dispute with the Respondent,

41308 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

in so far as jurisdiction is founded on that Convention, has disappeared — Con-
tention that Applicant has forfeited right of action and is estopped from pursu-
ing the proceedings — No withdrawal of claims as to merits — Applicant
cannot be held to have renounced its rights or to be estopped from continuing the
action.

Court cannot dismiss case in limine litis.

**

Questions of jurisdiction — Court’s “freedom to select the ground upon which
it will base its judgment” — Distinction between present proceedings and other

cases — Applicant’s right of access to Court under Article 35, paragraph 1, of
Statute, challenged — If not party to Statute at time of institution of proceed-
ings, subject to application of Article 35, paragraph 2, Applicant had no right to
appear before Court — Court must determine whether Applicant meets condi-
tions laid down in Articles 34 and 35 of Statute before examining conditions in
Article 36 of Statute.

*

Break-up of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991-1992 — Dec-
laration of 27 April 1992 and Note of same date from Permanent Representa-
tive of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, addressed to Secretary-General —
Security Council resolution 757 of 30 May 1992 — Security Council resolu-
tion 777 of 19 September 1992 — General Assembly resolution 47/1 of 22 Sep-
tember 1992 — Legal Counsel’s letter of 29 September 1992 regarding “prac-
tical consequences” of General Assembly resolution 47/1 — General Assembly
resolution 47/229 of 29 April 1993.

Complexity and ambiguity of legal position of FRY within and vis-à-vis the

United Nations during the period 1992-2000 — Absence of authoritative deter-
mination by competent United Nations organs.

Different positions taken within United Nations — Positions of Security
Council and General Assembly — Resolution 777 (1992) and resolution 47/1
cannot be construed as conveying an authoritative determination of FRY’s legal
status — Position of FRY — Maintained claim of continuity of legal personal-
ity of SFRY as stated in Note of 27 April 1992 — Position of Secretariat —
Adherence to practice prevailing prior to break-up of SFRY pending authorita-
tive determination of FRY’s legal status.

Reference by Court to “sui generis” position of FRY in Judgment of 3 Feb-

ruary 2003 in Application for Revision case — Term not prescriptive but
merely descriptive of amorphous situation — No conclusion drawn by Court as
to status of FRY vis-à-vis the United Nations in 2003 Judgment or in incidental
proceedings in other cases including Order on provisional measures in present
case.

51309 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

FRY’s sui generis position came to end with admission to United Nations on
1 November 2000 — Admission did not have effect of dating back — New devel-
opment clarified amorphous legal situation — Situation faced by Court mani-
festly different from that in 1999 — Applicant was not a Member of United
Nations, hence not party to Statute, on 29 April 1999 when it filed Application.

Court not open to Applicant, at date of filing of Application, under Article 35,
paragraph 1, of Statute.

*

Question whether Court open to Applicant under Article 35, paragraph 2, of
Statute — Contention by certain Respondents that Applicant may not rely on
this text — Appropriate for Court to examine question.

Scope of Article 35, paragrap h 2 — Determination by Court in provisional
measures Order of April 1993 in Genocide Convention case that Article IX of
the Genocide Convention “could ...be regarded prima facie as a special provi-
sion contained in a treaty in force ” — Contentions by certain Respondents that
“treaties in force” relates only to treaties in force when Statute came into force.

Natural and ordinary meaning allows two different interpretations: treaties in
force at time when Statute came into force and treaties in force at date of insti-
tution of proceedings — Object and purpose of Article 35 is to define conditions
of access to Court: natural to reserve position in relation to treaties that might
then exist, not to allow States to obtain access to Court by conclusion between
themselves of any special treaty — First interpretation reinforced by examina-
tion of travaux préparatoires — Substantially same provision in PCIJ Statute
intended to refer to special provisions in Peace Treaties concluded after First
World War — No discussion in travaux of ICJ Statute to suggest that exten-
sion of access to Court intended.

Genocide Convention came into force after Statute — Not “treaty in force”
within meaning of Article 35, paragrap h 2 — Unnecessary to decide whether
Applicant was party to Genocide Convention on 29 April 1999.

*

In view of Court’s conclusion of lack of access to Court under either para-
graph 1 or paragraph 2 of Article 35 of Statute, unnecessary for Court to con-
sider Respondents’ other preliminary objections.

**

Distinction between existence of jurisdiction and compatibility of acts with
international law — Irrespective of whether Court has jurisdiction, Parties
remain responsible for acts attributable to them that violate the rights of other

61310 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

States — In present case, having no jurisdiction, Court can make no finding on
such matters.

JUDGMENT

Present: President SHI; Vice-PresidentANJEVA ; Judges UILLAUME ,K OROMA ,
V ERESHCHETIN,H IGGINS,P ARRA -ARANGUREN ,K OOIJMANS,R EZEK,
A L-KHASAWNEH ,BUERGENTHAL ,E LARABY ,O WADA ,T OMKA ; Judge ad
hoc K RECA ; Registrar OUVREUR .
u

In the case concerning legality of use of force,

between

Serbia and Montenegro,
represented by

Mr. Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), Chief Legal Adviser at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro, Professor of Law at the
Central European University, Budapest, and Emory University, Atlanta,

as Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Vladimir Djeriu, LL.M. (Michigan), Adviser to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro,

as Co-agent, Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., Chichele Professor of Public Inter-

national Law (Emeritus), University of Oxford, Member of the Inter-
national Law Commission, member of the English Bar, member of the
Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocate;

Mr. Slavoljub Cari´, Counsellor, Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro, The
Hague,
Mr. Saša Obradovic´, First Secretary, Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro,
The Hague,

Mr. Vladimir Cvetkovicu Third Secretary, International Law Department,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro,
Ms Marijana Santracˇ, LL.B., M.A. (Central European University),
Ms Dina Dobrkovic ´, LL.B.,

as Assistants;
Mr. Vladimir Sre´kovi´, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Monte-
negro,

as Technical Assistant,

and

the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

71311 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

represented by

Sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G., Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office,
as Agent;

Mr. Chanaka Wickremasinghe, Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office,
Mr. Dominic Raab, First Secretary, Embassy of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The Hague,
as Deputy Agents;

Mr. Christopher Greenwood, C.M.G., Q.C., Professor of International Law,
London School of Economics and Political Science, member of the English
Bar,
as Counsel;

Mr. David Burton, Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, The Hague,
as Adviser,

T HE COURT ,

composed as above,
after deliberation,

delivers the following Judgment:

1. On 29 April 1999 the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(with effect from 4 February 2003, “Serbia and Montenegro”) filed in the
Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter “the United
Kingdom”) in respect of a dispute concerning acts allegedly committed by the
United Kingdom

“by which it has violated its international obligation banning the use of
force against another State, the obligation not to intervene in the internal
affairs of another State, the obligation not to violate the sovereignty of
another State, the obligation to protect the civilian population and civilian
objects in wartime, the obligation to protect the environment, the obliga-
tion relating to free navigation on international rivers, the obligation
regarding fundamental human rights and freedoms, the obligation not to
use prohibited weapons, the obligation not to deliberately inflict condi-
tions of life calculated to cause the physical destruction of a national
group”.

The Application invoked as a basis of the Court’s jurisdiction Article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute of the Court, as well as Article IX of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948 (hereinafter “the
Genocide Convention”).

2. On 29 April 1999, immediately after filing its Application, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia also submitted a request for the indication of provi-
sional measures pursuant to Article 73 of the Rules of Court.
3. On the same day, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia filed Applications

81312 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

instituting proceedings and submitted requests for the indication of provisional
measures, in respect of other disputes arising out of the same facts, against the
Kingdom of Belgium, Canada, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of
Germany, the Italian Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portu-
guese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain and the United States of America.

4. Pursuant to Article 38, paragraph 4, and Article 73, paragraph 2, of the
Rules of Court, on 29 April 1999 the Registrar transmitted signed copies of the
Application and the request to the Government of the United Kingdom.
5. In accordance with Article 43 of the Rules of Court, the Registrar sent the
notification referred to in Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court,
to all States appearing on the list of parties to the Genocide Convention held
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as depositary; the Registrar
also sent to the Secretary-General the notifications respectively provided for in
Article 34, paragraph 3, and Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the
Court.
6. Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of Yugoslav national-
ity, the Yugoslav Government exercised its right under Article 31 of the Statute

and chose Mr. Milenko Krec ´a to sit as judge ad hoc in the case.

7. By Orders of 2 June 1999 the Court, after hearing the Parties, rejected the
requests for the indication of provisional measures submitted in the present
case by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 29 April 1999. By Orders of the
same date, the Court, after hearing the Parties, also rejected the requests for the
indication of provisional measures in the nine other cases referred to in para-
graph 3 and decided to remove from the List the cases against Spain and the
United States of America.
8. By Order of 30 June 1999 the Court fixed 5 January 2000 as the time-limit
for the filing of a Memorial by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
5 July 2000 as the time-limit for the filing of a Counter-Memorial by the United
Kingdom. On 4 January 2000, within the prescribed time-limit, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia duly filed its Memorial, dated 5 January 2000, explain-

ing that it had prepared a single Memorial covering this case and the seven
other pending cases concerning Legality of Use of Force.

9. On 4 July 2000, within the time-limit fixed for the filing of its Counter-
Memorial, the United Kingdom, referring to Article 79, paragraph 1, of the
Rules, submitted preliminary objections relating to the Court’s jurisdiction to
entertain the case and to the admissibility of the Application. Accordingly, by
Order of 8 September 2000, the Vice-President of the Court, Acting President,
noted that by virtue of Article 79, paragraph 3, of the Rules, the proceedings
on the merits were suspended, and fixed 5 April 2001 as the time-limit within
which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia might present a written statement of
its observations and submissions on the preliminary objections made by the
United Kingdom.

10. By letter of 18 January 2001 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia, referring inter alia to certain diplomatic initia-
tives, requested the Court, for reasons stated in that letter, to grant a stay of the
proceedings or to extend by 12 months the time-limit for the submission of
observations by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the preliminary objec-
tions raised by the United Kingdom. By letter of 26 January 2001 the Agent of

91313 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

the United Kingdom informed the Court that his Government was not opposed
to the request by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

By Order of 21 February 2001 the Court extended to 5 April 2002 the time-
limit within which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia might present a written

statement of its observations and submissions on the preliminary objections
made by the United Kingdom.
11. By letter of 8 February 2002 the Agent of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia, referring to “dramatic” and “ongoing” changes in Yugoslavia which had
“put the [case]...ina quite different perspective”, as well as to the decision to
be taken by the Court in another case involving Yugoslavia, requested the
Court, for reasons stated in that letter, to stay the proceedings or to extend for
a further period of 12 months the time-limit for the submission by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia of its observations on the preliminary objections raised
by the United Kingdom. By letter of 22 February 2002 the Agent of the United
Kingdom informed the Court that his Government was not opposed to the
request by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

By Order of 20 March 2002 the Court extended to 7 April 2003 the time-limit
within which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia might present a written state-
ment of its observations and submissions on the preliminary objections made
by the United Kingdom.
12. On 20 December 2002, within the time-limit as thus extended, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia filed a written statement of its observations and submis-
sions on the preliminary objections in the present case (hereinafter referred to as
its “Observations”) and filed an identical written statement in the seven other
pending cases. By letter of 17 January 2003 the Agent of the United Kingdom
presented certain comments of his Government on those Observations
13. By letter of 5 February 2003 the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia to the Netherlands informed the Court that, following the adoption
and promulgation of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro by
the Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 4 February 2003, the

name of the State of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been changed to
“Serbia and Montenegro”. By letter of 28 February 2003 the Agent of Serbia and
Montenegro presented his Government’s comments in response to the above-
mentioned letter from the Agent of the United Kingdom of 17 January 2003.
14. Pursuant to Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Statute, on 25 November 2003
Judge Simma informed the President that he considered that he should not take
part in the decision in the cases concerningLegality of Use of Force.
15. At a meeting held by the President of the Court on 12 December 2003
with the representatives of the Parties in the cases concerning Legality of Use of
Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium) (Serbia and Montenegro v. Canada)
(Serbia and Montenegro v. France) (Serbia and Montenegro v. Germany)
(Serbia and Montenegro v. Italy) (Serbia and Montenegro v. Netherlands)
(Serbia and Montenegro v. Portugal) (Serbia and Montenegro v. United King-

dom) in order to ascertain their views with regard to questions of procedure,
the representatives of the Parties were invited to submit to the Court any obser-
vations which their Governments might wish to make, in particular on the fol-
lowing questions: organization of the oral proceedings; presence on the Bench
of judges ad hoc during the preliminary objections phase; possible joinder of
the proceedings (General List Nos. 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111 and 113).
In reply to the questions put by the President of the Court, the Agent of the

101314 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

United Kingdom cited his Government’s need to produce new documents, in
view of important developments in the case since the filing of its preliminary
objections, and stated that the United Kingdom was opposed to the proceed-
ings being joined. The Agent of Serbia and Montenegro responded that his
Government also considered that it needed to produce new documents. As

regards the nomination of judges ad hoc by those respondent States not having
a judge of their nationality upon the Bench, the Agent of Serbia and Monte-
negro explained that his Government no longer maintained its objection; the
Agent further indicated that his Government was in favour of a joinder of all
the proceedings in accordance with Article 47 of the Rules of Court. By letter
of 18 December 2003 the Agent of Serbia and Montenegro confirmed the views
thus expressed at the meeting of 12 December 2003.

16. By letter of 23 December 2003 the Registrar informed all the Parties to
the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force of the Court’s decisions on the
issues discussed at the meeting of 12 December 2003. The Agents were informed
that the Court had decided, pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 5, of the Statute,

that, taking into account the presence upon the Bench of judges of British,
Dutch and French nationality, the judges ad hoc chosen by the respondent
States should not sit during the current phase of the procedure in these cases;
it was made clear to the Agents that this decision by the Court did not in any
way prejudice the question whether, if the Court should reject the preliminary
objections of the Respondents, judges ad hoc might sit in subsequent stages of
the cases. The Agents were also informed that the Court had decided that a
joinder of the proceedings would not be appropriate at that stage. Finally, the
Agents were informed that the Court had fixed 27 February 2004 as the time-
limit for the filing of any new documents, and that such documents, which
should only relate to jurisdiction and to admissibility, would be dealt with as
provided for in Article 56 of the Rules of Court.

17. By a joint letter of 27 February 2004 the Agents of the respondent States

in the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force indicated that their Govern-
ments wished to produce new documents pursuant to Article 56 of the Rules.
In the absence of any objection by Serbia and Montenegro, to which the docu-
ments had been communicated in accordance with paragraph 1 of that Article,
the Court decided that they would be added to the file of each case.

18. Pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of its Rules, the Court, having con-
sulted the Parties, decided that copies of the pleadings and documents annexed
would be made accessible to the public on the opening of the oral proceedings.

19. Public sittings were held between 19 and 23 April 2004, at which the
Court heard the oral arguments and replies of:

For Serbia and Montenegro: Mr. Tibor Varady,
Mr. Ian Brownlie,
Mr. Vladimir Djeric ´.

For the United Kingdom: Sir Michael Wood,
Mr. Christopher Greenwood.

*

111315 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

20. In the Application, the claims of Serbia and Montenegro were formu-
lated as follows:

“The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests the
International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:

— by taking part in the bombing of the territory of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom has acted against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to use force
against another State;

— by taking part in the training, arming, financing, equipping and sup-
plying terrorist groups, i.e. the so-called ‘Kosovo Liberation Army’,
the United Kingdom has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in breach of its obligation not to intervene in the affairs of
another State;

— by taking part in attacks on civilian targets, the United Kingdom has
acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its

obligation to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian
objects;

— by taking part in destroying or damaging monasteries, monuments of
culture, the United Kingdom has acted against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to commit any act of hos-
tility directed against historical monuments, works of art or places of
worship which constitute cultural or spiritual heritage of people;

— by taking part in the use of cluster bombs, the United Kingdom has
acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obli-
gation not to use prohibited weapons, i.e. weapons calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering;

— by taking part in the bombing of oil refineries and chemical plants, the
United Kingdom has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in breach of its obligation not to cause considerable environmental
damage;

— by taking part in the use of weapons containing depleted uranium, the
United Kingdom has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in breach of its obligation not to use prohibited weapons and not to
cause far-reaching health and environmental damage;

— by taking part in killing civilians, destroying enterprises, communica-
tions, health and cultural institutions, the United Kingdom has acted

against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation
to respect the right to life, the right to work, the right to information,
the right to health care as well as other basic human rights;

— by taking part in destroying bridges on international rivers, the United
Kingdom has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in

121316 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

breach of its obligation to respect freedom of navigation on interna-
tional rivers;

— by taking part in activities listed above, and in particular by causing
enormous environmental damage and by using depleted uranium, the

United Kingdom has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in breach of its obligation not to deliberately inflict on a national
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruc-
tion, in whole or in part;

— the United Kingdom is responsible for the violation of the above inter-
national obligations;

— the United Kingdom is obliged to stop immediately the violation of the
above obligations vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

— the United Kingdom is obliged to provide compensation for the dam-
age done to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to its citizens and

juridical persons.
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia reserves the right to submit subse-
quently accurate evaluation of the damage.”

21. In the course of the written proceedings, the following submissions were
presented by the Parties:

On behalf of the Government of Serbia and Montenegro,
in the Memorial:

“The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests the
International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:
— by the bombing of the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
the Respondent has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

in breach of its obligation not to use force against another State;

— by using force against the Yugoslav army and police during their
actions against terrorist groups, i.e. the so-called ‘Kosovo Liberation
Army’, the Respondent has acted against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to intervene in the affairs of
another State;
— by attacks on civilian targets, and by inflicting damage, injuries and
losses to civilians and civilian objects, the Respondent has acted against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation to spare
the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects;

— by destroying or damaging monasteries, monuments of culture, the

Respondent has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in
breach of its obligation not to commit any act of hostility directed
against historical monuments, works of art or places of worship which
constitute cultural or spiritual heritage of people;

— by the use of cluster bombs, the Respondent has acted against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to use

131317 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

prohibited weapons, i.e. weapons calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering;
— by the bombing of oil refineries and chemical plants, the Respondent
has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its
obligation not to cause considerable environmental damage;

— by the use of weapons containing depleted uranium, the Respondent
has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its
obligation not to use prohibited weapons and not to cause far-reaching
health and environmental damage;
— by killing civilians, destroying enterprises, communications, health and
cultural institutions, the Respondent has acted against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation to respect the right
to life, the right to work, the right to information, the right to health
care as well as other basic human rights;

— by destroying bridges on international rivers, the Respondent has
acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obli-

gation to respect State sovereignty;
— by activities listed above, and in particular by causing enormous envi-
ronmental damage and by using depleted uranium, the Respondent
has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its
obligation not to deliberately inflict on a national group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction, in whole or in
part;
— by failures to prevent killing, wounding and ethnic cleansing of Serbs
and other non-Albanian groups in Kosovo and Metohija, the Respon-
dent has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of
its obligations to ensure public safety and order in Kosovo and Meto-
hija and to prevent genocide and other acts enumerated in Article III
of the Genocide Convention;

— the Respondent is responsible for the violation of the above interna-
tional obligations;
— the Respondent is obliged to stop immediately the violation of the
above obligations vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

— the Respondent is obliged to provide compensation for the damages,
injuries and losses done to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to
its citizens and juridical persons.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests the
International Court of Justice to settle the form and amount of the repara-
tion, failing agreement between the Parties and to reserve, for this purpose,
the subsequent procedure in this case.”
On behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom,

in the Preliminary Objections:
“For the reasons advanced above, the United Kingdom requests the

Court to adjudge and declare that:
— it lacks jurisdiction over the claims brought against the United King-
dom by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; and/or

141318 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

— the claims brought against the United Kingdom by the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia are inadmissible.”

On behalf of the Government of Serbia and Montenegro,
in its written statement of 20 December 2002 containing its observations and
submissions on the preliminary objections presented by the United Kingdom:

“The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests the Court to decide on its
jurisdiction considering the pleadings formulated in these Written Obser-
vations.”

22. At the oral proceedings, the following submissions were presented by the
Parties:

On behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom,
at the hearing of 22 April 2004:

“For the reasons given in our written Preliminary Objections and at the
oral hearing, the United Kingdom requests the Court:
— to remove the case from its List, or, in the alternative,
— to adjudge and declare that:
— it lacks jurisdiction over the claims brought against the United King-
dom by Serbia and Montenegro,

and/or
— the claims brought against the United Kingdom by Serbia and Mon-
tenegro are inadmissible.”

On behalf of the Government of Serbia and Montenegro,
at the hearing of 23 April 2004:

“For the reasons given in its pleadings, and in particular in its Written
Observations, subsequent correspondence with the Court, and at the oral
hearing, Serbia and Montenegro requests the Court:

— to adjudge and declare on its jurisdiction ratione personae in the
present cases; and
— to dismiss the remaining preliminary objections of the respondent
States, and to order proceedings on the merits if it finds it has jurisdic-
tion ratione personae.”

*
* *
23. The official title of the Applicant in these proceedings has changed
during the period of time relevant to the present proceedings. On

27 April 1992, the Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia adopted and promulgated the Constitution of “the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia”. The State so named claimed to be the continuation of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and as such to be entitled
to continued membership in the United Nations. Inasmuch as this latter

claim was not recognized by, inter alia, the Security Council and the
General Assembly of the United Nations, these bodies initially referred
to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as “the Federal Republic of Yugo-

151319 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

slavia (Serbia and Montenegro)”, and this term was also used in certain
previous decisions of the Court. On 1 November 2000 the Applicant was

admitted to membership in the United Nations under the name of “the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”; and on 4 February 2003, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia officially changed its name to “Serbia and Mon-
tenegro”. In the present judgment, the Applicant will be referred to so far
as possible as “Serbia and Montenegro”, even when reference is made to

a procedural step taken before the change of name; in some instances,
however, where the term in a historical context might cause confusion,
the title in use at the relevant time will be employed.

24. The Court must first deal with a preliminary question that has
been raised in each of the cases, including the present one, brought before
it by Serbia and Montenegro concerning Legality of Use of Force.Ithas
been argued by the Respondents in these cases that the Court could and
should reject the claims of Serbia and Montenegro in limine litis,b y
removing the cases from the List; by a “pre-preliminary” or summary

decision in each case finding that there is no subsisting dispute or that the
Court either has no jurisdiction or is not called upon to give a decision on
the claims; or by declining to exercise jurisdiction. Thus the contention
for rejecting the Application in limine litis has been presented in different
forms by the eight respondent States, and supported by various argu-

ments, in order to achieve the same conclusion that, as a result of the
changed attitude of the Applicant to the question of the Court’s jurisdic-
tion, expressed in its Observations (see paragraph 27 below), the Court is
no longer required to adjudge and declare whether or not those objec-
tions to jurisdiction are well founded, but can simply dismiss the case,

without enquiring further into matters of jurisdiction.

25. In addressing the question whether the case should be dismissed in
limine litis, the Court will consider the arguments put forward in this case
and any other legal issue which it deems relevant to consider with a view

to arriving at its conclusion on this point, including the issues raised in
the other cases referred to in paragraph 3 above.

26. In the original Applications instituting proceedings in this group
of cases, Serbia and Montenegro invoked as the title of jurisdiction of the
Court in each case Article IX of the Genocide Convention; in five cases,

including the present one, it invoked its own acceptance of the jurisdic-
tion of the Court under the optional clause of Article 36, paragraph 2, of
the Statute, together with that of the respondent State; and in two of the
cases, it also invoked a bilateral treaty between the respondent State con-
cerned and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The Applications of Serbia and

Montenegro of 29 April 1999 asserted, at least by implication, that the
Court was then open to Serbia and Montenegro, under Article 35, para-
graph 1, of the Court’s Statute, on the basis that it was a Member of the

161320 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

United Nations and thus a party to the Court’s Statute, by virtue of
Article 93, paragraph 1, of the Charter. Subsequently, this was in fact

expressly stated in the Memorial filed by Serbia and Montenegro.

27. However, in its Observations on the preliminary objections of
each of the respondent States, filed on 20 December 2002, Serbia and
Montenegro claimed that “the acceptance of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia as a new member of the United Nations on 1 November
2000” constituted a “new fact”; and on this basis it stated as follows:

“As the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia became a new member of
the United Nations on 1 November 2000, it follows that it was not a
member before that date. Accordingly, it became an established fact
that before 1 November 2000, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

was not and could not have been a party to the Statute of the Court
by way of UN membership.”

In addition, as regards the question of jurisdiction of the Court under the
Genocide Convention, Serbia and Montenegro in its Observations drew
attention to its own accession to that Convention in March 2001, and
stated that

“[t]he Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not continue the per-
sonality and treaty membership of the former Yugoslavia, and thus
specifically, it was not bound by the Genocide Convention until

it acceded to that Convention (with a reservation to Article IX) in
March 2001”.

In its submissions, however, Serbia and Montenegro did not ask the
Court to rule that it had no jurisdiction but only requested the Court “to
decide on its jurisdiction considering the pleadings in these Written
Observations” (emphasis added).

28. The question whether Serbia and Montenegro was or was not a
party to the Statute of the Court at the time of the institution of the
present proceedings is a fundamental one (see paragraph 44 below).
However, at this initial stage of its judgment, it is necessary for the Court
to decide first on a preliminary question raised by the Respondents,

namely whether in the light of the assertions by the Applicant quoted
above coupled with the contentions of each of the respondent States, the
Court should take a decision to dismiss the case in limine litis, without
further entering into the examination of the question whether the Court
has jurisdiction under the circumstances.

29. A number of arguments have been advanced by different Respon-
dents as possible legal grounds that would lead the Court to take this
course. One argument advanced by some of the respondent States is that

171321 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

the position of Serbia and Montenegro is to be treated as one that in
effect results in a discontinuance of the proceedings which it has insti-

tuted. Discontinuance of proceedings by the Applicant is provided for in
Article 89 of the Rules of Court, which contemplates the situation in
which “the applicant informs the Court in writing that it is not going on
with the proceedings . . .”. However, Serbia and Montenegro has expressly
denied that its Observations were a notice of discontinuance, and has

emphasized that it did not state that it was “not going on with the pro-
ceedings”, but rather that it was requesting the Court to decide on the
issue of jurisdiction. It has emphasized that it wants the Court to con-
tinue the case and to decide upon its jurisdiction, even though the deci-
sion that it seeks may result in a conclusion that there is no jurisdiction.

30. The role of the Court in a discontinuance procedure, whether by
agreement between the parties (Article 88 of the Rules of Court) or at the
initiative of the Applicant (Article 89) in the absence of any objection by
the Respondent, is “simply to record it and to remove the case from its
list” (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Prelimi-
nary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1964, p. 20). It may be true

that the logical consequence of the contention of Serbia and Montenegro
in its Observations could be that the case would go no further; but this
would be the result of the Court’s own finding and not the placing on
record of a withdrawal by Serbia and Montenegro of the dispute from
the Court’s purview. The Court is therefore unable to treat the Obser-

vations of Serbia and Montenegro as having the legal effect of a dis-
continuance of the proceedings instituted by that State.

31. The question has been raised whether there is a procedure open to
the Court itself, whereby the Court has ex officio the power to put an end

to a case whenever it sees that this is necessary from the viewpoint of the
proper administration of justice. Although the Rules of Court do not
provide for such a procedure, there is no doubt that in certain circum-
stances the Court may of its own motion put an end to proceedings in a
case. Prior to the adoption of Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of

Court, in a number of cases in which the application disclosed no sub-
sisting title of jurisdiction, but merely an invitation to the State named as
respondent to accept jurisdiction for the purposes of the case, the Court
removed the cases from the List by order. By Orders of 2 June 1999, it
removed from the List two cases brought by Serbia and Montenegro con-
cerning Legality of Use of Force against Spain and the United States of

America, on the ground that the Court “manifestly lack[ed] jurisdiction”
(I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II) , pp. 773-925). The present case does not how-
ever fall into either of these categories.

32. Another argument for the removal of the case from the List which

has been advanced in interpretation of the position of Serbia and Mon-
tenegro is that there is substantive agreement between the Parties on a
“question of jurisdiction that is determinative of the case”, and that as a

181322 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

result the dispute before the Court has disappeared. The Respondents
have noted that the Court is asked by Serbia and Montenegro to deter-

mine the question of jurisdiction raised in the preliminary objections of
the respondent States, in its exercise of the compétence de la compétence
reflected in Article 36, paragraph 6, of the Statute. They have however
claimed that, in accordance with the well-established jurisprudence of the
Court, “the Court is not compelled in every case to exercise [its] jurisdic-

tion” (Northern Cameroons, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963 , p. 29); and
that the Court has the power to decide to dispose of the case in limine
litis. After all, “[t]here are inherent limitations on the exercise of the judi-
cial function which the Court, as a court of justice, can never ignore”
(ibid.). It is emphasized in particular that “the Court can exercise its

jurisdiction in contentious proceedings only when a dispute genuinely
exists between the parties ”( Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judg-
ment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 , p. 271, para. 57; Nuclear Tests (New Zea-
land v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 , p. 477, para. 60; empha-
sis added).
33. In this argument before the Court, attention has been drawn to the

specific terms of the provision in Article 36, paragraph 6, of the Statute,
whereby “[i]n the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdic-
tion, the matter shall be settled by decision of the Court” (emphasis
added). It has thus been argued that it is common ground between the
Parties that the Applicant was not a party to the Statute at the time of

institution of the proceedings, and that there is therefore now no “dispute
as to whether the Court has jurisdiction”. On this basis, it has been
suggested that

“[f]or the Court to exercise jurisdiction on a basis which has been
abandoned by the Applicant and which was always denied by the
Respondent, would make a mockery of the principle that jurisdic-
tion is founded on the consent of the parties”.

34. On this point, however, it is the view of the Court that a distinc-
tion has to be made between a question of jurisdiction that relates to the

consent of a party and the question of the right of a party to appear
before the Court under the requirements of the Statute, which is not a
matter of consent. The question is whether as a matter of law Serbia and
Montenegro was entitled to seise the Court as a party to the Statute at
the time when it instituted proceedings in these cases. Since that question
is independent of the views or wishes of the Parties, even if they were now

to have arrived at a shared view on the point, the Court would not have
to accept that view as necessarily the correct one. The function of the
Court to enquire into the matter and reach its own conclusion is thus
mandatory upon the Court irrespective of the consent of the parties and
is in no way incompatible with the principle that the jurisdiction of the

Court depends on consent.
35. As noted above (paragraph 27), Serbia and Montenegro, after
explaining why in its view it is questionable whether the Court has juris-

191323 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

diction, has asked the Court simply “to decide on its jurisdiction” con-
sidering the pleadings formulated in its Observations. At the hearings, it

insisted that it “wants the Court to continue the case and to decide upon
its jurisdiction — and to decide on the merits as well, if it has jurisdic-
tion”. Serbia and Montenegro contends that “the position of the FRY
with regard to international organizations and treaties has been a most
intricate and controversial matter”, so that “[o]nly a decision of this

Court could bring clarity”.

36. The function of a decision of the Court on its jurisdiction in a par-
ticular case is solely to determine whether or not the Court may entertain
that case on the merits, and not to engage in a clarification of a contro-

verted issue of a general nature. A decision of the Court should have, in
the words of the Judgment in the Northern Cameroons case, “some prac-
tical consequence in the sense that it can affect existing legal rights or
obligations of the parties, thus removing uncertainty from their legal rela-
tions” (I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 34; emphasis added); and that will be the
proper consequence of the Court’s decision on its jurisdiction in the

present case.
37. It may be mentioned here briefly that some of the Respondents
have implied that the attitude of Serbia and Montenegro might be influ-
enced by the existence of a pending case concerning Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), hereinafter referred
to as “the Genocide Convention case”. It is recalled that Serbia and Mon-
tenegro in 2002 sought a revision of a Judgment of 11 July 1996 on pre-
liminary objections in that case, basing itself on arguments similar to
those which are advanced in the present case concerning its status in rela-

tion to the United Nations (Application for Revision of the Judgment of
11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bos-
nia and Herzegovina), hereinafter referred to as “the Application for

Revision case”). The Court, by its Judgment of 3 February 2003, rejected
this Application for revision of the earlier Judgment, on the ground that
the necessary conditions specified in Article 61 of the Statute for revision
of a judgment were not met in that case. In one of the other cases con-
cerning Legality of Use of Force, the Respondent contends that there is
no dispute between itself and the Applicant on jurisdiction; that if there

is any subsisting dispute to which Serbia and Montenegro is party, it is
the dispute with Bosnia and Herzegovina; and that the current proceed-
ings “cannot be used to procure a favourable opinion [from the Court],
for use in an entirely separate piece of litigation”.
38. In the view of the Court, it cannot decline to entertain a case

simply because of a suggestion as to the motives of one of the parties
or because its judgment may have implications in another case.

201324 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

39. Yet another argument advanced for reaching the conclusion that
the Court would be justified in summarily disposing of the case without a

jurisdictional decision relates to a proposition that the substantive dis-
pute under the Genocide Convention, rather than the dispute over juris-
diction, has disappeared. It has been argued that Serbia and Montenegro,
by contending that it was not a party to the Genocide Convention
until March 2001, is bound to recognize that the rights which it was

asserting in its Application under that Convention had no legal basis,
and that therefore any legal dispute between itself and the respondent
States concerning these rights and obligations under the Convention has
ceased to exist. That dispute is the sole dispute in the cases concerning
Legality of Use of Force in which the only ground of jurisdiction relied

on is Article IX of the Genocide Convention, and thus, in those cases, the
whole dispute would have disappeared. In the present case, this argument
would imply that the Genocide Convention cannot be relied on by Serbia
and Montenegro against the United Kingdom.

40. It has also been suggested that Serbia and Montenegro has, by its
conduct, either forfeited or renounced its right of action in the present
case and is in any event now estopped from pursuing the present action
in so far as that right of action is based on the Genocide Convention.
More broadly, it is suggested that, by inviting the Court to find that it

has no jurisdiction, the Applicant can no longer be regarded as pursuing
the settlement by the Court of the substantive dispute.

41. The Court is unable to uphold these various contentions. As
regards the argument that the dispute on jurisdiction has disappeared,

Serbia and Montenegro has not invited the Court to find that it has no
jurisdiction; while it is apparently in agreement with the arguments
advanced by the Respondents in that regard in their preliminary objec-
tions, it has specifically asked in its submissions for a decision of the
Court on the jurisdictional question. This question, in the view of the

Court as explained above, is a legal question independent of the views of
the parties upon it. As to the argument concerning the disappearance of
the substantive dispute, it is clear that Serbia and Montenegro has by no
means withdrawn its claims as to the merits. Indeed, these claims were
extensively argued and developed in substance during the hearings on
jurisdiction, in the context of the question of the jurisdiction of the Court

under Article IX of the Genocide Convention. It is equally clear that
these claims are being vigorously denied by the Respondents. It could not
even be said under these circumstances that, while the essential dispute
still subsists, Serbia and Montenegro is no longer seeking to have its
claim determined by the Court. Serbia and Montenegro has not sought a

discontinuance (see paragraph 30 above); and it has stated that it “wants
the Court to continue the case and to decide upon its jurisdiction — and
to decide on the merits as well, if it has jurisdiction”. In the present cir-

211325 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

cumstances, the Court is unable to find that Serbia and Montenegro has
renounced any of its substantive or procedural rights, or has taken the

position that the dispute between the Parties has ceased to exist. As for
the argument based on the doctrine of estoppel, the Court does not con-
sider that Serbia and Montenegro, by asking the Court “to decide on its
jurisdiction” on the basis of certain alleged “new facts” about its own
legal status vis-à-vis the United Nations, should be held to have forfeited

or renounced its right of action and to be estopped from continuing the
present action before the Court.

42. For all these reasons, the Court cannot remove the cases concern-

ing Legality of Use of Force from the List, or take any decision putting
an end to those cases in limine litis. In the present phase of the proceed-
ings, it must proceed to examine the titles of jurisdiction asserted by the
Applicant and the objections thereto advanced by the Respondents, and
give its decision with respect to jurisdiction.

*
* *

43. The Court accordingly turns to the questions of jurisdiction arising
in the present case. The Application filed by Serbia and Montenegro on

29 April 1999 indicated that it was submitted “[o]n the basis of Article 40
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and Article 38 of the
Rules of Court”. On the question of the legal grounds for jurisdiction of
the Court, the Application stated that “[t]he Government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia invokes Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of

the International Court of Justice as well as Article IX of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”.

44. The Court notes that in several cases it referred to “its freedom to
select the ground upon which it will base its judgment” (Application of

the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1958,p.62; Application for Revision and Interpretation of
the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case concerning the Continental
Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jama-
hiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985 , p. 207, para. 29; Oil Platforms
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J.

Reports 2003, p. 180, para. 37).
By the same token, the Court in the past pointed out that when its
jurisdiction is challenged on diverse grounds, it is free to base its decision
on one or more grounds of its own choosing, in particular “the ground
which in its judgment is more direct and conclusive” (Certain Norwegian

Loans (France v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1957 ,p .5;e
also Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 127; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v.

221326 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978 , pp. 16-17, paras. 39-40, and
Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), Jurisdiction,

Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2000 , p. 24, para. 26).
But in those instances, the parties to the cases before the Court were,
without doubt, parties to the Statute of the Court and the Court was thus
open to them under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute. That is not
the case in the present proceedings in which an objection has been made

regarding the right of the Applicant to have access to the Court. And it is
this issue of access to the Court which distinguishes the present case from
all those referred to above.
As the Court observed earlier (see paragraph 28 above), the question
whether Serbia and Montenegro was or was not a party to the Statute of

the Court at the time of the institution of the present proceedings is fun-
damental; for if it were not such a party, the Court would not be open to
it under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute. In that situation, subject
to any application of paragraph 2 of that Article, Serbia and Montenegro
could not have properly seised the Court, whatever title of jurisdiction it
might have invoked, for the simple reason that Serbia and Montenegro

did not have the right to appear before the Court.

The Court can exercise its judicial function only in respect of those
States which have access to it under Article 35 of the Statute. And only
those States which have access to the Court can confer jurisdiction

upon it.
It is the view of the Court that it is incumbent upon it to examine first
of all the question whether the Applicant meets the conditions laid down
in Articles 34 and 35 of the Statute and whether the Court is thus open to
it. Only if the answer to that question is in the affirmative will the Court

have to deal with the issues relating to the conditions laid down in
Article 36 of the Statute of the Court (see Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Provisional
Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993 , pp. 11 et seq.,

paras. 14 et seq.).
There is no doubt that Serbia and Montenegro is a State for the pur-
pose of Article 34, paragraph 1, of the Statute. However, the objection
was raised by certain Respondents (see paragraphs 47, 49, 91, 94 and 95
below) that Serbia and Montenegro did not meet, at the time of the filing
of its Application on 29 April 1999, the conditions set down in Article 35

of the Statute.
45. No specific assertion was made in the Application that the Court
was open to Serbia and Montenegro under Article 35, paragraph 1, of
the Statute of the Court, but it was later made clear that the Applicant
claimed to be a Member of the United Nations and thus a party to the

Statute of the Court, by virtue of Article 93, paragraph 1, of the Charter,
at the time of filing of the Application. As indicated earlier (paragraph 26
above) this position was expressly stated in the Memorial filed by Serbia

231327 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

and Montenegro on 4 January 2000 (Memorial, Part III, paras. 3.1.17
and 3.1.18).

46. In each of the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force, a request
for the indication of provisional measures of protection was submitted by
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the day of the filing of its Appli-
cation, i.e. 29 April 1999 (see paragraphs 2 and 3 above). The Court, by
Orders of 2 June 1999, rejected these requests (see paragraph 7 above), on

the ground that it had no prima facie jurisdiction to entertain the Appli-
cations. In the instant case, it found
“the declarations made by the Parties under Article 36, paragraph 2,

of the Statute manifestly cannot constitute a basis of jurisdiction in
the present case, even prima facie” (I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II) , p. 836,
para. 25)

since
“there [could] be no doubt that the conditions for the exclusion of
the Court’s jurisdiction provided for in the second part of subpara-

graph (iii) of the first paragraph of the United Kingdom’s declara-
tion are satisfied in this case” (ibid., p. 835, para. 25).
It further stated that it was

“not in a position to find, at this stage of the proceedings, that the
acts imputed by Yugoslavia to the Respondent are capable of
coming within the provisions of the Genocide Convention; and

[that] Article IX of the Convention, invoked by Yugoslavia, cannot
accordingly constitute a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court
could prima facie be founded in this case” (ibid., p. 839, para. 36)

47. In the course of the proceedings on this request, however, the
Respondent raised the issue of whether the Applicant was a party to the
Statute of the Court. Referring, inter alia, to United Nations Security
Council resolution 777 (1992) of 19 September 1992 and United Nations

General Assembly resolution 47/1 of 22 September 1992, the United
Kingdom contended that
“since Yugoslavia cannot be regarded as a Member of the United

Nations or as a party to the Statute of the Court, it could not estab-
lish a jurisdictional link with parties to the Statute by purporting to
make a declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2” (ibid., p. 836,
para. 26).

48. Notwithstanding this contention by the Respondent, the Court did
not, in its Order on provisional measures, carry out any examination of
it, confining itself to observing that in view of its finding relating to the
lack of prima facie jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2, “the Court

need not consider this question for the purpose of deciding whether or
not it can indicate provisional measures in the present case” (ibid., p. 836,
para. 28).

241328 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

49. The United Kingdom subsequently argued as its first preliminary
objection to the jurisdiction of the Court that “the FRY is not qualified

to bring these proceedings” on the grounds, inter alia, that

“[t]he FRY is not a party to the Statute of the Court, since it is
neither a Member of the United Nations nor a non-Member State
that has become a party to the Statute under Article 93 (2) of the

Charter [of the United Nations]” (Preliminary Objections of the
United Kingdom, p. 25, para. 3.1).

50. The Court notes that it is, and has always been, common ground
between the Parties that Serbia and Montenegro has not claimed to have

become a party to the Statute on any other basis than by membership in
the United Nations. Therefore the question raised in this first preliminary
objection is simply whether or not the Applicant was a Member of the
United Nations at the time when it instituted proceedings in the present
case.
51. In addressing the question whether Serbia and Montenegro had

access to the Court under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute, the
Court will consider the arguments put forward in this case and any other
legal issue which it deems relevant to consider with a view to arriving at
its conclusion on this point, including the issues raised in the other cases
referred to in paragraph 3 above.

52. The Court will first recapitulate the sequence of events relating to
the legal position of Serbia and Montenegro vis-à-vis the United
Nations — events already examined, so far as was necessary to the
Court, in the context of another case (see Judgment in the case concern-

ing Application for Revision, I.C.J. Reports 2003 , pp. 14-26, paras. 24-
53).
53. In the early 1990s the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
made up of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro,
Serbia and Slovenia, began to break up. On 25 June 1991 Croatia

and Slovenia both declared independence, followed by Macedonia on
17 September 1991 and Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 March 1992.
On 22 May 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia were
admitted as Members to the United Nations; as was the former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia on 8 April 1993.

54. On 27 April 1992 the “participants of the joint session of the
SFRY Assembly, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia and
the Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro” adopted a declaration,
stating in pertinent parts:

“The representatives of the people of the Republic of Serbia and
the Republic of Montenegro,

251329 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

Expressing the will of the citizens of their respective Republics to
stay in the common state of Yugoslavia,

.............................

wish to state in this Declaration their views on the basic, immediate
and lasting objectives of the policy of their common state, and on its
relations with the former Yugoslav Republics.

.............................
1. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the state, inter-

national legal and political personality of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, shall strictly abide by all the commitments
that the SFR of Yugoslavia assumed internationally,

.............................
Remaining bound by all obligations to international organiza-
tions and institutions whose member it is..” . (United Nations

doc. A/46/915, Ann. II.)

55. An official Note of the same date from the Permanent Mission of
Yugoslavia to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, stated inter alia that:

“The Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at
its session held on 27 April 1992, promulgated the Constitution of

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Under the Constitution, on the
basis of the continuing personality of Yugoslavia and the legitimate
decisions by Serbia and Montenegro to continue to live together in
Yugoslavia, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is trans-
formed into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of the

Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro.

Strictly respecting the continuity of the international personality
of Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall continue to
fulfil all the rights conferred to, and obligations assumed by, the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in international relations,

including its membership in all international organizations and
participation in international treaties ratified or acceded to by Yugo-
slavia.” (United Nations doc. A/46/915, Ann. I.)

56. On 30 May 1992, the Security Council adopted resolu-

tion 757 (1992), in which, inter alia, it noted that “the claim by
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to con-
tinue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal

261330 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE JUDGMENT )

Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally
accepted”.

57. On 19 September 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 777
(1992) which read as follows:

“The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all
subsequent relevant resolutions,

Considering that the state formerly known as the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist,
Recalling in particular resolution 757 (1992) which notes that ‘the

claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Monte-
negro) to continue automatically the membership of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations
has not been generally accepted’,

1. Considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of
the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United

Nations; and therefore recommends to the General Assembly that it
decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and
that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly;

2. Decides to consider the matter again before the end of the

main part of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly.”
(United Nations doc. S/RES/777.)

The resolution was adopted by 12 votes in favour, none against, and
3 abstentions.
58. On 22 September 1992 the General Assembly adopted resolu-
tion 47/1, according to which:

“The General Assembly,
Having received the recommendation of the Security Council of

19 September 1992 that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United
Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General
Assembly,

1. Considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United
Nations; and therefore decides that the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the

United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the
General Assembly;

271331 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE JUDGMENT )

2. Takes note of the intention of the Security Council to
consider the matter again before the end of the main part of the

forty-seventh session of the General Assembly.” (United Nations
doc. A/RES/47/1.)

The resolution was adopted by 127 votes to 6, with 26 abstentions.

59. On 25 September 1992, the Permanent Representatives of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Croatia addressed a letter to the Secretary-General,
in which, with reference to Security Council resolution 777 (1992) and

General Assembly resolution 47/1, they stated their understanding as fol-
lows: “At this moment, there is no doubt that the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia is not a member of the United Nations any more.
At the same time, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is clearly not yet a
member.” They concluded that “[t]he flag flying in front of the United

Nations and the name-plaque bearing the name ‘Yugoslavia’ do not
represent anything or anybody any more” and “kindly request[ed]
that [the Secretary-General] provide a legal explanatory statement con-
cerning the questions raised” (United Nations doc. A/47/474).

60. In response, on 29 September 1992, the Under-Secretary-General

and Legal Counsel of the United Nations addressed a letter to the
Permanent Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia,
in which he stated that the “considered view of the United Nations
Secretariat regarding the practical consequences of the adoption by the
General Assembly of resolution 47/1” was as follows:

“While the General Assembly has stated unequivocally that the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot

automatically continue the membership of the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations and that the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should
apply for membership in the United Nations, the only practical con-
sequence that the resolution draws is that the Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not participate in
the work of the General Assembly. It is clear, therefore, that represen-
tatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro) can no longer participate in the work of the General
Assembly, its subsidiary organs, nor conferences and meetings con-
vened by it.

On the other hand, the resolution neither terminates nor suspends
Yugoslavia’s membership in the Organization. Consequently, the
seat and nameplate remain as before, but in Assembly bodies repre-
sentatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro) cannot sit behind the sign ‘Yugoslavia’. Yugoslav missions

at United Nations Headquarters and offices may continue to func-
tion and may receive and circulate documents. At Headquarters, the
Secretariat will continue to fly the flag of the old Yugoslavia as it is

281332 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE JUDGMENT )

the last flag of Yugoslavia used by the Secretariat. The resolution
does not take away the right of Yugoslavia to participate in the

work of organs other than Assembly bodies. The admission to the
United Nations of a new Yugoslavia under Article 4 of the Charter
will terminate the situation created by resolution 47/1.” (United
Nations doc. A/47/485; original emphasis.)

61. On 29 April 1993, the General Assembly, upon the recommenda-
tion contained in Security Council resolution 821 (1993) (couched in

terms similar to those of Security Council resolution 777 (1992)), adopted
resolution 47/229 in which it decided that “the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not participate in the work of
the Economic and Social Council”.
62. As is clear from the sequence of events summarized in the above
paragraphs (paragraphs 53-61), the legal position of the Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia within the United Nations and vis-à-vis that Organization
remained highly complex during the period 1992-2000. In fact, it is the
view of the Court that the legal situation that obtained within the United
Nations during that eight-year period concerning the status of the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia, after the break-up of the Socialist Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia, remained ambiguous and open to different
assessments. This was due, inter alia, to the absence of an authoritative
determination by the competent organs of the United Nations defining
clearly the legal status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia vis-à-vis the
United Nations.

63. Within the United Nations, three different positions were taken on
the issue of the legal status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In the
first place, there was the position taken by the two political organs con-
cerned. The Security Council, as an organ of the United Nations which

under the Charter is vested with powers and responsibilities as regards
membership, stated in its resolution 777 (1992) of 19 September 1992 that
it “consider[ed] that the state formerly known as the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist” and that it “[c]onsider[ed]
that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) can-
not continue automatically the membership of the Socialist Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations”.

64. The other organ which under the Charter is vested with powers
and responsibilities as regards membership in the United Nations is the
General Assembly. In the wake of this Security Council resolution, and

especially in light of its recommendation to the General Assembly that “it
decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
should apply for membership in the United Nations”, the Assembly took

291333 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

the position in resolution 47/1 of 22 September 1992 that it “[c]on-
sider[ed] that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Monte-

negro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations”. On that
basis, it “decide[d] that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations”.

65. While it is clear from the voting figures (see paragraphs 57 and 58
above) that these resolutions reflected a position endorsed by the vast
majority of the Members of the United Nations, they cannot be con-
strued as conveying an authoritative determination of the legal status of

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within, or vis-à-vis, the United
Nations. The uncertainty surrounding the question is evidenced, inter
alia, by the practice of the General Assembly in budgetary matters during
the years following the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
66. The following were the arrangements made with regard to the

assessment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for annual contribu-
tions to the United Nations budget, during the period between 1992 and
2000. Prior to the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia, the rate of assessment for that State for 1992, 1993 and 1994 had
been established in 1991 as 0.42 per cent (General Assembly resolu-

tion 46/221 of 20 December 1991). On 23 December 1992, the General
Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee, decided to
adopt the recommendations of the Committee on Contributions that,
inter alia, for 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia
should pay seven-twelfths of their rates of assessment for 1993 and 1994,

and that “their actual assessment should be deducted from that of Yugo-
slavia for that year” (United Nations doc. A/47/11, para. 64). By resolu-
tion 48/223 of 23 December 1993, the General Assembly determined that
the 1993 rate of assessment of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia, admitted to membership in the United Nations in 1993, should be

deducted from that of Yugoslavia. The General Assembly also decided
that the rate of assessment of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia should be deducted from that of Yugoslavia for 1994. Following this
practice, the rate of assessment for the contribution of Yugoslavia to the
regular budget of the United Nations for the years 1995, 1996 and 1997
was determined to be 0.11, 0.1025 and 0.10 per cent respectively (General

Assembly resolution 49/19 B of 23 December 1994), and for the next tri-
ennial period, the rate of assessment of Yugoslavia for the years 1998,
1999 and 2000 was determined to be 0.060, 0.034 and 0.026 per cent
respectively (General Assembly resolution 52/215 A of 20 January 1998).
(See further I.C.J. Reports 2003, pp. 22-23, paras. 45-47.)

67. Secondly, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, for its part, main-
tained its claim that it continued the legal personality of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This claim had been clearly stated in the

301334 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE JUDGMENT )

official Note of 27 April 1992 from the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General of the United

Nations (see paragraph 55 above). It was sustained by the Applicant
throughout the period from 1992 to 2000 (see, for example, Memorial,
Part III, paras. 3.1.3 and 3.1.17).

68. Thirdly, another organ that came to be involved in this problem

was the Secretariat of the United Nations. In the absence of any authori-
tative determination on the legal status of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia within, or vis-à-vis, the United Nations, the Secretariat, as the
administrative organ of the Organization, simply continued to keep to
the practice of the status quo ante that had prevailed up to the break-up

of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992, pending such a
determination. This is illustrated by the practice of the Secretariat in its
role in the preparation of the budget of the Organization for considera-
tion and approval by the General Assembly. The “considered view of the
United Nations Secretariat regarding the practical consequences of the
adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 47/1” (United Nations

doc. A/47/485), issued by the Under-Secretary-General and Legal Coun-
sel on 29 September 1992 (see paragraph 60 above), should probably also
be understood in the context of this continuation of the status quo ante.

69. By the same token, the position of the Secretary-General as
reflected in the “Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Deposi-
tary of Multilateral Treaties”, prepared by the Treaty Section of the
Office of Legal Affairs and published at the beginning of 1996, was scru-

pulously to maintain the approach of following the existing practice on
the basis of the status quo ante. As originally issued, that Summary con-
tained a paragraph (paragraph 297) on the practice of the Secretariat on
the break-up of a State party to a multilateral convention of which the
Secretary-General was the depositary. It was there stated, inter alia, that

“[t]he independence of the new successor State, which then exercises its
sovereignty on its territory, is of course without effect as concerns the
treaty rights and obligations of the predecessor State as concerns its own
(remaining) territory”. The example was given of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, and the text continued:

“The same applies to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro), which remains as the predecessor State upon
separation of parts of the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
General Assembly resolution 47/1 of 22 September 1992, to the effect

that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could not automatically
continue the membership of the former Yugoslavia in the United
Nations..,.s adopted within the framework of the United

311335 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE JUDGMENT )

Nations and the context of the Charter of the United Nations,
and not as an indication that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

was not to be considered a predecessor State.” (United Nations
doc. ST/LEG/8; see also I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 19, para. 38.)

This passage could be read as lending support to the claims of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was deleted by the Secretariat in
response to the objections raised by a number of States that the text was
contrary to the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolu-
tions and the pertinent opinions of the Arbitration Commission of the

International Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia (see United Nations
docs. A/50/910-S/1996/231, A/51/95-S/1996/251, A/50/928-S/1996/263
and A/50/930-S/1996/260).

70. A further example of the application of this approach is afforded
by the way in which the Secretariat treated the deposit of the declaration

by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia recognizing the compulsory juris-
diction of the International Court of Justice dated 25 April 1999. On
30 April 1999 the Secretary-General issued a Depositary Notification
informing Member States of that deposit (C.N.311.1999.TREATIES-1).
Although on 27 May 1999 the Permanent Representatives of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia sent a letter to the Secretary-General, questioning the validity
of the deposit of the declaration recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice by the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (United Nations doc. A/53/992), the Secretariat adhered to its past

practice respecting the status quo ante and simply left the matter there.

71. To sum up, all these events testify to the rather confused and com-
plex state of affairs that obtained within the United Nations surrounding
the issue of the legal status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the

Organization during this period. It is against this background that the
Court, in its Judgment of 3 February 2003, referred to the “sui generis
position which the FRY found itself in” during the period between 1992
and 2000.
72. It must be stated that this qualification of the position of the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia as “sui generis”, which the Court employed

to describe the situation during this period of 1992 to 2000, is not a pre-
scriptive term from which certain defined legal consequences accrue; it is
merely descriptive of the amorphous state of affairs in which the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia found itself during this period. No final and
definitive conclusion was drawn by the Court from this descriptive term

on the amorphous status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia vis-à-vis
or within the United Nations during this period. The Court did not com-
mit itself to a definitive position on the issue of the legal status of the

321336 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE JUDGMENT )

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in relation to the Charter and the Statute
in its pronouncements in incidental proceedings, in the cases involving

this issue which came before the Court during this anomalous period.
For example, the Court stated in its Order of 2 June 1999 on the request
for the indication of provisional measures in the present case as follows:

“Whereas the United Kingdom, referring to resolution 777 (1992)
of the United Nations Security Council, dated 19 September 1992,

and to resolution 47/1 of the United Nations General Assembly,
dated 22 September 1992, also contends that, since Yugoslavia can-
not be regarded as a Member of the United Nations or as a party to
the Statute of the Court, it could not establish a jurisdictional link
with parties to the Statute by purporting to make a declaration

under Article 36, paragraph 2;

Whereas Yugoslavia, referring to the position of the Secretariat,
as expressed in a letter dated 29 September 1992 from the Legal
Counsel of the Organization (doc. A/47/485), and to the latter’s sub-
sequent practice, contends for its part that General Assembly resolu-

tion 47/1 ‘[neither] terminate[d] nor suspend[ed] Yugoslavia’s mem-
bership in the Organization’, and that the said resolution did not
take away from Yugoslavia ‘[its] right to participate in the work of
organs other than Assembly bodies’;

Whereas, in view of its finding in paragraph 25 above, the Court
need not consider this question for the purpose of deciding whether
or not it can indicate provisional measures in the present case”
(I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II), p. 836, paras. 26-28).

73. This situation, however, came to an end with a new development
in 2000. On 24 September 2000, Mr. Koštunica was elected President of

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In that capacity, on 27 October 2000
he sent a letter to the Secretary-General requesting admission of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to membership in the United Nations,
in the following terms:

“In the wake of fundamental democratic changes that took place
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the capacity of President,
I have the honour to request the admission of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia to membership in the United Nations in light of the

implementation of Security Council resolution 777 (1992) .” (United
Nations doc. A/55/528-S/2000/1043; emphasis added.)

74. Acting upon this application by the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia for membership in the United Nations, the Security Council on
31 October 2000 “recommend[ed] to the General Assembly that the Fed-

331337 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

eral Republic of Yugoslavia be admitted to membership in the United
Nations” (United Nations doc. S/RES/1326). On 1 November 2000, the

General Assembly, by resolution 55/12, “[h]aving received the recom-
mendation of the Security Council of 31 October 2000” and “[h]aving
considered the application for membership of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia”, decided to “admit the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to
membership in the United Nations”.

75. As the letter of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia quoted above demonstrates, this action on the part of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia signified that it had finally decided to act on
Security Council resolution 777 (1992) by aligning itself with the position
of the Security Council as expressed in that resolution. Furthermore the

Security Council confirmed its own position by taking steps for the
admission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a new Member of the
United Nations, which, when followed by corresponding steps taken by
the General Assembly, completed the procedure for the admission of a
new Member under Article 4 of the Charter, rather than pursuing any
course involving recognition of continuing membership of the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations.

76. This new development effectively put an end to the sui generis
position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within the United Nations,
which, as the Court has observed in earlier pronouncements, had been

fraught with “legal difficulties” throughout the period between 1992 and
2000 (cf. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro)), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, I.C.J.
Reports 1993, p. 14, para. 18). The Applicant thus has the status of mem-

bership in the United Nations as from 1 November 2000. However, its
admission to the United Nations did not have, and could not have had,
the effect of dating back to the time when the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia broke up and disappeared; there was in 2000 no question
of restoring the membership rights of the Socialist Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia for the benefit of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At the
same time, it became clear that the sui generis position of the Applicant
could not have amounted to its membership in the Organization.

77. In the view of the Court, the significance of this new development

in 2000 is that it has clarified the thus far amorphous legal situation con-
cerning the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia vis-à-vis the
United Nations. It is in that sense that the situation that the Court now
faces in relation to Serbia and Montenegro is manifestly different from
that which it faced in 1999. If, at that time, the Court had had to deter-

mine definitively the status of the Applicant vis-à-vis the United Nations,
its task of giving such a determination would have been complicated by
the legal situation, which was shrouded in uncertainties relating to that

341338 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE JUDGMENT )

status. However, from the vantage point from which the Court now
looks at the legal situation, and in light of the legal consequences of the

new development since 1 November 2000, the Court is led to the conclu-
sion that Serbia and Montenegro was not a Member of the United
Nations, and in that capacity a State party to the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, at the time of filing its Application to institute the
present proceedings before the Court on 29 April 1999.

78. A further point to consider is the relevance to the present case of
the Judgment in the Application for Revision case, of 3 February 2003.
There is no question of that Judgment possessing any force of res judi-
cata in relation to the present case. Nevertheless, the relevance of that

judgment to the present case has to be examined, inasmuch as Serbia and
Montenegro raised, in connection with its Application for revision, the
same issue of its access to the Court under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the
Statute, and the judgment of the Court was given in 2003 at a time when
the new development described above had come to be known to the
Court.

79. On 20 March 1993, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting
proceedings against the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in respect of a dispute concerning alleged violations of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The

Application invoked Article IX of the Genocide Convention as the basis
of the jurisdiction of the Court.
80. On 30 June 1995, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, referring to
Article 79, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, raised preliminary objec-
tions concerning the admissibility of the Application and the jurisdiction

of the Court to entertain the case. The Court, in its Judgment on Pre-
liminary Objections of 11 July 1996, rejected the preliminary objections
raised by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and found inter alia that
“on the basis of Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, it has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon

the dispute” (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II) , p. 623). The question of the status
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in relation to Article 35 of the
Statute was not raised and the Court saw no reason to examine it.

81. However, in the wake of the new development in the legal status of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2000 mentioned above (para-

graphs 73-75), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia filed a new Applica-
tion dated 23 April 2001 instituting proceedings, whereby, referring
to Article 61 of the Statute of the Court, it requested the Court to revise
the above-mentioned Judgment of 11 July 1996. In its Application the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia contended the following:

“The admission of the FRY to the United Nations as a new
Member on 1 November 2000 is certainly a new fact. It can also be

351339 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

demonstrated, and the Applicant submits, that this new fact is of
such a nature as to be a decisive factor regarding the question of

jurisdiction ratione personae over the FRY.

After the FRY was admitted as new Member on 1 Novem-
ber 2000, dilemmas concerning its standing have been resolved, and
it has become an unequivocal fact that the FRY did not continue the

personality of the SFRY, was not a Member of the United Nations
before 1 November 2000, was not a State party to the Statute, and
was not a State party to the Genocide Convention . . .
The admission of the FRY to the United Nations as a new
Member clears ambiguities and sheds a different light on the issue

of the membership of the FRY in the United Nations, in the Statute
and in the Genocide Convention.” (Judgment of 3 February 2003,
I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 12, para. 18.)

82. In its oral argument however, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
explained that it did not invoke its admission to the United Nations in
November 2000 as a decisive “new fact”, within the meaning of Article 61
of the Statute, capable of founding its request for revision of the

1996 Judgment. In this context, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
referred to that admission and a letter of 8 December 2000 from the
Under-Secretary-General and Legal Counsel of the United Nations to
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
expressing the view that in respect of multilateral treaties deposited with
the Secretary-General, “the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should now

undertake treaty actions, as appropriate,...ifits intention is to assume
the relevant legal rights and obligations as a successor State”. The
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia contended that its admission to the
United Nations “as a new Member” as well as the Legal Counsel’s letter
of 8 December 2000 were

“events which . . . revealed the following two decisive facts:

(1) the FRY was not a party to the Statute at the time of the Judg-
ment; and
(2) the FRY did not remain bound by Article IX of the Genocide

Convention continuing the personality of the former Yugo-
slavia”.

83. In the proceedings on that Application instituted under Article 61 of
the Statute, it was for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to show,
inter alia, the existence of a fact which was, “when the judgment was
given” on the preliminary objections of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia, i.e. on 11 July 1996, “unknown to the Court and also to the party

claiming revision”, this being one of the conditions laid down by Article 61
of the Statute for the admissibility of an application for revision. The
Court was at this stage concerned simply to establish whether the Federal

361340 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

Republic of Yugoslavia’s Application for revision was admissible in con-
formity with the provisions of Article 61 of the Statute. If it had found that

it was admissible, it would have given a judgment “expressly recording the
existence of the new fact” in accordance with Article 61, paragraph 2, of
the Statute, and further proceedings would have been held, in accordance
with Article 99 of the Rules of Court, “on the merits of the application”.
84. In the Judgment in the Application for Revision case, the Court

found the Application for revision inadmissible. It is to be noted that the
Court observed specifically that:
“In advancing this argument, the FRY does not rely on facts that

existed in 1996. In reality, it bases its Application for revision on the
legal consequences which it seeks to draw from facts subsequent to the
Judgment which it is asking to have revised. Those consequencese,ven
supposing them to be established, cannot be regarded as facts within
the meaning of Article 61. The FRY’s argument cannot accordingly be

upheld.” (I.C.J. Reports 2003, pp. 30-31, para. 69; emphasis added.)
85. Thus the Court did not regard the alleged “decisive facts” specified
by Serbia and Montenegro as “facts that existed in 1996” for the purpose

of Article 61. The Court therefore did not have to rule on the question
whether “the legal consequences” could indeed legitimately be deduced
from the later facts; in other words, it did not have to say whether it was
correct that Serbia and Montenegro had not been a party to the Statute
or to the Genocide Convention in 1996. It is for this reason that the

Court included in its Judgment the words now italicized in the above
quotation.
86. In its Judgment the Court went on to state that:

“Resolution 47/1 did not inter alia affect the FRY’s right to
appear before the Court or to be a party to a dispute before the
Court under the conditions laid down by the Statute...To ‘termi-
nate the situation created by resolution 47/1’, the FRY had to sub-
mit a request for admission to the United Nations as had been done

by the other Republics composing the SFRY. All these elements
were known to the Court and to the FRY at the time when the Judg-
ment was given. Nevertheless, what remained unknown in July 1996
was if and when the FRY would apply for membership in the United
Nations and if and when that application would be accepted, thus

terminating the situation created by General Assembly resolution
47/1.” (Ibid., p. 31, para. 70.)

On the critical question of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s admis-
sion to the United Nations as a new Member, the Court emphasized
that:

“General Assembly resolution 55/12 of 1 November 2000 cannot
have changed retroactively the sui generis position which the FRY
found itself in vis-à-vis the United Nations over the period 1992 to

371341 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

2000, or its position in relation to the Statute of the Court and the
Genocide Convention” (I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 31, para. 71).

These statements cannot however be read as findings on the status of

Serbia and Montenegro in relation to the United Nations and the Geno-
cide Convention; the Court had already implied that it was not called
upon to rule on those matters, and that it was not doing so.

87. In the immediately following paragraph of the Judgment, the

Court stated:
“It follows from the foregoing that it has not been established that

the request of the FRY is based upon the discovery of ‘some fact’
which was ‘when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court
and also to the party claiming revision’. The Court therefore con-
cludes that one of the conditions for the admissibility of an applica-
tion for revision prescribed by paragraph 1 of Article 61 of the
Statute has not been satisfied.” (Ibid., para. 72.)

The Court thus made its position clear that there could have been no
retroactive modification of the situation in 2000, which would amount

to a new fact, and that therefore the conditions of Article 61 were not
satisfied. This, however, did not entail any finding by the Court, in the
revision proceedings, as to what that situation actually was.

88. Given the specific characteristics of the procedure under Article 61

of the Statute, in which the conditions for granting an application for
revision of a judgment are strictly circumscribed, there is no reason to
treat the Judgment in the Application for Revision case as having pro-
nounced upon the issue of the legal status of Serbia and Montenegro
vis-à-vis the United Nations. Nor does the Judgment pronounce upon

the status of Serbia and Montenegro in relation to the Statute of the
Court.
89. For all these reasons, the Court concludes that, at the time of filing
of its Application to institute the present proceedings before the Court on
29 April 1999, the Applicant in the present case, Serbia and Montenegro,

was not a Member of the United Nations, and, consequently, was not, on
that basis, a State party to the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice. It follows that the Court was not open to Serbia and Montenegro
under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute.

*
* *

90. The Court will now consider whether it might be open to Serbia
and Montenegro under paragraph 2 of Article 35, which provides
that:

“The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other

381342 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

States [i.e. States not parties to the Statute] shall, subject to the
special provisions contained in treaties in force, be laid down by

the Security Council, but in no case shall such conditions place
the parties in a position of inequality before the Court.”

The conditions of access provided for in this text were laid down by the
Security Council in resolution 9 (1946); but Serbia and Montenegro has
not invoked that resolution, nor brought itself within the terms laid down
therein.

91. The Court notes that the Applicant, in the present case, has not in
fact claimed that the Court is open to it under paragraph 2 of Article 35,
but has based its right of access to the Court solely on paragraph 1 of the
Article. However, in some of the cases concerning Legality of Use of
Force, including the present one, the Respondent has in its preliminary

objections, or in oral argument, raised the question of the possible appli-
cation of paragraph 2, in order to contend that Serbia and Montenegro
may not rely upon that text. In this context, reference has been made
to an Order of the Court in another case, in which the provisional view
was expressed that Article IX of the Genocide Convention could be
considered as a special provision contained in a treaty in force. The

Court is therefore of the view that in the circumstances of this case it is
appropriate for it to examine the possible application of paragraph 2 of
Article 35.
92. In its Order of 8 April 1993 in the Genocide Convention case, the
Court, after quoting paragraph 2 of Article 35, stated that

“the Court therefore considers that proceedings may validly be insti-
tuted by a State against a State which is a party to such a special
provision in a treaty in force, but is not party to the Statute, and
independently of the conditions laid down by the Security Council
in its resolution 9 of 1946 (cf. S.S. “Wimbledon”, 1923, P.C.I.J.,

Series A, No. 1, p. 6); whereas a compromissory clause in a multi-
lateral convention, such as Article IX of the Genocide Convention
relied on by Bosnia-Herzegovina in the present case, could, in the
view of the Court, be regarded prima facie as a special provision
contained in a treaty in force; whereas accordingly if Bosnia-

Herzegovina and Yugoslavia are both parties to the Genocide
Convention, disputes to which Article IX applies are in any event
prima facie within the jurisdiction ratione personae of the Court”
(I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 14, para. 19; emphasis added).

In the further proceedings in that case, however, this point was not pur-
sued; the Court rejected the preliminary objections raised by the Respon-

dent in that case, one of them being that the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina had not become a party to the Genocide Convention. The
Respondent however did not raise any objection on the ground that it

391343 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

was itself not a party to the Genocide Convention, nor to the Statute of
the Court since, on the international plane, it had been maintaining its

claim to continue the legal personality, and the membership in inter-
national organizations including the United Nations, of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and its participation in international
treaties. The Court, having observed that it had not been contested
that Yugoslavia was party to the Genocide Convention (I.C.J. Reports

1996 (II), p. 610, para. 17) found that it had jurisdiction on the basis of
Article IX of that Convention.

93. As in respect of the questions of dismissal of the case in limine litis
and access under paragraph 1 of Article 35 (see paragraphs 25 and 51

above), the Court will consider the arguments put forward in this case
and any other legal issue which it deems relevant to consider, including
the issues raised in the other cases referred to in paragraph 3, with a view
to arriving at its conclusion regarding the possible access to the Court by
Serbia and Montenegro under Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

94. A number of Respondents contended in their pleadings that the
reference to the “treaties in force” in Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Stat-
ute relates only to treaties in force when the Statute of the Court entered
into force, i.e. on 24 October 1945. In respect of the observation made by
the Court in its Order of 8 April 1993, quoted in paragraph 92 above, the

Respondents pointed out that that was a provisional assessment, not
conclusive of the matter, and considered that “there [were] persuasive
reasons why the Court should revisit the provisional approach it adopted
to the interpretation of this clause in the Genocide Convention case”
(Preliminary Objections of Belgium, p. 73, para. 222). In particular they

referred to the “evident focus of the clause in question on the peace trea-
ties concluded after the First World War”, and argued that to construe
the phrase of Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute, “the special provi-
sions contained in treaties in force”, as meaning “jurisdictional clauses
contained in treaties in force” (i.e., any treaties whatever) would “funda-

mentally undermine the scheme of the Statute and the distinction between
access to the Court and the jurisdiction of the Court in particular cases”.
Such interpretation would, according to Belgium, “place States not party
to the Statute in a privileged position as they would have access to the
Court without any assumption of the obligations...required of States to
which the Court is open” (Preliminary Objections of Belgium, p. 73,

para. 223), or according to the United Kingdom “would...place them
in a privileged position by giving them access to the Court without
requiring them to meet the conditions normally imposed as a prerequisite
to access to the Court” (Preliminary Objections of the United Kingdom,
p. 40, para. 3.32).

95. During the oral proceedings these arguments were maintained and
reiterated by certain Respondents. Belgium argued that “[t]he Applica-

401344 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

tion instituting proceedings...fell comprehensively outside the jurisdic-
tional framework of the Court under Articles 35, 36 and 37 of the Statute

at the point at which the proceedings were instituted”. It elaborated
further that “[i]n the Genocide Convention case, the controlling consid-
eration is that the FRY did not contest jurisdiction on the ground that it
was not a Member of the United Nations” and continued that Serbia and
Montenegro “cannot rely on its acquiescence as respondent in one case in

order to found jurisdiction as Applicant in this case”. Belgium concluded
that it “relie[d] on both the letter and the spirit of Article 35 of the
Statute” and “[did] not acquiesce to the bringing of a claim against it
by an applicant for whom the Court was not open at the relevant time”
(emphasis added).

Italy observed that

“the question is still whether the Court could...regard itself as
having jurisdiction ratione personarum pursuant to Article 35, para-
graph 2, because Serbia and Montenegro was allegedly a party to a
‘treaty in force’ laying down the jurisdiction of the Court”.

Italy recalled the arguments on this issue in its second preliminary objec-
tion, and emphasized that,

“[i]n particular, Italy maintained that the mere presence of a clause
conferring jurisdiction in a treaty in force between two States, one of
which, the Applicant, is not at the same time a party to the Statute,
could not give that State the right to appear before the Court, unless

it met the conditions laid down by the Security Council in its resolu-
tion No. 9 of 15 October 1946. This Serbia and Montenegro has not
done and does not claim ever to have done.”

96. The Court notes that the passage quoted above (paragraph 92)
from the 1993 Order in the Genocide Convention case was addressed to
the situation in which the proceedings were instituted against a State the
membership of which in the United Nations and status of a party to the

Statute was unclear. Bosnia and Herzegovina in its Application in that
case maintained that “the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro)” was a Member of the United Nations and a party to the
Statute and at the same time indicated in the Application that the “con-
tinuity” of Yugoslavia with the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, a Member of the United Nations, “has been vigorously

contested by the entire international community ,...including by the
United Nations Security Counci l...aswell as by the General Assem-
bly” (I.C.J. Reports 1993 , p. 12, para. 15). The Order of 8 April 1993
was made in a different case; but as the Court observed in a previous
case in which questions of res judicata and Article 59 of the Statute

were raised, “[t]he real question is whether, in this case, there is cause
not to follow the reasoning and conclusions of earlier cases” ( Land and
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.

411345 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 292,
para. 28).

97. The Order of 8 April 1993 was made on the basis of an examina-
tion of the relevant law and facts in the context of incidental proceedings
on a request for the indication of provisional measures. It would there-
fore now be appropriate for the Court to make a definitive finding on the

question whether Article 35, paragraph 2, affords access to the Court in
the present case, and for that purpose, to examine further the question of
its applicability and interpretation.
98. The Court will thus proceed to the interpretation of Article 35,
paragraph 2, of the Statute, and will do so in accordance with customary

international law, reflected in Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. According to paragraph 1 of Article 31, a treaty
must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary mean-
ing to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of the treaty’s
object and purpose. Interpretation must be based above all upon the text
of the treaty. As a supplementary measure recourse may be had to means

of interpretation such as the preparatory work of the treaty and the cir-
cumstances of its conclusion.
99. Article 35, paragraph 2, refers to “the special provisions contained
in treaties in force”, in the context of the question of access to the Court.
Taking the natural and ordinary meaning of the words “special provi-

sions”, the reference must in the view of the Court be to treaties that
make “special provision” in relation to the Court, and this can hardly be
anything other than provision for the settlement of disputes between the
parties to the treaty by reference of the matter to the Court. As for the
words “treaties in force”, in their natural and ordinary meaning they do

not indicate at what date the treaties contemplated are to be in force, and
thus they may lend themselves to different interpretations. One can con-
strue those words as referring to treaties which were in force at the time
that the Statute itself came into force, as was contended by certain
Respondents; or to those which were in force on the date of the institu-

tion of proceedings in a case in which such treaties are invoked. In favour
of this latter interpretation, it may be observed that the similar expression
“treaties and conventions in force” is found in Article 36, paragraph 1, of
the Statute, and the Court has interpreted it in this sense (for example,
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Con-
vention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab

Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1998, p. 16, para. 19). The expression “treaty or convention in
force” in Article 37 of the Statute has also been read as meaning in force
at the date proceedings were instituted (Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Company, Limited, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.

Reports 1964, p. 27).
100. The object and purpose of Article 35 of the Statute is to define
the conditions of access to the Court. While paragraph 1 of that Article

421346 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

opens it to the States parties to the Statute, paragraph 2 is intended to
regulate access to the Court by States which are not parties to the Stat-

ute. The conditions of access of such States are, “subject to the special
provisions contained in treaties in force”, to be determined by the Secu-
rity Council, with the proviso that in no case shall such conditions place
the parties in a position of inequality before the Court. The Court con-
siders that it was natural to reserve the position in relation to any rele-

vant treaty provisions that might then exist; moreover, it would have
been inconsistent with the main thrust of the text to make it possible in
the future for States to obtain access to the Court simply by the conclu-
sion between themselves of a special treaty, multilateral or bilateral, con-
taining a provision to that effect.

101. The first interpretation, according to which Article 35, para-
graph 2, refers to treaties in force at the time that the Statute came into
force, is in fact reinforced by an examination of the travaux préparatoires
of the text. Since the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice contained substantially the same provision, which was used as
a model when the Statute of the present Court was drafted, it will be

necessary to examine the drafting history of both Statutes. The text
proposed by the 1920 Committee of Jurists (as Article 32 of its draft)
was as follows:

“The Court shall be open of right to the States mentioned in the
Annex to the Covenant, and to such others as shall subsequently
enter the League of Nations.

Other States may have access to it.
The conditions under which the Court shall be open of right or
accessible to States which are not Members of the League of Nations
shall be determined by the Council, in accordance with Article 17 of
the Covenant.” (League of Nations, Permanent Court of International

Justice, Documents concerning the action taken by the Council of the
League of Nations under Article 14 of the Covenant and the adoption
by the Assembly of the Statute of the Permanent Court , p. 78.)

102. During the consideration of this text by the Sub-Committee of
the Third-Committee of the First Assembly Meeting of the League of
Nations it was pointed out “that under the Treaties of Peace the Central

Powers would often be Parties before the Court” and that “[t]he text of
the draft does not take sufficient account of this fact” and it was pro-
posed suppressing the first two paragraphs of the Article (ibid., p. 141).
A question was raised “whether the Council might place conditions on
the admission of Germany before the Court, for example in the case men-
tioned in Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles” to which a negative

response was given. Then the Chairman proposed to entrust a small com-
mittee with the task of drafting a new formula for Article 32 which

“should act upon the three following principles, upon which the
Sub-Committee was agreed:

431347 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

1. The Council shall have the power of determining conditions for
the admission before the Court of States which are not Members

of the League of Nations.
2. The rights of the Parties before the Court are equal.
3. Account shall be taken of Parties who may present themselves
before the Court by virtue of the Treaties of Peace .” (League of
Nations, op. cit, p. 141; emphasis added.)

103. The Sub-Committee received from the three delegates entrusted
with this task a proposal for a new text of Article 32 as follows:

“Article 32
1st paragraph: No change.

The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other
States shall, subject to special provisions contained in treaties in
force, be laid down by the Council.
When a State which is not a Member of the League of Nations is
a party to a dispute, the Court will fix the amount which that party

shall contribute towards the expenses of the Court.”
104. The Court notes that it is here, that for the first time in the
legislative history of what later became Article 35, paragraph 2, the

phrase “subject to the special provisions contained in treaties in force”
appeared. It may safely be assumed that this phrase was inserted into
the text as a response to principle 3 referred to above.

105. When the text was presented to the Sub-Committee, the Chair-

man recalled the proposal made at the previous meeting, to add to
Article 32 a provision stating that, as far as party rights are concerned,
all States are equal before the Court. In order to meet this objection
of the Chairman and of the author of that proposal, one of the three co-
authors of the proposed text of Article 32 suggested making the follow-

ing addition to the second paragraph of Article 32:
“The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other
States shall, subject to the special provisions contained in treaties in

force, be laid down by the Council, but in no case shall such provi-
sion place the parties in a position of inequality before the Court.”
(Ibid., p. 144.)

The second paragraph thus amended was adopted without any further
discussion.
106. In the report presented to the Assembly by the Third Committee,
it was stated that:

“The wording of this Article [i.e. the original draft Article 32]
seemed lacking in clearness, and the Sub-Committee has re-cast it in
an effort to express clearly [that]

.............................
The access of other States to the Court will depend either on the

441348 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

special provisions of the Treaties in force (for example the provisions
of the Treaty of Peace concerning the right of minorities, labour,

etc.) or else on a resolution of the Council.” (League of Nations, op.
cit., p. 210.)

107. Before the Permanent Court of International Justice, the issue
arose on two occasions. In the S.S. “Wimbledon” case (1923, P.C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 1, p. 6) the jurisdiction of the Court was founded on
Article 386 of the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919. When the pro-
ceedings were instituted in that case against Germany, that State was

not a Member of the League of Nations nor was it mentioned in the
Annex to the Covenant. A declaration by Germany accepting the juris-
diction of the Court was not considered as necessary, in light of the
reservation contained in Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute which
was intended, as shown above (paragraphs 102-104), to cover special

provisions in the Peace Treaties.
In the case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper
Silesia (1925, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 6 ), the proceedings were instituted
by Germany, before its admission to the League of Nations, against
Poland on the basis of Article 23 of the Convention relating to
Upper Silesia of 15 May 1922 and brought into force on 3 June 1922. The

Court noted that Poland “[did] not dispute the fact that the suit has been
duly submitted to the Court in accordance with Articles 35 and 40 of the
Statute” (ibid., p. 11). The Court, before rendering its judgment, con-
sidered the issue and

“was of the opinion that the relevant instruments when correctly
interpreted (more especially in the light of a report made by
M. Hagerup at the First Assembly of the League of Nations) author-

ized it in accepting the German Government’s application without
requiring the special declaration provided for in the Council Resolu-
tion” (Annual Report of the Permanent Court of International Justice
(1 January 1922-15 June 1925), P.C.I.J., Series E, No. 1 , p. 261).

Further, it is to be noted that when the Court was discussing amend-
ments of its Rules of Court a year later, two judges expressed the view
that the exception in Article 35 “could only be intended to cover situa-

tions provided for by the treaties of peace” (Acts and Documents (1926),
P.C.I.J., Series D, No. 2, Add. , p. 106). One of them explained that, in
the case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia ,

“the question then related to a treaty — the Upper Silesian Conven-
tion — drawn up under the auspices of the League of Nations which
was to be considered as supplementary to the Treaty of Versailles.
It was therefore possible to include the case in regard to which

the Court had then to decide in the general expression ‘subject to
treaties in force’, whilst construing that expression as referring to
the peace treaties . . .” (Ibid., p. 105.)

451349 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

No other interpretation of the phrase at issue was advanced by any
Member of the Court when in 1926 it discussed the amendment of its

Rules.
108. When the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the
Court were under preparation, the issue was first discussed by the United
Nations Committee of Jurists. In the debate, some confusion apparently
arose regarding the difference between a non-Member State which may

become party to the Statute and one which may become party to a case
before the Court. Some delegates did not make a clear distinction between
adherence to the Statute and access to the Court. The debate mostly con-
centrated on the respective roles of the General Assembly and the Secu-
rity Council in that context: there was some criticism that the Assembly

was excluded from action under paragraph 2 of Article 35 (Documents of
the United Nations Conference on International Organization , Vol. XIV,
pp. 141-145). A proposal was made to adopt paragraph 2 as it stood,
but some delegates continued to argue for a role of the Assembly to
be recognized in that paragraph. The United Kingdom suggested
that there might be inserted in paragraph 2, after the words “Security

Council”, the phrase “in accordance with any principles which may
have been laid down by the General Assembly”.

A proposal was then again made to adopt the Article as contained in
the draft. Thereupon the delegate of France observed that “it lay within

the power of the Council to determine conditions in particular cases but
the actual practice had not given cause for criticism”. He then continued:

“The Council could not restrict access to the Court when the
Assembly permitted it, but the Council could be more liberal in par-
ticular cases. The decision of the Assembly was actually the more
important, and the Council could not go against it. The Council

furthermore would have to take into account any existing treaties,
and it could not prevent access to the Court when a State had a
treaty providing for compulsory jurisdiction.” (Ibid., p. 144.)

He then proposed that Article 35 be adopted as it stood; no further sub-
stantive discussion followed, and Article 35 was adopted.
109. The report on the draft of the Statute of an International Court

of Justice submitted by the United Nations Committee of Jurists to the
United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Fran-
cisco noted in respect of Article 35 merely that:

“Aside from the purely formal changes necessitated by references
to The United Nations Organization instead of to the Covenant of
the League of Nations, Article 35 is amended only in that, in the
English text of paragraph 2, the word ‘conditions’ is substituted for

the word ‘provisions’ and in paragraph 3, the word ‘case’ is substi-
tuted for the word ‘dispute’ which will assure better agreement with
the French text.” (Ibid., p. 839.)

461350 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

Since the draft Statute of this Court was based on the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, the report did not indicate

any change in respect of the scope of the applicability of Article 35,
paragraph 2.
110. At the San Francisco Conference, the question here examined
was not touched upon; the discussion of draft Article 35 focused mainly
on a proposal by Egypt to insert a new paragraph 2 stating “[t]he condi-

tions under which states not members may become parties to the Statute
of the Court shall be determined in each case by the General Assembly
upon recommendation of the Security Council” (Documents of the United
Nations Conference on International Organization , Vol. XIII, p. 484). In
the debate in Committee IV/1 of the Conference,

“[i]t was pointed out that the question as to what states are to be

parties to the Statute should be decided in the Charter, while the
question as to what states may appear before the Court in the case,
once the Court is established, should be determined by the Statute”
(ibid., p. 283).

The Egyptian proposal was not pursued but the essence of it was reflected
in Article 93, paragraph 2, of the Charter.
111. The Court considers that the legislative history of Article 35,
paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Permanent Court demonstrates that it

was intended as an exception to the principle stated in paragraph 1, in
order to cover cases contemplated in agreements concluded in the after-
math of the First World War before the Statute entered into force. How-
ever, the travaux préparatoires of the Statute of the present Court are less
illuminating. The discussion of Article 35 was provisional and somewhat

cursory; it took place at a stage in the planning of the future interna-
tional organization when it was not yet settled whether the Permanent
Court would be preserved or replaced by a new court. Indeed, the records
quoted in paragraphs 108 to 110 above do not include any discussion
which would suggest that Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute should

be given a different meaning from the corresponding provision in the
Statute of the Permanent Court. It would rather seem that the text was
reproduced from the Statute of the Permanent Court; there is no indica-
tion that any extension of access to the Court was intended.

Accordingly Article 35, paragraph 2, must be interpreted, mutatis

mutandis, in the same way as the equivalent text in the Statute of the Per-
manent Court, namely as intended to refer to treaties in force at the date
of the entry into force of the new Statute, and providing for the jurisdic-
tion of the new Court. In fact, no such prior treaties, referring to the
jurisdiction of the present Court, have been brought to the attention of

the Court, and it may be that none existed. In the view of the Court,
however, neither this circumstance, nor any consideration of the object
and purpose of the text, nor the travaux préparatoires, offer support to

471351 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE JUDGMENT )

the alternative interpretation that the provision was intended as granting
access to the Court to States not parties to the Statute without any condi-

tion other than the existence of a treaty, containing a clause conferring
jurisdiction on the Court, which might be concluded any time subse-
quently to the entry into force of the Statute. As noted above (para-
graph 100), this interpretation would lead to a result quite incompatible
with the object and purpose of Article 35, paragraph 2, namely the regu-

lation of access to the Court by States non-parties to the Statute. In the
view of the Court therefore, the reference in Article 35, paragraph 2, of
the Statute to “the special provisions contained in treaties in force”
applies only to treaties in force at the date of the entry into force of the
Statute, and not to any treaties concluded since that date.

112. The Court thus concludes that, even assuming that Serbia and
Montenegro was a party to the Genocide Convention at the relevant
date, Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute does not provide it with a
basis to have access to the Court, under Article IX of that Convention,
since the Convention only entered into force on 12 January 1951, after
the entry into force of the Statute (see paragraph 111 above). The Court

does not therefore consider it necessary to decide whether Serbia and
Montenegro was or was not a party to the Genocide Convention
on 29 April 1999 when the current proceedings were instituted.

*
* *

113. The conclusion which the Court has reached, that Serbia and
Montenegro did not, at the time of the institution of the present proceed-
ings, have access to the Court under either paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of
Article 35 of the Statute, makes it unnecessary for the Court to consider

the other preliminary objections filed by the Respondents to the jurisdic-
tion of the Court (see paragraph 44 above).

*
* *

114. Finally, the Court would recall, as it has done in other cases and
in the Order on the request for the indication of provisional measures in
the present case, the fundamental distinction between the existence of the
Court’s jurisdiction over a dispute, and the compatibility with interna-
tional law of the particular acts which are the subject of the dispute (see
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom), Provisional

Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II) , p. 839,
para. 39). Whether or not the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over a
dispute, the parties “remain in all cases responsible for acts attributable
to them that violate the rights of other States” (see Fisheries Jurisdiction
(Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports

1998, p. 456, paras. 55-56; Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Paki-
stan v. India), Jurisdiction, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2000 ,p .33
para. 51). When, however, as in the present case, the Court comes to the

481352 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

conclusion that it is without jurisdiction to entertain the claims made in
the Application, it can make no finding, nor any observation whatever,
on the question whether any such violation has been committed or any

international responsibility incurred.

* * *

115. For these reasons,

T HE COURT ,

Unanimously,

Finds that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the claims made in the
Application filed by Serbia and Montenegro on 29 April 1999.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at

the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fifteenth day of December, two thou-
sand and four, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives
of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of Serbia
and Montenegro and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland, respectively.

(Signed) S HIJiuyong,

President.

(Signed) Philippe C OUVREUR ,

Registrar.

Vice-President RANJEVA and Judges G UILLAUME ,H IGGINS,K OOIJMANS,
A L-KHASAWNEH ,B UERGENTHAL and E LARABY append a joint declaration
to the Judgment of the Court; Judge KOROMA appends a declaration to
the Judgment of the Court; Judges H IGGIN,K OOIJMANS and E LARABY

and Judge ad hoc K RECu append separate opinions to the Judgment of
the Court.

(Initialled) J.Y.S.
(Initialled) Ph.C.

49

Bilingual Content

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE

(SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO v. UNITED KINGDOM)

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

JUDGMENT OF 15 DECEMBER 2004

2004

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES AR|TS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE A v LA LICEuITu
DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE

(SERBIE-ET-MONuNuGRO c. ROYAUME-UNI)

EXCEPTIONS PuLIMINAIRES

ARR|TDU15DE uCEMBRE 2004 Official citation:
Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 1307

Mode officiel de citation:
Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Serbie-et-Monténégro c. Royaume-Uni),
exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2004, p. 1307

Sales number
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ISBN 92-1-071004-5 15 DECEMBER 2004

JUDGMENT

LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE

(SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO v. UNITED KINGDOM)

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

LICuITu DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE

(SERBIE-ET-MONTuNuGRO c. ROYAUME-UNI)

EXCEPTIONS PREuLIMINAIRES

15 uCEMBRE 2004

ARRE|T 1307

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

2004 YEAR 2004
15 December
General List 15 December 2004
No. 113

CASE CONCERNING
LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE

(SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO v. UNITED KINGDOM)

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

Case one of eight similar cases brought by the Applicant — Court to consider
arguments put forward in this case as well as any other legal issue, including
issues raised in other seven cases.

**
Contentions by Respondents that case should be dismissed in limine litis as a
result of Applicant’s changed attitude to Court’s jurisdiction in its Observations.

Whether Applicant’s changed attitude amounts to discontinuance — Appli-

cant expressly denied notice of discontinuance and wants the Court to decide
upon its jurisdiction — Court unable to treat Observations as having legal effect
of discontinuance — Court has power, ex officio, to put an end to a case in
interests of proper administration of justice — Not applicable in present case.

Whether Applicant’s position discloses substantive agreement on jurisdiction
resulting in absence of dispute for purposes of Article 36, paragraph 6, of
Statute — Distinction to be drawn between question of jurisdiction and right
of party to appear before the Court under the Statute — Latter not a matter
of consent — Court must reach its own conclusion.

Court cannot decline to entertain case because of a suggestion as to motives
of one of the parties or because its judgment may have influence in another case.

Whether, in light of Applicant’s contention that it was not party to the Geno-
cide Convention until March 2001, the substantive dispute with the Respondent,

4 1307

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 2004 2004
15 décembre
Rôlo général
15 décembre 2004 n 113

AFFAIRE RELATIVE A v LA LICÉITÉ

DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE

(SERBIE-ET-MONTÉNÉGRO c. ROYAUME-UNI)

EXCEPTIONS PRÉLIMINAIRES

Affaire constituant l’une des huit affaires similaires introduites par le deman-
deur — Examen par la Cour des arguments présentés en l’espèce, ainsi que de
toute autre question de droit, y compris des questions soulevées dans les sept
autres affaires.

**

Arguments des défendeurs selon lesquels l’affaire doit être rejetée in limine
litis à la suite du changement d’attitude du demandeur, exprimé dans ses obser-
vations, quant à la compétence de la Cour.
Question de savoir si le changement d’attitude du demandeur équivaut à un
désistement — Demandeur niant expressément avoir notifié un désistement et
souhaitant que la Cour se prononce sur sa compétence — Cour n’étant pas en
mesure de considérer que les observations ont pour effet juridique un désiste-
ment — Pouvoir qu’a la Cour de mettre d’office un terme à une affaire dans
l’intérêt d’une bonne administration de la justice — Inapplicabilité en
l’espèce.

Question de savoir si, compte tenu de la position du demandeur, il existe en
substance un accord en ce qui concerne la compétence, en conséquence duquel il
n’y aurait plus de différend aux fins du paragraphe 6 de l’article 36 du Statut
— Distinction à établir entre la question de la compétence et le droit d’une par-
tie d’ester devant la Cour conformément aux prescriptions du Statut — Droit
ne relevant pas du consentement d’une partie — Cour étant tenue de tirer ses
propres conclusions.
Cour ne pouvant refuser de connaître de l’affaire du fait des motivations allé-
guées de l’une des parties ou en raison des conséquences que son arrêt pourrait
avoir dans une autre instance.
Question de savoir si, le demandeur ayant prétendu qu’il n’était pas partie à la
convention sur le génocide avant mars 2001, le différend au fond, dans la mesure

41308 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

in so far as jurisdiction is founded on that Convention, has disappeared — Con-
tention that Applicant has forfeited right of action and is estopped from pursu-
ing the proceedings — No withdrawal of claims as to merits — Applicant
cannot be held to have renounced its rights or to be estopped from continuing the
action.

Court cannot dismiss case in limine litis.

**

Questions of jurisdiction — Court’s “freedom to select the ground upon which
it will base its judgment” — Distinction between present proceedings and other

cases — Applicant’s right of access to Court under Article 35, paragraph 1, of
Statute, challenged — If not party to Statute at time of institution of proceed-
ings, subject to application of Article 35, paragraph 2, Applicant had no right to
appear before Court — Court must determine whether Applicant meets condi-
tions laid down in Articles 34 and 35 of Statute before examining conditions in
Article 36 of Statute.

*

Break-up of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991-1992 — Dec-
laration of 27 April 1992 and Note of same date from Permanent Representa-
tive of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, addressed to Secretary-General —
Security Council resolution 757 of 30 May 1992 — Security Council resolu-
tion 777 of 19 September 1992 — General Assembly resolution 47/1 of 22 Sep-
tember 1992 — Legal Counsel’s letter of 29 September 1992 regarding “prac-
tical consequences” of General Assembly resolution 47/1 — General Assembly
resolution 47/229 of 29 April 1993.

Complexity and ambiguity of legal position of FRY within and vis-à-vis the

United Nations during the period 1992-2000 — Absence of authoritative deter-
mination by competent United Nations organs.

Different positions taken within United Nations — Positions of Security
Council and General Assembly — Resolution 777 (1992) and resolution 47/1
cannot be construed as conveying an authoritative determination of FRY’s legal
status — Position of FRY — Maintained claim of continuity of legal personal-
ity of SFRY as stated in Note of 27 April 1992 — Position of Secretariat —
Adherence to practice prevailing prior to break-up of SFRY pending authorita-
tive determination of FRY’s legal status.

Reference by Court to “sui generis” position of FRY in Judgment of 3 Feb-

ruary 2003 in Application for Revision case — Term not prescriptive but
merely descriptive of amorphous situation — No conclusion drawn by Court as
to status of FRY vis-à-vis the United Nations in 2003 Judgment or in incidental
proceedings in other cases including Order on provisional measures in present
case.

5 LICÉITÉ DE L ’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1308

où la compétence est fondée sur cette convention, a disparu — Argument selon
lequel le demandeur a perdu son droit d’action et se trouve empêché de pour-

suivre la procédure — Absence de renonciation aux prétentions au fond — De-
mandeur ne pouvant être considéré comme ayant renoncé à ses droits ou
comme étant empêché de poursuivre la procédure.
Cour ne pouvant rejeter l’affaire in limine litis.

**

Questions de compétence — Liberté de la Cour «dans le choix des motifs sur
lesquels elle fondera son arrêt» — Distinction entre la présente instance et
d’autres affaires — Contestation du droit d’accès du demandeur à la Cour en
vertu du paragraphe 1 de l’article 35 du Statut — Demandeur n’ayant pas le
droit d’ester devant la Cour au moment où l’instance a été introduite, s’il n’était
pas partie au Statut, sous réserve de l’application du paragraphe 2 de l’article 35
— Cour devant déterminer si le demandeur remplit les conditions énoncées aux
articles 34 et 35 du Statut avant d’examiner celles énoncées à l’article 36 du
Statut.

*

Eclatement de la République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie en 1991-
1992 — Déclaration du 27 avril 1992 et note de la même date adressée au Secré-
taire général par le représentant permanent de la Yougoslavie auprès de l’Orga-

nisation des Nations Unies — Résolution 757 du 30 mai 1992 du Conseil de
sécurité — Résolution 777 du 19 septembre 1992 du Conseil de sécurité — Réso-
lution 47/1 du 22 septembre 1992 de l’Assemblée générale — Lettre du conseiller
juridique datée du 29 septembre 1992 relative aux «conséquences pratiques» de
la résolution 47/1 de l’Assemblée générale — Résolution 47/229 du 29 avril 1993
de l’Assemblée générale.
Complexité et ambiguïté de la situation juridique de la RFY au sein de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies et à l’égard de celle-ci pendant la période com-
prise entre 1992 et 2000 — Absence de décision faisant autorité des organes
compétents de l’Organisation des Nations Unies.
Positions différentes adoptées au sein de l’Organisation des Nations Unies
— Positions du Conseil de sécurité et de l’Assemblée générale — Résolu-

tions 777 (1992) et 47/1 ne pouvant être interprétées comme constituant des
décisions faisant autorité quant au statut juridique de la RFY — Position de la
RFY — Maintien de sa prétention selon laquelle elle assurait la continuité de la
personnalité juridique de la RFSY, telle qu’exprimée dans la note du 27 avril 1992
— Position du Secrétariat — Adhésion à la pratique qui avait prévalu avant
l’éclatement de la RFSY en attendant une décision faisant autorité quant au sta-
tut juridique de la RFY.
Mention par la Cour de la situation «sui generis» de la RFY dans l’arrêt
rendu le 3 février 2003 en l’affaire de la Demande en revision — Expression
sans portée normative, mais purement descriptive, renvoyant au caractère indé-
terminé de la situation — Absence de conclusion de la Cour quant au statut de

la RFY vis-à-vis de l’Organisation des Nations Unies dans l’arrêt de 2003 ou
dans le cadre de procédures incidentes dans d’autres instances, y compris dans
l’ordonnance rendue en l’espèce sur la demande en indication de mesures conser-
vatoires.

51309 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

FRY’s sui generis position came to end with admission to United Nations on
1 November 2000 — Admission did not have effect of dating back — New devel-
opment clarified amorphous legal situation — Situation faced by Court mani-
festly different from that in 1999 — Applicant was not a Member of United
Nations, hence not party to Statute, on 29 April 1999 when it filed Application.

Court not open to Applicant, at date of filing of Application, under Article 35,
paragraph 1, of Statute.

*

Question whether Court open to Applicant under Article 35, paragraph 2, of
Statute — Contention by certain Respondents that Applicant may not rely on
this text — Appropriate for Court to examine question.

Scope of Article 35, paragrap h 2 — Determination by Court in provisional
measures Order of April 1993 in Genocide Convention case that Article IX of
the Genocide Convention “could ...be regarded prima facie as a special provi-
sion contained in a treaty in force ” — Contentions by certain Respondents that
“treaties in force” relates only to treaties in force when Statute came into force.

Natural and ordinary meaning allows two different interpretations: treaties in
force at time when Statute came into force and treaties in force at date of insti-
tution of proceedings — Object and purpose of Article 35 is to define conditions
of access to Court: natural to reserve position in relation to treaties that might
then exist, not to allow States to obtain access to Court by conclusion between
themselves of any special treaty — First interpretation reinforced by examina-
tion of travaux préparatoires — Substantially same provision in PCIJ Statute
intended to refer to special provisions in Peace Treaties concluded after First
World War — No discussion in travaux of ICJ Statute to suggest that exten-
sion of access to Court intended.

Genocide Convention came into force after Statute — Not “treaty in force”
within meaning of Article 35, paragrap h 2 — Unnecessary to decide whether
Applicant was party to Genocide Convention on 29 April 1999.

*

In view of Court’s conclusion of lack of access to Court under either para-
graph 1 or paragraph 2 of Article 35 of Statute, unnecessary for Court to con-
sider Respondents’ other preliminary objections.

**

Distinction between existence of jurisdiction and compatibility of acts with
international law — Irrespective of whether Court has jurisdiction, Parties
remain responsible for acts attributable to them that violate the rights of other

6 LICÉITÉ DE L ’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1309

Fin de la situation sui generis de la RFY avec son admission au sein de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies le 1 ernovembre 2000 — Admission n’ayant

pas d’effet remontant dans le passé — Evolution clarifiant la situation juridique
indéterminée — Situation devant laquelle la Cour se trouve manifestement dif-
férente de celle devant laquelle elle se trouvait en 1999 — Demandeur n’étant
pas membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies le 29 avril 1999, et n’étant dès
lors pas partie au Statut au moment où il a déposé la requête.
Cour n’étant pas ouverte au demandeur à la date du dépôt de la requête sur la
base du paragraphe 1 de l’article 35 du Statut.

*

Question de savoir si la Cour est ouverte au demandeur en vertu du para-
graphe 2 de l’article 35 du Statut — Argument de certains défendeurs selon
lequel le demandeur ne peut se prévaloir de ce texte — Question qu’il appartient
à la Cour d’examiner.
Champ d’application du paragraphe 2 de l’article 35 — Conclusion de la Cour
dans son ordonnance d’avril 1993 en indication de mesures conservatoires ren-

due en l’affaire de la Convention sur le génocide, selon laquelle l’article IX de
cette convention «pourrait être [considéré] prima facie comme une disposition
particulière d’un traité en vigueur » — Arguments avancés par certains défen-
deurs selon lesquels la mention «traités en vigueur» visait uniquement les traités
en vigueur à la date d’entrée en vigueur du Statut.
Sens naturel et ordinaire permettant deux interprétations: les traités qui
étaient en vigueur à la date à laquelle le Statut lui-même était entré en vigueur,
ou les traités qui étaient en vigueur à la date de l’introduction de l’instance
— Objet et but de l’article 35 étant de définir les conditions d’accès à la Cour:
démarche naturelle tendant à réserver le cas de toute disposition conventionnelle
pertinente qui pouvait alors exister et à ne pas permettre qu’à l’avenir des Etats

puissent avoir accès à la Cour par la simple conclusion d’un traité spécial
— Première interprétation confortée par une analyse des travaux préparatoires
— Disposition identique en substance dans le Statut de la CPJI, qui visait à
renvoyer aux dispositions particulières des traités de paix conclus après le pre-
mier conflit mondial — Absence de discussions dans le cadre des travaux pré-
paratoires du Statut de la CIJ permettant de dire que l’intention était d’élargir
l’accès à la Cour.
Entrée en vigueur de la convention sur le génocide postérieure à celle du Sta-
tut — Instrument n’étant donc pas un «traité en vigueur» au sens du para-
graphe 2 de l’article 35 — Nul besoin de déterminer si le demandeur était partie
à la convention sur le génocide le 29 avril 1999.

*
* *
Nul besoin pour la Cour d’examiner les autres exceptions préliminaires sou-
levées par les défendeurs compte tenu de la conclusion à laquelle elle est parve-

nue, à savoir qu’elle n’était pas ouverte au demandeur, que ce soit en vertu du
paragraphe 1 ou du paragraphe 2 de l’article 35.

**

Distinction entre l’existence de la compétence et la compatibilité avec le droit
international de certains actes — Que la Cour ait ou non compétence, Parties
demeurant responsables des actes portant atteinte aux droits d’autres Etats qui

61310 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

States — In present case, having no jurisdiction, Court can make no finding on
such matters.

JUDGMENT

Present: President SHI; Vice-PresidentANJEVA ; Judges UILLAUME ,K OROMA ,
V ERESHCHETIN,H IGGINS,P ARRA -ARANGUREN ,K OOIJMANS,R EZEK,
A L-KHASAWNEH ,BUERGENTHAL ,E LARABY ,O WADA ,T OMKA ; Judge ad
hoc K RECA ; Registrar OUVREUR .
u

In the case concerning legality of use of force,

between

Serbia and Montenegro,
represented by

Mr. Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), Chief Legal Adviser at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro, Professor of Law at the
Central European University, Budapest, and Emory University, Atlanta,

as Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Vladimir Djeriu, LL.M. (Michigan), Adviser to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro,

as Co-agent, Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., Chichele Professor of Public Inter-

national Law (Emeritus), University of Oxford, Member of the Inter-
national Law Commission, member of the English Bar, member of the
Institut de droit international,
as Counsel and Advocate;

Mr. Slavoljub Cari´, Counsellor, Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro, The
Hague,
Mr. Saša Obradovic´, First Secretary, Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro,
The Hague,

Mr. Vladimir Cvetkovicu Third Secretary, International Law Department,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro,
Ms Marijana Santracˇ, LL.B., M.A. (Central European University),
Ms Dina Dobrkovic ´, LL.B.,

as Assistants;
Mr. Vladimir Sre´kovi´, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Monte-
negro,

as Technical Assistant,

and

the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

7 LICÉITÉ DE ’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1310

leur seraient imputables — En l’espèce, par défaut de compétence, Cour ne pou-
vant se prononcer sur ces questions.

ARRÊT

Présents: M. S H, président .R ANJEVA, vice-président ; MM. UILLAUME ,
K OROMA ,V ERESHCHETIN,M me H IGGIN, MM. P ARRA-A RANGUREN ,

K OOIJMANS,R EZEK,A L-KHASAWNEH ,B UERGENTHAL ,E LARABY ,
O WADA,T OMKA, juges;M.K REuA , juge ad hoc; M. C OUVREUR ,
greffier.

En l’affaire relative à la licéité de l’emploi de la force

entre

la Serbie-et-Monténégro,

représentée par
M. Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), conseiller juridique principal au minis-
tère des affaires étrangères de Serbie-et-Monténégro, professeur de droit à

l’Université d’Europe centrale de Budapest et à l’Université Emory
d’Atlanta,
comme agent, conseil et avocat;

M. Vladimir Djeric´, LL.M. (Michigan), conseiller auprès du ministre des
affaires étrangères de Serbie-et-Monténégro,
comme coagent, conseil et avocat;

M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., professeur émérite de droit interna-
tional public à l’Université d’Oxford, ancien titulaire de la chaire Chichele,
membre de la Commission du droit international, membre du barreau

d’Angleterre, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseil et avocat;

M. Slavoljub Caric´, conseiller à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro à
La Haye,
M. Saša Obradovic´, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténé-
gro à La Haye,
M. Vladimir Cvetkovic´, troisième secrétaire, département de droit interna-
tional du ministère des affaires étrangères de Serbie-et-Monténégro,
me
M me Marijana Santraˇ, LL.B., M.A. (Université d’Europe centrale),
M Dina Dobrkovic´, LL.B.,
comme assistants;

M. Vladimir Sre´kovi´, ministère des affaires étrangères de Serbie-et-Monté-
négro,

comme assistant technique,
et

le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord,

71311 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

represented by

Sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G., Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office,
as Agent;

Mr. Chanaka Wickremasinghe, Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office,
Mr. Dominic Raab, First Secretary, Embassy of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The Hague,
as Deputy Agents;

Mr. Christopher Greenwood, C.M.G., Q.C., Professor of International Law,
London School of Economics and Political Science, member of the English
Bar,
as Counsel;

Mr. David Burton, Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, The Hague,
as Adviser,

T HE COURT ,

composed as above,
after deliberation,

delivers the following Judgment:

1. On 29 April 1999 the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(with effect from 4 February 2003, “Serbia and Montenegro”) filed in the
Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter “the United
Kingdom”) in respect of a dispute concerning acts allegedly committed by the
United Kingdom

“by which it has violated its international obligation banning the use of
force against another State, the obligation not to intervene in the internal
affairs of another State, the obligation not to violate the sovereignty of
another State, the obligation to protect the civilian population and civilian
objects in wartime, the obligation to protect the environment, the obliga-
tion relating to free navigation on international rivers, the obligation
regarding fundamental human rights and freedoms, the obligation not to
use prohibited weapons, the obligation not to deliberately inflict condi-
tions of life calculated to cause the physical destruction of a national
group”.

The Application invoked as a basis of the Court’s jurisdiction Article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute of the Court, as well as Article IX of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948 (hereinafter “the
Genocide Convention”).

2. On 29 April 1999, immediately after filing its Application, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia also submitted a request for the indication of provi-
sional measures pursuant to Article 73 of the Rules of Court.
3. On the same day, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia filed Applications

8 LICÉITÉ DE L EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1311

représenté par
Sir Michael Wood, K.C.M.G., conseiller juridique du ministère des affaires
étrangères et du Commonwealth,

comme agent;
M. Chanaka Wickremasinghe, conseiller juridique au ministère des affaires
étrangères et du Commonwealth;
M. Dominic Raab, premier secrétaire à l’ambassade du Royaume-Uni de
Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord à La Haye,

comme agents adjoints;
M. Christopher Greenwood, C.M.G., Q.C., professeur de droit international
à la London School of Economics and Political Science, membre du bar-
reau d’Angleterre,

comme conseil;
M. David Burton, ambassade du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et
d’Irlande du Nord à La Haye,

comme conseiller,

L A COUR ,
ainsi composée,

après délibéré en chambre du conseil,

rend l’arrêt suivant:
1. Le 29 avril 1999, le Gouvernement de la République fédérale de Yougo-
slavie (devenue à compter du 4 février 2003 la «Serbie-et-Monténégro»)
a déposé au Greffe de la Cour une requête introductive d’instance contre
le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord (ci-après dénommé

le «Royaume-Uni») au sujet d’un différend concernant des actes que le
Royaume-Uni aurait commis
«en violation de son obligation internationale de ne pas recourir à l’emploi
de la force contre un autre Etat, de l’obligation de ne pas s’immiscer dans
les affaires intérieures d’un autre Etat, de l’obligation de ne pas porter

atteinte à la souveraineté d’un autre Etat, de l’obligation de protéger les
populations civiles et les biens de caractère civil en temps de guerre, de
l’obligation de protéger l’environnement, de l’obligation touchant à la
liberté de navigation sur les cours d’eau internationaux, de l’obligation
concernant les droits et libertés fondamentaux de la personne humaine, de
l’obligation de ne pas utiliser des armes interdites, de l’obligation de ne pas
soumettre intentionnellement un groupe national à des conditions d’exis-
tence devant entraîner sa destruction physique».

La requête invoquait comme base de compétence de la Cour le paragraphe 2 de
l’article 36 du Statut de la Cour ainsi que l’article IX de la convention pour la
prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, adoptée par l’Assemblée géné-
rale des Nations Unies le 9 décembre 1948 (ci-après dénommée la «convention
sur le génocide»).
2. Le 29 avril 1999, immédiatement après le dépôt de sa requête, la Répu-
blique fédérale de Yougoslavie a en outre présenté une demande en indication
de mesures conservatoires fondée sur l’article 73 du Règlement de la Cour.

3. Le même jour, dans le cadre d’autres différends ayant leur origine dans les

81312 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

instituting proceedings and submitted requests for the indication of provisional
measures, in respect of other disputes arising out of the same facts, against the
Kingdom of Belgium, Canada, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of
Germany, the Italian Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portu-
guese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain and the United States of America.

4. Pursuant to Article 38, paragraph 4, and Article 73, paragraph 2, of the
Rules of Court, on 29 April 1999 the Registrar transmitted signed copies of the
Application and the request to the Government of the United Kingdom.
5. In accordance with Article 43 of the Rules of Court, the Registrar sent the
notification referred to in Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court,
to all States appearing on the list of parties to the Genocide Convention held
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as depositary; the Registrar
also sent to the Secretary-General the notifications respectively provided for in
Article 34, paragraph 3, and Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the
Court.
6. Since the Court included upon the Bench no judge of Yugoslav national-
ity, the Yugoslav Government exercised its right under Article 31 of the Statute

and chose Mr. Milenko Krec ´a to sit as judge ad hoc in the case.

7. By Orders of 2 June 1999 the Court, after hearing the Parties, rejected the
requests for the indication of provisional measures submitted in the present
case by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 29 April 1999. By Orders of the
same date, the Court, after hearing the Parties, also rejected the requests for the
indication of provisional measures in the nine other cases referred to in para-
graph 3 and decided to remove from the List the cases against Spain and the
United States of America.
8. By Order of 30 June 1999 the Court fixed 5 January 2000 as the time-limit
for the filing of a Memorial by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
5 July 2000 as the time-limit for the filing of a Counter-Memorial by the United
Kingdom. On 4 January 2000, within the prescribed time-limit, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia duly filed its Memorial, dated 5 January 2000, explain-

ing that it had prepared a single Memorial covering this case and the seven
other pending cases concerning Legality of Use of Force.

9. On 4 July 2000, within the time-limit fixed for the filing of its Counter-
Memorial, the United Kingdom, referring to Article 79, paragraph 1, of the
Rules, submitted preliminary objections relating to the Court’s jurisdiction to
entertain the case and to the admissibility of the Application. Accordingly, by
Order of 8 September 2000, the Vice-President of the Court, Acting President,
noted that by virtue of Article 79, paragraph 3, of the Rules, the proceedings
on the merits were suspended, and fixed 5 April 2001 as the time-limit within
which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia might present a written statement of
its observations and submissions on the preliminary objections made by the
United Kingdom.

10. By letter of 18 January 2001 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia, referring inter alia to certain diplomatic initia-
tives, requested the Court, for reasons stated in that letter, to grant a stay of the
proceedings or to extend by 12 months the time-limit for the submission of
observations by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the preliminary objec-
tions raised by the United Kingdom. By letter of 26 January 2001 the Agent of

9 LICÉITÉ DE L ’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1312

mêmes faits, la République fédérale de Yougoslavie a déposé des requêtes
introductives d’instance contre la République fédérale d’Allemagne, le Canada,

le Royaume d’Espagne, les Etats-Unis d’Amérique, la République française, la
République italienne, le Royaume de Belgique, le Royaume des Pays-Bas et la
République portugaise, ainsi que des demandes en indication de mesures conser-
vatoires.
4. Conformément au paragraphe 4 de l’article 38 et au paragraphe 2 de
l’article 73 du Règlement de la Cour, le 29 avril 1999, le greffier a fait tenir au
Gouvernement britannique des copies signées de la requête et de la demande.
5. Conformément à l’article 43 du Règlement de la Cour, le greffier a adressé
la notification prévue au paragraphe 1 de l’article 63 du Statut de la Cour à
tous les Etats figurant sur la liste des parties à la convention sur le génocide
telle que tenue par le Secrétaire général de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en
tant que dépositaire; le greffier a en outre adressé au Secrétaire général les noti-

fications prévues respectivement au paragraphe 3 de l’article 34 et au para-
graphe 3 de l’article 40 du Statut de la Cour.
6. La Cour ne comptant pas sur le siège de juge de nationalité yougoslave, le
Gouvernement yougoslave s’est prévalu du droit que lui confère l’article 31 du
Statut de la Cour et a désigné M. Milenko Krec ´a pour siéger en qualité de juge
ad hoc en l’affaire.
7. Par ordonnance du 2 juin 1999, la Cour, après avoir entendu les Parties, a
rejeté la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires présentée en l’affaire
par la République fédérale de Yougoslavie le 29 avril 1999. Par ordonnances
datées du même jour, la Cour, après avoir entendu les Parties, a également
rejeté les demandes en indication de mesures conservatoires présentées dans les

neuf autres affaires évoquées au paragraphe 3 et décidé de rayer du rôle les
affaires introduites contre l’Espagne et les Etats-Unis d’Amérique.
8. Par ordonnance du 30 juin 1999, la Cour a fixé au 5 janvier 2000 la date
d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt du mémoire de la République fédérale de
Yougoslavie et au 5 juillet 2000 la date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt du
contre-mémoire du Royaume-Uni. Le 4 janvier 2000, dans le délai qui lui avait
été prescrit, la République fédérale de Yougoslavie a dûment déposé son
mémoire, daté du 5 janvier 2000, en expliquant qu’elle avait élaboré une pièce
unique couvrant cette affaire et les sept autres affaires pendantes relatives à la
Licéité de l’emploi de la force .
9. Le 4 juillet 2000, dans le délai fixé pour le dépôt de son contre-mémoire, le
Royaume-Uni, se référant au paragraphe 1 de l’article 79 du Règlement, a pré-

senté des exceptions préliminaires portant sur la compétence de la Cour pour
connaître de l’affaire et sur la recevabilité de la requête. En conséquence, par
ordonnance du 8 septembre 2000, le vice-président de la Cour, faisant fonction
de président en l’affaire, a constaté que, en vertu des dispositions du para-
graphe 3 de l’article 79 du Règlement, la procédure sur le fond était suspendue
et a fixé au 5 avril 2001 la date d’expiration du délai dans lequel la Répu-
blique fédérale de Yougoslavie pourrait présenter un exposé écrit contenant ses
observations et conclusions sur les exceptions préliminaires soulevées par le
Royaume-Uni.
10. Par lettre du 18 janvier 2001, le ministre des affaires étrangères de la
République fédérale de Yougoslavie, se référant notamment à certaines initia-

tives diplomatiques, a prié la Cour, pour les raisons exposées dans ladite lettre,
de suspendre la procédure ou de reporter de douze mois la date d’expiration du
délai fixé pour la présentation par la République fédérale de Yougoslavie de ses
observations sur les exceptions préliminaires soulevées par le Royaume-Uni.

91313 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

the United Kingdom informed the Court that his Government was not opposed
to the request by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

By Order of 21 February 2001 the Court extended to 5 April 2002 the time-
limit within which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia might present a written

statement of its observations and submissions on the preliminary objections
made by the United Kingdom.
11. By letter of 8 February 2002 the Agent of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia, referring to “dramatic” and “ongoing” changes in Yugoslavia which had
“put the [case]...ina quite different perspective”, as well as to the decision to
be taken by the Court in another case involving Yugoslavia, requested the
Court, for reasons stated in that letter, to stay the proceedings or to extend for
a further period of 12 months the time-limit for the submission by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia of its observations on the preliminary objections raised
by the United Kingdom. By letter of 22 February 2002 the Agent of the United
Kingdom informed the Court that his Government was not opposed to the
request by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

By Order of 20 March 2002 the Court extended to 7 April 2003 the time-limit
within which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia might present a written state-
ment of its observations and submissions on the preliminary objections made
by the United Kingdom.
12. On 20 December 2002, within the time-limit as thus extended, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia filed a written statement of its observations and submis-
sions on the preliminary objections in the present case (hereinafter referred to as
its “Observations”) and filed an identical written statement in the seven other
pending cases. By letter of 17 January 2003 the Agent of the United Kingdom
presented certain comments of his Government on those Observations
13. By letter of 5 February 2003 the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia to the Netherlands informed the Court that, following the adoption
and promulgation of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro by
the Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 4 February 2003, the

name of the State of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been changed to
“Serbia and Montenegro”. By letter of 28 February 2003 the Agent of Serbia and
Montenegro presented his Government’s comments in response to the above-
mentioned letter from the Agent of the United Kingdom of 17 January 2003.
14. Pursuant to Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Statute, on 25 November 2003
Judge Simma informed the President that he considered that he should not take
part in the decision in the cases concerningLegality of Use of Force.
15. At a meeting held by the President of the Court on 12 December 2003
with the representatives of the Parties in the cases concerning Legality of Use of
Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium) (Serbia and Montenegro v. Canada)
(Serbia and Montenegro v. France) (Serbia and Montenegro v. Germany)
(Serbia and Montenegro v. Italy) (Serbia and Montenegro v. Netherlands)
(Serbia and Montenegro v. Portugal) (Serbia and Montenegro v. United King-

dom) in order to ascertain their views with regard to questions of procedure,
the representatives of the Parties were invited to submit to the Court any obser-
vations which their Governments might wish to make, in particular on the fol-
lowing questions: organization of the oral proceedings; presence on the Bench
of judges ad hoc during the preliminary objections phase; possible joinder of
the proceedings (General List Nos. 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111 and 113).
In reply to the questions put by the President of the Court, the Agent of the

10 LICÉITÉ DE L ’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1313

Par lettre du 26 janvier 2001, l’agent du Royaume-Uni a informé la Cour que
son gouvernement ne s’opposait pas à la demande de la République fédérale de

Yougoslavie.
Par ordonnance du 21 février 2001, la Cour a reporté au 5 avril 2002 la date
d’expiration du délai dans lequel la République fédérale de Yougoslavie pour-
rait présenter un exposé écrit contenant ses observations et conclusions sur les
exceptions préliminaires soulevées par le Royaume-Uni.
11. Par lettre du 8 février 2002, l’agent de la République fédérale de You-
goslavie, invoquant des changements «profonds» et «encore en cours» en
Yougoslavie qui auraient «placé [l’affaire] dans une tout autre perspective»,
ainsi que la décision que devait encore rendre la Cour en une autre affaire à
laquelle la Yougoslavie était également partie, a prié la Cour, pour les raisons
exposées dans ladite lettre, de suspendre la procédure ou de reporter pour une
nouvelle période de douze mois la date d’expiration du délai fixé pour la pré-

sentation par la République fédérale de Yougoslavie de ses observations sur les
exceptions préliminaires soulevées par le Royaume-Uni. Par lettre du
22 février 2002, l’agent du Royaume-Uni a informé la Cour que son gouverne-
ment ne s’opposait pas à la demande de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie.
Par ordonnance du 20 mars 2002, la Cour a reporté au 7 avril 2003 la date
d’expiration du délai dans lequel la République fédérale de Yougoslavie pour-
rait présenter un exposé écrit contenant ses observations et conclusions sur les
exceptions préliminaires soulevées par le Royaume-Uni.
12. Le 20 décembre 2002, dans le délai ainsi prorogé, la République fédérale
de Yougoslavie a déposé l’exposé écrit de ses observations et conclusions sur les
exceptions préliminaires soulevées en l’espèce (ci-après dénommées les «obser-

vations»), ainsi qu’un exposé écrit identique dans les sept autres affaires pen-
dantes. Par lettre du 17 janvier 2003, l’agent du Royaume-Uni a présenté cer-
tains commentaires de son gouvernement sur ces observations.
13. Par lettre du 5 février 2003, l’ambassadeur de la République fédérale de
Yougoslavie aux Pays-Bas a informé la Cour que, à la suite de l’adoption et de
la promulgation par l’Assemblée de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie, le
4 février 2003, de la charte constitutionnelle de la Serbie-et-Monténégro, le
nom de l’Etat de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie était désormais «Ser-
bie-et-Monténégro». Par lettre du 28 février 2003, l’agent de la Serbie-et-Mon-
ténégro a présenté les observations de son gouvernement sur la lettre précitée
de l’agent du Royaume-Uni, en date du 17 janvier 2003.
14. Conformément au paragraphe 1 de l’article 24 du Statut, le 25 novembre

2003, le juge Simma a informé le président qu’il estimait ne pas devoir partici-
per au jugement des affaires relatives à la Licéité de l’emploi de la force .
15. Au cours d’une réunion que le président de la Cour a tenue le 12 décembre
2003 avec les représentants des Parties dans les affaires relatives à la Licéité de
l’emploi de la force (Serbie-et-Monténégro c. Allemagne) (Serbie-et-Monténé-
gro c. Belgique) (Serbie-et-Monténégro c. Canada) (Serbie-et-Monténégro
c. France) (Serbie-et-Monténégro c. Italie) (Serbie-et-Monténégro c. Pays-
Bas) (Serbie-et-Monténégro c. Portugal) (Serbie-et-Monténégro c. Royaume-
Uni) afin de se renseigner sur leurs vues concernant les questions de procédure,
les représentants des Parties ont été invités à soumettre à la Cour toutes obser-
vations que leurs gouvernements souhaiteraient formuler, en particulier sur les

questions suivantes: l’organisation de la procédure orale; la présence sur le
siège de juges ad hoc dans la phase de la procédure relative auxosxceptions pré-
liminaires; et l’éventuelle jonction des instances (rôle général n 105, 106, 107,
108, 109, 110, 111 et 113). En réponse aux questions posées par le président de

101314 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

United Kingdom cited his Government’s need to produce new documents, in
view of important developments in the case since the filing of its preliminary
objections, and stated that the United Kingdom was opposed to the proceed-
ings being joined. The Agent of Serbia and Montenegro responded that his
Government also considered that it needed to produce new documents. As

regards the nomination of judges ad hoc by those respondent States not having
a judge of their nationality upon the Bench, the Agent of Serbia and Monte-
negro explained that his Government no longer maintained its objection; the
Agent further indicated that his Government was in favour of a joinder of all
the proceedings in accordance with Article 47 of the Rules of Court. By letter
of 18 December 2003 the Agent of Serbia and Montenegro confirmed the views
thus expressed at the meeting of 12 December 2003.

16. By letter of 23 December 2003 the Registrar informed all the Parties to
the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force of the Court’s decisions on the
issues discussed at the meeting of 12 December 2003. The Agents were informed
that the Court had decided, pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 5, of the Statute,

that, taking into account the presence upon the Bench of judges of British,
Dutch and French nationality, the judges ad hoc chosen by the respondent
States should not sit during the current phase of the procedure in these cases;
it was made clear to the Agents that this decision by the Court did not in any
way prejudice the question whether, if the Court should reject the preliminary
objections of the Respondents, judges ad hoc might sit in subsequent stages of
the cases. The Agents were also informed that the Court had decided that a
joinder of the proceedings would not be appropriate at that stage. Finally, the
Agents were informed that the Court had fixed 27 February 2004 as the time-
limit for the filing of any new documents, and that such documents, which
should only relate to jurisdiction and to admissibility, would be dealt with as
provided for in Article 56 of the Rules of Court.

17. By a joint letter of 27 February 2004 the Agents of the respondent States

in the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force indicated that their Govern-
ments wished to produce new documents pursuant to Article 56 of the Rules.
In the absence of any objection by Serbia and Montenegro, to which the docu-
ments had been communicated in accordance with paragraph 1 of that Article,
the Court decided that they would be added to the file of each case.

18. Pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of its Rules, the Court, having con-
sulted the Parties, decided that copies of the pleadings and documents annexed
would be made accessible to the public on the opening of the oral proceedings.

19. Public sittings were held between 19 and 23 April 2004, at which the
Court heard the oral arguments and replies of:

For Serbia and Montenegro: Mr. Tibor Varady,
Mr. Ian Brownlie,
Mr. Vladimir Djeric ´.

For the United Kingdom: Sir Michael Wood,
Mr. Christopher Greenwood.

*

11 LICÉITÉ DE L EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1314

la Cour, l’agent du Royaume-Uni a évoqué la nécessité pour son gouvernement
de produire en l’espèce des documents nouveaux, compte tenu des importants

développements qu’aurait connus l’affaire depuis le dépôt des exceptions préli-
minaires, et a fait connaître l’objection du Royaume-Uni à la jonction des ins-
tances. Pour sa part, l’agent de la Serbie-et-Monténégro a déclaré que son
gouvernement estimait se trouver également dans la nécessité de produire des
documents nouveaux. En ce qui concerne la désignation de juges ad hoc par les
Etats défendeurs ne comptant pas sur le siège de juge de leur nationalité, l’agent
de la Serbie-et-Monténégro a fait savoir que son gouvernement ne maintenait
plus son objection; il a indiqué par ailleurs que son gouvernement était en
faveur d’une jonction de toutes les instances conformément à l’article 47 du
Règlement de la Cour. Par lettre du 18 décembre 2003, l’agent de la Serbie-et-
Monténégro a confirmé les vues ainsi exprimées au cours de la réunion du
12 décembre 2003.

16. Par lettre du 23 décembre 2003, le greffier a porté à la connaissance de
toutes les Parties aux affaires relatives à la Licéité de l’emploi de la force les
décisions de la Cour sur les questions soulevées lors de la réunion du 12 dé-
cembre 2003. Les agents ont été informés que la Cour avait décidé, en applica-
tion du paragraphe 5 de l’article 31 du Statut, que, compte tenu de la présence sur
le siège de juges de nationalité britannique, française et néerlandaise, les juges
ad hoc désignés par les Etats défendeurs ne devraient pas siéger dans la phase
en cours de ces affaires; il leur a été précisé que cette décision de la Cour était
sans préjudice de la question de savoir si, dans l’hypothèse où elle rejetterait les
exceptions des défendeurs, des juges ad hoc pourraient siéger lors de phases
ultérieures desdites affaires. Les agents ont également été avisés que la Cour

n’avait pas jugé opportun de joindre les instances au stade considéré. Enfin, il
leur a été indiqué que la Cour avait fixé au 27 février 2004 la date d’expiration
du délai pour le dépôt de tout document nouveau, étant entendu que de tels
documents, qui devraient se rapporter uniquement aux questions de compé-
tence et de recevabilité, seraient traités selon la procédure prévue à l’article 56
du Règlement.
17. Par lettre conjointe datée du 27 février 2004, les agents des Etats défen-
deurs dans les affaires relatives à la Licéité de l’emploi de la force ont indiqué
que leurs gouvernements souhaitaient produire des documents nouveaux en
vertu des dispositions de l’article 56 du Règlement. En l’absence d’objection de
la Serbie-et-Monténégro, à qui les documents avaient été communiqués en
application des dispositions du paragraphe 1 dudit article, la Cour a décidé que

ceux-ci seraient versés au dossier de chacune des affaires.
18. Conformément au paragraphe 2 de l’article 53 du Règlement, la Cour,
après s’être renseignée auprès des Parties, a décidé de rendre accessibles au
public, à l’ouverture de la procédure orale, les pièces de procédure et docu-
ments y annexés.
19. Des audiences publiques ont été tenues entre le 19 et le 23 avril 2004, au
cours desquelles ont été entendus en leurs plaidoiries et réponses:

Pour la Serbie-et-Monténégro: M. Tibor Varady,
M. Ian Brownlie,
M. Vladimir Djeric ´.
Pour le Royaume-Uni: Sir Michael Wood,

M. Christopher Greenwood.

*

111315 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

20. In the Application, the claims of Serbia and Montenegro were formu-
lated as follows:

“The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests the
International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:

— by taking part in the bombing of the territory of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom has acted against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to use force
against another State;

— by taking part in the training, arming, financing, equipping and sup-
plying terrorist groups, i.e. the so-called ‘Kosovo Liberation Army’,
the United Kingdom has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in breach of its obligation not to intervene in the affairs of
another State;

— by taking part in attacks on civilian targets, the United Kingdom has
acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its

obligation to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian
objects;

— by taking part in destroying or damaging monasteries, monuments of
culture, the United Kingdom has acted against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to commit any act of hos-
tility directed against historical monuments, works of art or places of
worship which constitute cultural or spiritual heritage of people;

— by taking part in the use of cluster bombs, the United Kingdom has
acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obli-
gation not to use prohibited weapons, i.e. weapons calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering;

— by taking part in the bombing of oil refineries and chemical plants, the
United Kingdom has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in breach of its obligation not to cause considerable environmental
damage;

— by taking part in the use of weapons containing depleted uranium, the
United Kingdom has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in breach of its obligation not to use prohibited weapons and not to
cause far-reaching health and environmental damage;

— by taking part in killing civilians, destroying enterprises, communica-
tions, health and cultural institutions, the United Kingdom has acted

against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation
to respect the right to life, the right to work, the right to information,
the right to health care as well as other basic human rights;

— by taking part in destroying bridges on international rivers, the United
Kingdom has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in

12 LICÉITÉ DE L ’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1315

20. Dans la requête, les demandes ci-après ont été formulées par la Serbie-
et-Monténégro:

«Le Gouvernement de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie prie la
Cour internationale de dire et juger:

— qu’en prenant part aux bombardements du territoire de la République
fédérale de Yougoslavie, le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et
d’Irlande du Nord a agi contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie
en violation de son obligation de ne pas recourir à l’emploi de la force
contre un autre Etat;
— qu’en prenant part à l’entraînement, à l’armement, au financement, à
l’équipement et à l’approvisionnement de groupes terroristes, à savoir
la prétendue «armée de libération du Kosovo», le Royaume-Uni de
Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord a agi contre la République

fédérale de Yougoslavie en violation de son obligation de ne pas
s’immiscer dans les affaires d’un autre Etat;
— qu’en prenant part à des attaques contre des cibles civiles, le
Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord a agi
contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie en violation de son
obligation d’épargner la population civile, les civils et les biens de
caractère civil;
— qu’en prenant part à la destruction ou à l’endommagement de monas-
tères, d’édifices culturels, le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et
d’Irlande du Nord a agi contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie
en violation de son obligation de ne pas commettre d’actes d’hostilité

dirigés contre des monuments historiques, des Œuvres d’art ou des
lieux de culte constituant le patrimoine culturel ou spirituel d’un
peuple;
— qu’en prenant part à l’utilisation de bombes en grappe, le Royaume-
Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord a agi contre la Répu-
blique fédérale de Yougoslavie en violation de son obligation de ne pas
utiliser des armes interdites, c’est-à-dire des armes de nature à causer
des maux superflus;
— qu’en prenant part aux bombardements de raffineries de pétrole et
d’usines chimiques, le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande
du Nord a agi contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie en viola-
tion de son obligation de ne pas causer de dommages substantiels à

l’environnement;
— qu’en recourant à l’utilisation d’armes contenant de l’uranium appau-
vri, le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord a agi
contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie en violation de son obli-
gation de ne pas utiliser des armes interdites et de ne pas causer de
dommages de grande ampleur à la santé et à l’environnement;
— qu’en prenant part au meurtre de civils, à la destruction d’entreprises,
de moyens de communication et de structures sanitaires et culturelles,
le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord a agi
contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie en violation de son obli-
gation de respecter le droit à la vie, le droit au travail, le droit à l’infor-

mation, le droit aux soins de santé ainsi que d’autres droits fondamen-
taux de la personne humaine;
— qu’en prenant part à la destruction de ponts situés sur des cours d’eau
internationaux, le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du

121316 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

breach of its obligation to respect freedom of navigation on interna-
tional rivers;

— by taking part in activities listed above, and in particular by causing
enormous environmental damage and by using depleted uranium, the

United Kingdom has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in breach of its obligation not to deliberately inflict on a national
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruc-
tion, in whole or in part;

— the United Kingdom is responsible for the violation of the above inter-
national obligations;

— the United Kingdom is obliged to stop immediately the violation of the
above obligations vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

— the United Kingdom is obliged to provide compensation for the dam-
age done to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to its citizens and

juridical persons.
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia reserves the right to submit subse-
quently accurate evaluation of the damage.”

21. In the course of the written proceedings, the following submissions were
presented by the Parties:

On behalf of the Government of Serbia and Montenegro,
in the Memorial:

“The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests the
International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare:
— by the bombing of the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
the Respondent has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

in breach of its obligation not to use force against another State;

— by using force against the Yugoslav army and police during their
actions against terrorist groups, i.e. the so-called ‘Kosovo Liberation
Army’, the Respondent has acted against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to intervene in the affairs of
another State;
— by attacks on civilian targets, and by inflicting damage, injuries and
losses to civilians and civilian objects, the Respondent has acted against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation to spare
the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects;

— by destroying or damaging monasteries, monuments of culture, the

Respondent has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in
breach of its obligation not to commit any act of hostility directed
against historical monuments, works of art or places of worship which
constitute cultural or spiritual heritage of people;

— by the use of cluster bombs, the Respondent has acted against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation not to use

13 LICÉITÉ DE L ’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE ARRÊT ) 1316

Nord a agi contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie en violation
de son obligation de respecter la liberté de navigation sur les cours

d’eau internationaux;
— qu’en prenant part aux activités énumérées ci-dessus et en particulier
en causant des dommages énormes à l’environnement et en utilisant de
l’uranium appauvri, le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande
du Nord a agi contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie en viola-
tion de son obligation de ne pas soumettre intentionnellement un
groupe national à des conditions d’existence devant entraîner sa des-
truction physique totale ou partielle;
— que le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord porte
la responsabilité de la violation des obligations internationales susmen-
tionnées;
— que le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord est

tenu de mettre fin immédiatement à la violation des obligations sus-
mentionnées à l’égard de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie;
— que le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord doit
réparation pour les préjudices causés à la République fédérale de You-
goslavie ainsi qu’à ses citoyens et personnes morales.
La République de Yougoslavie se réserve le droit de présenter ultérieu-

rement une évaluation précise des préjudices.»
21. Dans la procédure écrite, les conclusions ci-après ont été présentées par
les Parties:

Au nom du Gouvernement de la Serbie-et-Monténégro,

dans le mémoire:
«Le Gouvernement de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie demande
à la Cour internationale de Justice de dire et juger:

— qu’en bombardant le territoire de la République fédérale de Yougo-
slavie, le défendeur a agi contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie
en violation de son obligation de ne pas recourir à l’emploi de la force
contre un autre Etat;
— qu’en employant la force contre l’armée et la police yougoslaves alors
que celles-ci menaient des actions contre des groupes terroristes, à
savoir la prétendue «armée de libération du Kosovo», le défendeur a

agi contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie en violation de son
obligation de ne pas s’immiscer dans les affaires d’un autre Etat;
— qu’en attaquant des cibles civiles et en infligeant des dommages, des
préjudices et des pertes à des civils et à des biens de caractère civil, le
défendeur a agi contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie en viola-
tion de son obligation d’épargner la population civile, les civils et les
biens de caractère civil;
— qu’en détruisant ou en endommageant des monastères, des édifices
culturels, le défendeur a agi contre la République fédérale de Yougo-
slavie en violation de son obligation de ne pas commettre d’actes
hostiles dirigés contre des monuments historiques, des Œuvres d’art

ou des lieux de culte constituant le patrimoine culturel ou spirituel
d’un peuple;
— qu’en utilisant des bombes en grappe, le défendeur a agi contre la
République fédérale de Yougoslavie en violation de son obligation de

131317 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

prohibited weapons, i.e. weapons calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering;
— by the bombing of oil refineries and chemical plants, the Respondent
has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its
obligation not to cause considerable environmental damage;

— by the use of weapons containing depleted uranium, the Respondent
has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its
obligation not to use prohibited weapons and not to cause far-reaching
health and environmental damage;
— by killing civilians, destroying enterprises, communications, health and
cultural institutions, the Respondent has acted against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obligation to respect the right
to life, the right to work, the right to information, the right to health
care as well as other basic human rights;

— by destroying bridges on international rivers, the Respondent has
acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its obli-

gation to respect State sovereignty;
— by activities listed above, and in particular by causing enormous envi-
ronmental damage and by using depleted uranium, the Respondent
has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of its
obligation not to deliberately inflict on a national group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction, in whole or in
part;
— by failures to prevent killing, wounding and ethnic cleansing of Serbs
and other non-Albanian groups in Kosovo and Metohija, the Respon-
dent has acted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in breach of
its obligations to ensure public safety and order in Kosovo and Meto-
hija and to prevent genocide and other acts enumerated in Article III
of the Genocide Convention;

— the Respondent is responsible for the violation of the above interna-
tional obligations;
— the Respondent is obliged to stop immediately the violation of the
above obligations vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

— the Respondent is obliged to provide compensation for the damages,
injuries and losses done to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to
its citizens and juridical persons.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests the
International Court of Justice to settle the form and amount of the repara-
tion, failing agreement between the Parties and to reserve, for this purpose,
the subsequent procedure in this case.”
On behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom,

in the Preliminary Objections:
“For the reasons advanced above, the United Kingdom requests the

Court to adjudge and declare that:
— it lacks jurisdiction over the claims brought against the United King-
dom by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; and/or

14 LICÉITÉ DE L EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1317

ne pas utiliser des armes interdites, c’est-à-dire des armes de nature à
causer des maux superflus;

— qu’en bombardant des raffineries de pétrole et des usines chimiques, le
défendeur a agi contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie en viola-
tion de son obligation de ne pas causer de dommages substantiels à
l’environnement;
— qu’en utilisant des armes contenant de l’uranium appauvri, le défendeur
a agi contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie en violation de son
obligation de ne pas utiliser des armes interdites et de ne pas causer des
dommages de grande ampleur à la santé et à l’environnement;
— qu’en tuant des civils ainsi qu’en détruisant des entreprises, des moyens
de communication et des structures sanitaires et culturelles, le défen-
deur a agi contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie en violation
de son obligation de respecter le droit à la vie, le droit au travail, le

droit à l’information, le droit aux soins de santé ainsi que d’autres
droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine;
— qu’en détruisant des ponts situés sur des cours d’eau internationaux, le
défendeur a agi contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie en viola-
tion de son obligation de respecter la souveraineté des Etats;
— qu’en prenant part aux activités énumérées ci-dessus, et en particulier
en causant des dommages énormes à l’environnement et en utilisant de
l’uranium appauvri, le défendeur a agi contre la République fédérale
de Yougoslavie en violation de son obligation de ne pas soumettre
intentionnellement un groupe national à des conditions d’existence
devant entraîner sa destruction physique totale ou partielle;

— qu’en s’abstenant d’empêcher les meurtres, les coups et blessures ou
l’épuration ethnique dont furent victimes les Serbes et d’autres groupes
non albanais au Kosovo-Metohija, le défendeur a agi contre la Répu-
blique fédérale de Yougoslavie en violation de son obligation d’assurer
l’ordre et la sécurité publics dans cette province, ainsi que d’empêcher
le génocide et les autres actes énumérés à l’article III de la convention
sur le génocide;
— que le défendeur est responsable de la violation des obligations inter-
nationales susmentionnées;
— que le défendeur est tenu de mettre fin immédiatement à la violation
des obligations susmentionnées à l’égard de la République fédérale de
Yougoslavie;

— que le défendeur doit réparation pour les dommages, préjudices et
pertes causés à la République fédérale de Yougoslavie ainsi qu’à
ses citoyens et personnes morales.
Le Gouvernement de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie demande à
la Cour internationale de Justice de définir la forme et le montant de la
réparation pour le cas où les Parties ne pourraient se mettre d’accord à ce
sujet et réserve à cet effet la suite de la procédure.»

Au nom du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni,

dans les exceptions préliminaires:
«Pour les motifs exposés ci-dessus, le Royaume-Uni prie la Cour de dire
et juger que:

— la Cour n’a pas compétence pour connaître des demandes formées contre
le Royaume-Uni par la République fédérale de Yougoslavie; ou bien que

141318 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

— the claims brought against the United Kingdom by the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia are inadmissible.”

On behalf of the Government of Serbia and Montenegro,
in its written statement of 20 December 2002 containing its observations and
submissions on the preliminary objections presented by the United Kingdom:

“The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests the Court to decide on its
jurisdiction considering the pleadings formulated in these Written Obser-
vations.”

22. At the oral proceedings, the following submissions were presented by the
Parties:

On behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom,
at the hearing of 22 April 2004:

“For the reasons given in our written Preliminary Objections and at the
oral hearing, the United Kingdom requests the Court:
— to remove the case from its List, or, in the alternative,
— to adjudge and declare that:
— it lacks jurisdiction over the claims brought against the United King-
dom by Serbia and Montenegro,

and/or
— the claims brought against the United Kingdom by Serbia and Mon-
tenegro are inadmissible.”

On behalf of the Government of Serbia and Montenegro,
at the hearing of 23 April 2004:

“For the reasons given in its pleadings, and in particular in its Written
Observations, subsequent correspondence with the Court, and at the oral
hearing, Serbia and Montenegro requests the Court:

— to adjudge and declare on its jurisdiction ratione personae in the
present cases; and
— to dismiss the remaining preliminary objections of the respondent
States, and to order proceedings on the merits if it finds it has jurisdic-
tion ratione personae.”

*
* *
23. The official title of the Applicant in these proceedings has changed
during the period of time relevant to the present proceedings. On

27 April 1992, the Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia adopted and promulgated the Constitution of “the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia”. The State so named claimed to be the continuation of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and as such to be entitled
to continued membership in the United Nations. Inasmuch as this latter

claim was not recognized by, inter alia, the Security Council and the
General Assembly of the United Nations, these bodies initially referred
to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as “the Federal Republic of Yugo-

15 LICÉITÉ DE L EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1318

— les demandes formées contre le Royaume-Uni par la République fédé-
rale de Yougoslavie sont irrecevables.»

Au nom du Gouvernement de la Serbie-et-Monténégro,

dans son exposé écrit daté du 20 décembre 2002, contenant ses observations sur
les exceptions préliminaires présentées par le Royaume-Uni:
«La République fédérale de Yougoslavie prie la Cour de statuer sur sa
compétence à la lumière de l’argumentation exposée dans les présentes
observations écrites.»

22. Dans la procédure orale, les conclusions ci-après ont été présentées par
les Parties:

Au nom du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni,
à l’audience du 22 avril 2004:

«Pour les motifs exposés dans nos exceptions préliminaires écrites ainsi
que dans la procédure orale, le Royaume-Uni prie la Cour:
— de rayer l’affaire de son rôle ou, subsidiairement,
— de dire et juger:

— qu’elle n’est pas compétente pour connaître des demandes présentées à
l’encontre du Royaume-Uni par la Serbie-et-Monténégro,
et/ou

— que les demandes présentées à l’encontre du Royaume-Uni par la
Serbie-et-Monténégro sont irrecevables.»

Au nom du Gouvernement de la Serbie-et-Monténégro,
à l’audience du 23 avril 2004:

«Pour les motifs exposés dans ses pièces de procédure écrite, en parti-
culier dans ses observations écrites, dans la correspondance subséquente
avec la Cour, et au cours de la procédure orale, la Serbie-et-Monténégro
prie la Cour:
— de statuer sur sa compétence ratione personae en les présentes affaires;
et
— d’écarter les autres exceptions préliminaires des Etats défendeurs et

d’ordonner une procédure sur le fond si elle estime qu’elle a compé-
tence ratione personae.»

* * *

23. L’appellation officielle du demandeur en la présente procédure a
changé au cours de la période pertinente à l’espèce. Le 27 avril 1992,
l’Assemblée de la République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie a

adopté et promulgué la Constitution de la «République fédérale de You-
goslavie». L’Etat ainsi dénommé a prétendu assurer la continuité de la
République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie et, à ce titre, la conti-
nuité de la qualité de Membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies. Cette
dernière prétention n’ayant pas été reconnue, notamment, par le Conseil

de sécurité et l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, ces organes ont,
dans un premier temps, désigné la République fédérale de Yougoslavie

151319 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

slavia (Serbia and Montenegro)”, and this term was also used in certain
previous decisions of the Court. On 1 November 2000 the Applicant was

admitted to membership in the United Nations under the name of “the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”; and on 4 February 2003, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia officially changed its name to “Serbia and Mon-
tenegro”. In the present judgment, the Applicant will be referred to so far
as possible as “Serbia and Montenegro”, even when reference is made to

a procedural step taken before the change of name; in some instances,
however, where the term in a historical context might cause confusion,
the title in use at the relevant time will be employed.

24. The Court must first deal with a preliminary question that has
been raised in each of the cases, including the present one, brought before
it by Serbia and Montenegro concerning Legality of Use of Force.Ithas
been argued by the Respondents in these cases that the Court could and
should reject the claims of Serbia and Montenegro in limine litis,b y
removing the cases from the List; by a “pre-preliminary” or summary

decision in each case finding that there is no subsisting dispute or that the
Court either has no jurisdiction or is not called upon to give a decision on
the claims; or by declining to exercise jurisdiction. Thus the contention
for rejecting the Application in limine litis has been presented in different
forms by the eight respondent States, and supported by various argu-

ments, in order to achieve the same conclusion that, as a result of the
changed attitude of the Applicant to the question of the Court’s jurisdic-
tion, expressed in its Observations (see paragraph 27 below), the Court is
no longer required to adjudge and declare whether or not those objec-
tions to jurisdiction are well founded, but can simply dismiss the case,

without enquiring further into matters of jurisdiction.

25. In addressing the question whether the case should be dismissed in
limine litis, the Court will consider the arguments put forward in this case
and any other legal issue which it deems relevant to consider with a view

to arriving at its conclusion on this point, including the issues raised in
the other cases referred to in paragraph 3 above.

26. In the original Applications instituting proceedings in this group
of cases, Serbia and Montenegro invoked as the title of jurisdiction of the
Court in each case Article IX of the Genocide Convention; in five cases,

including the present one, it invoked its own acceptance of the jurisdic-
tion of the Court under the optional clause of Article 36, paragraph 2, of
the Statute, together with that of the respondent State; and in two of the
cases, it also invoked a bilateral treaty between the respondent State con-
cerned and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The Applications of Serbia and

Montenegro of 29 April 1999 asserted, at least by implication, that the
Court was then open to Serbia and Montenegro, under Article 35, para-
graph 1, of the Court’s Statute, on the basis that it was a Member of the

16 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE ARRÊT ) 1319

par l’appellation «République fédérale de Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monté-

négro)», qui a été eralement utilisée dans certaines décisions précédentes
de la Cour. Le 1 novembre 2000, le demandeur a été admis comme
Membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies sous le nom de «Répu-
blique fédérale de Yougoslavie»; le 4 février 2003, la République fédérale
de Yougoslavie a changé officiellement de nom pour prendre celui de

«Serbie-et-Monténégro». Dans le présent arrêt, le demandeur sera, dans
la mesure du possible, désigné sous le nom de «Serbie-et-Monténégro»,
même lorsqu’il est fait référence à un acte de procédure accompli avant le
changement de nom; dans certains cas, toutefois, lorsque cette appella-
tion risquerait de créer une confusion dans un contexte historique donné,

il sera fait usage du nom qui était employé à l’époque considérée.
24. La Cour doit tout d’abord examiner une question préliminaire qui
a été soulevée dans chacune des affaires, dont la présente, portées devant
elle par la Serbie-et-Monténégro et relatives à laLicéité de l’emploi de la

force. Les défendeurs en ces affaires ont soutenu que la Cour pouvait et
devait débouter la Serbie-et-Monténégro de ses demandesin limine litis et,
pour ce faire, rayer les affaires du rôle; rendre, dans chacune des affaires,
une décision «pré-préliminaire» ou sommaire concluant soit qu’il ne sub-
siste plus de différend entre les Parties, soit que la Cour n’a pas compé-

tence pour se prononcer sur les demandes ou n’est pas appelée à le faire;
ou encore se refuser à exercer sa compétence. Ainsi, la thèse selon laquelle
la requête devrait être rejetéein limine litis a été présentée sous différentes
formes par les huit Etats défendeurs, qui ont formulé divers arguments à
l’appui de la même conclusion, à savoir que, à la suite du changement

d’attitude du demandeur, exprimé dans ses observations (voir para-
graphe 27 ci-après), en ce qui concerne la compétence de la Cour, la
Cour n’est plus appelée à statuer sur le bien-fondé des exceptions prélimi-
naires à cette compétence, mais peut simplement se dessaisir de l’affaire,
sans aller plus avant dans l’examen des questions de compétence.

25. En examinant la question de savoir si l’affaire doit être rejetée in
limine litis, la Cour se penchera sur les arguments présentés en l’espèce et
sur toute autre question de droit qu’elle estimera pertinent d’examiner
en vue de parvenir à une conclusion sur ce point, y compris les ques-
tions soulevées dans les autres instances mentionnées au paragraphe 3

ci-dessus.
26. Dans les requêtes initiales introductives de cet ensemble d’ins-
tances, la Serbie-et-Monténégro a invoqué comme base de compétence de
la Cour dans chacune des affaires l’article IX de la convention sur le géno-
cide; dans cinq affaires, dont la présente, elle a invoqué à la fois sa

propre acceptation de la juridiction de la Cour au titre de la clause facul-
tative du paragraphe 2 de l’article 36 du Statut et celle de l’Etat défendeur;
dans deux affaires, elle a également invoqué un traité bilatéral entre l’Etat
défendeur concerné et le Royaume de Yougoslavie. Dans les requêtes de
la Serbie-et-Monténégro du 29 avril 1999, il a été affirmé, du moins impli-

citement, que la Cour était alors ouverte à la Serbie-et-Monténégro, aux
termes du paragraphe 1 de l’article 35 du Statut de la Cour, du fait qu’elle

161320 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

United Nations and thus a party to the Court’s Statute, by virtue of
Article 93, paragraph 1, of the Charter. Subsequently, this was in fact

expressly stated in the Memorial filed by Serbia and Montenegro.

27. However, in its Observations on the preliminary objections of
each of the respondent States, filed on 20 December 2002, Serbia and
Montenegro claimed that “the acceptance of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia as a new member of the United Nations on 1 November
2000” constituted a “new fact”; and on this basis it stated as follows:

“As the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia became a new member of
the United Nations on 1 November 2000, it follows that it was not a
member before that date. Accordingly, it became an established fact
that before 1 November 2000, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

was not and could not have been a party to the Statute of the Court
by way of UN membership.”

In addition, as regards the question of jurisdiction of the Court under the
Genocide Convention, Serbia and Montenegro in its Observations drew
attention to its own accession to that Convention in March 2001, and
stated that

“[t]he Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not continue the per-
sonality and treaty membership of the former Yugoslavia, and thus
specifically, it was not bound by the Genocide Convention until

it acceded to that Convention (with a reservation to Article IX) in
March 2001”.

In its submissions, however, Serbia and Montenegro did not ask the
Court to rule that it had no jurisdiction but only requested the Court “to
decide on its jurisdiction considering the pleadings in these Written
Observations” (emphasis added).

28. The question whether Serbia and Montenegro was or was not a
party to the Statute of the Court at the time of the institution of the
present proceedings is a fundamental one (see paragraph 44 below).
However, at this initial stage of its judgment, it is necessary for the Court
to decide first on a preliminary question raised by the Respondents,

namely whether in the light of the assertions by the Applicant quoted
above coupled with the contentions of each of the respondent States, the
Court should take a decision to dismiss the case in limine litis, without
further entering into the examination of the question whether the Court
has jurisdiction under the circumstances.

29. A number of arguments have been advanced by different Respon-
dents as possible legal grounds that would lead the Court to take this
course. One argument advanced by some of the respondent States is that

17 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE ARRÊT ) 1320

était Membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et en conséquence par-
tie au Statut de la Cour en vertu du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 de la
Charte. Cette thèse a été par la suite expressément formulée par la Serbie-

et-Monténégro dans son mémoire.
27. Toutefois, dans ses observations sur les exceptions préliminaires de
chacun des Etats défendeurs, déposées le 20 décembre 2002, la Serbie-et-
Monténégro a soutenu que «l’admission de la République fédérale de
Yougoslavie en tant que nouveau Membre de l’Organisation des
er
Nations Unies le 1 novembre 2000» constituait un «fait nouveau»; sur
cette base, elle a affirmé ce qui suit:

«La République fédérale de Yougoslavie étant devenue nou-
vellement Membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies le 1 er no-
vembre 2000, il en découle qu’elle ne l’était pas avant cette date.
Il est donc maintenant établi que, avant le 1 novembre 2000, la Ré-

publique fédérale de Yougoslavie n’était pas et ne pouvait pas être
partie au Statut de la Cour en sa qualité de Membre de l’Organisa-
tion des Nations Unies.»

En outre, pour ce qui concerne la compétence de la Cour au regard de la
convention sur le génocide, la Serbie-et-Monténégro a appelé l’attention,
dans ses observations, sur son adhésion à ladite convention en mars 2001,

avant d’ajouter que

«[l]a République fédérale de Yougoslavie n’a[vait] pas assuré la
continuité de la personnalité juridique de l’ex-Yougoslavie ni de sa
qualité de partie à la convention avec pour conséquence, en particu-
lier, que la République fédérale de Yougoslavie n’était pas liée par la
convention sur le génocide avant d’y accéder (avec une réserve à

l’article IX) en mars 2001».
Dans ses conclusions, la Serbie-et-Monténégro n’a toutefois pas prié la

Cour de juger qu’elle n’avait pas compétence, mais lui a simplement
demandé de «statuer sur sa compétence à la lumière de l’argumentation
exposée dans les présentes observations écrites » (les italiques sont de la
Cour).

28. La question de savoir si la Serbie-et-Monténégro était ou non par-
tie au Statut de la Cour à l’époque de l’introduction des présentes ins-
tances est une question fondamentale (voir paragraphe 44 ci-après). Tou-
tefois, à ce stade initial de son arrêt, il est nécessaire pour la Cour de

trancher en premier lieu la question préliminaire, soulevée par les défen-
deurs, de savoir si, à la lumière des assertions précitées du demandeur et
des prétentions de chacun des Etats défendeurs, la Cour devrait décider
de rejeter l’affaire in limine litis, sans examiner plus avant si, dans les cir-
constances de l’espèce, elle a ou non compétence.

29. Un certain nombre d’arguments ont été avancés par différents
défendeurs comme moyens de droit susceptibles d’amener la Cour à sta-
tuer ainsi. Certains Etats défendeurs ont soutenu que la position de la

171321 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

the position of Serbia and Montenegro is to be treated as one that in
effect results in a discontinuance of the proceedings which it has insti-

tuted. Discontinuance of proceedings by the Applicant is provided for in
Article 89 of the Rules of Court, which contemplates the situation in
which “the applicant informs the Court in writing that it is not going on
with the proceedings . . .”. However, Serbia and Montenegro has expressly
denied that its Observations were a notice of discontinuance, and has

emphasized that it did not state that it was “not going on with the pro-
ceedings”, but rather that it was requesting the Court to decide on the
issue of jurisdiction. It has emphasized that it wants the Court to con-
tinue the case and to decide upon its jurisdiction, even though the deci-
sion that it seeks may result in a conclusion that there is no jurisdiction.

30. The role of the Court in a discontinuance procedure, whether by
agreement between the parties (Article 88 of the Rules of Court) or at the
initiative of the Applicant (Article 89) in the absence of any objection by
the Respondent, is “simply to record it and to remove the case from its
list” (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Prelimi-
nary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1964, p. 20). It may be true

that the logical consequence of the contention of Serbia and Montenegro
in its Observations could be that the case would go no further; but this
would be the result of the Court’s own finding and not the placing on
record of a withdrawal by Serbia and Montenegro of the dispute from
the Court’s purview. The Court is therefore unable to treat the Obser-

vations of Serbia and Montenegro as having the legal effect of a dis-
continuance of the proceedings instituted by that State.

31. The question has been raised whether there is a procedure open to
the Court itself, whereby the Court has ex officio the power to put an end

to a case whenever it sees that this is necessary from the viewpoint of the
proper administration of justice. Although the Rules of Court do not
provide for such a procedure, there is no doubt that in certain circum-
stances the Court may of its own motion put an end to proceedings in a
case. Prior to the adoption of Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of

Court, in a number of cases in which the application disclosed no sub-
sisting title of jurisdiction, but merely an invitation to the State named as
respondent to accept jurisdiction for the purposes of the case, the Court
removed the cases from the List by order. By Orders of 2 June 1999, it
removed from the List two cases brought by Serbia and Montenegro con-
cerning Legality of Use of Force against Spain and the United States of

America, on the ground that the Court “manifestly lack[ed] jurisdiction”
(I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II) , pp. 773-925). The present case does not how-
ever fall into either of these categories.

32. Another argument for the removal of the case from the List which

has been advanced in interpretation of the position of Serbia and Mon-
tenegro is that there is substantive agreement between the Parties on a
“question of jurisdiction that is determinative of the case”, and that as a

18 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1321

Serbie-et-Monténégro devait être considérée en fait comme un désiste-

ment dans les procédures introduites par elle. Un tel désistement par le
demandeur est prévu à l’article 89 du Règlement de la Cour, qui envisage
la situation dans laquelle «le demandeur fait connaître par écrit à la Cour
qu’il renonce à poursuivre la procédure...». Cependant, la Serbie-et-
Monténégro a expressément nié que ses observations fussent une notifica-

tion de désistement, et a insisté sur le fait qu’elle ne «renon[çait] pas à
poursuivre la procédure», mais demandait plutôt à la Cour de statuer sur
la question de la compétence. Elle a souligné qu’elle voulait que la Cour
poursuive l’affaire et se prononce sur cette question, dût-elle, dans la
décision sollicitée, conclure à un défaut de compétence.

30. Lors d’une procédure de désistement, que celle-ci résulte d’un
accord entre les parties (article 88 du Règlement) ou qu’elle intervienne à
l’initiative du demandeur (article 89) en l’absence de toute objection de la

part du défendeur, la tâche de la Cour est simplement «de prendre acte
du désistement et de radier l’affaire de son rôle» (Barcelona Traction,
Light and Power Company, Limited, exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1964, p. 20). Il se pourrait que la thèse défendue par la
Serbie-et-Monténégro dans ses observations ait pour conséquence lo-

gique l’arrêt des procédures; mais celui-ci interviendrait parce que la
Cour se serait prononcée elle-même, et non parce qu’elle aurait pris acte
du fait que la Serbie-et-Monténégro aurait soustrait les affaires à son
examen. La Cour n’est dès lors pas en mesure de considérer que les ob-
servations de la Serbie-et-Monténégro ont pour effet juridique un désis-

tement dans les procédures introduites par cet Etat.
31. La question a été posée de savoir s’il existerait une procédure
ouverte à la Cour elle-même, par laquelle celle-ci pourrait mettre d’office
un terme à une affaire dès lors qu’elle estimerait qu’une telle décision
s’impose pour une bonne administration de la justice. Si le Règlement de la

Cour ne prévoit pas pareille procédure, il ne fait aucun doute que, dans cer-
taines circonstances, celle-ci peut, de sa propre initiative, mettre un terme
à la procédure en une affaire donnée. Avant l’adoption du paragraphe 5
de l’article 38 dudit Règlement, dans un certain nombre d’affaires dans
lesquelles la requête n’indiquait aucun titre de compétence existant, mais

invitait simplement l’Etat désigné comme défendeur à accepter la compé-
tence de la Cour aux fins de l’espèce, la Cour, par voie d’ordonnance, a
rayé les affaires en question de son rôle. Par ordonnances du 2 juin
1999, elle a rayé du rôle deux affaires relatives à la Licéité de l’emploi
de la force, portées devant elle par la Serbie-et-Monténégro contre

l’Espagne et les Etats-Unis d’Amérique, au motif qu’elle «n’a[vait] mani-
festement pas compétence»C ( .I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 773 et 925). La pré-
sente espèce ne relève toutefois ni de l’une ni de l’autre de ces catégories.
32. Un autre argument — tiré de l’interprétation de la position de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro — en faveur de la radiation de l’affaire du rôle est

qu’il y aurait, en substance, accord entre les Parties sur une «question de
compétence qui est déterminante dans l’affaire» et que, dès lors, le diffé-

181322 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

result the dispute before the Court has disappeared. The Respondents
have noted that the Court is asked by Serbia and Montenegro to deter-

mine the question of jurisdiction raised in the preliminary objections of
the respondent States, in its exercise of the compétence de la compétence
reflected in Article 36, paragraph 6, of the Statute. They have however
claimed that, in accordance with the well-established jurisprudence of the
Court, “the Court is not compelled in every case to exercise [its] jurisdic-

tion” (Northern Cameroons, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963 , p. 29); and
that the Court has the power to decide to dispose of the case in limine
litis. After all, “[t]here are inherent limitations on the exercise of the judi-
cial function which the Court, as a court of justice, can never ignore”
(ibid.). It is emphasized in particular that “the Court can exercise its

jurisdiction in contentious proceedings only when a dispute genuinely
exists between the parties ”( Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judg-
ment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 , p. 271, para. 57; Nuclear Tests (New Zea-
land v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 , p. 477, para. 60; empha-
sis added).
33. In this argument before the Court, attention has been drawn to the

specific terms of the provision in Article 36, paragraph 6, of the Statute,
whereby “[i]n the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdic-
tion, the matter shall be settled by decision of the Court” (emphasis
added). It has thus been argued that it is common ground between the
Parties that the Applicant was not a party to the Statute at the time of

institution of the proceedings, and that there is therefore now no “dispute
as to whether the Court has jurisdiction”. On this basis, it has been
suggested that

“[f]or the Court to exercise jurisdiction on a basis which has been
abandoned by the Applicant and which was always denied by the
Respondent, would make a mockery of the principle that jurisdic-
tion is founded on the consent of the parties”.

34. On this point, however, it is the view of the Court that a distinc-
tion has to be made between a question of jurisdiction that relates to the

consent of a party and the question of the right of a party to appear
before the Court under the requirements of the Statute, which is not a
matter of consent. The question is whether as a matter of law Serbia and
Montenegro was entitled to seise the Court as a party to the Statute at
the time when it instituted proceedings in these cases. Since that question
is independent of the views or wishes of the Parties, even if they were now

to have arrived at a shared view on the point, the Court would not have
to accept that view as necessarily the correct one. The function of the
Court to enquire into the matter and reach its own conclusion is thus
mandatory upon the Court irrespective of the consent of the parties and
is in no way incompatible with the principle that the jurisdiction of the

Court depends on consent.
35. As noted above (paragraph 27), Serbia and Montenegro, after
explaining why in its view it is questionable whether the Court has juris-

19 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE ARRÊT ) 1322

rend dont la Cour a été saisie aurait disparu. Les défendeurs ont relevé

que la Serbie-et-Monténégro priait la Cour de statuer sur la question de
la compétence soulevée dans leurs exceptions préliminaires, en exerçant la
compétence de la compétence énoncée au paragraphe 6 de l’article 36 du
Statut. Ils ont toutefois soutenu que, conformément à sa jurisprudence
bien établie, «la Cour n’[était] pas toujours contrainte d’exercer [sa] com-

pétence» (Cameroun septentrional, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1963 , p. 29) et
qu’elle pouvait décider de mettre un terme à l’affaire in limine litis. Après
tout, «[i]l y a[urait] des limitations inhérentes à l’exercice de la fonction
judiciaire dont la Cour, en tant que tribunal, doit toujours tenir compte»
(ibid.). L’accent a été mis en particulier sur le fait que «la Cour ne peut

exercer sa compétence contentieuse que s’il existe réellement un différend
entre les parties »( Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 271, par. 57; Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande
c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974 , p. 477, par. 60; les italiques sont de

la Cour).

33. Dans l’argumentation développée devant la Cour à ce propos,
l’attention a été appelée sur les termes exprès du paragraphe 6 de l’ar-
ticle 36 du Statut, selon lequel: «En cas de contestation sur le point de sa-

voir si la Cour est compétente, la Cour décide.» (Les italiques sont de
la Cour.) Il a ainsi été soutenu que les Parties s’accordaient à reconnaître
que le demandeur n’était pas partie au Statut au moment de l’introduc-
tion des instances et que, dès lors, il n’existait désormais «plus de diffé-
rend entre les Parties quant à la compétence» de la Cour. Sur cette base,

il a été suggéré que
«[s]i la Cour exerçait sa compétence sur une base à laquelle le

demandeur a renoncé et qui a toujours été contestée par le défen-
deur, elle tournerait en dérision le principe d’une compétence fondée
sur le consentement des parties».

34. Sur ce point, toutefois, de l’avis de la Cour, il y a lieu d’établir une
distinction entre une question de compétence liée au consentement d’une
partie et celle du droit d’une partie à ester devant la Cour conformément
aux prescriptions du Statut, qui n’implique pas un tel consentement. La

question qui se pose est celle de savoir si, en droit, au moment où elle a
introduit les présentes instances, la Serbie-et-Monténégro était habilitée à
saisir la Cour en tant que partie au Statut. Cette question étant indépen-
dante des vues ou des souhaits des Parties à ces affaires, la Cour ne serait
pas, quand bien même les Parties partageraient à présent le même point

de vue à cet égard, tenue pour autant de considérer ce dernier comme
nécessairement exact. Ainsi la Cour se doit-elle d’examiner la question
pour tirer ses propres conclusions indépendamment du consentement des
parties, ce qui n’est en aucun cas incompatible avec le principe selon
lequel la compétence de la Cour est subordonnée à un tel consentement.

35. Ainsi qu’il a été noté ci-dessus (paragraphe 27), la Serbie-et-Mon-
ténégro, après avoir expliqué pourquoi, à son avis, la compétence de la

191323 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

diction, has asked the Court simply “to decide on its jurisdiction” con-
sidering the pleadings formulated in its Observations. At the hearings, it

insisted that it “wants the Court to continue the case and to decide upon
its jurisdiction — and to decide on the merits as well, if it has jurisdic-
tion”. Serbia and Montenegro contends that “the position of the FRY
with regard to international organizations and treaties has been a most
intricate and controversial matter”, so that “[o]nly a decision of this

Court could bring clarity”.

36. The function of a decision of the Court on its jurisdiction in a par-
ticular case is solely to determine whether or not the Court may entertain
that case on the merits, and not to engage in a clarification of a contro-

verted issue of a general nature. A decision of the Court should have, in
the words of the Judgment in the Northern Cameroons case, “some prac-
tical consequence in the sense that it can affect existing legal rights or
obligations of the parties, thus removing uncertainty from their legal rela-
tions” (I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 34; emphasis added); and that will be the
proper consequence of the Court’s decision on its jurisdiction in the

present case.
37. It may be mentioned here briefly that some of the Respondents
have implied that the attitude of Serbia and Montenegro might be influ-
enced by the existence of a pending case concerning Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), hereinafter referred
to as “the Genocide Convention case”. It is recalled that Serbia and Mon-
tenegro in 2002 sought a revision of a Judgment of 11 July 1996 on pre-
liminary objections in that case, basing itself on arguments similar to
those which are advanced in the present case concerning its status in rela-

tion to the United Nations (Application for Revision of the Judgment of
11 July 1996 in the Case concerning Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (Yugoslavia v. Bos-
nia and Herzegovina), hereinafter referred to as “the Application for

Revision case”). The Court, by its Judgment of 3 February 2003, rejected
this Application for revision of the earlier Judgment, on the ground that
the necessary conditions specified in Article 61 of the Statute for revision
of a judgment were not met in that case. In one of the other cases con-
cerning Legality of Use of Force, the Respondent contends that there is
no dispute between itself and the Applicant on jurisdiction; that if there

is any subsisting dispute to which Serbia and Montenegro is party, it is
the dispute with Bosnia and Herzegovina; and that the current proceed-
ings “cannot be used to procure a favourable opinion [from the Court],
for use in an entirely separate piece of litigation”.
38. In the view of the Court, it cannot decline to entertain a case

simply because of a suggestion as to the motives of one of the parties
or because its judgment may have implications in another case.

20 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1323

Cour pourrait n’être pas avérée, a prié celle-ci de simplement «se pro-

noncer sur sa compétence» en tenant compte des arguments formulés
dans ses observations. A l’audience, elle a insisté sur le fait qu’elle «[vou-
lait] que la Cour poursuive l’affaire et se prononce sur sa compétence
— et se prononce aussi sur le fond, si elle a[vait] compétence». La Serbie-
et-Monténégro fait valoir que «le statut de la RFY vis-à-vis des organi-

sations internationales et des traités est une question des plus complexes
et des plus controversées», et qu’en conséquence «[s]eule une décision de
la Cour pourrait faire la lumière à cet égard».
36. Lorsque la Cour se prononce sur sa compétence dans une affaire
déterminée, c’est uniquement pour décider si elle peut connaître de cette

affaire au fond, et non pour procéder à l’élucidation d’une question
controversée de nature générale. Une décision de la Cour devrait avoir,
selon les termes de l’arrêt rendu en l’affaire du Cameroun septentrional ,
«des conséquences pratiques en ce sens qu’[elle devrait] pouvoir affecter

les droits ou obligations juridiques existants des parties, dissipant ainsi
toute incertitude dans leurs relations juridiques» (C.I.J. Recueil 1963,
p. 34; les italiques sont de la Cour); et telle est la conséquence de la déci-
sion que la Cour rendrait sur sa compétence en l’espèce.
37. Il convient de mentionner ici brièvement que quelques-uns des

défendeurs ont laissé entendre que l’attitude de la Serbie-et-Monténégro
pourrait être influencée par l’existence d’une affaire en cours relative à
l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime
de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Serbie-et-Monténégro) (ci-après
dénommée «l’affaire relative à la Convention sur le génocide »). On rap-

pellera que la Serbie-et-Monténégro a demandé, en 2002, la revision d’un
arrêt rendu le 11 juillet 1996 sur des exceptions préliminaires soulevées en
cette affaire, en s’appuyant sur des arguments semblables à ceux qu’elle
avance à présent au sujet de son statut vis-à-vis de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies (Demande en revision de l’arrêt du 11 juillet 1996 en

l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la
répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie),
exceptions préliminaires (Yougoslavie c. Bosnie-Herzégovine) (ci-après
dénommée «l’affaire de la Demande en revision »)). Dans son arrêt du
3 février 2003, la Cour a rejeté cette demande en revision de son arrêt

antérieur, au motif que les conditions nécessaires spécifiées à l’article 61
du Statut aux fins de la revision d’un arrêt n’étaient pas remplies en l’ins-
tance. Dans l’une des autres affaires relatives à la Licéité de l’emploi de la
force, le défendeur affirme qu’aucun différend ne l’oppose au demandeur
au sujet de la compétence, que, s’il est un différend auquel la Serbie-et-

Monténégro reste partie, c’est celui qui l’oppose à la Bosnie-Herzégovine,
et que la présente affaire «ne saurait être utilisée pour obtenir un avis
favorable [de la Cour] dans une procédure totalement distincte».
38. La Cour est d’avis qu’elle ne peut refuser de connaître d’une
affaire simplement du fait des motivations alléguées de l’une des parties,

ou en raison des conséquences que son arrêt pourrait avoir dans une
autre instance.

201324 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

39. Yet another argument advanced for reaching the conclusion that
the Court would be justified in summarily disposing of the case without a

jurisdictional decision relates to a proposition that the substantive dis-
pute under the Genocide Convention, rather than the dispute over juris-
diction, has disappeared. It has been argued that Serbia and Montenegro,
by contending that it was not a party to the Genocide Convention
until March 2001, is bound to recognize that the rights which it was

asserting in its Application under that Convention had no legal basis,
and that therefore any legal dispute between itself and the respondent
States concerning these rights and obligations under the Convention has
ceased to exist. That dispute is the sole dispute in the cases concerning
Legality of Use of Force in which the only ground of jurisdiction relied

on is Article IX of the Genocide Convention, and thus, in those cases, the
whole dispute would have disappeared. In the present case, this argument
would imply that the Genocide Convention cannot be relied on by Serbia
and Montenegro against the United Kingdom.

40. It has also been suggested that Serbia and Montenegro has, by its
conduct, either forfeited or renounced its right of action in the present
case and is in any event now estopped from pursuing the present action
in so far as that right of action is based on the Genocide Convention.
More broadly, it is suggested that, by inviting the Court to find that it

has no jurisdiction, the Applicant can no longer be regarded as pursuing
the settlement by the Court of the substantive dispute.

41. The Court is unable to uphold these various contentions. As
regards the argument that the dispute on jurisdiction has disappeared,

Serbia and Montenegro has not invited the Court to find that it has no
jurisdiction; while it is apparently in agreement with the arguments
advanced by the Respondents in that regard in their preliminary objec-
tions, it has specifically asked in its submissions for a decision of the
Court on the jurisdictional question. This question, in the view of the

Court as explained above, is a legal question independent of the views of
the parties upon it. As to the argument concerning the disappearance of
the substantive dispute, it is clear that Serbia and Montenegro has by no
means withdrawn its claims as to the merits. Indeed, these claims were
extensively argued and developed in substance during the hearings on
jurisdiction, in the context of the question of the jurisdiction of the Court

under Article IX of the Genocide Convention. It is equally clear that
these claims are being vigorously denied by the Respondents. It could not
even be said under these circumstances that, while the essential dispute
still subsists, Serbia and Montenegro is no longer seeking to have its
claim determined by the Court. Serbia and Montenegro has not sought a

discontinuance (see paragraph 30 above); and it has stated that it “wants
the Court to continue the case and to decide upon its jurisdiction — and
to decide on the merits as well, if it has jurisdiction”. In the present cir-

21 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1324

39. Un autre argument qui a été avancé à l’appui de la conclusion

selon laquelle la Cour serait fondée à refuser sommairement de connaître
de l’affaire, sans se prononcer sur sa compétence, est lié à l’idée que le
différend au fond concernant la convention sur le génocide, par opposi-
tion au différend relatif à la compétence, aurait disparu. Il a été soutenu
que la Serbie-et-Monténégro, en prétendant qu’elle n’était pas partie à la

convention sur le génocide avant mars 2001, reconnaissait nécessairement
que les droits dont elle se prévalait dans sa requête en s’appuyant sur
cette convention n’avaient aucune base juridique et qu’en conséquence
tout différend juridique entre elle et les Etats défendeurs au sujet des
droits et obligations procédant de la convention avait cessé d’exister. Tel

est le seul différend qui serait en cause s’agissant des affaires relatives à la
Licéité de l’emploi de la force dans lesquelles l’unique base de compé-
tence invoquée est l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide; l’en-
semble du différend à l’égard de ces affaires aurait dès lors disparu.

Dans le cas particulier, il en découlerait que la convention sur le génocide
ne peut être invoquée par la Serbie-et-Monténégro à l’encontre du
Royaume-Uni.
40. Il a également été suggéré que la Serbie-et-Monténégro, en raison
de sa conduite, avait perdu son droit d’action en l’espèce, ou qu’elle y

avait renoncé, et se trouvait, en tout état de cause, empêchée maintenant
de poursuivre la procédure dans la mesure où son droit d’action est fondé
sur la convention sur le génocide. De façon plus générale, il a été avancé
que, ayant invité la Cour à dire qu’elle n’avait pas compétence, le deman-
deur ne pouvait plus être considéré comme recherchant un règlement au

fond du différend par la Cour.
41. La Cour ne peut faire droit à ces diverses assertions. S’agissant de
l’argument selon lequel le différend relatif à la compétence aurait disparu,
la Serbie-et-Monténégro n’a pas prié la Cour de se déclarer incompé-
tente; si elle paraît souscrire aux arguments avancés à cet égard par les

défendeurs dans leurs exceptions préliminaires, elle a expressément
demandé à la Cour, dans ses conclusions, de se prononcer sur sa compé-
tence. Cette question est, de l’avis de la Cour et ainsi qu’il a été expliqué
plus haut, une question de droit indépendante des points de vue des
parties à son sujet. Quant à l’argument concernant la disparition du dif-

férend au fond, il est clair que la Serbie-et-Monténégro n’a aucunement
renoncé à ses prétentions au fond. De fait, celles-ci ont été abondamment
exposées et développées en substance au cours de la procédure orale sur
la compétence, à propos de la compétence de la Cour au titre de l’ar-
ticle IX de la convention sur le génocide. Il est tout aussi clair que lesdites

prétentions sont vigoureusement rejetées par les défendeurs. Dans ces cir-
constances, on ne saurait même dire que, bien que le différend au fond
subsiste, la Serbie-et-Monténégro ne demande plus à la Cour de statuer
sur ses prétentions. La Serbie-et-Monténégro n’a pas cherché à se désister
(voir paragraphe 30 ci-dessus); et elle a déclaré qu’elle «v[oulait] que la

Cour poursuive l’affaire et se prononce sur sa compétence — et se pro-
nonce aussi sur le fond, si elle a[vait] compétence». Dans ces conditions,

211325 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

cumstances, the Court is unable to find that Serbia and Montenegro has
renounced any of its substantive or procedural rights, or has taken the

position that the dispute between the Parties has ceased to exist. As for
the argument based on the doctrine of estoppel, the Court does not con-
sider that Serbia and Montenegro, by asking the Court “to decide on its
jurisdiction” on the basis of certain alleged “new facts” about its own
legal status vis-à-vis the United Nations, should be held to have forfeited

or renounced its right of action and to be estopped from continuing the
present action before the Court.

42. For all these reasons, the Court cannot remove the cases concern-

ing Legality of Use of Force from the List, or take any decision putting
an end to those cases in limine litis. In the present phase of the proceed-
ings, it must proceed to examine the titles of jurisdiction asserted by the
Applicant and the objections thereto advanced by the Respondents, and
give its decision with respect to jurisdiction.

*
* *

43. The Court accordingly turns to the questions of jurisdiction arising
in the present case. The Application filed by Serbia and Montenegro on

29 April 1999 indicated that it was submitted “[o]n the basis of Article 40
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and Article 38 of the
Rules of Court”. On the question of the legal grounds for jurisdiction of
the Court, the Application stated that “[t]he Government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia invokes Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of

the International Court of Justice as well as Article IX of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”.

44. The Court notes that in several cases it referred to “its freedom to
select the ground upon which it will base its judgment” (Application of

the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1958,p.62; Application for Revision and Interpretation of
the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case concerning the Continental
Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jama-
hiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985 , p. 207, para. 29; Oil Platforms
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J.

Reports 2003, p. 180, para. 37).
By the same token, the Court in the past pointed out that when its
jurisdiction is challenged on diverse grounds, it is free to base its decision
on one or more grounds of its own choosing, in particular “the ground
which in its judgment is more direct and conclusive” (Certain Norwegian

Loans (France v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1957 ,p .5;e
also Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 127; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v.

22 LICÉITÉ DE L EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1325

la Cour ne peut dire que la Serbie-et-Monténégro a renoncé à l’un

quelconque de ses droits au fond ou de ses droits procéduraux, ni
qu’elle a adopté pour position que le différend entre les Parties a cessé
d’exister. Quant à l’argument fondé sur la doctrine de l’estoppel, la Cour
ne considère pas que la Serbie-et-Monténégro, du fait qu’elle demande
à la Cour de «se prononcer sur sa compétence» en raison de certains

«faits nouveaux» qui seraient intervenus concernant son propre statut
juridique vis-à-vis de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, doive être
considérée comme ayant perdu son droit d’action ou y ayant renoncé
et comme étant empêchée de poursuivre la présente procédure devant
la Cour.

42. Pour tous ces motifs, la Cour ne peut rayer du rôle les affaires rela-
tives à la Licéité de l’emploi de la force , ou prendre une décision qui met-
trait fin à ces affaires in limine litis. Au stade actuel des procédures, elle
doit examiner les chefs de compétence invoqués par le demandeur ainsi

que les exceptions soulevées à leur encontre par les défendeurs, et se pro-
noncer sur sa compétence.

* * *

43. La Cour passera en conséquence aux questions relatives à la com-
pétence se posant en l’espèce. La requête déposée par la Serbie-et-Mon-
ténégro le 29 avril 1999 précise que l’instance est introduite «[s]ur la base
de l’article 40 du Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice et de l’ar-

ticle 38 de son Règlement». S’agissant des fondements juridiques de la
compétence de la Cour, la requête indique que «[l]e Gouvernement de la
République fédérale de Yougoslavie invoque le paragraphe 2 de l’ar-
ticle 36 du Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice ainsi que l’article IX
de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de géno-

cide».
44. La Cour relève que, dans plusieurs affaires, elle a rappelé qu’elle
«rest[ait] libre dans le choix des motifs sur lesquels elle fonder[ait] son
arrêt» (Application de la convention de 1902 pour régler la tutelle des
mineurs, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1958 ,p.2;Demande en revision et en

interprétation de l’arrêt du 24 février 1982 en l’affaire du Plateau conti-
nental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne) (Tunisie c. Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1985 , p. 207, par. 29; Plates-formes pétro-
lières (République islamique d’Iran c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 180, par. 37).

De la même manière, la Cour a par le passé précisé que, lorsque sa
compétence est contestée pour différents motifs, elle est libre de baser sa
décision sur un ou plusieurs motifs de son choix, et en particulier «sur le
motif qui, selon elle, est plus direct et décisif» (Certains emprunts norvé-
giens (France c. Norvège), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1957 , p. 25; voir égale-

ment Incident aérien du 27 juillet 1955 (Israël c. Bulgarie), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1959, p. 127; Plateau continental de la mer Egée (Grèce c.

221326 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978 , pp. 16-17, paras. 39-40, and
Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), Jurisdiction,

Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2000 , p. 24, para. 26).
But in those instances, the parties to the cases before the Court were,
without doubt, parties to the Statute of the Court and the Court was thus
open to them under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute. That is not
the case in the present proceedings in which an objection has been made

regarding the right of the Applicant to have access to the Court. And it is
this issue of access to the Court which distinguishes the present case from
all those referred to above.
As the Court observed earlier (see paragraph 28 above), the question
whether Serbia and Montenegro was or was not a party to the Statute of

the Court at the time of the institution of the present proceedings is fun-
damental; for if it were not such a party, the Court would not be open to
it under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute. In that situation, subject
to any application of paragraph 2 of that Article, Serbia and Montenegro
could not have properly seised the Court, whatever title of jurisdiction it
might have invoked, for the simple reason that Serbia and Montenegro

did not have the right to appear before the Court.

The Court can exercise its judicial function only in respect of those
States which have access to it under Article 35 of the Statute. And only
those States which have access to the Court can confer jurisdiction

upon it.
It is the view of the Court that it is incumbent upon it to examine first
of all the question whether the Applicant meets the conditions laid down
in Articles 34 and 35 of the Statute and whether the Court is thus open to
it. Only if the answer to that question is in the affirmative will the Court

have to deal with the issues relating to the conditions laid down in
Article 36 of the Statute of the Court (see Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Provisional
Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993 , pp. 11 et seq.,

paras. 14 et seq.).
There is no doubt that Serbia and Montenegro is a State for the pur-
pose of Article 34, paragraph 1, of the Statute. However, the objection
was raised by certain Respondents (see paragraphs 47, 49, 91, 94 and 95
below) that Serbia and Montenegro did not meet, at the time of the filing
of its Application on 29 April 1999, the conditions set down in Article 35

of the Statute.
45. No specific assertion was made in the Application that the Court
was open to Serbia and Montenegro under Article 35, paragraph 1, of
the Statute of the Court, but it was later made clear that the Applicant
claimed to be a Member of the United Nations and thus a party to the

Statute of the Court, by virtue of Article 93, paragraph 1, of the Charter,
at the time of filing of the Application. As indicated earlier (paragraph 26
above) this position was expressly stated in the Memorial filed by Serbia

23 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE ARRÊT ) 1326

Turquie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1978 , p. 16-17, par. 39-40; et Incident

aérien du 10 août 1999 (Pakistan c. Inde), compétence de la Cour, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2000, p. 24, par. 26).
Il s’agissait là cependant de cas dans lesquels les parties aux affaires
soumises à la Cour étaient, à n’en pas douter, parties au Statut de la Cour
et, de ce fait, celle-ci leur était ouverte en vertu du paragraphe 1 de l’ar-

ticle 35 du Statut. Tel n’est pas le cas en la présente espèce, dans laquelle le
droit du demandeur d’accéder à la Cour a été contesté. C’est cette ques-
tion de l’accès à la Cour qui distingue la présente affaire de toutes celles
qui sont mentionnées ci-dessus.
Comme la Cour l’a observé plus tôt (voir paragraphe 28), la question

de savoir si la Serbie-et-Monténégro était ou non partie au Statut de la
Cour à l’époque de l’introduction des présentes instances est une question
fondamentale; en effet, si elle n’avait pas été partie au Statut, la Cour ne
lui aurait pas été ouverte en vertu du paragraphe 1 de l’article 35 du Sta-

tut. En pareille situation, et sous réserve d’une possible application du
paragraphe 2 dudit article, la Serbie-et-Monténégro n’aurait pu saisir la
Cour de manière valable, quel que soit le titre de compétence qu’elle
puisse invoquer, pour la simple raison qu’elle n’avait pas le droit d’ester
devant la Cour.

La Cour ne peut exercer sa fonction judiciaire qu’à l’égard des seuls
Etats auxquels elle est ouverte en vertu de l’article 35 du Statut. Et seuls
les Etats auxquels la Cour est ouverte peuvent lui conférer compétence.

Aussi la Cour est-elle d’avis qu’il lui appartient d’examiner tout d’abord

la question de savoir si le demandeur remplit les conditions énoncées aux
articles 34 et 35 du Statut et si, de ce fait, la Cour lui est ouverte. Ce n’est
que si la réponse à cette question est affirmative que la Cour aura à exa-
miner les questions relatives aux conditions énoncées à l’article 36 du Sta-
tut de la Cour (voir Application de la convention pour la prévention et la

répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie
(Serbie et Monténégro)), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du
8 avril 1993, C.I.J. Recueil 1993 , p. 11 et suiv., par. 14 et suiv.).

Il ne fait aucun doute que la Serbie-et-Monténégro est un Etat aux fins

du paragraphe 1 de l’article 34 du Statut. Cependant, certains défendeurs
ont contesté (voir paragraphes 47, 49, 91, 94 et 95 ci-après) que la Serbie-
et-Monténégro remplît les conditions posées à l’article 35 du Statut au
moment où elle a déposé sa requête, le 29 avril 1999.

45. La Serbie-et-Monténégro n’a pas spécifiquement affirmé dans sa
requête que la Cour lui était ouverte en vertu du paragraphe 1 de l’ar-
ticle 35 du Statut de la Cour, mais il est devenu par la suite manifeste
que le demandeur prétendait être Membre de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies, et donc partie au Statut de la Cour en vertu du para-

graphe 1 de l’article 93 de la Charte, à la date du dépôt de la requête.
Ainsi qu’il a été dit ci-dessus (paragraphe 26), cette position a été expres-

231327 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

and Montenegro on 4 January 2000 (Memorial, Part III, paras. 3.1.17
and 3.1.18).

46. In each of the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force, a request
for the indication of provisional measures of protection was submitted by
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the day of the filing of its Appli-
cation, i.e. 29 April 1999 (see paragraphs 2 and 3 above). The Court, by
Orders of 2 June 1999, rejected these requests (see paragraph 7 above), on

the ground that it had no prima facie jurisdiction to entertain the Appli-
cations. In the instant case, it found
“the declarations made by the Parties under Article 36, paragraph 2,

of the Statute manifestly cannot constitute a basis of jurisdiction in
the present case, even prima facie” (I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II) , p. 836,
para. 25)

since
“there [could] be no doubt that the conditions for the exclusion of
the Court’s jurisdiction provided for in the second part of subpara-

graph (iii) of the first paragraph of the United Kingdom’s declara-
tion are satisfied in this case” (ibid., p. 835, para. 25).
It further stated that it was

“not in a position to find, at this stage of the proceedings, that the
acts imputed by Yugoslavia to the Respondent are capable of
coming within the provisions of the Genocide Convention; and

[that] Article IX of the Convention, invoked by Yugoslavia, cannot
accordingly constitute a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court
could prima facie be founded in this case” (ibid., p. 839, para. 36)

47. In the course of the proceedings on this request, however, the
Respondent raised the issue of whether the Applicant was a party to the
Statute of the Court. Referring, inter alia, to United Nations Security
Council resolution 777 (1992) of 19 September 1992 and United Nations

General Assembly resolution 47/1 of 22 September 1992, the United
Kingdom contended that
“since Yugoslavia cannot be regarded as a Member of the United

Nations or as a party to the Statute of the Court, it could not estab-
lish a jurisdictional link with parties to the Statute by purporting to
make a declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2” (ibid., p. 836,
para. 26).

48. Notwithstanding this contention by the Respondent, the Court did
not, in its Order on provisional measures, carry out any examination of
it, confining itself to observing that in view of its finding relating to the
lack of prima facie jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2, “the Court

need not consider this question for the purpose of deciding whether or
not it can indicate provisional measures in the present case” (ibid., p. 836,
para. 28).

24 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1327

sément énoncée dans le mémoire déposé par la Serbie-et-Monténégro le

4 janvier 2000 (mémoire, troisième partie, par. 3.1.17 et 3.1.18).
46. Dans chacune des affaires relatives à la Licéité de l’emploi de la
force, une demande en indication de mesures conservatoires a été présen-
tée par la République fédérale de Yougoslavie le jour même où elle a
déposé sa requête, le 29 avril 1999 (voir paragraphes 2 et 3 ci-dessus). Par

son ordonnance du 2 juin 1999, la Cour a rejeté ces demandes (voir para-
graphe 7 ci-dessus), au motif qu’elle n’avait pas, prima facie, compétence
pour en connaître. Dans la présente instance, elle a conclu que

«les déclarations faites par les Parties conformément au para-
graphe 2 de l’article 36 du Statut ne sauraient manifestement pas
constituer une base de compétence dans la présente affaire, même
prima facie »( C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II) , p. 836, par. 25)

puisque

«il ne [faisait] aucun doute que les conditions d’exclusion de la juri-
diction de la Cour spécifiées dans le second membre de phrase de
l’alinéa iii) du premier paragraphe de la déclaration du Royaume-
Uni sont remplies en l’espèce» (ibid., p. 835, par. 25).

Elle a dit aussi qu’elle n’était

«pas en mesure de conclure, à ce stade de la procédure, que les actes
que la Yougoslavie imput[ait] au défendeur seraient susceptibles
d’entrer dans les prévisions de la convention sur le génocide; et que
l’article IX de la convention, invoqué par la Yougoslavie, ne
constitu[ait] ... pas une base sur laquelle la compétence de la Cour

pourrait prima facie être fondée dans le cas d’espèce» (ibid., p. 839,
par. 36).
47. Au cours de la procédure portant sur cette demande, cependant, le

défendeur a soulevé la question de savoir si le demandeur était partie au
Statut de la Cour. Se référant notamment à la résolution 777 (1992), en
date du 19 septembre 1992, du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, et
à la résolution 47/1, en date du 22 septembre 1992, de l’Assemblée géné-
rale des Nations Unies, le Royaume-Uni a soutenu que

«la Yougoslavie ne peut pas être considérée comme un Etat Membre
des Nations Unies ni comme un Etat partie au Statut de la Cour, de

sorte qu’elle ne saurait établir de lien juridictionnel avec des Etats
parties au Statut en prétendant faire une déclaration au sens du
paragraphe 2 de l’article 36» (ibid., p. 836, par. 26).

48. Bien que le défendeur ait fait valoir cet argument, la Cour ne l’a
pas examiné dans son ordonnance sur les mesures conservatoires, se bor-
nant à faire observer que, eu égard à la conclusion à laquelle elle était
parvenue au sujet de l’absence de compétence prima facie au titre du
paragraphe 2 de l’article 36, «[elle] n’a[vait] pas à examiner cette question

à l’effet de décider si elle p[ouvait] ou non indiquer des mesures conser-
vatoires dans le cas d’espèce» (ibid., p. 836, par. 28).

241328 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

49. The United Kingdom subsequently argued as its first preliminary
objection to the jurisdiction of the Court that “the FRY is not qualified

to bring these proceedings” on the grounds, inter alia, that

“[t]he FRY is not a party to the Statute of the Court, since it is
neither a Member of the United Nations nor a non-Member State
that has become a party to the Statute under Article 93 (2) of the

Charter [of the United Nations]” (Preliminary Objections of the
United Kingdom, p. 25, para. 3.1).

50. The Court notes that it is, and has always been, common ground
between the Parties that Serbia and Montenegro has not claimed to have

become a party to the Statute on any other basis than by membership in
the United Nations. Therefore the question raised in this first preliminary
objection is simply whether or not the Applicant was a Member of the
United Nations at the time when it instituted proceedings in the present
case.
51. In addressing the question whether Serbia and Montenegro had

access to the Court under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute, the
Court will consider the arguments put forward in this case and any other
legal issue which it deems relevant to consider with a view to arriving at
its conclusion on this point, including the issues raised in the other cases
referred to in paragraph 3 above.

52. The Court will first recapitulate the sequence of events relating to
the legal position of Serbia and Montenegro vis-à-vis the United
Nations — events already examined, so far as was necessary to the
Court, in the context of another case (see Judgment in the case concern-

ing Application for Revision, I.C.J. Reports 2003 , pp. 14-26, paras. 24-
53).
53. In the early 1990s the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
made up of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro,
Serbia and Slovenia, began to break up. On 25 June 1991 Croatia

and Slovenia both declared independence, followed by Macedonia on
17 September 1991 and Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 March 1992.
On 22 May 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia were
admitted as Members to the United Nations; as was the former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia on 8 April 1993.

54. On 27 April 1992 the “participants of the joint session of the
SFRY Assembly, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia and
the Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro” adopted a declaration,
stating in pertinent parts:

“The representatives of the people of the Republic of Serbia and
the Republic of Montenegro,

25 LICÉITÉ DE L EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1328

49. Par la suite, le Royaume-Uni a soutenu, à titre de première excep-

tion préliminaire à la compétence de la Cour, que «la RFY n’[était] pas
habilitée à engager cette procédure» au motif, notamment, que,

«la RFY n’[était] pas partie au Statut de la Cour puisqu’elle n’[était]
ni Membre des Nations Unies ni un Etat non membre devenu partie

au Statut en application du paragraphe 2 de l’article 93 de la Charte
[des Nations Unies]» (exceptions préliminaires du Royaume-Uni,
p. 25, par. 3.1).

50. La Cour note qu’il a toujours été admis par les Parties que la Ser-

bie-et-Monténégro n’avait pas prétendu être devenue partie au Statut sur
une quelconque autre base que celle de la qualité de Membre de l’Orga-
nisation des Nations Unies. Aussi, dans le cadre de cette première excep-
tion préliminaire, s’agit-il simplement de savoir si, au moment d’intro-

duire la présente instance, le demandeur était ou non Membre de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies.
51. Lorsqu’elle examinera la question de savoir si la Serbie-et-Monté-
négro avait qualité pour ester devant la Cour en vertu du paragraphe 1 de
l’article 35 du Statut, la Cour se penchera sur les arguments présentés en

l’espèce et sur toute autre question de droit qu’elle estimera pertinent
d’examiner en vue de parvenir à une conclusion sur ce point, y compris
les questions soulevées dans les autres instances mentionnées au para-
graphe 3 ci-dessus.
52. La Cour récapitulera d’abord la suite des événements concernant

le statut juridique de la Serbie-et-Monténégro vis-à-vis de l’Organisation
des Nations Unies — événements qu’elle a déjà examinés, en tant que de
besoin, dans le cadre d’une autre affaire (voir l’arrêt en l’affaire de la
Demande en revision, C.I.J. Recueil 2003 , p. 14-26, par. 24-53).

53. Au début des années quatre-vingt-dix, la République fédérative
socialiste de Yougoslavie, constituée de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, de la
Croatie, de la Macédoine, du Monténégro, de la Serbie et de la Slovénie,
commença à se désintégrer. Le 25 juin 1991, la Croatie et la Slovénie
déclarèrent l’une et l’autre leur indépendance, suivies par la Macédoine le

17 septembre 1991 et par la Bosnie-Herzégovine le 6 mars 1992. Le
22 mai 1992, la Bosnie-Herzégovine, la Croatie et la Slovénie furent
admises en qualité de Membres de l’Organisation des Nations Unies.
Il en fut de même le 8 avril 1993 pour l’ex-République yougoslave de
Macédoine.

54. Le 27 avril 1992, les «participants à la session commune de l’Assem-
blée de la RFSY, de l’Assemblée nationale de la République de Serbie et
de l’Assemblée de la République du Monténégro» adoptèrent une décla-
ration, dont les passages les plus pertinents en l’espèce sont les suivants:

«Les représentants du peuple de la République de Serbie et de la
République du Monténégro,

251329 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

Expressing the will of the citizens of their respective Republics to
stay in the common state of Yugoslavia,

.............................

wish to state in this Declaration their views on the basic, immediate
and lasting objectives of the policy of their common state, and on its
relations with the former Yugoslav Republics.

.............................
1. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the state, inter-

national legal and political personality of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, shall strictly abide by all the commitments
that the SFR of Yugoslavia assumed internationally,

.............................
Remaining bound by all obligations to international organiza-
tions and institutions whose member it is..” . (United Nations

doc. A/46/915, Ann. II.)

55. An official Note of the same date from the Permanent Mission of
Yugoslavia to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, stated inter alia that:

“The Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at
its session held on 27 April 1992, promulgated the Constitution of

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Under the Constitution, on the
basis of the continuing personality of Yugoslavia and the legitimate
decisions by Serbia and Montenegro to continue to live together in
Yugoslavia, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is trans-
formed into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of the

Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro.

Strictly respecting the continuity of the international personality
of Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall continue to
fulfil all the rights conferred to, and obligations assumed by, the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in international relations,

including its membership in all international organizations and
participation in international treaties ratified or acceded to by Yugo-
slavia.” (United Nations doc. A/46/915, Ann. I.)

56. On 30 May 1992, the Security Council adopted resolu-

tion 757 (1992), in which, inter alia, it noted that “the claim by
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to con-
tinue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal

26 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE ARRÊT ) 1329

Exprimant la volonté des citoyens de leurs républiques respectives

de demeurer au sein de l’Etat commun de Yougoslavie,
.............................

Souhaitent exprimer [dans la présente déclaration] leurs vues sur
les objectifs fondamentaux, immédiats et à long terme de la politique
de leur Etat commun, ainsi que sur ses relations avec les anciennes
républiques yougoslaves...

1. La République fédérale de Yougoslavie, assurant la continuité
de l’Etat et de la personnalité juridique et politique internationale de
la République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie, respectera stric-
tement tous les engagements que la République fédérative socialiste

de Yougoslavie a pris à l’échelon international.
.............................

Restant liée par toutes ses obligations vis-à-vis des organisations
et institutions internationales auxquelles elle appartient...» (Nations
Unies, doc.A/46/915, annexe II.)

55. Dans une note officielle de la mission permanente de la Yougo-
slavie auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, datée du même jour

et adressée au Secrétaire général de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, il
fut notamment indiqué ce qui suit:

«L’Assemblée de la République fédérative socialiste de Yougo-
slavie, à la session qu’elle a tenue le 27 avril 1992, a promulgué la
Constitution de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie. Aux termes
de la Constitution, et compte tenu de la continuité de la personnalité

de la Yougoslavie et des décisions légitimes qu’ont prises la Serbie
et le Monténégro de continuer à vivre ensemble en Yougoslavie, la
République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie devient la Répu-
blique fédérale de Yougoslavie, composée de la République de Serbie
et de la République du Monténégro.

Dans le strict respect de la continuité de la personnalité interna-
tionale de la Yougoslavie, la République fédérale de Yougoslavie
continuera à exercer tous les droits conférés à la République fédéra-
tive socialiste de Yougoslavie et à s’acquitter de toutes les obliga-
tions assumées par cette dernière dans les relations internationales, y

compris en ce qui concerne son appartenance à toutes les organisa-
tions internationales et sa participation à tous les traités internatio-
naux que la Yougoslavie a ratifiés ou auxquels elle a adhéré.»
(Nations Unies, doc.A/46/915, annexe I.)

56. Le 30 mai 1992, le Conseil de sécurité adopta la résolution 757
(1992), dans laquelle, entre autres, il notait que «l’affirmation de la Répu-

blique fédérative de Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténégro) selon laquelle
elle assure automatiquement la continuité de l’ex-République fédérative

261330 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE JUDGMENT )

Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally
accepted”.

57. On 19 September 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 777
(1992) which read as follows:

“The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all
subsequent relevant resolutions,

Considering that the state formerly known as the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist,
Recalling in particular resolution 757 (1992) which notes that ‘the

claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Monte-
negro) to continue automatically the membership of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations
has not been generally accepted’,

1. Considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of
the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United

Nations; and therefore recommends to the General Assembly that it
decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and
that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly;

2. Decides to consider the matter again before the end of the

main part of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly.”
(United Nations doc. S/RES/777.)

The resolution was adopted by 12 votes in favour, none against, and
3 abstentions.
58. On 22 September 1992 the General Assembly adopted resolu-
tion 47/1, according to which:

“The General Assembly,
Having received the recommendation of the Security Council of

19 September 1992 that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United
Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General
Assembly,

1. Considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United
Nations; and therefore decides that the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the

United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the
General Assembly;

27 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1330

socialiste de Yougoslavie comme Membre de l’Organisation des

Nations Unies n’a pas été généralement acceptée».
57. Le 19 septembre 1992, le Conseil de sécurité adopta la résolu-
tion 777 (1992), qui se lit comme suit:

«Le Conseil de sécurité,
Réaffirmant sa résolution 713 (1991) du 25 septembre 1991 et

toutes les résolutions consécutives pertinentes,
Considérant que l’Etat antérieurement connu comme la Répu-
blique fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie a cessé d’exister,

Rappelant en particulier sa résolution 757 qui note que «l’affirma-
tion de la République fédérative de Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monté-
négro), selon laquelle elle assure automatiquement la continuité de
l’ancienne République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie comme

Membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies n’a pas été générale-
ment acceptée»,
1. Considère que la République fédérative de Yougoslavie (Serbie

et Monténégro) ne peut pas assurer automatiquement la continuité
de la qualité de Membre de l’ancienne République fédérative socia-
liste de Yougoslavie aux Nations Unies et par conséquent recom-
mande à l’Assemblée générale de décider que la République fédéra-
tive de Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténégro) devrait présenter une

demande d’adhésion aux Nations Unies et qu’elle ne participera pas
aux travaux de l’Assemblée générale.
2. Décide de reconsidérer la question avant la fin de la partie prin-
cipale de la quarante-septième session de l’Assemblée générale.»
(Nations Unies, doc.S/RES/777.)

La résolution fut adoptée par douze voix contre zéro, avec trois absten-
tions.
58. Le 22 septembre 1992, l’Assemblée générale adopta sa résolu-

tion 47/1, laquelle dispose:
«L’Assemblée générale,

Ayant reçu la recommandation du Conseil de sécurité, en date du
19 septembre 1992, selon laquelle la République fédérative de You-
goslavie (Serbie et Monténégro) devrait présenter une demande

d’admission à l’Organisation des Nations Unies et ne participera pas
aux travaux de l’Assemblée générale,
1. Considère que la République fédérative de Yougoslavie (Ser-

bie et Monténégro) ne peut pas assumer automatiquement la [conti-
nuité de la] qualité de Membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies
à la place de l’ancienne République fédérative socialiste de Yougo-
slavie et, par conséquent, décide que la République fédérative de
Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténégro) devrait présenter une demande

d’admission à l’Organisation et qu’elle ne participera pas aux tra-
vaux de l’Assemblée générale;

271331 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE JUDGMENT )

2. Takes note of the intention of the Security Council to
consider the matter again before the end of the main part of the

forty-seventh session of the General Assembly.” (United Nations
doc. A/RES/47/1.)

The resolution was adopted by 127 votes to 6, with 26 abstentions.

59. On 25 September 1992, the Permanent Representatives of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Croatia addressed a letter to the Secretary-General,
in which, with reference to Security Council resolution 777 (1992) and

General Assembly resolution 47/1, they stated their understanding as fol-
lows: “At this moment, there is no doubt that the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia is not a member of the United Nations any more.
At the same time, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is clearly not yet a
member.” They concluded that “[t]he flag flying in front of the United

Nations and the name-plaque bearing the name ‘Yugoslavia’ do not
represent anything or anybody any more” and “kindly request[ed]
that [the Secretary-General] provide a legal explanatory statement con-
cerning the questions raised” (United Nations doc. A/47/474).

60. In response, on 29 September 1992, the Under-Secretary-General

and Legal Counsel of the United Nations addressed a letter to the
Permanent Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia,
in which he stated that the “considered view of the United Nations
Secretariat regarding the practical consequences of the adoption by the
General Assembly of resolution 47/1” was as follows:

“While the General Assembly has stated unequivocally that the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot

automatically continue the membership of the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations and that the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should
apply for membership in the United Nations, the only practical con-
sequence that the resolution draws is that the Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not participate in
the work of the General Assembly. It is clear, therefore, that represen-
tatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro) can no longer participate in the work of the General
Assembly, its subsidiary organs, nor conferences and meetings con-
vened by it.

On the other hand, the resolution neither terminates nor suspends
Yugoslavia’s membership in the Organization. Consequently, the
seat and nameplate remain as before, but in Assembly bodies repre-
sentatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro) cannot sit behind the sign ‘Yugoslavia’. Yugoslav missions

at United Nations Headquarters and offices may continue to func-
tion and may receive and circulate documents. At Headquarters, the
Secretariat will continue to fly the flag of the old Yugoslavia as it is

28 LICÉITÉ DE L EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1331

2. Prend acte de l’intention du Conseil de sécurité de reconsidérer

la question avant la fin de la partie principale de la quarante-
septième session de l’Assemblée générale.» (Nations Unies, doc.A/
RES/47/1.)

La résolution fut adoptée par cent vingt-sept voix contre six, avec vingt-
six abstentions.
59. Le 25 septembre 1992, les représentants permanents de la Bosnie-
Herzégovine et de la Croatie adressèrent une lettre au Secrétaire général,

dans laquelle, se référant à la résolution 777 (1992) du Conseil de sécurité
et à la résolution 47/1 de l’Assemblée générale, ils exprimaient le point de
vue commun suivant: «Il est actuellement incontestable que la Répu-
blique fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie n’est plus membre de l’Orga-

nisation des Nations Unies. D’autre part, il est clair que la République
fédérative de Yougoslavie n’est pas encore membre.» Ils estimaient en
conclusion que «[l]e drapeau flottant en face de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies et la plaque portant le nom «Yougoslavie» ne représen-
t[aient] plus rien ou plus personne» et priaient le Secrétaire général de

«bien vouloir [leur] donner une explication juridique au sujet des ques-
tions soulevées plus haut» (Nations Unies, doc.A/47/474).
60. En réponse, le Secrétaire général adjoint, conseiller juridique de
l’Organisation, adressa le 29 septembre 1992 aux représentants perma-
nents de la Bosnie-Herzégovine et de la Croatie une lettre, dans laquelle

il indiquait que «la position réfléchie du Secrétariat de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies en ce qui concerne les conséquences pratiques de l’adop-
tion par l’Assemblée générale de la résolution 47/1» était la suivante:

«Si l’Assemblée générale a déclaré sans équivoque que la Répu-
blique fédérative de Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténégro) ne pouvait
pas assurer automatiquement la continuité de la qualité de Membre
de l’ancienne République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie à

l’Organisation des Nations Unies et que la République fédérative de
Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténégro) devrait présenter une demande
d’admission à l’Organisation, l’unique conséquence pratique de cette
résolution est que la République fédérative de Yougoslavie (Ser-
bie et Monténégro) ne participera pas aux travaux de l’Assemblée

générale. Il est donc clair que les représentants de la République
fédérative de Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténégro) ne peuvent plus
participer aux travaux de l’Assemblée générale et de ses organes sub-
sidiaires, ni aux conférences et réunions organisées par celle-ci.
D’un autre côté, la résolution ne met pas fin à l’appartenance de la

Yougoslavie à l’Organisation et ne la suspend pas. En conséquence,
le siège et la plaque portant le nom de la Yougoslavie subsistent,
mais dans les organes de l’Assemblée les représentants de la Répu-
blique fédérale de la Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténégro) ne peuvent
occuper la place réservée à la «Yougoslavie». La mission de la You-

goslavie auprès du Siège de l’Organisation des Nations Unies ainsi
que les bureaux occupés par celle-ci peuvent poursuivre leurs acti-

281332 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE JUDGMENT )

the last flag of Yugoslavia used by the Secretariat. The resolution
does not take away the right of Yugoslavia to participate in the

work of organs other than Assembly bodies. The admission to the
United Nations of a new Yugoslavia under Article 4 of the Charter
will terminate the situation created by resolution 47/1.” (United
Nations doc. A/47/485; original emphasis.)

61. On 29 April 1993, the General Assembly, upon the recommenda-
tion contained in Security Council resolution 821 (1993) (couched in

terms similar to those of Security Council resolution 777 (1992)), adopted
resolution 47/229 in which it decided that “the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not participate in the work of
the Economic and Social Council”.
62. As is clear from the sequence of events summarized in the above
paragraphs (paragraphs 53-61), the legal position of the Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia within the United Nations and vis-à-vis that Organization
remained highly complex during the period 1992-2000. In fact, it is the
view of the Court that the legal situation that obtained within the United
Nations during that eight-year period concerning the status of the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia, after the break-up of the Socialist Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia, remained ambiguous and open to different
assessments. This was due, inter alia, to the absence of an authoritative
determination by the competent organs of the United Nations defining
clearly the legal status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia vis-à-vis the
United Nations.

63. Within the United Nations, three different positions were taken on
the issue of the legal status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In the
first place, there was the position taken by the two political organs con-
cerned. The Security Council, as an organ of the United Nations which

under the Charter is vested with powers and responsibilities as regards
membership, stated in its resolution 777 (1992) of 19 September 1992 that
it “consider[ed] that the state formerly known as the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist” and that it “[c]onsider[ed]
that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) can-
not continue automatically the membership of the Socialist Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations”.

64. The other organ which under the Charter is vested with powers
and responsibilities as regards membership in the United Nations is the
General Assembly. In the wake of this Security Council resolution, and

especially in light of its recommendation to the General Assembly that “it
decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
should apply for membership in the United Nations”, the Assembly took

29 LICÉITÉ DE L EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1332

vités, ils peuvent recevoir et distribuer des documents. Au Siège, le

Secrétariat continuera de hisser le drapeau de l’ancienne Yougosla-
vie, car c’est le dernier drapeau que le Secrétariat ait connu. La réso-
lution n’enlève pas à la Yougoslavie le droit de participer aux tra-
vaux des organes autres que ceux de l’Assemblée. L’admission à
l’Organisation des Nations Unies d’une nouvelle Yougoslavie, en

vertu de l’article 4 de la Charte, mettra fin à la situation créée par la
résolution 47/1.» (Nations Unies, doc.A/47/485; les italiques sont
dans l’original.)

61. Le 29 avril 1993, l’Assemblée générale, suivant la recommandation

figurant dans la résolution 821 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité (formulée en
des termes similaires à ceux de la résolution 777 (1992) du Conseil de
sécurité), adopta la résolution 47/229, dans laquelle elle décida que «la
République fédérative de Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténégro) ne partici-

pera[it] pas aux travaux du Conseil économique et social».
62. Ainsi qu’il ressort sans équivoque de la suite d’événements résumée
aux paragraphes précédents (paragraphes 53 à 61), la situation juridique
de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie au sein de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies, et à l’égard de celle-ci, demeura des plus complexes au

cours de la période comprise entre 1992 et 2000. De fait, de l’avis de la
Cour, la situation juridique qui prévalut aux Nations Unies pendant ces
huit années à l’égard du statut de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie
après l’éclatement de la République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie
demeura ambiguë et ouverte à des appréciations divergentes. Cette situa-

tion était due notamment à l’absence d’une décision faisant autorité par
laquelle les organes compétents de l’Organisation des Nations Unies
auraient défini de manière claire le statut juridique de la République fédé-
rale de Yougoslavie vis-à-vis de l’Organisation.
63. Au sein de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, trois positions diffé-

rentes furent adoptées sur la question du statut juridique de la Répu-
blique fédérale de Yougoslavie. La première était celle des deux organes
politiques concernés. Le Conseil de sécurité, l’un des organes de l’Orga-
nisation des Nations Unies dotés en vertu de la Charte, de pouvoirs et de
responsabilités en matière d’admission à l’Organisation, avait déclaré

dans sa résolution 777 (1992) du 19 septembre 1992 qu’il considérait
«que l’Etat antérieurement connu comme la République fédérative socia-
liste de Yougoslavie a[vait] cessé d’exister» et «que la République fédé-
rative de Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténégro) ne p[ouvait] pas assurer
automatiquement la continuité de la qualité de Membre de l’ancienne

République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie aux Nations Unies».
64. L’autre organe doté, en vertu de la Charte, de pouvoirs et de res-
ponsabilités en matière d’admission à l’Organisation des Nations Unies
est l’Assemblée générale. A la suite de la résolution 777 du Conseil de
sécurité, et tout particulièrement à la lumière de la recommandation ten-

dant à ce qu’elle «décid[e] que la République fédérative de Yougoslavie
(Serbie et Monténégro) devrait présenter une demande d’adhésion aux

291333 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

the position in resolution 47/1 of 22 September 1992 that it “[c]on-
sider[ed] that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Monte-

negro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations”. On that
basis, it “decide[d] that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations”.

65. While it is clear from the voting figures (see paragraphs 57 and 58
above) that these resolutions reflected a position endorsed by the vast
majority of the Members of the United Nations, they cannot be con-
strued as conveying an authoritative determination of the legal status of

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within, or vis-à-vis, the United
Nations. The uncertainty surrounding the question is evidenced, inter
alia, by the practice of the General Assembly in budgetary matters during
the years following the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
66. The following were the arrangements made with regard to the

assessment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for annual contribu-
tions to the United Nations budget, during the period between 1992 and
2000. Prior to the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia, the rate of assessment for that State for 1992, 1993 and 1994 had
been established in 1991 as 0.42 per cent (General Assembly resolu-

tion 46/221 of 20 December 1991). On 23 December 1992, the General
Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee, decided to
adopt the recommendations of the Committee on Contributions that,
inter alia, for 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia
should pay seven-twelfths of their rates of assessment for 1993 and 1994,

and that “their actual assessment should be deducted from that of Yugo-
slavia for that year” (United Nations doc. A/47/11, para. 64). By resolu-
tion 48/223 of 23 December 1993, the General Assembly determined that
the 1993 rate of assessment of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia, admitted to membership in the United Nations in 1993, should be

deducted from that of Yugoslavia. The General Assembly also decided
that the rate of assessment of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia should be deducted from that of Yugoslavia for 1994. Following this
practice, the rate of assessment for the contribution of Yugoslavia to the
regular budget of the United Nations for the years 1995, 1996 and 1997
was determined to be 0.11, 0.1025 and 0.10 per cent respectively (General

Assembly resolution 49/19 B of 23 December 1994), and for the next tri-
ennial period, the rate of assessment of Yugoslavia for the years 1998,
1999 and 2000 was determined to be 0.060, 0.034 and 0.026 per cent
respectively (General Assembly resolution 52/215 A of 20 January 1998).
(See further I.C.J. Reports 2003, pp. 22-23, paras. 45-47.)

67. Secondly, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, for its part, main-
tained its claim that it continued the legal personality of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This claim had been clearly stated in the

30 LICÉITÉ DE L EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1333

Nations Unies», l’Assemblée générale adopta, dans sa résolution 47/1 du

22 septembre 1992, la position consistant à «[c]onsid[érer] que la Répu-
blique fédérative de Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténégro) ne p[ouvait] pas
assumer automatiquement la [continuité de la] qualité de Membre de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies à la place de l’ancienne République
fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie» et décida en conséquence «que la

République fédérative de Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténégro) devrait
présenter une demande d’admission à l’Organisation».
65. S’il ressort sans ambiguïté des résultats des votes (voir para-
graphes 57 et 58 ci-dessus) qu’elles reflétaient une position adoptée par la
vaste majorité des Etats Membres de l’Organisation des Nations Unies,

ces résolutions ne sauraient être interprétées comme constituant des déci-
sions faisant autorité quant au statut juridique de la République fédérale
de Yougoslavie au sein de l’Organisation ou vis-à-vis de celle-ci. L’incer-
titude entourant cette question est attestée, entre autres, par la pratique

de l’Assemblée générale en matière budgétaire dans les années qui sui-
virent l’éclatement de la République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie.
66. Les dispositions suivantes furent prises s’agissant des contributions
annuelles au budget de l’Organisation des Nations Unies dues par la
République fédérale de Yougoslavie au cours de la période allant de 1992

à 2000. Avant l’éclatement de la République fédérative socialiste de You-
goslavie, la quote-part de cet Etat pour 1992, 1993 et 1994 avait été fixée,
en 1991, à 0,42 % (résolution 46/221 de l’Assemblée générale du 20 dé-
cembre 1991). Le 23 décembre 1992, l’Assemblée générale, sur recomman-
dation de la Cinquième Commission, décida d’adopter les recommanda-

tions du comité des contributions, disposant notamment que, pour 1992,
la Bosnie-Herzégovine, la Croatie et la Slovénie devraient payer sept dou-
zièmes de leur quote-part pour 1993 et 1994, et que «leurs contributions
seraient déduites de celle de la Yougoslavie» (Nations Unies, doc.A/47/
11, par. 64). Par sa résolution 48/223 du 23 décembre 1993, l’Assemblée

générale décida que, pour 1993, la quote-part de l’ex-République yougo-
slave de Macédoine, admise à l’Organisation des Nations Unies en 1993,
serait déduite de celle de la Yougoslavie. Elle prit la même décision s’agis-
sant de la quote-part de l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine
pour 1994. Suivant cette pratique, les quotes-parts pour le calcul des

contributions de la Yougoslavie au budget ordinaire de l’Organisation
des Nations Unies pour les années 1995, 1996 et 1997 furent fixées
à 0,11%, 0,1025% et 0,10% respectivement (résolution 49/19B de
l’Assemblée générale du 23 décembre 1994) et pour la période triennale
suivante, soit pour 1998, 1999 et 2000, à 0,060%, 0,034% et 0,026% res-

pectivement (résolution 52/215A de l’Assemblée générale du 20 jan-
vier 1998). (Voir également C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 22-23, par. 45-47.)

67. La deuxième position était celle de la République fédérale de You-

goslavie, qui soutenait pour sa part qu’elle assurait la continuité de la
personnalité juridique de la République fédérative socialiste de Yougo-

301334 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE JUDGMENT )

official Note of 27 April 1992 from the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General of the United

Nations (see paragraph 55 above). It was sustained by the Applicant
throughout the period from 1992 to 2000 (see, for example, Memorial,
Part III, paras. 3.1.3 and 3.1.17).

68. Thirdly, another organ that came to be involved in this problem

was the Secretariat of the United Nations. In the absence of any authori-
tative determination on the legal status of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia within, or vis-à-vis, the United Nations, the Secretariat, as the
administrative organ of the Organization, simply continued to keep to
the practice of the status quo ante that had prevailed up to the break-up

of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992, pending such a
determination. This is illustrated by the practice of the Secretariat in its
role in the preparation of the budget of the Organization for considera-
tion and approval by the General Assembly. The “considered view of the
United Nations Secretariat regarding the practical consequences of the
adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 47/1” (United Nations

doc. A/47/485), issued by the Under-Secretary-General and Legal Coun-
sel on 29 September 1992 (see paragraph 60 above), should probably also
be understood in the context of this continuation of the status quo ante.

69. By the same token, the position of the Secretary-General as
reflected in the “Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Deposi-
tary of Multilateral Treaties”, prepared by the Treaty Section of the
Office of Legal Affairs and published at the beginning of 1996, was scru-

pulously to maintain the approach of following the existing practice on
the basis of the status quo ante. As originally issued, that Summary con-
tained a paragraph (paragraph 297) on the practice of the Secretariat on
the break-up of a State party to a multilateral convention of which the
Secretary-General was the depositary. It was there stated, inter alia, that

“[t]he independence of the new successor State, which then exercises its
sovereignty on its territory, is of course without effect as concerns the
treaty rights and obligations of the predecessor State as concerns its own
(remaining) territory”. The example was given of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, and the text continued:

“The same applies to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro), which remains as the predecessor State upon
separation of parts of the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
General Assembly resolution 47/1 of 22 September 1992, to the effect

that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could not automatically
continue the membership of the former Yugoslavia in the United
Nations..,.s adopted within the framework of the United

31 LICÉITÉ DE L EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1334

slavie. Cette position fut exprimée clairement dans la note officielle du

27 avril 1992 adressée au Secrétaire général par la mission permanente de
la Yougoslavie auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies (voir para-
graphe 55). Elle fut maintenue par le demandeur tout au long de la
période comprise entre 1992 et 2000 (voir, par exemple, mémoire, troi-
sième partie, par. 3.1.3 et 3.1.17).

68. La troisième position était celle d’un autre organe appelé à inter-
venir dans ce contexte, à savoir le Secrétariat de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies. En l’absence de toute décision faisant autorité quant au
statut juridique de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie au sein ou vis-
à-vis de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, le Secrétariat, en sa qualité

d’organe administratif de l’Organisation, continua simplement à se
conformer, dans l’attente d’une telle décision, à la pratique du statu quo
ante qui avait prévalu jusqu’à l’éclatement de la République fédérative
socialiste de Yougoslavie en 1992. C’est ce qu’illustre la pratique suivie

par le Secrétariat pour la préparation du budget de l’Organisation, aux
fins de la soumission de celui-ci à l’examen et à l’approbation de l’Assem-
blée générale. La «position réfléchie du Secrétariat de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies en ce qui concerne les conséquences pratiques de l’adop-
tion par l’Assemblée générale de la résolution 47/1» (Nations Unies,

doc.A/47/485) énoncée par le Secrétaire général adjoint, conseiller juridi-
que de l’Organisation, le 29 septembre 1992 (voir paragraphe 60 ci-
dessus) doit sans doute être comprise, elle aussi, dans le contexte de ce
maintien du statu quo ante.
69. De la même façon, la position du Secrétaire général, telle qu’expo-

sée dans le «Précis de la pratique du Secrétaire général en tant que dépo-
sitaire de traités multilatéraux» établi par la section des traités du bureau
des affaires juridiques et publié au début de l’année 1996, était d’observer
scrupuleusement la ligne de conduite consistant à suivre la pratique exis-
tante sur la base du statu quo ante. Dans la première édition, ce précis

contenait un paragraphe (le paragraphe 297) consacré à la pratique du
Secrétariat en cas d’éclatement d’un Etat partie à une convention multi-
latérale déposée auprès du Secrétaire général, qui disposait notamment
que «[l]’indépendance du nouvel Etat successeur, qui exerce désormais la
souveraineté sur son territoire, est naturellement sans effet quant aux

droits et obligations d’origine conventionnelle de l’Etat prédécesseur se
rapportant à ce qui lui reste de son territoire». Le texte citait l’exemple
de l’Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques, et poursuivait en ces
termes:

«Il en va de même de la République fédérative de Yougoslavie
(Serbie et Monténégro), qui demeure l’Etat prédécesseur après sépa-
ration de parties du territoire de l’ex-Yougoslavie. La résolution 47/1
de l’Assemblée générale en date du 22 septembre 1992, aux termes de
laquelle la République fédérative de Yougoslavie ne pouvait pas

assumer automatiquement la continuité de la qualité de Membre de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies de l’ex-Yougoslavie..., fut adoptée

311335 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE JUDGMENT )

Nations and the context of the Charter of the United Nations,
and not as an indication that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

was not to be considered a predecessor State.” (United Nations
doc. ST/LEG/8; see also I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 19, para. 38.)

This passage could be read as lending support to the claims of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was deleted by the Secretariat in
response to the objections raised by a number of States that the text was
contrary to the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolu-
tions and the pertinent opinions of the Arbitration Commission of the

International Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia (see United Nations
docs. A/50/910-S/1996/231, A/51/95-S/1996/251, A/50/928-S/1996/263
and A/50/930-S/1996/260).

70. A further example of the application of this approach is afforded
by the way in which the Secretariat treated the deposit of the declaration

by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia recognizing the compulsory juris-
diction of the International Court of Justice dated 25 April 1999. On
30 April 1999 the Secretary-General issued a Depositary Notification
informing Member States of that deposit (C.N.311.1999.TREATIES-1).
Although on 27 May 1999 the Permanent Representatives of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia sent a letter to the Secretary-General, questioning the validity
of the deposit of the declaration recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice by the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (United Nations doc. A/53/992), the Secretariat adhered to its past

practice respecting the status quo ante and simply left the matter there.

71. To sum up, all these events testify to the rather confused and com-
plex state of affairs that obtained within the United Nations surrounding
the issue of the legal status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the

Organization during this period. It is against this background that the
Court, in its Judgment of 3 February 2003, referred to the “sui generis
position which the FRY found itself in” during the period between 1992
and 2000.
72. It must be stated that this qualification of the position of the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia as “sui generis”, which the Court employed

to describe the situation during this period of 1992 to 2000, is not a pre-
scriptive term from which certain defined legal consequences accrue; it is
merely descriptive of the amorphous state of affairs in which the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia found itself during this period. No final and
definitive conclusion was drawn by the Court from this descriptive term

on the amorphous status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia vis-à-vis
or within the United Nations during this period. The Court did not com-
mit itself to a definitive position on the issue of the legal status of the

32 LICÉITÉ DE L EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1335

dans le cadre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et dans le contexte

de la Charte de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, et non pour indi-
quer que la République fédérative de Yougoslavie ne devait pas être
considérée comme un Etat prédécesseur.» (Traduction par le Greffe
de l’édition anglaise du document des Nations Unies ST/LEG/8 ; voir
également C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 19, par. 38.)

Ce passage pouvait être interprété comme venant à l’appui des thèses
de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie. Il fut supprimé par le Secré-
tariat en réponse aux objections soulevées par un certain nombre d’Etats,
faisant valoir qu’il allait à l’encontre des résolutions du Conseil de sécu-

rité et de l’Assemblée générale relatives à cette question ainsi que des avis
pertinents de la commission d’arbitrage de la conférence internationale
pour la paix en Yougoslavie (voir Nations Unies, doc.A/50/910-S/1996/
231, doc.A/51/95-S/1996/251, doc.A/50/928-S/1996/263 et doc.A/50/930-

S/1996/260).
70. La manière dont fut traité par le Secrétariat le dépôt de la déclara-
tion de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie reconnaissant la juridic-
tion obligatoire de la Cour internationale de Justice, en date du
25 avril 1999, fournit une nouvelle illustration de cette ligne de conduite.

Le 30 avril 1999, le Secrétaire général émit une notification dépositaire,
informant les Etats Membres du dépôt de cette déclaration
(C.N.311.1999.TREATIES-1). Le 27 mai 1999, dans une lettre adressée
au Secrétaire général, les représentants permanents de la Bosnie-Herzé-
govine, de la Croatie, de la Slovénie et de l’ex-République yougoslave de

Macédoine mirent en cause la validité du dépôt de la déclaration recon-
naissant la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour internationale de Justice par
la République fédérale de Yougoslavie (Nations Unies, doc.A/53/992),
mais le Secrétariat continua à suivre sa pratique antérieure consistant à
respecter le statu quo ante et s’en tint là.

71. En définitive, tous ces éléments attestent l’assez grande confusion
et la complexité de la situation qui prévalait aux Nations Unies autour de
la question du statut juridique de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie
au sein de l’Organisation pendant cette période. C’est dans ce contexte
que la Cour, dans son arrêt du 3 février 2003, évoqua la «situation sui

generis dans laquelle se trouvait la RFY» dans la période comprise
entre 1992 et 2000.
72. Il convient de préciser que la locution «sui generis» employée par
la Cour pour qualifier la situation de la République fédérale de Yougo-
slavie dans la période allant de 1992 à 2000 n’est pas une expression nor-

mative, dont découleraient certaines conséquences juridiques bien défi-
nies, mais une expression descriptive renvoyant au caractère indéterminé
de la situation dans laquelle s’est trouvée la République fédérale de You-
goslavie au cours de cette période. Aucune conclusion finale et définitive
ne fut tirée par la Cour de cette formule utilisée pour décrire le statut

juridique indéterminé de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie vis-à-vis
de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, ou au sein de celle-ci, pendant ladite

321336 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE JUDGMENT )

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in relation to the Charter and the Statute
in its pronouncements in incidental proceedings, in the cases involving

this issue which came before the Court during this anomalous period.
For example, the Court stated in its Order of 2 June 1999 on the request
for the indication of provisional measures in the present case as follows:

“Whereas the United Kingdom, referring to resolution 777 (1992)
of the United Nations Security Council, dated 19 September 1992,

and to resolution 47/1 of the United Nations General Assembly,
dated 22 September 1992, also contends that, since Yugoslavia can-
not be regarded as a Member of the United Nations or as a party to
the Statute of the Court, it could not establish a jurisdictional link
with parties to the Statute by purporting to make a declaration

under Article 36, paragraph 2;

Whereas Yugoslavia, referring to the position of the Secretariat,
as expressed in a letter dated 29 September 1992 from the Legal
Counsel of the Organization (doc. A/47/485), and to the latter’s sub-
sequent practice, contends for its part that General Assembly resolu-

tion 47/1 ‘[neither] terminate[d] nor suspend[ed] Yugoslavia’s mem-
bership in the Organization’, and that the said resolution did not
take away from Yugoslavia ‘[its] right to participate in the work of
organs other than Assembly bodies’;

Whereas, in view of its finding in paragraph 25 above, the Court
need not consider this question for the purpose of deciding whether
or not it can indicate provisional measures in the present case”
(I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II), p. 836, paras. 26-28).

73. This situation, however, came to an end with a new development
in 2000. On 24 September 2000, Mr. Koštunica was elected President of

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In that capacity, on 27 October 2000
he sent a letter to the Secretary-General requesting admission of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to membership in the United Nations,
in the following terms:

“In the wake of fundamental democratic changes that took place
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the capacity of President,
I have the honour to request the admission of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia to membership in the United Nations in light of the

implementation of Security Council resolution 777 (1992) .” (United
Nations doc. A/55/528-S/2000/1043; emphasis added.)

74. Acting upon this application by the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia for membership in the United Nations, the Security Council on
31 October 2000 “recommend[ed] to the General Assembly that the Fed-

33 LICÉITÉ DE L EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1336

période. La Cour n’adopta aucune position définitive sur la question du

statut juridique de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie au regard de la
Charte et du Statut lorsque, dans les affaires qui lui furent soumises au
cours de cette période singulière, la question se posa et qu’elle se pro-
nonça dans le cadre de procédures incidentes. C’est ainsi que, dans son
ordonnance du 2 juin 1999 sur la demande en indication de mesures

conservatoires en l’espèce, la Cour a dit:
«Considérant que, se référant à la résolution 777 (1992), en date

du 19 septembre 1992, du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, et à
la résolution 47/1, en date du 22 septembre 1992, de l’Assemblée
générale des Nations Unies, le Royaume-Uni soutient aussi que la
Yougoslavie ne peut pas être considérée comme un Etat Membre des

Nations Unies ni comme un Etat partie au Statut de la Cour, de
sorte qu’elle ne saurait établir de lien juridictionnel avec des Etats
parties au Statut en prétendant faire une déclaration au sens du
paragraphe 2 de l’article 36;
Considérant que la Yougoslavie, se référant à la position du

Secrétariat, telle qu’exprimée dans une lettre en date du 29 sep-
tembre 1992 du conseiller juridique de l’Organisation des Nations
Unies (doc. A/47/485), ainsi qu’à la pratique ultérieure de celle-ci,
soutient pour sa part que la résolution 47/1 de l’Assemblée générale
n’a «pas [mis] fin à l’appartenance de la Yougoslavie à l’Organi-

sation et ne [l’a pas suspendue] non plus», ladite résolution n’ôtant
pas à la Yougoslavie «le droit de participer aux travaux d’organes
autres que ceux qui relèvent de l’Assemblée générale»;
Considérant que, eu égard à la conclusion à laquelle elle est par-
venue au paragraphe 25 ci-dessus, la Cour n’a pas à examiner cette

question à l’effet de décider si elle peut ou non indiquer des mesures
conservatoires dans le cas d’espèce». (C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II) ,
p. 836, par. 26-28.)

73. Toutefois, en 2000, une nouvelle évolution marqua la fin de cette
situation. Le 24 septembre 2000, M. Koštunica fut élu président de la
République fédérale de Yougoslavie. En cette qualité, il adressa le 27 oc-
tobre 2000 au Secrétaire général une lettre demandant l’admission de la

République fédérale de Yougoslavie à l’Organisation des Nations Unies
dans les termes suivants:

«Après l’évolution démocratique fondamentale qui s’est produite
en République fédérale de Yougoslavie, j’ai l’honneur, en ma qualité
de président, de demander l’admission de la République fédérale de
Yougoslavie à l’Organisation des Nations Unies, comme suite à la
résolution 777 (1992) du Conseil de sécurité .» (Nations Unies,

doc.A/55/528-S/2000/1043; les italiques sont de la Cour.)
74. Donnant suite à cette demande d’admission de la République fédé-

rale de Yougoslavie à l’Organisation des Nations Unies, le Conseil de
sécurité, le 31 octobre 2000, «[r]ecommand[a] à l’Assemblée générale

331337 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

eral Republic of Yugoslavia be admitted to membership in the United
Nations” (United Nations doc. S/RES/1326). On 1 November 2000, the

General Assembly, by resolution 55/12, “[h]aving received the recom-
mendation of the Security Council of 31 October 2000” and “[h]aving
considered the application for membership of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia”, decided to “admit the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to
membership in the United Nations”.

75. As the letter of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia quoted above demonstrates, this action on the part of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia signified that it had finally decided to act on
Security Council resolution 777 (1992) by aligning itself with the position
of the Security Council as expressed in that resolution. Furthermore the

Security Council confirmed its own position by taking steps for the
admission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a new Member of the
United Nations, which, when followed by corresponding steps taken by
the General Assembly, completed the procedure for the admission of a
new Member under Article 4 of the Charter, rather than pursuing any
course involving recognition of continuing membership of the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations.

76. This new development effectively put an end to the sui generis
position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within the United Nations,
which, as the Court has observed in earlier pronouncements, had been

fraught with “legal difficulties” throughout the period between 1992 and
2000 (cf. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro)), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, I.C.J.
Reports 1993, p. 14, para. 18). The Applicant thus has the status of mem-

bership in the United Nations as from 1 November 2000. However, its
admission to the United Nations did not have, and could not have had,
the effect of dating back to the time when the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia broke up and disappeared; there was in 2000 no question
of restoring the membership rights of the Socialist Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia for the benefit of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At the
same time, it became clear that the sui generis position of the Applicant
could not have amounted to its membership in the Organization.

77. In the view of the Court, the significance of this new development

in 2000 is that it has clarified the thus far amorphous legal situation con-
cerning the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia vis-à-vis the
United Nations. It is in that sense that the situation that the Court now
faces in relation to Serbia and Montenegro is manifestly different from
that which it faced in 1999. If, at that time, the Court had had to deter-

mine definitively the status of the Applicant vis-à-vis the United Nations,
its task of giving such a determination would have been complicated by
the legal situation, which was shrouded in uncertainties relating to that

34 LICÉITÉ DE L EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1337

d’admettre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie en qualité de Membre
de l’Organisation des Nations Unies» (Nations Unies, doc.S/RES/1326).
Le 1 er novembre 2000, l’Assemblée générale, par sa résolution 55/12,
«[a]yant examiné la recommandation du Conseil de sécurité, en date du

31 octobre 2000» et «[a]yant examiné la demande d’admission présentée
par la République fédérale de Yougoslavie», décida d’«admettre la Répu-
blique fédérale de Yougoslavie à l’Organisation des Nations Unies».
75. Ainsi que l’atteste la lettre du président de la République fédérale
de Yougoslavie citée ci-dessus, cette démarche de la République fédérale

de Yougoslavie signifiait qu’elle avait finalement décidé de donner suite à
la résolution 777 (1992) du Conseil de sécurité en se conformant à la posi-
tion du Conseil exprimée dans cette résolution. En outre, le Conseil de
sécurité confirma sa propre position en prenant des dispositions en vue de
l’admission de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie comme nouveau

Membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies — dispositions qui, conju-
guées à celles que l’Assemblée générale adopta par la suite, parachevèrent
la procédure d’admission d’un nouveau Membre au titre de l’article 4 de
la Charte —, au lieu de suivre une voie qui eût impliqué la reconnaissance

de la continuité de la qualité de Membre des Nations Unies de la Répu-
blique fédérale de Yougoslavie.
76. Cette évolution mit fin effectivement à la situation sui generis de la
République fédérale de Yougoslavie au sein des Nations Unies, situation
qui, ainsi que la Cour l’a observé dans de précédents prononcés, avait

présenté de nombreuses «difficultés juridiques» durant toute la période
comprise entre 1992 et 2000 (cf. Application de la convention pour la pré-
vention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c.
Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténégro)), mesures conservatoires, ordon-
nance du 8 avril 1993, C.I.J. Recueil 1993 , p. 14, par. 18). Le demandeur

aerinsi le statut de Membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies depuis le
1 novembre 2000. Toutefois, son admission au sein de l’Organisation
des Nations Unies n’a pas remonté et n’a pu remonter à l’époque de
l’éclatement et de la disparition de la République fédérative socialiste de

Yougoslavie; il n’était pas question en 2000 de rétablir les droits de la
République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie en tant que Membre de
l’Organisation au bénéfice de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie. En
même temps, il est apparu clairement que la situation sui generis du
demandeur ne pouvait être regardée comme équivalant à la qualité de

Membre de l’Organisation.
77. De l’avis de la Cour, l’importance de cette évolution survenue en
2000 tient au fait qu’elle a clarifié la situation juridique, jusque-là indé-
terminée, quant au statut de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie vis-

à-vis de l’Organisation des Nations Unies. C’est en ce sens que la situa-
tion qui se présente aujourd’hui à la Cour concernant la Serbie-et-
Monténégro est manifestement différente de celle devant laquelle elle se
trouvait en 1999. Si la Cour avait alors eu à se prononcer définitivement
sur le statut du demandeur à l’égard de l’Organisation des Nations Unies,

cette tâche aurait été compliquée par les incertitudes entourant la situa-

341338 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE JUDGMENT )

status. However, from the vantage point from which the Court now
looks at the legal situation, and in light of the legal consequences of the

new development since 1 November 2000, the Court is led to the conclu-
sion that Serbia and Montenegro was not a Member of the United
Nations, and in that capacity a State party to the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, at the time of filing its Application to institute the
present proceedings before the Court on 29 April 1999.

78. A further point to consider is the relevance to the present case of
the Judgment in the Application for Revision case, of 3 February 2003.
There is no question of that Judgment possessing any force of res judi-
cata in relation to the present case. Nevertheless, the relevance of that

judgment to the present case has to be examined, inasmuch as Serbia and
Montenegro raised, in connection with its Application for revision, the
same issue of its access to the Court under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the
Statute, and the judgment of the Court was given in 2003 at a time when
the new development described above had come to be known to the
Court.

79. On 20 March 1993, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting
proceedings against the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in respect of a dispute concerning alleged violations of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The

Application invoked Article IX of the Genocide Convention as the basis
of the jurisdiction of the Court.
80. On 30 June 1995, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, referring to
Article 79, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, raised preliminary objec-
tions concerning the admissibility of the Application and the jurisdiction

of the Court to entertain the case. The Court, in its Judgment on Pre-
liminary Objections of 11 July 1996, rejected the preliminary objections
raised by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and found inter alia that
“on the basis of Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, it has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon

the dispute” (I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II) , p. 623). The question of the status
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in relation to Article 35 of the
Statute was not raised and the Court saw no reason to examine it.

81. However, in the wake of the new development in the legal status of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2000 mentioned above (para-

graphs 73-75), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia filed a new Applica-
tion dated 23 April 2001 instituting proceedings, whereby, referring
to Article 61 of the Statute of the Court, it requested the Court to revise
the above-mentioned Judgment of 11 July 1996. In its Application the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia contended the following:

“The admission of the FRY to the United Nations as a new
Member on 1 November 2000 is certainly a new fact. It can also be

35 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE ARRÊT ) 1338

tion juridique, s’agissant de ce statut. Cependant, la Cour se trouvant
aujourd’hui à même d’apprécier l’ensemble de la situation juridique, et
compte tenu des conséquences juridiques du nouvel état de fait existant
depuis le 1 novembre 2000, la Cour est amenée à conclure que la Serbie-

et-Monténégro n’était pas membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies,
ni en cette qualité partie au Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice, au
moment où elle a déposé sa requête introduisant la présente instance
devant la Cour, le 29 avril 1999.
78. Un autre point est celui de la pertinence, aux fins de la présente

instance, de l’arrêt rendu le 3 février 2003 en l’affaire de la Demande en
revision. Cet arrêt ne saurait en aucun cas revêtir une quelconque autorité
de la chose jugée pour la présente espèce. Sa pertinence pour la présente
affaire n’en doit pas moins être examinée, dans la mesure où la Serbie-
et-Monténégro a soulevé, dans le cadre de sa demande en revision, cette

même question de savoir si elle avait accès à la Cour en vertu du para-
graphe 1 de l’article 35 du Statut, et dans la mesure où l’arrêt a été rendu
en 2003, à un moment où la Cour avait eu connaissance du nouvel état de
fait décrit plus haut.

79. Le 20 mars 1993, le Gouvernement de la République de Bosnie-
Herzégovine déposa au Greffe de la Cour une requête introductive d’ins-
tance contre le Gouvernement de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie
au sujet d’un différend relatif à des violations alléguées de la convention
pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide. Dans sa

requête, le demandeur invoquait l’article IX de la convention sur le géno-
cide comme base de compétence de la Cour.
80. Le 30 juin 1995, la République fédérale de Yougoslavie, se référant
au paragraphe 1 de l’article 79 du Règlement de la Cour, souleva des
exceptions préliminaires portant sur la recevabilité de la requête et sur la

compétence de la Cour pour connaître de l’affaire. La Cour, dans l’arrêt
qu’elle rendit le 11 juillet 1996 sur les exceptions préliminaires, rejeta les
exceptions soulevées par la République fédérale de Yougoslavie et conclut,
notamment, «qu’elle a[vait] compétence, sur la base de l’article IX de la

convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide,
pour statuer sur le différend» (C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II) , p. 623). La ques-
tion du statut de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie au regard de
l’article 35 du Statut ne fut pas soulevée et la Cour ne vit aucune raison
de procéder à son examen.

81. Toutefois, à la suite du changement intervenu en 2000 dans son
statut juridique, qui a été évoqué plus haut (paragraphes 73 à 75), la
République fédérale de Yougoslavie déposa une nouvelle requête intro-
ductive d’instance datée du 23 avril 2001, par laquelle, se référant à l’ar-

ticle 61 du Statut de la Cour, elle demandait à cette dernière de reviser
l’arrêt susmentionné du 11 juillet 1996. Dans sa requête, la République
fédérale de Yougoslavie affirmait ce qui suit:

«Il est incontestable que l’admission de la RFY à l’Organisation
er
des Nations Unies le 1 novembre 2000 en tant que nouvel Etat

351339 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

demonstrated, and the Applicant submits, that this new fact is of
such a nature as to be a decisive factor regarding the question of

jurisdiction ratione personae over the FRY.

After the FRY was admitted as new Member on 1 Novem-
ber 2000, dilemmas concerning its standing have been resolved, and
it has become an unequivocal fact that the FRY did not continue the

personality of the SFRY, was not a Member of the United Nations
before 1 November 2000, was not a State party to the Statute, and
was not a State party to the Genocide Convention . . .
The admission of the FRY to the United Nations as a new
Member clears ambiguities and sheds a different light on the issue

of the membership of the FRY in the United Nations, in the Statute
and in the Genocide Convention.” (Judgment of 3 February 2003,
I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 12, para. 18.)

82. In its oral argument however, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
explained that it did not invoke its admission to the United Nations in
November 2000 as a decisive “new fact”, within the meaning of Article 61
of the Statute, capable of founding its request for revision of the

1996 Judgment. In this context, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
referred to that admission and a letter of 8 December 2000 from the
Under-Secretary-General and Legal Counsel of the United Nations to
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
expressing the view that in respect of multilateral treaties deposited with
the Secretary-General, “the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should now

undertake treaty actions, as appropriate,...ifits intention is to assume
the relevant legal rights and obligations as a successor State”. The
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia contended that its admission to the
United Nations “as a new Member” as well as the Legal Counsel’s letter
of 8 December 2000 were

“events which . . . revealed the following two decisive facts:

(1) the FRY was not a party to the Statute at the time of the Judg-
ment; and
(2) the FRY did not remain bound by Article IX of the Genocide

Convention continuing the personality of the former Yugo-
slavia”.

83. In the proceedings on that Application instituted under Article 61 of
the Statute, it was for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to show,
inter alia, the existence of a fact which was, “when the judgment was
given” on the preliminary objections of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia, i.e. on 11 July 1996, “unknown to the Court and also to the party

claiming revision”, this being one of the conditions laid down by Article 61
of the Statute for the admissibility of an application for revision. The
Court was at this stage concerned simply to establish whether the Federal

36 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1339

Membre constitue un fait nouveau. Il est également possible de mon-
trer que ce fait nouveau est de nature à exercer une influence décisive
sur la question de la compétence de la Cour ratione personae à
l’égard de la RFY et telle est la thèse du demandeur.
er
L’admission de la RFY le 1 novembre 2000 en tant que nouveau
Membre a résolu les difficultés concernant son statut et il est désor-
mais patent que la RFY n’assurait pas la continuité de la personna-
lité juridique de la RFSY, n’était pas Membre de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies avant le 1 novembre 2000, et n’était pas un Etat par-

tie au Statut non plus qu’à la convention sur le génocide...
L’admission de la RFY à l’Organisation des Nations Unies en
tant que nouveau Membre lève les ambiguïtés et jette un nouvel
éclairage sur sa qualité de Membre de l’Organisation des
Nations Unies et de partie au Statut et à la convention sur le géno-

cide.» (Arrêt du 3 février 2003, C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 12, par. 18.)

82. A l’audience, la République fédérale de Yougoslavie expliqua tou-
tefois qu’elle n’invoquait pas son admission à l’Organisation des
Nations Unies en novembre 2000 comme étant le «fait nouveau» décisif,
au sens de l’article 61 du Statut, de nature à fonder sa demande en revi-
sion de l’arrêt de 1996. A cet égard, la République fédérale de Yougosla-

vie se référa à ladite admission ainsi qu’à la lettre du 8 décembre 2000
adressée au ministre des affaires étrangères de la République fédérale de
Yougoslavie par le Secrétaire général adjoint, conseiller juridique de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies. Dans cette lettre, ce dernier estimait

que, s’agissant des traités multilatéraux déposés auprès du Secrétaire géné-
ral, «la République fédérale de Yougoslavie devrait [alors] accomplir les
formalités conventionnelles, s’il y a[vait] lieu, si elle entend[ait] faire valoir
les droits et assumer les obligations qui lui re[venaient], en qualité d’Etat
successeur» [traduction du Greffe]. La République fédérale de Yougo-

slavie soutint que cette admission «en qualité de nouveau Membre» ainsi
que la lettre du conseiller juridique du 8 décembre 2000 étaient des

«événements qui [avaient] révélé deux faits décisifs, à savoir que:
1) la RFY n’était pas partie au Statut au moment de l’arrêt; et

2) la RFY ne demeurait pas liée par l’article IX de la convention sur
le génocide en continuant d’assumer la personnalité juridique de
l’ex-Yougoslavie».

83. Dans la procédure relative à cette demande formée en vertu de
l’article 61 du Statut, c’était à la République fédérale de Yougoslavie qu’il

incombait de démontrer, entre autres, l’existence d’un fait qui, «avant le
prononcé de l’arrêt» sur ses exceptions préliminaires, c’est-à-dire avant le
11 juillet 1996, était «inconnu de la Cour et de la partie qui demand[ait] la
revision», telle étant l’une des conditions auxquelles l’article 61 du Statut
subordonne la recevabilité d’une demande en revision. A ce stade, la tâche

de la Cour consistait simplement à établir si la demande en revision de la

361340 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

Republic of Yugoslavia’s Application for revision was admissible in con-
formity with the provisions of Article 61 of the Statute. If it had found that

it was admissible, it would have given a judgment “expressly recording the
existence of the new fact” in accordance with Article 61, paragraph 2, of
the Statute, and further proceedings would have been held, in accordance
with Article 99 of the Rules of Court, “on the merits of the application”.
84. In the Judgment in the Application for Revision case, the Court

found the Application for revision inadmissible. It is to be noted that the
Court observed specifically that:
“In advancing this argument, the FRY does not rely on facts that

existed in 1996. In reality, it bases its Application for revision on the
legal consequences which it seeks to draw from facts subsequent to the
Judgment which it is asking to have revised. Those consequencese,ven
supposing them to be established, cannot be regarded as facts within
the meaning of Article 61. The FRY’s argument cannot accordingly be

upheld.” (I.C.J. Reports 2003, pp. 30-31, para. 69; emphasis added.)
85. Thus the Court did not regard the alleged “decisive facts” specified
by Serbia and Montenegro as “facts that existed in 1996” for the purpose

of Article 61. The Court therefore did not have to rule on the question
whether “the legal consequences” could indeed legitimately be deduced
from the later facts; in other words, it did not have to say whether it was
correct that Serbia and Montenegro had not been a party to the Statute
or to the Genocide Convention in 1996. It is for this reason that the

Court included in its Judgment the words now italicized in the above
quotation.
86. In its Judgment the Court went on to state that:

“Resolution 47/1 did not inter alia affect the FRY’s right to
appear before the Court or to be a party to a dispute before the
Court under the conditions laid down by the Statute...To ‘termi-
nate the situation created by resolution 47/1’, the FRY had to sub-
mit a request for admission to the United Nations as had been done

by the other Republics composing the SFRY. All these elements
were known to the Court and to the FRY at the time when the Judg-
ment was given. Nevertheless, what remained unknown in July 1996
was if and when the FRY would apply for membership in the United
Nations and if and when that application would be accepted, thus

terminating the situation created by General Assembly resolution
47/1.” (Ibid., p. 31, para. 70.)

On the critical question of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s admis-
sion to the United Nations as a new Member, the Court emphasized
that:

“General Assembly resolution 55/12 of 1 November 2000 cannot
have changed retroactively the sui generis position which the FRY
found itself in vis-à-vis the United Nations over the period 1992 to

37 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE ARRÊT ) 1340

République fédérale de Yougoslavie était recevable au regard des dispo-
sitions de l’article 61 du Statut. Si la Cour avait jugé cette requête rece-
vable, elle aurait rendu un arrêt «constatant expressément l’existence du
fait nouveau» comme il est prévu au paragraphe 2 de l’article 61 du Statut

et, conformément à l’article 99 du Règlement de la Cour, une procédure
aurait ultérieurement eu lieu «sur le fond de la demande».
84. Dans l’arrêt rendu en l’affaire de la Demande en revision, la Cour
a conclu à l’irrecevabilité de la requête. Il convient de noter que la Cour
a expressément relevé ce qui suit:

«[en avançant cet argument], la RFY ne se prévaut cependant pas de
faits existant en 1996. Elle fonde en réalité sa requête en revision sur

les conséquences juridiques qu’elle entend tirer de faits postérieurs à
l’arrêt dont la revision est demandée. Ces conséquences,à les supposer
établies, ne sauraient être regardées comme des faits au sens de l’ar-
ticle 61. L’argumentation de la RFY ne peut par suite être retenue.»
(C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 30-31, par. 69; les italiques sont de la Cour.)

85. Ainsi la Cour n’a-t-elle pas considéré les «faits décisifs» allégués
par la Serbie-et-Monténégro comme des «faits existant en 1996» aux fins

de l’article 61. Elle n’a donc pas eu à se prononcer sur la question de
savoir si des «conséquences juridiques» pouvaient bien être inférées des
faits postérieurs; en d’autres termes, la Cour n’a pas été appelée à dire s’il
était exact que la Serbie-et-Monténégro n’était pas partie au Statut ou à
la convention sur le génocide en 1996. C’est la raison pour laquelle la

Cour a inclus dans son arrêt le membre de phrase qui figure présentement
en italiques dans l’extrait cité ci-dessus.
86. Dans son arrêt, la Cour a ajouté:

«La résolution 47/1 ne portait notamment pas atteinte au droit de
la RFY d’ester devant la Cour ou d’être partie à un différend devant
celle-ci dans les conditions fixées par le Statut... Pour «mettr[e] fin à
la situation créée par la résolution 47/1», la RFY devait présenter

une demande d’admission à l’Organisation des Nations Unies comme
l’avaient fait les autres Républiques composant la RFSY. Tous ces
éléments étaient connus de la Cour et de la RFY au jour du pro-
noncé de l’arrêt. Ce qui toutefois demeurait inconnu en juillet 1996
était la réponse à la question de savoir si et quand la RFY présen-

terait une demande d’admission à l’Organisation des Nations Unies
et si et quand cette demande serait accueillie, mettant ainsi un terme
à la situation créée par la résolution 47/1 de l’Assemblée générale.»
(Ibid., p. 31, par. 70.)

Sur la question cruciale de l’admission de la République fédérale de
Yougoslavie à l’Organisation des Nations Unies en qualité de nouveau
Membre, la Cour a souligné que

«la résolution 55/12 de l’Assemblée générale en date du 1 er no-
vembre 2000 ne p[ouvait] avoir rétroactivement modifié la situa-

tion sui generis dans laquelle se trouvait la RFY vis-à-vis de l’Orga-

371341 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

2000, or its position in relation to the Statute of the Court and the
Genocide Convention” (I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 31, para. 71).

These statements cannot however be read as findings on the status of

Serbia and Montenegro in relation to the United Nations and the Geno-
cide Convention; the Court had already implied that it was not called
upon to rule on those matters, and that it was not doing so.

87. In the immediately following paragraph of the Judgment, the

Court stated:
“It follows from the foregoing that it has not been established that

the request of the FRY is based upon the discovery of ‘some fact’
which was ‘when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court
and also to the party claiming revision’. The Court therefore con-
cludes that one of the conditions for the admissibility of an applica-
tion for revision prescribed by paragraph 1 of Article 61 of the
Statute has not been satisfied.” (Ibid., para. 72.)

The Court thus made its position clear that there could have been no
retroactive modification of the situation in 2000, which would amount

to a new fact, and that therefore the conditions of Article 61 were not
satisfied. This, however, did not entail any finding by the Court, in the
revision proceedings, as to what that situation actually was.

88. Given the specific characteristics of the procedure under Article 61

of the Statute, in which the conditions for granting an application for
revision of a judgment are strictly circumscribed, there is no reason to
treat the Judgment in the Application for Revision case as having pro-
nounced upon the issue of the legal status of Serbia and Montenegro
vis-à-vis the United Nations. Nor does the Judgment pronounce upon

the status of Serbia and Montenegro in relation to the Statute of the
Court.
89. For all these reasons, the Court concludes that, at the time of filing
of its Application to institute the present proceedings before the Court on
29 April 1999, the Applicant in the present case, Serbia and Montenegro,

was not a Member of the United Nations, and, consequently, was not, on
that basis, a State party to the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice. It follows that the Court was not open to Serbia and Montenegro
under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute.

*
* *

90. The Court will now consider whether it might be open to Serbia
and Montenegro under paragraph 2 of Article 35, which provides
that:

“The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other

38 LICÉITÉ DE L EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1341

nisation des Nations Unies pendant la période 1992-2000, ni sa

situation à l’égard du Statut de la Cour et de la convention sur le
génocide» (C.I.J. Recueil 2003, par. 71).

Ces déclarations ne sauraient toutefois être interprétées comme des
conclusions quant au statut de la Serbie-et-Monténégro vis-à-vis de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies et de la convention sur le génocide; la
Cour avait déjà laissé entendre qu’elle n’était pas appelée à se prononcer
sur ces questions, et qu’elle ne faisait rien de tel.

87. Dans le paragraphe de l’arrêt qui suit immédiatement l’extrait cité,
la Cour a indiqué:

«Il découle de ce qui précède qu’il n’a pas été établi que la requête
de la RFY reposerait sur la découverte «d’un fait» qui, «avant le
prononcé de l’arrêt, était inconnu de la Cour et de la Partie qui
demande la revision». La Cour en conclut que l’une des conditions

de recevabilité d’une demande en revision prescrites au paragraphe 1
de l’article 61 du Statut n’est pas satisfaite.» (Ibid., par. 72.)

La Cour a donc clairement exprimé sa position, à savoir qu’une modifi-
cation rétroactive de la situation, constituant un fait nouveau, ne pouvait
avoir eu lieu en 2000, et que les conditions énoncées à l’article 61
n’étaient donc pas satisfaites. Cela n’emportait, toutefois, aucune conclu-

sion de la Cour, dans la procédure en revision, quant à ce qu’était la
situation en réalité.
88. Compte tenu des spécificités de la procédure prévue à l’article 61
du Statut, qui circonscrit rigoureusement les conditions à réunir pour
qu’il soit fait droit à une demande en revision d’un arrêt, rien ne justifie

de considérer que, dans l’arrêt qu’elle a rendu en l’affaire de la Demande
en revision, la Cour s’est prononcée sur la question du statut juridique de
la Serbie-et-Monténégro vis-à-vis de l’Organisation des Nations Unies.
Dans cet arrêt, la Cour ne s’est pas davantage prononcée sur la situation
de la Serbie-et-Monténégro au regard du Statut de la Cour.

89. Pour tous les motifs qui précèdent, la Cour conclut que, au moment
où il a déposé sa requête pour introduire la présente instance devant la
Cour, le 29 avril 1999, le demandeur en l’espèce, la Serbie-et-Monténé-
gro, n’était pas membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies ni, dès lors,
en cette qualité, partie au Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice. Par

voie de conséquence, la Cour n’était pas ouverte à la Serbie-et-Monténé-
gro sur la base du paragraphe 1 de l’article 35 du Statut.

*
* *

90. La Cour examinera à présent la question de savoir si elle pouvait
être ouverte à la Serbie-et-Monténégro en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l’ar-
ticle 35, lequel dispose:

«Les conditions auxquelles [la Cour] est ouverte aux autres Etats

381342 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

States [i.e. States not parties to the Statute] shall, subject to the
special provisions contained in treaties in force, be laid down by

the Security Council, but in no case shall such conditions place
the parties in a position of inequality before the Court.”

The conditions of access provided for in this text were laid down by the
Security Council in resolution 9 (1946); but Serbia and Montenegro has
not invoked that resolution, nor brought itself within the terms laid down
therein.

91. The Court notes that the Applicant, in the present case, has not in
fact claimed that the Court is open to it under paragraph 2 of Article 35,
but has based its right of access to the Court solely on paragraph 1 of the
Article. However, in some of the cases concerning Legality of Use of
Force, including the present one, the Respondent has in its preliminary

objections, or in oral argument, raised the question of the possible appli-
cation of paragraph 2, in order to contend that Serbia and Montenegro
may not rely upon that text. In this context, reference has been made
to an Order of the Court in another case, in which the provisional view
was expressed that Article IX of the Genocide Convention could be
considered as a special provision contained in a treaty in force. The

Court is therefore of the view that in the circumstances of this case it is
appropriate for it to examine the possible application of paragraph 2 of
Article 35.
92. In its Order of 8 April 1993 in the Genocide Convention case, the
Court, after quoting paragraph 2 of Article 35, stated that

“the Court therefore considers that proceedings may validly be insti-
tuted by a State against a State which is a party to such a special
provision in a treaty in force, but is not party to the Statute, and
independently of the conditions laid down by the Security Council
in its resolution 9 of 1946 (cf. S.S. “Wimbledon”, 1923, P.C.I.J.,

Series A, No. 1, p. 6); whereas a compromissory clause in a multi-
lateral convention, such as Article IX of the Genocide Convention
relied on by Bosnia-Herzegovina in the present case, could, in the
view of the Court, be regarded prima facie as a special provision
contained in a treaty in force; whereas accordingly if Bosnia-

Herzegovina and Yugoslavia are both parties to the Genocide
Convention, disputes to which Article IX applies are in any event
prima facie within the jurisdiction ratione personae of the Court”
(I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 14, para. 19; emphasis added).

In the further proceedings in that case, however, this point was not pur-
sued; the Court rejected the preliminary objections raised by the Respon-

dent in that case, one of them being that the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina had not become a party to the Genocide Convention. The
Respondent however did not raise any objection on the ground that it

39 LICÉITÉ DE L EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1342

[à savoir les Etats non parties au Statut] sont, sous réserve des dis-
positions particulières des traités en vigueur, réglées par le Conseil de
sécurité, et, dans tous les cas, sans qu’il puisse en résulter pour les
parties aucune inégalité devant la Cour.»

Les conditions d’accès à la Cour dont il s’agit dans ce texte ont été réglées

par le Conseil de sécurité dans sa résolution 9 (1946); la Serbie-et-
Monténégro n’a cependant pas invoqué la résolution en question, ni ne
s’est conformée aux termes y énoncés.
91. La Cour note que le demandeur, dans la présente instance, n’a en fait
pas prétendu que la Cour lui était ouverte en vertu du paragraphe 2 de

l’article 35, et n’a fondé son droit d’accès à la Cour que sur le seul para-
graphe 1 de l’article en question. Cependant, dans certaines des affaires
relatives à laLicéité de l’emploi de la force, dont la présente, le défendeur a,
dans ses exceptions préliminaires ou à l’audience, soulevé la question de
l’applicabilité de ce paragraphe 2, à l’appui de son affirmation selon laquelle

la Serbie-et-Monténégro ne pouvait pas se prévaloir de ladite disposition. Il
a été fait référence à cet égard à une ordonnance, rendue dans une autre
affaire, dans laquelle la Cour a considéré à titre provisoire que l’article IX
de la convention sur le génocide pouvait être regardé comme une disposi-

tion particulière d’un traité en vigueur. La Cour est par conséquent d’avis
que, dans les circonstances de la présente espèce, il est approprié de sa part
d’examiner une possible application du paragraphe 2 de l’article 35.
92. Dans son ordonnance rendue le 8 avril 1993 en l’affaire relative à
la Convention sur le génocide , la Cour, après avoir cité le paragraphe 2 de

l’article 35, dit

«qu’en conséquence, la Cour estime qu’une instance peut être vala-
blement introduite par un Etat contre un autre Etat qui, sans être
partie au Statut, est partie à une telle disposition particulière d’un
traité en vigueur, et ce indépendamment des conditions réglées par le

Conseil de sécurité dans sa résoluoion 9 (1946) (voir Vapeur Wim-
bledon, 1923, C.P.J.I. série A n 1, p. 6); que, de l’avis de la Cour,
une clause compromissoire d’une convention multilatérale, telle que
l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide, invoqué par la Bosnie-
Herzégovine en l’espèce, pourrait être considérée prima facie comme

une disposition particulière d’un traité en vigueur; qu’en consé-
quence, si la Bosnie-Herzégovine et la Yougoslavie sont toutes deux
parties à la convention sur le génocide, les différends auxquels
s’applique l’article IX relèvent en tout état de cause prima facie de la
compétence ratione personae de la Cour» (C.I.J. Recueil 1993,p.14,

par. 19; les italiques sont de la Cour).

Toutefois, dans la suite de la procédure en ladite affaire, cette question ne
fut pas examinée plus avant et la Cour rejeta les exceptions préliminaires
soulevées par le défendeur, l’une de celles-ci étant que la République de
Bosnie-Herzégovine n’était pas devenue partie à la convention sur le

génocide. Le défendeur n’avait cependant soulevé aucune exception fai-

391343 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

was itself not a party to the Genocide Convention, nor to the Statute of
the Court since, on the international plane, it had been maintaining its

claim to continue the legal personality, and the membership in inter-
national organizations including the United Nations, of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and its participation in international
treaties. The Court, having observed that it had not been contested
that Yugoslavia was party to the Genocide Convention (I.C.J. Reports

1996 (II), p. 610, para. 17) found that it had jurisdiction on the basis of
Article IX of that Convention.

93. As in respect of the questions of dismissal of the case in limine litis
and access under paragraph 1 of Article 35 (see paragraphs 25 and 51

above), the Court will consider the arguments put forward in this case
and any other legal issue which it deems relevant to consider, including
the issues raised in the other cases referred to in paragraph 3, with a view
to arriving at its conclusion regarding the possible access to the Court by
Serbia and Montenegro under Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

94. A number of Respondents contended in their pleadings that the
reference to the “treaties in force” in Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Stat-
ute relates only to treaties in force when the Statute of the Court entered
into force, i.e. on 24 October 1945. In respect of the observation made by
the Court in its Order of 8 April 1993, quoted in paragraph 92 above, the

Respondents pointed out that that was a provisional assessment, not
conclusive of the matter, and considered that “there [were] persuasive
reasons why the Court should revisit the provisional approach it adopted
to the interpretation of this clause in the Genocide Convention case”
(Preliminary Objections of Belgium, p. 73, para. 222). In particular they

referred to the “evident focus of the clause in question on the peace trea-
ties concluded after the First World War”, and argued that to construe
the phrase of Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute, “the special provi-
sions contained in treaties in force”, as meaning “jurisdictional clauses
contained in treaties in force” (i.e., any treaties whatever) would “funda-

mentally undermine the scheme of the Statute and the distinction between
access to the Court and the jurisdiction of the Court in particular cases”.
Such interpretation would, according to Belgium, “place States not party
to the Statute in a privileged position as they would have access to the
Court without any assumption of the obligations...required of States to
which the Court is open” (Preliminary Objections of Belgium, p. 73,

para. 223), or according to the United Kingdom “would...place them
in a privileged position by giving them access to the Court without
requiring them to meet the conditions normally imposed as a prerequisite
to access to the Court” (Preliminary Objections of the United Kingdom,
p. 40, para. 3.32).

95. During the oral proceedings these arguments were maintained and
reiterated by certain Respondents. Belgium argued that “[t]he Applica-

40 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1343

sant valoir qu’il n’était lui-même pas partie à la convention sur le géno-

cide et au Statut de la Cour, puisque, sur le plan international, il main-
tenait sa prétention à assurer la continuité de la personnalité juridique et
de la qualité de membre au sein d’organisations internationales, y com-
pris l’Organisation des Nations Unies, de la République fédérative socia-
liste de Yougoslavie, ainsi que de la qualité de partie de celle-ci aux

traités internationaux. La Cour, ayant observé qu’il n’avait pas été
contesté que la Yougoslavie fût partie à la convention sur le génocide
(C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II) , p. 610, par. 17), conclut qu’elle avait compé-
tence sur la base de l’article IX de cette convention.
93. Tout comme pour les questions du rejet in limine litis et de l’accès

à la Cour en vertu du paragraphe 1 de l’article 35 (voir paragraphes 25 et
51 ci-dessus), la Cour se penchera sur les arguments présentés en l’espèce
et sur toute autre question de droit qu’elle estimera pertinent d’examiner,
y compris les questions soulevées dans les autres instances mentionnées

au paragraphe 3 ci-dessus, en vue de parvenir à une conclusion concer-
nant le possible accès à la Cour de la Serbie-et-Monténégro en vertu du
paragraphe 2 de l’article 35 du Statut.
94. Un certain nombre de défendeurs ont soutenu dans leurs écritures
que la mention «traités en vigueur» figurant au paragraphe 2 de l’ar-

ticle 35 du Statut visait uniquement les traités qui étaient en vigueur à la
date d’entrée en vigueur du Statut de la Cour, à savoir le 24 octobre 1945.
Concernant l’observation de la Cour dans son ordonnance du 8 avril
1993, citée au paragraphe 92 ci-dessus, les défendeurs ont fait valoir qu’il
s’agissait là d’une évaluation provisoire, qui laissait la question en sus-

pens, et ont estimé qu’il «exist[ait] des raisons convaincantes pour que la
Cour reconsidère l’approche provisoire qu’elle a[vait] adoptée dans l’inter-
prétation de cette clause dans l’affaire sur l’application de la Convention
sur le génocide » (exceptions préliminaires de la Belgique, p. 73, par. 222).
Ils se sont référés en particulier aux «traités de paix conclus après la pre-

mière guerre mondiale que la clause entendait viser», et ont soutenu
qu’interpréter les termes du paragraphe 2 de l’article 35 du Statut, «les
dispositions particulières des traités en vigueur», comme visant «les
clauses de règlement juridictionnel des traités en vigueur»(de quelque traité
que ce soit) aurait «pour objet d’ébranler fondamentalement le système

du Statut et la distinction entre accès à la Cour et compétence de la Cour
dans des affaires particulières». Une telle interprétation, selon la Bel-
gique, «placerait les Etats qui ne sont pas parties au Statut dans une posi-
tion privilégiée dans la mesure où ils accéderaient à la Cour sans nulle-
ment s’approprier les obligations ... imposées aux Etats auxquels la Cour

est ouverte» (exceptions préliminaires de la Belgique, p. 73, par. 223), ou,
selon le Royaume-Uni, «équivaudrait à [les] placer ... dans une situation
privilégiée en leur donnant accès à la Cour sans exiger d’eux qu’ils satis-
fassent aux conditions normalement imposées en préalable à l’accès à la
Cour» (exceptions préliminaires du Royaume-Uni, p. 40, par. 3.32).

95. A l’audience, ces arguments ont été maintenus et réitérés par cer-
tains défendeurs. La Belgique a soutenu que, «[à] la date où elle a été

401344 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

tion instituting proceedings...fell comprehensively outside the jurisdic-
tional framework of the Court under Articles 35, 36 and 37 of the Statute

at the point at which the proceedings were instituted”. It elaborated
further that “[i]n the Genocide Convention case, the controlling consid-
eration is that the FRY did not contest jurisdiction on the ground that it
was not a Member of the United Nations” and continued that Serbia and
Montenegro “cannot rely on its acquiescence as respondent in one case in

order to found jurisdiction as Applicant in this case”. Belgium concluded
that it “relie[d] on both the letter and the spirit of Article 35 of the
Statute” and “[did] not acquiesce to the bringing of a claim against it
by an applicant for whom the Court was not open at the relevant time”
(emphasis added).

Italy observed that

“the question is still whether the Court could...regard itself as
having jurisdiction ratione personarum pursuant to Article 35, para-
graph 2, because Serbia and Montenegro was allegedly a party to a
‘treaty in force’ laying down the jurisdiction of the Court”.

Italy recalled the arguments on this issue in its second preliminary objec-
tion, and emphasized that,

“[i]n particular, Italy maintained that the mere presence of a clause
conferring jurisdiction in a treaty in force between two States, one of
which, the Applicant, is not at the same time a party to the Statute,
could not give that State the right to appear before the Court, unless

it met the conditions laid down by the Security Council in its resolu-
tion No. 9 of 15 October 1946. This Serbia and Montenegro has not
done and does not claim ever to have done.”

96. The Court notes that the passage quoted above (paragraph 92)
from the 1993 Order in the Genocide Convention case was addressed to
the situation in which the proceedings were instituted against a State the
membership of which in the United Nations and status of a party to the

Statute was unclear. Bosnia and Herzegovina in its Application in that
case maintained that “the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro)” was a Member of the United Nations and a party to the
Statute and at the same time indicated in the Application that the “con-
tinuity” of Yugoslavia with the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, a Member of the United Nations, “has been vigorously

contested by the entire international community ,...including by the
United Nations Security Counci l...aswell as by the General Assem-
bly” (I.C.J. Reports 1993 , p. 12, para. 15). The Order of 8 April 1993
was made in a different case; but as the Court observed in a previous
case in which questions of res judicata and Article 59 of the Statute

were raised, “[t]he real question is whether, in this case, there is cause
not to follow the reasoning and conclusions of earlier cases” ( Land and
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.

41 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1344

déposée, la requête introductive d’instance ... sortait complètement du
cadre juridictionnel de la Cour tel que défini aux articles 35, 36 et 37 du
Statut», ajoutant que, «[d]ans l’affaire relative à la Convention sur le
génocide, la considération déterminante [était] que la RFY n’a[vait] pas

contesté la compétence en invoquant sa non-appartenance à l’Organisa-
tion des Nations Unies»; elle a ensuite affirmé que la Serbie-et-Monté-
négro «ne saurait pour autant invoquer [son] acquiescement [à être
défenderesse dans une affaire] pour établir la compétence de la Cour dans
la présente affaire». La Belgique a conclu qu’elle «se fond[ait] à la fois

sur la lettre et l’esprit de l’article 35 du Statut, [et qu’e]lle n’acquies[çait]
pas à la présentation d’une demande à son encontre par un demandeur
qui n’avait pas qualité pour saisir la Cour au moment où il l’a fait» (les
italiques sont de la Cour).
L’Italie a fait observer que

«la question rest[ait] de savoir si la Cour pourrait ... se considérer

compétente ratione personarum en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l’ar-
ticle 35, du fait que la Serbie-et-Monténégro serait partie [à] un «traité
en vigueur» prévoyant la compétence de la Cour».

L’Italie a rappelé les arguments qu’elle avait développés sur ce point dans
sa deuxième exception préliminaire avant de souligner que,

«[e]n particulier, l’Italie a soutenu que la seule présence d’une clause
d’attribution de compétence dans un traité en vigueur entre deux
Etats, dont l’Etat requérant n’est pas en même temps partie au Statut,
ne saurait conférer à cet Etat le droit d’ester devant la Cour, à moins

que ce même Etat ne se conforme aux condotions établies par le
Conseil de sécurité, dans sa résolution n9 du 15 octobre 1946. Ce que
la Serbie-et-Monténégro n’a pas fait, ni ne prétend avoir jamais fait».

96. La Cour note que l’extrait cité plus haut (paragraphe 92) de l’ordon-
nance rendue en 1993 dans l’affaire relative à laConvention sur le géno-
cide visait le cas d’une procédure engagée contre un Etat dont la qualité

de Membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et de partie au Statut
n’était pas certaine. La Bosnie-Herzégovine, dans sa requête en ladite
affaire, soutenait que la «République fédérale de Yougoslavie (Ser-
bie et Monténégro)» était Membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et
partie au Statut et, en même temps, y indiquait que la «continuité» entre

la Yougoslavie et l’ex-République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie,
Etat Membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, «a[vait] été vigoureu-
sement contestée par l’ensemble de la communauté internationale, y com-
pris par le Conseil de sécurité de l’Organisation des Nations Unies ... ainsi

que par l’Assemblée générale» (C.I.J. Recueil 1993, p. 12, par. 15).
L’ordonnance du 8 avril 1993 a été rendue dans une affaire différente,
mais ainsi que la Cour l’a fait observer dans une précédente affaire où des
questions ayant trait à l’autorité de la chose jugée et à l’article 59 du Sta-
tut avaient été soulevées, «[l]a question [était] en réalité de savoir si, dans

la présente espèce, il exist[ait] pour la Cour des raisons de s’écarter des

411345 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 292,
para. 28).

97. The Order of 8 April 1993 was made on the basis of an examina-
tion of the relevant law and facts in the context of incidental proceedings
on a request for the indication of provisional measures. It would there-
fore now be appropriate for the Court to make a definitive finding on the

question whether Article 35, paragraph 2, affords access to the Court in
the present case, and for that purpose, to examine further the question of
its applicability and interpretation.
98. The Court will thus proceed to the interpretation of Article 35,
paragraph 2, of the Statute, and will do so in accordance with customary

international law, reflected in Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. According to paragraph 1 of Article 31, a treaty
must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary mean-
ing to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of the treaty’s
object and purpose. Interpretation must be based above all upon the text
of the treaty. As a supplementary measure recourse may be had to means

of interpretation such as the preparatory work of the treaty and the cir-
cumstances of its conclusion.
99. Article 35, paragraph 2, refers to “the special provisions contained
in treaties in force”, in the context of the question of access to the Court.
Taking the natural and ordinary meaning of the words “special provi-

sions”, the reference must in the view of the Court be to treaties that
make “special provision” in relation to the Court, and this can hardly be
anything other than provision for the settlement of disputes between the
parties to the treaty by reference of the matter to the Court. As for the
words “treaties in force”, in their natural and ordinary meaning they do

not indicate at what date the treaties contemplated are to be in force, and
thus they may lend themselves to different interpretations. One can con-
strue those words as referring to treaties which were in force at the time
that the Statute itself came into force, as was contended by certain
Respondents; or to those which were in force on the date of the institu-

tion of proceedings in a case in which such treaties are invoked. In favour
of this latter interpretation, it may be observed that the similar expression
“treaties and conventions in force” is found in Article 36, paragraph 1, of
the Statute, and the Court has interpreted it in this sense (for example,
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Con-
vention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab

Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1998, p. 16, para. 19). The expression “treaty or convention in
force” in Article 37 of the Statute has also been read as meaning in force
at the date proceedings were instituted (Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Company, Limited, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.

Reports 1964, p. 27).
100. The object and purpose of Article 35 of the Statute is to define
the conditions of access to the Court. While paragraph 1 of that Article

42 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1345

motifs et des conclusions adoptés dans ces précédents» (Frontière ter-

restre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria),
exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998 , p. 292, par. 28).
97. L’ordonnance du 8 avril 1993 a été rendue sur la base d’un examen
du droit et des faits pertinents dans le cadre d’une procédure incidente de
demande en indication de mesures conservatoires. Aussi y a-t-il lieu pour

la Cour, afin de trancher définitivement la question de savoir si le para-
graphe 2 de l’article 35 permet d’avoir accès à la Cour en l’espèce, d’exa-
miner plus avant la question de l’applicabilité et de l’interprétation de
cette disposition.
98. La Cour procédera donc à l’interprétation du paragraphe 2 de

l’article 35 du Statut, et le fera en se conformant au droit international
coutumier, qui a trouvé son expression dans l’article 31 de la convention
de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des traités. Selon le paragraphe 1 de l’ar-
ticle 31, un traité doit être interprété de bonne foi suivant le sens ordinaire

à attribuer à ses termes dans leur contexte et à la lumière de son objet et
de son but. L’interprétation doit être fondée avant tout sur le texte du
traité lui-même. Il peut être fait appel à titre complémentaire à des
moyens d’interprétation tels que les travaux préparatoires et les circon-
stances dans lesquelles le traité a été conclu.

99. En ce qui concerne la question de l’accès à la Cour, le paragraphe 2
de l’article 35 du Statut fait référence aux «dispositions particulières des
traités en vigueur». Prise dans son sens naturel et ordinaire, l’expression
«dispositions particulières» doit, de l’avis de la Cour, se référer à des trai-
tés qui contiennent une «disposition particulière» visant la Cour, et il ne

peut guère s’agir d’autre chose que d’une disposition tendant à soumettre
à la Cour le règlement de différends entre les parties au traité. Quant à
l’expression «traités en vigueur», son sens naturel et ordinaire ne fournit
pas d’indication quant à la date à laquelle les traités visés doivent être en
vigueur, et par conséquent elle peut être interprétée de différentes ma-

nières. On peut l’interpréter comme visant les traités qui étaient en vigueur
à la date à laquelle le Statut lui-même était entré en vigueur, comme l’ont
fait certains défendeurs; ou comme visant les traités qui étaient en vigueur
à la date de l’introduction de l’instance dans une affaire où ces traités sont
invoqués. On peut rappeler à l’appui de cette dernière interprétation que

l’expression «traités et conventions en vigueur» se retrouve également au
paragraphe 1 de l’article 36 du Statut, et la Cour l’a interprétée en ce sens
(voir par exemple Questions d’interprétation et d’application de la conven-
tion de Montréal de 1971 résultant de l’incident aérien de Lockerbie
(Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c. Royaume-Uni), exceptions préliminaires,

arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 16, par. 19). L’expression «un traité ou une
convention en vigueur» figurant à l’article 37 du Statut a elle aussi été
interprétée comme signifiant «en vigueur» à la date de l’introduction de
l’instance (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, excep-
tions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1964, p. 27).

100. L’article 35 du Statut a pour objet et pour but de définir les
conditions d’accès à la Cour. Tandis que le paragraphe 1 de cet article

421346 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

opens it to the States parties to the Statute, paragraph 2 is intended to
regulate access to the Court by States which are not parties to the Stat-

ute. The conditions of access of such States are, “subject to the special
provisions contained in treaties in force”, to be determined by the Secu-
rity Council, with the proviso that in no case shall such conditions place
the parties in a position of inequality before the Court. The Court con-
siders that it was natural to reserve the position in relation to any rele-

vant treaty provisions that might then exist; moreover, it would have
been inconsistent with the main thrust of the text to make it possible in
the future for States to obtain access to the Court simply by the conclu-
sion between themselves of a special treaty, multilateral or bilateral, con-
taining a provision to that effect.

101. The first interpretation, according to which Article 35, para-
graph 2, refers to treaties in force at the time that the Statute came into
force, is in fact reinforced by an examination of the travaux préparatoires
of the text. Since the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice contained substantially the same provision, which was used as
a model when the Statute of the present Court was drafted, it will be

necessary to examine the drafting history of both Statutes. The text
proposed by the 1920 Committee of Jurists (as Article 32 of its draft)
was as follows:

“The Court shall be open of right to the States mentioned in the
Annex to the Covenant, and to such others as shall subsequently
enter the League of Nations.

Other States may have access to it.
The conditions under which the Court shall be open of right or
accessible to States which are not Members of the League of Nations
shall be determined by the Council, in accordance with Article 17 of
the Covenant.” (League of Nations, Permanent Court of International

Justice, Documents concerning the action taken by the Council of the
League of Nations under Article 14 of the Covenant and the adoption
by the Assembly of the Statute of the Permanent Court , p. 78.)

102. During the consideration of this text by the Sub-Committee of
the Third-Committee of the First Assembly Meeting of the League of
Nations it was pointed out “that under the Treaties of Peace the Central

Powers would often be Parties before the Court” and that “[t]he text of
the draft does not take sufficient account of this fact” and it was pro-
posed suppressing the first two paragraphs of the Article (ibid., p. 141).
A question was raised “whether the Council might place conditions on
the admission of Germany before the Court, for example in the case men-
tioned in Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles” to which a negative

response was given. Then the Chairman proposed to entrust a small com-
mittee with the task of drafting a new formula for Article 32 which

“should act upon the three following principles, upon which the
Sub-Committee was agreed:

43 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1346

ouvre la Cour aux Etats parties au Statut, le paragraphe 2 vise à régle-

menter les conditions d’accès à la Cour pour ceux qui ne sont pas parties
au Statut. Les conditions dans lesquelles la Cour est ouverte à ces der-
niers sont, «sous réserve des dispositions particulières des traités en
vigueur», déterminées par le Conseil de sécurité pour autant qu’en toutes
circonstances aucune inégalité ne résulte de ces conditions pour les parties

devant la Cour. La Cour considère qu’il était naturel de réserver le cas de
toute disposition conventionnelle pertinente qui pouvait alors exister; il
aurait par ailleurs été incompatible avec l’objet essentiel du texte que de
permettre qu’à l’avenir des Etats puissent avoir accès à la Cour par la
simple conclusion d’un traité spécial, multilatéral ou bilatéral, contenant

une disposition à cet effet.
101. La première interprétation, selon laquelle le paragraphe 2 de
l’article 35 se réfère aux traités en vigueur à la date de l’entrée en vigueur
du Statut, est d’ailleurs confortée par une analyse des travaux prépara-

toires du texte. Etant donné que le Statut de la Cour permanente de Jus-
tice internationale contenait en substance la même disposition, qui fut
prise pour modèle lorsque le Statut de la présente Cour fut rédigé, il sera
nécessaire d’examiner l’histoire rédactionnelle du texte des deux Statuts.
Le texte que le comité de juristes de 1920 proposa (en tant qu’article 32

de son projet) était le suivant:

«La Cour est ouverte aux Etats mentionnés à l’Annexe au Pacte et
à ceux qui seront ultérieurement entrés dans la Société des Nations.

Elle est accessible aux autres Etats.
Les conditions auxquelles elle est ouverte ou accessible aux Etats

qui ne sont pas Membres de la Société des Nations sont réglées par
le Conseil, en tenant compte de l’article 17 du Pacte.» (Société des
Nations, Cour permanente de Justice internationale, Documents au
sujet de mesures prises par le Conseil de la Société des Nations, aux
termes de l’article 14 du Pacte, et de l’adoption par l’Assemblée du

Statut de la Cour permanente , p. 78.)

102. Lors de l’examen de ce texte par la Sous-Commission de la Troi-
sième Commission de la première Assemblée de la Société des Nations, il
fut rappelé «qu’aux termes des traités de paix les puissances centrales
ser[aient] souvent parties en cause devant la Cour» et que «[l]e texte [en
question] ne t[enait] pas suffisamment compte de ce fait», et il fut pro-

posé de supprimer les deux premiers alinéas de l’article (ibid., p. 141).
La question fut soulevée de savoir «si le Conseil p[ouvait] poser des
conditions à l’admission de l’Allemagne, par exemple dans le cas visé à
l’article 380 du Traité de Versailles», et il y fut répondu par la négative.
Le président proposa ensuite de confier à un petit comité la rédaction

d’un nouveau texte d’article 32, qui

«d[evait] s’inspirer des trois principes suivants, sur lesquels la Sous-
Commission se trouv[ait] d’accord:

431347 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

1. The Council shall have the power of determining conditions for
the admission before the Court of States which are not Members

of the League of Nations.
2. The rights of the Parties before the Court are equal.
3. Account shall be taken of Parties who may present themselves
before the Court by virtue of the Treaties of Peace .” (League of
Nations, op. cit, p. 141; emphasis added.)

103. The Sub-Committee received from the three delegates entrusted
with this task a proposal for a new text of Article 32 as follows:

“Article 32
1st paragraph: No change.

The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other
States shall, subject to special provisions contained in treaties in
force, be laid down by the Council.
When a State which is not a Member of the League of Nations is
a party to a dispute, the Court will fix the amount which that party

shall contribute towards the expenses of the Court.”
104. The Court notes that it is here, that for the first time in the
legislative history of what later became Article 35, paragraph 2, the

phrase “subject to the special provisions contained in treaties in force”
appeared. It may safely be assumed that this phrase was inserted into
the text as a response to principle 3 referred to above.

105. When the text was presented to the Sub-Committee, the Chair-

man recalled the proposal made at the previous meeting, to add to
Article 32 a provision stating that, as far as party rights are concerned,
all States are equal before the Court. In order to meet this objection
of the Chairman and of the author of that proposal, one of the three co-
authors of the proposed text of Article 32 suggested making the follow-

ing addition to the second paragraph of Article 32:
“The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other
States shall, subject to the special provisions contained in treaties in

force, be laid down by the Council, but in no case shall such provi-
sion place the parties in a position of inequality before the Court.”
(Ibid., p. 144.)

The second paragraph thus amended was adopted without any further
discussion.
106. In the report presented to the Assembly by the Third Committee,
it was stated that:

“The wording of this Article [i.e. the original draft Article 32]
seemed lacking in clearness, and the Sub-Committee has re-cast it in
an effort to express clearly [that]

.............................
The access of other States to the Court will depend either on the

44 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1347

1. Le Conseil pourra fixer des conditions pour l’admission devant la

Cour des Etats qui ne sont pas membres de la Société des Nations;

2. Les droits des parties devant la Cour sont égaux;
3. On tiendra compte des parties qui peuvent se présenter devant la
Cour en vertu des traités de paix » (Société des Nations, op. cit.,

p. 141; les italiques sont de la Cour).
103. La Sous-Commission reçut des trois représentants ainsi mandatés

une proposition tendant à reformuler comme suit le texte de l’article 32:
«Article 32

Alinéa I. — Sans changement.
Les conditions auxquelles la Cour est ouverte aux autres Etats
sont réglées, sous réserve des dispositions particulières des traités en
vigueur, par le Conseil.

Lorsqu’un Etat, qui n’est pas membre de la Société des Nations,
est partie en cause, la Cour fixera la contribution aux frais de la
Cour, que cette partie devra supporter.»

104. La Cour relève que ce fut à ce moment-là qu’apparut, pour la
première fois dans la genèse du texte de ce qui devait par la suite devenir
le paragraphe 2 de l’article 35, l’expression «sous réserve des dispositions
particulières des traités en vigueur». Il est permis de supposer que cette
expression fut insérée dans le texte pour satisfaire au troisième des prin-

cipes évoqués ci-dessus.
105. Lorsque le texte fut présenté à la Sous-Commission, le président
rappela la proposition qui avait été faite, lors de la séance précédente,
d’ajouter à l’article 32 une clause disposant que, s’agissant des droits des

parties, tous les Etats étaient égaux devant la Cour. Pour tenir compte de
cette objection du président et de l’auteur de la proposition, l’un des trois
auteurs du projet d’article 32 suggéra d’ajouter la mention suivante au
deuxième alinéa de l’article 32:

«Les conditions auxquelles la Cour est ouverte aux autres Etats
sont réglées, sous réserve des dispositions particulières des traités en
vigueur, par le Conseil et, dans tous les cas, sans qu’il puisse en résul-
ter pour les parties aucune inégalité devant la Cour.» (Ibid., p. 144.)

Le deuxième alinéa ainsi modifié fut adopté sans autre discussion.

106. Le rapport présenté à l’Assemblée par la Troisième Commission
indique que:

«La rédaction de cet article [il s’agit du projet d’article 32 initial] a
semblé peu claire; la Sous-Commission l’a remaniée et s’est efforcée
d’exprimer clairement ce qui suit:
.............................

Pour les autres Etats, leur accès à la Cour dépendra ou bien des

441348 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

special provisions of the Treaties in force (for example the provisions
of the Treaty of Peace concerning the right of minorities, labour,

etc.) or else on a resolution of the Council.” (League of Nations, op.
cit., p. 210.)

107. Before the Permanent Court of International Justice, the issue
arose on two occasions. In the S.S. “Wimbledon” case (1923, P.C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 1, p. 6) the jurisdiction of the Court was founded on
Article 386 of the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919. When the pro-
ceedings were instituted in that case against Germany, that State was

not a Member of the League of Nations nor was it mentioned in the
Annex to the Covenant. A declaration by Germany accepting the juris-
diction of the Court was not considered as necessary, in light of the
reservation contained in Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute which
was intended, as shown above (paragraphs 102-104), to cover special

provisions in the Peace Treaties.
In the case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper
Silesia (1925, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 6 ), the proceedings were instituted
by Germany, before its admission to the League of Nations, against
Poland on the basis of Article 23 of the Convention relating to
Upper Silesia of 15 May 1922 and brought into force on 3 June 1922. The

Court noted that Poland “[did] not dispute the fact that the suit has been
duly submitted to the Court in accordance with Articles 35 and 40 of the
Statute” (ibid., p. 11). The Court, before rendering its judgment, con-
sidered the issue and

“was of the opinion that the relevant instruments when correctly
interpreted (more especially in the light of a report made by
M. Hagerup at the First Assembly of the League of Nations) author-

ized it in accepting the German Government’s application without
requiring the special declaration provided for in the Council Resolu-
tion” (Annual Report of the Permanent Court of International Justice
(1 January 1922-15 June 1925), P.C.I.J., Series E, No. 1 , p. 261).

Further, it is to be noted that when the Court was discussing amend-
ments of its Rules of Court a year later, two judges expressed the view
that the exception in Article 35 “could only be intended to cover situa-

tions provided for by the treaties of peace” (Acts and Documents (1926),
P.C.I.J., Series D, No. 2, Add. , p. 106). One of them explained that, in
the case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia ,

“the question then related to a treaty — the Upper Silesian Conven-
tion — drawn up under the auspices of the League of Nations which
was to be considered as supplementary to the Treaty of Versailles.
It was therefore possible to include the case in regard to which

the Court had then to decide in the general expression ‘subject to
treaties in force’, whilst construing that expression as referring to
the peace treaties . . .” (Ibid., p. 105.)

45 LICÉITÉ DE L ’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1348

dispositions particulières des traités en vigueur (par exemple les dis-
positions dans les traités de paix concernant le droit des minorités, le

travail, etc.), ou bien d’une résolution du Conseil.» (Société des
Nations, op. cit., p. 210.)

107. La question se posa à la Cour permanente de Justice internatio-
nale en deux occasions. Dans l’affaire du Vapeur Wimbledon (1923,
C.P.J.I. série A n 1, p. 7), la compétence de la Cour était fondée sur l’ar-
ticle 386 du traité de paix de Versailles du 28 juin 1919. Lorsque cette ins-

tance fut introduite contre l’Allemagne, cet Etat n’était pas membre de la
Société des Nations, et il n’était pas davantage mentionné à l’annexe au
Pacte. Il ne fut pas jugé nécessaire pour l’Allemagne de faire une déclara-
tion d’acceptation de la compétence de la Cour, compte tenu de la réserve

contenue au paragraphe 2 de l’article 35 du Statut, dont l’objet, ainsi
qu’il a été indiqué ci-dessus (paragraphes 102 à 104), était de prévoir le
cas des dispositions particulières des traités de paix.
Dans l’affaire relative à Certains intérêts allemands en Haute-Silésie
o
polonaise (1925, C.P.J.I. série A n 6), l’Allemagne introduisit, avant son
admission à la Société des Nations, une instance contre la Pologne sur la
base de l’article 23 de la convention relative à la Haute-Silésie du
15 mai 1922, entrée en vigueur le 3 juin 1922. La Cour nota que la Po-

logne «ne contest[ait] pas que la Cour [fût] régulièrement saisie en confor-
mité des articles 35 et 40 du Statut» (ibid., p. 11). Avant de rendre son
arrêt, la Cour considéra la question et

«estim[a] que les textes pertinents correctement interprétés (notam-
ment à la lumière d’un rapport présenté par M. Hagerup à la pre-

mière Assemblée de la Société des Nations et adopté par elle) lui
permett[ai]ent d’accepter la requête du Gouvernement allemand sans
exiger d’office la déclaration spéciale prévue dans la résolution du
Conseil» (Rapport annuel de la Cour permanente de Justice interna-
er o
tionale (1 janvier 1922-15 juin 1925), C.P.J.I. série E n 1, p. 252).
En outre, il convient de relever que, alors que la Cour discutait un an

plus tard des éventuels amendements à apporter à son Règlement, deux
juges se dirent d’avis que «l’on n’a[vait] pu viser, par l’exception inscrite
à l’article 35, que des situations prévues par les traités de paix» (Actes et
documents (1926), C.P.J.I. série D n o2 Add., p. 106). L’un d’eux expli-

qua que, en l’affaire relative à Certains intérêts allemands en Haute-
Silésie polonaise,

«il s’agissait ... d’un traité — la convention de Haute-Silésie —
rédigé sous les auspices de la Société des Nations et qui devait être
considéré comme un complément du traité de Versailles. Il [était]
donc possible de faire rentrer le cas sur lequel la Cour a[vait] alors

statué dans l’expression générale «sous réserve des traités en
vigueur», tout en interprétant cette expression comme visant les trai-
tés de paix...» (Ibid., p. 105.)

451349 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

No other interpretation of the phrase at issue was advanced by any
Member of the Court when in 1926 it discussed the amendment of its

Rules.
108. When the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the
Court were under preparation, the issue was first discussed by the United
Nations Committee of Jurists. In the debate, some confusion apparently
arose regarding the difference between a non-Member State which may

become party to the Statute and one which may become party to a case
before the Court. Some delegates did not make a clear distinction between
adherence to the Statute and access to the Court. The debate mostly con-
centrated on the respective roles of the General Assembly and the Secu-
rity Council in that context: there was some criticism that the Assembly

was excluded from action under paragraph 2 of Article 35 (Documents of
the United Nations Conference on International Organization , Vol. XIV,
pp. 141-145). A proposal was made to adopt paragraph 2 as it stood,
but some delegates continued to argue for a role of the Assembly to
be recognized in that paragraph. The United Kingdom suggested
that there might be inserted in paragraph 2, after the words “Security

Council”, the phrase “in accordance with any principles which may
have been laid down by the General Assembly”.

A proposal was then again made to adopt the Article as contained in
the draft. Thereupon the delegate of France observed that “it lay within

the power of the Council to determine conditions in particular cases but
the actual practice had not given cause for criticism”. He then continued:

“The Council could not restrict access to the Court when the
Assembly permitted it, but the Council could be more liberal in par-
ticular cases. The decision of the Assembly was actually the more
important, and the Council could not go against it. The Council

furthermore would have to take into account any existing treaties,
and it could not prevent access to the Court when a State had a
treaty providing for compulsory jurisdiction.” (Ibid., p. 144.)

He then proposed that Article 35 be adopted as it stood; no further sub-
stantive discussion followed, and Article 35 was adopted.
109. The report on the draft of the Statute of an International Court

of Justice submitted by the United Nations Committee of Jurists to the
United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Fran-
cisco noted in respect of Article 35 merely that:

“Aside from the purely formal changes necessitated by references
to The United Nations Organization instead of to the Covenant of
the League of Nations, Article 35 is amended only in that, in the
English text of paragraph 2, the word ‘conditions’ is substituted for

the word ‘provisions’ and in paragraph 3, the word ‘case’ is substi-
tuted for the word ‘dispute’ which will assure better agreement with
the French text.” (Ibid., p. 839.)

46 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE ARRÊT ) 1349

Lorsque, en 1926, la Cour discuta la revision de son Règlement, aucun

de ses membres n’avança d’interprétation divergente de l’expression en
question.
108. Dans la phase d’élaboration de la Charte des Nations Unies et du
Statut de la Cour, la question fut dans un premier temps discutée par le
comité de juristes des Nations Unies. Le débat révéla l’existence d’une

certaine confusion quant à la différence entre Etat non membre suscep-
tible de devenir partie au Statut et Etat non membre susceptible de deve-
nir partie à une affaire devant la Cour. Certains délégués n’établissaient
pas de distinction claire entre l’adhésion au Statut et l’accès à la Cour. Le
débat porta pour l’essentiel sur les rôles respectifs de l’Assemblée géné-

rale et du Conseil de sécurité en la matière: le fait que l’Assemblée ne fût
pas habilitée à agir aux termes du paragraphe 2 de l’article 35 suscita cer-
taines critiques (Documents de la conférence des Nations Unies sur l’orga-
nisation internationale , t. XIV, p. 141-145). Il fut proposé d’adopter tel

quel le paragraphe 2, mais certains délégués continuèrent de plaider pour
qu’un rôle soit dévolu à l’Assemblée dans ce paragraphe. Le Royaume-
Uni proposa que soit intégré au paragraphe 2, à la suite des mots
«Conseil de sécurité», le membre de phrase suivant: «en conformité avec
tout principe que pourrait avoir énoncé l’Assemblée générale» [traduc-

tion du Greffe].
Il fut de nouveau proposé d’adopter le texte tel que libellé dans le pro-
jet d’article. Le délégué de la France fit alors observer qu’il «appart[enait]
au Conseil de régler les conditions dans les cas particuliers mais que, de
fait, cette pratique n’avait pas donné matière à critique», et poursuivit:

«Le Conseil ne pourra limiter l’accès à la Cour lorsque celui-ci

aura été autorisé par l’Assemblée, mais il pourra se montrer moins
strict dans certains cas. La décision de l’Assemblée primera de fait,
et le Conseil ne pourra s’y opposer. Le Conseil devra en outre tenir
compte de tous les traités existants, et ne pourra empêcher d’ester
devant la Cour un Etat qui pourra se prévaloir d’un traité prévoyant

la juridiction obligatoire.» (Ibid.,p.144 [traduction du Greffe].)

Il proposa ensuite que l’article 35 soit adopté en l’état; aucun autre débat
de fond ne suivit cette proposition et l’article 35 fut adopté.
109. Le rapport sur le projet de Statut d’une Cour internationale de
Justice présenté par le comité de juristes des Nations Unies à la confé-
rence des Nations Unies pour l’organisation internationale à San Fran-

cisco ne contenait, au sujet de l’article 35, que l’observation suivante:

«En dehors des modifications de pure forme nécessitées par la
référence à l’Organisation des Nations Unies et non plus au Pacte de
la Société des Nations, l’article 35 est rectifié seulement en ce que,
dans le texte anglais du paragraphe 2, le mot «conditions» est sub-
stitué au mot «provisions», et dans le paragraphe 3, le mot «case» est

substitué au mot «dispute», ce qui assurera une meilleure concor-
dance avec le texte français.» (Ibid., p. 870.)

461350 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

Since the draft Statute of this Court was based on the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, the report did not indicate

any change in respect of the scope of the applicability of Article 35,
paragraph 2.
110. At the San Francisco Conference, the question here examined
was not touched upon; the discussion of draft Article 35 focused mainly
on a proposal by Egypt to insert a new paragraph 2 stating “[t]he condi-

tions under which states not members may become parties to the Statute
of the Court shall be determined in each case by the General Assembly
upon recommendation of the Security Council” (Documents of the United
Nations Conference on International Organization , Vol. XIII, p. 484). In
the debate in Committee IV/1 of the Conference,

“[i]t was pointed out that the question as to what states are to be

parties to the Statute should be decided in the Charter, while the
question as to what states may appear before the Court in the case,
once the Court is established, should be determined by the Statute”
(ibid., p. 283).

The Egyptian proposal was not pursued but the essence of it was reflected
in Article 93, paragraph 2, of the Charter.
111. The Court considers that the legislative history of Article 35,
paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Permanent Court demonstrates that it

was intended as an exception to the principle stated in paragraph 1, in
order to cover cases contemplated in agreements concluded in the after-
math of the First World War before the Statute entered into force. How-
ever, the travaux préparatoires of the Statute of the present Court are less
illuminating. The discussion of Article 35 was provisional and somewhat

cursory; it took place at a stage in the planning of the future interna-
tional organization when it was not yet settled whether the Permanent
Court would be preserved or replaced by a new court. Indeed, the records
quoted in paragraphs 108 to 110 above do not include any discussion
which would suggest that Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute should

be given a different meaning from the corresponding provision in the
Statute of the Permanent Court. It would rather seem that the text was
reproduced from the Statute of the Permanent Court; there is no indica-
tion that any extension of access to the Court was intended.

Accordingly Article 35, paragraph 2, must be interpreted, mutatis

mutandis, in the same way as the equivalent text in the Statute of the Per-
manent Court, namely as intended to refer to treaties in force at the date
of the entry into force of the new Statute, and providing for the jurisdic-
tion of the new Court. In fact, no such prior treaties, referring to the
jurisdiction of the present Court, have been brought to the attention of

the Court, and it may be that none existed. In the view of the Court,
however, neither this circumstance, nor any consideration of the object
and purpose of the text, nor the travaux préparatoires, offer support to

47 LICÉITÉ DE L’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE ARRÊT ) 1350

Le projet de Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice étant fondé sur le

Statut de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, le rapport ne
mentionnait aucun changement s’agissant de l’applicabilité du para-
graphe 2 de l’article 35.
110. A la conférence de San Francisco la question examinée ici ne fut
pas abordée; la discussion sur le projet d’article 35 porta essentiellement

sur une proposition de l’Egypte visant à incorporer un nouveau para-
graphe 2 libellé comme suit: «Les conditions auxquelles les Etats non
membres peuvent devenir parties au Statut de la Cour seront déterminées
dans chaque cas par l’Assemblée générale sur la recommandation du
Conseil de sécurité.» (Documents de la conférence des Nations Unies sur

l’organisation internationale , t. XIII, p. 484.) Au cours du débat au sein
du comité IV/1 de la conférence, l’on fit observer que

«[l]a question de savoir quels Etats ser[aie]nt parties au Statut dev[ait]
être tranchée dans la Charte..., alors que celle de savoir quels Etats
pourr[aie]nt se présenter devant la Cour, quand cette dernière sera[it]
établie, dev[ait] être réglée par le Statut» (ibid., p. 289).

La proposition de l’Egypte resta sans suite; le paragraphe 2 de l’article 93

de la Charte en reprend toutefois la teneur.
111. La Cour considère que l’histoire rédactionnelle du paragraphe 2
de l’article 35 du Statut de la Cour permanente montre que ses disposi-
tions étaient conçues comme une exception au principe énoncé au para-
graphe 1, en vue de couvrir les cas prévus par les accords conclus immé-

diatement après le premier conflit mondial, avant l’entrée en vigueur du
Statut. Les travaux préparatoires du Statut de la présente Cour sont
cependant moins éclairants. Les discussions relatives à l’article 35 revê-
tirent un caractère provisoire et quelque peu superficiel. Elles eurent lieu à
un stade de la planification de la future organisation internationale où

l’on ne savait pas encore si la Cour permanente serait conservée ou rem-
placée par une nouvelle cour. De fait, les comptes rendus cités aux para-
graphes 108 à 110 ci-dessus ne font mention d’aucune discussion d’où il
ressortirait qu’il conviendrait de donner au paragraphe 2 de l’article 35
du Statut un sens différent de celui qui était le sien dans le Statut de la

Cour permanente. Il semble plutôt que le texte ait été simplement repris
du Statut de la Cour permanente; rien n’indique que l’on ait eu l’inten-
tion d’élargir l’accès à la Cour.
Aussi faut-il interpréter, mutatis mutandis, le paragraphe 2 de l’ar-
ticle 35 de la même manière que le texte correspondant du Statut de la

Cour permanente, à savoir comme visant les traités en vigueur à la date
de l’entrée en vigueur du nouveau Statut et prévoyant la juridiction de la
nouvelle Cour. Certes, aucun de ces traités antérieurs faisant référence à
la compétence de la présente Cour n’a été porté à l’attention de la Cour
et il se peut qu’il n’en ait jamais existé. La Cour estime cependant que ni

cette circonstance, ni l’examen de l’objet et du but du texte, pas plus que
les travaux préparatoires ne permettent d’étayer l’autre interprétation

471351 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE JUDGMENT )

the alternative interpretation that the provision was intended as granting
access to the Court to States not parties to the Statute without any condi-

tion other than the existence of a treaty, containing a clause conferring
jurisdiction on the Court, which might be concluded any time subse-
quently to the entry into force of the Statute. As noted above (para-
graph 100), this interpretation would lead to a result quite incompatible
with the object and purpose of Article 35, paragraph 2, namely the regu-

lation of access to the Court by States non-parties to the Statute. In the
view of the Court therefore, the reference in Article 35, paragraph 2, of
the Statute to “the special provisions contained in treaties in force”
applies only to treaties in force at the date of the entry into force of the
Statute, and not to any treaties concluded since that date.

112. The Court thus concludes that, even assuming that Serbia and
Montenegro was a party to the Genocide Convention at the relevant
date, Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute does not provide it with a
basis to have access to the Court, under Article IX of that Convention,
since the Convention only entered into force on 12 January 1951, after
the entry into force of the Statute (see paragraph 111 above). The Court

does not therefore consider it necessary to decide whether Serbia and
Montenegro was or was not a party to the Genocide Convention
on 29 April 1999 when the current proceedings were instituted.

*
* *

113. The conclusion which the Court has reached, that Serbia and
Montenegro did not, at the time of the institution of the present proceed-
ings, have access to the Court under either paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of
Article 35 of the Statute, makes it unnecessary for the Court to consider

the other preliminary objections filed by the Respondents to the jurisdic-
tion of the Court (see paragraph 44 above).

*
* *

114. Finally, the Court would recall, as it has done in other cases and
in the Order on the request for the indication of provisional measures in
the present case, the fundamental distinction between the existence of the
Court’s jurisdiction over a dispute, and the compatibility with interna-
tional law of the particular acts which are the subject of the dispute (see
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom), Provisional

Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II) , p. 839,
para. 39). Whether or not the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over a
dispute, the parties “remain in all cases responsible for acts attributable
to them that violate the rights of other States” (see Fisheries Jurisdiction
(Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports

1998, p. 456, paras. 55-56; Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Paki-
stan v. India), Jurisdiction, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2000 ,p .33
para. 51). When, however, as in the present case, the Court comes to the

48 LICÉITÉ DE L EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1351

selon laquelle cette disposition avait pour objet de permettre à des Etats

non parties au Statut d’ester devant la Cour sans autre condition que
l’existence d’un traité contenant une clause conférant compétence à la
Cour et pouvant avoir été conclu à tout moment après l’entrée en vigueur
du Statut. Ainsi qu’il a été noté ci-dessus (paragraphe 100), cette inter-
prétation conduirait à un résultat tout à fait incompatible avec l’objet et

le but du paragraphe 2 de l’article 35, qui sont de réglementer les condi-
tions d’accès à la Cour pour les Etats qui ne sont pas parties au Statut.
De l’avis de la Cour, en conséquence, la référence faite au paragraphe 2
de l’article 35 du Statut aux «dispositions particulières des traités en
vigueur» ne s’applique qu’aux traités en vigueur à la date de l’entrée en

vigueur du Statut et non aux traités conclus depuis cette date.
112. La Cour conclut donc que, même à supposer que la Serbie-et-
Monténégro ait été partie à la convention sur le génocide à la date per-
tinente, le paragraphe 2 de l’article 35 ne lui donne pas accès à la Cour

sur la base de l’article IX de cette convention puisque celle-ci n’est entrée
en vigueur que le 12 janvier 1951, après l’entrée en vigueur du Statut (voir
paragraphe 111 ci-dessus). Dès lors, la Cour n’estime pas nécessaire de
décider si la Serbie-et-Monténégro était ou non partie à la convention sur
le génocide le 29 avril 1999, lorsque la présente instance a été introduite.

* * *

113. La Cour ayant conclu que la Serbie-et-Monténégro n’avait, au

moment de l’introduction de l’instance, qualité pour ester devant la Cour
ni en vertu du paragraphe 1 ni en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l’article 35 du
Statut, il n’est pas nécessaire qu’elle examine les autres exceptions préli-
minaires à sa compétence soulevées par les défendeurs (voir para-
graphe 44 ci-dessus).

* * *

114. Enfin, la Cour rappellera, ainsi qu’elle l’a fait dans d’autres
affaires et dans l’ordonnance sur la demande en indication de mesures

conservatoires en l’espèce, la distinction fondamentale qui doit être établie
entre l’existence de la compétence de la Cour à l’égard d’un différend et la
compatibilité avec le droit international des actes qui font l’objet de ce
différend (voir Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Royaume-
Uni), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999, C.I.J. Recueil

1999 (II), p. 839, par. 39). Que la Cour conclue ou non qu’elle a compé-
tence pour connaître d’un différend, les parties «demeurent en tout état
de cause responsables des actes portant atteinte aux droits d’autres Etats
qui leur seraient imputables» (voiCompétence en matière de pêcheries (Es-
pagne c. Canada), compétence de la Cour, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998 ,

p. 456, par. 55-56; Incident aérien du 10 août 1999 (Pakistan c. Inde),
compétence de la Cour, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2000 , p. 33, par. 51).

481352 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (JUDGMENT )

conclusion that it is without jurisdiction to entertain the claims made in
the Application, it can make no finding, nor any observation whatever,
on the question whether any such violation has been committed or any

international responsibility incurred.

* * *

115. For these reasons,

T HE COURT ,

Unanimously,

Finds that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the claims made in the
Application filed by Serbia and Montenegro on 29 April 1999.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at

the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fifteenth day of December, two thou-
sand and four, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives
of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of Serbia
and Montenegro and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland, respectively.

(Signed) S HIJiuyong,

President.

(Signed) Philippe C OUVREUR ,

Registrar.

Vice-President RANJEVA and Judges G UILLAUME ,H IGGINS,K OOIJMANS,
A L-KHASAWNEH ,B UERGENTHAL and E LARABY append a joint declaration
to the Judgment of the Court; Judge KOROMA appends a declaration to
the Judgment of the Court; Judges H IGGIN,K OOIJMANS and E LARABY

and Judge ad hoc K RECu append separate opinions to the Judgment of
the Court.

(Initialled) J.Y.S.
(Initialled) Ph.C.

49 LICÉITÉ DE ’EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (ARRÊT ) 1352

Lorsque, cependant, comme elle le fait en l’espèce, la Cour parvient à
la conclusion qu’elle n’est pas compétente pour connaître des demandes

formulées dans la requête, elle ne peut se prononcer ni formuler de com-
mentaire sur l’existence de telles atteintes ou sur la responsabilité inter-
nationale qui pourrait en découler.

* * *

115. Par ces motifs,

L A COUR ,

A l’unanimité,

Dit qu’elle n’a pas compétence pour connaître des demandes formulées
par la Serbie-et-Monténégro dans sa requête déposée le 29 avril 1999.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au Palais de la
Paix, à La Haye, le quinze décembre deux mille quatre, en trois exem-
plaires, dont l’un restera déposé aux archives de la Cour et les autres

seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la Serbie-et-Monté-
négro et au Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et
d’Irlande du Nord.

Le président,

(Signé) S HI Jiuyong.

Le greffier,
(Signé) Philippe COUVREUR .

M. le juge RANJEVA, vice-président, M. le jugUILLAUME ,M mele juge
H IGGINSet MM. les juges K OOIJMANS,A L-K HASAWNEH ,BUERGENTHAL et

ELARABY joignent une déclaration commune à l’arrêt; M. le jugOROMA
joint une déclaration à l’arrêt; Mme le juge HIGGINS, MM. les juges
K OOIJMANS et ELARABY et M. le juge ad hoc RECA joignent à l’arrêt les
u
exposés de leur opinion individuelle.

(Paraphé) J.Y.S.

(Paraphé) Ph.C.

49

ICJ document subtitle

Preliminary Objections

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Judgment of 15 December 2004

Links