Judgment of 27 February 1998

Document Number
088-19980227-JUD-01-00-EN
Document Type
Incidental Proceedings
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
THE 1971MONTREAL CONVENTION ARISING

FROM THE AERIAL INCIDENT
AT LOCKERBIE

(LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA v. UNITED KINGDOM)

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

JUDGMENTOF 27 FEBRUARY 1998

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE À DES QUESTIONS

D'INTERPRÉTATION ET D'APPLICATION
DE LA CONVENTION DE MONTRÉAL DE 19-71
RÉSULTANT DE L'INCIDENT AÉRIEN

DE LOCKERBIE
(JAMAHIRIYA ARABE LIBYENC.ROYAUME-UNI) Officialcitatio:

Questionsof Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Conven-
tionarisingfrom the Aerial Incidentut Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1998,p. 9

Mode officielde citation:

Questions d'interprétationet d'application de la convention de Montréal
de 1971 résultant del'incident aérien deLockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne c. Royaume- Uni), exceptionspréliminaires,arrêt,C.. Recueil
1998, p. 9

Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441 No de vente: 698
ISBN 92-1-070761-3 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1998 YEAR 1998
27 February
General List
No. 88 27 February1998

CASE CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF

THE 1971MONTREAL CONVENTION ARISING

FROM THE AERIAL INCIDENT
AT LOCKERBIE

(LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA v.UNITED KINGDOM)

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

Objection to jurisdictio- Montreal Convention of 23 September 1971 -

Treaty inforce between the Parties - Article 14,paragraph 1, of the Conven-
tion.
Groundsfor lack ofjurisdiction invokedin theprovisionalmeasuresphase -
Arguments not reiterated in the present phase of the proceedings- Necessity
for the Court nonetheless to deal with those arguments - Negotiations
-Request for arbitration - Six-month period before the Court can be seised.
Contention that no legal dispute exists concerning the interpretation and
application of theMontreal Convention - Dispute ofa general natureas to the
legal régime applicableto the destructionof the Pan Am aircraft overLockerbie
- Spec$c disputes concerning the interpretationand application of Article 7of

the Convention, read in conjunction with Articles1, 5, 6 and 8, and the inter-
pretation and application of ArticleII of the Convention.

Contention that itis notfor the Courtto decide on the lawfulness of actions
instituted by the Respondent to securethe surrender of the two alleged offenders
- Jurisdiction of the Courtto decideon the lawfulness ofthoseactions insofur
as they would be at variancewith the provisions of theMontreal Convention.

Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) - Adoption after
jïling of the Applicatio- Jurisdiction to be determinedat the date ofjïling of

the Application. Objection to admissibility- Contention that Security Council resolutions
748 (1992) and 883 (1993) created legal obligationsfor the Partieswhichare
determinative of any dispute submitled to the Court - Admissibility to be
determinedut the date ofjîling of the Applicat-onAdoption of the resolutions
after thefiling of the Application.
Contention that those resolutions rendered the Applicant's claims without
object - Objection to the Court proceeding to judgment on the merits -
Article 79,paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court- "Preliminary" Objection -

Formal conditionsfor presentation- Article 79,paragraph 7, of the Rules of
Court - 1972 Revision - Objectioizwhich is "not exclusively" preliminary
containing "both preliminary aspectsand other aspects relating to the merits"
- Rights on the merits constituting the verysubject-matter of a decisionon the
objection.
Fixing of time-limitsfor thefurther proceedings.

JUDGMENT

Present: Vice-PresidentWEERAMANTA Rct, g Presiden;PresidentSCHWEBEL;
JudgesODA,BEDJAOU GI, ILLAUM RA,NJEVH A, RCZEGS HH, I,FLEISCH-
HAUERK , OROMAV , ERESHCHETP INA,RRA-ARANGURK ENO, IJMANS,
REZEK; Judges ad hoc Sir Robert JENNINGE S, -KOSHERIR ;egistrar
VALENCIA-OSPINA.

In the case concerning questions of interpretation and application of the

1971 Montreal Convention arising from the aerial incident at Lockerbie,
between

the Great Socialist People'sLibyan Arab Jamahiriya,

represented by
H.E. Mr. Hamed Ahmed Elhouderi, Ambassador, Secretary of the People's
Office of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the
Netherlands,

as Agent;
Mr. Mohamed A. Aljady,
Mr. Abdulhamid Raeid,

as Counsel;
Mr. Abdelrazeg El-Murtadi Suleiman, Professor of Public International
Law, Faculty of Law, University of Benghazi,
Mr. Ian Brownlie,C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., ChicheleProfessor of Public Inter-
national Law, University of Oxford,

Mr. Jean Salmon, Professor of Law emeritus, Université librede Bruxelles,
Mr. EricSuy,Professor of International Law, Catholic Universityof Louvain
(K.U. Leuven),
Mr. Eric David, Professor of Law, Université libre deBruxelles,
as Counsel and Advocates; Mr. Nicolas Angelet, Principal Assistant, Faculty of Law, Catholic Univer-
sity of Louvain (K.U. Leuven),
Mrs. Barbara Delcourt, Assistant, Faculty of Social, Political and Economic
Sciences,Université librede Bruxelles; Research Fellow, Centre of Inter-
national Law and Institute of European Studies, Université libre de

Bruxelles,
Mr. Mohamed Awad,
as Advisers.

and

the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
represented by
Sir Franklin Berman, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Legal Adviser to the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office,

as Agent and Counsel;
The Right Honourable the Lord Hardie, Q.C., The Lord Advocate for Scot-
land,
Mr. Christopher Greenwood, Barrister, Professor of International Law at
the London School of Economics,
Mr. Daniel Bethlehem, Barrister, London School of Economics,

as Counsel ;
Mr. Anthony Aust, C.M.G.,

as Deputy-Agent ;
Mr. Patrick Layden, T.D.,
Mr. Norman McFadyen,
Ms Sarah Moore,
Ms Susan Hulton,

as Advisers ;
Ms Margaret McKie,
as Secretary,

composed as above,

after deliberation,
delivevs thefollowing Judgment:

1. On 3 March 1992,the Government of the Great Socialist People'sLibyan
Arab Jamahiriya (hereinafter called "Libya") filed inthe Registry of the Court
an Application instituting proceedings against the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter called "the United
Kingdom") in respect of a "dispute . . . between Libya and the United King-
dom over the interpretation or application of the Montreal Convention" of
23 September 1971for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation (hereinafter called "the Montreal Convention"). The Applica-

tion referred to the destruction, on 21 December 1988,over Lockerbie (Scot-
land), of the aircraft on Pan Am flight 103,and to chargesbrought by the Lord
Advocate for Scotland in November 1991 against two Libyan nationals sus-pected of having caused a bomb to be placed aboard the aircraft, which bomb
had exploded causing the aeroplane to crash. The Application invoked as the

basis for jurisdiction Article 14,paragraph 1, of the Montreal Convention.

2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was
immediately communicated to the Government of the United Kingdom by the
Registrar; pursuant to paragraph 3 of that Article, al1Statesentitled to appear
before the Court were notified of the Application.
3. Pursuant to Article 69, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar
addressed to the Secretary General of the International CivilAviation Organi-
zation the notification provided for in Article 34, paragraph 3, of the Statute.
Pursuant to Article 43 of the Rules of Court, the Registrar alsoaddressedthe
notificationprovided for in Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Statute to al1those
States which, on the basis of information obtained from the depositary Gov-
ernments, appeared to be parties to the Montreal Convention.
4. Sincethe Court included upon the Bench no judge of Libyan nationality,
Libya exercisedits right under Article 31,paragraph 2, ofthe Statute to choose

a judge ad hoc to sit in the case: it chose Mr. Ahmed Sadek El-Kosheri to
do so.
5. On 3 March 1992,immediately after the filing of its Application, Libya
submitted a request for the indication of provisional measures under Article 41
of the Statute.
By an Order dated 14April 1992,the Court, after hearing the Parties, found
that the circumstances of the casewere not such as to require the exerciseof its
power to indicate provisional measures.
6. By an Order of 19June 1992,having regard to the requests of the Parties,
the Court fixed20 December 1993as the time-limitfor the filingby Libya of a
Memorial and 20 June 1995as the time-limit for the filingby the United King-
dom of a Counter-Memorial.
Libya duly filed its Memorial within the prescribed time-limit.
7. Within the time-limit fixed for the filing of its Counter-Memorial, the
United Kingdom filed Preliminary Objections to the jurisdiction of the Court

and the admissibility of the Application.
Accordingly, by an Order of 22 September 1995,the Court, noting that by
virtue of Article 79, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court the proceedings on the
merits were suspended, fixed 22 December 1995as the time-limit within which
Libya might present a written statement of its observations and submissionson
the preliminary objections.
Libya filed such a statement within the time-limit so fixed, and the case
became ready for hearing in respect of the preliminary objections.
8. By a letter dated 19February 1996,the Registrar, pursuant to Article 34,
paragraph 3, of the Statute, communicated copies of the written pleadings to
the Secretary General of the International Civil Aviation Organization and,
referring to Article 69, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, specifiedthat, if the
Organization wished to present written observations to the Court, they should
be limited, at that stage, to questions of jurisdiction and admissibility.

By a letter of 26 June 1996,the Secretary General of the International Civil
Aviation Organization informed the Court that the Organization "ha[d] no
observations to make for the moment" but wished to remain informed about
the progress of the case, in order to be able to determine whether it would be
appropriate to submit observations later. 9. By a letter dated 23 November 1995,the Registrar informed the Parties
that the Member of the Court having United Kingdom nationality had asked
to be excused from taking part in the decision of the case, pursuant to Ar-

ticle 24, paragraph 1, of the Statute. By a letter of 5 March 1997,the Deputy-
Agent of the United Kingdom, referring to Articles 31 of the Statute and 37 of
the Rules of Court, informed the Court of his Government's intention to
choose Sir Robert Jennings to sit as judge ad hoc in the case. In accordance
with Article 35, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court a copy of that letter was
communicated by the Registrar to the LibyanGovernment, whichwas informed
that 7 April 1997had been fixed as the time-limit within which Libya could
make any observations it might wish to make. No observations from the
Libyan Government reached the Court within the time-limit thus fixed.

Having regard to the proceedings instituted by Libya against the United
States of America on 3 March 1992in the case concerning Questionsof Inter-
pretation and Application of the 1971Montreal Convention arisingfrom the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of
America), and to its composition in the present case in which a judge having

United States nationality was sitting, in accordance with Article 31, para-
graph 1,of the Statute, the Court instructed the Registrar to inform Libya and
the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, that it was prepared to
accept from them, no later than 30 June 1997,any observations they wished to
make in respect of the application of Article 31, paragraph 5, of the Statute.
The Registrar wrote to the three States on 30 May 1997to that effect. Each of
the three Governments submitted observations within the prescribed time-limit.
After due deliberation, the Court, by ten votes to three, decided that in the
present phase relating to jurisdiction and admissibility in the two cases, the
United Kingdom and the United States of America were not parties in the
same interest within the meaning of Article 31, paragraph 5, of the Statute;
that the choice of ajudge adhocby the United Kingdom was therefore justified
in the current phase of the proceedings in the present case; and that accord-
ingly Sir Robert Jennings would sit on the Bench for the purpose of the oral

proceedings and would take part in the deliberations bythe Court in that phase
of the case. The Registrar notified that decision to Libya and to the United
Kingdom, and informed the United States of America of the decision,by letters
dated 16 September 1997.
10. The President of the Court, being a national of one of the Parties to the
case concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 197M 1 on-
treal Convention arisingfrom the Aerial Incidentut Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. UnitedStates of America), was unable, by virtue of Article 32,
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, to exercisethe functions of the presidency
in respect of that case. Although that provision is not applicable in the present
case, the President thought it appropriate that he should not exercisethe func-
tions of the presidency in the present case as well. It therefore fell to the Vice-
President, in accordance with Article 13,paragraph 1,of the Rules of Court, to
exercisethe functions of the presidency in the case.
11. In accordance with Article 53, paragraph 2, of its Rules, the Court

decided to make accessibleto the public, on the opening of the oral proceed-
ings, the Preliminary Objections of the United Kingdom and the written state-
ment containing the observations and submissions of Libya on the objections,
as well as the documents annexed to those pleadings, with the exception of
Annex 16to the Preliminary Objections. 12. Public sittings were held between 13and 22 October 1997,at which the
Court heard the oral arguments and replies of:

For the UnitedKingdom: Sir Franklin Berman,
The Right Honourable the Lord Hardie,
Mr. Daniel Bethlehem,
Mr. Christopher Greenwood.
For Libya: H.E. Mr. Hamed Ahmed Elhouderi,
Mr. Abdelrazeg El-Murtadi Suleiman,

Mr. Jean Salmon,
Mr. Eric David,
Mr. Eric Suy,
Mr. Ian Brownlie.
At the hearings, Members of the Court put questions to the Parties, who
answered in writing after the close of the oral proceedings.

13. In the Application, the following requests were made by Libya:

"Accordingly, while reserving the right to supplement and amend this
submission as appropriate in the course of further proceedings, Libya
requests the Court to adjudge and declare as follows:

(a) that Libya has fully complied with al1 of its obligations under the
Montreal Convention;
(b) that the United Kingdom has breached, and is continuing to breach,
its legalobligations to Libya under Articles 5(2), 5(3),7, 8 (2)and 11
of the Montreal Convention; and
(c) that the United Kingdom is under a legal obligation immediately to
cease and desist from such breaches and from the use of any and al1
force or threats against Libya, including the threat of force against
Libya, and from al1violations of the sovereignty,territorial integrity,
and the political independence of Libya."

14. In the written proceedings,the following submissions were presented by
the Parties :

On behalf of the Governmentof Libya,
in the Memorial:
"For these reasons, while reserving the right to supplement and amend

these submissions as appropriate in the course of further proceedings,
Libya requests the Court to adjudge and declare as follows:
(a) that the Montreal Convention is applicable to this dispute;
(b) that Libya has fully complied with al1 of its obligations under the
Montreal Convention and isjustified in exercisingthe criminaljuris-
diction provided for blythat Convention;
(c) that the United Kingdom has breached, and is continuing to breach,
its legal obligations to Libya under Article 5, paragraphs 2 and 3,
Article 7, Article 8, paragraph 3, and Article 11 of the Montreal
Convention ;

(d) that the United Kingdom is under a legal obligation to respect
Libya's right not to have the Convention set aside by means which would in any case be at variance with the principles of the United
Nations Charter and with the mandatory rules of generalinternational

law prohibiting the use of force and the violation of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity, sovereign equality and political independence
of States."

On behalfof the Governmentof the UnitedKingdom,
in the Preliminary Objections :

"For the reasons advanced, the United Kingdom requests the Court to
adjudge and declare that:

it lacksjurisdiction over the claims brought against the United Kingdom
by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
andior

the claims brought against the United Kingdom by the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya are inadmissible."

On behalf of the Governmentof Libya,
in the written statement of its observations and submissionson the preliminary
objections :

"For these reasons, and reservingthe right to complement or modify the
present subrnissions in the course of the proceedings if necessary, Libya
requests the Court to adjudge and declare:

- that the preliminary objections raised by the United Kingdom must be
rejected and that, as a consequence:
(a) the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the Application of Libya,
(b) that the Application is admissible;

- that the Court should proceed to the merits."
15. In the oral proceedings,the followingsubmissions werepresented by the

Parties :
On behalf of the Governmentof the UnitedKingdom,

at the hearing of 20 October 1997:

"[Tlhe Court [isrequested to] adjudge and declare that :
it lacksjurisdiction over the claims brought against the United Kingdom
by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

andlor
those claims are inadmissible;
and that the Court dismiss the Libyan Application accordingly."

On behalf of the Government ofLibya:

at the hearing of 22 October 1997:
"The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya requeststhe Courtto adjudgeand declare:

- that the preliminary objections raised by the United Kingdom . . .
must be rejected and that, as a consequence: (a) the Court has jurisdictionto entertainthe Applicationof Libya,
(b) that the Applicationis admissible;
- that the Court shouldproceedto the merits."

16. In the present case, the United Kingdom has raised two objec-
tions: one to the jurisdiction of the Court and the other to the admissi-
bility of the Application. According to the United Kingdom, "both of
these are objections of an essentially preliminary character".

17. The Court will first consider the objection raised by the United
Kingdom to itsjurisdiction.
18. Libya submits that the Court has jurisdiction on the basis of
Article 14,paragraph 1,of the Montreal Convention, whichprovides that:

"Any dispute between two or more Contracting Statesconcerning
the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be
settled through negotiation, shall, at the request of one of them, be
submitted to arbitration. If within six months of the date of the
request for arbitration the Parties areunable to agree on the organi-
zation of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dis-
pute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity
with the Statute of the Court."

19. TheParties agree that the Montreal Convention isin force between
them and that it was already in force both at the time of the destruction
of the Pan Am aircraft over Lockerbie, on 21 December 1988,and at the
time of filingof the Application, on 3March 1992.However, the Respon-
dent contests the jurisdiction of the Court because, in its submission, al1
the requisites laid down in Article 14, paragraph 1, of the Montreal

Convention have not been complied with in the present case.

20. The Respondent expressly stated that it did not wish to contest
the jurisdiction of the Court on al1of the same grounds it had relied
upon in the provisional measuresphase of the proceedings, and restricted
itself to alleging that Libya had failed to show,first, that there existed a
legal dispute between the Parties and second, that such dispute, if any,
concerned the interpretation or application of the Montreal Conven-
tion and fell, as a result, within the terms of Article 14,paragraph 1, of
that Convention. Consequently, the United Kingdom did not, in the
present phase of the proceedings, reiterate its earlier arguments as to
whether or not the dispute that, in the opinion of Libya, existed between

the Parties could be settled by negotiation; whether Libya had made aproper request for arbitration; and whether the six-month period
required by Article 14, paragraph 1, of the Convention had been com-
plied with.
21. The Court nonetheless considers it necessary to deal briefly with

these arguments. It observes that in the present case the Respondent has
always maintained that the destruction of the Pan Am aircraft over
Lockerbie did not give rise to any dispute between the Parties regarding
the interpretation or application of the Montreal Convention, and that,
for that reason, in the Respondent's view,there was nothing to be settled
by negotiation under the Convention; the Court notes that the arbitra-
tion proposa1 contained in the letter sent on 18 January 1992 by the
Libyan Secretary of the People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and
International Co-operation to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
United Kingdom met with no answer; and it notes, in particular, that the
Respondent clearly expressedits intention not to accept arbitration - in
whatever form - when presenting and strongly supporting resolution
731 (1992)adopted by the Security Council three days later, on 21 Janu-
ary 1992.

Consequently, in the opinion of the Court the alleged dispute between
the Parties could not be settled by negotiation or submitted to arbitration
under the Montreal Convention. and the refusal of the Remondent to
enter into arbitration to resolve that dispute absolved Libya from any
obligation under Article 14,paragraph 1,of the Convention to observe a
six-monthperiod starting from the request for arbitration, before seising
the Court.

22. As recalled by the Parties, the Permanent Court of International
Justicestated in 1924that "[a]dispute is a disagreement on a point of law
or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons"
(Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924, P.C. Z .., Series A, No. 2,
p. 11).The present Court for its part, in its Judgment of 30June 1995in
the case concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), emphasized the
following :

"In order to establish the existence of a dispute, 'It must be
shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the
other' (South West Africa, Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
1.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 328); and further, 'Whether there exists an
international dispute is aatter for objective determination' (Znter-
pretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania,
First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74)." (1C..J.
Reports 1995, p. 100.) 23. In its Application and Memorial, Libya maintained that the
Montreal Convention was the only instrument applicable to the destruc-
tion of the Pan Am aircraft over Lockerbie, for the following reasons:

(a) the Respondent and Libya are bound by the Montreal Convention
which is in force between the Parties;
(b) the Montreal Convention is specifically aimed at preventing that
type of action (third paragraph of the Preamble);
(c) the actions ascribed to the Libyan nationals are covered by Article 1
of the Montreal Convention;
(d) "the system of the Montreal Convention, as compared to the system
of the Charter, is both a lex posterior and a lex specialis; conse-
quently, for matters covered by that Convention, it must a priori
take precedence over the systems for which the Charter provides";
and

(e) there is no other convention concerning international criminal law
in force which is applicable to these issues in the relations between
Libya and the United Kingdom.
24. The United Kingdom does not deny that, as such, the facts of the
case could fa11within the terms of the Montreal Convention. However, it
emphasizes that, in the present case, from the time Libya invoked the
Montreal Convention, the United Kingdom has claimed that it was not
relevant as the question to be resolvedhad to do with "the ... reaction of
the international community to the situation arisingfrom Libya'sfailure
to respond effectively to the most serious accusations of State involve-
ment in acts of terrorism".

25. Consequently,the Parties differon the question whetherthe destruc-
tion of the Pan Am aircraft over Lockerbie is governed by the Montreal
Convention. A dispute thus exists between the Parties as to the legal
régimeapplicable to this event. Such a dispute, in the view ofthe Court,
concerns the interpretation and application of the Montreal Convention,
and, in accordance with Article 14,paragraph 1, of the Convention, falls
to be decided by the Court.

26. Furthermore, in its Application and Memorial, Libya stressed the
following six points in particular in support of the submissions set forth,
respectively, in paragraph 13 (subparagraphs (a) and (b)) and para-
graph 14 (subparagraphs (b) and (c)), above:

(a) the actions which brought about the destruction of the Pan Am
aircraft over Lockerbie constitute one of the offences covered by
Article 1 of the Montreal Convention and therefore the Montreal
Convention must be applied to those facts;
(b) Libya has complied with the obligation imposed by Article 5, para-
graph 2, of the Montreal Convention of establishingitsjurisdiction
over the alleged offenders in the destruction of the aircraft, and it
has the right to exercisethe jurisdiction so established;(c) Libya has exerciseditsjurisdiction over the two alleged offenders on
the basis of its Penal Code, and the Respondent should not interfere
with the exerciseof that jurisdiction;

(d) Libya has exercisedthe rights conferred by Article 6 of the Montreal
Convention by taking al1necessary measures to ensure the presence
of the two alleged offenders, making preliminary enquiries, notify-
ing the States concerned and indicating that it intended to exercise
jurisdiction, but the Respondent, by its actions and threats, is
attempting, according to Libya, to prevent the application of the
Convention ;
(e) Libya having decided not to extradite the two alleged offenders,
Article 7 of the Montreal Convention gives it the right to submit
them to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution in
accordance with Libyan law; and
(f) on the basis of Article 8, paragraph 3, of the Montreal Convention,
it has the right not to extradite the two alleged offenders because
they are Libyan nationals and the Libyan Constitution does not per-

mit their extradition.
27. The Respondent disputes that the Montreal Convention confers

on Libya the rights it claims to enjoy. It contends, moreover, that none of
the provisions referred to by Libya imposes obligations on the United
Kingdom. Finally, it recalls that it never itself invoked the Montreal
Convention, and observes that nothing in that Convention prevented it
from requesting the surrender of the two alleged offenders outside the
framework of the Convention.
28. Article 1 of the Montreal Convention provides as follows:

"1. Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and inten-
tionally:

(a) performs an act of violence against a person on board an air-
craft in flight if that act is likely to endanger the safety of that
aircraft; or
(b) destroys an aircraft in serviceor causes damage to such an air-
craft which renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to
endanger its safety in flight; or
(c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any
means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to
destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which renders it
incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it which is likely to
endanger its safety in flight; or
(d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with
their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safety

of aircraft in flight; or
(e) communicatesinformation which he knows to be false, thereby
endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight. 2. Any person also commits an offence if he:

(a) attempts to commit any of the offences mentioned in para-
graph 1 of this Article; or
(b) is an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to com-
mit any such offence."
Article 5 provides:

"1. Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be
necessary to establishitsjurisdiction over the offencesin the follow-
ing cases:

(a) when the offence is committed in the territory of that State;
(b) when the offence is cornmitted against or on board an aircraft
registered in that State;
(c) when the aircraft on board which the offence is committed
lands in its territory with the alleged offender still on board;

(d) when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft
leased without crew to a lessee who has his principal place of
business or, if the lesseehas no such place of business, his per-
manent residence, in that State.
2. Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as
may be necessary to establishitsjurisdiction over the offencesmen-

tioned in Article 1, paragraph 1 (a),(b) and (c), and in Article 1,
paragraph 2, in so far as that paragraph relates to those offences,in
the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it
does not extradite him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction
exercised in accordance with national law."
Article 6, for its part, States:

"1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any
Contracting State in the territory of which the offender or the
alleged offender is present, shall take him into custody or take other
measures to ensure his presence. The custody and other measures
shall be as provided in the law of that State but may only be con-
tinued for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal or extra-
dition proceedings to be instituted.
2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary enquiry into

the facts.
3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article
shall be assisted in communicating immediately with the nearest
appropriate representative of the State of which he is a national.

4. When a State, pursuant to this Article, has taken a person into custody, it shall immediately notify the States mentioned in Ar-
ticle 5, paragraph 1, the State of nationality of the detained person
and, if it considersit advisable,any other interested State of the fact
that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which war-

rant his detention. The State which makes the preliminary enquiry
contemplated in paragraph 2 of this Article shall promptly report its
findings to the said States and shall indicate whether it intends to
exercisejurisdiction."

Article 7 is worded in the following terms:

"The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged
offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, with-
out exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was com-
mitted in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities
for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their
decisionin the samemanner as in the case of any ordinary offenceof
a serious nature under the law of that State."

Finally, in the words of Article 8:

"1. The offences shall be deemed to be included as extraditable
offences in any extradition treaty existing between Contracting
States.Contracting Statesundertake to include the offencesas extra-
ditable offencesin every extradition treaty to be concluded between
them.
2. If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional on
the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from
another Contracting State with which it has no extradition treaty, it
may at its option consider this Convention as the legal basis for

extradition in respect of the offences. Extradition shall be subject to
the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State.

3. Contracting States which do not make extradition conditional
on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the offences as extra-
ditable offences between themselves subject to the conditions pro-
vided by the law of the requested state.
4. Each of the offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extra-
dition between Contracting States, as if it had been committed not
only in the place in which it occurredbut also in the territories of the
States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with
Article 5, paragraph 1 (b), (c) and (d) ."

29. In viewof the positions put forward by the Parties, the Court finds
that there exists between them not only a dispute of a general nature, as
definedin paragraph 25 above, but also a specificdispute which concerns

the interpretation and application of Article 7 - read in conjunction
with Article 1, Article 5, Article 6 and Article 8 - of the MontrealConvention and which, in accordance with Article 14, paragraph 1, of
the Convention, falls to be decided by the Court.

30. Furthermore, Libya maintained in its Application and Memorial
that, once it had commenced its judicial investigation of the two alleged

offenders, the Respondent was, according to Article 11,paragraph 1, of
the Montreal Convention, under an obligation to hand over to the
Libyan authorities al1the evidencein its possession regardingthe offence.
In Libya's opinion, this obligation was not duly complied with, because
the United Kingdom only transmitted "a copy of the statement of the
facts" against the accused, a document that "contains no evidence of
which the Libyan judiciary could make use".

31. In this connection, the United Kingdom acknowledges that "Ar-
ticle 11,paragraph 1, differs from the other provisions on which Libya
has relied, in that ites impose obligations on other States" and "is thus
capable, in the abstract, of givingrise to a dispute between Libya and the

United Kingdom". However, it maintains that it did not violate this pro-
vision, and claims in particular that it "provided Libya with copies of the
Scottishcharges, the warrant for the arrest of the accused and the State-
ment of Facts prepared by the Lord Advocate". It also recalls that at the
time when Libya presented its claims, Libya had not - any more than
had the United Kingdom - invoked the Montreal Convention, and it
concluded that,

"For the failure of the United Kingdom to supply further infor-
mation to Libya to constitute a violation of Article 11,the Conven-
tion must at least have been invoked by one of the States con-
cerned."

32. Article 11of the Montreal Convention is worded as follows:

"1. Contracting States shall afford one another the greatest mea-
sure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought
in respect of the offences.The law of the State requested shall apply
in al1cases.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1of this Article shall not affect
obligations under any other treaty, bilateral or multilateral, which
governs or will govern, in whole or in part, mutual assistance in
criminal matters."

33. Having taken account of the positions of the Parties as to the
duties imposed by Article 11 of the Montreal Convention, the Court con-
cludes that there equally exists between them a dispute which concerns
the interpretation and application of that provision, and which, in accor- dance with Article 14,paragraph 1,of the Convention, fallsto be decided
by the Court.

34. Libya, in the latest version of its submissions, finally asks the
Court to find that

"the United Kingdom is under a legal obligation to respect Libya's
right not to have the [Montreal] Convention set aside by means
which would in any case be at variance with the principles of the
United Nations Charter and with the mandatory rules of general
international law prohibiting the use of force and the violation of the
sovereignty,territorial integrity, sovereignequalityand politicalnde-
pendence of States".

35. The United Kingdom maintains that it is not for the Court, on the
basis of Article 14,paragraph 1, of the Montreal Convention, to decide
on the lawfulness of actions which are in any event in conformity with
international law, and which were instituted by the Respondent to secure
the surrender of the two allegedoffenders. It concludes from this that the
Court lacksjurisdiction over the submissions presented on this point by
Libya.
36. The Court cannot uphold the line of argument thus formulated.
Indeed, it is for the Court to decide, on the basis of Article 14, para-

graph 1, of the Montreal Convention, on the lawfulness of the actions
criticized by Libya, in so far asthose actions would be at variance with
the provisions of the Montreal Convention.

37. In the present case, the United Kingdom has contended, however,
that even if the Montreal Convention did confer on Libya the rights it
claims, they could not be exercisedin this case because they were super-
seded by Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) which,
by virtue of Articles25 and 103 of the United Nations Charter, have pri-
ority over al1rights and obligations arising out of the Montreal Conven-
tion. The Respondent has also argued that, because of the adoption of
those resolutions, the only dispute which existed from that point on was
between Libya and the Security Council; this, clearly, would not be a dis-
pute falling within the terms of Article 14,paragraph 1, of the Montreal
Convention and thus not one which the Court could entertain.

38. The Court cannot uphold this line of argument. Security Council
resolutions 748 (1992)and 883(1993)were in fact adopted after the filing
of the Application on 3 March 1992.In accordance with its established
jurisprudence, if the Court had jurisdiction on that date, it continues to
do so; the subsequent coming into existence of the above-mentionedresolutions cannot affect its jurisdiction once established (cf. Nottebohm,
Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 122; Right of
Passage overIndian Territory, Preliminary Objections,Judgment, I. C.J.
Reports 1957, p. 142).

39. In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the objec-
tion to jurisdiction raised by the United Kingdom on the basis of the
alleged absence of a dispute between the Parties concerningthe interpre-
tation or application of the Montreal Convention must be rejected, and
that the Court has jurisdiction to hear the disputes between Libya and
the United Kingdom as to the interpretation or application of the provi-
sions of that Convention.

40. The Court will now proceed to consider the objection of the
United Kingdom that the Libyan Application is not admissible.
41. The principal argument of the United Kingdom in this context is
that

"what Libya claimsto be the issueor issuesin dispute between it and
the United Kingdom are now regulated by decisions of the Security
Council, taken under Chapter VI1 of the Charter of the United
Nations, which are binding on both Parties and that (if there is any
conflict between what tde resolutions require and rights or obliga-
tions alleged to ariseunder the Montreal Convention) the resolu-
tions have overriding effect in accordance with Article 103 of the
Charter7'.

In this connection, the United Kingdom explains that

"resolutions 748 and 883 are legally binding and they create legal
obligations for Libya and the United Kingdom which are determi-
native of any dispute over which the Court might havejurisdiction".

According to the United Kingdom, those resolutions require the surren-
der of the two suspects by Libya to the United Kingdom or the United
States for trial, and this determination by the Security Councilis binding
on Libya irrespective of any rights it may have under the Montreal
Convention. On this basis, the United Kingdom maintains that

"the relief which Libya seeks from the Court under the Montreal

Convention is not open to it, and that the Court should therefore
exerciseits power to declare the Libyan Application inadmissible". The United Kingdom also argues that, should the Court be minded to
consider the questions raised by Libya on the Montreal Conventionwith-
out regard to the effect of the Security Council resolutions, it would find
itselfin the position of having to proceed to a consideration of the merits
of those matters; if the Court were then to rule in favour of the position
advanced by Libya, it would presumably pronounce judgment on that
basis, although such ajudgment would be neither applicable nor enforce-
able in view of prior decisions of the Security Council which remain in
force.

The United Kingdom also adds that the terms of the resolutions con-
cerned, as well as the relevant provisions of the Charter, have been fully
argued before the Court. The Court would therefore need no further
material deriving from argument on the merits to enable it to interpret
the decisions of the Security Council or determine their effects.

42. For its part, Libya argues that it is clear from the actual terms of
resolutions 731 (1992),748 (1992)and 883(1993)that the SecurityCoun-
cilhas never required it to surrender its nationals to the United Kingdom
or the United States; it stated at the hearing that this remained "Libya's
principal argument". It added that the Court must interpret those reso-
lutions "in accordance with the Charter, which determinedtheir validity"
and that the Charter prohibited the Council from requiring Libya to
hand over its nationals to the United Kingdom or the United States.
Libya concludes that its Application is admissible "as the Court can use-
fully rule on the interpretation and application of the Montreal Conven-
tion . . independently of the legal effects of resolutions 748 (1992) and

883 (1993)".
Libya also observes that the arguments of the United Kingdom based
on the provisions of the Charter raise problems which do not possess an
exclusivelypreliminary character, but appertain to the merits of the dis-
pute. It argues in particular that the question of the effect of the Security
Council resolutions is not of an exclusivelypreliminary character, inas-
much as the resolutions under consideration are relied upon by the
United Kingdom in order to overcome the application of the Montreal
Convention, and since Libya is justified in disputing that these resolu-
tions are opposable to it.
43. Libya furthermore draws the Court's attention to the principle
that "The critical date for determiningthe admissibility of an application
is the date on which it is filed"(Border and TransborderArmed Actions
(Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, I.C.J. Reports
1988,p. 95,para. 66).It points out in this connection that itsApplication
was filed on 3 March 1992; that Security Council resolutions 748 (1992)
and 883 (1993) wereadopted on 31 March 1992and 11November 1993,

respectively; and that resolution 731 (1992) of 21January 1992was not
adopted under Chapter VI1of the United Nations Charter and was only
a mere recommendation. Consequently, Libya argues, its Application is
admissible in any event. 44. In the view of the Court, this last submission of Libya must be
upheld. The date, 3 March 1992,on which Libya filed its Application, is
in fact the only relevant date for determining the admissibility of the
Application. Security Council resolutions 748 (1992)and 883 (1993)can-
not be taken into consideration in this regard since they were adopted at
a later date. As to Security Council resolution 731(1992),adopted before
the filing of the Application, it could not form a legal impediment to the
admissibility of the latterecause it was a mere recommendationwithout
binding effect,as was recognizedmoreover by the United Kingdom itself.

Consequently, Libya's Application cannot be held inadmissible on these
grounds.
45. In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the objec-
tion to admissibility derived by the United Kingdom from Security
Councilresolutions 748 (1992)and 883 (1993)must be rejected, and that
Libya's Application is admissible.

46. In dealing with admissibility, the Agent of the United Kingdom
also stated that his Government "ask[ed]the Court to rule that the inter-
vening resolutions of the Security Council have rendered the Libyan
claims without object".
The Court has already acknowledged, on several occasions in the past,
that events subsequent to the filing of an application may "render an
application without object" (Border and Transborder Armed Actions
(Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 95, para. 66) and "therefore the Court is not
called upon to give a decision thereon" (Nuclear Tests (Australia

v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974,p. 272,para. 62)(cf.Northern
Cameroons,Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 38).
In the present case, the United Kingdom puts forward an objection
aimed at obtaining from the Court a decisionnot to proceed tojudgment
on the merits, which objection must be examined within the framework
of thisjurisprudence.
47. The Court must satisfy itself that such an objection does indeed
fa11within the provisions of Article 79 of the Rules, relied upon by the
Respondent. In paragraph 1,this Article refers to "Any objection. . to
the jurisdiction of the Court or to the admissibility of the application,
or other objection" (emphasis added); its field of application ratione
materiae is thus not limited solely to objections regarding jurisdiction
or admissibility.However,if it is to be coveredby Article 79, an objection
must also possessa "preliminary" character. Paragraph 1of Article 79 of
the Rules of Court characterizesas "preliminary" an objection "the deci-
sion upon which is requested before any further proceedings". There can
be no doubt that the objection envisaged here formally meets this condi-
tion. The Court would also indicate that, in this instance,the Respondent

is advancing the argument that the decisions of the Security Councilcould not form the subject of any contentious proceedings before the
Court, since they allegedly determine the rights which the Applicant
claims to derive from a treaty text, or at least that they directly affect
those rights; and that the Respondent thus aims to preclude at the outset

any consideration by the Court of the claims submitted by the Applicant
and immediately terminate the proceedings brought by it. In so far as the
purpose of the objection raised by the United Kingdom that there is no
ground for proceeding to judgment on the merits is, effectively, to pre-
vent, in limine, any consideration of the case on the merits, so that its
"effect [would]be, if the objection is upheld, to interrupt furtheroceed-
ings in the case7',and "it [would]therefore be appropriate for the Court
to deal with [it]before enquiring into the merits" (Panevezys-Saldutiskis
Railway, Judgment, 1939, P. C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 76,p. 16),this objec-
tion possesses a preliminary character and does indeed fa11within the
provisions of Article 79 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, it is incontrovertible that the objection concerned was sub-
mitted in writing within the time-limit fixedfor the filingof the Counter-
Memorial, and was thus submitted in accordance with the forma1condi-
tions laid down in Article 79.
48. Libya does not dispute any of these points. It does not contend
that the objection derived by the United Kingdom from SecurityCouncil
resolutions 748 (1992)and 883(1993) isan objectionon the merits, which

does not fa11within the provisions of Article 79 of the Rules of Court,
nor does it claim that the objection was not properly submitted. What
Libya contends is that this objection falls within the category of those
which paragraph 7 of Article 79 of the Rules of Court characterizes as
objections "not possess[ing],in the circumstances of the case, an exclu-
sivelypreliminary character" (see paragraph 42 above).
On the contrary, the United Kingdom considers that the objection
concerned possesses an "exclusively preliminary character" within the
meaning of that provision; and, at the hearing, its Agent insisted on the
need for the Court to avoid any proceedings on the merits, which to his
mind werenot only "likelyto be lengthy and costly" but also, by virtue of
the difficulty that "the handling of evidentiary material . . might raise
serious problems".
Thus it is on the question of the "exclusively"or "non-exclusively7'pre-
liminary character of the objection here considered that the Parties are
divided and on which the Court must now make a determination.
49. The present wording of Article 79, paragraph 7, of the Rules of
Court was adopted by the Court in 1972.The Court has had occasion to
examine its precise scope and significancein the Judgments it deliveredin

the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), on 26 November
1984 (Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984,
pp. 425-426) and on 26 June 1986 (Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1986, pp. 29-31),respectively.As the Court pointed out in the second of
those Judgments, "Under the Rules of Court dating back to 1936 (which on this
point reflected still earlier practice),the Court had the power to join
an objection to the merits 'wheneverthe interests of the good admin-
istration of justice require it' (Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway,
P.C.Z.J., Series AIB, No. 75, p. 56), and in particular where the
Court, if it were to decide on the objection, 'would run the risk of
adjudicating on questions which appertain to the merits of the case
or of prejudging their solution' (ibid.) (1.C.J. Reports1986, pp. 29-
30, para. 39.)
However, the exerciseof that power carried a risk,

"namely that the Court would ultimately decide the case on the
preliminary objection, after requiring the parties to fully plead the
merits, - and this did in fact occur (Barcelona Traction, Light
and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, Z.C.J. Reports 1970,
p. 3).The result wasregarded in somequarters as an unnecessarypro-
longation of an expensive and time-consuming procedure." (Iibid.,
p. 30, para. 39.)

The Court was then faced with the following choice:
"to revise the Rules so as to exclude for the future the possibility of
joinder to the merits, so that every objection would have to be
resolved at the preliminarystage, or to seek a solution which would

be more flexible" (ibid., p. 30, para. 40).
The solution adopted in 1972was ultimately not to exclude the power
to examine a preliminary objection in the merits phase, but to limit the
exerciseof that power, by laying down the conditions more strictly. The
Court concluded, in relation to the new provision thus adopted:

"It thus presents one clear advantage: that it qualifies certain
objections as preliminary, making it quite clear that when they are
exclusively of that character they will have to be decided upon
immediately, but if they are not, especially whenthe character of the
objections is not exclusivelypreliminary because they contain both
preliminaryaspectsand other aspectsrelating to the merits, they will
have to be dealt with at the stage of the merits. This approach also
tends to discourage the unnecessary prolongation of proceedings at
the jurisdictional stage." (Zbid.,p. 31, para. 41.)

50. The Court must therefore ascertain whether, in the present case,
the United Kingdom's objection based on the Security Council decisions
contains "both preliminaryaspects and other aspectsrelating to the mer-
its" or not.
That objection relates to many aspects of the dispute. By maintaining
that Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) have ren-
dered the Libyan claims without object, the United Kingdom seeks to
obtain from the Court a decision not to proceed to judgment on themerits, which would immediately terminate the proceedings. However, by
requesting such a decision, the United Kingdom is requesting, in reality,
at least two others which the decision not to proceed to judgment on the
merits would necessarilypostulate: on the one hand a decision establish-
ing that the rights claimed by Libya under the Montreal Convention are
incompatible with its obligations under the Security Council resolutions;
and, on the other hand, a decision that those obligations prevail over
those rights by virtue of Articles 25 and 103of the Charter.
The Court therefore has no doubt that Libya's rights on the merits
would not only be affected by a decision, at this stage of the proceedings,
not to proceed to judgrnent on the merits, but would constitute, in many
respects, thevery subject-matter of that decision. The objection raised by
the United Kingdom on that point has the character of a defence on the
merits. In the view of the Court, this objection does much more than
"touch[ing] upon subjects belonging to the merits of the case" (Certain
GermanInterests in Polish UpperSilesia, Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 6,
1925, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 6, p. 15); it is "inextricably interwoven"

with the merits (Barcelona Traction,Light and Power Company Limited,
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1964, p. 46).
The Court notes furthermore that the United Kingdom itselfbroached
many substantiveproblems in its written and oral pleadings in this phase,
and pointed out that those problems had been the subject of exhaustive
exchanges before the Court; the United Kingdom Government thus
implicitly acknowledged that the objection raised and the merits of the
case were "closelyinterconnected" (Barcelona Traction,Light and Power
Company, Limited, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1964, p. 46, and the reference to Pajzs, Csaky, Esterhazy, Order of
23 May 1936, P. C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 66, p. 9).
If the Court were to rule on that objection, it would therefore inevi-
tably be ruling on the merits; in relying on the provisions of Article 79
of the Rules of Court, the Respondent has set in motion a procedure
the precise aim of which is to prevent the Court from so doing.
The Court concludes from the foregoing that the objection of the
United Kingdom according to which the Libyan claims have been ren-

dered without object does not have "an exclusivelypreliminary charac-
ter" within the meaning of that Article.
51. Having establisheditsjurisdiction and concluded that the Applica-
tion is admissible, the Court will beable to consider this objection when
it reaches the merits of the case.

52. In accordance with Article 79, paragraph 7, of the Rules of Court,
time-limits for the further proceedings shall be fixedsubsequently by the
Court. 53. For these reasons,

(1) (a) By thirteen votes to three,

Rejects the objection to jurisdiction raised by the United Kingdom on
the basis of the alleged absence of a dispute between the Parties concern-
ing the interpretation or application of the Montreal Convention of
23 September 1971 ;

IN FAVOUR :Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President;Judges Bedjaoui,
Guillaume, Ranjeva,Herczegh,Shi, Fleischhauer,Koroma, Vereshchetin,
Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans,Rezek; Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri;

AGAINS PTesident Schwebel; Judge Oda; Judge ad hoc SirRobert Jennings ;

(b) By thirteen votes to three,

Finds that it has jurisdiction, on the basis of Article 14,paragraph 1,of
the Montreal Convention of 23 September 1971, to hear the disputes
between Libya and the United Kingdom as to the interpretation or appli-
cation of the provisions of that Convention;

IN FAVOUR Vi:ce-PresidentWeeramantry, Acting President; JudgesBedjaoui,
Guillaume, Ranjeva,Herczegh,Shi, Fleischhauer,Koroma, Vereshchetin,
Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek; Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri;

AGAINST :President Schwebel ;Judge Oda ; Judgead hoc SirRobert Jennings ;

(2) (a) By twelve votes to four,

Rejects the objection to admissibility derived by the United Kingdom
from Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993);
IN FAVOUR :Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President; Judges Bedjaoui,
Guillaume, Ranjeva, Shi, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans,Rezek; Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri;

AGAINST: President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Herczegh; Judge ad hoc Sir
Robert Jennings ;

(b) By twelve votes to four,
Finds that the Application filed by Libya on 3 March 1992 isadmissible;

IN FAVOUR Vi:ce-PresidentWeeramantry, Acting President; JudgesBedjaoui,
Guillaume, Ranjeva, Shi, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans,Rezek; Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri;

AGAINST: President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Herczegh; Judge ad hoc Sir
Robert Jennings ; (3) By ten votes to six,
Declares that the objection raised by the United Kingdom according to
which Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) haveen-
dered the claims of Libya without object does not, in the circumstances
of the case, have an exclusivelypreliminary character.

INFAVOUR Vice-PresidenWeeramantry, Acting President; JudgBedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Shi, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans,
Rezek; Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri;
AGAINST: PresidentSchwebel;Judges Oda, Guillaume, Herczegh, Fleisch-
hauer;Judge ad hoc SirRobert Jennings.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-seventh day of February, one
thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight, in three copies, one of which
will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to
the Government of the Great SocialistPeople's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, respectively.

(Signed) Christopher G. WEERAMANTRY,
Vice-President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.

Judges BEDJAOUG I,UILLAUM aEd RANJEVa ppend ajoint declaration to

theJudgment of the Court; Judges BEDJAOURI, NJEVaAnd KOROMa Append
a joint declaration to the Judgment of the Court; Judges GUILLAUand
FLEISCHHAUa Eppend a joint declaration to the Judgment of the Court;
Judge HERCZEGH appends a declaration to the Judgment of the Court.

Judges KOOIJMANaS nd REZEK append separate opinions to the Judg-
ment of the Court.

President SCHWEBEJL u, ge ODAand Judge ad hoc Sir Robert JENNINGS
append dissenting opinions to the Judgment of the Court.

(InitialledC.G.W

(InitialledE.V.O.

Bilingual Content

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
THE 1971MONTREAL CONVENTION ARISING

FROM THE AERIAL INCIDENT
AT LOCKERBIE

(LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA v. UNITED KINGDOM)

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

JUDGMENTOF 27 FEBRUARY 1998

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE RELATIVE À DES QUESTIONS

D'INTERPRÉTATION ET D'APPLICATION
DE LA CONVENTION DE MONTRÉAL DE 19-71
RÉSULTANT DE L'INCIDENT AÉRIEN

DE LOCKERBIE
(JAMAHIRIYA ARABE LIBYENC.ROYAUME-UNI) Officialcitatio:

Questionsof Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Conven-
tionarisingfrom the Aerial Incidentut Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1998,p. 9

Mode officielde citation:

Questions d'interprétationet d'application de la convention de Montréal
de 1971 résultant del'incident aérien deLockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne c. Royaume- Uni), exceptionspréliminaires,arrêt,C.. Recueil
1998, p. 9

Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441 No de vente: 698
ISBN 92-1-070761-3 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1998 YEAR 1998
27 February
General List
No. 88 27 February1998

CASE CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF

THE 1971MONTREAL CONVENTION ARISING

FROM THE AERIAL INCIDENT
AT LOCKERBIE

(LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA v.UNITED KINGDOM)

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

Objection to jurisdictio- Montreal Convention of 23 September 1971 -

Treaty inforce between the Parties - Article 14,paragraph 1, of the Conven-
tion.
Groundsfor lack ofjurisdiction invokedin theprovisionalmeasuresphase -
Arguments not reiterated in the present phase of the proceedings- Necessity
for the Court nonetheless to deal with those arguments - Negotiations
-Request for arbitration - Six-month period before the Court can be seised.
Contention that no legal dispute exists concerning the interpretation and
application of theMontreal Convention - Dispute ofa general natureas to the
legal régime applicableto the destructionof the Pan Am aircraft overLockerbie
- Spec$c disputes concerning the interpretationand application of Article 7of

the Convention, read in conjunction with Articles1, 5, 6 and 8, and the inter-
pretation and application of ArticleII of the Convention.

Contention that itis notfor the Courtto decide on the lawfulness of actions
instituted by the Respondent to securethe surrender of the two alleged offenders
- Jurisdiction of the Courtto decideon the lawfulness ofthoseactions insofur
as they would be at variancewith the provisions of theMontreal Convention.

Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) - Adoption after
jïling of the Applicatio- Jurisdiction to be determinedat the date ofjïling of

the Application. COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

ANNÉE 1998 27 février
Rôle général
27 février1998 no88

AFFAIRE RELATIVE À DES QUESTIONS

D'INTERPRÉTATION ET D'APPLICATION
DE LA CONVENTION DE MONTRÉAL DE 1971

RÉSULTANT DE L'INCIDENT AÉRIEN

DE LOCKERBIE

(JAMAHIRIYA ARABE LIBYENNE c. ROYAUME-UNI)

EXCEPTIONS PRÉLIMINAIRES

Exception d'incompétence - Convention deMontréal du23 septembre 1971
- Traitéen vigueurentre les Parties - Paragraphe 1 de l'article 14 de la
convention.
Motifs d'incompétence invoqués lors d lephase de laprocédure relativeaux
mesures conservatoires - Arguments non repris dans la présente phasede la
procédure - Nécessité pour la Cour d'examiner néanmoins cesarguments -
Négociations - Demande d'arbitrage - Délaide six moispour saisir la Cour.
Allégationd'inexistence de tout différendjuridique concernant l'interpréta-
tion ou l'applicationde la convention deMontréa- Différendde naturegéné-

rale sur lerégimejuridique applicableà la destruction de l'appareilde la Pan
Am au-dessus deLockerbie - Différendsspécijiquesconcernantl'interprétation
et l'application de l'article7 de la convention,lu conjointement avec ses ar-
ticles 1, 5, 6 et 8, ainsi que l'interprétationet l'application de l'articleII de la
convention.
Allégationselon laquelleil n'appartiendraitpaà la Courde se prononcer sur
la licéité desctions engagéespar ledéfendeuren vue d'obtenir la livraison des
deux auteursprésumés de l'infraction- Compétencede la Courpour juger de
la licéité dces actions dans la mesure où ellesseraient contrairesaux disposi-
tions de la convention deMontréal.
Résolutions748 (1992) et 883 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité - Adoption
aprèsle dépôtde la requête- Appréciation de la compétenc ela date d'intro-

duction de la requête. Objection to admissibility- Contention that Security Council resolutions
748 (1992) and 883 (1993) created legal obligationsfor the Partieswhichare
determinative of any dispute submitled to the Court - Admissibility to be
determinedut the date ofjîling of the Applicat-onAdoption of the resolutions
after thefiling of the Application.
Contention that those resolutions rendered the Applicant's claims without
object - Objection to the Court proceeding to judgment on the merits -
Article 79,paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court- "Preliminary" Objection -

Formal conditionsfor presentation- Article 79,paragraph 7, of the Rules of
Court - 1972 Revision - Objectioizwhich is "not exclusively" preliminary
containing "both preliminary aspectsand other aspects relating to the merits"
- Rights on the merits constituting the verysubject-matter of a decisionon the
objection.
Fixing of time-limitsfor thefurther proceedings.

JUDGMENT

Present: Vice-PresidentWEERAMANTA Rct, g Presiden;PresidentSCHWEBEL;
JudgesODA,BEDJAOU GI, ILLAUM RA,NJEVH A, RCZEGS HH, I,FLEISCH-
HAUERK , OROMAV , ERESHCHETP INA,RRA-ARANGURK ENO, IJMANS,
REZEK; Judges ad hoc Sir Robert JENNINGE S, -KOSHERIR ;egistrar
VALENCIA-OSPINA.

In the case concerning questions of interpretation and application of the

1971 Montreal Convention arising from the aerial incident at Lockerbie,
between

the Great Socialist People'sLibyan Arab Jamahiriya,

represented by
H.E. Mr. Hamed Ahmed Elhouderi, Ambassador, Secretary of the People's
Office of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the
Netherlands,

as Agent;
Mr. Mohamed A. Aljady,
Mr. Abdulhamid Raeid,

as Counsel;
Mr. Abdelrazeg El-Murtadi Suleiman, Professor of Public International
Law, Faculty of Law, University of Benghazi,
Mr. Ian Brownlie,C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., ChicheleProfessor of Public Inter-
national Law, University of Oxford,

Mr. Jean Salmon, Professor of Law emeritus, Université librede Bruxelles,
Mr. EricSuy,Professor of International Law, Catholic Universityof Louvain
(K.U. Leuven),
Mr. Eric David, Professor of Law, Université libre deBruxelles,
as Counsel and Advocates; Exception d'irrecevabilit- Allégation selon laquelle les résolutions 748
(1992) et 883 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité créeraentr les Parties des obli-
gationsjuridiquesdéterminantesau regard detout différendsoumis la Cour-
Appréciation de la recevabiliéla date d'introduction de la requête Adop-
tion des résolutions après le déôet la requête.
Allégation selon laquelle lesdites résolutions aurernitvéde tout objet les
demandesformuléespar le demandeur - Exception tendantau prononcé d'un
non-lieu- Paragraphe1 de l'article79du Règlementde la Cour - Exception
((préliminaire)) Modalitésdeprésentation - Paragraphe7 de l'article79du

Règlement - Revisionde 1972 - Exception «non exclusivement))préliminaire
comportant «à la fois des aspects préliminaireset des aspects de fond-)
Droits aufond constituant l'objetmêmed'unedécisionsur l'exception.

Fixation des délais pourla suite de la procédure.

Présents: M. WEERAMANTR vce,-président, faisant fonction de présideennt
l'affaire;. SCHWEBE pLé, sident de laCour; MM. ODA,BEDJAOUI,
GUILLAUME R,ANJEVA H,ERCZEGH S,HI, FLEISCHHAUE KRO,ROMA,
VERESHCHETP IA,RRA-ARANGUR KEON,IJMANS R,EZEK,juges; sir
Robert JENNINGS M ,. EL-KOSHERI, juges ad hoc; M. VALENCIA-
OSPINA g,refJier.

En l'affaire relativeà des questions d'interprétation et d'applicationde la
convention de Montréalde 1971résultant de l'incident aérien de Lockerbie,

entre

la Grande Jamahiriya arabe libyenne populaire et socialiste,
représentéepar
S. Exc. M. Hamed Ahmed Elhouderi, ambassadeur, secrétairedu bureau

populaire de la Grande Jamahiriya arabe libyenne populaire et socialiste
aux Pays-Bas,
comme agent;

M. Mohamed A. Aljady,
M. Abdulhamid Raeid,
comme conseils;
M. AbdelrazegEl-Murtadi Suleiman,professeurde droit international public

à la faculté dedroit de l'universitéde Benghazi,
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international
public, titulaire de la chairehele à l'Université d'Oxford,
M. Jean Salmon, professeur éméritededroit à l'universitélibre de Bruxelles,
M. Eric Suy, professeur de droit internationall'universitécatholique de
Louvain (K.U. Leuven),
M. Eric David, professeur de droit l'universitélibre de Bruxelles,

comme conseilset avocats; Mr. Nicolas Angelet, Principal Assistant, Faculty of Law, Catholic Univer-
sity of Louvain (K.U. Leuven),
Mrs. Barbara Delcourt, Assistant, Faculty of Social, Political and Economic
Sciences,Université librede Bruxelles; Research Fellow, Centre of Inter-
national Law and Institute of European Studies, Université libre de

Bruxelles,
Mr. Mohamed Awad,
as Advisers.

and

the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
represented by
Sir Franklin Berman, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Legal Adviser to the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office,

as Agent and Counsel;
The Right Honourable the Lord Hardie, Q.C., The Lord Advocate for Scot-
land,
Mr. Christopher Greenwood, Barrister, Professor of International Law at
the London School of Economics,
Mr. Daniel Bethlehem, Barrister, London School of Economics,

as Counsel ;
Mr. Anthony Aust, C.M.G.,

as Deputy-Agent ;
Mr. Patrick Layden, T.D.,
Mr. Norman McFadyen,
Ms Sarah Moore,
Ms Susan Hulton,

as Advisers ;
Ms Margaret McKie,
as Secretary,

composed as above,

after deliberation,
delivevs thefollowing Judgment:

1. On 3 March 1992,the Government of the Great Socialist People'sLibyan
Arab Jamahiriya (hereinafter called "Libya") filed inthe Registry of the Court
an Application instituting proceedings against the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter called "the United
Kingdom") in respect of a "dispute . . . between Libya and the United King-
dom over the interpretation or application of the Montreal Convention" of
23 September 1971for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation (hereinafter called "the Montreal Convention"). The Applica-

tion referred to the destruction, on 21 December 1988,over Lockerbie (Scot-
land), of the aircraft on Pan Am flight 103,and to chargesbrought by the Lord
Advocate for Scotland in November 1991 against two Libyan nationals sus- M. Nicolas Angelet, premier assistant à la facultéde droit de l'université

catholique de Louvain (K.U. Leuven),
MmeBarbara Delcourt, assistante àla facultédes sciencessociales,politiques
et économiques del'universitélibre de Bruxelles, collaboratrice scienti-
fiqueau centre de droit international etinstitut d'études européennedse
l'université libre deBruxelles,
M. Mohamed Awad,
comme conseillers,

le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord,
représentépar

sir FranklinBerman, K.C.M.G., Q.C., conseillerjuridique du ministèredes
affaires étrangères etdu Commonwealth,
comme agent et conseil;
le très honorable lord Hardie, Q.C.,ord Advocate d'Ecosse,

M. Christopher Greenwood, Barrister, professeur de droit international à la
London School of Economics,
M. Daniel Bethlehem,Barrister, LondonSchool of Economics,
comme conseils;
M. Anthony Aust, C.M.G.,

comme agent adjoint;
M. Patrick Layden, T.D.,
M. Norman McFadyen,
MmeSarah Moore,
Mme Susan Hulton,

comme conseillers ;
MmeMargaret McKie,

comme secrétaire.

ainsi composée,

après délibéreén chambre du conseil,

rend l'arrêt suivant:
1. Le 3mars 1992,leGouvernement de la Grande Jamahiriya arabe libyenne
populaire et socialiste (dénommée ci-après la«Libye») a déposéau Greffe
de la Cour une requête introductive d'instancecontre le Gouvernement du
Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord (dénomméci-aprèlse
«Royaume-Uni») au sujet d'un ((différendentre la Libye et le Royaume-Uni
concernant l'interprétationou l'application dela convention de Montréal»du

23 septembre 1971pour la répression d'actesillicites dirigéscontre la sécurité
de l'aviationcivile(dénomméeci-aprèsla ((conventionde Montréal))D ).ans la
requête,il était faitréférence destruction le 21 décembre1988,au-dessusde
Lockerbie (Ecosse), de l'appareil qui assurait le vol 103de la Pan Am, ainsi
qu'aux accusationsprononcéesennovembre 1991par le Lord Advocated'Ecossepected of having caused a bomb to be placed aboard the aircraft, which bomb
had exploded causing the aeroplane to crash. The Application invoked as the

basis for jurisdiction Article 14,paragraph 1, of the Montreal Convention.

2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was
immediately communicated to the Government of the United Kingdom by the
Registrar; pursuant to paragraph 3 of that Article, al1Statesentitled to appear
before the Court were notified of the Application.
3. Pursuant to Article 69, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, the Registrar
addressed to the Secretary General of the International CivilAviation Organi-
zation the notification provided for in Article 34, paragraph 3, of the Statute.
Pursuant to Article 43 of the Rules of Court, the Registrar alsoaddressedthe
notificationprovided for in Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Statute to al1those
States which, on the basis of information obtained from the depositary Gov-
ernments, appeared to be parties to the Montreal Convention.
4. Sincethe Court included upon the Bench no judge of Libyan nationality,
Libya exercisedits right under Article 31,paragraph 2, ofthe Statute to choose

a judge ad hoc to sit in the case: it chose Mr. Ahmed Sadek El-Kosheri to
do so.
5. On 3 March 1992,immediately after the filing of its Application, Libya
submitted a request for the indication of provisional measures under Article 41
of the Statute.
By an Order dated 14April 1992,the Court, after hearing the Parties, found
that the circumstances of the casewere not such as to require the exerciseof its
power to indicate provisional measures.
6. By an Order of 19June 1992,having regard to the requests of the Parties,
the Court fixed20 December 1993as the time-limitfor the filingby Libya of a
Memorial and 20 June 1995as the time-limit for the filingby the United King-
dom of a Counter-Memorial.
Libya duly filed its Memorial within the prescribed time-limit.
7. Within the time-limit fixed for the filing of its Counter-Memorial, the
United Kingdom filed Preliminary Objections to the jurisdiction of the Court

and the admissibility of the Application.
Accordingly, by an Order of 22 September 1995,the Court, noting that by
virtue of Article 79, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court the proceedings on the
merits were suspended, fixed 22 December 1995as the time-limit within which
Libya might present a written statement of its observations and submissionson
the preliminary objections.
Libya filed such a statement within the time-limit so fixed, and the case
became ready for hearing in respect of the preliminary objections.
8. By a letter dated 19February 1996,the Registrar, pursuant to Article 34,
paragraph 3, of the Statute, communicated copies of the written pleadings to
the Secretary General of the International Civil Aviation Organization and,
referring to Article 69, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, specifiedthat, if the
Organization wished to present written observations to the Court, they should
be limited, at that stage, to questions of jurisdiction and admissibility.

By a letter of 26 June 1996,the Secretary General of the International Civil
Aviation Organization informed the Court that the Organization "ha[d] no
observations to make for the moment" but wished to remain informed about
the progress of the case, in order to be able to determine whether it would be
appropriate to submit observations later. CONVENTIONDE MONTRÉALDE 1971 (ARRÊT) 12

contre deux ressortissants libyens soupçonnés d'avoir fait placer à bord de
l'appareil une bombe qui, en explosant, l'aurait détruit.La requête invoquait

comme base de compétencele paragraphe 1de l'article 14de la convention de
Montréal.
2. Conformémentau paragraphe 2 de l'article 40 du Statut, la requête a été
immédiatementcommuniquéeau Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni par le gref-
fier; conformémentau paragraphe 3 de cet article, tous les Etats admis à ester
devant la Cour ont été informés de la requête.
3. Conformémentau paragraphe 3 de l'article 69 du Règlement,le greffiera
adresséau secrétairegénérad le l'organisation de l'aviationcivileinternationale
la notification prévueau paragraphe 3 de l'article 34 du Statut.
Conformémentà l'article 43 du Règlement,le greffier a en outre adresséla
notification prévueau paragraphe 1 de l'article 63 du Statut à tous les Etats
qui, sur la base de renseignements obtenus des gouvernements dépositaires,
sont apparus comme étantparties à la convention de Montréal.
4. La Cour ne comptant pas sur le siègede juge de nationalité libyenne, la

Libye s'estprévaluedu droit que lui confèrele paragraphe 2 de l'article 31 du
Statut de procéderàla désignation d'unjuge ad hoc pour siégerenl'affair:elle
a désigné à cet effet M. Ahmed Sadek El-Kosheri.
5. Le 3 mars 1992,dèsaprèsle dépôt desa.requête,la Libye a présenté une
demande en indication de mesures conservatoires en vertu de l'article 41 du
Statut.
Par ordonnance en date du 14 avril 1992,la Cour, après avoir entendu les
Parties, a dit que les circonstances de l'espècen'étaient pas denature à exiger
l'exercicede son pouvoir d'indiquer des mesures conservatoires.
6. Par ordonnance du 19juin 1992,la Cour, compte tenu des demandes des
Parties, afix éu 20 décembre1993la date d'expiration du délaipour le dépôt
du mémoiredela Libye et au 20juin 1995la date d'expiration du délaipour le
dépôtdu contre-mémoiredu Royaume-Uni.
La Libye a dûment déposéson mémoiredans le délai ainsi prescrit.
7. Dans le délaifix péour le dépôt de son contre-mémoire,le Royaume-Uni

a déposédes exceptionspréliminaires àla compétence de laCour et à la rece-
vabilitéde la requête.
En conséquence,par ordonnance du 22 septembre 1995,la Cour, constatant
qu'en vertu des dispositions du paragraphe 3 de l'article 79 du Règlement la
procédure sur le fond était suspendue, a fix éu 22 décembre 1995 la date
d'expiration du délaidans lequel la Libye pourrait présenter un exposéécrit
contenant ses observations et conclusions sur les exceptionspréliminaires.
La Libye a déposé untel exposédans le délaiainsi prescrit, et l'affaire s'est
trouvée enétatpour ce qui est des exceptionspréliminaires.
8. Par lettre en date du 19 février1996,le greffier,conformémentau para-
graphe 3 de l'article 34 du Statut, a communiquéles piècesde la procédure
écriteau secrétairegénéral del'organisation de l'aviation civileinternationale
et a précisé,n se référantau paragraphe 2 de l'article 69du Règlement,que,si
l'organisation souhaitait présenteà la Cour des observations écrites,celles-ci
ne devraient porter, au stade considéré, que surles questions de compétenceet

de recevabilité.
Par lettre du 26juin 1996,le secrétairegénéraldle'organisation de l'aviation
civile internationale a fait savoir à la Cour que l'organisation «n'a[vait] pas
d'observations à faire pour le moment» mais désirait être tenue informée de
l'évolution de l'affaire,afin d'êtreen mesure de déterminers'ilconviendrait de
présenterdes observations à un stade ultérieur. 9. By a letter dated 23 November 1995,the Registrar informed the Parties
that the Member of the Court having United Kingdom nationality had asked
to be excused from taking part in the decision of the case, pursuant to Ar-

ticle 24, paragraph 1, of the Statute. By a letter of 5 March 1997,the Deputy-
Agent of the United Kingdom, referring to Articles 31 of the Statute and 37 of
the Rules of Court, informed the Court of his Government's intention to
choose Sir Robert Jennings to sit as judge ad hoc in the case. In accordance
with Article 35, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court a copy of that letter was
communicated by the Registrar to the LibyanGovernment, whichwas informed
that 7 April 1997had been fixed as the time-limit within which Libya could
make any observations it might wish to make. No observations from the
Libyan Government reached the Court within the time-limit thus fixed.

Having regard to the proceedings instituted by Libya against the United
States of America on 3 March 1992in the case concerning Questionsof Inter-
pretation and Application of the 1971Montreal Convention arisingfrom the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of
America), and to its composition in the present case in which a judge having

United States nationality was sitting, in accordance with Article 31, para-
graph 1,of the Statute, the Court instructed the Registrar to inform Libya and
the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, that it was prepared to
accept from them, no later than 30 June 1997,any observations they wished to
make in respect of the application of Article 31, paragraph 5, of the Statute.
The Registrar wrote to the three States on 30 May 1997to that effect. Each of
the three Governments submitted observations within the prescribed time-limit.
After due deliberation, the Court, by ten votes to three, decided that in the
present phase relating to jurisdiction and admissibility in the two cases, the
United Kingdom and the United States of America were not parties in the
same interest within the meaning of Article 31, paragraph 5, of the Statute;
that the choice of ajudge adhocby the United Kingdom was therefore justified
in the current phase of the proceedings in the present case; and that accord-
ingly Sir Robert Jennings would sit on the Bench for the purpose of the oral

proceedings and would take part in the deliberations bythe Court in that phase
of the case. The Registrar notified that decision to Libya and to the United
Kingdom, and informed the United States of America of the decision,by letters
dated 16 September 1997.
10. The President of the Court, being a national of one of the Parties to the
case concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 197M 1 on-
treal Convention arisingfrom the Aerial Incidentut Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. UnitedStates of America), was unable, by virtue of Article 32,
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, to exercisethe functions of the presidency
in respect of that case. Although that provision is not applicable in the present
case, the President thought it appropriate that he should not exercisethe func-
tions of the presidency in the present case as well. It therefore fell to the Vice-
President, in accordance with Article 13,paragraph 1,of the Rules of Court, to
exercisethe functions of the presidency in the case.
11. In accordance with Article 53, paragraph 2, of its Rules, the Court

decided to make accessibleto the public, on the opening of the oral proceed-
ings, the Preliminary Objections of the United Kingdom and the written state-
ment containing the observations and submissions of Libya on the objections,
as well as the documents annexed to those pleadings, with the exception of
Annex 16to the Preliminary Objections. 9. Par lettre en date du 23 novembre 1995, le greffier avait informé les
Parties que le membre de la Cour ayant la nationalitédu Royaume-Uni avait
demandéà ne pas participer au jugement de l'affaire, conformémentau para-
graphe 1de l'article 24 du Statut.Par lettre du 5mars 1997,l'agent adjoint du

Royaume-Uni, se référantaux articles 31 du Statut et 37 du Règlement, afait
connaître à la Cour l'intention de son gouvernement de désigner sir Robert
Jennings pour siégeren qualité dejuge ad hoc en l'affaire. Conformément au
paragraphe 3 de l'article 35 du Règlement, copie de cette lettre a étécommu-
niquée par le greffier au Gouvernement libyen, qui a été informéque la
date d'expiration du délaidans lequel la Libye pourrait présenterles obser-
vations qu'elle voudrait faire avait étéfixéeau 7 avril 1997.Aucune observa-
tion du Gouvernement libyen n'est parvenue à la Cour dans le délai ainsi
prescrit.
Compte tenu de l'instance introduite par la Libye contre les Etats-Unis
d'Amériquele 3 mars 1992dans l'affaire relative à des Questions d'interpré-
tation et d'applicationde la convention deMontréalde 1971 résultantde l'in-
cident aériende Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c. Etats-Unis d'Amé-
rique), et de sa composition en la présente affaire où, conformément aux
dispositions du paragraphe 1 de l'article 31 du Statut, siègeun juge ayant la

nationalitédes Etats-Unis, la Cour a donné instruction au greffierd'informer la
Libyeet le Royaume-Uni, ainsi que lesEtats-Unis d'Amérique,qu'elleétaitdis-
posée à recevoir d'eux,le 30juin 1997au plus tard, toutes observations qu'ils
eussent souhaité formuler au regard de l'application du paragraphe 5 de l'ar-
ticle 31du Statut. Le greffiera adressédes communications à cette fin aux trois
Etats le 30 mai 1997.Dans le délaifixéà cet effet, chacun des trois gouverne-
ments a présentédes observations. Après en avoir dûment délibéréla , Cour,
par dix voix contre trois, a décidé qu'en larésente phase relativeà la compé-
tence et à la recevabilitédans les deux affaires le Royaume-Uni et les Etats-
Unis d'Amériquene faisaient pas cause commune au sens du paragraphe 5 de
l'article31 du Statut; que la désignation d'unjuge ad hoc par le Royaume-Uni
se justifiait dèslors dans la phase en cours de la procédure en la présente
affaire; et qu'en conséquencesirRobert Jennings siégeraitaux fins de la pro-
cédure orale et prendraitpart aux délibérations quela Cour tiendrait dans cette

phase de l'affaire.Le greffiera notifiécette décisionà la Libye et au Royaume-
Uni, et en a aviséles Etats-Unis d'Amérique,par lettres en date du 16 sep-
tembre 1997.
10. Le président de laCour, étantressortissant de l'unedes Parties àl'affaire
relativeà des Questions d'interprétation etd'application dela convention de
Montréalde 1971 résultantde l'incident aérien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique),ne pouvait pas, en vertu du paragraphe 1
de l'article 32 du Règlement,exercer la présidencepour cette affaire. Bien que
cette disposition ne trouve pas à s'appliquer en l'espèce,le président aestimé
approprié de ne pas non plus exercer la présidenceaux fins de la présente
affaire. Il a donc incombéau vice-président,conformémentau paragraphe 1 de
l'article 13du Règlement, d'assurer laprésidenceen l'affaire.

11. Conformémentau paragraphe 2 de l'article 53 du Règlement, la Cour a
décidéde rendre accessiblesau public, à l'ouverture de la procédure orale,les

exceptionspréliminairesdu Royaume-Uni et l'exposéécritcontenant les obser-
vations et conclusions de la Libye sur ces exceptions, ainsi que les documents
qui étaient joints à ces pièceà,l'exclusionde l'annexe 16aux exceptions pré-
liminaires. 12. Public sittings were held between 13and 22 October 1997,at which the
Court heard the oral arguments and replies of:

For the UnitedKingdom: Sir Franklin Berman,
The Right Honourable the Lord Hardie,
Mr. Daniel Bethlehem,
Mr. Christopher Greenwood.
For Libya: H.E. Mr. Hamed Ahmed Elhouderi,
Mr. Abdelrazeg El-Murtadi Suleiman,

Mr. Jean Salmon,
Mr. Eric David,
Mr. Eric Suy,
Mr. Ian Brownlie.
At the hearings, Members of the Court put questions to the Parties, who
answered in writing after the close of the oral proceedings.

13. In the Application, the following requests were made by Libya:

"Accordingly, while reserving the right to supplement and amend this
submission as appropriate in the course of further proceedings, Libya
requests the Court to adjudge and declare as follows:

(a) that Libya has fully complied with al1 of its obligations under the
Montreal Convention;
(b) that the United Kingdom has breached, and is continuing to breach,
its legalobligations to Libya under Articles 5(2), 5(3),7, 8 (2)and 11
of the Montreal Convention; and
(c) that the United Kingdom is under a legal obligation immediately to
cease and desist from such breaches and from the use of any and al1
force or threats against Libya, including the threat of force against
Libya, and from al1violations of the sovereignty,territorial integrity,
and the political independence of Libya."

14. In the written proceedings,the following submissions were presented by
the Parties :

On behalf of the Governmentof Libya,
in the Memorial:
"For these reasons, while reserving the right to supplement and amend

these submissions as appropriate in the course of further proceedings,
Libya requests the Court to adjudge and declare as follows:
(a) that the Montreal Convention is applicable to this dispute;
(b) that Libya has fully complied with al1 of its obligations under the
Montreal Convention and isjustified in exercisingthe criminaljuris-
diction provided for blythat Convention;
(c) that the United Kingdom has breached, and is continuing to breach,
its legal obligations to Libya under Article 5, paragraphs 2 and 3,
Article 7, Article 8, paragraph 3, and Article 11 of the Montreal
Convention ;

(d) that the United Kingdom is under a legal obligation to respect
Libya's right not to have the Convention set aside by means which 12. Des audiencespubliques ont été tenuesentre le 13et le 22 octobre 1997,
au cours desquelles ont été entendusen leurs plaidoiries et réponses:

Pour leRoyaume-Uni: sir Franklin Berman,
le très honorable lord Hardie,
M. Daniel Bethlehem,
M. Christopher Greenwood.
Pour laLibye: S. Exc. M. Hamed Ahmed Elhouderi,
M. Abdelrazeg El-Murtadi Suleiman,
M. Jean Salmon,

M. Eric David,
M. Eric Suy,
M. Ian Brownlie.
A l'audience, des membres de la Cour ont posé aux Parties des questions,
auxquelles il a été répondu par écrit, après la clôture de la procédure orale.

13. Dans la requête,les demandes ci-après ont été formuléep sar la Libye:

«En conséquence,tout en se réservantle droit de compléter etmodifier
s'ily a lieu la présente conclusionen cours de procédure, laLibye prie la
Cour de dire et juger:

a) que la Libye a satisfait pleinement à toutes sesobligations au regard de
la convention de Montréal;
b) que le Royaume-Uni a violé,et continue de violer, ses obligationsjuri-
diques envers la Libye stipuléesaux articles5,paragraphes 2 et 3, 7, 8,
paragraphe 2, et 11de la convention de Montréal;
c) que le Royaume-Uni estjuridiquement tenu de mettre fin et de renon-
cer immédiatementà ces violations et à toute forme de recours à la
force ou à la menace contre la Libye, y compris la menace de recourir
à la force contre la Libye, ainsi qu'à toute violation de la souveraineté,
de l'intégrité territoriale et de l'indépendance politique dlea Libye.»

14. Dans la procédure écrite,les conclusions ci-aprèsont été présentép esar
les Parties:

Au nom du Gouvernementlibyen,
dans le mémoire:
«Par ces motifs, et tout en se réservantle droit de compléteret modifier

s'ily a lieu lesprésentesconclusionsen cours de procédure,la Libyeprie la
Cour de dire et juger:
a) que la convention de Montréals'applique au présent litige;
b) que la Libyea pleinementsatisfait à toutes sesobligations au regard de
la convention de Montréalet est fondéeàexercerla compétencepénale
prévuepar cette convention;
c) que le Royaume-Uni a violé,et continue de violer, sesobligationsjuri-
diques envers la Libye stipuléesà l'article 5, paragraphes 2 et 3, à l'ar-
ticle 7, à l'article 8, paragraphe 3, et à l'article 11de la convention de

Montréal;
d) que le Royaume-Uni estjuridiquement tenu de respecter le droit de la
Libye à ce que cette convention ne soit pas écartéepar des moyens qui would in any case be at variance with the principles of the United
Nations Charter and with the mandatory rules of generalinternational

law prohibiting the use of force and the violation of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity, sovereign equality and political independence
of States."

On behalfof the Governmentof the UnitedKingdom,
in the Preliminary Objections :

"For the reasons advanced, the United Kingdom requests the Court to
adjudge and declare that:

it lacksjurisdiction over the claims brought against the United Kingdom
by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
andior

the claims brought against the United Kingdom by the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya are inadmissible."

On behalf of the Governmentof Libya,
in the written statement of its observations and submissionson the preliminary
objections :

"For these reasons, and reservingthe right to complement or modify the
present subrnissions in the course of the proceedings if necessary, Libya
requests the Court to adjudge and declare:

- that the preliminary objections raised by the United Kingdom must be
rejected and that, as a consequence:
(a) the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the Application of Libya,
(b) that the Application is admissible;

- that the Court should proceed to the merits."
15. In the oral proceedings,the followingsubmissions werepresented by the

Parties :
On behalf of the Governmentof the UnitedKingdom,

at the hearing of 20 October 1997:

"[Tlhe Court [isrequested to] adjudge and declare that :
it lacksjurisdiction over the claims brought against the United Kingdom
by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

andlor
those claims are inadmissible;
and that the Court dismiss the Libyan Application accordingly."

On behalf of the Government ofLibya:

at the hearing of 22 October 1997:
"The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya requeststhe Courtto adjudgeand declare:

- that the preliminary objections raised by the United Kingdom . . .
must be rejected and that, as a consequence: seraient au demeurant en contradiction avec les principes de la Charte
des Nations Unies et du droit international généralde caractèreimpé-
ratif qui prohibent l'utilisation de la force et la violation de la souve-
raineté, de l'intégrité territorialed,e l'égalsouveraine des Etats et de
leur indépendance politique.»

Au nom du Gouvernementdu Royaume-Uni,

dans les exceptionspréliminaiïes :
«Pour lesmotifs qu'ila exposés,le Royaume-Uni prie la Cour de dire et

juger :
qu'ellen'a pas compétencepour se prononcer sur les demandes présentées
par la Jamahiriya arabe libyenne à l'encontre du Royaume-Uni

que les demandes présentéespar la Jamahiriya arabe libyenne à l'encontre
du Royaume-Uni ne sont pas recevables.»

Au nom du Gouvernementlibyen,
dans l'exposéécrit contenantses observations et conclusions sur les exceptions
préliminaires :

«Par ces motifs, et tout en se réservantle droit de compléter ou modi-
fier, s'ily a lieu, les présentes conclusionsen cours de procédure, laLibye
prie la Cour de dire et juger:

- que les exceptions préliminaires présentéep sar le Royaume-Uni doi-
vent êtrerejetées etqu'en conséquence :
a) la Cour est compétentepour statuer sur la requêtelibyenne,
b) cette requêteest recevable;

- que la procéduredoit être poursuiviequant au fond du différend.»
15. Dans la procédure orale,les conclusions ci-après ont étéprésentéespar
les Parties:

Au nom du Gouvernementdu Royaume-Uni,

à l'audiencedu 20 octobre 1997:
«La Cour est priée de dire et juger:

qu'ellen'a pas compétencepour se prononcer sur les demandes présentées
par la Jamahiriya arabe libyenne à l'encontre du Royaume-Uni

que ces demandes ne sont pas recevables;
en conséquencelaCour doit rejeter la requête dela Libye.»

Au nom du Gouvernementlibyen,
à l'audiencedu 22 octobre 1997:

«La Jamahiriya arabe libyenne prie la Cour de bien vouloir dire et
juger:

- que les exceptionspréliminairesprésentéep sar le Royaume-Uni ...doi-
vent êtrerejetées etqu'en conséquence: (a) the Court has jurisdictionto entertainthe Applicationof Libya,
(b) that the Applicationis admissible;
- that the Court shouldproceedto the merits."

16. In the present case, the United Kingdom has raised two objec-
tions: one to the jurisdiction of the Court and the other to the admissi-
bility of the Application. According to the United Kingdom, "both of
these are objections of an essentially preliminary character".

17. The Court will first consider the objection raised by the United
Kingdom to itsjurisdiction.
18. Libya submits that the Court has jurisdiction on the basis of
Article 14,paragraph 1,of the Montreal Convention, whichprovides that:

"Any dispute between two or more Contracting Statesconcerning
the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be
settled through negotiation, shall, at the request of one of them, be
submitted to arbitration. If within six months of the date of the
request for arbitration the Parties areunable to agree on the organi-
zation of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dis-
pute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity
with the Statute of the Court."

19. TheParties agree that the Montreal Convention isin force between
them and that it was already in force both at the time of the destruction
of the Pan Am aircraft over Lockerbie, on 21 December 1988,and at the
time of filingof the Application, on 3March 1992.However, the Respon-
dent contests the jurisdiction of the Court because, in its submission, al1
the requisites laid down in Article 14, paragraph 1, of the Montreal

Convention have not been complied with in the present case.

20. The Respondent expressly stated that it did not wish to contest
the jurisdiction of the Court on al1of the same grounds it had relied
upon in the provisional measuresphase of the proceedings, and restricted
itself to alleging that Libya had failed to show,first, that there existed a
legal dispute between the Parties and second, that such dispute, if any,
concerned the interpretation or application of the Montreal Conven-
tion and fell, as a result, within the terms of Article 14,paragraph 1, of
that Convention. Consequently, the United Kingdom did not, in the
present phase of the proceedings, reiterate its earlier arguments as to
whether or not the dispute that, in the opinion of Libya, existed between

the Parties could be settled by negotiation; whether Libya had made a a) la Cour est compétente pourstatuer sur la requête libyenne,
b) cette requêteest recevable;
- que laprocéduredoit être poursuiviq euant au fond du différend.

16. Dans la présenteaffaire, le Royaume-Uni a soulevé deuxexcep-
tions: l'une visant la compétence dela Cour et l'autre portant sur la
recevabilitéde la requête.Selon le Royaume-Uni, «ces deux exceptions
revêtent uncaractèreessentiellementpréliminaire)).

17. La Cour examinera en premier lieu l'exception soulevéepar le
Royaume-Uni concernant sa compétence.
18. La Libye soutient que la Cour est compétente surla base du para-
graphe 1 de l'article 14 de la convention de Montréal, qui dispose que:

((Tout différendentre des Etats contractants concernant l'inter-
prétationou l'application de la présente convention qui ne peut pas
êtreréglépar voie de négociation est soumis à l'arbitrage,à la
demande de l'un d'entre eux. Si, dans les sixmois qui suivent la date
de la demande d'arbitrage, lesParties ne parviennent pas à semettre
d'accord sur l'organisation de l'arbitrage, l'une quelconque d'entre
ellespeut soumettre le différend à la Cour internationale de Justice,
en déposant une requête conformémena tu Statut de la Cour. »

19. Les Parties conviennent que la convention de Montréal est en
vigueur entre elles et qu'ellel'était déj,ussi bien lors de la destruction
de l'appareil de la Pan Am au-dessus de Lockerbie, le 21 décembre1988,
qu'au moment du dépôt dela requête,le 3mars 1992.Toutefois, le défen-
deur conteste la compétence dela Cour au motif que, selon lui, il n'a pas
été satisfait,en l'espèce, toutes les exigencesénoncées au paragraphe 1
de l'article 14de la convention de Montréal.

20. Le défendeura expressément affirmé qu'il ne souhaitait pas contes-
ter la compétencede la Cour sur la base de tous les motifs qu'il avait
invoquéslors de la phase de la procédurerelative aux mesures conserva-
toires et il s'est bornà alléguerque la Libye n'avait pas établi,premiè-
rement, qu'il existait un différendjuridique entre les Parties et, deuxiè-
mement, qu'un tel différendconcerneraitl'interprétation ou l'application
de la conventionde Montréal et entrerait par suitedans les prévisionsdu
paragraphe 1 de l'article 14 de cette convention. Le Royaume-Uni n'a
donc pas repris, lors de la présente phase de la procédure,les arguments

qu'il avait précédemment avancés sur le point de savoir si le différend
qui, d'après laLibye, existerait entre les Parties ne pouvait se réglerparproper request for arbitration; and whether the six-month period
required by Article 14, paragraph 1, of the Convention had been com-
plied with.
21. The Court nonetheless considers it necessary to deal briefly with

these arguments. It observes that in the present case the Respondent has
always maintained that the destruction of the Pan Am aircraft over
Lockerbie did not give rise to any dispute between the Parties regarding
the interpretation or application of the Montreal Convention, and that,
for that reason, in the Respondent's view,there was nothing to be settled
by negotiation under the Convention; the Court notes that the arbitra-
tion proposa1 contained in the letter sent on 18 January 1992 by the
Libyan Secretary of the People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and
International Co-operation to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
United Kingdom met with no answer; and it notes, in particular, that the
Respondent clearly expressedits intention not to accept arbitration - in
whatever form - when presenting and strongly supporting resolution
731 (1992)adopted by the Security Council three days later, on 21 Janu-
ary 1992.

Consequently, in the opinion of the Court the alleged dispute between
the Parties could not be settled by negotiation or submitted to arbitration
under the Montreal Convention. and the refusal of the Remondent to
enter into arbitration to resolve that dispute absolved Libya from any
obligation under Article 14,paragraph 1,of the Convention to observe a
six-monthperiod starting from the request for arbitration, before seising
the Court.

22. As recalled by the Parties, the Permanent Court of International
Justicestated in 1924that "[a]dispute is a disagreement on a point of law
or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons"
(Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924, P.C. Z .., Series A, No. 2,
p. 11).The present Court for its part, in its Judgment of 30June 1995in
the case concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), emphasized the
following :

"In order to establish the existence of a dispute, 'It must be
shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the
other' (South West Africa, Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
1.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 328); and further, 'Whether there exists an
international dispute is aatter for objective determination' (Znter-
pretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania,
First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74)." (1C..J.
Reports 1995, p. 100.)voie de négociation,si la Libye avait présenté unedemande d'arbitrage
en bonne et due forme et si elleavait respectéle délai desixmois prescrit
par le paragraphe 1 de l'article 14de la convention.
21. La Cour n'estime pas moins nécessaire d'examiner brièvemenc tes
arguments. Elle relèvequ'en l'espècele défendeura toujours soutenu que
la destruction de l'appareil de la Pan Am au-dessusde Lockerbien'avait
suscitéentre les Parties aucun différendconcernant l'interprétation ou
l'application de la convention de Montréal et que,de ce fait, il n'y avait,
de l'avis du défendeur, aucune question à réglerpar voie de négociation

conformément à la convention; elle constate que la proposition d'arbi-
trage contenue dans la lettre que le secrétaire libyendu comitépopulaire
de liaison avec l'étranger etde coopération internationale a adresséele
18janvier 1992au ministre des affaires étrangères du Royaume-Uni est
restéesans réponse; et elle note en particulier que le défendeura claire-
ment expriméson intention de ne pas accepter d'arbitrage - sous quel-
que formeque ce soit - lorsqu'ila présentéetvigoureusement soutenu la
résolution731 (1992)que le Conseil de sécurité a adoptée troisjours plus
tard, le 21janvier 1992.
En conséquence,de l'avis dela Cour, le différendqui existerait entre
les Parties ne pouvait ni êtreréglépar voie de négociationni être soumis
à l'arbitrage en application de la convention de Montréal, et le refus

du défendeurde prendre part à un arbitrage pour réglerce différend exo-
néraitla Libye de toute obligation, aux termes du paragraphe 1 de l'ar-
ticle 14de la convention, d'observer un délai desix mois à compter de
la demande d'arbitrage avant de saisir la Cour.

22. Comme les Parties l'ont rappelé, la Cour permanente de Justice
internationale a affirmé dès1924 qu'«[u]n différendest un désaccord sur
un point de droit ou de fait, une contradiction, une opposition de thèses
juridiques ou d'intérêts entredeux personnes)) (Concessions Mavrom-
matis en Palestine, 1924, C.P.J.I. sérieA no2, p. 11).La Cour actuelle a
pour sa part souligné,dans son arrêtdu 30juin 1995 enl'affaire relative
au Timor oriental (Portugal c. Australie), ce qui suit:

((Pour établirl'existenced'un différend:((11faut démontrer que la
réclamation de l'unedes parties seheurte à l'opposition manifeste de
l'autre» (Sud-Ouest africain, exceptions préliminaires,arrêt,C.I.J.
Recueil 1962, p. 328); par ailleurs, ((l'existenced'un différendinter-
national demande à être établie objectivement)()Interprétationdes
traitésdepaix conclusavec la Bulgarie, laHongrie et la Roumanie,
premièrephase, avis consultat$ C.I.J. Recueil 1950,p. 74).» (C.I.J.

Recueil 1995, p. 100.) 23. In its Application and Memorial, Libya maintained that the
Montreal Convention was the only instrument applicable to the destruc-
tion of the Pan Am aircraft over Lockerbie, for the following reasons:

(a) the Respondent and Libya are bound by the Montreal Convention
which is in force between the Parties;
(b) the Montreal Convention is specifically aimed at preventing that
type of action (third paragraph of the Preamble);
(c) the actions ascribed to the Libyan nationals are covered by Article 1
of the Montreal Convention;
(d) "the system of the Montreal Convention, as compared to the system
of the Charter, is both a lex posterior and a lex specialis; conse-
quently, for matters covered by that Convention, it must a priori
take precedence over the systems for which the Charter provides";
and

(e) there is no other convention concerning international criminal law
in force which is applicable to these issues in the relations between
Libya and the United Kingdom.
24. The United Kingdom does not deny that, as such, the facts of the
case could fa11within the terms of the Montreal Convention. However, it
emphasizes that, in the present case, from the time Libya invoked the
Montreal Convention, the United Kingdom has claimed that it was not
relevant as the question to be resolvedhad to do with "the ... reaction of
the international community to the situation arisingfrom Libya'sfailure
to respond effectively to the most serious accusations of State involve-
ment in acts of terrorism".

25. Consequently,the Parties differon the question whetherthe destruc-
tion of the Pan Am aircraft over Lockerbie is governed by the Montreal
Convention. A dispute thus exists between the Parties as to the legal
régimeapplicable to this event. Such a dispute, in the view ofthe Court,
concerns the interpretation and application of the Montreal Convention,
and, in accordance with Article 14,paragraph 1, of the Convention, falls
to be decided by the Court.

26. Furthermore, in its Application and Memorial, Libya stressed the
following six points in particular in support of the submissions set forth,
respectively, in paragraph 13 (subparagraphs (a) and (b)) and para-
graph 14 (subparagraphs (b) and (c)), above:

(a) the actions which brought about the destruction of the Pan Am
aircraft over Lockerbie constitute one of the offences covered by
Article 1 of the Montreal Convention and therefore the Montreal
Convention must be applied to those facts;
(b) Libya has complied with the obligation imposed by Article 5, para-
graph 2, of the Montreal Convention of establishingitsjurisdiction
over the alleged offenders in the destruction of the aircraft, and it
has the right to exercisethe jurisdiction so established; 23. Dans sa requête et sonmémoire,la Libye a soutenu que la conven-
tion de Montréal est le seul instrument applicable à la destruction de
l'appareil de la Pan Am au-dessus de Lockerbiepour lesmotifs suivants:
a) le défendeuret la Libye sont liéspar la convention de Montréal, qui
est en vigueur entre les Parties;

b) cetteconvention est spécifiquementdestinée à prévenirce type d'actes
(troisièmeparagraphe du préambule);
c) lesactesimputés aux ressortissantslibyens sont viséspar l'articlepre-
mier de la convention de Montréal;
d) «le systèmede la conventionde Montréal est,par rapport au système
de la Charte des Nations Unies, à la fois une lex posterior et une lex
specialis; il en résulte que, pour les questions qui relèvent de cette
convention, celle-ci doità priori l'emporter sur les systèmes prévus
par la Charte));
e) il n'existeaucune autre convention relative au droit pénal internatio-
nal en vigueur qui soit applicableà ces questions dans les rapports

entre la Libye et le Royaume-Uni.
24. Le Royaume-Uni ne nie pas que, comme tels, les faits de la cause
puissent entrer dans les prévisionsde la convention de Montréal. Toute-
fois, il souligne qu'en l'espèce,dèsque la Libye a invoqué la convention
de Montréal,il a fait valoir que celle-cin'était pasen jeu car la question
à résoudre avait trait à «la réaction de la communauté internationale
devant la situation découlant de l'absencede réponseeffectivede la Libye

aux accusationstrès graves de participation étatiqueà des actes de terro-
risme D.
25. Ainsi, lesParties s'opposent sur la question de savoir si la destruc-
tion de l'appareil de la Pan Am au-dessus de Lockerbie est régiepar la
convention de Montréal. Il existe donc un différendentre les Parties sur
le régimejuridique applicableà cet événementU . n tel différendconcerne,
de l'avis de la Cour, l'interprétation et l'applicationde la convention de
Montréal, et, conformémentau paragraphe 1de l'article 14de la conven-
tion, il appartient la Cour de le trancher.

26. En outre, dans sa requête et sonmémoire,la Libye, àl'appui des
conclusions reproduites, respectivement, aux paragraphes 13 (alinéas a)
et b)) et 14 (alinéasb) et c)) ci-dessus, a en particulier soulignéles six

points suivants:
a) les actes qui ont entraînéla destruction de l'appareil de la Pan Am
au-dessus de Lockerbie constituent l'une des infractions viséespar
l'articlepremier de la convention de Montréal et celle-ci doit partant
s'appliquerà ces faits;

b) la Libye s'estacquittée de l'obligationque lui imposele paragraphe 2
de l'article 5 de la convention de Montréal d'établirsa compétenceà
l'égarddes auteurs présumés de la destruction de l'aéronefet ellea le
droit d'exercerla compétence ainsiétablie;(c) Libya has exerciseditsjurisdiction over the two alleged offenders on
the basis of its Penal Code, and the Respondent should not interfere
with the exerciseof that jurisdiction;

(d) Libya has exercisedthe rights conferred by Article 6 of the Montreal
Convention by taking al1necessary measures to ensure the presence
of the two alleged offenders, making preliminary enquiries, notify-
ing the States concerned and indicating that it intended to exercise
jurisdiction, but the Respondent, by its actions and threats, is
attempting, according to Libya, to prevent the application of the
Convention ;
(e) Libya having decided not to extradite the two alleged offenders,
Article 7 of the Montreal Convention gives it the right to submit
them to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution in
accordance with Libyan law; and
(f) on the basis of Article 8, paragraph 3, of the Montreal Convention,
it has the right not to extradite the two alleged offenders because
they are Libyan nationals and the Libyan Constitution does not per-

mit their extradition.
27. The Respondent disputes that the Montreal Convention confers

on Libya the rights it claims to enjoy. It contends, moreover, that none of
the provisions referred to by Libya imposes obligations on the United
Kingdom. Finally, it recalls that it never itself invoked the Montreal
Convention, and observes that nothing in that Convention prevented it
from requesting the surrender of the two alleged offenders outside the
framework of the Convention.
28. Article 1 of the Montreal Convention provides as follows:

"1. Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and inten-
tionally:

(a) performs an act of violence against a person on board an air-
craft in flight if that act is likely to endanger the safety of that
aircraft; or
(b) destroys an aircraft in serviceor causes damage to such an air-
craft which renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to
endanger its safety in flight; or
(c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any
means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to
destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which renders it
incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it which is likely to
endanger its safety in flight; or
(d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with
their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safety

of aircraft in flight; or
(e) communicatesinformation which he knows to be false, thereby
endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight. CONVENTION DE MONTREALDE 1971 (ARRÊT) 19

c) elle a exercésa compétence à l'égarddes deux auteurs présumés de
l'infraction en vertu de son code pénal etle défendeurne devrait pas
entraver l'exercicede cette compétence;
d) elle a exercé lesdroits qu'elle tient de l'article 6 de la convention de
Montréal en prenant toutes les mesures nécessairespour assurer la
présence des deuxauteurs présumés del'infraction, en procédant à
des enquêtes préliminairese ,n avisant les Etats intéressés eten leur

indiquant qu'elleentendait exercer sa compétence, maisle défendeur
tente, selon elle,par ses actions et ses menaces, d'empêcher l'applica-
tion de la convention;
e) la Libye ayant décidéde ne pas extrader les deux auteurs présumés de
l'infraction, l'article 7 de la convention de Montréal lui confère le
droit de les déféreà ses autoritéscompétentes auxfins d'engagerdes
poursuites pénales conformémentau droit libyen;
f) elle est en droit, conformémentau paragraphe 3 de l'article 8 de la
convention de Montréal,de ne pas extrader lesdeux auteurs présumés
de l'infraction car il s'agit de ressortissants libyens et la Constitution

libyenne n'autorise pas leur extradition.

27. Le défendeurcontesteque la convention de Montréal confère à la
Libye les droits qu'elle entend ainsi faire valoir. Il prétend en outre
qu'aucune des dispositions auxquelles la Libye se réfèren'impose d'obli-
gation au Royaume-Uni. Enfin, il rappelle qu'il n'ajamais invoqué lui-
mêmela convention de Montréalet observe que rien, dans cette conven-
tion, ne l'empêchaitde demander la livraison des auteurs présumésde
l'infraction en dehors du cadre de ladite convention.
28. L'article premier de la convention de Montréal dispose ce qui
suit:

((1. Commet une infraction pénaletoute personne qui illicitement
et intentionnellement:

a) accomplit un acte de violence à l'encontre d'une personne se
trouvant à bord d'un aéronefen vol, si cet acte est de natureà
compromettre la sécuritéde cet aéronef;
b) détruit unaéronefen serviceou cause à un tel aéronefdes dom-
mages qui le rendent inapte au vol ou qui sont de natureà com-

promettre sa sécuritéen vol;
c) place ou fait placer sur un aéronefen service,par quelque moyen
que ce soit, un dispositif ou des substances propres à détruire
ledit aéronefou àlui causer des dommages qui le rendent inapte
au vol ou qui sont de nature à compromettre sa sécuritéen
vol ;
d) détruit ouendommage des installationsou services de navigation
aérienneouen perturbe le fonctionnement, sil'un de cesactes est
de nature àcompromettre la sécurité d'aéronefsen vol;

e) communique une information qu'elle sait êtrefausse et, de ce
fait, compromet la sécuritéd'un aéronefen vol. 2. Any person also commits an offence if he:

(a) attempts to commit any of the offences mentioned in para-
graph 1 of this Article; or
(b) is an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to com-
mit any such offence."
Article 5 provides:

"1. Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be
necessary to establishitsjurisdiction over the offencesin the follow-
ing cases:

(a) when the offence is committed in the territory of that State;
(b) when the offence is cornmitted against or on board an aircraft
registered in that State;
(c) when the aircraft on board which the offence is committed
lands in its territory with the alleged offender still on board;

(d) when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft
leased without crew to a lessee who has his principal place of
business or, if the lesseehas no such place of business, his per-
manent residence, in that State.
2. Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as
may be necessary to establishitsjurisdiction over the offencesmen-

tioned in Article 1, paragraph 1 (a),(b) and (c), and in Article 1,
paragraph 2, in so far as that paragraph relates to those offences,in
the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it
does not extradite him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction
exercised in accordance with national law."
Article 6, for its part, States:

"1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any
Contracting State in the territory of which the offender or the
alleged offender is present, shall take him into custody or take other
measures to ensure his presence. The custody and other measures
shall be as provided in the law of that State but may only be con-
tinued for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal or extra-
dition proceedings to be instituted.
2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary enquiry into

the facts.
3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article
shall be assisted in communicating immediately with the nearest
appropriate representative of the State of which he is a national.

4. When a State, pursuant to this Article, has taken a person into 2. Commet égalementune infraction pénaletoute personne qui:
a) tente de commettre l'une des infractions énuméréea su para-
graphe premier du présentarticle;
b) est le complicedela personne qui commet ou tente de commettre
l'une de ces infractions.»

L'article 5 est ainsi conçu:

«1. Tout Etat contractant prend lesmesures nécessairespour éta-
blir sa compétence auxfins de connaître des infractionsdans les cas
suivants :

a) si l'infraction est commise sur le territoire de cet Etat;
b) si l'infraction est commise à l'encontre ou à bord d'un aéronef
immatriculédans cet Etat;
c) si l'aéronefà bord duquel l'infraction est commise atterrit sur
son territoire avec Sauteur présuméde l'infraction se trouvant
encore à bord;
d) si l'infraction est commise à l'encontre ou à bord d'un aéronef
donnéen location sans équipage à une personne qui a le siège
principal de son exploitation ou, à défaut,sa résidenceperma-
nente dans ledit Etat.

2. Tout Etat contractant prend égalementles mesures nécessaires
pour établirsa compétence auxfins de connaître des infractions pré-
vues aux alinéas a), b) et c) du paragraphe 1 de l'article premier,
ainsi qu'au paragraphe 2 du mêmearticle, pour autant que ce der-
nier paragraphe concerne lesdites infractions,dans le cas où l'auteur
présuméde Yuned'elles setrouve sur son territoire et où ledit Etat
ne l'extrade pas conformément à l'article 8 vers l'un desEtats visés

au paragraphe 1 du présent article.
3. La présente convention n'écarte aucune compétence pénale
exercéeconformémentaux lois nationales. ))
Pour sa part, l'article 6 porte:

«1. S'ilestime que lescirconstances lejustifient, tout Etat contrac-
tant sur le territoire duquel setrouve l'auteur ou l'auteur présuméde
l'infraction assure la détention de cette personne ou prend toutes
mesures nécessairespour assurer sa présence.Cette détention et ces
mesures doivent être conformes à la législationdudit Etat; elles ne

peuvent êtremaintenues que pendant le délainécessaire à l'engage-
ment de poursuites pénalesou d'une procédure d'extradition.
2. Ledit Etat procède immédiatementà une enquêtepréliminaire
en vue d'établirles faits.
3. Toutepersonne détenueen application du paragraphe 1du pré-
sent article peut communiquer immédiatementavec le plus proche
représentantqualifiéde 1'Etatdont ellea la nationalité;toutes facilités
lui sont accordées à cette fin.
4. Lorsqu'un Etat a mis une personne en détention conformé- custody, it shall immediately notify the States mentioned in Ar-
ticle 5, paragraph 1, the State of nationality of the detained person
and, if it considersit advisable,any other interested State of the fact
that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which war-

rant his detention. The State which makes the preliminary enquiry
contemplated in paragraph 2 of this Article shall promptly report its
findings to the said States and shall indicate whether it intends to
exercisejurisdiction."

Article 7 is worded in the following terms:

"The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged
offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, with-
out exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was com-
mitted in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities
for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their
decisionin the samemanner as in the case of any ordinary offenceof
a serious nature under the law of that State."

Finally, in the words of Article 8:

"1. The offences shall be deemed to be included as extraditable
offences in any extradition treaty existing between Contracting
States.Contracting Statesundertake to include the offencesas extra-
ditable offencesin every extradition treaty to be concluded between
them.
2. If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional on
the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from
another Contracting State with which it has no extradition treaty, it
may at its option consider this Convention as the legal basis for

extradition in respect of the offences. Extradition shall be subject to
the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State.

3. Contracting States which do not make extradition conditional
on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the offences as extra-
ditable offences between themselves subject to the conditions pro-
vided by the law of the requested state.
4. Each of the offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extra-
dition between Contracting States, as if it had been committed not
only in the place in which it occurredbut also in the territories of the
States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with
Article 5, paragraph 1 (b), (c) and (d) ."

29. In viewof the positions put forward by the Parties, the Court finds
that there exists between them not only a dispute of a general nature, as
definedin paragraph 25 above, but also a specificdispute which concerns

the interpretation and application of Article 7 - read in conjunction
with Article 1, Article 5, Article 6 and Article 8 - of the Montreal mentaux dispositions du présentarticle, il avise immédiatementde
cette détention,ainsi que des circonstances qui lajustifient, les Etats
mentionnésau paragraphe 1 de l'article 5, 1'Etat dont la personne
détenuea la nationalité et, s'il le juge opportun, tous autres Etats
intéressés.L'Etat qui procède à l'enquête préliminairv eiséeau pa-
ragraphe 2 du présent articleen communique rapidement les conclu-
sions auxdits Etats et leur indique s'il entend exercer sa compé-
tence.»

L'article 7 est libellédans les termes suivants:

«L7Etat contractant sur le territoire duquel l'auteur présuméde
l'une des infractions est découvert,s'iln'extrade pas ce dernier, sou-
met l'affaire, sansaucune exception et que l'infraction ait ou non été
commise sur son territoire, à ses autoritéscompétentespour l'exer-
cice de l'action pénale.Ces autorités prennent leur décisiondans les
mêmesconditions que pour toute infraction de droit commun de

caractèregrave conformémentaux lois de cet Etat. »

Enfin, aux termes de l'article 8:
«1. Les infractions sont de plein droit comprises comme cas

d'extradition dans tout traité d'extradition conclu entre Etats
contractants. Les Etats contractants s'engagent à comprendre les
infractions comme cas d'extradition dans tout traité d'extradition à
conclure entre eux.
2. Si un Etat contractant qui subordonne l'extradition à l'exis-
tence d'un traitéest saisi d'une demande d'extradition par un autre
Etat contractant avec lequel il n'est pas liépar un traité d'extradi-
tion, il a la latitude de considérer la présente conventioncomme
constituant la base juridique de l'extradition en ce qui concerne les
infractions. L'extradition estsubordonnéeaux autres conditions pré-
vues par le droit de1'Etatrequis.

3. Les Etats contractants qui ne subordonnent pas l'extradition à
l'existence d'un traité reconnaissent les infractions comme cas
d'extradition entre eux dans les conditions prévuespar le droit de
1'Etatrequis.
4. Entre Etats contractants, les infractions sont considérées aux
fins d'extradition comme ayant étécommises tant au lieu de leur
perpétration que sur le territoire des Etats tenus d'établirleur com-
pétence envertu des alinéas b), c) et d) du paragraphe 1 de l'ar-
ticle 5.»

29. Au vu des positions expriméespar les Parties, la Cour constate
qu'il existe entre elles non seulement un différendde nature généraletel
que définiau paragraphe 25 ci-dessus,mais aussi un différendspécifique
qui concerne l'interprétation etl'application de l'article - lu conjoin-

tement avec l'article 1,l'article 5, l'article 6 et l'ar-iclde la conven-Convention and which, in accordance with Article 14, paragraph 1, of
the Convention, falls to be decided by the Court.

30. Furthermore, Libya maintained in its Application and Memorial
that, once it had commenced its judicial investigation of the two alleged

offenders, the Respondent was, according to Article 11,paragraph 1, of
the Montreal Convention, under an obligation to hand over to the
Libyan authorities al1the evidencein its possession regardingthe offence.
In Libya's opinion, this obligation was not duly complied with, because
the United Kingdom only transmitted "a copy of the statement of the
facts" against the accused, a document that "contains no evidence of
which the Libyan judiciary could make use".

31. In this connection, the United Kingdom acknowledges that "Ar-
ticle 11,paragraph 1, differs from the other provisions on which Libya
has relied, in that ites impose obligations on other States" and "is thus
capable, in the abstract, of givingrise to a dispute between Libya and the

United Kingdom". However, it maintains that it did not violate this pro-
vision, and claims in particular that it "provided Libya with copies of the
Scottishcharges, the warrant for the arrest of the accused and the State-
ment of Facts prepared by the Lord Advocate". It also recalls that at the
time when Libya presented its claims, Libya had not - any more than
had the United Kingdom - invoked the Montreal Convention, and it
concluded that,

"For the failure of the United Kingdom to supply further infor-
mation to Libya to constitute a violation of Article 11,the Conven-
tion must at least have been invoked by one of the States con-
cerned."

32. Article 11of the Montreal Convention is worded as follows:

"1. Contracting States shall afford one another the greatest mea-
sure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought
in respect of the offences.The law of the State requested shall apply
in al1cases.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1of this Article shall not affect
obligations under any other treaty, bilateral or multilateral, which
governs or will govern, in whole or in part, mutual assistance in
criminal matters."

33. Having taken account of the positions of the Parties as to the
duties imposed by Article 11 of the Montreal Convention, the Court con-
cludes that there equally exists between them a dispute which concerns
the interpretation and application of that provision, and which, in accor- 22
CONVENTION DE MONTRÉAL DE 1971(ARRÊT)

tion de Montréal; conformément au paragraphe 1 de l'article 14 de la
convention, il appartientà la Cour de trancher ce différend.

30. Par ailleurs, la Libye a soutenu, dans sa requêteet son mémoire,
que, dès lors qu'elle avait entamé son enquêtejudiciaire à l'égarddes
deux auteurs présumés de l'infraction, le défendeurétait tenu, auxtermes
du paragraphe 1de l'article 11de la convention de Montréal,de remettre
aux autorités libyennes tous les élémentsde preuve en sa possession
concernant l'infraction en cause. Or, de l'avis dela Libye, le Royaume-
Uni ne s'estpas dûment acquittéde cette obligation puisqu'il s'estborné
à envoyer «une simple copie de l'exposédes faits» retenus contre les
accusés,document qui «ne contien[t] aucun élémentde preuve dont la
justice libyenne pourrait se servir)).
31. A ce propos, le Royaume-Unireconnaît que «[l]eparagraphe 1de

l'article 11 diffère des autres dispositions invoquéespar la Libye en
ce qu'il impose des obligations à d'autres Etats)) et «peut donc, dans
l'abstrait, donner lieu un différendentre la Libye et le Royaume-Uni)).
Toutefois, il soutient qu'il n'a pas violécette disposition, et fait notam-
ment valoir qu'il «a fourni à la Libye des copies de l'acte d'accusation
dressépar l'Ecosse,du mandat d'arrêtdes accuséset de l'exposé desfaits
établi par le procureur général)).11relèveau demeurant qu'à l'époque
où la Libye avait présentéses demandes elle n'avait - pas plus que le
Royaume-Uni - invoqué la convention de Montréal et il conclut que:

«Pour que le refus du Royaume-Uni de fournir de plus amples
informations à la Libye constitue une violation de l'article 11, la
convention aurait dû au moins avoir été invoquép ear l'un des Etats
concernés.»

32. L'article 11de la convention de Montréal est ainsi libellé:

«1. Les Etats contractants s'accordent l'entraidejudiciaire la plus
large possible dans toute procédure pénale relativeaux infractions.
Dans tous les cas, la loi applicablepour l'exécutiond'une demande
d'entraide est celle de'Etatrequis.
2. Toutefois, les dispositions du paragraphe 1 du présent ar-
ticlen'affectentpas les obligationsdécoulantdes dispositionsde tout
autre traitéde caractère bilatéral ou multilatéral quirégitou régira,
en tout ou en partie, le domaine de l'entraide judiciaire en matière

pénale.»
33. Considérant les positions des Parties quant aux obligations
imposéespar l'article 11de la convention de Montréal, la Cour conclut
qu'il existeégalemententre elles un différendqui concerne l7interpréta-

tion et l'application de cette disposition; conformémentau paragraphe 1 dance with Article 14,paragraph 1,of the Convention, fallsto be decided
by the Court.

34. Libya, in the latest version of its submissions, finally asks the
Court to find that

"the United Kingdom is under a legal obligation to respect Libya's
right not to have the [Montreal] Convention set aside by means
which would in any case be at variance with the principles of the
United Nations Charter and with the mandatory rules of general
international law prohibiting the use of force and the violation of the
sovereignty,territorial integrity, sovereignequalityand politicalnde-
pendence of States".

35. The United Kingdom maintains that it is not for the Court, on the
basis of Article 14,paragraph 1, of the Montreal Convention, to decide
on the lawfulness of actions which are in any event in conformity with
international law, and which were instituted by the Respondent to secure
the surrender of the two allegedoffenders. It concludes from this that the
Court lacksjurisdiction over the submissions presented on this point by
Libya.
36. The Court cannot uphold the line of argument thus formulated.
Indeed, it is for the Court to decide, on the basis of Article 14, para-

graph 1, of the Montreal Convention, on the lawfulness of the actions
criticized by Libya, in so far asthose actions would be at variance with
the provisions of the Montreal Convention.

37. In the present case, the United Kingdom has contended, however,
that even if the Montreal Convention did confer on Libya the rights it
claims, they could not be exercisedin this case because they were super-
seded by Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) which,
by virtue of Articles25 and 103 of the United Nations Charter, have pri-
ority over al1rights and obligations arising out of the Montreal Conven-
tion. The Respondent has also argued that, because of the adoption of
those resolutions, the only dispute which existed from that point on was
between Libya and the Security Council; this, clearly, would not be a dis-
pute falling within the terms of Article 14,paragraph 1, of the Montreal
Convention and thus not one which the Court could entertain.

38. The Court cannot uphold this line of argument. Security Council
resolutions 748 (1992)and 883(1993)were in fact adopted after the filing
of the Application on 3 March 1992.In accordance with its established
jurisprudence, if the Court had jurisdiction on that date, it continues to
do so; the subsequent coming into existence of the above-mentionedde l'article 14 de la convention, il appartientà la Cour de trancher ce
différend.

34. La Libye, dans le dernier étatde ses conclusions,demande enfin à
la Cour de juger que
«le Royaume-Uni est juridiquement tenu de respecter le droit de la

Libye à ce que [la convention de Montréal] ne soit pas écartéepar
des moyens qui seraient au demeurant en contradiction aveclesprin-
cipes de la Charte des Nations Unies et du droit international géné-
ral de caractère impératif qui prohibent l'utilisation de force et la
violation de la souverainetéde l'intégrité territoriale, del'égsou-é
veraine des Etats et de leur indépendance politique)).

35. Le Royaume-Uni soutient qu'il n'appartient pas àla Cour, sur la
base du paragraphe 1 de l'article 14de la convention de Montréal, dese
prononcer sur la licéitédes actions, au demeurant conformes au droit
international, engagéespar le défendeuren vue d'obtenir la livraison des
deux auteurs présumésde l'infraction. Il en déduit quela Cour n'a pas
compétencepour connaître des conclusions présentées sur ce point par la
Libye.
36. La Cour ne saurait accueillirl'argumentation ainsi formulée.Il lui
appartient en effet dejuger, sur la base du paragraphe 1de l'article 14de
la convention de Montréal, de la licéitédes actions critiquées par la
Libye, dans la mesure ou ces actions seraient contraires aux dispositions
de la convention de Montréal.

37. Dans l'instance, le Royaume-Uni a cependant affirméque, quand
bien mêmela convention de Montréal conférerait à la Libye les droits
qu'elle revendique,ceux-cine pourraient êtreexercésen l'espèce,au motif
qu'ilsauraient été supplantép sar les résolutions748 (1992)et 883 (1993)
du Conseil de sécuritéqui, en vertu des articles 25 et 103de la Charte des
Nations Unies, prévalent sur tous droits et obligations crééspar la
convention de Montréal. Le défendeur a aussi avancé que,du fait de
l'adoption de ces résolutions,le seul différendqui existerait désormais
opposerait la Libye au Conseil de sécurité;or il s'agirait là,l'évidence,
d'un différendqui n'entrerait pas dans les prévisionsdu paragraphe 1de
l'article 14de la convention de Montréal etdont la Cour ne pourrait dès
lors connaître.
38. La Cour ne saurait accueillir cette argumentation. Les résolu-

tions 748 (1992)et 883(1993)du Conseilde sécurité ont en effetété adop-
téesaprèsle dépôt dela requête,le 3mars 1992.Or, conformément à une
jurisprudence constante, si la Cour était compétenteà cette date, ellel'est
demeurée; l'intervention ultérieuredes résolutions susviséesne sauraitresolutions cannot affect its jurisdiction once established (cf. Nottebohm,
Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 122; Right of
Passage overIndian Territory, Preliminary Objections,Judgment, I. C.J.
Reports 1957, p. 142).

39. In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the objec-
tion to jurisdiction raised by the United Kingdom on the basis of the
alleged absence of a dispute between the Parties concerningthe interpre-
tation or application of the Montreal Convention must be rejected, and
that the Court has jurisdiction to hear the disputes between Libya and
the United Kingdom as to the interpretation or application of the provi-
sions of that Convention.

40. The Court will now proceed to consider the objection of the
United Kingdom that the Libyan Application is not admissible.
41. The principal argument of the United Kingdom in this context is
that

"what Libya claimsto be the issueor issuesin dispute between it and
the United Kingdom are now regulated by decisions of the Security
Council, taken under Chapter VI1 of the Charter of the United
Nations, which are binding on both Parties and that (if there is any
conflict between what tde resolutions require and rights or obliga-
tions alleged to ariseunder the Montreal Convention) the resolu-
tions have overriding effect in accordance with Article 103 of the
Charter7'.

In this connection, the United Kingdom explains that

"resolutions 748 and 883 are legally binding and they create legal
obligations for Libya and the United Kingdom which are determi-
native of any dispute over which the Court might havejurisdiction".

According to the United Kingdom, those resolutions require the surren-
der of the two suspects by Libya to the United Kingdom or the United
States for trial, and this determination by the Security Councilis binding
on Libya irrespective of any rights it may have under the Montreal
Convention. On this basis, the United Kingdom maintains that

"the relief which Libya seeks from the Court under the Montreal

Convention is not open to it, and that the Court should therefore
exerciseits power to declare the Libyan Application inadmissible".affecter une compétence déjà établie(voir Nottebohm, exceptionprélimi-
naire, arrêt,C.Z.J.Recueil 1953, p. 122; Droit de passage en territoire
indien,exceptions préliminaires,arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 1957, p. 142).

39. Au vu de ce qui précède,la Cour conclut que l'exception d'incom-
pétence tiréepar le Royaume-Uni de l'absencealléguée de différendentre
les Parties concernant l'interprétation ou l'application de la convention

de Montréal doit êtrerejetée,et qu'ellea compétencepour connaître des
différendsqui opposent la Libye au Royaume-Uni en ce qui concerne
l'interprétationou l'application des dispositions de cette convention.

40. LaCour passera maintenant à l'examende l'exceptiondu Royaume-

Uni selon laquelle la requêtelibyenne n'est pas recevable.
41. Le principal argument présenté par le Royaume-Uni dans ce
contexte est le suivant:
«ce que la Libye affirme êtrela ou les questions en litige entre elle-

mêmeet le Royaume-Uni est maintenant réglé par les décisionsque
le Conseil de sécuritéa prises en application du chapitreVI1de la
Charte des Nations Unies et qui lient les deux Parties, et.les réso-
lutions adoptées priment, conformément à l'article 103de la Charte,
en cas de conflit entre ce qu'ellesexigent et les droits ou obligations
qui découleraientde la convention de Montréal)).

Le Royaume-Uni précise à cet égard que
«les résolutions748 et 883 sont juridiquement obligatoireset créent
pour la Libye et le Royaume-Uni des obligationsjuridiques qui sont

déterminantespour tout différendsur lequel la Cour pourrait avoir
compétence P.
Selon le Royaume-Uni, lesdites résolutionsprescrivent la livraison par la
Libye des deux suspects au Royaume-Uni ou aux Etats-Unis, afin d'y
êtrejugés,et cette décisiondu Conseil de sécurité estobligatoire pour la

Libye, indépendamment de tout droit que celle-ci pourrait tirer de la
convention de Montréal. Sur cette base, le Royaume-Uni soutient que la
Libye ne pourrait
((obtenir lesmesures qu'ellesollicitede la Cour au titre de la conven-
tion de Montréal et quela Cour devrait dès lorsexercer son pouvoir

de déclarer irrecevablela requête libyenne». The United Kingdom also argues that, should the Court be minded to
consider the questions raised by Libya on the Montreal Conventionwith-
out regard to the effect of the Security Council resolutions, it would find
itselfin the position of having to proceed to a consideration of the merits
of those matters; if the Court were then to rule in favour of the position
advanced by Libya, it would presumably pronounce judgment on that
basis, although such ajudgment would be neither applicable nor enforce-
able in view of prior decisions of the Security Council which remain in
force.

The United Kingdom also adds that the terms of the resolutions con-
cerned, as well as the relevant provisions of the Charter, have been fully
argued before the Court. The Court would therefore need no further
material deriving from argument on the merits to enable it to interpret
the decisions of the Security Council or determine their effects.

42. For its part, Libya argues that it is clear from the actual terms of
resolutions 731 (1992),748 (1992)and 883(1993)that the SecurityCoun-
cilhas never required it to surrender its nationals to the United Kingdom
or the United States; it stated at the hearing that this remained "Libya's
principal argument". It added that the Court must interpret those reso-
lutions "in accordance with the Charter, which determinedtheir validity"
and that the Charter prohibited the Council from requiring Libya to
hand over its nationals to the United Kingdom or the United States.
Libya concludes that its Application is admissible "as the Court can use-
fully rule on the interpretation and application of the Montreal Conven-
tion . . independently of the legal effects of resolutions 748 (1992) and

883 (1993)".
Libya also observes that the arguments of the United Kingdom based
on the provisions of the Charter raise problems which do not possess an
exclusivelypreliminary character, but appertain to the merits of the dis-
pute. It argues in particular that the question of the effect of the Security
Council resolutions is not of an exclusivelypreliminary character, inas-
much as the resolutions under consideration are relied upon by the
United Kingdom in order to overcome the application of the Montreal
Convention, and since Libya is justified in disputing that these resolu-
tions are opposable to it.
43. Libya furthermore draws the Court's attention to the principle
that "The critical date for determiningthe admissibility of an application
is the date on which it is filed"(Border and TransborderArmed Actions
(Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, I.C.J. Reports
1988,p. 95,para. 66).It points out in this connection that itsApplication
was filed on 3 March 1992; that Security Council resolutions 748 (1992)
and 883 (1993) wereadopted on 31 March 1992and 11November 1993,

respectively; and that resolution 731 (1992) of 21January 1992was not
adopted under Chapter VI1of the United Nations Charter and was only
a mere recommendation. Consequently, Libya argues, its Application is
admissible in any event. Le Royaume-Uni fait égalementvaloir que, dans l'hypothèse où la
Cour entendrait examiner lesquestions soulevéespar la Libye concernant
la convention de Montréal sans tenir compte de l'effetdes résolutionsdu
Conseil de sécuritée,lle se trouverait dans la situation de devoir procé-
der à un examen desdites questions sur le fond; si la Cour devait alors se
prononcer en faveur de l'analyse offerte par la Libye, elle rendrait

vraisemblablement un arrêtsur cette base, alors que celui-ci ne serait ni
applicable ni exécutable,au vu des décisionsantérieures du Conseil de
sécuritéqui demeureraient en vigueur.
Le Royaume-Uni ajoute par ailleurs que les termes des résolutionsen
cause, ainsi que des dispositionspertinentes de la Charte, ont fait l'objet
d'une discussioncomplète devant la Cour. 'Celle-cin'aurait donc besoin
d'aucun élémentadditionnel tiré d'une argumentation sur le fond pour
êtreen mesure d'interpréterles décisionsdu Conseil de sécuritéou d'en
déterminerles effets.
42. La Libye soutient pour sa part qu'il ressort des termes mêmesdes
résolutions731 (1992),748 (1992)et 883(1993)que le Conseil de sécurité
n'a jamais exigéqu'elle livre ses nationaux au Royaume-Uni ou aux
Etats-Unis; à l'audience, elle a indiqué que telle étaitbien toujours «la
thèse principale de la Libye)). Elle ajoute qu'il convient pour la Cour
d'interpréter lesdites résolutions«en conformité avec la Charte, qui
détermine leur validité» et que laCharte interdit au Conseil d'obliger la
Libye à livrer ses nationaux au Royaume-Uni ou aux Etats-Unis. Et la

Libye de conclure que sa requêteest recevable «en ce que la Cour peut
utilement se prononcer sur l'interprétation et l'application de la conven-
tion de Montréal ..indépendamment des effets juridiques des résolu-
tions 748 (1992)et 883 (1993))).
La Libye observe au demeurant que les arguments du Royaume-Uni
fondés surles dispositions de la Charte soulèvent des problèmesqui ne
présentent pas un caractèreexclusivementpréliminaire,maisrelèventdu
fond du différend.Elle fait valoir, en particulier, que la question de l'effet
des résolutionsdu Conseil de sécuritén'a pas un caractère exclusivement
préliminaire,dansla mesure où lesrésolutionsconsidérées sont invoquées
par le Royaume-Uni pour écarter l'applicationde la conventionde Mon-
tréal, et alorsmêmeque la Libye est fondée à contester que ces résolu-
tions lui soient opposables.
43. La Libyeappelleen outre l'attention de la Cour sur leprincipe selon
lequel «[l]a date critiquà retenir pour déterminerla recevabilitéd'une
requêteest celle de son dépôt))(Actions armées frontalièreset transfron-
talières(Nicaragua c. Honduras), compétenceet recevabilité,arrêt,C.I.J.
Recueil 1988,p. 95, par. 66). Elleobserveà cet égard quesa requêtea été

introduite le 3 mars 1992;que les résolutions748 (1992)et 883 (1993)du
Conseilde sécurité ont étéadoptéesles 31mars 1992et 11novembre 1993
respectivement; et que la résolution731 (1992)du 21janvier 1992n'a pas
étéadoptéeen vertu du chapitre VI1de la Charte des Nations Unies et ne
constituait qu'unesimplerecommandation. En conséquence,la Libyesou-
tient que sa requêteest en tout étatde cause recevable. 44. In the view of the Court, this last submission of Libya must be
upheld. The date, 3 March 1992,on which Libya filed its Application, is
in fact the only relevant date for determining the admissibility of the
Application. Security Council resolutions 748 (1992)and 883 (1993)can-
not be taken into consideration in this regard since they were adopted at
a later date. As to Security Council resolution 731(1992),adopted before
the filing of the Application, it could not form a legal impediment to the
admissibility of the latterecause it was a mere recommendationwithout
binding effect,as was recognizedmoreover by the United Kingdom itself.

Consequently, Libya's Application cannot be held inadmissible on these
grounds.
45. In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the objec-
tion to admissibility derived by the United Kingdom from Security
Councilresolutions 748 (1992)and 883 (1993)must be rejected, and that
Libya's Application is admissible.

46. In dealing with admissibility, the Agent of the United Kingdom
also stated that his Government "ask[ed]the Court to rule that the inter-
vening resolutions of the Security Council have rendered the Libyan
claims without object".
The Court has already acknowledged, on several occasions in the past,
that events subsequent to the filing of an application may "render an
application without object" (Border and Transborder Armed Actions
(Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 95, para. 66) and "therefore the Court is not
called upon to give a decision thereon" (Nuclear Tests (Australia

v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974,p. 272,para. 62)(cf.Northern
Cameroons,Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 38).
In the present case, the United Kingdom puts forward an objection
aimed at obtaining from the Court a decisionnot to proceed tojudgment
on the merits, which objection must be examined within the framework
of thisjurisprudence.
47. The Court must satisfy itself that such an objection does indeed
fa11within the provisions of Article 79 of the Rules, relied upon by the
Respondent. In paragraph 1,this Article refers to "Any objection. . to
the jurisdiction of the Court or to the admissibility of the application,
or other objection" (emphasis added); its field of application ratione
materiae is thus not limited solely to objections regarding jurisdiction
or admissibility.However,if it is to be coveredby Article 79, an objection
must also possessa "preliminary" character. Paragraph 1of Article 79 of
the Rules of Court characterizesas "preliminary" an objection "the deci-
sion upon which is requested before any further proceedings". There can
be no doubt that the objection envisaged here formally meets this condi-
tion. The Court would also indicate that, in this instance,the Respondent

is advancing the argument that the decisions of the Security Council 44. De l'avisde la Cour, il y a lieu de retenir cette dernière conclusion
de la Libye. La date du 3 mars 1992 à laquelle la Libye a déposésa
requêteest en effet la seule date pertinente aux fins d'apprécier larece-
vabilité decelle-ci. Lesrésolutions48(1992)et 883(1993)du Conseil de
sécuriténe sauraient êtreprises en considération à cet égard dès lors
qu'ellesont étéadoptées à une date ultérieure.Quant à la résolution731
(1992) du Conseil de sécurité,adoptéaevant ledépôt de la requêtee,llene
saurait constituer un obstaclejuridiqueà la recevabilitéde celle-cicar il
s'agissait d'une simple recommandation sans effet contraignant, comme
le reconnaît d'ailleurs le Royaume-Uni lui-même.La requêtelibyenne ne
saurait par suite êtredéclarée irrecevablpour ces motifs.
45. Au vu de ce qui précède,la Cour conclut qu'il y a lieu de rejeter
l'exception d'irrecevabilité tirear le Royaume-Uni des résolutions 748

(1992) et 883(1993)du Conseil de sécurité,etque la requête de laLibye
est recevable.

46. En traitant de la recevabilité, l'agentdu Royaume-Uni a aussi
exposéque son gouvernement «pri[ait] la Cour de déclarer que les réso-
lutions prises dans l'intervallepar le Conseil de sécuont privéde tout
objet les demandes de la Libye».
La Cour a déjà reconnu à plusieurs reprises par le passéque des évé-
nements postérieurs à l'introduction d'une requêtepeuvent (([priver]
ensuitela requête de sonobjet» (Actions arméesfrontalièreset transfron-
talières(Nicaragua c.Honduras), compétenceet recevabilité,arrêt,C.I.J.
Recueil 1988, p. 95, par. 66) et «qu'il n'y a dèslors pas liàustatuer»
(Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 1974,

p. 272, par. 62) (cf. Cameroun septentrional, arrêt, .I.J. Recueil 1963,
p. 38).
En l'espèce, leRoyaume-Uni développeune exception qui tend àobte-
nir de la Cour le prononcé d'un non-lieu etdoit êtreexaminéedans le
cadre de cettejurisprudence.

47. La Cour doit s'assurer qu'une telle exception entre bien dans les
prévisionsde l'article 79du Règlement,invoquépar le défendeur.Cetar-
ticle vise,en son paragraphe 1, «[tloute exceptioà la compétencede la
Cour ou à la recevabilitéde la requêteou toute autre exception))(lesita-
liques sont de la Cour); son champ d'application ratione materiae n'est
donc pas limitéaux seulesexceptions d'incompétenceou d'irrecevabilité.
Mais, pour être couvertepar l'article 79, une exception doit en outre
revêtirun caractère «préliminaire». Le paragraphe 1 de l'article 79 du

Règlement qualifie de «préliminaire» une exception «sur laquelle le
défendeur demande une décisionavant que la procédure sur le fond se
poursuive». Il ne fait pas de doute que, d'un point de vue formel, l'excep-
tion icienvisagéesatisfasse cettecondition. La Cour relèveraau demeu-
rant que le défendeurcherche, en l'occurrence, faireprévaloir lapréten-could not form the subject of any contentious proceedings before the
Court, since they allegedly determine the rights which the Applicant
claims to derive from a treaty text, or at least that they directly affect
those rights; and that the Respondent thus aims to preclude at the outset

any consideration by the Court of the claims submitted by the Applicant
and immediately terminate the proceedings brought by it. In so far as the
purpose of the objection raised by the United Kingdom that there is no
ground for proceeding to judgment on the merits is, effectively, to pre-
vent, in limine, any consideration of the case on the merits, so that its
"effect [would]be, if the objection is upheld, to interrupt furtheroceed-
ings in the case7',and "it [would]therefore be appropriate for the Court
to deal with [it]before enquiring into the merits" (Panevezys-Saldutiskis
Railway, Judgment, 1939, P. C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 76,p. 16),this objec-
tion possesses a preliminary character and does indeed fa11within the
provisions of Article 79 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, it is incontrovertible that the objection concerned was sub-
mitted in writing within the time-limit fixedfor the filingof the Counter-
Memorial, and was thus submitted in accordance with the forma1condi-
tions laid down in Article 79.
48. Libya does not dispute any of these points. It does not contend
that the objection derived by the United Kingdom from SecurityCouncil
resolutions 748 (1992)and 883(1993) isan objectionon the merits, which

does not fa11within the provisions of Article 79 of the Rules of Court,
nor does it claim that the objection was not properly submitted. What
Libya contends is that this objection falls within the category of those
which paragraph 7 of Article 79 of the Rules of Court characterizes as
objections "not possess[ing],in the circumstances of the case, an exclu-
sivelypreliminary character" (see paragraph 42 above).
On the contrary, the United Kingdom considers that the objection
concerned possesses an "exclusively preliminary character" within the
meaning of that provision; and, at the hearing, its Agent insisted on the
need for the Court to avoid any proceedings on the merits, which to his
mind werenot only "likelyto be lengthy and costly" but also, by virtue of
the difficulty that "the handling of evidentiary material . . might raise
serious problems".
Thus it is on the question of the "exclusively"or "non-exclusively7'pre-
liminary character of the objection here considered that the Parties are
divided and on which the Court must now make a determination.
49. The present wording of Article 79, paragraph 7, of the Rules of
Court was adopted by the Court in 1972.The Court has had occasion to
examine its precise scope and significancein the Judgments it deliveredin

the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), on 26 November
1984 (Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984,
pp. 425-426) and on 26 June 1986 (Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1986, pp. 29-31),respectively.As the Court pointed out in the second of
those Judgments,tion selon laquelle les décisionsdu Conseil de sécuriténe pourraient
donner lieu à aucun recours contentieux devant la Cour, alors même
qu'elles statueraient sur des droits que le demandeur prétend tirer d'un
texte conventionnel,ou pour le moins qu'elles affecteraient directement
ceux-ci: et aue le défendeurentend ainsi écarterd'embléetout examen
par la cour 'desdemandes introduites par le demandeur et mettre immé-
diatement fin à la procédure engagéepar celui-ci. Dans la mesure où
l'exception de non-lieu soulevéepar le Royaume-Uni a effectivement
pour objet d'empêcher in liminetout examen de l'affaire au fond, où son
((effet, si elle étaitretenue par la Cour, serait de mettre finla procé-
dure» et où «il conviendrait, par conséquent,pour la Cour de s'[en]occu-

per avant d'aborder le fond)) (Chemin de fer Panevezys-Saldutiskis,
arrêt, 1939,C. P.J.1.sérieAIB no 76, p. 16)'cette exception possèdeun
caractèrepréliminaire etentre bien dans les prévisionsde l'article 79 du
Règlement.
Il est par ailleurs constant que ladite exception a été formulear écrit
dans le délaifixépour le dépôtdu contre-mémoireet a de ce fait été pré-
sentée selonles modalités prescritesà l'article 79.

48. La Libye ne conteste aucun de ces points. Elle ne soutient nulle-
ment que l'exceptiontiréepar le Royaume-Uni des résolutions748(1992)
et 883 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité seraitune exception de fond qui
n'entrerait pas dans les prévisions del'article 79 du Règlement; etelle ne
prétend pasdavantage que cette exception n'aurait pas étéintroduite de
manière appropriée.Ce que la Libye soutient, c'est que ladite exception
relèvede la catégoriede cellesque leparagraphe 7de l'article79du Règle-

ment qualified'exceptions «n7a[yant]pas dans lescirconstancesdel'espèce
un caractèreexclusivementpréliminaire))(voir paragraphe 42 ci-dessus).
Le Royaume-Uni considère au contraire que l'exception en cause
possèdeun ((caractèreexclusivementpréliminaire))au sensde cette même
disposition; et,à l'audience, son agent a insistésur la nécessitpour la
Cour d'évitertoute procédure sur le fond, qui, àson sens, risquerait non
seulement «d'êtrelongue et coûteuse)), mais aussi, en raison des diffi-
cultésliéesau ((maniementde documents probatoires en l'espèce ..de
poser de graves problèmes)).
C'est donc sur la question du caractère «exclusivement» ou «non
exclusivement» préliminaire de l'exception ici envisagéeque les Parties
s'opposent et que la Cour doit à présentse prononcer.
49. La formulation qui apparaît aujourd'hui au paragraphe 7 de l'ar-
ticle 79 du Règlementa étéadoptée par la Cour en 1972.La Cour a eu

l'occasion d'en examiner la portée dans les arrêtsqu'elle a rendus en
l'affaire desctivitésmilitaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre
celui-ci,le 26 novembre 1984 (compétenceet recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 1984, p. 425-426) et le 26 juin 1986 (fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil
1986, p. 29-31), respectivement. Comme la Cour l'a rappelédans le
second de ces arrêts, "Under the Rules of Court dating back to 1936 (which on this
point reflected still earlier practice),the Court had the power to join
an objection to the merits 'wheneverthe interests of the good admin-
istration of justice require it' (Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway,
P.C.Z.J., Series AIB, No. 75, p. 56), and in particular where the
Court, if it were to decide on the objection, 'would run the risk of
adjudicating on questions which appertain to the merits of the case
or of prejudging their solution' (ibid.) (1.C.J. Reports1986, pp. 29-
30, para. 39.)
However, the exerciseof that power carried a risk,

"namely that the Court would ultimately decide the case on the
preliminary objection, after requiring the parties to fully plead the
merits, - and this did in fact occur (Barcelona Traction, Light
and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, Z.C.J. Reports 1970,
p. 3).The result wasregarded in somequarters as an unnecessarypro-
longation of an expensive and time-consuming procedure." (Iibid.,
p. 30, para. 39.)

The Court was then faced with the following choice:
"to revise the Rules so as to exclude for the future the possibility of
joinder to the merits, so that every objection would have to be
resolved at the preliminarystage, or to seek a solution which would

be more flexible" (ibid., p. 30, para. 40).
The solution adopted in 1972was ultimately not to exclude the power
to examine a preliminary objection in the merits phase, but to limit the
exerciseof that power, by laying down the conditions more strictly. The
Court concluded, in relation to the new provision thus adopted:

"It thus presents one clear advantage: that it qualifies certain
objections as preliminary, making it quite clear that when they are
exclusively of that character they will have to be decided upon
immediately, but if they are not, especially whenthe character of the
objections is not exclusivelypreliminary because they contain both
preliminaryaspectsand other aspectsrelating to the merits, they will
have to be dealt with at the stage of the merits. This approach also
tends to discourage the unnecessary prolongation of proceedings at
the jurisdictional stage." (Zbid.,p. 31, para. 41.)

50. The Court must therefore ascertain whether, in the present case,
the United Kingdom's objection based on the Security Council decisions
contains "both preliminaryaspects and other aspectsrelating to the mer-
its" or not.
That objection relates to many aspects of the dispute. By maintaining
that Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) have ren-
dered the Libyan claims without object, the United Kingdom seeks to
obtain from the Court a decision not to proceed to judgment on the «[d]ans le Règlement remontant à 1936 (qui sur ce point repre-
nait une pratique elle-mêmeantérieure), la Cour avait la faculté de
joindre une exception au fond ((lorsque les intérêtsde la bonne
administration de la justice lui en [faisait] un devoir))Chemin de
fer Panevezys-Saldutiskis, C.P.J.I. sérieAIB no 75, p. 56) et en

particulier lorsque en statuant sur les exceptions elle risquait «soit
de trancher des questionsqui appartiennent au fond de l'affaire, soit
d'en préjuger la solution)) (ibid.) » (C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 29-30,
par. 39).
Toutefois, l'exercicede cette facultéprésentait un danger,

«à savoir que la Cour ne seprononce en définitiveque sur la base de
l'exception préliminaire, etcela après avoir imposé auxparties un
débatexhaustif sur le fond ...ce qui [étaitbien] arrivé dansles faits
(Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, deuxième
phase, C.I.J. Recueil 1970, p. 3). Pour certains, on ne faisait ainsi
queprolonger inutilement une procédurelongue et coûteuse. »(Ibid.,
p. 30, par. 39.)

La Cour s'étaitalors trouvéedevant le choix suivant:
«reviser le Règlementde manière à exclure dorénavant toute jonc-

tion au fond, ce qui aurait obligéseprononcer sur toutes lesexcep-
tions au stade préliminaire,ou rechercher une solution plus souple))
(ibid., p. 30, par. 40).
La solution retenue en 1972 avait finalement consisténon pas à exclure
toute facultéd'examend'une exceptionpréliminaireau fond, mais à limi-
ter l'exercicede cette faculté,en en précisant plus strictementles condi-

tions. Et la Cour de conclure, à propos de la nouvelle disposition alors
adoptée :
«Elle présentedonc un avantage certain : en qualifiant certaines
exceptions de préliminaires,elle montre bien que, lorsqu'elles pré-
sentent exclusivement ce caractère,les exceptions doivent être tran-
chéessans délai, maisque, dans le cas contraire, et notamment lors-
que ce caractère n'est pas exclusifpuisqu'elles comportent à la fois

des aspects préliminaires etdes aspects de fond, elles devront être
régléesau stade du fond. Ce procédétend d'autre part à décourager
toute prolongation inutile de la procédure au stade de la compé-
tence.» (Ibid., p. 31, par. 41.)
50. La Cour doit donc rechercher en l'espècesi l'exception que le
Royaume-Unitire des décisionsdu Conseil de sécurité comporte ou non

«à la fois des aspects préliminaires etdes aspects de fond».

Cette exception s'attache àde multiples aspects du litige. En soutenant
que les résolutions748 (1992) et 883 (1993) du Conseil de sécuritéont
privé les demandes de la Libye de tout objet, le Royaume-Uni tente
d'obtenir de la Cour une décisionde non-lieu qui mettrait immédiate-merits, which would immediately terminate the proceedings. However, by
requesting such a decision, the United Kingdom is requesting, in reality,
at least two others which the decision not to proceed to judgment on the
merits would necessarilypostulate: on the one hand a decision establish-
ing that the rights claimed by Libya under the Montreal Convention are
incompatible with its obligations under the Security Council resolutions;
and, on the other hand, a decision that those obligations prevail over
those rights by virtue of Articles 25 and 103of the Charter.
The Court therefore has no doubt that Libya's rights on the merits
would not only be affected by a decision, at this stage of the proceedings,
not to proceed to judgrnent on the merits, but would constitute, in many
respects, thevery subject-matter of that decision. The objection raised by
the United Kingdom on that point has the character of a defence on the
merits. In the view of the Court, this objection does much more than
"touch[ing] upon subjects belonging to the merits of the case" (Certain
GermanInterests in Polish UpperSilesia, Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 6,
1925, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 6, p. 15); it is "inextricably interwoven"

with the merits (Barcelona Traction,Light and Power Company Limited,
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1964, p. 46).
The Court notes furthermore that the United Kingdom itselfbroached
many substantiveproblems in its written and oral pleadings in this phase,
and pointed out that those problems had been the subject of exhaustive
exchanges before the Court; the United Kingdom Government thus
implicitly acknowledged that the objection raised and the merits of the
case were "closelyinterconnected" (Barcelona Traction,Light and Power
Company, Limited, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1964, p. 46, and the reference to Pajzs, Csaky, Esterhazy, Order of
23 May 1936, P. C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 66, p. 9).
If the Court were to rule on that objection, it would therefore inevi-
tably be ruling on the merits; in relying on the provisions of Article 79
of the Rules of Court, the Respondent has set in motion a procedure
the precise aim of which is to prevent the Court from so doing.
The Court concludes from the foregoing that the objection of the
United Kingdom according to which the Libyan claims have been ren-

dered without object does not have "an exclusivelypreliminary charac-
ter" within the meaning of that Article.
51. Having establisheditsjurisdiction and concluded that the Applica-
tion is admissible, the Court will beable to consider this objection when
it reaches the merits of the case.

52. In accordance with Article 79, paragraph 7, of the Rules of Court,
time-limits for the further proceedings shall be fixedsubsequently by the
Court.ment fin àl'instance.Or, en sollicitant une telledécision,le Royaume-Uni
en sollicite, en réalité,au moins deux autres, que le prononcé d'un non-
lieu postulerait nécessairement:d'une part une décisionétablissant que
les droits revendiquéspar la Libye aux termes de la convention de Mon-
tréal sontincompatibles avec lesobligationsdécoulantpour elle desréso-
lutions du Conseil de sécurité;et d'autre part une décisionfaisant préva-
loir ces obligations sur ces droits par le jeu des articles et 103 de la
Charte.
Il ne fait dèslors pas de doute pour la Cour que les droits de la Libye
au fond seraient non seulementtouchéspar une décision denon-lieu ren-
due à ce stade de la procédure,mais constitueraient, à maints égards,
l'objet mêmede cette décision.L'exceptionsoulevéepar le Royaume-Uni

sur ce point a le caractère d'une défenseau fond. De l'avis de la Cour,
cette exception fait bien plus qu'«effleurer des sujets appartenant au fond
de l'affaire)) (Certains intérêtsallemands en Haute-Silésie polonaise,
compétence,arrêtno6, 1925, C.P.J.I. sérieA no6, p. 15);elleest ((inex-
tricablement liée» àcelui-ci(Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Com-
pany, Limited, exceptionspréliminaires,arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1964,p. 46).

La Cour relèvera d'ailleurs que le Royaume-Uni a lui-mêmeabordé
de nombreux problèmes de fond dans ses écritureset ses plaidoiries à
ce stade, et qu'il a soulignéque ces problèmes avaient fait l'objet de
débatsexhaustifs devant la Cour; ce gouvernement a ainsi implicitement
reconnu l'existenceentre l'exception soulevéeet le fond du litige d'une
«connexité ...intime)) (Baucelona Traction, Light and Power Company,
Limited, exceptionspréliminaires, arrêtC, ..J. Recueil 1964,p. 46,et réfé-

rence à Pajzs, Csaky, Esterhazy, ordonnance du 23 mai 1936, C.P.J.I.
série AIB no66, p. 9).
Si la Cour devait statuer sur cette exception, elle statuerait donc
immanquablement sur le fond; or, en invoquant le bénéfice des disposi-
tions de l'article 79 du Règlement,le défendeura mis en Œuvre unepro-
cédure quivise précisément à empêcherla Cour de ce faire.
La Cour conclut de ce qui précèdeque l'exception du Royaume-Uni
selon laquelle les demandes libyennes auraient été privéed se tout objet
n'a pas un ((caractèreexclusivementpréliminaire))au sens de cet article.

51. Ayant établisacompétenceet conclu à la recevabilitéde la requête,
la Cour pourra connaître de cette exception dans le cadre de son examen
de l'affaire au fond.

52. Conformémentau paragraphe 7 de l'article 79 du Règlement,les
délaispour la suite de la procédure seront fixésultérieurement par la
Cour. 53. For these reasons,

(1) (a) By thirteen votes to three,

Rejects the objection to jurisdiction raised by the United Kingdom on
the basis of the alleged absence of a dispute between the Parties concern-
ing the interpretation or application of the Montreal Convention of
23 September 1971 ;

IN FAVOUR :Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President;Judges Bedjaoui,
Guillaume, Ranjeva,Herczegh,Shi, Fleischhauer,Koroma, Vereshchetin,
Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans,Rezek; Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri;

AGAINS PTesident Schwebel; Judge Oda; Judge ad hoc SirRobert Jennings ;

(b) By thirteen votes to three,

Finds that it has jurisdiction, on the basis of Article 14,paragraph 1,of
the Montreal Convention of 23 September 1971, to hear the disputes
between Libya and the United Kingdom as to the interpretation or appli-
cation of the provisions of that Convention;

IN FAVOUR Vi:ce-PresidentWeeramantry, Acting President; JudgesBedjaoui,
Guillaume, Ranjeva,Herczegh,Shi, Fleischhauer,Koroma, Vereshchetin,
Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek; Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri;

AGAINST :President Schwebel ;Judge Oda ; Judgead hoc SirRobert Jennings ;

(2) (a) By twelve votes to four,

Rejects the objection to admissibility derived by the United Kingdom
from Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993);
IN FAVOUR :Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President; Judges Bedjaoui,
Guillaume, Ranjeva, Shi, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans,Rezek; Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri;

AGAINST: President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Herczegh; Judge ad hoc Sir
Robert Jennings ;

(b) By twelve votes to four,
Finds that the Application filed by Libya on 3 March 1992 isadmissible;

IN FAVOUR Vi:ce-PresidentWeeramantry, Acting President; JudgesBedjaoui,
Guillaume, Ranjeva, Shi, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans,Rezek; Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri;

AGAINST: President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Herczegh; Judge ad hoc Sir
Robert Jennings ; 53. Par ces motifs,

1)a) Par treize voix contre trois,
Rejette l'exception d'incompétence tirée par le Royaume-Uni de
l'absence alléguéede différend entre les Parties concernant l'interpréta-
tion ou l'application dela convention de Montréal du 23 septembre 1971 ;

POUR:M. Weeramantry, vice-président,faisant fonction de président en
l'affaireMM. Bedjaoui,Guillaume,Ranjeva,Herczegh, Shi,Fleischhauer,
Koroma, Vereshchetin, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, juges;
M. El-Kosheri,juge ad hoc;
CONTRE M:. Schwebel,présidentde la Cour; M. Oda, juge; sir Robert Jen-
nings,juge ad hoc;

b) Par treize voix contre trois,

Dit qu'elle acompétence,sur la base du paragraphe 1 de l'article 14de
la convention de Montréal du 23 septembre 1971,pour connaître des dif-
férends qui opposent la Libye au Royaume-Uni en ce qui concerne
l'interprétation ou l'application des dispositions de cette convention;

POUR:M. Weeramantry, vice-président,faisant fonction de président en
l'affaireMM. Bedjaoui,Guillaume,Ranjeva,Herczegh,Shi,Fleischhauer,
Koroma, Vereshchetin, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, juges;
M. El-Kosheri,juge ad hoc;
CONTRE M:. Schwebel,présidentde la Cour; M. Oda, juge; sir Robert Jen-
nings,juge ad hoc;

2) a) Par douze voix contre quatre,
Rejette l'exception d'irrecevabilité tirpar le Royaume-Uni des réso-
lutions 748 (1992) et 883 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité;

POUR:M. Weeramantry, vice-président,faisant fonction de président en
l'affaireMM. Bedjaoui,Guillaume,Ranjeva, Shi,Fleischhauer,Koroma,
Vereshchetin,Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans,Rezek, juges; M. El-Kosheri,
juge ad hoc;
CONTRE: M. Schwebel, présidentde la Cour; MM. Oda, Herczegh, juges;
sir Robert Jenningsjuge ad hoc;

b) Par douze voix contre quatre,

Dit que la requêtedéposéepar la Libye le 3 mars 1992est recevable;
POUR:M. Weeramantry, vice-président,fqisant fonction de président en
l'affaireMM. Bedjaoui,Guillaume,Ranjeva,Shi,Fleischhauer,Koroma,
Vereshchetin,Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans,Rezek, juges; M. El-Kosheri,
juge ad hoc;
CONTRE M:. Schwebel, présidentde la Cour; MM. Oda, Herczegh, juges;
sir Robert Jenningsjuge ad hoc; (3) By ten votes to six,
Declares that the objection raised by the United Kingdom according to
which Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) haveen-
dered the claims of Libya without object does not, in the circumstances
of the case, have an exclusivelypreliminary character.

INFAVOUR Vice-PresidenWeeramantry, Acting President; JudgBedjaoui,
Ranjeva, Shi, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans,
Rezek; Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri;
AGAINST: PresidentSchwebel;Judges Oda, Guillaume, Herczegh, Fleisch-
hauer;Judge ad hoc SirRobert Jennings.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-seventh day of February, one
thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight, in three copies, one of which
will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to
the Government of the Great SocialistPeople's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, respectively.

(Signed) Christopher G. WEERAMANTRY,
Vice-President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,
Registrar.

Judges BEDJAOUG I,UILLAUM aEd RANJEVa ppend ajoint declaration to

theJudgment of the Court; Judges BEDJAOURI, NJEVaAnd KOROMa Append
a joint declaration to the Judgment of the Court; Judges GUILLAUand
FLEISCHHAUa Eppend a joint declaration to the Judgment of the Court;
Judge HERCZEGH appends a declaration to the Judgment of the Court.

Judges KOOIJMANaS nd REZEK append separate opinions to the Judg-
ment of the Court.

President SCHWEBEJL u, ge ODAand Judge ad hoc Sir Robert JENNINGS
append dissenting opinions to the Judgment of the Court.

(InitialledC.G.W

(InitialledE.V.O. 3) Par dix voix contre six,
Déclare que l'exception du Royaume-Uni, selon laquelle les résolu-
tions 748 (1992)et 883 (1993) du Conseil de sécuritéauraient privéles
demandes de la Libye de tout objet, n'a pas, dans les circonstances de
l'espèce,un caractèreexclusivementpréliminaire.

POUR: M. Weeramantry, vice-président, faisant fonction de président en
l'affaire;M. Bedjaoui,Ranjeva, Shi, Koroma, Vereshchetin,Parra-
Aranguren, Kooijmans,Rezek,juges; M.El-Kosherjuge ad hoc;
CONTRE: M. Schwebel,président dela Cour; MM.Oda, Guillaume,Herc-
zegh,FleischhauerjugessirRobert Jenningsjugead hoc.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au Palais de la
Paix,à La Haye, le vingt-sept févriermil neuf cent quatre-vingt-dix-huit,
en trois exemplaires, dont l'un restera déaux archives de la Cour et
les autres seront transmis respectivementau Gouvernement de la Grande

Jamahiriya arabe libyennepopulaire et socialisteet au Gouvernement du
Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord.

Le vice-président,
(Signé) Christopher G. WEERAMANTRY.

Le greffier,
(Signé) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA.

MM. BEDJAOUG I,UILLAUM etERANJEVA ju,ges, joignent une déclara-
tion commune à l'arrêt;MM. BEDJAOUR I,ANJEVAet KOROMA j, ges,
joignent une déclarationcommune àl'arrêt;MM. GUILLAUM etEFLEISCH-
HAUER j,ges,joignent une déclaration communà l'arrêt;M. HERCZEGH,
juge, joint une déclaration'arrêt.

MM. KOOIJMAN etSREZEKj,uges, joignenà l'arrêtles exposésde leur
opinion individuelle.

M. SCHWEBE pr, sident dela Cour, M. ODA,juge, et sir Robert JEN-
NINGS j,gead hoc,joignentà l'arrêtlesexposésde leur opinion dissidente.

(Paraphé) C.G.W.

(Paraphé) E.V.O.

ICJ document subtitle

Preliminary Objections

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Judgment of 27 February 1998

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