COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES
AFFAIRE DE L'INTERHANDEL
(SUISSEc.ÉTATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE)
(EXCEPTIONS PRÉLIMINAIRES)
ARRÊT DU 21 MARS 1959
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS
INTERHANDEL CASE
(SWITZERLAND v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
(PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS)
JUDGMENT OF MARCH Zlst1959 Le présent arrêtdoit êtrecitécomme s:it
(Agaire de IJInterhandel,
Arrêt d21 mars1959: C. I. J. Recu1959,p. 6.))
This Judgment should be cited as follows:
"Interhandel Case,
Judgment of March z~st,Ip59: I.CJ. ReportsI959, p.6."
w ci vente: 205 1
Sales number INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
1959
March zrst
YEAR 1959 GeXo.34 L:st
March zrst, 1959
INTERHANDEL CASE
(SWITZERLAND v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
(PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS)
Declarationsof acceptanceof compulsoryjurisdiction of Court.-
Reservationatione tempowith regardto date on which dispute
arase.-O$eratof princi$le of reciprocity.-Domestic jurisdiction
of United States and scopeof rese(bof its declarationof
acceptanceof compulsoryjurisdiction of Court.-A$plication of rule
of exhaustion of local remedies.
JUDGMENT
Presen: PresidenKLAESTA D Vice-PresidenZAFRULLA KHAN ;
JudgesBASDEVANT H,ACKWORTH W, INIARSKI, ADAWI,
ARMAND-UGOK NO, JEVNIKOVSirHersch LAUTERPACHT,
MORENO QUINTANA, CORDOVA W,ELLINGTOKNOO,SPIRO-
POULOS,Sir Percy SPENDER; Jdge ad hoc CARRY;
Deputy-RegistrGARNIER-COIGNET. In the Interhandel case,
between
the Swiss Confederation,
represented by
M. Georges Sauser-Hall, Professor emeritus of the Universities
of Geneva and Neuchâtel,
as Agent,
and by
M. Paul Guggenheim, Professor at the Law Faculty of the
University of Geneva and at the Graduate Institute of Inter-
national Studies,
as Co-Agent,
assisted by
M. Henri Thitvenaz, Professor of International Law at the
University of Neuchâtel,
as Counsel and Expert,
and
M. Michael Gelzer, Doctor of Laws,
M. Hans Miesch, Doctor of Laws, First Secretary of Embassy,
as Experts,
und
the United States of America,
represented by
the Honorable Loftus Becker, Legal Adviser of the Department
of State,
as Agent,
assisted by
Mr. Stanley D. Metzger, Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic
Affairs, Department of State,
Mr. Sidney B. Jacoby, Professor of Law, Georgetown University,
as Counsel,
composed as above,
On October znd, 1957,the Ambassador of the SwissConfederation
to the Netherlands filed with the Registrar an Application dated
October 1st instituting proceedings in the Court relating to a dispute
which had arisen between the Swiss Confederation and the United INTERHANDEL CASE (JUDGMENT OF 21 III 59) 8
States of America with regard to the claim by Switzerland to the
restitution by the United States of the assets of the Société inter-
nationale pour participations industrielles et commerciales S.A.
(Interhandel).
The Application, which invoked Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
Statute and the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court by the United States of America on August 26th, 1946, and
by Switzerland on July 28th, 1948, was, in accordance with
Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, communicated to the
Government of the United States of America. In accordance with
paragraph 3 of the same Article, the other Members of the United
Nations and the non-Member States entitled to appear before the
Court were notified.
Time-limits for the filing of the Memorial and the Counter-
Memorial were fixed by an Order of the Court on October 24th,
1957, and subsequently extended at the request of the Parties by
an Order of January 15th, 1958. The Memorial of the Swiss Govern-
ment was filed within the time-limit fixed by that Order. Within
the time-limit fixed for the filing of the Counter-Memorial, the
Government of the United States of America filed preliminary
objections to the jurisdiction of the Court. On June 26th, 1958,
an Order recording that the proceedings on the merits were sus-
pended under the provisions of Article 62 of the Rules of Court,
granted the Swiss Government a time-limit expiring on Septem-
ber eznd, 1958, for the submission of a written statement of its
observations and submissions on the preliminary objections. The
written statement was filed on that date and the case became
ready for hearing in respect of the preliminary objections.
The Court not including upon the Rench a judge of Swiss natio-
nality, the Swiss Govemment, pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 2,
of the Statute, chose M. Paul Carry, Professor of Commercial Law
at the University of Geneva, to sit as Judge ad lzocin the present
case.
Hearings were held on November 5th, 6th, 8th, ~oth, t th, ~zth,
14th and 17th, 1958, in the course of which the Court heard the
oral arguments and replies of the Honorable Loftus Becker, on
behalf of the Govemment of the United States of America, and of
M. Sauser-Hall and M. Guggenheim, on behalf of the Swiss Govern-
ment.
In the course of the written and oral proceedings, the following
submissions were presented by the Parties:
On behalf of the Government of the Swiss Confederation, in the
Application :
"May it please the Court:
To communicate the present Application instituting proceedings
to the Government of the United States of America, in accordance
with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court;
6 To adjudge and declare, whether the Government of the United
States of America appears or not, after considering the conten-
tions of the Parties,
I. that the Government of the United States of America is
under an obligation to restore the assets of the Société inter-
nationale pour participations industrielles et commercialesS.A.
(Interhandel) to that Company;
2. in the alternative, that the dispute is one which is fit for
submission for judicial settlement, arbitration or conciliation
under the conditions which it will be for the Court to
determine.
The Swiss Federal Council further reserves the right to sup-
plement and to modify its submissions."
On behalf of the same Government, in the Memorial:
"May it please the Court to adjudge and declare:
A. Principal Submissions
I.that the Government of the United States of America is
under an obligation to restore the assets of the Société inter-
nationale +our participations industrielleset commercialesS.A.
(Interhandel) ;
2. in the alternative, that in case the Court should not consider
that proof of the non-enemy character of the property of the
Sociétéinternationale pour participations industrielles et com-
merciales S.A. (Interhandel) has been furnished, an expert
selected by the Court should be designated, in accordance
with Article 50 of the Statute of the Court, with the task of
(a) examining the documents put at the disposa1 of the
American Courts by Interhandel,
(b) examining the files and accounting records of the Sturze-
negger Bank the seizure of which was ordered by the
public authorities (Ministère public) of the Swiss Confe-
deration on June 15th, 1950, subject to the reservation,
however, that the expert in his expert opinion shall refer
only to such documents as relate to the Interhandel case
and shall be instructed to observe absolute secrecy con-
cerning the documents of the Sturzenegger Bank, its
clients and al1 other individuals and legal perçons if such
documents are not relevant to the case pending before
the Court,
for the purpose of enabling the Court to determine the enemy
or non-enemy character of the Interhandel assets in the
General Aniline and Film Corporation.
B. Alternative Submissions in case the Court should not sztstain
the Swiss request to examine the merits of the dispute
I. (a) that the Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the
dispute is one which is fit for submission either to the
arbitral tribunal provided for in Article VI of the
7 INTERHANDEL CASE (JUDGMENT OF 21 III59) IO
Washington Accord of 1946, or tothe arbitral tribunal pro-
vided for by the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation be-
tween Switzerland and the United States of February
16th, 1931;
(b) that in case of an affirmative reply to submission (a)
either the arbitral tribunalprovided for in the Washington
Accord or the tribunal provided for in the Treaty of
Arbitration and Conciliation of 1931, has jurisdiction to
examine the dispute, and that the choice of one or the
other tribunal belongs to the applicant State;
2. in the alternative :
(a) that the Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the
dispute is fit to be submitted to the arbitral tribunal
provided for by Article VI of the Washington Accord of
1946;
(b) that in case of an affirmative reply to submission (a) the
said tribunal has jurisdiction to examine the dispute;
3. in the further alternative:
(a) that the Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the
dispute is fit to be submitted to the arbitral tribunal
provided for by the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation
of 1931 between the Swiss Confederation and the United
States of America ;
(b) that in case of an affirmative reply to submission (a) the
said tribunal has jurisdiction to examine the dispute;
4. in the final alternative:
that the dispute between the Swiss Confederation and the
United States of America should be submitted to the
examination of the Permanent Commission of Conciliation
provided for in Articles II-IV of the Treaty of Arbi-
tration and Conciliation of 1931.
The Swiss Federal Council furthermore reserves the right to
supplement and to amend the preceding submissions."
On behalf of the Government of the United States of America,
in the Preliminary Objections :
"May it please the Court to judge and decide:
(1) First Preliminary Objection
that there is no jurisdiction in the Court to hear or determine
the matters raised by the Swiss Application and Memorial,
for the reason that the dispute arose before August 26th,
1946, the date on which the acceptance of the Court's com-
pulsory jurisdiction by this country became effective;
(2) SecondPreliminary Objection
that there is no jurisdiction in the Court to hear or determine
the matters raised by the Swiss Application and Memorial,
for the reason that the dispute arose before July 28th, 1948,
8 the date on which the acceptance of the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction by this country became binding on this country
as regards Switzerland;
(3) Third Preliminary Objection
that there is no jurisdiction in this Court to hear or determine
the matters raised by the Swiss Application and Memorial,
for the reason that Interhandel, whose case Switzerland is
espousing, has not exhausted the local remedies available
to it in the United States courts;
(4) Fourth Preliminary Objection
(a) that there is no jurisdiction in this Court to hear or
determine any issues raised by the Swiss Application or
Memorial concerning the sale or disposition of the vested
shares of General Aniline and Film Corporation (including
the passing of good and clear title to any person or
entity), for the reason that such sale or disposition has
been determined by the United States of America,
pursuant to paragraph (b) of the Conditions attached to
this country's acceptance of this Court's jurisdiction, to
be a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of this country; and
(b) that there is no jurisdiction in this Court to hear or
determine any issues raised by the Swiss Application or
Memorial concerning the seizure and retention of the
vested shares of General Aniline and Film Corporation,
for the reason that such seizure and retention are,
according to international law, matters within the
domestic jurisdiction of the United States.
The United States of America reserves the right to supplement
or to amend the preceding submissions, and, generally, to submit
any further legal argument."
On behalf of the Swiss Government, in its Observations and
Submissions :
"May it please the Court to adjudge and declare:
I. to dismiss the first preliminary objection of the United States
of America ;
2. to dismiss the second preliminary objection of the United
States of America;
3. either to dismi~s, or to join to the merits, the third preli-
minary objection of the United States of America;
4. either to dismiss, or to join to the merits, preliminary
objection 4 (a) of the United States of America;
either to dismiss, or to join to the merits, preliminary
objection 4 (b) of the United States of America.
9 The Swiss Federal Council maintains and confirms its main and
alternative submissions as set out on pages 67and 68 of the Memorial
of the Swiss Confederation of March 3rd, 1958.
The Swiss Federal Council supplements its main submissions
by the following alternative submission:
The Swiss Federal Council requests the Court to declare that
the property, rights and interests which the Sociétéinternationale
pour participations industriellesetcommercialesS.A. (Interhandel)
possesses in the General Aniline and Film Corporation have the
character of non-enemy (Swiss) property, and consequently to
declare that by refusing to return the said property the Govem-
ment of the United States of America is in breach of Article IV,
paragraph 1, of the Washington Accord of May 25th, 1946, and
of the obligations binding upon it under the general rules of
international law.
The Swiss Federal Council further reserves the right to supple-
ment and to modify the preceding submissions."
On behalf of the same Government, Submissions deposited in the
Registry on November yd, 1958:
"A. Principal Submissions
I. that the Government of the United States of America is
under an obligation to restore the assets of the Société inter-
nationale pour participations industrielleset commercialesS.A.
(Interhandel) ;
2. in the altemative, that in case the Court should not consider
that proof of the non-enemy character of the property of the
Société internationale pour participations industrielleset com-
merciales S.A. (Interhandel) has been furnished, an expert
selected by the Court should be designated, in accordance
with Article 50 of its Statute, with the task of:
(a) examining the documents put at the disposa1 of the
American courts by Interhandel,
(b) examining the files and accounting records of the Stur-
zenegger Bank, the seizure of which was ordered by the
public authorities (Ministère public) of the Swiss Con-
federation on June 15th, 1950, subject to the reservation,
however, that the expert in his expert opinion shall refer
only to such documents as relate to the Interhandel case,
and shall be instructed to observe absolute secrecy con-
cerning the documents of the Sturzenegger Bank, its
clients and al1 other individuals and legal persons, if
such documents are not releivant to the case pending
before the Court,
for the purpose of enabling the Court to determine the enemy
or non-enemy character of the Interhandel assets in the
General Aniline and Film Corporation.
B. Alternative Principal Submission
The Swiss Federal Council requests the Court to declare that
the property, rights and interests which the Société internationalepour participations industrielleset commercialesS.A. (Interhandel)
possesses in General Aniline and Film Corporation have the
character of non-enemy (Swiss) property, and consequently to
declare that by refusing to return the said property, the Govern-
ment of the United States is acting contrary to the decision of
January 5th, 1948, of the Swiss Authority of Review based on the
Washington Accord, and is in breach of Article IV, paragraph 1,
of the Washington Accord of May 25th, 1946,and of the obligations
binding upon it under the general rules of the law of nations.
C. Submissions regardingthe Submissions of the Governmentof
the United States follozuingits Preliminary Objections
I. To dismiss the first preliminary objection of the United
States of Amenca;
2. To dismiss the second preliminary objection of the United
States;
3. Either to dismiss, or to join to the merits, the third preliminary
objection of the United States of America;
4. Either to dismiss, or to join to the merits, the preliminary
objection 4 (a) of the United States of Amenca;
either to dismiss, or to join to the merits, the preliminary
objection 4 (b) of the United States of America;
In the alternative
should the Court uphold one or the other of the preliminary
objections of the United States of America, to declare its com-
petence in any case to decide whether the United States of
America is under an obligation to submit the dispute regarding
the validity of the Swiss Government's claim either to the
arbitral procedure provided for in Article VI of the Washington
Accord of 1946, or to the Arbitral Tribunal provided for in the
1931 Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation, or to the Conci-
liation Commission provided for in the same Treaty, and to
fixthe subsequent procedure.
D. Submissions on the merits in the event of the Courtacceptilzg
one or otherof the preliminary objectionsof the United States
of America and acceptingjurisdiction in conformitywith the
alternativesubmission as under C
I. To declare that the United States of America is under an
obligation to submit the dispute for examination either to
the arbitral procedure of the Washington Accord or to the
Tribunal provided for in the Arbitration and Conciliation
Treaty of 1931, and that the choice of one or the other
Tribunal belongs to the Applicant State.
2. In the alternative:
that the United States of America is under an obligation to
submit the dispute to the arbitral procedure provided for in
Article VI of the Washington Accord of 1946. 3. In the further alternative:
that the United States of America is under an obligation to
submit the dispute to the Arbitral Tribunal provided for in
the Arbitration and Conciliation Treatg of 1931 between the
Swiss Confederation and the United States of America.
4. In the final alternative:
that the United States of America is under an obligation to
submit the dispute for examination by the Permanent Con-
ciliation Commission provided for in Articles II-IV of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Treaty of 1931.''
At the hearing on November 6th, 1958, the Agent for the Govern-
ment of the United States of America reaffirmed the submissions
set forth in the Preliminary Objections.
For his part, the Agent for the Swiss Government repeated, at
the hearing on November ~zth, 1958, the submissions he had filed
on Xovember 3rd, whilst reserving his right to modify them after
hearing any explanations that might be put forward on behalf of
the Government of the United States of America.
At the hearing on November 14th, 1958, the Agent for the
Government of the United States of America reaffirmed and
maintained his earlier submissions whilst emphasizing that the
preliminary objections were directed against al1 of the alternative
as well as the principal submissions made on behalf of the Swiss
Government.
Finally, at the hearing on November 17th, 1958, the Agent for
the Swiss Government maintained the submissions he had filed in
the Registry on November 3rd, 1958, which thus acquired the
character of final submissions.
The declarations by.which the Parties accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court are as follows:
Declaration of the United States of America of August 14th, 1946
(in force since August 26th, 1946):
"1, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America,
declare on behalf of the United States of America, under Article 36,.
paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
and in accordance with the Resolution of August 2, 1946, of the
Senate of the United States of America (two-thirds of the Senators
present concumng therein), that the United States of America
recognizes as compulsory ipso factoand without special agreement,
in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in al1legal disputes
hereafter arising concerning
(a) The interpretation of a treaty;
12 (b) Any question of international law;
(c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would con-
stitute a breach of an international obligation;
(d) The nature or extent of the reparation <O be made for the
breach of an international obligation;
Provided, that this declaration shall not apply to
(a) Disputes the solution of which the Parties shall entrust to
other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence
or which may be concluded in the future; or
(b) Disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as
determined by the United States of America; or
(c) Disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) al1
parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties
to the case before the Court, or (2) the United States of
America specially agrees to jurisdiction; and
Provided further, that this declaration shall remain in force for
a period of five years and thereafter until the expiration of six
months after notice may be given to terminate this declaration."
Declaration of Switzerland of July 6th, 1948 (in force since July
z8th, 1948) :
"The Swiss Federal Council, duly authorized for that purpose
by a Federal decree which was adopted on 12 March 1948 by the
Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation and became operative
on 17 June 1948,
Hereby declares that the Swiss Confederation recognizes as
to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice inal1legal disputes concerning:
(a) The interpretation of a treaty;
(b) Any question of international law;
(c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would con-
stitute a breach of an international obligation;
(d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation.
of the International Court of Justice, shall take effect from the
date on which the Swiss Confederation becomes a party to that
Statute and shall have effect as long as it has not been abrogated
subject to .one year's notice."
The present proceedings are concerned onlywith the preliminary
objections raised by the Government of the United States of
13America. It is nevertheless convenient to set out briefly the facts
and circumstances as submitted by the Parties which constitute the
origin of the present dispute.
By its decisions of February 16th and April qth, 1942, based on
the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6th, 1917, as amended,
the Government of the United States vested almost al1of the shares
of General Aniline and Film Corporation (briefly referred to as the
GAF), a company incorporated in the United States, on the ground
that these shares in reality belonged to the I.G. Farbenindustrie
company of Frankfurt or that the GAF was in one way or another
controlled by that enemy company.
It is not disputed thatuntilr94o I.G. Farben controlled the GAF
through the Sociétéinternationale pour entreprises chimiques S.A.
(I.G. Chemie), entered in the Commercial Register of the Canton
of Bâle-Ville in 1928. However, according to the contention of the
Swiss Government, the links between the German company I.G.
Farben and the Swiss company I.G. Chemie were finally severed
by the cancellation of the contract for an option and for the guaran-
tee of dividends, a cancellation which was effected in June 1940,
that is, well before the entry of the United States into the war.
The Swiss company adopted the name of Société internationale pour
Farticipations industrielles et commercialesS.A. (briefly referred to
as Interhandel) ; Article2 of its Statute as modified in 1940 defines
it as follows: "The enterprise is a holding company. Its object is
participation in industrial and commercial undertakings of every
kind, especially in the chemical field, in Switzerland and abroad,
but excluding banking and the professional purchase and sale of
securities." The largest item in the assets of Interhandel is its
participation in the GAF. Approximately 75 % of the GAF "A"
shares and al1its issued "B" shares are said to belong to Interhandel.
A considerable part, approximately go%, of these shares and a
sum of approximately 1,800,000 dollars, have been vested by the
Government of the United States.
Towards the end of the war, under a provisional agreement
between Switzerland, the United States of America, France and
the United Kingdom, property in Switzerland belonging to Germans
in Germany was blocked (Decree of the Federal Council of February
16th, 1945). The Swiss Compensation Officewas entrusted with the
task of uncovering property in Switzerland belonging to Germans
or controlled by them. In the course of these investigations, the
question of the character of Interhandel was raised, but as a result
of investigations carried out in June and July, 1945, the Office,
considering it to have been proved that Interhandel had severed
its ties with the German company, did not regard it as necessary
to undertake the blocking of its assets.
For its part, the Government of the United States, considering
that Interhandel was still controlled by I.G. Farben, continued to
seek evidence of such control. In these circumstances the Federal
14Department of Public Economy and the Federal Political Depart-
ment ordered the Swiss Compensation Office provisionally to block
the assets of Interhandel; this was done on October 3oth, 1945.
The Office then carried out a second investigation (November
1945-February 1946) which led it to the same conclusion as had
the first.
On May 25th, 1946, an agreement was concluded between the
three Allied Powers and Switzerland (the Washington Accord).
Under one of the provisions of the Accord, Switzerland undertook
to pursue its investigations and to liquidate German property in
Switzerland. Itwas the Compensation Officewhich was "empowered
to uncover, take into possession, and liquidate German property"
(Accord, Annex, II, A), in collaboration with a Joint Commission
"composed of representatives of each of the four Governments"
(Annex, II, B). The Accord lays down the details of that collabora-
tion (Annex, II, C, D, E, F) and provides that, in the event of dis-
agreement between the Joint Commission and the Compensation
Office or if the party in interest so desires, the matter may within
a period of one month be submitted to a Swiss Authority of Review
composed of three members and presided over by a Judge. "The
decisions of the Compensation Office, or of the Authority of Review,
should the matter be referred to it, shall be final" (Annex, III).
In the event, however, of disagreement with the Swiss Authority
of Review on certain given matters, "the three Allied Governments
may, within one month, require the difference to be submitted to
arbitration" (Annex, III).
The Washington Accord further provides :
"Article IV, paragraph I.
The Government of the United States will unblock Swiss assets
without delay.States. The necessary procedure will be determined
Article VI.
In case differencesof opinion arise with regard to the application
or interpretation of this Accord which cannot be settled in any
other way, recourse shall be had to arbitration."
After the conclusion of the Washington Accord, discussions with
regard to Interhandel between the Swiss Compensation Office and
the Joint Commission as well as between representatives of Switzer-
land and the United States were continued without reaching any
conclusion accepted by the two parties. The Office, while declaring
itself ready to examine any evidence as to the German character of
Interhandel which might be submitted to it, continued to accept
the results of its twoinvestigations;the Joint Commission challengedthese results and continued its investigations. By its decision of
January 5th, 1948, aven on appeal by Interhandel, the Swiss
Authority of Review annulled the blocking with retroactive effect.
It had invited the Joint Commission to participate inthe procedure,
but the latter had declined the invitation. This question was not
referred to the arbitration provided for in the Washington Accord.
In these circumstances, the Swiss Government considered itself
entitled to regard the decision of the Swiss Authority of Review as
a final one, having the force ofresjudicata vis-à-vis the Powers par-
ties to the Washington Accord. Consequently, in a Note ofMay 4th,
1948, to the Department of State, the Swiss Legation at Wash-
ington invoked this decision and the Washington Accord to request
the'Government of the United States to restore to Interhandel the
property which had been vested inthe United States. On July 26th,
1948, the Department of State rejected this request, contending
that the decision of the Swiss Authority of Review did not affect
the assets vested in the United States and claimed by I.G. Chemie.
On September 7th, 1948, in a Note to the Department of State,
the Swiss Legation in Washington, still relying on its interpretation
of the Washington Accord, maintained that the decision of the
Swiss Authority of Review recognizing Interhandel as a Swiss
Company was legally binding upon the signatories of that Accord.
It expressed the hope that the United States Government would
accordingly release the assets of Interhandel in the United States,
failing which the Swiss Government would have to submit the
question to the arbitral procedure laid down in Article VI of the
Washington Accord. On October nth, 1948, the Department of
State replied to that communication, maintaining its previous view
that the decision of the Swiss Authority of Review was inapplicable
to property vested in the United States. It added that United
States law in regard to the seizure and disposa1 of enemy property
authorized non-enemy foreigners to demand the restitution of
vested property and to apply for it to the courts. On October z~st,
1948, Interhandel, relying upon the provisions of the Trading with
the Enemy Act, instituted proceedings inthe United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. Direct discussion between the
two Governments was then interrupted until April gth, 1953, on
which day the Swiss Government sent to the Government of the
United States a Note questioning the procedure applied in the
United States in the Interhandel case, stating that this procedure
had led to a deadlock, and suggesting negotiations fora satisfactory
settlement.
Up to 1957 the proceedings in the United States courts had made
little progress on the merits. Interhandel, though it had produced
a considerable number of the documents called for, did not produce
al1 of them; it contended that the production of certain documents
was prohibited by the Swissauthorities asconstituting an offenceun-
der Article 273 of the Swiss Criminal Code and as violating banking
16secrecy (Article 47 of the Federal Law of November Sth, 1934).
The action brought by Interhandel was the subject of a number
of appeals in the United States courts and in a Memorandum
appended to the Note addressed by the Department of State to
the Swiss Minister on January t th, 1957, it was said that Inter-
handel had finally failed in its suit. It was then that the Swiss
Government, on October znd, 1957, addressed to the Court the
Application instituting the present proceedings. The assertion in
the Note of January t th, 1957, that Interhandel's claim was
finally rejected proved, however, to be premature, as the Court
will have occasion to point out in considering the Third Objection
of the United States.
As stated, the exchange of notes with regard to Interhandel
which had taken place in 1948, was resumed in 1953. In its Note
of April gth, 1953, the Swiss Legation at Washington suggested
negotiations between the two Governments with a view to arriving
amicably at a just and practical solution of the problem of Inter-
handel; these suggestions were repeated in the Notes of Decem-
ber ~st, 1954, and March ~st, 1955; they were not accepted by the
Department of State. Finally, the Swiss Note of August gth, 1956,
formulated proposals for the settlement of the dispute either by
means of arbitration or conciliation as provided for in theTreaty
between Switzerland and the United States of February 16th, 1931,
or by means of arbitration as provided for in the Washington
Accord. This approach did not meet with the approval of the
Government of the United States, which rejected it in its Note,
already referred to, of January th, 1957.
The subject of the claim as set forth in the final submissions
presented on behalf of the Swiss Government, and disregarding
certain items of a subsidiary character which can be left aside for
the moment, is expressed essentially in two propositions:
(1) as a principal submission, the Court is asked to adjudge and
declare that the Government of the United States is under an
obligation to restore theassets of the Sociétéinternationalepour
participations industrielleset commercialesS.A. (Interhandel) ;
(2) as an alternative submission, the Court is asked to adjudge and
declare that the United States is under an obligation to submit
the dispute to arbitration or to a conciliation procedure in
accordance with certain conditions set forth first inthe principal
submissions and then in the alternative submissions.
The Government of the United States has put forward four
preliminary objections to the Court's dealing with the claims of the
Swiss Government. Before proceeding to examine these objections,
the Court must direct its attention to the claim, formulated for the
17first time in the Observations and Subrnissions of the SwissGovern-
ment, which is in the following terms :
"The Swiss Federal Council requests the Court to declare that
the property, rights and interestswhich the Société iwternationale
pour participations industrielleset commercialesS.A. (Interhandel)
possesses in General Aniline and Film Corporation have the
character of non-enemy (Swiss) property, and consequently to
declare that by refusing to return the said property the Govern-
ment of the United States of America is in breach of Article IV,
paragraph 1, of the Washington Accord of May 25th, 1946, and
of the obligations binding upon it under the general rules of
international law."
In its final Subrnissions, deposited in the Registry on Novem-
ber 3rd, 1958, the SwissGovernment gives the following explanation
with regard to this claim:
"The Swiss Government, after examining the Preliminary
Objections of the United States of America, has come to the
conclusion that these involve the modification of the Swiss
Government's principal and alternative Submissions, which are
as follows."
The claim in question, however, which is described as "alternative
principal Submission", does not constitute a mere modification; it
constitutes a new claim involving the merits of the dispute. Art-
icle 62, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, however, is categorical:
"Upon receipt by the Registrar of a preliminary objection filed
by a party, the proceedings on the merits shall be suspended."
Consequently, the new Swiss submission relating to a request
for a declaratory judgment, presented after the suspension of the
proceedings on the merits, cannot be considered by the Court at
the present stage of the proceedings.
First Preliminary Objection
The First Objection of the Government of the United States
seeks a declaration that the Court is without jurisdiction on the
ground that the present dispute arose before August 26th, 1946,
the date on which the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court by the United States came into force. The declaration
of the United States does indeed relate to legal disputes "hereafter
arising". The Government of the United States maintains that the
dispute goes back at least to the middle of the year 1945, and that
divergent opinions as to the character of Interhandel were exchanged
between the Amencan and Swissauthorities ona number of occasions
before August 26th, 1946.
18 The Court would recall that the subject of the present dispute is
indicated in the Application and in the Principal Final Subrnission
of the Swiss Government which seeks the return to Interhandel
of the assets vested in the United States. An examination of the
documents reveals that a request to this effect was formulated by
Switzerland for the first time in the Note of the Swiss Legation at
Washington dated May 4th, 1948. The negative reply, which the
Department of State describes as its final and considered view, is
dated July 26th, 1948. Two other Notes exchanged shortly after-
wards (on September 7th and October 12th of that same year)
confirm that the divergent views of the two Governments were
concerned with a clearly-defined legal question, namely, the
restitution of Interhandel's assets in the United States, and that
the negotiations to this end rapidly reached a deadlock. Thus the
dispute now submitted to the Court can clearly be placed at July
26th, 1948, the date of the first negative reply which the Govern-
ment of the United States described as its final and considered
view rejecting the demand for the restitution of the assets. Conse-
quently the dispute arose subsequently to the date of the entry
into force of the Declaration of the United States.
During the period indicated by the Government of the United
States (the years 1945 and 1946), the exchanges of views between
the Swiss authorities on the one hand and the Allied and, in the
first place, the American authorities, on the other, related to the
search for, and the blocking and liquidation of, German property
and interests in Switzerland; the question of the Swiss or German
character of Interhandel was the subject of investigations and
exchanges of views for the purpose of reaching a decision as to the
fate of the assets in Switzerland of that Company. It was only after
the decision of the Swiss Authority of Review of January 5th, 1948,
definitely recognizing the non-enemy character ofthe assets of Inter-
handel and, in consequence, putting an end to the provisional
blocking of these assets in Switzerland, had, in the opinion of the
Federal Government,acquired the authority of res judicata,thatthat
Government for the first time addressed to the United States its
claim for the restitution of Interhandel'sassets in the United States.
The discussions regarding Interhandel between the Swiss and
American authorities in 1945, 1946 and 1947 took place within the
framework of the collaboration established between them prior to
the Washington Accord and defined in that Accord. The represen-
tatives of the Joint Commission and those of the SwissCompensation
Office communicated to each other the results of their enquiries
and investigations, and discussed their opinions with regard to
Interhandel, without arriving at any final conclusions. Thus, for
instance, the minute of the meeting of the Joint Commission on
September 8th, 1947, records :
"The representatives of the Swiss Compensation Office stated
that their investigations had yielded only negative results and
19 that they werestill waiting for the Alliesto furnish their documents
which the Swiss Compensation Office was ready to discuss with
the Allied experts."
The Court cannot see in these discussions between the Allied and
Swiss officials a dispute between Governments which had already
arisen with regard to the restitution of the assets claimed by Inter-
handel in the United States; the facts and situations which have
led to a dispute must not be confused with the dispute itself; the
documents relating to this collaboration between the Allied and
Swiss authorities for the purpose of liquidating German property
in Switzerland are not relevant to the solution of the question
raised by the first objection of the United States.
The First Preliminary Objection must therefore be rejected so
far as the principal submission of Switzerland is concerned.
In the Alternative Submission, Switzerland asks the Court to
adjudge and declare that the United States is under an obligation
to submit the dispute to arbitration or conciliation.
In raising its objection ratione temporis to the Application of the
Swiss Government, the Government of the United States has not
distinguished between the principal claim andthe alternative claim
in the Application. It is, however, clear that the alternative claim,
in spite of its close connection with the principal claim, is never-
theless a separate and distinct claim relating not to the substance
of the dispute, but to the procedure for its settlement.
The point here in dispute is the obligation of the Government
of the United States to submit to arbitration or to conciliation an
obligation the existence of which is asserted by Switzerland and
denied by the United States. This part of the dispute can only have
arisen subsequently to that relating to the restitution of Inter-
handel's assets in the United States, since the procedure proposed
by Switzerland and rejected by the United States was conceived
as a means of settling the first dispute. In fact, the Swiss Govern-
ment put fonvard this proposa1 for the first time in its Note of
-4ugust gth, 1956, and the Government of the United States reject-
ed it by its Note of January th, 1957.
With regard to the Alternative Submission of Switzerland, the
First Preliminary Objection cannot therefore be upheld.
Second P~eliminary Objection
According to this Objection, the present dispute, even if it is
subsequent to the date of the Declaration of the United States,
arose before July 28th, 1948, the date of the entry into force of
the Swiss Declaration. The argument set out in the Preliminary
Objections is as follows: "The United States Declaration, whichwas effectiveAugustz6th,
1946, contained the clause limiting the Court's jurisdiction to
disputes 'hereafter arising', while no such qualifying clause is
contained in the SwissDeclaration which was effective July 28th,
194% But the reciprocity principle ... requires that as between
the United States and Switzerland the Court's jurisdiction be
limited to disputes arising after July 28th, 1948 ...Othenvise,
retroactive effect would be given to the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court."
In particular, it was contended with regard to disputes arising
after August 26th, 1946, but before July 28th, 1948, that "Switzer-
land, as a Respondent, could have invoked the principle of reci-
procity and claimed that, in the same way as the United States is
not bound to accept the Court's jurisdiction with respect to disputes
arising before its acceptance, Switzerland, too, could not be re-
quired to accept the Court's jurisdiction in relation to disputes
arising before its acceptance."
Reciprocity in the case of Declarations accepting the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court enables a Partyto invoke a reservation to
that acceptance which it has not expressed in its own Declaration
but which the other Party has expressed in its Declaration. For
example, Switzerland, which has not expressed in its Declaration
any reservation rationetemporis,while the United Stateshas accept-
ed the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court only in respect of
disputes subsequent to August 26th, 1946, might, if in the position
of Respondent, invoke by virtue of reciprocity against the United
Statesthe American reservation if the United Statesattempted to
refer to the Court a dispute with Switzerland which had arisen
before August 26th, 1946. This is the effect of reciprocity in this
connection. Reciprocity enables the State which has made the
wider acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court to rely upon the
reservations to the acceptance laid down by the other Party. There
the effect of reciprocity ends. It cannot justify a State, in this
instance, the United States, in relying upon a restriction which the
other Party, Switzerland, has not included in its own Declaration.
The Second Preliminary Objection must therefore be rejected
so far as the Principal Submission of Switzerland is concerned.
Since it has already been found that the dispute concerning the
obligation of the United States to agree to arbitration or conciliation
did not arise until 1957, the Second Preliminary Objection must
also be rejected so far as the Alternative Submission of Switzerland
is concerned.
ii: * *
Fourth Preliminary Objection
Since the Fourth P,reliminary Objection of the United States
relates to the jurisdiction of the Court in the present case, the
Court will proceed to consider it before the Third Objection which is an objection to admissibility. This Fourth Objection really
consists of two objections which are of different character and of
unequal scope. The Court will deal in the first place with part (b)
of this Objection.
The Government of the United States submits "that there is no
jurisdiction in this Court to hear or determine any issues raised
by the Swiss Application or Memorial concerning the seizure and
retention of the vested shares of General Aniline and Film Cor-
poration, for the reason that such seizure and retention are,
according to international law, matters within the domestic juris-
diction of the United States".
In challenging before the Court the seizure and retention of these
shares by the authorities of the United States, the Swiss Govern-
ment invokes the Washington Accord and general international law.
In order to determine whether the examination of the grounds
thus invoked is excluded from the junsdiction of the Court for the
reason alleged by the United States, the Court will base itself on
the course followed by the Permanent Court of International
Justice in its Advisory Opinion concerning Nationality Decrees
issued in Tunis and Morocco (Series B, No. 4), when dealing with
a similar divergence of view. Accordingly, the Court does not, at
the present stage of the proceedings, intend to assess the validity
of the grounds invoked by the Swiss Government or to give an
opinion on their interpretation, since that would be to enter upon
the merits of the dispute. The Court will confine itself to considenng
whether the grounds invoked by the Swiss Government are such
asto justify the provisional conclusion that they may be of relevance
in this case and, ifso, whether questions relating to the validity and
interpretation of those grounds are questions of international law.
With regard to its principal Submission that the Government of
the United States is under an obligation to restore the assets of
Interhandel in the United States, the Swiss Government invokes
Article IV of the Washington Accord. The Government of the
United States contends that this Accord relates only to German
property in Switzerland, and that Article IV 'lis of no relevance
whatever in the present dispute".
By Article IV of this international agreement, the United States
has assumed the obligation to unblock Swiss assets in the United
States. The Parties arein disagreement with regard to the meaning
of the term "unblock" and the term "Swiss assets". The inter-
pretation of these terms is a question of international law which
affects the merits of the dispute. At the present stage of the pro-
ceedings it is sufficient for the Court to note that Article IV of the
Washington Accord may be of relevance for the solution of the
present dispute and that its interpretation relates to international
law.
The Government of the United States submits that according
to international law the seizure and retention of enemy property
22 INTERHANDEL CASE (JVDGMEXT OF 21 III j9) 25
in time of war are matters within the domestic jurisdiction of the
United States and are not subject to any international supervision.
A11the authorities and judicial decisions cited by the United States
refer to enemy property; but the whole question is whether the
assets of Interhandel are enemy or neutral property. There having
been a formal challenge based on principles of international law
by a neutral State which has adopted the cause of its national, it is
not open to the United States to Say that their decision is final and
not open to challenge; despite the American character of the
Company, the shares of which are held by Interhandel, this is a
matter which must be decided in the light of the principles and rules
of international law governing the relations between belligerents
and neutrals in time of war.
In its alternative Submission, the Swiss Government requests
the Court to adjudge and declare that the Vnited States is under
an obligation to submit the dispute to arbitration or conciliation.
The Swiss Government invokes Article VI of the Washington
Accord, which provides: "In case differences of opinion arise with
regard to the application or interpretation of this Accord which
cannot be settled in any other way, recourse shall be had to arbi-
tration." It also invokes theTreaty of Arbitration and Conciliation
between Switzerland and the United States, dated February 16th,
1931. Article 1 of this Treaty provides: "Every dispute arising
between the Contracting Parties, of whatever nature it may be,
shall, when ordinary diplornatic proceedings have failed, be sub-
mitted to arbitration or to conciliation, as the Contracting Parties
may at the time decide." The interpretation and application of
these provisions relating to arbitration and conciliation involve
questions of international law.
Part (b) of the Fourth Preliminary Objection must therefore be
rejected.
Part (a) of the Fourth Objection seeks a finding from the Court
that it is without jurisdiction to entertain the Applicationof the
SwissGovernment,for the reason that the saleor disposition by the
Government of the United States of the shares of the GAF which
have been vested as enemy property "has been determined by the
United States of America, pursuant to paragraph (b) of the Con-
ditions attached to this country's acceptance of this Court's juris-
diction, to be a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of this country". The Preliminary Objections state that: "Such
declination encompasses al1 issues raised in the Swiss Application
and Memorial (including issues raised by the Swiss-United States
Treaty of 1931 and the Washington Accord of 1946)", but they
add: "in so far as the determination of the issues would affect the
sale or disposition of the shares". And they immediately go on to
Say: "However, the determination pursuant to paragraph (b) of the
Conditions attached to this country's acceptance of the Court'scompulsory jurisdiction is made only as regards the sale or dis-
position of the assets."
During the oral arguments, the Agent for the United States
continued to maintain that the scope of part (a) of the Fourth
Objection was limited to the sale and disposition of the shares.
At the same time, while insisting that local remedies were once
more available to Interhandel and that, pending the final decision
of the Courts of the United States, the disputed shares could not
be sold, he declared on several occasions that part (a) of the Fourth
Objection has lost practical significance, that "it has become
somewhat academic", and that it is "somewhat moot".
Although the Agent for the United States maintained the Objec-
tion throughout the oral arguments, it appears to the Court that,
thus presented, part (a) of the Fourth Objection only applies to
the claim of the Swiss Government regarding the restitution of the
assets of Interhandel which have been vested in the United States.
Having regard to the decision of the Court set out below in respect
of the Third Preliminary Objection of the United States, it appears
to the Court that part (a) of the Fourth Preliminary Objection is
without object at the present stage of the proceedings.
Titird Preliminary Objection
The Third Preliminary Objection seeks a finding that "there is
no jurisdiction in this Court to hear or determine the matters raised
by the Swiss Application and Memorial, for the reason that Inter-
handel, whose case Switzerland is espousing, has not exhausted the
local remedies available to it in the United States courts".
Although framed as an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court,
this Objection must be regarded as directed against the admissibility
of the Application of the Swiss Government. Indeed, by its nature
it is to be regarded as a plea which would become devoid of object
if the requirement of the prior exhaustion of local remedies were
fulfilled.
The Court has indicated inwhat conditions the SwissGovernment,
basing itself on the idea that Interhandel's suit had been finallÿ
rejected in the United States courts, considered itself entitled to
However, the decision given by the Supreme Court of the United 1957.
States on October 14th, 1957, on the application of Interhandel
made on August 6th, 1957, granted a writ of certiorari and re-
admitted Interhandel into the suit. The judgment of that Court on
June 16th, 1958, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals
dismissing Interhandel's suit and remanded the case to the District
24Court. It was thenceforth open to Interhandel to avail itself again
of the remedies available to it under the Trading with the Enemy
Act, and to seek the restitution of its shares by proceedings in the
United States courts. Its suit isstill pending in the United States
courts. The Court must have regard to the situation thus created.
The rule that local remedies must be exhausted before inter-
national proceedings may be instituted is a well-established rule
of customaryinternational law; the rule has been generally observed
in cases in which a State has adopted the cause of its national whose
rights are claimed to have been disregarded in another State in
violation of international law. Before resort may be had to an
international court in such a situation, it has been considered
necessary that the State where the violation occurred should have
an opportunity to redress it byits own means, within the framework
of its owndomestic legal system. A fortio theirule must be observed
when domestic proceedings are pending, as in the case of Inter-
handel, and when the two actions, that of the Swiss Company in
the United States courts and that of the Swiss Government in
this Court, in its principal Submission, are designed to obtain the
same result: the restitution of the assets of Interhandel vested in
the United States.
The Swiss Government does not challenge the rule which requires
that international judicial proceedings may only be instituted
following the exhaustion of local remedies, but contends that the
present case is one in which an exception to this rule is authorized
by the rule itself.
The Court does not consider it necessary to dwell upon the
assertion of the Swiss Government that "the United States itself
hasadmitted that Interhandel had exhausted the remedies available
in the Cnited States courts". It is true that the representatives of
the Government of the United States expressed this opinion on
several occasions, in particular in the memorandum annexed to the
Note of the Secretary of State of January th, 1957. This opinion
was based upon a view which has proved unfounded. In fact, the
proceedings which Interhandel had instituted before the courts of
the United States were then in progress.
However, the Swiss Government has raised against the Third
Objection other considerations which require examination.
In the first place, it is contended that the rule is not applicable
for the reason that the measure taken against Interhandel and
regarded as contrary to international Iaw is a measure which was
taken, not by a subordinate authority but by the Government of
the United States. However, the Court must attach decisive
importance to the fact that the laws of the United States make
available to interested perçons who consider that they have been
deprived of their rights by measures taken in pursuance of the
Trading with the Enemy Act, adequate remedies for the defence
of their rights against the Executive.
25 It has also been contended on behalf of the Swiss Government
that in the proceedings based upon the Trading with the Enemy
-kt, the United States courts are not in a position to adjudicate
in accordance with the rules of international law and that the
Supreme Court, in its decision of June 16th, 1958, made no reference
to the many questions of international law which, in the opinion
of the Swiss Government, constitute the subject of the present
dispute. But the decisions of the United States courts bear witness
to the iact that United States courts are competent to apply
international law in their decisions when necessary. In the present
case, when the dispute was brought to this Court, the proceedings
in the United States courts had not reached the merits, in which
co.sid.rations of international law could have been profitably
relied upon.
The Parties have argued the question of the binding force before
the courts of the United States of international instruments which,
according to the practice of the United States, fa11within the
category of Executive Agreements; the Washington Accord is said
to belong to that category. At the present stage of the procqedings
it is not necessary for the Court to express an opinion on the matter.
Neither is it practicable, before the final decision of the domestic
courts, to anticipate what basis they may adopt for their judgment.
Finally, the Swiss Government laid special stress on the argument
that the character of the principal Submission of Switzerland is
that of a claim for the implementation of the decision given on
January 5th, 1948, by the Swiss Authority of Review and based
on the Washington Accord, a decision which the Swis Government
regards as an international judicial decision. "When an international
decision has not been executed, there are no local remedies to
exhaust, for the injury has been caused directly to the injured
State." It has therefore contended that the failure by the United
States to implement the decision constitutes a direct breach of
international law, causing immediate injury to the rights of Switzer-
land asthe Applicant State. The Court notes in the first place that
to implement a decision is to apply its operative part. In the opera-
tive part of its decision, however, the Swiss Authority of Review
"Decrees: (1)that the Appeal is sustained and the decision sub-
jecting the appellant to the blocking of German property in Switzer-
land is annulled ..." The decision of the Swiss Authority of
Review relates to the unblocking of the assets of Interhandel in
Switzerland; the Swiss claim is designed to secure the restitution
of the assets of Interhandel in the United States. Without prejudg-
ing the validity of any arguments which the Swiss Government
seeks or may seek to base upon that decision, the Court would
confine itself to observing that such arguments do not deprive the
dispute which has been referred to it of the character of a dispute
in which the Swiss Government appears as having adopted the
cause of its national, Interhandel, for the purpose of securing therestitution to that Company of assets vested by the Government of
the United States. This is one of the very cases which give rise to
the application of the rule of the exhaustion of local remedies.
For al1 these reasons, the Court upholds the Third Preliminary
Objection so far as the principal Submission of Switzerland is
concerned.
In its alternative claim, the Swiss Government asks the Court to
declare its competence to decide whether the United States is under
an obligation to submit the dispute to arbitration or conciliation.
The Government of the United States contends that this claim,
while not identical with the principal claim, is designed to secure
the same object, namely, the restitution of the assets of Interhandel
in the United States, and that for this reason the Third Objection
applies equally to it. It maintains that the rule of the exhaustion
of local remedies applies to each of the principal and alternative
Submissions which seek "a ruling by this Court to the effect that
some other international tribunal now has jurisdiction to determine
that very same issue, even though that issue is at the same time
being actively litigated in the United States courts".
The Court considers that one interest, and one alone, that of
Interhandel, which has led the latter to institute and to resume
proceedings before the United States courts, has induced the Swiss
Government to institute international proceedings. This interest is
the basis for the present claim and shoulddetermine the scope of the
action brought before the Court by the Swiss Government in its
alternative form as well asin its principal form. On the other hand,
the grounds on which the de of the exhaustion of local remedies
is based are the same, whether in the case of an international court,
arbitral tribunal, or conciliation commission. Inthese circumstances,
the Court considers that any distinction so far as the rule of the
exhaustion of local remedies is concerned between the various
claims or between the various tribunals is unfounded.
It accordingly upholds the Third Preliminary 0-bjection also as
regards the alternative Submission of Switzerland.
For these reasons,
by ten votes to five,
rejects the First Preliminary Objection of the Government of the
United States of America;
unanimously,
rejects the Second Preliminary Objection;
by ten votes to five,
finds that it is not necessary to adjudicate on part (a) of the Fourth
Preliminary Objection;
27 by fourteen votes to one,
rejects part (b) of the Fourth Preliminary Objection; and
by nine votes to six,
upholds the Third Preliminary Objection and holds that the
-1pplication of the Government of the Swiss Confederation is
inadmissible.
Done in French and English, the French text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-first day of March,
one thousand nine hundred and fifty-nine, in three copies, one of
\vhich will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others
transmitted to the Government of the Swiss Confederation and the
Government of the Cnited States of America, respectively.
(Signed) Helge KLAESTAD,
President .
(Sig~zed)GARNIER-COIGNET,
Deputy-Registrar.
Judge BASDEVANT states that he concurs in the decision that
the Application is inadmissible as that decision is set forth in the
operative part of the Judgment, but he adds that his opinion on
this point was reached in a way which, in certain respects, differs
from that followed by the Court. Basing himself on the provisions
of the Statute and of the Rules of Court, he considered that, in
order to assess the validity of the objections advanced, he should
direct his attention to the subject of the dispute and not to any
particular claim put forward in connection with the dispute. The
subject of the dispute and the subject of the claim are explicitly
differentiated in Article 32, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court.
*lccordingly, he has directed his attention to the statement in the
.Application to the effect that the latter submits to the Court the
dispute relating to "the restitution by the United States of the
assets" of Interhandel. Thisindication of the subject of the dispute,
~rhich is confirmed by an examination of the correspondence,
reveals the scope of the dispute, shows that it is not limited to
whatever may have been discussed at any particular moment
between the two Governments and consequently throws a light
upon the date at \&,hichthe dispute between them arose. He was
thus led to the conclusion that the dispute to which the Appli-
cation relates did not arise until after July 28th, 1948, and this
factual finding is sufficient to justify the rejection of the first
two preliminary objections.
28 In his view, the subject of the dispute justifies, in this case,
the requirement of the preliminary exhaustion of local remedies
on the ground that if, through them, Interhandel obtains satis-
faction, the subject of the dispute will disappear. He refrained
from complicating the problem by considering any particular
claim that might be put forward in connection with the dispute
indicated in the Application. In considering the question whether
in fact the local remedies have been exhausted, he based himself
largely on the factual data mentioned in the Judgment. He took
account also of certain other facts-the fact that, at the date of
the memorandum of January ma th,1957, an appeal by Interhandel
was pending in the American courts, the mention by the Swiss
Co-Agent (at the hearing on October ~zth, 1957) of the application
made to the Supreme Court, with the comment that that appli-
cation alsowould end in a negative decision and, finally, the mention
in the preamble of the Order of the Court of October 24th, 1957,
of a judicial proceeding then pending in the United States.
As the anticipated effect of a judgment on a preliminary ob-
jection is to determine whether the proceedings on the merits
\vil1or will not be resumed, he might have agreed that the Court
should confine itself to adjudicating on the Third Objection
which it has upheld. As the Application is declared to be
inadmissible, this puts an end to the proceedings and al1 the
other questions that were connected with them no longer arise.
He considered, nevertheless, that it was his duty to follow the
Court in the examination of the other points with which it dealt
and, on those points, he concurs in the operative part of the
Judgment .
Judge KOJEVNIKO Vtates that he concurs in the Judgment of
the Court so far as the First, Second, Third and part (a) of the
Fourth Preliminary Objections of the Government of the Tjnited
States are concerned. He is, however, unable to concur in the
reasoning of the Judgment relating to the Second Preliminary
Objection since, in his opinion, the Judgment should have been
based not on the question of reciprocity, which is of very great
importance, but upon the factual circumstances which show that
the legal character of the dispute between the Swiss Government
and the Government of the United States was clearly defined only
after July 28th, 1948, the date of the entry into force of the Swiss
Declaration.
Judge Kojevnikov is further of the opinion that the Third
Objection should have been upheld by the Court, not only as a
contention relating to the admissibility of the Application, but also
with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court.
Finally, he considers that part (b) of the Fourth Preliminary
Objection, having regard to its subject-matter, ought not to have been rejected but, in the present case, should have been joined
to the merits if the Court had not upheld the Third Objection.
M. CARRYJ ,udge ad hoc, states that he regrets that he cannot
subscribe to the decisions taken by the Court on the Third and
part (a) of the Fourth Objections of the Government of the United
States. He agrees generally with the dissenting opinion of President
Klaestad.
He considers that in any event the Third Objection should not
have been upheld in so far as it was directed against the alternative
claim of the Swiss Government relating to arbitration or conciliation.
separate and distinct from the principal
He regards that claim as
claim, since it did not relatto the merits of the dispute but only
to the procedure for its settlement. By this claim the Court was
invited to pass only upon the arbitrability of the dispute, not on
the obligation of the United States to return the assets of Inter-
handel. That latter question was within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the tribunal to be seised. It follows, in his opinion, that the
relating to the exhaustion of local remedies was not applicable to
the alternative claim of the Swiss Government, inasmuch as, by
that claim, the applicant State sought to secure from the inter-
national tribunal a result different from that which Interhandelis
seeking to obtain in the American courts. The question of exhaustion
of local remedies is one which could arise only before the arbitral
tribunal seised of the case: the Court should not, in his opinion,
encroach upon the jurisdiction of that tribunal.
Judges H.~CKWORTH C,ORDOVA W, ELLINGTOX KOOand Sir Percy
SPENDER ,vailing thernselves of the right conferred upon them
by Article 57 of the Statute, append to the Judgment of the Court
statements of theirseparate opinions.
Vice-President ZAFRULLA KHAX states that he agrees with
Judge Hackworth.
President KLAESTAD and Judges WINIARSKI,ARMAND-EGOX S,ir
Hersch LAUTERPACHT and SPIROPOULOS a,vailing themselves of the
right conferred upon them by Article 57 of the Statute, append to
the Judgment of the Court statements of their dissenting opinions.
(Initialled) H.K.
(Initialled) G.-C.
COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES
AFFAIRE DE L'INTERHANDEL
(SUISSEc.ÉTATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE)
(EXCEPTIONS PRÉLIMINAIRES)
ARRÊT DU 21 MARS 1959
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS
INTERHANDEL CASE
(SWITZERLAND v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
(PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS)
JUDGMENT OF MARCH Zlst1959 Le présent arrêtdoit êtrecitécomme s:it
(Agaire de IJInterhandel,
Arrêt d21 mars1959: C. I. J. Recu1959,p. 6.))
This Judgment should be cited as follows:
"Interhandel Case,
Judgment of March z~st,Ip59: I.CJ. ReportsI959, p.6."
w ci vente: 205 1
Sales number COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
1959
Le 21mars
Rôlno 34éral ANNÉE 1959
21 mars 1959
AFFAIRE DE L'INTERHANDEL
(SUISSE c. ETATS-UNIS D'AMÉRIQUE)
(EXCEPTIONS PRÉLIMINAIRES)
Déclarations d'acceptade la juridiction obligatoirede la Cour.
- Réserveratione temporis relàtla datà laquellele digérend
a pris naissanc-. Fonctionnementdu principe de récipr-.ité
Compétencenationale des États-Unis et 9ortéede la rb)edee
leur déclaration d'accepde la juridiction obligatoirede la Cour.
- A$plication de la règlede l'épuisementdes recoursinternes.
Présents:M. KLAESTAD ,résident;M: ZAFRULLA KHAN, Vice-
Président;MM.BASDEVANT H,ACKWORTH W,INIARSKI,
BADAWI,ARMAND-UGON , OJEVNIKOV,Sir Hersch
LAUTERPACHT M, M. MORENO QUINTANA,CORDOVA,
WELLINGTON KOO,SPIROPOULOS S,ir PercySPENDER:
Juges; M. CARRY uge ad hoc; M. GARNIER-COIGNET.
Grefier adjoint.
4 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
1959
March zrst
YEAR 1959 GeXo.34 L:st
March zrst, 1959
INTERHANDEL CASE
(SWITZERLAND v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
(PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS)
Declarationsof acceptanceof compulsoryjurisdiction of Court.-
Reservationatione tempowith regardto date on which dispute
arase.-O$eratof princi$le of reciprocity.-Domestic jurisdiction
of United States and scopeof rese(bof its declarationof
acceptanceof compulsoryjurisdiction of Court.-A$plication of rule
of exhaustion of local remedies.
JUDGMENT
Presen: PresidenKLAESTA D Vice-PresidenZAFRULLA KHAN ;
JudgesBASDEVANT H,ACKWORTH W, INIARSKI, ADAWI,
ARMAND-UGOK NO, JEVNIKOVSirHersch LAUTERPACHT,
MORENO QUINTANA, CORDOVA W,ELLINGTOKNOO,SPIRO-
POULOS,Sir Percy SPENDER; Jdge ad hoc CARRY;
Deputy-RegistrGARNIER-COIGNET. En l'affaire de l'Interhande1,
entre
la Confédération suisse,
représentéepar
M. Georges Sauser-Hall, professeur honoraire des Universités de
Genèveet de Neuchâtel,
comme agent,
et par
M. Paul Guggenheim, professeur à la faculté de droit de l'Uni-
versité de Genève et à l'Institut universitaire de hautes
étudesinternationales,
comme co-agent,
assistés de
M. Henri Thévenaz, professeur de droit international à l'Uni-
versité de Neuchâtel,
comme conseil et expert,
et de
M. Michael Gelzer, docteur en droit,
M. Hans Miesch, docteur en droit, premier secrétaire d'ambas-
sade,
comme experts,
et
les États-unis d'Amérique,
représentéspar
l'Honorable Loftus Becker, conseiller juridique du Département
d'Etat,
comme agent,
assisté de
M. Stanley D. Metzger, conseiller juridique adjoint pour les
affaires économiques au Département d'Etat,
M. Sidney B. Jacoby, professeur de droit à l'université de
Georgetown,
comme conseils,
ainsi composée,
rend l'arrêstuivant.
Le 2 octobre 1957 'ambassadeur de la Confédération suisseaux
Pays-Bas a remis au Greffier une requête portant la date du
leroctobre et introduisant devant la Cour une instance oncernant
le différend surgi entre la Confédération suisseet les Etats-Unis
5 In the Interhandel case,
between
the Swiss Confederation,
represented by
M. Georges Sauser-Hall, Professor emeritus of the Universities
of Geneva and Neuchâtel,
as Agent,
and by
M. Paul Guggenheim, Professor at the Law Faculty of the
University of Geneva and at the Graduate Institute of Inter-
national Studies,
as Co-Agent,
assisted by
M. Henri Thitvenaz, Professor of International Law at the
University of Neuchâtel,
as Counsel and Expert,
and
M. Michael Gelzer, Doctor of Laws,
M. Hans Miesch, Doctor of Laws, First Secretary of Embassy,
as Experts,
und
the United States of America,
represented by
the Honorable Loftus Becker, Legal Adviser of the Department
of State,
as Agent,
assisted by
Mr. Stanley D. Metzger, Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic
Affairs, Department of State,
Mr. Sidney B. Jacoby, Professor of Law, Georgetown University,
as Counsel,
composed as above,
On October znd, 1957,the Ambassador of the SwissConfederation
to the Netherlands filed with the Registrar an Application dated
October 1st instituting proceedings in the Court relating to a dispute
which had arisen between the Swiss Confederation and the Unitedd'Amérique au sujet de la restitution demandée par la Suisse aux
Etats-Unis des avoirs de la Sociétéinternationale pour partici-
pations industrielles et commerciales S. A. (Interhandel).
La requête, qui invoque l'article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut
eJ l'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour par les
Etats-Unis d'Amérique le 26 août 1946 et par la Suisse le 28
juillet1948, a, conformément à l'article 40, arag graphe 2,duStatut,
étécommuniquée au Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.
Conformément au paragraphe 3 du mêmearticle, les autres Mem-
bres des Nations Unies ainsi que les Etats non membres admis à
ester en justice devant la Cour en ont étéinformés.
Les délais pour le dépôt du mémoire et du contre-mémoire ont
étéfixéspar ordonnance de la Cour du 24 octobre 1957 puis proro-
gés à la demande des Parties par ordonnance du 15 janvier 1958.
Le mémoire du Gouvernement suisse a étédéposédans le délai
fixépar cette ordonnance. Dans ledélai fixépour le dépôtdu contre-
mémoire, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique a présenté
des exceptions préliminaires à la compétence de la Cour. Le 26 juin
1958, une ordonnance, constatant que la procédure sur le fond
était suspendue en vertu des dispositions de l'article 62 du Règle-
ment de la Cour, a accordéau Gouvernement suisse un délai expi-
rant le 22 septembre 1958 pour présenter un exposéécritcontenant
ses observations et conclusions sur les exceptions préliminaires.
A cette date, l'exposé écrit a étédéposéet l'affaire s'est trouvée
en état pour ce qui est des exceptions préliminaires.
En application de l'article31,paragraphe 2, duStatut, le Gouver-
nement suisse, ne comptant pas sur le siègeun juge de sa nationa-
lité, a désignéM. Paul Carry, professeur de droit commercial à
l'université de Genève, pour siégerdans la présente affaire en qua-
litéde juge ad hoc.
Des audiences ont ététenues les 5, 6, 8, IO, II, 12, 14 et
17 novembre 1958 durant lesquelles ont étéentendus, en leurs plai-
doiries et réponses,pour le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amé-
rique : l'Honorable Loftus Becker ; pour le Gouvernement suisse :
MM. Sauser-Hall et Guggenheim.
Au cours de la procédure écrite et orale, les conclusions ci-après
ont été prises par les Parties:
Au nom du Gouvernement de la Confédération suisse,dans la
requête :
(Plaise à la Cour:
Communiquer la présente requête introductive d'instance au
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, conformément à
l'article 40, chiff2, du Statut de la Cour;
6 INTERHANDEL CASE (JUDGMENT OF 21 III 59) 8
States of America with regard to the claim by Switzerland to the
restitution by the United States of the assets of the Société inter-
nationale pour participations industrielles et commerciales S.A.
(Interhandel).
The Application, which invoked Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
Statute and the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court by the United States of America on August 26th, 1946, and
by Switzerland on July 28th, 1948, was, in accordance with
Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, communicated to the
Government of the United States of America. In accordance with
paragraph 3 of the same Article, the other Members of the United
Nations and the non-Member States entitled to appear before the
Court were notified.
Time-limits for the filing of the Memorial and the Counter-
Memorial were fixed by an Order of the Court on October 24th,
1957, and subsequently extended at the request of the Parties by
an Order of January 15th, 1958. The Memorial of the Swiss Govern-
ment was filed within the time-limit fixed by that Order. Within
the time-limit fixed for the filing of the Counter-Memorial, the
Government of the United States of America filed preliminary
objections to the jurisdiction of the Court. On June 26th, 1958,
an Order recording that the proceedings on the merits were sus-
pended under the provisions of Article 62 of the Rules of Court,
granted the Swiss Government a time-limit expiring on Septem-
ber eznd, 1958, for the submission of a written statement of its
observations and submissions on the preliminary objections. The
written statement was filed on that date and the case became
ready for hearing in respect of the preliminary objections.
The Court not including upon the Rench a judge of Swiss natio-
nality, the Swiss Govemment, pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 2,
of the Statute, chose M. Paul Carry, Professor of Commercial Law
at the University of Geneva, to sit as Judge ad lzocin the present
case.
Hearings were held on November 5th, 6th, 8th, ~oth, t th, ~zth,
14th and 17th, 1958, in the course of which the Court heard the
oral arguments and replies of the Honorable Loftus Becker, on
behalf of the Govemment of the United States of America, and of
M. Sauser-Hall and M. Guggenheim, on behalf of the Swiss Govern-
ment.
In the course of the written and oral proceedings, the following
submissions were presented by the Parties:
On behalf of the Government of the Swiss Confederation, in the
Application :
"May it please the Court:
To communicate the present Application instituting proceedings
to the Government of the United States of America, in accordance
with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court;
6 Dire et juger, tant en présence qu'en l'absence dudit Gouver-
nement, après avoir examiné les thèses des Parties,
I. que le Gouvernement des États-unis d'Amériqueest tenu de
restituer les avoirs de la Sociétéinternationale pour parti-
cipations industrielles et commerciales S. A. (Interhandel) à
cette société;
2. subsidiairement que le différend est de nature à êtresoumis
à la juridiction, à l'arbitrage ou à la conciliation dans les
conditions qu'il appartiendra à la Cour de déterminer.
Le Conseil fédéral suissese réserve en outre le droit de com-
pléter et de modifier ses conclusions. ))
Au nom de ce même Gouvernement, dans le mémoire:
«Plaise à la Cour de dire et juger:
A. Conclusions principales
I. que le Gouvernement des États-unis d'Amériqueest tenu de
restituer les avoirs de la Sociétéinternationale pour partici-
pations industrielles et commerciales S. A. (Interhandel) ;
2. subsidiairement, qu'au cas où la Cour ne considérerait pas
que la preuve a étéapportée du caractère non-ennemi des
avoirs de la Sociétéinternationale pour participations indus-
trielles et commerciales S. A. (Interhandel), il y a lieu de
désignerun expert choisi par la Cour, conformément à l'ar-
ticle 50 de son Statut, auquel incomberait la mission
a) d'examiner les documents mis par 1'Interhandel à la dispo-
sition des tribunaux américains,
b) d'examiner les dossiers et les livres de comptes de la
dération suisse a ordonnéle séquestre leb15 juin 1950, mais
avec la réserve que l'expert ne devra faire état dans son
expertise que des documents se rapportant à l'affaire de
lJInterhandel et devra observer le secret le plus absolu sur
les documents de la banque Sturzenegger, ses clients et
d'autres personnes physiques ou morales, s'ils n'ont aucune
incidence sur l'affaire pendante devant la Cour,
en vue de permettre à la Cour de déterminer le caractère
ennemi ou non-ennemi des avoirs de 1'Interhandel dans la
GeneralAniline and Film Corporation.
B. Conclusions subsidiaires$our le cas où la Cour rejetterait la
demande suisse d'examiner le digérendquant au fond
I. a) que la Cour est compétente pour décidersi le différendest
de nature à êtresoumis soit au tribunal arbitral prévu à
l'article VI de l'Accord de Washington de 1946, soit au To adjudge and declare, whether the Government of the United
States of America appears or not, after considering the conten-
tions of the Parties,
I. that the Government of the United States of America is
under an obligation to restore the assets of the Société inter-
nationale pour participations industrielles et commercialesS.A.
(Interhandel) to that Company;
2. in the alternative, that the dispute is one which is fit for
submission for judicial settlement, arbitration or conciliation
under the conditions which it will be for the Court to
determine.
The Swiss Federal Council further reserves the right to sup-
plement and to modify its submissions."
On behalf of the same Government, in the Memorial:
"May it please the Court to adjudge and declare:
A. Principal Submissions
I.that the Government of the United States of America is
under an obligation to restore the assets of the Société inter-
nationale +our participations industrielleset commercialesS.A.
(Interhandel) ;
2. in the alternative, that in case the Court should not consider
that proof of the non-enemy character of the property of the
Sociétéinternationale pour participations industrielles et com-
merciales S.A. (Interhandel) has been furnished, an expert
selected by the Court should be designated, in accordance
with Article 50 of the Statute of the Court, with the task of
(a) examining the documents put at the disposa1 of the
American Courts by Interhandel,
(b) examining the files and accounting records of the Sturze-
negger Bank the seizure of which was ordered by the
public authorities (Ministère public) of the Swiss Confe-
deration on June 15th, 1950, subject to the reservation,
however, that the expert in his expert opinion shall refer
only to such documents as relate to the Interhandel case
and shall be instructed to observe absolute secrecy con-
cerning the documents of the Sturzenegger Bank, its
clients and al1 other individuals and legal perçons if such
documents are not relevant to the case pending before
the Court,
for the purpose of enabling the Court to determine the enemy
or non-enemy character of the Interhandel assets in the
General Aniline and Film Corporation.
B. Alternative Submissions in case the Court should not sztstain
the Swiss request to examine the merits of the dispute
I. (a) that the Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the
dispute is one which is fit for submission either to the
arbitral tribunal provided for in Article VI of the
7 tribunal arbitral prévu dans le T~aité d'arbitrage et de
conciliation entre la Suisse et les Etats-Unis du 16 février
1931;
b) qu'en cas de réponse affirmative sous la conclusion a) est
compétent pour l'examen du différend soit le tribunal
arbitral prévu dans l'Accord de Washington, soit le tribunal
prévu dans le Traité d'arbitrage et de conciliation de 1931,
et que le choix de l'un ou de l'autre tribunal appartient
à 1'Etat demandeur;
2. subsidiairement :
a) que la Cour est compétente pour décider si le différend est
de nature à êtresoumis au tribunal arbitral prévu à l'ar-
ticle VI de l'Accord de Washington de 1946;
b) en cas de réponse affirmative sous la conclusion a) que ce
tribunal est compétent pour examiner le différend;
3. plus subsidiairement
a) que la Cour est compétente pour décider si le différend est
de nature à êtresoumis au tribunal arbitral prévu par le
Traité d'arbitrage et de conciliation de 1931 entre la
Confédération suisse et les Etats-Unis d'Amérique;
b) en cas de réponse affirmative sous la conclusion a) que ce
tribunal est compétent pour examiner le différend;
4. tout à fait subsidiairement:
que le différend entre la Confédération suisseet les États-
Unis d'Amérique doit être soumis à l'examen de la Com-
mission permanente de conciliation prévue aux articles II-
IV du Traité d'arbitrage et de conciliation de 1931.
Le Conseil fédéral suissese réserve en outre le droit de complé-
ter et de modifier les conclusions qui précèdent. ))
Au nom du Gouvernement des États-unis d'Amérique, dans les
exceptions préliminaires :
«Plaise à la Cour dire et juger:
(1) Première exception préliminaire
qu'elle est incompétente pour connaître ou décider des ques-
tions soulevéespar ia requêteet le mémoiredu Gouvernement
suisse, pour le motif que le différend s'est élevéavant le
26 août 1946, date à laquelle ll?cceptation de la juridiction
obligatoire de la Cour par les Etats-Unis est entrée en vi-
gueur ;
(2) Deuxième exception préliminaire
qu'elle est incompétente pour connaître ou décider des ques-
tions soulevées par la requête et le mémoire du Gouverne-
ment suisse, pour le motif que le différend s'est élevéavant INTERHANDEL CASE (JUDGMENT OF 21 III59) IO
Washington Accord of 1946, or tothe arbitral tribunal pro-
vided for by the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation be-
tween Switzerland and the United States of February
16th, 1931;
(b) that in case of an affirmative reply to submission (a)
either the arbitral tribunalprovided for in the Washington
Accord or the tribunal provided for in the Treaty of
Arbitration and Conciliation of 1931, has jurisdiction to
examine the dispute, and that the choice of one or the
other tribunal belongs to the applicant State;
2. in the alternative :
(a) that the Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the
dispute is fit to be submitted to the arbitral tribunal
provided for by Article VI of the Washington Accord of
1946;
(b) that in case of an affirmative reply to submission (a) the
said tribunal has jurisdiction to examine the dispute;
3. in the further alternative:
(a) that the Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the
dispute is fit to be submitted to the arbitral tribunal
provided for by the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation
of 1931 between the Swiss Confederation and the United
States of America ;
(b) that in case of an affirmative reply to submission (a) the
said tribunal has jurisdiction to examine the dispute;
4. in the final alternative:
that the dispute between the Swiss Confederation and the
United States of America should be submitted to the
examination of the Permanent Commission of Conciliation
provided for in Articles II-IV of the Treaty of Arbi-
tration and Conciliation of 1931.
The Swiss Federal Council furthermore reserves the right to
supplement and to amend the preceding submissions."
On behalf of the Government of the United States of America,
in the Preliminary Objections :
"May it please the Court to judge and decide:
(1) First Preliminary Objection
that there is no jurisdiction in the Court to hear or determine
the matters raised by the Swiss Application and Memorial,
for the reason that the dispute arose before August 26th,
1946, the date on which the acceptance of the Court's com-
pulsory jurisdiction by this country became effective;
(2) SecondPreliminary Objection
that there is no jurisdiction in the Court to hear or determine
the matters raised by the Swiss Application and Memorial,
for the reason that the dispute arose before July 28th, 1948,
8 le 28 juillet 1948, date à laquelle l'?cceptation de la juri-
diction obligatoire de,la Cour par les Etats-Unis est devenue
obligatoire pour les Etats-Unis à l'égard de la Suisse;
(3) Troisièmeexception préliminaire
qu'elle est incompétente pour connaître ou décider des ques-
tions soulevées par la requête et le mémoire du Gouver-
nement suisse, pour le motif que IlInterhandel, dont le
Gouvernement suisse épouse la cause, n'a pas épuisé les
recours internes dont il disposait devant les tribunaux des
Etats-Unis ;
(4) Quatrième exception préliminaire
a) qu'elle est incompétente pour connaitre ou décider de
toutes les questions soulevéespar la requêteou le mémoire
du Gouvernement suisse, concernant la vente ou la dispo-
sition des actions sous séquestre de la GeneralAniline and
Film Corporation (y compris la transmission d'un titre
valable et incontestable à toute personne physique ou
morale), pour le mptif que cette vente ou disposition a
étédéfiniepar les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, confprmément
au paragraphe b) des réserves attachées par les Etats-Unis
à l'acceptation de la juridiction de la Cour, comme rele-
yant essentiellement de la compétence nationale des
Etats-Unis; et
b) qu'elle est incompétente pour connaitre ou décider de
toute question soulevée par la requête ou le mémoire du
Gouvernement suisse concernant la saisie et la rétention
des actions sous séquestre de la GeneralAniline and Film
Corporation, pour le motif que ces mesures relèvent, selon
le droit international, de la compétence nationale des
Etats-Unis.
Les États-Unis d'Amérique se réservent le droit de compléter
ou d'amender les conclusions qui précèdent et, en général, de
soumettre à la Cour tout nouvel argument juridique. 1)
Au nom du Gouvernement suisse, dans ses observations et con-
clusions sur les exceptions préliminaires :
((Plaise à la Cour de dire et juger:
I. de rejeter la première exception préliminaire des États-Unis
d'Amérique;
2. de rejeter la deuxième exception préliminaire des États-Unis
d'Amérique;
3. soit de rejeter, soit de joindre au fond la troisième exception
préliminaire des Etats-Unis d'Amérique;
4. soit de rejeter, çoit de joindre au fond l'exception prélimi-
naire 4 a) des Etats-Unis d'Amérique;
soit de rejeter, ,soit de joindre au fond l'exception prélimi-
naire 4 b) des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.
9 the date on which the acceptance of the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction by this country became binding on this country
as regards Switzerland;
(3) Third Preliminary Objection
that there is no jurisdiction in this Court to hear or determine
the matters raised by the Swiss Application and Memorial,
for the reason that Interhandel, whose case Switzerland is
espousing, has not exhausted the local remedies available
to it in the United States courts;
(4) Fourth Preliminary Objection
(a) that there is no jurisdiction in this Court to hear or
determine any issues raised by the Swiss Application or
Memorial concerning the sale or disposition of the vested
shares of General Aniline and Film Corporation (including
the passing of good and clear title to any person or
entity), for the reason that such sale or disposition has
been determined by the United States of America,
pursuant to paragraph (b) of the Conditions attached to
this country's acceptance of this Court's jurisdiction, to
be a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of this country; and
(b) that there is no jurisdiction in this Court to hear or
determine any issues raised by the Swiss Application or
Memorial concerning the seizure and retention of the
vested shares of General Aniline and Film Corporation,
for the reason that such seizure and retention are,
according to international law, matters within the
domestic jurisdiction of the United States.
The United States of America reserves the right to supplement
or to amend the preceding submissions, and, generally, to submit
any further legal argument."
On behalf of the Swiss Government, in its Observations and
Submissions :
"May it please the Court to adjudge and declare:
I. to dismiss the first preliminary objection of the United States
of America ;
2. to dismiss the second preliminary objection of the United
States of America;
3. either to dismi~s, or to join to the merits, the third preli-
minary objection of the United States of America;
4. either to dismiss, or to join to the merits, preliminary
objection 4 (a) of the United States of America;
either to dismiss, or to join to the merits, preliminary
objection 4 (b) of the United States of America.
9 Le Conseil fédéral suissemaintient et confirme les conclusions
principales et les conclusions subsidiaires telles qu'elles ont été
formulées aux pages 67 et 68 du mémoire de la Confédération
suisse du 3 mars 1958.
Le Conseil fédéral suisse complète ses conclusions principales
par la conclusion subsidiaire suivante:
Le Conseil fédéral suissedemande à la Cour de déclarer que
les biens, droits et intérêts que la Sociétéinternationale pour
participations industrielles et commerciales S. A. (Interhandel)
possède dans la General Aniline and Film Corporation ont le
caractère de biens non-ennemis (suisses), et en conséquence de
déclarer qu'en refusant de restituer lesdits avoirs, le Gouver-
nement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique viole l'article IV, para-
graphe 1, de l'Accord de Washington du 25 mai 1946 et les
obligations découlant pour lui des règles générales du droit
des gens.
Le Conseil fédéral suissese réserve en outre le droit de com-
pléter et de modifier les conclusions qui précèdent. »
Au nom de ce même Gouvernement, conclusions déposées au
Greffe le 3 novembre 1958 :
«A. Conclusions principales
I. que le Gouvernement des États-unis d'Amérique est tenu de
restituer les avoirs de la Sociétéinternationale pour partici-
pations industrielles et commerciales S. A. (Interhandel) ;
2. subsidiairement, qu'au cas où la Cour ne considérerait pas
que la preuve a été apportéedu caractère non-ennemi des
avoirs de la Sociétéinternationale pour participations indus-
trielles et commerciales S. A. (Interhandel), il y a lieu de
désigner un expert choisi par la Cour, conformément à l'ar-
ticle 50 de son Statut, auquel incomberait la mission:
a) d'examiner les documents mis par lJInterhandel à la dispo-
sition des tribunaux américains,
b) d'examiner les dossiers et les livres de comptes de la banque
Sturzenegger dont le Ministère public de la Confédération
suisse a ordonné le séquestre le 15 juin 1950, mais avec la
réserve que l'expert ne devra faire état dans son expertise
que des documents se rapportant à l'affaire de l'Inter-
handel et devra observer le secret le plus absolu sur les
documents de la banque Sturzenegger, ses clients et d'autres
personnes physiques ou morales, s'ils n'ont aucune inci-
dence sur l'affaire pendante devant la Cour,
en vue de permettre à la Cour de déterminer le caractère
ennemi ou non-ennemi des avoirs de IlInterhandel dans la
General Aniline and Film Cor$oration.
B. Conclusion princi$ale subsidiaire
Le Conseil fédéral suissedemande à la Cour de déclarer que les
biens, droits et intérêts que la Sociétéinternationale pour par-
IO The Swiss Federal Council maintains and confirms its main and
alternative submissions as set out on pages 67and 68 of the Memorial
of the Swiss Confederation of March 3rd, 1958.
The Swiss Federal Council supplements its main submissions
by the following alternative submission:
The Swiss Federal Council requests the Court to declare that
the property, rights and interests which the Sociétéinternationale
pour participations industriellesetcommercialesS.A. (Interhandel)
possesses in the General Aniline and Film Corporation have the
character of non-enemy (Swiss) property, and consequently to
declare that by refusing to return the said property the Govem-
ment of the United States of America is in breach of Article IV,
paragraph 1, of the Washington Accord of May 25th, 1946, and
of the obligations binding upon it under the general rules of
international law.
The Swiss Federal Council further reserves the right to supple-
ment and to modify the preceding submissions."
On behalf of the same Government, Submissions deposited in the
Registry on November yd, 1958:
"A. Principal Submissions
I. that the Government of the United States of America is
under an obligation to restore the assets of the Société inter-
nationale pour participations industrielleset commercialesS.A.
(Interhandel) ;
2. in the altemative, that in case the Court should not consider
that proof of the non-enemy character of the property of the
Société internationale pour participations industrielleset com-
merciales S.A. (Interhandel) has been furnished, an expert
selected by the Court should be designated, in accordance
with Article 50 of its Statute, with the task of:
(a) examining the documents put at the disposa1 of the
American courts by Interhandel,
(b) examining the files and accounting records of the Stur-
zenegger Bank, the seizure of which was ordered by the
public authorities (Ministère public) of the Swiss Con-
federation on June 15th, 1950, subject to the reservation,
however, that the expert in his expert opinion shall refer
only to such documents as relate to the Interhandel case,
and shall be instructed to observe absolute secrecy con-
cerning the documents of the Sturzenegger Bank, its
clients and al1 other individuals and legal persons, if
such documents are not releivant to the case pending
before the Court,
for the purpose of enabling the Court to determine the enemy
or non-enemy character of the Interhandel assets in the
General Aniline and Film Corporation.
B. Alternative Principal Submission
The Swiss Federal Council requests the Court to declare that
the property, rights and interests which the Société internationale ticipations industrielles et commerciales S. A. (Interhandel) pos-
sèdedans la GeneralAniline and Film Corporationont le caractère
de biens non-ennemis (suisses), et en conséquence de déclarer
qu'en refusant de restituer lesdits avoirs, le Gouvernement des
États-Unis va à l'encontre de la décision du 5 janvier 1948 de
l'Autorité suisse de recours fondée sur l'Accord de Washington et
viole l'article IV, paragraphe 1, de l'Accord de Washington du
25 mai 1946 et les obligations découlant pour lui des règles géné-
rales du droit des gens.
C. Conc<usionsse rapportant aux conclusions du Gouvernement
des Etats-Unis à la suite de ses exceptions préliminaires
I. de rejeter la première exception préliminaire des États-unis
d'Amérique ;
2. de rejeter la deuxième exception préliminaire des États-unis;
3. soit de rejeter, soi; de joindre au fond la troisième exception
préliminaire des Etats-Unis d'Amérique;
4. soit de rejeter, soit de joindre au fond l'exception prélimi-
naire 4 a) des Etats-Unis d'Amérique;
soit de rejeter, .soit de joindre au fond l'exception prélimi-
naire 4 b) des Etats-Unis d'Amérique;
Subsidiairement
dans le cas où la Cour donnerait suite à l'une ou l'autre des
exceptions préliminaires des Etats-Unis d'dmériqqe, de se
déclarer en tout cas compétente pour décider si les Etats-Unis
d'Amérique sont tenus de soumettre le différend relatif à la
validité de la réclamation du Gouvernement suisse, soit à la
procédurearbitrale prévue àl'article VI de l'Accord de Washing-
ton de 1946, soit au tribunal arbitral prévu dans le Traité
d'arbitrage et de conciliation de 1931, soità la Commission de
conciliation prévue par le mêmetraité et de fixer la suite de
la procédure.
D. Conclusionsde fond pour le cas où la Cour donner$ suite à
l'une ou l'autre des exceptions#réliminaires des Etats-Unis
d'Amériqueet accepterait dese déclarercompétente conformé-
ment à la conclusion subsidiaire sousC
I. Dire que les États-Unis d'Amériquesont tenus de soumettre
l'examen du différend soit à la procédure arbitrale de l'Ac-
cord de Washington, soit au tribunal prévu dans le Traité
d'arbitrage et de conciliation de 1931, ef que le choix de
l'un ou de l'autre tribunal appartientà l'Etat demandeur.
2.Subsidiairement :
que les États-unis d'Amérique sont tenus de soumettre le
différendà la procédure arbitrale prévue à l'article VI de
l'Accord de Washington de 1946.
IIpour participations industrielleset commercialesS.A. (Interhandel)
possesses in General Aniline and Film Corporation have the
character of non-enemy (Swiss) property, and consequently to
declare that by refusing to return the said property, the Govern-
ment of the United States is acting contrary to the decision of
January 5th, 1948, of the Swiss Authority of Review based on the
Washington Accord, and is in breach of Article IV, paragraph 1,
of the Washington Accord of May 25th, 1946,and of the obligations
binding upon it under the general rules of the law of nations.
C. Submissions regardingthe Submissions of the Governmentof
the United States follozuingits Preliminary Objections
I. To dismiss the first preliminary objection of the United
States of Amenca;
2. To dismiss the second preliminary objection of the United
States;
3. Either to dismiss, or to join to the merits, the third preliminary
objection of the United States of America;
4. Either to dismiss, or to join to the merits, the preliminary
objection 4 (a) of the United States of Amenca;
either to dismiss, or to join to the merits, the preliminary
objection 4 (b) of the United States of America;
In the alternative
should the Court uphold one or the other of the preliminary
objections of the United States of America, to declare its com-
petence in any case to decide whether the United States of
America is under an obligation to submit the dispute regarding
the validity of the Swiss Government's claim either to the
arbitral procedure provided for in Article VI of the Washington
Accord of 1946, or to the Arbitral Tribunal provided for in the
1931 Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation, or to the Conci-
liation Commission provided for in the same Treaty, and to
fixthe subsequent procedure.
D. Submissions on the merits in the event of the Courtacceptilzg
one or otherof the preliminary objectionsof the United States
of America and acceptingjurisdiction in conformitywith the
alternativesubmission as under C
I. To declare that the United States of America is under an
obligation to submit the dispute for examination either to
the arbitral procedure of the Washington Accord or to the
Tribunal provided for in the Arbitration and Conciliation
Treaty of 1931, and that the choice of one or the other
Tribunal belongs to the Applicant State.
2. In the alternative:
that the United States of America is under an obligation to
submit the dispute to the arbitral procedure provided for in
Article VI of the Washington Accord of 1946. 3. Plus s~bsidiairement :
que les États-unis d'Amérique sont tenus de soumettre le
différendau tribunal arbitral prévu dansle Traité d'arbitrage
et de conciliation de 1931 entre la Confédérationsuisse et
les Etats-Unis d'Amérique.
4. Tout à fait subsidiairement:
que les États-unis d'Amérique sont tenus de soumettre le
différend à l'examen de la Commissionpermanente de conci-
liation prévue aux articles II-IV du Traitéd'arbitrage et de
conciliation de 1931. ))
A l'audience du 6 novembre 1958, l'agent du Gouvernement des
États-Unis d'Amérique a confirmé les conclusions énoncéesdans
les exceptions préliminaires.
De son côté, l'agent du Gouvernement suisse a repris à l'au-
dience du 12 novembre 1958 les conclusions par lui déposéesle
3 novembre, tout en se réservant le droit de les modifier après
avoir entendu les explications qui seraient présentées au nom du
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.
A l'audience du 14 novembre 1958, l'agent du Gouvernement des
États-unis d'Amérique a confirméet maintenu sesconclusions anté-
rieures tout en insistant sur le fait que les exceptions préliminaires
visaient toutes les conclusions, tant subsidiaires que principales,
présentéesau nom du Gouvernement suisse.
Enfin, à l'audience du 17 novembre 1958, l'agent du Gouveme-
ment suisse a maintenu les conclusions par lui déposéesau Greffe le
3 novembre 1958, qui ont ainsi acquis le caractère de conclusions
finales.
Les déclarations par lesquelles les Parties ont accepté la juri-
diction obligatoire de la Cour sont les suivantes :
Déclaration des Etats-Unis d'Amérique du 14 août 1946 (en
vigueur depuis le 26 août 1946) :
« Nous, Harry S. Truman, Président des États-Unis, décla-
rons au nom des Etats-Unis d'Amérique,en application de l'ar-
ticle 36, paragraphe2, du Statut dela Courinternationale de Justice
et en conformitéayec la résolutionadoptée,en date du 2 août 1946,
par le Sénat des Etats-Unis d'Amérique(par un vote des deux-
tiers des sénateurs présents), queles Etats-Unis d'Amériquerecon-
naissent comme obligatoire de- plein droit et sans convention
spéciale,à l'égard detout autre Etat acceptant la mêmeobligation,
la juridiction de la Cour internationale de Justice sur tous les
différends d'ordre juridique qui s'élèveront à l'avenir et ayant
pour objet:
a) l'interprétation d'un traité; 3. In the further alternative:
that the United States of America is under an obligation to
submit the dispute to the Arbitral Tribunal provided for in
the Arbitration and Conciliation Treatg of 1931 between the
Swiss Confederation and the United States of America.
4. In the final alternative:
that the United States of America is under an obligation to
submit the dispute for examination by the Permanent Con-
ciliation Commission provided for in Articles II-IV of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Treaty of 1931.''
At the hearing on November 6th, 1958, the Agent for the Govern-
ment of the United States of America reaffirmed the submissions
set forth in the Preliminary Objections.
For his part, the Agent for the Swiss Government repeated, at
the hearing on November ~zth, 1958, the submissions he had filed
on Xovember 3rd, whilst reserving his right to modify them after
hearing any explanations that might be put forward on behalf of
the Government of the United States of America.
At the hearing on November 14th, 1958, the Agent for the
Government of the United States of America reaffirmed and
maintained his earlier submissions whilst emphasizing that the
preliminary objections were directed against al1 of the alternative
as well as the principal submissions made on behalf of the Swiss
Government.
Finally, at the hearing on November 17th, 1958, the Agent for
the Swiss Government maintained the submissions he had filed in
the Registry on November 3rd, 1958, which thus acquired the
character of final submissions.
The declarations by.which the Parties accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court are as follows:
Declaration of the United States of America of August 14th, 1946
(in force since August 26th, 1946):
"1, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America,
declare on behalf of the United States of America, under Article 36,.
paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
and in accordance with the Resolution of August 2, 1946, of the
Senate of the United States of America (two-thirds of the Senators
present concumng therein), that the United States of America
recognizes as compulsory ipso factoand without special agreement,
in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in al1legal disputes
hereafter arising concerning
(a) The interpretation of a treaty;
12 b) tout point de droit international;
c) la réalité de tout fait qui, s'il est établi, constituerait la
violation d'un engagement international;
d) la nature ou l'étendue de la réparation due pour la rupture
d'un engagement international;
sous la réserveque cette déclaration ne s'applique pas:
a) aux différends dont la solution est confiéepar les parties à
d'autres tribunaux, en vertu d'accords déjà existants ou qui
pourront êtreconclus à l'avenir; ou
b) aux différendsrelatifs à des questions relevant essentiellement
de la compétence nationle des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, telle
qu'elle est fixéepar les Etats-Unis d'Amérique; ou
c) aux différends résultant d'un traité multilatéral, à moins
que 1) toutes les parties au traité que la décision concerne
soient également parties à l'affaire soumise à la Cour, ou
que 2) les Etats-Unis d'Amérique acceptent expressément la
compétence de la Cour; et
sous la réserveenfin que cette déclaration demeure en vigueur pour
une durée de cinq ans et qu'elle reste en vigueur de plein droit
jusqu'à l'expiration d'un délai de six mois à compter de la date
où notification est donnée à l'intention d'y mettre fin. »
Déclaration de la Suisse du 6 juillet 1948 (en vigueur depuis le
28 juillet1948 )
((Le Conseil fédéral suisse,dûment autorisé à cet effet par un
arrêtéfédéral pris le 12 mars 1948 par l'Assemblée fédérale de la
Confédération suisse et entré en vigueur le 17 juin 1948,
Déclare par les présentes que la Confédération suisse reconnaît
comme obligatoire de -plein droit et sans convention spéciale, à
l'égard de tout autre Etat acceptant la mêmeobligation, la juri-
diction de la Cour internationale de Justice sur tous les différends
d'ordre juridique ayant pour objet:
a) l'interprétation d'un traité;
b) tout point de droit international;
c) la réalitéde tout fait qui, s'il était établi, constitueraitla
violation d'un engagement international;
d) la nature ou l'étendue de la réparation due pour la rupture
d'un engagement international.
Cette déclaration, qui est fondée sur l'article36 du Statut de
la Cour internationale de Justice, portera effet dès la date à
laquelle la Confédération suisse sera devenue partie à ce Statut
et aussi longtemps qu'elle n'aura pas étéabrogée moyennant un
préavis d'un an. »
La présente instance ne vise que leç exceptions préliminaires
soulevées par le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique. Il (b) Any question of international law;
(c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would con-
stitute a breach of an international obligation;
(d) The nature or extent of the reparation <O be made for the
breach of an international obligation;
Provided, that this declaration shall not apply to
(a) Disputes the solution of which the Parties shall entrust to
other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence
or which may be concluded in the future; or
(b) Disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as
determined by the United States of America; or
(c) Disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) al1
parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties
to the case before the Court, or (2) the United States of
America specially agrees to jurisdiction; and
Provided further, that this declaration shall remain in force for
a period of five years and thereafter until the expiration of six
months after notice may be given to terminate this declaration."
Declaration of Switzerland of July 6th, 1948 (in force since July
z8th, 1948) :
"The Swiss Federal Council, duly authorized for that purpose
by a Federal decree which was adopted on 12 March 1948 by the
Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation and became operative
on 17 June 1948,
Hereby declares that the Swiss Confederation recognizes as
to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice inal1legal disputes concerning:
(a) The interpretation of a treaty;
(b) Any question of international law;
(c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would con-
stitute a breach of an international obligation;
(d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation.
of the International Court of Justice, shall take effect from the
date on which the Swiss Confederation becomes a party to that
Statute and shall have effect as long as it has not been abrogated
subject to .one year's notice."
The present proceedings are concerned onlywith the preliminary
objections raised by the Government of the United States of
13convient néanmoins d'exposer brièvement les faits et les circons-
tances tels qu'ils ont étéalléguéspar les Parties et qui sont à
l'origine du présent différend.
Par ses décisionsdu 16 févrieret du 24 avril 1942, fondéessur le
Trading withfie Enemy Act du 6 octobre 1917 modifié, le Gouver-
nement des Etats-Unis mit sous séqueçtre la presque-totalité des
actions de la société enregistréeaux Etats-Unis General Aniline
and Film Corporation(appeléeen abrégéGAF), pour le motif que
ces actions appartenaient en réalitéà la sociét1. G. Farbenindustrie
de Francfort ou que la GAF était sous une forme ou sous une autre
contrôlée par cette société ennemie.
Il n'est pas contesté que jusqu'en 1940 1'1.G.Farben contrôlait la
GAF par l'intermédiaire de la Sociétéinternationale pour entre-
prises chimiques S. A. (I. G. Chernie)inscrite au registre du com-
merce du canton de Bâle-Ville en 1928. Cependant, d'après les
allégations du Gouvernement suisse, les liens entre la société alle-
mande I. G.Farben et la société suisseI. G. Chemie furent définiti-
vement dénouéspar la résiliation du contrat d'option et de garantie
de dividende, résiliation intervenue en juin 1940, donc bien avant
l'entrée en guerre des Etats-Unis. La société suisseprit le nom de
Sociétéinternationale pour participations industrielles et commer-
ciales S. A. (en abrégé: Interhandel); l'article2 de ses statuts,
modifiés en 1940, la définit comme suit: ((L'entreprise constitue
une société holding. Ellea pour but la participation aux entreprises
industrielles et commerciales de toute nature, en particulier dans
le domaine chimique, en Suisse et à l'étranger, à l'exclusion des
affaires bancaires ainsi que de l'achat et de la vente professionnelle
des papiers valeurs. ))Le poste le plus important de l'actif de
YInterhandel consiste dans sa participation à la GAF. Environ
75 % desactionsAde laGAF et la totalité de ses actions B en circula-
tion appartiendraient à 1'Interhandel. Une grande partie, environ
go%, de ces actions et une somme d'environ 1,800 ooo dollars se
trouvent sous séquestre du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis.
Vers la fin de la guerre, en vertu d'un accord provisoire entre la
Suisse, les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, la France et le Royaume-Uni,
les biens en Suisse appartenant à des Allemands en Allemagne
furent bloqués (arrêtédu Conseil fédéral du 16 février 1945).
L'Office suisse de compensation fut chargé de la recherche en
Suisse des avoirs appartenant à des Allemands ou par eux contrôlés.
Au cours de ces investigations, la question du caractère de l'Inter-
handel fut poséemais, à la suite d'une expertise effectuéeen juin
et juillet 1945, l'office, tenant pour démontréque 1'Interhandel
s'était libéréde ses liens de dépendance à l'égard de la société
allemande, ne jugea pas nécessaire de procéder au blocage de ses
biens.
De son côté, le Gouvernement des États-unis, estimant que
1'Interhandel était toujours contrôlépar 1'1. G.Farben, poursuivait
ses recherches en vue d'en découvrir la preuve. Dans ces conditions,America. It is nevertheless convenient to set out briefly the facts
and circumstances as submitted by the Parties which constitute the
origin of the present dispute.
By its decisions of February 16th and April qth, 1942, based on
the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6th, 1917, as amended,
the Government of the United States vested almost al1of the shares
of General Aniline and Film Corporation (briefly referred to as the
GAF), a company incorporated in the United States, on the ground
that these shares in reality belonged to the I.G. Farbenindustrie
company of Frankfurt or that the GAF was in one way or another
controlled by that enemy company.
It is not disputed thatuntilr94o I.G. Farben controlled the GAF
through the Sociétéinternationale pour entreprises chimiques S.A.
(I.G. Chemie), entered in the Commercial Register of the Canton
of Bâle-Ville in 1928. However, according to the contention of the
Swiss Government, the links between the German company I.G.
Farben and the Swiss company I.G. Chemie were finally severed
by the cancellation of the contract for an option and for the guaran-
tee of dividends, a cancellation which was effected in June 1940,
that is, well before the entry of the United States into the war.
The Swiss company adopted the name of Société internationale pour
Farticipations industrielles et commercialesS.A. (briefly referred to
as Interhandel) ; Article2 of its Statute as modified in 1940 defines
it as follows: "The enterprise is a holding company. Its object is
participation in industrial and commercial undertakings of every
kind, especially in the chemical field, in Switzerland and abroad,
but excluding banking and the professional purchase and sale of
securities." The largest item in the assets of Interhandel is its
participation in the GAF. Approximately 75 % of the GAF "A"
shares and al1its issued "B" shares are said to belong to Interhandel.
A considerable part, approximately go%, of these shares and a
sum of approximately 1,800,000 dollars, have been vested by the
Government of the United States.
Towards the end of the war, under a provisional agreement
between Switzerland, the United States of America, France and
the United Kingdom, property in Switzerland belonging to Germans
in Germany was blocked (Decree of the Federal Council of February
16th, 1945). The Swiss Compensation Officewas entrusted with the
task of uncovering property in Switzerland belonging to Germans
or controlled by them. In the course of these investigations, the
question of the character of Interhandel was raised, but as a result
of investigations carried out in June and July, 1945, the Office,
considering it to have been proved that Interhandel had severed
its ties with the German company, did not regard it as necessary
to undertake the blocking of its assets.
For its part, the Government of the United States, considering
that Interhandel was still controlled by I.G. Farben, continued to
seek evidence of such control. In these circumstances the Federal
14le Département fédéral del'Économie publique et le Département
politique fédéral donnèrent à l'Office suisse de compensation
l'ordre de bloquer provisoirement les avoirs de l'Interhande1, ce
qui fut fait le 30 octobre945. L'Officeprocéda alors àune deuxième
expertise (novembre 1945-février 1946) qui le conduisit au
mêmerésultat que la première.
Le 25 mai 1946, un accord fut conclu entre les trois Puissances
alliéeset la Suisse(Accord de Washington). Par une des dispositions
de cet Accord, la Suisse s'engageait àpoursuivre les recherches et à
liquider les biens ailemands en Suisse. C'estl'Officede compensation
qui fut ccchargé de rechercher, prendre possession et liquider les
biens allemands » (Accord, Annexe, II, A), en collaboration avec
une Commission mixte ccomposée d'un représentant de chacun
des quatre gouvernements 1)(Annexe, II, B). L'Accord règle les
détails de cette collaboration (Annexe, II, C, D, E, F) et dispose
qu'en cas de désaccord entre la Commission mixte et I'Office de
compensation, ou si la partie en cause le désire, l'affaire pourra
êtresoumise, dans le délai d'un mois, à une Autorité suisse de
recours qui sera composéede trois membres et présidéepar un juge.
cLa décisionde l'Officede compensation ou, selon le cas, de l'Auto-
rité suisse de recours, sera définitive » (Annexe, III). Toutefois, en
cas de désaccord avec l'Autorité suisse de recours portant sur
certains points déterminés, cles trois Gouvernements alliéspour-
ront, dans le délai d'un mois, soumettre le différend ... à un
Tribunal arbitral ))(Annexe, III).
L'Accord de Washington dispose d'autre part:
ccArticle IV, paragraphe I.
Le ,Gouvernement des États-unis débloquerales avoirs suisses
aux Etats-Unis. La procédure nécessairesera fixéesans délai.
Article VI
S'il devait s'éleverdes divergences d'opinion au sujet de l'ap-
plication ou de l'interprétation du présent accord et si ces di-
vergences nepouvaient êtrerésoluesautrement, il serait fait appel
à l'arbitrage))
Après la conclusion de l'Accord de Washington, les discussions
au sujet de 1'Interhandel entre I'Office suisse de compensation et
la Commission mixte, ainsi qu'entre les représentants de la Suisse et
des Etats-Unis, se poursuivirent sans aboutir à une conclusion
acceptée par les deux parties. L'Office, tout en se déclarant prêt à
examiner toute preuve qui lui serait soumise du caractère allemand
de I'Interhandel, s'en tenait aux résultats de ses deux expertises;
la Commission mixte contestait ces résultats et continuait sesDepartment of Public Economy and the Federal Political Depart-
ment ordered the Swiss Compensation Office provisionally to block
the assets of Interhandel; this was done on October 3oth, 1945.
The Office then carried out a second investigation (November
1945-February 1946) which led it to the same conclusion as had
the first.
On May 25th, 1946, an agreement was concluded between the
three Allied Powers and Switzerland (the Washington Accord).
Under one of the provisions of the Accord, Switzerland undertook
to pursue its investigations and to liquidate German property in
Switzerland. Itwas the Compensation Officewhich was "empowered
to uncover, take into possession, and liquidate German property"
(Accord, Annex, II, A), in collaboration with a Joint Commission
"composed of representatives of each of the four Governments"
(Annex, II, B). The Accord lays down the details of that collabora-
tion (Annex, II, C, D, E, F) and provides that, in the event of dis-
agreement between the Joint Commission and the Compensation
Office or if the party in interest so desires, the matter may within
a period of one month be submitted to a Swiss Authority of Review
composed of three members and presided over by a Judge. "The
decisions of the Compensation Office, or of the Authority of Review,
should the matter be referred to it, shall be final" (Annex, III).
In the event, however, of disagreement with the Swiss Authority
of Review on certain given matters, "the three Allied Governments
may, within one month, require the difference to be submitted to
arbitration" (Annex, III).
The Washington Accord further provides :
"Article IV, paragraph I.
The Government of the United States will unblock Swiss assets
without delay.States. The necessary procedure will be determined
Article VI.
In case differencesof opinion arise with regard to the application
or interpretation of this Accord which cannot be settled in any
other way, recourse shall be had to arbitration."
After the conclusion of the Washington Accord, discussions with
regard to Interhandel between the Swiss Compensation Office and
the Joint Commission as well as between representatives of Switzer-
land and the United States were continued without reaching any
conclusion accepted by the two parties. The Office, while declaring
itself ready to examine any evidence as to the German character of
Interhandel which might be submitted to it, continued to accept
the results of its twoinvestigations;the Joint Commission challengedrecherches. Par décisiondu 5 janvier 1948, rendue sur recours de
I'Interhandel, l'Autorité suisse de recours annula le blocage avec
effet rétroactif. Elle avait invité la Commission mixte àparticiper
à la procédure, mais celle-ci avait déclinél'invitation. Cette ques-
tion ne fut pas soumiseà l'arbitrage prévu par l'Accord deWashing-
ton.
Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement suisse s'estima autorisé à
considérer la décisionde l'Autorité suisse de recours comme défini-
tive, ayant force de chose jugéeà l'égard des Puissances parties à
l'Accord de Washington. En conséquence, dans une note du 4 mai
1948 au Département d'État, la Légation de Suisse à Washington
invoqua cette décisionet l'Accord de Washingtonpour demander au
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis de restituer à lJInterhandel les avoirs
séquestrés aux États-unis. Le 26 juillet1948, le Département
d'État rejeta cette demande, soutenant que la décisionde l'Autorité
suisse de recours était sans effeàl'égarddes avoirs séquestrésaux
Etats-Unis et réclaméspar YI. G. Chemie. Le 7 septembre 1948,
dans une note au Département d'Etat, la Légation de Suisse à
Washington, s'appuyant toujourssur son interprétation de l'Accord
de Washington, maintint que la décision de l'Autorité suisse de
recours reconnaissant à 1'Interhandel le caractère de sociétésuisse
avait force de droitpour les signataires de cet Accord; Elle exprimait
l'espoir qu'en conséquence le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis libé-
rerait les avoirs de IlInterhandel aux Etats-Unis, faute de quoi le
Gouvernement suisse devrait soumettre la question à la procédure
d'arbitrage prévue par l'article VI de l'Accord de Washington.
Le 12 octobre 1948, le Département d'Etat répondait à cette com-
munication en maintenant ses vues antérieures touchant l'inappli-
cabilité de la décision de l'Autorité suisse de recours à-des biens
séquestrésaux États-unis. Il ajoutait que la loi des Etats-Unis
concernant la saisie et la disposition de biens ennemis autorisait
les étrangers non ennemis à demander la restitution des biens
séquestréset à porter leur demande devant les tribunaux. Le 21 oc-
tobre 1948, l1Interhandel, se prévalant des dispositions du Trad-
ing with the Enemy Act, introduisait une instance devant la United
States District Courtfor theDistrict of Columbia. discussion directe
entre les deux Gouvernements se trouva alors interrompue jusqu'au
g avril1953, date à, laquelle le Gouvernement suisse a adresséau
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis une note qui exprimait des doutes
quant à la procédureappliquéeaux Etat-Unisdans l'affaire de l'Inter-
handel, déclarait que cette procédure aboutissait à une impasse
et proposait des négociations en vue d'une solution satisfaisante.
Jusqu'en 1957, le procès engagédevant les tribunaux des Etats-
Unis n'a fait que peu de progrès sur le fond. L'Interhandel, bien
qu'ayant produit un grand nombre des documents exigés, ne les
a pas produits tous; il a invoqué que la production de certains
documents étaitinterdite par les autorités suissescomme constituant
le délit prévu par l'article73 du code pénal suisse et la violation
16these results and continued its investigations. By its decision of
January 5th, 1948, aven on appeal by Interhandel, the Swiss
Authority of Review annulled the blocking with retroactive effect.
It had invited the Joint Commission to participate inthe procedure,
but the latter had declined the invitation. This question was not
referred to the arbitration provided for in the Washington Accord.
In these circumstances, the Swiss Government considered itself
entitled to regard the decision of the Swiss Authority of Review as
a final one, having the force ofresjudicata vis-à-vis the Powers par-
ties to the Washington Accord. Consequently, in a Note ofMay 4th,
1948, to the Department of State, the Swiss Legation at Wash-
ington invoked this decision and the Washington Accord to request
the'Government of the United States to restore to Interhandel the
property which had been vested inthe United States. On July 26th,
1948, the Department of State rejected this request, contending
that the decision of the Swiss Authority of Review did not affect
the assets vested in the United States and claimed by I.G. Chemie.
On September 7th, 1948, in a Note to the Department of State,
the Swiss Legation in Washington, still relying on its interpretation
of the Washington Accord, maintained that the decision of the
Swiss Authority of Review recognizing Interhandel as a Swiss
Company was legally binding upon the signatories of that Accord.
It expressed the hope that the United States Government would
accordingly release the assets of Interhandel in the United States,
failing which the Swiss Government would have to submit the
question to the arbitral procedure laid down in Article VI of the
Washington Accord. On October nth, 1948, the Department of
State replied to that communication, maintaining its previous view
that the decision of the Swiss Authority of Review was inapplicable
to property vested in the United States. It added that United
States law in regard to the seizure and disposa1 of enemy property
authorized non-enemy foreigners to demand the restitution of
vested property and to apply for it to the courts. On October z~st,
1948, Interhandel, relying upon the provisions of the Trading with
the Enemy Act, instituted proceedings inthe United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. Direct discussion between the
two Governments was then interrupted until April gth, 1953, on
which day the Swiss Government sent to the Government of the
United States a Note questioning the procedure applied in the
United States in the Interhandel case, stating that this procedure
had led to a deadlock, and suggesting negotiations fora satisfactory
settlement.
Up to 1957 the proceedings in the United States courts had made
little progress on the merits. Interhandel, though it had produced
a considerable number of the documents called for, did not produce
al1 of them; it contended that the production of certain documents
was prohibited by the Swissauthorities asconstituting an offenceun-
der Article 273 of the Swiss Criminal Code and as violating banking
16du secret bancaire (article47 de la loi fédéraledu 8 novembre 1934).
L'action de 1'Interhandel a fait l'objet de plusieurs appels devant
les tribunaux deç Etats-Unis et l'aide-mémoire joint à la note du
Département d'Etat du II janvier 1957 au ministre de Suisse
déclarait que 1'Interhandel avait définitivement été débouté de son
action. C'est alors que le Gouvernement suisse a adresséà la Cour,
le 2 octobre 1957, la requête introduisant la présente instance. Ce-
pendant, les affirmations de la note du II janvier 1957 quant au
rejet définitif de la demande de lJInterhandel se sont avérées
prématurées,comme la Cour aura loccasion de le constater en exa-
minant la troisième exception des Etats-Unis.
Comme il a étéindiqué, l'échangede notes au sujet de 1'Interhan-
del qii avait eu lieu en 1948 a étérepris en 1953. Par sa note du
g avril 1953, la Légation de Suisse à Washington suggéra la voie
des négociations entre les deux Gouvernements, qui permettrait
de trouver à l'amiable une solution juste et pratique du problème
de YInterhandel; ces suggestions furent reprises dans les notes des
ler décembre 1954 et I: mars 1955; elles n'ont pas étéaccueillies
par le Département d'Etat. Enfin, la note suisse du 9 août 1956
formula des propositions en vue du règlement du différend soit
par la voie d'arbitrage ou de conciliation prévuepar le Traité entre
la Suisse et les Etats-Unis du 16 février1931, soit par la voie d'ar-
bitrage prévue dans l'Accord de Washington. Cette tentative n'a
pas rencontré l'approbation du Gouvernement des États-unis
qui l'a déclinéedans sa note déjà mentionnée du II janvier 1957.
L'objet de la demande, tel qu'il a étéprécisédans les conclusions
finales présentéesau nom du Gouvernement suisse et abstraction
faite de certains énoncésde caractère subsidiaire et qui peuvent
être laissés de côté pour le moment, s'analyse essentiellement en
deux propositions :
1) à titre principal, il es; demandé à la Cour de dire et juger que le
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis est tenu de restituer les avoirs
de la Sociétéinternationale pour participations industrielles et
commerciales S. A. (Interhandel) ;
2) à titre subsidiaire, il est demandé à la Cour de dire et juger que
les Etats-Unis sont tenus de soumettre le différend à l'arbitrage
ou à la procédure de conciliation suivant certaines modalités
qu'énoncent les conclusions en ligne principale, puis subsidiaire.
Le Gouvernement des États-unis a présentéquatre exceptions
préliminairesqui s'opposent àce que la Courconnaisse desdemandes
du Gouvernement suisse. Avant de procéder à l'examen des excep-
tions, la Cour doit porter son attention sur la demande formuléesecrecy (Article 47 of the Federal Law of November Sth, 1934).
The action brought by Interhandel was the subject of a number
of appeals in the United States courts and in a Memorandum
appended to the Note addressed by the Department of State to
the Swiss Minister on January t th, 1957, it was said that Inter-
handel had finally failed in its suit. It was then that the Swiss
Government, on October znd, 1957, addressed to the Court the
Application instituting the present proceedings. The assertion in
the Note of January t th, 1957, that Interhandel's claim was
finally rejected proved, however, to be premature, as the Court
will have occasion to point out in considering the Third Objection
of the United States.
As stated, the exchange of notes with regard to Interhandel
which had taken place in 1948, was resumed in 1953. In its Note
of April gth, 1953, the Swiss Legation at Washington suggested
negotiations between the two Governments with a view to arriving
amicably at a just and practical solution of the problem of Inter-
handel; these suggestions were repeated in the Notes of Decem-
ber ~st, 1954, and March ~st, 1955; they were not accepted by the
Department of State. Finally, the Swiss Note of August gth, 1956,
formulated proposals for the settlement of the dispute either by
means of arbitration or conciliation as provided for in theTreaty
between Switzerland and the United States of February 16th, 1931,
or by means of arbitration as provided for in the Washington
Accord. This approach did not meet with the approval of the
Government of the United States, which rejected it in its Note,
already referred to, of January th, 1957.
The subject of the claim as set forth in the final submissions
presented on behalf of the Swiss Government, and disregarding
certain items of a subsidiary character which can be left aside for
the moment, is expressed essentially in two propositions:
(1) as a principal submission, the Court is asked to adjudge and
declare that the Government of the United States is under an
obligation to restore theassets of the Sociétéinternationalepour
participations industrielleset commercialesS.A. (Interhandel) ;
(2) as an alternative submission, the Court is asked to adjudge and
declare that the United States is under an obligation to submit
the dispute to arbitration or to a conciliation procedure in
accordance with certain conditions set forth first inthe principal
submissions and then in the alternative submissions.
The Government of the United States has put forward four
preliminary objections to the Court's dealing with the claims of the
Swiss Government. Before proceeding to examine these objections,
the Court must direct its attention to the claim, formulated for the
17pour la première fois dans les observations et conclusions du Gou-
vernement suisse et qui est ainsi conçue :
«Le Conseil fédéralsuisse demande à la Cour de déclarer que
les biens, droits et intérêtsque la Sociétéinternationale pour
participations industrielles et commerciales S. A. (Interhandel)
possède dans la General Aniline and Film Corfioration ont le
caractère de biens non-ennemis (suisses), et en conséquence de
déclarerqu'en refusant de restituer lesdits avoirs, le Gouvernement
des Etats-Unis d'Amérique viole l'article IV, paragraphe 1, de
l'Accordde Washington du 25 mai 1946et les obligationsdécoulant
pour lui des règlesgénéralesdu droit des gens. ))
Dans ses conclusions finales déposées au Greffe le 3 novembre
1958, le Gouvernement suisse donne de cette demande l'explication
suivante :
ccLe Gouvernement suisse, après avoir examiné les exceptions
préliminaires desEtats-Unis d'Amérique,est arrivé à la conclusion
que ces dernières entraînent la modification de ses propres con-
clusions principales et subsidiaires dont la teneur suit. ))
Cependant, la demande en question, qualifiée de «conclusion
principale subsidiaire n, ne constitue pas une simple modification;
elle constitue une nouvelle demande portant sur lefond du différend.
Or, l'article62, paragraphe 3, du Règlement de la Cour est formel:
((Dèsréception par le Greffier de l'acte introductif de l'excep-
tion, la procédure sur le fond est suspendue.,))
En conséquence, la nouvelle conclusion suisse visant une demande
de jugement déclaratoire et présentée après la suspension de la
procédure sur le fond ne peut pas être examinée par la Cour au
stade actuel de la procédure.
Première exceptionpréliminaire
La première exception du Gouvernement des États-Unis tend à
faire déclarer que la Cour n'est pas compétente pour le motif que le
différend actuel s'est élevéavant le 26 août 1946, date à laquelle
l'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour parjes États-
Unis est entrée en vigueur. En effet, la déclaration des Etats-Unis
se rapporte aux différends d'ordre juridique cqui s'élèveront à
l'avenir ». Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis soutient que le diffé-
rend remonte au moins au milieu de l'année 1945et que des opinions
divergentes sur le caractèrede IJInterhandel ont étééchangéesentre
les autorités américaines et suisses à plusieurs reprises avant le
26 août 1946.
18first time in the Observations and Subrnissions of the SwissGovern-
ment, which is in the following terms :
"The Swiss Federal Council requests the Court to declare that
the property, rights and interestswhich the Société iwternationale
pour participations industrielleset commercialesS.A. (Interhandel)
possesses in General Aniline and Film Corporation have the
character of non-enemy (Swiss) property, and consequently to
declare that by refusing to return the said property the Govern-
ment of the United States of America is in breach of Article IV,
paragraph 1, of the Washington Accord of May 25th, 1946, and
of the obligations binding upon it under the general rules of
international law."
In its final Subrnissions, deposited in the Registry on Novem-
ber 3rd, 1958, the SwissGovernment gives the following explanation
with regard to this claim:
"The Swiss Government, after examining the Preliminary
Objections of the United States of America, has come to the
conclusion that these involve the modification of the Swiss
Government's principal and alternative Submissions, which are
as follows."
The claim in question, however, which is described as "alternative
principal Submission", does not constitute a mere modification; it
constitutes a new claim involving the merits of the dispute. Art-
icle 62, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, however, is categorical:
"Upon receipt by the Registrar of a preliminary objection filed
by a party, the proceedings on the merits shall be suspended."
Consequently, the new Swiss submission relating to a request
for a declaratory judgment, presented after the suspension of the
proceedings on the merits, cannot be considered by the Court at
the present stage of the proceedings.
First Preliminary Objection
The First Objection of the Government of the United States
seeks a declaration that the Court is without jurisdiction on the
ground that the present dispute arose before August 26th, 1946,
the date on which the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court by the United States came into force. The declaration
of the United States does indeed relate to legal disputes "hereafter
arising". The Government of the United States maintains that the
dispute goes back at least to the middle of the year 1945, and that
divergent opinions as to the character of Interhandel were exchanged
between the Amencan and Swissauthorities ona number of occasions
before August 26th, 1946.
18 La Cour rappelle que l'objet du présent litige est indiqué dans
la requête aussi bien que dans la conclusion finale principale du
Gouvernement suisse qu? tend à la restitution à 1'Interhandel des
avoirs séquestrés aux Etats-Unis. L'examen du dossier permet
d'établir qu'une demande à cet effet a étéformulée par la Suisse
pour la première foisdans la note de la LégationdeSuisse àWashing-
ton en date du 4 mai 1948.La réponse négative, quele Département
d'Etat qualifie d'opinion définitive, est du 26 juillet1948. Deux
autres notes échangéesbientôt après (les 7 septembre et 12 octobre
de la mêmeannée)confirment que les opinions divergentes des deux
Gouvernements ont eu pour objet un problème de droit nettement
défini.à savoir la restitution des avoirs de 1'Interhandel aux Etats-
Unis, et que les négociations à ce sujet sont rapidement arrivées à
une impasse. Ainsi, le différend soumis actuellement à la Cour se
situe au 26 juillet1948, date de la première réponsenégative que le
Gouvernement des États-Unis présente comme son opinion défi-
nitive consistant à rejeter la demande de restitution des avoirs. Par
conséquent, le différends'est élevéposférieurement à ladate del'en-
tréeen vigueur de la déclaration des Etats-Unis.
Pendant la périodeindiquéepar le Gouvernement des États-unis
(années 1945 et1946), les échangesde vues entre les autorités suisses
d'un côtéet alliées,en premier lieu américaines, de l'autre, avaient
trait à la recherche, au blocage et à la liquidation des biens et
intérêtsallemands en Suisse; la question du caractère suisse ou alle-
mand de lJ1nterhandel a fait l'objet d'investigations et d'échanges
d'opinions en vue d'une décision sur le sort des avoirs de cette
sociétéen Suisse. C'est seulement aprèsque la décisionde l'Autorité
suisse de recours du 5 janvier 1948 reconnaissant définitivement le
caractère non-ennemi des avoirs de 1'Interhandel et mettant fin en
conséquenceau blocageprovisoire de ces avoirsen Suisse eût acquis,
dans l'opinion du Gouvernement fédéral, forcede chose jugéeque ce
Gouvernement a adressé pour la première fois aux Etats-Unis sa
réclamation tendant à obtenir la restitutiondes avoirs de l'Inter-
handel situésaux Etats-Unis.
Les échanges de vues au sujet de 1'Interhandel entre les autorités
suisses et américaines en 1945, 1946 et 1947 ont eu lieu dans le
cadre de la collaboration instituée entre elles antérieurement même
à l'Accord de Washington et préciséedans cet Accord. Les repré-
sentants de la Commission mixte et ceux de l'Officesuisse de com-
pensation se communiquaient les résultats de leurs recherches et
investigations et discutaient leurs opinions au sujet de'Interhandel
sans arriyer à des conclusions définitives. C'est ainsi, par exemple,
que le procès-verbal de la séancede la Commission mixte du 8sep-
tembre 1947 note :
<Les représentants de l'Officesuisse de compensation déclarent
que leurs enquêtesont donnéseulement des résultats négatifset The Court would recall that the subject of the present dispute is
indicated in the Application and in the Principal Final Subrnission
of the Swiss Government which seeks the return to Interhandel
of the assets vested in the United States. An examination of the
documents reveals that a request to this effect was formulated by
Switzerland for the first time in the Note of the Swiss Legation at
Washington dated May 4th, 1948. The negative reply, which the
Department of State describes as its final and considered view, is
dated July 26th, 1948. Two other Notes exchanged shortly after-
wards (on September 7th and October 12th of that same year)
confirm that the divergent views of the two Governments were
concerned with a clearly-defined legal question, namely, the
restitution of Interhandel's assets in the United States, and that
the negotiations to this end rapidly reached a deadlock. Thus the
dispute now submitted to the Court can clearly be placed at July
26th, 1948, the date of the first negative reply which the Govern-
ment of the United States described as its final and considered
view rejecting the demand for the restitution of the assets. Conse-
quently the dispute arose subsequently to the date of the entry
into force of the Declaration of the United States.
During the period indicated by the Government of the United
States (the years 1945 and 1946), the exchanges of views between
the Swiss authorities on the one hand and the Allied and, in the
first place, the American authorities, on the other, related to the
search for, and the blocking and liquidation of, German property
and interests in Switzerland; the question of the Swiss or German
character of Interhandel was the subject of investigations and
exchanges of views for the purpose of reaching a decision as to the
fate of the assets in Switzerland of that Company. It was only after
the decision of the Swiss Authority of Review of January 5th, 1948,
definitely recognizing the non-enemy character ofthe assets of Inter-
handel and, in consequence, putting an end to the provisional
blocking of these assets in Switzerland, had, in the opinion of the
Federal Government,acquired the authority of res judicata,thatthat
Government for the first time addressed to the United States its
claim for the restitution of Interhandel'sassets in the United States.
The discussions regarding Interhandel between the Swiss and
American authorities in 1945, 1946 and 1947 took place within the
framework of the collaboration established between them prior to
the Washington Accord and defined in that Accord. The represen-
tatives of the Joint Commission and those of the SwissCompensation
Office communicated to each other the results of their enquiries
and investigations, and discussed their opinions with regard to
Interhandel, without arriving at any final conclusions. Thus, for
instance, the minute of the meeting of the Joint Commission on
September 8th, 1947, records :
"The representatives of the Swiss Compensation Office stated
that their investigations had yielded only negative results and
19 qu'ils attendent toujours que les Alliésfournissent leurs docu-
discuter avec les experts alliés.)) de compensation est prêt à
Dans ces échanges de vues entre fonctionnaires alliéset suisses,
la Cour ne peut voir un différend déjà néentre gouvernements au
sujet de la restitution des avoirs que réclame 1'Interhandel aux
Etats-Unis; les faits et les situations qui ont mené à un différendne
sauraient être confondus avec le différend même; lesdocuments
relatifsà cette collaboration des autorités alliéeset suisses en vue
de la liquidation des biens allemands en Suisse sont sans pertinence
pour,la solution de la question soulevéepar la première exception
des Etats-Unis.
La première exception préliminaire doit donc êtrerejetée en ce
qui concerne la conclusion principale de la Suisse.
Dans la conclusion subsidiaire, la Suisse demande à la Cour de
dire et juger que les États-Unis sont tenus de soumettre le différend
à l'arbitrage ou à la conciliation.
En opposant son exception rationetemporis à la requêtedu Gouver-
nement suisse, le Gouvernement des États-unis n'a pas distingué
entre la demande principale et la demande subsidiaire de la re-
quête. Or, il est évident que la demande subsidiaire, malgré son
étroite connexité avec la demande principale, constitue cependant
une demande distincte et séparéevisant non pas le fond du différend
mais la procédure de son règlement.
Le point ici en litige est l'obligation du Gouvernement des États-
Unis de se prêter à l'arbitrage ou à la conciliation, obligation al-
léguéepar la Suisse et niée par les États-unis. Cette partie du
différend n'a pu s'élever que po~térieureme~ntà celle relative à la
restitution des avoirs de lJInterhandel aux Etats-Unis, parce que la
procédure proposéepar la Suisse et rejetée par les Etats-Unis était
conçue comme un moyen de réglerle premier différend. De fait, le
Gouvernement suisse a présenté pourla première fois cette propo-
sition dans sa note du g août 1956 et le Gouvernement des Etats-
Unis l'a rejetée par sa note du II janvier 1957.
En ce qui concerne la conclusion subsidiaire de la Suisse, la pre-
mière exception préliminaire ne peut donc êtreretenue.
Deztxièmeexceptionpréliminaire
D'aprèscette exception, ledifférendactuel, mêmes'ilestpostérieur
à la date de la déclaration des Etats-Unis, s'est élevéavant le
28 juille1948, date d'entréeenvigueurde la déclaration de la Suisse.
L'argument exposédans les exceptions préliminaires est le suivant : that they werestill waiting for the Alliesto furnish their documents
which the Swiss Compensation Office was ready to discuss with
the Allied experts."
The Court cannot see in these discussions between the Allied and
Swiss officials a dispute between Governments which had already
arisen with regard to the restitution of the assets claimed by Inter-
handel in the United States; the facts and situations which have
led to a dispute must not be confused with the dispute itself; the
documents relating to this collaboration between the Allied and
Swiss authorities for the purpose of liquidating German property
in Switzerland are not relevant to the solution of the question
raised by the first objection of the United States.
The First Preliminary Objection must therefore be rejected so
far as the principal submission of Switzerland is concerned.
In the Alternative Submission, Switzerland asks the Court to
adjudge and declare that the United States is under an obligation
to submit the dispute to arbitration or conciliation.
In raising its objection ratione temporis to the Application of the
Swiss Government, the Government of the United States has not
distinguished between the principal claim andthe alternative claim
in the Application. It is, however, clear that the alternative claim,
in spite of its close connection with the principal claim, is never-
theless a separate and distinct claim relating not to the substance
of the dispute, but to the procedure for its settlement.
The point here in dispute is the obligation of the Government
of the United States to submit to arbitration or to conciliation an
obligation the existence of which is asserted by Switzerland and
denied by the United States. This part of the dispute can only have
arisen subsequently to that relating to the restitution of Inter-
handel's assets in the United States, since the procedure proposed
by Switzerland and rejected by the United States was conceived
as a means of settling the first dispute. In fact, the Swiss Govern-
ment put fonvard this proposa1 for the first time in its Note of
-4ugust gth, 1956, and the Government of the United States reject-
ed it by its Note of January th, 1957.
With regard to the Alternative Submission of Switzerland, the
First Preliminary Objection cannot therefore be upheld.
Second P~eliminary Objection
According to this Objection, the present dispute, even if it is
subsequent to the date of the Declaration of the United States,
arose before July 28th, 1948, the date of the entry into force of
the Swiss Declaration. The argument set out in the Preliminary
Objections is as follows: «La déclaration des États-Unis, qui est entrée en vigueur le
26août 1946, contenait la clause limitant la compétencede la Cour
aucune clause de ce genre dans la déclaration suisse qui est entrée
en vigueur le 28 jujllet 1948. Mais ...le principe de réciprocité
exige qu'entre les Etats-Unis et la Suisse la compétence de la
Cour soit limitée aux différendsnésaprès le 28 juillet1948...Dans
le cas contraire, la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour aurait un
effet rétroacti))
Il a été soutenu notamment, à propos des différendsnés après le
26 août 1946 mais avant le 28 juillet1948, que « La Suisse, en tant
que défenderesse, aurait pu invpquer le principe de réciprocité et
alléguer que, de mêmeque les Etats-Unis ne sont pas tenus d'a&-
mettre la compétence de la Cour au sujet des différends ayant pris
naissance avant leur acceptation, la Suisse, elle non plus, ne peut
êtretenue d'accepter la compétence de la Cour au sujet des diffé-
rends survenus avant son acceptation. ))
La réciprocité en matière de déclarations portant acceptation de
la juridiction obligatoire dela Cour permet à une partie d'invoquer
une réserve à cette acceptation qu'elle n'a pas exprimée dans sa
propre déclaration mais que l'autre partie a exprimée dans la sienne.
Par exemple, la Suisse, qui n'a pas exprimé dans sa déclaration de
réserve ratione temporis, alors que les Etats-Unis n'ont accepté la
juridiction obligatoire que pour les différends postérieurs au
26 août 1946, pourfait, si elle était défenderesse, invoque; par réci-
procité contre les Etats-Unis la réserve américaine si les Etats-Unis
tentaient de porter devant la Cour un différend avec la Suisse qui
aurait pris naissance avant le 26 août 1946. Tel est l'effet de la
réciprocité en la matière. La réciprocité permet à l'État qui a
accepté le plus largement la juridiction de la Cour de se prévaloir
des réserves à cette acceptation énoncéespar l'autre partie, Là
s'arrête l'effetde la réciprocité. Elle ne saurait autoriser un Etat,
en l'espèce les Etats-Unis, à se prévaloir d'une restriction dont
l'autre partie, la Suisse, n'a pas affecté sa propre déclaration.
La deuxième exce~tion rél liminairedoit donc êtrerejetée en ce
qui concerne la conclusion principale de la Suisse.
La constatation déjà faite que le différend relatif à l'obligation
desEtats-Unis de se prêter à l'arbitrage ou à la conciliationn'a pris
naissance qu'en 1957 conduit à rejeter la deuxième exception
préliminaire en ce qui concerne également la conclusion subsidiaire
de la Suisse.
* * *
Quatrièmeexceptionpréliminaire
Étant donné que la quatrième exception préliminaire des États-
Unis se rapporte à la compétence de la Cour en l'espèce, la Cour
l'examinera avant la troisième exception, qui est une exception
21 "The United States Declaration, whichwas effectiveAugustz6th,
1946, contained the clause limiting the Court's jurisdiction to
disputes 'hereafter arising', while no such qualifying clause is
contained in the SwissDeclaration which was effective July 28th,
194% But the reciprocity principle ... requires that as between
the United States and Switzerland the Court's jurisdiction be
limited to disputes arising after July 28th, 1948 ...Othenvise,
retroactive effect would be given to the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court."
In particular, it was contended with regard to disputes arising
after August 26th, 1946, but before July 28th, 1948, that "Switzer-
land, as a Respondent, could have invoked the principle of reci-
procity and claimed that, in the same way as the United States is
not bound to accept the Court's jurisdiction with respect to disputes
arising before its acceptance, Switzerland, too, could not be re-
quired to accept the Court's jurisdiction in relation to disputes
arising before its acceptance."
Reciprocity in the case of Declarations accepting the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court enables a Partyto invoke a reservation to
that acceptance which it has not expressed in its own Declaration
but which the other Party has expressed in its Declaration. For
example, Switzerland, which has not expressed in its Declaration
any reservation rationetemporis,while the United Stateshas accept-
ed the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court only in respect of
disputes subsequent to August 26th, 1946, might, if in the position
of Respondent, invoke by virtue of reciprocity against the United
Statesthe American reservation if the United Statesattempted to
refer to the Court a dispute with Switzerland which had arisen
before August 26th, 1946. This is the effect of reciprocity in this
connection. Reciprocity enables the State which has made the
wider acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court to rely upon the
reservations to the acceptance laid down by the other Party. There
the effect of reciprocity ends. It cannot justify a State, in this
instance, the United States, in relying upon a restriction which the
other Party, Switzerland, has not included in its own Declaration.
The Second Preliminary Objection must therefore be rejected
so far as the Principal Submission of Switzerland is concerned.
Since it has already been found that the dispute concerning the
obligation of the United States to agree to arbitration or conciliation
did not arise until 1957, the Second Preliminary Objection must
also be rejected so far as the Alternative Submission of Switzerland
is concerned.
ii: * *
Fourth Preliminary Objection
Since the Fourth P,reliminary Objection of the United States
relates to the jurisdiction of the Court in the present case, the
Court will proceed to consider it before the Third Objection whichd'irrecevabilité. Cette quatrième exception consiste en réalitéen
deux exceptions de caractère différent et de portée inégale. La
Cour examinera d'abord la partie b) de cette exception.
Le Gouvernement des États-unis soutient que «la Cour est
incompétente pour connaître ou décider de toute question soulevée
par la requête oule mémoire du Gouvernement suisse concernant la
saisie et la rétention des actions sous séquestre de la GeneralAnili~ie.
and Film Corporation, pour le motif que ces mesures rejèvent, selon
le droit international, de la compétence nationale des Etats-Unis n.
Pour contester devant la Coyr la saisie et la rétention desdites
actions par les autorités des Etats-Unis, le Gouvernement suisse
invoque l'Accord de Washington et le droit international commun.
Pour déterminer si l'examen des titres ainsi invoqué: échappe à la
compétence de la Cour pour le motif alléguépar les Etats-Unis, la
Cour s'inspirera de ce qu'a fait la Cour permanente de Justice inter-
nationale en présence d'une contestation analogue dans son avis
consultatif sur les Décretsde nationalitépromz~lguésen Tunisie et
au Maroc (SérieB, no 4). En conséquence, la Cour n'entend pas, en
la présente phase de la procédure, apprécier la validité des titres
invoqués par le Gouvernement suisse ni se prononcer sur leur
interprétation, ce qui serait aborder le fond du différend. Elle se
bornera à rechercher si les titres invoqués par le Gouvernement
suisse permettent la conclusion provisoire qu'ils peuvent êtreperti-
nents en l'espèce et, dans ce cas, à rechercher si les questions rela-
tives àlavalidité et àl'interprétation de ces titres sont desquestions
de droit international.
En ce qui concerne la conclusion principale, à savoir que le Gou-
vernement des Etats-Unis est tenu de restituer les avoirs de l'Inter-
handel situés aux États-Unis, le Gouvernement suisse invoque
IIarticle IV de l'Accord de Washington. Le Gouvernement des
Etats-Unis soutient que cet Accord ne vise que les biens allemands
en Suisse et que l'article IV cest dénué de toute pertinence en
l'espèce 1).
Par l'article IV de cet accord international, les États-Unis ont
assumé l'obligation de débloquer les avoirs suisses aux Etats-Unis.
Les Parties sont en désaccord sur la signification du mot «déblo-
quer ))et des mots (avoirs suisses 1).Interpréter ces termes est un
point de droit international et ce point affecte le fond de l'affaire.
Au présent stade de la procédure, il suffit à la Cour de constater que
l'article IV de l'Accord de Washington peut êtrepertinent pour la
solution du présent différend et que son interprétation relève du
droit international.
Le Gouvernement des États-~nis soutient que, d'après le droit
international, la saisie et la rétention de biens ennemis en temps de is an objection to admissibility. This Fourth Objection really
consists of two objections which are of different character and of
unequal scope. The Court will deal in the first place with part (b)
of this Objection.
The Government of the United States submits "that there is no
jurisdiction in this Court to hear or determine any issues raised
by the Swiss Application or Memorial concerning the seizure and
retention of the vested shares of General Aniline and Film Cor-
poration, for the reason that such seizure and retention are,
according to international law, matters within the domestic juris-
diction of the United States".
In challenging before the Court the seizure and retention of these
shares by the authorities of the United States, the Swiss Govern-
ment invokes the Washington Accord and general international law.
In order to determine whether the examination of the grounds
thus invoked is excluded from the junsdiction of the Court for the
reason alleged by the United States, the Court will base itself on
the course followed by the Permanent Court of International
Justice in its Advisory Opinion concerning Nationality Decrees
issued in Tunis and Morocco (Series B, No. 4), when dealing with
a similar divergence of view. Accordingly, the Court does not, at
the present stage of the proceedings, intend to assess the validity
of the grounds invoked by the Swiss Government or to give an
opinion on their interpretation, since that would be to enter upon
the merits of the dispute. The Court will confine itself to considenng
whether the grounds invoked by the Swiss Government are such
asto justify the provisional conclusion that they may be of relevance
in this case and, ifso, whether questions relating to the validity and
interpretation of those grounds are questions of international law.
With regard to its principal Submission that the Government of
the United States is under an obligation to restore the assets of
Interhandel in the United States, the Swiss Government invokes
Article IV of the Washington Accord. The Government of the
United States contends that this Accord relates only to German
property in Switzerland, and that Article IV 'lis of no relevance
whatever in the present dispute".
By Article IV of this international agreement, the United States
has assumed the obligation to unblock Swiss assets in the United
States. The Parties arein disagreement with regard to the meaning
of the term "unblock" and the term "Swiss assets". The inter-
pretation of these terms is a question of international law which
affects the merits of the dispute. At the present stage of the pro-
ceedings it is sufficient for the Court to note that Article IV of the
Washington Accord may be of relevance for the solution of the
present dispute and that its interpretation relates to international
law.
The Government of the United States submits that according
to international law the seizure and retention of enemy property
22guerre relèvent de la compétence nationale des États-~nis et ne
sont sujettes à aucun contrôle internat-onal. Toutes les autorités
et les décisions judiciaires citéespar les Etats-Cnis parlent de biens
ennemis; mais le problème est justement de savoir si les avoirs de
1'Interhandel sont des biens ennemis ou neutres. En présence d'une
contestation formelle,fondéesur lesprincipes du droit international,
de la part d'yn Etat neutre qui prend fait et cause pour son ressor-
tissant, les Etats-Unis ne sont pas fondés à dire que leur décision
est définitive et ne saurait êtrecontestée; c'est un problème qui,
malgré le caractère américain de la sociétédont 1'Interharidel
détient les actions, doit êtrerésolu à la lumière des principes et des
règles du droit international qui régissent les rapports entre les
belligérants et les neutres en temps de guerre.
Dans sa conclusion subsidiaire, le Gouvernement suisse demande
à la Cour de dire et juger que les Etats-Gnis sont tenus de soumettre
le différend à l'arbitrage ou à la conciliation. Le Gouvernement
suisse invoque l'article VI de l'Accord de Washington ainsi conçu:
((S'il devait s'élever des divergences d'opinion au sujet de l'appli-
cation ou de l'interprétation de présent Accord et si ces divergences
ne pouvaient êtrerésolues autrement, il serait fait appel à l'arbi-
trage. » Il invoque également leTraitéd'arbitrage et de conciliation
conclu le 16février1931entre la Suisse et les Etats-Unis. L'article 1
de ce Traité dispose: ((Tout différend, de quelque nature qu'il soit,
qui viendrait à s'élever entre les parties contractantes, sera, en
cas d'échec des procédésdiplomatiques ordinaires, soumis à l'arbi-
trage ou à la conciliation, suivant ce que décideront alors les par-
ties contractantes. »L'interprétation et l'application de ces dispo-
sitions visant l'arbitrage ou la conciliation comportent des questions
de droit international.
La quatrième exception préliminaire dans sa partie b) doit donc
êtrerejetée.
La partie a) de la quatrième exception tend à ce que la Cour se
déclare incompétente pour examiner la requêtedu Gouvernement
suisse pour,le motif que la vente ou la disposition par le Gouverne-
ment des Etats-Unis des actions de la GAF plac5es sous séquestre
comme biens ennemis (ont étédéfiniespar les Etats-Unis d'Amé-
rique, en vertu du paragraphe b) des réserves attachées, à l'accep-
tation de la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour par les Etats-Unis,
Gomme relevant essentiellement de la compétence nationale des
Etats-Unis ».Les exceptions préliminaires déclarent que: ((Ce refus
s'applique à toutes les questions soulevées dans la requête et le
mémoirede la Confédération suisse (y compris les questions soule-
véespar le Traité conclu entre la Suisse et les Etats-Unis en 1931et
l'Accord de Washington de 1946) », mais elles ajoutent: ((pour
autant que la décisionprise au sujet de ces questions affecterait la
vente ou la disposition des actions ».Et immédiatement elles pré-
cisent: ((Toutefois, la décision prise aux termes du paragraphe b) INTERHANDEL CASE (JVDGMEXT OF 21 III j9) 25
in time of war are matters within the domestic jurisdiction of the
United States and are not subject to any international supervision.
A11the authorities and judicial decisions cited by the United States
refer to enemy property; but the whole question is whether the
assets of Interhandel are enemy or neutral property. There having
been a formal challenge based on principles of international law
by a neutral State which has adopted the cause of its national, it is
not open to the United States to Say that their decision is final and
not open to challenge; despite the American character of the
Company, the shares of which are held by Interhandel, this is a
matter which must be decided in the light of the principles and rules
of international law governing the relations between belligerents
and neutrals in time of war.
In its alternative Submission, the Swiss Government requests
the Court to adjudge and declare that the Vnited States is under
an obligation to submit the dispute to arbitration or conciliation.
The Swiss Government invokes Article VI of the Washington
Accord, which provides: "In case differences of opinion arise with
regard to the application or interpretation of this Accord which
cannot be settled in any other way, recourse shall be had to arbi-
tration." It also invokes theTreaty of Arbitration and Conciliation
between Switzerland and the United States, dated February 16th,
1931. Article 1 of this Treaty provides: "Every dispute arising
between the Contracting Parties, of whatever nature it may be,
shall, when ordinary diplornatic proceedings have failed, be sub-
mitted to arbitration or to conciliation, as the Contracting Parties
may at the time decide." The interpretation and application of
these provisions relating to arbitration and conciliation involve
questions of international law.
Part (b) of the Fourth Preliminary Objection must therefore be
rejected.
Part (a) of the Fourth Objection seeks a finding from the Court
that it is without jurisdiction to entertain the Applicationof the
SwissGovernment,for the reason that the saleor disposition by the
Government of the United States of the shares of the GAF which
have been vested as enemy property "has been determined by the
United States of America, pursuant to paragraph (b) of the Con-
ditions attached to this country's acceptance of this Court's juris-
diction, to be a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of this country". The Preliminary Objections state that: "Such
declination encompasses al1 issues raised in the Swiss Application
and Memorial (including issues raised by the Swiss-United States
Treaty of 1931 and the Washington Accord of 1946)", but they
add: "in so far as the determination of the issues would affect the
sale or disposition of the shares". And they immediately go on to
Say: "However, the determination pursuant to paragraph (b) of the
Conditions attached to this country's acceptance of the Court'sdes réserves attachées à l'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire
de la Cour par les Etat~-~nis ne concerne que la vente ou la dispo-
sition des avoirs.))
En plaidoirie, l'agent des États-Unis a continué à soutenir que la
portée de la partie a) de la quatrième exception était limitée à la
vente et disposition des actions. En mêmetemps, tout en insistant
sur le fait que la voie des recours internes était de nouveau ouverte
à1'Interhaqdel et qu'en attendant la décision définitive destribu-
naux des Etais-Unis les actions litigieuses ne pouvaient pas être
vendues, il a déclaré à plusieurs reprises que la partie a) de la
quatrième exception a perdu toute importance pratique, qu'elle
«n'a plus guère qu'une portée académique » et qu'elle est «some-
what qnoot ».
Bien que l'agent des États-Unis ait maintenu cette exception
jusqu'à la fin des plaidoiries, il apparaît àla Cour qu'ainsi présentée,
la partiea) de la quatrième exception ne s'applique qu'à la demande
du Gouvernement suisse relatjve à la restitution des avoirs de
1'Interhandel séquestrésaux Etats-Unis. Eu égard à la décision
de la Cour au sujet de la troisième exception préliminaire des Etats-
Unis, décision dont l'énoncéva suivre, il apparaît à la Cour que la
partie a) de la quatrième exception préliminaire est sans objet au
stade actuel de la procédure.
Troisièmeexception préliminaire
La troisième exception préliminaire demande à la Cour de se
déclarer «incompétente pour connaître ou décider des questions
soulevées par la requête et le mémoire du Gouvernement suisse,
pour le motif que lJInterhandel, dont le Gouvernement suisse
épouse la cause, n'a pas utilisé les recours internesdont il disposait
devant les tribunaux des Etats-Unis 1).
Bien que visant la compétence de la Cour, cette exception doit
êtreconsidérée comme dirigéecontre la recevabilité de la requête
du Gouvernement suisse. En effet, par sa nature, elle se présente
comme un moyen qui deviendrait sansobjet au cas où serait remplie
la condition d'é~uisement réala abledes recours internes.
La Cour a indiquédans quelles conditions le Gouvernement suisse,
partant de l'idée que lJInterhandel avait été définitivement
déboutédevantlestribunaux des Etats-Unis, a cru pouvoir introduire
l'instance par sa requête du 2 octqbre 1957. Cependant, la décision
rendue par la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis le 14 octobre 1957, à
la demande de 1'Interhandel présentéele 6 août 1957, a accordéun
zetritof certiorariet réintég1'Interhandel dans ses droits de procé-
dure. Puis, l'arrêtde cette Cour en date du 16 juin 1958 a casséla
décisionde la Cour d'appel déboutant lJInterhandel de son action
et renvoyé l'affaire devant la District Cozwt.L'Interhandel pouvaitcompulsory jurisdiction is made only as regards the sale or dis-
position of the assets."
During the oral arguments, the Agent for the United States
continued to maintain that the scope of part (a) of the Fourth
Objection was limited to the sale and disposition of the shares.
At the same time, while insisting that local remedies were once
more available to Interhandel and that, pending the final decision
of the Courts of the United States, the disputed shares could not
be sold, he declared on several occasions that part (a) of the Fourth
Objection has lost practical significance, that "it has become
somewhat academic", and that it is "somewhat moot".
Although the Agent for the United States maintained the Objec-
tion throughout the oral arguments, it appears to the Court that,
thus presented, part (a) of the Fourth Objection only applies to
the claim of the Swiss Government regarding the restitution of the
assets of Interhandel which have been vested in the United States.
Having regard to the decision of the Court set out below in respect
of the Third Preliminary Objection of the United States, it appears
to the Court that part (a) of the Fourth Preliminary Objection is
without object at the present stage of the proceedings.
Titird Preliminary Objection
The Third Preliminary Objection seeks a finding that "there is
no jurisdiction in this Court to hear or determine the matters raised
by the Swiss Application and Memorial, for the reason that Inter-
handel, whose case Switzerland is espousing, has not exhausted the
local remedies available to it in the United States courts".
Although framed as an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court,
this Objection must be regarded as directed against the admissibility
of the Application of the Swiss Government. Indeed, by its nature
it is to be regarded as a plea which would become devoid of object
if the requirement of the prior exhaustion of local remedies were
fulfilled.
The Court has indicated inwhat conditions the SwissGovernment,
basing itself on the idea that Interhandel's suit had been finallÿ
rejected in the United States courts, considered itself entitled to
However, the decision given by the Supreme Court of the United 1957.
States on October 14th, 1957, on the application of Interhandel
made on August 6th, 1957, granted a writ of certiorari and re-
admitted Interhandel into the suit. The judgment of that Court on
June 16th, 1958, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals
dismissing Interhandel's suit and remanded the case to the District
2427 AFFAIRE DE L'IXTERHANDEL (ARRÊT DU 21 III 59)
désormaisse prévaloir de nouveau des moyens prévuspar le Trading
with theE~zemyAct et chercher à obtenir la re-itutionde ses actions
par une procédure devant les tribunaux des Etats-Unis. Çon action
est actuellement en cours devant les tribunaux des Etats-Unis.
La Cour doit tenir compte de la situation ainsi créée.
La règle selon laquelle les recours internes doivent êtreépuisés
avant qu'une procédure internationale puisse êtreengagéeest une
règle bien établie du droit international coutumier; elle a étégéné-
ralement observéedans les cas où un Etat prend fait et cause pour
s9n ressortissant dont les droits auraient étélésésdans un autre
Etat en violation du droit international. Avant de recourir à la
juridicfion internationale, il a étéconsidéré enpareil cas nécessaire
que 1'Etat où la lésion a étécommise puisse y remédier par ses
propres moyens, dans le cadre de son ordre juridique interne.
Cette règle s'impose à plus forte raison quand les procédures inter-
nes sont en cours, comme c'est le cas pour 1'Interhandel et quand
les deux actions, celle de la société suissedevant les tribunaux des
Etats-Unis et celle du Gouvernement suisse devant la Cour dans
sa conclusion principale, visent à obtenir le mêmerésultat: la resti-
tution des avoirs de 1'Interhandel séquestrésaux Etats-Unis.
Le Gouvernement suisse ne conteste pas la règle qui subordonne
l'action judiciaire internationale à l'épuisement préalable des
recours .internes, mais il soutient que l'on est en présenced'un cas
où une dérogation à la règle est autorisée par la règleelle-même.
La Cour n'estime pas nécessaire de s'arrêter à l'affirmation du
Gouvernement suisse d'après laquelle ccles Etats-Unis eux-mêmes
ont admis que 1'Interhandel avait épuisé les recours devant les
tribunaux americains ».Il est vrai que les représentants du Gouver-
nement des Etats-Unis avaient émis cette opinion à plusieurs
reprises et notamment dans l'aide-mémoire annexé à la note du
secrétaire d'Etat du II janvier 1957. Cette opinion reposait sur
une appréciation qui s'est révélée mal fondée.En réalité,la procé-
dure que 1'Interhandel avait introduite devant les tribunaux des
Etats-Unis était alors en cours.
Cependant, le Gouvernement suisse oppose à la troisième excep-
tion d'autres considérations qu'il convient d'examiner.
En premier lieu, la règle ne s'appliquerait pas pour la raison que
la mesure dirigéecontre 1'Interhandel et considérée commecontraire
au droit international est une mesure prisernon pas par une aiiitorité
subalterne mais par le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis. Cependant, la
Cour-doit attacher une importance décisiveau fait que la législation
des Etats-Unis donne aux intéressésqui estiment qu'ils ont pu être
privés de leurs droits par les mesures prises en vertu du Trading
with the EnerizyAct des remèdes adéquats pour la défensede leurs
droits contre le pouvoir exécutif.Court. It was thenceforth open to Interhandel to avail itself again
of the remedies available to it under the Trading with the Enemy
Act, and to seek the restitution of its shares by proceedings in the
United States courts. Its suit isstill pending in the United States
courts. The Court must have regard to the situation thus created.
The rule that local remedies must be exhausted before inter-
national proceedings may be instituted is a well-established rule
of customaryinternational law; the rule has been generally observed
in cases in which a State has adopted the cause of its national whose
rights are claimed to have been disregarded in another State in
violation of international law. Before resort may be had to an
international court in such a situation, it has been considered
necessary that the State where the violation occurred should have
an opportunity to redress it byits own means, within the framework
of its owndomestic legal system. A fortio theirule must be observed
when domestic proceedings are pending, as in the case of Inter-
handel, and when the two actions, that of the Swiss Company in
the United States courts and that of the Swiss Government in
this Court, in its principal Submission, are designed to obtain the
same result: the restitution of the assets of Interhandel vested in
the United States.
The Swiss Government does not challenge the rule which requires
that international judicial proceedings may only be instituted
following the exhaustion of local remedies, but contends that the
present case is one in which an exception to this rule is authorized
by the rule itself.
The Court does not consider it necessary to dwell upon the
assertion of the Swiss Government that "the United States itself
hasadmitted that Interhandel had exhausted the remedies available
in the Cnited States courts". It is true that the representatives of
the Government of the United States expressed this opinion on
several occasions, in particular in the memorandum annexed to the
Note of the Secretary of State of January th, 1957. This opinion
was based upon a view which has proved unfounded. In fact, the
proceedings which Interhandel had instituted before the courts of
the United States were then in progress.
However, the Swiss Government has raised against the Third
Objection other considerations which require examination.
In the first place, it is contended that the rule is not applicable
for the reason that the measure taken against Interhandel and
regarded as contrary to international Iaw is a measure which was
taken, not by a subordinate authority but by the Government of
the United States. However, the Court must attach decisive
importance to the fact that the laws of the United States make
available to interested perçons who consider that they have been
deprived of their rights by measures taken in pursuance of the
Trading with the Enemy Act, adequate remedies for the defence
of their rights against the Executive.
25 Il a étéégalement soutenu de la part du Gouvernement suisse
que, dans les procedures fondéessur le Trading with theEnemy Act,
les tribunaux des Etats-Unis ne sont pas en mesure de statuer selon
les règles du droit international et que la Cour suprême,dans sa
décision du 16 juin 1958, n'a fait aucune allusion aux nombreux
problèmes de droit international qui, selon l'avis du Gouvernement
suisse, constituent l'objet du présent litige, Mais la jurisprudence
américaine atteste que les tribunaux des Etats-Unis sont compé-
tents pour appliquer dans leurs décisions le droit international
quand il y a lieu. Dans le cas actuel, quand l'affaire a étésoumise
à la Cour, la procédure qui s'était dérouléedevant ces tribunaux
n'avait pas atteint le stade de la discussion au fond, où les consi-
dérations de droit international auraient pu êtreutilement invo-
quées.
Les Parties oqt discutéla question de la force obligatoire pour les
tribunaux des Etats-Unis des actes internationaux qui, selon la
pratique des Etats-Unis, constituent la catégorie des accords appe-
lés Executive Agreements; l'Accord de Washington appartiendrait
à cette catégorie. Au stade actuel de l'affaire, la Cour n'a pas à
exprimer d'opinion à ce sujet. D'autre part, on ne saurait, avant la
décision définitive destribunaux nationaux, prévoir la base qu'ils
adopteront pour leur jugement.
Enfin, le Gouvernement suisse a insisté tout particulièrement sur
l'argument d'après lequel la conclusion principale de la Suisse se
caractérise comme une demande d'exécuter la décision rendue le
5 janvier 1948 par l'Autorité suisse de recours et fondéesur l'Accord
de Washington, décision considéréepar ce Gouvernement comme
décision judiciaire internationale.« Quand une décisioninternatio-
nale n'a pas étéexécutée,il n'y a pas de juridictions internes à
épuiser,car ledommage a étécausédirectement à1'Etat lésé . Il a en
cpxéquence soutenu que l'inexécution de cette décision par les
Etats-Unis constitue une violation directe du droit international,
lésant immédiatement les droits de la Suisse en sa qualité d'Etat
demandeur. La Cour observe en premier lieu qu'exécuter une dé-
cision, c'est mettre en exécution le dispositif de celle-ci. Or, dans le
dispositif de sa décision,l'Autorité suisse de recours« Arrête: 1) le
recours est admis et la décisionsoumettant la recourante au blocage
des biens allemands en Suisse est annulée ...»La décisionde l'Au-
torité suisse de recours porte sur le déblocage des avoirs del'Inter-
handel en Suisse; la demande suisse a pour objet la restitution des
avoirs de lJInterhandel aux Etats-Unis. Sans préjuger la valeur des
arguments que le Gouvernement suisse cherche ou chercherait à
tirer de cette décision,la Cour se borneà constater que lesdits argu-
ments n'enlèvent pas au différend qui lui est soumis le caractère
d'un différend dans lequel le Gouvernement suisse se présente
comme épousant la cause de son ressortissant, l'Interhande1, en vue
d'obtenir la restitutjon à cette sociétéd'avoirs séquestrés par le
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis. C'est précisément là une situation
26 It has also been contended on behalf of the Swiss Government
that in the proceedings based upon the Trading with the Enemy
-kt, the United States courts are not in a position to adjudicate
in accordance with the rules of international law and that the
Supreme Court, in its decision of June 16th, 1958, made no reference
to the many questions of international law which, in the opinion
of the Swiss Government, constitute the subject of the present
dispute. But the decisions of the United States courts bear witness
to the iact that United States courts are competent to apply
international law in their decisions when necessary. In the present
case, when the dispute was brought to this Court, the proceedings
in the United States courts had not reached the merits, in which
co.sid.rations of international law could have been profitably
relied upon.
The Parties have argued the question of the binding force before
the courts of the United States of international instruments which,
according to the practice of the United States, fa11within the
category of Executive Agreements; the Washington Accord is said
to belong to that category. At the present stage of the procqedings
it is not necessary for the Court to express an opinion on the matter.
Neither is it practicable, before the final decision of the domestic
courts, to anticipate what basis they may adopt for their judgment.
Finally, the Swiss Government laid special stress on the argument
that the character of the principal Submission of Switzerland is
that of a claim for the implementation of the decision given on
January 5th, 1948, by the Swiss Authority of Review and based
on the Washington Accord, a decision which the Swis Government
regards as an international judicial decision. "When an international
decision has not been executed, there are no local remedies to
exhaust, for the injury has been caused directly to the injured
State." It has therefore contended that the failure by the United
States to implement the decision constitutes a direct breach of
international law, causing immediate injury to the rights of Switzer-
land asthe Applicant State. The Court notes in the first place that
to implement a decision is to apply its operative part. In the opera-
tive part of its decision, however, the Swiss Authority of Review
"Decrees: (1)that the Appeal is sustained and the decision sub-
jecting the appellant to the blocking of German property in Switzer-
land is annulled ..." The decision of the Swiss Authority of
Review relates to the unblocking of the assets of Interhandel in
Switzerland; the Swiss claim is designed to secure the restitution
of the assets of Interhandel in the United States. Without prejudg-
ing the validity of any arguments which the Swiss Government
seeks or may seek to base upon that decision, the Court would
confine itself to observing that such arguments do not deprive the
dispute which has been referred to it of the character of a dispute
in which the Swiss Government appears as having adopted the
cause of its national, Interhandel, for the purpose of securing thequi donne lieu àl'application de la règlede.lJépuisementdes recours
internes.
Pour toutes ces raisons, la Cour retient la troisième exception
préliminaire en ce qui concerne la conclusionprincipale de la Suisse.
Dans sa demande subsidiaire, le Gouvernement suisse prie la
Cour de se déclarer compétente pour décider si les Etats-Gnis sont
tenus de soumettre le différend à l'arbitrage ou à la conciliation.
Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis soutient que cette demande,
sans être identique à la demande principale, tend au mêmebut,
à savoir la restitution des avoirs de 1'Interhandel aux États-unis,
et que pour ce motif la troisième exception s'y applique également.
Il soutient que la règlede l'épuisement des recours internes s'appli-
que à chacune des conclusions principales et subsidiaires qui solli-
citent de la Cour ((un arrêt déclarant qu'un autre tribunal inter-
national est compétent pour trancher cette mêmequestion, bien
qu'elle fasse actuellement et simultanément l'objet d'une procédure
active devant les juridictions des Etats-Unis 1).
La Cour estime qu'un seul et mêmeintérêt,celui de1'Interhandel
qui a dicté à celle-ci l'introduction et la reprise d'une procédure
devant les tribunaux des États-Unis, a conduit le Gouvernement
suisse à entamer une procédure internationale. Cet intérêt est
à la base de la présente réclamation et devrait déterminer la portée
de l'action intentée devant la Cour par le Gouvernement suisse,
dans sa forme subsidiaire aussi bien que dans sa forme principale.
D'autre part, les motifs sur lesquels se fonde la règlede l'épuisement
des recours internes sont les mêmesqu'il s'agisse d'une cour inter-
nationale, d'un tribunal arbitral ou d'une commission de concilia-
tion. Dans ces conditions, la Cour estime que toute distinction en
ce qui concerne la règle de l'épuisement des recours internes entre
les diverses demandes ou entre les diverses juridictions est sans
fondement.
Elle retient donc la troisième exception préliminaire en ce qui
concerne également la conclusion subsidiaire de la Suisse.
Par ces motifs,
par dix voix contre cinq,
rejette la première exception préliminaire du Gouvernement des
Etats-Unis d'Amérique ;
à l'unanimité,
rejette la deuxième exception préliminaire;
par dix voix contre cinq,
dit qu'il n'y a pas lieu de prononcer surla partie a) de la quatrième
exception préliminaire ;
27restitution to that Company of assets vested by the Government of
the United States. This is one of the very cases which give rise to
the application of the rule of the exhaustion of local remedies.
For al1 these reasons, the Court upholds the Third Preliminary
Objection so far as the principal Submission of Switzerland is
concerned.
In its alternative claim, the Swiss Government asks the Court to
declare its competence to decide whether the United States is under
an obligation to submit the dispute to arbitration or conciliation.
The Government of the United States contends that this claim,
while not identical with the principal claim, is designed to secure
the same object, namely, the restitution of the assets of Interhandel
in the United States, and that for this reason the Third Objection
applies equally to it. It maintains that the rule of the exhaustion
of local remedies applies to each of the principal and alternative
Submissions which seek "a ruling by this Court to the effect that
some other international tribunal now has jurisdiction to determine
that very same issue, even though that issue is at the same time
being actively litigated in the United States courts".
The Court considers that one interest, and one alone, that of
Interhandel, which has led the latter to institute and to resume
proceedings before the United States courts, has induced the Swiss
Government to institute international proceedings. This interest is
the basis for the present claim and shoulddetermine the scope of the
action brought before the Court by the Swiss Government in its
alternative form as well asin its principal form. On the other hand,
the grounds on which the de of the exhaustion of local remedies
is based are the same, whether in the case of an international court,
arbitral tribunal, or conciliation commission. Inthese circumstances,
the Court considers that any distinction so far as the rule of the
exhaustion of local remedies is concerned between the various
claims or between the various tribunals is unfounded.
It accordingly upholds the Third Preliminary 0-bjection also as
regards the alternative Submission of Switzerland.
For these reasons,
by ten votes to five,
rejects the First Preliminary Objection of the Government of the
United States of America;
unanimously,
rejects the Second Preliminary Objection;
by ten votes to five,
finds that it is not necessary to adjudicate on part (a) of the Fourth
Preliminary Objection;
27 par quatorze voix contre une,
rejette la partie) de la quatrième exception préliminaire;
par neuf voix contre six,
retient la troisième exception préliminaire et déclare irrecevable
la requêtedu Gouvernement de la Confédération suisse.
Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au
Palais de la Paix, à La Haye, le vingt et un mars mil neuf cent
cinquante-neuf, en trois exemplaires, dont l'un restera déposéaux
archives de la Cour et dont les autres seront transmis respective-
ment au Gpuvernement de la Confédération suisseet au Gouverne-
ment des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.
Le Président,
(Signé) Helge KLAESTAD.
Le Greffier adjoint,
(Signé) GARNIER-COIGNET.
M. BASDEVANTj,uge, declare souscrire à la décision d'irrece-
vabilité de la requête énoncéedans le dispositif de l'arrêtmais il
ajoute que sa conviction sur ce point s'est formée en suivant une
voie qui, à certains égards, diffère de celle suivie par la Cour.
S'inspirant des dispositions du Statut et du Règlement, il a pensé
que, pour apprécier la valeur des exceptions soulevées, il devait
s'attacher à l'objet du différend, non à telle ou telle demande
présentée à l'occasion du différend. Objet du différend et objet
de la demande sont expressément distingués dans l'article 32, para-
graphe 2,du Règlement. En conséquence, il s'est attaché à l'énon-
ciation de la requêteportant que celle-ci soymet à la Cour le dif-
férendse rapportant ((àla restitution par les Etats-Unis des avoir))
de 1'Interhandel. Cette indication de l'objetdu différend, confirmée
par l'examen de la correspondance, fait apparaître l'ampleur
de celui-ci, montre qu'il ne se limite pasà ce qui a pu êtredébattu
à un certain moment entre les deux Gouvernements, éclaireen consé-
quence sur la date de naissance du différendentre ceux-ci. Il a été
conduit par là à constater que le différend visépar la requête n'a
pris naissance qu'après le 28 juille1948, constatation de fait suffi-
sante pour justifier le rejet des deux premières exceptions préli-
minaires. by fourteen votes to one,
rejects part (b) of the Fourth Preliminary Objection; and
by nine votes to six,
upholds the Third Preliminary Objection and holds that the
-1pplication of the Government of the Swiss Confederation is
inadmissible.
Done in French and English, the French text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-first day of March,
one thousand nine hundred and fifty-nine, in three copies, one of
\vhich will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others
transmitted to the Government of the Swiss Confederation and the
Government of the Cnited States of America, respectively.
(Signed) Helge KLAESTAD,
President .
(Sig~zed)GARNIER-COIGNET,
Deputy-Registrar.
Judge BASDEVANT states that he concurs in the decision that
the Application is inadmissible as that decision is set forth in the
operative part of the Judgment, but he adds that his opinion on
this point was reached in a way which, in certain respects, differs
from that followed by the Court. Basing himself on the provisions
of the Statute and of the Rules of Court, he considered that, in
order to assess the validity of the objections advanced, he should
direct his attention to the subject of the dispute and not to any
particular claim put forward in connection with the dispute. The
subject of the dispute and the subject of the claim are explicitly
differentiated in Article 32, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court.
*lccordingly, he has directed his attention to the statement in the
.Application to the effect that the latter submits to the Court the
dispute relating to "the restitution by the United States of the
assets" of Interhandel. Thisindication of the subject of the dispute,
~rhich is confirmed by an examination of the correspondence,
reveals the scope of the dispute, shows that it is not limited to
whatever may have been discussed at any particular moment
between the two Governments and consequently throws a light
upon the date at \&,hichthe dispute between them arose. He was
thus led to the conclusion that the dispute to which the Appli-
cation relates did not arise until after July 28th, 1948, and this
factual finding is sufficient to justify the rejection of the first
two preliminary objections.
28 L'objet du différend lui est apparu comme justifiant, en l'espèce,
l'exigence de l'épuisement préalable des recours internes pour ce
motif que si, par ceux-ci, l1Interhandel obtient satisfaction, l'objet
du différend s'évanouit. Il s'est abstenu de compliquer le problème
en s'attachant à telle ou telle demande pouvant être présentée
à l'occasion du différend indiqué par la requête. Examinant si, en
fait, les recours internes ont été épuisés, il s'est largement inspiré
des données de fait relevées dans l'arrêt. Il a tenu compte aussi
de quelques autres: le fait qu'à la date de l'aide-mémoire du
II janvier 1957 un appel de 1'Interhandel était pendant devant les
tribunaux américains, la mention par le CO-agentsuisse(audience du
12 octobre 1957) de la demande adressée à la Cour suprême avec ce
commentaireque cette demande aboutirait, elle aussi, à une décision
négative, enfin la mention, dans les motifs de l'ordonnance de la
Cour du 24 octobre 1957, d'une instance judiciaire actuellement
pendante aux Etats-Unis.
Comme l'effet attendu d'un arrêt sur exception préliminaire est
de déterminer si la procédure sur le fond sera ou non reprise, il
aurait pu accepter de voir la Cour se borner à statuer sur la troisième
exception qu'elle a retenue. La requête étant déclaréeirrecevable,
il est mis fin par là à l'instance et toutes autres questions qui s'5-
rattachaient ne se posent plus. Il a cru néanmoins qu'il était de
son devoir de suivre la Cour dans l'examen des autres points par
elle retenus et, sur ces points, il souscrit au dispositif de l'arrêt.
M. KOJEVNIKOVj,uge, déclare se rallier à l'arrêtde la Cour en ce
qui concerne les première, deuxième, troisième et quatrième a)
exceptions préliminaires du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis. Cepen-
dant, il ne peut se rallier aux motifs de l'arrêtvisant la deuxième
exception préliminaire car, à son avis, l'arrêt aurait dû être basé
non sur la question de la réciprocité, qui est d'une très grande
importance, mais sur les circonstances de fait quiprouvent que la
nature juridique du-différend entre le Gouvernement suisse et le
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis n'a été nettement définie qu'après
le 28 juillet1948, date de l'entrée en vigueur de la déclaration
suisse.
Ensuite, M. Kojevnikov est d'avis que la troisième exception
aurait dû être retenue par la Cour, non seulement comme un moyen
visant la recevabilité de la requête, mais également en ce qui
concerne la compétence de la Cour.
Enfin, il estime que la quatrième b) exception préliminaire, vu
son contenu, n'aurait pas dû êtrerejetée mais, dans le cas présent,
29 In his view, the subject of the dispute justifies, in this case,
the requirement of the preliminary exhaustion of local remedies
on the ground that if, through them, Interhandel obtains satis-
faction, the subject of the dispute will disappear. He refrained
from complicating the problem by considering any particular
claim that might be put forward in connection with the dispute
indicated in the Application. In considering the question whether
in fact the local remedies have been exhausted, he based himself
largely on the factual data mentioned in the Judgment. He took
account also of certain other facts-the fact that, at the date of
the memorandum of January ma th,1957, an appeal by Interhandel
was pending in the American courts, the mention by the Swiss
Co-Agent (at the hearing on October ~zth, 1957) of the application
made to the Supreme Court, with the comment that that appli-
cation alsowould end in a negative decision and, finally, the mention
in the preamble of the Order of the Court of October 24th, 1957,
of a judicial proceeding then pending in the United States.
As the anticipated effect of a judgment on a preliminary ob-
jection is to determine whether the proceedings on the merits
\vil1or will not be resumed, he might have agreed that the Court
should confine itself to adjudicating on the Third Objection
which it has upheld. As the Application is declared to be
inadmissible, this puts an end to the proceedings and al1 the
other questions that were connected with them no longer arise.
He considered, nevertheless, that it was his duty to follow the
Court in the examination of the other points with which it dealt
and, on those points, he concurs in the operative part of the
Judgment .
Judge KOJEVNIKO Vtates that he concurs in the Judgment of
the Court so far as the First, Second, Third and part (a) of the
Fourth Preliminary Objections of the Government of the Tjnited
States are concerned. He is, however, unable to concur in the
reasoning of the Judgment relating to the Second Preliminary
Objection since, in his opinion, the Judgment should have been
based not on the question of reciprocity, which is of very great
importance, but upon the factual circumstances which show that
the legal character of the dispute between the Swiss Government
and the Government of the United States was clearly defined only
after July 28th, 1948, the date of the entry into force of the Swiss
Declaration.
Judge Kojevnikov is further of the opinion that the Third
Objection should have been upheld by the Court, not only as a
contention relating to the admissibility of the Application, but also
with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court.
Finally, he considers that part (b) of the Fourth Preliminary
Objection, having regard to its subject-matter, ought not to have32 AFFAIRE DE L'IXTERHA~~DEL (ARRÊT DU 21 III 59)
aurait dû être jointe au fond si la Cour n'avait pas retenu la
troisième exception.
M. CARRY,juge ad hoc, déclare regretter de ne pouvoir souscrire
aux décisions prises par la Cour sur la troisjème et la quatrième
exceptions partie a) du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis. Il déclare
se rallier d'une façon générale à l'opinion dissidente du Président
Klaestad.
Il estime qu'en tout cas la troisième exception n'aurait pas dîi
êtreretenueen tant qu'elle était opposéà la demande subsidiaire du
Gouvernement suisse relative à l'arbitrage ouà la conciliation. 11
considère que cette demande étaitnettement distincte de la demande
principale, car elle ne visait pas le fond du différend mais simple-
ment la procédure de son règlement. Par elle, la Cour était invitée
à se prononcer uniquement sur l'arbitrabilité du litige, mais non
sur l'obligation des États-Unis de restituer les avoirs d'Interhand-l.
Cette seconde question était de la compétence exclusive de la
juridiction à saisir. M. Carry en déduit que la règle relative à
l'épuisement des recours internes ne s'appliquait pas à,la demande
subsidiaire du Gouvernement suisse, car,par celle-ci,1'Etat deman-
deur tendait à obtenir devant la juridiction internationale unrésul-
tat différent de celui que tend à obtenir Interhandel devant
les tribunaux américains. Le problème de l'épuisement des recours
internes ne pouvait se poser, éventuellement,que devant le tribunal
arbitral saisi la Cour ne pouvait, à son avis, empiéter sur la com-
pétence de celui-ci.
MM. HACKWORTHC , ORDOVA\,I.7~~~~~~~~K xOO et Sir Percg-
SPENDER,juges, se prévalant du droit que leur confère l'article 57
du Statut, joignent àl'arrêtles exposés de leur opinion individuelle.
M. ZAFRULLA KHAX,TTice-Président,déclare se rallier àl'opinion
de M. Hackworth.
MM. KLAESTAD,Président, WINIARSKI, AR~IAKD-GGON,Sir
Hersch LAUTERPACHT et M. SPIROPOULOS j, ges, se prévalant du
droit que leur confère l'article57 du Statut, joignent à l'arrêt les
exposés de leur opinion dissidente.
(Paraphé)H. K.
(Paraphé)G.-C. been rejected but, in the present case, should have been joined
to the merits if the Court had not upheld the Third Objection.
M. CARRYJ ,udge ad hoc, states that he regrets that he cannot
subscribe to the decisions taken by the Court on the Third and
part (a) of the Fourth Objections of the Government of the United
States. He agrees generally with the dissenting opinion of President
Klaestad.
He considers that in any event the Third Objection should not
have been upheld in so far as it was directed against the alternative
claim of the Swiss Government relating to arbitration or conciliation.
separate and distinct from the principal
He regards that claim as
claim, since it did not relatto the merits of the dispute but only
to the procedure for its settlement. By this claim the Court was
invited to pass only upon the arbitrability of the dispute, not on
the obligation of the United States to return the assets of Inter-
handel. That latter question was within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the tribunal to be seised. It follows, in his opinion, that the
relating to the exhaustion of local remedies was not applicable to
the alternative claim of the Swiss Government, inasmuch as, by
that claim, the applicant State sought to secure from the inter-
national tribunal a result different from that which Interhandelis
seeking to obtain in the American courts. The question of exhaustion
of local remedies is one which could arise only before the arbitral
tribunal seised of the case: the Court should not, in his opinion,
encroach upon the jurisdiction of that tribunal.
Judges H.~CKWORTH C,ORDOVA W, ELLINGTOX KOOand Sir Percy
SPENDER ,vailing thernselves of the right conferred upon them
by Article 57 of the Statute, append to the Judgment of the Court
statements of theirseparate opinions.
Vice-President ZAFRULLA KHAX states that he agrees with
Judge Hackworth.
President KLAESTAD and Judges WINIARSKI,ARMAND-EGOX S,ir
Hersch LAUTERPACHT and SPIROPOULOS a,vailing themselves of the
right conferred upon them by Article 57 of the Statute, append to
the Judgment of the Court statements of their dissenting opinions.
(Initialled) H.K.
(Initialled) G.-C.
Preliminary Objections (including the text of the declarations of Judges Basdevant, Kojevnikov, Judge ad hoc Carry, Zafrulla Khan)
Judgment of 21 March 1959