Judgment of 1 July 1952

Document Number
015-19520701-JUD-01-00-EN
Document Type
Incidental Proceedings
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPO'RTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORE' OPINIONS AND ORDEWS

AMBATIELOS CASE

(GREECEv.UNITED KINGDOM)
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

JUDGMENT OF JULY lst1952

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFSET ORDONNANCES

AFFA1R.E AMBATIELOS
(GRECE c. ROYAUME-UNI)

EXCEE"ïI0N PRÉLIMINAIRE

ARRÊT DU lerJUILLE T952 This Judgmentshould be cited as fol:ows
"Ambatielos case (jurisdiction), Judgment of Jul: ~st, 1952
I.CJ.Reflorts 195p.28."

Le présent arrêt doit être cité comm: suit
«dflaire Ambatielos (compétence),Arrêtdu
I~~luillet I9:C.I. J. Reczceil19p.28.»

NOde vente:
1sdw 89 1 JULY IS~1952

JUDGMENT

AMBATIELOSCASE
(GREECE v.UNITED KINGDOM)

PRELIMINARYOBJECTION

AFFAIREAMBATIELOS
(GRÈCE c. ROYAUME-UNI)

EXCEPTION PRÉLIMINAIRE

leJUILLET 1952 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1952
July 1st
GeneralList : YEAR 1952
NO. 15

AMBATIELOS CASE

(GREECE v. UNITED KINGDOM)

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

Analysis of the Submission.~ of the Parties. to define the issues before
the C'oîirt.-Conditionproposed for the conferring of juvisdiction on the
Court as Coinnzission of Arbitrati:nunequivocal agreementof the

On~tirs.-~Vo retroartive operation of a treaty vhere no provision to this
etfrrt and no spceial reason.-Relation between the Declarationof
,July 161h, 1926, and the Tr~aty of the same date; externa1 and interîzal
rvidencc of the dl of the contvacting Parties ivhthis conn:samen
si,nnalovirs, rniificaof the 7i1holeby each of the parties, registration

of thc ~,,l~eC,itllfhc 7,eague of lVations, chavacter of the L)eclaration as
intrr~vrtati7~ provision.-lpossibility of conflict between the decision
of the Cozivt and that of the Commission of Avbitvation.-Distinction
between claims formzilated b~fore, and those not formulatbefore a
certain date not warranted by the terms of the Dec1avation.-Inter-

pvetation of tveaty provisions resulting in certain categories of disputes
remaining without means O!solution:contrary desire of the Parties.

Present : Vice-President GUERRERO,Acting President ; President
Sir Arnold MCNAIR ; judges ALVAREZB ,ASDEVANT,

HACKWORTH W, INIARSKI, ZORIEI~,KLAESTADB , ADAWI
PASHAR , EAD,HSUMO,LEVICARNEIROS ,ir Benegal RAU,
ARMAND-UGON ;M.SPIROPOULOjS u,dge ad hoc ;Registrar

HAMBRO. In the Ambatielos case,

between

the United Kingdom of Great Rritain and Northem Ireland,
represented by :
Mr. V. J. Evans, Assistant Legal Adviser of the Foreign Office,

as Agent,

assisted by :
Sir Eric Beckett, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Legal Adviçer of the Foreign
Office,

Rlr. D. H. K. Johnson, Assistant Legal Adviser of the Foreign
Office,
Mr. J. E. S. Fawcett, D.S.C., Member of the English Bar,

as Counsel,

and
the Kingdom oi Greece,
represented by :

31.N. G. Lély,Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten-
tiary of H.M. the King of the Hellenes in the Netherlands,

assisted by:

The Right Honourable Sir Hartley Shawcross, Q.C., M.P., former
Attorney-General of the United Kingdom,
Mr. C. J. Colombes, Q.C., LL.D., llember of the English Bar,
M. Henri Rolin, Professor of Intemational Law at Brussels

University, former President of the Belgian Senate,
RI.Jason Stavropoulos, Legal Adviser of the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs,
as Counsel,

composed as above,

adjudicating on the Preliminary Objection of the Government of
the United Kingdom,

deliversthefollowing Jzcdgment :
8 JUDGMENT OF I VII 52 (AMBATIELOS CASE)
30
On April gth, 1951, the Greek Minister in the Netherlands, duly
authorized by his Governnient, filed in the Registry an Application
instituting proceedings before the Court against the United King-

dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning the claim
relating to the rights of a Greek shipowner, Nicolas Eustache
Ambatielos, alleged to have suffered considerable loss in conse-
quence of a contract which he concluded in 1919 with the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom (represented by the Ministry of
Shipping) for the purchase of nine steamships which were then
under construction, and in consequence of certain adverse judicial
decisions in the English Courts in connection therewith.
The Hellenic Application refers to the Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation between Greece and Great Britain, signed at Athens on

November ~oth, 1886, and to the Treaty of Commerce and Naviga-
tion between the same Contracting Parties signed at London on
July 16th, 1926, including the Declaration. The Application
requests the Court :

"To declare that it has jurisdiction :
To adjudge and declare ....
1. That the arbitral procedure referred to in the Final Protocol
of the Treaty of 1886must receive application in the present
case ;
2. That the Commission of Arbitration provided for in the said
Protocol shall be constituted within a reasonable period, to
be fixed by the Court".

Pursuant to Article 40, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Statute, the
Application was iiotified to the Government of the United Kingdom
and'to the States entitled to appear before the Court. It was also
transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
The hlemorial ~f the Hellenic Government was filed within the
time-limit prescribed by Order of May 18th, 1951, and later extended
by Order of July 3oth, 1951. It sets out the following Submissions :

" ...the Hellenic Government requests the Court to adjudge and
declare :
(1) That the United Kingdom Government is under an obliga-
tion to agree to refer its present dispute with the Hellenic Govern-
ment to arbitration, and to carry out the Judgment which will
be delivered ;
(2) that the arbitral procedure instituted by the Protocol of
the Greco-British Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1886,
or alternatively, that of the Treaty of Commerce of 1926, must
be applied in this case ;
(3) that any refusa1 by the United Kingdom Government to
accept the arbitration provided for in those Treaties would con-
stitute a denial of justice (Anglo-Iranian Oz1 Company case,
Order of July 5th, 1951 : I.C.J. Reports, 1951, p. 89) ;
(4) that the Hellenic Government is entitled to seise the Court
of the rnerits of the dispute between the two Governments without

931 JUDGMENT OF 1 VIX 52 (AMBATIELOS CASE)

even king bound to resort beforehand to the arbitration mentioned
unzer submissions I and 2 above ;
under an obligation, as a Memberof the United Nations, to conform
to the provisions of Article1, paragraph I, of the Charter of the
United Nations, one of whose principal purposes is:'tobring about
by peaceful means, and in conformity with the princip!es of justice
and international law, adjustment or settleinent of international
disputes or situations', and to those of Article 36, paragraph 3,
of the Charter, according to which 'legal disputes should, as a
general rule, be referred by the Parties to the International Court
of Justice'. There is no doubt that the dispute between the Hellenic
Govemment and the United Kingdom Govemment is a legal
dispute susceptible of adjudication by the Court."

On February gth, 1952, within the time-!imit prescribed by Order
of July 3oth, and later extended by Orders of November gth, 1951,
and January r6th, 1952, the Government of the United Kingdom
filed a Counter-Memorial in which, whilst setting out its arguments
and submissions on the merits of the case, it contended that the
Court lacked jurisdiction, expressly presenting this contention as a
Preiiminary Objection under Article 62 of the Rules of Court. As
regards jurisdiction, the Counter-Mernorial requests the Court to
adjudge and declare that it has no jurisdiction :

"(a) to entertain a request by the Hellenic Govemment that it
should order the United Kingdom Government to submit
to arbitration a claim b the Hellenic Government based
on Article XV or any otler Article of the Treaty of 1886 ;

or

(b) itself to decide on the merits of such a claim",
and that, likewise, it has no jurisdiction :

"(a) to entertain a request by the Hellenic Govemment that it
should order the United Kingdom Govemment to submit
to arbitration a claim by the Hellenic Government for denial
of justice based on the general principles of international
law or for unjust enrichment, or

(b) itself to decide upon the merits of such a claim."

The filing of the Preliminary Objection having suspended pro-
ceedings on the merits, a time-limit was prescribed by Order of
February 14th, 1952, for the presentation by the Hellenic Govern-
ment of a written statement of its Observations and Submissions
on the Objection. Furthermore, the States entitled to appear before
the Court were informed of the deposit of the Objection. The Observations and Submissions of the Hellenic Government
were fiied on April 4th, 1952. They contain the following Siibmis-
sions :

"....the Hellenic Government asks that it may please the Court
to dismiss the Objection to the jurisdiction lodged by the British
Government and, adjudicating upon the Submissions relating to
the competence of the Court, formulated in the Application insti-
tuting proceedings and hereinafter clarified :

1. in the first place, to hold that the United Kingdom Government
is bound to accept the submission to the International Court
of Justice, Sitting as an arbitral tribunal, of tlie dispute now
existing between that Government and the Hellenic Govern-
ment, and accordingly to fix time-limits for the filing by the
Parties of the Keply and the Rejoinder dealing with the merits
of the dispute ;

2. alternatively, to authorize the British Government to notify
to the Greek Government, within the time-limit of one month,
its preference, if any, for the submission of the dispute to the
decision of a Commission of Arbitration as provided for in the
Protocol of 1886, it being understood that in the event of a
failure by the British Government to exercise this option within
the time-limit laid down, the proceedings on the merits will
bc resumed before the Court, the President of which, upon the
Application of the Hellenic Government, shall fix time-limits
for tlie filing of the Keply and the Rejoinder ;
3. iîzthe further alternative, to direct the Parties toput into execu-
tion the procedure for a Commission of hrbitration as provided

for by the Protocol of 1886 ;
4. in the final alternative, if the Court should hold that it cannot
decide as to its competence witliout further information as to
the merits, by application of Article 62 of the Rules, to join
the Objection to the merits."

After the deposit of the Hellenic Government's Observations

and Submissions, the case was ready for hearing, in so far as the
Preliminary Objection was concerned. As the Court included upon
the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of the Parties, the
other Party-the Hellenic Government-availed itself of the
right conferred on it by Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute
of the Court and appointed Professor Jean Spiropoulos to sit

as judge ad hoc. As the President of the Court was the national
of one of the Parties, he transferred the Presidency for the present
case to the Vice-President, in accordance with Article 13, para-
graph 1, of the Rules of Court. Public hearings were held on
May 15th, 16th and 17th, in the course of which the Court heard
Sir Eric Beckett, Counsel, on behalf of the Government of the

United Kingdom ; and M. Lély, Agent, Sir Hartley Shawcross and
M. Henri Rolin, Counsel, on behalf of the Hellenic Government. In the course of the argument before the Court, the following
Submissions were presented :

On behalf of the United Kingdom Government :

"The formal conclusion of the United Kingdom is that the
International Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to deal with
the claim brought against the Govemment of the United Kingdom
by the Hellenic Govemment in respect of the treatment of
M. Ambatielos."

On behalf of the Helienic Govemment :
"In the light of the Submissions of the Parties :
Having regard to Article 29 of the Treaty of Commerce between
the United Kingdom and Greece, signed in London on July 16th,
1926, and, in so far as it may be necessary, to the Declaration of
the same date,
May it please the Court : to record a finding for the Hellenic
Government :

I. that the complaints formulated by that Govement in its
Memorial, relating to the breach of the contract of sale of the
ships, to the unjust enrichment, to the non-production at the
trial of certain documents of which M. Ambatielos was unaware
and to the improper administration of justice (denial of justice
stricto sensu), ail have, in the opinion of that Government, a
legal foundation in Articles 1,X, XV, paragraph 3, of the Treaty
likewise in Articles 1, 3 and 4 of the Treaty of July 16th, 1926,
which are in identical or equivalent terms to the first two provi-
sions referred to above ;
2. that the British Government has, through its Counsel, Sir Eric
Beckett, expressed its wiilingness that the Court should under-
take the function of arbitration in the event of its holding that
it has jurisdiction to decide the question whether the Greek
claim should be subrnitted to arbitration, as provided for by
the Protocol annexed to the Treaty of 1886, and in the event
of the Court's giving an a5rmative decision on this question.
This having been done, for the reasons indicated in the Hellenic
Observations and enlarged upon by Counsel ;
to hold that it has jurisdiction to deal with the ments of the
Helienic claim, and accordingly to fix time-lirnits for the filing by
the Parties of the Reply and the Rejoinder on the merits ;
in the alternative, if the Court should hold that it cannot reach
a decision asto its jurisdiction without going into the merits, by
application of Article 62 of its Rules, to join the Objection to the
merits."34 JUDGMENT OF I VII 52 (AMBATIELOS CASE)

The Treaty provisions herein before mentioned are as follows :

Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of November ~oth, 1886

"Article I

There shall be between the dominions and possessions of the
two High Contracting Parties reciprocal freedom of commerce
and navigation. The subjects of each of the two Parties shall have
liberty freely to come, with their ships andcargoes, to al1 places,
ports and rivers in the dominions and possessions of the other
to which native subjects generally are or may be permitted to
come, and shall enjoy respectively the same. rights, privileges,
liberties, favours,immunities and exemptions in ,matters of com-
merce and navigation which are or may be enjoyed by native
subjects without having to pay any tax or impost greater than
those paid by the same, and they shall be subject to the laws and
regulations in force.

Article X

The Contracting Parties agree that, in al1 matters relating to
commerce and navigation, any privilege, favour, or immunity
whatever which either Contracting Party has actually granted
or may hereafter grant to the subjects or citizens of any other
State shall be extended immediately and unconditionally to the
subjects or citizens of the other Contracting Party ; it being their
intention that the trade and navigation of each country shall be
placed, in al1 respects, by the other on the footing of the most-
favoured nation.

Article XV
The dwellings, manufactories, warehouses and shops of the
subjects of each of the Contracting Parties in the dominions and
possessions of the other, and al1 premises appertaining thereto

destined forpurposes of residence or commerce shall be respected.
It shall not be allowable to proceed to make a search of, or
a domiciliary visit to, such dwellings and premises, or to examine
and inspect books, papers, or accounts, except under the con-
ditions and with the form prescribed by the laws for subjects of
the country.
The subjects of each of the two Contracting Parties in the
dominions and possessions of the other shall have free access to
the Courts of Justice for the prosecution and defence of their
rights, without other conditions, restrictions, or taxes beyond
those imposed on native subjects, and shall, like them, be at liberty
to employ, in al1causes, their advocates, attorneys or agents, from
among the perçons admitted to the exercise of those professions
according to the laws of the country."

Protocol of November ~oth, 1886

"At the moment of proceeding this day to the signature of
the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain
13 and Greece, the Plenipotentiaries of the two High Contracting
Parties have declared as follows :
Any controversies which may arise respecting the interpretation
or the execution of the present Treaty, or the consequences of
any violation thereof, shall be submitted, when the means of
settling them directly by amicable agreement are exhausted, to
the decision of Commissions of Arbitration, and the result of such
arbitration shall be binding upon both Governments.
The members of such Commissions shall be selected by the two
Governments by common consent, failing which each of the Parties
shall nominate an Arbitrator, or an equal number of Arbitrators,
and the Arbitrators thus appointed shall select an Umpire.
The procedure of the Arbitration shall in each case be determined
by the Contracting Parties, failing which the Commission of Arbi-
tration shall be itself entitled to determine it beforehand.
shall be submitted to the two High Contracting Parties at theotocol
same time as the Treaty, and that when the Treaty is ratified,
the agreements contained in the Protocol shall also equaiiy be
considered as approved, without the necessity of a further forma1
ratification."

Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of July 16th, 1926

"Article I
There shall be between the terntories of the two Contracting
Parties reciprocal freedom of commerce and navigation.
The subjects or citizens of each of the two Contracting Parties
shall have liberty freely to come, with their ships and cargoes,
to al1 places and ports in the territories of the other to which
subjects or citizens of that Contracting Party are, or may be,
permitted to come, and shall enjoy the same rights, privileges,
liberties, favours, immunities and exemptions in matters of
commerce and navigation as are, or may be, enjoyed by subjects
or citizens of that Contracting Party.

Article 3
The subjects or citizens of each of the two Contracting Parties
inthe temtories of the other shallenjoy, in respect of their persons,
their property, rights and interest, and in respect of their com-
merce, industry, profession, occupation, or any other matter, in
every way the same treatment and legal protection as the subjects
or citizens of that Party or of the most-favoured foreign country,
in as far as taxes, rates, customs, imposts, fees which are sub-
stantially taxes, and other similar charges are concerned.

Article q
The two Contracting Parties agree that in al1 matters relating
to commerce, navigation and industry and the exercise of profes-
sions or occupations, any privileges, favour or immunity which
either of the two Contracting Parties has actually granted,ormay hereafter grant, to the ships and subjects or citizens of any other
foreign country shall be extended, simultaneously and uncondition-
ally, without request and without compensation, to the ships and
subjects or citizens of the other, it being their intention that the
commerce, navigation and industry of each of the two Contracting
Parties shall be placed in al1respects on the footing of the most-
favoured nation.

Article 29

that may arise between them as to the proper interpretationisputor
application of any of the provisions of the present Treaty shall,
at the request of either Party, be referred to arbitration.

The court of arbitration to which disputes shall be referred
shall6e the Permanent Court of International Justice at The
Hague, unless in any particular case the two Contracting Parties
agree otherwise."

neclaration of July 16th, 1926
"It is well understood that the Treaty of Commerce and Navi-
gation between Great Britain and Greece of to-day's date does not
prejudice claims on behalf of pnvate persons based on the provi-
sions of the Anglo-Greek Commercial Treaty of 1886, and that
any differences which may anse between Our two Govemments
as to the validity of such clairns shall, at the request of either
Government, be referred to arbitration in accordance with the
provisions of thc Protocol of November ~oth, 1886, annexed to.
the said Treaty."

The Agents of the Parties have informed the Court that the com-
mercial relations between the United Kingdom and Greece were
regulated in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of 1886
until the Treaty of 1926 came into force.
Although the Treaty of 1886 was denounced by Greece in
1919 and 1924, nevertheless, by successive agreements and

exchanges of notes, it was continued in force from time to time ;
in the final exchange of notes, it was agreed that the provisional
modus vivendi by which theTreaty was continued until August pst,
1926, would lapse on the date on which the Treaty of 1926 came
into force.
It is necesçary for the Court at the outset to review briefly
the Submissions of the Parties as they were developed during the
proceedings.
In the Application of the Hellenic Government there were three
requests, the first of which was that the Coiirt should declare that it
had jurisdiction; the second that the Court shoulddeclare and adjudge
that the arbitral procedure referred to in the Final Protocol of the
Treaty of 1886must receive application in the present case; and the

1.5third related to the constitution of the Arbitration Commission. In
the Memorialwhich followed the Application, the request, infer dia,
was that the Court should declare and adjudge that the arbitral
procedure aforesaid should receive application, which implies a

previous decision that the Court had jurisdiction so to do. In the
Hellenic Government's Observations and Submissionson the United
Kingdom Government's Counter-Memorial, the Court was asked to
dismiss the United Kingdom Government's Objection to the juris-
diction, and, adjudicating upon the competence of the Court as
requested in the Application, to direct the Parties to put into exe-
cution the procedure for a Commission of Arbitration as provided
for by the Protocol of 1886 (this latter Submission being an alter-
native to the Submission asking the Court to hold that the
United Kingdom Government is bound to accept the submis-
sion of the difference to this Court acting as an arbitral tribunal).
Finally, at the conclusion of the oral arguments, the Hellenic
Government , after reciting inter alia that the United Kingdom
Government had, through its Counsel, expressed its willingness that
the Court should undertake the function of arbitration upon certain
conditions, asked that the Court should hold that it had jurisdiction
to deal with the merits, or, in the alternative, that it should join the

Objection to the merits. These conditions, as stated by the Hellenic
Government in its final Submissions, were, first, that the Court
should hold that ithad jurisdiction to decide the question whether
the claim should be submitted to arbitration under the Protocol
of 1886, and secondly, that the Court should actually decide this
question in the affirmative.
The United Kingdom Government's final Submission is that the
Court "has no jurisdiction todeal with the claim brought against the
Government of the United Kingdom by the Hellenic Government
in respect of the treatment of M. Ambatielos". The Submissions in
the Counter-Memorial of the United Kingdom were more
detailed. So far as they related to jurisdiction, with which alone
the Court is now concerned, they were :

(i) That for certain reasons the Court has no jurisdiction
"(a) to entertain a request by the Heiienic Government that
it should order the United Kingdom Government to
submit to arbitration a claim by the Hellenic Govern-
ment based on Article XV or any other article of the
Treaty of 1886, or,
(b) itself to decide on the merits of such a claim."

(ii) That for certain reasons, the Court has no jurisdiction
"(a) to entertain a request by the Hellenic Government that
it should order the United Kingdom Government to
submit to arbitration a claim by the Hellenic Govern-
16 ment for denial of justice based on the general principles
of international law or for unjust enrichment, or

(b) itself to decide upon the merits of such a claim."

The brief but comprehensive final Submission obviously includes
the jurisdictional objections more particularly set out in the
Counter-Memorial.
It is evident from the above surrimary that, apart from the
jurisdiction of the Court on the merits; the question of its juris-
diction to decide upon the obligation to submit the difference to
arbitration is implicit in the final Submissions of both Parties.

The Hellenic Government's final Submissions refer to an offer of
the United Kingdom Govemment (through its Counsel), upon
certain conditions, that the Court itself should undertake the. func-
tion of arbitration. It is true that the United Kingdom Govemment
has made some such offer, but the conditions attached to it are not
very clear. In paragraph III of the Submissions at the end of the
Counter-Memorial, the United Kingdom Government stated thatif,
contrary to its contentions, the Court should hold that it had
"jurisdiction to order arbitration of a claim by the Hellenic Govem-

ment based on the Treaty of 1886 and that the Hellenic Government
isnot precluded by lapse of time from submitting any such claim",
then the Court should substitute itself for the Commission of
Arbitration under the Protocol of 1886 and itself decide al1relevant
issues. This condition does not appear to involve the necessity of
exarnining whether the Ambatielos claim is in truth based on the
Treaty of 1886. It implies that the United Kingdom Government's
contention is that the Court has no jurisdiction even where a claim is
based on the Treaty. But, during the oral arguments, Counsel said
at one stage that the Court would have jurisdiction to decide whether
the United Kingdom had committed a breach of the Declaration of
1926 in regard to the Ambatielos claim if (1)the Declaration was a
provision of the Treaty of 1926 and (2)the Helleiiic Government's
claim in respect of M. Ambatielos was both a claim based on the
Treaty of 1886 and a claim which that Declaration covers. A little
later Counsel said :

"Before 1 go further, 1 wish to repeat what we have said in
the Counter-Mernorial, that if, contrary to our contentions, the
Court should hold (1) that the Declaration is a provision of the
Treaty of 1926a ,nd as such is covered by Article 29,and (2)that
the claim in this case is a claim to which the Declaration applies,
and (3)that the claim is one which the United Kingdom is legally
obliged to arbitrate, then the United Kingdom is, at any rate to
=7 this extent, in accord with its opponents, that it will, in that
event, agree that this Court should itself replace the arbitral
tribunal provided for in the1886 Treaty, and should deal with
the merits of the case in theme manner and to the same extent
it had been constituted."l would have had to deal with them if

These conditions seem to go beyond those in the Counter-
Memorial ;for they require, in effect, that the Court should not only
find in favour of jurisdiction but should also actually decide
that the Ambatielos claim is in fact a claim based on the Treaty
of 1886 and that the United Kingdom is legally obliged to submit
it to arbitration.This discrepancy throws some doubt on the
existence of any unequivocal agreement between the Parties upon
this matter. The Court has, however, no doubt that in the absence
of a clear agreement between the Parties in this respect, the Court
has no jurisdiction to go into al1the merits of the present case as a
commission of arbitration could do.

As regards the reference in the Counter-Memorial to theiienic
Govemment being precluded by lapse of time froni submitting the
present claim, the Court holds that this is a point to be considered
with the merits and not at the present stage.

The Court can now proceed to deal with the various arguments
put forward by the United Kingdom Govemment in support of its
Preliminary Objection to the Court's jurisdiction. Seven mainpoints
have been raised, the first two of which are

"(1) The jurisdiction of the Court, if it exists at all, must be
(2)Articl29fof the Treaty o1926Tonly confersjurisdiction on
the Court toeal with disputesrelatin to the interpretation
or application of the provisionsof%reaty of1926itself."

Greece has not accepted thecompulsory jurisdiction of the Court
under Article 36 (2)of its Statute and therefore can invoke the
jurisdiction of the Court only under Articl36 (I), by virtue of a
special agreement or the provisions of a treaty. The Hellenic
Govemment relies, in the present case, on Articl29 of the Treaty
of 1926,read in the light of Articl37 of the Statute of the Court,
which in effect provides that al1 references in treaties to the
Permanent Court of International Justice must now be construed
as references to the International Court of Justice. Articl29 of
the Treaty of 1926 between Great Britain and Greece is in the
following terms :

"The two ContractingParties agree in principle that any dispute
that may arise between them as to the proper interpretation or
18 application of any of the provisions of the present Treaty shd, at
the request of either Party, be referred to arbitration.

The court of arbitration to which disputes shall be referred shall
be the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague,
unless in any particular case the two Contracting Parties agree
otherwise."
It follows, therefore, that any dispute as to the interpretation or
application of any of the provisions of the Treaty of 1926 is refer-
able by either Party to this Court.
The third and fourth points raised on behali of the United King-
dom Government are that :

"(3) The Treaty of 1926only came into force in July 1926, and
none of its provisions are applicable to events which took
pIace or acts which were comrnitted before that date. This
is so whether or not the 1886Treaty, which the Treaty of
1926 replaced, contained provisions similar to those of the
Treaty of 1926.
(4) The acts on which the Greek Government's claim is based
the Treaty of 1926are not applicable to them."rovisions of

These points raise the question of the retroactive operation of the
Treaty of 1926 and are intended to meet what was described dunng
the hearings as "the similar clauses theory", advanced on behalf of
the Hellenic Govemment. The theory is that where in the 1926
Treaty there are substantive provisions similar to substantive
pro\~isions of the 1886 Treaty, then under Article 29 of the 1926
Treaty this Court can adjudicate upon the validity of a claim

based on an alleged breach of any of these similar provisions, even
if the alleged breach took place wholly before the new treaty came
into force. The Court rannot accept this theory for the foliowing
reasons :

(i) To accept this theory would mean giving retroactive effect to
Article 29 of the Treaty of 1926, whereas Article 32 of this Treaty
states that the Treaty, which must mean ail the provisions of the
Treaty, shall come into force immediately upon ratification. Such a
conclusion might have been rebutted if there had been any speciai
clause or any special object necessitating retroactive interpretation.
There is no such cIause or object in the present case. It is therefore
impossible to hold that any of its provisions must be deemed to
have been in force earlier.

ItRas contended on behalf of the Hellenic Govemment that the
arbitral procedure stipulated in Article 29 of the Treaty of 1926

differed from that in the Protocol of 1886 orJy in respect of the
tribunal provided for arbitration : under the Treaty of 1926 the
arbitral tribunal was to be the Permanent Court of International
19 Justice, while under the Protocol of 1886 the tribunal was to be an
ad hoccommission of arbitration. This, it was argued, was a proce-
dura1 variation and in matters of procedure, at lest in English law,
the presumption as to procedural statutes is in favour of retroactive
application. Now, whatever may be the position in national law in
various countries of the world-a matter which the Court has
not thought it necessary to investigate-and without examining
whether questions of procedure cover questions of jurisdiction, the
Court observes that, in any event, the language of Article 32 of
the Treaty of 1926 precludes any retroactive effect being given to
selected provisions of that Treaty.

(ii) Accompanying the Treaty of 1926-whether as a part thereof
or not is a question which wiii be dealt with later-was a Declara-
tion which provided, in effect, that any differences which might
arise asto the validity of claims based on the Treaty of 1886should
be referred, at the request of either Government, to arbitration
under the Protocol annexed to the Treaty of 1886. That was the
understanding between the Parties. The language of the Decla-

ration makes no distinction between claims based on one class of
provisions of the 1886 Treaty and those based on another class ;
they are al1 placed on the same footing and differences relating to
their validity are referable to arbitrationder the Protocol of 1886.
To argue that differences relating to claims based on those of the
provisions of the earlier Treaty, which were similar to provisions of
the later Treaty, were intended to be referred to arbitration in
accordancc with Article 29 of the later Treaty, while differences
relating to other claims based on the earlier Treaty were meant to
be arbitrated under the Protocol of the earlier Treaty, introduces a
distinction for which the Court sees no justification in the plain
language of the Declaration.

The fifth poirit raised on behalf of the United Kingdom Govern-
ment is that :

"The Declarationwhich wassignedat the sametime as the Treaty
of 1926was not a part of that Treaty and the provisions of that
Declaration are not provisionsof that Treaty within the meaningof
Article29."
Both Parties agree that this is the most important issue in the
case. In support of the contention that the Declaration is not a

part of the Treaty, it is said that the Declaration was signed
separately from the Treaty proper, though by the same signatories
and on the same day. It is also pointed out that the Declaration
refers to the Treaty not as "this Treaty" or "the present TreatyM-
which would have been the proper mode of reference if the Declara-
tion had been regarded as part of the Treaty-but as "the Treaty
20....of to-day's date", thereby indicating that the Treaty had
already becn completed and signed. hloreover, it is urged, the
Ilrclaration does not Say that it is to be regarded as a part of the
Treaty, prescnting iri this respect a marked contrast to one of the
Declarations annexed to the Greco-Italian Commercial Treaty of
Sovember qth, 1926, which is followed by two Declarations, one
expressed to be an integral part of the Treaty and the other not so
expressed, the latter being almost identical in form and purpose
with the 1926 Anglo-Greek Declaration with which the Court is now

concerned.

On the other hancl, it is to be noted that the Plenipotentiaries
incliided the Treaty and the Customs Schedule (which is unques-
tionably a part of the Treaty) andthe Declaration in a single docu-
ment of 44 pages, the Declaration being on page 44. Again, shortly
after the cxchange of ratifications, the Govemment of the United
Kingdom issued Treaty Series No. 2 (1927), a single document
entitlrd "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United
Kingdom and Greece and accompanying Declaration", and pre-
sented it to Parliament. Furthermore, the British Foreign Officeand
the Chargé d'Affaires of the Hellenic Republic at Berne commun-
icated official texts to the League of Nations at Geneva for registra-
tion, which led to their inclusion in the League of Kations Treaty
Series under a single number, as "No. 1425. Treaty of Commerce

and Navigation between the United Kingdom and Greece and
accompan7ing Declaration signed at London, July 16th, 1926."

Cogent evidence asto what both Parties intended is furnished by
the instruments of ratification exchanged between the United King-
dom and Greece. The instrument of ratification by Greece was in
the foiiowing terms :"We declare that the Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation having been signed in London on the 16th July of this
year between Greece and Great Britain with annexed Customs
Schedule and Declaration, the texts of which follow :[Here follow
the Greek and English texts of the Treaty, Schedule and Decla-
ration.] We accept, approve and ratify the Treaty, the Customs
Schedule and the Declaration in al1 their provisions, promising to
faithfiilly observe and not to violate the same, or to permit their
violation by any other person whatsoever", etc.

Thus, this instrument made no distinction between the Treaty,

on the one hand, and the Customs Schedule.which is indisputably a
part of the Treaty, and the Declaration annexed to the Treaty, on
the other. It is clear, therefore, that Greece treated the Declaration
as a part of the Treaty.43 JUDGMENT OF I VII 52 (AJIBATIELOS CASE)

The United Kingdom's instrument of ratification is even more
explicit. It reads: "GEORGE,by the Grace of God ....greeting.
Whereas a Treaty between Us and Our good friend the President
of the Hellenic Republic, relative to commerce and navigation,
was concluded and signed at London on the sixteenth day of
July in the year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and
twenty-six by the Plenipotentiaries of L-s and of Our said good
friend duly and respectively authorized for that purpose, which
Treaty is, word for ivord, as folloivs : Pere follow the English
and Greek texts of the Treaty, Schedule and Declaration.]
"We, having seen and considered the Treaty aforesaid, have

approved, accepted and confirmed the same in ail and every one
of its articles and clauses", etc.
From the wordç "which Treaty is, word for word, as follows"
and the text that follows the words, it is clear that the Cnited
Kingdom also regarded the Declaration, as well as the Customs
Schedule, as included in the Treaty. The ratification of a treaty
which provides for ratification, as does the Treaty of 1926, is an
indispensable condition for bringmg it into operation. It is not,
therefore, a mere forma1 act, but an act of vital importance. When
the Government of the United Kingdom speaks of the Treaty in
its own instrument of ratification, as being "word for word as
follows" and includes the Declaration in the text that follows,
itis not possible for the Court to hold that the Declaration is not
included in the Treaty.
The nature of the Declaration also points to the same con-
clusion. It records an understanding amved at by the Parties
before the Treaty of 1926 was signed asto what the Treaty, or as

Counsel for the Govemment of the United Kingdom preferred to
put it, the replacement of the Treaty of 1886 by the Treaty of
1926, would not prejudice. This is clear from the opening words
"It is well understood that the Treaty ....of to-day's date, does
not prejudice claims on behalf of private persons based on the
provisions of the Anglo-Greek Commercial Treaty of 1886." From
the series of instruments which from time to time continued the
Treaty of 1886 in force after its initial denunciation by Greece,
itis evident that ultimately it was the coming into force of the
Treaty of 1926 that finally terminated the operation of the Treaty
of 1886. But for the Declaration, Article 32 of the Treaty of
1926, which brought that Treaty into force upon ratification,
might, in the absence of any saving clause, have been regarded
as putting the Treaty into full operation so as completely to wipe
out the Treaty of 1886 and al1 its provisions, including its remedial
provisions, and any claims based thereon. Indeed, the United
Kingdom Government, before proceeding to the signature of the

Treaty of 1926, asked for an assurance that the Hellenic Govem-
ment would not regard "the conclusion of the Treaty" as preju-
dicing certain claims of British subjects based on the older Treaty.
22The intention of the Declaration was to prevent the new Treaty
from being interpreted as coming into fuli force in this sweeping
manner and thus prejudicing claims based on the older Treaty or
the remedies provided for them. It follows that, for the proper
interpretation or application of the provisions of the Treaty of
1926, some siich words as "Save as provided in the Declaration
annexed to this Treaty" have to be read into Article 32 before
the words "It shali come into force". Thus, the provisions of the
Declaration are in the nature of an interpretation clause, and,

as such, should be regarded as an integral part of the Treaty,
even if this was not stated in terms.

For these reasons, the Court holds that either expressly (by
virtue of the United Kingdom's own instrument of ratification)
or by necessary implication (from the very nature of the Declar-
ation) the provisions of the Declaration are provisions of the
Treaty within the meaning of Article 29. Consequently, this Court
has jurisdiction to decide any dispute as to the interpretation or
application of the Declaration and, in a proper case, to adjudge
that there should be a reference to a Commission of Arbitration.
Any differences as to the validity of the claims involved will, how-
ever, have to be arbitrated, as provided in the Declaration itself,
by the Commission.

It may seem at first sight that there is here a possibility of a
conflict between a decision of the Court finding that there is an
obligation to submit a difference to a Commission of Arbitration
and an eventual decision by the Commission. There is in reality
no such possibility.
The Court would decide whether there is a differerLce between
the Parties within the meaning of the Declaration of 1926. Should
the Court find that there is such a difference, the Commission
of Arbitration would decide on the merits of the difference.
It may be contended that because a special provision overrides
a general provision, the Declaration should ovemde Article 29
of the Treaty of 1926 and, as it lays down a special arbitral
procedure, it excludes the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 29.
While it is true that the Declaration excludes the Court from
functioning as the Commission of Arbitration, it is equally true
that it lies with the Court to decide precisely whether there

should he a reference to a Commission of Arhitration.

The sixth argument of the United Kingdom Government is that :

"The claim wliich the Greek Governrnent is rnaking on behalf
of 31. .4rnbaticloin so far as it is bnscd on any provision of the
Trc;ity of 1S130i, not aclaim covc,red by the Dcclaration of 1926,
23 For these reasons,

adjudicating on the Preliminary Objection fded by the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland to the Application of the Royal Hellenic Government,
by thirteen votes to two,

finds that it is without jurisdiction to decide on the merits of
the Ambatielos claim ;

by ten votes to five,
finds that it has jurisdiction to decide whether the United
Kingdom is under an obligation to submit to arbitration, in accord-
ance with the Declaration of 1926, the difference as to the validity
of the Ambatielos claim, in so far as this claim is based on the
Treaty of 1886 ;

decides that the time-limits for the filing of a Reply and a
Rejoinder shall be fixed by subsequent Order.

Done in English and French,the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this first day of July, one
thousand nine hundred and fifty-two, in three copies, one of
which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others
wiil be transniitted to the Royal Hellenic Govemment and to the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem
Ireland, respectively.

(Signed) J. G. GUERRERO,
Vice-President.

(Signed E. HAMBRO,

Registrar. Judge LEVI CARNEIROand M. SPIROPOULOS J, dge ad hoc,
availing themselves of the right conferred on them by Arti57e
of the Statute, append to the Judgrnent of the Court statements
of their individual opinions.

Judge ALVAREZ declares that there are in the present case
sufficient grounds for holding that the Court has juridictito
deal with the merits of the Ambatielos claim.

The President Sir Arnold MCNAIR,Judges BASDEVANT Z,ORICIC,
KLAESTAD and Hsu Mo, availing themselves of the right conferred
on them by Article 57 of the Statute, append to the Judgment
statements of their dissenting opinions.

(Initialled) J. G. G.

(Initialled) EH.

Bilingual Content

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPO'RTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORE' OPINIONS AND ORDEWS

AMBATIELOS CASE

(GREECEv.UNITED KINGDOM)
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

JUDGMENT OF JULY lst1952

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFSET ORDONNANCES

AFFA1R.E AMBATIELOS
(GRECE c. ROYAUME-UNI)

EXCEE"ïI0N PRÉLIMINAIRE

ARRÊT DU lerJUILLE T952 This Judgmentshould be cited as fol:ows
"Ambatielos case (jurisdiction), Judgment of Jul: ~st, 1952
I.CJ.Reflorts 195p.28."

Le présent arrêt doit être cité comm: suit
«dflaire Ambatielos (compétence),Arrêtdu
I~~luillet I9:C.I. J. Reczceil19p.28.»

NOde vente:
1sdw 89 1 JULY IS~1952

JUDGMENT

AMBATIELOSCASE
(GREECE v.UNITED KINGDOM)

PRELIMINARYOBJECTION

AFFAIREAMBATIELOS
(GRÈCE c. ROYAUME-UNI)

EXCEPTION PRÉLIMINAIRE

leJUILLET 1952 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1952
July 1st
GeneralList : YEAR 1952
NO. 15

AMBATIELOS CASE

(GREECE v. UNITED KINGDOM)

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

Analysis of the Submission.~ of the Parties. to define the issues before
the C'oîirt.-Conditionproposed for the conferring of juvisdiction on the
Court as Coinnzission of Arbitrati:nunequivocal agreementof the

On~tirs.-~Vo retroartive operation of a treaty vhere no provision to this
etfrrt and no spceial reason.-Relation between the Declarationof
,July 161h, 1926, and the Tr~aty of the same date; externa1 and interîzal
rvidencc of the dl of the contvacting Parties ivhthis conn:samen
si,nnalovirs, rniificaof the 7i1holeby each of the parties, registration

of thc ~,,l~eC,itllfhc 7,eague of lVations, chavacter of the L)eclaration as
intrr~vrtati7~ provision.-lpossibility of conflict between the decision
of the Cozivt and that of the Commission of Avbitvation.-Distinction
between claims formzilated b~fore, and those not formulatbefore a
certain date not warranted by the terms of the Dec1avation.-Inter-

pvetation of tveaty provisions resulting in certain categories of disputes
remaining without means O!solution:contrary desire of the Parties.

Present : Vice-President GUERRERO,Acting President ; President
Sir Arnold MCNAIR ; judges ALVAREZB ,ASDEVANT,

HACKWORTH W, INIARSKI, ZORIEI~,KLAESTADB , ADAWI
PASHAR , EAD,HSUMO,LEVICARNEIROS ,ir Benegal RAU,
ARMAND-UGON ;M.SPIROPOULOjS u,dge ad hoc ;Registrar

HAMBRO. COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

1952
Le ~erjuillet
ANNEE 1952 Rôle général
no 15

rerjuiiiet 1952

AFFAIRE AMBATIELOS

(GIZÈCE c. ROYAUME-UNI)

EXCEPTION PRÉLIMINAIRE

Analyse des ccinclusions des Parties, aux fins de définir les questions
posées à la Couv. - Conditions proposées pour conférer compétenre
à la Cour comme commission arbitrale: accord non éq,uivoquedes
Parties. - E8e.t rétroactif d'un traité en l'absence d'une clause à cet
eoet ou d'une ra:ison particulière. -Rapports entre la déclaration du

16 juillet1926 et le traité de la même date; preuves extrinsèques et
intrinsèques de ltz volontédes contractants à cet:n?êntessignataires,
ratificationde l'ensemble par chacun des contractants, enregistrement
de l'ensembleà la Société desNations, nature de la déclaration comme
clause interprétative- Possibilité de conflit entre la décision de la

Cour et celle de la commission arbitrale.- Une distinction entre les
réclamations suivant qu'elles sontou non formulées dans un délai
déterminé n'est pas justifiéé par les termcs de la déclaration. -
Interprétation des textes conventiolznels qui conduiraà laisser sans
solution certaines catégories de digéren:volonté contraire des Parties.

Présents : M. GUERREROV , ice-Président,faisant fonction dePrési-
dent en l'aflaire; Sir Arnold MCNAIR, Président;

MhI. ALVAREZ,BASDSVANTH , ACKWORTIIW , INI-~RSKI,
ZORICIC,,KLAESTADB , ADAWIPACHA,MM. READ, HSU
Mo, LE.VI CARNEIRO,Sir Benegal RAU, X. ARMAND-

UGON, Juges; M. SPIROPOULOS Ju,ge ad hoc; RI.HAMRKO,
Grefier.

7 In the Ambatielos case,

between

the United Kingdom of Great Rritain and Northem Ireland,
represented by :
Mr. V. J. Evans, Assistant Legal Adviser of the Foreign Office,

as Agent,

assisted by :
Sir Eric Beckett, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Legal Adviçer of the Foreign
Office,

Rlr. D. H. K. Johnson, Assistant Legal Adviser of the Foreign
Office,
Mr. J. E. S. Fawcett, D.S.C., Member of the English Bar,

as Counsel,

and
the Kingdom oi Greece,
represented by :

31.N. G. Lély,Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten-
tiary of H.M. the King of the Hellenes in the Netherlands,

assisted by:

The Right Honourable Sir Hartley Shawcross, Q.C., M.P., former
Attorney-General of the United Kingdom,
Mr. C. J. Colombes, Q.C., LL.D., llember of the English Bar,
M. Henri Rolin, Professor of Intemational Law at Brussels

University, former President of the Belgian Senate,
RI.Jason Stavropoulos, Legal Adviser of the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs,
as Counsel,

composed as above,

adjudicating on the Preliminary Objection of the Government of
the United Kingdom,

deliversthefollowing Jzcdgment :
8 En l'affaire Ambatielos,

entre
le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord,
représentépar

M. V. J. Evans, jurisconsulte adjoint du ministère des Affaires
étrangères,
comme agent,

assisté par

Sir Eric Beckett, K. C. M. G.,Q. C., jurisconsulte du ministère
des Affaires ét.rangères,
M. D. H. N. Johnson, jurisconsulte adjoint du ministére des
Affaires ktrangères,
M. J. E. S. Fawcett, D. S. C., membre du barreau anglais,

comme conseils,

le Royaume de Grèce,
représentépar
M. N. G. Lély,envoyéentraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire
de S. M. le Roi des Hellènes aux Pays-Bas,

comme agent,

assisté par
le très honorablir sir Hartley Shawcross, Q. C., M. P., ancien
Attorney-Gen,eraldu Royaume-Uni,
M. C. J. Colomblos, Q. C., LL. D., membre du barreau anglais,

M. Henri Rolin, profeççeur de droit internationalà l'université
de Bruxelles, ancien président du Sénat belge,
M. Jason Staviropoulos, conseiller juridique du ministère des
Affaires étrangères,

comme conseils,

ainsi composée,
statuant sur l'exception préliminaire du Gouvernement du
Royaume-Uni,

rend l'arrêtszcivant:
S JUDGMENT OF I VII 52 (AMBATIELOS CASE)
30
On April gth, 1951, the Greek Minister in the Netherlands, duly
authorized by his Governnient, filed in the Registry an Application
instituting proceedings before the Court against the United King-

dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning the claim
relating to the rights of a Greek shipowner, Nicolas Eustache
Ambatielos, alleged to have suffered considerable loss in conse-
quence of a contract which he concluded in 1919 with the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom (represented by the Ministry of
Shipping) for the purchase of nine steamships which were then
under construction, and in consequence of certain adverse judicial
decisions in the English Courts in connection therewith.
The Hellenic Application refers to the Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation between Greece and Great Britain, signed at Athens on

November ~oth, 1886, and to the Treaty of Commerce and Naviga-
tion between the same Contracting Parties signed at London on
July 16th, 1926, including the Declaration. The Application
requests the Court :

"To declare that it has jurisdiction :
To adjudge and declare ....
1. That the arbitral procedure referred to in the Final Protocol
of the Treaty of 1886must receive application in the present
case ;
2. That the Commission of Arbitration provided for in the said
Protocol shall be constituted within a reasonable period, to
be fixed by the Court".

Pursuant to Article 40, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Statute, the
Application was iiotified to the Government of the United Kingdom
and'to the States entitled to appear before the Court. It was also
transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
The hlemorial ~f the Hellenic Government was filed within the
time-limit prescribed by Order of May 18th, 1951, and later extended
by Order of July 3oth, 1951. It sets out the following Submissions :

" ...the Hellenic Government requests the Court to adjudge and
declare :
(1) That the United Kingdom Government is under an obliga-
tion to agree to refer its present dispute with the Hellenic Govern-
ment to arbitration, and to carry out the Judgment which will
be delivered ;
(2) that the arbitral procedure instituted by the Protocol of
the Greco-British Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1886,
or alternatively, that of the Treaty of Commerce of 1926, must
be applied in this case ;
(3) that any refusa1 by the United Kingdom Government to
accept the arbitration provided for in those Treaties would con-
stitute a denial of justice (Anglo-Iranian Oz1 Company case,
Order of July 5th, 1951 : I.C.J. Reports, 1951, p. 89) ;
(4) that the Hellenic Government is entitled to seise the Court
of the rnerits of the dispute between the two Governments without

9 Le 9 avril 1951, le ministre de Grèce aux Pays-Bas, dûment
autorisé par son gouyernement, a déposé au Greffe une requête
introduisant devant la Cour, contre le Royaume-Cni de Grande-
Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, une instance relative à une récla-
mation touchant les droitsd'un armateur hellène, Nicolas Eustache
Ambatielos, qui aurait subi une perte considérable en conséquence
d'un contrat condu par lui en 1919 avec le Gouvernement du
Royaume-Uni (représenté par le ministère de la Marine marchande)
pour l'achat de neuf bateaux à vapeur alors en construction et en

conséquence de certaines décisions judiciaires rendues contre lui
A ce sujet par les tribunaux anglais.
La requête heClénique se réfère au traité de commerce et de
navigation entre la Grèce et le Royaume-Uni, signé à Athènes le
IO novembre 1886, ainsi qu'au traité de commerce et de navigation
entre les mêmesParties contractantes, signé à Londres le 16 juiliet
1926, y compris la1déclaration. Eile prie la Cour :

(Se déclarer compétente
Dire et juger....
I. Que la procédure arbitrale visée par le protocole final du
traité de 1:886doit recevoir application en l'espèc;

2. Qu'il doit êtreprocédé à la constitution de la Commission
arbitrale prévue par ledit protocole, danun délai raisonnable
qu'il appartiendra à la Cour de fixeru.

Conformément à l'article 40, paragraphes 2 et 3, du Statut, la
requête a été,corrimuniquée au Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni
ainsi qu'aux Etat:; admis à ester en justice devant la Cour. Elle
a ététransmise aussi au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies.
Le mémoire du Gouvernement hellénique a étédéposédans le
délai fixé par ordonnance du 18 mai 1951 puis prorogé par
ordonnance du 30 juillet1951. Il énonce les conclusions suivantes :

u ...le Gouvernement hellénique demande à la Cour de dire et
juger :
1) Que le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni est tenu d'accepter
la soumission à l'arbitrage du différendqui sépare actuellement ce
gouvernement et le Gouvernement hellénique et d'exécuter la
se2)eque la pirocédure arbitrale organisée par le protocole du
traité de cornnlerce et de navigation gréco-britannique de 1886 ou
alternativement celle du traité de commerce de 1926 doit recevoir
application en Lfespi.c;
3) que tout refus de la part du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni
d'accepter l'arbitrage prévu par lesdits traités constituerait un
déni de justice (affaire de 1'Anglo-Zranian OilCo., ordonnance du
5 juillet1951 :C. 1. J. Recueil 1951p ,.89) ;

4) que le Gouvernement hellénique est en droit de saisir la
Cour du fond du différendexistant entre les deux gouvernements31 JUDGMENT OF 1 VIX 52 (AMBATIELOS CASE)

even king bound to resort beforehand to the arbitration mentioned
unzer submissions I and 2 above ;
under an obligation, as a Memberof the United Nations, to conform
to the provisions of Article1, paragraph I, of the Charter of the
United Nations, one of whose principal purposes is:'tobring about
by peaceful means, and in conformity with the princip!es of justice
and international law, adjustment or settleinent of international
disputes or situations', and to those of Article 36, paragraph 3,
of the Charter, according to which 'legal disputes should, as a
general rule, be referred by the Parties to the International Court
of Justice'. There is no doubt that the dispute between the Hellenic
Govemment and the United Kingdom Govemment is a legal
dispute susceptible of adjudication by the Court."

On February gth, 1952, within the time-!imit prescribed by Order
of July 3oth, and later extended by Orders of November gth, 1951,
and January r6th, 1952, the Government of the United Kingdom
filed a Counter-Memorial in which, whilst setting out its arguments
and submissions on the merits of the case, it contended that the
Court lacked jurisdiction, expressly presenting this contention as a
Preiiminary Objection under Article 62 of the Rules of Court. As
regards jurisdiction, the Counter-Mernorial requests the Court to
adjudge and declare that it has no jurisdiction :

"(a) to entertain a request by the Hellenic Govemment that it
should order the United Kingdom Government to submit
to arbitration a claim b the Hellenic Government based
on Article XV or any otler Article of the Treaty of 1886 ;

or

(b) itself to decide on the merits of such a claim",
and that, likewise, it has no jurisdiction :

"(a) to entertain a request by the Hellenic Govemment that it
should order the United Kingdom Govemment to submit
to arbitration a claim by the Hellenic Government for denial
of justice based on the general principles of international
law or for unjust enrichment, or

(b) itself to decide upon the merits of such a claim."

The filing of the Preliminary Objection having suspended pro-
ceedings on the merits, a time-limit was prescribed by Order of
February 14th, 1952, for the presentation by the Hellenic Govern-
ment of a written statement of its Observations and Submissions
on the Objection. Furthermore, the States entitled to appear before
the Court were informed of the deposit of the Objection. sans mêmeêtre tenu d'avoir recours au préalable à l'arbitrage
mentionné dans les conclusions I et z ci-dessus;
5) à titre subsidiaire, que le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni
est tenu, en sa qualité de Membre de l'organisation des Nations
Unies, de se conformer aux dispositions de l'article premier, para-
graphe 1, de la Charte des Nations Unies, dont l'un des buts
principaux est « de réaliser par des moyens pacifiques, conformé-
ment aux princ:ipes de la justice et du droit internationall'ajuste-
ment ou le règlement de différendsou de situations de caractére
internationalD, et de l'article 36, paragraphe 3,de la Charte, selon
lequel «les différends d'ordre juridique devraient, d'une manière
générale,être!;oumis par les parties à la Cour internationale de
Justice 1)Il est incontestable que le différendqui met en opposition
le Gouvernement hellénique et le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni
est un différendd'ordre juridique susceptible de faire l'objet d'un
arrêtde la Cour. ))

Le 9 février 195,2,dans le délai fixé par ordonnance du 30 juillet
puis prorogé par ordonnances du 9 novembre 1951 et du 16 janvier
1952, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a présenté son contre-
mémoire où, tout en énonçant ses arguments et conclusions sur

le fond de l'affaire, il a contesté la compétence de la Cour et
présenté expressé~nent cette contestation comme une exception
préliminaire au sens de l'article 62 du Règlement. En ce qui
concerne la compétence, le contre-mémoire prie la Cour dire et
juger qu'eue n'est pas compétente

« a) pour connaître d'une demande du Gouvernementhellénique
tendant à ce qu'elle ordonne au Gouvernementdu Royaume-
Uni de déférer à l'arbitrage une réclamation du Gouverne-
ment hellénique fondéesur l'article XV ou sur tout autre
article du traité de 1886;
ou bien
b) pour statuer elle-mêmesur le fond d'une telle réclamation D,

et que, de même, elle n'est pas compétente

« a) pour connaître d'une demande du Gouvernementhellénique
tendant à ce qu'elle ordonne au Gouvernementdu Royaume-
Uni de déférer à l'arbitrage une réclamation du Gouverne-
ment hellénique pour déni de justice selon les règles géné-
rales du droit international, ou pour enrichissement indû,
ou bien
b) pour sta.tuer elle-mêmesur le fond d'une telle réclamation.B

Le dépôt de l'exception préliminaire d'incompétence ayant
suspendu la procédure sur lefond, un délaia étéfixépar ordonnance
du 14 février 1952 pour la présentation par le Gouvernement
hellénique d'un exposé écrit contenant ses observations et conclu-
sions sur l'exceptiion. D'autre part, les États admis à ester en
justice devant la Cour ont étéinformés du dépôt de l'exception. The Observations and Submissions of the Hellenic Government
were fiied on April 4th, 1952. They contain the following Siibmis-
sions :

"....the Hellenic Government asks that it may please the Court
to dismiss the Objection to the jurisdiction lodged by the British
Government and, adjudicating upon the Submissions relating to
the competence of the Court, formulated in the Application insti-
tuting proceedings and hereinafter clarified :

1. in the first place, to hold that the United Kingdom Government
is bound to accept the submission to the International Court
of Justice, Sitting as an arbitral tribunal, of tlie dispute now
existing between that Government and the Hellenic Govern-
ment, and accordingly to fix time-limits for the filing by the
Parties of the Keply and the Rejoinder dealing with the merits
of the dispute ;

2. alternatively, to authorize the British Government to notify
to the Greek Government, within the time-limit of one month,
its preference, if any, for the submission of the dispute to the
decision of a Commission of Arbitration as provided for in the
Protocol of 1886, it being understood that in the event of a
failure by the British Government to exercise this option within
the time-limit laid down, the proceedings on the merits will
bc resumed before the Court, the President of which, upon the
Application of the Hellenic Government, shall fix time-limits
for tlie filing of the Keply and the Rejoinder ;
3. iîzthe further alternative, to direct the Parties toput into execu-
tion the procedure for a Commission of hrbitration as provided

for by the Protocol of 1886 ;
4. in the final alternative, if the Court should hold that it cannot
decide as to its competence witliout further information as to
the merits, by application of Article 62 of the Rules, to join
the Objection to the merits."

After the deposit of the Hellenic Government's Observations

and Submissions, the case was ready for hearing, in so far as the
Preliminary Objection was concerned. As the Court included upon
the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of the Parties, the
other Party-the Hellenic Government-availed itself of the
right conferred on it by Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute
of the Court and appointed Professor Jean Spiropoulos to sit

as judge ad hoc. As the President of the Court was the national
of one of the Parties, he transferred the Presidency for the present
case to the Vice-President, in accordance with Article 13, para-
graph 1, of the Rules of Court. Public hearings were held on
May 15th, 16th and 17th, in the course of which the Court heard
Sir Eric Beckett, Counsel, on behalf of the Government of the

United Kingdom ; and M. Lély, Agent, Sir Hartley Shawcross and
M. Henri Rolin, Counsel, on behalf of the Hellenic Government. Les observatioris et conclusions du Gouvernement hellénique
ont étéprésentées le 4 avril 1952. Elles contiennent les conclusions
suivantes :

« ...le Gouvernement hellénique demande qu'il plaise à la Cour de
rejeter l'exception d'incompétence présentée par le Gouvernement
britannique et,statuant sur les demandes relatives àla compétence,
formulées dans la requête introductive d'instance et qui sont
précisées ci-après,de bien vouloir:
I. en ordre principal dire pour droit que le Gouvernement du
Royaume-Uni est tenu d'accepter la soumission à la Cour inter-
nationale de Justice siégeantcomme cour arbitrale du différend
entre ce gouvernement et le Gouvernement hellénique, et en
conséquence fixer aux Parties les délais pour le dépôt de la
réplique et de la contre-réplique visant le fond du différend ;

2. en ordre subsidiaire autoriser le Gouvernement britannique à
notifier dan:; le délaid'un mois au Gouvernement hellénique sa
préférence éventuelle pourla soumission du différend à la déci-
sion d'une commission arbitrale comme prévu dans le proto-
cole de 18816;étant entendu que, faute par le Gouvernement
britannique d'avoir exercécette option dans le délai prescrit,
la procédure au fond sera reprise devant la Cour, dont le Pré-
sident, sur simple requêtedu Gouvernement hellénique, fixera
les délaispour le dépôt de la réplique et de la contre-réplique ;

3. en ordre plus subsidiaire renvoyer les Parties à la procédure
de la Comrriission arbitrale prévue par le protocole de 1886 ;

4.en ordre toui à fait subsidiaireet pour le cas où la Cour estime-
rait ne pouvoir se prononcer sur sa compétence avant d'avoir
recueilli de plus amples explications surlefond,faisantapplication
de l'article62 de son Règlement, joindre l'incident au fond. ))

Avec le dépôt d,es observations et conclusions du Gouvernement
hellénique, l'affaire s'est trouvée en état en ce qui concerne l'excep-
tion préliminaire. La Cour comptant sur le siège un juge de la
nationalité d'une des Parties, l'autre Partie - le Gouvernement
hellénique -, se prévalant du droit prévu à l'article 31, para-
graphe 2, du Statuit, a désignépour siégeren qualité de juge ad hoc
M. Jean Spiropoillos, professeur. Le Président de la Cour se
trouvant être le ressortissant d'une des Parties a, pour la présente
affaire, cédé la présidence au Vice-Président, conformément à
l'article13, paragraphe 1, du Règlement. Des audiences publiques
ont ététenues les 15,16 et 17 mai, au cours desquelles ont été

entendus : pour le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, sir Eric
Beckett, conseil ; pour le Gouvernement hellénique, M. Lély,
agent, ainsi que sir Hartley Shawcross et M. Henri Rolin, conseils. In the course of the argument before the Court, the following
Submissions were presented :

On behalf of the United Kingdom Government :

"The formal conclusion of the United Kingdom is that the
International Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to deal with
the claim brought against the Govemment of the United Kingdom
by the Hellenic Govemment in respect of the treatment of
M. Ambatielos."

On behalf of the Helienic Govemment :
"In the light of the Submissions of the Parties :
Having regard to Article 29 of the Treaty of Commerce between
the United Kingdom and Greece, signed in London on July 16th,
1926, and, in so far as it may be necessary, to the Declaration of
the same date,
May it please the Court : to record a finding for the Hellenic
Government :

I. that the complaints formulated by that Govement in its
Memorial, relating to the breach of the contract of sale of the
ships, to the unjust enrichment, to the non-production at the
trial of certain documents of which M. Ambatielos was unaware
and to the improper administration of justice (denial of justice
stricto sensu), ail have, in the opinion of that Government, a
legal foundation in Articles 1,X, XV, paragraph 3, of the Treaty
likewise in Articles 1, 3 and 4 of the Treaty of July 16th, 1926,
which are in identical or equivalent terms to the first two provi-
sions referred to above ;
2. that the British Government has, through its Counsel, Sir Eric
Beckett, expressed its wiilingness that the Court should under-
take the function of arbitration in the event of its holding that
it has jurisdiction to decide the question whether the Greek
claim should be subrnitted to arbitration, as provided for by
the Protocol annexed to the Treaty of 1886, and in the event
of the Court's giving an a5rmative decision on this question.
This having been done, for the reasons indicated in the Hellenic
Observations and enlarged upon by Counsel ;
to hold that it has jurisdiction to deal with the ments of the
Helienic claim, and accordingly to fix time-lirnits for the filing by
the Parties of the Reply and the Rejoinder on the merits ;
in the alternative, if the Court should hold that it cannot reach
a decision asto its jurisdiction without going into the merits, by
application of Article 62 of its Rules, to join the Objection to the
merits." Les conclusions ci-après ont été présentées lors des plaidoiries :

Au nom du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni :

« La conclusion expresse du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni est
que la Cour n'est pas compétente pour connaître de la réclamation
présentéecontre le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni par le Gou-
vernement hellénique au sujet de la manière dont a ététraité
M. Ambatielos. ))

Au nom du Gouvernement hellénique :

((Revu les conclusions des Parties :
Vu l'article 29 du traité de commerce entre le Royaume-Uni et
la Grèce, signéà Londres le 16 juillet1926, et pour autant que

de besoin la déclaration du mêmejour,

Plaise à la Cour : donner acte au Gouvernement hellénique:

I. que les grief:sformulés par lui dans son mémoire relativement à

l'inob~ervati~ondu contrat de vente des navires, à l'enrichisse-
ment indû, à~la non-production au procès de certains documents
ignorésde M. Ambatielos et à une mauvaise administration de la
justice (déni de justice stricto sensu) ont tous suivant lui pour
fondement juridique les articles 1, X, XV, paragraphe 3, du
traité de coirimerce et de navigation duIOnovembre 1886, et éga-
lement les articles 1, 3 et 4 du traité du 16 juillet1926 iden-
tiques ou équivalents aux deux premières dispositions précitées;

2. que le Gouvernement britannique a par la voix de son conseil
sir Eric Beckett exprimé son accord pour que la Cour exerce les
fonctions arbitrales en cas où elle estimerait avoir compétence

pour déclarer si la demande hellénique doit être soumise à la
procédure arbitrale prévueau protocole annexé au traité de 1886
et où la Cour donnerait une réponse affirmative à cette question.

Ce fait, pour les raisons indiquées dans les observations hellé-
niques et développéespar ses conseils ;
se déclarer compétente pour l'examen au fond de la demande hel-
lénique et en conséquence fixer aux Parties les délaispour le dépôt
de la réplique et de la contre-réplique visant le fond du différend ;

subsidiairement, pour le cas où la Cour estimerait ne pouvoir se
prononcer sur sa compétence, sans aborder le fond, faisant applica-
tion de l'article62 de son Règlement, joindre l'incident au fond. ))34 JUDGMENT OF I VII 52 (AMBATIELOS CASE)

The Treaty provisions herein before mentioned are as follows :

Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of November ~oth, 1886

"Article I

There shall be between the dominions and possessions of the
two High Contracting Parties reciprocal freedom of commerce
and navigation. The subjects of each of the two Parties shall have
liberty freely to come, with their ships andcargoes, to al1 places,
ports and rivers in the dominions and possessions of the other
to which native subjects generally are or may be permitted to
come, and shall enjoy respectively the same. rights, privileges,
liberties, favours,immunities and exemptions in ,matters of com-
merce and navigation which are or may be enjoyed by native
subjects without having to pay any tax or impost greater than
those paid by the same, and they shall be subject to the laws and
regulations in force.

Article X

The Contracting Parties agree that, in al1 matters relating to
commerce and navigation, any privilege, favour, or immunity
whatever which either Contracting Party has actually granted
or may hereafter grant to the subjects or citizens of any other
State shall be extended immediately and unconditionally to the
subjects or citizens of the other Contracting Party ; it being their
intention that the trade and navigation of each country shall be
placed, in al1 respects, by the other on the footing of the most-
favoured nation.

Article XV
The dwellings, manufactories, warehouses and shops of the
subjects of each of the Contracting Parties in the dominions and
possessions of the other, and al1 premises appertaining thereto

destined forpurposes of residence or commerce shall be respected.
It shall not be allowable to proceed to make a search of, or
a domiciliary visit to, such dwellings and premises, or to examine
and inspect books, papers, or accounts, except under the con-
ditions and with the form prescribed by the laws for subjects of
the country.
The subjects of each of the two Contracting Parties in the
dominions and possessions of the other shall have free access to
the Courts of Justice for the prosecution and defence of their
rights, without other conditions, restrictions, or taxes beyond
those imposed on native subjects, and shall, like them, be at liberty
to employ, in al1causes, their advocates, attorneys or agents, from
among the perçons admitted to the exercise of those professions
according to the laws of the country."

Protocol of November ~oth, 1886

"At the moment of proceeding this day to the signature of
the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain
13 Les textes converitionnels mentionnés ci-dessus sont les suivants :

Traité de commerce et de navigation du IO novembre 1886
(traduction)

« Article premier

Il y aura entre les domaines et possesssions des deux Hautes
Parties contractantes liberté réciproque de commerce et de navi-
gation. Les sujets de chacune des deux Parties pourront entrer
librement, avec leurs vaisseaux et cargaisons, dans toutes les
places, ports et rivières des domaines et possessions de l'autre
où des sujets indigènes ont généralementou peuvent avoir la per-
mission d'entrer, et jouiront respectivement des mêmes droits,
privilèges, libertés, faveurs, immunités et exemptions en matière
de commerce et de navigation que ceux dont jouissent ou pourront
jouir les sujetsndigènes, sans avoir à payer des taxes ou des impôts
supérieurs à ceux payés par eux, et ils seront soumis aux lois et
règlements en vigueur.

Article X

Les Parties irontractantes conviennent que, dans toutes les
questions relatives au commerce et à la navigation, tout privilège,
faveur ou immunité quelconque que l'une des Parties contractantes
a actuellement a.ccordéou pourra désormais accorder aux sujets et
citoyens d'un auitre Etat, sera étendu immédiatement et sans qu'il
soit besoin de dcéclarationpréalable aux sujets ou aux citoyens de
l'autre Partie contractante ; leur intention étant que le commerce
et la navigation. de chacun des deux pays soient placés, à tous
égards, par l'aurre sur le pied de la nation la plus favorisée.

Article XV

Les habitations, manufactures, magasins et boutiques des sujets
de chacune des :Parties contractantes, dans les domaines et posses-
sions de l'autre, et tous les bâtiments leur appartenant et destinés
à l'habitation ou.au commerce, devront êtrerespectés.
11 ne devra pas être permis de procéder à des recherches ou
à une visite domiciliaire dans ces habitations et bâtiments, ou
d'examiner ou d'inspecter les livres, papiers ou comptes, sauf
aux conditions et dans les formes prescrites par la loi, à l'égard
des sujetsnationaux.
Les sujets de chacune des deux Parties contractantes, dans
les domaines et. possessions de l'autre, devront avoir libre accès
aux cours de justice pour la poursuite et la défensede leursdroits,

sans autres restrictions ou taxes que celles imposées aux sujets
nationaux, et devront, comme eux, avoir toute liberté de prendre,
dans toutes les causes, leurs avocats, avoués et agents d'affaires
panni les persoiules admises à l'exercice de ces fonctions par les
loisdi1 pays. ))

Protocole du IO novembre 1886 (tradz~ction)
« Au moment de procéder, en ce jour, à la signature du traité
de commerce et lie navigation entre la Grande-Bretagne et la Grèce, and Greece, the Plenipotentiaries of the two High Contracting
Parties have declared as follows :
Any controversies which may arise respecting the interpretation
or the execution of the present Treaty, or the consequences of
any violation thereof, shall be submitted, when the means of
settling them directly by amicable agreement are exhausted, to
the decision of Commissions of Arbitration, and the result of such
arbitration shall be binding upon both Governments.
The members of such Commissions shall be selected by the two
Governments by common consent, failing which each of the Parties
shall nominate an Arbitrator, or an equal number of Arbitrators,
and the Arbitrators thus appointed shall select an Umpire.
The procedure of the Arbitration shall in each case be determined
by the Contracting Parties, failing which the Commission of Arbi-
tration shall be itself entitled to determine it beforehand.
shall be submitted to the two High Contracting Parties at theotocol
same time as the Treaty, and that when the Treaty is ratified,
the agreements contained in the Protocol shall also equaiiy be
considered as approved, without the necessity of a further forma1
ratification."

Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of July 16th, 1926

"Article I
There shall be between the terntories of the two Contracting
Parties reciprocal freedom of commerce and navigation.
The subjects or citizens of each of the two Contracting Parties
shall have liberty freely to come, with their ships and cargoes,
to al1 places and ports in the territories of the other to which
subjects or citizens of that Contracting Party are, or may be,
permitted to come, and shall enjoy the same rights, privileges,
liberties, favours, immunities and exemptions in matters of
commerce and navigation as are, or may be, enjoyed by subjects
or citizens of that Contracting Party.

Article 3
The subjects or citizens of each of the two Contracting Parties
inthe temtories of the other shallenjoy, in respect of their persons,
their property, rights and interest, and in respect of their com-
merce, industry, profession, occupation, or any other matter, in
every way the same treatment and legal protection as the subjects
or citizens of that Party or of the most-favoured foreign country,
in as far as taxes, rates, customs, imposts, fees which are sub-
stantially taxes, and other similar charges are concerned.

Article q
The two Contracting Parties agree that in al1 matters relating
to commerce, navigation and industry and the exercise of profes-
sions or occupations, any privileges, favour or immunity which
either of the two Contracting Parties has actually granted,ormay les plénipotentiaires des deus Hautes Parties contractantes ont
fait les déclaratïons suivantes:
Toutes controverses qui pourront s'élever au sujet de l'inter-
prétation ou de l'exécution du présent traité, ou des conséquences
d'une violation quelconque de ce traité, devront être soumises
une fois les mo;yens de les régler directement par un arrangement
à l'amiable épuisés,à la décision de commissions d'arbitrage, et

le résultat de cet arbitrage liera les deux gouvernements.
Les membres de ces commissions devront être choisis par les
deux gouvernements d'un commun accord, faute de quoi chacune
des deux Partie:; nommera un arbitre ou un nombre égald'arbitres,
et les arbitres ainsi désignéschoisiront un tiers arbitre.
La procédure de l'arbitrage devra être, dans tous les cas, déter-
minée par les E'arties contractantes, faute de quoi la commission
d'arbitrage sera chargée elle-mêmede la fixer préalablement.
Les plénipotentiaires soussignés ont convenu que ce protocole
devra être soumis aux deux Parties contractantes en mêmetemps
que le traité, et que, quand le traité sera ratifié, l'accord contenu
dans le protoco:le sera également considéré commeapprouvé, sans
qu'il soit besoin d'une autre ratification formelle»

Traité de commerce et de navigation du IG juillet1926 (traduction)

«Article premier

Il y aura liberté réciproque de commerce et de navigation entre
les territoires des deux Parties contractantes.
Les sujets ou citoyens de chacune des deux Parties contractantes
auront entière liberté de se rendre avec leurs navires et leurs car-
gaisons dans toiis les lieux et ports des territoires de l'autrPartie
où des sujets ou citoyens de ladite Partie contractante sont, ou
pourront êtreautorisés à se rendre ; ils jouiront des mêmesdroits,
privilèges, libertés, faveurs, immunités et exemptions en matière
de commerce et de navigation que ceux dont jouissent ou pourront
jouir les sujets ou citoyens de cette Partie contractante.

Article 3
Les sujets oc1 citoyens de chacune des deux Parties contrac-
tantes résidant sur les territoires de l'autre Partie jouiront, en
ce qui concerne leur personne, leurs biens, leurs droits et intérêts,
comme en ce qui concerne leur commerce, industrie, profession,

occupation ou ;Itous autres égards, du même traitement et de
la même protection légale que les sujets ou citoyens de cette
Partie, ou que l'essujets ou citoyens de la nation la plus favorisée,
en matière de taxes, droits, tarifs douaniers, impositions, rede-
vances équivalant en fait à des impôts et autres charges analogues.

Article q

Les deux Parties contractantes conviennent qu'en toute matière
de commerce, de navigation et d'industrie, comme en ce qui
concerne l'exercice des professionsou des occupations, tous privilèges,
faveurs ou immunités que l'une des Parties contractantes a, en hereafter grant, to the ships and subjects or citizens of any other
foreign country shall be extended, simultaneously and uncondition-
ally, without request and without compensation, to the ships and
subjects or citizens of the other, it being their intention that the
commerce, navigation and industry of each of the two Contracting
Parties shall be placed in al1respects on the footing of the most-
favoured nation.

Article 29

that may arise between them as to the proper interpretationisputor
application of any of the provisions of the present Treaty shall,
at the request of either Party, be referred to arbitration.

The court of arbitration to which disputes shall be referred
shall6e the Permanent Court of International Justice at The
Hague, unless in any particular case the two Contracting Parties
agree otherwise."

neclaration of July 16th, 1926
"It is well understood that the Treaty of Commerce and Navi-
gation between Great Britain and Greece of to-day's date does not
prejudice claims on behalf of pnvate persons based on the provi-
sions of the Anglo-Greek Commercial Treaty of 1886, and that
any differences which may anse between Our two Govemments
as to the validity of such clairns shall, at the request of either
Government, be referred to arbitration in accordance with the
provisions of thc Protocol of November ~oth, 1886, annexed to.
the said Treaty."

The Agents of the Parties have informed the Court that the com-
mercial relations between the United Kingdom and Greece were
regulated in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of 1886
until the Treaty of 1926 came into force.
Although the Treaty of 1886 was denounced by Greece in
1919 and 1924, nevertheless, by successive agreements and

exchanges of notes, it was continued in force from time to time ;
in the final exchange of notes, it was agreed that the provisional
modus vivendi by which theTreaty was continued until August pst,
1926, would lapse on the date on which the Treaty of 1926 came
into force.
It is necesçary for the Court at the outset to review briefly
the Submissions of the Parties as they were developed during the
proceedings.
In the Application of the Hellenic Government there were three
requests, the first of which was that the Coiirt should declare that it
had jurisdiction; the second that the Court shoulddeclare and adjudge
that the arbitral procedure referred to in the Final Protocol of the
Treaty of 1886must receive application in the present case; and the

1.5 fait, accordés ou pourra ultérieurement accorder aux navires et
aux sujets ou citoyens d'un autre Etat étranger quelconque, seront
éformuler une demandet àtcet effet et sans compensation, aux navires
et sujets ou cito:yens de l'autre Partie, les Parties désirant que le
commerce, la navigation et l'industrie de chacune d'elles jouissent
à tous égardsdu traitement de la nation la plus favorisée.

Article 29

Les deux Parties contractantes conviennent, en principe, que
tout différendqui pourrait surgir entre elles quantà l'exacte inter-
prktation ou application de l'une quelconque des dispositions du
présent traité, sera,à la demande de l'une ou de l'autre Partie,
soumis à l'arbitirage.
Le tribunal d'arbitrage auquel ces différendsseront soumis, sera
la Cour permanente de Justice internationale de La Haye, à moins
que, dans un cas. particulier quelconque, les deux Parties contrac-
tantes n'en conviennent autrement. u

Déclaration du 16 juillet 192G (traduction)

«Il est bien en.tendu que le traité de commerce et de navigation
entre la Grande-:Bretagne et la Grèce daté de ce jour ne porte pas
préjudice aux réclamations au nom de personnes privées fondées
sur les dispositions du traité commercial anglo-grec de 1886, et
que tout différendpouvant s'éleverentre nos deux gour.emements
quant à la validité de telles réclamations seraà la demande de
l'un des deus gouvernements, soumis à arbitrage conformément
aux dispositions du protocole du IO novembre 1886, annexé audit
traité))

Les agents des Parties ont informé la Cour que les relations

commerciales entre la Grèce et le Royaume-Uni ont été régies
par les dispositions du traité de 1886 jusqu'à l'entrée en vigueur
du traité de 1926.
Bien que dénoncépar la Grèce en 1919 et 1924, le traité de 1886
avait étémaintenu en vigueur en vertu d'accords et d'échanges de
notes successifs ;par un dernier échange de notes, il avait été
convenu que le modus vivend provisoire, en vertu duquel le traité
devait rester en vigueur jusqu'au 31 août 1926, prendrait fui à
la date d'entrée en vigueur du traité de 1926.

Il y a lieu, dès 1i: début, pour la Cour, d'examiner brièvement

les conclusions des Parties, telles qu'elles se sont développées au
cours de la procédiire.
La requête déposée par le Gouvernement hellénique contenait
trois demandes, dont la première consistait à inviter la Cour à
se déclarer compétente ; la seconde lui demandait de dire et juger
que la procédure a.rbitrale visée par le protocole final du trait6
de 1886 devait recevoir application en l'espèce ; la troisième

15third related to the constitution of the Arbitration Commission. In
the Memorialwhich followed the Application, the request, infer dia,
was that the Court should declare and adjudge that the arbitral
procedure aforesaid should receive application, which implies a

previous decision that the Court had jurisdiction so to do. In the
Hellenic Government's Observations and Submissionson the United
Kingdom Government's Counter-Memorial, the Court was asked to
dismiss the United Kingdom Government's Objection to the juris-
diction, and, adjudicating upon the competence of the Court as
requested in the Application, to direct the Parties to put into exe-
cution the procedure for a Commission of Arbitration as provided
for by the Protocol of 1886 (this latter Submission being an alter-
native to the Submission asking the Court to hold that the
United Kingdom Government is bound to accept the submis-
sion of the difference to this Court acting as an arbitral tribunal).
Finally, at the conclusion of the oral arguments, the Hellenic
Government , after reciting inter alia that the United Kingdom
Government had, through its Counsel, expressed its willingness that
the Court should undertake the function of arbitration upon certain
conditions, asked that the Court should hold that it had jurisdiction
to deal with the merits, or, in the alternative, that it should join the

Objection to the merits. These conditions, as stated by the Hellenic
Government in its final Submissions, were, first, that the Court
should hold that ithad jurisdiction to decide the question whether
the claim should be submitted to arbitration under the Protocol
of 1886, and secondly, that the Court should actually decide this
question in the affirmative.
The United Kingdom Government's final Submission is that the
Court "has no jurisdiction todeal with the claim brought against the
Government of the United Kingdom by the Hellenic Government
in respect of the treatment of M. Ambatielos". The Submissions in
the Counter-Memorial of the United Kingdom were more
detailed. So far as they related to jurisdiction, with which alone
the Court is now concerned, they were :

(i) That for certain reasons the Court has no jurisdiction
"(a) to entertain a request by the Heiienic Government that
it should order the United Kingdom Government to
submit to arbitration a claim by the Hellenic Govern-
ment based on Article XV or any other article of the
Treaty of 1886, or,
(b) itself to decide on the merits of such a claim."

(ii) That for certain reasons, the Court has no jurisdiction
"(a) to entertain a request by the Hellenic Government that
it should order the United Kingdom Government to
submit to arbitration a claim by the Hellenic Govern-
16 concernait la constitution de la commission arbitrale. Dans le
mémoire qui a suivi la requête, la Cour, entre autres demandes,

était invitéeà dire et juger que la procédure arbitrale mentionnée
ci-dessus devait recevoir application en l'espèce,ce qui impliquait
une décision préalable aux termes de laquelle la Cour se recon-
naîtrait compétente pour ce faire. Dans les observations et conclu-
sions du Gouvernement hellénique, en réponse au contre-mémoire
du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, la Cour était invitée à rejeter
l'exception d'incoinpétence présentée par le Gouvernement du
Royaume-Uni et, statuant sur les demandes relatives à la com-
pétence formulées dans la requête, à renvoyer les Parties à la
procédure de la commission arbitrale prévue par le protocole de
1886 (cette dernière conclusion étant subsidiaire à celle qui prie
la Cour de dire que le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni est tenu
d'accepter la soumission du différend à la Cour siégeant comme

commission arbitrale). Enfin, à l'issue des débats oraux, le Gouver-
nement hellénique, après avoir notamment relevé que le Gouver-
nement du Royaun~e-Uni avait, par la voix de son conseil, exprimé
son accord pour que la Cour exerce les fonctions arbitrales sous
certaines condition:;, demandait à la Cour de se déclarercompétente
pour examiner le fond, ou subsidiairement de joindre l'incident au
fond. Les conditions dont il s'agit, telles que les a énoncéesle
Gouvernement hellénique dans ses conclusions finales, étaient les
suivantes : en premier lieu que la Cour estimât avoir compétence
pour décider si la demande devait être soumise à la procédure
arbitrale prévue aiu protocole de 1886 et, en second lieu, que la
la Cour donnât en fait une réponse affirmative à cette question.
Les conclusions finales du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni sont

que la Coiir n'est pas«compétente pour connaitre de la réclamation
présentée contre le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni par le Gouver-
nement hellénique au sujet de la manière dont a été traité
M. Ambatielos 1).Les conclusions énoncéesdans le contre-mémoire
du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni étaient plus détaillées.Dans
la mesure où ces c~onclusionsavaient trait à la compétence, seule
question dont la Cour s'occupe en ce moment, elles étaient les
suivantes :

(i) Que, pour certaines raisQns, la Cour n'était pas compétente
«a) pour connaitre d'une demande du Gouvernement hellé-
nique tendant à ce qu'elle ordonneau Gouvernementdu
Royaume-Unidedéférer àl'arbitrage une réclamation du
Gouvernement helléniquefondéesur l'article XV ou sur
tout autre article du traitéde 1886, ou bien
b) pour statuer elle-même sur le fond d'une telle réclama-
tion.11
(ii) Que, pour certaines raisons, la Cour n'était pas compétente
«a) pour connaître d'une demande du Gou.irernementhellé-
nique tendant à ce qu'elleordonne au Gouvernementdu
Royaume-Unide déférer àl'arbitragune réclamationdu
I6 ment for denial of justice based on the general principles
of international law or for unjust enrichment, or

(b) itself to decide upon the merits of such a claim."

The brief but comprehensive final Submission obviously includes
the jurisdictional objections more particularly set out in the
Counter-Memorial.
It is evident from the above surrimary that, apart from the
jurisdiction of the Court on the merits; the question of its juris-
diction to decide upon the obligation to submit the difference to
arbitration is implicit in the final Submissions of both Parties.

The Hellenic Government's final Submissions refer to an offer of
the United Kingdom Govemment (through its Counsel), upon
certain conditions, that the Court itself should undertake the. func-
tion of arbitration. It is true that the United Kingdom Govemment
has made some such offer, but the conditions attached to it are not
very clear. In paragraph III of the Submissions at the end of the
Counter-Memorial, the United Kingdom Government stated thatif,
contrary to its contentions, the Court should hold that it had
"jurisdiction to order arbitration of a claim by the Hellenic Govem-

ment based on the Treaty of 1886 and that the Hellenic Government
isnot precluded by lapse of time from submitting any such claim",
then the Court should substitute itself for the Commission of
Arbitration under the Protocol of 1886 and itself decide al1relevant
issues. This condition does not appear to involve the necessity of
exarnining whether the Ambatielos claim is in truth based on the
Treaty of 1886. It implies that the United Kingdom Government's
contention is that the Court has no jurisdiction even where a claim is
based on the Treaty. But, during the oral arguments, Counsel said
at one stage that the Court would have jurisdiction to decide whether
the United Kingdom had committed a breach of the Declaration of
1926 in regard to the Ambatielos claim if (1)the Declaration was a
provision of the Treaty of 1926 and (2)the Helleiiic Government's
claim in respect of M. Ambatielos was both a claim based on the
Treaty of 1886 and a claim which that Declaration covers. A little
later Counsel said :

"Before 1 go further, 1 wish to repeat what we have said in
the Counter-Mernorial, that if, contrary to our contentions, the
Court should hold (1) that the Declaration is a provision of the
Treaty of 1926a ,nd as such is covered by Article 29,and (2)that
the claim in this case is a claim to which the Declaration applies,
and (3)that the claim is one which the United Kingdom is legally
obliged to arbitrate, then the United Kingdom is, at any rate to
=7 Gouvernement helléniquepour déni dejustice selon les
règles généraledsu droit international, ou pour enrichis-
sement indû, ou bien
6) pour statuer elle-mêmesur le fond d'une telle réclarna-
tion.a

La conclusion finale, qui est brève mais d'une large portée,
comprend évidemrnent les exceptions d'incompétence plus parti-
culièrement énoncéesdans le contre-mémoire.
Ce résumé démontre à l'évidence qu'indépendamment de la
compétence de la Cour pour statuer sur le fond, la question de sa

compétence pour (lire s'il y a obligation de soumettre le différend
à l'arbitrage est iniplicitement incluse dans les conclusions finales
des deux ~arties.
Le Gouvernemeint hellénique, dans ses conclusions finales, a
mentionné une offre qu'a faite le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni
(par l'entremise de son conseil) et selon laquelle, sous certaines
conditions, la Couir elle-même assumerait les fonctions d'arbitre.
Il est vrai que le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a fait une offre
de ce genre ; mais les conditions qu'il y a attachées ne ressortent
pas très clairement. Sous le numéro III des conclusions à la fin
du contre-mémoire, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a déclaré

que si, contrairement à ses conclusions, la Cour devait décider
« qu'elle est compétente pour prescrire l'arbitrage d'une réclamation
du Gouvernement hellénique fondée sur le traité de 1886, et que
le Gouvernement hellénique n'est pas forclos à raison de son
retard à présenter pareille réclamation », elle devrait se substituer
à la commission d'arbitrage prévue au protocole de 1886, et
statuer elle-même :sur tous les points. pertinents. Cette condition
ne semble pas entraîner la nécessitéde rechercher si la réclamation
Ambatielos est véritablement fondée sur le traité de 1886. Elle
implique que, selori la thèse britannique, la Cour n'est pas com-
pétente, même quand une réclamation est fondée sur le traité.

Mais, au cours de :la procédure orale, le conseil du Royaume-Uni
a dit à un moment que la Cour serait compétente pour décider
si le Royaume-Uni avait commis une infraction à la déclaration
de 1926 relativement à la réclamation Ambatielos, 1) au cas où la
déclaration serait iine ~artie du traité de 1a,6 et 2) au cas où
la réclamation du G.ouvernement hellénique concernant Ambatielos
serait à la fois unIr réclamation fondée sur le traité de 1886 et
une réclamation que vise la déclaration. Un peu plus tard, le
conseil du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a dit :

aAvant d'aller plus loin, je désirerépéterce que nous avons
dit dans le contre-mémoire, a savoir que si, contrairement à notre
thèse, la Cour estimait 1) que la déclaration est une disposition
du traité de 19.26, et à ce titre viséepar l'article29, que 2) la
réclamation présentée dans l'instance actuellc<,stune réclamation
à laquelle la déclaration s'applique, et que 3) la réclamation est
de celles que le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni est légalement this extent, in accord with its opponents, that it will, in that
event, agree that this Court should itself replace the arbitral
tribunal provided for in the1886 Treaty, and should deal with
the merits of the case in theme manner and to the same extent
it had been constituted."l would have had to deal with them if

These conditions seem to go beyond those in the Counter-
Memorial ;for they require, in effect, that the Court should not only
find in favour of jurisdiction but should also actually decide
that the Ambatielos claim is in fact a claim based on the Treaty
of 1886 and that the United Kingdom is legally obliged to submit
it to arbitration.This discrepancy throws some doubt on the
existence of any unequivocal agreement between the Parties upon
this matter. The Court has, however, no doubt that in the absence
of a clear agreement between the Parties in this respect, the Court
has no jurisdiction to go into al1the merits of the present case as a
commission of arbitration could do.

As regards the reference in the Counter-Memorial to theiienic
Govemment being precluded by lapse of time froni submitting the
present claim, the Court holds that this is a point to be considered
with the merits and not at the present stage.

The Court can now proceed to deal with the various arguments
put forward by the United Kingdom Govemment in support of its
Preliminary Objection to the Court's jurisdiction. Seven mainpoints
have been raised, the first two of which are

"(1) The jurisdiction of the Court, if it exists at all, must be
(2)Articl29fof the Treaty o1926Tonly confersjurisdiction on
the Court toeal with disputesrelatin to the interpretation
or application of the provisionsof%reaty of1926itself."

Greece has not accepted thecompulsory jurisdiction of the Court
under Article 36 (2)of its Statute and therefore can invoke the
jurisdiction of the Court only under Articl36 (I), by virtue of a
special agreement or the provisions of a treaty. The Hellenic
Govemment relies, in the present case, on Articl29 of the Treaty
of 1926,read in the light of Articl37 of the Statute of the Court,
which in effect provides that al1 references in treaties to the
Permanent Court of International Justice must now be construed
as references to the International Court of Justice. Articl29 of
the Treaty of 1926 between Great Britain and Greece is in the
following terms :

"The two ContractingParties agree in principle that any dispute
that may arise between them as to the proper interpretation or
18 tenu de soumettre à l'arbitrage, le Royaume-Uni est, tout au
moins dans cette mesure, d'accord avec ses contradicteurs, à
savoir qu'il reconnaîtra dans ce cas que la Cour devrait elle-même
remplacer le tribunal arbitral prévu dans le traité de 1886et
qu'elle devrait traiter de l'affaire au fond de la mêmemanière
et dans la mêmemesure que le tribunal arbitral eût eu en traiter
s'il avait été~onstitué.I
Ces conditions semblent aller au delà de celles qui ont été
énoncées dans le contre-mémoire ; en effet, elles exigent que la
Cour non seulement statue en faveur de sa compétence mais
encore qu'elle décide que la réclamation Ambatielos est en fait

une réclamation fondée sur le traité de 1886 et que le Royaume-
Uni est juridiquement tenu de la soumettre à l'arbitrage. Cette
divergence fait planer quelque doute quant à l'existence d'un
accord non équivoque entre les Parties sur ce point. Toutefois,
la Cour ne doute pas qu'en l'absence d'un accord bien net entre
les Parties à cet effet, elle n'est pas comp6tente pour traiter au
fond l'ensemble de la présente affaire conime pourrait le faire
une commission d''arbitrage.
Pour ce qui est de l'argument présentédans le contre-mémoire
selon lequel le Gouvernement hellénique serait forclos à raison
de son retard à soumettre la présente réclamation, la Cour estime
qu'il y a là une question à traiter avec le fond et non pas au
stade actuel.

La Cour peut maintenant s'occuper de divers argumentsprésentés
par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni à l'appui de son exception
préliminaire d'incompétence. Sept points principaux ont été
soulevés, dont les deux premiers sont les suivants :
«1) La compétencede la Cour, si elle existe, doit êtretiréede
l'article du traitéde 1926.
2) L'article29 du traité de 1926 ne confère compétence à la
Cour que pour connaître des différendsrelatifs l'interpré-
tationoc1 à l'application des dispositions du traité1926
lui-même )

La Grèce n'a pas accepté la juridiction obligatoire de- la Cour
aux termes de l'article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut et, partant,
elle ne peut invoquer la compétence de la Cour aux termes de
l'article36, paragraphe 1, qu'en vertu d'un compromis ou des
dispositions d'un t.raité. Le Gouvernement hellénique se fonde,
dans la présente espèce, sur l'article29 du traité de 1926, 111à
la lumière (de l'article 37 du Statut de la Cour, lequel dispose
que, lorsqu'un traité prévoit le renvoi à la Cour permanente de
Justice internationale, c'est la Cour internationale de Justice
qui constituera cette juridiction. 1,'articl29 du traité de 1926,
entre le Royaume-Uni et la Grèce, est conçu dans les termes
suivants :

Les deux Parties contractantes conviennent, en principe, que
tout différendqui pourrait surgir entre elles quaàl'exacte inter-
18 application of any of the provisions of the present Treaty shd, at
the request of either Party, be referred to arbitration.

The court of arbitration to which disputes shall be referred shall
be the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague,
unless in any particular case the two Contracting Parties agree
otherwise."
It follows, therefore, that any dispute as to the interpretation or
application of any of the provisions of the Treaty of 1926 is refer-
able by either Party to this Court.
The third and fourth points raised on behali of the United King-
dom Government are that :

"(3) The Treaty of 1926only came into force in July 1926, and
none of its provisions are applicable to events which took
pIace or acts which were comrnitted before that date. This
is so whether or not the 1886Treaty, which the Treaty of
1926 replaced, contained provisions similar to those of the
Treaty of 1926.
(4) The acts on which the Greek Government's claim is based
the Treaty of 1926are not applicable to them."rovisions of

These points raise the question of the retroactive operation of the
Treaty of 1926 and are intended to meet what was described dunng
the hearings as "the similar clauses theory", advanced on behalf of
the Hellenic Govemment. The theory is that where in the 1926
Treaty there are substantive provisions similar to substantive
pro\~isions of the 1886 Treaty, then under Article 29 of the 1926
Treaty this Court can adjudicate upon the validity of a claim

based on an alleged breach of any of these similar provisions, even
if the alleged breach took place wholly before the new treaty came
into force. The Court rannot accept this theory for the foliowing
reasons :

(i) To accept this theory would mean giving retroactive effect to
Article 29 of the Treaty of 1926, whereas Article 32 of this Treaty
states that the Treaty, which must mean ail the provisions of the
Treaty, shall come into force immediately upon ratification. Such a
conclusion might have been rebutted if there had been any speciai
clause or any special object necessitating retroactive interpretation.
There is no such cIause or object in the present case. It is therefore
impossible to hold that any of its provisions must be deemed to
have been in force earlier.

ItRas contended on behalf of the Hellenic Govemment that the
arbitral procedure stipulated in Article 29 of the Treaty of 1926

differed from that in the Protocol of 1886 orJy in respect of the
tribunal provided for arbitration : under the Treaty of 1926 the
arbitral tribunal was to be the Permanent Court of International
19 prétation ou application de l'une quelconque des dispositions du
présenttrait6 sera,à la demande de l'une ou de l'autre Partie, sounlis
à l'arbitrage.
Le tribunal d.'arbitrage auquel ces différendsseront soumis sera
la Cour permanente de Justice internationale de La Haye, à moins
que, dans un cas particulier quelconqiie, les deux Parties contrac-
tantes n'en conviennent autrcment. ))

Il s'ensuit que tout différend relatif à l'interprétation ou à
l'application de l'une des dispositions du traité de 1926 peut être
soumis à la Cour acttielle par l'une oii l'autre des Parties.
Les troisième et quatrième points présentés aii nom du Gouver-
nement du Royauime-Cni sont les suivants :

((3)Le traité de 1926 n'est entréen vigueur qu'au mois de juillet
1926 et aucune de ses dispositions ne peut êtreappliquée
à des évcinementsqui ont eu lieu ou àdes actes qui ont été
commis avant cette date. Il en est ainsi, que le traité de
1886, remplacé par le traité de 1926,ait contenu ou non des
dispositions semblables à celles du traité de 1926.
4) Les actes sur lesquels se fonde la réclamation du Gouverne-
ment he1:léniquese sont produits en 1922 et 1923 et, partant,
lesdispositions du traitéde1926 ne leur sont pas applicables))

Ces points sou:lèvent la question relative à l'effet rétroactif
du traité de 1926, et l'objet en est de répondre à ce que l'on a
appelé, au cours des débats oraux, cla théorie des clauses simi-
laires)),énoncéepar les représentants du Gouvernement hellénique.
Selon cette théorile, là où, dans le traité de 1926, figurent des
dispositions de fond semblables à des dispositions de fond du
traité de 1886, la Cour peut, en vertu de l'article 29 du traité de
1926, .se prononceir sur la validité d'une réclamation fondée sur
une prétendue violation de l'une de ces dispositions semblables,
même si la prétendue violation a étéentièrement commise avant

que le nouveau traité n'entrât en vigueur. La Cour ne peut
accepter cette théalrie pour les motifs siiivants :
i) Accepter cette théorie serait conférer un effet rétroactif à
l'article 29 du traité de 1926, alors que l'article 32 du mên-ie
traité énonce que le traité, ce qui doit signifier toutes les
dispositions du traité, entrera en vigueur dès sa ratification. Cette
conclusion aurait pu être contredite s'il avait existé une claiise
ou une raison particulières appehnt üne interprétation rétroactive.
Il n'existe pas dans le cas prtsent de telle claiise ni de telle raison.

Il est donc impossible d'admettre que l'unr quelcunclue de ses
dispositions doive être considér4c comme ayant ;té en vigucur à
une date antérieure.
On a soutenu, au nom di1 Goiivernernerit hellCni~ue, clut' la
procédure arbitrale, mentionnée à l'article 29 du traité de 1926,
ne difiérait de celle qu'institiiait le ~)rotocolc.dc 1886 qu'à l'égard
du tribunal prévu pour l'arbitrage : selori le trait4 de 192U, le
tribunal arbitral devait êtrela (hur perma~iente tlc Jiistice inter- Justice, while under the Protocol of 1886 the tribunal was to be an
ad hoccommission of arbitration. This, it was argued, was a proce-
dura1 variation and in matters of procedure, at lest in English law,
the presumption as to procedural statutes is in favour of retroactive
application. Now, whatever may be the position in national law in
various countries of the world-a matter which the Court has
not thought it necessary to investigate-and without examining
whether questions of procedure cover questions of jurisdiction, the
Court observes that, in any event, the language of Article 32 of
the Treaty of 1926 precludes any retroactive effect being given to
selected provisions of that Treaty.

(ii) Accompanying the Treaty of 1926-whether as a part thereof
or not is a question which wiii be dealt with later-was a Declara-
tion which provided, in effect, that any differences which might
arise asto the validity of claims based on the Treaty of 1886should
be referred, at the request of either Government, to arbitration
under the Protocol annexed to the Treaty of 1886. That was the
understanding between the Parties. The language of the Decla-

ration makes no distinction between claims based on one class of
provisions of the 1886 Treaty and those based on another class ;
they are al1 placed on the same footing and differences relating to
their validity are referable to arbitrationder the Protocol of 1886.
To argue that differences relating to claims based on those of the
provisions of the earlier Treaty, which were similar to provisions of
the later Treaty, were intended to be referred to arbitration in
accordancc with Article 29 of the later Treaty, while differences
relating to other claims based on the earlier Treaty were meant to
be arbitrated under the Protocol of the earlier Treaty, introduces a
distinction for which the Court sees no justification in the plain
language of the Declaration.

The fifth poirit raised on behalf of the United Kingdom Govern-
ment is that :

"The Declarationwhich wassignedat the sametime as the Treaty
of 1926was not a part of that Treaty and the provisions of that
Declaration are not provisionsof that Treaty within the meaningof
Article29."
Both Parties agree that this is the most important issue in the
case. In support of the contention that the Declaration is not a

part of the Treaty, it is said that the Declaration was signed
separately from the Treaty proper, though by the same signatories
and on the same day. It is also pointed out that the Declaration
refers to the Treaty not as "this Treaty" or "the present TreatyM-
which would have been the proper mode of reference if the Declara-
tion had been regarded as part of the Treaty-but as "the Treaty
20nationale, alors que, selon le protocole de 1886, le tribunal devait
être une commission arbitrale ad hoc. Ceci, a-t-on fait ressortir,
est une modification d'ordre procédural et, en matière de procé-
dure, tout au moins en droit anglais, la présomption, s'agissant
de dispositions de procédure, joue en faveiir de l'application

rétroactive. Quelle que soit la situation en droit interne dans les
divers pays du monde - question que la Cour n'a pas jugé néces-
saire d'examiner et sans rechercher si les qiiestions de procédure
comprennent les cluestions de compétence, la Cour observe qu'en
tout cas les termes de l'article 32 du traité: de 1926 empêchent
d'attribuer un efflet rétroactif à certaines des dispositions qu'il
contient.
(ii) Le traité de 1926 est accompagné d'une déclàration - le
point de savoir si cette déclaration fait ou non partie du traité
sera examiné plus loin - disposant que tout différend pouvant
s'élever quant à la. validité de réclamations fondées sur les dispo-

sitions du traité de 1886 sera, à la demande de l'un des deux
gouvernements, soiumis à arbitrage conformément aux dispositions
du protocole annexé au traité de 1886. Tel était l'accord des
Parties. Les termes de la déclaration ne font aucune distinction
entre les réclamations fondées sur une catégorie de dispositions
du traité de 1886 et celles fondées sur une autre catégorie ; elles
sont toutes placées sur le même pied et les différends relatifs
à leur validité sont 'sujets à l'arbitrage conformément au
protocole de 1886. Prétendre que les différends relatifs aux
réclamations fondées sur celles des dispositions du traité antérieur
qui sont similaires aux dispositions du traité plus récent étaient

destinés à être soilmis à l'arbitrage conformément à l'article 29
du traité plus récent, alors que les différends relatifs à d'autres
réclamations, fond.ées sur le traité antérieur, étaient considérés
comme devant être arbitrés selon le protocole du traité antérieur,
serait introduire une distinction que, selon la Cour, le texte clair
de la déclaration nie justifie pas.
Le cinquième point présenté au nom du Gouvernement du
Royaume-Uni est le suivant :

«La déclarati.onqui a étésignée en mêmteemps que le traité de
1926 ne constituait pas une partie de ce traité et les dispositionsde
cette déclaratioinne sont pas des dispositionsde ce traitéau sens de
l'article 2))

Les deux Parties reconnaissent que, des points contestés en
l'espèce, celui-ci est le plus important. A l'appui de la thèse selon
laquelle la déclaration ne serait pas une partie du traité, on avance
que la déclaration a étésignée à part du traité proprement dit,
encore que par les mêmessignataires et à la mêmedate. On fait
essor tir également que la déclaration ne désigne pas le traité
comme «ce traité 1)ou comme le présent traité ))- ce qui eût
étéla manière cor~ecte de s'exprimer si la déclaration avait été....of to-day's date", thereby indicating that the Treaty had
already becn completed and signed. hloreover, it is urged, the
Ilrclaration does not Say that it is to be regarded as a part of the
Treaty, prescnting iri this respect a marked contrast to one of the
Declarations annexed to the Greco-Italian Commercial Treaty of
Sovember qth, 1926, which is followed by two Declarations, one
expressed to be an integral part of the Treaty and the other not so
expressed, the latter being almost identical in form and purpose
with the 1926 Anglo-Greek Declaration with which the Court is now

concerned.

On the other hancl, it is to be noted that the Plenipotentiaries
incliided the Treaty and the Customs Schedule (which is unques-
tionably a part of the Treaty) andthe Declaration in a single docu-
ment of 44 pages, the Declaration being on page 44. Again, shortly
after the cxchange of ratifications, the Govemment of the United
Kingdom issued Treaty Series No. 2 (1927), a single document
entitlrd "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United
Kingdom and Greece and accompanying Declaration", and pre-
sented it to Parliament. Furthermore, the British Foreign Officeand
the Chargé d'Affaires of the Hellenic Republic at Berne commun-
icated official texts to the League of Nations at Geneva for registra-
tion, which led to their inclusion in the League of Kations Treaty
Series under a single number, as "No. 1425. Treaty of Commerce

and Navigation between the United Kingdom and Greece and
accompan7ing Declaration signed at London, July 16th, 1926."

Cogent evidence asto what both Parties intended is furnished by
the instruments of ratification exchanged between the United King-
dom and Greece. The instrument of ratification by Greece was in
the foiiowing terms :"We declare that the Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation having been signed in London on the 16th July of this
year between Greece and Great Britain with annexed Customs
Schedule and Declaration, the texts of which follow :[Here follow
the Greek and English texts of the Treaty, Schedule and Decla-
ration.] We accept, approve and ratify the Treaty, the Customs
Schedule and the Declaration in al1 their provisions, promising to
faithfiilly observe and not to violate the same, or to permit their
violation by any other person whatsoever", etc.

Thus, this instrument made no distinction between the Treaty,

on the one hand, and the Customs Schedule.which is indisputably a
part of the Treaty, and the Declaration annexed to the Treaty, on
the other. It is clear, therefore, that Greece treated the Declaration
as a part of the Treaty.considéréecomme une partie du traité - mais comme «le traité
...daté de ce jour D,indiquant par là que le traité avait déjà
étéparachevé et signé. En outre, on relève qu'il n'est pas dit
dans la déclaration que celle-ci est considérée comme une partie
du traité, en quoi elle présenterait une différence très marquée

avec l'une des dBclarations jointes en annexe au traité de com-
merce du 24 novembre 1926 entre la Grècc et l'Italie, lequel est
suivi de deux décl.arations, dont l'une est indiquée comme faisant
partie intégrante du traité et dont l'autre ne porte pas la même
indication, cette dernière étant presque identique, quant à sa
forme et à son o'bjet, à la déclaration anglo-hellénique de 1926
dont la Cour s'occupe en ce moment.
Mais, d'autre part, il convient d'observer que les plénipotentiaires
ont inclus le traité, la liste douanière (laquelle est indubitablement
une partie du traité) ainsi que la déclaration dans un document
unique de quarante-quatre pages, la déclaration figurant à la
page 44. En outre, peu après l'échangedes ratifications, le Gouver-
nement du Royaume-Uni a fait paraître, sous le titre Treaty

Series No. 2 (1927)u ,n document unique intitulé ((Traité de
commerce et de navigation entre le Royaume-Uni et la Grèce et
déclaration l'accompagnant », et l'a présenté au Parlement. De
plus, le ministère des Affaires étrangères britannique et le chargé
d'affaires de la R:épublique hellénique à Berne ont transmis les
textes officielsà la Société des Nations à Genève aux fins
d'enregistrement, à la suite de quoi ces textes ont été insérés
dans le Recueil des Traitésde la Société des Nations sous un seul
numéro, savoir « :No 1425. Traité de commerce et de navigation
entre le Royaume-Uni et la Grèce et déclaration y annexée, signés
à Londres le 16 jjuille1926. ))
L'intention commune des Parties est démontréed'une manikre
Cvidente par les i.nstruments de ratification échangés entre le

Royaume-Uni et la Grèce. L'instrument de ratification déposé
par le Gouvernement hellénique est ainsi conçu :((Nous déclarons
que le traité de commerce et de navigation ayant étésigné à
Londres le 16 juillet de la présente année entre la Grèce et la
Grande-Bretagne avec, en annexe, la liste douanière et une décla-
ration dont les textes suivent : [Suit le texte, grec et anglais, du
traité, de la liste et de la déclaration.] Nous acceptons, approuvons
et ratifions le traité, la liste douanière et la déclaration dans toutes
leurs clauses, promettant de les observer loyalement, de ne pas
les enfreindre ni de permettre qu'ils soient enfreints par toute
autre personne quelle qu'elle soit», etc.
Ainsi cet instrwment ne fait aucune distinction entre le traité,

d'une part, et, d'autre part, la liste douanière qui en fait incon-
testablement partiie et la déclaration annexée au traité. Il est
donc bien clair que la Grèce considérait la déclaration comme
une partie du trai.té.43 JUDGMENT OF I VII 52 (AJIBATIELOS CASE)

The United Kingdom's instrument of ratification is even more
explicit. It reads: "GEORGE,by the Grace of God ....greeting.
Whereas a Treaty between Us and Our good friend the President
of the Hellenic Republic, relative to commerce and navigation,
was concluded and signed at London on the sixteenth day of
July in the year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and
twenty-six by the Plenipotentiaries of L-s and of Our said good
friend duly and respectively authorized for that purpose, which
Treaty is, word for ivord, as folloivs : Pere follow the English
and Greek texts of the Treaty, Schedule and Declaration.]
"We, having seen and considered the Treaty aforesaid, have

approved, accepted and confirmed the same in ail and every one
of its articles and clauses", etc.
From the wordç "which Treaty is, word for word, as follows"
and the text that follows the words, it is clear that the Cnited
Kingdom also regarded the Declaration, as well as the Customs
Schedule, as included in the Treaty. The ratification of a treaty
which provides for ratification, as does the Treaty of 1926, is an
indispensable condition for bringmg it into operation. It is not,
therefore, a mere forma1 act, but an act of vital importance. When
the Government of the United Kingdom speaks of the Treaty in
its own instrument of ratification, as being "word for word as
follows" and includes the Declaration in the text that follows,
itis not possible for the Court to hold that the Declaration is not
included in the Treaty.
The nature of the Declaration also points to the same con-
clusion. It records an understanding amved at by the Parties
before the Treaty of 1926 was signed asto what the Treaty, or as

Counsel for the Govemment of the United Kingdom preferred to
put it, the replacement of the Treaty of 1886 by the Treaty of
1926, would not prejudice. This is clear from the opening words
"It is well understood that the Treaty ....of to-day's date, does
not prejudice claims on behalf of private persons based on the
provisions of the Anglo-Greek Commercial Treaty of 1886." From
the series of instruments which from time to time continued the
Treaty of 1886 in force after its initial denunciation by Greece,
itis evident that ultimately it was the coming into force of the
Treaty of 1926 that finally terminated the operation of the Treaty
of 1886. But for the Declaration, Article 32 of the Treaty of
1926, which brought that Treaty into force upon ratification,
might, in the absence of any saving clause, have been regarded
as putting the Treaty into full operation so as completely to wipe
out the Treaty of 1886 and al1 its provisions, including its remedial
provisions, and any claims based thereon. Indeed, the United
Kingdom Government, before proceeding to the signature of the

Treaty of 1926, asked for an assurance that the Hellenic Govem-
ment would not regard "the conclusion of the Treaty" as preju-
dicing certain claims of British subjects based on the older Treaty.
22 L'instrument de ratification du Royaume-Uni est encore plus
explicite. Il est ainsi conçu : «GEORGE,par la Grfice de Dieu ....

salut. Attendu qu'un traité entre Nous et Notre cher ami, le
Président de la République hellénique, se rapportant au commerce
et à la navigation, a étéconclu et signé à Londres, le seizième
jour de juillet en l'an de Grâce mil neuf cent vingt-six, par Nos
plénipotentiaires et ceux de Notre dit cher ami dûment et respecti-
vement autorisés à cette fin, lequel traité est, mot pour mot,
ainsi conçu : [suit le texte, anglais et grec, du traité, de la liste
et de la déclarati~on].
«Ayant vu et examiné le traité ci-dessus, Nous avons approuvé,
accepté et confirmé ledit traité, dans tous ses articles et clauses
et dans chacun d'eux », etc.
Des termes ((lequel traité est, mot pour mot, ainsi conçu » et

du texte qui leur fait suite, il ressort clairement que le Royaume-
Uni aussi considéiraitla déclaration et la Iiste douanière comme
compris dans le traité. La ratification d'un traité, lorsqu'elle y
est prévue, comnne dans le traité de 1926, est une condition
indispensable de l'entrée en vigueur du traité. Elle n'est donc
pas une simple formalité mais un acte d'importance essentielle.
Lorsque le Gouveimement du Royaume-Uni mentionne, dans son
propre instrument de ratification, le traité qui ((est, mot pour
mot, ainsi conçu Xet qu'il comprend la déclaration dans le texte
qui suit, il n'est pas possible à la Cour de décider que la décla-

ration n'est pas piirtie du traité.
La nature de la déclaration conduit aussi à la même conclusion.
Elle enregistre un accord auquel ont abouti les Parties avant la
signature du traité de 1926, au sujet de ce à quoi ne porterait pas
préjudice le traité!ou, selon la formule que préfère le conseildu
Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, au sujet de ce à quoi ne porterait
pas préjudice la substitution du traité de 1926 au traité de 1886.
Cela ressort clairement des termes par lesquels le texte débute :
« Il est bien entendu que le traité ....daté de ce jour, ne porte pas
préjudice aux récllamationsau nom de personnes privées, fondées
sur les dispositions du traité commercial anglo-grec de 1886. ))
De la séried'actes en vertu desquels le traité de 1886a étémaintenu

en vigueur après sa dénonciation initiale par la Grèce, il appert
qu'en définitive c'est l'entrée en vigueur du traité de 1926
qui a mis fin à l'existence du traité de 1886. Sans la déclaration,
l'article 32 du traité de 1926 qui a fait entrer ce traité en vigueur
après la ratificatio:n, aurait pu, en l'absence de clausede sauvegarde,
êtreconsidérécom.melui donnant pleinement effet, de telle manière
qu'il effacerait entièrement le traité de 1886 et toutes ses dispo-
sitions, y compris celles qui sont destinées à apporter des remèdes
juridiques ainsi que toutes les réclamations fondées sur elles.
En fait, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, avant de procéder
à la signature du traité de 1926, demanda à êtreassuré que le

Gouvernement hellénique ne considérerait pas cla conclusion du
22The intention of the Declaration was to prevent the new Treaty
from being interpreted as coming into fuli force in this sweeping
manner and thus prejudicing claims based on the older Treaty or
the remedies provided for them. It follows that, for the proper
interpretation or application of the provisions of the Treaty of
1926, some siich words as "Save as provided in the Declaration
annexed to this Treaty" have to be read into Article 32 before
the words "It shali come into force". Thus, the provisions of the
Declaration are in the nature of an interpretation clause, and,

as such, should be regarded as an integral part of the Treaty,
even if this was not stated in terms.

For these reasons, the Court holds that either expressly (by
virtue of the United Kingdom's own instrument of ratification)
or by necessary implication (from the very nature of the Declar-
ation) the provisions of the Declaration are provisions of the
Treaty within the meaning of Article 29. Consequently, this Court
has jurisdiction to decide any dispute as to the interpretation or
application of the Declaration and, in a proper case, to adjudge
that there should be a reference to a Commission of Arbitration.
Any differences as to the validity of the claims involved will, how-
ever, have to be arbitrated, as provided in the Declaration itself,
by the Commission.

It may seem at first sight that there is here a possibility of a
conflict between a decision of the Court finding that there is an
obligation to submit a difference to a Commission of Arbitration
and an eventual decision by the Commission. There is in reality
no such possibility.
The Court would decide whether there is a differerLce between
the Parties within the meaning of the Declaration of 1926. Should
the Court find that there is such a difference, the Commission
of Arbitration would decide on the merits of the difference.
It may be contended that because a special provision overrides
a general provision, the Declaration should ovemde Article 29
of the Treaty of 1926 and, as it lays down a special arbitral
procedure, it excludes the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 29.
While it is true that the Declaration excludes the Court from
functioning as the Commission of Arbitration, it is equally true
that it lies with the Court to decide precisely whether there

should he a reference to a Commission of Arhitration.

The sixth argument of the United Kingdom Government is that :

"The claim wliich the Greek Governrnent is rnaking on behalf
of 31. .4rnbaticloin so far as it is bnscd on any provision of the
Trc;ity of 1S130i, not aclaim covc,red by the Dcclaration of 1926,
23traité » comme portant préjudice à certaines réclamations de

ressortissants britanniques fondées sur l'ancien traité. L'objet de
la déclaration a étéd'empêcherle nouveau traité d'êtreinterprété
comme entrant en vigueur d'une manière aussi radicale et de
porter ainsi atteinte aux réclamations fondéessur l'ancien traité ou
aux moyens de lei5faire valoir. Il s'ensuit qu'aux fins de l'exacte
interprétation ou application des dispositions du traité de 1926,
il faut lire,à l'article 32, avant les mots «.Il entrera en vigueur »,
une formule telle que (Sous réserve des dispositions de la clécla-
ration jointe en annexe au présent traité 1)Ainsi, les dispositions
de la déclaration ont le caractère de clauses interprétatives, et

comme telles devraient être considérées comme partie intégrante
du traité, même sicela n'avait pas étédit expressément.
Pour ces raisoris, la Cour estime que, soit expressément (en
vertu de l'instmrnent de ratification déposé par le Royaume-
Uni lui-même), soit par voie d'implication nécessaire (c'est-à-dire
de par la nature mêmede la déclaration), les dispositions de la
déclaration sont des dispositions du traité au sens de l'article 29.
En conséquence, la Cour est compétente pour connaître de tout
différend relatif à l'interprétation ou à l'application de la décla-

ration, et, dans un cas approprié, pour dire qu'il devrait y avoir
soumission à une commission arbitrale. Cependant, tout différend
quant à la validité des réclamations en cause devra, ainsi qu'il
est prévu dans la, déclaration elle-même, être soumis à la com-
mission.
Il peut sembler à première vue qu'il existe ici une possibilité de
conflit entre une décision de la Cour déclarant qu'il y a obligation
de soumettre un différend à une commission arbitrale et une
décision éventuelbe de la commission. En réalité,il n'y a pas de
possibilité de ce genre.

La Cour aura à juger s'il y a un différend entre les Parties au
sens de la déclaraition de 1926. Si eile arrive à la conclusion qu'un
tel différend existe, la tommission arbitrale aura à se prononcer
sur le fond du différend.
On pourrait soutenir qu'une disposition particulière l'emportant
sur une disposition générale, la déclaration devrait l'emporter sur
l'article29 du traité de 1q26 ;et comme elle prescrit une procédure
arbitrale spéciale, elle exclurait la compétence de la Cour selon
l'article29. S'il est vrai que la déclaration ne permet pas à la Cour
de remplir les fonctions d'une commission arbitrale, il est également

vrai qu'il appartient à la Cour de se prononcer précisémentsur le
point de savoir s'il doit y avoir soumission à une commission
arbitrale.
Le sixième argument du (;ouvernement du Royaume-Uni
s'énonce comme suit :
(La réclamation que pristmtt.lt,Gouverncmcnt Iiellénicliieail
nom tie M. Arnbntielos, d;ins larntxiiiioù ctlltse foridc sur une
disposition cluelconcludu trait6 de ISFO,n'estpas une réclamation viséepar la diiclaration de1926 ,arce que cette déclaration ne
visait que lesbclamations énoncées envertu de ce traité avantque
la déclaration eût étésignée,et le Gouvernement helléniquen'a
pas présenté pour le compte de M. Ambatielos, de réclamation
d'ordre juridique avant 1933, ni de réclamation juridique sur la
base du traité de1886 avant 1939 .

La phrase qui figure dans la déclaration est la suivante : récla-
mations ((fondées sur les dispositions du traité commercial anglo-
grec de 1886 ».Orine trouve dans la déclaration aucune allusion
quelconque à la date de présentation des réclamations ;la seule
exigence est que (cesréclamations soient fondées sur le traité de
1886. Le conseil du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a tenté
d'appuyer sa thèse en se référantaux négociations qui ont abouti
à la signature de la déclaration. Les procès-verbaux des négocia-
tions ne viennent pas appuyer cette thèse. Il ressort de ces procès-
verbaux que, bien que le Gouvernement hellénique ait à l'origine
proposé un texte de déclaration où il était fait allusion à ((des
réclamations ant~érieures découlant éventuellement du traité
commercial anglo-grec de 1886 », ce projet, en fin de compte, n'a

pas étéaccepté el: les deux Parties ont adopté, en lieu et place,
le texte actuel de la déclaration en ometant le mot ((antérieuresB.
En tout cas, quand le texte à interpréter est clair, comme en
l'espèce,il n'y a pas lieu de recourir aux travaux préparatoires.
Si l'interprétation proposée par le Royaume-Uni était admise,
des réclamations fondées sur le traité de 1886, mais présentées
après la conclusiori du traité de1926, demeureraient sans solution.
Elles ne pourraierit êtresoumises à l'arbitrage en vertu d'aucun
des deux traités, même si la disposition dont la violation leur
servirait de base figurait dans les deux traités et était ainsi demeurée
en vigueur sans interruption depuis 1886. La Cour ne saurait
accueillir une interprétation qui conduise à un résultat manifeste-
ment opposéaux termes de la déclaration et à la volonté continue

des deux Parties de soumettre tous les différends à l'arbitrage,
sous une forme ou.sous une autre.
Reste à examiner le dernier argument selon lequel «le traité
de 1886 ne contient pas de dispositions incorporant au traité les
principes généraux du droit international en matière de traitement
des étrangers devant les tribunaux ou d'autre manière et, en
conséquence, on ne peut soutenir que le prétendu déni de justice
commis en violation des principes généraux du droit international
constitue un manquement au traité de 1886, simplement parce
qu'il constituerait un nianquement aux principes généraux du
droit internationaln.
Le point soulevé ici n'a pas encore étécomplètement débattu
par les Parties, et par coriséqucint, il ne peut être tranché au

stade actuel. For these reasons,

adjudicating on the Preliminary Objection fded by the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland to the Application of the Royal Hellenic Government,
by thirteen votes to two,

finds that it is without jurisdiction to decide on the merits of
the Ambatielos claim ;

by ten votes to five,
finds that it has jurisdiction to decide whether the United
Kingdom is under an obligation to submit to arbitration, in accord-
ance with the Declaration of 1926, the difference as to the validity
of the Ambatielos claim, in so far as this claim is based on the
Treaty of 1886 ;

decides that the time-limits for the filing of a Reply and a
Rejoinder shall be fixed by subsequent Order.

Done in English and French,the English text being authoritative,
at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this first day of July, one
thousand nine hundred and fifty-two, in three copies, one of
which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others
wiil be transniitted to the Royal Hellenic Govemment and to the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem
Ireland, respectively.

(Signed) J. G. GUERRERO,
Vice-President.

(Signed E. HAMBRO,

Registrar. Par ces motifs,

statuant sur l'exception préliminaire opposée par le Gouver-
nement du Royailme-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du
Nord à la requête du Gouvernement royal hellénique,

par treize voix contre deux,
dit qu'elle n'est. pas compétente pour statuer sur le fond de
la réclamation Anibatielos ;

par dix voix contre cinq.

dit qu'elle est compétente pour décidersi le Royaume Uni est
tenu de soumettre à l'arbitrage, conformément à la déclaration
de 1926, le différend relatià la validité de la réclamation Amba-
tielos, en tant que cette réclamation est fondée sur le traité de
1886 ;
dit que les délais pour le dépôt d'une réplique et d'une duplique

seront fixés par voie d'ordonnance.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au
Palais de la Paix, à La Haye, le premier juillet mil neuf cent
cinquante-deux, en trois exemplaires, dont l'un restera déposé
aux archives de la. Cour et dont les autres seront transmis respec-
tivement au Gouvernement royal hellénique et au Gouvernement
du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord.

Le Vice-Président,

(Signé) J. G. GUERRERO.

Le Greffier,

(Szgnk) E. HAMBRO. Judge LEVI CARNEIROand M. SPIROPOULOS J, dge ad hoc,
availing themselves of the right conferred on them by Arti57e
of the Statute, append to the Judgrnent of the Court statements
of their individual opinions.

Judge ALVAREZ declares that there are in the present case
sufficient grounds for holding that the Court has juridictito
deal with the merits of the Ambatielos claim.

The President Sir Arnold MCNAIR,Judges BASDEVANT Z,ORICIC,
KLAESTAD and Hsu Mo, availing themselves of the right conferred
on them by Article 57 of the Statute, append to the Judgment
statements of their dissenting opinions.

(Initialled) J. G. G.

(Initialled) EH. M. LEVI CARNEIROj,uge, et M. SPIROPOULOS j,ge ad hoc, se
prévalant du droit que leur confère l'arti57edu Statut, joignent
à l'arrêt les exposés de leur opinion individuelle.

M. ALVAREZj,uge, déclare que l'affaire présente des motifs de
compétence qui suffiraient à la Cour pour se prononcer sur le
fond de la réclamation Ambatielos.

Sir Arnold MC:NAIR,Président, MM. BASDEVANT,ZORICIC,
KLAESTAD et Hsiu Mo, juges, se prévalant du droit que leur
confère l'article.7du Statut, joignent à l'arrêt les exposés de
leur opinion dissidente.

(Paraphé) J. G.G.
(Paraphé) E. H.

ICJ document subtitle

Preliminary Objection (including the text of the declaration of Judge Alvarez)

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Judgment of 1 July 1952

Links