Judgment of 26 June 1992

Document Number
080-19920626-JUD-01-00-EN
Document Type
judgment
Case
80 - Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia)
Incidental Proceedings
Preliminary objections
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DE CERTAINES TERRES

À PHOSPHATES À NAURU
(NAURU cAUSTRALIE)

ARRÊT DU 26 JUIN 1992

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING

CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU

(NAURU vAUSTRALIA)

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

JUDGMENT OF 26 JUNE 1992 Modeofficielde citati:n
CertainesterresàphosphatàNauru(Nauruc.Australie),
exceptionspréliminair,rrêt, C.I.ecueil1992,. 240

Official citat:on
CertainPhosphateLandsinNauru(Nauru v.Australia),
Preliminaty Objections,JudgmentI,.C.J.Reports 1992,p. 240

Nodevent:
Salesnumber 616 /
ISBN 92-1-070674-9 INTERNATIONALCOURTOF JUSTICE

YEAR 1992 1992
26June
GeneralList
26 June 1992 No. 80

CASECONCERNING

CERTAINPHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU

(NAURU v.AUSTRALIA)

PRELIMINARYOBJECTIONS

Jurisdictionof the Court and admissibility.
Declarationof acceptanceof compulsoiyjurisdiction excluding "anydispute in
regardto whichthe Parties theretohaveagreed orshallagreeto haverecourseto
someothermethodofpeacefulsettlement "- ApplicationtoStates aloneofdeclar-
ations underArticle36,paragraph2, of Statute - Respondent's declarationand
exclusionfor whichitprovides.
Alleged waiverof claimsprior to independence - (1)Agreement betweenthe
localauthorities ofa trust territoryand theAdministering AuthorityAbsenceof
explicitclause operatingas waive- Absence ofimplicitwaiver - (2)Discussions
in the UnitedNations - Significance ofstatements by representativeof thelocal
authorities.
Alleged breachesof a trusteeshipagreement - "Definitivelegaleffect"of Gen-
eralAssembly resolutions terminating trusteeship agreements - Particularcir-
cumstances in which the Trusteeshipover Nauru was terminated - Question
of dischargesaid to have beengivenby resolution.

Need to determine in each case effects of passage of time with regard to the
admissibilityofan application.
Applicant's allegedinconsistencyand lack ofgoodfaith - Absenceof an abuse
ofprocess.
Mandateconferredon"HisBritannicMajesty"asSovereignof the UnitedKing-
dom,Australia andNew Zealand - TrusteeshipgrantedtoAustralia, New Zea-
landand the UnitedKingdom 'fjointly"designatedasAdministering Authority -
Absence of international legalpersonality of the Adrninistering Authority -
(1)Claimsbased onconductof Respondentas one of the threeStates making up
theAdministeringAuthority - Suing ofRespondentalonea questionindependent
of thatofpossible Joint andseveral"liabili-y Possibilityof the Court'sconsider-
ing a clairnof alleged breachby Respondent of its obligationsunder Trusteeship
Agreement - (2)Fundamentalprincipleof consentof States to Court'sjurisdic-
tion- Possibilityof the Court'stakinga decisionwithoutrulingonlegalsituationof non-partyState- Situationdifferentfrom that withwhichthe Court hadto
dealintheMonetary Gold case.

Article40,paragraph1,oftheStatuteoftheCourtandArticle38,paragraph2,
oftheRulesof Court- Claimnewinbothfonnandsubstancewhoseexamination
by theCourtwould transfonnthe subjectof thedispute originally submittedto it.

JUDGMENT

Present: President Sir Robert JENNINGS; ice-PresidentODA;Judges LACHS,
AGO, SCHWEBEL B,EDJAOUI N,I, EVENSENT ,ARASSOV G,UILLAUME,
SHAHABUDDEA ENU, ILAMAWDSLEY RA, NJEVA;egistrarVALENCIA-

OSPINA.

In the case concerningcertain phosphate lands in Nauru,

between
the Republic of Nauru,

represented by
Mr. V. S. Mani, Professor of International Law, Jawaharlal Nehru Uni-
versity, New Delhi; former Chief Secretary and Secretary to Cabinet,
Republic of Nauru,
Mr. Leo D. Keke, Presidential Counsel of the Republic of Nauru; former
Minister for Justice of the Republic of Nauru; and Member of the Bar of
the Republic of Nauru and of the Australian Bar,

as Co-Agents,Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Hammer DeRoburt, G.C.M.G., O.B.E., M.P., Head Chief and
Chairman ofthe Nauru Local GovernmentCouncil; formerPresident and
Chairman of Cabinet and former Minister for External and Interna1
Affairs and the Phosphate Industry, Republic of Nauru,

Mr. Ian Brownlie, Q.C., Member of the English BChichele Professor of

Public International Law, University of Oxford; Fellow ofuls Col-
lege, Oxford,
Mr. Barry Connell, Associate Professor of Law, Monash University, Mel-
bourne; Member ofthe Australian Bar; formerChief Secretary andre-
tary to Cabinet, Republic of Nauru,
Mr.JamesCrawford, Challis Professor of International Lawand Dean ofthe
Faculty of Law,University of Sydney; Member of the Australian Bar,

as Counsel and Advocates,

and

the Commonwealth of Australia,represented by
Mr. Gavan Griffith, Q.C., Solicitor-General of Australia,
as Agent and Counsel;

H.E. Mr. Warwick Weemaes, Ambassador of Australia to the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;

Mr. Henry Burmester, Principal Adviser in International Law, Australian
Attorney-General'sDepartment,
as Co-Agent and Counsel;

Mr. Eduardo JiménezdeAréchaga,Professor of International Law, Monte-
video,
Mr. Derek W. Bowett, Q.C., emeritus Whewell Professor of International
Law, University of Cambridge,
Mr.Alain Pellet,Professor of Law,Universityof ParisX-Nanterre and Insti-
tute of Political Studies,Paris,
Ms Susan Kenny, of the Australian Bar,

as Counsel;
Mr. Peter Shannon, Deputy Legal Adviser, Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Mr. Paul Porteous, First Secretary, Australian Embassy in the Netherlands,

as Advisers,

composedas above,
after deliberation,

delivers thefollowingJudgment:

1. On 19May 1989,the Government of the Republic of Nauni (hereinafter
called "Nauni") filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting
proceedingsagainst the Commonwealth of Australia (hereinafter called "Aus-
tralia") in respect of a "dispu... overthe rehabilitation of certain phosphate
lands [in Nauru] worked out before Naunian independence". To found the
jurisdiction ofthe Courtthe Application relies on the declarationsmade by the
two Statesaccepting thejurisdiction ofthe Court, asprovided forin Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court.
2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was
communicated forthwith by the Registrar to the Government of Australia; in
accordance with paragraph 3 of that Article, al1other Statesentitled to appear
before the Court were notified of the Application.
3. Time-limits for the filing of the Memorial of Nauni and the Counter-
Memorial of Australia were fixed by an Order of 18July 1989.The Memorial
was filed on 20 April 1990,within the time-limit fixed for thispurpose. By a
letter dated 19September 1990,the Agent of Australia informed the Registrar
that, after due consideration of the Memorial of Nauru, his Government had
come to the conclusion that the Court had nojurisdiction in the case and that
the Application was not admissible; he consequently informed the Registrar

that Australia would raise preliminaryobjectionsin accordance withthe provi-sions of Article 79of the Rules of Court. On 16January 1991,within the time-
limitfixedforthefiling ofthe Counter-Memorial,the Government of Australia
filed PreliminaryObjectionssubmitting that the Application was inadmissible
and that the Court lackedjurisdiction to hearthe claimsmade therein. Accord-
ingly,by an Order dated 8 February 1991,the Court, recording that byvirtue of
the provisionsof Article79,paragraph 3,of theRulesof Court,theproceedings
on the merits were suspended, fixed a time-limit for the presentation by the
Government of Nauru of a Written Statement of its Observations and Sub-
missions on the Preliminary Objections. That statement was filed on 17July
1991,withintheprescribed time-limit,and the casebecamereadyforhearingin
respect of the preliminary objections.
4. On 11to 19,and 21 and 22 November 1991,public hearings were held in

the course of which the Court heard the oral arguments and replies of the
following :
ForAustralia: Mr.GavanGriffith, Q.C.,
Mr. Eduardo JiménezdeAréchaga,
Mr.Derek W.Bowett,Q.C.,
Mr. HenryBurmester,
Mr.Alain Pellet.

ForNauru: Mr. V.S.Mani,
H.E. Mr. Hammer DeRoburt, G.C.M.G., O.B.E.,M.P.,
Mr.LeoD. Keke,
Mr. Barry Connell,
Mr.Ian Brownlie,Q.C.,
Mr.JamesCrawford.

During the hearings, questions were put by Members of the Court to both
Parties, and replies were giveneither orally or in writing.

5. In the course of the written proceedings, the following submissions were
presented by the Parties :

Onbehalfof theGovemmentof Nauru,
in the Memorial:

"On the basis of the evidence and legal argument presented in this
Memorial, the Republic of Nauru
RequeststheCourtto adjudge anddeclare

that the Respondent Statebears responsibility for breaches of the follow-
ing legal obligations:
First: the obligations set forth in Article 76 of the United Nations
Charter and Articles 3 and 5 of the Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru
of 1November 1947.
Second:the international standards generally recognized as applicable
in the implementation of the principle of self-determination.

Third:the obligationto respect the right of the Nauruan people to per-
manent sovereigntyovertheir natural wealth and resources. Fourth: the obligation of general international law not to exercise
powers of administration in such a way as to produce a denial of justice
latosensu.
Fgth:the obligation of generalinternational law not to exercisepowers
of administration in such a way as to constitute an abuse of rights.

Sixth: the principle of general international law that a State which is
responsible forthe administration of territory isunder an obligationnot to
bring about changes in the condition of the territory which will cause
irreparable damage to, or substantially prejudice, the existing or contin-
gent legal interest of another Statein respect of that territory.
RequeststheCourtto adjudge anddeclarefurther

that the Republic of Nauru has a legalentitlement tothe Australianalloca-
tion of the overseas assets of the British Phosvhate Commissioners which
were marshalled and disposed of in accordance with the trilateral Agree-
ment concluded on 9 February 1987.

RequeststheCourtto adjudge and declare
that the Respondent State is under a duty to make appropriate reparation
in respect of the loss caused to the Republic of Nauru as a result of the
breaches of its legal obligationsdetailed above and its failure to recognize
the interest of Nauru in the overseas assets of the British Phosphate Com-
missioners."

Onbehalfof theGovemmentofAustralia,
in the Preliminary Objections :

"On the basis of the facts and law presented in these PreliminaryObjec-
tions, the Government of Australia requests the Court to adjudge and
declare that the Application by Nauru is inadmissible and that the Court
lacks jurisdiction to hear the claims made by Nauru for al1or any of the
reasons set out inthese Preliminary Objections."

Onbehalfof theGovemmentof Nauru,
in the Written Statement of its Observations and Submissionson the Prelimi-
nary Objections :

"In consideration of the foregoing the Government of Nauru requests
the Court :
Torejectthe preliminaryobjections of Australia, and

Toadjudge anddeclare:
(a) that the Court hasjurisdiction in respect of the claim presented in the
MemorialofNauru, and
(b) that the claimisadmissible."

6. In the course of the oral proceedings, the following submissions were
presented by the Parties :
Onbehalfof theGovemmentofAustralia,

atthe hearing of 21 November 1991 :
"On the basis of the facts and law set out in its PreliminaryObjections
and its oral pleadings, and foral1or any ofthe grounds and reasons set out therein,the Governmentof Australia requeststhe Court to adjudgeand
declarethattheclaimsbyNauru againstAustraliasetoutintheirApplica-
tion and Memorialareinadmissibleand that the Court lacksjurisdiction
to hear theclaims."

Onbehalfof the Governmentof Nauru,
at the hearingof 22 November1991 :

"In considerationof its written and oral pleadingsthe Governmentof
the Republicof Nauru requeststhe Court:
To rejecthe preliminaryobjectionsraisedbyAustralia,and
Toadjudge anddeclare:

(a)thattheCourthasjurisdictioninrespectoftheclaimspresentedinthe
Memorial ofNauru,and
(b)thattheclaimsareadmissible.
In the alternative,the Governmentof the Republicof Nauru requests
the Court to declarethat someor al1ofthe Australianpreliminaryobjec-
tionsdoSotpossess, inthecircumstancesofthecase,an exclusivelypreli-
minarycharacter,and in consequence,tojoin someor al1of theseobjec-
tions t/khemerits."

7. The Court will first consider those of Australia's objections which
concern the circumstances in which the dispute relating to rehabilitation
of the phosphate lands worked out prior to 1July 1967arose between

Nauru and Australia. It will then turn tothe objection based on the fact
.- that New Zealand and the United Kingdom are notparties tothe proceed-
ings. Lastly,it willrule on the objections to Nauru's submissionsrelating
to the overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners.

8. The Court willbegin by considering the question of itsjurisdiction.
In itsApplication, Nauru basesjurisdiction on the declarations whereby
Australia and Nauru have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court under
Article 36,paragraph 2,ofthe Statute. Those declarations were deposited
withthe Secretary-General ofthe United Nations on 17March 1975inthe
caseofAustralia and on 29January 1988inthe caseofNauru. The declara-
tion of Nauru stipulates that Nauru's acceptance of the Court's jurisdic-
tion does not extend to "any dispute with respect to which there exists a

dispute settlementmechanism under an agreementbetween the Republic
of Nauru and another State". The declaration of Australia, for its part,
specifies that it"does not apply to any dispute in regard to which the
parties thereto have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some
othermethod of peaceful settlement".
9. Australia contends that as a result ofthe latter reservation theCourt lacks jurisdiction to deal with Nauru's Application. It recalls in that
respectthat Nauru, havingbeen previouslyadministered under a League
of Nations Mandate, wasplaced under the Trusteeship Systemprovided
forinChapter XII ofthe United Nations Charter bya Trusteeship Agree-
ment approved by the General Assembly on 1 November 1947.That
Agreementprovided that theadministration ofNauru wasto be exercised
byan AdministeringAuthoritymade up ofthe Governments ofAustralia,
NewZealand and the United Kingdom.Australiaargues that anydispute
which arose in the course ofthe Trusteeshipbetween"the Administering
Authority and the indigenousinhabitants" fellwithin the exclusive juris-
diction of the United Nations Trusteeship Council and General Assem-

bly. Those organs, kept informed about Nauruan affairs by the Visiting
Missions appointed by the Trusteeship Council, by petitions from the
inhabitants, and by the reports of the Administering Authority, could
make recommendations with respect to such disputes, not only to that
Authority, but also to the representatives of the Nauruan people; they
couldalsoprompt negotiations withaviewto settlementofsuchdisputes.
Butinanyevent,accordingto Australia,anydispute ofthat typeshouldbe
regarded as havingbeen settled by the veryfact of the termination ofthe
Trusteeship,provided thatthat termination was unconditional.
10. In the present case, Australia emphasizes that the Nauru Local
GovernmentCouncil - an organ, created in 1951,representing the Nau-
ruan community and which, from 1963onwards, had been, in many
respects, responsible for local administrative tasks - raised with the
United Nations the question of rehabilitation of the worked-out phos-
phate lands from 1965onwards. That question was discussed in subse-
quent years,both withinthe United Nations and indirectcontacts. Atthe
end of those discussions,anAgreementrelatingtotheNauru Island Phos-

phate Industry was concluded on 14November 1967between the Nauru
Local Government Council, on the one hand, and Australia, New Zea-
land and the United Kingdom, on the other, the effect of which,in Aus-
tralia's submission,was that Nauru waived itsclaimsto rehabilitation of
the phosphate lands.Australiamaintains,moreover, that on 19December
1967,the United Nations General Assemblyterminated the Trusteeship
without makinganyreservationrelatingtothe administration oftheTerri-
tory. In those circumstances,Australia contends that, with respect tothe
dispute presented in Nauru's Application, Australia and Nauru had
agreed "to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement"
within the meaning ofthe reservation in Australia'sdeclaration, and that
consequently the Court lacksjurisdiction to deal with that dispute.
11. The Court does not consider it necessaryto enter at this point into
the details ofthe arguments thus advanced. Declarations made pursuant
to Article 36,paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court can only relate to
disputes between States. The declaration of Australia only covers that
type ofdispute; itismade expressly"in relationto any other Stateaccept-

ing the same obligation ...". In these circumstances, the question that
arises in this case is whether Australia and the Republic of Nauru did ordid not, after 31 January 1968,when Nauru acceded to independence,
conclude an agreementwhereby the two States undertook to settletheir
disputerelatingto rehabilitation ofthe phosphate lands byresorting to an
agreed procedure other than recourse to the Court. No such agreement
has been pleaded or shown to exist. That question has therefore to be
answered in the negative. The Court thus considers that the objection
raised by Australia on the basis ofthe above-mentioned reservation must
be rejected.

12. Australia'ssecond objection isthat the Nauruan authorities, even
before accedingto independence, waived al1claimsrelating to rehabilita-
tion ofthe phosphate lands.Thisobjection contains two branches. In the
firstplace,the waiver,itissaid,wasthe implicitbut necessaryresultofthe
above-mentioned Agreementof 14November 1967.It isalso said to have
resultedfrom the statementsmadein the United Nations in theautumn of
1967bytheNauruan Head Chiefonthe occasionofthe termination ofthe
Trusteeship. In theviewofAustralia, Nauru maynot goback onthat two-
fold waiverand its claimshould accordinglybe rejected as inadmissible.

13. TheCourt doesnot deemit necessaryto enterintothe various ques-
tionsoflawthatare raisedbythe foregoingargument and, inparticular, to
consider whether any waiver by the Nauruan authorities prior to acces-
sion to independence is opposable to the Republic of Nauru. It will suf-
fice to note that in fact those authorities did not at anytime effecta clear
and unequivocal waiveroftheir claims,whether onetakes into considera-

tion the negotiations which led to the Agreement of 14November 1967,
the Agreement itself,or the discussionsat the United Nations.

14. The Parties are at one in recognizing that the Agreement of
14November 1967laid down the conditions under whichthe property in
the capitalassets of the phosphate industry on Nauru was to pass to the
localauthorities and the waysinwhichthe phosphate would,in future,be
worked and sold.Theyalsorecognizethatthat Agreementdid not contain
any express provision relating to rehabilitation of the phosphate lands
previously worked out. However, the Parties disagree as to the signifi-
cance ofthat silence.Australia maintains that "the Agreement did repre-
sent a comprehensivesettlement of al1claimsby Nauru in relation to the
phosphate industry", including rehabilitation of the lands, and that the
Agreement wasaccordinglytantamount to a waiverby Nauru of its pre-
vious claims in that regard. Nauru, on the contrary, contends that the
absence of anyreferenceto that matter in the Agreement cannot be inter-
preted as implyinga waiver.

15. TheCourt notesthat during the discussionswiththe Administering
Authority the delegation ofthe Nauru Local Government Council main-
tained, as earlyas June 1965,that "there was a responsibility on the Part-nerGovernmentsto restore attheir costthe land that had been mined". In
June 1966the delegationrestated that position,noting that costshad been
estimatedat 91million Australiandollars and proposing that those costs
shouldbe shared bythe three Governmentsin proportion to the benefits
they had previously derived from the mining of the phosphate. It con-
cluded by adding that Nauru would beprepared to assumeresponsibility
for the restoration of any land mined subsequently if "the full economic
benefit from the phosphate" was made available to the Nauruans at a
future time. No agreement was reached on that subject in 1966and the
discussions resumed in April 1967.The Administering Authority then
proposed the insertion into the future agreement of a provision to the

effectthat :
"The Partner Governments consider that the proposed financial
arrangements on phosphate cover the future needs of the Nauruan
communityincludingrehabilitation or resettlement."

During the meetingheld on 16May 1967,the delegation ofthe Adminis-
tering Authority asked

"would the Nauruans press their argument despite any financial
arrangements made, that the Partner Governments had a responsi-
bility on rehabilitation?"

The summary record ofthe discussions goeson to Saythat

"Duringthefollowing discussionit emerged that the Nauruans
would still maintain their claim on the Partner Governments in
respectofrehabilitation ofareasminedinthepast, evenifthePartner
Governments did not press for the withdrawal of the claim in a
forma1manner such asin an agreement."

There is no trace of any subsequent discussion of this question in the
documentsbeforethe Court.
16. TheCourt notesthat the Agreementof 14November 1967contains
no clausebywhichthe Nauruan authorities expresslywaivedtheirearlier
claims.Furthermore, in the view ofthe Court, the text of the Agreement,
read as a whole, cannot, regard being had to the circumstances set out in
paragraph 15above, be construed as implying such a waiver. The first
branch of the Australianargument mustbe rejected.

17. Australia maintains further that the Nauruan authorities also
waivedtheir claimsto rehabilitation ofthelands during the debates atthe
United Nations that led,in the autumn of 1967,tothe termination of the
Trusteeship over Nauru and to its independence. Australia relies chiefly
upon a statementmade in the Fourth Committee of the United Nations
General Assembly on 6 December 1967, bythe Nauruan Head Chief,

Mr. DeRoburt, in which he said : "[theisland had the]good fortune [topossess]largedeposits of high-
grade phosphate. That economicbase, of course, presented its own
problems. One which worried the Naumans derived from the fact
that land from which phosphate had been mined would be totally
unusable. Consequently, although it would be an expensive opera-
tion, thatland wouldhave to be rehabilitated and steps werealready
being taken tobuild up funds to beused for that purpose. That phos-
phate was a wasting asset was,in itself,a problem; in about twenty-
five years' timethe supply would be exhausted. The revenuewhich
Naum had received in the past and would receive during the next
twenty-fiveyearswould,however,makeitpossibleto solvethe prob-
lem. Already some of the revenue was being allocated to develop-

ment projects ...In addition,a muchlargerproportion ofitsincome
was being placed in a long-terminvestmentfund, so that, whatever
happened, future generations would be provided for. In short, the
Naumans wanted independence and were confident that they had
the resources with whichto sustain it."

Australiaargues that thisstatementamounted to an undertaking bythe
Naunian authorities to finance any rehabilitation of lands worked out in
the pastfromrevenuederivingfrom future exploitation, and that it conse-
quently constituted a waiver of any claim against the Administering
Authority.
18. In orderto ascertainthe significanceofthis statement,itneeds tobe
placed in context.Asearlyas 1965,the Nauru LocalGovernmentCouncil
had submitted to a Visiting Mission appointed by the United Nations
Tmsteeship Council a memorandum indicating thatthe soi1onthe island
"must be fullyrehabilitated". Then at itsthirty-third session,in the spring
of 1966,the Tmsteeship Councilnoted a statementmade bythe represen-
tative ofthe people of Naum that :

"the responsibility for rehabilitating the Island, in so far as it is the
AdministeringAuthority's, remainswiththe Administering Author-
ity. If it should turn out that Nauni gets its own independence in
January 1968,from then on the responsibility willbe ours. A rough
assessment of the portions of responsibility for this rehabilitation
exercisethen isthis:one-third isthe responsibilityofthe Administer-
ing Authority and two-thirds is the responsibility of the Nauman
people."

In the spring of 1967,the representative of the people of Naum again
emphasized before the Trusteeship Council, at its thirty-fourth session,
that "the Administering Authority should accept responsibility for the
rehabilitation ofthe lands already mined".
19. Lastly,on 22 November 1967,the Tmsteeship Council met to con-
siderthe requestbyAustralia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom for

the termination ofNaum's Tmsteeship to enabletheterritory to accedetoindependence on31January 1968.Atthat meeting,Head Chief DeRoburt
stated that:

"There wasone subject,however,on whichthere wasstilla differ-
ence of opinion - responsibilityfor the rehabilitation of phosphate
lands.The Nauruan people fullyacceptedresponsibilityinrespectof
land mined subsequently to 1July 1967, since under the new agree-
ment they were receivingthe net proceeds of the sale of phosphate.
Prior to that date, however,they had not received the net proceeds
and it was therefore their contention that the three Governments
should bear responsibility forthe rehabilitation of land mined prior
to 1July 1967.Thatwasnot an issuerelevantto thetermination ofthe
Trusteeship Agreement,nor did the Nauruans wishto makeit a mat-
ter for United Nations discussion. He merely wished to place on
record that the Nauruan Government would continue to seekwhat
was, in the opinion ofthe Nauruan people, ajust settlement of their

claims."
TheTrusteeship Council then adopted a draft resolution recommend-
ing the termination of the Trusteeship. Its report was submitted to the
Fourth Committee of the General Assembly and it was during the pro-
ceedings of the Fourth Committee that Head Chief DeRoburt made the
statementquoted abovewhich Australia contends amounted to a waiver.

20. TheCourt cannot sharethisview.Thestatementreferred tobyAus-
tralia (set out in paragraph 17above) deals with two distinct problems,
namely, on the one hand, rehabilitation of the phosphate lands, and, on
the other, the future depletion ofthe deposits.On the first point, whichis
the onlyone ofinteresthereto theCourt,Head ChiefDeRoburt confined
himselfto statingthat measureshad alreadybeen taken to setasidefunds
for rehabilitation of the lands. Notwithstanding some ambiguity in the
wording,thestatement didnot implyanydeparture fromthepoint ofview
expressed clearly and repeatedly by the representatives of the Nauruan
people before various organs of the United Nations and, in particular,
before the TrusteeshipCouncil on 22November 1967.

21. The Court concludes that the Nauruan local authorities did not,
before independence, waive their claim relating to rehabilitation of the

phosphate lands worked out prior to 1July 1967.The second objection
raised by Australia must in consequencebe rejected.

22. Australia'sthird objection isthat Nauru's claimis

"inadmissible on the ground that termination of the Trusteeship by
the United Nations precludes allegationsof breachesof the Trustee-
ship Agreementfrom now being examined by the Court".Australia observesthat "al1the Nauruan allegations ofbreaches ofobliga-
tions" relateto "the administration oftheterritory"placed under Trustee-
ship. Australia adds that "the competence to determine any alleged
breach ofthe Trusteeship Agreementand Article 76ofthe Charter rested
exclusivelywith the Trusteeship Council and General Assembly"; that
when the General Assembly terminates a trust, "the whole system of
administrative supervision [cornes]to an end"; and that

"in the absence of an express reservation recording a breach and an
outstandingresponsibility onthe AdministeringAuthority, termina-
tion is conclusive and operates as a complete discharge from al1
further responsibility".

Accordingto Australia,Nauru thereforecannot nowrequestthe Court :

"to undertake the task of exploring again the performance of the

Trusteeship in order to overrule and contradict the conclusions and
decisions taken bythe competentUnited Nations organs inthe exer-
ciseoftheir functions of supervision ofthe trusteeship system".
23. The Court notes that, by resolution 2347(XXII) of 19December
1967,the General Assemblyofthe United Nations resolved

"in agreement with the AdministeringAuthority, that the Trustee-
ship Agreement for the Territory of Nauru ... shall cease to be in
force upon the accession of Nauru to independence on 31 January
1968".

Such a resolution had "definitive legal effect" (Northem Cameroons,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 32). Consequently, the Trusteeship
Agreement was "terminated" on that date and "is no longer in force"
(ibid.,p. 37).In the light ofhese considerations,it might be possible to
questionthe admissibilityof an actionbrought against the Administering
Authority onthebasisofthe allegedfailurebyitto complywithitsobliga-
tions with respect to the administration of the Territory. However, the

Court doesnot consideritnecessaryto enterintothisdebate and willcon-
fine itselfto examiningtheparticular circumstancesin whichtheTrustee-
shipfor Nauru wasterminated.
24. It istoberecalled inthis respectthat from 1965to 1967thequestion
of rehabilitation of the worked-out lands was on several occasions dis-
cussedinthevarious competentUnitedNationsbodies, namely,the Trus-
teeshipCouncil,the SpecialCommitteeontheSituation withregardtothe
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, the Fourth Committee of the General
Assemblyand the General Assemblyitself.
25. The Nauru Local Government Council, in 1965,submitted to a
United Nations VisitingMission appointed by the TrusteeshipCouncil a
memorandum on the subject. The Mission stated in its report that, itsmembers not being "experts in the matter", it was unable to make any
recommendation.TheTrusteeshipCouncilconfined itselfto taking note
of that report on 29June 1965.Butthe General Assembly,on 21 Decem-
ber 1965,requestedthat

"immediate stepsbe taken by the AdministeringAuthoritytowards
restoringthe island of Nauru for habitation by the Nauruan people
as a sovereignnation" (resolution 2111(XX)).

26. In agreementwiththe localauthorities, the Administering Author-
itythen commissioneda studyby a Committee of Experts, whichbecame
known asthe Davey Committee, on the possibilities of rehabilitating the
phosphate lands. The Trusteeship Council, at its thirty-third session, in
the spring of 1966,recalledresolution 2111(XX)and noted thatthe study
wasbeing prepared. Asfor the General Assembly,on 20December 1966,
it again recommended that
"the administering authority .. .take immediate steps, irrespec-
tive of the cost involved, towards restoring the island of Nauru for
habitation by the Nauruan people as a sovereign nation" (resolu-
tion 2226(XXI)).

27. In May 1967,thereport bythe DaveyCommitteewasdistributed to
the members of the Trusteeship Council. A number of members of the
Councilraisedthe question ofrehabilitation ofthe lands.The representa-
tive of France said he regretted that "no agreement had been reached
between the AdministeringAuthority and the Nauruan people" on the
question.Liberiasubsequentlysubmitted totheCounciladraftresolution
stressingthat it was the responsibility of the AdministeringAuthority to
restorethe landsat itsexpense.Thatdraft wasnot adopted,butthe Coun-
cil,"regrettingthat differencescontinue to existon thequestion ofrehabi-
litation", expressed the "earnest hope that it will be possible to find a
solution to the satisfaction ofboth parties".
28. During the discussions in the Trusteeship Council in November
1967withaviewtotermination oftheTrusteeship, Head Chief DeRoburt,
as indicated in paragraph 19 above, reserved his position on rehabilita-
tion, expressly placing on record that "the Nauruan Government would
continue to seek what was, in the opinion of the Nauruan people, a just
settlement oftheir claims".Therepresentative ofthe USSR stated that he
was certain "that the legitimatedemands of the Nauruan people ... for
the rehabilitation of the land would be fullymet". Therepresentatives of
the AdministeringAuthority, while indicating that the agreements con-
cluded were financiallyfavourable to Nauru, made no referencein their
statementstothe question of rehabilitation.
During the discussionsin the Fourth Committee, followingthe state-
ment by Head Chief DeRoburt mentioned in paragraph 17above, the
representative of theUSSR again referred to the problem and the repre-

sentativeof India recalled that "Withregardtothequestion ofresponsibilityforthe rehabilitation
ofthe mined areas ofthe island, there wasstilla considerable differ-
ence of opinion between the Nauruans and the Administering
Authority."
The representative of India further expressed the hope that an equitable
agreement would be concluded in this respect. Again,the representatives
ofthe Administering Authority did not react.
29. Thefinal resolution oftheGeneral Assemblyof19December 1967,

by which it decided, in agreement with the Administering Authority, to
terminate the Trusteeship, doesnot,unlikethe earlierresolutions, contain
any provision inviting the Administering Authority to rehabilitate the
lands. The resolution however recalls those earlier resolutions in its
~reambie.
30. Thefactssetout aboveshowthat, when,onthe recommendation of
the Trusteeship Council, the General Assemblyterminated the Trustee-
ship over Nauru in agreement with the Administering Authority, every-
one was aware of subsisting differences of opinion between the Nauru
LocalGovernment Council and the AdministeringAuthority withregard
to rehabilitation of the phosphate lands worked out before 1July 1967.
Accordingly, though General Assemblyresolution 2347 (XXII) did not
expresslyreserveany rights which Nauru might have had in that regard,
the Court cannot viewthat resolution asgivinga dischargeto the Admin-
isteringAuthority withrespectto suchrights. Intheopinion ofthe Court,
the rights Nauru might have had in connection with rehabilitation of the
lands remained unaffected. Regard being had to the particular circum-

stances of the case, Australia's third objection must in consequence be
rejected.

31. Australia'sfourth objection stressesthat Nauru achievedindepen-
denceon31January 1968and that, asregardsrehabilitation ofthelands,it
was not until December 1988that that State formally "raised with Aus-
tralia andthe other former Administering Powersitsposition". Australia

therefore contends that Nauru's claimisinadmissible on the ground that
it has not been submitted within a reasonable time. Nauru's delay in
making its claim is alleged to be al1the more prejudicial to Australia
because the documentation relating to the Mandate and the Trusteeship
mayhavebeen lostordispersedinthe interval,and because developments
in the law during the interval render it more difficult to determine the
legal obligations incumbent on the Administering Powers at the time
ofthe allegedbreaches of those obligations.

32. The Court recognizes that, even in the absence of any applicable
treatyprovision,delayonthepart ofa claimant Statemayrender anappli-
cation inadmissible.It notes,however,that international lawdoesnot laydownany specifictime-limitinthat regard. It istherefore forthe Courtto

determine in the light of the circumstances of each case whether the
passage oftime renders an application inadmissible.
33. In the present case, it was well known, at the time when Nauru
gained its independence, that the question of rehabilitation of the phos-
phate lands had not been settled. Onthe day of declaring independence,
31January 1968,the Nauruan Head Chief,Mr.DeRoburt, stated, accord-
ingto press reports, that
"We hold it against Britain, Australia and New Zealand to recog-

nize that it is their responsibility to rehabilitate one third of the
island."
On 5 December 1968the President of Nauru wrote to the Minister for
External Affairs of Australia indicating his desire to examine a specific
rehabilitation scheme for the building of a new airstrip. The Australian
Minister replied on 4 February 1969as follows :

"the Partner Governments, in the talks preceding the termination of
the Trusteeship Agreement, did not accept responsibility for the
rehabilitation of mined-out phosphate lands. The Partner Govern-
ments remain convinced that the terms of the settlement with Your
Excellency'sGovernment were sufficientlygenerous to enable it to
meet itsneeds for rehabilitation and development."

34. This letterdid not elicitanyimmediatereaction. Fiveyearslater,on
the occasionofa Statevisitto Canberra,the PresidentofNauru raisedthe
question ofrehabilitation withthe PrimeMinisterofAustralia. In 1974he
brought up the matter a second time, without success,on the occasion of
the visitto Nauru of the Australian Acting Minister for External Affairs.

35. It wasonlyon 6October 1983that the President of N~U'IU wroteto
the Prime Ministerof Australia requesting himto "seek a sympathetic re-
considerationofNauru'sposition".ThatrequestwasdeclinedbyAustralia
on 14March 1984. Then,on 3December 1986,Nauru setup athree-mem-
ber Commission of Inquiry to studythe question and informed the three
formerAdministeringGovernments ofthe establishmentofthat Commis-

sion. Those Governments maintained their position and, following a
seriesofexchangesofletters,Nauru applied tothe Court on 19May 1989.
36. TheCourt,in thesecircumstances,takesnote ofthefactthat Nauru
was officially informed, at the latest by letter of 4 February 1969,of the
position of Australia on the subject of rehabilitation of the phosphate
lands worked out before 1July 1967.Nauru took issuewith that position
in writingonlyon 6October 1983.In the meantime,however,asstated by
Nauru and not contradicted by Australia, the question had on two occa-
sionsbeen raised by the President of Nauru with the competent Austral-
ian authorities. The Court considers that, given the nature of relations
between Australia and Nauru, as well as the steps thus taken, Nauru's PHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU (JUDGMENT) 255

Application wasnot rendered inadmissible bypassage oftime. Neverthe-
less,it willbe forthe Court, in due time, to ensure that Nauru's delayin
seising itwill in no way cause prejudice to Australia with regard to both
the establishment ofthe facts and the determination of the content ofthe
applicable law.

37. Australia's fifth objectionis that "Nauru has failed to act consist-
ently and in good faith in relation to rehabilitation" and that therefore
"the Court in exercise of its discretion, and in order to uphold judicial
propriety should ... decline to hear the Nauruan claims".

38. TheCourt considersthatthe Application by Nauru hasbeen prop-
erlysubmittedinthe framework ofthe remediesopento it.Atthe present
stage,the Court isnot called uponto weighthe possible consequences of
the conduct of Nauru with respectto the merits ofthe case.It need merely

note that such conduct does not amount to an abuse of process. Aus-
tralia'sobjection on this point must alsobe rejected.

39. The Court will now consider the objection by Australia based on
the factthat New Zealand and the United Kingdom arenot parties to the
proceedings. Australia recalls that the League of Nations Mandate
relating to Nauru was conferred in 1920upon "His Britannic Majesty"
as Sovereign of the United Kingdom as well as of Australia and New

Zealand. That Mandate was exercised under arrangements agreed on
by the three States. Subsequently a Trusteeship over the Territory was
granted in 1947by the United Nations to the same three Governments,
"jointly"designatedasAdministeringAuthority. Consequently, according
to Australia:
"the claim of Nauru is, in substance, not a claim against Australia
itselfbut a claim against the Administering Authority in relation to

Nauru".
TheCourt, itisargued,couldthereforenotpass upon the responsibilityof
the Respondentwithoutadjudicating upon the responsibilityof New Zea-
land and the United Kingdom; these two States are in reality "parties
to the dispute"; but they are not parties to the proceedings. Australia
accordingly contends that

"the claims[ofNauru] are inadmissible andtheCourt lacksjurisdic-
tion as anyjudgment on the question of breach of the Trusteeship
Agreementwould involvethe responsibility ofthird Statesthat have
not consented tothe Court's jurisdiction inthe present case". 40. In order to assessthe validityofthis objection, the Court willfirst
refer to the Mandate and Trusteeship régimesand the way in which they
applied to Nauru.
41. The Mandate system,instituted by virtue of Article 22ofthe Cov-
enant ofthe Leagueof Nations, was conceivedfor the benefit ofthe terri-
tories "whichareinhabited by peoplesnot yetableto stand bythemselves
under the strenuousconditions ofthe modern world". In accordance with
the same Article 22, "the well-being and development of such peoples
forma sacredtrust ofcivilisation". ThustheMandate "was created,inthe
interest ofthe inhabitants of the territory, and of humanity in general,as
aninternationalinstitution withaninternational object- asacredtrust of
civilization"(IntemationalStatusofSouthWestAfrica,I.C.J.Reports1950,
p. 132).This "'trust'had to be exercisedforthe benefit ofthe peoples con-
cemed, who were admitted to have interests of their own" (Legal Conse-
quencesforStates of the ContinuedPresenceof South Africain Namibia
(SouthWestAfrica)notwithstandingSecurity CouncilResolution 276(1970),
I.C.J.Reports1971,pp. 28-29,para. 46).

42. It is in that context that the Council of the League of Nations
granted to His Britannic Majesty, on 17December 1920,"full power of
administration and legislation over the territory subject to the.. Man-
date as an integral portion of his territory". An Agreement concluded
between "His Majesty'sGovernment in London, His Majesty's Govern-
ment ofthe Commonwealth ofAustralia, and His Majesty'sGovernment

ofthe Dominion of NewZealand" on2July 1919and amended on30May
1923laid down the conditions "for the exerciseof the said Mandate and
forthe mining ofthephosphate deposits on the said island". Thisexploi-
tation was entrusted to an enterprise managed by three "British Phos-
phate Commissioners" appointed by the three Governments.Article 1of
the amended Agreementprovided that
"The Administration of the Island shall be vested in an Admin-
istrator. The first Administrator shall be appointed for a term of
fiveyears bythe Australian Government; and thereafter the Admin-
istrator shallbe appointed in suchmanner as the three Govemments
decide."

It wasfurther provided that
"Al1Ordinances made by the Administrator shall be subject to
confirmation or disallowance in the name of His Majesty, whose
pleasure in respect of such confirmation or disallowance shall be
signifiedby oneofHis Majesty'sPrincipal Secretaries ofState,orby
the Govemor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia ... or by
the Governor-General ofthe Dominion of NewZealand ...accord-
ingasthe Administrator shall havebeen appointed by His Majesty's
Government in London, or by the Government of the Common-
wealth of Australia, or by the Govemment of the Dominion of
New Zealand, as the casemaybe."Thetext added :
"The Administratorshallconform to such instructions as he shall

from time to time receive from the Contracting Government by
which he has been appointed."
Provision was made finally for a systemwhereby decisions taken by the
Administrator werecommunicated to the three Governmentsconcerned.

43. Asa matter offact,the Administrator wasat al1timesappointed by
the Australian Government and was accordingly under the instructions
of that Government. His "ordinances, proclamations and regulations"
were subject to confirmation or rejection by the Governor-General of
Australia. The other Governments, in accordance with the Agreement,
receivedsuch decisions for information only.
44. On the demise of the League of Nations and with the birth of the
United Nations, provisions comparable to those of the Covenant were
incorporated into the Charter of the United Nations as it relates to the
Trusteeship System therein established. In this connection,Article 76 of
the Charter provides that :

"Thebasic objectivesofthetrusteeship system,inaccordance with
the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the
present Charter, shallbe :
.............................
(b) to promote the political, economic, social, and educational
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their

progressive development towards self-government or indepen-
dence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of
each territory and its peoples and the freelyexpressed wishesof
the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms
ofeachtrusteeship agreement".

45. The system of administration applied in Nauru at the time of the
League of Nations was maintained in essence when the Mandate was
replacedbyaTrusteeship.TheTrusteeship AgreementfortheTerritory of
Nauru, approved bythe United Nations General Assemblyon 1 Novem-
ber 1947,providedin Article2that :

"The Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United
Kingdom (hereinafter called 'the Administering Authority') are
hereby designated as the joint Authority which will exercise the
administration of the Territory."

It added in Article4that :
"The AdministeringAuthority will be responsible for the peace,
order, good government and defence of the Territory, and for this
purpose, inpursuance ofan Agreementmadebythe Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the Government
of Australia will, on behalf of the Administering Authority and
except and until othenvise agreed by the Governments of Australia,
New Zealand and the United Kingdom, continue to exercise full
powersoflegislation,administration andjurisdiction in and overthe
Territory."

46. Under the régimethus established, the Agreements of 2 July 1919
and 30 May 1923remained in force and the Administrator continued to
be appointed in fact by Australia. The provisions of those Agreements
relating to the administration of the Territory were not abrogated until
26November 1965by a new Agreementreached between the three Gov-
ernments, providing for the establishment of a Legislative Council, an
ExecutiveCouncilandNauruan Courts ofJustice.ItspecifiedinArticle3
thatthe "administration oftheTerritory" wastobevestedin "an Adminis-
trator appointed bythe Government ofthe Commonwealth of Australia".
It provided that the Administrator, the Governor-General of Australia
and the Parliament of Australia wereto have certain powers. The agree-

ment to establish these new arrangements was implemented by appro-
priate legislativeand other steps taken by Australia. The arrangements
continued to apply until Nauru attained independence.

47. Inthesecircumstances,the Court notesthatthethree Governments
mentioned in the Trusteeship Agreementconstituted, in the veryterms of
that Agreement, "the Administering Authority" for Nauru; that this
Authority did not have an international legal personality distinct from
those of the States thus designated; and that, of those States, Australia
played a very special role established by the Trusteeship Agreement of
1947,bythe Agreementsof 1919,1923and 1965,and by practice.

48. Australia's preliminary objection inthis respectappears tocontain
two branches, the first of which can be dealt with briefly. It is first con-
tended byAustraliathat, in sofar as Nauru's claimsarebased onthe con-
duct of Australia as one ofthe three Statesmaking up the Administering
Authority under the Trusteeship Agreement,the nature ofthe responsibi-
lity in that respect is such that a claim may only be brought against the
three Statesjointly, and not against one ofthem individually. In this con-
nection,Australiahasraisedthe questionwhetherthe liabilityofthe three
Stateswouldbe "joint and several" (solidai srthat,anyone ofthethree
would be liable to make full reparation for damage flowing from any
breach ofthe obligationsofthe Administering Authority, and not merely
a one-third or some other proportionate share. This is a question which
the Court mustreserveforthe merits ;but itisindependent ofthe question

whether Australia can be sued alone. The Court does not consider that
any reason has been shown why a claim brought against only one of thethree Statesshouldbe declaredinadmissible inliminelitismerelybecause
that claim raises questions of the administration of the Territory, which
was shared with two other States. It cannot be denied that Australia had
obligationsunder theTrusteeship Agreement,initscapacityasone ofthe
three Statesformingthe AdministeringAuthority, and there isnothingin
the character ofthat Agreementwhichdebars the Court fromconsidering
a claimof abreach of those obligationsby Australia.

49. Secondly, Australia argues that, since together with itself, New

Zealand and the United Kingdom made up the AdministeringAuthority,
any decision ofthe Court as to the allegedbreach byAustralia of itsobli-
gations under the Trusteeship Agreement would necessarily involve a
findingas to the dischargeby those two otherStatesoftheirobligationsin
that respect, which would be contrary to the fundamental principle that
thejurisdiction ofthe Court derivessolelyfromthe consent ofStates.The
question that arises is accordingly whether, given the régime thus
described,the Court may, without the consent of New Zealand and the
United Kingdom, deal with an Application brought against Australia
alone.

50. The Court has had to consider questions of this kind on previous
occasions.Inthe caseconcerningthe MonetaryGoldRemovedfromRome
in1943(Preliminary Question)t,he firstsubmissioninthe Italian Applica-
tion was worded as follows :

"(1)that the Governments of the French Republic,Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the United States of America should
deliver to Italy any share of the monetarygold that rnightbe due to
Albania under Part III ofthe Paris Act ofJanuary 14th,1946,in par-
tialsatisfactionfor the damagecausedto Italybythe Albanian lawof
January 13th,1945"(I.C.J. Reports1954,p. 22).

In itsJudgment of 15June 1954the Court, noting that only France,Italy,
the United Kingdom and the United States ofAmericawereparties to the
proceedings, found that
"To adjudicate upon the international responsibility of Albania
without her consent would run counter to a well-established prin-
ciple of international law embodied in the Court's Statute, namely,
thatthe Court can onlyexercisejurisdiction overa Statewithitscon-
sent." (Ibid.,p. 32.)

Noting that Albania had chosen not to intervene,the Court stated :
"In the present case, Albania's legalinterests would not only be
affected by a decision,but wouldformthe very subject-matter ofthe
decision. Insuch a case,the Statute cannot be regarded, by implica-
tion, as authorizing proceedings to be continued in the absence of

Albania." (Ibid.) 51. Subsequently, in the case conceming Military and Paramilitary
Activitiesinandagainst Nicaragua(Nicaragua v. UnitedStatesofArneriCa)
the Court observed as follows:
"There is no doubt that in appropriate circumstancesthe Court
willdecline,asit did inthe caseconcerning Monetary GoldRemoved
from Rome in 1943,to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it

where the legal interests of a State not party to the proceedings
'wouldnot only be affected by a decision, but would form the very
subject-matter of the decision' (Z.C.J.eports 1954,p. 32). Where
howeverclaimsof a legalnature are made by an Applicantagainsta
Respondent in proceedingsbefore the Court, and made the subject
of submissions, the Court has in principle merely to decide upon
those submissions, with binding force for the parties only, and no
otherState,inaccordance withArticle59ofthe Statute.AstheCourt
has alreadyindicated(paragraph 74, above)other States which con-
siderthat they maybe affectedarefree to institute separate proceed-
ings, or to employ the procedure of intervention.There is no trace,
eitherinthe Statuteorinthe practice ofinternationaltribunals, ofan
'indispensable parties' rule of the kind argued for by the United
States,whichwould onlybeconceivableinparallel to apower,which
the Court doesnot possess,to directthat athird Statebemadeaparty
to proceedings. The circumstances of theMonetary Goldcase prob-
ablyrepresentthe limitofthe power ofthe Courtto refuseto exercise

itsjurisdiction; and none ofthe Statesreferred to can beregarded as
inthesamepositionasAlbania inthat case,soasto betrulyindispen-
sableto the pursuance ofthe proceedings." (Judgment of26 Novem-
ber 1984,Z.C.J.Reports1984,p. 431,para. 88.)

52. Thatjurisprudence was applied by a Chamber of the Court in the
case concemingthe Land, Islandand MaritimeFrontierDispute (ElSal-
vador/Honduras)by a Judgment given on 13 September 1990,which

examinedwhetherthe legalinterestsasserted by Nicaraguain support of
an application for permission to intervenein the case did or did not form
"part of 'thevery subject-matter of the decision"' to be taken or whether
they were only affected by that decision (Z.C.J.Reports 1990,p. 116,
para. 56).
53. National courts,fortheirpart, havemoreoften than notthe neces-
sarypower to order propriomotuthejoinder of third parties who may be
affectedbythe decisionto be rendered; that solution makesit possibleto
settle a dispute in the presence ofl1the parties concemed. But on the
internationalplanethe Court has no suchpower. Itsjurisdiction depends
on the consent of States and, consequently,the Court may not compel a
Stateto appear before it, evenby way ofintervention.

54. A State,however,which is not a party to a case is freeto apply for PHOSPHATELANDSIN NAURU (JUDGMENT) 261

permissionto interveneinaccordance withArticle62ofthe Statute,which
provides that

"Should a State consider that it has an interest of a legal nature
which may be affected by the decision in the case, it may submit a
request to the Court to be permitted to intervene."

But the absence of such a request in no way precludes the Court from
adjudicating upon the claimssubmittedto it,provided that the legal inter-
estsofthethird State whichmaypossiblybe affected do notformthe very
subject-matter of the decision that is applied for. Where the Court is so
entitled to act, the interests of the third State which is not a party to the
caseareprotected byArticle59ofthe Statuteofthe Court, whichprovides
that "The decision of the Court has no binding forceexcept between the
parties and in respect ofthat particular case."
55. In the present case, the interests of New Zealand and the United
Kingdom do not constitutethe very subject-matter ofthe judgment to be
rendered on the merits of Nauru's Applicationand the situation isin that
respect different from that with which the Court had to deal in the Mon-
etary Goldcase.In the latter case,the determination of Albania'srespon-

sibilitywas a prerequisitefor a decision to be taken on Italy's claims.In
the present case,the determination of the responsibility of NewZealand
or the United Kingdom is not a prerequisitefor the determination of the
responsibility of Australia, the only object of Nauru's claim. Australia,
moreover,recognizesthat in thiscasethere would not bea determination
of the possibleresponsibility of NewZealand and the United Kingdom
previousto the determination of Australia's responsibility.It nonetheless
asserts that there would be asimultaneousdetermination of the responsi-
bility of al1three States and arguesthat, so faras concerns New Zealand
and the United Kingdom, such a determination would be equally pre-
cluded by the fundamental reasons underlying the Monetary Gold
decision.The Court cannot acceptthis contention. In the Monetary Gold
casethe link between, on the one hand, the necessaryfindingsregarding
Albania's allegedresponsibilityand, on the other,the decision requested
of the Court regarding the allocation of the gold, was not purely tem-
poral but also logical;asthe Court explained,

"In order ...to determinewhether Italy is entitled to receivethe
gold,itisnecessaryto determinewhetherAlbaniahas committedany
international wrong against Italy, and whether she is under an obli-
gation to pay compensation to her." (I.C.J. Reports1954,p. 32.)

In the present case,a finding by the Court regarding the existenceor the
content of the responsibility attributed to Australia by Nauru might well
haveimplicationsforthe legalsituation ofthetwootherStatesconcerned,
but no finding inrespectofthat legalsituationwillbeneededasa basisforthe Court's decision on Nauru's claims against Australia. Accordingly,
the Court cannot decline to exerciseitsjurisdiction.

56. The Court must however emphasize that its ruling in the present
Judgment on thisobjection ofAustralia doesnot in any wayprejudge the
merits.ThepresentJudgment doesnot settlethe questionwhetherrepara-
tion would be due from Australia, if found responsible,for the whole or
onlyforpart ofthe damage Nauru allegesithassuffered,regard beinghad
to the characteristics of the Mandate and Trusteeship Systemsoutlined
aboveand,inparticular, the specialroleplayedbyAustraliainthe admin-
istration oftheTerritory.Thesequestionsaretobedealt with atthemerits
stage.
57. For the reasons given, the Court considers that the fact that
NewZealand and the United Kingdomarenotparties to the caseisnobar
to theproceedingsbrought by Nauru against Australia.Theobjection put
fonvard in thisrespect by Australia mustbe rejected.

58. Finally, the Court will examinethe objectionsaddressed by Aus-
tralia to the claimby Nauru concerningthe overseasassets ofthe British
Phosphate Commissioners. At the end of its Memorial on the merits,
Nauru requeststhe Courtto adjudge and declarethat

"the Republicof Nauru has alegalentitlementto theAustralianallo-
cation ofthe overseasassetsofthe BritishPhosphateCommissioners
which were marshalled and disposed of in accordance with the
trilateral Agreementconcluded on 9 February 1987"
and

"the Respondent State is under a duty to make appropriate repara-
tion in respect ofthe losscaused to the Republic of Nauru as a result
of. ..its failure to recognize the interest of Nauru in the overseas
assets ofthe British Phosphate Commissioners".
59. The British Phosphate Commissioners were established by
Article 3 of the Agreement of 2 July 1919between the United Kingdom,
Australia and New Zealand (see paragraph 42 above); that Article pro-
vided forthe establishment of a body called "Board of Commissioners",

composed of three members, one to be appointed by each of the
Partner Governments. Article 6provided that the
"title to the phosphate deposit... and to al1land, buildings,plant,
and equipment on the island used in connection withthe workingof
the depositsshallbe vested in the Commissioners";

Article 9 provided on the one hand that the depositswould "be worked
and sold under the direction, management, and control of the Commis-sioners" and, on the other, that it would be the duty of the latter "to dis-
pose ofthephosphatesfor the purpose ofthe agriculturalrequirements of
the United Kingdom,Australia and NewZealand,so far asthose require-
ments extend"; and, although in accordance with Articles 10and 11,the
sale of phosphates to third States and at market prices was to beexcep-
tional - itbeingmandatoryforpriority salesto thethreePartner Govern-
ments to be at a price closeto the cost pric-, Article 12provided that
anysurplusfundsaccumulated asa result of salesto third States or other-
wisewould

"be creditedbythe Commissionersto thethreeGovernments ... and
heldbytheCommissionersintrustforthethreeGovernments to such
uses asthose Governments may direct. ..".

60. The British Phosphate Commissionersconducted their activities
on Nauru, in accordance with the Agreement of 2 July 1919, under the
Mandate and then under the Trusteeship.The Agreement concluded on
14November 1967betweenthe Nauru LocalGovernmentCouncil,onthe
one hand, and the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom, onthe other (seeparagraph 10above),providedfor the
sale to Nauru, by the Partner Governments, of the capital assets of the
phosphate industry on the island, which had been vested in theCommis-

sioners on behalf ofthose Governments (Arts.7-11);the Agreement also
providedforthe transfer to Nauru ofthe management and supervision of
phosphate operations onthe island (Arts. 12-15).The assetsofthe British
Phosphate Commissionerson Nauru weretransferred to the Government
of Nauru in 1970,afterthefinal paymenttherefor had been made and the
British Phosphate Commissionersthereupon terminated their activities
on Nauru. Followingthe entryintoforce of an Agreement of9June 1981
between New Zealand and Australia, which put an end to the functions
that the Commissioners exercised on Christmas Island, Australia, New
Zealand and the United Kingdom decided to wind up the affairs of the
British Phosphate Commissioners and to divide among themselves the
remaining assets and liabilities of the Commissioners:to that end, they
concluded on 9 February 1987an Agreement to "terminate the Nauru
Island Agreement [of]1919".

61. During 1987,there were various exchanges of correspondence
betweenthe Partiesconcerningthe windingup ofthe affairs ofthe British
Phosphate Commissioners.Havingrequested and obtained confirmation
ofthe intention ofthe Partner Governments to proceed withthe disposa1
ofthe assetsofthe Commissioners,and havingasked to be consulted,the
Department of External Affairsof Nauru, on 30January 1987,addressed
a Note to the Australian High Commission,in whichitrequestedthe said
Governments "to begoodenough atleasttokeepthefunds ofthe BritishPhosphate
Commissionersintact without disbursementuntil the conclusion of
the task of the. ..Commission of Inquiry (intorehabilitation setup
byNauru on3 December 1986)[and]that theofficerecords and other
documents of the ... Commissioners may kindlybe kept preserved
and that the said Commission of Inquirybepermitted to have access
to and use of these records and documents".

Mter the conclusion of the Tripartite Agreementof 9 February 1987,the
President of Nauru addressed, on 4 May 1987,a letter to the Australian
Ministerfor Foreign Affairsin which,amongotherthings,he stated that :
"Mygovernmenttakesthe strong viewthat suchassets,whoseulti-
mate derivation largely arises from the very soi1of Nauru Island,
should be directed towards assistance in its rehabilitation, particu-
larlyto that one-third which was mined priorto independence."

By a letter of 15June 1987,the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs
replied in the followingterms :
"The BPCand the Partner Governments have discharged fairlyal1
outstanding obligations. The residual assets of the BPC were not
derived from its Nauru operations."

Lastly,afurther letter addressed on 23July 1987tothe Australian Minis-
ter forForeign Affairsbythe President of Nauru contained the following
passage :

"1am sure, taking into account my Government's knowledge of
the manner of accumulation of surplus funds by the BPC, that you
would not be surprised if 1wereto Saythat 1find itdifficultto accept
yourstatementthattheresidual assetsofthe BPCwerenot derived in
part fromitsNauru operations. 1 shallnot, however,pursue that here
but leaveit perhaps for another place and another time."

62. Australiaasserts that Nauru's claimconcerningthe overseasassets
of the British Phosphate Commissioners is inadmissible and that the
Court hasnojurisdiction inrelation tothat claim,onthegrounds that the
claimisanewone; Nauru hasnotestablished thatthe claimarisesout ofa
"legal dispute" between the Parties, within the meaning of Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court; Nauru cannot claim any legal
titleto theassetsin question and hasnotproven alegalinterest capable of
justifying its claim in this regard; and each of the objections raised by
Australia concerningthe other claimsby Nauru also appliesto the claim
relatingto the overseasassets. 63. The Court willfirst deal with the Australianobjectionbased on its
contention that the Nauruan claimis a new one.Australiamaintains that
the claiminquestion isinadmissibleontheground that itappeared forthe
first time in the Nauruan Memorial; that Nauru has not provedthe exis-
tence of any real linkbetween that claim,on the one hand, and its claims
relatingto the allegedfailureto observetheTrusteeship Agreementandto
the rehabilitation ofthe phosphate lands, on the other;andthat the claim
inquestion seeksto transformthe disputebroughtbefore theCourt intoa

disputethat wouldbe ofadifferentnature.Nauru,forits part, arguesthat
itsclaimconcerningthe overseasassetsofthe BritishPhosphate Commis-
sioners does not constitute a new basis of claim and that, even if it were
formally so, the Court could neverthelessentertain it; that the claim is
closelyrelated to the matrix of fact and law concerning the management
of the phosphate industry during the period from 1919until indepen-
dence; and that the claim is "implicit" in the claimsrelating to the viola-
tions ofthe Trusteeship Agreement and "consequentialon" them.

64. TheCourt notesinthefirst placethatno referencetothe disposa1of
the overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commissionersappears in
Nauru's Application,eitheras an independent claim or in relation to the
claim for reparation submitted, and that the Application nowhere men-
tions the Agreement of 9 February 1987,notwithstanding the statement
contained in the letter of the President of Nauru dated 23July 1987that
he was leavingthe matter "perhaps for another place and another time"
(see paragraph 61 above). On the other hand, the Court notes that, after
reiterating the claims previously made in its Application, Nauru adds,

at the end of its Memorial,the followingsubmission :
"Requests the Courtto adjudge and declarefurther

that the Republic of Nauru has a legal entitlement to the Australian
allocation of the overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commis-
sioners ..."(Emphasisadded.)
This submission is presented separately, in the form of a distinct para-
graph.
65. Consequently,the Court notes that, from a forma1point of view,
the claimrelatingto the overseas assetsofthe BritishPhosphate Commis-
sioners,aspresentedinthe Nauruan Memorial, isa new claiminrelation
to the claims presented in the Application. Nevertheless, as the Per-
manent Court of International Justice pointed out in the Mavrommatis
PalestineConcessions case:

"The Court, whose jurisdiction is international, is not bound to
attach to matters of form thesame degree of importance whichthey
might possess in municipal law." (P.C.I.J.,Series A, No. 2, p. 34;
cf.also NorthernCameroon,I.C.J.Reports1963,p. 28.)

The Court will therefore consider whether, although formally a newclaim,the claimin question can be consideredasincludedin the original
claimin substance.
66. It appears to the Court difficult to deny that links may exist
between the claim made in the Memorial and the general context of the
Application. Whatismore,Australiahas acknowledgedbeforethe Court
that the "assets distributed in 1987 were derived from a number of
sources" and that "some of [them]may have been derived from the pro-
ceeds of sale of Nauruan phosphate"; and Nauru, in its Application,
has alleged that the phosphate industry on the island was carried on in
such a way that the real benefit went to the three States - principally
Australia -, that exploitation of the phosphate had resulted in the
devastation of the land and that inadequate royalties had been paid
to the Nauruan people. Moreover, the Court also notes that the
diplomatic correspondence exchanged by the Parties in 1987(see para-
graph 61 above) indicates that the Nauruan Government considered
thatthere wasalinkbetweenitsclaimforrehabilitation oftheworked-out
lands and the disposa1of the overseas assets of the British Phosphate

Commissioners.
67. TheCourt, however,isofthe viewthat, forthe claimrelatingto the
overseas assetsofthe BritishPhosphateCommissioners to beheld to have
been,asa matterofsubstance,included intheoriginal claim,itisnot suffi-
cientthat thereshould belinksbetweenthem ofageneralnature. Anaddi-
tional claim must have been implicit in the application (Templeof Preah
Vihear,Merits, I.C.J.Reports1962,p. 36)ormust arise "directly out ofthe
question whichisthe subject-matter ofthat Application" (FisheriesJuris-
diction (fideral Republicof Germanyv. Zeeland),Merits, I.C.J. Reports
1974,p.203,para. 72).TheCourt considersthat thesecriteria arenot satis-
fied in the present case.
68. Moreover, while not seeking in any way to prejudge the question
whetherthere existed, on the date of the filing of the Application,a dis-
pute ofalegalnature betweenthe Partiesas tothe disposa1ofthe overseas
assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners, the Court is convinced
that, if it had to entertainch a dispute on the merits,the subject of the
dispute on which it would ultimately have to pass would be necessarily
distinct from the subject of the dispute originally submitted to it in the
Application. To settle the dispute on the overseas assets of the British
Phosphate Commissionersthe Court would haveto consider anumber of

questions that appearto it to be extraneous to the original claim,uch as
theprecisemake-up and origin ofthe wholeof these overseasassets; and
the resolution of an issue ofthis kind would lead itto consider the activi-
ties conducted by the Commissioners not only, ratione temporis,after
1 July 1967, but also, ratione loci, outside Nauru (on Ocean Island
(Banaba)and ChristmasIsland) and, rationemateriae,infieldsother than
the exploitation of the phosphate (for example, shipping).

69. Article 40,paragraph 1,ofthe Statuteofthe Court providesthat the
"subject of the dispute" must be indicated in the Application; and Ar-ticle 38,paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court requires "the precise nature
of the claim" to be specifiedin the Application. These provisionsare so
essentialfromthepoint of viewoflegalsecurityand the goodadministra-
tion ofjustice that they were already,in substance, part of the text of the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, adopted in 1920
(Art. 40,first paragraph), and of the text of the firstules of that Court,
adopted in 1922(Art. 35, second paragraph), respectively. On several
occasionsthe Permanent Court had toindicatetheprecisesignificance of
thesetexts.Thus,initsOrder of4February 1933inthe caseconcerningthe
Prince vonPlessAdministration (PreliminaryObjectioni)t,stated that :

"under Article 40 of the Statute, it is the Application which sets out
the subject of the dispute, and the Case,though it may elucidate the
terms of the Application, must not gobeyond the limits ofthe claim
as set outtherein ..."(P.C.Z.J.S, eriesA/B, No.52,p. 14).
In the caseconcerningthe Société commercialedeBelgique,the Permanent
Court stated :

"It is to be observed that the liberty accorded to the parties to
amend their submissions up to the end ofthe oralproceedings must
be construed reasonably and without infringing the terms of Ar-
ticle40of the Statuteand Article32,paragraph 2,of the Ruleswhich
provide that the Application must indicate the subject of the dis-
pute. ...itisclearthat the Court cannot,inprinciple, allowadispute
broughtbefore itbyapplication to betransformed byamendments in
the submissionsintoanother dispute which isdifferentin character.
Apractice ofthis kind wouldbe calculated to prejudicethe interests
ofthird Statesto which,under Article40,paragraph 2,ofthe Statute,
al1applications mustbe communicatedin order that theymaybeina
position to availthemselvesofthe right ofintervention provided for
in Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute." (P.C.I.J.,SeriesA/B, No. 78,
p. 173;cf. Militaryand ParamilitaryActivitiesinand againstNicara-
gua (Nicaragua v. UnitedStates ofAmerica),Jurisdiction andAdmis-
sibility, I.C.J.Reports1984,p. 427,para. 80.)

70. In the lightofthe foregoing,the Court concludesthatthe Nauruan
claimrelatingtothe overseas assetsofthe BritishPhosphate Commission-
ers is inadmissible inasmuch as it constitutes,both in form and in sub-
stance,a newclaim,andthe subject ofthe disputeoriginallysubmitted to
the Court wouldbetransformed ifit entertained that claim.
71. Thepreliminaryobjection raisedbyAustralia onthispoint isthere-
fore wellfounded. It followsthat it is not necessary forthe Courtto con-
siderherethe otherobjections ofAustraliawithregard to the submissions
of Nauru concerningthe overseas assets of the British Phosphate Com-
missioners. 72. For these reasons,

(1) (a) rejects,unanimously, the preliminary objection based on the
resewation made byAustralia inits declaration of acceptance ofthe com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court;

(b) rejects,by twelve votes to one, the preliminary objection based on
the alleged waiver by Nauru, prior to accession to independence, of al1
claims concerning the rehabilitation of the phosphate lands worked out
prior to 1July 1967;
IN FAVOUR: PresidentSir Robert Jennings; JudgesLachs, Ago, Schwebel,
Bedjaoui, Ni, Evensen, Tarassov,Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Aguilar
Mawdsley,Ranjeva;

AGAINST :Vice-PresidenOt da;
(c) rejects,bytwelve votes to one, the preliminary objection based on
thetermination of the Trusteeship over Nauru by the United Nations;

IN FAVOUR: PresidentSir Robert Jennings; JudgesLachs, Ago, Schwebel,
Bedjaoui, Ni, Evensen, Tarassov,Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Aguilar
Mawdsley,Ranjeva;
AGAINST :Vice-PresidenOt da ;

(d) rejects,bytwelve votes to one, the preliminary objection based on
the effect of the passage of time on the admissibility of Nauru's Applica-
tion ;
IN FAVOUR: PresidentSir Robert Jennings; Judges Lachs,Ago, Schwebel,
Bedjaoui, Ni, Evensen, Tarassov,Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Aguilar
Mawdsley,Ranjeva;

AGAINST :Vice-PresidenOt da;
(e) rejects,by twelve votes to one, the preliminary objection based on
Nauru's allegedlack of good faith;

IN FAVOUR: PresidentSir Robert Jennings; Judges Lachs,Ago, Schwebel,
Bedjaoui, Ni, Evensen, Tarassov,Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Aguilar
Mawdsley,Ranjeva;
AGAINST :Vice-PresidenOt da;

(0 rejects,by nine votes to four, the preliminary objectionbased onthe
factthat New Zealand and the United Kingdom are notparties to thepro-
ceedings ;

IN FAVOUR: Judges Lachs, Bedjaoui, Ni, Evensen, Tarassov,Guillaume,
Shahabuddeen,Aguilar Mawdsley,Ranjeva;
AGAINST: PresidentSir Robert Jennings; Vice-PresidenO t da; JudgesAgo,
Schwebel;
(g) upholds,unanimously, the preliminaryobjectionbased onthe claim
concerning the overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners

being a new one; (2) finds, by nine votes to four, that, on the basis of Article 36,para-
graph 2, of theStatute of the Court, it has jurisdiction to entertain the
Application filed by the Republic of Nauru on 19May 1989and that the
said Application is admissible;
IN FAVOUR: JudgesLachs, Bedjaoui,Ni, Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume,
Shahabuddeen,Aguilar Mawdsley, Ranjeva;
AGAINSP Tr:esident SirRobert Jennings; Vice-Prest da; JudgesAgo,
Schwebel;

(3)finds, unanimously,thatthe claimconcerningthe overseasassetsof
the BritishPhosphate Commissioners,made by Nauruin itsMemorial of
20April 1990,is inadmissible.

Done in French and in English,the French text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace,TheHague,this twenty-sixthdayofJune,onethousand
nine hundred and ninety-two,inthree copies,one ofwhichwillbe placed
inthe archivesofthe Courtandthe otherstransmitted tothe Government
of Nauru and the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia,
respectively.

(Signed) R.Y. JENNINGS,
President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,

Registrar.

Judge SHAHABUDDE appNends aseparate opinion tothe Judgment of
the Court.

President Sir Robert JENNINGS V,ice-President ODA,JudgesAGOand
SCHWEBE aLpend dissentingopinions to the Judgment of theCourt.

(Initialled) R.Y.J.

(Initialled) E.V.O.

Bilingual Content

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE DE CERTAINES TERRES

À PHOSPHATES À NAURU
(NAURU cAUSTRALIE)

ARRÊT DU 26 JUIN 1992

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING

CERTAIN PHOSPHATE LANDS IN NAURU

(NAURU vAUSTRALIA)

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

JUDGMENT OF 26 JUNE 1992 Modeofficielde citati:n
CertainesterresàphosphatàNauru(Nauruc.Australie),
exceptionspréliminair,rrêt, C.I.ecueil1992,. 240

Official citat:on
CertainPhosphateLandsinNauru(Nauru v.Australia),
Preliminaty Objections,JudgmentI,.C.J.Reports 1992,p. 240

Nodevent:
Salesnumber 616 /
ISBN 92-1-070674-9 COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

1992
26juin
Rôlnoé80ral
26 juin 1992

AFFAIRE DE CERTAINESTERRES

À PHOSPHATES À NAURU

(NAURU c.AUSTRALIE)

EXCEPTIONSPRÉLIMINAIRES

Compétencedela Couret recevabilité.
Déclarationd'acceptationde lajuridiction obligatoireexcluantles ((différends
au sujet desquels lespartiesont convenu ou conviennentde recourirne autre
procédurede règlementpacifique))- Applicationaux seulsEtats des déclarations
faites au titreduparagraphe2 de l'article du Statut- Déclarationdu défen-
deur et exclusionqu'ellecomporte.
Prétenduerenonciationaux demandesformuléesavant l'accession à l'indépen-
dance - 1)Accordconcluentrelesautoritéslocalesd'un territoiresous tutelleet
l'autorité administrante Absence de clause expliciteemportant renonciation
- Absence de renonciation implicite - 2) Débats à l'Organisation des
Nations Unies- Sens des déclarationsdu représentat es autoritéslocales.
Allégationsde violationsd'unaccordde tutelle«Effetjuridique définitif)des
résolutionsdeIAssembléegénérale mettantfin aux accordsde tutelle- Condi-
tionsparticulièresdanslesquellesla tutellesur Naurua levée- Questiond'un
quitusqu'auraitdonnéla résolution.

Nécessitéd'évaluedanschaqueespèceleseffetsdel'écoulemend tu tempsquant
àla recevabilid'unerequête.
Allégation d'inconstance te manque de bonnefoi du demandeur - Absence
d'abusdeprocédure.
Mandat confié à «Sa Majesté britannique)) en tant que Souverain du
Royaume-Uni,de l'Australie etde la Nouvelle-Zélande Tutelleconfiéeà IAus-
tralie, à la Nouvelle-Zélande etau Royaume-Uni ((conjointement))désignés
commeautoritéadministrante - Absencedepersonnalitéjuridique internationale
de I'autoritéadministrante 1) Réclamationsfondées surle comportementdu
défendeuragissanten tant que l'undes troisEtats constituantI'autoadminis-
trante- Assignation du défendeurseul, question indépendante decelle d'une
éventuellresponsabilit«solidaire»- Possibilipour laCourde connaîtred'une
demande relativeà laprétendue méconnaissanc pear le défendeurdeses obliga-
tions en vertu de l'accordde tutelle) Principefondamental du consentement INTERNATIONALCOURTOF JUSTICE

YEAR 1992 1992
26June
GeneralList
26 June 1992 No. 80

CASECONCERNING

CERTAINPHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU

(NAURU v.AUSTRALIA)

PRELIMINARYOBJECTIONS

Jurisdictionof the Court and admissibility.
Declarationof acceptanceof compulsoiyjurisdiction excluding "anydispute in
regardto whichthe Parties theretohaveagreed orshallagreeto haverecourseto
someothermethodofpeacefulsettlement "- ApplicationtoStates aloneofdeclar-
ations underArticle36,paragraph2, of Statute - Respondent's declarationand
exclusionfor whichitprovides.
Alleged waiverof claimsprior to independence - (1)Agreement betweenthe
localauthorities ofa trust territoryand theAdministering AuthorityAbsenceof
explicitclause operatingas waive- Absence ofimplicitwaiver - (2)Discussions
in the UnitedNations - Significance ofstatements by representativeof thelocal
authorities.
Alleged breachesof a trusteeshipagreement - "Definitivelegaleffect"of Gen-
eralAssembly resolutions terminating trusteeship agreements - Particularcir-
cumstances in which the Trusteeshipover Nauru was terminated - Question
of dischargesaid to have beengivenby resolution.

Need to determine in each case effects of passage of time with regard to the
admissibilityofan application.
Applicant's allegedinconsistencyand lack ofgoodfaith - Absenceof an abuse
ofprocess.
Mandateconferredon"HisBritannicMajesty"asSovereignof the UnitedKing-
dom,Australia andNew Zealand - TrusteeshipgrantedtoAustralia, New Zea-
landand the UnitedKingdom 'fjointly"designatedasAdministering Authority -
Absence of international legalpersonality of the Adrninistering Authority -
(1)Claimsbased onconductof Respondentas one of the threeStates making up
theAdministeringAuthority - Suing ofRespondentalonea questionindependent
of thatofpossible Joint andseveral"liabili-y Possibilityof the Court'sconsider-
ing a clairnof alleged breachby Respondent of its obligationsunder Trusteeship
Agreement - (2)Fundamentalprincipleof consentof States to Court'sjurisdic-
tion- Possibilityof the Court'stakinga decisionwithoutrulingonlegalsituationdes Etatsà la compétencede la Cour- Possibilipour laCourdeprendre une
décisionsansseprononcersurlasituationjuridique desEtats nonpartiesSitua-
tiondSfférentde celledont la Coura eu à connaîtredans l'affairede l'Or moné-
taire.
Paragraphe1de I'article40du Statut de la Couretparagraphe2 de l'article38

de son Règlement - Demande tant formellement que matériellementnouvelle
dont l'examenpar laCouremporteraittransformationde l'objetdudifférendelle
originellementsoumis.

Présents:SirRobertJENNINGS P,résident;M. ODA,Vice-Préside;tMM. LACHS,
AGO,SCHWEBEL B,EDJAOUN I,I, EVENSENT ,ARASSOV G,UILLAUME,
SHAHABUDDE AGNU,ILAMRAWDSLEY R,ANJEVA,uges; M. VALENCIA-
OSPINAG , reffier.

En l'affaire de certainesterres àphosphates à Nauni,

entre

la République deNauni,
représentéepar

M. V. S. Mani, professeur de droit international à l'université Jawaharlal
Nehni de New Delhi; ancien secrétaireenchef et secrétairedu conseil des
ministresde la République de Nauni,
M. Leo D. Keke, conseiller du présidentde la République deNauni; ancien
ministredela justice de la Républiquedeauni; membre du barreau dela
République de Nauni et du barreau d'Australie,
comme coagents, conseils et avocats;

S. Exc. M. Hammer DeRoburt, G.C.M.G., O.B.E., M.P.,chef principal et
président duconseil de gouvernementlocal deNauni; ancienprésidentet
responsable dela présidencedu conseil des ministres, ancien ministredes
affaires extérieures et intérieureset de l'industrie des phosphates de la
République de Nauni,
M. Ian Brownlie,Q.C.,membre du barreau d'Angleterre; professeur de droit
international public, titulaire de la chaireChichele à l'université
d'Oxford; Fellowde l'Al1Souls College, Oxford,
M. Barry Connell, professeur associéde droit à l'université Monash de
Melbourne; membre du barreau d'Australie; ancien secrétaire en chef et
secrétaireduconseil des ministres de la République deuni,
M. James Crawford, professeur de droit international, titulaire de la chaire
Challis et doyen de la faculté de droit de l'universitéde Sydney; membre

du barreau d'Australie,
comme conseils et avocats,

le Commonwealthd'Australie,of non-partyState- Situationdifferentfrom that withwhichthe Court hadto
dealintheMonetary Gold case.

Article40,paragraph1,oftheStatuteoftheCourtandArticle38,paragraph2,
oftheRulesof Court- Claimnewinbothfonnandsubstancewhoseexamination
by theCourtwould transfonnthe subjectof thedispute originally submittedto it.

JUDGMENT

Present: President Sir Robert JENNINGS; ice-PresidentODA;Judges LACHS,
AGO, SCHWEBEL B,EDJAOUI N,I, EVENSENT ,ARASSOV G,UILLAUME,
SHAHABUDDEA ENU, ILAMAWDSLEY RA, NJEVA;egistrarVALENCIA-

OSPINA.

In the case concerningcertain phosphate lands in Nauru,

between
the Republic of Nauru,

represented by
Mr. V. S. Mani, Professor of International Law, Jawaharlal Nehru Uni-
versity, New Delhi; former Chief Secretary and Secretary to Cabinet,
Republic of Nauru,
Mr. Leo D. Keke, Presidential Counsel of the Republic of Nauru; former
Minister for Justice of the Republic of Nauru; and Member of the Bar of
the Republic of Nauru and of the Australian Bar,

as Co-Agents,Counsel and Advocates;
H.E. Mr. Hammer DeRoburt, G.C.M.G., O.B.E., M.P., Head Chief and
Chairman ofthe Nauru Local GovernmentCouncil; formerPresident and
Chairman of Cabinet and former Minister for External and Interna1
Affairs and the Phosphate Industry, Republic of Nauru,

Mr. Ian Brownlie, Q.C., Member of the English BChichele Professor of

Public International Law, University of Oxford; Fellow ofuls Col-
lege, Oxford,
Mr. Barry Connell, Associate Professor of Law, Monash University, Mel-
bourne; Member ofthe Australian Bar; formerChief Secretary andre-
tary to Cabinet, Republic of Nauru,
Mr.JamesCrawford, Challis Professor of International Lawand Dean ofthe
Faculty of Law,University of Sydney; Member of the Australian Bar,

as Counsel and Advocates,

and

the Commonwealth of Australia,représenté par
M. Gavan Griffith, Q.C., Solicitor-Generald'Australie,

commeagent et conseil;
S.Exc. M. WarwickWeemaes,ambassadeur d'Australieaux Pays-Bas,

comme coagent;
M. Henry Burmester, conseiller principal en droit international dans les
servicesde l'Attorney-General 'Australie,

comme coagent et conseil;
M. Eduardo Jiménezde Aréchaga, professeurde droit international, Monte-
video,
M. Derek W. Bowett, Q.C.,professeur émérite, ancien titulairede la chaire
Whewellde droit international à l'universitéde Cambridge,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur de droit à l'universitéde Paris X-Nanterre eà
l'Institut d'études politiqse Paris,
MmeSusan Kenny, du barreau d'Australie,

comme conseils;
M. Peter Shannon, conseillerjuridique adjoint au départementdes affaires
étrangèreset du commerceextérieurd'Australie,
M. Paul Porteous, premier secrétaireà l'ambassade d'Australieaux Pays-

Bas,
comme conseillers,

ainsi composée,
aprèsdélibéré en chambre du conseil,

rend l'arrêstuivant:

1. Le19mai 1989,leGouvernement de la Républiquede Nauru (dénommée
ci-aprèsNauru) a déposéau Greffe de la Cour une requête introductive d'ins-
tance contre le Commonwealth d'Australie(dénomméci-après l'Australie)au
sujet d'un ((différend..relatif à la remise en étatde certaines terres à phos-
phates [de Nauru] exploitéesavant l'indépendancede Nauru S.Pour établirla
compétencede la Cour, la requête invoqueles déclarationspar lesquelles les
deux Etats ont acceptélajuridiction obligatoire delaCour dans lesconditions
prévuesau paragraphe 2 de l'article36 du Statut.
2. Conformémentau paragraphe 2 de l'article40 du Statut, la requête a été
immédiatement communiquéeau Gouvernement australien par le Greffier;
conformémentau paragraphe 3 de cet article,tous lesautresEtats admis àester

devant la Cour ont été informédse la requête.
3. Les délais pourle dépôtdu mémoirede Nauru et du contre-mémoirede
l'Australieont été fixépsar ordonnance du 18juillet 1989.Le mémoire a été
déposé le 20avril 1990,dansle délaifixéàcet effet. Par lettredu 19septembre
1990,l'agentde l'Australie afait connaître au Greffier qu'aprèsavoir dûment
examiné le mémoire de Nauru son gouvernement étaitvarvenu àla conclusion
quela Cour n'étaitpas compétenteen l'espèceet quelayequêten'étaitpas rece-
vable: il informait en conséauencele Greffier aue l'Australie soulèverait des
excepfions préliminairesco~fonnémentaux dispositions de l'article 79 du

6represented by
Mr. Gavan Griffith, Q.C., Solicitor-General of Australia,
as Agent and Counsel;

H.E. Mr. Warwick Weemaes, Ambassador of Australia to the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;

Mr. Henry Burmester, Principal Adviser in International Law, Australian
Attorney-General'sDepartment,
as Co-Agent and Counsel;

Mr. Eduardo JiménezdeAréchaga,Professor of International Law, Monte-
video,
Mr. Derek W. Bowett, Q.C., emeritus Whewell Professor of International
Law, University of Cambridge,
Mr.Alain Pellet,Professor of Law,Universityof ParisX-Nanterre and Insti-
tute of Political Studies,Paris,
Ms Susan Kenny, of the Australian Bar,

as Counsel;
Mr. Peter Shannon, Deputy Legal Adviser, Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Mr. Paul Porteous, First Secretary, Australian Embassy in the Netherlands,

as Advisers,

composedas above,
after deliberation,

delivers thefollowingJudgment:

1. On 19May 1989,the Government of the Republic of Nauni (hereinafter
called "Nauni") filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting
proceedingsagainst the Commonwealth of Australia (hereinafter called "Aus-
tralia") in respect of a "dispu... overthe rehabilitation of certain phosphate
lands [in Nauru] worked out before Naunian independence". To found the
jurisdiction ofthe Courtthe Application relies on the declarationsmade by the
two Statesaccepting thejurisdiction ofthe Court, asprovided forin Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court.
2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the Application was
communicated forthwith by the Registrar to the Government of Australia; in
accordance with paragraph 3 of that Article, al1other Statesentitled to appear
before the Court were notified of the Application.
3. Time-limits for the filing of the Memorial of Nauni and the Counter-
Memorial of Australia were fixed by an Order of 18July 1989.The Memorial
was filed on 20 April 1990,within the time-limit fixed for thispurpose. By a
letter dated 19September 1990,the Agent of Australia informed the Registrar
that, after due consideration of the Memorial of Nauru, his Government had
come to the conclusion that the Court had nojurisdiction in the case and that
the Application was not admissible; he consequently informed the Registrar

that Australia would raise preliminaryobjectionsin accordance withthe provi-Règlementde la Cour. Le 16janvier 1991,dans le délai fixé pourle dépôt du
contre-mémoire,leGouvernementaustralienaprésentédesexceptionsprélimi-
naires concluant àl'irrecevabilitéde la requête etàl'absencedecompétencede
la Cour pour connaître des demandes y formulées.En conséquence,par une
ordonnance en date du 8 février 1991,la Cour, constatant qu'en vertu des
dispositionsdu paragraphe 3 de l'article 79 du Règlementla procédure surle
fondétaitsuspendue,afixéun délaipour laprésentationp,ar leGouvernement
de Nauru, d'un exposéécrit contenantses observations et conclusions sur les
exceptionspréliminaires.Cetexposéaété déposéle17juillet 1991,dans ledélai
prescrit, et l'affaires'esttrouvée enétat pource qui est des exceptions prélimi-
naires.
4. Desaudiencespubliquesont été tenuesdu 11au 19novembreainsique les

21 et 22novembre 1991,au coursdesquellesont été entendus en leurs plaidoi-
ries et réponses
Pourl'Australie: M.GavanGriffith, Q.C.,
M.Eduardo Jiménezde Aréchaga,
M. Derek W.Bowett,Q.C.,
M.Henry Burmester,
M.AlainPellet.

PourNauru: M. V.S.Mani,
S.Exc.M. Hammer DeRoburt, G.C.M.G., O.B.E., M.P.,
M.LeoD. Keke,
M.BarryConnell,
M.Ian Brownlie,Q.C.,
M.James Crawford.

A l'audience, des membresde la Cour ont posé aux deux Parties des questions
auxquelles il a été répondu oralemenotu par écrit.

5. Dans la procédureécrite, les conclusions ci-aprèsont étéprésentéespar
les Partie:

Au nomdu Gouvernementde Nauru,
dans le mémoire :

«Sur la base des moyens de fait et de droit présentés dans le présent
mémoire,la Républiquede Nauru
Priela Courde dire etjuger

que l'Etat défendeurassume la responsabilitédu manquement aux obli-
gationsjuridiques ci-après:
Premièrement:les obligations énoncéesà l'article 76 de la Charte des
Nations Unies et aux articles 3 et 5 de l'accord de tutelle pour Nauru du
1enovembre 1947.
Deuxièmement:les normes internationales généralement reconnues

comme étant applicables àla mise en Œuvredu principe d'autodétermina-
tion.
Troisièmementl:'obligationderespecterle droit de souverainetéperma-
nente du peuple nauruan sur ses richesses et ressources naturelles.sions of Article 79of the Rules of Court. On 16January 1991,within the time-
limitfixedforthefiling ofthe Counter-Memorial,the Government of Australia
filed PreliminaryObjectionssubmitting that the Application was inadmissible
and that the Court lackedjurisdiction to hearthe claimsmade therein. Accord-
ingly,by an Order dated 8 February 1991,the Court, recording that byvirtue of
the provisionsof Article79,paragraph 3,of theRulesof Court,theproceedings
on the merits were suspended, fixed a time-limit for the presentation by the
Government of Nauru of a Written Statement of its Observations and Sub-
missions on the Preliminary Objections. That statement was filed on 17July
1991,withintheprescribed time-limit,and the casebecamereadyforhearingin
respect of the preliminary objections.
4. On 11to 19,and 21 and 22 November 1991,public hearings were held in

the course of which the Court heard the oral arguments and replies of the
following :
ForAustralia: Mr.GavanGriffith, Q.C.,
Mr. Eduardo JiménezdeAréchaga,
Mr.Derek W.Bowett,Q.C.,
Mr. HenryBurmester,
Mr.Alain Pellet.

ForNauru: Mr. V.S.Mani,
H.E. Mr. Hammer DeRoburt, G.C.M.G., O.B.E.,M.P.,
Mr.LeoD. Keke,
Mr. Barry Connell,
Mr.Ian Brownlie,Q.C.,
Mr.JamesCrawford.

During the hearings, questions were put by Members of the Court to both
Parties, and replies were giveneither orally or in writing.

5. In the course of the written proceedings, the following submissions were
presented by the Parties :

Onbehalfof theGovemmentof Nauru,
in the Memorial:

"On the basis of the evidence and legal argument presented in this
Memorial, the Republic of Nauru
RequeststheCourtto adjudge anddeclare

that the Respondent Statebears responsibility for breaches of the follow-
ing legal obligations:
First: the obligations set forth in Article 76 of the United Nations
Charter and Articles 3 and 5 of the Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru
of 1November 1947.
Second:the international standards generally recognized as applicable
in the implementation of the principle of self-determination.

Third:the obligationto respect the right of the Nauruan people to per-
manent sovereigntyovertheir natural wealth and resources. Quatrièmement:l'obligation de droit international général dene pas
exercer de pouvoirs d'administration de telle manièrequ'il en résulte un
déni dejustice latosensu.
Cinquièmement: l'obligation de droit international général dene pas
exercerde pouvoirsd'administration detellemanièrequ'ily aitun abus de

droit.
Sixièmement:le principe de droit international général selon lequel
1'Etatchargéd'administrer un territoire a l'obligationde ne pas apporter à
celui-cide modifications touchant à son étatsi cesmodifications portent
une atteinteirréparableàun intérêtjuridique actuelou éventue dl'un autre
Etat sur ceterritoire, ou lèsentcet intérte façon substantielle.

Prieenoutre la Courde direetjuger
quela Républiquede Nauru aun titrejuridiqu surlapart allouéeàl'Aus-
tralie des avoirs d'outre-mer des British Pho&hate Commissioners qui
ont été inventoriéest liquidés en application del'accord trilatéral conclu
le9 février1987.

Priela Courde direetjuger
que 1'Etatdéfendeur aledevoirde fournir une réparationappropriéepour
le préjudice causéà la Républiquede Nauru en raison du manquement à
ses obligationsjuridiques telles qu'énoncées ci-dessuest du fait qu'il n'a
pas reconnu l'intérêdte Nauru sur les avoirsd'outre-mer desBritishPhos-
phate Commissioners.»

Au nomdu Gouvernemena t ustralien,
dans les exceptionspréliminaires:

«Se fondant sur les points de fait et de droit exposés dansles présentes
exceptionspréliminaires,le Gouvernementaustralien prie la Cour de dire
etjugerquelarequêtede Nauru estirrecevableetquelaCourn'a pascompé-
tence pour connaître des demandes formuléespar Nauru, pour toutes ou
l'une quelconque des raisonsexposéesdans ces exceptions préliminaires. »

Au nomdu Gouvernementde Nauru,
dans l'exposéécrit contenantsesobservations et conclusionssur les exceptions
préliminaires:

«En considérationdecequiprécède, le Gouvernementde Nauru prie la
Cour :
De rejeterles exceptionspréliminairesdel'Australie, et
De direetjuger :

a) que la Cour a compétencepour connaître de la demande présentée
dans lemémoire de Nauru, et
b) quela demande estrecevable. »
6. Dansla procédure orale,lesconclusionsci-aprèsont étéprésentép esr les

Parties:
Aunomdu Gouvernementaustralien,

à l'audiencedu 21novembre 1991 :
«Se fondant surlespoints de fait et de droit exposésdanssesexceptions
préliminaireset sesplaidoiries, etpour tous lesmotifs et raisons quisont Fourth: the obligation of general international law not to exercise
powers of administration in such a way as to produce a denial of justice
latosensu.
Fgth:the obligation of generalinternational law not to exercisepowers
of administration in such a way as to constitute an abuse of rights.

Sixth: the principle of general international law that a State which is
responsible forthe administration of territory isunder an obligationnot to
bring about changes in the condition of the territory which will cause
irreparable damage to, or substantially prejudice, the existing or contin-
gent legal interest of another Statein respect of that territory.
RequeststheCourtto adjudge anddeclarefurther

that the Republic of Nauru has a legalentitlement tothe Australianalloca-
tion of the overseas assets of the British Phosvhate Commissioners which
were marshalled and disposed of in accordance with the trilateral Agree-
ment concluded on 9 February 1987.

RequeststheCourtto adjudge and declare
that the Respondent State is under a duty to make appropriate reparation
in respect of the loss caused to the Republic of Nauru as a result of the
breaches of its legal obligationsdetailed above and its failure to recognize
the interest of Nauru in the overseas assets of the British Phosphate Com-
missioners."

Onbehalfof theGovemmentofAustralia,
in the Preliminary Objections :

"On the basis of the facts and law presented in these PreliminaryObjec-
tions, the Government of Australia requests the Court to adjudge and
declare that the Application by Nauru is inadmissible and that the Court
lacks jurisdiction to hear the claims made by Nauru for al1or any of the
reasons set out inthese Preliminary Objections."

Onbehalfof theGovemmentof Nauru,
in the Written Statement of its Observations and Submissionson the Prelimi-
nary Objections :

"In consideration of the foregoing the Government of Nauru requests
the Court :
Torejectthe preliminaryobjections of Australia, and

Toadjudge anddeclare:
(a) that the Court hasjurisdiction in respect of the claim presented in the
MemorialofNauru, and
(b) that the claimisadmissible."

6. In the course of the oral proceedings, the following submissions were
presented by the Parties :
Onbehalfof theGovemmentofAustralia,

atthe hearing of 21 November 1991 :
"On the basis of the facts and law set out in its PreliminaryObjections
and its oral pleadings, and foral1or any ofthe grounds and reasons set out exposésoupour l'un quelconqued'entreeux,le Gouvernementaustralien
prie la Courde dire etjuger que les demandes formuléàsl'encontrede
l'Australie par Naurudans sa requêet sonmémoiresontirrecevableset
que laCourn'apas compétence pour en connaître.»
Au nomdu Gouvernementde Nauru,

al'audiencedu 22novembre 1991:
«Enconsidérationdesespiècesdeprocédureetplaidoiries,le Gouver-
nementde la Républiquede Nauru prie la Cour:
De rejetelesexceptions préliminairesoulevéespar l'Australie,et

De direetjuger:
a)que la Cour a compétencepour connaître des demandes présentées
dansle mémoire deNauru,et
b)quelesdemandessontrecevables.
Subsidiairement,le Gouvernementde Nauru prie la Cour dejuger que
certaines ou la totalitédes exceptions préliminase 1'Australien'ont
pas,danslescirconstancesdel'espèce,ncaractèreexclusivementprélimi-
naire et,en conséquenced, ejoindre certaines oula totalité decesexcep-
tionsau fond.»

7. LaCour étudiera enpremierlieu les exceptionssoulevéespar i'Aus-

tralie en ce qui concerne les conditions dans lesquelles le différend relatif
à la remise en état des terreà phosphates exploitées avant le lerjuillet
1967estnéentre Nauru etl'Australie. Puisellesepenchera surl'exception
tiréedu fait que la Nouvelle-Zélande et le Royaume-Uni ne sont pas
parties àl'instance. Enfin elle se prononcera sur les exceptions dirigées
contre les conclusions de Nauru afférentes aux avoirs d'outre-mer des
«British Phosphate Commissioners P.

8. LaCour examinera tout d'abord laquestion de sa compétence.Dans
sa requête,Nauru fonde cette compétence sur les déclarations par
lesquellesl'Australie et Nauru ont acceptélajuridiction de la Cour dans
lesconditionsprévuesau paragraphe 2del'article 36du Statut.Cesdécla-
rations ont été déposées auprèdsu Secrétairegénéralde l'organisation
desNations Uniesle 17mars 1975dans lecas del'Australieetle29janvier
1988dans le cas de Nauru. La déclarationde Nauru dispose que l'accep-
tation par Nauru de lajuridiction de la Cour ne s'étend pas aux «diffé-
rends à l'égard desquels il existe un mécanisme de règlement d'un
différenden application d'un accord entre la Républiquede Nauru et un
autre Etat».LadéclarationdeYAustralieprécise,quant àelle,qu'elle«ne
s'applique pas auxdifférendsau sujetdesquels lesparties ont convenuou
conviennent de recourir à une autre procédurede règlementpacifique ».

9. L'Australieseprévautde cettedernière réservepour soutenir que la therein,the Governmentof Australia requeststhe Court to adjudgeand
declarethattheclaimsbyNauru againstAustraliasetoutintheirApplica-
tion and Memorialareinadmissibleand that the Court lacksjurisdiction
to hear theclaims."

Onbehalfof the Governmentof Nauru,
at the hearingof 22 November1991 :

"In considerationof its written and oral pleadingsthe Governmentof
the Republicof Nauru requeststhe Court:
To rejecthe preliminaryobjectionsraisedbyAustralia,and
Toadjudge anddeclare:

(a)thattheCourthasjurisdictioninrespectoftheclaimspresentedinthe
Memorial ofNauru,and
(b)thattheclaimsareadmissible.
In the alternative,the Governmentof the Republicof Nauru requests
the Court to declarethat someor al1ofthe Australianpreliminaryobjec-
tionsdoSotpossess, inthecircumstancesofthecase,an exclusivelypreli-
minarycharacter,and in consequence,tojoin someor al1of theseobjec-
tions t/khemerits."

7. The Court will first consider those of Australia's objections which
concern the circumstances in which the dispute relating to rehabilitation
of the phosphate lands worked out prior to 1July 1967arose between

Nauru and Australia. It will then turn tothe objection based on the fact
.- that New Zealand and the United Kingdom are notparties tothe proceed-
ings. Lastly,it willrule on the objections to Nauru's submissionsrelating
to the overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners.

8. The Court willbegin by considering the question of itsjurisdiction.
In itsApplication, Nauru basesjurisdiction on the declarations whereby
Australia and Nauru have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court under
Article 36,paragraph 2,ofthe Statute. Those declarations were deposited
withthe Secretary-General ofthe United Nations on 17March 1975inthe
caseofAustralia and on 29January 1988inthe caseofNauru. The declara-
tion of Nauru stipulates that Nauru's acceptance of the Court's jurisdic-
tion does not extend to "any dispute with respect to which there exists a

dispute settlementmechanism under an agreementbetween the Republic
of Nauru and another State". The declaration of Australia, for its part,
specifies that it"does not apply to any dispute in regard to which the
parties thereto have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some
othermethod of peaceful settlement".
9. Australia contends that as a result ofthe latter reservation theCourtCour estincompétentepour statuersur larequêtede Nauru. Ellerappelle
à cet effet que Nauru, après avoir été administrée sous mandatde la
Société des Nations, a été placée solu esrégimede tutelle prévupar le
chapitre XII de la Charte des Nations Unies, en vertu d'un accord de
tutelleapprouvépar l'Assemblée générale lele'novembre 1947.En appli-
cation de cet accord, l'administration de Nauru devait être assuréepar
une autoritéadministrante composéedes Gouvernementsde l'Australie,
de la Nouvelle-Zélandeetdu Royaume-Uni.L'Australieexposequetout
différend néau cours de la tutelle entre ((l'autorité administranteet les
habitants autochtones »relevaitdelacompétenceexclusivedu Conseilde
tutelle et de l'Assembléegénérale des NationsUnies. Ceux-ci,informés
sur la situation Nauru par lesmissionsdevisitenomméespar leConseil
detutelle, lespétitions deshabitantset lesrapports de l'autoritéadminis-

trante, pouvaient faire des recommandations en ce qui concerne de tels
différends,non seulement àcetteautorité,mais encore aux représentants
du peuple nauruan. Ilspouvaient en outreprovoquer desnégociationsen
vue d'aboutir au règlementde ces différends.Maisen tout étatde cause,
tout différendde ce type devrait, selon l'Australie, être regardé comme
réglédu faitmême delalevéedelatutelledèslorsque celle-cia été opérée
sans réserve.
10. Au casparticulier, l'Australie souligneque le conseil degouverne-
mentlocal de Nauru - organereprésentatifdela communauténauruane
créé en 1951et auquel, depuis 1963,incombaient, à de nombreux égards,
lestâches administratives locales- a soulevéla questionde la remiseen
état desanciennesterres a phosphates devant l'organisation des Nations
Uniesdès1965.Cettequestiona été discutéedans lesannées quisuivirent
tant au seindel'organisation que lorsdecontactsdirects.Autermedeces
discussions, un accord relatif à l'industrie des phosphates de l'île de
Nauru a été conclule 14novembre 1967entreleconseilde gouvernement

local de Nauru, d'une part, et l'Australie, la Nouvelle-Zélande et le
Royaume-Uni, d'autre part; selon l'Australie, Nauru a, du fait de cet
accord, renoncéà ses revendications concernant la remise en état des
terresàphosphates. En outre, l'Australie expose que l'Assembléegéné-
rale des Nations Uniesa levéla tutellele 19décembre1967sansformuler
de réserveen ce qui concerne l'administration du territoire. Dans ces
conditions, 1'Australiesoutient qu'en ce qui concernele différend faisant
l'objetdelarequêtel'Australie etNauru étaientconvenues «de recourir à
une autre procédurede règlementpacifique»,au sens de la réservefaite
par l'Australiedanssadéclaration.LaCour seraitenconséquenceincom-
pétentepour connaître de cedifférend.
II. La Cour ne considère pas nécessaired'entrer à ce stade dans le
détaildel'argumentation ainsiavancée.En effet,lesdéclarations faitesen
application duparagraphe 2del'article36du StatutdelaCour nepeuvent
viserquelesdifférendsentreEtats.Ladéclarationdel'Australienecouvre
que ce type de litige; elle est faite expressém«atl'égardde tout autre

Etat acceptant lamême obligation.»Dans cesconditions,laquestion qui
sepose en l'espèceede savoir si l'Australieet la Républiquede Nauru lacks jurisdiction to deal with Nauru's Application. It recalls in that
respectthat Nauru, havingbeen previouslyadministered under a League
of Nations Mandate, wasplaced under the Trusteeship Systemprovided
forinChapter XII ofthe United Nations Charter bya Trusteeship Agree-
ment approved by the General Assembly on 1 November 1947.That
Agreementprovided that theadministration ofNauru wasto be exercised
byan AdministeringAuthoritymade up ofthe Governments ofAustralia,
NewZealand and the United Kingdom.Australiaargues that anydispute
which arose in the course ofthe Trusteeshipbetween"the Administering
Authority and the indigenousinhabitants" fellwithin the exclusive juris-
diction of the United Nations Trusteeship Council and General Assem-

bly. Those organs, kept informed about Nauruan affairs by the Visiting
Missions appointed by the Trusteeship Council, by petitions from the
inhabitants, and by the reports of the Administering Authority, could
make recommendations with respect to such disputes, not only to that
Authority, but also to the representatives of the Nauruan people; they
couldalsoprompt negotiations withaviewto settlementofsuchdisputes.
Butinanyevent,accordingto Australia,anydispute ofthat typeshouldbe
regarded as havingbeen settled by the veryfact of the termination ofthe
Trusteeship,provided thatthat termination was unconditional.
10. In the present case, Australia emphasizes that the Nauru Local
GovernmentCouncil - an organ, created in 1951,representing the Nau-
ruan community and which, from 1963onwards, had been, in many
respects, responsible for local administrative tasks - raised with the
United Nations the question of rehabilitation of the worked-out phos-
phate lands from 1965onwards. That question was discussed in subse-
quent years,both withinthe United Nations and indirectcontacts. Atthe
end of those discussions,anAgreementrelatingtotheNauru Island Phos-

phate Industry was concluded on 14November 1967between the Nauru
Local Government Council, on the one hand, and Australia, New Zea-
land and the United Kingdom, on the other, the effect of which,in Aus-
tralia's submission,was that Nauru waived itsclaimsto rehabilitation of
the phosphate lands.Australiamaintains,moreover, that on 19December
1967,the United Nations General Assemblyterminated the Trusteeship
without makinganyreservationrelatingtothe administration oftheTerri-
tory. In those circumstances,Australia contends that, with respect tothe
dispute presented in Nauru's Application, Australia and Nauru had
agreed "to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement"
within the meaning ofthe reservation in Australia'sdeclaration, and that
consequently the Court lacksjurisdiction to deal with that dispute.
11. The Court does not consider it necessaryto enter at this point into
the details ofthe arguments thus advanced. Declarations made pursuant
to Article 36,paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court can only relate to
disputes between States. The declaration of Australia only covers that
type ofdispute; itismade expressly"in relationto any other Stateaccept-

ing the same obligation ...". In these circumstances, the question that
arises in this case is whether Australia and the Republic of Nauru did or ont ou non passé après le31 janvier 1968,date de l'indépendancede
Nauru,un accord par lequel cesdeux Etatsseraient convenus de régler le
différend quiles oppose en ce qui concernela remise en état desterràs
phosphates en recourant à une procédure agrééa eutre que le règlement
judiciaire.l n'apas étésoutenu qu'un tel accord aurait existéet sonexis-
tence n'a pas étédémontrée.La question posée appelle par suite une
réponsenégative.La Cour estime en conséquenceque l'exception tirée
par l'Australiede la réserveinvoquée doit êtrerejetée.

12. La deuxièmeexceptionde l'Australieesttiréedu fait que les auto-
ritésnauruanes auraient renoncé avant même l'indépendance à toute
revendicationconcernant la remise en état desterreà phosphates. Cette
exception comporte deux branches. En premier lieu, la renonciation
résulterait implicitement,mais nécessairement,de l'accord précitédu
14 novembre 1967.Elle résulterait également des déclarations faiteà
l'automne 1967par le chefprincipal nauruan devant les Nations Uniesà
l'occasion de la levéede la tutelle. Nauru ne saurait, selon l'Australie,
revenir sur cette double renonciation et sa demande devrait en consé-
quence être écartée commie rrecevable.

13. La Cour n'estime pas nécessaire d'entrerdans les diverses ques-
tions dedroitque soulèvecetteargumentation et enparticulier de s'inter-
roger sur l'opposabilitéà la Républiquede Nauru d'une renonciation
éventuellementopérép ear les autoritésnauruanesavant l'indépendance
de ce pays.Il lui suffira de constater qu'enfait ces autoritésn'ont jamais
renoncé à leurs prétentionsde manière claire etnon équivoque,que l'on
considèretant les négociations ayant mené àl'accord du 14novembre
1967que l'accord lui-même ou les discussions au sein de l'Organisation
des Nations Unies.
14. Les Parties s'accordent pour reconnaître que l'accord du 14no-
vembre 1967réglaitlesconditions dans lesquellesla propriétédesimmo-
bilisations de l'industrie des phosphatesNauru devait être transférée
aux autorités locales et les modalités selon lesquellesles phosphates

seraient dans l'avenir exploitéset vendus. Elles s'accordent également
pour relever que cet accord ne contenait aucune clause expliciterelative
à la remise en étatdesterreà phosphates exploitéesdans le passé. Mais
les Parties divergent sur la portéede ce silence. L'Australie soutient en
effetque «l'accord constituaitun règlementglobal detoutes lesquestions
soulevéespar Nauru en ce qui concerne l'industrie des phosphates)),
y compris la remise en état des terres,et que dès lors cet accord valait
renonciation par Nauru à ses demandes antérieures àce sujet. Nauru
affirme au contraire que le silence de l'accord ne saurait être interprété
commeimpliquant renonciation.
15. La Cour constate que lors despourparlers avecl'autoritéadminis-

trante ladélégationdu conseildegouvernementlocal de Nauru avait,dès
juin 1965,soutenu que «les gouvernements participants ont une respon-did not, after 31 January 1968,when Nauru acceded to independence,
conclude an agreementwhereby the two States undertook to settletheir
disputerelatingto rehabilitation ofthe phosphate lands byresorting to an
agreed procedure other than recourse to the Court. No such agreement
has been pleaded or shown to exist. That question has therefore to be
answered in the negative. The Court thus considers that the objection
raised by Australia on the basis ofthe above-mentioned reservation must
be rejected.

12. Australia'ssecond objection isthat the Nauruan authorities, even
before accedingto independence, waived al1claimsrelating to rehabilita-
tion ofthe phosphate lands.Thisobjection contains two branches. In the
firstplace,the waiver,itissaid,wasthe implicitbut necessaryresultofthe
above-mentioned Agreementof 14November 1967.It isalso said to have
resultedfrom the statementsmadein the United Nations in theautumn of
1967bytheNauruan Head Chiefonthe occasionofthe termination ofthe
Trusteeship. In theviewofAustralia, Nauru maynot goback onthat two-
fold waiverand its claimshould accordinglybe rejected as inadmissible.

13. TheCourt doesnot deemit necessaryto enterintothe various ques-
tionsoflawthatare raisedbythe foregoingargument and, inparticular, to
consider whether any waiver by the Nauruan authorities prior to acces-
sion to independence is opposable to the Republic of Nauru. It will suf-
fice to note that in fact those authorities did not at anytime effecta clear
and unequivocal waiveroftheir claims,whether onetakes into considera-

tion the negotiations which led to the Agreement of 14November 1967,
the Agreement itself,or the discussionsat the United Nations.

14. The Parties are at one in recognizing that the Agreement of
14November 1967laid down the conditions under whichthe property in
the capitalassets of the phosphate industry on Nauru was to pass to the
localauthorities and the waysinwhichthe phosphate would,in future,be
worked and sold.Theyalsorecognizethatthat Agreementdid not contain
any express provision relating to rehabilitation of the phosphate lands
previously worked out. However, the Parties disagree as to the signifi-
cance ofthat silence.Australia maintains that "the Agreement did repre-
sent a comprehensivesettlement of al1claimsby Nauru in relation to the
phosphate industry", including rehabilitation of the lands, and that the
Agreement wasaccordinglytantamount to a waiverby Nauru of its pre-
vious claims in that regard. Nauru, on the contrary, contends that the
absence of anyreferenceto that matter in the Agreement cannot be inter-
preted as implyinga waiver.

15. TheCourt notesthat during the discussionswiththe Administering
Authority the delegation ofthe Nauru Local Government Council main-
tained, as earlyas June 1965,that "there was a responsibility on the Part-248 TERRES À PHOSPHATES À NAURU (ARRÊT)

sabilitépour ce qui est de remettre en étatàleurs frais, lesterres exploi-
tées ».Ladélégationavaite ,njuin 1966,exprimé à nouveau cetteposition,
notéque les frais correspondants avaient étéestimés à 91 millions de

dollars australiens et proposé queces frais soient partagéspar les trois
gouvernements proportionnellement aux avantages qu'ils avaient tirés
dans lepassédel'exploitation desphosphates. Elleavaitenfin ajoutéque
Nauru serait prête àprendre en charge la remise en état des terres qui
seraient exploitéespar la suite sila totalité des avantageséconomiques
découlant desphosphates» était disponiblepour les Nauruans dans le
futur. Aucunaccord n'intervint àcesujet en 1966etlespourparlers repri-
rent enavril 1967.L'autoritéadministrante proposa alorsl'insertion dans
le futur accord d'une disposition selonlaquelle:

«Les gouvernements participants considèrent que les arrange-
ments financiers proposés pour réglerla question des phosphates
répondent aux besoins futurs de la communauté nauruane, y
compris la remise en étatou la réinstallation.

Lorsdela séancedu 16mai 1967,la délégation del'autoritéadministrante
demanda si :

«au casoù on parvient àun accord financier, les Nauruans persiste-
ront malgré tout à mettre en cause la responsabilité des gouverne-

mentsparticipants dans la remiseen état».
Lecompterendu despourparlers porte ensuite :

«Des échangesqui suivent,il ressort que les Nauruans maintien-
dront leurréclamationau sujet de la remiseen état deszonesexploi-
tées dans le passé même si lesgouvernements participants ne
demandent pas officiellement son retrait, par exemple dans le cadre
d'un accord.))

Aucune trace de discussion ultérieure de cette question ne figure au
dossier de la Cour.
16. La Cour constate que l'accord du 14novembre 1967ne contient
aucune clausepar laquelle lesautoritésnauruanesauraient expressément

renoncé àleurs prétentions antérieures.En outre, de l'avisde la Cour, le
textedel'accord considéré dans sonensemblene saurait,compte tenu des
circonstances évoquéesau paragraphe 15 ci-dessus, être interprété
commeimpliquant une tellerenonciation. L'argumentation australienne,
dans sapremièrebranche, doit être écartée.
17. L'Australie soutient par ailleurs que, lors des débats aux Nations
Unies ayant mené à l'automne 1967 à la levéede la tutelle sur Nauru eà
l'indépendancede ce pays, les autoritésnauruanes ont égalementaban-
donnéleursprétentionsen cequi concerne la remise en état desterres.A
cet égard,l'Australie s'appuie principalementsur une déclaration faiteà

la Quatrième Commissionde l'Assembléegénéraledes Nations Unies le
6décembre1967par lechefprincipal nauruan DeRoburt, selonlaquelle :nerGovernmentsto restore attheir costthe land that had been mined". In
June 1966the delegationrestated that position,noting that costshad been
estimatedat 91million Australiandollars and proposing that those costs
shouldbe shared bythe three Governmentsin proportion to the benefits
they had previously derived from the mining of the phosphate. It con-
cluded by adding that Nauru would beprepared to assumeresponsibility
for the restoration of any land mined subsequently if "the full economic
benefit from the phosphate" was made available to the Nauruans at a
future time. No agreement was reached on that subject in 1966and the
discussions resumed in April 1967.The Administering Authority then
proposed the insertion into the future agreement of a provision to the

effectthat :
"The Partner Governments consider that the proposed financial
arrangements on phosphate cover the future needs of the Nauruan
communityincludingrehabilitation or resettlement."

During the meetingheld on 16May 1967,the delegation ofthe Adminis-
tering Authority asked

"would the Nauruans press their argument despite any financial
arrangements made, that the Partner Governments had a responsi-
bility on rehabilitation?"

The summary record ofthe discussions goeson to Saythat

"Duringthefollowing discussionit emerged that the Nauruans
would still maintain their claim on the Partner Governments in
respectofrehabilitation ofareasminedinthepast, evenifthePartner
Governments did not press for the withdrawal of the claim in a
forma1manner such asin an agreement."

There is no trace of any subsequent discussion of this question in the
documentsbeforethe Court.
16. TheCourt notesthat the Agreementof 14November 1967contains
no clausebywhichthe Nauruan authorities expresslywaivedtheirearlier
claims.Furthermore, in the view ofthe Court, the text of the Agreement,
read as a whole, cannot, regard being had to the circumstances set out in
paragraph 15above, be construed as implying such a waiver. The first
branch of the Australianargument mustbe rejected.

17. Australia maintains further that the Nauruan authorities also
waivedtheir claimsto rehabilitation ofthelands during the debates atthe
United Nations that led,in the autumn of 1967,tothe termination of the
Trusteeship over Nauru and to its independence. Australia relies chiefly
upon a statementmade in the Fourth Committee of the United Nations
General Assembly on 6 December 1967, bythe Nauruan Head Chief,

Mr. DeRoburt, in which he said : l'îlea la bonne fortune de posséderde vastes gisements de phos-
phate de haute teneur.Il est évidentque cette situation économique
pose aussidesproblèmesparticuliers. L'unde ceuxqui préoccupent
les Nauruans tientàce que lesterres d'où l'on a extraitlephosphate
resteronttotalementinutilisables. En conséquence,bienque l'opéra-
tion soit coûteuse, il faudrait les amender, et on adopte déjà des
mesures visant àréserver desfonds àcette fin. Le fait que le phos-

phate est une source de revenus momentanée poseen soi un pro-
blème; d'icià vingt-cinq ans environ, les gisements seront épuisés.
Toutefois, les revenus que Nauru en a déjà tirés etqu'ilen tirera au
coursdesvingt-cinqannées qui vont suivrepermettront de résoudre
le problème.Une partie des revenus est déjà affectéeà des projets
de développement ..En outre, une proportion beaucoup plus im-
portante des profits réalisésestversàun fonds d'investissement à
long terme, afin que la subsistance des générations futures soit
assuréequoi qu'il arrive. Un fait demeure: les Nauruans désirent
l'indépendance et saventqu'ilsdisposent des ressourcesnécessaires
pour que cette indépendancesoitviable. »

L'Australie soutient que cette déclaration équivalàiun engagement
des autoritésnauruanes de financer une éventuelle remiseen état des
terres exploitéesdans le passé aveclesrevenus de l'exploitation future et
qu'en conséquenceelleconstituait une renonciationà toute revendication
à l'encontrede l'autorité administrante.
18. En vue d'apprécier laportéede cette déclaration,il convient de la

replacer dansson contexte.Dès1965, leconseildegouvernementlocal de
Nauru avaitremis àunemissiondevisitedésignée par leConseildetutelle
desNations Uniesun mémoiretendant àcequelesoldel'île«soit entière-
mentremisenétat ».Puis,lorsdelatrente-troisièmesessiondu Conseilde
tutelle,au printemps 1966,cedernier prit note d'une déclaration faitepar
lereprésentantdu peuple nauruan, selon laquelle :

«la responsabilitéde remettre l'îleen état revenàl'autorité admi-
nistrante tant qu'elleresterait autoritéadministrante. S'ilsetrouvait
que Nauru accède àl'indépendanceenjanvier 1968,cetteresponsa-
bilitédeviendraitalorscelledupeuple nauruan. Lapart deresponsa-
bilitéde chacun dans cetravail deremiseenétatétaidtonc àpeu près
la suivanteun tiers àl'autorité administranteetdeuxtiers au peuple
nauruan. »

Au printemps 1967,le représentant du peuple nauruan souligna à
nouveau devant le Conseil de tutelle,lors de la trente-quatrième session
decetorgane,que«l'autoritéadministrantedevaitassumer laresponsabi-
litédela remiseen état desterres déjàexcavées».

19. Le 22 novembre 1967enfin, le Conseil de tutelle se réunitafin
d'examiner la demande de l'Australie, de la Nouvelle-Zélande et du
Royaume-Uni tendant à la levéede la tutelle sur Nauru en vue de per- "[theisland had the]good fortune [topossess]largedeposits of high-
grade phosphate. That economicbase, of course, presented its own
problems. One which worried the Naumans derived from the fact
that land from which phosphate had been mined would be totally
unusable. Consequently, although it would be an expensive opera-
tion, thatland wouldhave to be rehabilitated and steps werealready
being taken tobuild up funds to beused for that purpose. That phos-
phate was a wasting asset was,in itself,a problem; in about twenty-
five years' timethe supply would be exhausted. The revenuewhich
Naum had received in the past and would receive during the next
twenty-fiveyearswould,however,makeitpossibleto solvethe prob-
lem. Already some of the revenue was being allocated to develop-

ment projects ...In addition,a muchlargerproportion ofitsincome
was being placed in a long-terminvestmentfund, so that, whatever
happened, future generations would be provided for. In short, the
Naumans wanted independence and were confident that they had
the resources with whichto sustain it."

Australiaargues that thisstatementamounted to an undertaking bythe
Naunian authorities to finance any rehabilitation of lands worked out in
the pastfromrevenuederivingfrom future exploitation, and that it conse-
quently constituted a waiver of any claim against the Administering
Authority.
18. In orderto ascertainthe significanceofthis statement,itneeds tobe
placed in context.Asearlyas 1965,the Nauru LocalGovernmentCouncil
had submitted to a Visiting Mission appointed by the United Nations
Tmsteeship Council a memorandum indicating thatthe soi1onthe island
"must be fullyrehabilitated". Then at itsthirty-third session,in the spring
of 1966,the Tmsteeship Councilnoted a statementmade bythe represen-
tative ofthe people of Naum that :

"the responsibility for rehabilitating the Island, in so far as it is the
AdministeringAuthority's, remainswiththe Administering Author-
ity. If it should turn out that Nauni gets its own independence in
January 1968,from then on the responsibility willbe ours. A rough
assessment of the portions of responsibility for this rehabilitation
exercisethen isthis:one-third isthe responsibilityofthe Administer-
ing Authority and two-thirds is the responsibility of the Nauman
people."

In the spring of 1967,the representative of the people of Naum again
emphasized before the Trusteeship Council, at its thirty-fourth session,
that "the Administering Authority should accept responsibility for the
rehabilitation ofthe lands already mined".
19. Lastly,on 22 November 1967,the Tmsteeship Council met to con-
siderthe requestbyAustralia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom for

the termination ofNaum's Tmsteeship to enabletheterritory to accedetomettre àce territoire d'accédeà l'indépendancele 3l janvier 1968.Lors
de cetteréunion, lechefprincipal DeRoburt précisa :
((11reste toutefois un point sur lequel les opinions divergent: la

responsabilitépour la remise en état des terres à phosphates. Le
peuplenauruan accepte l'entièreresponsabilitédesterres exploitées
après lele'juillet 1967,puisque, selon le nouvel accord, il reçoit le
produit net de la vente des phosphates. Mais, n'ayant pas perçu le
produit net avantcettedate, il estime qu'ilincombeaux trois gouver-
nements d'assurer la remise en état des terres exploitées avantle
le'juillet 1967.Cen'estpasune questionquitouche àl'expirationde
l'accord de tutelle, et les Nauruans ne souhaitent pas non plus en
fairel'objet d'undébatàl'ONU.M. DeRoburt voudrait simplement
qu'il soit consignéque le Gouvernement nauruan continuera à
rechercher ce quele peuplenauruan considèrecommelajuste satis-
faction de cesrevendications.

Puisle Conseil de tutelle approuva un projet de résolution recomman-
dant la levéede la tutelle. Son rapport fut présenté à la Quatrième
Commission de l'Assembléegénéraleet ce fut lors des débats à la
Commission que le chef principal DeRoburt fit la déclaration précitée

que l'Australie assimile une renonciation.
20. LaCour nesauraitpartager cepoint devue.En effet,la déclaration
invoquéepar l'Australie(telleque reproduite auparagraphe 17ci-dessus)
traite dedeuxproblèmesdistincts :d'unepart celuidelaremiseenétatdes
terresà phosphates; d'autre part celui de l'épuisementfutur des gise-
ments.Surlepremierpoint, quiseulintéresseicilaCour, lechefprincipal
DeRoburt se bornait à préciser que desmesures étaient déjà adoptées
pour réserverdes fonds en vue de la remise en état des terres.En dépit
d'une formulation quelque peu ambiguë, cette déclaration n'impliquait
aucune renonciation aupoint devueexprimédemanière claireetrépétée
par lesreprésentantsdu peuple nauruan devant diversorganes de l'Orga-
nisationdes Nations Uniesetenparticulier devantleConseil detutelle le

22novembre 1967.
21. La Cour conclut que les autorités localesde Nauru n'ont pas
renoncé avant l'indépendance à leur revendication relativà la remise
en état des terresà phosphates exploitées avant le lerjuillet 1967.La
deuxième exception avancéepar l'Australie doit en conséquence être
rejetée.

22. D'après latroisièmeexceptiondel'Australie,lademandedeNauru
est
((irrecevableau motif que, l'Organisation des Nations Unies ayant

misfinà latutelle,la Cournepeutconnaîtred'allégations faisantétat
de violations de l'accordde tutelleindependence on31January 1968.Atthat meeting,Head Chief DeRoburt
stated that:

"There wasone subject,however,on whichthere wasstilla differ-
ence of opinion - responsibilityfor the rehabilitation of phosphate
lands.The Nauruan people fullyacceptedresponsibilityinrespectof
land mined subsequently to 1July 1967, since under the new agree-
ment they were receivingthe net proceeds of the sale of phosphate.
Prior to that date, however,they had not received the net proceeds
and it was therefore their contention that the three Governments
should bear responsibility forthe rehabilitation of land mined prior
to 1July 1967.Thatwasnot an issuerelevantto thetermination ofthe
Trusteeship Agreement,nor did the Nauruans wishto makeit a mat-
ter for United Nations discussion. He merely wished to place on
record that the Nauruan Government would continue to seekwhat
was, in the opinion ofthe Nauruan people, ajust settlement of their

claims."
TheTrusteeship Council then adopted a draft resolution recommend-
ing the termination of the Trusteeship. Its report was submitted to the
Fourth Committee of the General Assembly and it was during the pro-
ceedings of the Fourth Committee that Head Chief DeRoburt made the
statementquoted abovewhich Australia contends amounted to a waiver.

20. TheCourt cannot sharethisview.Thestatementreferred tobyAus-
tralia (set out in paragraph 17above) deals with two distinct problems,
namely, on the one hand, rehabilitation of the phosphate lands, and, on
the other, the future depletion ofthe deposits.On the first point, whichis
the onlyone ofinteresthereto theCourt,Head ChiefDeRoburt confined
himselfto statingthat measureshad alreadybeen taken to setasidefunds
for rehabilitation of the lands. Notwithstanding some ambiguity in the
wording,thestatement didnot implyanydeparture fromthepoint ofview
expressed clearly and repeatedly by the representatives of the Nauruan
people before various organs of the United Nations and, in particular,
before the TrusteeshipCouncil on 22November 1967.

21. The Court concludes that the Nauruan local authorities did not,
before independence, waive their claim relating to rehabilitation of the

phosphate lands worked out prior to 1July 1967.The second objection
raised by Australia must in consequencebe rejected.

22. Australia'sthird objection isthat Nauru's claimis

"inadmissible on the ground that termination of the Trusteeship by
the United Nations precludes allegationsof breachesof the Trustee-
ship Agreementfrom now being examined by the Court".L'Australie expose que atoutes les obligations dont Nauru allèguela
méconnaissance»concernent «l'administrationdu territoire »placé sous

tutelle. Or«le Conseil de tutelle et l'Assembléegénérale avaient compé-
tence exclusivepour seprononcer surd'éventuellesviolationsdel'accord
de tutelle et de l'article 76 de la CharteLorsque l'Assembléegénérale
met fin àune tutelle,«l'ensemble du systèmede surveillanceadministra-
tivecess[e]d'exister»et

«en l'absence de réservesexpressesconstatant que l'autoritéadmi-
nistrante a commis une violation et que sa responsabilité demeure
engagée,l'extinction est terminale et vaut exonération totalepour
l'avenirde toute responsabilité.

Selon l'Australie, Nauru ne saurait donc demander aujourd'hui à la
Cour:
((d'entreprendreun nouvel examen de l'administration de la tutelle

pour écarteret contredire les conclusions et décisionsprisespar les
organescompétentsdel'organisation desNations Unies dansl'exer-
cicede leurs fonctions de surveillancedu régimede la tutellB.
23. La Cour constate que, par résolution2347(XXII) du 19décembre

1967,l'Assemblée généraledes Nations Unies a décidé,
«de concert avec l'autorité administrante,que l'accord de tutelle
pour leTerritoire deNauru, ..cesserad'avoireffetaumoment même
où Nauru accédera à l'indépendance le 31janvier1968 D.

Unetellerésolutionaeuun «effetjuridique définitif»(Camerounsepten-
trional,arrêt,.I.J.Recueil1963,p. 32).Par voiede conséquencel'accord
detutelle «a prisfin »àcette date et ((n'estplus en vigueur»(ibid.,p. 37).
L'onpourrait de cefaits'interrogersurlarecevabilitéd'une action dirigée
contre l'autorité administranteet fondée sur la prétendue méconnais-

sancepar cettedernièredesesobligationsen cequiconcernel'administra-
tion du Territoire. La Cour n'estime cependant pas nécessaire d'entrer
dans ce débatet se bornera àexaminerles conditions particulières dans
lesquellesla tutelle surNauru a étélevée.

24. A cet égard,il convient de rappeler que la question de la remiseen
étatdes terres exploitées avait,de 1965 à 1967,étédiscutéeà plusieurs
reprises dans les différentesinstances compétentesde l'organisation des
Nations Unies: Conseil de tutelle, Comité spécial chargé d'étudielr a
situation en cequi concernel'application de la déclarationsur l'octroide
l'indépendance aux pays et aux peuples coloniaux, Quatrième Commis-
sion de l'Assemblée générae lt Assembléegénérale elle-même.
25. Le conseilde gouvernementlocal de Nauru avait,en 1965,remis à
une mission devisitedes Nations Uniesdésignée par leConseil de tutelle
un mémoiresur le sujet. La mission indiqua dans son rapport qu'elleneAustralia observesthat "al1the Nauruan allegations ofbreaches ofobliga-
tions" relateto "the administration oftheterritory"placed under Trustee-
ship. Australia adds that "the competence to determine any alleged
breach ofthe Trusteeship Agreementand Article 76ofthe Charter rested
exclusivelywith the Trusteeship Council and General Assembly"; that
when the General Assembly terminates a trust, "the whole system of
administrative supervision [cornes]to an end"; and that

"in the absence of an express reservation recording a breach and an
outstandingresponsibility onthe AdministeringAuthority, termina-
tion is conclusive and operates as a complete discharge from al1
further responsibility".

Accordingto Australia,Nauru thereforecannot nowrequestthe Court :

"to undertake the task of exploring again the performance of the

Trusteeship in order to overrule and contradict the conclusions and
decisions taken bythe competentUnited Nations organs inthe exer-
ciseoftheir functions of supervision ofthe trusteeship system".
23. The Court notes that, by resolution 2347(XXII) of 19December
1967,the General Assemblyofthe United Nations resolved

"in agreement with the AdministeringAuthority, that the Trustee-
ship Agreement for the Territory of Nauru ... shall cease to be in
force upon the accession of Nauru to independence on 31 January
1968".

Such a resolution had "definitive legal effect" (Northem Cameroons,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 32). Consequently, the Trusteeship
Agreement was "terminated" on that date and "is no longer in force"
(ibid.,p. 37).In the light ofhese considerations,it might be possible to
questionthe admissibilityof an actionbrought against the Administering
Authority onthebasisofthe allegedfailurebyitto complywithitsobliga-
tions with respect to the administration of the Territory. However, the

Court doesnot consideritnecessaryto enterintothisdebate and willcon-
fine itselfto examiningtheparticular circumstancesin whichtheTrustee-
shipfor Nauru wasterminated.
24. It istoberecalled inthis respectthat from 1965to 1967thequestion
of rehabilitation of the worked-out lands was on several occasions dis-
cussedinthevarious competentUnitedNationsbodies, namely,the Trus-
teeshipCouncil,the SpecialCommitteeontheSituation withregardtothe
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, the Fourth Committee of the General
Assemblyand the General Assemblyitself.
25. The Nauru Local Government Council, in 1965,submitted to a
United Nations VisitingMission appointed by the TrusteeshipCouncil a
memorandum on the subject. The Mission stated in its report that, its252 TERRES À PHOSPHATES À NAURU (ARR~~T)

s'estimaitpas «experte en la matière»et qu'elle ne pouvait par suitefor-
muler aucune recommandation. Le Conseil de tutelle seborna àprendre
acte de ce rapport le 29juin 1965.Mais l'Assembléegénéralel,e 21 dé-
cembre 1965,pria
((l'autorité administrantede prendre immédiatement des mesures
pour remettre en état l'île de Nauru de manière que le peuple
nauruan puisse y vivre en tant que nation souveraine)) (résolu-

tion 2111(XX)).
26. En accord avecles autoritéslocales,l'autorité administrante char-
gea alors une commissiond'experts, dite commission Davey,d'effectuer
uneétudesur lespossibilitésde remiseen état desterres àphosphates. Le
Conseil de tutelle,lors de satrente-troisièmesession,au printemps 1966,
rappela la résolution2111(XX) et nota que cette étude étaiten cours.

Quant à l'Assembléegénéralel,e 20décembre1966,elle recommanda à
nouveau
«à l'autorité administrante..de prendre des mesures immédiates,
quellesquesoientlesdépensesqu'ellesentraîneraient, pour remettre
enétatl'îlede Nauru afinque lepeuple nauruan puisseyvivreentant
que nation souveraine))(résolution2226(XXI)).

27. En mai 1967,le rapport de la commission Davey fut distribué aux
membres du Conseil de tutelle. Plusieurs de ces membres évoquèrentla
question de la remise en état desterres. Le représentant de la France
exprimale regretque((l'autorité administranteetlepeuplenauruan nese
soient pas encore entendus sur la question». Puis le Libéria soumitau
Conseilun projet derésolutionsoulignantqu'ilentrait danslaresponsabi-
litéde l'autorité administrantede restaurer lesterres àsesfrais.Ceprojet
nefutpasadopté,maisleConseil,((regrettantquelaquestion delaremise

en état desterres continue de donner lieu àdes divergencesd'opinion»,
exprima «l'espoir sincèrequ'ilserapossible detrouverune solutionsatis-
faisante pour lesdeux parties».
28. Lors des discussions qui eurent lieu au Conseil de tutelle en no-
vembre 1967en vue de la levéede la tutelle,le chef principal DeRoburt,
commeil a étérappelé auparagraphe 19ci-dessus,réservasaposition sur
la remise en état endemandant expressémentqu'ilsoit consignéque «le
Gouvernement nauruan continuera à recherchercequelepeuple nauruan
considère comme lajuste satisfaction de ces revendications». Le repré-
sentant de l'URSSse déclara certain((qu'ilsera fait droit aux demandes
légitimesde lapopulation de Nauru ..pour lareconstitution du sol».Les
représentantsde l'autorité administrante,tout en précisantque lesarran-
gementsconclusétaientfinancièrement favorables à Nauru, ne seréférè-
rent pas, dans leursdéclarations,la question de la remiseen état.
LorsdesdébatsenQuatrièmeCommission,aprèsl'interventiondu chef

principal DeRoburt mentionnéeau paragraphe 17ci-dessus,lereprésen-
tant de l'URSSévoqua ànouveau le problèmeet celui de l'Inde rappela
qu'ilsubsistaitmembers not being "experts in the matter", it was unable to make any
recommendation.TheTrusteeshipCouncilconfined itselfto taking note
of that report on 29June 1965.Butthe General Assembly,on 21 Decem-
ber 1965,requestedthat

"immediate stepsbe taken by the AdministeringAuthoritytowards
restoringthe island of Nauru for habitation by the Nauruan people
as a sovereignnation" (resolution 2111(XX)).

26. In agreementwiththe localauthorities, the Administering Author-
itythen commissioneda studyby a Committee of Experts, whichbecame
known asthe Davey Committee, on the possibilities of rehabilitating the
phosphate lands. The Trusteeship Council, at its thirty-third session, in
the spring of 1966,recalledresolution 2111(XX)and noted thatthe study
wasbeing prepared. Asfor the General Assembly,on 20December 1966,
it again recommended that
"the administering authority .. .take immediate steps, irrespec-
tive of the cost involved, towards restoring the island of Nauru for
habitation by the Nauruan people as a sovereign nation" (resolu-
tion 2226(XXI)).

27. In May 1967,thereport bythe DaveyCommitteewasdistributed to
the members of the Trusteeship Council. A number of members of the
Councilraisedthe question ofrehabilitation ofthe lands.The representa-
tive of France said he regretted that "no agreement had been reached
between the AdministeringAuthority and the Nauruan people" on the
question.Liberiasubsequentlysubmitted totheCounciladraftresolution
stressingthat it was the responsibility of the AdministeringAuthority to
restorethe landsat itsexpense.Thatdraft wasnot adopted,butthe Coun-
cil,"regrettingthat differencescontinue to existon thequestion ofrehabi-
litation", expressed the "earnest hope that it will be possible to find a
solution to the satisfaction ofboth parties".
28. During the discussions in the Trusteeship Council in November
1967withaviewtotermination oftheTrusteeship, Head Chief DeRoburt,
as indicated in paragraph 19 above, reserved his position on rehabilita-
tion, expressly placing on record that "the Nauruan Government would
continue to seek what was, in the opinion of the Nauruan people, a just
settlement oftheir claims".Therepresentative ofthe USSR stated that he
was certain "that the legitimatedemands of the Nauruan people ... for
the rehabilitation of the land would be fullymet". Therepresentatives of
the AdministeringAuthority, while indicating that the agreements con-
cluded were financiallyfavourable to Nauru, made no referencein their
statementstothe question of rehabilitation.
During the discussionsin the Fourth Committee, followingthe state-
ment by Head Chief DeRoburt mentioned in paragraph 17above, the
representative of theUSSR again referred to the problem and the repre-

sentativeof India recalled that «des divergences d'opinions considérables entreles Nauruans et
l'autorité administrantequantà la question delaresponsabilitédela
remiseen état desterres épuiséesD.

Le représentantde l'Inde exprima en outre l'espoir qu'un accord équi-
table serait concluà cet égard.Les représentantsde l'autorité adminis-

trante ne réagirentpas davantage.
29. La résolutionfinalede l'Assemblée générad lu 19décembre1967
décidant,de concert avec I'autorité administrante,de mettre fin à la
tutelle, ne comporte, contrairement aux résolutions antérieures,aucune
disposition invitant l'autorité administrante à remettre en état les
terres. La résolution rappelle toutefois les résolutions antérieuresdans
sesvisas.
30. Les faits exposés ci-dessus montrent que, lorsque l'Assemblée
générale a, sur recommandation du Conseil de tutelle, levéla tutelle sur
Nauru en accord avec l'autoritéadministrante, nul n'ignorait que des
divergencesd'opinion subsistaiententreleconseilde gouvernementlocal
deNauru etl'autorité administranteausujetdelaremiseenétatdesterres

àphosphates exploitéesavantle le'juillet 1967.Dèslors,bien quelaréso-
lution 2347 (XXII) de l'Assembléegénérale n'ait pasréservéexplicite-
mentlesdroitsqueNaurupourrait avoireus à cetégard,laCournesaurait
considérer cette résolution commedonnant quitus à l'autorité adminis-
tranteen cequiconcerne detels droits. De l'avisdela Cour, lesdroits que
Nauru pourrait avoir eus en ce qui concerne la remise en état des terres
sont demeurés intacts.Compte tenu des circonstances particulières de
l'affaire, la troisième exception de l'Australie doit en conséquence être
rejetée.

31. Exposant sa quatrième exception,l'Australie souligne que Nauru
est devenue indépendantele 3l janvier 1968,et qu'en ce qui concerne la
remiseen étatdesterrescetEtat n'aformellement «fait connaître saposi-
tion à l'Australie et aux autres anciennes puissances administrantes »
qu'en décembre 1988. L'Australie soutient qu'en conséquence la
demande de Nauru est irrecevable,au motif qu'elle n'apas étéprésentée

dans des délais raisonnables.Le retard mis par Nauru à faire valoir ses
revendicationsseraitd'autant pluspréjudiciableà l'Australiequeladocu-
mentation relative au mandat et à la tutelle a pu dans l'intervalle être
dispersée ou perdueet que l'évolutiondu droit depuis lors rendrait plus
difficilela détermination des obligationsjuridiques qui étaientcellesdes
puissances administrantes à l'époque des manquements allégué s ces
obligations.
32. La Cour reconnaît que, mêmeen l'absencede disposition conven-
tionnelle applicable, le retard d'un Etat demandeur peut rendre une
requête irrecevable. Ellenote cependant que le droit international "Withregardtothequestion ofresponsibilityforthe rehabilitation
ofthe mined areas ofthe island, there wasstilla considerable differ-
ence of opinion between the Nauruans and the Administering
Authority."
The representative of India further expressed the hope that an equitable
agreement would be concluded in this respect. Again,the representatives
ofthe Administering Authority did not react.
29. Thefinal resolution oftheGeneral Assemblyof19December 1967,

by which it decided, in agreement with the Administering Authority, to
terminate the Trusteeship, doesnot,unlikethe earlierresolutions, contain
any provision inviting the Administering Authority to rehabilitate the
lands. The resolution however recalls those earlier resolutions in its
~reambie.
30. Thefactssetout aboveshowthat, when,onthe recommendation of
the Trusteeship Council, the General Assemblyterminated the Trustee-
ship over Nauru in agreement with the Administering Authority, every-
one was aware of subsisting differences of opinion between the Nauru
LocalGovernment Council and the AdministeringAuthority withregard
to rehabilitation of the phosphate lands worked out before 1July 1967.
Accordingly, though General Assemblyresolution 2347 (XXII) did not
expresslyreserveany rights which Nauru might have had in that regard,
the Court cannot viewthat resolution asgivinga dischargeto the Admin-
isteringAuthority withrespectto suchrights. Intheopinion ofthe Court,
the rights Nauru might have had in connection with rehabilitation of the
lands remained unaffected. Regard being had to the particular circum-

stances of the case, Australia's third objection must in consequence be
rejected.

31. Australia'sfourth objection stressesthat Nauru achievedindepen-
denceon31January 1968and that, asregardsrehabilitation ofthelands,it
was not until December 1988that that State formally "raised with Aus-
tralia andthe other former Administering Powersitsposition". Australia

therefore contends that Nauru's claimisinadmissible on the ground that
it has not been submitted within a reasonable time. Nauru's delay in
making its claim is alleged to be al1the more prejudicial to Australia
because the documentation relating to the Mandate and the Trusteeship
mayhavebeen lostordispersedinthe interval,and because developments
in the law during the interval render it more difficult to determine the
legal obligations incumbent on the Administering Powers at the time
ofthe allegedbreaches of those obligations.

32. The Court recognizes that, even in the absence of any applicable
treatyprovision,delayonthepart ofa claimant Statemayrender anappli-
cation inadmissible.It notes,however,that international lawdoesnot lay254 TERRESÀ PHOSPHATESÀ NAURU (ARR~T)

n'imposepas à cetégardune limitedetempsdéterminéeL . aCour doitpar
suite se demander à la lumière des circonstances de chaque espèce si
l'écoulementdu temps rend une requêteirrecevable.
33. Au casparticulier, nul n'ignorait au moment de l'indépendancede
Nauru que la question de la remiseen étatdesterres àphosphates n'avait
pas été résolueL . e jour de la proclamation de l'indépendance, le
31janvier 1968,M. DeRoburt, chef principal de Nauru, a, selon des ar-
ticles de presse, décla:é

((Nous maintenons àl'encontrede la Grande-Bretagne, de 1'Aus-
tralie et de la Nouvelle-Zélande qu'elles doivent reconnaître la
responsabilitéde la remise en étatd'untiers de l'île.

Le 5 décembre 1968,le président de Nauru écrivitau ministre des
affaires étrangèresde l'Australieen se déclarant désireux d'examinerun
projet ponctuel deremiseen étattendant àla constructiond'une nouvelle
piste d'atterrissage. Leministreaustralien réponditle4 février1969:

«les gouvernements participants, au cours des pourparlers menés
avant qu'ilne soit misfinàl'accordde tutelle,n'avaient pas accepté
la responsabilitéde la remiseen état desterreà phosphates exploi-
tées.Ils demeurent convaincus que les conditions du règlement
conclu avec votre gouvernement étaient suffisamment généreuses
pour permettre à celui-cide faire facàsesbesoins de réhabilitation
et de développement. ))

34. Cette lettre ne suscita aucune réaction immédiate. Cinq ans plus
tard, le présidentde Nauru, àl'occasion d'unevisite d'Etat à Canberra,
soulevala question delaremiseen étatauprèsdu premierministre d'Aus-
tralie. Puisilévoquaunedeuxièmefoiscettequestionsanssuccèsen 1974,
lors de la visiàeNauru du ministreaustralien desaffairesétrangèrespar
intérim.

35. Ce n'estque le 6octobre 1983que leprésidentde Nauru écrivitau
premierministred'Australieenluidemandant de ((réexaminerfavorable-
ment la position de Nauru ».Cette demandefut écartée par l'Australiele
14mars 1984.Puis, le3décembre1986,Nauru constitua une commission
d'enquêtede trois membres chargée d'étudier la question et informa les
trois anciens gouvernements administrants de la création de cette
commission. Ceux-ci maintinrent leur position et, à la suite de divers
échangesde correspondance, Nauru saisitla Cour le 19mai 1989.
36. La Cour constate dans ces conditions que Nauru a été officielle-

ment informée,au plus tard par lettre du 4 février1969,de la position de
l'Australieau sujet de la remiseen état desterresphosphates exploitées
avant le le'juillet 1967.Nauru n'a contestécettepositionpar écritque le
6 octobre 1983.Dans l'intervalle cependant la question avait, selon les
dires de Nauru, non contredits par l'Australie, été soulevée à deux
reprises par le présidentde Nauru auprès des autorités australiennes
compétentes.La Cour estimeque, eu égardtant à la nature des relations
existant entre l'Australie et Nauru qu'aux démarches ainsi accomplies,downany specifictime-limitinthat regard. It istherefore forthe Courtto

determine in the light of the circumstances of each case whether the
passage oftime renders an application inadmissible.
33. In the present case, it was well known, at the time when Nauru
gained its independence, that the question of rehabilitation of the phos-
phate lands had not been settled. Onthe day of declaring independence,
31January 1968,the Nauruan Head Chief,Mr.DeRoburt, stated, accord-
ingto press reports, that
"We hold it against Britain, Australia and New Zealand to recog-

nize that it is their responsibility to rehabilitate one third of the
island."
On 5 December 1968the President of Nauru wrote to the Minister for
External Affairs of Australia indicating his desire to examine a specific
rehabilitation scheme for the building of a new airstrip. The Australian
Minister replied on 4 February 1969as follows :

"the Partner Governments, in the talks preceding the termination of
the Trusteeship Agreement, did not accept responsibility for the
rehabilitation of mined-out phosphate lands. The Partner Govern-
ments remain convinced that the terms of the settlement with Your
Excellency'sGovernment were sufficientlygenerous to enable it to
meet itsneeds for rehabilitation and development."

34. This letterdid not elicitanyimmediatereaction. Fiveyearslater,on
the occasionofa Statevisitto Canberra,the PresidentofNauru raisedthe
question ofrehabilitation withthe PrimeMinisterofAustralia. In 1974he
brought up the matter a second time, without success,on the occasion of
the visitto Nauru of the Australian Acting Minister for External Affairs.

35. It wasonlyon 6October 1983that the President of N~U'IU wroteto
the Prime Ministerof Australia requesting himto "seek a sympathetic re-
considerationofNauru'sposition".ThatrequestwasdeclinedbyAustralia
on 14March 1984. Then,on 3December 1986,Nauru setup athree-mem-
ber Commission of Inquiry to studythe question and informed the three
formerAdministeringGovernments ofthe establishmentofthat Commis-

sion. Those Governments maintained their position and, following a
seriesofexchangesofletters,Nauru applied tothe Court on 19May 1989.
36. TheCourt,in thesecircumstances,takesnote ofthefactthat Nauru
was officially informed, at the latest by letter of 4 February 1969,of the
position of Australia on the subject of rehabilitation of the phosphate
lands worked out before 1July 1967.Nauru took issuewith that position
in writingonlyon 6October 1983.In the meantime,however,asstated by
Nauru and not contradicted by Australia, the question had on two occa-
sionsbeen raised by the President of Nauru with the competent Austral-
ian authorities. The Court considers that, given the nature of relations
between Australia and Nauru, as well as the steps thus taken, Nauru'sl'écoulementdu temps n'a pas rendu la requêtede Nauru irrecevable.

Toutefois,ilappartiendra àla Cour, lemomentvenu,deveiller à cequele
retard mispar Nauru àlasaisirneporte enrienpréjudice àl'Australie en
ce qui concerne tant l'établissement desfaits que la détermination du
contenu du droit applicable.

37. Auxtermesdelacinquièmeexception de l'Australie,«Nauru a agi
sans constance ni bonne foi en matièrede remiseen état»et,par voie de
conséquence,«dans l'exercice de son pouvoir discrétionnaire et pour

servirlabonne règlejudiciaire, laCour devrait.refuser de connaître des
demandes de Nauru B.
38. La Cour considère que la requêtede Nauru a été présentée de
manièreappropriéedanslecadredes voiesde droitquiluisont ouvertes.
La Cour n'a pas à ce stade àapprécierles conséquenceséventuellesdu
comportement de Nauru sur le fond de l'affaire.Il lui suffit de constater
quececomportementn'équivautpas àun abus deprocédure.L'exception
de l'Australiesur cepoint doit aussiêtrerejetée.

39. La Cour examineramaintenant l'exceptiontiréepar l'Australiedu

fait que la Nouvelle-Zélande et le Royaume-Uni ne sont pas parties à
l'instance. L'Australierappelle que le mandat de la Sociédes Nations
surNauru avaitétéconfiéen 1920 à«SaMajestébritannique»entant que
Souverain tant du Royaume-Uni que de l'Australie etde la Nouvelle-
Zélande. Ce mandat avait étéexercédans le cadre d'arrangements
conclus par lestrois pays. Puis la tutelle du territoire fut confiée en
par l'organisation des Nations Unies aux trois mêmesgouvernements,
({conjointement))désignés commeautoritéadministrante. Par voie de
conséquence,selonl'Australie,

«la demande de Nauru n'est pas, en substance, formulée contre
l'Australie elle-mêmemaiscontre l'autorité administrante du Terri-
toire de Nauru ».
L'Australie soutient que la Cour ne saurait dès lors se prononcer sur
les responsabilités du défendeur sansjuger des responsabilités de la

Nouvelle-Zélandeet du Royaume-Uni; cesdeux Etatsseraient en réalité
({partiesau différend»,maisilsnesontpasparties àl'instance.L'Austra-
lieprétendpar suiteque
«les demandes[deNauru] sont irrecevableset la Cour n'apas com-
pétencedu fait que tout jugement sur la question de la violation de
l'accord de tutelle mettrait en cause la responsabilitéd'Etats tiers
qui n'ont pas consenti à la juridiction de la Cour en la présente

instance». PHOSPHATELANDS IN NAURU (JUDGMENT) 255

Application wasnot rendered inadmissible bypassage oftime. Neverthe-
less,it willbe forthe Court, in due time, to ensure that Nauru's delayin
seising itwill in no way cause prejudice to Australia with regard to both
the establishment ofthe facts and the determination of the content ofthe
applicable law.

37. Australia's fifth objectionis that "Nauru has failed to act consist-
ently and in good faith in relation to rehabilitation" and that therefore
"the Court in exercise of its discretion, and in order to uphold judicial
propriety should ... decline to hear the Nauruan claims".

38. TheCourt considersthatthe Application by Nauru hasbeen prop-
erlysubmittedinthe framework ofthe remediesopento it.Atthe present
stage,the Court isnot called uponto weighthe possible consequences of
the conduct of Nauru with respectto the merits ofthe case.It need merely

note that such conduct does not amount to an abuse of process. Aus-
tralia'sobjection on this point must alsobe rejected.

39. The Court will now consider the objection by Australia based on
the factthat New Zealand and the United Kingdom arenot parties to the
proceedings. Australia recalls that the League of Nations Mandate
relating to Nauru was conferred in 1920upon "His Britannic Majesty"
as Sovereign of the United Kingdom as well as of Australia and New

Zealand. That Mandate was exercised under arrangements agreed on
by the three States. Subsequently a Trusteeship over the Territory was
granted in 1947by the United Nations to the same three Governments,
"jointly"designatedasAdministeringAuthority. Consequently, according
to Australia:
"the claim of Nauru is, in substance, not a claim against Australia
itselfbut a claim against the Administering Authority in relation to

Nauru".
TheCourt, itisargued,couldthereforenotpass upon the responsibilityof
the Respondentwithoutadjudicating upon the responsibilityof New Zea-
land and the United Kingdom; these two States are in reality "parties
to the dispute"; but they are not parties to the proceedings. Australia
accordingly contends that

"the claims[ofNauru] are inadmissible andtheCourt lacksjurisdic-
tion as anyjudgment on the question of breach of the Trusteeship
Agreementwould involvethe responsibility ofthird Statesthat have
not consented tothe Court's jurisdiction inthe present case". 40. En vued'apprécierla valeur de cetteexception, la Cour rappellera
tout d'abord cequ'étaientlesrégimesdemandat et detutelle,etlescondi-
tions dans lesquellesils ont étappliqués àNauru.
41. Lesystèmedesmandats, instituéenvertu del'article22du Pactede
la Sociétédes Nations, était conçu pour le bien des territoiresui sont
habitéspar des peuples non encore capables de se diriger eux-mêmes
dans les conditions particulièrement difficiles du monde moderne)).
Selonlemême article 22,«le bien-êtreetledéveloppementdecespeuples
forment une mission sacréede civilisation)). Ainsi, le mandat avait été
«crééd , ans l'intérêt deshabitantsu Territoire et del'humanitéengéné-
ral, comme une institution internationaleàlaquelle était assignéun but
international:une missionsacréede civilisation»(Statut internationaldu
Sud-Ouest africain,C.I.J.Recueil 1950,p. 132).Cette «mission » ..devait
êtreexercéeau profit despopulations en cause auxquelles on reconnais-
sait des intérêts propre» (Conséquencesjuridiques pour les Etats de la
présencecontinuede l'Afriquedu Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouestafricain)
nonobstantla résolution 276 (1970)du Conseilde sécuritéC , .I.J.Recueil
1971,p. 28-29,par. 46).
42. C'estdans cecadre queleConseildela Sociétédes Nationsdonna,

le 17décembre1920, à Sa Majestébritannique«pleins pouvoirs d'admi-
nistration et de législationsur le territoire soumisau mandat comme
portion intégrantede son territoire)). Un accord conclu le 2juillet 1919
entre «le Gouvernement de Sa MajestéàLondres, le Gouvernement de
Sa Majestédu Commonwealth d'Australie et le Gouvernement de Sa
Majestédu Dominion de Nouvelle-Zélande», modifié le30 mai 1923,
fixa «les conditions de l'exercicedudit mandat et de l'exploitation des
gisementsde phosphates sur ladite île».Cetteexploitation étaitconfiéeà
une entreprise dirigéepar trois «British Phosphate Commissioners))
nommés par les trois gouvernements. L'article premier de l'accord
amendé disposait :

«Lepouvoird'administrer l'îleestconféré à un administrateur. Le
premier administrateur doit être désignépour une période de cinq
ans par le Gouvernement australien; par la suite l'administrateur
sera désignéde la manière fixéepar lestroisgouvernements. ))

Il étaitenoutre convenu que :
«Toutes les ordonnances prises par l'administrateur peuvent être
confirmées ou rejetéesau nom de Sa Majestédont i'approbation de

cette confirmation ou de ce rejet doit être notifiée star l'un des
principaux secrétairesd7Etatde Sa Majesté, soitpar le gouverneur
généraldu Commonwealth d'Australie ...soit par le gouverneur
générad lu Dominion deNouvelle-Zélande ..selonquel'administra-
teur a été nommé par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté à Londres,
par le Gouvernement du Commonwealth d'Australie ou par le
Gouvernement du Dominion de Nouvelle-Zélande respective-
ment.» 40. In order to assessthe validityofthis objection, the Court willfirst
refer to the Mandate and Trusteeship régimesand the way in which they
applied to Nauru.
41. The Mandate system,instituted by virtue of Article 22ofthe Cov-
enant ofthe Leagueof Nations, was conceivedfor the benefit ofthe terri-
tories "whichareinhabited by peoplesnot yetableto stand bythemselves
under the strenuousconditions ofthe modern world". In accordance with
the same Article 22, "the well-being and development of such peoples
forma sacredtrust ofcivilisation". ThustheMandate "was created,inthe
interest ofthe inhabitants of the territory, and of humanity in general,as
aninternationalinstitution withaninternational object- asacredtrust of
civilization"(IntemationalStatusofSouthWestAfrica,I.C.J.Reports1950,
p. 132).This "'trust'had to be exercisedforthe benefit ofthe peoples con-
cemed, who were admitted to have interests of their own" (Legal Conse-
quencesforStates of the ContinuedPresenceof South Africain Namibia
(SouthWestAfrica)notwithstandingSecurity CouncilResolution 276(1970),
I.C.J.Reports1971,pp. 28-29,para. 46).

42. It is in that context that the Council of the League of Nations
granted to His Britannic Majesty, on 17December 1920,"full power of
administration and legislation over the territory subject to the.. Man-
date as an integral portion of his territory". An Agreement concluded
between "His Majesty'sGovernment in London, His Majesty's Govern-
ment ofthe Commonwealth ofAustralia, and His Majesty'sGovernment

ofthe Dominion of NewZealand" on2July 1919and amended on30May
1923laid down the conditions "for the exerciseof the said Mandate and
forthe mining ofthephosphate deposits on the said island". Thisexploi-
tation was entrusted to an enterprise managed by three "British Phos-
phate Commissioners" appointed by the three Governments.Article 1of
the amended Agreementprovided that
"The Administration of the Island shall be vested in an Admin-
istrator. The first Administrator shall be appointed for a term of
fiveyears bythe Australian Government; and thereafter the Admin-
istrator shallbe appointed in suchmanner as the three Govemments
decide."

It wasfurther provided that
"Al1Ordinances made by the Administrator shall be subject to
confirmation or disallowance in the name of His Majesty, whose
pleasure in respect of such confirmation or disallowance shall be
signifiedby oneofHis Majesty'sPrincipal Secretaries ofState,orby
the Govemor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia ... or by
the Governor-General ofthe Dominion of NewZealand ...accord-
ingasthe Administrator shall havebeen appointed by His Majesty's
Government in London, or by the Government of the Common-
wealth of Australia, or by the Govemment of the Dominion of
New Zealand, as the casemaybe."Letexte ajoutait:
t(L'administrateur doit se conformer aux directives qui lui sont
données, à diversmoments, par le gouvernementcontractant qui l'a

désigné.»
Il prévoyaitenfin unmécanismede communicationdes décisionsprises
par l'administrateur aux troisgouvernements intéressés.

43. Enfait,l'administrateurfutconstamment désigné par leGouverne-
mentaustralienetfutsoumis par voiedeconséquenceauxdirectivesdece
gouvernement. Ses ttordonnances, proclamations et règlements» furent
sujetsàconfirmationou rejetpar legouverneurgénéraldel'Australie.Les
autresgouvernements,conformément àl'accord,nereçurentcommunica-
tion de cesdécisionsque pour information.
44. Lorsdeladisparition dela Société desNationset delanaissancede
l'organisation des Nations Unies, des dispositionscomparables àcelles
du Pacte de la Sociétédes Nations furent incorporéesdanslaCharte des
Nations Unies en ce qui concerne le régimede tutelle établipar cette
dernière.A cet égardl'article76de la Charte disposeque :

ttConformémentauxbutsdes Nations Unies,énoncés à l'articl1
delaprésenteCharte, lesfins essentiellesdurégimedetutellesont les
suivantes:

b) favoriser le progrèspolitique, économiqueet socialdes popula-
tions des territoires sous tutelle ainsi que le développement de
leur instruction; favoriser égalementleur évolutionprogressive
vers la capacitéà s'administrer eux-mêmes ou l'indépendance,
comptetenu des conditionsparticulières à chaque territoire età
sespopulations, desaspirationslibrementexpriméesdespopula-
tions intéresséeset des dispositions qui pourront être prévues
dans chaqueaccord detutelle ».

45. Lesystèmed'administration quiavaitété celuide Nauru àl'époque
de la Sociétédes Nationsfut pour l'essentielmaintenulorsquelemandat
futremplacépar latutelle.L'accorddetutellepour leTerritoiredeNauru,

approuvépar l'Assembléegénérale des Nations Uniesle le' novembre
1947,disposaiten effeten son article2:
LesGouvernements del'Australie,dela Nouvelle-Zélandeetdu

Royaume-Uni(ci-aprèsdénommés tl'autorité chargéedel'adminis-
tration~) sont conjointement désignéspar les présentes comme
l'autorité quiexercera l'administration du Territoire.

Il ajoutait en son article 4:
«L'autoritéchargéede l'administration répondra de la paix, de
l'ordre, de la bonne administration et de la défensedu Territoire.
cette fin, en vertu d'un accord conclu entre les Gouvernements deThetext added :
"The Administratorshallconform to such instructions as he shall

from time to time receive from the Contracting Government by
which he has been appointed."
Provision was made finally for a systemwhereby decisions taken by the
Administrator werecommunicated to the three Governmentsconcerned.

43. Asa matter offact,the Administrator wasat al1timesappointed by
the Australian Government and was accordingly under the instructions
of that Government. His "ordinances, proclamations and regulations"
were subject to confirmation or rejection by the Governor-General of
Australia. The other Governments, in accordance with the Agreement,
receivedsuch decisions for information only.
44. On the demise of the League of Nations and with the birth of the
United Nations, provisions comparable to those of the Covenant were
incorporated into the Charter of the United Nations as it relates to the
Trusteeship System therein established. In this connection,Article 76 of
the Charter provides that :

"Thebasic objectivesofthetrusteeship system,inaccordance with
the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the
present Charter, shallbe :
.............................
(b) to promote the political, economic, social, and educational
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their

progressive development towards self-government or indepen-
dence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of
each territory and its peoples and the freelyexpressed wishesof
the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms
ofeachtrusteeship agreement".

45. The system of administration applied in Nauru at the time of the
League of Nations was maintained in essence when the Mandate was
replacedbyaTrusteeship.TheTrusteeship AgreementfortheTerritory of
Nauru, approved bythe United Nations General Assemblyon 1 Novem-
ber 1947,providedin Article2that :

"The Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United
Kingdom (hereinafter called 'the Administering Authority') are
hereby designated as the joint Authority which will exercise the
administration of the Territory."

It added in Article4that :
"The AdministeringAuthority will be responsible for the peace,
order, good government and defence of the Territory, and for this
purpose, inpursuance ofan Agreementmadebythe Governments of258 TERRESÀ PHOSPHATESÀ NAURU(ARRÊT)

l'Australie,de la Nouvelle-Zélandeet du Royaume-Uni, le Gouver-
nement del'Australiecontinuera àexercerdans leditterritoire pleins
pouvoirs législatifs,administratifs etjudiciaires, au nom del'autorité
chargéede l'administration - à moins que lestrois gouvernements
susmentionnés en décident autrementet jusqu'au moment où une
décision danscesensinterviendrait. 0

46. Sous le régimeainsi établi,les accords du 2juillet 1919et 30 mai
1923demeurèrent en vigueuret l'administrateur continua à être désigné
en fait par l'Australie.Lesdispositions de ces accords relativàsl'admi-
nistration du Territoirenefurentabrogéesquele26novembre 1965par un
nouvel accord intervenu entre les trois gouvernements. Ce dernier
prévoyaitla créationd'un conseil législatif,d'un conseilexécutifet de
juridictions nauruanes. Il précisait formellement en son article 3 que
«l'administration du Territoire» serait confiée à un administrateur
nommépar le Gouvernement du Commonwealth d'Australie B. Il stipu-
lait quel'administrate~r,~legouverneur généralde l'Australie etle Parle-

ment australien disposeraient de certaines compétences.L'Australieprit
des mesures appropriées,de caractèrelégislatifet autre, afin de donner
effetà l'accord intervenu pour mettre en place ces nouveaux arrange-
ments. Lesditsarrangementsrestèrenten vigueurjusqu'à l'indépendance
de Nauru.
47. Dans ces conditions la Cour constate que les trois gouvernements
mentionnésdans l'accord de tutelle constituaient, aux termes mêmesde
cet accord, ((l'autoritéchargéede l'administration» de Nauru; que cette
autorité ne jouissait pas d'une personnalité juridique internationale
distincte de cellesdes Etats ainsidésignés;et queparmi ces Etats, l'Aus-
tralie jouait un rôle tout particulier consacrépar l'accord de tutelle de

1947etlesaccords de 1919,1923et 1965,ainsi quepar la pratique.

48. L'exceptionpréliminairede l'Australie à cetégardsemblecompor-
ter deux branches; la première peut être traitée brièvement. L'Australie
soutienttout d'abord que,dans lamesureoù lesréclamationsde Nauru se
fondent sur le comportement de l'Australie agissant entant que l'un des

trois Etats constituant l'autorité administranteen vertu de l'accord de
tutelle, la responsabilitéde ce chef estde nature telle qu'une réclamation
ne saurait être présentéqeue contre les trois Etats pris conjointement et
non contre l'un d'entre eux àtitre individuel. A ce propos, l'Australie a
soulevé la questionde savoir si la responsabilité des trois Etats serait
((solidaire (((jointand several))),en ce sens que l'un quelconque des
trois serait tenu de réparer en totalitéle préjudice résultantde toute
méconnaissance des obligationsde l'autorité administranteet non pas
seulement d'assurer cette réparationpour un tiers ou dans toute autre
proportion. Il s'agitlà d'une question que la Cour doit réserverpour le
fond del'affaire; maiscettequestionestindépendantedecelledesavoirsi Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the Government
of Australia will, on behalf of the Administering Authority and
except and until othenvise agreed by the Governments of Australia,
New Zealand and the United Kingdom, continue to exercise full
powersoflegislation,administration andjurisdiction in and overthe
Territory."

46. Under the régimethus established, the Agreements of 2 July 1919
and 30 May 1923remained in force and the Administrator continued to
be appointed in fact by Australia. The provisions of those Agreements
relating to the administration of the Territory were not abrogated until
26November 1965by a new Agreementreached between the three Gov-
ernments, providing for the establishment of a Legislative Council, an
ExecutiveCouncilandNauruan Courts ofJustice.ItspecifiedinArticle3
thatthe "administration oftheTerritory" wastobevestedin "an Adminis-
trator appointed bythe Government ofthe Commonwealth of Australia".
It provided that the Administrator, the Governor-General of Australia
and the Parliament of Australia wereto have certain powers. The agree-

ment to establish these new arrangements was implemented by appro-
priate legislativeand other steps taken by Australia. The arrangements
continued to apply until Nauru attained independence.

47. Inthesecircumstances,the Court notesthatthethree Governments
mentioned in the Trusteeship Agreementconstituted, in the veryterms of
that Agreement, "the Administering Authority" for Nauru; that this
Authority did not have an international legal personality distinct from
those of the States thus designated; and that, of those States, Australia
played a very special role established by the Trusteeship Agreement of
1947,bythe Agreementsof 1919,1923and 1965,and by practice.

48. Australia's preliminary objection inthis respectappears tocontain
two branches, the first of which can be dealt with briefly. It is first con-
tended byAustraliathat, in sofar as Nauru's claimsarebased onthe con-
duct of Australia as one ofthe three Statesmaking up the Administering
Authority under the Trusteeship Agreement,the nature ofthe responsibi-
lity in that respect is such that a claim may only be brought against the
three Statesjointly, and not against one ofthem individually. In this con-
nection,Australiahasraisedthe questionwhetherthe liabilityofthe three
Stateswouldbe "joint and several" (solidai srthat,anyone ofthethree
would be liable to make full reparation for damage flowing from any
breach ofthe obligationsofthe Administering Authority, and not merely
a one-third or some other proportionate share. This is a question which
the Court mustreserveforthe merits ;but itisindependent ofthe question

whether Australia can be sued alone. The Court does not consider that
any reason has been shown why a claim brought against only one of thel'Australie peut êtreassignée seule.La Cour n'estime pas qu'il ait été
démontré qu'une demande formée contre l'un des trois Etats seulement
doiveêtre déclaréeirrecevablie nlimineIitisau seul motif qu'elle soulève
des questions relativesàl'administration du Territoire àlaquellepartici-
paient deux autres Etats. En effet, il est indéniableque l'Australie était
tenue d'obligations en vertu de l'accordde tutelle,dans la mesure où elle
étaitl'un destrois Etats qui constituaientl'autorité administrante,etrien

dans la nature de cet accord n'interdità la Cour de connaître d'une de-
mande relative àla méconnaissancedesdites obligations par l'Australie.
49. L'Australiesoutienten secondlieuqu'étant donné que la Nouvelle-
Zélande et le Royaume-Uni constituaient avec elle-mêmel'autorité
administrante, toute décision de la Cour sur le prétendu manquement,
par l'Australie,à ses obligations en vertu de l'accord de tutelle impli-
querait nécessairementun jugement sur la manièredont ces deux autres
Etats se sont acquittésde leurs obligations en la matière; et qu'un tel
jugement seraitcontraireauprincipe fondamentalselonlequellacompé-
tence de la Cour procède exclusivement du consentement des Etats. La
question qui se pose est dès lors de savoir si, compte tenu du régime
ainsi décrit, laCour peut, sans le consentement de la Nouvelle-Zélande

et du Royaume-Uni, statuer sur une requête présentée contrlea seule
Australie.
50. La Cour a déjà étéamenée àseprononcer sur des questionsde ce
genre.Dans l'affairede l'Ormonétairepris à Romeen 1943(questionpréli-
minaire),la première conclusion de la requêtede l'Italie était ainsi rédi-
gée :
«1) que les Gouvernements de la République française, de la
Grande-Bretagne et de l'Irlande du Nord et des Etats-Unis d'Amé-

rique devront remettre à l'Italie la quote-part d'or monétaire, qui
reviendraitàl'Albanieauxtermesdelapartie III del'actedeParisdu
14janvier 1946,ensatisfactionpartielle desdommagescausés à 1'Ita-
liepar la loialbanaise du 13janvier 1945»(C.I.J.Recueil1954,p.22).
Dans son arrêtdu 15juin 1954,laCour,rappelant que seulslesEtats-Unis
d'Amérique,la France, l'Italie et le Royaume-Uniétaient parties àl'ins-
tance, a estiméque :

Statuersur la responsabilitéinternationale del'Albanie sansson
consentementserait agir à l'encontred'unprincipe de droitinterna-
tional bien établietincorporédans le Statut,à savoirquela Cour ne
peut exercer sa juridiction à l'égardd'un Etat si ce n'est avec le
consentement de cedernier. »(Ibid.,p. 32.)

Notant que l'Albanie avaitchoisidene pas intervenir,la Cour a déclaré:
«En l'espèce, lesintérêts juridiquesde l'Albanie seraient non
seulement touchés par une décision,mais constitueraient l'objet

mêmede ladite décision.En pareil cas, le Statut ne peut être consi-
dérécomme autorisant implicitement la continuation de la procé-
dure en l'absencede l'Albanie.))(Zbid.)three Statesshouldbe declaredinadmissible inliminelitismerelybecause
that claim raises questions of the administration of the Territory, which
was shared with two other States. It cannot be denied that Australia had
obligationsunder theTrusteeship Agreement,initscapacityasone ofthe
three Statesformingthe AdministeringAuthority, and there isnothingin
the character ofthat Agreementwhichdebars the Court fromconsidering
a claimof abreach of those obligationsby Australia.

49. Secondly, Australia argues that, since together with itself, New

Zealand and the United Kingdom made up the AdministeringAuthority,
any decision ofthe Court as to the allegedbreach byAustralia of itsobli-
gations under the Trusteeship Agreement would necessarily involve a
findingas to the dischargeby those two otherStatesoftheirobligationsin
that respect, which would be contrary to the fundamental principle that
thejurisdiction ofthe Court derivessolelyfromthe consent ofStates.The
question that arises is accordingly whether, given the régime thus
described,the Court may, without the consent of New Zealand and the
United Kingdom, deal with an Application brought against Australia
alone.

50. The Court has had to consider questions of this kind on previous
occasions.Inthe caseconcerningthe MonetaryGoldRemovedfromRome
in1943(Preliminary Question)t,he firstsubmissioninthe Italian Applica-
tion was worded as follows :

"(1)that the Governments of the French Republic,Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the United States of America should
deliver to Italy any share of the monetarygold that rnightbe due to
Albania under Part III ofthe Paris Act ofJanuary 14th,1946,in par-
tialsatisfactionfor the damagecausedto Italybythe Albanian lawof
January 13th,1945"(I.C.J. Reports1954,p. 22).

In itsJudgment of 15June 1954the Court, noting that only France,Italy,
the United Kingdom and the United States ofAmericawereparties to the
proceedings, found that
"To adjudicate upon the international responsibility of Albania
without her consent would run counter to a well-established prin-
ciple of international law embodied in the Court's Statute, namely,
thatthe Court can onlyexercisejurisdiction overa Statewithitscon-
sent." (Ibid.,p. 32.)

Noting that Albania had chosen not to intervene,the Court stated :
"In the present case, Albania's legalinterests would not only be
affected by a decision,but wouldformthe very subject-matter ofthe
decision. Insuch a case,the Statute cannot be regarded, by implica-
tion, as authorizing proceedings to be continued in the absence of

Albania." (Ibid.) 51. Par la suite,dansl'affaire desActivitmilitairesetparamilitaires au
Nicaragua et contrecelui-ci(Nicaragua c.Etats-Unisdümérique), laCour
s'estexpriméedans lestermes suivants :

Il ne fait pas de doute que, quand les circonstances l'exigent,la
Cour déclineral'exercicede sa compétence,commeelle l'afait dans
l'affaire de l'Or monétairepris Rome en 1943,lorsque les intérêts
juridiques d'un Etat qui n'est pas partie l'instance ((seraient non
seulement touchés par une décision, mais constitueraient l'objet
mêmede ladite décision))(C.I.J. Recueil 1954,p. 32). En revanche
lorsque des prétentions d'ordre juridique sont formuléespar un
demandeur contre un défendeurdansune instancedevantla Cour et
setraduisent par desconclusions,laCour,enprincipe,nepeut que se
prononcer sur cesconclusions,avec effetobligatoirepour lesparties
et pour nul autre Etat, en vertu de l'article 59du Statut. Comme la

Cour l'a déjàindiqué(au paragraphe 74 ci-dessus),les autres Etats
quipensentpouvoirêtreaffectép sar ladécisionontlafacultéd'intro-
duireune instance distincte oude recourir àla procédurede l'inter-
vention. Dans le Statut comme dans la pratique des tribunaux
internationaux, on ne trouve aucune trace d'unerègleconcernant les
((partiesindispensables))commecellequedéfendentlesEtats-Unis,
qui ne serait concevable que parallèlement à un pouvoir, dont la
Cour est dépourvue,de prescrire la participation à l'instance d'un
Etat tiers. Les circonstances de l'affairede l'Or monétamarquent
vraisemblablementla limitedu pouvoir delaCour de refuserd'exer-
cer sajuridiction; aucun des pays mentionnés en la présente espèce
ne peut être considéré commé etant dans la mêmesituation que

l'Albaniedans cetteaffaire, aupointque saprésenceseraitvéritable-
ment indispensable à la poursuite de la procédure.)) (Arrêtdu
26novembre 1984,C.Z.J.Recueil1984,p. 431,par. 88.)
52. Cette jurisprudence a étéappliquéepar une chambre de la Cour
dans l'affaire du Différendfrontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime

(El Salvador/Honduras), par arrêtrendu le 13 septembre 1990 qui
examine si les intérêts juridiques invoquép sar le Nicaragua à l'appui
d'une requête à fin d'intervention dans l'affaire faisaient ounon ((partie
de ((l'objet mêmede la décision)) à rendre ou s'ils étaient seulement
affectéspar cettedécision(C.Z.J.Recueil1990,p. 116,par. 56).

53. Lestribunaux nationaux, quant à eux,ontleplus souventl'autorité
nécessairepour ordonner d'officela mise en cause des tiers qui risquent
d'être affectépsar lejugementà intervenir;cettesolutionpermet derégler
les différendsen présencede toutes les parties concernées.Mais dans
l'ordre international la Cour n'a pas une telle autorité. Sa compétence
dépend eneffet du consentement des Etats et, par voie de conséquence,

elle ne saurait contraindre un Etat à se présenter devantelle, mêmeen
qualité d'intervenant.
54. Il est toutefois loisibàeun Etat qui n'est pas partie àune affaire 51. Subsequently, in the case conceming Military and Paramilitary
Activitiesinandagainst Nicaragua(Nicaragua v. UnitedStatesofArneriCa)
the Court observed as follows:
"There is no doubt that in appropriate circumstancesthe Court
willdecline,asit did inthe caseconcerning Monetary GoldRemoved
from Rome in 1943,to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it

where the legal interests of a State not party to the proceedings
'wouldnot only be affected by a decision, but would form the very
subject-matter of the decision' (Z.C.J.eports 1954,p. 32). Where
howeverclaimsof a legalnature are made by an Applicantagainsta
Respondent in proceedingsbefore the Court, and made the subject
of submissions, the Court has in principle merely to decide upon
those submissions, with binding force for the parties only, and no
otherState,inaccordance withArticle59ofthe Statute.AstheCourt
has alreadyindicated(paragraph 74, above)other States which con-
siderthat they maybe affectedarefree to institute separate proceed-
ings, or to employ the procedure of intervention.There is no trace,
eitherinthe Statuteorinthe practice ofinternationaltribunals, ofan
'indispensable parties' rule of the kind argued for by the United
States,whichwould onlybeconceivableinparallel to apower,which
the Court doesnot possess,to directthat athird Statebemadeaparty
to proceedings. The circumstances of theMonetary Goldcase prob-
ablyrepresentthe limitofthe power ofthe Courtto refuseto exercise

itsjurisdiction; and none ofthe Statesreferred to can beregarded as
inthesamepositionasAlbania inthat case,soasto betrulyindispen-
sableto the pursuance ofthe proceedings." (Judgment of26 Novem-
ber 1984,Z.C.J.Reports1984,p. 431,para. 88.)

52. Thatjurisprudence was applied by a Chamber of the Court in the
case concemingthe Land, Islandand MaritimeFrontierDispute (ElSal-
vador/Honduras)by a Judgment given on 13 September 1990,which

examinedwhetherthe legalinterestsasserted by Nicaraguain support of
an application for permission to intervenein the case did or did not form
"part of 'thevery subject-matter of the decision"' to be taken or whether
they were only affected by that decision (Z.C.J.Reports 1990,p. 116,
para. 56).
53. National courts,fortheirpart, havemoreoften than notthe neces-
sarypower to order propriomotuthejoinder of third parties who may be
affectedbythe decisionto be rendered; that solution makesit possibleto
settle a dispute in the presence ofl1the parties concemed. But on the
internationalplanethe Court has no suchpower. Itsjurisdiction depends
on the consent of States and, consequently,the Court may not compel a
Stateto appear before it, evenby way ofintervention.

54. A State,however,which is not a party to a case is freeto apply ford'adresser à la Cour une requête à fin d'intervention, conformémentà
l'article62du Statut,aux termes duquel :
«Lorsqu'un Etat estimeque, dans un différend,un intérêtd'ordre

juridique estpour luien cause,ilpeut adressàlaCour unerequête,
àfin d'intervention.»

Mais l'absence d'une telle requête n'interdit nullementà la Cour de
statuer sur les prétentions qui lui sont par ailleurssoumisespour autant
quelesintérêtsjuridiques de1'Etattierséventuellementaffectésneconsti-
tuent pas l'objet mêmede la décisionsollicitée.Dans l'hypothèseoù la
Cour est ainsià mêmede statuer, les intérêts d1'Etattiers qui n'estpas
partieà l'affairesont protégéspar l'article 59du Statut de la Cour selon
lequel: «La décisionde la Cour n'estobligatoire que pour les parties en
litigeet dans le casqui a étédécidé.
55.En l'espèce,les intérêtse la Nouvelle-Zélandeet du Royaume-
Unineconstituentpas l'objet mêmedela décision àrendre surlefond de
la requêtede Nauru et la situation estet égarddifférentedecelledont
la Cour a connu dans l'affaire de'Ormonétaire.En effet,dans cetteder-

nière affaire,la déterminationde la responsabilitéde l'Albanieétait une
condition préalable pour qu'il puisse être statuésur les prétentions de
l'Italie. Dans la présente espèce, la détermination de la responsa-
bilitéde la Nouvelle-Zélandeou du Royaume-Uni n'estpas une condi-
tion préalable à la détermination de la responsabilité de l'Australie,
seul objet de la demande de Nauru. L'Australie reconnaît d'ailleurs
qu'au cas particulier la détermination de la responsabilitééventuellede
la Nouvelle-Zélandeet du Royaume-Unin'aurait pas à être opérée anté-
rieurement à la déterminationde la responsabilitéde l'Australie. Mais
elle affirme qu'il y aurait détermination simultanéede la responsabi-
lité destrois Etats et soutient que, s'agissant de la Nouvelle-Zélande
et du Royaume-Uni, les mêmesraisons profondes qui ont conduit àla
décision rendue dans l'affaire de l'Or monétaires'opposeraient à une

telledétermination.LaCour nesauraitacceptercettethèse.Dans l'affaire
de l'Ormonétaire,le lienentre, d'une part, laposition que la Cour devait
nécessairementarrêterquant àla responsabilitéalléguéede l'Albanie et,
d'autre part, la décisionqu'elle avait été priéede rendre concernant
l'attribution de l'or, n'étaitpas purement temporel, mais également
logique; commelaCour l'a expliqué,

«pour déterminersi l'Italie a titreàrecevoir l'or,il est nécessairede
déterminersil'Albaniea commisun délitinternational contrel'Italie
etsielleesttenueàréparationenverselle»(C.I.J.Recueil1954,p.32).

Dans la présente affaire,toute décisionde la Cour sur l'existenceou le
contenu de la responsabilité que Nauru impute à l'Australie pourrait
certesavoir desincidencessur la situationjuridique desdeuxautresEtats
concernés,maisla Courn'aura pas àseprononcer surcettesituation juri- PHOSPHATELANDSIN NAURU (JUDGMENT) 261

permissionto interveneinaccordance withArticle62ofthe Statute,which
provides that

"Should a State consider that it has an interest of a legal nature
which may be affected by the decision in the case, it may submit a
request to the Court to be permitted to intervene."

But the absence of such a request in no way precludes the Court from
adjudicating upon the claimssubmittedto it,provided that the legal inter-
estsofthethird State whichmaypossiblybe affected do notformthe very
subject-matter of the decision that is applied for. Where the Court is so
entitled to act, the interests of the third State which is not a party to the
caseareprotected byArticle59ofthe Statuteofthe Court, whichprovides
that "The decision of the Court has no binding forceexcept between the
parties and in respect ofthat particular case."
55. In the present case, the interests of New Zealand and the United
Kingdom do not constitutethe very subject-matter ofthe judgment to be
rendered on the merits of Nauru's Applicationand the situation isin that
respect different from that with which the Court had to deal in the Mon-
etary Goldcase.In the latter case,the determination of Albania'srespon-

sibilitywas a prerequisitefor a decision to be taken on Italy's claims.In
the present case,the determination of the responsibility of NewZealand
or the United Kingdom is not a prerequisitefor the determination of the
responsibility of Australia, the only object of Nauru's claim. Australia,
moreover,recognizesthat in thiscasethere would not bea determination
of the possibleresponsibility of NewZealand and the United Kingdom
previousto the determination of Australia's responsibility.It nonetheless
asserts that there would be asimultaneousdetermination of the responsi-
bility of al1three States and arguesthat, so faras concerns New Zealand
and the United Kingdom, such a determination would be equally pre-
cluded by the fundamental reasons underlying the Monetary Gold
decision.The Court cannot acceptthis contention. In the Monetary Gold
casethe link between, on the one hand, the necessaryfindingsregarding
Albania's allegedresponsibilityand, on the other,the decision requested
of the Court regarding the allocation of the gold, was not purely tem-
poral but also logical;asthe Court explained,

"In order ...to determinewhether Italy is entitled to receivethe
gold,itisnecessaryto determinewhetherAlbaniahas committedany
international wrong against Italy, and whether she is under an obli-
gation to pay compensation to her." (I.C.J. Reports1954,p. 32.)

In the present case,a finding by the Court regarding the existenceor the
content of the responsibility attributed to Australia by Nauru might well
haveimplicationsforthe legalsituation ofthetwootherStatesconcerned,
but no finding inrespectofthat legalsituationwillbeneededasa basisfordique pour prendre sa décisionsurles griefs formuléspar Nauru contre

l'Australie.Parvoiede conséquence,laCour nepeut refuser d'exercersa
juridiction.
*

56. La Cour doit cependant souligner que la décision qu'elle est
amenée àprendre dans le présent arrêt sur cetteexception del'Australie
ne préjugeen rien lefond. Le présent arrêt ne tranchepas la questionde
savoirsil'Australie,dans lecasoù elleseraitdéclaréeresponsable,devrait
réparer,en totalitéou seulement pour partie, les dommages que Nauru
prétend avoir subis, compte tenu des caractéristiquesdes régimesde
mandat et de tutellerappeléesci-dessusetnotamment du rôleparticulier
jouépar l'Australie dans l'administration du Territoire. Ces questions
sont àtraiter lors de l'examenau fond.
57. Pour ces motifs, la Cour considère que le fait que la Nouvelle-
Zélande et le Royaume-Uni ne sont pas parties à l'instance n'interdit
pas la poursuite de la procédureengagéepar Nauru contre l'Australie.
L'exceptiondéveloppée à cet égardpar l'Australiedoit êtrerejetée.

58. La Cour examinera enfin lesexceptionssoulevéespar l'Australieà
l'encontre de la demande naurua'ne relative aux avoirs d'outre-mer des
British Phosphate Commissioners.Au terme de son mémoiresurlefond,
Nauru prie la Cour de direetjuger que

«la République de Nauru a un titrejuridique sur la part allouéeà
l'Australie des avoirsd'outre-mer des British Phosphate Commis-
sioners qui ont étéinventoriéest liquidésen applicationde l'accord
trilatéralconclu lefévrier1987»
et que

«lYEtatdéfendeur ale devoir de fournir une réparationappropriée
pour lepréjudicecausé àla Républiquede Nauru ..du fait qu'il n'a
pas reconnu l'intérêdte Nauru sur les avoirsd'outre-mer des British
Phosphate Commissioners ».
59. Les British Phosphate Commissioners ont été instituép sar l'ar-
ticle3 de l'accorddu 2juillet 1919entre le Royaume-Uni,l'Australieet la

Nouvelle-Zélande(voirparagraphe 42 ci-dessus);cet article prévoyaitla
créationd'unconseildénommé «BoardofCommissioners»,composéde
trois membres nommés chacun par l'un des gouvernements parties.
L'article 6del'accordstipulait que
«la propriétédes gisements de phosphates ..et de tous les terrains,
bâtiments,installationsetbiensd'équipementdans l'île,utiliséspour
l'exploitation des gisements,era[it]dévolueaux Commissioners»;

l'article 9 disposait d'une part que les gisements seraient ((exploitéset
vendus sousla direction, la gestion et lecontrôledes Commissioners »etthe Court's decision on Nauru's claims against Australia. Accordingly,
the Court cannot decline to exerciseitsjurisdiction.

56. The Court must however emphasize that its ruling in the present
Judgment on thisobjection ofAustralia doesnot in any wayprejudge the
merits.ThepresentJudgment doesnot settlethe questionwhetherrepara-
tion would be due from Australia, if found responsible,for the whole or
onlyforpart ofthe damage Nauru allegesithassuffered,regard beinghad
to the characteristics of the Mandate and Trusteeship Systemsoutlined
aboveand,inparticular, the specialroleplayedbyAustraliainthe admin-
istration oftheTerritory.Thesequestionsaretobedealt with atthemerits
stage.
57. For the reasons given, the Court considers that the fact that
NewZealand and the United Kingdomarenotparties to the caseisnobar
to theproceedingsbrought by Nauru against Australia.Theobjection put
fonvard in thisrespect by Australia mustbe rejected.

58. Finally, the Court will examinethe objectionsaddressed by Aus-
tralia to the claimby Nauru concerningthe overseasassets ofthe British
Phosphate Commissioners. At the end of its Memorial on the merits,
Nauru requeststhe Courtto adjudge and declarethat

"the Republicof Nauru has alegalentitlementto theAustralianallo-
cation ofthe overseasassetsofthe BritishPhosphateCommissioners
which were marshalled and disposed of in accordance with the
trilateral Agreementconcluded on 9 February 1987"
and

"the Respondent State is under a duty to make appropriate repara-
tion in respect ofthe losscaused to the Republic of Nauru as a result
of. ..its failure to recognize the interest of Nauru in the overseas
assets ofthe British Phosphate Commissioners".
59. The British Phosphate Commissioners were established by
Article 3 of the Agreement of 2 July 1919between the United Kingdom,
Australia and New Zealand (see paragraph 42 above); that Article pro-
vided forthe establishment of a body called "Board of Commissioners",

composed of three members, one to be appointed by each of the
Partner Governments. Article 6provided that the
"title to the phosphate deposit... and to al1land, buildings,plant,
and equipment on the island used in connection withthe workingof
the depositsshallbe vested in the Commissioners";

Article 9 provided on the one hand that the depositswould "be worked
and sold under the direction, management, and control of the Commis-d'autre part qu'il incomberaità ces derniers de «vendre les phosphates
nécessairesaux besoinsde l'agriculture du Royaume-Uni, de l'Australie
etdelaNouvelle-Zélande,danslamesuredecesbesoins» ;et,bien qu'aux
termesdes articles 10et 11la vente de phosphates àdes Etatstiers et aux
prix du marchédût êtreexceptionnelle - lesventesprioritaires auxtrois
gouvernements parties devant se faire à un prix proche du prix de
revient -, l'article 12prévoyaitque les fonds excédentairesqui seraient
accumulés à la suite de ventesàdestiers ou autrement seraient

((portéspar les Commissioners au crédit destrois gouvernements ...
[et]gardésentrustpar lesCommissionersaunomdestroisgouverne-
mentspour êtreutilisésà detelsusagesque cesgouvernementspour-
daient] ordonner..»

60. Les British Phosphate Commissionersont exercéleurs activités à
Nauru conformément aux termes de l'accord du 2 juillet 1919 sous
l'empire du mandat, puis de la tutelle. L'accord conclu le 14novembre
1967entre le conseil de gouvernement local de Nauru d'une part et les
Gouvernements de l'Australie,de la Nouvelle-Zélandeet du Royaume-
Uni de l'autre(voirparagraphe 10ci-dessus)a organisélavente à Nauru,
par les gouvernements participants, des immobilisations de l'industrie

des phosphates sur l'île, dont les British Phosphate Commissioners
étaient propriétaires en titrepour le compte desdits gouvernements
(art.7-11);l'accordaégalementorganiséle transfertàNauru delagestion
et du contrôle de l'exploitation des phosphates de l'île(art. 12-15).Les
avoirsdesBritishPhosphate Commissioners àNauru furenttransférés au
Gouvernement de Nauru en 1970,après quele dernier paiement yrelatif
eut été effectué, eltes British Phosphate Commissionerscessèrent alors
leursactivitésàNauru. Commesuite àl'entréeenvigueur d'unaccord en
datedu 9juin 1981entrelaNouvelle-Zélandeetl'Australie,quimettaitfin
aux fonctions que les Commissioners exergaient sur l'île Christmas,
l'Australie,la Nouvelle-Zélandeet le Royaume-Unidécidèrentde liqui-
der les affairesdes BritishPhosphate Commissioners et de répartir entre

eux-mêmes lerestedesavoirs etdesdettesdesCommissioners :àceteffet,
ilsconclurentle9février1987un accord ((pourmettrefin àl'accordrelatif
à l'îlede Nauru de 1919B.

61. Au cours de l'année 1987, divers échangesde correspondance
eurent lieu entre les Parties au sujet de la liquidation des affaires des
British Phosphate Commissioners. Après avoir demandé et obtenu
confirmation del'intention desgouvernementsparticipants deprocéder à
la liquidation des biens des Commissioners, et avoir demandé à être
consulté,le département des affaires extérieuresde Nauru adressa le

30janvier 1987une note au haut-commissariataustralien, dans laquelle il
priait lesditsgouvernementssioners" and, on the other, that it would be the duty of the latter "to dis-
pose ofthephosphatesfor the purpose ofthe agriculturalrequirements of
the United Kingdom,Australia and NewZealand,so far asthose require-
ments extend"; and, although in accordance with Articles 10and 11,the
sale of phosphates to third States and at market prices was to beexcep-
tional - itbeingmandatoryforpriority salesto thethreePartner Govern-
ments to be at a price closeto the cost pric-, Article 12provided that
anysurplusfundsaccumulated asa result of salesto third States or other-
wisewould

"be creditedbythe Commissionersto thethreeGovernments ... and
heldbytheCommissionersintrustforthethreeGovernments to such
uses asthose Governments may direct. ..".

60. The British Phosphate Commissionersconducted their activities
on Nauru, in accordance with the Agreement of 2 July 1919, under the
Mandate and then under the Trusteeship.The Agreement concluded on
14November 1967betweenthe Nauru LocalGovernmentCouncil,onthe
one hand, and the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom, onthe other (seeparagraph 10above),providedfor the
sale to Nauru, by the Partner Governments, of the capital assets of the
phosphate industry on the island, which had been vested in theCommis-

sioners on behalf ofthose Governments (Arts.7-11);the Agreement also
providedforthe transfer to Nauru ofthe management and supervision of
phosphate operations onthe island (Arts. 12-15).The assetsofthe British
Phosphate Commissionerson Nauru weretransferred to the Government
of Nauru in 1970,afterthefinal paymenttherefor had been made and the
British Phosphate Commissionersthereupon terminated their activities
on Nauru. Followingthe entryintoforce of an Agreement of9June 1981
between New Zealand and Australia, which put an end to the functions
that the Commissioners exercised on Christmas Island, Australia, New
Zealand and the United Kingdom decided to wind up the affairs of the
British Phosphate Commissioners and to divide among themselves the
remaining assets and liabilities of the Commissioners:to that end, they
concluded on 9 February 1987an Agreement to "terminate the Nauru
Island Agreement [of]1919".

61. During 1987,there were various exchanges of correspondence
betweenthe Partiesconcerningthe windingup ofthe affairs ofthe British
Phosphate Commissioners.Havingrequested and obtained confirmation
ofthe intention ofthe Partner Governments to proceed withthe disposa1
ofthe assetsofthe Commissioners,and havingasked to be consulted,the
Department of External Affairsof Nauru, on 30January 1987,addressed
a Note to the Australian High Commission,in whichitrequestedthe said
Governments «de bien vouloir au moins conserver intacts les fonds des British
Phosphate Commissionerssans procéder àleur liquidation jusqu'à
ce que [la]commissiond'enquête[surla remise en état,instituée par
Nauru le 3décembre19861 aitachevésatâche ..[et]faireensorteque
les archives et autres documents des ...Commissioners soient
conservéstels quels et que ladite commission d'enquêtesoit autori-
sée àlesconsulter et às'en servir».
Aprèslaconclusiondel'accordtripartitedu 9février1987,leprésidentde

Nauru adressa, le 4 mai 1987,au ministre australien des affaires étran-
gères,une lettre dans laquelle il indiquait notamment:
«La position ferme de mon gouvernement est que ces avoirs qui,
en fin de compte, sont issuspour la plupart du sol mêmede Nauru,
devraientservir àla remiseenétatdel'île,etnotamment à larestaura-
tion du tiers de sa surface qui a été exploité avant l'indépendance.

Parune lettredu 15juin 1987,leministreaustraliendesaffairesétrangères
répondit ainsi:
«Les British Phosphate Commissioners et les gouvernements
participants se sont convenablementacquittésde tous leurs engage-

ments en cours. Le restant des avoirs des ..Commissioners n'était
pas leproduit de leurs opérationsàNauru. ))
Enfinune nouvellelettre adresséele23juillet 1987au ministreaustralien
des affaires étrangèrespar le présidentde Nauru contenait le passage
suivant :

«Compte tenu des élémentsdont mon gouvernement dispose
quant àla façon dont lesbénéfices ont été capitalisésar les British
Phosphate Commissioners,je suis sûr que vous ne serezpas surpris
d'apprendre qu'il meparaît difficiled'accepter cequevousaffirmez,
à savoir que le restant des avoirs des British Phosphate Commis-
sioners n'apas été enpartie le produit de leurs opérationsàNauru.
Quoi qu'ilen soit,je ne m'étendraipas ici sur la question, me réser-
vant de l'évoquerpeut-êtredans d'autres circonstances. ))

62. L'Australie affirmeque la demande de Nauru relative aux avoirs
d'outre-mer desBritish Phosphate Commissioners est irrecevable et que
la Cour n'est pas compétentepour en connaître, au motif que: ladite
demande est une demande nouvelle; Nauru n'a pas établi que cette
demande procèded'un«différendd'ordrejuridique »entrelesParties,au
sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article36du Statut de la Cour; Nauru ne peut
prétendre à un quelconquetitrejuridique sur lesavoirsen question etn'a
pas fait la preuve d'un intérêt juridique susceptiblede justifier sa

demande àcetégard;etchacunedesexceptionsformuléespar l'Australie
concernant les autres demandes de Nauru s'appliquent également à sa
demande relativeaux avoirsd'outre-mer. "to begoodenough atleasttokeepthefunds ofthe BritishPhosphate
Commissionersintact without disbursementuntil the conclusion of
the task of the. ..Commission of Inquiry (intorehabilitation setup
byNauru on3 December 1986)[and]that theofficerecords and other
documents of the ... Commissioners may kindlybe kept preserved
and that the said Commission of Inquirybepermitted to have access
to and use of these records and documents".

Mter the conclusion of the Tripartite Agreementof 9 February 1987,the
President of Nauru addressed, on 4 May 1987,a letter to the Australian
Ministerfor Foreign Affairsin which,amongotherthings,he stated that :
"Mygovernmenttakesthe strong viewthat suchassets,whoseulti-
mate derivation largely arises from the very soi1of Nauru Island,
should be directed towards assistance in its rehabilitation, particu-
larlyto that one-third which was mined priorto independence."

By a letter of 15June 1987,the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs
replied in the followingterms :
"The BPCand the Partner Governments have discharged fairlyal1
outstanding obligations. The residual assets of the BPC were not
derived from its Nauru operations."

Lastly,afurther letter addressed on 23July 1987tothe Australian Minis-
ter forForeign Affairsbythe President of Nauru contained the following
passage :

"1am sure, taking into account my Government's knowledge of
the manner of accumulation of surplus funds by the BPC, that you
would not be surprised if 1wereto Saythat 1find itdifficultto accept
yourstatementthattheresidual assetsofthe BPCwerenot derived in
part fromitsNauru operations. 1 shallnot, however,pursue that here
but leaveit perhaps for another place and another time."

62. Australiaasserts that Nauru's claimconcerningthe overseasassets
of the British Phosphate Commissioners is inadmissible and that the
Court hasnojurisdiction inrelation tothat claim,onthegrounds that the
claimisanewone; Nauru hasnotestablished thatthe claimarisesout ofa
"legal dispute" between the Parties, within the meaning of Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court; Nauru cannot claim any legal
titleto theassetsin question and hasnotproven alegalinterest capable of
justifying its claim in this regard; and each of the objections raised by
Australia concerningthe other claimsby Nauru also appliesto the claim
relatingto the overseasassets. 63. La Cour sepenchera d'abord sur l'exception australiennetiréedu
caractère prétendument nouveaude la demande nauruane. L'Australie
soutientquecettedemande estirrecevabledu faitqu'elle estapparuepour
la première fois dans le mémoirede Nauru; que Nauru n'a démontré
l'existence d'aucun lien réelentre ladite demande, d'une part, et ses
prétentionsafférentes àl'inobservation alléguédee l'accorddetutelleetà
la remiseen étatdesterres àphosphates, de l'autre; et quelademande en
question viseà transformer ledifférendportédevant laCour enun diffé-
rend dont le caractère ne serait pas le même.Nauru, pour sa part, fait
valoir que sa demande relative aux avoirsd'outre-mer des British Phos-
phate Commissioners ne constituepas un nouveau chef de demande et
que, même sitel étaitformellementlecas,laCour pourrait néanmoinsen
connaître; que cette demande a un rapport étroitavec la trame des
éléments de fait et de droit relatifs'administration de l'industrie des
phosphatespendant lapériode quivade 1919 àl'indépendance ;etqu'elle

est «implicite» dans les réclamationsse rapportant aux violations de
l'accordde tutelle et «en découleD.
64. La Cour commencera par relever qu'aucune référenceà l'aliéna-
tion des avoirs d'outre-mer des British Phosphate Commissioners ne
figure dans la requêtede Nauru, ni au titre d'un grief autonome, ni en
relation avecla demande de réparation présentée,et qu'aucune mention
n'yestfaite del'accorddu 9février1987,endépitde la déclarationconte-
nue dansla lettredu présidentde Nauru endatedu 23juillet 1987suivant
laquelle celui-ci se réservait d'«évoquer peut-être[la question] dans
d'autres circonstances» (voir paragraphe 61 ci-dessus). La Cour note en
revanche que Nauru, après avoir réitéré les griefs déjà formulésdans sa
requête,yajoute auterme de son mémoirela conclusionsuivante :

«Prie enoutrela Cour de dire etjuger
que la Républiquede Nauru a un titrejuridique sur la part allouéà
l'Australie desavoirs d'outre-mer des British Phosphate Commis-
sioners..»(Lesitaliquessont de la Cour.)

Cette conclusion est présentée séparément, sous la forme d'un alinéa
distinct.
65. La Cour constate en conséquenceque, du point de vue formel,la
demande relative aux avoirsd'outre-merdes BritishPhosphate Commis-
sioners,tellequ'elleapparaîtdans lemémoiredeNauru, estune demande
nouvelleparrapport àcellecontenue dansla requête.Cependant,comme
la Cour permanente de Justice internationale l'a fait observer dans
l'affairedes ConcessionsMavrommatisenPalestine:

«La Cour,exerçantunejuridiction internationale, n'estpas tenue
d'attacher à des considérations de forme la mêmeimportance
qu'ellespourraient avoir dans ledroit interne. »(C.P.J.Z.séA no2,
p. 34; cf, également Camerounseptentrional,C.Z.J. Recueil1963,
p. 28.)
LaCourrecherchera donc si,bienqueformellementnouvelle,lademande 63. The Court willfirst deal with the Australianobjectionbased on its
contention that the Nauruan claimis a new one.Australiamaintains that
the claiminquestion isinadmissibleontheground that itappeared forthe
first time in the Nauruan Memorial; that Nauru has not provedthe exis-
tence of any real linkbetween that claim,on the one hand, and its claims
relatingto the allegedfailureto observetheTrusteeship Agreementandto
the rehabilitation ofthe phosphate lands, on the other;andthat the claim
inquestion seeksto transformthe disputebroughtbefore theCourt intoa

disputethat wouldbe ofadifferentnature.Nauru,forits part, arguesthat
itsclaimconcerningthe overseasassetsofthe BritishPhosphate Commis-
sioners does not constitute a new basis of claim and that, even if it were
formally so, the Court could neverthelessentertain it; that the claim is
closelyrelated to the matrix of fact and law concerning the management
of the phosphate industry during the period from 1919until indepen-
dence; and that the claim is "implicit" in the claimsrelating to the viola-
tions ofthe Trusteeship Agreement and "consequentialon" them.

64. TheCourt notesinthefirst placethatno referencetothe disposa1of
the overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commissionersappears in
Nauru's Application,eitheras an independent claim or in relation to the
claim for reparation submitted, and that the Application nowhere men-
tions the Agreement of 9 February 1987,notwithstanding the statement
contained in the letter of the President of Nauru dated 23July 1987that
he was leavingthe matter "perhaps for another place and another time"
(see paragraph 61 above). On the other hand, the Court notes that, after
reiterating the claims previously made in its Application, Nauru adds,

at the end of its Memorial,the followingsubmission :
"Requests the Courtto adjudge and declarefurther

that the Republic of Nauru has a legal entitlement to the Australian
allocation of the overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commis-
sioners ..."(Emphasisadded.)
This submission is presented separately, in the form of a distinct para-
graph.
65. Consequently,the Court notes that, from a forma1point of view,
the claimrelatingto the overseas assetsofthe BritishPhosphate Commis-
sioners,aspresentedinthe Nauruan Memorial, isa new claiminrelation
to the claims presented in the Application. Nevertheless, as the Per-
manent Court of International Justice pointed out in the Mavrommatis
PalestineConcessions case:

"The Court, whose jurisdiction is international, is not bound to
attach to matters of form thesame degree of importance whichthey
might possess in municipal law." (P.C.I.J.,Series A, No. 2, p. 34;
cf.also NorthernCameroon,I.C.J.Reports1963,p. 28.)

The Court will therefore consider whether, although formally a newen question ne peut être considérée commeétant matériellement incluse
dans la demande originelle.
66. Il paraîà laCour difficilementcontestable que des lienspuissent
existerentre la demande formuléedans lemémoireetle contextegénéral
dans lequel s'inscritla requête.Bienplus, l'Australiea reconnu devant la
Cour que «les avoirsrépartisen 1987provenaient d'un certainnombrede
sources » et que ((certains d'entre eux pouvaient provenir de la vente de
phosphates nauruans » ;et Nauru,dans sarequête,asoutenu quel'indus-
trie des phosphates de l'île avait étégéréed'une manière telle queles
profits réelsétaientrecueillispar lestrois Etat- surtout l'Australie-,
que l'exploitation des phosphates avait conduit à une dévastation des
terres etque lesredevancesverséesaupeuplenauruan avaientétéinsuffi-
santes. Par ailleurs la Cour note aussi que la correspondance diploma-

tique échangée entreles Parties en 1987(voir paragraphe 61 ci-dessus)
montre que le Gouvernement nauruan estimait qu'il y avait un lien entre
sa demande de remise en état des terres exploitéeset la liquidation des
avoirsd'outre-mer des BritishPhosphate Commissioners.

67. La Cour esttoutefois d'avisque,pour que la demande relativeaux
avoirs d'outre-mer des British Phosphate Commissioners puisse être
tenue pour incluse matériellement dans la demande originelle, il ne
saurait suffire que des liens de nature générale existent entreces
demandes. Il convient que la demande additionnelle soit implicitement
contenue dans la requête(Templede PréahVihéarf,ond, C.I.J. Recueil
1962,p. 36)ou découle«directementdelaquestion quifaitl'objetdecette
requête »(Compétence en matièredepêcheries (Républiqufeédérale dillle-
magnec.Islande),fond, C.I.J. Recuei1 l974,p.203,par. 72).LaCour estime

que cesconditions ne sont pas rempliesen l'espèce.
68. En outre, sans vouloir préjugerde quelque manière quece soit la
question de savoir s'ilexistait,la date du dépôtde la requête,un diffé-
rend d'ordre juridique entre les Parties sur la liquidation des avoirs
d'outre-mer desBritish Phosphate Commissioners,la Cour est convain-
cueque,sielledevaitconnaître d'unteldifférendaufond,l'objetdu diffé-
rend sur lequel elle aurait en définitiveà statuer serait nécessairement
distinct de l'objetdu différend qui luia étéoriginellementsoumid sans la
requête.Pour trancher le différend surles avoirsd'outre-mer des British
Phosphate Commissioners,la Cour devrait en effet se pencher sur une
sériede questions qui lui apparaissent extrinsèques par rapport à la
demande initiale, telles que la composition et l'origine exactes de I'en-
semblede cesavoirs; etla solution d'un problèmede cegenreappellerait
de sa part un examen des activités menées par les Commissioners non
seulement, ratione temporis,aprèsle le'juillet 1967,mais aussi, ratione

loci,hors de Nauru (sur l'île Océan (Banaba)et sur l'île Christmas) et,
ratione materiae, dans des domaines autres que l'exploitation des phos-
phates (par exempleceluides transports maritimes).
69. Le paragraphe 1 de l'article 40 du Statut de la Cour stipule que
l'«objetdu différend»doitêtre indiquédanslarequête,etleparagraphe 2claim,the claimin question can be consideredasincludedin the original
claimin substance.
66. It appears to the Court difficult to deny that links may exist
between the claim made in the Memorial and the general context of the
Application. Whatismore,Australiahas acknowledgedbeforethe Court
that the "assets distributed in 1987 were derived from a number of
sources" and that "some of [them]may have been derived from the pro-
ceeds of sale of Nauruan phosphate"; and Nauru, in its Application,
has alleged that the phosphate industry on the island was carried on in
such a way that the real benefit went to the three States - principally
Australia -, that exploitation of the phosphate had resulted in the
devastation of the land and that inadequate royalties had been paid
to the Nauruan people. Moreover, the Court also notes that the
diplomatic correspondence exchanged by the Parties in 1987(see para-
graph 61 above) indicates that the Nauruan Government considered
thatthere wasalinkbetweenitsclaimforrehabilitation oftheworked-out
lands and the disposa1of the overseas assets of the British Phosphate

Commissioners.
67. TheCourt, however,isofthe viewthat, forthe claimrelatingto the
overseas assetsofthe BritishPhosphateCommissioners to beheld to have
been,asa matterofsubstance,included intheoriginal claim,itisnot suffi-
cientthat thereshould belinksbetweenthem ofageneralnature. Anaddi-
tional claim must have been implicit in the application (Templeof Preah
Vihear,Merits, I.C.J.Reports1962,p. 36)ormust arise "directly out ofthe
question whichisthe subject-matter ofthat Application" (FisheriesJuris-
diction (fideral Republicof Germanyv. Zeeland),Merits, I.C.J. Reports
1974,p.203,para. 72).TheCourt considersthat thesecriteria arenot satis-
fied in the present case.
68. Moreover, while not seeking in any way to prejudge the question
whetherthere existed, on the date of the filing of the Application,a dis-
pute ofalegalnature betweenthe Partiesas tothe disposa1ofthe overseas
assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners, the Court is convinced
that, if it had to entertainch a dispute on the merits,the subject of the
dispute on which it would ultimately have to pass would be necessarily
distinct from the subject of the dispute originally submitted to it in the
Application. To settle the dispute on the overseas assets of the British
Phosphate Commissionersthe Court would haveto consider anumber of

questions that appearto it to be extraneous to the original claim,uch as
theprecisemake-up and origin ofthe wholeof these overseasassets; and
the resolution of an issue ofthis kind would lead itto consider the activi-
ties conducted by the Commissioners not only, ratione temporis,after
1 July 1967, but also, ratione loci, outside Nauru (on Ocean Island
(Banaba)and ChristmasIsland) and, rationemateriae,infieldsother than
the exploitation of the phosphate (for example, shipping).

69. Article 40,paragraph 1,ofthe Statuteofthe Court providesthat the
"subject of the dispute" must be indicated in the Application; and Ar-del'article38du RèglementdelaCour requiert que la «nature précisede
la demande» soit indiquéedans la requête. Ces dispositions sont telle-

mentessentiellesauregard delasécuritéjuridiqueetdelabonne adminis-
tration de lajustice qu'ellesfiguraientéjà,ensubstance, dans letexte du
Statut de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale adopté en 1920
(art. 40, premier alinéa)et dans le texte du premier Règlementde cette
Cour adopté en1922(art. 35,deuxièmealinéa),respectivement.La Cour
permanente a, à plusieurs reprises, eu l'occasionde préciser laportée de
ces textes. Ainsi, dans son ordonnance du 4 février 1933,rendue en
l'affaire relative l'Administrationduprince vonPless(exceptionprélimi-
naire),ellea affirmé

N qu'aux termesde l'article40du Statut, c'estla requête quiindique
l'objet du différend..[et]que le mémoire,tout en pouvant éclaircir
les termes de la requête,ne peut pas dépasser les limites de la
demande qu'ellecontient ..»(C.P.J.Z.sériAe /B no52,p. 14).
La mêmeCour a déclaréd ,ans l'affaire de la Société commerciadle Bel-

gique :
Ilyalieud'observerquelafacultélaisséeauxpartiesdemodifier
leurs conclusionsjusqu'à lafin de la procédure orale doit être com-
prise d'une manière raisonnableet sans porter atteinteà l'article40
du Statut età l'article32,alinéa2,du Règlement,qui disposent que
la requête doitindiquer l'objet du différend ..il est évident que la
Cour ne saurait admettre, en principe, qu'un différendportédevant
elle par requête puisse être transformé p,ar voie de modifications

apportéesauxconclusions,enun autre différenddont lecaractèrene
seraitpas le mêmeU . ne semblablepratique serait de nature àporter
préjudiceauxEtatstiersqui,conformément àl'article40,alinéa2,du
Statut, doivent recevoir communication detoute requête afinqu'ils
puissent seprévaloirdu droit d'intervention prévupar lesarticles 62
et63du Statut.»(C.P.J.Zs .érieA/Bno78,p. 173 ;cf.Activitésmilitaires
et paramilitairesau Nicaraguaet contrecelui-ci(Nicaragua c.Etats-
Unis dAmérique), compétene cte recevabilité,.Z.J.Recueil 1984,
p. 427,par. 80.)

70. Au vude cequiprécède,la Cour conclutque lademandenauruane
relative aux biens d'outre-mer des British Phosphate Commissioners est
irrecevableau motifqu'elle constitueunedemande tant formellementque
matériellement nouvelleet que l'objet du différend qui lui a originelle-
mentétésoumissetrouveraittransformé sielleaccueillaitcettedemande.
71. L'exception préliminairesoulevéepar l'Australie sur ce point est
donc fondée. LaCour n'a pas en conséquence à examiner ici les autres
exceptions que l'Australie a présentées à l'encontre des conclusions de
Nauru relatives aux avoirs d'outre-mer des British Phosphate Commis-
sioners.ticle 38,paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court requires "the precise nature
of the claim" to be specifiedin the Application. These provisionsare so
essentialfromthepoint of viewoflegalsecurityand the goodadministra-
tion ofjustice that they were already,in substance, part of the text of the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, adopted in 1920
(Art. 40,first paragraph), and of the text of the firstules of that Court,
adopted in 1922(Art. 35, second paragraph), respectively. On several
occasionsthe Permanent Court had toindicatetheprecisesignificance of
thesetexts.Thus,initsOrder of4February 1933inthe caseconcerningthe
Prince vonPlessAdministration (PreliminaryObjectioni)t,stated that :

"under Article 40 of the Statute, it is the Application which sets out
the subject of the dispute, and the Case,though it may elucidate the
terms of the Application, must not gobeyond the limits ofthe claim
as set outtherein ..."(P.C.Z.J.S, eriesA/B, No.52,p. 14).
In the caseconcerningthe Société commercialedeBelgique,the Permanent
Court stated :

"It is to be observed that the liberty accorded to the parties to
amend their submissions up to the end ofthe oralproceedings must
be construed reasonably and without infringing the terms of Ar-
ticle40of the Statuteand Article32,paragraph 2,of the Ruleswhich
provide that the Application must indicate the subject of the dis-
pute. ...itisclearthat the Court cannot,inprinciple, allowadispute
broughtbefore itbyapplication to betransformed byamendments in
the submissionsintoanother dispute which isdifferentin character.
Apractice ofthis kind wouldbe calculated to prejudicethe interests
ofthird Statesto which,under Article40,paragraph 2,ofthe Statute,
al1applications mustbe communicatedin order that theymaybeina
position to availthemselvesofthe right ofintervention provided for
in Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute." (P.C.I.J.,SeriesA/B, No. 78,
p. 173;cf. Militaryand ParamilitaryActivitiesinand againstNicara-
gua (Nicaragua v. UnitedStates ofAmerica),Jurisdiction andAdmis-
sibility, I.C.J.Reports1984,p. 427,para. 80.)

70. In the lightofthe foregoing,the Court concludesthatthe Nauruan
claimrelatingtothe overseas assetsofthe BritishPhosphate Commission-
ers is inadmissible inasmuch as it constitutes,both in form and in sub-
stance,a newclaim,andthe subject ofthe disputeoriginallysubmitted to
the Court wouldbetransformed ifit entertained that claim.
71. Thepreliminaryobjection raisedbyAustralia onthispoint isthere-
fore wellfounded. It followsthat it is not necessary forthe Courtto con-
siderherethe otherobjections ofAustraliawithregard to the submissions
of Nauru concerningthe overseas assets of the British Phosphate Com-
missioners. 72. Par ces motifs,

1) a) rejette,à l'unanimité, l'exceptionpréliminaire tiréede la réseme
faite par l'Australie dans sa déclaration d'acceptation de la juridiction
obligatoire de la Cour;

b) rejette,par douzevoixcontre une, l'exceptionpréliminairetiréedela
prétenduerenonciation par Nauru, avantl'indépendance,àtoutespréten-
tions concernant la remise enétatdesterres àphosphates exploitéesavant
le le'juillet 1967;
POUR: Sir Robert Jennings, Président; MM. Lachs, Ago, Schwebel,
Bedjaoui, Ni, Evensen, Tarassov,Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Aguilar
Mawdsley,Ranjeva,juges
;
CONTRE : M.Oda, Vice-Présiden ;t
c) rejette,par douze voixcontreune, l'exception préliminairetiréedela
levéedela tutelle surNauru par l'organisation des Nations Unies;

POUR : Sir Robert Jennings, Présiden ;t MM. Lachs, Ago, Schwebel,
Bedjaoui, Ni, Evensen, Tarassov,Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Aguilar
Mawdsley,Ranjeva,juges ;
CONTRE :M.Oda, Vice-Présiden ;t

d) rejette, par douze voix contre une, l'exception préliminaire tirée
de l'effet de l'écoulementdu temps sur la recevabilitéde la requêtede
Nauru ;

POUR: Sir Robert Jennings, Président; MM. Lachs, Ago, Schwebel,
Bedjaoui, Ni, Evensen, Tarassov,Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Aguilar
Mawdsley,Ranjeva,juges;
CONTRE :M.Oda, Vice-Présiden ; t

e) rejette,par douze voixcontre une, l'exceptionpréliminairetiréede la
prétendueabsence de bonne foi deNauru;
POUR: Sir Robert Jennings, Président; MM. Lachs,Ago, Schwebel,
Bedjaoui, Ni, Evensen, Tarassov,Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Aguilar
Mawdsley,Ranjeva,juges;

CONTRE :M.Oda, Vice-Présiden ; t
f) rejette,par neuf voix contrequatre, l'exception préliminairetiréedu
fait que la Nouvelle-Zélande et le Royaume-Uni ne sont pas parties à
l'instance;

POUR: MM. Lachs, Bedjaoui, Ni, Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume,
Shahabuddeen,Aguilar Mawdsley,Ranjeva,juges ;
CONTRE: SirRobert Jennings, PrésidentM ; .Oda, Vice-Préside ;nt M.Ago,
Schwebelj,uges ;

g) retient, à l'unanimité, l'exceptionpréliminaire tiréedu caractère
nouveau de la demande relative aux avoirs d'outre-mer des ((British
Phosphate Commissioners »; 72. For these reasons,

(1) (a) rejects,unanimously, the preliminary objection based on the
resewation made byAustralia inits declaration of acceptance ofthe com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court;

(b) rejects,by twelve votes to one, the preliminary objection based on
the alleged waiver by Nauru, prior to accession to independence, of al1
claims concerning the rehabilitation of the phosphate lands worked out
prior to 1July 1967;
IN FAVOUR: PresidentSir Robert Jennings; JudgesLachs, Ago, Schwebel,
Bedjaoui, Ni, Evensen, Tarassov,Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Aguilar
Mawdsley,Ranjeva;

AGAINST :Vice-PresidenOt da;
(c) rejects,bytwelve votes to one, the preliminary objection based on
thetermination of the Trusteeship over Nauru by the United Nations;

IN FAVOUR: PresidentSir Robert Jennings; JudgesLachs, Ago, Schwebel,
Bedjaoui, Ni, Evensen, Tarassov,Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Aguilar
Mawdsley,Ranjeva;
AGAINST :Vice-PresidenOt da ;

(d) rejects,bytwelve votes to one, the preliminary objection based on
the effect of the passage of time on the admissibility of Nauru's Applica-
tion ;
IN FAVOUR: PresidentSir Robert Jennings; Judges Lachs,Ago, Schwebel,
Bedjaoui, Ni, Evensen, Tarassov,Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Aguilar
Mawdsley,Ranjeva;

AGAINST :Vice-PresidenOt da;
(e) rejects,by twelve votes to one, the preliminary objection based on
Nauru's allegedlack of good faith;

IN FAVOUR: PresidentSir Robert Jennings; Judges Lachs,Ago, Schwebel,
Bedjaoui, Ni, Evensen, Tarassov,Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Aguilar
Mawdsley,Ranjeva;
AGAINST :Vice-PresidenOt da;

(0 rejects,by nine votes to four, the preliminary objectionbased onthe
factthat New Zealand and the United Kingdom are notparties to thepro-
ceedings ;

IN FAVOUR: Judges Lachs, Bedjaoui, Ni, Evensen, Tarassov,Guillaume,
Shahabuddeen,Aguilar Mawdsley,Ranjeva;
AGAINST: PresidentSir Robert Jennings; Vice-PresidenO t da; JudgesAgo,
Schwebel;
(g) upholds,unanimously, the preliminaryobjectionbased onthe claim
concerning the overseas assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners

being a new one; 2) dit,par neuf voixcontre quatre, qu'elle a compétence,surlabase du
paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 de son Statut, pour connaître de la requête
déposée par la Républiquede Nauru le 19mai 1989,et que ladite requête
estrecevable;
POUR: MM. Lachs, Bedjaoui, Ni, Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume,
Shahabuddeen,Aguilar Mawdsley, Ranjeva,juges;

COSchwebelj,uges;Jennings,Président; .Oda, Vice-PrésidenMt;M.Ago,

3) dit,à l'unanimité,que la demande relative aux avoirs d'outre-mer
des ((British Phosphate Commissioners»,formuléepar Nauru dans son
mémoireendate du 20avril 1990,estirrecevable.

Fait enfrangaisetenanglais,letextefrançaisfaisant foi, au Palaisdela
Paix,à LaHaye,levingt-sixjuinmilneufcentquatre-vingt-douze,entrois
exemplaires,dont l'un restera déposaux archivesde la Cour etlesautres
seront transmis respectivement au Gouvernement de la Républiquede
Nauru et au Gouvernement du Commonwealth d'Australie.

Le Président,

(Signé)R. Y. JENNINGS.
Le Greffier,

(Signé)Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA.

M. SHAHABUDDE EgNe,, joiàl'arrêt l'exposde son opinion indivi-
duelle.

Sir Robert JENNINGP Sr,ésident,M. ODA,Vice-Président,MM. AGOet
SCHWEBE jLg,es,joignent àl'arrêt sxposésde leuropinion dissidente.

(Paraphé)R.Y.J.
(Paraphé)E.V.O. (2) finds, by nine votes to four, that, on the basis of Article 36,para-
graph 2, of theStatute of the Court, it has jurisdiction to entertain the
Application filed by the Republic of Nauru on 19May 1989and that the
said Application is admissible;
IN FAVOUR: JudgesLachs, Bedjaoui,Ni, Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume,
Shahabuddeen,Aguilar Mawdsley, Ranjeva;
AGAINSP Tr:esident SirRobert Jennings; Vice-Prest da; JudgesAgo,
Schwebel;

(3)finds, unanimously,thatthe claimconcerningthe overseasassetsof
the BritishPhosphate Commissioners,made by Nauruin itsMemorial of
20April 1990,is inadmissible.

Done in French and in English,the French text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace,TheHague,this twenty-sixthdayofJune,onethousand
nine hundred and ninety-two,inthree copies,one ofwhichwillbe placed
inthe archivesofthe Courtandthe otherstransmitted tothe Government
of Nauru and the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia,
respectively.

(Signed) R.Y. JENNINGS,
President.

(Signed) Eduardo VALENCIA-OSPINA,

Registrar.

Judge SHAHABUDDE appNends aseparate opinion tothe Judgment of
the Court.

President Sir Robert JENNINGS V,ice-President ODA,JudgesAGOand
SCHWEBE aLpend dissentingopinions to the Judgment of theCourt.

(Initialled) R.Y.J.

(Initialled) E.V.O.

ICJ document subtitle

Preliminary Objections

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Judgment of 26 June 1992

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