Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2007/16
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2007
Public sitting
held on Monday 4 June 2007, at 10.10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Higgins presiding,
in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaragua v. Colombia)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2007
Audience publique
tenue le lundi 4 juin 2007, à 10 h 10, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,
en l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime
(Nicaragua c. Colombie)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presieigtgins
Vice-Prsi-Kntasawneh
Ranjevaudges
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc Fortier
Gaja
Couevrisrar
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : Mme Higgins,président
Al-Kh.vsce-prh,ident
RanMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skjoteiskov,
FortiMr .
jugesaja, ad hoc
Cgeffrerr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Nicaragua is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Carlos José Argüello Gómez, Ambassa dor of the Republic of Nicaragua to the Kingdom
of the Netherlands,
as Agent and Counsel;
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., member of the English Bar, Chairman of the International
Law Commission, Emeritus Chichele Professor of Public International Law, University of
Oxford, member of the Institut de droit interna tional, Distinguished Fellow, All Souls College,
Oxford,
Mr. Alex Oude Elferink, Research Associate, Neth erlands Institute for the Law of the Sea, Utrecht
University,
Mr.Alain Pellet, Professor at the University ParisX-Nanterre, Member and former Chairman of
the International Law Commission,
Mr. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, Professor of International Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Ms Irene Blázquez Navarro, Doctor of Public International Law, Universidad Autónoma, Madrid,
MsTania Elena Pacheco Blandino, Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Nicaragua in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
MsNadine Susani, Doctor of Public Law, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
University of Paris X-Nanterre,
as Assistant Advisers.
The Government of Colombia is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Julio Londoño Paredes, Ambassador,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Guillermo Fernández de Soto, Ambassador of Colombia to the Kingdom of
theNetherlands; member of the Permanent C ourt of Arbitration and former Minister for
Foreign Affairs,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. Stephen M. Schwebel, member of the Bars of the State of New York, the District of Columbia,
and the Supreme Court of the United States of America; member of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration; member of the Institute of International Law,
Sir Arthur Watts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., member of the English Bar; member of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration; member of the Institute of International Law, - 5 -
Le Gouvernement du Nicaragua est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Carlos José Arguëllo Gómez, ambassad eur de la République du Nicaragua auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme agent et conseil ;
M.Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, président de la
Commission du droit international, professeur ém érite de droit international public (chaire
Chichele) à l’Université d’Oxford, membre de l’Institut de droit international,Distinguished
fellow au All Souls College d’Oxford,
M. Alex Oude Elferink, research associate à l’Institut néerlandais du droit de la mer de
l’Université d’Utrecht,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de Paris X-Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international,
M. Antonio Remiro Brotóns, professeur de droit international à l’Universidad autónoma de Madrid,
comme conseils et avocats ;
Mme Irene Blázquez Navarro, docteur en droit in ternational public, Universidad autónoma de
Madrid,
Mme Tania Elena Pacheco Blandino, conseiller à l’ambassade du Nicaragua aux Pays-Bas,
Mme Nadine Susani, docteur en droit public, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN),
Université de Paris X-Nanterre,
comme conseillers adjoints.
Le Gouvernement de la Colombie est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Julio Londoño Paredes, ambassadeur,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Guillermo Fernández de Soto, ambassad eur de la République de Colombie auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage, ancien ministre des affaires
étrangères,
comme coagent ;
M. Stephen M. Schwebel, membre des barreaux de l’ Etat de New York, du district de Columbia et
de la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis d’Amérique, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,
membre de l’Institut de droit international,
Sir ArthurWatts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, membre de la Cour
permanente d’arbitrage, membre de l’Institut de droit international, - 6 -
Mr. Prosper Weil, Professor Emeritus, University of Paris II; member of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration; member of the Institute of Inte rnational Law; member of the Académie des
Sciences Morales et Politiques (Institut de France),
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, member of the International Law Commission,
Mr. Rafael Nieto Navia, former Judge of the In ternational Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia;
former Judge of the Inter-American Court of Hu man Rights; member of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration; member of the Institute of International Law,
Mr. Andelfo García González, Professor of Inte rnational Law, Deputy Chief of Mission of the
Colombian Embassy at Madrid, former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of
Colombia,
Mr. Enrique Gaviria Liévano, Professor of Public International Law; former Ambassador of
Colombia and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations; former Chairman of the
Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly; former Ambassador of Colombia to
Greece and to the Czech Republic,
Mr. Juan Carlos Galindo Vacha, former Deputy In spector-General before the Council of State,
National Head of the Civil Registry,
as Advocates;
Ms Sonia Pereira Portilla, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Embassy of the Republic of Colombia in
the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Juan José Quintana, Minister Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia,
Ms Mirza Gnecco Plá, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia,
Mr. Julián Guerrero Orozco, Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Colombia in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
Ms Andrea Jiménez Herrera, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia,
Ms Daphné Richemond, member of the Bars of Paris and the State of New York,
as Legal Advisers;
Mr. Scott Edmonds, Cartographer, International Mapping,
as Technical Adviser;
Ms Stacey Donison,
as Stenographer. - 7 -
M. Prosper Weil, professeur émérite de l’Université de Paris II, membre de la Cour permanente
d’arbitrage, membre de l’Institut de droit international, membre de l’Académie des sciences
morales et politiques (Institut de France),
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, membre de la Commission du droit international,
M. Rafael Nieto Navia, ancien juge du Tribuna l pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie, ancien
juge de la Cour interaméricaine des droits de l’homme, membre de la Cour permanente
d’arbitrage, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Andelfo García González, professeur de dro it international, chef adjoint de mission à
l’ambassade de Colombie au Royaume d’Espa gne, ancien ministre adjoint des affaires
étrangères,
M. Enrique Gaviria Liévano, professeur de droit in ternational, ancien ambassadeur de Colombie,
ancien ambassadeur et représentant perman ent adjoint auprès de l’Organisation des
NationsUnies, ancien président de la Sixi ème Commission de l’Assemblée générale de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies, ancien amba ssadeur de Colombie en Grèce et en République
tchèque,
M. Juan Carlos Galindo Vacha, an cien inspecteur général adjoint auprès du Conseil d’Etat de la
République de Colombie, chef du bureau de l’état civil,
comme avocats ;
Mme Sonia Pereira Portilla, ministre plénipotentiaire à l’ambassade de Colombie aux Pays-Bas,
M. Juan José Quintana, ministre-conseiller, ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme Mirza Gnecco Plá, conseiller, ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Julián Guerrero Orozco, conseiller, ambassade de Colombie aux Pays-Bas,
Mme Andrea Jiménez Herrera, premier secrétaire, ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme Daphné Richemond, membre des barreaux de Paris et de l’Etat de New York,
comme conseillers juridiques ;
M. Scott Edmonds, cartographe, International Mapping,
comme conseiller technique ;
Mme Stacey Donison,
commseténographe. - 8 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated.
The Court meets today to hear the oral statements of the Parties on the Preliminary
Objections raised by the Res pondent in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaragua v. Colombia).
I note that since the Court does not include upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of
either of the Parties, both Parties have ava iled themselves of the right, under Article31,
paragraph 2, of the Statute, to choose a judge ad hoc. Nicaragua originally chose Mr. Mohammed
Bedjaoui. Following the resignation of the latter, Nicaragua chose Mr. Giorgio Gaja and Colombia
chose Mr. Yves Fortier.
Article 20 of the Statute provides: “Every Member of the Court shall, before taking up his
duties, make a solemn declaration in open court that he will exercise his powers impartially and
conscientiously ” Pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 6, of the Statute, that same provision applies to
judges ad hoc. Although both Mr.Fortier and Mr.Gaja have been judges ad hoc and made a
solemn declaration in previous cases, Article8, pa ragraph3, of the Rules of Court provides that
they must make a further solemn declaration in the present case.
In accordance with custom, I shall first say a few words about the career and qualifications
of each judge ad hoc before inviting him to make his solemn declaration.
Mr.YvesFortier, of Canadian nationality, holds degrees from the University of Montreal,
McGill University and Oxford University. He is a distinguished jurist and has pursued a career as
both diplomat and lawyer. In particular, he served as Canada’s Ambassador and Permanent
Representative to the United Nations in New York from 1988 to 1992 and, in that capacity, served
as Vice-President of the General Assembly and Presi dent of the Security Council. Mr.Fortier is
well known to the Court since he was chosen as judge ad hoc in the Qatar v. Bahrain case and
appeared before the Court as counsel in the Gulf of Maine case. He has also pleaded a number of
important arbitration cases and has sat as arbitrator in many cases, including as a Member of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration.
Mr. Giorgio Gaja, of Italian nationality, is Pr ofessor at the Faculty of Law of the University
of Florence. He has held numerous other teaching posts around the world including at the - 9 -
European University Institute and the University of ParisI, and has also taught at The Hague
Academy of International Law. Mr.Gaja ha s been a Member of the International Law
Commission since 1999 and is a member of the Institut de droit international. He has represented
his Government on a number of occasions including before this Court as counsel in the Elettronica
Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) case. Mr. Gaja was also chosen as judge ad hoc in one of the cases concerning
Legality of Use of Force , namely the Serbia and Montenegro v. Italy case, and in the case
concerning Maritime Delimitation between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea.
In accordance with the order of precedence fixed by Article7, paragraph3, of the Rules of
Court, I shall first invite Mr. Fortier to make the solemn declaration prescribed by the Statute, and I
would request all those present to rise.
M. FORTIER: Merci, Madame le président.
“Je déclare solennellement que je remplirai mes devoirs et exercerai mes
attributions de juge en tout honneur et dévouement, en pleine et parfaite impartialité et
en toute conscience.”
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. I shall now inv ite Mr. Gaja to make the solemn declaration
prescribed by the Statute.
Mr. GAJA: Thank you.
“I solemnly declare that I will perform my duties and exercise my powers as
judge honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously.”
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. Please be seated. I take note of the solemn declarations
made by Mr.Fortier and Mr.Gaja and declare them duly installed as judges ad hoc in the case
concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia).
*
I shall now recall the principal steps of the procedure so far in this case.
On 6December2001, the Republic of Nicaragua filed in the Registry of the Court an
Application instituting proceedings against the Re public of Colombia in respect of a dispute - 10 -
consisting of a group of “related legal issues subsisting” between the two States “concerning title to
territory and maritime delimitation” in the western Caribbean.
In its Application, Nicaragua founded the jurisd iction of the Court first on the provisions of
Article XXXI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement signed on 30 April 1948, known as the
“Pact of Bogotá”, and secondly on the declarations made by the Parties accepting the Court’s
jurisdiction.
By an Order dated 26 February 2002, the Cour t fixed 28 April 2003 as the time-limit for the
filing of the Memorial of Nicaragua and 28J une 2004 as the time-limit for the filing of the
Counter-Memorial of Colombia. Nicaragua filed its Memorial within the time-limit so prescribed.
Pursuant to the instructions of the Court under Article 43 of the Rules of Court, the Registrar
addressed to all States parties to the Pact of B ogotá the notifications provided for in Article63,
paragraph1, of the Statute. In accordance with the provisions of Article69, paragraph3, of the
Rules of Court, the Registrar moreover addressed to the Organization of American States the
notification provided for in Article 34, paragraph3, of the Statute. The Registrar subsequently
transmitted to that organization copies of the plead ings filed in the case and asked its Secretary-
General to inform him whether or not the OAS intended to present observations in writing within
the meaning of Article 69, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court. The Registrar was informed that the
OAS did not intend to submit such observations.
On 21 July 2003, within the time-limit set by Ar ticle 79, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court,
Colombia raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court. Consequently, by an Order
dated 24 September 2003, the Court, noting that by vi rtue of Article 79, paragraph 5, of the Rules
of Court, the proceedings on the merits were susp ended: it fixed 26 January 2004 as the time-limit
for the presentation by Nicaragua of a written stat ement of its observations and submissions on the
preliminary objections made by Colombia. Nicara gua filed such a statement within the time-limit
so prescribed, and the case thus became ready for hearing on the Preliminary Objections.
Pursuant to Article53, paragraph1, of th e Rules of Court, the Governments of Honduras,
Jamaica, Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela asked to be furnished with copies of the pleadings
and documents annexed produced in the case. In accordance with the same provision, having
ascertained the views of the Parties, the Court granted these requests. - 11 -
Having ascertained the views of the Parties, the Court decided, pursuant to Article53,
paragraph 2, of its Rules, that copies of the pl eadings and the documents annexed would be made
accessible to the public on the opening of its oral proceedings. Further, in accordance with Court
practice, the pleadings without their annexes will be put on the Court’s new website today.
*
I note the presence at the hearing of the Agents , counsel and advocates of both Parties. In
accordance with the arrangements on the organizati on of the procedure which have been decided
by the Court, the hearings will comprise of fi rst and second round of oral argument. Colombia,
which raised the preliminary objections, will be heard first.
The first round of oral argument will begin t oday. Each Party will dispose of one three-hour
session. Colombia will present its arguments today a nd the Court is aware that we start with an
overrun on your time and will take due notice of that: and Nicaragua, tomorrow, will begin at
10 a.m. The second round of oral argument w ill begin on Wednesday and each Party will dispose
of one two-hour session. Colombia will present its second round of oral arguments on Wednesday
at 4 p.m. and Nicaragua on Friday at 10 a.m.
*
I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Londoño Paredes, the Agent of Colombia.
Mr. PAREDES:
1. Madam President and distinguished judges. It is a great honour for me to address the
Court, as Agent for the Republic of Colombia in these hearings on the Preliminary Objections
submitted by my country, in the case brought by Nicaragua against Colombia by Application on
6 December 2001. If I may, Madam President, I should now like to briefly set out the salient facts:
2. A dispute existed between Colombia a nd Nicaragua since 1838 over the Mosquito Coast,
and since 1890 over the Corn Islands. In 1913, Ni caragua extended the dispute by advancing, for
the first time ever, claims over the Archipelago of San Andrés. The Archipelago had by then, for a - 12 -
century, been part of one of the provinces of th e Republic of Colombia and had been under its
jurisdiction like any other part of its national terr itory. Despite this fact, a lengthy negotiation then
began over the whole of the dispute, which was to end with the conclusion on 24March1928 of
the Esguerra-Bárcenas Treaty.
3. By the terms of the Treaty, Colombia recognized Nicaragua’s sovereignty over the
Mosquito Coast and the Corn Islands, while Nicaragua recognized Colombia’s sovereignty over the
islands of San Andrés, Providencia , Santa Catalina, and all the othe r islands, islets and cays that
form part of the Archipelago of San Andrés. Both Parties also expressly stipulated that sovereignty
over three of the archipelago’s cays ⎯ Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana ⎯ was in dispute
between Colombia and the United States of America.
4. The Treaty was discussed and approved by the two chambers of Congress in each country.
The agreement reached by the Parties establishi ng the 82º W meridian as their maritime boundary
was embodied in the Treaty’s Protocol of Exch ange of Ratifications, of 5May1930. The
1928 Treaty along with its 1930 Protocol was registered with the League of Nations by Colombia
on 16 August 1930, and two years later by Nicaragua, on 25 May 1932.
5. Colombia continued, in a public, peaceful and uninterrupted manner, to exercise its
sovereignty over the entire Archipelago of San Andrés and its jurisdiction over the appurtenant
maritime areas up to the 82° W meridian boundary.
6. Now Nicaragua, in the present case, not only would have the Court validate its attempts to
disavow a territorial and boundary treaty, in force for over three quarters of a century, but would
also have the Colombian Archipelago of San Andrés delivered to it on a silver platter, despite the
terms of the Treaty and despite the fact that Ni caragua has never exercised jurisdiction over the
archipelago. Likewise, Nicaragua would have the Court ignore the maritime boundary established
by the 1928/1930 Treaty. In fact, what Nicaragua would like, is for this Court to endorse a flagrant
violation of the governing principle of international relations, pacta sunt servanda.
7. Colombia’s unwavering practice has been th at of respect for treaties and international
agreements. Colombia has entered into 17treati es and agreements on territorial issues, land or
maritime delimitation with 12 States. It equally r esorted to arbitration with Costa Rica before the
President of France; and arbitrations with Ve nezuela before the King of Spain and the Swiss - 13 -
Confederation. Several of these treaties and arbitral awards are linked to the present case, in so far
as they directly or indirectly relate to the Ar chipelago of San Andrés a nd its appurtenant maritime
areas.
8. For its part, Nicaragua has endeavoured to disown established boundaries with all its
neighbours, whether defined by an arbitral awar d, or in treaties that it signed and ratified.
Nicaragua has also presumed to question other te rritorial treaties and agreements in force, on
delimitation and other matters, signed by Colombia with other States in the area. Nicaragua’s
approach carries grave consequences for the stability of the region.
9. Madam President and distinguished judges, Colombia and Nicaragua are parties to the
Pact of Bogotá which provides for several procedur es of pacific settlement of disputes. Nicaragua
would have the Court ignore an essential provisi on of that instrument, Article VI. It provides that
the Pact’s procedures do not apply to matters already settled by arrangement between the parties, or
that are governed by agreements or treaties in fo rce on the date of its conclusion, 30April1948.
All of the claims raised by Nicaragua relate to matters so settled or governed.
10. Nicaragua also wishes the Court to disreg ard a provision of the Pact aimed at preventing
one of the parties from attempting to have any of its settlement procedures ⎯ including recourse to
the Court ⎯ applied to matters expressly excepted by the Pact itself. Article XXXIV provides that
disputes relating to matters such as those included in Article VI are to be declared ended.
11. Nicaragua also invokes declarations under the optional clause as an additional title of
jurisdiction. But prior to the filing of Nicara gua’s Application, Colombia had terminated its
1937 declaration with immediate effect.
12. Nicaragua would have the Court disregard Colombia’s will, manifested by its letter of
termination, and disregard as well the concordant practice of both States, evidenced by the fact that
Nicaragua had at the time recently modified its 1929 declaration also with immediate effect.
13. In any event, Nicaragua would have the Court ignore the reservation in the Colombian
declaration that excluded controversies arising out of facts prior to 6 January 1932 from the Court’s
jurisdiction. But all the matters raised by Nicaragua in its Application arise out of such facts.
14. Nicaragua’s wish to avoid these limitations upon the Court’s jurisdiction is evident: but,
Madam President, wishing does not make it so. The fact is that, as Colombia will show over the - 14 -
course of the present proceedings, both under the Pact of Bogotá and in the context of the optional
clause, the Court is without jurisdiction to hear this case.
15. Madam President, pursuant to the Pact of B ogotá, it falls to the Court to determine that,
in the circumstances of the case, the conditions set forth in ArticleVI of the Pact are fulfilled.
Those conditions are:
⎯ that the 1928Treaty and its Protocol of Exchange of Ratifications of 1930 were in force on
30 April 1948, the date of the Pact’s conclusion;
⎯ that the Treaty and Protocol settled the ma tter of sovereignty over the Archipelago of
San Andrés; and
⎯ that the limit between both States was determined in the agreement embodied in the Protocol of
Exchange of 1930.
Having established this, it is for the Court, in application of Article XXXIV of the Pact, to find that
it is without jurisdiction to hear the controversy and to declare the controversy ended.
16. Moreover, Colombia terminated its accep tance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction
and thus, under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the St atute, does not consent to the Court’s jurisdiction
on that basis.
17. Even under the 1937declaration, if it applied, the Court would in any event lack
jurisdiction to hear the case, by virtue of the very terms of that instrument. This is so, because the
controversy raised by Nicaragua regarding sovereignty over the Archipelago of San Andrés and the
establishment of the 82° W Meridian limit, arises out of facts prior to 6 January 1932.
18. In short, Madam President, both because of the termination of Colombia’s declaration
and because of its terms, Article 36, paragraph 2, simply does not apply.
19. Madam President and distinguished judges, in its Written Statement of 2004, Nicaragua
maintains that Colombia has not been firm and consistent with regard to its defence of the
82° W Meridian as the maritime boundary between both countries, contending that there were what
Nicaragua calls “rounds of negotiations” over it. It is simply not true, and Colombia calls the
Court’s attention to the significant fact that Nicaragua itself so acknowledges in its Written - 15 -
Statement that Colombia has always upheld the ma ritime limit established by agreement of the
two countries in 1930.
20. Nicaragua also advances the insupportable a llegation that Colombia acted in bad faith in
the period leading up to the withdrawal of its declaration under the optional clause.
21. Not only does Nicaragua misstate the facts, but its contentions are said to be supported
by affidavits fabricated years after the event. These self-serving affidavits do not reflect the truth
of the matter. My Government strenuously rej ects Nicaragua’s claims and affidavits. My
Government trusts that the Court will give them no credit.
22. Madam President and distinguished judges, from its Written Statement Nicaragua’s
strategy appears crystal clear: to induce the Court to declare that Colombia’s objections do not
possess, in the circumstances of the case, an exclus ively preliminary character. It attempts to
achieve this objective by raising itself at every turn matters that would properly belong to the
merits and distorting Colombia’s position by accusing it of doing the same. In so acting, Nicaragua
ignores the provisions of Article79 of the Rules as well as Practice DirectionVI. For its part,
Colombia will adhere to those provisions and will th us confine its statements to those matters that
are relevant to the objections.
23. Colombia respectfully invites the Court to uphold the Preliminary Objections it has
submitted, thus putting an end to Nicaragua’s attempt to have Colombian territories and waters
transferred to Nicaragua.
24. I am grateful to the Court for having a llowed me the privilege of opening Colombia’s
oral argument in these proceedings. If the Court pl eases, Sir Arthur Watts shall continue with the
presentation of Colombia’s preliminary objections, beginning with an explanation of the pertinent
background and general aspects. Then, Prof essorProsperWeil shall analyse the objection
submitted by Colombia based on the Pact of Bogot á. And thereafter Mr.StephenSchwebel shall
deal with the objection raised by Colombia con cerning the declarations under the optional clause.
May I now invite you, Madam President, to give the floor to Sir Arthur Watts.
1
Written Statement of Nicaragua (WSN), p. 19, para. 1.22. - 16 -
The PRESIDENT: I thank the Agent of Colombia and I now give the floor to
Sir Arthur Watts.
SirArthurWATTS: Thank you, Madam President. Madam President and Members of the
Court, it is an honour for me to address the Court today, as counsel for the Republic of Colombia.
1. Could I just say at the outset that my colleagues and I will not read out the footnote
references which are included in the written texts of our statements, but we hope the Court will find
them helpful when reading the compte rendu.
2. Madam President, let me ⎯ just for a moment ⎯ leave aside the details of this case, and
look instead at the heart of the matter.
3. Nearly 200 years ago the Spanish Empire in the Americas broke up. It was not a tidy
process. There were many uncertainties. They included the geographical extent of the newly
independent States. There were disputes ⎯ inevitably.
4. There were disputes between Colombia and Nicaragua. They flared up from time to
time ⎯ long ago, in the nineteenth century, and the early years of the twentieth century. There
were negotiations, lengthy negotiations. Eventually ⎯ in 1928 and 1930 ⎯ a treaty settlement was
agreed.
5. That treaty settlement was applied. For the next five years there were no problems;
tenyears; 15; 20 ⎯ half a century in fact. It was not until 1980 that Nicaragua first raised
problems about that treaty settlement ⎯ 50 years after the event!
6. And now Nicaragua comes to this Court. For what, Madam President? Nicaragua asks
the Court to adjudicate to Nicaragua territories and maritime areas which, even since before
Nicaragua emerged as an inde pendent nation, have always belonged to Colombia, as was
confirmed by the 1928-1930 treaty settlement.
7. In short, let us be clear, Nicaragua asks the Court to set aside a 75-year-old treaty
settlement: Nicaragua asks the Court to rewrite history.
8. Madam President, let me now turn to the case in more detail. Colombia has raised two
preliminary objections. The first is that the di spute which Nicaragua seeks to bring before the
Court was settled 75years ago in the Esguerra -Bárcenas Treaty of 1928-1930, and that, - 17 -
accordingly, under the terms of the Pact of Bogotá the Court has no jurisdiction to consider the
merits of that dispute.
9. Colombia’s second objection is that the Court lacks jurisdiction under the declarations of
acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.
10. The scope of what was settled in the Esgue rra-Bárcenas Treaty is crucially important. It
may therefore help the Court if I first outline the background to that Treaty, and then explain the
terms of the settlement reached all those years ago.
H ISTORICAL BACKGROUND
2
11. I can outline the historical background quite briefly , particularly since in any event the
dispute which emerged from those historical circumstances has already been settled.
12. That dispute had its origins in the circum stances surrounding the break up of the Spanish
Empire in the Americas in the early nineteenth century. The essential geography of that old dispute
is shown on the sketch-map at tab2 in the judges’ folders, and now on the screen. In briefest
summary, the situation was this.
3
(1)At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Vice-Royalty of Santa Fe (i.e., mostly
present-day Colombia) included part of the Mos quito Coast in present-day Nicaragua and the
Archipelago of San Andrés (which included at that time the Corn Islands).
(2) As regards the Mosquito Coast, Colombia’s hi storical and legal title wa s derived from Spain.
Nevertheless Colombia, once inde pendent, had to defend its right s through diplomatic means,
first against Great Britain which occupied that Coast, and subsequently against Nicaragua.
(3)In 1890 the dispute with Nicaragua extende d to the Corn Islands, which Nicaragua had
forcefully occupied, despite protests from the islanders and the Colombian Government.
(4) Those differences over the Mosquito Coast and th e Corn Islands became sharper in 1913. In
that year Nicaragua and the United States signed a treaty whereby Nicaragua purported to lease
the Corn Islands to the United States: Colombia protested, and in reply Nicaragua repeated its
2
For a fuller treatment see Preliminary Objections oflombia (POC), Introduction, pp. 6-8, paras. 9-13;
pp. 29-32, paras. 1.22-1.32.
3POC, p. 29, para. 1.22, footnote 18. - 18 -
alleged rights over the Mosquito Coast and the Crn Islands and, for the first time, asserted
claims to sovereignty over certain islands of the Archipelago of San Andrés.
13. Nicaragua’s appetite for acquiring territory at Colombia’s expense is abundantly clear.
1913-1928: T HE NEGOTIATIONS
14. Colombia and Nicaragua then embarked on some 15years of negotiations. This led to
the Esguerra-Bárcenas Treaty of 1 928 and its Protocol of Exchange of Ratifications of 1930. The
two States settled their differences in that Treaty and Protocol.
15. The settlement which was then agreed involved three clear and simple elements:
⎯ first, Colombia recognized Nicaragua’s sovere ignty over the Mosquito Coast and the Corn
Islands;
⎯ second, Nicaragua recognized Colombia’s sovere ignty over the Archipelago of San Andrés;
and
⎯ third, Colombia and Nicaragua mutually agreed on the 82º W meridian as their boundary.
16. That settlement is illustrated on the sketch-m ap at tab 6 in the judges’ folders, and now
on the screen. That is the treaty settlement which the two States agreed; and that,
MadamPresident and Members of the Court, is the agreed settlement which Nicaragua, in these
present proceedings, seeks to disavow.
T HE 1928-1930 E SGUERRA -BÁRCENAS T REATY
1928: The signing of the Treaty
17. Let me now look more closely at that se ttlement. The Treaty signed in 1928 is short and
simple. Its translation into English is at tab 7 (b) in the judges’ folders.
18. It contains only one substantive Article, which is now on the screen and at tab 7 (a) in the
judges’ folders. It is in effect in three parts.
⎯ The first part of Article I stipulates that Colo mbia recognizes the full and entire sovereignty of
Nicaragua over “the Mosquito Coast between the Cape Gracias a Dios and the San Juan River,
and over the Mangle Grande and Mangle Chico is lands, in the Atlantic Ocean (Great Corn
Island and Little Corn Island)”. This was Colo mbia’s concession to Nicaragua, by way of the
diplomatic compromise which was negotiated. - 19 -
⎯ The second part of Article I incorporates Nicaragua’s recognition of Colombia’s full and entire
sovereignty over “the islands of SanAndrés, Providencia, Santa Catalina and all the other
islands, islets and cays that form part of the said Archipelago of San Andrés”. In the context of
the present proceedings, this formulation is par ticularly important and it is highlighted in
tab 7 (a) of the folders and is now on the screen. It makes it clear that the Archipelago consists
of more than the three islands named, that is Sa n Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina: it
comprises other “islands, islets and cays”. And it is “all” these other islands, islets and cays
which also form part of the Archipelago ove r which Colombia’s sovereignty is so fully
recognized by Nicaragua.
⎯ The third part of Article I deals with the speci al situation of three of the Archipelago’s cays ⎯
Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana. It says that those three cays “are not considered to be
included in this Treaty, sovereignty over which is in dispute between Colombia and the United
States”. Nicaragua argues that it means that these three cays do not form part of the
Archipelago of San Andrés. But on the contrary, the provision is only explicable on the basis
that they are part of the Archipelago: only on that basis was it necessary to put them beyond
the reach of the principal “recognition of sovere ignty” provision in ArticleI to which they
would otherwise be subject. Given that the Ar chipelago was one element in the dispute which
the Parties were resolving, there was no reas on for including a provision regarding the three
cays if they were not part of the Archipelago.
19. ArticleI also necessarily implies that Nicaragua itself did not have any claim to
sovereignty over the three cays. Nicaragua accepte d that sovereignty over them “is in dispute
between Colombia and the United States” ⎯ no mention of any dispute involving any Nicaraguan
claim or right. It is not conceivable that, had Nicaragua had any claim to the three cays, Nicaragua
would have refrained from at least menti oning it. But there was no such mention ⎯ because there
was no such claim. And indeed, over several decades after the Treaty’s entry into force, Nicaragua
never purported to claim any rights over those thre e cays. In fact, the Colombia-United States - 20 -
dispute referred to has now long since been se ttled, as explained in Colombia’s Preliminary
Objections .4
20. In short, as between Colombia and Nicar agua, the position of the three cays was settled
by ArticleI and from then on it has been governed by that provision: the Parties acknowledged
that the cays formed part of the Archipelago, and that Nicaragua had no claim to them.
21. So, Madam President and Members of the Court, that was how the
Esguerra-Bárcenas Treaty settled and governed the dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua over
the whole Archipelago of San Andrés, and the Mosquito Coast.
22. The islands, islets and cays forming the Archipelago of San Andrés which have always
been under Colombia’s sovereignty and jurisdiction, have long been well understood in the region:
they are set out in Colombia’s preliminary objections 5, in the long-repeated form used in the
6
official texts and maps . There is nothing new about that. For instance, in 1896 Colombia’s then
Foreign Minister, JorgeHolguin when referring to the occupation of the Corn Islands by ⎯ as it
happens ⎯ Nicaragua, stated that the Archipelago of San Andrés was formed by three groups of
islands that spread from the coasts of Central Amer ica, facing Nicaragua, to the cay of Serranilla:
the first of these groups being formed by the islands of Providencia and Santa Catalina and the cays
of Roncador, Quitasueño, Serrana, Serranilla a nd BajoNuevo; the second being formed by the
islands of San Andrés and the cays of Albuquerque, Courtown Bank and others of less importance;
and the third by the islands of San Luis de Ma ngle, such as Mangle Grande, Mangle Chico and the
7
cays of Las Perlas .
4POC, pp. 55-56, paras. 1.82-1.88.
5Ibid., p. 25, paras. 1.7-1.9.
6Ibid., Vol. III, Map 4, 4bis, 5, 5bis, 6, 6bis, 7, 7bis, 8, 8bis, 9, 9bis, 10, 10bis, 11, 11bis.
7
The 1896 Report to Congress appears in the Anales Diplomáticos y Consulares de Colombia (Diplomatic and
Consular Records of Colombia), Vol. IV ⎯ 1914, Imprenta Nacional, Bogotá, 1914, p. 719. A translation of the chapter
containing the relevant text has been furnished to the Court’ s Registry. This is a publication in the public domain which
is readily available and may be found on the Internet at
http://www.lablaa.org/blaavirtual/historia/andicoiv/mem1896e.pdf. (the pertinent excerpt),
http://www.lablaa.org/blaavirtual/historia/andicoiv/indice.htm. (the entire text of volume IV).
It is also available in the following libraries: Peace Palace Library, The Hague, Systematic code 452, Request
number P 138; the Library of Congress of the United States of America, LC Classification (Call Number) JX553.A3, LC
Control No. 12027366; and the Library of the United Nati ons Office at Geneva, under Call Number 986.1:327 A532
Stack L, online database: UNOG Catalog 1987-Today, United Nations Office at Geneva Library (pre-1987). - 21 -
1928-1930: The approval and ratification process
23. In Colombia the Treaty was approved by Congress on 17 November 1928, about nine
months after its signature 8.
9
24. In Nicaragua the Treaty was approved on 5April 1930, about two years after its
signature. It was submitted to Congress in Dece mber 1928. The next year the Senate set up a
special Study Commission to examine the Treaty an d make a recommendation to the plenary as to
its approval.
25. Members of Nicaragua’s Government a nd Congress considered it important that a
provision be added fixing the 82º W meridian “as the limit in the dispute with Colombia” 10. Given
that the 1928 text had already been approved by the Colombian Congress, this proposal required
11
further negotiations between Nicaragua and Colombia .
26. Colombia accepted the Nicaraguan proposal , but adding that the provision about the
82ºW meridian being the boundary should be included in the Protocol of Exchange of
12
Ratifications . And this was accepted by Nicaragua.
27. The Nicaraguan Senate’s Study Commission accepted this additional agreed provision ⎯
“understanding that the Archipelago of San Andrés me ntioned in the first clause of the Treaty does
13
not extend west of Greenwich meridian 82” . The Nicaraguan Senate unanimously approved the
treaty on 6March 1930, with the additional provi sion proposed by Nicaragua and agreed with
Colombia.
14
28. A month later the Chamber of Deputies approved the Treaty, along with that addition .
In the congressional approval decree the 82ºW boundary was expressly stated 15. Nicaragua’s
16
President signed the Treaty into law on 5 April 1930 .
POC, pp. 39-40, paras. 1.48-1.50.
Ibid., pp. 40-49, paras. 1.51-1.68.
10
POC, p. 40, para. 1.52.
11
Ibid., pp. 40-41, paras. 1.52-1.58.
12
Ibid., p. 40, para. 1.54.
1Ibid., p. 42, para. 1.59.
1Ibid., p. 48, para. 1.66.
1Ibid., p. 48, para. 1.67.
16
Ibid., p. 49, para. 1.68; Vol. II, Ann. 10, pp. 69-73. - 22 -
29. Nicaragua’s attitude during this approval process is particularly important, since the
adoption of the 82º W meridian as a dividing line was Nicaragua’s own proposal. As it was stated
in the Senate, that proposal was made because it was considered that the “demarcation of the
dividing line of the waters in dispute... was... indispensable for the question to be at once
terminated for ever” . 17
30. The Nicaraguan Foreign Minister similarly expressed before the Senate the view that the
18
question in dispute could only be completely settled if the boundary was fixed .
31. Moreover, when the Foreign Minister t estified before the Senate on 5March 1930, he
referred to the earlier agreement between the Se nate’s Study Commission and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs “to accept the 82º west Greenwich meridian... as the boundary in this dispute
with Colombia” 19, as “the geographical boundary between the archipelagos in dispute” . 20
32. Nicaragua now seeks to avoid these histor ical facts by referring dismissively to
Colombia’s reliance on “words used by some Nicaraguan Senators during the ratification
21
discussions” . But, Madam President and Members of the Court, these are not informal
observations made by peripheral members of a legislative body ⎯ we are talking of formal
ratification debates, and of speeches by Senato rs belonging to the Study Commission and the
Foreign Affairs Commission, in the plenary of the Nicaraguan Senate, dealing specifically with the
inclusion of the 82º W meridian in the Treaty. And we are not just talking of Senators ⎯ we are
talking of what the Foreign Minister of Nicaragua himself officially said, when summoned to the
Senate precisely to explain the scope of the provi sion agreed with Colombia. And the Court has
already treated formal statements by Foreign Mi nisters before Congress as part of a pattern of
conduct on which a State cannot subsequently go back ( Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain
22
on 23 December 1906, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 213) .
17
Ibid., p. 44, para. 1.61.
18Ibid., p. 47, para. 1.63.
19POC, p. 45, para. 1.62.
20Ibid., p. 47, para. 1.63.
21
Written Statement of Nicaragua (WSN), p. 36, para. 1.55; also similarly p. 36, para. 1.56 and p. 37, para. 1.58.
22
In the case concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 the Court included
statements made by the Foreign Minister in a report to th e Assembly among the items which in the Court’s view showed
that Nicaragua had “by express declarat ion and by conduct, recognized the Award as valid and it is no longer open to
Nicaragua to go back upon that recognition and to challenge the validity of the Award”. - 23 -
33. The inclusion of the 82ºW meridian boundary in the Treaty, before it was proposed to
Colombia and considered by the Nicaraguan Cong ress, was analysed carefully by its Foreign
Minister and his advisers, and by the members of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Senate.
The words used by them in the course of the appr oval debates were clearly no accident: they knew
perfectly well what they referred to when using terms such as “boundary between the
23
archipelagoes” and “dividing line of the waters in dispute” .
34. Therefore, Nicaragua ⎯ which itself initiated the proposal to refer to the 82ºW
meridian ⎯ cannot now disown the views then expressed by its own legislative bodies, as well as
by its Foreign Minister, at the very time that its own proposal was being adopted and agreed to by
its own Parliament, Government and President.
35. In short, Madam President and Members of the Court, it is clear from the history of this
matter that the 82º W Meridian was understood by both States as a boundary.
1930: The Protocol of Exchange of Ratifications
36. The agreement on the 82º W meridian was embodied in the 1930 Protocol of Exchange
24
of Ratifications . In that Protocol the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister and the Colombian Minister in
Managua declared “that the Archipelago of San Andrés and Providencia, which is mentioned in the
first clause of the referred to Treaty, does not ex tend west of the 82 Greenwich meridian”. That
formulation was substantially the same as that on the basis of which the Nicaraguan Congress
approved the inclusion of the 82º W meridian as an essential and integral part of the agreement.
37. The Protocol referred to the Treaty as ha ving been concluded “to put an end to the
question pending between both Republics” concerning the Archipelago and the Mosquito Coast, an
outcome which the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister regarded as necessary for the good of both
25
countries . But I draw attention to an important difference between the language used in the
Protocol and the equivalent language in the preamble to the Treaty itself. The two texts are on the
screen, and at tab 8 in the judges’ fo lders. In the Treaty the parties ⎯ before having added the
82º W meridian boundary ⎯ recorded that they were “desirous of putting an end to the territorial
2Ibid., p. 44, para. 1.61; and p. 46, para. 1.63.
24
POC, Vol. II, Ann. 1a, p. 3.
25POC, p. 47, para. 1.63. - 24 -
dispute between them”. In the Protocol they re fer to putting an end to “the question” pending
between them. In other words they “deterritorialized” the nature of their dispute and this is entirely
consistent with the additional maritime scope of their settlement resulting from the Treaty’s
approval process.
38. And that, Madam President, is the crux of the matter. One must ask, what was the
intention of the Parties? And the answer is clear. In agreeing the limit of the archipelago ⎯ a
concept combining seas and islands ⎯ they intentionally gave their agreement a maritime
dimension. Nicaragua, the initiator of the propo sal, knew full well that the meridian agreed upon
was to constitute ⎯ to use their own words ⎯ the “dividing line of the waters” and a “boundary”.
39. Ratification instruments were excha nged and the Treaty entered into force on
5May1930. As from that date the matters falli ng within the scope of the Treaty were clearly
governed by it, and the dispute which had occasione d the conclusion of the Treaty was definitively
settled. And “settled”, Madam President, means “settled”.
40. In Colombia’s official maps the 82º W meridian was always depicted as the boundary
between the two countries, from the year immediatel y following the Treaty’s entry into force, that
is 1931, onwards. Likewise, the 1934 and 1944 offi cial publications of the Colombian Foreign
Affairs Ministry regarding Colombia’s borders, entitled Limits of the Republic of Colombia ,
expressly referred to that meridian as the border between Colombia and Nicaragua 2. Nicaragua
made no reservation or objection to these publica tions which were public knowledge and widely
circulated.
1930-1932: REGISTRATION WITH THE LEAGUE OF N ATIONS
41. Nicaragua not only signed, approved and ratified the Treaty, and then brought it into
force with the exchange of ratifications, but it actually went further. On 16 August 1930 Colombia
registered the Treaty and its associated Protocol of Exchange of Ratifications with the League of
27
Nations . Although that procedure was sufficient for registration, the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister
registered it again, on his own initiative, two years later Nothing could more clearly demonstrate
2POC, pp. 69-70, para.1.115.
27
Ibid., p. 52, para. 1.74.
2Ibid., p. 52, para. 1.75. - 25 -
the commitment of Nicaragua, as well as of Colombia, to the settlement arrived at by the
conclusion of the 1928-1930 Treaty.
1948: S TATUS OF THE 1928-1930 E SGUERRA -B ÁRCENAS T REATY
42. Let me now move on to 1948. By that time both Parties had complied with the Treaty
for nearly 20 years: Nicaragua had raised no objection, no question about the Treaty’s scope or
validity.
43. In April 1948 the Pact of Bogotá was concluded. That treaty ⎯ being both lex posterior
and lex specialis ⎯ governs the Court’s jurisdiction in this case. And ⎯ as Professor Weil will
explain ⎯ its Article VI stipulates that the procedures set out in the Pact, including that of judicial
settlement, do not apply to matters “already settled” between the parties or “governed by...
treaties in force on the date of the conclusion of the [Pact]”.
44. The Court has therefore to put itself in the position of 1948. It is evident that the
Esguerra-Bárcenas Treaty was in force in 1948. Both Parties had consistently conducted
themselves on the basis that that Treaty was in force at that time. If, in 1948, the question had been
asked of Nicaragua whether the Treaty was in for ce, the only conceivable answer would have been
“Yes, of course it is in force” ⎯ for that is the fact of the matter.
45. Nicaragua, on signing and ratifying the Pact of Bogotá entered a reservation. But it had
nothing to do with the Treaty of 1928-1930 29. So Nicaragua was well aware of the possibility of
making a reservation; and Nicaragua knew ⎯ of course ⎯ of the Treaty and its Protocol and knew
that the 82º W meridian limit was depicted as such in Colombia’s official publications and maps,
30
such as that of 1931 ⎯ yet Nicaragua made no reservation in that context. Nothing could show
more clearly Nicaragua’s acceptance in 1948 that the Treaty was in force.
1980 AND 2003: N ICARAGUA ’S UNAVAILING ATTEMPT
TO DISAVOW THE 1928-1930 T REATY SETTLEMENT
46. Let me now “fast forward” another 32 y ears, to 4 February 1980. Nicaragua, by an
outrageous statement of the newly-installed provisi onal revolutionary Junta, unilaterally purported
29
It related instead to the validity of a 1906ard concerning the border with Honduras: POC, p.81,
para. 2.19.
30POC, Vol. III, maps 4 and 4 bis. - 26 -
to declare the Treaty null and void. It was a desperate challenge, devoid of any substance and
lacking any legal effect. It was Nicaragua’s first challenge ever to the Treaty, made half a century
after its entry into force.
47. Madam President, the Court has been here before. In the case concerning the Arbitral
Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 192),
this Court was similarly faced with an attempt by Nicaragua to undo an earlier territorial settlement
with Honduras. That case involved an arbitral award. Nicaragua had recognized the Award as
valid. The Court held that
“it is no longer open to Nicaragua to go back upon that recognition and to challenge
the validity of the Award. Nicaragua’s failure to raise any question with regard to the
validity of the Award for several years after the full terms of the Award had become
known to it further confirms the conclusion at which the Court has arrived.” ( Ibid.,
p. 213.)
In that case it was “several years” ⎯ six, in fact ⎯ which the Court regarded as too late. Even
more so is it too late when, as in the present case, over half a century has elapsed.
48. Nicaragua’s suggestion, after all these years, that it was at the time of the Treaty’s
conclusion effectively deprived of its treaty-making capacity, and its official declaration that it was
only in July 1979, when the revolution succeeded, that it “recovered its national sovereignty . . .” 31
are equally unconvincing and, indeed, utterly preposterous. Following Nicaragua’s reasoning, does
Nicaragua now consider null and void all other Ni caraguan treaties or other international acts,
which pre-date the 1979 “recovery of national sovereignty”? In particular, are the two instruments
on which it has based the jurisdiction of the Court in the present case also null and void, namely, its
optional clause declaration of 1929, which was contemporary with the 1928-1930 Treaty, and the
Pact of Bogotá which it ratified in 1950?
49. No less absurd is the further argument ⎯ advanced for the very first time in its pleadings
in this case ⎯ that the Treaty has been te rminated because Colombia acted in breach of it in 1969.
Nicaragua is thus acknowledging that the Treaty was in force in 1969 (for otherwise there could
have been no breach of it), but more importantly, that it also was in force on 30 April 1948, the
3Nicaragua’s White Paper on the case, Libro Blanco sobre el caso de San Andrés y Providencia , Ministerio de
Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica de Nicaragua, Managua, 4 February 1980, quoted at POC, p. 59, para. 1.94. - 27 -
date of the conclusion of the Pact of Bogotá. As set out in Colombia’s preliminary objections32,
Nicaragua’s assertions in this regard are groundless both in law and in fact.
50. In any event Nicaragua ⎯ again ⎯ raises the argument too late in the day: only in its
Memorial, in April 2003, did Nicaragua “discover” this consequence of a breach alleged to have
occurred over 30years previously. There is no need for Colombia ⎯ or, Colombia respectfully
suggests, the Court ⎯ to waste time over such a manifestly insubstantial argument.
2004: THE ALLEGED “R OUNDS OF N EGOTIATIONS ” TO DEFINE A NEW MARITIME BOUNDARY
BETWEEN C OLOMBIA AND N ICARAGUA
51. In its Written Statement Nicaragua puts forward a new and even more extravagant
assertion3 regarding alleged “rounds of negotiations” to establish a maritime limit different from
the agreed 82º W meridian. Nicaragua seeks to show that the 82º W line is not “settled” but still
under negotiation; and to that end Nicaragua misrepresents Colombia’s position.
52. Colombia totally rejects Nicaragua’s as sertion of continuing negotiations. Since 1930
Colombia has firmly and consistently maintain ed that the issue is “settled”. No boundary
negotiations ever took place thereafter. Moreove r, Nicaragua has itself so stated on several
occasions, both through its highest officials and in its pleadings in the present proceedings. In fact,
one need not go further than the Introduction to its Memorial to find the following admission:
“Colombia for her part has consistently rejected any dialogue on this matter . . .”
53. States regularly hold discussions with their neighbouring countries for the purpose of
promoting co-operation, preventing incidents and taking joint actions of several kinds in the
bordering land or maritime areas. Colombia , which has land boundaries with five States and
maritime boundaries with nine, including Nicaragua, is naturally no exception to this. But such
discussions in no way amount to “rounds of negotiations”.
54. Magnifying a brief encounter requested by the Foreign Minister of Nicaragua ⎯ I repeat,
of Nicaragua ⎯ with his Colombian counterpart, during a recess of a multilateral meeting in 2001,
Nicaragua also says that the latter suggested to his Nicaraguan colleague that “the filing of
3POC, pp. 68-72, paras. 1.112-1.119.
33
WSN, pp. 40-48, paras. 1.67-1.84.
3Memorial of Nicaragua (MN), Introduction, p.9, para. 21. - 28 -
Nicaragua’s Application” i.e., to this Court “b e postponed in order to give an opportunity for
negotiations on the territorial and delimitati on questions pending between their respective
countries” . Nicaragua goes on to say that “the real purpose” of the request was to gain time to
complete the “required” legal and political st eps to withdraw Colombia’s optional clause
declaration 36. All of this is utterly false, and Colombia forcefully rejects it. More to the point, its
premise is wrong: no special internal legal or po litical steps were required for the withdrawal of
Colombia’s optional clause declaration.
55. Also, Nicaragua fails to mention that any delay in filing the Application was due to its
own budget constraints, not to any request by Co lombia. As Nicaragua’s President and Foreign
37
Minister publicly stated , the budget provision to allow the Application to be filed was only made
in late 2001: the Application was eventually filed in December that year.
56. Nicaragua’s assertions are supported, it is claimed, by self-serving affidavits made by
Nicaraguan officials years after the alleged facts ⎯ one of them 26years later ⎯ and in the
aftermath of the filing of Colombia’s Preliminar y Objections. In this dubious way Nicaragua
tries ⎯ but in vain ⎯ to show that negotiations took place on the matters already settled by the
1928-1930 Treaty.
57. In this respect, it may be recalled that in a recent Judgment ( Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo (Demo cratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of
19December2005), the Court reaffirmed the scant evidentiary value of this type of material.
Indeed, in assessing an affidavit by a member of th e military of one of the Parties in that case,
prepared “in view of the forthcoming case before” (ibid., para. 65; para. 129) the Court, the Court
recalled that “it has elsewhere observed that a me mber of the government of a State engaged in
litigation before this Court... ‘will probably tend to identify himself with the interests of his
country’(Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
35
WSN, pp. 128-129, paras. 3.95-3.96.
3Ibid., p.129, para. 3.97.
3See press statements by Nicaraguan President, Arnoldo Aleman, and Foreign Minister, Francisco Aguirre in
October 2001, in “Lista demanda contra Co lombia: Canciller Aguirre afirma que se rá introducida en La Haya a finales
de este año” (Suit against Colombia ready: Foreign Minister Aguirre states that it will be filed at The Hague by year’s
end), La Prensa (newspaper), Ed. No2.2516, Managua, Tuesday, 9 October 2001. Found at
http://www.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2001/octubre/09/politica/politica-20… - 29 -
States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 43, para. 70)”. The Court added that
“while in no way impugning the honour or veracity” of such a person, the Court should “treat such
evidence with great reserve” (loc. cit., para. 65).
58. Likewise, with regard to another affidav it rendered by a high government official of a
Party in that same case, the Court noted that “[w] hile a notarized affidavit is entitled to a certain
respect, the Court must observe that it is provided by a party in the case and provides at best
indirect ‘information’ that is unverified” (ibid., para. 129).
59. Madam President and Members of the Court, this is what the case raised by Nicaragua is
truly about: an attempt to ignore a bilateral treat y, valid and in force for over 75years; and an
attempt to institute proceedings on settled matters that Colombia has not consented to submit to the
Court.
60. Nicaragua’s Written Statement provides no grounds for concluding that the matters
which were in express terms dealt with in the Esguerra-Bárcenas Treaty were other than validly
settled, once and for all, by that Treaty . Furthermore, these matters have never ceased to be
governed by that Treaty. Given the provisions of the Pact of Bogotá, and both the terms and timely
withdrawal of Colombia’s optional clause declaratio n, Colombia submits that the Court is without
jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the matters which Nicaragua seeks to place before the Court.
61. Madam President and Members of the Cour t, I thank you for the patience and courtesy
with which you have listened to my statement on behalf of the Republic of Colombia. Might I
invite you, Madam President, now to call upon Prof essor Prosper Weil to continue the presentation
of Colombia’s arguments, unless, of course, you were to think that this might be a convenient
moment for a short recess.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir Arthur. We will call Professor Weil and perhaps he
might be, in turn, ready for a pause after about 15 or 20 minutes.
Oui, si vous voulez commencer maintenant et peut-être après quinze ou vingt minutes, vous
ferez une pause.
M.WEIL: Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, permettez-moi de dire à la Cour
combien je me sens honoré de prendre la parole devant elle pour exposer la position de la - 30 -
Colombie. Permettez-moi aussi d’exprimer au Gouvernement co lombien ma gratitude pour la
confiance qu’il me témoigne en m’associant à la défense de ses droits.
1. Madame le président, à l’appui de sa demande, le Nicaragua invoque deuxtitres de
juridiction: l’articleXXXI du pacte de Bogotá et les déclarations facultatives d’acceptation de la
juridiction obligatoire de la Cour déposées par le Nicaragua en 1929 et la Colombie en 1937. Ces
deuxtitres de juridiction, le Nicaragua les met su r le même plan; il n’établit entre eux aucune
38
hiérarchie .
2. Cette thèse du double degré de juridiction, le Nicaragua l’avait déjà soutenue il y a
quelques années face au Honduras dans l’affaire des Actions armées frontalières et
transfrontalières (Nicaragua c. Ho nduras) (compétence et recevab ilité, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1988,
p.82, par.26), et la réponse de la Cour avait été ferme, claire, sans é quivoque: «[L]es relations
entre les Etats parties au pacte de Bogot á sont régies par ce seul pacte…» ( Ibid., p.82, par.27.)
avait-elle affirmé. La déclaration facultative de l’article 36, paragraphe 2, avait-elle expliqué, a été
«incorporée au pacte de Bogotá en tant qu’artic le XXXI. Dès lors elle ne saurait être
modifiée que selon les règles fixées par le pacte lui-même. Or l’articleXXXI
n’envisage à aucun moment que l’engagement pris par les parties au pacte puisse être
amendé par voie de déclaration unilatérale…» (Ibid., p. 84, par. 34.)
La Cour posait ainsi le principe de la prim auté du titre de juridiction du pacte de Bogotá ⎯
instrument complémentaire de l’Organisation des Etats américains, comme l’indique son article 26,
et pilier fondamental de cette organisation ⎯ sur le titre de juridiction de l’article 36, paragraphe 2,
du Statut. Cette primauté du pacte de Bogotá a été analysée de manière lumineuse par
EduardoJiménez de Aréchaga dans une étude intitulée The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice under the Pact of Bogotá and the Optional Clause . L’ancien et très
regretté président de la Cour a montré dans cette étude qu’en raison des liens historiques et
culturels qui les unissent les Etats latino-américains parties au pacte de Bogotá ont reconnu la
juridiction obligatoire de la Cour d’une manière plus forte ⎯ on much stronger terms, a-t-il écrit⎯
que celle qui résulterait du simple jeu des déclarations optionnelles de l’article 36, paragraphe 2, du
38Requête introductive d’instance Nicaragua, par. 1 ; mémoire du Nicaragua, p.1-2, par.3; observations
écrites du Nicaragua, p. 4, par. 8 ; et p. 141, par. 1. - 31 -
Statut . Entre les Etats parties au pacte de Bogotá, a-t-il expliqué, l’articleXXXI du pacte crée
une véritable treaty relationship ⎯ un lien contractuel qui «absorbe» (c’est le mot qu’il emploie) le
lien plus lâche né des déclarations optionnelles.
3. Madame le président, dans l’affaire des Actions armées, la Cour a décidé que le titre de
juridiction tiré du pacte de Bogotá de 1948 prévaut sur les déclarations optionnelles postérieures.
A plus forte raison, dans notre affaire, le titre de juridiction tiré du pacte de Bogotá prévaut-il sur le
titre de juridiction antérieur qui résulte des déclarations d’acceptation du Nicaragua de 1929 et de
la Colombie de 1937.
4. La situation juridique dans notre affaire est en conséquence la suivante. Lorsque le
6décembre2001, le Nicaragua a déposé sa requête introductive d’instance, les Parties n’étaient
plus liées par des déclarations facultatives de l’article36 du Statut, pour une raison très simple,
c’est que la Colombie avait retiré sa déclaration la veille, le 5décembre, avec effet immédiat (la
note colombienne du 5 décembre est reproduite sous les onglets 12 et 13 du dossier que nous avons
préparé à l’intention des membres de la Cour). Seules faisaient droit entre les Parties le
6 décembre 2001, jour où le Nicaragua a déposé sa requête, les dispositions pertinentes du pacte de
Bogotá. Mais même si le 6 décembre 2001 les Par ties avaient encore été liées par des déclarations
facultatives de l’article 36 du Statut ⎯ ce qui, je le répète, n’est pas le cas ⎯ ce serait quand même
la lex à la fois specialis et posterior du pacte de Bogotá qui ferait droit dans notre affaire. En un
mot, Madame le président, c’est le pacte de Bogotá qui constitue le titre de juridiction de la Cour
dans notre affaire, et c’est donc dans le cadre et en application des dispositions pertinentes du
pacte de Bogotá que la Cour doit établir et exercer sa compétence.
Souhaitez-vous que je m’arrête maintenant ou que je continue encore un petit peu ?
The PRESIDENT: Si vous voulez continuer peut-être pour 10 minutes.
39«[T]he Latin-American States which have accepted the Pact of Bogotá have estab lished, in their mutual
relations, and in view of the close historical and cultural ti es between them, the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court on
much stronger terms than those resulting from the network of de clarations made under Article 36 (2) of the Statute.» In
Y. Dinstein (ed.), International Law at a Time of Perplexity. Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne, Kluwer, 1989, p. 355
et suiv. - 32 -
M. WEIL :
5. Madame le président, en juillet 2003, la Colombie a présenté deux exceptions
préliminaires. Par la première, elle demande à la Cour de dire et juger qu’en vertu des dispositions
du pacte de Bogotá sur la base desquelles elle doi t établir et exercer sa compétence dans notre
affaire elle est «incompétente pour juger le différend» et doit déclarer le différend «terminé». C’est
à cette exception que sera consacré mon exposé.
6. Une question surgit alors immédiatement : Quelles sont, parmi les dispositions du pacte de
Bogotá, celles qui font droit dans la présente af faire? Pour le Nicaragua une seule, une seule
disposition est à prendre en considération, celle de l’articleXXXI, qui reprend les termes de
40
l’article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut de la Cour . Madame le président, cette lecture réductrice du
pacte, n’est pas compatible avec son article II, qui dispose que, «au cas où surgirait, entre deux ou
plusieurs signataires, un différend…, les parties s’engagent à employer les procédures établies
dans ce traité sous la forme et dans les conditions prévues aux articles suivants …» 41 ⎯ «aux
articles suivants», et non pas, comme voudrait le lire le Nicaragua, «à l’articleXXXI», au seul
articleXXXI. Cette lecture réductrice du pacte ramenée à un seul article, la Cour l’a condamnée
dans son arrêt de 1988 en l’affaire des Actions armées, elle a observé que «[c]ertaines dispositions
du traité restreignent par ailleurs la portée de l’engagement pris» ( Actions armées frontalières et
transfrontalières (Nicaragua c. Honduras), compét ence et recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1988 ,
p. 84-85, par. 35) ⎯ «certaines dispositions», au pluriel, pas seulement l’article XXXI. Ainsi, écrit
la Cour dans le texte français qui fait foi de l’arrêt,
«[c]es procédures [prévues au pacte] ne s’appliqueront pas …
«aux questions déjà réglées au moyen d’une entente entre les parties, ou
d’une décision arbitrale, ou d’une décision d’un tribunal international, ni
à celles régies par des accords ou traités en vigueur à la date de la
signature du présent pacte»»,
c’est-à-dire en vigueur au 30 avril 1948. L’artic le XXXIII du pacte précise par ailleurs que, «[a]u
cas où les parties ne se mettraient pas d’accord sur la compétence de la Cour au sujet du litige, la
40
Requête introductive d’instance, par.1; mémoire du Nicaragua, p.1-2, par.3; observations écrites du
Nicaragua, p. 4, par. 8.
41Les italiques sont de nous. - 33 -
Cour elle-même décidera au préalable [shall first decide, decidirá previamente] de cette question».
Et l’article XXXIV ajoute que, «[s]i pour les motifs indiqués aux articles V, VI et VII de ce traité,
la Cour se déclarait incompétente pour juger le différend, celui-ci sera déclaré terminé» (such
controversy shall be declared ended, se declarará terminada la controversia).
7. Madame le président, comme nous l’avons indiqué dans nos écritures 42, l’un des objectifs
du pacte de Bogotá a été de décourager toute te ntative d’un gouvernement partie au pacte de
rouvrir un différend auquel une solution aurait été précédemment apportée par un traité ou par une
sentence judiciaire ou arbitrale. L’article XXXIV du pacte ⎯qui, je le répète, dispose que si la
Cour se déclare incompétente pour juger le différend, celui-ci sera déclaré terminé ⎯ donne effet
au principe, énoncé à l’articleVI du pacte, de l’ intangibilité du règlement apporté à un différend
par la voie conventionnelle ou par la voie judiciaire ou arbitrale, en mettant ce règlement à l’abri de
toute tentative ou de toute tentation de s’en échappe r. Les déclarations que nous avons citées dans
nos exceptions des représentants du Pérou, du Chili et de Cuba au cours de la négociation du pacte
⎯ celles, notamment, du Péruvien Victor Belaúnde ⎯ sont significatives quant à l’objet et au but
de ces dispositions clés du pacte que sont ses articles VI et XXXIV. Un différend réglé est un
différend réglé, un différend clos est un différe nd clos, et les mécanismes de règlement des
différends institués par le pacte ne peuvent pas et ne doivent pas servir à rouvrir une querelle close
et réglée : tel est le sens de ces dispositions, qui s ont au cŒur même du pacte de Bogotá. La Cour
s’opposera ⎯nous en sommes confiants ⎯ à ce que les mécanismes de règlement pacifique du
pacte de Bogotá soient utilisés aujourd’hui, pour ro uvrir un différend qui a été «réglé» par le traité
de 1928 et qui depuis lors, depuis trois quarts de siècle est régi par ce traité.
8. Madame le président, je diviserai mon exposé en trois parties :
⎯ Premièrement : le différend soumis à la Cour par le Nicaragua en2001 sur la question de la
souveraineté sur les territoires insulaires et la détermination des frontières maritimes porte sur
des questions qui sont «déjà réglées au moyen d’une entente entre les parties» et qui sont
«régies par des accords ou traités en vigueur à la date de la signature» du pacte de Bogotá, à
42
Exceptions préliminaires, p. 76 et suiv., par. 2.10 et suiv. - 34 -
savoir le traité Esguerra-Bárcenas de 1928 ec son protocole d’échange des ratifications
de 1930.
⎯ Deuxièmement : en conséquence, conformément aux articles VI et XXXIV du pacte de Bogotá,
la procédure judiciaire ne peut pas «s’appliquer» (may not be appliedtampoco podrán
aplicarse), la Cour doit se déclarer «incompétente pour juger le différend» (without jurisdiction
to hear the controversy ; incompetente para conocer de la controversia), et elle doit déclarer le
différend «terminé» (such controve rsy shall be declared ense declarará terminada la
controversia).
⎯ Troisièmement, et enfin : c’est au présent stade des exceptions préliminaires que la Cour a
compétence pour faire cette déclaration et qu’elle est tenue de la faire.
Souhaitez-vous, Madame le président…
The PRESIDENT: Yes, this could be conveni ent… Je vous remercie. Nous faisons une
petite pause café et nous serons avec vous dans 5 à 7 minutes.
M. WEIL : Merci.
The PRESIDENT: Merci bien. The Court now rises.
The Court adjourned from 11.45 a.m. to noon.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Monsieur Weil, vous avez la parole.
M. WEIL : Merci, Madame le président.
A. LE DIFFEREND SOUMIS A LA C OUR PAR LE N ICARAGUA PORTE SUR DES «QUESTIONS DEJA
REGLEES AU MOYEN D ’UNE ENTENTE ENTRE LES PARTIES »ET QUI SONT «REGIES
PAR DES ACCORDS OU TRAITES EN VIGUEUR A LA DATE DE LA SIGNATURE »
DU P ACTE DE B OGOTA
Le règlement du différend par le traité Esguerra-Bárcenas de 1928 et son protocole
d’échange des ratifications de 1930
9. Madame le président, sir Arthur Watts vient de rappeler comment les divergences
apparues entre les deux pays au sujet de la côte de Mosquitos, des îles Mangles (ou Corn) et de
l’archipel de San Andrés ont été résolues par le tr aité du 24 mars 1928. Par ce traité, le Nicaragua - 35 -
a, je le rappelle, reconnu explicitement «la pleine et entière souveraineté» de la Colombie sur les
îles de San Andrés, Providencia, Santa Catalina et su r toutes les autres îles, cayes et îlots qui font
partie de l’archipel.
10. C’est, il faut le rappeler, au cours de l’examen du traité par le Gouvernement du
Nicaragua et la commission des affaires étrangères du Sénat nicaraguayen qu’était apparue l’idée
que pour régler le problème définitivement ⎯ para siempre ⎯ il était nécessaire de prolonger le
règlement territorial par un règlement maritime. Sans une disposition destinée à établir «la limite
géographique entre les archipels disputés» ⎯ el limite geográfico entre los archipiélagos en
disputa ⎯, avait expliqué le ministre nicaraguayen d es affaires étrangères, le conflit ne serait pas
entièrement terminé : une limite entre los archipiélagos, une frontière entre des archipels, Madame
le président, peut-elle être autre chose qu’une li mite en mer, une frontière maritime? La
proposition du Nicaragua avait été acceptée par la Colombie; toutefois, étant donné que la
ratification du traité avait déjà été votée par le Congrès colombien, le gouvernement de Bogotá
avait demandé que le règlement maritime fû t repris dans le protocole d’échange des
ratifications ⎯ ce qui fut fait.
11. Madame le président, c’est, je le répète , à l’initiative du Nicaragua que la disposition
destinée à faire du méridien de 82° la línea divisoria de las aguas en disputa ⎯ en clair: la
frontière maritime ⎯ a été introduite dans le protocole d’éch ange des ratifications de 1930. C’est
le Nicaragua qui a demandé cette adjonction, une adjonction que la Colombie a acceptée. De cela
les écritures nicaraguayennes ne font pas mystère 43.
12. Le traité une fois approuvé par le Congrès du Nicaragua, la limite du méridien de 82° fut
incorporée au protocole de ratification de 1930 ; et c’est accompagné de ce protocole que le traité
44
sera publié dans les Journaux officiels des deux pays , enregistré à la demande de la Colombie
auprès de la Société des Nations en 1930, publié au Recueil des traités de la Société des Nations 45,
et enfin enregistré une nouvelle fois auprès de la Société des Nations, à la demande du Nicaragua
43
«[T]hat restricted the Archipelago of San Andrés to areas East of the 82°meridian of longitude West»,
mémoire du Nicaragua, p. 149, par. 2.193. Cf. p. 146 et suiv., par. 2.189 et suiv.
44
Exceptions préliminaires, p. 51, par. 1.73.
45Op. cit., p. 52, par. 1.74. - 36 -
cette fois-ci, en1932. Le protocole d’échange des ratifications, avec sa référence explicite au
méridien de 82°, est ⎯ le Nicaragua le reconnaît ⎯ partie intégrante du traité.
13. En résumé, Madame le président, Messieurs les juges: c’est à la suite d’une initiative
nicaraguayenne ⎯ pas colombienne ⎯, et au cours du processus de ratification à Managua ⎯ pas
à Bogotá ⎯, que l’idée apparut et fut débattue, avant d’être soumise à la Colombie, qui l’accepta,
de compléter l’arrangement territorial par un arrangement maritime sans lequel la question des
limites n’aurait pas été en tièrement réglée et sans lequel le germe aurait été semé de nouveaux
conflits. Prétendre, comme le fait le Nicaragua da ns son mémoire, que le traité de1928/1930 ne
46
régit pas les espaces maritimes , prétendre cela est une négation de l’évidence.
La composante maritime du règlement de 1928/1930 : le méridien de 82°,
frontière maritime
14. Madame le président, le Nicaragua a dépl oyé de formidables efforts dans ses écritures
pour réduire le méridien de82° à une ligne d’a ttribution de souveraineté sur des îles, sur des
territoires, et pour lui dénier le caractèr e de frontière maritime: «The Treaty ⎯écrit-il en toutes
lettres ⎯ simply recognizes sovereignty over territo ry and no mention is made of maritime
47
delimitation.» Le Nicaragua voudrait convaincre la C our que le règlement de1928/1930 est de
caractère terrestre, qu’il n’a pas de portée maritime et qu’en conséquence il appartient à la Cour de
procéder à la délimitation en faisant appli cation du droit régissant la délimitation maritime
aujourd’hui. Ce thème est repris encore et encore par le Nicaragua, indéfiniment 48.
15. Madame le président, les échanges diploma tiques qui ont précédé la conclusion du traité
Esguerra-Bárcenas et les débats pa rlementaires qui ont conduit à sa ratification dans les deux pays
ne laissent place à aucun doute: par leurs accords de 1928/1930 le Nicaragua et la Colombie ont
entendu mettre fin définitivement et complètement à leur conflit, sur mer autant que sur terre. La
fixation de la limite maritime au méridien de 82° constituait un élément fondamental, une
46
Mémoire du Nicaragua, p. 175, par. 2.249 et p. 181, par. 2.263.
47Observations écrites du Nicaragua, p. 34, par. 1.50.
48Mémoire du Nicaragua, p.175, par.2.249; p. 181, par.2. 23; p.185 et suiv., par. 3.1 et suiv.; observations
écrites du Nicaragua, p. 33, par.1.46 et 1.48 ; p. 34, par. 1.50 ; p. 35, par. 1.54 ; p. 48, par. 1.86 ; p. 67, par. 2.41-2.42 ;
p. 69, par. 2.44. - 37 -
composante essentielle, de la solu tion d’ensemble au même titre, et sur le même pied, que le
règlement territorial.
16. Comme nous l’avons relevé da ns nos exceptions préliminaires 49, un an à peine après
l’entrée en vigueur du traité, en1931, le méridien de 82° a été représenté sur la carte officielle
colombienne intitulée Mapa de la República de Colombia , actuellement sur l’écran. Dans l’angle
droit en haut de la carte il y a un encart intitulé Cartela del Archipielago de SanAndrés y
Providencia perteneciente a la República de Colombia ⎯je ne le vois pas ici mais il est sur la
carte ⎯ (la carte et son encart figurent sous le numé ro10 du dossier de la Cour). La Cour
constatera que l’archipel défini comme perteneciente a la República de Colombia comprend, outre
les îles de Providencia, San Andrés et Santa Cata lina, les cayes de Quitasueño, Serrana, Serranilla,
Roncador, Bajo Nuevo, Albuquerque et Est-Sud-Es t. La limite de l’archipel est constituée ⎯ je le
vois ici aussi ⎯ par le Meridiano 82° al W. de Greenwich . Sur la gauche de cette mention vous
pouvez lire en lettres majuscules les mots República de Nicaragua , ce qui implique que les îles,
îlots et cayes, ainsi que les espaces maritimes, à droite de la ligne, c’est-à-dire à l’est, font partie du
territoire colombien.
17. C’est postérieurement à la publication de cette carte colombienne ⎯ une carte officielle,
je le répète ⎯ que le 25mai 1932 le Nicaragua demanda l’ enregistrement du traité de1928 et de
l’acte de ratification de 1930 auprès du Secrétariat de la Société des Nations.
18. La carte officielle colombienne de 1931 allait être suivie de nombreuses, de très
nombreuses autres cartes, qui décriront elles aussi le méridien de 82° comme la frontière maritime
et territoriale entre les deuxpays. La Cour en trouvera des exemples sous l’onglet11 du dossier
que nous avons eu l’honneur de lui remettre. Madame le président, si ces cartes officielles
colombiennes, qui s’étendent sur près d’un demi-siècle ⎯ et dont le Nicaragua reconnaît dans ses
observations écrites avoir eu connaissance 50 ⎯, avaient contredit ou mal interprété le traité
de 1928/1930, le Gouvernement du Nicaragua aurait-il gardé le silence ?
19. Aucun doute n’est permis, je le répète : c’est comme une frontière maritime que les
parties au traité de1928/1930 ont conçu le méridien de 82°. C’est en application de ce traité, et
16
Exceptions préliminaires de la Colombie, p. 18, par. 46 ; p. 57-8, par. 1.92 ; p. 69, par. 1.115 ; p. 94, par. 2.47.
50Observations écrites du Nicaragua, p. 75, par. 2.55. - 38 -
conformément à ses dispositions, que la Colombie a exercé de manière constante et pacifique ses
droits sur les espaces maritimes relevant de l’ar chipel à l’est du méridien de82°. C’est en
application de ce traité, et conf ormément à ses dispositions, que la Colombie a protesté en1969
contre l’octroi par le Nicaragua de concessions pétrolières à l’est du méridien. Et lorsque, au cours
des débats de ratification à Managua, on se référa à une démarcation de la ligne divisoire des eaux,
à une limite entre les archipels (una demarcacion de la linea divisoria de las aguas, el limite entre
los archipiélagos), à quoi donc les autorités nicaraguayennes au raient-elles pu penser si ce n’est à
une frontière maritime? Madame le président , lorsque dans un traité deux gouvernements se
réfèrent à un méridien qui passe en mer, entre le territoire de l’un des Etats et le territoire de l’autre,
et lorsque ce méridien est décrit comme la «ligne divisoire des eaux», de quoi donc pourrait-il
s’agir si ce n’est d’une limite maritime? Le Nicaragua s’appuie sur l’affaire de la Frontière
maritime entre la Guinée et la Guinée-Bissau dans laquelle le tribunal arbitral avait conclu que
«tout indique que ces deux Etats [la France et le Portugal] n’ont pas entendu établir une frontière
51
maritime générale entre leurs possessions de Guinée» . Dans notre affaire, au contraire, tout
indique que la Colombie et le Nicaragua ont entendu établir la linea divisoria de las aguas, le límite
entre los archipiélagos ⎯ en d’autres termes et en clair : la frontière maritime entre les deux pays.
20. Madame le président, nos adversaires obj ectent que c’est une «absurdité historique»
⎯c’est le mot qu’ils emploient: a historical absurdity ⎯ de prétendre qu’en1930, quinzeans
avant la proclamation Truman de 1945, le Nicar agua et la Colombie auraient revendiqué des
limites maritimes situées, écrivent-ils, «à près de 60 milles marins du territoire le plus proche du
52
Nicaragua et à des douzaines de milles marins de l’archipel de San Andrés» . Je remarquerai au
passage, mais sans insister là-dessus, que la distan ce entre le méridien de 82° et l’île la plus
occidentale de l’archipel de San Andrés ne dépasse pas 9 milles marins. Ceci est un détail. Cela
dit, pour faire justice de l’argum ent du Nicaragua, il me suffira de me référer aux passages bien
connus de l’avis consultatif de 1971 relatif à la Namibie et de l’arrêt de 1978 en l’affaire du Plateau
continental de la mer Egée.
51
Mémoire du Nicaragua, p. 171, par. 2.243.
52Observations écrites du Nicaragua, p. 34, par. 1.51. - 39 -
21. Dans l’avis relatif à la Namibie, la Cour a déclaré ⎯ et vous me pardonnerez, Madame le
président, de citer le passage un peu longuement mais il mérite d’être cité :
«Sans oublier la nécessité primordiale d’interpréter un instrument donné
conformément aux intentions qu’ont eues les parties lors de sa conclusion, la Cour doit
tenir compte de ce que les notions consacrées [par cet instrument] … n’étaient pas
statiques mais par définition évolutives… On doit donc admettre que les parties … les
ont acceptées comme telles... De plus, tout instrument international doit être interprété
et appliqué dans le cadre de l’ensemble du système juridique en vigueur au moment où
l’interprétation a lieu… Dans ce dom aine comme dans les autres, le corpus juris
gentium s’est beaucoup enrichi et, pour pouvoi r s’acquitter fidèlement de ses
fonctions, la Cour ne peut l’ignorer.» ( Conséquences juridiques pour les Etats de la
présence continue de l’Afrique du Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain) nonobstant la
résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité , avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1971,
p. 31-32, par. 53.)
22. Quant à l’arrêt relatif à la Mer Egée, on y lit que lorsqu’un instrument juridique se réfère
à une notion générique (un generic term, dans le texte anglais, qui fait foi, de l’arrêt) ⎯ il s’agissait
en l’espèce de la notion et du terme de statut territorial ⎯, «il faut nécessairement présumer que
son sens était censé évoluer avec le droit et revêtir à tout moment la signification que pourraient lui
donner les règles en vigueur» ( Plateau continental de la mer Egée (Grèce c.Turquie), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1978, p. 32, par. 77 ; p. 33, par. 78).
23. C’est dire que lorsque deux Etats procèdent à une délimitation maritime, leur accord doit
être interprété et appliqué à la lumière de l’évol ution du droit international et en tenant compte de
cette évolution. Comme l’a écrit sir Ian Sinclair dans son o uvrage souvent cité The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, l’évolution et le développement du droit international peuvent
exercer une influence décisive sur le sens à donne r à des expressions qui se réfèrent à des notions
évolutives, tels les concepts de «mer territoriale» ou de «plateau continental» 5. A moins que les
parties n’aient manifesté une intention contraire, ces expressions peuvent être interprétées «par
référence au droit international en vigueur au moment de l’interprétation» (by reference to
54
international law in force at the time of the interpretation) .
24. Peut-être, Madame le président, c’est possi ble, peut-être le tracé du méridien de 82°ne
coïncide–t-il pas avec le tracé de la frontière ma ritime auquel conduirait l’application des principes
et règles du droit de la délimitation maritim e d’aujourd’hui. Et alors ? So what ?, ai-je envie de
53 e
Manchester University Press, 2 éd., 1984, p. 139.
54Ian Sinclair, op. cit., p. 139. - 40 -
dire. Il est à peine besoin de rappeler que le tracé d’une frontière, qu’il s’agisse d’une frontière
maritime ou d’une frontière terrestre, ne devient pas caduc pour la simple raison que la pratique
conventionnelle ou la jurisprudence aurait évolué depuis qu’il a été défini. Serait-il concevable
que, sous le prétexte que le dro it de la délimitation maritime a ch angé entre-temps, qu’il a évolué,
on considère comme caducs tous les accords de délimitation maritime conclus au cours de ces
cinquante dernières années ⎯et plus particulièrement ceux conclus avant les conventions de
Genève de1958 ou la convention de 1982 sur le droit de la mer, ou avant les grands arrêts de la
Cour et les sentences arbitrales qui ont façonné le droit moderne de la délimitation maritime ? On
imagine, Madame le président, le danger qu’ une telle solution présenterait pour la stabilité des
relations internationales. Et comment ne pas songer aussi à la disposition de l’article 62 2) a) de la
convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités qui exprime le principe de droit international
coutumier selon lequel un changeme nt fondamental de circonstan ces ne peut pas être invoqué
comme motif pour mettre fin à un traité ou pour s’en retirer «s’il s’agit d’un traité établissant une
frontière». En un mot, ce n’est pas parce que le droit de la mer et le droit de la délimitation
maritime ont évolué depuis1930 que la línea divisoria de las aguas, la limite entre les archipels,
convenue en 1930 par le Nicaragua et la Colombie, au terme de longues négociations et de débats
parlementaires approfondis, serait à regarder co mme caduque. L’établissement d’une frontière, a
décidé la Cour dans l’affaire Libye/Tchad, a «une existence juridique propre, indépendante du sort
du traité» qui l’a établie. Et la Cour continue : «U ne fois convenue, la frontière demeure, car toute
autre approche priverait d’effet le principe fondamental de la stabilité des frontières, dont la Cour a
souligné à maintes reprises l’importance.» ( Différend territorial (Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne/Tchad), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil1994 , p.37, par.72.) Oui, Madame le président, «la
frontière demeure».
25. Madame le président, des années et des années se sont écoulées sans que le Nicaragua ne
soulève le moindre doute à l’encontre du tra ité de 1928/1930, sans qu’il n’élève la moindre
protestation à l’encontre des nombreuses cartes o fficielles colombiennes qui, à partir de 1931, ont
exprimé graphiquement les solutions convenues par les parties, tant sur mer que sur terre 5. Venir
55
Voir Exceptions préliminaires de la Colombie, p. 18, par. 46 ; p. 57, par. 1.91-1.92 ; p. 69, par. 1.112 et suiv. - 41 -
aujourd’hui, trois quarts de siècle après la conclusion du traité Esguerra-Bárcenas ⎯ trois quarts de
siècle ⎯, remettre en cause le règlement territorial et maritime adopté en1928/1930 «pour
toujours», para siempre, comme il a été dit au cours du débat de ratification à Managua, c’est lire
«toujours» comme signifiant «quelques années»; c’ est méconnaître le pacte de Bogotá; c’est ne
pas tenir compte des préoccupations de stabilité ou de permanence qui sont au cŒur du droit
international tel qu’il s’est forgé au cours des siècles; c’est ne faire aucun cas du principe de
l’inviolabilité des traités ⎯ pacta sunt servanda ; c’est violer le principe selon lequel il faut savoir
mettre un point final à un différend ⎯ ut finis sit litium. Ces maximes et ces principes reflètent des
nécessités sociales fondamentales, communes à tous les systèmes juridiques et à toutes les époques.
Madame le président, près de deuxsiècles d’ex ercice ininterrompu par la Colombie de sa
souveraineté sur l’archipe;l quinzannées de négociations pour résoudre le confli;t
cinquanteannées d’application paisible de la so lution adoptée au terme de ces négociations; et
puis, soudainement, en 1980, une déclaration unilaté rale de nullité dépourvue de toute justification
et de fondement : voilà, résumé en quelques dates, le tableau de l’affaire que le Nicaragua a portée
devant la Cour.
26. Madame le président, si la Colombie reve ndiquait aujourd’hui la souveraineté sur la côte
de Mosquitos ou les îles Mangles, le Nicaragua dirait ⎯et il aurait raison de le dire ⎯ que cette
question est «réglée», settled, resuelta, depuis le traité de 1928/1930, qu’elle est «régie», governed,
regida, par ce traité. En avançant les thèses qu’il avance, le Nicaragua joue avec le feu, puisqu’il
mine les fondements de sa propre souveraineté sur une partie de son propre territoire national.
27. Ce que le Nicaragua de mande à la Cour, Madame le président, c’est de retenir du
règlement de 1928/1930 les éléments favorables au Ni caragua et de rejeter les éléments favorables
à la Colombie. On pense au passage bien connu et souvent cité de l’arrêt dans l’affaire du Temple
de Préah Vihéar dans lequel la Cour a déclaré que «[l]a Thaïlande ne peut aujourd’hui, tout en
continuant à invoquer les bénéfices du règlement et à en jouir, contester qu’elle ait jamais été partie
consentante au règlement» ( Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), fond, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p.32). Le règlement de 1928/1930 c onstitue un tout indivisible, dont le
Nicaragua ne peut prétendre aujourd’hui retenir certaines composantes et en rejeter les autres. - 42 -
28. Madame le président, j’en ai ainsi terminé avec le premier pôle de cette affaire, à savoir
le principe posé à l’article VI du pacte de Bogotá, selon lequel la procédure de règlement judiciaire
prévue par le pacte «ne pourr[a] pas… s’appliq uer…aux questions déjà réglées au moyen d’une
entente entre les parties…ni à celles régies par des accords ou traités en vigueur à la date de la
signature du présent pacte». J’espère, Madame le président, avoir réussi à montrer que le différend
que le Nicaragua a porté devant la Cour en 2001 au sujet du titre sur des territoires insulaires et de
la détermination de frontière maritimes éta it depuis longtemps «déjà réglé», already settledya
resuelto, et régi par des accords en vigueur, et qu’en conséquence les procédures prévues au pacte
de Bogotá ⎯y compris la procédure judiciaire devant la Cour à laquelle le Nicaragua a
recouru ⎯ ne peuvent pas «s’appliquer», may not be applied, tampoco podrán aplicarse. De cette
première constatation découle une seconde, à savoir qu’en applicati on de l’articleXXXIV de ce
même pacte de Bogotá la Cour doit se déclarer «incompétente pour juger le différend» et que
«celui-ci sera déclaré terminé», ended, terminado.
B.L A PROCEDURE JUDICIAIRE NE PEUT PAS «S’APPLIQUER »,LA C OUR DOIT SE DECLARER
« INCOMPETENTE POUR JUGER LE DIFFEREND » ET ELLE DOIT
DECLARER LE DIFFEREND « TERMINE »
29. Madame le président, nous avons montré dans nos écritures 56que l’un des objectifs du
pacte de Bogotá a été d’étouffer dans l’Œuf toute te ntative de recourir aux mécanismes prévus par
ce pacte pour rouvrir un différend auquel une so lution avait été précédemment apportée par un
traité ou par une sentence judiciaire ou arbitrale. Comme les représentants du Pérou, du Chili et de
Cuba l’ont souligné au cours de la négociation du pacte, la fonction stabilisatrice des articlesVI
etXXXIV du pacte aurait été compromise si, pour mettre en mouvement les mécanismes de
règlement institués par le pacte, il avait suffi à une partie de faire revivre un différend auquel une
solution avait été précédemment apportée. C’ est pourquoi il a paru nécessaire d’ajouter aux
mécanismes curatifs destinés à résoudre un conflit dé jà né une disposition de caractère préventif
destinée à décourager toute tentation ou toute te ntative de remettre en cause devant le juge
international un règlement antérieur qui aurait cess é de plaire. Les articles VI et XXXIV du pacte
de Bogotá assurent l’intangibilité du règlement a pporté à un différend par la voie conventionnelle
56
Exceptions préliminaires de la Colombie, p. 76 et suiv., par. 2.10 et suiv. - 43 -
ou par la voie judiciaire ou arbitrale, en mettant ce règlement à l’abri de toute tentative de le
contester. C’est ce qu’explique le commentaire officiel du pacte publié par l’Organisation des
Etats américains dont nous avons reproduit un extrait dans nos exceptions préliminaires . La Cour
n’acceptera pas, nous en formulons l’espoir, que les mécanismes de règlement du pacte de Bogotá
servent à rouvrir aujourd’hui un différend qui a été «terminé», terminado, ended, par la voie
conventionnelle il y a trois quarts de siècle.
30. Le Nicaragua tente de s’évader de cette évidence en soutenant que puisque le différend
actuellement devant la Cour est apparu après1948, après la conclusion du pacte de Bogotá, la
compétence de la Cour n’est pas écartée par l’article VI du pacte et que l’article XXXIV du pacte
58
ne fait pas obligation à la Cour de déclarer le différend «terminé» . Madame le président, ce n’est
pas un différend apparu postérieurement à 1948, ap rès la conclusion du pacte de Bogotá, que le
Nicaragua a porté devant la Cour et qui est au jourd’hui devant la Cour . C’est un différend qui
remontait à1838 et qui avait été «réglé» en tre-temps par le traité Esguerra-Bárcenas
de 1928/1930 ⎯ exactement le même différend ⎯ que le Nicaragua cherche aujourd’hui à rouvrir
devant la Cour. La Cour, nous l’espérons, fera échec à cette tentative de remettre en cause non
seulement les accords de1928/1930 entre la Colomb ie et le Nicaragua, mais aussi, par-delà ces
accords, l’ensemble des mécanismes du pacte de Bogotá auquel de si nombreux Etats sont parties.
31. Madame le président, la Colombie prie r espectueusement la Cour de donner effet à ces
deuxpiliers du pacte de Bogotá que sont ses articlesVI etXXXIV. Déclarer «terminé»,
terminado, ended, ce différend réglé depuis de si longues a nnées et régi par un accord en vigueur,
et refuser qu’il soit aujourd’hui rouvert: c’est là la mission qui incombe à la Cour en vertu des
articles VI et XXXIV du pacte de Bogotá.
57
Exceptions préliminaires de la Colombie, p. 82, par. 2.21.
58Observations écrites du Nicaragua, p. 59-61, par. 2.19-2.25. - 44 -
C. C’EST AU PRESENT STADE DES EXCEPTIONS PRELIMINAIRES QUE LA C OUR PEUT ET DOIT
« SE DECLARER INCOMPETENTE POUR JUGER LE DIFFEREND »ET QU ’ELLE
DOIT DECLARER LE DIFFEREND « TERMINE »
32. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, que c’est maintenant, au présent stade des
exceptions préliminaires, que la Cour a le pouvoir et le devoir de déclarer le différend «terminé»,
cela ressort de l’article 79, alinéa premier, du Règlement de la Cour qui prévoit que :
«Toute exception à la compétence de la Cour ou à la recevabilité de la requête
ou toute autre exception sur laquelle le défendeur dem ande une décision avant que la
procédure sur le fond se poursuive doit être présentée par écrit dès que possible, et au
59
plus tard trois mois après le dépôt du mémoire.»
33. J’ai à peine besoin de rappeler qu’à l’occasi on de la refonte de son Règlement, en 1972,
la Cour a élargi le concept d’exceptions préliminai res. Elle a analysé, en détail, les raisons et
l’objet de cette réforme dans ses arrêts de 1984 et 1986 en l’affaire des Activités militaires au
Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Activités militaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c.
Etats-Unis d’Amérique), compétence et recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984 , p. 425, par.76;
Activités militaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), fond,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 14, p. 29 et suiv., par. 37 et suiv.), et elle est revenue sur ce problème
un peu plus tard, en 1998, dans les affaires Lockerbie (Questions d’interprétation et d’application
de la convention de Montréal de 1971 résultant de l’incident aérien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya
arabe libyenne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), excep tions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998,
p.131 et suiv., par.46 et suiv.; Questions d’interprétation et d’ application de la convention de
Montréal de 1971 résultant de l’incident aérien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c.
Royaume-Uni), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 26 et suiv., par. 47 et suiv.).
Comme la Cour l’a observé dans ces dernières affaires, le champ d’application ratione materiae de
l’article79 n’est plus limité aujourd’hui aux seu les exceptions d’incompétence ou d’irrecevabilité
mais couvre toute exception dont l’objet est «d’empêcher in limine tout examen de l’affaire au
fond».
34. Que c’est maintenant, au stade des exceptions préliminaires, que la Cour peut et doit se
déclarer incompétente pour juger le différend et qu’elle doit déclarer le différend «terminé», cela
ressort du pacte de Bogotá, dont l’articleXXXIII dispose que: «Au cas où les parties ne se
59
Les italiques sont de nous. - 45 -
mettraient pas d’accord sur la compétence de la Cour au sujet du litige, la Cour elle-même décidera
au préalable de cette question.»
«Au préalable», selon la version française du pacte ; first, selon la version anglaise du pacte ;
previamente, selon la version espagnole du pacte ⎯autrement dit, à titre préliminaire, avant tout
examen de l’affaire au fond.
35. Madame le président, l’exception soulevée par la Colombie consiste à prier la Cour,
respectueusement, de constater, comme le lui dema nde et l’y habilite le pacte de Bogotá, que les
questions soulevées par la requête du Nicaragua s ont «déjà réglées au moyen d’une entente entre
les Parties», qu’elles sont «régies par des accords ou traités en vigueur à la date de la signature
du… pacte» et, en conséquence, de déclarer le différend «terminé», ende d. Cette exception a
«pour objet d’empêcher in limine tout examen de l’affaire au fond» : ce sont là, je le rappelle, les
expressions de la Cour elle-même. Cette ex ception, que nous avons présentée, possède un
caractère exclusivement préliminaire.
* *
36. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, en application de l’article XXXIII du pacte de
Bogotá et de l’article 79 du Règlement de la Cour , la Colombie prie respectueusement la Cour de
décider «au préalable», «avant que la procédure sur le fond se poursuive» ⎯ c’est-à-dire au présent
stade des exceptions préliminaires ⎯ que, puisque la question soumi se à la Cour par le Nicaragua
est «déjà réglée au moyen d’une entente entre les Pa rties» et qu’elle est «régie par des accords ou
traités en vigueur à la date de la signature» du pacte de Bogotá, les procédures prévues par ce pacte
«ne pourront [pas]… s’appliquer» (articleVI du pacte), et qu’en conséquence la Cour doit se
déclarer «incompétente pour juger le différe nd» et doit déclarer le différend «terminé»
(article XXXIV du pacte).
* *
Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, je vous prie de vouloir bien excuser la longueur
de mes développements, et je vous remercie de votre attention. Je vous prie, Madame le président, - 46 -
de donner la parole à M.Schwebel, dont l’interv ention terminera la présentation colombienne du
premier tour. Merci, Madame le président.
The PRESIDENT : Thank you, Professor Weil. We now call Mr. Schwebel to the Bar.
Mr. SCHWEBEL:
1. Madam President and Members of the Cour t, I appreciate the honour of representing the
Government of the Republic of Colombia and the privilege of addressing the Court on its behalf.
My task is to show that the Court is without jurisdiction under the optional clause of its Statute to
entertain the claims advanced by the Government of Nicaragua.
B ECAUSE “THE CONTROVERSY SHALL BE DECLARED ENDED ”
THERE IS NO SUBSISTING DISPUTE
2. A paramount submission of Colombia is that, pursuant to the terms of the Pact of Bogotá,
the Court is bound to declare the dispute “ended”. It follows that there is no subsisting dispute to
which the Court’s jurisdiction under the optional clause can attach.
3. As the Court declared in Border and Transborder Armed Actions, where a party relies on
the Pact of Bogotá as a title of jurisdiction, and also invokes declarations under the optional clause,
the Pact, “in relations between the States parties to the Pact... is governing” (Border and
Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 82, para. 27). Nicaragua, however, ar gues that, since the Court in that case
declared that jurisdiction afforded by the Pact is “an autonomous commitment” (ibid., p. 85,
para.36), if the Court should declare the contr oversy ended, it is ended “only as concerns the
60
possibility of invoking the Pact as a basis of jurisdiction”
4. Nicaragua’s contention is unpersuasive. The application of the Pact requires the Court to
declare the controversy ended, not only for the pu rposes of the Court’s jurisdiction under the Pact,
but for all purposes.
5. That this is so follows from the terms of the Pact. Article VI specifies that the procedures
of peaceful settlement provided for in the Pact, including recourse to the Court, may not be applied
60
Written Statement of the Government of Nicaragua (WSN), p. 83, para. 2.67. - 47 -
to matters already settled by arrangement between the parties or governed by treaties in force on
the date of the Pact’s conclusion. ArticleXXX III provides that, if the parties fail to agree as to
whether the Court has jurisdiction over the controve rsy, “the Court itself shall first decide that
question.” Now if Nicaragua is correct when it argues that ArticleXXXIV means no more than
that “the controversy is ended only as concerns the possibility of invoking the Pact as a basis of
jurisdiction”, it follows that Article XXXIV of the Pact means no more than does Article XXXIII.
Under Nicaragua’s interpretation, both Articles XXXIII and XXXIV simply import that the Court
may declare itself without jurisdiction under the Pact. Nicaragua’s construction thus renders
Article XXXIV superfluous, because its meaning is found wholly in Article XXXIII.
6. That construction transgresses a cardinal rule of the interpretation of treaties, to which this
Court has lent its authority (Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube, 1927 ,
P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 14 , p. 27; Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, pp. 179, 184; Corfu Channel, Merits, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 24; South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment , I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 319, 335 ff.), namely, that each and
every provision of a treaty should be interpreted to give it meaning and to render it effective.
Accordingly Article XXXIV must be interpreted not as equating with the Court’s power to decide
upon its own jurisdiction affirmed by Article XXXIII but rather as requiring the Court to go further
and, having found itself without jurisdiction to hear the controversy, to declare ⎯ as the terms of
Article XXXIV prescribe ⎯ the controversy to be “ended”.
7. It follows that, once the controversy between the parties has been declared by the Court to
be ended, there is no controve rsy outstanding to which jurisdic tion could attach under any other
title, including that of the declarations of the parties under the optional clause.
8. But in any event, Madam President, Colomb ia maintains that the Court lacks jurisdiction
under the declarations of acceptance of the Court’ s compulsory jurisdiction for two reasons. The
first is that Colombia terminated its 1937 declar ation of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction with
immediate effect before the filing of Nicaragua ’s Application. The second is that, even if
Colombia’s declaration is treated as having been in force on the date of Nicaragua’s Application,
the Court lacks jurisdiction under the optional cl ause to pass upon the merits of the Application - 48 -
because the terms of the Colombian declaration apply “only to disputes arising out of facts
subsequent to 6 January 1932”. My argument will develop these two submissions.
B ECAUSE THE C OLOMBIAN DECLARATION WAS NOT IN FORCE ,THERE
IS NO JURISDICTION UNDER THE OPTIONAL CLAUSE
9. The Parties differ on whether the referen ce in a judgment of the Court to “a reasonable
time” for termination or modification of declarati ons under the optional clause to take effect was
obiter dicta or not. Colombia submits that this reference was obiter, for the reasons set out in its
61
Preliminary Objections . In its view, the Court decided as it decided in that case because the
optional clause declaration in question contained a six months’ notice proviso. But as the Court
stated, “the United States retained the right to m odify the contents of the 1946 declaration or to
terminate it, a power which is inherent in any unilateral act of a State...” ( Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 419, para. 61).
10. In any event, what is dispositive in the ca se now before the Court is that both Parties in
62
practice have treated their declarations as subject to termination or modification with immediate
effect. As is well known, in another case invol ving Nicaragua the Court treated modification as
tantamount to termination ( Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1984, pp. 419-421, para. 65).
11. Now, Nicaragua denies this, both as regards the acts and intentions of Colombia and its
own acts and intentions. But its denial does not comport with the facts.
12. On 5 December 2001, Colombia terminated its 1937 declaration with immediate effect.
While Nicaragua in its Written Statement maintains that “there is no evidence that the intention . . .
63
was to terminate... the pertinent declaration with immediate effect” , and that Colombia on
5 December 2001 made “no statement . . . clarifying the legal position” 6, the fact is that Colombia
6POC, p. 114-118, paras. 3.14-3.21.
62
POC, Vol. I, paras. 3.22 ff, pp. 118 ff.
6WSN, p. 103, para 3.26.
6Ibid, p. 103, para 3.30. - 49 -
notified the Secretary-General on 5 December 2001 of the termination of its 1937 declaration “with
65
effect from the date of this notification” , as shown in the judges’ folders, at tab12, and on the
screen.
13. The Court’s Yearbook 2001-2002 accordingly records that: “On 5December2001,
Colombia notified the Secretary-General of its d ecision to withdraw, with immediate effect, the
declaration which it had deposited on 30 October 1937.” 66 (At tab13, and on the screen.)
Consequently, while in the Yearbook 2000-2001 the subsistence of seven declarations made under
the Permanent Court of Internationa l Justice Statute was recorded, the Yearbook 2001-2002 states:
“There are now six such declarations.” 67 Moreover, in a footnote to the foregoing, the declaration
of Colombia for the first time is included in the enumeration of declarations which “have expired,
been withdrawn or been terminated without being subsequently replaced” 68.
14. The force to be given to such attestations in the Court’s Yearbook was earlier described
by Nicaragua itself in these terms: “The most authentic public record of the acceptances of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court is the Yearbook of the Court . . .” ( I.C.J. Pleadings, Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Memorial of Nicaragua, Questions of Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Vol. I, p. 374, para. 54.)
15. Nicaragua in its Written Statement rightly emphasizes that “the test is the intention of the
69 70
respective States” , citing the Court’s seminal analysis in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case .
But Nicaragua maintains that here there is “ no evidence that the inte ntion in each case was to
terminate . . . the pertinent declaration with immediate effect” 71, that, “when Nicaragua notified the
Secretary-General of the inclusion of a reserva tion in the Nicaraguan declaration of 1929, the
notification, dated 7 November 2001, containe d no reference to the question of its having
65C.N. 1401.2001.Treaties-1 (Depositary Noti fication), Preliminary Objections of the Government of Colombia,
p. 114, para. 3.13.
66
I.C.J. Yearbook 2001-2002, p. 117.
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid., footnote 1.
69WSN, p. 103, para. 3.27.
70Ibid., p. 103, para. 3.27.
71
Ibid., p. 103, para. 3.26. - 50 -
72
immediate effect” , and that “there is no proof of a patte rn of clear and consistent conduct which
could, in law, amount to a practice binding upon Nicaragua” 73.
16. Madam President, Members of the Court, these statements of Nicaragua do not withstand
scrutiny. There is conclusive proof that Ni caragua’s true intention was to modify its
1929declaration with immediate effect. The lette r by which the Foreign Minister of Nicaragua
informed the Secretary-General of the modification of its declaration, reproduced in Colombia’s
Preliminary Objections and in the judges’ folder at tab 14 and on the screen, is based expressly and
squarely on Presidential Decision No.335 2001 of 22October 2001, issued by the President of
Nicaragua.
17. The Presidential Decision da ted 22 October 2001, published in La Gaceta, the Official
74
Journal of Nicaragua , reproduced in the judges’ folders at tab15, and on the screen, reads as
follows:
“To communicate . . . the Reservation that the Republic of Nicaragua, as of this
date, makes to its Declaration, the text of which is as follows: ‘Nicaragua will not
accept, as of 1 November 2001, the jurisdicti on or competence of the International
Court of Justice in relation to any matter or claim based on interpretations of Treaties
or Arbitral Awards, havi75 been signed and ra tified or rendered, respectively, prior to
31 December 1901.”
18. It is thus clear, Madam President, that th e true intention of Nicaragua was to amend its
declaration with immediate effect ⎯ that is, to take effect “as of this date” of issuance of 22
October ⎯ or, at the latest, “as of 1 November 2001”. As Managua’s La Prensa reported in its
edition of 23 October 2001, “The President of the Republic issued a presidential decree in which he
discards from now on accepting any resolution that the Interna tional Court of Justice may issue . . .
in light of possible proceedings being brought against Nicaragua by Costa Rica . . .” 76
19. Costa Rica ⎯ the State most directly affected by the amendment of Nicaragua’s
declaration ⎯ so understood the intention of Nicaragua at the time and consequently, its Note
72
Ibid., p. 103, para. 3.29.
73Ibid., p. 104, para. 3.31.
74La Gaceta (Official Journal of Nicaragua), No. 206, of 30 October 2001. La Gaceta is in the public domain and
particularly chargeable to the knowledge of the Government of Nicaragua.
75La Gaceta, No. 206, of 30 October 2001.
76
La Prensa, Managua, 23 October 2001 (emphasis supplied). La Prensa is in the public domain. Its internet
source is http://www.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2001/octubre/23/politica/politica-20… . A translation into
English has been filed with the Registry. - 51 -
77
Verbale of 9January2002 , circulated as a United Nations document, which objects to
Nicaragua’s decision, rests on the Nicaraguan amendment having taken effect as of 1 November.
20. Nicaragua presents the agreement it conc luded with a successor Government of Costa
Rica on 26 September 2002 to refrain from bringing th e border dispute over the San Juan River to
the Court for three years as “cogent” evidence “t hat in her practice Nicaragua does not accept that
78
declarations are subject to modification or termination on notice” .
21. Madam President, it is nothing of the kind. When the Government of Costa Rica
announced that it would bring a case in the Court against Nicaragua over the régime of the San
Juan River, the Nicaraguan Government proceeded to amend its 1929declaration with immediate
effect in order to forestall Costa Rica’s Appli cation. Costa Rica then objected to Nicaragua’s
action as just described.
22. But shortly thereafter, elections were held in Costa Rica and a new president took office.
The new Government signed an agreement with Nicaragua providing that Nicaragua “commits
itself to maintain the legal situation as it exists at present for a period of three years . . . as concerns
its declaration of acceptance of the jurisdic tion of the International Court of Justice” 79, a period in
which Costa Rica undertook not to commence a case before the Court against Nicaragua. But in
fact neither Colombia nor any other party to the Statute has been notified by the depositary of any
decision by Nicaragua that provides that its reservation to its optional clause declaration notified to
the Secretary-General in October 2001 would not take effect for three years. On the contrary, the
Court’s Yearbook 2001-2002 reproduces the reservation of Nicaragua as effective as of
80
24 October 2001 . Please see the judges’ folders, tab 16.
23. The Government of Colombia, Madam President, wishes to bring to the Court’s attention
this critical fact: the crucial consideration that led the Colombian Government to take its decision
to terminate its 1937declaration with immedi ate effect in December 2001 was Nicaragua’s
77Note Verbale dated 9 January 2002 from the Permanent Mi ssion of Costa Rica to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General, United Nations doc. A/56/770, issued on 11 January, 2002, Annex dated 18 December 2001.
78WSN, p. 104, para. 3.32.
79Ibid.
80
International Court of Justice , Yearbook 2001-2002, p. 146, reproduces the text of Nicaragua’s reservation as
effective on 24 October 2001 and footnot es the text of Nicaragua’s letter tothe Secretary-General referring to
Presidential Decision No. 335-2001 of 22 October 2001 as we ll as Costa Rica’s formal objection to Nicaragua’s
reservation. - 52 -
modification in October 2001 of its optional clause declaration with immediate effect. If Nicaragua
could modify its declaration with immediate effect, so could Colombia terminate its.
24. Madam President, Members of the Court, Colombia submits that this striking
subsequent, concordant practice of Nicaragua and Colombia regarding their entitlements in respect
of declarations under the optional clause, constitut es, between them, an agreed interpretation of
their rights and obligations of whose legal effect the Court should take account.
IN ANY EVENT ,THE TERMS OF COLOMBIA ’S 1937 D ECLARATION EXCLUDE
N ICARAGUA S CLAIMS ,BECAUSE THE DISPUTE ARISES OUT OF FACTS
PRIOR TO 6 JANUARY 1932
25. Madam President, I turn now to the conclusive reason why, in any event, there is no
jurisdiction under the optional clause.
26. Colombia’s 1937 declaration “applies only to disputes arising out of facts subsequent to
6January1932”, a fact that Nicaragua herself “fully accepts” 8. As I shall shortly show,
Nicaragua’s Application falls well outside the scope of Colombia’s declaration.
27. Nicaragua’s Memorial itself asserts, correctly, that “the dispute now before the Court is
82
longstanding [and] dates back to the first years after the Independence from Spain” ⎯ well prior
to 6 January 1932. The facts giving rise to the di spute between Nicaragua and Colombia over the
Mosquito Coast date back to the mid-nineteenth century ⎯ well prior to 6 January 1932. The facts
giving rise to the dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua over the Corn Islands run back to
1890 ⎯ well prior to 6January 1932. Nicaragua firs t advanced its claims to the Archipelago of
San Andrés in 1913 ⎯ well prior to 6 January 1932.
28. In its Application, Nicaragua, based on its singular construction of facts well prior to
6 January 1932, contends that the Treaty by whose terms it recognized the sovereignty of Colombia
over the San Andrés Archipelago, and by whose terms Colombia recognized Nicaragua’s
sovereignty over the Mosquito Coast and Corn Isla nds, lacks legal validity. However questionable
Nicaragua’s construction of those facts is, those facts incontestably antedate 1932. The Treaty was
signed in 1928 and ratified in 1930 ⎯ prior to 6January 1932. Nicaragua equally challenges the
81
WSN, p. 113, para. 3.56.
82MN, Vol. I, Introduction, p. 2, para. 4. - 53 -
82° West Greenwich meridian est ablished as a limit between the two countries in the Protocol of
Exchange ⎯ prior to 6 January 1932.
29. Madam President, subtract Nicaragua’s claims to the San Andrés Archipelago made as
from 1913, subtract the 1928Treaty that settled those claims, subtract the 1930Protocol that
established the limit at the 82° West meridian, and what is left? How can it be seriously
maintained that the dispute before the C ourt between Nicaragua and Colombia arises not out of
those facts but “out of facts subsequent to 6 January 1932”?
30. Colombia therefore respectfully requests the Court, in the event that its 1937 declaration
should be found to be in force on the date of the f iling of Nicaragua’s Application, to give full and
faithful effect to the reservation embodied in that declaration, limiting the Court’s jurisdiction to
disputes arising out of facts subsequent to 1932. Colombia’s intention as the depositing State must
prevail, as the Court held in its Judgment in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Fisheries Jurisdiction
(Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, pp. 453-455;
Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 74 , p. 24; Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co., Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 107; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 29). Nicaragua’s arguments run contrary to the clear text and
express intention of Colombia’s declaration.
I31. Phosphates in Morocco, the seminal case whose continuing force was recently
reaffirmed by the Court ( Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Provisional Measures,
83
Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 135) , the Permanent Court construed the equivalent
French reservation as one concerning facts “which must be considered as being the source of the
dispute” (Phosphates in Morocco , loc. cit., p. 23). The Court held that the facts which form the
subject of the reservation ratione temporis have to be considered from the viewpoint of their
connection “with the birth of the dispute” (ibid., p. 24). It is clear in our case that the real source of
the dispute that Nicaragua has raised turns on th e issue of sovereignty over the Archipelago of
San Andrés, a matter that was determined by th e 1928 Treaty, and on the issue of the delimitation
determined by the 1930 Protocol of Exchange of Ratifications of that Treaty.
8See the other similar references assembled in theliminary Objections of the Government of Colombia,
p. 135, note 192. - 54 -
32. Can it seriously be doubted that the facts of “the birth of the dispute” pre-date 1932? The
Court in Phosphates in Morocco observed that the object of the French reservation was to deprive
the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of “any retr oactive effects in order... to avoid... the
revival of old disputes . . .” (ibid., p. 24). How pertinent that observation is to the current case and
to the intent of the Pact of Bogotá.
33. The compelling case law of the Court in this sphere has been reaffirmed and refined as
recently as February2005 in the Judgme nt of the Court in the case concerning Certain Property.
Liechtenstein based the Court’s jurisdiction on the European Convention for the Peaceful
Settlement of International Disputes, Article27 (a) of which provides: “The provisions of this
Convention shall not apply to . . . disputes relating to facts or situations prior to the entry into force
of this Convention as between the parties to the dispute.” ( Certain Property (Liechtenstein v.
Germany), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, para. 18.)
34. Germany filed a preliminary objection main taining that all the relevant facts occurred
before the entry into force of the European Conve ntion as between the parties, that is, prior to
18 February 1980, the relevant facts being the Be neš decrees and a Settlement Convention entered
into by Germany. Liechtenstein argued that, in so far as there was a change of position by
Germany, the decisions of the German courts in the Pieter van Laer Painting case and the
“positions taken by the Government of Germany, in the period after 1995” gave rise to the dispute
(ibid., para. 33).
35. The Court emphasized that, in determining th e facts or situations with regard to which a
dispute has arisen, only those facts or situations that can be considered “as being the source of the
dispute, its real cause” (ibid., para. 44) are relevant. It found that while the post-1980 decisions of
German courts “triggered the dispute” between Li echtenstein and Germany, “the source or real
cause of the dispute” was to be found in the Settle ment Convention and the Beneš decrees, events
well antedating 1980 ( Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, para.52). The Court accordingl y upheld Germany’s preliminary
objection and decided that the Court lacked jurisdiction ratione temporis to decide the dispute.
36. Now, Madam President, if we apply the teaching of this case, and seek to establish the
source or real cause of the instant dispute, the plac e to turn is the Application of Nicaragua, for, as - 55 -
the Court has held, it is the Applicati on that initially defines the dispute ( Fisheries Jurisdiction
(Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998 , pp.447-449,
paras.29-32). Nicaragua there asks the Court to adjudge and declare that Nicaragua has
sovereignty over the Archipelago of San Andrés a nd, in the light of the determinations of title
requested, to determine the course of the maritime boundary between Nicaragua and Colombia.
37. However, Nicaragua’s Written Statement endeavours ⎯ on second thought ⎯ to elude
the constraints imposed by the temporal limitation of Colombia’s declaration by attempting
radically to narrow the extent of the dispute as fra med by its own Application. It now argues that
the real dispute between it and Colombia is not ov er sovereignty over the Archipelago after all.
Perhaps also apprehending the ex travagance of its claims to sovereignty over the Archipelago,
Nicaragua now contends that “the facts which are the source of the dispute, from which the dispute
arises, are constituted by the decisions of Colombia of 1969, subsequently maintained, to deny any
sovereign rights of Nicaragua over the continenta l shelf (and an exclusive economic zone) east of
84
the 82nd meridian” .
38. But, Madam President, this convenient retr eat of Nicaragua is not enough to satisfy the
terms of Colombia’s reservation ratione temporis. The question is not, “When did the dispute
between Nicaragua and Colombia arise?” The ques tion rather is, “Does the dispute arise out of
facts subsequent to 6 January 1932?”
39. It is plain that it does not, because the essential fact on which the alleged dispute would
turn, the essential fact from which it would arise ⎯ the true “source” and “real cause of the
dispute” between Nicaragua and Colombia (t o use the terminology of the Court in Electricity
Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, Judgment, 1939, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 77 85 on which
Nicaragua places such reliance, so recently reaffirmed in the case concerning Certain Property) ⎯
the true source and real cause would be the estab lishment in 1930 of the 82° West meridian as the
limit in the sea between the two countries, and 1930 antedates 1932!
40. Nicaragua tries to recast the dispute described in its Application as one over a Colombian
diplomatic Note sent to remind Nicaragua of Colombia’s rights to the east of the 82° West meridian
84
WSN, p. 122, para. 3.79.
8As relied on in the Written Statement of the Government of Nicaragua, pp. 118-122, paras. 3.73-3.78. - 56 -
when, in 1969, Nicaragua for the first time grante d oil exploration permits in these areas. That
Note simply reaffirmed Colombia’s long-sta nding, public, peaceful, and routine exercise of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Archipela go and its appurtenant maritime areas up to the
specified meridian.
41. As in the Certain Property case, the diplomatic Notes of 1969 might be argued to have
“triggered” the dispute, just as the actions by the German courts in the 1990s did in that case. But
“the source or real cause” of the dispute before the Court would have to be found in the
1930Protocol, a legal instrument that in the pr esent case plays essentially th e same role that the
Settlement Convention and the Beneš decrees played in that case.
42. In the light of the events leading up to the adoption of the 1930 Protocol as recounted by
Professor Weil, and its continued legal force for over 70 years, Nicaragua cannot now be heard to
contend that the dispute that she submitted to the Court is not a dispute arising out of the limit
established by the 1930 Protocol. Nicaragua’s contrived contentions as to the outbreak of a dispute
in 1969 are in the submission of Colombia profoundly unpersuasive.
43. Madam President, Members of the Court, for all the reasons just set out, Colombia
respectfully submits that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims advanced in the Application of
the Government of Nicaragua. Colombia’s 1937de claration was not in force on the date of the
filing of Nicaragua’s Application. But even if Co lombia’s declaration were to be deemed then to
have been in force, Nicaragua’s claims nevert heless are excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction by
the very terms of Colombia’s declaration.
44. That concludes, Madam President, the argument of the Government of Colombia for the
first round. My colleagues and I are grateful for the attention of the Court.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Schwebel. That brings to an end the first round of oral
argument by Colombia. The Court will meet again tomorrow at 10 a.m. to hear the first round of
oral argument of Nicaragua. The Court now rises.
The Court rose at 1.10 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Monday 4 June 2007, at 10.10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding, in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)