Ali rîghts reserved by the
International Court of Justice
Tous droits réservés par la
Cour internationale de Justice Abbreviated reference:
I.C.]. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear, Vol. II
R.éférenceabrégée;
C.I.]. Mémoires, 'Femplede Préah Vihéar,vol. II
1
Sales nu.m.ber286
N° 1e vente : •
CASE CONCERNING
THE TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
(CAMBODIA v.THAILAND)
AFFAIRE DU
·TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
(CAMBODGE c.THAÏLANDE) INTERNATIONAL COURT JUSTICE
•
PLEADINGS, ORAL DOCUMENTS
CASE CONCE G
THE VIHEAR
{CAMBODIAv.
(General List No, 45-juofments
rs June rg6z)
VOLUME II COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE
MÉMOIRES, PLAIDOIRIFS ET DOCUMENTS
AFFAIRE DU
TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
(CAMBODGE c. THAÏLANDE)
(Rôle généraln° 45Arrêtsdu 26 mai rg6r et du
15 juin 1962)
VOLUME II
PlaidoiriesDocuments. - CorrespondancePRINTED lN THE NETHERLANDS _"\J
-1 ' ~
CONTENTS 1 - TABLE DES MATIÈRES 2
PART LL ORAL ARGUMENTS
DEUXIÈME PARTIE. PLAIDOIRIES
SECTION A. ORAL ARGUMENTS
CONCERNING THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
SECTION A. PLAIDOIRIES
RELATIVES AUX EXCEPTIONS PRÉLIMINAIRE:>
MINUTES.- PROCÈS-VERBAUX
, Page
. Public hearings held from ro to rs April rg6r. - Audiences ·
publiques tenues du IO au Ij avril rg6r 4
Public hearing held on 26 May rg6r. - Audience publique
tenue le z6 mai rg6r . . . . . . . . . . . 8
ANNEX TO THE MINUTES.- ANNEXE AUX PROCÈS-VERBAUX
r. Statement of H.R.H. Prince Vongsamahip Jayankura (Thai-
land) (ro rv 6r) ........ : . . . . . . . . . . . 9
z. Argument of Sir Frank Soskice (Thailand) (ro rv 6r) . . . . ro
First Prelimina:ry Objection . . . . . : . . . . . . :ro
3- Argument of Mr. James Nevins Hyde (Thailand{(i:o rv tSr) 20
Second Preliminary Objection . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4- Plaidoirie de M. Marcel Slusny (Thaïlande) (ro-n tv 6r) JI
Deuxième exception préliminaire 31
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1 The page references originally appearing in the oral arguments have been
'altcn:d to correspond with the pagination of the present edition; references to
Volume 1 of this edition are indicated by the figure 1 in bold type. Of the maps
filcd in the Registrby the Parties, only those which the Court deemed necessary
ior an understanding of the1 udgmen t of 15 1une 1g6:2 have been reproduced in
th2 present edition. .
Le~ renvois d'une plaidoirie à l'autre ont étémodifiés pour tenir compte de la
pagination de la présente édition: les renvois au volume I de la présente édition
sont indiqués par le chiffre I en caractères .gras. Des cartes déposées au Greiie
par les Parties,seules sont reproduitesdans la présente édition celles que la Cour
a jugées nécessaires à l'intelligence de l'arrê15djuin.Ig6~. · 1VIH TEM}'LE OF PREAH VIHEAR
1 :Page
5· Déclaration de S. Exc. M. Truong Cang (CCambodg(IIIV 6r) 4I
1
6. Argument of Mr. Dean Acheson (Cambodia) (IIIV6r) 43
First Preliminary Objectio.. . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7· Plaidoirie dM.Roger Pinto (Cambodge) (u-rz Iv6r) 57
Première exception préliminair. . . . . . . . .
57
8. Plaidoirie de M. Paul Reuter (Cambodg(12 IV6r)
74
Deuxième exception préliminaire ...... . 74
Première exception préliminair. . . . . . . 83
· g. Reply of Sir Frank Soskice (Thail(14!IV61) 87
First Preliminary Objectio. . . . . ·1·· · 87
ro. Reply of Mr. James Nevins Hyde (Thailand) (r4 IV 6r) ro6
Second Preliminary Objection. . . . ·\· . . . . . I06
rr. Rejoinder of Mr. Dean Acheson (Cambodia) (rs IV 6r) IIO
First Preliminary Objectio. . . . . ·1·· · · · · IIO
12. Déclaration dS. Exc.M. Truong Cang (U:ambodge) (151V6r) II7
1 '
SECTION B. ORAL ARGUMENTS
1
CONCERNING THE 1\ŒR:ITS
1
SECTION B. PLAIDOIRI,ES
RELATIVES AU FOND 1
M INUTES.- PROCES-V ERBAUX
Public hearings held fromI to 31 March rg62. - Audiences
publiques tenuedu 1er au 31 mars rg62 . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Public hearîng held on 15 June rg62. - Audience publique
tenue le rs juin rg6z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I20
ANNEX TO THE NI.JNUTES.- ANNEXE AUX PROCÈS-VERBAUX
1
r. Déclaration de S. ExclVLTruong Cang (Ci:ambodge(xIII62) 137
2. Argument of Mr. Deari Acheson (Cambodil) III62) . . . . 139
Delimitation of the frontier in I904-19. . . . . 140
Present location of the watershed . . . . . 153
3· Plaidoirie M. Roger Pinto (Cambodge) {2-3III62) I6X
C~nver e~d einvce e~desetnhcè e~serssence . x6r
R.efutahon de la duplique thaïlanda1. 1· . . . . r66
Origine de la carte deJ'annexe I . . .. 172 CONTENTS lX
Page
Position de la Thaïlande en 1958 . . 179
Utilisation de la carte de l'annexe l 180
Exercice de la souveraineté territoriale- 186
Charge de la preuve . . . . . . . . 190
4. Plaidoirie de M. Paul Reuter (Cambodge) (3·5 Ill62) 193
Evénements postérieurs à rgo8 194
Conséquences de droit . . . . 203
s. Déclaration de S. Exc. l\1.Truong Cang (Cambodge) (S m 62) zog
Conclusions . . . . . zog
6. Déclaration de S.A.S. le prince Vongsamahip Jayankura
(Thaïlande) (7 m 62) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
7· Argument of Mr. Seni Pramoj (Thailand) (7 m 62) 212
8. Plaidoirie de M. Henri Rolin (Thai:Jande) (7-Ili62) . 219
Délimitation de la frontière . . . . . . . . . . . 22l
Arguments du Cambodge sur la nature juridique de la carte de
J'annexe 1 . . . . . . . . . . 229
Origine de la carte de l'annexe 1 . . 239
Protocole annexé au "traité de 1907 . 259
Seconde Commission de délimitation 262
g. Argument of Mr. James Nevins Hyde (Thailand)
(10-12 m 62) . . . . . . . 272
lnaccuracy of Annex 1 Map . . . 273
Position ofthe watershed . . . . 280
ro. Argument of Sir Frank Soskice (Thailand) (12-13 III 62) 288
Legal arguments as to the post-rgo8 events . . . . . . 292
Acts of sovereignty a:nd jurisdiction exercised by Thaila.nd 301
Alleged recognition by Thailand of Ca.mbodia's title 312
Observations on M. Reuter's Argument . . . . . 317
Onus of proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
1
II. Hearing of the witnesses and experts (rs-rg m 62) 33
lVl.Suon Bonn . . 331
Mr. Schermerhorn
346
Mr. Ackermann }82
Mr. Verstappen 415
12. Questions put by the Court (20 III 62). 434
Witnesses and experts 434
Submissions . . . . . . . . . . . . 439x TEMPLEOF PREAVIHIEAR
Page
13. Déclaration de S. Exc. lVI.Truong Cang (443bodge} (zr ru 6z)
14.Re~ :W.Den~_ co hfe~ (znz _62-: . a 46 bodia)
Dehmitatwn of the m1904-lgo. . . . . . . 449
Alleged error made by Firston of :Delimitation in
drawing the wate. . . . .J ... ... .. ..462
Discussion of the ora. . .J . . ... 465
15.R~p del.~i qPno (_ Ce a ~(z26r62dge 47)
DiscussiOn des tem. . . . . . . . . . . .476
Observations sur la plaido1rie de M. Roli479 . . . . .
Pouvoir autonomeaptation de la première Commission de
délimitation . . .· . . ..1 ...•• ... • 489
Portée du mandat donnéà la Commissiorl fr492aise .
Décision de.Comrhîssion' de délimîtdtion quant à Préah
Vihéar . . . . . .. . . . . . . . ·1. ._497. .
Existence et effets juridiques de l'erreuSISalléguée. .
r6.Réplique d.eM. Paul Reuter (Cambodge) 1(2S227rn 62)
Caractère conventionnel des titres du Cam522ge . . .
Exercice effectif de la souveraineté sur 536parcelle contestée
Le cadre géographique et humain 538
Les principes juridiques. . . . . . .. S44
Les thèses cambodgiennes ... _. . . .- . 545 . . . .
17. Rejoinder of Mr. Seni Pramojm(62).land) 559
r8. Duplique de M. Henri Roli(28~Il62).de) s&s
Place de la carte de l'annexe I dans le tadre de la demande
566
cambodgienne.... · · · ·1
Nature juridique de-la carte de l'annexè 573 . . . . . . . .
Effet juridique deur . . . . . . . . . . sss . . . .
Prétendue non-invocabilité de l'erreurdeà raison
du caractère illicite de . . . . . . . .s8g
Absence de promotion ultérieure de laanne591I .
rg. Rejoinder of.Mr. James Nev.ins Hyw62).hf596nd) (29
Interpretaof the watershed boundar}j . . 596 . .
20.Rejoinder of Sir Frank Soskice (Thailand) (29-31 rn 62)
Observations on Mr. Acheson's Reply . 607
Discussion of the oral evidence . . . 6oS
Observations oninto's Reply 63I
Observations on M. H.euter's Reply . 635
Events of rg. . . . . . . . . 644 CONTENTS XI
PART III. DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT
AFTER THE CLOSURE OF THE WRITTEN PROCEEDINGS
TROISIÈME PARTIE. DOCUMENTS PRÉSENTÉS A LA COUR
APRÈS LA FIN DE LA PROCÉDURE ÉCRITE
SECTION A. DOCUMENTS FILED BY THE AGENT
FOR THE GOVERNi\ŒNT OF CAMBODIA
SECTION A. DOCUMENTS DÉPOSÉS PAR L'AGENT
DU GOUVERNEMENT CAMBODGIEN
Page
LXX Dépêchetélégraphiquede M. Beau, 25 août 1907. 652
LXXI Let,tre. du capitaine Tixier au ministre des Colonies,
3 fevner rgog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 653
LXXII a Lettre du gouverneur général de l'Indochine au
ministre desolonies, ro novembre 1908 . . . . . 654
LXXII b Extraits du rapport du chef de mission, 30 septembre
1908. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 655
LXXII c Carte des provinces rétrocédéesentre le Siam et le
Cambodge a:u I/400 ooome, jointe a:u rapport du chef
de mission [non reproduiJ. ·
LXXII d Rapport du lieutenant Malandain sur le secteuU 05
de la frontière compris entre les passes deSmet
et de Kel, 28 mai 1908 (extraits) . . . . . . . . .· 657
LXXIII .Extraits d'une lettre du lieutenant-colonel Bernard au
gouverneur généralde J'Indochine, 12 janvier 1907 658
LXXIV Extraits d'une lettre du lieutenant-colonel Bernard au
ministre des Colonies, 14 avril 1908 . . . . . . .659
LXXV Déclaration de l\{meJacqueline Bernard, 21 février
rg62 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 661
LXXVI Déclaration de MmeFernand Bernard, 22 février rg62662
LXXVII Rapport supplémentaire de MM.Doeringsfeld, Aroue-
do et Ivey, zr févr.ierrg6z . . . . . . . . . . . 663
LXXVIII Lettre du ministre des Affaires étrangères de France
au ministre desolonies, 31 janvier rgo7. . . . . 666
LXXIX Rapport du commandant Montguers au gouverneur
généralde l'Indochine,7 juin 1908. . . . . . . . 667
LXXX Calque de la carte de la frontière entre l'Indochine et
le Siam, secteur n° 5 [non reproduit].
LXXXI Extrait sur calque de la carte de la circonscription de
Siem H.ea:p au rjzoo ooome, juillet 1939, utilisée à
!'audience du 8 mars 1962 [non reproduit).
LXXXII Carte de Khet Siemreap au I/2oo ooomeétablie,par le
Service du cadastre du Royaume du Cambodge
[non reproduite).Xll TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
Page
LXXXIll Carte de l'Indochine au rjwo Lome, feuille Anlong
Veng ouest, 1953 [non reproduit~}.
LXXXIV Diskul (M. C. Subhadradis), Prasat Phra Viharn,
publiéi Bangkok par ldéparte des~B1aex-A.rts,
rg6o [non reproduit}. 1
LXXXV The Lofty Sanctuary of Khao Phra Vihar, par john
Black, F.R.G.S ..(extraits, pJ ........ . 6?3
LXXXVI Extraits elu Bulletin de la Commission archéologiquede
l'Indochine . . . . . . . . ·1 .. . . . . . . .
LXXXVII Télégrammedu ministre de France au Siam au minis
tre des Affaires étrangèresj~nv 1907.r . . . .
LXXXVIII Lettre du ministre de Francelu Siam au ministre
des Affaires étrangères, 30 janvier 1907 ..
1
SECTION B. DOCUMENTS FILED BY THE AGENT
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ifHAILAND
SECTION B. DOCUMENTS· D.ÉP PAO .S'AÊENT
DU GOUVERNEMENT THAIL'\NDAIS
77 a Minutes of the first meeting of the FraAco-Siamese Commis
sion for the Delimitation of the Frontierlbetween Indo-China
and Sian1, 8 October 1907. . . . . . . . . . . . · . . 68o
77 b Mmutes of the third meeting of the Franco-Siamese Commis
sion for the Delimitation of the Frontierlbetween Indo~China
and Smm, 22 March 1908 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
77 c Minutes of the fourth meeting of the Franco-Siamese Commis-
~io f<;>trhe Delimitation of the Frontierlbetween Indo-China
and S1am, r June rgo8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 688
77 d Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Franco-Siamese Commis
sion for the Delimitation of the Frontier lbetween lndo-China
and Siam, 6 June rgo8.
[See Annex XL VIlla l_othe Reply, Vo4·p. 508]
77 e Sketch maps and tracmgs ofsectors NQS. 1,3 and 4of the
fonti er between Indo-China and Siam~no teproduced].
78 a Proclamation for the inspection and preservation of archaeo
logical abjects, 17 January 192.. ·1· .. · · · · · · 6g2
78 b Draft communication from the Presi8ent of the Royal
Jnstitute,6 July 1930 . . . . . . ·1· . . . . 694
78 c List of communications concerning the inventor. 6gs
78 d Letter of reminder, 2July1931 ... 1 ..... 6g6
78 e Communication from the Governor-General of Nakhon
Ratchasima to the President of the Royal lnstitute, 31 August
1931"........................ .
78 f Inventory of ancient monuments . . . . . . . . . . . .
79 a Instructions from the Thai M.inistry of Foreign Affairs to the
Agent for Thailand, dated 29 September r961 . . . . . . CONTENTS XIII
Page
79 b Reply from the Agent for Thailand to the Thai Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, dated 5 October rg6r . . . . . . . . . . 700
So Generalized geologie section of Phra Viharn extracted from
US Geotogical Sttrvey, water su.pply paper I429, 1958 [not
reproduced}.
Sr a Map on the scale 1 :zoo,ooo of the district of Siem Reap
drawn up by the Land Register Department of Cambodia
in July 1939 [not reproduced].
Sr b Tracing of the rough sketch by Lieut. Malandain attached to
the Minutes of the third meeting of the Mixed Commission
set up under the Treaty of 1907 [not reproduced}.
82 Bernard (F.), A l'écoledes diplomates - La perte et le retot;r
d'A ngflor [not reproduced}.
83 a Letter from the French M.inister .in Bangkok to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs in Paris, dat23\February 1907, together
with the report by Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard to the French
.Minister in Siam, dated 20 February 1907 . . . . . 702
83 c R.eport from Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard to the Governor
General of Indo-China, dated 6 rl'larch1907 . . . . . . . . 708
84 Partial photographie reproduction of Anne:x No_ 76 to the
Rejoinder from which the boundary as indicated in Anne.x I
to the Memorial has been removed [not reprodttced}.
85 a Sketch showing areas covered by I904 and 1907 Commissions:
maps issued in Paris, maps issued in Saigon [not reproduced).
85 b Sketch show.ing positions of boundaries in Annex I map,
Sector 5 map, and Malandain's sketch, this last one confirmed
by findings of the Commissioners when putting boundary stone
at Kel Pass [not reproduced].
85 c Sketch showing place names mentioned in severa! annexes to
the Counter-Memorial and Rejoinder [not reprodtJced}.
85 d Map on the scale of r: z,ooo prepared by the International
Training Centre for Aerial Survey [see pocket ùr,back cover].
PART IV. CORRESPONDENCE
QUATRIÈME PARTIE. CORRESPONDANCE
Nos. r-zrg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7r6 PART II
ORAL ARGUMENTS
PUBLIC HEAR.INGS
held at the Peace Palace, The Hague,jrmn .ro to 1'5 April Ig6I and
26 lVay Ig6I and from I to JI Marclt I962 and I5 June I962, the
President,. Winiarski, presiding
DEUXIÈME PARTIE
PLAIDOIRIES
AUDIENCES PUBLIQUES
temtes au Palais de la Pa-ix, La Haye, dtt IO au 1'5 avril I96Iet
le 26 mai I961' etdu Ier ŒuJI ·mars I962 et le 1'5 jttin I962, sozts
·la présidence de iV[. TFiwiarski, Président SECTION A
ORAL ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE
PRELIMIN ARY OBJECTIONS
"PUBLIC HEARlNGS
held fromIO to I 5ApritI961·and 26 May I96I,the President,
M. Winiarski, .presiding
SECTION A
PLAIDOIRIES CONCERNANT
LES EXCEPTIONS PRÉLIMINAIRES
AUDIENCES PUBLIQUES
tenues du IOau I5 avrilI96I et l26 mai I961, sous la présidence
de M.· Winiarski, Président
'..(
2 4
MINUTES OF THE HEARINGS HELD FROM
ro TO 15 APRIL 1961
YEAR rg6r
FIRST PUBLIC HEARING (.ro IV6IO.]a.m.)
Present : Preside\1\lmrARSKI; ·P~ese- ALFAdO;e] dgs
BAsDEVANT, BADAWI, MoRENo QUINTANA,WELLINGToNI<oo, SPIRO
POuLos, Sir PERCY SPENDER, Sir GeraFnzMAURICE, KoRETSKY,
TANAKA,BusTA.MANTEY RIVERO,].EssuP, lVlo~eLitrr GARNIER
COIGNET.
Also present:
For the Governrnent of Cambodia: ·.
H.E. TRUONGCANG,Member of the Haut Conseil du Trône, as Agent;
a.ssisted by:
Hon. Dean ACHESON,Member of the Ba:r of the Supreme Court of the
United States of America, ·
M. }~og PINTO, Professor at the Paris Law Faculty,
-r-.aul .REUTER,ProfessoJlatari~L~w Faculty,
as Counsel;
FortheGovernmentof Thailand:
H.R.H. Prince VONGSAMAHI]PAYANKURA,Ambassadoof Thailand
to the Netherlaas Agent,·.
assistby :
The Rt. Hon. Sir Frank SosKICE, Q.C., M.P., former Attorney-General
of England, 1
M. Seni PRAMOJ,Member of th,e.Thai Bar, ·
Mr. James Nevins HYDE, Member of the Bar of the State of New
York and Member of the Bar of the Supreme Cburt of the United States,
M.eMarcel SLUSNY,Member of the the.If Borr~oApspalls
Mr. ]. G. LE QUESNE,Member of the Enghsh Bar,
ds Advocates and Counsel;
ar.dDavrd S. Do'~'N SS1citor,upreme Court of , u 1cature,
England,
Mr. Sompong SUCHARITKUL, ember of the Legal Division, Ministry
ofForeign Affairs,
1 as Advisers.
The PRESIDENTopened the hearing and stated that the Court was
assembled today to deal with the dibhween the Kîngdom of
1 4
PROCÈS-VERBAUX DES AUDIENCES TENUES
DU IO AU I5 AVRIL I96I
ANNÉE rg6r
PREMIÈIŒ AUDIENCE PUBLIQUE (10IV6r, ro h. 30}
Présents: M. WINIARSKI, Président; M. ALFARO, Vice-Président,·
MM. EASDEVANT,BADAWI, MoRENO QUINTANA,vVELLINGTONKoo,
SPJROPouws, sir Percy SPENDER, sir Gerald FnzMAURICE, MM. Ko
RETSKY, TANAKA, Bus"rAMANTEY RIVERO, jESSUP, MORELLI,Juges;
M. GARNI.ER-COIGNET G,reffier.
Présents également:
Pour le Gouvernement cambodgien :
S. Exc. M. "fRUONGCANG,membre du Haut Conseil du Trône, comme
agent;
·assistépar :
l'honorable Dean ACHESON,membre du barreau de la Cour suprême
des Etats-Unis d'Amérique,
M. Roger PINTO, professeur à la faculté de droit de Paris,
.i\Paul REUTER, professeur à la faculté de droit de Paris,
comme conseils;
Pour le Gouvernement thaïlandais :
S.A.S. le prince VoNGSAMAHIP jAYANKURAa ,mbassadeur de Thaïlande
aux Pays-Bas, comme agent;
assistépar:
Le très honorable sir Frank SosKICE, Q.C., M.P., ancien Attorney
General d'Angleterre,
M. Seni PRAMOJ,membre du baneau de Thaïlande,
M. James Nevins HYDE, membre du barreau de l'Etat de New York
et membre du barreau de la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis,
l\1CMarcel SLUSNY,avocat près la Cour d'appel de Bruxelles,
M. J.G. LE QUESNE,membre du barreau d'Angleterre,
comme avocats et conseils ;
et
M. David S. DowNs, Solicitor, Stlpreme Court oj Judicature d'Angle
terre,
M. Sompong SucHARITKUL,membre du serv.ice juridique du ministère
des Affaires étrangères,
comme conseillers.
Le PRÉSIDENT ouvre l'audience et annonce que la Cour se réunit
aujourd'hui pour connaître du differend entre le Royaume de Cambodge 5 MINUTES
Cambodia and the Kingdom of Thailand concerning the Temple of
Preah Vihear. This is the first public sitting oflthe Court since important
changes in its membership. In November rg6o the General Assembly
and the Security Council of the United Nations elected to this Court
six new Members. Firstlv, Sir Gerald Fitzmahrice of the United King
dom, who fills the vacar;_cycaused by the death of Sir Hersch Lauter
pacht, and whose term of office under the St'atute began with the day
of his election. Five further judges were th~ eected by the three-ye:~.r
system of a parhal renewal of membersh1p, and entered upon then
dutîes on 6 February rg6r. These are M. Vhâimir M. Koretsky (Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics), M. Kotara Tan~k (Japan), M. José Luis
Bustamante y Rivero (Peru), Mr. Philip C.IJes.sup (United St::ttes of
America) and i\L Gaetano Morelli (Italy).
These new Members are required by Articlr:20 of the Statute of the
Court to make solemn declarations in open Œourt that they will exer
cise their powers impartial\y and conscientidusly. In accordance with
Article 5 of the Rules of Court, these declarations must be made at the
first public sitting_ of the Court at which theiiJ udges are present after
their election.
The President asked each of these Judges, as his name was called, to
make this Declaration.
(The Court rose.)
Sir Gerald FITZMAU.RICm I!:ade his declaration.
M. Ko.RETSKYmade his declaration.
M. TANAKAmade Iris declaration.
M. BusTAMANTEmade his declaration.
Mr. ]ESSUP made his declaration.
M. MoRELLI made his declaration.
The PRESIDENTplaced on record the dec)arations made by Judges
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, J{oretsky, Tanaka, !Bustamante, Jessup and
Morelli and declared them dulv installed as Members of this Court.
The President announced that the Court vlrould adjourn for a few
moments.
(The Court rose at I0.40 a.m.)
(Signed) B. \'VINIARSKI,
. 1 President.
(Stgnixl)GARNIER-COIGNET,
Registrar.
SECOND PUBLIC HEARING (ro Iv 6r, 10.55a.m.)
Present: [See hearing of ro IV 6r, ro.30 a.m., except for Judge
Jessup.J
The PRESIDENTopened the hearing. He announced that Judge C6r
dova was prevented, for reasons of health, frdm attending the present PROCÈS- VERBAUX
5
et le Royaume de Thaïlande au sujet du temple de Préah Vihéar: Or,.
la présente audience est la première séance publique de la Cour après
l'important renouvellement de sa composition. En novembre rg6o,
l'Assemblée généraJeet le Conseil de Sécuritédes Nations Unies ont élu
six nouveaux membres de la Cour. En premier lieu, sir Gerald Fitzmau
rice, du Royaume-Uni, a étéélu pour remplir la vacance causée par le
décèsde sir Hersch Lauterpacht;conformément au Statut, son mandat
a commencé le jour mêmede l'élection.Ensuite, par voie de renouvelle
ment partiel triennal, cinq jugesétéélusqui sont entrés en fonction
le 6 février-rg6.r. Ce sont: M. Vladimir M. Koretsky, de l'Union des Ré
publiques socialistes soviétiqM.sKotaro Tanaka, du ]apon ; M. José
Luis Bustamante y Rivero, du Pérou; fiLPhilC.Jessup, des Etats- Unis
d'Amérique, et M. Gaetano M.orelli,d'Italie.
Aux termes de l'artic20 du Statut·cle la Cour, ces nouveaux membres
doivent prononcer en séance publique un engagement solennel d'exer
cer leursattributions en pleine impartialité et en toute conscience. Con
formément à l'article 5 elu Règlement, ces déclarations doivent· être
prononcées au cours de la première séance publique à laquelle le juge
assiste après son élection.
Le Président inv.îte donc chacun de ces juges, à l'appel de son nom,
à prononcer cette déclaration.
(La Cour se lève.)
Sir Gerald FITZMAURICp Erononce sa déclaration.
M. KüRETSKYprononce sa déclaration.
M. TANAKAprononce sa déclaration.
M. BUSTAMANTp Erononce sa déclaration.
M. JESSUPprononce sa décl<Œation.
M. MORELLIprononce sa déclaration.
Le PHÉSIDENTprend acte des déclarations qui viennent d'êtrepro
noncées par sir Gera1d Fitzmaurice,MM. Koretsky, Tanaka, Busta
mante, J essup et Morelli et les déclare dùment installés comme juges à
la Cour et annonce que la sé<mceest maintenant suspendue pour quelques
instants.
(L'audience est levéeà ro h. 40.)
Le Président,
(Signé) B. WtNIARSKL
Le Greffier,
(Signé) GARNIER-COIGNET.
DEUXIl?M.E AUDIENCE. PUBLIQUE- (ra IV 6i:, roh. 55)'
Présents: [Voir audience du ro IV 6.1,JO h. 30, à l'exception l:le
M. Jessup.] ! · .
Le PRÉSIDENT ~uv l;uriece et annonce quel\1le ju g6rova ~e
pourra pas assister à la présente session de la Cour pour raisons. de santé.6 MINUTES
session of the Court Judge Jessup had stated that, in pursuance of
Article 17 of the Statu te of the Court, he woulcl not be able to participate
in the decio ~fithis case. J . .
The Pres1dent called upon the Agent for the Government of Thatland.
H.R.H. Prince VO1GSAMAHI]P AYANKURAmade the speech repro-
duced in the Annex .
The PRESIDENTcalled upon Sir Frank SosK.ice.
2
Sir Frank SosKICE made the speech reprodLced in the Annex .
(The Court adjourned from 12.48 p.m. to 4\p.m.)
The PRESWENTcalled upon Mr. Hyde.
Mr. HYOE made the speech reproduced in the Annex •
The PRESII)ENTcalled upon Me Slusny. 1
MeSLUSNYbegan the speech reproduced in the Annex .
(The Court rose at 5-59 p.m.)
[Signatures.}
THIRD PUBLIC HEARING (u '16r, ro.30 a.m.)
Present: [See hearing of ro rv 6.ro.ss a.m.ü
The PRESIDENTopened the hearing and call upond MeSlusny.
1\fSLUSNYconduded the speech repro id tuecAnen~x •
The PRESIDENTcalled upon the Agent for €ambodia.
M. TRUONGCANG,Agent for Cambodia, madk a declaration 6 and asked
the President to caU upon Mr. Acheson. 1 ·
The PRESIDENTcalled upon Mr. Acheson. ·
. Mr. ACHESONbegan the speech reproduced 1inthe Annex 7.
(The Court adjourned from 12.56 p.m. to 4 p.m.)
Mr. ACHESON concluded the speech reprod n the~Adnnex 8•
The PRESIDENTcalled upon M. Pinto. 1
9
M. PINTObegan the speech reproduced în tlie Annex •
(The Court rose at 5.58 p.m.) ' . ·
[Signatures.]
FOURTH PUBLIC HEARING (r2 IV 6r, ro.3o a.m.)
1
Present: [Seehearing of ro IV 6r, ro.55 a.m.~
The PRESIDENTopened the hearing and calléd upon M. Pinto.
10
M. PINTOconc\uded the speech reproduced jn the Annex •~:
1See p. g. · ·6 Sec BP· 41-42. -
2See pp.10-19. 1 Seepp. 43-53·
3See pp.20-30. s Secpp. 53-56.
~See pp.31-36. 9 Seep'p.57-66.
5 10
See pp.36-40. · Seepp. 66-73. PROCÈS- VERBAUX 6
M. Jessup, juge, a déclaréne pas pouvoir participer au règlement de
la présente a.ff0!repar.applicatiof1 ~e 'article 17.du, StatuL_. :;;-:
Le Président donne la parole "àM. l'agent du Gouvernement de Thaï·
lande.
S.A.S. le prince VONGSAMAHJIA PYANKURA prononce le discours repro-
1
duit en annexe ·. ·
··Le ·PRÉSIDENT donne la parole à sir Frank Soskice.
2
Sir Frank SosKICEprononce la plaidoir.ie reproduite en annexe .
(L'audience, suspendue à 12 h. 48, est reprise à r6 h.)
Le PRÉSIDENTdonne la parole à M. Hy·de.
M. HYDE prononce la plaidoirie reproduite en annexe 3.
Le PRÉSIDENTdonne la parole à l\{eSlusny.
Me SLUSN'{commence la plaidoirie reproduite en annexe 4. ·
(L'audience est levéeà IJ h. sg.)
[Signatures.}
TROISLËME AUDIENCE PUBLIQUE (n IV6r, roh. 30).
Présents: (Voir audience du I 0 Iv 6 I' I 0 h. ssJ.
. Le PRÉSIDENTouvre l'audience et donne la parole à MeSlusny.
5
MeSLUSNYtermine la plaidoirie reproduite en annexe .
Le PRÉSIDENTdonne la parole à l'agent du Cambodge.
6
M·. TRUONGCANGfait une déclaration et demande au Président de
donner la parole à M. Dean Acheson.
Le PRÉSIDENTdonne la parole à M. Dean Acheson.
M. Dean AcHESONcommence la plaidoirie reproduite en annexe 7•.
(L'audience, suspendue à 12 h. 56, est reprise à 16 h.)
M. Dean AcHESONtermine la plaidoirie reproduite en annexe 8•
Le PRÉSIDENTdonne la parole au professeur Pinto.
M. PINTOcommence la plaidoirie reproduite en annexe 9•
(L'audience est levée à I7 h. sB.)
[Signatures.]
QUATRIÈME AUDIENCE PUBLIQUE (r2 IV6r, roh. 30)
Présents: [Voir audience du TOIV61, 10 h. 55]
Le PRÉSIDENTouvre l'audience et donne la parole à M..Pinto.
M. PINTOtermine la plaidoirie reproduite en annexe 10•
1 Voir p. 9· 6 Voir pp. 41-42.
2 Voir pp. IO·I9. 7 Voir pp. 43-53·
3 Voir pp. zo-3o. " Voir pp. 53-56.
4 Voir pp. 3r-36. ~ Voir pp. 57-66..v· .·:;l).
10
' Voir pp. 36-40. Voir pp. 66-73. MJNUTES
7
The PRESIVENTcalled upon IlL Reuter.
M. REUTERbegan the speech reproduced in the Annex 1•
(The Co_urtadjourned from 12.50 p.m. to 4\p.m.)
l\<1.'EUTERconcluded 'the speech reprodnced in the Annex 2.
The PRESIDENT,after consulting the Agent for Thailand, announced
that the next sitting would be on Friday, 14 April 1961, at IO.JO a.m,
The Court would then hear the Govemment of Thailand in their oral
reply. ·
(The Court rose at 5.10 p.m.)
[Signatures.]
FIFTH PUBLIC HEARING (14 r~ 61, 10.30 a.m.)
Present: [See hearing of w rv 6r, 10.55 a.m.t] .
The PRESIDENTopened the hearing and call up~ondSir Frank Soskice.
Sir Frank SosKJCE began the speech repro&uced in the Annex .
(~~ Co ure adjourned from 12.54 p.m. to 4\p.m.) .
Slr Frank SOSKICEconcluded the speech rewroduced 111the Annex 4.
'fhe PRESIDENTcalled upon Mr. Hyde. 1
Mr. HYDE made the speech reproduced in the Annex 5.
The PRESJDENT,after consulting the CamThodian Agent, announced
that the next hearing would be held on Saturday, rs April rg61, at
IO.JO a.m; to hear the oral rejoinder on behàlf of the Government of
Cambodia.
(The Court rose at 5-35 p.m.)
[Signatures.}
SIXTH PUBLIC HEARING (15 'rv16r, IO.Jo a.m.)
Present: [See hearing of ro IV 61, 10.55 a.m.]
The PRESIDENTopened the hearing and calr'edupon Mr. Acheson.
Mr. AcHESONmade the speech reproduced iljlthe Annex1 6. ·.
The PRESIDENTcalled upon the Agent of the Government of Cam-
bodia. . · 1 . ·
7
M. TRUONGCANGmade the speech reproduced in the Annex .
T)J.el'RESIDENT closed the oral hearings on the Preliminary Objections.
(The Court rose at 11.53 a.m.)
'_,\ (Signed) B. WINIARSKI,
1 Presî?ent. .
. (Signed) GARNIER-COIGNET,
• .•1 Registrai' ...
5
1 See pp. 74-80. , See f1P ·o6· rog.1-· • · •
2 See pp. So-86. ô See pp. 11o-r r6. · · ·
3 See pp. 87-Ioo. 1 See ~p r.'7-1 r8.
' See pp. Joo-ros ...· ·. .,L. PROCÈS-VERBAUX 7
Le PRÉSIDENT donne la parole à M. Reuter.
M..REUTER commence la plaidoirie reproduite en annexe 1.
(L'audience, suspendue à 12 h. 50, est reprise à r6 h.)
?ILREUTER termine la plaidoirie reproduite en annexe 2.
Le P~<ÉsiD aErès Tavoir interrogé l'agent du Gouvernement de
la Thaïlande, annonce que la prochaine audience aura lieu le vendredi
14 avril rg61, à roh. 30, pour entendre ce Gouvernement en sa réplique
orale.
(L'audience est levée à 17 h. ro)
[Signatures.]
CINQUIÈl\iE AUDIENCE PUBLIQUE (14"rv 6r, roh. 30)
Présents: [Voir-audience du ro rv 6.r, ro k. 55]
Le PRÉSIDENT ouvre l'audience et donne la parole à sir Frank Soskice.
Sir Frank SosKICE commence la plaidoirie reproduite en annexe 3..
(L'audience, suspendue à rz h. 54, est reprise à r6 h.)
4
Sir Frank SosKICE termine la plaidoirie reproduite en annexe .
Le PRÉSIDENT dcinne·la parole à M. Hyde.
5
M. HYDE prononce la plaidoirie reproduite en annexe .
Le PRÉSWF:NT, après avoir consulté l'agent du Cambodge, annonce
que la prochaine audience aura,lieu le samedi 15 avril .rg6r; à roh. 30,
pour entendre la duplique orale du Gouvernement cambodgien.
(L'audience est levée à 17 h. 35-)
[Signatures.}
SIXIÈME AUDIENCE PUBLIQUE (r5 rv 6r, roh. 30)
Présents: [Voir_audience du ro IV 61, ro h. 55]
Le PRÉSI.DENT ouvre l'audience et donne la parole à M. Dean Acheson.
6
M. Dean AcHEsoN prononce la plaidoirie reproduite en annexe .
Le PRÉSWENT donne la parole àM. l'agent du Gouvernement du Cam
bodge.
M. TRuONG CANGprononce la plaidoirie reproduite en annexe 7.
Le PRÉSIDENT prononce .la clôture des débats oraux. sur les exceptions
préliminaires.
(L'audience est levée à II h. 53-)
Le Président,
( Sl:gné)B. vVINlARSKL
Le Greffier,
(Signé) GAHNIER-CorGNET.
1 Voir pp. 74-So. ' Voir pp. Io6-109.
2 Voir pp. So-86. 6 Voir pp. Iw-, 16.
' Voir pp.S7-r.oo. 7 Voir pp. 11]-118.
' Voir pp.Joo-To5.8 MINUTES
SEVENTH PUBLIC HEARING (16v 61,IIa.m.)
Present:PresidentWINIARSKI; Vice A-FARPO;rJudes sident
BADAW1, MoRENO QUINTANA,vVELLINGTON K!oo, SPIROPOULOS,Sir
Percy SPENDER, Sir Gerald FTTZMAURICEI,10RETSKY, TANAKA,Bus
TAMANTE Y RrvERO, MoRELLI; Registrar GARNIER-COIGNET.
Also present: 1
For the Government of Cambodia:
H.E. TRUONGCANG,Member of the Haut Crnseil du Tr6ne, as Agent;
i.V]~ogePrNTO, Professor at the Paris Law FacasCounsel.
For ihGovernment of Thailand:
· H.R.H. Prince VoNGSAMAHlP]AYANKURA,Ambassador of Thailand
to the Netherlandas Agent.
The PRESIDENTopened the sitting and declared that the Court had
met toda y to deliveJudgment on the Pr~limO ibectinsyraised
by the Government of the Kingdom of Thaildncl in the case concerning
t~T eemple of Preah Vihear bro_ught before Jthbytthe ap~lica-
twn of the Government of the Kmgdom of CambodJa. ·
· He regretted to announce that Judge Bas·who participatin
the ?r!ll h~arwasgss~bseq~ peyentlyj'forreasons of"health from
parhCipatmg m the dehberatwm tlus case. ·
The President read the French text of the Jucand asked the,
Registrar to read the operative part of the Jtidgment in English. ·
The REGISTRARread the relevant clause inl Eng.lîsh.
The :PRESIDENTannounced thatVice-PresidenAlfaro <md Judge
·wellington Koo had appended Declaratbothe Judgment.
Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurand Judge Tanaka appended a Joint
Dedarati theoudgmeot. . · . \ · .
Judges S1r Percy Spender and Morelh appendto the Judgment
statementsof their Separate Opinions.
The President closed the sitting.
{The Court rose 12.15a.m.)
(Signed)J3vVINIARSKI,
1 President.
( Signedf" GÙNIER-COIGNET,
J~egi~trar.
1See l.C.Reports I96I17-50. PROCÈS- VERBAUX 8
SEPTIÈME AUDIENCE PUBLIQUE (z6 v 6r,II h.)
Présents: M. WINIARSKI, Président; M. ALFARO, Vice-Président;
MM. BADAWI, MoRENO QUINTANA,"WELLINGTON Koo, SPIROPOULos,
sir Percy SPENDER,sir Gerald FrTZMAURICEM , M. KoRETSKY,TANAKA,
BusTAMANTE Y RivERO, MoRELLI,Juges; M. GARNIER-CorGNETG , reffier.
Présentségalement:
Pour le Gouvernement cambodgien:
S. Exc. M. TRUoNG GANG,membre du Haut Conseil. du Trône, en
qualitéd'agent;
M. Roger PrNTO, professeur à la faculté de droit de Paris, en qualité
de conseil.
Pour le Gotwernement thaïlandais:
S.A.S. le prince VoNGSAMAHIP jAYANKURAa ,mbassadeur de Thatlande
aux Pays-Bas, en qualitéd'agent.
.Le PRÉSIDENTouvre l'audience et annonce que la Cour se réunit
aujourd'hui pour rendre son arrêt sur les exceptions préliminaires soule
vées par le Gouvernement du Royaume de Thaïlande dans l'affaire du
temple de Préah Vihéar, introduite devant la Cour par requête du
Gouvernement du Royaume du Cambodge. ·
Il a le regret d'annoncer que M. Basdevant qui a pris part aux au
diences de la procédure orale a ensuite étéempêché,pour raisons de
santé, de participer au délibéréen cette affaire.
Il donne lecture du texte français de l'arrêt 1 et invite le Greffierà
donner lecture elu dispositif de l'arrêt en langue anglaise.
Le GREFFIERlit le dispositif en anglais.
Le PRÉSIDENTannonce que M.l\1.Alfaro, Vice-Président, et Wellington
Koo, juge, ont joint à l'arrêt des déclarations.
Sir Gerald F:itzmaurice et M. Tanaka, juges, ont joint à l'arrêt une
déclaration commune.
Sir Percy Spender et M. Morelli, juges, ont joint à l'arrêt les exposés
de leurs opinions .individuelles.
Le Président lève l'audience.
{L'audience est levée à I2 h. rs.)
Le Président,
(Signé) B. WrNIARSKI.
Le Greffier,
(Signé) GARNIER-CoI.G NET.
1 Voir C.l.fRecueil 196r, ppr7-50. 9
ANNEX TO THE MINUTES
ANNEXE AUX PROCÈS-VERBAUX
1. STATEMENT OF H.R.H. PRINCE VONGSAMAHIP
JAYANKURA
(AGENT FOH THE GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND)
.'\T THEPUBLIC HEARING Ot' .IO APRILrg6r, MORNING
Mr. President, Members of the Court.
As I believe is known to the Court, I appear before you as Agent for
the Government of Thailand which desires to raise two preliminary
objections to the jurisdiction of the Court in the present proceedings.
:First,Mr. President, and Members of the Court, may I, with your
permission, extend to the new Members of the Court who were sworn
this morning our \varmest welcome on taking up the very high responsi
bilities incumbent upon them as Judges of this Court. We are indeecl
delighted to see them, and wish them weiL
The Court may have noticed that our objections fall into two parts,
and Counsel for Thailand would desire to divide amongst themselves
the task of presentîng separately the two points.
The first part, which you will find dealt with in paragraphs 5-16 in
our Preliminary Objections, willbe dealt with by Sir Frank Soskice, and
when he has completed his submissions on the first point we propose
that the second point should be dealt with by Mr. Hyde, who will
speak next, and by Maître S!usny, who \vil! devote himself particularly
to the questions of law that are raised by the second objection.
This being so, Mr. President and Members of the Court, I should be
grateful if you would be so good as to cali on Sir Frank Soskice to
make his address to the Court.·IO
2. ARGUMENT OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE
(COUNSEL FOR THE GOVEHNMErHIOF THAILAND)
ATTHE l'UBLIC HEARINGOF IOAPRN. 1961,MORNING
Mr. President, Members of the Court.
The Court will have appreciated that tl1is case concerns the ownership
as between Thailand and Cambodia of a verv ifamous and ancient temple
situated on an eminence which \Vesay is clehrly within the boundaries
of Thailand,s sett ~lytdrea inthe earlylyears of this century. It is
a monument of antlqUJty whiCh means a great deal to the people of
Thailand.Ifthe case has to be triee\ on the Jllerits a great deal will have
to be placed by way of evidence beforethe Court as to the precise
situation of the temple and the true edfethe treaties undwhich
the boundaries between Thailand and Catnboclia were demarcated
between the French authorities then con~ tfrCamlbodia and the
Royal Thai Government in the years rgo4 lnd 1907. At present, it is
the desire of the Thai Govemment to ask fol- the opinion of the Court
upon preliminary objections to the jmisdictibn of the Court, which, in
the respectful submission of the TGoven~m aie very real and
important questions of legal interpretoiithe documents conferring
jurisdiction onhe Court. These are questiqns divorced entirely from
the merits of the case, and involve entirely legal arguments of construction
and interpretation. The Thai Govemment de5ires respectfully to submit
to the Court that, upon the true constructiob of these documents, and
the authori tv of the decision of this 1ourt in the case of Israel v. Btdgaria,
there can hé little doubt that, for rewslich my colleagues and I
will ventureto deploy before the Court and which are already adum
brated in the Preliminary Objections filed on behalf of the Thai Govern
ment, the decision ofe ownership of the temple does not fall within
the jurisdiction conferrecl uponCourt. 1
At the present stage, our argnments will l:ielimited to that, and for
this reasone do not think it necessarv to üivite the Court to consider
inany detail the geographical configuration oflthe ground through which
the boundary runs, as shawn in a map in tli.e pocket of the Thai Ob
jections, and in a number of other maps wliich, if the Court is called
upon to pronounce upon the merits, wiha~ o be placed before the
Court for examination.The Thai Govemrnent desires at this stage,
ho~veto vemark,it perfect_Jy-plain that, inl :aising these prelimi~ary
pomts of law, they do not w1sh to be thought m any way to be anxwus
to shun a full investigation of the merits of tl•e case. The two questions
are entirely separate, andis respectfully sJ:bmitted that, when there
is a real question as to the jurisdiction codferred upon the Court, a
party is fully justified in seekîng the opinidn of the Court upon the
question, which is one of fundamental impottance. I say no more on
this aspect of the case will, if I may, ndw address myself directly
to _the.first of the points which are raised in the Thai Preliminary
ObJections. ARGUMENT OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE II
That point is set out in paragraphs 5 to 16. At the outset may I, by
way of reminder, formulate the point in a very few sentences. We contend
that this Court is not given jurisdiction to try the present dispute by the
Thai declaration of 20 May 1950. The Thai declaration of 3 .May 1940,
accepting as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court,
1apsed when the Permanent Court of International Justice was dissolved
on rg April 1946. Since Thailand was not at that date a party to the
Statute of this Court, her declaration of 3 May 1940 wa.s not preserved,
or converted into an acceptance of the jurisdiction of this Court, by
Article 36, paragraph 5, of the Statute. This follows from the decision
of this Court in the case of Israel v. Bulgaria. The Thai declaration of
20 May 1950 clearly on its terrns is not a fresh acceptance of the joris
diction of this Court, but an ineffective attempt to preserve in being the
declaration of 3 May 1940 which, in view of the decision in the case of
Israel v. Bulgarùt, was impossible. The declaration of 20 May 1950
\vas therefore wholly ineffective for all purposes.
My task now is t6 add to what has been stated in the Preliminary
Objections raised by the Government of Thailand, such additional
considerations as, in my submission, arise in view of the Observations
of the Government of Cambodia upon this first objection. It would
not assist the Court if, in the course of my speech today, I \Vere to
recapitula te what bas been said on behalf of the Government of Thailand
in paragraphs 5 to r6 of their Preliminary Objections. I content myself
by saying that the Government of Thailand relies on what is there
stated, and rcspectfully submits, for reasons which I will seek to deploy,
that the Observations of the Government of Cambodia do not in any
sense invalidate the submissions made on behalf of the Government of
Thailand in those paragraphs. May I therefore begin by assuming that
in effect the contentions in those paragraphs stand as the forefront of
my argument today, and may be taken as having been respectfully
repeated by way of reminder of their content.
The contentions of the Government of Cambodia in reply to our
first objection, as contained in paragraphs II to 26 of their Obser
vations, begin with an indication of certain differences. of fact between
the present case and the facts which were considered by this Court in
the Israel v. Bulgaria case. The differences in question, upon which the
Government of Cambodia seeks to place great rcliance, can be summa
rized under three heads:
I. The Government of Cambodia points out that in the Israel v.
Bulgaria case it was shawn that Bulgaria only became a Member of
the United Nations in 1955, whereas Bulgaria's declaration accepting
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court was made in. 1921.
An înterv<ù, therefore, of 34 years had elapsed between the date of tbat
declaration and the date of the admission of Bulgaria as a Member of
the United Nations. In the present case, on the other hand, the last
renewal by the Govemment of Thailand, before its admission as a
Member of the United Nations, of its declaration accepting the com
pulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court was in 1940, and the
admission of Thailand as a Member of the United Nations took place
in rg46. A contrast is accordingly drav.rn between the interval of 34 years
inthe Israel v. Bulgaria case and the interval of six years in the present
case.12 TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
2. In the present case, the intebetl the dissluton of the
Permanent Court on I9 April ·1946 and thJ admission to the United
Nations of Thailand on r6 December 1946 only sorne eight montils.
IJ! the ~asofe1srtul v. Bulgah~owiee,,1the i_nt~ btweer:the
d1ssolutwn of the Permanent Court and thq admiSSion of Bulgana to
the United Nations, the one having taken place in r946 and the other
in r955, was sorne nine years.
3. As is pointed out in paragraphs 14 to 17 of the Observations of
the Government of Cambodia, Bulgaria had, between the dissolution of
the old Court and her admission to the United Nations, shown herself
quite unwilling submit to the jurisdicbfthe International Court.
On the other band, the Govemment of Th~ilw aanat aU material
times unclerhe impression that it was su8ject to the jurisdiction of
this~ourt. . .1 . .
Tt 1s respectfuUy submlttthat these dtshnchons of fact between
t~c1irumstances investigated in the case ofiJsrael v..Bulgaria am! ~he
ctrcurnstances of the present case have no poss1blebeanng on the vahchty
or otherwise of the objections raised to the jJrisdîction of this Court b;,r
the Government of Thailancl. \iVith the vetry greatest respect to our
opponents, it is apparent throughout the cohtentions which they have
embodied in their Observations that they hakre misunclerstood the true
basis of the reasoning of this Court in the IIsrael v. Bulgar,ia case. Jf
~hi reasoning is properly ynr;lerstooddifferences of fact above
mcl1cated are seen to be qmte 1mmatenaJ, and to produce no result on
the proper determination of the questions nd\v before the Court.
Mr. President, Members of the Court. Ugon a true analysis of the
reasoning of the Court, it is, I respectfully sJbmit, quite apparent that
the lapse of time between Bulgaria's declaunder the Statuteof
the Permanent Court and her admission toi the United Nations, and
between the dissolution of the PermCou~tnd Bulgaria's admission
to the United Nations, and Bulgaria's 1nwillingness to submît to the
jurisdiction of the Court, although mentione d in the Judgment as part
of the circumstances, were not among the rhaterial and vital facts on
which the decision of the Court was based. ifhat decision turned upon
the meaning of Article 36, paragraph 5, of tite Statute of this Court. It
is necessary in these circumstanto exa:mine preeisely what that
Article enacts, and exactly how it impingds uponcircumsta.nc~s
now uncler investigation if.!the case.nt ~rt~leprovides, as 1s
well known, that declarations made under A!rtlcle 36 of the Statute of
the Permanent Court 1
"am! which are stiJl in force shall be deemecl, as between the
parhes to the present Statute, to be acceptances of.the compulsory
·jurisdiction" 1
of this Court. \iVhat is requisite, therefore, is that there should be a
declaration under Article 36 of Statutel of the Permanent Court,
and t\lat that declaration should still be in force at the date on which
the State which made it becomes a party to the Statu te of the Inter
national Court. If these requisites are found td be present, the declaration
in question is to be deemed to constitute an acteptance of the compulsory
jur.îsclictionof this Court,nly as betwtheparties to the Statute
of this Court. This is clear from thedfeArticle 36, paragraph 5, ARGUMENT OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE I3
and it is precîsely what was made the basis of the decision in the Israel
v. Bulgaria case by this Court. This emerges guite clearly from the
language used in the Judgment of this Court, quoted in paragraph II
of the Prelîminary Objections of the Government of Thailand. I would
respectfully venture to quote the language again, because·it is of great
importance for the purposes of this case. The relevant passage reads
as follows:
"Since this provision [that is, Article 36 (5)] was originally
subscribed to only by the signatory States, ît was without legal
force so far as non-signatory States were concerned ... So far as
non-signatory States were concerned ... the Statute, in the absence
of their consent, could neither maintain nor transform their original
obligation. Sbortly after the entry into force of the Statute, the disso
lution ofthe Permanent Court freed them from that obligation."
That is to say, in the case of non-signatoryStates, Article 36, paragraph 5,
of the Statu te of this Court did not, and could not, convert acceptances
by·them of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court into acceptances of
the jurisdiction of this Court. On the contrary, in the case of those
States acceptances by them of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court
inevitably lapsed on .19 April 1946, when the Permanent Court was
disso.lved..
This analysis show·sthat the differences of fact on which the Govern
ment of Cambodia seeks to rely are entirely irrelevant to the reasoning
of the Court in the case of 1srael v. Bulgaria. According to th at reasoning,
those States which bad declarations under Article 36 of the Statute of
the Permanent Court stiJl in force on 19 April 1946 must be divided
into two categories:
(r) Those which, by Ig April l.946, bad already become parties to
the Statute of this Court. By so doing, those States bad agreed, by
Article 36 (S) of the Statute, that their declarations under the Statute
of the Permanent Court should be deemed to be acceptances of the
compulsory jurisdiction of this Court.
(2) Those States which, on I9 April 1946, had not become parties to
the Statute of this Court. Their declarations under Article 36 of the
Statute of the Permanent Court became altogether void on the disso
lution of the Permanent Court on I9 April 1946.
It is thus quîte clear that the position vis-à-vis this Court of any
State which on I9 April 1946 had a declaration still in force onder
Article 36 of the Permanent Court depends entirely on the question
whether that State by that date had become a party tothe Statute of this
Court. It is solelv to the position on that date, 19 April 1946, that
enquiry must be' clirected. The reasoning of the Court shows that it
makes no difference whether the declaration onder Article 36 of the
Statute of the Permanent Court had been in existence for many years
of for few, or was of indefinite or a limited duration. It is also ciear that,
if the State was not a party to the Statute of this Court on 19 April
1946, it makes no difference whether it became a party a few months
or many years after that date. Likewise, whether the State was on
rg April 1946 willing to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court
is also an irrelevant question. \iVhat is to be seen is whether the necessary
formai steps for adhering to the Statute of this Court bad been taken.
314 TEMPl-E OF PREAH VIHiEAR
It may be, as indîcated in the Judgmeo~the Court in the case of
Jsracv.. B!flg t~atrieref,orma~ willnitssuff tocreateCOJ?l
pulsory JtmsdJCtiOIfthe State d1d not have the w.Jll to aclt:t
Nevertheless, it is certain that the will alohe does not suffice if the
necessary formalities are not observed. If a State was not party to the
Statute of this Court on rg April 19d~daras undeo nrticle 36
ofthe Statute of the old Court lapthatlH d~~Y)·\.vi_invtetr
State !Tlayhave been to accept the compulsory JtmsdictJOn of th1s Court,
it did not in law accept it unless on ·becomi:hga party to this Court's
Statute. it made a new, independent de1laration.
V,Thatis therefore in my submission beyond any controversy is this.
On 19 April 1946, any declaration made beforè that date by the Govern
ment .ofThailand accepting the cornpulsory jmhsdiction of the Permanent
Court became wholly ineffective fopurp~ Tseededarationthen
in force was that made b.y the Governm-~rhai ona2nSeptember
1929 and renewed on 3 May 1940.
A.sfr~m rg April 1946, theref<t~e_Go~ernm ofnTtailand \vas
not subJect to the compulsory JunsdJCbon of the PermaneCourt,
because it had been dissolved, nor to the cbmpulsory jurisdîction of
this Court, because Thailand was not a partJ{ to the Statute. The only
way in which, in accordance withe provisi.ons of the Statute of this
Court, the Goverhment of Thailand cou\d subject itself to the com
pu\sory jürisdiction of thist was by(rJbecoming a party to the
Statute and {2)then making a declaration ilnder Article 36,2.aragraph
There \\•as no other method. Thailbecan aparty to the Statute
on 16 December 1946. The only document which is allegecl to constitute
a declaratiounder Article36, paragraph2lis the letter 20 May
1950 to the Secretary-GeneraThe sole qtlestion, therefore, in the
respectful submission which I present to the Court, which falls for
determina tion, is whether that le20 M~yfI950 was a declara ti on
made under Article 36, paragra2,of the Statute of this Conrt. The
only way in which this question can be tested is by an examination
of the terms of tl1at letter, in arder to ascertain from the terms used
whether,.in fact, it is a declaration wllich falls \Vithin the four corners
of .Artide.Jparagraph_2.~t_isrespectfullyisubmitthat it ipe~~
fectly pla1n upbn a consideratiOn of the terms of the letter that 1t 1s
nothîng ofthe sort. 1
On 20May 1950,when the letter was wrjtten, the Govemment of
Thailand was not subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court.
It could become subject to that jurisdictiori only by making a new
deèlaration accepting. lt could not do sd in any othway. The
question is whether the letter20fMay dso did constitute such a
new acceptance of. jurisdiction. It .is plain th'at upon its terms it was
nothing ofthe sort. It was thé contrary. Tlie letter did not purport
to make a fresh start and to submit tGo~ernm efThailand to
the compulsory jurîsdiction of the Court. V•hthout more, therefore, ît
may weil be said, in my respectful submissidn, that the enguiry may
end here, and the Application of the Governtnent of Cambodia ought
to be held incompetent without further investigation.îr Obser
vations, however, the Governmentof Caml::\odîa maintain para
graphs 22to 24, that the lette20oMay I9fJOeven aithough ît may
not in terms be anacceptance of the complilsory jurisdiction of this
Conrt, is in substance the equivalent oh acceptance and should ARGUMENT OF·SIR FRANK SOSKICE 15
be treated as if ît did constitute such an acceptance, broadly beéause
it was the intention of the Government of Thailand to accept the
compulsory jurisdiction of this Court. This contention, however, of
the Government of Cambodia is in direct confiict with the reasoning
of this Court in the .Israel v. Bulgaria case, as it appears from the
quotation from the Judgment of this Court contained in paragraph 13
of the Preliminar:v Objections of the Governrnent of Thailand. I would
respectfully repeat that quota hon, which reads as follows:
"lt is one thing to preserve an existing undertaking by changing
its subject-matter; it is quite another thing to revive an under
taking which has ·already been. extinguished."
The latter the Court held to be impossible; yet it was precisely this
which the Government of Thailand tried and purported to achieve by
the letter of 20 May 1950. The renewal attempted by that letter·was
impossible; but that does not justify the Government of Cambodia in
reading the letter as though it said, not ''renew'', but something else.
The impossibility of reviving an ui1dertaking which had already been
extinguished was the whole basis of the reasoning of this Court in the
case of Israel v. Bulgaria, and it is respectfu.lly submitted that ·the
present Application of Cambodia cannat possibly be entertained by
the Court unless this reasoning is not followed. The 'submîssiün made
by the Government of Thailancl may, in other words. be put as follows:
the Govemment of Thailand could most certainly on 20 May 1950
have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court; what it did
do, however, was to attempt to revive its deda.ration of acceptance
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court, made on
20 September 1929 and renewed on 3 May 1940. The Govemment of
Thailand made this attempt under the mistaken impression that that
declaration, made in 1929 and renewed in 1940, was sti\1 valicl. Jt·was
in fact invalîd, and accordingly no declaration made by the Government
of Thailand in 1950 could continue in being an application which was
.at that. tirne·no -longer in beii1g,sinee it had Japsed severa! years before.
The sharp distinction drawn by this Court between the preservation
of an existing undert<.tking and the attempted revival of an extinct
undertakîng is fundamental to the case which I respectfully present
on beha.Hof the Government of Thailand. The letter of the Government·
of Thailand of 20 May 1950 plainly, I submit, upon its terms, is of
the latter description. Therefore, in accordance with the decision, of
this Court in the case of .Israel v. Bulgaria, that letter was of no effect,
and did not submit the Govemmént of Thailand to the compulsory
jurisdiction of this Court.
In these circurnstances, it is submitted that ]t is quite beside the
point to refer to the drcumstances, as does the Government of Cam
bodia, that the Government of Thailand .înclicated bv that letter its
willingness to be bound by the jurisdiction of this Court. The Govem
rnent of Thailand, no doubt, was willing, and by taking the proper
steps could have submitted to the compulsory jur.isdiction of this
Court in May 1950. The question is whether the proper steps were
taken. Being under a complete misapprehension as to the validity of
her declaration under the. Statute of the Permanent Court and the
effect of a letter in the forrn of that of20 ·May rgso, the Government
of Thailand did not succeed in submitting herself to the compulsory 16 TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
jurisdiction of this Court. This was a misap on ~thr paet of ension
the Government of Thailand which was onlyl revealed when this Court
pronounced its Judgment in the case of Israel v. Bulgaria.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, the lnisapprehension to which
I have referred was indeed a misapprehensidn which was not peculiar
to the Government of Thailand. In this connedtion I would call attention
to a letter from the Registrar of this Court to the Thai Minister of
Foreign Affairs dated II November 1949, \~hi mcahes it plain that
the Registrar was under a similar misapprehension. The letter reads
as follows: · [
"Dans l'intérêtdu bon fonctionnement 'dela Cour, j'ai l'honneur
de signaler à la bienveillante attentidt Voire Excellence qu'à la
date dtt 3 mai I940, par 1tne déclaration faite en application de
l'article 36 du·Statut de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale
et considéréecomme étanten~o ervigueuf (article 36, paragraphe 5,
du Statutde la présenteCour), le Gouvernement de la Thai1andeavait
reconnu comme obligatoire la juridiction de lfaCour dans les conditions
prévttesà lart 3i6cp~_écfté: 1 , .
. Cette acceptatwn, qut etat! valable pour une duree de dtx ans,
1
expire le2 mai I950 ." . 1
In this letter it is made plain that the Registrar was under the
impression that the declaration of the Gover'nment of Thailand made
under the Statute of the Permanent Court cotttinued in operation until
2 May rgso. The fact is that until the preciseJlegal effect of Article 36,
paragraph 5, of the Statute of this Court was examined by the Court
in the Israel v. Bulgaria case, it was generally hsumed without question
that a declaration such as that of 20 Seph:imber 1929, rene\ved on
3 May 1940, could be continued, upon thel basis that it remained
effective notwithstanding the dissolution of the Permanent Court.
From the Judgment in the case of Israel v.J Bulgaria, however, it is
now clear that the letter o20May 1950 could not renew the declaration
of 20 September 1929, 'and so did not sutlmit the Govemment of
Thailand to the compulsory jurisdîction of thCo~urt. There is a f.urther
consideration concerning the case of Israel v..Bulgan:a which I desire
to bring to the notice of the Court. Counsel for Israel in the course
of his argument did expressly make reference! to the declaration made
by the Government of Thailand and did, in terrns, discuss the effect
of the arguments advanced on behalf of Bulgaria on the Govemrnent
of Thailand's letter of20 May rgso. I refer Jto the fo!Iowing passage
in Counsel's argument on the afternoon of 2flMarch 1959:
"This basic assumption, Mr. President,! is incorrect. The Decla
ration of Thailand bas been overlooked. .. If the Bulgarian con
tention is correct, theo in rgso the Government of Thailand was
. . 1
1 {Translation]"ln the interesof the administratioof the CourtI have
the honour to invite Your Excellenkind attcntioto the fact tha,.t, on 3 Ma.y
· 1940. by a Declaramade pursuantto Artic\e 36~heStatuteof the Permanent
Court of InternationJusticeand considered. as being still in force (Article 36,
paragraph :;, of the Statof the presenCourt), tJ1e Governmenof Thailand
recognized as compulsory the jurisdic.tion of the Court in the c.ircumstances providcd
for .in Article 36 quo te? ab.ve. . 1 . . .
1.h1s acceptancwluch was vahd for a pc nod of ten years, will 2xMaye on
19.)0.'" . ARGUMENT OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE 17
purporting to renew something which could not be renewed. If
the Bulgarian contention is correct, the automatic adaptation of
the Thailand Declaration acceptîng the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Fermement Court onder Article 36, paragraph 5, so that that
declaration is deemed to be acceptance of the compulsory joris
diction of this Court, would not have applied. I submit, J\llr.
President, that if the Court upholds the Bulgarian contention, this
would lead to the automatic consequence that Thailand has not
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court."
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that this Court must have
had in mind the possible impact of i.ts decision upon the position of
Thailand. With this clearly in mind. nevertheless the Court arrived
at the conclusion to which attention· has been called.
Le PRÉSIDENT: J'ai compris que M.le professeur Pinto voudrait prendre
la parole. Voulez-vous faire votre observation après la fin de la plaidoirie
de sir Frank Soskice, ou bien tenez-vous à la faire maintenant?
M. PINTO :Je suis à la disposition de la Cour, M.le Président ; coni.me
il s'agit d'une remarque au sujet d'un document dont nous n'avons
pas eu conmüssance, j'aurais voulu prier respectueusement la Cour de
bien vouloir se reporter à l'article 48 du R.èglement qui interdit à une
Partie de déposer un nouveau document sans l'assentiment de la
Partie adverse. ·
Le PRÉSIDENT: La Cour ne manquera pas d'examiner le point soulevé
par M. le professeur Pinto.
Sir Frank SosKJCE: I take it, Mr: President, that you do not invite
me to reply to the objection at this moment.
Le PRÉSWENT: Vous n'êtes pas obligé; c'est comme vous voulez:
la Cour le laisse à votre convenance.
Sir Frank SOSKIC In: those circumstances, Mr. President, perhaps
I might be allowed, briefly, simply to say this: the letter which I
sought to place before the Court is merely a short letter which actually
o::omesfrom the files of the Court itself. I a1n not really introducing
any outside and extraneous material; this is a letter which, as it
appears from its form and content, was sent to us by the Registrar
of the Court, and inasmuch as the Court has a discretion whether to
allow further documentation to be produced or not, I would respectfully
submit that there can be no objection of substance at any rate to the
letter being taken into account by the Court.
Le PRÉSIDENT: Je vous prie de continuer.
Sir Frank SosKrcE: Mr. President and Members of the Court. I must
add sorne brief comments on the a.rguments set out in paragraphs rg
to 24 of the Cambodian Observations.
In paragraph ·rg,it is alleged that the Thai documents of rgzg,
1940 and· rgso do not present "an absolute continuity", because the
renewal by the letter of 20 May 1950 was expressed to operate from
3 May rgso, whereas the renewal of 3 May 1940 did not expire until
6 May rgso. It is not dea.r what argument the Government of Cambodia
seek to base upon this overlap of three days. However, the explanation
of the overlap is p.rovided by the Registrar's lette.r of rr November
1949, to which 1 have already referred. In that letter, the Registra.r18 TEMP,LE OF PREAH VIHEAR
said the Thai acceptance would expire *nMay 1950. This. clearly,
was the reason why the purported renewal wlas made to operate from
the next day, 3 May 1950.
The Govemment of Cambodia proceeds to argue that the letter of
20 May 1950, unlike the declaration of rg2g and its renewal in 1940,
is "based on the Statute of the InternatCourt of Justice" (Obser
vations, paragraph21). This argumentis ifounded on the following
words ~' thnletter : .. . . J . .
In accordance w1th the prov!Slons of Artlcle 36, paragraph 4.
of the Statute of the InternatioCoJrt of Justice ..."
The il\usorv character of this argumJec clemrtee ~oment
one looks at ~Art3 i6,caagraph 4, of thé Statute. That paragraph
is merely procedural. Its only purpose is to rrtake the Secretary-General
of the_ l!nited N~tiothe1~srop r~cpient! of communications~ad
the M1mster of Fore1gn Affa1rs, m the letter of 20 May 1950, rel!ed
upon the su~stap rovsio_ns of Articiel3paragr 2,aof the
Statute of th1s Court, there m1ght have been sorne torce m the Cam
bodian argument. As it is, he relies upon the Statof this Court
only for the procedural provisions of Arti\:le 36, para4; and
this gives adcled significance to the fact a substantive provision
he refersback to Article 36, para'gr2,hhotof the Statute of this
Court, but of the Statute of the Permanen!t Court. lt is Article 36,
paragraph z, of the Statute of the PermaneAt Court that the Minister
mentions inthe first paragraph of the lettet.
It .is plain that Article 36, paragraph 4. is \nentioned only to explain
why the communication is addressed to trle Secretary-GeneThe.
nat~ andepurpose of the .communicatio1are not to .be found in
Article 36, paragraph 4, but m the language of the letter ltself, namely
to "renew the declaration above mentioned"J that is to sav, the decla
ration of 20 September 1929. The effect of the letter depends entirely
upon that declarationIt contains nà refetence to anv substantive
provision of thetatute of this Court. 1~ t. use thelanguage of
paragraph 21 of the Cambodian Observatiqns,a ''renewal pure and
simple" of the declaration of 1929. The Governmentof Carnbodia
has stated the position with entire accuracy lin tint paragraph, saying
that the nullity of the letter of 1950 is th<; result of its attempt ·to
"pralong the declarations of 1929 and 1940'[. ..
I have a.lready referred to paragraphs 22 to 24 of the Observatwns,
in which the Government of Cambodia tries! to interpret the letter of
20 May 1950 as a new acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of
this Court, independenot the declaratio\of1929 and its renewal
in 1940. 1 \vill only repeat that such an interpredoes violence
to the langnage of thtter. As,the. Court pointed out Judgmen t
in the case of Israel v. Bulgaria, in ·a augtd in paragraph 15
of the Preliminary Objections, recognition of tlle compulsory jurisdiction
of this Court is a "new obligation" distinct from any obligation under
the Statute of the Permanent Court. A letter which attempts to renew
an old obligation cannat be ·interpreas an acceptance of a new
obligation under a different instrument.
Mr. {>resident and Members of the Court!: for the above reasons,
the Government of Thailand respectfullv subrriits that the first of its
two preliminary objectionsis shown;Jon examinatîon,to be well- ARGUi\IENT OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE
founded, and respectfully asks that it may be declared that this Court
îs not able to entertaîn the application of the Government of Cambodia
on the grounds and for the reasons above given.
I will now, with the permission of the Court, leave it to my colleague,
Mr. Hyde, to present, on behalf of the Government of Thailand, the
first part of the arguments which -they would ask to be considered
în support of the second preliminary objection which they have raised.20
3. ARGUMENT OF lVIR.JAlVIES NEVINS HYDE
(COUNSEL FOR THE GOVERNMENT \oF TH AlLAND)
AT THE PUBLIC HEARINGS OF 10 APRIL 1961
1 .
[Public hearing ofIO April I96I, morning]
May it please the Court.
The second preliminary objection of the Government of Thailand
is that its consent to the jurisdiction of this Court cannat be derived,
nor can it be inferred, from the invoca byttheoG~overnment of
Cambodia of the General Act for the Pacifie Settlement of International
Disputes of z6 September 1928. 1
The second paragraph of the Cambodian Application begîns:
"Having regard to the General Act ~or the Pacifie Settlement
of International Disputes of z6 September rgzS."
1
This recital the Government of Cambodia has now supplemented
11amended in the Submissions contained ih its Observations on the
Preliminary Objections. And its second Subhüssion now reads:
"Haying regard to Articles 21 and z!z of the Franco-Siamese
Treaty of 7 December 1937, Article z of the Settlement Agreement
of17 November 1946, and the General Ad for the Pacifie Settlement
of International Disputes dated z6 September rgzS."
This supplemented or amended specîficati6n of the provisions upon
which the Applicant founds the jurisdiction :of the Court cornes as no
surprise to Counsel for Thailand, and, therefore, the Government of
Thailand does not press the point that twd of the three agreements
relied on were not pleaded in the Application! .Rather, we shall indicate
the inapplicability of ail three agreements 1so pleaded, as we have
done in developing our second prelîminary objection. A ccordingly,
Mr. President, the Government of Thailand fdrmally requests the Court
to consider that its own second objection bel considered to extend to
the two additional agreements now pleaded by Cambodia,
vV~ shall first examine. the General Act, lthat famous multilateral
Treaty of League of Nations days, which has served so often as a
procedural madel and compendium and which also contained a system
of compulsory pacifie settlement, to see how it was intended to operate,
how States became parties to it and how\ its provisions have been
used as models in the long quest for effective procedures for pacifie
settlement_. . 1 . .
Two stnkmg facts, however, should be noted at the outset. Thaliand
is not, and at no time has been, a s1gnatory to:or a party to the General
Act, Secondly, Cambodia is not, and at no time has been, a signatory
to or a party to that Treaty. 1
There is no dispute about these two fact T~h.y are stated in the
Preliminary Objections of the Government of Thailand at paragraphs 22 ARGUMENT OF MR. HYDE 2!
and 23, and the Cambodîan Observations state in paragraph 29 that
neîther Cambodia nor Thailand is directly a party to the General Act.
Thus the Government of Cambodia argues that this Court can rest
its jurisdiction in this case upon a treaty to which neither the Applic<mt
itself nor the .Respondent is directly a pa.rty.
This, then, is the essence of the second basis upon which this Court
is asked to exercise its jurisdiction. After considering the General
Act, we shall turn to the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
between Siam and France, signed at Bangkok on 7 December 1937
(and to be found in the League of Nations Treaty Series, Volume 201,
at p. 113). There are two articles of that Treaty ·which directly relate
to the present contention, ArticlesZI and zz, \vhich we shall consider
in sorne detail.
Cambodia has also relied upon a Protocol or Settlement Agreement
of 17 November 1946. This agreement was signed in V•/ashington by
representatives of the Government of the French Republic and the
Kingdom of Siam on 17 November 1946. In essence it provided· for
the re-establishment of the prewar boundaries between Thailand and
what was then French Indo-China, and then, in Article Iii,it provided
for the setting up of a conciliation commission in accordance with the
General Act to examine ethnical, geographical and economie arguments
of the parties with a view to the revision or confirmation of certain
boundaries. This Article is reproduced in Annex V of the Memorial
of Cambodia. Jt also contained in Article II the declaration of France
that it would no longer oppose the admission of Thailand to member
ship in the United Nations. As we have indicated in paragraph 8 of
our Preliminary Objections, a special Franco-Siamese Commission on
Conciliation was, in fact, established by the two Governments following
the signature in Washington of this Agreement.
These, then, a.re ail of the jurisdîctional documents which either
directly or indirectly or by implication are put forward as a basis for
the Court's jurisdiction. Cambodia is a party to none of them. The
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation is between Siam, as
Thailand was then known, and France, as is the Settlement Agreement.
Yet France is not an Applicant in this case, nor, so far as Counsel is
aware, has France asked to appear as an interested party. Yet this
Court is. asked to interpret these two bilateral agreements to which
France is a party, in its absence, and to find in them the consent of
Thailand to this proceeding. As I have indicated, it is common ground
between the Parties here that neither Party in this proceeding îs or
ever has been a signatory or party to the General .Act itself.
This then is the long and tortuons road which must be traversed
to show that Thailand bas consented to the compulsory judicial settle
ment of a dispute with Cambodia, because of Thailand's relationships
with France, and because of this reference in Article 21 of the I937
Treaty to the great League of Nations madel-the Gene.ral Act.
Our argument in support of the second objection divides itself
naturally into two parts. 1shall address myself to the first part, showing
that the treaties I have dîscussed cannat be so interpreted as to find
that Thailand has, through sorne reasoning, consented to the jurisdiction
of the Court.
And my distinguished colleague, Maître Marcel Slusny, will then
present the second part of Thailand's argument onits second preliminary22 TEMPLE OF l'REAH VIHEAR
objection. He. will sh?w. that under general! prind_ples of international
law there ex1sts no mduect process through wh1ch, ·as a matter ol
interpretationor through the operations of principles of law, including
the law of State succession, Cambodia might! daim to assert the rights
of another State, if such rights exist, as a "8asis for this Court's juris
diction. Maître Slusnv will also summarth .eientire argument on
the second objection ~ndformulate the Subn~io sfthe oovernment
of Thailand in respect to it.
[Public hearin{!,of ra April .r96I, a/ternoo·n)
Mr. President, may it please the Court, I Jhould now like to address
myself to the three international agreements nleaded by the Government
of Ca.mbodi?-·First of all, ~eeneral Act..1
This mulhlateral Treaty, mtendecl as cre1tw e of asystemof compulsory
pacifie settlementdid not, asevents transpiredhave that effect.
However, I shall refer to three articlesbf the Treaty which will
indicate its compulsory aspect. 'Vie are palticularconcerned with
Chapter II entjtled "] udicial Settlement". Tht• first article of Chapter II,
which ~~ Arti IJ,proeides: . · " 1 ·. . .
Ali disputes with regard to wh1ch the parties are m confhct as
to the.ir respective rights shall, subject to any reservations which
may be made under Article 39, be subtnitted for decision to the
Permanent Court of InternationalJusti uclss,the parties agree,
in the manner hereînafter provided, to have resort to an arbitral
tribunal. 1
It is understood that the disputes referred to above include in
particular those mentioned in Article ,36of the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice."
We .shall then touch on the procedure of [conciliation. Article r of
Cha pt e: ntitled"Con oni, privaes: 1 . .
D1sputes of every kmd between two or more parties to the
present General Act' which it has not t!een possible to settle by
diplomacy shall, subject to such reservati6ns as may be made under
Article 39,be submittecl, under the con'ditions laid clown in the
present chapter, tothe procedure of condiliation."
The chapter then goes on to provide for the cbmposition and procedure
of a Concilîation Commissi<;m. 1 .. . . .
Now, the apparent confhct between the obhgatwns clefined m these
two articles is resolved bv Arti20,containdd in the chapter on "Ju
dicîal Settlemen t", whic6 states in its first cfause:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Article r, disputes of the
kind referred to in Article 17 arising bhween parties who have ·
acceded to the obligations contained in 'the present chapter shall
only be subject to the procedure of conbliationif the parties so
,a~ree." , 1
\t'Iule twenty-two States ,vere parhes to sorne or ali of the separable
chapters of this treaty, its principal significante has been as a mode! of . ARGUMENT OF 1\'IR.HYDE
procedure for pacifie settlement, especially in the field of conciliation,
and until the application of Cambodia to this Court on the sixth day of
October 1959, no State had attempted to invoke the General Act as a
basis for this Court's jurisdiction, so far as our research can indicate,
or as a basis for the jurisdiction of its predecessor.
In the light of the present attempt, Counsel for the Government of
Thailand have examined the detailed and meticulous procedures under
the original treaty plan whereby the Secretary-General of the League
of Nations and the Registry of the Permanent Court of International
Justice recorded and kept up to date lists of States parties to the General
Act through their adherence to one or more of its substantive chapters.
This examination shows, and there is no dispute about this fact, that
Thailand was never a party to the General Act either as a whole or in
part.
Cambodia could not have become a party to the General Act before
1953 when, according to its Application in this Court, it first became a
sovereign State. We have also examined the records for possible refer
ences to Cambodia. Again the position is verified and supported that
Cambodia was never a party to the General Act either as a whole or
in part.
Lists were kept to indicate the position of each party to the Treaty
asto adherence to (a) the entire General Act; (b) the Conciliation and
Judicial Settlement chapters; and (c) the Conciliation chapter alone.
The fact that a State could thus adhere to part of the General Act is,
in itself, one variable. It was still not enough in a particular case to
conclude that a State was a party.
. Y.le examined the Annual Reports of the Secretary-General of the
League of Nations retording adherences in the categories of (a), (b) and
(c) which I have mentioned, as well as the annual Year Books of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, especially the lists of instru
ments considered by its Registry as governing the jurisdiction of that
Court.
Parenthetically, a second variable is the fact that a State might
condition its original adherence by some other reservation, such as do
mestic jurisdiction. This was permissible under Article 39 of the General
Act. Such reservations under the language of Article 39, paragraph 3,
had reciprocal effect. It was also possible to record a reservation after
adherence and this was treated as a partial denunciation, specifically
under Article 45, paragraph 4·
So that a State seeking to invoke the General Act would éÙSO have
to consider to what extent, if any, a State party to the General Act had
adhered to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of Inter
national Justice. Such declaration of adherence might at the same time
constitute a limitation of obligations under the General Act, and hence
itself be a partial denunciation.
Thus, it would have created great uncertainty if a third State, such
as Cambodia, in this proceeding, never having subjected itself to the
adherence and reservation procedures of the General Act, could invoke
it as against another State also not a party.
If Cambodia could invoke the General Act as against Thailand, the
latter's obligations, if any, would depend at )east in part on the then
adherence of France to the General Act as evidenced by its reservations
to adherence and to the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court. TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
Here I should say a word about the Revised General Act of 1949.
This was, as the Court will recall, a revision, in fact it was a new treaty,
recommended by the General Assembly of the United Nations in a
resolution of28 April 1949 (General Assembly Resolution No. 268 of the
Third Session).
The recommendation of the General Assembly came out of a dis
cussion in its Interim Committee. There· the doubtful efficacy of the
General Act of 1928 as to States which had not adhered to it during the
life of the League of Nations and before the dissolution of the Permanent
Court of International Justice in April 1946 was discussed. The Interim
Committee suggested a new and revised General Act which would be a
new treaty in which references to the League of Nations organizations
would be replaced by references to appropriate United Nations organs.
In describing a Belgian proposai which was ultimately adopted by the
General Assembly, the Report of the Interim Committee stated in part,
and this quotation will be found in paragraph 29 of our Preliminary
Objections and I would like to restate it:
"... Thanks to a few alterations, the new General Act woulcl, for
the benefit of those States accecling thereto, restore the original
effectiveness "ofthe machinery provicled in the Act of 1928, an Act
which though still theoretically in existence, has become largely
inapplicable."
and continuing from the Report of the Interim Committee:
"It was noted, for example, that the provisions of the Act re
lating to the Permanent Court of International justice had lost
much of their effectiveness in respect of parties wlùch are not
Members of the United Nations or parties to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice."
The Revised General Act of 1949 was then open for accessions and
the Secretary-General of the United Nations was instructed to record
such accessions just as the Secretary-General of the League of Nations
hacl kept records of the original General Act of 1928 which I have
clescribed.
The Annual Reports of the Secrttary-General of the United Nations
have never reported adherences to the General Act of 1928 presumably
because the Secretary-General does not consicler that he has succeeded
to the obligations of the League of Nations Secretary-General in this
respect. As instructed by the General Assembly, he does hold open and
list the accession of States to the "Revised General Act for the Pacifie
Settlement of International Disputes". 'vVehave examined his lists, as
contained in his Annual Reports, as well as related Secretariat publica
tions recording accessions to multilateral conventions. We have also
consulted the Yearbooks of this Court. While we are aware that those
Yearbooks in no way involve the responsibility of the Court, we have
noted that neither Camboclia nor Thailand has ever been listed in them
as accecling to the Revised General Act. (In fact, only four States are
so listee!: Belgium, Sweden, Norway and Denmark.)
We also observed that the Court's Yearbooks, beginning with the
year 1949-1950, include the Revised General Act of 1949. but not the
General Act of 1928. ARGUMENT OF !l'IR.·HYDE
Cambodia could have acceded to the Revised General Act. Thailand
could have acceded to it. The records consulted show that neither State
did·so. As recently as 1958, negotiations between Thailand and Cambodia
included proposais and counter-proposals suggesting as one element of
a settlement formula that Article 33 of the United Nations Charter and
appropriate provisions of the Revised General Act might govern contro
versies between the two States. The proposals, as we have stated in
paragraph 36 of our Preliminary Objections, did not lead to an agreement.
Thus our research has disclosed no evidence that either State is or has
been listed as a party to the Revised General Act of 1949.
There is also no suggestion and no evidence that Cambodia was
regarded by the record-keeping autborities either of the League of
Nations or of the United Nations as possessing, or succeeding to, rights
under the General Act of rgz8 or under the Revised General Act of 1949.
I turn now to the second treaty pleaded in the Observations of
Cambodia, the Treaty of Friendshîp, Commerce and Navigation between
Siam and France of 7 December 1937. This bilateral Treaty is the most
recent in a series of Friendship, Navigation and Commerce Treaties
between France and Thailand. Its first twenty articles, with which we
are not directly concerned, deal with matters typical to this type of
instrument, including commercial matters and "most favoured nation''
treatment,
The final tluee articles contain, in Article zr a broad reference to the
General Act, in Article 22 a guaranty of boundaries between Siam and
French Indo-China, and in Article 23 a termination clause on one year's
notice after I944·
1 turn n6w to Article 2r.It is a single sentence which reads as follows:
"In accordance with the principles embodied in the Covenant of
the League of Nations, the Hîgh Contracting Parties agree to apply
the provisions of the Generai Act for the Pacifie SeUlement of
International Disputes,· adopted on September. z6, 1gz8 by the
Assembly of the League of Nations, for the settlement of any dis
puted questions which may arise behveen them in the future and
which cannat be settled through tp.e diplomatie channel."
The reference is to the General Act for the settlement of any disputed
questions which may arise between tite parties, that is to say, between
Thailand and France, in the future, which cannot be settled through
diplomatie channels. The next article of the Treaty, Article 22, contains
two paragraphs. The first one, although it is common law, 1 would like
to read: ·
"The present Treaty shall, as from the date of its entry into
force, replacethe Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
concluded at Bangkok on r4 February rgzs. It shan also annul, as
from the same date, the other Treaties, Conventions and Agree
ments conduded between Siam and France, with the exception,
however, of the clauses relating to the definition and delimitation
of the frontiers, the guarantee in respect thereof, the demilitarization
of the Mekong frontier (contained in the Treaty of 3 October 1893,
the Convention of 13 Februa.ry 1904, the Treaty of 23 March rgoï
and the Protocol annexed thereto, and the Treaty of 14 February
I925) and also the Convention relating to Indo-China,. signed at26 TEMPLE OF PREAH VIH!EAR
Bangkok on 25, August 1926, and the 1Agreements provided for
therein. It is fnrther agreed thatpr~se nreaty shall, as from
the date of its entry into force, replace the 'freaty of 14February 1925,
in regard tohe relations between Sia~nd Indo-China, in so far as'.
. the provisions thereofe not incompatible wîth those of the Con
vention in question and of the Agreeme nts provided for therein."
The second clause of this Article 22 read1:
"The provisions of the 'resent Trea1ymav~ bv.....claration
agreed upon between the two Govemments, be subsequently
extended in }vho\e or in part to French cdlonies and possessions and
to countries placed under French protedtoraor mandate."
It will be noticed that the first clthseArtcleis a saving clause,
saving the gua.ranty in respect clauses of learlier treaties re.lating to
the definition and delimitatioof frontiers. Of these earlier frontier
defmition treaties, those of 1904 and 1907 in particular would be material
if the Court had to consider the merits of Hiis case.
The second clause emphasizes the bilat natureaof he Treaty as a
whole, by providing that a future declaration, between the two Govern
ments, that is to say between Thailand and F:rance, might subsequently
extend the provisions of the Treaty-nosimtJly this Arti22ebut the
Treaty-between the two Govemments in whole, or in part, to French
colonies and possessions. Of course, in 19371Cambodia was a French
Protectora te..
1f one compares this saving Clause containedin the first part of
.>-\rti22,and the provision for the extension lof the Treaty. to countries
under a French Protectorate under the second clause, w1th the next
earlier in the series of Treaties of Friendship, <!::ommerceand Navigation
of 14 September 1925, which the 1937 Treaty hnder the precise language
of Article22replaces, then it is apparent that this Arofcthe 1937
Treaty simply combines in one article of twp clauses what the earlier
Treaty contained in two_sep'!-~a~e (_r.rces.6.aeds 27 of the
1925 [reaty). ·
And theo, tuming to Article 23 of the 1937 Treaty dealing with its
duration,as I have indicatecl it mav be deriounced after its first five,
years, that is to say after 1944, uporye~re notse by eitherpar~y,
without having the effect of bringing into jforce any of the treat1es
which it abrogates. 1
That means that either Thailand or France could, uncler Arti23,
denounce this Treaty and it would then be Jterminated at the end of
one year.
Such denunciation would destroy the possibility of Cambodia there
after pleacling the Treaty as a basis thi Court's jurisdictioYet
such an act by France would not destroy l~g saals of the boundary
bctween Thailand and Cambodia. Thus theT~ea taynat be consider_ed
as any part of the boundary delimitatioprovidecl for in tTreatl~s
of 1904 and 1907 between France and Thailahd which do establish th1s
boundary, and which woulcl be presented to the Court in any consider-
ation of the merits of this case. 1
This bilateral Treaty of 1937 is in no sense one which constitutes a title
deed of Cambodîa or of France to the boundaty with Thailand. Nor does
it create a continuingprocedure for the .s~rvi acdiadjusting of ARGUMENT OF MR. HYDE 27
boundary disputes as such. Indeecl, the entîre thrust of Article 22 is in
the opposite direction.
The reference to the procedure of pacifie settlement and to the
Geneml Act in Article 21 is a general provision, quite independent of
the saving clause in the first paragraph of Article 22.
The reference to pacifie seUlement through the General Act in Article
21 is quite different from the provisions contained in the Treaties of r904
and r907 providing for demarcation procedures.
This interpretation of Article 2I wîth its references to the General
Act \Vas stated in the clearest language by the Agent of .France when
he referred ta this 1937 Treaty hefore a Conciliation Commission created
under the Settlement Agreement of I7 November 19~6 upon which
Cambodia also relies as part of its theory on jurisdiction. That agreement
I shaH consider in my next point.
But in the Cambodia:n Memorial, at page 89 (1), this statement of
M. :Francis Lacoste, the Agent of France hefore the Conciliation Commis
sion created by Thailand and France under this bilateral Agreement, is
contained in a memorandum ta the Commission which discussed a f"rench
view of the interpretation of Article2 r. Considering the history of the
Treaty of 1937 during the period from 1940 to 1946, M. Lacoste used
these words to formulate the position of France asto Article 21 of the
Treaty with reference ta pacifie settlement. He said:
"The legal position of the French Government was even.stronger
than shawn by the concise and moderate wording of the memo
randum of 2 Oc_tober. Not only had the High Contracting Parties
confirmed, in their successive treaties of 1925 and 1937, and thi;:
1907 boundary settlement, dedared final at the outset, they had
also mutually guaranteed each other's boundaries, thus forbidding
themselves ta dispute them. lt was therefore out of the question,
in the circumstances, to apply Article 21 of the 1937 Treaty, since
no dispute, according to the meaning of this provision, could arise
in connection with the boundary. The absolute refusai of the French
Government was therefore perfectly well founded."
·This statement is a clear indicationof the Frerich position that there
was no inter-relationship between the guaranty of bonndar co~nained
in Article22 and the general reference to pacifie settlement of disputes
with reference to the General Act .in Article 21..
It also emphasizes what emerges from a careful reading of Article 21
itself; that it created an obligation of an essentiaily political nature
between the two parties to the Treaty, between Thailand and France.
I have indicated that our research shows no record of Cambodia
as aparty to, or successor of, rights under the General Act. At the same
time we did find in the Süteenth Report of the Permanent Court of
International Justice this 'Ireaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navi
gation between Tha:iland and l'rance listed under the section entitled
"OUter instruments provîding for the jurisdiction of the Court" and
this we have duly noted in paragraph 26 of our Preliminary Objections.
This distinction het\veen parties and interested States is implicit in
the general provisions of the General Act and as we have observed
in our Preliminary Objections, this distinction is supported by the
structure and precise language of Article 22 with its two clauses, the
first guaranteeîng certain boundaries and the second providing that28 TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
the Treaty can be extended to countries plLed under French protec-
iorate. . 1
So againr return to the inevitable conclusion that Cambodia is here
attempting to find the consent of Thailand1to the jurisdiction of the
Court in Article 21 of a bilateral treaty to whiitis not a party. One
of the parties to that Treaty, France, has irtterpreted it as creative of
no rights inthird States interested in boundhy matters guaranteed by
the Treaty. 1 ·
Turning now to the Settlement Agreement of IJ November 1946,
finally,Ishall say a word abdut the thircl agreement upon which Cam
bodia in its Observations relies as a dbasct or~asserting the consent
<JfThailand to the jurisdiction of the Court. We begin with the fact that
Cambodia was not a party to the Settlementl Agreement of 1946 which
was negotiated between Thailand and Franc t ee.p!r~es aseUlemeedt
-ofa controversv between those two States ex1stmg at the end of Wmld
\Var Two. This ~wa tse time when Thailandw~s seeking admission to the
United Nations. The historv of the Agreement is to be found in the
records of the Security Couiicil, which we ha!ve cited in paragraph 8 of
our Preliminary Objections. lt begins with thb Report of the Committee
on the Admission of New Members of the Security Council, which had
before it the application of Thailand. The Frerch representative, accord
"ingto the record, told the Committee of the Security Council in August
of 1946 that his Govemment would not. be 1able to vote in favour of
the admission of Siam to membership in the ilJnited Nations and would
<:onsider itself in an actual state of war ~iam so long as agreement
bad not been reached for the procedure for the solution of a territorial
dispute (this occurs in an Annex to the Official Record of the 81st
Meeting of the Security Council qf 29 Noverhber 1946}. ·
A representative of Siam, M r.Konthi Sttphamongkhon, thereu pon
.addressed a letter on 24 August 1946 to lthe Secretary-General, in
which he referred to thisReport of the Committee for New Members.
He stated that his Government would acce apde~ision of the Security
'Council or a :French proposa! to refer the \territorial dispute to this
Court. As events developed, in fact, a Franco-Siamese Settlement
Agreement was reached on 17 NO\;ember lg46, and was laid before
the Security Council at its meeting of zg\ November together with
Jetters from the representative.oFrance and from His Royal Highness
Prince Wan of Siam. Prince Wan, in his lettef to the Secretary-General,
which was read to the Security Council, stated: .
"I now have the honour to înform 1Vour Excellencv that in
accordance with the provisions of Articlej33 of the Chartèr, contact
\vas establishedin \Vashington between the representatives of
Siam and the representatives of France and that, as a result of
the negotiations thus undertaken, an IAgreement of Settlement
and Protocol was concluded on 17 Nbvember 1946, a copy of
\vhich I beg to forward herewith." . 1
The representative of France .in the Securitv Council, M. Parodi,
rea.d to the Security Council his own 1etter of z8 November 1946,
·which referred to this Agreement, and the letter concluded by saying:
"As a token of its sentiments in this }espect, and in a.ccordance
with the provisions of Article TJ of the Settlement Agreement ARGUMENT OF MR. HYDE zg
of 17 November, the French Government bas instructed me to
request you to inform the Security Council that France is in
favour ofthe admission of Siam to the United Nations." (Security
Council,Official Records,Srst Meeting, 29 November 1946.)
The text of the SeUlement Agreement itself is therefore to be found
in Annex r4 to the 81st Meeting of the Council. Its first Article refers
to the transfer of Indo-Chinese territories to the French authorities.
The second Article states that relations between France and Siam
shall once more be regulatec\ by the Treaty of 7 December 1937, as
weil as by a Commercial and Customs Agreement of 9 December I937.
Article 3 of the Setthoment Agreement provides:
"Irnmediately upon the signature of the present Agreement,
l'rance and Siam shall" set up, in application of Article 21 of the
Franco-Siamese Treaty of 7 December 1937, a Conciliation Com
mission composed of two representatives of the parties and tinee
neutrals,in accordance with the Generai Act of Geneva dated
26 September 1928 for the pacifie settlement of international
disputes which regulates the constitution and operation of the
Commission. The Commission shall begin îts work as soon as
possible after the transfer ofe territories referred to .in Article r.,
paragraph 2, has been effectedTtshall be responsible for examining
the ethnical, geographical and economie arguments of the parties
with a view to ·the revision or confirmation of the clauses of the
Treaty of 3 Odober 1893, of the Convention of 13 February 1904
and of the Treaty• of 23 March I90J, maintained in force by
Article 22 of the ~reat oy 7 December 1937."
And so it came about that after considering other possible methods
of scttlement, Thailandand France entcred into this bilateral Settlement
Agreement which provideci for a Conciliation Commission. According
to the language of Article 3, which l have just read, the Commission
would be responsible for examining the ethnical, geographical and
economie <:irguments of the parties relating to the boundary treaties
between them.
This Conciliation Commission was created in accordance with the
procedures contained in the first chapter of the General Act, which
beats -the title "Conciliation", and when the Thai Agent presented his
case, with a covering letter dated 12 May 1947, to the President of
the Commission, he stated that he was submitting an application on
behalf of the l~oy a amese Government in accordance with Article 7
of the General Act, and this letter is to be found in the Cambodîan
Memorial <Ü page 38 (1). Article 7 of the General Act provides that each
party to a dispute may bring it before a Conciliation Commission by
means of an application. And correspondingly, the French Agent,
M. Francis Lacoste, wrote to the President of the Commission on 5 May
1947 that he held himself at the disposition of the Commission since
he understood that, in accordance with Article 7 of the General Act,
a Siamese application had been submitted (his letter is to be founcl
at page 32 (1) of the Cambodian Memorial}.
The Conciliation Commission was composed of the representatives
of Siam, the representative of France and three neutral members,
Mr. Victor Belaunde of Peru, Mr. \>"1/illiPhîllips of the United States
4 TEMPLE OF PREAH V.Il;ŒAR
30
and Sir Horace Seymour of. the United Kingdom.Its final Report
stated tl1<1tthe functioof the Commi~s werendetmmined by
Article 3 of the Settlement Agreement and iby the first chapter of the
General Act which, as I have said, be1rs the title "Conciliation".
This, then, is the briefest history of the relationship between Article 3
of th~ Set~le mgernet~~ e ~fter_to tn_Gg_ene .ct ald the
way m wh1ch the ConClbahon CommiSSIOn1orgamzed Jtself and drew
on the procedures of the General Act.
This SettlementAgreement, whose historyI have described,is
evidence of the usefulness and of thedfthese procedures for the
establishmenof a Conciliation Commission lcontained in CIaofer
the General Act. As indicated by this bilateral agreement, France and
Thailand fo~n them use.ful as the pacifie ls~ttmeesereno be
preferred, giVen the relations between them m 1946.
But so far as the research of Counsel can !determine, neither France
nor Thailand moved to take the.ir dispute to this Court on the basis
of those references to the PermanCour o~ InternationaJustice
containedin Chapter z of the General Act under the general title
"JudiciaJ _Sett!ement". 1 .
And thts brmgs me to the end of my opemng statemeThere are
three agreements on which Cambodia relie$ to show the consent of
Thailand to this proceeding. 1
First, there is the General Act of 1928 with îts references to judicial
settlementby the Permanent Court of InthnationaJusticeIt has
never been adhered to either by Thailand ior Cambodia.
Second, there is the Treaty of .Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
of 1937 with its references in Article 21 tb the peaceful settlement
proceduresof the General Act. This is bilateraltreatybetween
Thailand and France. Cambodia is not a partyit.
Third, tl1ere is the Settlement AgrdtNovember 1946 between
Thailand and France, refen:ing in its Articlel3 to a Conciliation Com
mission set up in application of Article 21 of the 1937 Treaty and in
accordancc w.ith the General Act. This was an ad hoc bilateral agreement.
Camboclia was not a party toit. That essentiallprivity between Cambodia
and Thailand which would evidence the consent of Thailto this
proceeding is thus lacking throughout.1
And so it remains for my colleague, Maître Slusny, to show that
under general principles of internatlaw there exists no indirect
process whereby Cambodia may daim forit~e tlfrights of another
State under treatieand under an agreerhent to which Cambodia
îtself is not a party. 3~
4. PLAIDOIRIE DE MeMARCEL SLUSNY
(CONSEIL DU GOUVERNEMENT DE THAÏLANDE)
AUX AUDIENCES PUBLIQUES DES IO ET II AVRIL rg6r
[Audience publique du IO mm:l1g6r, après-midi]
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour.
Mon excellent confrère, Me Hyde, vient de vous démontrer par une
analyse rigoureuse des textes, dans une plaidoirie que je croisxtrême
ment complète et convaincante, qu'aucun des titres que le Gouverne
ment cambodgien a invoqués dans ses observations, savoir .l'acte
généralde 1928, le traité d'amitié, de navigation et de commerce de 1937
ou l'accord de règlement du 17 novembre 1946, ne peut servir de base
à la compétence de la Cour.
La tâche qui rn'est dévolue parmi les conseils de la Thaïlande consiste
à présenter quelques brèves observations supplémentaires sur la question
de savoir si, compte tenu de la théorie généraleen matière de succession
des États, le Cambodge peut prétendre succéder à la France dans les
droits que celle-ci peut éventuellement puiser dans l'article 21 du
Traité de 1937, auquel, comme on le sait, le Cambodge n'est pas partie
en tant que tel.
Il va de soi que jen'ai nu\lement l'ambition - et j'ajouterais volon
tiers la présomption -, ayant à examiner ce point particulier, de
reprendre l'ensemble de la théorie sur la succession des États, par
ailleurs si complexe et si controversée dans bien de ses aspects. Mais
je me bornerai, avec la permission de la Cour, à me référerà certains
principes, dans la mesure où cette référenceme sera utile pour faire
la démonstration que le point de vue du Gouvernement cambodgien
sur les incidences de cette théorie sur la compétence de la Cour, point
de vue exposé aux paragraphes 31, 32 et 33 des observations du Cam
bodge sur les exceptions préliminaires de la Thaïlande, ne peut, à
notre sens, être retenu.
Si nous laissons de côté les<~ute uui nient l'existence mêmed'une
théorie de la succession des Etats, et qui vont ainsi à l'encontre de
la jurisprudence à tout le moins de la Cour permanente de Justice
internationale, les auteurs qui ont étéamenés à examiner le problème
de la succession des États aux traités ont, dans l'ensemble, admis
une distinction fortnette entre deux catégories de traités, étant entendu
cependant que la terminologie diffère souvent d'un auteur à l'autre,
sans compter, bien sür, qu'il existe des difficultés considérables pour
passer d'une langue utilisée à l'autre.
Cette réserve étant formulée, ces deux catégories peuvent être
caractériséescomme étant, d'une part, les traités à caractère personnel
et, d'autre part, les traités réels ou encore d'ordre territorial.Cette
distinction, la Cour le sait, est celle admise par de nombreux auteurs,
et parmi les auteurs les plus récents je me permettrai de citer, sans
le lire, car rienn'est plus fastidieux que la lecture de citations, le
professeur CastJ.::é,ans le cours donné par lui à l'Académie de droit 32 TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VHIÉAR
internationalet qui figure aRecueil des coLrde l'Académiede Droit
international1951, sous les pages 430 et seq.
La mêmedistinction entre traités personnels, d'une part, et traités
territoriauou d'ordre réel, d'autre part, eSt faite par l'auteur d'une
monographie récente égalemen'tsur cet imrrtense sujet, •O'Connell, qui
établit une dichotomie entre,d'une part_j_ ct ici je m'excuse d'em
ployer les termes anglais qui ne recouvrent ipas exactement les termes
français - persona! treaties (traités persontilels) et dispositive treaties,
qu'il faudraittraduire,pour reprendre le!langage de Castrén, par
traités réelsou d'ordre territoriaL· (O'Connell, D.P., The La<l'!of State
SHccession, Cambridge,rgs6, p. rs.) 1
Un autre auteur également, ayant à ·examiner le problème, très par
ticulier d'ailleurs, qui était celui posl~partage de l'Inde britan
nique entre l'Inde et le .Pakistan, et reprertant à cet égard l'avis du
Département juridiquedes Nations Uniesl, Oscar Schachter, étant
lui-mêmele pr.incipal conseiller juridique de ce Département, a examiné
cc problème dans un article qui a paru darts le BritiY ear Book of
InternationalLaw de 1948 (p. ro6). Il fait, h:liégalement, la distinction
traditionnelle quoique, je le répète,lte1m utissés soient souvent
différents - entre les traités qui ont un lien local avec le territoire
cédéou qui a fait sécession et, d'autre Rart, les traités politiques
comme les traités d'alliance ou de règlemerit pacifique.
Cette distinction fondamentale entre ces Heux catégories de traités
éhmt faite, il faut bien reconnaître que lediergences apparaissent
immédiatement en doctrine lorsqu'il s'agitle déterminer quels sont,
en fait, les traités qu'il faut rangert d~n une catégorie que dans
1'autre. Et il serait d'aillenrs extrêmement hasardeux et inutile pour
notre propos de reprendre les controverses lqui existent à cet égard,
par exemple à propos des traités à caractère économique, administratif
.ou judiciaire qui, quoique relevant. de la p:cemièrc catégorie et .étan.t
des traités à caractère personnel, pourraieM cependantdonner lieu
à une certaine application de la notion de sdccession et s'imposeraient
à l'État successeur ou créeraient des droits \en sa faveur.
Par contre, où il semble n'y avoir aucune espèce de divergence entre
les auteurs qui ont examiné ce problème, c'est quant au sort des traités
politiques, des traités purement politiques, liquels il.faut ranger
les traités d'alliance, de neutralité, d'amitié qu de règlement pacifique,
selon l'opinion de O'Conne!l, déjà citée; llopinion également émise
par votre regretté collègue Lauterpachdans .la nouvelle édition qu.'il
avait donnée cle.l'ouvrage classique de Oppenlh(Oppenheim~Lauter
pacht, International~aw .8thEditi Y .'n,.p. ISQ), et également
par Schachter, dans1 articlauqf~ 1al de]a faJt alluswn... .:
Car, lorsqu'il s'agit de traités d'allia.nce, cle neutralitt\,.:d'anlÎtié ·Ou
de règlement pacifique, on se tr.o.uvedev~ nes traités .puren1ent
politiques conclus, pourrait-on dire; intwitu personae, en considération
de .1 personna_litéde l'État avec ,lequel. on [traite,un C?I.lt~xte
pohtrque ·donne,so ~ent en vue .d obtenu des concessiOns correlat! ves
du co-contractant, et 'Fon, peut donc ,dire qu'il s'agit de traités qui
ont un .caractère à ce point ·personnel• que l'on n;::-peut concevoir. que
le bénéficeou la· charge s'en transmetteà 611 Etattiers qui'.n'était
pas le .co-contractant .ori.ginai.e~· ·. [ . ; · ,. .
· Sans doute· nos estrmes contrachctcursse~ont-lls. ,apardnres
que le principe de non"succession aux traités .purement politiques, PLAIDOIRIE DE ;\fSLUSNY 33
parmi lesquels les auteurs rangent donc les traités prévoyant un mode
de règlement pacifique des litiges, ne joue qu'en cas de disparition.
de l'État originairement lié,soit par absorption ou annexion, c'est-à-dire
en cas de succession totale, mais que ce principe ne s'applique pas
en cas de succession partielle, et plus particulièrement en cas d'accession
à l'indépendance d'un territoire sous mandat, d'un protectorat ou d'un
territoiredépendant ayant eu une large autonomie administrative.
Il est possible que nos estimés contradicteurs citent à ce. propos
certains exemples historiques, notamment de pays ayant accédé à
l'indépendance après la seconde guerre mondiale, et invoquent que
clans des traités conclus entre l'État qui acquiert son indépendance
et celui auquel il était précédemment soumis, l'État devenu indépendant
se voyait continuer le bénéficede traités précédemment conclus et
acceptait d'en assumer la charge. .
Nous nous réseryons évidemment de reprendre ce point si cl ~areils
exemples sont invoqués de part adverse, mais nous désirons dès à
pré~en ftrmuler deux brèves remarques à ce propos:
a) les États tiers peuvent de toute manière considérer de pareils
traités comme des res inter alios acta, qui en tout cas ne les lient pas;
b) ,si pour certains ti;aités à caractère personnel, l'opinion peut être,
défendue qu'ils peuvent être transférés à un État successeur, en cas
de succession partielle, question sur laquelle nous ne nous prononçons
pas, en tout état de cause, les traités à caractère proprement politique,
comme les traités d'alliance, d'amitié ou de règlement pacifique, ont
un caractère à çe point personnel, qu'ils ne peuvent être considérés
comme étant de ceux auxquels un État successeur peut succéder, et
cela à cause de l'intuitus personae.
Nous estimons qu'il est inutile d'en elire pour l'instant davantage
sur ce sujet précis, et qu'étant donné le caractère fragmentaire des
solutions intervenues dans divers cas, après la seconde guerre mondiale
notamment, et l'impossibilité à notre sens d'en dégager avec certitude
une règle qui viendrait contredire celle que nous avons formulée, savoir
la non-succession aux traités politiques, nous croyons, sous réserve
des considérations que nous pourrions faire valoir en cours de réplique,
qu'il vaut mieux, au stade actuel, examiner le texte sur lequel se fonde
le Gouvernement cambodgien, savoir l'article21. elu Traité de 1937.
Cependant, avant de passer à cet examen et de soumettre en quelque
sorte l'article 21 du Traité de 1937 à l'épreuve du principe général
retenu, je voudrais cependant citer un traité conclu entre la France
ct le Laos. repris chez un auteu ~ui a également traité récemment
le problème de la succession des Etats aux traités, M. de Murait, dans
un ouvrage intitulé The Problem of State Succession with regard to
Treaties (La Haye, 1954, p. 127 in fine).
Si je cite ce texte, c'est parce qu'il existe entre la situation du Cam
bodge et du Laos, au point de vue de la succession des États, un certain
parallélisme de situation, et que j'estime pouvoir, même à ce stade
de la discussion, en tirer certaines conclusions.
Ce texte présente en effet, a contrario, un certain intérêt. C'est le
traité conclu le 22 octobre 1953 à Paris entre le Laos et la France,
et qui dispose en son article 17 (et je répète qu'il s'agit d'une citation
que j'ai trouvée dans un auteur - qui est donc M. de-Murait -
se référant lui-même à La Docmnintatioh fraiz.çaùC, notes et études34 TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
documentaires, 5 décembre 1953, no18II, Textes diplomatiques CXXX\',
Série Outremer LXI, p. 2):
''La République française reconnaît et déclare que le Royaume
Uni du Laos est un État pleinement indépendant et souverain.
En conséquence, il est substitué à la République française dans
tous les droits et obligations résultant de tous traités internationaux,
ou conventions particulières, contractés par celle-ci au nom du
Royaume du Laos ou de l'Indochine française antérieurement
à la présente convention. ,,
Sous la seule réserve que de toute manière les tiers co-contractants
devraient donner leur accord à de pareils transferts de droit ou d'obliga
tions, il reste que la France et le Laos n'ont point considéré que la
succession du Laos à la France pour les traités, mêmeconclus au nom
du Laos ou de l'Indochine française, allait de soi, puisque aussi bien ces
deux États ont eu recours à un texte formel.
Comme il n'existe à notre connaissance aucun traité analogue entre
la France et le Cambodge, on pourrait peut-être en conclure, eu égard
au parallélisme des situations, que le Cambodge et la France ont estimé
qu'en ce qui concerne les traités conclus par la France et auxquels le
Cambodge pouvait être intéressé, les questions juridiques touchant à
la succession des .États ne pouvaient être résolues qu'en appliquant les
règles générales elu droit international coutumier relatives à cette
matière.
En tout état de cause, ce traité ne vise que les traités internationaux
et les conventions particulières contractées par la France au nom du
Royaume elu Laos ou de l'Indochine française.
Or, nous allons rappeler clans un instant, comme Me Hyde l'a déjà
fait, que le traité de 1937 n'est pas conclu au nom elu Laos ou de l'Indo-
chine française. .
Il y a donc lieu d'examiner le traité invoqué lui-même,pour déterminer
si le Cambodge a succédéaux droits que lit France puisait dans ce
traité.
Si l'on examine ce traité qualifié, on le sait, de ''Traité d'amitié, de
commerce et de navigation entre la Thaïlande et la France,,, on voit
que l'article premier établit un principe général.Je me permets de le lire,
ilest extrêmement bref: ''Il y aura paix constante et amitié perpétuelle
entre le Royaume de Thaïlande et la République française. ,, L'ar
ticle r6 prévoit la faculté d'établir des consuls; l'article2r contient une
référence à l'acte généralde 1928; l'article22 contient un rappel d'un
certain nombre de traités antérieurs, les articles 23 et 24 sont relatifs à
la duréedu traité et à l'échange des ratifications et pour tout le surplus,
il s'agit d'un traité de navigation et de commerce comme son titre
l'indique (et, ajouterons-nous, d'un traité d'établissement, car il contient
des clauses importantes quant à l'établissement des ressortisants des deux
États contractants, à leur statut personnel, aù régimede leurs biens, etc.).
Si la Cour le permet, je voudrais bien rappeler une dernière fois ce
texte de l'article 21, déjà lu par Me Hyde en anglais et traduit depuis
lors, il est bref également; l'article21 dispose donc:
«Conformément aux principes énoncés dans le Pacte de la
Sociétédes Nations, les Hautes Parties contractantes conviennent
cl'appliquer les dispositions de l'Acte général pour le règlement PLAIDOIRIE DE ·M. SLUSNY 35
pacifique des différends internationaux, adopté le 26 septembre .rg28
par l'Assembléede la Sociétédes Nations, au règlement des questions
litigieuses qui surgiraient entre elles dans l'avenir et qui ne pour
raient êtrerésolues par la voie diplomatique. "
La Cour le sait déjà,la Thai1ande soutient que le Cambodge ne succède
pas aux droits que la France a pu acquérir pa.r application de cet article
vis-à-vis de la Thaïlande.
A notre sens il ne peut être question que le Cambodge, après la
conquête de son indépendance, y succède, pa.rcequ'il s'agit de dispositions
conclues ùttutïu personae, en considération de la personne du co-contrac
tant, et que la Thaïlande n'a certes pas entendu se lier pour l'avenir
avec les protecto.rats de la France ou les colonies qui pourraient accéder
à l'indépendance.
La Partie adverse n'est d'ailleurs pas loin de reconnaître le bien-fondé
de cette thèse, puisque le Gouvernement cambodgien, au paragraphe 32,
page r65 (1) de ses observations, soutient que:
((La clause du règlement juridictionnel obligatoire inscrite clans
le traité de 1937 n'est pas invoquée par le Cambodge comme clause
générale.Elle est invoquée pour assurer la solution d'un diffé.rend
relatif à une question régléepar le traité. »
Autrement dit, Je Cambodge ne succéderait point à la France d'une
façon généralepour tous les différends, mais parce qu'il existe un lien
nécessaire entre l'article 2 1 et \'article2 2 et plus particuliè.rement la
partie de l'article 22 confirmative des traités de frontières de 1904 et
190'7. Il y aurait donc entre l'article zr et cette partie de l'article 22
une sorte d'interdépendance conceptuelle.
Cette thèse ne nous paraît pas pouvoir êtreretenue, car il n'existe pas
à notre sens de lien logique entre toutes les dispositions du traité de
1937·
L'article21, d'une part, se relie plus particulièrement à l'article premier,
dont je vous ai donné lecture, et s'inscrit dans le cadre des objectifs
proprement politiques visésau préambule du traité. D'autre part, l'ar
ticle 21 ne se réfèrepas explicitement aux litiges nésde l'apphcation du
traité.
De son côté, l'article 22, paragraphe premier, ne nous paraît pas être
une disposition créant des droits nouveaux. C'est, Me Hyde vous l'a
montré, une clause de sauvegarde de certains traités antérieurs et
notamment des traités de 1904 et 190'7 relatifs aux frontiè.res. Cette
clause de sauvegarde a étéinscrite dans le traité parce que les parties,
voulant simplifier la situation juridique existant entre elles, ont abrogé
les traités antérieurs, sauf ceux visés à l'articl22.
Pour démontrer la relation, à son sens nécessaire, qui existenit entre
l'article zr et l'articl22 du traité, le Gouvernement cambodgien invoque
in fine du paragraphe 32 de ses observations sur les exceptions prélimi
naires ce qui suit:
"La Thaïlande reconnaît que le Cambodge est successeur de la
France en ce qui concerne les traités relatifs à la définition et à la
délimitation des frontières. Elle ne peut exclure arbitrairement du
jeu de tels traités les dispositions qu'ils renferment quant au règle
ment juridictionnel obligatoire, dans la mesure où ce règlement est
accessoire à la définition et à la délimitation des frontières. n3P TEMPLEDE PRÉAH VIHÉAK
Sa_nsdoute, le Gouvernemepourha_ïc<;nsérere.l a fiti_l
alluswn loyalement clans·ses exceptiOns prehmmmres au paragraphe 40,
qu'étant· lié par les traités de 1904 et 190]i, pour ce qui concerne les
frontières, il pourrait être un jour expéclien'tpour les gouvernements
intéressés de recourir à des procédée détarction sur le
terrain de la frontière qui, danâecses parties, n'avait fait
l'objet que d'une définition de principe par féférence,en l'espèce, à la
ligne de partage des eauxI(du tra.ité du r3 février 1904; para-
grap 4de~a r~qu c_aè~~eodgien 1ne.}." . .
·l\1a1scelà ne s1gmfie pas, a notre sens, que don;e etre mamtenue au
profit dü Cambodge une clause dep~cifemquqaue caractère
politique'prem cef~rrécisément parce q\u'elle a étéconclue intuitu
personae avec un Etat déterminé, clans un contexte politique déterminé,
à une époque déterminée.
[Audience publiqu11dm1ril 196.r, matin)
~Io lnPrssieneMessiurs de la Cor\r, je vous remercie de me
donner. la parole et de me pde continuer ·ainsi la démonstra
tion que j'avais commencée hier à propos de l'.ibsence·d'interdépendance
entre les articles zr et 22 du traité de 1937· \
·Nous estimons, de ce côtéde la barre, qu'il y a·si peu interdépendance
nécessaire entre ces deux articd'a~ent uetaté avait dù
êtrèdénoncéconformément à l'a23,les frontières telles qu'elles
résultaient des traitésetde 1907, dppelés eux-mêmes à l'ar
ticJe·zz du traité de 1937, n'aup~isu êtrediscütées, parce
que les traité904 et de 1907, rap~-l'article 22, créaient une
situatiobjective destinée à subsister aussi longtemps qu'un traité
postérieur ne serait pas venu laloo~u, certainemel'ar
ticl21,qui crée une procédure de règlement pacifique des litiges, ne
serait pas demeuré en vigueur. On peut d'ailléur23durer de l'article
traité, qui estàrla dénonciation de ce tbité, un autre argument:
c'est que si l'upattequ~SO?J.n nom ltr<~ lvaitdénoncé,
on peut se demander quel eut alors ete le sort des dr01ts que le Cambodge
prétend en tirer. Le Cambodge et'tt-ilpu préteddre que dès son accession
à l'indépendance il se trouvait investi de droits autonomes en vertu du
trai pa~l,jeu du principe de la succession! des États, et que la dé
nonciation du traité par la France n'eüt eu aucune incidence sur ses
droit"lui, Cambodge, quant au règlement pdcifique prévu par l'article
21,ou encore qu'en cas de dénonciation du traité par la Thaïlande, celle-ci
eüt dù notifier au Cambodge son intention delle dénoncer?
Nous croyons ainsi avoir faitbsurde la démonstration qu'il ne
peut êtrequestion de considérer dq'ce genre, ou plus exacte
ment qu'une disposition comme celle prévue à l'article zr, à raison de
son caractère purempolitiqustrictemepersonnepuisse être
considéréecomme'étendant au-delà du cham}) contractuel délimitéau
départ par les Parties. 1 . ,
Le Gouvernemencambodg1en se rend tellement bwn compte, a notre
sens, c~arac étè!r~ine d~mscnudeasios!ti?n, si on l'an_alyseà
lalum~e rueprmupede droit mternatrelatif a la successwn des
États, que dans un bref passage des observatÛms, au paragraphe 33, il
défend la thèse selon laquelle 1937r'a agi que notamment PLAIDOIN.IE DE M. SLUSNY 37
comme représentant du Cambodge et que, par conséquent, les prüi'cipes
en matière de succession des États ne sont pas .en jeu en l'esp~ce.
Pour pouvoir affirmer qu'un État protecteur traite avec un Etat tiers
comme représentant de son protectorat, et ce en vue de stipcller en.
faveur de ce protectorat, il faudrait, à notre sens, que le texte du traité
fùt tout à fait clair à cet égard.
Et ici je me permettrai, Monsieur le I>résident,Messieurs de la Cour,
de vous rappeler à cet égard l'enseignement du professeur Rousseau,
dans ce maître-livre qu'il a consacré aux traités, publié en 1944, sous
le titre Les principes générauxdu droit international public. Page 381,
au paragraphe 248, le professeur Rousseau rappelle, à propos des
colonies - ma.is nous verrons dans un instant que ce principe s'applique
également mutatis mutandis aux protectorats - que le principe généraL
est l'inapplication des traitésux colonies, sauf clause contraire. Et, sous
le paragraphe 249, le professeur Rousseau examine quels sont les pro-.
cédéstechniques qui ont étémis en Œuvre, et il cite à cet égard plus
particulièrement la pratique de la France, pour étendre le bénéficedes
traités aux colonies. Ces procédéssont au nombre de trois. Il peut y
avoir extension du traité aux colonies par une déclaration formelle
intervenue au moment de la signature, de la ratification ou de l'adhésion;
il peut y avoir application de plein droit du traité à l'çnsemble du terri
toire métropolitain et colonial, avec faculté pour les Etats contractants
d'exclure l'extension du traité aux colonies, et il peut y avoirtroisième
procédé- application pure et simpl d~ traité à l'ensemble des terri
toires métropolitains et coloniaux desEtats contractants, avec cependant
cette réserve indiquée in fine page 386 et qui v.ient confirmer l'ensemble
des réserves qui sont déjà introduites à propos des deux procédés
techniques précédents,que <<quelque soit le procédétechnique utilisé,
il laisse intact le principe de l'inapplication du traité aux colonies dans
le silence du droit conventionnel, principe qui domine toute la matière
et auquel il ne peut êtredércgéqu'en vertu d'une clause .formellepréa
lable J>.
En appliquant ces principes, définisà propos d'extension des traités
aux colonies, aux territoires sous protectorat ou sous mandat, Rousseau,
paragraphe 250 de son ouvrage, note que
((En dehors des cas où les traités internationaux sont conclus soit
au nom de l'État protégépar la puissance protectrice, soit pour le
compte de l'État sous mandat par la puissance mandataire - ce
qui est une hypothèse qui ne nous intéresse pas -, il est possible
que les traités concluspar l'État protecteur ou m_andataire en son
nom propre soient étendus à l'Etat protégéou à l'Etat sous mandat
dans des conditions analogues à celles gui viennent d'êtreindiquées
pour les possessions coloniales."
Il faut donc, si on se réfèreà cette doctrine, soit que le traité indique
clans son intitulé qu'il est conclutamment au nom du protectorat, soit
que l'on ait eu recours à un des procédéstechniques que je viens d'énu
mérer pour étendre l'application du traité à ce protectorat, procédé
'i'echnique qui tout de mêmeprévoit toujours l'insertion d'une clause
formelle à cet égard. Des exemples sont donnés à cet égard par Je·pro
fesseur Rousseau ..Il répète,dans un autre _passage de son ouvrage; au
paragraphe 2or, I!JU'en ce qui concerne les J}tats protégés,il faut que le
préambule du tra,·itéporte l'indication de l'Etat au nom duquel on traite,38 TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
1
et il donne dans un autre paragraphe de ~l'ouvr pagae,aphe 86,
page r8o, une séried'exemples où l'on voit lance conclure des traités
notamment au nom du Maroc ou de la Tunisie en indiquant clairement
dans le préambule du traité qu'elle agit au nbm de ces États. Or, dans
le traité qui est soumis à la Cour à l'heure aCtuelle, le traité de 1937, il
suffit de lire l'intitulé pour constater qu'ilt pas question du Cam
bodge et que la France y apparaît comme traitant pour elle-mêmeet,
d'autre part, aucun des procédéstechniques !indiqués par le professeur
Rousseau à propos des colonies et dont l'extension est prévue par lui
aux protectorats et aux territoires sousdat n'a étéutilisé. Bien au
contraire, l'article zz, qui à cet égard ne fait\ que reprendre la pratique
constante d'ailleurs de la France pourplu~a rtses traités, indique,
en son second alinéa,que le traité ne s'étenipso factaux territoires
sous protectorat, sousandat et aux colonies, et le second paragraphe
de l'article2 que je me permets de relire Cetégard est le suivant:
((Les dispositions du présent traité pohrront êtreultérieurement
étendues en tout ou en partie aucolon eip~ssessions françaises,
ainsi qu'aux pays placés sous le protectoratou le mandat de la
France, par une déclaration concertée bntre les deux gouverne-
ments." 1
Comment imaginer par ailleurs que le Gouvernement français ait
pu songer au moment de la conclnsion du traité qu'il stipulait des droits
au profit du Cambodge dont il n'envisageait \certes pas la sécession, et
que la Thaïlande ait entendu accepter une formule du règlement obliga
t_oirede conflits selon les procédures prévues par l'acte général,avec un
Etat qui, à l'époque,n'avait pas d'existence internationale?
C'est, pensons-nous, vouloir forcer le sensextes et surtout vouloir
donner à un échange de volontés intervenu e]11937, entre la France e_t
la Thailande seule, dans des conditions particulières, une portée qu'Il
n'a pas pu avoir. . . . \ , . .
Nous pensons donc_que la d1stmcüon entre les consequences_ a tirer
de la succession des Etats ou du principe de \la succession des Etats et
du principe de la représentation apparaît dans l'espèce comme tech
niquement exacte, mais ne créant aucune es'pècede différences quant
au;-~onséquen ecleso_bjectio!lsmajeures 'iguenou_savonformul~es
preced.emment nous paraissent JOUer quelle que soit la qualificatiOn
donnée à la situation juridique crééeensuite de l'accession du Cambodge
à l'indépendance. \
Par ailleurs, il nous paraît d'une façon générale,et plus particulière
ment dans le cas qui nous intéresse, extrêmbment douteux qu'un ex
protectorat,après son indépendance, accepté ipso factode considérer
qu'il est liér les traités purement politiques conclus par la puissance
protectrice.t s'il n'est pas liépar de pareils ttaités, s'il n'en assume pas
les obligations, de quel droit pourrait-il, en phncipe, prétendre en tirer
avantage et y puiser des droits? 1
A notre avis, par conséquent, le principe de la relativité des traités
et celui de leur interprétation restriexclu quenlon puisse étendre
au Cambodge le bénéficede l'article zr dutr~i dt 937·
Sans doute, le Gouvernement cambodgien linvoquqct-il un argument
de texte: savoir la déclaration faite par le premier plénipotentiaire
français, au moment de la signature de l'accord de règlement franco- PLAIDOIRIE DE M. SLUSNY 39
siamois du IJ novembre 1946, declaration citée dans les observations
du Gouvernement cambodgien au paragraphe 33·
Cette déclaration est ainsi libellée:
((En signant l'accord de règlement franco-si<1moîs en date de
ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de déclarer d'ordre de mon Gouvernement
qu'il reprend possession des territoires indochinois visésarticlI,
alinéa 2,de cet accord au nom des Gouvernements cambodgien·
et laotien. ))
A notre avis, il serait extrêmement hasardeux de tirer une conclusion
de ce texte en faveur de la thèse cambodgienne.
En effet, s'il apparaît qu'après 1945, et ce à raison des boulever
sements politiques qui se sont produits pendant la guerre, le Gouver
nement français a tenu à citer les Gouvernements des protectorats du
Laos et du Cambodge--: et effectivement partie des territoires récupérés
sont inclus dans ces Etats -, cela signifie-t-il que par un coup de
baguette magique, cette seule déclaration à laquelle le Gouvernement
thaïlandaisn'avait d'ailleurs rien à redire, puisqu'il s'agissait de questions
de frontières (pour lesquelles joue la succession des :Ëtats) et qu'il
n'avait pas à discuter des rapports entre la France et ses protectorats,
ait pu avoir pciur effet, rétroactivement, de faire· du Cambodge une
partie au traité de 1937?
Bien au contraire, dans l'article 2 de l'accord de règlement franco
siamois du r7 novembre 1946, également cité par le Gouvernement
cambodgien, il est prévu "que les rapports entre les deux pays se trouve
ront de nouveau régispar le traitédu 7 décembreI9J7 )Jsans qu'il y soit
question, et pour cause, du Cambodge.
D'autre part, dans les remarques de l'agent du Gouvernement siamois
sur la note, les observations et l'appendice présentéesle 22 mai 1947
par l'agent du Gouvernement français, jointes à la lettre du 29 mai
1947 _de1:ag~ dun touvernement ~i~mo ais!?résidentde laCommiss~on
de negoctation (lettreno 3/2490) citee par le Gouvernement cambodg1en
à la page 58 (1) de son mémoire,on lit:
,,De plus, les réserves faites par l'agent du Gouvernement
français concernant les "revendications>Jdu Cambodge et du Laos
ne semblent également pas pertinentes. Comme l'accord de règle
ment de rg46 n'est intervenu qu'entre le Siam et la l'rance, des
revendications faites au nom des tiers, qui pourraient ne pas
profiter de leur satisfaction, sont inadmissibles. Cet argument
n'implique pas.. cependant, que le Gouvernement siamois a des
objections, à savoir des rapports directs avec le Laos etle Cambodge
libres et indépendants. Au contraire, le Gouvernement siamois
est prêt à les accueillir dans la famille des nations. "
Pour autant, par conséquent, que l'accord de règlement de 1946
se référait au traité de 1937, il apparaît des deux textes cités que
les deux parties, lors des négociations de 1946 et 1947, ont considéré
qu'elles seules étaient parties à l'accord de règlement de 1946, et
par voie de conséquence, au traité de I93J.
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, je crois m'êtreacquitté
de la tâche qui m'était dévolue en tant que conseil du Gouvernement
thaïlandais, qui mnsistait, après l'analyse des textes qui avait été
faite par Me Hyde, à m'attacher plus particulièrement à montrer que,40 n:i\IPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
ni pa.r le jeu du principe.-de la succession cJJJ:État, ni par le jèu dês:
principes en matière de représentation d'uni Etat par un autre, l'on•
ne peut prétendre que le Cambodge a pu tirer certains droits de
l'article 21 du traité de 1937 et succède à 1~France quant aux droits
compris dans l'article 21, et par conséqu quann~ aux droits à un
règlement paciHque des conflits selon les méthodes ~t dans les termes
prévus par l'acte généralde 1928. . 1 '· ·
je suis arrivé au moment même où il me faut résumer l'ensemble
de l'a.rgumentation de la Thaïlande, et je croik que la meilleure méthode
pour les conseils de la Thaïlande consiste à ls1en _tenir au tex te. Nous
avions conclu dans nos exceptions préliminaires, au paragraphe •46,
par une série de conclusions rédigéesd'ailleÜrs en anglais, et je crois
que pour l'unité de Ia. pensée il vaut mieux !que nous les laissions en
anglais. Nous n'y apportons que des modifications tout à fait mineures
consistant dans la suppression du paragrapl-\e C (1} et J'addition des
paragraphes C (3} et C (4) selon une nouvel(e numérotation d'ailleurs
provoquée par la suppression du paragraphe <l (1).Comme il s'agit dtun
texte anglais, je me permettrai, après la tradud,tion qui vient d'êtrefaite
des quelques mots que je viens de vous elire,. de demander à sir
Frank Soskice de relire ces conclusions qui ·lisesubstitueront à celles
qui sont indiquées au paragraphe 46 de nos exceptions préliminaires.
je vous remercie pour votre attention.
Sir Frank Sosl<ICE: Mr. President and Mer;nbers of the Court. _
The Conclusions in their amended form will be as follows and, with
the permission of the Court, perhaps I shoul0\ read them: .
Paragraph (A) will be as it is at present·; :paragraph (B} will be as
it is at present; paragraph (C) wîll read: 1 .
(i) that Cambodia is not a party to the Ifranco-Siamese Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of ? December 193?.
nor has she succeeded to any of th~ rights of France there-
under; _ 1 _ .
(ii) that consequently the sa1d Treaty does: not constJtute an agree~
ment of the Parties to submit the said dispute to the jurisdiction
of th ~ourt: _ _l __ .·
.(iiithat CambodJa ISnot .a party to the h:ranco-S1amese Settlement
Agreement of 17 November 1946, nor has she succeedecl to any
of the rights of France t?ereunder; 1 _
(iv) that. consequent! y the sa1d Agreement does not constitute an
agreement of the Parties to submit the .said dispute "to the
jurisdiction of the Court_ 1
1 5. DÉCLARATION DE S. EXC. M. TRUONG CANG
(AGENT DU GOUVERNEMENT DU CAMBODGE)
A L'AUDIENCE PUBLIQUE DU II AVRIL Ig6r, MATIN
!VIonsieurle Président, Messieurs de la Cour.
J'ai l'honneur de représenter devant la Cour le Gouvernement royal.
du Cambodge.
Avant de prendre la parole à titre de plaidoiries, je demande hum
blement au nom du Gouvernement royal du Cambodge et au nom de
toute la délégation cambodgienne ici présente la permission de saluer
respectueusement MM. les Membres de la Cour et plus particulièrement
ceux qui viennent d'être appelés en son sein.
A mes côtés, M. Dean Acheson, membre du barreau de la Cour
suprême des États-Unis, MM. Roger Pinto et M. Paul Reuter, tous
deux professeurs à la faculté de droit de l'Université de Paris, ont
bien voulu accepter d'être nos conseils.
La Cour me permettra de rappeler très brièvement l'origine et la
cause du différend dont elle est saisie.
Malgré les protestations réitérées,les démarches et réclamations
diplomatiques du Cambodge, le Hoyaume de Thaïlande persiste, depuis
I949, à faire acte d'occupation sur une parcelle du territoire cambodgien,
sisedans la province de Kompong-Thom, où se trouvent les ruines d'un
saint monastère, le temple de Préah Vihéar, lieu sacré de. pèlerinage
et de culte pour la population çambodgienne de nos jours encore.
Bien plus, en I954, la Thaïlande, en violation de la Charte des
Nations Unies, a introduit sur cette parcelle, relevant de la souveraineté
du Cambodge, des élémentsde ses forces armées. Le Cambodge s'est
abstenu de répondre par la force à cette grave violation de son intégrité
territoriale.M.ais Ies recours diplomatiques engagés avec Ja Thaïlande
n'ont donné aucun résultat. Pour assurer le respect de ses droits et
obtenir du Roy;wmc de Thaïlande qu'il remplisse ses obligations inter
nationales, le Cambodge a étéainsi amené à saisir la Cour.
La Thaïlande a soulevédeux exceptions préliminaires que ses avocats
viennent de développer à la barre. Nous demandons à la Cour de
rejeter ces deux exceptions. Nous prions la Cour de dire et juger
qu'elle est compétente pour statuer sur le différend porté devant elle,
le 6 octobre r959, par la requêteintroductive d'instance du Cambodge.
M. Dean Acheson présentera à la Cour les principes généraux qui
commandent, à notre très humble avis, la solution de cette compétence.
Les professeurs Roger Pinto et Paul ·Reuter réfuteront, dans le détail,
la_thèse thaïlandaise.
La Cour me permettra, en terminant ces brèves observations, de
rappeler que la politique constante du Cambodge est de recourir, comme
il l'a déjà fait, sans aucune exception, aux moyens de règlement paci
fiques prévus par la Charte des Nations Unies. En application de l'ar
ticle 36, paragraphe 3, de la Charte, le Cambodge, après avoir recouru
en vain aux négociations diplomatiques et même à des tentatives de
conciliation, soumet ainsi un différend d'ordre juridique à la Cour----~--- ~---
42 TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
internatîonale de Justice confonnément aux 1dispositions clu Statut de
la Cour. Le Gouvernement royal du Camboage considère cette affaire
comme étant de la plus haute importance, !non seulement en ce qui
concerne les légitimes intérêtsde son pays, mais, sur un plan plus
élevé,pour se convaincre lui-même de l'efficacité des institutions de
1
règlement pacifique établies par la Charte des Nations Unies, et ce
faisant, il ne croit pas avoir commis un abe peu amical envers la
Thaïlande. 1
Je vous prie, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour. de bien
vouloir donner maintenant la parole à M. Dean Acheson. 43
6. ARGUMENT OF Mr. DEAN ACHESON
(COUNSEL FORlTHE GOVERN.MENT OF CAMBODIA)
AT THE PUBLIC HEARINGS OF II APRIL rg6r
[Public hearing of II April I96I, mom.ing]
Mr. President, Members of the Court.
At this stage of the proceedings, as the distinguished Agents for both
of the Parties before the Court have agreed, we are dealing, not with
the merits of this cause, but with objections raised by the Government
of Thailand to the jurisdiction ofthe Court. I shaH address my arguments
to the first of these objections, which have to do with the declaration
of May 1950, and my colleague Dr. Pinto will do the same; my colleague
Dr. Reuter will address himself in part to the second objection, which
has to do with the Treaty of 1937.
Now, if the Court please, Thailand says, in paragraph 4 of its Objec
tions, that it sought in complete good faith to file with the Secretary
General of the United Nations its consent to the compulsory jurisdiction
of thisCourt. And, indeed, it did file a paper with the Secretary-General
which led that official to believe that Thailand had succeeded in its
purpose.
However, Thailand now believes that it failed in its purpose because
of the inept use of an English word. And it believes also that a decision
by this Court, rendered sorne years-nine years-after it filed its decla
ration, has contributed to its doubt that this Court has jurisdiction of
the cause. Were it not for this doubt, Thailand states in paragraph 3 of
its Preliminary Objections, it "would approach an investigation of the
merits willingly and with confidence".
One cannot altogether escape the thought that, if the Government of
Thailand, instead of asking this Court to resolve its doubts about
jurisdiction,had confirmed the intent which so plainly appears in the
declaration of rgso that it submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court,
then we would get on much more quickly with that willing and confident
approach to the merits. And indeed, this thought is strengthened by
the apparent fact that Thailand's concern about the jurisdiction of this
Court is, except for this particular cause, rather a theoretical matter,
for the declaration of rgso has already expired sorne eleven months ago,
and no case was filed either by or against Thailand before that expiration.
However that may be, the preliminary questions have been raised;
the jurisdiction of the Court has been called in question, and that
question must be decided before progress can be made to a decision on
the merits.
Thailand has a long and honourable history of accepting compulsory
international judicial jurisdiction.Many of us in my own country wish
that our own record had been as unqualified.
May 1 briefly run over the documents which evidence Thailand's
consent to the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court, the predecessor of
this Court, and then of this Court itself? They begin in September 1929, TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
44
when Thailand filed a document which is of such importance that I think
it is worth reading again. That document said:
"On behalf of the Siamese Government, I recognize, subject to
ratification, in relation to other Member or State which accepts
the same obligation, that is to say, on the basis of reciprocity, the
jurisdiction of theourt as compulsory ipso facto and without any
special convention, in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2, of
the Statute of the Court, for a period of ten years, in all disputes
as to which no other means of pacifie settlement is agreed upon
between the Parties."
This declaration came into effect on 7 May 1930 with the filing of the
necessary ratification with the Secretary-General of the League of
Nations.
Then ten years expired, and by another letter dated 4 May 1940 the
following declaration was transmitted to the Secretary-General of the
League of Nations:
"I hereby renew for a period of 10 years from the 7th May, 1940
the declaration of the 2oth September, 1929, accepting the com
pulsory jurisdiction ofhe Permanent Court of International Justice
in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute of the
Court within the limits of and subject to the conditions and reser
vations set forth in the said declaration."
Then, ten years later, another document was filed, and this, if the
Court please, is the document with which we are principally concerned
at this point in the proceedings. This document was dated 20 May 1950
-a significant date-and was addressed to tlie Secretary-General of the
United Nations. In that declaration the Thaï Government declared:
"I have the honour to inform you that by a declaration dated
September 20, 1929 His Majesty's Government had accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of .the Permanent Court of International
Justice in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute
for a period of ten years on condition of reciprocity."
The declaration continued:
.
"That declaration has been renewed on May 3, 1940 for another
period of ten years." . ·
And then cornes this very significant paragraph:
"In accordance with the provio sf Amtiles36, paragrap,h 4 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, I have now the
honour to inform you that His Majesty:s Government hereby rl'!new
the declaration above mentioned for a further period of ten years
as from May 3, 1950 with the limits and subject to the same con
ditions and reservations as set forth in the first declaration of
September 20, 1929."
Now the Court will note that the operativ,e paragraph of this decla
ration, the last paragraph, begins with these words: "In accordance
with the provisions of Article 36, paragraph 4 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice ...". We note that in makirig this decla
ration Thàiland was referring to tht:sCourt and !lot to any other court. ARGUi\ŒNT OF i\fR. ACHESON
45
We must look therefore at paragraph 4 of Article 36 of the Statute of
this Court for further light on what Thailand had in mind. That para
graph tells us exactly what Thailand had in mind, for the paragraph
says:
"Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the
parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court."
Now, it says "such declarations",but what declarations? To find .out
what declarations are referred to in paragraph 4 we turn to the preceding
paragraphs, 2 and 3, and these paragraphs read as follows:
"The States parties to the present Statute may at any time
declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without
special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same
obligation, the jurisdiction of this Court in alllegal disputes ..."
of a type then described. And paragraph 3 goes on to say that this
acceptance may be unconditional, or it may be conditional.
It would therefore seem, if the Court please, entirely clear that,
in the communication of 20 May 1950, Thailand believed that it w:as
depositing with the Secretary-Generalof the UnitedNationsadeclaration
falling within paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 36 of the Statute of this
Court, consenting to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. And
indeed, thereis no argument about Thailand's intention to accept the
jurisdiction of this Court, since the Government of Thailand and its
learned Counsel readily concede that. The intent of Thailand is therefore
established beyond all question. Learnedunsel do not question intent;
learned Counsel question only whether that intent was carried out.
Let us stay on the matter of intent for a few minutes. Cambodia fully
accepts Thailand's assertionsthat this declaration was made in good
faith. Thereis no reason to doubt this at ali, and we earnestly trust that
this Court will accept the declaration in the same way and will give it
the effect which it was intended to have.
And therefore one may ask, why is it that Thailand now believes that
the achievement of this lofty purpose was frustrated? The explanation
seems to lie in Thailand's doubt about the English word "renew".·And
why does the use of this word cause trouble? Because we are told that
the prior declaration had expired-that is, the declaration. of 1929 as
renewed in 1940 had expired-and that something which ·has expired
cannot be renewed. One, so it is said, can only "renew" something which
is in existence. And a decision of thisurt, the decision in Israel v.
Bulgaria, is called upon to sustain the argument that the declaration
of 1940 renewing that of 1929 had ceased to have effect when the Perma
nent Court of InternationalJustice, to which .it referred, had ceased to
exist. However,it seems quite unnecessary to charge this Court through
its decision with having caused the .expiration of the declaration of 1929,
because that declaration had already expired by its own terms. The
renewal of 1940 was only to go until 6 May r9so. Tdecl~r. waeareon
no_wtalking a~:> wOautated 20 May-two weèks had expir snce the
pnor declaratiOn ceased to be in full force and effect. So we have no
need to turn to any decision of this Court to establish_ the fact that· the
prior declarationhad ceased to exist. . . · . .· . .' ~ .
5 TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
Mr. President and Members of the Court: let us ask again what it is
that Thailand was attempting to do when it filed its declaration of May
1950. I suggest, if the Court please, that it was trying, and trying eamest
ly, and trying in good faith, to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of
this Court; and in doing so it quite properly referred to its long and
proud record of havjng accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
predecessor court to this one. It referred to its prior acceptances for the
purpose of incorporating in the document of 1950, for the purpose of
incorporating by reference, what it referred to as the "limits, conditions
and reservations" set forth in the declaration of 1929. In other words, if
the Court please, it revived what, upon any view of the situation, had
lapsed; that is, it revived the obligation; the obligation which it had
first assumed in 1929 and had attempted to continue right along, but
which unhappily had lapsed at !east for a period of two weeks and
possibly for a period of four years. It sought to revive that obligation,
the obligation to consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court,
and it made that clear by its references in the document of 1950.
But the Government of Thailand and its learned Counsel now have
doubts that Thailand's use of the word "renew" was a correct use under
the circumstances. A declaration which has lapsed, so it is argued, is
"incapable of renewal". In other words, the mcaning of the English
word "to renew" can only be to continue life or continue effectiveness;
it cannot mean, so it is said, to revive something which has become
ineffective. But a turn to the dictionary disposes of this argument very
quickly, for the dictionary tells us that among the meanings, the common
meanings, of the word "renew" are to "make new again", to "re-es
tablish", to "rebuild", to "revive". There are many dictionaries which
confirm what I have said. I hesitate, if the Court please, to refer to an
American dictionary, since, perhaps, that may be regarded as referring
to a related but different tongue. There are, however, English diction
aries, for example, theOdham's Dictionary of the English Language (1946),
the VIII Oxford English Dictionary (1941), and Chambcrs's Twentieth
Century Dictionary (1901), ail of which give the meanings of the word
which I have now used.
But going beyond the dictionary to established English usage, it
seems particularly strange to me to hear the argument made at this
particular time of year that the word "renew" cannot mean to revive
that which has lapsed. This week, if the Court please, follows closely
upon Easter. Throughout the world in many religions this is the festival
of the renewal of !ife. What was dead has become alive again. Spring
is the symbol of resurrection. Over two millennia ago the Roman poet
Horace spoke of this miracle of Spring in the seventh ode of his Fourth
Book and that ode has been translated by the distinguished English
poet Housman, in which he uses the word "renew" in the sense which
1 am now pressing upon the Court, and this is what he says:
"The snows have fied away, leaves on the shaws
And grasses in the mead renew their birth,
The river to the river-bed withdraws,
And altered is the fashion of the earth."
(Housman, More Poems (1936).)
Thailand's declaration of 1950 was in the English language. Perhaps
one of the greatest authorities, certainly the two greatest authorities, ARGUMENT OF MR. ACHESON
47
on the use of the English language are the King James Version of the
Bible and Shakespeare. Over and over again we fincl in the King James
Version of the Bible the use of the word "renew" to mean "create",
to "make new", to "revive". For instance, in the srst Psalm, the
psalmist, after confessing his manifold sins and his fall from grace,
cries:
"Hide thy face from my sins, and blot out ail mine iniquities.
Create in me a dean heart, 0 God; and renew a right spirit
within me."
The prayer is to make something new which was dead. And again in
the 8th verse of the rsth Chapter of Second Chrc;micles,it is said that:
"When Asa beard the words, and the prophecy of Oded the
prophet, he took courage, and put away the abominable idols
out of ali the land of Judah and Benjamin, and out of the cities
which he had taken from Mount Ephraim, and renewed the altar
of the Lord."
Now, he renewed the altar which had been destroved.
Particularly inthe Epistles of St. Paul we find the use of the word
"renew" in this sense. And so in the rzth Chapter of the Epistle to
the Romans, St. Paul says:
"And be not conformed to this world; but be ye transformed
by the renewing of your minci...".
This is a re-creation. And in the 4th Chapter of the Epistle to the
Ephesians, he says:
"That ye put off concerning the former conversation the old
man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts;
And be renewed in the spirit of your minci."
And again, writing to the Colossians, in the 3rd Chapter, after warning
them against the wickedness of the !ife in which they had walked,
he says: · ·
"Lie not to one another, seeing that ye have put off the old
man with his deeds;
And have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge
after the image of him that created him...".
Shakespeare himself uses this worcl in a context which makes the
meaning which l urge indisputably clear. This use appears in the
second Act of Othelloin the first Scene, when Cassio, hearing of Otheilo's
return to Cyprus, makes a prayer as follows:
"Great Jove, Othello guard,
And swell his sail with thine own powerful breath,
That he may bless this bay with his tall ship...
Give renew'd fire to our extincted spirits,
And bring ail Cyprus comfort!"
"Renew" is here used to rekindle something which has gone out: "Give
renew'd fire to our extincted spirits."
Nor do we have to turn only to the Scriptures and the poets to fmd
this use. lt is also used in the language of international law. For
example, France and Paraguay executed a Treaty in r86z by which TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
they "renewed" (renouvelé) a treaty which they expressly recognized
as having expired more than a year previously. This is the Convention
concluded at Asunci6n on 9 August 1862. De Clerq, Recueil des Traités
de la France, Vol. VIII, page 503.
Moreover, other countries besicles Thailand have used the word
"renew" to mean revive in order to bring bad: to !ife an expired
declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court.
Honduras made a declaration on 2 January 1948, effective for six
years from 10 February 1948. I.C.]. Yearbook I947-I948, page 129.
This declaration was not renewed while it was still in force, and con
sequently expired on 9 February 1954.
But on 24 May 1954, more than tluee months after the expiration,
Honduras deposited a declaration "renewing" from that date its
declaration of 1948. 190 U.N.T.S., page 377· Honduras used the Spanish
word "renueva", which the Secretarv-General translated as "renews".
And it will be noted that Honduras "did not even attempt to date this
renewal back to the expiration of the other declaration, but was
perfectly content to leave a gap in the period of its submission to the
compulsory jurisdiction of this Court. And yet it bas occurred to no
one that Honduras took a quixotic and quite impossible act.
Similarly, if the Court please, Estonia, in 1928, filed a document
in accordance with the Statute of the prior Court stating that its prior
declaration, which had expired sorne time before, "is deemed to be
renewed". Publications of the P.C.I.]., 4th Annu.al Report, Series E,
No. 4, page 422.
We submit, therefore, that from the etymological point of view
Thailand's doubts are quite without foundation.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, may I now invite the Court
to consider with me the operative paragraph of the declaration of
1950, that is, the last paragraph. If we read it by spelling out ali the
implications and ellipses in that paragraph, if we do that, I submit
to the Court that it would read as follows: "In accordance with the
provisions of Article 36, paragraph 4, of the Statu te of the International
Court of Justice (which provides for depositing with you, Mr. Secretary
General, declarations described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the same
article), I am depositing this declaration (which in the language of
paragraph 2 is one recognizing 'as compulsory ipso facto and without
special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same
obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court') which revives and re-establishes
as tothe International Court of] ustice the obligations of the declaration
of 20 September 1929, for a further period of ten years from 3 May
1950, with the same limitations and subject to the same conditions
and reservations."
This, if the Court please, is what the words actually mean. lt is
not artistic; but it is clear. Indeed, what else could the declaration
of Thailand have meant or been intencled to mean? Plainly, Thailand
did not intend a futile act. It dicl not intend to continue its submission
to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court, which hacl
then been cleacl for four vears. But it clid intend, clearlv intencl, to
subject itself to the compulsory jurisdiction of some court, and it
identified that court as this Court. lt specifically declares that it is
filing the declaration of consent under the very article and paragraph
of this Court's Statute which provides that "States parties to the present ARGUMENT OF MR. ACHESON 49
Statute may at any time" file declarations "that they recognize as
compulsory ~·p racto and without special agreement .._the jurisdiction
of this Court". It makes this declaration by referring to and incorporating
by reference an earlicr obligation to accept the tenns and conditions
of that obligation.
It is difficult to conceive of a more clear demonstration of the intention '
of a State to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court and it
would, indeed, be a perverse technicality, I submit, which would
frustrate so manifest a demonstration of sovereign will. Fortunately,
both this Court and its predecessor have expounded the law of their
jurisdiction as having been based squarely on consent of the State
sought to be brought before it. This Court has been equally clear that
consent is evidenced by the intent of the State in question. It is not
a matter of form. If the intention to consent to jurisdiction is manifest,
then jurisdîction attaches.
But learned Counsel iloes not agree. In his opening statement he
said: ''\Villdoesnot suffice unless the necessary fonnalities are observed.''
This statement and another similar to it appear on pages r2 and 15 1
of the transcript of yesterday's argument.
1 submit, if the Court please, that consent is not a matter of for
malities. I submit tbat consent is evidenced by the plain and ordinary
meaning of words, or îndeec\ of acts. Consent is not hedged about by
traps of formality for the unwary or unskilful, like a putting green
on a golf course.
Here I bespeak the indulgence of the Court ifI venture to refer
to rules of international law which this Court itself has been principally
effective in promulgating. White this Court, of course, is fully familiar
with these rules, sinceit promulgated them itself, it may be of assistance
to it to have views of Counsel as to how they apply in our present
case_ For instance, in The Interpretation of Peace Treaties case, this
Court declared :
"The consent of States,. parties to a dispute, is the basis of
the Court's jurisdictîon in contentions cases." l.C.J. Reports IgjO,
page 71.
Itis equally clear that it is the fact of consent, and not any particu\ar
formula, which establishes the jurisdiction of the Court. A document,
if a document exists, simply constitutes evidence of the intent and
evidence of the fact of consent. If that fact is established by other
means, then a document may not be needed at ail. No particular form
is necessary for the expression of consent; any fonn which the party
or parties may choose is adequate providing that it makes the fact
of consent clear. In the Corfu Channel case this Court held, and I
quote from its Judgment:
"While the consent of the parties confers jurisdictîon on the
Court, neither the Statute nor the Rules require that this consent
should be expressed in any particular form." I.C.). Reports I947-
I948, page 27.
And in the j1Javrommatis case the Permanent Court, in rejecting an
objection to its jurisdiction which it found to be formalistîc, declaree\,
and I quote from .its Judgmen t :
1 Seepp. 14-15 ahove_50 TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
''The Court, whose jurisdicis intdrnationis not bound to
attach to matters of form the same ofi~portance which they
might possess in municipal law." P.C.LJI., Seri2, page 34-
The doctrine of this and similar holdings by the PermCourt is
weil described Judge Hudson in The Permanent Court of Intlffnational
JusticeI920-I942on pages 410 and 411. 1
The natural and ordinary meaning of thG words used by Thailand
in its declaratiof 1950 are clear. The on\y word whose meaning is
disputed is "renew" and we have seen that Thailand's contention that
to be able of renewal an obligation must be cJ..rrently in force is entirely
wiWe may respectfully enquire of Thailand whether it can show any
meaning which its declaration of 1950 could have had other than that
of acceptance of the jurisdiction of this Court for a period of ten years.
Thailand clearly does not deny that as a m~of ubstance its dec
laration of 1950 expressed its cotothe ljurisdiction of this Court.
M r._Pre s,iCc:~eesnf.t h?~:t. Th1pri~1 whih w 7heve
been dtscussmg relatmg to the )Urtsdtctwn of tlus Court are an apphcatwn
of broader principles which are equally weil e~inintrnatonal
law. The rule thaitis COflSentwl1ich is of the essence in establishing
jurisdiction,d that substance rather than fÇn:.mis·crucial in ascertàin
ing whether consent has in fact been given, is in harmony with the more
general· doctrine tiinternationinstrum arenttsbe applied in
accordance with their manifest purpose[ intent and so as to give
effect to the objectives for whichwere wnduded, if those can be
ascert Vat'tip't~ietdi.way: 1 ..
The motwe of the la11!Jo,r of the treaty, that ts to say, the purpose
whichthe parties had in mind, is one of the surest means of fixing
its true sense, and careful attshou1ld be paid to it whenever
there îs a question either of explaining an obscure, equivocal, or
und~ter pasage inda law or trea orof'applying it to a
parttcular case. When once the puwh~ce has led the speaker lo
actis clearly known his 1fJOrdsmust be t>nûrpreted and applied ·in the
light of that purpose only. OtherwquüJ,be made lo speak and
act conlrary to his inten#on and to the obfect he had in view." (The
Lau! of Nations, Book IJ, Chapter 17, Engl. transi. Camegie Insti-
tution, 1916.) 1
The list of weig:h_tyi_nternational autwhich could be cited_ for
the same proposJtwn 1sail but endless. l shall qonfine myself to mentwn
ing the lucid statement in Crandall (Treaties, Jl"heirMa!àng and Enforce
ment, pp. 371-377, 2nd Ed., 1916).
The Court ·willpermit me to mention in passing that the jurisprudence
of the highest courts of my own country asl to the constrandion
application of internatiinstrumentsis in entîre accord with these
principles.e rule of înterpretand applying a trcaty according to
its purpose was, for examplc, stated and fol16wed in Sautovv.cenzo
Egan (Uwited States Reports, Volume 284, pp.[3o, 37 (1931)).
In view of these consideratioît is not surprising to fine\ that, if
the Court must choose between an applicbtan international instru
ment which would make it effective and an [application which would
make it totally void and of no efwilinvariably choose the former ARGUl\ŒNT OF l'l'IR. ACHESON SI
unless the language of the instrument absolutely requires a different
rcsult. It follows neces.sarily from a consideration of the purpose behind
an instrument, that it would be altogether extraordinary for a State to
execute an instrument with the intent that it should have no effect
whatever. Thailand bas expressly denied that it bad any such intent in
making the declaration of rgso. Thailand has insisted that the declaration
was made in good faith and with the intent that it be effective.
As Arbitra tor Lardy said in The Island of T1:morcase in I9I4:
"Conventions between States, like those between individuals,
ought to be interpreted 'rather in the sense in which they have
sorne effect than in the sense in which they can produce none'."
Scott, Hague Conrt Reports, page 384 {rgr6).
And to quote Vattel again:
"It is not presumee\ that sensible persans, when drawing up a
treaty or any other serions document, meant that nothing should
come of their act-the interpretation "li:JhhPJoulrdender a treaty null
and void cannot beadmüted... [I]t is a form of absurdity that the very
terms of the document should reduce it to mean nothing. The
document must be interpreted in suck a way as to prodttce its ejjecls
and not prove meaningless and void..." The Law of Nat1"ons,Book Il,
Ch. IJ,sec. 283.
This language of Vattel was, 1 might add, adopted and applied by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Geojroy v. R1:ggs
(United States Reports, Vol. 133, pp. 258, 270 {rSgo)) and it is followed
generally by the courts of the United States.
The same principle has been applied by this Court. By way of example
only I mention the Cor/tt Channel case, 1.C.]. 1?eports 1:949at page 24,
and the Reparal'ion for 1njuries case, T.C.]. Reports I949 at pages
I78-r84.
The argument advanced by Thailand today presents a stark challenge
to this salutary principle. Thailand would have this Court interpret
and apply a solemn international instrument, undertaken in good faith,
in such a W<ty as to deny it a.ny effect whatever and leave it a total
nullity. Cambodia urges that the Court give the declaration effect, and
give it the clear and evident effect which was intended and which is
shawn by the natural and ordinary meaning of the words employed. In
those circumstances there is no need to consider rules designed for the
interpretation of instruments whose me:ming and language is less than
clear. But if those rules are consîdered, they lend additional support to
the conclusion that the 1:950declaration was effective to vest this Court
with jurisdiction of the present case.
Both of Thailand's objections to the jurisdiction of .this Court. are
sough t to he founded on this Court's decision in 1srael v. Bulgaria. Yet
that decision, r respectfully submit, does not bear upon any question
presentee\ here.
The decision in that case lends, I snbmit, no support whatever to the
argument of Thaila:nd. Thailand's problem is this: it is to overcome,
if possible, the fi.ling of a declaration in 1950, a.fter it had become a
Member of the United Nations, the plain purpose and intent of which was
to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of a court, and specifically referring
to the Statute of thù Court.52 TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
1
With Bulgaria it was wholly different. Bulgaria had filed nothing. it
bad referred to nothing, it had expressed lno intentwhatever of
accepting the compu!sory jurisdiction of this; in fitbad shown
umnista.kably the intentinotto accept the jurisdiction of this Court.
Nevertheless the argument was made, and rJjected by this Court, that
as a matter olm~m·ee!v bv becoming a l\·1en1berof the United Nations,
Bulgariabad revived, and 1;ude applicable t6 this Court, a declaration
of 1921, thirty-four years before, accei~defi nhi omepulo'y
jurisdictioof another court, the PermanehtCourt of International
Justi~e. . 1 . : .
Ttus Court held that no such rule of law ex.1sted, and that the ]Uns
diction of this Court rested upon the consen't of the parties, and that,
regardless of what Bulgaria had clone thirty-f6ur years before, it bad not
in 1955, on joining the United Natiexpre~ ay consent to accept
the compulsory jurisdiction of this CourJ.
The allegee\ rule of law, which the Court rejccted, was sought to be
der.ived from Article 36,graph 5, of the Statute of this Court, which
reads as follows : 1
"Declarations made unc\er Article 36 oBthe Statute of the Perma
nent Court· of Intema tional Justic\\~hdare shl! in 'force shall
be deemecl, as betweenthe parties to the present Statuto be
acceptances of the compulsoryjurisdicbonof the ·International
Court of Justice for the period which they still have to 111,
acc~rd withnteie tenns." . 1 .
Now tlus Court hele\ that paragrapappllca!ble only to those natwns
which by signing the Charter of the Unitedi Nations at its beginning
became partiesto the Statuteof this Court on I5 December 1946.
This Court believed and said that these part,es clearly intended by the
language which they drafted in Article 36 (5) to transfer to this Court
their opera ti ve acceptances of the jurof.its then existing_ prede
cessor. But the Court held that no such mtentwcould be denved on
the part of a stranger to the negotiation of the Statute, in respect to a
declarationmade years before and a dead lètter for a decade during
which that nation bad not been a party to the Statute of this Court_
There is not a word, if the Court please, in Israel v. Bulgaria to suggest
that Bulgaria, had it so desired, couldv~acceptee\ the compulsory
jurisdiction of this Court by a declarafi~naftr it had become a
.Member. This Bulgaria coule\ have clone even !had it clrafted the declara
tion by referring to its former acceptance of the old Court's jurisdiction
to incorporateapplicable provisions, so long as it specifiee\ that the
declarationwas being filed under Article 36 '(4)of the Stof this
Court. By such a document it coulcl have reacbvarevived, renewed,
and re-established its former declaraof .icceptance with the same
limits, reservatioand conditions asbeforeJ but made applicable to,
and filed with and under the procedures of, the InternatCourt of
JuTs 1 t'fh·1i ld-deI .. d '1 1 1 · · d" · f
ISlSw 1at a1anc 1 . t accepte t1e 1wmpu soryJUriSIctwn o.
this Court. The issue, if this Court please, pmay be somewhat
clarifiee\ by my submitting that it is not whetHer the declaration of 1929
was renewed or rev.ived; it is whether the obligation, evidenced bv the
declaration of 1929, to accept compulsory lprocess was revived in ARGU.MENT OF MR. ACHESON 53
respect of this Court. We are speaking of an obligation, not of a piece of
paper. An obligation was referred to in the declaration of 1929. Was
that obligation revived, recreated, transferred to this Court by the
declaration of 1950? I respectfully submit that both the intention to do
that and the accomplishment of that purpose was shown and achieved
by the declaration of 1950.
[Public hearing of II April196I, afternoon]
Mr. President, l\fembers of the Court. When the Court rose this morning,
we were considering the bearing of the decision of the Court in 1srael
v. Bulgaria upon the issue presented in this case, and 1 had ventured
to suggest that israel v. Bulgan:a did not mean, and the Court clid not
say, that Bulgaria coulclnot have, if it had chosen, filecla new declaration
after it became a Member of the United Nations accepting the compulsory
jurisdiction of this Court. And it could have made that declaration if
it had wished to, so far as any language in this Court's decision in
Israel v. Bulgan:a is concerned, by referring to its previous declaration
and saying that it revived that one by a new act of will, and submitted
under the same terms to the jurisdiction of this Court. There is nothing,
I urged upon this Court, to the contrary in that decision.
And I should like to go on now to suggest that the difficulties in
Thailand's argument, which is based on Israel v. Bulgaria, are very
starkly revealed if we look at the language used by the Government of
Thailand in its Objections. If we compare that language with the language
used by this Court in Israel v. Bulgaria, the Court will see, I hope, that
there is no correlation between them. For instance, Thailand says in
paragraph 5 of its Preliminary Objections that the declaration of
20 September 1929 lapsed on the dissolution of the Permanent Court on
19 April 1946, and then follows this language: "... and thereafter was
incapable of renewal". But this Court has never said that a lapsed
declaration, the obligation contained in a lapsed declaration, was "in
capable of renewal". vVhat this Court said in 1srael v. Bulgaria was
very different indeecl, and the language of the Court is as follows: "it
[that is Article 36, paragraph 5] could not preserve ... declarations (of
States not original parties to the Statute] from the lapsing with which
they were threatened by the impending dissolution of the Permanent
Court". I.C.j. Reports I959. page 138. Now that, of course, is a very
different thing altogether. True, Article 36 (5), as this Court said, couic!
not prevent the lapsing of a·declaration made under the old Court by
a party not an original l\fember of the United Nations, but that is not
the case here; the Court did not say that by a subsequent act of will,
by a subsequent declaration, subsequently subjecting itself to the com
pulsory jurisdiction of this Court, a party couic! not refer to and adopt
both the obligation and the conditions of an earlier declaration.
Cambodia, of course, makes no argument that Thailancl's declaration
of 20 September 1929 had not lapsed prior to its renewal. The fact is
too plain. Thailand's declaration had lapsecl at !east two weeks before
the declaration of 20 May 1950, whatever the bearing of the decision of
this Court in Israel v. Bulgaria. And, of course, the letter which was
referrecl to by learned Counser, written by the Registrar of this Co~rt
to the Foreign Minister of Thailancl, has no bearing on this questiOn TEMPLE Of' PREAH VIHEAR
54
whatever. I should like to submit that ail that [ can gatl1er from that
letter was the unusual fallibility of the Registrar of the Court at that
time. He seems to have been unable to predict decisions of the Court,
which is perhaps understanclable, but in addition to that he seems to
have been a little confusecl by the plain language of the declaration.
He wrote that it would expire on 2 May, but by its own terms it was not
going to expire until 6 T'l'layT.his is of no importance, and neither one
of his statements is of any importance in this argument. In other words,
that document has no bearing on this case of any sort whatever. Thaï
land's declaration of 20 May accepted the jurisdiction of this Court,
and through incorporation by reference revived and re-established the
obligation of the older document to new life and to new purpose, as
containing the terms and conditions of Thailand's acceptance of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
Turning again to the language of the Prelirninary Objections, and
looking at paragraph 13, we find these words:
"Any force which the document of May 20, 1950 rnight have;
therefore, was not original but derivative. It depended for its
operation upon the survival until 3rd May, 1950 of the renewed
.declaration'of the 20th Septernber, 1929 as an effectivè instrument
capable of being further renewed."
Now this, I respectfully submit, seerns to me the most baffiing of ali
of Thailancl's arguments. Tmust confess that I cannot understancl what
significance survival until 3 May 1950 can possibly have upon the mean
ing and effect of another document datecl seventeen days later. To in
corporate by reference, to adopt for a new purpose, and bence to revive
the substance of another document is entirely possible depencling upon
the intent of the draftsman, regardless of whether that document still
bas legal effect or whether it is merely of historical interest.
Thailand's Objection in paragraph 13 quotes this Court as observing
in Israel v. Bulgaria that:
"... it is one thing to preserve an existing unclertaking by changing
its subject-matter; it is quite another to revive an unclertaking
which has already been extinguished".
As my colleague Professor Pinto will show, this Court in this passage
was not stating a general principle of law, but was making a distinction
which it believecl was material in discerning the intention of the authors
of Article 36, paragraph 5, of the Statute of this Court, a section which,
so far as I can sec, has no bearing upon any issue before the Court in
this case. On any view of the situation Thailand was in 1950, in the
very words of this Court, reviving "an undertaking which ... [hadJ
already been extinguished". Its declaration of 20 September 1929 had
been extinguished on 6 May 1950. Thailancl knew this to be the fact, and
therefore filed, a new declaration with a new official, referring to the
statute of a new Court, directing that such new declaration accepting the
jurisdiction of the new Court should be filed with that official, who was the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. The form which the language
took was to incorporate by reference the language of submission and
the terms and conditions of submission contained in the document
draftecl twenty-one years before for a similar purpose but with a different
court. Thailand revived its old obligation, but to a new Court. ARGUMENT OF l\Œ. ACHESON
55
. Thailand complains that the language used was not "apt" to do
this.Why it was not apt, we are not told. It certainly was not apt
for any other purpose. This was the only purpose which Thailand
was seeking to achieve. Surely there must be some statable reason for
frustrating so lofty a purpose, so plainly and so concecledly pursued,
in language capable of no other rational interpretation.
There are passages in Thailand's Preliminary Objections which hint
at a reason of sorts. These passages suggest that in one respect Thailand,
in May 1950, may have been under a misapprehension regarcling the
date of the lapsing of its declaration of 20 September 1929. In para
graphs 9 through TT, Thailand asserts that at the. time of making its
1950 declaration it believed that its 1929 declaration had remainecl
in force after 1946. Only later, so it is said. when this Court renderecl
its opinion in Israel v. Bulgaria, did Thailand discover that in the
Court's view it hacl lapsed in 1946.
Thailand nevertheless has not arguecl in so many words that the
declaration of 1950 was vitiated and should be helcl null and void
because of its belief, which later proved to be unfounded, that it,
\that is, Thailancl, had been subject to the compulsory juriscliction of
this Court until some time early in May 1950. However, this is what
Thailand's argument amounts to as a matter of analysis. But the
Government of Thailancl's failure so to argue expressly is quite uncler
standable, for such a misapprehension could not by any rational process
be thought to vitiate, or even cast cloubt upon, Thai consent to the
compulsory jurisdiction of this Court. Indeed, every act of Thailancl
leads to the opposite conclusion; that is, that had Thailand been aware
that after 1946 the status of its acceptance was in doubt, it would
have hastenecl to remove the doubt.
We venture to suggest, in all courtesy, that Thailancl might wish
to enlighten the Court on how it would have actecl differently, hacl it
construed paragraph 5 of Article 36 of the Statute of this Court as
the Court itself did nine years later in Israel v. Bulgaria. \Vould
Thailand have refrained from accepting the compulsory jurisdiction
of this Court? We have already suggested that every indication is to
the opposite, a view confirmed by Thailand's evident and just pride
in its long record of submission to such juriscliction of the highest
international courts.
Paragraphs ro and 13 of Thailand's Preliminary Objections suggest
that the sole change in Thailand's conduct would have been a change
in the language of its declaration of acceptance. Tt would have filed,
perhaps, a declaration more artistic in form from the professional
point of view-a declaration which in form as well as in substance
would have been what paragraph 13 refers· to as an "original decla
ration", rather than one which revived the obligation of an olcl decla
ration and made it applicable to the jurisdiction of this Court. But
it coulcl not have addecl to the "goocl faith" of the declaration of
20 May 1950, nor woulcl the intent of Thailand have shone more clearly
through the worcls or given them any greater internai illumination.
As for the worcls themselves, they are, as we have shown, good
enough, which means plain enough, for the purposes of expressing the
intent. Here no narrow or technical rules lie in wait to frustrate intent,
even if somewhat awkwardly expressecl. The conception of an "original
declaration" is not found in the Statute; that phrase "original clecla-s6 TEMPLE OF PREAH VUiEAR
ration" is not found in the Statute of this Court. Article 36, paragraph2,
states with the utmost simplicity that "States parties to the present
Statute may at any time declare that they recognize" the compulsory
jurisdiction of this Court. Thailand has done just this, in goocl faith
and in plain, effective words.
The authorities, we submit, are clear that an instrument is not
impaired merely because the party making it was uncler a misappre
hension of the legal situation by failure to anticipate a Juclgment of
this Court. It must be further shown that an error was macle such
thilt, if the party making it had not clone so, that party woulcl not
have actecl as it did. In other words, there must have been an essential,
material, decisive or controlling error, which was not the case here.
My colleagues will deal further with this subject.
I am most grateful for the patient and courteous attention to my
argument of this illustrions Court.
i 57
7. PLAIDOIRIE DE M. ROGER PINTO
(CONSEIL DU GOUVERNEMENT DU CAMBODGE)
AUX AUDIENCES PUBLIQUES DES II ET 12 AVRIL 1961
[Audience publique du II avril I96I, après-midiJ
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour.
En prenant la parole devant vous sur la première exception préli
minaire soulevée par la Thaïlande, après la plaidoirie de lVI.Dean
Acheson, j'ai l'impression de ne pouvoir apporter à la Cour que des
éléments d'appréciation secondaires. Et pourtant, par déférencepour
nos honorables adversaires, il nous faut aller au fond des choses. et
j'espère convaincre la Cour que l'argumentation thaïlandaise se heurte
à trois objections décisives. J'examinerai en trois parties de cet exposé
ces objections.
Premièrement: l'arrêt rendu par la Cour dans l'affaire Israël c.
Bulgarie ne constitue pas un précédentqui commande, sans distinction
aucune et de façon en quelque sorte mécanique, la décision de la Cour
sur la première exception d'incompétence soulevée par la Thaïlande.
Deuxièmement: la déclaration de 1950 de la Thaïlande ne peut être
considéréecomme un acte de procédure destiné à prolonger l'existence
d'un instrument antérieur dont la validité n'a pas encore pris fin.
Troisièmement: les conditions dans lesquelles la déclaration de 1950
a étéfaite ne sont pas de nature à infirmer le consentement donné
par la Thaïlande à la juridiction de la Cour.
I
Quelle est donc, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, la
portée du précédent invoqué dans l'affaire Israël c. B·ulgarie? Et, au
moment mêmeoù je prononce ces paroles, je suis bien près de m'ar
rêter effrayé. J'ai l'impression de me trouver dans la situation de cet
avocat anglais du moyen-âge plaida:nt devant la Cour du Parlement
sur la portée d'un statut. ''Ne commentez pas le statut >>,lui dit le
juge, "nous le connaissons mieux que vous, c'est nous qui l'avons
fait.n Ici, notre statut, c'est un arrêtrendu par cette Cour il y a moins
d'une année. Et cependant, je me vois obligé de suivre la Thaïlande
sur le terrain qu'elle a choisi et de tenter d'interpréter à mon tour
un arrêtrendu par la Cour il y a si peu de mois. En invoquant l'autorité
du précédent dans l"affaire Israë:l c. Bulgarie, la Thaïlande en tire
deux conséquences juridiques tout à fait distinctes. D'une part, elle
constate que sa déclaration du 20 septembre 1929, renouvelée le 3 mai
1940, est devenue caduque lors de la dissolution de la Cour permanente,
mais, d'autre part, la Thaïlande prétend tirer de cet arrêt un principe
juridique selon lequel, s'il est possible de maintenir un engagement
existant en en modifiant l'objet, il ne l'est pas de faire revivre un
engagement déjà éteint. TEMPLE DE l'RÉAH VlHÉAR
ss
r) j'examinerai immédiatement cette seconde et prétendue consé
quence de l'arrêt. Et je crois pouvoir montrer à la Cour que rien dans
l'arrêtne permet de dégager un tel principe. M. Dean Acheson a évoqué
déjà elevant vous ce passage du paragraphe 13 des exceptions prélimi
naires de la Thaïlande. Le Gouvernement de Thaïlande y déclare,
comme la Cour l'a elit clans l'arrêtrendu clans l'affaire Israël c. Bulgarie,
page 14S:
" ... autre chose est maintenir un engagement existant en en
modifiant l'objet, autre chose faire revivre un engagement déjà
éteint».
Sir Frank ..Soskice a insisté sur ·l'importance vitale pour la démons
tration thaïlandaise de cet extrait de l'arrêt. Mais les observations
de la Thaïlande ne nous fournissent qu'un extrait détaché de son
contexte. Cet extrait détachéde son contexte vous est présentécomme
l'énoncéd'un principe juridique fondamental. Je crois qu'il est indis
pensable de citer l'ensemble du paragraphe dont cette formule est
détachée par nos honorables adversaires pour en comprendre le sens
exact. Ce paragraphe est ainsi conçu clans l'arrêtde 1959:
" ... l'intention bien certaine qui a inspiré l'article 36, paragraphe 5,
a étéde continuer ce qui existait, de .maintenir les acceptations
existantes, d'éviter que la création d'une Cour nouvelle ne rendît
caduc un progrès accompli; à cette intention de maintien, de conti
Imité, on ne peut substituer celle de redonner force de droit à
des engagements expirés; autre chose est maintenir un engage
ment existant... ».
La Cour, comme elle vient de l'expliquer, a clone simplement constaté
((l'intention bien certaine >>qui a inspiré l'article 36, paragraphe 5.
Cette intention était de continuer ce qui existait. Il s'agit - et le
texte est sans ambiguïté aucune - de l'intention des auteurs du Statut.
La Cour, clans la phrase qui précède la citation thaïlandaise, l'exprime
clairement. A cette intention de maintien de continuité on ne peut
s1:1bstituer·celle de redonner ·force de droit à des engagements expirés.
C'est l'intention des auteurs du Statut qui a dicté cette conclusion
à la Cour. Il va de soi que l'intention qui a inspiré les auteurs de
l'article 36, paragraphe 5, elu Statut ne peut servir à interpréter la
déclaration thaïlandaise de 1950. L'intention qui a inspiré cette décla
ration thaïlandaise de 1950 doit êtrerecherchée en toute indépendance
clans. l'acte lui-même et clans les circonstances de son acceptation.
Je puis clone conclure que l'autorité du précédent Israël c. Bulgarie,
invoqué sur ce point précis par la Thaïlande, est sans pertinence, donc
sans effet juridique.
z) La situation est différente en ce qui concerne la caducité de la
déclaration thaïlandaise lors de la dissolution de la Cour permanente.
Appliqués d'une façon quasi automatique, ~ans tenir compte des cir
constances particulières à chacune des affaires dont la Cour a été
successivement saisie, les principes posés par l'arrêt dans l'affaire
1sraé'lc. Bulgarie pourraient en effet conduire à constater que la décla
ration thaïlandaise de 1929, renouvelée en 1940, est devenue caduque
en 1946.
Et pourtant, l'attitude constante, l'attitude non ambiguë de la
Thaïlande prouve que cet État s'est considérécomme lié par la décla- PLAIDOIRIE DE M. PINTO 59
ration de 1929 renouvelée en 1940. La Thaïlande, selon ses propres
termes, a "accepté n - c'est le mot que je trouve au paragraphe 10
des exceptions préliminaires -, la Thaïlande a "accepté n une inter
prétation de l'article 36, paragraphe 5, qui confirmait sa reconnaissance
de la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour. La Thaïlande a accepté cette
interprétation. Elle ne l'a pas contestée. Elle ne l'a pas combattue.
Cette interprétation a étémaintenue par elle pendant quatorze ans,
jusqu'au mois de mai 1960. JInous semble que cette continuité dans
l'interprétation de cette disposition du Statut lie la Thaïlande. Elle
lui est opposable. A propos d'un acte juridique d'une importance plus
grave encore, puisqu'il s'agissait d'une sentence internationalela Cour,
dans son arrêt du r8 n~vembr 1960 dans .l';,tffaire elu Nicaragua c.
le Honduras, a pu s'exprimer ainsi, et je cite à la page 213 elu Recueil:
"De l'avis de la Cour, le Nicaragua a, par ses déclarations
expresses et par son comportement, reconnu le caractère valable
de la sentence et il n'est plus en droit de revenir sur cette recon
naissance pour contester la validité de la sentence. Le fait que le
Nicaragua n'ait émis de doute quant à la validité de la sentence
que plusieurs années après avoir pris connaissance de son texte
complet confirme la conclusion à laquelle la Cour est parvenue. n
Il s'agissait, là encore, d'un acte juridique dont la portée, dont la
valeur était contestée.
Est-ce qu'il est possible, Monsieurle Président, Messieurs de la Cour,
d'expliquer en termes de droit, à partir de votre jurisprudence même,
une telle situation? Je le crois, car la Cour a admis, clans le passé,
que des États, d'un commun accord, donnent à son Statut une portée
ne correspondant pas nécessairement à l'interprétation que la Cour,
elle, saisie d'un différend, aurait pu donner par voie de décision conten
tieuse. Je fais allusion, par exemple, à l'affaire relative à· Certains
emprunts norvégiens.La Cour, dans son arrêt de 1957, Recueil, page 27,
s'est exprimée ainsi:
<<Dans ces conditions, la Cour se trouve en présence d'une dispo
sition que les deux P.arties au. dif(érend.considèr.ent c;omme expri
mant leur volonté co'rrimune ~qiia à nst compétence. La Cour ne
se tient donc pas pour appelée à entrer dans un examen de cette
réserve à la lumière de considérations qui ne sont pas liées aux
données elu procès. Sans préjuger la question, elle applique la
réserve telle qu'elle est, telle que les Parties la reconnaissent.n
Sans doute, la Cour n'admettrait pas que les Parties mettent en
Œuvre d'un commun accord, ou bien qu'un État adopte unilatéralement
une interprétation elu Statut qui porterait atteinte au caractère judi
ciaire de son institution.Et la Cour l'a dit de la façon la plus nette
dans son avis consultatif du 23 mai 1956 relatif aux Jugements dtt
tribunal administratif de l'O. 1. T. A la page 77 du Rectteü, la Cour
s'exprime ainsi:
<<LaCour est un corps judiciaire et elle doit rester fidèle aux
exigences de son caractère judiciaire. n
Mais, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, en l'espèce l'inter,
prétation de l'article 36, paragraphe 5, qui a étéacceptée - c'est
elle qui nous le dit -, l'interprétation de l'article 36, paragraphe 5,6o TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
qui a étéacceptée par la Thaïlande ne fait nullement échec, bien au
contraire, aux exigences propres à un corps judiciaire. La conception
que la Thaïlande s'est faite en 1946 elu Statut de la Cour - même
si elleétait erronée - a produit à cette époque des effets juridiques
valables. Cette conception, peut-on dire, n'était pas contraire à des
dispositions que je me permettrai d'appeler d'ordre public, elu Statut
de la Cour. Cette interprétation elu Statut était au surplus conforme
à la volonté exprimée par la Thaïlande en 1950, lorsqu'elle a renouvelé
son obligation. Ainsi clone, à la croyance en la validité de la déclara
tion de 1929, renouvelée en 1940, s'ajoutait en 1950 le consentement
non équivoque à la juridiction de la Cour.
Cette attitude de la Thaïlande s'est prolongéeaprès mêmele prononcé
de l'arrêtelu 26 mai 1959 clans l'affaire 1sraël c. Bulgarie. La Thaïlande
n'a tiré aucune conséquence du cas ainsi jugé pour modifier sa position
vis-à-vis de la Cour. La Thaïlande aurait pu, par exemple, notifier au
Secrétaire généralde J'Organisation des Nations Unies que sa déclaration
d'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour était devenue
caduque à la suite de l'arrêt. La Thaïlande n'en a rien fait.
II
:Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, aujourd'hui la Thaïlande
vient soutenir cependant que sa déclaration elu 20 mai 1950 ne possède
pas d'existence propre. Ceci m'amène au deuxième point de mes obser
vations au cours duquel j'essaierai de déterminer quelle est la nature juri
dique exacte de la déclaration thaïlandaise de 1950. Pour nos adversaires
cette déclaration vise uniquement à renouveler la déclaration elu 20 sep
tembre 1929. Cette argumentation tend à donner au verbe anglais
<<renouveler » une certaine acception juridique, une acception juridique
déterminée, une acception juridique univoque que ce terme ne possède
ni dans la langue commune, ni dans le vocabulaire technique elu droit.
Pour la langue commune, M. Dean Acheson en a illustré le sens par
plusieurs citations. Ce que je voudrais dire ici, c'est que le terme <<re
nouveler>> n'apparaît pas comme un concept, comme une catégorie
définie par le droit. Il s'agit d'un mot du 'langage commun, employé
pour désigner des opérations juridiques très diverses.
En premier lieu, renouveler un acte peut signifier prolonger l'existence
de cet acte. Le renouvellement présente alors le caractère d'un acte de
procédure, opérant reconduction pure et simple de l'acte originaire. Dans
ce cas, en effet, l'inexistence ou la nullité de J'acte originaire peut priver
d'effet juridique l'acte de renouvellement.
En second lieu, renouveler un acte peut signifier remettre en vigueur
un acte qui a pris fin. Dans ce cas, la caducité de l'acte antérieur est
sans effet sur la validité de l'acte de renouvellement. Car cet acte de
renouvellement a pour but précisément de faire revivre un acte qui a
cesséses effets - un acte qui est devenu caduc.
Enfin, dans une troisième acception, renou,veler un acte peut signifier
établir un acte nouveau, en prenant pour base un acte ancien et à plus
forte raison dans cette dernière acception, seule la validité de J'acte
nouveau est susceptible d'être mise en cause.
1) En premier lieu, <<renouveler», donc, c'est dans certains cas pro
longer J'existence d'un acte juridique. Un exemple de cet emploi du
terme <<renouveler>> nous est donné par un accord relatif à l'application :PLAIDOIRIE l)E M. PINTO
provisoire des projets de conventions douanières internationales sur le
tourisme, les véhicules routiers commerciaux et sur le transport inter
national des marchandises par la route, accord signéà Genève, le 16 juin
1949, et qui est publié au !?ecueil des Traités des Nations Unies (vol. 45,
p. 149)·
L'article III de cet accord dispose:
"1. Le présent accord entrera en vigueur le 1er janvier 1950.
3· n demeurera en vigueur pendant une durée de trois ans.
Toutefois, à moins que les gouvernements contractants n'en
conviennent autrement, il sera considéréau terme 'de cette
période comme renouvelé pour une nouvelle période d'un an
et ainsi de suite. "
La Cour me permettra de citer un document qui n'est pas un accord
international mais qui a étérédigépar les juristes éminents qui sont
membres de l'Institut de droit international. .ta résolution adoptée en
I959 à la session de Neuchâtel de l'Institut nous fournit un second
exemple d'emploi du terme "renouveler" dans le sens de <(prolonger"·
La résolution 1959 s'exprime ainsi dans son paragraphe 3: · ,
" Les déclarations acceptant la juridiction de la Cour interna
tionale de Justice en vertu de l'article 36, par. 2, du Statut de la
Cour devraient prévoir également qu'à l'expiration de chaqüe
période, elles seront tacitement renouvelées pour une nouvelle
période d'au moins cinq années. "
Il est clair que la déc.laration thaïlandaise du 20 mai 1950 ne constitue
pas un simple acte de procédure, destiné à prolonger l'existence d'une
déclaration antérieure. Et à cet égard je voudrais attirer l'attention de
la Cour sur les observations présentées par sir Frank Soskice qui ten
draient à faire considérer (c'est à la page 21 du compte rendu provisoire
1
de l'audience ) que le Cambodge dans ses observations, également au
paragraphe 21, aurait admis la nullité de la déclaration thailandaise de
1950. Sir Frank. Soskice 8'est exprimé ainsi:
((C'est, pour employer le langage du paragraphe 21 des observa
tions cambodgiennes, un renouvellement pur et simple de la déda
ration de 1929. (({C'est JJc'est-à-dire la déclaration thaïlandaise de
1950.] Le Got~vernem denCtambodge a exposé la position avec
une exactitude enhère dans ce paragraphe en disant que la nullité
de la lettre de r950 résulte de ce qu'elle prolonge les 'declarafions
de 1929 et de 1940. " · ·
Naturellement le Gouvernement du Cambodge n'a rien dit de teLau
paragraphe 21 de ses observations. Au paragraphe 21 de ses observations,
je suis obligé de constater que le Gouvernement du Cambodge a dit
exactement tout 1e contrai re. Je me permets de citer la phrase .déteqnic
nante, au paragraphe 21, page 160 (1) des observatio!ls du Cambodge:
''Ces constatations permettent déjà d'établir, contrairement à
la thèse soutenue par la Thaïlande, que la déclaration de 1950 ne
peut êtreconsidérée J[et non pas ''peut êtreconsidérée 11- ne peut
êtreconsidérée]''comme le renouvellement pur et simple des décla-
rations de 1929 et de 1940. )) '
1
Voir p. 18 ci-rlessus.
662 TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
Et pourquoi? D'une part les déclarations dntérieures de laThailande,
celle de 1929 et celle de 1940, n'ont pas préd1 de prolongation. Il aurait
étépossible d_epré:roirune telle prolong<én>f:el~edéclratins_,
de quelquedtx-hmt .États acceptant la ]UrldJctwn obhgatotre de la Cour
contiennent des dispositions qui prolongent lA.période initiale par tacite
reconduction. \
Mais cen'est pas le cas de la Thaïlande. Les trois déclarations thaï
landac ieleds1,929, celle de 1940, celle ide 1950, devaient prendre
fin au terme, prév1.1par chacune d'elles., Aucune disposition de ces
déclarations n'envisage une notification àiprloeger les effets
de la déclaration précédente ou mêmed1~déclaration originale. Le
renouvellementd'une telle déclaration ne peu'tdonc êtreque le résultat
d'une déclaration nouvelle. 1
Mais d'autre part, le contenu mêmede la déclaration de 1950 de la
Thaïlande ne permet pas de la qualifier d'acte de procédure exclusive
ment destiné à prolonger J'existence des déclarations de 1929 ou de 1940.
Il existe en effet une différence significatit·e entre la déclaration de
rg4o.et celle de rgso. La déclaration de 19éite, le 3 mai, avant
l'expiratione la déclaration initiale de 9le renouvelaitcette
déclaration à compter du jour mêm7,mai] où celle-ci devait prendre
~~-_ rC~nou':' _dl1l40m~n?tt~r ~Jalcducitéd~ ~adéclara~îo,n
InJtlale, ètabhssatt ams1une contmmte absolue entre les penodes conside
rées. Il pourrait, à la rigueur, êtreconsidéré!dans une perspective de
pur formalisme, comme prolongeant cette dëclaratLa Cour nous
pardonnerade ne pas approfondir ce point, dr ce qui nous intéresse, ce
sont les formes dedéclaration de r950. Ofsrmes de la déclaration
de 1950 ne sont pas du tout les mêmes.AuJmoment où intervient la
déclaration thaïlandaise dumai 1950, la déclaration antérieure de
1940 a déjà pris fin depuis le 6 mai. Et tout à l'heure, Monsieur le Prési
dent, lVIessieurs de la Cour, M. Dean Achesbn vous disait que cette
lettre du Greffier (et naturelnous savdns bien qu'il ne s'agit ni
du Greffier actuel ni de son prédécesseurdiat), cette lettre du
Greffier'avait aucun effet juridique. Bien sû:r. elle n'avait aucun effet
juridique.ais en fait elle avertissait la Thaïlande que sa déclaration
allait prendre fin au début de ma2,maq mêmeun peu avant J'é
chéance exacte duenne. Et par conséquent20lmai, la Thaïlande ne
pouvait pas ignorer que sa déclaration de rg4o avait déjà pris fin par
l'échéance du terme.Au moment où par conséquent intervienla
déclaration thaïlandaise du zo mai rgso, la détlaration antérieure a pris
fin.La Thailande le sait. Il n'est pas questidn pour elle de prolonger
un acte devenu caduc. Tout ce qu'ellef~iutrteout ce qu'elle fait,
c'est de le remettre en vigu·ur. 1
2) Et en effet Jesecond sens du terme " renoureler ))que nous trouvons,
non seulement dans les dictionnairesa langue anglaise mais aussi
dans les dictionnaires de la langue française, pat exemple dans ce diction
naire bien connuu'est le Littré, l'un s~n du verbe renouveler,
d'après ce dictionnaire Littré, c'est précisémehtrdonner une
nouvelle forcn,et les exemples donnés pari le dictionnaire sont les
suivants:"renouveleun édit, renouveler les anciennes ordonnances ...
les remettre en viguJJ[Il s'agissait là de ci1ations.] Tel est d'ailleurs
le sens que donneu mot anglais<renewal1i- renouvellement -le
Dictionnairee la terminologie du droit interna!t"onal. Dans ce diction
naire vous trouverezque «renewal11signi "fmii~een vigu_eur'1. PLAIDOIRIE DE ;\1.PINTO
Plusieurs exemples tirés d'actes juridiques ont étédonnés par M. Dean
Acheson de l'emploi du terme <<renouveler n dans ce sens. Je ne revien
drai pas sur ces exemples. M. Acheson a citéà la Cour la déclaration du
Hof1duras, celle plus ancienne de l'Estonie. Cela nous permet de elire que
la déclaration de 1950, si elle ne constitue pas un acte de simple procédure
destiné à prolonger les effets d'un acte toujours en vigueur, doit être
considéréecomme un acte dont le but est de remettre en vigueur un
acte antérieur devenu caduc.
En 1950, je le répète, le Gouvernement de la Thaïlande connaissait
cette situation. Il savait qu'à la date de la déclaration du zo mai 1950,
la déclaration de 1929, renouvelée e1i 1940, était devenue caduque, par
l'expiration du délai prévu. Son attention avait étéattirée sur ce point
par la lettre que j'ai déjà citée.
Certes, à ce moment, le Gouvernement thaïlandais ignorait peut-être
par suite d'une interprétation différente de l'article 36, paragraphe 5, du
Statut de la Cour -, le Gouvernement thaïlandais ignorait peut-être
la cause de caducité qui devait êtrefornmlée par l'arrêtde la Cour dans
l'affaire Israël c. Bulgarie. ;\1aisce Gouvernement, je le répète,ne pouvait
ignorer la cause de caducité résultant de l'expiration par la survenance
elu term ~e la déclaration de 1929.
Par conséquent, dès 1950, le Gouvernement thaïlandais n'hésitait pas
à renouveler une déclaration dont ~1savait qu'elle était devenue caduque.
Et cependant, à ce moment-là, le Gouvernement thaïlandais n'avait
aucun doute sur la validité de ce renouvellement. Dans ces conditions,
le 20 mai 1950, pour la Thaïlande, il ne s'agissait pas de renouveler une
déclaration qu'on pense exister, comme le dit le paragraphe I4 des
exceptions préliminaires. li ne s'agissait pas de maintenir un engage
ment existant, comme s'expriment également les exceptions prélimi
naires de la Thaïlande. Cet engagement n'existait plus depuis le début du
mois de mai 1950. II s'agissait le 20 mai 1950 de remettre en vigueur un
engagement devenu caduc. Peu importe que cet engagement soit devenu
caduc le 6 mai 1950·ou le 19 avril 1946. Il est vrai peut-être que nous
entendrons les honorables défenseurs de la Thaïlande contester que
l'échéancedu terme entraîne caducité de la déclaration. Mais si cela
était le cas, ce que je ne puis croire, il suffirait de renvoyer nos honorables
contradicteurs à l'arrêt rendu par la Cour dans l'affaire Nottebohm
(exception préliminaire) qui consacre expressément une telle cause de
caducité, et je cite l'arrêtau Recueil, page 122:
<<... Cela .étant (elit la Cour], la caducité d'une déclaration par
l'échéance,avant le dépôt de la requête,du terme qui lui était tixé
entraîne l'impossibilité d'invoquer cette déclaration pour saisir la
Cour. n
La nullité de l'acte de remise en vigueur d'un acte frappé de caducité
ne peut donc êtretirée, c'est me semble-t-il l'évidence même,de cette
caducité même. C'est pourtant ce que vient d'affirmer aujourd'hui la
Thaïlande. ·
Mais la Cour me permettra- puisque ·entraînépar mes adversaires je
m'attarde à une analyse formelle de la déclaration de 1950 -, la Cour
me permettra peut-être de ne p;:tsm'arrêter à ce point.
Pour nous, cette déclaration n'est pas seulement la remise en vigueur
d'une déclaration frappée de caducité. Pour nous, cette déclaration TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
apparaît également comme un acte nouveau -selon la troisième accep
tion du terme «renouveler >>.
3) Ce sens du terme ccrenouveler», c'est le premier, le principal que
donne le dictionnaire Littré que je citais tout à l'heure, dans une défini
tion saisissante: ccrenouveler», nous dit Littré, c'est ccrendre nouveau,
en substituant une chose nouvelle à une autre de mêmeespèce... n,
avec l'exemple suivant: ccrenouveler un texte n. cRenouveler>> donc,
au sens de la déclaration de 1950, c'était précisément,pour le Gouver
nement thaïlandais, prendre, à l'époque,un engagement nouveau.
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, à l'époque où la Thaï
lande a formulé sa déclaration de 1950, une autorité des Nations Unies
a dû se pencher sur cette déclaration pour déterminer quelle était sa
nature juridique. Cette autorité, c'est le Secrétairegénéralde l'Organisa
tion des Nations Unies. En effet, lorsque le Secrétaire générala reçu le
dépôt de la déclaration thaïlandaise de 1950, il a examiné les conditions
dans lesquelles il devait procéder à l'enregistrement de cette déclaration,
conformément aux termes de l'article 102 de la Charte des Nations
Unies. Et l'opinion du département juridique du Secrétariat a étéqu'il
s'agissait d'une déclaration nouvelle. Je ne voudrais pas rappeler à la
Cour- mais je le fais en quelque sorte en raison des exigences du compte
rendu - les conditions daJ?Slesquelles le Secrétariat enregistre les accords
internationaux. Une note du Secrétariat qui est publiée en tête du
premier volume du Rec·ueildes Traités explique clairement les conditions
de cette publication:
ccLe présent volume n, explique cette note, <divisé en deux
parties et trois annexes, marque le commencement de la publication
du recueil des traités des Nations Unies.
Sa première partie est consacrée aux traités ou accords inter
nationaux conclus par un ou plusieurs membres des Nations Unies
postérieurement au 24 octobre 1945, da1:~·d'e nntriéeeur de la
Charte, et enregistrés soit sur l'initiative d'une partie, soit d'office
par le Secrétariat, conformément aux dispositions de l'article 4 du
Règlement. >> ·
(Ce règlement c'est le règlement adopté par l'Assemblée générale,sur
lequel j'aurai quelque mots à dire dans un instant.) Et la note du Secré-'
tariat poursuit:
ccLa portée exacte des termes "traités et accords internationaux n
a étédiscutée. Le Secrétariat a estimé qu'il devait se conformer à
cet égardà l'interprétation du terme ccaccord >>quia étédonnéedans
le rapport du ComitéIV (I) de la Conférencede .San Francisco et qui
comprend ccles engagements unilatéraux de caractère international
qui ont étéacceptés n.
(II) [leSecrétariat] a considéréque rentraient clanscette catégorie...
les déclarations d'acceptation à-la clause facultative de compé~ence
obligatoire de la Cour internationale de Justice faites par les Etats
conformément à l'article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut de la Cour... »
Donc, en vertu de cette pratique du Secrétariat, il a fallu enregistrer
la déclaration de 1950. Cet enregistrement s'est fait conformément
aux dispositions du Règlement auquel la note.que je viens de présenter
à la Cour a fait allusion. . . PLAIDOIRIE DE 1\L PINTO 6s
Le Règlement approuvé par l'Assemblée générale le 14 décembre
1946, résolution 97, première session, modifiée par les résolutions 365
de la quatrième session et 484 de la cinquième qui ont étéadoptées
par l'Assemblée généralele· rer décembre 1949 et le 12 décembre 1950
respectivement, a étépublié au Recueil des Traités, volume 76 - les
articles r et 2 de ce H.èglement distinguent clairement deux catégories
d'accords: les accords nouveaux et les accords prolongés ou modifiés.
C'est ainsi que l'article 2 elu Règlement de l'Assemblée générale
relatif à la publication et à l'enregistrement des traités dispose:
<<Lorsqu'un traité aura été enregistré au Secrétariat, une
déclaration certifiée relative à tout fait ultérieur comportant un
changement dans les parties audit traité ou accord, ou modifiant
ses termes, sa portée ou son application, sera également enregistrée
au Secrétariat. »
Pour mettre en Œuvre cette disposition elu Règlement de l'Assemblée
générale,le Secrétariat a établi clans le Recueil des Traités une disposition
matérielle et qui permet immédiatement de distinguer les obligations
nouvelles des accords anciens, prolongés, renouvelés, modifiés.
Le Recueil comporte en effet une première. partie destinée à l'en
registrement' des obligations· nouvelles, et une annexe, 'l'annexe A,·
qui concerne les obligations existantes, simplement modifiées. La note
du Secrétariat à laquelle j'ai fait allusion touà l'heure les décrit ainsi:
<<Lesdeux annexes A et B [l'annexe B concerne les accords
qui ne sont pas enregistrés en ,vertu de l'article 102 mais qui sont
publiés] des volumes du Recueil des Traités des Nations Unies
sont respectivement consacrées à la publication des faits ultérieurs
relatifs à un accord ou traité [et naturellement une déclaration
unilatérale, comme nous l'avons vu, fait partie des accords ou
des traités, des faits ultérieurs relatifs à un accord ou à un traité].
enregistré ou classéct inscrit au répertoire. ))
Or, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, la déclaration
thaïlandaise de 1950 n'a pas étéconsidéréepar le département juridique
du Secrétariat comme prolongeant les déclarations antérieures. Elle
est publiée au volume 65 elu Recueil des Traités clans sa première partie
et non à l'Annexe A. La déclaration thaïlandaise est enregistrée sous
un numéro d'ordre nouveau, le no 844, à la page 157 du volume 65.
Ainsi, le Secrétaire général, dans l'accomplissement d'une mission
qui lui est confiée par la Charte, qui lui a étépréciséepar l'Assemblée
générale,a qualifié la déclaration thaïlandaise de déclaration nouvelle.
Il l'a enregistrée comme telle. Le Gouvernement de la Thaïlande a
considéréà cette époque que cette qualification était exacte. Le Gouver
nement de la Thaïlande l'a acceptée sans protestation ni réserve. Je
dois dire que cette attitude du Gouvernement de la Thaïlande était
parfaitement justifiée.
L'opinion du Secrétaire général est confirmée par la doctrine elu
droit international. Aucun auteur, à notre connaissance, n'a mis en
cloute la validité de la déclaration thaïlandaise de 1950. Les travaux
de l'Institut de droit international sont à cet égard particulièrement
intéressants et révélateurs. Lors de sa session cl'Amsterdam de 195·7,
l'Institut a été saisi du rapport particulièrement remarquable de 66 TEMPLE "DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
M. Wilfred jenks sur la compétence obligatoire des instances judiciaires
et arbitrales internationales.
Pour. établir la liste des États liés par la clause facultative de juri
diction obligatoire, M. Wilfred Jenks a examiné à cette époque le
cas de la Bulgarie -la Cour n'avait pas encore rendu son arrêt, puisque
l'arrêt date de 1959 -, M. Jenks a examiné le cas de la Bulgarie et
celui de la Thaïlande. Le rapporteur de la commission compétente
de l'Institut de droit international a bien indus la Bulgarie clans la
liste des États qui n'ont pas souscrit à la clause facultative, pressentant
ainsi la décision de la Cour (à la différence de M. le Greffi.er), mais par
contre, M. Jenks a inclus la Thaïlande dans la liste des Etats qui ont
effectivement accepté la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour. C'est dans
l'Annuaire I957 de l'Institut, volume I' page 5 I et page 50, note I'
que l'on trouve ces indications.
[Aud-ience publ1:quedu I2 avril Ig6I, matùz]
.Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, j'ai cru pouvoir, hier,
en terminant mes observations, citer l'opinion d'un juriste, qui est
en même temps en contact quotidien avec les réalitésinternationales,
parce que je n'ignore pas les scmpules de sa méthode scientifique.
Je suis donc assuré, lorsque M. Wilfrecl Jenks, en établissant la liste
des États parties à la clause facultative de compétence obligatoire,
a classé, d'une part, la Bulgarie comme n'étant pas liée par cette
clause, d'autre part, la Thaïlande comme étant liée par cette clause,
il ne l'a fait qu'après mûre réflexion.
C'est, je pense, à titre d'opinion doctrinale également que mon très
estimé contradicteur, sir Frank Soskice, a fait état de la plaidoirie
de Me Rosenne devant cette Cour clans l'affaire Jsraël c. Bulgarie .
. j'avoue que si j'avais étéà la place de sir Frank, j'aurais hésité à
invoquer l'opinion de i\1Rosenne. Je sais bien que le fondement exclusif,
unique en quelque sorte de la thèse thaïlandaise, c'est le précédent
apporté par cette affaire Israël c. Bulgarie. Mais, sur ce point, le
précédent me paraît quelque peu dangereux. Car, après tout, la Cour
n'a pas consacré les doctrines qui lui étaient présentéespar M. Rosenne.
Ce précédent invoqué par sir Frank me paraît d'autant plus dange
reux pour sa thèse que si l'on examine attentivement le but poursuivi
par M. Rosenne, en développant l'argumentation qui a étérappelée à
la Cour, on s'aperçoit que l'agent du Gouvernement d'Israël s'est
appuyé fortement sur la déclaration thaïlandaise de 1950, parce qu'il
savait que personne n'en contestait la validité. Pour tout le monde,
cette déclaration thaïlandaise de 1950 était pleinement valable. Par
contre, la déclaration bulgare de rgzr apparaissait déjà comme quelque
peu chancelante. Avec l'habileté de l'avocat, M. Rosenne a voulu lier
en quelque sorte ces deux déclarations. Il a voulu infuser dans la
branche presque morte de la déclaration bulgare de rgzr la jeune sève
de la déclaration thaïlandaise de 1950. Il disait en quelque sorte à la
Cour: «Que ces déclarations vivent ensemble ou qu'elles meurent
ensemble! >> Il plaçait en quelque sorte la Cour elevant un dilemme
que je puis reconstituer de la façon suivante: ccMessieurs de la Cour,
vous reconnaissez la validité de la déclaration thaïlandaise de 1950.
Tout le monde la reconnaît. Vous ne pouvez pas, dans ces conditions, . PLAIDOIRIE. DE l\1.PINTO
vous prononcer contre la déclaration bulgare. Ce. serait détruire cette
déclaration thaïlandaise dont l'existence est incontestable. »
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, il est évident que la
Cour ne s'est pas laissée enfermer clans ce dilemme. Elle a examiné
la déclaration bulgare sur ses propres mérites, sans d'ailleurs en tirer
aucune conséquence quant à la validité de la déclaration tl)aïlandaise.
j'en suis persuadé, la Cour examinera la déclaration thaïlandaise de
1950 sur ses propres mérites. .
S'il m'est permis d'évoquer l'opinion dissidente collective, je crois
pouvoir elire que l'opinion dissidente collective n'a pas consacré, sur
ce point, l'opinion présentée, la suggestion faite par l\1. Rosenne.
L'opinion dissidente collective approuve, certes, l'interprétation donnée
par la Thaïlande en 1946 à l'article 36, paragraphe 5, elu Statut de la
Cour. Elle la trouve parfaitement raisonnable. Mais l'opinion dissidente
collective n'en conclut pas, comme le lui proposait M. Rosenne, que
la décision de la majorité de la Cour aura pour conséquence et pour
effet de frapper de caducité la déclaration thaïlandaise de 1950. Les
motifs pertinents de cette opinion se trouvent au Recueil de 1959, et
je me permettrai de les rappeler à la Cour, ce que je n'aurais pas fait si
nos adversaires n'avaient pas cru devoir citer la plaidoirie de M. Rosenne:
<<Teln'a pas étél'avis de la Thaïlande [en ce qui concerne l'inter
prétation de l'article 36, paragraphe 5). Elle s'est considéréecomme
liée par sa déclaration de 1940. En conséqu.ence, elle n'a pas jugé
nécessaire de prendre aucune disposition avant l'expiration de toute
la période de elix ans énoncée clans sa déclaration de 1940. A
l'expiration de cette période, elle a renouvelé son acceptation pour
une nouvelle période de dix ans à partir du 3 mai 1950. D'après
l'opinion qui limite l'application elu paragraphe 5 aux Membres
originaires des Nations Unies, l'attitude elu Gouvernement de la
Thaïlande procédait d'une conception erronée de la situation juri
dique. Toutefois, cette attitude reposait sur une opinion qui n'a pas
étécontredite. Au surplus, il est significatif que la mesure prise par
la Thaïlande l'ait étéindépendamment de toute controverse en
cours. » (C. !. ]. Recueil I959· pp. 182-183.)
Il n'y a rien clans ces motifs, dont je viens de donner lecture à la
Cour, qui permette de elire que l'opinion dissidente collective adoptait
les conclusions de M. Rosenne.
D'ailleurs, elevant la Cour et sur ce point précis, M. Rosenne avait
trouvé un premier contradicteur, dont la Cour a eu l'occasion d'ap
précier le talent et la finesse. Mon collègue et ami, M. Pierre Cot, en
effet, a saisi, sur le vif, la faille dans le raisonnement présenté par
l'agent du Gouvernement d'Israël. Comme tout le monde, M. Pierre
Cot reconnaissait, lui aussi, la pleine validité de la déclaration thaïlan
daise de 1950. Cette validité serait-elle affectée par un arrêt de la Cour
constatant la caducité de la déclaration bulgare de 1921? M. Pierre
Cot répond par la négative. Et pour la symétrie, pour l'harmonie des
positions respectives des Parties, la Cour me permettra, puisque l'opi
nion de M. Rosenne a étécitée, de rappeler quelle a étésur ce point
l'opinion de M. Cot:
<<... je voudrais [et c'est à la page 175 du compte rendu provi
soire] répondre en deux minutes à l'argumentation que mon sa-68 TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
vant contradicteur et ami, Me Rosenne, a cru devoir tirer elu cas
de la Thaïlande )),
[Pag ~76, maintenant]:
«Mon brillant contradicteur craint que si vous acceptiez la thèse
bulgare, la déclaration signée par la Thaïlande le 20 mai rgso
dût être tenue pour caduque. Qu'il en soit tout à fait rassuré.
Rien de tel ne se produirait. Le 20 mai [rgso] la Thaïlande a
renouvelé - c'est le mot qui préoccupe Me Rosenne [et préoccupe
aussi nos adversaires] - sa déclaration de 1929, laquelle avait
déjà étérenouvelée pour une période expirant le 7 mai rgso. Et
·en tout état de cause, mêmesi l'on n'admettait pas la thèse bulgare,
la Thaïlande, quand elle a renouvelé sa déclaration en 1950, le
'20 mai, n'était plu's liée par une clause d'acceptation de la juri-
diction obligatoire qui était expirée quinze jours auparavant. En
sorte que l'acte déposé par la Thaïlande le 20 mai 1950 est en
fait une déclaration nouvelle. Et comme c'est à l'intention des
parties qu'il faut s'att;:tcher plutôt qu'à la forme, puisque nous
sommes dans le 'domaine conventionnel en matière de déclarations,
la Thaïlande est bien liée à la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour
internationale.n
· Mais, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, peu après le
prononcé de votre arrêt de 1959. M. Roseime elevait trouver un second
contradicteur, et j'ose elire d'égale valeur. Dans une étude qui a été
publiée en rg6o, l'auteur examine les déclarations d'acceptation de la
juridiction obligatoire de la Cour. Il n'affirme nulle part l'invalidité,
la caducité de la déclaration thaïlandaise de 1950 comme conséquence
de votre arrêt de 1959. que cet auteur avait pourtant des raisons de
bien connaître. ·
Par contre, il soutient une thèse diamétralement opposée à celle
de sir Frank Soskice, en ce qui concerne la validité formelle de la
déclaration thaïlandaise de 1950.
La Cour a peut-être remarqué - cela a été,en tout cas, l'impres
sion de celui à qui vous avez bien voulu donner la parole -, la Cour
a peut-être remarqué avec quelle nuance péjorative, dans la voix et
clans l'expression, sir Frank a évoqué la déclaration thaïlandaise de
1950. Cette déclaration émane pourtant elu représentant qualifié de
ce pays pour agir clans les relations inteniationales, le ministre des
Affaires étrangères. ·
Pour sir Frank, c'est une simple lettre. Tel est le mot qu'il emploie
exclusivement pour la désigner. Ce n'est même plus un document,
mais, pourrait-on dire, un papier sans forme. La lettre du 20 mai 1950
n'est pas une déclaration d'acceptation pour lui. Il ne s'agit pas, et
je cite ic! le compte rendu 6rj2 (traduction), page 17:
<<ilne s'agit pas d'une déclaration qui s'insère exactement dans
les dispositions du paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 du Statut n.
Eh bien! l'auteur auquel je viens de faire allusion a émis, à la
page 62 de son ouvrage, une opinion ·absolument contraire: <<En la
forme n,écrit-il, «l'instrumentde renouvellement constitue une nouvelle
déclaration qui devrait être déposée entre les mains du Secrétaire
général, conformément à l'ai·ticle 36, paragraphe 4, du Statut. n PLAIDOIRIE DE M. PINTO
·Quel est cet instrument de renouvellement auquel notre auteur
fait allusion?
C'est l'instrument de renouvellement, qu'il appelle renouvellements
stricto sensu. Parmi eux, il cite immédiatement (en note, la note 3 de
la page 6z), il cite immédiatement en note la Thaïlande sous la forme
suivante (note 3, je lis):
« ...Le renouvellement des instruments enregistrés au Recuâl des
Traités des Nations Unies n'est pas doté d'un nouveau numéro
d'enregistrement. ))
·C'est la démonstration que j'ai essayé de faire elevant la Cour;
lorsqu'il s'agit d'un instrument qui est un instrument ancien, le service
compétent du Secrétariat se contente de le publier en annexe. Lorsqu'il
s'agit d'un document qui est un document concernant un accord ou
une déclaration nouvelle, le Secrétariat le publie clans la première
partie elu Recueil des Traités et l'affecte d'un numéro nouveau.
Et la note 3 continue:
« On remarquera. que la déclaration de la Thaïlande a étécorrec
tement ré-enregistrée au volume· ,65 du ·Recuèil,;:desTraités des
Nations Unies, p. 157. ))
C'est M. Rosenne qui parle clans cette étude, qu'il a publiée après
son ouvrage magistral sur la Cour internationale de Justice, étude plus
courte qu'il a publiée en rg6o et qui est intitulée Le facteur temps dans
la juridiction de la Cour internationale de Justice, Leyde, rg6o. Pour
lui, par conséquent, la déclaration thaïlandaise de 1950 c'est, en la
forme, une déclaration nouvelle, qui elevait être déposée,comme elle
l'a été,entre les mains elu Secrétaire généraldes Nations Unies.
Vous voyez que quelquefois les avocats et les auteurs ne sont pas
toujours d'accord ensemble. Je crois que nous pouvons nous appuyer sur
l'opinion qui a étécette fois plus réfléchie,plus longuement méditéede
M. Rosenne, lorsque, en rg6o, après l'arrêtde 1959, il ne considère plus
que la déclaration thaïlandaise de rgso soit frappée de caducité, lorsqu'il
affirme qu'en la forme il s'agit bien d'une nouvelle déclaration.
Contrairement donc aux conclusions du Gouvernement de Thaïlande,
la déclaration de 1950 ni visait pas exclusivement à ''renouveler » - et
je place le mot ici entre guillemets - la déclaration de rgzg, soit pour
en prolonger les effets, soit pour la remettre en vigueur, puisque cette
déclaration de 1929 reposait sur un statut devenu caduc et s'adressait
à une cour dont la dissolution était intervenue. La déclaration de 1950,
dans sa forme même,apparaît comme un instrument nouveau. Elle est
fondée sur une cause juridique nouvelle: le Statut de la Cour interna
tionale de Justice. Elle observe une procédure nouvelle: la notification
prévue par l'article 36, paragraphe 4, du Statut de la Cour, au lieu et
place de la Cour pennanente.
Sur le terrain choisi par la Thaïlande, celui d'un fom1alisme rigoureux
ct, oserai-je dire, d'un formalisme excessif, l'inexistence de la déclaration
de rgso ne peut être constatée, pas mêmesa simple nullité. Mais je
voudrais montrer à la Cour que le terrain choisi par la Thaïlande ne
correspond pas aux réalités du droit international. La validité de la
déclaration de 1950 dépend essentiellement de la volonté clairement
exprimée par la Thaïlande d'accepter la juridiction obligatoire de laJO TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
Cour internationale de Justice. Ce sera l'objet, si la Cour le permet, de
la troisième partie de mes observations.
III
Pour fonder la juridiction de la Cour, le consentement clair et non
équivoque donné par ·la Thaïlande est décisif.
« La Cour permanente, tout comme depuis la Cour internationale
de Jus tice, a écarté toutes les exceptions qui lui sont apparues
comme dictées par le désird'éluder,sous le couvert d'objections de
caractère technique, un engagement dont la bonne foi imposait le
respect. >>
C'est ce qu'a pu écrire un observateur attentif et pénétrant de votre
jurisprudence, le professeur Charles de Visscher, dans Théorieset réalités
en droit international public,3me édition, page 457·
Nous savons que le Gouvernement de Thaïlande n'a pas quant à lui
le désir d'éluder l'engagement pris de bonne foi en 1950. Il désire être
assuré de la validité de cet engagement. Les exceptions préliminaires de
la Thaïlande, comme la plaidoirie de sir Frank, n'expriment nullement
une position de principe hostile à la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour.
A plusieurs reprises la délégationthaïlandaise a souligné- à juste titre
d'ailleurs et nous sommes entièrement d'accord avec elle - que sa
déclaration de 1950, reconnaissant la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour,
«avait étéfaite en toute bonne foin.
C'est précisémentsous l'autorité de ce principe de base des relations
internationales et du droit international -le principe de la bonne foi -
que le Gouvernement cambodgien se placera également pour déterminer
la réalitéde l'acceptation par la Thaïlande de la juridiction de la Cour.
La réalitéde cette acceptation nous apparaît à deux points de vue:
I0 la déclaration de la Thaïlande est claire et' non équivoque,
2° elle n'est entachée d'aucun vice susceptible de la détruire.
r) Il est constant que la manifestation de volonté de l'État crée
l'obligation. Le document qui enregistre cette obligation permet de
constater cette volonté. Il en est l'instrument probatoire. La source de
l'obligation ne réside pas dans le document, mais dans la déclaration
de volonté.
Le Gouvernement de Thaïlande ne conteste pas cette manifestation
de volonté qui exprime son consentement à la juridiction de la Cour.
Il n'oppose pas à l'intention non ambiguë- qui résulte du libellémême
d~ la déclaration de 1950 - une intention différente qui résulterait de
Circonstances extérieures à cette déclaration.
La Cour ne se trouve donc pas en présence d'un problème analogue à
celui qu'elle a dù résoudre dans l'affaire de l'Anglo-Iranian Oit Company
du 22 juillet1952 (Recueil, p. ros). Le Gouvernement iranien, lui, invo
quait, pour qualifier et pour restreindre la manifestation de volonté
exprimé::dans sa déclaration d'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire,
le Gouvernement iranien invoquait sa politique généraleà l'égard de
tels instruments et les intentions énoncéespar lui dans la loi interne,
dans la loi nationale iranienne autorisant l'acceptation de la compétence ' PLAIDOIRIE DE M. PINTO 71
de la Cour. La Cour a reconnu en effet que le texte de la déclaration
devait êtreinterprété à la lumière de ces circonstances (Reweit I952,
p. IIO).
Le Gouvernement de Thaïlande n'invoque aucune considération de
cet ordre. II ne conteste pas son intention et sa volonté d'accepter, à
l'époque,la juridiction obligatoire. Je pense que la plaidoirie de M. Dean
Acheson en a apporté une démonstration éclatante.
2) Mais, et ce sera le second point de cette dernière partie de mes
observations, le Gouvernement thaïlandais ne soutient pas non plus que
son acceptation a étédonnée dans des conditions de nature à infirmer
sa déclaration de volonté - selon la formule employée par la Cour
pc:rmanente dans l'affaire des Droits des minorités en H a1~te-Silésie
(Ecoles minoritaires) (arrêtde rgz8).
Le Gouvernement thaïlandais soutient pourtant qu'en rg5o il a
commis une erreur dans l'interprétation du paragraphe 5 de l'article 36
du Statut, - ceci au paragraphe II des exceptions préliminaires de la
Thaïlande. Je présenterai, à ce sujet, trois observations.
La première question qu'il nous paraît nécessaire de poser devant la
Cour, c'est de savoir si un acte entaché d'erreurs, à le supposer entaché
d'erreurs, ce qui est la thèse, l'allégationque nous n'acceptons pas de la
Thaïlande, la première question donc qu'il nous paraît nécessaire de
poser est celle de savoir si un acte entaché d'erreur est nul ab initia.
La doctrine du droit international a examiné ce problème, sans le
secours d'une jurisprudence bien établie. Elle n'a pu se référerqu'aux
principes- tant de droit public que de droit privé -consacrés par les
différents systèmes juridiques du monde. Je me permettrai de citer
devant la Cour l'ouvrage classique de lord McNair sur le droit des traités,
aux pages I3I à r34, qui examine ce point. Depuis, les travaux de la
Commission du droit international ont apporté une contribution pré
cieuse à l'étudede ce problème (Anmtaire I958, vol. 2, pages 25 et 35).
On peut donc essayer de résumer ce qui apparaît comme les éléments
d'une théorie de l'erreur en disant que, d'une façon générale,un acte
entaché d'erreur n'est pas un acte inexistant. Il n'est mêmepas frappé
de nullité absolue, mais d'une simple nullitérelative. Or les conséquences
de la nullité relative sont bien connues. L'acte continue à produire ses
effets de droittant qu'il n'a pas étéannulé. Si la nullité de l'acte est
constatée ou déclarée,cette nullité constatée ou déclaréen'a pas d'effet
rétroactif. Elle ne porte pas atteinte aux droits acquis ou aux situations
juridiques crééesen vertu de l'acte, antérieurement à la constatation
de sa nullité.
Je puis me référerici au projet publié en 1935 par l'Université de
Harvard qui dispose dans son article 29, et je m'excuse de traduire
directement,
«qu'un traité entaché d'erreur peut êtredéclaré... n'êtrepas obli
gatoire entre les partiesn.
Le commentaire de cet article montre bien la différenceque les auteurs
de ce projet faisaient entre la déclaration de nullité avec rétroactif et
la simple constatation que l'accord entaché d'erreur ne liait pas les
parties.
L'acte entaché d'erreur<<est susceptible d'annulation», pour reprendre
les termes mêmesemployés par le très regretté sir Hersch Lauterpacht TE.l\IPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
72
dans son rapport devant la Commission du droit international (AjCN4J
63, p. 212).
La déclaration thaïlandaise de 1950 - mêmesi elle était viciée par
une erreur, ce que nous contestons- ne peut en tout cas êtreconsidérée
comme un acte inexistant. Ce serait tout au plus un acte annulable, et
la nullité dont la déclaration thaïlandaise serait frappée est une nullité
relative. Certes, la Thaïlande aurait pu invoquer cette nullité, par
exemple par notification au Secrétaire généraldes Nations Unies, -
mais avant le dépôt de la requêteintroductive d'instance du Çamboclge.
Une fois la Cour valablement saisie, l'action unilatérale de l'Etat défen
deur ne peut retirer compétence à la Cour. Il est admis, je me suis permis
de le rappeler, que les actes atteints de nullité relative ne peuvent être
annulés avec effet rétroactif.Or la requête introductive d'instance du
Cambodge est antérieure à la constatation publique et officielle par la
Thaïlande de la prétendue nullité de sa déclaration de 1950. La date de
cette constatation aurait pu êtrenormalement celle d'une notification
de la Thaïlande au Secrétaire généraldes Nations Unies de la caducité,
de la nullité de la déclaration de950. Cette déclaration, cette notifica
tion, la Thaïlande nel'a pas faite. On peut donc à la rigueur admettre que
la Thaïlande a officiellement constaté la.nullité de sa déclaration de 1950
à la date du dépôt de ses exceptions préliminaires en mai 1960.
En droit, pourrait-on dire, il s'agirait en quelque sorte d'une dénoncia
tion, fondée sur une cause de nullité révéléepar l'arrêtde 1959. Mais
cette dénonciation constatant la nullité de la déclaration de 1950 ne
comporterait pas d'effet rétroactif.a portée est définie par une juris
prudence constante de la Cour, rappelée dans l'arrêtdu 26 novembre
1957 relatif au Droit de passage sur territoire indien (exceptions prélimi
naires, C. I. ]. Recuâl I957, p. 157). où la Cour s'est exprimée ainsi:
«C'est une règle de droit généralement acceptée et appliquée
dans le passépar la Cour qu'une fois)a Cour valablement saisie d'un
différend, l'action unilatérale de l'Etat défendeur, dénonçant tout
ou partie de sa déclaration, ne peut retirer compétence à la Cour.
Dans l'affaire Nottebohm, la Cour a exprimé le principe en ces
termes: « Un fait extérieur tel que la caducité ultérieure de la
déclaration par échéancedu terme ou par dénonciation, ne saurait
retirer à la Cour une compétence déjàétablie. ))(C. I.ReczteilI953,
p.123).))
Mais, et ce sera là ma seconde observation, mêmepour l'avenir, la
nullité de l'acte entachéd'erreur n'est jamais prononcée de plein droit.
Encore faut-il que cette erreur puisse êtrcon~idé coé ee ayant vicié
le consentement. Or, à aucun moment le Gouvernement thaïlandais
n'expose que l'erreur alléguéepar lm a viciésa déclaration de volonté.
Il ne suffit pas en effet de constater l'existence d'une erreur. Pour per
mettre à la Cour d'examiner la question de savoir si, en droit international,
cette erreur - plus particulièrement s'il s'agit d'une erreur de droit -
est susceptible d'entrainer l'annulation de l'acte entaché d'erreur, il est
nécessaire de rapporter au préalable la preuve que cette erreur a vicié
le consentement. En l'espèce, le Gouvernement thaïlandais devrait dé
montrer que son erreur a étéen quelque sorte déterminante. Il devrait
démontrer qu'il s'agit d'une de ces« erreurs essentielles11,selon l'expres
sion mêmeemployée par la Cour dans l'affaire Nicaragua c. Honduras
clans son arrêtdu r8 novembre 1960, page 215: à savoir, si le Gouverne- PLAIDOIRIE DE M. PINTO 73
ment de Thaïlande avait pu connaître, en 1950, l'interprétation donnée
par la Cour à l'article 36, paragraphe 5, du Statut, il n'aurait pas accepté
la juridiction obligatoire.
Mais cette preuve administrée ne suffirait même pas. C'est la troi
sième observation que je me permets de présenter à la Cour. Cette preuve
administrée ne suffirait pas encore, car il appartiendrait alors à votre
haute juridiction de décider de l'application, en l'espèce, du principe
juridique que sir Hersch qualifiait de «primordial ))dans son rapport,
déjà cité, à la Commission du droit international, et qu'il énonçait ainsi:
<<Nul- individu ou État-· ne peut arguer d'une ignorance de
la loi pour éluder les conséquences de ses actes. n
L'article12 du projet de convention sur le droit des traités élaboré
dans le cadre des travaux de la Commission elu droit international
exclut également l'erreur de droit.
Le Gouvernement de Thaïlande nous déclare lui-mêmeque son erreur
n'a pas eu pour effet de contraindre la Thaïlande à une déclaration
de volonté qu'elle n'aurait pas exprimée si elle avait connu l'erreur.
Nous ne sommes clone pas, en tout état de cause, en présence d'une
erreur de nature à porter atteinte à la réalitédu consentement.
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, au terme de ces obser
vations, il me sera permis de conclure que ni dans la forme ni dans
le fond la déclaration thaïlandaise de 1950 n'était entachée d'un vice
de nature à l'empêcher de produire ses effets juridiques à la date où
le Cambodge a saisi la Cour de sa requête introductive d'instance.
Le Gouvernement du Cambodge est sûr en tout cas que son recours
ne peut êtreconsidéré- pour reprendre le principe énoncépar l'Institut
de droit international lors de sa sessi9n de Neuchâtel en 1959- comme
un acte peu amical à l'égard de l'Etat défendeur.74
8. PLAIDOIRIE DE M. PAUL REUTER
(CONSEIL DU GOUVERNEMENT DU CAMBODGE)
AUX AUDIENCES PUBLIQUES DU !2 AVRIL rg6r
[A tulience publique duI2 avril I96I, matinJ
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges.
Les brèves observations qu'au nom du Gouvernement royal du
Cambodge nous avons l'honneur de soumettre respectueusement à la
Cour porteront sur deux objets: d'abord et principalement sur les
obligations qui pèsent sur la Thaïlande en vertu du traité de 1937,
ensuite et en mode de conclusion généralesur quelques aspects théori
ques des thèses thaïlandaises relatives à la première exception.
I
Le Gouvernement cambodgien n'a nul besoin d'invoquer les disposi
tions du traité de 1937, puisque, selon lui, les déclarations d'acceptation
de la juridiction de la Cour fondées sur l'article 36 du Statut sont
pleinement suffisantes pour justifier sa compétence. Cependant il estime,
vu les cloutes profondément ressentis avec la plus entière bonne foi
par le Gouvernement thaïlandais, qu'il y a intérêtà établir la constance
des engagements de ce Gouvernement et la stabilité de sa politique
en ce qui concerne les litiges de frontières avec le Cambodge.
Si, comme il espère le faire devant la Cour, le Gouvernement royal
du Cambodge établit la réalitédes engagements de la Thaïlande, la
compétence de la Cour ne pourra que s'en trouver renforcée et, peut
être, les doutes du Gouvernement thaïlandais dissipés.
Qu'il nous soit permis de nous référer à une jurisprudence bien
connue de la Cour; celle de la Cour permanente de Justice interna
tionale qui a déclaréclans J'affaire Compagnie d''tlectricité de Sofia et
de Bulgarie (Série AfB, no 77, p. 76):
«La multiplicité d'engagements conclus en faveur de la juridiction
obligatoire atteste chez les contractants. la volonté d'ouvrir de
nouvelles voies d'accès à laCour plutôt que de fermer les anciennes
ou de les laisser se neutraliser mutuellement pour aboutir à
l'incompétence. ''
C'est clans cet esprit que nous allons aborder l'examen du traité
de 1937.
L'indiscutable talent de nos distingués adversaires a opposé à notre
démonstration des obstacles presque infranchissables. Que la Cour nous
pardonne la familiaritéd'une comparaison. Certains alpinistes choisissent
la saison la plus dure pour tenter la conquête des sommets les plus
redoutés par des itinéraires réputés impossibles. On suit leurs tentatives
avec l'intérêtque suscite toute prouesse sportive et avec la sympathie
que l'on accorde, à l'avance, au courage malheureux. Telle serait notre
situation si nous suivions l'itinéraire qui nous est proposé. Mais nous PLAIDOIRIE DE M. REUTER 75
pensons pouvoir en suivre un autre plus simple et que nous devons
exposer à la Cour.
Les problèmes que nous allons rencontrer sont au nombre de· trois ..
Le premier se rapporte au contenu de l'obligation poséepar l'article 2r.
Le second se rapP.orte à l'organe juridictionnel compétent. Le troisième
se rapporte aux Ëtats qui bénéficientde cet article 2r.
Abordons le premier: quel est le contenu de l'obligation posée par
l'article 21 du traité de 1937? Nos distingués contradicteurs ont
consacré beaucoup de temps à démontrer d'une manière parfaitement
pertinente que la Thaïlande n'était pas partie à l'acte général d'ar
bitrage. Cette démonstration nous a beaucoup surpris; elle est incontes
table, mais pourquoi nos distingués contradicteurs ont-ils voulu l'effec
tuer? Avec beaucoup de déférence pour leur pensée, nous sommes
obligés d'émettre l'hypothèse que, peut-être, ils n'ont pas saisi le
mécanisme de l'article 21; ils ne l'ont en tout cas, semble-t-il, pas
compris comme le Gouvernement cambodgien le comprend.
Nous demandons à la Cour la permission de nous arrêter un peu
sur ce point. Il est très important non seulement parce qu'il concerne
le traité de 1937, mais parce qu'il jette peut-être aussi une certaine
lumière sur la première exception. Quand un, deux ou plusieurs États
veulent instituer des règles juridiques obligatoires, ils ont une première
voie très simple qui est de promulguer une loi, de conclure un traité,
c'est-à-dire de poser un acte juridique qui simultanément institue la
source de l'obligation et en décrit le contenu. Mais il y a une autre
voie qui consiste à poser dans un acte juridique le principe de l'obli
gation, tout en se référant pour la description de l'obligation à un
autre acte, à un document ou à une source quelconque. Donnons de
suite quelques exemples:
On pourrait imaginer que pour résoudre un problème de frontière
fluviale, deux Etats concluent un traité clans lequel ils décideraient
que la frontière sera déterminée d'après les principes des codes de
Justinien; cette hypothèse ne serait peut-être pas si fantaisiste. La
déclaration de Londres de 1909 n'a jamais eu de force obligatoire;
on peut imaginer, et il en existe des cas, qu'un État, par un acte
juridique interne, décide d'appliquer les règles de la déclaration de
Londres à la conduite des hostilités navales. Nous serions tentés
d'ajouter ici un troisième exemple qui nous ramène à la première
exception. Est-ce qu'un État ne peut pas poser le principe de l'accep
tation de la juridiction de la Cour, tout en renvoyant, pour le contenu
de cette obligation, à un autre document? Est-ce-que cette hypothèse
ne permettrait peut-être pas de jeter une certaine lumière sur les
difficultés que rencontrent nos adversaires?
Quoi qu'il en soit, on rencontre bien dans l'article 21 une application
de la méthode qui consiste à dissocier le principe de l'obligation et la
description de son contenu. Ni la Thaïlande ni la France ne sont liées
par cet article 2r à l'acte général; la Thaïlande et la France ont sim
plement convenu d'appliquer certaines règles pour la description des
quelles elles se réfèrent à un texte qui est celui de l'acte général
d'arbitrage.
Cependant, un cloute subsiste encore. On s'est demandé si cet article 21
n'avait pas une portée purement politique, c'est-à-dire s'il ne contenait
pas simplement l'expression d'une directive, d'autres diraient d'une
règle programmatique, sans poser une obligation directe. Mais il suffit76 TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
de se reporter au texte pour être convaincu; il se réfère bien aux
principes énoncésdans le Pacte de la Sociétédes Nations, mais il va
plus loin. Il précise: «les Hautes Parties contractantes conviennent
d'appliquer les dispositions de l'acte général».
Par conséquent, il s'agit bien d'une obligation juridique; deux obser
vations le confiqneraient s'il était besoin. Il n'est pas surprenant qu'en
1937 les deux Etats en cause aient accepté ces obligations. Dans le
traité précédent- sur lequel nous reviendrons - du 14 février 1925,
l'article2 prévoyait déjà la compétence obligatoire de la Cour per
manente de Justice internationale et dans toute une liste de traités
dont nous épargnons l'énumération à la Cour, la Th,aïlancle au cours
des années 1937 et 1938 a accepté à l'égard d'autres Etats des engage
ments très ·précis en ce qui concerne la cOmpétence de la Cour per
manente de Justice internationale.
Or, les dispositions de l'acte généralprévoient la compétence de la
Cour permanente de Justice internationale faute d'accord pour recourir
à un tribunal arbitral en ce qui concerne tous différends au sujet
desquels les parties se contesteraient réciproquement un droit. Ce qui
est le cas clans l'espèce actuelle. La compétence de la Cour est ainsi
établie. Nous noterons pour terminer que l'accord de règlement franco
siamois du 17 novembre 1946 a eu recoprs à une commission de
con ciliation,
«Par application de l'article 21 du traité franco-siamois du
7 décembre 1937... »
On s'est étonné que l'on n'ait pas recours, à l'époque, à la Cour
internationale de Justice, et on a voulu y voir un argument contre
la compétence de la Cour; mais du moment que la conciliation avait
suffi pour régler le différend, pourquoi aurait-on recouru à la Cour
internationale de Justice? .
La deuxième question est de savoir quel est l'organe juridictionnel
compétent. Le traité de 1937 par lçs référencesauxquelles il procède
ne vise que la Cour permanente de Justice internationale. Et l'on
retrouve alors, mais sur le plan de l'article 37 du Statut de la Cour,
tous les problèmes qui viennent d'êtredébattus pendant plus de deux
jours devant vous. On pourrait certes discuter la question de savoir
si les principes applicables en ce qui concerne l'article 36 peuvent
être transposés sans précaution à l'article 37· Ce pr:oblèmea étédéjà,
dans d'autres affaires, discuté devant la Cour. Nous croyons que nous
pouvons nous dispenser de l'examiner à nouveau. Dans l'espèce, le
problème peut être résolu en faisant appel à qeux principes: suivant
le premier, c'est l'intention, la volonté des États qui est à la source
de la compétence de la Cour; suivant le deuxième, la volonté des États
doit être établie en considérant simultanément l'ensemble des actes
qui se conditionnent les uns les autres. Ce deuxième principe appelle
quelques explications.
Quand plusieurs actes juridiques sont séparés par un bref intervalle
de temps, quand il apparaît que clans l'intention des parties ces actes
se conditionnent l'un l'autre, quand ils sont, pourrait-on dire, la cause
juridique l'un de l'autre, il découle de cette solidarité des conséquences.
Dans les cas les plus extrêmes, peut-être faut-il elire que tous ces actes
constituent une opération unique, il y aurait ,ainsi par exemple une
notion juridique de l'«instance» juridictionnelle.Mais mêmeclans les PLAIDOIRIE DE 1\1. REUTER
77
cas moins caractérisés,il faut au moins admettre que ces actes doivent
êtreinterprétés l'un à la lumière de l'autre. Or, en présence de quelle
situation concrète sommes-nous dans le cas présent?
A la suite d'événements qui se rapportent à la période de guerre
et qu'il est inutile de rappeler ici, Je traité du 7 décembre 1937 avait
cessé d'être en vigueur entre la France et la Thaïlande. Il ne devait
être « renouvèlé n et rentrer à nouveau en vigueur que par J'accord
de règlement franco-siamois du 17 novembre 1946 (article 2):
<<Aussitôt après la signature du présent accord, les relations
diplomatiques serons rétablieset les rapports entre les deux pays
se trouveront de nouveau régis par le traité du 7 décembre 1937
et par l'arrangement commercial et douanier elu 9 décembre I937·
Les parties contractantes communiqueront le présent accord au
Conseil de Sécuritéet le Siam retirera la plainte qu'il a introduite
auprès de lui. La France ne s'opposera plus à l'entrée elu Siam aux
Nations Unies. ))
A l'époqueoù un consentement exprès est donné pour une remise en
vigueur elu traité de 1937, la Cour permanente de Justice internationale
a disparu et la Cour internationale de Justice a pris sa place La/Thaï
lande aurait pu à ce moment exclure de l'article 21 les dispositions
relativesau règlement judiciaire ou faire une réserve en ce qui concerne
la Cour internationale de Justice. Loin de là, sa position est tout à fait
précise: l'accord de 1946 se situe clans cadre des procédures pacifiques
de la Charte des Nations Unies, et le Siam qui a posésa candidature aux
Nations Unies obtient de la France la reconnaissance de son aptitude à
y rentrer. Le Siam ne pouvait ignorer que, selon la Charte, la Cour inter
nationale de Justice était substituée à la Cour permanente de Jus tice
internationale et que son nouvel engagement conduisait à une nouvelle
compétence de la Cour internationale de Justice.
Nous voici en présenceelutroisième problème: comment les obligations
souscrites clans le traité de 1937 peuvent-elles bénéficierau Cambodge?.
Nos distingués contradicteurs savent que nous ne nous plaçons pas sur
le terrain de la successioncl'J~ taastssr,celui de la représentation
qui est liée la notion de protectorat international et suppose donc que
l'État protégéa bien la qualité d'un État.
Nous allons raisonner en ce domaine en fonction de quelques principes
généraux,mais nous allons raisonner surtout en fonction de la situation
particulièreelu Cambodge et, d'une manière plus précise, en fonction de
la situation particulière du Cambodge au regard de la Thaïlande. Nous
n'entendons clonenullement, clans les conclusions auxquelles nous arrive
rons, dégager des règles qui soient valablesl'une manière généralepour
d'autres situations ou pour d'autres rapports juridiques.
Cette remarque reçoit de suite application. Nous venons de elire que
pour qu'il y ait possibilité d'une représentation, il fallait que le Cambodge
ait eu la qualité d'État durant la période elu protectorat français ..Nous
avons cru comprendre, avec beaucoup de surprise, qu'hier on soutenait
du côté thaïlandais que le Cambodge n'avait pas eu d'existence inter
nationale pendant la période du protectorat. On pourrait, à ce sujet,
faire valoir beaucoup d'arguments théoriques ou historiques, mais nous
n'avons pas à débattre ici d'un problème aussi vaste. Ce qui nous a
surpris, c'est que ce soit la Thaïlande qui soutienne cette thèse, car, en
ce qui la concerne, le problème est régléconventionnellement par un
7 TElllPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
traité qui n'a jamais étéabrogé; le 15 juillet r867, la France et le Siam
ont conclu à Paris un traité «pour régler la position politique et les
limites du Cambodge>>. (Reweil de Traités cieDe Clercq, tome IX, page
ï34·)
Selon l'article premier,
«Sa Majesté le Roi de Siam reconnaît solennellement le protec
torat de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français sur le Cambodge. n
Mais clans son article 3,
«Sa Majesté le Roi de Siam renonce, pour lui et ses successeurs,
à tout tribut présent ou autre marque de vassalité de la part du
Cambodge.
De son côté, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des FranÇais s'engage à ne
point s'emparer de ce Royaume pour l'incorporer à ses possessions
de Cochinchine. >>
Par conséquent, au regard de la Thaïlande, le Cambodge ne pouvait
êtreque sous le régime du protectorat, régimetotalement distinct d'un
régime d'annexion.
Et la Thaïlande connaît fort bien cette obligation car, comme on l'a
rappelé hier à l'audience, son souci a toujours éténon seulement de la
faire respecter mais d'aller plus loin et d'obtenir l'abolition de cette tutelle
du protectorat pour que le Cambodge recouvre sa totale indépendance.
Mais il y a encore clans ce traité un dernier article qui présente pour
nous un grand intérêt,c'est l'article 7:
ccLe Gouvernement français s'engage à faire observer par le
Cambodge les stipulations qui précèdent. n
Dès lors, la ligne généralede la politique thaïlandaise est tout à fait
claire. Elle a reconnule protectorat, mais elle ne veut pas d'une annexion
et elle s'est fait garantir qu'il n'y aurait pas d'annexion. Et elle tire la
conséquence logique de l'existence du protectorat: la France s'engage à
faire respecter par le Cambodge des engagements, elle devra donc s'en
gager non seulement en son propre nom, mais, pour les obligations qui
concernent les rapports entre le Cambodge et la Thaïlande, il est normal
de considérer que la France s'engage non seulement en son nom mais
également au nom du Cambodge. Voilà le schéma généralqui définitle
statut du protectorat du Cambodge, à l'égard de la Thaïlande tout au
moins.
Tldécoulede ce régimedu protectorat que tous les engagements inter
nationaux conclus par la France doivent êtreexaminés attentivement
afin d'établir si la France les a conclus en son seul nom, au seul nom du
Cambodge, ou bien en son nom et en mêmetemps en celui du Cambodge.
De telles questions se posent nécessairement à propos des démarches
internationales de l'État protecteur. Certaines procédures poursuivies
clans la Cour ont mis ce point bien en lumière.
Dans l'Affaire relative attx droits des ressortissants des États-Unis
d'Amérique au Maroc, une des parties s'est poséela question de savoir
à quel titre agissait l'autre et a soulevé à cet égard une exception préli
minaire, et la Cour a finalement demandé à l'État protecteur de répondre
sur ce point et de préciser s'il agissait en son nom propre, au nom de
l'État protégéou à ces deux qualités à la fois (Cour internationale de
Justice, Mémoires, Affaire dtt Maroc, vol. I, p. 235, et vol. JI, p. 431). PLAIDOIRLE DE M. REUTER 79
D'ailleurs, la Cour a dù examiner ce problème clans certaines questions
qui ont étéabordées par son arrêt.
Dès lors, la question se pose de savoir à quel titre la France a souscrit
les engagements internationaux contenus clans le traité de 1937. On
conçoit sans peine que les engagements qu'elle a conclus en son propre·
nom n'engagent qu'el_le,mais il n'en est pas de mêmede ceux qu'elle a
conclus au nom de l'Etat protégé.Ceux-ci peuvent persister et se main
tenir au-delà elu protectorat.
Sans doute y a-t-il une condition nécessairepour que ces engagements
obligent l'État protégé?Cette condition est énoncéed'une manière très
claire clansl'arrêt relatif aux Drods des ressortissants des États-Unis au.
Maroc (C.'!. ]. Recueil I952, p. 193):
" La convention ct les déclarations doivent donc êtreconsidérées
comme des accords passés par la Puissance protectriçe clans les
limites de ses pouvoirs, accords relatifs aux affair:esdeEtat protégé
et destinés à l'obliger.n.
Il faut que les accords soient passés dans les limites des pouvoirs de
la Puissance protectrice; mais c'est là une question qui regarde l'État
protégéet non les autres États. Elle n'est pas mise ici en cause par le
Cambodge. L'État protégédevenu indépendant aurait-il perdu le droit
d'invoquer le bénéficed'un traité conclu en son nom par l'État protecteur,
pour le seul motif qu'il assure désormais lui-mêmela gestion des affaires
extérieures? Poser la question, c'est la résoudre.
C'est d'après ces lignes généralesqu'il faut rechercher au nom de qui
l'accord de 1937, tel qu'il a étérenouvelé en 1946, a étéconclu.
Certes, l'objet étendu et complexe de l'accord de 1937 porte sur
des questions qui, pour certaines, ne concernent que la France agissant
en tant que telle. Il s'agit donc de rechercher pour nous quelles sont
les dispositions qui engagent à la fois la France et le Cambodge.
L'article 22 qui a étécité ici plusieurs fois ,nous donne à cet égard
une ..double .indication. Tout d'abord il fait ùne mention spéciale pour
les· questions de frontières; toutes les clauses relatives à ces matières
et qui figurent dans les conventions antérieures sont maintenues.
Comment sont définies les questions de frontières? Selon l'article 22,
il s'agit
<<des clauses relatives à la définition et à la délimitation des
frontières, à leur garantie et à la démilitarisation de la frontière
du Mékong >>.
On remarque que les clauses relatives à la garantie des frontières font
l'objet d'une mention spéciale. Il est hors de doute que toutes ces
clauses, toutes ces stipulations examinées à la lumière du traité de
r867, ne sont pas prises seulement au nom du Gouvernement français,
mais encore au nom elu Gouvernement elu Cambodge. Il est exclu
d'imaginer que par la seule fin du protectorat la Thaïlande puisse·
refuser au Cambodge le bénéficede ces dispositions.
Mais l'article22 contient une autre précision qui explique parfaite
ment les intentions des parties. Le traité s'applique, sauf dispositions
prévues dans des traités antérieurs, aux relations de l'Indochine et
du Siam: 8o TE!IIPLEDE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
« Il est entendu d'ailleurs que le présent traité sera, à la date
de sa mise en vigueur, substitué au traité du 14 février·1925 en
ce qui concerne les relations de l'Indochine et du Siam. 11
Considérons maintenant l'article décisif, l'article 21 qui institue d'une
manière généraledes procédüres de solution p_acifique. Ces procédures
sont valables pour l'ensemble des matières visées par le traité; l'enga
gement de recourir aux procédures pacifiques lie donc, selon les cas,
la France seule ou bien la France et le Cambodge, suivant que l'enga
gement principal concerne la France seule, ou'la France et le Cambodge.
Repousser cette affirmation serait pénaliser le Cambodge parce qu'il
a recouvré la libre gestion de ses affaires extérieures; ce serait donner
à la Thaïlande le droit de réduire à néant des engagements qui ne
peuvent valoir que parce qu'ils ont étéconclus au nom du Cambodge.
Dans la présente affaire, nous sommes incontestablement en présence
d'un litige de frontières entre la Thaïlande et le Cambodge.
En tant que tel il tombe sous le coup des dispositions elu traité que
l'on vient de commenter et qui ont éténécessairement conclues au nom
du Cambodge; il s'agit par ailleurs d'une affaire qui touche les relations
de la Thaïlande et de l'Indochine, il s'agit d'une affaire de frontière.
Comment soutenir notamment que le Cambodge, .au nom duquel ont
étéconclus les engagements concernant la garantiè des frontières, ne
pourrait pas invoquer le bénéficedes procédures pacifiques qui consti
tuent manifestement une garantie des frontières?
[Audience P~tbli duqI2 tevrilI9~I après-midi]
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges, nous avons exposé ce
matin les thèses du Gouvernement cambodgien. A ces thèses, nos
distingués adversaires ont opposé certaines objections que nous vou
drions maintenant brièvement examiner.
Ces objections sont de deux ordres: les un!'!ssont relatives au texte
même du traité de 1937, les autres sont relatives à des faits ou à des
événements postérieurs. . ,
Nos distingués adversaires ont exprimé le 'sentiment que la présen
tation du traité de 1937, et notamment des deux articles essentiels
que nous discutons, l'article zr et l'article 22, n'était pas parfaitement
claire et qu'elle pouvait susciter bien des doutes. Sur ce point, nous
ne pouvons que dire notre plein accord.
Ilsont pensé également que la meilleure méthode pour éclairer le
sens des dispositions du traité de 1937 était d'examiner les dispositions
des traités dont il prend la suietavec lesquels, d'ailleurs, il se combine.
Et sur ce point aussi nous devons êtrede plein accord avec nos adver-
saires. ,
Antérieurement au traité de 1937. nous trouvons d'abord un traité
d'amitié, de commerce et de navigation elu 14 ~évri 192r5.
Quand nous considérons les dispositions de ce traité, nous remarquons
d'abord - c'est un point que nous avons déjà signalé - que l'article2
de ce traité de 1925 prévoit que les parties acceptent la compétence
de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale.
Nous voyons également plus loin - et c'est l'article 26 - que ce
traité de 1925 ne règle que les rapports de ,la France, à l'exclusion PLAIDOIRIE DE M. REUTER Sr
de l'Indochine, avec la Thaïlande. En effet, l'article 26 prévoit que le
traité de 1925 pourra être étendu dans ses effets à des colonies, à des
protectorats, à des territoires sous mandat, mais toujours à l'exclusion
de ce qui concerne l'Indochine, et dans sa disposition finale cet article 26
dispose que, en ce qui concerne particulièrement l'Indochine fran
çaise, il sera négociéle plus rapidement possible une convention spéciale
et des arrangements complémentaires.
Nous sommes donc ici, au départ, en présence d'une situation qui
est très claire. Le traité de 1925 ne comporte que des engagements au
nom de la France et toutes les dispositions qu'il établit ne s'appliquent
en tant que telles qu'à la France et à la Thaïlande, à l'exclusion des
territoires composites qui forment à l'époque ce que l'on appelle l'In
dochine française.
La convention spéciale prévue par l'article 26 du traité du 14 février
1925 a étéconclue. C'est la convention de Bangkok, du 25 août 1926,
concernant les rapports du Siam et de l'Indochine.
Bien entendu, dans les dispositions de cette convention, certaines
engagent la France en tant que telle, car la France figure au titre de
l'Indochine pour les territoires qui sont incorporés à )'État français.
Mais pour les entités qui ne sont pas incorporées à ·l'Etat français, la
France stipule certes en son nom comme Puissance protectrice, mais elle
stipule aussi,quand il s'agit d'un État et donc du Cambodge, en leur nom.
Or, si nous consultons cette convention du 25 aoüt 1926, nous voyons
que l'article premier pose une règle générale,qui est la suivante: toutes
les dispositions du traité de 1925 qui ne sont pas incompatibles avec
des dispositions particulières du traité de 1926 sont incorporées dans
ce traité de 1926. Or, le traité de 1926 ne contient aucune disposition
particulière concernant les modes de solution pacifique des litiges. Et
ceci implique donc comme _conséquenceque, dans les rapports spéciaux
entre la Thaïlande et les Etats, ou pays, ou territoires qui composent
l'Indochine française, il existe une clause de juridiction qui attribue
compétence à la Cour permanente de Justice internationale.
Dès lors, le traité de 1937 s'éclaire. Certes, on ne saurait le donner
comme un modèle de rédaction. Ceux qui l'ont préparé ont voulu,
pour aller plus vite, fondre en un seul texte les dispositions qui avaient
ététrès logiquement et très clairement séparéesdans le passé dans le
traité de 1925 d'une part et la convention de 1926 de l'autre. C'est ce
qui explique que lorsque l'on se reporte à l'article 22, on trouve une
disposition qui fasse mention des règles qui concernent spécialement
les rapports de la Thaïlande et de l'Indochine. C'est ce qui permet
également de donner sa juste valeur à l'alinéa 2 de l'article 22, à cette
clause dite coloniale. Il est bien clair que lorsqu'il est prévu que les
dispositions du traité de 1937 pourront être étendues aux colonies et
possessions françaises, ainsi qu'aux pays placés sous le protectora!,
cela doit s'entendre à l'exclusion des dispositions concernant les terri
toires d'Indochine, puisque ceux-ci font l'objet, dans le premier alinéa,
d'une réserve spéciale. Il nous semble donc que ce recours aux sources
du traité de 1937 l'éclaire dans un sens qui montre que lorsque les
négociateurs ont pris tout leur temps et ont rédigécorrectement les
traités, ilsont b_ien clairement séparé les deux problèmes: celui de~
rapports entre l'Etat· français en tant que tel et la Thaïlande, et celm
de l'État français comme protecteur et au nom de l'État protégé, qui
ont fait l'objet de dispositions particulières. En 1937, on a rédigédans82 TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
une certaine hâte -peut-être la saison y est-elle pour quelque chose -
un traité dont l'ensemble des dispositions nous semble ainsi parfaitement
clair.
En ce qui concerne certains événements ou certaines déclarations
postérieures à 1937, il a étéfait état d'abord de certaines déclarations
échangées devant la Commission de conciliation franco-siamoise établie
par le règlement de 1946.
Il s'agit là d'événementsanciens, d'événementsoubliés, d'événements
qu'il faut oublier. Mais si onveut les évoquer il faut bien rappeler le
climat dans lequel s'est dérouléecette procédure de conciliation.
Certes, on y a parlé incidemment de proj:>lèmesde délimitation de
frontières au sens technique du terme. Mais on y a parlé aussi de ques
tions beaucoup plusgra ves, on y a parléde véritables revision de frontières.
Et les deux États en présence,France et Thaïlande, ont essayé,chacun de
son côté,d'amener la Commission à traiter de ces problèmes de revision;
chacun de son côtéa essayéégalement d'empêcherla Commission d'exa
miner les revendications territoriales adverses.
C'est à la lumière de ces considérations qu'il faut commencer par
apprécier les déclarations thaïlandaises qui ~ont rapportées à la page
58 (1) du mémoire du Gouvernement du Royaume de Cambodge. Le
Gouvernement français qui se trouvait en présence de demandes de
revisimi émanant de la Thaïlande s'est réservéle droit aussi de présenter
des demandes de revision au nom du Cambodge et du Laos.
Le Gouvernement de la Thailancle a voulu répondre à cette demande
de revision et il l'a fait par le passage qui vous a étécité. Disons que
cette réponse thaïlandaise a surtout une portée politique. Car sur le
plan juridique elle n'a pas de pertinence. La Thaïlande affirme que des
revendications au nom clJ.!Cambodge et au nom elu Laos seraient des
revendications au nom d'Etats tiers. l\'Iaisceci est absolument contraire
au traité elu protectorat.S'il y a des revendications à présenter, il faut
bien qu'elles le soient par quelqu'un, et ce ne peut êtreque par la
France. Par conséquent, sur le plan juridique, l'objection thaïlandaise
est sans portée, mais sur le plan politique elle a une très grande portée,
car le fond de la penséedu Gouvernement thaïland c~estqu'il n'accepte
pas des revendications présentées au ,nom des Etats sous protectorat,
parce qu'il n'est pas certain que les Etats protégésen profitent, et la
fin de sa phrase qui vous a étécitée indique bien que le Gouvernement
thaïlandais attache le plus grand prix à l'indépendance de ces territoires.
Sur ce point, le Gouvernement cambodgien doit dire que la disposition
de sa totale indépendance est aussi un objet auquel il attache le plus
grand prix, et il prend volontiers acte de ces déclarations de la Thaïlande
de 1946 et se réjouit de ce qu'elles soient renouvelées encore aujourd'hui,
et il attend avec la confiance de bénéficierdes effets de cet accueil dans
la famille des nations que cette déclaration lui a promis.
En ce qui concerne le Gouvernement français, il s'est trouvé de son
côtéen présence d'une revendication siamoise, et il y a répondu. Et c'est
le passage qui a étécitéà la page Sg (1) du lTJémoireeluGouvernement
du Cambodge.
Qu'a fait valoir le Gouvernement français. contre une demande de
revision? Il a fait valoir que dans les traités originaires les revisions de
frontières étaient exclues, puisque les parties étaient tombées d'accord
sur le principe des frontières. Jamais les phrases qui ont étélues et
qui sont à la page 89 (1) n'ont voulu dire qu'un litige qui serait relatif à PLAIDOIRIE DE M. REUTER
une délimitation de la frontière se heurterait aux mêmesobjections.
Autrement dit le Gouvernement français, instruit peut-être par la
première position prise par la Thaïlande, a cherché une justification
plus juridique; mais ceci ne porte en rienatteinte à l'efficacitédes clauses
de compétence juridictionnelle qui se trouvaient dans les accords. Si la
question devait êtreportée dans l'avenir devant la Cour, il est bien clair
que soit l'une, soit l'autre des parties ferait sans doute les mêmesob
jections à l'examen d'un problème de revision, alors qu'elle n'en fait
aucune à l'examen d'une question de délimitation.
On a encore fait valoir, et c'est le dernier point sur lequel nous présen
terons une brève observation, que dans son attitude vis-à-vis d'un
autre État voisin du Cambodge, le Laos, le Gouvernement français
avait pris une position contraire aux thèses que le Cambodge soutient
actuellement. On a fait état d'un accord entre la France et le Laos -
traité d'amitié et d'association - du 22 octobre 1953, que l'on peut
trouver dans le recueil Actualités internationales et diplomatiques I950-
I956 de mon collègue M. Colliard, page 224. On a cité l'article premier,
qui dit que le Royaume du Laos <<estsubstitué>>dans tous les droits ct
obligations résultant de tous traités internationaux. Et on a raisonné
par a contrario en elisant: si une telle disposition est nécessaire pour
produire les effets qui en découlent, cela prouve bien que ces effets
n'existent pas par la vertu propre des engagements antérieurement
souscrits.
Eh bien, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges, nous croyons que
c'est là un raisonnement très hasardé, car il s'agit dans ce traité du
Laos et la situation du Laos vis-à-vis de la Thaïlande n'a jamais été
définie comme la situation du Cambodge,.
D'autre part, ce Laos de 1953 est un Etat. Mais est-ce bien sûr que
ce Laos ait étéprécédéd'un autre État identique? Il y avait bien un
royaume de Louang-Prabang, mais le Laos de 1953 a étérecomposé à
partir d'élémentsterritoriaux disparates, et il n'est pas certain, nous
n'avons pas à prendre position sur ce point, mais il n'est pas certain
qu;en ce qui concerne le Laos il n'y ait pas des problèmes de succession
d'Etat qui se posent. Enfin et surtout, ces raisonnements a contrario
ne prouvent pas grand'chose, pas plus que ne prouverait ici un argument
très simple mais que nous ne faisons pas valoir, qui consisterait à dire
que puisqu'il n'y a pas eu de traité de ce genre pour le Cambodge, c'est
que la situation du Cambodge est meilleure.
Voilà les quelques observations que nous voulions présenter au sujet
des objections qui nous ont étéproposées.
Il
Et nous en arrivons alors à notre conclusion, à la conclusion générale
qui est présentéeau nom elu Gouvernement royal du Cambo(jge. Cette
conclusion nous ramène à la compétence de la Cour fondée sur l'article
36 et l'acceptation thaïlandaise.
Ce procès est simple. Il est suspendu, pour l'essentiel, à une lettre,
la lettre du 20 mai 1950. Cette lettre veut dire quelque chose. Elle ne
peut vouloir elire qu'une seule chose: la Thaïlande veut accepter la
juridiction de la Cour internationale de Justice. Sur ce point l'accord est
unanime. TE!\IPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
La Thaïlande s'interroge sur la réalitéactuelle de cet engagement et
elle devrait, pour que cet engagement soit privé d'effet, démontrer que,
bien qu'elle ait voulu ce résultat, elle n'a pas pu le réaliser. Cette_démons
tration est difficile, car en droit international la volonté des Etats qui
veulent s'obliger est puissante. D'aucuns diront mêmequ'elle est toute
puissante. Comment détruire cette capacité créatrice de la volonté? Les
représentants de la Thaïlande ont, semble-t-il, poursuivi deux voies
différentes. Ils ne les ont poussées peut-être ni l'une ni l'autre jusqu'à
leur terme. Ils ne les ont peut-être mêmepas toujours distinguées, bien
qu'elles soient contradictoires. Ni l'une ni l'autre de ces voies ne per
mettent d'atteindre le résultat recherché. Non seulement pour les motifs
qui ont étési bien exposés par mes collègues, mais parce que l'une et
l'autre de ces voies, poussées à leur terme, sont contraires aux principes
généraux du droit international contemporain.
La première de ces voies est celle d'une conception purement psycho
logique de la volonté. La deuxième est celle d'une conception purement
formaliste.
Comment, en suivant le raisonnement de la Thaïlande, en le pour
suivant peut-être au-delà de ce qu'elle a exprimé jusqu'à présent, com
ment aboutit-on à une conception purement psychologique dela volonté?
Mais tout simplement sur la base de la théorie de l'erreur comme vice
atteignant une manifestation de la volonté. lV!aisjusqu'où faut-il aller
dans cette voie? ·
Si la déclaration thaïlandaise est viciée par l'erreur, il faut admettre
d'abord qu'une erreur de droit peut vicier la volonté. Et c'est un prem.jer
pas. Dans l'espèce,il faut admettre que l'erreur de droit serait la suivante:
si la Thaïlande avait su que son engagement de 1929 était atteint de
caducité en 1946, jamais elle n'aurait, en 1950, accepté la juridiction
obligatoire de la Cour. Donc, il faut admettre que l'erreur de droit,
même propre à l'une seule des parties, mêmerestéesecrète, est une cause
de nullité, et c'est un deuxième pas. 1
Mais ce n'est pas suffisant dans l'espèce, caf il est bien impossible de
prouver que cette erreur de droit a étéla cause déterminante de l'engage
ment de 1950, et alors il faut élargir eo.core la formule et dire: toute
erreur de droit importante est une cause de nullité, et c'est un troisième
pas.
On voit donc que l'on pousse l'exigence des qualités psychologiques
de la volonté jusqu'à son point extrême; une volontéquin'estpastotale
ment éclairéen'oblige pas. Dans l'Affaire relative à la souveraineté sur
certaines parcelles frontalières, la Cour a rendu le 20 juin 1959 un arrêt
qui aborde le problème de l'erreur. Il lui appartient, et il lui appartient
à elle seule, de préciser et de développer les fonpules qu'elle a employées
dans cet arrêt. lllais, à notre humble avis, on ne saurait en aucun cas
admettre des conséquences aussi extrêmes que celles que nous venons
de développer: ce serait la fin de la sécurité dans les engagements
internationaux. ,
Mais il existe une deuxième voie pour priver l<l.éclaration thaïlandaise
de son effet et, pour autant qu'il nous semble, c'Est peut-être plutôt cette
voie-là qui a étéretenue. C'est celle d'une conception purement formaliste.
La volonté de la Thaïlande était droite et éclairéemais elle a étéprise
dans un piège, le piège d'un document. La volonté juridique, dans
cette conception, n'est pas maîtresse des documents et des signes par
lesquels elle s'exprime. Elle en est l'esclave, elle en est la captive. Ces PLAIDOIRIE DE M. REUTER ss
documents, ces signes ne sont plus des "instruments », ce sont des
maîtres. Si la volonté juridique rentre en simple contact avec un mauvais
document, avec un document caduc, elleperd toute efficacité.La Thaïlande
a, le20 mai 1950, une volonté bien claire; malheureusement elle fait le
mauvais geste, elle effectue le mauvais rite. Sa volonté traverse un
circuit documentaire où elle rentre en contact avec le mauvais document.
C'est pourquoi son engagement est nul. C'est là une conception très
primitive elu droit. Certains pourraient mêmeelire, usant d'une expres
sion certes excessive, que c'est une conception «magique >>elu droit.
Sans aller jusque là, une telle analyse fait bon marché des notions
fondamentales du droit international moderne. Celui-ci n'est point un
droit formaliste. Pour qu'une obligation conventionnelle existe, il faut
essentiellement qu'existe une volonté de s'obliger. La Cour nous par
donnera de citer ici une opinion exprimée dans l'Affaire Ambatielos au
Recueil I952, page 6g, un bon texte vaut toujours mieux qu'un mauvais
commentaire:
<La rédaction et la signature d'un accord international sont les
actes par lesquels s'énonce la volonté des États contractants; la
ratification est l'acte par lequel la volonté ainsi exprimée est confir
mée par l'autorité compétente en vue de lui donner force de droit.
Tous ces actes concernent la substance même de l'accord inter
national. Mais la constatation de ces actes dans les instruments qui
leur donneront un aspect extérieur comporte des opérations maté
rielles d'écriture, d'impression, de remise d'une partie à l'autre,
etc., opérations qui ne contribuent pas à la formation de la volonté
des États contractants; le plus souvent, ceux qui ont compétence
pour former, exprimer ou confirmer cette volonté ne participent pas
à ces 'opérations matérielles; celles-ci revêtent souvent des formes
empruntées à la tradition, suivies scrupuleusement et, par suite,
aveuglément par les fonctionnaires chargés de cette besogne maté
rielle.On ne saurait attribuer aux détails de forme qui se super
posent ainsi à l'opération juridique de conclusion elu traité une
influence déterminante quand il s'agit de discerner, dans le cloute,
le sens réel de l'accord intervenu, le caractère que les parties ont
entendu donner à tel ou tel accord intervenu entre elles. >>
Ainsi apparaît la contradiction qu'il y a entre les deux voies extrêmes
que nous venons de présenter. Lorsque l'on présente une erreur de droit,
qui n'a même pas étédéterminante dans l'engagement, comme une
cause de nullité, on exige que la volonté juridique, pour être prise en
considération, soit examinée dans tous ses arrière-plans intellectuels,
et que tout ce qui pourrait ternir sa pureté, sa diaphanéité, la condamne
à l'inefficacité. Mais lorsqu'on l'asservit à passer par un labyrinthe de
références documentaires, où le moindre contact matériel la fixe et
l'immobilise, on lui retire toute autonomie propre pour ne retenir que
l'efficacité du rite. Le droit internationaltient une juste moyenne entre
ces extrêmes. Il est nécess"!irement simple et un peu rustique. Il donne
efficacité à la volonté des Etats telle qu'elle s'exprime en ne pénétrant
qu'exceptionnellement dans le cadre, souvent inaccessible, des motiva
tions et des intentions cachées. En revanche, il attache peu de prix aux
élémentsmatÇriels en tant que tels. Ceux-ci sont parfois des signes de la
volonté des Etats, mais ils ne sont rien en eux-mêmes. Toute autre86 TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHÉAR
conception du droit international rendrait la vie internationale trop
incertaine, trop difficile. Elle ne serait pas à la mesure des intérêtsdont
les Etats ont la charge.
C'est pour ces motifs que le Gouvernement royal du Cambodge main
tient les conclusions qu'il a formuléesdans ses observations, page r67 (1),
ct demande respectueusement à la Cour de lui en adjuger le bénéfice. 9. REPL Y OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE
(COUNSEL FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND)
~\ THE PUBLIC HEARINGS OF 14 APRIL 1961
[PubUc hearing of I4 April rg6r, morning}
Mr. President and Members of the Court.
It is now my turn to reply on behalf of Thailand to the careful and
well-balanced arguments of Counsel for Cambodia, so far as they affect
the first preliminary objection. They were a little self-revealing. Counsel
for Cambodia concentratecl their major effort on the first objection,
thereby indicating that it was here that both their hopes and fears
were centred. We ali, I am sure, enjoyed their learning and eloquence
though my own enjoyment was tinged with that degree of disquietude
with which an advocate for one party listens to powerful advocates
for the other side.T hope I shall not be thought guilty of presumption
if I say that by the close of their arguments, my bosom had regainecl
its repose. I am, however, concerned that T cannot hope to match
the wealth of literary, scriptural and philological allusion which graced
the admirable address of Mr. Dean Acheson. Ali I cau offer is a modest
quotation from Virgil, "Hùtc illae lacrimae". Our opponents' misgivings
ali stem from the decision of this Court in the 1srael v. Bulgaria case.
Hence these tears! That is why we listened to such a moving appeal
to this Court, in effect, to disregard that decision. It is that decision
which, in my submission, is the main and indeed fatal obstacle in the
way of Cambodia. r ask this Court to cio no more than apply the clear
result of that decision in this case. As a decision of this Court, it is of
supreme authority and takes precedence over the views of the Secre
tary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Rosenne or anybody else's
opinion. To argue otherwise is to argue that the law should not be
applied, but that, it is submitted,is an approach which shoulcl not be
countenancecl in any· court of law, particularly the highest court of
law.
Counsel for Camboclia, in their arguments, cited a number of expres
sions of opinion which bore directly or indirectly upon the question
whether Thailand's declarations should be regarcled as valid, as repre
senting valid renewals of the 1929 declaration or as constituting, in
the case of the 1950 declaration, a new acceptance of the jurisdiction
of this Court. I mean, in the course of my argument, to return to sorne
of those expressions of opinion: but, in general, may I at the outset
say with regard to them, that with the one exception of the opinion
expressecl by Mr. Rosenne in 1q6o, those opinions or indications of
opinion were expressed before fhe date when, in 1959, the decision
of this Court was pronounced in the l srael v. Bulgaria case. Tt is, I
think, generally accepted that it was the prevailing opinion, widely
held, before that decision was pronounced, that a renewal of a previous
acceptance of the Permanent Court's juriscliction was valid even in the
case of a country not an original party to the Statute. I invite the88 TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
Court to infer that if the authors of those opinions, when they expressed
them, had had before them the majority judgment of this Court in the
Israel v. Bulgaria case, sorne, or indeed probably ali of those opinions,
other than that of Mr. H.osenne, would have been framed in an opposite
sense.
When ali is said and done, what the Court has to decide is simply
a short, sharp, crisp point of law.
This Court has before it three documents and Article 36 of its Statute.
The documents are the Thai declarations of 1929, 1940 and 1950. The
question is, what legal i·esult in the light of Article 36, paragraph s.
as construed in the Israel case, do these documents produce?
The answer is, whatever their legal result may be, if any, it is not
that Thailand accepted the jurisdiction of this Court. Whatever cloes
not conduce to the solution of this legal problem is, I submit, irrelevant.
Counsel for Cambodia at times dilated upon what I hope 1 may
uncontroversially describe as the "ambiance" of the case. Such matters
might or might not have relevance if the Court were concemed with
questions of behaviour in which sympathy, approbation or the reverse
might play a legitimate part. They are, I submit, totally extraneous
to any question at present before the Court and I do not propose to
take any time in offering any observations on what Counsel for Cambodia
saicl on these matters. I will go straight to my point of law.
Mr. President and Members of the Court, in presenting my argument,
I will take heecl of the warning given to me by my learned friend Pro
fessor Reuter not to lose iny way on the two roacls which he so graphi
cally described. I agree with him that it is very clifficult to see exactly
where they lead. The peril in which I stand of getting !ost in them is
the greater for the fact that so far as I could recognize them from Pro
fessor Reuter's description of them, [ have never yet in my !ife trodden
either of those roacls. \Vith the permission of the Court, I prefer to fol
low the path which I mapped out before, direct to the point of law which
I submit on the first preliminary objection.
It is, in the first place, I subm1t, quite crucial to the true under
stancling of the first preliminary objection raised by Thailand to
have fully in minci that uncler the Statute of this Court, two separate
methocls of submitting to the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court
were provided. One is that contained in Article 36, paragraph 2, and
one is that contained in Article 36, paragraph S· l apologize to the
Court for repeating what is trite and obvious. My excuse, however,
must be that, if I may say so with deference to the careful argumen~s
of Mr. Dean Acheson and Professor Pinto, it seemed to me that the1r
arguments suggested that the Court shoulcl put out of minci the radical
distinction between these two methocls. Under paragraph 2, a party
coulcl accept the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court by making a
declaration which complies with the requirements of paragraph 2.
Under paragraph s. a country which was a party to the Court's Statute,
when it was originally clrawn up, became subject to the compulsory
jurisdiction of this Court if it had made a declaration under Article 36
of the Statute of the Permanent Court which was still in force. The
basic and fundamental contention in support of Thailand's first pre
liminary objection is that Thailand elected to use the ·second and not
the first of these two methods; but because of the decision in the Israel v.
Bulgaria case, which for the first time clecided the true meaning of REPLY OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE 8g
Article 36, paragraph 5, failed by the use of this method to achieve
the objective which undoubtedly she desired to achieve of subjecting
herself tothe compulsory jurisdiction of this Court.
In the second place, may I reply shortly to Mr. Acheson's comment
upon what I said in my opening address to the Court to the effect that,
even although the will to subject oneself to the jurisdiction of this
Court may be present, this cannot take place unless certain formalities
are complied with. What I meant was, and what I maintain still to be
perfectly correct is, that however much a country may wish to subject
itselfto the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court, it can only do so
by, as it were, passing through the gateway built into paragraphs 2or
5 of Article 36. The word "formality" in this context is perhaps some
what dangerous, as it may seem to imply the performance of something
of small importance. However much a country wishes to subject itself
to the jurisdiction of this Court, and however repeatedly and clearly
it may have proclaimed this desire, it still nevertheless can only achieve
this desire by taking the steps prescribed by Article 36, paragraph 2,
or, in the alternative, Article 36, paragraph S· Whatever steps it takes
and however impelling the motive behind the taking of those steps,
they nevertheless have to be individually examined and analysed to
see whether they constitute a compliance with the minimum require
ments of one or the other of those two paragraphs. To use terms such
as the term "formality" simply as a synonym for procedure of lesser
and secondary consequence may lead to error; since a formality, being
sometimes a matter of minor importance, may nevertheless assume
considerable importance if there is a categorical requirement to be found,
as in the present case, in sorne statute or other similar constitutive
document which prescribes in terms that a particular end cannot be
attained unless a particular formality is observed.
If I may say so with deference to the argument addressed to the
Court by Mr. Dean Acheson, there is a danger which lurks in thinking
too much upon the !ines that the intent is everything and the form and
nature of the document entirely subsidiary and unimportant. I accept
fully that where there is ambiguity, in resolving that ambiguity in a
document intent is a valuable guide, although other considerations
may also have to be taken into account for the purpose of resolving
the ambiguity. Furthermore, I accept that no precise form is laid
clown which must be used by a party wishing to make a declaration
under Article 36, paragraph 2. Beyond this, I submit, one should not go.
To push the doctrine that intent is the supreme test beyond these
limits is to run the risk of inclulging in loose thinking. Isubmit in the
first place, that if one examines Article 36, paragraph 2, and the other
paragraphs in Article 36, it is undoubtedly the case that there are
certain essential minimum requisites which must be complied with
before a document can constitute a valid declaration for the purposes
of paragraph 2. Perhaps to begin with I should have said that it is
apparent from the terms of Article 36 that there must be a document,
and that an oral declaration would not be sufficient. This is made
plain, for example, by the requirement in paragraph 4 that the Secre
tary-General shall transmit copies of the declaration to the parties
to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court.
What, then, are the minimum requisites with which the document
must comply to constitute a declaration undcr paragraph 2?go TEMPLE OF PREAH VlHEAR
It is, in the first place, to be contrasted with an agreement to refer
under paragraph r. A minimum requirement of such an agreement
would be, clearly, that it should specify the case which it has been
agreed to refer to the Court. A declaration under paragraph 2 must
surely at least include a statement that the party making the decla
ration recognizes the juriscliction of this Court as compulsory. Perhaps
-though 1 do not concede this-it is not essential that the declara
tion should state that the jurisdiction of this Court is accepted as com
pulsory ipso facto and without special agreement. But surely, at !east
the declaration must state that it is the juriscliction of this Court, and
not some otlter court, such as the Permanent Court, which is recognized
as compulsory. Furthermore; the declaration must surely state that
it accepts this Court's jurisdiction "in relation to any other State accep
ting the same jurisdiction". Furthermore, the conclusion would seem
inevitable from the language of paragraph 2 that the declaration must
state in terms whether the juriscliction of this Court is accepted in
relation tothe matters specified in sub-paragraphs(a) or(b) or(c) or(d),
or more than one of them, or ali of the said paragraphs contained in
paragraph 2. Moreover, paragraph 3 provides that the declaration
may be either unconditional, or on condition of reciprocity on the part
of severa! or certain States, or for a certain time. It must surely be
stated in the terms of the declaration which of these alternatives spe
cified in paragraph 3 is to characterize the declaration.
It is therefore, l submit, apparent that there must be a specifie
minimum content in the declaration, and that a loose and unspecific
statement is far from what is contemplatecl as complying with the
requirements of paragraph 2. To say what I have said is in no sense
inconsistent with the view, to which I adhere, that no particular form
is requisite.Whatever the language employecl, however, language must
express in its terms, or at least by the very clearest and most unambi
guous implication, the various matters to which I have made reference.
The next question, Mr. President and Members of the Court, is whether
it could possibly be said that the declaration of 20 May 1950 can be
regarded .as ·complying ·with··these minimum requisites. In the first
place, cloes it contain anywhere a statement that Thailand recognizes
as compulsory the jurisdiction of this Court?
The answer to that initial question is plainly "No". Such a statement
is not to be found from the beginning to the end of it. On the contrary,
it contains a wholly different statement. It contains a statement that
Thailand renews the 1929 and 1940 declarations, both of which are
specifically mentioned (although the 1929 declaration is wrongly des
cribed as the declaration dated 20 September 1920). It accordingly
asserts something which is almost the converse of that which it must
assert to be a valicl declaration for the purpose of paragraph2. It further
goes on to repeat that the renewal of those earlier declarations is to
be subject to the same limits and conditions and reservations as set
forth in the declaration of 1929. Had it not been for the 1srael v. Bulgaria
decision this woulcl have had the effect of converting the acceptance
by Thailand of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court as so extendecl
into an acceptance of the jurisdiction of this Court because of the appli
cation of Article 36, paragraph 5· Nobody at that date, as has been
saicl by me, I am afraid, only too often, realized what the true effect
of Article 36, paragraph 5, was. Thailand thus meant to achieve the REPL Y OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE gr
result that she was subject to the jurisdiction of this Court by making
use of a method which, had Article 36, paragraph 5, meant what was
then supposed, would have achieved the result that Thailand was so
bound. As it did not have this meaning, Thailand failecl of her purpose
and in my submission is not, in consequence, today subject, in regard
to the present dispute, to the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court.
Mr. Acheson submitted that no particular form is necessary for the
expression of the consent which establishes the jurisdiction of this
Court (C.R. 6rj3, pp. 25-26). He went so far asto suggest that if consent
"is established by other means, then a document may not be
needed at ali".
This particular submission is surely plainly wrong, since, as l pointed
out, the Secretary-General cannot circulate copies of an oral declaration.
In support of the submission that no particular form is necessary,
Mr. Acheson cited the Corfu Channel Case and the Mavrommatis Case.
Neither of those cases, I submit, has any bearing on the question now
before the Court. Cambodia now endeavours to establish the Court's
jurisdiction by relying upon Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute.
The Court has therefore to decide what is requisite for the expression
of a State's consent under that paragraph-Article 36, paragraph 2.
No such question arose in the Corfu Channel Case because the Court
entertained that case on the basis that its jurisdiction to deal with
that particular case had been voluntarily accepted by Albania, the
respondent State. This is clearly stated in the Judgment (I.C.j. Reports
I947-I948, p. 26). On the next page of the Judgment, the Court, referring
to a letter of 2 July 1947 from the Albanian Govemment, said that
letter constituted
"a voluntary and indisputable acceptance of the Court's juris
diction".
Then follows the sentence which Mr. Acheson quoted:
"\-\ihile the consent of the parties coju~isdi on .ieoCourt,
neither the Statu te nor thl~ule rquire that this consent shoulcl
be expressed in any particular form."
It is clear that this sentence refers to what the Court was then con
sidering-a voluntary consent to submit to the Court's jurisdiction in
a particular case. It cannot legitimately be applied to the different
subject of consent to be bound by the compulsory jurisdiction of _the
Court under Article 36, paragraph 2.The Statute expressl:r prov1~es
that such consent is to be expressed by means of a declaratiOn, wluch
must comply with the requirements of Article 36 to which I have pre
viously called attention.
l may here add that the passage in Judge Hudson's book on ~he
Permanent Court, cited by Mr. Acheson, is also dealing only w1th
voluntary consent to submit to the jurisdiction in a particular case, not
with the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36,
paragraph 2.
Even less apposite, I venture to submit, was Mr. Acheson's reference
to the Mavrommatis Case. He quoted the sentence in which the Per
manent Court said it was92 TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
"not bound to attach to matters of form the same degree of impor- ·
tance which they might possess in municipal law" (Series A, No. 2,
p. 34)-
The point then under consideration had nothing to do with the acceptance
of the Court's jurisdiction or compliance with the terms of its Statute.
The Greek Government, the applicant in that case, sought to found the
jurisdiction upon a number of instruments, including one of the protocols
to the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. One of the grounds on which the
respJndent, the Government of the United Kingdom, challenged the
Court's jurisdiction was that that protocol had been ratified after, not
before, the date of the application originating the proceedings. It was
in the course of rejectingthat technïcality that the Court used the words
which Mr. Acheson quoted. I submit they are quite inapplicable to the
present case, because a failure to comply with the requirements of the
Statu te is not a "matter of form" such as the Permanent Court was then
considering .
.Mr.Acheson went on to suggest that his alleged principle that no
particular form is necessary for the expression of consent to the Court's
jurisdiction is an application of the broader principle that international
instruments
"are to be applied in accordance with their manifest purpose and
intent and so asto give effect to the objectives for which they were
concluded" (C.R., p. so).
I have already submitted that there must be limitations upon the principlc
of interpreting a document according to its purpose rather than its words.
I would here only add a word about the second part of Mr. Acheson's
"broader principle", that an international instrument must be applied
so as to make it effective rather than ineffective. Here again, there is
no doubt that the principle is sound within proper limits. If there are
two possible interpretations of a provision, and one of them would add
something to the rest of the instrument in which the provision is con
tained while the other would add nothing, the former is to be preferred.
Of the two cases cited by Mr. Acheson as applications by this Court of
his principle, the first is an example of a situation of that kind: Cor/tt
Channel Case (I.C.J. Reports r949, pp. 23-24). (It should be noted,
however, that in the Anglo-Iranian Oit Co. Case the Court refused to
apply this rule of interpretation to a declaration under Article 36,
paragraph 2: I.C.J. Reports I952, p. ros.) If an instrument imposes
upon a body certain duties but does not expressly confer powers which
are essential to the performance of those duties, the instrument must
be interpreted, not as withholding those powers, but as conferring them
by implication. The second case cited by Mr. Acheson is an example of
a situation of that kind: Case of Reparation for Injuries (I.C.]. Reports
I949. pp. r82-183).
The situation in the present case is quite different. The first question
which the Court has to decide here is whether the document of 20 May
1950 is a fresh and independent declaration, or a renewal of the decla
ration of 1929. Upon the language of the document there can, as I ha\'e
said, in my submission, be only one answer to that question. It is a
renewal. Tf so, then as a matter of law, in consequence of the decision
in the case ofIsrael v. Btûgaria, the document was ineffective. No process REPLY OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE
93
of interpretation can be invoked to evade this legal consequence. In
neither of the cases cited by Mr. Acheson, nor, I venture to add, in any
other case or any principle of international law, is it laid down that if
a document, upon its natural and ordinary meaning, is rendered in
effective by sorne rule of law, that natural and ordinary meaning can
be abandoned and sorne other meaning introduced. Indeed, in the Free
Zones Case, the Permanent Court expressly said that the rule of inter
preting clauses of an instrument so asto enable them to have appropriate
effects could only be invoked
"if it does not involve cloing violence to their terms" (P.C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 22, p. 13).
Mr. Acheson and Professor Pinto were at pains to satisfy the Court
that the worcl "renew" in the English language is apt to inclucle the
process of bringing into being again something which has lapsecl. I have
never arguecl to the contrary. lt depends on the context in which the
worcl is usecl, and undoubtedly it is sometimes usecl in this sense. My
argument was, and is, entirely different. It is that this Court, in the
Israel v. Hulgaria case, helcl that an acceptance of the juriscliction 'of
the Permanent Court was incapable of renewal once it bad lapsecl. The
Court said so in the plainest terms in the passage I quoted: ariel to put
it beyoncl doubt may I qu'ote the wnole relevant passage on page 145 of
the Juclgment, of which I previously only quotecl part: ·
"... the clear intention which inspired Article 36, paragraph 5, was
to continue in being something which was in existence, to preserve
existing acceptances, to avoid that the creation. of a new Court
shoulcl frustra te progress already achieved: it is not permissible to
substitute for this intention to preserve, to secure continuity, an
intention to restore legal force to undertakings which have expired:
it is one thing to preserve an existing undertaking by changing its
subject-matter; it is quite another to revive an undertaking which
has alreacly been extinguished.".
Lower clown, on the same page, the Judgment reacls:
"At the time when Bulgaria sought and obtained admission to
the United Nations, its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Permanent Court had long since lapsed. There is nothing in
Article 36, paragraph 5, to indicate any intention to revive an
undertaking which is no. longer in force."
The Court is, as I read these passages, saying that once an unde'rtaking
to accept the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court has ·1apsed, it is
incapable of being revived. That is what I was submitting. Even, there
fore, if, in the1950 declaration, Thailancl hacl used, instead of the word
"renew", a worcl which beyoncl controversy meant or included '"bring
back into force something which has lapsed", it woulcl have made no
difference-the position woulcl have been the same. That is because this
Court has saicl in the passages quoted that whatever else you can bring
back into being, the one thing you cannot, under Article 36, paragraph 5,
is a lapsed acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court.
l\1r. President, .Members of the Court, 1 go further. Even let it be
assumed against me that in ail I have just submitted I am entirely wrong,
894 TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
that the Court, in other words, has not said "you cannot under Article
36, paragraph 5, bring back to !ife a lapsed acceptance", still, I submit,
the position remains the same and the first preliminary objection must
succeecl. Why? Let it be assumed against me that you can renew a
lapsecl acceptance. \Vhat, on this hypothesis, clic!the 1950 declaration
bring back to !ife? It brought back to !ife an acceptance of the juris
diction of the Permanent Court. Has this any legal result? No, none at
ail. Why none at all? Because it coule!have legal result only through the
application of Article 36, paragraph 5-without this, to revive acceptance
of the juriscliction of a Court which no longer exists can have no legal
result. Does, then, Article 36,aragraph 5, apply? No, because this Court
has saicl it cloes not apply except in the case of original parties to the
Statu te, and Thailancl was not an original party to the Statu te. Therefore
it follows that the 1950 declaration hacl no legal result and in particular
die! not have the legal result of subjecting Thailand to the juriscliction
of this Court.
May I suggest another test? Camboclia's application in this present
case was filed in 1959. Let it be supposee! that Thailancl's declaration of
1940 hacl been expressecl to be valicl, not for 10 years as the Court
knows it was, but for say 30 years, so that it would have been current
on the date when Camboclia lilecl her application. Woulcl this Court in
those assumed circumstances have had jmiscliction to entertain the
Camboclian application? Clearly not if the logic in the 1srael case is
appliecl; because Thailancl's declaration of 1940 lapsed on 19 April 1946.
If this is so, how on earth coule! this Court be given juriscliction by
Thailand's renewal in 1950 of that very same declaration of 1940?
My submission is that Counsel for Camboclia clic!not by their reasoning
provicle an answer to the reasoning upon which Thailancl seeks to base
her first preliminary objection. Incleecl, I submit that I may fairly
say that even if for the purpose of argument the basic contentions which
they put forward were ali held by this Court to be sound, still, in my
submission, it must result that the first preliminary objection succeecls.
May Tassume, for the purpose of argument, that Counsel for Cambodia
were right in what I think I may fairly state were the basic contentions
upon which their arguments were founded. I hope I do justice to those
arguments if I summarize those basic contentions as follows:
(1) the word "renew" is a word which is apt to include the bringing
into effect again of something which has actually lapsed and ceased to
have effect;
{2) Thailancl at ali material times did mean to accept the jurisdiction
of this Court;
(3) in interpreting the Thai declaration of 20 May 1950, regard should
be had to the intention which unclerlies this declaration and the nature
of the intention should be prominently borne in minci when the actual
language usee! in the declaration is construed;
(4) in the case of documents, particularly documents of an inter
national character, any ambiguity in the language used should be con
strued in such a way, if possible, as to give the document effect rather
than to procluce the result that the document is ineffective or meaningless;
(5) in filing the declaration of 20 May 1950, Thailand meant to become
subject to the jurisdiction of this Court, and believed that she had so
become; REPL Y OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE 95
(6) what is important is not the physical paper on which the decla
ration of 3 May 1940 was written, but the obligation which it enshrines.
I do not say that these were all the Cambodian contentions, but they
were, I hope I may say, the major ones.
If ali these points were to be deciclecl in favour of Cambodia and
against Thailand, it in my submission still necessarily results from the
l srael v. Bulgaria decision that the first preliminary objection raised
by Thailand must succeecl, for the following reasons:
I. Although Thailancl may have made the declaration of 20 May 19so,
meaning to subject herself to the jurisdiction of this Court, it is super
abundantly plain, upon the language of the declaration itself, that
Thailand meant to achieve this result by preserving in being the obligation
enshrined in the Thai declarations of 20 September 1929 and 3 May 1940.
2. Those obligations were no other than obligations to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Permanent Court.
3· Thailand intenclecl by extending that obligation to procluce the result
that, owing to the application of Article 36, paragraph s. of the Statu te
of the present Court, Thailand was subject to the juriscliction of this
Court, in the erroneous belief sharecl by ali in I9SO that by extencling
the obligation to submit to the juriscliction of the Permanent Court,
Thailand automatically, owing to Article 36, paragraph s. subjected
itself tothe juriscliction of the present Court.
4· Whatever else the case of 1srael v. Bulgaria decides, it undoub.tedly
decides that Article 36, paragraph s. was, for this purpose, only effective
as far as original parties to the Statute were concerned. Thailand was
not such an original party. As a result, Thailand, muchas she may have
intended to submit herself to the jurisdiction of this Court, was unable
to do so by the methocl which she deliberately and with intent adoptecl,
namely, by the method of extending the obligations enshrinecl in the
1929 and 1940 declarations.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is submitted that the ar
guments of Counsel for Cambodia overlook the distinction between the
intention with which a party does an act, and the ulterior purposes or
motives which he has in mind and which lead him to form that intention.
Thailand clearly intended to revive the obligations contained in the
1929 and 1940 declarations, that was what in express terms, by the
declaration of 20 May 19SO,she set out to do. Rer reason, or motive, or
purpose for forming this intention and putting it into execution was
that she mistakenly thought that by carr)ring out this act she would
subject herself to the jurisdiction of this Court. It was in that regard
that she was mistaken, having put an interpretation on Article 36,
paragraph s.which was not accepted by this Court in the case of 1srael
v. Bulgaria.
With deference to the arguments of Counsel for Cambodia, it is sub
mitted that these arguments went near, if not the whole way, to in
viting the Court to consider solely what is the motive in the mind of a
person who executes a written document, disregarding entirely what
that person sets out to cioby the document. This really amounts to a con
tention that once you have a document you may disregard its ter11_1s
and look only into the mind of the person who executed it to ascertam
what his general desires in any particular connection may have been.g6 TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
May I seek to clemonstrate this by taking a purely imaginary example,
which I intentionally conceive in a rather extreme form, in arder to
illustrate the point that I seek to make? Our learned opponents in
effect (so T submit) argue that once a party clearly evinces a desire
to achieve a purpose of a particular kind, the mode and form of the
document in which that party seeks to embody the accomplishment
of this purpose is for practical purposes immaterial. Let it be supposed
that Country A is in fact in dispute with Country B and that Country 13
is a Member of the United Nations which has filed a declaration uncler
Article 36, paragraph 2, accepting the jurisdiction of this Court. Let
it further be assumed that Country A is not a Member of the United
Nations but is anxious to place itself in a position in which it can
invoke the jurisdiction of this Court against Country B. Assume also
that there is no special agreement to refer the dispute under Article 36,
paragraph 1. One then has to assume that Country A receives wrong
aclvice in law as to how it may accomplish its desire to place itself
in a position to litigate before thisCourt with Country B. For example,
let it be supposed that Country A is advised that by applying to become
a Member of the United Nations and being received as such a Member
it may, without more, file an application to institute proceedings before
this Court against Country B.
Accordingly Country A formally lodges an application to be received
as a Member of the United Nations with the Secretary-General, making
it perfectly plain, beyond any conceivable doubt, whether by statements
included in the letter to the Secretary-General or in other ways, that
its prime and indeed sole motive in applying for membership of the
United Nations is to place itself in a position to litigate before this
Court with Country B. For the purpose of my illustration, I am assum
ing that it has been made superabunclantly clear to everybody that this
is its sole purposein seeking admission to the United Nations. If, never
theless,Country A does not file a declaration under Article 36, paragraph
2, it is (soit is respectfully submitted) beyond controversy that it would
be quite impossible to construe Country A's application for membership
to the United Nations as being in substance the equivalent of a decla
ration accepting the jurisdictio.n of this Court under Article 36, para
graph 2. If this conclusion is correct, I submit that precisely parallel
reasoning is applicable to the present case. Thailancl in 1950 also acted
under wrong legal advice. The only relevant question is whether that
action achieved the result which Thailand desired and, as I have, I hope,
sufficiently established,there can be no question that it clic\not.
I take this example to demonstrate what I submit is the result of
applying the contention of Counsel for Cambodia in its fullness if they
go to the length of arguing that, provicling it is clear what a party means
to achieve, it is wholly immaterial what express intention he incorpora tes
in the language of the document by which he means to achieve his
purpose.
Mr. Acheson arguecl that in any event the case of Israel v. Bulgaria
was not applicable and pointed to one additional distinction of fact
between the circumstances of that case and the circumstances of the
present case, namely, that Bulgaria clic\not file any further declaration
analogons in the circumstances of that case to the declaration of 20 May
rgso. filed by Thailand in the present case. Again, I would submit. as
I did with regard to the previous distinctions of fact to which attention REPL Y OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE
97
was called in the Cambodian Observations on the Thai Preliminarv
Objections, that this distinction of fact can have no possible effect upon
the principle upon which the Israel v. Bulgaria case was decided. That
case decided in tenus, as I have previously said, that Article 36, para
graph 5, is not effective to convert an acceptance of the jurisdiction of
the Permanent Court into acceptance of the juriscliction of this Court,
except as between countries who were original parties to the Court's
Statute. I need, for the purpose of my argument, to have recourse to
the decision of the Court in the Israel v. Bulgaria case for no other
purpose than to establish that Article 36, paragraph 5, is to be so
construed. Once this is established it follows, I submit, as the night
follows the day, that Thailand, by carrying out the intention which she
clearly formed and expressed in the declaration of 20 May 1950, coulcl
not and did not achieve the ulterior objective which she desired to
encompass, namely, of converting the obligations under the 1929
and 1940 declarations into an acceptance of the jurisdiction of this
Court.
I would like now to make brief reference to an argument used by
:rvrr.cheson and Professor Pinto with regard to the circumstance tha t
in any event the declaration of 3 May 194 expired on 6 May 1950, that
is to say;fourteen days before the declaratiOn of 20 May 1950 was made.
Jncidentally, ifis to be borne in minci that the declaration of 20 May,
1950 was by its terms expressecl to operate from 3 May rgso. But it
was said that quite clearly the Thais must have realized or at !east
have been put on notice that when they filee! their declaration in 1950,
they were renewing a declaration which had lapsed owing to the
efftuxion of time and quite independently of the decision in the case of
Israel v. Buigaria. As I have been at pains to contend, even if it be
acceptee! that the worcl "renew" is apt to revive a declaration which
has lapsed, this does not in any sense invalidate what has always been
and still remains the main burden of my argument, that is, that what
the Thai Government was purporting to renew was not an acceptance
of the jurisdiction of this Court under paragraph 2 of Article 36, but
an acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court. As 1 have
previously said, let it be assumee! against me that the declaration of
20 May 1950 was aptly worded to express an intention to bring into
life again the declaration of May 1940, the result, as 1 have respectfully
urged upon the Court, still remains that Thailand did not by so doing
succeed in subjecting herself to the jurisdiction of this Court.
Mr. President and Members of the Court, I woulcl like now shortlv
to examine some of the arguments aclvancecl especially by Professor
Pinto.
I was indeed grieved to think that I had incurred his clispleasure by
referring to the 1950 declaration as a "letter", and even more so by
quite unconsciously allowing a disparaging intonation to creep into my
voice when I made reference to it. Professor Pinto would, J believe,
desire that I should refer to the declaration as a "document" and I
willingly assure him that 1 will use my utmost encleavours to mend my
ways in this respect and on ali occasions to modulate my voice appropri
ately.
I hope that 1 shall not be sowing dissension in the opposite camp by
pointing out that Professor Reuter also in his speech characterizecl the
declaration as a "letter".We must both do our best in future to choose TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
only seemly nomenclature in orcier to characterize this ali-important
declaration.
Professor Pinto submittecl that the worcl "renew" might in common
speech bear any one of three meanings. As regards the two first of those
meanings, the submissions which I have made show that, if either of
them is attributecl to the word in the Thai declaration of 20 May 1950,
that declaration was from the first ineffective. Professor Pinto suggested
that the third possible meaning of the word is, as he said, "to substitute
something new". He relied upon the following meaning attributed to the
word by Littré:
"to make new, by substituting a new thing for another of the same
kind".
Even if this be accepted as a possible meaning of "renew", it is clear
that the definition given by Littré is by no means applicable to the
facts of the present case. There is no question here of Thailand having
substituted in 1950 a new thing for another of the same kind. \Vhat
Thailand sought to do on 20 May 1950 was to substitute the declaration
of that date for the declaration of 1929 which had been renewed in 1940.
In other words, Thailand was endeavouring to substitute a new thing,
of a new kind, an acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court,
_foranother thing of a different kind, an acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of thePermanent Court. I say "of a different kind" because,
as this Court pointed out in the case of Israel v. Bulgaria (at p. 143 of
the Judgment), the obligation under Article 36 of the Statute of this
Court, although no more onerous than the obligation under Article 36
of the Statute of the Permanent Court, is "nevertheless a new obligation".
It is quite clear, I submit, that by "a new obligation" the Court meant
"a different obligation".
However, it is not really by recourse to dictionaries, and still less
by recourse to poets or to the Bible, that the language of the declaration
of 20 May 1950 is to be interpreted. It must be interpreted in its con
text. I submit it is absolutely clear to anyone who reacls the document
without prepossessions that what its author intcnclecl to cio was to
prolong the !ife of an existing obligation or, altematively, to render
effective once more an instrument the validity of which hacl expirecl.
He clearly clic!not intend to create something new and distinct from
the former declaration. He did not refer to that former declaration
merelv as a statement of limits and conditions to be included in a
new obligation then being assumed. He said the Government of Thailand
renewed the declaration of 1929. In other worcls he may have used
the word "renew" in either of the first two meanings given by Professor
Pinto. It does not matter which, since on either meaning the declaration
was ineffective. It is certain that he did not use the worcl in the third
of Professor Pinto's meanings.
One argument used by Professor Pinto was that, although it might
follow from the principles laid clown by this Court in the case of Israel
v. Bulgaria that the Thaï declaration of 1929 lapsed on 19 April 1946,
Thailand by her conduct after 19 April 1946 had clearly shown that
she considerecl herselt still boun<l by that declaration and, Professor
Pinto went on, Thailand is now bound by the interpretation which
she then showed herself to be accepting. "Interpretation" is the wor.d
which Professor Pinto used. With respect to him, I submit that it was REPL Y OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE 99
not the appropriate word, and to realize this is to see the fallacy upon
which this argument rests. Whether the Thai declaration of 1929
continued to be valid after rg April rg46 is not a question of inter
pretation, particularly by Thailand, of that declaration. It is a question
of the effect in law upon that declaration of the dissolution of the
Permanent Court on rg April 1946. In the case of Israel v. B·ulgaria
this Court decided that the legal effect of the dissolution of the Per
manent Court was to dissolve and render ineffective anv declarations
accepting the juriscliction of that Court made by States which were
not original parties to the Statute of this Court. The declaration of
Thailand was one of the declarations thus rendered ineffective. That
declaration thus died by. operation of law. A declaration which has
diecl by operation of law cannot be preserved, or restored to life, merely
by a demonstration by the State which made it that that Stafe regards
it as still having !ife. In other worcls, the operation of law is not diverted
by the legal opinions of a single State, particularly the State concerned.
In support of his argument Professor Pinto referred to certain decisions
of this Court. The first of these decisions was the decision of r8 November
rg6o in the case of Honduras v. Nicaragua concerning the Arbitral
Award made by the King of Spain. In that case the Award was ·macle
on 23 December rgq6, and its valiclity was first challengecl by Nicaragua
on 19 March 1912. Between those two dates, as the Court found,
"Nicaragua, by express declaration and conduct, recognized the award
as valid". The Court held that the consequence of this was that "it
is no longer open to Nicaragua to go back on that recognition and
to challenge the validity of the award" (l.C.J. Reports I96o, p. 213).
In my submission, that decision of this Court lends no support whatever
to the argument of Professor Pinto. What the Court had there to
consider was whether the Award was binding upon Honduras and
Nicaragua, or in other words, whether it was such an award as those
States had bound themselves by agreement to accept. It has sometimes
been said that a State may debar itself by conduct from denying that
an instrument has a certain effect. But that is only possible where
the effect of the instrument depends upon contract, upon the agreement
of the parties. lt is an entirely different matter to say that where by
operation of law, quite apart from any agreement, a unilateral instru
ment is invalid, validity can be conferred upon it, in spite of the
operation of law, by conduct of the party responsible for it.
Professor Pinto also referred to the case of Certain Norwegian Loans
(I.C.J. Reports I957, p. g). That case turned upon a "domestic affairs"
reservation in the French declaration accepting the compulsory juris
cliction of thisCourt. The reservation excludecl from the Court's decla
ration "matters which are essentially within the national jurisdiction
as understood by the Government of the French Republic". The passage
in the juclgment upon which Professor Pinto reliecl was apparently
the passage at pages 26-27 in which the Court said that it clic! not
fee! obliged to consider whether this reservation was compatible with
Article 36, paragraph 6, of the Statute, because the validity of the
reservation had not been questioned by either party to the proceedings.
What the Court actually said was this:
"In consequence the Court has before it a provision which both
the Parties to the dispute regard as an expression of their commonIOO TE!\·IPLE OF PREAH VlHEAR
will relating to the competence of the Court. The Court c\oes not
therefore consic\er that it is callecl upon to enter into an examination
of the reservation in the light of considerations which are not
presentee\ by the issues in the proceec\ings. The Court, without
prejuclging the question, gives effect to the reservation as it stands
and as the Parties recognize it."
This passage really amounts to no more than a statement that the
Court was reserving the question of the valiclity of. the reservation
without c\ecic\ingit in that case, since neither party desiree\ to raise it.
It certainly contains nothing to suggest that, if the Court hac\ founc\
that as a matter of law the reservation was invalicl, it woulcl neverthe
less have been preparee\ to fine\ it effective simply because the State
which made it regardee\ it as effective. The result of such a view would
incleecl be extraorclinary.It woulcl mean that henceforth, in juclging
whether a purportecl acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction complied
with Article 36 of the Statute, the Court would not have to be guidee\
by any rules of law but only by the opinion, however unreasonable
or erroneous, of the State making the declaration.
I therefore submit that Professor Pinto's argument that the Thai
declaration of 1929 must be hele\ not to have lapsed on 19 April 1946,
because after that date Thailand regardecl it as still being effective,
is both wrong in principle and quite unsupportecl by authority. How
ever, Professor Pinto went further than this. Not only die\ he submit
that Thailancl might be bouncl by her opinions; he even suggested
that she might be bound by her silence. He complained that even
after the .Juclgment of this Court in the case of Israel v. Bttlgaria had
been delivered, Thailand die\ nothing. She might, he suggestecl, have
informee\ the Secretary-General then that she gatherecl that her decla
ration was in fact no longer effective. lt is true that Thailancl might
have clone this. On the other hanc!, I suggest that there was no
particular reason why she should, and certainly no obligation upon
her to do so. But if, as I submit, the effect of the Juclgment in the
case of 1srael v. Bulgaria was to rencler ineffective the Thai declaration
of 20 May 1950, the result was that Thailand, whether silent or not,
had not acceptecl the compulsory juriscliction of this Court. What
Professor Pinto is really submitting is that she clic\ then accept the
compulsory jurisdiction by her silence in the face of the Judgment.
I think I can only say that by no possible construction can silence
constitute such a declaration as Article 36 of the Statute requires.
[Public hearing oj14 April I96I, afternoon]
Mr. President, i\'Iembers of the Court, Professor Pinto went on to
explain in some detail the way in which the Thai declaration of
1950 was recordee\ in the United Nations Treaty Series. His object in
cloing so was to show that the Secretary-General looked upon that
declaration as a new declaration. The same view seems to have been
taken by Professor Sohn in his book Basic Doc'Uments of the Unüed
Nations published in rgs6. As to this I need only say that it is for this
Court, and not for the Secretary-General or Professor Sohn, to pass
judgment ·upon the nature and effect of that declaration. In our sub- REPL Y OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE IOI
mission, the Secretarv-General and Professor Sohn made a mistake. It
is hardly surprising that they did so, for, as we have seen from the
letter addressed tb the Government of Thailand by a former Registrar
of this Court, the topic which we are discussing is a complicated topic,
upon which even experts may go astray. But, as I have already pointed
out, these misapprehensions are readily understandable in that in gen
eral they took place before the decision of this Court was pronounced
in the Israel v. Bulgaria case.
lndeed, it is interesting to observe that, if the Secretary-General
regarded the declaration of 20 May 1950 as a new declaration, a different
view has been taken by the Registry of this Court. The Yearbook of
the Court is prepared annually by the Registry, in accordance with the
Court's direction of March 1947 to the Registrar. The current acceptances
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court are printecl in eachYearbool~.
The Thai declaration of 1929 has been cited in every edition. In the
Yearbook of 1959-1960, Thailand's acceptance appears at page 252, and
what is there printed is the declaration of 20 September 1929, with a
footnote stating that it was renewed on 7 May 1940, and again on 20 May
1950. This is indeed a significant entry. lt appeared after the Judgment
of the Court in the case oflsrael v. Bulgaria had been delivered (there
is a reference to that Judgment at p. 76 of the same Yearbook); and
it shows that even then the Registry continued to regard the declaration
of 20 May 1950 not as ·a new declaration, but as a mere renewal-or,
as I submit, attempted renewal-of that of 1929.
Not only the Registry of this Court, but also Mr. Jenks, on whose
support Professor Pinto relied, regard the declaration of 1950 as an
effective instrument. \Vhat, however, is of greatest significance for our
purpose is that, considering the effect of the language which the Govem
ment of Thailand actually used, they take that view of the declaration
which 1submit to be right. They regard it as nothing more thau a renewal
of the declaration of 1940. So also, incidentally, does Mr. Rosenne,
whom Professor Pinto also cited: vide page 82 of his book The Time
Factor in the ]urisdiction of the International Court of J-ustice. There is
no sign that these writers were in terms considering the further question
which this Court must now decide, whether such an instrument can have
any force in the light of the Com·t's Judgment in the case of Israel v.
Bulgaria.
Professor Pinto added that when the Thai declaration of 20 May 1950
was recorded as it was in the Treaty Series, the Government of Thailand
"accepted it without protest or reserve".
It is no doubt true that no protest was made. There seems no particular
reason why the Government of Thailand should have scanned every
volume of the Treaty Series in orcier to see how its obligations were there
recorcied. ln any case, for the reasons which I have already put forward,
I suggest it is ·impossible to binci the Government of Thailand to any
view _now, simply upon the grounci of their silence on some earlier
occasiOn.
May 1 refer shortly now to Professor Pinto's observations on my
reference to the argument useci by l\ir. Rosenne in the Israel case.
I fear that I cannot have macle it perfectly plain why I referrecl to
Mr. Rosenne's argument. 1 quoted his argument simply in orcier to point
out that this Court, in the Israel case, must have hacl it plainly in mind
that at any rate in i\1r. Rosenne's submission, if they decicled in favour102 TEMPLE OF PREAH VlHEAR
of the Bulgarian contention, it must logically follow that Thailand's
declaration of 1950 was ineffective as an acceptance of the jurisdiction
of this Court.
The Judgment of the Judges who formed the majority does not make
reference to Mr. Rosenne's argument on this point.
As Professor Pinto indicated, however, the Joint Dissenting Opinion of
Juclges Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Mr. \Vellington Koo and Sir Percy
Spender does make reference to this argument of Mr. Rosenne. On page
r82 of the Dissenting Opinion they used language which, in my sub
mission, clearly indicates that they did accept that it would be the
consequence of the view of the majority that Thailand would not have
accepted the jurisdiction of this Court by the 1950 declaration and re
ferred to this consideration as one of the considerations which made
them fee! unable to concur in the majority Judgment. Mr. Rosenne's
argument on this point, therefore, quite obviously must have been in
the mind of ali the Judges, and I submit that the only conclusion that
can be drawn is that, whereas the dissenting minority felt unable to
accept the consequence which they agreed resulted from the majority
view, that Thailancl was not subject to the juriscliction of the Court, the
majority, on the other hanc!, in expressing the majority view of the
Court, clearly were preparee! to accept the consequence which Mr.
Rosenne inclicated as the necessary logical result of the majority view.
In other worcls, I invite the inference that had the majority Juclges, in
their Judgment, dealt in terms with Mr. Rosenne's submissions on this
point, they would have accepted that his submission that Thailand was
not bouncl was the logical consequence of the view that they were
expressing and would have saicl in terms that they were prepared to
accept that consequence of their view. In other words, had it been within
the purview of their Judgment to do so, the majority JneigeswouId
have decided that Thailand is not subject to the jurisdiction of this
Court. Professor Pinto seemed to be under the impression that I was
quoting Mr. Rosenne as an authority for the view that Thailand did
not accept the jurisdiction of this Court. I was doing nothing of the
sort. l was quoting him purely as an advocate in orcier to lead up to
what is authoritative on the matter, namely, the Judgment of this
Court.
I hope I shaH not be thought to.speak in any sense disparagingly of
l'Vlr.Rosenne when I say that I prefer to rely on the necessary impli
cation from the majority Juclgment of this Court rather than upon
Mr. Rosenne's opinion above quoted from his book, if, which I do not
concede, Mr. Rosenne meant to imply that Thailancl had accepted the
jurisdiction of this Court. His opinion is not the opinion of a Judge and
no cloubt many extra-juclicial opinions of varions sorts on this topic can
be quotecl. As an example, Professor Sohn in his book on Basic Instru
ments of the United Nations, 1956, listee! the Bulgarian declaration of
29 July 1921 as stiJl binding by virtue of Article 36, paragraph 5, of the
Statute of this Court. That also is a view which confticts with that formed
by the majority of this Court in the 1srael case. \Vith great respect to
both these learned gentlemen, I cite the decision of the majority of
this Court as being of far greater authority than either of the opinions
that they have expressecl in a contrary sense.
At the conclusion of his speech Professor Pinto discussed the legal
position of an act "affected by mistake", to use his own expression (C.R., REPL Y OF SIR F.RANK SOSKICE _!03
p. 71). He sought to show that such an act is not void, but on!y voidable,
and therefore, is valid until something is done to avoid or to annul it.
According to his argument, Thailand did nothing to annul her declara
tion of rgso before the Cambodian application was filed, so that that
declaration, even if it be affected by mistake, is valid for the purpose
of these proceedings. ·
With respect to his argument, I submit that it rests upon a confusion
of two different ideas. A party may perform a legal act which because
of misrepresentation or mistake can be avoidec\. If the party chooses,
he can annul it. If he does not, it will remain valid and produce its
result. On the other band, a party supposing a certain state of affairs to
exist may perform a legal act which, if that state of affairs in fact
existed, would produce a certain result. That state of affairs in fact does
not exist, and the legal act performed is in consequence ineffective and
can produce no result. It is not then a quesi:ion of whether that act is
void or voidable. It is simply misconceived and ineffective for ali purposes
and there is nothing to avoid.
A simple illustration will, 1 hope, make dear the distinction which
I am draw.ing. Supposing A enters into a contract to buy a house from
B. He does so in reliance upon an assurance that the house is built of
stone. It is in fact build of wood. The result of that may be that A is
entitled to have the contract set aside; but if he does not choose to do
that, it is a valid contract which B can enforce.
On the other hand, suppose for example that A makes a declaration
establishing in favour of the public a right of way over a field. He does
so because he believes the field belongs to him, but in fact it belongs to
somebody else. In such a case no question arises whether A's legal act
in making the declaration is void or voidable. It is simply ineffective.
It was designed to produce a certain result on the assumption that a
certain state of affairs existed. There in fact exists a different state of
affairs, in which itis impossible for A's act to produce any result at aiL
lt cannat be avoided because there is nothing to avoid.
The making of the Thai declaration of rgso was clearly an act, not
of the former kind, but of the latter. It was an act performed on the
assumption that Article 36, paragraph 5, of the Statute had convertecl
the 1940 declaration into a valid acceptance by Thailand of the com
pulsory jurisdiction of this Court. Had that assumption been right,
the declaration of 1950 would have had the effect of renewing that
acceptance for ro years, but the true state of affairs, as we now know,
was that there had never been a valid acceptance by Thaüand of the
compulsory jurisdiction of this Court. In that state o[ affairs the rene\val
-which is what the declaration was-was simply misconceivecL
It is not a question of whether it was void or voidable. The state of
affa.irs which in fact ex:istecl was such that it was impossible for the
act performed by Thailand to produce any result. Tt was wholly
ineffecti ve.
Bearing in mind the distinction which I have drawn, one can see
that the authorities upon \vhich Professor Pinto rehed are quite ir
relevant to the present case. The passage at pages 131-134 of Lord
McNair's book The Law of Trea#es is dealing only with cases of the
first of the two kinds which I have mentioned. Lord McNair savs
nothing about a legal act which in the actual state of affairs-which104 TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
is different from the _state _of affairs which îthose who performed the
act understood to exist-s1mply cannat produce any result. ·
Professer Pinto referred to a passage in the Judgment in the case
of Nicaragua v. Hondttras as showing that it is necessary to establish
an "essen tial error'' in arder to vitiate Thailand 's consent. It follo\VS
from what I have said that no question ofl the vitiating of consent
arises. \".lhat has to be decided is whether Thailand has effectively
acceptee\ the compulsory jurisdiction under either Article 36, para-·
graph z, or Article 36, paragraph s. The position .is that a step was
taken in 1950 which, while it would have aÇhievecl that result if the
circumstances assumee\ bv the Thai Government had existee\, coule\
not achieve that result iii the citcumstances which in fact dicl exist.
Professor Pinto also referred to a sentence in the late Judge Sir
Hersch Lauterpacht's report on the Law of [Treaties, in Volume z of
the Year Book of the International Law Commission for 1953. Judge
Lauterpacht there stated, at page 154, that a persan or a State
"cannat plead ignorance of the law, civil 1r crimina1, as a reason
for escaping the consequences of his con,duct". ,
It is hardly necessary to point out that that sentence is dealing
with a case in which aState has clone something entailing consequences.
If so, it cannat escape those consequences by pleading that it acted
in ignorance of the law. The point of the argÙ.ment \vhich I have been
presenting, however, is that in 1950 the Thai Government, because
of a misapprehension of the circumstances, did something which in
the circurnstances actually existing coule\ not produce any consequence.
Lastlv, Mr. President and Members of the Court, I come to the last
of the arguments put fonvard by our 1eamed opponents, with reference
to the first preliminary objection. ·It is the argument presentee\ by
Professer Reuter at the end of his address on \iVednesdav afternoon.
The Court will remember that he tannted us \vith having taken at one
moment an excessively psychological view, ~nd at the next moment
a view excessively [ormalistic.
\•Ve were excessively psychological, according to Professor l(euter,
\vhen we argued that a mistake of law hacll vitiated the declaration
of 1950. I will not go back to this subject, except to remind the Court
once again what our argument really is. The Government of Thailand
in 1950 took a mista.ken view of the effect of Article 36, paragraph 5
-a mistake which at that time was shared [by many authorities. In
consequence of that mistake, the Government of Thailand, in making
their declaration, did something \vhich, on the truc effect of Article 36,
paragraph 5, was absolutely barren of result. If this is said to be an
excessively psycholog.ical argument, I cao oply reply that l do not
sec where the excess of psychology lies. I wouli:l.add that since Professer
Reuter referred to the case of Soveràgnty ov'erCertm:n Froutier Land
as a case dealing with the problem of mistake, that that case provides
no guidànce on the effect of mistake, since the Court, having investigated
whcther .in .fact there was a mistake, came tb the conclusion that no
mistake hac\ been established (J.C.j. Reports i959, p. 227). ·
In the circumstances, as I have said, the Thai declamtion was barren
of result. This, apparently, is what Professor Reuter regards as an
excessively for:mal.istic argument. For us, he says, the will has become
a slave and documents have become masths. Because the wrong REPLY OF SIR FRANK SOSKICE I05
ceremony has been performed the will of Thailand has been frustrated.
Certainly, if to do one thing when one ought to have done another
is to be described as performing the wrong ceremony, there is some
force in this crîticism. But let us remember what in fact happened.
vVe have the authority of this Court's Judgment in the case of Israel
v. Bulgaria for saying that an obligation under Article 36 of the Statute
.of the Permanent Court îs not the same obligation as an obligation
under Article 36 of the Statute of this Court. Thailand attempted to
pralong the former obligation, when she should have acceptee\ the
latter. This error, I submit, is not aptl_y described as the performance
of a wrong ceremony: and to insist upon a distinction which the Court
itself has drawn is not to commit an excess of formalism.
Professor Reuter quoted a passage from the Opinion of Judge Bas
devant in the Ambatielos Case. I need hardlv sav that we entirelv
accept the whole of what .Judge Basdevant" was there expressing.
He \vas saying, if I may summarize the passage, that details of form
are not to be given any determining influence in the ascertainment
of the true meaning of an agreement. That we accept no Jess than
our opponents: but what we do not accept is its relevance to this
case. It is not upon any detail of form that we rely. We rely upon the
true nature of the document of zo May 1950, and contencl that it was
not effective to accept the compulsory juriscliction of the Court.
That, ·Mr. .President and Members of the Court, brings me to the
.end of the submissions I would offer in support of the first preliminary
objection raised by the Government of Thailand. It remains for me to
thank the Court for the consistent patience and courtesy with which
they have beard me. I should be grateful, Mr. President, ifyou would
now cali on Mr. Hyde to present Thailand's reply on the second
preliminary objection.ro6
10. REPLY OF lVIT.JAMES NEVINS HYDE
(COUNSEL FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND)
AT THE PUBLIC HEARING OF I4APHILi rg6r,AFTERNOON
Mr. President, J\'lembersof the Court.
1 should now like to reply on behalf of Thailand in support of its
second preliminary objection.
1
Whatever path Cambodia chooses, its purpose, its goal, is to invoke
Chapter II of the General Act providing for 'judicial settlement.
Yet our learned opponent has. expressed surprise that Counsel for
Thailand has paid so much attention to the General Act and attached
so much .importance to it. It is common ground that neither State is a
party to it. 1
The reasons for this attention are simple.~I nhe first place, this was
the only treaty originally pleaded by Cambodia as an alternative to the
rgso declaration as a basis for the Court's jurisdiction. Secondly, my
consideration of the careful and detailed methods of the international
organizations concerned for recording what S~at esre parties to part,
or ali, of the General Act, showed that one essential element of the very
Treaty itself is the recording of adherences to its various chapters offer
ing a choice of three methods of pacifie settlement. Thirdly, I gave sorne
attention to the effect of reservations of adhering States because the
obligation for judicîal settlement in Articl117 of the General Act is
"subject to any reservations".
The path chosen by our opponent is, wc are told, a short eut which
will render unnecessary such a tedious recital. Consistently with this
approach no attention was given by him to ali this procedural machinery
or to the possible effect of reservations. 'l
Rather, suggests our opponent, the path to Chapter II of the General
Act should be the principle of representation ofCambodia by France,
so that when the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation was
signed in 1937, France was representing the then protectorate of
Cambodia. Here .he rests his case squarely on jthe last clause of the first
paragraph in Article 22 of the I937 Treaty, and argues that this clause
provides the essential link between Cambodia and Thailand. He adds
that Cambodia does not rest on the theory of State succession.
Our opponent is free to choose what path he wishes, because on him
is the burden of showing that Thailand has consented to be bound by
Chapter II of the General Act vis-à-vis Ca.rrlbodia. This, then, is the
indirect approach which bas been chosen. '
Counsel for Thailand found no evidence that either Thailand or France
!nt~nd ie hat 1937 Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. Treaty. or
m 1ts predecessor of rgzs as a whole, or asi to the respective paofic
settlement articles, that these articles be binqing on, or for the bene.fit
of,,~ren In~o-China, or binding on Cambodia as one of its countnes
or pays .
Our opponent points to the last clause of the first paragraph. of
Article 22. The Article contains boundary guarantees and a savmg
1 REPLY OF MR. HYDE
I07
clause as to earlier treaties, and theo this language relied on reads as
follows:
"It is further agreed that the present Treaty shall, as from the
date of its entry into force, replace the Treaty of 14 February 1925,
in regard to the relations between Siam and Ioda-China, in so far
as the provisions thereof are not incompatible with those of the
Convention in question and of the Agreements provided for therein."
That reference leads us back to the 1925 Treaty of Friendship, Com
merce and Navigation which in its Article 2 also contained a pacifie
settlement article with a reference to the Permanent Court of Inter
national Justice. There are, in Article 27 of that 1925 Treaty, references
to the guarantee of the boundary between Siam and French Indo-China
and the right of France to protect its "ressortissants" in Siam.
Apart from these two types of provisions relating to Ioda-China, the
language of the article negatives, it is submitted, any broader application
of the Treaty through its political provisions.
On this point the language of Article 27 reads:
"With regard to the provisions concerning French Indo-China
other than the clauses relating ta the definition and delimitation of
frontiers as weil as the exercise of the right of French protection
in Siam, the High Contracting Parties mutually recognize the right
to propose and discuss the maintenance, modification or sup
pression thereof, at the time of the negotiation of the special
Convention and .complementary Arrangements provided for under
the preceding Article, without it being possible to invoke anything
in the present Treaty which is likely to limit discussion or hinder
solutions to be adopted."
Thus Thailand and France in this Article declared that subjects, that
is to say, topics, "other than" the clauses relating to the definition and
delimitation of frontiers as weil asthe r.ights of French protection were
not involved. This Article, by including these two tapies, may be taken
to exclude the pacifie settlement obligation contained in Article 2 from
application to Indo-China.
·On these two subjects France and Thailand did in fact enter into a
subsequent Convention on 25 August rg26. lts parties were France and
Thailand. In this Convention, unlike the 1937 and 1925 Treaties, the
preamble indicated that its purpose was to secure as completely as
possible for special relations between Siam and Indo-China the provisions
of the 1925 Treaty. The Convention provides for a demilitarized fronti~r
zone and for the treatment of French "ressortissants" in Siam. There IS
no ·"most-favoured-nations" clause-no "pacifie settlement" article.
Unlike the 1925 and the 1937 Treaties, this Convention deals with local
questions and the protection of individual rights. That presumably was
why these tapies were assembled in a separate Convention and not in
cluded in the 1925 Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty itself.
The distinction between this rg26 Convention and the 1925 and 1937
Treaties is also shawn by the Convention's denunciation article. Article 17
of the Convention provides that it has a ten-year !ife, continuing there
after on a year-to-year basis but subject to denunciatîon by France or
Tha.iland on one year's notice.But unlike the 1925and 1937Treaties whic~
contain no implication of any right of Indo-China in the act of denunci
ahon, Article 17 of the Convention states in its last clause: TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
"It is clearly understood however thilt denunciation could not
have the effect of revivingy of the s'tipulations that have been
abrogated either by previous agreements or by the present Con
vention.''
The other evidence, not mentioned in thel Cambodian Observations,
but to which our opponent devoted some attention in his statement to
the Court, is an r867 Treaty between Siam and France.
Here the preamble states that the parties, again Siam and France,
desire to settle definitively the positi1the two States as to the
Kingdom of Cambodia. The first Article is a·recognition by Siam of the
French protectorate over Cambodia. lt defines the boundar.ies hetween
Siam and France and provides in ArticlVI~I:
"The French Government undert toacausesthe preceding
provisions to be observed by Cambodia."
\Ve do not understand our opponent, by his recent reference to this
r86? Treaty, to assert that this cconsti atret ent and consent
by Thailand that in aU treaties between Thailand and France thereafter
to be negotiated the parties agree that France shall be acting by and
on behalf of Cambodia. ·
The political status of Cambudia has changed as a result of this r867
Treatv between Thailand and France. Its first Article was solemn re
cognition by Thailand·of a French protectoratover Cambodia. This
Treaty also contained a guarantee by France that Cambodia would not
be incorporated into Cochin China (Article IV). Such incorporation
never did take place, and the Kingdom of Carnbodia was able to retain a
certain interna! autonomy,t limited by a Convention between .France
and Cambodia signed at Pnom-Penh on I7 June r884. After this period
Camboclia was no longer referred to as such in treaties, the on!y territory
so indicated being French Indo-China, of~\'h icmbodia was one
country of the composite whole. The r86? Trcaty was historically the
la.st between Siam and France relating to Cambodia as such.
Yet this is the evidence on which reliance .is placed by our opponent
to sus-gest.Thailand's agreement co~~ent ~ldvn<; thac~engeneral
treatres!th France, even as to the polrtrcal obltgatron of pac!f'rcsettle
ment, France acted for itself, also on behalf of Cambodia.
This is the indirect approach by Cambodia seeking by operation of
law to assert the rights of France under Articleof its I93? Treaty
with Thailand, and thus invoking thGener Ac~l.Unless this position
of Cambodia is recognized by the Court, our opponent argues, Cambodia
would be penalized and what he considers Thailand's obligationto
Cambodia reduced to nothing. This operation of law is termed by
our opponen trepresentation, not State succèssion.
We can understand the possible view of our opponent that principles
of State succession, and particularly non-succession to political treatres,
would not be helpful in his position, especially as applied to2Irticle
of the I93? Treaty. 1 .
There are two related situations in which a question can arise; the
first is the determinatioof the degree of capacity in international
relations of a protected State. The second is the rights of such a State
upon obtaining full independence, and it is iwith this second situation
that we are here concerned. · REPL Y OF iiiR. HYDE rog
At this late stage I shall not attempt any conceptual disputation
of what label is the more appropriate for the position of Cambodia on
the law. Whatever name it bears, the practical, pragmatic result is the
same. Cambodia daims the right to come to this Court under the "pacifie
settlement" article in the 1937 Treaty. Cambodia lacked independent
status until 1953. Renee it could not have filed an application here
before that time. Thereafter, not on the basis of any subsequent
agreement between Cambodia and Thailand, Cambodia now daims
the right to proceed under this "pacifie settlement" article. lt would
follow from this position that the Treaty could not be denounced by
France or Thailand without Cambodia's consent.
It would involve much research to determine what other States
formerly countries of Indo-China might daim similar rights, and so
this persona!, political Treaty of 1937 would have tumed, not by
agreement of France and Thailand but by operation of law, into another
multilateral pacifie settlement treaty.
Whatever the rights of Cambodia by operation of law in the boundary
confirmed by Article 22 of the 1937 Treaty, Article 21 of the Treaty
raises an entirely different question. It is only proper again to state
that no precedent has been brought forward for the proposition that
Cambodia could hold Thailand to the political provisions found in
Article 21 of the 1937 Treaty.
They are of quite a different character from theboundary guarantees
contained in Article 22. Certainly this was the position of the French
Government, as M. Lacoste stated it. He said, it will be recalled, that
it was out of the question to apply Article 21 to the boundary guarantees
of Article 22. He was writing as the representative of France. Our
opponent as Counsel for Cambodia, on the other hand, argues that
Article 21 is a "garde-frontière", that it is directly related to Article 22.
This 1937 Treaty is now in force between France and Thailand-but
France is not here to state for itself its position on that question.
These, then, are sorne of the hazardsof the path chosen by Cambodia.
What State would know, in this period of change, the extent of its
political obligations with others? \Vben does a bilateral treaty, by
operation of law, become a multilateral treaty? \\ here can an authori
tative record be found of who are the parties to such a treaty?
To conclude, as the first State to invoke the General Act as the
basis of this Court's jurisdiction, Cambodia rests firmly on the pacifie
settlement clause, Article 21, of the 1937 Treaty of Friendship, Com
merce and Navigation between Thailand and France. This Cambodia
daims the right to do, not as a party to the General Act, not as a party
to the 1937 Treaty, but in a "special fashion", if I may use the phrase
to be found in the Memorial of Cambodia, paragraph 30.
This special fashion must be operation of law. Whether labelled
"representation" or "State succession", Cambodia is here assertingwhat
is a right of France, and France is not a party to this proceeding.
Therefore the Government of Thailand maintains its~econ pdre
liminary objection, that Cambodia has not shown Thailand's consent
to the application in this case of Chapter II of the General Act.
Mr. President, this completes my argument in support of the second
preliminary objection. I am grateful to the Court for its courtesy and
attention in hearing me.
9 llO
11. REJOINDER OF Mr. DEAN ACHESON
(COUNSEL FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA)
AT THE PUBLIC HEARING OF 15 APRIL 1961,MORNING
:Mr. President, Members of the Court.
My colleagues have left it to me to make the concluding argument
on behalf of Cambodia, at the end of which I will ask the Court to call
on the distinguished Agent for Cambodia to say a few closing words.
My colleagues have not thought it desirable or necessary for them to
prolong the argument this morning by repeating, or referring again, to
much which has been said before. 'vVeali, however, believe that it
would be unsafe to leave the Court under the charm of Sir Frank
Soskice's last argument.
I was distressed, when he began his argument, to learn from him
that I had, even briefly, caused him discomfort. However, it was a
great pleasure for me to see that he had almost instantaneously recovered
from that discomfort, and returned to the battle with undiminished
energy, wit and brilliance. lndeed, 1 felt, if the Court please, that my
own excursion among the poets and the prophets and the saints bad
become almost pedestrian as I listened to the brilliance with which
he added one refinement to another. lndeed, 1 felt transported, as I
listened to him, from the rather prosaic consideration of a dull juris
dictional argument into a world of gossamer conceptions, whose delicacy
was only equalled by their frailness.
In the presence of my own distinguished colleagues, I would hesitate
greatly to use the word "academie" in regard to anything which has
been said; that word is often .used by Philistines such as I am to
describe very refined discussions which are beyondhe reach of ordinary
mortals. But I think they will pardon me if I recall an observation
~ade to me years ago by a distinguished President of a University
m our country, in which he described discussions which occurred at
his own faculty meetings, and he said these discussions were as though
one professor said to another, "You hold the sieve, while I milk the
barren heifer".
Only one as heartless as an opponent in a litigation would take apart
so perfect a thing as my learned opponent's argument to see how it
was made. The argument, I submit, might be entitled "Variations on
a Theme". The principal theme is, of course, the decision of this Court
in Israel v. Bttlgaria. Then there are two subsidiary themes. One con
cerns the two supposed gateways provided by Article 36 to submission
to the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court. Another highly involved
theme is with regard to the legal alchemy by which a submission to
the Permanent Court can or cannat be transformed into a submission
to this Court. ·
With the Court's permission, 1 shall begin with the first movement
of Counsel's principal theme. Counsel places his whole reliance on
I sraet v. Bulgaria. The question, he says, is whether the law should
be applied. Surely, anyone who would choose to take the opposite REJOINDER OF MR .. ACHESON III
side of that argument would be most ill-advised. Therefore I hasten to
place myself squarely besîde learned Counsel on the other side in
support of the law. The only difference between us, I believe, will be,
what law? And this difference, of course, has existed between advocates
ever since there was law, and ever since there were Courts.
The issue of jurisdiction, says learned Counsel, is to be determined
by Article 36, paragraph 5. This, he says, is required by the decision
of this Court in the case of Israel v. Bulgaria. But we respectfully
submît that this is quite erroneous. In our submission Article 36,
paragraph 5, has no bearing whatever upon the issue before this Court.
The relevant law, we believe, is to be found in Article 36, but in
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4·
Let us examine in more detail the intricate rcasoning of learned
Counsel. It begins with a statement that under Article 36 there are
two gateways into the state of grace, that is, into the compulsory
jurisdiction of thisCourt. This, we submit, is plainly wrong by reason
of the very decision on which Counsel lays such great stress, that is,
the decision in Israel v. Bulgaria.
By that decision, it is clear that there are not two gateways. Upon
the coming into effect of the Statute of the Court, those signatories
who had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the predecessor Court
entered înto the same jurisdiction of this Court through the gateway
of Article 36, paragraph s.Thereupon that gateway closed, and it was
no longer available for any State, whether an original signatory or a
later adherent. That I take to be the true doctrine of Israel v. Bulgaria.
Thereafter, the only gateway was through Article 36, paragraphs z,
3 and 4· About this I cannat see that there can be any doubt. But,
argues Counsel, Thailand's declaration of 20 May 1950 cannot, despite
Thailand's manifest purpose and intention, pass the guards stationed
at the gateway of paragraphs 2, 3 and. 4· They are apparently posted
there to make entrance as difficult as possible. Perhaps those guards
are·supposed by learned Counsel to be this Court, which stands, perhaps,
in l\iilton's phrase, "like that two-handed engine at the door, which
stands readv to strike once, and strike no more". ·
But why can the declaration of 1950 not pass these guards? Because,
says Counsel, it does not accept the jurisdiction of thisCourt, and in
those tvords; nor, he says, does it state ali the terms and matters required
to be stated in paragraphs z and 3 of Article 36.
Let us consider this observation, and let us consider first the question
of the terms and other requirements of paragraphs z and 3· There cari
be no question, I submit, that these are stated in the earlier declaration
of September 1929, which is a document known to this Court. Surely
Counsel does not contend that they {that is, these requirements of
sections 2 and 3) cannot be incorporated by reference to some other
document, but that they must be copied out laboriously and in fulL
Perhaps, however, he does mean this by the gloss which he has put
on Article 36, paragraph z, as requiring what he cails a "fresh docu
ment". What a "fresh document" is, we are not tolcl, and I find sorne
difficulty in conceiving. Assuming that the document is newly typed
and is on new paper, can it not refer to any other document? For
instance, can it not say "referring to Article 36, paragraph 4, of the
Statute of this Court, I file this dedaration", etc.? Or must it copy
out ail the words of Article 36, paragraph 4? l refuse, if the Court 1
II2 TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
please, to let even my learned friend make hîm appear so stern a
formalist.
. Bt1t if the declaration can incorporate the language of the Statute by
reference, why can ît not incorporate the la1iguage of the earlier decla
ration of September 1929, which contains ali the information which
Counsel says must be supplied under paragraphs 2 and 3? This is what
Thai!and did. Every last detail was supplied as meticulously as though
it bad been copied out in fulL 1
1 submit, therefore, if the Court please, that we are not expected to
take seriously .the objection that Thailand failed to give such important
information as that the jurisdiction was accepted on the basis of reci
procity, and without any special convention, and in ail disputes in which
no other form of pacifie settlement is agreed lupon between the parties.
Ali this was made clear in_the document referred to, and was incorpo
rated by reference. The pomt on which Counsel stuck, however, was
that-so he a!leged-the declaration did not accept the jurisdiction of
this Court. AU it succeeded in doing, so he <j.rgued,was to accomplish
the astounding result of attempting, quite futile!y, to continue submission
to the jur.isdiction of a court which had long ~in gonee out of business.
Counsel's argument seems tome to be drawri by a three-horse droshky.
In the centre is an error of fact, and on either side of it an error of law.
The error of fact concerns what the declaration said, and what it
intended by the words usee\. It said, and mearit, so Counsel argues, that
Thailand renewed its acceptance of the jurisdiÇtion of the ole\ Permanent
Court, believing that the legal alchemy of paragraph 5 of Article 36
would transform or transfer this obeisance to the past into an acceptance
of the present.
The two errors of law which ftank this error of fact are two interpre
tations of the decision in l srael v. Bulgaria. ~ shall caU these interpre
tations, for easy reference, the "death-sentence" interpretation and the
"rule-against-alchemy" interpretation; the latter is a fall-back position,
should the former prove to be as vulnerable as it appears.
l\'fr.President, Members of the Court, first Iet us consider the error
1
of fact. Vlhat die\ Thailand sav? And what did the words mean? To
begin with, and I quote its very words, Thailknd said:
"In accordance with the provrsions of Article 36, paragraph 4 of
the Statu te of the International Court of Jus tice 1 have the honour
to inform you..." 1
In using these words, Thailand drew att ention to the fact tha t i t was
acting under the Statute of this Court-and under that very Article and
paragraph which referred to depositing declarations accepting the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of this Court. 1
vVith that introduction, with that preliminary, significant and reveal
ing disclosure ofintent, His Majesty's Government made its decla.ration.
And before 1 state its precise words, may 1 refer to an observation of
leamed Counsel yesterday which touchee\ me at a most sensitive point.
Counsel suggested-he was too courteous to do more than that-that I
might have committed, or almost committed, an offence which 1 abhor
above ail others. l bad approached, he suggested, loose thinking.
One waming, if the Court please, is enough. I shall now be so strict
a verbalist and formalist as to tighten my thinking beyond reproach.
1 REJOINDER OF MR. ACHESON II3
What, therefore, did His Majesty's Govemment have the honour to
inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations? Nothing Jess than
that His Majesty's Government, and 1 quote its very words:
"renewed the declaration above mentioned jor a jurther period oj ten
years".
And what was the declaration above mentioned? Let me quote it also
in orcier to avoid allloose thinking and loose talking. It was to recognize,
and these are the very words:
"in relation to any other Member or State which accepts the same
obligation, that .isto say on the basis of reciprocity, the jurisdiction
of this Court as compulsory ipso jacta and without any special
convention, in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2 of the
Statu te of the Court ..."
This, .if the Court please, îs exactly what Thailand said. These are
the verv words it used. Ifwe are to be verbaJists we must start from this
point, and the words accept the jurisdiction of this Court without mention
of any other court whatever. But, if the Court please, I can already feel
the blood pressure of my learned friend beginning to rise. He is thinking
that the Article 36, paragraph 2, to which the declaration of 1929
referred, was in the Statute of the Permanent Court and not in the
Statute of tMs Court; but to that I have severa! answers. The first is
that it was he. not 1, who asked for this excessive attention to the exact
words used. In the second place, 1 would suggest that it is not by chance
that the articles and paragraphs mentioned are identical în number and
identical in phraseology. This was clone by the drafters of the Statute
of this Court to make references possible with a minimum of confusion.
But what 1 would say most emphatically is that the intention of the
declaration of 1950 is clear beyond any possibility of confusion. The
Government of Thailand was referring. as I have previously stated, to
the very article and paragraph in the Statu te of this Court whîch referred
to the filing of declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of this
Court. Nothing could reveal a clearer intent to accept this Court's
compulsory jurisdiction.
Therefore, when learned Counsel suggests that the intent of Thailand
was to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court by means of a
sort of carom shot off the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent
Court, and that it is entrapped by this error in the method used, I say
that this is ali too intricate and complex for ordinary understancling.
The intention was clear, the words were clear, and if this were ali that
there was to it. it would plainly put an end to the matter.
But as I have suggested before, this error of fact by leamecl Counsel
as to what Thailand said and as to what it intended by what it said is
flanked by two errors of law-both growing out of Counsel's interpre
tation of this Court"s decision in Israel v. Bulgan·a. The first interpre
tation, I suggested. should be caHed the "death-sentence" interpretation.
Tt is that by its Judgment in Israel v. Bulgaria this Court held that the
obligation of any ]apsec\ declaration was so dead and so decomposed that
nothing could revive it. Plainly this is not what this Court decided. It
merely decided that a lapsed declaration to accept the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Permanent Court was not revived by paragraph 5 of
Article 36. In the present case, if the Court please. paragraph 5 appears TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
to me to be a straw man with which learned Counsel carries on a heroic
struggle. Hut this struggle is irrelevant td his necessities here, for
Cambodia makes no daim under paragraph 5 and has beyoncl ali doubt
stated that it fileclunder the paragraphs which learned Counsel concedes
are the on!y ones under which it could have filed, that is paragraph 4 as
to .the filing and paragraphs 2 and 3 as to! the content. Jndeed, the
"death-sentence" construction goes much too far, for it would obviously
prevent renewal of a declaration filed under paragraphs 4 and 2 of this
Court's Statute if that declaration had been allowed to Iapse for as
muchas a day. This, indeed, is the case of Hohduras, which I mentioned
in my earlier argument.
Mr. President and Members of the Court. Leamed Counsel, I suspect,
sets no great store by what I have calied tqe "death-sentence" inter
pretation of 1srael v. Bulgaria. He counts rather more, I believe, upon
the more metaphysical doctrine of the "rule-against-alchemy" inter
pretation. This rule appears to be that while a declaration to accept
the compnlsory jurisdiction of this Court-what Counsel has called a
fresh declaration-may refer to and adopt 1terms and conditions of
any previous declaration, it may not perform the transformation from
the submission to the jur.isdiction of the old Court to submission to
the jurisdiction of this new Court without uttering words as ritualistic
as any contained in the most sacred ceremonies. The words apparently
must be even more formai than those of the rrlarriage rite. The declaring
State must-soit appears to be argued--declare almost in these words:
"I hereby accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice." And perhaps it must go on in even further detail than
this to spell out the requirements of every sub~paro afgaragraphh 2.
However, it seems to me that Counsel's own words belie so harsh
and rigid an interpretation. If I have taken them clown correctly, and
I believc that I have, Counsel savs that the ,jurisdiction of this Court
must be accepted either express!y"or, and th~ sre his words, "by the
very clearest and most unambiguous implication". \Ve on our side, if
the Court please, are not to be outdone in strictness or in unambiguity.
We believe that the declaration of May rgso can pass the str.îctest test.
Jts purpose and intent were plain, its words1werc plain. But there is
one refinement of Counsel's argument yesterday which I must confess
left me puzzled. This was a distinction which he attempted to make
between intent on the one band and what he called "ulterior purposes
or motives" on th1 other. The Court will find lthis on page rg of yester-
day's transcript . ,
Thailand's intent, I understood him to say, was not to accept the
compulsory jurisdiction of this Court, but to renew the declaration
of 1929. On the other band, Thailand's ulterior purpose and motive,
he continued, was, to be sure, to accept thÇ compulsory jurisdiction
of this Court. But this ulterior motive and purpose he considered as
a pure! y subjective or irrelevant matter which, must be left out of
consideration in determining the meaning to be given to the document.
Now, if the Court please, I must confess my ipability to see the dicho
tomv. If there is anv distinction it seems to me to be a distinction
withou t a difference. "I suggest that t is a matt er of form and not of
snbstance. Not that there is not a point whçre the intent behind an
' See p.95 above. REJOINDER OF 1\'IR.ACHESO"' ns
act may shacle off into unverifiable and indeterminable factors such
as motive; for, of course, there is. But Counsel for Thailand have
maintainecl-as, of course, they must maintain to prevail-that intent
has nothing to do with the practical and immediate object to be
achievecl by an act, but is confined to the intent to use the particular
language which was in fact used. But if we follow Counsel along this
roacl,we fincl, no cloubt to his surprise, that the worcls actuallv usecl
mean exactly what we say that Thailand meant. So one way or ài10ther
we come out at the same place, which I respectfully submit is that
of common sense, a place which the law consistently strives to reach.
Learned Counsel for Thailancl have procluced many analogies to
suggest that elire consequences must result from Thailand's alleged
misapprehension that its declaration of 1940 had continuecl until rgso.
None of these analogies, we submit, are very exact or very useful. Let
us pose sorne which, we respectfully submit, are more apt than those
suggested, and which indicate that so unimportant a misapprehension
or so inartistic a use of language can have no such dire effects.
Here is our first analogy. Suppose that a man whose name is Smith
places an advertisement in a newspaper in which he offers himself out
for employment. He states that he will accept any employment which
meets certain conditions and that his advertisement constitutes an
offer which can be acceptecl by writing to him at a certain adclress,
agreeing to the conditions which he names.
Another man whose name is Jones sees the advertisement and.decides
to accept Smith's offer. He writes Smith. a letter in which he says:
"I hereby accept the offer contained in your advertisement of so-and-so,
and hereby accept you, Mr. Smith, for employment upon the conditions
and tem1s set out in that advertisement: ·~
But, alas, in writing this letter he made a fatal fiaw-he is careless,
and he writes SMYTH instead of SMITH. In the terms used by learned
Counselancl founcl on page 35 of yesterday's transcripti, he was acting
on the "assumption that a certain state of affairs existed':,. whereas in
fact it did not. He thought the man who placecl the advertisement
was named Smvth.
Now on Thailand's reasoning the contract which one would think
was created by this offer and acceptance is absolutely void. It is void
for want of an object-there was no Smyth to be hired. If one ventures
to suggest that Jones intended to hire the man who placed the adver
tisement, and merely wrote Smyth because he was under the mis
apprehension that the man's name was Smyth, the inexorable answer
given by Counsel is: it may have been Jones'sulteriormotiveandpurpose
to hire Smith, but his intent was to hire Smvth; and since there was
no Smyth, the acceptance is absolutely void- and there is no contract
at ali.
Now, if the Court please, l submit that Thailand's intent in 1950
may be described as an intent to "hire Smith". It was to accept the
compulsory jurisdiction of this Court. It expressed that intent in a
written declaration, expressly made under Article 36, paragraph 2,of
the Statute of this Court, and meeting aU the requirements imposed
by that Article. That was sufficient to vest the Court with jurisdiction.
Or let me suggest another analogy. Suppose a man is in the habit
1 See p.103abovc.rr6 TEMPLE OF• PRE AH VII:fEAR •
of buying chickens from a certain merchant every Sunday. One Sunday
he says, "give me the same as last Sunday"-or, as I am told by my
French colleagues he might have put it, "fe renouvelle ma commaruie
du dimanche dernier".
Does he expect to get the same bird he got the Sunday before? If so,
the merchant bas been given a truly impossible command-to resuscitate
and recompose the long-eaten chicken of last week. Tt seems unlikely,
however, that the merchant would understand the orcier to be quite so
unattainable.
Or let me suggest another analogy along the same line. Suppose I
discover that my subscription to the international edition of The New
York Times bas expired or is about to expire. I write to the newspaper
office and I say "Please renew my subscription". Will I geta letter back
saying "We regret very much that we cannot find enough copies of last
year's papers to renew last year's subscription"? Surely not. Surely not.
Common sense says that I am renewing my subscription for the coming
year, not for the past year.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, if, in discussing the arguments
of learned Counsel, my sense of humour has on occasion overcome my
gravity, that does not in any way derogate from the high respect and
regard which I hold for learned Counsel and, indeed, it is very high.
When Counsel have been at the Bar as long as Sir Frank Soskice and
I have been, and I do not mean by that to force him into the company
of elderly gentlemen, we understand that the regard which our opponents
hold for us rarely extends to our arguments. None of us can transcend
the limits of the material with which we have to deal.
It has been an honour and a pleasure for me, 1r. President, to be
associated with distinguished Counsel on eithèr side of me in appearing
before this Court and I join with them in expressing my gratitude to the
Court for its unfailing courtesy and attention.
Mr. President, I would appreciate it if you would now caU on the
distinguished Agent for Cambodia for our closing words.
1 117
12. DÉCLARATION DE S. EXC. M. TRUONG CANG
(AGENT DU GOUVERNEMENT DU CAMBODGE)
-~L' ...UDIENCPUBLIQUE DU 15 AVRIL 1961,MATIN
l'vlonsieurJe Président, Messieurs de la Cour.
·Comme M. Dean Acheson l'a indiqué à la Cour, la délégationcambod
gienne, pour conclure à la compétence de la Cour, maintient l'argumen
tation développéeà la barre à titre principal et subsidiaire par ses trois
conseils.
Il me reste à présenter quelques observations générales.
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour, pour un pays comme le
Cambodge, le droit international, considérésous les aspects techniques
que soulève un tel procès, pouvait apparaître au premier abord comme
un peu lointain. En effet, ce droit a été,en fait, élaborépar des nations
qui appartiennent à d'autres spneres de civilisation et de culture que le
Cambodge. Mais en prenant contact avec le droit international d'une
manière plus approfondie que par les relations diplomatiques, l'homme
d'État, le juriste cambodgien n'eprouvent aucune surprise. C'est qu'en
effet la famille des nations est une. Les grands principes qui animentet
coordonnent les institutions internationales trouvent un échodans nos
vieillescivilisatîons d'Asie.
Quels sont ces principes que la présente affaire a particulièrement mis
en cause?
Il nous semble qu'ils sont au nombre de deux: le principe du respect
de la parole donnée et celui de la continuité del'État.
Le respect de la parole donnée, dans les relations tant publiques que
privées, est à la base du droit khmer.
Une formule de nos anciens textes sacrés, recueiHie par Adhémar
Leclère (Les Codes cambodgiens, Paris. r8g8, p. 77), disait déjà« Le roi
et les dignitaires ne doivent avoir qu'une seule parole.
Cette valeur de la parole donnée implique bien entendu que le fond,
c'est-à-dire l'intention manifestée et exprimée, l'emporte surla forme.
DèsIe xv1mesièclele droit khmer a connu des contrats privés seformant
par le seul consentement: la vente, la location, le prêtà usage... (Jean
Imbert, Histoire des Institutionkhmères, Pnom Penh, .rg6r, pp. I09 et
suiv.). Ce n'est donc pas seulement pour les besoins de sa cause, mais
par une démarche toute naturelle, que le Cambodge soutient dans la
présente affaire le principe de la compétence de la Cour.
Il est un autre principe auquel)e droit cambodgien est très attaché,
c'est-<::eluide la permanence de l'Etat. Le droit khmer l'a admis de très
bonne heure sur le plan interne, lors du changement de chaque souverain.
Mais il en revendique également le bénéficesur le plan international.
Nous sommes un .l!tat depuis une haute antiquité. Nous n'avons jamais
cesséde l'être.Ni la vassalité que certains États d'Extrême-Orient ont
cherchéà nous imposer, ni notre participation à l'ancienne Union indo
chinoise ne nous ont jamais retiré cette qualité. Telle était, pour ne
donner qu'un seul exemple, l'opinion exprimée dans le grand Traité de
droit~nternat d'o npelheim-Lauterpacht (7meédition,vol. I, par. 94,
p. 176).rr8 TEMPLE DE PRÉAH VIHJ~AR
Sur le plan juridique comme sur celui du simple bon sens nous ne
comprenons pas la contradiction suivante: 1 .
D'une part, le Siam, en reconnaissant le protectorat, a admis l'obliga
tion où nous étions d'êtrereprésentés.
D'autre part, et en mêmetemps, il nous cçmteste les droits que nous
avons pu acquérir par cette représentation. 1
Nous déplorons qu'on ait pris tant de souci de notre indépendance
quand nous n'avions pas l'exercice de nos droits pour faire si peu de
cas de ces mêmesdroits quand nous sommes devenus indépendants.
L'absence à nos côtésdans ce procès de l':Ëtatl qui exerçait le protectorat
rend-elle caducs les engagements qu'il n'a pu prendre qu'en notre nom?
Mais ce procès n'est pas seulement une rencontre avec le ç\roit .inter
national sous son expression la plus technique. JI est encore une ren
contre avec la plus haute instance chargee de d1re ce dro.it: la Cour
internationale de Justice. C'est la première fois, en effet, dans notre
histoire que nous abordons la justice intern~tio etall e;ur compren
dra tout ce que cela représente pour tin Etat comme le !lôtre. Qu'e!le
nous permette d'exprimer ici quelques-unes de nos pensées. '
Et, d'a.bord, la gratitude pour la patience dt l'attention avec laquelle
elle a bien voulu nous entendre, nous et nos conseils; e·nsuite, la confiance
que nous mettons' en eUe.Certes, personn'e ne sera surpris de ce que rious·
éprouvions des sentiments communs à tous .les plaideurs, et qu'il est
inutile de répéter. !viaisnous les éprouvons ave1 une nuance de gravité,
et la Cour doit le savoir.
Le Cambodge ne veut recourir ni à la violence, ni à la menace de la
violence. Le Cambadge n'a ni la force que don;ne un puissant développe
ment industriel, ni celle qui résulte des comb,inaisons politiques, car sa
volonté pacifique est égaleà l'égardde tous. Sa situation est donc celle
de tous ces peuples qui ont recouvré la libre disposition d'eux-mêmes
et qui pensent que le droit est leur seule protection: .en se soumettat1t
au jugement de la Cour, le Cambodge tient à dire toute sa foi dans la
Charte des Nations Unies et la justice internhtionale.
Minutes of the Public Hearings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from 10 to 15 April 1961, and on 26 May 1961, the President, M. Winiarski, presiding