l
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Peace Palace, 2517 KJ The Hague. Tel. -0392 4441). Cables: Intercourt, The Hague.
Telefax (07- 36499 28). Telex 32323.
Communiqué
unof'ficial
for imtnediate release
1 '*<] , 1) i C / 13 September1990
/ k/ ,+Hc%.r~ k*ir!{.rsi;f, ii
-1
Land. Island and Maritime FrontieD rispute(El Salvador/Honduras)
Apvlicationof Nicarapua for permissio to intervene
Judgmentof the Chamber
The following informatio ns cornmunicatet do the Pressby the
Registryof the International Cour of Justice:
Today,13 September1990,the Chamberformedto deal with the case
concerning the Land. Islaa ndd Maritime Frontier DisDute
(El Salvador/Honduras)d ,elivered its Judgmen on the Application for
permissionto intervenein that case filedby Nicaragua underArticle 62
of the Statute. It found, unanimouslyt ,hatNicaragua hadshown that it
has an interestof a legal nature whichmay be affectedby part of the
Judgmentof the Chamberon the meritsin the caseand decided that
Nicaraguawas accordingly permittet do intervenein the casein certain
respects.
The compositionof the Chamberwas as follows: President,
Judge Sette-Camara;JudgesOda and Sir RobertJennings; Judgesad hoc
Valticosand TorresBernirdez. The completetextof the operative paragrao ph the Judgment reads
as follows:
"Forthesereasons,
THE CHAMBER,
Unanimously,
1. Finds that the Republicf Nicaraguahas shownthat it has
an interestof a legalnature which may be affectedby part of the
Judgmentof the Chamberon the meritsin the present case, namely
its decisionon the legal régimoef the watersof the Gulf of
Fonseca, buthas not shownsuchan interest whichmay be affectedby
any decisionwhich the Chambermay be requiredto make concerning
the delimitatioonf thosewaters,or any decisionas to the legal
situationof the maritime spacesoutsidethe Gulf,or any decision
as to the legal situatioonf the islandsin the Gulf; W
2.Decides accordingly that the Republ ofcNicaraguais
permittedto intervenein the case,pursuantto Article62 of the
Statute,to the extent, in the manner and for tpherposesset out
in the present Judgment, bn utt furtheror otherwise."
JudgeOda appended a separateopinionto the Judgment.
In thisopinionthe Judgeconcerned Statesand explainsthe position
he adoptsin regardto certain points deal wtith in the Judgment.A
brief summaryof this opinion mabye foundin Annex 1 hereto.
The printed textof the Judgmentwill be availablein a fewweeks'
time. (Orders and enquiries shoulbde addressedto the ~istributionand
SalesSection, Offico ef the United Nations1,211Geneva10; the Sales
Section, United NationN s,w York,N.Y. 10017; or anyspecialized
bookshop.)
An analysisof the Judgment iasttached. This analysis, prepare dy
the Registry for th use of the Press, inno wayinvolvesthe
responsibilityof the Chamber. It cannotbe quoted against the teo xt
the Judgment,of which it doesnot constitutean interpretation. Analvsisof the Jud~ment
1. Proceedinnsand submissions by the Parties(paras.1-22)
1. By a joint notification date 11 December1986, filedin the
Registryof the Court the same day, the Ministers foFroreignAffairsof
the Republicof Hondurasand the Republic of El Salvador transmittetdo
the Registrar a certified copyof a Special Agreementin Spanish, signed
in the Cityof Esquipulas, Republio cf Guatemala,on 24 May 1986. Its
preamble refers to the conclusionon 30 October1980, in Lima, Peru,of a
GeneralPeace Treatybetween the two States whereby,interalia, they
delimited certain sectioo ns theircommonland frontier; andt records
thatno direct settlement hab deen achievedin respectof the remaining
land areas,or as regard,s"the legal situationof the islandsand
maritimespaces".
Article2 of the Special Agreement whichdefinesthe subjectof the
dispute, reads, in a translationby the Registryof the Court,
"The Parties request theChamber:
1. To delimitthe frontier line in the areasor sections
not describedin Article16 of the GeneralPeace Treatyof
30 October1980.
2. To determine the legal situatio on the islandsand
maritimespaces."
On 17 November 1989 Nicaragua fila edrequest for permissio no
intervene underArticle62 of the Statuteof the Courtin the proceedings
institutedby the notifilcationf the Special Agreement.
The Court, inan Orderdated28 February1990, found thatit was for
the Chamberformedto deal with the present case to decidewhether
Nicaragua's requestshou.1dbe granfed.
II. Natureand extentof the dis~ute(paras.23-33)
The Chamberobserves that the dispute betweenEl Salvadorand
Honduraswhich isthe suhjectof the Special Agreement concers nsveral
distinct though in somerespects interrelated matters .he Chamberis
asked firstto delimittlieland frontier linb eetweenthe twoStatesin
the areas or sectionsnot describedin Article16 of the General Peace
Treatyconcludedby them on 30 October1980; Nicaragua is not seekingto
intervenein this aspectof the proceedings.The Chamberis also to
"determine the legal situati ofnthe islands", and thaotf the "maritime
spaces". The geographicinclontext of the islanand maritime aspectsof
the dispute,and the natureand extentof the disputeas appears from the
Parties'claims beforetlie Chamber,is as follows.
The Gulf ofFonseca lies on the Pacificcoastof Central America,
openingto the oceanin i3generallysouth-westerly direction. The
north-west coastof the Gulf isthe land territory of El Salvador,and
the south-eastcoast thatof Nicaragua; the land territo ryHonduras
lies betweenthe two,with a substantial coasotn the innerpart of the
Gulf. The entry to the Gulf,betweenPuntaAmapalain El Salvadorto thenorth-west,and Punta Cosigüinain Nicaraguato the south-east,is some
19 nautical mileswide. The penetrationof the Gulf from a line drawn
between thesepoints varies betwee3 n0 and32 nauticalmiles. Withinthe
Gulf of Fonseca,there isa considerable numberof islandsand islets.
El Salvador asks theChamberto find that"El Salvadorhas and had
sovereignty over al1 the islandsin the Gulfof Fonseca,with the
exceptionof the Islandof Zacate Grande which can be consideredas
forming partof the Coastof Honduras". Honduras for its part invites
the Chamberto find that the islandsof Meangueraand Meanguerita are the
only islandsin dispute between the Parties s, that the Chamberis not,
accordingto Honduras, calleu dpon to determine sovereignty over aony
the other islandsa ,nd todeclarethe sovereignty of Hondurasover
Meangueraand Meanguerita.
The Chamberconsidersthat the detailed historo yf the disputeis
not hereto the purpose,but that two events concerning the maritime
areasmust be mentioned. First,the waters within th eulf of Fonseca
betweenHondurasand Nicaraguawere to an importantextentdelimitedin W
1900by a Mixed Commission establishp edrsuantto aTreatyconcluded
betweenthe two States on 7 October1894,but the delimitation lin does
not extendso far as to meet a closing line betweePnuntaArnapalaand
Punta Cosigüina.
The second eventto be mentioned is the following. In 1916
El Salvador brought proceedings against Nicari aguahe Central American
Court of Justice,claiming inter alit ahat the Bryan-CharnorTreaty
concludedby Nicaraguawith the United Stateo sf America, for the
construction of a naval base, "ignored anviolated the righto sf
CO-ownership possessedby El Salvadorin the Gulf ofFonseca".
Nicaragua resisted the claim contendinginter alia) that the lack
of demarcation of frontiers between theiparianStates did"not result
in comrnonownership". The Decisionof the Central AmericanCourt of
Justicedated 9 March 1917 records the unanimo view of the judgesthat
the international statu of the Gulfof Fonsecawas tha.tit was "an
historicbay possessed of the characteristicosf a closedsea",and in
its "Examinationof factsand law",the Courtfound:
"Whereas: The legal statusof the Gulf of Fonseca having
been recognizedby this Courtto be that of a historic bay
possessedof the characteristico sf a closedsea, the three
riparianStatesof El Salvador, Honduraa snd Nicaragua are,
therefore, recognize ds coownersof its waters, excepats to
the littoral marine leagw ueich isthe exclusive propertoyf
each, ..."
It is claimedby El Salvadorin its Memorialin the present case
that:
"On the basisof the 1917 judgemenatn objective legal
régimehas been establishedin the Gulf. Even if initially the
judgementwas binding onlyin respectof the direct partiet so
the litigation, Nicaragu and El Salvador, the legal status
recognizedthereinhas beenconsolidated in the courseof
tirne[;its effectsextendto third States, and in particular,
they extendto Honduras"and furtherthat the juridical situatio of the Gulf "doesnot permitthe
dividingup of the waters held in condominium",with the exception of "a
territorialsea within the Gulf",recognizedby the Central American
Courtof Justice. It thereforasks the Chamberto adjudge anddeclare
that:
"The juridical positioonf the maritimespaces withinthe
Gulf of Fonsecacorrespondsto the juridical position
established by the Judgementof the Central American Cour of
JusticerenderedMarch 9th1917,as acceptedand applied there
after."
It also contendsthat
"So far as the maritimespacesare concerned, thP earties
have notasked the Chambereitherto tracea line of
delimitationor to definethe Rulesand Principles of Public
International Law applicableto a delimitationof maritime
spaces,either insideor outsidethe Gulf of Fonseca."
Honduras rejects the view that the 1917Judgement produceodr
reflectedan objective legal régime, contendi tnhat in the case of
"a judgment or arbitral award layingdom a delimitationas
betweenthe partiesto a dispute, the solutionthereinadopted
can only be opposed tothe parties".
It also observes that
"it is not the 1917Judgementwhich conferssovereigntyupon the
riparianStatesover the waters of the Bay of Fonseca. That
sovereignty antecedes considerably that judg metweentwo
riparianStates,since it dates backto the creation of the
threeStatesconcerned."
Honduras'scontentionas to the legalsituationof the maritimespaces,
to be examined furthertielow,involvestheir delimitation between the
Parties. It considers t.hatthe Chamberhas jurisdiction under the
Special Agreement to effectsuch delimitation, anhdas indicatedwhat, in
the view of Honduras, sbouldbe the courseof the delimitation line.
As regards maritime spaces situatedoutsidethe closing line of the
Gulf, Honduras asks theChamberto find thatthe "cornmunito yf interests"
betweenEl Salvador and Honduraa ss coastal Statesof the Gulf implies
that they each have an equal rightto exercise jurisdictioonver such
spaces. On this basis,it asks theChamberto determinea line of
delimitation extending200 miles seaward,to delimit the territoria sea,
the exclusive economic zoa ned thecontinentalshelfof the two
Parties. El Salvador howevercontendsthat the Chamberdoes not, under
the SpecialAgreement,have jurisdiction to delimit maritimeareas
outsidethe closing line of the Gulf. El Salvadordeniesthat Honduras
has any legitimateclainito any partof the continental shelf or
exclusive economiz cone inthe Pacific,outsidethe Gulf; it is however
preparedto accept that this questib on decidedby the Chamber.III. Reauirements for interventi underArticle62 of the Statuteand
Article81 of the Rulesof Court (paras. 35-101)
In its Application for permissit onintervene, filedon
17 November1989,Nicaragua stated that the Applicationwas made by
virtueof Article36, paragraph1, and Article62 of the Statute. An
application underArticle62 is requiredby Article81, paragraph1, of
the Rules of Court to be filed "assoon aspossible,and not laterthan
the closureof the writtenproceedings".The Applicationof Nicaragua
was filed in the Registry of the Court two months before theime-limit
fixed for the filino gf the Parties'Replies.
By Article81, paragraph2, of the Rulesof Courta Stateseekingto
intervene is requiredto specify the case to which it relatesand toset
out:
"(a) the interestof a legal nature which the Stateapplying
to intervene considers ma be affectedby the decisionin
that case;
the precise objectof the intervention;
any basisof jurisdictionwhich is claimedto existas
between the State applyit ng interveneand the partiesto
the case".
The Chamberfirst examines argument of El Salvadorwhich wereput
forwardas grounds for the Chamberto rejectthe Application of Nicaragua
in limine,without there being any need for further examina ofions
compliancewith Article62 of the Statuteof the Court. These arguments,
none of which wereupheldby the Chamber,relatedto the forma1
complianceof the Application with the requiremento sf Article81,
paragraph2, of the Rulesof Court,to the alleged"untimeline~s' of the
Applicationin view ofrequests containei dn it whichwouldbe disruptive
at the present advanced stao ge the proceedings, and tothe absenceof
negotiations prior to the filingof the Application.
(a) Interestof a lepalnature (paras.37 and 52-84)
Nicaraguastates inits Application that: "As can be appreciatedin
Article2 of the Special Agreement ..., the Governmentof Nicaraguahas
an interestof a legalnature whichmust inevitablybe affectedby a
decisionof the Chamber." (Para.2.) It then proceedsto enumeratethe
"particular considerations supporting t opinion". The Chamber
observesthat as the Courthas made clearin previous cases, in orderto
obtainpermissionto intervene underArticle62 of the Statute,a State
has to show an interestof a legal nature whichmay be affectedby the
Court's decisionin the case, orthatun intérêt d'ordre luridiauees
pour luien cause- the criterion statei dn Article62.
In the present case, Nicaragh uas gone further: citingthe case
concerning Monetary Gold Removed from R inme943 (I.C.J.Reports 1954,
p. 19), it has arguedthat its interests are so much part of the
subject-matter of the casethat theChambercouldnot properly exercise
its jurisdictionwithout the participatio of Nicaragua. The Chamber
therefore examines the wa in which theinterestsof Albania would have
formed "the very subject-matterof the decision"in the case concerningMonetarvGold RemovedfromRome in 1943,and explainsthat theCourt's
findingin that case was that,while the presencein the Statuteof
Article62 rnight impliedlyauthorize continuanc of the proceedings in
the absenceof a Statewlnose"interestsof a legal nature" mighb te
"affected", thisdid not justify continuancoef proceedingsin the
absenceof a State whoseinternational responsibility wou bed"thevery
subject-matter of the decision". Therehad been no need to decidewhat
the position woulhdave lbeehad Albania appl-iefor permission to
interveneunderArticle 62. The Chamberconcludes that, ii fn the
present case the legal interes ofsNicaragua would form par of "the
very subject-matteo rf tlkdecision",as Nicaraguahas suggested,this
would doubtless justifyan intervention by NicaraguaunderArticle62 of
the Statute,which laysdom a less stringent criterionT .he question
would then arise, however, whethe such interventionunderArticle62 of
the Statutewould enablethe Chamberto pronounceupon the legal
interestsof Nicaraguawhich it is suggested by Nicaragua would form the
very subject-matter ofthe decision. The Chamberwill thereforefirst
considerwhether Nicaraguh aas shownthe existence of an "interestof a
legalnature whichrnaybe affectedby the decision", so as to justifyan
intervention;and if su,chis the case,will then considerwhetherthat
interestrnayin fact forin"thevery subject-matteo rf the decision"as
did the interesto sfAlb.aniain the case concerning Monetary Gold Removed
from Rome in 1943.
The Chamberfurther observes thatArticle62 of the Statute
contemplates interventio on the basisof an interestof a legalnature
"whichrnaybe affected by the decisionin the case". In the present case
however,what is requestedof the Chamberby the SpecialAgreementis not
a decisionon a single circumscribed issub e,t severaldecisionson
variousaspectsof the overall disputb eetweenthe Parties. The Chamber
has to considerthe possible effeco tn legal interests assertebdy
Nicaraguaof its eventual decisionon each of the different issue which
might fa11 to be determined,in order to define the scope of any
intervention which rnaybe foundto be justifiedunderArticle62 of the
Statute. If a State can satisfythe Court that ithas an interestof a
legalnaturewhich rnaybe affectedby the decisionin the case,it rnaybe
permittedto intervenein respectof that interest. But thatdoes not
mean that the intervening State t isen also permittedto make excursions
into other aspectsof the case; this is in fact recognizedby
Nicaragua. Since the scopeof any permitted interventih ons to be
determined, the Chamberhas to considerthe mattersof the islands, the
situation ofthe waters within the Gulf, the possible delimitati ofnthe
waters withinthe Gulf, the situation of the watersoutsidethe Gulf,and
the possible delimitatio of the watersoutsidethe Gulf.
Whether al1 of thesematters are indeed raisb ed the wordingof
Article 2, paragraph2, of the Special Agreementis itself disputed
betweenthe Partiesto the case. Accordingly, the list of mattersto be
considered must in this phaseof the proceedingsbe entirely without
prejudiceto the meaningof Article2, paragraph 2, as a whole,or of any
of the termsas used in that Article.The Chamberclearly cannot take
any stand inthe present proceeding on the disputesbetweenthe Parties
concerning the proper meanio ng the SpecialAgreement: it must
determinethe questions raiseb dy Nicaragua's Applicatio while leaving
thesequestionsof interpretation entirel open.Burdenof roof(paras. 61-63)
Therewas some argument before th ehamberon the questionof the
extentof the burden ofproofon a Stateseekingto intervene. In the
Chamber'sopinion,it is clear, first, that it is for aStateseekingto
interveneto demonstrate convincingly wh attasserts, andthusto bear
the burdenof proof; and, second, thatit has onlyto show thatits
interest"may"be affected, not that it will ormust be affected. What
needs to be shownby a Stateseeking permissiot no intervenecan onlybe
judgedin concret0and in relationto al1 the circumstances of a
particularcase. It is for theStateseekingto intervene to identify
the interestof a legalnature whichit considers may be affected bythe
decisionin the case, and to show in whatway that interestmay be
affected; it is not for the Court itself- or in the presencasethe
Chamber - to substitute itself fothe Statein that respect. The
Chamberalso recallsin this connectiot nhe problemthatthe Partiesto
the case arein dispute about the interpretationf the very provisionof
the SpecialAgreementinvokedin Nicaragua's Application .he Chamber
notes the reliancb ey Nicaraguon the principleof recognition,or on
estoppel,but doesnot acceptNicaragua's contentionsin thisrespect.
The Chamberthen turnsto considerationof the severalspecific
issuesin the case whichmay cal1 for decisionas indicatedabove,in
orderto determinewhetherit has been shownthatsuchdecisionmay
affecta Nicaraguaninterestof a legalnature.
1, Lepalsituationof the islands(paras. 65-66)
So far as thedecisionrequestedof the Chamberby thePartiesis to
determinethe legalsituationof the islands, the Chamberconcludesthat
it shouldnot grant permissiof nor intervention by Nicaraguia,the
absenceof any Nicaraguaninterestliableto be directly affecteb dy a
decisionon thatissue. Any possible effecto sf the islandsas relevant
circumstances for delimitati ofnmaritime spacesfa11to be considered
in the contextof the question whether Nicaragua shob ulpermittedto
interveneon the basisof a legal interestwhichmay be affected by a
decisionon the legalsituationof thewatersof the Gulf.
2. Lena1situationof thewaters within the Gulf (paras.67-79)
(i) The rénimeof thewaters
It is El Salvador'scasethat,as between El Salvador, Hondura asd
Nicaragua, there exists"a régimeof community,CO-ownershipor joint
sovereignty" oversuchof the waters ofthe Gulf of Fonseca"as lie
outsidethe areaof exclusivejurisdiction"a ,n "objectivelegalrégime"
on the basisof the 1917Judgementof the Central Arnericanourtof
Justice. On thatbasis,El Salvador consider that thejuridical
situationof the Gulf doesnot permit the dividingup of thewatersheld
in condominium.El Salvadoralso contendsthat theSpecialAgreement
doesnot confer jurisdictio to effect anysuchdelimitation. Honduras
on the otherhand contends,interalia,that "theGulf'sspecific
geographical situatio creates aspecial situation betweethe riparian
States which generate ascommunityof interests"which inturn "calls for
a speciallegal régime to determine theimrutualrelations";that the
communityof interests"doeçnot mean integration and theabolitionof boundaries"but, on the contrary,"theclear definitioonf those
boundariesas a conditionof effective CO-operation";
and that eachof
the threeriparianStates"hasan equal right to a portionof the
interna1waters".
The Chamberconsidersthatquiteapartfrom the questioo nf the
legal statusof the 1917 Judgement, howeverthe factis thatEl Salvador
now claimsthat thewaters ofthe Gulf are subject to a condominiuof
the coastal Statesa,nd:hasindeedsuggestedthat thatrégime"wouldin
any casehave been applicablteo the Gulfundercustomary international
law". Nicaraguahas referredto the factthat Nicaragua plainl has
rightsin the Gulfof Fonseca,the existence of which is undisputedand
contendsthat
"Thecondominium, if it is declaredto be applicable, would
by its very natureinvolvethree riparians, an not only the
partiesto the SpecialAgreement."
In the opinionof the Chamber,this is a sufficient demonstration by
Nicaragua that it has an interestof a legal naturein the determination
whether or not thisis the régime governing the wate ofsthe Gulf: the
very definition of a condominium pointso this conclusion.Furthermore,
a decisionin favour ofsome of the Hondurantheseswould equallybe such
as may affect legal interests N ofcaragua. The "communityof interests"
which is the starting-pointof the argumentsof Hondurasis a community
which, like the condomini umaimedby El Salvador, embraces Nicaragua as
one of the three ripariailtates,and Nicaragua must therefob re
interested also in thatquestion. The Chamber,therefore, findt shat
Nicaraguahas shownto the Chamber'ssatisfaction the existenceof an
interestof a legal nature whicm hay be affectedby its decisionon these
questions.
On the other hand, whil ehe Chamberis thussatisfiedthat
Nicaraguahas a legalinterestwhichmay be affectedby the decisionof
the Chamberon the question whether or not the wato ersthe Gulf
of Fonseca are subjectto a condominium ora "communityof interests"of
the threeriparianStates,it cannot accept th contention of Nicaragua
that the legalinterestof Nicaragua"wouldform the very subject-matter
of the decision",in the sensein whichthatphrasewas used in the case
concerning MonetarvGold Removedfrom Romein 1943 to describethe
interestsof Albania. 11:followsthat thequestion whether the Chamber
wouldhave powerto takea decisionon thesequestions, without the
participationof Nicaraguain the proceedings,doesnot arise; butthat
the conditions foarn interventionby Nicaragua in this aspeocft the
case are nevertheles clearly fulfilled.
(ii)Possible delimitationof thewaters
If theChamberwere notsatisfiedthat thereis a condominium over
the watersof the Gulfof such a kind asto excludeany delimitationi ,t
might thenbe calledupori, if it were satisfied thait has jurisdiction
to do so, to effect adel-imitationT.he Chamberhas thereforeto
considerwhethera decisionas to delimitation of thewatersof the Gulf
might affectan interestof a legal nature appertainit ng Nicaragua,in
orderto determine whether Nicaragua should peremittedto intervene in
respectof this aspect of the casealso. It doesnot, however,have to
considerthe possible efirecon Nicaragua's interest of everypossibledelimitation which might bearrivedat; it is for the State seeking to
interveneto show that its interests might be affected by a particular
delimitation, or by delimitation in general. Honduras hasalready
indicatedin its pleadings how, in its view, the delimitation shou bed
effected. El Salvador,consistently with its position, has not indicated
its views on possiblelinesof delimitation.Nicaragua, for its part,
has not given any indicationof any specificline of delimitation which
it considers wouldaffect its interests.
The Chamberexamines argumentp sut forwardin the Nicaraguan
Application asconsiderations supporting its assertionof a legal
interest; it does not considerthat an interestof a third Statein the
general legalrules and principles likely to be appliedby the decision
can justifyan intervention, or that the takinginto accountof al1 the
coastsand coastal relationship wsithin the Gulf asa geographical fact
for thepurposesof a delimitation betweenEl Salvadorand Hondurasmeans
that theinterestof a third riparianState,Nicaragua, may be affected.
The Chamberobserves that the essential difficul inywhich the Chamber
finds itself, on this matter of a possible delimitatio within the waters
of the Gulf,is that Nicaragua did not in its Applicationindicateany
maritime spacesin which Nicaragua might have a legal interestwhich
couldbe said to be affected by a possible delimitati line between
El Salvadorand Honduras.
Accordingly the Chamberis not satisfiedthat a decisionin the
present case eithea rs to the law applicableto a delimitation,or
effecting adelimitation, between Hondura and El Salvador,of the waters
of the Gulf (exceptas regards the alleged "communityof interests"),
would affectNicaragua's interests. The Chambertherefore considert shat
althoughNicaraguahas, for purposesof Article62 of the Statute,shown
an interestof a legalnature whichmay be affected by thC ehamber's
decisionon the questionof the existence or natureof a régimeof
condominiumor communityof interestswithin the Gulf of Fonseca, it has
not shown such an interestwhichmight be affected by the Chamber's
decisionon any questionof delimitation within theGulf. This finding
also disposesof the question,referredto above,of thepossible
relevanceof a decisionin the island dispute.
3. Lena1 situationof watersoutsidethe Gulf (paras.80-84)
The Chambernow turns to the questionof thepossible effect on
Nicaragua's legal interest of its futuredecisionon the waters outside
the Gulf. Hondurasclaimsthatby the Special Agreement
"the Parties havenecessarilyendowedthe Courtwith competence
to delimitthe zonesof territorialsea and the exclusive
economiczonespertainingto Hondurasand El Salvador
respectively"
and asks the Chamberto endorsethe delimitation line advancb eyd
Hondurasfor the waters outsidethe Gulf as "productiveof an equitable
solution". El Salvador interprets th epecialAgreementas not
authorizing the Chamberto effect anydelimitation.Both Partiescontend
that Nicaraguahas no legal interestwhichmay be affected by the
decisionon the "legal situationo "f the maritimespacesoutsidethe Gulf
and both Partiesdeny that the carryingout by the Chamberof their
respective interpretation of Article 2 could affectNicaragua'slegal
interests. The ChambernotesHonduras' demonstratioonf a proposedschemeof
delimitation designeto avoidany impingement uponwatersoutsidethe
Gulf whichmight conceivably b claimedby Nicaragua,uponwhichthe
Chambercannot passin theseincidental proceedings, and before hearing
argumenton themerits. That demonstratio did cal1 for some indication
in response, by the State seektiongintervene,of how thoseproposals
would affect a specificinterestof thatState, or what other possible
delimitation would affet ctat interest.The chartedproposition of
Hondurasthusgave Nicaragua the opportunityto indicatehow theHonduran
proposals might affect"to a significantextent"any possible Nicaraguan
legalinterestin watersWest of thatHonduranline. Nicaraguafailedto
indicatehow this delimitation, or any other delimitation reb garitd
as a possible one, would affe ctactual Nicaraguai nnterestof a legal
nature. The Chambertherefore cannotgrant Nicaragua permission to
intervene over the delimitatioof thewatersoutsidethe Gulf closing
line.
(b) Objectof the interventio(nparas.85-92)
The Chamberturnsto the questionof the objectof Nicaragua's
Application for permissi oonintervenein the case. A statementof the
"preciseobjectof the intervention" is required by Article 81,
paragraph2 (b),of the Rulesof Court.
Nicaragua'sindication, in its Application for permission to
intervene, of the object ofits interventionin the present casei,s as
follows:
"The intervention for which permissi iorequestedhas the
followingobjects:
First, generalltyo protect the legal righots the
Bepublicof Nicaraguain the Gulfof Fonseca and the adjacent
maritimeareasby al1 legalmeansavailable.
Secondlv,to intervenein the proceedingisn orderto
inform the Courotf thenatureof the legal righto sf Nicaragua
whichare in issuein the dispute.This formof intervention
wouldhave the conservative'urposeof seekingto ensurethat
the determinatio nf the Chamberdid not trenchupon the legal
rights and interest of the Republicof Nicaragua..."
At the hearings, the Agent of Nicare aguaasizedits willingnestso
adjustto any procedure indicatedby the Chamber. It hasbeen contended,
in particularby El Salvador,thatNicaragua's stated object is not a
properob ject.
So far as the objectof Nicaragua's interventiion"to inform the
Court of thenatureof the legal righto sf Nicaraguawhichare in issue
in the dispute",it cannot besaid thatthis object in sot a properone:
it seemsindeedto accordwith the functionof intervention.The use in
an Application to interveo nea perhaps somewhamtore forceful
expression ("trenchupon the legal rightasndinterests") is immaterial,
providedthe object actualla yimedat is a properone. Secondly,it does
not seemto theChamberthatfor a Stateto seek byintervention "to
protect its claim by al1 legalmeans"necessarily involvesthe inclusion
in suchmeansof "thatof seekinga favourable judicia pronouncemento"n its own claims. The "legalmeansavailable" must be thoseafforded by
the institution of intervention for the protecto ifna thirdState's
legalinterests. So understood, thatobject cannot be regardedas
improper
(c) Basisof jurisdiction:Valid linkof Aurisdiction (paras. 93-101)
The Chamberhas nowfurtherto considerthe argument of El Salvador
that forNicaraguato interveneit must in addition showa "validlinkof
jurisdiction" betweenNicaraguaand the Parties. In itsApplication,
Nicaragua doesnot assert the existenceof any basisof jurisdiction
other than the Statuteitself,and expresses the view thatArticle 62
doesnot requirea separatetitleof jurisdiction.
The questionis whetherthe existence of a validlinkof
jurisdiction with the partiesto the case- in the senseof a basisof
jurisdiction whicc houldbe invoked, by aStateseekingto intervene, in
orderto institute proceedings against eit oreroth of the parties- is
an essentialconditionfor the grantino gf permissionto interveneunder w
Article 62 of the Statute. In orderto decidethe pointthe Chambermust
considerthe generalprincipleof consensual jurisdictionin its relation
with the institutioo nf intervention.
There can be no doubtof the importanceof thisgeneralprinciple.
The patternof international judicialsettlement underthe Statuteis
that twoor more States agret ehatthe Courtshall hearand determine a
particulardispute. Such agreement may be givenad hoc, by Special
Agreementor otherwise, or may resultfrom the invocation,in relationto
the particular dispute,of a compromissory claus of a treatyor of the
mechanismof Article 36, paragraph2, of the Court's Statute. Those
States arethe "parties"to the proceedings, and are boundby theCourt's
eventualdecisionbecause theyhave agreedto conferjurisdiction on the
Courtto decidethe case,the decisionof the Courthavingbinding force
as provided for in Article59 of the Statute. Normally, therefore no
other State may involveitselfin the proceedings withou the consentof
the originalparties. Nevertheless, procedures for a "third"Stateto
intervenein a case areprovidedin Articles 62 and 63 of the Court's
Statute. The competence of the Courtin thismatterof intervention is
not, like itscompetence to hear and determinethe dispute referretdo
it, derived from the consentof the partiesto the case,but fromthe
consentgivenby them,in becoming partiet so the Court'sStatute,to the
Court'sexerciseof its powers conferre by the Statute. Thus the Court
has the competenceto permitan intervention even though itbe opposedby
one or both of the partiesto the case. The natureof the competence
thus created by Articl e2 of the Statuteis definableby referenceto
the object andpurposeof intervention, as this appearsfromArticle62
of the Statute.
InterventionunderArticle62 of the Statuteis for the purposeof
protecting a State's"interestof a legalnature"thatmightbe affected
by a decisionin an existingcasealready establishe betweenother
States, namelythe partiesto the case. It is not intendedto enablea
thirdStateto tackon a new case, to become anew Party,and so have its
own claims adjudicatedby the Court. Intervention cannothave been
intended tobe employedas a substitute for contentiousproceedings.
Acceptanceof the Statuteby aStatedoesnot of itself create
jurisdiction to entertain aparticularcase: the specific conseno tf thepartiesis necessaryfor that. If an intervener were held to become a
partyto a case merely as a consequenceof being permittedto intervene
in it, this wouldbe a very considerable departufrom the principleof
consensual jurisdiction.It is therefore clear thatSatate whichis
allowedto intervenein a case,doesnot, by reasononly of beingan
intervener, become alsopa artyto the case.
It thus follows fromthe juridicalnatureand from thepurposesof
intervention that theexistenceof a validlink of jurisdiction between
thewould-be intervene and theparties is not a requirement fotrhe
successof the application. On the contrary,the procedureof
intervention is toensurethata State withpossibly affected interests
may be permittedto intervene even though the iseno jurisdictional link
and it therefore cannot becomepa arty. The Chambertherefore concludes
that theabsenceof a jurisdictional lin between Nicaraguaand the
Partiesto this case is no bar to permission beingivenfor intervention.
IV. Proceduralriphtsof State~ermittedto intervene(paras. 102-104)
Sincethis is thefirstcase in the history of the two Courtsin
which a State will have'beeaccorded permissio to interveneunder
Article62 of the Statute,it appears appropriat to give someindication
of the extentof the procedural rights acquiredtb he interveningState
as a resultof that permission.In the first place, as has been
explained above,the intervening Stat doesnot become partyto the
proceedings,and doesnot acquirethe rights, or become subjectto the
obligations, which attac to the statusof a party,under the Statuteand
Rulesof Court,or the general principleo sf procedurallaw. Nicaragua,
as an intervener,has of course a rightto be heardby the Chamber. That
right is regulated by Articl85 ofthe Rulesof Court,whichprovides
for submissionof a written statementa,nd participation ithe hearings.
The scopeof the interventioinn this particularcase,in relation
to the scopeof the caseas a whole,necessarilyinvolveslimitations of
the rightof the intervenerto be heard. An initiallimitationis that
it is not for the interveneto addressargumentto the Chamberon the
interpretatioonf the Special Agreement conclub dedweenthe Partieson
24 May 1986,becausethe Special Agreement is, fN orcaragua,
res inter alios acta; and Nicaraguahas disclaimedany intentionof
involving itselifn the dispute overthe land boundary. The Chamberthen
summarizesthe aspectsof the case in respectof whichNicaraguahas
shownthe existence of an interestof a legal natureand thosein respect
of which it has not,with the consequent limitatioonsthe scopeof the
interventionpermitted. Annex to PressCornmuniau é0/16
Summaryof the SevarateOvinionof Judne Oda
While agreeing strongl yith the Chamberin permittingNicaraguato
intervenein the case brought to the Courtpursuantto the Special
Agreementof 24 May 1986 betweenHondurasand El Salvador,JudgeOda
expressesthe view thatNicaragua's intervention shon uld have been
restricted to the sole questioonf the legal régimoef the waters within
the Gulf. In his view, once it had, if only ivery general terms, shown
that it had an interestof a legalnature which might baeffected bythe
decisionin the case,then (i)Nicaragua, havingnow been permitted to
intervenein respectof the legalrégime within the watersof the Gulf,
shouldnot have been excludedfrom expressini gts viewsin due courseon
any delimitationbetweenEl Salvadorand Honduras within the Gulf which
may fa11 to be effectedby theChamber; and, moreover, (ii)Nicaragua
shouldnot have beenexcludedfrom expressing itsviews in due course
with respectto any delimitatiow nhichmay fa11to be effectedoutside
the Gulf in the event thatsome title mayhave beenestablished in favour
of Honduras.
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras) - Judgment of the Chamber