117
50
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SEBUTINDE
The first preliminary objection of the UAE does not, in the circumstances of the
present case, have an exclusively preliminary character and should be joined to the
merits, pursuant to the provisions of Article 79ter, paragraph 4, of the Rules of
Court — In particular, the question of whether or not the measures taken by the
UAE against Qatar and Qataris on 5 June 2017 had “the purpose or effect of
racial discrimination” within the meaning of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the CERD,

111 44 DECLARATION OF PRESIDENT YUSUF Majority frames subject-matter of dispute in manner totally disconnected from Applicant’s written and oral pleadings — This leads to mischaracterization of subject-matter of dispute — Subject-matter of dispute concerns alleged measures of racial discrimination on basis of “national origin”, not current nationality — Majority should have applied long-standing jurisprudence in identifying subject-matter of dispute — No need for factual assessment of measures complained of by Qatar — Issues of fact are a matter for the merits — Whether “Qataris” form disti

SEPARATE, PARTLY CONCURRING AND PARTLY DISSENTING, OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC BROWER

DECLARATION OF JUDGE TOMKA
Second preliminary objection — Jurisdiction ratione materiae — Question whether “third country measures” fall within the scope of the Treaty of Amity — Court departing radically from the approach set out in its prior case law relating to the same bilateral treaty.
1. The way the Court has treated the second preliminary objection raised by the United States calls for some observations.

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE GEVORGIAN

DECLARATION OF JUDGE ROBINSON
1. I am in agreement with the finding in the dispositif of the Judgment. I wish however to make some brief comments on the case.

DECLARATION OF JUDGE GAJA
Obligation under a treaty to settle a dispute according to one of the means stipulated in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations ⎯ Referral to a decision of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the choice of means of settlement ⎯ Decision implying an obligation for the Parties to resort to judicial settlement ⎯ Whether it confers jurisdiction on the Court ⎯ Need for the consent of both Parties ⎯ Object and purpose of the treaty.

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE BENNOUNA
Jurisdiction of the Court — Consent of the Parties in the light of the Statute and the Court’s consistent jurisprudence — Interpretation of Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Geneva Agreement ⎯ Two alternatives provided for in Article IV, paragraph 2 — Subject-matter of the dispute — Power delegated by the Parties to the Secretary-General under Article IV, paragraph 2.

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ABRAHAM
[Translation]
1. To my great regret, I am unable to subscribe to the conclusion reached by the majority of my colleagues in the present case, namely that there is a jurisdictional basis allowing the Court to entertain the dispute between Guyana and Venezuela, which is essentially a territorial dispute, of which it has been seised by the unilateral Application of Guyana.

DECLARATION OF JUDGE TOMKA Geneva Agreement as agreement for the peaceful settlement of the dispute — Authority of the Secretary-General of the United Nations — Jurisdiction ratione materiae concerns the frontier dispute — Issue of the validity of the 1899 Arbitral Award ripe for judicial determination — Effet utile of Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Geneva Agreement.
Having voted in favour of the conclusions reached by the Court, I nevertheless wish to offer a few remarks on this case, which is rather unusual.