DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC MCRAE Disagreement with the finding of the Court that it has jurisdiction ratione temporis — No justification for the assimilation of a dispute involving events subsequent to the application to a dispute involving events subsequent to the lapse of the jurisdictional title — Responsibility may not be based on events subsequent to the lapse of the jurisdictional title — Policy considerations.

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE NOLTE 1. I am not persuaded that the Court has jurisdiction ratione temporis to adjudicate facts or events which took place after 27 November 2013, the date on which the Pact of Bogotá ceased to be in force with respect to Colombia. I therefore voted against subparagraphs (1) to (4) of the operative clause of the Judgment by which the Court recognizes and exercises jurisdiction with regard to such facts or events (Judgment, paragraph 261). 2.

DECLARATION OF JUDGE IWASAWA Article 33, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS reflects customary international law on the contiguous zone in respect of the powers that a coastal State may exercise in that zone  It is significant that, at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, there were no proposals to add other matters to the list in Article 33, paragraph 1.

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE ROBINSON Nature and scope of rights and duties in the exclusive economic zone  Exclusive sovereign rights of the coastal State  Freedom of navigation. 1. I am in agreement with the Court’s finding that Colombia has breached Nicaragua’s sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone (hereinafter “EEZ”). In this opinion I make some observations on the Court’s treatment of a coastal State’s sovereign rights in its EEZ. I treat Articles 56, 58, 61, 62, 69, 70 and 73 as reflecting customary international law. 2.

DECLARATION OF JUDGE XUE 1. With regard to Colombia’s third counter-claim relating to the artisanal fishing rights of the inhabitants of the San Andrés Archipelago, I agree with the Court’s conclusion that Colombia fails to prove the existence of its traditional practice of artisanal fishing that extends to the area that falls within Nicaragua’s exclusive economic zone. In regard to traditional or historic fishing rights, however, I wish to make a few observations in this declaration. 2.

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE YUSUF First disagreement with conclusion on jurisdiction ratione temporis — Jurisdiction based on consent of the parties and subject to limits and conditions thereto — Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá establishes those limits — No detailed interpretation of Article XXXI of the Pact is undertaken — Such interpretation would lead to conclusion that Court lacks jurisdiction over claims predicated on facts and events having occurred after lapse of jurisdictional title — Nothing in 2016 Judgment suggests that Court’s jurisdiction extends to events subsequent to termin

DECLARATION OF JUDGE BENNOUNA 1. To my regret, I had to vote against the decision of the Court, which found that it had jurisdiction ratione temporis to entertain facts and events alleged by Nicaragua to have occurred after 27 November 2013 (paragraph 261, subparagraph 1). Indeed, this is the date on which the Pact of Bogotá, the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction, ceased to be in force in relations between the two Parties. 2. Under the terms of Article XXXI, subparagraph (c), of the Pact, the Parties recognize “the jurisdiction of the Court . . .

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ABRAHAM
[Translation]

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE TOMKA Jurisdiction of the Court under Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá  Interpretation of Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá  The meaning and purpose of the phrase “so long as the present Treaty is in force”  No temporal limitation of the Court’s jurisdiction under Article XXXI  Requirement that the Pact of Bogotá be in force when the Application instituting proceedings is filed  No new claim formulated by Nicaragua after the filing of the Application and the lapse of the title of jurisdiction.

DECLARATION OF VICE-PRESIDENT GEVORGIAN Disagreement with the Court’s finding that Colombia has infringed upon Nicaragua’s EEZ rights by issuing fishing permits  Conclusion that related incidents at sea imply an authorization to fish in Nicaragua’s EEZ is not fully convincing  Doubts over whether there is sufficient evidence that resolutions by DIMAR and the Archipelago’s Governor constitute fishing permits. 1.