Public sitting held on Monday 30 September 2024, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Salam presiding, in the case concerning Land and Maritime Delimitation and Sovereignty over Islands (Gabon/Equatorial Guinea)

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CR 2024/29
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 2024
Public sitting
held on Monday 30 September 2024, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Salam presiding,
in the case concerning Land and Maritime Delimitation and Sovereignty over Islands
(Gabon/Equatorial Guinea)
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2024
Audience publique
tenue le lundi 30 septembre 2024, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Salam, président,
en l’affaire de la Délimitation terrestre et maritime et souveraineté sur des îles
(Gabon/Guinée équatoriale)
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
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Present: President Salam
Vice-President Sebutinde
Judges Tomka
Yusuf
Xue
Iwasawa
Nolte
Charlesworth
Brant
Gómez Robledo
Cleveland
Aurescu
Judges ad hoc Wolfrum
Pinto
Registrar Gautier

- 3 -
Présents : M. Salam, président
Mme Sebutinde, vice-présidente
MM. Tomka
Yusuf
Mme Xue
MM. Iwasawa
Nolte
Mme Charlesworth
MM. Brant
Gómez Robledo
Mme Cleveland
M. Aurescu, juges
M. Wolfrum
Mme Pinto, juges ad hoc
M. Gautier, greffier

- 4 -
The Government of the Gabonese Republic is represented by:
HE Mr Régis Onanga Ndiaye, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in charge of Sub-Regional Integration
and Gabonese Living Abroad;
HE Mr Paul-Marie Gondjout, Minister of Justice, Keeper of the Seals;
HE Ms Marie-Madeleine Mborantsuo, Honorary President of the Constitutional Court,
as Agent;
HE Mr Guy Rossatanga-Rignault, Secretary General of the Office of the President of the Republic,
as Co-Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
HE Mr Serge Mickoto Chavagne, Ambassador of the Gabonese Republic to the Kingdoms of
Belgium and the Netherlands, to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and to the European Union,
as Co-Agent;
Mr Ben Juratowitch, KC, member of the Bar of England and Wales, member of the Paris Bar, Essex
Court Chambers, London,
Ms Alina Miron, Professor of International Law, University of Angers, member of the Paris Bar,
Founding Partner of FAR Avocats,
Mr Daniel Müller, member of the Paris Bar, Founding Partner of FAR Avocats,
Mr Alain Pellet, Professor Emeritus, University Paris Nanterre, former Chairperson of the
International Law Commission, member and former President of the Institut de droit international,
Ms Isabelle Rouche, member of the Paris Bar, Asafo & Co.,
Ms Camille Strosser, member of the Paris Bar and of the Bar of the State of New York, Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
Mr Romain Piéri, member of the Paris Bar, Founding Partner of FAR Avocats,
Ms Élise Ruggeri Abonnat, Senior Lecturer, University of Lille,
Mr Ysam Soualhi, PhD candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Angers,
Mr David Swanson, David Swanson Cartography, LLC,
Mr Samir Moukheiber, trainee lawyer, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
as Counsel and Advocates.
- 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la République gabonaise est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Régis Onanga Ndiaye, ministre des affaires étrangères, chargé de l’intégration sousrégionale
et des Gabonais de l’étranger ;
S. Exc. M. Paul-Marie Gondjout, ministre de la justice, garde des sceaux ;
S. Exc. Mme Marie-Madeleine Mborantsuo, présidente honoraire de la Cour constitutionnelle,
comme agente ;
S. Exc. M. Guy Rossatanga-Rignault, secrétaire général de la présidence de la République,
comme coagent, conseil et avocat ;
S. Exc. M. Serge Mickoto Chavagne, ambassadeur de la République gabonaise près les Royaumes
de Belgique et des Pays-Bas, le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg et auprès de l’Union européenne,
comme coagent ;
M. Ben Juratowitch, KC, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles et du barreau de
Paris, Essex Court Chambers (Londres),
Mme Alina Miron, professeure de droit international à l’Université d’Angers, membre du barreau de
Paris, associée fondatrice du cabinet FAR Avocats,
M. Daniel Müller, membre du barreau de Paris, associé fondateur du cabinet FAR Avocats,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur émérite de l’Université Paris Nanterre, ancien président de la
Commission du droit international, membre et ancien président de l’Institut de droit international,
Mme Isabelle Rouche, membre du barreau de Paris, cabinet Asafo & Co.,
Mme Camille Strosser, membre des barreaux de Paris et de l’État de New York, cabinet Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
M. Romain Piéri, avocat au barreau de Paris, associé fondateur du cabinet FAR Avocats,
Mme Élise Ruggeri Abonnat, maîtresse de conférences, Université de Lille,
M. Ysam Soualhi, doctorant à la faculté de droit de l’Université d’Angers,
M. David Swanson, David Swanson Cartography, LLC,
M. Samir Moukheiber, avocat stagiaire, cabinet Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP,
comme conseils et avocats.
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The Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea is represented by:
HE Mr Domingo Mba Esono, Minister Delegate of Hydrocarbons and Mining Development,
as Agent;
HE Mr Carmelo Nvono Ncá, Ambassador of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the French
Republic, the Principality of Monaco and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization,
as Co-Agent;
HE Mr Simeón Oyono Esono Angué, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation
and Diaspora,
HE Mr Pastor Micha Ondó Bile, Adviser to the Presidency of the Government,
HE Mr Juan Olo Mba Nseng, Adviser to the Presidency of the Government,
HE Mr Rafael Boneke Kama, Adviser to the Presidency of the Government,
HE Mr Lamberto Esono Mba, Secretary General of the Ombudsman, Lawyer at the Malabo Bar
Association,
HE Ms Rosalía Nguidang Abeso, Director General of Borders, Lawyer at the Malabo Bar
Association,
HE Mr Pascual Nsue Eyi Asangono, Director General of Consular, Cultural, Legal and Diaspora
Affairs, Lawyer at the Malabo Bar Association,
HE Mr Miguel Oyono Ndong Mifumu, Ambassador of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the
Kingdom of Belgium,
Mr Francisco Moro Nve, State Attorney, member of the Malabo Bar Association,
Mr Aquiles Nach Dueso, Lawyer at the Malabo Bar Association,
HE Mr Domingo Esawong Ngua, official in the Ministry of National Defence,
Mr Asensi Buanga Beaka, official in the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Mining Development,
as Members of the Delegation;
Mr Derek C. Smith, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of the District of
Columbia,
HE Mr Anatolio Nzang Nguema Mangue, Attorney General of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea,
Lawyer at the Malabo Bar Association,
Mr Dapo Akande, Chichele Professor of Public International Law, University of Oxford, Barrister,
member of the Bar of England and Wales, Essex Court Chambers,
Mr Pierre d’Argent, Full Professor, Université catholique de Louvain, member of the Institut de droit
international, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of Brussels,
- 7 -
Le Gouvernement de la République de Guinée équatoriale est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Domingo Mba Esono, ministre délégué aux hydrocarbures et au développement minier,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Carmelo Nvono Ncá, ambassadeur de la République de Guinée équatoriale auprès de la
République française, de la Principauté de Monaco et de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour
l’éducation, la science et la culture,
comme coagent ;
S. Exc. M. Simeón Oyono Esono Angué, ministre d’État chargé des affaires étrangères, de la
coopération internationale et de la diaspora,
S. Exc. M. Pastor Micha Ondó Bile, conseiller auprès de la présidence du Gouvernement,
S. Exc. M. Juan Olo Mba Nseng, conseiller auprès de la présidence du Gouvernement,
S. Exc. M. Rafael Boneke Kama, conseiller auprès de la présidence du Gouvernement,
S. Exc. M. Lamberto Esono Mba, secrétaire général du bureau du défenseur des droits, juriste,
barreau de Malabo,
S. Exc. Mme Rosalía Nguidang Abeso, directrice générale des frontières, juriste, barreau de Malabo,
S. Exc. M. Pascual Nsue Eyi Asangono, directeur général des affaires consulaires, culturelles,
juridiques et de la diaspora, juriste, barreau de Malabo,
S. Exc. M. Miguel Oyono Ndong Mifumu, ambassadeur de la République de Guinée équatoriale
auprès du Royaume de Belgique,
M. Francisco Moro Nve, avocat de l’État, membre du barreau de Malabo,
M. Aquiles Nach Dueso, juriste, barreau de Malabo,
S. Exc. M. Domingo Esawong Ngua, fonctionnaire au ministère de la défense nationale,
M. Asensi Buanga Beaka, fonctionnaire au ministère des hydrocarbures et du développement minier,
comme membres de la délégation ;
M. Derek C. Smith, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau du district de Columbia,
S. Exc. M. Anatolio Nzang Nguema Mangue, procureur général de la République de Guinée
équatoriale, juriste, barreau de Malabo,
M. Dapo Akande, professeur de droit international public (chaire Chichele) à l’Université d’Oxford,
barrister, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles, Essex Court Chambers,
M. Pierre d’Argent, professeur titulaire à l’Université catholique de Louvain, membre de l’Institut
de droit international, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de Bruxelles,
- 8 -
Mr Andrew B. Loewenstein, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Ms Alison Macdonald, KC, Barrister, Essex Court Chambers, London,
Mr Yuri Parkhomenko, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of the District of
Columbia,
Ms Tafadzwa Pasipanodya, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District
of Columbia and the State of New York,
Mr Paul S. Reichler, Attorney at Law, 11 King’s Bench Walk, member of the Bars of the Supreme
Court of the United States and the District of Columbia,
Mr Philippe Sands, KC, Professor of International Law, University College London, Barrister,
11 King’s Bench Walk,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr Diego Cadena, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of Ecuador,
Ms Alejandra Torres Camprubí, Adjunct Professor on International Environmental Law, IE Law
School, member of the Madrid and Paris Bars,
Mr Baldomero Casado, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Texas and Madrid Bars,
Mr Coalter G. Lathrop, Sovereign Geographic, member of the Bar of North Carolina,
Mr Remi Reichhold, Barrister, 11 King’s Bench Walk,
Mr Peter Tzeng, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of Columbia
and the State of New York,
Ms Elena Sotnikova, Foley Hoag LLP,
Mr M. Arsalan Suleman, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of
Columbia and the State of New York,
as Counsel;
Ms Gretchen Sanchez, Foley Hoag LLP,
Ms Nancy Lopez, Foley Hoag LLP,
as Assistants.
- 9 -
M. Andrew B. Loewenstein, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau du
Commonwealth du Massachusetts,
Mme Alison Macdonald, KC, barrister, Essex Court Chambers (Londres),
M. Yuri Parkhomenko, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau du district de
Columbia,
Mme Tafadzwa Pasipanodya, avocate au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district
de Columbia et de l’État de New York,
M. Paul S. Reichler, avocat au cabinet 11 King’s Bench Walk, membre des barreaux de la Cour
suprême des États-Unis d’Amérique et du district de Columbia,
M. Philippe Sands, KC, professeur de droit international à l’University College London, barrister,
cabinet 11 King’s Bench Walk,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Diego Cadena, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de l’Équateur,
Mme Alejandra Torres Camprubí, professeure associée en droit international de l’environnement à la
faculté de droit de l’IE, membre des barreaux de Madrid et de Paris,
M. Baldomero Casado, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du Texas et de
Madrid,
M. Coalter G. Lathrop, Sovereign Geographic, membre du barreau de Caroline du Nord,
M. Remi Reichhold, barrister, cabinet 11 King’s Bench Walk,
M. Peter Tzeng, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de Columbia
et de l’État de New York,
Mme Elena Sotnikova, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP,
M. M. Arsalan Suleman, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de l’État de New York,
comme conseils ;
Mme Gretchen Sanchez, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP,
Mme Nancy Lopez, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP,
comme assistantes.
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The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open. For reasons made known to me,
Judges Abraham and Tladi are unable to sit with us today. For reasons made known to me as well,
Judge Bhandari is unable to be present on the Bench for the duration of these hearings.
Before we start our judicial proceedings today, I would first like to pay solemn tribute to the
memory of three esteemed former judges of the Court who sadly passed away in August:
Judges Vereshchetin and Elaraby, and Judge ad hoc Verhoeven.
Judge Vladlen Stepanovich Vereshchetin was a Member of the Court from 1995 to 2006.
Before joining the Bench, he enjoyed a distinguished and wide-ranging career in international law.
Having graduated with honours from the International Law Faculty of the Moscow Institute of
International Relations in 1954 and obtained his doctorate degree at the same Institute, he began his
professional career at the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1967, he was appointed
First Vice-Chairman and Legal Counsel of the Academy’s Council on International Cooperation in
relation to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space  also known as Intercosmos. He subsequently
became the Head of the International Law Department of the Academy of Sciences’ Institute of State
and Law. He was a renowned expert on the law of the sea and space law in particular, published
extensively and lectured at universities and institutes around the world. He was elected a member of
the International Law Commission in 1992 and became Chairman of the Commission in 1994, in
which position he remained until his election to the Court. As a Member of the Court, I am told by
my colleagues who had the privilege to work along with him, that he was a greatly respected jurist
and a charming peer. He invariably sought solutions with a sound conceptual and theoretical basis
while never overlooking the need to provide States parties in cases before the Court with a practical
and workable solution to their differences. This twofold objective underpinned each and every
opinion and declaration appended by him to the decisions of the Court. Above all, he was a modernminded
and independent thinker who yet thrived on collegial debate and interaction  qualities
which made his contribution to the work of the Court all the more precious. He leaves behind him a
lasting and illustrious legacy.
*
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Let me now pay tribute to our esteemed late colleague, Judge Nabil Elaraby, who was a
Member of the Court from 2001 to 2006. Prior to his election to the Court, Judge Elaraby pursued a
distinguished career as a diplomat and high-ranking Legal Adviser. After completing his law degree
at Cairo University in 1955 and subsequently obtaining his doctorate degree at New York University
Law School, Judge Elaraby took on various important posts within the Egyptian Government,
including serving as Ambassador for more than 20 years, including as the Permanent Representative
of Egypt to the United Nations, initially in Geneva, then in New York. In that capacity, during the
1990s, he was elected Vice-President of the General Assembly and served as President of the Security
Council. Judge Elaraby was a member of the International Law Commission and a member of
numerous United Nations committees. As a Member of the Court, he is remembered for his
intellectual rigour and great integrity, as well as for his warm and charismatic personality. He brought
to bear his extensive knowledge of law to the many multi-faceted cases under deliberation during his
time in office. Upon leaving the Court, Judge Elaraby acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in Egypt
in 2011 before being appointed that same year as Secretary-General of the Arab League, where he
served until 2016. Throughout his life, Judge Elaraby dedicated himself to international law and
justice with unwavering commitment  he will be sorely missed.
Permettez-moi de dire quelques mots au sujet du juge Joe Verhoeven, qui a siégé en qualité
de juge ad hoc en l’affaire des Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (République démocratique
du Congo c. Ouganda). Le juge Verhoeven a été professeur émérite à l’Université catholique de
Louvain et à l’Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas. Il a également été directeur de l’Institut des hautes
études internationales et secrétaire général de l’Institut de droit international. Pendant sa longue et
illustre carrière universitaire, il a publié de nombreux ouvrages marquants sur le droit international
et a été un conférencier très prisé auprès de diverses enceintes universitaires. En 2002, il a donné le
cours général de droit international public à l’Académie de droit international de La Haye, enseignant
de manière stimulante et dynamique, sans même avoir à consulter ses notes. Il a également pris part
à des procédures arbitrales internationales. À la Cour, le juge Verhoeven était grandement respecté
et apprécié par ses collègues, tant d’un point de vue professionnel que personnel. Son remarquable
esprit aiguisé et son professionnalisme, empreints de douceur et de modestie, resteront gravés dans
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nos mémoires. Il a été un juge exemplaire, un juriste international de premier plan et un enseignant
talentueux qui a enrichi la vie de tous ceux qui ont eu la chance de le côtoyer.
*
En mon nom et au nom des membres de la Cour, du greffier et de tous les fonctionnaires du
Greffe, permettez-moi d’adresser nos sincères condoléances à la famille et aux proches des juges
Vereshchetin et Elaraby et du juge ad hoc Verhoeven. Véritables sources d’inspiration et fidèles à
leurs principes, chacun d’entre eux a consacré sa vie, à sa façon, au droit international et à bâtir un
monde meilleur pour les générations à venir.
I invite you now to stand and observe a minute of silence in their memory.
[The Court observed a minute of silence.]
I shall now turn to the judicial proceedings before the Court today. The Court meets this
morning and will meet in the coming few days to hear the oral arguments of the Parties on the merits
in the case concerning Land and Maritime Delimitation and Sovereignty over Islands
(Gabon/Equatorial Guinea).
I note that, in addition to interpretation from and into the Court’s two official languages,
English and French, interpretation from Spanish is available, in accordance with specific
arrangements made at the request of Equatorial Guinea.
Since the Court does not include upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of either of the
Parties, both Parties have availed themselves of the right, under Article 31, paragraph 3, of the
Statute, to choose a judge ad hoc. Gabon chose Ms Mónica Pinto and Equatorial Guinea, Mr Rüdiger
Wolfrum.
Article 20 of the Statute provides that “[e]very Member of the Court shall, before taking up
his duties, make a solemn declaration in open court that he will exercise his powers impartially and
conscientiously”. Pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 6, of the Statute, that same provision applies to
judges ad hoc. Notwithstanding that Mr Wolfrum has been a judge ad hoc and made a solemn
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declaration in a previous case, Article 8, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court provides that he must
make a further solemn declaration in the present case.
Before inviting Mr Wolfrum and Ms Pinto to make their solemn declarations, I shall first, in
accordance with custom, say a few words about their careers and qualifications.
Mr Wolfrum, of German nationality, studied law at the Universities of Bonn and Tübingen
and subsequently obtained his doctorate degree in international law from the University of Bonn in
1973. During his illustrious academic career, spanning over thirty years, he first taught national
public law and international public law at the faculties of the Universities of Mainz and Kiel in the
1980s and 1990s. From 1993 to 2012, he was Professor at the Faculty of Law at Heidelberg
University, as well as Director of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law. He was subsequently appointed Managing Director of the Max Planck Foundation
for International Peace and the Rule of Law, of which he is currently an Honorary Director.
Alongside his distinguished career as a scholar, Mr Wolfrum has extensive judicial experience,
having served as a judge at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea from 1996 to 2017,
during which time he was elected by his colleagues to serve as Vice-President and as President. He
has also been chosen as a judge ad hoc in the case concerning Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899
(Guyana v. Venezuela), currently pending before the Court. Mr Wolfrum, in addition, is an
experienced arbitrator, having been a member of numerous international arbitral tribunals, as well as
sitting on the Timor Sea Conciliation Commission between Timor-Leste and Australia.
Mr Wolfrum is a member of the Institut de droit international. He is the recipient of a great
many academic awards and has published widely, covering in an authoritative manner diverse areas
of international law, as well as national and comparative public law.
Mme Pinto, de nationalité argentine, a étudié le droit à l’Université de Buenos Aires, où elle a
obtenu son doctorat en droit en 1983. En 1994, elle est devenue professeure de droit international
public à la même université, avant d’occuper le poste de doyenne de la faculté de droit de 2010 à
2018. Elle est aujourd’hui professeure émérite et directrice du programme de maîtrise en droit
international des droits de l’homme à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Buenos Aires. En 2007,
elle a enseigné à l’Académie de droit international de La Haye, et a été invitée à y dispenser le cours
général à l’occasion de la session d’hiver de l’année à venir — 2025. Mme Pinto a également été
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professeure invitée à la Columbia Law School, à l’Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas, à l’Université
Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, et à l’Université de Rouen. En dehors de son travail universitaire,
Mme Pinto a acquis une vaste expérience en tant que praticienne. Elle a participé à des procédures
devant la Cour et divers organes des droits de l’homme, en tant que conseil et avocate. Elle a
également été arbitre et est membre de divers comités ad hoc d’annulation, dans le domaine des
investissements internationaux, devant le Centre international pour le règlement des différends
relatifs aux investissements (CIRDI). Elle a été juge et présidente du Tribunal administratif de la
Banque mondiale et juge et présidente du Tribunal administratif de la Banque interaméricaine de
développement. Elle a également occupé le poste de vice-présidente et de membre de la Commission
consultative pour l’examen des candidatures de la Cour pénale internationale. Depuis 2022, elle est
membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage.
Mme Pinto est membre de l’Institut de droit international. Elle s’est vu décerner de nombreux
prix et distinctions, dont des doctorats honorifiques. Elle est l’auteure de nombreuses publications
renommées en droit international. Elle a également rédigé plusieurs rapports pour les Nations Unies
en sa qualité de rapporteuse spéciale sur l’indépendance des juges et des avocats et d’experte
indépendante sur la situation des droits de l’homme au Guatemala et au Tchad.
I shall now invite Mr Wolfrum to make the solemn declaration prescribed by the Statute, and
I request all those present to rise.
Mr WOLFRUM: Thank you, Mr President.
“I solemnly declare that I will perform my duties and exercise my powers as judge
honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously.”
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr Wolfrum. J’invite maintenant Mme Pinto à faire la
déclaration solennelle prescrite par le Statut.
Mme PINTO :
« Je déclare solennellement que je remplirai mes devoirs, exercerai mes
attributions de juge en tout honneur et dévouement, en pleine et parfaite impartialité et
en toute conscience. »
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The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ms Pinto. Please be seated. I take note of the solemn
declaration made by Mr Wolfrum and Ms Pinto and declare them duly installed as judges ad hoc in
the case.
*
Je vais à présent retracer les principales étapes de la procédure en l’espèce.
Le 5 mars 2021, la République de Guinée équatoriale a officiellement notifié à la Cour le
« compromis entre la République gabonaise et la République de Guinée équatoriale » signé à
Marrakech le 15 novembre 2016, par lequel la République gabonaise et la République de Guinée
équatoriale sont convenues de soumettre à la Cour un différend les opposant sur la « délimitation de
leurs frontières maritime et terrestre communes » et sur la « souveraineté sur les îles Mbanié,
Cocotiers et Conga ».
Par ordonnance du 7 avril 2021, la Cour, eu égard aux dispositions du compromis relatives
aux pièces de procédure et à l’accord conclu entre les Parties quant à l’ordre dans lequel elles
souhaitaient déposer leurs premières pièces, a fixé au 5 octobre 2021 et au 5 mai 2022,
respectivement, les dates d’expiration des délais pour le dépôt d’un mémoire par la Guinée
équatoriale et d’un contre-mémoire par le Gabon. Le mémoire et le contre-mémoire ont été déposés
dans les délais ainsi fixés.
Par ordonnance du 6 mai 2022… Bon, je crois qu’il y a un problème de traduction.
Excusez-moi, on va s’arrêter quelques instants pour s’assurer que la traduction est rétablie. C’est
bon ? Excusez-moi, il paraît que c’est bon maintenant.
Par ordonnance du 6 mai 2022, la Cour a fixé au 5 octobre 2022 et au 6 mars 2023,
respectivement, les dates d’expiration des délais pour le dépôt d’une réplique par la Guinée
équatoriale et d’une duplique par le Gabon. La réplique et la duplique ont été déposées dans les délais
ainsi fixés.
After ascertaining the views of the Parties, the Court decided, pursuant to Article 53,
paragraph 2, of its Rules, that copies of the written pleadings and the documents annexed thereto
would be made accessible to the public on the opening of the oral proceedings. In accordance with
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the Court’s practice, the pleadings and documents annexed will be put on the Court’s website from
today.
*
I note the presence at the hearing of the Agents, counsel and advocates of both Parties. In
accordance with the arrangements for the organization of the proceedings which have been decided
by the Court, the hearings will comprise a first and a second round of oral argument. The first round
of oral argument will begin today, with the statement of Equatorial Guinea, and will close on
Wednesday 2 October, following Gabon’s first round of oral argument. Each Party has been allocated
a period of five hours for the first round. The second round of oral argument will begin on the
afternoon of Thursday 3 October and come to a close on Friday 4 October. Each Party will have a
maximum of three hours to present its reply.
In this first sitting, Equatorial Guinea may, if required, avail itself of a short extension beyond
1 p.m., in view of the time taken up by the opening part of these oral proceedings.
I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr Domingo Mba Esono, Agent of Equatorial Guinea.
You have the floor Sir.
Mr MBA ESONO:
SPEECH OF THE AGENT OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA
[English translation provided by Equatorial Guinea]
1. Mr President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is a great honour and privilege for me
to appear before you on behalf of my country.
2. On 5 March 2021, Equatorial Guinea submitted the present dispute to the Court, formally
notifying it of the Special Agreement concluded with Gabon on 15 November 2016.
3. Equatorial Guinea appears before the Court in a spirit of friendship towards Gabon, and
with the desire to strengthen the bilateral relationship, based on mutual respect, good
neighbourliness, and the rule of law. We are convinced that the Court’s judgment will help our
countries resolve their outstanding disputes over sovereignty and borders, laying a sustainable
foundation for their relations to flourish.
- 17 -
4. The dispute submitted to the Court arose in 1972, twelve years after Gabon’s independence
and four years after Equatorial Guinea’s. That year, Gabon, for the first time, changed its position
and claimed the island of Mbañe, in Corisco Bay. In August 1972, Gabon, with the use of force,
invaded this territory under Equatoguinean sovereignty, occupying it illegally ever since.
5. Shortly thereafter, in 1974, Gabon for the first time contested the land border established
decades ago by the colonial powers of both countries, again invading our territory, this time on the
western bank of the Kie River.
6. The purpose of Gabon’s conduct is clear: to nullify the territorial situation existing at the
time of the independence of both nations.
7. In response to Gabon’s illegal occupation of Mbañe and the assertion of other territorial
claims, Equatorial Guinea refrained from using force to recover its sovereign territory. Instead, my
country has committed itself to resolve its dispute with Gabon peacefully, based exclusively on
international law.
8. Regrettably, Equatorial Guinea’s diplomatic efforts between 1972 and 2003 did not produce
any results.
9. Then, in May 2003, at a meeting of the ad hoc Border Commission between the two
countries, Gabon suddenly invoked, for the first time, what it claimed was a “Convention on the
demarcation of the land and maritime borders of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, signed in Bata on
12 September 1974 between President Macías and President Bongo.”
10. Not once until then had Gabon mentioned such a document — neither during negotiations
between the Parties, nor when the two countries granted permits for oil exploration and exploitation
in Corisco Bay or asserted maritime claims and fixed their maritime borders with third States.
11. The document presented by Gabon in May 2003 took the members of the Equatorial
Guinea delegation completely by surprise. None of them had seen or heard of this so-called
“Agreement”.
12. Moreover, the document submitted was not an original, but merely an unauthenticated
photocopy. The Equatoguinean representatives asked Gabon to submit the original Spanish and
French versions of the document. Gabon replied that it did not have the original document. For its
part, Equatorial Guinea questioned the legitimacy of the document and insisted that Gabon submit
- 18 -
an original and authenticated version of it. Since then, more than 20 years have passed, Gabon has
not submitted anything.
13. Gabon’s insistence on this document prevented the Parties from reaching an agreement.
Equatorial Guinea then proposed to submit the dispute to the Court for a final resolution. Gabon
refused.
14. In July 2003, the Parties requested the mediation of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations. He appointed Mr Yves Fortier as mediator, and mediation sessions were held in
2003, 2004 and 2006. Again, no agreement was reached.
15. Subsequently, at the initiative of Equatorial Guinea once again, the Parties agreed to
explore the possibility of submitting the matter to the Court. In June 2008, the mediation entered into
a new phase, aimed at defining the terms of the Parties’ Special Agreement before the Court. With
the assistance of United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and his special adviser and
mediator, Nicolas Michel of Switzerland, the Parties negotiated this issue between 2009 and 2016.
16. Equatorial Guinea proposed to empower the Court to definitively resolve all aspects of the
dispute between the Parties, from the determination of sovereignty over the islands of Mbañe,
Cocoteros and Conga, to the delimitation of their land and maritime borders. Gabon, once again,
objected.
17. Finally, in 2016, the Parties reached an agreement on the Special Agreement. However,
the most that Gabon agreed to was to refer to the Court the question of which legal titles apply to
determine sovereignty over the disputed islands and the land and maritime boundaries. Given the
circumstances, Equatorial Guinea agreed to grant the Court jurisdiction to identify the applicable
legal titles.
18. On 15 November 2016, the Presidents of both countries signed the Special Agreement,
which, in its Article 1, requests the Court to determine whether the legal titles, treaties and
international conventions invoked by the Parties have the force of law between them, in so far as
they relate to sovereignty over the islands of Mbañe, Cocoteros and Conga and to the delimitation of
their common land and maritime boundaries.
19. In its written submissions, Equatorial Guinea has established the existence and
applicability of its legal titles, treaties and conventions applicable to the sovereignty and delimitation
- 19 -
disputes between the Parties. Gabon has offered nothing to refute the extensive evidence provided
by Equatorial Guinea.
20. Instead, ignoring the irrefutable evidence presented by my country, Gabon continues to
invoke the unauthenticated 2003 document as the dominant legal title to, among other things, the
territory and islands that Gabon forcibly took from Equatorial Guinea in 1972.
21. Mr President, Members of the Court, Equatorial Guinea respectfully considers that
Gabon’s position is factually and legally untenable, as its distinguished counsel will demonstrate
today:
(a) At the outset, Dr Smith will summarize the dispute that brings us before you today.
(b) Next, Professor d’Argent will demonstrate that the Court is competent to determine all applicable
legal titles, including those arising under international law by effect of the principle of succession
of States; and that Gabon is wrong to assert that Article 1 of the Special Agreement limits the
Court’s jurisdiction to determining only the applicability of legal titles that take the form of
written documents, such as treaties and conventions.
(c) Following that, Professor Sands and Mr Parkhomenko will demonstrate that the unauthenticated
2003 document has no force of law between the parties and does not establish any title.
(d) Then — and this will conclude the morning session — Mr Reichler will address the legal titles
to the islands of Mbañe, Cocoteros and Conga, showing that the applicable title belongs to
Equatorial Guinea on the basis of its succession to Spain in 1968; and that Gabon, and France
before Gabon, never had title to these islands.
(e) The afternoon session will begin with Professor Akande, who will address the importance of the
1900 Convention, which both Parties recognize as a valid source of legal title to determine
sovereignty over the disputed territory.
(f) Afterwards, Mr Loewenstein, Ms Pasipanodya and HE Mr Nzang Nguema will address the legal
titles applicable to the various parts of the land boundary.
(g) And to conclude the first round of presentations by Equatorial Guinea, Ms MacDonald will
address the titles applicable to the maritime boundaries.
22. Mr President: Equatorial Guinea hopes and trusts that, by identifying the applicable legal
titles, the Court’s Judgment will enable our two States to resolve their dispute in a definitive manner.
- 20 -
23. With this I conclude my presentation. Mr President, Members of the Court, I thank you for
your kind attention and ask that you call Professor Derek Smith to the lectern.
The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency Mr Domingo Mba Esono, Agent of Equatorial
Guinea, for his statement. I now invite Mr Derek Smith to take the floor. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr SMITH:
THE ORIGIN OF THE PARTIES’ SOVEREIGNTY
AND BOUNDARY DISPUTE
1. Thank you. Mr President, Madam Vice-President, Members of the Court, it is my great
honour to be before you on behalf of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.
2. I will address today the origin of the sovereignty and boundary dispute between Equatorial
Guinea and Gabon. This will provide the context for the Court’s decision on the issues that the Parties
have decided to put before you in Article 1 of the Special Agreement.
3. I will start with “the ‘photograph’ of the territorial situation” existing at independence, to
use the Court’s words from Burkina Faso v. Mali1. You can see this photograph on the screen now
and in your folders at tab 2. This map shows the territorial situation at the independence of the Parties.
The Spanish territories, noted in red, included Bioko Island, Annobón Island, and all of the islands
in Corisco Bay, as well as the continental region of Rio Muni.
4. The evidence shows that, at the time of Gabon’s independence, Spain and France had no
territorial disputes, and Gabon and Spain equally had no territorial disputes at the time of Equatorial
Guinea’s independence in 1968. At the moment of decolonization, the territorial relationship was
settled.
5. In the continental region, seen on the next map, Spain and France delimited the boundary
in their 1900 Convention and through adjustments made in accordance with Article 8 and Appendix 1
of that Convention. The territorial situation was not in dispute when Gabon and Equatorial Guinea
attained their independence and succeeded to the colonial legal titles. Indeed, as Mr Nzang
1 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 568, para. 30.
- 21 -
Nguema Mangue will discuss this afternoon, outside these proceedings, Gabon and Equatorial
Guinea continue to respect this boundary today.
6. In addition to its continental territory, Spain held undisputed legal title to ten islands off the
west African coast2: these islands, as you can see on the screen, included all eight of the islands in
Corisco Bay. Looking at the map on the screen, the Corisco Bay islands are, going from north to
south, the larger islands of Elobey Chico, Elobey Grande and Corisco as well as the islets of Leva,
Hoco, Mbañe, Cocoteros and Conga. As Mr Reichler will discuss later this morning, Spain acquired
title to these islands in the nineteenth century and maintained it until the independence of Equatorial
Guinea in 19683. France, for its part, did not hold title to or even claim any of the islands in the
region, and it expressly recognized Spain’s title to all ten islands, including, importantly, the islands
in Corisco Bay4. The evidence further shows that following its independence, Gabon accepted
Spain’s sovereignty over all of these islands and later accepted Equatorial Guinea’s acquisition of
Spain’s legal titles by succession5.
7. Despite its international law obligations to respect this inherited situation, Gabon began
efforts to alter the territorial map in 1970, after Spain had withdrawn its armed forces that protected
Equatorial Guinea, and after oil companies had reported significant hydrocarbon prospects in the
maritime areas adjacent to Mbañe, Cocoteros and Conga.
8. Gabon made its first move in May 1970 by unilaterally expanding the northern limits of the
Libreville Marin petroleum concession6. As you can see on the map on the screen, Gabon awarded
this concession in 1967, and reissued it in 1969, and when it did this it respected the equidistance
line between its continental coast and the Spanish and Equatoguinean Corisco Bay islands. This
equidistance line was constructed using Spanish basepoints on Mbañe, Cocoteros and Conga7. But,
as you can see on the next map showing new limits to Gabon’s concession, just one year later, Gabon
2 Memorial of Equatorial Guinea (“MEG”), Vol. I, paras. 6.10-6.16; Reply of Equatorial Guinea (“REG”), Vol. I,
paras. 4.8-4.43.
3 MEG, Vol. I, paras. 6.11-6.12; REG, Vol. I, para 4.44.
4 MEG, Vol. I, paras. 6.12-6-14, 3.17, 3.19, 3.26, 3.32-3.33; REG, Vol. I, paras. 4.4, 4.9-4.33.
5 MEG, Vol. I, paras. 3.85-3.101; REG, Vol. I, paras. 4.37-4.42.
6 MEG, Vol. I, para. 4.3.
7 MEG, Vol. I, para. 3.98.
- 22 -
radically changed its position, encroaching on Equatorial Guinea’s territorial sea8 and affecting half
of the southernmost block of Equatorial Guinea’s petroleum exploration permits.
9. Next, on 12 August 1970, Gabon extended its territorial sea from 12 nautical miles to
25 nautical miles9 and further confirmed this extension in October 197010. This claim drew objections
from Equatorial Guinea and many other States, including the United States, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands and the Soviet Union11.
10. But those objections did not deter Gabon. In January 1972, Gabon further extended its
territorial sea from 25 nautical miles to 30 nautical miles to arrogate even more maritime areas in,
and beyond, Corisco Bay12.
11. Gabon’s increasingly aggressive claims raised serious concerns for Equatorial Guinea, and
to address them, the Parties met in March 1972. It was during these meetings that Gabon, for the first
time, claimed sovereignty over islands in Corisco Bay13. Gabon confirmed its recognition of
Equatorial Guinea’s sovereignty over Corisco, Elobey Grande and Elobey Chico14. But with respect
to the Corisco dependencies, Gabon suddenly alleged that Mbañe, Cocoteros and Conga were
Gabon’s territory15. It justified this new claim by asserting that the islets are “located on the
8 The Gabonese Republic, Decree 689/70 (14 May 1970). MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 184.
9 MEG, Vol. I, para. 4.4; Telegram from the US Embassy in Libreville to the US Department of State (13 August
1970), p. 1. MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 152; Letter from the Ambassador of Spain in Libreville to the Spanish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (18 August 1970), p. 1. MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 153; Cable from UN to Permanent Missions (14 September
1970), enclosing Communication from Mr Manadou D’Niaye, Charge d’Affaires of the Republic of Gabon to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations Announcing the Extension of Gabonese Territorial Waters by Presidential Decree
(20 August 1970), p. 1. MEG, Vol. III, Annex 22; Airgram from the US Department of State regarding Protest of Gabon’s
Extension of Territorial Waters (12 November 1970), p. 1. MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 156.
10 MEG, Vol. I, para. 4.4; The Gabonese Republic, Order No. 55-70-PR-MTAC (5 October 1970), p. 1. MEG,
Vol. VI, Annex 187.
11 Telegram from the US Embassy in Libreville to the US Department of State (13 August 1970), p. 1. MEG,
Vol. VI, Annex 152; Letter from the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations to the
UN Secretary-General (14 October 1970), p. 1. MEG, Vol. III, Annex 24; MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 157, p. 1; Permanent
Mission of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the United Nations, Statement Before the United Nations Security Council
by His Excellency Mr Jesus Alfonso Oyono Alogo (September 1972) (excerpt), p. 3. MEG, Vol. III, Annex 28.
12 MEG, Vol. I, para. 4.7; Airgram No. A-011 from the Embassy of the United States to the Gabonese Republic to
the US Department of State (8 February 1972), p. 1. MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 159; Letter from the Permanent Representative
of the Gabonese Republic to the United Nations to the UN Secretary-General (1 March 1972), p. 3. MEG, Vol. III,
Annex 25.
13 MEG, Vol. I, para. 4.7.
14 Report Prepared by the Gabon-Equatorial Guinea Joint Commission After the Meeting in Libreville from
March 25 to 29, 1972, Libreville (25-29 March 1972), p. 51. MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 199.
15 MEG, Vol. I, para. 4.7.
- 23 -
continental shelf . . . constituting the natural extension of the Gabonese territory”16. That is the only
argument Gabon had for its sovereignty. Equatorial Guinea reminded Gabon that its claim was
inconsistent with Gabon’s prior recognition of Spain’s — and then Equatorial Guinea’s —
sovereignty over these islands17. Gabon must have known that it was reversing the position that it,
and France before it, had held for over 100 years. Against the background of Gabon’s new claims
and the sovereignty dispute it created, the Parties agreed to refrain from further unilateral action in
the disputed area18.
12. Gabon did not wait long before breaching this agreement. In July 1972 — for the third
time in less than two years — Gabon extended its territorial sea from 30 nautical miles to 100 nautical
miles19. Equatorial Guinea and other States, of course, protested again20.
13. These exorbitant maritime claims were not enough for Gabon. The following month, on
26 August 1972, Gabon sent its military forces to seize and occupy Mbañe Island21 and reasserted its
claim that this island was part of Gabon’s territory. Gabon misleadingly seeks to downplay this
16 Report Prepared by the Gabon-Equatorial Guinea Joint Commission After the Meeting in Libreville from March
25 to 29, 1972, Libreville (25-29 March 1972), p. 5. MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 199.
17 Report Prepared by the Gabon-Equatorial Guinea Joint Commission After the Meeting in Libreville from
March 25 to 29, 1972, Libreville (25-29 March 1972), pp. 1, 5-6. MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 199; Minutes Drawn up by the
Gabonese-EquatoGuinean Delegation Following the Meeting in Libreville from March 25-29, 1971[2], Libreville
(29 March 197[2]), p. 3. MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 197.
18 MEG, Vol. I, para. 4.7; Minutes of the Joint Gabon-Equatorial Guinea Commission’s Meeting in Libreville
(25-29 March 1972), pp. 3, 8, points 2.1, 8.2. MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 198.
19 MEG, Vol. I, para. 4.8; Letter from the Ambassador of the Gabonese Republic to the United Nations to the
UN Secretary-General (28 August 1972), p. 1. MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 161; The Gabonese Republic, Ordonnance No. 58/72
Extending the Outer Limit of Gabon’s Territorial Waters to 100 Nautical Miles (16 July 1972), p. 3, art. 1. MEG, Vol. VI,
Annex 188; Telegram No. 546 from the Embassy of the United States to the Gabonese Republic to the US Department of
State (2 September 1972), p. 1. MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 162.
20 The Gabonese Republic, Ordonnance No. 58/72 Extending the Outer Limit of Gabon’s Territorial Waters to
100 Nautical Miles (16 July 1972), p. 3. MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 188; Letter from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of
Equatorial Guinea to the United Nations to the Permanent Missions and Offices of Permanent Observers to the
United Nations (5 September 1972). MEG, Vol. III, Annex 26; Telegram No. 190230 from the US Department of State to
the Embassies of the United States of America to the Gabonese Republic, the United Kingdom, The French Republic, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Japan, the United Nations, and The United Republic of Cameroon (18 October 1972),
p. 1. MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 170; Telegram No. 282 from the Embassy of the United States of America to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands to the US Department of State (26 October 1972). MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 171.
21 MEG, Vol. I, para. 4.9; Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the
United Nations to the UN Secretary General (11 September 1972). MEG, Vol. III, Annex 27; Permanent Mission of the
Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the United Nations, Statement Before the United Nations Security Council by His
Excellency Mr Jesus Alfonso Oyono Alogo (September 1972). MEG, Vol. III, Annex 28; Telegram from Equatorial
Guinea’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the
United Nations (11 September 1972). MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 164; Telegram No. 644 from the Embassy of the United States
of America to the Gabonese Republic to the US Department of State (11 September 1972). MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 165;
REG, Vol. I, para. 3.3.
- 24 -
territorial conquest, calling it a police action22, but this was blatant armed aggression undertaken with
the intention to acquire the sovereign territory of another State.
14. On 11 September 1972, Equatorial Guinea brought Gabon’s violation of Equatorial
Guinea’s territorial sovereignty to the United Nations Security Council23. To avoid Security Council
action, Gabon agreed to submit the dispute to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) for
mediation24. Nevertheless, shortly after the Parties’ agreement on 17 September 1972 to “settle their
dispute . . . by peaceful means”25, the Gabonese President made clear that he would not respect the
request of the mediators to withdraw his troops from Mbañe, pending resolution of the dispute. “I
am here, and I am staying here”26, he stated.
15. On 13 November 1972, in Brazzaville, with the assistance from the OAU mediators, the
Parties signed a Joint Communiqué, agreed to “the neutralization of the disputed zone in the Corisco
Bay” and to the delimitation of their maritime boundary by an ad hoc OAU commission27. But Gabon
refused to withdraw its troops from Mbañe and continued to assert a right to the territory it had
illegally seized.
16. Gabon’s military aggression did not end there. In June 1974, less than two years after
invading Mbañe, Gabon sent troops across the Kie River boundary in the north-east of Equatorial
Guinea’s continental territory near the city of Ebebiyin28. The title to this area was held by Spain
22 Counter-Memorial of Gabon (“CMG”), Vol. I, paras. 6, 2.49, 2.50.
23 MEG, Vol. I, para. 4.10; Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the
United Nations to the UN Secretary General (11 September 1972). MEG, Vol. III, Annex 27; Permanent Mission of the
Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the United Nations, Statement Before the United Nations Security Council by His
Excellency Mr Jesus Alfonso Oyono Alogo (September 1972). MEG, Vol. III, Annex 28.
24 MEG, Vol. I, para. 4.10; Routine Telegram No. 434 from Kinshasa (15 September 1972). MEG, Vol. VI,
Annex 167; Letter from Gabon to Secretary of the United Nations (13 September 1972). MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 166.
25 Conference of the Heads of State and Government of Central and East Africa, Dar es Salaam, 7-9 September
1972, Joint Communiqué on the Work of the Conference on Settlement of the Dispute Between Equatorial Guinea and
Gabon, as recorded by the Embassy of the United States to the Republic of Zaire (18 September 1972). MEG, Vol. VII,
Annex 200.
26 “Gabon-Equatorial Guinea: Next Meeting on 30 September,” Fraternité Matin : Le Grand Quotidien Ivoirien
News (20 September 1972). MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 228; see also MEG, Vol. I, para. 4.11; Telegram from US Embassy in
Libreville to US Department of State (19 September 1972), p. 2. MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 168; Letter from the Embassy of
Spain in Abidjan to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Madrid (30 September 1972). MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 169; News
Article, “Dateline Africa: Gabon Frontier Dispute Settled,” West Africa (29 September 1972). MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 229.
27 Conference of the Heads of State and Government of Central and East Africa, Second Session, Final
Communiqué Regarding the Dispute Between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon (13 November 1972), p. 2. MEG, Vol. VII,
Annex 201.
28 REG, Vol. I, paras. 3.4, 5.76; Message Text from the US Department of State EO Systematic concerning
Equatorial Guinea-Gabon Land Border Problem (20 June 2005), p. 2. REG, Vol. IV, Annex 52.
- 25 -
pursuant to the 1900 Convention and the 1919 Governors’ Agreement29, and then by Equatorial
Guinea as the successor State30. Under international pressure, Gabon withdrew from the Kie River
area. But, true to President Bongo’s words, Gabon stayed on Mbañe Island. In the image on the
screen from 2022, taken from Gabon’s pleadings, you can see the installation Gabon has built on
Mbañe to consolidate its 50-year occupation of Equatorial Guinea’s territory31.
17. As the Agent of Equatorial Guinea noted, since 1972, the invasion of Mbañe has been at
the heart of the dispute between the Parties, and this is the principal reason we are before you today.
All of Equatorial Guinea’s prior efforts to find a peaceful resolution to this dispute have been stymied
by Gabon’s insistence that it acquired legal title to Mbañe after its invasion.
18. Now that the Parties are finally before the highest international judicial body to help
resolve this dispute, Equatorial Guinea simply requests the Court to affirm the legal titles conferred
on the Party by succession at independence. For its part, Gabon, alleging a dubious legal title, asks
the Court to change the territorial situation at independence and legitimate its acquisition of another
State’s sovereign territory by military force.
19. Mr President, Madam Vice-President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your kind
attention. May I request, Mr President, that you call Professor d’Argent to the podium. Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Derek Smith. J’appelle maintenant à la barre le professeur Pierre
d’Argent. Vous avez la parole.
M. D’ARGENT : Merci, Monsieur le président.
29 MEG, Vol. I, paras. 3.67-3.69, 6.36; Letter from the Governor-General of Spanish Territories of Africa to the
Governor of French Gabon (22 November 1917), pp. 2-3. MEG, Vol. IV, Annex 65; Letter from French Minister of
Colonies to Minister of Foreign Affairs (24 November 1919), pp. 2-3. MEG, Vol. IV, Annex 68; Letter No. []3 from the
Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa to the Governor-General of the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea
(24 January 1919), p. 1. MEG, Vol. IV, Annex 66; Letter from Spanish Governor General of Spanish Guinea to His
Excellency the French Governor General of French Equatorial Africa (1 May 1919), p. 7. MEG, Vol. IV, Annex 67; REG,
Vol. I, paras. 5.51-5.61.
30 MEG, Vol. I, para. 6.1.
31 CMG, Vol. II, Annex P4 (Aerial view of Mbanié Island from the northwest, taken on 17 March 2022, at 9:58 a.m.
at low tide).
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LA PORTÉE DU COMPROMIS
1. Monsieur le président, Madame la vice-présidente, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges : c’est
toujours un honneur de prendre la parole devant la Cour et c’est un honneur particulier de le faire, ce
matin, au soutien de la Guinée équatoriale.
2. Il me revient d’aborder la question de la portée du compromis du 15 novembre 2016 dont
vous trouverez le texte intégral, ainsi que la traduction anglaise établie par le Greffe, sous
l’onglet no 3.1 de votre dossier d’audience.
3. D’emblée, je tiens à souligner, comme notre agent l’a rappelé, que la mission confiée à la
Cour par le compromis ne consiste pas à tracer la frontière terrestre ou maritime entre les Parties, pas
plus qu’à dire pour droit qui, de la Guinée équatoriale ou du Gabon, est souverain sur les îles de
Mbanié, Cocotiers et Conga. Le Gabon a consacré une grande partie de ses écritures à cette
question32, comme si la Guinée équatoriale attendait de la Cour qu’elle outrepasse les termes clairs
du compromis. Cela n’a jamais été le cas et je ne m’attarderai donc pas davantage sur ce point au
sujet duquel il n’y a en réalité aucune divergence entre Parties.
4. Mais comme vous le savez, les Parties s’opposent toutefois au sujet des « titres juridiques »
qu’elles peuvent invoquer dans le cadre du présent différend et au sujet desquels la Cour est appelée
à statuer : le Gabon soutient que seuls des titres documentaires, tels que des traités et des conventions,
peuvent vous être présentés et que la Cour ne peut pas se prononcer sur l’applicabilité d’un titre
juridique invoqué par une Partie si ce titre ne se présente pas sous la forme d’un document33 ; la
Guinée équatoriale soutient que cette lecture restrictive du compromis est erronée car il résulte
clairement de son article premier qu’en plus des titres manifestés par un instrumentum documentaire,
chaque Partie peut soumettre à votre examen tout titre juridique qui, selon elle, fonde sa souveraineté
sur les trois îles, ou délimite les droits de chaque Partie au sujet de la frontière terrestre ou de la
frontière maritime.
5. J’aborderai cette question qui divise les Parties en rappelant tout d’abord que la notion de
« titres juridiques » doit se comprendre au regard de la mission confiée par le compromis à la
Cour (I). Dans un deuxième temps, j’exposerai tout à la fois les errements interprétatifs du Gabon et
32 Contre-mémoire de la République gabonaise (ci-après, « CMG »), par. 5.5-5.62.
33 Ibid., par. 5.69.
- 27 -
la correcte interprétation du compromis (II). Et je terminerai, dans un troisième temps, en abordant
la place de la succession d’États, des effectivités, de la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de
la mer et de certaines règles de droit coutumier dans les soumissions de la Guinée équatoriale (III).
I. Les titres juridiques invoqués par les Parties
et la mission de la Cour
6. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges : pour comprendre le sens des
termes « titres juridiques » qui apparaissent, au pluriel, aux paragraphes 1 et 4 de l’article premier du
compromis, il faut revenir à la mission confiée à la Cour. Et cette mission consiste  je cite
l’article premier, paragraphe 1, du compromis  à « dire si les titres juridiques, traités et conventions
internationales invoqués par les Parties font droit dans les relations entre [elles] s’agissant de la
délimitation de leurs frontières maritime et terrestre communes et de la souveraineté sur les îles
Mbanié, Cocotiers et Conga » (les italiques sont de nous).
7. Au regard de la mission ainsi confiée à la Cour, le paragraphe 4 de l’article premier consacre
quant à lui « le droit » de chaque Partie, au cours de la procédure, « d’invoquer d’autres titres
juridiques » (les italiques sont de nous) que ceux mentionnés aux paragraphes 2 et 3 de
l’article premier, lesquels explicitent, respectivement pour le Gabon et pour la Guinée équatoriale,
les ou la convention(s) que chaque Partie, en ce qui la concerne, « reconnaît comme applicable[s] au
différend ». Ces paragraphes 2 et 3 sont introduits par les mots « [à] cette fin », c’est-à-dire qu’ils
énoncent dans le compromis les conventions qui sont d’ores et déjà « invoqué[e]s par les Parties »
au sens du paragraphe 1  mais, comme le rappelle le paragraphe 4, chaque Partie demeure libre
d’invoquer d’autres titres juridiques.
8. Comme on le voit, le compromis utilise les termes « titres juridiques », ainsi que « traités »
et « conventions internationales » pour viser ce que les Parties « invoqu[ent] » devant la Cour. Le
verbe « invoquer » décrit donc l’action procédurale, et ainsi la prétention substantielle, de chaque
Partie. Selon le paragraphe 2, « [à] cette fin », le Gabon invoque le document présenté en 2003, et
c’est bien à son sujet que se situe, vous le savez, le noeud principal du présent différend. Mais bien
sûr, ce document n’est ni un titre juridique, ni un traité, ni une convention au sens propre de ces
termes aussi longtemps que la Cour n’a pas dit qu’il faisait droit dans les relations entre les Parties.
Ce n’est qu’alors et à cette condition seulement que le document présenté en 2003 sera  quod
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non  une convention applicable entre Parties ; avant cela, il n’est rien d’autre qu’une prétendue
convention « invoqué[e] » par le Gabon. Avant votre arrêt à venir, cette prétendue convention n’est
même pas un titre documentaire au sens où l’entend le Gabon puisque la question de savoir si elle
constitue un titre conventionnel liant le Gabon et la Guinée équatoriale, et opposable à ces États, est
précisément au coeur de ce différend. Il est donc parfaitement possible qu’à l’issue de la procédure
 et c’est d’ailleurs ce que la Guinée équatoriale vous demande de constater  le document présenté
en 2003 ne soit en rien un « titre juridique »  et pourtant, bien sûr, le Gabon est en droit de
l’invoquer.
9. Donc, les Parties invoquent ce que chacune d’elles considère comme étant des titres
juridiques, y compris des traités et des conventions, et la Cour décide si chacun de ces titres, traités
et conventions ainsi invoqués fait droit entre Parties. Et pour s’acquitter de cette tâche, ainsi que le
précise l’article 2 du compromis, la Cour applique les sources du droit international visées à
l’article 38, paragraphe 1, du Statut.
10. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, cette lecture toute simple et de
bon sens du compromis fondée sur le sens ordinaire de ses termes est toutefois rejetée par le Gabon
sur la base d’une approche conceptuelle inutilement compliquée et totalement artificielle. Le Gabon
soutient en effet que vous ne pourriez pas dire pour droit que certains titres juridiques invoqués par
la Guinée équatoriale font ou ne font pas droit dans les relations entre les Parties car lesdits titres ne
seraient pas des titres documentaires.
11. Monsieur le président : la lecture gabonaise du compromis revient à y insérer une sorte de
condition de recevabilité des prétentions de chaque Parties qui ne s’y trouve pas. En effet, faute de
satisfaire à la qualification de « titre documentaire », un titre juridique invoqué comme tel par une
partie ne pourrait prétendument pas être examiné par la Cour aux fins de déterminer s’il fait droit
entre parties34. L’interprétation gabonaise impose donc à la Cour de procéder en deux temps : tout
d’abord de faire le tri au sein des « titres » invoqués par les Parties entre ceux qui sont documentaires
et ceux qui ne le seraient pas ; et ensuite, examinant seulement les titres dits documentaires, de
déterminer si ces derniers font droit entre les Parties. Selon le Gabon, la Cour n’aurait donc pas le
34 Duplique de la République gabonaise (ci-après, « DG »), par. 1.55.
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pouvoir de statuer sur l’applicabilité d’un titre juridique invoqué par une partie si celui-ci n’est pas
un titre documentaire.
12. L’interprétation gabonaise est erronée tout d’abord parce qu’elle attribue à la Cour un
pouvoir différent de celui que le compromis prévoit : la compétence de la Cour est d’examiner toutes
les prétentions des Parties au sujet de tous les « titres juridiques, traités et conventions internationales
invoqués » (les italiques sont de nous) par elles et de déterminer si  c’est-à-dire dans quelle
mesure  ceux-ci « font droit dans le[ur]s relations ». La Cour n’a pas d’autre pouvoir. Si la Cour
conclut qu’un titre invoqué fait droit entre Parties, alors ce titre sera à proprement parler un titre
juridique ; la prétention de la Partie à cet égard sera reconnue et validée par la Cour. Mais il ne saurait
être question d’écarter un titre invoqué par une Partie comme titre juridique, sans examiner s’il fait
droit entre Parties, sous prétexte qu’il ne serait pas un « titre documentaire ». Faire cela, ce serait
s’écarter de la mission confiée à la Cour, laquelle n’est pas de refuser d’examiner un titre invoqué
par une Partie comme titre juridique sous prétexte qu’il ne serait pas un « titre documentaire » ; la
mission confiée à la Cour est de dire si les titres juridiques invoqués par les Parties comme tels font
droit entre elles, c’est-à-dire dire s’ils sont effectivement des titres juridiques.
13. J’ajoute que si la Cour rejette la prétention du Gabon au sujet du document présenté en
2003, mais retient par ailleurs son interprétation « documentaire » et restrictive de la notion de « titres
juridiques », votre office serait très largement privé de toute utilité. En effet, dans ce cas de figure, la
Cour ne pourrait même pas dire dans quelle mesure la convention de Paris de 1900 s’applique entre
Parties puisque son applicabilité de principe en tant que « document » ne faisait pas l’objet d’un
différend au moment de la saisine de la Cour, comme cela ressort clairement du compromis. Or, ainsi
que vous l’avez souligné dans l’affaire Burkina Faso/Niger, la fonction judiciaire de la Cour est,
conformément à l’article 38 du Statut, de régler les différends qui existent au moment de sa saisine,
ce qui signifie que, même par accord, les parties ne peuvent pas disposer de cette fonction en lui
demandant d’entériner un accord existant entre elles35. Et c’est bien la raison pour laquelle la Cour
est appelée à dire dans quelle mesure la convention de Paris fait droit entre Parties, ce qui exige de
35 Différend frontalier (Burkina Faso/Niger), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2013, p. 69-70, par. 46-50.
- 30 -
se pencher sur les titres juridiques qui s’y greffent en termes d’accords subséquents, d’effectivités
infra legem et d’acquiescement, et que la Guinée équatoriale invoque.
14. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, voyons le fond des choses et ne
nous y trompons pas : l’interprétation gabonaise est essentiellement formulée afin de vous pousser à
valider le document présenté en 2003. En effet, si l’interprétation gabonaise du compromis devait
être retenue, compte tenu de la jurisprudence Burkina Faso/Niger que je viens de rappeler, vous
n’auriez rien à dire au sujet de la convention de Paris puisque, en tant que titre documentaire, elle ne
fait l’objet, au jour de la saisine, d’aucun différend entre Parties. Mais tout cela est évidemment
erroné : rejeter l’interprétation gabonaise du compromis permettra à la Cour de faire oeuvre utile entre
Parties, quelle que soit sa décision au sujet du document présenté en 2003. En revanche, retenir
l’interprétation gabonaise du compromis aboutirait à imposer à la Cour de ne pas pouvoir retenir
comme applicables un ensemble de titres juridiques invoqués par la Guinée équatoriale, non pas pour
le motif qu’ils ne feraient pas droit entre Parties, mais parce que ces titres ne seraient pas
« documentaires », au sens où le Gabon l’entend, alors que le compromis n’impose en rien cette
restriction.
15. Le Gabon invente donc à des fins stratégiques une question interprétative nourrie de
distinguos conceptuels qui, à la lumière du texte clair du compromis et de la mission de la Cour au
regard du droit des Parties d’invoquer des titres juridiques, n’ont pas lieu d’être.
II. L’interprétation du compromis
16. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, même s’il devait être nécessaire
de procéder à une approche conceptuelle du compromis, l’interprétation proposée par le Gabon est
erronée à la lumière des règles coutumières reflétées aux articles 31 et 32 de la convention de Vienne
sur le droit des traités.
17. D’emblée, il y a lieu de relever que rien n’indique que les termes « titres juridiques »
utilisés aux paragraphes 1 et 4 de l’article premier du compromis  et qui ont évidemment le même
sens dans les deux paragraphes  devraient s’entendre dans un sens particulier. En effet, il n’est
- 31 -
nullement établi que l’intention des Parties ait été de donner un sens particulier, différent du sens
ordinaire, à ces termes36. Et d’ailleurs, le Gabon ne semble pas en disconvenir.
18. S’agissant dès lors du sens ordinaire des termes du compromis, le Gabon s’attache à
démontrer que le contentieux dont la Cour est saisie n’est pas un contentieux de délimitation37. Mais
comme je l’ai rappelé, cela n’est nullement contesté par la Guinée équatoriale. Toutefois, cela ne
permet en rien d’affirmer que la notion de « titre[] juridique[] » employée dans le compromis serait
identique à celle de « traité[] et convention[] internationale[] » et limitée à la notion de titre
documentaire. Le compromis vise cumulativement les « titres juridiques, [virgule] traités et
conventions internationales invoqués par les Parties » (les italiques sont de nous). Le texte du
compromis n’est pas « les titres juridiques, c’est-à-dire les traités et conventions internationales ».
La virgule qui sépare « titres juridiques » et « traités » a bien sûr tout son sens. Elle signifie que le
compromis mentionne les « titres juridiques » en plus des « traités et conventions internationales »
et non comme synonyme à ces derniers. Les « titres juridiques » invoqués par les Parties sont donc,
à côté des traités et conventions, une catégorie supplémentaire plus large de sources de droits en
matière de délimitation et de souveraineté insulaire que la Cour est appelée à examiner à la demande
de la Partie les ayant invoqués.
19. Quant au contexte dans lequel les termes « titres juridiques, traités et conventions
internationales » apparaissent au paragraphe 1 de l’article premier, les paragraphes 2, 3 et 4 qui
suivent sont particulièrement éclairants.
20. En précisant que les Parties se réservent le droit d’invoquer « d’autres titres juridiques »
(les italiques sont de nous), le paragraphe 4 indique certes que les conventions visées aux
paragraphes 2 et 3 sont des titres juridiques invocables par chacune des Parties  et d’ores et déjà
invoqués par elles comme le signale la locution introductive « [à] cette fin » , mais les termes des
paragraphes 2 à 4 n’impliquent en rien que seuls des titres juridiques se présentant sous la forme de
traités ou conventions peuvent être invoqués.
36 Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, Recueil des traités (RTNU), vol. 1155, par. 4, art. 31, p. 363.
37 CMG, par. 5.5-5.62.
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21. D’une part, il est évident  et le Gabon à nouveau n’en disconvient pas38  que tous les
traités et toutes les conventions internationales qui existent ne sont pas des titres juridiques.
22. Mais, d’autre part, il est tout aussi clair qu’un titre juridique en matière de souveraineté et
de délimitation peut être autre chose qu’un traité ou une convention et n’est pas nécessairement
documentaire. Dans l’affaire Burkina Faso/Mali, la Chambre souligna que ce n’est que dans le
contexte de l’opposition entre « titres juridiques » et « effectivités » que, fort logiquement,
« l’expression “titre[s] juridique[s]” semble se référer exclusivement à l’idée de preuve
documentaire ». Cette affirmation est évidemment liée au contexte spécifique d’opposition entre
titres juridiques et effectivités contra legem qui était en cause dans cette affaire car la Chambre a
souligné aussitôt  je cite à nouveau  : « Il est à peine besoin de rappeler que ce n’est pas là la
seule acception du mot “titre”. » En effet, selon la Chambre,  je cite à nouveau  « la notion de
titre peut également et plus généralement viser aussi bien tout moyen de preuve susceptible d’établir
l’existence d’un droit que la source même de ce droit »39. Dans l’affaire El Salvador/Honduras, la
Chambre a approuvé et réitéré cette position en expliquant : « [E]n général le mot “titre” ne renvoie
pas uniquement à une preuve documentaire, mais “peut … viser aussi bien tout moyen de preuve
susceptible d’établir l’existence d’un droit que la source même de ce droit”. »40 Dans cette même
affaire, la succession à la Couronne espagnole constituait le « “titre” d’El Salvador ou du
Honduras …, au sens de source de leurs droits sur le plan international »41. Et aussi, selon le
Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international qui date de 1960, le terme « titre juridique »
désigne « tout fait, acte ou situation qui est la cause et le fondement d’un droit »42.
23. Donc, ce n’est pas parce que la notion de « titre juridique » englobe certains traités et
certaines conventions que cette notion ne recouvre que des traités ou des conventions, c’est-à-dire
des titres constitués par des « preuves documentaires ». Comme le Gabon en convient — et je cite le
paragraphe 1.50 de sa duplique —, les « “traités et conventions internationales” … font, très
38 DG, par. 1.49.
39 Différend frontalier (Burkina Faso/République du Mali), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 564, par. 18.
40 Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras ; Nicaragua (intervenant)), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 388-389, par. 45.
41 Ibid., p. 389, par. 45.
42 J. Basdevant, Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international, Sirey, Paris, 1960, p. 604, reproduit dans la
réplique de la Guinée équatoriale (ci-après, « RGE »), vol. V, annexe 59, p. 104.
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évidemment, partie des titres juridiques invocables » (les italiques sont de nous)43. Nous sommes
tout à fait d’accord, mais si tel est le cas, c’est bien parce que la notion de « titre juridique » ne se
réduit pas aux seuls titres documentaires que sont les traités et les conventions.
24. Pour tenter néanmoins de vous convaincre que seuls des titres juridiques documentaires
tels que des traités ou des conventions peuvent être invoqués, le Gabon soutient encore que leur
compromis aurait « exactement la même signification que l’on y inclue la mention des “traités et
conventions internationales” ou qu’on l’en ampute »44. Alors, cela est certes exact puisque les traités
et conventions constituent seulement une partie des titres juridiques invocables. Mais c’est confondre
la partie avec le tout que d’affirmer que si la partie est mentionnée, c’est parce que le tout s’y
réduirait. Le Gabon fait à cet égard une évidente erreur de logique. Ainsi, la théorie de l’effet utile
dans l’interprétation des traités exige, non pas de s’interroger sur la signification du compromis en
l’absence des termes « traités et conventions internationales » (lesquels constituent la partie), mais
sur la signification du compromis en l’absence des termes « titres juridiques » (lesquels constituent
le tout). Si les auteurs du compromis avaient souhaité que la Cour ne se prononce que sur des titres
documentaires tels que des traités et des conventions, ils n’auraient pas inclus la référence aux « titres
juridiques ». L’effet utile de l’énumération cumulative « titres juridiques, traités et conventions
internationales » impose donc de ne pas réduire la notion de « titres juridiques » aux seuls traités et
conventions ou aux autres titres se présentant sous la forme d’un document conventionnel puisque
ces derniers font partie des titres juridiques.
25. C’est donc en vain et de manière  nous semble-t-il  parfaitement contradictoire avec
la proposition élémentaire selon laquelle les traités et conventions font partie de la catégorie plus
large des titres juridiques que le Gabon soutient que, lors de la négociation du compromis,
l’adjonction à sa demande des mots « traités et conventions internationales » à l’expression « titres
juridiques » aurait visé « à préciser la catégorie des titres juridiques pouvant être invoqués par les
Parties  en les limitant aux seuls traités et conventions » (les italiques sont de nous)45. Bien au
contraire, cet ajout signifie que la notion de « titres juridiques » est distincte et ne se limite pas aux
43 DG, par. 1.50.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., par. 1.55.
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« traités et conventions internationales », c’est-à-dire tout document conventionnel, mais qu’elle ne
s’y réduit pas.
26. Monsieur le président, pour conclure sur ce point, j’ajouterais que la position de la Guinée
équatoriale est parfaitement conforme à l’objet et au but du compromis, dont le préambule précise
qu’il est intervenu alors que « plusieurs années d’efforts consacrés à la recherche d’une solution par
voie de négociation n’ont pas permis d’atteindre le résultat escompté ». Durant ces négociations,
différents titres juridiques autres que documentaires ont été invoqués par les Parties, y compris par
le Gabon ainsi que mes collègues le souligneront46. Les termes du compromis reflètent cette réalité
et ils doivent donc être compris en en tenant compte. J’ajoute que retenir l’interprétation gabonaise
serait imposer aux Parties de reprendre des négociations au sujet de la pertinence de certains de ces
titres juridiques déjà invoqués lors de ces négociations, alors que les Parties avaient des vues à ce
point inconciliables quant à leur applicabilité que le recours à la Cour fut nécessaire. L’objet et le but
du compromis sont de permettre aux Parties de régler complètement ce vieux différend territorial et
insulaire en étant éclairées par le futur arrêt de la Cour. Pour que cet objectif puisse être rempli,
l’interprétation restrictive du compromis avancée par le Gabon doit être rejetée.
27. Et selon la Guinée équatoriale, vous l’avez compris, il n’y a pas de doute quant au sens du
compromis, mais même s’il devait y avoir un doute à cet égard, l’interprétation gabonaise ne peut
être retenue. En effet, comme nous le savons depuis 1929 — et je cite l’affaire des Zones franches :
« dans le doute, les clauses d’un compromis par lequel la Cour est saisie d’un différend doivent, si
cela n’est pas faire violence à leurs termes, être interprétées d’une manière permettant à ces clauses
de déployer leurs effets utiles »47.
III. La succession d’États, les effectivités, la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit
de la mer et le droit coutumier dans les soumissions de la Guinée équatoriale
28. Monsieur le président, j’aborde le troisième point et dernier point de ma plaidoirie.
L’interprétation erronée du compromis proposée par le Gabon l’amène à contester que la Guinée
équatoriale puisse invoquer des titres juridiques sur la base de la succession d’États, des effectivités,
46 Commission ad hoc des frontières, Gabon/Guinée équatoriale, Libreville du 29 au 31 janvier 2001,
Procès-verbal, reproduit dans MEG, vol. VII, annexe 212 ; voir aussi CR 2024/29 (Parkhomenko).
47 Zones franches de la Haute-Savoie et du Pays de Gex, ordonnance du 19 août 1929, C.P.J.I. série A no 22, p. 13.
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de la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer et du droit coutumier48. Et le Gabon conteste
que la Cour puisse statuer à cet égard.
29. Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je ne vais évidemment pas anticiper ce que mes collègues
qui vont me suivre à la barre vous exposeront, mais vous constaterez chaque fois qu’en invoquant la
succession d’États, qu’en invoquant des effectivités infra legem, qu’en invoquant un acquiescement,
qu’en invoquant la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer ou certains principes de droit
coutumier, la Guinée équatoriale a simplement reflété non seulement les termes du compromis mais
aussi ce que la Chambre de la Cour a dit pour droit dans l’affaire du Golfe du Maine, à savoir que le
« “titre juridique” … est toujours et uniquement l’effet d’une opération juridique »49. En d’autres
termes, il n’y a pas de titre juridique sans opération juridique et prétendre détacher le titre de
l’opération qui en est la cause est absurde car c’est cette opération qui, au sens propre, constitue le
titre. Étant « toujours et uniquement l’effet d’une opération juridique », le « titre juridique » en est
donc indissociable ; c’est cette opération qui fait le titre  et c’est bien la raison pour laquelle, pour
citer à nouveau l’arrêt Burkina Faso/Mali, comme l’a dit la Cour, « la notion de titre peut … plus
généralement viser aussi bien tout moyen de preuve susceptible d’établir l’existence d’un droit que
la source même de ce droit ».
30. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je conclus : l’exigence
fondamentale d’interpréter un traité de bonne foi suivant le sens ordinaire des termes qui y sont
utilisés, dans leur contexte et à la lumière de l’objet et du but de l’accord conduit naturellement à ne
pas assimiler la notion de « titre[] juridique[] » à celle de « traité[] et convention[] internationale[] »
et à ne pas limiter aux seuls « titres documentaires » les titres pouvant être invoqués par les Parties
et ainsi valablement soumis à l’examen de la Cour. L’interprétation du compromis proposée par le
Gabon doit être rejetée.
31. Je vous remercie pour votre bienveillante attention, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, et
puis-je vous demander, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir appeler le professeur Sands à la barre ?
48 CMG, par. 5.95.
49 Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine (Canada/États-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 296, par. 103.
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Le PRÉSIDENT : Je remercie le professeur Pierre d’Argent. I call now Professor Sands. You
have the floor, Sir.
Mr SANDS:
THE DOCUMENT PRESENTED BY GABON IN 2003 DOES NOT ESTABLISH LEGAL TITLE
OR HAVE FORCE OF LAW IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES
1. Mr President, Madam Vice-President, Members of the Court, it is an honour for me to
appear before you on behalf of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.
2. I am going to address a key issue of the case put by Gabon: the document that Gabon first
brought to the attention of Equatorial Guinea in May 2003. The two-page document had five notable
characteristics: first, it was a photocopy, not an original; second, it was partly illegible; third, it was
dated 12 September 1974; fourth, Equatorial Guinea’s negotiators had never seen it before, despite
the passage of nearly thirty years; and fifth, Gabon never once mentioned it in any negotiations.
3. In these proceedings, Gabon invites the Court to declare that this document — copied, partly
illegible and disappeared for nearly three decades — somehow gives rise to its claim to legal title.
This is despite the fact that Gabon made no mention of its belief that there was in place with
Equatorial Guinea a binding agreement on their respective sovereign territories for some
10,477 days — total silence.
4. With great respect, the claim is wholly implausible, absurd even. I am going to explain why
in four steps. First, there are the points of agreement between the Parties as to the two pages, as
emerged from two rounds of written pleadings. Second, Gabon has failed completely to discharge its
burden of proving that the two pages on which it relies can somehow produce legal effects. Third,
the two pages are not a complete and authentic copy of any alleged “convention”. And fourth, even
on its own terms, the two pages are not — and cannot be — a final delimitation treaty.
5. Gabon invites this Court to rule these scraps of paper should somehow be dispositive of this
case, but they are not. For the Court to accede to its invitation, very frankly, is to enter into the world
of implausibility and ridicule. You are being asked to rule that a State can rely on a photocopy of a
photocopy of a purported document, the original of which cannot be found, and of which no mention
- 37 -
was made, or any reliance placed, for three decades. The consequence of this claim for the stability
and certitude of our legal order is obvious.
I. Points of agreement
6. Mr President, let us begin with the evidence that is actually before the Court. It indicates
eight points of agreement not in dispute.
7. First, there is no dispute that before May 2003 Gabon never once referred to, invoked or
sought to rely on a supposed agreement signed in 1974. The evidence makes clear that it was only at
the May 2003 meeting of the Equatorial Guinea–Gabon ad hoc Boundary Commission that Gabon
first introduced a poor quality and partially illegible photocopy of a treaty it now says was signed
28 years and 8 months earlier50.
8. Second, there is no evidence before you — literally nothing — to indicate that at any point
between 1974 and 2003 did Gabon’s President Bongo, who is said to be a signatory of the supposed
document and was in office throughout that period, ever mention any supposed agreement with
Equatorial Guinea’s President Macías. Nor did he, or his government, ever publish or produce a copy
of the lately produced document.
9. Third, Gabon has still not produced an original version of the document. What does Gabon
say? As you can see, despite “best efforts” it has “not been able to locate in its archives an original”
of the 2003 document51. I have never seen an original version, and Equatorial Guinea has instructed
us that it has no copy and it has never had a copy.
10. In its Rejoinder, Gabon states that it relies on what it calls “deux ampliations”, by which
it seems to mean two certified true copies. It claims that these were transmitted by President Bongo
to the French Ambassador in Gabon on 28 October 197452. But, the evidence before you does not
indicate that a certified true copy exists or was in fact sent. What the evidence does show is that
President Bongo sent photocopies to the French Ambassador, not one or more certified copies53.
50 Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Minutes of the Ad-hoc Commission on Equatorial Guinea-Gabon Borders,
Malabo (23 May 2003), p. 9. MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 213.
51 CMG, Vol. I, para. 3.12.
52 RG, Vol. I, para. 2.2 (b).
53 Lettre no 12/AL de l’ambassadeur de France au Gabon au ministre des Affaires étrangères, de la Coopération et
de la Francophonie gabonais, 6 janvier 2004, p. 404, CMG, Vol. V, Annex 172.
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Indeed, there is no evidence at all before this Court that any certified copy exists or was ever prepared.
There is only a photocopy of a photocopy, with nothing certified. And, it must be said, it is a very
poor and incomplete photocopy: you will note, as I have said, the document is partly illegible, and
the Spanish version is cut off at the bottom of the signature page, where the names of the signatories
are to be found — we will come back to this. We simply do not know what else may have been cut
off.
11. Fourth, the evidence before the Court has Gabon relying on different versions of the
document, each with material differences. Let me just give one example, on the left is Article 4 of
the photocopy sent by Gabon to the UN Secretary-General on 5 February 2004, this one states that
the alleged maritime boundary lies “1.3 miles to the west” (“1,3 millas al oeste”) of the Elobey
Islands54. Now look at Article 4 on the right, the transcribed version Gabon registered with the
UN Secretary-General, a little later in 2004: the alleged maritime boundary seems to have moved, it
is now to be found “1.5 miles to the coast” (“1,5 millas al coste”) of Elobey Islands55. Gabon relies
on both versions, they are both in Spanish. How does Gabon explain this material difference, or the
error which replaces the word “oeste” with “coste”? It doesn’t. Which is the correct of the two
versions? We have no idea. Gabon says only that these differences “have no impact on the existence
of the Bata Convention or its validity” and it says, almost remarkably, that the French and Spanish
versions are “equally authoritative”56 whilst at the same time offering no explanation at all for the
inconsistencies. We honestly look forward to counsel for Gabon’s guidance as to what a Court is to
do faced with a supposed treaty that exists in different versions, with no original to be found, and of
which no mention has been made for nearly thirty years.
12. Fifth, the version of the document that was registered with the United Nations on
5 February 2004 was registered 29 years late. This prompted an immediate objection from Equatorial
Guinea. Can the passage of 29 years amount to registration, as Article 102 of the UN Charter requires,
“as soon as possible”? No.
54 Lettre du ministre d’État gabonais au secrétaire général des Nations Unies, 5 février 2004. CMG Vol. V,
Annex 174.
55 The Republic of Equatorial Guinea and The Gabonese Republic, Convention Delimiting the Land and Maritime
Boundaries of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon (12 September 1974) (Retyped Spanish-language version, as published in the
UNTS). MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 216.
56 RG, Vol. I, para. 2.2 (e).
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13. Sixth, the document has never been put before Gabon’s parliament for ratification. That is
required by its Constitution for any treaty that affects its territory57 — but it didn’t happen.
14. Seventh, for almost three decades after Gabon says the supposed document was signed, the
Parties conducted themselves on the basis mutually that there was no agreement. Their practice
maintained pre-1974 claims to the disputed islands, and land and maritime areas, by reference to
other legal titles. Gabon has only been able to find one — a single reference to an alleged
“Convention”, mentioned in passing in an unsigned memo dated 1984 from the French Embassy in
Malabo58. Crucially, however, Gabon has not put before the Court any example of either Party ever
making even one reference to the document in the course of more than ten thousand days of
negotiations. Nor has it been able to explain to you why it was silent for ten thousand days. The
reasonable inference is that throughout this period Gabon did not believe — or did not know — it
had signed a supposedly binding document in 1974, and that was because there was no agreement
signed. Throughout that period, Gabon argued for respect for colonial boundaries, for the 1900
Convention, for UNCLOS. These were the only legal bases upon which the negotiations proceeded.
This is not in dispute.
15. Eighth, the various versions of the document refer to the specific steps to be taken by the
Parties to resolve their disputes concerning land and maritime boundaries. Is there any evidence
before this Court that any of those steps were taken? Again, there is none. Gabon took none of the
steps provided for by the document on which it now relies, and the Parties never did reach any
agreement thereafter.
16. Mr President, these are the facts: they are not in dispute. Against the background of the
evidence, there is, frankly, good reason to treat Gabon’s claim as utterly unpersuasive, to say the
least, or hopeless, if I am going to put the boot in. Let me turn now to the points of disagreement.
17. Gabon argues that the document is a treaty covered by Article 1 (1) of the Special
Agreement. Is it a legal title, treaty or international convention that has the force of law in relations
between the Parties on the issues of delimitation and sovereignty before the Court? It is not, and it is
very plainly not.
57 MEG, Vol. I, para. 7.12.
58 RG, Vol. I, para. 2.12.
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18. Yet somehow, Gabon invites this Court to say that there is a treaty. It argues:
 one, a treaty was adopted on 12 September 1974 with the consent of both Presidents;
 two, the document it relies on is an authentic copy of that alleged treaty; and
 three, somehow, it has the force of law between the two countries.
19. There is no merit to any of these arguments.
II. Gabon has manifestly failed to discharge its burden of proof
20. Was a treaty adopted in 1974? The burden of proof — on the facts and on the law — is on
Gabon. As the Court has long recognized, “it is the duty of the party which asserts certain facts to
establish the existence of such facts”59. It is for Gabon to prove that on 12 September 1974 the two
heads of State signed a treaty with binding legal effect.
21. What are “the particular circumstances” in which Gabon tells you the document was drawn
up60? Well, the evidence before you — including contemporaneous views and all subsequent
practice — does not establish that the Parties reached a final agreement and signed a treaty on
12 September 1974, or that they “definitively settle[d]” their disputes over the land and maritime
boundary, and sovereignty over the islands of Mbañe, Cocoteros and Conga61.
22. Mr Smith has described what transpired in Bata, in Equatorial Guinea, on 12 September
1974. The meeting of the Presidents took place against the backdrop of Gabon’s seizure of Equatorial
Guinea’s insular and continental territory, and Equatorial Guinea’s protests. The idea that two heads
of State in those circumstances could negotiate and conclude a final and binding treaty in less than a
day is, at the very least, for those with experience, and that includes all of you, counterintuitive. The
total absence of any preparatory material is very telling.
59 Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I),
p. 71, para. 162; case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 392, para. 101; case concerning
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 43, para. 204; Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea
(Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 61, para. 68; case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic
of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 324, para. 15.
60 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 3, para. 96; case
concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Jurisdiction
and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1994, p. 112, para. 23.
61 CMG, Vol. I, para. 7.13.
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23. There are no minutes of any meeting. There is no official public statement to confirm the
preparation or the adoption of a treaty. Gabon knows this, so what it does is distort the evidence. It
quotes selectively from the accounts of foreign diplomats. It invokes statements by President Bongo
that do not refer to any treaty. It introduces video footage of a statement made by President Bongo
at Libreville Airport on 12 or 13 September 1974. It is well worth watching. Does the President of
Gabon refer to a treaty or a convention? No, he does not. Does the reporter in the video refer to the
signing of a treaty or a convention? No, he does not: he speaks only of a “final communiqué”.
Mr President, a “final communiqué” is not a treaty or a convention, and it is not  and it cannot
be  a source of legal title under Article 1 of this Special Agreement.
24. Gabon relies on a few photographs. Do they provide evidence that any treaty was signed?
No, they do not! Here is a photograph from the Gabonese newspaper L’Union, apparently the only
photograph that purports to provide a description of what is depicted. Does that description say that
a treaty was being signed? It does not, as Gabon itself recognized. Gabon says, “[a]ccording to the
description of this photograph it is of the signing of the ‘final communiqué’”. There is no reference
anywhere in this image to a treaty62. Gabon tells you that President Bongo reportedly said that
“everything is settled”  “tout est réglé”63. Why then, if “tout est réglé”, did President Bongo and
Gabon spend the next 10,477 days trying to negotiate an agreement on boundaries with Equatorial
Guinea? Gabon does not answer the question. “Curiouser and curiouser”, said Alice in Wonderland64.
25. What followed? The events of September 1974. Five days after the meeting, the French
Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea confirmed reports that “a joint communiqué” was signed. He did
not say anything about a treaty65, and there is no evidence before you that he even had a copy of the
communiqué. The French Ambassador also stated that as at 17 September 1974 “no one had the
slightest indication of the result” of President Bongo’s state visit, and “no specific common ground
62 CMG, Vol. I, para. 3.11.
63 CMG, Vol. II, Appendix V2; “‘Tout est réglé !’ avec la Guinée Équatoriale” (“‘Everything is settled!’ with
Equatorial Guinea”), L’Union (20 September 1974), p. 1. CMG, Vol. V, Annex 150.
64 L. Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, M. Burstein (ed.), Princeton University Press 2015, p. 14.
65 Letter No. 38/DA/DM from the Embassy of the French Republic to Equatorial Guinea to the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs concerning the State Visit of President Bongo, 9/12 September 1974 (17 September 1974), pp. 4-5. REG,
Vol. IV, Annex 33.
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on the question of boundaries could be found”66. That is the French Ambassador. What did the
Ambassador conclude? “ Les deux présidents se seraient donc quittés sans avoir signé aucun
communiqué, toutes les questions litigieuses entre les deux pays restant en suspense jusqu’à de
nouveaux et hypothétiques entretiens.”67
26. For France, the document was no more than a “projet d’Accord”  a “draft agreement” 
which “was, in the end, not signed”68. That is not evidence of a treaty having been signed. Quite the
contrary.
27. The Spanish Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea also reported that discussions held in
September 1974 did not result in an agreement. On 25 September 1974, less than two weeks after
the meeting, he wrote that it was  as you can see on the screen  “fundamentally false that
Equatorial Guinea will cede even a single portion of national territory”69.
28. These conclusions are fully consistent with the views expressed by representatives of both
countries at the time. On 2 October 1974 Gabon’s Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea reported that
“no definitive decision” was reached at the meeting in Bata. He then refers to a subsequent attempt —
a week later — to achieve a “definitive result” (« un résultat définitif »), but that did not bear fruit70.
He made clear that a treaty settling the Parties’ sovereignty and boundary disputes had not been
concluded in Bata on 12 September 1974. What does Gabon have to say about this contemporaneous
evidence? Nothing.
29. What did President Macías have to say? He told the French Ambassador to Equatorial
Guinea that “general principles of an agreement” could be defined but that “final decisions”
(« décisions finales ») were yet to be taken71. He evoked a hypothetical future agreement, and spoke
66 Ibid.
67 Letter No. 38/DA/DM from the Embassy of the French Republic to Equatorial Guinea to the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs concerning the State Visit of President Bongo, 9/12 September 1974 (17 September 1974), pp. 4-5. REG,
Vol. IV, Annex 33.
68 Report from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic concerning the Gabon-Equatorial Guinea Point
of Cooperation (1986-1994), p. 1. REG, Vol. IV, Annex 45.
69 Letter No. 509/74 from the Spanish Ambassador in Malabo to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning
the Conflict with Gabon (25 Sept 1974). REG, Vol. IV, Annex 34.
70 Dépêche d’actualité No. 40/DA/DAM-2 de l’ambassadeur de France en Guinée Équatoriale à la direction des
Affaires africaines et malgaches du ministère des Affaires étrangères français (2 Oct. 1974). CMG, Vol. V, Annex 152.
71 Ibid., p. 5.
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of the “impasse in which we currently find ourselves”72. This is three weeks after Gabon now tells
you that an agreement was somehow concluded.
30. Throughout the rest of 1974, Equatorial Guinea consistently denied the existence of any
agreement with Gabon. President Macías repeatedly stressed that the Parties did no more than agree
on the general principles of a future agreement, and possible “envisaged provisions” (« les
dispositions envisagées »)73. He made no mention of any agreement with Gabon, and he stated clearly
that the “conflict” between the Parties “has not yet been resolved”74. No final decisions were taken.
There was no final treaty.
31. President Macías’ account is also consistent with the contemporaneous understandings
expressed by other countries. For example, a telegram from the United States Embassy in Libreville
dated 29 April 1975 — less than eight months after the Bata meeting — reported that the “Gabonese-
Equatorial Guinean border problem [is] far from solved and may indeed be heating up”75.
32. As set out in the pleadings, the Parties and the former colonial Powers shared the view that
there was no agreement reached on 12 September 1974. This is confirmed by the Parties’ own
actions: they proceeded to engage in negotiations.
33. Eleven days after the meeting, on 23 September 1974, a high-level Equatoguinean
delegation travelled to Libreville to “continue negotiations to resolve the boundary conflict with
Gabon”76. Those talks yielded no agreement. The next day, a Gabonese delegation travelled to
Malabo to continue the negotiations. As it did so, in seeking documents from Spain, Equatorial
Guinea indicated that engineers would have to delimit the land boundary pursuant to [ . . .] the 1900
Convention. No reference was made to any agreement signed, purportedly, two weeks earlier77.
72 Dépêche d’actualité No. 43/DA/DAM-2 de l’ambassadeur de France en Guinée Équatoriale à la direction des
Affaires africaines et malgaches du ministère des Affaires étrangères français (14 Oct. 1974). CMG, Vol. V, Annex 153,
p. 267.
73 Dépêche d’actualité No. 40/DA/DAM-2 de l’ambassadeur de France en Guinée Équatoriale à la direction des
Affaires africaines et malgaches du ministère des Affaires étrangères français (2 Oct.1974). CMG, Vol. V, Annex 152,
p. 253.
74 Letter No. 524/74 from the Ambassador of Spain to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning Meeting
in Bata with the President for Life (2 Oct. 1974), p. 4, point 25. REG, Vol. IV, Annex 38.
75 Télégramme No. 621 de l’ambassade des États-Unis au Gabon (29 Apr. 1975). CMG, Vol V, Annex 159, p. 307.
76 Letter No. 509/74 from the Spanish Ambassador in Malabo to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning
the Conflict with Gabon (25 Sept. 1974), REG, Vol. IV, Annex 34, p. 179.
77 Letter No. 125 from the Spanish Ambassador in Malabo to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs (27 Sept.
1974), REG, Vol. IV, Annex 35, p. 189.
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34. The following month, in October 1974, the Parties continued to negotiate , and they did so
on the basis of no agreement. President Macías told the diplomatic community in Malabo that a lack
of agreement on delimitation of territorial waters in Corisco Bay had prevented signature78.
35. Mr President, Members of the Court, I have taken you through the record of evidence that
is before you, that is not disputed. The evidence confirms only one thing: the continued disagreement
between the Parties, and their failure to conclude an agreement in 1974 or, indeed, at any point
subsequently. Mr President, I wonder if this is a good moment for a quick break?
The PRESIDENT: Sure, that is exactly what I wanted to suggest. Let’s take a 15-minute break
now and we will resume in 15 minutes. The sitting is adjourned.
The Court is adjourned from 11.45 a.m. to 12 noon
The PRESIDENT: Okay, please be seated. Professor Sands.
Mr SANDS: Thank you. Just before the break, I was making my second point, which is that
Gabon has manifestly not met the burden of proving the existence of a treaty.
III. Gabon has failed to prove that the 2003 document is an authentic copy
of a treaty signed on 12 September 1974
36. I turn to the third issue of my submissions: can the evidence before the Court satisfy it that
it has before it a complete and authentic copy of an alleged “convention”? We say plainly not.
37. It seems, Gabon is well aware of its own evidential quandary: in its Rejoinder, it seeks to
shift the burden of proof, arguing that “it is incumbent on [Equatorial Guinea] to provide proof of its
inauthenticity”79.
38. This is a curious proposition, one that relies on two authorities. The first is Sovereignty
over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium/Netherlands)80. But that case is about reconciling discrepancies
between competing versions of a document the authenticity of which is not in dispute.
78 Letter No. 582/74 from the Spanish Embassy in Malabo to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning
Statements by the President for Life Before Heads of Missions Accredited Here (16 Oct. 1974), p. 6, point 10. REG,
Vol. IV, Annex 40, p. 242.
79 RG, Vol. I, para. 2.2 (a).
80 RG, Vol. I, para. 2.2 (a); Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1959, p. 224.
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39. The second authority on which Gabon relies is the judgment of the Iran-US Claims
Tribunal in Golshani, which concerned a dispute over the authenticity of a deed that was alleged to
be a forgery81. The Rules of Procedure of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal specify that “[e]ach party
shall have the burden of proving the facts relied on to support his claim or defence”82. As the
respondent in that case contended that the deed in question was fabricated, it bore the burden of
proving that fact. The Golshani decision is of course easily distinguishable. Equatorial Guinea
accepts that the document Gabon has put before the Court is a copy of a photocopied document found
in the archives of a third State, France. Consequently, it is for Gabon to prove that the document it
relies upon is a true and exact copy of the alleged treaty which it says was signed on 12 September
1974. We say it has manifestly failed to meet that burden. The Tribunal in Golshani made clear that
a party that seeks to rely on a document must “first . . . demonstrate prima facie that the Deed is
authentic”83. The Tribunal in that case concluded that the claimant had failed to discharge that
burden84.
40. We say Gabon has manifestly failed to discharge its own prima facie burden. It has not
given you an original copy, it has not told you where an original copy could be found, it has not even
said that an original copy even exists. It has not told you what may have become of the original. And
very strikingly, it has provided no witness testimony that could support the drafting, negotiation,
conclusion or adoption of a treaty. It has not even provided witness testimony to confirm that the
photocopy is an authentic copy of a treaty. Gabon has very obviously not proved authenticity.
41. What Gabon has done is to present different versions of the document, in Spanish and
French and this is very striking. There appear to be at least three different Spanish-language versions:
 On your screen, you can see what I will call Version 1, in Spanish, the copy sent by Gabon to
the UN Secretary-General on 5 February 2004. As you can see, it is the version that is cut off on
81 Abrahim Rahman Golshani v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Final Award No. 546-812-3, 2 March
1993, para. 49.
82 Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Tribunal Rules of Procedure, 3 May 1983, Article 24 (1) (Evidence and Hearings).
83 Abrahim Rahman Golshani v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Final Award No. 546-812-3, 2 March
1993, para. 49 (emphasis added).
84 Ibid., para. 122.
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the final page at the bottom, with only partial signatures, no names of the signatories, and
significantly, no nota bene85.
 Now, next to it, let us look at Version 2, as submitted by Gabon to the United Nations a month
later, on 2 March 2004. This was described as a “retranscription” of Spanish and French versions
of the document, and what we see here is that the names of the signatories somehow magically
appear86.
 And now let us look at Version 3, the one relied upon by Gabon in these proceedings, at
Annex 155 of its Counter Memorial87. It is again different.
42. The three versions are different. We ask our friends, which of these three versions is the
correct version? Because we have no idea.
43. As to Version 2, Gabon told the UN Office of Legal Affairs that this was its own
“retranscription” and a certified true copy, and that the Parties “did not formulate any reservations
or objections to the agreement”88. These statements are not correct. As mentioned, Version 2 adds a
signature line, and it also adds a nota bene, elements which did not appear in Version 1. This is
re-writing. This is not retranscription! And it is wholly wrong to say that there was no “objection” to
the document when it was presented. As you can see on the screen, Equatorial Guinea immediately
“refutes and denies” the existence of such a treaty and the validity of the document presented by
Gabon89.
44. What about Version 3? It is different from Version 2, the so-called “retranscription”: in
Version 3 the nota bene under the names of the signatories has just disappeared, and instead new
handwriting appears in the margin of Version 3 that was not present in Version 1 or Version 2.
Interestingly, the nota bene in Version 2 on the left side and the margin text in Version 3 on the
85 Lettre du ministre d’État gabonais au secrétaire général des Nations Unies (5 February 2004). CMG, Vol. V,
Annex 174.
86 The Republic of Equatorial Guinea and The Gabonese Republic, Convention Delimiting the Land and Maritime
Boundaries of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon (12 September 1974) (Retyped Spanish-language version, as published in the
UNTS). MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 216.
87 RG, Vol. I, para. 2.2 (b); Lettre du président du Gabon à l’ambassadeur de France au Gabon (28 October 1974),
CMG, Vol. V, Annex 155.
88 Letter from the Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Permanent Representative of the
Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the United Nations (22 March 2004). MEG, Vol. III, Annex 32.
89 Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Minutes of the Ad-hoc Commission on Equatorial Guinea-Gabon Borders,
Malabo (23 May 2003), p. 9. MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 213, p. 249.
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right-hand side do both mention Article 4, but they do so in materially different ways, as you can see
on your screens. Version 2, on the left, says: “The two heads of State agree to subsequently proceed
with a new drafting of Article 4 in order to bring it into conformity with the 1900 Convention”. But
Version 3, on the right-hand side, says something different: “Article 4 will be examined by the two
Heads of State, pursuant [to] the 1900 Convention”. Well, which version is the original? We do not
know. Gabon tells you that both versions are certified true copies of the same document, in the same
language90. But how can that possibly be? Perhaps counsel for Gabon will explain.
45. The differences do not end there. I invite you to look carefully at the signature line on
Version 2, on the left91. Now look at the signature line in Version 3, on the right. What do you notice?
They are not the same. Version 2, from 2004, shows “Albert-Bernard BONGO” on the left, and
“Don Francisco Macías NGUEMA BIYOGO” on the right. Version 3, on the other hand, produced
by Gabon for these proceedings, gives Mr Bernard Bongo a new name; he has now become
“Alberto”. It is not exactly the same name. And the name of the other signatory, which is no longer
legible, is now on the left. It just gets curiouser and curiouser. How can two different documents be
identical? How can two different documents both be authentic?
46. Mr President, while we are on the subject of the two Presidents, it is worth asking: did they
have authority under their respective laws and constitutions to conclude a final and binding
agreement that could affect the extent of their countries’ sovereign territories?
47. They did not. Equatorial Guinea’s Constitution provided that a treaty that infringed or
diminished the country’s jurisdiction or sovereignty over “any portion whatsoever” of its territory
would be illegal and invalid92. The conclusion of an agreement with Gabon that ceded territory would
have required an amendment of the Constitution. There is no evidence before the Court that any such
amendment was ever discussed, proposed, drafted, prepared or adopted. It did not happen.
90 MEG, Vol. III, Annex 32, p. 413 (“certified true copy”); RG, Vol. I, para. 2.1 (“ampliation”).
91 The Republic of Equatorial Guinea and The Gabonese Republic, Convention Delimiting the Land and Maritime
Boundaries of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon (12 September 1974) (Retyped Spanish-language version, as published in the
UNTS). MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 216.
92 Letter No. OR 511 EQGU from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea in the
United Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the Distribution of the Constitution of the
Republic of Equatorial Guinea of 4 August 1973 (13 December 1973), p. 5, art. 7. REG, Vol. III, Annex 7.
- 48 -
48. And what about Gabon? Its Constitution prohibited President Bongo from concluding any
agreement entailing cession, exchange or addition of territory without parliamentary ratification and
a public referendum93. Again, there is no evidence before the Court that such procedures were
proposed or adopted. Indeed, in February 1977, the Foreign Minister of Gabon acknowledged that
the document was never put before the Parliament of Gabon or ratified. He said, “It has fallen by the
wayside for now.”94
49. Mr President, the evidence before the Court — and the evidence that is not before the
Court  points inexorably only to one conclusion: no agreement was signed in 1974.
IV. The document invoked by Gabon is not, even on its
own terms, a final treaty
50. I turn to my fourth and final point, and in so doing I invite you to suspend disbelief. Even
if an alleged “convention” existed  which it plainly did not and does not — on its own terms the
piece of paper put forward to you by Gabon cannot provide a basis on which to adjudicate the Parties’
boundaries and entitlements within the meaning of Article 1 (1) of the Special Agreement.
51. Whichever of the many versions of Gabon’s documents you take, it does not on its face
purport to be a definitive settlement of the sovereignty and boundary disputes between the Parties.
This is because each version is contingent in different ways on the Parties taking future steps to
resolve their disputes and establish their boundaries. Gabon makes a half-hearted attempt to persuade
you otherwise95, but it accepts that the Parties did not take any of these steps96.
52. Take Article 1 of the document. This purports to define the general course of the land
boundary, but it takes almost word for word from the 1900 Convention. Article 2 describes, in
general terms, supposed exceptions to the lines referred to in Article 1. Gabon argues that this
amounts to an agreement on delimitation, with only demarcation to be carried out at a later date97.
93 The Gabonese Republic, Constitution of The Gabonese Republic (29 July 1972), Article 52, MEG, Vol. VI,
Annex 189, p. 331.
94 Letter No. 85 from the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Spanish Ambassador in Malabo
(25 February 1977), REG, Vol. IV, Annex 44, p. 276.
95 RG, Vol. I, para. 2.23.
96 CMG, Vol. I, para. 4.3.
97 RG, Vol. I, para. 2.2 (f).
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But that cannot be right: the locations and limits of areas referred to in Article 2 are not defined. That
is a matter that requires a future delimitation of undefined boundaries.
53. This is also confirmed by Article 7. As you can see, it states that “[p]rotocols shall be
made, both to determine the surface area and exact limits of the land area ceded” by each of the
Parties and “to specify the terms and conditions of the application of the present Convention”98. This
makes crystal clear that the areas referred to in Article 2 were not agreed, and that the Parties did not
agree on the “terms and conditions of the application” referred to in that supposed document. These
matters were left to be determined by future protocols, and there are no future protocols.
54. In its Rejoinder, Gabon argues that a meeting of the Parties on 23 September 1974 was
undertaken specifically, as it puts it, “to determine the boundaries of portions of territory ceded
between the Parties along the land border”99. Yet there is no evidence before the Court that the talks
on 23 September were concerned with a document allegedly signed on 12 September 1974. Rather,
the evidence shows that the later meeting, and all the other meetings that followed, were negotiations
that sought to reach an agreement on the substance. As Gabon recognizes, those negotiations
failed100.
55. Relatedly, Article 8 requires the boundary to be subsequently defined by representatives
of Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Gabon offers no evidence that any team of representatives,
technicians or observers were established to carry out the “materialization of the boundaries”101.
Gabon seeks to equate the term “materialization” with an agreement to demarcate an already
delimited boundary.
56. That argument is not supported by the French version of Article 8, which Gabon says is
equally authoritative102. As you can see, that states that “[l]a matérialisation des frontières sera
98 The Republic of Equatorial Guinea and The Gabonese Republic, Convention Delimiting the Land and Maritime
Boundaries of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon (12 September 1974) (Retyped Spanish-language version, as published in the
UNTS). MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 216, p. 292.
99 RG, Vol. I, para. 2.37.
100 Ibid.
101 The Republic of Equatorial Guinea and The Gabonese Republic, Convention Delimiting the Land and Maritime
Boundaries of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon (12 September 1974) (Retyped Spanish-language version, as published in the
UNTS), MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 216, p. 292.
102 RG, Vol. I, p. 42, note 110.
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faite”  in English: “the material delimitation shall be carried out”103. This document, even if
authentic, which it is not, is no more than an agreement to undertake certain steps in the future with
a view to delimiting the Parties’ land and maritime boundaries. As Gabon must accept, none of those
steps were ever taken.
57. Nor is the argument of Gabon supported by Article 4 of the document, which purports to
provide a definition of the maritime boundary. You will recall the nota bene that appeared after the
signatures on Version 2, as translated in French, which stated that the two Heads of State were to
“subsequently proceed with a new drafting of Article 4 in order to bring it into conformity with the
1900 Convention”104. Variations of that language appear in Versions 2 and 3, in Spanish, but what
they all have in common, notwithstanding their differences, is that they refer to a future activity.
58. Gabon argues — somewhat meekly, it must be said — that the nota bene merely refers to
potential future redrafting. But whichever version you take, that is not what the words say. What the
words say is: “The two heads of State agree to subsequently proceed with a new drafting”105. Or in
the alternative version, “Article 4 will be examined”106. On either version, the text of Article 4 was
to be redrafted, to bring it into conformity with the 1900 Convention. There is no evidence before
you that any such redrafting ever took place.
V. Conclusions
59. Mr President, Members of the Court, I can conclude briefly. There is no evidence before
this Court to allow it to conclude that the various pieces of paper that Gabon unexpectedly has
conjured up since May 2003, and offered in different versions, could be said to constitute an
agreement by two States that is binding under international law to give rise to titles. The original of
the document, if it ever existed, is not before you. There is no contemporaneous evidence of any
103 The Republic of Equatorial Guinea and The Gabonese Republic, Convention Delimiting the Land and Maritime
Boundaries of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon (12 September 1974) (Retyped French-language version, as published in the
UNTS), MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 214.
104 The Republic of Equatorial Guinea and The Gabonese Republic, Convention Delimiting the Land and Maritime
Boundaries of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon (12 September 1974) (French-language photocopy). MEG, Vol. VII,
Annex 215, p. 287.
105 The Republic of Equatorial Guinea and The Gabonese Republic, Convention Delimiting the Land and Maritime
Boundaries of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon (12 September 1974) (Retyped Spanish-language version, as published in the
UNTS), MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 216, p. 283.
106 Lettre du président du Gabon à l’ambassadeur de France au Gabon (28 October 1974), CMG, Vol. V,
Annex 155, p. 285.
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alleged “convention” being prepared or signed or having entered into force. There is no evidence that
the future steps envisaged by the document itself ever took place. There is no evidence of any
subsequent practice premised on the existence of an agreement.
60. It is on this last issue that Mr Parkhomenko will now address the Court. For 10,477 days
after 12 September 1974, Gabon said nothing about any agreement signed that year. For 10,477 days
the Parties engaged in bilateral negotiations to resolve their continuing sovereignty and boundary
disputes. For 10,477 days both Parties proceeded on the basis that their territorial and sovereignty
disputes remained unresolved. Gabon now asks you to just set aside and ignore those 10,477 days
and to rule that somehow an agreement was entered into. It asks you to ignore the inconsistencies
between the various versions, to ignore the total absence of contemporaneous evidence, to ignore the
absence of an original copy, and to ignore nearly 30 years of subsequent practice on which you will
now hear more.
61. Mr President, Members of the Court, with great respect, the argument is totally hopeless.
I thank you for your kind attention and invite you now to bring Mr Parkhomenko to the Bar.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor Sands for his statement. I now invite Mr Parkhomenko
to take the floor.
Mr PARKHOMENKO:
THE PARTIES’ CONDUCT SINCE 1974 CONFIRMS THAT THE DOCUMENT PRESENTED
BY GABON IN 2003 HAS NO FORCE OF LAW AND ESTABLISHES NO LEGAL
TITLE IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES
I. Introduction
1. Thank you. Mr President, Madam Vice-President, Members of the Court, it is an honour to
appear before you again.
2. I will show that until 2003 Gabon never invoked any treaty that it now alleges was concluded
in September 1974. Rather, for nearly 30 years the Parties continued their negotiations to resolve the
very same disputes based on other treaties, legal titles and legal principles. Such conduct makes clear
that the document Gabon first presented in 2003 cannot have any legal force or support any claim to
title.
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II. The Parties’ conduct between 1974 and 2003
3. The Parties had no negotiations between 1974 and 1979. When a new government in
Equatorial Guinea came to power in 1979, the Parties resumed their negotiations the same year.
4. For the next five years, they sought to negotiate a provisional solution, in the form of a joint
development zone, to access oil and gas in still disputed maritime areas. Gabon misleadingly alleges
that “none of those [negotiations] called into question the maritime boundary provided in the Bata
Convention”107. Well, they did. Gabon itself did it. This is confirmed by the jointly signed negotiation
minutes. When proposing a joint development zone in September 1984, Gabon stated:
“As a result of the overlapping sovereignty in these waters, the Gabonese Party
understands that this zone would be best suited for joint development, regardless of any
determination of maritime boundaries between the two countries, which determination
will be made in due time by other competent entities.”108
5. These are Gabon’s words. Gabon admitted that it believed that the Parties had overlapping
sovereignty claims. Gabon also admitted that a maritime boundary was yet to be determined. These
admissions refute the claim Gabon makes now that the Parties had resolved their sovereignty and
boundary disputes by a treaty in 1974.
6. Equatorial Guinea had the same understanding. According to the minutes, it proposed a joint
development zone depicted on this map in hatched pink. To support its proposal, Equatorial Guinea
relied on UNCLOS and its Constitution, which describes its territory as including the islands in
Corisco Bay109. It argued that the application of those legal instruments “means that the zone
proposed by” Gabon, depicted on this map in green “is located entirely within territory that falls
under the sovereignty of Equatorial Guinea”110. Like Gabon, Equatorial Guinea proceeded on the
basis that there was no treaty concluded in 1974 or thereafter.
7. In 1984, Gabon did not claim otherwise. Rather, Gabon itself relied on UNCLOS “to
reaffirm its sovereignty” over the disputed area and accepted that its “principles . . . give[] rise to
overlapping sovereignty”111. Of greatest significance is the fact that, at no time prior to or during the
107 RG, Vol. I, para. 5.13 (b).
108 Minutes of the Second Session of the Ad Hoc Commission on the Review of the Oil Cooperation Agreement
Between the Republic of Equatorial Guinea and The Gabonese Republic, Malabo (10–13 Sept. 1984), p. 139. MEG,
Vol. VII, Annex 205.
109 Ibid., p. 140.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid., p. 141.
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five-year period between 1979 and 1984 did Gabon even mention a document concluded in 1974;
nor did it claim that a treaty existed between the States.
8. After failing to agree on a joint development zone, the Parties continued their diplomatic
efforts. In November 1985, they agreed to establish “a sub-commission of experts . . . to study in
detail the delimitation of the maritime boundaries”112. The jointly signed negotiation minutes record
that “[b]oth parties have reaffirmed a series of principles and basic criteria to be used in delimiting
the maritime boundary between [them]”113, and these principles include:
“(a) The principle of acceptance of the borders inherited from the former colonial powers
(Treaty of Paris of 1900).
(b) The principle of applying law of the sea international conventions that have been
ratified and accepted by the States.
(c) Respect for States’ sovereignty over their respective national territories.”114
9. Did these principles refer to a 1974 treaty? They do not. During that meeting, Gabon did
claim Mbañe, Conga, Cocoteros, Leva and Hoco as “an integral part of Gabonese territory”, but it
did not invoke any legal title or any treaty to justify that claim115. In particular, it did not claim that
a treaty had been concluded in 1974.
10. Let us go forward five years to May 1990, when Gabon protested an oil exploration permit
granted by Equatorial Guinea in Corisco Bay. Gabon recognized in its protest that “the area in which
the . . . permit is located is very much under dispute and is the subject of negotiations”116, and it
requested that “any petroleum prospection in this area [be] stopped without delay pending the
definition of their maritime border by the ad hoc commission on borders of the two countries”117.
Did Gabon invoke a 1974 treaty? It did not.
11. The Parties met again in January 1993. The report of their meeting stated that it was still
“not possible to proceed to determine the maritime boundary”, because “each Party” still “claim[ed]
112 Minutes of the Guinean-Gabonese Ad Hoc Commission on the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in Corisco
Bay, Bata (10–16 Nov. 1985), p. 165. MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 207.
113 Ibid., p. 166.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid., p. 167.
116 Letter No. 293 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation to the Embassy of the Republic of
Equatorial Guinea in Gabon concerning Note. No 253.89/AMGE of 16 October 1989 in reference to the Clarion Petroleum
Permit Issued to the Company of the Same Name (4 May 1990), p. 296. REG, Vol. IV, Annex 46.
117 Ibid.
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sovereignty over Conga, Cocoteros, and Mbañe”118. Equatorial Guinea “proposed . . . international
mediation or arbitration”119. Did Gabon say that the matter had been resolved by a 1974 treaty? It did
not. Instead, Gabon said it was “willing to negotiate towards delimitation of the maritime boundary
between the two countries”120.
12. In the absence of any such treaty, Equatorial Guinea continued to assert its sovereignty
over Mbañe consistent with its legal title inherited from Spain upon independence. For example, in
March 1999, Equatorial Guinea enacted a decree designating the median line as the maritime
boundary with Gabon and placing base points on Mbañe, Cocoteros and Conga121. On 13 September
1999, Gabon protested. Did it invoke any “Bata Convention”? It did not. Instead, it “propose[d] . . .
to resume negotiations” to finally resolve the sovereignty and boundary disputes122.
13. In June 1999, Equatorial Guinea concluded a maritime delimitation agreement with
São Tomé and Príncipe, which established the maritime boundary, as shown on this slide. Gabon
admits that this boundary is located “well to the south” of a putative delimitation line alleged by
Gabon in the document that it first presented in 2003123. Accordingly, this area would have fallen to
Gabon if this document were a treaty concluded in 1974. Significantly, Gabon did not protest the
delimitation agreement between Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Príncipe.
14. Tellingly, Gabon’s own maritime delimitation agreement with São Tomé and Principe is
inconsistent with any supposed treaty concluded in 1974. As you can see on this slide, their maritime
boundary ends well to the south; it does not go further north to connect with the putative delimitation
line that Gabon.
15. Because the Parties never delimited their maritime boundary, Equatorial Guinea continued
to object to Gabon’s attempts to exercise its sovereignty and sovereign rights in the disputed maritime
areas. In 2000, for example, Gabon granted permits for petroleum blocks identified as “Mbañe” and
118 MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 210, p. 206.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Decree No. 1/1999 Designating the Median Line as the Maritime Boundary of
the Republic of Equatorial Guinea (6 March 1999), pp. 359-363. MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 193.
122 Note Verbale from the Embassy of the Gabonese Republic to the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the Ministry
of External Affairs, International Cooperation, and Francophony of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea (13 September
1999), p. 207. MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 178.
123 CMG, para. 4.18.
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“Mbañe West”124. This caused Equatorial Guinea to protest on 21 December 2000. It stated that the
“permits encroach upon the maritime area under the state sovereignty . . . of Equatorial Guinea”125.
The protest further made clear that the Parties had not “defined the boundary” or “resolved matters
of sovereignty . . . through negotiation, mediation and arbitration, or through the courts”126.
16. The Parties continued negotiations in January 2001 “[a]t the invitation” of Gabon”127. The
jointly signed negotiation minutes confirm that the Parties agreed that “the time had come for [them]
to seek definitive resolution” of their sovereignty and boundary disputes128. When opening the
negotiations,
“the Head of the Gabonese delegation . . . asked the Parties to work in compliance with
the following [treaties] governing the legal framework of this work:
 The French-Spanish Convention of June 27, 1900;
 The United Nations Charter;
 The Charter of the Organization of African Unity;
 The International Convention on the Law of the Sea.”129
17. The Head of the Gabonese delegation also “urged” the Parties “to base their work on the
principles underlying the definition and delimitation of [their] border”, which include:
 “respecting borders inherited from colonization;
 respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State”130.
18. Those were the only treaties and principles that Gabon said should be applied to reach a
definitive solution for the Parties’ disputes. Did Gabon invoke a 1974 treaty? It did not. By now
27 years had passed since September 1974.
124 Note Verbale from the Ministry of External Affairs, International Cooperation, and Francophonie of the Republic
of Equatorial Guinea to the Second Vice-Prime Minister of the Gabonese Republic (21 December 2000), p. 225. MEG,
Vol. VI, Annex 179.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 The Gabonese Republic, Minutes of the Ad Hoc Border Committee, Libreville (31 January 2001), p. 230. MEG,
Vol. VII, Annex 212.
128 Ibid., p. 231.
129 Ibid., p. 230.
130 Ibid.
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19. Moreover, during the 2001 negotiations the Parties addressed possible solutions that
completely differed from those supposedly agreed in 1974. As the negotiation minutes record,
Equatorial Guinea presented “two work hypotheses” for maritime delimitation: first, to divide the
disputed maritime area into three sectors; second, to delimit the maritime border by “disregarding
the islands of Mbañe, Conga, and Cocotier in order to display the general panorama and trace a
median line between the two territories and then examine the situation of the islands after the line is
traced”131. As you can see on this slide, the proposed delimitation line is completely different from
the one Gabon now alleges was “definitively established” in 1974132, and it leaves those islands on
the Equatoguinean side. If the sovereignty and boundary disputes had been definitively resolved in
1974, Gabon would have invoked a corresponding treaty. It did not do so.
20. It was only two years later, in May 2003, that Gabon pulled out of nowhere a photocopy
of a never previously mentioned document that it claimed to have been signed and concluded in
1974.
21. Mr President, Members of the Court, the minutes of that meeting recorded Equatorial
Guinea’s genuine surprise133.
III. The legal consequences of the Parties’ conduct
22. These are the facts. What are the legal consequences of silence for nearly three decades?
23. First and foremost, the Parties’ conduct reaffirms what Professor Sands has shown: no
treaty was concluded in Bata in September 1974. If the Parties understood themselves to have
concluded such a treaty, they would have relied on it as having resolved their sovereignty and
boundary disputes. Instead, for the next 30 years, the Parties negotiated the very same disputes, never
invoking the alleged 1974 document and always referring to other treaties and legal principles.
24. The legal consequences resulting from the conduct of both Parties are further reinforced
by Gabon’s own conduct as reflected in its consistent failure to invoke the alleged “Bata Convention”
since 1974 in the circumstances calling for its invocation.
131 Ibid., p. 232.
132 RG, para. 5.7.
133 Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Minutes of the Ad-hoc Border Commission Equatorial Guinea-Gabon, Malabo
(23 May 2003), p. 249. MEG, Vol. VII, Annex 213.
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25. If a State confronted with a situation calling for a response fails to respond, this constitutes
acquiescence, indicating agreement or a waiver of rights and precluding the State from denying the
situation thus accepted. The Court addressed similar circumstances in the Temple case. To show that
Thailand had illegally occupied the Cambodian territory, Cambodia invoked a map prepared by a
delimitation commission under the Franco-Siamese Treaty showing the disputed area on the
Cambodian side. Thailand argued that the map was not binding because it had never accepted it. The
Court disagreed. It ruled that by failing to object to the map, Thailand acquiesced in its application.
The Court stated: “it is clear that the circumstances were such as called for some reaction, within a
reasonable period, on the part of the Siamese authorities, if they wished to disagree with the map . . .
They did not do so . . . for many years”134. Thailand was thus “precluded by [its] conduct from
asserting that [it] did not accept [the map]”135.
26. Gabon seeks to distinguish this case by contending that “the Court did not rule on
Thailand’s acquiescence to the existence or validity of [the Franco-Siamese Treaty], which was not
in dispute”136. Gabon misses the point. And the point is that Gabon never invoked the alleged “Bata
Convention” to “protect” what it now calls “the assets gained from Bata”137. For nearly thirty years,
Gabon never invoked the document to support its unlawful claims. For nearly thirty years, Gabon
never invoked the document to protest Equatorial Guinea’s lawful claims. Gabon is now precluded
by its own conduct from making a substantive assertion that, under Article 1 of the Special
Agreement, the piece of paper it first presented in 2003 is a treaty having the force of law between
the Parties. Gabon acquiesced in the absence of a treaty.
27. This brings me to a second principle: a party cannot be permitted to benefit from its own
inconsistencies. “This principle”, as the ILC stressed, “has a particular importance in the law of
treaties”138. It relied on the separate opinion of Judge Alfaro, the Vice-President of the Court, in the
134 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962,
p. 23.
135 Ibid., p. 32.
136 RG, para. 2.41.
137 Ibid., para. 2.43.
138 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its eighteenth session, Yearbook of the International
Law Commission (1966), Vol. II, p. 239.
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Temple case139, who wrote that: “[t]he legal effect of the principle is” that “the party which by its
recognition, . . . conduct or its silence has maintained an attitude manifestly contrary to the right it is
claiming before an international tribunal is precluded from claiming that right”140. The Court has
applied this principle before141.
28. Under this principle, Gabon cannot be permitted to benefit from its own inconsistencies.
As the evidence on the record shows, for nearly thirty years, Gabon never mentioned the alleged
“Bata Convention” as an applicable treaty having the force of law in regard to the Parties’ titles and
boundaries. Instead, it referred to other treaties and legal principles applicable to these matters.
IV. Conclusion
29. Mr President, Members of the Court, the conduct of the Parties over an extended period
does matter. By never mentioning for nearly 30 years the document that Gabon first invoked in 2003,
the Parties’ conduct confirms that no treaty was concluded in 1974. Put simply, Gabon’s contention
that this document has the force of law is not only mistaken; it is also fatally undermined by its own
conduct.
30. I thank you for your kind attention and ask you to invite to the podium Mr Reichler.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr Parkhomenko for his statement. I now invite Mr Paul Reichler
to take the floor. You have the floor, sir.
Mr REICHLER:
THE LEGAL TITLES TO DISPUTED ISLANDS
1. Mr President, Members of the Court, it is, as always, an honour for me to appear before you.
2. Today, I will address the validity of the legal titles that the Parties claim in respect of certain
islands in Corisco Bay, or, in the more precise language of the Compromis, whether the titles to these
islands invoked by the Parties have the force of law.
139 Ibid.
140 Separate opinion of Vice-President Alfaro in case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v.
Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 40.
141 Case concerning the Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Honduras v. Nicaragua),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1960, pp. 213-214; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 832, para. 79.
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3. Corisco Bay and its islands are depicted on your screens now. As my colleague, Mr Smith,
mentioned, the titles to the largest of these islands are not disputed. Both Parties recognize that legal
title to those islands is held by Equatorial Guinea, and not by Gabon. These are Corisco Island, the
largest island with a land area of 14 sq km142, which has historically been a seat of government of the
other islands in the bay143. The other uncontested features are Elobey Grande, Elobey Chico, and two
small islets, Leva and Hoco. Gabon accepts the validity of Equatorial Guinea’s legal title to these
islands and islets, and that they were acquired by succession from Spain, upon Equatorial Guinea’s
independence in 1968.
4. But Gabon does not accept the validity of Equatorial Guinea’s legal title to three other small
islets: Mbañe, comprising 0.07 of a sq km at high tide; Cocoteros, at 0.003 of a sq km; or Conga,
also at 0.003 of a sq km.
5. For Equatorial Guinea, the source of its legal title is the same for them as it is for the other,
larger islands and islets of Corisco Bay: succession from Spain, upon the attainment of independence
in 1968.
6. Gabon disagrees. It argues that during the colonial period both Spain and France claimed
title to them, that the competing claims were never resolved, and that the two successor States —
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon — inherited this unresolved dispute144. Gabon further argues that, in
the circumstances, Equatorial Guinea cannot establish the validity of its title without producing a
treaty or convention in which France ceded the islets to Spain, or otherwise recognized Spain’s title
to them145.
7. Both of Gabon’s arguments are demonstrably wrong. First, as I will show you, the three
islets at issue in this case were not disputed during the colonial period. Spain claimed title to them.
France did not. In fact, France expressly, and repeatedly, recognized Spain’s title to Corisco Island
and all of its dependencies. Second, in the absence of a dispute there was no need for a formal
agreement between Spain and France, and no treaty or convention was required to vest valid legal
142 MEG, Vol. I, para. 2.6.
143 MEG, Vol. I, para. 3.5.
144 CMG, Vol. I, paras. 12, 8.2.
145 RG, Vol. I, para. 4.9.
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title in Spain. The undisputed evidence shows that Spain acquired these insular features by means
long recognized by the Court as valid sources of title — occupation by a colonial Power, agreements
with local rulers, public and notorious assertion of sovereignty without protest, and effective
administration over a prolonged period — and that Equatorial Guinea acquired Spain’s valid legal
title by succession.
8. In the remainder of this speech, I will address: first, the rules established by the Court in its
jurisprudence for determining the validity of legal title to territory, including insular territory; second,
the evidence of Spain’s acquisition and exercise of legal title to the islands of Corisco Bay, including
the three disputed islets, and France’s recognition and acceptance of Spain’s title; and third, the legal
titles to which Equatorial Guinea succeeded upon its independence.
I. The rules for determining the validity of legal title
9. I begin with the applicable rules established in your Judgments in Burkina Faso/Mali and
El Salvador/Honduras, and in the Advisory Opinion in Western Sahara. As Professor d’Argent
pointed out, the Judgment in Burkina Faso/Mali explains that “the concept of title . . . comprehend[s]
both any evidence which may establish the existence of a right, and the actual source of that right”146.
This was reaffirmed in El Salvador/Honduras in the same words147. Both cases are especially relevant
here because they considered the validity of titles obtained by colonial Powers to which their former
colonies succeeded upon independence.
10. In Western Sahara, the Court recognized that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
colonial occupation was “an original means of peaceably acquiring sovereignty over territory
otherwise than by cession or succession”148, and that “agreements with local rulers, whether or not
considered as an actual ‘cession’ of the territory, were regarded as derivative roots of title”149, as was
the “continued display of authority” demonstrated by effective administration and external
recognition150.
146 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 564, para. 18.
147 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1992, pp. 388-389, para. 45.
148 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 39, para. 79.
149 Ibid., p. 39, para. 80.
150 Ibid., pp. 42-43, paras. 91-93, 98, 108, 128.
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11. Spain’s acquisition of legal title and exercise of sovereignty over the islands of Corisco
Bay, including the three disputed islets, satisfies all of these rules.
II. Spain’s legal title to the islands of Corisco Bay
12. The historical evidence begins in 1778, with the Treaty of El Pardo between Spain and
Portugal, whose relevant part is included in your judges’ folders at grey tab 5. Under this treaty,
Spain acquired all of Portugal’s colonial claims in or abutting the Gulf of Guinea, including Corisco
Bay, except for the islands of Saõ Tomé and Príncipe. This map shows the vast continental territory
and two prominent islands, Bioko and Annobón, that were claimed by Portugal and ceded to Spain.
France did not assert claims over any of this land territory until 1838, some 50 years later, and there
is no record that it ever asserted claims to these islands.
13. Gabon argues that the Corisco Bay islands were not formally acquired by Spain under the
Treaty of El Pardo151. We disagree. But this is academic, because the evidence is indisputable that if
Spain did not acquire legal title then, in 1788, it most certainly acquired it subsequently. The evidence
is abundant, and it is uncontroverted.
14. In 1843, after an English warship destroyed a Spanish installation on Corisco Island, Spain
sent a naval expedition to reassert its sovereign control. The commander of the expedition issued this
Declaration asserting Spanish sovereignty, which is at grey tab 6 of your folders:
“Spaniards have been established on the island of Corisco for many years without
any nation disputing their possession and rights . . . [the] entire population has shown
its loyalty to Spain, proclaiming Queen Isabella as their ruler . . .
I DECLARE to Commanders of any nation’s warships that may come to this island of
Corisco: that; for the circumstances described and in the name of the Regent of the
Kingdom . . . I declare it a SPANISH ISLAND and an integral part of the Monarchy.
The display of any other nation’s flag on her is prohibited. All her inhabitants and any
foreigners who trade on her are subject and bound by the current laws governing the
Spanish colonies and those that the Kingdom’s Parliament may enact in the future.”152
15. France made no protest. Subsequently, the Spanish authorities appointed King Baldomero
Boncoro as Pilot of Corisco Bay and Chief of the Southern Point of Corisco Island153. Three years
151 CMG, Vol. I, paras. 1.5, 8.10.
152 MEG, Vol. I, para. 3.3; Kingdom of Spain, Royal Commissioner for the Islands Fernando Póo, Annobón and
Corisco on the Coast of Africa, Declaration of Corisco (16 March 1843). MEG, Vol. V, Annex 110.
153 MEG, Vol. I, para. 3.4.
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later, in 1846, his successor, King Boncoro II, signed a Record of Annexation with the Inspector
General of the Spanish Possessions in the Gulf of Guinea, as the continental and insular territory that
Spain acquired from Portugal were then known. This Record of Annexation is at grey tab 7 of your
folders, in the original handwritten Spanish, in the English translation annexed to the Memorial, and
in a certified corrected translation. It provides:
“ . . . the Island of Corisco, Elobey and their current dependencies are Spanish,
I solemnly promise to respect and obey, without delay and faithfully, all the laws that
Her Majesty the Queen, and the authorities she sends to the possessions of the Gulf of
Guinea, may issue.”154
16. Following this, the Spanish Inspector General issued a “Charter of Spanish Citizenship
given to the inhabitants of Corisco, Elobey and Their Dependencies”, which is at tab 8 of your
folders. This Charter, which was addressed to “all the inhabitants of Corisco” affirmed that “the
Island itself and its dependencies, among which is the island of Elobey, is Spanish”. It goes on to
say, “the inhabitants of Corisco and dependencies enjoy the same protection as Spanish residents of
the motherland; and on the basis of today’s act, those inhabitants should be respected as Spaniards
now that the same territory is part of the Nation . . . ”155 Again, there is no record — no record — of
any protest from France.
17. The evidence establishes that Spain’s public declaration of title to Corisco Island and its
dependencies, and its open exercise of sovereign authority over these islands and islets, were both
continuous and unchallenged. In 1858, for example, Spain’s sovereignty over the islands and islets
of Corisco Bay was proclaimed again, by the Spanish Governor General156. By this time, France’s
colonial enterprise on the mainland, which ran along the Corisco Bay coast, was well established.
Yet, despite their awareness of Spain’s declaration and exercise of sovereign title over Corisco Island
and its dependencies, the French made no protest, no challenge to Spanish authority over the islands
and islets of Corisco Bay.
18. The situation was different on the mainland. There, Spanish and French territorial claims
were in conflict with each other. In 1885, France and Spain appointed a mixed commission to resolve
154 Ibid., para. 3.5; Kingdom of Spain, Ministry of State, Record of Annexation (18 February 1846). MEG, Vol. V,
Annex 112.
155 MEG, Vol. I, para. 3.5; Kingdom of Spain, Ministry of State, Charter of Spanish Citizenship Given to the
Inhabitants of Corisco, Elobey and their Dependencies (18 February 1846), pp. 2-3. MEG, Vol. IV, Annex 47.
156 MEG, Vol. I, para. 3.6.
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their territorial disputes. The Commission met from 1886 to 1891157. It did not address disputes about
Corisco Island, Mbañe, Cocoteros or Conga because there were no disputes about these islands.
19. In fact, France expressly recognized, at least twice during these meetings, that Spain had
annexed Corisco Island and its dependencies by virtue of the Declaration of 1843 at tab 6, which was
on your screens a few moments ago. In December 1886, a French Foreign Ministry report, which is
at tab 9 of your folders, acknowledged that “The geographical dependencies of Corisco are: Laval
[Leva] and the one called Baynia [Mbañe]”158. At tab 10, you will find a similar statement on this
subject by the Head of the French delegation to the French-Spanish Commission in September 1887:
“In effect, the act of 1843 is the one to which Spain owes the annexation of
Corisco and of its natural dependencies, the islets of Laval [Leva] and Baynia [Mbañe],
included in the zone of the territorial waters of that island.”159
20. The Conference adjourned in 1891 without fully resolving the parties’ competing claims
on the mainland. Negotiations resumed in 1900. In the meantime, France provided further evidence
of its recognition of Spain’s legal title to Corisco Island and its dependencies. In 1895, the Spanish
Governor General protested to the Commissaire Général of French Congo certain French actions in
the Bay of Corisco. This protest is at tab 11:
“Furthermore, the fishermen from Corisco have brought to my attention that,
upon traveling to the Embagna [Mbañe] islet, located 6 miles southeast of Corisco
Island, to conduct their fishing activity, they were ordered to leave by a French agent
because France intends to establish a new post at that location. Since Corisco belongs
to Spain, Embagna [Mbañe] is a dependency attached thereto . . . And this is a right that
Spain cannot relinquish, let alone acquiesce to its being supplanted by a French agent’s
occupation, which would constitute a violation of the status quo.”160
21. The French Commissaire Général did not challenge or question Spain’s title to Mbañe. His
response to the Spanish protest merely denied French intentions to establish a post at Mbañe: “The
information that it mentions regarding establishing a post on an islet located 6 miles to the SE of
157 Ibid., para. 3.9.
158 French-Spanish Commission, Conference on the Delimitation in West Africa, Archives of the French Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Annex to Protocol No. 17 (24 December 1886), p. 2. MEG, Vol. III, Annex 11.
159 French-Spanish Commission, Conference on the Delimitation in West Africa, Archives of the French Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Protocol No. 30 (16 September 1887), p. 13. MEG, Vol. III, Annex 3.
160 MEG, Vol. I, para. 3.14; Letter No. 368 from the Spanish Governor-General of Fernando Póo to the General
Commissioner of the French Congo (22 November 1895), pp. 1-2. MEG, Vol. IV, Annex 50.
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Corisco is unfounded.”161 The “status quo” referred to by the Spanish Governor General is reflected
in contemporaneous French maps. This one is from the Atlas of French Colonies, published in
1899162. The Bay of Corisco, Corisco Island, Leva (or Laval) and Mbañe (Baynia) have been
highlighted in yellow. The capital letter “E” after each of these islands stands for Espagne, indicating
that they were recognized as Spanish possessions.
22. When France and Spain resumed negotiations in 1900, they reached agreement on the land
boundaries between their respective colonies, which was embodied in the 1900 Convention163.
Although the Convention is a source of legal title for land territory, it is not for any of the islands.
But it does reflect further French recognition of Spain’s title to them. Article 7 provides:
“In the event that the Spanish government wishes to cede in any way, in whole
or in part, its possessions recognized in articles I and IV of this Convention, as well as
the Elobey Islands and the Island of Corisco, near the border with the French Congo;
the French government shall have the right of first refusal under the same conditions as
those proposed to the Spanish government.”164
23. Gabon argues that the 1900 Convention created Spain’s legal title to Corisco Island and
the Elobeys165. But this argument is defeated by the text of the Convention itself. It says nothing
about granting or ceding title to Spain. It is worded in such a way as to recognize Spain’s title as
pre-existing, by granting France in Article VII a right of first refusal if Spain were ever to wish to
“cede in any way” those islands. Obviously, Spain could only cede territory to which it already held
title.
24. Following the Convention, Spain continued to openly assert its legal title and exercise its
administrative authority over Corisco Island and its dependencies, without challenge or protest from
France. In 1908, the Spanish Governor ordered the Deputy Governor to station guards on Mbañe and
Leva. This is at tab 12 of your folders:
161 MEG, Vol. I, para. 3.15; Letter No. 203 from the Commissioner-General of the Colonial Administration of the
French Republic to the Governor-General of Fernando Póo and Dependencies of the Kingdom of Spain (4 February 1896),
p. 1. MEG, Vol. IV, Annex 51.
162 MEG, Vol. I, para. 3.16, Figure 3.3.
163 Ibid., para. 3.19.
164 Special Convention on the Delimitation of Spanish and French Possessions in Western Africa on Coasts of the
Sahara and the Gulf of Guinea, between the Kingdom of Spain and The French Republic, art. 7 (signed 27 June 1900,
ratified 27 March 1901). MEG, Vol. III, Annex 4.
165 RG, Vol. I, para. 4.36.
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“with regard to the islets of Mbañe and Leva, over which our sovereignty is
indisputable . . . proceed immediately to ensure that they be occupied and our glorious
flag be raised upon them, for which purpose I sent you with this steamer eight guards
that will be based at the post on Corisco, to give service in the occupation of the islets,
with a pair or sentinel of the eight individuals continuously stationed on each one and
the pairs will be relieved weekly.”166
25. Again, there is no record that France challenged Spain’s sovereignty or its continued
exercise of authority over any of the islands and islets of Corisco Bay. This evidence, extending over
more than a century, supports only one conclusion: France recognized and accepted Spain’s legal
title to these islands and islets.
26. The same conclusion can be drawn from the conduct of France and Spain in the 1950s
concerning Cocoteros. In 1953, France requested from Spain permission for a French ship to conduct
a hydrographic survey of Corisco Bay. France’s letter to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at
tab 13 of your folders, stated:
“The French Embassy in Madrid is writing to this Department in order to inform
that the Secretariat of State of the French Navy announces that the Central Hydrographic
Service of the neighbor country would like to obtain the necessary authorization so that
the hydrographic boat called ‘BEAUTEMPS-BEAUPRE’ can visit, without prior
notice, between the months of November and December of 1953 and during the months
of September and December of 1954 and 1955, the different anchorages of Corisco Bay,
located in Territorial Waters of Spanish Guinea.”167
27. Spain permitted the placement of buoys and beacons, provided they were temporary and
France gave notice to the Spanish authorities168. Spain’s response is at tab 14 of your folders.
28. This proceeded smoothly until February 1955, when the Spanish Governor reported to
Madrid that a beacon was being built on Cocoteros under the direction of French colonial
authorities169. In March 1955, after receiving instructions from Madrid, the Spanish Governor
directed the French Territorial Administrator to suspend the work170. The French promptly agreed,
166 MEG, Vol. I, para. 3.21; Letter of the Minister of the Minister of State of the Kingdom of Spain (18 May 1908),
p. 2. MEG, Vol. IV, Annex 59.
167 Letter No. 223 from the Embassy of the Republic of France to the Spanish State to the Spanish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (7 May 1953). MEG, Vol. IV, Annex 79.
168 MEG, Vol. I, para. 3.26; The Spanish State, Letter No. 87 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the
Department of Morocco and Colonies (24 Feb. 1954). MEG, Vol. IV, Annex 81.
169 MEG, Vol. I, para. 3.28; The Spanish State, Letter No. 20-R from the Governor General of Santa Isabel to the
General Directorate of Morocco and Colonies (17 Feb. 1955). MEG, Vol. IV, Annex 83.
170 MEG, Vol. I, para. 3.30; The Spanish State, Telegram No. [ ]11 from the General Directorate of Morocco and
Colonies to the Governor of Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea (8 Mar. 1955). MEG, Vol. IV, Annex 88.
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stopped the work and evacuated the workers and materials171. An internal French government
document, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Overseas France, dated 6 May
1955, explains why. This is at tab 15 of your folders:
“‘Cocotier’ [Cocoteros] must be considered as following the fate of Baynia [Mbañe]
Island, of which it is a geographical dependency . . .
Over the past fifty years, Baynia Island was occupied by the Spanish on several
occasions, without protest or alternate occupation by us.
Baynia Island is located within the six nautical mile-limit forming the boundary of
Spanish territorial waters … the situation of the islet within Corisco’s territorial waters
places us in a disadvantageous basic legal position.”172
29. The following month, in June 1955, France issued this formal Notice to Mariners “[a]s
Spanish sovereignty over Cocoteros Island has been recognized by the French High Officials, the
Cocotiers beacon located in Spanish territory is Spanish”173.
30. Gabon offers no explanation in its written pleadings for these repeated French actions
confirming France’s longstanding position that Spain held legal title to Corisco Island and all its
dependencies, including Mbañe, Cocoteros and Conga.
31. Even after Gabon became independent in 1968, France continued to recognize Spain’s
sovereignty over these islands.
32. In September 1968, the official Institut Géographique National, then an agency of the
French Government, published this map. We have enlarged the portion covering Corisco Bay, so that
you can clearly see that Corisco Island and Mbañe, referred to here as Banie, are expressly described
by the geographic institute of the French Government as pertaining to Equatorial Guinea. This is at
tab 16 of your folders174.
33. The evidence thus leads to two firm conclusions. First, Spain obtained and held legal title
to the islands of Corisco Bay, including the islets of Mbañe, Cocoteros and Conga. Throughout this
171 MEG, Vol. I, paras. 3.30-3.31; The Spanish State, Telegram No. 7 from the Governor of Spanish Territories of
the Gulf of Guinea to the Director-General of Morocco and Colonies (12 Mar. 1955). MEG, Vol. IV, Annex 91; The
Spanish State, Letter from the Governor-General of the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea to the General Directorate
of Morocco and Colonies (17 Mar. 1955). MEG, Vol. IV, Annex 89.
172 MEG, Vol. I, para. 3.32; The French Republic, Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of
Overseas France (6 May 1955), pp. 3-4. MEG, Vol. IV, Annex 94.
173 REG, Vol. I, para. 4.31; Bulletin to Advise Sailors, Bulletin of Information No. 626 (1955), p. 1. REG, Vol. III,
Annex 17.
174 MEG, Vol. I, para. 3.100, fig. 3.25. =
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period, Spain continuously, openly and indisputably displayed — to quote from Western Sahara —
“the intention and will to act as sovereign, and . . . actual exercise or display of such authority”175.
34. Second, France neither had nor claimed to have title to Corisco Island or any of its
dependencies. To the contrary, France recognized and accepted Spain’s title over these islands,
including Mbañe, Cocoteros and Conga.
III. The legal titles to which Equatorial Guinea and Gabon succeeded
35. I come now to the final part of my presentation: the succession of Equatorial Guinea to the
titles held by Spain. Mr President, it is a little bit after 1 p.m. I understand that we have been granted
additional time because of the starting time of our presentation. I will finish my speech as promptly
as I can.
36. Because Spain held legal titles to all the Corisco Bay Islands, including Mbañe, Cocoteros
and Conga, these titles inevitably passed to Equatorial Guinea by succession upon its independence
in 1968176.
37. This is reflected in Equatorial Guinea’s first Constitution, which defined its territory as
including “Corisco . . . and the adjacent islets”177. In September 1970, Equatorial Guinea issued a
decree establishing “the limits of the territorial waters . . . surrounding the Elobey Islands, Corisco
and the Mbañe, Conga and Cocoteros Islets, which are an integral part of the national territory of
Guinea”178. This decree was sent to the United Nations and all Member States, including Gabon.
Gabon did not protest nor did France179. Thereafter, Equatorial Guinea continuously exercised
sovereignty over these islets without any protest until 1972, when, as you have heard, Gabon seized
Mbañe by military force.
175 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 43, para. 92 (quoting Legal Status of Eastern
Greenland, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 53, pp. 45 et seq.).
176 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 566, para. 24.
177 MEG, Vol. I, para. 6.20; Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Constitution of 1968 (11 August 1968), art. 1. MEG,
Vol. VI, Annex 182.
178 Cable from the UN to Permanent Missions (13 October 1970), enclosing Letter from Equatorial Guinea to
UN Secretary-General (8 October 1970). MEG, Vol. III, Annex 23. See also MEG, Vol. I, para. 6.22; Republic of
Equatorial Guinea, Presidential Decree No. 17/1970 (24 September 1970). MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 186.
179 MEG, Vol. I, para. 6.22.
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38. The evidence shows that Gabon, from its independence in 1960 until 1972 recognized and
accepted the validity of Spain’s, and then Equatorial Guinea’s, legal title to the three islets, along
with the rest of the Corisco Bay islands.
39. For example, in 1962 Gabon concluded with Spain a Maritime Protocol confirming Spain’s
sovereign authority for maintaining the maritime signals in all of Corisco Bay, including the beacon
on Cocoteros180. Under this Protocol, Gabon, like France before it, was not allowed to conduct work
on Cocoteros or in the surrounding waters without Spain’s authorization181. This was agreed by
Gabon in its Protocol with Spain. In 1967, Gabon issued an oil concession covering offshore areas.
Pursuant to this concession, Gabon’s licensee requested and received Spanish permission to conduct
seismic surveys on the “islands of Corisco and the rocks of Conga”, which were identified as
“Spanish Guinea islands”182.
40. In 1972, as Mr Smith explained, Gabon suddenly reversed its position and, for the first
time, asserted a claim to Mbañe and the other two islets. To justify this reversal, Gabon claimed that
no other State, including Spain and Equatorial Guinea, had ever held a valid legal title to them. This
is from paragraph 4.61 of Gabon’s Rejoinder:
“When Gabon gained independence in 1960, it inherited a situation where no
legal title to the disputed islands was established.”
41. To justify this remarkable assertion, Gabon has not only ignored the evidence, but invented
new legal rules. In particular, Gabon opposes Spain’s title to the disputed islands on the ground that
“agreements with local indigenous leaders”, can only be a source of title to “inhabited” islands, not
uninhabited islets like Mbañe, Cocoteros, and Conga183. If there is any support for this in the Court’s
jurisprudence, Gabon has failed to identify it. In fact, Gabon’s argument runs contrary to the Court’s
Judgments in El Salvador/Honduras and, farther back, in Minquiers and Ecrehos. In both cases, legal
180 REG, Vol. I, para. 4.37; Implementation Protocol in Compliance with the Maritime Signal Organization for the
Buoyage and Signaling of Corisco Bay and the Muni River (23 May 1962). REG, Vol. III, Annex 1.
181 REG, Vol. I, para. 4.37; Implementation Protocol in Compliance with the Maritime Signal Organization for the
Buoyage and Signaling of Corisco Bay and the Muni River (23 May 1962), art. 2. REG, Vol. III, Annex 1.
182 MEG, Vol. I, para. 3.99; Gulf Oil Company of Gabon, Letter from Mr Rigo de Righi to the Ambassador of Spain
(22 December 1967). MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 147; Gulf Oil Company of Gabon, Letter from Mr Rigo de Righi to the
Ambassador of Spain (28 Dec. 1967). MEG, Vol. VI, Annex 148.
183 RG, Vol. I, para. 4.16.
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title to small islands was based on “effective possession and control”184, or the exercise of “State
functions in respect of the group”185. Both cases also demonstrate that tiny, uninhabited islets may
be regarded as “dependencies” of larger islands in close proximity, such that title to the larger island
carries with it title to the dependency. As the Chamber in El Salvador/Honduras explained: “The
small size of Meanguerita, its contiguity to the larger island, and the fact that it is uninhabited, allow
its characterization as a ‘dependency’ of Meanguera”186. On this basis, having found that El Salvador
held title to Meanguera, the Court ruled that this title extended to Meanguerita.
42. This is precisely the situation of Mbañe, Cocoteros and Conga in relation to Corisco Island.
The evidence in this case shows that the three islets have always been treated as dependencies of
Corisco Island, that legal title to them has always followed from title to Corisco Island, and that only
Spain and then Equatorial Guinea have ever held title to them. It shows that France recognized and
accepted Spain’s and then Equatorial Guinea’s title, as did Gabon from 1960 to 1972. As
Professor Sands and Mr Parkhomenko have fully demonstrated, there is no valid basis for Gabon’s
belated claim of title under the document that first appeared in 2003, nearly 30 years after its
supposed creation.
43. There is, in fact, only one source of title Gabon can invoke that is consistent with the
evidence adduced in this case: military conquest. We came, we saw, we conquered. Fortunately,
international law has evolved considerably since the age of Caesar. There was no United Nations
Charter in Roman times. There was no Article 2 (4). Nor was there a Declaration on Friendly
Relations providing that “[n]o territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be
recognized as legal.”187 In its Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, the Court made clear that “the
prohibition of territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force, as a corollary of the
184 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), Judgment, I.C.J
Reports 1992, p. 579, para. 367.
185 Minquiers and Ecrehos (France/United Kingdom), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 70.
186 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), Judgment, I.C.J
Reports 1992, p. 570, para. 356 (citing to Minquiers and Ecrehos (France/United Kingdom, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1953,
p. 71).
187 UN General Assembly, Resolution 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1970),
pp. 77-78. REG, Vol. III, Annex 6.
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prohibition of the threat or use of force, is a principle of customary international law”188. This means,
quoting again from that Advisory Opinion: “The annexation of occupied territory by an occupying
Power is unlawful”189.
44. As a definitive statement of the law by the world’s highest judicial authority, this principle
must be applied universally. Military invasion, occupation and annexation of another State’s territory
is as unlawful in Corisco Bay as it is elsewhere in the world. It is a scourge that threatens the very
foundations of the precious, but fragile, structure of international law — of which this Court is the
world’s principal guardian. No State should be allowed to benefit from transgression of this
fundamental rule.
45. But that is exactly what would result if Gabon’s unlawful use of force against Equatorial
Guinea and conquest of Equatorial Guinea’s territory were permitted to stand, through recognition
of the legal title Gabon now claims. If valid legal title cannot be obtained through the acquisition of
territory by military force, then it certainly cannot be lawfully acquired in the aftermath of an
unprovoked military invasion and occupation, while the aggressor is occupying the territory with the
intention of retaining it permanently, and in position to dictate terms to the aggrieved State.
46. Mr President, Members of the Court, the evidence, and the law, fully demonstrate that
Equatorial Guinea acquired the islands of Corisco Bay, including Mbañe, Cocoteros and Conga, by
succession from Spain, that these legal titles are valid, and that Gabon has no valid titles to these
islands. This concludes my presentation and that of Equatorial Guinea this morning, and I thank you
for your kind courtesy and patient attention, and especially for allowing me to proceed to this hour,
and I wish you all a most enjoyable lunch. Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr Reichler. The Court will meet again this afternoon, at 3 p.m.,
for the continuation of Equatorial Guinea’s first round of oral argument. The sitting is adjourned.
The Court rose at 1.20 p.m.
___________
188 Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, para. 175.
189 Ibid.