Public sitting held on Friday 26 April 2024, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Salam presiding, in the case concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armenia)

Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2024/24
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 2024
Public sitting
held on Friday 26 April 2024, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Salam presiding,
in the case concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armenia)
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2024
Audience publique
tenue le vendredi 26 avril 2024, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Salam, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention internationale sur l’élimination
de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Azerbaïdjan c. Arménie)
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
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Present: President Salam
Vice-President Sebutinde
Judges Tomka
Abraham
Xue
Bhandari
Iwasawa
Nolte
Charlesworth
Brant
Cleveland
Aurescu
Tladi
Judges ad hoc Daudet
Koroma
Registrar Gautier

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Présents : M. Salam, président
Mme Sebutinde, vice-présidente
MM. Tomka
Abraham
Mme Xue
MM. Bhandari
Iwasawa
Nolte
Mme Charlesworth
M. Brant
Mme Cleveland
MM. Aurescu
Tladi, juges
MM. Daudet
Koroma, juges ad hoc
M. Gautier, greffier

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The Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan is represented by:
HE Mr Elnur Mammadov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Azerbaijan,
as Agent;
HE Mr Rahman Mustafayev, Ambassador of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr Vaughan Lowe, KC, Emeritus Chichele Professor of Public International Law, University of
Oxford, member of the Institut de droit international, Essex Court Chambers, member of the Bar
of England and Wales,
Mr Samuel Wordsworth, KC, Essex Court Chambers, member of the Bar of England and Wales,
member of the Paris Bar,
Ms Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Professor of International Law and International Organization
at the University of Geneva, member of the Institut de droit international, member of Matrix
Chambers,
Mr Stefan Talmon, Professor of International Law, University of Bonn, Barrister, Twenty Essex
Chambers,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr Stephen Fietta, KC, Fietta LLP, Solicitor Advocate of the Senior Courts of England and Wales,
Ms Oonagh Sands, Fietta LLP, member of the Bars of the State of New York and the District of
Columbia, Solicitor Advocate of the Senior Courts of England and Wales,
Mr Luke Tattersall, Essex Court Chambers, member of the Bar of England and Wales,
Ms Eileen Crowley, Fietta LLP, member of the Bar of the State of New York, solicitor of the Senior
Courts of England and Wales,
Mr Gershon Hasin, JSD, Fietta LLP, member of the Bar of the State of New York,
Ms Mercedes Roman, Fietta LLP, member of the Bar of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
Mr Sean Aughey, Essex Court Chambers, member of the Bar of England and Wales,
Mr Aditya Laddha, PhD candidate and assistant, Faculty of Law, University of Geneva,
Ms Miglena Angelova, Fietta LLP, member of the Paris Bar, Solicitor Advocate of the Senior Courts
of England and Wales,
as Counsel;
Mr Nurlan Aliyev, Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
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Le Gouvernement de la République d’Azerbaïdjan est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Elnur Mammadov, ministre adjoint aux affaires étrangères de la République
d’Azerbaïdjan,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Rahman Mustafayev, ambassadeur de la République d’Azerbaïdjan auprès du Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. Vaughan Lowe, KC, professeur émérite de droit international public (chaire Chichele) à
l’Université d’Oxford, membre de l’Institut de droit international, Essex Court Chambers,
membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
M. Samuel Wordsworth, KC, Essex Court Chambers, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de
Galles, et du barreau de Paris,
Mme Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, professeure de droit international et organisation
internationale à l’Université de Genève, membre de l’Institut de droit international, membre de
Matrix Chambers,
M. Stefan Talmon, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Bonn, barrister, Twenty Essex
Chambers,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Stephen Fietta, KC, cabinet Fietta LLP, avocat et solicitor près les juridictions supérieures
d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
Mme Oonagh Sands, cabinet Fietta LLP, membre des barreaux de l’État de New York et du district
de Columbia, avocate et solicitor près les juridictions supérieures d’Angleterre et du pays de
Galles,
M. Luke Tattersall, Essex Court Chambers, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
Mme Eileen Crowley, cabinet Fietta LLP, membre du barreau de l’État de New York, solicitor près
les juridictions supérieures d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
M. Gershon Hasin, JSD, cabinet Fietta LLP, membre du barreau de l’État de New York,
Mme Mercedes Roman, cabinet Fietta LLP, membre du barreau de la République bolivarienne du
Venezuela,
M. Sean Aughey, Essex Court Chambers, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
M. Aditya Laddha, doctorant et assistant à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Genève,
Mme Miglena Angelova, cabinet Fietta LLP, membre du barreau de Paris, avocate et solicitor près
les juridictions supérieures d’Angleterre et du pays de Galles,
comme conseils ;
M. Nurlan Aliyev, conseiller, ambassade de la République d’Azerbaïdjan au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
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Ms Sabina Sadigli, First Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr Vusal Ibrahimov, First Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr Badir Bayramov, Second Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan,
Mr Shahriyar Hajiyev, Second Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan,
as Advisers.
The Government of the Republic of Armenia is represented by:
HE Mr Yeghishe Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal
Matters,
as Agent;
Mr Lawrence H. Martin, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of
Columbia and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Ms Alison Macdonald, KC, Barrister, Essex Court Chambers, London,
Mr Constantinos Salonidis, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the State of
New York and Greece,
Mr Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Professor of International Law, Dean of the Faculty of Law of the
University of Athens, member of the Institut de droit international, member of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration,
Mr Pierre d’Argent, Full Professor, Université catholique de Louvain, member of the Institut de droit
international, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of Brussels,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr Sean Murphy, Manatt/Ahn Professor of International Law, The George Washington University
Law School, associate member of the Institut de droit international, member of the Bar of
Maryland,
Mr Joseph Klingler, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of
Columbia and the State of New York,
Mr Peter Tzeng, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of Columbia
and the State of New York,
Ms Iulia Padeanu Mellon, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of the District of
Columbia and Illinois,
Mr Amir Ardelan Farhadi, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of the State of New
York,
Ms Yasmin Al Ameen, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of the State of New
York,
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Mme Sabina Sadigli, première secrétaire, ambassade de la République d’Azerbaïdjan au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
M. Vusal Ibrahimov, premier secrétaire, ambassade de la République d’Azerbaïdjan au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
M. Badir Bayramov, deuxième secrétaire, ministère des affaires étrangères de la République
d’Azerbaïdjan,
M. Shahriyar Hajiyev, deuxième secrétaire, ministère des affaires étrangères de la République
d’Azerbaïdjan,
comme conseillers.
Le Gouvernement de la République d’Arménie est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Yeghishe Kirakosyan, représentant de la République d’Arménie chargé des affaires
juridiques internationales,
comme agent ;
M. Lawrence H. Martin, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et du Commonwealth du Massachusetts,
Mme Alison Macdonald, KC, barrister, Essex Court Chambers (Londres),
M. Constantinos Salonidis, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux de l’État de
New York et de Grèce,
M. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, professeur de droit international, doyen de la faculté de droit de
l’Université d’Athènes, membre de l’Institut de droit international, membre de la Cour
permanente d’arbitrage,
M. Pierre d’Argent, professeur titulaire à l’Université catholique de Louvain, membre de l’Institut
de droit international, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de Bruxelles,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. Sean Murphy, professeur de droit international titulaire de la chaire Manatt/Ahn à la faculté de
droit de l’Université George Washington, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
membre du barreau du Maryland,
M. Joseph Klingler, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de l’État de New York,
M. Peter Tzeng, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de Columbia
et de l’État de New York,
Mme Iulia Padeanu Mellon, avocate au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre des barreaux du district de
Columbia et de l’Illinois,
M. Amir Ardelan Farhadi, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de l’État de
New York,
Mme Yasmin Al Ameen, avocate au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de l’État de
New York,
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Ms Diem Huong Ho, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bars of England and Wales
and the State of New York,
Mr Harout Ekmanian, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of the State of New
York,
Ms María Camila Rincón, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP, member of the Bar of Colombia,
as Counsel;
HE Mr Viktor Biyagov, Ambassador of the Republic of Armenia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
HE Mr Andranik Hovhannisyan, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Armenia to the
United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva,
Mr Liparit Drmeyan, Head of the Office of the Representative of the Republic of Armenia on
International Legal Matters, Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia,
Mr Aram Aramyan, Head of the Department of Protection of the Interests of the Republic of Armenia
in Interstate Disputes, Office of the Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International
Legal Matters, Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia,
Ms Kristine Khanazadyan, Head of the Department for Representation of the Interests of the
Republic of Armenia before International Arbitral Tribunals and Foreign Courts, Office of the
Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters, Office of the Prime
Minister of the Republic of Armenia,
Ms Zoya Stepanyan, Head of the International Human Rights Cooperation Division, Department for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Viviana Kalaejian, Third Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Armenia in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Nanami Hirata, Attorney at Law, Foley Hoag LLP,
as Advisers;
Ms Jennifer Schoppmann, Foley Hoag LLP,
Ms Deborah Langley, Foley Hoag LLP,
as Assistants.
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Mme Diem Huong Ho, avocate au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau d’Angleterre et du
pays de Galles ainsi que du barreau de l’État de New York,
M. Harout Ekmanian, avocat au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de l’État de New York,
Mme María Camila Rincón, avocate au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP, membre du barreau de Colombie,
comme conseils ;
S. Exc. M. Viktor Biyagov, ambassadeur de la République d’Arménie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
S. Exc. M. Andranik Hovhannisyan, représentant permanent de la République d’Arménie auprès de
l’Office des Nations Unies et des autres organisations internationales à Genève,
M. Liparit Drmeyan, chef du bureau du représentant de la République d’Arménie chargé des affaires
juridiques internationales, cabinet du premier ministre de la République d’Arménie,
M. Aram Aramyan, directeur du département de la protection des intérêts de la République
d’Arménie dans les différends interétatiques, bureau du représentant de la République d’Arménie
chargé des affaires juridiques internationales, cabinet du premier ministre de la République
d’Arménie,
Mme Kristine Khanazadyan, directrice du département chargé de la représentation des intérêts de la
République d’Arménie devant les tribunaux arbitraux internationaux et les juridictions étrangères,
bureau du représentant de la République d’Arménie chargé des affaires juridiques internationales,
cabinet du premier ministre de la République d’Arménie,
Mme Zoya Stepanyan, cheffe de la division de la coopération internationale en matière des droits de
l’homme, département des droits de l’homme et des affaires humanitaires, ministère des affaires
étrangères,
Mme Viviana Kalaejian, troisième secrétaire, ambassade de la République d’Arménie au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
Mme Nanami Hirata, avocate au cabinet Foley Hoag LLP,
comme conseillers ;
Mme Jennifer Schoppmann, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP,
Mme Deborah Langley, cabinet Foley Hoag LLP,
comme assistantes.
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The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open.
For reasons duly made known to me, Judges Yusuf and Gómez Robledo are unable to sit with
us today. The Court meets this morning to hear the second round of oral argument of the Republic
of Azerbaijan on the preliminary objections raised by the Respondent in the case concerning
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Azerbaijan v. Armenia). I shall now give the floor to Mr Vaughan Lowe. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr LOWE:
TEMPORAL JURISDICTION
Introduction
1. Mr President, Members of the Court, Armenia’s request was spelled out in its initial
formulation in paragraph 143 of its Preliminary Objections; and in its current formulation it was set
out in the final submissions of its Agent on Wednesday afternoon1.
2. The short answer to Armenia’s case is that both Parties are agreed that there is no objection
on grounds either of jurisdiction ratione temporis or of admissibility to Azerbaijan’s claims
concerning acts and omissions that had not been “completed” by September 1996.
3. There is no dispute that Azerbaijan has such post-1996 claims. Armenia addressed some of
them on Wednesday  the claims concerning the laying of landmines and booby traps during the
2020s; the failure to act against hate speech; the obstruction of the return of Azerbaijanis and the
looting and destruction of cultural artefacts, which indisputably occurred after 1996. The
dispossession of property throughout the years of the occupation, which international courts have
consistently treated as a continuing wrong, is another obvious example2.
4. Therefore this case must go ahead to a hearing on the merits. The only question is whether
some aspects of Azerbaijan’s claims are excluded.
5. Azerbaijan agrees that the Court can and should make determinations now concerning, first,
its jurisdiction over Azerbaijan’s case ratione materiae, in so far as it relates to landmines, booby
traps and environmental harm, and, second, the scope of its jurisdiction ratione temporis, that is on
1 CR 2024/23, pp. 46-47, para. 11 (a)-(d) (Kirakosyan).
2 E.g. Cyprus v. Turkey (Application no. 25781/94), GC, 10 May 2001, paras. 175, 189, 269.
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the question whether in this case Armenia can in principle bear responsibility for any conduct
completed after 23 July 1993 or only for conduct completed after 15 September 1996. These matters
have a preliminary character that can be decided now, although their impact on Azerbaijan’s case is,
at most, marginal.
6. Those determinations will help the Parties focus their forthcoming written pleadings. The
effect of the answers to these questions on Azerbaijan’s claims is something to be addressed in the
Counter-Memorial and subsequent written pleadings and at the hearing on the merits. But there is no
doubt that Azerbaijan’s CERD case will go ahead.
Azerbaijan maintains the claims outlined in its Application
7. Armenia has repeatedly mischaracterized Azerbaijan’s case, and each time Azerbaijan
explains what its case actually is, in the face of Armenia’s misunderstanding, Armenia complains
that Azerbaijan is changing its case.
8. In both rounds of its submissions this week, Armenia tried to reformulate Azerbaijan’s
CERD complaint in an attempt to bolster its ratione materiae and ratione temporis objections.
9. Armenia tried to convince you that Azerbaijan has failed to demonstrate that Armenia’s
landmines, booby traps and environmental destruction formed part of a campaign of ethnic cleansing
and cultural eradication. But these are issues for the merits. Indeed, watching Armenia’s slide
presentation on Wednesday, with its multiplicity of maps and colourful overlays, it was hard to
believe that this is a hearing on preliminary objections rather than on the merits.
10. Azerbaijan has not changed its case. Azerbaijan’s case has always centred upon Armenia’s
30-year campaign of ethnic cleansing and cultural erasure, including both the forcible and collective
expulsion and displacement of Azerbaijanis and the prevention of their return. Azerbaijan has always
presented Armenia’s deployment of landmines and booby traps, and its destruction and pillage of the
environment and resources of the formerly occupied areas, as being among the many elements of the
30-year campaign. This was made perfectly clear in Azerbaijan’s letter of 8 December 2020
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informing Armenia of its CERD complaint3; in Azerbaijan’s Application to the Court in
September 20214; in Azerbaijan’s Memorial in January 20235; and in its submissions this week.
11. Azerbaijan has set out (i) the facts on which it relies, and (ii) the provisions of the CERD
that it says are violated by those facts. As written and oral submissions have been exchanged, it has
refined or clarified its case. That is what rounds of submissions and phases of proceedings are for:
the clarification of the precise legal questions on which the parties disagree. But the allegation that
sits at the heart of Azerbaijan’s CERD complaint has not changed. This Armenia has long known,
despite its claim that these proceedings took it completely by surprise even as it prepared its own
CERD claim against Azerbaijan. Professor Talmon will say more on that shortly.
Azerbaijan’s submissions this morning
12. Both Parties are agreed that this case will go forward to a merits hearing and the response
by Azerbaijan could stop at this point. But Armenia made a number of further points to which it is
convenient to respond at this stage.
(a) I shall address the ratione temporis objection.
(b) Professor Talmon will then address the objections to admissibility.
(c) The legal and factual aspects of Armenia’s objection relating to landmines and booby traps will
be addressed by Mr Wordsworth and Mr Aughey, respectively.
(d) Professor Boisson de Chazournes will address the ratione materiae objection concerning
environmental harm.
Armenia’s objection ratione temporis
13. Mr Martin repeated more than once that Armenia’s assertion that the ethnic cleansing
campaign had ended by 1994. It may become clearer at the merits stage why Armenia is so keen to
exclude the First Garabagh War from the Court’s view, but three points can be made at this stage:
3 Annex 6 to the Application of Azerbaijan, Letter from Jeyhun Bayramov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Azerbaijan, to Ara Aivazian, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, dated 8 December 2020,
ref. 0540/27/20/22.
4 Application of Azerbaijan, para. 17.
5 Memorial of Azerbaijan, para. 4.
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(a) First, a campaign of ethnic cleansing is not over and done with the minute the last resident is
pushed over the border. It continues when steps are taken to prevent or otherwise frustrate the
residents’ return, and to import and maintain new residents in their place. It continues as the
occupying Power makes former cities, towns and villages uninhabitable, or destroys the
infrastructure or the cultural buildings and artefacts, or the environment and natural resources
that have sustained the community prior to its expulsion. Ethnic cleansing is not an “act”: it is a
strategy, a policy, a campaign, and in this case it continued after 1994, and after 1996, and up
until recent months.
(b) Second, Azerbaijan’s claim concerning a violation of the CERD by conducting a campaign of
ethnic cleansing no more precludes or extinguishes Azerbaijan’s separate claims relating, for
example, to the promotion of racial hatred and incitement to violence, or to the failure to provide
protection and remedies against racially discriminatory acts, than a claim concerning apartheid
would extinguish claims concerning individual racially motivated murders. The ethnic cleansing
claim stands alongside these other claims in this case.
(c) Third, it is indisputable that these other claims, such as deprivation of property, incitement of
racial hatred, and the prevention of the return of displaced Azerbaijanis to the Garabagh region,
continued for many years after 1994 or 1996, throughout the Armenian occupation and even
beyond. This is the key point. Whatever questions Armenia may raise around the margins,
Azerbaijan’s case is essentially about the fact that Armenia has been violating its CERD
obligations on a continuing basis throughout the past thirty years or so.
14. Armenia presented arguments as to what could and could not be part of a “composite
breach” in this case6, but it had very little to say about Azerbaijan’s main point on jurisdiction, which
relates to continuing breaches and the fact that the breaches in this case continued long after even
Armenia’s preferred critical date of 1996.
15. A detailed consideration of which specific aggregations of facts constitute “composite
breaches” in the present case is a matter for the merits phase. So is the question of which specific
conduct constitutes a continuing breach of the CERD. But what is important at this stage is that there
6 CR 2024/23, p. 15, para. 25 (Martin).
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is neither a basis, nor even a request from Armenia, for a ruling that composite and continuing claims
extending beyond 1996 are outside the Court’s jurisdiction, or inadmissible.
16. Mr Martin spent most of his time on Wednesday on his erga omnes partes argument,
though it is of relatively minor importance to Azerbaijan’s case because it only affects conduct
completed between July 1993 and September 1996, and leaves continuing acts, including composite
acts, unaffected.
17. There is, nonetheless, a real legal question here. Armenia says that a State party 
Azerbaijan  can only pursue a dispute settlement procedure in respect of conduct occurring after
the CERD enters into force for it, regardless of how much earlier the respondent State was bound by
the Convention. Azerbaijan says that once the CERD enters into force for a State (i) it can pursue the
procedure in respect of any question concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention,
regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred, but (ii) no State party can be held in breach of
the CERD for any conduct completed before the Convention entered into force for that party. It is a
narrow and peripheral question, which has no bearing on Azerbaijan’s ethnic cleansing claim and
could only affect any isolated acts that were completed between July 1993 and September 1996. But
it is at least a real question.
18. You have heard the Parties’ submissions on the matter. Azerbaijan maintains that its
understanding of the position fits with the ordinary meaning of the words of Article 22; and we note
that even on Wednesday Armenia did not argue that the application of the rules on treaty
interpretation in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention leads to any different conclusion. Armenia
simply asserts that the drafters of the CERD could not have intended to establish a position contrary
to that now advanced by Armenia, in which Azerbaijan cannot point to breaches of the CERD by
Armenia between the dates of Armenia’s ratification in 1993 and Azerbaijan’s ratification in 1996.
19. Though Armenia sees things differently, Azerbaijan sees nothing unfair or irrational, let
alone absurd7, in a State that has accepted legal obligations being thenceforth expected to comply
with them.
7 Ibid., p. 12, para. 10 (Martin).
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20. I should note two further points. First, in its Application, Azerbaijan does not ask the Court
to say that Armenia breached Azerbaijan’s rights, but rather that Armenia breached its obligations
under the CERD. The distinction is important.
21. Second, Armenia seems to view the CERD as a network of bilateral contractual “package
deal[s]” between these States parties8. This is at odds with the plain language of CERD, whose
obligations to eliminate racial discrimination are not expressed as or limited to inter partes
obligations, but rather  as its preamble repeatedly emphasizes  apply to “all human beings”, with
a view to eliminating racial discrimination “throughout the world in all its forms”.
22. As we recalled on Tuesday, the Court itself explained many years ago that in conventions
of this kind “one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the
maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties”9.
23. Armenia surely cannot seriously suggest that its obligation to eliminate racial
discrimination as from 23 July 1993 applied only to the select nationals of those States parties who
were also bound by the Convention as at that date  for example, looking at Armenia’s table of
CERD ratifications, that Armenia remained free to discriminate against South Africans, but not
Ethiopians, or against Americans, but not French nationals, or against Japanese, but not Chinese
nationals.
24. More fundamentally, the CERD is not all about us. Conventions such as the CERD are not
only about States. They are designed for the protection of individuals: that is their purpose10. That is
why the human rights instruments have  and emphasize the importance of having  collective
enforcement mechanisms.
25. Mr Martin also referred to a 2005 resolution of the Institut de droit International.
Interesting as the work of the Institut always is, there are many loose threads here. For example,
Article 2 refers to “States to which the obligation is owed”, not “States to which the obligation was
8 Ibid., pp. 14-15, para. 24 (Martin).
9 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion,
I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23.
10 See Jadhav (India v. Pakistan), Provisional Measures, Order of 18 May 2017, I.C.J. Reports 2017, p. 243,
para. 48: “The Court considers that these measures are aimed at preserving the rights of India and of Mr. Jadhav under
Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention. Therefore, a link exists between the rights claimed by India and the
provisional measures being sought.” (Emphasis added.)
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owed at the time of the act complained of”; and Article 6 says that this is all without prejudice to the
rights and remedies pertaining to a State which is specially affected by the breach of an obligation
erga omnes  as Azerbaijan is obviously “specially affected” here.
26. But because this argument is of such marginal importance, and the Institut text seems to
have left no discernible footprint on the sands of State practice, Azerbaijan leaves the matter there
and invites the Court to decide this question on the basis of the Parties’ respective submissions, in so
far as it considers that it needs to decide it at all.
27. That, Sir, brings my submission on behalf of Azerbaijan to an end. I thank the Court for
its attention, and ask that you call Professor Talmon to the lectern.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr Vaughan Lowe for his statement. I now invite Mr Stefan
Talmon to take the floor. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr TALMON:
ADMISSIBILITY OF AZERBAIJAN’S CLAIMS RELATING TO EVENTS
PRIOR TO 15 SEPTEMBER 1996
1. Monsieur le président, Madam Vice-President, distinguished Members of the Court, my
task is once again to respond to Armenia’s admissibility objection.
2. The Parties agree that a delay, if any, is only relevant if it is detrimental to the respondent,
and it is only detrimental if the respondent could have a reasonable expectation that a claim would
no longer be pursued11.
3. Armenia claims that it had a reasonable expectation that no claim would be brought by
Azerbaijan with regard to Armenia’s campaign of ethnic cleansing that allegedly took place only
before 15 September 1996.
4. I would invite you, Members of the Court, to pause for a moment, take a step back and ask
yourself this question: how can a State forcibly seize a fifth of the territory of another State; kill some
23,000 of its nationals; cause some 3,900 of its nationals to go missing; ethnically cleanse a whole
area; drive one million people from their homes, deprive them of their property; destroy their cultural
11 CR 2024/23, p. 18, para. 1 (d’Argent).
- 17 -
heritage; loot their natural resources; and then stand up and claim with a straight face that it has a
reasonable expectation that no claim would be brought against it? It cannot, but that is exactly what
Armenia has been doing the last few days.
5. Armenia bases its purported reasonable expectation on the fact that the latest letter to the
United Nations referred in the transcript of my speech on Tuesday dates from 25 August 199712.
However, these letters to the United Nations were only given as examples to show that from 23 July
1993, when Armenia became a party to CERD, Azerbaijan had registered its grievances about
Armenia’s ethnic cleansing campaign with the United Nations and asked for these grievances to be
made known to the international community, including Armenia. Numerous other letters could be
provided. If one searches the UN Official Document System for the terms “Armenia”, “ethnic
cleansing” and “Karabakh”, some 224 documents are shown for the period between July 1993 and
September 202113.
6. For example, in January 1999, Azerbaijan wrote to the Human Rights Commission that “[a]s
a result of the policy of the Republic of Armenia of aggression and ethnic cleansing against
Azerbaijan, the rights and freedoms of 1 million Azerbaijanis . . . continue to be gravely violated on
a daily basis”14. In 2005, Azerbaijan intervened in the case of Chiragov and Others v. Armenia before
the European Court of Human Rights, submitting that there were “continuing violations” by Armenia
of, inter alia, the prohibition on discrimination15. Azerbaijan based the violations on the fact that
“Azerbaijani internally displaced persons . . . were physically prevented from returning home
through the deployment of Armenian military forces and land mines on the Line of Contact”16. And
in 2007 and 2012 Azerbaijan submitted extensive reports to the United Nations “on the international
12 CR 2024/23, p. 21, para. 5 (d’Argent).
13 United Nations, Official Document System, https://documents.un.org/.
14 Letter dated 4 January 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations Office at
Geneva addressed to the Secretariat of the fifty-fifth session of the Commission on Human Rights, UN doc.
E/CN.4/1999/116, 3 February 1999, p. 2.
15 European Court of Human Rights, Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [Grand Chamber], application no. 13216/05,
decision of 14 December 2011, para. 92.
16 Ibid.
- 18 -
legal rights of the Azerbaijani internally displaced persons and the Republic of Armenia’s
responsibility”17.
7. Armenia dismisses the letters and documents sent to the United Nations because they
allegedly referred to “‘ethnic cleansing’ which took place and was already completed in 1994”18.
Does this mean that claims with regard to ethnic cleansing can be made only during the time when
the cleansing is actually underway? That cannot be correct. In any case, as Professor Lowe has
shown, Armenia’s ethnic cleansing campaign was by no means completed in 1994.
8. Armenia also tries to brush aside these constant reminders of its ethnic cleansing campaign
by introducing the new admissibility requirement of “a proper legal claim”19. In Armenia’s view, a
claim is only to be admissible if a “legal claim” has been presented to the respondent without delay.
9. For such a proper legal claim, it is not enough that grievances are raised or that the factual
situation is presented nor even that these facts are described in legal terms as ethnic cleansing. No 
such a proper legal claim must, according to Armenia, mention the CERD, formulate a specific
request for remedies and specifically invoke the international responsibility of the Republic of
Armenia and not just its leaders.
10. This last point undoubtedly marks the height of legal sophistry in Armenia’s argument.
What more do you need to invoke the international responsibility of a State for ethnic cleansing than
accuse its State organs of the act and ask for remedial action? In any case, there are numerous
examples of Azerbaijan expressly accusing the Republic of Armenia of ethnic cleansing20.
17 Report on the international legal rights of the Azerbaijani internally displaced persons and the Republic of
Armenia’s responsibility, annexed to Letter dated 30 April 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN doc. A /66/787– S /2012/289, 3 May 2012; Military occupation of
the territory of Azerbaijan: a legal appraisal, annexed to Letter dated 8 October 2007 from the Permanent Representative
of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN doc. A /62/491– S /2007/615, 23 October
2007.
18 CR 2024/23, p. 19, para. 4 (d’Argent).
19 CR 2024/23, p. 20, para. 4 (d’Argent). See also ibid., p. 18, para. 2 (d’Argent).
20 See e.g. United Nations, Letter dated 9 July 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/53/172 – E/1998/86, 10 July 1998, Annex; Council of Europe,
Committee of Ministers, Minutes, 114th Session, 12-13 May 2004, doc. CM(2004)PV1-final (Confidential) 3 May 2005,
https://search.coe.int/cm/pages/result_details.aspx?objectid=09000016805da6d2.
- 19 -
11. While according to the Court in Georgia v. Russia raising grievances related to the subjectmatter
of the CERD is sufficient for there to be a dispute under CERD21, this does not suffice for
Armenia’s new requirement of a proper legal claim.
12. Armenia, of course, did not tell the Court when exactly such a proper legal claim should
have been made in order to prevent a reasonable expectation that no claim would be brought  on
15 September 1996, on 15 September 2006 or at any other date?
13. Such a proper legal claim was allegedly made in the Nauru case on four occasions22, but
all Nauru did was to state in general terms that it was Australia’s “responsibility to rehabilitate one
third of the island”23. No legal basis, no specific request.
14. Armenia’s new admissibility requirement has no basis in the Court’s jurisprudence or in
the work of the ILC. It is not about whether or when a proper legal claim has been presented but
whether the respondent State could have reasonably expected that a claim would no longer be
presented. Armenia could not have developed such a reasonable expectation.
15. Armenia also submitted that there were no circumstances that could excuse Azerbaijan’s
delay in submitting its claim. The question of excuse, however, does not arise. As long as there was
no reasonable expectation on the part of Armenia, Azerbaijan could bring its claim at any time.
16. But as I stated on Tuesday, there were good reasons for Azerbaijan to wait with the
submission of its Application until it could gather evidence in the territories that had been under
Armenian occupation for more than twenty-six years. Armenia asserted that “it was difficult to see
why access to the territory to collect specific evidence was necessary”24. But it is precisely a
campaign of ethnic cleansing  in contrast to the expulsion of a single Azerbaijani  that requires
the collection and preservation of evidence in the ethnically cleansed area. It is the desecrated
cemeteries, the booby-trapped private homes, the mines planted in the agricultural fields, the
vandalized religious buildings and the cut-down ancient monument trees that prove the campaign 
21 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v.
Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 133, para. 161.
22 CR 2024/23, p. 20, para. 4 (d’Argent).
23 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992,
p. 254, para. 33.
24 CR 2024/23, p. 22, para. 10 (d’Argent).
- 20 -
that evidence is, of course, only available in the territory from which the local population was
cleansed.
17. Let me finally briefly turn to Armenia’s argument that it was disadvantaged in mounting a
defence to Azerbaijan’s claims despite having had control for over twenty-six years. Armenia must
surely have collected evidence to defend itself before the European Court of Human Rights in cases
concerning violations of the European Convention on Human Rights with regard to the First
Garabagh War25.
18. Armenia’s argument that it did not need to prepare its defence because it could reasonably
expect that no claim would be made is purely self-serving. If it really thought that occupying and
ethnically cleansing a fifth of the territory of Azerbaijan and proceeding to erase all signs of
Azerbaijani culture in the area would not give rise to any claim, then this is entirely Armenia’s fault
and cannot prevent Azerbaijan from bringing a claim under CERD.
19. Members of the Court, I thank you for your kind attention.
20. Mr President, may I ask you to call on Mr Wordsworth to respond to Armenia’s second
preliminary objection.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr Talmon for his statement. I now invite Mr Samuel Wordsworth
to take the floor. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr WORDSWORTH:
AZERBAIJAN’S RESPONSE TO ARMENIA’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION CONCERNING
“AZERBAIJAN’S CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS CONCERNING LANDMINES
AND BOOBY TRAPS” (LEGAL ISSUES)
1. Thank you, Sir. Mr President, Members of the Court, I have four short points to make in
response to Armenia’s misconceived objection ratione materiae to what it wishes still to portray as
a discrete claim concerning landmines and booby traps26. There is by contrast nothing to respond to
on Armenia’s curious argument that landmines and booby traps cannot fall within a CERD claim as
they are not themselves capable of discrimination, and likewise its incorrect interpretation of
25 See European Court of Human Rights, Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [Grand Chamber], application
no. 13216/05, decision of 14 December 2011; Samadov v. Armenia (dec.), application no. 36606/08, 26 January 2021.
26 Preliminary Objections of Armenia, p. 41, heading, and para. 80; CR 2024/23, p. 23, para. 1 (Salonidis).
- 21 -
Article 1 (1) as a rigid two-step test27. This line of argument, it appears, quite correctly, has been
abandoned.
A. Introduction
2. First, then, and by way of introduction, it is useful to recall the difference between the two
Parties’ jurisdictional objections ratione materiae concerning military force.
3. Azerbaijan objects to the assertion of jurisdiction over Armenia’s claim concerning alleged
killings and violence during the active hostilities phases of an armed conflict because this is put
forward by Armenia as a free-standing claim of CERD, and Azerbaijan considers that alleged
unlawful use of cluster bombs and indiscriminate shelling is, where presented as a free-standing
claim, a matter for the rules of international humanitarian law. However, to the extent that Armenia
wishes to rely on evidence of the use of cluster bombs and indiscriminate shelling as part of the
evidence to support its separate and broader claim of breach of CERD through an alleged practice of
ethnic cleansing, Azerbaijan has made no objection28. It considers that it would have no basis for
doing so  it is up to Armenia to put forward the evidence it wishes to support a claim concerning
a practice of ethnic cleansing, and all agree that such a claim is capable of engaging CERD.
4. Precisely the same applies to Azerbaijan’s claim concerning Armenia’s breach of CERD
through its campaign of ethnic cleansing. It is up to Azerbaijan to put forward the evidence it wishes
to support its claim, which includes evidence of the pursuit of this campaign through military means,
including through the planting of landmines and booby traps to prevent the return of ethnic
Azerbaijanis to the areas unlawfully occupied by the former illegal régime. This should be the end
of the matter.
5. But, because of the obvious force of this point, Armenia seeks to recharacterize Azerbaijan’s
reliance on conduct and evidence with respect to landmines and booby traps as a free-standing claim,
despite the fact that no such claim has been made.
27 Cf. CR 2024/22, pp. 38-39, paras. 2-5 (Wordsworth).
28 Memorial of Armenia, para. 6.19 et seq.
- 22 -
B. The Court’s correct characterization of Azerbaijan’s claim
6. This leads me to my second point: the Court has correctly noted, in two separate Orders,
that, as to Armenia’s alleged conduct concerning landmines and booby traps, “Azerbaijan claims that
this conduct is part of a longstanding campaign of ethnic cleansing”29. Armenia’s response is to
suggest that you should ignore your own past Orders30, although the characterization in those Orders
is also the only one that could be available from the wording of the submissions in Azerbaijan’s
Memorial31.
7. The suggested basis for the Court ignoring its past characterization is a misapplication of
the long-standing jurisprudence on the real nature of the dispute, through which the Court seeks “to
determine on an objective basis the subject-matter of the dispute between the parties, by isolating the
real issue in the case and identifying the object of the claim”32. But there is no issue here as to any of
this.
(a) As correctly identified by the Court, the claim is of a campaign of ethnic cleansing, with the
laying of landmines and booby traps being conduct presented as part of the evidence of that
campaign.
(b) Armenia does not suggest that there is no genuine ethnic cleansing claim before you, and it would
be absurd to suggest that the “real issue” in the case is not ethnic cleansing at all, but rather some
discrete but disguised claim confined to landmines and booby traps.
8. I would also add that it is simply incorrect for Mr Salonidis to assert that Azerbaijan “did
not address the abundance of evidence that I pointed to on Monday” (emphasis in original). Armenia
is simply electing to ignore what we said in response on Tuesday, alongside the various references
that we pointed the Court to33.
29 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Azerbaijan v. Armenia), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 425, para. 53. See also
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v.
Armenia), Provisional Measures, Order of 22 February 2023, paras. 22-23.
30 CR 2024/23, p. 24, para. 3 (Salonidis).
31 Memorial of Azerbaijan, para. 591 (1) (a).
32 See e.g. Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (II), p. 575, para. 24, relied on at CR 2024/23, p. 24, para. 3
(Salonidis).
33 CR 2024/23, p. 24, para. 4 (Salonidis); cf. CR 2024/22, p. 42, para. 20, and fn. 103 (Wordsworth).
- 23 -
9. Finally, on this point, there was a brief but baffling reference to certain irrelevant lines of
jurisprudence concerning the submissions of disputing parties:
(a) Reference was made to the Court’s past cases concerning its power to exclude from a party’s
submissions contentions which are not indications of what the party is asking the Court to decide,
but are rather “reasons advanced why the Court should decide in the sense contended for by that
party”34. But it is Armenia, not Azerbaijan, that is quite bizarrely seeking to include within
Azerbaijan’s submissions what are indeed “reasons advanced why the Court should decide in the
sense contended for” by Azerbaijan.
(b) Reference was also made to the ICAO Council case and the situation where a respondent State
seeks to cast the submissions in its defence in such a way as to alter the nature of the dispute35.
To recall the rather obvious point that Azerbaijan is the claimant, not the respondent, so there is
no question of the Court being asked to characterize a claim by looking at submissions made in
a defence.
C. Armenia’s misplaced reliance on Certain Iranian Assets and Diallo
10. My third point concerns Armenia’s misplaced reliance on the Court’s rejection of certain
of the claims made in Certain Iranian Assets and the Diallo case36.
(a) In the former, Iran had a number of free-standing claims of breach of the Treaty of Amity
expressly concerning the failure to accord sovereign immunity to Iran and Iranian companies37.
The Court rejected those claims when it held that the Treaty did not offer protection with respect
to sovereign immunity38.
34 CR 2024/23, pp. 24-25, para. 5 (Salonidis), referring to Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of
the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 449, para. 32 (and to related cases).
35 CR 2024/23, pp. 24-25, para. 5 (Salonidis), referring to Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of
the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 449, para. 32 (and to related cases), and also referring to Appeal Relating to
the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1972, p. 61, para. 27.
36 CR 2024/23, pp. 25-26, paras. 6-8 (Salonidis).
37 Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2019 (I), pp. 17-18, para. 14 (a) (ii), (d) and (e), and see also paras. 33 and 48-80.
38 Ibid, pp. 25-35, paras. 48-80.
- 24 -
(b) In Diallo, likewise, Guinea made a number of claims, including an express claim with respect to
deprivation of the rights of Mr Diallo as shareholder39, and the Court accepted that this claim was
admissible40.
11. All the Court is doing in such cases is to identify, by reference to the claims actually made
by the claimants, which claims are within jurisdiction and admissible, and which are not. Armenia
has not pointed to, and cannot point to, any case where the Court has sought to strip out from a claim
that is accepted to be within its jurisdiction, through I guess some form of unknown power of strikeout,
an element of evidence and allegation of fact that a claimant considers relevant to the claim that
it has in fact made.
D. Armenia’s misplaced reliance on the Court’s finding on plausibility
12. My final point concerns Armenia’s continued reliance on the Court’s past Orders in this
case concerning plausibility.
13. Mr Salonidis sought to draw out a distinction in the different phases of the Ukraine v.
Russia ICSFT case between statements of the Court concerning the plausibility of rights and the
plausibility of claims41. If there is a relevant distinction, it is not one that assists Armenia. The point,
if we understood it correctly, is that if the Court finds that there are no plausible rights at the
provisional measures phase, it should generally not be accepting jurisdiction ratione materiae over
claims based on those rights. But that is precisely what the Court did in the Ukraine v. Russia case,
and on the express basis that an assessment of plausibility of claims was generally inappropriate at
the jurisdictional stage42.
14. Notably, it was also asserted that “the Court has already twice found that the alleged rights
asserted by Azerbaijan with respect to landmines and booby traps are not plausible”43. There was
again no attempt to look at what the Orders of December 2021 and February 2023 actually say, or to
39 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 588, para. 11 (1).
40 Ibid, p. 607, para. 67.
41 CR 2024/23, p. 27, para. 13 (Salonidis).
42 Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (II), p. 584, para. 58.
43 CR 2024/23, p. 27, para. 14 (Salonidis).
- 25 -
address our point that there the Court was focused specifically on the plausibility of obligations with
respect to the interim remedies then being sought by Azerbaijan.
15. As we explained on Tuesday, and as was not challenged, the Court expressly recognized
in both Orders that “a policy of driving persons of a certain national or ethnic origin from a particular
area, as well as preventing their return thereto, can implicate rights under CERD and that such a
policy can be effected through a variety of military means”44. So the existence of potential rights was
expressly recognized. What the Court did not accept was that the CERD plausibly imposed
obligations on Armenia to provide assistance with de-mining and the like, and that concerns the
plausibility of the interim remedies then being sought by Azerbaijan. The question of whether rights
are engaged under a treaty, and the remedies that might then follow in a case of breach, are entirely
separate matters.
16. As to Armenia’s campaign of ethnic cleansing, so far as is relevant, Azerbaijan seeks
declaratory relief. Such declaratory relief plainly can be ordered, and the conduct concerning
landmines and booby traps is simply relevant evidence to the existence of the campaign. By contrast,
Azerbaijan does not seek any relief with respect to de-mining or, of course, landmines or booby traps
more generally.
17. Mr President, Members of the Court, that concludes my remarks, and I thank you for your
attention. May I ask you to call on Mr Aughey, who will be making some short points on the
presentation of facts that you heard on Wednesday.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr Wordsworth for his statement. I now invite Mr Aughey to take
the floor. You have the floor, Sir.
44 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Azerbaijan v. Armenia), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 425, para. 53. See also
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v.
Armenia), Provisional Measures, Order of 22 February 2023, paras. 22-23.
- 26 -
Mr AUGHEY:
AZERBAIJAN’S RESPONSE TO ARMENIA’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION CONCERNING
“AZERBAIJAN’S CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS CONCERNING LANDMINES
AND BOOBY TRAPS” (AZERBAIJAN’S EVIDENCE ON ITS FACE)
Azerbaijan’s evidence on placement of landmines and booby traps
in civilian areas far from the contact line
1. Mr President, Members of the Court, it is common ground that, at this stage, the Court
should assume that Armenia’s armed forces planted mines and booby traps in civilian areas far from
the line of contact45.
2. Mr Salonidis continued to insist that all such explosives were set for “defensive purposes
only”46. His conclusion was this: “Landmines planted to obstruct the progress of the enemy and
protect the retreat of armed forces cannot possibly amount to racial discrimination”47, and it was said
that this was the only conclusion that can be reached “based on [the face of] Azerbaijan’s own
evidence and objective facts”48.
3. Considerable time was also spent comparing Azerbaijan’s updated map of mines found with
a series of further maps. The big point was that the mines were laid by Armenia’s military forces as
they withdrew from the formerly occupied territories49. But all of this was to agree with a point that
I made on Tuesday when introducing Azerbaijan’s map50.
4. And, just as on Monday, you heard not one word about Azerbaijan’s detailed evidence of,
for example, landmines placed in desecrated cemeteries or booby traps placed in civilian homes.
There was no answer to my question of whether it was really being said that this could have been for
defensive purposes only51. And plainly, it would have been nonsensical to say that, for example, the
only reason for hiding landmines under toppled Azerbaijani gravestones in a desecrated cemetery
45 CR 2024/23, pp. 28-29, paras. 18-19 (Salonidis).
46 CR 2024/23, p. 30, para. 26 (Salonidis).
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 CR 2024/23, pp. 29-30, paras. 19-26 (Salonidis).
50 CR 2024/22, p. 49, paras. 8 (c)-(d) (Aughey).
51 CR 2024/22, p. 49, para. 6 (Aughey).
- 27 -
can have been to obstruct the progress of enemy advancing forces or to protect Armenian forces
“retreating in haste”52.
5. Perhaps Mr Salonidis was seeking to side-step Azerbaijan’s evidence by focusing on the
locations where mines have exploded  what he referred to as the “red dots” on Azerbaijan’s map,
on the screen  rather than where mines have been found53.
6. As regards the landmines and booby traps laid by Armenia’s forces in civilian areas in the
districts of Kalbajar and Lachin, as well as Aghdam, there is the further obvious difficulty that
Armenia’s forces did not retreat hastily as Azerbaijani soldiers advanced. Rather, Armenia’s forces
withdrew by agreement after the cessation of hostilities.
7. Mr Salonidis also suggested that what he called the “sporadic dots to the left side of the
map . . . are remnants of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War”54. That was an invitation carefully to
assess and weigh Azerbaijan’s map of where mines have been found against Azerbaijan’s earlier
belief as to where mines might have been laid, and that weighing can, of course, be done at the merits
stage only.
8. Notably, Armenia has previously suggested to the Court other explanations for the location
of certain mines shown on this map. In January 2023, Armenia’s counsel told the Court that some of
these mines were laid within Armenia’s territory, but between 2021 and 2022 they were dug up by
Azerbaijani forces who then transported those mines into Garabagh55.
9. Further, by focusing on the top and the bottom of Azerbaijan’s map only, Mr Salonidis
avoided the area in the middle near Lachin city, now circled on the screen  including Azerbaijan’s
evidence of booby traps being set by Armenian forces long after the cessation of hostilities in the
former homes of Azerbaijani civilians which were deliberately destroyed, by way of example, in the
villages of Sus and Zabukh during the agreed withdrawal of the Armenian forces in August 202256.
52 CR 2024/23, p. 29, para. 21 (Salonidis).
53 CR 2024/23, p. 29, paras. 21-23 (Salonidis).
54 CR 2024/23, p. 30, para. 25 (Salonidis).
55 CR 2023/4, pp. 12-14, paras. 3-9 (Murphy).
56 See CR 2024/22, pp. 50-51, paras. 9-10 (Aughey).
- 28 -
10. Mr Salonidis claimed that Azerbaijan’s evidence was “thoroughly addressed by
Professor Murphy” at the hearing of Azerbaijan’s second request for provisional measures57. But
please note that the passages he referred to concerned only the alleged defensive purpose of certain
landmines found in the smaller area now circled on the screen, which is not among the civilian areas
that I highlighted on Tuesday58.
11. As to the sources of Azerbaijan’s evidence, Mr Salonidis could not suggest that ANAMA’s
findings are to be disregarded as this stage. Nor could he dispute that ANAMA is a very wellrespected
agency, supported by the United Nations Development Programme59. However, it was
implied that ANAMA’s announcements “after the scheduling of this hearing” should be dismissed
as self-serving60. There is no basis whatsoever for that suggestion. And to note, the December 2020
United Nations report, to which both Mr Salonidis and I referred61, states: “The assessment team
found ANAMA to be an experienced and highly competent national mine action centre well placed
to manage, coordinate and execute [mine action]”62.
12. Mr Salonidis was also wrong to say that the November 2021 report of the Organisation of
Islamic Cooperation was “prepared solely on the basis of Azerbaijan’s allegations”63. That report
states: “The delegation received a comprehensive briefing at ANAMA and visited the vast tracts of
lands in the Agdam district, heavily infested with lethal landmines.”64 The apparent suggestion that
this report should be disregarded merely because Armenia is not a Member State of the OIC was
perplexing65.
57 CR 2024/23, pp. 30-31, paras. 27-28 (Salonidis).
58 CR 2024/23, p. 31, para. 28 (Salonidis), citing CR 2023/4, pp. 20-21, paras. 28-31 (Murphy).
59 CR 2024/22, p. 48, para. 4 (Aughey).
60 CR 2024/23, p. 31, para. 30 (Salonidis).
61 CR 2024/23, p. 31, para. 29 (Salonidis); CR 2024/22, p. 48, para. 43 (Aughey).
62 United Nations, “Mine Action Assessment Mission to Azerbaijan, 10-16 December 2020”, p. 11.
63 CR 2024/23, p. 31, para. 30 (Salonidis).
64 Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission (IPHRC) of The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC),
Report of the OIC-IPHRC Fact Finding Visit to the Territories Previously Occupied by Armenia to Assess Human Rights
& Humanitarian Situation, 22-26 September 2021 (14 November 2021), https://oic-iphrc.org/home/post/35, para. 24.
65 CR 2024/23, p. 31, para. 30 (Salonidis).
- 29 -
Armenia’s refusal to share comprehensive and accurate information
13. I turn to Armenia’s refusal to hand over comprehensive and accurate information as to the
placement of mines and booby traps after the cessation of hostilities. Mr Salonidis stated that there
are “many possible justifications” for this66. He came up with just two.
14. His first possible justification was that perhaps the “information was not simply at
Armenia’s disposal” and it became available only later through so-called “Nagorno-Karabakh
military personnel”67, and it was said that Armenia’s statement of 25 January 2024 supports this68.
(a) Thus, an attempt was made to distinguish between Armenia’s forces and the so-called “Nagorno-
Karabakh’s armed forces”69. This is to ignore the established fact that armed forces of the
illegally installed régime were highly integrated in Armenia’s forces70.
(b) It is also to ignore Armenia’s own statement that it has only now “resumed” its survey, and
Mr Salonidis blanked the question of why on earth Armenia had ever stopped asking so-called
“NK military personnel” for information which they were known to have71. He also blanked the
Armenian Prime Minister’s admission in July 2021 that only a “tiny part” of the maps in
Armenia’s possession had been handed over72.
15. In this connection, it should be recalled, as should be obvious, that the United Nations
report of December 2020 expressly stated:
“The urgency to gather, analyse and disseminate EO [explosive ordnance] related
data cannot be stressed enough . . . Information gathering is therefore by far the most
important task for ANAMA at this stage and ANAMA must direct its focus towards this
critical task”73.
66 CR 2024/23, p. 32, para. 32 (Salonidis).
67 Ibid., para. 33.
68 Ibid.
69 CR 2024/23, p. 28, para. 18 (Salonidis).
70 See Memorial of Azerbaijan, para. 408 referring to Chiragov, para. 180.
71 CR 2024/22, p. 53, para. 21 (Aughey).
72 See CR 2024/22, p. 52, para 14 (Aughey), citing Extract from Speech by Nikol Pashinyan, posted on YouTube
channel of NEWS AM (13 June 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7lbPymz14zQ (certified translation) (Annex 33
to Azerbaijan’s Application and Request for provisional measures, 21 September 2021).
73 United Nations, “Mine Action Assessment Mission to Azerbaijan, 10-16 December 2020”, p. 9.
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16. Armenia’s second suggested justification was that “maybe” the landmines were used to
“defend [the ethnic Armenian population and] military positions” in territory that continued to be
held by the illegally installed régime74.
(a) That could not explain the refusal to share such information after the cessation of hostilities in
September 2023. Indeed, when Armenia previously deployed this supposed justification at the
December 2021 hearing, it emphasized that “the military situation in the geographic area at issue
remains active”75.
(b) Nor could it explain why, after the November 2020 Trilateral Statement, Armenia did not share
maps of landmines and booby traps set in areas away from the zone where the Russian
peacekeepers were temporarily deployed. And, in this connection, Mr Salonidis also ignored
Armenia’s statement to this Court in October 2021 that “we stand ready to provide any more
maps in our possession regarding minefields behind the lines currently held by Azerbaijani armed
forces, which now present solely humanitarian concerns”76.
17. Mr President, Members of the Court, there is plainly evidence that Armenia’s forces
planted landmines and booby traps with the purpose and effect of barring the return of Azerbaijani
civilians. Armenia’s preliminary objection asks that you either ignore or carefully weigh that
evidence at this stage. The former is inconceivable, while the latter could only be for the merits. That
concludes my submissions. I thank you for your attention and may I ask you to call on
Professor Boisson de Chazournes.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr Aughey for his statement. Je donne maintenant la parole à
Mme la professeur Laurence Boisson de Chazournes.
74 CR 2024/23, p. 32, para. 34 (Salonidis).
75 CR 2021/27, p. 17, para. 16 (Murphy).
76 CR 2024/22, p. 53, para. 20 (Aughey), referring to CR 2021/25, p. 13, para. 9 (Kirakosyan).
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Mme BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES :
L’EXCEPTION PRÉLIMINAIRE DE L’ARMÉNIE CONCERNANT LA DESTRUCTION ET
LA DÉGRADATION DIFFÉRENTIELLES DE L’ENVIRONNEMENT NATUREL DANS
LES ZONES OÙ LES AZERBAÏDJANAIS RÉSIDAIENT AVANT LE NETTOYAGE
ETHNIQUE ET L’OCCUPATION PAR L’ARMÉNIE DOIT ÊTRE REJETÉE
I. Introduction
1. Monsieur le président, Madame la vice-présidente, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de
la Cour, je traiterai de quelques questions qui permettront de répondre à des assertions erronées faites
par l’Arménie. Cela montrera une nouvelle fois que les revendications de l’Azerbaïdjan portant sur
des actes de destruction et de dégradation de l’environnement sont constitutives de racisme
environnemental77. En 2002, le Comité CIEDR a reconnu que le racisme environnemental est une
forme de discrimination couverte par la CIEDR78.
2. Je dois toutefois faire quelques remarques préliminaires. Tout d’abord, s’agissant de la
compétence de la Cour, l’Arménie reconnaît que le test des deux éléments tel que formulé par votre
juridiction en l’affaire Ukraine c. Russie79 est celui qui doit être satisfait au stade du fond. Mais là où
le bât blesse, c’est que le conseil de l’Arménie s’empresse ensuite de réinterpréter l’article premier,
paragraphe 1, de la CIEDR en ajoutant un troisième élément qui devrait être satisfait, à savoir celui
d’une « “differentiation of treatment” of human beings »80. Outre le caractère artificiel de cette
condition, il est intéressant de noter que l’Arménie n’a pas invoqué cette condition supplémentaire
la semaine dernière dans ses allégations de détention et de disparition forcée.
3. En outre, l’Arménie convient que, à ce stade de la procédure, elle doit accepter que ce sont
les éléments de preuve présentés par l’Azerbaïdjan dans ses écritures qui doivent être pris en
compte81. Et ceux-ci démontrent que la destruction de l’environnement est bien « fondée sur »
77 Voir mémoire de l’Azerbaïdjan (ci-après « MA »), p. 237-275, par. 291-344.
78 Voir Report of the Committee on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination for
the Sixtieth (4-22 March 2002) and Sixty-first session (5-23 August 2002), Decisions, Statements and General
Recommendations: Statement by the Committee to the World Summit on Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. A/57/18.
79 Application de la convention internationale pour la répression du financement du terrorisme et de la convention
internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Ukraine c. Fédération de Russie), arrêt du
31 janvier 2024, par. 195.
80 CR 2024/23, p. 37, par. 13 (Macdonald).
81 CR 2024/23, p. 34-35, par. 6 (Macdonald).
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l’origine ethnique ou nationale des Azerbaïdjanais et donc « capable » de relever du champ
d’application de la CIEDR.
4. Enfin, l’Arménie semble finalement admettre que des déductions fondées sur des preuves
peuvent être faites82. Les déductions sont un élément essentiel de l’établissement judiciaire des faits.
La question de savoir si elles sont correctes ou non sera examinée au stade du fond.
5. Permettez-moi maintenant de passer à la première question que je souhaite aborder.
II. L’Arménie a toujours su que les Azerbaïdjanais d’origine ethnique retourneraient
sur leurs terres d’origine mais a empêché leur retour
6. L’Arménie est encore une fois revenue sur le fait que les Azerbaïdjanais d’origine ethnique
ne vivaient pas dans la zone où les dommages environnementaux ont eu lieu et que l’Azerbaïdjan
aurait déclaré que ces personnes n’avaient pas l’intention de retourner sur leurs terres d’origine83. La
raison pour laquelle l’Arménie continue d’avancer cet argument fallacieux laisse perplexe.
7. L’intention de l’Arménie a toujours été celle d’empêcher le retour des Azerbaïdjanais
d’origine ethnique sur leurs terres d’origine.
8. Les Azerbaïdjanais, quant à eux, ont toujours eu l’espoir et la volonté de retourner dans
leurs foyers ainsi que l’agent de l’Azerbaïdjan l’a rappelé84.
9. Comme l’Azerbaïdjan l’a établi dans son mémoire, la campagne brutale de nettoyage
ethnique de l’Arménie a si bien réussi que les Azerbaïdjanais n’ont jamais été autorisés, et n’ont pas
été en mesure de revenir sur leurs terres d’origine pendant les 30 années d’occupation, et cela malgré
plusieurs négociations et efforts internationaux.
10. Dans le cadre de sa campagne de nettoyage ethnique contre les Azerbaïdjanais d’origine
ethnique, l’Arménie a détruit l’environnement naturel des districts azerbaïdjanais, en surexploitant
et négligeant la gestion des ressources naturelles.
11. Le fait que les Azerbaïdjanais d’origine ethnique n’aient pas pu rentrer chez eux ne signifie
pas qu’ils n’ont pas été discriminés ou que leurs droits n’ont pas été violés ainsi qu’a voulu le
prétendre à nouveau l’Arménie. Trois remarques doivent être faites à ce sujet. Tout d’abord, ces
82 CR 2024/23, p. 34-35, par. 5 et 6 (Macdonald).
83 CR 2024/23, p. 35, par. 7 et p. 40, par. 27 (Macdonald).
84 CR 2024/22, p. 13-14, par. 16-20 (Mammadov).
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personnes n’ont pas été autorisées à retourner dans les sept districts parce qu’elles étaient des
Azerbaïdjanais d’origine ethnique. Deuxièmement, leurs droits ont été violés du fait, notamment,
que la destruction et la dégradation de l’environnement naturel de leurs territoires constituent une
violation fondamentale de leur droit au retour. En troisième lieu, à l’heure actuelle, leurs droits
d’accès, d’utilisation et de jouissance de leurs biens, de leurs terres et de leurs ressources sont
effectivement atteints parce que ces territoires sont désormais dans un état non soutenable et
insalubre.
12. Parmi les exemples de l’intention de l’Arménie de détruire et de dégrader l’environnement
naturel des territoires azerbaïdjanais, les rapports de mission de l’OSCE, auxquels l’Azerbaïdjan s’est
référé en détail dans son mémoire, doivent être évoqués. Le rapport de 2011 note que « the seven
occupied territories of Azerbaijan [around] Nagorno-Karabakh … are generally in ruins »85.
13. Cette situation explique que l’Azerbaïdjan prenne de manière active des mesures pour
réparer les dommages environnementaux causés par l’Arménie et faire en sorte que ces territoires
redeviennent habitables. L’Arménie a fait valoir mercredi que l’Azerbaïdjan construisait une
autoroute reliant Fuzuli et Shusha, mais cela n’a rien à voir avec les revendications présentées par
l’Azerbaïdjan. Après la libération des territoires occupés, l’Azerbaïdjan doit relier ses anciens
territoires pour les rendre accessibles et les restaurer.
III. Il y a un traitement différencié des sept districts azerbaïdjanais qui entourent
la région du Garabagh avec celui que l’Arménie a réservé aux zones
habitées par des personnes d’origine arménienne
14. L’Arménie a prétendu que l’ensemble des preuves présentées par l’Azerbaïdjan ne laissait
pas apparaître de traitement différencié des sept districts azerbaïdjanais avec celui que l’Arménie a
réservé aux zones habitées par des personnes d’origine arménienne, voulant ainsi réfuter l’existence
d’un comportement de discrimination ciblée. Cette interprétation biaisée doit être rectifiée.
15. Les allégations de l’Azerbaïdjan sur les impacts discriminatoires directs et indirects sur les
Azerbaïdjanais du fait de la dégradation et de la destruction de l’environnement nécessitent une
comparaison entre les territoires concernés. Cependant, à ce stade, la Cour ne peut pas entreprendre
85 MA, annexe 64, OSCE Minsk Group, Report of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs’ Field Assessment Mission
to the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan Surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh (2011), p. 1-3.
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cette analyse. Une analyse comparative est clairement un exercice réservé à la phase du fond, lorsque
les deux Parties auront présenté leurs arguments et leurs preuves. Il est également important de noter
que l’affirmation de l’Azerbaïdjan selon laquelle l’Arménie a dégradé et détruit de manière
discriminatoire l’environnement naturel des territoires de l’Azerbaïdjan est fondée à la fois sur le but
et sur l’effet au sens de l’article premier de la CIEDR.
16. L’Arménie est restée silencieuse sur l’impact discriminatoire sur le couvert arboré et
forestier dans les territoires azerbaïdjanais. Les experts de Industrial Economics ont pourtant identifié
une réduction de 8 899 hectares du couvert arboré et forestier en raison de l’exploitation forestière,
des incendies, du développement de l’hydroélectricité, de la conversion de l’utilisation des terres et
de l’extraction de minéraux86. Ils ont constaté que le district d’Aghdam, peuplé d’Azerbaïdjanais, a
connu la plus grande réduction du couvert forestier et arboré en termes de superficie, affectant un
total de 3 353 hectares87. De même, Fuzuli, un autre district peuplé d’Azerbaïdjanais, a perdu 56 %
du total du couvert forestier et arboré du district88.
17. On doit comparer cette perte de forêt et de couvert arboré avec les districts de Khojaly,
Khojavand et Shusha, qui sont eux peuplés d’Arméniens. Permettez-moi d’insister à nouveau sur le
fait que, dans les districts peuplés d’Arméniens, la perte n’était environ que de 1 %89.
18. De même, jouant de la rhétorique, le conseil de l’Arménie a fait valoir que les installations
hydroélectriques ne font que suivre le cours des rivières. Et le conseil de poser la question :
« Is Azerbaijan’s case that these rivers flow in a discriminatory manner? Or that the rain in
[Garabagh] falls in a discriminatory way? »90. Il s’agit là, vous en conviendrez, d’un exemple de ce
qui est dénommé « raisonnement par l’absurde ».
19. Comme vous pouvez le voir sur la carte à l’écran, des rivières coulent également à Khojali,
Khankendi et Khojavand, trois districts peuplés d’Arméniens, mais il n’y a pas de centrales
hydroélectriques. Les centrales n’ont été construites qu’à Kalbajar, Gubadly et Lachine, trois districts
peuplés d’Azerbaïdjanais d’origine ethnique et occupés par l’Arménie. Comme l’ont noté les experts,
86 IEc Environmental Expert Report, p. ES-1.
87 Ibid., p. ES-2.
88 Ibid., p. ES-2.
89 Ibid., p. 13.
90 CR 2024/23, p. 38, par. 19 (Macdonald).
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le développement de l’énergie hydroélectrique est l’une des raisons de la disparition des forêts et du
couvert végétal dans les territoires occupés91.
20. Il y a une autre raison pour laquelle l’Arménie a construit des sites hydroélectriques dans
des districts peuplés d’Azerbaïdjanais d’origine ethnique. Prenez, par exemple, le district de
Kalbajar : comme vous pouvez le voir à l’écran, la rivière qui prend sa source à Kalbajar coule vers
l’est, ce qui signifie qu’elle fournit, comme l’ont noté les experts92, des ressources en eau douce aux
utilisateurs, et au-delà des territoires occupés, c’est-à-dire aux Azerbaïdjanais. Mais comme vous
pouvez le voir sur la carte à l’écran, environ 15 centrales hydroélectriques ont été construites pendant
l’occupation pour empêcher l’accès, l’utilisation et la jouissance de ces ressources en eau par les
Azerbaïdjanais.
21. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, est-ce que ce
traitement n’est pas un traitement discriminatoire ?
22. L’Arménie a également tenté de simplifier à l’extrême les arguments faits par
l’Azerbaïdjan en suggérant que « mines can only be built where the deposits are [and that it certainly
cannot be argued] that the mineral resources [have been] distributed in a discriminatory [manner] »93.
Il s’agit là d’une tentative d’obscurcir les problèmes de discrimination soumis à la Cour. Il va sans
dire que les mines sont construites là où il existe des gisements de minéraux. Cependant, la question
cruciale ici n’est pas celle de la présence de mines, mais celle de leur exploitation excessive et celle
des activités minières illégales menées par l’Arménie dans les territoires occupés, lesquelles privent
les Azerbaïdjanais de leur accès légitime aux ressources naturelles. Les gisements d’or et d’autres
ressources naturelles précieuses situés dans les territoires occupés ont été systématiquement pillés
par des entreprises locales arméniennes94.
23. En outre, le rapport du PNUE, rapport rédigé par des experts indépendants, n’en déplaise
à l’Arménie, note que « [a] significant expansion of mining and quarrying activities reportedly took
91 IEc Environmental Expert Report.
92 Ibid., p. 456-458.
93 CR 2024/23, p. 38, par. 20 (Macdonald).
94 Voir “Illegal economic and other activities in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan”, Report by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2016, accessible à l’adresse suivante : https://geneva.mfa.gov.az/
files/MFA_Report_on_the_occupied_territories_1.pdf.
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place during the conflict period ... [S]ite visits [indicate] that mining development has had one of the
largest physical [impacts] on the [environment in] the region. »95
24. Il découle des propos précédents que l’Azerbaïdjan a raison de soutenir que les actes
discriminatoires de destruction et de dégradation de l’environnement commis par l’Arménie ont été
« fondés sur » l’origine ethnique ou nationale, car les actes illicites de l’Arménie ont été délibérément
concentrés dans des zones qui étaient majoritairement peuplées et habitées par des Azerbaïdjanais
d’origine ethnique avant leur occupation par l’Arménie.
25. S’agissant de l’atteinte aux droits des Azerbaïdjanais d’origine ethnique, l’Arménie
affirme dans son mémoire que l’article 5 « extends to … all human rights [and] acts as a bridge to
“the broader international [human rights’] canon to which it is organically [link]ed” »96. Toutefois,
lorsqu’il s’agit des droits des Azerbaïdjanais d’origine ethnique, c’est une interprétation restrictive
de l’article 5 que l’Arménie veut promouvoir97. Cette approche restrictive et partiale doit être rejetée.
26. L’article 5 ne fait place à aucune des limitations que l’Arménie invoque. Et dans sa
recommandation générale XXIV concernant l’article premier de la convention, le Comité CIEDR a
bien souligné que « la Convention englobe toutes les personnes qui font partie de races ou de groupes
nationaux ou ethniques différents ou de populations autochtones »98. C’est cette interprétation qui
doit prévaloir.
27. Le droit international reconnaît aux personnes déplacées le droit de retourner dans leurs
foyers dans des conditions de sécurité et de dignité et le droit de se voir restituer les biens dont ils
95 United Nations Environment Programme, Report of the UNEP Environmental Scoping Mission to the Conflict-
Affected Territories of Azerbaijan (April 2022), accessible à l’adresse suivante : http://eco.gov.az/frqcontent/
plugins/pages_v1/entry/20221223145000_59496900.pdf, p. 20.
96 Application de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale
(Arménie c. Azerbaïdjan), mémoire de l’Arménie, p. 549-550, par. 6.13.
97 CR 2024/23, p. 41-42, par. 29-32 (Macdonald).
98 Voir General Recommendation 24, Information on the demographic composition of the population (Fifty-fifth
session, 1999), U.N. Doc. A/54/18, Annex V at 103 (1999), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 213 (2003) (les italiques
sont de nous).
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ont été spoliés99. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, comment ce droit peut-il
être exercé lorsque les terres d’origine des personnes déplacées sont rendues inhabitables par la
dégradation et la destruction de l’environnement naturel ?
28. De plus, comme l’Azerbaïdjan l’a déjà mentionné, le comportement illégal de l’Arménie
implique des violations de l’article 2 ainsi que des violations d’autres droits de l’homme100. Ces droits
doivent être interprétés de manière intégrée à la lumière des faits de la présente affaire.
29. Pour conclure, les faits et arguments juridiques présentés par l’Azerbaïdjan ont bien
démontré que l’objection préliminaire de l’Arménie relative à la destruction de l’environnement doit
être rejetée.
30. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, je vous remercie
de votre bienveillante attention. Monsieur le président, puis-je vous demander de donner la parole à
M. l’ambassadeur Rahman Mustafayev, coagent de la République d’Azerbaïdjan ?
Le PRÉSIDENT : Je remercie Mme Boisson de Chazournes de son intervention. I now call
upon the Co-Agent of Azerbaijan, His Excellency Mr Rahman Mustafayev. You have the floor,
Excellency.
M. MUSTAFAYEV :
1. Monsieur le président, Madame la vice-présidente, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de
la Cour, je suis honoré de me présenter devant vous, encore une fois, en tant que coagent de mon
pays, la République d’Azerbaïdjan, afin de présenter ses conclusions finales.
2. Prenant en compte les plaidoiries que vous avez entendues cette semaine, l’Azerbaïdjan est
convaincu que la Cour rejettera chacune des exceptions préliminaires présentées par l’Arménie en ce
qui concerne la compétence de la Cour et la recevabilité de la plainte de l’Azerbaïdjan au titre de la
convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale.
99 Art. 13, UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 217 A (III), 10 December 1948 ; Art. 12,
UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999,
p. 171, 16 December 1966 ; Art. 5, UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195, 21 December 1965 ; voir Report of the
Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39,
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, UN Commission on Human Rights, 22 July 1998 ;
UN General Assembly, The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (25 April 2008), UN Doc. A/RES/62/243,
par. 3.
100 Voir MA, p. 353.
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3. Mr President, it was notable yesterday that Armenia’s counsel spent much time addressing
you with detailed factual rebuttals relating to its placement of landmines and booby traps, and its
environmental destruction, as part of its ethnic cleansing and cultural eradication campaign in the
formerly occupied territories. Azerbaijan has identified some basic flaws in Armenia’s factual
narrative today, but will respond in detail at the merits phase. The same can be said of Armenia’s
self-serving and clearly incorrect assertion that its racist campaign was all over by 1994101. As
Azerbaijan has explained, Armenia’s campaign continued relentlessly for almost another two
decades, until the final liberation of the occupied territories in 2023.
4. Yesterday the Agent of Armenia labelled Azerbaijan’s comments with regard to the racist
ideology which underpinned Armenia’s breaches of the CERD as “not the proper province of this
phase”102. Such matters may cause Armenia discomfort, but they are absolutely relevant to this
preliminary objections phase because they will assist the Court’s understanding of the singular nature
and scope of Azerbaijan’s CERD complaint, the material jurisdiction over which has been questioned
by Armenia.
5. Yesterday, remarkably, the Agent of Armenia repeated its charade that Armenia was never
the occupying Power in Azerbaijan’s sovereign territories103. He quoted selectively from UN Security
Council resolutions104. He misrepresented the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence105.
Counsel to Armenia faithfully followed suit, alluding to the so-called “Nagorno-Karabakh’s armed
forces” in an effort to convey that they were somehow separate from Armenian armed forces106. All
of this was a vain attempt to evade the simple reality: in violation of international law, Armenia
invaded, occupied and ethnically cleansed Garabagh and the adjacent seven districts over a period of
nearly thirty years.
6. Armenia’s assertions are easily disproven with reference to Security Council
resolutions 822 and 853 of 1993, which demanded the “withdrawal of all occupying forces” from the
101 CR 2024/23, p. 11, para. 5 (Martin).
102 CR 2024/23, p. 42, para. 1 (Kirakosyan).
103 CR 2024/23, p. 44, para. 7 (Kirakosyan).
104 Ibid.
105 CR 2024/23, p. 44, para. 6 (Kirakosyan).
106 CR 2024/23, p. 28, para. 18 (Salonidis).
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Kalbajar and Aghdam districts and other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan107. These are the same
Kalbajar and Aghdam districts of Azerbaijan from which Armenia finally and officially undertook
to withdraw its troops, 27 years later.
7. I draw the Court’s attention to the Trilateral Statement of 10 November 2020 which ended
the Second Garabagh War108. This statement was made jointly by the President of the Russian
Federation, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of the Republic of
Armenia. The statement proclaims “a complete cease fire and cessation of all military operations”109
between two States  the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia.
8. Specifically, the Trilateral Statement proclaims that “the Aghdam region shall be returned
to” Azerbaijan and “[t]he Republic of Armenia shall return the Kalbajar region to the Republic of
Azerbaijan by 15 November, 2020, and the Lachin region by 1 December 2020”. The conclusions to
be drawn are obvious. Armenia was, throughout the relevant period, the sole occupying Power in
then sovereign territories of Azerbaijan.
9. The Agent for Armenia refused to acknowledge a misleading statement made by Armenia’s
counsel on Monday. But her statement was clear: “discrimination against an ethnic group which was,
on its [that is, Azerbaijan’s] own case, not located in the relevant territory and never intended to
return there”110. “Never intended to return.” I will not explain again why it is simply inconceivable
that Azerbaijanis never intended to return to their homes in the occupied areas and why all parties
knew that such return would happen.
10. Armenia’s Agent seemed to say that his counsel might have misspoken and intended to
say that Armenia did not intend Azerbaijanis to return. But, even if that is the case, it is irrelevant.
Whatever Armenia “intended”, the relevant issue is that it “expected” that Azerbaijanis would return,
including to districts where they had previously constituted 99 per cent of the population. Not only
did Azerbaijanis intend to return, but this was always a fundamental precondition to any resolution
107 UN Security Council resolution 822 of 30 April 1993; UN Security Council resolution 853 of 19 July 1993
(reaffirming resolution 822).
108 The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, “Statement by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia,
the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the President of the Russian Federation”, 10 November 2020,
https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2020/11/10/Announcement/.
109 Ibid.
110 CR 2024/21, p. 61, para. 44 (Macdonald) (emphasis added).
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of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. And yet, Armenia intentionally pillaged those
districts, rather than those where Armenians lived, with the intention to frustrate the ability of
Azerbaijanis to return.
11. Armenia’s Agent made three additional assertions yesterday. First, he claimed that “neither
Armenia nor the local representatives in Nagorno-Karabakh ever prevented the United Nations from
accessing Nagorno-Karabakh”111.
12. As the Court can see on the screen, in 2005, responding to a request of the Azerbaijani side
to send a fact-finding mission to occupied areas to verify the state of Azerbaijani cultural heritage,
UNESCO explained that it had been prevented from accessing the territories occupied by Armenia:
“[h]owever, the Secretariat has been prevented from sending a mission to verify the
state of cultural property in the area, as other specialized agencies of the United Nations
have not been able to enter these territories since their occupation by Armenian military
forces”112.
Again, in disregard of the clear documentary evidence, the Agent of Armenia asserted that “[i]n
reality, it was Azerbaijan that impeded UN access”113. This is absurd. Members of the Court, how
could Azerbaijan have physically prevented access to the territories that were, at the time, occupied
militarily by Armenia?
13. Second, Armenia’s Agent asserted twice that Azerbaijan, in his words, “abandoned the
Minsk Group” negotiations114. Again, this was not correct. It is well known that, in 2019, Armenia’s
Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, proclaimed to the world that “Karabakh is Armenia, and that’s
it”115. It was that belligerent statement from the leadership of Armenia that brought the negotiations
to a halt.
14. Third, Armenia’s Agent asserted that the Court denied Azerbaijan’s preliminary measures
request in 2021 based on Armenia’s racial incitement through Twitter accounts116.
111 CR 2024/23, p. 46, para. 10 (Kirakosyan).
112 UNESCO, Report on the Implementation of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
in the Event of Armed Conflict and its Two 1954 and 1999 Protocols, Report on the Activities from 1995 to 2004 (2005),
p. 7, para. 54.
113 CR 2024/23, p. 46, para. 10 (Kirakosyan).
114 CR 2024/23, pp. 44-45, paras. 7-8 (Kirakosyan).
115 President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, “Ilham Aliyev attended Forum titled ‘Karabakh: Back
Home After 30 Years. Accomplishments and Challenges’”, 6 December 2023, https://president.az/en/articles/view/62400.
116 CR 2024/23, p. 43, para. 4 (Kirakosyan).
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15. As the Court can see on the screen, the Court unanimously ordered that
“[t]he Republic of Armenia shall . . . take all necessary measures to prevent the
incitement and promotion of racial hatred, including by organizations and private
persons in its territory, targeted at persons of Azerbaijani national or ethnic origin”117.
16. Azerbaijan secured this order based on evidence of racial hatred emanating from Armenia,
an element of which was the extensive use by Armenia of fake Twitter accounts to stoke such hatred
on both sides118.
17. Mr President, Members of the Court, you have heard much over the past two weeks about
hate speech. These included multiple misrepresentations by Armenia of the speeches of Azerbaijan’s
Head of State, President Aliyev.
18. Although these misrepresentations were systematically corrected by Azerbaijan’s
counsel119, I want to close my remarks by reiterating that, from the Head of State down, Azerbaijan
has consistently stated that it has never had any complaint with the minority ethnic Armenian
population of Garabagh. An example of President Aliyev’s statement is on the screen. You can see,
as he said, “[i]f they want to live in Azerbaijan as citizens of Azerbaijan, of course, they can” 120.
19. To conclude, I would like to inform the Court of some recent, and most welcome,
developments in the relations between our two countries. For the first time since Armenia’s 1991
invasion, Azerbaijan has recovered some remaining parts of its occupied sovereign territory without
bloodshed. Last week, Armenia agreed to demarcate part of the land boundary and return to
Azerbaijan four villages occupied since 1992. This development shows that genuine negotiations
between the Parties can result in meaningful and positive outcomes.
20. Mr President, Madam Vice-President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your kind
attention. I will now read out Azerbaijan’s final submissions:
117 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Azerbaijan v. Armenia), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, I.C.J. Reports 2021, pp. 430-431, para. 76 (1).
118 Twitter Safety, “Disclosing networks of state-linked information operations”, Twitter, Inc. (23 February 2021),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2021/disclosing-networks-of-state-linked-information-operations-.html;
Memorial of Azerbaijan, para. 350.
119 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Armenia v. Azerbaijan), CR 2024/19, pp. 11-15, paras 4-14 (Aughey).
120 President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, “Ilham Aliyev was interviewed by Euronews channel,
9 December 2023”, Official website of President of Azerbaijan Republic; President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham
Aliyev, “Ilham Aliyev attended Forum titled ‘Karabakh: Back Home After 30 Years. Accomplishments and Challenges’”,
6 December 2023, https://president.az/en/articles/view/62400.
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“The Republic of Azerbaijan requests that the Court:
1. dismiss each of the preliminary objections that Armenia sets forth in its final
submission of 24 April 2024 on the ground that none of them is a valid objection to
the Court’s jurisdiction or to the admissibility of Azerbaijan’s claims; and
2. in the alternative, dismiss each of those preliminary objections on the ground that
each raises issues that should be deferred to the hearing on the merits.”
21. Enfin, Monsieur le président, je voudrais remercier le greffier et son personnel pour leurs
services avant et pendant cette procédure. Je voudrais également remercier les interprètes pour leur
professionnalisme au cours de cette semaine. Et, bien sûr, nous vous remercions encore une fois,
distingués Membres de la Cour, pour votre attention bienveillante. Je vous remercie, Monsieur le
président.
The PRESIDENT: I thank the Co-Agent of Azerbaijan. The Court takes note of the final
submissions which you have just read on behalf of your Government. This brings the present series
of sittings to an end. I would like to thank the Agents, counsel and advocates of the two Parties for
their statements. In accordance with the usual practice, I shall request both Agents to remain at the
Court’s disposal to provide any additional information the Court may require. With this proviso,
I declare closed the oral proceedings in the case concerning Application of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Azerbaijan v. Armenia) on
the preliminary objections raised by the Respondent. The Court will now retire for deliberation. The
Agents of the Parties will be advised in due course as to the date on which the Court will deliver its
Judgment. Since the Court has no other business before it today, the sitting is declared closed.
The Court rose at 11.30 a.m.
___________