Written statement of the United Arab Emirates

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES ARISING FROM THE POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF
ISRAEL IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, INCLUDING EAST
JERUSALEM
(REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION)
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
25 JULY 2023
Written Statement of the United Arab Emirates
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION ................................................................ 4
III. THE OCCUPATION OF EAST JERUSALEM AND ISRAEL’S ACTIONS TO ALTER ITS STATUS,
CHARACTER AND DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION ................................................................... 6
A. Israel has undermined the character and historical status quo of East Jerusalem ..................... 7
B. Israel has altered or purported to alter the status and demographic composition of East
Jerusalem ................................................................................................................................. 10
IV. THE CONSTRUCTION AND EXPANSION OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY ...................................................................................................... 15
A. Israel’s activities in constructing and expanding Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory .................................................................................................................................. 17
B. Israel’s conduct in constructing and expanding Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory constitutes a violation of international law .............................................................. 19
i. Israel’s conduct violates international humanitarian law ........................................................ 19
ii. Israel’s conduct constitutes a breach of the obligation to respect the right to self-determination
of the Palestinian people ......................................................................................................... 21
V. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF ISRAEL’S VIOLATION OF ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS . 23
A. Legal consequences for Israel ................................................................................................. 23
B. Legal consequences for all other States and international organisations, including the United
Nations .................................................................................................................................... 24
VI. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................... 30
1
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The United Arab Emirates (the “UAE”) has the honour to submit its written statement on the
request for an advisory opinion addressed to the International Court of Justice (the “Court”)
by the General Assembly of the United Nations (“General Assembly”) on 30 December 2022
in its Resolution 77/247, entitled “Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the
Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem”.1 The
present written statement is submitted in accordance with Article 105 of the Rules of Court
and pursuant to the Order of the Court dated 3 February 2023, by which the Court fixed 25
July 2023 as the time-limit within which Member States of the United Nations (“UN”) may
present written statements on the questions submitted by the General Assembly.
2. The UAE is a strong supporter of the international rule of law and of the role of the Court as
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. The UAE believes that the provision by the
Court of an advisory opinion in response to the questions posed by the General Assembly will
contribute to achieving a durable peace and security in our region, with an independent and
sovereign Palestinian State based on the borders of 4 June 1967 (“1967 Borders”), having
East Jerusalem as its capital, living in peace with the State of Israel.
3. In its capacity as an elected member of the Security Council of the United Nations (“Security
Council”), the UAE notes that on 20 February 2023 the Security Council adopted a
Presidential Statement put forward by the UAE, which reaffirmed the Council’s “unwavering
commitment to the vision of the two-State solution where two democratic States, Israel and
Palestine, live side by side in peace within secure and recognized borders, consistent with
international law and relevant UN resolutions”.2 The UAE is greatly concerned that the
continued lack of a credible peace process and escalating provocations, tension, violence and
violations of international law continue to erode the viability of the two-State solution to a
degree that places it in peril.
4. It is these aforementioned factors which contributed to the UAE’s decisions to vote in favour
of Resolution 77/247 to request an advisory opinion, and to participate in the present
proceedings.
5. These proceedings are in a line of continuity with the advisory opinion rendered by the Court
in 2004 in respect of Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory (“Wall Advisory Opinion”).3 In light of such continuity, the UAE
1 General Assembly Resolution 77/247, A/RES/77/247, 30 December 2022.
2 Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2023/1, 20 February 2023.
3 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 136.
2
considers that the jurisdiction of the Court to render an advisory opinion in the present case,
and the judicial propriety of it doing so, are beyond question. The same reasons underlying
the Court’s conclusion in the Wall Advisory Opinion that it was in a position to comply with
the request for an advisory opinion in those proceedings are equally applicable to the present
proceedings.
6. In particular, the fact that the Security Council is exercising its functions in respect of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict under the Charter of the United Nations4 (“UN Charter”) does not
make the General Assembly’s request to the Court ultra vires. This reflects the accepted
practice with regard to Article 12, paragraph 1, of the UN Charter,5 as underlined by the Court
in the Wall Advisory Opinion.6 Moreover, the questions posed to the Court are “legal
questions”, as required by Article 96, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter7 and Article 65 of the
Statute of the Court, because they are questions “directed to the legal consequences arising
from a given factual situation considering the rules and principles of international law”.8 With
that criterion being satisfied, the political implications of the questions posed to the Court are
immaterial to the existence of the Court’s jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion in the
present proceedings. As the Court has previously stated, the fact that a legal question also has
political aspects “does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a ‘legal question’ and to
‘deprive the Court of a competence expressly conferred on it by its Statute’”.9
7. The UAE is also convinced that the Court can and should exercise its jurisdiction to render an
advisory opinion in response to the present request. The object of the request before the Court
is to obtain from the Court an advisory opinion which the General Assembly has deemed to
be of assistance to the proper exercise of its functions, in respect of a matter that has been, and
remains, of particular concern to the UN as a whole.
8. The UAE considers that the exercise by the Court of its jurisdiction will provide important
guidance to and will support—rather than impede—a negotiated solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict consistent with the two-State solution. This point will be elucidated
throughout the UAE’s written statement. For present purposes, the UAE notes that in the Wall
4 Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI (“UN Charter”).
5 UN Charter, Article 12, para. 1.
6 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 150, para. 28.
7 UN Charter, Article 96, para. 1.
8 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 153, para. 37.
9 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 66,
para. 16 citing Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1973, p. 172, para. 14; Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, para. 27.
3
Advisory Opinion, the Court stressed the need for “efforts to be encouraged with a view to
achieving as soon as possible, on the basis of international law, a negotiated solution to the
outstanding problems and the establishment of a Palestinian State, existing side by side with
Israel and its other neighbours, with peace and security for all in the region”.10 Given the
increasingly dire situation on the ground and the growing threats to the viability of a two-State
solution, the Court’s opinion will provide an ever more critical foundation and impetus for
achieving a just and lawful resolution to the conflict.
9. In the circumstances of the present case, the bedrock and foundation for a negotiated solution
consists not only of the principles set out in Article 2, paragraph 3 and Article 33 of the UN
Charter, in the “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”
(“Friendly Relations Declaration”),11 and in the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful
Settlement of International Disputes.12 It is also rooted in the numerous relevant UN
resolutions that shape the framework for a two-State solution. An advisory opinion from the
Court addressing the questions submitted by the General Assembly in the present proceedings
may assist with additional identification and clarification of the legal parameters for a
comprehensive settlement.
10. Finally, the UAE notes that in the Wall Advisory Opinion, the Court considered and rejected
the argument that it was inappropriate for the Court to address the specific questions relating
to the construction of the wall because those questions were part of a greater whole.13 Having
regard to the breadth of the questions now posed by the General Assembly to the Court, the
UAE considers that the Court’s reasoning as to the propriety of its exercise of jurisdiction in
the Wall Advisory Opinion applies, a fortiori, in the present advisory proceedings.
11. In anticipation of the volume of written statements that these proceedings and the important
legal questions involved will elicit from other States and international organisations, including
organisations to which the UAE belongs, such as the League of Arab States and the
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the UAE’s written statement is not intended to be
exhaustive. The Court will undoubtedly have before it written statements that will enable it to
take into account fully other important considerations, including the issues of violations of the
10 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 201, para. 162.
11 General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, A/RES/2625(XXV)
24 October 1970.
12 General Assembly Resolution 37/10, Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes,
A/RES/37/10, 15 November 1982.
13 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 160, para. 54.
4
right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the adoption of discriminatory
legislation and measures.
12. Accordingly, for the sake of assisting the Court in the efficient management of these advisory
proceedings, and in an effort to keep this written statement concise, the UAE will focus its
written statement on those violations of international law by Israel that it considers to have a
special impact on the two-State solution—namely, those resulting from the Israeli settlements
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (“OPT”) since 1967 and those concerning the status of
East Jerusalem. These important matters are inextricably tied to the viability of the two-State
solution.
13. The UAE reaffirms its strong support for the two-State solution, which represents the
international community’s vision for a peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.14
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION
14. The question of Palestine was first brought before the General Assembly in 1947. By
Resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947,15 the General Assembly adopted the Plan of
Partition with Economic Union thereby mandating the partition of Palestine into two
independent States.
15. Following the June 1967 armed conflict, the Security Council, by Resolution 242 (1967),
“affirm[ed] that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and
lasting peace in the Middle East” and set forth principles for such a peace.16 By Resolution
3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, the General Assembly “[r]eaffirm[ed] the inalienable
rights of the Palestinian People in Palestine, including: (a) The right to self-determination
without external interference; (b) The right to national independence and sovereignty”.17
Subsequent to the signing of the 13 September 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements, by Resolution 904 (1994), the Security Council “reaffirm[ed] its
support for the peace process currently underway”.18
16. Following various other initiatives in the intervening years, on 7 May 2003, the UN Secretary-
General presented to the Security Council a “Road Map” which outlined the applicable
principles for a permanent two-State solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (“Road
14 General Assembly Resolution 73/89, A/RES/73/89, 6 December 2018; Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2023/1, 20
February 2023; Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), S/RES/2334 (2016), 23 December 2016, preamble.
15 General Assembly Resolution 181(II), A/RES/181(II), 29 November 1947.
16 Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), S/RES/242(1967), 22 November 1967, para. 1.
17 General Assembly Resolution 3326(XXIX), A/RES/3326(XXIX), 22 November 1973, para.1.
18 Security Council Resolution 904 (1994), S/RES/904(1994), 18 March 1994, para. 5.
5
Map”).19 The Road Map, prepared by representatives of the United States of America, the
European Union, the Russian Federation and the UN (the “Quartet”), sought to achieve the
cessation of the conflict and the implementation of the two-State solution through a phased
process and timeline.
17. Both the Security Council and the General Assembly have endorsed and reaffirmed the two-
State solution as being fundamental to achieving peace between Israel and Palestine. For
instance, by Resolution ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, the General Assembly “[c]all[ed] upon
both parties to fulfil their obligations under relevant provisions of the road map”.20 In
Resolution 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003, the Security Council similarly “[e]ndorse[d]
the Quartet Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict” and “[c]all[ed] on the parties to fulfil their obligations under the
Roadmap in cooperation with the Quartet and to achieve the vision of two States living side
by side in peace and security”. 21
18. Thereafter, in Resolution ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003,22 the General Assembly “affirm[ed]
the necessity of ending the conflict on the basis of the two-State solution of Israel and Palestine
living side by side in peace and security based on the Armistice Line of 1949, in accordance
with relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions”.
19. More recently, in Resolution 2334 (2016) of 23 December 2016, the Security Council
“reiterat[ed] its vision of a region where two democratic States, Israel and Palestine, live side
by side in peace within secure and recognized borders”.23 In recent years, the Security Council
and the General Assembly have continued to express their commitment to the two-State
solution. By Resolution 77/25 of 30 November 2022, the General Assembly “[r]eaffirm[ed]
its commitment, in accordance with international law, to the two-State solution of Israel and
Palestine, living side by side in peace and security within recognized borders, based on the
pre-1967 borders”.24
20. On 20 February 2023, the Security Council adopted a Presidential Statement, in which it
stated:
19 Letter dated 7 May 2003 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2003/529,
7 May 2003.
20 General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13, A/RES/ES-10/13, 21 October 2003, para. 2.
21 Security Council Resolution 1515 (2003), S/RES/1515(2003), 19 November 2003 paras. 1, 2.
22 General Assembly Resolution ES-10/14, A/RES/ES-10/14, 8 December 2003, preamble.
23 Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), S/RES/2334(2016), 23 December 2016.
24 General Assembly Resolution 77/25, A/RES/77/25, 30 November 2022, para. 10.
6
“The Security Council reaffirms the right of all States to live in peace within secure and
internationally recognized borders, and stresses that both the Israeli and Palestinian people
are entitled to equal measures of freedom, security, prosperity, justice, and dignity.
“The Security Council reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the vision of the two-State
solution where two democratic States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace within
secure and recognized borders, consistent with international law and relevant UN
resolutions”.25
21. The framework endorsed and relied upon by the Security Council and the General Assembly
for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the two-State solution. The UAE fully
endorses this framework,26 and considers the violations of international law committed by
Israel to be gravely alarming because they severely undermine the viability of the two-State
solution.
22. The following sections of this statement focus on such violations in particular as regards:
(a) actions altering or purporting to alter the status, character and demographic composition
of East Jerusalem; and
(b) the establishment and continued presence of Israeli settlements and the increasing
number of settlers in the OPT.
III. THE OCCUPATION OF EAST JERUSALEM AND ISRAEL’S ACTIONS TO ALTER ITS
STATUS, CHARACTER AND DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION
23. Israel has imposed and implemented measures which are aimed at altering the demographic
composition, character and status of East Jerusalem. This is of grave concern for two distinct
reasons.
24. First, East Jerusalem, which has been occupied by Israel since 1967, is inextricably tied to the
viability of the two-State solution, with an independent Palestinian State based on the 1967
Borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, and living side by side with Israel, in peace, security
and mutual recognition. As such, the measures and actions taken by Israel having as their aim
the alteration of the status, character or demographic composition of East Jerusalem, in
25 Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2023/1, 20 February 2023.
26 See e.g., Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9361st Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.9361, 27 June 2023,
pp. 16-17.
7
addition to being unlawful, “constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive,
just and lasting peace in the Middle East”.27
25. Second, the international community has a legitimate interest in protecting the unique
spiritual, religious and cultural character and dimensions of Jerusalem.28 Changes to the legal
and historic status quo in East Jerusalem jeopardize not just the rights, presence, and identity
of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, but also risk inciting broader violence which
continues to erupt as a result of provocations and unilateral actions at the Holy Places in East
Jerusalem.
A. Israel has undermined the character and historical status quo of East Jerusalem
26. Jerusalem has a unique character and heritage for humanity that is of significance to the entire
international community.29 It is a sacred city for the three Abrahamic religions: Islam,
Christianity, and Judaism. As home to many Holy Places, Jerusalem holds immense religious
value for hundreds of millions of worshippers worldwide.
27. The unique religious, cultural and human heritage of Jerusalem has consistently been
recognised by the UN. The Security Council has emphasised “the need to preserve the unique
spiritual and religious dimension of the Holy Places in the city”.30 Similarly, the General
Assembly has underlined the “need to protect and preserve the unique spiritual and religious
character and dimensions of the Holy City”31 and affirmed “the importance and holiness of
the City of Jerusalem for the three monotheistic religions”.32
27 Security Council Resolution 465 (1980), S/RES/465(1980), 1 March 1980, para. 5; Security Council Resolution
471 (1980), S/RES/471 (1980), 5 June 1980, preamble; Security Council Resolution 476 (1980), S/RES/476(1980),
30 June 1980, para. 3. See also Security Council Resolution 298(1971), S/RES/298(1971), 25 September 1971;
Security Council Resolution 478 (1980), S/RES/478(1980), 20 August 1980.
28 General Assembly Resolution 77/247, A/RES/77/247, 30 December 2022, preamble; General Assembly Resolution
76/12, A/RES/76/12, 1 December 2021, preamble.
29 Most recently, General Assembly Resolution 77/247, A/RES/77/247, 30 December 2022, preamble; General
Assembly Resolution 76/12, A/RES/76/12, 1 December 2021, preamble.
30 See e.g., Security Council Resolution 452 (1979), A/RES/452(1979), 20 July 1979, preamble; Security Council
Resolution 465 (1980), S/RES/465(1980), 1 March 1980, preamble; Security Council Resolution 476 (1980),
S/RES/476(1980), 30 June 1980, preamble.
31 General Assembly Resolution 36/15, A/RES/36/15, 28 October 1981, preamble. See also General Assembly
Resolution ES-10/19, A/RES/ES-10/19, 21 December 2017, preamble.
32 Most recently in General Assembly Resolution 76/12, 6 December 2021, preamble. See also General Assembly
Resolution 77/247, A/RES/77/247, 30 December 2022, preamble.
8
28. It is because of its unique character that the General Assembly has referred to “the obligation
to respect the historic status quo” of Jerusalem”,33 and has “call[ed] for respect for the historic
status quo at the holy places of Jerusalem, in word and in practice”.34
29. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan plays a vital role as the Custodian of the Holy Places in
Jerusalem. The 1949 Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan recorded the States’
agreement in respect of “free access to the Holy Places and cultural institutions”.35
Subsequently, in 1994, pursuant to the Jordan-Israel Peace Agreement, both States undertook
to “provide freedom of access to places of religious and historical significance”,36 and Israel
committed to respect the role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.37
30. In the Wall Advisory Opinion, the Court placed specific emphasis on the obligations deriving
from Israel’s commitments under these agreements. The Court noted that under the 1949
Armistice Agreement, Israel undertook “to guarantee freedom of access to the Holy Places”
and that “this undertaking by Israel has remained valid for the Holy Places which came under
its control in 1967”, as also confirmed by the 1994 Peace Treaty.38 The Court emphasised that
“account must […] be taken of specific guarantees of access to the Christian, Jewish and
Islamic Holy Places” given that Israel had committed to the principle of “free access to the
Holy Places”, which the Court considered to extend to all Holy Places located in Jerusalem.39
31. In a similar vein, the Security Council was unequivocal when in its Presidential Statement of
20 February 2023, it “call[ed] for upholding unchanged the historic status quo at the holy sites
in Jerusalem in word and in practice, and emphasiz[ed] in this regard the special role of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan”.40
32. It is therefore a matter of great concern that Israel has taken and continues to take various
measures which undermine the special character of East Jerusalem. The UAE has strongly
condemned such actions and has consistently stressed the need to ensure the protection of
33 General Assembly Resolution 77/247, A/RES/77/247, 30 December 2022, preamble.
34 General Assembly Resolution 76/12, A/RES/76/12, 1 December 2021, para. 4.
35 Israel-Jordan General Armistice Agreement, 3 April 1949, 656 U.N.T.S. 194, Article VIII.
36 Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 26 October 1994, 2042 U.N.T.S.
393, Article 9, para. 1.
37 Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 26 October 1994, 2042 U.N.T.S.
393, Article 9, para. 2.
38 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 189, para. 129.
39 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 189, para. 129.
40 Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2023/1, 20 February 2023, para. 2.
9
worshippers, to allow their free access and to maintain the legal and historic status quo of
Jerusalem and its Holy Places.41
33. In Jerusalem, Israel has hindered freedom of access to the Holy Places by actively preventing
access to or unduly interfering with the long-established arrangements governing the Holy
Places in the city. These actions have included repeated violent incursions, including by Israeli
state actors, into the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound as well as the imposition of access
restrictions on Muslim worshippers.42
34. Furthermore, as indicated by UN reporting,43 Israel’s excavation activities in Jerusalem
threaten its historic and religious character. The General Assembly,44 the League of Arab
States,45 and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation46 have variously condemned and
expressed concern about Israeli excavations, including in and around religious sites in the Old
City of Jerusalem. Moreover, the General Assembly has noted with alarm that Israeli
excavations and transformations “seriously endanger the historical, cultural and religious sites
of Jerusalem”, and has determined that these activities “constitute a flagrant violation of the
principles of international law and the relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention relative
41 Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9021st Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.9021, 25 April 2022.
42 See e.g., Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2023/458,
21 June 2023, para. 21; Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General,
S/2022/504, 22 June 2022, para. 36; Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the
Secretary-General, S/2021/584, 18 June 2021, paras. 12-14; General Assembly, Report of the Committee on the
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, A/76/35, 31 August 2021 para. 10, Implementation of
Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/584, 18 June 2021, para. 12.
43 See e.g., General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human
Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, A/10272, 27 October 1975, para. 27(d); General Assembly,
Report of the Secretary-General: Permanent sovereignty over national resources in the occupied Arab territories,
A/10290, 3 November 1975, Annex V, para. 15; General Assembly, Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, A/36/35, 16 October 1981, paras. 21, 28; General Assembly, Report of
the Secretary-General: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the
occupied Syrian Golan, A/69/348, 25 August 2014, para. 33; General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied
Territories, A/70/406, 5 October 2015, paras. 6, 39; General Assembly, Report of the Committee on the Exercise of
the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, A/70/35, 6 October 2015, para. 3.
44 See e.g., General Assembly Resolution 69/23, A/RES/69/23, 25 November 2014, preamble; General Assembly
Resolution 71/23, A/RES/71/23, 30 November 2016, preamble; General Assembly Resolution 76/12, A/RES/76/12,
1 December 2021, preamble.
45 See e.g., League of Arab States, Summit Resolution 455 on Developments on the Palestinian question, 21st ordinary
session, 30 March 2009, para. 8; League of Arab States, Resolution 8600 on Developments and Israeli violations in
the occupied city of Jerusalem, 155th extraordinary session, 3 March 2021, para. 4.
46 See e.g., Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Resolution No. 1/48-PAL on The Cause of Palestine, 48th session of
the Council of Foreign Ministers, 22-23 March 2022, para. 23.
10
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949”.47 Undertaking,
approving, or failing to prevent such abuses, all of which severely impact the integrity of Holy
Places in Jerusalem, undermines the Islamic and Christian characters of East Jerusalem.
Reports of planned and executed excavations and related activities near Holy Places are
particularly concerning in this regard.48
35. Apart from demonstrating disregard for the historical, religious and cultural significance of
the Holy Places and the Hashemite custodianship, the actions described above further
constitute a violation of Israel’s obligations under Article 27 of the Convention (IV) relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949 (“Fourth Geneva Convention”).
This provides that “[p]rotected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for […]
their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs”.49
B. Israel has altered or purported to alter the status and demographic composition of East
Jerusalem
36. Since the occupation of East Jerusalem by Israel in 1967,50 the Security Council and General
Assembly have consistently and repeatedly affirmed that its status, character, and
demographic composition must be preserved.51
47 General Assembly Resolution 36/15, A/RES/36/15, 28 October 1981, preamble, para. 1.
48 For example, recent projects for the construction of an elevator, and a cable car connecting West Jerusalem to a
settler organisation centre near a gate in the Old City. See UNESCO, General Conference, 41 C/16, 8 November 2021,
para. 3; General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan, A/77/493, 3 October 2022, para. 15. Israel has also
approved certain construction works on a park near the Yusufiya Islamic cemetery, and an Israeli court declined the
Islamic Waqf’s petition for an order halting construction following the discovery of human remains which were
unearthed during the works. See Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334(2016), Report of the Secretary-
General, S/2021/1047, 15 December 2021, para. 41.
49 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949 (“Fourth Geneva
Convention”), Article 27.
50 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 167, para. 78.
51 See e.g., Security Council Resolution 252 (1968), S/RES/252(1968), 21 May 1968, paras. 2, 3; Security Council
Resolution 267 (1969), S/RES/267(1969), 3 July 1969, paras. 3, 4, 5; Security Council Resolution 298 (1971),
S/RES/298(1971), 25 September 1971, preamble, paras. 3, 4; Security Council Resolution 476 (1980),
S/RES/476(1980), 30 June 1980, preamble, paras. 3, 4, 5; Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016),
S/RES/2334(2016), 23 December 2016, preamble, para. 3; General Assembly Resolution 2253 (ES-V),
A/RES/2253(ES-V), 4 July 1967, preamble, paras. 1, 2; General Assembly Resolution 32/91(C), A/RES/32/91(C), 13
December 1977, para. 6; General Assembly Resolution 35/207, A/RES/35/207, 16 December 1980, para. 6; General
Assembly Resolution 36/120(E), A/RES/36/120(E), 10 December 1981, preamble, paras. 1, 3; General Assembly
Resolution 42/209(B), A/RES/42/209(B), 11 December 1987, para. 7; General Assembly Resolution 49/87(A),
A/RES/49/87(A), 16 December 1994, preamble, para. 1; General Assembly Resolution 70/15, A/RES/70/15, 24
November 2015, preamble, paras. 9, 15.
11
37. By altering or purporting to alter the status and the demographic composition of occupied East
Jerusalem, Israel has breached its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention, and its
obligation to respect the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people.
38. The unlawful nature of Israel’s conduct, and the Security Council’s characterisation thereof,
were addressed by this Court in the Wall Advisory Opinion. As the Court found, “[f]rom 1967
onwards, Israel took a number of measures in the territory it occupied, […] aimed at changing
the status of the City of Jerusalem”.52 The Court recognised that, by stating in Resolution 298
(1971) that “all legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status of
the City of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties, transfer of populations
and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section, are totally invalid and
cannot change that status”,53 the Security Council had conveyed its response to Israel’s actions
in “the clearest possible terms”.54
39. Yet, Israel has repeatedly taken measures with a view to extending and expanding its
administration and legislation to East Jerusalem, in contravention of the Fourth Geneva
Convention.55 In response, the Security Council has repeatedly and urgently called upon Israel
to rescind all previous measures and actions which affect or purport to affect the status of East
Jerusalem.56
40. In particular, in 1980, Israel enacted legislation (the Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel)
to make Jerusalem the “complete and united” capital of Israel.57 Following the introduction
of the draft legislation in the Knesset, the Security Council adopted Resolution 476 (1980), in
which it deplored “the persistence of Israel in changing the physical character, demographic
composition, institutional structure and the status of the Holy City of Jerusalem” and stated
that it was “gravely concerned about the legislative steps initiated in the Israeli Knesset with
the aim of changing the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem”.58 Reconfirming
that any such measures “constitute a flagrant violation” of the Fourth Geneva Convention and
are “null and void and must be rescinded”, the Council urgently called on Israel “to abide by
52 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 166, para. 75.
53 Security Council Resolution 298 (1971), S/RES/298(1971), 25 September 1971, para. 3.
54 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 166, para. 75.
55 Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 47.
56 Security Council Resolution 252(1968), S/RES/252(1968), 21 May 1968, para. 3; Security Council Resolution 267
(1967), S/RES/267(1969), 3 July 1969, para. 5; Security Council Resolution 298(1971), S/RES/298(1971), 25
September 1971, para. 4; Security Council Resolution 476(1980), S/RES/476(1980), 30 June 1980, para. 4.
57 The Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel (available at: knesset.gov.il).
58 Security Council Resolution 476(1980), S/RES/476(1980), 30 June 1980, Preamble.
12
the present and previous Security Council resolutions and to desist forthwith”.59 Moreover,
“in the event of non-compliance by Israel”, the Security Council foreshadowed that it would
examine “practical ways and means in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter
of the United Nations to secure full implementation of the present resolution”.60
41. Subsequently, a few weeks after Israel’s enactment of the legislation, the Security Council
expressed its deep concern over “the enactment of a ‘basic law’ in the Israeli Knesset
proclaiming a change in the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem”.61 In
Resolution 478 (1980), the Council went on to state that it:
“2. Affirms that the enactment of the ‘basic law’ by Israel constitutes a violation of
international law and does not affect the continued application of the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection to Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, in the
Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem;
“3. Determines that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel,
the occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter the character and status of the
Holy City of Jerusalem, and in particular the recent ‘basic law’ on Jerusalem, are null and
void and must be rescinded forthwith;
“4. Affirms also that this action constitutes a serious obstruction to achieving a
comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
“5. Decides not to recognize the ‘basic law’ and such other actions by Israel that, as a result
of this law, seek to alter the character and status of Jerusalem and calls upon: (a) All
Member States to accept this decision […]”.62
42. The aforementioned Basic Law, and the other legislative and administrative measures since
adopted by Israel in an attempt to alter the character and status of East Jerusalem, have been
widely and consistently condemned by the international community as being in violation of
international law.63
59 Security Council Resolution 476(1980), S/RES/476(1980), 30 June 1980, paras. 3, 5.
60 Security Council Resolution 476(1980), S/RES/476(1980), 30 June 1980, para. 6.
61 Security Council Resolution 478(1980), S/RES/478(1980), 20 August 1980, preamble.
62 Security Council Resolution 478(1980), S/RES/478(1980), 20 August 1980, paras. 2-5
63 See e.g., General Assembly Resolution 36/120(E), A/RES/36/120E, 10 December 1981; General Assembly
Resolution 41/162(C), A/RES/41/162C, 4 December 1986; General Assembly Resolution 46/82(B), A/RES/46/82B,
16 December 1991; General Assembly Resolution 52/53, A/RES/52/53, 9 December 1997; General Assembly
Resolution 57/111, A/RES/57/111, 3 December 2002; General Assembly Resolution 62/84, A/RES/62/84, 10
December 2007; General Assembly Resolution 68/16, A/RES/68/16, 26 November 2013; General Assembly
13
43. The unambiguous text of the Security Council’s decision in Resolution 478 (1980), read in
the context of its preceding resolutions including Resolution 476 (1980), leaves no possible
margin for doubt that it was intended to be legally binding on Israel and all other UN Member
States. As this Court stated in its Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), once confronted with such an internationally unlawful
situation, as declared by the Security Council, UN Member States “would be expected to act
in consequence of the declaration made on their behalf”. 64 Thus, the Security Council’s
decisions in Resolution 478 (1980) were, and remain, binding on all UN Member States,
because “[t]o hold otherwise would be to deprive this principal organ of its essential functions
and powers under the Charter”. 65
44. Accordingly, all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel in the
context of its occupation of East Jerusalem, which affect or aim to alter the status of East
Jerusalem, constitute violations of international law, are null and void and have no legal effect
on the status of East Jerusalem under international law.
45. In addition to taking such measures that aim at altering the status of East Jerusalem, Israel has
continued to undermine the Arab identity of East Jerusalem by altering its demographic
composition, in contravention of its obligations under international law and relevant Security
Council resolutions.
46. This Court has previously determined that the construction of the wall and the establishment
of Israeli settlements “severely impede[s] the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to
self-determination”,66 result in “alterations to the demographic composition of the [OPT]”,67
and “contravene[s] Article 49, paragraph 6, of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Security
Council resolutions [446 (1979) of 22 March 1979, 452 (1979) of 20 July 1979 and 465 (1980)
of 1 March 1980]”.68
Resolution 73/22, A/RES/73/22, 30 November 2018; General Assembly Resolution 76/12, A/RES/76/12, 1 December
2021.
64 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 52, para. 112.
65 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, pp. 53-54, para. 116.
66 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 184, para. 122.
67 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 184, para. 122.
68 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 192, para. 134.
14
47. Notwithstanding the Wall Advisory Opinion, Israel’s illegal practices have not stopped in the
years since; and have, in fact, escalated. As recently as 21 June 2023, the Report of the
Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016)
covering the period between 14 March and 14 June 2023 noted that “Israeli authorities
advanced plans for 920 housing units in occupied East Jerusalem” and tenders for a further 90
housing units in East Jerusalem were announced.69
48. The violations by Israel of its international obligations arising from the illegal construction of
settlements are addressed in Section IV of this statement. Certain matters bear noting,
however, in the specific context of East Jerusalem.
49. First, the continued construction and consolidation of the “ring”70 settlements that encircle
East Jerusalem violate Article 49, paragraph 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. These
settlements effectively isolate East Jerusalem from the remainder of the West Bank,71 thereby
wholly undermining its viability as the capital of an independent Palestinian State and, more
broadly, the viability of an independent and contiguous Palestine. The General Assembly has
recently deplored “the further isolation of the city from the rest of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory”.72
50. Second, Israel continued to displace Palestinians in East Jerusalem, in violation of Article 49,
paragraph 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as a corollary of the construction of settlements
and its seizure of Palestinian land for the construction of infrastructure.73
51. The notable impact of these practices in East Jerusalem is the irreversible alteration of the
demographic composition of the city. Since 2009, Israel has demolished over 1,900
69 Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2023/458, 21 June
2023, para. 3.
70 General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan, A/77/493, 3 October 2022, para. 6; Implementation of
Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/1047, 15 December 2021, para. 5;
General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, A/75/376, 1 October 2020, paras. 40-42; Implementation
of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/555, 18 June 2020, para. 3.
71 General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan, A/77/493, 3 October 2022, para. 6; Implementation of
Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/1047, 15 December 2021, para. 5;
General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, A/75/376, 1 October 2020, paras. 40-42; Implementation
of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/555, 18 June 2020, para. 3.
72 General Assembly Resolution 76/12, A/RES/76/12, 1 December 2021, preamble.
73 General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
including East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan, A/77/493, 3 October 2022, para. 13.
15
Palestinian structures, leading to the displacement of 3,658 Palestinians in East Jerusalem.74
These measures are compounded by zoning restrictions considering that, as of December
2017, only 13 per cent of East Jerusalem is designated for Palestinian construction, much of
which is already built up; and that over a third of Palestinian homes lack difficult-to-obtain
Israeli building permits, placing over 100,000 residents at risk of displacement.75 Through
these interlinked practices of forcible displacement and the expansion of illegal settlements or
infrastructure, Israel continues to unlawfully erode the Arab identity of East Jerusalem.
52. The indisputable cumulative effect of the above-described violations of international law is
that Israel’s ongoing, unlawful practices alter the status, character, and demographic
composition of East Jerusalem. As a result, these violations threaten the viability of a two-
State solution with East Jerusalem as the capital of an independent Palestinian State.
IV. THE CONSTRUCTION AND EXPANSION OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
53. In the Wall Advisory Opinion, the Court concluded that international humanitarian law and
international human rights law apply concurrently to the situation of occupation in the OPT.76
Israel’s continued occupation of the OPT and its concomitant activities in constructing and
expanding Israeli settlements there are inconsistent with established principles of international
law, including the principle that occupation of territory must be a temporary situation.
Simultaneously, they also constitute a serious threat and impediment to the future viability
and realisation of an independent Palestinian State based on the 1967 Borders.
54. On 12 December 2022, the impact of the violations of international law resulting from Israel’s
settlement activity on the two-State solution was emphasised by the General Assembly in its
Resolution 77/126, in which the General Assembly stressed “the urgent need to reverse
negative trends on the ground, including the building of settlements and the demolition of
Palestinian homes, which are imperilling the viability of the two-State solution”.77
55. In the same vein, the Security Council has consistently denounced Israel’s establishment and
expansion of Israeli settlements in the OPT as a violation of international law, and it has also
expressed its concern about the impact of the settlements on the two-State solution. In its
74 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Data on demolition and displacement in the West Bank,
updated on 19 July 2023 (available at: https://www.ochaopt.org/data/demolition).
75 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, West Bank-East Jerusalem: key humanitarian concerns,
21 December 2017 (available at: https://www.ochaopt.org/content/west-bank-east-jerusalem-key-humanitarianconcerns).
76 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 177, para. 101, pp. 180-181, paras. 112-113.
77 General Assembly Resolution 77/126, A/RES/77/126, 12 December 2022, para. 5.
16
Resolution 446 (1979), the Security Council determined “that the policy and practices of Israel
in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967
have no legal validity and constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just
and lasting peace in the Middle East”.78 The Security Council has repeated this message on
several occasions in the years which have followed.79
56. More recently, Israel’s conduct in respect of the construction and expansion of settlements
was condemned by the Security Council in its Resolution 2334 (2016), in which the Security
Council reaffirmed “that the establishment by Israel of settlements in the Palestinian territory
occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant
violation under international law and a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-State
solution and a just, lasting and comprehensive peace”.80
57. The Security Council’s position on this matter has remained firm. In its Presidential Statement
adopted on 20 February 2023,81 the Security Council expressed “deep concern and dismay
with Israel’s announcement on February 12, 2023, announcing further construction and
expansion of settlements and the ‘legalization’ of settlement outposts”, and reiterated “that
continuing Israeli settlement activities are dangerously imperilling the viability of the two-
State solution based on the 1967 lines”. The Security Council also stated its strong opposition
to “all unilateral measures that impede peace, including, inter alia, Israeli construction and
expansion of settlements, confiscation of Palestinians’ land, and the ‘legalization’ of
settlement outposts, demolition of Palestinians’ homes and displacement of Palestinian
civilians”.82
58. The UAE shares the concerns expressed by the Security Council, and has consistently
condemned Israel’s continued construction, expansion and attempts to legalise Israeli
settlements in the OPT. In this regard, the UAE has highlighted the unlawful nature of those
settlements under international law, and has called on Israel to immediately cease all its
settlement activities and to reverse the negative trends on the ground.83 The UAE has also
78 Security Council Resolution 446 (1979), S/RES/446(1979), 22 March 1979, para. 1.
79 Security Council Resolution 452 (1979), S/RES/452(1979), 20 July 1979, preamble; Security Council Resolution
465 (1980), S/RES/465(1980), 1 March 1980, para. 5.
80 Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), S/RES/2334(2016), 23 December 2016, para. 1.
81 Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2023/1, 20 February 2023.
82 Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2023/1, 20 February 2023, paras. 3-5.
83 See e.g., Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9309th Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.9309, 25 April 2023,
p. 11 (“we reiterate our call on Israel to immediately cease all its settlement activities, reverse the negative trends on
the ground and uphold its responsibilities in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian
law”); Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9290th Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.9290, 22 March 2023, p. 13
(“It is imperative for Israel to fully cease all settlement activities, since they constitute flagrant violation of
17
affirmed its rejection of any steps taken by Israel having as their aim the annexation of
Palestinian territory.84
A. Israel’s activities in constructing and expanding Israeli settlements in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory
59. Since 1967, Israel has planned and facilitated the transfer of its nationals to the OPT, including
East Jerusalem, by establishing and supporting a significant number of settlements or outposts
in the OPT. Israel’s construction and expansion of settlements in the OPT has increased
quickly and steadily over the last decade. This has occurred despite the unequivocal
condemnation of such activities by the Security Council, the General Assembly and the wider
international community. For the sake of brevity and expediency, this section does not address
the historical development of Israeli settlements in the OPT, but focusses instead on some of
the most recent developments, in order to set the factual background relevant for the UAE’s
legal observations that follow.
60. Numerous independent UN reports addressing the Israeli occupation attest to Israel’s
progressive expansion of settlements in the OPT.85 This expansion has been implemented
international law and Council resolutions”); Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9263rd Meeting of the Security
Council, S/PV.9263, 20 February 2023, p. 17 (“First, de-escalation is key. That must include reversing, in addition to
suspending, unilateral actions such as settlement activities, which undermine the prospects for a two-State solution
and constitute a clear violation of international law and the Council’s resolutions”); Provisional Verbatim Record of
the 9224th Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.9224, 19 December 2022, p. 13 (“First, in the context of our
discussion on resolution 2334 (2016) today, we reiterate our demand that Israel must stop all of its continuing
settlement activities in the [O]ccupied Palestinian [T]erritory, which constitute a violation of international law and
undermine peace efforts”). See also Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9139th Meeting of the Security Council,
S/PV.9139 28 September 2022, p. 13; Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9116th Meeting of the Security Council,
S/PV.9116, 25 August 2022, p. 13; Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9099th Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.
9099, 26 July 2022, p. 18; Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9077th Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.9077, 27
June 2022, p. 15; Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9000th Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.9000, 22 March
2022, p. 18; Provisional Verbatim Record of the 8973rd Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.8973, 23 February
2022, pp. 13-14; Provisional Verbatim Record of the 8950th Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.8950, 19 January
2022, p. 16.
84 Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9224th Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.9224, 19 December 2022, p. 13.
85 See e.g., Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2023/458,
21 June 2023, paras. 3, 61; Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9290th Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.9290,
22 March 2023, p. 2; Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334(2016), Report of the Secretary-General,
S/2022/504, 22 June 2022, para. 9; Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the
Secretary-General, S/2022/945, 14 December 2022, para. 3; General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied
Territories, A/70/406, 5 October 2015, paras. 11-12.
18
alongside the simultaneous displacement of significant numbers of Palestinians,86 and the
seizure and demolition of their property as well as of critical infrastructure.87
61. It is also well documented that the expansion of Israeli settlements has the potential to alter,
and has in fact resulted in the alteration of the demographic composition of the OPT.88 This
further exacerbates the plight of the Palestinian people, who are victimised by continuous
episodes of settler-related violence,89 and restricted in their movements as well as in their
access to basic services and resources.90
62. The situation for individual Palestinians has continued to deteriorate. On 21 June 2023, in his
most recent report on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016),
covering the period from 14 March 2023 to 14 June 2023, the UN Secretary-General observed
that the “Israeli authorities advanced plans for 920 housing units in occupied East Jerusalem
and approved 1,890 housing units in Area C, 45 per cent of which are deep in the occupied
West Bank”,91 and stated that he remained “deeply troubled by the relentless expansion of
Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, that is impeding
86 Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2022/504, 22 June
2022, para. 11; Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General,
S/2023/458, 21 June 2023, para. 11; Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9290th Meeting of the Security Council,
S/PV.9290, 22 March 2023, p. 2; Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-
General, S/2022/945, 14 December 2022, paras. 4, 9-10; Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9139th Meeting of the
Security Council, S/PV.9139, 28 September 2022, p. 4.
87 Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2022/945, 14
December 2022, paras. 4-5; Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334(2016), Report of the Secretary-
General, 22 June 2022, S/2022/504, paras. 11-12, 17-18; Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016),
Report of the Secretary-General, 21 June 2023, S/2023/458, paras. 7-9.
88 Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9000th Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.9000, 22 March 2022, p. 5-6;
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, 21 June 2023,
S/2023/458, para. 61; Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9290th Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.9290, 22
March 2023, p. 2; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 190, para. 133; Security Council Resolution, 446 (1979), S/RES/446(1979), 22 March
1979, para. 3.
89 Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2022/945, 14
December 2022, paras. 12, 41-47, 73; Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the
Secretary-General, S/2022/504, 22 June 2022, paras. 59-60, 62-65.
90 Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2023/458, 21 June
2023, paras. 9, 61, 64; Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General,
S/2022/945, 14 December 2022, paras. 8, 68, 70; Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report
of the Secretary-General, S/2022/504, 22 June 2022, paras. 93, 95.
91 Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2023/458, 21 June
2023, para. 3.
19
access by Palestinians to their land and resources, reshaping the geography of the occupied
West Bank and threatening the viability of a future Palestinian State”.92
B. Israel’s conduct in constructing and expanding Israeli settlements in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory constitutes a violation of international law
63. Israel’s establishment and expansion of settlements in the OPT since 1967 constitutes a serious
and continuing breach of fundamental principles of international law. While the rules and
principles of international law engaged by Israel’s conduct in relation to the Israeli settlements
are various, the UAE’s written statement focuses on the specific violations of fundamental
erga omnes obligations underpinning international humanitarian law and the right to selfdetermination
of the Palestinian people.
i. Israel’s conduct violates international humanitarian law
64. It is well established, including by the Court, that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to
Israel’s occupation of the OPT.93 In this regard, Israel’s conduct in constructing and expanding
settlements in the OPT, and its transfer of Israeli settlers to said territory, constitutes a clear
and serious violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
65. Article 49, paragraph 6, of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that “[t]he Occupying
Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it
occupies”. As stated in the International Committee of the Red Cross’ Commentary to the
Fourth Geneva Convention, the object and purpose of Article 49, paragraph 6 is “to prevent a
practice adopted during the Second World War by certain Powers, which transferred portions
of their own population to occupied territory for political and racial reasons or in order, as
they claimed, to colonize those territories”.94
66. Article 49, paragraph 6, does not require the transfer of a population to the occupied territory
to be compulsory in character.95 The transfer can be effected directly or indirectly, i.e. through
92 Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2023/458, 21 June
2023, para. 61.
93 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 177, para. 101. See also Theodore Meron, “The West Bank and International Humanitarian Law on
the Eve of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Six-Day War” in American Journal of International Law, 111(2), (2017)
357-375, at 361-364.
94 Commentary: Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva:
ICRC, 1958, p. 283.
95 Theodore Meron, “The West Bank and International Humanitarian Law on the Eve of the Fiftieth Anniversary of
the Six-Day War” in American Journal of International Law, 111(2), (2017) 357-375, at 373-374.
20
measures aimed at encouraging such a transfer.96 In the Wall Advisory Opinion, the Court
observed that Article 49, paragraph 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention “prohibits not only
deportations or forced transfers of population such as those carried out during the Second
World War, but also any measures taken by an occupying Power in order to organize or
encourage transfers of parts of its own population into the occupied territory”.97
67. As the Court previously concluded,98 Israel’s measures and policies establishing and
facilitating the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements in the OPT, including East
Jerusalem, constitute a patent breach of international humanitarian law and, in particular, of
Article 49, paragraph 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
68. As noted above, Israel’s policy of establishing, facilitating, and supporting the construction
and expansion of Israeli settlements in the OPT has continued unabated since 1967, without
any regard for the numerous calls for cessation in Security Council resolutions. Notably, the
reports of the UN Secretary-General concerning the Implementation of Security Council
Resolution 2334 (2016)99 reflect Israel’s continuous advancement in recent years of its agenda
to increase the number of Israeli settlers and settlements in the OPT, to the detriment of
Palestine and the Palestinian people.100 Both in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, Israel has
continued to advance plans for the construction of new housing units and residential buildings.
96 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 183, para. 120. Cf. Theodore Meron, “The West Bank and International Humanitarian Law on the
Eve of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Six-Day War” in American Journal of International Law, 111(2), (2017) 357-
375, at 373-374.
97 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 183, para. 120.
98 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 183, para. 120.
99 Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2023/458, 21 June
2023, para. 3; Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9290th Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.9290, 22 March 2023,
p. 2; Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2022/504, 22
June 2022, para. 9; Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General,
S/2022/945, 14 December 2022, para. 3; Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9000th Meeting of the Security Council,
22 March 2022, S/PV.9000, p. 5-6; Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the
Secretary-General, S/2021/584, 18 June 2021, paras. 48-49; Implementation of Security Council Resolution
2334(2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/1234, 12 December 2020, para. 80; Implementation of Security
Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2019/938, 12 December 2019, paras. 48-49;
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2019/251, 20 March
2019, para. 54; Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), Report of the Secretary-General,
S/2018/614, 18 June 2018, para. 61; Provisional Verbatim Record of the 7977th Meeting of the Security Council,
S/PV.7977, 20 June 2017, pp. 2-3.
100 Security Council Resolution 446 (1979), S/RES/446(1979), 22 March 1979, para. 3; Security Council Resolution
452 (1979), S/RES/452(1979), 20 July 1979, para. 3; Security Council Resolution 465 (1980), S/RES/465(1980), 1
March 1980, para. 6; Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), S/RES/2334(2016), 23 December 2016, para. 1;
Presidential Statement, PRST 2023/1, 20 February 2023, paras. 3-5.
21
Most recently, Israel has taken steps to retroactively legalise such outposts and settlements
through the enactment of legislation.101 Currently, there are around 279 settlements in the
OPT, with a total of 700,000 Israeli settlers living in Palestine.102 East Jerusalem counts 14
Israeli settlements and a total population of more than 229,000 Israeli settlers.103
69. The continuous growth of Israeli settlements in the OPT is consistent with the pattern of
expansion and illegality which began in 1967. In light of Israel’s pattern of conduct, the
Court’s findings in the Wall Advisory Opinion that such activities constitute a violation of
Article 49, paragraph 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention apply a fortiori to Israel’s conduct
in constructing, establishing, expanding and supporting Israeli settlements in the OPT from
2004 to date.
70. Likewise, the destruction and demolition of Palestinian property, the forced displacement, and
settler violence against the life and bodily integrity of Palestinians104 trigger a further series
of additional breaches of international humanitarian law. These acts and conduct constitute
breaches of relevant obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention applicable in a situation
of occupation, including: (1) the obligation under Article 27 to protect civilians against all acts
of violence or threats thereof; (2) the obligation under Article 49, paragraph 1 not to subject
the population of the occupied territory to forcible transfer or deportation within or outside
this territory;105 and (3) the obligation under Article 53 not to destroy personal property.
ii. Israel’s conduct constitutes a breach of the obligation to respect the right
to self-determination of the Palestinian people
71. Israel’s conduct relating to the construction, establishment, support and expansion of Israeli
settlements in the OPT also constitutes a violation of Israel’s obligations vis-à-vis the right to
101 Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9290th Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.9290, 22 March 2023, p. 2;
Presidential Statement, PRST 2023/1, 20 February 2023, para. 3.
102 Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Israeli settlements
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, A/HRC/52/76, 15
March 2023, para. 5.
103 Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Israeli settlements
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, A/HRC/52/76, 15
March 2023, para. 5.
104 See above, paras. 60-61.
105 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 (“Additional Protocol I”), Article 85, para. 4, letter (a) (“In
addition to the grave breaches defined in the preceding paragraphs and in the Conventions, the following shall be
regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol […]: (a) […] the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of
the occupied territory within or outside this territory, in violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Convention”) (emphasis
added).
22
self-determination of the Palestinian people.106 Enshrined in multiple instruments including
in Article 1, paragraph 2 of the UN Charter and the Friendly Relations Declaration,107 the right
to self-determination has the status of customary international law.108 The right to selfdetermination
guarantees the freedom of all peoples to, inter alia, determine their status
without external intervention that may impair such status.109
72. In the Wall Advisory Opinion, the Court found that Israel’s construction of the wall violated
the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people in light of, inter alia: (1) the risk of
alterations to the demographic composition of the OPT, contributing to the departure of
Palestinian populations from certain areas therein; (2) the restrictions on the freedom of
movement and access to basic services; and (3) the negative impact on the agriculture of the
area.110
73. Assessed over the period from 1967 to date, those same factors apply a fortiori in the present
proceedings, establishing a violation by Israel of the Palestinian people’s right to selfdetermination
as a result of the Israeli settlements. Indeed, the scale of the violation arising
from the construction and expansion of the Israeli settlements is of much greater magnitude
compared to that determined by the Court in the Wall Advisory Opinion, in light of the
narrower scope of that case.
74. Over the years, Israel’s practices and policies have had a cumulative impact on the
demographic composition of the OPT, freedom of movement (including through forcible
transfer of the Palestinian population), and the security of the Palestinian people, as well as
on their agriculture and economy.111 These factors, when considered together with the
negative impact of Israel’s conduct in respect of Israeli settlements on the two-State solution,
106 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, pp. 182-183, para. 118 (“As regards the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination, the Court
observes that the existence of a ‘Palestinian people’ is no longer in issue”), p. 197, para. 149 (“Israel is bound to
comply with its obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and its obligations under
international humanitarian law and international human rights”).
107 General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, A/RES/2625(XXV),
24 October 1970, Annex.
108 Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2019, p. 132, para. 152.
109 General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, A/RES/2625(XXV),
24 October 1970, Annex.
110 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 184, para. 122, pp. 189-191, para. 133.
111 See above, paras. 60-61.
23
have impaired the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people for many decades, and
show no sign of abating.
V. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF ISRAEL’S VIOLATION OF ITS INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS
75. Israel’s breaches of its obligations give rise to legal consequences under international law for
Israel itself, and also entail obligations for all other States. In addition, the violations have
implications for international organisations, including the UN.
A. Legal consequences for Israel
76. In light of the fact that Israel’s actions in the OPT are contrary to its obligations under
international law, it follows that its international responsibility is engaged.112
77. As a consequence, whilst Israel remains bound by, and under an obligation to comply with,
the various primary obligations it has breached,113 in light of the continuing character of the
relevant violations, Israel is also under a secondary obligation to ensure cessation of those
breaches.114
78. In the Wall Advisory Opinion, the Court held that Israel’s violation of multiple international
obligations resulted both from the actual construction of the wall and from the associated
regime.115 As a consequence of that finding, the Court held that Israel was under an obligation
of cessation which “entails the dismantling forthwith of those parts of [the wall] situated
within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem”, and that,
save to the extent necessary to ensure the provision of compensation to Palestinian landowners
for the harm they had suffered, “[a]ll legislative and regulatory acts adopted with a view to its
112 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 197, para. 147; Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in
1965, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2019, p. 138, para. 177; see also Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II (Part Two), p. 26,
Article 1.
113 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 197, para. 149; Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in
1965, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2019, p. 139, para. 178.
114 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 197, para. 150; see also Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II (Part Two), p. 28, Article 31.
115 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 195, para. 143, p. 198, para. 151.
24
construction, and to the establishment of its associated régime, must forthwith be repealed or
rendered ineffective”.116
79. In a similar manner, Israel is bound by obligations of cessation in respect of the violations of
its international obligations resulting from its other continuing wrongful acts, policies and
practices. These notably include, inter alia, the obligation to bring to an end the breaches
resulting from its activities altering the status, character and demographic composition of the
OPT, including Israel’s settlements activities and the transfer of Israeli settlers to East
Jerusalem and the rest of the OPT, as well as those resulting from Israel’s confiscation of land,
demolition of homes and forced displacement of Palestinian civilians in the OPT.
80. Israel is likewise under an obligation to bring to an end the violations of its international
obligations resulting from its actions taken to alter the character, status and demographic
composition of East Jerusalem. Notably, insofar as Israel’s actions result in an ongoing
violation of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, and of its obligations
under Articles 27, 49 and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel is under an obligation
to bring the conduct resulting in those violations to an end.
81. Finally, insofar as Israel continues to be in breach of the obligations identified by the Court in
the Wall Advisory Opinion, and to the extent that it has failed in the years since to ensure
cessation of the breaches resulting from the construction of the wall in the OPT, the legal
consequences identified by the Court in 2004 remain fully applicable.
B. Legal consequences for all other States and international organisations, including the
United Nations
82. Given the character and importance of the obligations violated, Israel’s conduct also entails
legal consequences for all other States. Notably, no State may recognise as lawful the situation
resulting from Israel’s unlawful conduct, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining such a
situation. At the same time, States are under an obligation to cooperate, including with the
UN, with a view to bringing to an end, through lawful means, the serious breaches by Israel
of its obligations. Israel’s breaches also have implications for international organisations,
including for the UN and its organs.
83. These consequences for all States result from the fact that a number of the obligations violated
by Israel have an erga omnes character. As held by the Court in the Wall Advisory Opinion,
116 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 198, para. 151.
25
that is notably the case as regards “the obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people
to self-determination” and certain obligations under international humanitarian law.117
84. In respect of relevant obligations under international humanitarian law, the Court observed
that certain such obligations “constitute intransgressible principles of international customary
law”, and that the relevant rules in this regard “incorporate obligations which are of an
essentially erga omnes character”.118 This is particularly the case in respect of the obligations
under Articles 27, 49 and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the violation of which
constitutes grave breaches of the Convention.119
85. As has been previously noted by the Court, it is also relevant in this connection that, pursuant
to Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, every State party is bound by an explicit
primary obligation “to respect and ensure respect” for the Conventions in all circumstances.120
86. As concerns the obligation to respect the right of peoples to self-determination, the Court has
repeatedly affirmed its erga omnes character.121 Further, as reflected in the Friendly Relations
Declaration, the obligation to respect the right to self-determination is complemented by a
primary obligation requiring all States:
“to promote, through joint and separate action, realization of the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to
render assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to it
by the Charter regarding the implementation of the principle […]”.122
117 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 199, para. 155.
118 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 199, para. 157.
119 Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention; Article 85(4)(a) of Additional Protocol I. The obligations reflected
in Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, including the protection of physical integrity of civilians, mirror
equivalent guarantees conferred upon the categories of protected persons under the other Geneva Conventions, namely
Article 12 of the First Geneva Convention (Wounded and Sick), Article 12 of the Second Geneva Convention
(Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked), Articles 13 and 14 of the Third Geneva Convention (Prisoners of War).
120 Cf. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, pp. 199-200, para. 158.
121 East Timor (Portugal v Australia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 90, para. 29; Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, para. 156;
Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2019, p. 95, para. 180.
122 General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, A/RES/2625(XXV),
24 October 1970, Annex.
26
87. The Court recognised in the Wall Advisory Opinion that, in light of the character and
importance of the obligations concerned, all States are under international legal obligations
not to recognise the illegal situation resulting from their breach, not to render aid or assistance
in maintaining the situation created, and to take appropriate steps to ensure compliance by
Israel with its obligations.123
88. The obligation of non-recognition operates in tandem with, and gives concrete effect to, the
nullity and lack of legal effect under international law of Israeli action in breach of its
international obligations, including the adoption of relevant legislation.124 As already noted,
the Security Council has declared, for example, that “all legislative and administrative
measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which purport to alter the
character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem have no legal validity […]” and that “all
such measures which have altered the geographic, demographic and historical character and
status of the Holy City of Jerusalem are null and void and must be rescinded in compliance
with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council”.125
89. Further, to the extent that the relevant obligations arise under peremptory norms of general
international law (jus cogens), and the conduct of Israel constitutes a serious breach of such
norms, the same obligations apply to all States under the principles reflected in Articles 40
and 41 of the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts
(“ARSIWA”).126
90. In the view of the UAE, at a minimum, the principal rules of international humanitarian law
at issue (the obligations pursuant to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention not to modify
the demographic composition of occupied areas, the violation of which constitutes a grave
breach of the Convention) must be considered to constitute peremptory norms, including
insofar as the Court has previously referred to those obligations as constituting
“intransgressible principles of international customary law”.127 The UAE considers that the
same conclusion is equally applicable in respect of the obligations under Articles 27 and 53
of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which protect the life, physical integrity and property of
123 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 200, para. 159.
124 See above, paras. 40-42.
125 Security Council Resolution 476 (1980), S/RES/476(1980), 30 June 1980, paras. 3-4.
126 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 2001, vol. II (Part Two), p. 29, Articles 40-41.
127 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 199, para. 157, citing Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 1996, p. 257, para. 79.
27
protected persons in occupied territory, and violation of which likewise constitutes a grave
breach.
91. For these purposes, a serious breach of a peremptory norm is defined in Article 40, paragraph
2, ARSIWA as “a gross or systemic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation”
concerned.128 In this regard, the International Law Commission’s Commentary to Article 40
notes that:
“To be regarded as systematic, a violation would have to be carried out in an organized and
deliberate way. In contrast, the term “gross” refers to the intensity of the violation or its
effects; it denotes violations of a flagrant nature, amounting to a direct and outright assault
on the values protected by the rule. […] Factors which may establish the seriousness of a
violation would include the intent to violate the norm; the scope and number of individual
violations, and the gravity of their consequences for the victims. […]”.129
92. In light of the systematic and continuous nature of Israel’s actions, and the extent of their
effects on both Palestine and its population, there can be little doubt that Israel’s conduct rises
to the level of a serious breach.
93. Pursuant to the principles enshrined in Article 41 ARSIWA, all States are under an obligation
to cooperate in order to bring to an end a grave breach of a peremptory norm, and not to
recognise the illegal situation resulting from such a breach or to render aid or assistance in
maintenance of such a situation. The existence of the latter obligation, reflected in Article 41,
paragraph 2 (i.e. the obligation not to recognise situations resulting from grave breaches, and
not to render aid or assistance in their maintenance) has been acknowledged and recognised
by the Court.130
94. Although all States are also obliged to ensure compliance and to cooperate to bring to an end
such breaches through lawful means, individual States have discretion to determine the most
appropriate action to achieve those ends; particular action is not prescribed.
128 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 2001, vol. II (Part Two), p. 29, Articles 40, para. 2. See also Report of International Law Commission
73rd Session of the General Assembly, A/77/10, 2022, Chapter IV: Peremptory Norms of General International Law
(jus cogens), Draft Conclusions on identification and legal consequences of peremptory norms of general international
law (jus cogens), with commentaries, Conclusion 19, para. 3, and commentary to Conclusion 19, p.70.
129 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 2001, vol. II (Part Two), p. 113.
130 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy; Greece Intervening), ICJ Reports 2012, p. 99, para. 93.
Cf. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 200, para. 159.
28
95. There are a range of potential actions that individual States can take to contribute to the
aforementioned objectives in a given situation, depending on their particular circumstances
and their relationships.
96. One such approach is to use direct political and diplomatic engagement and dialogue,
including on a bilateral basis, to encourage compliance and cessation of unlawful conduct,
and to foster dialogue and trust between the parties. Such methods can be particularly effective
when undertaken by countries with particular influence in the relevant situation, either
individually or in coordination with other such influential actors. The sustained engagement
by certain small groups of States has been shown to be beneficial in the past in regards to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for example the recent efforts by the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan, Arab Republic of Egypt and the United States to engage the parties.131 The Security
Council has recognised the role that States can play by exerting their influence to induce the
cessation of illegal acts and compliance with its resolutions.132
97. In terms of the implications for international organisations, whilst again no particular approach
is mandated,133 in previous similar cases the Court has highlighted steps that it considered
might appropriately be taken. For instance, in the Wall Advisory Opinion, the Court drew to
the attention of the General Assembly the need to encourage efforts:
“with a view to achieving as soon as possible, on the basis of international law, a negotiated
solution to the outstanding problems and the establishment of a Palestinian State, existing
side by side with Israel and its other neighbours, with peace and security for all in the
region”.134
98. More generally, in the dispositif, the Court recognised that:
131 See e.g., Aqaba Joint Communiqué dated 26 February 2023 (available at: https://www.state.gov/aqaba-jointcommunique/);
Sharm-el-Sheikh Joint communiqué, dated 19 March 2023 (available at:
https://eg.usembassy.gov/joint-communique-from-the-march-19-meeting-in-sharm-el-sheikh/).
132 Security Council Resolution 190 (1964), S/RES/190(1964), 9 June 1964, para. 2; Security Council Resolution 264
(1969), S/RES/264(1969), 20 March 1969, para. 7; Security Council Resolution 290 (1970), S/RES/290(1970), 8
December 1970, para. 10; Security Council Resolution 437 (1978), S/RES/437(1978), 10 October 1978, para. 4.
133 Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2019, p. 139, para. 180.
134 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 201, para. 162.
29
“The United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and the Security Council,
should consider what further action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation
resulting from the construction of the wall”.135
99. It remains, however, for the relevant bodies, and their members, to consider how and to what
extent these and other steps should be taken, consistent with the mandate of the body, with a
view to ensuring that serious breaches are brought to an end.
100. Focussing specifically upon the Security Council, as the organ having primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security, Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter
provide the Council with a range of tools which can be employed in exercising its mandate.
Such measures include, most obviously, the adoption of decisions, in accordance with Article
27 of the UN Charter, by which the Security Council may, inter alia, demand the cessation of
conduct in breach of international legal obligations. UN Member States are to carry out the
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the UN Charter.136 In this regard, the
UAE underscores the need for full implementation of all previous Security Council resolutions
relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.137
101. During its tenure as an elected member of the Security Council, the UAE has actively
endeavoured to ensure that the Security Council accords due attention and takes appropriate
action with respect to the situation in the OPT including in relation to the tensions and violence
which have escalated since the beginning of 2023 as a result of provocative statements, violent
actions, incitement, and the further expansion of settlements. These efforts by the UAE include
putting forward a decision of the Security Council138 as well as less formal messages of the
Security Council139 and requesting to convene meetings to consider developments as they
unfold.140 The UAE will endeavour to ensure that the Security Council continues to devote
attention to the situation and takes appropriate action.
135 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 2004, p. 200, para. 163.
136 UN Charter, Article 25.
137 Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9290th Meeting of the Security Council, 22 March 2023 (S/PV.9290), p. 13.
138 Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2023/1, 20 February 2023.
139 Security Council Press Statement on the Killing of Journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, SC/14891, 13 May 2022. Oral
remarks (“press elements”) on the situation at issue were conveyed on 27 June 2023 by the President of the Security
Council Lana Zaki Nusseibeh (UAE), as an outcome of the Council’s informal consultations of the whole on the
situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian Question, held on 23 June 2023.
140 Formal meetings of the Security Council: e.g. the Council met in open briefing format on 8 August 2022 in response
to the request of China, France, Ireland, Norway and the UAE (Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9107th Meeting of
the Security Council, S/PV.9107, 8 August 2022); the Council met in open briefing format on 5 January 2023 in
response to the request of China, France, Malta and the UAE (Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9236th Meeting of
30
VI. CONCLUSION
102. The UAE submits that the Court should provide the advisory opinion requested by the General
Assembly and that the Court should confirm the continued and ongoing violations of Israel’s
obligations under international law vis-à-vis the Palestinian people and the OPT.
103. The UAE’s written statement has focused on Jerusalem and the impact of settlements in the
OPT, for reasons previously explained, while recognising that there is a much broader suite
of legal matters to be considered in relation to the present proceedings. In this broader context,
the UAE takes the opportunity to recall that Palestinians have a right to return141 and to
emphasise that, as a matter of international law, occupation has not and cannot result in any
transfer of sovereignty over any part of the OPT, and neither the policies and practices adopted
by Israel, nor the length of the occupation, are liable to have any impact upon the status of the
OPT.142
104. Israel’s acts, policies and practices which constitute a violation of its international obligations
strike at the heart of the core pillars of the two-State solution.
105. The continuous expansion of the Israeli settlements, as well as the transfer and facilitation of
Israeli settlers serve to entrench the occupation of the OPT by Israel. Such actions risk
undermining the prospect of a viable independent Palestinian State.
106. Further, they undermine the prospect of “secure and recognized borders”143 of Palestine based
on the 1967 Borders. They also impair the concretization of an independent Palestinian state
that is contiguous on the West Bank. The settlements have indeed fragmented and
the Security Council, S/PV.9236, 5 January 2023). Informal consultations of the whole: e.g. consultations were
convened on 19 April 2022 at the request of China, France, Ireland, Norway and the UAE to discuss the situation in
Jerusalem (Letter dated 16 November 2022 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2022/868, 17
November 2022, Annex, p. 8).
141 See e.g., General Assembly Resolution 35/169, A/RES/35/169, 15 December 1980, para. 2.
142 See in this sense General Assembly Resolution 77/126, A/RES/77/126, 12 December 2022, para. 7 (“Stresses that
the occupation of a territory is to be a temporary, de facto situation, whereby the occupying Power can neither claim
possession nor exert its sovereignty over the territory it occupies, recalls in this regard the principle of the
inadmissibility of the acquisition of land by force and therefore the illegality of the annexation of any part of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which constitutes a breach of international law, undermines
the viability of the two-State solution and challenges the prospects for a just, lasting and comprehensive peace
settlement, and expresses its grave concern at recent statements calling for the annexation by Israel of areas in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory”). See similarly Security Council Resolution 478 (1980), S/RES/478(1980), 20 August
1980; Security Council Resolution 681 (1990), S/RES/681(1990), 20 December 1990; Security Council Resolution
2334 (2016), S/RES/2334 (2016), 23 December 2016.
143 Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2023/1, 20 February 2023, para. 1.
31
disarticulated Palestine’s territory, separating Palestinians from their lands and from other
Palestinian communities.144
107. As regards East Jerusalem, the settlements that encircle it effectively isolate the city from the
remainder of the West Bank, thereby undermining its viability as a capital.145
108. In addition to the attempts to physically separate East Jerusalem from the West Bank, Israel’s
policies and measures implemented with a view to altering its status, character and
demographic composition represent another attempt to break the existential bonds between
East Jerusalem and the rest of Palestine. Such measures risk, over time, drastically altering
the cultural and religious character of East Jerusalem, deepening the separation of the city
from the rest of Palestine and its population.
109. The UAE is deeply concerned by the measures undertaken unilaterally by Israel that create
facts on the ground that could become both irreversible and irremediable, and dangerously
imperil the possibility of the two-State solution. 146
110. The UAE’s stance in this regard aligns with the position of the Security Council,147 including
in respect of its reiterated appeals that the parties return to negotiations as the way forward to
remedy the present state of affairs.
111. The UAE notes, in this regard, Article 2, paragraph 3 of the UN Charter, by which all Members
have an obligation to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner
that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. Article 33 of the UN
Charter, which complements and provides substance to Article 2, paragraph 3, further provides
that “the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice”. This is the overarching
144 General Assembly Resolution, 77/126, A/RES/77/126, 12 December 2022, preamble.
145 See also General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan, A/77/493, 3 October 2022, para. 6.
146 Provisional Verbatim Record of the 9236th Meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.9263, 20 February 2023.
147 Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016), S/RES/2334(2016), 23 December 2016, preamble (“Expressing grave
concern that continuing Israeli settlement activities are dangerously imperiling the viability of the two-State solution
based on the 1967 lines”), paras. 3-4; Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2023/1, 20 February 2023, para. 4 (“The
Security Council reiterates that continuing Israeli settlement activities are dangerously imperiling the viability of the
two-State solution based on the 1967 lines”); Security Council Resolution 1073 (1996), S/RES/1073(1996), 28
September 1996, para. 3 (“Calls for the immediate resumption of negotiations within the Middle East peace process
[…]”); Security Council Resolution 476 (1980), S/RES/476(1980), 30 June 1980, preamble, paras. 3-5; Security
Council Resolution 478 (1980), S/RES/478(1980), 20 August 1980, preamble, paras. 3, 5.
32
framework within which States are obligated by international law to conduct themselves in
the resolution of international disputes.148
112. In this context, it is crucial to recall that Israel must negotiate meaningfully, in good faith, and
in a manner that does not aggravate or extend the conflict. Yet Israel’s unilateral policies and
faits accomplis are inconsistent with this duty, and to a more severe extent than was at issue
in the Wall Advisory Opinion.
113. The Security Council has on numerous occasions stressed the need for a negotiated process.
In response to Israel’s violations the Security Council has reiterated that “continuing Israeli
settlement activities are dangerously imperilling the viability of the two-State solution”;149 it
has called “for affirmative steps to be taken immediately to reverse the negative trends on the
ground that are imperilling the two-State solution”;150 and it has further called upon “all parties
to continue […] to exert collective efforts to launch credible negotiations on all final status
issues in the Middle East peace process […]”.151 In the UAE’s view, this is indeed the path
forward.
148 Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece),
Judgment of 5 December 2011, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 685, para. 132.
149 Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2023/1, 20 February 2023, para. 4.
150 Security Council Resolution 2334(2016), S/RES/2334(2016), 23 December 2016, para. 4. See also Presidential
Statement, S/PRST/2023/1, 20 February 2023, para. 4 (“The Security Council reiterates that continuing Israeli
settlement activities are dangerously imperiling the viability of the two-State solution based on the 1967 lines”).
151 Security Council Resolution 2334(2016), S/RES/2334(2016), 23 December 2016, para. 8. See also Security
Council Resolution 1073(1996), S/RES/1073(1996), 28 September 1996, para. 3.