Written comments of Belize

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES ARISING FROM THE POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF ISRAEL IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, INCLUDING EAST JERUSALEM
WRITTEN COMMENTS OF BELIZE
25 OCTOBER 2023

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................1
CHAPTER 1. THE FRAMEWORK FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IS NOT A COMPELLING REASON FOR THE COURT TO DECLINE TO ANSWER FULLY THE QUESTIONS ASKED OF IT ........................................................................................8
CHAPTER 2. THE FRAMEWORK FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IS IRRELEVANT TO THE ANSWERS THE COURT WOULD GIVE TO THE QUESTIONS ASKED OF IT................................................................................................11
A.INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................11
B.THE IRRELEVANCE OF ANY OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE.............................................13
1.Palestine and Israel are not subject to an obligation to negotiate ............................13
a.No obligation to negotiate by virtue of UN Security Council Resolutions 242and 338.............................................................................................................13
b.No obligation to negotiate by virtue of Israel-Palestine documents andagreements .......................................................................................................17
2.Even if there were an obligation to negotiate (which there is not), it would beirrelevant to the answers the Court would give to the questions asked of it ...........24
C.THE IRRELEVANCE OF ANY ‘RIGHT TO REMAIN’ ..........................................................24
1.Israel does not have a ‘right to remain’ in, or exercise control or authority over, thePalestinian territory until a negotiated solution is achieved....................................25
a.No ‘right to remain’ by virtue of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967)and 338 (1973) .................................................................................................25
b.No ‘right to remain’ by virtue of Israel-Palestine agreements ........................30
2.Even if there were a ‘right to remain’ (which there is not), it would be irrelevant tothe answers the Court would give to the questions asked of it................................33
CHAPTER 3. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RULES RELEVANT TO NEGOTIATIONS..................................................................................................................35
A.INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RULES RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT-MATTER AND OUTCOME OFANY NEGOTIATIONS........................................................................................................36
1.States are under a continuing duty to comply with their international obligations andare obliged immediately to cease any continuing wrongful act ..............................36
2.The duty to comply with peremptory norms is non-negotiable...............................36
3.The duty to comply with non-peremptory obligations stands until there has beenconsensual inter-se modification of those obligations ............................................37
B.ISRAEL’S DUTY TO COMPLY WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL LAW OBLIGATIONS IS NOTCONDITIONED BY THE EXISTENCE OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS.............38
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................42

1
INTRODUCTION
1.
Belize seeks to assist the Court in relation to one further issue, which was not addressedin its Written Statement but which has been raised in a number of Written Statementssubmitted by other participants. This is the issue of a negotiated solution to the Israel-Palestine situation.
2.
Written Statements from other participants addressed this issue in two differentrespects. First, in the context of examining whether the Court should answer thequestions asked of it (discretion), someWritten Statements contended that the existenceof a framework for a negotiated solution is a compelling reason for the Court to declineto issue an Advisory Opinion, or to decline fully to answer the questions asked of it.1Second, when addressing the substance of the prospective Advisory Opinion (content),some Written Statements cautioned that the Court should answer the questions in amanner that does not conflict with or undermine the framework for a negotiatedsolution.2
3.
Both of these arguments assume that the answers that the Court would provide ifunconstrained by the postulated limitations would in some way conflict with orundermine the negotiation framework. Crucially, however, the Written Statementsadopting this position did not examine the negotiation framework in order to explainhow it could conflict with, or be undermined by, the Court issuing an Opinion or thecontent of such an Opinion.
4.
Belize’s Written Comments therefore examine the relationship between the frameworkfor a negotiated solution and the questions asked of the Court.3
5.
Belize’s position, in summary, is that the existence of a framework for negotiations isirrelevant to the Court’s task.
(a)
It is not a compelling reason for the Court to exercise its discretion to decline toanswer, or answer fully, the questions asked of it (Chapter 1).
1See the references in footnote 31 below.
2See the references in the footnotes to paras. 19-20, 22 and 41 below.
3Defined terms used in Belize’s Written Statement are adopted here.
2
(b)
It does not affect the legal consequences of Israel’s unlawful conduct, and thuswould not change the Court’s answers to the questions asked of it. As Belizeexplained in its Written Statement, Israel: (i) is in continuing breach of itsobligations to comply with a number of peremptory norms; (ii) is in unlawfuloccupation of the Palestinian territory; and (iii) as a result of those breaches andthat unlawful occupation, Israel must immediately end its occupation andviolations of peremptory norms.4 None of those conclusions is affected by thefact that there is a framework for negotiations. In particular, none of thoseconclusions is affected by arguments that the negotiation framework allegedlycreated an obligation for Israel and Palestine to negotiate with respect topermanent status issues, or a right for Israel to remain in the Palestinian territoryuntil a negotiated solution is achieved (Chapter 2).
(c)
The irrelevance of the negotiation framework to the answers that the Court wouldgive to the questions asked follows from international law rules relevant tonegotiations (Chapter 3).
6.
It is necessary first to address the term “framework for a negotiated solution”. The valueof negotiations in achieving a just and lasting peace between Israel and Palestine haslong been recognised. Various resolutions, documents and agreements have initiated orendorsed efforts towards that end. These resolutions, agreements and documents aresometimes loosely referred to collectively as a “framework for a negotiated solution”or a “negotiation framework”. There is no agreed definition of what constitutes thisframework. It is often said to have been established by or consist of the followingdocuments:5
(a)
UN Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973);6
4See the references in footnotes 44-46 below.
5See, e.g., Written Statement of the Czech Republic, 20 July 2023, pp. 1-2; Written Statement of Nauru, undated, paras. 5, 10 and 12; Written Statement of the United States of America, 25 July 2023, paras. 1.7 and 2.3; Written Statement of the United Kingdom, 20 July 2023, paras. 9-10; Written Statement of Hungary, 25 July 2023, paras. 13-14 and 22; Written Statement of Morocco, July 2023, p. 4; Written Statement of Canada, 14 July 2023, para. 6.
6UNSC Resolution 242, UN Doc. S/RES/242, 22 November 1967 (S/RES/242 (1967)); UNSC Resolution 338, UN Doc. S/RES/338, 22 October 1973 (S/RES/338 (1973)).
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(b)the 1993 and 1995 agreements between Israel and the Palestinian LiberationOrganisation (PLO) known as the Oslo Accords;7 and
is sometimes also said to include other documents such as:
(c)the 1991 Madrid terms of reference, the 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the 1998Wye River Memorandum, the 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, the 2002Arab Peace Initiative, the 2003 Quartet Roadmap, the 2007 Joint Understandingand the 2023 Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Communiqué.8
7.
In addressing the framework for a negotiated solution in these Written Comments,Belize deals with all of these documents.
8.
Before proceeding further, Belize considers it necessary to acknowledge the violentevents currently taking place in Israel, Gaza and the West Bank. All acts of violencetargeting civilians are obviously unacceptable and constitute clear violations ofinternational law. Israel’s conduct in recent weeks demands particular attention. Belizewishes to express that it is gravely concerned by the failure of the internationalcommunity to intervene to end Israel’s prolonged illegal occupation, which wasrecognised by the UN Security Council in Resolution 242 (1967) as being necessary fora just and lasting peace.9 Israel’s prolonged occupation amounts to a continuing illegalact of aggression contrary to the jus ad bellum, which has been ongoing since 196710and which is catalysing rounds of worsening hostilities against the protected Palestinianpopulation under Israel’s effective control.
9.
Belize is alarmed by statements by Israel, the occupying Power, aimed at régimechange, annexation and forcible transfer of civilians in occupied Gaza, in breach of
7Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, 13 September 1993, annexed to UN Doc. A/48/486–S/26560, 11 October 1993 (Oslo I); Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 28 September 1995, reproduced in (1997) 36(3) ILM 557 (Oslo II) (together, the Oslo Accords).
8One or more of these documents are referred to in the Written Statements of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Jordan, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Nauru, Fiji, China, Egypt, Russia, Bolivia, Morocco and in the annexes to the Written Statement of Spain.
9See para. 48(b) below. See also UNSC Resolution 2334, UN Doc. S/RES/2334, 23 December 2016 (S/RES/2334 (2016)), para. 9 (urging diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a “comprehensive, just and lasting peace … on the basis of … an end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967”).
10See Written Statement of Belize, 25 July 2023, para. 33.
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international law, including
Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.11 On 7 October 2023, Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, stated: “I say to the residents of Gaza: Leave now because we will operate forcefully everywhere”.12 Cabinet Minister Gideon Sa’ar expressed that “Gaza must be smaller at the end of the war”, “they have to lose this territory” because it “is the price of loss that the Arabs understand”.13 Referring to the mass forcible transfer of Palestinians across Gaza, on 14 October 2023 the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese, warned that “Palestinians are in grave danger of mass ethnic cleansing and called on the international community to urgently mediate a ceasefire between warring Hamas and Israeli occupation forces”.14
10. As of 21 October 2023, according to the UN Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs, some 4,385 Palestinians had been killed and 13,561 injured inIsrael’s then fifteen-day military offensive on Gaza.15 A further estimated 1,400Palestinians remain trapped under the rubble.16 Israel is also continuing a concertedcampaign of violence against Palestinians across the West Bank, where a further 84Palestinians have been killed and 1,653 injured.17 Israeli military forces continue to
11Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950, 75 UNTS 287 (GC IV), Article 47: “Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.” On forcible transfer, see GC IV, Article 49. On the prohibition of annexation, see Written Statement of Belize, 25 July 2023, paras. 44-45.
12Prime Minister of Israel, X (formerly Twitter), 7 October 2023 (available here); Statement by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 7 October 2023 (available here).
13“Israeli minister: Gaza ‘must be smaller at the end of war’”, interview on Channel 12 News, recording reproduced by TRT World, 14 October 2023 (available here).
14“UN expert warns of new instance of mass ethnic cleansing of Palestinians, calls for immediate ceasefire”, UN Press Release, 14 October 2023 (available here).
15UNOCHA, “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #15”, 21 October 2023 (available here).
16WHO, “oPT Emergency Situation Report, Issue 6”, 21 October 2023 (available here), p. 2.
17UNOCHA, “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #15”, 21 October 2023 (available here).
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carry out mass arrests and arbitrary administrative detentions, including the
recent arrest of more than 60 Gazan Palestinian labourers trapped in the West Bank.18
11.Israel’s 17-year land, sea and air blockade19 of Gaza has already been declared an actof collective punishment against the Palestinian people.20 There is evidence of strikeson an “unprecedented scale” and the destruction of entire residential neighbourhoods,including Rimal, Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahiya,21 and a mounting catalogue ofindiscriminate attacks on (or unlawfully targeting of) ambulances, hospitals, UNWRAschools and other buildings, mosques, churches, and places of refuge, amongst others.22
12.
Statements by senior Israeli officials concerning the collective targeting of the civilianpopulation of Gaza are alarming. This includes the statement on 9 October 2023 byYoav Gallant, Israel’s Minister of Defence, that Israel is “imposing a complete siege onGaza. There will be no electricity, no food, no water, no fuel. Everything is closed. Weare fighting human animals, and we are acting accordingly”.23 This sentiment wasechoed by the Coordinator of the Government in the Territories, Major GeneralGhassan Alian, stating that: “Human beasts are dealt with accordingly. Israel hasimposed a total blockade on Gaza, no electricity, no water, just damage. You wanted
18UNRWA, “Situation Report #9 on the situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank”, 20 October 2023 (available here). On arbitrary arrests and detention in the West Bank more generally, see Written Statement of Belize, 25 July 2023, para. 56(b).
19On the use of the term “blockade”, see Written Statement of Belize, 25 July 2023, footnote 52.
20See Written Statement of Belize, 25 July 2023, para. 56(e)(vi).
21“IAF hits Gaza on ‘unprecedented scale’; Strip’s power plant shuts down”, The Times of Israel, 11 October 2023 (available here); “Damage maps of Gaza’s hard-hit areas since the start of the war”, The Washington Post, 19 October 2023 (available here).
22Statement of Volker Türk, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk on horrific killings at Al Ahli Arab Hospital in Gaza”, 17 October 2023 (available here); UNRWA, “Situation Report #9 on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (including East Jerusalem)”, 20 October 2023 (available here); OCHA, “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #6”, 12 October 2023 (available here); “Ambulances hit during Israeli air attack in Gaza”, Al Jazeera, 14 October 2023 (available here); Al-Haq, Al Mezan and PCHR, “Joint Urgent Appeal to UN Special Procedures on Journalists Killed While Reporting in Gaza, Highlights Israel in Breach of International Law”, 13 October 2023 (available here); Al-Haq, Al Mezan and PCHR, “Al-Haq, Al Mezan, and PCHR Send Urgent Appeal to UN Special Procedures and the Commission of Inquiry on Israel’s Total Warfare on Gaza’s Civilian Population”, 12 October 2023 (available here).
23“Israeli Defense Minister Announces Siege On Gaza To Fight ‘Human Animals’”, Huffington Post, 9 October 2023 (available here). A similar statement has been made by Israel’s Minister of Energy and Infrastructure, Israel Katz. See Al Mezan, “Urgent Action: Palestinian Human Rights Organisations Call on Third States to Urgently Intervene to Protect the Palestinian People Against Genocide”, 18 October 2023 (available here), linking and translating the statements.
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hell
– you will get hell”.24 At the same time, a massive evacuation order for 1.1 million people to leave northern Gaza and move south, has been carried out in the absence of any discernible military objective,25 while the evacuation routes and people in the south have also been subject to relentless bombing campaigns.26 According to the WHO, the “[e]vacuation orders by Israel to hospitals in northern Gaza are a death sentence for the sick and injured”.27
13.
To secure peace, international law must prevail. A group of UN Special Rapporteursissued a warning on 19 October 2023: “We are sounding the alarm: There is an ongoingcampaign by Israel resulting in crimes against humanity in Gaza. Consideringstatements made by Israeli political leaders and their allies, accompanied by militaryaction in Gaza and escalation of arrests and killing in the West Bank, there is also a riskof genocide against the Palestinian People”.28 Belize is compelled at this juncture toexpress its grave concern in respect of indications that war crimes, crimes againsthumanity and genocide (including intent to commit and incitement to genocide) arebeing, or may be, committed against the people of Gaza.29 The international law
24Coordinator of the Government in the Territories (COGAT), X (formerly Twitter), 10 October 2023 (available here). The statement is also linked and translated in Al Mezan, “Urgent Action: Palestinian Human Rights Organisations Call on Third States to Urgently Intervene to Protect the Palestinian People Against Genocide”, 18 October 2023 (available here).
25Contrary to GC IV, Article 49(2), which limits any evacuations of civilians within an occupied territory to situations in which “the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand”.
26See Al Mezan, “Urgent Action: Palestinian Human Rights Organisations Call on Third States to Urgently Intervene to Protect the Palestinian People Against Genocide”, 18 October 2023 (available here); “Gaza civilians afraid to leave home after bombing of ‘safe routes’”, The Guardian, 15 October 2023 (available here); “‘The strikes are everywhere’: Palestinians flee south in Gaza but cannot escape bombs”, The Guardian, 21 October 2023 (available here).
27WHO, “Evacuation orders by Israel to hospitals in northern Gaza are a death sentence for the sick and injured”, 14 October 2023 (available here).
28“Gaza: UN experts decry bombing of hospitals and schools as crimes against humanity, call for prevention of genocide”, UN Press Release, 19 October 2023 (available here). See also the warning of 800 scholars, including of genocide and Holocaust studies, “about the possibility of the crime of genocide being perpetrated by Israeli forces against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip” (see “Public Statement: Scholars Warn of Potential Genocide in Gaza”, Opinio Juris, 18 October 2023 (available here)). See further the report of the Centre for Constitutional Rights, “Israel’s Unfolding Crime of Genocide of the Palestinian People & U.S. Failure to Prevent and Complicity in Genocide”, 18 October 2023 (available here). A letter was sent by genocide scholars and 100 organisations to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court calling for, among other things, an investigation into Israeli officials’ statements constituting incitement to genocide (see Letter addressed to Mr. Karim A.A. Khan KC, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 19 October 2023 (available here)).
29See “A Textbook Case of Genocide”, Jewish Currents, 13 October 2023 (available here).
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prohibitions against these acts are peremptory, and their violation gives rise to obligations on the part of all States to cooperate in bringing such violations to an end.30
30See Belize’s Written Statement, 25 July 2023, paras. 83-84.
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CHAPTER 1. THE FRAMEWORK FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IS NOT A COMPELLING REASON FOR THE COURT TO DECLINE TO ANSWER FULLY THE QUESTIONS ASKED OF IT
14.
In expressing their support for a two-State negotiated solution, a minority of States haveproposed that the Court should decline to issue an Advisory Opinion or, in issuing it,stop short of fully answering the questions asked, in order not to undermine orcircumvent the framework for a negotiated solution.31 The consistent jurisprudence ofthe Court is that only “compelling reasons” may lead the Court to refuse its opinion inresponse to a request falling within its jurisdiction.32 In the present case, there are nosuch compelling reasons. The Court should reject the argument calling for it to declineto answer fully the questions asked of it, for the following reasons.
15.
First, the UN General Assembly has seen fit to seek answers to the questions posed inthe request, and it is for the UN General Assembly to decide how to use those answersto assist it in the discharge of its functions. It is not for the Court to determine whetherthe answers to those questions are needed by, or would be useful for, the UN GeneralAssembly.33 In particular, it is not for the Court to partially answer the questions askedby reference to how a political process may or may not be conducted in the future. Thatwould be an inappropriate exercise of the Court’s advisory jurisdiction. There is,moreover, no basis on which the Court could objectively judge the impact of itsanswers, whether full or partial, on any future negotiations.34
31As to participants that consider the Court should decline to answer the questions at all, see, e.g., the Written Statements of Canada, Fiji, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Togo, the United Kingdom and Zambia. As regards participants that say the Court should stop short of fully answering the questions, see, e.g., Written Statement of Norway, 7 July 2023, p. 2 (asking the Court to depart from the language of the questions asked and only clarify the legal framework for negotiations), and see also the Written Statements referred to in footnote 41 below, which contend that the Court should alter the content of its Advisory Opinion so as to preserve the negotiation framework, which could also be construed as an argument that the Court should stop short of fully answering the questions asked.
32See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (Chagos Advisory Opinion), p. 113, para. 65; Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (Kosovo Advisory Opinion), p. 416, para. 30; Legal Consequences of the Constructionof a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (Wall AdvisoryOpinion), p. 156, para. 44.
33Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion), p. 237, para. 16; Kosovo Advisory Opinion, pp. 417-418, para. 34; Wall Advisory Opinion, p. 163, paras. 61-62.
34Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, p. 237, para. 17; Kosovo Advisory Opinion, p. 418, para. 35; Wall Advisory Opinion, pp. 159-160, paras. 51-54.
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16.
Second, the argument is premised on the assumption that by answering, fully or at all,the questions asked by the UN General Assembly, the Court would undermine effortsto achieve a negotiated solution.35 This is incorrect. The only way that fully answeringthe questions asked could undermine negotiations would be if the Court’s answerswould dictate outcomes on issues that the parties have free rein to negotiate, such thatit would unjustifiably reduce the space for meaningful negotiations. But as explainedbelow in Chapter 3, Israel and Palestine are not unconstrained. Any negotiations thattake place must be consistent with international law. International law imposes rulesrelevant to the negotiations, including that compliance with peremptory norms is non-negotiable.36 By providing complete answers to the questions, on the basis ofinternational law, quite apart from not undermining negotiations, the Court will beassisting the UN General Assembly in its efforts to facilitate them taking place in alawful, realistic and productive manner.37 It is not credible to suggest otherwise.
17.
Third, the argument suggests that declining to answer or stopping short of fullyanswering the questions asked would have positive effects on achieving a negotiatedsolution. This, however, presupposes that the parties are ready and willing to concludea negotiated settlement and that the Court should, in essence, not risk interfering. Thatpremise is not an accurate reflection of the current state of affairs. The negotiationframework aimed at achieving a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement hasbeen stalled for years.38 The prospect of the parties engaging in productive and
35Various suggestions are made as to how negotiations could be undermined, including: (i) general speculative suggestions that an Advisory Opinion could damage relations between Israel and Palestine (see, e.g., Written Statement of the United States of America, 25 July 2023, para. 3.20); (ii) that establishing the precise scope of Israel’s responsibility may run counter to creating conditions for negotiations (see Written Statement of Russia, 24 July 2023, p. 27); (iii) that, by determining the issues on which it has been asked to opine, the Court could “prejudice” the outcome of negotiations between Israel and Palestine (see, e.g., Written Statement of Zambia, undated, p. 2); and (iv) because the Court is only being asked to opineon some of the matters that are relevant to negotiations (see, e.g., Written Statement of Fiji, July 2023,p.3).
36See para. 66 below.
37Contra Written Statement of Togo, 24 July 2023, pp. 2-3 (suggesting the main purpose of the request for an Advisory Opinion is to have the negotiation framework abandoned). See also, agreeing that the Advisory Opinion will facilitate negotiations: Written Statement of the United Arab Emirates, 25 July 2023, para. 8; Written Statement of Colombia, 24 July 2023, paras. 3.16-3.17 and 4.11; Written Statement of Qatar, 25 July 2023, para. 6.105; Written Statement of Cuba, 24 July 2023, pp. 3-4; Written Statement of Norway, 7 July 2023, p. 2.
38See Written Statement of Jordan, 25 July 2023, para. 3.53 (noting that since the last peace talks in 2014, there has been no progress on reaching a permanent settlement). See further other participants’ recognition that the progress of negotiations has stalled: Written Statement of Qatar, 25 July 2023, para. 6.105; Written Statement of Ireland, 25 July 2023, para. 10; Written Statement of Bangladesh, undated, para. 8.
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comprehensive negotiations within a relevant timeframe
has decreased even further in the wake of the recent violent escalations across Israel, Gaza and the West Bank, occurring in the context of Israel’s entrenchment of its annexation and apartheid policies and the struggle of the Palestinian people against a 56 year-long illegal and oppressive occupation.39 The Court should therefore not countenance any path that may further contribute to the stagnation of negotiations in circumstances where the UN General Assembly has determined that the Court answering the questions it has posed would assist it in the exercise of its own functions to facilitate a peaceful solution to the Israel-Palestine situation.
18.
The existence of the framework for a negotiated solution is therefore not a compellingreason for the Court to decline to issue the Advisory Opinion or to decline fully toanswer the questions asked of it.
39See also footnote 158 below.
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CHAPTER 2. THE FRAMEWORK FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IS IRRELEVANT TO THE ANSWERS THE COURT WOULD GIVE TO THE QUESTIONS ASKED OF IT
A.INTRODUCTION
19.
As explained in Chapter 1, the Court should fully answer the questions asked of it. TheCourt’s answers to those questions will be based on the relevant rules of internationallaw. To the extent that there is a non-binding political (as opposed to legally-binding)framework for negotiations, that is evidently irrelevant to the content of the AdvisoryOpinion to be issued by the Court. However, a small number of participants have takenthe position that there is a legally-binding framework for negotiations.40 Theseparticipants have urged the Court to be careful to ensure that any Advisory Opinionrendered “respects” and is “in line with” the negotiation framework.41 Crucially,however, the handful ofWritten Statements adopting this position do not clearly explainhow they consider the negotiation framework gives rise to rights and obligations thatwould impact the answers to the questions asked of the Court.
40See, e.g., Written Statement of Nauru, undated, para. 3 (“Nauru is of the view that there is an established legal framework for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”); Written Statement of Fiji, July 2023, p.2 (“the binding legal framework established specifically to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict”);Written Statement of Hungary, 25 July 2023, para. 25 (referring to the “established legal framework” fornegotiations); Written Statement of Israel, 24 July 2023, p. 5 (“the established legal framework governingthe Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its negotiated resolution”); Written Statement of Togo, 24 July 2023,p.2 (“le cadre juridique établi pour parvenir à la paix israélo-palestinienne”); Written Statement of Zambia,undated, p. 1 (“the established legal framework for the resolution of their conflict”).
41See, e.g., Written Statement of Russia, 24 July 2023, para. 43 (refers to “the universally recognized international legal framework of the Middle East Peace Process” and considers that “[a]ny advisory opinion that the Court will deliver will have to be in line with this framework and contribute to its implementation”) and see also para. 82; Written Statement of the United States of America, 25 July 2023, paras. 3.3, 3.14 and 5.6 (calls on the Court to “address the referral request in a manner that respects the established framework”; “The referral therefore places the Court in the unenviable position of having to consider how to address the potentially far-reaching questions without disturbing the established negotiating framework”; “It is imperative for the Court to ensure that its opinion, even if addressing legal consequences of alleged violations of international law, is tailored to preserve the parties’ ability to negotiate peace and a two-State solution consistent with the established framework”); Written Statement of Italy, undated, para. 5 (refers to “the established legal framework for the resolution of the conflict” and “respectfully submits that the Court carefully consider how to exercise its functions … so as to preserve the parties’ ability to negotiate peace and a two-State solution consistent with the framework”); Written Statement of the Czech Republic, 20 July 2023, p. 3 (“the answers should not be construed as allowing departure from the established legal framework”); Written Statement of Guatemala, July 2023, paras. 46 and 48 (“Such a mandatory framework enjoys the endorsement of the international community and of the Security Council. … Guatemala wishes to request the Court that any advisory opinion it may decide to furnish carefully considers the above-mentioned bilateral negotiations framework and contribute to its prompt implementation”).
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20.
Those Written Statements appear to make two arguments about such rights andobligations allegedly created by the framework for negotiations. The first is that Israeland Palestine are subject to a legally-binding obligation to negotiate on certain issues,specifically what are described as “permanent status issues”.42 This phrase is derivedfrom Article V of Oslo I and includes: “Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, securityarrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and otherissues of common interest”. The second is that Israel has a ‘right to remain’ in thePalestinian territory, and to continue to exercise authority and control over that territory,until there is a negotiated solution.43
21.
In this Chapter, Belize explains that the negotiation framework is irrelevant because itdoes not change the answers that would otherwise be given to the questions asked ofthe Court. As Belize explained in its Written Statement, Israel: (i) is in continuingbreach of its obligations to comply with a number of peremptory norms;44 (ii) is inunlawful occupation of the Palestinian territory;45 and (iii) as a result of those breachesand that unlawful occupation, Israel must immediately end its occupation.46 None ofthose conclusions is affected by the fact that there is a framework for negotiations. Inparticular, none of those conclusions is affected by arguments that the negotiationframework allegedly created rights and obligations that bind Israel and Palestine.Section B explains that Israel and Palestine are not subject to an obligation to negotiate,but even if they were (which they are not), it would not affect the legal consequencesof Israel’s unlawful conduct and therefore would be irrelevant to the Court’s task.Section C demonstrates that Israel has no ‘right to remain’ in the Palestinian territoryuntil a negotiated solution is achieved, but even if it did have such a right (which it doesnot), that would not prevail over peremptory obligations that require Israel’s completeand immediate withdrawal. The existence of such a right would not, therefore, affectthe legal consequences of Israel’s unlawful conduct and therefore would be irrelevantto the Court’s task.
42See para. 22 and the references in footnote 48 below.
43See para. 41 and the references in footnote 102 below.
44Written Statement of Belize, 25 July 2023, paras. 19-24, 33-34, 36-41, 47-52, 66-73 and 83.
45Written Statement of Belize, 25 July 2023, paras. 31-34 and 96-99.
46Written Statement of Belize, 25 July 2023, paras. 33, 76-78 and 103.
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B.THE IRRELEVANCE OF ANY OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE
22.
A number of Written Statements contend that the framework for a negotiated solutionis legally binding,47 and appear to argue that it imposes an obligation to negotiate onIsrael and Palestine.48 However, Israel and Palestine are not subject to any extantobligation to negotiate (subsection 1). Moreover, even if there were some obligation tonegotiate (which there is not), it would not need to be taken into account in the answersto be given by the Court because it could not affect Israel’s duty to comply withobligations that it has breached that require its complete and immediate withdrawalfrom the Palestinian territory (subsection 2).
1.Palestine and Israel are not subject to an obligation to negotiate
23.
No obligation to negotiate has been imposed upon Israel and Palestine by the UNSecurity Council (subsection a). Nor are they subject to any extant obligation tonegotiate created by agreement (subsection b).
a.No obligation to negotiate by virtue of UN Security Council Resolutions242 and 338
24.
UN Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) do not impose anobligation on Israel and Palestine to negotiate for three reasons:
47See footnote 40 above.
48See, e.g., Written Statement of Russia, 24 July 2023, p. 27 (“Israel and Palestine are under an obligation to conduct, in good faith and without delay, negotiations aimed at reaching a final status settlement”); Written Statement of the African Union, 25 July 2023, para. 154 (“these provisions from the Oslo Accords constitute a pactum de negotiando requiring both parties to negotiate in good faith to reach an agreement”); Written Statement of Guatemala, July 2023, para. 46 (“the distinct and subsequent frameworks for a negotiated outcome of the Palestine question and their current applicability to the parties, which include the requirement for the parties to resolve through direct negotiations the matter before the Court”); Written Statement of Nauru, undated, para. 14 (“Israel and Palestine have both committed to resolving the conflict and their competing claims through good faith negotiations”). This point is also raised by a number of Written Statements in the context of their arguments relating to the Court’s discretion. Those Written Statements contend that the UN General Assembly’s request concerns a bilateral dispute and that Israel and Palestine have not consented to the jurisdiction of the Court, but rather, they have agreed to a different mode of dispute settlement, negotiations (e.g. Written Statement of Zambia, undated, p. 2 (“Israel, which expressly committed to negotiate a settlement through direct negotiations with the Palestinian side”); Written Statement of Israel, 24 July 2023, p. 3 (“the two sides have agreed to resolve through direct negotiations precisely the subject-matter placed before the Court”)). That argument relating to the Court’s discretion is adequately responded to in Written Statements already before the Court. See, e.g., Written Statement of South Africa, 25 July 2023, paras. 26-38; Written Statement of Luxembourg, 20 July 2023, paras. 20-23; Written Statement of Russia, 24 July 2023, paras. 19-22; Written Statement of China, 25 July 2023, paras. 12-15; Written Statement of France, 25 July 2023, paras. 15-16; Written Statement of Jordan, 25 July 2023, paras. 2.12-2.15; Written Statement of Switzerland, 17 July 2023, paras. 15-17.
14
(a)
First, an examination of the content of the resolutions makes plain that they donot impose an obligation to negotiate on Israel and Palestine.
(b)
Second, at the time of the adoption of the two resolutions, Palestine was not yeta State,49 let alone a Member State of the UN, and therefore the UN SecurityCouncil could not impose an obligation to negotiate on it.
(c)
Third, even now, Palestine is a non-Member Observer State of the UN, not aMember State, and is therefore not obliged to comply even with mandatorydecisions of the UN Security Council.50
25.
As to the first of these reasons, which is the only one requiring elaboration, each of thetwo resolutions is addressed in turn immediately below.
26.Resolution 242 (1967) was adopted following the Third Arab-Israeli (the Six-Day) Warin June 1967, which resulted in the occupation by Israel of large swathes of territory,including all of the Palestinian territory. In that resolution, the UN Security Councilunanimously emphasised the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” andthe commitment of all UN Member States to act in accordance with Article 2 of the UNCharter.51 The key operative paragraphs of that resolution read:
“1. Affirms that the fulfilment of the Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
(i)Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recentconflict;
(ii)Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for andacknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and politicalindependence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace withinsecure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2.Affirms further the necessity
49The Palestine National Council proclaimed the establishment of the State of Palestine in 1988. See Letter dated 18 November 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/43/827–S/20278, 18 November 1988.
50UN Charter, Article 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”).
51S/RES/242 (1967), preambular paras. 2-3.
15
(a)For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterwaysin the area;
(b)For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
(c)For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independenceof every State in the area, through measures including the establishment ofdemilitarized zones;
3.Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative toproceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the Statesconcerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve apeaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions andprinciples in this resolution”.52
27.
The terms of this resolution and the discussion leading to it make clear that it does notimpose an obligation to negotiate.53
(a)
First, the resolution does not state that negotiations must occur. To the contrary,the resolution uses permissive language in identifying principles and outcomesthat “should” be included in any peace agreement.54
(b)
Second, the affirmation in operative paragraph 1 that the “fulfilment of theCharter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace” at mostrestates the duty in Articles 2(3) and 33(1) of the UN Charter that Member States“shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means”. As the Court hasrecognised, these provisions do not impose an obligation on Member States tonegotiate.55
(c)
Third, the resolution requests the designation of a Special Representative to“promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and acceptedsettlement”,56 which demonstrates that the UN Security Council supported
52S/RES/242 (1967), paras. 1-3.
53On the interpretation of UN Security Council resolutions, see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971 (Namibia Advisory Opinion), p. 53, para. 114.
54S/RES/242 (1967), para. 1 (emphasis added).
55Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean), pp. 560-561, paras. 165-166. Cf. Written Statement of France, 25 July 2023, para. 98.
56Emphasis added.
16
negotiations as an appropriate
way to achieve a “just and lasting peace”, but imposed no obligation on the States concerned to that end.
(d)
Fourth, that the resolution does not impose a binding obligation to negotiate isconsistent with the debates leading to its conclusion, which show that the issueof direct negotiations was deliberately excluded.57
28.
Similarly, Resolution 338 (1973) imposes no obligation on Israel and Palestine tonegotiate. It was adopted during the Fourth Arab-Israeli (the Yom Kippur/Ramadan)War in October 1973, fought between Israel and a coalition of States led by Egypt andSyria (Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait and Sudan, among others). After callingupon the “parties to the present fighting” to cease all military activity, the resolution:
“2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3.Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire,negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriateauspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.”58
29.
Resolution 338 was capable of binding only Israel and other warring UN MemberStates59 — i.e. not Palestine.60 Moreover, the Member States concerned were calledupon simply to “start … the implementation of Security Council resolution 242” and
57This was recalled by Iraq: “the old position of direct negotiations … was expressly excluded from the resolution of 22 November 1967—excluded not by accident but deliberately excluded in the long weeks and months of discussions and deliberations that preceded the adoption of the resolution”. See UNSCOR, 1407thmeeting, UN Doc. S/PV.1407, 24 March 1968, para. 98. The resolution instead provided for contacts between the States concerned to be established and maintained through a Special Representative designated by the UN Secretary-General. See S/RES/242 (1967), para. 3 (quoted in para. 26 above).
58S/RES/338 (1973), paras. 1-3.
59UN Charter, Article 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter” (emphasis added)).
60This is also consistent with the fact that references to Resolution 338 appeared in numerous UN Security Council resolutions concerning the situation pending between Israel and each of Egypt and Syria for at least the next 17 years following 1973, often calling for the “implementation” of Resolution 338. These resolutions were concerned, in particular, with the UN peacekeeping and observer forces stationed between those States. See, as illustrative examples: UNSC Resolution 438, UN Doc. S/RES/438, 23 October 1978 (regarding the UN Emergency Force stationed between Egypt and Israel); UNSC Resolution 481, UN Doc. S/RES/481, 26 November 1980 (regarding the UN Disengagement Observer Force stationed between Israel and Syria). In contrast, references to Resolution 338 did not appear in UN Security Council resolutions concerning Palestine during that same period. It was not until 1990 that the UN Security Council began referring to Resolution 338 in the context of Palestine specifically (the first resolutions were: UNSC Resolution 672, UN Doc. S/RES/672, 12 October 1990 and UNSC Resolution 1322, UN Doc. S/RES/1322, 7 October 2000).
17
to “
start” negotiations directed towards “a just and durable peace”.61 As was the case with Resolution 242, the negotiations envisaged were not direct negotiations between the States involved. During the drafting of the resolution, multiple States made the point that the negotiations to be started under “appropriate auspices”, were negotiations under UN auspices.62
30.
The Security Council therefore did not, through Resolutions 242 or 338, impose anobligation to negotiate on Israel and Palestine.
b.No obligation to negotiate by virtue of Israel-Palestine documents andagreements
31.
An examination of the documents issued by, and agreements concluded between, Israeland Palestine63 from 1993 to 2023 confirm that the States are not subject to an extantobligation to negotiate. Israel and Palestine were subject to an obligation to negotiateon relevant issues by virtue of the Oslo Accords, but that obligation was temporallylimited, expired on 4 May 1999 without the envisaged agreement having beenconcluded, and is therefore no longer extant. All subsequent documents and agreementsinvolving references to negotiations were expressions of political will and did notconstitute a legally-binding obligation to negotiate.
32.
Each of the relevant documents and agreements will be addressed in turn.
33.
Oslo I, concluded on 13 September 1993, did create an obligation to negotiate, but thatobligation existed only within the window of a five-year transitional period:
(a)
In its preamble, Oslo I recorded that the parties “agree that it is time to … striveto … achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement”.
(b)
Article I set out the “aim of the negotiations” as being “to establish a PalestinianInterim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the ‘Council’), for thePalestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period
61Emphasis added.
62See, e.g., UNSCOR, 1747th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.1747, 21 October 1973, para. 165 (Guinea): “the negotiations envisaged in paragraph 3 of the draft will be carried out at the United Nations, through the United Nations”. See also para. 61 (United Kingdom), para. 67 (France), para. 124 (Peru), para. 147 (Sudan) and para. 183 (Yugoslavia).
63See para. 6 above on what is generally considered to constitute part of the framework for negotiations.
18
not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement
based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).”64
(c)
The agreement provided, among other things, three relevant obligations tonegotiate. The parties were to: (i) negotiate and conclude an agreement onIsrael’s withdrawal from Gaza and the Jericho area, which they subsequentlydid;65 (ii) negotiate and conclude an agreement on the five-year interim period,which they subsequently did;66 and (iii) commence negotiations with a view toachieving the “permanent settlement” referred to in Article I.
(d)
Regarding the obligation to negotiate in point (iii):
(i)
The source of the obligation was Article V(2), which stated: “Permanentstatus negotiations will commence … not later than the beginning of thethird year of the interim period”.
(ii)
The matters to be covered in the negotiations were specified inArticle V(3) as the “remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees,settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperationwith other neighbours, and other issues of common interest.”67
64Emphasis added.
65Oslo I, Article XIV and Annex II, para. 1; Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, 4 May 1994 (available here) (1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement).
66Oslo I, Article VII. See also Article III(2). The agreement on the interim period was Olso II, discussed below.
67This reference to “borders” may be the basis on which Fiji contends that the Court could not determine the legality of Israel’s settlements in the Palestinian territory because the issue of sovereignty over that territory has not yet been settled in a peace agreement. See Written Statement of Fiji, July 2023, pp. 6-7, stating, among other things: “The sovereignty of these territories is, arguably, in abeyance until such a time as a peace agreement is reached” (emphasis in original). The astounding suggestion that Israel’s settlements might be lawful stands in blatant defiance of the true position under international law, which is that all Israel’s settlements in the Palestinian territory are illegal, as recognised by the Court and numerous UN bodies, including the UN Security Council. See Written Statement of Belize, 25 July 2023, para. 36. On the duty of UN Member States to act appropriately where the UN Security Council has declared a situation to be illegal, see Namibia Advisory Opinion, p. 52, para. 112: “It would be an untenable interpretation to maintain that, once such a declaration had been made by the Security Council under Article 24 of the Charter, on behalf of all member States, those Members would be free to act in disregard of such illegality or even to recognize violations of law resulting from it. When confronted with such an internationally unlawful situation, Members of the United Nations would be expected to act in consequence of the declaration made on their behalf.”
19
(iii)
As to the start of the five-year interim period, Article V(1) specified thatthis “transitional period” was to commence from Israel’s withdrawal fromGaza and the Jericho area, but the parties later agreed that it wouldcommence from the date of the signing of the withdrawal agreement on4 May 1994.68 The “beginning of the third year of the interim period” bywhich time permanent status negotiations had to commence was therefore4 May 1996.69 The five-year interim period accordingly expired on 4 May1999.70
(iv)
This obligation to negotiate imposed by Oslo I is clearly one of conduct,not of result.71 It required the parties to “commence” negotiations on thespecified issues on or before 4 May 1996.
(v)
It is also clear that the obligation was limited in time. The agreementenvisaged the interim, transitional period as “leading to a permanentsettlement”, which would commence no later than the end of that five-year period.72 The obligation to negotiate therefore persisted only until theend of that five-year period, i.e. until 4 May 1999. It was because Oslo Ienvisaged a permanent settlement being reached within the five-yeartransitional period that it made no provision for an obligation to negotiatepersisting beyond that point in time. After 4 May 1999, Oslo I thereforedid not subject the parties to an obligation to negotiate.73
68Oslo I, Article V(1); 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Article XXIII(3), setting the date of the signing of that withdrawal agreement as the date for the commencement of the five-year interim period.
69This was confirmed by Oslo II, discussed below. See Oslo II, preambular para. 6 and Article XXXI(5).
70This is confirmed by the 1998 Wye River Memorandum discussed below, Section IV of which refers to the “goal of reaching an agreement by May 4, 1999.”
71See Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean, p. 538, para. 87. This is also clear when comparing Article V(2) to other provisions in Oslo I that do impose an obligation of result, such as Annex II, para. 1: “The two sides will conclude and sign … an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.”
72Oslo I, Article I (“a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement”). Eminent jurists agree. See, e.g., Benvenisti, “The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles: A Framework for Future Settlement” (1993) 4(4) EJIL 542, p. 551: “foresees a final settlement of the conflict, which will commence no later than the end of the five-year transitional period”.
73This is not an argument that Oslo I itself terminated upon 4 May 1999; only that a proper interpretation of the obligation to negotiate in Oslo I is that it expired on that date.
20
34.
Oslo II, concluded on 28 September 1995, was the agreement on the interim periodrequired to be concluded under Oslo I.74 This agreement reaffirmed “that thenegotiations on the permanent status … will lead to the implementation of SecurityCouncil Resolutions 242 and 338”, i.e. a “just and durable peace”.75 It also, among otherthings, set the start date of the interim period as 4 May 1994,76 confirmed the date bywhich the permanent status negotiations were to commence as 4 May 1996,77 but addednothing to the content of the obligation to negotiate contained in Oslo I.78
35.
Negotiations on permanent status issues were formally launched in early May 1996,79but soon faced difficulties. Israel and Palestine nonetheless endeavoured to reach anagreement by the 4 May 1999 deadline. In 1998, in the non-binding Wye RiverMemorandum, they stated that: “The two sides will immediately resume permanentstatus negotiations on an accelerated basis and will make a determined effort to achievethe mutual goal of reaching an agreement by May 4, 1999.”80 Ultimately, the two sideswere unable to reach an agreement by that date, i.e. the end of the five-year transitionalperiod.81
36.
Since 4 May 1999, there have been various negotiations between Israel and Palestine,but they have been conducted as a matter of political will and not pursuant to any legalobligation to negotiate. In particular:
74See para. 33(c) above.
75Oslo II, preambular para. 6. See paras. 26 and 28 above for the relevant text of the resolutions.
76Oslo II, preambular para. 5 and Article III(4), confirming Article XXIII(3) of the 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement.
77Oslo II, preambular para. 6 and Article XXXI(5).
78See Oslo II, Article XXXI(5), including its repetition of the same issues to be addressed in the negotiations as were identified in Oslo I, Article V(3). These were phrased slightly differently in Article XVII as “Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian refugees, borders, foreign relations and Israelis”.
79See Israel-Palestinian Joint Communiqué, Taba, 6 May 1996 (available here).
80The Wye River Memorandum, 23 October 1998 (available here) (1998 Wye River Memorandum), Section IV.
81See generally, Written Statement of Jordan, 25 July 2023, paras. 3.29-3.30.
21
(a)
On 4 September 1999, in the non-binding Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum,82Israel and the PLO stated that they “will resume the Permanent Statusnegotiations in an accelerated manner and will make a determined effort toachieve their mutual goal of reaching a Permanent Status Agreement” for up toone year, starting no later than 13 September 1999.83 Evidently, no finalagreement was reached by 13 September 2000.84
(b)
On 27 November 2007 at the Annapolis Conference, United States PresidentGeorge W. Bush read a non-binding “Joint Understanding” reached by Israel andthe PLO, in which the parties “agree[d] to immediately launch good-faithbilateral negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty, resolving alloutstanding issues” and to “make every effort to conclude an agreement beforethe end of 2008”.85 No final agreement was reached by the end of 2008 orotherwise.86
(c)
On 19 March 2023, the non-binding Sharm El Sheikh Joint Communiqué wasadopted.87 It was a joint communiqué setting out points of agreement betweenthe “five Parties”: Egyptian, Jordanian, Israeli, Palestinian and United States’officials.88 In the Communiqué, Israel and the Palestinian National Authority“reaffirmed”, among other things, “their agreement to address all outstandingissues through direct dialogue”, and the five “Parties reaffirmed the importance
82The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations, 4 September 1999 (available here) (1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum).
831999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, paras. 1(a), 1(d) and 1(e).
84See UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, “The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: Part V (1989-2000)”, 2014 (available here), Section III.H.
85Joint Understanding Read by President Bush at Annapolis Conference, 27 November 2007 (available here) (2007 Joint Understanding). They also “commit[ted] to immediately implement their respective obligations under the performance-based road map” issued by the Quartet in 2003, and “to continue the implementation of the ongoing obligations of the road map until they reach a peace treaty”. As discussed at para. 38(c) below, the 2003 Quartet Roadmap was also non-binding, and contained no obligation to engage in permanent status negotiations.
86See UN, “History of the Question of Palestine” (available here).
87U.S. Department of State, “Joint Communiqué from the March 19 meeting in Sharm El Sheikh”, 19 March 2023 (available here) (2023 Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Communiqué). The Joint Communiqué also reaffirmed the previous agreements between the parties (see paras. 3 and 5), none of which imposed an obligation to negotiate that remained extant, as explained above.
882023 Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Communiqué, first and second unnumbered paras.
22
of maintaining the meetings under this format, and are looking forward to
cooperating with a view to consolidating the basis for direct negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis, towards achieving comprehensive, just and lasting peace”.89
37.
These expressions of political will did not create a legal obligation to negotiate for Israeland Palestine, nor were there any subsequent binding decisions of the UN SecurityCouncil in respect of them. The 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum and 2023 SharmEl Sheikh Joint Communiqué have not been mentioned in UN Security Councilresolutions, and the 2007 Joint Understanding has received only the UN SecurityCouncil’s declared “support”.90
38.
Moreover, other third-party documents aimed at encouraging negotiations also did notcreate a legally-binding obligation to negotiate for Israel and Palestine, notwithstandingtheir having received support from the UN Security Council and General Assembly.The UN Security Council, for example, has urged diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving“a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East on the basis of the relevantUnited Nations resolutions, the Madrid terms of reference, including the principle ofland for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Quartet Roadmap and an end to theIsraeli occupation that began in 1967”.91 The UN General Assembly has referred tothese same documents in calling for the achievement of a “comprehensive, just andlasting peace”.92 As to these documents:
(a)
The 1991 “Madrid terms of reference” was an invitation to the Madrid MiddleEast Peace Conference (held in 1992) sent by the United States and theU.S.S.R.93 It was evidently not a binding instrument. Moreover, it was only theGovernments of Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan that were invited to theConference. “Palestinians” were invited to attend as part of a “joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation”. Neither the 1991 Madrid terms of reference, nor the
892023 Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Communiqué, paras. 5 and 8.
90UNSC Resolution 1850, UN Doc. S/RES/1850, 16 December 2008, paras. 1-2.
91S/RES/2334 (2016), para. 9.
92See, e.g., UNGA Resolution 77/25, UN Doc. A/RES/77/25, 30 November 2022, para. 1.
93Invitation to Madrid Middle East Peace Conference (‘Madrid Principles’) – US, USSR Letter, 19 October 1991 (available here) (1991 Madrid terms of reference).
23
general support it received, created a legal obligation to negotiate for Israel and
Palestine.
(b)
The 2002 “Arab Peace Initiative” was a resolution of the Council of the Leagueof Arab States, adopted in 2002.94 The resolution, among other things, called onIsrael to withdraw fully from the occupied territories and to accept theestablishment of “an independent, sovereign Palestinian State”, following whichthe Arab States would enter into a peace agreement with Israel.95 Israel is not amember of the League of Arab States. The relevant resolution of the ArabLeague is thus evidently not opposable to Israel.
(c)
The 2003 “Quartet Roadmap” was a “road map to a permanent two-Statesolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” prepared by the United States, theEuropean Union, Russia and the UN, and “presented” to Israel and thePalestinian Authority.96 It envisaged three phases of action, the third includingpermanent status agreement negotiations, which there was only to be “[p]rogressinto … based on consensus judgment of Quartet”.97 Progress to negotiation ofpermanent status issues was not automatic. As a third-party document, it wasevidently not binding on Israel and Palestine. Nor did the UN Security Council’ssubsequent “endors[ing]” of it create a legal obligation to negotiate.98
39.
In summary, Israel and Palestine were only subject to an obligation to negotiate byvirtue of Oslo I, but that obligation expired on 4 May 1999 and is thus no longer extant.
94League of Arab States, “Arab Peace Initiative”, Resolution 14/221, 28 March 2002, contained in Annex II to the Letter dated 24 April 2002 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General, UN Doc. A/56/1026–S/2002/932, 15 August 2002 (2002 Arab Peace Initiative, A/56/1026–S/2002/932).
952002 Arab Peace Initiative, A/56/1026–S/2002/932, paras. 2(a), 2(c) and 3(a).
96“A performance-based road map to a permanent two-State solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”, 30 April 2003, annexed to Letter dated 7 May 2003 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2003/529, 7 May 2003 (2003 Quartet Roadmap, S/2003/529).
972003 Quartet Roadmap, S/2003/529, p. 7.
98UNSC Resolution 1515, UN Doc. S/RES/1515, 19 November 2003, para. 1. As noted at footnote 85 above, the parties later “commit[ted]” to implementing the 2003 Quartet Roadmap, in their 2007 Joint Understanding, but this was no more than a non-binding commitment to implement a non-binding roadmap: no obligation to negotiate was created.
24
2.Even if there were an obligation to negotiate (which there is not), it would beirrelevant to the answers the Court would give to the questions asked of it
40.
Even if Israel and Palestine were obliged to negotiate by UN Security CouncilResolution 242 or 338 (which they were not), or consented to such an obligation that isstill extant in Oslo I or elsewhere (which they did not), it would not affect any existingrights or obligations of the two States. The obligation would be one of conduct, toengage in good faith negotiations, which would not, as the Court has repeatedlyrecognised, require the parties to reach a result.99 The existence of such an obligationwould not in any way affect, suspend or make conditional Israel’s duties immediatelyto cease its internationally wrongful conduct, to comply with its obligations (includingperemptory obligations), and to make reparation for the many prior and continuingbreaches of its obligations.100 Israel would not be able to invoke the existence of anyobligation to negotiate as a justification for withholding compliance with these dutiespending the outcome of negotiations. This follows from the rules of international lawrelevant to the negotiations set out in Chapter 3 below. The existence of any suchobligation to negotiate would therefore not affect the legal consequences of Israel’sunlawful conduct, and thus would not change the answers the Court would give to thequestions asked of it. The existence of any obligation to negotiate is therefore irrelevantto the Court’s task.
C.THE IRRELEVANCE OF ANY ‘RIGHT TO REMAIN’
41.
The second argument put forward in a very small number of Written Statements is thatIsrael has a ‘right to remain’ in the Palestinian territory, and to exercise control andauthority over that territory and its inhabitants, until a negotiated solution to the entireIsraeli-Palestinian conflict is achieved (referred to for convenience here as a ‘right to
99Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean, p. 538, paras. 86-87; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 68, para. 150.
100See Written Statement of Belize, 25 July 2023, paras. 75-81 and 103. Some Written Statements seem to suggest that other UN Member States and even UN organs have obligations arising out of or in connection with the framework for negotiations (see, e.g., Written Statement of Fiji, July 2023, p. 2; Written Statement of Russia, 25 July 2023, para. 57 and p. 27 (conclusion 15)). This too is irrelevant to the Court’s task. Even if there were obligations on other UN Member States and UN organs relating to the framework for negotiations that would not affect the existing rights and obligations of Israel and Palestine, nor would it affect the obligations on all States arising out of Israel’s violations of peremptory norms. See Written Statement of Belize, 25 July 2023, paras. 82-89 and 104, and see para. 59 below.
25
remain
’101).102 The suggested consequence of this argument is that the Court cannot declare that Israel is obliged immediately to end its occupation of the Palestinian territory and to cease its exercise of authority and control over that territory. This argument is incorrect and misconceived. It is incorrect because Israel does not have a ‘right to remain’ in the Palestinian territory pending a negotiated settlement (as explained in subsection 1). It is misconceived because, even if Israel did have a ‘right to remain’ (which it does not), it would not prevail over Israel’s duty to comply with peremptory norms, which require its complete and immediate withdrawal from the Palestinian territory (as addressed in subsection 2).
1.Israel does not have a ‘right to remain’ in, or exercise control or authority over,the Palestinian territory until a negotiated solution is achieved
42.
No ‘right to remain’ has been granted to Israel by force of UN Security CouncilResolutions 242 (1967) or 338 (1973) (subsection a), nor by any Israel-Palestineagreements (subsection b).
a.No ‘right to remain’ by virtue of UN Security Council Resolutions 242(1967) and 338 (1973)
43.
A small number of Written Statements refer to the “principle” of “land for peace”,103which is said to derive from UN Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338(1973),104 without any real explanation as to what it actually means. Three participantsappear to go so far as to suggest that the “principle” of “land for peace” implies that
101For the avoidance of doubt, this includes Israel’s conduct in respect of Gaza, notwithstanding that Israel maintains no permanent physical presence inside Gaza. On Israel’s frequent incursions into Gaza, its control and authority exerted over Gaza, and its de facto annexation of Gaza, see Written Statement of Belize, 25 July 2023, paras. 30, 52 and 56(e).
102Written Statement of Nauru, undated, para. 14 (“Israel and Palestine have … agreed to Israeli presence and responsibilities in the territory pending a negotiated outcome”); Written Statement of Fiji, July 2023, p. 2 (“They specifically agreed that, pending a final agreement … Israel is entitled to maintain a military government and civil administration in the West Bank and Gaza Strip”). See also the references in footnotes 105 and 124 below. Belize responds here only to arguments concerning the legality of Israel’s presence in / occupation of the Palestinian territory insofar as they relate to the question of a negotiated settlement. In respect of other arguments regarding the legality of the occupation, Belize refers to its Written Statement.
103See the Written Statements of Jordan, the United Kingdom, Egypt, Spain, Russia, Italy, the United States of America, China and Cuba.
104Referring to the “principle” being derived from Resolution 242, see Written Statement of the United Kingdom, 20 July 2023, para. 10; Written Statement of Cuba, 24 July 2023, p. 20; Written Statement of Italy, undated, para. 1; Written Statement of the United States of America, 25 July 2023, para. 1.4. See the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 242 quoted at para. 26 above.
26
Israel does not have to
withdraw from the Palestinian territory — that is, relinquish “land” — until there is a comprehensive “peace”.105 The suggested consequence is that Israel has the right to maintain its occupation until there is a peace agreement.
44.
Two preliminary observations are required.
45.
First, this understanding of “land for peace” suggests that each side will give something(i.e. Israel will give “land” and the Arab countries will give “peace”). Israel is not,however, sovereign over the Palestinian territory. It cannot give what it does not have(nemo dat quod non habet). To suggest otherwise on the basis that Israel would berelinquishing something to which it has a right is truly an astounding position for Statesto adopt. This is especially so in circumstances where it has been repeatedly declaredby the UN — including in a recent mandatory resolution of the UN Security Councilthat binds all Member States to accept the decisions contained therein — that Israel hasno legal right to the Palestinian territory.106 That determination is based on thefundamental and peremptory prohibition of the acquisition of territory by force.107Israel is obliged by international law to withdraw from land which it has no right topossess. In doing so, it would not be relinquishing land or any ‘right to remain’ in thatland.
46.
Second, the existence of such an arrangement (if there was one, but there is not) wouldalso have dire consequences for the peace negotiations because it would allow Israel tohold the negotiations hostage and refuse to withdraw until the peace settlement metterms that it dictated. It is difficult to imagine that either the UN Security Council inissuing Resolutions 242 and 338, or Palestine in agreeing to the Oslo Accords whichreferred to these resolutions, could have intended or agreed to such a situation.
105See in particular Written Statement of the United States of America, 25 July 2023, para. 3.20 (contending that a requirement for Israel to “withdraw … without the comprehensive, just and lasting peace envisioned as a result of ‘land for peace’” would be contrary to the negotiation framework (emphasis in original)). See also, less clearly, Written Statement of Fiji, July 2023, p. 6 (referring to “trading peace” for Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territories); Written Statement of the United Kingdom, 20 July 2023, para. 10 (“This is often referred to as the ‘land for peace’ formula, as it calls for Israeli withdraw in exchange for peace and security in the region” (emphasis added)) and para. 71.1 (“a comprehensive peace settlement between the parties is required in order to bring the occupation to an end” (emphasis added)).
106See, e.g., S/RES/2334 (2016), para. 3: “Underlines that it will not recognize any changes to the 4 June 1967 lines, including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties through negotiations”; UN Charter, Article 25; Namibia Advisory Opinion, p. 52, para. 112, quoted at footnote 67 above.
107In respect of which, see Written Statement of Belize, 25 July 2023, paras. 44-46.
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47.
Moreover, the argument is flawed for two further specific reasons.
48.
First, Resolution 242 does not embody a “principle” of “land for peace” granting Israelthe ‘right to remain’ until a negotiated solution is achieved. This is clear from the termsof Resolution 242 and the debates relating to its adoption.108
(a)It is clear from the terms of Resolution 242 that it does not create any expressright for Israel to remain in the Palestinian territory. The resolution only speaksof Israel’s “withdrawal”, stating that a just and lasting peace should includeIsrael’s withdrawal. The resolution nowhere states that Israel is not required towithdraw until peace is achieved. Indeed, the underlying reason for the absenceof peace is Israel’s continued illegal occupation.
(b)It is equally clear that Resolution 242 does not imply a ‘right to remain’. Theresolution states that “a just and lasting peace” “should include the applicationof both the following principles”, which it then lists, one of which is thewithdrawal of Israeli forces (the so-called “land” part of the “principle”).Nothing in this text suggests that Israel need not withdraw and is entitled toremain until a just and lasting peace is reached. To the contrary, the text suggeststhat, for there to be a just and lasting peace, Israel needs to withdraw. If there isa “principle” of “land for peace” to be derived from Resolution 242, that wouldbe its content: Israel must withdraw (handover109 “land”) for there to be peace.That was the interpretation of the concept set out by the Palestinians when theyaccepted to attend the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. The letter they sent stated:
“We further affirm that the principle of territory for peace means Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, a prerequisite for genuine stability and peace in the region. Thus, there can be no real progress on multilateral negotiations dealing with regional issues if the basic cause of the conflict, the Israeli occupation of Arab lands, is not resolved”.110
108On the interpretation of UN Security Council resolutions, see Namibia Advisory Opinion, p. 53, para. 114.
109It is recalled here that Israel would not be handing over anything to which it was entitled, as explained in para. 44 above. What Israel is capable of doing with respect to “land” is simply withdrawing from territory to which it has no right.
110“The Palestinian Response to the Invitation”, in “The Peace Conference: Part I” (1990-1991) 6 Palestine Yearbook of International Law 262, p. 280. See also Statement by the President of the Security Council,
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When “land for peace” began to be mentioned in UN General Assembly resolutions in 1997,111 this was also other States’ interpretation of the “principle”. For example, Jordan referred to:
“the principle of land for peace, which means the return of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, in order to achieve further progress on all tracks — between Palestine, Syria and Lebanon and Israel — and in order to achieve the comprehensive, just and lasting peace we desire for the region”.112
This understanding of “land for peace” also underlies the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative113 and the 2003 Quartet Roadmap.114 It is relevant that both the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council have repeatedly encouraged negotiations “based on the relevant United Nations resolutions, the terms of reference of the Madrid Conference, including the principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Quartet road map”115 — all of which tends to confirm that Israel’s withdrawal from the Palestinian territory is regarded as a
UN Doc. S/PRST/2002/9, 10 April 2002, supporting the annexed joint statement, which recognised that “the principle of land for peace … formed the basis for the Madrid Conference of 1991”. The invitation to the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, the 1991 Madrid terms of reference (available here and also addressed at para. 38(a) above), proposed the outline of arrangements subsequently discussed at Madrid and ultimately implemented in Oslo I, namely the staged commencement of an interim period, which involved Israeli withdrawals from Palestinian territory, followed by the commencement of negotiations regarding permanent status.
111See, e.g., UNGA Resolution ES-10/2, UN Doc. A/RES/ES-10/2, 25 April 1997, preambular para. 6; UNGA Resolution ES-10/3, UN Doc. A/RES/ES-10/3, 15 July 1997, para. 11; UNGA Resolution ES-10/4, UN Doc. A/RES/ES-10/4, 13 November 1997, para. 7.
112See UNGAOR, 10th Emergency Special Session, 5th plenary meeting, UN Doc. A/ES-10/PV.5, 15 July 1997, p. 5. See also, e.g., UNGAOR, 10th Emergency Special Session, 3rd plenary meeting, UN Doc. A/ES-10/PV.3, 25 April 1997, pp. 17 (“The issue of the Middle East should be resolved fairly and comprehensively on the principle of land for peace. The legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to establish an independent State, should be restored and Israel should withdraw from all occupied Arab territories”) (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and 25 (“Israel must respect the principle of land for peace and withdraw from all occupied Arab territories”) (Lebanon); UNGAOR, 10th Emergency Special Session, 7th plenary meeting, UN Doc. A/ES-10/PV.7, 13 November 1997, p. 10 (“Mr. Netanyahu refuses to pick up the negotiations where they were broken off, and to accept the principle of land for peace, which is the very basis of the United States initiative. On the contrary, sometimes he offers peace for peace, sometimes peace for security”) (Syrian Arab Republic).
113It calls upon Israel to, among other things, “withdraw fully” following which “the Arab States shall then … enter into a peace agreement between them and Israel” (emphasis added). See 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, A/56/1026–S/2002/932, paras. 2(a), 2(c) and 3(a). See further para. 38(b) above.
114It provides, among other things, that “Israel withdraws from Palestinian areas occupied” in “Phase I”, and that there would be “negotiations aimed at a permanent status agreement” in “Phase III”. See 2003 Quartet Roadmap, S/2003/529, pp. 3 and 7. See further para. 38(c) above.
115See, e.g., UNGA Resolution 67/19, UN Doc. A/RES/67/19, 29 November 2012, para. 5 (and see also preambular para. 9: “Reaffirming … all relevant resolutions … which, inter alia, stress the need for the withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967”); S/RES/2334 (2016), para. 9.
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necessary first step towards peace. There is thus no foundation for the suggestion that Resolution 242 impliedly conferred a legal right on Israel to remain in the Palestinian territory pending peace; if anything, it supports the opposite.116
(c)
This plain meaning of the terms of Resolution 242 is supported by the UNSecurity Council debates relating to its adoption. In particular, there was nounified view among Security Council members that Israel’s withdrawal was tobe contingent on a “just and lasting peace” being established. The U.S.S.R., forexample, stated that “the ‘withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territoriesoccupied in the recent conflict’ becomes the first necessary principle for theestablishment of a just and lasting peace in the Near East”.117 Mali expressed theview that Israel’s withdrawal “cannot be made subject to any conditionwhatever”.118 Bulgaria was of the view that Israel’s withdrawal should be thefirst step taken, referring to it as “an important condition for the implementationof the other principles set out in operative paragraphs 1 (ii) and 2 of theresolution”.119
49.
Second, in any event, even if Resolution 242 could be interpreted as granting Israel a‘right to remain’ (which it cannot), no such right would be opposable to Palestinebecause it is not a UN Member State and only Member States are bound by mandatorydecisions of the Security Council. It follows that any ‘right to remain’ would only beopposable to Palestine if incorporated in agreements between Israel and Palestine.Security Council Resolution 242 is referred to in Oslo I and II, but, through those
116The League of Arab States also disputes that Resolution 242 created a ‘right to remain’ for Israel, and does so on a purely textual basis. It rightly observes that (i) the plain language of Resolution 242 simply recognises that both “land” and “peace” are required for “a just and lasting peace” to be achieved, and (ii)that it does not follow that, if one is absent, there is a legal right for the other to be withheld, i.e., theresolution did not create a right to land in the absence of peace. See Written Statement of the League ofArab States, 20 July 2023, paras. 64-65.
117UNSCOR, 1382nd meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.1382, 22 November 1967, para. 119 (emphasis added). The U.S.S.R. also stated that the language in Resolution 242 relating to “the right of all States in the Near East ‘to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries’ cannot serve as a pretext for the maintenance of Israel forces on any part of the Arab territories seized by them as a result of war”.
118UNSCOR, 1382nd meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.1382, 22 November 1967, para. 189, and see also para. 195.
119UNSCOR, 1382nd meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.1382, 22 November 1967, para. 141. The same position was also taken by Jordan and the United Arab Republic, which participated in the discussion at the meeting: UNSCOR, 1382nd meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.1382, 22 November 1967, para. 148 (United Arab Republic), and para. 153 (Jordan).
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references,
Israel has not been granted a ‘right to remain’ in the Palestinian territory until a negotiated solution is achieved.
(a)
Oslo I makes two references to Resolution 242, both of which appear in theArticle setting out the “aim of the negotiations”. The Article first refers to thefive-year interim period “leading to a permanent settlement based on SecurityCouncil resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973)”.120 The Article then states theparties’ understanding that the “negotiations on the permanent status will lead tothe implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338(1973)”.121 Oslo II simply repeats these two statements from Oslo I.122
(b)Both statements draw on Security Council Resolution 242 as being relevant forinforming the ultimate outcome of the permanent status negotiations. That is,these statements are concerned with the content of what will be agreed in the“permanent settlement” being consistent with what is said in Resolution 242.That resolution is not drawn on as having any relevance for Israel and Palestine’srights in the intervening period. The references to Resolution 242 do not adoptor incorporate any purported right of Israel to remain in the Palestinian territorypending the “permanent settlement”.123
b.No ‘right to remain’ by virtue of Israel-Palestine agreements
50.
Two States have argued that, independently of the references to Security CouncilResolutions 242 and 338, the Oslo Accords grant Israel the ‘right to remain’ in thePalestinian territory until a negotiated solution is achieved. Nauru, for instance, assertsthat Israel and Palestine have “agreed to Israeli presence and responsibilities in theterritory pending a negotiated outcome” and that “Israel has the recognised right to
120Oslo I, Article I (emphasis added).
121Emphasis added.
122Oslo II, preambular paras. 5-6.
123Cf. Written Statement of Nauru, undated, para. 12, asserting in passing that the references to Resolutions 242 and 338 “incorporated” those resolutions into the Oslo Accords.
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maintain its presence in the territory,
inter alia, in order to meet its security obligations”, citing to Oslo II.124
51.
The contention appears to be that, by virtue of the Oslo Accords, Palestine hasconsented to or granted a right to Israel to remain in the Palestinian territory until anegotiated solution is reached, and thus any declaration by the Court that Israel isobliged immediately to cease its occupation would conflict with or circumvent thatright.125
52.
This argument is fundamentally flawed for four reasons.
53.
First, the Oslo Accords126 grant no right to Israel to remain. They say nothing about thelegality or otherwise of Israel’s presence in the Palestinian territory, nor do they grantIsrael a new ‘right to remain’ pending a negotiated solution. They simply proceed fromthe fact that Israel is present in and in control of the Palestinian territory.
54.Second, in respect of the provisions of the Oslo Accords that contemplate or makeprovision for Israel being present in certain parts of the Palestinian territory and toexercise certain powers and jurisdiction, they cannot be said to constitute Palestine’sconsent to that presence or exercise of powers and jurisdiction. Palestine is underoccupation. Israel is the occupying Power. Occupying Powers exercise authority overoccupied territories.127 The Oslo Accords were concerned with transferring some of the
124Written Statement of Nauru, undated, paras. 9 and 14. Fiji contends that “Israel’s presence in the West Bank is endorsed by detailed international legal agreements” and that “[a]ccording to the Oslo Accords, the final status of the territories is subject to negotiations” — as if to suggest that, until such negotiations are concluded, Israel’s presence in Palestine is endorsed by the Oslo Accords. See Written Statement of Fiji, July 2023, p. 5. In referring to “detailed international legal agreements” that purportedly endorse Israel’s presence in the Palestinian territory, Fiji also mentions the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace agreement, but that document obviously cannot create a right for Israel to remain in Palestinian territory given that Palestine was not a party to that treaty and Jordan was not competent to grant such a right. Moreover, the terms of that document do not endorse the presence of Israel in the West Bank. See Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 26 October 1994, 2042 UNTS 351.
125See also Written Statement of the United Kingdom, 20 July 2023, paras. 70 and 72, contending that the advisory opinion would “conflict with” the “agreed negotiation framework” which “aims to bring about the termination of the Israeli occupation that the Request seeks”, implying that Israel does not have to withdraw until there is a negotiated settlement as envisaged by the negotiation framework.
126To the extent Oslo II remains in force: see Statement by Mr. Mahmoud Abbas, President of the State of Palestine to the General Assembly, UNGAOR, 70th Session, 19th plenary meeting, 30 September 2015, UN Doc. A/70/PV.19, p. 30.
127Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 18 October 1907 (Hague Regulations), Article 42: “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such
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authority exercised by Israel to Palestine. This is
clear from Article VI of Oslo I, titled “Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities”, and is confirmed explicitly in the language of the very first provision of Oslo II, Article I(1), which states:
“Israel shall transfer powers and responsibilities as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the [Palestinian] Council in accordance with this Agreement. Israel shall continue to exercise powers and responsibilities not so transferred.”128
55.
A large part of the authority being exercised by Israel was not transferred to thePalestinian Authority. As occupying Power, Israel simply continued to exercise thatauthority. The legality of that continuing exercise of authority is determined by the jusad bellum;129 it is not granted anew by the Oslo Accords. It is utterly absurd to say thatPalestine consented to the occupying Power exercising the authority that the latterretained.130
56.
Third, no such ‘right to remain’ is granted to Israel by virtue of Article XXXI(7) ofOslo II. Nauru points to Article XXXI(7), according to which “[n]either side shallinitiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strippending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.”131 In relying on this Articleto contend that the parties have “agreed to Israeli presence and responsibilities in theterritory pending a negotiated outcome”,132 Nauru suggests that the “status” which mustnot be unilaterally changed pending a negotiated solution, is Israel’s factual presence inand exercise of authority over the Palestinian territory, which thereby implies a rightfor Israel to remain. There is no support for that interpretation of the term “status” inthe terms of Article XXXI(7). Moreover, that interpretation would ascribe toArticle XXXI(7) the function of turning a factual state of affairs into a legal right forIsrael, and in doing so waive Palestine’s right that Israel immediately end its illegal
authority has been established and can be exercised.” See also Written Statement of Belize, 25 July 2023, para. 29.
128Emphasis added. See also, e.g., Article XI titled “Land” and providing for certain areas of Palestinian territory to “come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council in a phased manner” and stating that certain powers and responsibilities “will be transferred” to the Palestinian Council.
129See Written Statement of Belize, 25 July 2023, paras. 31-34.
130Cf. Written Statement of Nauru, undated, paras. 9 and 12, citing to Oslo I, Article VIII and Oslo II, Articles X(4), XII and XIII(2)(a).
131Written Statement of Nauru, undated, para. 13.
132Written Statement of Nauru, undated, para. 14.
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occupation.
133 However, Article XXXI(6) of Oslo II declares: “Neither Party shall be deemed, by virtue of having entered into this Agreement, to have renounced or waived any of its existing rights, claims or positions.” Article XXXI(7) therefore cannot be interpreted as implying that Palestine has waived its right that Israel end its illegal occupation.
57.
Fourth, to the extent that any rights were conferred on Israel under the Oslo Accords,those rights were limited in time. They were rights for “a transitional period notexceeding five years”,134 as explained in paragraph 33(d)(v) above.
2.Even if there were a ‘right to remain’ (which there is not), it would beirrelevant to the answers the Court would give to the questions asked of it
58.
Even if the negotiation framework did somehow grant Israel a ‘right to remain’ in thePalestinian territory pending a negotiated solution (which it did not), it would not matterbecause it would not affect the legal consequences of Israel’s unlawful conduct, or,therefore, the answers the Court would give to the questions asked of it. This followsfrom the relevant rules of international law relevant to negotiations set out in Chapter 3below.
59.
Peremptory norms require Israel’s complete and immediate withdrawal from thePalestinian territory. Nothing supervenes that. As explained in Chapter 3 below,peremptory norms are non-derogable and can only be modified or displaced bysubsequent norms of the same character. Any ‘right to remain’ created through the “landfor peace” “principle”135 or Oslo II136 would not have that status.
133In respect of which, see Written Statement of Belize, 25 July 2023, paras. 76, 78 and 103.
134Oslo I, Article I; Oslo II, preambular para. 5.
135The legal force of any such ‘right to remain’ would derive from the UN Charter and the duty of all Member States under Article 25 of the Charter to accept binding decisions of the Security Council. Peremptory norms cannot be modified or displaced by a treaty provision, including Article 25 of the UN Charter. This is so notwithstanding Article 103 of the UN Charter. See ILC, Draft conclusions on identification and legal consequences of peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) with commentaries, ILC Yearbook 2022, vol. II, Part Two, Annex (ILC, Draft conclusions on peremptory norms), conclusion 16, commentary para. 4; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht, p. 440, para. 100.
136Even if a temporary ‘right to remain’ pending a negotiated settlement were consented to by Israel and Palestine through Oslo II (which it was not), and even if that constituted valid consent by Palestine (as to
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60.
It follows that the existence of any postulated ‘right to remain’ does not affect the legalconsequences of Israel’s unlawful conduct. The framework for negotiations is,accordingly, legally irrelevant to the Court’s task.
which, see para. 69 below) rendering Israel’s presence not unlawful under jus ad bellum, it would not have any impact on Israel’s obligation to withdraw immediately from the Palestinian territory. That is because compliance with other peremptory norms — namely, the right to self-determination and the prohibition of the acquisition of territory by force — would still oblige Israel to withdraw completely and immediately from the entirety of the Palestinian territory. See Written Statement of Belize, 25 July 2023, paras. 75, 76 and 78. Those obligations are unaffected by any consent expressed in Oslo II because: (i) any such consent to Israel’s limited presence during the five-year transitional period was manifestly not consent to annexation of the Palestinian territory (i.e. it was evidently not a treaty of cession) (see, on the scope of consent, para. 69(b) below); and (ii) it is not possible to validly consent to the violation of the right to self-determination, such as those being committed by Israel today (see para. 66 and footnote 145 below).
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CHAPTER 3. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RULES RELEVANT TO NEGOTIATIONS
61.
Regardless of whether the framework for negotiations gives rise to any rights andobligations, or whether it is merely a non-binding political framework for negotiations,any negotiations that are to take place must be consistent with international law. Thisincludes the rules of customary international law relevant to negotiations. This wasrecognised by the Court in the Wall Advisory Opinion, when it stressed the need fornegotiations “to be encouraged with a view to achieving as soon as possible, on thebasis of international law, a negotiated solution to the outstanding problems”.137 Inencouraging negotiations, the Court was not giving free rein to the parties in respect ofthose outstanding issues, contrary to the suggestion of a number of WrittenStatements.138 Rather, it was recognising the importance of negotiations andemphasising that any solution reached through them must be based on and consistentwith international law.
62.
This Section examines the international law principles relevant to the subject-matterand outcome of negotiations. It is not concerned with the well-established internationallaw principles concerning the conduct of negotiations.139 Following this introduction,Section A sets out the key international law principles that are relevant. Section Bapplies those principles in the context of the present Advisory Opinion proceedings todemonstrate that Israel’s duties to comply with its international law obligations are notconditioned by the framework for a negotiated solution.
137Wall Advisory Opinion, p. 201, para. 162 (emphasis added).
138See, e.g., Written Statement of Canada, 14 July 2023, para. 20; Written Statement of the United States of America, 25 July 2023, paras. 3.6-3.7 and 3.16-3.17; Written Statement of the United Kingdom, 20 July 2023, para. 60.3.3, all characterising the Court’s approach in the Wall Advisory Opinion as addressing a narrow question while leaving the broader situation to the parties to negotiate, impliedly free from pronouncements by the Court as to the obligations of Israel in respect of the subject-matter and outcome of the negotiations.
139As to which see, e.g., Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean, p. 538, paras. 86-87.
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A.INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RULES RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT-MATTER AND OUTCOME OFANY NEGOTIATIONS
1.States are under a continuing duty to comply with their internationalobligations and are obliged immediately to cease any continuing wrongful act
63.
States are under a duty to comply in good faith with their obligations.140 This duty ofcompliance extends to both primary and secondary obligations.141 States are alsoobliged immediately to cease any continuing wrongful act.142
2.The duty to comply with peremptory norms is non-negotiable
64.
Peremptory norms are, by definition, non-derogable. They are customary internationallaw obligations that are recognised and accepted by the international community as awhole as norms from which no derogation is permitted, and which can only be modifiedby a subsequent norm of international law having the same character.143 Non-derogability means subject to no exception, condition or justification whatsoever. Theduty to comply with peremptory norms is therefore absolute.
140UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV), UN Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV), 24 October 1970, Annex: “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”, sixth principle, second para., sub-para. (f) (“Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international obligations”); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT), Article 26; ILC, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries, ILC Yearbook 2001, vol. II, Part Two (ILC, Articles on State Responsibility), Article 29 and commentary thereto.
141See ILC, Articles on State Responsibility, Article 33, commentary para. 4, referring to Part Two as dealing with “secondary obligations of States in relation to cessation and reparation” (emphasis added).
142ILC, Articles on State Responsibility, Article 30. See also, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 149, dispositif para. 12 (“Decides that the United States of America is under a duty immediately to cease and to refrain from all such acts as may constitute breaches of the foregoing legal obligations”); Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2022, p. 340, para. 195 (“Colombia must therefore immediately cease its wrongful conduct”).
143See generally, ILC, Draft conclusions on peremptory norms, conclusion 3. See also Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 141, para. 95 (“A jus cogens rule is one from which no derogation is permitted”).
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65.
A treaty which, at the time of its conclusion, conflicts with a peremptory norm isautomatically and from the outset void.144
66.
It follows from the absolute nature of the duty of compliance, and the inability toassume an obligation that conflicts with a peremptory norm, that compliance withperemptory norms is non-negotiable. States may not, as between themselves, consentto modify the content of, or duty to comply with, peremptory norms.145
3.The duty to comply with non-peremptory obligations stands until there hasbeen consensual inter-se modification of those obligations
67.
In respect of obligations that are not peremptory in nature,146 States are free, as betweenthemselves and on the basis of consent, to modify the existence and/or content of suchobligations. This is generally so whether the obligation being modified is sourced intreaty or custom.147
68.
However, until such time as the relevant States have actually consented to anymodification of their non-peremptory obligations, the general duty to comply in goodfaith with those obligations (and the correlative duty immediately to cease anycontinuing breach of those obligations) remains in full force.148 The existence of anynegotiations and the possibility of any agreement being reached on the removal ormodification of a non-peremptory obligation does not operate to suspend, remove orcondition its binding force.
144VCLT, Article 53; ILC, Draft conclusions on peremptory norms, conclusion 11(1). See also conclusion 14(1) as regards customary obligations and conclusion 15(1) as regards unilateral acts.
145ILC, Articles on State Responsibility, commentary to Article 26, para. 6, and commentary to Article 20, para. 7.
146See para. 74 below.
147See North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 42 (“it is well understood that, in practice, rules of international law can, by agreement, be derogated from in particular cases, or as between particular parties”). There may be some exceptions that it is not necessary to address here (e.g. inter se modifications of obligations established for the protection of a collective interest or which affect the rights or performance of obligations owed to other States, or inter se modifications of treaty provisions that are contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty).
148See also Imseis, “Negotiating the Illegal” (2020) 31(3) EJIL 1055, p. 1068.
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69.
In considering the freedom of States to consent to the modification inter se of theirobligations and whether States have validly done so, rules of international law relatingto consent are relevant, including:
(a)
Consent is only effective if it is validly given.149 Valid consent is freely given,clearly established and not vitiated by coercion or some other factor.150 Incircumstances where one consenting party is occupied by the other, particularconsideration should be given to whether consent of the occupied State is freelygiven, as well as to international humanitarian law rules concerning limits onagreements between occupied and occupying States.151
(b)
Consent operates prospectively and is limited in scope to that which is actuallyconsented to.152 Under the law of State responsibility, consent operates as ajustification and thereby precludes the existence of a breach of international lawfollowing the point in time at which consent is given. It does not retroactivelyrender prior breaches lawful or preclude the existence of the responsibility of theState in respect of such breaches, in particular the duty to make reparations.
B.ISRAEL’S DUTY TO COMPLY WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL LAW OBLIGATIONS IS NOTCONDITIONED BY THE EXISTENCE OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS
70.
Applying the three principles identified in Section A immediately above to the factsrelevant to the request for an Advisory Opinion, it is clear that the framework fornegotiations does not condition Israel’s ongoing duty to comply with all of its legalobligations, both peremptory and non-peremptory.
149ILC, Articles on State Responsibility, commentary to Article 20, para. 4.
150ILC, Articles on State Responsibility, commentary to Article 20, para. 6; VCLT, Articles 51-52, and see also Articles 46-50 concerning certain grounds that may be invoked for invalidating consent to a treaty (lack of competence, lack of authority, error, fraud and corruption).
151See, e.g., GC IV, Article 7 (“No special agreement shall adversely affect the situation of protected persons … nor restrict the rights which it confers upon them”), Article 8 (“Protected persons may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention”) and Article 47 (“Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention … by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power”).
152Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 198-199, para. 52; ILC, Articles on State Responsibility, commentary toArticle 20, para. 3; ILC Yearbook 1979, vol. II, Part Two, p. 113, commentary to draft Article 29, paras. 16-17.
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71.
As to obligations of a peremptory character, as explained in detail in Belize’s WrittenStatement, Israel is in continuing breach of its obligations to comply with jus cogensnorms, including:153
(a)
the obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to full external self-determination;
(b)
the prohibitions of the use of force, aggression and non-acquisition of territoryby force, which Israel has breached in relation to its unlawful occupation andannexation of East Jerusalem, the remainder of the West Bank and Gaza;
(c)
basic rules of international humanitarian law; and
(d)
the prohibition of racial discrimination and apartheid.154
72.
Israel has an absolute and unconditional obligation to comply with these peremptorynorms, and to cease its continuing breaches of them. The question of whether or to whatextent Israel is going to comply with these norms cannot, consistently with internationallaw, be negotiated between Israel and Palestine because the parties are unable toconclude a valid agreement that would remove or modify the content of theseobligations. Any agreement that were concluded would be automatically void.155
73.
The full details of what Israel is obliged to do in order to cease breaching, and to complywith, these peremptory norms are set out in Belize’s Written Statement.156 It is relevantto note here that they require Israel immediately to end its occupation of all of thePalestinian territory (including all of the settlements), and to dismantle, remove orrender ineffective all acts, policies and practices that prevent the Palestinian peoplefrom exercising their right to self-determination, that constitute apartheid, or thatconstitute violations of international humanitarian law. Whether Israel is going to
153See the references in footnote 44 above.
154Belize also notes the evidence that suggests Israel may be inciting genocide, and may commit genocide in Gaza: see para. 13 above. The prohibition of genocide is, of course, peremptory: Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, pp. 31-32, para. 64; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 47, para. 87.
155VCLT, Article 53; ILC, Draft conclusions on peremptory norms, conclusion 11(1).
156Written Statement of Belize, 25 July 2023, paras. 76-79 and 103.
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comply with these
peremptory obligations is a question which is unable to be subjected to any conditions or negotiations; they are non-negotiable.157 The obligations of Israel and the rights of the Palestinian people in respect of these peremptory norms are, accordingly, unchanged by the existence of a framework for negotiations.
74.
As to obligations of a non-peremptory character, including certain of Israel’sobligations under relevant human rights treaties, it is plain that there has been noagreement through which Israel and Palestine have consented to modify the existenceor content of particular obligations between themselves. Until such time, the rights andobligations of both parties remain unchanged by the mere fact of the existence of aframework for negotiations. In particular, until there is a negotiated agreement that mayspecify otherwise, Israel’s obligations to comply with its non-peremptory obligationscontinue in full force. Similarly, the rights of the Palestinian people remain unchanged.This includes the entire range of rights of the Palestinian people under internationalhuman rights law, including the right to struggle against foreign domination andoccupation.158 Even if an agreement to modify non-peremptory obligations were to beconcluded in the future, Palestine’s consent to that situation — freely given, clearlyestablished and not vitiated by coercion or some other factor — would only operateprospectively. It would not negate the existence of Israel’s prior breaches of the relevantobligations, nor its duty to make reparation for the injury caused by them.159 It followsthat the existence of the framework for negotiations does not, in any way, condition or
157That is not to say that negotiations cannot be undertaken that do not conflict with these peremptory norms, e.g. negotiations on an agreement for managing the practicalities of Israel’s compliance with theseperemptory obligations could occur.
158See Written Statement of the League of Arab States, 25 July 2023, paras. 114-117 and the material cited therein. See further the recognition of this right in UNGA Resolution 3314 (XXIX), UN Doc. A/RES/3314(XXIX), 14 December 1974, Annex, Article 7; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978, 1125 UNTS 3, Article 1(4); and UNGA Resolution 38/36, UN Doc. A/RES/38/36, 1 December 1983, para. 4 (affirming “the legitimacy of [the Namibian people’s] struggle by all the means at their disposal, including armed struggle, against the illegal occupation of their territory by South Africa”).
159The same is also true in situations where the absence of consent is a necessary condition for the breach of a peremptory norm. The peremptory prohibition on the unlawful use of force, for example, requires the absence of consent of the territorial sovereign. If such consent is given, then there is no unlawful use of force from the moment in time when consent is given. If, for example, Israeli withdrew from the Palestinian territory completely but Palestine consented to Israeli troops carrying out border patrols within its territory along its border, then such patrols would not constitute an unlawful use of force in violation of a peremptory norm. That specific and prospective consent of Palestine, however, does not alter the fact that Israel was in violation of the peremptory prohibition on the use of force in respect of its occupation of the Palestinian territory as a whole in the past.
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relieve Israel from its duty immediately to cease continuing breaches and to comply
with its obligations of a non-peremptory character.
75.
Accordingly, Israel is obliged immediately to comply with both its peremptory and non-peremptory obligations. The existence of a framework for negotiations changes nothingof relevance to the Court and does not in any way condition Israel’s obligations ofcessation and compliance.
76.
The UN and its Member States recognise that Israel’s duty to comply with its legalobligations is not conditioned by the framework for negotiations. This is clear fromresolutions and statements that support both a negotiated two-State solution while at thesame time firmly declaring that measures breaching international law mustunconditionally and immediately cease.160
77.
That Israel’s compliance with its obligations is not conditioned by the framework fornegotiations is also confirmed by the fact that the UN has never suggested that thecessation of Israel’s numerous violations of international law in the Palestinian territorybe conditioned on negotiation.161
160See, e.g., Written Statement of Turkey, undated, p. 13 (stating that measures constituting a “breach of international law must be unconditionally and immediately rescinded” but reiterating “its firm support [for] a negotiated two-state solution”); Written Statement of Norway, 7 July 2023, p. 2 (“a lasting, peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be found through political negotiations and must be in conformity with the framework of international law”). See also S/RES/2334 (2016), paras. 1-3 and 8-9 (reaffirming that Israel’s settlement activities in the Palestinian territory constitute flagrant violations of international law that must “immediately and completely cease” while urging diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a “comprehensive, just and lasting peace … on the basis of … an end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967”).
161As also recognised in Imseis, “Negotiating the Illegal” (2020) 31(3) EJIL 1055, p. 1069.
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CONCLUSION
78.
The Court need not concern itself with the framework for negotiations because it is notrelevant to the UN General Assembly’s request for an Advisory Opinion. It is not acompelling reason for the Court to decline to answer, or to answer fully, the questionsasked of it. Nor does it affect the legal consequences of Israel’s unlawful conduct whichCourt has been asked to address.
79.
Belize reiterates its grave concern about the impact on the Palestinian people of Israel’slong-standing illegal conduct, and Belize’s firm belief in the value of the AdvisoryOpinion as a catalyst for determined efforts to bring such conduct to a permanent end.Belize supports negotiations between Israel and Palestine, but they must be based on,and respect, fundamental rules of international law. By answering the questions fully inaccordance with international law, the Advisory Opinion will provide practical andmeaningful assistance to the UN General Assembly in its efforts to facilitate a solutionto the Israel-Palestine situation that ensures the right of the Palestinian people to fullindependence, freedom and territorial integrity in the exercise of their inalienable rightto self-determination.
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Assad Shoman
Representative of Belize
25 October 2023