DISSENTING OPINION OF VICE-PRESIDENT GEVORGIAN
The Court lacks prima facie jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures — Conditions under Article 30 (1) of the Convention Against Torture are not met — No genuine attempt to resolve the dispute through negotiations.
1. I am unable to join the majority in indicating provisional measures in this case because I believe the Court lacks prima facie jurisdiction. Canada and the Netherlands rely on Article 30 (1) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter the “CAT”) as the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. Article 30 (1) provides as follows:
“Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.”
2. This compromissory clause imposes several conditions on the Court’s jurisdiction. First, there must be a “dispute” between the parties “concerning the interpretation or application” of the CAT. Second, the parties must have attempted, but failed, to settle the said dispute through negotiations. Third, following unsuccessful negotiations, one of the parties must have submitted the dispute to arbitration. If, and only if, the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, one of the parties may refer the dispute to the Court.
3. It is clear from these provisions that submitting the dispute to this Court is a last resort. Accordingly, the Court must satisfy itself that all the other methods of settling the dispute as set out in Article 30 (1) have been exhausted before it exercises its jurisdiction. In the present case, I believe the Court lacks prima facie jurisdiction as I do not think that the negotiation requirement has been met.
4. The Court has already had the opportunity to interpret the negotiation requirement of Article 30 (1). In Belgium v. Senegal, the Court held that it must “ascertain[] whether there was, ‘at the very least[,] a genuine attempt by one of the disputing parties to engage in discussions with the other disputing party, with a view to resolving the dispute’”1. The Court then specified that “the precondition of negotiation is met only when there has been a failure of negotiations, or when negotiations have become futile or deadlocked” such that “no reasonable probability exists that further negotiations would lead to a settlement”2.
5. I do not believe this requirement was met in the present case. In my view, Canada and the Netherlands have not made a genuine attempt to negotiate with a view of settling the dispute, nor have they shown that there was “no reasonable probability . . . that further negotiations would lead
1 See Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), pp. 445-446, para. 57 (citing Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 132, para. 157).
2 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), pp. 445-446, para. 57. See also South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 345.
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to a settlement”. In their Application, Canada and the Netherlands argued that the negotiations became deadlocked or futile after “more than two years of exchanges of Notes Verbales” and two rounds of in-person meetings. However, a closer look at the exchanges between the Parties paints a different picture.
6. While they sent their first request to negotiate in September 2020 and March 2021 respectively, the Netherlands and Canada declined to provide clarifications and specific information on the substance of their allegations to Syria until 9 August 20213. The Notes Verbales the Parties exchanged thereafter did not engage in the detail of the Parties’ positions. The Parties then held two in-person meetings in April and October 2022, the first of which was largely procedural4. The Parties thus negotiated on the substance in earnest during only one in-person meeting held on 5 October and 6 October 20225. Shortly after that single substantive round of negotiations, Canada and the Netherlands decided that the negotiations were “deadlocked” and “futile” and decided to refer the dispute to arbitration6, despite the fact that they had committed to hold meetings with Syria every three months7. Participating in one substantive round of negotiations and then immediately abandoning talks cannot constitute, in my view, a “genuine attempt” at settling the dispute by negotiation.
7. Moreover, there is insufficient evidence that the negotiations had become deadlocked or futile. Unlike in other cases where the Court found negotiations to be “deadlocked”, Syria was responsive throughout and never refused to pursue negotiations8. While it still opposed Canada and the Netherlands’ claims, Syria considered that the October 2022 meeting had been fruitful, expressed its willingness to continue negotiating and proposed a new round of negotiations9. There was thus still a reasonable possibility of settling the dispute at that point, since Syria was still willing to negotiate and provide further explanations10. Canada and the Netherlands denied Syria that opportunity by immediately demanding arbitration. This is no surprise: the Applicants’ conduct and press releases reveal that the ultimate aim was always to bring this case to the Court. It appears that they have submitted the dispute to negotiation and arbitration solely to artificially fulfil the prerequisite of Article 30 (1) and trigger the Court’s jurisdiction.
3 See Joint Application instituting proceedings, Vol. II, Annex 3, Note Verbale dated 18 June 2021 (p. 25); Note Verbale dated 6 July 2021 (p. 26); Note Verbale dated 29 July 2021 (pp. 27-28) and Note Verbale dated 9 August 2021 (Annexes II and III, pp. 29-50).
4 Ibid., Note Verbale dated 4 May 2022 (pp. 101-102) and Note Verbale dated 19 May 2022 (pp. 103-104).
5 Ibid., Note Verbale dated 17 October 2022 (pp. 135-136).
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., Note Verbale dated 27 October 2022 (pp. 137-138); Note Verbale dated 7 November 2022 (pp. 139-141) and Note Verbale dated 17 November 2022 (pp. 142-143).
8 See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 27, para. 51; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 17, para. 21.
9 Joint Application instituting proceedings, Vol. II, Annex 3, Note Verbale dated 27 October 2022 (pp. 137-138).
10 Ibid.
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8. In sum, because I do not believe the negotiation requirement of Article 30 (1) was fulfilled, I conclude that this Court lacks prima facie jurisdiction over this dispute.
(Signed) Kirill GEVORGIAN.
___________
613
DISSENTING OPINION
OF VICE-PRESIDENT GEVORGIAN
The Court lacks prima facie jurisdiction to indicate provisional
measures — Conditions under Article 30 (1) of the Convention against
Torture are not met — No genuine attempt to resolve the dispute through
negotiations.
1. I am unable to join the majority in indicating provisional measures in
this case because I believe the Court lacks prima facie jurisdiction. Canada
and the Netherlands rely on Article 30 (1) of the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter
the “CAT”) as the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. Article 30 (1) provides
as follows:
“Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled
through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to
arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration
the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration,
any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court
of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.”
2. This compromissory clause imposes several conditions on the Court’s
jurisdiction. First, there must be a “dispute” between the parties “concerning
the interpretation or application” of the CAT. Second, the parties must have
attempted, but failed, to settle the said dispute through negotiations. Third,
following unsuccessful negotiations, one of the parties must have submitted
the dispute to arbitration. If, and only if, the parties are unable to agree on
the organization of the arbitration, one of the parties may refer the dispute to
the Court.
3. It is clear from these provisions that submitting the dispute to this Court
is a last resort. Accordingly, the Court must satisfy itself that all the other
methods of settling the dispute as set out in Article 30 (1) have been exhausted
before it exercises its jurisdiction. In the present case, I believe the Court
lacks prima facie jurisdiction as I do not think that the negotiation requirement
has been met.
4. The Court has already had the opportunity to interpret the negotiation
requirement of Article 30 (1). In Belgium v. Senegal, the Court held that it
613
OPINION DISSIDENTE
DE M. LE JUGE GEVORGIAN, VICE-PRÉSIDENT
[Traduction]
Cour n’ayant pas compétence prima facie pour indiquer des mesures
conservatoires — Conditions énoncées au paragraphe 1 de l’article 30 de la
convention contre la torture n’ayant pas été remplies — Aucune véritable
tentative n’ayant été faite pour régler le différend par voie de négociation.
1. Je n’ai pu m’associer à la décision de la majorité d’indiquer des mesures
conservatoires en la présente espèce car j’estime que la Cour n’avait pas
compétence prima facie. Le Canada et les Pays-Bas invoquaient le paragraphe
1 de l’article 30 de la convention contre la torture et autres peines ou
traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants (ci-après la « convention contre la
torture ») pour fonder la compétence de la Cour. Cette disposition est ainsi
libellée :
« Tout différend entre deux ou plus des États parties concernant
l’interprétation ou l’application de la présente Convention qui ne peut
pas être réglé par voie de négociation est soumis à l’arbitrage à la
demande de l’un d’entre eux. Si, dans les six mois qui suivent la date de
la demande d’arbitrage, les parties ne parviennent pas à se mettre
d’accord sur l’organisation de l’arbitrage, l’une quelconque d’entre elles
peut soumettre le différend à la Cour internationale de Justice en déposant
une requête conformément au Statut de la Cour. »
2. Cette clause compromissoire établit plusieurs conditions à la compétence
de la Cour. Elle impose tout d’abord qu’un « différend » concernant
« l’interprétation ou l’application » de la convention contre la torture existe
entre les parties. Il faut ensuite que celles-ci aient tenté, sans y parvenir, de
régler ce différend par voie de négociation. Enfin, l’une d’elles doit avoir,
après l’échec de ces négociations, demandé à l’autre que le différend fût
soumis à l’arbitrage. À défaut d’accord entre les parties sur l’organisation de
cet arbitrage et dans ce cas seulement , l’une d’elles peut saisir la Cour
du différend.
3. Il ressort clairement de ces dispositions que la soumission du différend
à la Cour n’intervient qu’en dernier recours. En conséquence, celle-ci doit,
avant d’exercer sa compétence, s’assurer que les autres modes de règlement
du différend énoncés au paragraphe 1 de l’article 30 ont été épuisés. En la
présente espèce, j’estime que la Cour n’avait pas compétence prima facie car
il n’a, selon moi, pas été satisfait à l’obligation de négociation.
4. La Cour a déjà eu l’occasion d’interpréter la condition de négociation
énoncée au paragraphe 1 de l’article 30. En l’affaire Belgique c. Sénégal,
614 convention against torture (diss. op. gevorgian)
must “ascertain[] whether there was, ‘at the very least[,] a genuine attempt
by one of the disputing parties to engage in discussions with the other disputing
party, with a view to resolving the dispute’”1. The Court then specified
that “the precondition of negotiation is met only when there has been a failure
of negotiations, or when negotiations have become futile or deadlocked”
such that “no reasonable probability exists that further negotiations would
lead to a settlement”2.
5. I do not believe this requirement was met in the present case. In my
view, Canada and the Netherlands have not made a genuine attempt to negotiate
with a view of settling the dispute, nor have they shown that there was
“no reasonable probability . . . that further negotiations would lead to a
settlement”. In their Application, Canada and the Netherlands argued that
the negotiations became deadlocked or futile after “more than two years of
exchanges of Notes Verbales” and two rounds of in-person meetings.
However, a closer look at the exchanges between the Parties paints a different
picture.
6. While they sent their first request to negotiate in September 2020 and
March 2021 respectively, the Netherlands and Canada declined to
provide clarifications and specific information on the substance of their
allegations to Syria until 9 August 20213. The Notes Verbales the
Parties exchanged thereafter did not engage in the detail of the Parties’
positions. The Parties then held two in-person meetings in April and
October 2022, the first of which was largely procedural4. The Parties
thus negotiated on the substance in earnest during only one in-person
meeting held on 5 October and 6 October 20225. Shortly after that
single substantive round of negotiations, Canada and the Netherlands
decided that the negotiations were “deadlocked” and “futile” and decided
to refer the dispute to arbitration6, despite the fact that they had committed
to hold meetings with Syria every three months7. Participating in one
substantive round of negotiations and then immediately abandoning talks
1 See Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), pp. 445-446, para. 57 (citing Application of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v.
Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 132,
para. 157).
2 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 446, para. 57. See also South West Africa (Ethiopia v.
South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962,
p. 345.
3 See Joint Application instituting proceedings, Vol. II, Annex 3, Note Verbale dated
18 June 2021 (p. 25); Note Verbale dated 6 July 2021 (p. 26); Note Verbale dated 29 July 2021
(pp. 27-28) and Note Verbale dated 9 August 2021 (Annexes II and III, pp. 29-50).
4 Ibid., Note Verbale dated 4 May 2022 (pp. 101-102) and Note Verbale dated 19 May 2022
(pp. 103-104).
5 Ibid., Note Verbale dated 17 October 2022 (pp. 135-136).
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., Note Verbale dated 27 October 2022 (pp. 137-138); Note Verbale dated 7 November
2022 (pp. 139-141) and Note Verbale dated 17 November 2022 (pp. 142-143).
convention contre torture (op. diss. gevorgian) 614
elle a dit qu’elle devait « rechercher si, “à tout le moins, … l’une des parties
[avait] vraiment [tenté] d’ouvrir le débat avec l’autre partie en vue de régler
le différend” »1. Elle a ensuite précisé qu’« il n’[était] satisfait à la condition
préalable de tenir des négociations que lorsque celles-ci [avaie]nt échoué,
[étaie]nt devenues inutiles ou [avaie]nt abouti à une impasse », de sorte qu’« il
n’[étai]t pas raisonnablement permis d’espérer que de nouvelles négociations
pu[]ssent aboutir à un règlement »2.
5. Je ne crois pas qu’il ait été satisfait à cette condition dans la présente
instance. De mon point de vue, le Canada et les Pays-Bas n’ont pas vraiment
tenté de négocier en vue de régler le différend et n’ont pas davantage montré
qu’il n’était « pas raisonnablement permis d’espérer que de nouvelles négociations
pu[]ssent aboutir à un règlement ». Dans leur requête, les deux États
faisaient valoir que les négociations avaient abouti à une impasse ou étaient
devenues inutiles après « plus de deux ans d’échanges de notes verbales » et
deux séries de rencontres en personne. Or ce n’est pas ce qu’indiquent les
échanges entre les Parties, lorsqu’on les examine de plus près.
6. Les Pays-Bas et le Canada, bien qu’ils aient formulé respectivement en
septembre 2020 et mars 2021 leur première demande de négociation, se sont
refusés à fournir à la Syrie des éclaircissements et des informations précises
quant au fond de leurs allégations jusqu’au 9 août 20213. Dans les notes
verbales qu’elles ont échangées par la suite, les Parties ne sont pas entrées
dans le détail de leurs positions respectives. Elles ont ensuite, en avril et en
octobre 2022, pris part à deux réunions en présentiel, dont la première a
essentiellement porté sur des questions de procédure4. Elles n’ont donc
sérieusement discuté du fond que lors d’une seule réunion, tenue entre leurs
représentants les 5 et 6 octobre 20225. Peu après ce cycle unique de négociations
sur le fond, le Canada et les Pays-Bas ont conclu que les négociations
avaient « abouti à une impasse » et étaient devenues « inutiles », et ont décidé
de soumettre le différend à l’arbitrage6, alors même qu’ils s’étaient engagés à
se réunir avec la Syrie tous les trois mois7. Le fait d’avoir participé à un cycle
1 Voir Questions concernant l’obligation de poursuivre ou d’extrader (Belgique c. Sénégal),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2012 (II), p. 445-446, par. 57 (citant Application de la convention
internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Géorgie
c. Fédération de Russie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (I), p. 132, par. 157).
2 Questions concernant l’obligation de poursuivre ou d’extrader (Belgique c. Sénégal),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2012 (II), p. 446, par. 57. Voir également Sud-Ouest africain
(Éthiopie c. Afrique du Sud ; Libéria c. Afrique du Sud), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 345.
3 Voir requête introductive d’instance conjointe, vol. II, annexe 3, note verbale du 18 juin
2021 (p. 25) ; note verbale du 6 juillet 2021 (p. 26) ; note verbale du 29 juillet 2021 (p. 27-28) et
note verbale du 9 août 2021 (annexes II et III, p. 29-50).
4 Ibid., note verbale du 4 mai 2022 (p. 101-102) et note verbale du 19 mai 2022 (p. 103-104).
5 Ibid., note verbale du 17 octobre 2022 (p. 135-136).
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., note verbale du 27 octobre 2022 (p. 137-138) ; note verbale du 7 novembre 2022
(p. 139-141) et note verbale du 17 novembre 2022 (p. 142-143).
615 convention against torture (diss. op. gevorgian)
cannot constitute, in my view, a “genuine attempt” at settling the dispute by
negotiation.
7. Moreover, there is insufficient evidence that the negotiations had
become deadlocked or futile. Unlike in other cases where the Court found
negotiations to be “deadlocked”, Syria was responsive throughout and never
refused to pursue negotiations8. While it still opposed Canada and the
Netherlands’ claims, Syria considered that the October 2022 meeting had
been fruitful, expressed its willingness to continue negotiating and proposed
a new round of negotiations9. There was thus still a reasonable possibility of
settling the dispute at that point, since Syria was still willing to negotiate and
provide further explanations10. Canada and the Netherlands denied Syria
that opportunity by immediately demanding arbitration. This is no surprise:
the Applicants’ conduct and press releases reveal that the ultimate aim was
always to bring this case to the Court. It appears that they have submitted the
dispute to negotiation and arbitration solely to artificially fulfil the prerequisite
of Article 30 (1) and trigger the Court’s jurisdiction.
8. In sum, because I do not believe the negotiation requirement of Article
30 (1) was fulfilled, I conclude that this Court lacks prima facie jurisdiction
over this dispute.
(Signed) Kirill Gevorgian.
8 See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v.
Iran), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 27, para. 51; Questions of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1998, p. 17, para. 21.
9 Joint Application instituting proceedings, Vol. II, Annex 3, Note Verbale dated
27 October 2022 (pp. 137-138).
10 Ibid.
convention contre torture (op. diss. gevorgian) 615
unique de négociations sur les questions de fond avant d’abandonner immédiatement
les pourparlers ne saurait, selon moi, constituer une « véritable
tentative » de régler le différend par voie de négociation.
7. En outre, il n’existe pas suffisamment d’éléments établissant que les
négociations avaient abouti à une impasse ou qu’elles étaient devenues
inutiles. Contrairement à la situation qui était celle d’autres affaires dans
lesquelles la Cour a considéré que les négociations avaient « abouti à une
impasse », en la présente espèce la Syrie a répondu à toutes les communications,
et n’a à aucun moment refusé de poursuivre les négociations8. Bien
qu’elle maintînt son opposition aux allégations du Canada et des Pays-Bas,
elle a estimé que la réunion d’octobre 2022 avait été fructueuse, exprimé sa
volonté de continuer à négocier et proposé qu’un nouveau cycle de négociations
fût entamé9. Il était donc alors raisonnablement permis d’espérer encore
régler le différend, la Syrie demeurant disposée à négocier et à fournir des
informations complémentaires10. Le Canada et les Pays-Bas l’ont privée de
cette possibilité en sollicitant sans attendre une procédure d’arbitrage. Cela
n’est guère étonnant : le comportement et les communiqués de presse des
demandeurs révèlent que ces derniers ont toujours eu pour objectif ultime de
porter la présente affaire devant la Cour. Les deux États semblent n’avoir
mené des négociations et présenté une demande d’arbitrage que pour remplir
artificiellement la condition préalable, prévue au paragraphe 1 de l’article 30,
pour que la compétence de la Cour s’applique.
8. En résumé, étant donné qu’il n’a, selon moi, pas été satisfait à la
condition de négociation énoncée au paragraphe 1 de l’article 30, je conclus
que la Cour n’avait pas compétence prima facie pour connaître du présent
différend.
(Signé) Kirill Gevorgian.
8 Voir Personnel diplomatique et consulaire des États-Unis à Téhéran (États-Unis
d’Amérique c. Iran), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1980, p. 27, par. 51 ; Questions d’interprétation
et d’application de la convention de Montréal de 1971 résultant de l’incident aérien de Lockerbie
(Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c. Royaume-Uni), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 1998, p. 17, par. 21.
9 Requête introductive d’instance conjointe, vol. II, annexe 3 ; note verbale du 27 octobre
2022 (p. 137-138).
10 Ibid.
Dissenting opinion of Vice-President Gevorgian