Request for the indication of provisional measures

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
28 SEPTEMBER 2023
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
ARMENIA
v.
AZERBAIJAN
REQUEST BY THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA
FOR THE INDICATION OF
PROVISIONAL MEASURES
VOLUME I

Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1
II. THE FACTS COMPELLING THE REQUEST ................................... 5
A. Azerbaijan’s Siege of Nagorno-Karabakh Before its
19 September 2023 Attack ........................................................ 5
B. Azerbaijan’s 19 September Attack .......................................... 15
III. PRIMA FACIE JURISDICTION ........................................................ 32
IV. THE RIGHTS WHOSE PROTECTION IS SOUGHT AND THE
LINK BETWEEN SUCH RIGHTS AND THE MEASURES
REQUESTED ...................................................................................... 33
V. RISK OF IRREPARABLE PREJUDICE AND URGENCY .............. 36
VI. PROVISIONAL MEASURES REQUESTED .................................... 38

1
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In accordance with Article 41 of the Statute of the Court and Article 73
of the Rules of Court, the Republic of Armenia (“Armenia”) urgently requests that
the Court indicate provisional measures against the Republic of Azerbaijan
(“Azerbaijan”) to preserve and protect rights enshrined in the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”).
Given the extraordinary gravity of the situation as described below, Armenia also
requests, pursuant to Article 74(4) of the Rules of Court, that the President, pending
the Court’s decision on Armenia’s request, immediately call upon Azerbaijan to act
in such a way as will enable any order the Court may make on the request to have
its appropriate effects.
2. On 19 September 2023, Azerbaijan—in manifest violation of the
ceasefire agreement included in the 2020 Trilateral Statement1 and its obligation
not to aggravate the dispute reiterated in multiple Orders of the Court2—launched
a full-scale military assault on the 120,000 ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh,
indiscriminately shelling the capital, Stepanakert, and other civilian settlements.3
1 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Information bulletin of the Ministry of Defense of
the Russian Federation on the activities of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict zone (as of September 19, 2023) (19 September 2023) (certified translation from
Russian) (Annex 55).
2 See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, I.C.J.
Reports 2021, p. 361, para. 98(1)(c); Application of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Request for the Modification of the
Order of 7 December 2021 Indicating Provisional Measures, Order of 12 October 2022, para. 23(2);
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 22 February 2023, paras.
3, 7; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Request for the Modification of the Order of 22 February
2023 Indicating Provisional Measures, Order of 6 July 2023, para. 30.
3 “Azerbaijani forces strike Armenian-controlled Karabakh, raising risk of new Caucasus war”,
Reuters (19 September 2023), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/armenia-azerbaijan2
The assault comes on the heels of Azerbaijan’s nine-month blockade of the Lachin
corridor. While reliable information remains scarce, it is clear that the attack killed
and wounded hundreds, including civilians, and at least 30% of the population was
almost immediately displaced within Nagorno-Karabakh. 4 Moreover, as with
Azerbaijan’s prior attacks on ethnic Armenians, credible reports of atrocities
against civilians have already begun to appear.5 Meanwhile, vile Armenophobic
hate speech continues to be circulate prolifically on Azerbaijani social networks.6
3. Thousands of the forcibly displaced men, women and children were
forced to live in the streets of Stepanakert, or in basements or other shelters, without
idCAKBN30P0L9 (Annex 56). The attack was unprovoked but pretextually characterized by
Azerbaijan as an “anti-terrorist operation” following the explosion of two landmines in an area under
the total control of Azerbaijan’s army which Azerbaijan attributed without a shred of evidence to a
commando-style operation allegedly led by local Armenian forces. See “Azerbaijan launches ‘antiterrorist’
operation in Nagorno-Karabakh”, Financial Times (19 September 2023), available at
https://www.ft.com/content/62d7923b-e68d-41ff-9ad6-428562389510 (Annex 71). See also
Compendium of Illustrative Images Showing the Civilian Suffering and Forced Displacement
Resulting from Azerbaijan’s Military Assault on Nagorno-Karabakh and its Targeting of Civilians
and Civilian Structures (Confidential) (Annex 122).
4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, Statement of Foreign Minister of Armenia
Ararat Mirzoyan at the 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly (23 September 2023),
available at https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2023/09/23/fm_unga/12236, p. 2 (Annex 97).
5 See, e.g., Nagorno Karabakh Observer, @NKobserver, “Reports of war crimes by Azeri forces in
ethnic-Armenian Karabakhi villages. We’ve come across some reports, verified a few, working on
getting a detailed picture. This could partially explain why many in the regions further out remain
unaccounted for 3 days after the ceasefire”, X (23 September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/nkobserver/status/1705605392074445040 (Annex 98); Lemkin Institute for
Genocide Prevention, @lemkininstitute, “There are stories coming out of Artsakh of the beheading
of children and the separation of older boys and men from women and children. We hope these are
not true, but we have every reason to believe that they are”, X (22 September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/lemkininstitute/status/1705395252385714513 (Annex 94); “Monitoring Ethnic
Cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh”, University Network for Human Rights, available at
https://www.humanrightsnetwork.org/nk-live-monitor, PDF p. 7 (“Reports began surfacing of
extrajudicial killings of civilians, … as well as hostage-taking and sexual violence”) (Annex 119).
6 See infra, para. 23. See also Demonstrative List of Hate Speech and Racial Hatred by Azerbaijani
State Officials, Public Figures and Other Individuals and Groups against Armenians Following the
19 September Military Assault against Nagorno-Karabakh (Annex 121).
3
adequate heat, electricity, medicine, sanitation facilities, or food, terrified of what
the next hour might bring.7 Hundreds of civilians remain missing.8
4. Under the terms of a ceasefire agreement Azerbaijan imposed on the
Nagorno-Karabakh authorities on 20 September 2023,9 the local armed forces have
begun laying down their arms. Azerbaijan, however, continues to ignore
widespread calls from the international community to offer transparency and
credible assurances that the rights and security of the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-
Karabakh will be respected, including by permitting neutral international observers
to access the region.10
5. As of 27 September, eight days after Azerbaijan’s attack, tens of
thousands of ethnic Armenians have been forcibly displaced from their ancestral
7 See infra, paras. 21-22, 24.
8 See infra, para. 20.
9 “Stepanakert and Baku reach 6 agreements”, News.am (23 September 2023), available at
https://news.am/eng/news/782870.html (Annex 99).
10 See infra, para. 26.
4
homeland to Armenia.11 Accounts that have emerged to date are harrowing.12 The
former State Minister of the civilian administration has already been arrested while
trying to flee to Armenia pursuant to what is almost certain to be a large-scale
punitive programme.13 The persecution and discrimination that ethnic Armenians
have historically suffered at the hands of Azerbaijan,14 including Azerbaijan’s ninemonth
siege on those it purports to consider its own citizens, leave no room for
doubt: those who remain in Nagorno-Karabakh are at grave risk of being forced to
choose between being deprived of the equal enjoyment of their CERD rights—
including the right to security of person, and other political, civil, economic, social
and cultural rights—and leaving their ancestral homes.
11 “50,243 forcibly displaced persons enter Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh as of 15pm
Wednesday”, News.am (27 September 2023), available at https://news.am/eng/news/783649.html
(Annex 117); The UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR ready to provide further humanitarian assistance
for those fleeing to Armenia (26 September 2023), available at https://www.unhcr.org/news/pressreleases/
unhcr-ready-provide-further-humanitarian-assistance-those-fleeing-to-armenia (“As of
this afternoon, the Government of the Republic of Armenia reported that some 19,000 people
had fled to Armenia since 23 September. The number has more than tripled since yesterday, with
long queues reported at the borders. The majority of those arriving are vulnerable, including mainly
older people, women and children. People arriving at the borders are exhausted and require
urgent emergency assistance, as well as psychosocial support”) (Annex 113); “People evacuating
en masse from Karabakh capital Stepanakert to Armenia (PHOTOS)”, News.am (25 September
2023), available at https://news.am/eng/news/783063.html (Annex 111); Compendium of
Illustrative Images Showing the Civilian Suffering and Forced Displacement Resulting from
Azerbaijan’s Military Assault on Nagorno-Karabakh and its Targeting of Civilians and Civilian
Structures (Confidential) (Annex 122).
12 G. Gavin, “‘We know we aren’t going back’: Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians face up to a life in
exile”, Politico (26 September 2023), available at https://www.politico.eu/article/we-know-wearent-
going-back-nagorno-karabakh-armenians-face-up-to-a-life-in-exile-refugees/ (Annex 114).
13 See infra, para. 24.
14 See, e.g., Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Memorial of Armenia (23 January 2023) (hereinafter
“Memorial of Armenia”), Vol. I, Part III, Chapters I, Section IV; Chapter II, Section I; Chapter III,
Section II; Part IV, Chapter II, Section II.
5
6. In these circumstances, Armenia is left with no choice but to ask the
Court to indicate provisional measures to protect the rights in dispute as a matter of
extreme urgency.
II. THE FACTS COMPELLING THE REQUEST
7. For more than nine months preceding its 19 September attack,
Azerbaijan besieged the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan
obstructed the free movement of persons, vehicles and cargo to and from the region;
intentionally deprived Nagorno-Karabakh of gas and electricity; and attacked
farmers to prevent even the most limited domestic production of food (Section
II.A). Azerbaijan’s 19 September attack represents the evident culmination of its
efforts to destroy or displace the ethnic Armenian population (Section II.B). It is in
this context that the current need for the Court’s protection must be understood.
A. Azerbaijan’s Siege of Nagorno-Karabakh Before its
19 September 2023 Attack
8. The nine-month siege of Nagorno-Karabakh that preceded Azerbaijan’s
19 September attack led to “acute shortages of food, medications, hygiene products,
and other essential supplies”,15 and was widely condemned by the international
community.16
15 “Azerbaijan: Ensure Civilians’ Rights in Nagorno Karabakh”, Human Rights Watch (23
September 2023), available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/09/23/azerbaijan-ensure-civiliansrights-
nagorno-karabakh, PDF p. 1 (Annex 100).
16 See, e.g., European Union External Action, Azerbaijan: Statement by High Representative Joseph
Borrell on the humanitarian situation on the ground (26 July 2023), available at
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/azerbaijan-statement-high-representative-josep-borrellhumanitarian-
situation-ground_en (“The European Union is deeply concerned about the serious
humanitarian situation affecting the local population in the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous
Oblast. The movement through the Lachin corridor remains obstructed for more than seven months,
despite Orders by the International Court of Justice to reopen it”), PDF p. 1 (Annex 25); Council of
6
Europe, Humanitarian Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh: Statement by Council of Europe Secretary
General Marija Pejčinović Burić (28 July 2023), available at https://www.coe.int/fr/web/portal/-
/humanitarian-situation-in-nagorno-karabakh (“I am extremely concerned about the serious
humanitarian and human rights situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and my thoughts go to the residents
who are bearing the brunt of this situation. I strongly reiterate my previous calls to restore the free
movement along the Lachin corridor”) (Annex 29); Foreign Relations Committee, Statement of Yuri
Kim Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (14 September 2023), available at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/assessingthe-
crisis-in-nagorno-karabakh (“The current humanitarian situation is not acceptable. Humanitarian
access through the Lachin corridor and other routes must be made available now”) (Annex 52);
Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, Arménie - Azerbaïdjan – Blocage
du corridor de Latchine (27 juillet 2023) (27 July 2023), available at
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/azerbaidjan/evenements/article/armenieazerbaidjan-
blocage-du-corridor-de-latchine-27-07-23 (“La France déplore le blocage persistant par
l’Azerbaïdjan du corridor de Latchine… La France appelle l’Azerbaïdjan à se conformer à ses
obligations internationales, notamment à mettre en oeuvre les mesures conservatoires indiquées par
la Cour internationale de justice dans son ordonnance du 22 février, qui ont force obligatoire”)
(Annex 26); “Speech Address by the Foreign Minister of Armenia: UK Response, July 2023”,
Gov.UK (20 July 2023), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/address-by-theforeign-
minister-of-armenia-uk-response-july-2023 (“We remain deeply concerned about the
ongoing disruptions to the Lachin corridor and the associated humanitarian consequences for the
local population. We support the International Court of Justice order of February 2023 for Azerbaijan
to ensure unimpeded movement along the Lachin corridor in both directions”) (Annex 21); Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry in
connection with the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh (15 July 2023), available at
https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1897041 (certified translation from Russian) (“We strongly
urge the Azerbaijani leadership to take urgent measures to immediately unblock the Lachin corridor,
resume the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles and goods in both directions, as well as supply
energy to the region”) (Annex 20); Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, @DutchMFA, “The
Netherlands follows the humanitarian situation affecting the population in the former Nagorno-
Karabakh Autonomous Oblast with serious concern, and fully supports the statement of
@JosepBorrellF”, X (27 July 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/DutchMFA/status/1684597264000425985 (Annex 27); International Committee
of the Red Cross, Azerbaijan/Armenia: Sides must reach “humanitarian consensus” to ease
suffering (25 July 2023), available at https://www.icrc.org/en/document/azerbaijan-armenia-sidesmust-
reach-humanitarian-consensus-to-ease-suffering (“Despite persistent efforts, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is not currently able to bring humanitarian assistance to the
civilian population through the Lachin corridor or through any other routes, including Aghdam. The
organisation is calling on the relevant decision makers to allow the ICRC to resume its essential
humanitarian operations in the area. Tens of thousands of people rely on humanitarian aid reaching
them through these routes. The civilian population is now facing a lack of life-saving medication
and essentials like hygiene products and baby formula. Fruits, vegetables, and bread are increasingly
scarce and costly, while some other food items such as dairy products, sunflower oil, cereal, fish,
and chicken are not available. The last time the ICRC was allowed to bring medical items and
essential food items into the area was several weeks ago”) (Annex 24); Amnesty International,
@amnesty, “The Azerbaijani authorities must lift the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh and bring an
end to the unfolding humanitarian crisis”, X (28 June 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/amnesty/status/1674075392708079616 (Annex 17).
7
9. The Court will recall that the siege began on 12 December 2022, when
Azerbaijan orchestrated a so-called environmental “protest” that blocked the Lachin
Corridor, the only road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, which under
the terms of the Trilateral Statement was to “provide a connection between
Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia”. 17 In recognition of the imminent risk of
irreparable harm posed by the severance of the ethnic Armenians’ sole link to
Armenia, on 22 February 2023, the Court ordered Azerbaijan to “take all measures
at its disposal to ensure unimpeded movement of persons, vehicles and cargo along
the Lachin Corridor in both directions”.18 Azerbaijan defied the Court’s Order and
continued its support of the so-called eco-protesters for another two months.19 The
ostensible protesters disbanded on 28 April 2023, but only after Azerbaijan
established a military checkpoint to directly impede traffic along the Corridor in
flagrant violation of the Court’s 22 February Order.20
17 Republic of Armenia, Office of the Prime Minister, Statement by the Prime Minister of the
Republic of Armenia, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the President of the Russian
Federation (9 November 2020), available at https://www.primeminister.am/en/pressrelease/
item/2020/11/10/Announcement/ (Armenia’s Request for Provisional Measures
(27 December 2022), Annex 37).
18 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 22 February 2023, para.
62.
19See Letter from Jeyhun Bayramov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, to
Antonio Guterres Secretary-General of the United Nations (27 February 2023) (Annex 10); Letter
from Ararat Mirzoyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, to Antonio Guterres
Secretary-General of the United Nations (14 March 2023) (Annex 11); Letter from Yeghishe
Kirakosyan, Agent of the Republic of Armenia before the International Court of Justice, to Philippe
Gautier, Registrar of the International Court of Justice (6 April 2023); Letter from Elnur Mammadov,
Agent of the Republic of Azerbaijan before the International Court of Justice, to Philippe Gautier,
Registrar of the International Court of Justice (17 April 2023); Letter from Yeghishe Kirakosyan,
Agent of the Republic of Armenia before the International Court of Justice, to Philippe Gautier,
Registrar of the International Court of Justice (24 April 2023).
20 Letter from Yeghishe Kirakosyan, Agent of the Republic of Armenia before the International Court
of Justice, to Philippe Gautier, Registrar of the International Court of Justice (12 May 2023).
8
10. On 6 July 2023, the Court made clear that its order that Azerbaijan “take
all measures at its disposal to ensure unimpeded movement of persons, vehicles and
cargo along the Lachin Corridor in both directions” applied to equally to the new
checkpoint.21 The Court also stressed the “need for effective implementation” of
that measure.22 But again Azerbaijan did not comply. Instead, it misrepresented the
Court’s Order as a vindication of its checkpoint23 and, within a matter of days,
began to block even the limited humanitarian assistance from the International
Committee of the Red Cross and the Russian Federation peacekeepers destined for
the ethnic Armenian population.24 As a result, from 15 June until 18 September
2023, no humanitarian aid crossed the checkpoint at all.25
21 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Request for the Modification of the Order of 22 February
2023 Indicating Provisional Measures, Order of 6 July 2023, paras. 9, 30. See also ibid., para. 28
(“the measure that the Court imposed in that 922 February 2023] Order applies without limitation
to the cause of the impediment of such movement”).
22 Ibid., para. 30.
23 See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, No:381/23, Press Release on
the decision of the International Court of Justice of July 6, 2023, on unanimous rejection of
Armenia’s request (7 July 2023), available at https://www.mfa.gov.az/en/news/no38123 (“We
welcome the Court’s ruling that has reconfirmed Azerbaijan’s right to control its borders, and that
Armenia’s request on removal of the Checkpoint was unfounded. Thus, misinterpretation by the
Armenian side of the latest decision is nothing than a desperate attempt. Azerbaijan’s decision to
establish its border checkpoint at the entrance of the Lachin road was in keeping with its sovereign
rights to secure its border”) (Annex 18).
24 See Letter from Yeghishe Kirakosyan, Agent of the Republic of Armenia before the International
Court of Justice, to Philippe Gautier, Registrar of the International Court of Justice (17 July 2023);
Letter from Yeghishe Kirakosyan, Agent of the Republic of Armenia before the International Court
of Justice, to Philippe Gautier, Registrar of the International Court of Justice (31 July 2023); Letter
from Yeghishe Kirakosyan, Agent of the Republic of Armenia before the International Court of
Justice, to Philippe Gautier, Registrar of the International Court of Justice (19 September 2023).
25 International Committee of the Red Cross, Operational update on ICRC’s work across the Lachin
Corridor (20 August 2023), available at https://blogs.icrc.org/ir/en/2023/08/operational-update-onicrc-
s-work-across-the-lachin-corridor (Annex 40).
9
11. Once again, Azerbaijan’s continued obstruction of the Lachin Corridor
and non-compliance with the Court’s Orders were widely condemned by
international organizations and third States.26
26 Delegation of the European Union to the Council of Europe, EU Statement on recent developments
around the Lachin corridor (6 September 2023), available at
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/council-europe/eu-statement-recent-developments-aroundlachin-
corridor_en (noting, inter alia, that “[m]ovement through the Lachin corridor has been
impaired for almost 9 months, and, since 15 June, the corridor has been almost completely blocked,
with the exception of sporadic medical evacuations. As a result, medical supplies and essential goods
are in critically short supply or have already run out, with dire consequences for the local population”
and reiterating its call “to ensure freedom and security of movement along the Lachin corridor in
both directions and to guarantee that the crisis does not escalate further, in line with the Trilateral
Statement of November 2020, the European Court of Human Rights interim measures of December
2022 and the ICJ order of February 2023”) (Annex 48); Council of Europe, Commissioner for
Human Rights, Restore free movement along the Lachin Corridor and ensure the rapid and
unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance in Nagorno-Karabakh (28 August 2023), available
at https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/restore-free-movement-along-the-lachin-corridorand-
ensure-the-rapid-and-unimpeded-delivery-of-humanitarian-assistance-in-nagorno-karabakh
(Annex 42); High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Azerbaijan: Statement by High Representative Josep Borrell on the humanitarian situation on the
ground (26 July 2023), available at https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/azerbaijan-statement-highrepresentative-
josep-borrell-humanitarian-situation-ground_en (“The movement through the Lachin
corridor remains obstructed for more than seven months, despite Orders by the International Court
of Justice to reopen it”), PDF p. 1 (Annex 25); British Embassy in Armenia @UKinArmenia, “The
Head of Political & Press Section of @UKinArmenia joined the visit of the diplomatic corps to
Syunik organised by @armgov. We reiterate our support for the @CIJ_ICJ order of February 2023
for Azerbaijan to ensure unimpeded movement along Lachin corridor in both directions”, X (28 July
2023), available at https://twitter.com/UKinArmenia/status/1684970857188270081 (Annex 30);
Federal Foreign Office of Germany @AuswaertigesAmt, “The Lachin corridor must be reopened.
The people in #NagornoKarabakh must receive vital humanitarian assistance. Foreign Minister
@abaerbock spoke on the phone today with the FM of Azerbaijan @Bayramov_Jeyhun about
opening this and possible further routes. 1/2”, X (8 September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/AuswaertigesAmt/status/1700173471026647431) (certified translation from
German) (Annex 50); Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs @DutchMFA, “The Netherlands follows
the humanitarian situation affecting the population in the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous
Oblast with serious concern, and fully supports the statement of @JosepBorrellF”, X (27 July 2023),
available at https://twitter.com/DutchMFA/status/1684597264000425985 (Annex 27); Ambassador
Muriel Peneveyre @swissmfaeurasia, “[Emoji of flag of Switzerland] is concerned about the
continued obstruction of access through the Lachin corridor and the deteriorating humanitarian
situation. Free passage for civilians and essential goods must be urgently restored. Rapid and
unimpeded humanitarian access must be allowed immediately”, X (31 July 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/swissmfaeurasia/status/1686024289017823232 (Annex 33); Embassy of Spain
in the Russian Federation @EmbEspRussia, “[Emoji of flag of Spain] supports the statement of
@Josepborrellf about the humanitarian situation related to the siege of Lachin. ‘[Emoji of flag of
10
Azerbaijan] The authorities must ensure security and free movement in the corridor very quickly
and prevent the crisis from escalating’”, X (27 July 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/EmbEspRusia/status/1684633654725623809 (certified translation from
Armenian) (Annex 28); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus @CyprusMFA, “Cyprus condemns
the ongoing blockade of the #LachinCorridor & is deeply concerned with the humanitarian crisis in
#NagornoKarabakh. #Azerbaijan must urgently lift the blockade and guarantee safety & freedom of
movement, in line with the 2020 ceasefire statement & ICJ decision”, X (28 July 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/CyprusMFA/status/1684926924060037120 (Annex 31); Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Estonia Margus Tsahkna @Tsahkna, “Had a call w/ [Emoji of flag of
Armenia] FM @AraratMirzoyan on Lachin corridor. The blockade & hum. situation of the local
population are concerning. Hum. access must not be politicised by any actors. [Emoji of flag of
Azerbaijan] has to guarantee safety & freedom of movement according to trilat. statement of 2020
& ICJ order”, X (14 August 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/Tsahkna/status/1691087763527925760 (Annex 38); MFEA Slovenia @mzez_rs,
“Slovenia [emoji of flag of Slovenia] is concerned about the humanitarian situation affecting
population in #Karabakh. Humanitarian aid must be allowed free passage for the people in need.
Support to the @JosepBorrellF statement”, X (28 July 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/mzez_rs/status/1684832642120687617 (Annex 32); Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Lithuania Gabrielius Landsbergis @GLandsbergis, “Spoke with @AraratMirzoyan, expressed
concern about the dire humanitarian consequences of the blocking of the Lachin corridor. Crucial to
ensure unimpeded movement as ordered by ICJ. Reiterated firm belief in absolute necessity of
working towards comprehensive & lasting peace”, X (9 August 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/GLandsbergis/status/1689208739117588480 (Annex 35); Lemkin Institute for
Genocide Prevention, Active Genocide Alert Azerbaijan - in Artsakh (18 August 2023), available at
https://www.lemkininstitute.com/active-genocide-alert-1/active-genocide-alert-azerbaijan----inartsakh-
(“This blockade is genocidal in its intent, which is to eliminate the Armenian population of
Artsakh, either through mass displacement or mass starvation. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev
has himself said as much on several occasions, including in his statement on May 29th, 2023, when
he threatened: ‘There will be no third invitation. Either they themselves will come to us humbly, or
events will develop in a different direction. We have every opportunity to carry out any operation in
that region’”), PDF p. 2 (Annex 39); Freedom House @freedomhouse, “(1/) We urge Azerbaijan to
allow @ICRC to provide vital humanitarian assistance to Nagorno Karabakh & immediately work
to ensure freedom of movement by opening the Lachin corridor, guaranteeing unrestricted
movement of individuals, vehicles & cargo”, X (25 July 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/freedomhouse/status/1683880665916354574 (Annex 22); Human Rights Watch,
Giorgi Gogia @Giorgi_Gogia, “Tens of thousands of civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh are facing lack
of life-saving medication & essential goods. @ICRC not allowed to bring medical items & essential
food for weeks. Alarming statement https://icrc.org/en/document/azerbaijan-armenia-sides-mustreach-
humanitarian-consensus-to-ease-suffering Azerbaijan should immediately ensure unimpeded
access!”, X (25 July 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/Giorgi_Gogia/status/1683828382989942785 (Annex 23); “Prominent genocide
scholars have submitted an open letter to the UN Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights, the Special Adviser of the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide,
and Member States of the UN Security Council regarding the potential for genocide in Artsakh
(Nagorno-Karabakh)”, The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute Foundation (9 August 2023),
available at http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/11.8.23.php (Annex 36).
11
12. Azerbaijan’s efforts to strangle the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-
Karabakh were not limited to its blockade of the Lachin Corridor. In parallel,
Azerbaijan also interrupted the supply of gas and electricity to Nagorno-Karabakh.
These interruptions, too, have been widely acknowledged and condemned.27
27 See, e.g., Delegation of the European Union to the UN and other international organisations in
Geneva, United Nations Human Rights Council 54th Session – Item 2 – EU Statement (12 September
2023), available at https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/hrc54-item-2-eustatement_
en (following with “great concern the serious humanitarian situation affecting the local
population … due to continued restrictions on free movement along the Lachin corridor, as well as
the cessation of electricity and gas supplies”), PDF p. 5 (Annex 51); European Council, Statement
by the spokesperson of Charles Michel, President of the European Council, regarding Armenia and
Azerbaijan (1 September 2023), available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/
2023/09/01/statement-by-the-spokesperson-of-charles-michel-president-of-the-europeancouncil-
regarding-armenia-and-azerbaijan/ (stressing “the need for Baku to provide clarity to
Karabakh Armenians in terms of procedures for their movements through Lachin corridor to and
from Armenia” and noting that exchanges “have also focused on restoring electricity and gas
supplies to Karabakh Armenians as soon as possible”) (Annex 47); Ministry for Europe and Foreign
Affairs of the French Republic, Azerbaijan – Lachin corridor (23 April 2023), available at
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/azerbaijan/news/article/azerbaijan-lachin-corridor-
23-april-2023 (“France calls on Azerbaijan to comply with its international obligations, particularly
to implement the provisional measures indicated by the International Court of Justice in its order of
22 February, which are binding. It calls for the free movement of property, people and goods to be
restored along the Lachin Corridor, in both directions, and for the population to be continuously
supplied with gas and electricity”) (Annex 13); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation, Statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry in connection with the situation around
Nagorno-Karabakh (15 July 2023), available at https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1897041
(“We strongly urge the Azerbaijani leadership to take urgent measures to immediately unblock the
Lachin corridor, resume the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles and goods in both directions,
as well as supply energy to the region”) (certified translation from Russian) (Annex 20); Germany
in the EU @germanyintheeu, “The situation in #NagornoKarabakh is catastrophic. Medication,
food, electricity are lacking. Our appeal to Azerbaijan and also Russia: The Lachin corridor must be
open. People must finally get what they need to live. @ABaerbock ahead of #Gymnich in [emoji of
flag of Spain] Toledo”, X (31 August 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/germanyintheeu/status/1697184637720670649 (Annex 46); “Azerbaijan:
Blockade of Lachin corridor putting thousands of lives in peril must be immediately lifted”, Amnesty
International (9 February 2023), available at
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/02/azerbaijan-blockade-of-lachin-corridor-puttingthousands-
of-lives-in-peril-must-be-immediately-lifted/ (“Disruptions to the supply of electricity,
natural gas and vehicle fuel add up to extreme hardship, especially for groups who are vulnerable to
discrimination and marginalization. This must end now”), PDF p. 2 (Annex 9).
12
13. In particular, on 21 March 2023, the gas supply was shut down for the
24th time since March 2022.28 This time, however, it was not restored. With one
brief exception for a few hours on 8 July 2023,29 no gas at all has flowed to
Nagorno-Karabakh ever since. Azerbaijan has repeatedly denied responsibility by
blaming “cold weather”.30 Cold weather, however, cannot explain why the gas has
now been shut off for more than half a year, including during the warmest summer
months.
14. Azerbaijan has also targeted the flow of electricity to Nagorno-
Karabakh. In particular, on 9 January 2023, the Shinuhayr-Stepanakert power line
running from Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh through territory controlled by
28 Letter from Artsakhgaz Closed Joint Stock Company to Minister of State of Nagorno-Karabakh
(10 May 2023) (certified translation from Armenian), p. 2 (Annex 15).
29 See “Gas Supply To Artsakh Briefly Unblocked By Azerbaijan Then Halted Again”, Asbarez (10
July 2023), available at https://asbarez.com/gas-supply-to-artsakh-briefly-unblocked-byazerbaijan-
then-halted-again/ (Annex 19).
30 Letter from Mr Elnur Mammadov, Agent of the Republic of Azerbaijan before the International
Court of Justice, to Philippe Gautier, Registrar of the International Court of Justice (1 February
2023), p. 1 (“Azerbaijan has not disrupted, and has no intention of disrupting, the supply of gas or
other utilities to Garabagh. ... Interruptions or reductions in the flow of gas supply are not uncommon
in cold weather regions and are not specific to Garabagh”); ibid., p. 2 (“[C]old weather can cause
interruptions in gas supply”); ibid. (“It is no coincidence that the times Armenia have accused
Azerbaijan of gas interference were characterized by severely cold weather”); Letter from Mr Elnur
Mammadov, Agent of the Republic of Azerbaijan before the International Court of Justice, to
Philippe Gautier, Registrar of the International Court of Justice (27 January 2023), p. 2 (“Azerbaijan
has made clear that gas disruptions were not caused by any action of Azerbaijan, but were caused
by ‘technical problems ... due to unprecedented severe weather in the region’”); Letter from Mr
Elnur Mammadov, Agent of the Republic of Azerbaijan before the International Court of Justice, to
Philippe Gautier, Registrar of the International Court of Justice (16 December 2022), p. 2 (“[I]t bears
repeating that the gas supply infrastructure throughout the region, particularly in high-altitude areas,
is vulnerable to recurring interruptions as a result of cold weather”); Letter from Azerbaijan’s Agent
to the Registrar (30 March 2022), p. 2 (“[T]he supply interruptions were the result of technical
problems with the pipeline due to unprecedented severe weather in the region”); Application of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v.
Azerbaijan), CR 2023/2 (30 January 2023), p. 21, para. 27 (Mammadov) (“[I]nterruptions of gas
supply are not uncommon in winter months”).
13
Azerbaijan was damaged.31 The local power company requested that Azerbaijan
give its technicians access to the area to inspect and repair the power line32 but
Azerbaijan did not respond. 33 As a result, the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-
Karabakh were forced to rely entirely on domestic electricity production.34 That in
turn placed a huge strain on the Sarsang Reservoir,35 which was used by the local
Armenian authorities to generate power. The local domestic production was
31 See “Key utilities in Artsakh disrupted amid ongoing blockade by Azerbaijan”, The Armenian
Weekly (18 January 2023), available at https://armenianweekly.com/2023/01/18/key-utilities-inartsakh-
disrupted-amid-ongoing-blockade-by-azerbaijan/, PDF p. 2 (Annex 4).
32 See “Artsakh Says Azerbaijan Hampering Repairs on Electricity Grid”, Asbarez (11 January
2023), available at https://asbarez.com/artsakh-says-azerbaijan-hampering-repairs-on-electricitygrid/
(Annex 3); “Karabakh energy company director: Azerbaijan does not allow repairing power
line for a month now”, News.am (1 February 2023), available at
https://news.am/eng/news/742387.html (Annex 7).
33 See Letters relating to the supply of utilities to Nagorno-Karabakh, p. 1 (Armenia’s Request for
Provisional Measures, Observations (24 January 2023), Annex 74); “Artsakh Says Azerbaijan
Hampering Repairs on Electricity Grid”, Asbarez (11 January 2023), available at
https://asbarez.com/artsakh-says-azerbaijan-hampering-repairs-on-electricity-grid/ (Annex 3);
“Karabakh energy company director: Azerbaijan does not allow repairing power line for a month
now”, News.am (1 February 2023), available at https://news.am/eng/news/742387.html (Annex 7);
Artsakh Info Centre, Artsakh Government Update | Day 135 Under Blockade (21-25 April 2023),
available at https://mailchi.mp/3761ba4db4e3/day135en?e=8a22815c40 (“On January 9th,
Azerbaijan damaged a high-voltage power transmission line that runs from Armenia to Artsakh, in
the Agavno-Berdzor section that is currently under Azerbaijani control. Engineers from Artsakh
Energo have been prevented from accessing the area to repair the damage”) (Annex 12).
34 See Letter from Minister of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure of Nagorno-Karabakh to
Minister of State of the Republic of Artsakh (11 May 2023) (certified translation from Armenian),
p. 1 (Annex 16).
35 See Letter from Minister of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure of Nagorno-Karabakh to
Minister of State of Nagorno-Karabakh (11 May 2023) (certified translation from Armenian), pp. 1-
2 (Annex 16).
14
sufficient to meet only 30 percent of the population’s needs,36 and, as a result, local
authorities were compelled to institute lengthy, rolling blackouts.37
15. In the months preceding Azerbaijan’s 19 September attack, Azerbaijan
also escalated its attacks on ethnic Armenian civilians working in the agricultural
sector. On dozens of occasions, many of which are corroborated by the Russian
peacekeepers, Azerbaijani forces opened fire on farmers and agricultural equipment
in the fields.38 Having deprived the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh of any
outside aid, Azerbaijan’s attacks sought to deter even the harvesting of local crops
that would allow ethnic Armenians to sustain themselves.
16. At the time Azerbaijan launched it 19 September attack, the situation in
Nagorno-Karabakh was thus already desperate: civilians had begun to starve to
death,39 much of the remaining food was strictly rationed,40 medication and other
36 See Letter from Minister of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure of Nagorno-Karabakh to
Minister of State of Nagorno-Karabakh (11 May 2023) (certified translation from Armenian), p.1
(Annex 16).
37 See, e.g., G. Ghazaryan, “Education Under Blockade”, EVN Report (20 January 2023), available
at https://evnreport.com/spotlight-karabakh/education-under-blockade/, PDF p. 3 (“On January 9,
the supply of electricity from Armenia was cut due to damage on the Goris-Stepanakert power line,
which passes through the territory currently occupied by Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani side prevents
any emergency and restoration work. Artsakh authorities have since resorted to rolling power
blackouts and urged people to reduce energy consumption”) (Annex 5). See also “Azerbaijan:
Blockade of Lachin corridor putting thousands of lives in peril must be immediately lifted”, Amnesty
International (9 February 2023), available at
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/02/azerbaijan-blockade-of-lachin-corridor-puttingthousands-
of-lives-in-peril-must-be-immediately-lifted/ (“The shortage of gas and petrol is further
exacerbated by frequent cuts to the supply of gas from Azerbaijan and electricity cuts that last an
average of six hours a day”), PDF p. 7 (Annex 9).
38 Illustrative List of Attacks by Azerbaijan on Farmers and Agricultural Equipment in Nagorno-
Karabakh (Annex 120).
39 “‘We are starving to death:’ Residents of Nagorno-Karabakh fear for future under blockade”, CNN
(7 September 2023), available at https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/06/europe/nagorno-karabakhblockade-
azerbaijan-armenia-intl-cmd/index.html (Annex 49).
40 “Nagorno-Karabakh: ‘People are fainting queuing up for bread’”, BBC (30 August 2023),
available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66646677 (Annex 45).
15
basic necessities were in extremely short supply when they were available at all,41
and schools and businesses had been forced to close.42 As the former Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court, the Former Special Advisor to the Secretary-
General on the Prevention of Genocide, and other credible international observers
explained, the risk of genocide and ethnic cleansing was already imminent.43
B. Azerbaijan’s 19 September Attack
17. On 19 September 2023, after weeks of troop build-up along the border
with Armenia and the line of contact with Nagorno-Karabakh, 44 Azerbaijan
launched a large-scale assault on Nagorno-Karabakh, using artillery, unmanned
aerial vehicles, missiles, rockets, and aircraft.45 Under the pretext of conducting an
41 “Nagorno-Karabakh: ‘People are fainting queuing up for bread’”, BBC (30 August 2023),
available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66646677 (Annex 45).
42 See, e.g., “Karabakh blockade deprives 20,000 children of right to education”, CivilNet (3
February 2023), available at https://www.civilnet.am/en/news/690908/karabakh-blockadedeprives-
20000-children-of-right-to-education/ (Annex 8); “Nagorno-Karabakh shuts schools amid
Azerbaijan blockade”, The New Arab (20 January 2023), available at
https://www.newarab.com/news/nagorno-karabakh-shuts-schools-amid-azerbaijan-blockade
(Annex 6).
43 Luis Moreno Ocampo, Genocide against Armenians in 2023 (7 August 2023), available at
https://luismorenoocampo.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Armenia-Report-Expert-Opinion.pdf
(Annex 34); Juan Ernesto Mendez, PRELIMINARY OPINION on the situation in Nagorno-
Karabakh and on the need for the international community to adopt measures to prevent atrocity
crimes (23 August 2023), available at
https://un.mfa.am/file_manager/un_mission/Preliminary%20Opinion%20-%2023.08.2023.pdf
(Annex 41).
44 See, e.g., “Chaos and Crisis as Azerbaijan Attacks Nagorno-Karabakh”, Bellingcat (21 September
2023), available at https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2023/09/21/chaos-and-crisis-as-azerbaijanattacks-
nagorno-karabakh/ (Annex 83); “Azerbaijani forces using Russian-style symbols are
massing on the border of Armenia”, The Telegraph (15 September 2023), available at
https://telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/09/15/azerbaijani-troops-russian-style-symbols-armeniaborder/
(Annex 54).
45 See Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Information bulletin of the Ministry of Defense
of the Russian Federation on the activities of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict zone (as of September 19, 2023) (19 September 2023) (certified translation from
Russian) (Annex 55); “Azerbaijani forces strike Armenian-controlled Karabakh, raising risk of new
Caucasus war”, Reuters (19 September 2023), available at
16
“anti-terrorist” operation, 46 Azerbaijan directly attacked civilian settlements,
including the capital Stepanakert.47
https://www.reuters.com/article/armenia-azerbaijan-idCAKBN30P0L9 (Annex 56);
“Azerbaijan launches attack in Nagorno-Karabakh, announces ‘evacuation’ of Armenian
population”, Politico (19 September 2023), available at https://www.politico.eu/article/azerbaijanlaunch-
anti-terror-operation-nagorno-karabakh-armenia/ (Annex 58).
46 Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Military attachés were informed about local
anti-terrorist activities conducted in the Karabakh region (19 September 2023), available at
https://mod.gov.az/en/news/military-attaches-were-informed-about-local-anti-terrorist-activitiesconducted-
in-the-karabakh-region-49392.html (Annex 59).
47 “Chaos and Crisis as Azerbaijan Attacks Nagorno-Karabakh”, Bellingcat (21 September 2023),
available at https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2023/09/21/chaos-and-crisis-as-azerbaijan-attacksnagorno-
karabakh/, PDF p. 1 (Annex 83); “Azerbaijan and Armenian forces reach cease-fire deal
for breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh”, France 24 (20 September 2023), available at
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230920-%F0%9F%94%B4-karabakh-armenians-agreeto-
lay-down-arms-on-second-day-of-azerbaijan-offensive, PDF p. 4 (“Even though Aliyev insisted
the Azerbaijani army struck only military facilities during the fighting, separatist officials in
Nagorno-Karabakh said Stepanakert and other areas came under ‘intense shelling.’
Before the cease-fire, explosions reverberated around Stepanakert every few minutes on Wednesday
— some in the distance and others closer to the city. Even after the truce was announced and the
shelling could no longer be heard in Stepanakert, many residents decided to stay in shelters for the
rest of the day.
Significant damage was visible in the city, with shop windows blown out and vehicles punctured,
apparently by shrapnel”) (Annex 77). See also Compendium of Illustrative Images Showing the
Civilian Suffering and Forced Displacement Resulting from Azerbaijan’s Military Assault on
Nagorno-Karabakh and its Targeting of Civilians and Civilian Structures (Confidential) (Annex
122).
17
18. International organizations and third States swiftly condemned
Azerbaijan’s renewed use of force. The European Union,48 France,49 the United
48 European Parliament Delegations, Joint statement on Azerbaijan’s attack on Nagorno-Karabakh
(19 September 2023), available at
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/dsca/documents/communiques, PDF p. 2 (“The
clearly pre-planned attack, reported along the entire line of contact, coming just hours after the blasts
and following weeks of observed Azerbaijani military build-up and aggressive rhetoric, is totally
unacceptable. We call for the immediate halt of all military actions … We are seriously concerned
about the consequences of Azerbaijan’s actions on the civilian population and urge Azerbaijan to
refrain from using military escalation as a pretext to force the exodus of the local population”)
(Annex 60); Peter Stano @ExtSpoxEU, “Azerbaijan: [EU] condemns the military escalation along
Line of Contact & elsewhere in Karabakh. We call for immediate cessation of hostilities & for
[Emoji of flag of Azerbaijan] to stop the current military activities. This shouldn’t be pretext to force
exodus of the local population http://europa.eu/!XctvBb”, X (19 September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/ExtSpoxEU/status/1704116258961084630 (Annex 61).
49 See, e.g., Le ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères de la France, Opération militaire
azerbaïdjanaise au Haut-Karabagh (19 September 2023), available at
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/armenie/evenements/article/operation-militaireazerbaidjanaise-
au-haut-karabagh-19-09-23 (« La France condamne avec la plus grande fermeté le
lancement par l’Azerbaïdjan d’une opération militaire au Haut-Karabakh, avec l’utilisation
d’armements lourds, y compris contre des zones habitées. Aucun prétexte ne peut justifier une telle
action unilatérale, qui menace des milliers de civils déjà affectés par des mois de blocus illégal et va
à l’encontre des efforts déployés par la communauté internationale pour parvenir à un règlement
négocié. La France appelle l’Azerbaïdjan à cesser immédiatement son offensive et à revenir au
respect du droit international. Elle tiendra l’Azerbaïdjan pour seul responsable du sort des
populations civiles du Haut-Karabakh.») (Annex 62).
18
Kingdom,50 Germany,51 the United States of America,52 Japan,53 numerous other
States,54 and the United Nations Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the
50 Statement by Lord Ahmad of Wimbeldon, Minister of State for the Middle East, North Africa,
South Asia and United Nations at the United Nations Security Council, “UK urges all parties to
respect ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh: UN Security Council statement”, Gov.UK (21 September
2023), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-urges-all-parties-to-respectthe-
ceasefire-in-nagorno-karabakh-uk-at-the-security-council (“This opportunity for progress,
however, was sadly cut short by Azerbaijan’s announcement of the start of a military operation.
Together with many of our partners, the United Kingdom has urged Azerbaijan to end its use of
force, refrain from further escalatory action, and importantly return to dialogue … The United
Kingdom on our part welcomes yesterday’s announcement of a ceasefire. We therefore strongly urge
all parties to respect that ceasefire, to end the violence, and to engage in urgent, open dialogue on a
safe and secure future for the people of the region”) (Annex 86).
51 German Federal Foreign Office, Speech by Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock at the United
Nations Security Council on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, Federal Foreign Office (21
September 2023), available at https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-
/2618034#:~:text=Far%20too%20many%20people%20have,completely%20cease%20its%20milit
ary%20actions (“We firmly condemn Baku’s military assault and call on it to permanently and
completely cease its military actions. We have taken note of reports of a ceasefire. But what we need
is a complete cessation of violence. Azerbaijan carries the responsibility to reliably and fully protect
the civilian population, especially children living in Nagorno-Karabakh”) (Annex 87).
52 US Department of State Press Releases, Call for End of Hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh (19
September 2023), available at https://www.state.gov/call-for-end-of-hostilities-in-nagornokarabakh/#:~:
text=The%20United%20States%20is%20deeply,and%20undermine%20prospects%2
0for%20peace. (“The United States is deeply concerned by Azerbaijan’s military actions in
Nagorno-Karabakh and calls on Azerbaijan to cease these actions immediately. These actions are
worsening an already dire humanitarian situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and undermine prospects
for peace. As we have previously made clear to Azerbaijan, the use of force to resolve disputes is
unacceptable and runs counter to efforts to create conditions for a just and dignified peace in the
region. We call for an immediate end to hostilities and for respectful dialogue between Baku and
representatives of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh”) (Annex 74); Unites Stations Mission to
the United Nations, Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council
Briefing on Armenia and Azerbaijan (21 September 2023), available at
https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-by-ambassador-linda-thomas-greenfield-at-a-un-securitycouncil-
briefing-on-armenia-and-azerbaijan-2/ (“Let me be clear: Azerbaijan has a responsibility to
ensure its forces rigorously comply with international law – including international humanitarian
law rules governing the conduct of hostilities, the protection of civilians, and the humane treatment
of combatants. Azerbaijan also has international obligations and commitments to respect the human
rights and fundamental freedoms of all individuals in its territory”) (Annex 85).
53 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Worsening of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh
(Statement by Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko) (20 September 2023), available at
https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_003300.html (“Japan expresses serious concern over
the recent worsening of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and strongly calls for the immediate
cessation of hostilities and for Azerbaijan to stop current military activities”) (Annex 75).
19
54 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation of the Kingdom of Spain, Official
Statement on the Situation in South Caucasus (19 September 2023), available at
https://www.exteriores.gob.es/en/Comunicacion/Comunicados/Paginas/2023_COMUNICADOS/2
0230919_COMUNICADO035.aspx (“The Government of Spain strongly condemns the use of
armed force against the Karabakh region and regrets the loss of human lives. Spain supports the
mediation of the European Union and calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to cease military activity
immediately and to resume dialogue in order to reach a peaceful resolution in accordance with the
United Nations Charter and international law”) (Annex 67); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Kingdom of Norway @NorwayMFA, “1/2 There are reports of civilian victims from artillery
shelling of Nagorno-Karabakh. Continued use of Azerbaijani military power may force the
Armenian population to flee the region and create a humanitarian catastrophy. Such a tragedy must
be avoided at all cost - @AHuitfeldt”, X (19 September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/NorwayMFA/status/1704177588829032928 (Annex 68); Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Cyprus @CyprusMFA, “#Cyprus categorically condemns the ongoing large-scale military
aggression by #Azerbaijan against the #Armenian-populated #NagornoKarabakh We deplore the
loss of lives caused by this utterly unjustified escalation. Azerbaijan must de-escalate now. A
ceasefire is critical”, X (19 September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/CyprusMFA/status/1704187155956871315 (Annex 69); Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Kingdom of Belgium, Hadja Lahbib @hadjalahbib, “Belgium condemns Azerbaijan’s
military operation against the Armenian population of #NagornoKarabakh and expresses deep regret
over the numerous victims. We urge the respect of the security and rights of Armenians in Karabakh,
as well as the ceasefire”, X (21 September 2023),
available at https://twitter.com/hadjalahbib/status/1704922816905204103 (Annex 89); Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Hanke Bruins Slot @HankeBruinsSlot, “Met
with Foreign Minister @AraratMirzoyan in New York. I echoed the EU’s clear position on the
situation in #NagornoKarabakh: we condemn Azerbaijan’s military operation and the harm caused
among civilians. Humanitarian actors should be granted access to the region right away 1/2”, X (23
September 2023), available at https://twitter.com/hankebruinsslot/status/1705642674907193509
(Annex 102); UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, Security Council, Latest Clash between
Armenia, Azerbaijan Undermines Prospects of Peace, Speakers Warn Security Council, Calling for
Genuine Dialogue to Settle Outstanding Issues (21 September 2023), available at
https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15418.doc.htm (Representatives of Switzerland and Ecuador)
(Annex 88); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, Announcement by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs regarding the developments in Nagorno Karabakh (Athens, 20.09.2023) (20
September 2023), available at https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/statementsspeeches/
announcement-by-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-regarding-the-developments-innagorno-
karabakh-athens-20092023.html (“Greece strongly condemns the military actions
undertaken by Azerbaijan in Nagorno Karabakh which resulted in the loss of life of many people.
Greece calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities … The safety of the population in Nagorno
Karabakh is an absolute priority. We call on Baku to respect the human rights and guarantee the
safety and dignity of the civilian population of Nagorno Karabakh. Their humanitarian needs must
also be urgently met”) (Annex 79); Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis
@GLandsbergis, X (19 September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/GLandsbergis/status/1704124775365562504 (“Military operation launched by
AZ after months of blockade imposed on Karabakh Armenians undermines efforts by intl
community to bring lasting peace. We urge immediate ceasefire&launching of dialogue between
Baku & Karabakh Armenians as the only way towards peaceful coexistence”) (Annex 72). See also
UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, Security Council, Latest Clash between Armenia,
20
Prevention of Genocide55 all called on Azerbaijan to halt its attack, expressing
concern over its impact on the civilian population.
19. Azerbaijan nonetheless insisted that it would continue “until the end”.56
After having blockaded the Lachin Corridor for more than nine months, it now
announced that it had opened “corridors … on the Lachin road and in other
directions to ensure the evacuation of the population from the danger zone”.57 That
did not stop it from firing at vehicles of the Russian Federation peacekeepers
attempting to discharge their duties, causing casualties among them.58 As a result
Azerbaijan Undermines Prospects of Peace, Speakers Warn Security Council, Calling for Genuine
Dialogue to Settle Outstanding Issues (21 September 2023), available at
https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15418.doc.htm (Statement of Sérgio França Danese, Representative
of Brazil) (“condemned resorting to unilateral actions, stressing that the attacks on populated areas
risk the fragile stability achieved after the 2020 ceasefire”) (Annex 88).
55 UN Press Release, Statement by Ms. Alice Wairimu Nderitu, UN Special Adviser on the Prevention
of Genocide, on the situation in Armenia and Azerbaijan (22 September 2023), available at
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/USG_Nderitu_Statement_Armenia_Azerba
ijan_22092023.pdf (Annex 95).
56 “Statement by the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan VIDEO”, Azertac
(19 September 2023), available at
https://azertag.az/en/xeber/statement_by_the_presidential_administration_of_the_republic_of_azer
baijan-2754034 (Annex 63).
57 Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Statement by Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense
(19 September 2023, 14:25), available at https://mod.gov.az/en/news/statement-by-azerbaijan-sministry-
of-defense-49363.html (emphasis added) (Annex 64). See also G. Gavin, “Azerbaijan
launches attack in Nagorno-Karabakh, announces ‘evacuation’ of Armenian population”, Politico
(19 September 2023), available at https://www.politico.eu/article/azerbaijan-launch-anti-terroroperation-
nagorno-karabakh-armenia/ (emphasis added) (Annex 58).
58 “Telephone conversation with President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev”, Kremlin (21 September
2023), available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/72312 (“Ilham Aliyev offered his
apology and deepest condolences following the tragic death of members of the Russian
Peacekeeping Corps (RPC) on September 20 in Karabakh”) (Annex 90); “Azerbaijan’s Aliyev
Apologizes for Russian Peacekeeper Deaths in Karabakh”, The Moscow Times (21 September 2023),
available at https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/09/21/azerbaijans-aliyev-apologizes-forrussian-
peacekeeper-deaths-in-karabakh-a82533 (“Russia’s Defense Ministry said one of its
vehicles came under small-arms fire while returning from an observation post on Wednesday, near
a Karabakh village that bears the Azeri name of Janyatag and the Armenian name of Chankatagh.
‘As a result of the shelling, the Russian servicemen in the vehicle were killed,’ the ministry said
without specifying the number of peacekeepers who perished”) (Annex 92).
21
of such attacks, and of Azerbaijan’s arrests of multiple ethnic Armenians seeking
to pass through the checkpoint even prior to Azerbaijan’s 19 September
aggression,59 many ethnic Armenians are as afraid of leaving their homeland as
they are of staying.
20. Azerbaijan’s attack largely ended on 20 September 2023, after it
imposed a ceasefire agreement on the local authorities.60 As of the filing of this
Request, Azerbaijan is known to have killed hundreds of ethnic Armenians,
including children. It has also caused widespread damage to civilian infrastructure,
including apartment buildings and other homes.61 Many ethnic Armenians who
were forced to leave their homes were separated from their families and have not
59 Letter from Yeghishe Kirakosyan, Agent of the Republic of Armenia before the International Court
of Justice, to Philippe Gautier, Registrar of the International Court of Justice (31 July 2023)
(enclosing Letter from Yeghishe Kirakosyan, Agent of the Republic of Armenia before the
International Court of Justice, to Mr Elnur Mammadov, Agent of the Republic of Azerbaijan before
the International Court of Justice (31 July 2023)). See also “Three more Armenians detained at
Azerbaijan’s Lachin checkpoint”, Eurasianet (29 August 2023), available at
https://eurasianet.org/three-more-armenians-detained-at-azerbaijans-lachin-checkpoint (Annex 43).
60 “Stepanakert and Baku reach 6 agreements”, News.am (23 September 2023), available at
https://news.am/eng/news/782870.html (Annex 99).
61 “Azerbaijan launches massive offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh”, Eurasianet (19 September 2023),
available at https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-launches-massive-offensive-in-nagorno-karabakh
(Annex 65); Nagorno-Karabakh Human Rights Ombudsman @ArtsakhOmbuds, “The Office of the
Human Rights Defender continues to collect the evidences of the civilian structure. These residential
houses in Berqadzor of the Askeran region were targeted and destroyed by the Azerbaijani military
forces during the attack on September 19, 2023”, X (24 September 2023), available at
https://x.com/ArtsakhOmbuds/status/1705978687504384133 (Annex 108). See also Compendium
of Illustrative Images Showing the Civilian Suffering and Forced Displacement Resulting from
Azerbaijan’s Military Assault on Nagorno-Karabakh and its Targeting of Civilians and Civilian
Structures (Confidential) (Annex 122).
22
been reunited.62 Many are missing, and with each day passing the hope that they
are still alive diminishes.63
21. Tens of thousands of ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh are
known to have been almost immediately forcibly displaced within Nagorno-
Karabakh in the wake of Azerbaijan’s attack.64 Thousands were forced to sleep on
the streets65 or in cold basements or other make-shift shelters, often on thin blankets
on the floor.66
22. Others sought shelter at the Russian Federation peacekeepers’ base at
the airport in Stepanakert,67 but the peacekeepers made clear that they cannot keep
62 Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia, The results of the monitoring and analyzes
conducted by the Office of the Human Rights Defender of the RA prove that the humanitarian
disaster in Nagorno-Karabakh is deepening hour by hour (21 September 2023) (Annex 84).
63 Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia, Statement of the Human Rights Defender of
Armenia on hatred towards Armenians by Azerbaijan (24 September 2023) (Annex 110).
64 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, Statement of Foreign Minister of Armenia
Ararat Mirzoyan at the 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly (23 September 2023),
available at https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2023/09/23/fm_unga/12236, PDF p. 2 (Annex 97).
65 O. Ivshina & R. Plummer, “Karabakh humanitarian fears grow with thousands sleeping on
Stepanakert streets”, BBC News (24 September 2023), available at https://www-bbccom.
cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66901759.amp (Annex 107);
Laurence Broers @LaurenceBroers, “Some #Karabakh updates: Humanitarian situation critical in
Stepanakert/Khankendi; seems gas and electricity not restored to town; people are in sleeping in
public buildings and in some cases the streets. Sanitary situation very precarious”, X (23 September
2023), available at https://twitter.com/laurencebroers/status/1705632539979788786 (Annex 101).
66 Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia, The results of the monitoring and analyzes
conducted by the Office of the Human Rights Defender of the RA prove that the humanitarian
disaster in Nagorno-Karabakh is deepening hour by hour (21 September 2023) (Annex 84). See
also “The children of Artsakh (photos)”, News.am (22 September 2023), available at
https://news.am/eng/news/782680.html (Annex 96). See also Compendium of Illustrative Images
Showing the Civilian Suffering and Forced Displacement Resulting from Azerbaijan’s Military
Assault on Nagorno-Karabakh and its Targeting of Civilians and Civilian Structures (Confidential)
(Annex 122).
67 “Chaos and Crisis as Azerbaijan Attacks Nagorno-Karabakh”, Bellingcat (21 September 2023),
available at https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2023/09/21/chaos-and-crisis-as-azerbaijan-attacksnagorno-
karabakh (Annex 83); F. Light, “Fleeing bombs and death, Armenians recount fear and
hunger”, Reuters (24 September 2023), available at https://www.reuters.com/world/fleeing-bombs23
Armenians safe. They were deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh to “prevent the mass
death of the civilian population”68 but, in the wake of Azerbaijan’s attack, the
Russian Federation announced that its peacekeepers “have no rights to use
weapons” as long as “the peacekeepers themselves are not threatened”.69
23. The ethnic Armenians therefore have been left to fend for themselves.
They live in a constant state of fear, well aware of the atrocities Azerbaijan’s armed
forces and agents have historically committed against ethnic Armenian civilians.70
While information is limited, credible reports of further atrocities are widespread.71
In the meantime, hate speech calling on Azerbaijani soldiers to perpetrate violence
death-karabakh-armenians-recount-visceral-fear-hunger-2023-09-24/ (“Thousands [at the airport]
slept on the ground without food and little water”) (Annex 109).
68 The Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, On the use of a
military unit of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Nagorno-Karabakh (18 November
2020), available at http://council.gov.ru/activity/documents/121580/ (RAPM2, Annex 23)
(certified translation from Russian).
69 “Peacekeepers in Karabakh cannot use weapons if not under threat — senior legislator”, TASS
Russian News Agency (19 September 2023), available at https://tass.com/politics/1677179 (Annex
70).
70 Memorial of the Republic of Armenia, Vol. I Part II, Chapter 2, Section I & II.A; Part III, Chapter
1, Sections II, III, VI; Part III, Chapter 2, Section II; Part III, Chapter 3, Section I.A; Part IV, Chapter
1; Part IV, Chapter 2, Section I.
71 Lemkin Institute for GenocidePrevention, @lemkininstitute, “There are stories coming out of
Artsakh of the beheading of children and the separation of older boys and men from women and
children. We hope these are not true, but we have every reason to believe that they are”, X (22
September 2023), available at https://twitter.com/lemkininstitute/status/1705395252385714513
(Annex 94); Nagorno Karabakh Observer @NKobserver, “Reports of war crimes by Azeri forces in
ethnic-Armenian Karabakhi villages. We’ve come across some reports, verified a few, working on
getting a detailed picture. This could partially explain why many in the regions further out remain
unaccounted for 3 days after the ceasefire”, X (23 September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/nkobserver/status/1705605392074445040 (Annex 98).
24
against Armenians is prolific,72 and footage depicts the Azerbaijan Armed Forces
shooting randomly at an Armenian home.73
24. The ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh do not just fear for their
physical safety; they also have other “dire humanitarian needs”.74 They are without
proper food, heat, reliable electricity, or hygiene essentials.75 The attack completely
paralyzed an already severely weakened healthcare system, depriving people of
72 See Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia, The results of the monitoring and
analyzes conducted by the Office of the Human Rights Defender of the RA prove that the
humanitarian disaster in Nagorno-Karabakh is deepening hour by hour (21 September 2023)
(Annex 84); Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia, Statement of the Human Rights
Defender of Armenia on hatred towards Armenians by Azerbaijan (24 September 2023) (Annex
110); “Monitoring Ethnic Cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh”, University Network for Human Rights,
available at https://www.humanrightsnetwork.org/nk-live-monitor, PDF p. 7 (“Azerbaijani
Telegram users reposted images of missing Armenians that had originally been published by their
relatives on social media, mainly images of children and young women, adding instructions to kill,
rape, dismember, mutilate and torture them if found”) (Annex 119). See also Demonstrative List of
Hate Speech and Racial Hatred by Azerbaijani State Officials, Public Figures and Other Individuals
and Groups against Armenians Following the 19 September Military Assault against Nagorno-
Karabakh (Annex 121).
73 See, e.g., Video showing an Azerbaijani Serviceman Opening Fire on a Civilian Home (Annex
14).
74 “Azerbaijan: Ensure Civilians’ Rights in Nagorno Karabakh”, Human Rights Watch (23
September 2023), available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/09/23/azerbaijan-ensure-civiliansrights-
nagorno-karabakh, PDF p. 1 (“Thousands of civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh have dire
humanitarian needs following Azerbaijan’s military operation to regain control over the region”)
(Annex 100).
75 Nagorno-Karabakh Human Rights Ombudsman @ArtsakhOmbuds “! More than 10,000 people
are currently evacuated from their native communities, forced to find a shelter in other settlements
of Artsakh, where relative safety can be provided. Among them are women, children and elderly,
many of whom have been displaced for several times in their life already due to the Azerbaijani
aggression. With no proper food, medication, hygiene essentials — this is a national catastrophe in
real time and a gross violation of all fundamental human rights”, X (20 September 2023), available
at https://twitter.com/artsakhombuds/status/1704534153411035457 (Annex 76); Human Rights
Defender of the Republic of Armenia, The results of the monitoring and analyzes conducted by the
Office of the Human Rights Defender of the RA prove that the humanitarian disaster in Nagorno-
Karabakh is deepening hour by hour (21 September 2023) (Annex 84). As of the date of filing,
Azerbaijan appears to have restored electricity to Stepanakert through its own electrical grid, but not
through the electrical line running through Armenia. It is therefore equipped to continue to
weaponize the provision of public utilities to the remaining ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh
at any time.
25
even basic first aid. 76 In conditions where many schools and other education
facilities had already been forced to close as a result of disruptions to the provision
of gas and electricity even before the attack, the education system has completely
collapsed.77 Azerbaijan’s attack has also destroyed ethnic Armenians’ homes and
created fears that others will inevitably be confiscated, and placed obstacles on
ethnic Armenians’ freedom of movement, even within Nagorno-Karabakh. 78
Moreover, additional Armenian cultural heritage sites and monuments have fallen
76 See Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia, The results of the monitoring and
analyzes conducted by the Office of the Human Rights Defender of the RA prove that the
humanitarian disaster in Nagorno-Karabakh is deepening hour by hour (21 September 2023)
(Annex 84); Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia, Statement of the Human Rights
Defender of Armenia on hatred towards Armenians by Azerbaijan (24 September 2023) (Annex
110).
77 S. Sargsyan, “Start of School in Jeopardy as Nagorny Karabakh Blockade Continues”, Institute
for War & Peace Reporting (29 August 2023), available at https://iwpr.net/global-voices/startschool-
jeopardy-nagorny-karabakh-blockade-continues (Annex 44).
78 See “Bodies of 100 victims are in settlements cut off from Stepanakert”, News.am (23 September
2023), available at https://news.am/eng/news/782883.html, (“There are cases when several peaceful
civilian victims from one family are killed, Arman Tatoyan, former Armenia Human Rights
Defender, said on Facebook. “People are not able to take the bodies of the victims to forensic
examinations so that they can bury them, since Azerbaijani armed servicemen keep communities
isolated from each other””) (Annex 104).
26
under Azerbaijan’s control 79 and at least one has been desecrated on film. 80
Furthermore, the former State Minister of the local Armenian civilian
administration has already been arrested,81 with numerous other arrests almost
certain to follow soon.82
25. In this context, Azerbaijan’s claims that it will henceforth afford ethnic
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh “all rights and freedoms in line with its
79 See “Hundreds of Armenian heritage sites at risk in Nagorno-Karabakh”, Cornell University (21
September 2023), available at https://as.cornell.edu/news/hundreds-armenian-heritage-sites-risknagorno-
karabakh (“As the Armenian population is removed from Nagorno-Karabakh, hundreds of
Armenian monasteries, churches, cemeteries and shrines will be at risk of erasure”; “Adam Smith:
‘If these organizations fail, another irreplaceable medieval and early modern Armenian cultural
landscape will vanish. And other national leaders, hostile to ethnic minorities in their midst, will see
inaction as a green light for their own purging of humanity’s past. The result will be an impoverished
archaeological record, a human past rebuilt around intolerant fictions of national homogeneity and
a future deprived of our tangible monuments to human creativity, tolerance and peace. UNESCO
and international organizations committed to preservation must not fail in protecting the cultural
heritage of the South Caucasus’”; “Lory Khatchadourian: ‘When that happens, Armenians will leave
behind a rich cultural and religious landscape with scores of heritage sites, from exquisite medieval
monasteries to modest village churches, to historic cemeteries with iconic engraved cross stones.
The risk of destruction and falsification of these cultural and religious sites is immense. If Azerbaijan
takes sovereign control over Nagorno-Karabakh, we estimate that an additional 200-300 Armenian
cultural heritage sites will be endangered’”) (Annex 91).
80 Caucasus Heritage Watch @CaucasusHW, “The video below shows two Azerbaijani soldiers
firing on the 13th century Charektar Monastery, one from an armored vehicle. Such attacks are in
direct violation of the ICJ’s provisional measure concerning Armenian cultural heritage and must be
investigated and prosecuted”, X (26 September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/CaucasusHW/status/1706826914009157724 (Annex 116) (including video
Annex 116V).
81 “Ruben Vardanyan arrested by Azerbaijani authorities, his wife confirms”, Public Radio of
Armenia (27 September 2023), available at https://en.armradio.am/2023/09/27/ruben-vadanyanarrested-
his-wife-confirms/ (Annex 118).
82 See, e.g., “Ilham Aliyev addressed the nation” President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham
Aliyev (20 September 2023), available at https://president.az/en/articles/view/61113 (“We accused
the elements and leaders of the criminal regime, and we will bring them to justice. Some have already
received their deserved punishment, and others will follow suit”) (Annex 82); “Azerbaijan’s intent
to prosecute NKR leadership outrages Yerevan”, JAM News (20 February 2022), available at
https://jam-news.net/azerbaijans-intent-to-prosecute-nkr-leadership-outrages-yerevan/ (Annex 2).
27
Constitution and relevant international human rights mechanisms”83 ring hollow.
Prior to its attack, Azerbaijan made clear that, notwithstanding Nagorno-
Karabakh’s unique historical status,84 “Armenians living in Karabakh will have no
status, no independence, and no special privilege”.85 Numerous international actors,
including at emergency sessions of the United Nations Security Council, have
expressed their concern over Azerbaijan’s intentions, underscoring its
responsibility for ensuring the rights and security of the ethnic Armenians of
Nagorno-Karabakh, including their right to live in their homes without intimidation
and discrimination. 86 For his part, the United Nations High Commissioner for
83 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, No:533/23, Statement by Jeyhun
Bayramov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, at the 9422nd Meeting of the
UN Security Council (19 September 2023), available at https://mfa.gov.az/en/news/no53323
(Annex 66).
84 Memorial of the Republic of Armenia, Vol. I, Part II, Chapter 2.
85 “Azerbaijan Television interviewed Ilham Aliyev in Basgal settlement of Ismayilli district”,
President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (12 August 2022), available at
https://president.az/en/articles/view/56906 (Annex 37).
86 See, e.g., UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, Security Council, Latest Clash between
Armenia, Azerbaijan Undermines Prospects of Peace, Speakers Warn Security Council, Calling for
Genuine Dialogue to Settle Outstanding Issues (21 September 2023), available at
https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15418.doc.htm (Annex 88); ibid. (Representative of Germany: “The
people of Nagorno-Karabakh deserve to live in security and to have their rights protected”); ibid.
(High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: “Baku should
engage in a comprehensive and transparent dialogue with the Karabakh Armenians to ensure their
rights and security, including their right to live in their homes in dignity, he said, taking note that a
meeting took place today”); ibid. (the Representative of the United States of America “voiced her
alarm at the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh resulting from Azerbaijan’s continued military action
and urged Baku to stop it. Yesterday’s announcement of a cessation of hostilities is a positive
development but the situation remains fluid. Azerbaijan should comply with international law,
including international humanitarian law, as well as its obligation to protect the human rights of
those people in its territory”.); ibid. (Representative of Ecuador: “The recently announced ceasefire
must be fully implemented on the ground and serve to de-escalate tensions to create the necessary
guarantees for the security and stability of the region’s inhabitants”); ibid. (Representative of Malta:
“‘Such acts constitute an obstacle to peace,’ he said, condemning any act that endangers civilian
lives and calling for the protection of women, children, the elderly, people with disability and other
vulnerable groups”). See also President of the European Council, Charles Michel @CharlesMichel,
“Called on @presidentaz Aliyev in a phone call this morning to ensure full ceasefire & safe,
dignified treatment by Azerbaijan of Karabakh Armenians. Their rights and security need to be
credibly guaranteed. Access needed for immediate humanitarian assistance”, X (20 September
28
Human Rights has emphasised that “[i]t is important that the rights of the ethnic
Armenian population on the ground are safeguarded and all actions rooted in
international law”.87
26. Moreover, while it is widely acknowledged that “[u]rgent humanitarian
access and monitoring are needed to ensure safety for Nagorno-Karabakh’s
2023), available at https://twitter.com/CharlesMichel/status/1704499593751277796 (Annex 78);
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE Chairman-in-Office Osmani calls for
de-escalation and return to dialogue after meeting Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and
Azerbaijan (20 September 2023), available at https://www.osce.org/chairpersonship/552871
(“Chairman Osmani raised his deep concerns over yesterday's military operations in the region and
the danger these pose to the affected civilian population. While calling for immediate de-escalation,
he again voiced his concerns over the severe consequences for the conflict-affected population,
especially on vulnerable groups. He emphasized that humanitarian considerations must prevail and
that humanitarian needs of the local people must be met”) (Annex 80); International Committee of
the Red Cross ICRC @ICRC, “1/ Azerbaijan/Armenia: following today’s escalation of hostilities,
we are extremely concerned about the humanitarian impact on civilians in the coming hours and
days”,, X (19 September 2023), available at https://x.com/ICRC/status/1704184288487293309 (“1/
Azerbaijan/Armenia: following today’s escalation of hostilities, we are extremely concerned about
the humanitarian impact on civilians in the coming hours and days”) (Annex 73); Azerbaijan: Ensure
Civilians’ Rights in Nagorno Karabakh”, Human Rights Watch (23 September 2023), available at
https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/09/23/azerbaijan-ensure-civilians-rights-nagorno-karabakh
(“‘Civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh are facing a dire humanitarian crisis and grave uncertainty about
their future,’ said Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch.
‘Azerbaijani authorities have said that everyone’s rights will be protected, but that is hard to take at
face value after the months of severe hardships and decades of conflict.’ … For civilians who choose
to evacuate, Azerbaijan is obligated to allow them to return to their homes under a fundamental
precept of international human rights law, Human Rights Watch said”) (Annex 100).
87 UNHR Statements and Speeches, Azerbaijan / Armenia - Comment by UN Human Rights Chief
Volker Türk (26 September 2023), available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-andspeeches/
2023/09/azerbaijan-armenia-comment-un-human-rights-chief-volker-turk (“I am
following with concern the evolving and fragile humanitarian situation. It is important that the rights
of the ethnic Armenian population on the ground are safeguarded and all actions rooted in
international law. Protection of all civilians must be an absolute priority. Those affected must have
access to humanitarian assistance … States have an obligation not to deny ethnic, religious or
linguistic minorities the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion,
or to use their own language. Each State should also protect the existence and the national or ethnic,
cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within its territory and encourage conditions
for promoting that identity”) (Annex 115).
29
civilians”,88 Azerbaijan resists any international presence or involvement.89 And it
does so in circumstances in which credible “international experts have repeatedly
warned of the risk of ethnic cleansing of Armenians in the enclave”;90 in which
88 “Azerbaijan: Ensure Civilians’ Rights in Nagorno Karabakh”, Human Rights Watch (23
September 2023), available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/09/23/azerbaijan-ensure-civiliansrights-
nagorno-karabakh (Annex 100). See also United States Agency for International
Development, Administrator Samantha Power At a Press Conference in Armenia (25 September
2023), available at https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/speeches/sep-25-2023-administratorsamantha-
power-press-conference-armenia (“First and foremost, we are calling on Azerbaijan to
maintain the ceasefire and take concrete steps to protect the rights of civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh.
President [Ilham] Aliyev has promised to guarantee the rights of ethnic Armenians. Azerbaijan must
live up to that promise, and more than that, and critically, the world must be able to verify that
Azerbaijan is living up to that promise”) (Annex 112); “Karabakh region: End the military escalation
and ensure the safety and human rights of civilians”, Council of Europe (20 September 2023),
available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/karabakh-region-end-the-militaryescalation-
and-ensure-the-safety-and-human-rights-of-civilians (“the local population has been
suffering the humanitarian and human rights consequences of armed hostilities in the region. Since
last December, in particular, they have been living in isolation, experiencing acute shortages of basic
supplies and services. I am deeply concerned to see that their safety is once again threatened and
their human rights violated, deepening their suffering … It is crucial that armed hostilities in the
region come to an end, to ensure the safety of the civilian population. Guaranteeing regular and
unimpeded access for those who provide humanitarian assistance and those who ensure human rights
protection to the affected local population is essential”) (Annex 81); “Scholz demands safety for
people in Nagorno-Karabakh”, Deutschland.de (23 September 2023), available at
https://www.deutschland.de/en/news/scholz-demands-safety-for-people-in-nagorno-karabakh (“the
Federal Chancellor stressed that the rights and safety of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh must
be protected if a long-term settlement to the conflict is to be found. The Federal Chancellor also said
that it was now up to Azerbaijan to provide humanitarian aid and guarantee the safety of people in
Nagorno-Karabakh in a transparent way”) (Annex 105).
89 See, e.g., “Elchin Amirbeyov: ‘Reintegration of Karabakh Armenians is an internal matter of
Azerbaijan’”, Report.az (21 September 2023), available at https://report.az/xarici-siyaset/elcinemirbeyov-
qarabag-ermenilerinin-reinteqrasiyasi-azerbaycanin-daxili-isidir (Ambassador Elchin
Amirbeyov, representative of the President of Azerbaijan on special tasks: “Dialogue between the
central government of Azerbaijan and the Armenian population of Karabakh, their reintegration into
our society is purely an internal matter of our country”) (certified translation from Azerbaijani)
(Annex 93); “Azerbaijan’s Pressure on Nagorno-Karabakh: What to Know”, Council on Foreign
Relations (14 September 2023), available at https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/azerbaijans-pressurenagorno-
karabakh-what-know (describing Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev as taking the position
that “demands for international protections were an infringement on Azerbaijan’s internal affairs,
and that ethnic Armenians were already covered by the Azerbaijani constitution’s protections for its
other ethnic minorities”) (Annex 53).
90 C. Edwards, “Azerbaijan has reclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh. What does that mean for the tens of
thousands living there?”, CNN (23 September 2023), available at
https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/23/asia/nagorno-karabakh-armenia-azerbaijan-reintegrate30
hatred of ethnic Armenians permeates the Azerbaijani education91 and judicial
systems,92 media,93 and statements by Azerbaijan’s highest public officials;94 and
in which countless past atrocities have been committed against ethnic Armenians95
with absolute impunity,96 if not outright glorification97 by the Azerbaijani State
itself.98
27. For decades, Azerbaijan has sought to suppress any expression of ethnic
Armenian identity in Azerbaijan. It has systematically worked to destroy all traces
of Armenian cultural heritage99 and to rewrite the history of the region to erase the
intl/index.html (Annex 103). See also, e.g., L. Moreno Ocampo, Genocide against Armenians in
2023 (7 August 2023), available at https://luismorenoocampo.com/wpcontent/
uploads/2023/08/Armenia-Report-Expert-Opinion.pdf (Annex 34); J. Ernesto Mendez,
PRELIMINARY OPINION on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and on the need for the
international community to adopt measures to prevent atrocity crimes (23 August 20230, available
at https://un.mfa.am/file_manager/un_mission/Preliminary%20Opinion%20-%2023.08.2023.pdf
(Annex 41).
91 Memorial of the Republic of Armenia, Vol. I, Part III, Chapter 1, Section I.C; Chapter 3, Section
II.D.
92 Memorial of the Republic of Armenia, Vol. I, Part III, Chapter 1, Section II; Part III, Chapter 2,
Section II; Part III Chapter 3, Section I.B; Part IV, Chapter 2, Section I.B; Part IV, Chapter 3.
93 Memorial of the Republic of Armenia, Vol. I, Part III, Chapter 1, Section I.B; Chapter 3, Section
II.D.
94 Memorial of the Republic of Armenia, Vol. I, Part III, Chapter 1, Section I.A & Chapter 3, Section
II.A.
95 Memorial of the Republic of Armenia, Vol. I, Part II, Chapter 2, Section I & II.A; Part III, Chapter
1, Sections II, III, VI; Part III, Chapter 2, Section II; Part III, Chapter 3, Section I.A; Part IV, Chapter
1; Part IV, Chapter 2, Section I.
96 Memorial of the Republic of Armenia, Vol. I, Part IV, Chapter 3.
97 Memorial of the Republic of Armenia, Vol. I, Part III, Chapter 1, Part III, Section III.
98 Memorial of the Republic of Armenia, Vol. I, Part III, Chapter 1, Section I.A; Part III, Chapter 3,
Section II.A.
99 Memorial of the Republic of Armenia, Vol. I, Part III, Chapter 1, Sections V.A, V.B; Part III,
Chapter 2, Section IV; Part III, Chapter 3, Sections III.A, III.D; Part IV, Chapter 2, Sections III.A,
III.C, and III.D.
31
presence of ethnic Armenians. 100 As a result of these and other forms of
persecution,101 even before Azerbaijan’s blockade and 19 September attack, the
few ethnic Armenians remaining in territory under Azerbaijan’s control felt
compelled to “behave as inconspicuously as possible or even hide their identity
because they fear[ed] possible negative consequences”.102 In President Aliyev’s
words, in a speech given in Shushi, the Armenian language is an “alien language”,
promising that “no songs will be sung [in Shushi] in an alien language”.103 Despite
statements and ostensible assurances for international consumption, Azerbaijan is
already effecting this reality on the ground.104
28. In this context, the fate of the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh
remains deeply uncertain. As of 27 September, Azerbaijan has already forcibly
displaced more than 50 thousand to Armenia.105 While Armenia will update the
Court with further information and evidence as it becomes available, it is already
clear that, absent the urgent intervention of the Court to protect their physical
security and political, civil, economic, social, cultural and other CERD rights, the
100 Memorial of the Republic of Armenia, Vol. I, Part III, Chapter 1, Section V.C; Part III, Chapter
3, Section III.B; Part IV, Chapter 2, Section III.B.
101 Memorial of the Republic of Armenia, Vol. I, Part VI, Chapter 2.
102 Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,
Fourth Opinion on Azerbaijan (8 November 2017), available at https://rm.coe.int/4th-acfc-opinionon-
azerbaijan-english-language-version/1680923201, para. 41, p. 17 (Annex 1).
103 “President, Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces Ilham Aliyev made a speech in front of
servicemen in Shusha”, The President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev (8 November
2021), available at https://en.president.az/articles/54047 (cited in Memorial of Armenia, Annex
292)
104 Ayshan Aslan-Mammadli @AyshanASLAN, X (24 September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/AyshanASLAN/status/1706000549122801959 (subsequently deleted tweet in
which a prominent Azerbaijani State-employed academic boasts about footage of removal of an
Armenian language road sign, stating: “No more Armenian words in #Karabakh”) (Annex 106).
105 “50,243 forcibly displaced persons enter Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh as of 15pm
Wednesday”, News.am (27 September 2023), available at https://news.am/eng/news/783649.html
(Annex 117).
32
forcibly displaced will never return and most if not all of the remaining ethnic
Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh will be killed, detained or displaced. The Court
must act to avert that human tragedy and radical change of the status quo in the
pending case.
III. PRIMA FACIE JURISDICTION
29. The Court “may indicate provisional measures only if the provisions
relied on by the Applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which its
jurisdiction could be founded, but need not satisfy itself in a definitive manner that
it has jurisdiction as regards the merits of the case”.106
30. In its Order of 7 December 2021 on Armenia’s first Request for
Provisional Measures, the Court “conclude[d] that, prima facie, it has jurisdiction
pursuant to Article 22 of CERD to entertain the case to the extent that the dispute
between the Parties relates to the ‘interpretation or application’ of the
Convention”.107 The Court saw no reason to revisit this conclusion in its Order of
22 February 2023 on Armenia’s second Request for Provisional Measures.108 There
is no reason to revisit this conclusion in the context of the present request either.
106 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, p. 361,
para. 15.
107 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, p. 361,
para. 43.
108 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 22 February 2023, para.
26.
33
IV. THE RIGHTS WHOSE PROTECTION IS SOUGHT AND THE LINK
BETWEEN SUCH RIGHTS AND THE MEASURES REQUESTED
31. The Court has “the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances
so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the
respective rights of either party”.109 The Court at this stage “is not called upon to
determine definitively whether the rights which Armenia wishes to see protected
exist”.110 Rather, it need only decide whether the rights claimed by Armenia on the
merits, and for which it is seeking protection, are “plausible” and linked to the
provisional measures requested.111
32. In its Order of 7 December 2021, the Court observed that Armenia in
the present proceedings “asserts rights under Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of CERD”,
and that at least some of the rights claimed by Armenia are plausible.112 In its Order
of 22 February 2023, the Court further observed that it “considers plausible at least
some of the rights that Armenia claims to have been violated in light of Articles 2
and 5 of CERD through the interruption of movement along the Lachin
Corridor”.113
109 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 41(1).
110 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, p. 361,
para. 45.
111 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, p. 361,
para. 45.
112 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, p. 361,
paras. 46, 59.
113 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 22 February 2023, para.
39.
34
33. By means of the present Request, Armenia seeks the preservation and
protection of these and other CERD rights, including:
1) the right to have Azerbaijan fulfil its obligation to pursue by all
appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial
discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among
all races under Article 2(1);
2) the right to be free from racial discrimination sponsored, defended,
or supported by Azerbaijan under Article 2(1)(b);
3) the right to be free from anything that strengthens racial division
under Article 2(1)(e);
4) the right to benefit from special and concrete measures to ensure the
adequate development and protection of ethnic Armenians for the
purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms under Article 2(2);
5) the right to be protected from ethnic cleansing under Article 3;
6) the right to have Azerbaijan fulfil its obligations to prohibit and to
eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the
right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national
or ethnic origin, to equality before the law in the enjoyment of:
i. the right to security of person and protection by the State
against violence or bodily harm under Article 5(b);
ii. the right to freedom of movement under Article 5(d)(i);
iii. the right to return to one’s country under Article 5(d)(ii);
35
iv. the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion
under Article 5(d)(vii);
v. the right to right to freedom of opinion and expression under
Article 5(d)(viii);
vi. the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association
under Article 5(d)(ix);
vii. the right to work and to just and favourable conditions of
work under Article 5(e)(i);
viii. the right to housing under Article 5(e)(iii);
ix. the right to public health, medical care, social security and
social services under Article 5(e)(iv);
x. the right to education under Article 5(e)(v);
xi. the right to participate in cultural activities under Article
5(e)(vi);
7) the rights to effective protection and remedies and to seek just and
adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a
result of racial discrimination under Article 6; and
8) the right to benefit from immediate and effective measures with a
view to combating prejudices which lead to racial discrimination
and to promoting understanding, tolerance and friendship among
nations and racial or ethnic groups under Article 7.
36
34. All of these rights are enshrined in the CERD, to which both Armenia
and Azerbaijan have acceded. Moreover, Azerbaijan’s actions prompting this
Request target ethnic Armenians alone, and clearly had the “purpose” and “effect”
of interfering with the equal enjoyment and exercise of their CERD rights:114
hundreds of ethnic Armenians have been killed; tens of thousands have been
forcibly displaced and continue to fear for their lives; homes and other civilian
infrastructure have been destroyed; cultural sites and monuments are under direct
threat of destruction or falsification; schools and businesses have been closed; and
there are dire shortages of food and other basic necessities, including medical care.
Even in periods of de facto peace, Azerbaijan has systematically incited hatred of
and otherwise discriminated against ethnic Armenians in areas under its control. To
expect that it will act any differently with the ethnic Armenian population in
Nagorno-Karabakh that is now at its complete mercy is a fallacy.
35. In such circumstances, the rights for which protection is sought are
plainly plausible. They are, moreover, linked to the provisional measures Armenia
requests because those measures, if indicated, would safeguard these very rights.
V. RISK OF IRREPARABLE PREJUDICE AND URGENCY
36. The Court has the power to indicate provisional measures “when
irreparable prejudice could be caused to rights which are the subject of judicial
proceedings or when the alleged disregard of such rights may entail irreparable
consequences”.115 This power will be exercised “only if there is urgency, in the
sense that there is a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice will be caused
114 See CERD, Art. 1(1).
115 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, p. 361,
para. 69.
37
to the rights claimed before the Court gives its final decision”.116 This “condition
of urgency is met when the acts susceptible of causing irreparable prejudice can
‘occur at any moment’ before the Court makes a final decision on the case”.117
37. The Court has found in past cases in which the CERD was at issue that
“the rights stipulated in Article 5 (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) are of such a nature that
prejudice to them is capable of causing irreparable harm”.118 The same is true of
the other rights for which Armenia seeks protection.
38. Indeed, Azerbaijan’s disregard for the rights in question has already
caused, and will continue to cause, irreparable prejudice to the rights of the ethnic
Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite the ceasefire that ended Azerbaijan’s
military assault, the rights of ethnic Armenians are in grave danger. As of the filing
of this Request, Azerbaijan’s armed forces—the same armed forces that have
repeatedly committed numerous atrocities against ethnic Armenians in the past—
remain deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh and in close proximity to the remaining
population. Thousands remain displaced from their homes and are living on the
streets or in shelters without access to food, medicine, gas or other basic necessities.
Many remain separated from their families. Moreover, the threat of further
atrocities remains high: the Russian Federation peacekeepers have made clear that
they have no authority to protect the ethnic Armenians who have laid down their
116 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, p. 361,
para. 70.
117 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, p. 361,
para. 70.
118 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, p. 361,
para. 81. See also Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 22 February 2023,
para. 53.
38
arms. In the meantime, prolific hate speech and credible evidence of atrocities
committed against ethnic Armenians make clear that they are at continued risk of
serious harm.
39. While Azerbaijan claims that it will provide ethnic Armenians “all rights
and freedoms in line with its Constitution and relevant international human rights
mechanisms”,119 such promises are meaningless without a credible mechanism to
ensure that they are kept. Azerbaijan’s past actions—including its systematic
persecution of ethnic Armenians living in areas under Azerbaijan’s control, as well
as its nine-month siege on the very ethnic Armenians it now cynically claims to be
willing to protect—make unequivocally clear that the ethnic Armenians of
Nagorno-Karabakh remain highly “vulnerable”, and that the situation is “unstable
and could rapidly change”.120 Indeed, if the Court does not act quickly, there is a
grave risk that the entire remaining ethnic Armenian population of Nagorno-
Karabakh will be killed, detained or displaced in violation of their most basic rights
under the CERD.
VI. PROVISIONAL MEASURES REQUESTED
40. Azerbaijan’s persistent aggravation of the dispute and non-compliance
with the previous Orders of the Court require the indication of specific, clear and
concrete provisional measures to avert imminent and grave prejudice to the
remaining ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. For the foregoing reasons,
119 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, No:533/23, Statement by Jeyhun
Bayramov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, at the 9422nd Meeting of the
UN Security Council (19 September 2023), available at https://mfa.gov.az/en/news/no53323, p. 6
(Annex 66).
120 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial
Discrimination, Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures (Georgia v. Russian
Federation), Provisional Order of 15 October 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 353, para. 143.
39
Armenia respectfully requests that the Court indicate the following provisional
measures:
1) “Azerbaijan shall refrain from taking any measures which might
entail breaches of its obligations under the CERD”;
2) “Azerbaijan shall refrain from taking any actions directly or
indirectly aimed at or having the effect of displacing the remaining
ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, or preventing the safe
and expeditious return to their homes of persons displaced in the
course of the recent military attack including those who have fled to
Armenia or third States, while permitting those who wish to leave
Nagorno-Karabakh to do so without any hindrance;
3) “Azerbaijan shall withdraw all military and law-enforcement
personnel from all civilian establishments in Nagorno-Karabakh
occupied as a result of its armed attack on 19 September 2023”;
4) “Azerbaijan shall facilitate, and refrain from placing any
impediment on, the access of the United Nations and its specialized
agencies to the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, and shall
not interfere with their activities in any way”;
5) “Azerbaijan shall facilitate, and refrain from placing any
impediment on, the ability of the International Committee of the Red
Cross to provide humanitarian aid to the ethnic Armenians of
Nagorno-Karabakh, and shall cooperate with the International
Committee of the Red Cross to address the other consequences of
the recent conflict”;
40
6) “Azerbaijan shall immediately facilitate the full restoration of
public utilities, including gas and electricity, to Nagorno-Karabakh,
and shall refrain from disrupting them in the future”;
7) “Azerbaijan shall refrain from taking punitive actions against the
current or former political representatives or military personnel of
Nagorno-Karabakh”;
8) “Azerbaijan shall not alter or destroy any monument
commemorating the 1915 Armenian genocide or any other
monument or Armenian cultural artefact or site present in Nagorno-
Karabakh”;
9) “Azerbaijan shall recognize and give effect to civil registers, identity
documents and property titles and registers established by the
authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh, and shall not destroy or confiscate
such registers and documents”;
10) “Azerbaijan shall submit a report to the Court on all measures taken
to give effect to this Order within one month, as from the date of this
Order, and thereafter every three months, until a final decision on
the case is rendered by the Court”.
41. Armenia further requests that the Court reaffirm Azerbaijan’s
obligations under the Court’s existing Orders, including its obligations to “[p]rotect
from violence and bodily harm all persons captured in relation to the 2020 Conflict
who remain in detention, and ensure their security and equality before the law”121;
121 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, p. 361,
para. 98(1)(a).
41
to “[t]ake all necessary measures to prevent and punish acts of vandalism and
desecration affecting Armenian cultural heritage, including but not limited to
churches and other places of worship, monuments, landmarks cemeteries and
artefacts”;122 to “take all measures at its disposal to ensure unimpeded movement
of persons, vehicles and cargo along the Lachin Corridor in both directions”;123 and
to “refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the
Court or make it more difficult to resolve”.124
42. In addition to the above, in view of the extreme urgency of the situation,
Armenia requests, pursuant to Article 74(4) of the Rules of Court, that the President,
pending the Court’s decision on Armenia’s request, call upon Azerbaijan to act in
such a way as will enable any order the Court may make on the request to have its
appropriate effects. In light of the rapid evolution of the situation on the ground and
the forcible displacement of the ethnic Armenian population that is already
underway, the intervention of the President has rarely been more needed.
43. Armenia reserves the right to revise, supplement, or amend the terms of
this Request, as well as the grounds invoked. Armenia furthermore certifies that all
translations of annexes submitted herewith are, to the best of its knowledge and
belief, a true and correct rendering of the text in the original language.
122 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, p. 361,
para. 98(1)(c).
123 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 22 February 2023, para.
67.
124 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan), Provisional Measures, Order of 7 December 2021, p. 361,
para. 98(2).
42
43
Respectfully submitted,
________________________
Dr. Yeghishe Kirakosyan
AGENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA
28 SEPTEMBER 2023
44
45
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the Annexes are true copies of the documents referred to and
that the translations provided are accurate.
________________________
Dr. Yeghishe Kirakosyan
AGENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA
28 SEPTEMBER 2023

LIST OF ANNEXES
Annex 1 Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities, Fourth Opinion on Azerbaijan (8 November
2017), available at https://rm.coe.int/4th-acfc-opinion-on-azerbaijanenglish-
language-version/1680923201
Annex 2 “Azerbaijan’s intent to prosecute NKR leadership outrages Yerevan”,
JAM News (20 February 2022), available at https://jamnews.
net/azerbaijans-intent-to-prosecute-nkr-leadership-outragesyerevan/
Annex 3 “Artsakh Says Azerbaijan Hampering Repairs on Electricity Grid”,
Asbarez (11 January 2023), available at https://asbarez.com/artsakhsays-
azerbaijan-hampering-repairs-on-electricity-grid/
Annex 4 “Key utilities in Artsakh disrupted amid ongoing blockade by
Azerbaijan”, The Armenian Weekly (18 January 2023), available at
https://armenianweekly.com/2023/01/18/key-utilities-in-artsakhdisrupted-
amid-ongoing-blockade-by-azerbaijan/
Annex 5 G. Ghazaryan, “Education Under Blockade”, EVN Report (20 January
2023), available at https://evnreport.com/spotlightkarabakh/
education-under-blockade/
Annex 6 “Nagorno-Karabakh shuts schools amid Azerbaijan blockade”, The
New Arab (20 January 2023), available at
https://www.newarab.com/news/nagorno-karabakh-shuts-schoolsamid-
azerbaijan-blockade
Annex 7 “Karabakh energy company director: Azerbaijan does not allow
repairing power line for a month now”, News.am (1 February 2023),
available at https://news.am/eng/news/742387.html
Annex 8 “Karabakh blockade deprives 20,000 children of right to education”,
CivilNet (3 February 2023), available at
https://www.civilnet.am/en/news/690908/karabakh-blockadedeprives-
20000-children-of-right-to-education/
Annex 9 “Azerbaijan: Blockade of Lachin corridor putting thousands of lives in
peril must be immediately lifted”, Amnesty International (9 February
2023), available at
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/02/azerbaijan-blockadeof-
lachin-corridor-putting-thousands-of-lives-in-peril-must-beimmediately-
lifted/
Annex 10 Letter from Jeyhun Bayramov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Azerbaijan, to Antonio Guterres Secretary-General of the
United Nations (27 February 2023)
Annex 11 Letter from Ararat Mirzoyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Armenia, to Antonio Guterres Secretary-General of the
United Nations (14 March 2023)
Annex 12 Artsakh Info Centre, Artsakh Government Update | Day 135 Under
Blockade (21-25 April 2023), available at
https://mailchi.mp/3761ba4db4e3/day135en?e=8a22815c40
Annex 13 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of the French Republic,
Azerbaijan – Lachin corridor (23 April 2023), available at
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/countryfiles/
azerbaijan/news/article/azerbaijan-lachin-corridor-23-april-2023
Annex 14 Video showing an Azerbaijani Serviceman Opening Fire on a Civilian
Home
Annex 15 Letter from Artsakhgaz Closed Joint Stock Company to Minister of
State of Nagorno-Karabakh (10 May 2023) (certified translation from
Armenian)
Annex 16 Letter from Minister of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure of
Nagorno-Karabakh to Minister of State of Nagorno-Karabakh (11 May
2023) (translation from Armenian)
Annex 17 Amnesty International, @amnesty, “The Azerbaijani authorities must
lift the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh and bring an end to the
unfolding humanitarian crisis”, X (28 June 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/amnesty/status/1674075392708079616
Annex 18 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, No:381/23,
Press Release on the decision of the International Court of Justice of
July 6, 2023, on unanimous rejection of Armenia’s request (7 July
2023), available at https://www.mfa.gov.az/en/news/no38123
Annex 19 “Gas Supply To Artsakh Briefly Unblocked By Azerbaijan Then Halted
Again”, Asbarez (10 July 2023), available at https://asbarez.com/gassupply-
to-artsakh-briefly-unblocked-by-azerbaijan-then-halted-again/
Annex 20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Statement of the
Russian Foreign Ministry in connection with the situation around
Nagorno-Karabakh (15 July 2023), available at
https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1897041 (certified translation
from Russian)
Annex 21 “Speech Address by the Foreign Minister of Armenia: UK Response,
July 2023”, Gov.UK (20 July 2023), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/address-by-the-foreignminister-
of-armenia-uk-response-july-2023
Annex 22 Freedom House @freedomhouse, “(1/) We urge Azerbaijan to allow
@ICRC to provide vital humanitarian assistance to Nagorno Karabakh
& immediately work to ensure freedom of movement by opening the
Lachin corridor, guaranteeing unrestricted movement of individuals,
vehicles & cargo”, X (25 July 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/freedomhouse/status/1683880665916354574
Annex 23 Human Rights Watch, Giorgi Gogia @Giorgi_Gogia, “Tens of
thousands of civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh are facing lack of lifesaving
medication & essential goods. @ICRC not allowed to bring
medical items & essential food for weeks. Alarming statement
https://icrc.org/en/document/azerbaijan-armenia-sides-must-reachhumanitarian-
consensus-to-ease-suffering Azerbaijan should
immediately ensure unimpeded access!”, X (25 July 2023), available
at https://twitter.com/Giorgi_Gogia/status/1683828382989942785
Annex 24 International Committee of the Red Cross, Azerbaijan/Armenia: Sides
must reach “humanitarian consensus” to ease suffering (25 July 2023),
available at https://www.icrc.org/en/document/azerbaijan-armeniasides-
must-reach-humanitarian-consensus-to-ease-suffering
Annex 25 High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, Azerbaijan: Statement by High Representative Josep
Borrell on the humanitarian situation on the ground (26 July 2023),
available at https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/azerbaijan-statementhigh-
representative-josep-borrell-humanitarian-situation-ground_en
Annex 26 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of the French Republic,
Arménie - Azerbaïdjan – Blocage du corridor de Latchine (27 juillet
2023) (27 July 2023), available at
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossierspays/
azerbaidjan/evenements/article/armenie-azerbaidjan-blocage-ducorridor-
de-latchine-27-07-23
Annex 27 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs @DutchMFA, “The Netherlands
follows the humanitarian situation affecting the population in the
former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast with serious concern,
and fully supports the statement of @JosepBorrellF”, X (27 July 2023),
available at
https://twitter.com/DutchMFA/status/1684597264000425985
Annex 28 Embassy of Spain in the Russian Federation @EmbEspRussia, “[Emoji
of flag of Spain] supports the statement of @Josepborrellf about the
humanitarian situation related to the siege of Lachin. ‘[Emoji of flag of
Azerbaijan] The authorities must ensure security and free movement in
the corridor very quickly and prevent the crisis from escalating’”, X (27
July 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/EmbEspRusia/status/1684633654725623809
(certified translation from Armenian)
Annex 29 Council of Europe, Humanitarian Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh:
Statement by Council of Europe Secretary General Marija Pejčinović
Burić (28 July 2023), available at https://www.coe.int/fr/web/portal/-
/humanitarian-situation-in-nagorno-karabakh
Annex 30 British Embassy in Armenia @UKinArmenia, “The Head of Political
& Press Section of @UKinArmenia joined the visit of the diplomatic
corps to Syunik organised by @armgov. We reiterate our support for
the @CIJ_ICJ order of February 2023 for Azerbaijan to ensure
unimpeded movement along Lachin corridor in both directions”, X (28
July 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/UKinArmenia/status/1684970857188270081
Annex 31 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus @CyprusMFA, “Cyprus
condemns the ongoing blockade of the #LachinCorridor & is deeply
concerned with the humanitarian crisis in #NagornoKarabakh.
#Azerbaijan must urgently lift the blockade and guarantee safety &
freedom of movement, in line with the 2020 ceasefire statement & ICJ
decision”, X (28 July 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/CyprusMFA/status/1684926924060037120
Annex 32 MFEA Slovenia @mzez_rs, “Slovenia [emoji of flag of Slovenia] is
concerned about the humanitarian situation affecting population in
#Karabakh. Humanitarian aid must be allowed free passage for the
people in need. Support to the @JosepBorrellF statement”, X (28 July
2023), available at
https://twitter.com/mzez_rs/status/1684832642120687617
Annex 33 Ambassador Muriel Peneveyre @swissmfaeurasia, “[Emoji of flag of
Switzerland] is concerned about the continued obstruction of access
through the Lachin corridor and the deteriorating humanitarian
situation. Free passage for civilians and essential goods must be
urgently restored. Rapid and unimpeded humanitarian access must be
allowed immediately”, X (31 July 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/swissmfaeurasia/status/1686024289017823232
Annex 34 L. Moreno Ocampo, Genocide against Armenians in 2023 (7 August
2023), available at https://luismorenoocampo.com/wpcontent/
uploads/2023/08/Armenia-Report-Expert-Opinion.pdf
Annex 35 Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania Gabrielius Landsbergis
@GLandsbergis, “Spoke with @AraratMirzoyan, expressed concern
about the dire humanitarian consequences of the blocking of the Lachin
corridor. Crucial to ensure unimpeded movement as ordered by ICJ.
Reiterated firm belief in absolute necessity of working towards
comprehensive & lasting peace”, X (9 August 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/GLandsbergis/status/1689208739117588480
Annex 36 “Prominent genocide scholars have submitted an open letter to the UN
Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the
Special Adviser of the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of
Genocide, and Member States of the UN Security Council regarding
the potential for genocide in Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh)”, The
Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute Foundation (9 August 2023),
available at http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/11.8.23.php
Annex 37 “Azerbaijan Television interviewed Ilham Aliyev in Basgal settlement
of Ismayilli district”, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (12
August 2022), available at https://president.az/en/articles/view/56906
Annex 38 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia Margus Tsahkna
@Tsahkna, “Had a call w/ [Emoji of flag of Armenia] FM
@AraratMirzoyan on Lachin corridor. The blockade & hum. situation
of the local population are concerning. Hum. access must not be
politicised by any actors. [Emoji of flag of Azerbaijan] has to guarantee
safety & freedom of movement according to trilat. statement of 2020
& ICJ order”, X (14 August 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/Tsahkna/status/1691087763527925760
Annex 39 Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention, Active Genocide Alert
Azerbaijan - in Artsakh (18 August 2023), available at
https://www.lemkininstitute.com/active-genocide-alert-1/activegenocide-
alert-azerbaijan----in-artsakh-
Annex 40 International Committee of the Red Cross, Operational update on
ICRC’s work across the Lachin Corridor (20 August 2023), available
at https://blogs.icrc.org/ir/en/2023/08/operational-update-on-icrc-swork-
across-the-lachin-corridor
Annex 41 J. Ernesto Mendez, PRELIMINARY OPINION on the situation in
Nagorno-Karabakh and on the need for the international community
to adopt measures to prevent atrocity crimes (23 August 2023),
available at
https://un.mfa.am/file_manager/un_mission/Preliminary%20Opinion
%20-%2023.08.2023.pdf
Annex 42 Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, Restore free
movement along the Lachin Corridor and ensure the rapid and
unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance in Nagorno-Karabakh
(28 August 2023), available at
https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/restore-free-movementalong-
the-lachin-corridor-and-ensure-the-rapid-and-unimpededdelivery-
of-humanitarian-assistance-in-nagorno-karabakh
Annex 43 “Three more Armenians detained at Azerbaijan’s Lachin checkpoint”,
Eurasianet (29 August 2023), available at https://eurasianet.org/threemore-
armenians-detained-at-azerbaijans-lachin-checkpoint
Annex 44 S. Sargsyan, “Start of School in Jeopardy as Nagorny Karabakh
Blockade Continues”, Institute for War & Peace Reporting (29 August
2023), available at https://iwpr.net/global-voices/start-schooljeopardy-
nagorny-karabakh-blockade-continues
Annex 45 “Nagorno-Karabakh: ‘People are fainting queuing up for bread’”, BBC
(30 August 2023), available at https://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-
66646677
Annex 46 Germany in the EU @germanyintheeu, “The situation in
#NagornoKarabakh is catastrophic. Medication, food, electricity are
lacking. Our appeal to Azerbaijan and also Russia: The Lachin corridor
must be open. People must finally get what they need to live.
@ABaerbock ahead of #Gymnich in [emoji of flag of Spain] Toledo”,
X (31 August 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/germanyintheeu/status/1697184637720670649
Annex 47 European Council, Statement by the spokesperson of Charles Michel,
President of the European Council, regarding Armenia and Azerbaijan
(1 September 2023), available at
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/
2023/09/01/statement-by-the-spokesperson-of-charlesmichel-
president-of-the-european-council-regarding-armenia-andazerbaijan/
Annex 48 Delegation of the European Union to the Council of Europe, EU
Statement on recent developments around the Lachin corridor (6
September 2023), available at
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/council-europe/eu-statementrecent-
developments-around-lachin-corridor_en
Annex 49 “‘We are starving to death:’ Residents of Nagorno-Karabakh fear for
future under blockade”, CNN (7 September 2023), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/06/europe/nagorno-karabakhblockade-
azerbaijan-armenia-intl-cmd/index.html
Annex 50 Federal Foreign Office of Germany @AuswaertigesAmt, “The Lachin
corridor must be reopened. The people in #NagornoKarabakh must
receive vital humanitarian assistance. Foreign Minister @abaerbock
spoke on the phone today with the FM of Azerbaijan
@Bayramov_Jeyhun about opening this and possible other routes.
1/2”, X (8 September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/AuswaertigesAmt/status/1700173471026647431
(certified translation from German)
Annex 51 Delegation of the European Union to the UN and other international
organisations in Geneva, United Nations Human Rights Council 54th
Session - Item 2 - EU Statement (12 September 2023), available at
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/hrc54-item-2-eustatement_
en
Annex 52 Foreign Relations Committee, Statement of Yuri Kim Acting Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee (14 September 2023), available at
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/assessing-the-crisis-innagorno-
karabakh
Annex 53 A. McGowan, “Azerbaijan’s Pressure on Nagorno-Karabakh: What to
Know”, Council on Foreign Relations (14 September 2023), available
at https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/azerbaijans-pressure-nagornokarabakh-
what-know
Annex 54 “Azerbaijani forces using Russian-style symbols are massing on the
border of Armenia”, The Telegraph (15 September 2023), available at
https://telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/09/15/azerbaijani-troopsrussian-
style-symbols-armenia-border/
Annex 55 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Information bulletin of
the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on the activities of
the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict zone (as of September 19, 2023) (19 September 2023) (certified
translation from Russian)
Annex 56 “Azerbaijani forces strike Armenian-controlled Karabakh, raising risk
of new Caucasus war”, Reuters (19 September 2023), available at
https://www.reuters.com/article/armenia-azerbaijanidCAKBN30P0L9
Annex 57 Intentionally Left Blank
Annex 58 G. Gavin, “Azerbaijan launches attack in Nagorno-Karabakh,
announces ‘evacuation’ of Armenian population”, Politico (19
September 2023), available at
https://www.politico.eu/article/azerbaijan-launch-anti-terroroperation-
nagorno-karabakh-armenia/
Annex 59 Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Military attachés
were informed about local anti-terrorist activities conducted in the
Karabakh region (19 September 2023), available at
https://mod.gov.az/en/news/military-attaches-were-informed-aboutlocal-
anti-terrorist-activities-conducted-in-the-karabakh-region-
49392.html
Annex 60 European Parliament Delegations, Joint statement on Azerbaijan’s
attack on Nagorno-Karabakh (19 September 2023), available at
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/dsca/documents/comm
uniques
Annex 61 Peter Stano @ExtSpoxEU, “Azerbaijan: [EU] condemns the military
escalation along Line of Contact & elsewhere in Karabakh. We call for
immediate cessation of hostilities & for [Emoji of flag of Azerbaijan]
to stop the current military activities. This shouldn’t be pretext to force
exodus of the local population http://europa.eu/!XctvBb”, X (19
September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/ExtSpoxEU/status/1704116258961084630
Annex 62 Le ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères de la France,
Opération militaire azerbaïdjanaise au Haut-Karabagh (19 September
2023), available at https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossierspays/
armenie/evenements/article/operation-militaire-azerbaidjanaiseau-
haut-karabagh-19-09-23
Annex 63 “Statement by the Presidential Administration of the Republic of
Azerbaijan VIDEO”, Azertac (19 September 2023), available at
https://azertag.az/en/xeber/statement_by_the_presidential_administrat
ion_of_the_republic_of_azerbaijan-2754034
Annex 64 Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Statement by
Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense (19 September 2023, 14:25),
available at https://mod.gov.az/en/news/statement-by-azerbaijan-sministry-
of-defense-49363.html
Annex 65 “Azerbaijan launches massive offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh”,
Eurasianet (19 September 2023), available at
https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-launches-massive-offensive-innagorno-
karabakh
Annex 66 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, No:533/23,
Statement by Jeyhun Bayramov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Azerbaijan, at the 9422nd Meeting of the UN Security
Council (19 September 2023), available at
https://mfa.gov.az/en/news/no53323
Annex 67 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation of the
Kingdom of Spain, Official Statement on the Situation in South
Caucasus (19 September 2023), available at
https://www.exteriores.gob.es/en/Comunicacion/Comunicados/Pagina
s/2023_COMUNICADOS/20230919_COMUNICADO035.aspx
Annex 68 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway
@NorwayMFA, “1/2 There are reports of civilian victims from artillery
shelling of Nagorno-Karabakh. Continued use of Azerbaijani military
power may force the Armenian population to flee the region and create
a humanitarian catastrophy. Such a tragedy must be avoided at all cost
- @AHuitfeldt”, X (19 September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/NorwayMFA/status/1704177588829032928
Annex 69 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus @CyprusMFA, “#Cyprus
categorically condemns the ongoing large-scale military aggression by
#Azerbaijan against the #Armenian-populated #NagornoKarabakh We
deplore the loss of lives caused by this utterly unjustified escalation.
Azerbaijan must de-escalate now. A ceasefire is critical”, X (19
September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/CyprusMFA/status/1704187155956871315
Annex 70 “Peacekeepers in Karabakh cannot use weapons if not under threat —
senior legislator”, TASS Russian News Agency (19 September 2023),
available at https://tass.com/politics/1677179
Annex 71 “Azerbaijan launches ‘anti-terrorist’ operation in Nagorno-Karabakh”,
Financial Times (19 September 2023), available at
https://www.ft.com/content/62d7923b-e68d-41ff-9ad6-428562389510
Annex 72 Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis @GLandsbergis,
X (19 September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/GLandsbergis/status/1704124775365562504
Annex 73 International Committee of the Red Cross ICRC @ICRC, “1/
Azerbaijan/Armenia: following today’s escalation of hostilities, we are
extremely concerned about the humanitarian impact on civilians in the
coming hours and days”, X (19 September 2023), available at
https://x.com/ICRC/status/1704184288487293309
Annex 74 US Department of State Press Releases, Call for End of Hostilities in
Nagorno-Karabakh (19 September 2023), available at
https://www.state.gov/call-for-end-of-hostilities-in-nagornokarabakh/#:~:
text=The%20United%20States%20is%20deeply,and%2
0undermine%20prospects%20for%20peace
Annex 75 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Worsening of the situation in
Nagorno-Karabakh (Statement by Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko)
(20 September 2023), available at
https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_003300.html
Annex 76 Nagorno-Karabakh Human Rights Ombudsman @ArtsakhOmbuds “!
More than 10,000 people are currently evacuated from their native
communities, forced to find a shelter in other settlements of Artsakh,
where relative safety can be provided. Among them are women,
children and elderly, many of whom have been displaced for several
times in their life already due to the Azerbaijani aggression. With no
proper food, medication, hygiene essentials — this is a national
catastrophe in real time and a gross violation of all fundamental human
rights”, X (20 September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/artsakhombuds/status/1704534153411035457
Annex 77 “Azerbaijan and Armenian forces reach cease-fire deal for breakaway
Nagorno-Karabakh”, France 24 (20 September 2023), available at
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230920-
%F0%9F%94%B4-karabakh-armenians-agree-to-lay-down-arms-onsecond-
day-of-azerbaijan-offensive
Annex 78 President of the European Council, Charles Michel @CharlesMichel,
“Called on @presidentaz Aliyev in a phone call this morning to ensure
full ceasefire & safe, dignified treatment by Azerbaijan of Karabakh
Armenians. Their rights and security need to be credibly guaranteed.
Access needed for immediate humanitarian assistance”, X (20
September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/CharlesMichel/status/1704499593751277796
Annex 79 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, Announcement
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the developments in
Nagorno Karabakh (Athens, 20.09.2023) (20 September 2023),
available at https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/statementsspeeches/
announcement-by-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-regardingthe-
developments-in-nagorno-karabakh-athens-20092023.html
Annex 80 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE
Chairman-in-Office Osmani calls for de-escalation and return to
dialogue after meeting Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and
Azerbaijan (20 September 2023), available at
https://www.osce.org/chairpersonship/552871
Annex 81 “Karabakh region: End the military escalation and ensure the safety
and human rights of civilians”, Council of Europe (20 September
2023), available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-
/karabakh-region-end-the-military-escalation-and-ensure-the-safetyand-
human-rights-of-civilians
Annex 82 “Ilham Aliyev addressed the nation”, President of the Republic of
Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev (20 September 2023), available at
https://president.az/en/articles/view/61113
Annex 83 “Chaos and Crisis as Azerbaijan Attacks Nagorno-Karabakh”,
Bellingcat (21 September 2023), available at
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2023/09/21/chaos-and-crisis-asazerbaijan-
attacks-nagorno-karabakh/
Annex 84 Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia, The results of the
monitoring and analyzes conducted by the Office of the Human Rights
Defender of the RA prove that the humanitarian disaster in Nagorno-
Karabakh is deepening hour by hour (21 September 2023)
Annex 85 Unites Stations Mission to the United Nations, Remarks by
Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council
Briefing on Armenia and Azerbaijan (21 September 2023), available at
https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-by-ambassador-linda-thomasgreenfield-
at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-armenia-andazerbaijan-
2/
Annex 86 Statement by Lord Ahmad of Wimbeldon, Minister of State for the
Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and United Nations at the United
Nations Security Council, “UK urges all parties to respect ceasefire in
Nagorno-Karabakh: UN Security Council statement”, Gov.UK (21
September 2023), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-urges-all-parties-torespect-
the-ceasefire-in-nagorno-karabakh-uk-at-the-security-council
Annex 87 German Federal Foreign Office, Speech by Foreign Minister Annalena
Baerbock at the United Nations Security Council on the situation in
Nagorno-Karabakh, Federal Foreign Office (21 September 2023),
available at https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-
/2618034#:~:text=Far%20too%20many%20people%20have,complete
ly%20cease%20its%20military%20actions
Annex 88 UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, Security Council, Latest
Clash between Armenia, Azerbaijan Undermines Prospects of Peace,
Speakers Warn Security Council, Calling for Genuine Dialogue to
Settle Outstanding Issues (21 September 2023), available at
https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15418.doc.htm
Annex 89 Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kingdom of Belgium, Hadja Lahbib
@hadjalahbib, “Belgium condemns Azerbaijan's military operation
against the Armenian population of #NagornoKarabakh and expresses
deep regret over the numerous victims. We urge the respect of the
security and rights of Armenians in Karabakh, as well as the ceasefire”,
X (21 September 2023),
available at https://twitter.com/hadjalahbib/status/1704922816905204
103
Annex 90 “Telephone conversation with President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev”,
Kremlin (21 September 2023), available at
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/72312
Annex 91 “Hundreds of Armenian heritage sites at risk in Nagorno-Karabakh”,
Cornell University (21 September 2023), available at
https://as.cornell.edu/news/hundreds-armenian-heritage-sites-risknagorno-
karabakh
Annex 92 “Azerbaijan’s Aliyev Apologizes for Russian Peacekeeper Deaths in
Karabakh”, The Moscow Times (21 September 2023), available at
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/09/21/azerbaijans-aliyevapologizes-
for-russian-peacekeeper-deaths-in-karabakh-a82533
Annex 93 “Elchin Amirbeyov: ‘Reintegration of Karabakh Armenians is an
internal matter of Azerbaijan’”, Report.az (21 September 2023),
available at https://report.az/xarici-siyaset/elcin-emirbeyov-qarabagermenilerinin-
reinteqrasiyasi-azerbaycanin-daxili-isidir (certified
translation from Azerbaijani)
Annex 94 Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention, @lemkininstitute, “There
are stories coming out of Artsakh of the beheading of children and the
separation of older boys and men from women and children. We hope
these are not true, but we have every reason to believe that they are”, X
(22 September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/lemkininstitute/status/1705395252385714513
Annex 95 UN Press Release, Statement by Ms. Alice Wairimu Nderitu, UN
Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, on the situation in
Armenia and Azerbaijan (22 September 2023), available at
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/USG_Nderitu_
Statement_Armenia_Azerbaijan_22092023.pdf
Annex 96 “The children of Artsakh (photos)”, News.am (22 September 2023),
available at https://news.am/eng/news/782680.html
Annex 97 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, Statement of
Foreign Minister of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan at the 78th session of
the United Nations General Assembly (23 September 2023), available
at https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2023/09/23/fm_unga/12236
Annex 98 Nagorno Karabakh Observer @NKobserver, “Reports of war crimes
by Azeri forces in ethnic-Armenian Karabakhi villages. We’ve come
across some reports, verified a few, working on getting a detailed
picture. This could partially explain why many in the regions further
out remain unaccounted for 3 days after the ceasefire”, X (23
September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/nkobserver/status/1705605392074445040
Annex 99 “Stepanakert and Baku reach 6 agreements”, News.am (23 September
2023), available at https://news.am/eng/news/782870.html
Annex 100 “Azerbaijan: Ensure Civilians’ Rights in Nagorno Karabakh”, Human
Rights Watch (23 September 2023), available at
https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/09/23/azerbaijan-ensure-civiliansrights-
nagorno-karabakh
Annex 101 Laurence Broers @LaurenceBroers, “Some #Karabakh updates:
Humanitarian situation critical in Stepanakert/Khankendi; seems gas
and electricity not restored to town; people are in sleeping in public
buildings and in some cases the streets. Sanitary situation very
precarious”, X (23 September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/laurencebroers/status/1705632539979788786
Annex 102 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Hanke
Bruins Slot @HankeBruinsSlot, “Met with Foreign Minister
@AraratMirzoyan in New York. I echoed the EU’s clear position on
the situation in #NagornoKarabakh: we condemn Azerbaijan's military
operation and the harm caused among civilians. Humanitarian actors
should be granted access to the region right away 1/2”, X (23
September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/hankebruinsslot/status/1705642674907193509
Annex 103 C. Edwards, “Azerbaijan has reclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh. What does
that mean for the tens of thousands living there?”, CNN (23 September
2023), available at https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/23/asia/nagornokarabakh-
armenia-azerbaijan-reintegrate-intl/index.html
Annex 104 “Bodies of 100 victims are in settlements cut off from Stepanakert”,
News.am (23 September 2023), available at
https://news.am/eng/news/782883.html
Annex 105 “Scholz demands safety for people in Nagorno-Karabakh”,
Deutschland.de (23 September 2023), available at
https://www.deutschland.de/en/news/scholz-demands-safety-forpeople-
in-nagorno-karabakh
Annex 106 Ayshan Aslan-Mammadli @AyshanASLAN, X (24 September 2023),
available at https://twitter.com/AyshanASLAN/status/
1706000549122801959
Annex 107 O. Ivshina & R. Plummer, “Karabakh humanitarian fears grow with
thousands sleeping on Stepanakert streets”, BBC News (24 September
2023), available at https://www-bbccom.
cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
66901759.amp
Annex 108 Nagorno-Karabakh Human Rights Ombudsman @ArtsakhOmbuds,
“The Office of the Human Rights Defender continues to collect the
evidences of the civilian structure. These residential houses in
Berqadzor of the Askeran region were targeted and destroyed by the
Azerbaijani military forces during the attack on September 19, 2023”,
X (24 September 2023), available at
https://x.com/ArtsakhOmbuds/status/1705978687504384133
Annex 109 F. Light, “Fleeing bombs and death, Armenians recount fear and
hunger”, Reuters (24 September 2023), available at
https://www.reuters.com/world/fleeing-bombs-death-karabakharmenians-
recount-visceral-fear-hunger-2023-09-24/
Annex 110 Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia, Statement of the
Human Rights Defender of Armenia on hatred towards Armenians by
Azerbaijan (24 September 2023)
Annex 111 “People evacuating en masse from Karabakh capital Stepanakert to
Armenia (PHOTOS)”, News.am (25 September 2023), available at
https://news.am/eng/news/783063.html
Annex 112 United States Agency for International Development, Administrator
Samantha Power At a Press Conference in Armenia (25 September
2023), available at https://www.usaid.gov/newsinformation/
speeches/sep-25-2023-administrator-samantha-powerpress-
conference-armenia
Annex 113 The UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR ready to provide further
humanitarian assistance for those fleeing to Armenia (26 September
2023), available at https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/unhcrready-
provide-further-humanitarian-assistance-those-fleeing-toarmenia
Annex 114 G. Gavin, “‘We know we aren’t going back’: Nagorno-Karabakh
Armenians face up to a life in exile”, Politico (26 September 2023),
available at https://www.politico.eu/article/we-know-we-arent-goingback-
nagorno-karabakh-armenians-face-up-to-a-life-in-exilerefugees/
Annex 115 UNHR Statements and Speeches, Azerbaijan / Armenia - Comment by
UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk (26 September 2023), available
at https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-andspeeches/
2023/09/azerbaijan-armenia-comment-un-human-rightschief-
volker-turk
Annex 116 Caucasus Heritage Watch @CaucasusHW, “The video below shows
two Azerbaijani soldiers firing on the 13th century Charektar
Monastery, one from an armored vehicle. Such attacks are in direct
violation of the ICJ’s provisional measure concerning Armenian
cultural heritage and must be investigated and prosecuted”, X (26
September 2023), available at
https://twitter.com/CaucasusHW/status/1706826914009157724
Annex 117 “50,243 forcibly displaced persons enter Armenia from Nagorno-
Karabakh as of 15pm Wednesday”, News.am (27 September 2023),
available at https://news.am/eng/news/783649.html
Annex 118 “Ruben Vardanyan arrested by Azerbaijani authorities, his wife
confirms”, Public Radio of Armenia (27 September 2023), available at
https://en.armradio.am/2023/09/27/ruben-vadanyan-arrested-his-wifeconfirms/
Annex 119 “Monitoring Ethnic Cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh”, University
Network for Human Rights, available at
https://www.humanrightsnetwork.org/nk-live-monitor
Annex 120 Illustrative List of Attacks by Azerbaijan on Farmers and Agricultural
Equipment in Nagorno-Karabakh
Annex 121 Demonstrative List of Hate Speech and Racial Hatred by Azerbaijani
State Officials, Public Figures and Other Individuals and Groups
against Armenians Following the 19 September Military Assault
against Nagorno-Karabakh
Annex 122 Compendium of Illustrative Images Showing the Civilian Suffering
and Forced Displacement Resulting from Azerbaijan’s Military Assault
on Nagorno-Karabakh and its Targeting of Civilians and Civilian
Structures (Confidential)