14.10.2022, 15:30 Joint statement on Ukraine’s application against Russia at the International Court of Justice - Federal Foreign Office
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-/2532254 1/2
Joint statement on Ukraine’s application
against Russia at the International Court
of Justice
20.05.2022 - Press release
Statement on behalf of Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Montenegro,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, European Union:
We, the undersigned, welcome Ukraine’s application against
Russia before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which
seeks to establish that Russia has no lawful basis to take military
action in Ukraine on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations of
genocide.
In these proceedings, the ICJ issued a significant ruling on March
16, 2022, which orders Russia to immediately suspend its
military operations in Ukraine. We welcome the Court’s ruling and
strongly urge Russia to comply with this legally binding order.
Reaffirming our commitment to accountability and the rulesbased
international order, we hereby express our joint intention
to explore all options to support Ukraine in its efforts before the
ICJ and to consider a possible intervention in these proceedings.
We strongly believe that this is a matter that is rightfully brought
to the ICJ, so that it can provide judgement on Russia’s
allegations of genocide as basis for its unprovoked and brutal
invasion of Ukraine. As the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations, the ICJ is a pillar of the rules-based international order
and has a vital role to play in the peaceful settlement of disputes.
We call upon the international community to explore all options to
support Ukraine in its proceedings before the ICJ.
Annex 1
14.10.2022, 15:35 Joint statement on supporting Ukraine's ICJ proceedings
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_4509 1/3
Statement 13 July 2022 Brussels
Joint statement on
supporting Ukraine in its
proceeding at the
International Court of
Justice
| |
Statement on behalf of Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Marshall Islands, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro,
Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States and the
European Union:
We reiterate our support for Ukraine's Application instituting
proceedings against the Russian Federation before the
International Court of Justice under the 1948 Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
which seeks to establish that Russia has no lawful basis to
take military action in Ukraine on the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations of genocide.
We reiterate the importance of these proceedings and urge,
again, Russia to immediately suspend its military operations
in Ukraine, as ordered by the Court in its Order on Provisional
Measures of 16 March 2022.
As the Court has repeatedly stated, its orders on provisional
Annex 2
14.10.2022, 15:35 Joint statement on supporting Ukraine's ICJ proceedings
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_4509 2/3
measures are legally binding on the Parties to the dispute.
Therefore, failure to comply with the Court's 16 March 2022
Order constitutes a further breach, by Russia, of its
international obligations.
We take note of the public statement of 1st July 2022,
according to which Ukraine announced that it had submitted
its Memorial to the Court.
We welcome once again Ukraine's efforts to ensure that
international law is respected and that the Court can fulfill its
fundamental function of promoting the peaceful settlement of
disputes.
The Genocide Convention embodies the solemn pledge to
prevent the crime of genocide and hold those responsible to
account. As the International Court of Justice itself stated in
its advisory opinion of 28 May 1951 on reservations to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, the object of the Convention “on the one hand is
to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and
on the other to confirm and endorse the most elementary
principles of morality”.
It is in the interest of all States Parties to the Genocide
Convention, and more broadly of the international community
as a whole, that the Convention not be misused or abused.
That is why the signatories of the present declaration which
are Parties to the Genocide Convention intend to intervene in
these proceedings.
In light of the serious questions raised in this case, and in
view of the far-reaching consequences of the judgment that
the Court will render, it is important that the States Parties to
this Convention be able to share with the International Court
of Justice their interpretation of some of its essential
provisions.
In closing, we reiterate that Russia must be held accountable
for its actions. In this regard, we consider that Russia's
violations of international law engage its international
responsibility, and that the losses and damage suffered by
Ukraine as a result of Russia's violations of international law
require full and urgent reparation by Russia, in accordance
14.10.2022, 15:35 Joint statement on supporting Ukraine's ICJ proceedings
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_4509 3/3
with the law of State responsibility.
We once again call upon the international community to
explore all options to support Ukraine in its proceedings
before the ICJ.
Press contact
Peter STANO
Phone
+32 2 295 45 53
Mail
[email protected]
Paloma HALL CABALLERO
Phone
+32 2 296 85 60
Mail
[email protected]
STATEMENT/22/4509
Share this page:
Twitter Facebook
LinkedIn E-mail
14.10.2022, 15:45 Romania Has Decided to Intervene in favour of Ukraine at the International Court of Justice in Proceedings against the Russ…
https://www.mae.ro/en/print/58706 1/2
Home
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Home
Romania Has Decided to Intervene in favour of Ukraine at the International Court of Justice in
Proceedings against the Russian Federation
Type:
Press release
Date:
05/18/22
In continuation of the measures taken in support of Ukraine as a result of the illegal war of aggression unleashed by the
Russian Federation against this state, the Romanian authorities approved, at the highest level, that Romania will
formulate a request for intervention in the proceedings initiated by Ukraine against the Russian Federation at the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 26 February 2022, regarding a dispute on the interpretation, application and
fulfilment of the obligations set out in the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.
The Romanian démarche to intervene in this process comes at the express request of the Ukrainian side, which was
transmitted by Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba to his Romanian counterpart Bogdan Aurescu during
the Ukrainian Minister's visit to Bucharest on April 22, 2022 (https://www.mae.ro/node/58483).
In the context of these proceedings, Romania will coordinate with other like minded states that have taken a similar
decision and will cooperate closely with Ukraine's representatives involved in the proceedings at the ICJ.
The decision of the Romanian authorities was communicated by Minister of Foreign Affairs Bogdan Aurescu to his
European colleagues and Ukrainian counterpart during the European Affairs Council meeting held in Brussels on 16 May
2022 (https://www.mae.ro/node/58670), as an expression of the constant and principled support of the Romanian
authorities for the Ukrainian cause.
Romania's decision reflects, once again, our country's constant position in favour of the use of international law
instruments and institutions in support of maintaining and restoring international peace and security, as well as its
unconditional trust in the fundamental role of the ICJ as a promoter of international justice.
Additional information
On February 26, 2022, Ukraine lodged a request to initiate proceedings against the Russian Federation at the ICJ
concerning a dispute over the interpretation, application and fulfilment of obligations under the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
Ukraine claimed that the Russian Federation falsely invoked acts of genocide in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions in
order to justify the recognition of the so-called Donetsk P.R. and Luhansk P.R. and to conduct a special military operation
against Ukraine. On the basis of these false accusations, the Russian Federation is currently engaged in a process of
military invasion of Ukraine, resulting in serious and widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law.
In an Order dated March 16, 2022, the Court indicated interim/conservative measures, whereby it imposed an obligation
on the Russian Federation to immediately suspend military operations commenced on 24 February 2022 on the territory
of Ukraine and to ensure that military or irregular units which the Russian Federation would direct or support, as well as
any organisations or persons subject to its control or direction, do not take any steps to continue military operations. The
Order also provides that both parties shall refrain from any action that might aggravate or extend the dispute before the
Court or make it more difficult to be resolved.
In an Order dated March 23, 2022, the ICJ indicated September 23, 2022 as the deadline for the submission of the
Memorial of Ukraine and March 23, 2023 as the deadline for the submission of the Counter-Memorial of the Russian
Federation.
Under the rules laid down in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, if a case appears to involve the
interpretation of a multilateral convention to which States, other than those involved in the dispute are parties, the
Registrar must notify those States, and any notified State has the right to intervene in the proceedings.
Romania (as well as the other States Parties to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide) has been notified by the ICJ Registry that the proceedings initiated by Ukraine appear to raise issues of
Annex 3
14.10.2022, 15:45 Romania Has Decided to Intervene in favour of Ukraine at the International Court of Justice in Proceedings against the Russ…
https://www.mae.ro/en/print/58706 2/2
© Copyright 2008 MAE. Toate drepturile rezervate.
interpretation of this Convention, and that those States Parties may avail themselves of the possibility to intervene in the
case.
The statement of intervention, which may be made before the date scheduled for the opening of oral proceedings in the
dispute in question, involves certain additional procedures on the part of the intervening State.
14.10.2022, 15:46 Consultările ministrului afacerilor externe Bogdan Aurescu cu ministrul afacerilor externe al Ucrainei, Dmytro Kuleba | Minist…
mae.gov.ro/print/58483 1/3
Prima Pagina
Ministerul Afacerilor Externe
Prima Pagina
Consultările ministrului afacerilor externe Bogdan Aurescu cu ministrul afacerilor externe al
Ucrainei, Dmytro Kuleba
Tip:
Comunicat de presă
Data:
22.04.2022
Ministrul afacerilor externe Bogdan Aurescu a avut vineri, 22 aprilie 2022, consultări politice cu ministrul afacerilor
externe al Ucrainei, Dmytro Kuleba, aflat în vizită în România, la invitația șefului diplomației române.
Vizita ministrului Dmytro Kuleba la București a avut loc în contextul agresiunii militare ilegale a Rusiei în Ucraina și al
situației deosebit de grave de securitate și din punct de vedere umanitar provocate de aceasta.
Ministrul Bogdan Aurescu a reiterat sprijinul ferm al României pentru independența, suveranitatea și integritatea
teritorială ale Ucrainei, precum și pentru efortul autorităților ucrainene de a respinge agresiunea rusă. Totodată, șeful
diplomației române a transmis, și cu acest prilej, poziția fermă a României de condamnare a invaziei Rusiei în Ucraina,
ce reprezintă o încălcare flagrantă a dreptului internațional.
La finalul consultărilor, ministrul Bogdan Aurescu și ministrul Dmytro Kuleba au susținut declarații comune de presă,
disponibile în format video aici: http://www.mae.ro/node/58482.
Transmitem, mai jos, transcrierea declarațiilor de presă ale ministrului afacerilor externe Bogdan Aurescu și ale
ministrului afacerilor externe al Ucrainei, Dmytro Kuleba.
Ministrul afacerilor externe Bogdan Aurescu:
Bine ați venit la Ministerul Afacerilor Externe!
Dragă domnule ministru, dragă Dmytro, bine ai venit la București! Bun venit la Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, din nou. Mă
bucur că am avut ocazia să ne revedem, să discutăm în persoană în această perioadă extrem de complicată. Vreau să te
felicit din inimă pentru activitatea excepțională pe care o desfășori, în beneficiul Ucrainei și al valorilor noastre comune.
Am avut astăzi un dialog foarte consistent pe care, de altfel, îl vom continua după această conferință de presă, un
schimb de opinii foarte aplicat despre situația gravă de securitate și umanitară din Ucraina, generată de războiul ilegal,
neprovocat, nejustificat și premeditat al Rusiei asupra Ucrainei. Am reiterat sprijinul ferm al României pentru
independența, pentru suveranitatea, pentru integritatea teritorială ale Ucrainei, precum și pentru efortul eroic al
autorităților ucrainene, al cetățenilor ucraineni de a respinge agresiunea rusă, care constituie o încălcare flagrantă a
tuturor obligațiilor internaționale asumate de Rusia.
Nici România, nici Ucraina, nici comunitatea internațională nu pot accepta călcarea în picioare a ordinii internaționale
bazate pe reguli, care ar însemna impunerea arbitrariului prin forță.
Exprim și cu această ocazie condoleanțe și regretul profund pentru pierderile de vieți omenești, pentru atât de multele
vieți omenești care au fost curmate în această agresiune ilegală, pentru masivele distrugeri materiale din Ucraina, care
influențează într-un mod profund negativ viața societății ucrainene. Dramele umane, ororile, suferința prin care trece
poporul ucrainean ne-au lăsat, alături de întreaga lume, îndoliați. Suntem alături de poporul ucrainean. Dragă Dmytro, toți
cei care au murit uciși în Ucraina sunt, de fapt, frații și surorile noastre, sunt părinții și copiii noștri. De aceea, atrocitățile
și crimele de război, crimele împotriva umanității, crimele de genocid nu pot să rămână nepedepsite, iar România sprijină
activ eforturile comunității internaționale pentru investigarea acestor încălcări ale dreptului internațional, ale drepturilor
omului, ale dreptului internațional umanitar. După cum știți, Guvernul României a decis acordarea unei contribuții
financiare voluntare către Curtea Penală Internațională, pentru a sprijini investigația din Ucraina.
De asemenea, am reacționat prompt și consistent, încă de la începutul invaziei ruse, prin numeroase măsuri pentru a
oferi adăpost și asistență refugiaților ucraineni, pentru care agresiunea rusă a avut efecte dramatice. Până în prezent, au
intrat pe teritoriul țării noastre peste 800.000 de refugiați ucraineni. Asistența acordată acestor persoane, inclusiv celor
care au rămas pe teritoriul României, a fost în valoare de peste 63 de milioane de euro, constând în acces gratuit la
Annex 4
14.10.2022, 15:46 Consultările ministrului afacerilor externe Bogdan Aurescu cu ministrul afacerilor externe al Ucrainei, Dmytro Kuleba | Minist…
mae.gov.ro/print/58483 2/3
servicii medicale, la învățământ - peste 1600 de copii sunt deja înregistrați în sistemul românesc, studenții sunt primiți în
universitățile din România – , a constat în măsuri de sprijin pentru copiii aflați în situații deosebite, asigurarea
transportului gratuit pe teritoriul României, deschiderea pieței de muncă - sunt peste 2.000 de cetățeni ucraineni care
sunt deja angajați în România, după începutul invaziei.
Doresc să vă asigur, domnule ministru, dragă Dmytro, că toți cetățenii ucraineni refugiați în România sunt și vor fi tratați
corespunzător, vor avea șansa să-și continue, în condițiile date, traiul normal, până când condițiile vor permite
reîntoarcerea lor, în siguranță, în Ucraina. Trebuie să menționez și să salut încă o dată atitudinea de extraordinară
solidaritate și ospitalitate a cetățenilor români, care au sprijinit, încă de la primele momente ale conflictului, pe refugiații
care au ajuns în România, dar și pe cei care au rămas în Ucraina. Platforma guvernamentală, care a fost creată în acest
sens, arată mai mult de 9.200 de inițiative de sprijin din partea societății civile. De asemenea, am trimis mai multe tranșe
de ajutor umanitar, combustibil, medicamente, alimente. Amintesc aici mai multe pachete de sprijin: cel din 28 februarie,
de 3,4 milioane de euro, din 16 martie, 2,3 milioane de euro, donația celor 11 ambulanțe care a fost finalizată în cursul
acestei săptămâni și altele. De asemenea, hub-ul umanitar de la Suceava, care este funcțional din 9 martie, asigură
livrarea, în mod constant, de sprijin internațional pentru Ucraina, fiind în prezent tranzitat de peste 31 de convoaie
umanitare, adică aproximativ 162 de camioane din numeroase țări europene - Italia, Franța, Bulgaria, Austria, Slovenia,
Cipru, România și alte state.
Ucraina trebuie să câștige acest război și sunt convins că-l va câștiga.
Apoi va urma procesul de reconstrucție, după ce conflictul se va fi încheiat. În cadrul acestui proces de reconstrucție,
care va fi unul de durată, întreaga comunitate internațională va trebui să acorde sprijin și îl asigur pe colegul meu că
România este gata să fie parte a acestui efort susținut.
De asemenea, vreau să transmit, cu acest prilej, felicitări Ucrainei pentru transmiterea răspunsului la prima parte a
chestionarului pentru aderare la Uniunea Europeană și vreau să reiterez, și cu acest prilej, sprijinul extrem de puternic al
României pentru aspirațiile europene ale Ucrainei, pentru recunoașterea perspectivei europene a acestui stat prieten și
vecin. Am transmis și susținut constant, la nivelul Uniunii Europene, atât la nivelul reuniunii șefilor de stat și de guvern, la
reuniunile miniștrilor de externe, la care am participat, că Uniunea Europeană trebuie să arate viziune, să arate curaj,
pentru a da Ucrainei, precum și Republicii Moldova, Georgiei, semnalul pe care îl așteaptă - și anume acela că sunt
îndreptățite să facă parte, cu drepturi depline, din Uniunea Europeană.
De asemenea, mă bucur să salut faptul că astăzi și Republica Moldova a transmis răspunsul la prima parte a
chestionarului pentru aderare.
În același timp, știm din propria noastră experiență că parcursul pentru aderare este unul complicat care presupune
multe eforturi și reforme. Vom continua să sprijinim în mod activ, în măsura în care va fi necesar, Ucraina, în tot acest
proces complex și laborios.
De asemenea, am discutat și despre deschiderea Ambasadei României la Kiev, am informat cu privire la decizia pe care
am luat-o – la momentul la care am anunțat acest demers al României, erau opt misiuni ale statelor membre ale Uniunii
Europene deja deschise la Kiev. Sper ca pregătirile să se finalizeze cât mai curând și să putem să ne reluăm activitatea
în capitala Ucrainei.
De asemenea, am discutat despre creșterea conectivității fizice între statele noastre. Am discutat despre deschiderea de
noi puncte de trecere a frontierei, pentru că este nevoie de mai multă conectivitate între noi, pentru a facilita fluxurile de
persoane, fluxurile de mărfuri și este, din acest punct de vedere, grăitor rolul pe care, de exemplu, punctul de trecere a
frontierei de la Isaccea l-a jucat pentru deplasarea în România a cetățenilor ucraineni afectați de război.
Am luat măsuri legate și de facilitarea comerțului Ucrainei cu alte state - de exemplu, liberalizarea temporară a
transportului efectuat de operatorii ucraineni pe teritoriul României - decizie adoptată la 5 aprilie. Am discutat și despre
cooperarea în materie de securitate energetică și mă bucur să salut conectarea Ucrainei la rețeaua europeană de
electricitate, la data de 16 martie.
Am discutat, de asemenea, și despre faptul că legăturile puternice dintre țările noastre sunt date și de minoritățile noastre
înrudite. Am evidențiat comportamentul exemplar al etnicilor români din Ucraina, care au sprijinit efortul comun de
apărare a statului ucrainean. Vom continua să ne ocupăm de problemele comunităților române și, respectiv, ucrainene
din România, respectiv din Ucraina și sunt convins că vom soluționa toate problemele acestora.
Mă opresc aici. Îmi exprim încă o dată convingerea că, prin efortul nostru comun, putem să ridicăm relațiile noastre
bilaterale la un nou nivel, să construim în această zonă a Europei un model de cooperare. Știu, din relația foarte
apropiată pe care o avem, și pe care am construit-o în ultimii ani, că sunt nu doar perspective, dar certitudini din acest
punct de vedere. Iar perioada aceasta foarte complexă, cu război, cu agresiune, cu suferință umană, nu a făcut altceva
decât să apropie și mai mult societățile noastre, cetățenii noștri.
Dragă Dmytro, te rog.
Ministrul afacerilor externe al Ucrainei, Dmytro Kuleba:
Thank you, Bogdan! I really appreciate that you agreed to receive me on the Eve of Easter, as your Prime Minister and
your Minister of Defense did. This is yet another example of the real, sincere friendship that we have between Ukraine
and Romania.
When it comes to the substance, you almost stole all of my speaking points, I can only subscribe to what Bogdan just
said, on all accounts. Let me say just a couple of points, in addition to that.
Every time President Putin tries to stop Ukraine in its development, in its European integration, the only result that he
achieves is the speeding up of this process. To my and our deepest regret, every such attempt by Putin comes at a price
for Ukraine. But what is happening now is not only another attempt of Russia to maintain its influence in this part of
14.10.2022, 15:46 Consultările ministrului afacerilor externe Bogdan Aurescu cu ministrul afacerilor externe al Ucrainei, Dmytro Kuleba | Minist…
mae.gov.ro/print/58483 3/3
© Copyright 2008 MAE. Toate drepturile rezervate.
Europe, in the Black Sea region, not only the attempt to stop Ukraine, it’s also the final battle. The final battle for the right
of all European nations - and it’s not only about Ukraine, it’s also about Georgia, about Moldova, about all countries in the
Black Sea region - it’s our common final battle for the opportunity to live in peace, in prosperity, as part of a whole and
free Europe. And I have no doubts, and I appreciate that Bogdan doesn’t have any doubts either, that we will win this
battle! Ukraine will prevail!
And there are two components which are necessary for us to prevail. The first one is the Ukrainian stamina and courage.
The second one is friends, friends who stand by Ukraine in practical terms, who support providing Ukraine with all
necessary equipment, who support more sanctions against Russia, who embrace Ukrainian refugees, giving the chance
for husbands, fathers and brothers to fight against Russia, knowing that their mothers, sisters, and children are in safety
and taken care of. As long as these two ingredients are in place, the victory is getting closer and closer.
And I would like to commend the Government of Romania for shaping a very smart policy, since the beginning of
aggression, to provide, to stand by Ukraine.
We all share the Black Sea and this war, as I said, is also about the future of the Black Sea region. Our security is your
security. You are helping us, you are also helping yourself. The fair deal that Ukraine offers to the world is simple: you
give us everything that we need to fight and to win, and we, in return, contain Putin in Ukraine and defeat him there, so
that he doesn’t dare to test Article 5 of NATO, and doesn’t try to expand further his aggression.
Those in Europe, who believe that this is just a Ukraine - Russia war and Putin will never dare to test Article 5, shouldn’t
be naive! We, in Central and Eastern Europe, are not naive, we know history. But others should be aware of a very
simple fact: the best way to stop Putin is to give Ukraine everything it needs.
During the war, the divisions are all gone. In Ukraine, ethnic Ukrainians, ethnic Romanians, ethnic Hungarians, ethnic
Belarusians, ethnic Georgians, Moldovans, Russians, they all fight for Ukraine. Some of them, regretfully, die in the war,
in combat, but they understand what they’re fighting for: they’re fighting not only for Ukraine, but for their own
motherlands, for their countries, so that they do not know the tragedy of war. And we respect highly every sacrifice on the
battleground. And the Romanian community in Ukraine, while being an inseparable part of a broader Romanian culture,
they also fight for their motherland, for Ukraine, and this is another element that brings us even closer, us - Ukraine and
Romania.
Now, unspeakable crimes were committed by the Russian army in Ukraine, but unfortunately this is only the tip of the
iceberg of all the crimes committed, especially in Mariupol. Romania and Bogdan personally, have vast experience in
international adjudication, in the prosecution of international crimes, at international level, so, yes, we discussed how we
can use the ICJ - International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, to bring Russia to account for everything
it has done, and we will be happy to learn, to work with Romania on this.
I would like, once again, to thank the Romanian Government for embracing Ukrainian refugees. These people could have
been victims of the Russian war crimes, and the fact that you allowed them to come to the country saved the lives of
many of them.
Now, it would be unfair for me not to mention that, of course, I want all of my compatriots to go back to Ukraine, and to
live a new life, and to rebuild the country, and hopefully together we will bring the moment closer to when this will be
possible. But let’s be objective: some of them will stay in Romania and will start a new life here. I would like to assure you
that they will be very committed new members of your society, and the Ukrainian community will fill, will enrich the
Romanian society, and will be another joint between our governments.
Thank you for the readiness of Romania to participate in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine. We are already thinking
about it, we are already building plans; we already have a picture of the new Ukraine that will be built. And this new
Ukraine will be a European Ukraine, and the support of Romania in providing Ukraine with candidate status at the
nearest opportunity in the end of June is very much appreciated. This will be a Ukraine that will remain a happy home, a
home for many ethnicities and nationalities, and this will be a Ukraine that will, together with friends and partners like
Romania and other countries, ensure safety and security of the entire Black Sea region.
The final words that I want to use are the following: Please, have no doubts, we will prevail!
But to make this happen rather sooner than later, we need to continue working on all fronts, on every issue, in the fastest
way possible to make sure that Ukraine receives everything that it needs, to make sure that all necessary sanctions are
imposed on Russia, to make sure that Russia is isolated everywhere in the world! We cannot stop; neither we, nor you,
nor anyone else can stop until we all defeat this evil! Thank you!
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Home Page
Consultations of Foreign Minister Bogdan Aurescu with Ukrainian Foreign Minister,
Dmytro Kuleba
Type: Press release
Date: 22.04.2022
On Friday, 22 April 2022, Minister of Foreign Affairs Bogdan Aurescu held political consultations with Ukrainian
Foreign Minister, Dmytro Kuleba, who is visiting Romania at the invitation of the head of Romanian diplomacy.
Minister Dmytro Kuleba's visit to Bucharest took place in the context of Russia's illegal military aggression in Ukraine
and the extremely serious security and humanitarian crisis caused by it.
Minister Bogdan Aurescu reiterated Romania's firm support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity, as well as for the Ukrainian authorities' efforts to repel Russian aggression. At the same time, the Romanian
Head of Delegation also conveyed Romania's firm position condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which is a
flagrant violation of international law.
At the end of the consultations, Minister Bogdan Aurescu and Minister Dmytro Kuleba made joint press statements,
available in video format here: http://www.mae.ro/node/58482.
Below is a transcript of the press statements by Foreign Minister Bogdan Aurescu and Ukrainian Foreign
Minister, Dmytro Kuleba.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Bogdan Aurescu:
Welcome to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs!
Dear Minister, dear Dmytro, welcome to Bucharest! Welcome to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs again. I'm glad we had
the opportunity to meet again, to talk in person during this extremely complicated time. I want to congratulate you
from the bottom of my heart for the exceptional work you are doing for the benefit of Ukraine and our common values.
We had a very substantial dialogue today, which we will continue after this press conference, a very detailed
exchange of views on the serious security and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine caused by Russia's illegal, unprovoked,
unjustified and premeditated war on Ukraine. I reiterated Romania's firm support for the independence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Ukraine, as well as for the heroic efforts of the Ukrainian authorities and Ukrainian citizens to
repel Russian aggression, which constitutes a flagrant violation of Russia's international obligations.
Neither Romania, nor Ukraine, nor the international community can accept the trampling of the international rulebased
order, which would mean the imposition of arbitrariness by force.
I also take this opportunity to express my condolences and deep regret for the loss of human lives, for so many
human lives that have been lost in this illegal aggression, for the massive property destruction in Ukraine, which has
a profoundly negative impact on the life of Ukrainian society. The human dramas, the horrors, the suffering that the
Ukrainian people are going through have left us, along with the whole world, in a state of grief. We stand with the
Ukrainian people. Dear Dmytro, all those who have been killed in Ukraine are, in fact, our brothers and sisters, our
parents and our children. That is why atrocities and war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide cannot
go unpunished, and Romania actively supports the efforts of the international community to investigate these
violations of international law, of human rights, of international humanitarian law. As you know, the Romanian
Government has decided to make a voluntary financial contribution to the International Criminal Court to support the
investigation in Ukraine.
We have also reacted promptly and consistently since the beginning of the Russian invasion with numerous
measures to provide shelter and assistance to Ukrainian refugees, for whom the Russian aggression has had
dramatic effects. So far, more than 800,000 Ukrainian refugees have entered our country. The assistance provided to
these people, including those who have remained on Romanian territory, has been worth more than 63 million euros,
consisting of free access to medical services, education - more than 1600 children are already registered in the
Romanian system, students are admitted to Romanian universities -, support measures for children in special
Annex 4
Translation
circumstances, free transport on Romanian territory, opening of the labor market - more than 2000 Ukrainian citizens
are already employed in Romania after the beginning of the invasion.
I would like to assure you, Minister, dear Dmytro, that all Ukrainian citizens who are refugees in Romania are and will
be treated properly, will have the chance to continue their normal life under the given circumstances, until the
conditions allow their safe return to Ukraine. I must mention and welcome once again the extraordinary solidarity and
hospitality of Romanian citizens, who have supported the refugees who arrived in Romania, as well as those who
remained in Ukraine, since the first moments of the conflict. The government platform, which was created for this
purpose, contains more than 9,200 support initiatives from civil society. We have also sent several tranches of
humanitarian aid, fuel, medicines, food. I would like to mention here several support packages: that of 28 February,
EUR 3.4 million, that of 16 March, EUR 2.3 million, the donation of 11 ambulances which was completed this week
and others. The humanitarian hub in Suceava, which has been operational since 9 March, also ensures the constant
provision of international support to Ukraine, with over 31 humanitarian convoys currently passing through it, about
162 trucks from many European countries - Italy, France, Bulgaria, Austria, Slovenia, Cyprus, Romania and others.
Ukraine has to win this war and I am convinced that it will.
Then the reconstruction process will follow, once the conflict is over. In this reconstruction process, which will be a
long-lasting one, the whole international community will have to provide support and I assure my colleague that
Romania is ready to be part of this sustained effort.
I would also like to take this opportunity to congratulate Ukraine on its submission of the reply to the first part of the
questionnaire for accession to the European Union and I would like to reiterate, also on this occasion, Romania's
extremely strong support for Ukraine's European aspirations, for the recognition of the European perspective of this
friendly and neighboring state. I have constantly stated and argued at European Union level, both at meetings of
heads of state and government and at meetings of foreign ministers, which I have attended, that the European Union
must show leadership and courage in order to give Ukraine, as well as the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, the
signal they are waiting for - namely that they are entitled to be full members of the European Union.
I am also pleased to welcome the fact that today the Republic of Moldova has also submitted its reply to the first part
of the accession questionnaire.
At the same time, we know from our own experience that the path to accession is a complicated one which requires a
lot of efforts and reforms. We will continue to actively support, as necessary, Ukraine throughout this complex and
laborious process.
We also discussed the opening of the Romanian Embassy in Kiev, we reported on the decision we had taken - at the
time we announced Romania's approach, eight missions of the European Union Member States were already open in
Kiev. I hope that the preparations will be completed as soon as possible and that we will be able to resume our work
in the Ukrainian capital.
We also discussed increasing physical connectivity between our states. We discussed the opening of new border
checkpoints, because we need more connectivity between us, to facilitate the flow of people, the flow of goods, and it
shows the role that, for example, the Isaccea border crossing point has played for the movement of war-affected
Ukrainian citizens to Romania.
We have also taken measures to facilitate Ukraine's trade with other countries - for example, temporary liberalization
of transport by Ukrainian operators on Romanian territory - a decision adopted on 5 April. We also discussed
cooperation on energy security and I am pleased to welcome Ukraine's connection to the European electricity grid on
16 March.
We also discussed the fact that the strong ties between our countries stem also from our related minorities. We
highlighted the exemplary role of ethnic Romanians in Ukraine, who supported the joint effort to defend the Ukrainian
state. We will continue to deal with the problems of the Romanian and Ukrainian communities in Romania and
Ukraine respectively and I am convinced that we will solve all their problems.
I will conclude here. I express once again my conviction that, through our joint effort, we can bring our bilateral
relations to a new level, to build a model of cooperation in this part of Europe. I know from the very close relationship
we have, and which we have built up over the last few years, that there are not only prospects, but certainties in this
respect. And this very complex period, of war, of aggression, of human suffering, has only brought our societies, our
citizens, closer together.
Dear Dmytro, please.
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba:
Thank you, Bogdan! I really appreciate that you agreed to receive me on the Eve of Easter, as your Prime Minister
and your Minister of Defense did. This is yet another example of the real, sincere friendship that we have between
Ukraine and Romania.
When it comes to the substance, you almost stole all of my speaking points, I can only subscribe to what Bogdan just
said, on all accounts. Let me say just a couple of points, in addition to that.
Every time President Putin tries to stop Ukraine in its development, in its European integration, the only result that he
achieves is the speeding up of this process. To my and our deepest regret, every such attempt by Putin comes at a
price for Ukraine. But what is happening now is not only another attempt of Russia to maintain its influence in this part
of Europe, in the Black Sea region, not only the attempt to stop Ukraine, it’s also the final battle. The final battle for
the right of all European nations - and it’s not only about Ukraine, it’s also about Georgia, about Moldova, about all
countries in the Black Sea region - it’s our common final battle for the opportunity to live in peace, in prosperity, as
part of a whole and free Europe. And I have no doubts, and I appreciate that Bogdan doesn’t have any doubts either,
that we will win this battle! Ukraine will prevail!
And there are two components which are necessary for us to prevail. The first one is the Ukrainian stamina and
courage. The second one is friends, friends who stand by Ukraine in practical terms, who support providing Ukraine
with all necessary equipment, who support more sanctions against Russia, who embrace Ukrainian refugees, giving
the chance for husbands, fathers and brothers to fight against Russia, knowing that their mothers, sisters, and
children are in safety and taken care of. As long as these two ingredients are in place, the victory is getting closer and
closer.
And I would like to commend the Government of Romania for shaping a very smart policy, since the beginning of
aggression, to provide, to stand by Ukraine.
We all share the Black Sea and this war, as I said, is also about the future of the Black Sea region. Our security is
your security. You are helping us, you are also helping yourself. The fair deal that Ukraine offers to the world is
simple: you give us everything that we need to fight and to win, and we, in return, contain Putin in Ukraine and defeat
him there, so that he doesn’t dare to test Article 5 of NATO, and doesn’t try to expand further his aggression.
Those in Europe, who believe that this is just a Ukraine - Russia war and Putin will never dare to test Article 5,
shouldn’t be naive! We, in Central and Eastern Europe, are not naive, we know history. But others should be aware
of a very simple fact: the best way to stop Putin is to give Ukraine everything it needs.
During the war, the divisions are all gone. In Ukraine, ethnic Ukrainians, ethnic Romanians, ethnic Hungarians, ethnic
Belarusians, ethnic Georgians, Moldovans, Russians, they all fight for Ukraine. Some of them, regretfully, die in the
war, in combat, but they understand what they’re fighting for: they’re fighting not only for Ukraine, but for their own
motherlands, for their countries, so that they do not know the tragedy of war. And we respect highly every sacrifice on
the battleground. And the Romanian community in Ukraine, while being an inseparable part of a broader Romanian
culture, they also fight for their motherland, for Ukraine, and this is another element that brings us even closer, us -
Ukraine and Romania.
Now, unspeakable crimes were committed by the Russian army in Ukraine, but unfortunately this is only the tip of the
iceberg of all the crimes committed, especially in Mariupol. Romania and Bogdan personally, have vast experience in
international adjudication, in the prosecution of international crimes, at international level, so, yes, we discussed how
we can use the ICJ - International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, to bring Russia to account for
everything it has done, and we will be happy to learn, to work with Romania on this.
I would like, once again, to thank the Romanian Government for embracing Ukrainian refugees. These people could
have been victims of the Russian war crimes, and the fact that you allowed them to come to the country saved the
lives of many of them.
Now, it would be unfair for me not to mention that, of course, I want all of my compatriots to go back to Ukraine, and
to live a new life, and to rebuild the country, and hopefully together we will bring the moment closer to when this will
be possible. But let’s be objective: some of them will stay in Romania and will start a new life here. I would like to
assure you that they will be very committed new members of your society, and the Ukrainian community will fill, will
enrich the Romanian society, and will be another joint between our governments.
Thank you for the readiness of Romania to participate in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine. We are already
thinking about it, we are already building plans; we already have a picture of the new Ukraine that will be built. And
this new Ukraine will be a European Ukraine, and the support of Romania in providing Ukraine with candidate status
at the nearest opportunity in the end of June is very much appreciated. This will be a Ukraine that will remain a happy
home, a home for many ethnicities and nationalities, and this will be a Ukraine that will, together with friends and
partners like Romania and other countries, ensure safety and security of the entire Black Sea region.
The final words that I want to use are the following: Please, have no doubts, we will prevail!
But to make this happen rather sooner than later, we need to continue working on all fronts, on every issue, in the
fastest way possible to make sure that Ukraine receives everything that it needs, to make sure that all necessary
sanctions are imposed on Russia, to make sure that Russia is isolated everywhere in the world! We cannot stop;
neither we, nor you, nor anyone else can stop until we all defeat this evil! Thank you!
© Copyright 2008 MFA. All rights reserved.
Homepage > Press > Croatia files declaration of intervention in the case of Ukraine v. Russian
Federation >
Published: 20.10.2022.
Croatia files declaration of intervention in the case
of Ukraine v. Russian Federation
Based on the government’s decision on Croatia’s intervention in the International Court of Justice case
concerning the Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Croatia filed on 19 October 2022 a declaration of intervention in
said case.
On 26 February 2022, Ukraine instituted proceedings against the Russian Federation in a dispute concerning
the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide
(the “Genocide Convention”). Ukraine claims that the Russian Federation’s declaration and implementation of
measures in or against Ukraine in the form of a “special military operation” declared on 24 February 2022 on
the basis of alleged genocide, as well as the recognition by the Russian Federation of so-called “Donetsk
People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic” that preceded the military operation, is incompatible with
the Convention. Following Ukraine’s request for provisional measures, the Court ordered on 16 March 2022
that the Russian Federation should immediately suspend the military operation that it had commenced on 24
February 2022 in the territory of Ukraine.
As a party to the Convention, Croatia has the right to intervene in the proceedings and intends to put forth its
own interpretation of the relevant provisions. In its declaration, Croatia focuses on Article IX of the
Convention, stating that the Court has jurisdiction in said case.
To date, declarations of intervention have also been filed by Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, United Kingdom,
Germany, United States, Sweden, Romania, France, Italy, Poland, Denmark, Ireland, Finland, Estonia, Spain,
Australia, Portugal, Austria, Luxembourg, and Greece.
Croatia reiterates its full commitment to international order based on rules and respect for the international
law, notably the obligation of countries not to resort to threats or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of another country, and to respect human rights and the international humanitarian
law as well as the Genocide Convention.
Press releases
Copyright © 2022 Ministarstvo vanjskih i europskih poslova.All rights reserved
Ministarstvo Republike Hrvatske - Croatia files declaration of interve... https://mvep.gov.hr/print.aspx?id=248953&url=print
1 of 1 12/12/2022, 03:23
Annex 5
Czech Embassy The Hague
@CzechEmbassyNL
has filed a declaration of intervention in the case
#Ukraine v. #Russia before the ICJ. The Court has
jurisdiction in the case. Justice matters.
4:11 PM · Nov 2, 2022
274 Retweets 16 Quote Tweets 1,190 Likes
Czech Embassy The Hague on Twitter: " has filed a declaration of i... https://twitter.com/CzechEmbassyNL/status/1587794403611000836
Annex 6
14.11.2022, 03:02 Further actions in response to Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine | Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs
https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/further-actions-response-russias-illegal-invasion-ukraine 1/4
Home (/minister/penny-wong/home)
Media Releases (/minister/penny-wong/media-releases)
Transcripts (/minister/penny-wong/transcripts)
Speeches (/minister/penny-wong/speeches)
(/)
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Senator the Hon Penny Wong
What are you looking for?
Home (/)
>
Senator the Hon Penny Wong (/minister/penny-wong)
>
Further actions in response to Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine
Further actions in response to
Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine
Joint media release with:
Mark Dreyfus KC MP, Attorney-General
02 October 2022
The Australian Government will impose further costs on Russia for its unilateral, illegal and
immoral war on Ukraine.
Additional targeted financial sanctions and travel bans will be imposed on 28 Russian-appointed
separatists, ministers and senior officials.
Among them are individuals who are flouting international law to legitimise Russia's illegal actions
in Ukraine through sham referenda, disinformation and intimidation.
Annex 7
14.11.2022, 03:02 Further actions in response to Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine | Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs
https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/further-actions-response-russias-illegal-invasion-ukraine 2/4
Russia's sham referenda in occupied areas of Ukraine are illegitimate and have no legal effect.
The regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia are sovereign Ukrainian territory.
President Putin's annexation is illegal and any claims that these territories are now part of Russia
are baseless and false.
Australia has also filed an intervention in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case brought by
Ukraine against Russia, supporting Ukraine's claims Russia has violated the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention).
Australia continues to call on Russia to immediately comply with the ICJ's legally binding order of
16 March 2022 to immediately withdraw its military forces from Ukraine.
We remind Russia that as a member of the United Nations, Russia is legally obliged to comply
with decisions of the ICJ in any case to which it is a party.
Australia will continue to coordinate closely with our partners to impose high costs on those
responsible for Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Attributable to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong:
“These additional sanctions reinforce Australia's strong objection to the actions of
President Putin and those carrying out his orders.
“The areas of Ukraine currently occupied by Russian forces are the sovereign
territory of Ukraine. No sham referendum will change this.
Attributable to the Attorney-General, the Hon Mark Dreyfus KC MP:
“We stand with Ukraine in bringing these proceedings against Russia before the
International Court of Justice.
“Our intervention underscores our commitment to upholding fundamental rules
of international law and the integrity of the Genocide Convention.”
Media enquiries
Minister's office: (02) 6277 7500
DFAT Media Liaison: (02) 6261 1555
Denmark MFA
@DanishMFA
For første gang anmoder Danmark om at gå ind i en
sag mellem to andre stater ved Den Internationale
Domstol (ICJ) i Haag. Det sker for at støtte Ukraines
anklager om Ruslands falske beskyldninger om
folkedrab.
Læs mere her via.ritzau.dk/pressemeddelel…
#dkpol
10:47 AM · Sep 20, 2022 · Twitter Web App
9 Retweets 1 Quote Tweet 32 Likes
Tweet your reply Reply
Boom @hulledulle · Sep 20
Replying to @DanishMFA
Hvordan kan Jeppe Kofod vide at Ruslands anklager er falske, inden
domstolen har taget stilling til om anklagerne er falske?
1
Tweet
Denmark MFA on Twitter: "For første gang anmoder Danmark om ... https://twitter.com/DanishMFA/status/1572130256542375938
1 of 2 11/14/2022, 3:14 AM
Annex 8
Annex 8
Translation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Twitter, 20 September 2022, 10:47 AM, available
at: https://twitter.com/DanishMFA/status/1572130256542375938.
Tweet
Denmark MFA
@DanishMFA
For the first time, Denmark asks to intervene in a case between two other states at
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. It does so to support
Ukraine's accusations of Russia's false allegations of genocide.
Read more here https://via.ritzau.dk/pressemeddelelse/udenrigsministerjeppe-
kofod-ruslands-falske-anklager-om-folkedrab-skal-fordomstolen?
publisherId=2012662&releaseId=13659910
#dkpol
<Text in the attached picture>
It is quite extraordinary that there is such a big build-up to a case at the
International Court of Justice. It is important for me that we continue to show
unity to bring justice to Ukrainians.
JEPPE KOFOD
Minister for Foreign Affairs
<End of the text>
10:47 AM · Sep 20, 2022 · Twitter Web App
Denmark at NATO
@DK_NATO
is committed to support in their fight for
freedom and justice & has for the first time filed a
declaration of intervention to the International Court of
Justice to support concerning Russia's false
accusations of genocide #Standwithukraine #dkpol
Denmark MFA @DanishMFA · Sep 20
For første gang anmoder Danmark om at gå ind i en sag mellem to andre stater
ved Den Internationale Domstol (ICJ) i Haag. Det sker for at støtte Ukraines
anklager om Ruslands falske beskyldninger om folkedrab.
Læs mere her via.ritzau.dk/pressemeddelel…
#dkpol
4:33 PM · Sep 20, 2022 · Twitter Web App
7 Retweets 2 Quote Tweets 22 Likes
Tweet your reply Reply
Boerge R. Jensen @BoergeOf61 · Sep 20
Tweet
Denmark at NATO on Twitter: " is committed to support in their... https://twitter.com/DK_NATO/status/1572217446064349186
1 of 2 11/14/2022, 3:16 AM
Annex 9
Denmark MFA
@DanishMFA
Russia’s false charges of genocide in Ukraine must be
refuted in court. Denmark files declaration of
intervention to in the Ukraine vs. Russia
genocide case. will always defend the rule of law and
we are happy to see that already 12 nations support
in the ICJ #dkpol
@CIJ_ICJ
5:54 PM · Sep 20, 2022 · Twitter Web App
9 Retweets 28 Likes
Tweet your reply Reply
Elias Pindsvin @Elias_623 · Sep 20
Replying to @DanishMFA and @CIJ_ICJ
Tak Denmark!
2
Show additional replies, including those that may contain offensive
content Show
Tweet
Denmark MFA on Twitter: "Russia’s false charges of genocide in ... https://twitter.com/DanishMFA/status/1572237755177910276
1 of 2 11/14/2022, 3:18 AM
Annex 10
14.11.2022, 00:15 September - Minister Coveney on Ireland’s intervention at the International Court of Justice in Ukraine v Russia - Departmen…
https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/press-releases/press-release-archive/2022/september/minister-coveney-on-irelands-intervention-at-the-intern… 1/7
Skip to main content
<>
Minister Coveney on Ireland’s intervention at the International Court of Justice in Ukraine v
Russia
News
21 September 2022
Minister Coveney on Ireland’s intervention at the International Court of Justice in Ukraine v
Russian Federation
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Simon Coveney TD, today announced that Ireland has filed an
intervention at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a third party in the case taken by Ukraine
against the Russian Federation under the Genocide Convention.
Ukraine instituted proceedings against the Russian Federation in February. In its application to the
Court Ukraine argued that Russia falsely claimed that acts of genocide have occurred in the Luhansk
and Donetsk oblasts of Ukraine, and used this as a basis to recognise the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic
and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’, and to invade Ukraine.
On 16 March 2022, the Court made an order granting provisional measures requested by Ukraine,
including an order that Russia must suspend its military operations in Ukraine. To date Russia has
ignored the Court’s order for provisional measures. Russia did not participate in the hearing preceding
the Order of Provisional Measures and denies that the ICJ has jurisdiction to hear the case.
Ireland is entitled to intervene in the proceedings as a Party to the Genocide Convention. Ireland’s
intervention argues that the ICJ does have jurisdiction in this case and that the use of force by Russia
on the pretext of a false allegation of genocide in Ukraine is a serious violation of the Genocide
Convention.
The Minister said:
“As a party to the Genocide Convention and a strong defender of the international rules-based system
Ireland has a strong interest in ensuring that the Convention is properly interpreted and applied. The
ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and plays a key role underpinning that rulesbased
system. Intervention allows a country that is not a party to the case to support that system by
putting its legal interpretation of the Convention before the Court.
“Ireland is also firmly committed to ensuring accountability for serious breaches of international law,
including abuse of the Genocide Convention as a pretext for the illegal use of force against Ukraine.
As an elected member of the UN Security Council, we have consistently condemned Russian
aggression, co-sponsoring a landmark resolution at the General Assembly denouncing the invasion as
illegal, unjustified, and unprovoked. Ireland’s intervention in this case is a further demonstration of our
determination to ensure accountability.”
ENDS
Press Office
21 September 2022
Notes to editors
Annex 11
14.11.2022, 00:36 Estonia submits a declaration of intervention to International Court of Justice in the case of Ukraine versus Russia – Estonia …
https://un.mfa.ee/estonia-submits-a-declaration-of-intervention-to-international-court-of-justice-in-the-case-of-ukraine-versus-russia/ 1/16
Estonia in UN
Secondary menu
Search
en
Main menu
Estonia in the UN Security Council
Estonia and the UN
Mission and Contacts
Discover Estonia
Mobile menu
Menu
Estonia in the UN Security Council
Estonia and the UN
Mission and Contacts
Discover Estonia
Search
en
Estonia submits a declaration of intervention to International Court
of Justice in the case of Ukraine versus Russia
Share widget
Annex 12
14.11.2022, 00:36 Estonia submits a declaration of intervention to International Court of Justice in the case of Ukraine versus Russia – Estonia …
https://un.mfa.ee/estonia-submits-a-declaration-of-intervention-to-international-court-of-justice-in-the-case-of-ukraine-versus-russia/ 2/16
Posted on: 24.09.2022
Estonia submitted a declaration of intervention to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in relation to the
dispute between Ukraine and Russia on compliance with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide.
“Estonia, along with other parties to the Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide, would like to
intervene in the dispute between Ukraine and Russia because Russia’s aggression on the pretext of preventing
and punishing genocide has seriously undermined the meaning of such a horrible crime as genocide,” Foreign
Minister Urmas Reinsalu said, adding that the court must give an assessment on Russia’s actions and false
accusations.
Ukraine turned to the ICJ on 26 February, as Russia justified its invasion of Ukraine on 24 February with the
need to prevent and punish Ukraine for the genocide allegedly committed in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.
Reinsalu said it was a false pretext for recognising the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts as separate countries.
“Russia had no right to invade Ukraine, as there is no substance to Russia’s accusations that Ukraine has
committed genocide,” the minister added.
Ukraine turned to the ICJ to ask the court to state that there was no evidence of Ukraine committing genocide
in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine on the pretext of preventing
genocide is illegal. On 7 March, the court held a hearing but Russia did not attend the oral proceedings. On
16 March, the ICJ issued a provisional measure, stating that Russia must immediately stop the military
aggression it launched on 24 February. Russia has not complied with the decision so far.
The other countries that have filed a declaration of intervention are alongside Estonia are the United States,
United Kingdom, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, France, New Zealand, Romania and Sweden and some more
countries may join later.
Seotud uudised
14.11.2022, 00:14 Spain files a Declaration of Intervention with the International Court of Justice in the case of Ukraine vs. Russia
https://www.exteriores.gob.es/en/Comunicacion/Comunicados/Paginas/2022_COMUNICADOS/20220929_COMU062.aspx 6/25
Spain files a Declaration of Intervention with the
International Court of Justice in the case of Ukraine vs.
Russia
September 29, 2022
The Spanish Embassy in The Hague has filed a Declaration of Intervention by Spain with the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of Allegations of Genocide under the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine vs. the
Russian Federation).
On 26 February 2022, Ukraine filed an action before the International Court of Justice against
the Russian Federation that invoked the commission of genocide by the Ukrainian authorities
as the pretext to justify Russian military aggression against Ukraine. As a State Party to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Spain is entitled to
intervene in the process as an interested State. By taking this step, Spain joins other Member
States of the European Union, along with the United States and Canada, among others, that
have filed similar declarations. In its declaration, Spain argues that the ICJ has jurisdiction to
try this case.
Spain reiterates its strong condemnation of the military intervention of Ukraine by the Russian
Federation, which is a serious threat to international peace and security, and underlines its
commitment to the territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine.
Spain reaffirms its commitment to international law and, in particular, to the obligations of
States to not resort to threats or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State and to respect international law on human rights, to which end the
Convention on the Crime of Genocide is a fundamental text.
-NON OFFICIAL TRANSLATIONMore
information
Meeting with representatives of Venezuelan delegations
José Manuel Albares highlights feminist foreign policy as a hallmark of
Spain’s identity
Official Trip by Their Majesties the King and Queen to the Republic of
Croatia
Cessation of hostilities in Ethiopia
Victory by Lula Da Silva
Annex 13
16.10.2022, 21:31 Lithuania formally intervenes in a case at the International Court of Justice | Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Lithuania
https://tm.lrv.lt/en/news/lithuania-formally-intervenes-in-a-case-at-the-international-court-of-justice 1/3
My Government
Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Lithuania
Following Lithuania's formal application to intervene in the case Ukraine v. Russia at the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Minister of Justice Ewelina Dobrowolska stressed at a
press conference that this step is particularly important because in this case charges are made
against Russia, i.e., against the state but not against its individual citizens.
According to Ms Dobrowolska, if Russia is held liable in this case, this fact would allow Ukraine to
claim damages which is, among others, Ukraine's most important expectation that the Ukrainian
Minister of Justice has been raising in all international formats. The funds received as
Lithuania formally intervenes in a case at the International
Court of Justice
Date 2022 09 13
Rating 0
BDAR
Annex 14
16.10.2022, 21:31 Lithuania formally intervenes in a case at the International Court of Justice | Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Lithuania
https://tm.lrv.lt/en/news/lithuania-formally-intervenes-in-a-case-at-the-international-court-of-justice 2/3
compensation would help Ukrainians not only to rebuild the country but also to continue to
defend its freedom, sovereignty and democracy.
The Minister stressed that Lithuania is the first country to take legal aid initiatives to help Ukraine
in order to ensure that justice is not delayed.
The Vice Minister of Justice Gabija Grigaitė-Daugirdė noted at the press conference that
Lithuanian lawyers are working hand-in-hand with Ukrainian lawyers seeking to strengthen
Ukraine's legal struggle, to express support and to prove once again that the solutions of
international law do exist; however, it is important to mobilize efforts and make use of these
solutions without delay.
The Vice-Minister stressed that under international law, the International Court of Justice is the
only institution that can address issues concerning responsibility of a state.
„All members of the United Nations are bound by the decisions of this Court, so it is very
important that non-compliance with these decisions could be addressed by the United Nations
Security Council or the General Assembly; this raises hopes that Russia's responsibility for the
violation of international law will be established and that reparation for the damage done to
Ukraine will be guaranteed", - said Ms Grigaitė-Daugirdė.
As many as 43 European states and world powers as well as the entire EU have expressed their
intention to intervene in this case at the International Court of Justice thus condemning Russia's
military aggression and the international crimes Russia has committed.
In this case, Ukraine also asked the Court to establish interim measures, and on 16 March 2022,
the Court issued an order whereby it ordered to immediately cease the hostilities committed by
military units that are under the direct or indirect control of Russia. Failure to comply with this
judgment is a violation of international law.
War crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Russia are also investigated by the
International Criminal Court. Lithuania has proposed to the international community to consider
establishment of a Special Tribunal on Russia's aggression against Ukraine.
Also read
BDAR
14.10.2022, 15:49 NZ to join International Court of Justice case against Russia | Beehive.govt.nz
https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-join-international-court-justice-case-against-russia 1/3
Releases (/releases)
30 JUNE 2022
NZ to join International Court of Justice case
against Russia
HON DAVID PARKER(/MINISTER/HON-DAVID-PARKER)
HON NANAIA MAHUTA(/MINISTER/HON-NANAIA-MAHUTA)
Attorney-General (/portfolio/labour-2020-2023/attorney-general)
Foreign Affairs (/portfolio/labour-2020-2023/foreign-affairs)
Aotearoa New Zealand will join Ukraine’s case against Russia at the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
which challenges Russia’s spurious attempt to justify its invasion under international law.
Ukraine filed a case at the ICJ (https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/182) in February arguing Russia has
falsely claimed genocide had occurred in Luhansk and Donetsk regions, as a prelude to its so-called
‘special military operation’. Ukraine emphatically denies a genocide has occurred.
Attorney-General David Parker and Foreign Affairs Minister Nanaia Mahuta announced the government
has agreed to formally intervene as a third party in the case at the ICJ, the United Nations principal
judicial body based in The Hague.
“As a party to the Genocide Convention and a strong defender of the international rules-based system,
New Zealand has a real interest in ensuring the Genocide Convention is properly interpreted and
applied. Disputes between states should be resolved by peaceful means, including through the ICJ, and
not by the illegal use of force,” David Parker said.
“Intervention enables a country that is not a party to the case to put its legal views before the court,”
said Nanaia Mahuta.
SHARE THIS
Annex 15
14.10.2022, 15:49 NZ to join International Court of Justice case against Russia | Beehive.govt.nz
https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-join-international-court-justice-case-against-russia 2/3
“Aotearoa New Zealand has only taken such action at the ICJ once before, in Australia’s 2012 case
against Japanese whaling in the Southern Ocean.
“Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and disingenuous attempt to justify it under the Genocide
Convention is a significant threat to basic principles of international law, the United Nations Charter
and the rules-based international system on which New Zealand strongly relies.
“We are profoundly concerned about the loss of life and human suffering in Ukraine as a result of
Putin’s illegal invasion, and seek to emphasise that all countries must uphold the rules of international
law and the purpose and principles of the United Nations Charter.
“Aotearoa New Zealand is prepared to play its part in assisting Ukraine and has already done so
through a range of diplomatic, military and economic measures,” Nanaia Mahuta said.
Notes
An intervention would include making written and possibly oral submissions to ensure Aotearoa
New Zealand’s views on the proper interpretation and use of the Genocide Convention are on the
record.
Third Party Interventions will be filed after Ukraine files its substantive case, which is due by 23
September 2022. Ukraine’s case seeks to establish that no acts of genocide occurred in Luhansk and
Donetsk and that Russia has no lawful basis to its invasion.
Aotearoa New Zealand recently joined a Canada-led statement (https://www.canada.ca/en/globalaffairs/
news/2022/05/joint-statement-on-ukraines-application-against-russia-at-the-internationalcourt-
of-justice.html) along with more than 40 other countries which indicated those countries would
all consider the possibility of making a third party intervention to support Ukraine.
TOP
Beehive.govt.nz
Home (/)
Releases (/releases)
Speeches (/speeches)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Republic of Poland
Back
Poland filed a declaration of intervention to the
International Court of Justice in Ukraine’s case
against Russia
16.09.2022
On 15 September 2022, Poland filed a declaration of intervention to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in
Ukraine’s case against the Russian Federation over allegations of genocide under the 1948 UN Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. the Russian Federation).
With this act, Poland has joined – for the first time in its post-war history – contentious proceedings before the ICJ.
The declaration is part of Poland’s consistent policy of firmly condemning all unlawful actions by Russia and is an
expression of our support and solidarity for Ukraine. It complements other actions the Republic of Poland is
currently taking in this area, including referral of crimes committed in Ukraine to the International Criminal Court
and a request for intervention in the Ukrainian-Russian dispute before the European Court of Human Rights,
among others.
Poland’s intervention with the ICJ, in keeping with the formal requirements set out in Article 63 of the ICJ Statute,
concerns the interpretation of the Genocide Convention, in particular Articles I and IX. With reference to Article IX,
the Polish side stressed that this provision also applies to disputes in which a request is made that the ICJ declare
that the Convention has not been violated. Thus, if one state accuses another of genocide, the latter may ask the ICJ
to declare that the accusation is factually and legally unfounded. With reference to Article I, the Polish side
emphasized that unilateral and groundless accusations of genocide constitute an abuse of the Convention contrary
to its letter and spirit, and that the Convention requires that measures to prevent and punish the crime of genocide
be consistent with international law.
As of 15 September, apart from Poland, relevant declarations of intervention have been made by (in chronological
order) Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, Sweden,
Romania and France. The full text of the Polish intervention is available on the ICJ website: https://www.icj-cij.org
/en/case/182/intervention
Łukasz Jasina
MFA Spokesperson
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland
ADDRESS
J. Ch. Szucha 23
EN
MENU
gov.pl
Coronavirus: information and
recommendations
Trusted profile
Knowledge base
Civil service
Сайт для громадян України –
Service for Ukrainian citizens
My Gov
Home
Council of Ministers
The Chancellery of the Prime
Minister
Ministries
Offices, institutions
and offices of the RP
Services for citizens
Services for business
Services for officials
Services for farmers
Poland filed a declaration of intervention to the International Court of ... https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/poland-filed-a-declaration-of-inter...
1 of 2 10/12/2022, 9:38 PM
Annex 16
13.11.2022, 23:30 Sweden participating in two court cases concerning the war in Ukraine - Government.se
https://web.archive.org/web/20220921194249/https://www.government.se/press-releases/2022/09/sweden-participating-in-two-court-cases-conce… 1/2
Published 09 September 2022
Press release from Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Sweden participating in two court
cases concerning the war in
Ukraine
Sweden has chosen to intervene (participate) in two court
cases concerning Russia’s responsibility for violations of
international law. A case between Ukraine and Russia on
allegations of genocide is pending before the International
Court of Justice in The Hague. At the same time, the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg is hearing
an inter-state case against Russia concerning serious
violations of human rights during the war in Ukraine.
“Accountability for crimes committed in connection with Russia’s
aggression against Ukraine is a high priority for Sweden. Sweden has
therefore chosen to participate in several of the court cases currently
pending to hold Russia accountable,” says Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ann Linde.
Sweden is a party to the Genocide Convention and has chosen to
participate in the case brought by Ukraine against Russia in the
International Court of Justice earlier this year. A declaration of
intervention submitted to the Court today sets out Sweden’s view on
the questions of interpretation raised in the case.
The Wayback Machine - https://web.archive.org/web/20220921194249/http…
Annex 17
13.11.2022, 23:30 Sweden participating in two court cases concerning the war in Ukraine - Government.se
https://web.archive.org/web/20220921194249/https://www.government.se/press-releases/2022/09/sweden-participating-in-two-court-cases-conce… 2/2
The inter-state case before the European Court concerns widespread
and serious violations of human rights during the war in Ukraine. A key
question in the case is the extent to which Russia can be held legally
responsible under the European Convention on Human Rights for
events on Ukrainian territory. Yesterday, the Government decided that
Sweden should request leave to intervene in the case as a third party.
In both cases, Sweden will put forward positions that are in line with
those of Ukraine. For Sweden, it is of fundamental importance that
international law is respected, that accountability for acts of aggression
is ensured and that any potential war crimes are investigated.
Deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian objects are contrary to the
laws of war. Human rights and fundamental freedoms apply even in
wartime and must always be protected.
Press contact
Adriana Haxhimustafa
Press Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs Ann Linde
Phone (switchboard)
+46 8 405 10 00
Mobile
+46 76 117 32 60
email to Adriana Haxhimustafa, via senior registry clerk
14.11.2022, 00:08 Statement on behalf of the Baltic States at the United Nations 77th Session of the United Nations General Assembly | News …
https://www.urm.lt/missionny/en/news/statement-on-behalf-of-the-baltic-states-at-the-united-nations-77th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-as… 1/2
Created: 2022.10.27
/ Updated: 2022.10.27 21:38
News
Statement on behalf of the Baltic States at the United Nations 77th Session of the
United Nations General Assembly
Statement on behalf of the Baltic States at the United Nations 77th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Agenda item 70 “Report of the International
Court of Justice” on Thursday, October 27, 2022.
Mister President,
Distinguished Delegates,
I have the honor to speak today on behalf of the three Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia and my own country, Lithuania.
The Baltic States align with the statement made by the European Union and its Member States.
Firstly, we would like to thank President Joan E. Donoghue for presenting the report of the International Court of Justice covering the period 1 August 2021 – 31
July 2022. The Baltic States welcome the report and commend the important work of the Court.
During the reporting period the workload of the Court continued to increase due to diverse subject matter and a broad range of international law issues to be
resolved, as well as a widening geographical representation of the States addressing the Court. That proves once again the Court’s crucial role in adjudicating legal
disputes among the States, in promoting peaceful settlement of international disputes, developing international law, advancing the rule of law globally, and directly
contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security.
Therefore, we would like to express our appreciation for the dedicated daily work of the International Court of Justice and welcome the Court’s ongoing efforts in
improving its procedures and working methods, including by swiftly reacting and adopting prompt decisions in exceptional circumstances when addressing
particularly urgent situations.
Mister President,
We firmly believe that the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for international law must be the main guidance for the conduct of all States, as
enshrined in the United Nations Charter. In this regard, we reiterate our strong support to the preeminent role of the International Court of Justice as the principal
judicial organ of the United Nation and as reaffirmed in the Declaration on upholding and promoting respect for international law, including the principles of the UN
Charter, adopted by the European Union and its Member States in June 2022.
Mister President,
We believe that the role of the Court in promoting the rule of law, ensuring respect for international law, and maintaining international peace can be reinforced by
widening the application of its jurisdiction. We consider that further universal acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court needs to be enhanced and, therefore, we
call on all UN Member States that have not yet done so to accept the jurisdiction of the Court, to enhance its universal reach, as also called upon by the General
Assembly most recently last year in the Resolution 76/117.
Moreover, in order to ensure successful judicial resolution of disputes it is not sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the Court. International justice can only be
pursued and the rule of law upheld by immediate and full implementation of binding rulings and decisions of the Court, including orders on provisional measures.
Therefore, besides reminding the legal obligation of all States involved in a dispute before the Court to completely and unconditionally implement final rulings, as
well as any provisional measures indicated by the Court, we believe international community should also find means to ensure that decisions of the Court are
executed.
Mister President,
The report of the ICJ evidently illustrates that States making recourse to the International Court of Justice are confident that the Court with its universal character,
unique mandate, impartiality and integrity, authoritative value of its decisions, high legal standards, vast expertise and comprehensive jurisprudence, is a pillar of
the rules-based international order and plays a vital role in the peaceful settlement of disputes.
We, the Baltic States, remain confident that the Court will continue to successfully perform its crucial mandate in ensuring justice and contributing to stability and
peace in the world. The war of aggression of Russia against Ukraine very poignantly demonstrates the need of the ICJ to deliver on its mandate.
Mister President,
As a final remark, we would like to touch upon a pending ICJ case Ukraine v. Russian Federation under the Genocide Convention, where Ukraine seeks to establish
that Russia has no lawful basis for ongoing, unprovoked and brutal military invasion of Ukraine on the grounds of unsubstantiated allegations of genocide. We
commend the Court for initiating speedy proceedings and swift issuing of an order on provisional measures on 16 March 2022, which orders Russia to immediately
cease its military actions that it commenced on 24 February 2022 in the territory of Ukraine. We welcome this legally binding order and strongly urge Russia to
comply with it, as highlighted together with other like-minded states in the declaration of May 2022 and noted by the European Council in March.
Reaffirming our commitment to the rules-based international order and wishing to assist the ICJ in the administration of justice, the Baltic States, like many other
States, have already filed their declarations of intervention as third parties in this case. The aim of the intervening contracting States of the Genocide Convention,
while not having any interests of their own but merely having a common interest, is to assist the Court, as to the interpretation, application and fulfillment of the
Genocide Convention and shed light on the extent of the obligations of the State parties. In this context, we encourage other contracting States, who have not yet
done so, to consider intervention in the case.
Lastly, assuring justice and accountability is of vital importance to the credibility of the UN and its principle judicial organ. We, the Baltic States, reaffirm our strong
and continued support to the mandate and activities of the Court on peaceful settlement of disputes and ensuring rules-based international order.
I thank you.
Permanent Mission of
Lithuania to the United
Nations in New York Annex 18
1
Annex 19
Transcript
UN Web TV, General Assembly: 21st plenary meeting, 77th session, 27 October 2022,
available at: https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1z/k1z9kavn6u.
77th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
Statement of Ukraine on the Report of the International Court of Justice
(01:49:24)
Mr President, distinguished Colleagues,
I would like to provide a brief overview of the state of play and the most recent developments
regarding the two cases Ukraine brought versus the Russia in the International Court of Justice.
These cases represent the center piece of the overarching and multifaceted legal response of
Ukraine towards the unjustified and unprovoked military aggression that Russia has waged against
my country back in 2014.
Since then, (01:50:00) since Russia tried to commit a brutal land grab of the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol of Ukraine, my country adherently referred to instruments of
international law seeking to protect its rights and legitimate interests.
First, after a lengthy time and effort consuming pre-trial settlement procedures commenced
practically at the inception of the Russian aggression, on January 16, 2017, Ukraine has filed its
first Application instituting proceedings in the ICJ. The Application is based on allegation that
Russia violates the Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism of 1999 and the
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965. In essence, Ukraine
claims that Russia is failing to prevent the financing of terrorism in Ukraine, including by provision
of Russian weapons (01:51:00) to groups engaged in terrorism, such as supply of Buk that was
used to shoot down the MH-17, and that Russia is engaged in a systematic campaign of cultural
erasure in the occupied Crimea against the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian ethnic communities. On
19 April 2017 the Court issued an Order on Ukraine’s request for the indication of provisional
measures. The Order required Russia, among other things, to “refrain from maintaining or
imposing limitations on ability of the Crimean Tatar community to preserve its representative
institution including the Mejlis” and the… and to “ensure the availability of education in Ukrainian
language”. 19 April 2017 - this is the first (01:52:00) date that I kindly ask you to memorize –
there will be just three days I’ll ask you to keep in mind. On 8 October 2019 the Court issued the
Decision that it has jurisdiction to hear this case on the merits. By now the Parties have already
held the first round of exchange of written documents, the second round has been found also
2
necessary. Thus, the Court has fixed April 8, 2022 for the Reply of Ukraine and 8 December 2022
for the Rejoinder of Russian Federation. Despite the ongoing full-scale invasion of the Russian
forces of Ukraine on 24 February we pulled ourselves together and showed resilience not only in
warfare, but also in lawfare. We requested extension and filed our Reply just three weeks later
than original deadline. Russian Rejoinder is due on 19 January 2023. Noteworthy, in short
aftermath of 24 February (01:53:00) invasion, the international legal team defending Russia in this
case led by large by professor Alain Pellet has resigned, at least publicly.
Second, just two days after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, on 26 February 2022,
Ukraine filed its second Application to the International Court of Justice. This case concerns
Russia’s accusations of genocide against the Russian speaking population in Ukraine under the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. At the same time Ukraine
filed a request for the indication of provisional measures. On 16 March 2022, the Court has issued
an Order that required Russia, among other things, to “immediately suspend the hostilities
launched on February 24, 2022 aimed at preventing and punishing genocide in (01:54:00) Lugansk
and Donetsk regions of Ukraine” and “to ensure that any military or irregular armed formations,
any organizations, persons controlled, supported and under the influence of Russia do not take any
measures to carry out the so-called “military operation”. 16 March 2022 is the second date I kindly
ask you to keep in mind for a short period of time. Ukraine has already filed its Memorial in this
case on 1st July 2022, almost three months in advance of established deadline. On 3rd October 2022
Russia submitted its Preliminary Objection on jurisdiction. But between those two dates indeed an
unprecedented event in the history of ICJ has happened. Between those two dates seventeen States
from different parts of the (01:55:00) world have filed their interventions into this case. Latvia,
Lithuania, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States of America, Sweden,
France, Romania, Poland, Italy, Denmark, Ireland, Finland, Estonia, Spain, and Australia. Just
during October, five more countries were added to this honorable list: Portugal, Austria, Greece,
Luxembourg, and Croatia. Thus, the total number of interventions in this case, as of now, is twentytwo.
We know that more interventions are coming. I would like to express sincere gratitude to
those countries who decided to stand beside us in the World Court, especially on behalf of
Ukraine’s legal team, that I represent here. We shall continue working together on this case. Apart
from that I call on and strongly encourage those countries, who believe in rule of law and are
parties to the (01:56:00) Genocide Convention, consider intervening into our case. Together we
can form a coalition that upholds a rules-based, not force-based world order. Only a rules-based
order can provide for peace and prosperity of States that are equal in their sovereignty and
3
independence. Ukraine sees no viable arguments against interventions and is ready to assist in all
possible ways.
As I about to conclude, I would like to remind you two of the three days I kindly ask you to keep
in memory - 19 April 2017 and 16 March 2022. More than five and a half years has passed since
the former and more than eight months has passed since the latter. This is exactly how much time
the Russian Federation is in violation of the binding Orders of the International Court of Justice.
Five and a half years and more than eight months. (01:57:00) Just hours after the ICJ delivered its
Order on preliminary measures in the Alleged Genocide case, the official spokesman for Kremlin
has publicly and unequivocally declared that Russia is not going to abide by the Order. Came it no
surprise for us, as at that time the Russia was ignorant to previous Order for almost five years. The
massive occasionally spilled ink on the page was Article 41 of the Statute of the Court.
So, the third and the final date I kindly ask you to keep in mind is the date when Russia shall finally
comply with the Orders of the ICJ. On that day we shall all become just one step closer to the
rules-based order, to peace, to equality, to fulfillment of aims of this organization. Whether this
day arrives sooner or later, depends on you, my dear Colleagues. Just keep these dates in mind and
keep working on it.
Thank you, Mr President.
(01:58:00)
14.11.2022, 00:09 Udenrigsminister Jeppe Kofod: Ruslands falske anklager om folkedrab skal for domstolen | Udenrigsministeriet
https://via.ritzau.dk/pressemeddelelse/udenrigsminister-jeppe-kofod-ruslands-falske-anklager-om-folkedrab-skal-for-domstolen?publisherId=2012… 1/4
Udenrigsminister Jeppe Kofod: Ruslands falske anklager
om folkedrab skal for domstolen
19.9.2022 19:30:00 CEST | Udenrigsministeriet
Del
For første gang anmoder Danmark om at gå ind i en sag mellem to andre stater ved
Den Internationale Domstol (ICJ) i Haag.
For første gang anmoder Danmark om at gå ind i en sag mellem to andre stater ved Den
Internationale Domstol (ICJ) i Haag. Det sker for at støtte Ukraine, som anklager Rusland for
at komme med falske beskyldninger om folkedrab for at retfærdiggøre sit angreb mod
Ukraine. Rusland er i forbindelse med invasionen af Ukraine gentagne gange kommet med
usande anklager om folkedrab mod den russiske befolkning i regionerne Donetsk og
Luhansk.
- Ruslands brutale overgreb på Ukraine skal stoppe, og Putins forsøg på at manipulere
virkeligheden og misbruge folkedrabskonventionen skal blotlægges. Derfor skal vi støtte
Ukraine – både i kampzonen og nu her i retslokalet – og det er derfor, vi går ind i sagen ved
at anmode om at fremlægge Danmarks syn på, hvordan konventionen skal fortolkes, siger
udenrigsminister Jeppe Kofod.
Der er massiv opbakning til Ukraine i denne proces. I juli tilsluttede 42 stater, inklusive
Danmark, sig en politisk erklæring til støtte for Ukraine i den anlagte sag.
- Det er helt ekstraordinært, at der er så stor opbakning til en sag ved Den
Internationale Domstol. Det er vigtigt for mig, at vi fortsat udviser sammenhold for at skabe
retfærdighed for ukrainerne. Det er også derfor, at Danmark i foråret gik forrest for at danne
en tværregional gruppe af FN-medlemsstater, som arbejder for at fastholde internationalt
fokus på at sikre ansvar for forbrydelser begået i Ukraine som følge af Ruslands invasion,
udtaler Jeppe Kofod.
Baggrund om intervention ved Den Internationale Domstol (ICJ)
Både Ukraine og Rusland har tiltrådt FN’s folkedrabskonvention fra 1948. Ukraine har den 26.
februar 2022 anlagt sag mod Rusland ved ICJ.
LOG IN
Annex 20
14.11.2022, 00:09 Udenrigsminister Jeppe Kofod: Ruslands falske anklager om folkedrab skal for domstolen | Udenrigsministeriet
https://via.ritzau.dk/pressemeddelelse/udenrigsminister-jeppe-kofod-ruslands-falske-anklager-om-folkedrab-skal-for-domstolen?publisherId=2012… 2/4
Domstolen skal tage stilling til om, at Ruslands angreb på Ukraine var baseret på falske
anklager om folkedrab, og om det er misbrug af folkedrabskonventionen. Den 16. marts 2022
besluttede ICJ foreløbigt, at Rusland øjeblikkeligt skulle suspendere den militære operation i
Ukraine, hvilket Rusland ikke har efterlevet.
De øvrige stater, som har tiltrådt folkedrabskonventionen, kan bede Domstolen om lov til at
fremlægge deres fortolkning af konventionen. Det har Danmark gjort, og det er første gang,
at der tages et sådan dansk skridt i en retssag ved ICJ.
Information om Udenrigsministeriet
Udenrigsministeriet
Asiatisk Plads 2
1448 København K
33 92 00 00
http://um.dk/
Følg pressemeddelelser fra Udenrigsministeriet
Skriv dig op her, og modtag pressemeddelelser på e-mail. Indtast din e-mail, klik på
abonner, og følg instruktionerne i den udsendte e-mail.
Flere pressemeddelelser fra Udenrigsministeriet
ABONNER
Dansk vare- og tjenesteeksport i september 2022
9.11.2022 16:23:02 CET | Pressemeddelelse
I september faldt Danmarks samlede eksport 3,5 pct. og årsvæksten steg til 32,5 pct.
Global varehandel steg 0,7 pct. i august i forhold til juli. Årsvækstraten faldt til 4,9
pct.
27.10.2022 11:50:18 CEST | Pressemeddelelse
Annex 20
Translation
Via Ritzau, Foreign Minister Jeppe Kofod: Russia's false accusations of genocide must go
to court (19 September 2022), available at:
https://via.ritzau.dk/pressemeddelelse/udenrigsminister-jeppe-kofod-ruslands-falskeanklager-
om-folkedrab-skal-for-domstolen?publisherId=2012662&releaseId=13659910.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign Minister Jeppe Kofod: Russia's false accusations of genocide must go
to court
19.9.2022 19:30:00 CEST | Ministry of Foreign Affairs
For the first time, Denmark seeks to intervene in a case between two other states at the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Hague.
For the first time, Denmark seeks to intervene in a case between two other states at the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Hague. It is doing so to support Ukraine, which accuses
Russia of making false allegations of genocide to justify its attack on Ukraine. Russia has
repeatedly made false allegations of genocide against the Russian population in the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions during its invasion of Ukraine.
- Russia's brutal aggression against Ukraine must stop, and Putin's attempts to manipulate
reality and abuse the Genocide Convention must be exposed. That is why we must support
Ukraine - both in the combat zone and now here in the courtroom - and that is why we are
entering the case by providing Denmark's views on how the Convention should be interpreted,
says Foreign Minister Jeppe Kofod.
There is massive support for Ukraine in this process. In July, 42 states, including Denmark,
signed a political declaration in support of Ukraine in the pending case.
- It is quite extraordinary that there is so much support for a case at the International Court
of Justice. It is important for me that we continue to show unity to create justice for Ukrainians.
That is also why Denmark took the lead in the spring to form a cross-regional group of UN
member states working to uphold international focus on ensuring accountability for crimes
committed in Ukraine as a result of Russia's invasion, says Jeppe Kofod.
Background on intervention before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Both Ukraine and Russia have ratified the 1948 UN Genocide Convention. On 26 February
2022, Ukraine brought an action against Russia before the ICJ.
The Court must decide whether Russia's attack on Ukraine was based on false allegations of
genocide and whether it is an abuse of the Genocide Convention. On 16 March 2022, the ICJ
provisionally ruled that Russia should immediately suspend the military operation in Ukraine,
which Russia has not complied with.
Other states that have ratified the Genocide Convention may ask the Court for permission to
present their interpretation of the Convention. Denmark has done so, and this is the first time,
Denmark has taken such a step in a case before the ICJ.
Information about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Asiatisk Plads 2
1448 Copenhagen K
33 92 00 00
http://um.dk/
15.11.2022, 01:53 less-a-wave-than-a-tsunami_voelkerrechtsblog
https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/less-a-wave-than-a-tsunami/# 1/3
Article
Less a Wave Than a Tsunami
Procedural Implications for the ICJ of the Article 63 Interventions
in Ukraine v. Russia
11.10.2022
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) faces an unprecedented procedural situation in the Ukraine v. Russia
case, as a result of the never-before-seen number of states intervening in the case pursuant to Article 63 of
the Court’s Statute.
Before Russia had even filed its preliminary objections 17 states had filed declarations of intervention. The
European Union (EU) has also furnished the Court with ‘relevant information’ pursuant to Article 34(2) of
the Court’s Statute. The latest intervention at the time of writing came from Portugal, making 18 in total. So
far.
This post addresses some of the procedural implications arising from this, with a particular focus on the
management of oral proceedings. The Court will need to be wary that it does not allow the sheer weight of
the number of interventions to overshadow the parties to the case.
Article 63 Interventions
While contentious proceedings before the Court are usually bilateral, the Statute in Article 63 grants a right
to States to intervene in a contentious case when they are party to a multilateral treaty that will be interpreted
in the Court’s judgment. Article 63 states, in full: “1. Whenever the construction of a convention to which
states other than those concerned in the case are parties is in question, the Registrar shall notify all such
states forthwith. 2. Every state so notified has the right to intervene in the proceedings; but if it uses this
right, the construction given by the judgment will be equally binding upon it.”
Article 63 interventions are incidental proceedings, governed by procedures under Articles 81-86 of the
Rules of Court. As an incidental proceeding, the original parties’ consent is not required to admit the
intervenor to the proceedings; the Court’s competence derives directly from the Statute and can be exercised
even in the face of opposition from the parties. Article 63 intervention results in a judgment that binds parties
and intervenors alike.
However, although Article 63 intervention is a “right”, the Court retains the power to decide whether or not
the conditions in Article 63 have been fulfilled, and thus whether an intervention is “admissible”. To that
end, it is worth observing that every intervening state in Ukraine v. Russia has emphasized their “right” to
intervene at this stage of the case and make submissions on questions of jurisdiction. It will be difficult for
the Court, in the face of such overwhelming concurrence between states, to deny them the exercise of this
right and declare the interventions premature and inadmissible, such as occurred in Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, when the Court decided to reject El Salvador’s Article 63
declaration on the basis that application was untimely for being made in the jurisdictional phase of the
proceedings.
An Unprecedented Procedural Moment
Proceeding on the assumption that these declarations will be held admissible, the Court has never had to
grapple with such a vast number of intervenors. In only one previous case have multiple states attempted to
intervene at the same time. In the Request for an Examination of the Situation (New Zealand v. France) case,
the Solomon Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Samoa all filed
identically-worded interventions on the basis of both Article 63 and Article 62. Samoan diplomat Tuiloma
Annex 21
15.11.2022, 01:53 less-a-wave-than-a-tsunami_voelkerrechtsblog
https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/less-a-wave-than-a-tsunami/# 2/3
Neroni Slade was appointed as Agent for all four States. On this basis, despite the somewhat awkward use of
separate-but-identical written declarations, one can infer that the Pacific states would have been able to make
a single set of observations during the oral proceedings. However, the Court took no action in respect of the
interventions before the case was dismissed.
Management of the Oral Proceedings
As such, there is no precedent for the Court regarding how to manage multiple intervenors, particularly
during the oral phase of proceedings. The Court’s Rules governing oral proceedings in Article 60(1) require
that “oral statements made on behalf of each party shall be as succinct as possible within the limits of what is
requisite for the adequate presentation of that party’s contentions at the hearing”. This is bolstered by the
Court’s Practice Direction VI, which firmly requests “full compliance” with Article 60(1) regarding brevity
in oral pleadings. It is to be noted that formally, these Rules only apply to the parties, which intervenors are
not. However, there is no doubt that the Court will expect intervening States to adopt a similar rigorous
attitude to verbosity.
At the same time there are Rules concerning the right of intervention that will govern how the Court is to
manage proceedings. First, Article 84(2) requires that an entirely separate round of hearings be held on the
question of the admissibility of a declaration of intervention where an objection is filed. Second, Article
86(2) requires that:
“The intervening State shall be entitled, in the course of the oral proceedings, to submit its
observations with respect to the subject-matter of the intervention.”
The language of this provision is mandatory. That is, if a state’s intervention is admissible, it has a right to
make submissions during the oral proceedings. In the ordinary course, the Court holds two rounds of oral
hearings for each stage of the case. That amounts to a minimum of four rounds of oral hearings: two for
jurisdiction and two for merits (should we get there), plus potentially another two rounds in respect of the
question of admissibility of the declarations. Further rounds of hearings are also on occasion held to address
questions from the bench. Within each of those phases, two sets of oral argument by the parties are usually
followed by one or two rounds of oral argument from the intervenors, followed again by the parties with
their observations on the intervenor submissions. It is easy to see how, as noted by Brian McGarry, even a
single intervention can ‘add months or even years to the life of a case’.
The Court is familiar with managing large numbers of states in hearings for Advisory Opinions. During the
Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 hearings no less
than 22 states appeared, as well as representatives of the African Union. In standard advisory proceedings,
there is a single round of hearings and the oral submissions are significantly shorter.
The problem for the Court in Ukraine v. Russia is that these case management principles cannot be adopted
without due consideration for the fact that this is a contentious case between two main parties. In seeking to
manage the sheer volume of intervenors, the Court cannot do away with the basic protections regarding the
administration of justice in respect of the original parties. In advisory proceedings, there are no parties, so the
Court is entitled to treat all states equally. In this case, there are formal parties, and a distinction should be
drawn between them and the intervenors. For example, the Court cannot hold only a single round of hearings
and thus deprive Ukraine and Russia of the opportunity to make their rejoinder to the other party’s
submissions.
One means of addressing this situation could be to restrict the intervenors to one round of oral argument
only, while the parties have the right to a second round of hearings to address their opponent’s arguments. A
further potential mechanism includes asking the intervening states to make their submissions in concert,
although so far only Spain, Germany, Sweden, Poland and Denmark have indicated their willingness to do
so.
The World v. Russia
This leads to another issue; the requirement for the Court to ensure procedural fairness and equality of arms
between the parties.
15.11.2022, 01:53 less-a-wave-than-a-tsunami_voelkerrechtsblog
https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/less-a-wave-than-a-tsunami/# 3/3
It is clear that all of the intervenors come in support of Ukraine. All argue that the Court has jurisdiction to
make a negative declaration in favour of Ukraine, to the effect that Ukraine has not committed any acts of
genocide. Many also make arguments regarding the merits of the case, including that the Genocide
Convention does not permit Russia to use military force to either prevent or punish genocide. No intervenor
makes a case in favour of Russia.
The Court has previously taken the view that intervention to support a party’s particular interpretation of the
relevant treaty is permissible. In the most recent intervention admitted under Article 63, that of New Zealand
in Whaling in the Antarctic, the Court confirmed that Article 63 interventions “cannot affect the equality of
the parties to the dispute”, because the intervenor cannot acquire the status of a party. Japan’s contention that
Australia and New Zealand were, for all intents and purposes, parties in the same interest “pursuing what
may in effect be a joint case” received minimal attention. Sweden, Australia, Spain, New Zealand, and
Romania have each made this point in their declarations of intervention.
The present case tends to suggest that although intervention was not intended to be a mechanism for ‘taking
sides’, Article 63 interventions can be a way for States to communally condemn breaches of international
obligations deemed of sufficient importance. Arguably, it’s largely performative, with a reasonably small
price to pay where the obligations in question are unlikely to be interpreted in ways that could adversely
affect the intervening States future actions.
But for the respondent, it means being faced with what in practice is a 19-to-1 battle. In the interests of
fairness, and its own institutional legitimacy, the Court needs to be conscious of this when making orders for
the conduct of the case. It would seem unduly formal to merely declare that 18 one-sided Article 63
interventions could not affect the equality of the parties to the dispute, and leave it at that.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Court will likely echo the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in
Mavrommatis when it said that: “[t]he Court, whose jurisdiction is international, is not bound to attach to
matters of form the same degree of importance which they might possess in municipal law.” The Court has a
certain amount of procedural flexibility, that it will no doubt rely on in this case. At the same time, however,
the Court must ensure that the basic standards of procedural fairness are upheld in respect of the parties, no
matter how many intervenors become involved.
Cite as
Juliette McIntyre, Less a Wave Than a Tsunami: Procedural Implications for the ICJ of the Article 63
Interventions in Ukraine v. Russia,
Völkerrechtsblog,
11.10.2022, doi: 10.17176/20221011-110234-0.
FORUM: RUSSIA’S WAR ON UKRAINE
Beyond the False Claim of Genocide: Preliminary Reflections
on Ukraine’s Prospects in Its Pursuit of Justice at the ICJ
Iryna Marchuka and Aloka Wanigasuriyab
aFaculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark; bCentre for Law & Social Justice,
Newcastle Law School, University of Newcastle (Australia), Newcastle, Australia
Introduction and Significance of the Case
The word “genocide” is not used lightly when it is invoked in the context of proceedings
before international courts and tribunals. Responsibility for genocide, be it individual
criminal responsibility or state responsibility, is notoriously difficult to prove as the genocidal
intent of perpetrators upon which both forms of responsibility are predicated, tends
to often be somewhat elusive. When Ukraine initiated a lawsuit against the Russian Federation
(Russia) before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) merely two days after
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it was initially assumed that Ukraine accused Russia of engaging
in genocide against the Ukrainian people. However, in an unexpected twist, Ukraine
sought for Russia to be held accountable for violating the terms of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) by using
the purported “genocide in Donbas” as the pretext for launching a full-scale war
against Ukraine disguised as a “special military operation.”1 In other words, Ukraine
claimed that Russia breached its obligation to prevent and punish genocide by advancing
a false claim of genocide in order to justify its aggression against Ukraine.
This is the first “false claim of genocide” case in the history of the ICJ, given that in previous
cases the claimants argued that a wrongdoing state had breached the Genocide
Convention by engaging in genocide against protected groups. Ukraine’s argument is
twofold in that it claims: (1) as a matter of fact, Ukraine has not engaged in genocide
in Donbas; and, (2) as a matter of law, there is no legal basis for Russia to use force
against Ukraine as a means of fulfilling its purported obligation to prevent and punish
genocide under Article I of the Genocide Convention.2 The case is notable for many
reasons. First, Ukraine attempts to combat the Kremlin’s propaganda and disinformation
about Ukrainians allegedly committing “genocide” in Donbas in a court of law. Second,
Ukraine highlights the abuse of international instruments that were adopted after
World War II (WWII) with a view to protecting humankind from the horrors of war and
the Holocaust in the future. This points towards the larger issue of Russia resorting to
the abuse of fundamental concepts of international law, such as humanitarian intervention,
responsibility to protect (R2P), self-defence, self-determination, etc., to justify its
© 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Iryna Marchuk [email protected] Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, Karen Blixens Plads
16, Building 6A (Afsnit 3), 2300 Copenhagen, Denmark
1 International Court of Justice, Allegations of Genocide Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Application Instituting Proceedings, 26 February 2022 (hereinafter –
ICJ Ukraine Application), para. 2.
2 Ibid., para. 3.
JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH
https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2022.2143528
Annex 22
warmongering actions in its neighbouring satellite states.3 The protection of the Russianspeaking
population has become a common denominator in the Russian narratives that
have been promoted over the last years. The “genocide” rhetoric in Ukraine by the
Kremlin is nothing new, as Russia earlier accused Georgia of alleged “genocide” against
South Ossetians during the 2008 war and commenced investigations into alleged genocide
through its Investigative Committee.4 The same modus operandi was replicated with
respect to Ukraine when Russia began circulating disinformation about the alleged genocide
in Donbas by Ukrainians.5
Third, the case has been supported by 42 states that expressed their solidarity with
Ukraine in denying Russian claims of genocide as an excuse to use force against
Ukraine, and stated that they are considering an intervention in the proceedings.6 At
the time of writing, 22 States have filed Article 63 interventions with the Court
seeking the clarification of issues pertinent to the construction of the Genocide Convention
in the given case.7 Further declarations of intervention by other states are likely to
roll in. In August 2022, the EU in its capacity as a public international organization, furnished
the ICJ with relevant information in support of Ukraine’s case pursuant to Article
34(2) of the Statute of the Court and Article 69(2) of the Rules of Court.8 Such unprecedented
mass support for an ICJ claimant state is rare and signifies the united
stance of the international community in its efforts to prevent the abuse of the Genocide
Convention. While third-party interventions have been welcomed by the Ukrainian
government,9 it is important to bear in mind that they may result in further extending
the length of the proceedings, as the ICJ now has to consider submissions from multiple
intervening states.10 However, as observed by international law pundits, such interventions
also entail potential positives by “creat[ing] opportunities to make
complementary legal arguments.”11
This article will situate Russia’s false claim of genocide within a broader discussion on
the relationship between genocide and the use of force under international law, and
reflect on the potential handling of such issues by the ICJ. It will provide a recap of
3 Iryna Marchuk, “Russia, International Law and the International Court of Justice,” in Research Handbook on the International
Court of Justice, ed. Achilles Skordas (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming 2022).
4 Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, “Interview of the Chairperson of the Investigative Committee of
the Prosecution Office of the Russian Federation A.I. Bastrykin for Journal ‘Orientir’,” Investigative Committee of the
Russian Federation, 31 August 2009, https://sledcom.ru/press/interview/item/507343/ (accessed 1 September 2022)
(in Russian).
5 Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, “Russian Investigative Committee: All Persons Who Committed
Crimes on the Territory of Donbas Will Be Identified and Held Accountable,” Investigative Committee of the Russian
Federation, 19 March 2022, https://sledcom.ru/news/item/1665761/ (accessed 1 September 2022) (in Russian).
6 UK Government: Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, “Ukraine’s Application Against Russia Before the
International Court of Justice: Joint Statement,” 20 May 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ukrainejoint-
statement-on-ukraines-application-against-russia-before-the-international-court-of-justice (accessed 1 September
2022).
7 International Court of Justice, Intervention, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/182/intervention (accessed 24 October
2022).
8 International Court of Justice, Information furnished by the European Union, 18 August 2022.
9 Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Twitter, 20 May 2022, https://twitter.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1527625956038524933
(accessed 1 September 2022).
10 Brian McGarry, “Mass Intervention?: The Joint Statement of 41 States on Ukraine v. Russia,” EJIL:Talk!, 30 May 2022,
https://www.ejiltalk.org/mass-intervention-the-joint-statement-of-41-states-on-ukraine-v-russia/ (accessed 1 September
2022).
11 Mike Becker, Twitter, 3 September 2020, https://mobile.twitter.com/mabecker17/status/1301240928141705221
(accessed 1 September 2022).
2 I. MARCHUK AND A. WANIGASURIYA
major arguments advanced by intervening states in Art. 63 declarations, and highlight
substantive and procedural issues arising out of such declarations that the ICJ will have
to grapple with. It will further analyse Ukraine’s prospects of extending its claim
beyond the false claim of genocide by advancing the argument that Russia breached
the Genocide Convention by committing genocide in such areas as Bucha, Mariupol
and Izyum. It will also highlight how the Russian practice of forcible transfer of children
from the occupied territories to Russia bears all the hallmarks of an organized genocidal
campaign.
Genocide and the Use of Force Under International Law
Ukraine’s claim on the factual absence of genocide in Donbas is intertwined with its
legal argument on the prohibition of the use of force under the pretext of upholding
the values contained in the Genocide Convention. Taking a step back from Ukraine’s
case regarding the false claim of genocide, it is necessary to note that the relationship
between the use of force and genocide is complex. The much debated R2P doctrine
was articulated during the UN World Summit that challenged the conventional prohibition
on the use of force laid down in the UN Charter.12 Hence, it was recognized that
in exceptional circumstances, collective military action may be warranted (R2P Third
Pillar) if national authorities are manifestly failing to protect populations from genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.13 However, such
action has to be authorised by the UN Security Council (UNSC), a political body
mostly unable to agree on matters of peace and security, whose work has often
been hampered by individual permanent five (P5) states using their veto power. The
conflict in Libya was the only instance in which the R2P doctrine was used in order
to authorise collective military action in response to the brutality of the Gaddafi
regime towards the Libyan population.14 However, the doctrine failed to garner the
necessary support for a collective military response in Syria. This was despite the enormous
human suffering endured by Syrians, even when the red line of using chemical
weapons had been crossed by the Assad regime.15 Russia vetoed any attempt to
invoke the R2P doctrine in relation to Syria at the UNSC and was backed by its strongest
ally, China.16 However, despite Russia’s portrayal and dismissal of the R2P doctrine
as a Western invention to justify neo-colonial ambitions, it has been keen to seize the
opportunity to invoke the doctrine in order to justify its ever-increasing imperial appetite
for power by engaging in land grabbing in neighbouring satellite states.17 Russia
has done so by emphasizing the need to “protect” and “liberate” the Russian-speaking
12 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/Res/60/1, 24 October 2005, paras 138–140.
13 Ibid., para. 139.
14 UNSC Resolution 1973 (2011), S/RES/1973 (2011), 17 March 2011.
15 United Nations, “‘Clear and Convincing’ Evidence of Chemical Weapons Use in Syria, UN Team Reports,” UN News, 16
September 2013, https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/09/449052-clear-and-convincing-evidence-chemical-weaponsuse-
syria-un-team-reports (accessed 1 September 2022); Human Rights Watch, “Death by Chemicals: The Syrian Government’s
Widespread and Systematic Use of Chemical Weapons,” 1 May 2017, Human Rights Watch, https://www.
hrw.org/report/2017/05/01/death-chemicals/syrian-governments-widespread-and-systematic-use-chemicalweapons
(accessed 1 September 2022).
16 Richard Croker, “Russia’s Justification for Using Its Veto on Syria is Pure Fiction,” UK Government, 21 July 2022, https://
www.gov.uk/government/speeches/russias-justification-for-using-its-veto-on-syria-is-pure-fiction (accessed 1 September
2022).
17 Marchuk, “Russia, International Law and the International Court of Justice.”
JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 3
communities in these states from “genocide,” an argument which it rehashed and
replicated in the Ukrainian context.18
The Kremlin’s official statements on the purported genocide in Donbas, as well as the
initiation of criminal proceedings by the Russian Investigative Committee on charges of
genocide have been referred to by the ICJ when making findings on the existence of a
dispute between Russia and Ukraine regarding the interpretation, application or fulfilment
of the Genocide Convention.19 Initially, Russia chose not to participate in the proceedings
and communicated a letter to the ICJ, in which it changed its narrative on the
justification of the use of force in Ukraine by removing the reference to genocide.20
Instead, Russia claimed that it has been acting in self-defence in accordance with
Article 51 of the UN Charter.21 By offering an alternative justification regarding the use
of force anchored in the UN Charter, Russia attempted to have Ukraine’s case dismissed
by the Court on the basis of it lacking merit to be heard on the alleged violations of the
Genocide Convention. At the preliminary measures stage, the ICJ made it clear that
Russia’s assertion on the use of force in self-defence does not, in any case, invalidate its
prima facie finding on the existence of a dispute between the parties within the
meaning of the Genocide Convention.22
Subsequently, in a sudden change of litigation strategy that may be linked to the
pressure exerted on Russia by the multiple incoming Art. 63 declarations, it decided to
abandon its stance of disengagement in the proceedings by filing preliminary objections
to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a brief press
release in which it maintained that the dispute before the ICJ had nothing to do with the
Genocide Convention and pertained to the “lawfulness of the special military operation”
and “the legal status of the ‘DPR’ and ‘LPR.’”23 The move is most likely calculated to delay
the proceedings in light of the bifurcation of the ICJ proceedings into separate stages
addressing jurisdiction/admissibility and issues pertaining to the merits.24
As a conservative judicial body with a sober outlook on international law, the ICJ has
consistently steered clear of adjudging broader claims on the use of force by narrowly
focusing on claims falling within the instruments that parties have relied upon to initiate
proceedings for establishing the jurisdictional basis. Nothing suggests that the ICJ will
deviate from its conventional line of reasoning in this matter. In its order on provisional
18 “Vladimir Putin’s Speech Announcing ‘Special Military Operation’ in Ukraine,” The Kremlin, 24 February 2022, http://
kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 (accessed 1 September 2022) (in Russian).
19 International Court of Justice, Allegations of Genocide Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Order, 16 March 2022, General List No. 182, paras 37–47 (hereinafter
– Ukraine v. Russia Provisional Measures Order).
20 International Court of Justice, Document (with annexes) from the Russian Federation Setting Out Its Position Regarding
the Alleged “Lack of Jurisdiction” of the Court in the Case, 7 March 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ Russia Submission).
21 Ibid., para. 15; For a critique of Russia’s argument of self-defense, see Kevin Jon Heller, “Options for Prosecuting
Russian Aggression Against Ukraine: A Critical Analysis,” Journal of Genocide Research (6 July 2022): DOI 10.1080/
14623528.2022.2095094, pp. 2–3.
22 Ukraine v. Russia Provisional Measures Order, para. 46.
23 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press release on the filing of Russia’s written objections to the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice in the case initiated by Kiev in February 2022 under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 5 October 2022, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/
1832628/?lang=en.
24 International Court of Justice, Fixing of time-limit: Written statement of observations and submissions on preliminary
objections, Order, 3 October 2022. See: Ori Pomson, “Ukraine Symposium – Russian Preliminary Objections at the
ICJ: The Case Must Go On?”, Article of War Lieber Institute, 13 October 2022, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/russianpreliminary-
objections-icj-case-must-go-on/ (accessed 13 October 2022).
4 I. MARCHUK AND A. WANIGASURIYA
measures, the ICJ stated that Ukraine’s case is “limited in scope” with respect to the Genocide
Convention and found it “doubtful” that the Convention, in light of its object and
purpose “authorises a Contracting Party’s unilateral use of force in the territory of another
state for the purpose of preventing or punishing an alleged genocide.”25 Should the case
proceed to the merits stage, the ICJ is likely to limit itself to fact-finding in ascertaining
whether genocide has occurred in Donbas. This is despite the fact that the ICJ had
already stated that it was not in possession of evidence substantiating Russia’s allegations
of genocide.26 Russia’s participation in the proceedings will not have a significant impact
on evidentiary issues, since its allegations of genocide in Donbas are not supported by
any genuine and reliable evidence.27 Such unsubstantiated allegations routinely feature
in declaratory statements of senior Russian politicians, including those of President
Putin, and statements of the Russian Investigative Committee.28 While it is logical that
the false claim of genocide cannot sustain the use of force under international law, a
broader question as to whether genuine claims of genocide can give rise to the use of
force is unlikely to be answered by the ICJ.29 The present dispute first and foremost
exposes the dangers of the abusive interpretation of the duty to prevent and punish genocide
as outlined in Art. I of the Genocide Convention. The legal issues arising out of the
current dispute received wider international resonance as many states that condemn the
abusive interpretation of the duty to prevent and punish genocide as a pretext for the
unilateral use of force have submitted Art. 63 declarations in which they strongly warn
against such abuse of the law.
Mass Intervention: Article 63 Declarations
Although 42 states expressed their support for Ukraine’s case at the ICJ and signalled their
intention to intervene in the proceedings, the declarations under Art. 63 of the ICJ Statute
did not start to come in till the end of July. The most fervent supporters of the Ukrainian
cause that maintain a strong anti-war stance in Europe, Latvia30 and Lithuania,31 filed
the very first declarations that set the tone for the subsequent submissions from
intervening states. The respective declarations that have been filed thus far by 22
states (Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand,32 United Kingdom and Northern Ireland,33
25 Ukraine v. Russia Provisional Measures Order, para. 19.
26 Ibid., para. 59.
27 Alexander Etkind, “Ukraine, Russia, and Genocide of Minor Differences,” Journal of Genocide Research (7 June 2022):
DOI 10.1080/14623528.2022.2082911, p. 18 (calling Russia’s claims of “genocide of millions of Russians” in Donbas
“outlandish”).
28 “Vladimir Putin’s Speech Announcingsp ‘Special Military Operation’ in Ukraine,” The Kremlin, 24 February 2022, http://
kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 (accessed 1 September 2022) (in Russian); Investigative Committee of the
Russian Federation, “Russian Investigative Committee: All Persons Who Committed Crimes on the Territory of
Donbas Will Be Identified and Held Accountable,” Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, 19 March
2022, https://sledcom.ru/news/item/1665761/ (accessed 1 September 2022) (in Russian).
29 William Schabas, “Preventing Genocide and the Ukraine/Russia Case,” EJIL:Talk!, 10 March 2022, https://www.ejiltalk.
org/mass-intervention-the-joint-statement-of-41-states-on-ukraine-v-russia/ (accessed 1 September 2022).
30 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of Latvia, 19 July 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ Latvia Declaration).
31 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of Lithuania, 19 July 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ Lithuania
Declaration).
32 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of New Zealand, 25 July 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ New Zealand
Declaration).
33 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1
August 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ UK Declaration).
JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 5
Germany,34 USA,35 Sweden,36 France,37 Romania,38 Italy,39 Poland,40 Denmark,41 Ireland,42
Finland,43 Estonia,44 Spain,45 Australia,46 Portugal,47 Austria,48 Luxembourg,49 Greece,50
and Croatia51) under Art. 63 differ in the breadth and depth of their legal arguments.
These declarations are a testament to the solidarity among state parties to the Genocide
Convention that expose the dangers of the abusive interpretation of the Genocide
Convention, which lends support to the unlawful use of force and waging an aggressive
war under the pretext of upholding the values enshrined in the Convention. Interestingly,
the declarations have predominantly flown in from European and “Western” states and
there is a notable absence of states from the Global South. In fact, many countries
from the Global South have adopted a noninterventionist approach to the Russia-
Ukraine war.52 The ongoing war has been portrayed by Ukraine and Western states as
a battle against Russia’s assault on the rules-based international order,53 which Russia
views as being unipolar and skewed in favour of the West.54 Hence, the narrative has
34 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of Germany, 1 September 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ German
Declaration).
35 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of the United States of America, 7 September 2022 (hereinafter
– ICJ USA Declaration).
36 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of Sweden, 9 September 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ Sweden
Declaration).
37 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of France, 12 September 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ France
Declaration).
38 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of Romania, 13 September 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ Romania
Declaration).
39 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of Italy, 12 September 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ Italy
Declaration).
40 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of Poland, 15 September 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ Poland
Declaration).
41 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of Denmark, 16 September 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ Denmark
Declaration).
42 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of Ireland, 19 September 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ Ireland
Declaration).
43 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of Finland, 21 September 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ Finland
Declaration).
44 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of Estonia, 22 September 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ Estonia
Declaration).
45 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of Spain, 29 September 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ Spain
Declaration).
46 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of Australia, 30 September 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ Australia
Declaration).
47 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of Portugal, 7 October 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ Portugal
Declaration).
48 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of Austria, 12 October 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ Austria
Declaration).
49 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of Luxembourg, 13 October 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ Luxembourg
Declaration).
50 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of Greece, 13 October 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ Greece
Declaration).
51 International Court of Justice, Declaration of Intervention of Croatia, 19 October 2022 (hereinafter – ICJ Croatia
Declaration).
52 Jonathan Guyer, “Why some countries don’t want to pick a side in Russia’s war in Ukraine”, Vox, 9 June 2022,
https://www.vox.com/23156512/russia-ukraine-war-global-south-nonaligned-movement (accessed 30 October
2022).
53 European Commission, “Speech by President von der Leyen at the European Parliament Plenery on the Russian
aggression against Ukraine”, European Commission, 1 March 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/
detail/en/SPEECH_22_1483 (accessed 30 October 2022).
54 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Twitter, 29 September 2022, https://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/
1575573460839198725 (accessed 30 October 2022).
6 I. MARCHUK AND A. WANIGASURIYA
been one of the West/Europe and Western/“European values”55 against Russia. Given this,
the overwhelming support from a particular portion of states for Ukraine at the ICJ does
not come as a surprise. Moreover, against the backdrop of such a dichotomy, states in the
Global South may not see themselves reflected or included in this portrayal of the conflict
that is framed as “the West against Russia” hence, providing little incentive for such states
to intervene in the proceedings. Additionally, with some of the regional heavyweights
from the Global South such as China, India, Pakistan, the UAE and South Africa failing
to condemn Russian actions in Ukraine and continuing to maintain trade and other ties
with Russia,56 a trend may have been set against openly displaying support for
Ukraine. The absence of interventions from states from the Global South may also be
due to pragmatic reasons. Smaller and less geopolitically powerful states in the Global
South are reliant on regional heavyweights and some are aligned with Russia for economic
and political reasons, which may prevent interventions that risk stoking the ire of
Russia and its allies. The large number of Article 63 interventions in the present case,
also stands in stark contrast to the lack of interventions in the only other case concerning
genocide currently on the ICJ’s docket, namely The Gambia v. Myanmar. This is despite the
case predating Ukraine’s application to the Court and despite the fact that several
Western governments had earlier expressed their intent to intervene in the case. The
precise reason for the lack of interventions in The Gambia v. Myanmar is unclear. While
it is true that no states from the Global South have intervened in The Gambia
v. Myanmar case either, the lack of Western interventions with regard to the Myanmar
case, when contrasted with the plethora of Western interventions in the present case,
may send a signal to states in the Global South that Western states are less concerned
with atrocity crimes being perpetrated in non-Western states. Thus, as some commentators
opine, the stark contrast in the levels of engagement in the two cases may give rise to
“accusations of Eurocentric bias.”57 This may be an additional factor that contributes
towards disincentivizing countries from the Global South from intervening in the
present case.
As for the interventions, first, it is necessary to clarify that a state intervening under Art.
63 exercises its right to seek the construction of a Convention to which it has acceded to
as a state party. Unlike interventions under Art. 62 that presuppose that an intervening
state has an interest of a legal nature, which may be affected by the decision of the
55 European Parliament, “Russia’s war on Ukraine: Speeches by Ukraine’s President to the European Parliament and
national parliaments”, European Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/729354/
EPRS_BRI(2022)729354_EN.pdf (accessed 30 October 2022).
56 E.g. United Nations, “Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Ending Ukraine Crisis, as Russian Federation
Weilds Veto,” United Nations, 25 February 2022, https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14808.doc.htm (accessed 30 October
2022);“General Assembly resolution demands end to Russian offensive in Ukraine”, 2 March 2022, https://news.un.
org/en/story/2022/03/1113152 (accessed 1 September 2022); C. Raja Mohan, “Imran Khan Goes to Moscow as Pakistan
Romances Russia: A warming relationship adds a new twist to South Asian geopolitics”, Foreign Policy, 23 February
2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/23/imran-khan-pakistan-russia-putin-india-geopolitics/ (accessed 30
October 2022); Rejendra Jadhav, Nupur Anand and Aftab Ahmed, “India explores setting up ruppee trade accounts
with Russia to soften sanctions blow – sources,” Reuters, 25 February 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/india/
india-explores-setting-up-rupee-trade-accounts-with-russia-soften-sanctions-blow-2022-02-25/ (accessed 30
October 2022); Aanu Adeoye, “UN vote on Russia invasion shows a changing Africa”, Chatham House, 7 March
2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/03/un-vote-russia-invasion-shows-changing-africa (accessed 30
October 2022).
57 Juliette McIntyre and Adam Simpson, “Myanmar’s Genocide Overshadowed by Ukraine,” East Asia Forum, 5 October
2022, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/10/05/myanmars-genocide-overshadowed-by-ukraine/ (accessed 30
October 2022).
JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 7
case at hand, an Art. 63 intervention does not make a third state a party to the proceedings.
The states that intervened in Ukraine v. Russia have made it clear that they do not
seek to become parties to the proceedings, but that their interventions exclusively
pertain to issue regarding the construction of the Convention.58 The Art. 63 declarations
raised the issue of the scope of the intervention, in particular, whether the observations of
intervening states pertaining to the construction of the Genocide Convention may
include both issues of jurisdiction as well as merits. Based on the wording of Art. 63
and the ICJ’s earlier practice, there appears to be a commonly shared stance that Art.
63 declarations do not hinder intervening states from seeking the construction of jurisdictional
issues on equal footing with issues pertaining to the merits.59 Hence, the majority of
intervening states submitted their observations with respect to issues of jurisdiction and
merits. Germany, Austria and Greece were exceptions in that they limited their intervention
to matters of jurisdiction.
In the context of the present case, an important procedural issue is whether Art. IX of
the Genocide Convention, which allows state parties to bring a dispute in relation to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, may encompass non-violation
claims by the Applicant State. In the case in question, Ukraine ultimately seeks to prove
that it has not violated the terms of the Genocide Convention, as it stands falsely
accused by Russia of committing “genocide in Donbas” in order to justify Russia’s aggression
against Ukraine. The intervening states argue that non-violation complaints fall
within the scope of Art. IX, and the ICJ may entertain its jurisdiction in cases when a
state accused of genocide argues that such accusations are without merit.60 Some intervening
states pay more attention to the wording of the compromissory clause, submitting
observations regarding the meaning of separate words in the clause “disputes…relating
to61…the fulfilment62 of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility
of a State for genocide…”63 The intervening states argue that the jurisdiction of
the ICJ under Art. IX extends to disputes concerning the fulfilment of the duty to prevent
and punish under Art. I, which encompasses the present dispute regarding Russia’s
unilateral use of force for the purported prevention and punishment of genocide under
58 E.g. ICJ Latvia Declaration, para. 12; ICJ New Zealand Declaration, para. 13; ICJ Denmark Declaration, paras 10–11; ICJ
Estonia Declaration, para. 18; ICJ Italy Declaration, paras 16–17; ICJ Ireland Declaration, para. 11; ICJ German Declaration,
para. 17; ICJ Finland Declaration, paras 11–13; ICJ USA Declaration, para. 11; ICJ Sweden Declaration, para. 18; ICJ
Spain Declaration, paras 11, 14; ICJ Romania Declaration, paras 12–13; ICJ Poland Declaration, paras 10–11; ICJ Portugal
Declaration, para. 15; ICJ Austria Declaration, para. 7; ICJ Greece Declaration, para. 18; ICJ Australia Declaration,
para. 8; ICJ Croatia Declaration, paras 11, 14.
59 ICJ Latvia Declaration, paras 15–20; ICJ Lithuania Declaration, para. 18; ICJ New Zealand Declaration, para. 17; ICJ
Denmark Declaration, para. 13; ICJ Estonia declaration, para. 15; ICJ Spain Declaration, para. 12; ICJ Poland Declaration,
para. 11; ICJ German Declaration, para. 25; ICJ Finland Declaration, para. 14; ICJ Portugal Declaration, paras 17–
19; ICJ Greece Declaration, para. 25; ICJ Croatia Declaration, para. 12.
60 ICJ Latvia Declaration, paras 40–44; ICJ UK Declaration, paras 32–33; ICJ Denmark Declaration, para. 23; ICJ Estonia,
paras 31–32; ICJ Ireland Declaration, paras 23–25; ICJ Finland Declaration, paras 29–33; ICJ Romania Declaration,
paras 27–30; ICJ Portugal Declaration, para. 27; ICJ Austria Declaration, paras 21–23; ICJ Greece Declaration, para.
37; ICJ Australia Declaration, paras 34–38; ICJ Croatia Declaration, paras 26–31.
61 ICJ Denmark Declaration, para. 25; ICJ Estonia Declaration, paras 34–35; ICJ Portugal, para. 25; ICJ Greece Declaration,
paras 31–32.
62 ICJ Latvia Declaration, para. 41; ICJ Lithuania, para. 23; ICJ UK Declaration, para. 33; ICJ Portugal, para. 26; ICJ Austria
Declaration, para. 33; ICJ Greece Declaration, para. 35.
63 ICJ Lithuania, para. 24; ICJ Denmark Declaration, para. 24; ICJ Estonia Declaration, para. 27; ICJ Austria Declaration,
paras 37–38.
8 I. MARCHUK AND A. WANIGASURIYA
Art. I.64 Many of the intervening states emphasize that the ICJ has the jurisdiction to declare
the absence of genocide linked to the breach of the good faith obligations under the
Convention as resulting in the abusive interpretation of the Convention’s provisions.65
One of the most important issues of substantive law that requires resolution is the scope
of the duty to prevent and punish under Art. I of the Genocide Convention and its interplay
with other provisions, in particular Art. VIII of the Convention. What runs like a red thread
through the declarations is a reference to the good faith fulfilment of treaty obligations in
line with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 that precludes the abusive
interpretation of the treaty that frustrates the object and the purpose of the Genocide Convention.
66 New Zealand makes a somewhat a novel argument that the fulfilment of the
good faith requirement in relation to Art. IX entails a respondent state’s participation in
the proceedings as well as its compliance with respective court orders and judgments.67
The UK advances the good faith discussion by enumerating a number of acts that may
be considered as contributing towards the abusive assessment of the occurrence of genocide,
including inter alia, manufacturing evidence of the commission of genocide.68 In
addition to the good faith requirement, some states place emphasis on exercising “due diligence”
in assessing whether genocide is taking place or there is “a serious risk…genocide
will be committed” in a situation where a state “purports to allegedly prevent genocide”
under Art. I.69 Furthermore, the intervening states caution against “unilateral and
unfounded allegations of genocide” that are not supported by “fully conclusive” evidence
that genocide has in fact been committed or there is a serious risk of it occurring.70
Lithuania appears to lower the bar to “substantial evidence” on the existence of genocide
or a “serious risk that it will be committed.”71 Poland sets out that action based on
claims of genocide is impermissible in the absence of “serious evidence of its commission.”
72 New Zealand and Portugal maintain that the claim of genocide must be
satisfied “on the facts” and supported by “compelling evidence” that genocide “has, or
is about, to occur”.73 The UK and Denmark emphasize the “good faith assessment of all
relevant evidence on an objective basis” as to whether genocide is occurring or there
is a serious risk of genocide occurring.74
As for the scope of the duty to punish genocide, intervening states appear to
agree that it is mostly associated with punitive measures linked to individual criminal
64 ICJ Lithuania, para. 24; ICJ UK Declaration, para. 43; ICJ Denmark Declaration, paras 24–25; ICJ Estonia Declaration,
para. 33; ICJ German Declaration, paras 35–45; ICJ Poland Declaration, paras 31–32; ICJ Spain Declaration, paras
26–30; ICJ Sweden Declaration, paras 34–38; ICJ Romania Declaration, para. 31; ICJ Greece Declaration, paras 31–32.
65 ICJ Denmark Declaration, para. 30; ICJ Estonia Declaration, para. 33; ICJ Portugal Declaration, para. 28; ICJ Austria
Declaration, para. 42; ICJ Greece Declaration, para. 41.
66 ICJ Latvia Declaration, paras 45–46; ICJ Lithuania Declaration, para. 20; ICJ New Zealand Declaration, paras 18–19; ICJ
UK Declaration, para. 54; ICJ Denmark Declaration, para. 31; ICJ Estonia Declaration, para. 41; ICJ Finland Declaration,
para. 20; ICJ Sweden Declaration, para. 44; ICJ Romania Declaration, paras 19–20; ICJ Ireland Declaration, paras 18–19;
ICJ Portugal Declaration, para. 35; ICJ Austria Declaration, paras 40–42; ICJ Greece Declaration, para. 29; ICJ Australia
Declaration, paras 24–26.
67 ICJ New Zealand Declaration, para. 25.
68 ICJ UK Declaration, para. 54.
69 ICJ Lithuania Declaration, para. 20; ICJ UK Declaration, para. 53; ICJ Denmark Declaration, para. 37; ICJ Estonia Declaration,
para. 44; ICJ USA Declaration, para. 22; ICJ Finland Declaration, para. 22; ICJ Australia Declaration, paras 49–51.
70 ICJ Latvia Declaration, para. 47; ICJ Romania Declaration, paras 38–41; ICJ Sweden Declaration, para. 45; ICJ Estonia
Declaration, para. 42; ICJ USA Declaration, para 26.
71 ICJ Lithuania Declaration, para. 20.
72 ICJ Poland Declaration, para. 38.
73 ICJ New Zealand Declaration, paras 32–33; ICJ Portugal Declaration, para. 37.
74 ICJ UK Declaration, para. 58; ICJ Denmark Declaration, para. 36.
JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 9
responsibility and does not extend to cover situations, where one state seeks to “punish”
another state through unleashing military force against it or its population.75
In terms of the appropriate international fora for addressing grievances relating to genocide
as a matter of preference, reference has been made to Art. VIII, which includes a
possibility to engage the UN to take appropriate measures for the prevention and suppression
of genocide,76 although it is not viewed either as an exhaustive77 or a binding
measure.78 Recourse to the UN is construed as a reflection of the Genocide Convention’s
“strong emphasis” on “multilateralism and application of international law”79 and the preference
for “collective institutional measures to prevent and suppress genocide.”80 In
addition, it has been pointed out that the duty to prevent and punish under Art. I may
be discharged by states through recourse to domestic and international penal tribunals,
such as the International Criminal Court.81 Denmark and Estonia emphasize international
cooperation in upholding values enshrined in the Genocide Convention, and construe Art.
VIII, Art. IX and the Preamble of the Convention as creating “a duty to employ multilateral
and peaceful means to prevent genocide” prior to undertaking “unilateral action as a
matter of last resort”.82 Similarly, Romania, Sweden and Portugal interpret Art. VIII as signalling
the essence of the Genocide Convention that enshrines a preference for international
cooperation and collective action rather than for undertaking unilateral
measures.83 Additionally, Estonia, Sweden and Finland refer to the “good practice” of
engaging independent UN investigative mechanisms in order to ascertain whether a situation
qualifies as genocide.84
The interventions make clear that resorting to the unlawful use of force cannot be
regarded as a means of fulfilling the duty to prevent and punish in Art. I of the Genocide
Convention.85 However, the intervening states tend to omit any discussion as to whether
the use of force may be justified when the international community is confronted with
genuine claims of genocide under the R2P doctrine. Lithuania and Estonia advance an
argument that the combined reading of Art. I and Art. VIII conditions “legality of any unilateral
preventive measure pursuant to Art I…in the territory of another state” to the
prior action by the competent UN organs or their failure to do so.86 Denmark makes an
identical argument,87 however, it expressly outlines that it does not consider that the construction
of the Genocide Convention necessitates a discussion of the broader issues
75 ICJ Lithuania Declaration, para. 21; ICJ UK Declaration, paras 63–65; ICJ Denmark Declaration, para. 39; ICJ Estonia
Declaration, para. 47; ICJ Finland Declaration, para. 23; ICJ Poland Declaration, paras 40–41; ICJ Australia Declaration,
para. 54.
76 ICJ Latvia Declaration, para. 48; ICJ USA Declaration, para. 27; ICJ Sweden Declaration, para. 53; ICJ Romania Declaration,
para. 44; ICJ Finland Declaration, para. 26.
77 ICJ New Zealand Declaration, para. 31; ICJ Portugal Declaration, para. 40.
78 ICJ UK Declaration, para. 57.
79 Ibid.
80 ICJ Estonia Declaration, para. 50.
81 ICJ Latvia Declaration, para. 48; ICJ Romania Declaration, para. 45; ICJ Sweden Declaration, para. 49.
82 ICJ Denmark Declaration, para. 34; ICJ Estonia Declaration, para. 45.
83 ICJ Sweden Declaration, para. 54; ICJ Romania Declaration, para. 44; ICJ Portugal Declaration, para. 41.
84 ICJ Estonia Declaration, para. 43; ICJ Sweden Declaration, para. 46; ICJ Finland Declaration, para. 22; ICJ Australia
Declaration, paras 52–53.
85 ICJ Latvia Declaration, paras 50–54; ICJ Estonia Declaration, para. 46; ICJ New Zealand Declaration, para. 31; ICJ
Finland Declaration, paras 24, 35; ICJ Sweden Declaration, para. 48; ICJ Portugal Declaration, para. 40; ICJ Australia
Declaration, para. 55.
86 ICJ Lithuania Declaration, para. 22; ICJ Estonia Declaration, para. 51.
87 ICJ Denmark Declaration, para. 42.
10 I. MARCHUK AND A. WANIGASURIYA
linked to the unilateral use of force, such as humanitarian intervention.88 Portugal makes a
broad argument that the legality of any unilateral action should be assessed against Art.
VIIII and the obligations enshrined in the UN Charter.89 Meanwhile, New Zealand makes
then most far-fetched argument on the existence of “an emerging customary norm of unilateral
humanitarian intervention” in exceptional circumstances when it is necessary to
protect population from genocide.90 It appears that the majority of intervening states
advocate for a narrow construal of the Genocide Convention omitting a broader discussion
on the legality of the use of force in response to “grave humanitarian crises” known as
“humanitarian intervention”.91
The interventions that have poured in signify several important aspects. As previously
mentioned, they are symbolic in that they display a united “Western” and European
stance in condemning Russian actions in Ukraine and show how the intervening
nations stand in solidarity with Ukraine. The interventions also symbolize the united
stance of the states submitting the declarations especially in advocating for the ICJ’s exercise
of its jurisdiction in the present case.92 Moreover, despite Russia’s recent filing of
its preliminary objections to the jurisdiction in the case, this concurrence on the issue
of the exercise of jurisdiction by the intervening states may have a positive impact on
the ICJ’s analysis of the scope of its jurisdiction, thus allowing Ukraine’s case to
proceed swiftly to the merits stage.93 What is also important to note is that as the case
progresses and as the two parties shape their legal arguments, the intervening states
may take further steps to amend their declarations of intervention to reflect their respective
positions.94 The interventions also raise important procedural questions as to how the
Court will decide to address such declarations. While there is a possibility that the ICJ may
dismiss the declarations altogether, the overwhelming concurrence between the intervening
states in arguing their right to intervene, may have created a situation where it
is difficult for the Court to refuse to consider the declarations on technical grounds and
deny admissibility.95 Should the ICJ’s stance be in favour of the intervening states, it is
then yet to be seen how it will choose to afford time to such states in the oral proceedings
for presenting their arguments. According to some commentators, in tackling this issue,
the Court may choose one of three options, namely: (i) grouping several submissions
together (as agreed to by states such as Greece, Germany and Austria96); (ii) choosing
to only hear submissions by the representatives of selected states; or (iii) allocating a
time slot at the end of the proceedings to each of the intervening states to make
submissions.97
88 Ibid., para. 38.
89 ICJ Portugal Declaration, para. 40.
90 ICJ New Zealand Declaration, para. 31.
91 ICJ UK Declaration, para. 62; ICJ Denmark Declaration, para. 38.
92 Juliette McIntyre, “The Russia-Ukraine War: Contemporary Developments and Challenges,” University of Newcastle,
Australia University of Newcastle, Australia: YouTube, 17 October 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
ZzWWNeCL-wI (accessed 21 October 2022).
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid. E.g. ICJ Austria Declaration, paras 16–17.
95 McIntyre, “The Russia-Ukraine War.”
96 States such as Greece, Germany, and Austria have expressed their willingness to work collaboratively in presenting
their arguments so as to assist the Court in the interest of an “expedient administration of justice”. ICJ Greece Declaration,
para. 19; ICJ German Declaration, para. 19; ICJ Austria Declaration, para. 8.
97 McIntyre, “The Russia-Ukraine War”.
JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 11
Genocide by Russia?
Whereas Ukraine’s present case is limited to the false claim of genocide, it has the potential
to go beyond this by advancing a claim that Russia has engaged in genocide against Ukrainians
as a protected national group under the Genocide Convention. The ICJ is competent
to adjudge a claim of whether Russia has violated the Genocide Convention by committing
genocide against Ukrainians. The Court has earlier found that an obligation not to commit
genocide, although not being explicitly mentioned in the Convention, “follows from the
expressly stated obligation to prevent the commission of acts of genocide”.98 Elaborating
on the scope of the duty to prevent, it emphasized that it would be “paradoxical” if
states were only under an obligation to prevent, but “were not forbidden to commit
such acts”.99 Hence, the case law of the ICJ has clearly spelled out that “the obligation to
prevent genocide implies the prohibition of the commission of genocide”.100
State responsibility for genocide is predicated on the actual commission of the crime of
genocide. The ICJ is not a criminal court and thus cannot attribute guilt for the crime of
genocide to individual perpetrators. Hence, in its earlier case law, the ICJ chose to defer to
the findings of an international criminal tribunal such as the ICTY when deciding whether
genocide had been committed by Serbia on the territory of Croatia and Bosnia, prior to
engaging in the discussion as to what extent Serbia breached its obligations under the
Genocide Convention.101 However, despite such deferral to the ICTY’s findings on genocide,
the ICJ outlined that there was no legal bar against it making a “finding that genocide
or the other acts enumerated in Article III have been committed […] while applying
the standard of proof appropriate to charges of exceptional gravity.”102 The ICJ found that
“State responsibility can arise under the Convention for genocide and complicity, without
an individual being convicted of the crime or an associated one.”103 Hence, in the present
instance, even in the absence of any finding of individual criminal responsibility for genocide
by an international body such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is currently
seized of the situation in Ukraine,104 the ICJ is not barred from making its
determination regarding Russia’s state responsibility for genocide.
In Ukraine, the first allegations of genocide began to emerge following the discovery
of mass graves and the emergence of horrific scenes containing the lifeless bodies
of civilians strewn across the streets of Bucha and other deoccupied areas in the Kyiv
region.105 World leaders joined in the condemnation of the crimes committed by the
Russian forces against civilians. Former UK prime minister, Boris Johnson stated in
April 2022 that the attacks on civilians in Bucha did not “look far short of
98 International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, para. 166
(hereinafter – Bosnian Genocide Judgment).
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., para. 223 (finding the ICTY findings "highly persuasive"); International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, 3 February 2015, I.C.J.
Reports 2015, p. 3, paras 440–441.
102 Bosnian Genocide Judgment, para. 181.
103 Ibid., para. 182.
104 International Criminal Court, “Situation in Ukraine,” International Criminal Court, https://www.icc-cpi.int/ukraine
(accessed 1 September 2022).
105 CNN, “Zelensky Accuses Russia of Genocide in Ukraine,” CNN, 4 April 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/
2022/04/04/ukraine-russia-zelensky-genocide-bucha-nr-vpx.cnn (accessed 1 September 2022).
12 I. MARCHUK AND A. WANIGASURIYA
genocide.”106 The same month, US president, Joe Biden stated that Putin was
attempting to “wipe out the idea” of a Ukrainian identity and accused Russian
forces of committing genocide in Ukraine.107 In addition, the Canadian House of
Commons unanimously passed a resolution recognizing that Russia has committed
genocide against the Ukrainian people.108 The Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian parliaments
followed suit by recognizing that Russia had engaged in genocide against
the Ukrainian people.109 On the home front, the Ukrainian parliament passed a
decree, in which it recognized that the actions of the Russian political and military
leadership, and Russian armed forces amount to the crime of genocide.110 It provided
a long, albeit a non-exhaustive, list of underlying acts that are believed to have been
accompanied by genocidal intent, such as: (1) wilful killings and other violent crimes
(e.g. murder, torture, enforced disappearances, imprisonment committed on the territory
of the Kyiv region); (2) deliberate imposition of conditions to bring about the
destruction of the group (e.g. intentional destruction of civilian infrastructure indispensable
for the survival of civilians, blockade of humanitarian corridors intended
for the evacuation of civilians, siege of Ukrainian cities and villages, etc.); (3) infliction
of serious physical and mental harm upon civilians, including clergy, journalists, activists,
governmental and NGO representatives; (4) forcible transfer of children from the
occupied territories to Russia; and lastly, (5) the imposition of measures intended to
interfere with the Ukrainian economic development that are calculated to bring about
the slow destruction of the group (e.g. obstruction of grain sowing campaigns, blockade
of trade routes, etc.).111
The provided instances of alleged genocide correspond to the underlying genocidal
acts as defined in the case law of international criminal courts and tribunals, with the
exception of the economic interference that has been interpreted by the Ukrainian parliament
as being capable of bringing about the slow destruction of the group. Yet it is
doubtful that Russia’s destructive acts aimed at undermining the Ukrainian economy
satisfy the actus reus of genocide. However, the situation could have different if, for
example, Russia’s obstruction of agricultural sowing activities would have resulted in
the starvation of civilians and led to the physical destruction of members of the group.
As mentioned above, the term “genocide” was initially prominently used in response to
the crimes committed in Bucha and the surrounding deoccupied areas in the Kyiv region.
However, the allegations of genocide surfaced yet again following the deoccupation of
106 Joseph Lee and Doug Faulkner, “Ukraine War: Bucha Deaths ‘Not Far Short of Genocide’ – PM,” BBC News, 6 April 2022,
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-61011022 (accessed 1 September 2022).
107 Steve Holland and Jeff Mason, “Biden Accuses Russia of Genocide in Ukraine,” Reuters, 12 April 2022 https://www.
reuters.com/world/biden-says-americans-should-not-pay-price-dictator-who-commits-genocide-2022-04-12/
(accessed 1 September 2022). See also Remarks by President Biden Before 77th Session of the United Nations General
Assembly, The White House, 21 September 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/
2022/09/21/remarks-by-president-biden-before-the-77th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly/ (accessed
21 September 2022).
108 Elizabeth Whatcott, “Compilation of Countries Statements Calling Russian Actions in Ukraine ‘Genocide,’” Just Security,
20 May 2022, https://www.justsecurity.org/81564/compilation-of-countries-statements-calling-russian-actions-inukraine-
genocide/ (accessed 1 September 2022)
109 Ibid.
110 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Declaration on the Commission of Genocide by the Russian Federation in Ukraine, No.
2188-IX,” Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 14 April 2022, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2188-20#Text (accessed 1
September 2022).
111 Ibid.
JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 13
large swathes of the Kharkiv region during a successful Ukrainian-led counteroffensive,
which led to the grim discovery of mass graves in the forest near Izyum. More than
440 bodies were discovered, with the majority of victims being civilians.112 Many
bodies bore horrific signs of torture, and some civilians died as a result of rocket
attacks and were buried in the forest to conceal the traces of crimes by Russian
forces.113 President Zelenskyy delivered a speech in which he accused Russia of razing
the city to the ground and genocide of Ukrainian people.114 The overwhelming evidence
of death and torture of civilians paints a grim picture of a genocidal campaign unleashed
by the occupying Russian forces against Ukrainians who were targeted for the physical
destruction on account of the belonging to a national group.
However, the difficulty in proving the crime of genocide rarely lies with the physical
element of the crime (i.e. actus reus). It is the mental element, i.e. genocidal intent, that
has proved to be the stumbling block in many cases. The crime of genocide requires a
double intent (i.e. a general intent in relation to the underlying genocidal act(s), as well
as a surplus or ulterior intent (dolus specialis) going beyond actus reus, which is “the
intent to destroy” a protected group, in whole or in part, as such. The case law of international
courts and tribunals has consistently embraced a purpose-based definition of
genocidal intent, having rejected a less rigorous knowledge-based definition to
intent.115 In other words, it does not suffice to prove the perpetrator’s knowledge that
the acts in question will lead to the destruction of the protected group, however, it
should be demonstrated that it is the express purpose of the perpetrator to destroy
the protected group, in whole or in part, as such.116
An important prerequisite for establishing the crime of genocide is to ascertain that the
group in question is protected under the Genocide Convention, thus meeting a set of criteria
for defining a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.117 Applying the definition of
a national group as formulated by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in
Akayesu (i.e. “collection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond based on
common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties”),118 it may be convincingly
concluded that Ukrainians constitute a national group protected by the Genocide
Convention.119 The practice of forced passportization that has been implemented by
Russians since 2014 and is currently being attempted to be enforced in the occupied territories,
does not, in any case, change the national group membership for those affected,
as their Ukrainian citizenship and status of belonging to the Ukrainian national group
remain intact.120
112 President Zelenskyy’s Video Address,The Presidential Office of Ukraine, 16 September 2022, https://www.president.
gov.ua/videos/rosiya-povtorila-v-izyumi-te-sho-zrobila-v-buchi-svit-povine-3249.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber I, 2 September 1998 (hereinafter
Akayesu Trial Judgement), paras 517–518; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-10-A,
Appeals Chamber, 5 July 2001, paras 42–52.
116 Kai Ambos, “What Does ‘Intent to Destroy’ in Genocide Mean?” International Review of the Red Cross 91, no. 876 (2009):
838–839.
117 Akayesu Trial Judgement, paras 512–515.
118 Ibid., para. 512.
119 Ibid.
120 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 11.07.2022, No 440, “On amending the decree of the President
of the Russian Federation dated 24 April 2019,” No 183, “On defining on humanitarian grounds persons
who are entitled to apply for Russian citizenship in accordance with a simplified procedure” and Decree of the
14 I. MARCHUK AND A. WANIGASURIYA
One may question whether Russia targets victims based on their ethnicity rather than
nationality. The Russian ethnic group constitutes only 17.3% of Ukrainian population.121
This number should not be conflated with the percentage of the Russian-speaking population
in Ukraine. Prior to 2022, a sociological survey showed that 31.8% of Ukrainians
used Russian in their daily lives.122 Regardless of ethnicity and the language spoken, all
those who live in Ukraine constitute the Ukrainian nation with a commonly shared legal
bond of Ukrainian nationality. As evidenced by the atrocities committed in eastern Ukraine
that is home to a predominantly Russian speaking population and higher numbers of
ethnic Russians, no one has been spared from death and violence. Russians have often
claimed they target “banderivtsi” or “Nazis,” which they use as derogatory words to describe
supporters of Ukrainian statehood. This demonstrates that Ukrainians are targeted based on
their belonging to a national group rather than their ethnicity or language.
Intent to Destroy
The next step is to determine whether the intent is related to the destruction of the protected
group. In this sense, the “destruction of a group” means “the material destruction
of a group either by physical or by biological means, not the destruction of the national,
linguistic, religious, cultural or other identity of a particular group.”123 There are traces of
both physical and cultural destruction of Ukrainians as a national group exhibited by the
actions of the Russian leadership and Russian forces. As for the physical destruction, Ukrainians
have been subjected to unprecedented levels of violence from Russian forces (i.e.
killings, attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, the use of prohibited
weapons to maximize the damage and death toll).124 Although some actions did not
lead to immediate physical destruction, they have nevertheless paved the way for a
slow death. This especially holds true for the horrendous situation in occupied
Mariupol, a city which epitomises despicable suffering and a major humanitarian catastrophe.
125 Here, the absence of access to clean water, food, medicine and healthcare
are intended measures to bring about the physical destruction of the group. In Mariupol,
the Russian leadership appears to have made a conscious decision to blatantly disregard
civilian lives and reduce the city to rubble. Russian forces have not only destroyed the
President of the Russian Federation dated 29 April 2019, No 187 “On separate categories of foreign citizens and stateless
persons who are entitled to apply for Russian citizenship in accordance with a simplified procedure,” Official Internet
Portal of Legal Information, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202207110002 (accessed 1
September 2022) (in Russian).
121 Valentyna Borysenko, “How Many ‘Peoples’ Live in Ukraine,” Government’s Gazette, 9 June 2017, https://ukurier.gov.
ua/uk/articles/skilki-narodiv-zhive-v-ukrayini/ (accessed 1 September 2022) (in Ukrainian).
122 Larysa Masenko, “Language Situation in Socio-Linguistic Dimensions: War with Russia Affected Many [Ukrainians],”
Radio Svoboda, 1 May 2020, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/amp/30586236.html (accessed 1 September 2022) (in
Ukrainian).
123 ILC Report (1996), Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Article 17 (commentary), pp. 45–
46, para. 12; ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Judgment and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Chamber
III, 15 May 2003, para. 315; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber, 19
April 2004, para. 25 (original footnote omitted).
124 OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine in the Context of the Armed Attack by the Russian Federation (24 February
– 15 May 2022), 29 June 2022; Human Rights Watch, “Ukraine: Apparent War Crimes in Russia-Controlled Areas,” 3
April 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/03/ukraine-apparent-war-crimes-russia-controlled-areas (accessed 1
September 2022).
125 Paul Niland, “Putin’s Mariupol Massacre is One of the 21st Century’s Worst War Crimes,” Atlantic Council, 24 May 2022,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-mariupol-massacre-is-one-the-worst-war-crimes-of-the-
21st-century/ (accessed 1 September 2022).
JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 15
foundations of livelihood but have also physically killed thousands of civilians who were
later hastily buried in mass graves or burnt in mobile crematoria.126
One may question whether the siege of Mariupol only served Russian military objectives
in creating a land corridor to Crimea, rather than constituting a campaign to physically
destroy Ukrainians living in Mariupol. It is difficult to accept that only military goals
have been pursued given the scale of devastation and death. The bombings of Mariupol
theatre and maternity ward were devoid of any military objectives.127 Likewise, the
destruction of 95% of residential buildings in Mariupol hardly served any military
purpose.128 The blocking of humanitarian corridors impeded the evacuation of thousands
of civilians who were doomed to death by falling bombs and had to endure unbearable
living conditions described as “hellish.”129 To suggest that the violence and death in Mariupol
did not reach the intensity threshold to qualify as genocide is to deny the ground
realities that Ukrainians living in besieged Mariupol had to endure: they were systematically
targeted for destruction with no option of fleeing the city unless they were willing to
put their lives at risk by choosing dangerous escape routes.130
The trail of death that the Russian military left behind in deoccupied Bucha and Izyum
is shocking as many civilians died or those who survived endured torture and inhuman
treatment in “torture chambers.”131 It appears that civilians were killed or tortured on a
whim simply because they were Ukrainians and perceived as being hostile to the
Russian military.132 The replication of the Bucha scenario in other deoccupied areas
points towards the existence of a deliberate policy to target Ukrainians for destruction.
In deoccupied Bucha, women were subjected to systematic rape and sexual violence
by Russian soldiers. They testified that during the occupation, they had been threatened
by Russian soldiers to be raped to the point where they would refuse “sexual contact with
any man in the future to hinder them from having Ukrainian children”.133 In addition, the
Ukrainian Security Service routinely publishes intercepted phone conversations of Russian
soldiers who boast to their relatives about killing Ukrainian civilians and speaking about
victims in a dehumanizing manner.134
126 Halya Coynash, “Russia Accused of Using Mobile Crematoria to Hide Its War Crimes in Mariupol,” Kharkiv Human
Rights Protection Group, 11 April 2022, https://khpg.org/en/1608810391 (accessed 1 September 2022).
127 Amnesty International, “Ukraine: Deadly Mariupol Theatre Strike ‘A Clear War Crime’ by Russian Forces,” 30 June 2022,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/06/ukraine-deadly-mariupol-theatre-strike-a-clear-war-crime-byrussian-
forces-new-investigation/ (accessed 1 September 2022); Truth Hounds, “Labour of Truth: Myths and Reality:
Russia’s Attack on a Maternity Hospital in Mariupol as a War Crime,” 16 March 2022, https://truth-hounds.org/en/
myths-and-reality-russias-attack-on-a-maternity-hospital-in-mariupol-as-a-war-crime/ (accessed 1 September 2022)
(in Ukrainian).
128 BBC Interview with President Zelenskyy, “It Is Not War, It Is Genocide”: Full Text of the Interview, 14 April 2022, https://
www.bbc.com/russian/features-61100748?ocid=wsrussian.social.in-app-messaging.telegram..russiantelegram_.edit
(accessed 1 September 2022).
129 Pjotr Sauer and Andrew Roth, “‘It was worse than hell’: Life in Mariupol Under Russian Occupation,” The Guardian, 16
June 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/16/ukraine-life-in-mariupol-under-russian-occupation
(accessed 25 October 2022).
130 Noelle Quénivet, “The Conflict in Ukraine and Genocide,” Journal of International Peacekeeping, 25 (2022): 151; Telegram
channel, Advisor to Mariupol City Mayor Petro Andryuschenko, 21 May 2022, 18:12 (on impossibility of leaving
Mariupol for residents).
131 Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Russian Forces Tortured Izium Detainees", 19 October 2022, https://www.hrw.org/
news/2022/10/19/ukraine-russian-forces-tortured-izium-detainees (accessed 19 October 2022).
132 Ibid.
133 Ukraine conflict: "Russian soldiers raped me and killed my husband", BBC News, 11 April 2022, https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-61071243 (accessed 1 September 2022).
134 E.g. Intercepted phone conversation on torture, in which Ukrainians were described as “not human” [ne lyudi], https://
armyinform.com.ua/2022/05/04/katuvannya-rosijskymy-vijskovymy-zdijsnyuyutsya-pid-kontrolem-fsb/, 4 May 2022
16 I. MARCHUK AND A. WANIGASURIYA
Apart fromthe intent to physically destroyUkrainians, Russian genocidal intent can also be
evinced fromits systematic practice of forcibly transferring Ukrainian children from the occupied
areas to Russia. This underlying genocidal act is under-explored in the case law of international
criminal courts and tribunals. In fact, it sits somewhat uncomfortably with the
intended physical destruction of a particular group. As evidenced by the earlier practices of
the forcible transfer of children fromone group to another (e.g. removal of aboriginal children
from their indigenous communities in Australia,135 removal of Greenlandic children by
Denmark136), it is rare that the physical destruction is intended. In such instances, the children’s
cultural identify and self-identification with a particular group are targeted.137 The
effects of the forcible transfer on such children are serious and mentally destabilizing, since
they lose ties with their culture, language and communities. Subjecting children to forcible
transfer from one group to another for assimilation or re-education purposes is tantamount
to physical destruction, as the very survival of the group depends on its future generation.138
In the context of Ukraine, the forcible transfer of children, who are later put up for “fasttrack”
adoption in Russia, has taken place in a particularly coercive manner, with reported
instances of removal of orphaned children and children separated from their families by
war in the occupied areas.139 Recently, the European Parliament condemned the practice
of forcible transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia as “genocide”, which has been undertaken
by the Russian authorities with the aim of “forced assimilation” by putting those
children through forced adoption and forced passportization.140 While forcible transfer
of children as an underlying genocidal act may be less shocking than the physical destruction
of the group, its implications are far-reaching for the very survival of the group. In this
process, Ukraine stands to lose thousands of children who will be raised and educated as
“Russians” leading to the severance of all ties to their Ukrainian heritage.141
The presence of genocidal intent is also evidenced by the assault on Ukrainian culture.
In the occupied territories, Russian forces burnt Ukrainian books, banned the Ukrainian
language, destroyed cultural buildings and even changed the language on road and
other signs from Ukrainian to Russian.142 The attacks on culture do not qualify as genocide
(accessed 1 September 2022); Security Service of Ukraine, Telegram Channel, 24 May 2022, 12:24 (on fulfilling a
“dream” of killing “ukr” used as a derogatory word for Ukrainian).
135 Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into
the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families (April 1997).
136 Danish Prime Minister’s Office, “Apology to 22 Greenlandic Children Who Were Sent to Denmark in 1951”, 8 December
2020, https://www.stm.dk/presse/pressemeddelelser/undskyldning-til-de-22-groenlandske-boern-som-blev-sendttil-
danmark-i-1951/ (accessed 1 September 2022) (in Danish).
137 Matthew Lippman, “Genocide: The Crime of the Century. The Jurisprudence of Death at the Dawn of the New Millennium,”
Hous. J. Int’l L. 23, no. 23(3) (2000): 467, at 524 (noting that forcible transfer of children “appears to constitute
more of a cultural than a biological attack on the integrity of a group”).
138 GA, 6th Committee, 83rd meeting, UN Doc A/C.6/SR.83 (1948) (per Mr Perez Perozo), at 195.
139 Human Rights Watch, “We Had No Choice”: “Filtration” and the Crime of Forcibly Transferring Ukrainian Civilians to
Russia,” 1 September 2022, https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/09/01/we-had-no-choice/filtration-and-crime-forciblytransferring-
ukrainian-civilians (accessed 1 September 2022).
140 European Parliament resolution on human rights violations in the context of the forced deportation of Ukrainian civilians
to and the forced adoption of Ukrainian children in Russia (2022/2825RSP), 15 September 2022, https://www.
europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0320_EN.html (accessed 15 September 2022).
141 Laurie R. Blank, “Forcible Transfer of Children in Ukraine: An Element of Genocide,” Jurist, 21 April 2022, https://www.
jurist.org/commentary/2022/04/laurie-blank-russia-invasion-ukraine-genocide/ (accessed 1 September 2022).
142 UNESCO, “Damaged Cultural Sites in Ukraine Verified by UNESCO,” UNESCO, 20 August 2022, https://www.unesco.org/
en/articles/damaged-cultural-sites-ukraine-verified-unesco (accessed 1 September 2022). See also: Denis Azarov,
Dmytro Koval, Gaiane Nuridzhanian and Volodymyr Venher, “Genocide committed by the Russian Federation in
Ukraine: Legal Reasoning And Historical Context,” 1 August 2022, SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4217444 (accessed
1 September 2022), 28–30.
JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 17
per se, but may serve as important evidence pointing to the existence of the requisite
genocidal intent to physically destroy the group.143 Overall, Russia’s conduct in Ukraine
“carries all the hallmarks of a genocidal campaign bent on eviscerating Ukrainian national
identity.”144
In Whole or in Part?
An important question arises as to whether the intent to physically destroy has been
directed at the entire group or only part of it. Reflecting on the publicly available information,
it appears that the term “genocide” can be plausibly used to describe the
crimes committed with particular ruthlessness in Mariupol, and the deoccupied regions
in Kyiv and Kharkiv regions (e.g. Bucha, Borodyanka, Izyum). The destruction envisioned
by the Genocide Convention does not have to be aimed at the whole group, since the
destruction of the group “in part” – yet a substantial part – would also satisfy the
definition.145 Whether the targeted part constitutes a substantial portion of the group
can be ascertained based on geography or the sheer number of those targeted from
the group in comparison to the total group.146 In terms of the numeric size of the targeted
group in Bucha and surrounding areas, more than 1,100 dead bodies have been recovered
by Ukrainian authorities.147 The number of victims in Mariupol is unknown, as the
town remains under Russian control. However, even according to modest estimates,
more than 20,000 have died, with 600 civilians perishing as a result of the strike on the
Mariupol theatre alone.148 It was confirmed that 447 bodies were exhumed from mass
graves in Izyum, with the majority of those being civilians and only 22 bodies being identified
as Ukrainian soldiers.149 Ukrainian authorities estimate that over 200,000 children
were forcibly transferred to Russia.150 Given the numbers above, the targeted part of
Ukrainians would satisfy the necessary “substantiality” requirement and qualify as “in
part” within the definition of genocide. Moreover, had the Russian military succeeded
in occupying larger swathes of Ukrainian territory, the above number of Ukrainian
victims targeted for destruction would have been immeasurably higher. In attempting
143 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Trial Chamber, 24 March 2016, para. 553.
144 Kristina Hook, “Why Russia’s War in Ukraine Is a Genocide: Not Just a Land Grab, but a Bid to Expunge a Nation,”
Foreign Affairs, 28 July 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/why-russias-war-ukraine-genocide (accessed 1
September 2022).
145 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001 (hereinafter – Krstić
Trial Judgment), para. 590; ILC Report (1996), Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Article
17 (commentary), p. 45, para. 8.
146 Catherine Renshaw, “The Numbers Game: Substantiality and the Definition of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research
(22 June 2021): 3; David Alonzo-Maizlish, “In Whole or in Part: Group Rights, the Intent Element of Genocide, and the
Quantitative Criterion,” New York University Law Review 77, no. 5 (2002): 1388.
147 Yaroslav Pryshchepa, “1,167 Bodies of Ukrainians Were Found around Bucha, Says Ministry of Interior,” Suspilne Media,
7 June 2022, https://suspilne.media/247767-poblizu-buci-znajsli-vze-1137-til-zagiblih-ukrainciv-mvs/ (accessed 1 September
2022) (in Ukrainian).
148 Saskya Vandoorne and Melissa Bell, “Mariupol Death Toll at 22,000, Says Mayor’s Adviser,” CNN News, 24 May 2022,
https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-05-24-22/h_
95e94c548d8a5f49e0b97bc3415c9320 (accessed 1 September 2022).
149 Ministry of Interior of Ukraine, “Igor Klymenko [Head of Ukrainian National Police]: Exhumation of Bodies Has Been
Completed in Izyum,” 24 September 2022, https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/ihor-klymenko-ekshumatsiia-til-izmistsia-
masovoho-pokhovannia-v-iziumi-zavershena (accessed 24 September 2022) (in Ukrainian).
150 Yuliya Sokolova, “[Russian] Occupiers Transferred to RF More Than 1 million Ukrainians, 200,000 of These are Children
– Denysova [former Ukrainian Ombudsman],” Fakty, 9 May 2022, https://fakty.com.ua/ua/ukraine/20220509-
okupanty-vyvezly-do-rf-ponad-1-mln-ukrayincziv-z-nyh-200-tys-ditej-denisova/ (accessed 1 September 2022) (in
Ukrainian).
18 I. MARCHUK AND A. WANIGASURIYA
to fend off the Russian army from advancing further into Ukraine, the Ukrainian armed
forces have impeded Russia from carrying out genocide on a larger scale against
Ukrainians.
As Such
The term “as such” implies that the intent to destroy concerns a collection of people on
account of their particular group identity based on nationality, race, ethnicity, or religion.
151 This characteristic connotes the gravity of the crime of genocide since the perpetrator
denies a protected group the right to exist, thus infringing upon human diversity.152
The Kremlin’s rhetoric that denies Ukrainians the right to exist as a nation combined with
its vicious propaganda aimed not only at depriving Ukrainians of their national identity
but also at dehumanizing them,153 thus making them a “justified object” of violence by
Russian forces, points to the fact that Ukrainians have been targeted based on their
belonging to the Ukrainian national group.
Genocide or Wartime Terrorism?
A series of missile strikes launched across the entirety of Ukraine with highly indiscriminate
weapons aimed at the critical civilian infrastructure and civilian objects that have
caused significant casualties and damage raises the question as to whether those
attacks against the wider Ukrainian population may also point towards the existence of
genocidal intent. Out of 4,500 rockets launched by Russia against Ukraine since February
2022, a staggering number of around 100 rockets and Iranian-made kamikaze drones
were launched at major Ukrainian cities on a single day in Russia’s alleged retaliation
for the partial destruction of the Kerch bridge linking Crimea and mainland Russia, with
new waves of attacks that have followed.154
President Zelensky and other senior Ukrainian officials have spoken of the campaign of
“missile terror” unleashed by Russian forces against Ukrainians and called on the UNSC to
designate Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism.155 While such calls remain unanswered
by the UN, PACE became the very first international organization that designated
Russia as a terrorist state.156 The Ukrainian government’s insistence on designating
151 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber, 22 March 2006 (hereinafter – Stakić Appeal
Judgement), para. 20.
152 ILC Report (1996), Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Article 17 (commentary), p. 45,
para. 7; Akayesu Trial Judgment, para. 521; Krstić Trial Judgment, para. 552.
153 Vladimir Putin, “Article by Vladimir Putin ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,’” President of Russia, 12
July 2021, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181 (accessed 1 September 2022); Timofei Sergeitsev, “What
Should Russia Do With Ukraine”, RIA Novosti, 3 April 2022, https://ria.ru/20220403/ukraina-1781469605.html (accessed
1 September 2022) (in Russian).
154 President Zelenskyy’s Address to Democracy Summit Haaretz, 24 October 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/videos/
mozhna-pozbaviti-sensu-alyans-rosiyi-ta-iranu-yaksho-mi-bude-3489 (accessed 24 October 2022); President Zelenskyy’s
Address, 17 October 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/videos/sho-menshe-teroristichnih-mozhlivostej-bude-v-rosiyishvidsh-
3453 (accessed 17 October 2022); President Zelenskyy’s Address, 10 October 2022, https://www.president.gov.
ua/videos/ukrayinu-nemozhlivo-zalyakati-tilki-she-bilshe-obyednati-zve-3409 (accessed 10 October 2022) (in Ukrainian).
155 Volodymyr Zelensky, “It Is Necessary That Russia Stops Killing People: Full Text Of Zelenskyy’s Speech at The UN Security
Council,” Presidential Office, 29 June 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/potribno-shob-rosiya-pripinilavbivati-
lyudej-potribno-prity-76109 (accessed 1 September 2022); Dmytro Kuleba, Twitter, 10 October, 14:19 (speaking
of Russia’s “missile terror” as an attempt “to change the pace of war in [Russia’s] favour”).
156 PACE, Further escalation in the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine, Res 2463 (2022).
JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 19
Russia as a terrorist state is clearly aimed at entrenching Russia’s isolation in the international
arena thus reducing its geopolitical standing to that similar of Iran and North
Korea.157
The terrorist and genocide rhetoric advanced by the Ukrainian leadership run in parallel
creating an impression that Russia engages in genocide through “missile terror” across
Ukraine. At this juncture, it appears that the sustained Russian campaign of missile strikes
against the critical infrastructure and other civilian objects is more indicative of the special
intent in support of the acts of terror as a war crime aimed at sowing fear among the civilian
population158 rather than genocidal intent. However, as the war unfolds, the intent to
terrorize the civilian population in Ukraine, which is being relentlessly pursued by Russian
leadership and its military, may evolve and transform into genocidal intent across Ukraine,
especially if the Kremlin were to act on its threats to destroy Ukrainian critical infrastructure
leaving Ukrainians without electricity, heating and water during the cold winter
months or resort to the use of nuclear weapons, thus deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction.
Beyond the False Claim of Genocide
Viewed strategically, it would make sense for Ukraine to expand its argument beyond the
false claim of genocide by arguing that Russia breached the Genocide Convention by
engaging in genocide against the protected part of the group. This would align Ukraine’s
litigation strategy with the numerous political statements of the Ukrainian leadership on
the commission of genocide.159 Given that Russian officials described the atrocity crimes
in Bucha and Izyum as “fake,”160 it is highly desirable that Ukraine involves a highly reputable
international court such as the ICJ to carry out independent fact-finding in relation
to the commission of genocide, which will contribute towards establishing a truthful
account about the war.
However, expanding the argument also comes with certain risks. Ukraine has a good
chance of prevailing with regard to the case on the false claim of genocide. The order
on provisional measures already alludes to this potential positive outcome for
Ukraine.161 The abuse of international instruments, such as the Genocide Convention,
for the purpose of attacking a sovereign neighbouring state deserves the utmost
157 Ingrid (Wuerth) Brunk, “How Congress Should Designate Russia a State Sponsor of Terrorism”, Just Security, 27 September
2022, https://www.justsecurity.org/83263/how-congress-should-designate-russia-a-state-sponsor-ofterrorism/
(accessed 1 October 2022).
158 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Appeal Judgment, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeals Chamber, 30 November 2006 (hereinafter
– Galić Appeal Judgement), para. 104.
159 E.g. Presidential Office, “Speech by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Saeima of Latvia,” Presidential
Office, 26 May 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vistup-prezidenta-ukrayini-volodimira-zelenskogo-usaejmi-
la-75385 (accessed 1 September 2022); Presidential Office, “Speech by Head of the Office of the President
of Ukraine Andriy Yermak at the Securing Europe Panel in the Framework of the World Economic Forum in
Davos,” Presidential Office, 24 May 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vistup-kerivnika-ofisu-prezidentaukrayini-
andriya-yermaka-n-75353 (accessed 1 September 2022); Dmytro Kuleba, Twitter, 22 October 2022, 15:13
(describing strikes on Ukrainian critical infrastructure as “genocide” under Art. 2(c) of the Genocide Convention);
23 October 2022 (calling the remarks of RT’s Director of Broadcasting Anton Krasovsky as “incitement to genocide”).
160 President of Russia, “Joint News Conference with President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko,” President of Russia, 12
April 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68182 (accessed 1 September 2022); “‘Kyiv is promoting the
same scenario in Izyum as in Bucha,’ declared in the Kremlin,” RIA, 19 September 2022, https://ria.ru/20220919/
izyume-1817804180.html (accessed 19 September 2022) (in Russian).
161 Ukraine v. Russia Provisional Measures Order, paras 59, 86.
20 I. MARCHUK AND A. WANIGASURIYA
condemnation. The argument runs like a red thread through the Article 63 declarations
filed by multiple intervening states. In the present case, the ICJ may play an important
role by affirming that the abuse of the provisions of the Genocide Convention violates
the good faith fulfilment of treaty obligations undertaken by states to maintain the integrity
of the rules-based international legal order and protect humankind from genocide.
Yet, taking the case further by arguing that Russia engaged in genocide would require
tremendous effort on the part of Ukraine to demonstrate the existence of genocidal
intent of individual perpetrators, which is a prerequisite for attribution of state responsibility
for genocide to Russia. Ukraine is not aided in this task by the findings of international
courts and tribunals, as had been the case in the Bosnian Genocide case, in
which the ICTY findings on genocide had proved to be persuasive for the ICJ in its factfinding.
162
It also appears that the ICC has thus far focused on the potential prosecution of war
crimes and crimes against humanity in its ongoing investigation in the situation of
Ukraine. No public statements have been issued by the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor
(OTP) on the preliminary findings of the investigation regarding the alleged commission
of genocide. This is notwithstanding the public press release by the OTP following prosecutor
Karim Khan’s visits to Bucha and the Kyiv region.163 Similarly, at the domestic level,
the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine (OPG) initiated in absentia criminal proceedings
only in relation to war crimes by Russian soldiers who are suspected of committing
alleged atrocity crimes in Bucha.164 The newly appointed Ukrainian Prosecutor
General Andriy Kostin announced that his office is in the process of collecting evidence
for building a convincing case on genocide, yet it appears that such work is in its early
stage.165 Hence, apart from political statements, Ukraine cannot rely on any criminal
cases, either in the national context or at the international level (i.e. ICC), that can
strengthen its claim of the commission of genocide by Russia. However, this is not to
suggest that Ukraine stands no chance in proving that Russia should bear responsibility
for genocide at least in relation to the forcible transfer of Ukrainian children, as well as
the despicable atrocities in Mariupol and the deocuppied areas in the Kyiv and Kharkiv
regions. To maximize the chance of success, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
(MFA) together with the OPG will need to furnish the ICJ with compelling evidence of
the commission of genocide by individuals whose conduct can be fully attributable to
Russia. For this, Ukraine will need to invest significantly in demonstrating that the
alleged genocide committed by Russian foot soldiers had been fully endorsed and orchestrated
by the Russian leadership.
162 For a broader discussion on the limits of international law in qualifying Russian crimes in Ukraine as genocide, see
A. Dirk Moses, “The Ukraine Genocide Debate Reveals the Limits of International Law,” Lawfare, 16 May 2022,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/ukraine-genocide-debate-reveals-limits-international-law (accessed 6 September
2022).
163 Karim A.A. Khan, “Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan QC, at the Arria-Formula Meeting of the UN Security
Council on ‘Ensuring Accountability for Atrocities Committed in Ukraine,’” International Criminal Court, 27 April 2022,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-qc-arria-formula-meeting-un-security-councilensuring
(accessed 1 September 2022).
164 On 28 April 2022, Bucha District Prosecutor’s Office initiated criminal proceedings against 10 Russian military on the
charges of the cruel treatment of the civilian population under Article 438(1) CC. See: OPG official Facebook page, 28
April 2022, https://www.facebook.com/pgo.gov.ua/posts/359030732926433 (accessed 1 September 2022) (in
Ukrainian)).
165 Ruth Green, “The IBA Interview: Andriy Kostin, Prosecutor General of Ukraine,” International Bar Association, 4 October
2022, https://www.ibanet.org/interview-Andriy-Kostin-Prosecutor-General-of-Ukraine (accessed 4 October 2022).
JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 21
A number of factors point towards the existence of a Russian genocidal policy in
Ukraine, from which the genocidal intent may be inferred: (1) denying the existence of
a Ukrainian identity, history and culture; (2) denying Ukrainians the right to exist as a
nation; (3) invoking the justification of “denazification” for its invasion of Ukraine with
the view of dehumanizing Ukrainians; (4) the use of derogatory language against Ukrainians;
(5) portraying Ukrainians as an existential threat to Russia; and (6) conditioning
the Russian military to commit atrocities against Ukrainians and the general public in
Russia to condone such crimes.166 Official Russian government statements, the language
used by Russian state-run channels and traditional print media, as well as the use of social
media for amplifying disinformation,167 point toward the existence of genocidal intent on
the part of Russian officials and supporters of the Putin regime who spread hateful rhetoric
against Ukrainians, which calls for the destruction of Ukrainians as a group. Such genocidal
rhetoric coupled with the physical destruction of the members of the group in the
deoccuppied areas and the areas under Russian control should suffice in convincing the
ICJ that Russia, through its organs, state agents and its proxies acting on its instructions,
has violated the Genocide Convention by engaging in genocide against Ukrainians.
No international treaty other than the Genocide Convention provides an avenue
through which to invoke state responsibility for atrocity crimes. While the ILC Draft Convention
on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity contains a compromissory
clause to engage the jurisdiction of the ICJ, this long overdue international
instrument is yet to become a reality.168 Holding Russia accountable for genocide in
Ukraine, a country where the inventor of genocide Raphael Lemkin once lived and
studied, will be hugely symbolic for Ukrainians who have campaigned for years to recognize
the “Holodomor” as genocide where the USSR communist regime subjected Ukrainians
to a man-made famine to crush Ukrainian aspirations for statehood.169 Tragically
today, history appears to be repeating itself. Russia as the main successor of the USSR
inherited its brutal tactics and has not given up on the idea of erasing Ukraine as an independent
country from the world map and eradicating Ukrainians as a national group once
they decided to abandon the “brotherly union” with Russia in favour of Western democratic
values.170 The World Court is an appropriate venue to hear the case on the allegations
of the ongoing genocide that Russia is unleashing against Ukrainians, as it has
a duty to sustain the post-WWII rules-based order based on universal values that leave
no room for genocide.
166 New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, An Independent Legal
Analysis of the Russian Federation’s Breaches of the Genocide Convention in Ukraine and the Duty to Prevent (May
2022): 1–2, 13–20.
167 For specific examples of disinformation narratives, calls for more violence and genocide against Ukrainians shared on
pro-Russian Telegram channels after Bucha, see Ian Garner, “‘We’ve Got to Kill Them’: Responses to Bucha on Russian
Social Media Groups,” Journal of Genocide Research (9 May 2022): DOI: 10.1080/14623528.2022.2074020.
168 International Law Commission, Draft articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity, A/CN.4/
L.935, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2019, vol. 2, Part II.
169 Roman Serbyn, “Lemkin on Genocide of Nations,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 7, no. 1 (2009): 123–130. For
more on the evolution of Lemkin’s thinking regarding the qualification of Soviet crimes committed during the “Holodomor”
in Ukraine as “genocide,” see Etkind, “Ukraine, Russia, and Genocide of Minor Differences,” 4–12.
170 Kristina Hook, “Vladimir Putin’s War to Crush Ukraine is Part of a Long Kremlin Tradition,” Atlantic Council, 17 March
2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/vladimir-putins-war-to-crush-ukraine-is-part-of-a-longkremlin-
tradition/ (accessed 1 September 2022).
22 I. MARCHUK AND A. WANIGASURIYA
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes on Contributors
Iryna Marchuk is an associate professor of international and criminal law at the Faculty of Law, University
of Copenhagen. Her main research interests lie in the fields of international criminal law,
public international law and international dispute settlement.
Aloka Wanigasuriya is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Centre for Law and Social Justice, Newcastle
Law School, University of Newcastle. Aloka’s research interests lie within the fields of international
criminal law and public international law.
JOURNAL OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 23
Comparison of Declarations
Declaration of Spain, ¶¶17-30; Declaration of Croatia ¶¶17-31
[Emphasis added where there are differences]
Declaration of Estonia Declaration of Croatia
17. Article IX of the Genocide Convention reads as
follows:
"Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating
to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the
present Convention, including those relating to the
responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of
the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be
submitted to the International Court of Justice at the
request of any of the parties to the dispute."
17. Article IX of the Genocide Convention reads as
follows:
“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating
to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the
present Convention, including those relating to the
responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of
the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be
submitted to the International Court of Justice at the
request of any of the parties to the dispute.”
18. Spain contends that the notion of "dispute" is
already well-established in the case law of the Court
and supports the current interpretation.
Accordingly, it concurs with the meaning given to
the word dispute as "a disagreement on a point of
law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests"
between parties. In order for a dispute to exist, "[i]t
must be shown that the claim of one party is
positively opposed by the other." The two sides
must "hold clearly opposite views concerning the
question of the performance or non-performance of
certain international obligations". Moreover, "in
case the respondent has failed to reply to the
applicant's claims, it may be inferred from this
silence, in certain circumstances, that it rejects those
claims and that, therefore, a dispute exists".
18. The Republic of Croatia contends that the notion of
“dispute” is already well-established in the case law
of the Court and supports the current interpretation.
Accordingly, it concurs with the meaning given to
the word dispute as “a disagreement on a point of
law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests”
between parties. In order for a dispute to exist, “[i]t
must be shown that the claim of one party is
positively opposed by the other”. The two sides must
“hold clearly opposite views concerning the
question of the performance or non-performance of
certain international obligations”. Moreover, “in
case the respondent has failed to reply to the
applicant's claims, it may be inferred from this
silence, in certain circumstances, that it rejects
those claims and that, therefore, a dispute exists”.
19. Spain hence concentrates on the interpretation of the
other parts of Article IX, namely that the scope of
such disputes must be "relating to the interpretation,
application or fulfilment of the present Convention".
It contends that Article IX is a broad jurisdictional
clause, allowing the Court to adjudicate upon
disputes concerning the alleged fulfilment by a
Contracting Party of its obligations under the
Convention. As Judge Oda noted, the inclusion of
the word "fulfilment" is "unique as compared with
the compromissory clauses found in other
multilateral treaties which provide for submission of
the International Court of such disputes between
Contracting Parties as relate to the interpretation or
application of the treaties in question".
19. The Republic of Croatia hence concentrates on the
interpretation of the other parts of Article IX,
namely that the scope of such disputes must be
“relating to the interpretation, application or
fulfilment of the present Convention”. It contends
that Article IX is a broad jurisdictional clause,
allowing the Court to adjudicate upon disputes
concerning not only the application and
interpretation but also alleged fulfilment by a
Contracting Party of its obligations under the
Convention. As Judge Oda noted, the inclusion of
the word “fulfilment” is “unique as compared with
the compromissory clauses found in other
multilateral treaties which provide for submission of
the International Court of such disputes between
Contracting Parties as relate to the interpretation or
application of the treaties in question”.
20. The Republic of Croatia's interpretation of Article
IX in general and of the phrase “relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the
Convention” in particular, is based on Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
which paragraph 1 reads as follows:
Annex 23
“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.”
20. The ordinary meaning of the phrase "relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the
Convention" may be divided in two sub-categories.
21. With regard to the phrase “relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the
Convention” its ordinary meaning may be divided in
two sub-categories.
21. The first point ("relating to") establishes a link
between the dispute and the Convention.
22. The second point ("interpretation, application or
fulfilment of the Convention") encompasses many
different scenarios. As Professor Kolb has observed,
Article IX of the Convention is "a model of clarity
and simplicity, opening the seizing of the Court as
largely as possible".
22. The first point (“relating to”) establishes a link
between the dispute and the Convention.
23. The second point ("interpretation, application or
fulfilment of the Convention") encompasses many
different scenarios.
23. There can be a dispute about the interpretation,
application or fulfilment of the Convention when
one State alleges that another State has committed
genocide. In that scenario, the Court verifies the
factual basis for such allegation: if it is not satisfied
that there were any acts of genocide actually being
committed by the respondent State, it may decline
its jurisdiction, also prima facie.
24. There can be a dispute about the interpretation,
application or fulfilment of the Convention when
one State alleges that another State has committed
genocide. In that scenario, the Court verifies the
factual basis for such allegation, that is whether
genocide has been committed or not.
24. While this scenario of (alleged) responsibility for
acts of genocide constitutes an important type of
dispute on the "interpretation, application or
fulfilment" of the Convention, it is not the only one.
For example, in The Gambia v. Myanmar (pending),
the applicant claimed that the defendant was not
only responsible for prohibited acts under Article
III, but that it was also violating its obligations under
the Convention by failing to prevent genocide in
violation of Article I; and failing to punish genocide
in violation of Articles I, IV and V. In that example,
one State alleges that another State is not honouring
its commitment to "prevent" and "punish" genocide,
because it grants impunity to acts of genocide
committed on its territory. Therefore, there can also
be disputes about "non -action" as a violation of the
substantive obligations under Article I, IV and V.
25. Therefore, the ordinary meaning of Article IX
makes it clear that there is no need to establish
genocidal acts as a basis to affirm the Court's
jurisdiction. Rather, the Court has jurisdiction over
the question whether genocidal acts have been or are
being committed or not. Hence, it also has
jurisdiction ratione materiae to declare the absence
of genocide and the violation of a good faith
performance of the Convention, resulting in an
abuse of the law. In particular, the jurisdiction of the
Court extends to disputes concerning the unilateral
use of military force for the stated purpose of
preventing and punishing alleged genocide.
25. While this scenario of (alleged) responsibility for
acts of genocide constitutes an important type of
dispute on the “interpretation, application or
fulfilment” of the Convention, it is not the only one.
For example, in The Gambia v. Myanmar (pending),
the applicant claimed that the defendant was not
only responsible for prohibited acts under Article
III, but that it was also violating its obligations under
the Convention by failing to prevent genocide in
violation of Article I; and failing to punish genocide
in violation of Articles I, IV and V. In that example,
one State alleges that another State is not honouring
its commitment to “prevent” and “punish” genocide,
because it grants impunity to acts of genocide
committed on its territory. Therefore, there can also
be disputes about “non -action” as a violation of the
substantive obligations under Article I, IV and V.
26. The ordinary meaning of the phrase (“relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the
Convention”) in Article IX makes it clear that there
is no need to establish genocidal acts as a basis to
affirm the Court's jurisdiction. In addition to
establishing genocidal acts the Court also has
jurisdiction over the question whether genocidal
acts have been or are being committed or not.
Hence, it also has jurisdiction ratione materiae to
declare the absence of genocide and the violation of
a good faith performance of the Convention,
resulting in an abuse of the law. In particular, the
jurisdiction of the Court extends to disputes
concerning the unilateral use of military force for the
stated purpose of preventing and punishing alleged
genocide.
26. The context of the phrase ("relating to ...") further
confirms this reading. In particular, the unusual
feature of the words "including" in the intermediate
sentence indicates a broader scope of Article IX of
the Convention when compared to standard
compromissory clause. Disputes relating to the
responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of
the other acts enumerated in Article III are therefore
only one type of dispute covered by Article IX,
which are "included" in the wider phrase of disputes
"relating to the interpretation, application and
fulfilment" of the Convention. Moreover, Article IX
expressly provides for ICJ jurisdiction "at the
request of any of the parties to the dispute"
(emphasis added). This language suggests that a
State accused of committing genocide has the same
right to submit the dispute to the Court as the State
making the accusation. In particular, such a State
may seek a "negative" declaration from the Court
that the allegations from another State that it was
responsible for genocide are without legal and
factual foundation.
27. The context of the phrase (“relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the
Convention”) further confirms this reading. In
particular, the unusual feature of the words
“including” in the intermediate sentence indicates a
broader scope of Article IX of the Convention when
compared to standard compromissory clause.
Disputes relating to the responsibility of a State for
genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in
Article III are therefore only one type of dispute
covered by Article IX, which are “included” in the
wider phrase of disputes “relating to the
interpretation, application and fulfilment” of the
Convention.
28. Moreover, Article IX expressly provides for ICJ
jurisdiction “at the request of any of the parties to
the dispute” (emphasis added). This language
suggests that a State accused of committing
genocide has the same right to submit the dispute to
the Court as the State making the accusation. In
particular, such a State may seek a “negative”
declaration from the Court that the allegations from
another State that it was responsible for genocide are
without legal and factual foundation.
27. Hence, the context of the phrase ("relating to") in
Article IX confirms that the Court's jurisdiction goes
beyond disputes between States about the
responsibility for alleged genocidal acts, but also
covers disputes between States about the absence of
genocide and the violation of a good faith
performance of the Convention, resulting in an
abuse of the law.
28. Finally, the object and purpose gives further support
to the wide interpretation of Article IX. The Court
noted that "[a]ll the States parties to the Genocide
Convention [thus] have a common interest to ensure
the prevention, suppression and punishment of
genocide, by committing themselves to fulfilling the
obligations contained in the Convention".
Famously, in its 1951 Advisory Opinion, the Court
held:
"The objects of such a convention must also be
considered. The Convention was manifestly adopted
for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose. It
is indeed difficult to imagine a convention that
might have this dual character to a greater degree,
since its object on the one hand is to safeguard the
very existence of certain human groups and on the
other to confirm and endorse the most elementary
principles of morality. In such a convention the
contracting States do not have any interests of their
own; they merely have, one and all, a common
interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high
purposes which are the raison d'être of the
convention. Consequently, in a convention of this
type one cannot speak of individual advantages or
29. Finally, the object and purpose of the Convention
gives further support to the wide interpretation of
Article IX. The Court noted that “[a]ll the States
parties to the Genocide Convention [thus] have a
common interest to ensure the prevention,
suppression and punishment of genocide, by
committing themselves to fulfilling the obligations
contained in the Convention”. Famously, in its 1951
Advisory Opinion, the Court held:
“The objects of such a convention must also be
considered. The Convention was manifestly adopted
for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose. It
is indeed difficult to imagine a convention that might
have this dual character to a greater degree, since
its object on the one hand is to safeguard the very
existence of certain human groups and on the other
to confirm and endorse the most elementary
principles of morality. In such a convention the
contracting States do not have any interests of their
own; they merely have, one and all, a common
interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high
purposes which are the raison d'être of the
convention. Consequently, in a convention of this
type one cannot speak of individual advantages or
disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a
perfect contractual balance between rights and
duties. The high ideals which inspired the
Convention provide, by virtue of the common will
of the parties, the foundation and measure of all its
provisions."
disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a
perfect contractual balance between rights and
duties. The high ideals which inspired the
Convention provide, by virtue of the common will of
the parties, the foundation and measure of all its
provisions.”
29. The Convention's object to protect the most
elementary principles of morality also prohibits any
possibility of a State Party to abuse its provisions for
other means. It would undermine the Convention's
credibility as a universal instrument to outlaw the
most abhorrent crime of genocide if its authority
could be abused by any State Party without a
possibility of the victim of such abuse to turn to the
Court. The purpose of the Convention hence speaks
loudly in favour of a reading of Article IX,
according to which disputes relating to the
interpretation, application and fulfilment include
disputes about the abuse of the Convention's
authority to justify a State's action vis-a-vis another
State party to the Convention.
30. In conclusion, the ordinary meaning of Article IX of
the Convention, its context and the object and
purpose of the entire Convention show that a dispute
regarding acts carried out by one State against
another State based on false claims of genocide falls
under the notion of "dispute between Contracting
Parties relating to the interpretation, application or
fulfilment of the present Convention". Accordingly,
the Court has jurisdiction to declare the absence of
genocide and the violation of a good faith
performance of the Convention, resulting in an
abuse of the law. In particular, the jurisdiction of the
Court extends to disputes concerning the unilateral
use of military force for the stated purpose of
preventing and punishing alleged genocide.
30. The Convention's object to protect the most
elementary principles of morality also prohibits any
possibility of a State Party to abuse its provisions for
other means. It would undermine the Convention's
credibility as a universal instrument to outlaw the
most abhorrent crime of genocide if its authority
could be abused by any State Party without a
possibility of the victim of such abuse to turn to the
Court. The purpose of the Convention hence speaks
loudly in favour of a reading of Article IX,
according to which disputes relating to the
interpretation, application and fulfilment include
disputes about the abuse of the Convention's
authority to justify a State's action vis-à-vis another
State party to the Convention.
31. In conclusion, the construction of Article IX of the
Convention shows that the Court's jurisdiction goes
beyond disputes between States about the
responsibility for alleged genocidal acts, but also
covers disputes between States about the absence of
genocide and the violation of a good faith
performance of the Convention, resulting in an
abuse of the law. It also confirms that a dispute
regarding acts carried out by one State against
another State based on false claims of genocide falls
under the notion of “dispute between Contracting
Parties relating to the interpretation, application or
fulfilment of the present Convention”. Accordingly,
the Court has jurisdiction to declare the absence of
genocide and the violation of a good faith
performance of the Convention, resulting in an
abuse of the law. Therefore the jurisdiction of the
Court extends to disputes concerning the unilateral
use of military force which is based on the false
claims that act of genocide have occurred.
Declaration of Croatia, ¶¶10, 18, 19, 28; Declaration of the Czech Republic ¶¶11, 24, 25, 27
[Emphasis added where there are differences]
Declaration of Croatia
Declaration of the Czech Republic
10. It is the understanding of the Republic of Croatia
that the Genocide Convention is of utmost
importance to prevent and punish genocide. Any
acts committed with an intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, national, ethnical, racial or religious
group constitutes a crime under international law.
The prohibition against genocide is a jus cogens
norm in international law. The rights and
obligations enshrined by the Convention are owed
11. The Genocide Convention is of utmost importance
to prevent and punish genocide and to protect the
basic values of the international community as a
whole. This case raises important issues concerning
the interpretation of the Genocide Convention. The
Court already found and confirmed that the
provisions of the Genocide Convention impose
obligations erga omnes, which are owed to the
international community as a whole, and that the
to the international community as a whole (rights
and obligations erga omnes partes).
prohibition against genocide is a ius cogens norm
of international law.
19. The Republic of Croatia hence concentrates on the
interpretation of the other parts of Article IX,
namely that the scope of such disputes must be
“relating to the interpretation, application or
fulfilment of the present Convention”. It contends
that Article IX is a broad jurisdictional clause,
allowing the Court to adjudicate upon disputes
concerning not only the application and
interpretation but also alleged fulfilment by a
Contracting Party of its obligations under the
Convention
24. The Czech Republic will focus on the interpretation
of Article IX, namely on the condition that the
scope of such disputes must be “relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the
present Convention”. It contends that Article IX is
a broad jurisdictional clause, allowing the Court to
adjudicate upon disputes between Contracting
States relating to all aspects of interpretation,
application or fulfilment by a Contracting Party of
its obligations under the Convention.
18. The Republic of Croatia contends that the notion of
"dispute" is already well-established in the case law
of the Court and supports the current interpretation.
Accordingly, it concurs with the meaning given to
the word dispute as “a disagreement on a point of
law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests”
between parties. In order for a dispute to exist, “[i]t
must be shown that the claim of one party is
positively opposed by the other”. The two sides
must “hold clearly opposite views concerning the
question of the performance or non-performance of
certain international obligations”.
25. The notion of a “dispute” is already wellestablished
in the case law of the Court and supports
the current interpretation. Accordingly, the Czech
Republic concurs with the meaning given to the
word dispute as “a disagreement on a point of law
or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests”
between parties. A dispute exists wherever the two
sides “hold clearly opposite views” with respect to
the issue brought before the Court, “the claim of
one party is positively opposed by the other”, and
“the respondent was aware, or could not have been
unaware, that its views were positively opposed' by
the applicant”.
28. Moreover, Article IX expressly provides for ICJ
jurisdiction “at the request of any of the parties to
the dispute” (emphasis added). This language
suggests that a State accused of committing
genocide has the same right to submit the dispute to
the Court as the State making the accusation. In
particular, such a State may seek a “negative”
declaration from the Court that the allegations from
another State that it was responsible for genocide
are without legal and factual foundation.
27. Therefore, whenever there is a dispute between two
or more Contracting Parties concerning whether a
Contracting Party has engaged in conduct contrary
to the Genocide Convention, the Contracting Party
accused of such conduct has the same right to
submit the dispute to the Court as the Contracting
Party that has made the accusation, and the Court
will be in a position to exercise its jurisdiction. In
particular, such a State may seek a “negative”
declaration from the Court that the allegations by
another State that it was responsible for the acts of
genocide are without legal and factual foundation.
Annexes