DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC SKOTNIKOV
Procedural issues
1. The range of procedural deficiencies and abnormalities in and of itself calls into question the credibility of any substantive findings of the Court, whatever they might be.
2. The Court does not deal with the present case as envisioned in its Statute (see Article 38, paragraph 1; Article 43, paragraphs 1 and 5; and Article 54, paragraph 1) and its Rules (see Article 31; Article 49, paragraph 4; Article 58, paragraph 1; Article 60, paragraph 1; and Article 61).
3. Article 43, paragraph 1, of the Statute provides that “[t]he procedure shall consist of two parts: written and oral”. In contrast, the oral proceedings in this case have been restricted to the discussion of two questions of pure law formulated by the Court.
4. Indeed, Article 61, paragraph 1, of the Rules indicates the approach that the Court ought to take where there are particular issues “it would like the parties specially to address” or when “it considers that there has been sufficient argument” on certain points. However, such possibilities stand in contrast to the present case, where the Court ordered the Parties to “exclusively” consider certain questions (Judgment, para. 14) without allowing for argument on any other points, including Nicaragua’s second and third submissions.
5. Thus, the Parties were deprived of the opportunity to complete their respective presentations of the case, which is inconsistent with Article 54, paragraph 1, of the Statute. This is made even clearer in the French text, which provides for the presentation by agents, counsel, and advocates of “tous les moyens qu’ils jugent utiles”.
6. The incompatibility between the absence of full oral proceedings and the Statute of the Court is further reflected in Article 43, paragraph 5, which requires the proceedings to include the hearing of experts, whom the Parties had engaged in this case but who were left unable to present their positions to the Court (see also Article 58, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court).
7. Despite Article 60 of the Rules of Court, the Parties were not permitted to make oral statements to cover “what is requisite for the adequate presentation of that party’s contentions”. Indeed, the arguments did not cover all the issues that still divide the Parties. Instead, they were required to repeat arguments that had been prepared in written proceedings and in oral proceedings in an earlier case between them.
8. No final submissions relating to the substance of the case, which in accordance with Article 60, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court ought to be presented at the end of the oral phase, were allowed. Yet, the Court rules on these issues in the operative clause (Judgment, para. 104), including the issue manifestly unrelated to the questions of pure law formulated by the Court (ibid., para. 104 (3)). The only oral submissions at the end of the hearings made by Nicaragua concerned these two questions and the “fix[ing of] a timetable to hear and decide upon all of the outstanding request in Nicaragua’s pleadings”. This latter submission was rejected by the Court.
- 2 -
9. The source of all the irregularities mentioned above is the Court’s unprecedented Order of 4 October 2022, which was adopted in departure from Article 31 of the Rules of the Court without consultation of the Parties (see the joint declaration of Judges Tomka, Xue, Robinson, Nolte and Judge ad hoc Skotnikov).
Substantive issues
10. The position taken by the Court in its Judgment of 19 November 2012 in the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) case (hereinafter the “2012 Judgment”) and in the Judgment of 17 March 2016 on preliminary objections in the present case (hereinafter the “2016 Judgment”), when read together, leaves no doubt that the Court was ready to consider delimitation once Nicaragua had made full submissions to the Commission on the Limits to the Continental Shelf (hereinafter “CLCS”); all other issues raised by the Parties would have been dealt with in the course of the delimitation process.
11. In its 2016 Judgment, the Court clarified the content and scope of subparagraph 3 of the operative clause of the 2012 Judgment, taking into account the differing views expressed by the Parties on the subject:
“It has found that delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast was conditional on the submission by Nicaragua of information on the limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, provided for in paragraph 8 of Article 76 of UNCLOS, to the CLCS. The Court thus did not settle the question of delimitation in 2012 because it was not, at that time, in a position to do so.”1
That was the only condition set forth by the Court for proceeding to delimitation. Incidentally, such delimitation would not necessarily affect Colombia’s 200-nautical-mile continental shelf entitlement (see paragraph 19 below).
12. In its Judgment of 25 July 1974 in the Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland) case, the Court made it clear that,
“as an international judicial organ, [it] is deemed to take judicial notice of international law, and is therefore required in a case falling under Article 53 of the Statute, as in any other case, to consider on its own initiative all rules of international law which may be relevant to the settlement of the dispute. It being the duty of the Court itself to ascertain and apply the relevant law in the given circumstances of the case, the burden of establishing or proving rules of international law cannot be imposed upon any of the parties, for the law lies within the judicial knowledge of the Court.”2
13. The Court’s approach in the 2012 and 2016 Judgments was consistent with that dictum, which cannot be said of its Order of 4 October 2022 and the present Judgment.
1 Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), p. 132, para. 85 (emphasis added).
2 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 9, para. 17.
- 3 -
14. The discussion of the questions of pure law formulated by the Court shows that there is nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter “UNCLOS”), its travaux préparatoires or the circumstances surrounding its conclusion specifically dealing with the possibility or impossibility of delimitation between one State’s extended continental shelf and the 200-nautical-mile continental shelf of another State. The Court’s finding of a “suggest[ion] that the States participating in the negotiations assumed” a certain position concerning the extended continental shelf based on certain UNCLOS provisions (Judgment, para. 76) seems a tenuous basis for a legal determination, to say the least. The same is true about the characterization of UNCLOS as a “package deal” (ibid., para. 48). There is nothing in this “package” relating to the question to which the Court tries to find an answer. Accordingly, there is nothing therein that could support the Court’s conclusion on this matter.
15. The Court seems to rely on the importance of the role of the CLCS in the protection of the common heritage of mankind (Judgment, para. 76). However, that is not the sole mission of the CLCS (see paragraph 11 above). Relatedly, payments and contributions in respect of the exploitation of the extended continental shelf are irrelevant in the present case. Curiously, the Court here focuses its reasoning on the provisions of UNCLOS, which are manifestly not part of the applicable law in the present case, i.e. customary international law.
16. To support its conclusion, the Court refers to the submissions to the CLCS of States parties to UNCLOS (Judgment, para. 77). However, States, in their CLCS submissions, do not consistently refrain from extending a claim within 200 nautical miles from the baselines of another State. Even when they do, this practice is generally unaccompanied by opinio juris, which cannot be simply inferred from practice. In contrast to what the Court suggests in the present case, “[t]he frequency . . . of the acts is not in itself enough” for the identification of opinio juris (North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 44, para. 77; see also International Law Commission, Draft conclusions on identification of customary international law, UN doc A/73/10, p. 129 (Conclusion 3, comment 7)). The Court does not have “authority to ascribe to States legal views which they do not themselves advance” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 109, para. 207). Indeed, for those submissions which do refrain from extending within 200 nautical miles from the baselines of another State, there are other, more plausible motivations, perhaps most notably the desire to avoid a dispute, since a dispute would preclude the CLCS from making recommendations3. In any event, it must be recalled that these submissions are made by States parties to UNCLOS within the specific treaty régime.
17. The existing jurisprudence does not support the Court’s conclusions either: in its 2021 Judgment in the Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya) case, the Court referred to a “possible grey area” (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 277, para. 197), while ITLOS and an arbitral tribunal have both accepted the existence of such “grey areas” (Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration between Bangladesh and India, Award of 7 July 2014, United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol. XXXII, p. 147, para. 498; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 119, para. 463). More recently, in Mauritius/Maldives, the ITLOS Special Chamber did not question the possibility of a grey area (Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Indian Ocean (Mauritius/Maldives), Judgment, 28 April 2023, para. 275). The Court itself, ITLOS, and an UNCLOS Annex VII tribunal have thus all accepted the possibility of different jurisdictions dealing with the sea-bed and subsoil, on the one hand, and the water column, on the
3 Paragraph 5 (a) of Annex I of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 17 April 2008, UN doc. CLCS/40/Rev.1.
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other. Moreover, another arbitral tribunal has held that there is neither priority nor hierarchy between the rule of distance and the rule of natural prolongation as regards an entitlement to a continental shelf (Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Guinea and Guinea Bissau, Decision of 14 February 1985, RIAA, Vol. XIX, p. 191, para. 116). Even more importantly, the present Judgment directly contradicts the 2012 and 2016 Judgments.
18. Hence, the Court’s finding that a State’s entitlement to a continental shelf throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin may not extend within 200 nautical miles from the baselines of another State is not in accordance with existing rules of international law. In its attempt to legislate instead of interpreting and applying the existing law, the Court has disregarded its function, as provided in Article 38, paragraph 1, of the Statute. Indeed, it has ignored the fundamental principle, according to which “the Court, as a court of law, cannot render judgment sub specie legis ferendae”4.
19. The only legally sound conclusion that the Court should have drawn is that both UNCLOS and customary international law provide for an equitable solution as the guiding principle in maritime delimitations, which allows, inter alia, for consideration of delimitation of one State’s extended continental shelf and the continental shelf of another State to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured. The Court should have continued with the case in order to implement this principle.
(Signed) Leonid SKOTNIKOV.
___________
4 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 192, para. 45.
558
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC SKOTNIKOV
Procedural Issues
1. The range of procedural deficiencies and abnormalities in and of itself
calls into question the credibility of any substantive findings of the Court,
whatever they might be.
2. The Court does not deal with the present case as envisioned in its Statute
(see Article 38, paragraph 1; Article 43, paragraphs 1 and 5; and
Article 54, paragraph 1) and its Rules (see Article 31; Article 49, paragraph 4;
Article 58, paragraph 1; Article 60, paragraph 1; and Article 61).
3. Article 43, paragraph 1, of the Statute provides that “[t]he procedure
shall consist of two parts: written and oral”. In contrast, the oral proceedings
in this case have been restricted to the discussion of two questions of pure
law formulated by the Court.
4. Indeed, Article 61, paragraph 1, of the Rules indicates the approach that
the Court ought to take where there are particular issues “it would like the
parties specially to address” or when “it considers that there has been sufficient
argument” on certain points. However, such possibilities stand in
contrast to the present case, where the Court ordered the Parties to “exclusively”
consider certain questions (Judgment, para. 14) without allowing for
argument on any other points, including Nicaragua’s second and third
submissions.
5. Thus, the Parties were deprived of the opportunity to complete their
respective presentations of the case, which is inconsistent with Article 54,
paragraph 1, of the Statute. This is made even clearer in the French text,
which provides for the presentation by agents, counsel, and advocates of
“tous les moyens qu’ils jugent utiles”.
6. The incompatibility between the absence of full oral proceedings and
the Statute of the Court is further reflected in Article 43, paragraph 5, which
requires the proceedings to include the hearing of experts, whom the Parties
had engaged in this case but who were left unable to present their positions
to the Court (see also Article 58, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court).
7. Despite Article 60 of the Rules of Court, the Parties were not permitted
to make oral statements to cover “what is requisite for the adequate presentation
of that party’s contentions”. Indeed, the arguments did not cover all the
issues that still divide the Parties. Instead, they were required to repeat argudelimitation
558
OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. LE JUGE AD HOC SKOTNIKOV
[Traduction]
Questions de procédure
1. L’ampleur des vices et anomalies de procédure en l’espèce remet à elle
seule en cause la crédibilité de toute conclusion, quelle qu’elle soit, à laquelle
la Cour a pu parvenir sur le fond.
2. La Cour n’a pas traité la présente affaire conformément aux prévisions
de son Statut (voir le paragraphe 1 de l’article 38, les paragraphes 1 et 5 de
l’article 43 et le paragraphe 1 de l’article 54) et de son Règlement (voir l’article
31, le paragraphe 4 de l’article 49, le paragraphe 1 de l’article 58, le
paragraphe 1 de l’article 60 et l’article 61).
3. Aux termes du paragraphe 1 de l’article 43 du Statut, « [l]a procédure a
deux phases : l’une écrite, l’autre orale ». Or, en l’espèce, la procédure orale a
été limitée à l’examen de deux questions purement juridiques posées par la
Cour.
4. Certes, le paragraphe 1 de l’article 61 du Règlement précise la manière
dont la Cour doit procéder en présence de problèmes particuliers « qu’elle
voudrait voir spécialement étudier par les parties » ou qu’« elle considère
[certains points] comme suffisamment discutés ». Cependant, on est loin
d’être face à ces éventualités en la présente instance, dans laquelle la Cour a
ordonné aux Parties de « circonscrire » leurs plaidoiries à certaines questions
(arrêt, par. 14), sans les autoriser à exposer leurs arguments sur un quelconque
autre point, notamment les deuxième et troisième chefs de conclusions
du Nicaragua.
5. Ainsi, les Parties ont été privées de la possibilité d’achever leurs présentations
respectives de l’affaire, ce qui contrevient au paragraphe 1 de
l’article 54 du Statut. Le texte français de cette disposition est à cet égard
particulièrement clair, puisqu’il prévoit que les agents, conseils et avocats
font valoir « tous les moyens qu’ils jugent utiles ».
6. L’incompatibilité d’une absence de procédure orale complète avec le
Statut de la Cour ressort également du paragraphe 5 de l’article 43, qui
impose que soient entendus les experts, lesquels avaient en l’espèce été engagés
par les Parties mais qui n’ont pas eu la possibilité de présenter leurs
exposés à la Cour (voir aussi le paragraphe 1 de l’article 58 du Règlement).
7. En dépit de l’article 60 du Règlement de la Cour, les Parties n’ont pas été
autorisées à plaider ce qui était « nécessaire pour une bonne présentation des
thèses à l’audience ». De fait, leurs arguments n’ont pas couvert tous les
points qui les divis[ai]ent encore. Au lieu de cela, il a été demandé aux
559 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. skotnikov)
ments that had been prepared in written proceedings and in oral proceedings
in an earlier case between them.
8. No final submissions relating to the substance of the case, which in
accordance with Article 60, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court ought to be
presented at the end of the oral phase, were allowed. Yet, the Court rules on
these issues in the operative clause (Judgment, para. 104), including the
issue manifestly unrelated to the questions of pure law formulated by the
Court (ibid., para. 104 (3)). The only oral submissions at the end of the hearings
made by Nicaragua concerned these two questions and the “fix[ing of]
a timetable to hear and decide upon all of the outstanding request[s] in Nicaragua’s
pleadings”. This latter submission was rejected by the Court.
9. The source of all the irregularities mentioned above is the Court’s
unprecedented Order of 4 October 2022, which was adopted in departure
from Article 31 of the Rules of the Court without consultation of the Parties
(see the joint declaration of Judges Tomka, Xue, Robinson, Nolte and
Judge ad hoc Skotnikov).
Substantive Issues
10. The position taken by the Court in its Judgment of 19 November 2012
in the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) case (hereinafter
the “2012 Judgment”) and in the Judgment of 17 March 2016 on
preliminary objections in the present case (hereinafter the “2016 Judgment”),
when read together, leaves no doubt that the Court was ready to
consider delimitation once Nicaragua had made full submissions to the
Commission on the Limits to the Continental Shelf (hereinafter “CLCS”);
all other issues raised by the Parties would have been dealt with in the course
of the delimitation process.
11. In its 2016 Judgment, the Court clarified the content and scope of subparagraph
3 of the operative clause of the 2012 Judgment, taking into account
the differing views expressed by the Parties on the subject:
“It has found that delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles from the Nicaraguan coast was conditional on the submission
by Nicaragua of information on the limits of its continental shelf beyond
200 nautical miles, provided for in paragraph 8 of Article 76 of UNCLOS,
to the CLCS. The Court thus did not settle the question of delimitation
in 2012 because it was not, at that time, in a position to do so.”1
1 Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia
beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), p. 132, para. 85 (emphasis added).
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. skotnikov) 559
Parties de répéter les arguments qu’elles avaient préparés pour la procédure
écrite et pour la procédure orale dans une affaire qui les avait antérieurement
opposées.
8. Les Parties n’ont pas non plus été autorisées à présenter des conclusions
finales sur le fond de l’affaire, comme elles auraient dû le faire à l’issue de la
phase orale conformément au paragraphe 2 de l’article 60 du Règlement.
Pourtant, la Cour statue à ce sujet dans son dispositif (arrêt, par. 104), et
notamment sur une question manifestement sans rapport avec les deux questions
purement juridiques qu’elle a posées (ibid., point 3). À la fin des
audiences, le Nicaragua a présenté des conclusions orales uniquement sur ces
deux questions, en sus de prier la Cour de « fixer … un calendrier pour examiner
toutes les autres demandes pendantes … exposées dans ses écritures,
et [de] statuer à leur sujet ». Cette dernière demande a été rejetée par la Cour.
9. La source de toutes les irrégularités susmentionnées est l’ordonnance du
4 octobre 2022, une décision sans précédent que la Cour a adoptée au mépris
de l’article 31 du Règlement sans consulter les Parties (voir la déclaration
commune des juges Tomka, Xue, Robinson et Nolte, et du juge ad hoc
Skotnikov).
Questions de fond
10. La position adoptée par la Cour dans son arrêt du 19 novembre 2012 en
l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie) (ciaprès
l’« arrêt de 2012 ») et dans l’arrêt du 17 mars 2016 qu’elle a rendu en la
présente affaire sur les exceptions préliminaires (ci-après l’« arrêt de 2016 »),
lus conjointement, ne laisse aucun doute sur le fait que la Cour était prête à
envisager une délimitation une fois que le Nicaragua aurait soumis toutes les
informations requises à la Commission des limites du plateau continental
(ci-après la « Commission des limites ») ; toutes les autres questions soulevées
par les Parties auraient alors été traitées dans le cadre du processus de
délimitation.
11. Dans l’arrêt de 2016, la Cour a clarifié le contenu et la portée du point 3
du dispositif de l’arrêt de 2012, en tenant compte des vues divergentes exprimées
par les Parties à ce sujet. Elle a ainsi conclu que
« la délimitation du plateau continental au-delà des 200 milles marins
des côtes nicaraguayennes était conditionnée par la soumission, de la
part du Nicaragua, des informations sur les limites de son plateau continental
au-delà de 200 milles marins, prévues au paragraphe 8 de
l’article 76 de la CNUDM, à la Commission. La Cour n’a[vait] donc pas
tranché la question de la délimitation, en 2012, parce qu’elle n’était pas,
alors, en mesure de le faire. »1
1 Question de la délimitation du plateau continental entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie
au-delà de 200 milles marins de la côte nicaraguayenne (Nicaragua c. Colombie), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2016 (I), p. 132, par. 85 (les italiques sont de moi).
560 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. skotnikov)
That was the only condition set forth by the Court for proceeding to delimitation.
Incidentally, such delimitation would not necessarily affect Colombia’s
200-nautical-mile continental shelf entitlement (see paragraph 19 below).
12. In its Judgment of 25 July 1974 in the Fisheries Jurisdiction
(United Kingdom v. Iceland) case, the Court made it clear that,
“as an international judicial organ, [it] is deemed to take judicial notice
of international law, and is therefore required in a case falling under
Article 53 of the Statute, as in any other case, to consider on its own initiative
all rules of international law which may be relevant to the
settlement of the dispute. It being the duty of the Court itself to ascertain
and apply the relevant law in the given circumstances of the case, the
burden of establishing or proving rules of international law cannot be
imposed upon any of the parties, for the law lies within the judicial
knowledge of the Court.”2
13. The Court’s approach in the 2012 and 2016 Judgments was consistent
with that dictum, which cannot be said of its Order of 4 October 2022 and the
present Judgment.
14. The discussion of the questions of pure law formulated by the Court
shows that there is nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (hereinafter “UNCLOS”), its travaux préparatoires or the circumstances
surrounding its conclusion specifically dealing with the possibility
or impossibility of delimitation between one State’s extended continental
shelf and the 200-nautical-mile continental shelf of another State. The
Court’s finding of a “suggest[ion] that the States participating in the negotiations
assumed” a certain position concerning the extended continental shelf
based on certain UNCLOS provisions (Judgment, para. 76) seems a tenuous
basis for a legal determination, to say the least. The same is true about the
characterization of UNCLOS as a “package deal” (ibid., para. 48). There is
nothing in this “package” relating to the question to which the Court tries to
find an answer. Accordingly, there is nothing therein that could support the
Court’s conclusion on this matter.
15. The Court seems to rely on the importance of the role of the CLCS in
the protection of the common heritage of mankind (Judgment, para. 76).
However, that is not the sole mission of the CLCS (see paragraph 11 above).
Relatedly, payments and contributions in respect of the exploitation of the
extended continental shelf are irrelevant in the present case. Curiously, the
Court here focuses its reasoning on the provisions of UNCLOS, which are
manifestly not part of the applicable law in the present case, i.e. customary
international law.
2 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1974, p. 9, para. 17.
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. skotnikov) 560
Cette condition était la seule énoncée par la Cour pour procéder à la délimitation.
Le résultat de ce processus n’aurait d’ailleurs pas nécessairement
d’incidence sur le droit de la Colombie à un plateau continental de 200 milles
marins (voir le paragraphe 19 ci-dessous).
12. Dans son arrêt du 25 juillet 1974 en l’affaire de la Compétence en
matière de pêcheries (Royaume-Uni c. Islande), la Cour a bien précisé que,
« en tant qu’organe judiciaire international, [elle] n’en est pas moins censée
constater le droit international et [que], dans une affaire relevant de
l’article 53 du Statut comme dans toute autre, [elle] est donc tenue de
prendre en considération de sa propre initiative toutes les règles de droit
international qui seraient pertinentes pour le règlement du différend. La
Cour ayant pour fonction de déterminer et d’appliquer le droit dans les circonstances
de chaque espèce, la charge d’établir ou de prouver les règles
de droit international ne saurait être imposée à l’une ou l’autre Partie, car
le droit ressortit au domaine de la connaissance judiciaire de la Cour. »2
13. Dans ses arrêts de 2012 et de 2016, la Cour a adopté une stratégie
conforme à ce dictum, ce qu’elle n’a pas fait dans son ordonnance du
4 octobre 2022 ni dans le présent arrêt.
14. Il ressort de l’examen des questions purement juridiques formulées par
la Cour que rien dans la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer
(ci-après la « CNUDM »), ni dans ses travaux préparatoires ou dans les circonstances
dans lesquelles elle a été conclue, ne permet de penser qu’aient
été traitées spécifiquement la possibilité ou l’impossibilité d’opérer une délimitation
entre le plateau continental étendu d’un État et le plateau continental
de 200 milles marins d’un autre État. La conclusion de la Cour selon laquelle
certaines dispositions de la CNUDM « semble[nt] indiquer que les États participant
aux négociations [ont adopté] » une certaine position concernant le
plateau continental étendu (arrêt, par. 76) paraît être un fondement pour le
moins ténu pour une décision juridique. Il en va de même de la qualification
de la CNUDM de « compromis global » (ibid., par. 48). Rien dans ce « compromis
» ne concerne la question à laquelle la Cour tente d’apporter une
réponse. Par conséquent, il n’existe rien dans cet instrument qui pourrait
étayer la conclusion de la Cour à ce sujet.
15. La Cour semble s’appuyer sur l’importance du rôle de la Commission
des limites dans la protection du patrimoine commun de l’humanité (arrêt,
par. 76). Or, ce n’est pas là l’unique mission de la Commission (voir le paragraphe
11 ci-dessus). Dans le même ordre d’idées, les contributions en
espèces ou en nature au titre de l’exploitation du plateau continental étendu
ne sont pas pertinentes en l’espèce. Étonnamment, la Cour concentre ici
son raisonnement sur les dispositions de la CNUDM, qui ne font manifestement
pas partie du droit applicable en la présente affaire, à savoir le droit
international coutumier.
2 Compétence en matière de pêcheries (Royaume-Uni c. Islande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil
1974, p. 9, par. 17.
561 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. skotnikov)
16. To support its conclusion, the Court refers to the submissions to the
CLCS of States parties to UNCLOS (Judgment, para. 77). However, States,
in their CLCS submissions, do not consistently refrain from extending a
claim within 200 nautical miles from the baselines of another State. Even
when they do, this practice is generally unaccompanied by opinio juris,
which cannot be simply inferred from practice. In contrast to what the Court
suggests in the present case, “[t]he frequency . . . of the acts is not in itself
enough” for the identification of opinio juris (North Sea Continental Shelf
(Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/
Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 44, para. 77; see also International
Law Commission, Draft conclusions on identification of customary
international law, UN doc A/73/10, p. 129 (Conclusion 3, comment 7)). The
Court does not have “authority to ascribe to States legal views which they do
not themselves advance” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 109, para. 207). Indeed, for those submissions which
do refrain from extending within 200 nautical miles from the baselines of
another State, there are other, more plausible motivations, perhaps most
notably the desire to avoid a dispute, since a dispute would preclude the
CLCS from making recommendations3. In any event, it must be recalled that
these submissions are made by States parties to UNCLOS within the specific
treaty régime.
17. The existing jurisprudence does not support the Court’s conclusions
either: in its 2021 Judgment in the Maritime Delimitation in the Indian
Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya) case, the Court referred to a “possible grey area”
(Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2021, p. 277, para. 197), while ITLOS and an arbitral
tribunal have both accepted the existence of such “grey areas” (Bay of
Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh v. India), Award of
7 July 2014, United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards
(RIAA), Vol. XXXII, p. 147, para. 498; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports
2012, p. 119, para. 463). More recently, in Mauritius/Maldives, the ITLOS
Special Chamber did not question the possibility of a grey area (Dispute
concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Mauritius and
Maldives in the Indian Ocean (Mauritius/Maldives), Judgment of 28 April
2023, para. 275). The Court itself, ITLOS, and an UNCLOS Annex VII tribunal
have thus all accepted the possibility of different jurisdictions dealing
with the seabed and subsoil, on the one hand, and the water column, on the
other. Moreover, another arbitral tribunal has held that there is neither priority
nor hierarchy between the rule of distance and the rule of natural
3 Paragraph 5 (a) of Annex I of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf, 17 April 2008, UN doc. CLCS/40/Rev.1.
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. skotnikov) 561
16. À l’appui de sa conclusion, la Cour invoque les demandes déposées
auprès de la Commission des limites par des États parties à la CNUDM (arrêt,
par. 77). Or, dans leurs demandes à la Commission, les États ne s’abstiennent
pas systématiquement de revendiquer un plateau continental s’étendant en
deçà de 200 milles marins des lignes de base d’un autre État. Même lorsqu’ils
le font, cette pratique n’est généralement pas accompagnée d’une
opinio juris, laquelle ne saurait être simplement déduite de la pratique.
Contrairement à ce que la Cour semble dire dans la présente affaire, la « fréquen[
ce] … [des] actes … ne suffi[t] pas en [soi] » à déterminer l’existence
d’une opinio juris (Plateau continental de la mer du Nord (République fédérale
d’Allemagne/Danemark ; République fédérale d’Allemagne/Pays-Bas),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1969, p. 44, par. 77 ; voir également Commission du
droit international, Projets de conclusion sur la détermination du droit international
coutumier, Nations Unies, doc. A/73/10, p. 136 (commentaire de la
conclusion 3, par. 7)). La Cour n’est pas autorisée « à prêter à des États des
vues juridiques qu’eux-mêmes ne formulent pas » (Activités militaires et
paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. États-Unis
d’Amérique), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 109, par. 207). De fait,
s’agissant des États qui s’abstiennent de revendiquer un plateau continental
s’étendant en deçà de 200 milles marins des lignes de base d’un autre État, il
y a d’autres motivations plus plausibles, dont la plus évidente est peut-être la
volonté d’éviter un différend qui empêcherait la Commission des limites de
faire des recommandations3. En tout état de cause, il convient de rappeler
que ces demandes sont soumises par des États parties à la CNUDM dans le
cadre d’un régime conventionnel spécifique.
17. La jurisprudence de la Cour ne vient pas non plus corroborer les
conclusions auxquelles celle-ci parvient en l’espèce : dans l’arrêt qu’elle a
rendu en 2021 en l’affaire relative à la Délimitation maritime dans l’océan
Indien (Somalie c. Kenya), la Cour a parlé d’une « éventuelle zone grise »
(arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2021, p. 277, par. 197), tandis que le TIDM et un tribunal
arbitral ont tous deux admis l’existence de telles « zones grises »
(Arbitrage concernant la frontière maritime dans le golfe du Bengale (Bangladesh
c. Inde), sentence du 7 juillet 2014, Nations Unies, Recueil des
sentences arbitrales (RSA), vol. XXXII, p. 155, par. 498) ; Délimitation de la
frontière maritime dans le golfe du Bengale (Bangladesh/Myanmar), arrêt,
TIDM Recueil 2012, p. 119, par. 463). Plus récemment, en l’affaire Maurice/
Maldives, la Chambre spéciale du TIDM n’a pas mis en cause la possibilité
d’une zone grise (Différend relatif à la délimitation de la frontière maritime
entre Maurice et les Maldives dans l’océan Indien (Maurice/Maldives),
arrêt du 28 avril 2023, par. 275). La Cour elle-même, le TIDM et un tribunal
constitué en application de l’annexe VII de la CNUDM ont ainsi tous admis
la possibilité que les fonds marins et leur sous-sol, d’une part, et la colonne
d’eau, d’autre part, relèvent de juridictions différentes. De surcroît, un autre
3 Alinéa a) du paragraphe 5 de l’annexe I du règlement intérieur de la Commission des
limites du plateau continental, 17 avril 2008, Nations Unies, doc. CLCS/40/Rev.1.
562 delimitation of the continental shelf (diss. op. skotnikov)
prolongation as regards an entitlement to a continental shelf (Delimitation
of the Maritime Boundary between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau (Guinea/
Guinea-Bissau), Award of 14 February 1985, RIAA, Vol. XIX, p. 191,
para. 116). Even more importantly, the present Judgment directly contradicts
the 2012 and 2016 Judgments.
18. Hence, the Court’s finding that a State’s entitlement to a continental
shelf throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer
edge of the continental margin may not extend within 200 nautical miles
from the baselines of another State is not in accordance with existing rules
of international law. In its attempt to legislate instead of interpreting and
applying the existing law, the Court has disregarded its function, as provided
in Article 38, paragraph 1, of the Statute. Indeed, it has ignored the fundamental
principle, according to which “the Court, as a court of law, cannot
render judgment sub specie legis ferendae”4.
19. The only legally sound conclusion that the Court should have drawn is
that both UNCLOS and customary international law provide for an equitable
solution as the guiding principle in maritime delimitations, which allows,
inter alia, for consideration of delimitation of one State’s extended continental
shelf and the continental shelf of another State to a distance of 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured.
The Court should have continued with the case in order to implement
this principle.
(Signed) Leonid Skotnikov.
4 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1974, p. 192, para. 45.
délimitation du plateau continental (op. diss. skotnikov) 562
tribunal arbitral a déclaré qu’il n’y avait ni priorité ni hiérarchie entre la règle
de la distance et la règle du prolongement naturel en ce qui concerne le droit
à un plateau continental (Délimitation de la frontière maritime entre la
Guinée et la Guinée-Bissau (Guinée/Guinée-Bissau), sentence du 14 février
1985, RSA, vol. XIX, p. 191, par. 116). Plus important encore, le présent arrêt
contredit directement les arrêts de 2012 et de 2016.
18. Par conséquent, la conclusion de la Cour, selon laquelle le plateau
continental auquel un État a droit sur toute l’étendue du prolongement naturel
de son territoire terrestre jusqu’au rebord externe de la marge continentale
ne saurait s’étendre en deçà de 200 milles marins des lignes de base d’un
autre État, n’est pas conforme aux règles de droit international actuelles. En
tentant de légiférer au lieu d’interpréter et d’appliquer le droit existant, la
Cour n’a pas respecté sa mission telle que définie au paragraphe 1 de l’article
38 de son Statut. De fait, elle a fait fi du principe fondamental qui veut
que « la Cour, en tant que tribunal, ne saurait rendre de décision sub specie
legis ferendae »4.
19. La seule conclusion juridiquement valable à laquelle la Cour aurait dû
parvenir est que tant la CNUDM que le droit international coutumier posent
la recherche d’une solution équitable comme principe directeur de la délimitation
maritime, ce qui permet, notamment, d’envisager la délimitation du
plateau continental étendu d’un État et du plateau continental d’un autre État
jusqu’à 200 milles marins des lignes de base à partir desquelles est mesurée
la largeur de sa mer territoriale. La Cour aurait dû poursuivre l’examen de
l’affaire afin de mettre ce principe en oeuvre.
(Signé) Leonid Skotnikov.
4 Compétence en matière de pêcheries (République fédérale d’Allemagne c. Islande), fond,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 192, par. 45.
ISBN 978-92-1-003216-2
Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Skotnikov